Marxist Sociology Revisited. Critical Assessments 0333366298

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MARXIST SOCIOLOGY REVISITED

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Also by Martin Shaw WAR, STATE AND SOCIETY (editor)

SOCIALISM AND MILITARISM MARXISM AND SOCIAL SCIENCE: the Roots of Social Knowledge

MARXISM VERSUS SOCIOLOGY: a Guide to Reading

MARXIST SOCIOLOGY REVISITED Critical Assessments Edited by Martin Shaw

©Martin Shaw 1985

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No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright Act 1956 (as amended).

Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and

civil claims for damages. First published 1985

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THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 QXS

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Printed in Hong Kong British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Marxist sociology revisited: clitical assessments, 1. Communism and society 2. Sociology I. Shaw, Martin, 1947-

301 I-IX542 ISBN 0-333-36629-8 ISBN U-333-36630-1 Pack

Contents Notes on the Corltributors Acknowledgements

1 2

3 4 5

6 7 8

Introduction: Sociology and the Crisis of Marxism Martin Shaw Marxism and the Urban Question Rosemary Mellor Marxism and Development Sociology: Interpreting the Impasse David Booth Marxism and Nationalism Ephraim Nimbi Marxism and the Sociology of Racism: Two Historical Variants Ivar Oxaal The Family and Capitalism in Marxist Theory Colin Creighton Marxism and Psychology Norman O'Neill Marxism, the State and Politics Martin Shaw

Index

vi vii 1

Z1 50

99

143 181

214 246

269

Notes on the Contributors David Booth, Colin Creighton, Norman O'Neill and Martin Shaw are Lecturers in Sociology, and Ivar 0xaa1 is Fellow in Sociology, in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, University of Hull. Rosemary Mellor is Lecturer in Sociology, University of Manchester , she was formerly a lecturer at Hull.

Ephraim Nimni is Lecturer in Sociology, Thames Polytechnic, and is completing a thesis at Hull .

vi

Acknowledgements We should like to thank colleagues and students in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, the University of Hull, as well as in other departments in which some of us have taught, for providing a climate in which our ideas have Hourished. Some of the papers were First presented as seminar papers at Hull. We should also like to thank Theresa Weatherston and Pat Wilkinson for typing many of the articles at different stages, and of course our families for their support.

MARTIN SHAW

Hull

I

vii

1 Introduction: Sociology and

the Crisis of Marxism MARTIN SHAW In the decade from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, sociology devel~ oped from a marginal discipline limited to a handful of British universities to a core social-science subject established in virtually all centres of further and higher education. In the same decade, however, it was widely believed that sociology was 'in crisis The crisis

was not merely a birth-pang: analyses of it were borrowed, as were the main concepts of the discipline itself, from writers in continental Europe and North America where sociology was long-established. lt was widely believed that the crisis reflected contradictions in the theoretical premises of the subject, which were highlighted by the emerging social conflicts of Western industrial society. The most iniiuential reflections on sociology's problems came from American theorists: C. Wright Mills whose criticism anticipated the radical decade, and Alvin Gouldner whose The Corning Crisis of Western Sociology appeared, typically, when a crisis was already widely recognised Neither was committed to Marxism, except in Mills' sense of the 'plain MarxiSt' using Marxist concepts pragmati-

cally where they made sense and discarding them when they did not. Younger sociologists, especially in Europe where there were better sources, were however less inhibited in their relationship to Marxist theory. The political radicalisation of the years before and after 1968 helped propel many in that direction; but Marxism also offered a theoretical answer to the apparent incoherence of mainstream sociology. Marxism came, of course, in many different guises, and the Marxisms the new sociologists embraced were often not those which an older generation had rejected. There was a recovery of earlier Marxist traditions, long buried by Stalinism, as well as a genuine new development of Marxist theory.

1

2

Marxist Sociology Revisited

For Marxist critics, the problem was not just that particular schools of sociology (for example, the structural-functionalisrn attacked by Mills and Gouldner) were ideological. Sociology as a discipline was an ideological field within the general framework of bourgeois ideol~ ogy. Marxism was not a particular sociology theory, but a method whose theoretical and practical assumptions were wholly opposed to those of sociology. Marxism, while it offered a solution to the theoretical problems of sociology, also threatened to dissolve sociology as a field of study Such analyses not only made sociology in general vulnerable to the Marxist ideas which were developing within: they also placed the individual 'Marxist sociologist' in a rather exposed and self-

contradictory position. Many who sympathised with the argument baulked at the conclusion, with its radical existential implications. It never became the practical premise of any significant group within sociology. Nevertheless many sociologists were heavily iniiuenced by Marxist ideas, and some even regarded themselves as Marxists. For more than a decade the developments of sociology and of Marxism have been closely related. The crisis of sociology, if not resolved (not in the revolutionary sense, although that now seems very problematic), has at least been defused, as well as diffused in the reconstitution of distinct areas of analysis. If anything, it is the crisis of Marxism, which briefly appeared close to some kind of resolution after 1968, which has re-asserted itself with a vengeance. Instead of looking to Marxism to 'solve' the theoretical crises of sociology, we may look to sociology as an area for 'managing' the crisis of Marxism . The immediate cause of the difficulties within Marxism is the loss of political momentum of the new radical forces which developed in the 1960s. A theory whose 'point is to change' the world, and which posits a 'unity of theory and practice', is more directly vulnerable to

changed practical conditions than an academic field. The social sciences, of course, are far from immune from such forces: the economic and political conditions in higher education have been

especially adverse for sociology in the last decade. Marxist sociologists have therefore been doubly affected, but in reaction to the political vicissitudes of the post-1968 left have tended to re-identify with the academic role. Lower political horizons and restricted career situations have tended to reinforce each other in the process. The job Of interpreting the world is always to be done, even when the ways of changing it are dih'icult to identify. This book reflects the experience of sociologists working in and

Introduction

3

around one University department during this period. As is usual in academic circles, we have all had our own starting points, our own

process of relating to a changing situation, and our own conclusions. Not all the contributors have been, still less are, Marxists in any strict or even self-defined sense, although some certainly were. The department involved was never 'Marxist' . - it always contained a good proportion of staff members for whom Marxism was not a central pre-occupation Working in a common context, being aware of the same intellectual as well as wider political developments, has however meant that we have shared a concern with Marxist ideas in sociology. By the early 1980s it seemed as though the situation had changed enough to warrant an examination of the role that these ideas were playing in our work. Since most of us had never taken up a position on the 'Marxism and sociology' issue, so much as tried to work through Marxist ideas in a particular sociological field, it seemed the best way to do this was to ask each contributor to write about his or her own area. The result, it is hoped, will show something of the range of responses which are possible as well as the way in which general perspectives are affected by particular clusters of theoretical and empirical problems. Later in this introduction I shall try to indicate some of the common perspectives which emerge from these papers, as well as the main divergences. But first it seems important to re-examine the underlying issue of the role of Marxist ideas: to discuss the previous treatment of sociology as an ideological field and the attempt to define Marxism independently of it. Since I was responsible for a particularly strong version of this argument,'* I may be in a good position to review the reasons for its inadequacy and to define the changing situation. The discussion will lead us, as I have already indicated, from the 'crisis' of sociology' to the 'crisis of rnar2Ns1n'.

THE FAILURE OF THE MARXIST CRITIQUE OF SOCIOLOGY To write of 'the failure' of the Marxist critique may seem harsh, since many of the lines of argument still seem valid. The basis for this assertion is not indeed a renunciation of earlier positions in their entirety ..... one of those 'road to Damascus' conversions which are not uncommon in intellectual life but § recognition that at certain . -

points the argument went w r e n , so that conclusions were drawn

4

Marxist Sociology Revisited

which have proved untenable. The proof of this has been, necessarily from a Marxist standpoint, in the practical failure of the perspectives which were derived from the argument. The argument for the ideological character of sociology was SOI1'lC~° times made on the grounds of the supposed political commitments of its theorists, or the political uses of social research, or, perhaps most widely, the socio-political assumptions of its conceptual apparatus. While each of these sorts of critique found valid targets, each was, taken by itself, misleading or inadequate as an account of sociology in general. Instead, as I suggested, sociology needed to be seen as a complex of research and theoretical activity inserted at different levels of capitalist production, the state and the higher education

systcrn. While the crasser material motives of, for example, some industrial and military research. were obvious, the organising centre of sociology as such was to be found in the professional grouping of sociologists within higher education. While this had its own material structure, it was in turn mediated by an ideology which defined 'sociology' in the context of the social sciences as a whole. Thus at the core of sociology we found a particular intellectual field (rather than a specific intellectual system), incorporating broad assumptions about the nature of society which defined the functions and boundaries of sociological ideology. lt was necessary to understand the historical development of this field.5 Drawing upon earlier Marxist critiques of the development of bourgeois thought - Korsch's outline of the mid-19th century crisis of the "revolutionary" thought of the early bourgeoisie, Dobbs's account of the passage from political economy based on a labour theory of value to marginalist economics, Marcuse's critique of the movement from negative to positive philosophy - it was possible to suggest how the space for a 'sociology' developed. Using Swingewood's account

of early sociology's rejection of political economy and the widely available critique of the 'positivism' of early sociology, one could argue that sociology in its formative period represented a specific response to the maturation of the capitalist system. This was moreover a polar response to that of Marxist theory, which in contrast continued the radical theoretical projects of idealist philosophy and political economy from the new proletarian standpoint. Drawing further on Lukacs' account of the Morinalienation of bourgeois philosophy and economics, it Gouldner's powerful statement of how sociology's domain assumptions explicitly rejected the economic, it was possible to define the role of sociology.

5

Introducrr0n

Sociology was the field of bourgeois thought to which since philosophy and economics had abandoned encyclopaedic claims the most general functions of social explanation now devolved. Sociology's specific mode of operation was to take social contradictions, and their cultural/ideological/political expressions, and analyse these in a set of social terms which assumed a rejection of economics. Since social problems were manifestly, it seemed, but certainly when investigated in depth - also economic problems, the denial of the economic roots of social contradictions was the nub of the ideological character of sociology. This was how sociology cut itself from understanding the nature of capitalist society, and this was where Marxism , with its promised integration of production, social classes and ideology, offered a decisively superior method. The structural divorce of economics and sociology in bourgeois .

-

-.-.

-

thought, confirmed as far as sociology was concerned by Gouldner's

Coming Crisis, lay at the centre of the critique. There is little cause to question the general point, as an analysis of how sociology had developed, although perhaps it was based too much on the post-war North American appropriation of earlier European traditions, and like that gave too little credit to the other, more historical and production-oriented, side of, say, Max Weber's work. (But at the heart of Weber lies the dualism of economic rationalism and cultural irrationalism, which is itself a charter for non-economic sociology.) The diMculty lies more in the implicit view that Marxism has fulfilled its promise of an integrated socio-economic theory. While the aim is undoubtedly essential, and a systematic separation of the economic and the social is absolutely untenable, the relations of the two are much more problematic than this critique recognised. The enormous expansion of means of production, which Marx saw as enabling a 'realm of freedom' under socialism, has in fact created an unprecedented freedom for political and ideological forces to escape from the strict limits of economic necessity - under capitalism. Actual Marxist

analysis often has to cope with the way in which such 'relatively autonomy' works. Indeed the autonomy of social forces has been seen by some Marxist writers as rather stronger than the 'relative' formula suggests.6 What this difficulty suggests is that the critique of sociology, resting on central assumptions about a crisis in 19th-century social thought, may have underestimated the extent to which historical development had complicated the subsequent trajectory. In particular, this argument suggests that the critique, despite its partial relevance (since the

6

Marxist Sociology Revisited

absurd denial of economics was certainly there in much sociology)7 neglected the possibility that sociology has identified real dimensions essential to adequate social theory. Or to put this another way, there were partially distinct 'social' (cultural, ideological, etc.) elements which needed integration in the 'integrated socio-economic theory' promised by Marxism. A related area of simplification was the historical interaction of sociology and Marxism. Although not denied in principle, its dimer s o n s were critically under-stated- It is probably true that each major flowering of independent Marxist thought in the 20th century, while largely the product of a new political conditions, has been substantially 'fed' by non-Marxist social thought. Each major generation of

Marxist thinkers has had to find its own way to Marxism through the major intellectual currents of its time, and has defined and enriched its Marxism through this encounter. Gran sci, Lukacs and Korsch

each had their major debts, while the later generation of 'Western Marxists' were, as Anderson has shown, largely working on questions marginal to classical Marxism but more developed by other schools of thought." The specifically sociological contribution was only one among several, but was clearly important, for example, in the way in which Weber's problematic of rationalisation/bureaucratisation was taken up as a central theme by Lukacs, and later in the contribution of the Frankfurt School- to Marxism. Ephraim Nimni's paper in this volume deals with another case of the cross-fertilisation, the sociological contribution to Otto Bauer's theory of nationalism. None of this is to deny the central conceptual point that sociology and Marxism are historically and in principle highly distinct and even opposed forms of social theory. Sociology, as an academic discipline, clearly functions within the institutions of capitalist society, while Marxism's raison d'étre is to transform them. Sociology and Marxism did arise, historically, as polar responses to the crucial 19th century social and intellectual transition; sociology's function within the

academic division of labour has rested largely on its separation of the social from the economic, which has a central ideological significance. The Marxist critique is justified on both these points. It is possible to identify the Marxist tradition independently of sociology (and vice versa), even where they overlap: since, for example, Lukacs transformed Weber's concept of rationalisation, integrating it with a critique of capitalist society; while the insights of 'critical theory' have only been accepted by mainstream Marxists after criticism of their fundamental premises.8

Introduction

7

The failure of the Marxist critique of sociology lies mainly, then, not in its historical assumptions, but in its contemporary applications. The problem does not lie primarily within the Marxist critique of sociology, but in what Marxism promised of itself. Marxists were

right to point out that social contradictions were also, fundamentally , economic contradictions, but they were wrong in believing that as a specifically economic crisis deepened (as it did in the 1970s), social

contradictions would explode. Marxists were right to criticise the structures and processes' "c acadé1°1ilc"§6EaT'R'nowledge, they were wrong in believing that an alternative social basis for a revolutionary theory would be formed. The way in which the failure has just been described might be thought to suggest that it was very much a matter of specific analytical defects: Marxists under-estimated the conservative effects of recession, and over-estimated the prospects of political regroupment on the revolutionary left. No one, looking back to the early 1970s, could deny these specific failures, but we are entitled to ask if they reflect more general difficulties in Marxist theory. A great deal of evidence points to the possibility that they do.

FROM 'CRISIS OF SOCIOLOGY' TO 'CRISIS OF MARXISM7 The 'crisis of Marxism' was of course Gouldner's immediate response to the Marxist critique of sociology, to which his Corning Crisis lent itself. Which Marxism? he asked, to some polemical effect, and he later developed his premise of a fur dam ental divide in Marxism, between scientific and critical versions, in a full-length study No one could deny the multiplicity of 'Marxisms', OI' the fact that systematic divisions (along axes of which the scientific/critical is

only one) can be found among the 57 varieties. The question is whether the proliferation of Marxisms or the division of Marxism invalidate any attempt to define a coherence or internal unity to 'Marxisln'. Linked is the issue of whether Marxism's difficulties reiiect historical limitations - although these may be every bit as disabling - rather than initial flaws. Although any attempt to define a single, core Marxist project is capable of an exclusivist use (or abuse), it does seem that Marx' and Engels' own conceptions of their work were broadly coherent and unified. However much tensions can be shown to exist within their writings

8

Marxist Sociology Revisited

(for example along the scientific/critical divide) there is little doubt that they saw these as in principle resolvable- For Marx and Engels, science and revolutionary consciousness were integrally related aspects of socialism.1° Any attempt to define Marxism as purely or basically 'scientilic', or similarly as 'critical', certainly represents a departure from their understanding of the kind of theory which was necessary. The possibility of such 'one-sided' interpretations of Marxism may always have been available, but it is far from established that all Marxism can actually be divided along these lines. Moreover, despite the inherent diffic ulties of uniting the scientific and revolutionary goals of Marxism, it can reasonably be claimed that the attempt has been made sufficiently consistently over the last century to justify defining a core tradition around this project. The more one-sided varieties of Marxism can be seen as 'deviations', not necessarily in the sense of wrong or 'incorrect' lines, but as adaptations to the difficulties of the central project. If the divergences increase, or the forms of Marxism become more varied and incoherent, this does not suggest that there is no core project: rather that it is becoming less and less viable, until perhaps it exists only as a historically outmoded ideal. Historical explanations of Marxism from within the tradition often start from the point that the 'unity of theory and practice' is not a theoretical goal in isolation, but an attempt at a conscious form of a general relation. Since Marxists see all ideas as a part of material, social history, the development of Marxism itself must be understood in this light. An early attempt was Karl Korsch's, which pinpointed the fact that only relatively brief and rare periods actually facilitated an intimate relation between Marxist theory and the revolutionary working class activity on which it was premised. The problem was then one of defining how the core project was developed when

circumstances were not immediately favourable. Marx's scientific work in the third quarter of the last century was a model of a relative abstraction of theory from practice which nevertheless preserved the integrity of the revolutionary project. The Social-Democratic movement of the turn of the century, which mechanically developed Marxist theory in tandem with reformist practice, appeared already as a distorted model, with a disjunction of supposedly Marxist theory from its original aims. The revolutionary period at the end of World War I enabled, it seemed, a reintegration of theory and practice in a more active mode. However, the Communist International failed, according to Korsch, to live up to this promise, and quickly fell prey

Introduction

9

to the same bureaucratic misuse of theory which had characterised Social Democracy. 11 This was the point at which Korsch's account ended, it was also the point at which the problem he had pinpointed became most acute. As I pointed out in my earlier work, the divorce of Marxist theory from the original project was far more total under Stalinism than it had

been under Social Democracy. It led indeed to an inversion of

Marxist concepts, when they were used to justify a new form of oppression of the working class." The extent of central dictation of a

theoretical as well as political 'line' placed insuperable obstacles in the way of serious intellectual development within the Communist movement. Anderson's seminal work attempted to define how a 'Western Marxism' developed despite this historical impasse. It is not necessary to accept his entire schema - the uncomplicated assumption of a 'classical' tradition characterised by a genuine unity of theory and practice, the neglect of distinctly 'Western' revolutionary tradition - to grant the main point. This is, surely, that the defeat of the working class and revolutionary Marxism in the 19205, made epochal by the twin disasters of Nazism and Stalinism in the 1930s, created a situation in which Marxism could only develop by means of a prolonged 'detour' from the central revolutionary project. The creative Marxism of the 1930s belonged to those classical revolutionaries left 'high and dry' by the ebb and defeat of the working class: Gran sci in his prison, Korsch in his political exile, Lukacs in his attempt to combine independent literary criticism with an accommodation to Stalin. The creative Marxism of the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s belonged to a generation of Marxists, excluded by Stalinist monolithism from serious political involvement, who developed its intellectual themes outside the 'core' areas of economics and politics. Western Marxism, Anderson argued, was characterised not only by

geographical and generational, but by formal and thematic displacement of the Marxist tradition. It developed the questions of phil-

osophy, culture, sexuality, psychology, art and literature which had at best been marginal to classical Marxism." The relation between Western Marxism and European sociology is historically crucial to both (to an extent not recognised in earlier Marxist critiques of sociology). There was also an institutional displacement of Marxism - from revolutionary party to academia and in Germany and France forms of independent Marxism, the 'critical' theory of the Frankfurt writers and the 'humanism' of Lucian Goldmann, were developed as sociology. When British sociology

Marxist Sociology Revisited

10

developed in the 1960s it was based on a dual appropriation of

classical sociology (partly as critique of American iunctionalisrn) and of classical Marxism (via the emerging European humanism). The formal and thematic shifts of Western Marxism were partly the result of, and in turn facilitated its acceptance as sociology. The philosophical encounters of Western Marxism made it particularly influential in a sociological tradition which was readdressing its own philosophical assumptions. Western Marxism was a great gain for the Marxist tradition: in particular the humanist writers continued its 'active side', abstractly and idealistically, a point which needs to be insisted upon in view of

the subsequent 'structuralist' reaction of Althusser and his followers. But the thematic shifts were also important, not only because classi-

cal Marxism was incomplete as a social theory, but also because historical change was pushing new issues to the fore. The concept of 'culture', hardly recognised in Marx and Engels, was becoming increasingly central to social understanding - as Raymond Williams showed in another context. The complex of issues represented by this concept were Milli struggling for expression within Marxism - in Trotsky's schemas of literature and revolution, and above all in Gralnsci's writing about 'llegemony'.14 In the 'long boom' while fundamental economic contradictions were contained, major sociocultural conflicts emerged. The dimensions of race, gender, and generation, suppressed in favour of class in classical Marxism, all came to the fore. The enormous transformation of working class 1l.l:1.llwll.lrll:

community, culture and consciousness, in a period of rapid economic growth, became a central concern of obvious political import. The issues which, in different ways, inspired the sociologists of 'embourgeoisement' and the ex-working class cultural critics such as Williams and Richard Hoggart, also engaged Western Marxists such as Herbert Marcuse and Henri Lefebvre (see Rosemary Mellor's discussion in this volume). Their treatments may have been as one-sided as any others, but at least there was some expansion of Marxist theory to grapple with new problems of manifest importance . When all this is said, it is also true, as Anderson argued, that in 'core' Marxist terms there was a detour historically necessary, productive, but a detour nonetheless. There was no continuation of the central problems of economy and political power. There was no engagement with revolutionary class politics. In order to develop Marxist theory it was essential at some point to reintegrate these themes with those elaborated by Western Marxism. It appeared to

-

Introduction

11

many that 1968 marked a decisive turning point: the French 'May events' seemed to vindicate the classical Marxist faith in the revolutionary potential of the working class, and open space for renewing Marxist theory and politics. The largely subterranean traditions of oppositional Marxism emerged into the ferment after 1968, to proinise a new revolutionary momentum. These hopes were reflected, with the usual theoretical lag, in the mid-1970s work of Anderson (and in my own Marxism and Social Science). Anderson's solution to the problem of how the reintegration was to occur was to introduce Trotskyism: the living continuation of classical Marxism, a tradition which had semi-miraculously maintained its conceptions of political economy and the state against all the odds. Trotskyism appeared in Anderson's work as a deus ex machine, its own peculiar detour largely unexamined, with too great a burden placed on the undeniable brilliance of Trotsky at his best and the faithful exposition of Ernest Mandel. Its flaws, always evident, were understated and its capacity for imaginative growth greatly overstated: as Anderson now recognises." But the eventual failure of the proposed reintegration, particularly in political terms, was not specific to one theoretical model. The general promise of a new revolutionary movement, which would change the situation in which theory developed, proved illusory. The 'crisis of Marxism' has therefore revived with a new vengeance: the most promising moment of synthesis since the 1920s has passed. Anderson limits the crisis to the Latin countries: and certainly it seems that the political contradictions of the Communist Parties in France, Italy and Spain have produced widespread disorientations, including dramatic denials of Marxist theory by its former exponents.16 Marxist ideas seem to be more firmly rooted in Northern

Europe and the Anglo-Saxon world where, paradoxically, there is no recent history of a strong 'Marxist' political force. But once again Anderson seems too ready to judge by appearances: the lack of a revolutionary political force is not just a specific failing, but a symptom of continuing crisis in the 'core project' of Marxism. Marxism has developed beyond 'Western Marxism proper', Anderson argues, to produce more grounded political, economic and sociological analyses - thus it has learnt from the limited encounter with the classical tradition. But it has failed, he admits, to produce crucial contributions to revolutionary strategy: if there has been a new linking of Marxist theory and mass political practice, 'the circuit reuniting them was predominantly a reformist rather than a revolutionary one'."

12

Marxist Sociology Revisited

This would seem to be a signal problem for Marxism: there is once again, despite or perhaps because of the recession, no serious prospect, short or medium term, of progress towards the revolutionary transformation of society. Anderson argues that Marxism remains the only intellectual paradigm capacious enough to be able to link the ideal horizon of a socialism to come with the practical contradictions and movements of the present, and their descent from structures of the _past?.. in a theory of the distinctive dynamics of

social development as a whole . . . it will not be replaced so long as there is no superior candidate for comparable overall advance in knowledge. There is no sign of that yet . . _is This much we may perhaps grant, although we must note that it is a weak defence: more persuasive in the latter, negative part of the case, where Marxism rests on the unrivalled foundation of its past, than in the former, positive half of the argument. What Marxism oilers is the hope or possibility that there may be a 'link' such as Anderson describes. In the admitted lack of a serious strategy of transformation grounded in the present historical period, Marxism reverts to faith, waiting to see what the latest 'historical recomposition' of the working class will produce. One begins again to appreciate the full meaning of Gramsci's oft-quoted motto: 'Pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will.' It seems likely that the new failure of Marxist movements to recreate a context for unifying theory and revolutionary practice will encourage the centrifugal tendencies in Marxism. The crisis can be seen as permanent: it is not merely a limited one produced by a specific Stalinist deformation. Even in so far as it is a product of

Stalinism, it is far more profound that even the most critical Marxists have often imagined. The crisis of Stalinisln, if it is dated from 1956, has now lasted three decades: as long as the period of high Stalinism itself. In one sense, it is unrealistic to expect the effects of Stalinism on Marxism to disappear so long as the systems which Stalinism created remain in Russia and Eastern Europe. In another, it is deeply depressing for Marxists to face the fact that the crisis of Stalinism has generated no new revolutionary synthesis able to pose the practical advancement of socialism in the advanced East or West. Stalinism has, perhaps, to be seen not just as a revolution 'gone wrong', but as a species of the political 'madness' which has produced repeated

'holocausts' in the 20th century. Confronting this extremely funda-

Introduction

13

mental problem may be a necessity, as Aronson has argued, for any 'preface to hope'.19

This is one sense among several in which the crisis of Marxism cannot just be seen as a specific failure, arising from a train of events

set in motion in 1917. Even if it started from that point, historical development has so complicated matters since then that this specific set of problems has merged into a more general range of difficulties for Marxism. Here we return to the idea advanced above: that the development of the productive forces, rightly identified as a prime factor, has proceeded so far that it has passed beyond the critical point for proletarian revolution." One side of this process is the immense technical capacity which is placed in the hands not just of capital, but crucially of the enlargement of power, the

mum

transformation of means - most important, of warfare -- has created

the potential for 'holocausts', including even the final obliteration of human society. Even before this limit is reached, HaMastrialisation, rationalisation and bureaucratisation have produced appalling distortions of social relations. The other side of this 'overdevelopment' of capitalism is the transformation of the human productive forces, so that a welter of social contradictions emerge which are either incapable of being tied directly to a basic class analysis, or require the qualification of such an analysis to the extent that it becomes largely

unrecognisable. That a classical working class no longer confronts a classical capitalist class does not invalidate 'class' as a mode of analysis, altogether, but it does imply that any socialist project must move beyond simple historical class terms. The political consequences of this two-sided analysis are to recognise a system of power which is far more dangerous even than could be projected from the rational interests of capital, and a range of social forces opposed to it which are far more complex and diverse, with less obviously coherent aims, than the classical Marxist model has proposed. The politics and intellectual life of the last decade (the mid-1970s to mid-198[)s) have emphasised these challenges to the incipient Marxist synthesis of the previous ten years. The transient revolutionary movement of that time recognised, when it was honest with itself, the new social forces which it expressed, as well as the re-emergence of the 'co1°e' class contradiction. The expanded means of education and knowledge provided as much of the impetus to change as did the challenges to the manual working class at the onset of capitalist

crisis." The cultural critique of the student movement was as much the 'truth' of the period as was the new militancy of the industrial

14

Marxist Sociology Revisited

workers. The subsequent years emphasised this fact, with "typical" radical forces which ranged from the new feminism, with its critique of the 'micro' level of male domination, to the peace movement with its attack on the 'macro' level of state military power. These movements have both been influenced, in Europe at least, by close contact with the Marxism of the earlier period. In each case their intellectual expression has been a coherent critique of Marxism in its dominant

mode." Such critiques are of course developed with a variety of purposes,

ranging from the overthrow of Marxist analysis per se to the more adequate reconstitution of Marxism in a way that takes accounts of the weaknesses which are identified- What is suggested here is that

they represent an overall crisis of the core project of Marxism, which has been growing. This is a crisis of which Stalinism has been a major but not in the last analysis the most important cause, and which has been accentuated in recent years by the particular failure of the late 1960s/early 1970s attempts at a new Marxist synthesis. Such a general crisis is of course also capable of being read in more than one way: as a pretext for abandoning the whole tradition of analysis, or as necessitating theoretical development within and beyond the main lines of Marxist theory. If, as seems to be the case, there is no alternative framework of equal explanatory power, and indeed the foundation of Marxist analysis is largely necessary to identify the problems which it poses, then we are in one sense stuck with the tradition. But if, as also seems to be the case, the crisis of the tradition is fundamental and its prospects of satisfactory internal resolution slim, then as we have suggested the centrifugal tendencies are likely to grow. Particular challenges will continue to emphasise, as those of gender and militarisrn have done, the limitations of Marxism as classically understood-

PERSPECTIVES FOR MARXIST SOCIOLOGY What then can Marxists do, or what can sociologists (and other social scientists) do with Marxism? Once the easier answers of the 'new revolutionary synthesis' are found wanting, the responses which are available must necessarily be more limited and ad hoe. Even if 'Western Marxism' represented - as in so many senses it clearly did a specific historical period which closed in the late 'sixties, some of its problems clearly live on. The divorce of Marxist theory from revol-

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Introduction

15

utionary working class activity is more permanent than critics of Western Marxism implied, although there may be possibilities for the theory to inform other sorts of political practice. Marxism then appears as one of the intellectual sources of the working class and wider social struggle against aspects of capital and the state, with both the strengths and the restrictions of its peculiar synthetic approach . Intellectually, Marxism faces a crisis of its promised analytical synthesis. A root cause of this is the failure of Marxist political economy, the prospect of which was always a lynchpin of an integrated social theory. This is just not a specific technical failure, although Marxist economic writing has been noticeably limited in quantity and constantly preoccupied with the most abstract theoretical questions. The more fundamental problem appears to be that

Marxist political economy was premised, like the classical school from which it developed, on an autonomous mode of production.

Marx's assumption was that one could treat the production of com modifies as a sphere in and of itself, and that this provided the key to analysis of class relations, the state, etc. The problem appears to be that since the production of commodities has constantly expanded as indeed Marx predicted - it has provided the basis for great spheres of social production, chiefly organised by the state, which are outside commodity production itself. Marx's abstraction of the mode of production, state, etc. , from each other, no longer appears as historically justified. Political economy has become 'political' in the new and obvious sense that politics, the state and class forces intervene in a complex and varied way in the process of commodity production There is no intention here to denigrate the work that has been carried out to grapple with these problems, but simply to note that there is no widely available, coherent economic synthesis to provide a foundation for Marxist social theory. The immensity of the problems ap pears largely to have overwhelmed the limited theoretical resources of Marxist economics, a contrast which is brought into exceptional

-

relief by the recessions of the last decade. At the very point, in the mid-1970s, at which a Marxist political economy should have come into its own, providing a framework for the analysis of capitalist society in crisis, its development and influence seemed to be stunted." Since the promise of a critical political economy was central to the Marxist prospectus, its non-achievement has had profound effects on other areas of work. The absence of the putative core, the economic theory, has meant that the social theory has had to develop on its

16

Marxist Sociology Revisited

own. The socialisation and politicsation of production has tended to mean that areas of social analysis have developed, each improvising its own political economy to meet the perceived need. Thus we have a political economy of the state, of domestic labour, of militarism, of race relations, etc., developed not as part of an integrated political economy, but in order to meet the needs of particular fields of social analysis. In this sense there has been some constructive dismantling of theoretical barriers between academic compartments. At the same time, however, the tension between political economy and social analysis, which is produced by central historical processes, has simply been displaced into the discrete fields of study. An interpretation of the problems created in the sociology of development is given in Chapter 3 by David Booth.

The failure to re~create an alternative institutional context for social theory (which existed in classical Marxism) has not prevented

fruitful interplay with particular social movements (e.g. women's, black, civil liberties, peace, ecology) as well as with particular political forces (e.g. Eurocommunist, Green, new Labour left). But the locus of theoretical development has remained firmly within academia, and heavily influenced by its institutional framework. Thus sociology, which from the 1960s offered the most space for radical and Marxist ideas, has continued, in Britain and some other Euro~ pean countries at least, to see the greatest working through of the problems of Marxist analysis. For the theoretical reasons already indicated, as well as for practical reasons, this work has actually reinforced the self-definition of 'sociology It is not even possible to talk unproblematically of a 'Marxist' sociology, since Marxism has become a major contributor to sociology in general, while Marxistinfluenced sociologists increasingly identify with their discipline. How could this reversal of the Marxist critique of sociology occur?

In part it is because, as we noted earlier, sociology had already moved on beyond the object of the Marxist critique. In part it is because of the general crisis of Marxism. But it can best be explained in theoretical terms derived from the original critique. If sociology's original Haw was the attempt to deal with social contradictions divorced from their basis in the muanlll of production, Harxism's historical problem has proved to be the issues arising from its very insistence on political economy as the root. As social contradictions have overflowed economic relations, forms of theory have been required which - while obviously not denying the significance of political-economic dimensions - have integrated these directly with

Introduction

17

social, cultural and ideological analysis. Sociology has not freed itself entirely from the ideological form which Marxists criticised; indeed as a broad academic field it naturally contains many contradictory strands and to the extent that sociology encourages a narrow 'sociologisrn', the critique will always be relevant. But actually existing sociology has undoubtedly been enriched by its encounter with Marxism and has come closer than much other social thought to achieving at least partial integrations of political economy and social analysis, if obviously without the total practical and theoretical context promised by MarxismIf it is still wrong to talk of Marxism as 'a sociology' in any narrow sense, there are obviously fields of interest to a Marxist-derived theory which correspond to what is generally understood as 'sociol-

ogy'. Within classical Marxism, the central area is that of the study of social classes, a problem intimately connected with the analysis of

the mode of production. Here Marxist theory is under great pressure , from within as well as from outside critics, because the distinctions generated by the analysis of the mode of production - ownership/ non-ownership of the means of production, income from property/ income from paid labour, productive/unproductive labour -- while still very necessary, are no longer sufficient to define either class divisions themselves or the major distinctions within classes. The issues have vexed sociologists, Marxist and otherwise, in the last two decades: to the point where one of the most respected Marxist writers finds it necessary to introduce concepts of authority roles, 'career' versus 'job' occupations, gender roles and family structure, in order to define contemporary class divisions. This sort of development can be seen as the resort to extra-economic explanations for what were previously seen as essentially economic phenomena, or as an indication that the division between mode of production and wider aspects of the social structure has broken down. Certainly, if the

concept of mode of production is to be retained, it must be defined a great more flexibly than hitherto. Central issues of class structure are not treated directly in this

book, in one sense this is obviously an unfortunate lack, but in another it reflects the fact that the contradictions of contemporary society are not always readily defined in class or economic terms. Marxist theorists have not always granted a specific meaning and autonomy to the fields articulated by sociology: studies in this book show however that attempts by Marxists to dissolve realities like 'urbanism', 'race' and 'farnily' into economic and class relations have

18

Marxist Sociology Revisited

generally caused great difficulties. If we are to define mode of production or class today we need to understand the specific realities which these sociological constructs designate. The attempt to apply a classical Marxist method in many areas of social life involves a tension between concepts and reality which can only be fruitfully resolvedlwhen the concepts themselves are re-examined. It is possibly interesting that the polarisation between classically Marxist and non-Marxist approaches is clearest in the field where the least concrete work has been carried out recently (and which is outside sociology narrowly defined): in social psychology, discussed in Chapter 7 by Norman O'Neill. The thematic range of this book, while arbitrary to the extent that

it reflects the special interests of a group of sociologists, is Western Marxist to a 't' in that, as Anderson once described Gramsci's work, it is 'unremittingly focussed on superstructural objects'. (Even David

Booth's paper, which deals with the development of capitalism in the 'Third World`, argues against narrowly materialist explanations.) But the articles also belie this sort of classification, showing how social development has undermined any narrow 'base/superstructure' division, since most of the problems discussed are shown to be simultaneously material-economic and cultural-ideological. The discussions of the state, urbanism, and development raise fundamental issues of the nature of contemporary capitalism, just as those on race relations, the family, and urbanism raise central questions of class structure. Concepts which bridge the 'economy/culture' divide, such as that of 'civil society' explored by Colin Creighton, are at a premium. The articles are to be read, First and foremost, as individual statements about areas of theory and research. They take no collective position about contemporary capitalism or class structure any more than about sociology, Marxism, or the issue of their relations.

And yet they can be seen, hopefully, as responses to the sorts of problem indicated here. They adopt positions which range from a classical counterposition of Marxism and bourgeois social science, to a fundamental rejection of Marxist premises, but most writers take an intermediate stance. Sympathetic to the attempt to work through Marxist categories, they nevertheless outline various issues which either prevent this being successful or must be taken account of if the theory is to become adequate. The choice between these two conclusions could be seen as personal and political, related to the degrees of initial sympathy for the Marxist project, or as related to the value one

Introduction

19

places on a coherent framework as at least a starting point for analysis- While this book contains a great deal of criticism of Marxism both in general and in particular, it stands as testimony to the formative influence of Marxism on the social thought of the last two decades, and the extent to which it is still an essential reference point in any debate. NOTES AND REFERENCES 1. C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination, Harmondsworth, Pen-

guin, 1970, Alvin W. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, London, Heinemann, 1971.

2. For parallel but distinct versions of this argument, see Paul Q, Hirst, 'Recent Tendencies in Sociological Theory', Economy and Society LJ 1, May 1972, and my 'The Coming Crisis of Radical Sociology', in Robin Blackburn (ed.), Ideology in Social Science, London, Fontana, 1972.

3. Not least because the department at Hull has always combined sociology and social anthropology, and our anthropological colleagues remained much more immune to Marxism: although there have always been areas of joint concern (see Talal Asad, ed., Anthropology and the

Colonial Encounter, London, Ithaca Press, 1973, and Ivar Oxaal, David Booth and Anthony Barnett (cos), Beyond the Sociology of Development, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975). Martin Shaw, Marxism and Social Science, London, Pluto Press, 1975. 4.5. Ibid. , esp. Preface and ch. 4; the following paragraphs summarise some of the arguments of this chapter, and references will be found there.

6. As recent discussion of the state has suggested: see e.g. Ralph Mili~ band, 'State Power and Class Interests' in his Class Power and Stare

Power, London, Verso 1983, and comments in oh. by Martin Shaw in this volume. 7. Perry Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism, London, New Left Books, 1976. S. For Lukacs see History and Class Consciousness, London, Merlin, 1971, and discussion in Shaw, op. cit., pp. 66-73, for 'critical theory' see Chapter 7 by Norman O'Nei1l in this volume. 9. Gouldner, 'Marxism and sociology' in his For Sociology, London, Heinemann, 1973, and The Two Marxisms, London, Macmillan, 1980 (see also review of latter by present writer, Theory, Culture and Society

l , 2, Autumn 1982). 10. See for example the programmatic statements in Engels, Principles of Communism, Shaw, op. cit., p. 114, and discussion by Karl Korsch, Karl Marx, New York, Russell & Russell, 196311. Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy, London, New Left Books, 1971. 12. Shaw, Marxism and Social Science, op. cit., p. 116. 13. Anderson, op. cit. The concept of 'Western Marxism' has now entered

20

Marxist Sociology Revisited into common usage: while Anderson's is the most accessible overview, an alternative survey and definition is odored by Russell Jacoby, Dialectic of Defeat, Cambridge University Press 1982 (my review in Theory, Culture and Society, op. cit.).

14. Raymond Williams, Culture and Society, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1961. A general overview of the emergence of the concept of 'culture' in Marxism has yet to be written, this is something to which I hope to address myself in a later work. 15. Perry Anderson, In the Tracks of Historical Materialism, London, Verso, 1983, p. 79. 16. bid., pp. 28-31. 17. Ibid., p. 78. 18. Ibid., p. 105. 19. Ronald Aronson, The Dialectics of Di5as.ter, London, Verso, 1983, esp.

oh. 3.

20. Gouldner has a memorable way of putting this' 'We have lived and still live through a desperate political and social malaise while, at the same time, we have also outlived the desperate revolutionary remedies that

had once been thought to solve it' (The Two Marxisms, op. cit., p. 26). 21. See e.g. Chris Harman et al., Education, Capirafism and the Student Revolt, London, International Socialism, 1968. 22. The critique of orthodox Marxism's treatment of women runs through

virtually the entire European feminist literature, but for an extension of this to the political theory of the left, see Sheila Rowbotham et al., Beyond the Fragments, London, Merlin, 1979. For the peace movement, see E.P. Thompson, 'Notes on Exterminism, the Last Stage of Civilization', in Thompson or al., Exterminism and Cold War, London, Verso, 1982, also Martin Shaw, °War, Imperialism and the StateSystem: a Critique of Orthodox Marxism for the 1980s', in Shaw (ed.), War, Stare and Society, London, Macmillan, 1984. 23. Anderson, who makes great claims for Marxist discussion of contemporary capitalism in the last decade or so, in fact refers to but three

authors of substantive studies (alongside a longer list of conceptual! methodological writers). One of these is Harry Braverman, for his analysis of the labour process, so that for political economy in the narrower sense he relics only on Ernest Mandel and Michel Aglietta.

This is hardly a broad basis for such a core area of knowledge . 24. John Westergaard, 'Class of '84', New Socialist, Ian.-Feb. 1984.

2 Marxism and the Urban Question ROSEMARY MELLOR The questions provoked by urbanisation - individualism, status definition, ethnicity, property capital and state intervention - challenge the very terms in which Marxism is cast. Over the past generation social theory has had to take account of changing alignments in the

l a b o r force, state planning and, as well, urbanisation. Even in 'urbanised' societies urbanisation remains a live issue. Despite legal and institutional constraints on labour mobility and low rates of economic growth, urban migration continues and rural society continues to be incorporated into the urban net. And, further, economic restructuring enforces the recategorisation and reshaping of urban places. Some of the more intractable political issues relate to this experience of urbanisation. In Britain, the peripheralisation of the inner cities with continued 'deurbanisation' is most conspicuous, in France, the urban question centred on the Qxplosive growth of French towns and the challenge this presented to state planning. The problem for Marxism is a compound one: not only is there no systematic treatment of urbanisation in the work of Marx or Engels, but strictly speaking such consideration was precluded by the terms

they set for historical analysis. As Lojkine commented? 'it would seem that an analysis of the meaning of the "urban revolution" for capitalist relations of production lay outside his theoretical field'.1 Urbanisation was disregarded as a condition for political action, issues of land and rent were secondary in the delineation of the capitalist mode of production, how the society lived was not critical to its political stability, to analyse in those terms was to accept a popular paradigm of social causation. The substantial quality of the writing on the 'urban question' by writers in the Marxist tradition over the past 25 years (and here one can list scholars as disparate as

Lefebvre, Marcuse, Williams, Castells, Lojkine and Harvey),2 is 21

22

Marxist Sociology Revisited

therefore testimony to the political and intellectual appeal of Marx-

ism. The strategies of rapprochement adopted have been to take a loose definition of Marxism as revolutionary politics, to take it as structuralist method, or to seek to refine and redefine the concepts of Marx. And so Lojkine, for example, constructs a theory of urbanisation on the basis that 'when Marx uses the term he does not in fact give it a meaning which would enable it to be linked to Marxist phenomena'.3 The intensive quarrying of Marxist texts so as to recast the problematic of urbanisation is generally seen as inaugurating a paradigm

shift in urban studies- Although previously there has been no apparent difficulty for social scientists working with the techniques of

sociology, social anthropology or history in assimilating these to Marxist interests" these had never been made explicit. The most outstanding example of Marxist urban historiography had been the work of the Hammonds.5 Structural analysis indicates abstraction as well as an integrative methodology - a concern to establish connections between institutions and ideas. This the Hammonds achieved with a construction of the industrial town as enforcing and reiterating the 'alien and unaccommodating power' of capitalism. But in subsequent community studies there was more of a preoccupation with the nuances of everyday life, and in establishing 'new facts, new connections between facts'.° The central concern of local study became the activities of people, the meanings ascribed to dramatic event, custom, myth and folklore. It was this tradition of research that was rejected for the study of 'society - its distribution of power and other resources, the structural limitations on life chances and the patterns and processes inherent in the nature of society'.7 In the paradigm shift Marxism was to be the preponderant influence. Yet it is hard to identify advances in social scientific under-

standing of urbanisation over the past fifteen years that can be Credited to Marxist (as opposed to radical) writing or research Any assessment also must admit the paucity of subsequent research: 'we are swimming in potent.but only marginally nuanced theories with few empirical islands in view'.9 Nor has there been a greater consistency in theoretical direction. Each writer responds to particular concerns, sectional interests: there is no acceptance of discipline imposed on the research problematic by theoretical constructs. The efflorescence of a Marxist urban sociology from the end of the 1960s spearheaded by French sociologists - has to be seen as a quest for specialised knowledge and a disciplining of research idiosyncracy in the drive for a unified programme. Only in this light can the intensity

Marxism and the Urban Question

23

of theoretical debate and the elaborate reconstruction of Marxist theory be explained. The untidiness of social life, the lack of fit between different areas of the economy, between one agency of the state and another," the contradictions of everyday life and episodic action, all these are unacceptable working assumptions. The capacity to live with uncertainty might be regarded as a sign of scientific maturity; from the standpoint of the 'new' urban sociology, such a view is impatiently dismissed as symptom of that bourgeois ideology which denies the identification of structural order.

NEO-MARXISM AND THE 'URBAN REVOLUTION' In broad terms, the Marxism of the 'long boom' after 1945 would appear to have had three lines of advancement in the study of: (i) the

organisation of production under monopoly capitalism, (ii) state orchestration of production, and provision of support for the working population, and (iii) the effects of mass consumption on identity and political action. Underlying the last are the questions articulated by Marcuse, namely the definition of need and the containment of the contradictions of capitalist society by consumption. For Marcuse, the critique was directed at the creation of 'false' needs by corporate interests and a welfare state that raised 'the standard of administered living'" so that 'the people Lind themselves in their commodities; they find their soul in their automobile, hi-fi set, split level home, kitchen equipment. The very mechanism which ties the individual to his society has changed and social control is anchored in the new needs it has produced'.12 The discipline identified by the Hainmonds as the 'brutal rhythm of the factory' had shifted to that of the market, advertis-

ing agencies, the media, towards a 'social life saturated with sexuality', and a language that represents 'an abridgement of thought'. Marcuse was drawing heavily on European ideas in philosophy so that in many respects his analysis replicated those of the European Marxists, notably Lefebvre and Gorz in France, Williams in England. Afliuence had to be confronted as a challenge to the Marxist prediction of social change. There were demonstrably different sets of needs, sources of satisfaction, criteria of wealth and poverty, boundaries of culture and constraints on political action so that the very idea of exploitation had to be widened to include definition of the values of consumption. All this was debate at a level of abstraction removed from urban

24

Marxist Sociology Revisited

experience. It remained for Lefebvre to develop a theory of the 'urban revolution' which in its movement away from the orthodox categories of production and class struggle was open to the charge that he was grounding 'new political strategy not on the bases of the structures of domination, but on the alienation of everyday life'.13 Lefebvre distinguished a sequence of three phases in urbanisation in the last of which 'urban praxis' succeeded 'industrial praxis'. Industrialisation was 'no more than a transition, a historical intermediary, a "mutation" which was viewed . . . as absolute'-14 'Urban praxis', as 'centrality and marginality, urban celebration and urban guerrilla warfare, everyday existence . . . anomie and normality, topicality and utopia would be the central concern. Lefebvre had therefore

moved out of the Marxist paradigm of change, vindicated in his analysis it would seem by the events of 1968. The appeal of Lefebvre's analysis lay in its designation of 'everyday life' as being 'the broad basis of the pyramid of modern society'.16 It was this that was being usurped by a 'well organised exploitation of society'. The imagery is that of Ton fies two generations earlier, it also echoes the themes adopted by historians of working class culture

in Britain. In the writings of Hoggart, Williams and Seabrook" there is the same double critique: that of the attenuation of working class culture confronted with an ideology of consumption, and that of 'the seizure of the private 918 by these and state agencies. The 'traditional' working class cultures cast in the era of industrial-urbanisation had been relatively opaque, but the conventions of everyday life were being opened out to the civilising mission of mail-order catalogue and state agencies. Lefebvre's indictment is not of afiiuence as such but of a consumption process that breaks up everyday autonomy, and of urban planning that accentuates this segmentation. His humanism, together with a resounding optimism in the potential of urban society, distinguished Lefebvre from the other prominent Marxists seeking to assimilate some shreds of Marxism to the conditions of a society in which the market defined need. Among Marxists that followed his lead into urbanisation only Castells retained some of this sense of an everyday life outside structural categories.

THE 'NEW WAVE' IN FRENCH URBAN STUDIES

After 1968 there was a radicalisation in research interests in France. The best known writer, outside France, is undoubtedly Castells. Not

Marxism and the Urban Question

25

only has he been prolific in publication, but his books have been translated. His recasting of the urban question is admitted to have

been 'virtually the only French neo-Marxist theoretical model employed so far by British urban sociologists 19 It has also attracted strong criticism as being formalist (Glass), a-historical (Harloe), confused in its key concepts (Pohl), restrictive (Pickvance), lacking empirical grounding (Elliott), and politically specific (Lebas).20 He will be remembered for three aspects to his WOI°k'

i. the refutation of urban ideology;

ii. the reconceptualisation of the 'urban' as 'collective consumption' , iii. the concept of 'urban social movements

The one over-riding interest is the definition of an academic field proper to the new research, yet in accordance with Marxist philos-

ophy. In theoretical terms this required the articulation of everyday life with 'totalitarian society', urbanisation with class struggle. Caste1ls's work is marked by a concern for popular social movements and there is nothing of the economic emphasis that characterised the work of Topalov, Lojkine or Lamarche, for instance. URBAN IDEOLOGY On this theme Castells had two targets: the decomposing field of urban sociology with, he argued, its latent ecological assumptions, and secondly, the technico-natural explanations for urban problems. Here, like Williams," his argument centred on the displacement of critiques of capitalism to a sustained anti-urbanisrn. With this there is no criticism. The former argument, however, was based on a series of misleading assumptions- These were: i. that urban sociologists were using the city as a sociological variable, ii. that the work of the Chicago School was still of significance, iii. that sociology could only study 'sociological entity' or 'scientific object', and not merely 'aspect of reality',,.@.....,a iv. that the city could not be studied as an aspect of reality as it could not be defined.

an

The objections to the Iirst two are simple: ecological research was confined to a few academic institutions in America, and the guidelines set out by the Chicago School had been discarded elsewhere. 22

Marxist Sociology Revisited

26

American research had accepted cities as context for everyday life without resorting to determinism. The possibility of extending this interest to a 'sociology of community' is admitted by Castells, but in accordance with Althusserian precepts he is insistent that there must be a scientific object of study. The objections to (iii) and (iv) involve questions as to the need for boundaries in social research. Castells assumes that scientific categories can be derived and imposed on 'an aspect of reality': if this expert arrogation of meaning is rejected then the argument founders. Castells is in fact ingenious here, as he claims to build his theoretical object on the ideologies of everyday life. As for (iv) one must query the utility of the boundary-in-space as a means to define social institutions, and as whether it is only 'the-city-

as-it-is' that is so hard to define. The same criticism could be leveled at the firm or the educational system, the two examples of an acceptable 'real object' admitted by Castells. The working practice of sociology has been to work to some typification and arbitrary closure of problem for study. All in all, one can conclude that Castells's rctutation was redundant, and in its insistence on the rigours of science open to the criticisms he leveled at the Chicago School.

COLLECTIVE CONSUMPTION Castells arrives at a resolution of the problem of the scientific content of urban sociology in The Urban Question (1972). He writes: the urban seems to me to connote directly the processes relating to labour power, other than in its direct application to the production process (but not without relation to it, since its entire reproduction is marked by them). Urban space thus becomes defined by a section of the l a b o r force, delimited both by a job market, and by the (relative) unity of its daily life."

Subsequently24 he reiterated the need to 'decode the urban', to take as problem for study 'the growing importance of the ideological problematic . . (which) organises symbolically . . . the problems experienced by people in their everyday practice',25 and to redefine the urban as to do with reproduction, je consumption. He urged concentration on the processes of collective consumption with the argument that state intervention would provoke new divisions in the social order and that this intervention would politicise urban exist-

_

Marxislll and the Urban Question

27

once. 'Monopolville' (the counterpart to the abstraction of the industrial town delineated by the Hammonds) may appear to be a

-becomes

'completely totalitarian universe',26 but state action is necessarily flawed and contradictory and will create awareness of power. Castells was hotly criticised" for the separation of consumption life outside issues from those of production. Everyday E: the workplace, urban life becomes domestic life. Scathing as Castells had been of earlier conventions of urban sociology, his own approach was open to identical criticism. As Pahl commented, 'There is no new urban sociology: Marxists are simply addressing themselves to questions which they had hitherto ignored." in neo-Weberian approaches expounded by Pahl (i969),29 or X (1967) had come to not dissimilar positions with far less theoreti-

me

cal anguish. Interestingly however, there was little comment on Castells's movement from reproduction of labour power (which was to be the starting point for Cockburn in The Local State3°), to a narrower focus on the processes of collective consumption. The argument for the restriction of the 'urban' to collective con~ sumption is most fully developed in the 'Aftelword' to the English edition of The Urban Question. This shows a surprising line of reasoning. Castells argues that this emphasis is justified as 'the organisation of a process will be all the more concentrated and centralised, and therefore structuring as the degree of objective socialisation of the process is advanced'. 32 There is an image of a totalitarian state, that state which is the 'real manager of everyday life',33 a Stalinist model of bureaucratic centralism in which the power of capital as well as the pluralist interests within state bureaucracies are discounted. In this emphasis on the state Castells is in accord with contemporary Marxists. The social disciplines of the market (which Castells acknowledges in his typification of 'monopolville' as 'rigid, standardised and constrained routines')34 are taken to be of secondary analytical status in the determination of the urban.

To explain this movement from issues of production and class, one must turn to the political and institutional contexts of urban research in France. Castells would seem to have three interests: to link the lives of the people with communism, to expose the mechanisrns of the capitalist state, and to achieve academic as well as political credibility. To expand: i. populism .-.- CasteIIs is a fluent exponent of a popular communism, inspired by experience of the shanty towns of Latin

28

Marxist Sociology Revisited

America as well as the events of 1968. He speaks repeatedly of 'new forms of popular protest and organisation arising from the

contradictions of daily existence in capitalist cities'. The model

of change is 'pluriclassiste' - broad based coalitions held together by a common interest in the shortfalls in state provision for collective consumption. He sees urban research as a means to enlarge the mass support for the political Left. ii. state power - As Harloe commented: One is strongly under the impression that Castells and Lorine have abstracted elements which are specific to

French experience . . . more importantly the emphasis both theories place on the state, its closeness to the interests of

monopoly capital, its central control and their de-emphasis of opposition, are surely influenced by (i) the historic centralisation of the French state (ii) economic and planning strategies of the previous twenty years and (iii) the long period of government by the Gaullists, and the exclusion of the left from power." State modernisation strategies had swept through French traditions, broken up local cultures: research into state planning and the resultant contradictions, was political education. iii. credibility In France, finance for research had been directed through specialised research institutes rather than the universities as in Britain. There was therefore an independence from established institutions, but with this a vulnerability to their criticism and that of the political bureaucracies. This institutional weakness is the background to the intensive theorisation of the urban, and may explain its emphases: 'urban research was part and parcel of state intervention in collective consumption; it was its central study'.36 (The problem to which Marxist

analysis was directed was perhaps as much the autonomy of the institute as the autonomy of the urban). Despite widespread criticism, uncertainties in terminology, and theoretical ambiguities, the concept of collective consumption has achieved a certain currency in British social science." It accords with empirical policy research, notably in housing, the interest in the political economy of the welfare state, and the political strategies of the new left in local politics. There is also something of a consensus that the distinctions between urban and rural are unimportant, even as terrains for everyday living, and that if space ceases to have utility

Marxism and the Urban Question

29

as an organising concept, then collective consumption has its attractions as providing 'a paradigmatic shift in the fie1d'.38 URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

'In the street, on their street . . >.39 this was the clarion call to Castells's manifesto. Struggles generated by contradictions in the urban system would become 'the essential sources of the new dynamics of struggle'."° Popular discontent with the cities, and the scattered protest movements could be channeled as they 'tend objectively towards the structural transformation of the urban system or towards a substantial change in the balance of forces within the political system as a whole'.41 None of the popular movements he described represent more than the 'coordination of spontaneity' but

each represents an opportunity for organisation of a mass movement against the state. Castells's formulation was strongly political, his argument throughout was directed at the Communist Party, and he was at pains to

emphasise the non-revolutionary potential of urban movements without class-political organisation. An urban social movement represents : the union of a series of intense contradictions which can only be achieved by an organisation imported from other practices. A purely 'urban organisation' can at most be an instrument of reform . . . an urban social movement emerges where there is a correspondence between the fundamental contradictions of the urban system, and a correct line within an organisation formed from the crystallisation of other practices. (emphasis mine)"2

This image of urban change can only be understood in the light of this political interest. It is this that leads him to discount the effects of

state-institutional reform" so apparent in British welfare history. However, given that local protest movements are a frequent source of embarrassment to local state administrators as well as private capital interests, Lil their successful defusing is a hallmark of stateprofessional skills44 the recognition of grassroots social protest has hmm welcome H) rrective to the orthodoxies of urban political studies. Castells's enthusiastic interest in cities and urbanisation is unmistakable, yet he directs urban sociology away from research into cities

30

Marxist Sociology Revisited

and from the mainstream of Marxist analysis. 'Mode of production', 'class struggle', 'state monopoly capitalism' are concepts observed for form's sake while the analytical emphasis is shifted to reproduction, consumption, state regulation and urban social movements. And the identification of the urban as 'collective consumption' puts urban studies in a strait-j acker. There is 'no reason to expect the city or the urban to correspond to a single theoretical process' even if that were 'a generally accepted everyday notion'.45 Collective consumption does not constitute the urban question: state intervention to guarantee material and social support for decent family life is a commitment triggered by movements in the economy, as well as the incorporation of the working population in the democratic state- There is an urban

element to the expansion of state investment/regulation (drains, water~supply, refuse disposal, transport) but this is a small part of welfare state provision .-- and one normally outside political struggle. Collective consumption, state provision, is not even an unknown, hence perhaps the paucity of 'solid research'.4° Nowhere is there recognition that the outcome of collective provision is the stimulation of in dividualised consumption, most notably in housing and transport. However, Castells does leave as residue 'urban' and 'urbanisation', 'city' and 'everyday life' within the new paradigm. It was left to others, non-Marxists, to extend the logical implications of the argument, and define out the 'urban' from urban sociology. In Alice in Wonderland fashion urban sociology was to become non~urban and non-spatial.

A NON~SPATIAL URBAN SOCIOLOGY Prior to 1975 the rapid development of sociology in higher education

had been to the disadvantage of urban sociology: no longer able to justify continued borrowings from American research, and losing ground to special areas within sociology such as race/ethnic, or welfare, studies. There was also movement in related disciplinary areas such as geography, economics and political studies which pre-enipted study by sociologists into understood urban concerns . social differentiation by area, the economics of urban land and urban politics. Urban sociology may also have lost standing because of its identification with 'the survey', and the micro-cosmic findings of some local research. The relationship with town-planning also re~

Marxism and the Urban Question

31

stricted its appeal: neither the role of consultant to planners, not that of their gadfly, offered theoretical return or political reward. Accordingly, the intellectual credibility of urban studies within sociology - despite the incursions of sociological theorists such as Rex remained low- Urban sociology had neither been able to shake off the reputation of dealing with the sociologically disreputable - the environment - nor had it achieved a secure niche in academic sociology . The initiatives taken, largely by Pickvance and I-Iarloc in first circulating the writings of the French 'new wave', and then creating a forum for their ideas" answered to this credibility deficit. The ideas they sponsored were novel and therefore intriguing, complex, and thereby demanding serious attention, Marxist and therefore orthodox, they were also distinctively contemporary. But, for all the novelty, developing research interests (in particular into housing) could be incorporated, and research in progress could seek a greater

- .

legitimacy." The emphatically revisionist formulations of Lefebvre and Castells had brought the new paradigm very close to the neoWeberian models of urbanisation already broached by Rex and Pahl. The boundary between a Marxism that had dropped all direct reference to production for concentration on the state, and a neo-Weberian sociology had become impossible to police. This convergence was conspicuous in the work of Saunders who, while using a markedly pragmatic Weberian methodology, came to a definition of field of study in accord with that of Castells. Saunders argues that 'Castells's theory may be retained as the initial basis for an ideal-typical conceptualisation of "urban" problems (the implication of this being that it should be assessed according to its heuristic value) . . .149 Despite therefore considerable criticism of

the Althusserian methodology on which Castells had drawn ('epistemological im._p§rialism'), and a thorough demonstration of the inconsistencies and lack of rigour in Castells's work, he is able to treat the definition of the urban question as collective consumption on its merits. As Castells's theoretical innovation had answered to a

political and institutional configuration not found in Britain, and, as Saunders makes clear, Castells's own position had shifted throughout the nineteen seventies in accordance with the direction taken by Eurocommunisrn" the question must be as to the validity of abstracting theory from political interest and moving the abstraction across to serve another interest." Saunders justifies the use of such a restrictive approach in the following terms:

32

Marxist Sociology Revisited

i. the simplification and purification of complex reality is 'an essential pre-requisite for theoretical and empirical research'; ii. it defines an area of analysis state social consumption provision - that is crucial to 'understanding contemporary capitalism' .-.

iii. that it encompasses some traditional concerns of urban sociology, e.g. housing,53 iv. that it 'avoids the tendency of urban sociology to collapse into sociology as a whole'.54

There is a concern to demonstrate a peculiarly sociological field of study, and his advocacy of a non-spatial urban sociology responds to the insistence that the subject of study should be 'theoretically

significant'.55 As the social salience of space (distance) is considered to be 'relatively trivial', the field of urban sociology is to be redefined. Simplification in theory confers intelligibility, contemporaneous appeal pulls in those who respond to the political reference, while continuity with old concerns allows the sub-discipline to build on existing strengths in personnel. Finally there is the resolution of the boundary problem with sociology that allows urban sociology to call on support in its own right. The model advanced for this non-spatial urban sociology is based on a dualism identified between 'social investment/corporate interestlcentral government' and 'social consumption/competitive politics/local governlnent'.56 Discussion of the national political economy enters into research only as it impinges on local contests around welfare resource allocation. Straightforwardly, the new urban sociology is to deal with public provision of consumption goods and services, and local adversary politics. It therefore identifies an academic field very close indeed to the interests of the 'Broad Left' alliances that have assumed a local political sphere from which oppositional alliances could be forged to contest national government. There was none of that sense of cohesion to a state system that

had characterised the earlier French writing, and the political assumption was that the corporatism that had prevailed in national politics could be breached in a local road to socialism. The dual model advocated by Saunders speaks for this break between the new urban left and the 'parliamentary road'.57 The political reference of the dual model is clear. As Sayer notes 'in general we have the particular "concerns" we do because real structures in the world affect us significantly and not just because some free floating groundless theory happens voluntaristically to

Marxism and the Urban Question

33

make them signiflcant'.58 The problem here is that even in political terms the theoretical dualism makes no sense. Simplification of the "urban" precludes analysis of much of what local government actually does (even if the omission of private capital interests were to be accepted), it also precludes discussion of politically contentious resource allocation. If local government agencies are forced by circumstantial logic (the need to retain employment and revenue) to subsidise private consumption and prime capital accumulation, then the terms under which these policies are negotiated within and between government agencies, and between these and extra-state interests, should be the subject of research. In that respect the structuralism demonstrated by Dunleavy59 is preferred.

Dunleavy has been a most enthusiastic advocate of the redefinition

proposed by Castells for urban sociology. Both as member of the Open University editorial team for the influential 'Urban Change and and in his own writing he has argued for 'a modified focus on the politics of collective consumption'.61 As in his

Conflict' course,

empirical study of state housing provision and the switch into highrise, industrialised building after 1956, he argues that urban political studies should be non-local, non-urban and even non-political." As research, and as a challenge to the orthodoxies of political science this is admirable, but it is far from clear why it is necessary to place the research into, inter alia the 'meta-causes and macro-implications of the long-run shift towards socialised consumption' in the mould of a 'non-spatial urban political sociology'.63 It is hard to see what the peculiarly urban element might be in that the emphasis on public services would seem to invite nothing more or less than a political economy of the welfare state. The reasons for retaining an urban label are never specified and it can only be surmised that Dunleavy, like Saunders, wishes to build on previous disciplinary strengths. There is also the attraction of the French Marxist writing which gave an urban imprint to the study of government policy making. Dunleavy is able to use Castells's paradigm shift to validate his own position: 'as a working hypothesis I accept Castells's argument that these processes lie at the heart of everyday conceptions of the "urban" in advanced capitalist societies',64 while claiming that there is no point to a spatial definition of the urban as the political scientist is relating to a 'society which is itself fully urbanised' .65 In fact, the two positions are contradictory in that Castells does accept that there is something to the experience of modern cities which is rather different to that of non-urban contexts:

34

Marxist Sociology Revisited

'la/lonopolville' is a different way of life. In this he is in accord with Lefebvre. British social scientists, in contrast, have taken the census statistics at face value and assumed a blanket urbanity to the society.6' Rad-ier more disturbingly Dunleavy accepts Castells's identification of everyday experience of the 'urban' with collective consump-

tion. This was for Castells a political exercise which answered to an issue posed by the new Left in France after a particular episode in political history. The pivotal movement of the events of 1968 had provoked an anguish reappraisal of ancient taboos, and a highly opportunist programme for urban research was one resolution of a political dilemma. In Britain popular culture and everyday concep-

tions are strongly tined by an anti-urbanism which owes little to expectations of collective consumption. If 'social science is f11nda~ mentally concerned with analysis everyday conceptions of social

realities',6 then at least ascertain in rigorous terms how conceptions of the urban can be read in the conventions of popular culture. Dunleavy and Saunders speak for the social scientific consensus in denying the utility of a spatial frame of reference. The assumption is that geographical distinctions are secondary (contingent) in that space is always constituted by social relations, and that the city has lost its specific institutional features to the national society. Further there is agreement that urban science will be distinguished by 'scientific' rather than 'real' categories. Quite apart from the argument (so ably presented by Sayer) as to the dubiousness of developing knowl-

edge in accordance with particular professional/political concerns, and not by reference to 'real structures', there is also misapprehension about the intersection between geography and society. It is not enough to refer to space as a flat category: it is the constitution of a place in/through the totality of social relations experienced there, that is at stake. And this is something that generalising social science has been reluctant to do. Saunders draws a revealing analogy between history and sociology, quoted here in full:

the historian does not simply study 'the past', but rather studies certain social, economic or political processes which took place in the past. Similarly, urban sociology, in my view, does not study space, but is rather concerned with certain processes which take place in space." This shows a misconception of history - the unit of analysis will be the period or society, i.e. time-space bundles or configurations of

Marxism and the Urban Question

35

events - and also of the 'urban' which must involve the relationship between social processes as contextualised by type of place. The problematic then is not space itself (which is of concern only to the mathematician), but 'the specific articulation of the instances of a social structure within a (spatial) unit . . _v_69 There is something rather disturbing about the denial of the urban as being even remotely interesting to sociology. The writing in urban sociology has become arid, with no reference to topical events, 'increasingly sophisticated and self-centred'.70 Somewhere outside the book-lined room there is congestion, inner-city blight, property speculation, even riots, as well as recurrent disputes over land use (burial grounds, science parks, playing fields, etc). Settlements of any type constrain movement, activities, associa-

tion, investment, politics and they do so in predictable ways. Urbanisation in the urbanised societies is a 'structural fact',71 the classic

exemplar of the intersection of capital interests and public needs. Even by the criteria of significance used by the 'new wave', i.e. theoretical specificity and political generality, research into urbanisation is justified. There are features to the urbanisation process which distinguish cities from society, and these are, as they have always been, of demonstrable economic and political significance. The denial that towns can be the subject of urban sociology could only have come about through acceptance of (i) the sub-disciplinary boundaries which place the study of the built environment outside sociology (and render suspect demography), and (ii) a conceptual dualism of production consumption. This latter indicates the blackboard presentation of Marxism that reflects the conventional split in

social ideology between home and work. The rejoinder must be that there is in everyday life 'an immediate unity' between production and reproduction: towns and cities function as working communities. (It is precisely the externalisation of work from the neighborhood that makes the suburb less than urban.) There is an 'artificial separation and forced abstraction, and an acceptance of the phenomenal forms that renders the city, conceptually, as a series of dormitory suburbs, and opens the way to the elimination of the urban as a scientific question. Not all the innovative theoretical writing in urban sociology has been Marxist, there is also a strong Weberian strand represented by Abrams," and Elliott and McCrone. The latter advocate 'a more permissive, humanistic and practical agenda for research'74 which would involve urban ethnography, and research into institutions as being 'repositories for historical delnands'. And the more recent

36

Marxist Sociology Revisited

work of Saunders" reactivates the distinctions between production/ class relations and consumption/sectoral alignments made by Rex." Saunders's emphasis has shifted to the questions of 'ontological security' raised by private property ownership. Evident, as in Pahl's research," is a rejection of the macro~politicaI economy approach as being 'disembodied' and a return to the study of 'the interactions of men's experience in detail',78 Also, in the shift to reconsideration of 'ways of life' (best understood as typifications of the everyday), there is a contingent recognition of the power of the 'regulated market' in the determination of need. As western societies openly reassert the values of privatised consumption, the driving fixation with the state which characterised Marxist writing in the 1970s has abated.

THE URBAN QUESTION

It is easy to reiterate a belief in an urban question, less easy to establish its dimensions One reason for its denial by sociologists has already been indicated -s a disinterest, even disbelief in the specificity of a place, and the web of relations through which it is sustained. There is no recognition of each 'urban' as being a specific articulation of the contradictions of the particular social formation. Confusingly perhaps, Castells, impare closer than any other Marxist writer to defining urban sociology in these terms, has been seized on as justifying its 'deurbanisationl A second basis for rejection has been the assertion of a rural-urban dichotomy which is impossible to substantiate in either empirical or theoretical terms. Even in ecological terms this is a misconstruction. Wirth's model of urbanism as deriving from size, density, and heterogeneity specified the conditions under which way of life would vary from place to place, i.e. it posits a continuum of community situations. In the criticisms of the Chicago School this variability of the 'urban' was overlooked. Yet from common experience there is knowledge that from 'most urban' to 'least urban' there will be as much variation in economic structure , political/social association, as between 'urban' and 'rural'. In the discussion that follows, it is assumed that it is legitimate, sociologically, to take the 'most urban' as demonstration of an urban question (much as Marcuse directed his discussion at Los Angeles, Lefebvre and Castells at Paris). Three elements of urbanisation are identified here as the starting points to analysis:

Marxism and the Urban Question

37

i. differentiation in location of activity, i.e. the territorial division of l a b o r , so that cities are characterised by range and specialis-

ation (in geographical theory denoted in terms of hierarchy and central place). ii. aggregation in population, i.e. concentration and more particularly heterogeneity, the latter accentuated by urban migration. iii. agglomeration of 'polarised differential location advantages

symbolised in equations of accessibility and land value. This Scott termed the 'urban land nexus'.

These are geographical variables in that they relate to the use of territory and a real differentiation of resources; they 'aII€ urban variables in that they constitute the city. Considering each of these three characteristics in turn.

i. Differentiation and Specialisation Differentiation in land use (uneven development) and the concentrated diversity of economic activity found in the large city are taken for granted. Very general ideas about linkages, the external economies of aggregation, the importance of centrality to specialised interests, the value of contact, and the symbolism of space are invoked as explanation. The value-sets which inform investment may derive from property interests and an institutionalised inertia in the organisation of work, or they may derive from a premium value given to urbanity and urban style. The urban hierarchy has as yet eluded rational explanation." This concentration of specialisation has profound effects on the occupational structure of the cities (and by implication their class alignments), on migration patterns (and thereby their population mix and patterns of association), their wealth generating capacity (and thereby domination in the naional culture).81 It is pure fallacy to speak of the city as mirroring more general social processes: it takes from the society and the subordinate places, it exerts a particular domination, and offers a particular structure of opportunity to those working or resident in it. By reason

of position in a hierarchical and territorial division of l a b o r there must be a distinctive urban social structure. Particular issues should therefore be referred to 'conceptions

of kinds of local frames'.82 Local community situation intersects with admitted sociological variables (class, status, gender, ethnicity) .

38

Marxist Sociology Revisited

Poverty, for example has different meaning in different types of 'local frame'. With the concentration of specialised occupations, and de-

industrialisation in the core cities, there will be a polarisation in l a b o r markets so that the widening national income differentials appear in their starkest form. There will theefore be great wealth and conspicuous consumption in reach of extensive poverty. This latter will be exacerbated by insecurity of employment (competitive labour supply) high costs of living (property and congestion costs), and enhanced expectations as to the socially conventional standard of living. The city creates new wants through its promotion of consumption, display of style and innovatory modes. In contrast, poverty in the non-metropolitan situation will be sustained by the community as

normal and typical a poverty of low wages, underemployment, old ...-

houses and poor services.*53 In the city poverty isolates and sets one group against another. Just by what it is - transactional centre, show-case for intern ational capitalism, arbiter of style of discourse the city confronts the state with instability:

Whatever else a city may be, it is at the same time a place inhabited by a concentration of poor people, and, in most cases, the locus of political power which aiects their lives. Historically, one of the things populations have done about this is to demonstrate, make riots or insurrections, or otherwise exert direct pressure on the authorities which happen to operate within their range." Such political challenge would not emerge but for accessibility: 'urban' means a necessary association between dominant and subordinate, a visibility to the rewards of power, and, in the use of public space and building to endorse authority, an ongoing invitation to resistance to that domination.

ii Aggregation and Heterogeneity U

Demographic composition will obviously be closely associated with the concentration of specialisation: l a b o r demand is one side of the migration equation. As important is the makeup of the l a b o r markets from which. the urban economy recruits. Typically the cities of the developed capitalist economy draw on young workers at the stage of the household cycle between families, whereas in conditions of

rural outflow family groups will be pulled into the urban economy.

Marxism and the Urban Question

39

Then there is the question of pluralism: there are obvious distinctions in that regard between, say, the US, France, and the UK. But it can be assumed that all 'world cities' will call on international l a b o r markets for both their elites with recherché skills and their draft l a b o r force. Ethnic diversity is therefore predictable. !As well, the big city offers privacy for social and political deviants, and holds those who value the diversity of subcultural experience found there. To be 'urban' is to be cosmopolitan, at least potentially: to be urban permits the redefinition of personal idiosyncracy into grooup membership. An accentuation of sub-cultural diversity results.

There is no comparative research on demographic composition of British cities (with the exception of that on census indicators to social

need). Analysis of the census material for individual urban areas does however point up the polarisation between inner cities and outer suburbs,85 and between the core cities and the satellite towns within metropolitan regions. Nor is there comparative research on the opportunities for association between different types of community formation. American evidence may be considered of doubtful utility: nevertheless the contrast shown by Fischer between the core city to

the San Francisco region and the outlying townships is illuminating." Fischer argues that urbanism (by which he means the size and density of population) promotes a diversity of subcultures through three processes: (i) selective migration (ii) critical mass, and (iii) intergroup friction. The exposition of 'critical mass' is: 'the sheer agglomeration of people in any social category makes possible key elements of a vibrant subculture - enough associates to develop inbred social networks, enough clients to support institutions, and enough collective strength to protect the group from political or cultural incursions'.87 This interest in the interpersonal, the definition of public and private, the etiquette of being in public, the spectacle of street life,

has had little parallel in British urban research.88 Without doubt this diversity makes the modern city: it is the basis of its social organisation and gives its politics a style that will not be replicated nationally. The political effects are more apparent in the US cities where local political establishments are more responsive to their particular constituencies. In contrast, until recently the dominant consensus over local state allocation of resources has been sufficiently strong in mainland UK to over-ride subcultural interests . And where there is departure from this consensus "ir in allocating resources to minority groups such as black women's collectives, gay rights centres, police monitoring groups, aussi- there is immediate

40

Marxist Sociology Revisited

antagonism and government penalties. Increased specialisation in labour markets, selective migration, and liberation in life style are likely to accentuate this dimension of urbanisation.

iii. Urban Land and Agglomeration Effects

A city is an agglomeration of population and activity in space: a concentrated use of land so as to minimise the frictional costs of distance. In this process of agglomeration new charges in energy and other resources are created with the so-called externality effects, ¥»§ pollution, congestion, etc. Agglomeration then is both an economic

asset and a tax on wealth generation and consumer satisfaction. Alternatively the city can be represented as an agglomeration of investment - successive, cumulative and thereby dynamic investment, in which is created 'a man-made resource system'.9° This system is the entity that operates according to 'laws of its own' because the resource island created sets the terms for further re-

source generation. Urbanisation can be read, therefore, either as a redefinition of space or as a redefinition of property rights. In the first reading agglomeration rninimises distance, at the cost of congestion, thereby influencing productivity; in the second, as translated into urban land rent structure it iniiuences wealth generation through property tenure. Urban land rent is the dimension that ultimately distinguishes city from town, town from rural district. Agglomeration creates assets that have no intrinsic content other than location in a city. Concentration means the differentiation of sites, and permits expropriation through the operation of monopoly rent on privileged sites. The 'free contracts between suppliers and purchasers of urban land',91 are

moderated by the constraints of an urban land rent system that creates its own differentials. Phrased differently the city is a system of property rights, a wholly artificial resource whose value would collapse if either the pressure for agglomeration were reduced, or the rights of property rescinded. The social construction of space can only occur through the medium of built property, the valuation of which is both an outcome of that social construction and an effect of agglomeration. It has become conventional among Marxist writers to read urban politics as an expression of class interest as moderated by local political culture. There has been insistence that, despite the existence

Marxism and the Urban Question

41

of specialised property capital, 'there are only class relations determined by the contradictions between l a b o r and capitals" Harvey would seem to be alone in having interpreted the city as 'an expression of the controlled power of finance capital backed by the power of the state over the totality of the production process,393 with therefore, its lines of conflict drawn between the consumers of urban resources and those who seek 'to realise value without producing it'.94 He takes as problem for study the production of the built environment, and places its dynamic in the conflict between those interests seeking to manipulate the returns from concentration by externalising the costs of agglomeration, and consumers. With Lojkine, he is explicit that there is no necessary affinity of interest between urban property

capital and production capital. This position points to an urbanisation process that accentuates the 'fractionalisation' of capital, and provokes 'urban class' confrontations. It also raises the question of the perennial contradiction between the private use of urban land, the external costs these generate, and the needs of the collectivity. A sociologist cannot endorse the statement that 'urban space and structure can only be meaningfully theorised in terms of the coalescent issues of land, land use and the land contingent (or location)

effects of dense social and economic activity' (emphasis mine)95 but there has to be consideration of the built environment as 'a material physical infrastructure'.96 The 'urban land nexus' has to be incorporated into theorisation of the urban question. It is intriguing that Lojkine, who came closer than Castells to addressing these issues, has had a restricted audience and limited following outside France." Like Castells, Lorine denotes the novelty of the urban mode of life as being the gathering concentration of the collective means of consumption, unlike Castells, he stressed the role of urban agglomeration ('the concentration of the totality of the means of reproduction

(labour and capital) )»98 in reducing the indirect costs of production, and the cost of circulation and consumption. Here interest is in his recognition of the limits imposed on agglomerative efficiency by urban rent, and in the distinction drawn between productive rationality and 'the "anarchy" manifest at the level o f the territorial division of labor'.99 This he extends to the investment/location decisions that lead to polarisation between underdeveloped regions and 'overurbanised' core cities, as well as that between the inner cities and the suburbs. Market appraisal of geographical resources, as well as the competing interests of finance, property and industrial capital, block the returns from urbanisation.

42

Marxist Sociology Revisited

The three elements of the core or metropolitan city identified here are the starting points for a construction of urbanisation. The argument is that there is a content to the 'urban' to which theoretical resolutions of the urban question must answer before moving away from the urban altogether. Two of these elements are, of course, reformulations of the ecological postulates as to urbanisation .... the aggregate of population and the logic of the land market. This does not entail leaving Marxist perspectives and reverting to explanations of the city in terms of itself. A knowledge of political economy is enforced on the urban student as the city, any city, is so obviously a specialised unit in a nationally divided, international productive system. The position adopted here is that theories of state and society

contextualive the urban, they do not constitute the urban. The urban question as broached here is real, interesting to both sociology and Marxism, and far from trivial.

NEW DIRECTIONS In Britain, as in France, the pendulum has swung away from the abstract and theoretical towards studies of everyday life - spatiotemporal routines in particular localities. There is therefore a revival of interest in community studies (sometimes couched as l a b o r market studies). For this study of 'modes de vie' French sociologists have devised the socio-biographical method, and British studies have increasingly relied on ethnographic accounts.100 As the constraining frameworks (investment, work, welfare, and political philosophy) to everyday life shift, there is awareness of ignorance as to 'how it is' either for households, or communities facing restructuring. Welfare state sociology with its heavy emphasis on resource allocation, policy

assessment, and professionalism, proved ill-adapted to the resurgence of market philosophies. This was early apparent in studies

of town planning where state authority over urban development was always tenuous, it is blatant now in the study of housing, or transport (less so in education or health where state professional estimations of need still dominate). There is then a revived interest in the disciplines of the market, a sense with Marcuse, that the domination of capital over urbanisation is exercised through a relationship, that of the 'regulated market' in which 'unfreedom, in the sense of man's subjection to his productive apparatus1101 is encountered in social life. Marcuse referred the

Marxism and the Urban Question

43

'one-dimensionality' of capitalist society to the homogeneity of commodities brought into the market by a society pledged to its freedom. Something of this emphasis is apparent in Lefebvre's discussion too , though it is entirely absent in the urban sociology of the following decade. It is as if there is a fatalism in the sociological consensus: monopoly interests have ultimate power to which rational analysis has no appeal, therefore there is no study of that for which there is no prospect of intellectual leverage. The state (collective consumption) became the conceptual black-hole into which urbanisation issues were drawn. In theoretical terms there was no acknowledgement that the power-house to capitalist society is that invasive system of ideas and practices we term the market. Ideas of market value constrain state actions: education become employability, health care costeffectiveness, housing satisfaction becomes housing revenue, and town planning becomes acceptability to developers. In whichever area of social policy 'the market constitutes a power situation independent of the exercise of that power: capital'.102 The significance of the market is that neither producer nor consumer can affect its operation through independent action, and that each, producer and consumer, is a bearer of market power over individual action through simple participation. It therefore acquires that 'alien facticity' and 'coercive instrumentality' ascribed by Berger to 'society'. And so, for example, a housing market is generally seen as having an autonomous modus operandi, 'the working of the housing market', and yet the producers of housing do not have autonomy for they are constrained by criteria of market acceptability to build a standard product. The occupiers of the dwellings are therefore bound in everyday life to a commodity whose form and

design they, as participants in the market, have brought about. (For housing, the criteria for design and construction will be those that most strictly satisfy the established conventions for family or house-

hold privacy.) The market therefore imposes a social discipline through standardisation to a convention. Professionally defined standards, administered by the state, can only break with these conventions if at the same time the state does become 'the real manager of everyday life In all aspects of state policy that closely affect investment/location decisions regional policy, transport and housing investment, and town planning - it has long been acknowledged that the ability of the public sector to impose non-market criteria is ....-.

quite limited without recourse to 'market' incentives i.e., subsidy,

fare/rent fixing, betterment levies etc. Control over urbanisation,

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Marxist Sociology Revisited

beyond accepted professional/technical issues such as building regulations, has had to come through negotiation and precept, a mobilisation of consent for state initiative. And the accepted criteria for consent have moved from equalisation to efficiency. The social relations of capitalism are expressed as ideas of social value by which actions are constrained. The cash-nexus is overlaid by contingent value-sets, e.g. patriarchy, nationalism, ethnicity, status. Ideas as to 'the urban' form one of these value sets. Without research informed by interest in the ideologies of the society, discussants are forced into contentious statements on the 'status value system' of the city. It is noticeable that it has been non-sociologists have traced the

particular motifs in English culture that inform urbanisation. Inglis pinpoints 'privacy and politeness',103 Williams the displacement of class antagonisms by a ruling orthodoxy ascribing social misery to the city.104 It appears paradoxical that the study of the territorial division of labour, migration, and the built environment, i.e. urbanisation, so long the preserve of positivist methodologies, should call on a critical study of culture, but logically this must be so. Markets are not abstract forms of domination but embody specific sets of ideas about 'the whole body of practices and expectations'.105 In the engagement

with the urban question Marxism has become identified with structuralist political economy, which, on the assessment presented here, has exhausted its informing potential. Urban sociology, too, in the quest for academic credibility, has lost the pioneer zeal that' impelled sociologists to invade private domains. Marxism and sociology, both , might reassert their humanist traditions, the one in studying 'that lived system of meaning and values - constitutive and constituting . . . a culture which has to be seen as lived do1ninance',1°6 the other in breaking through that screen of privacy by which sociology, as urban life, is constrained.

NOTES AND REFERENCES 1. J. Lorine, 'Contributions to a Marxist Theory of Capitalist Development' in C. Pickvance, Urban Sociology: Critical Essays, London, Methuen, 1976, p. 119. 2. The key publications are H. Lefebvre, La revolution urbane, Gallimard, Paris, 1970, H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, London,

Sphere Books, 1970, R. Williams The Country and the City, London, Chatto &

Windus, 1973; M.

Castells, La

question u,rbazlne, Paris,

Maspero, 1973, J. Lorine, Le Marxism, Fetal et la question urbane,

Marxism and the Urban Question

45

Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1977, and D. Harvey, The Limits to Capital, Oxford, Blackwell, 1982. 3. I. Lojkine, op. cit. (1976) p. 120. se

4- For British sociology there was J. Westergaard and R. Glass?, also the study Coat Is Our Life, N. Dennis, F. Henriques and E. Slaughter, London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1956. 5. J. and B. Hammond, The Town Labourer (1917), London, Longman, 1978.

6. U. Hannerz, Exploring the City, New York, Columbia Press, 1980. 7. Research Committee for the Sociology of Urban and Regional Development, International Sociological Association, Budapest, 1972, quoted by M. Harloe, Introduction to Captive Cities, London, John Wiley, 1977, p. 2.

.

8. lam prepared to concede R. Williams, The Country and the City, op. cit.

9. J . Walton, book review, International Journal of Urban and Regional Studies, 1983, vol. 7, p. 298. 10. For example, the comments by R. Moore: 'it would be a mistake to see the state as monolithic and omnicompetenf, in 'Urban development on the periphery of industri alised societies', in M. Harloe (ed.), New Perspectives in Urban Change and Confticr London, Heinemann, 1981, p. 153. 11. H. Marcuse, op. cit., p. 52. 12. Ibid., p. 24. 13. M. Castells, The Urban Quesniorz, London, Edward Arnold, 1977, p. 92. 14. H. Lefebvre, The Explosion, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1969, p. 137. 15. Ibid., p. 138. 16. H. Lefebvre, Everyday Life in the Modern World, London, Allen Lane, 1972, p. 57. 17. Notably R. Hoggart, The Uses of Literacy, London, Chatto & Windus, 1957, R. Williams, The Long Revolution, London, Chatto & Windus, 1961, and Marxism and Literature Oxford, University Press, 1977, and J. Seabrook, Unemployment, St. Albans, Granada Publishing, 1982.

18. R. Williams, Marxism and Literature, op. cit., p. 125. 19. E. Lebas, 'Urban and regional sociology in advanced industrial societies', Current Sociology, vol. 30, no. 1, 1982, p. 28.

20. See R. Glass, 'Verbal Pollution', New Society, vol. 41, 1977, pp. 66729, M. Harloe, 'Marxism, the State and the Urban Question' in C. Crouch (ed.), British Political Sociology Yearbook, London, Croom Helm, 1979, R. Pahl, 'Castells and Collective Consumption', Sociology, 1978, vol. 12, pp. 309-12, C. Pickvance, 'The Urban Question - a Review' in Sociological Review, vol. 23, 1978, pp. 173-6, B. Elliott, 'Manuel

Castells and the New Urban Sociology', British Journal of Sociology, vol. 31, 1980, pp. 151-8; E. Lebas, 'The State in British and French Urban Research', in V. Pons and R. Francis (eds), Urban Social Research, London, Routledge, 1983, pp. 9-30. 21. R. Williams, The Country and the City, op. cit. 22. Criticisms of the ecological approach, and Wirth's theory of uibanisrn ,

had been developed by E. Mannheim, 'Theoretical Prospects of Urban

46

Marxist Sociology Revisited Sociology in an Urbanised Society', American Journal of Sociology vol. XLVI, 1960, H. Gans, 'Urbanism and Suburbanism as Ways of Life' in A. Rose, Human Behaviour and Social Processes, London, Routledge, 1962, S. Greer, The Emerging City, New York, Free Press, 1962; P. Hauser, 'Observations on the Folk-Urban and Urban-Rural Dichotomies', and O. Lewis, 'Further Observations on the Folk-Urban Continuum', both in P. Hauser and L. Sch fore, The Study of Urbanisarion, New York, John Wiley, 1965. M. Castells, The Urban Question, London, Edward Arnold, 1977, p. 236. See the 'Afterword` (1975) to The Urban Question, and the essays

collected in Cozy Class and Power, London, Macmillan, 1978. 25. M. Castells, The Urban Question, p. 440. 26. M. Castells, City Class and Power, p. 33.

27. For reviews of criticisms see M. Harloe (1978), op. cit. and Lebas (1982 and 1983), op. cit. 28. R. Pohl, op. cit., p. 314. 29. R. Pahl, Whose City?, London, Longmans, 1969 and I. Rex and R.

Moore, Race, Community and Conflict, London, Oxford University Press 1967. C. Cockburn, The Lock! State, London, Pluto Press, 1977. Collective consumption is most straightforwardly defined as 'state involvement in the provision of consumption facilities? C. Pickvance,

The state and collective consumption, Milton Keynes, Open University, 32. 33.

34.

35. 36. 37.

38.

39. 40. 41. 42. 43.

44.

45 ,

1982, p. 10. M. Castells, The Urban Question, op. cit., p. 445. M. Castells, 'Towards a political urban sociology' in M. Harloe (ed.), Captive Cities, London, John Wiley 1977, p. 64. M. Castells, City Class and Power, op. cit. p. 33. M. Harloe, op. cit., p. 31. E. Lebas, op. cit., 1983, p. 25. Notably P. Dunleavy, Urban Political Analysis: the Politics of Collective Consumption London, Macmillan, 1980, and P. Saunders, Social Theory and the Urban Question, London, Hutchinson, 1981. C. Pickvance, book review, Sociology, vol. 14, 1980, p. 159. M. Castells, Lutres urbaiaes et poavoir politiqae, Paris, Maspero, 1971, p. 11. M. Castells, Cay Class and Power, op. cit., p. 171. 'Theoretical Propositions for the Study of Urban Social Movements' in C. Pickvance (ed.), Urban Sociology London, Methuen, 1976, p. 155. Ibid., pp. 170-1. C. Pickvance, 'On the Study of Urban Social Movements' in C. Pickvance (ed.), Urban Sociology, op. cit., pp. 207-11. As the Director of Housing interviewed by Dunleavy on the outcome of protest about rehousing into Ronan Point type blocks after the explosion commented: 'You know there's a skill in dealing with people that achieved that result', P. Dunleavy, The Politics of Mass Housing in Britain 1945-75, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981, p. 254. C. Pickvance, book review, Sociological Review 1978, Q. 175.

46. J. Walton, book review, International Journal of Urban and Regional

Research, 1983, vol. 6, p. 298.

°

-

Marxism and the Urban Question

47

47. The first major conference was held in 1975, under the auspices of the Centre of Environmental Studies: the first issue of the International Journal of Urban and Regional Research was in 1977. 48. In particular, J. Lambert et al. , Housing Policy and the State, London, Macmillan, 1978. 49. P. Saunders, Social Theory and the Urban Question, op. cit., p. 218. 50. Ibid., pp. 198-9. 51. In different terms Lebas makes a similar point: 'we argue that the imports (French state theory and its concrete application) have been narrowly and apolitically appropriated', op- cit. (1983), p- 10.

52. Saunders, op. cit., pp. 214-15. 53. Ibid., p. 54. Ibid., p. 278. 55. P. Saunders, 'Towards a Non-Spatial Urban Sociology', University of Sussex, Urban and Regional Studies Working Paper, no. 21, 1980, p. ii. 56. P. Saunders, Social Theory and Zhe Urban Question, op. cit., pp. 267-9. 57. J. Gifford, 'The New Urban Left: a Local Road to Socialism', New Society, 21 April 1983, pp. 91-3. 58. A. Sayer, 'A Response' in P. Saunders, Working Paper, no. 21, op. cit., p. 58. 59. P. Dunleavy, The Politics of Mass Housing in Britain 1945-1975, op. cit. 60. Open University Second Level Course (D202), Urban Change and Conjiict, Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 1981-82. 61. P. Dunleavy, Urban Political Analysis, op. cit., p. 163. 62. P. Dunleavy, 'Socialised Consumption and Economic Development' draft paper prepared for Anglo-Danish seminar on Local State Research, Copenhagen, September 1983, revised version forthcoming in International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. 63. Ibid., p. 31. 64. P. Dunleavy, Urban Political Analysis, op. cit., p. 50. 65. Ibid., p. 52. 66. There is of course a considerable difference in British and French urban history in this respect. In 1946 barely half the French population was enumerated as being urban, by 1975 72.9% were resident in 'unit's

urbaines', i.e. built-up areas. The population of French towns and cities swelled by 16 million in that period, leaving only 10% working or living on farm holdings. I. Scargill, Urban France, London, Croom Helm, 1983. 67. P. Dunleavy, The Scope of Urban Studies in Social Science, Milton

Keynes, Open University, 1981, p. 54. 68. P. Saunders, 'Towards a Non-Spatial Urban Sociology' Working Paper no. 21, op. cit., p. iii. 69. M. Castells, The Urban Question, op. cit., p. 237. 70. E. Lebas, 'Urban and Regional Sociology . . .', op. cit. (1982), p. 126. 71. C.W. Mills, 'The Big City: Private Troubles and Public Issues', in I.L. Horowitz, (ed.), Power Politics and People, Oxford University Press, . 1963, p. 400. 72. G.S. Bhatti, 'Housing and Privatization; a Critique of Consumption

Sector Analysis', University of Sussex, Urban and Regional Studies Working Paper, no. 37, 1984, p. 54.

48

Marxist Sociology Revisited

73. P. Abrams, 'Towns and Economic Growth' in P. Abrams (ed.), Towns in Societies, Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 9-34, and B. Elliott and D. McCrone, The City: Patterns of Domination and Conflict, London, Macmillan 1982.

Ibid., p- 139. P. Saunders, 'Beyond Housing Classes: the Sociological Significance of Private Property Rights in Means of Consumption', University of Sussex, Urban and Regional Studies Working Paper, no. 33, 1982. 76. See J. Rex and R. Moore, op. cit., J. Rex, Race, Colonialism and the City, London, Routledge, 1973, and J. Rex and S. Tomlinson, Colonial

Immigrants in a EritfsN City, London, Routledge, 1979. 77. R. Pohl, 'Employment, Work and the Domestic Division of Labour', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, vol. 4, 1980,

pp. 1-16.

.

78. W. James, Pragmatism, London, Longman, 1907, p. 241

79. P. Scott, The Urban Land Nexus and the State, London, Pion, 1980, p.i. SU. As Harvey admits, 'there is much to do, and unfortunately not much theoretical guidance on how to do it . . .' (p. 374), and again, 'the circulation of capital transforms . . . certain social structures at the expense of others. It is hard to get a handle on exactly how' (emphasis mine) (p. 399): D. Harvey, The Limits to Capital, Oxford, Blackwell, 1982. SI, This differentiation between types of place is accepted in historical reconstruction. See in particular A. Briggs, Victorian Cities, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1969, I . Foster, Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution ., London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1974, and G.S. Jones, Outcast London, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971. U. Hannerz, Exploring the City, New York, ColumbiaPress, 1980, p. 100. Compare the interviews reported by P. Harrison, Inside the Inner City , Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1983, with those reported by J. Seabrook,

op. cit. E.J . Hobsbawm, Revolutionaries, London, Quartet Books, 1977, p. 220. R. Mellor, 'Manchester's inner city', in H. Newby (ed.), Restructuring

Capital, London. Macmillan, forthcoming. 86. The community activities listed in the local papers were sampled: those

recorded for Berkeley included 'cross-cultural couples meeting, black

women, black co-eds, middle-years groups, lesbian parents, transvestites/transsexuals rap, round dancing, and many more'. Those for a small 'wine country town' included 'two bridge clubs, model railroaders, 5 branch meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous, 2 square dances, senior citizens group etc', C.S. Fischer, To Dwell Among Friends, University of Chicago Press, 1982, p. 198.

Ibid., p. 196. Notable reviews include R. Sennett, The Fall of Public Man, New York, Alfred Knopf, 19775 L. Lofland, A World of Strangers, New

York, Basic Books, 1973, J. I-Iannerz, Exploring the City, New York, Columbia Press, 1980. See also the Urban Affairs Quarterly and Urban L i f e and Culture.

89. R. Friedland, Power and Crisis in the City, London, Macmillan, 1982.

49

Marxism and the Urban Question

90. D. Harvey, 'Class-monopoly rent, finance capital and the urban revolution', Regional Studies, vol. 8, 1974, p. 240. 91. H. Richardson, Urban Economics, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1971, p. 15. 92- F. Lamarche, Property development and the economic foundations of the urban question', in C. Pickvance, Urban Sociology, op. cit., p. 86. 93. D. Harvey, op. cit., p. 254. 94. Ibid.

95. P. Scott, op. cit., p.i. 96. D. Harvey, 'The urban process under capitalism' International JTournaZ of Urban and Regional Research, vol. 2, 1978, p. 114. 97. J. Lojkine, 'Contribution to a Marxist theory of capitalist urbanisation' in C. Pickvance, Urban Sociology, op. cit., p. 120.

98. Ibid., p. 133. 99. Lojkine's writing has been summarised by Harloe, op. cit. (1978), Saunders, op. cit. (1981), Lebas, op. cit. (1982 and 1983). In each case,

however, the summaries are brief. 100. See in particular A.P- Cohen, Belonging, Manchester University Press , 1982, and R. Frankenberg, Custom and Conflict in British Society, Manchester University Press, 1982. 101. H. Marcuse, op. cit., p. 41. _. 102. J. Lea, 'Discipline and capitalist development' in B. Fine et al., (e Capitalism and the Rate of Law, London, Hutchinson, 1979, p. 80. 103. F. Inglis, 'Nation and Community: a Landscape and Its Morality', Sociological Review, vol. 25, 1977, pp. 489-513. 104. R. Williams, The Country and the City, op. cit. For a discussion see R. Mellor, Images of the City, Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 1981. 105. R. Williams, Marxism and Literature, op. cit., p. 110. u

106. Ibid.

m

3 Marxism and Development

Sociology: Interpreting the

Impasse DAVID BOOTH After more than a decade of vigorous growth, the 'new', Marxistinfluenced sociology of development' has reached something of an impasse. At the theoretical level the most influential positions of the past are now strenuously rejected by many of their former adherents , few of whom pretend to see a clear way forward. Bold and heterodox proposals have not been lacking, but have failed to establish them-

selves as a widely accepted alternative, showing an equal and in some ways parallel inability to generate theoretically~informed research on fundamental issues of Third World development. Apparently promising discussions about basic concepts have proved inconclusive, with related empirical work becoming increasingly arid and repetitive. Large areas remain under-researched and untheorised; and even the strongest sections of the literature lack the cumulative quality that one expects of a healthy field of enquiry in the social sciences.

If this is true - and I think the above expresses in its essentials a wide and growing consensus among those working in the field - it is obviously serious matter. However, beyond the general feeling that something has gone wrong somewhere, there is little agreement as to how the various deficiencies of the new development sociology relate to each other and to the classical core of Marxist theory. There have been a number of useful attempts to analyse the weaknesses of the field in terms of the mistaken assumptions and methodology of specific radical perspectives on Third World development, most of them implying the potential superiority of a more rigorous approach within the Marxist tradition.; On the other hand, there has been a general reluctance to explore ways in which the current impasse

might be related to more generic and less tractable difficulties in the

50

Marxism and Development Sociology

51

inheritance of radical social theory such as those which have been drawn to our attention in different ways by Hindess and Hirst, Cohen and Giddens.3 This is the issue I wish to broach in this paper. What follows does not pretend to be even a rapid survey of the contribution of Marxism to recent sociological development literature. This chapter begins by reviewing a number of much-discussed topics: the debate about dependency and 'transitive underdevelopment' approaches, Bill Warren's deface of the 'classical' view of capitalist development, the 'modes of production' literature, and some of the general shortcomings of current research in the sociology

of development. It then goes on to propose a new way of looking at these familiar problems, adapting and applying recent insights not specifically concerned with development studies from a variety of sources. The burden of the concluding argument is that in a number of respects it is the intellectual framework of Marxism as such, and not the shortcomings of this or that particular perspective, that is to blame for the stagnation and lacunae in current sociological develop-

ment research. DEPENDENCY THEORY AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT: FIFTEEN YEARS AFTER The dominant feature on the horizon of radical development theory today is undoubtedly the decline and threatened, but never quite realised, disappearance of deepend e n y theory as a widely accepted

perspective. I refer here to the belief, influential in research on a

number of parts of the world, that the development problems and hence the social structures and politics of less developed countries are to be understood primarily in terms of the particular nature of their insertion into the international capitalist system, rather than in terms of largely domestic considerations Different writers in the dependency tradition have of course assigned different weights to the several constituent properties of 'dependent' or 'peripheral' status, emphasising respectively trade, finance, ownership of productive assets, technology or ideology and culture. There have also been sharply different views as to what precisely dependency theory is supposed to explain. However the central idea, that the critical causal factors for an understanding of the structure and dynamics of Third World social formations are related to a specific mode of insertion

into the international economic system, so that external relations are

52

Marxist Sociology Revisited

seen as determining the role of 'domestic' structural properties, not vice-versa, is common to all. Hence I believe it does make sense to try to encompass the dependency perspective, in the singular, with a single argument.5 Although perhaps they were never as generally influential as some of us once imagined, dependency and 'transitive underdevelopment conceptions of Third World reality have today, quite rightly, lost much of their pull. The views of Frank, Amir and Wallenstein, and to a lesser extent Sunkel, Cardoso and Quijano, have been vigorously

criticised from a number of angles over many years. It is now commonplace to observe that radical development theory has generated rather less cumulative empirical research and more sterile controversy than might have been hoped, and it is increasingly usual to lay this at the door of the dependency perspective I was comparatively slow to come around to this point of view but would now go somewhat further than most in drawing a balance sheet of the dependency phase of the new development sociology. It is now reasonably clear that the dependency position is vitiated by a variable combination of circular reasoning, empirical fallacy and a weak base in deductive theory. The circular logic of crucial arguments in the dependency armoury was recognised at an early date but has perhaps never been given sufficient prominence.8 The dependency view of development is

fatally iiawed on logical grounds at precisely the point where it seems strongest empirically - for example in Frank's early historical sketch of the economic history of Latin America Over the years Frank's early studies have been much maligned as representing an unusually vulgar or simplistic variant of the dependency position, yet they contain one of the very few attempts in the primary dependency literature to formulate a theory in the sense of a logically-interrelated set of general propositions, and to derive and test empirical generalisations on the basis of research. Thus it is not perverse to take as a leading case in point here Frank's 1966 validation of the dependency position, the more so since in broad terms it exemplifies perfectly a form of argument still in common use. Frank's main theoretical proposition asserted: 'contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now developed metropolitan countries'. This generated the hypothesis that 'the satellites experience their greatest

economic development and especially their most classically capitalist

Marxism and Development Sociology

53

industrial development if and when their ties to their metropolis are weakest'. Several sorts of historical and comparative evidence were invoked in support of this proposition." Today there are grounds for questioning some of the factual elements in Frank's proof, notably improved evidence on the timing of the first stages of industrialisation in some of the larger Latin American economies." Nevertheless the crucial flaw remains the definition of 'development' (and hence 'underdevelopment') which was smuggled into the statement of the hypothesis, with the result that the proposition becomes tautologically true, rendering the historical material illustrative rather than corroborative. In the hypoth-

esis and the accompanying text satisfactory development is identified as 'self-sustaining' or 'autonomous' and (hence'?) industrial growth, this is the meaning attached to 'classically capitalist' development. But this amounts to saying that it is non-satellite (or to use the language subsequently adopted, non-dependent) development. Hence the empirical demonstration that in historical fact satisfactory development occurs only to the extent that metropolis-satellite, or dependency, links are broken or weakened, is nothing of the kind, but an exercise in tautology." This argument or something rather similar has been forcefully advanced by Smith with reference to the work of Saris Amir, and Warren has pointed to the element of logical circularity in Dos Santos's famous attempt to define 'dependence'.13 The basic critique applies well to Rodney's essay on African underdevelopment and to several other influential studies of dependency and alternative development paths for Third-World regions.1" Circular, that is tautological, reasoning is central to dependency

theory and to those variants of Marxist development theory which operate within a dependency framework; but it is perhaps not an intrinsic characteristic, and at any rate there is more to the tradition than circular arguments about autonomous and non-autonomous economic growth. Many Latin American dependency writers were concerned from the beginning not with structural underdevelopment or dependency conceived in these broad and problematic terms, but with more specific economic and social problems held to be characteristic of the latest phase in Latin America's relations with international capitalism." Focusing on the one hand on patterns of deteriorating income distribution, social 'marginalisation' and authoritarian politics, and on the other on the role of multinationals,

inappropriate technology and/or cultural alienation, this type of

54

Marxist Sociology Revisited

dependency proposition lends itself less readily to tautologous presentation. At least in principle it is capable of being formulated as a set of substantive hypotheses linking proposed causal factors to independently identified effects. To recognise the existence of such hypotheses is, however, by no means to accept them. There remains the very live issue of whether they can be validated empirically, that is whether marginalisation and related processes ,can be shown to be the result of factors of 'depend deuce' such as the colonisation of the most dynamic sectors of the economy by transnational capital, as opposed to other kinds of factors suggested by other kinds of development thinking. In the

original dependency literature the answer to this question tended to be presented as self-evident on the basis of a small range of broadly similar national experiences, frequently those of the larger Latin American countries. In other words no systematic effort was made to distinguish the effects of transnationalisation per se from those of the local social and political context, the prevailing economic policy regime and so on.16 More recently there has been a trend towards the use of cross-national statistical testing to vindicate dependency propositions. However despite protestations to the contrary the bulk of this work has not escaped from the empiricism of the original dependency formulations, so that the conditions for drawing valid causal inferences from statistical analyses have not usually been net." Systematic and theoretically-informed comparative analysis has in contrast seldom been employed by those most sympathetic to the

dependency viewpoint, and the results of such exercises have typically proved unfavorable to the standard dependency claims." The required evidence is of course patchy. Nevertheless the essays

by Lall and Weisskopf have made effective use of comparative analysis to distinguish the effects of dependence (variously defined)

from those of capitalism in general and/or from those of particular policy-patterns or institutional arrangements. Drawing on a very wide range of empirical sources, Morawetz has concluded that 'fastgrowing, market-oriented countries', that is successful 'dependent developers', include both cases where the income share of the poor-

est has declined and a group of countries (conspicuously excluding Latin American ones) whose record by this criterion has not been at all bad. Morawetz suggests the working hypothesis (which would seem to be strongly supported by the historical record of certain East Asian countries) that what determines the trend is the degree of

inequality at the outset."

Marxism and Development Sociology

55

Dependency Marxism would seem, then, to be logically flawed where it appears at first sight to square well with empirical evidence, and empirically very questionable where it is logically sound. This ought not to be surprising, because, additionally, writers in the dependency tradition have typically worked from an extraordinarily weak base in deductive economic theory. A number of critics have made much of the fact that dependency and underdevelopment theory is not rooted in a rigorous application of Marxist economic theory," but unless one lives in a thoroughly Manichean world of proletarian truth and bourgeois error, the point is surely that it is not rooted in any rigorous body of deductive-type theory. This is not to say there are no economic ideas behind dependency theory, but dependency writers tend to be either almost literally the slaves of defunct economists or amateurish and uncritical consumers of economic literature.

Dependency theory was the child of its time in both a passive and an active sense. Dependency writers assumed unquestioningly either one or both of the theories influential for a short time in the 1960s to the effect that participation in world trade was likely to be secularly impoverishing for less developed countries (qua primary producers, or as low-wage areas). This remained the case even after these theories were subjected to devastating criticism and academic support for them was reduced to a rump inside certain international bureaucracies." Other concepts which passed rapidly out of vogue after the mid-sixties but were permanently absorbed into the dependency lexicon, include the target notion of 'rapid and self-sustaining growth' and the belief that shortages of local savings and capital (or 'surplus') are among the critical obstacles to development in the typical Third World country." Dependency also took over and transformed in a more active way the trend in nationalist thinking - not only in Latin America in the late 1950s and the 19605 towards the view that the causes of the apparently multiplying difficulties of the national development process were located 'outside' rather than 'inside' the national society. The crucial juncture came with the realisation, first in Latin America and East Asia, later elsewhere, that industrialisation by import substitution was deepening rather than resolving serious social inequities and balance-of-payrnents problems. Careful studies of various theoretical and ideological complexions were eventually to appear which documented analytically and empirically the ways in which these problems could be seen to be inherent in the ISI policy .--

56

Marxist Sociology Revfisited

package." These studies agreed in indicting ISI policies, or their more extreme manifestations, as sufficient causes of the regressive income-distribution trends and external vulnerability (and in this special sense dependency) observed in many semi-industrialised countries. The odd unusually sophisticated defender of the dependency approach has tried, not very convincingly, to show that dependency theory can subsume such insights. But there really is not much doubt that mainstream 1960s dependency theorists were taken in by a perfectly ordinary spurious correlation. Advanced import substitution was associated with an invasion of manufacturing multinationals, growing external vulnerability and regressive trends in

employment and income distribution. Plausibly but wrongly the last two things were laid at the door of the first.25 For a variety of reasons this was a mistake most easily committed in Latin America, and later easily transported to Africa. We may reasonably say, in sum, that the dependency position has been shown to be untenable on a combination of logical, empirical and theoretical grounds." Something of the kind is increasingly recognised even, and in some respects particularly, among scholars

who contributed significantly to the dependency inspired critiques of the older development literature. Vigorous rebuttals of the dependency approach have come from scholars whose previous work placed them squarely within that tradition. And yet the change in the intellectual scene is in some ways more apparent than real. Too often, I would argue, dependency views have been renounced on the basis of superficial critiques directed at particular authors; Frank has been the butt of many such attacks. Other critics, moved by an understandable but to my mind spurious desire not to throw out the baby with the bathwater, have contented themselves with partial, incomplete accounts of what is wrong with dependency theory even though the full picture is agreed and understood. I have in mind here the tendency to rely on conceptual critiques when only a combination of arguments of the type outlined above will lay to rest the more serious claims of the dependency point of view. I interpret this as the product partly of a lingering Althusserian theoreticism, and partly of a wish not to concede that dependency's traditional critics from the intellectual and political right have been in some sense vindicated- Either way, the effect is that for all their insight on particular aspects, these critiques stop short of the point of no return."

Marxism and Development Sociology

57

The same critics and others have made strenuous efforts to theorise away the relationship between dependency-type thinking and the main tradition of twentieth century Marxism, and this too has helped to weaken the impact of their arguments. While even on a reasonably inclusive definition the 'dependency perspective' is obviously at variance with the theoretical core of classical Marxism, it has clearly had a certain place in Marxist thought not just since Lenin but since Marx himself. There is now a good deal of published argument to this effect. Mori has pointed out on the basis of a valuable re-reading of Marx's writings on India, Ireland and Poland, that Marx did not just abandon his much-quoted early views on the destructive-but-also-

regenerative consequences of British free trade, late in life he came to adopt an almost diametrically opposed position, albeit still in relation to particular countries." Other recent literature suggests that the ambiguity in Lenin's formulations on the impact of imperialism on the productive forces in the colonies was cleared up and in a way which clearly anticipated contemporary theoretical developments, at a relatively early stage in the history of the Third International." Dependency-type positions thus have a long history within the Marxist tradition. Such theories have also had their Marxist critics but, to be blunt, if there is a case to be made for the view that dependency theory represents merely an intrusion of bourgeois nationalism into Marxist thought, then some weighty figures have to be held co-responsible along with Amir, Cardoso and Frank, Granted this, framing a critique of dependency theory in terms of a simple opposition between the latter and Marxism has two unfortunate effects. One is that to the unwary it can easily seem that the criticisms only affect a rather narrow circle of mainly Latin American writers

specifically identified with the concept of dependence, so that essentially similar ideas framed in terms of concepts such as imperialism, neocolonialism or 'the international law of value' remain perfectly acceptable. Second and perhaps more importantly, the current stress on the unMarxist character of dependency theory makes it difficult to pursue what is surely now the most important question: why, if empirically wrong and theoretically wrongheaded, the dependency perspective has such an enduring presence in the broad Marxist tradition. Altogether the critics have been far stronger at detecting the weaknesses in dependency reasoning than in explaining how these mistakes came to be made, hence they have generally failed to

58

Marxist Sociology Revisited

indicate how we should proceed if we are to avoid falling into similar traps again. One reason is that with significantly partial exceptions (Warren and Phillips)3° they have been unprepared to grasp the nettle of Marxism's political, and especially its metatheoretical, interest in theoretical constructions of a certain kind the topic to which we turn later in this paper. Whether because of these limitations of the theoretical debate or for more powerful reasons of the kind discussed below, dependency-

. -

type assumptions have a strong ongoing presence in the radical development literature. The journals which have sponsored the leading work in the new development sociology continue to publish a

steady How of (often factually informative) concrete studies of the supposed results of imperialism/dependence in particular areas of the Third World, which effectively swamp the occasional unmuddled anti-dependency piece. Major foci of empirical work in the sociology of development, such as the formation of national bourgeoisies and working classes, have continued to be dominated by false problems and schematic tendencies derived from dependency Marxism, as is now beginning to be recognised. In alliance with a form of Marxian state theory that scarcely anybody now defends, dependency assumptions are a pervasive influence on studies of politics including the politics of meaningful reform - in major developing countries, contributing to the obfuscation of real political choices in a number of areas." These contradictions between the ground which has been covered in theory and the actual practice of development sociology is a striking and disturbing feature of the present state of the field.

WARREN'S CHALLENGE: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES Similarly unsatisfactory is the way the literature has responded, or failed to respond, to the revival of radically anti-dependency Marxism in the work of Bill Warren and others.34 Warren has provided what is arguably the most thorough and courageous critique of the dependency Marxist viewpoint. He also goes some way towards identifying the political 'uses' of dependency Marxism and thus explaining in part its persistent attractions in some quarters." But although his position is beginning to be accorded a grudging respect

on this basis, the full implications are far from having been grasped.

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Marxism and Development Sociology

This should not be interpreted as an endorsement of Warren's approach. On the contrary I think there are solid reasons why even those like the present writer who think Warren's main theses are supported by the evidence, should be unenthusiastic about embracing them as an alternative framework. Interest here focuses on the arguments in the second half of the book regarding the effects of colonialism

and of the post-colonial

international

system on the

development of the productive forces in Third World countries. These are sumrnarised as follows: 1. 'Contrary to current Marxist views, empirical evidence suggests that the prospects for successful capitalist development in many underdeveloped countries are quite favorable

..

2. '[T]he period since the end of the Second World War has witnessed a major surge in capitalist social relations and productive forces in the Third World.' 3. 'Direct colonialism, far from having retarded or distorted indigenous capitalist development that might otherwise have occurred, acted as a powerful engine of progressive social change . . .'. 4. 'Insofar as there are obstacles to [capitalist] development, they originate not in current relationships between imperialism and the Third World, but in the internal contradictions of the Third World itself." 5. 'The overall, net effect of the policy of "imperialist" countries and the general economic relations of these countries with the under~ developed countries actually f a v o r s the industrialization and general economic development of the latter." 6. 'Within a context of growing economic interdependence, the ties of "dependence" (or subordination) binding the Third World and

the imperialist world have been and are being markedly loosened with the rise of indigenous capitalisms . .

. 3 6

I do not suggest that these propositions, even when elaborated as they are in the original text, are unproblematic. However, Warren's main assertions are well informed and well supported, and not open to the kinds of objections which have been most commonly raised." Although perhaps propositions 3 and 4 remain controversial, much of what Warren has to say is rather standard stuff in development economics, and the fact that it was necessary to insist so much on these points says something about the way left-tending social scien-

tists and activists have seen fit to close their minds to pertinent

60

Marxist Sociology Revisited

mainstream literature. Overall, it would not be easy to establish that any of his carefully-worded propositions are actually wrong. Even while stressing this aspect, however, it is hard not to be struck by a certain perversity in the way Warren's theses organise the evidence, and it is difficult to dismiss the feeling that while what he has said is true it is in a certain sense not the whole truth. Specifically , his views on the current prospects and problems of Third World development are subject to important non-dependency objections centric on the level and mode of abstraction which is employed. The

basic feature is a single-minded and unremitting concentration on the general, intrinsic and mainly economic qualities and effects of development understood as the unfolding or diffusion of the capitalist mode of production. This (theoretically determined) approach has several consequences or corollaries. First, in examining the postwar economic experience of the less developed world Warren frequently acknowledges variations in the general pattern of development progress, but consistently downplays them. There is an almost explicit theoretical denial of the possibility

of important systematic variations within the general pattern," The book does not claim that the surge in the forces of production since the war has affected all areas of the Third World equally, and prospects are said to be favourable only in 'many' underdeveloped countries. This is probably correct but certainly insufficient. The past performance of different regions and countries of the less developed world has been notoriously uneven, and by and large the poorest

countries have done least well. It is tragically the case that the prospects for the next decades vary between countries from excellent (maintenance of GDP growth rates of 8-12 per cent per year) to

disastrous (negative growth in per capita if not absolute terms). Warren's method of argument takes us from the indiscriminate pessimism of the dependency view of the world to a barely less m i l e adding generalised optimism. Worse, it distracts attention from some of the most deplorable aspects of the contemporary situation, and hence from the exploration of the underlying causes." As a rule, secondly, specific national policy regimes and institutional arrangements get extremely short shrift in Warren's treatment of the variations in performance between countries. This is a feature of his discussion of income distribution (the interesting experience of post-war Taiwan is mentioned only to subsume it within a general vision in which institutions and policies are entirely subordinate to

the stage of the development process which has been reached) and it

Marxism and Development Sociology

I

61

is also true more generally. Obviously there are various both positive and negative features of the Third World development experience which can be said to be inherent in capitalist (if not all) development. But equally clearly, there are achievements and failures which must be laid squarely at the door of governments and their policies. Warren recognises this but is most unwilling to accept its implications. On the last three pages of the book he tells us of 'major policy blunders' which resulted in a 'squandering of many of the benefits of Third World postwar economic development', a different set of policies 'would have permitted the promotion of a more efficient and humane capitalist development' than actually occurred. But this, we are assured, 'has failed to halt the gathering momentum of capitalist advance', so the discussion of policy errors appears merely as a gloss on the main theme, an illustration of the silliness of failing to recognise capitalist development when it occurs." Warren's approach, I am suggesting, is unhelpful on the role of national policy regimes and institutional arrangements. For related reasons, thirdly and fourthly, it has difficulty dealing with direct

colonialism and its aftermath, and generates a very unsatisfactory treatment of nationalism and 'the national question'. In both areas the problems arise from the attempt to understand the development of national social formations relying entirely on a general concept of capitalism and its dynamics. An unsentimental reexamination of the effects of capitalist colonialism in Africa and elsewhere was certainly called for, and in the context of the book Warren was no doubt right to emphasise the various ways in which the changes effected by colonialism were necessary conditions for what has been achieved since. Yet in the

book colonialism is presented in such a way as to make one wonder why independence movements should have arisen at all, and when decolonisation comes under discussion, the benefits of this "stage" are emphasised in a way which could not have been anticipated from the discussion of colonialism." The trouble with Warren's account is not that in the everyday sense it lacks 'balance' but that is onedimensional in a way which eventually generates incoherence. The appreciations about colonialism may not be grosse mode mistaken but they are overgeneralised and economistic. The fixation on cape talist development, conceived as a unitary process," leads to a neglect of features which were less than general but nonetheless rather significant aspects of the process (the dispossession of African

peasantries, forced labour, racial segregation and so on) and of

62

Marxist Sociology ReWsired

causal factors ranging from colonial development policies to the social and cultural backgrounds of the different national groups involved.

The same kind of economism is behind Warren's position on the national question. Apart from his oddly inconsistent admiration for the way post-Independence regimes have used their bargaining power to promote national capitalisms, Warren is wholly and unreservedly opposed to nationalism and, apparently, to the right of nations to self-determination. In his analysis such a position seems to be a necessary counterpart or corollary i i critique imperialism' as this term has been understood in Marxist circles since

the 1920s. But this is a mistake. One source of the confusion is the fact that historically the 'Leninist world view' , the notion that imperialisrn/dependency is responsible for backwardness in the less developed world, entered Marxist discussions 'through' the national question. The concept of the (mainly political and cultural) oppression of nations by other nations was in effect extended to include the idea of a specifically economic oppression inherent in capitalist colon alism and/or the world market." But to question the latter does not necessarily mean abandoning the whole idea of national oppression here Warren throws out the baby with the bathwater, which unfortunately weakens his case against those other Marxists who are slaves to dependency mythology but have correctly grasped the progressive thrust of certain nationalisms. In sum, Warren's approach is limiting in a series of connected ways, not because the authors and positions he criticises are after all right, but because of the nature of the theoretical framework he offers in their place. The capitalist mode of production and its ...-

dynamics (including 'uneven development.') are offered as sufficiently explaining both the ugly and the attractive faces of development in the Third World today and in the recent past: both aspects are simply a function of normal capitalist development. But important variations within the general pattern are certainly not sufficiently explained by differences in the evolution or spread of capitalist social relations. Moreover, there is much that is of interest and importance in the contemporary experience of the less developed countries which escapes the attention of this framework more or less entirely.44 This makes it virtually unusable as a framework for social science research, let alone politics or policy formation. In the light of the above comments the fact that the demise of

dependency theory has not led to the emergence of a flourishing

Marxism and Development Sociology

63

Warrenite or 'classical-Marxist' development sociology," is neither surprising nor particularly regrettable. What is to be regretted is that we have not yet entered a post-Warren era in sociological development research. There is a widespread sense of the unhelpfulness of pursuing the dependency-versus-Warren debate any further, and yet one feels the sources of Warren's 'extremism' have not been properly grasped or the implications thought through. Rather as in the previously considered case of the critique of dependency theory, the response to Warren has been in the first place overpersonalised and

then stronger on perceiving theoretical weaknesses than on grasping the nettle of metatheory - the reasons why a given intellectual tradition articulates problems for theory in the way that it does. In summary, while the need to move on from the type of generalised controversy represented by Warren versus dependency is now obvi~ ous and widely accepted, there is as yet little real understanding of what this might entail.

THE MODE OF PRODUCTION DEBATE: IMPASSE WITHIN AN IMPASSE It may well be thought that the necessary theoretical basis for a development sociology which cuts across the simplistic polarities of the 1970s already exists in the form of the large and now quite diverse literature on subordinate modes of production, 'forms of exploitation' and the formal subsumption of l a b o r under capital.46 After all it has been over a decade since the debate prompted by Laclau's seminal article on 'Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America','*7

which was itself widely regarded as an important step beyond the dependency problematic- Since then research on subordinate forms of production has been one of the most vigorous areas of work in the sociology of development. Arguably Frank's transitive underdevelopment theory and Warren's. evolutionary mode of production theory are unrepresentative polar positions about which it is no longer necessary to concern ourselves. There is some truth in this, in my view, but as a comment on the empirical strengths of the work in this area, not on its theoretical basis. The growing aridity and final inconclusiveness of the 'mode of production debate' is now widely acknowledged. Careful observers also admit that the attempt to resuscitate the concept of mode of

production and its associated categories has produced a crop of

64

Marxzbrt Sociology Revisited

seemingly unresolvable conceptual problems." But what the debate has served to establish most sharply, I would argue, is the impossibility of steering a middle course between dependency and the so-called 'classical' (Warren) position using the concepts of theoretical Marxism. From a theoretical point of view there have been three outstanding contributions to the mode of production debate. Each has contributed important clarifications, so that the level of general understanding of the issues involved in worldng with the central concepts is now very high by the standards of the recent past. Each also represents in a certain sense a facet of the truth from the point of view of the rigorous application of classical Marxist concepts to the purposes of development theory. But because, in addition, it has proved to be the case that the positions adopted are mutually exclusive, the controversy has not led to the progressive resolution of the outstanding issues. Rather it has established that the concept of mode of production is subject to multiple and in practice contradictory theoretical requirements which make it incapable of consistent application to the task of illuminating world development since the 16th century. Laclau argued convincingly that the 'world capitalist system' of Frank's early studies confused the realms of production and exchange, giving in effect causal primacy to the latter. This was not only at variance with Marx's method in which circulation is subordinate to the process of production, but it produced a theory of underdevelopment which could not account for certain important aspects of modern world history and was in a general sense lacking in explanatory power. Recognising that capitalism and feudalism are distinguished by their different relations of production, rather than in the sphere of exchange, we can admit the fundamental concept that the world

economic system has been marked since the 17th century (not the 6th) by the combination (or as later writers were to say, articulation) of elements belonging to different modes of production with precapitalist social relations of production being restructured but not eliminated by the intrusion of merchant capital. .L

Laclau's analysis, however, was quite weak where its claims were boldest. The propensity of capitalist expansion in certain times and places to promote the reinforcement and even restoration of precapitalist relations in agriculture was attributed not to such factors as the local dynamics of labour supply and class struggle, but to the needs of capital in the metropolitan countries understood in terms of a variant of the Marx-Bukharin-Lenin theory of capital exports to backward

regions." Leaving aside the scientific status of the parts of Marx's

Marxism and Development Sociology

65

economic theory to which the latter belongs,5° this account was subject to the well~worn objection that it did not and probably could not specify the mechanisms by which what capital 'needed' was translated into reality at the local level. In this sense the explanatory power of the alternative theory of underdevelopment rested largely on bluff. The claim that the theory was rooted in production relations, understood in terms of groups of producers and non-producers and their struggles, was also illusory. On the other hand, Laclau undoubtedly detected a major theme in Marx and drew attention once again to the point made in the 1950s by Dobb, that comparative economic and social history provides many suggestions as to the correctness of a 'productionist' approach to conceptualising transitions to capitalism?" In opposition to this view , there remain a few Marxist scholars who take an unrepentantly 'circulationist' position in the tradition of Sweezy's 19503 contributions." In general, however, the basic point has been well taken , and what has drawn the attention of critics has been the formalism' of Laclau's critique of Frank, and his only partial grasp of Marx's theory of modes of production and the transitions between them. The writings of Ala vi and Banaji in particular have drawn attention to another aspect of the role of capitalism in the periphery, and to another major theme in Marx. The common starting point of the authors who have contributed to this second major focus of the debate is that it is formalistic and wrong to characterise the social relations resulting from colonial imposition in Asia, Latin America and elsewhere as feudal, and in this sense non-capitalist. In Marx, it is argued, the feudal mode of production is a system of localised production and appropriation with

a specific place in a whole epoch of European history. This is in contrast with the experiences of areas like north-eastern Europe in the 16th century and after, and parts of Latin America in the late 19th

century, where feudal-type tenancies were introduced in response to the stimulus of long-distance trade. The latter 'forms are typical of what happened in the territories of direct colonialism, which represents a distinct epochal reality.5"! What makes it impossible to dismiss this argument as a simple resurgence of unMarxist 'circulationism' is the accompanying critique ,of Laclau's understanding of the concept of mode of production.

Ala vi stresses 'the inadequacy of any conception of the "mode of production" that is premised narrowly on sets of relationships that

are arbitrarily assigned to the "structure", ignoring the totality', for

66

Marxist Sociology Revisited

Marx the totality was fundamental. 55 To put it another way, in Marx the capitalist mode of production (the only mode about which he wrote extensively) was not just 'an articulated combination of relations and forces of production',5° but also, or instead, 'a definite totality of historical laws of motion'. Thus: As modes of production are only a definite totality of historical laws of motion, relations of production thus become a function of the given mode of production. The character of any definite type of production relations, is, in short, impossible to determine until these laws of motion are themselves deter1nined.57 This explains some references in Marx and in subsequent Marxist analysis to the presence of various 'relations of exploitation' other than wage labour in production systems dominated by capital. It also explains why in Marx modes of production are characterisations of whole epochs, and why Marx leaves us in no doubt that crises of the transition apart, only one mode of production can prevail in any one place at any single time. To the extent that this interpretation is correct, it becomes absurd in Marxist terms to talk about combinations of (plural) modes o f production as a permanent feature of Third World social formations. The issue becomes a double one: first, which are the .forms of exploitation of labour which are being employed, and, second and above all, what are the 'laws of motion' under which these are subsumed? Most of the writers who have posed the matter in this way have had recourse, at least in the first instance, to a 'colonial mode Of production', a construction designed to admit both that a variety of

relations other than that of wage-labour typified the periphery in the colonial era and that these 'forms of exploitation' had their raison d'étre in a totality embracing the metropolitan economy. However the colonial mode idea was short-lived." The authors of the concept were among the first to admit that even at a common-sense level it is full of holes. Ala vi concedes that there is a 'highly problematic area' relating to - in my words rather than his - whether the 'colonial mode of production' leaves any room for capitalism proper, since on the criteria established by this liters § metropolitan economy cannot be involved in both. An additional question-mark hangs over whether and why a new (posts or neo-colonial) mode should be said to intervene as a

consequence of the achievement of administrative Independence by ex-colonial territories."

Marxism and Development Sociology

67

At a more fundamental level, the colonial mode concept has proved unstable. Despite the strong emphasis placed on the specification of laws of motion as the means of conceptualising a mode of production, what the 'laws' of the colonial mode are, and what if anything distinguishes them from the 'laws' established by Marx for capitalism, has not been explained beyond the assertion that whereas the latter rapidly expand the forces of production, the former do not.60 At the same time it has been impossible to ignore two aspects of Marx's method in this area: on the one hand the insistence on the necessity of uncovering laws of motion, and on the other hand the belief that the laws of motion of a specific mode arise from and are in some sense determined by the character of the prevailing combination of relations and forces of production. In this regard different authors have moved in different, and indeed opposite, directions. Ala vi represents a tendency to allow a strict understanding of these terms to go hang, in favour of the empirical investigation of the circuits of capital and forms of labour recruitment of what comes to be called colonial capitalism or peripheral capitalism. This tendency now occupies the murky middle-ground between classical Frank and Laclau, and is barely distinguishable in theoretical terms from what is today the position of Frank himself and Samir Airlin.61 In this literature Marx's now famous distinction between the merely formal ..

... . .

subsumption of the labour process under capital and the 'real' sub-

sumption characteristic of 'the specifically capitalist mode of production in its developed form' is increasingly used to buttress the concept of peripheral capitalism, But this idea too is unstable; it is also applied (following Marx literally) in a more evolutionary spirit, so that formal subsumption represents a more or less extended moment in the transition to capitalism. Some have interpreted this sort of conceptual indeterminacy as a legacy of the ideological character of dependency/underdeveloprnent theory. At least in part, however, this is to confuse cause and consequence. I believe Ala vi and company have cast themselves back into the arms of Frank, so to speak, because only one other step seems conceptually allowable: it is either this or take the course apparently preferred by Banaji and revert to the conception of the capitalist mode of production and its relation to precapitalisrn which is expressed with different emphases and on different terrains by Warren and Brenner.64 Brenner's article is deservedly famous not only for its fascinating

demolition of the circulationist interpretation of the history of uneven development in the early modern world, but also for its lucid

68

Marxist Sociology Revisited

exposition of the Marxian view of capitalism. The link between the emergence of a system of free wage l a b o r and competition between capitals on the one hand, and the dynamic transformative characteristics of modern capitalism on the other, is well explained and convincingly supported on the broad canvas of modern world history . There is much to be said for this 'classic' view of matters. But for all its brilliance, Brenner's piece does not give us what many people have looked for in the mode of production literature, namely a genuine third position in the debate over colonial and contemporary development in the Third World. Brenner's theory is limited in one rather obvious way: it tells us

nothing about the contemporary, post-Independence Third World, or indeed about anything much subsequent to the decline of feudalism and slavery (the dating of which is in any case unclear). 65 The vision of capitalist development, once that process is under way, is broadly optimistic, at least as far as the forces of production and the improvement of the productivity of human labour are concerned, but it is also highly unspecific.66 In this sense it does not by itself offer a comprehensive alternative to dependency and colonial-mode theories. Brenner's contribution is best treated as an interesting, and across a narrow historical field, thoroughly convincing footnote to the only real alternative to dependency within Marxism: the one espoused by Warren. The relevance of Brenner's thesis is actually even narrower, and its critical impact on dependency/world-systems work weaker, than appears at first sight. It is striking that Brenner barely discusses the phenomenon of colonialism. The issue is taken to be between those who emphasis external, trade-related causes of development and

underdevelopment, and those who see that the decisive determinants are internal social relations, class struggles and systems of power. In fact, of course, the case for viewing underdevelopment as an exter-

nally imposed condition rests in part on a particular view of the effects of direct colonialism and other non-economic relations be-

tween nations and territories. In this context it is often perfectly correct to see domestic class structure as derivative of inter-societal relations: colonial powers dramatically transformed the social and economic fabrics of the places they colonised, and where in conformity with Brenner's thesis, mere commerce proved insuMcient to break down pre-capitalist social relations, they took whatever other steps were necessary- To the extent that they have been among those

drawing attention to this aspect of the history of the Third World,

Marxism and Development Sociology

69

dependency theorists can hardly be accused of economic determinism and 'neo-Smithianism', in fact the boot of economism would seem to be on the other foot, in a sense which recalls our discussion of Warren above. Brenner's critique thus seems to be doubly limited, to a particular historical period, and to the historically rather special case of pure trade. To sum up the discussion in this section, it has not proved possible to bring the mode of production controversy to a satisfactory close. Wolpe's perceptive article notwithstanding," the obstacles to an adequate theory of articulation are not so insubstantial as to yield to some simple conceptual innovation (such as the distinction between 'restricted' and 'extended' concepts of mode of production) useful as such things

may J

be for cxpogitional

.

.' DUTDOSBS.

The truth of the

matter is that the debate has defined several positions which are for different reasons irreconcilable with Marxist theoretical norms, and none which are genuinely independent of the theoretical poles of dependency and Warrenism. All roads lead to one or other of the basic variants of Marxist development theory, and the mode of production concept as such is no guarantee against either.

PEASANTS AND THE POOR: TRANSITION, ARTICULATION, SUBSUMPTION

Is this assessment borne out by a consideration of the empirical work ani n 'middle-range' theoretical literature in the same tradition? I think so. My argument here is that the attempt to transcend both 'classical' Marxism and dependency via the focus on subordinate

modes of production/forms of exploitation/degrees of subsumption of

labour under capital has generated - or at any rate has been assoc c i t e d with - more and better empirical research. Much of this work is of lasting interest, quantitatively it is far more significant than what

was produced in direct response to the dependency 'boom' of the early 1970s, and in sophistication it compares favorably with the earlier modernisation/acculturation literature of the 1950s and 1960s. However the specifically Marxist theoretical input has not been a source of strength for this branch of the new development sociology. For - even leaving aside the implications of the modes debate proper - the research-based articulation literature has produced its own crop of unnecessary theoretical tangles.

Articulation-of-modes and related concepts have been influential

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Marxist Sociology Revisited

in two major empirical fields, the study of peasants and trends in rural social structure, and research on the 'informal sector' and its relations with large-scale enterprise in urban centres. In the former field attention has focused on explaining the incompleteness of the agrarian "transition" expected by classical Marxist writers and the variety of ways in which peasant enterprise survives within a global capitalist context-" In urban settings the main effort has been directed towards a theoretical renewal of the concept of petty commodity production with a view to providing an adequate explanation of the persistence of non-traditional small-scale economic activities in the 'informal sector'.69

While taking their initial bearings from Laclau, researchers in these fields have also incorporated elements of theory derived from Marx through Meillassoux, Rey and others. This has permitted them to dispense with the rather cumbersome apparatus of export-ofcapital theory, and to employ the seemingly simpler and more attractive language of production and reproduction. Thus in the literature on 'peasantisation' a central notion has been that the capitalist mode of production in the periphery is endowed with the capacity to sustain partially transformed pre-capitalist relations of production or forms of labour process which ensure a supply of l a b o r power to the former sector at less than its value, that is less than its full cost of reproduction. Here the theorisation of the persistence of peasant enterprise involves a notion of exploitation through unequal exchange (in value terms) between sectors comprising different scales and types of enterprise. A more general thesis, spanning both the rural and the urban research, has been that small-scale enterprises supply products (goods or services) to the

capitalist sector at less than their value. In either case the contention is that the pattern of small-enterprise development is explained in a more satisfactory and satisfying way by an approach which reveals such mechanisms than by more conventional types of analysis which do n o t " One difficulty in assessing the proposition that the peasant or informal sector 'subsidises' the formal sector via output and other prices is that it is often expressed in an eclectic language which moves between two theoretically very different conceptualisations of the exploitative relationship at issue. The one is neoclassical, involving

the yardstick of perfect competition and centring on allocative efficiency and unequal market power. The other involves Marxian

values and prices. It is, however, on the validity of the second type of

Marxism and Development Sociology

71

concept, stripped of 'common sense' reformulations derived from the first, that the usefulness of this theoretical framework must be judged." To the extent this is so, there would seem to be three major problems. The first and perhaps the most important has to do with a certain theoretical arbitrariness in the specification of the mechanism of super~exploitation or unequal exchange. What, we may legitimately ask, is the yardstick of equivalent exchange against which exchanges between the small-scale and capitalist sectors are judged to be unequal? Take the case where the former supplies labour power to the latter. Here the wages paid to, say, migrant laborers from areas of peasant agriculture are deemed to be below the value of the labour power supplied on the implicit or explicit basis that its cost of reproduction is given by what it would have cost to reproduce it wholly within the capitalist sector, or under pure capitalism. In other words, exchanges within social formations with combinations of modes or forms of production are judged against an ideal type of purely capitalist exchange representing (it might be argued) the

-

future historical pattern in the social formation in question. This offends against one's sense of history and does not seem to have any warrant within Marxist theory. An identical arbitrariness is involved when products rather than l a b o r power are said to be supplied below their value. The goods or services of the small-scale sector sell for less than their value because , it is maintained, the 'wages' imputed to the members of the enterprise or household are below what they would earn producing the same output under capitalist conditions. The appeal to an abstract standard of equivalence representing a more 'advanced' historical

pattern is, again, unwarranted." In addition to being arbitrary, however, the hypothesis that smallscale enterprise subsidises the capitalist sector through unequal exchange is also logically insufficient to explain what it is supposed to explain, that is the persistence of pre- or non-capitalist production

relations in social formations where the capitalist mode is indisputably dominant. The functionalist logic of Laclau's presentation is retained without significant modification. The empirical literature has taken no more seriously than the original theoretical work the necessity of specifying the 'feedback' mechanisms whose existence is asserted. To this extent the aura of explanatory significance which tends to surround statements about the contribution of petty

modity production to capital accumulation is based on bluff.73

coni-

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Marxist Sociology Revisited

Finally, such arguments are also superfluous. If it were the case that important facts about small-scale economic activities in the Third World could not be satisfactorily accounted for in any other way, there might be grounds for overlooking a measure of theoretical arbitrariness or logical insufficiency. However, this is not the case. Researchers on the ground generally have no difficulty in explaining why particular activities remain the preserve of small-scale enterprise and others are largely taken over by large capitalist organisations. It is increasingly clear that these patterns are highly sector-specific and non-generalisable, and that the topic would repay a lot more detailed empirical research." Nevertheless once a pattern has been detected, explaining it would seen to be conceptually quite straightforward: enterprises of different types move in and out of particular activities in line with expectations of profit and risk, given the prevailing

structure of costs, the importance of scale economies and so $n.75 The possibility of super-exploitation in the sense discussed here does not enter into any of these decisions, and for the purposes of explaining actual behavior we have no need of so complicated a hypothesis. The empirical articulation-of-modes literature, then, contains nothing which is in theoretical terms fresh and vigorous. The new attention focused on the social relations of small-scale enterprise has led to some useful research with a cumulative impact at certain levels, but to regard the theoretical underpinnings of this work as the foundation of a viable alternative position in the radical development debate seems a little sanguine. In the final analysis articulation theory

would seem to represent a somewhat desperate effort to give substance in Marxist terms to the essential dependency claim that development in the Third World is not and cannot be "normal" capitalist

development, whereas related concepts such as 'subsumption' would seem to inhabit an area which is capable of either dependency or Warrenite interpretationsThese unpromising options, it is worth emphasising, have been pursued at the expense of alternative, logically unproblematic and empirically challenging, research strategies. As a result we know less about a number of critical questions to do with small-scale enterprises and the people who work in them than we might." Yet so far only a few specialists have been prepared to admit this, and the dominant

tendency in the literature consists in reproducing the same essential combination of vulgar value theory and functionalism in superficially novel conceptual languages.

Marxism and Development Sociology

73

THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF RADICAL POLITICAL

ECONOMY The situation just described is particularly deplorable because the

research stimulated by the modes debate has been in spite of everything one of the most fruitful areas of the new development sociology. There are many other special areas that have progressed little if at all under the influence of the dominant theoretical perspectives of the past decade and a half. These include notably a number of topics which are cognate to major debates which have occupied develop~ rent economists over the same period, and which, however one looks at it, are of outstanding policy or praxological relevance. Surprising as it may seem, the sociology of class in LDCs is quite poorly developed ,77 and the complex forces responsible for the tendencies in public policy-making in less developed countries . 'urban bias' have been barely studied by anyone apart from the economists who identified the problems in the first place. Another example of an opportunity missed would be the non-controversy about the concept of 'redistribution with growth' (RwG) developed by World Bank and IDS staff in the mid 1970s. Many of the issues posed (including questions begged) by the RwG concept, as later by the 'basic needs' discussion, were social and political rather than economic. Yet sociologists and political scientists were in the main conspicuous by their absence from the modest discussion which took place." This was the case not only in respect of the Bank's direct sphere of inherence, where perhaps such 'soft' concerns are not rated as highly important, but also elsewhere, suggesting that lack of interest on the part of independent researchers was at least as much to blame. The most telling independent contributions on the socio-political dimensions of the RwG issue were made by the more institutionally-

minded development econornists.8° And this, unfortunately, is rather typical. For all the new sociology's emphasis on doing 'political economy' topics which involve rubbing shoulders and sharing concerns with development economists and other specialists have been downgraded in practice in favour of single disciplinary topics con~ erred, preferably at the micro level, with 'production'.*" It is small wonder perhaps that sociological development research has seldom exercised more than a modest influence on the making and implementation of development policy, either directly, within developing

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Marxist Sociology Revisited

countries, or indirectly through the work of multilateral agencies and national aid program1nes.82 Things are far from well, then, in the field of Marxist-influenced development sociology- But why? In the remainder of the paper I try to suggest some elements of an answer.

INTERPRETING THE IMPASSE Until now the development debate as it has affected sociology has taken the form, almost exclusively, of exchanges between different poles of opinion within Marxism: circulationism versus 'productionism', dependence (in its Marxist or marxisant versions) versus 'classical Marxisln', and so forth. It is now time to stand back a bit from the controversy of the past decade and a half and allow the light of scrutiny to fall on some features which are common to all of the major contributions. We also need to move on from purely theoretical to ret theoretical considerations of a certain type. While previous writers have in different degrees indicated an awareness that, for example, the positions of Frank and Warren mirror one another's weaknesses, this insight has not been taken very far.83 It ought to be pressed further, so that we are asking not just in what senses both Frank et al. and Warren were wrong but also, in a deeper sense, why they were wrong - what it was that led them to advance and persist in theoretically limiting positions. This type of questioning, which can

be applied also to the theoretical and empirical modes of production/ subsumption under capital literatures, should also shed light on the inability of the standard critiques to prevent the reproduction of the

old errors in new guises. The conclusion I have reached is that there is a basic problem with Marxist theory as an input to development sociology which transcends the particular forms in which it has been manifested. This is its metatheoretical commitment to demonstrating that what happens in societies in the era of capitalism is not only explicable but also in some stronger sense necessary. This is what is most fundamentally wrong about the 'dependency debate' as it has usually been conducted over the last decade; it is because they share this underlying commitment that both sides in the debate are in different degrees myopic and one-dimensional. The urge to establish that prevailing patterns of exploitation are not only explicable but necessary within

capitalism also accounts for the aridity and repetition in the modes/

75

Marxism and Development Sociology

subsumption literature. Overall this is what explains the inability of the radical literature genuinely to go beyond itself, even years after

the need for some decisive advance has been recognised. The Marxist commitment to the 'necessity' of socio-economic patterns under capitalism takes two main forms in the development literature. The first operates through the way in which it is usual to conceive of the relation between the theoretical concept of the capitalist mode of production and the national or international economies, polities, and social formations under analysis. The other - . if anything more persistent and fundamental 1 Involves .i form of I

system teleology or functionalism. As components of Marxist theory

in general, both forms have been usefully discussed by a number of recent writers, the most important of whom are Hindess and Hirst and their collaborators.8"' However, the implications of the new critical insights for development studies in particular have not been spelt out. Let us consider the argument in more detail. Hindess et of. maintain that Marxist theory systematically neglects certain kinds of issues because of a belief derived from the methodology of Marx's Capital that the significant characteristics of national economies and social formations may be 'read off' from the characteristics, especially the 'laws of motion', of the capitalist mode of production. They object to the conception of mode of production 'as a totality which has inscribed in its structure certain necessary effects' and question the way the concept 'records an ontological privilege, that is, the necessary and universal primacy of a certain order of causes'. The logic of Marx's position, that the concept of the capitalist mode is 'directly "mappable" on to concrete capitalist social formations', is 'refused, qualified and contradicted' within Marx's

own discourse, but these refusals and contradictions do not eliminate the initial conception. This seems to me to be a concise and accurate

appreciation of one of the main problems affecting Marxistinfluenced development sociology today. It encapsulates most effectively the limitations of Warren's contribution as an optic on Third World development issues: its blindness to

systematic variation in development experience between countries, its evolutionist prejudices and its economic reductionism. None of these things are personal quirks or excesses; they are the result, as I have argued, of a single-minded concentration on the general, intrinsic and mainly economic qualities and effects of capitalist developinent- Warren

IS

wrong because it

IS

everything that is of interest and imp l

4

-not l n f a c t

-

0331bl6

tO grasp

any

76

Marxist Sociology Revisited

experience of the less developed countries by deduction from the dynamics and differential impact of the capitalist mode of production. To put it another way, in Warren '[t]he specific structures of capitalist national economies are suppressed as objects of theorisation, being considered as exemplars of capitalism-as-g enerality and of its "laws" 186 Warren's work would seem to represent the purest, perhaps indeed the most classical, instance in the development field of what Hindess et al. are concerned about. Nevertheless a critique along similar lines has been applied by Sheila Smith in a useful reexamination of the work of the dependency Marxist Samir Amin. It is perhaps significant in this context that Amir of all dependency theorists is the one who does roost to cast his argument in the language of classical Marxism, retracing the historical steps taken by Lenin and his successors by conceiving 'dependence' strictly as imperialism viewed from the periphery, and imperialism as capitalist accumulation on a world scale. Armin's theory is unhelpful because in the real world the development problems of individual developing countries cannot be 'read off' from the structure of the international capitalist system, the room for manoeuvre and scope for differential performance by national governments and power groups deserve to be taken far more seriously than this approach allows." The theoretical abstraction from which the analysis starts is not quite the capitalist mode of production analysed by Marx and Warren, but the method and its shortcomings are identical. This critique can be taken a little further in respect of the dependency wing of Marxist development theorising, although there is some danger of taking it too far.89 In some (but only some) hands

'dependence has functioned as an abstract category of the same order as 'the capitalist mode of production', and in this case the limitations of the approach are conveyed well by the concept of

'reading off'-90 In an early critique, Lall wrote of the dependency approach that what it does is to 'pick Off' some salient features of modern capitalism as it affects some LDCs and put them into a

distinct category of "dependence" ' . 9 1 We might now agree and argue that picking off and lumping together reprehensible features of different types and stages of capitalist growth is not far removed, metatheoretically speaking, from the Warrenite or 'classical-Marxist'

procedure of lumping together various characteristics of different national economies and conceiving them as aspects or results of some

'law' or other of the unfolding of capitalism.

Marxism and Development Sociology

77

The more general-theoretical part of the 'mode of production controversy' can also be made sense of in these terms. It was argued above that apart from confirming the impossibility of steering a course between dependency and Warren using the categories of theoretical Marxism, the modes debate threw up a number of seemingly unresolvable conceptual tangles. These, we may add, can fruitfully be read as a commentary on the attempt to theorise the status of a group of national social formations each with distinct economic, political and social histories employing only the abstract and universal 'laws' of the capitalist mode of production, or some alternative framework of (metatheoretically) the same type. Reality has shown itself too rich to be captured by the simple terms of a concept of relations of production with corresponding 'laws of mo_MMm" -and relations mMeduction with wholly non-corresponding laws of motion are a theoretical nonsense. These arguments, however, relate only to the first of the two forms of metatheoretical commitment alluded to above, and there remains ....._J

a very substantial body of dependency and articulation/subsurnption work which is conducted at a humbler level of abstraction and whose characteristic theoretical weaknesses are better seen in other terms. Here there is no theoretical construction of the laws~of-motion type and no implication that observed patterns of development are necess~ any in the sense of being derivable from an abstract totality governed by a privileged causality. Instead, one of two things is asserted: that the development problems and hence the social structure and politics of less developed countries are explained by the particular (essentially static or essentially changing) nature of their insertion into the international system of capitalism; or that given socio-economic

processes in the Third World persist and take the particular form that they do because of the way they contribute to the process of capital accumulation in the wider system. I have argued that both these typical claims have to be rejected, but both have acquired a certain life of their own: they are repeated and constantly reappear in new

guises, their evident weaknesses notwithstanding. Why? The weight of intellectual tradition apart, I think the main factor is the seductive attraction exercised in the social sciences by certain forms of system teleology. I use the latter term in its usual, that is non-Althusserian, sense, so that it is equivalent to a form of functionalism." The suggestion is that dependency and articulation analysis is very often inspired in and gains much of its attraction from

a functionalist-type conviction that ordinary causal analyses do not

78

Marxist Sociology Revisited

'really' explain, do not get to the bottom of, Third World reality. The interest in discovering a 'deeper' - effectively more teleological - set of reasons for the wa.y_ the world is, is what lies behind the persistence in analysis development problems in certain ways even when they can be explained well or better in other terms. In addition to any attractions that such approaches may have on account of the class position or human sensitivities of the observer," they over the promise of a form of explanation that is intellectually peculiarly

satisfying at least, given certain strategic assumptions about the way the world works. There has been an important convergence of opinion in the last few years to the effect that the major propositions of historical material...-

ism are best understood as functional, rather than simply causal, statements.94 I 'rind this common thesis convincing and tend to agree with Hindess et al. and Giddens (in effect against Cohen who makes a vigorous deface of Marxism-as-functionalism)95 that this conclusion is damaging to Marxism's intellectual standing. In sociology it is wrong to pretend that functional claims are explanatory - that they are in fact, not just can be in principle - whether this takes the form of Parsonian-type structural-functionalism or is expressed in the seemingly very different language of Marxism. It has not been established, and there are strong reasons for doubting that it ever will, that there are 'feedback' mechanisms in the social order of the type whose existence is necessarily presupposed by a strictly functional statement which purports to be an explanation. Given this, to persist in advance niiin such statements is not only unscientific but pernicious. ferent but equivalent ways both structural-functional theory and Marxism reify social institutions of a given type, placing them by

metatheoretical list further beyond human control than they can be shown empirically to be. This is socially and politically corrupting. Unfortunately to point this out does not do away with the strong attractions which generic functionalism has exercised at least since the nineteenth century. As philosophers have shown, when functional explanations are reduced to a causal form, they do turn out to be richer than ordinary causal explanations.96 Functionalism is seductive for related reasons. Theorising of a functionalist type has the immediate appearance of possessing great potential explanatory power, and whole traditions of theorising (of which the most current is Marxism) conspire to maintain this appearance. This is what lies behind the attraction to sociological development

researchers of working in a generic dependency framework.

If the

Marxism and Development Sociology

79

world is such that functional statements are explanatory (that is, if mechanisms of feedback exist) then an approach to the institutions of less developed countries which uncovers or explains the changing nature of their 'contribution' to some wider system represents an irresistible challenge. Although the types of contributions specified have been notoriously varied," the dependency movement as a whole has been a response to this challenge; this is what accounts for its peculiar rnagnetisrn. It also explains why critiques of dependency from within Marxism tend to be such half-hearted affairs, and why so many theoretical debates eventually end up with formulations which barely differ from those whose limitations were the initial point of disagreement. Generic functionalism is in the same way both a source of attraction and the main cause of intellectual stagnation in the more empirical articulation/subsurnption literature. The urge to prove the (functionalist-type) 'necessity' of actual patterns of small-scale enterprise development is a crucial element of continuity, which is ignored by those who view the transition from "circulation" to "production" as a critical step forward in radical development research. It is what

lends an apparent justification to the dubious excursions into value/ price theory which, as we have seen, have characterised this work. And because of the way the insidious though false scientific pretensions of functionalism influence the importance attached to different sorts of questions, it is what accounts for the repetitive, noncumulative character of this literature, and its failure to explore

systematically some of the more urgent empirical issues. As a whole the foregoing takes us some way towards understanding why the sociological development Held has the particular unevenness and lacunae that it does. A set of rnetatheoretical preoccupations not wholly restricted to Marxism, but largely represented by it since the late 1960s or early 1970s, has forced theorising along certain rather restricted lines. The distance in substantive terms

between the different perspectives on offer has concealed the underlying homogeneity of the field, a homogeneity which has tended to limit the questions asked and to weaken the impact of damaging criticisms of particular theories. In consequence empirical work on middle-range topics has remained geared to the false problems generated by refuted but still influential theoretical perspectives, while areas of empirical enquiry about which these perspectives have little to say have been simply neglected.

The failure to realise the promise of a 'political economy' approach

80

Marxist Sociology Revisited

can be understood in a similar way. As suggested above, genuinely interdisciplinary work has been rarer than it might have been, but in fact the very concept of political economy as it has tended to be used works against a fully collaborative relationship between economists and sociologists in the development field. To the latter it has tended to signify not so much the crossing of real boundaries between subjects as presently constituted, as doing the sort of work which establishes the necessity of socio-economic patterns under capitalism in the sense explained in this paper, with the aid, if possible, of concepts borrowed from classical political economy. Real contact with what actual living economists (with few exceptions neoclassicals of various stripes) are concerned about has thereby been made extraordinarily diiiicult. This in turn helps to explain the failure of sociological work to respond adequately to the wider debates about development policy and practice.

CONCLUSION

This paper has sought to explain the nature and examine the causes of the current impasse in the 'new', Marxi.st~influenced development sociology. The bulk of the discussion has been devoted to some familiar themes - the demise of dependency theory, the 'classical' alternative expounded by Bill Warren, the mode of production controversy, and high and low points in recent sociological develop-

ment research. At this level my contention has been that the impasse is indeed a general one: not the product of the weaknesses of one particular theoretical perspective (dependency) or even of a mutually

contradictory pair of perspectives (dependency vs. Warren) but the result of a generalised theoretical disorientation aiecting in different degrees all of the main positions in the radical development debate. The once~dorninant dependency approach, I argued. has been subjected to what ought to have been fatally damaging criticism on logical, empirical and theoretical grounds. But partly because in various ways the radical literature has conspired to weaken the impact of this attack, the dependency perspective has refused to die, continuing to iniiuence much of the published work in the field and contributing to the lack of a serious body of cumulative research in such areas as the sociology of class. On the other hand, no significant 'Warrenite' development sociology has emerged in response to the

crisis of dependency Marxism, for the good reason that Warren's

Marxism and Development Sociology

81

theory is systematically limiting: the complex and challenging issues of development in the Third World today cannot be sufficiently grasped in terms of the dynamics and differential spread of the capitalist mode of production, the theoretical primacy of which is the hallmark of the 'Classical-Marxist' approach. This much is perhaps beginning to be accepted, but what lies behind the respective theoretical limitations of the dependency and Warrenite views has not been explored very far until now. This is partly because the notion still persists that there are promising avenues of research employing fundamental Marxist concepts that occupy a sort of middle ground between the polarised paradigms of the 1970s. However, a re-examination of the mode of production controversy does not suggest that there is any such middle position, or indeed that the central concepts involved are capable of consistent application to the subject matter of development studies. The modes/ subsumption literature has produced some useful empirical research - cumulative at a certain level - on peasantries and the urban poor, but despite rather than because of the input from theory. It has also left some notable lacunae. Although committed to a political economy approach, the new devel opment sociology has tended to shun actual collaboration with economists and has failed to contribute to the extent that one might have hoped to the illumination of current development issues. The reasons for these serious limitations, I have argued, are theoretical, but what accounts for the persistence in theoretically limiting positions and the repeated reproduction of old fallacies in new guises, is a matter of metatheory. Behind the distinctive preoccupations, blind spots and contradictions of the new development

sociology there lies a metatheoretical commitment to demonstrating that the structures and processes which we find in the less developed . world are not only explicable but necessary under capitalism. This general formula covers two variants: the type of necessity entailed by the Marxian insistence that the salient features of capitalist national economies and social formations can be derived or 'read oft' from the concept of the capitalist mode of production and its

laws, and another, also inspired in Marx's theory, which involves a system teleology or functionalism. The critique of 'reading off' would seem to add something significant to our appreciation of the onedimensional character of Warren's theory and the inconclusiveness of the debate started by Laclau on the analysis of modes of production-

On the other hand the discussion of functionalism seems to cast light

82

Marxist Sociology Revisited

on the persistent weaknesses, and the persistence in weakness, of those forms of dependency and articulation analysis which are less directly descended from the Marxism of Capital. Jointly, I suggest, the two modes of necessitist metatheoretical commitment constitute the basic underlying cause of the current impasse of the new development sociology and the main obstacle to be removed if we are to do better in the future. It would not be appropriate for this paper to conclude with an attempt to map out in detail the problems of research and analysis to which development sociology should turn its attention during the later 1980s and beyond. The paper has tried to uncover the causes of

a general malaise in a certain broad field of enquiry, it has not attempted the sort of survey which can result in the construction of a new research agenda. Substantive problems and new lines of theoretical advance will no doubt emerge from the usual encounter between the crises and sufferings of the world and the intellectual creativity of us all. What is more uncertain is how far this enterprise will continue to be dogged by the sorts of problems discussed at length in the paper. A final clarification is in order. If the analysis presented here is correct, the main idea to be taken on board is not that a particular tradition of theory, Munir ism, has proved to contain some central difficulties and needs to be looked at in a more critical light in the future. This is certainly an implication of what has been said, but the essential point is in one sense more specific, and in another more general. Firstly, the objection is not to the Marxist tradition as a whole (either in the name of some alternative tradition or on empiricist grounds), but to theoretical formulations of a particular type

which are central to Marxism and happen to have been influential in recent years primarily in a Marxist form. Development sociology does not need to be purged wholesale of questions and lower-order concepts derived from Marx, but specifically of abstract entities conceived as having 'necessary effects inscribed in their structure' or as being endowed with the capacity to shape socio-economic relations in accordance with their 'needs'. Curiosity about why the world is the way it is, and how it may be changed, must be freed not from Marxism but from Marxisln's ulterior interest in proving that within given limits the world has to be the way it is. The second important idea is that there is a case for a relative (and hobefully temporary) shift of embhasis in the sociological develop-

ment debate from theory to metatheory. Along with a revitalised

Marxism and Development Sociology

83

interest in the real-world problems of development policy and practice, an enhanced sensitivity to questions of this type seems essential if we are to get out, and stay out, of the impasse discussed in this paper.

NOTES AND REFERENCES This is a slightly revised version of a paper submitted to World Development. It is included here with the kind permission of the editor and publisher. 1. I refer here and throughout the chapter to the broad current of discussion and research which emerged during the First half of the 1970s under the influence of Marxist and 'neo-Marxist' critiques of earlier literature in the 'modernisatiorf traditions, Influential early compi-

lations include Ronald H. Chilcote and Joel C. Edelstein (eds), Latin America; The Struggle with Dependency and Beyond, Cambridge, Mass., Schenkman, 1974, Ivar Oxaal, Tony Barnett and David Booth (eds), Beyond the Sociology of Development, London, Routledge & Kevan Paul, 1975, and Peter C.W. Gutkind and Immanuel Wallenstein (eds), The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa, Beverly Hills, Sage,1976. 2. Anne Phillips, 'The Concept of "Development" ', Review of African Political Economy, no. 8, Jan.-Apr. 1977, Colin Leys, 'Underdevelopment and Dependency: Critical Notes', Journal of Contemporary Asia,

vol. 7, no. 1, 1977, and Henry Bernstein, 'Sociology of Underdevelopment vs. Sociology of Development in David Lehmann (ed.), Development Theory: Four Critical Studies, London, Frank Cass, 1979, and industrialization, Development, and Dependence' in Hamza Ala vi and Teodor Shanin (eds), Introduction to one Sociology of 'Developing Soc£eties', London, Macmillan, 1982. 3. Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst, Mode of Production and Social Formu-

tion: An Auto-Cr'tique of 'Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production', London, Macmillan, 1977, Antony Cutler, Barry Hindess, Paul Hirst and Athar Hussein, Marx's 'CapitaZ' and Capitalism Today, 2 vols, London , Routledge & Kevan Paul, 1977-78, G.A. Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History: a Defence, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978, and Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, Vol. I: Power, Property and Zne State, London, Macmillan, 1981. 4. There are numerous critical surveys of dependency writing. Two of the most recent and useful are Gabriel Palma, 'Dependency and Development: A Critical Overview' in Dudley Seers (ed.), Dependency Theory .' a Critical Reassessment, London, Frances Pinter, 1981, and Gary Gerefli, The Pharmaceutical' Industry and Dependency in tNe Third World, Princeton University Press, 1983, oh. 1. 5. The most obvious objection to this is that there is a major gulf between

those dependency writers who have sought to advance a formal theory

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Marxist Sociology Revzlvited

of development and underdevelopment and those, notably Fernando Henrique Cardoso, for whom the dependency perspective is more 'a methodology for analysis concrete situations of underdevelopment' (Gabriel Palma, 'Dependency a Formal Theory of Underdcvelopment or a Methodology for the Analysis of Concrete Situations of Underdevelopment', World Development, vol. 6, nos 7/8, 1978, taking up the view expressed in various places by Cardoso). However. this influential argument seems to me thoroughly confused, for four reasons: 1. certain of Cardoso's writings are devoted entirely to expounding a substantive thesis (if not perhaps a 'formal theory') about Latin American development in opposition to the substantive views of other dependency theorists (e.g. 'Dependency and Development in Latin America', New Left Review, no. 74, July-Aug- 1972), 2. in works such as Dependency and Development in Latin America (with Enzo Faletto, University Of California Press, 1979) substantive assumptions about the causes of Latin American development problems exercise an implicit but significant influence on the categories used to analyse the economic changes and socio-political cleavages which are the focus of attention, 3. this book and others inspired by Cardoso (kg. Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinatiortal, Stare, and Luca! Capital in Brazil, Princeton University Press, 1979) are of undeniable interest, but it is very questionable whether what makes them important is the same as what makes them examples of dependency analysis, and 4. the contention that dependency is only a 'methodology' seems to rest on a confused and quite improper identification of the term 'theory' with a particular approach to the empirical validation of theoretical propositions, namely cross-national statistical testing (on this see in particular Cardoso's 'The Consumption of Dependency Theory in the United States', Latin American Research Review, vol. 12, no. 3, 1977) , 6. That is, in which 'underdevelopment' is conceived not just as a process rather than a condition, but as something which is done to certain sorts of social formation by others. The expression is Ronald Dore's. See the references in note 2. 7-8. See for example Philip O'Brien, 'A Critique of Latin American Theories

of Dependency m Oxaal et of., op. cit. p. 24, and Sanjaya Lall 'Is "Dependence"

EI

Useful Concept in Analysing Underdevelopment?',

World Development, vol. 3, nos 11/12, 1975, p. 800. . 9. 'The Development of Underdevelopment, Monthly Review, vol. 18, no. 4, Sept 1966, which drew upon his Capitalism and Underdevelop-

ment in Latin America, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1967. 10. 'The Development', op. cit., pp. 4, 9-10, 10-13, emphasis added (page references are to the reprinted version in Frank, Latin America: Under afevdopment or RevoZurion?, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1969) . 11. See for example Henry W. Kirsch, Industrial Development in a Tradirional Society: The Conflict of Entrepreneurship and Modernz'zation in Chile, Gainesville, University Presses of Florida, 1977, Luis Ortega, 'Acerca de los Origenes de la IndustrializaciOn Chilena (1860-79)', Nuevo Historic (Association of Chilean Historians - U.K.), vol. 1, no.

Marxism and Development Sociology

85

2, 1981, and Gabriel Salazar, 'Entrepreneurs and Peons in the Tran sition to Industrial Capitalism: Chile, 1820-78', Ph.D. thesis, Univer sity of Hull, 1984, oh. 8. 12. Phillips and Bernstein have usefully drawn attention to the way depen

d e n y arguments draw on 'a contrast between development in the [under developed countries] and an idealised process of development . . = an

ideal type of "normal capitalist development" which serves as a measure by means of which we can recognise underdevelopment, an ideal type which

. . . does

not correspond to the actual process of development in

most of the advanced capitalist countries' (Phillips, op. cit., p. 11, of BernStein, 'Sociology of Underdevelopment', op. cit., pp. 85-7). How ever, they do not rest their case either on the historical arbitrariness of the norm of nationally autonomous development or on the logical circularity

stressed in this paper, but on less compelling objections. They argue that dependency reasoning is caught within an 'ideological problematic',

meaning 1. the questions asked are not those posed by a materialist

analysis but are borrowed from bourgeois nationalist development theory and 2. the dependency or underdevelopment perspective 'replicates . . :

[the] essential circularity . . . characteristic of an ideological discourse in the theoretical sense, that is, a discourse which is unable to problematic its object in order to carry out the tasks of investigation necessary to any

science' (Bernstein, 'Sociology of Underdevelopment', op. cit., pp. 94, 83). The first contention is true but rather weak as an objection on its own (the shortcomings of nationalist development theory are not spelled out). The appeal to the Althusserian distinction between theory and ideology, focusing attention on a kind of 'circularity' which appears to involve little more than what would ordinarily be called intellectual consistency, is positively unhelpful, queering the pitch for more decisive critiques relating to errors of logic. 13. Sheila Smith, 'The Ideas of Samir Amir: Theory or Tautology?'

Journal of Development Studies, vol. 17, no. l , Oct. 1980, p. 13, and Bill Warren, Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism, London, New Left Books, 1980, pp, 160, 165-6- Amin's deployment of the contrast between 'extraverted' and 'autocentric' development is open to further objections to do with its consistency with other parts of the theory of accumulation on a world scale (see Bernstein, 'Sociology of Underde-

velopment', op. cit., p. 92). 14- Walter Rodney, How Europe U n derde velop eol Africa, London Bogle-I'Ouverture, 1972, passirri, James D. Cockroft, Andre Gunder

Frank and Dale L. Johnson, Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin

America's Political Economy, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1972 pp. xvi, 76, Chilcote and Edelstein, op. cit., p. 27, Clive Y. Thomas, Dependence and Transformation: The Economics of the Transition to Socialism, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1974, p. 123 and passim, and Dieter Senghaas, 'Dissociation and Autocentric Development: an Alternative Development Policy for the Third World' in Richard L. Merritt and Bruce M. Russett (eds), From National Development to Global Community, London, Allen & Unwire, 1981. At a certain level

86

Marxist Sociology Revisited this type of criticism seems to me to apply even to works of historical scholarship on the scale of Thorp and Bertram's study of Peru (Rose-

mary Thorp and Geoffrey Bertram, Peru 1890-/977: Growth and Policy in an Open Economy, London, Macmillan, 1978, particularly pp. 321-7). 15. In this particular respect one can agree with the protests of Cardoso, 'The Consumption', op. cit., p. 18, echoed by, among others, Raymond D. Duvall, 'Dependence and Dependencia Theory: Notes Toward Precision of Concept and Argument', International Organization ,

vol. 32, no. 1, Winter 1978, p. 58, and Colin Henfrey, Dependency, Modes of Production, and the Class Analysis of Latin America', Latin American Perspectives, vol. 8, nos 3/4, Summer/Fall 1981, p. 27. 16. See for example Theotonio Dos Santos, 'El Nuevo Caracter de la

Dependence' in Jose Matos Mar (ed.), La Crisis del DesarrolllSmo y la Nuevo Dependence, Buenos Aires, Amorrortu, 1969, pp. 110~12,

Cardoso and Faletto, op. cit., Chapter 6, Robert Girling, 'Dependency, Technology and Development' and 'Dependency and Persistent

Income Inequality' in Frank Bonilla and Robert Gilling (eds), Structures of Dependency, Stanford, Calif., authors' edition, 1973, Osvaldo Sunkel, 'Transnational Capitalism and National Disintegration in Latin America', Social & Economic Studies, vol. 22, no. 1, 1973, pp. 136-45; and Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, Essays in the Political Economy of Africa, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1973, oh. 3. 17. The argument here is not the usual one that the 'testers' have set up grossly oversirnplitied dependency propositions as straw men to be knocked down with the most advanced quantitative techniques. On the contrary, the quantitative literature has become increasingly adept at operationalising the more sophisticated dependency theses, and the balance of declared Endings is overwhelmingly favourable to some important denendengy claims, the nhiectlon

is

that most studies are

restricted to evaluating the statistical support for dependency theory and no attention is given to the possibility that the relationships detected might equally be consistent with alternative interpretations,

the obvious candidates being those suggested by neoclassical and mainstream institutionalist development economics (see particularly Volker Bornschier, Christopher Chase-Dunn and Richard Rubinson, 'Cross-national Evidence of the Effects of Foreign Investment and Aid

on Economic Growth and Inequality: a Survey of Findings and a Reanalysis', American Journal of Sociology, vol. 84, no. 3, Nov. 1978, Vincent A. Mahler, Dependency Approaches to International Political

Economy: a Cross-National Study, New York, Columbia University Press, 1980, and Steven Jackson, Bruce M. Russett, Duncan Snidal and

David Sylvan, 'A Formal Model of "Dependeneia Theory"; Structure and Measurement' in Merritt and Russett, op. cit.). The approach followed by Patrick J. McGowan and Dale L. Smith, 'Economic Dependency in Black Africa: An Analysis of Competing Theories', International Organization, vol. 32, no. 1, Winter 1978, seems more promising in this regard.

18. Rhys Jenkins's study of the Latin American auto industry might seem

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to be an exception on both counts; but both the conclusion, that there are important long-run, dynamic benefits from retaining domestic

ownership and control, and the analysis, which considers foreign ownership in the context of several other explanatory factors, place this book more in the reputable tradition of Latin American structuralism or alternatively in a 'post-dependency, post neoclassical' phase - than in the dependency tradition as considered in this paper (Rhys O. Jenkins, Dependent Indastrialtzation in Latin America: The Automotive Industry in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, New York, Praeger, 1977). A recent work of somewhat similar scope by a sociologist (Gerefli, op. cit.) contains some particularly lucid remarks about what is wrong with standard dependency evaluations of the impact of transnationals (e.g. pp. 60-1) and would similarly seem to qualify as something other than

. -

dependency analysis. 19. Lall, op. cit., Thomas E. Weisskopf, 'Dependence as an Explanation of Underdevelopment: A Critique', University of Michigan, Center for Research on Economic Development (miineo), Mar. 1976, and David Morawetz, Twenty-Five Years o f Economic Development, 1950-75, Washington, D,C., World Bank, 1977, pp. 40-1. There is also telling argument along similar lines from economists of various schools in Benjamin J . Cohen, The Question of fmperialisrn, London, Macmillan,

1974, oh. 6, C. Richard Bath and Dilmus D. James, 'Dependency Analysis of Latin America: Some Criticisms, Some Suggestions', Latin American Research Review, vol. 11, no. 3, 1976, Michael Lipton, Why Poor People Stay Poor, London, Temple Smith, 1977, ch. 3, the contributions by Albert Fishlow and Carlos Diaz-Alejandro in Fishlow et al., Rich and Poor Nations in the World Economy, New York, McGraw-Hill/Council on Foreign Relations, 1978, and Ian M.D. Little, Economic Development, New York, Basic Books/Twentieth Century Fund, 1982, ch- 12. 20. See note 2, also John G. Taylor, From Modernization to Modes of Production: a Critique of the Soc f o logies of Development and Underdevefopment, London, Macmillan, 1979, and John Weeks, 'The DiEer-

ences between Materialist Theory and Dependency Theory and Why

They Matter', Latin American Perspectives, vol. 8, No. 3/4, Summer/ Fall 1981.

21. This refers to the 'Prebisch thesis' and the original, neo-Marxist formulation of unequal exchange theory by Arghiri Emmanuel. When dependency theorists explain that what was novel about their contribution in the late 1960s was not a stress on 'external' factors but the conceptualisation of dependence in terms of the internal structure of societies (e.g. Cardoso, 'The Consumption', op. cit., pp. 12-13, or Anibal Quijano, Dependencia, UrbanizaciOn y Can bio Social en América Latina, Lima, Mosca Azul, 1977, pp. 99-103) they implicitly underline this uncritical assimilation of the ECLAXUNCTAD view of international trade- Cardose's 'The Originality of a Copy: CEPAL and the Idea of Development', Cecal Review, 1977: 2, illustrates the point in another way. Immanuel Wallerstein has to my knowledge never explained the theory

of unequal trade upon which his enormously influential world-system

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concept (see The Capitalist World-Economy, Cambridge University Press, 1979) crucially depends. For an up-to-date professional view on

the Prebisch thesis, see John Spraos, Inequalising Trade?: a Study

of

Traditional North!South Specialisation in the Context of Terms of Trade

Concepts, Oxford, Clarendon Press with UNCTAD, 1983.

22. On the transiency of such concerns, see Paul Streeten, 'Development Ideas in Historical Perspective' in his Development Perspectives, London, Macmillan, 1981. 23. Albert O. Hirschman, 'The Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization in Latin America', Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 82, Feb 1968, I.M.D. Little et al., Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries, Oxford University Press, 1970, Bela Balassa and Associates, The Structure of Protection in Developing Countries, Baltic

more, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971; various contributions in Werner Baer and Larry Samuelson (eds), Latin America in the PostImport Substitution Era, Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1977, and in a rather special way, Lipton, op. cit. 24. Dudley Seers, 'Indian Bias')' in 'Urban Bias' e'*See.rs veras Institute of Development Studied, University of Sussex, Discussion Paper 116, Aug. 1977. 25. Taking this view of what dependency theory is ultimately about does not commit one, it seems to me, to any particular position on complicated issues such as how far and at what stage trade regimes should be liberalised, the degree to which 'imported technology' is a real and intractable problem, under what conditions transnationals compound the problems caused by the policies of states (either by their business decisions, or because they add socio-political clout to the local support for the status quo), and whether openness to foreign capital and trade can prevent the solution of other, dynamic problems of a type not considered by dependency writers any more than by traditional neo-

classical analyses. Dependency theory cannot defend itself, except in company which is wholly ignorant of the economics literature, by posing as the only alternative to a neo~liberal, neoclassical, pro-TNC

view of the world. Space does not permit the citation of literature relevant to all aspects of this point, however, it is worth saying that at least some of the analyses of TNC impacts which tend to be cited in support of the dependency viewpoint (e.g. in the Review of African

Political Economy's 'Kenya Debate') do not seem incompatible with the present critique, even if they contradict a particular antidependency writer's view on a particular country (e.g. Colin Leys's on Kenya) - for example, Steven Langdon, 'Multinational Corporations and the State in Africa' and Martin Godfrey and Steven Langdon, 'Partners in Underdevelopment? The Transnationalization Thesis in a Kenyan Context' in José J. Villarnil (ed.) Transnational Capitalism and National Development: New Perspectives on Dependence, Brighton, Harvester Press, 1979, and Rhys Jenkins, 'Transnational Corporations and their Impact on the Mexican Economy' in Jean Carriers (ed.), Industrialization and the State in Latin America, Amsterdam, CEDLA,

1980.

Marxism and Development Sociology

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26. If it is accepted that it has all three kinds of weakness it seems a little perverse to keep insisting on the virtues of the 'questions raised' (as opposed to some of the answers suggested) by the dependency school (Martin Godfrey, 'Editorial' and Manfred Bienefeld, 'Dependency in the Eighties', IDS Bulletin, issue entitled 'Is Dependency Dead?', vol. 12, no. 1, Dec. 1980). Bienefeld is led by this concern to give a very non-specific account of what a dependency approach involves (ibid., p. 10) and elsewhere to credit 'the basic premises of depend dency' with a series of emphases which were never defended by anyone closely associated with that tradition, though they are very properly the

stuff of the non-neo-liberal wing of development economics today ('Dependen pa and the Newly Industrialising Countries: Towards a Reappraisal' in Seers, Dependency Theory, op. cit., pp. 90-1). 27. The reference is again to the writings of Phillips, Leys, Bernstein and Taylor (see notes 2 and 20). Taylor says some substantively rather

dependentista things (imperialism promotes a restricted development, etc.) in those parts of the book not devoted to conceptual critique. 28. Mori Kenzo, 'Marx and "Underdevelopment": His Thesis on the "Historical Roles of British Free Trade" Revisited', Annals of the Institute of Socfai Science (University of Tokyo), no. 19, 1978, espe-

cially pp, 50-1. See also Palma's already cited articles, 29. Warren, op. cit., chs 3 and 4, is good on this phase despite his rather one-sided reading of Marx (and terse dismissal of Mori's argument,

p. 153rd), but see also Second Congress of the Communist International: Minutes of the Proceedings, vol. 1, London, New Park, 1977, p. 117, Jane Degras (ed.), The Communist International, 1919-1943: Documents, vol. 1, London, Oxford University Press for RIIA, 1956, p. 384 , and esp. Richard B. Day, 'Trotsky and Preobrazhensky: The Troubled Unity of the Left Opposition', Studies in Comparative Communism, vol. 10, nos 1/2, Spring/Summer 1977. In retrospect it seems clear that Aidan Foster-Carter's 'Neo-Marxist Approaches to Development and Underdevelopment' in Emanuel de Kadt and Gavin Williams (eds), Sociology and Develop/nent, London, Tavistock, 1974, overrated the

consistency of 'palaeo-Marxism' in respect of such questions, and that My own essay on Frank (in Oxaal et al., op. cit.) may have helped to give the false impression that dependency theory was the result of the

first-ever major encounter between Marxist theory and Third-World nationalism. 30. Warren argues that in 'reversing' Marx's view of capitalist imperialism, the leaders of the Russian Revolution were motivated in part by the political need to find allies against the central capitalist states, and that the burgeoning of Third-World nationalism in the period following the

Second World War made new versions of the 'Leninist world-view' politically convenient as well as psychologically satisfying to Marxists and other radicals. It is unclear why he is so sure that Marx and Engels were immune to such temptations (c.g. vis-ri-vis Irish patriots and Russian Narodniks) in the world of the 1870s and 1880s. Phillips (op. cit.) has some good ideas about the political sources of the

'neo-Marxist' fashions of the late 1960s and early 1970s but inexplicably

90

Marxist Sociology Revisited absolves earlier Marxisms from a 'moralistic thesis of the contradiction

between capitalism as a whole and the needs of mankind' (p. 15). 31. One of the editors of one such journal has said as much in an issue devoted to 'Dependency and Marxism' (Ronald Chilcote in the Introduction to Latin American Perspectives vol. 8, nos 3/4, Summerfliall 1981). It is also the case that some of the best undergraduate textbooks in development sociology incorporate rather uncritical summaries of the dependency view of industrialisation ..... particularly Richard Sand-

brook, The Politics of Basic Needs: Urban Aspects of Assaulting Poverty in Africa London, Heinemann, 1982, pp. 49-58. Countless books

of lesser quality incorporating a similar perspective (the language of imperialism' tends to be preferred) are published throughout the world every year. 32. See for example Nicola Swainson, The Development of Corporate Capitalism in Kenya, 1918-77, London, Heinemann, 1980, Frits Wils, Industrializatfon, Industrialists and the Nation-State in Peru, University

of California, Institute of International Studies, 1979; Colin Leys's 1978 and 1980 contributions to the 'Kenya debate', reprinted as 'Accumulation, Class Formation and Dependency: Kenya' and 'Kenyaz What Does "Dependency" Explain?' in Martin Fransman (ed.), Industry and Accumulation in Africa, London, Heinemann, 1982, David G. Becker, The New Bourges-isie and the Limits of Dependency, Princeton University Press 1923, Bernardo Sort, 'The Qtate

the Finnrgenrsie and

Imperialism in the Light of the Peruvian Experience' in David Booth and Bernardo Sorj (eds), Military Reformism and Social Classes, London, Macmillan, 1983, pp. 194-8, Eugene F. Safer, 'Recent Trends in Latin American Labor Historiography, Latin American Research Review, vol. 15, no. 1, 1980, Ian Roxborough, 'The Analysis of Labour

Movements in Latin America', Bulletin of Latin American Research, vol. 1, no. 1, Oct. 1981, Henfrey, op. cit., pp. 47-9, and David G.

Becker, 'Modem Mine Labour and Politics in Peru since 1968', Boleyn de Esiudios Lafinoamericanos y del Carine, no. 32, June 1982. It is often argued that because of its emphasis on 'external' exchange relationships the dependency approach has engendered better work on

dominant than on subordinate classes, however, this would seem quite a relative difference in the light of Leys's critique. 33. A 'representational' Marxist view of politics and the state is often taken as intrinsic to the dependency perspective (e.g. Richard R. Fagen, 'Studying Latin American Politics: Some Implications o f a Dependencia Approach', Latin American Research Review, vol. 12, no. 2, 1977, pp. 9-11), although of course there is a range of more and less 'instrumentalist' applications. Beyond the state theory aspect, which can mean ad hoe and contradictory policy measures are graced with analysis as part of some socially-rooted 'project' or 'model of accumulate son ', the main way dependency obscures Third-World political realities is by hugely exaggerating the underlying interest conflict between export-oriented and domestic-market-oriented social forces. The already cited works of Cardoso and Falsetto, Dos Santos, Quijano, and

Chilcote and Edelstein exemplify the tendency. I have discussed both

Marxllwn and Development Sociology

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aspects in a partial way in 'Dependency Theory as Political Analysis: the Case of Peru (1968-80)', University of Dar es Salaam, Department of Sociology, Research Report R-82-R4, 1982, and 'The Reform of the Press: Myths and Realities' in Booth and Sorj, op. cit. 34. Warren, op. cit-, anticipated by Warren, 'Imperialism and Capitalist industrialization', New Left Review, no. 81, Sept.-oct. 1973, and followed in certain respects by Jay R. Mandle, 'Marydst Analysis and Capitalist Development in the Third World', Theory & Society, vol. 9, no. 6, 1980, and Gavin Kitching, Development and Underdevelopment in Historical Perspective, London, Methuen, 1982, and Rethinking Socialism, London, Methuen, 1983. 35. See note 30. 36. Warren, Imperialism, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

37. The reaction toWarren's original, 1973, statement is extremely well assessed in Bernstein, 'Industrialization', op. cit., pp. 226-30. The tone and substance of more recent critiques has tended to be less elevated (et. Alain Lipietz, 'Marx or Rostov?', New Left Review, no. 132,

Mar.-Apr. 1982, and Aijaz Ahmad, 'Imperialism and Progress' in Ronald H. Chilcote and Dale L. Johnson (eds), Theories of Development: Mode of Production or Dependency?, Beverly Hills, Sage, 1983) , though Ronaldo Munck's review article 'Imperialism and Dependency: Recent Debates and Old Dead-Ends', Latin American Perspectives,

vol. 8, nos 3/4, Summer/Fall 1981, makes fair and pertinent criticisms38. Imperialism, op. cit., oh. 8. Compare pp. 189, 200-2, 212-16, 243-4 on the one hand with p. 195-9, 200, 204, 216-24, 231-5, 249-53 on the other. The 'uneven development' said to be characteristic of capitalism and perhaps of human progress in general (p. 252) provides an apparent theoretical rationale for ignoring such questions. 39. An important instance is the treatment of trends in income distribution. Major variations in country performance, including between countries

with similar rates of economic growth, are first acknowledged and then set aside in the interests of the general argument. Warren also commits the textbook fallacy of moving directly from current cross-section data to conclusions about the March of Progress, espousing an evolutionary

view of the relation of inequality to growth which used to be fashionable among development economists twenty or more years ago but has lost ground for very good reasons in recent times (pp. 199-211). 40. Ibid., pp. 253-5, also pp. 177, 236.

41. Post-independence regimes are credited (pp. 170-4) with a longish list of achievements resulting from a diversification of market outlets and greater control over foreign-owned firms, neither of which appeared as

possible desiderata in the previous chapter, investments in health and education are held to have been an essential contribution of the colonial 'stage' to subsequent economic progress, yet the recent 'basic

needs' approach is disparaged as 'curtailing growth to improve income distribution' (p. 206).

42. For reasons which will become apparent, I make no apology for using the phrase Henry Bernstein coins in his critique of Frankrl'An1in under-

development theory.

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43- See the references in notes 28 and 29. 44. This seems to bring us close to the statement in Leys's opening contri-

bution to the 'Kenya debate': 'all of these positions [those of Frank, Warren and Emmanuel (in his 1974 critique of Warren)] are mistaken insofar as they propose tendencies inherent in "capitalism in general"; whereas . . . each of them may, on the other hand, be correct and illuminating . . . in particular historical circumstances ('Accumulation', op. cit., p. 189). Unfortunately Leys has not pursued the theoretical implications for Marxists of challenging 'inherent tendencies', and the debate has remained a fascinating case-study in postdependency but non~Warrenite class analysis. 45. Mueller's work on Tanzanian tobacco farming is the exception that confirms the rule (see e.g. Susanne Mueller, 'Barriers to the Further Development of Capitalism in Tanzania: The Case of Tobacco', Capital & Class, no. 15, Autumn 1981). Kitching's large and excellent book on Kenya does not qualify, since despite the unashamedly evolutionary

and vigorously anti-'populist' Marxism he espouses elsewhere (see note 34) he favours 'unpacking' the concept of mode of production into a number of lower-level concepts for the purposes of analysis particular societies, a view not unlike the one taken here (Gavin Kitching, Class and Economic Change in Kenya: The Making of an African PeNte-

Bourgeofsie, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1980, p. 5). 46. The more theoretical contributions are extremely well surveyed and discussed, with varied emphases, by Aidan Foster-Carter, 'The Modes of Production Controversy', New Left Review, no. 107, Jan.-Feb. 1978; John Harriss, lie Mode of Production Controversy: Themes and Problems of the Debate', University of East Anglia, Development Studies Discussion Paper 60, Nov. 1979; Harold Wolpe, 'Introduction' in Wolpe (ed.), The Articuiarion of Modes of Production, London, Routledge & Kevan Paul, 1980; and David Goodman and Michael Redclift, From Peasant to Proletarian: Capitalist Development and Agrarian Transitions, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1981, cbs 2-3 . 47. Ernesto Laclau, in New Left Review, no. 67, May-June 1971, reprinted

. with a postscript in his Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, London, New Left Books, 1977. 48. Particularly Foster-Carter and Goodman/Redclift (note 46). 49. Ibid., pp. 35-7. 50. Viz. the search for factors offsetting the 'tendency of the rate of profit to

fall', for critiquesseelan Steedman, MarxAfterSro]j'a,London, New Left Books, 1977, oh. 9, and Cutler et al., op. cit. , vol. 1, chs 4 and 6. 51. Reprinted in Paul Sweezy et al., The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism, London, New Left Books, 1976. Reprinted in ibid. Hamza Ala vi, 'India and the Colonial Mode of Production', Socialist Register I975, London, Merlin Press, 1975, and 'The Structure of Peripheral Capitalism' in Ala vi and Shanin, op. cit., Jairus Banaji, 'For a Theory of Colonial Modes of Production', Economic & Political Weekly, no. SO, 23 Dec. 1972, and 'Modes of Production in a Material-

ist Conception of Histor

Capital & Class, no. 3, Autumn 1977.

Marxism and Development Sociology

93

54. Ala vi, 'India', op. cit., and Banaji, 'For a Theory', op. cit. , also Ciro F S. Cardoso, 'Los Modos de ProducciOn Colonialesz Estado de la CuestiOn y Perspectiva TeOrica' in Roger Bartra et al., Modes de ProdueciOrz en América Latina, Lima, Delva, 1976.

'India', op. cit., p. 182. Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst, Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975, p. 9, or 'an integrated complex of social productive forces and relations linked to a determinate type of ownership of the means of production' (Laclau, op. cit.

p. 33, citing Oscar Lange). 57. Banaji, 'Modes', op. cit., p. 10. 58- Both Ala vi and Banaji distance themselves from it in the more recent articles cited in note 53.

59. 'India', op. cit., pp. 190-3, and Foster-Carter,'Tlle Modes', op. cit_ , p. 72 60.

Banaji, 'For a Theory', op. cit., p. 2500, Ala vi, 'India', op. cit., p. 187

61. Ala vi, 'The Structure', op. cit., and Hamza Ala vi, P. L. Burns, G. R.

Knight, P. B. Mayer and Doug McEachern, Capitalism and Colonial Production, London, Croom Helm, 1982, of. Andre Gunder Frank, World Accumulation, 1942-/789, London, Macmillan, 1978, and Amir, Unequal Development: an Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1976.

62. Karl Marx, 'Results of the Immediate Process of Production', Appear did to the 1976 Penguin edition of Capital, Volume I , Harmondsworth Penguin/New Left Review, 1976, p. 1019ff. Dependency-type interpret ations are suggested by Ben Fine, 'On the Origins of Capitalist Develop

men', New Left Review, no. 109, May-June 1978, and Ala vi, 'The Structure', op. cit. , pp. 185-91, the 'transition' view is taken in a strong form, in a historical context, by CristObal Kay, 'Transform aciones de las Relaciones de DominaciOn y Dependencia entre Terratenientes y CamI

pesinos en el Periodo Post-oolonial en Chile', Nuevo HiStoria, vol. 2 no. 6, 1982, and in a perhaps more ambiguous form by Henry Bernstein, 'African Peasantries: a Theoretical Framework', Journal of Peasant Studies, vol. 6, no. 4, July 1979.

Bernstein, 'Sociology of Underdevelopment', op. cit-, p. 88. Robert Brenner, 'The Origins of Capitalist Development: a Critique of

Neo-Smithian Marxism', New Left Review, no. 104, July-Aug. 1977. 65. Brenner does not go into the concrete transition from economic forma sons which remain backward because of their non-capitalist class struc tube, to capitalist economies which experience productivity growth but remain (in the ordinary sense) underdeveloped by comparison with advanced industrial economies. The same is true of an article which to

some extent anticipated Brenner's thesis, Jay R. Mandie, 'The Plantation

.

Fconomy an Fssay in Definition Yrzence & Society vol 36, no 1, 1072, but Frederick Weaver, whose contribution complements Brenner's, does till in some of the gaps ('American Underdevelopment: An Interpretative Essay on Historical Change', Latin American Perspectives, vol. 3, no. 4. Fall 1976) . 66. To this extent one sympathises with the intention behind Fine's paper

(note 62).

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67. OP- cit. 68. The best synthesis of this literature is Goodman and Redclift, op. cit. ,

John Harriss (ed.), Rural Development." Theories of Peasant Economy and Agrarian Change, London, Hutchinson, 1982, has relevant readings in Part 2, but is of wider scope. For the purposes of one part of my argument in this chapter, that which relates to the 'classical' conception of the capitalist mode of production and the transition to it, perhaps the most striking feature of the new rural studies is the sheer empirical diversity of patterns and trends detected: rural class relations do not seem to converge along a single path, and in some cases even the directionality of what we persist in calling the transition is in some doubt, all of which raises the question of the soundness and ultimate theoretical foundations of our initial expectations. Goodman and Redclift (op-cit., pp.

66-7) recognise this problem, whence the plural transitions in the title of their book. David Lehmann has been led by comparative Latin

American evidence from distinguishing alternative 'paths of transformation' (including some which are on the face of it reverse transitions) to calling for 'a modest differentiation of the concept of capitalist development itself', applying not just to differences between centre and periphery countries but to contrasts between countries, and regions,

within the periphery ('A Theory of Agrarian Structure: Typology and Paths of Transformation', University of Cambridge, Centre of Latin American Studies, Working Paper 25, Jan. 1976, and 'Peasantisation and Proletarianisationz Recent Agrarian Changes in Brazil and Mexico' in Steve Jones et al. (eds), Rural Poverty and Agrarian Reform, New Delhi, Allied Publishers for Erda, Dakar, 1982, p. 269). 69. The best introduction is still Caroline O. N. Moser, 'Informal Sector or

Petty Commodity Production: Dualism or Dependence in Urban Development?', World Development, special issue on 'The Urban Informal Sector', vol. 6, nos 9/10, Sept./Oct. 1978. Victor Tokman's article in the same collection puts this literature into a wider context of research and perspectives. 70. Rural researchers are divided between l . those who see petty producers as involved in a distinct mode which 'art_iculates' with capitalism, and 2.

those who argue that they are subsumed under the laws of motion of peripheral capitalism or capitalism proper, becoming at the limit, 'disguised proletarians'. The thesis under discussion is important to both groups .... for example 1. Harold Wolpc, 'Capitalism and Cheap LabourPower in South Africa', Economy & Society, vol. 1, no. 4, not. 1972, Jannik Boesen, 'On Peasantry and the "Modes of Production" Debate' Q

Review of African Political Economy, nos 15/16, May- Dec. 1979, Alex-

ander Schejtman, 'The Peasant Economy: Internal Logic, Articulation and Persistence', Cepal Review, no. 11, Aug. 1980, 2. Bernstein, 'African Peasantries', op. cit.; Claudia v. Werlhof and Hanns-Peter Neuhoif, 'The Combination of Different Production Relations on the Basis of Nonproletarianization: Agrarian Production in Yaracuy, Venezuela', Latin American Perspectives, vol. 9, no. 3, Summer 1982. Examples from urban research include: Martin Godfrey, 'Surplus Population and Underdevel~

opment: Reserve Army or Marginal Mass`?', Manpower & Unemploy-

Marxism and Development Sociology

95

men Research, vol. 10, no. 1, Apr. 1977, Alejandro Portes and John

Walton, Labor, Class, and the Iaternaaonal System, New York, Academic Press, 1981, oh. 3, Sandbrook, op. it., pp. 63-8, and James D. Cockroft, 'Immigration, Not Marginalization: the Case of Me>dco', Latin American Perspectives, vol. 10, nos 2/3, Spring/Summer 1983. 71. Thus the term 'subsidy' ought probably not to be used, even in quotation marks.

72. The variety of moods and tenses employed, or the seemingly casual omission of a verb, is symptomatic of the problem. Thus we have the labor power or products of small-scale enterprises being supplied 'below their value (under capitalist conditions)' (Boesen, p. 157, italics removed); 'at prices lower than those which a capitalist producer would require' (Schejtrnan, p. 128), at prices 'enabling [the wages or "wages" of

enterprise members] to be lower than they would otherwise need to be' (Godfrey, p. 67), and 'lower than they might have to be in the absence of the marginal pole' (Sandbrook, p. 67). Criticisms in a broadly similarvein have been made by Harriet Friedmann, 'Household Production and the National Economy', Journal of Peasant Studies, vol- 7, no. 2, Jan. 1980, p. 173; Kitching, Class and Economic Change, op. cit., Appendix; and Caroline Moser and Kate Young, 'Women of the Working Poor', IDS Bulletin, issue on 'Women and the Informal Sector', vol. 12, no. 3, July

1981, p. 54. 73. As has been suggested in different ways by Nicos Mouzelis, 'Review Article: Capitalism and the Development of Agriculture', Journal of Peasant Studies, vol. 3, no. 4, July 1976, p. 490; Goodman and Redclift, op. cit., pp. 60-2, and Moser and Young, op. cit., p. 54. 74. See for example Hubert Schmitz, 'Growth Constraints on Small-scale

Manufacturing in Developing Countries: a Critical Review', World Development, vol. 10, no. 6, .Tune 1982. 75. Susan Mann and James Dickinson ('Obstacles to the Development of a Capitalist Agriculture, Journal of Peasant Studies, vol. 5, no. 4, July 1978) have shown how it is possible to use Marxist concepts in this kind of way.

76. See the section on 'Necessary New Perspectives and Directions for

Research', pp. 249-65 in Subbiah Kannappan, Employment Problems and The Urban Labor Market in Developing Nations, University of

'77,

Michigan, Graduate School ofBusinessAdministration, 1983, which calls inter alia for more work by sociologists or anthropologists. Excellent work in this general held is of course appearing, and has been cited in these pages, but much of the literature is either loose and overgeneralised, as Lehmann and Roxborough have complained, or else so focused as to make it unreasonable to hope for an eventual synthesis (David Lehmann, 'Introduction' in Lehmann, Development Theory , op. cit., p. 5, Ian Roxborough, Theories of Underdevelopment, London,

Macmillan, 1979, pp. ix-x). Notwithstanding my earlier suggestion that

the analysis of class has been particularly hampered by dependency ideas,

economistic or formalist tendencies common to both of the main traditions of radical development theory have undoubtedly played their part,

as argued by Henfrey (op. cit. , pp. 38-47) and Dale Johnson ('Economjsnl

96

Marxist Sociology Revisited and Determinism in Dependency Theory', Latin American Perspectives , vol. 8, nos 3/4, Summerlliall 1981, and 'Class Analysis and Dependency' in Chilcote and Johnson, op. cit.).

78. Exceptions include Robert H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa, University of California Press, 1981, and in part, John Harriss and Mick Moore (eds), Development and the Rural~Urban Divide', special issue of the Journal of Development Studies, vol. 20, no. 3, Apr. 1984. 79. Hollis Chenery, Montek S. Ahluwalia, C. L. G. Bell, John H. Duloy and Richard Jolly, Redistribution with Growth, London, Oxford University Press for World Bank and IDS, 1974. Colin Leys, by training a political scientist, represents the only significant exception with his contribution to IDS Bulletin, issue on 'Redistribution with Growth?', vol. 7, no. 2, Aug. 1975. 80. For example, Frances Stewart and Paul Streeter, 'New Strategies for

Development: Poverty, Income Distribution, and Growth', Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 28, no. 3, Nov. 1976; see also Paul Streeter with others, First Things First: Meeting Basic Human Needs in Developing Countries, New York, Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1981.

81. My impression is that those working in multi-disciplinary development or area studies centres have been less guilty on this score than the rest of us, if only because the notion that focusing on 'relations of production' is ipso facto doing political economy is harder to sustain in such an environment. 82. This is a casual, outsider's impression of course, I should be pleased to be contradicted by anyone who knows better. 83. Leys, 'Accumulation', op. cit., Bienefeld, 'Dependency in the Eighties', op. cit., Bernstein, 'Industrialization', op. cit., and John Browett,

'Out of the Dependency Perspective' in Peter Limqueco and Bruce McFarlane (eds), Neo-Marxist Theories of Development, London, Croom Helm, 1983,

See note 3. Cutler et al., op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 244, 241, vol. 1, pp. 121-4, 133-4.

They also argue that this conception generates a view of the economic role of the state in which state policy is reduced to a mechanism offsetting the basic underlying tendencies of capitalism, such that the 'dif erential effect of the policies of states on the conditions of economic performance' tends to be neglected (ibid., vol. 2, p. 250).

86. Ibid., vol. 1, p, 3. 87. Smith, op. cit., pp. 18-19. 88. Ibid. 89. Some of the most influential work in the dependency tradition is not usefully discussed in these terms.

90. Dos Santos, Ruy Mauro Marini and Vania Bainbirra have all maintained that 'dependent capitalism' is characterised by specific laws of

motion (see Henfrey, op. cit., pp. 23-4, and Gereffi, op. cit., pp. 37-8) , .... . ....

and others have sketched a theory of 'dependent reproduction' (see

Munck, op. cit. p. 174).

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97

Op. cit., p. 806. I agree with Mouzelis that the Althusserian critique of 'teleology', applied to the development Held by Bernstein and Taylor among

others, debases the concept in a serious way (Nicos Mouzelis, 'Review Article: Modernization, Underdevelopment, Uneven Development:

~.

Prospects for a Theory of Third World Formations', Journal of Peasant Studies, vol. 7, no. 3, Apr 1980). Teleology will refer here to a form of explanation by reference to 'ends', of which explanations which invoke the "ends" of non-purposive self-regulating systems are one type. 93. See David E. Stanstield, 'Perspectives on Dependency' in Stanfield et al. (eds), Dependency and Latin America: a Workshop, Amsterdam: CEDLA, 1974, p. 9, and Ronald Dore, 'Underdevelopment in Theoretical Perspective', Institute of Development Studies, Discussion Paper 109, May 1977, p. 4. 94. Discussion has focused quite properly on the two central ideas set out in Marx's '1859 Preface' - the forces of production relations of production couple, and the base superstructure image and thesis that the economy is determinant in the last instance. The contention is that these are to be construed as statements ab lotions between different kinds of structures. As Co . . the character of the forces functionally explain character of the relations. . . . [T]he production relations are of a kind R at time t because relations of land R are suitable to the use and development of *|

the productive forces at t, given the level of development of the latter at

t' (op. cit., p. 160, italics removed), And 2. '. . . property relations are, in turn, functionally explained by production relations: legal structures

rise and fall according as they promote or frustrate forms of economy favored by the productive forces. Property relations have the character they do because production relations require that they have it' (ilbid., p. 230). In the language of Cutler et al.: 'Rather than the limited

position that specific social relations presuppose definite conditions of existence these theses maintain that certain types of social relations are capable of securing their own conditions of existence' (op. cit., vol, 1, p. 209). I agree with these (otherwise divergent) contributions in being uneonyinced by the contention that the propositions in the "Preface" are nothing more than 'research hypotheses' or diagnostic aids, as argued

most recently by Terrell Carver, Marx'5 Social Theory, Oxford University Press, 1982- Even if it is not accepted that Marx's theory of the

J

broad sweep of history is functionalist, it is fairly obvious that his conception of the 'reserve army of l a b o r ' and the various Marxian and post-Marxian theses about factors offsetting the tendency of the rate of profit tri fall have to he constriIedin this way (of Gldrlens ob, cit., b, 18) 95. Cohen maintains that we can rationally hypothesise functional explanations even when we lack the 'elaborations' required to show 'how the explanations work', such hypotheses, he argues, raise useful questions .

for future research (op. cit., ch. 10).

96. See for example Alan Ryan, The Philosophy of the Social Sciences, London, Macmillan, 1970, pp. 182-94.

97. Once again it is necessary to insist that it is true both that there is

98

Marxist Sociology Revisited enormous diversity among social scientists who adopt a dependency perspective and that certain crucial difficulties are common to all. On the one hand there are dependency-type statements whose functional-

ism is explicit (though not necessarily self-conscious) - Dos Santos's account of uneven development as a 'necessary and structural feature of the world economy', Amin on 'the functions of the periphery',

Taylor on 'the reproductive requirements of imperialist penetration', and so forth. At the other extreme, writers such as Cardoso are concerned to distance themselves from specific functionalist-type claims which they find untenable (such as Maririi's that the development of capitalism in the centre 'requires' the super-exploitation of l a b o r in the periphery), but their own account gains much of its poignancy and influence from an implicit negative functionalism: the needs of transnational capital, and hence the possibilities for transformation in the Third World, are no longer quite what they used to be.

Finally, there are writers such as Wallerstein whose explanations are richly teleological in both a functionalist and a non~functionalist sense .

4 Marxism and Nationalism EPHRAIM NIMNI INTRODUCTION: NATIONALISM AND SOCIOLOGY The conceptualisation of national phenomena presents a series of difficulties and contradictions for modern social theories. Since the emergence of both Marxism and sociology, the concern of theory has been to explain social phenomena by constantly refining a universal logic. Slowly but surely, the apparent mystery of specificities and localisins was to be unraveled by the penetrating force of logically refined and empirically tested theories. Their task was to enhance human perceptions of social realities, much in the same way as the theory of gravity and the theory of relativity enhanced time understanding of the way in which the universe works. The Tower of Pisa and the Newtonian Apple were no longer self contained phenomena , but the result of the laws of gravity, an aprioristic condition that transcended the immediate existence of the tower and the apple. Thus, the modern concept of causality emerged in Physics, as the at times empirical, at times theoretical, ascertainable combination of

conditions which is usually followed by a predictable occurrence which constitutes its effect

This analytical logic exercised a profound impact in social theory, especially through the concept of evolution. This is one of those few 'rarefies' in the history of ideas which both made an enormous and lasting impact in philosophy and social sciences, and provided a no less powerful and influential paradigm for a number of disciplines in the natural sciences. Sociology and Marxism were (and are) unmistakably shaped by this paradigm, the aim of which is to explain specific and localised problems in the context of an overall logic of

analysis. Specificities and localisms are both anomalies to account for, and stumbling blocks to the efficient performance of these social

theories. 99

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It is then no coincidence that they have little sympathy for any social phenomenon that resists being subsumed by an all-inclusive logic of analysis. The resilience of multi -faceted national phenomena is perhaps one of the most obstinate forms of social relativism: nationalism preaches the importance of the specific over the general , going into lengthy justifications as to why the national movement in question is so 'unique', that should be considered a special case. At the same time, attempts to explain the nature of the national phenomenon in universal terms clashed with a diversified reality that

resisted such monocausal explanations. It is therefore no coincidence that classical sociology and Marxism are logically poised to reject the

claims to specificity and uniqueness of nationalist ideologies. The national question did not disappear because classical sociologists and Marxists wished it to do just that. What really happened was the opening of an amazing theoretical gap in both disciplines, coupled with a studious avoidance of theoretical discussions of the

nature of national phenomenon. Sociological discussions of nationalism were ad hoc case studies, where its essence was submerged into a sea of details relevant only to the case study, with the result that the discussion of the case in question claimed to have no relevance to the overall understanding of the national phenomenon. Marxist discussions of nationalism were with few and relatively unknown exceptions clouded in epiphenomenological terminology, where concrete cases of nationalist agitation were to be explained in terms of the class struggle, or of a pervasive 'false consciousness' that distracted the workers from their real aim, the destruction of the bourgeois order. The purpose of this article will be to discuss the failures of classical

_

Marxism to come to grips with the national phenomenon. In this sense, classical sociology has little to offer instead. If classical Marx-

ism was severely limited by the paradigmatic straitjacket of economism, classical sociology was no less limited by the universal laws of social evolution that it so proudly cherished. In the case of Marxism the failure to adequately understand and conceptualise the national p enomenon as been widely acknowledged by those who feel-Gihappy with this s`ia'ie of affairs. The constant repetition of stereotyped formulas, and the impossibility of providing an adequate conceptual and theoretical understanding of the problem, moved Tom Nairn to head the theoretical section of his The Break Up of Britain, with a statement of desperation:

The theory of Nationalism represents Marxism's great historical failure. It may have others as well, and some of these have been

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more debated: Marxism's shortcomings over imperialism, the state, the falling rate of profit and the immigration of the masses are certainly old battlefields. Yet none of these is as important, as fundamental, as the problem of nationalism, either in theory or in political practice. (London, New Left Books, 1977, p. 329)

Nairn goes on to argue that this failure was inevitable, but that we are now in a position to understand it- However, there is nothing inevitable about it, unless the paradigms of economic reductionism become uncontested features of Marxist discourse. The failure is highlighted by the fact that when Marxism produced a more sensitive

and imaginative perception of the national question, in the work of Otto Bauer, the author was ideologically 'excomlnunicated' and his work was declared "heretic" by the high priests of the Second and Third Internationals. They could not tolerate a transgression of the economistic dogma.

It is not a coincidence that the explanatory power of Bauer's theory developed through a dialogue with sociology, in which he assimilated valid sociological critiques of classical Marxism, without losing any of its basic components. It is perhaps possible that through a successful cross-fertilisation of Marxism and sociology a valid theoretical perception of this highly complex, elusive and recurrent phenomenon could be ascertained. The volatility of the national phenomenon defies monocausal explanations of a sociological or a Marxist kind. Before going on to discuss the Marxist theory, it is necessary to

briefly discuss some terminological problems, since the sociological and Marxist terminology of 'nations' and 'nationalism' belongs to a highly contested field.

Classical Marxists referred to the National Question as the totality of political, ideological, economic and legal relations between national communities. I see no reason not to continue using this term, which is interchangeable with the national phenomenon. Nations are for classical Marxists fully formed national communities, usually in possession of a national state. Nationalities are national communities not fully developed as nations. The distinction between these two

concepts is ambivalent and unclear, so the term national communities will be used instead to cover both cases. This term highlights the communitarian aspect of the national phenomenon. A national stare is the ideal, and often unobtainable symbiosis between a complete nation and a complete state. Whenever the term 'nation' is used it will

denote a closer connection with the national state rather than with the national community. Nationalism is a political and ideological

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movement whose main concern is the wellbeing of the national community, be it real or fictitious. Sometimes nationalisms 'make' national communities. Nationalism was unanimously defined by classical Marxists as a bourgeois phenomenon alien to Marxism. MARX AND ENGELS ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION It has been argued that Marx and Engels did not have a theoretically coherent approach to the national question. It is widely believed that they approached every national movement on an ad hoc basis, their position often dictated by their attitude to circumstantial political events such as the emergence of a democratic movement (the Polish case) or their opposition to a despotic ruler (such as the russian

Czar).2 It will be argued that this approach is incorrect: Marx and Engels had a coherent perception of the national question even if there is no single corpus of literature that explicitly presents their views. A form of economic reductionism combined with a universal social-evolutionary paradigm provides a coherent basis for formulating a theory, which is compatible with the apparently contradictory positions held by the founding fathers of historical materialism in relation to a number of movements. It will be also argued that this unwritten perception provided the intellectual basis for the understanding of the national question by subsequent generations, as well as many of today's generally accepted political and strategical considerations on the nature of national communities. Above all, two considerations appear to be crucial in the formulation of Marx' and Engels' understanding of the national question: the

formulation of a universal and at the same time historically located model for national development (the model 'State-Language-Na

son'), and the capacity or icecapacity of given national communities to evolve from a 'lower' to a 'higher' form of social organisation (the theory of 'historical' vs 'non-historical' nations). Both considerations will be discussed in some detail.

The Pattern State-Language-Nation

For Marx and Engels, what they call 'the modern nation', is the direct result of the process by which the feudal mode of production was

replaced by the capitalist mode. 'Modern nations' could exist only in

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the context of a capitalist economy, and originated in the process of transition from feudalism to capitalism One of the most important features of this transition is that the fragmented feudal society was slowly united under the tutelage of an embryonic modern state. This caused the destruction of local peculiarities and indicated a process of standardisation of populations which was for Engels an essential condition for the formation of markets, and hence necessary to the capitalist system. A strong empirical indicator of this process was the formation of modern West European languages. The capitalist mode of production requires both an intensification of the division of l a b o r and a growing interdependence of the different units of production. Marx and Engels argued that modern Western European languages emerged to consolidate recognisable cultural and political units that will ensure the interdependence of the various units of production and constitute a recognisable market: all under the tutelage of the emerging state. These distinct and recognisable culturalpolitical units, delimited by the territorial area of influence of the emerging absolutist states, were for Marx and Engels the 'modern nations'.4 From the above it is possible to ascertain two essential components or conditions for the existence of such nations. A nation exists if it has: i.

ii.

a large enough population to allow for the internal division of l a b o r that characterises a capitalist society with its competing classes, and a cohesive and sufficiently large territorial space that provides the basis for a feasible state.

This pattern of national formation is clearly derived from Marx' and Engels' observation of the process in Western Europe, particularly in

England and France. It was above all the revolutionary ideals of the French Revolution which inspired Marx' and Engels' understanding of the process of national formation in Europe. The process of national consolidation that followed the French Revolution was regarded as a model for national formation in other less advanced areas of the world, and much of their discussion of the national question, particularly their discussion of the situation in Eastern Europe, appears to be an implicit attempt to formulate a model of 'national development' derived from the principal features of the French case. Since French national consolidation appears to have influenced Marx' and Engels' thought, it may be useful to briefly discuss its main

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features. The Jacobins and other French revolutionaries believed that the best way to proceed to the formation of a democratic state was to follow a path of tight centralisation and linguistic standardisation. It has been widely argued that the mobilising effect of the revolutionary ideology assisted the formation of the first modern nationalist movement creating the unity of the French people (nation). Sieyes and the Jacobins firmly believed that the third estate was the French Nation. However all this belongs to the revolutionary mythology. The geographical area occupied by the French absolutist state, was in fact inhabited during the best part of the period preceeding the Revolution by a conglomerate of linguistic communities, some of which spoke neo-Latin languages (Langue D'Oc, Langue D'oil, Catalan), others Celtic languages (Breton) and others ancient pre-Latin languages (Basque). In reality, the language of the court of Versailles, which subsequently became 'French' was spoken only by a minority of the population of the state, Pierre Giraud argues that 'During the Middle Ages there was not one French language but several French languages. rEach province spoke and wrote its own dialect-15 But in the period immediately preceding the Revolution, the language of Paris began to exercise its definitive supremacy, eventually converting itself into the official language of the State.6 After the revolution, this process was greatly accelerated by the policies of the revolutionary government, anxious to create a uniform

national state with one language for all its citizens. The French language penetrated the family structure of the other national communities via the state educational system.7 But given that a substantial number of citizens of the state were unable to speak Parisian French, the 1791 constitutional convention decided to intensify its

use. Two closely connected reasons account for this: the revolutionaries wished to create a democratic and tightly centralised state, and to ensure the hegemony of the Parisian bourgeoisie against pockets of aristocratic resistance. _ Given the close association between Parisian French and revolutionary aims, it is hardly surprising that the counterrevolution was stronger in those areas where it was hardly spoken. A tightly central-

ised state was bound to destroy the administrative and cultural autonomy of the non-French national communities. This combination of cultural imperialism coupled with tight administrative centralisation, lead to an almost complete destruction of the culture and language of the non-Parisian French national communities. As the

animosity of the oppressed national communities towards the Pari-

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Sian bourgeoisie grew, they became the rallying point for counterrevolutionary activities. The respose of the Jacobins was to equate the national identity of these monfort nate peoples with counterrevolutionary forces, without realising that it was their own lack of sensitiv-

ity towards their cultural aspirations that was pushing them into the arms of reaction. Deputies Barrere and Gregoire presented a report to the 1794 Assembly with a very revealing title: 'Report on the need to destroy rural diaieets (patois) and universalise the use of the French language'. Rosdolsky quotes a revealing passage:

Federalism and superstition speak low Breton, the Emigration and hatred to the Republic speak German, the counter revolution speaks Italian and fanaticism speaks Basque. . . . It is necessary to popularise the (French) language, it is necessary to stop this linguistic aristocracy that seems to have established a civilised nation in the midst of barbaric ones.*'

It is perhaps interesting to note that this tendency to use the French language as the cultural medium for the advancement of revolution-

ary goals was noted by Marx in his famous refutation of Lafar.gue's attempt to declare the abolition of all national differences . . . The English laughed very much when I began my speech by saying that our friend Lafargue and other had spoken "en francais" to us, i.e. a language that nine tenths of the audience did not understand. I also suggested that by the negation of nationalities, he appeared quite unconsciously to understand their absorption by the model French nation" However Marx did not draw any theoretical conclusion from this incident and continued all his life to believe that the 'French Model' was the universal path for national development. Marx and Engels

believed that state centralisation and national unification with the consequent assimilation of small national communities was the only viable path to social progress. Their preference for large centralised states was not only

8

strategic consideration, but also the basis of

their unwritten conceptualisation of the national phenomenon. The reasons for this could be ascertained in their discussion of the civil society, the national state, and what they called the 'historical' national communities.

Marx redefined the Hegelian notion of 'civil society' by locating the

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emergence of the civil society within a specific stage of development of the productive forces, inheriting in this way the universalevolutionist view of Hegel but rejecting its idealistic base. The bourgeois state overcomes the contradictions of the civil society by granting political emancipation, and by establishing that every member of society is an equal partner in popular sovereignty. But, according to Marx, crucial differences still remain since the state leaves intact the world of private interest, and from this he concludes that the state cannot overcome the contradictions that exist within civil society and becomes the reflection of its dominant forces.

The Civil Society embraces the whole material intercourse within a definite stage of development of the productive forces, it embraces the whole of the commercial and industrial life of a given stage, and, insofar, transcends the state and the nation, though, on the other hand, again it must assert itself in its foreign relations as nationality and inwardly must organise itself as a state."

Since the general form of civil society is present in the specific forms "state" and 'nation', and civil society is nothing but the reflection of the dominant forces within it, it follows that in the capitalist mode of production, the hegemonic class (bourgeoisie) is the class that determines the form and content of the civil society. For Marx and Engels, the 'modern nation' is an historical phenomena that has to be located in a precise historical period, the period of the ascendence of the bourgeoisie as an hegemonic class, which at the same time is the period of consolidation of the capitalist mode of production. Thus modern nations are a mere epiphenoinena

of the development of the bourgeoisie, and the former should be

judged on the merits of the latter. If nationalist agitation leads to a 'higher' state in the development of productive forces, than the nationalist movement deserves support. But on the other hand, if nationalist movements emerge among 'historyless' peoples national communities based on peasant-feudal social organisation, incapable of surviving the transformations and upheavals caused by the universalisation of capitalism - these must disappear as separate entities. This vision of the emergence and development of national communities, presented in a social-evolutionist and epiphenomenal way, is coherent with practically every analysis or discussion of specific national communities in the works of Marx and Engels. It constitutes ...-

the essence of their theories of national development, even if not explicitly discussed in any specific work.

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The 'Historyless' Peoples

The way in which Marx and Engels related to certain non-European, stateless or small national communities has been a matter for considerable disquiet among sympathetic commentators since the days of the Second International. However there have been relatively few attempts to understand the reasons behind their positions on the subject and relate them to their overall theory. In what follows, an attempt will be made to provide such a link. The idea of progressive centralisation as the economy evolves from a lower to a higher stage is at the heart of the Marxist analysis of the national question. This premise, as Ian Cummings rightly argues 'runs like a thread through Marx's writings'.11 An important consequence of this point of departure was that Marx and Engels regarded every form of nationalist agitation as aimed towards the formation and consolidation of states, and therefore they dramatically underestimated the ethnic and cultural dimensions of nationalist agitation. For Marx and Engels then, nationalist ideologies are mere epiphenomena of the growth of nations." One initial difficulty with this approach is that it leads on the one hand to a gross overestimation of the heeds of the bourgeoisie to build a national state, and on the other to a gross underestimation of ethnicity. The problem here is not so much the indiscriminate use of Western European models, but rather a 'capitalocentric$13 emphasis in the discussion of national phenomena. Nationalist movements and national communities are always deaned in terms of their position in the capitalist system. As the growth of the nation heralds only the formation of a national state to help the bourgeoisie develop to a higher stage of production, the inescapable logic behind this analysis dictates that national communities that are incapable of constituting themselves into national states are acting against the 'tide of history'. Such national communities are 'functionally reactionary' because they cannot develop a healthy bourgeoisie, and 'intrinsically reactionary' because their mere social existence defies modernity. In this case, their existence in a capitalist environment is a hindrance to social progress, and they must therefore assimilate to more "vital" neighbours. But if these unfortunate communities insist in following a path of national revival, they will become 'socially regressive' since they cannot suiyive under capitalist conditions and must regress to a feudal system. These feudal enclaves will have no other choice but to associate with reactionary forces that oppose the progressive unifying role of the bourgeoisie. These national communities ('ethnographic

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monuments', in Engels' words) must culturally and politically perish to pave the way for the unifying leadership of the bourgeoisie. Following one of the most metaphysical notions of Hegelian political philosophy, Marx and Engels called these national communities 'non-historical nations' (Geschichtslosen VOlker). Why Marx and Engels chose such a Hegelian notion can only be understood if the rigid evolutionary and capitalocentric nature of classical Marxism is taken into account. The central idea behind this dubious concept of 'non-historical nations' is that communities that had proved to be unable to build a national state over a period of time, will not be able to do so in the

future." Hegel, unlike Marx, makes a sharp distinction between a nation and a state. For Hegel a group of people may exist as a national community, but in that conditions are unable to contribute to the unfolding of world history. A nation, according to Hegel, will only fulfil its historical role if it is capable of building a state." Hegel justifies this analysis by arguing that history is the process of development from less to greater freedom, which must be realised in an organised community, i.e. the embryonic state." It is not an accident therefore that what Hegal calls 'uncivilised' peoples have no history, since they have been proved incapable' of having a state. It is from the Hegelian eonceptualisation of history that Marx and Engels draw the nucleus of their evolutionary paradigm. Hegel argued that history cannot be conceived a mere recording of change, but must be first and foremost considered in terms of the unfolding of the human

agency. This is a process of evolution towards an a prioristically defined state of freedom. Hegel's teleological conceptualisation of history indicates not only the direction, but also the stages of evolution towards a higher degree of freedom embodied in a better state.

earlier or less developed ciyilisations must give way to more advanced forms of social organisation that will result in a superior state. Freedom is embodied in the state, and the state in turn is the expression of the particular spiritual values (Grist) o f the people in question. Given this situation, Hegel argues that those .peoples who had proved themselves unable to build a state will never be able to build one and are condemned to perish in the stream of history. While Hegel makes a clear distinction between a state and a nation, he argues that the supporting base for a state is the nation. While the nation is held together by ties of kinship and language, the state is ... .. ..

derived from the ethical ideals derived from the spirit of the national

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community in question (Volkgefst). This 'communal spirit of the people' takes an objective form and creates the state and its institutions, but this is only possible when the quality of the Voftgeisf in question allows for a significant contribution to the unfolding of freedom.

National communities incapable of developing a national state are not the bearers of the 'World Spirit'. These peoples are without rights and 'count no longer in history'.17 The rights of 'barbarian' nations are for Hegel unequal to those of 'civilised nations' which are the true bearers of the spirit of freedom. These idealistic speculations are perhaps one of the weakest features of Hegel's political philosophy and are certainly in direct opposition to an historical materialist conception of history. It is indeed enigmatic to Hnd this conceptualisation echoed in the works of the founding fathers of historical materialism. The revival of hegelian terminology, particularly in the context of the 1848 revolutions, was coupled with an increasing usage of abusive language vis at vis' communities that did not conform with the path to national development discussed above. The intense dislike for these national communities could be ascertained from the following quotations: Spaniards and Mexicans

. . . The Spaniards

are indeed degenerate. But a degenerate Span-

iard, a Mexican that is the ideal. All vices of the Spaniards Boastfulness, Grandiloquence, and Quixotieism -- are found in the

Mexicans raised to the third power . .

.19

Scandinavians

. . . Scandinavism

is enthusiasm for the brutal, sordid, piratical old national traits . for the deep inner life which is unable to express exhuberant ideas aNd sentiments in words, but can express them in deeds, [namely in rudeness towards women, perpetual drunkenness and wild berserk frenzy alternating with tearful sentimentality. . . . Obviously, the more primitive a nation is, the more closely its customs and way of life resemble those of the old noise

noise

people, the more 'scandinavia' it must be."

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Cheese It is almost needless to observe that, in the same measure in which opium has obtained the sovereignty over the Chinese, the Emperor and his staff of pedantic mandarins have become dispossessed of their own sovereignty. It would seem as though history had first to make this whole people drunk before it could raise them out of their hereditary stupidity." North African Bedouins

. . . The struggle of the Bedouins was a hopeless one, and though the manner in which brutal soldiers like Bugeaud have carried on the war is highly blameworthy, the conquest of Algeria is an important and fortunate fact for the progress of civilisation . . and if we may regret that the liberty of the Bedouins of the desert has been destroyed, we must not forget that these same Bedouins

.

were a nation of robbers, whose principal means of living consisted in making excursions upon each other, or upon settled villagers

. . .22

This is only a sample, Marx and Engels were, to put it mildly, impatient and intolerant with ethnic minorities- It is possible to ascertain this from their private correspondence, of which the most famous example is the characterisation of Lasalle as a 'Jewish

Nigger'.23 But the dichotomy 'historical'/'non-historical' nations was revived by Marx and Engels in the context of the 1848 revolution while discussing the revival to national life of the Czechs, Slovaks,

Ukrainians, Serbs, etc., all of which were Eastern European national communities that spoke Slavonic-related languages. These diverse national communities were imaginarily constituted into a fictitious

unit called 'the Southern Slavs'. The reasons that lie behind this can be understood if Marx' and Engels' model of national formation, discussed above, is taken into consideration, If the conditions of a national community do not allow for the formation of a 'viable' state,

this national community has to 'assimilate' to a larger state and a more viable national community, with 'democracy as compensation'.2" In Marx and Engels, the metaphysical notion of Volkgeist was replaced by 'the capacity to enter capitalist relations of production' as the criterion determining historicity, but keeping intact the social-

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darwinian logic of this analysis. Engels presents the argument very clearly:

There is no country in Europe which does not have in some corner or other one or several fragments of peoples, the remnant of a former population that was suppressed and held in bondage by the nation which later became the main vehicle of historical develop-

ment. These relics of a nation, mercilessly trampled under the course of history, as Hegel says, These residual fragments of

peoples (Volkerabfalle) always become fanatical standard bearers of counter revolution and remain so until their complete extimation or loss of their national character, just as their whole existence in general is itself a protest against a great historical revolution. Such in Scotland are the Gaels, the supporters of the Stuarts from 1640 to 1745. Such in France are the Bretons, the supporters of the Bourbons from 1742 to 1800. Such in Spain are the Basques, the supporters of Don Carlos. Such in Austria are the panslavist Southern Slavs, who are

nothing but the residual fragments of peoples, resulting from an extremely confused thousand years of development. This residual fragment, which is likewise extremely confused sees its salvation only in the reversal of the whole European movement, which in its view ought to go not from west to east, but from east to west . . _25

Here we have, as Rosdolsky correctly points out, the repetition and universalisation

of a pattern which first emerged with the French

Revolution, and constitutes the theoretical basis of Marx' and Engels' analysis of the national question. The revolution will destroy the particularisms of the small national communities incorporating them to the 'higher' and 'more advanced' national communities, and being thereby a vehicle for emancipation from feudalism and superstition. German is the 'language for liberty' for the Czechs, as French was for the Basques, Bretons and Catalans. The Jacobins perceived the non-French national communities in their area on influence as reactionary, and Marx and Engels saw the 'South Slavs' as similarly reactionary. The same argument that so strongly denies the right to selfdetermination and historical continuity to the 'non-historical' nations, also sustains a strong justification for the emancipation and

state independence of the so-called 'historical nations'.

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These are national communities capable of being agents of historical transformation, that with the formation of separate national states, will, in the judgment of Marx and Engel further the formation of a strong capitalist economy. Marx and Engels strongly supported the right to state independence of the Irish and Poles, since they were historical nations that did not have at that point in time an independent stay In this sense, HW right to self determination (meaning state independences was only iii right of the 'history-ical' nations, because by becoming independent they also become agents of social transformation for themselves, and for the states that hold them in subjection. Marx argued that England could not embark on a

revolutionary path until 'it got rid' of Ireland. In Capital, Marx shows persuasively that the British occupation of Ireland had the role of inderdeveloping' the Irish economy. Thus Irish independence was supposed to be highly beneficial for the British working class: 'W nation that oppresses another forges its own chains.' But this celebrated slogan is not applicable to the non-historical nations. Contrary to the assertions of some commentators, it has been argued that Marx and Engels had, on the whole, a coherent analysis of the national phenomenon, even if the latter is not explicitly presented over a single corpus of literature. The theory of the 'non-historical' nations is not a curiosity, a slip of tongue, an ad hoc argument or regrettable mishap. It is the result of the formulation of rigid laws of social evolution, which results in the epiphenomenalist equation NATION=BOURGEOISIE=NATIONAL STATE, an unfortunate formula which obscures rather than clarifies the full complexity of national phenomena.

A detailed analysis of the somewhat dated ideas of Marx and Engels on the national question was required here not so much because of their contemporary relevance, but because these ideas and parameters of analysis have, with a few exceptions, deeply permeated the corpus of Marxist literature on the national question, laying the basis for the rigidities and insensitivities of subsequent marxist discussions. The failures of Kautsky, Lenin, Stalin and Luxemburg (among others) to deal adequately with the national phenomenon are the result of the paradigms first systematised by the founding fathers of historical materialism. The formulation of a model that decisively breaks with rigid and epiphenomenological formulations of the national question must begin by reexamining rigid and unilinear inter-

pretations of social evolution, and by questioning the universality of

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certain models. We require an approach that takes into account the different objective and subjective conditions that determine human behavior. This means a theory that recognises the causal plurality of historically determinated human agents, that decisively breaks with mechanical evolutionism, and perhaps above all, that fully appreciates the fundamental importance of logical, cultural and philosophical diversity of the human species, in the analysis of the processes of social transformation and change. Among the classical Marxists, only Otto Bauer managed to partially achieve this break. The theories and

actions of the leaders of the Second and Third internationals fell into the original Marxist paradigmatic trap.

KAUTSKY AND LUXEMBURG

The positions of K. Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg represented two different and often contradictory positions and political strategies in the context of the Second International immediately proceeding World War I. Luxemburg was perhaps the most important leader of the radical left, and Kautsky the unquestionable leader of the socalled 'centrist faction'. But in spite of the strong political and tactical differences between these two positions, it is possible to detect a common, axiomatic point of departure in their analysis of the national question. This is the rigid epiphenomenalist thought that shaped the ideas and political action of the men and women of the

Second International. This analysis argues in essence that there is a direct equation between political and social institutions and most

meaningful features of the economic order. Every social institution is functional to the requirements of the class struggle, and capitalism will evolve to socialism much in the same way as feudalism evolved

into capitalism. Kautsky, strongly influenced by earlier forms of social darwinism, constructed his analysis in terms of the 'natural necessities' of the capitalist mode of production. He perceived history as a succession of interrelated stages, and the iron laws of social evolution as leading to the inevitable goal: the socialist transformation of society. Luxemburg also confid ently predicted the unavoidable collapse of capitalism: 'Though imperialism is the historical method for prolonging the career of capitalism, it is also a sure means of bringing it to a swift conclusion

. . .s'.26 This apocalyptic perception of

the collapse of the

capitalist system was perhaps the most glaring characteristic of the

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mechanistic marxism of the men and women of the Second International, and had a direct iniiuence on the ways in which the national phenomenon was conceptualised over this period. For Kautsky, as for Marx, the origin of the modern nation was unequivocally located in the period that led to the consolidation of the capitalist system. He also argued that the basis of a national community is to be found in the development of national languages, evolved from the idioms use by traders. With the creation of internal markets and the formation of a free labour force, the modern nation merges embracing all classes in society. Nationalism is for Kautsky, the expression of the interests of commercial capitalism and the cover for 'the most sordid profiteeringi" Since the modern capitalist economy shapes and consolidates new markets, the need of all those who speak a common language to be united in a common state becomes all the more evident." Languages, according to Kautsky, play the role of 'barometers' of the development of modern nations. However Kautsky argues that the process of development and consolidation of common languages is by no means abrupt. It is a slow process of evolution in which different dialects merge to form a common language, and is sometimes painful for the communities in question. Often small national communities are reluctant to give up their languages or dialects, but the unescapable laws of capitalist development evolve without mercy. The fate of modern nations is linked with the fate of capitalism, and this is reflected in the fate of

languages To the extent that international communications expand, the need

is felt for a medium of international communication, for a universal language _29

But this "universal" language will not be an artificial language such

as Esperanto. It will be the end result of the process of assimilation and integration of the most important modern languages, as the process of economic development brings into a single system the different national economies." However Kautsky argued that linguistic assimilation in itself is not the solution to the problem. Linguistic difference is a symptom rather than the cause of national differences, which have always to be located at the level of the economy. In order to make his point clear he refers to the Irish question;

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The Irish case is a clear proof that the solution to the "linguistic question" would not be enough to supress a national antagonism , while the economic conditions that created this antagonism in the first place still persist." Thus Kautsky argues that after centuries of British colonisation of Ireland, and the subsequent loss of Gaelic as the national language , Ireland did not become a part of Britain. This was because this country was exploited and colonised rather than integrated and assimilated into the British economy.

For Kautsky then, amalgamation and assimilation of nations is an unavoidable process, but a process that cannot be implemented by political decree. The assimilation of nations into one supernational entity will be the result of the integration of nations into one world system, rather than the result of the political activities of states and governments. Following this line of argument Kautsky argued that the small national communities of the Czarist and Austro-Hungarian empires will not, like the Irish, be assimilated out of political compulsion. But like Gaelic, the languages of the small national communities of the multinational empires have little, if any, political future. The process of assimilation of all nations into an international community will necessarily mean the early vanishing of small national communities. At most, Kautsky argues, their national languages will remain for 'domestic use', in the same way as useless pieces of old furniture is kept for family veneration, but with little, if any, practical use." They will be replaced with the languages spoken in 'the centres of world communication', such as London, Paris, New York and Berlin. Eventually these languages also will disappear, giving way to

a new supranational language. In concrete terms, this means that for Kautsky only the most 'advanced' and 'developed' nations will survive, small national communities, like the Czechs (Kautsky's own) are bound to disappear' in the near future." To the extent that capitalism develops in Bohemia, the importance of the Czech language decreases, and the importance of German increases. Kautsky advises the Czechs to find consolation in the tact that the same fate awaits 'larger' and 'more advanced' national communities. Kautsky's position on the national question remained unchanged through his long and prolific political life. Twenty years after Die Moder re Nationalitrit, Kautsky wrote a polemic article in which he tried to refute Bauer's contention that national communities will

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survive capitalism. In this article he restates his epiphenomenal analysis in all its crudity:

Once we have reached the state in which the bulk of the population of our advanced nations speak one or more world languages besides their own national language, there will be a basis for a gradual reduction leading to the total disappearance of languages of minor nations, and finally, to the uniting of all civilised humanity into one language and one nationality.

ROSA LUXEMBURG AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION Luxemburg always took a most uncompromising position on the national question. She became involved in countless discussions and debates on the subject, particularly in relation to Poland, and this led one of her most important biographers to argue that she had an 'insatiable appetite for public polemics on the subject',35 Her uncompromising opposition to any concession to nationalism or the widely accepted 'right of nations to self determination' must be understood in the context of her discussion of the Polish situation: she was in principle opposed to the creation of a separate Polish state. Around the turn of the century, the demand for the liberation of Poland was one of the most important demands of the newly formed socialist parties. This followed a long tradition dating from the works of Marx and Engels in which Polish independence was considered to be of paramount importance for the revolution in Europe. Luxemburg challenged this interpretation of eveala argued that the

Polish working class in the areas of occupation should join forces with their respective fellow workers in their respective multinational states, rather than joining forces with the Polish petty bourgeoisie and intellectuals for what she regarded as the 'utopian' liberation of Poland. In her article 'Social Patriotism in Poland 736 she argued that industry had 'mushroomed' in Congress Poland (the area under Russian occupation), with the effect of tying it to Russia on which it depended for its markets. In her doctoral thesis for the University of Zurich, 37 Luxemburg presents a substantial amount of data on the link between the Russian and Polish economies, and particularly on how the Russian occupation boosted Polish industry. The independence of Poland would therefore be a retrograde step, producing a

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tariff barrier which would halt Polish industrial development. The revolution would occur sooner if Polish industrial development continues to flourish in a Russian context. These arguments aroused bitter controversies in the Socialist International as well as among Polish socialists- The discussion created a split in the ranks of the Poles over the wider issues of whether social liberation preceeds national liberation or vice versa- Luxemburg left the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and created the Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland (SKDPiL). She accused the leader~ ship of the PPS of being 'Social Patriots' (a phrase that she thus coined and used for the first time). One of the results of this split was

that Luxemburg developed a theoretical and political animosity towards the liberation movements of small national communities, adopting uncompromising positions which puzzled some observers. 38 She discussed the situation of the small communities in Czarist Russia with the same lack of sympathy that was characteristic of Marx and Engels on the 'Southern Slavs'. In an article published in Die Neue Zest, the theoretical journal of the German Social Democratic Party," Luxemburg argued that the Russian middle class was 'imlnature' it sat and watched the freedom of Russia being destroyed because of the conflicts between the various national groups. The many Kirgiz, Baschirs, Lapps and others, the remainders and ruins of former nations had no more to say in the social and political life of Russia than the Basques in France and the Wends in

Germany."

She then rhetorically asks how these numerous nationalities could constitute a parliament and concluded that in two days 'they will tear each others hair out'.41 Clearly the model that emerged from her doctoral thesis, of the lack of viability of small economic units, was the basis for her political analysis. The only 'healthy objective criterion' to judge a nation's performance was to evaluate its capacity to develop productive forces that will help it to evolve towards socialism. But it was only in 1908, when she wrote the article 'The question of nationality and auton-

omy' that her ideas on the national question were presented in a systematic way. In this article Luxemburg argues that the very concept of nation is

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'temporary'; it is not an absolute and permanent standard of measurement, it is no more than the particular way in which the bourgeois society encapsulates its structural arrangement, and this will wither away at the end of the capitalist period." In other words, the nation is nothing else but the ideology of the bourgeoisie 'in disguise' and it will vanish with the class society. Luxemburg argues that the concept of self determination is 'abstract' and 'metaphysical', because notions of rights and ethics are themselves the outcome of idealist philosophy and therefore alien to historical materialism. To talk about the right of nations to self determination is for Luxemburg like arguing that the working class has the right to eat off 'golden plates' - an irrelevant metaphysical assertion. The problems of national oppression will be solved with .the problems of oppression in general, and not by engaging in discussions about the 'rights of nations'. The essential part of this argument is the idea that a nation as a transcendental entity simply does not exist:

. . . In a society based on classes, the nation as a uniform social and political whole simply does not exist. Instead there are within nations classes with antagonistic interests and 'righrsl There is literally no social arena, from the strongest material relationship to the most subtle moral one, in which the possessing classes and the self conscious proletariat could take one and the same position as an undifferentiated national whole.

Since the nation as a uniform entity does not exist, support for the right of nations to self-determination invariably means support for

the 'rights' of the bourgeoisie. The epiphenomenal analysis of Luxemburg perceives every form of national existence as an expression of bourgeois ideology. National oppression is for Luxemburg a symptom and not a cause; the working class has no time for symptoms, it must solve the causal problems of exploitation and oppression.

The nation was for Kautsky and Luxemburg a passing phenomenon closely related with the fate of the class society which will inevitably collapse as productive forces develop towards their teleological end- This epiphenomenal analysis was the paradigmatic trap that greatly impoverished the capacity of historical materialism to correctly perceive the real dimensions of the national phenomenon and helped lead to the resounding Marxist defeats of the First and

Second World Wars.

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THE BOLSHEVIKS AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION In terms of the rigid evolutionist notions that prevailed in the thought and actions of the leaders of the Second International, a revolution in Russia would have been almost inconceivable. But at the same time , to regard Lenin's break with the rigid epiphenomenal and evolutionist paradigms of the Second International as an attempt to justify the Bolshevik revolution, is an equal oversimplification of its social and political background. The social and political structure of Czarist Russia defied attempts to extrapolate rigid Western models of development. Located on the

physical and political periphery of Europe, inhabited by more than one hundred national communities, Czarist Russia's social and political order was perceptibly different from that of Central and Western Europe. This difference was certainly a major factor in the transformation experienced by Marxism in Russia and in the originality of Lenin's work. Above all, three aspects of Lenin's innovations in the theory and practice of Marxism have a direct bearing on the MarxistLeninist analysis of the national question: Lenin's perception of the revolution, his emphasis on the political dimension, and his theories of imperialism. In direct opposition to the belief that the revolution will take place as a result of the inescapable tide of history, Lenin stressed the revolutionary importance of a properly organised party of the working class with a correct theoretical analysis of the situation. Classical Marxists predicted that the revolution will take place in advanced capitalist societies, Lenin argued that bourgeois-democratic revolutions in less advanced societies could eventually be transformed into

fully fledged socialist revolutions. The third Leninist innovation was the reformulation of the previously developed theory of imperialism into a theoretical analysis that articulates the social contradictions of the class struggle with the national contradictions of imperialist domination. The above mentioned innovations introduced by Lenin resulted in the intense politicisation of the national question, for it was above all at the political level that the Bolsheviks made their most important contributions to the discussion of the national phenoinenon.

By the turn of the century the socialist reference point on the national question was the resolution of the London meeting of the Second International calling for the right of nations to self determina-

tion.44* The concrete meaning of this resolution is rather vague, for

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self determination could mean different things (autonomy, independence, etc), and it could also be implemented in different ways. However 'self determination' had for Lenin a clear and unambiguous meaning: 'We must inevitably reach the conclusion that self determination of nations means the political separation of nations from alien national bodies, and the formation of independent national states."'5 National self determine ation meant for Lenin the exclusive right to separation in the political sense. In order to explain the reasons behind this position, he draws upon Kautsky's analysis and argues that throughout the world, the period of final victory of capitalism over feudalism has been linked with the development of national movements. In The Right of Nations to Self DeterminatioN, Lenin repeats Kautsky's fundamental assertions on the centrality of language for the development of nations. According to Lenin, unity of language is one of the most important conditions for genuinely free and extensive commercial intercourse, to the extent needed for the development of capitalism, for a free and broad grouping of the population in its different classes and for the establishment of a close connection between the market and each proprietor and between seller and buyer. Consequently the tendency of every national movement is towards the formation of national states, under which the requirements of modern capitalism can be best satisfied. The economic logic of capitalism drives towards this goal. Therefore, according to Lenin, the 'typical', 'normal' state is a national state." So far, Lenin's theoretical analysis appears to be almost identical as the one sustained by Kautsky. Both refer to the nation as the outcome of the emerging capitalist system, and as an expression of bourgeois hegemony. Both give crucial importance to language as the

nucleus of the national community, and both conspicuously fail to distinguish theoretically between the capitalist state and the nation. Both exhibit the main features of the class reductionist analysis: The bourgeoisie and the nation are closely connected in a relation of causality from the former to the latter. From the Kautsky-Lenin assertion that the national state is 'typical' state under capitalism, Lenin derives his most original contribution to the debate, the theory of the 'right of nations to self determinations While this theory accepts the basic theoretical premises of the Marx-Kautsky position, it differs from the former analysis on the principled application of the concept 'self-determination' to every national community. Lenin asserts that self determination

means only the right to political separation of oppressed national

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communities, and the constitution of separate national states. It means neither 'federation' nor 'autonomy': . . . Self Determination of Nations he Marxist programme cannot from a Hlstornco-economic point of view have any other meaning than political self determination, state independence and the formation of a national state."

For Lenin then, the right to self determination means only the right to state independence in the political scnse.'*9 Lenin justifies advocacy of the right of nations to self determination by arguing that this is a way of ensuring the development of productive forces under capitalism. In this sense for Lenin the na-

tional question must be looked upon within 'delimitive' historical limits, namely the development of capitalist relations of production. This means that a clear distinction must be drawn between two

historically different periods. The first is that of the collapse of feudalism and absolutism in which the 'bourgeois-democratic' state is formed and the national movement becomes a mass movement under the leadership of bourgeoisie. The national struggle in this case deserves to be supported because it is part and parcel of the struggle for civil and political liberties and for democracy. The second is the period of fully formed capitalist states, with long established constitutional regimes and above all a highly developed antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. In this case support for national movements is like supporting the bourgeoisie's consolidating power of the expense of the proletariat. From this analysis he draws the conclusion that national movements should be supported if their aim is to build a 'bourgeois-democratic' national state, but not when the 'bourgeois-democratic' state achieves its maturity. In this sense it is very interesting to note that Lenin argued that bourgeois-democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe did not begin until 1905 while in Western Europe they were completed by 1871.SO This rigid and formalistic presentation of a universal path of social evolution leads Lenin to argue that in Western Europe nationally uniform states became 'the rule', and to seek tht: right to selfdetermination in Western Europe was to ignore the 'ABC of Marxism'.51 Lenin's theory of the right of nations to self determination achieves its greatest impact when it is connected with his theory of imperial-

ism. One of the most important implications of this theory is that

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imperialism transforms capitalism into an interconnected world system in which a 'central' group of nation-states oppress a majority of peripheral countries. In this situation the contradiction between the oppressed national communities of the periphery and the oppressor national states belonging to the centre constitutes one of the main contradictions of the imperialist system. The national movements of the colonial and oppressed national communities are 'always progressive' in relation to the oppressor national states, because they represent a rupture in the 'weakest link' of the imperialist chain. Lenin's most important and original contribution to the Marxian discussion of the national question was his articulation of the inherent class convict of the capitalist system with the inherent national conflict of the imperialist system. Stalin in The Foundations of Leninism summarises the differences between the classical orthodox approach of the Second International and the innovations introduced by Lenin:

Formerly the national question was usually confined to a narrow circle of I-Iungarians, the Poles, the Finns, the Serbs and several other European nationalities. This was the circle of unequal peoples in whose destinies the leaders of the Second International were interested. The scores and hundreds of millions of Asiatic and African peoples who are suffering national oppression in the most savage and cruel form usually remained outside their Held of vision. Lenin's break with the epiphenomenalist ideas of the Second International in fields of political struggle. imperialism and revolu-

tion had a direct effect on his perception of the national question. It enlarged the concept of self determination in a way in which it became articulated into the anti-imperialist struggle. The politicisa-

tion of the national question, to the extent that it became in the work of Lenin one of the main contradictions of the imperialist world, is both the main advantage and weakness of the Leninist theory, as we shall see. STALIN AND THE BOLSHEVIK STRATEGY

Contemporary discussions of Marxist-Leninist theories, particularly sympathetic ones," tend to diminish Stalin's contribution. If Stalin is

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the 'enfant terrible' of the bolsheviks, then he should be detached as much as possible from Lenin. But whatever crimes were committed by Stalin in his leadership of the Soviet Union cannot refute the fact that he was regarded in the early years of the Bolshevik movement as the highest party authority on the national question. In 1913 he left for Vienna, possibly sent by Lenin,54 to study the theories of the Austro-Marxists and to produce a monograph on the Bolshevik theoretical position on the national question. The 'marvellous Georgian who sat down to produce an article=55 in fact produced a mediocre monograph, which engaged in a discussion of Bauer's theories without seeming to understand them properly. However, Lenin at the time believed that the essay was a 'very good one'.56 In 'Marxism and the National Question', Stalin defines the principal task of Social Democracy as protecting the peoples against 'epidemic' of militant nationalism, which however he fails to define. But without any doubt the most important part of this essay is Stalin's additive definition:

A nation is an historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make up manifested in a community of culture." Language and unit of economic life were already in Kautsky's and Lenin's discussions on the subject. Community of territories is a derivative category of Lenin's theory of the right of nations to self determination; for if self determination means secession and the formation of separate states the territorial component is essential. The concept of 'psychological make up manifested in a community of culture' is derived directly from Bauer"s definition of nations as

communities of destiny formed into communities of character (see next section). By integrating this element into his definition of nations, Stalin is implicitly accepting Bauer's main contention th at the nation is a historical community which is created through a common cultural, social and historical experience. The problem for Stalin was that this last argument was precisely the point of contention between Bolsheviks and Austria-Marxists. Lenin never accepted the cultural unity of the nation." Lowy and Davies rightly argue that the concept of 'psychological make up' is not at all Leninist, because Lenin's argument is exclusively political. At least Stalin was aware o f the one-sidedness of the exclusive emphasis on the political level. It is

possible to see in Stalin's work an implicit acknowledgement that

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national communities are multi-faceted phenomena, which cannot be satisfactorily explained only taking into account the political and economic development. in fact, Lowy's criticism of Stalin for using culturalist elements in his definition is a good example of arid dogmatism caused by the rigid Leninist appreciation of the national phenomenon:

In fact, the idea of 'national psychology' has more in common with certain superficial and pre-scientific folklore than with a Marxist analysis of the national question."

The main problem of Stalin's definition of nations is that it excludes a large number of modern national communities. If Stalin's definition is accepted, the Germans would have been two nations, Italy would have only become a nation in the nineteenth century, the Puerto Ricans in New York and in Puerto Rico would have been two nations, etc. Stalin's understanding of the right of nations to self determination appears to differ from that of Lenin: The right of self determination means that a nation can arrange ifs life according to its own will. It has the right to enter into federal relations with other nations, it has the right to complete secession .en Lenin, in the same year in which Stalin's article was published, wrote to the Armenian Bolshevik, Schaoumian: The right to self determination is an exception to our general premise of centralisation. This exception is absolutely essential in view of reactionary Great Russian nationalism, and any rejection of this exception is opportunism (as in the case of Rosa Luxemburg), it means foolishly playing into the hands of reactionary Great Russian nationalism. But exceptions must not be too broadly

interpreted. In this case there is not, and must not be anything more , than the right to secede." In theory Stalin's version of the right of nations to self determination is far less rigid than Lenin's version, in practice Stalin was much less prepared to compromise his wish to achieve the highest possible

centralisation of the Soviet State. In the same article Stalin gives a clue as to what will be his behaviour ten years later as Comissar of

Nationalities:

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The National problem in the Caucasus can be solved only by drawing the backward nations and peoples into the common stream of higher culture." The main achievement of Lenin and Stalin is their successful articulation of national and colonial questions, thereby breaking the eurocentric bias of the Second International. 'Putting politics in command' is both the strength of the Bolshevik Approach, because it politicised the national question to the point it required a separate solution, an improvement on the Second International understanding that national oppression was part of 'oppression in general'; and its

weakness because in his rigid interpretation of the right of nations to self determination as meaning only the right to secession, Lenin failed to grasp the ethnocultural aspects. This point is further clarified by discussing his understanding of the All Russian situation. Lenin believed that the 'centrifugal forces' operating in Russia were 'psychological in origin', a consequence of national oppression. As long as national oppression was allowed to exist, Lenin believed that the victirnised national community was receptive to national agitation , once repression ceases, the psychological basis for nationalism and separatism will vanish. What better way could there be of striking at the very root of national oppression than to guarantee to every nation the right to political independence?63 Obviously Lenin was wrong, there is more than mere reaction to oppression in nationalist ideologies. believed that 'national culture is a divisible unit: each class in the nation has a different culture'While Lenin was wrong in denying the cultural unity of a nation, he was not entirely mistaken in his equation of a hegemonic national

culture and major aspects of ruling class ideology. It was in fact a regrettable irony that the only theoretical analysis of the national question that could have provided Lenin and Stalin with useful insight into those areas that they neglected in their analysis, was precisely the theory that they set out to fiercely criticise, with the sense of self righteousness so characteristic of the polemical discussions of the Bolsheviks: the theory of Otto Bauer. THE SOCIOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION: THE THEORY OF OTTO BAUER The nationalities theory of Otto Bauer has been unjustifiably omitted

from many contemporary discussions of the theoretical and empirical

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aspects of the process of national formation. In the English speaking world he has been virtually ignored. His monumental work Die Nationalitatenfrage and die Sozia£demokratie64 has not yet been translated into English, except for some subsections of paragraphs 10 and 30.65 Moreover, not only is Bauer's work unavailable in English or French," but a number of important works on nationalism make only passing references to it," which are not always very accurate. This is not surprising given the difficulties in reading the original work and the unjustified distortions that it suffered in the hands of its Leninist critics." In spite of the challenge to Marxism posed by the recurrence of nationalist movements, the highly original contribution of Bauer appears to have been forgotten. This omission is all the more puzzling when his prominent role in the Marxist debates around the turn of the century is taken into account." Kolakowski considers that Bauer's work is '. . . the best treatise on nation ality problems to be found in Marxist literature and of the most significant products of Marxist theory in general,870 while H. B. Davies argues that Bauer's book remains to this day, 'the most pretentious Marxist treatise in the f1eld'."'1 So why was Bauer's work forgotten? This form of 'Marxist amnesia' seems to have three related causes. Firstly, a substantial number of commentators argue that Bauer's work was primarily devoted to a discussion of the nationalities problem in the context of the AustroHungarian empire, in this multinational state. Consequently, it has been argued that with the collapse of the Habsburg Empire, Bauer's analysis ceased to have w relevance to contemporary national 'Pi,

r

""""v"

movements- While it is true that empirical case study of Bauer's work

is devoted mainly to the study of the development of the German, and to a certain extent, the Czech nation, the theoretical contribution of this work certainly goes beyond the empirical examples. Secondly, Bauer's main programmatic proposals in the context of the Habsburg State (the notion of 'cultural-national' autonomy) are confused with his theoretical analysis, to the point that the failure the programme of national-cultural autonomy is considered tantamount to the failure of Bauer's theory. This is the line of argument taken by most Leninist critics of Bauer, who were very anxious to criticise the notion of 'cultural-rlational autonomy since it contradicted the Leninist notions of both 'democratic centralism' and the national quest son. The Jewish 'Bund' and other Social Democratic parties of the

oppressed national communities of the Czarist Empire were inspired

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by the programme of national-cultural autonomy in their demands for self rule in the context of Russia, since the Bolsheviks opposed these demands, it was a matter of great political urgency for them to refute Bauer's argument." Their argument was inaccurate in a number of ways. The programme of national~cultural autonomy was not 'invented' by Bauer, it was first discussed in the congress of the Austrian Socialist Party held in Brno (Bruno) in 1899, and Bauer was then too young to attend this meeting. Secondly the project for national cultural autonomy is not a theoretical discussion, but a programmatic political position taken by socialists when confronted with specific political issues in the context of pre~]914 Austria. Bauer

himself was critical of some aspects of this programme, and as Lenin was always quick to quote, Bauer also supported state independence

on a number of occasions. The third element that contributed to this form of amnesia is perhaps the most important: the unchallenged intiuence of economistic paradigms in the Second and Third Internationals. In this context 'economism' relates to two situations which appear to signify different attitudes towards so called 'superstructural' phenomena in gen-

eral (although they are not entirely independent from each other at the conceptual level). These attitudes are defined by C. Mouffe as 'epiphenomenality and 'class reductionism'.73 'Epiphenornenality' refers to the conception which regards every so-called superstructural phenomena as a mere reflection of the economic base. In this sense, a correct understanding of the economic base is necessary and sufficient for the complete explanation of what occurs at the level of the superstructure. The transparent relations between the socio-political and economic spheres, do not allow for any form of autonomy of the

former from the latter. The economic relations of production are the only source of causality. A 'class reductionist' approach represents variation of .emphasis in the same conceptual framework. Social classes are considered to be the only possible historical subjects. Ideologies and other 'superstructural' phenomena (such as nation alis and national identities) 'belong' to different social classes located in the base, but this does not prevent them from having a certain relative autonomy from the latter. While all type of contradictions are determined by class positions, they may not relict transparently the positions of those classes at the economic level. Political and organisational activities may advance or delay (according to the circumstances) the outcome

of class struggle.

-

.-

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The first form of econornism characterises the thought of the most important figures of the Second International, including the previously discussed theories of Kautsky and Luxemburg on the National question. The second is best exemplified in our previous discussion on Lenin's and Stalin's work on the national question. While the first form of economism has been much criticised in the contemporary literature on the subject, the second continues to be the dominant form of Marxist analysis, or at least it was until very recently." Bauer's discussion on the nature of national communities cannot be encapsulated in any of the above economistic paradigms, and

therefore was excluded as 'idealistic' and 'non-marxist' by the defenders of the prevailing marxist orthodoxy. Given the powerful impact of the ideas and actions of the Bolsheviks in 20th century Marxism, it is not surprising that Bauer's work on the national question was consigned to oblivion. In his discussion of the nature of nations, Bauer incorporates a number of ideas directly taken from mainstream German sociology. In particular, Ferdinand Ton fies' Gemeinsc/*raft and Gesellschaft was a considerable influence on his work. In sharp distinction to previous analysis of the national question, Bauer does not begin from the role of the bourgeoisie, nor from the mode of production, nor even from the point of view of class struggle. He begins from what he calls 'national character? The question of the nation could only be developed from the concept of 'national character'. Let us take the first German we come across to a foreign country, for example among the English. He will immediately perceive the change. They are other people,

with a different way of thinking, of feeling, people who when confronted with the same external stimuli will react differently

from the average German. Provisionally, we shall call the set of physical and spiritual connotations which distinguish one nation from another its 'national character'.75

Bauer acknowledges that groups of peoples that share occupations or belong to the same social class, are bound to have common elements that transcend national differences. Also as an internationalist, he acknowledges the ties H solidarity that unite workers of different

nations, but carefully differentiates this solidarity from 'national character'. The question of the intensity of the cultural bonds be-

tween proletariat and the bourgeoisie has nothing to do with the

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question of the attitude of the workers to their own bourgeoisie, or to workers of other nationalities. The question of solidarity between workers is ethical and political, and has nothing to do with the intensity of a community of character. Bauer is also aware that the notion of 'national character' has been often monopolised by idealistic and transhistorical theories, which try to present the national character as a metaphysical essentiality from which causal explanations about the behaviour of nations are derived. To counteract idealistic distortion Bauer locates the national character in a historical perspective. While the Germans at the time of Tacitus had a common culture that distinguished them from the Romans, it cannot be denied that contemporary Germans have more culturally in common with other European national communities

than with their carly forebears. For Bauer national character is being constantly modified by the forces of history: the community of character links the members of a nation only for a limited historical p e r i o d " The national character is only a descriptive category. To acknowledge that there are different national characters is not an explanation, but something to be explained:

By acknowledging the differences between national characters, Science has simply enunciated, not solved the problem."

The common national character does not constitute the nation but

it is its concrete expression. Once the community of character has been identified, the task of the researcher is to explain the sociological and historical conditions for its emergence. Bauer provides a first

approximation to this discussion: national character is a determining factor in the sphere of will. For Bauer 'wilT (Wills) is exteriorised in

every cognitive process through which subjects perceive certain an servable phenomenon, taking only those characteristics characteristics into account and ignoring or giving secondary importance to others. This is to say that for Bauer 'wilT is a process of subjective selectivity, and in the case of the national character of collectivesubjective selectivity. Bauer then goes on to provide a narrower appreciation of the national character. National character ceases to a descriptive observation of cultural behaviour, to become a form of ...__

socialised subjectivity. Different national communities have different

perceptive criteria of morality, justice etc. This diversity of criteria is

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not according to Bauer the result of diversity of will, on the contrary, these diverse perceptive criteria determine the diversity of will. For Bauer then, national character is not a fixed and immutable phenomenon, but the result of the historical forces that shape the national community. The diversity of orientation and the diversity of what it is possible to call today 'cultural characteristics of nations' are the result of the different historical experiences of these national communities, and the result of the diverse conditions, material and spiritual, that shaped the nation in its struggle for existence. The diversity of historical conditions and experience, the different forms of social organisation, as well as the diversity of geographical and physical conditions is what determines the specificity of each national community. For Bauer, the nation is not only the result of the historical determination of material conditions of existence, it is also a form of communal fife, emanating from the latter. The nation is in Bauer's words a 'community of fate'.79 Bauer distinguishes two related concepts, 'community' and 'homogeneity' and to illustrate the difference he provides an historical example. Britain and Germany faced in the nineteenth century a similar process of capitalist development. The same historical forces decisively influenced both national communities, but despite these similar experiences Britain and Germany didn't constitute one nation. This is because according to Bauer, 'community of fate' is not the same as being subjected to the same fate. A 'community of fate' signifies not only the experience of the same historical circumstances,

but the common experience of this historical circumstances. To the experience of the same historical circumstances Bauer calls 'homogeneity of fate', and to the common experience of the same histori-

cal circumstances Bauer calls 'community of fate'.80 The term 'community of fate' is defined by Bauer in Kantian terlns,81 meaning a process of 'reciprocal common interaction'. It is only the historical experience (fate) lived in a situation of common and reciprocal interaction, what generates a national community. The fact that this is not only the product of similar historical circumstances, but also experiences them in common is what distinguishes it from other forms of 'communities of character' such as the working class, etc. The common experiences of the working class are of a different order from the communal experiences of the nations. The common experiences of oppression under capitalism may cause the working class Of different nations to react in the same way, and even

to join forces against their common enemy, the capitalist class. But

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the experience of the French, Russian and British working class is not a joint 'communitarian' experience, only a common experience in different situations of the injustices of capitalism. The 'communitarian' relations exist between the German workers and the German bourgeoisie, the British workers and the British bourgeoisie, etcCommunitarian experience may not be conducive to solidarity, communitarian relations could indeed be asymmetrical and exploitative . A communitarian experience is indicating the fact that the lived social experiences interact with each other, and this interaction may shape the participants' perception of reality. The communal ties that link the members of the nation are the

result of common interaction. In this sense Bauer resorts to sociological theory to make his argument explicit. He uses the concepts of "community" and 'society' of F. Ton fies.82 Community is the bond resulting from the process of common interaction whereby the characteristics and identity of the members is the result of this process of interaction. In this sense the individual national subject does not preexist the national community, he or she is constructed by it. The national identity and culture of each member of the nation is the result of his/her socialised existence.

For us society is not a mere addition of individuals, but each individual is the product of society. In the same way, the nation is not a mere addition of individuals that interact through a common language. The individual himself is the product of the nation, his

(her) individual character does not emerge in other form but through his (her) interaction with other individuals." It is this communality of soeialised experience which determines

many of the cultural, moral, aesthetic, etc. forms of the national community. The bond of communication, which according to Bauer is crucial for the formation of the national community, does not occur in a 'face to face' interaction with other members of the community. It is rather the result of what we may call today the use of a common medium or 'code' of communication. This is often a national language, but there is no intriNsic need for this code to take a linguistic form.84 Bauer argues that fellow nationals are often affected by the same 'channels' of communication: workers and bourgeois of the same national community often live in the same city, read similar newspapers, and (it will be possible to add with the hindsight of

contemporary experiences) are subjected to the same media, see

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similar TV programmes, take part in the same elections, and are subjected to the same forms of propaganda. In this sense, an aspect neglected by Bauer is the growing influence of the state apparatus and dominant ideologies in shaping the national culture over a given historical period. Certainly the enormous expansion of mass communication validates Bauer's argument on the interaction between members of national communities, though the term 'interactioIl' is not perhaps the most adequate way of describing the effects of very complex networks of communications that shape contemporary S0cieties. Bauer neglected the role of the state in the formation of national communities: contemporary states almost always take this form and where a community does not exist, the state creates one in the long run. The American nations are cases of successful national creations by states, but the same process in Asia and Africa appears to be less successful. Bauer's theory of the national community is a clear example of a successful interaction between sociology and Marxism. This interaction produced a more complex and sophisticated theory than the previously discussed economistic paradigms. This theory was not universally accepted by Bauer's contemporaries, nor it will be universally accepted today, but it is a bold and thought provoking investigation into a subject that defies the validity unidimensional theories, as Kautsky and Lenin learned to their own peril.

CONCLUSION: THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE The interwar period saw very little change to the previous discussion

of the national question. The economic reductionist positions of the Second and Third Internationals pushed the debate into a relative stalemate at the time when a correct understanding of national phenomena was a matter of the upmost political and ideological urgency. It is then not surprising that the emergence of fascist movements caught Marxists off guard. Perhaps the only exception in this period of rigidity and dogmatism is the work of Antonio Gramsci. Like Bauer, Grarnsci also understood the importance of national culture in the correct understanding of national phenomena. Gramsci's view of national culture comes close to the one advocated by Bauer. Culture for Gran sci unifies a series of social strata, to the extent

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that they understand each others' modes of expression. From this, Gran sci deduces the crucial importance of national cultures: . . . From this, one can deduce the importance o f t h e cultural aspect, even in practical (collective) activity. An historical act can be only performed by a collective man, and this presupposes the attainment of a 'cultural-social' unity through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims are welded together with a single aim, on the basis of an equal and common perception of the world.85

Gran sci agrees with Bauer that common culture is an important aspect in the crystallisation process Of the national community. No hegemonic class can emerge in society without having a claim to represent society as a whole. National culture becomes , a 'contested' field between the fundamental classes in society. Gran sci urges the working class to monopolise the national culture by becoming the 'national class' much in the same way as the bourgeoisie became the national class during the French RevoIution.8' A more recent attempt to provide a fresh insight into the national question is the 'internal colonialism' thesis. This thesis was strongly inspired by the ideas of the so called 'dependency' theories of A. Gunder Frank and his disciples. The dependency model first emerged as a critique of 'modernisation' theories in Latin America, particularly as a reaction to the dubious claim of European and North American specialists, like W. Rostow. The crux of Rostow's argument was that the development of Europe and North America could be replicated in Latin America. In sharp rebuff to this argument

Gunder Frank and his disciples argued that the strong North American and European economies had been built on the structural underdevelopment of peripheral areas such as Latin America.8? The theories of 'internal colonialism' try to apply the same model of analysis to relatively deprived areas of Western Europe. This theory argues that the great colonial powers such as Great Britain and France, and to a certain extent Spain, not only expanded by acquiring overseas colonies, but their expansion is also the reflection the relative underdevelopment of certain areas within those states. Michael Hechter wrote a very detailed study of the development and consolidation of the British state, concluding that British capitalism developed through the exploitation not only of external colonial

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resources, but also of its Celtic peripheral national communities, creating 'internal colonies' within the British State." From the point of view of our discussion, the main argument that emerges here is that thro-national identities persisted because of uneven economic development and relative deprivation. The rc-

emergence of nationalist movements in peripheral areas of European and North American states is therefore explained in terms of 'unequal development Despite the novel use of the dependency model to explain nationalist militancy, this hardly introduces any new insights into the process of national formation. The argument that nationalism and the persistence of national identities are the result of

the persistence of economic inequalities sounds depressingly familiar. Here we have again an attempt to explain the existence of nations and nationalism in terms of something else, and that something else is again economic inequalities. As A. D. Smith argues, this model will be hard put to explain the resurgence of the national identity of Euzkadi and Catolonia within the context of the Spanish state. Are the areas inhabited by Basques and Catalans relatively more 'economically advanced' in industrial terms than the Castillian centre?89 Tom Nairn's celebrated work, The Break Up of Britain represents a more complex attempt to reformulate the same theoretical analysis with aid of a number of case studies from the British Isles. His theoretical analysis begins, as we have seen, with the provocative statement that the theory of nationalism represents Marxism's great historical failure," a failure that had been shared with other social disciplines including sociology. In the context of the Marxist theory, Nairn argues that this failure was exacerbated by the sinister coincidence that it was a text of the 'great

dictator' Stalin that was most suited for cancnisation. Nairn is undoubtedly right about Stalin's 'Marxism and the national question', but it must not be forgotten that the canonisation took place in the name of 'Marxism-Leninism'. Nairn argues that the failure of classical Marxism was ' unavoidable', because historical development had not at the time produced certain 'things' necessary for such a theory. Unfortunately it is not that clear from Nairn's arguments what such

necessary things are, although he gives us certain clues. Nairn is generally right when he argues that classical Marxism had underestimated the force and vitality of nationalism, but it seems unfair to both Lenin and Bauer to argue they did not foresee the importance of nationalism

to capitalist development. However,

Nairn returns .to familiar and less convincing arguments when he

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argues that the 'real origins' of nationalism are to be located in the machinery of world political economy. Nationalism is not the result of the quest for national identity or culture, but it is the result of uneven development of history since the eighteenth century. This unevenness is for Nairn a material fact: This statement allows us to reach a satisfying and near paradoxical conclusion. The most notoriously subjective ideal of historical phenomena is in fact a by-product of the most brutally hopelessly material side of the history of the last two centuries."

Here again we have a depressing repetition of the epiphenomenal analysis. Nationalism and nations are explained in terms of 'something else' which seems to be part of the world economy. One wonders as to whether the 'great historical failure' of marxism so eloquently enunciated by Nairn is not connected with this repetition. A more original analysis is to be found in Nicos Poulantzas' State, Power, Socialism, which argues that there is a connection between the state and the modern nation. The state exhibits the historical tendency to encompass a single, constant nation, and at the same time, modern nations exhibit the tendency to form their own states." Poulantzas argues that the failure to explain the reasons for this connection constitutes the most important failures of previous Marxist investigations on this subject. Poulantzas goes on implicitly to criticise Lenin and Kautsky by arguing that the generalisation of commodity exchange cannot adequately account for the creation of the modern nation, all based in the development of economic forces and in the formation of internal markets do nothing to explain why the unification of society is to be located at the level of the nation."

Poulantzas identifies the problem correctly by arguing that there is no logical connection between the state and the nation, and he is also right in arguing that any theory attempting to explain the formation of national states, and the tendency of nations to form states needs to provide a convincing explanation of this connection. However Poulantzas' own explanation is less convincing: he does not enter into the origins and dynamics of nations, but is only interested in the nation insofar as the nation provides useful insights into the nature of modern states. The modern nation appears as a product of the state, since its constitutive elements (economic unity, territory, tradition)

are

modified through the state's direct activity in material organisation

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of space and time. The modern nation further tends to coincide with the state since it is actually incorporated by the state and acquires flesh and blood in the state apparatuses: it becomes anchorage of state power in society and maps out its contours. The capitalist state is functional to the nation.94

Poulantzas is right in stressing the important role of the state in shaping and restructuring modern nations. It is also possible to safely argue that the modern state creates nations where they have previously not existed. The case of Latin America is very much an example of this. The Argentinian or the Mexican nations would have not become into existence if these would have not been created by the Argentinian or the Mexican states. However this is not the whole story. As Walker Connor shows, only about 10 per cent of Modern States encompass one single national community.95 In most European and North American states it is possible to find ethnic and national communities that desperately cling to their ethnocultural identities in spite of covert and overt efforts of the state to assimilate them into the hegemonic nation. This phenomena is not only European, many non-European states face increasing militancy of thro-national minorities, in spite of ruthless efforts to eradicate their separate existence. Poulantzas' analysis scores an important point in that it emphasises the role of the state in the formation of modern nations, and this is certainly one of the weakest points in the theory of Bauer and Lenin. But one should never be drawn into monocausal explanations in such complex phenomena as the national question. Much in the same way as Kautsky and Lenin fall victims of economic reductionism by emphasising

economical causal variables in the process of national formation Poulantzas appears to be falling into a form of 'political reductionism' by over-emph asising the role of the state. However, his work exhibits the first signs of a longly awaited break with economic reductionism in the theoretical discussion of the national question . The recent book by Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities continues this trend, with a most interesting attempt to understand the cultural and ideological dimensions of modern National communities. He argues that a nation is an 'imagined political commu-

nity', imagined as inherently limited (there are always 'other' nations) and sovereign in the political sense. 3 g an imagined' community because even the members of the smallest nation will

never meet most their fellow members, yet in the minds of each lives

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the image of their communion. The constitution of these 'imagined communities' was caused by the collapse of the old aristocratic religions that monopolised the knowledge of the written word in the hands of a few, and the collapse of universal 'high certes' of human loyalties, in the form of dynastic rulers and capitals of empires. Anderson argues further that the convergence of capitalism and print technology together with the 'fatality' of linguistic diversity created the possibility of an imagined community which set the stage for the modern nation." For Anderson then, national identities are forms of 'consciousness of the collective' as opposed to a Durkheimian 'collective consciousness'. The nation is an 'ideological' phenomena in which the individual member is conscious of his/her belonging to the community and has a sense of imagined solidarity other members. The idea that the national community is an. ideological construct of which the individual member is conscious of his/her belonging, denotes a very important dimension of the national phenomena. But this dimension is however incomplete. The sense of belonging and the sentiment of national solidarity do not in themselves constitute national communities. An English person, before being conscious of hisser belonging to England (and not to France) and his sense of solidarity with fellow English people, is a social being whose social personality has been constructed to communicate and perceive reality in a certain codified manner. The 'ideological' approach of Anderson underemphasises the socialised nature of the human agency, a point that has been convincingly developed by Bauer. Anderson appears therefore to fall in a form of 'ideological reductionism', which again defies the complexity of national phenomena.

The theory of nationalism has been Marxism's great historical failure because manifest incapacity of its classical theory to encapsulate the different dimensions of this highly complex question. Epiphenomenal and economic reductionist analyses impoverished the

capacity historical materialism to come to grips with national phenomena. Bauer's theory stands alone and unfortunately ostracised, in the midst of monocausal and unidimensional analyses. Recent breaks with economism have paved the way for a more sensitive analyses like those of Poulantzas and Anderson, but for the time being the sheer weight of the economistic tradition inhibits further progress in

this direction. We are only seeing the beginnings of more imaginative discussions, until economistic paradigms are left behind, the theory

of nationalism will continue to be a Marxist failure.

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138

NOTES AND REFERENCES MECW denotes reference to Marx' and Engels' Collected Works, London, Lawrence & Wis fart. 1. 'Evolution,in C. D. Renoing (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Marxism, Communism and Western Society, New York, Herder & Herder, 1972-73, p. 241.

2. See H. B. Davis, Socialism and Nationalism, London Monthly Review Press, 1967, M. Lowy, 'Marxists and the National Question', New Left Review, 96, Mar.-Apr. 1976. 3. F. Engels, Uber den Vergfall das Feudalism iis and das Aufkommen der Bourgeoisie, Marx-Engels Werke, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1969, Band 21

P- 393-7. Ibid. This definition is similar to what we call today a 'nation state'.

4.5. Pierre Guiraud, Patois or Les dialectes francais, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1968, p. 27. Albert Doujot, Le Patois, Paris, Librairie Delagrave, 1946. Sergio Salvi, Le Nazione Proibire, Florence, Vallese edit, 1976, p. 477.

6.7.8. R. Rosdolsky, 'Frederich Engels und Das Problem der "Gechichtslossen" Volker', Archiv fur Sozialgeschichte, vol. IV, 1964, translated by present writer. 9. K. Marx to F. Engels, 20 June 1866, MECW, vol. xxi, pp. 288-9.

10. K. Marx, The German Ideology, London, Lawrence & Wis fart, 1976,

p. 57. 11. Ian Cummins, Marx and Engels and National Movements, London, Croom Helm, 1980, p. 31. 12. See A. D. Smith, "'Ideas" and "Structure" in the formation of independent ideas' Philosophy of the Social Sciences, vol. 3, 1973, p. 21. 13. R. Gallisot 'Nazione e Nazionalita net Dibattiti del Movimento Ope-

raio', Storia del Marxism, progetto di E. Hobsbawn, G. Haupt, F. Marek, E. Ragionieri, Turin, Einaudi Editore 1979, vol. 2, p. 809.

14. Davis, op. cit., p. 2. 15. Ibid.

16. H. A. Rayburn, The ethical theory of Hegel, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967, p. 220.

17. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, Para. 347, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1945, pp. 217-18. 18. bid, para. 351. 19. Marx' and Engels' correspondence, 2 Dec. 1847, quoted by L. Aguilar, Marxism in Latin America, New York, W. Knopf, 1968, p. 67.

20. MECW, vol- 7, p. 422. 21. Quoted in S. Avineri (ed.), Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernisation, New York, Anchor Books, 1969, p. 68. Quoted by Cummins, op. cit., p. 54. 'It is now perfectly clear to me that, as testified by his craneal formation and hair growth, he is descended from the negroes who joined Moses' exodus from Egypt (unless his paternal mother or grandmother was

crossed with a nigger). Well this combination of Jewish and Germanic

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stock with the negroid basic substance IE bound to yield a strange product.' K. Marx to F. Engels, 30 July 1862, in F. J. Raddatz (ed.), Marx and Engels Personal Letters, London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson,

.

24. F. Engels, 'The democratic Panslavism', pp. 362-8, and 'The Magyar Struggle', p. 227, in MECW, vol. 8. 25. F. Engels, 'The Magyar Struggle' in MECW, vol. 8, pp. 234-5. Quoted by Cummins, op. cit., p. 38. 26. This deterministic understanding of the development of capitalism contradicts Luxemburg's emphasis on political activism and radical action by the workers. This contradiction in Luxemburg's work has been discussed by some of her biographers, e.g. J.P. Netti Rosa Luxemburg, abridged edition, Oxford University Press, 1969, and P. Friilich, Rosa Luxemburg, London, Pluto Press, 1972. 27. K. Kautsky, 'Die Moderns Nationahtar, Neue zest, v, 1887, quoted and translated by H , Mon sen and A. Martiny in Nationalism, Nationalities question', Encyclopaedia of Marxism, Communism and Western Society , op. cit., p. 42. 28. K. Kautsky, 'Die Moder re Nationality', extracts translated into 29. 30. 31. 32.

French' in G. I-Iaupt, M. Lowy, C. Weill, Les Marxistes et la question rationale, Paris, Maspero 1974, p. 119. Ibid., p. 121. English translation by the editor. Ibid., p. 122. Ibid., p. 117. Ibid., p. 118.

33. Ibid., p. 121. 34. K. Kautsky, 'Nationality und internalit§t', in H. Mon sen, op. cit. J p. 43. 35. J. P. Nettl, op. cit, p. 505. 36. Die Neue Zeit, 2, 14, 1895-6, pp. 324-32. 37. "The industrial Development of Poland", Spanish translation, Mexico,

Pasado y Presents, 1980. Netti, op. cit., p. 505. R. Luxemburg, 'The problem of the hundred nationalities', quoted in

.C. Herod, The Nation in the History of Marxian Thought, The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1976. 40. Herod, ibid. 41. Ibid.

42. Nettl, op. cit., p. 506, Lowy, op. cit., p. 86. For an English version of 'The Question of Nationalities and Autonolny', see H. B. Davis (ed.),

The National Question selected writings of R. Luxemburg, London, M. R. Press, 1976. Ibid. The official report of the London congress, quoted by Lenin 'The Right

of Nations to Self Determination', in Questions of National Policy and Proletarian lntemationalism, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1970, p. 80. 45. Lenin, 'The Right of Nations to Self Determination', in ibid., p. 47. 46. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 20, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1970, pp. 393-454, reprinted in ibid.

47. Ibid.

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Marxzlwt Sociology Revisited

48. Lenin, 'What is meant by Self Determination? in Questions of notional policy

. . ., op.

cit., p. 50.

49. Lenin, 'Thesis on the Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self Determination', Collected Works, vol. 22, p. 324. Lenin, 'The Right of Nations to Self Determination', op. cit., p. 51. Ibid., p. 56. The theoretical rigidity of Lenin's analyses led him to overestimate the national cohesiveness of Western European States. 52. Stalin, Works, vol. 6, London, Lawrence & Wis fart, 1953, p. 443. 53. See for example M. Lowy, 'Marxists and the National Question' , op. cit.

54. Ibid., p. 95. 55. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 5, p. 84. The article in question is 'Marxism and the National Question', Stalin's 'magnus opus? Quoted by Davis, op. cit., p. 81. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question, London, Martin Lawrence , 1951, p. 8. 58. See Lenin, 'Critical Remarks on the National Question', especially the section on national culture, in Questions of National Policy . . . ,

op. cit., pp. 16-19. 59. Lowy, op. cit, p. 95. It seems that for Lowy the only possible 'Marxist'

60. 61 62. »

63. 64.

65.

analysis of the national question is the Leninist intepretation, if cultural elements are integrated into the definition of a nation this is 'pre scientific folklorism'. One wonders if this is also the case of Mao, Fanon, Cabral, etc. Stalin, op. cit., p. 19. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 19, p. 501. Stalin, op. cit., p. 49. Lenin, quoted by S. Shaheen, The communist theory of national self determination, The Hague, 1956, p. 103. Vienna, Volksbuchandlunl, 1907 (Marx~Studien, vol. II): second edition with a new introduction by the author, 1924. I know only of translations into Hebrew, Hashela Haleumiz, Sifriat Hapoalim 1941, and into Spanish, La cuestiOn de Las nacionalidades y la social democracia, Mexico, Sig lo XXI Editores, 1979. In T. Bottomore and P. Goode (eds), Austria-Marxism, Oxford Univer-

sity Press, 1978. 66. Except for a chapter in Haupt, Lowy, and Weill's excellent reader Les Marxistes et la Question Nationale, op. cit., pp. 233-72. 67. For example in his stimulating book Theories of Nationalism, London, Duckworth, 1971, A. D. Smith has only a passing reference to Bauer, and in a recent article'Smith wrongly equates Bauer with Renan (Nationalism and Classical Social Theory', British Journal of Sociol-

ogy, vol. 34, n. 1 Mar. 1983, p. 23)- On the same misinterpretation of Bauer see Davis, op. cit., p. 151. 68. Lowy, op. cut. 69. Kautsky wrote an article in Die Neue Zeit to criticise Bauer's work: 'Nationality und Internationalist', op. cit., to which Bauer wrote a rejoinder 'Bemerkungen zur Nationalitatenfrage', Die f l u e Zeit, March 1908. Stalin's monograph, 'la/Iarxism, and the National Onestion', was mainly written to critise Bauer's work. Lenin also takes issue

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141

with some of Bauer's arguments in 'Critical Remarks on the National Question', op. cit.

70. L. Kolakowsky, Main Currents of Marxism, vol. 11, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1978, p. 255. 71. Davis, op. cit., p. 149. 72. See Lenin, 'The Right of Nations to Self Determination' and 'Critical

Remarks on the National Question', op. cit., on the Jewish Bund, see H. Tobias, The Jewish Band in Russia from its origins to 1905 , Stanford University Press, 1965. 73. For the original elaboration of these concepts see C. Mouffe's excellent

article 'Hegemony and Ideology in Gran sci' in Mouffe, Grarnsci and the Marxist Theory, London, Routledge and Kevan Paul, 1979, p. 168. I wish to thank also E. Laclau for a number of stimulating observations

on an earlier version of this paper read at the Hegemony Research Group. 74. In recent years a number of works have criticised the class reductionist approach via the 'rediscovery' of the work of A. Gran sci and the

formulation of non-economistic theories of ideology. See E. Laclau, Politics and Ideology in the Marxist Theory, London, New Left Books , 1977, C. Bus-Glueksmann, Gran sci and the State London, Lawrence & Wis fart, 1980; C. Mouffe, op. cit.; B. Jessop, The Capitalist State, Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1982; A. Sassoon, Approaches to Gramsei, London, Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, 1982. 75. O. Bauer, La cuestién de las rzacionalidades . . ., Spanish translation from Die Nationaiitatenfrage . . ., op. cit., p. 24. My own translation from Spanish. 76. Ibid., p. 25. 77. Ibid., p. 27. 78. Ibid., p. 119. 79. The Bauerian concept of Schiksaigemeinschaft is difficult to translate into English. Bottomore (op. cit., p. 107) translates it as 'Common Destiny'. 'Community of Fate' or 'Communality of Fate' seem to me

.

more appropriate

80. Bauer, op. cit., p. 123. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85.

Third analogy of experience, the principle of community; ibid., p. 122. Ibid., p. 134. Ibid., p. 135. Kautsky and Bauer polemised over this issue in Neut Zeit: see footnote 69. A. Gran sci, Selections from the Prison notebooks, London, Lawrence

& Wis fart, 1971, p, 344. 86. A. Gran sci, Letteratura e Vita Nazionaie, Turin 7 Einaudi Editore , pp. 105 and 107. 87. See A. Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, Monthly Review Press, 1967. A good discussion on dependency theories could be found in I. Oxaal, A.. Barnett, D. Booth (eds) , Beyond tNe Sociology of Development, London, Routledge & Kevan Paul, 1975. 88. M. Heuliler, Inferno! Colonialism." Fluff Cedric Fringe in Erirish Niuionaf: Development, London, Routledge & Kevan Paul, 1975.

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Marxist Sociology Revisited

89.

&_ E. Smith, The Ethnic Revival, Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 26-44. 90. T. Nairn, The Break Up of Britain, London, New Left Books, 1977, sea 329.

, pp. 335-6.

91.

_

92. N. Poulantzas, Stare Power Socialism, London, New Left Books, 1978,

93.. 94. _,__., r ' 95. W. Connor, 'Nation Building or Nation Destroying?', World Politics,

24, 1972, pp. 319-55.

96. mum 97.

A

_ , _

98. Ibid., p. 46 acT p. 49.

'~¢

s

i

London, Verso, 1983.

5 Marxism and the Sociology of Racism: Two Historical Variants IVAR OXAAL This essay seeks to analyse the situation of two sets of minority groups, widely separated by history, geography and racial origin, with particular reference to ways in which a minority's position within the class structure, or its subjective self-perception, can pose difficulties and contradictions for contemporary Marxist analysis. The two sets of groups to be discussed are the Jews of pre-Nazi, i.e. pre-1914 central Europe, and the West Indian and Asian minorities in Britain at the present time. Each community has been 'subjected to the scrutiny of Marxist social scientists whose own ethnic origins have been from inside, as well as outside, the minority culture. In the earlier, Jewish variant, assimilated Marxist sociologists strongly tended to reject, for reasons to be shown, the historical right of a future existence for their own ethnic group; in the more recent situation of coloured minorities in Britain, the emphasis of at least some major Marxist analysts originating in the Asian or West Indian communities has been to aNirrn the right, and even vital necessity, to a strong sense of racial and ethnic identity. The issues which will be briefly raised here represent then, in part, a continuation in the area of 'race relations' of the discussion of Marxist dilemmas in reconciling the competing forces of class and national consciousness outlined by Ephraim Nirnni in Chapter 4. The sociology of race relations, like every specialist area, has developed over many years a wide range of explanatory models, worldng hypotheses and research strategies, some of which have been derived from classical Marxist writers or are directly and explicitly intended to apply and develop the ideas of a particular version of

Marxist insight - ranging from the founding fathers to recent writers 143 \

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Marxist Sociology Revisited

like Gran sci, Althusser or Poulantzas. Moreover, with the growth of interest in race and minority problems in the Third World, and particularly in the continuing racial stratification practised in South Africa, the theoretical perspectives of the political economy of underdevelopment have recently been linked-up with the former, more limited national horizons, of race relations The historical vistas of race relations are therefore very wide, and ideological schisms among various Marxist writers - between Marxist revolutionaries and semi-Marxist sociologists, between black militants and white sympathisers - have long been the order of the day in Britain. A further cause of the complexity of this intellectual arena has been the fact that race relations, as an academic subject, developed chiefly in the United States from the 1920's onward. The attempt, by no means uncritical, to adapt American research and public policy in the field of race relations to British conditions has entailed, as some Marxists have viewed it, a reformist, state-controlled process of reducing the revolutionary potential of the black masses There is insufficient space to discuss this problem here, but we shall return to the related problem of the long shadow of American black experience on the consciousness of the Afro-Caribbean community in Britain in the second part of this chapter. The sociology of race relations in Britain, then, has been highly receptive to Marxist ideas. A principal reason for this must be that the subject matter lends itself to Marxist interpretation like practically no other. How else to account for the trans-Atlantic slave trade, black slavery in the Caribbean and the Americas not to mention the global panorama of European imperialism over past centuries - but by reference to the primary role of systems of labour exploitation" Straightforward economic-determinist interpretations of slavery and its abolition in such classic works as Eric Willialns's Capitalism and Slavery or Marvin Harris's Patterns of Race in the Americas, have been criticised for portraying complex, multi-dimensional historical phenomena in a too crass and one-sidcd manner Nevertheless, few would question the importance, broadly speaking, of economic selfinterest, crystallised into systems of exclusive privilege, as the real causes of the emphasis assigned to phenotypical, 'racial' differences in generating and reproducing the social structure of a whole range of slave, post-slavery, colonial and backward European-dominated so-.-.-

cieties, including the internal colonialism practised in South Africa at the present time. In a vulgar world, vulgar Marxism is not an

inappropriate tool of analysis, as the non-Marxist writer and founder of the Institute of Race Relations, Phillip Mason, appeared to recog-

Marxism and the Sociology

of Racism

145

rise in the title of his 1971 global survey of race relations, Patterns of Dominance, even Professor Michael Barton conceded, in his comprehensive 1967 textbook Race Relations, which became a standard' work in the Held, that the Marxist paradigm was essential to an understanding of historical developments in South Marxists and non-Marxists have tended to agree on the salience of economic factors in analysing classic historical situations of white domination over blacks, however, the capacity of Marxist exploitation theory to give a satisfactory account of the role of racist ideologies and practices in more open, liberal-capitalist, societies has been subject to serious question.5 The problem can be crudely phrased in functionalist terms, e.g. does the maintenance of a capitalist economic and social system in countries like Britain or America really need the pervasive racial prejudice and discrimination which still characterises both societies? Or, to pose an even more complex and controversial historical question: did the transition to monopoly capitalism in central Europe depend to an important degree, on the possibility of blaming all of the negative consequences of capitalist industrialisation on the Jews? Put in. such extreme terms it would seen to be almost self-evident that one must distinguish between (a) social formations whose structure and very survival require the maintenance of a system of racial stratification, and (b) societies in which racist ideologies and practices, while directly or indirectly

A

f

r

i

c

a

.

4

I

f

contributing to the welfare and survival of some social interests, are dysfunctional or of no utility to others. In the latter case, the disappearance of racist ideologies and practices would not necessarily alter the dominant mode of exploiting the labour force. It is perhaps much easier for whites than it is for blacks living in a racist society to accept

such an epiphenomenalist interpretation of modern racism- But the essentialist position can be extended: it can be argued that while racism in a highly developed liberal-capitalist society may not appear as internally essential to the reproduction of that social order, the

continuation of capitalism in a society like Britain or the United States is fundamentally dependent on exploiting the peoples and resources of the Third World. Thus it can be forcefully hypothesised that the maintenance of an internal racist ethos is necessary in order to rationalise whatever draconian political and military interventions may be required by neoimperialist interests in the 'colored' parts of the world, and, in the case of Britain, that the perpetuation of such an ethos facilitates the retention of a close and vital economic link

with racialist South Africa Marxist theory has historically been unclear on the origins and

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Marxist Sociology Revisited

functions of racism in relation to capitalist society. In the first variant we shall consider, the Marxist analysis of anti~Semitisln in the pre-

1914 world, the proposition just advanced that there exists a functionally indispensible bond between the development of capitalism and racism, would have been regarded as nothing less than a theoretical aberration. .The present-day view of the significance of race held by many Marxists derives chiefly from a pessimistic theoretical outlook which, whether explicitly acknowledged or not, bears the historical imprint of the role of racism in Nazi Germany. Because of the relatively minor role Jews would play in British industrialisation compared with the Jews of central Europe, racism in its political

anti-Semitic variant made limited inroads as a factor in British life." But with the arrival of the colored minorities in Britain after World War II, neo-fascism sprang into life. Organisations like the racist National Front enjoyed local electoral successes and violent agitational coups that immediately raised the spectre, for Marxist social scientists, of some kind of repetition of the Nazi nightmare in Britain.8 At the present writing that frightening if distant prospect has, momentarily at least, almost faded away, but it was a major element in the interpretation of the potential direction of British society held by many Marxists engaged in the area of race relations during the 1960s and 1970s. In attempting to juxtapose, and make some comparative observa-

tions about two situations in which Marxism has been theoretically engaged with the phenomenon of racism, the present writer is of

course aware, as just noted, of the vast differences between the two cases. Yet, the assumption here is that there is a broad underlying historical connection between British culture and central European

social attitudes which can be traced back to the 19th century Age of Imperialism. That era produced an international Weltanschauung in which belief in the over-arching superiority of white Europe - often coupled with a belief in the exceptional racial and cultural superiority of some national group within it

- was so much taken

for granted that

even Marx and Engels, as Nimni suggests, were far from immune to its rabidly ethnocentric style of analysis and expression By way of symbolic confirmation of this internationalist thesis, it will be recalled that Richard Wagner, who was a fanatical anti-Semite before the term, with its biological pretensions, was even invented, was proud to cultivate the French racial theorist Count de Gobineau, and to acquire as his son-in~law the British-born Houston Stewart Cham-

berlain whose racialist writings would become a major Nazi text."

Marxism and the Sociology

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147

I

The first challenge to organised Marxism from an ideology and political movement incorporating an explicitly racist theory was, of course, riot the white-black variant but the populist 'anti-Semitic' parties which arose, principally in Austria and Germany, during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. As is well known, the Austrian pan»Gerrnanist and virulent anti-Semite Georg von Schoenerer was greatly admired for his unflinching racialist principles by the young Adolf Hitler." It was von Schoenerer who helped to develop extreme proto-Nazi agitational strategems on such issues as the uncontrolled

internal migration of the poor Osfjuden to Vienna from the remote province of Galicia in the Habsburg Empire. 12 His great contemporary Karl Lueger, the popular mayor of Vienna during Hitler's long sojourn there before World War I, also resorted to regular antiJewish rhetoric to advance the cause of his Christian Social party in municipal politics but, as the author o f Man Kampf correctly diagnosed, Lueger although a master mass manipulator was more of an opportunist Jew-baiter than a true believer in racial anti~Semitism. His famous dictum, 'I decide who is a Jew' ('Wer Jude i t , bestimme ich') was consistent with his successful efforts to establish harmonious working relations with the Jewish bourgeoisie in Vienna during his long and prosperous reign from 1896 to 1910. In the judgment of a leading Jewish scholar of the present day, Robert Wistrich, writing in his 1982 monograph, Socialism and the Jews, Lueger's administration in Vienna coincided with a golden age of Viennese Jewry in the arts and sciences." And, it might be added, with a high point of participation by assimilated Jews in oppositional Marxist politics. A number

of the top figures of the Marxist Austrian._Social Democratic party were of Jewish origin: most notably the party leader Viktor Adler and the theoreticians Otto Bauer and Max Adler. Despite Lueger's lack of racial seriousness, and the EmperorS benign attitude toward his Jewish subjects - they alone of all his myriad ethnic groups were not demanding self-determination, at least not to a signilicant extent within the Habsburg lands - anti-Semitism posed a continuous threat to Jewish communities in central and eastern Europe-" Even France, the cradle of the principle of human equality and Jewish emancipation in Europe, had been torn by anti-Jewish hysteria during the Dreyfus affair in the 1890's. At any time there might appear some new fabricated charge of the feudal blood libel. Most Jews found the

situation worrisome, but few would go so far as to support the radical

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solution of a mass exodus from Europe proposed by the Zionists, preferring instead to place their faith in the legal guarantees entrenched in the liberal or authoritarian state." The problem posed by anti-Semitism to Marxism was two-fold,

political and ideological. With the advent of increasing political mobilisation and expanding franchises in the latter 19th century, socialists found themselves in competition with the anti-Semites not only for artisan and working-class support, but also for ideological credibility. Marxists may have had an explanation for the causes of capitalist exploitation, but so too did the anti-S.emites. The standard socialist view of their political enemies was, of course, summarised in the notion that anti-Semitism represented 'the socialism of fools'.16 Anti-Semites and Marxists might point to the same evils of capitalism, but Marxism provided the correct scientific understanding of the underlying causes of those evils while anti-Semitism could only provide a totally mystified, superstitious interpretation placing all the blame on the JewS. This ideology appeared so anachronistic that, when consulted on the subject by continental comrades in 1890, Engels sent back the first definitive interpretation which emphasised the transitional, superstructural nature of the phenomenon which would automatically disappear as capitalist development neared its culmination. Only where there was not yet a strong capitalist class and a strong proletariat, '. . . where capital, being still too weak to control the whole national production, has the Stock Exchange as the main scene of its activity, and where production is still in the hands of

land-owners, handicraftsmen and similar classes surviving from the middle ages - only here is capital predominantly Jewish and only here is anti-Semitism to be found'. He concluded:

Anti-Sernitism, therefore, is nothing but the reaction of the medieval, decadent

strata of society, which essentially consists of wage-earners and capitalists . . . it is a variety of feudal socialism and with that we can have nothing to do. If it is possible in a country, that is a sign that there is not yet enough capital in that country. . . . The stronger the capital the stronger also the wageearning class and the nearer therefore the end of capitalist domination. To us Germans, therefore, among whom I include the Viennese, I wish a rapid development of capitalist economy and in no wise that it should sink into stagnation." Later historians like Pulzer have shown that the sociological insight

which Engels advances here as to the major structural location

Marxism and the Soeioiogy

of Raeisrn

149

of anti-Semitism was basically sound. There is ample evidence to confirm, particularly for that nursery of political anti-Seinitisrn, Vienna, that it was precisely the defenders of traditional class interests against the rising tide of 'Manchesteristn' and liberalism who angrily equated these disruptive developments with the activities of the Jews. But Engels' apparently straightforward formulation, resting on the common base-superstructure paradigm, in fact concealed a thicket of thorny issues which have recurred ever since in attempts to expand Marxist accounts in 'race relations', and have indeed been

discovered to be generic problems in the interpretation of all forms of I`3C1SM.19

One of the most difficult of these issues is the question of the relative causal importance which might be assigned, in the analysis of

a particular instance of racism, to its basis in objectively real and in a sense 'rational' causes such as the existence of actual economic competition between members of the minority ethnic group and the majority as against the weight to be assigned to 'irrational' factors like the psychological-displacement mechanisms implied by the popular 'scapegoating' type of explanation, and also by the persist~ once of traditional prejudices carried over into the present from a previous historical era. One can discern, in the quotation from Engels, an explicit acknowledgment that Jews played a competitive economic role -- but this factor is minimised as a declining anachronism - and also the historical legacy of Jew~hatred from the Middle Ages. Moreover, his suggestion that anti-Semitism is to be seen as 'the reaction of medieval, decadent strata' contains the germ of the irrationalist psychological interpretation of anti-Semitism which later became paramount in light of the use made of this ideology as a mass hallucigen by the Nazis. But in the more innocent days of the

-

-...

pre-1914 world, Marxists found it both theoretically justifiable and politically convenient to adopt a dismissive posture towards antiSemitism. This was consistent, of course, with their general position toward 'superstructural' phenomena. ideologies and beliefs incompat~ ible with the onward rush of capitalism, whether religion, nationalism or racism, would be swept away with the victory of the proletariat so why be excessively bothered about them?20 The Jews themselves would disappear. Marx had laid the foundations for this prediction with an early essay," and Otto Bauer, in his comprehensive 1907 study of the national question, reinforced that expectation by advancing what today can be recognised as an early statement of a sociological theory which analyses the conditions under which ethnic

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minorities become assimilated into the majority society. There were two typical situations, according to Bauer, in which Jews found the salience of their ethnic feeling declining: the one immediately to hand was the abundant evidence of assimilation, despite the prevalence of anti-Semitisrn, resulting from the progressive economic integration of Jews into the life of the great melting pots in the urban centres like Vienna, Budapest, Paris, Frankfurt and Berlin. Here they were bound to find that the dominant mode of interaction was no longer, as in the pre-capitalist era, with other Jews, but that they were daily obliged to establish working relations with non-Jews and this would inevitably erode their sense of ethnic particularity. Similarly, even the Jews in backward parts of Galicia, Poland and Russia were being exposed to industrialisation

and their incorporation into a modern

proletariat would lead them to see their destiny as bound up with that emergent class rather than requiring, as the Zionists among them were insisting, a separate national identity and state. In both situations capitalist development would resolve the Jewish question." In an earlier study entitled Revolutionary Jews from Marx to Trotsky, Wistrich was inclined to view Otto Bauer's dismissal of Jewish national aspirations, and the merely sporadic and ambivalent attacks made by the Austria-Marxists against anti-Semitism, as possibly concealing, behind a screen of theoretical rationalisation, an element of Jewish self-hatred on the part of the assimilated leadership of the Social Democratic party. How else to account for the inconsistency in Bauer's analysis of the elements which constitute a

nation?23 In Bauer's theory the possession of a historical territory associated with a particular national group was not regarded as a

-

necessary defining characteristic except in his treatment of the Jews

whose lack of such a territory made them ineligible to be regarded as a bona fide national minority along with the Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, Ruthenians, Slovaks etc. We unfortunately have no reliable autobiographical information to support a psychoanalytical interpretation of this apparent Freudian logical slip in Bauer's theoretical

narrative, but evidence of another kind, concerning the probable effect of the socio-economic position of the Jews themselves as the major factor inhibiting the development of a militant socialist posture against the anti-Semitic movement, has recently come to light. It is evident from Wistrich's account in Socialism and the Jews that some leading continental Manrists, notable among them the German leader August Bebel - author of the often-cited resolution on anti~

Seinitism passed at the Berlin congress in 1893 - were deeply per-

Marxism and the Sociology

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151

plexed about the prospects of discrediting the allegations of the anti-Semites against Jewish capital. Bebel recognised that antiSemitism had to be regarded not only as a feudal hangover but also as rooted in current economic competition. A majority of students were anti-Semitic because of the competition from Jewish students in higher education. In rural areas of Germany Jews had achieved a inonopolistic position in the marketing of agricultural produce in many regions; and Bebel claimed that the situation was similar in the urban clothing, tailoring and shoe-making industries." The ambiguity of his view of the situation is manifest from a close reading of the very first paragraph of his 1893 resolution which, while asserting at the outset the superstructural nature of anti-Sernitism, appears to be self-contradictory:

Anti-Semitism springs from the discontent of certain bourgeois strata who find themselves adversely affected by the development of capitalism. . . . These groups, however, mistake the actual causes of their situation and therefore do not light against the capitalist economic system but against such surface phenomena appearing in it which seem to hurt them most in the competitive struggle: namely the Jewish exploiters." (emphasis added) The trouble was, as the italicised non-sequitur makes apparent, that while the theoretical significance of the Jews in the contemporary economy could be abstractly conjured away with a wave of the Marxist wand, the Jews themselves remained concretely and inconveniently in place as important participants in the modernisation process. This was surely a major reason why Bebel, as Wistrich observes , ' . . . was not at all convinced that Social Democrats could persuade peasants and craftsmen (let alone the upper classes and bourgeoisie) that capitalism was the real cause of their misery, rather than the .I€W$'_26

It should not be prematurely concluded from the foregoing that because real, live Jews - and not just phantoms in the neurotic brains of decaying classes - were an important objective feature in the socio-economic landscape of central Europe in the late 19th century, that the anti~Sernites, rather than the Marxists, had arrived at the correct analysis of the situation. They were wrong on two basic counts. First, the Marxists were certainly correct (as was Max Weber) in their basic contention that capitalism as a historical movement

comprised far more than the transformation of relatively small numbers

152

Marxist Sociology Revisited

of feudal Jewish commercial strata into modern capitalist entrepreneurs. Marxists were right in not accepting at face value anti-Semitic empirical, statistical evidence of Jewish over-representation in certain fields of commerce and the professions, because such politically-charged data were incorrectly theorised, failing to ask how the Jewish aspects of the capitalist phenomenon articulated with the system as a whole. Secondly, while the historical evidence has yet to be comprehensively collated from different central European regions and countries, it is clear that the anti-Semitic indictment of Jews as arch-capitalists was highly exaggerated. Data examined by the present writer comparing the socio-conomic position of Jews with Christians in the Austrian half of the Habsburg empire, for example, show that while it was true that Jewish ethnicity was importantly associated with statistical overrepresentation in some industries and occupations, the relatively small percentages of the Jews in the population as a whole meant that they were usually vastly outnumbered by Christians even in such an allegedly Jewish specialism as money-lending." The statistical trick which was deployed by the anti-Semites - whether based on a deliberate intention to ideologically falsify the situation or on plain sloppy, illogical thinking, or both - was to trumpet the proportional over-representation of Jews in some occupation or class, while ignoring the even greater absolute numbers of Christians in the same sectors. The facts were not necessarily invented, they were often simply placed in a misleading context. But even the quantitative aspects of the issue , misrepresented by the anti-Semites and largely ignored by the Marxists , have been obscure to the present time. Together with the early Marxist theoretical vagueness in the analysis of the multiple levels of causation of racism, the lack of objective factual information has worked considerable mischief in the attempts of later historians to clarify the pre-1914

confrontation between Jews, anti-Semites and Marxists - even in a major and much-analyzed crucible like the Vienna experienced by the young Hitler. This problem can be briefly illustrated by reference to Peter Pulzer's classic and unsurpassed study The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, published in 1964. The very first question tackled by Pulzer in his study was precisely the one which we have just been considerir@: to what extent, M asked, presenting an array of statistics from official sources, had Jewish over-representation in a wide range of bourgeois activities banking, trade, entrepreneurial innovation, medicine, law journalism, artistic and cultural life etc- - itself been a primary cause of

anti-Semitism during the period before World War I? As suggested above, however, this line of inquiry, while important and legitimate

Marxism and the Sociology

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153

from a scientific standpoint, does tend, as it were, to play into the hands of the anti-Semitic tradition insofar as it emphasises the exceptional as opposed to the more mundane features of Jewish economic life. Pulzer recognised this danger, querying whether Are we not, in our search for exact statistics, taking the antiSemitic case too much on its own valuation? The number of Jewish cornbrokers is no doubt fascinating to the student of sociology, but does it illuminate the causes of anti-Semitism? Are the statistics which are the stock-in-trade of standard anti-Semitic literature anything more than rationalizations by and for the converted?28 Having however already adopted, in the interest of c a n d o r and objectivity, the selective bias and causal problematic of the antiSemites, Pulzer had perforce to retreat momentarily from the hypothesis of a direct rational interest-conflict model of anti-Semitism to (an equally plausible and relevant) non-rational psychological displacement model, viz.:

Rather is it not true that the anti-Semitic image of the Jew. bears little relation to the objective Jew, that the Jew of the anti-Semites is simply a handy target for the fears, hatreds and pre dices the origins of which must be sought within the anti-Semites themselves, and that he is a 'scapegoat' for disasters which cry out for simple explanations?

To argue thus is to underrate the complexities of political para-

noia . . . the plot mongers explanations would not be nearly so persuasive if they did not bear some relation Io ascertaMablefaet and a hard core of genuine evidence." (emphasis added)

This further confuses the issue because by reducing the problem to the exaggerations of 'plot mongers' Pulzer cancels out the possibility that knowledge of 'the objective Jew' could ever clarify the actual connection between Jewish economic status and anti-Semitism, the task he had initially embarked upon in this, the first chapter of his seminal investigation. The solution to this methodological tangle can be simply stated in principle but is extremely difficult - as students of race relations will know only too well - to sort out in empirical historical investigation. Both the interest-conflict and the psychological-displacement, 'scape-

goating', models are arguably applicable to the interpretation of the sources of anti-Semitism in Lueger's and the young Hitler's Vienna;

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Marxist Sociology Revisited

so too are the origins of political anti-Semitism lodged in 'endelnic' traditional, pre~capitalist and religious prejudices. The emphasis given to one or another causal model in empirical historical studies will depend - as Pulzer continually and brilliantly demonstrates throughout his many-faceted text - on the degree to which the surviving sources permit us to penetrate a given situation or historical moment. Lacking a thought-out theoretical approach, Pulzer retreats from the attempt to relate the objective socio-economic status of Jews to the causes of anti-Sernitisrn and began the retreat by attempting instead to write his way out of the dilemma by creating a diversion

and resorting to impressionistic pathos: . . . as the number of Galician Jews increased in Vienna the Jewish haute bourgeoisie became less and less representative of Viennese Jewry as a whole, while the peddler, the old clothes dealer and the L umpenprolerarier, scraping an irregular existence on the periphery of the economic system became typical." This sudden suggestion of a Jewish bourgeois Gétterdammerung in the city before 1914 - which effectively destroys his initial premise appears, in fact, to be a slight exaggeration. Table 5.1 and the accompanying figure (5.1) depict some of the complexities of the

actual situation, based on a reworking, by the present author, of the single and only table from any of the pre-1914 occupational censuses which supplied information by religious affiliation on the occupy tonal structure of Vienna. Despite obvious limitations, these data help to place the economic role of the city's Jews in clearer perspective.

The total male and female workforce in Vienna by 1910, it may be noted by way of introduction, added up to just one million, exactly one-half of the total population of the capital city in which Jews numbered 175 000, less than 10 per cent. Over a third of this industrial army consisted of women and girls: 80 000 females were in the garment industry in some capacity, 50 000 as workers and another 21 000 classified as self-employed. Another 38 000 were in some type of trade .... no less than 47 000 out of the 74 000 Catholics listed as self-employed in trade were women. However, as a much Iowa proportion of Jewish women were employed in trade, it bas been necessary to deduct the ethnically-variable female workforce to arrive at the inter-ethnic comparison of Catholic and Jews as shown in

Table 5.1.

Marxism and the Sociology

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155

TABLE 5.1 Employment of catholic and Jewish males in Vienna by economic sector and occupational status in 1910 Catholic occupational statuses

Selfemployed

Salaried employee

Worker*

Totals by sector

Industry

41 453 8.6

17 596 3.7

266 690 55.4

325 739 67.7

Trade &

27 381 5.7

27 096 5.6

101.050

transport

155 527 32.3

Totals

68 834

44 692

367 740

14.3

9.3

76.4

by status

21.0

481 266 100.0%

Jewish occupational statuses See

Industry

Salaried employee

Worker*

employed

Totals by sector

5 464

5 455

7 337

10.7

10.6

14.4

18 256 35.7

32 850 64.3

Trade & transport

12 975 25.4

11 479 . 22.5

8 396 16.4

Totals

18 439

16 934 33.1

15 733 30-8

36.1

by status

51 106 100.0%

* Includes day labourers and apprentices, family helpers are not included in this table.

Totals for other Viennese industrial sectors:

Civil-service, military, free professions, no occupation Catholics: 123 666, Jews: 14 086

Agriculture Catholics: 6 686; Jews: 116 SOURCE

Berufsstatistik nach den Ergebnisserz Der Volkszdhfung vol 3/

Dezember I9/0, 3. Band, 1. Heft (Neue Folge) Oesterreichische Stazisték,

Vienna, 1916, p. 132

The most salient features of the inter-ethnic occupational structure are readily discerned. Excluding the figures for the Civil Service, the liberal professions and the insignificant agricultural sector, it will be noted that while fully two-thirds of the Catholic male workforce were in the industrial sector as opposed t o only one-third in trade, for

the Jewish workforce the ratios were reversed. The proportional

156

Marxist Sociology Revisited INDUSTRY

Self-employed

41 453 Carhohcs

5464 Jews

Salaried

17595

employee

5455

I

Worker

y

7337

1266690

TRADE & TRANSPORT Self-employed

27381

y

/ , 12975

2? 096

Salaried

employee

7

// r

r////////l.A

11 479

I

Worker

M 8396

101 050

FIGURE 5.1 Graphic representation of catholic and Jewish male occupational statistics presented in Table 5./

distribution of occupational statuses between the self-employed , salaried employees and-ordinary workers is even more conspicuous.

The greatest occupational discrepancy -between the two groups, however, would appear to be that while 70 per cent of Jewish men were either salaried or self-employed, three out of every four Catholic men in Vienna were employed as a worker in some capacity. It is hard to resist the suspicion that general awareness in the Catholic population of this dichotomy, despite the even greater absolute numbers of salaried or self-employed Catholics see figure 5 . 1), was so massive as

to have engendered a sense of social grievance which would be

Marxism and the Sociology of Racism

157

directed against the Jews regardless of the degree of actual direct economic competition or even contact. If such resentments were pervasive in the huge Catholic working class which was, after all, the Social Democrats' main constituency - they would help to explain the feeble and ambiguous opposition to political anti-Semitic ideology on the part of the Marxists, which Wistrich has recently noted. From a Marxist class-analysis perspective, were not the Viennese Jews, in the main, guilty as charged? It is manifest from these figures that they certainly did constitute a predominantly bourgeois, petty bourgeois and white-collar stratum in an overwhelmingly artisan and proletarian city. Two major caveats must, however, be observed. First, the high proportion of the Jewish self-employed is not a reliable indicator of their class position: many in this group would have represented precisely the lumpenproletariat, petty traders and marginal artisans who Pulzer wanted to regard as the most typical stratum. Second, as previously observed in respect of the distorted statistical logic of the anti-Semites, the relatively high proportion or over-representation of Jews in some occupational sectors coincides, as just noted, with the much larger numbers of non-Jews in the same classilication- Nevertheless, the existence of the sharp skew in the distribution of the Jewish workforce away from the masses of the working class, combined with their relatively small numbers in the population, must have made pragmatic, opportunist resignation on the issue of antiSemitism an almost irresistible option in the ideological struggle which the Social Democrats waged for the hearts and minds of the Viennese populace." . -

With the gratifying wisdom of historical hindsight it is clear that

the pre-1914 European Marxist underestimation of the potency and longevity of anti-Semitism was of a piece with their faith in the long-term destructive-but-progressive processes of capitalist development itself. To them, of course, this would not have seemed an unreasonable theoretical postulate: like everyone else they could see

the old social order breaking up around them as technological and economic changes multiplied. Thus the problem of the persistence of obscene anti-Jewish stereotypes from a previous era of history, like the problem of the extreme social and psychological destabilisation of the individual in an insecure and alienating urban-industrial environment - images which today loom so large in our attempt to interpret the Nazi era which arrived a few years later - went almost totally

unrecognised by the leadership of the Second International. The

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Marxist Sociology Revisited

disastrous consequences of World War I and its aftermath for the Central Powers fatally undermined the possibility of realising socialism in central Europe, an eventuality so confidently expected by the immediate descendants of Marx and Engels. In the wake of that cataclysm, in which the internationalist illusions of working class solidarity had been shattered, the relatively minor pre-war issue of anti-Seinitisni received, with the appearance of the ferocious Jewhatred of the Nazis, a heightened salience for Marxist social science . It was at this historical conjuncture that the Marxist, and mainly Jewish, social scientists of the Institut fair Sozialforschung in Frankfurt began to make the conceptual innovations which they believed

would strengthen Marxist theory - by redesigning the critical paradigm of capitalist society in order to cope with the realities of the postwar crisis. The economistic paradigm of the pre-1914 analysis of anti-Semitism, and cultural phenomena generally, was no longer credible: the Frankfurt School, over the many years of its existence in Germany, and in American exile, sought to supply the missing psycho-cultural terms of the Marxist theoretical equation. The work

of Erich Fromm in Fear of Freedom, or of Theodor Adorno and his associates in the analysis of The Authoritarian Personality, were among the major texts in this enterprise." These writers would be under HO illusions about the ease with which historically-rooted socially-manufactured and psychologically-functional racial prejudice could be dispelled. As fascism swept through all of Europe and as the existence of the genocidal programme against the Jews became known, several of the theorists of this school would conclude that the Marxist paradigm had collapsed altogether. This retreat would, of course, be condemned by later Marxists who retained the faith, but despite their rejection of the Frankfurt School, the latter's analysis of the organic connection between racism and capitalist crisis has become an almost generic, if unacknowledged element in contemporary Marxist thought.

II As we have seen, the early confrontation between Marxism and racism in its anti~Sernitic variant occurred within a relatively parochial and specifically continental European setting. Leaping ahead in time some sixty years to survey the context within which Marxist

analyses of race relations in Britain emerged one is struck, in con-

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trast, by the global awareness, historical depth and theoretical diversity of radical perspectives on this social issue. The international sophistication of this literature stems from the fact that it is a product of the aftermath of the British Empire: both in the sense that British scholars find it natural to relate events on a global scale like probably no other national intellectual community, and in the direct physical sense that the subjects of British race relations are themselves highly

conscious products of British colonial societies, or separated by only one generation from that experience. The general facts concerning the postwar immigration of workers from the British West Indies and the Indian sub-continent need not be repeated in detail here. The

optimistic, paternalistic elite expectations that a colored labourforce, recruited to replace upwardly-mobile white workers at the lower end of the occupational ladder, would be readily absorbed into British society soon gave way to the shocked realisation that many white Britons were not prepared to accept their colonial cousins on an equal basis." Political uproar with the objective of totally sealingoff Britain from the invasion of colored aliens became a standard feature of British life during the period 1960-80, and even beyond. Neo-Nazi groups, which like Mosley's fascist movement in the thirties found a limited public appeal for anti-Semitism, could now finally capitalise on the agitational possibilities of a militant defence of English national and racial purity. Right-wing politicians and newspapers within the political mainstream were likewise always prepared to defend the threat to national survival posed by 'the alien wedge'. Lacking a pluralistic national ideology like the American 'Melting

Pot' myth, British attitudes towards the presence of the colored immigrants tended to polaris between those supporting the develop-

ment of a liberal concept of the 'Multi-Cultural' society - emphasising the need to include courses in the schools on the cultural background of the immigrant communities -- and those who, often unthinkingly, tended to regard some form of voluntary or compulsory repatriation as the only realistic solution. The latter looked enviously at the tougher policies adopted by continental countries like France and Germany. These had conferred very limited rights of residence on their Third World migrant workers, in contrast to the full citizenship rights of most British immigrants, and could begin a policy of expulsion once their economic usefulness had been reduced with the onset of the world recession." These were just a few of the surface features which accompanied

the emergence, on a substantial scale, of the study of race relations in

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Marxist Sociology Revisited

Britain. It is worth adding that this emergence was part of the proliferation of social science departments in the rapidly-expanding higher education sector which, as it happened, coincided with the radicalisation of a generation of young scholars around 1968. This ensured that there would be a strong Marxist (but very little 'coloured') representation in British sociology, and the obvious applicability of that perspective to the study of white-black race relations has already been noted. However, the theoretical-ideological situa-

tion was complicated by the existence of an already vast literature on race relations and social policy in the United States.35 That literature had not, in fact, attempted to deny the significance of racial discrimination as part of a long-standing tradition of black economic deprivation but, given the virtual absence of socialist ideology and political organisation in the United States, studies of race were seldom presented with a view to advancing the cause of social revolution. The political implications of such studies were almost invariably directed at achieving piecemeal reformsin the civil rights and economic status of blacks, with an emphasis on the moral and psychological dimensions of the problem. There also existed, however, a second American legacy in race relations in the form of a rich, parallel, semi- or non-academic stream of radical black writings. These included pioneering black Marxists like W.E.B. Dubois, C.L.R. James and Richard Wright, and the vociferous and militant work of the 1960s Black Power spokespersons like Malcolm X, James Baldwin, Eldridge Cleaver, Stokeley Carmichael, Bobby Scale, George Jackson, and Angela Davis.36 Inevitably the question would repeatedly be raised of how much, or which parts, of the American experience of race relations in both its academic and directly political form was relevant to the British situation? This question, in various forms and guises, obviously had the broadest relevance for that section of the colored British population, about one-third of the total of around two million, who were the descendants of African slaves in the British colonies of the Caribbean. The positions of Indian, Pakistani and other groups in British society are, of course, also relevant to questions of ethnicity, assimilation and identity raised in the following discussion, but here considerations of space compel that the narrative focus on the AfroCaribbean communities. It will be most convenient to proceed phenomenologically, that is, by briefly reconstructing elements of the tripartite historical connec-

tions between the West Indies, the United States and Britain because

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each of these societies, historically and today, constitutes basic points of reference in attempts to rationalise the contradictions and pressures of identity experienced by blacks in Britain. From this historical vantage point it will be possible to brieiiy consider the views of

several writers on the causes of racism in Britain, a question which in turn relates back to the attempt to theorise the relationship between what we might term the politics of racial identity versus the politics of class. This is perhaps the central underlying issue of Marxist or Marxist-inspired discussions of race relations in Britain, and its family resemblance to the earlier tradition of Marxist debate over the national question will become obvious. Leaving aside the great historical legacy and mystique of black Africa, the most appropriate model with which to visualise the historical ebb and flow of Afro-Caribbean consciousness is a triangle, the corners of which represent the West Indies, black America, and urban England. Significant physical migration, and reversemigration, has historically occurred along just two lines on the triangle, between the West Indies and both other countries, but in the communication of culture and political ideas there has existed a complete and interacting circuit. To illustrate: socialist ideas, transmitted to the West Indies during the early twentieth century by periodicals and trade unionists aiming to organise colonial unions, impregnated the bourgeoning local movements for self-government with an advanced, metropolitan working-class consciousness. They implanted the idea that the anti-colonial left-wing of the Labour movement was the natural ally of the aspirations of the colored population. This spread of ideas from the metropolis was intensified by the first-hand experience of 'the Mother Country' of a trickle of

budding professionals and scholars who came to be educated and in the process acquired skills which would be of value of the nationalist movements in their home territories.

Eric Williams's Capitalism and Slavery was the product of this itinerary, which he then extended by moving to the United States, to teach at a black university, before returning to the West Indies to lead the independence movement in Trinidad after World War 11.37 Meanwhile, a West Indian connection had been established with black America both through the migration of West Indians there, and most significantly, through the formation, during the nineteentwenties, of the mass pan~African consciousness movement led by the Jamaican Marcus Garvey." It was the advent of the Garvey

movement in the United States which precipitated the first of a long

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series of Marxist confrontations, or attempted syntheses, between socialism and Afro-American consciousness and identity. Marxists in the United States, including the coloured Marxist W. E. B. Dubois, were not slow to attack -- on grounds familiar to readers of Chapter 4 - Garvey's attempt to create a pan-African nationalist movement among the black proletariat of the urban North. Garvey had rightly claimed to have been influenced by the Negro self-help and separate-development strategy advocated in a previous generation by Booker T. Washington. But that strategy had been imposed on blacks by virtue of the draconian racial repression which they faced in the backward, rural South. The subsequent mass

migration of blacks out of that region to the industrial cities of the North had created, in the view of both white and black progressives, the possibility of pursuing the goal of socially-integrating blacks into white society. The sudden appearance in Harlem of a charismatic orator from the economically-backward colonial island of Jamaica, flainboyantly attempting to stimulate black racial pride and separate development, was a most unwelcome intervention, even more unwelcome, perhaps, than Teodor Herzl's Zionist agitation had been to Viennese Marxists a generation before. Garvey, W. E. B. Dubois declared, was attempting to solve the issue of national selfdetermination, which had begun to stir in the black West Indies, in the wrong place: in a society in which black advance could only be won in collaboration with the progress of the numerically-dominant white working class." This was the nub of the problem which would

repeatedly surface in sectarian left-wing debates and polemics in the United States before eventually re-rnaterialising many years later in Britain, not only in similarly isolated Marxist milieux but as

a central

issue of race relations theory and policy. From the early 1970s the periodical Race & Class established itself, as its title proclaimed, as

the major Marxist forum for critical reflections and studies on this issue.40 Although the Garvey movement disintegrated, in the face of official hostility and persecution, the question of the potential role of America's blacks in developing a revolutionary socialist movement was periodically debated in the Communist Party which at one stage advocated, on the rationale provided by Stalin for the ethnic Republics in the Soviet Union, the establishment of a separate black state in the federal republic of the United States. The issue would also be discussed by the American Trotskyist movement which in

1939 sent the black Trinidad-born C. L. R. James, newly-arrived

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from six years of Marxist politics in London, to Mexico to present tentative proposals on the issue to Trotsky himself. A transcript of some of these discussions between James and Trotsky has recently been published revealing a talent for praxis-oriented originality on the part of the former, and a non-doctrinaire approach to the issue of socialism and nationalism on the part of the latter. James was at pains to explain to Trotsky the essential differences between the situation of blacks in the West Indies and the United States. Both in the West Indies and Africa self-determination was the correct policy to support, but in America, he argued, the situation was different: 'The Negro desperately wants to be an American citizen. He says, "I have been here from the beginning . . 2.41 James favoured giving support to a movement toward self-determination by blacks in America only if they themselves initiated the demand, but he was sceptical that the Garvey movement had actually signaled a mass readiness for a significant move in that direction. Trotsky, however, recalling European debates over the national question, and with the precedent of the ethnic republics in the Soviet Union in mind, appears as more receptive to a possible development in the direction of American black self-determination: I believe that the differences between the West Indies, Catalonia, Poland and the situation of the Negroes in the States are not so

decisive. Rosa Luxemburg was against self-determination for .Poland. She felt it was reactionary and fantastic, as fantastic as demanding the right to fly. It shows that she did not possess the necessary historic imagination in this H..42 -

During a later conference with James, Trotsky declared in a more orthodox vein, but one which also recognised the special revolutionary potential 'of blacks as a super-exploited, victimised people:

racially-

We must say to the conscious elements of the Negroes that they are convoked by the historic development to become a vanguard of the working class. What serves as a break on the higher [white] strata? It is the privileges, the comforts that hinder them from becoming revolutionists. It does not exist for the Negroes." It was James, however, who put forward a detailed set of practical

proposals for the establishment of a 'Negro Organisation' which

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would attempt to champion black rights in the United States and fight racial discrimination in housing, restaurants, employment etc. in order to create a movement which might eventually attract blacks to socialism. 'If we want to build a mass movement," he argued, with reference to the United States, 'we cannot plunge into a discussion of socialism, because I think that it would cause more confusion than it would gain support. The Negro is not interested in socialism. He can be brought to socialism [only] on the basis of his concrete experiences-544

Like W. E. B. Dubois before him, then, James saw the necessity of distinguishing between the West Indian situation, where regional nationalism and black emancipation as an oppressed class were identical mutually-reinforcin processes, and the situation in the United States where black emancipation could only be attained as part of a wider anti-capitalist class struggle. But it is a noteworthy feature of the source just quoted that neither James nor Trotsky display any theoretical dogmatism on this point: they acknowledge that they are uncertain as to how pervasive and deep the desire for black self-determination may be in the United States and are prepared to accommodate to such aspirations should they be forcefully pursued by blacks themselves." Theoretical uncertainty on this point persisted right through the dramatic American decade of the 1960s. The civil rights movement led by Dr Martin Luther King, confronted with the full brutality of racism in the South, gave rise to the creation of a number of black radical groups, some of which rejected the historic aims of racial integration and advocated counter-violence against white oppression One of the foremost exponents in this movement was the young

_

founder and theoretician of the Black Power pcrsbective, Stokely

Carmichael, who, as it happened, had been born in Trinidad but had been formed by his experiences of racial discrimination in the United States.4* The explosive confrontations, ideas and rhetoric which were associated with the black movement in America at this time were observed, admired and criticised from afar by black youth both in the West Indies - where they soon established what was essentially a multi-racial, anti-imperialist front under the fashionable banner of Black Power" and in the black semi-ghettos of English cities where the recently/~arrived Afro-Caribbean community was experiencing a continual escalation of racism. Thus, to the older West Indian nationalist tradition with its roots in the colonial l a b o r movement and the politics of class, and which in effect equipped many black workers for potential participation in the British working-class movement, was

-

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added a newer, basically American politics of racial identity. The latter rekindled the long-submerged pride in the African racial and cultural heritage which Garvey had pioneered in the United States but which had previously received very limited response or recognition in West Indian nationalist politics or middle class cultural life.48 It would, however, exaggerate the apparent disparities between the West Indian and American black traditions to suggest that the former was marked solely by the anti-colonial politics of class, while the impact of American-style Black Power brought a totally new and exclusive emphasis to the politics of racial confrontation. West Indian

history reveals abundant evidence for the existence of racial and ethnic grievances and tensions, these were merely papered-over during the long period of sublimated independence politics associated with the 'tutelary democracy' phase of terminal colonial rule." Conversely, when Carmichael and other black militants - Malcolm X had patented the style - patiently explained to the horrified white liberals that c o l o r , race and black identity really did matter, there often lurked the.implication that the real object of the exercise was to

educate and psychologically enable a proud and self-affirmative black community to obtain a better deal for itself in a white-dominated world. Thus a movement which was intended to emphasis the need for the development of a distinct black nationalist identity and racial consciousness could be easily converted into a rationale for the

acceleration of black upward social mobility

- through

improved

competitive competence in an advanced consumerist society. The social-psychological model which was often cited was that of the Jews: if blacks only had the racial pride, group cohesion and achievement-motivation of the Jews, all would be well.50 Similar concepts

were advanced by educationists in Britain in the following years, in the movement for programmes of Multi-Cultural education in the schools. This movement, although trenchantly criticised by the Marxist writer of West Indian background Maureen Stone, in The Education of the Black Child in Britain, was regarded by many black parents as an important step forward in combatting racism - and thereby poor motivation among black pupils. The major thrust of Stone's criticism was not against the principle can'lti-Cultural education as such but rather that mere tinkering with the curriculum would not eliminate the massive discrepancies in educational attainment between working-class pupils, of whatever colour, and children from more affluent homes. Moreover, she presented data from her

own studies which aimed to show that the psychological theory of the

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black child's 'negative self-concept' in a racist society, adduced to explain the under-achievement of black pupils in Britain as well as the United States, was invalid. Black kids did not automatically internalise white stereotypes because there existed a range of alternative supporting experiences within the culture of the black community.S1 The educational debate is only one of a number of key social policies in which the echoes of American research and administrative initiatives in the area of race can be clearly heard. The terminology of 'aflirinative action' in the area of employment; pressure from the state agencies to introduce ethnic monitoring of employment in local government, anti-racist courses in trade unions and the police; ac-

commodation to the special cultural norms of religious Minorities in industry and the school system, establishment of a means of legal redress against racial discrimination through assistance from a Com-

mission on Racial Equality - such measures, similar to programmes initiated in the United States a decade or so earlier, were slowly introduced into British institutional life during the seventies and early 1980s. Their implementation was accelerated in the aftermath of the long-predicted inner-city riots which erupted in 1980 and 1981. These riots, too, were widely interpreted as a latter-day black Britons' version of the 'Burn, baby, burnt' ghetto riots which had swept the United States in the late 1960s. That the liberal reforms and piecemeal remedies then introduced in the United States, although meliorating racial discrimination, had signally failed to transform the desperate socio-economic plight of most blacks was a lesson which the British establishment would not, for the time being, take on board." Once again, however, the parallels with the American case should

not be pressed too far. The existence of white racism in both societies created similar problems and precipitated various forms of emulative response in Britain among both blacks and white policy-makers. But, as previously indicated, West Indians, despite acculturation to English norms in the colonies, were regarded in Britain as outsiders, 'immigrants This contrasted with the undeniable claim of black Americans to be an important part of the indigenous national culture. The experience of rejection in Britain had certain major consequences for people of West Indian background in that, as with the Asian minority in Britain, it intensified links with the countries of origin, providing a basis for both vicarious and direct participation in politics and cultural developments 'back home'. A major impact of

this dualistic situation on people of Afro-Caribbean origin in Britain

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was to intensify their sense of identity as 'West Indians', as opposed to the rival small-island patriotisms and identities which had reigned supreme in the Caribbean. The hard lessons of white racism in Britain tended to radicalise their political attitudes not only in relation to British society, but also towards developments back in the Caribbean.

.

Diaspora West Indians would view sympathetically the aim of the self-declared socialist government of Michael Manley in Jamaica during the 1970s to achieve economic development by attempting to break the hold of American interests in the region, the debauch of socialist ideals in Guyana symbolised by the murder of Dr. Walter Rodney was widely condemned, as was the military intervention of the Americans in Grenada in 1983, an island in which a movement for socialism on a small scale had seemed to be making progress." Thus the political education of black Britons, which had begun under colonial rule, continued even after migration out of the region and undoubtedly helped to create that relatively sophisticated understanding, in the literature of British race relations, of the relationship of Third World politics to American and British neo-imperialism which was remarked at the outset of this discussion. The happy ending to this story from a Marxist standpoint would have been the incorporation of the more politically-conscious overseas workers, with their insight into the operations of capitalism gleaned from anti-colonial struggle, into the main body of the classconscious British trade union movement and Labour Party. Certainly Afro-Caribbean and Asian workers displayed the capacity to engage in industrial action in deface of their own interests, but the trade unions and the national Labour party -- despite some sporadic, token,

attempts at obtaining black candidates for election to parliament were not prepared to give a strong lead in cornbatting the racism which seemed to grow and achieve respectability during the sixties and seventies. Sociological studies like Ken Pryce's investigation of the black community in Bristol, Endless Pressure, and the John Rex , Sally Tomlinson study of the black and Asian community in a section of Birmingham, Colonial Immigrants in a British City: a Class Analysis, depicted a profound alienation of immigrant communities from all of the major institutions of British society, including, or even most especially, those of the white working~class.54* An extended debate took place in Marxist and academic sociological circles as to whether the black working class constituted simply part of the British

proletariat, or whether they were a 'fraction' of the working class, a

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'sub-proletariat' or an 'under-class'. The reader can obtain some impression of the nature of this issue by means of the overview of the employment of colored and white workers in England shown in Table 5.2. The dominant impression from such quantitative depictions of the situation is that while colored workers, especially the West Indians and lie Pakistan/Bangladesh category, are strongly over-represented in the lower, manual-grade occupations, they all appear to be situated on a shared vertical continuum of status and class. John Rex was among those who would argue that appearances were deceptive and that while black workers may have been in the British proletariat, they were not, because of the operation of the institutionalised racism, accepted as members of the proletariat. Although he went so far as to posit a 'structural break' between the white and black working class, Rex was fully aware of the difficulties of arriving at a categorical analysis of the situation:

TABLE 5.2 Percentage distribution of economically active males by ethnic origins (in England only) in 1977 Ethnic origin

Socio-economic group

West

India

Indies Professionals Employers & managers Other non-manual (Total non-manual) Skilled manual Semi-skilled manual

Unskilled (Total manual)

0.9 2.7 8.0 (11.6) 50.1 25.5

Pakistan &

'Whites'

Bangladesh

4.1 4.4 5.9

9.3 9.6 14,9 (34.3) 34.7

(14.4) 31.2

39.9

13.7 5.7 (59.3)

12.9

10.1

38.0 16.4

(88.5)

(65.6)

(85.6)

20.8

6.5 15.7 18.5 (40.7)

Total population in Great Britain in 1976 was 54 million. West Indians numbered 604 000 or 11%, Asians 636 000 or 1.2% , other 'New Common-

wealth'

-

including Aflica, Hong Kong, Malaysia etc.

- .

numbered 531 000

Of l.0*/0.

SOURCE Ethnic Minorities in Britain: a Study of Trends in Their Posifiofz Since $96/, Home Oiiice Research Study no. 68, by Simon Field, George Mair, Tom Rees and Philip Stevens, 1980, p. 39. Because of ambiguities in official definitions of ethnic origin the above figures are approximations. 'Whites`, of course, refers to over 90 per cent of the total male workforce, most of whom were born in England, or the British Isles.

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On the one hand there appears to be some statistical evidence that black immigrants and black Britons are slowly being absorbed into the British working class, albeit into its least privileged sectors. On the other hand there appears to be a tendency towards growing militancy among blacks which leads, given the fact of overt racist agitation and implicitly racialist policies being pursued by members of the white majority and white government, to a situation of defensive confrontation." The 'structural break' was not therefore only a matter of competitive position in the labour market; it entailed the potential for a reactive, racial and ethnic consciousness of black workers, the multiple origins of which we have just been considering, Rex understood the motivational rationale for the inclusion of Multi-Cultural black studies in the school curriculum, but he questioned whether the encouragement of

a separate ethnic identity might not be dysfunctional for the longterm objective of reducing tendencies toward structural divisions in the workforce along racial lines: It may well be that for many assertion of black cultural identity appeals simply because competition in white schools on white terms seems to be unfair. In any case, since black studies programmes draw heavily upon a culture of revolt, their initiation is bound to mean the focussing of moral and political ideas about a centre remote from that which is found in working-class culture. Thus the growth of black consciousness and black power movements is a sign not merely of withdrawal from approved forms of middle class mobility-seeking,

but from the working class values which have

arisen both in conflict with this mobility striving and as an adjustment to it.56 Although Rex, a white sociologist of South African origins, was not regarded as a bona fide Marxist theorist by some black Marxists , he posed here the classic Marxist question of the apparent contradiction between the requirements for the development of working class solidarity and the maintenance of a separate national, racial identity. The implication of the passage just quoted seemed to be that blacks could not have it both ways: they could not expect to consolidate an exclusive black identity while at the same time hoping to gain admission into the majority working class. Hut since one of the chief causes

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of the intensification of black identity in the first place had been the existence of white racism the argument was really circular and led nowhere. The issue was diff rently theorised in a study, published .in 1978, which must rank as one of the best Marxist studies of racism in Britain, Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order, of which the senior author was the leading black academic Marxist Stuart Hall. Policing the Crisis traces, inter alia, the way in which media preoccupation with the crime of 'mugging' served to facilitate the manufacture of a racist panic during the economic, political and cultural crisis of British capitalism throughout the 1970s; thus pro-

ducing a climate of opinion which would assist in the legitimation of more directly repressive policies of state control. Adhering to a Gramscian paradigm, the study argues that the society was undergoing a crisis of hegemony, moving from the Gramscian 'moment of consent' to the 'moment of force' when the working class, black and white, would be subjected 'to a systematic ideological onslaught aimed at transforming the ideological terrain into an "authoritarian consensus" favourable to the imposition of strong remedies and reactionary policies'.57 The position of the black worker, as analysed in this study, cannot be reduced to a simple formula, but the following extracts give some of the flavor of this approach to the issue of race and class:

Racism is not simply the discriminatory attitudes of the personnel with whom blacks come into contact. It is the specific mechanism which 'reproduces' the black l a b o r force, from one generation to another, in places and positions which are race-specific. The outcome of this complex process is that blacks are ascribed to a

position within class relations of contemporary capitalism which is at one and the same time coterminous with the white working class (of which black labour is a fraction) and yet segmentally different from it. In these terms, ethnic relations are continually over-determined by class relations, but the two cannot be collapsed into a single structure. . . . It is through the operation of racism that blacks are beginning to comprehend how the system works. It is through a specific kind of 'black consciousness' that they are beginning to appropriate, or 'cone to consciousness' of their class position, organise against it and 'fight it out.258 In this version, then, what we have termed, for the purposes of the discussion, as the politics of class, and the politics of racial identity

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are subsumed in a more comprehensive schema in which the two are not counterposed but presented as different moments of the same dialectical process. Whether this theoretical solution works out in practice remains to be seen. It is a position obviously far removed from the classic Marxist dichotomization, but one which certainly has features in common, superficially at least, with Otto Bauer's ideas on the compatibility of national identity with the requirements of class struggle. Returning to Table 5.2, it will be noted that workers of Indian

origin appear to have a profile nearer to that of the white workforce, but this is partially misleading since the figures do not reveal such features as the career-blockages experienced by junior hospital doctors and the precarious marginal position of many small businessmen . Nevertheless, the rise of Sikh, Hindu and Moslem traders would occasion racial violence in some areas of the country, displaying forms and pretexts historically associated with the anti-Jewish syndrome." However, since West Indian and Asian workers were recruited into British industry mainly as a replacement proletariat, and since the appearance of widespread white working-class rejection of coloured workers seems to have pre-dated the emergence of a significant degree of economic competition between the two groups, explanations of the causes of racism in Britain have tended to emphasis not economic conflict but continuities with the ingrained sense of racial superiority which the British working class, along with the whole of British society, acquired through centuries of slave-

trading and imperialism. The tendency toward a historicist reduction of the problem to a simple 'legacy of colonialism' explanation is avoided by a number of contemporary black Marxist writers, how~

ever, who recognise that knowledge of historical causes must be combined with an on-going analysis of the role of racism in the current context. Thus the authors of the introductory chapter to the 1982 Marxist anthology The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 70s Britain, acknowledge that 'The historical roots of racist practices within the British state, the British dominant classes, and the British working class . . . have been conditioned, it not determined, by the historical development of colonial societies. . . . This process generated a specific type of "nationalism" pertinent to the formation of British classes long before the "immigrant" issue became a central aspect of political discourse. 760 But they go on to an interpretation of what they

regard as the stages in the development of racism in Britain over

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recent decades on the basis of the orientation which Stuart Hall enunciated in a seminal paper: Though it may draw on the cultural and ideological traces which are deposited in a society by previous historical phases, it always assumes specific forms which arise out of the present - not the past - conditions and organisation of society- . . The indigenous racism of the 6U's and 70's is significantly different, in form and effect from the racism of the 'high' colonial period. It is a racism 'at Horne', not abroad. It is the racism not of a dominant but of a declining social formation."

_

The undeniable good sense of this orientation cannot, however, allay the difficulties in constructing accounts of British racism which are both theoretically coherent from a Marxist standpoint, and empirically substantiated. As these sons and daughters of the old Empire strike back they appear to this writer to rely too heavily on illdigested neo~Marxist constructs, and to proceed by way of rather emotive, rambling and trite polemics. Given the strong anti-positivist, anti-empiricist tenor of much recent Marxist theory it is not surprising that direct Marxist investigation of the crucial problem of white working class racism, utilising traditional methods of sociological research, should be relatively rare. Two notable exceptions, studies dealing with the dimension of inter-ethnic competition, and the social-psychological bases of work-

ing class racism may be briefly cited. In their 1980 study Labour and Racism, Annie Phizacklea and Robert Miles presented findings from a detailed study of white and black working class attitudes in the

London district of Willesden, which sought to discover the extent and direct causes of white racist attitudes. Although 75 per cent of the white manual workers interviewed were found to articulate racist

views of some sort, the majority of the racist beliefs, the authors contend, were attempts to understand and explain immediate daily experience: workers had seen their area decline economically and tended to identify the presence of black workers as the cause of the decline. 'A large proportion of the racist beliefs expressed in the interviews', they state, 'stem from a perceived conflict with black people over the allocation of scarce resources, particularly housing.'62 The impression gained is that these attitudes took the form of shifting rationales which did not clearly distinguish between actual competition

with blacks and negative assertions which were structured by the normative logic of scapegoating. But the dominant impression from this

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study is that despite the existence of cleavages between the white and black working class, these are not associated with a high degree of ideological awareness on either side, nor necessarily so deep or permanent as to overcome the pressures for common class action arising out of the similarities in their objective class situation. Phizacklea and Miles do not attempt to probe the psychological dimensions of working class racism to any great depth. One of the

few Marxist investigations of this type to have been executed in Britain is reported in the study Fascism and the WoriiCing Class conducted by a contributor to the present anthology, Norman O'Neill. While O'Neill has rejected the Freudian basis of the Frankfurt School's investigations of authoritarianism, he has sought to find explanations for the same phenomena which they observed by analysing differences in working class cognition in relation to variations in life-styles. He demonstrates, for example, that within the same occupational category of manual workers in a British city, significant differences in social attitudes are correlated with relatively subtle sociological variables: e.g. the way changing patterns of social interaction of workers on a new housing estate tend to undermine the authoritarian, tradition-bound verities supported by the pattern of life of workers still living in the older, self-enclosed working class areas. His general objective is to provide an interpretation, within. . a wider theoretical analysis of fascism, of which features of working class life tend to create attitudes which may be receptive to fascist ideology, and with it, racism." . . . .. .. . ..

. .. . . . .. . .

111

This mere sketch, or rather, sample, of recent Marxist studies of race relations in Britain has attempted to do no more than to provide a point of entrée for the non-specialist into a readily-available body of current literature, the range and complexity of which has only been hinted at here. It is, of course, eminently likely that the changing historical configuration of which British racism is a part, along with the studies and theoretical models which have been constructed to provide explanations and guides to action, will soon appear as timebound and limited in their leading assumptions as the pre-1914 Marxists now appear to us in their assessments of the historical fragility of Jewish ethnicity and anti-Semitism. The contrast of the

classic anti-Semitic variant of racism with the contemporary blackwhite confrontation in Britain has illustrated, among other possible

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connections, that when racism is deeply rooted in the historical legacy of a society, whether the racial minority is over-represented in the middle class or working class may be irrelevant to the odds of its becoming enmeshed in the crude, if systemic, processes of demagogic political manipulation. But in no way can the black communities in Britain repeat the disastrous and tragic history of the Jews of continental Europe, to the extent that the fate of some of the latter was partly due to the relative ease with which they could racially 'pass' and assimilate into the non-Jewish world. Hitler himself confessed in his autobiography that when he first came to Vienna as a young man he was not aware of the presence of the numerically large, and outwardly mainly acculturated, Jewish community,64 It seems unlikely that blacks in Britain will in the near future be lulled into complacency and underestimate the threat of racism for that reason.

As for the efficacy of socialist parties in combatting racism in the two situations just reviewed, there is clearly less ground for optimism. One can understand the political reasons why the Austrian social democrats, long before the terrible potential of the ideology was revealed, found it difficult to make anti-Semitism a central issue in their own ideological and political practice. The uncreative posture of the leadership of the British Labour party under Wilson, Callaghan and Foot, vis-ri-vis the racism endemic in the working class, indicates however that economistic rationalizations for inaction remain serviceable. But all that may be changing as well as the rising generation of

black Britons achieves a firmer sense of self-confidence and rootedness in the British scene, as there are many indications that it will. Even education reforms like the spread of serious programmes of Multi-Cultural education may provide more of a usable past for the

class struggle in Britain than is generally realised. In the CSE social studies course at Tulse Hill School in south London topics on which the 16-year-old might write included 'connexions between racism and economic class relations'. Two questions from the 1982 examinations were: 'Describe the harrassment many black people have faced as a

result of immigration controls in two of the following areas: police raids, detention centre, family break-up, hospital treatment." and 'What can people in the industrial countries and the Third World do to stop multinational companies harming the interests of people in the Third World?$65

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NOTES AND REFERENCES 1. This connection, between the political economy of the industrialised capitalist nations and the Third World, has been a feirmotiv of the British journal Race & Class. See especially the essays by its editor A. Sivanandan, A Different Hunger: Writings on Black Resistance. London, Pluto Press, 1982. Sivanandan has been a leading independent theorist of the issues of race and class from this perspective. For an example of studies of race and economics during the 1970s see Harold

Wolpe, 'The Theory of Internal Colonialism: the South African Case," and I. Oxaal, 'The Dependency Economist as Grassroots Politician in the Caribbean' in I. Oxaal, D. Booth and T. Barnett (eds), Beyond the

Sociology of Development: Economy and Society in Latin America and Africa, London, Routledge & Kevan Paul, 1975.

2. Perhaps the major British sociologist to attempt to bridge the gaps between American and British race relations, and between more trade

tional sociological perspectives and Marxism has been John Rex. See, for example, his early statement Race Relations in Sociological Theory , London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1970. See also the papers collected

from the British Sociological Association's 1969 conference, Sami Zubaida (ed.), Race and Racialism, London, Tavistock Publications, 1970. 3. For recent literature on the Williams thesis see, inter alia, Roger Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade and British Abolition, 1975, David Eltis and Stanley Engerman ; 'Economic Aspects of th e Abolition m o w

Debate' in Christine Bolt and Seymour Drescher (eds), Anti-Slavery,

Religion and Reform, London, Folkstone & Hambden, 1980, pp. 272-93, the classic critique of the Harris thesis is Eugene Genovese , 'Materialism and Idealism in the History of Negro Slavery in the Americas', reprinted in Gordon Bowler and John Carrier (eds), Race and Ethnic Relations, London, Hutchinson, 1976, pp. 145-64. Michael Barton, Race Relations, London, Tavistock, 1967, p. 1694.5. See the dissection of this and related issues provided by Percy Cohen in

his introduction to Bowker and Carrier (eds), Race and Ethnic Relations, op. cit., pp, 9-26- The present writer has resisted the temptation to here enter into the long debate as to whether the concept of 'race' is a legitimate construct for Marxist analysis.

6. See, for example, James Barber, The Uneasy Relationship: Britain and South Africa, London, Heinemann Educational, 1983. 7. This, in any case, is the major difference which strikes the student of Central European Anti-Semitism- See also Howard Brotz 'The Posi-

tion of Jews in English Society' The Jewish Journal of Sociology, (Apr. 1959, pp. 94-113). 8. For an extensive bibliography see Michael Billie and Andrew Bell, 'Fascist Parties in Postwar Britain' , Sage Race Relations Abstracts, vol. 5 ,

no. l (Feb. 1980) pp. 1-30. 9. As Marx wrote to Engels

:

_

._l1861: 'The Jewish Nigger Lassalle

fortunately departs at the end of this week.

..

...

It is now completely

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Marxist Sociology Revisited clear to me that he, as is proved by his cranial formation and his hair, descends from the Negroes who had joined Moses's exodus from Egypt (assuming that his mother or grandmother on the paternal side had not interbred with a nigger). Now this union of Judaism with Gerrnanisrn with a basic Negro substance must produce a peculiar product. The obstructiveness of the fellow is also Nigger-like.' Quoted by Paul Johnson, 'Marx: ill will towards all men', Daffy Telegraph, 24 Dec. 1983. The usefulness of such private correspondence, however ironical its intent, for right-wing attacks on Marxism is well-illustrated here. Paul Johnson also cites Robert Wistrich's Revolutionary Jews from Marx to Trotsky (Lon Harrap, 1976) as 'the best and fairest account I know of Marx's anti-Selnitisln'. Wistrich's analysis of this trait in Marx is more sensitive and qualified than is suggested by

Johnson's endorsement. But there is no denying the existence of this streak of rhetorical excess in the founding fathers. The same Friedrich Engels who would later, during the 189U's, strongly oppose political anti-Semiti-sm (see below) could write to Marx concerning Lassalle in 1856: 'It is revolting to see how he is always trying to push his way into the aristocratic world. He is a greasy Jew disguised under brilliantine and flashy jewels', MEGA, vol. 2, part II (Berlin, I930] 122. EngelsMarx, 7 Mar., 1856. 10. 'Gobineau's Essay on the Inequality of Races threw its strange shadow over Wagner's final years. The work, written over a quarter of a century earlier, had remained relatively unexplored until Wagner helped make it famous and eventually a pillar of Nazi racial theory through its enthusiastic adaptation by his disciples, especially Houston Stewart Chamberlain's ambitious refashioning. In the frail, almost

blind French intellectual, Wagner thought he had found a scholarly corroborator of his own scribblings on race, and the Count, whom Wagner had taken to Berlin for the fourth Ring, imagined his ethnological thesis come alive on the stage of the Viktoria Theater'. Robert W. Gut ran, Richard Wagner: the Man, His Mind and His Masie, New

York, Harcourt Brace, 1968. See Man Kampf, London, Hutchinson, pp. 90-1. See Andrew G. Whiteside, The Socialism of Fools: Georg Ritter von Schoenerer and Austrian Pun-Germanism, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975. Concludes Whiteside (p. 311): 'It was primarily due to Schoenerer that Pan-German ideology . . . was defined by the purging of all "racial Jews" from political, economic and cultural life, the reduction of the Slavs to the level of helots, the destruction of the

Habsburg state, the cult of Bismarck and of Prussianism in an exaggerated, bizarre form, and the rejection of any possibility of gradualism and compromise. It was primarily due to him that crude threats, name

calling, and physical bullying became essential features of the movement." Remarkably, Schoenerer was the man who Hitler would criticise for having addressed himself principally to bourgeois circles and thus ' . . . the result was bound to be very feeble and tame', Man Kampf, op. cit., p. 93. This was a judgment which Whiteside, giving the devil

his due, shows was totally unfair to the genuine destructive malevol~

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once unleashed by Schoenerer's movement. The Socialism of Fools, pp.318-25. 13. Robert S. Wistrich, Socialism and the Jews: the Dilemmas of Assimilation in Germany and Austria-Hungary, London and Toronto, Associated University Presses, 1982, p. 202. 14. See Wistrich, ibid., pp. 204-24. 15. Ibid, p. 210. 16. The origins of this term, or similar ones 11 - . I N 'der Sozialismus des blOnder Mannes' has been variously attributed to a number of late-19th century socialists. 17. Quoted by Wistrich in Socialism and Fhe Jews, op. cit., p. 128. 18. See Peter G.J. Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semiffsm in Germany and Austria, New York, John Wiley, 1964, pp. 127-88 et passim.

19. For a classic race relations textbook summary of different theoretical approaches see George Simpson and Milton Yinger, Racial and Cul-

tara! Minorities, (4th edu) New York, Harper & Row, 1972. 20. See Ephraim Nimni's discussion of this issue in the foregoing chapter. 21. See the analysis of Marx's 'Zur Judenfrage' in R.S. Wistrich, Revolutionary Jews from Marx to Trotsky, op. cit., pp. 26-45. 22. Otto Bauer, 'Nationale Autonomic der Auden', chap. 23 in Die Nationalirétenfrage und die So zialdemokratie, Vienna, 1924, pp. 366-81. 23. Wistrich, op. cit., pp. 118-29. 24. Wistrich, Socialism and the Jews, op. cit., p. 134,

25. Ibid., p. 133. Wistrich's translation actually exaggerates the contradicson suggested here. Pulzer's rendering is more faithful: . . . [strata] who, mistaking the actual cause of their situation, direct their struggle not against the capitalist economic system, but against a symptom appearing in it which becomes inconvenient to them in the competitive struggle against Jewish exploitation' (emphasis added) The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, op. cit., p. 345. original text reads '. . . aber in Verkennung der eigentlichen Ursache ihrer Lage den Kampf nicht gegen das kapitalistische Wirtschaftsystem, sondern gegen sine in demselben h e rvo rtretende Erscheinungen richter, die ihnen in Konkurrerzzkarnpfe urzbequem word; g e e r das jiidische Ausbeuterthum' (emphasis added). In Iring Fetscher (ed.), Marxisten regen

Antisemizismus, Hamburg, Hoffman & Kempfe, 1974, p. 58. The essential sense of contradiction remains, however. Socialism and the Jews, op. cit., p. 135. See I. Oxaal and Walter Weitzmann, 'The Jews of Pre-1914 Vienna', Leo Baeck Institute Year Book, vol. 30, 1985. 28. The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, op. cit., p. 14. 29. Ibid., pp. 14-15. 30. Loc. cit. In a later passage (p. 285) Pulzer writes: 'Some of the sources of political anti-Sernitism, therefore are self-evident. Among farmers and traders there was economic discontent, among aristocrats and climbers there was snobbery, among all classes there was religious prejudice from a pre-Liberal, pre-capitalist era. But these did not provide the sole motivating force. The characteristic of twentieth

century politics has been the triumph of ideology over self-interest.'

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Marxist Sociology Revisited The latter sweeping judgment, which conflates the pre- and post-1914 situation suggests a tendency to attach paramount importance to the irrationalist mode of interpretation of anti-Semitism over 'objective' economic causes, consistent with the appearance of ambiguity in Pul-

zer's initial approach to the issue. 31. Despite the spread of modern industrialisation in Vienna during the early 20th century, the typical scale of Viennese industrial and commercial establishments remained quite small, retarding the development of proletarianisation of the artisan and petit-bourgeois strata a tendency which the Social Democrats realised weakened their appeal to the masses, and which tended to strengthen the basis of anti-Semitism. "ii-m1gel's original analysis of the correlation between antiSemitism and economic backwardness was by no means out of date in

-

the immediate pre-World War I situation. See data and discussion of this point in I. Oxaal and W. Weitzmann, 'The Jews of Pre-1914 Vienna', op. cit.

32. 'One of the essential characteristics of Critical Theory from its inception had been a refusal to consider Marxism a closed body of received truths. As the concrete social reality changed, so too, Horkheimer and his colleagues argued, must the theoretical constructions generated to make sense of it.' See Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination.' a History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research,

1923-50, London, Heinemann, 1973, p. 254.

33. For an extensive report on this period see E. J. B. Rose and associates, Colour & Citizenship: a Report on British Race Relations, London, Oxford, 1969. 34. For example, see Stephen Castles, 'Racism and Politics in West Germany', Race & Class, vol. 25, no. 3 (Winter 1984). 35. See note Z above. 36. For a recent treatment of this theme see Manning Marable, How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America, London, Pluto Press, 1983, and Cedric I. Robinson, Black Marxism: the Making of the Black Radical Tradition, London, Zed Press, 1983. The latter contains extensive discussion of the problems raised in the present chapter.

37. See I. Oxaal, Black Intellectuals and the Dilemmas of Race and Class in Trinidad (rep. edu), Cambridge, Mass, Schenkman Publishing Co.,

1982. 38. Evidence for the existence of a strong British West Indian presence in Harlem is provided by Gilbert Osofsky, Harlem: the Making of a Ghetto, New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1965, pp. 131-5, or passim. 39. Quoted in Harold Cruse, The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual New

York, William Morrow, 1967, p. 119. 40. As cited in footnote 1 above. See also the work of C. L. R. James's colleague, Darcus Howe, and the Race Today collective. 41. C. L. R. James, At the Rendezvous of Vicro , London, Allison & Busby, 1984, p. 33. 42. Ibid, p. 37. 43. Ibid., p. 47.

44. Ibid., p. 46.

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45. That this issue is in some form of much more than purely historical interest is illustrated by the current (1984) controversy over the attempt of some black militants to establish separate black sections within the British Labour Party - proposals which have been strenuously resisted by the patty leader Neil Kinnock and deputy leader Roy Hattersley. And that such demands for separate black representations should be

made in Britain during the same year that Reverend Jesse Jackson mounted a historic campaign to strengthen black America's political bargaining power at the presidential level, may not be entirely coincidental, but in part attributable to the on-going 'demonstration elifects'

of the West Indies - USA Britain interconnections mentioned above. 46. See Stokeley Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: the Politics of Liberation in America, New York, Random House, 1967. 47. Carmichael's attempt to intervene in West Indian developments during . -

a personal visit during 1970 were a fiasco. His more restricted panAirican outlook could not come to terms with the traditional multiracial perspectives of the Marxists in Guyana nor with the Black Power youth movement in Trinidad whose most prominent slogan was 'Indians and Africans Unite Nowl' - an attempt to bring together the rural Hindu and Moslem workers with the urban, industrial AfroTrinidadian sector. For an interpretation of this movement and its relation to Trinidad figures like Dr Eric Williams and C. L. R. James, see I. Oxaal, Black Intellectuals and the Dilemmas of Race and Class in

Trinidad, op. cit., pp. 195-280. 48. The positive recognition and legitimacy accorded to African cultural survivals in the West Indies since independence, however, has transformed its status in the region and affected the cultural outlook of

blacks in Britain as well. 49. A locus classics in the literature of West Indian pluralism is M.G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies, Berkeley, Univer-

sity of California Press, 1965. 50. See, for example, A. Mazrui, 'Negritude, the Talmudic tradition and the Intellectual Performance of Black and Jews', Ethnic and Racial

Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, 1978, pp. 19-36.

51. Maureen Stone, The Education of the Elack Child in BrftarNz: the Myth of Multi-racial Education, Glasgow, Fontana, 1981. Maureen Stone over-generalises about the degree of causal significance attached by other researchers to negative self concept in determining pupil performance according to David Milner, Children and Race: Ten Years On, London, Ward Lock, 1983, pp. 220-24. 52. For an account of the failure of programmes to develop 'Black Capitalism' in the USA (a development also favoured by the Tory party in

Britain) see Arthur I. Blaustein and Geoffrey Faux, The Star-.Spangled Hustle, New York, Anchor, 1973, 53. The murder of Maurice Bishop, the principal leader of the Grenada revolution which set in train the events which were used as a pretext for American military intervention appears to have been a consequence . -

of an internal split in the ruling Marxist party. Bishop's chief rival (it is

alleged at present writing) was Bernard Coard, author of a pioneering

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study of racism in British schools during the early seventies - thus illustrating, here in a tragic context, the extent to which Marxist ideological and political interaction between Britain and the West Indies can occur at the present time. 54. Ken Pryce, Endless Pressure, Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1979, John Rex and Sally Tomlinson, Colonial Immigrants in a British City; A Class Analysis, London, Routledge, 1979.

55. John Rex, 'Black Militancy and Class Conflict', in Robert Miles and Annie Phizacklea (eds), Racism and Political Action in Britain, Rout-

__

ledge, 1979, p. 72. 56. Ibld., p. 82. 57. Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke and Brian Roberts, Policing the Crisis; Magging, the State and Law and Order, Macmillan, 1978, p. 390. Echoes of earlier analyses of the role of obvious but totally anti-Semitism in the Nazi regime are, of coit .

e

ignored by these writers. 58. Ibid., pp. 389-90. 59. Racist attacks against Asians have been perhaps the ugliest manifesta. tion of racism in Britain. 60. Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 70s Britain, London, Hutchinson, 1982, p, 11. 61. Ibid., p. 14, 62. Annie Phjzacklea and Robert Miles, Labour and Racism, London,

r

Routledge, 1980, p. 117. 63. Norman O'Neill, Fascism and oNe Working Class, Southall, Middlesex, Shakti Publications, 1982. 64. Man Kampf, op. cit., p. 48. 65. 'Exams reflect changing attitudes on race,' The Times Educational Supplement, 4 May 1984, p. 9.

6 The Family and Capitalism in Marxist Theory COLIN CREIGHTON INTRODUCTION There have been three major contributions within Marxism to the study of the family: the classic texts of Marx and Engels, the work of the Frankfurt School and the responses of contemporary Marxists to the challenge of the women's movement. Each of these phases has been characterised by different concepts and different concerns. In reviewing these approaches, with particular reference to the relationship between the family and capitalism, I shall make the following points. Firstly, that the methodological problem for Marxism of satisfactorily relating base and superstructure has had serious consequences for the study of the family which has generally either fallen

into economic reductionism or laid excessive emphasis upon the role of the family as an ideological institution, failing to root this adequately in its material activities. Similarly, it has been difficult to

avoid functionalist formulations in analysing the family. Secondly, that despite the weaknesses of the domestic labour debate, a Marxist account of the family in capitalist society must rest upon a materialist analysis of domestic labour and that the socialisation of children is its central component and main contribution to the maintenance of capitalist social relations. Thirdly, that we must examine the relationship of both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat to the family, recognising that the relationship of each is a contradictory one and that the interests of the two are not wholly incompatible with each other but overlap in certain important ways. Fourthly, I shall examine certain neglected aspects of the relationship between the processes of socialisation and the institutions of capitalist society whose study may lead

to a more satisfactory theorisation of the family and capitalism. 181

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As a final introductory point the importance must be stressed of avoiding a unitary approach to 'the family' for this has two pitfalls. Firstly, it leads to an essentialist concept of the family as an*hject with a constant 'core' instead of viewing it as a constantly changing phenomenon which is constituted and reconstituted on the basis of the prevailing forces and social relations of production encourages generalised judgments of the fairly as 'good' or 'bad', as 'bourgeois' or 'proleta1°ian', and so hampers appreciation of the contradictions at play within family structures and within their rela-

tionship to the social formation THE FOUNDATIONS

In the work of both Marx and Engels the dominant concept for analysis the family is that of property relations. In this respect there is a substantial continuity of approach from Marx's early critique of Hegel to Engels' late work on The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. In the early 1840s, during his assessment of Hegel's political philosophy, Marx demonstrates how the former's analysis leads him to justify the domination of property over the interests of the individual members of the family In The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels extend this critique to family relations within capitalist society by pouring scorn on the bourgeoisie who hypocritically laud love in theory but sacrifice it in practice to econ-

omic considerations while supplementing loveless marriage by prostitution.4 It is only The Origin, however, which tries to offer a systematic study of the family.5

In this work, Engels attempts to apply the approach of historical materialism to the family by relating changes in the forms of marriage in pre-class society and the transition to class society to transforma-

tions in the forces and social relations of production. During the earliest stages of social development, descent was traced through the female line, marriage could be easily dissolved, women had supremacy in the household and household l a b o r had not yet become

separate from social production. There was a strict division of l a b o r between the sexes but no substantial inequality between then. These arrangements were shattered by new economic and social forces, particularly by the domestication of animals which led to the concentration of greater sources of wealth in (male) private hands.

The desire to pass this wealth to their own children led men to

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replace female by male descent and the concomitant urge to ensure that heirs were legitimate led to the monogamous family based firmly on the supremacy of the man. These changes solidly institutionalised the subordination of women and radically transformed the family. Henceforth family organisation was subordinated to considerations of property and its development was tied to transformations in property relations. Assessment of Engels' work has taken three main forms. The first relates to his analysis of the family in pre-class societies and of the origins of gender inequality, questioning for instance his assumption that the original sexual division of l a b o r was a 'natural' one and that it did not involve oppression." The second relates to the manner in which his conceptual framework relates to the interpretative prince pies of historical materialism. The third is the relevance of his approach

for understanding the development of the family under capitalisnl.7 It is this last aspect which is of most concern to this paper. It is in this area that the conceptual weaknesses of Engels' analysis are most clearly displayed. In relation to the bourgeois family, he stressed the continuing priority of property relations, but for the working-class family this concept offered little purchase. Engels recognised this, but drew erroneous conclusions, suggesting that the absence of property meant that among the proletariat there was no longer any stimulus to assert male domination, that the marriage tie was dissolving, that women had regained the right of separation, and that these developments were underpinned and being consolidated by women's waged work. Only amongst the proletariat, Engels concluded, could sex love in the relation of husband and wife become the rule.8 This approach provided no possibility of explaining the continued subordination of women within the working-class family, or major developments - such as the consolidation of the family and the increasing domestication of women - which were already well under way within the working class when Engels was writing. There are indeed hints in his analysis of other mechanisms which could provide the basis of a more satisfactory explanation, as in his insistence that the socialisation of private household labour is a precondition for the emancipation of women,g but overall the emphasis that he places upon the employment of women in industry suggests that Engels viewed domestic work as a residual problem, even under capitalism, and it is undeniably the case that he fails to offer any elaboration ,

either theoretical or empirical, of the concept of domestic work."

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Within Marxist attempts since Engels to theorise the relation of the family to the capitalist mode of production there have been three main axes of debate. The first is the issue of the nature of the contribution of the family to the operations of capitalism. The second is the question of whether the processes of capitalism tend to support or undermine the family. The third is the evaluation of the family as a 'bourgeois' or 'working class' institution. Each of these issues has been approached in a variety of ways. The contribution of the family to capitalism, for instance, has been examined in both economic and ideological terms while the treatment of ideology has varied according to the emphasis laid on psychological processes. Similarly, the impact of capitalism on the family has variously stressed the socioeconomic and the psychological operations of the latter as have discussions of whether the family is a capitalist or a proletarian institution. The relationship of these debates to the position of women is variable. For the Frankfurt School" and for Althusser" the issue was only of marginal concern while for Lasch the women's movement has contributed to the culturally disastrous decline of the family." The dominant tendency has been to regard the family as the major institution mediating between the mode of production and the subordination of women. Dissatisfaction with this approach, however, has led in recent years to a stress on the autonomy of the family and to analysing it in the light of such terms as patriarchy or relations of reproduction. The discussion of these issues which follows will centre exclusively upon the working-class family.

DOMESTIC LABOUR Engels argued that the privatisation of domestic work was one of the chief obstacles to the emancipation of women."' A number of writers, with this as their starting-point, have taken the persistence of domestic labour to be a central issue for Marxist analysis. Within what has become known as the domestic l a b o r debate this problem has been discussed in terms of the economic contribution that domestic labour makes to capitalism by performing the essential task of replenishing labor-power. More specifically these writers have argued that domestic l a b o r makes a contribution, either directly or indirectly, to surplus value." This debate has serious theoretical, methodological and substan-

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five weaknesses, yet I would argue that its focus upon the material practices of domestic labour and their effects is one that should remain central to a Marxist analysis of the family. It is necessary, however, to re-examine the priority that has been attached to the different components of domestic labour and to reassess the nature of the contribution that they make to capitalist social relations. The attempt to apply the law of value to the work of the housewife

is misconceived in a number of ways. In the stronger versions of the approach it is maintained either that domestic labour produces sur-

plus value directly or else that it creates value which is embodied in labor-power and realised when the latter is exchanged." Both arguments rest upon the assumption that domestic labour can be treated as abstract labour. It is now generally agreed, however, that this equation is inadmissible since domestic l a b o r is privatised labour which produces use values only, not exchange values, and as such is not part of social production and is thus necessarily carried on independently of the law of value." The approach is not saved, moreover, in its weaker version which holds that domestic labour contributes to surplus value by keeping the level of wages below the value of labor-power." Against this thesis, Molyneux has convincingly argued that the relationship between domestic l a b o r and the value of labor-power is not an invariant one and must be established empirically." In certain situations domestic labour may not be the cheapest way of meeting workers' needs, and indeed this may be the more common situation historically given that the cost of supporting a full-time housewife has to be covered by paying men a 'family wage'. Further theoretical errors are to conflate the reproduction of labour-power with the reproduction of the living individual" and to

conflate the question of the effect of labour-power upon surplus value with the question of why it is that housework is allocated overwhelmingly to women. On the second of these questions it is important, as Molyneux has pointed out, to separate the two issues:

even if we accept that domestic labour can lower the value of labor-power in certain circumstances, this. is insufficient to account for the position of women in the home." Once we have distinguished between the actual consequences of domestic l a b o r and its allocation women, we can pose the question of how they are related to each other. I will argue that the

sexual division of l a b o r within the family is dependent upon the

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existence of the family-household and can therefore only be explained once we have satisfactorily explored the reasons for the perpetuation of the latter and thus for the continuing existence of domestic l a b o r (which, it must be emphasised, is not identical with the work of a full-time housewife, nor even with that of women alone) . The methodological weaknesses of this debate are as marked as the theoretical ones. The first of these is the functionalist assumption that domestic labour is to be explained in terms of its necessary functions for capital, The wider problems of functionalist positions within Marxism are beyond the scope of this paper. It is enough here to mention some narrower criticisms. The first is that the formulation fails to appreciate that there are various ways in which the family operates for the benefit of capital. For instance, it both reproduces the labour force and enables women to act as a reserve army of l a b o r , and no necessity makes these two functions harmonise." A second is that the functionalist assumption obscures a very important feature of the workings of capital in relation to the family. While the capitalist system may have certain requirements of the family, it also contains processes which tend to undermine the family

thus making the relation of capital to the family a deeply contradictory one." Thirdly, functionalism obstructs understanding of a further area of contradiction by preventing us from analysis the ways in which the family may stand in opposition to capitalism." An equally significant methodological problem is the economic reductionism of this approach which marginalises both the ideological dimensions of family life and the interaction of the family with the social relations of capitalism. Moreover, if it is accepted that capital-

ism weakens the family as well as relying upon it, it follows that the existence of the family unit within capitalism is not secured automatically at the economic level but rests also upon various practices of the state and other social agencies" One response to these problems is that we must move away from a structural account of domestic l a b o r to an historical one and that for this to be accomplished we must analyse the family in relation to determinate social formations and their reproduction rather than in relation to the mode of production." Another suggestion is that we should widen the investigation by examining the relations between domestic labour and the social and ideological, as well as the economic, aspects of capitalism.28 Both of these proposals hold great

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promise, but so far very little of the concrete historical work that they entail has been carried out, and to develop this is one of the more urgent tasks facing Marxist studies of the family. At the same time , historical enquiry must rest upon conceptual clarity regarding the processes involved in housework and the aspects of capitalism to which they contribute. This issue will be discussed at greater length later in this chapter. Here I would just make two points. The first is that the reaction against economic reductionism should not lead us to neglect the economic dimensions of the activities of the family and to substitute an excessive pre-occupation with the ideological dimensions. The domestic l a b o r debate's narrow focus upon surplus value

does not exhaust economic matters for there are a number of aspects of the labour process and the labour market which must be woven into a Marxist analysis. The second point is that the role of the family in relation to child care within capitalism has been seriously neglected, even though it has frequently been pointed out that child care is the most restrictive part of household work for women and the aspect most resistant to transformation from private to social l a b o r . " In spite of this, the domestic labour debate has over-emphasised the work carried out by the housewife for her husband to the neglect of that performed in rearing children. Included in this neglect is the issue of the obstacles within capitalism to the socialisation of child care, a matter which has been treated in a relatively cursory manner. Four reasons have been most commonly advanced: that it would be too expensive, given the labour intensive character of child care; that further socialisation would not add significantly to the efficiency of labour-power; that present arrangements conceal high rates of (female) unemployment, and that

the socialisation of pre-school children may entail certain ideological

consequences such as a reduction in competitiveness, individualism and passive acceptance of authoritarianism.3' None of these reasons makes much reference to the particular characteristics of child care which distinguish it from many other aspects of domestic work, namely the psychological dimensions of the formation of human personality. Blumenfeld and Mann are a rare exception in stressing that 'there is also a qualitative and inalienable aspect to child-rearing which is part of the process of becoming human, even within capitalist society, where the process is distorted'.32 An underemphasis upon the processes of socialisation

is not a

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feature of the domestic l a b o r debate alone. Nava has pointed out that while analysis of ideologies of motherhood and child care were central to the early texts of the feminist movement, this work

was primarily an assertion about the needs of mothers. The interests of children, their dependence and vulnerability, have never really been explored within feminist theory." In later texts, adds Nava, discussion of even these issues fell away. Such omissions are understandable. It was important to challenge certain widely-accepted ideas such as those of Bowlby and to counter

the more general ways in which the needs of dependent children have been used to oppose the demands of the wolnen's movement and to undermine attempts to restructure family relationships. Yet the

neglect of this area is both a practical and a theoretical weakness and is increasingly being seen as such. No advantage can come from simply abandoning an important area of concern to the defenders of the sexual and familial status quo.

It is important, however, to avoid the assumption that human needs can always best be met by the same kinds of institutions, whatever the nature of the wider society, or that there exist a range of universal human psychological needs- We must take care to avoid a transhistorical approach to socialisation and must insist that both needs and their satisfaction are studied within the context of particu-

lar social formations .

REPRODUCTION AND PATRIARCHY

In reaction to the methodological weaknesses of the domestic labour debate and its neglect of the specific features of the marriage relationship, a number of writers have turned to the concepts of reproduction and of patriarchy.34* These would at first sight appear to ofter more scope for incorporating child-rearing into the analysis of the family, but this promise is largely nullified by the broader theoretical inadequacies of the concepts. The conceptual starting-point for the discussion of reproduction is the passage in The Origin where Engels suggests that material pro-

duction has two aspects: the production of the means of subsistence and the production of human beings themselves, the latter being

associated with the institution of the family."

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The merit of a focus upon reproduction is that it proposes a wider analysis than the domestic l a b o r debate of the family's contribution to the reproduction of human beings and social relations. There are, however, a number of problems. To begin with, it is easy to use the concept too widely and loosely. This has led Edholm et al. to point out that reproduction should not be regarded as a homogeneous process, for it covers a wide range of activities, and that in general insufficient attention has been paid to this diversity or to the variation in these activities between different modes of production. To try to provide more precision, Edholrn or al. have usefully distinguished between biological (or human) reproduction, the reproduction of the

labour force and social reproduction." This categorisation still leaves us, of course, with the problem of how to put historically specific content into these boxes and how these various aspects of reproduction relate to each other and to other social institutions. The narrower concept of 'social relations of (human) reproduction' still remains full of problems not the least because it is unclear whether this concept is used to exclude all aspects of the reproduction of the labour force, or some only (and if so, which ones) or none at all. Some writers have equated the social relations of reproduction with the family, but this is unsatisfactory since the family can be the arena for a range of activities, productive as well as reproductive, while reproduction covers many processes which have little or nothing to do with the family. Other writers have identified the social relations of reproduction with patriarchy (sometimes the identification is made with both the family and patriarchy). This, however, is to understate the role that the relations of production themselves play in the subordination of

women and to 'inhibit analysis and understanding of the gendersaturated character of social relations by sectioning off those involving women'.31' The same argument applies to attempts to equate the

family and patriarchy." A further reason for denying the equation of the relations of human reproduction with patriarchy, or even with the concept of the sex-gender system, is that these relations may be imposed by men upon other men as well as upon women. Many limitations upon marriage and fertility have been placed on men: postponement of the age of marriage, primogeniture (and other restrictive inheritance customs) and even bars upon the marriage rights of non-heirs are some examples.39 Other curbs have operated through the medium of

class domination, such as feudal controls over the marriage rights of

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the peasantry which affected men and women alike." Overall, the management of biological reproduction may well impinge more upon women than upon men, but the extent and manner to which it does so is a matter for concrete historical investigation and no progress in this task can be made if we prematurely conflate the control of human reproduction with patriarchy or with gender relations. The greatest danger, however, in the concept of social relations of reproduction is that it emphasises structures rather than processes, thus suggesting that alongside relations of production lie a parallel set of relations of reproduction. The dualism that results from this can be seen even more clearly with the concept of patriarchy. A number of

Marxist-feminist writers, as a way out of the impasse created by economic reductionism, have suggested that the family must be understood in terms of the operation of structures of patriarchy as well as (or even instead of) in terms of its relation to the mode of production. Two distinct lines of argument have been put forward here. One defines patriarchy/relations of human reproduction as material relations, the other as ideological relations." In either case the question arises as to the nature of the relationship between patriarchy and the relations of production. One common answer is to regard them as two separate structures or at least to insist that the former have some autonomy of content and are not simply an effect of the mode of production. This dualism creates grave difficulties for analysis the relations between the two structures and for examining the varying historical forms of patriarchy and the historical dynamics behind them." The problem of dualism is seen at its most acute in those approachcs which analyse patriarchy in terms of the transhistorical categories of psycho-analysis. Thus Juliet Mitchell, as a number of writers have pointed out, produces an account of patriarchy which applies in a basically similar fashion to all types of human society, and the logic of the concepts leads her to move, in the course of her argument, from postulating a relative to a virtually absolute autononly of the ideological structures of patriarchy."3 An even more radical attempt to avoid positions which are redolent of functionalism or reductionism, and to resolve the contradictions inherent in analyses which try to combine the historical categories of Marxism with the universal categories of psycho-

analysis, has been made by the contributors to the journal m/f. The core of their position is that the family is constituted by particular

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discursive practices, with no one discourse having any analytical primacy.44 This position, however, simply bypasses the theoretical problems of Marxism rather than overcoming them, and in so doing moves substantially away from any relationship with historical materialism." Common to a number of the adherents of the concept of patriarchy is a definition of the mode of production in economistic terms.46 It is this which leads them to think that the categories of Marxism need

theoretical supplementation for the analysis of the family. A similar point can be made in relation to Hartlnann's influential contention that the categories of Marxism are 'sex-blind' and thus cannot in

themselves serve to examine the family or the position of women.47lh is indeed accurate to term as 'sex-blind' those concepts which Marx deploys at a particular level of abstractio It , that is, for analysis the workings of capitalism as a pure mode of production." When we move to another level, however, the position changes. In analysing concrete social formations and the class struggles that take place within them, Marxism by no means has to be sex blind. Examination of the way in which gender relations enter into the constitution of social classes and their reproduction is an important aspect of the project of producing an historical materialist analysis of social relations, even if it has hitherto been grossly neglected. Furthermore, the separation of capitalism and patriarchy overlooks the important point that 'it is impossible to have a notion of production which does not also involve reproduction . . . it is important therefore that we attempt to understand the interrelations between production and reproduction as part of a single process'.49 The discussions of reproduction and patriarchy have directed attention towards the issue of the socialisation of children through its

concern with the processes which lead to the acquisition of feminine and masculine identities." The contribution that this can make to a Marxist analysis of family is, however, limited in two ways. The first, as we have already suggested, is that the conceptual framework of psychoanalysis is poorly suited to exploring the relation between socialisation practices and social formations in an historically specific way. The second is that the production of gendered subjects is one aspect only, albeit an important one, of the processes of socialisation carried out within the family. We need a fuller exploration of the other dimensions and of their relationship to the economic, social and political processes of capitalist society.

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THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL The importance of incorporating the socialisation of children into a Marxist analysis of the family, and the need to avoid an analysis based upon economic reductionism, are both central features of the conti button of the Frankfurt School. This group of writers were the first to open up for Marxism the study of the psychological dimer sons of family life and of the relationship of the processes of socialist son to the ideological functioning of capitalism, and their work remains the most systematic in this field. Nevertheless, I will argue that beyond the focus upon socialisation there is little in this body

of writing upon which contemporary Marxist study of the family can dII3W.51 The work of the Frankfurt School on the family took place within the context of an attempt to bring together Freudianism and Marx-

ism. In reaction against the vulgar materialism of the Marxism of the Second International they believed that psychoanalysis could help to provide a better understanding of the links between the economic base of society and the ideological superstructure. At a more practical level, they hoped that Freudian concepts could lead to a deeper appreciation of the psychological obstacles to class consciousness and revolutionary change. Confronted by the political reality of the failure of the German working-class to make a revolution after World War I or, later, to offer effective opposition to the rise of Fascism, the Frankfurt School turned to an analysis of the ways in which the

structure of the family predisposed individuals to accept authoritarian forms of leadership. The treatment of this theme by the Frankfurt School will be illustrated primarily from the writings of

Max Horkheimer." A fuller discussion would of course require coverage of Promer, of the collectively-produced The Authoritarian Personality and the parallel work of Wilhelm Reich. Socialisation, the Frankfurt School argued,_ is an_important sup-

plement to the processes of coercion in human society. cannot explain, in terms of coercion alone, why subject classes have endured their fate for so long, particularly in times of cultural decline. thus need to examine the ways in which a particular culture pen~ grates the human psyche and leads people to act in ways which

maintain existing institutions, even against their own objective economic interests. The family plays a particularly crucial role in forming the character

of members of a society. Horkheirner wrote,

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The family sees to it that the kind of human character emerges which social life requires, and gives this human being in great measure the indispensable adaptability for a specific authorityoriented conduct on which the existence of the bourgeois order largely depends.55 In all periods the family prepares individuals for the acceptance of relations of authority. This is based, fundamentally, upon the power which the father wields and which the child has no alternative but to accept. To be truly effective, however, this power must be internalised and seen as morally justified. This internalisation is an important

part of human maturation, for it corresponds to the need for successful development of the ego in the child and is accomplished as part of this process. As the son comes to identify with his father and to internalise his commands (the child, in Horkheimer's discussions is always assumed to be the son) he comes both to develop a sense of personal autonomy and to respect the given structures of the outside world. When certain conditions prevail, the imposition of authority can be regarded as rational. It was so in the beginning of the bourgeois era, for it was then a condition of historical progress, and because the father's authority was not purely arbitrary but was rooted in his own practical experience in production. In the modern world the basis for rationality is absent. The power of the father has become more wholly arbitrary since his position as head of the economicallyproductive unit of the family has disappeared and his rule is now mediated through the wage, while even this is not secure since he is subject to the fluctuations of the l a b o r market. The father dominates through his possession of money, but since

this domination is independent of moral or personal qualities on his part it can no longer be given an acceptable moral justification. As a

result, the child simply learns to surrender his individual volition and to adapt to existing conditions, instead of putting into practice judgements of moral value. This predisposes him to an acceptance of authoritarian ideas and leadership. It is important to stress, here, that I-Iorkheimer does not regard the inculcation of submission as due primarily to particular child-rearing practices but as embodied in the very structure of the family and so operating independently of the attitudes of individual fathers. The mechanisms involved are those which psychoan alyss has started to uncover. The Institute's analysis of the family in contemporary society is

based upon a belief that the central focus should be on the position of

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the father. This assumption is due in part to the influence of Freudianism, but also to a particular sociological assessment of the effect of capitalism upon the structure of the family. Capitalism was seen as inherently patriarchal and as increasing the power of the father at the expense of the mother. This trend was important to the development of early capitalism as it required a performance principle so firmly anchored in the mental structure of the individual that it did not need to be constantly imposed from without but worked as a compulsion from within. The authority of the father instigated the repression necessary to achieve this aim, together with a training which enhanced 'the self-control of the individual, the disposition for work .

and discipline

. . . . . .. . .

-I

a an

W`S€V€IIHI1C€ and pleasure in constructive

activity'

Elements of an alternative analysis which could have led to a greater appreciation of the role of the mother in the development of the child's psyche were available to the Frankfurt School, as Jay has pointed out. Only Fromm responded positively to suggestions of the importance of maternal love, however, and even he regarded it as irrelevant to the analysis of the family under capitalism for he shared the general Institute opinion that the strength of the real mother had been eroded in contemporary life." Horkheimcr's view was that the economic dependence of the woman upon the father, and her acceptance of the laws of the patriarchal family, undermined her independent influence, and that in certain ways her familial role actually strengthened the authority of the status q.uo.5S._ The Frankfurt School thus took an extremely pessimistic view of un

_

al

me

the prospects for the family. On the one hand there was very little hope that the principle of love, historically identified with the

mother, could act effectively against the dehumanisation of the contemporary world. On the other hand, there was no way of countering the forces which were undermining the authority of the father, and in this situation any attempt to maintain the latter's authority could only intensify its irrationality, so heightening the child's resentment and strengthening the foundations for the authoritarian personality. There was thus no hope of arresting the decay of the family, even though the outcome of this was to allow outside agencies to assume a more direct and powerful role in the socialisation of the child and thereby to induce a higher degree of conformity than ever the family achieved. . The work of the Frankfurt School illustrates some of the problems

inherent in trying to analyse the family within the constraints of

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existing understandings of the base-superstructure model. The political and theoretical failures of the Marxism of the early decades of the 20th century led the Institute to look for assistance from psychology in unraveling the complexities of ideology. However, their perception of the shortcomings of economic determinism did not lead them to rethink the way in which the base-superstructure relation was formulated, so much as to seek ways of bridging it. As a result, their focus on the ideological role of the family was pursued at the expense of its economic role and in separation from it. Their depiction of the economic position of the father is a partial exception to this generalist son, but the economic activities of the family itself, the nature of the family as an economic unit of society, the significance of domestic labour and its association with the sexual division of labour, and the

effects of socialisation for the economic and other non~political processes of capitalist society are almost totally ignored by the Frankfurt School. The project of examining the family as one of the institutions which mediates between the economic base and the ideological superstructures was, nevertheless, one which held great promise, but the recourse to psychoanalysis vitiated the enterprise from the outset, and resulted in the family being seen as a relatively autonomous institution with its own internal laws, I l l precluding the possibility of satisfactorily exploring its relationship with other institutions in society. ' One of the more general problems of the work of the Institute is the undialectical nature of its picture of advanced capitalism. In its monopolistic stage, capitalism is pictured as having acquired an enormously enhanced ability to overcome its internal contradictions

and to induce conformity in its citizens." The Institute's analysis of the family shares in this defect. The decline of the family, which itself

contributes to the weakening of popular resistance, is taken as an unproblematical process. This is related, as we have seen, to their lack of attention to the role of the mother in the socialisation of the child. They thus overlooked the developments in psychological theory and practice, increasingly put into operation by the agencies of the welfare state, which were stressing the importance of the contribution of the mother to the formation of the personality of the young child and encouraging the mother to devote herself more wholeheartedly and more skilfully to this task. In the same way, the Frankfurt School underestimated the extent to which the search for

more fulfilling personal relationships could continue to grow within

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monopoly capitalism and could serve as a force to transform the family and to find positive alternatives to it. Nor did the School believe that there was much to hope from the activity of women themselves, emancipation had come too late and done too little, and women had become incorporated more firmly than ever before within the structures of domesticity. Hence, no further changes in the position of women or in the husband-wife relationship were deemed likely. The undialectical nature of the Institute's analysis is also to be seen in the treatment of socialisation itself. In the early stages of capitalism, they regarded the rule of the father as having both positive and negative features. It acted as an agent of repression but it also guaranteed the development of individuality and self-control, while society, in Horkheilner's words, 'was renewed by the education for authority which went on in the patriarchal family',6° In advanced capitalism there was no possibility that the processes of socialisation could have an historically progressive role, or that the system might require any positive moral qualities in its citizens that the family did, or might, nurture. CHILD~REARING AND THE CAPITALIST ECONOMY

At this point I would like to turn to a tentative exploration of certain lines of enquiry that could advance our understanding of the relevance of practices of socialisation to the institutions of capitalism. I will deal, in turn, with the l a b o r process, the l a b o r market and civil society. Throughout, I shall stress that we should be alive to the 'historically progressive' as well as the repressive features of socialisation in the family. In what follows I shall be concerned less with long-term tendencies within capitalism for activities to be taken away from the family than with the question of what considerations would lead the ruling class to avoid assisting these processes or to actively obstruct them.61 Ultimately this issue requires detailed historical investigation of policies followed towards the working-class family within specific phases of capitalist development, but I would contend that certain problems can well be broached in a more structuralist manner since they are of long-term significance within capitalism and persist through a long succession of historical conjunctures.

Let us first examine certain aspects of the capitalist labour process.

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It is demonstrable that appropriate attitudes toward work amongst the l a b o r force are as important for the success of a factory as the possession of certain skills, and that the former are often more difficult to inculcate. In the early stages of factory production, labour discipline was a most intractable problem for the entrepreneur. Its solution rested not only upon more sophisticated management techniques but also upon wider changes in social life which helped to produce a more appropriate orientation to work amongst a large section of the proletariat." The question of motivation is present always, not only during the transition to industrial production, but as industrial societies evolve this tends to become embodied more

systematically within major social institutions, above all schools and the family."

To illustrate the importance of certain aspects of socialisation let us examine some experiences in the early phases of the Industrial Revolution in Britain which made contemporaries very aware of the importance of the family-household in child-upbringing." A review of these can help to suggest several reasons why capitalism has not been neutral over whether to support or replace the family. There was much experience in 19th century Britain of raising children outside the family. This took three main forms. One was the system of apprentice labour to which many of the early entrepreneurs were forced to resort because of the remoteness of their enterprises and the unwillingness of parents to send their children into factories. The second consisted of the institutions established under the New Poor Law. The third came through voluntary organisations. In each case, institutional care was found to be more expensive, to exacerbate problems of l a b o r discipline, to lead to poor physical health

and development, and, above all, to provide poor character training. Under the system of apprentice l a b o r , the employer took charge of housing and feeding the children, of looking after their health and , at a later stage, their education as well. This arrangement had many disadvantages. In the first place, it was expensive: costs of mainten-

ance were not insignificant, infectious diseases were common; and the employer had to pay for the shelter and upkeep of the children when they were not able to work because of sickness or slackness of trade. All such expenditure entered into the manufacturer's costs of production and lowered profits. The use of free l a b o r avoids these problems: upkeep is taken care of outside the sphere of production and is cheapened by the hours of unpaid l a b o r put in by parents and

other relatives; while the workers (whether adults or children) need

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Marxist Sociology Revisited

be paid only as and when they perform a day's work- The problems of apprentice labour were compounded by their effect upon labour discipline. The harshness of their lives and the lack of emotional compensations made apprentices even less willing than free children to work conscientiously, and attempts to run away were frequent. Family life provided an altogether better stimulus for work.65 Of equal significance was the psychological effect of apprentice labour. Mr Muggeridge, in a Report to the Poor Law Commissioners on Home Migration, remarked that

The incentive to industry and good conduct, which almost naturally flows from labour independently and willingly afforded, and proportionately remunerated, is lost where the young person feels himself in a state of bondage."'

And he went on to deplore the evil effects of indenture upon the future character and dispositions of the apprentices, and its tendency to 'destroy those very springs of independence from which industry must HOWv.6'? The institutions for children run by the state and by voluntary bodies came up against the same problems of ill-health and poor character-training as the apprentice houses.68 This led workhouse upbringing to be replaced by separate district schools, despite the extra cost, yet these soon revealed familiar inadequacies. Health was one of these and certain compla `. ~.g... such as opthalmia and skin eruptions, were so common that they came to characterise the institutional child, Nor was general physical development any better. Children were found to be 'stunted in size and . . delicate in health'. 'The boys are often rejected from the Army and Navy', continued Mrs Senior, 'and the girls in service repeatedly tell me that they would have no chance in getting into a good family because they are so little'."9 Another problem was the ineffectiveness of district schools in developing character and intelligence. Florence Hill wrote of them, Fr

1

.

We are constrained to ask how will individuality of character develop itself from this complete subjection to the will of others,

from this routine of duty which leaves open no temptation to wrong and annihilates the choice of right."

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She similarly criticised the 'unlimited authority' of. the workhouse regime, which 'saps the very foundation of individual selfgovernmenti" This viewpoint was supported by other investigators , and confirmed by Mrs Senior in a special report on district schools produced in 1873.72

Criticisms such as these led to a move towards a boarding-out system by which children were housed in private families. In the voluntary sector, too, there was the same tendency to move away from institutions to arrangements which would simulate family life, the most famous example being Dr Barnardo's development of cottage homes. The experience of institutional care in 19th century Britain suggests strongly that it was inferior to the family as regards physical and emotional development, l a b o r motivation, and the inculcation of independence and initiative. This situation, I suggest, is a relatively permanent feature of capitalist societies for reasons which will be discussed later. The basis for the advantages of the family, however, can easily be misunderstood. It would be wrong to conclude, as have so many, that a family upbringing is necessarily superior to a non~ familial one. The effects of each will depend very much upon the specific nature of the type of family and institution concerned. Of equal significance is the question of what child-rearing aims a particular society or social group has in mind and what qualities it wishes to develop. Thus any comparison between the effects of different types of upbringing must be related to specific societies and specific social objectives. One of the tasks for Marxism is to explore more deeply the relationship between the nature of family life and the characteristics required in the l a b o r force. In doing this, we should not assume that the family only carries out a repressive role. It may also have liberating potential as can be seen by considering the labour process within capitalism. All labour which takes place under conditions of exploitation presents a problem of control. The problem is in certain ways more complex in capitalism than in previous modes of production. The fact that the l a b o r e r is formally free, can leave his employment, and has the potential to organise with his fellow-workers means that it is particularly necessary to supplement coercion by a variety of other devices. Moreover, the expense of capital equipment, the delicacy of many industrial operations, the consequences of bad workmanship

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Marxist Sociology Revisited

upon successive stages of the production process, and the difficulty of supervising many types of industrial work are other factors which mean that capitalist production benefits from the development of feelings of self-respect in the worker and from the internalisation of standards of workmanship and responsibility. Again, many tasks are

not just a matter of mechanical repetition, despite continuous managerial eEorts to simplify and to mechanise the l a b o r process, but require thought and initiative. Finally, the frequency of the changes in skill and in forms of organisation that characterises capitalist production means that workers need a fairly high degree of adaptability. It is for these kinds of reasons that the nineteenth century bourgeoisie laid so much emphasis upon the importance of character formation amongst the working class. The appropriate approach to work needed to be internalised rather than simply enforced by external pressures (though the latter were not lacking either). While some aspects of upbringing involved repressive measures to induce workers to submit to the discipline of the machine and of factory life, there was another side as well since employers also wanted a degree of initiative, independence, flexibility, honesty and responsibility. I would suggest that within the context of capitalist society the family

has distinct advantages over other institutions in producing these traits, particularly when it encourages close emotional bonds between the parents (or other adults) and children. The psychological reason for success of the family in this respect is due partly to the ability of humans to respond to love and affection but also to 'the 7

union of love and discipline in the same persons$ 37 4 for this permits children to accept authority without being cowed by it, and to outgrow it without a total rejection of the values that it has inculcated.

The qualities mentioned above are not required for the l a b o r process alone. The operation of the capitalist l a b o r market also depends upon them and particularly upon the development of selfesteem. Capitalism functions at a much higher level of efficiency when individuals participate fully and actively in the l a b o r market.

That they should do so is, of course, guaranteed to a certain degree by the separation of the labourer from the means of production, but

this alone cannot ensure the level of commitment that the bourgeoisie desires. Alternatives to steady work are frequently available: casual labour, for instance, vagrancy, begging, prostitution and crime. The possibility that people may make these choices has always been a matter of concern to the middle classes.

.

The temptation to take one (or more) of these options is increased

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by capitalism's continual recreation of the industrial reserve army for it is precisely amongst this group that the motivation to work is most easily destroyed. Thus the bourgeoisie in the 19th century were greatly concerned to prevent members of the 'floating' element of the reserve army from entering the 'stagnant' element, or even worse the 'sediment'. Attempts to use coercion to prevent this taking place. or to structure the situation so that self-interest weighed even more heavily against it, were common, as the example of the New Poor Law demonstrates, but measures such as these are even more effective if underpinned by the development of an appropriate character formation, and it is here that the family plays a crucial part.

CHILD-REARING AND CIVIL SOCIETY

At various points in the paper I have drawn attention to the tendency for Marxist work on the family to embrace either economic reductionism or ideological 'autonomy'. One promising line of advance which may help to overcome this dichotomy within Marxist theory lies in the development of Gramsci's concept of civil society. In this section I will suggest that the role of the family in relation to civil society is an important area of investigation and that the perspective outlined above concerning the relation between the family and economy under capitalism can be extended to cover civil society as well." in The family plays its part - along with other institutions preparing people to function in a wide variety of roles in civil society as consumers and savers, as voters, as parents, as men and women, as members of religious, political and cultural organisations, to give but a few examples. These are subjects of diverse kinds, but we can sum ,

-

them up, despite their heterogeneity, as aspects of being a citizen The ways in which people behave as citizens (and we can see that this is a much wider matter than just participation in the political process) has always been of concern to the ruling class who have consequently tried to regulate the whole range of such behaviour, from political activity to leisure pursuits, from parental behaviour to patterns of consumption. In this section I shall raise some questions about the interests of the ruling class in the creation of citizens, although it is important not to forget that the working class also has a concern in the process. Hence, the nature of this preparation, and of the role of the family in relation to it, is never determined solely by the domi-

nant class but is the outcome of class struggle.

l

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The constitution of citizens poses particular problems for the ruling class within capitalism. These difficulties are rooted primarily in the structural separation of the ec6H6ih"Ty", Civil society and the state. This separation creates a space within which members of the working class can act in relative independence of the social relations of the workplace. They can form their own political parties, and their own religious, cultural and other organisations. As individuals and as groups they have some degree of freedom in the way in which they spend their non-working hours. The activities of the working class in civil society cannot be adequately supervised by employers from the vantage~point of their ownership of the means of production. A few opportunities exist for insisting that employees act in certain specified ways, but these are generally limited in scope, difficult to enforce effectively and constantly under challenge. The problem of regulation is heightened, moreover, by the processes of residential segregation within capitalism which make it difficult for the ruling class to participate in and to supervise the activities of the working class within the local community. As with economic behaviour, regulation of the activities of civil society cannot be based for any length of time on coercion alone but needs to be supplemented by other measures. These are carried out by a vast array of organisations situated both within the state and within civil society, but the family plays a very specific and crucial role through forming the character structure of the child and setting in place certain deep-seated attitudes and predispositions. Once again, it is not adequate to describe this process simply as one of ideological control. It is more complicated than just the imposition of conformity and submission. In most areas of life, men and women are required to act with initiative and forethought and a certain degree of

independence. Again, due to the constantly changing nature of capitalist society, they cannot just follow a set of external rules, but

have to apply general principles to new situations. Even more importantly, capitalism contains a greater number of moral codes and ways of behaving than previous societies, so that individuals are constantly presented with conflicting pressures and with the need to make choices that are rationally-informed and that are reasonably appropriate to the circumstances in which they find themselves. These features of capitalist society must be reflected in the processes of socialisation. People must be equipped to make sensible choices in relation to such matters as consumption, housing, leisure pursuits, their choice of marriage partner and their behavior as parents. They should possess a code of morality which mininiises illegal and anti-

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social behavior but, equally, one which does not cripple in its rigidity. People must therefore be brought up to have a degree of independence, initiative and moral self-regulation. Such qualities do not have to be distributed evenly within all strata of society or within all sections of the working class, but to a minimum degree are needed in all but a small prop rtion of individuals. Many of those who lack them will be unable to function with a basic degree of competence and will have to be supported by others or cared for institutionally. While a range of institutions play a part in developing these qualities of personality, the family has, historically, been particularly important. The reason, I suggest, is that it is better fitted for this role than any alternatives yet developed within capitalism. We have seen that 19th century commentators considered that institutional care produced children' lacking in what they called 'character'. Twentieth century experience also suggests that institutional care is emotionally inferior to that carried out within a familial-type of institution. Marxists and feminists have been reluctant to confront this situation properly. Nevertheless, it is possible to recognise the truth of it without thereby espousing a belief in the priority of maternal affection, or the naturalness of maternal love, or the impossibility of young children relating to more than two or three major figures in their early life. Children do appear to benefit from being reared within a community where the bonds of love and affection are likely to be maximised, where intimate knowledge of a relatively small number of others can be achieved, where you are known as an individual, and where relationships are likely to be long-term. There is no intrinsic reason why this should take place within the nuclear family, and I do not wish to deny the emotional drawbacks of this unit. Nevertheless,

it is difficult to see on what basis capitalism could create institutions which could combine emotional closeness and long-term commitment in a higher form than the present family. To build such institutions presupposes a different structure of social relationships than that which currently prevails. The problem is twofold. In the first place, the destruction by capitalism of so many of the bonds of community and of the multi-faceted relationships of the pre~capitalist world make the family more central than before as the locus of emotional and moral development, Secondly, the aims and management of emotional and moral development are more complex than previously, and institutions concerned with child-rearing need to

reflect t h i s " Replacement of the family as an emotional and socialising unit can

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be carried out either under the control of the participants or by external institutions. Within capitalism, either way encounters profound difficulties. The problems of the former method, in a nonsupportive society, are immense as experiences in communal living have shown." Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that the ruling class would be complacent about the generalised development of socialising institutions under working-class control when it has consistently tried to dominate this area of reproduction. The alternative is that child-rearing is handled by institutions of the capitalist state. Such institutions, however, are prone precisely to the drawbacks discussed above," they would, too, be resisted firmly by the working class.

Thus replacement of the family under capitalism seems most unlikely.

So far we have examined the family from the perspective of the ruling class. We have suggested that the needs of the labour market and of civil society tend to operate in the same direction. In both, the ruling class desires to control behaviour in certain ways, and in both the problems of control are more complicated than in previous modes of production. At the same time, the control exerted cannot be too tight or too direct or it will stifle certain positive qualities which are also needed, and will inhibit the development of a sense of moral self-direction. The superiority of the family for carrying out this task means that the bourgeoisie is prepared to go to great lengths to support it and to counteract those pressures within capitalism which tend to undermine it.81

THE FAMILY AND THE WORKING CLASS So far I have examined the working-class family largely from the perspective of the bourgeoisie and have tried to point to certain ways in which the processes of socialisation may help to sustain the social relations of capitalism. At the same time I have been concerned to

suggest that the consequences of socialisation should not be regarded as always repressive and opposed to the needs of the working class. Some of the personality characteristics discussed are valuable in themselves and there is no reason why they cannot be used against capitalism as well as in support of it.82 The potentially contradictory

character of socialisation is one

consideration indicating that it would be wrong to regard the interests

of the bourgeoisie as the only reason for the persistence of the

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205

family-ho use fold unit. The working-class has its interests too and we must now mention these. The viewpoint that family relations substantially serve the needs of the working class and have anti-capitalist potential, stands in opposition to both the cultural pessimism of the Frankfurt School and those theories which analyse family organisation solely in terms of the economic or ideological requirements of capitalism. The case that the continued existence of the family has been due primarily to its defence by the working class has been vigorously argued by Jane Humphries." Maintaining that 'capitalism's dependence on the family and inability to generate alternative institutions never seem to be

adequately explained' in existing theories, she suggests that a more convincing explanation is to be found in the struggles that have been waged by the working class for personalised, non-market methods of distribution and social interaction. The family and kinship network has been an important instrument for the redistribution of resources within the working class and has provided a popular support system for non-labouring members of the class. The family has also made an important contribution to the development of class consciousness and struggle. These two arguments have been sharply criticised," yet the historical evidence seems to me to support them." But this, the main thrust of Humphries' analysis, needs to be separated from two other propositions in which it is embedded. The first of these is summarised in the following quotation: Capitalism has a history of market relations inexorably replacing social relations as capitalist expansion leads to the rationalisation of production according to the dictates of production for profit-

The working-class family has escaped the disciplinary power of the

market only because it has resisted that power." As we have argued earlier, the relationship of capitalism and the family cannot be analysed in terms of a homogeneous set of press~ ures. There are forces which serve to support the family and forces which serve to undermine it. Both sets have to be analysed, in their combination and contradictions. In the same way, it is one-sided to link the support of the family purely with the interests of a particular class. To argue for the concern of the working-class in the preservation of family life is not necessarily to deny that the capitalist class may have its own set of interests as well (and vice-versa). It is too frequently assumed within Marxism that the interests of the bour-

geoisie and the proletariat must contradict each other at every

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conceivable point. This picture is unrealistic, for it overlooks those historical conjunctures in which the interests of two groups converge or overlap. The maintenance of the family is one such area. This argument does not mean that there will not be conflicts over the ways in which the family should be assisted, over the organisation of sexual roles and parental-child relations within the family, and over the deeper values and meaning of family life. Struggles over such issues take place constantly. They do so, however, on the basis of a shared concern that the family-household should in some form survive. The conclusion would thus seem to be that the family is not to be seen simply as a bourgeois institution, nor just as the product of working-class struggles. Rather, it should be conceptualised as an institution of capitalist society, structurally rooted in the conditions of capitalism, but of benefit to both classes and accepted by each since neither has yet been able to create a better alternative." The second element in Humphries' analysis which needs to be separately examined is the extension of her argument to cover the sexual division of labour within the working-class family. She claims that the withdrawal of married women from wage»labour can also be explained in terms of its advantages to the working class, since it resulted in a limitation of the supply of workers on the l a b o r market thus increasing the bargaining strength of organised l a b o r and the value of l a b o r power." Whether or not this theory is accurate can only be decided by concrete historical research. The important point to emphasise, however, is that this question, which relates to the form of the family, is conceptually and empirically distinct from the issue of the maintenance of the family. The former can only be breached satisfactorily once the latter question has been resolved.

The confusion of these two issues has been one of the main reasons for the inadequacies of much existing work on domestic l a b o r . The main aim of this paper has been to try to shed additional light on the second of these matters. NOTES AND REFERENCES 1. Michele Barrett, Women's Oppression Today, London: Verso, 1980, oh. 6, Felicity Edholm, 'The Unnatural Family' in Elizabeth Whiteley

et. al., (eds), The Changing Experience of Women, Oxford, Martin Robertson/Open University, 1982, Rosalind Coward, 'Sexual Liberation' and the Falnily', in/f, no. 1, 1978, pp. 7-24, Paween Adams and Jeff Minion, 'The 'Subject' of Feminism', rtf, no. 2, 1978, pp. 43-61;

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Colin Creighton, 'Family, Property and Relations of Production in Western Europe', Economy and Society, pp. 129-67.

l m .

9, no. 2, 1980,

2. Mica Nava, Utopian to Scientific Feminism? Early Feminist Critiques of the Family' in Lynne Segal (ed.), What Is To Be Done About the Family? Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1983, pp. 85-6. 3._ Karl Marx, Early Writings (intro by L. Collets), I-larmondsworth, 1

v

u

;

Penguin, 1975, esp. pp. 166-7. 4. Karl Marx mmederick Engels, Selected Works, . w, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962, pp. 50'1, 5. Frederick Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State in ibid., vol. II. 6. Karen Sacks, 'Engels Revisited: Women, the Organisation of Produetion, and Private Property' in Michelle Rosaldo and Louise Larnphere

ma

(eds), Woman, Culture and Society, Stanford, Calif., University Press,

1974, Rosalind Delmar, 'Looking Again at Engels's Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State' in Juliet Mitchell and Ann Oakley (eds), The Rights and Wrongs of Women, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1976, Kate Young and Olivia Harris, 'The Subordination of Women in Cross-Cultural Perspective' in Papers on Patriarchy Conference, London, Wornen's Publishing Collective, 1976; Rayna Reiter,

'The Search for Origins', Critique of Ani'Nropology, vol. 3, nos 9 & 10, 1977, pp. 5-24, Peter Aaby, 'Engels and Women', ibid., pp. 25-53, Beverley Brown, 'The Natural and Social Division of Labour', m/f, no. 1, 1978, pp. 25-47, Rosalind Coward, Patriarchal Precedents, London, Routledge & Kevan Paul, 1983, esp. oh. 5. The contention that Engels was wrong to deny that the sexual division of l a b o r in early societies was oppressive of women has been challenged by Eleanor Leacock, 'Class, Commodity and the Status of Women' in Ruby Rohrlich-Leavitt (ed.), Women Cross-Cultitrafiys Change and Challenge, The Hague, Mouton Press, 1975; and by Mina Davis Caulfield, 'Equality, Sex

and Mode of Production' in Gerald Berreman (ed.), Social Inequalirv: Comparative and Developmental Approaches, London, Academic Press, 1981. 7. Chris Middleton, 'Sexual Inequality and Stratification Theory' in Frank Parking (ed.), The Social Analysis of Class Structure, London, Tavistock

Publications, 1974, Veronica Beeches, 'Some Notes on Female Wage Labour in Capitalist Production', Capital and Class, no. 3, 1977, pp. 45-6, Ann Foreman, Feminity as Alienation, London, Pluto Press, 1977.

8. Frederick Engels, op. cit., pp. 209-12.

9. Ibid., p. 282. 10. Middleton, op. cit., PP- 186-7, 196-201. 11. Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, London, Heinemann, 1973, chs 3, 4 and 7, David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, London, Hutchinson, 1980, ch. 4. 12. Louis Althusser, 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses' in Lenin and Philosophy, London, New Left Books, 1971

_

13. Christopher Lasch, Haven in a Heartless World, N.Y., Basic Books,

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Marxist Sociology Revisited

1977 and The Culture of Narcissism, N.Y., W.W. Norton, 1978, Michele Barrett and Mary Mcintosh, The Anti-social Family, London, Verso, 1982, pp. 105-30. 14. Engels, op. cit., p. 282. 15. To follow the evolution of the domestic l a b o r debate see' Margaret Benston, 'The Political Economy of Women's Liberation', Monthly Review, vol. 21, 1969, pp. 13-23, Peggy Morton, 'A Woman's Work Is Never Done', Leviathan, May 1970, reprinted in Ellen Matos (ed.), The Politics of Housework, London, Allison & Busby, 1980, Mariarosa Dalia Costa and Selma James, The Power of Women and the Subversion of the Community, Bristol, Falling Wall Press, 1972; Lise Vogel, 'The Earthly Family', Radical America, vol. 7, July-Oct. 1973, pp. 9-50, Ira Gerstein, 'Domestic Work and Capitalism', Radical

America, vol. 7, July-Oct., 1973, pp. 101-28, John Harrison, 'The Political Economy of Housework', Bulletin of the Conference of Socialist Econorrcists, Winter, 1973, pp. 35-52, Wally Seccombe, 'The Housewife and Her Labour Under Capitalisln', New Left Review, no. 83, 1974, pp. 3-24, Jean Gardiner, 'Women's Domestic Labour', New Left

Review, no, 89, 1975, pb, 47-58, Margaret Coulson, Bianka Mamas and Hilary Wainwright, 'The Housewife and Her Labour Under Capitalism - a Critique', New Left Review, vol. 89, 1975, pp. 59-71; Wally Seccombe, 'Domestic Labour: Reply to Critics', New Left Review, no94, 1975, pp. 85-96; Jean Gardiner, Susan Himmelweit and Maureen Mackintosh, 'Women's Domestic Labour', Bulletin of the Conference of Socialist Economists, vol. iv, June 1975, (reprinted in On the Political Economy of Women, CSE pamphlet, no. 2, London, Stage One, 1976), Jean Gardiner, 'The Political Economy of Domestic Labour in Capitalist Society' in Diana Leonard Barker and Sheila Allen (eds), Dependence and Exploitation in Work and Marriage, London, Longman, 1976, Terry Fee, 'Domestic Labour: an Analysis of House-

work and Its Relation to the Production Process', Rev. of Radical Political Economy, vol. 8, 1976, pp. 1-8, Olivia Adamson, Carol Brown, Judith Harrison and Judy Price, 'Women's Oppression under Capitalism', Revolutionary Communist, 110. 5, 1976, pp. Z-48, Susan Himmelweit and Simon noh un, 'Domestic Labour and Capital`, Cam-

bridge Jn! Economies, no. 1, 1977, pp. 15-31, Joan Landes, 'Women, Labor and Family Life: a Theoretical Perspective', Science and Society , vol. 41, 1977-78, pp. 386-409, Paul Smith, 'Domestic Labour and Marx's Theory of Value' in Annette Kuhn and Ann Marie Wolpe (eds), Feminism and Materialism, London, Routledge & Kevan Paul, 1978, Maxine Molyneux, 'Beyond the Domestic Labour Debate', New Left Review, no. 116, 1979, pp. 3-27; Maureen Mackintosh, 'Domestic Labour and the Household' in Sandra Burn an (ed.), Fit Work for Women, London, Croom Helm, 1979, Bonnie Fox (ed.), Hidden in the Household, Toronto: The Women's Press, 1980, M. Barrett, op. cit., chs 5 and 6, Nancy Holmstrom, ' "Women's Work", The Family and Capitalism', Science and Society, vol. 41, 1977-78, pp. 186-211. 16. Dalla Costa and James, op. Cit.

17. Seccombe, op. cit. 18. Gardiner, New Left Review, No. 895 Coulson et al., op. cit.; Adamson

The Family and Capitalism in Marxist Theory

209

et al., op. cit., Himmelwcit and Mohun, op. cit., Gardiner, Hirnmel-

weit and Mackintosh, op. cit., Fee, op. cit. 19. Gardiner, op. cit.

20. Molyneux, op. cit., see also Irene Breugel, 'What Keeps the Family Going?', International Socialism, series 2, no. 1, 1978. 21. Fee, op. cit., pp. 5-6, M. Carter, 'Housework under Capitalism .... Wally Seccombe', Revolutionary Communist, no. 2, 1975, cited in Himmelweit and noh un, op. cit-, p. 23, Helen Saffiotti, 'Women, Mode of Production and Social Formations', Latin American Perspectives, vol. iv, issues 12 and 13, 1977, p. 32. 22. Molyneux, op. cit., p. 12. 23. Mary Mcintosh, 'The Welfare State and the Needs of the Dependent

Family', in S. Burn an (ed.), op. cit., pp. 155-6. 24. Irene Breugel, op. cit. 25. Mina Davis Caulfield, imperialism, the Family and Cultures of Resist-

ance', Socialist Revolution, no. 20, 1974, pp. 67-85, Jane Humphries, 'Class Struggle and the Persistence of the Working Class Fainily', Cambridge Jn] of Economics, vol. 1, no. 3, 1977, pp. 241-58. 26. Mary Mcintosh, 'The State and the Oppression of Women', in Kuhn and Wolpe, op. cit., Lucy Bland, Charlotte Brunsdon, Dorothy Hobson, Janice Worship, 'Women "Inside and Outside" the Relations of Production' in Women's Studies Group, Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham, Women Take Issue, London, Hutchinson, 1978, Barrett, op. cit., chap. 7. 27. Molyneux, op. cit. 28. Barrett, op. cit., p. 220. 29. Gardiner, New Left Review, no. 89, p. 54, Adamson et al., op. cit.,

pp. 29-30, Molyneux, op. cit., pp. 25-6. 30. Molyneux, op. cit., p. 4. It should be pointed out, however, that not all discussions of domestic labour have been as economistic as the 'dom-

estic l a b o r debate' proper. A number of writers have drawn attention to the emotional aspects of women's unpaid work in the home, e.8. Sheila Rowbotham,

Woman's Consciousness, Man's World, Har-

mondsworth, Penguin, 1973, chs 4 and 5, Foreman, op. cit., Breugel, op. cit. Their attention, however, has been concentrated upon the 'repair' work on the husband.

31. Gardiner, New Left Review, no. 89, pp. 52-6, Adamson et at., op. cit., p. 29, Molyneux, op. cit., p. 26. 32. Emily Blumenfeld and Susan Mann, 'Domestic Labour and the Reproduction of Labour Power: Towards an Analysis of Women, the Family and Class' in B. Fox (ed.), op. cit., p. 296. 33. Novo, op. cit., p. 88. 34. Juliet Mitchell, Psychoanalysis and Feminism, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1975, Renate Bridenthal, 'The Dialectics of Production and Reproduction in History', Radical America, vol. 10, Mar.-Apr. 1976, pp. 3-1l: Maureen Mackintosh, Reproduction and Patriarchy: a Critique of Meillassoux, "Femmes, Greniers et Capitaux" ', Capital and Class, no. 2 , 1977, PP. 119-275 Raisin la/Icllanough and Rachel Harri-

son, 'Patriarchy and Relations of Production' in Kuhn and Wolpe, op. cit., Annette Kuhn, 'Structures of Patriarchy and Capital in the

210

Marxist Sociology Revisited Family' in ibid., L. Bland, C. Brunsdon, D. Hobson and J. Winship, in Women Take Issue, op. eit.; L. Bland, R. Harrison, F. Mort and C. Weedon, 'Relations of Production: Approaches Through Anthropol-

ogy' in ibid.; Zillah Eisenstein (ed.), Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism, N.Y., Monthly Review Press, 1979, Heidi Hartmann, 'Capitalism, Patriarchy and Job Segregation by Sex' in ibid., Heidi Hartmann, 'The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminisrn', Capita! and Class, no. 8, 1979, pp. 1-33, reprinted in Lydia Sargent (ed.l, The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism, London, Pluto Press, 1981. 35. Engels, op, cit., pp. 155-6. 36. Felicity Edholrn, Olivia Harris and Kate Young, 'Conceptualising Women', Critique of Anthropology, nos 9 & 10, 1977, pp. 101-30. I

37. Dorothy Smith, 'Women, Class and Family? in Ralph Miliband and John Saville (eds), The Socialist Register ; London, The Merlin Press, 1983, p. 2. 38. In addition, Rubin's point should be noted that the equation of the sex-gender system with patriarchy ignores gender-stratified societies that are not truly patriarchal and, conversely, denies the possibility of creating non-patriarchal ways of organising relations between the sexes . See Gayle Rubin, 'The Traffic in Women: Notes on the Political Economy of Sex' in Rayna Reiter, op. cit. 39. Jack Goody, Joan Thirsk and E.P. Thompson, Family and Inheritance,

Cambridge: University Press, 1976, Conrad Arensberg and Solon Kimball, Fanuly and Commtutnfy in Ireland Cambridge, M a s s , Her

University _Press, 1940; Sidney Painter, 'The Family and the Feudal System i i l v e l f t h Century England`, Speculum, vol. XXXV, 1960, pos. 1-16, loan Thirsk, 'Younger Sons in the Seventeenth Century', History, vol. HV, 1969, pp. 358-77, W. Goldschmidt and E.}. yard

Kunkel, 'The Structure of the Peasant I8amily', American Anthropologist, vol. 73, 1971, pp. 1058-76. For a discussion of inheritance practices in relation to family structure and relations of production, and for further references, see C. Creighton, op. cit. 40. W. Kula, 'The Seigneury and the Peasant Family in Eighteenth Century Poland' in R. Forster and O. Ran um (eds), Family and Society, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1976, Marc Bloch, Feudal Society, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961, pp. 263, 267.

41. Veronica Beeches, 'On patriarchy', Feminist Review, no. 3, 1979, pp. 72-6. 42. Ibid., pp. 76-80, Steve Burniston, Frank Mort, Christine Weedon, 'Psychoanalysis and the Cultural Acquisition of Sexuality and Subjectivity' in Women Take Lvsiie, Barrett, op. cit., pp. 10-29, Sargent, op. cit., passim. . 43. Barrett, op. cit., Beechey, Feminist Review, l. 1979, pp. '§2 53 Burniston et al., Women Take Issi, pp. 120~3, McDonough and Harrison, in Kuhn and Wolpe, op. it., pp. 14-25.._ . 44. Coward, mif, no. l , 1978, Adams and Minson§__:nt'i= 1978, :

Rosalind Coward, 'Rethinking Marxism`, m / f , no.l-, 1978, pp. 85-96.

45. John Urry, The Anatomy of Capitalist Societies, ch. 5, Barrett, op. cit., pp. 32-6, 86-90, Beechey, Fem. Rev., pp. 74-5.

The Family and Capitalism in Marxist Theory

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46. Beeches, op. cit., p. 75. 47. Hartmann, 'The Unhappy Marriage' in L. Sargent, op. cit.

48. Mark Cousins, 'Material Arguments and Feminism', in/f, no. 2, 1978, 49. Beechey, op. cit., p. 79. 50. J. Mitchell, op. cit.; Nancy Chodorow, 'Family Structure, and Female Personality' in Rosaldo and Lamphere, op. cit. 51. For assessments of the work of the Frankfurt School on the family, see

M. Jay, op. cit., passim, D. H. J. Morgan, Social Theory and the Family, London, Routledge & Kevan Paul, 1975, ch. 6, Phil Slater, Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School: a Marxist Perspective, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977, ch. 4, C. Lasch, Haven, pp. 85-96, Jessica Benjamin, 'Authority and the Family Revisited: or,

A World without Fathers?', New German Critique, vol. 13. 1978, pp. 35-57, Mark Poster, Critical Theory of the Family, London, Pluto Press, 1978, oh. 2, D. Held, op. cit., oh. 4, T.M. Norton, 'Contemporary Critical Theory and the Family: Private World and Public Crisis' in lean Bethke Elshtain (ed.), The Family in Political Thought, Brighton, Harvester Press, 1982. 52. Jay, op. cit., ch. 1-3, Held, op. cit., oh. 1. 53. The chief writings of Horkheimer on the family are 'Authority and the Family' in his Critical Theory (trans. M.]. O'Connell), N.Y., Herder & Herder, 1972 (first pub. 1936), 'Authoritarianism and the Family' in Ruth Nanda Ans fen (ed.), The Family: Its Function and Destiny, N.Y., Harper and Row, 1949, 'The Family' in The Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, Aspects of Socio£ogy, London, Heinemann, 1973. 54. Theodore W. Adorno, Else Frenkel~Brunswick, Daniel J. Levinson and R. Nevitt Sandford, The Aurhoritariarz Personality, N.Y., Harper

& Row, 1950 (repr. Norton 1969). Wilhelm Reich, Character Analysis, N.Y., Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1949, The Mass Psychology of Fascism., Harrnondsworth, Penguin, 1975, Sex-Pol. Essays, 1929-34 (ed. Lee Baxandall), N.Y., Vintage Books, 1972. 55. Horkheimer, 'Authority and the Family', p. 98.

56. Ibid., p. 101. 57. Jay, op. cit., pp. 93-6. 58. Horkheirner, 'Authority and the Family', pp. 118-21. 59. Held, op. cit., pp. 364-74. 60. Horkheimer, 'Authority and the Family', p. 128. 61. It is worth stressing that while some Marxist writers have argued that domestic l a b o r can never be dispensed with under capitalism, others

have questioned whether the family~household structure is really the most beneficial for capital, e.g. Barrett, op. cit., p. 221. 62. Sidney Pollard, The Genesis of Modern Management, Harrnondsworth,

Penguin, 1968, oh. 5, E. P. Thompson. The Making of the English Working Class, London, Gollancz, 1963, chs 11 and 12, Harold Perkin, The Origins of English Society, $780-/180, London, Routledge & Kevan Paul, 1969, pp. 380407. 63. L. Althusser, op. eit., Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in

Capitalist America, London, Routledge & Kevan Paul, 1976. 64. 'The Factories', Westminster Rev., vol. 26, 1836, pp. 174-215, r e p . in

212

65. 66. 6'7. 68.

Marxzlvt Sociology Revisited Victorian Social Conscience, Working Conditions in the Victorian Age (intro. by John Saville), Farnborough, Gregg International Publications, 19i13. Here I follow the usage of Mcintosh in Burr ran, op. cit, and Barrett, op. a t. , oh. 6. 'The Factories', pp. 177-8. Ibid. , p. 178. Ivy Pinchbeck and Margaret Hewitt, Children in English Society, vol. II, London, Routledge & Kevan Paul, 1973, oh. 16. Ibid., p. 158 A.F. Young and E.T. Ashton, British Social Work in the Nineteenth

Century, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956, p. 128. 71. Ibid. p. 134.

72. Pinchbeck and Hewitt, op. cit., pp. 517-19. 73. Ibid., pp. 518-41.

74. C. Lasch, Haven, p- 4. 75. The interpretation of civil society employed here leans heavily on John Urry, op. cit., chs 2, 3, and 5. The relevance of the concept of civil society for the study of the family has also been stressed by Christine Riddiough, 'Socialism, Feminism and Gay/Lesbian Liberation' in

L. Sargent (ed.), op. cit. 76. There have been few Marxist contributions to the %ady of moral development other than those who, like the Frankfurt School, take their departure from Freud. The major non-Marxist, non-Freudian approaches in this field are the cognitive developmental perspective, as represented by Piaget and by Kohlberg, and the social-learning per~ spective. For discussions of these, see Lawrence Kohlberg, 'Development of Moral Character and Moral Ideology' in M. L. Hothnan and L. W. Hoffman (eds), Review of Child Development Research, vol. 1, N. Y., Russell Sage Foundation, 1964, Eleanor Maccoby, 'The Development of Moral Values and Behaviour in Children' in John Clausen et al. (eds), Socialization and Society, Boston, Little, Brown, 1968, L. Kohlberg and R . Kramer, 'Continuities and Discontinuities in

Childhood and Adult Moral Development', Human Development, vol. 12, 1969, pp, 93-120, L. Kohlberg, 'Stage and Sequence: the Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization' in D. A. Gosling (ed.),

Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1969, Martin L. Hoffman, 'Moral Development' in P.H. Musser (ed.), Carmichael's* Manual of Child Psychology, vol. or John Wiley, 1970; Kohlberg, 'Continuities in Childhood and Adult Moral Development Revisited' in P. Baltes and K. W. Schaie (eds), Life-Span Developmental Psychology, N.Y. and London, Academic Press, 1973. Habermas has recently engaged with Kohlberg, see his 'Moral Development and Ego Identity' in Jorgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, London, Heinemann, 1979. It is important to bear in mind that Kohlberg's work relates to moral judgments rather than to moral behavior.

77. Wendy Clark, 'Home Thoughts from Not So Far Away: a Personal

Look at Family' in L. Segal (ed.), What is' to be done about the family?

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213

78. The history of both education and family life shows that the bourgeoisie have always strongly opposed any significant exercise of working-class independence. See e.g. Brian Simon, Studies in the History of Education, 1780-/870, London, Lawrence & Wis fart, 1960, Richard Johnson, 'Education and Social Control in Early Victorian England', Past and Present, no. 49, 1970, pp. 96-119, Simon Frith, 'Socialization and Rational Schooling: Elementary Education in Leeds before 1870, in Phillip McCann (ed.), Popular education and socialization in the nineteenth century, London, Methuen, 1977, A.P. Donajgrodski (ed.), Social Control in Nineteenth Century Britain, London, Croom Helm, 1977. 79. These have invariably been rigid and relatively authoritarian institutions. For an account of the inherent obstacles to liberalising them,

see Max Jaggi, Roger Muller and Sil Sch rid, Red Bologna, London, Writers and Readers Pub. Coop., 1977, pp. 1.33-58.

80. In relation to the nature of the institutions which might substitute for the family it is relevant to consider the case of the English public schools. These do not replace the family, for the latter retains responsibility for the early years of childhood and remains in partnership with

the school thereafter, but they do represent a significant increase in extra-familial upbringing. It is clear that in spite of a long series of protests about the psychological deformations of a public school upbringing the ruling class has not lost its faith in them and the reasons for this, which contrast so strongly with their Opposition to the extension of non-familial care for the children of the working class, would be worth further exploration. In terms of moral development part of the answer may well lie in the contrasting nature of the class relationships involved. Public schools are run by and on behalf of a particular class and aim to transmit the culture of that class to a new generation, the workhouse and district schools were organisations which expressed the dominance of one class over another. It would seem likely that the different forms of relationships would be an important influence upon the psychic effects of the institutions. 81. Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, 1-larmondsworth, Penguin, 1976, chs 10 and

15; Anna Davin, 'Imperialism and Motherhood', History Workshop, no. 5, Spring 1978, pp. 9-65. 82. Robert Lane, 'Waiting For Lefty: the Capitalist Genesis of Socialist

Man', Theory and Society, vol. 6, 1978, pp. 1-28. 83. J. Humphries, 'Class Struggle and the Persistence of the Working-Class me i , 1977, pp. 141-58. See also M.D. Family', Comb. J'nl .

Caulfield, 'Imperialis m, the Family and Cultures of Resistance', Social-

ist Revolution, no. 26, 1974, pp. 67-85. I 84. M. Barrett and M. Mcintosh, 'The Family Wage', Capital and Class, no. 11, pp. Sl-72, M. Barrett, op. cit., pp. 215-19. 85. This statement is based in part upon my own unpublished research. 86. Humphries, op. cit., p. 256. 87. For a similar position see Riddiough in L. Sargent, op. cit., p. 81. 88. Humphries, op. cit., pp. 251-4.

7 Marxism and Psychology NORMAN O'NEILL Academic psychology has developed since and for the most part independently of the work of Karl Marx and of Marxism. This is the case even though some Marxist scholars (such as those of the Frankfurt School) have sought to bridge the 'gap' between material base

and ideological super-structure (largely derived from Marx's Preface to the Critique of Political Economy), by conceptualising it as E

problem involving psychology? They are not alone in conceiving it as a problem. Anyone advocating a Marxist analysis of social relations invariably confronts arguments as to its incompatibility with, or serious neglect of, human psychology. The improbable theory the Frankfurt scholars chose in their attempted solution was psychoanalysis-2 I say improbable because fundamentally Marx's social theory and Freud's psychology appear to be philosophically incompatible. Marx conceived civilisation as the consequence of man's increasingly successful attempts at overcoming repressive physical and social forces, whereas Freud conceived it as the very product of repression itself. For him, therefore, the greater the degree of repression, the greater the degree of civilisation. Ironically, the first major critique of Freud, which was undertaken by Alfred Adler, was in

most respects far closer in substance to Math's social theory (Adler supported Social Democracy) than much of what has been written by

those Marxists influenced by psychoanalysis. This is the case even among psychoanalysts themselves. Concepts that correspond far more closely to those found in Adler's 'Individual Psychology' are nevertheless presented as Freudian in either substance or derivation One reason for this is undoubtedly the tendency in academe towards a form of intellectual hero-worship that frequently bedevils progress in both social theory and psychology. Thus, Marx and Freud the sophisticated heavy-weights - are contrasted with Engels and

--.

-

Adler the unsophisticated light-weights and those engaging in the activity thereby feel themselves to be like the great men whom they most admire. The attitude adopted is that by criticising Engels (for - .

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vulgarity) and/or Adler (for superficiality or lack of depth) the dialectical purity and subtlety of Marx and Freud with whom the critics identify can ever be maintained. This practice. soon degenerates into scholasticism - into a religious devotion towards what the great scholars actually said, meant to say, or would have said had they lived longer, and an almost total disregard for the empirical validity of their scientific work. Social theory is then transposed into a variant of political philosophy or the 'history of ideas' and the clarion call for empirical verification (usually tO be undertaken by somebody else) is grafted roost uncomfortably - onto citations made in concluding paragraphs. It would, however - as well shall see - be quite uncharitable (if not .-.

disingenuous) to level this accusation directly as the Frankfurt schol-

ars themselves. Many of their social and psychological speculations were largely based on the empirical claims made by Freud, and at least in their studies of 'authoritarianism' some serious attempt was made at veriflcation.4 Their failure was due not to the adoption of 'American empirical and statistical techniques', but in the selection of facts derived from a theoretical aberration. In attempting to reconcile the irreconcilable Marx and Freud - they conceived a methodological embryo whose eventual miscarriage was a certainty, For, unlike Marx, who viewed human consciousness and culture as among other things the reiiexive outcome of man's striving to overcome alienation, Freud saw them as the necessary consequences of an inevitable alienation, in which the only compensation for a

-

-.-.

sacrificial libido was, at best, sublimation. That, for Freud, is what culture is: repressive subli1nation.5 This ontological contrast corresponds with the different political

propensities of the two scholars. Freud was as conservative as

Thomas Hobbes, and for much the same reason: namely, that man's innate aggression had to be held in check, so that a degree of cooperation could be possible. Marx, on the other hand, was a revolutionary, and held man to be alienated from himself, his fellows

and his potential. All social and psychological theorising is - without exception premised on a conception of 'human nature', whether explicitly acknowledged or not. Before the development of social science this frequently took the form of a crude characterisation in which man is presented as either a 'noble savage' corrupted by the social order, or a savage ennobled by it. But the two dominant models in sociology those of positivism (in which human beings are conceived almost as

-

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passive respondents to external social forces) and symbolic interactionism (in which there is a curious hiatus between thought and action), do not offer much of an improvement. Moreover, these conceptualisations have their inverted forms in psychology. In their extreme, they are expressed in terms of either inherited predispositions (drives, impulses, etc. seeking gratification) or, as environmental conditioning (stimulus-response, or else a variant of what nowadays is known as 'mentalist' but what Marx called 'idealism') . Most psychologists consider that an account of these two influences that with which we are born (heredity) and that which we experience (environment) are sufficient to explain behavior. Since the critique of such a position forms the kernel of Marx's method, from which a Marxist approach to psychology can be derived, and runs like a thread through the transition he made from alienation to surplusvalue, it will be instructive to remind ourselves of that extra ordinary intellectual tour de force. ALIENATION, RELIGION AND THE DIALECTICS OF LABOUR

The theme of alienation - conceived originally as estrangement from God - has deep roots within Judeo-Christian theology, and Marx encountered it early in his philosophical studies, when he sought to draw atheistic and revolutionary conclusions from Hegel's philosophy.6 Hegel had undertaken a systematic critique of Kant's interpretation of man as being at odds with himself due to his dual nature: Homo-noumenon and Homo-phenomenon - part spirit, part

animal. For Kant, morality was man's compulsion torealise himself as a holy being, but man's animal nature stood in the way. The tension between what we are, and what we aspire to become, is therefore ever present, and all that can reasonably be hoped is ' . . for a rational but finite being' to engage in an '. . . endless progress from the lower to the higher degree of moral perfection'.7 Hegel acknowledged that the difficulty with Kant's prescription is that in aspiring to be like God, man forms an idealised image of himself which through self-deception he takes to be real, and therefore falls prey to pride, something that Christian theologians, with their stress on humility, had always condemned. This dilemma, however, existed only because Christianity had drawn a rigid divide

.

-

-..

between human nature and the divine. Hegel's solution was to invert

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the figure of Jesus as, not God become man, but man become God. In striving to become like God, man is therefore striving to realise his own potential perfection. Henceforth, alienation could be conceived not in terms of man's estrangement from God, but instead as his estrangement from his own true nature, his own potential. It was Feuerbach who was to extend the inversion in his Essence of Christianity - which, he boldly proclaimed, was to be found in anthropology; just as the origins of the holy family were to be found in the earthly family. Marx was subsequently to argue in the Preface to the Paris Manuscripts of /844 that Feuerbach's writings were the only ones '. . since Hegel's Phenomenology and Logic which con~ rain a real theoretical revolutions8 Religion was therefore conceived as man's self-alienation," but the call to recognise it as such is also, argues Marx, a radical call to abolish the conditions which promote it.10 Feuerbach's materialism had thus explained the content of religious idealism - 'the origins of the holy family residing in the earthly

_

family' (its material basis) - as man's self-alienation, but his philosophy remained speculative, it did not explicitly point to the practical abolition of that alienation. It ignored the significance of 'practicalcritical activity'." Marx had developed this philosophical premise concerning consciousness even before his use of Feuerbach's transformative method. It was a secular version of Hegel's notion - contained in his Phenomenology - that actuality is not an external, objective datum but is shaped by human activity (action). Avineri has expressed it perfectly: 'Marx extricates the activist element of Hegel's doctrine from its metaphysical setting and combines it with a materialist epistemology. »12

The emphasis on the necessity to transform the material basis upon which ideology resides, occurs, of course, much later in Marx's work , when it is not simply religion that is the measure of man's alienation, but the degree of surplus~value, and the ideology that serves to disguise and legitimise this form of class exploitation. Marx begins with the critique of religion, adopts a materialist standpoint to explain it as alienation, and proposes that man can abolish alienation through a transformation of the conditions which promote it and all of this, in 1843, before his early critique of political economy. Precisely the same is true of the role of the proletariat, as a revolutionary class." Admittedly, this is Marx before Marxism, and the proletariat .-.

we are presented with in the Critique o f Hegel Philosophy of Right

is not the one we encounter later, in the Communist Manifesto, but

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the refinement of these ideas through what David McLellan some~ where refers to as 'self-clarilication', nevertheless still falls back on the method, and even the substance, of his early critique of religion. Thus, in The Paris Manuscripts: The more of himself man attributes to God the less he has left in himself," and The alienation of the worker in his object iS expressed as follows in the laws of political economy: the more the worker produces the less he has to consume, the more value he creates the more worthless he becomes, . . . . .15

In earmarking industrial workers as the agents of revolution, and at the outset of his critique of the classical economists, in insisting that they ignored the social foundation upon which capital accumulation resides, Marx conceives the economic conflict between workers and employers as the basis of class conflict - the fundamental contradiction of capitalist property relations. This conflict, argued Marx later on in Capital is structural - unavoidable - because it is through these property relations that l a b o r power becomes a commodity. The value of this commodity he conceives as being expended in its creation, but since this is manifestly more than the workers receive, surplus-value becomes the measure of capital's exploitation of Iabour. In this broad, yet highly specific conceptualization, Marx felt able in the manner of Hegel - to encompass, at once, the ensemble -..-.

of social relations and their inherent forces of disintegration: totality and contradiction . The key concept through which this became possible was 'the mode of production'. This provided substance to fit his materialist epistemology. It was - as it were - the structural equivalent of the 'earthly family' from which was to emanate the practicing religion the ideology of capitalist exploitation. Moreover, it was insufficient merely to debunk this 'religion' - as bourgeois ideology, it was necessary for a transfer rmation to occur in the material conditions which promote it. In considering such a transformation (involving a conflict between the 'productive forces and the relations of produc-.-

tion' a distinction is made between ideology, and 'the material

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transformation of the economic conditions of production', which according to Marx 'can be determined with the precision of natural science . 116 There is no doubt that Marx himself believed that he had made a scientific breakthrough here, for which all of his previous work had been a preparation. This is why he had no intention of publishing much of the earlier (preparatory) work, and instead set out - as he expressed it in the 'Introduction' to Capital 'to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society'." An analysis of Marx's theoretical transition - through his 'dialectics of l a b o r ' - from alienation to surplus value, has been attempted by Walton and Gamble. Their emphasis on the overriding significance of Marx's ontology is germane to this discussion. They write'

_

......

Marx sees man as the only species capable of purposeful creation. The human species is different because man is a teleological creature. Marx argues that man exteriorises himself through the process of his labour, that is through objectification. But, as the

history of society is a history of class societies, men objectify under conditions limited by such classes. Thus men cannot truly produce until classless society is achieved." This passage follows a citation from the Paris Manuscripts in which Marx argued that animals merely produce 'one-sidedly, whilst man produces universally'. Use of the term teleology can, however, be misleading, even in this context because it is well-known that Marx

expressed a marked hostility towards teleological explainations in both natural and social science. His enthusiasm for Darwin's The Origin of Species, for example, was precisely that '. . . it . . . deals

the death-blow to teleology in the natural sciences.719 This, argues Sayer and Corrigan, forms '. . . part of a long-standing hostility on

Marx's part to teleological explanations in history, which dates back at least (to) the text which first proclaimed the fundamentals of

historical materialism, The German Ideology of 1.845-620 But use of the term teleology is usually intended to emphasis that external stimuli evoke, in the human organism, an internal creative

response. This, however, ..is true of a great many organisms other than man, a fact emphasised - as we shall see - by Engels. The difference lies in the form of the response. It is not 'consciousness' that is crucial here, but what Marx (after Hegel) calls self-conscious activity. The term teleology does not, of course, imply that history

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has a meaning over and above that which human beings give to it. No non-human animal can give history a meaning quite simply because it does not possess language. Nor do animals produce other than for their immediate needs. What distinguishes human beings, therefore, from all other species, is the creation of their material and symbolic culture. The relationship between these, in terms of human evolution, was examined by Engels following the publication of Darwin's The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (1871). The essay is entitled 'The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Mani" After speculating that c . . the hand is not only the origin of l a b o r , it is also the product of labour', Engels argues that

_

. . the development of labour necessarily helped to bring the members of society closer together by increasing cases of mutual support and joint activity, by making clear the advantage of this joint activity to each individual. In short, men in the making arrived at a point where they had something to say to each other. Necessity created the organ, the underdeveloped larynx of the ape was slowly but surely transformed by modulation to produce constantly more developed modul ation and the organs of the mouth gradually learned to pronounce one articulate sound after another. Comparison with animals proves that this explanation of the origin of language from and in the process of l a b o r is the only correct 0116.22

And then: 'First labour, after it and then with it, speech -.- these were the two most essential stimuli under the influence of which the brains of the ape gradually changed into that of man . . _._23

It goes without saying that it would not occur to us to dispute the ability of animals to act in a planned, premed rared fashion. On the

contrary, a planned mode of action exists in embryo wherever protoplasm, living albumen, exists and reacts, that is, carries out definite even if extremely simple movements as a result of definite external stimuli. . . . But all the planned action of all mammals has never succeeded in impressing the stamp of their will upon the earth. That was left to man. In short, the animal merely uses its environment . man . . . masters it. This is the final, essential distinction between man and

..

other animals, and once again, it is l a b o r that brings about this

distinction."

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Earlier in the passage Engels expresses a view entirely consistent with modern thinking on the significance of l a b o r in the evolution of homo sapiens. Thus: The reaction on labour and speech of the development of the brain and its attendant senses, of the increasing clarity of consciousness, power of abstraction of judgement, gave both labour and speech an ever-renowned impulse to further development. . But all that was not yet labour in the proper sense of the word. Labour begins with the making of tools . . .25 . . . even the most materialistic natural scientists of the Darwinian

_ _

.

school are still unable to form any clear idea of the origin of man, because . . . they do not recognise the part that has been played therein by labour.26

And now compare with Washburn and Howell's paper at the Centennial Celebration of Darwin's The Origin of Species, addressed to the American Psychological Association

It would now appear . . . that the large size of the brain of certain hominids was a relatively late development and that the brain evolved due to new selection pressure after bipedalism and consequent upon the use of tools. . . . (We) believe this conclusion is the most important result of the recent fossil hominid discoveries. . . . The important point is that the size of brain, insofar as it can be measured by cranial capacity, has increased some threefold subsequent to the use and manufacture of implements . . .

Engels' proposition that once having made its appearance, language - however primitive - must also have greatly increased the development of the brain, is also supported by evidence from modern linguistics, and in the reasoning of geneticists such as Jacques Monod."

Monod - the Nobel prize-winner and pioneer in molecular biology argues that '. . the capacity for language can no longer be regarded as a superstructures" Acknowledging Cholnsky's linguistic analysis which reveals one basic 'form' common to all languages, he rebukes all those philosophers and anthropologists who perceive in this thesis a return to Cartesian metaphysics.

.

'Provided', argues Monod, 'its implied biological content be ac-

cepted I see nothing whatever wrong with it. On the contrary, it

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strikes me as the most natural conclusion, once one assumes that the evolution of man's cortical structures could not but be inliuenced by a capacity for language acquired very early and in the crudest possible state. This amounts to assuming that spoken language, when it appeared among primitive mankind, not only made possible the evolution of culture but contributed decisively to man's physical €V0101[1()I1_130

The clear recognition by Engels that animals act in 'a planned premeditated fashion' is similarly acknowledged by most natural scientists, including Monod who relates it directly to natural selection. Thus, 'It is obvious that the part played by teleonornic performances in the orientation of selection becomes greater and greater, the higher the level of organisation and hence autonomy of the organism with respect to its environment - to the point where teleonomic performance may indeed be considered decisive in the higher organisms, whose survival and reproduction depend above all upon their behavior. Most - if not all - life-forms do not merely react to the environment, they act upon it, and generally speaking the more developed the life-form, the greater the degree of purposeful reaction. Lack of a purposeful concept whether expressed as 'teleology' or not - would reduce psychology merely to the terminology of stimulus-response, it would not be psychology, it would be physiology. But the term teleology has a wider meaning - as the doctrine that . -

all things and processes are designed to fulfil a purpose. As such, it

was - during Marx's lifetime frequently pivoted against materialism, as a means of accounting for organic life. To put it cnldely, it -.-

soon became associated with the notion of 'God's will', a 'life~force'

élan viral in order to explain how 'dead' matter became transmuted organism- For all his imputed 'vulgar materialism', Engels - as we have seen entertained no such proposition. Like Marx, he makes a clear distinction between the purposeful behavior of animals, and the (then conceived) laws of physics. For Marx, a satisfactory account of the relationship between a materialism that presupposes determinism, and the seemingly indeterminate, purposeful behavior of human beings, can never be satisfactorily achieved until the materialist/idealist dichotomy itself is transcended. This is the significance of the Theses on Feuerbach. The tendency of all previous materialism to isolate men's (and women's) 01'

in a living

. -

thoughts from their b e h a v i o r , and to abstract them as though

something alien and outside of human experience, forms the basis of Marx's critique.

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. . . in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism - which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from the thought objects, but he does not conceive human activity as objective activity . . .32

In The German Ideology Marx and Engels extend this critique to embrace all other materialists and the idealists who between them separate consciousness from the individuals who are its basis and from their actual conditions." In the Paris Manuscripts these conditions had been conceived in terms of alienation as 'appropriations Thus: 'The product of l a b o r is l a b o r which has been embodied in an object and turned into a physical thing, this product is an objectiNcation of labour. The performance of work is at the same time its objectification. The performance of work appears in the sphere of political economy as a vitiation of the worker, objectification as a loss and as servitude to the object, and appropriation as alienation.'34 And on this occasion, Marx again evokes his earlier criticism of religion: . . . Just as in religion the spontaneous activity of human fantasy, of the human brain and heart, reacts independently as an alien activity of gods or devils upon the individual, so the activity of the worker is not his own activity. It is another's activity and a loss of his own spontaneity." : God is presented the idealised symbol of human alienation, and I I

s o ;

s we later encounter it in Capital) as the ideological consequence of commodity production.

Feuerbach's materialism is criticised because it serves to perpetuate the duality of mind and matter; it ignores reflexivity, it is not a materialism of human practice, because it lacks an historical/cultural dimension. Commenting on the Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach - in which Marx argues that '. . . the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual' but '. . . is the ensemble of the social relations', Norman Geras has recently reminded us that '. . . for Marx, Feuerbach is mistaken not because he views man in terms of "inner", "general", "species" (or "natural") characteristics but because he views him exclusively in those terms'.36 Geras goes on to argue

-.-

convincingly that Feuerbach is wrong, in the opinion of Marx, for a 'one-sidedness of perspective rather than wrong tout court'. On that . -

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interpretation, he continues, 'Marx would here be echoing the thought he communicated to Arnold Rugs two years earlier that Feuerbach "refers too much to nature and too little to politics".737 Man, OI' more accurately, 'potential human beings', are the product of nature, and of their own history which they themselves create, but not under circumstances of their own choosing. It was his failure to recognise the full implications of this that led Feuerbach to propound a materialism devoid of historical content. Marx, in treating history, distinguishes human beings from animais, in terms of the production of their means of subsistence. This, he conceives as preceding the development of culture in its wider sense the view also expressed by Engels in the essay quoted above. . -

--.

Productive life . . . is species life. . . . In the type of life activity resides the whole character of a species, its species-character, and free, conscious activity is the species-character of human beings." The animal is one with its life activity. It does not distinguish the activity from itself. It is its activity. But man makes his life activity itself an object of his will and consciousness. He has a conscious life activity. . - . Only for this reason is he a species-being. Or rather, he is only a self-conscious being, i.e. his own life in an object for him, because he is a species~being. Only for this reason

is his activity free activity. Alienated l a b o r reverses the relationship, in that man because he is a self-conscious being makes his life activity, his being, only a means for his existence." The theme of symbolic and purposeful activity Marx returns to in Capital when again - he relates it to human l a b o r . Thus: . -

A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labor-process,

we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realities a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will.

In the transition from alienation to surplus-value, Marx conceives

of three elements in alienated labor: alienation in work ('whicll

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appears in the sphere of political economy as a vitiation of the worker'),41 human self-alienation (which 'takes away hisl5pecies~life, his real objectivity as a species-being, and changes his advantage over animals. . . . It alienates from man his own body, external nature, his mental life, and his human life' .42 and alienation from other human beings (in which 'every man regards other men according to the standards and relationships in which he finds himself. . . .').43 Freedom resides, according to Marx therefore, in transforming the social conditions that deny human beings their full potential as individuals. 'It is above all necessary', he argues, 'to avoid postulating "society" once again as an abstraction confronting the individual. The 7

individual is the social beirzg.$4'4 A measure of this human freedom lies in the quality of the relationship between man and woman:

The immediate, natural and necessary relation of human being to human being is also the relation of man to woman. In this natural species-relationship, man's relation to nature is directly his relation to man, and his relation to man is directly his relation to nature, to his own natural function. Thus, in this relation is sensuously revealed, reduced to an observable fact, the extent to which human nature has become nature for man and to which nature has become human nature for him. From this relationship man's whole level of development can be assessed."

This freedom from the constraints imposed by class society (cape talisin) would result in the freedom to develop individuality in what Marx calls 'Communism', but still the relationship between man and woman would be a measure of human development because 'Com-

munism is the necessary form and the dynamic principle of the immediate future, but communism is not itself the goal of human development .... the form of human society.'46

ALIENATION AND PSYCHOLOGY

What Marx conceives as alienation - the depravity in class society of human beings in work, social relations, and love, instinct psychology came to define as universal absolutes: the three instincts of Nutrition > the Herd, and of Sex. Freud's psychology came to be based upon the last of these, Adler, however, transformed each of them into what he

called 'the three problems of practical adaptation'.47

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In Adler's conception, the manner in which an individual responded in work, social relations and love, conditioned his or her mental health. Psychosis almost always involves a failure of response in all three spheres whereas neurosis generally entails a breakdown in only one or two, with a degree of what he refers to as 'social interest' being preserved in the others. But these outward manifestations of what we may legitimately call alienation, Adler never regards as the "Winn cause of the breakdown, rather they are its conseq_uences. w'==='~'° etiology of neurosis lies in subjective experienc I s' and is therefore related to the specific interpretation made by individual concerned. This interpretation is, of course, itself social, insofar as man is a social being. The subjective experience of alienation in work could induce workers either to seek a transformation (or, at least, an aleviation) of the conditions that promote it, or (through rationalisation) to over~evaluate activity in one of the other spheres - as a form of psychic-compensation: the so-called 'instrumental orientation' of workers, beloved by some contemporary sociologists." Since Adler's psychology is based on the notion of psychic compensation (through which he seeks to debunk Freud's psychoanalysis)49 and has its roots in a teleology not unlike that which has frequently been attributed to Marx, it is useful to examine it in some detail. Adler's first scientific monograph examined 'the inferiority of organs and their compensations'. The work had originated in his study of diseases of the kidneys. What interested him was the wellknown capacity of the body to compensate for organic damage. Malfunction in certain organs is frequently followed by a compensatory reaction which, from a teleological viewpoint, is regarded as the

m

organism's attempt to overcome its deficiency. Damage to a kidney

or lung, for example, may be followed by increased compensatory functioning of its twin, or a diseased heart valve may respond by hypertrophy of the cardiac muscle, thereby - to a degree making up for its loss of efficiency. Adler extended this observation in physiology to encompass psychology. It is well-known, for example, that artists are frequently people who have suffered from defective vision, or musicians from defective hearing. Observations such as these led Adler to suppose that it was the deficie ncies themselves that had induced the individuals to compensate for their defect. This is not to imply, of course, that everyone suffering these handicaps will necessarily seek to overcome them in precisely the same way. The point is .

-

that some attempt will be made to do so. His fundamental notion was

that to be a human being means the possession of a feeling of

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inferiority that is constantly pressing on towards its own conquest.50 This inferiority is rooted in childhood. All children - because of their helplessness in the face of adults - experience a degree of conscious inferiority. As they grow older they adopt various attitudes, which taken in combination - constitute what Adler terms their individual 'life-style'. It is upon this foundation that they construct their individual personalities. This purposeful behavior exhibitoh three basic orientations: (1) successful compensation: when the striving results in an objective and realistic relation to social circumstances. This obviously does not imply acquiescence towards the status quo: Adler's own intention as . -

a socialist was to transform it, (2) over-compensation: when the striving becomes excessive and unrealistic, and is frequently antisocial (as in the case of a bumptious small man who seeks to be a dictator), and (3) the retreat into neurosis: as a means of escaping objectivity, and seeking 'fictive goals'. These are based on impossibly perfectionist standards designed to excuse failure. Psychosis - it should perhaps be added - Adler conceives as a further (qualitative) stage of self-deception, in which the person retreats quite literally into a dream world of his or her own. All these features of Adler's approach to human psychology reflect his insistence that a purposeful explanation does not ignore origins (in terms of either 'heredity' or 'environment') but interprets them in the light of what is achieved. It is therefore this presupposition of intent (whether fully conscious or not) that is crucial, and not behav-

iour conceived in terms of a primary cause. This is very much in tune with Marx's own conception of human motivation, but quite at variance with that of Freud. The arbitrary character of the psychoanalytic method becomes very apparent when we recognise that interpretation ceases once a sexual component has been discerned. It is only because Freud' draws such a rigid distinction between conscious and unconscious motivation that his interpretation often appears to be plausible. Adler's approach was to deny such a sharp distinction," and to argue that 'knowing' and 'not-knowing' are themselves purposeful. Thus, in relation to the interpretation of dreams, Adler regarded them as, in large measure, a preparation for life, while Freud's view was that they are the end-product of thwarted libidinal drives. Eventually, Freud modified this view that all dreams are sexual wish-fulfilment, in order to accommodate repetitive traumatic dreams that could obviously not be explained merely in

relation to sex.

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Adler's critique of 'penis envy' and the 'castration-complex' is similarly derived from his interpretation of purposeful behavior socially defined. He argues that when in a family a boy is overvalued in the eyes of his sister, and she has seen his penis, she may indeed perceive it as a symbol of superiority, and her felt inferiority may be expressed - symbolically - as castration. These are simply social symptoms of what Adler conceived in terms of exaggerated masculinity, leading to what he called the 'masculine protest'. Sadomasochism is thus not derived solely from sexual repression, but includes the cultural equation of masculinity with strength and feminity with weakness. Some men, therefore, often prefer a 'strong' vice to a 'weak' virtue because the former serves to emphasis their masculinity. This is particularly true of some adolescent boys who are frequently insecure and eager to appear like 'grown-up' men.52 Adler shared with Marx the view that social development would be at its highest, when sexual life is also raised to its most refined level. Conversely, they also agreed that repressive social relations correspond with perverted sex, sadism and the subjugation of woman. Sex, in fact, reflects the cultural patterns derived from, and defining, the ensemble of social relations. The essential difference between Adler and Freud has been aptly summed up by Lewis Way:

-.-

Freud chooses always to regard the individual as a mechanism, isolated from his social surroundings, and looks within, to internal forces, for his explanation, Adler, in the symptom as well as in the dream, takes note of the individual's environment and explains him objectively in terms of his social strivings.53

It is, I think, this notion of 'social striving' (that Adler derived mainly from Nietzche's 'will to power') that has precluded most Marxists, in particular, from taking him very seriously. For in it, they recognise the ideology of capitalism, taken as the universal criterion of social life. Yet, it would be a strange psychology that permitted social striving to account for the activities of political parties, social movements and classes, but denied it to individuals. lt would be even stranger to describe 'Man' as purposeful and goal-seeking, only to exclude men and women from the definition. The important question is: what goals are being sought? To argue that human beings are purposeful is not to imply that they necessarily engage in selfish, and

individually competitive behavior.

Marxism and Psychology

-

229

Those who do and whose culture encourages it will tend to undervalue even the closest human ties. Indeed, Adler conceives in neurosis a lack of what he termed 'social interest', and this reflect~ ing the life-style - refers to social attitudes, or, to express it in a term favoured by Marx: the form of social consciousness. If an individual's response to others is arbitrary, a-logical and ultimately insane, it is literally a private enterprise: it is anti-social, contrary to 'comrnonsense' - to the 'social sense', that which defines the rules of social intercourse. These rules sociologists call 'norms'. When a person (for whatever social / psychological reasons) adopts particular norms which few (if any living) people share, but which nevertheless he or she is deluded into believing are those norms which commonly prescribe existing and/or legitimate behaviour, then we have - in large measure - the symptoms of psychosis. The general form of self-deception that most interested Marx was that which emanates from class society namely, ideology. This can take a variety of institutional and cognitive forms, and the method of its analysis is presented by Marx in the Preface to The Critique of Political Economy. -..

..-.

ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND PSYCHOLOGY In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of

these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure, and to which correspond definite forms of social €0)$€i0u$I]€55.54

The key concept is that relations of production constitute the economic structure of society. Marx does not speak simply of an 'economic base' and 'ideological superstructure'. It is the social relations of production that constitute the structural foundation of society, and not the reified economic categories contained in political economy. This is important, because all those who interpret Marxism as a conception of historical change in which economic forces are somehow independent of social relations and their corresponding

forms of social consciousness, overlook the crucial fact that it is

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above all a critique of political economy, and not its belauded elaboration. The fault lies in equating Marx's dialectical and structural approach with the simple linear and mechanistic model of causation that characterises much of social science. At the point where Marx merely begins a critique of bourgeois ideology, others happily conclude. The significance of Marx's theses on Feuerbach, in which idealism and materialism are to be transcended in practice (praxis), is ignored. This, therefore, leaves only two possible interpretations of Marx's method: either a return to the metaphysics of Hegel, or a continuation of the materialism of Feuerbach. Idealism or materialism: for many scholars these remain the Marxist legacy. The revolutionary attempt to relate the objective (material) conditions of class conflict with their (subjective) realisation in praxis turns full circle. Both Marx and Engels became increasingly concerned about this possibility,55 probably because its crude voluntarism on the one hand, and vulgar determinism on the other, implied political strategies alien to their own involvement in the emerging working-class movement. "Class" consciousness among workers - according to Marx's analysis of capitalism - could range all the way from those whose active relation to the (material) reality of class conflict, is to smash up machines, to those whose scientific understanding of the conflict leads them to abolish the conditions which promote it. The latter was MarX'S own expressed intention. In the theory of value he attempted to define (at once) the capitalist mode of production and the social forces of revolution, It was also his intention to relate these to the intellectual process in which (through varying degrees of consciousness) 'explanations' in social science, serve to disguise, maintain, and legitimisc the structural

domination of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat. Two questions

are implied in this interpretation of ideology - against which Marx posits 'science': (i) which class stands to gain and (ii) what facts are ignored? Marx's method presupposes that a focus on one provides the substance of the other. Political economy was in default because it failed to explain the basis of capital accumulation as exploitation, and it was in demonstrating the class significance of this ideological

omission that made economy that it was Engels went on to is '. . . accomplished

Capital the thoroughgoing critique of political intended to be. define ideology as an intellectual process which by the so-called thinker consciously . . . indeed,

but with a false consciousness. The real motives impelling him remain

unknown to him, otherwise it would not be an ideological process at all. Hence he imagines false or apparent motives'.56

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231

The similarity between this and Freud's concept of self-deception known as 'rationalisation' is clearly apparent, but in neither case is there an adequate conceptualisation which could serve to link social theory and psychology. One attempted solution is to posit 'culture', but vulgar Marxists dismiss this as a contradiction. In their perspective the relationship between the social relations of production and their corresponding forms of social consciousness, loses all of its dialectical subtleties and becomes bereft of human mediation. But this it can never be. For Marx, the relationship between what he characterised in his theory of surplus value as the structural contradiction in capitalism and its symbolic and institutional articulation, cannot in any sense be considered direct or immediate. Always, it is mediated by culture, or -- as Marx would express it - by the traditions of dead generations." Culture is therefore implied not because it structurally determines social relations, but because it defines them, and therefore gives them meaning. The conceptual problem, which has for long bedevilled attempts to develop a 'Marxist psychology' is that culture not merely mediates between "foundation" and 'superstructure' but that it defines the former and embraces the latter. As an analytical concept it is therefore far too cumbersome. Like the social formation in which it is subsumed, it must first be analytically broken down into its constituent parts, before the attempt is made to conceptualise it as an integral part of the structured totality. By culture I refer to the sum of symbols, norms, customs, and ideas within a social formation. These symbols, norms, customs and ideas become operative at various institutional levels, and come to be articulated with varying degrees of internal consistency. The working class in the historical process of becoming

d

class for-itself (as sub-

ject), in contrast to a class in-itself (as object)58 encounters such symbolic mediation in the form of normative frameworks (or 'modes of cognition') that come to define what Weber called status-groups

and communities.59 These normally centre on occupation and sociologists refer to them, in terms of social stratification. It is through the lexicon of these frameworks that individuals creatively select, translate and interpret their lives. Theoretically they present the clearest and most systematic way of examining not merely what exists in a particular social consciousness, but also what alternatives are available in the wider culture. It is clear that each normative framework contains rules which prescribe what is acceptable b e h a v i o r

- what

is 'go-od', and those

which describe what is unacceptable behaviour - what is 'bad'. When examined from the standpoint of psychology these rules or norms are

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usually called 'social attitudes' (Eysenck'),6° the individual 'life-style' (Adler)61 or 'personal constructs' (Kelly).62 All of these should therefore be interpreted in the first instance as being merely particular components of a more general normative framework. At the social level, acquiescence to a normative framework can be understood in the following way. The cultural traces of the past, whether chance mutations or straightforward adaptations, survive and are transmitted to the future to the extent that they perform

some function (purpose) either for the ensemble of social relations, or for status-groups or communities. This implies that quite often in history original ideas will emerge, but being devoid of a sympathetic

reception that iinbues them with wider social significance, they never constitute the normative basis for a group, community or social movement. Those which do receive such a sympathetic reception are eventually combined in a more or less coherent social perspective and in time come to form a much more consistent ideology that functions to promote, maintain, and legitimise class interests. It therefore follows that within the working class as elsewhere - one should expect to encounter cultural legacies derived from the accumulated experience of hardship, struggle and solidarity, and which are reinforced in the social consciousness by current experience, the process of socialisation, and normative pressures to conform. This conformity, however, refers not to such a positive proclivity as is implied in the notion of an over-zealous 'super-ego'. It refers instead to an acquiescence to the group-integrative norms of a status-group or community. The dominant function being served by the expression of an attitude should therefore be characterised as facilitating groupattachment, and not either the moral philosopher's 'rational appraisal' or the psychoanalyst's 'psychological projection'. 63

-

It is through the prism of normative frameworks that political ideas come to be interpreted and invested with social importance. Their disregard leads to either a crude sociology in which culture is conceptualised as an amorphous mass, or a naive psychology in which the expression of attitudes is explained not by reference to longestablished group apothegms or even perceived interests, but rather in terms of operant conditioning as when rats in a maze seek out cheese.

-

Even the Frankfurt scholars who set out to theoretically under~ mine these ideological extremes -- succeeded only in serving to reinforce them .

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233

THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL It was primarily through the work of Erich Fromm that members of the Institute of Social Research first attempted to reconcile social theory and psychology." Fromm reasserted the commitment we have observed in Marx, to a philosophical anthropology which views the essence of human nature as residing in man's creative and purposeful mastery over repressive physical and social forces. This is why more than any other social theorist associated with the Institute, he focused

on the anthropological implications that we have seen in Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. In this concern, less attention came to be paid to what we have conceptualised as Marx's dialectics of l a b o r , as the root of alienation, with its subsequent

extension in the theory of value, and more to the social-psychological bases of sexual repression and authoritarianism. The analysis of authority relations and their psychological correlates therefore became a major theoretical and empirical preoccupation of the Frankfurt School. Presupposed in their work was an explicit rejection of all those ideological tendencies to universalise the psychological responses in Western society, such as., for example, the Oedipus complex, which they - like Adler regarded as a feature of patriarchal domination. Yet despite this important and fundamental criticism of psychoanalysis, and whatever their sociological basis, these psychological responses were nevertheless still conceptualised in basically Freudian terms. Thus, as in Adorno's later Authoritarian Personality, Fromm's character typology was firmly rooted in the psychoanalytic framework of sublimation or the reaction formation of fundamental libidinal drives. Following on from the work of Karl

Abraham and Ernest Jones, he outlined the oral, anal and genital character types - expressing a preference for the latter which he

associated with independence, freedom and friendliness, and the marked hostility towards the others that characterises his later work, and which distinguishes him from Herbert Marcuse whose ideas on pregenital 'polymorphous ferversity$65 were altogether different. In all of this he was in close agreement with Wilhelm Reich who had expressed a similar sentiment, and Fromm too focused on the family as the primary agent of socialisation. Early childhood experience of the repressive sexual mores in petit-bourgeois and some proletarian families was therefore seen as preventing the development of a healthy genital sexuality, thereby

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fostering the pregenital character types later associated with authoritarian aggression and submission. In this way, bourgeois rationality and puritanism were seen to be linked to anal repression and orderly ness. Later Fromm was to revise this approach - partly as a result of renewed interest in Johann Bachofen's studies of matriarchal culture,6" but more because Freud's own anthropological speculations (derived primarily from James Frazer's work on totemism)67 had been largely debunked in Malinowski's Sex and Repression in Savage Society6 and Robert Briffault's book The Mothers: a Study of the Origins of Sentiments and Institutions.69 Love and altruistic feelings generally - far from being based on sexuality as Freud had Supposed -- were henceforth viewed as being derived from the maternal sentiments generated by the extended period of human pregnancy and child care. Masculinity and feminity were therefore not to be seen as inherently and essentially physiological in origin, but instead derived from a socio-economically determined sex-based division of l a b o r . This was the argument originally presented by Adler in his critique of Freud. The extent to which Fromm eventually departed from Freud's psychologist can be observed in his definition of 'social character' which he later considered to be his 'most important contribution . . to the field of social psychology'.7° Thus 'The social character comprises only a selection of traits, the essential nucleus of the character structure of a group which has developed as a result of the basic experiences and mode of life common to that group' (Fromm's italics).71 This is a far cry from his earlier emphasis on repressive childhood experiences, and clears the way forward for a redefinition of

_

neuroses, in which sado-masochism,

for example, ceases to be a

merely sexually derived phenomenon, and is seen instead

...-

like

Adler - as striving that 'tends to help the individual to escape his unbearable feelings of aloneness and powerlessness'.72 In shifting emphasis in this manner from the individual to the social, Fromm's notion of 'social character' may be viewed as a

general response to what I have conceptualised as a socioeconomically determined normative framework. This does not imply that masochistic traits can never be derived from particular childhood experience within a given culture, but only that, in the words of Fromm's own clinical advice, '. , . the analyst must not get stuck in the study of childhood experiences, but turn his attention to the unconscious processes as they exist now'.73 This effectively counters the otherwise convincing criticism made by Adorne, who argued

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from the standpoint of orthodox psychoanalysis that Fromm was at fault in denying the sexual basis of sadism when the Nazis were displaying it so blatantly at the time. But Adorno could still, of course, be correct in equating sadism with sexual repression, while remaining wrong in assuming that they can both be explained in Freudian terms. The same can be said of Adorno's own conceptualisation of the so-called 'authoritarian personality' for which he is most famous. While it may be true and even empirically verified that there are individuals who have an 'authoritarian personality' and that all of them express a measurable authoritarianism, this does not

imply that all those who express authoritarianism necessarily possess an 'authoritarian personality'. Adorne himself believes otherwise. He cannot escape a one-sided and illogical conclusion because he insists on equating the individual and the social through the distorting lens of orthodox psychoanalysis. This in no way denies that in so far as psychology and sociology operate in isolation from each other, they project the intellectual division of l a b o r on to the object of their study and thereby express a 'false consciousness' in which 'psyche' and 'society' are erroneously separated." Nor that the ' . . . ideal of conceptual unification taken from the natural sciences cannot be indiscriminately applied to a society whose unity resides in its not being unitied'.7" It merely questions the theoretical basis of Adorno's own conclusion in so far as failure to approach the particular from the vantage point of the general leads inevitably to psychologism .... as when he seeks to explain the expression of authoritarian attitudes in terms of 'personality' via Freud, rather than more generally as normative acquiescence.

CRITICAL THEORY

The self-procl aimed synthesis of psychoanalysis and the brand of Marxism the Frankfurt scholars call Critical Theory is in fact made possible only through a quite explicit rejection of Marxism as social science. This is abundantly clear in their attitude towards the critique of political economy. 'Unlike the operation of modern specialised science', I-Iorkheimer proclaims, 'the critical theory of society remains philosophical even as a critique of economics: its content is formed by the inversion of the concepts which govern the economy into their opposites: fair exchange into widening social injustice, the

free economy into the domination of monopoly, productive labour

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Marxist Sociology Revisited

into the consolidation of relations which restrict production, the maintenance of the life of the society into the immigration of the people'.77 The theoretical confusion here stems from the premise that the concepts undergoing inversion 'govern the economy', whereas, for

Marx, what makes them ideological is not simply that they serve the economic interests of the bourgeoisie, but emphatically that they do

not explain the operation of the capitalist economy, and are therefore, at least in his terms, 'scientiflcally' invalid. Accordingly, it is the omissions from political economy (expressed in his theory of value) that therefore suggest to Marx the necessary concepts which are to lay bare the 'economic law of motion of modern society' that we have seen was his declared 'ultimate aim' in Capital. For, as he and Engels argue in the German Ideology 'when reality is depicted, philosophy as an independent branch of knowledge loses its medium of existence'.7° The ideological omissions from economics form the basis of its scientific critique, argues Marx, because they serve to disguise the reality of capitalist exploitation. But since Critical Theory is held to be philosophical, it cannot, as Goran Therborn has pointed out, create any new scientific concepts." It merely perceives political economy as 'a-historical', but not as 'incorrect and unscientific'. The 'very radicalism of this interpretation of Marxism', he goes on to argue, 'dramatically limits its effects and the gaze of their philosophy on economics fulfils Wittgenstein's prescription. It leaves everything as it is'.8" Indeed, this retreat from science to philosophy corresponds with a retreat from politics to psychology. Critical Theory is forced to confine itself to moral indignation, because from the high clouds of philosophical idealism, it rejects all

forms of scientific discourse. The result is that despite a thoroughgoing condemnation of its categories, the Frankfurt scholars leave political economy intact and scientifically unchallenged. Psychoanalysis is different. Among the Frankfurt School it induces no such moral incantation. Not only does Critical Theory acquiesce in Freud's scientific pretentions, but it invests in his psychology a philosophical approach quite at variance with its content. In Civilization and its Discontents, Freud had categorically argued that all culture was founded upon a common and universal renunciation of sexual drives. Without the diversion, or sublimation of sexual energy there could be no genuine affection between human beings and no civilisation. There is therefore in Freud a contrast between

sexuality on the one hand and civilisation on the other. He conceives

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237

also another contrast that between freedom and happiness. Critical Theory requires a philosophical reconciliation. It attempts this in arguing that human nature appears innately aggressive only because of the institution of bourgeois society. Sadistic strivings would end once sexual repression ceased to exist. Yet, as Alasdair Maclntyre pointed out, the 'contrast between freedom and happiness is founded on the fact that for Freud liberation is essentially liberation from the hold that the instructional desires of infancy and the fixations resulting from the encounter of those desires with the external world still combine to impose on us'.82 Such liberation, however, 'depends upon the ego with its grasp of the reality principle having displaced from its - .

sovereignty the instructural id with its commitments to the pleasure

principle'.83 Among the Frankfurt School it was Marcuse who attempted a solution to this twin contradiction between sexuality and civilisation/ freedom and happiness, through the perplexing concept of 'repressive desublirnation'. Since sublimation is a diversion of sexual energy, de-sublimation represents its hypothetical return to an unfettered opportunity for fulfillment. But such fulfillment is not possible under capitalism because of its repressive institutions, the bourgeois family being the most repressive of all. Wilhelm Reich, whom Marcuse dismisses in 21 lines as having 'wild and fantastic hobbies', had long before argued much the same, and in view of this, as Maclntyre suggests, the least we should expect is 'a sympathetic and careful account of the differences between Freud and Marcuse on the one side and Reich on the other, and a consideration of what empirical tests would be decisive in determining on

which side, if either, truth lies'.E5"' But, on the subject of empirical research, Critical Theory is understandably reticent, because in its polemic against positivism - against describing the 'facts out there' it seeks not to debunk the 'facts' .-.

through a criticism based on science, but instead to invert their interpretation through a criticism derived from philosophical speculation. This practice is so far removed from MarX'S own insistence that, 'where speculation ends -§§I] real life - there real positive science s that one wonders how the Frankfurt School can seribegins . ously claim any affinity at all to Marxism. The contemporary legacy is observed in the polemics of those left-wing 'intellectuals', . . whose contempt for the 'facts' is so great that 'theory' has become almost entirely divorced from empirical research. me Frankfurt scholR.

ars certainly stopped short of this. Their philosophical speculations

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Marxist Sociology Revisited

were at least based on what they believed to be empirically controlled psychological theories, and some serious attempts were made to test them. More convincing explanations might have accompanied their brilliant description, had Marx's social theory influenced them more than Freud's psychology. Significantly, it is among some Marxist-feminists that such an undertaking has been fruitful - largely because their primary objective was to debunk Freud's psychologism. Michele Barrett, for instance, comments that all attempts to explain social behaviour with reference to biological determinants have 'subsequently been discredited, and psychological findings concerning supposedly innate sex differences have now been subjected to a stringent critique'.86 Again, it is worth reminding ourselves that in contradistinction to Freud, Adler wrote: Certain character traits count as masculine, others as feminine, albeit there is no basis to justify these valuations. If we compare the psychic state of boys and girls and seemingly find evidence in support of this classification, we do not deal with natural phe~ nomena but are describing the expressions of individuals who have been directed into a specific channel, whose style-of-life and behavior pattern have been narrowed down by specific conceptions of power. These conceptions of power have indicated to them with compelling force the place where they must seek to develop.

There is no justification for the differentiation of "manly" and "womanly" character traits." As I have demonstrated empirically in Fascism and the Working

Class" these specific conceptions of power are themselves institutionalised, and the authority relations of which they are an expression, correspond with the class structure of capitalism. The abolition of capitalism - as a mode of production - is therefore a necessary, but

not a sufficient condition for the total elimination of authority relations through, and in which most women are oppressed. Exactly the same principle obtains in all other forms of authority relations, including those politically sanctioned by 'Marxism' as ideology, because the intellectual process of rationalisation referred to above, does not cease upon the abolition of classes. It does, though, become considerably more transparent .... as feminists have been among the first to point out. For, the abolition of capitalism does not guarantee

women's (total) liberation, any more than it guarantees that the

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Marxism and Psychology

socialist mode of production is necessarily democratic. To Adler's rhetorical question (aimed speed-ically at those who spoke only of 'economic emancipation'): 'Who but people possessed of social feel~ ing could succeed in solving social problems?', 211 auld fruitfully add: And who but those who have purged themselves of sexism and of racialism could succeed in building democratic socialism? This recognition leads feminists like Rosalind Coward to conclude that Marx's concept of the 'mode of production' is politically harmful, because she perceives it as resulting in a delimitation of political struggle. What, in fact, she opposes is what others have condemned as 'economism',90 but her theoretical formulation of it amounts to a rejection Of materialism

- as a theory of knowledge,

and the political

implications of this, seem to me, to be precisely the opposite of what she intends. Coward's argument is that all 'epistemological theories' are either 'empiricist' or 'rationalist'.91 They presuppose a "real" world that can be reflected in some corresponding discourse, and that their rejection provides a route out of the fruitless debate as to whether or not the position of women serves the class interests of the bourgeoisie. There is (she argues) no general and essential economic existence of the relations of production - there is only particularity in which they are secured, a particularity in which the conditions of existence are all-important."

This is a rejection not of 'epistemological theories' but of the reality of capitalist exploitation, through a theory of knowledge implicitly grounded in phenomenology." The political implications

are that the abolition of capitalism - as a mode of production

- .

is

neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for women's liberation. Indeed, if the reality of capitalist exploitation is merely a 'particularity' whose conditions of existence can undergo change, then there is no theoretical reason whatsoever to struggle for women's liberation through socialism. This is hardly a conclusion that is 'potentially exciting for socialist-feminism'.94 Quite the contrary . What Coward's work does contribute, however, is a refreshing reminder of the limitations of Marxism in explaining women's oppression, and what Adler conceptualised as - its related psychological expression in authoritarianism. The psychological relationship .--

between sexism and authoritarianism becomes particularly evident in

the most extreme form of bourgeois ideology: Fascism.95

"+

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Marxist Sociology Revisited

FASCISM AND SEXUALITY

Fascism has long been most accurately defined as a mass movement based on the lower middle-class - that usurps political power in the interests of monopoly capital, even though fascist ideology is superficially anti-trust and pro-free enterprise. It also frequently utilities racialism, but from a psychological perspective, fascism represents a desire to re-establish 'a man's world'.9° The ideology of fascism may therefore be understood as exaggerated masculinity. This, as I have argued elsewhere, constitutes the normative roots of its contempt for weakness. The work of E. R. Jaensch - the Nazi psychologist -

. -

expresses it very clearly in terms of his 'J-type' and 'Anti-Type' human forms." The J-type is tough, masculine, firm, persevering and makes unambiguous, perceptual judgements. In liberal 'social science' he is cruel, bestial and determinedly rigid in his thinking - the ideal stormtrooper. The Anti-Type, on the other hand, is flaccid, weak, effeminate, lacks will-power, and is indeterminate, and is characterised chiefly as a 'typical' Slav, Jew, Communist or liberal. More charitably, the Anti-Type is tolerant, tender-hearted, flexible and considerate. What all this represents is a fascist interpretation of 'masculinity' on the one side, and femininity' on the other. These ideological stereotypes are, therefore, not merely the ravins of fascists alone. They can be observed in a whole range of symbolically related dichotomies expressed in terms of tough and tender, thinking and feeling, head and heart, reason and emotion, and so on and so forth. In contemporary psychology they are frequently interpreted as 'convergent' in contrast to 'divergent' thinking," while in sociology they

appear as "instrumental" as against 'expressive modes of orientation'.'"° lt is not necessarily the denotation of these concepts, so much as their related ideological connotations, that prejudices their analytical value. This is especially evident in the equation of 'femininity' (itself an ideological construct) with "weakness" (which in the comprehension of many amounts to the same thing) It is easy to understand why 'nothing more effectively strikes at the sacred kernel of masculine self-identity than the self-assertion of women'.101 Once women appear to be strong, aggressive and self-

_

willed, they displace many of the prevailing norms defining 'mascu1inity'. The fear of women is, therefore, frequently a fear of feeling weak. In extreme cases, the equation of feminity with weakness, results in sadism. Many men are sometimes callous for fear that any

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241

sign of pity should be construed as tenderness - behavior conceived by them as being characteristically female, and therefore in their belief, weak. Similarly, hate is preferred to love, and depravity to virtue. Vilification of the humane, therefore, soon comes to be justified in terms of all those traits associated - symbolically -.- with being 'manly'. Women are symbolised as being weak, and so their company is therefore to be avoided. This also applies to everything symbolically associated with them, such as housework, and childrearing. Exaggerated masculinity has even wider ideological implications. It provides a convenient justification for imperialist expansion. At war, men are at their most aggressive - . fighting shoulder-toshoulder, eating, drinking, sleeping and even dying together in a milieu largely free of women. In Fascism, peace is the symbol not of love but of decadence: it is considered weak, cowardly, and woman1ike.102 Only in combat is there dignity, heroism and pride. War is thus as far away as is symbolically possible from the influence of women, and their allotted place of 'tranquil domesticity'. For women are seen not only as weak, but also as weakening - a common rationalisation expressed by those who (Adler's psychology informs

us) fear the consequences of some anticipated failure. Feminists have reiterated some of these ideas, and further developed others,103 so that our interpretations of the psychological relation between sex and violence, authority, power and aggression go far beyond the narrow limits previously imposed by the work of Reich,104* Sevew5 and Brown." In 1974 Char fie Guettel wrote: There can be no isolated super-theory of women's liberation. The next thing on the agenda is a more developed Marxist psychology

to analyse sexuality, socialization, and the myriad of aspects of development involved in our liberation

P

- t

A decade later, it is clear that feminists have played a significant role in not only contributing towards a Marxist psychology, but also in what we may properly call the feminisation of politics.

NOTES AND REFERENCES 1. Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, London, Heinemann, 1973,

p. 86.

2. David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, London, Hutchinson,

1980, D. 110.

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3. J . A. C. Brown, Freud & the Post-Freudians, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1966, p. 41. 4. See T.W. Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality, New York, Harper, 1950. 5. Sigmund Freud, Civilization & its Discoaterzts, tr. Joan Riviere, London, 1930. . 6. Karl Marx, Early Writings, tr. & ed. by T.B. Bottomore, London, C.A. Watts, 1963, p. 43. 7. Immanuel Kant, Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, tr. T.K. Abbott , London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1909, p. 219.

8. Karl Marx, Early Writings, op. cit., p. 64. 9. Ibid., pp. 43-4. 10. Ibid., p. 52.

_1'»me

11. Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, in Marx & Engels 12.

"

13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18.

19. 20. 21.

22.

1

Oman

IdeolOgy, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1964, p. 645. Shlomo Avineri, The Social & Political Thought of Karl Marx, Carnbridge University Press, 1968, p. 65. Karl Marx, Early Writings, op. cit., p. 58. Ibid., P- 122. Ibid., P. 123. Karl Marx, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, in Marx-Engels Selected Works, vol. 1, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1969, pp. 503-4. Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1962, p. 10. Paul Walton & Andrew Gamble, From Alienation to Surplus Value, London, Sheed & Ward, 1972, p. 28. Marx's letter to F. Lassalle in Berlin, Marx-Engels, Selected Correspondence, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 115. D. Sayer 8.: P. Corrigan, 'Late Marx: Continuity, Contradiction & Learning' in T. Shanin (ed.), Late Marx and the Russian Road, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul/Monthly Review Press, 1984. Frederick Engels, 'The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man', Marx-Engels, Selected Works, op. cit. , vol. 3, pp. 66-77. Ibid., p. 68. '

-

23. Ibid., p. 09. 24. Ibid., pp. 73-4. 25. Ibid., pp. 71-2,. 26. Ibid., p. 72. 27. Quoted by Jerome S. Bruner in 'The course of cognitive growth', American Psychologist, 1964 (19), pp. 1-15 . 28. Jacques Monod, Chance and Necessity, London, Fontana, 1974, p. 126. 29. Ibid., p. 129. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid., p. 121.

32. Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, op. cit. 33. Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, Th e German Ideology, op. cit. , p. 101. 34. Karl Marx, Early Writings, op. cit., p. 122. 35.

Ibid.,p. 12S.

36. Norman Geras, Marx & Human Nature, London, Verso, 1983, p. 31.

Marxism and Psychology 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

43. 44.

243

Ibid. Karl Marx, Early Writings, op. cit., p, 127. Ibid. Karl Marx, Capital, op. cit., p. 178. Karl Marx, Early Writings, op. cit., p. 122. Ibid., pp. 12849. Ibid. Ibid., p. 1581,-

45. Tbid., p. 154.1

46. Ibid-, p. 167. 47. Alfred Adler, Understanding Human Nature, tr. W.B. Wolfe, London, Allen & Unwire, 1937. 48. J. H. Goldthorpe & D. Lockwood, et up., The Affluent Worker,

vols. 1~3, Cambridge University Press, 1968. 49. Alfred Adler, Introduction: the Neurotic Constitution, tr. B. Glueck, London, Kevan Paul, Trench, 1921. 50. ibid. 51. Cf. Juliet Mitchell, Psychoanalysis & Feminism, Harrnondsworth, Pen-

guin, 1974, p. 8. 52. Alfred Adler, Understanding Human Nature, op. cit. 53. Lewis Way, Adler's Place in Psychology, London, Allen & Unwire, 1950, p. 258. 54. Karl Marx, Marx-Engels, Selected Works, 1969, op. cit., p. 503. 55. See, for example, Engels' letters to Schmidt (5 Aug. 1890) and Bloch (21 Sept. 1890) in Marx-Engels, Selected Correspondence, Moscow,

Progress Publishers, 1975 pp. 392-6. 56- Engel's letter to Mehring (14 July 1893), in Marx-Engels, Selected Works, vol. 1, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1933, p. 388.

57. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brairnaire of Louis Bonaparte, in MarxEngels, Selected Works, 1969, op. cit., p. 398. 58. For an elaboration of this by a contemporary Marxist see Ernest Mandel, 'The Leninist Theory of OrganisatioN, in Robin Blackburn (ed.), Revolution and Class Struggle, London, Fontana, 1977, pp. 84-5 . 59. Hans H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber, London, Rout-

ledge & Kevan Paul, 1964, p. 183. 60. HJ

61.

62. 63.

64.

.

Eysenck, Sense & Nonsense in Psychology, Harmondsworth,

Penguin, 1964, p. 289. Alfred Adler, The Practice & Theory of lndividual Psychology, op. cit., tr. P. Radio, London, Kevan, Paul, Trench, 1929. George A. Kelly, The Psychology of Personal C`onstrucrs, New York, Norton, 1955, pp. 105-83. See M.B. Smith, J.S. Bruner & P.W. White, Opinions & Personality, New York, Wiley, 1966. See Martin Jay, op. cit. Ibid., p. 110.

65. 66. Johann Bachofen, see ibid., p. 94. 67. James G. Frazer, The Golden Bough, London, 1890.

68. Bronislaw Malinowski, Sex & Repression in Savage Society,

69. Robert Briffault, The Mothers: a Study of the Origins o}"Sentiment &

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Marxist Sociology Revisited

Institutions, WE .M,,,."Hlaylor, London, Allen & Unwire, 1927. 70. Martin Jay, op. cit., W 99. 71. 72. pp. 92 and 317. 73. 74. 75. Adorno, 'Sociology and Psychology', New Left Review, 46,

Dec. 1967, pp. 67-80. 76. 77. Max Horkheimer, Kritische Theorie, Frankfurt, 1968, p. 195, quoted ..-.....__._-..

by Goran Therborn, 'Frankfurt Marxism: a Critique', New Left Review, 63, Sept.-Oct. 1970, p. 19. 78. Karl Marx, Capital, op. cit., p. 10. 79. Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, op. cit., p. 38. 80. 81. 82. 83.

Goran Therborn, op. cit., p. 70. Ibid,

Alasdair Mcintyre, Marcuse, London, Fontana, 1970, p. 44, Ibid.

84. Ibid., p. 34. 85. Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, op. cit., p. 38. 86. Michele Barrett, WomenS Oppression Today, Problems in Marxist Feminist Analysis, London, Verso, 1980, p. 13. 87. Alfred Adler, Understanding Human Nature, op. cit., p. 127. 88. Norman O'Neill, Fascism & the Working Class, Southall, Shakti, 1982. 89. Lewis Way, Alfred Adler, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1956, p. 48. 90. See Ernest Mandel, 91. Rosalind Coward, 'Rethinking Marxism' (Discussion of Anthony Cutler, Barry Hindess, Paul Hurst and Arthur Hussain, Marx's 'Capira£' and Capitalism Today), in/f., 2, 1978, pp. 96, 91, 92. Quoted in Barrett, op. fit., p-33.

92. 93. 94. 95.

Coward, ibid. For an elaboration on this point see Barrett, op. cit. , pp. 35-6. Ibid., p. 33. See O'Neill, op. cit., pp. 129-137.

96. PeterNathan, The Psychology of Fascism, Faber&Faber,London, 1933. 97. O'neill, op. cit., p. 131. 98. Sec Roger Brown, Social Psychology, London, Collier-Macmillan, 1967, P- 477. 99. Liam Hudson, Contrary Imaginations, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1967. 100. See Alfred L. Baldwin, 'The Parsonian Theory of Personality' in Max Black (ed.), The Social Theories* of Talcotr Parsons, Englewood Cliffs,

New Jersey, Prentice-Hall Inc., 1961, p. 166. 101. O'Neill, op. at. 102. Ibid. 103. For a comprehensive analysis of the literature see Barrett, op. cit. 104. Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, London, Souvenir Press, 1970.

Marxism and Psychology

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105. Lucien Seve, Man in Marxist Theory and the Psychology of Personality , Sussex, Harvester Press, 1978.

106. Phil Brown, Toward a Marxist Psychology, New York, Harper & Row , 1974. 107. Char fie Guettel, Marxism & Feminism, Ontario, The Canadian Women's Educational Press, 1974, p. 62.

1

8 Marxism, the State and

Politics MARTIN SHAW Politics is of the essence of Marxism: 'The philosophers have only interpreted the world, the point is to change it'. However much Marxist economic and social theory may become divorced from its practical function, as in academia they often have, Marxist political theory must by definition embody it. And yet there has often been something rather paradoxical about Marxist political thought. Why should a theory which insists that the basis of human society is its socio-economic relations, set so much store by political change? What precisely is the meaning and status of 'politics' in relation to the socio-economic foundation? Why, having been very clear that politics is so crucial, should Marx himself have failed to develop a political theory? There are two sorts of answer to these questions. One, to which many an expert mind has turned, is to examine the complex logic of Marx's own thought, i lliconstruct a Marxist political theory from classical categories. There is something satisfying about this procedure: the end result may be internally consistent and logical. But the edge is given to the question, not by the apparent inconsistencies of Marx's categories, but by the contradictions of real politics: reformist, revolutionary, Communist. And so the other sort of answer, at least as necessary as the first, is to attempt to understand the prob~ l e n s of politics in the context of contemporary socio-econoMic realities. The meaning of Marxist political theory can hardly be given for all times by Marx's own work: changing economic and social relations imply changing politics. The argument of this paper will be that classical Marxism contained only a very incomplete theorisation of politics, and of the institution of the state which is evidently central to the political

question. It posed some of the important questions which need to be

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asked, but often gave ambiguous answers, the inadequacy of which has become apparent with time, and equally it failed to ask others which have proved to be central. The development of capitalism, the state, class structure and politics have moreover created new problems, which the classical Marxists could hardly have foreseen, but which concern contemporary Marxist writers. The presentation of this chapter will be list, a brief exposition and some initial criticisms of classical positions, second, a lengthier discussion of the roost important general problems in the Marxist theory of the state and politics, and in conclusion a short examination of the specific problems of Marxist analysis of the state and politics in Britain- I hope that by focusing on the national situation it will be possible to make the more abstract discussion relevant and so contribute to thinking about change.

CLASSICAL POSITIONS Marx' and Engels' views on the state have frequently been summarised: it would distort the argument of this paper to carry out this sort of survey here At the risk of simplification, I intend instead to outline what seem to be the main issues raised by classical Marxist analysis and recent commentary on it, and suggest the extent to which they have been satisfactorily resolved within the Marxist tradition. Even at this stage, I shall not stick narrowly to the texts of the 'founding fathers' themselves, since this would erect an unhelpful division between their work and a large body of later writing which derives from it. Marx' theory is a historical one, in which society evolves through a

succession of modes of production and of class conflicts, which both grow out of and help to determine the further development of modes of production- Although Marx's theory is neither teleological (it has no pre-determined end), nor linear (there is no automatic 'progress' in one given direction), he does see a broad pattern in the evolution of historical societies. Class societies develop out of simpler non-class societies, and capitalism emerges as the most developed possible form of class society - in which indeed the development of productive forces and the complete form of class antagonism raises the possibility of a .new sort of classless society. The development of the state is linked by Marx and Engels directly to the emergence of class convict based on private property in the

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means of production. The state originated therefore long before modern capitalism, but capitalism, with its more direct, polarised and conscious class struggle necessarily sees a dramatic growth in the role of the state. The state's role in class conflict is a regulative one, but not in a neutral sense: by the very act of regulating class conflict the state is preventing it from disrupting the existing mode of production, and thus acts on behalf of the class which benefits from the existing relations. Because of its role in suppressing the subordinate classes, the state's main functions are identified as repressive. Its core elements are based on organised violence (police, prisons, standing army), which is used primarily against the economically exploited classes. It is important, though, that while the modern state is defined by

Marx and Engels as 'an executive committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie',2 it is not seen as identical with, Ol' a simple reflection of, the economically dominant class. In previous class societies, such as feudalism, where the state is incompletely developed, the economic hierarchy and the state hierarchy were often nearly identical. But where the state develops to its modern extent (and what was 'modern' in Marx's time looks very puny today) it separates out from the economically powerful. It is defined by Marx, insistently, as 'special' means of coercion, distinct from the ordinary coercion of the social relations of production themselves. ._ 'separation of the state from the organisation of production, and from the economic organisation of the possessing class itself, is the source of many problems in the Marxist theory. First, it draws attention to the nature of the economically dominant class: that although it may possess considerable social cohesion, economically the nature of capitalism divides the owning class into competing groups. This considerably compounds a general problem, namely how does an economically dominant class become a politically 'rul-

_

ing' one? The state cannot simply reflect the prior economic or political interests, still less wishes, of the owning class, since there is no ordinary mechanism by which these can be established. The state may be in effect the means by which the economically dominant class is constituted politically, but the very separation of the state makes this a highly problematic process. Marx himself drew attention to the way in which the state repre-

sented its autonomy from the ruling class by constituting itself a sphere of "universal" rights and freedoms, as representative of the

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'whole' of society. In his early writings he saw this 'universality' as basically flawed, offering partial or illusory freedom, since men were free only in a political and not in a social or economic sense. Later he drew attention to the way in which this universality might have concrete meaning, both actually (in France, where Napoleon III was able to balance the support of the peasantry against the capitalists in order to shape the state in his own image) and potentially (in Britain and elsewhere where the working class might use universal suffrage to change society)- For later marxists, the relationship of state forms to classes, and to groups and fractions within classes, has been a major problem area, in analysing both political democracies (with complex and changing party systems) and dictatorships (such as fascist and military regimes).

The fact that the state cannot simply be identified with the capitalist class, as a vulgar Marxist might suppose, creates further problems of a fundamental kind at the heart of the theory. A conceptual debate has ensued as to whether the state can be viewed 'instrurnentally' (as something which the ruling class 'uses' for its interests), 'structurally' (as internally and externally locked into the capitalist mode of production), or 'derivatively' (as an institution whose necessity can be 'derived' from the nature of the capitalist mode).3 The more sophisticated 'structural' and 'derivation' views raise difficult questions as to how the state is in fact related to the structure and interests of capital. The 'state derivation' school returns to the nature of capital itself, deriving the category of the state from the nature of the tasks which 'capital', by its very nature as a category, is unable to perform: tasks which are necessary for capital as a whole rather than for individual competitive capitals. This is an acutely important issue, in view of the vast range of functions which have been taken over by states in the

poSt-1945 period. It is also extremely difficult to discuss a priori, for the recent crisis of state ownership and expenditure has shown how much the nature and functions of the state are a matter of conflict between and within classes. Any explanation of the state from an abstract model of the mode of production and classes runs the risk of a simplifying reductionism. In the light of such difficulties the postulate of the autonomy of the state has been advanced by Marxist-inliuenced historians, to the point of suggesting that 'fundamental conflicts of interest might exist between the dominant class or set of groups, on the one hand, and the state rulers on the other'.4* The argument has impressed Ralph

Midband sufficiently for him to separate a correct premise, that the

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state has (or those who run it have) distinct interests, from what he sees as an incorrect conclusion, that there may be fundamental conflicts between the state and dominant interests in society. He proposes instead that we should see the relationship as one o f 'partnership between two different, separate forces, linked to each other by many threads, yet each having its own separate sphere of concerns'.5 In place of conflict, he acknowledges a 'certain tension' within the framework of generally compatible interests. Miliband's formulation is intended to avoid either the old classeconomic reductionism or a new 'state reductionism The postulate of 'partnership' seems too loose however to encompass either the framework of class and economic constraints within which states operate, on which all varieties of Marxist analysis have insisted, or the very real ability of states to shape national economies and societies, pinpointed by the critics. The element of truth in each harder, 'one-sided' version suggests a dynamic, dialectical relationship between state and capital, the terms of the relationship, as Midband acknowledges, are constantly shifting. The interests of states are normally embedded in complexes of class-economic relations, but they are also defined by the international relations of states. In certain 'extreme' situations of war and social crisis, states use their formidable coordinating potential to re-order socioeconomic relations in their own interests. Then the partnership is very much on the state's terms - as in all war situations - or may even lead to such excesses of state power that all social interests are either harnessed or destroyed.6 The tension over the primacy of economics or politics in capitalist societies is paralleled by a tension between 'social' and 'political' concepts of revolution. Marx's own standpoint was, of course, fundamentally anti-statist. He looked towards the overthrow of the increasingly centralised, repressive capitalist state (a peaceful transformation was only conceivable where this had not fully developed), towards the establishment of a proletarian semi~state, or commune~state, repressive only towards the dispossessed bourgeoisie; to the 'withering away' of this state as it lost even this repressive aspect; leading finally to a situation in which rule over people was replaced by the administration of things, by society acting in common. This complex attitude to the state - recognising the necessity of a limited form of state, while seeldng its ultimate dissolution was accompanied by an ambivalence towards

-

politics. From his earliest writings, in which it is seen as an alienated

form of human existence to be transcended in a fully "social" revolution,

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251

Marx was critical of politics in the narrow sense. And revolutionaries have often claimed that theirs is not politics in the ordinary sense, that it expresses deeper social and cultural needs. All the same, they have recognised that at a certain point the revolution is supremely about political power, dominated by politics 'in the direct and I`laII1'OW sense of

the words The tension over 'politics' has been a creative one, leading for example to Graznsci's concept of hegemony which will be discussed further below. But at the same time it has been limiting. Within the revolutionary tradition, it has led to an underestimation of the problems of the forms and institutions of power. The assumption that the proletarian semi-state would be extremely transitory meant that little thought was given to the way in which working-class democracy might be expressed. Even Lenin's State and Revolution, written shortly before October 1917, fails to discuss the relationship between workers' councils and revolutionary party, although this was to be crucial to the actual revolutionary history.8 And where the revolutionary tradition has proved inadequate as a political guide, as in today's mature capitalist democracies, the revolutionary dismissal of 'ordinary', parliamentary politics has often inhibited Marxists from thinking clearly about how to formulate a politics and forms of organisation relevant to real conditions.

GENERAL PROBLEMS This cursory survey of classical Marxist positions on the state and politics has only indicated some of the problems which the theory raises. In this section of the chapter I shall discuss five main problem areas in more specific ways, starting with those which concern the evolution of the state, and then turning to those which arise out of socialist practice . States and State-Systems

We can start by discussing more explicitly what increasingly looks like the Achilles heel of attempts to understand the modern state simply as a capitalist institution. This is the fact that, in emphasising the determination of the state by class struggle, the Marxist theory

has systematically neglected one of the most fundamental features of

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any state: its territorial basis. If the state, as Max Weber defined it, is an organisation claiming a monopoly of coercion within a given territory,9 then states always function in relation to the forms of social organisation in other territories, and especially to other states.

They are always concerned with their boundaries with other states (in a power as well as a strictly geographical sense). They normally operate within a system of states, and the external relationships are as important as (and under given circumstances can be considerably more important than) the internal relationships with class forces. As

Otto Hinze put it, 'External conflicts between states form the shape of the state', within which social structure and the pattern of class conflict are formed." The geopolitical framework pre-existed capitalism, which originated within particular states and a European state system. Few would dispute, of course, that once capitalism developed so far as to transform national economies, then it began to have a very profound effect on states and indeed on the state-system. Capitalism provided the economic basis for a massive expansion of the state's resources; the social basis for unprecedented political mobilisation of the population, and the technical basis for qualitatively

more destructive

forms of warfare. At the same time, states obviously became more responsive to the needs, interests and demands of capital within their territory, and this affected their external as well as internal operation . As Marxist writers on imperialism stressed, states were concerned with the extent to which they, or firms operating from their base

territory, could operate profitably in other territories, and they sought to control or intervene in them partly for such reasons. In all these senses, modem states and state systems can be seen as

capitalist (although aNs begs the question of the nature of present-day

Communist states, to which we return below). Similarly, previous forms of state and state-system (the classical empires and city-states, medieval states, the absolute monarchies etc.) can be partly explained in terms of the socio-economic relations of the period. But any such explanations mn the risk of neglecting the extent to which the state-system has its own logo of conflict and competition which cannot simply be reduced to particular form of economic competition. Warfare is the open manifestation of this, and it is remarkable how little Marxism has seriously been able to come to terms with war." It has implicitly treated war as an 'exceptional' condition, and ignored the extent to which the extreme circumstance highlights the nature of

the 'normal'. What the circumstances of war have shown, never more

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vividly than in modern times, is that however much states need economic resources to set them in motion, once this has happened the logic of competitive violence is stronger than any economic logicIt can be argued that this logic is almost as important in peacetime, when it is often latent or implicit, as in war itself.

States in National Capitalist Economies

To start our discussion of the state with the geopolitical aspect is to remind ourselves that a great deal of the expansion of the state in modern capitalism is due to this sort of factor, and not to tendencies internal to the capitalist mode of production. This places a major question mark against central parts of most Marxist accounts of the modern state. It has implications for the way we understand the most important change of the last hundred years, the integration of the

state with the national economy. Classical Marxist theory of the state, like classical liberal theory, assumed the separation of the state from the mode of production. It tacitly accepted that the state's role was to secure, in a non-economic sense, the conditions for the functioning of the capitalist economy. The historical evolution of capitalism has, however, made this assumption redundant, as the state has 'intervened', to use the conventional term, more and more deeply. Marxist theory, often handicapped by a starting point which gives little explicit recognition to the economic role of the state (such as Lenin's 'monopoly capital'), has had to try to explain this development." There are three main facets to this economic role: state expendi-

ture, state ownership of means of production, and state management of the national economy. Marxists have attempted to explain each of these in terms of the inherent tendencies of capitalism, but in each case have had to recognise more complex causation. State expenditure, for example, must be divided between various categories, e.g. military and welfare. There has been for a long period a secular tendency for state expenditure as a whole to increase, and for the different categories of spending to increase together. This encouraged the view that there was a structural necessity for high state spending as such, or for each particular category (deface spending to protect the external interests of capitalists, welfare spending to reproduce the labour force, etc.). In the 19805, however, deliberate

policies of states, aimed at reducing state spending, are slowing down

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the rate of growth by increasing only certain categories (et. military, police) at the expense of others (e.g. social expenditure, usually particular kinds more than others). In retrospect, the growth of state spending as a whole looks much more uneven and problematic. Military spending has been higher in some countries (e.g. USA, UK) than in others (e.g. West Germany, Japan): it reflected the geopolitical outcome of World War II, and ironically helped to undermine that balance since the low-military spending countries proved far more economically dynamic. The association of warfare and welfare appears very much as the domestic political side of the same geopolitical phase, it was associated with a particular period of labourintensive militarism and the political consensus of Atlanticist social democracy, both of which are passing. Certainly, so far as structural determination remains, its relationship with contingent military, social and political factors needs to be more clearly explored. A similar problem arises with state ownership of the means of production, although it is complicated by severe conceptual prob-

lems. Marxists have constantly been bedevilled by an inability to distinguish between a very basic category of the theory, the social relations of production, and the more subordinate category of the legal forms of ownership. There is in fact a very plausible structural explanation for state involvement in productive industry - that the growing socialisation and centralisation of production in larger units implies that the state with its greater resources will increasingly take on functions which private capitals cannot carry out (at least within the context of national economies). But for many Marxists, the legal expression of this in state ownership and control is di/Ficult to explain.

There is a tendency either to deny that state-owned industry can be considered as capital at all, as with some of the German state derivation theorists, or to see it simply as capital, as with some theorists of 'state capitalism'.13 Each polar position is surely wrong, since state-owned industries both operate as capital, and (because the state is the state) are different from other forms of capital. State capital is quite simply what the term implies, state and capital, and cannot be reduced to either. Although a structural explanation can be suggested for the involvement of the state in capitalist production, state ownership ('nationalisation') does not follow inevitably from this. The tendency towards state ownership can he seen as a product of particular circumstances and pressures which are not typical of modern capitalism as a whole:

the urgent need for very direct control in war, the political pressures

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255

from the labour movement, or the crises of declining industries. The revaluation of state ownership on both the right and the left indicates that it is state involvement in organising production, not a particular . form of ownership, which is the main trend. Historically, Marxists have not in fact explained even this trend simply in terms of the structural tendencies inherent in the capitalist mode of production. For Bukharin, for example, the first major Marxist to analyse the problem, state direction of the economy is the outcome of 'fusing' the economic competition of capitals and the military competition of states." Certainly, historians would agree that the two world wars were major levers for state 'intervention',

and strategic reasons remain central to state control over national economies. At the same time, state management of economies has become institutionalised, due to political pressure for economic success (economic analysts have identified a 'political~economic cycle', linked to the electoral cycle, in Western economies), and partly to the sheer weight of state expenditure in national economies, which gives governments levers they cannot afford not to use. Taking these trends as a whole, they amount to an integration of the state with the capitalist economy, at a national and embryonically an international level, which changes both. Capitalism becomes less and less pure: the categories of Marx's Capital more remote a guide to actual behavior. Strategic and political factors have more and more influence on economic trends. At the same time the state, while never losing its core geopolitical and socially coercive functions, becomes increasingly an instrument of economic, social and indeed political and ideological management (although more on these aspects below) . This expansion of functions has a great effect on the structure of the state as an institution. By proliferating bureaucracies for one new task after another, the state ceases to be simply a repressive institution above society. It now appears as a complex of institutions, many of them quite integral to economy and society, and linked to sets of social interests which can be quite contradictory. In this context, it becomes Inoue difficult even to talk of 'the state', either as distinct from society, or as an internal unity. By the same token, the meaning of the classical Marxist positions on the overthrow and withering away of the state becomes less simple, if they remain tenable at all. While the idea of overthrowing the repressive machinery remains theoretically conceivable (if practically exceptionally difficult), the

branches of the state concerned with economic management, social

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services etc., can scarcely be overthrown in the classical revolutionary sense. Certainly, repressive aspects are central to their structures and need to be undermined, but it is difficult to think of change other than as an internal transformation of large parts of the 'state' machinery. It is possible that with changing economic and social circumstances, existing bureaucratic systems of welfare, education, health, etc., might in a sense be 'dissolved'. But some sort of collective social organisation of these functions, as of material production, will be a necessity for the foreseeable future. With the 'withering away of the state', a great deal of recognisable continuity with the present institutions of the state would remain.

These difficulties can be explained if we understand that Marx was right about the trend to broad 'socialisation' of production (and consumption), but wrong in the assumption that this would lead to an early rupture of capitalism and the state. In essence, socialisation has continued within-existing forms, thus transforming them, and hence, necessarily, also changing the socialist tasks.

The Experience of Revolutions

The classical theory of socialist revolution grew out of the bourgeoisdemocratic revolution. When Marx wrote, the French Revolution was the model which was available. Marx deepened the understanding of this revolution by comprehending this apparently 'political'

process as the expression of a social transformation. For Marx, the socialist revolution would differ in that it would be an explicit, conscious social transformation. Instead of building up the state, it

would dissolve it. Instead of hiding behind a political revolution, the socialist revolution would subordinate the necessary political tasks,

connected with the overthrow of the existing state, to its work of social change." The form of revolution, in Marx's day, was still essentially what it had been in 1789. The Paris Commune of 1871, established in a city of small workshops, was a street revolt of the urban poor, closer to the earlier model than to the action of a factory proletariat. Only with the Russian Revolutions of 1905, and of course 1917, were more "modern" forms of workers' revolution developed. In 1905, according to Rosa Luxemburg, the economic struggle of the workers fused with a political struggle: the 'mass strike' was shown as an essential

component of modern revolution." 1905 also saw the emergence of

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257

the workers' council, or soviet, which was eventually seen as an alternative basis for state power. Marxist theory, in identifying the centrality of class contradictions to revolution, linked social change explicitly to the conflict between forces and relations of production. Implicitly, Marx and Engels saw the likelihood of revolutionary crises in the worsening cyclical economic crises of 19th century capitalism. Later Marxist analyses and historiography have had to become extremely cautious about this thesis, introducing many complicating factors as qualifications, and

admitting that the connections are often very indirect. A basic problem is indicated by the geopolitical perspective which we have already discussed. While Marxist theory is concerned with the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production, which exists on a global scale, classes (the working class even more than the capitalist) are formed almost entirely within nation-states. It is the nation-state, moreover, rather than the mode of production, which is the immediate obstacle to social change, and which revolutionaries seek to overthrow- The nation-state is conditioned as much by external as by internal contradictions: as Theda Skocpol has argued, it is 'fundamentally Janus-faced, with an intrinsically dual anchorage in class-divided socioeconomic structures and an international system of states?" Skocpol argues further, from her study of the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions, that it was international conflict that created the conditions for revolution: specifically in the case of the Russian, the only part-plausibly proletarian revolution of the three, that it was 'war~related processes that led to the breakdown of state repressive capacitiesi" Certainly a historical survey of the last century will show that revolutions have never broken out directly or

mainly as a result of economic crisis, but always as a result of some sort of breakdown of the state or regime, roost typically in the context of war. World War I was the catalyst for a waveof workers' revolutions in Europe, the Second for a pattern of peasant-based ievolts

from China to Yugoslavia. By contrast, neither the Great Slump of 1929-31 nor the generalised recessions of the period since 1974 have provided any noticeable revolutionary stimulus whatsoever.

The historical record of proletarian revolutionary upheaval is not very encouraging for Marxists. The Franco-Prussian war and the Russo-Japanese war set in train the heroic but doomed revolts of Paris in 1871 and Russia in 1905. The First World War provoked a much more serious wave of revolutionary events, but only in Russia

(where the workers' revolution relied on the peasant revolution to

258

Marxist Sociology Revisited

overthrow a backward autocratic regime) was there a sustained seizure of power by a soviet-based revolutionary party. In Germany and Italy, however shaken the state was by the war, its greater solidity combined with the greater parliamentary integration of the workers to prevent such an outcome. After the 1920s, only relatively marginal states saw genuinely proletarian upheavals: China in 1925, where the defeat blocked the revolutionary development of the workers and deflected the revolution into the path of Mao's peasantbased Red Army; and Spain in 1936, where social revolt was fused with military struggle, and gaye way to it before being defeated by Franco. World War Two gave a new revolutionary impetus, but this

was successful only where the proletarian revolution had long since given way to rnilitarised peasant struggle. In these later cases, as contemporary revolutionaries endlessly explain, Stalinisrn inhibited success for a workers' revolution. But despite the great truth of this indictment, proletarian revolution was already defeated, after 1918-19, and Stalinism was as much a consequence (of the isolation of the Soviet Union which defeat produced), as a further cause. rnarginalisation and containment of proletarian revolt has continued since 1945. In the Western countries, only one of the most backward, Portugal, has seen something approaching a classical revolution, in the wake of its delayed decolonisation in 1974-75. This was fairly easily 'controlled' and a parliamentary democracy installed. In France, of course, the May events of 1968 encouraged revolutionary hopes: they remain one of the great enigmas of postwar history, a sign of deep and complex tensions, but not a clear vindication of classical socialist revolution. Certainly there was a huge gulf between the optimism they entailed, and the actual political

possibilities. Apart from these cases, it is in the bureaucratic dictatorships of Eastern Europe that the closest approximations to social revolutions have occurred, a protest against the external control of the USSR as well as against domestic state structures. But here again there is a pattern, corresponding to the industrial and political maturation of the Eastern system, away from the relatively pure

proletarian revolution based on workers' councils (Hungary 1956), to the reformist movement (Czechoslovakia 1968) and the attempt at reformism-through-trade unionism (Poland 1980-81). Although the potential for revolutionary upheaval may still exist, even in advanced Western states if more obviously in the East and in the Third World, the likelihood of a Ssuccessful'

outcome in the

classical Marxist sense must be deemed remote. The external crises

Marxism, the State and Politics

259

which have brought about revolutionary victories in the past, especially war, are likely to bring only absolute destruction if they occur in the future. The increase in the resources and sophistication of state repression makes it even more daunting to 1 g ; difficult avoid the conclusion that the classical road is blocked, and that socialist theory must identify different conditions for change.

Bureaucracy and Socialism

If proletarian revolutions are unlikely, and even more, unlikely to be successful, in advanced industrial states, the problem of 'bureaucracy' in states which claim to be socialist is still a central one for contemporary Marxism. The term is really a code-word for the whole phenomenon of the highly undemocratic, centralised and repressive state forms which exist in these countries. Certainly Communist states today are typically dull, methodical authoritarian establishments, close in spirit to Weber's model of the predictable, hierarchical apparatus, as well as proof that his belief in its efficiency was misplaced. But the term 'bureaucracy' was first used to describe the arbitrary, terroristic and personalised dictatorship which existed in the Soviet Union under Stalin. The connections of these state forms to the processes of revolution are often obscure. In Russia, they were constructed ad hoc, as soviets gave way to party-state and the latter to Stalin's monolith, under the impact of civil war and the attempt to control a massive backward society lacking the material basis for socialism. In later cases, the Stalinisation of Communist parties, or the role which the USSR played in establishing the Communist state, ensured 'bureaucratisa-

tion' from the start. In many ways, however, the state form was conditioned by the military-state system within which new states -

whether created by revolutions as in Russia and China, or as a buffer for the existing Soviet state as in Eastern Europe . - had to be created and maintained. Again, the geopolitical context proves important to the internal form of the state, together with the form of organisation of the dominant group. Marxist theory has of course tried to explain the state forms of the Communist countries primarily in terms of the social characteristics and basis of the group who control the state. This is the origin of 'the bureaucracy' - Trotsky's attempt to grasp the social foundations of

Stalin's rule, at a time when, as we have suggested, 'bureaucracy' was

260

Marxist Sociology Revisited

a very inadequate description of the regime. Nevertheless the term stuck, becoming less inaccurate with the normalisation of a rigid hierarchy. And whereas Trotsky saw the bureaucracy as a stratum growing out of the distorted political system of the USSR, other Marxists analysed the socio-economic foundations of the society as exploitative, hence defining the bureaucracy as a ruling class, either Sui generis ('bureaucratic collectivist') or as a variety of capitalism ('bureaucratic state capitalist'). The coherence of the Soviet system, developed over many decades now, and the depth and persistence of the social revolt against it in Eastern Europe, both testify to the consistency of its political and economic structures and argue the

redundancy of Trotsky's attempt to separate the two. A contemporary Marxist analysis of the Soviet-type state, which follows Marx's classical method of studying capitalism, will therefore start by explaining the social contradictions of the Eastern system. It is then possible to explain the form of state - its repressive, centralised, bureaucratic character (bureaucracy being used here in the more orthodox sense, to indicate a system of command rather than the nature of the commanding group) - in terms of class contradictions. Just as Marx and Engels explained the growth of the state in class societies generally in terms of growing social antagonisms, so the growth of the state in Russia, Eastern Europe, China, etc., can be explained by the need to control social schisms. The extent of the repressive apparatuses is only testimony to their depth. The trouble with such an analysis is not just that, by making socio-economic relations once more fundamental, it seems to cut

across the historical pattern in Soviet-type states, where political and military power have been used to create as well as sustain social divisions. It is also - and here it reflects some of the general problems

of the Marxist theory of the state, already discussed that it ignores the extent to which 'state' goals are the driving force of the economy , rather than vice versa. The rulers of the USSR are, first of all, commanders of a state, in competition with other states (notably the USA, NATO, China), as well as seeking to control subordinate classes in their own society. Political-military tasks have a primacy over purely socio-economic ones, reflected in the distorting priority given to the deface sector in the economy. The same is true in China, Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba, in all of whose histories external conflict has played a crucial role. The situation is complicated in Eastern Europe by the essentially subordinate relation of the

states and ruling strata to the USSR, but the defining character of this

Marxism, the State and Politics

261

relationship bears out the general point very precisely. The dominance of politics in Soviet-type systems is real enough, but should be seen in geopolitical, strategic and socially repressive terms rather than the familiar Western preoccupation with 'ideology'., Hegemony, Parliamentary Democracy and Reform It is manifestly true of Soviet-type states that they offer very little

space, except in major crises, for any politics among or on behalf of the majority of the population. As Marxist critiques of the Soviet Union have been extended, so recognition of the political space within Western capitalist democracies has increased, and more attention has focused on how to use and expand it. The most influential perspective on this problem is, paradoxically, one which was originally developed to understand the fascist variety of totalitarianism Gramsci's theory of 'hegemony Gramsci's argument, that a dominant or would-be dominant class must construct its moral and intellectual hegemony through institutions of civil society, is well enough known not to require elaboration

. -

here." What is less well known - or understood - is that in arguing that a ruling class must work to achieve consent among the ruled, Gran sci was far from arguing away the coercive apparatuses of the state traditionally stressed by Marxists. Instead he saw in fascism and the totalitarian tendencies of mass-production capitalism the creation of an 'integral state', or 'hegemony protected by the Armour of coercion'. Ideology and coercion were not so much functional alternatives for modem capitalism, as integrated necessities. Further, as is

equally poorly understood, Gran sci assumed - not unreasonably for

one writing in a fascist gaol - that capitalism was tending to abolish parli momentary democracy. The alternative to it had to be the pains~ taking construction of a working-class hegemony leading to a new kind of representation (still identified for him with the 'soviet' form) .zo Gramsci's epigones have adapted his ideas to the conditions of post-war Western democracies, often without making clear the nature of the adaptation involved and hence marrying him to ill-thought out tactics. In reality the simple alternatives of pre-war Marxism of which Gramsci's ideas are the most sophistication formulation no longer apply. The choice is no longer - as Marxists had portrayed it, - .

. -

from Luxemburg and Lenin in 191.4-18 to Trotsky and Gran sci in the

1930s - between militarist capitalism dispensing with democracy, and

262

Marxist Sociology Revisited

a new form of socialist democracy. Western capitalism, centred in USA since 1940, has combined militarism with democracy, of a limited but still real kind. Since 1945 forms of parliamentary democracy have spread to and been consolidated in almost all the advanced Western states" - although not to many of the West's clients and allies in the Third World. The military-democratic state, if thus we may term it, can be traced back to the associated rise of industrialised militarism and mass democracy in the late nineteenth century. World War I saw extensive popular mobilisation, followed after the war by extensions of democratic rights and strengthened l a b o r movements. World War II, with the victory of capitalist states basing themselves on democratic mobilisation over the fascist powers, made this the dome rant model. Parliamentary regimes were extended by the victorious Allies to the liberated and defeated states. Democracy was consolidated, but so was militarism as the major Western states locked themselves quickly into the East-West conflict. Just as 'democracy' became the West's banner in the Cold War, so the new external conflict helped to discipline democracy. Democracy was limited in practice both institutionally (in that the central components of the state were typically bureaucratic, secretive and manipulalive) and ideologically (in that the Cold War formed a new consensus narrowly

limiting the frame of legitimate politics). Social democracy provided perhaps the most adequate political form for the military-democratic state: certainly it advanced the positive case for reform, while accepting the very definite constraints of the warfare-welfare nexus. But British Atlanticist social democracy was only one political expression of the change in the state: liberal-democratic and even conservative reform were equally suc-

cessful elsewhere. The dual character of the state was a more fundamental characteristic, and survives even the partial success of the

attempts to undermine welfarism, by New Right leaders in Britain and the USA. Capitalist democracy, as Miliband calls it, may be fundamentally a means of containing popular pressure." However, it gives enough space for popular expression to make it difficult to dismiss it simply as 'phooey', or to posit that working class interests will be expressed politically largely outside the given democratic forms. The military-bureaucratic side of the state (strengthened internally, as marxist writers have emphasised, by powerful pressure for 'law and order') makes it difficult to anticipate the success of conven-

Marxism, the State and Politics

263

tonal social-democratic reformism in achieving social change. Equally, the entrenchment of real democratic rights, institutions and practices, however limited in crucial ways, makes it difficult to conceive of classical revolutionary politics winning mass support. Marxist writers have therefore looked for a 'third way', 'between reform and revolution', emphasising the mutual support of progress through the institutions and of mass, campaigning movements in the population. This strategy in effect utilities the two sides of existing democracy: the formal democracy of the electoral system , and the substance five democracy of organisation and expression in society at large. This sort of strategic approach is sometimes identified with Eurocommunism, which formally rejects both classical revolutionism and the social-democratic adaptation to capitalism. In reality, however,

the matter is more complex: the major Eurocommunist Parties often practise a rather mechanical attempt to harness social movements to their more limited goals within the parliamentary and electoral arenas. They function in ways not dissimilar to the social democratic parties. The difference of approach is more to be seen within than between the 'socialist' and 'communist' parties. The radical impetus, which for a few years led to attempts to create independent revolutionary movements, has now been channeled into attempts to transform the practice of the major left-wing parties, often at a local as much as a national level. Although in theory the 'third way', as much as classical reform or revolution, is a model of total socialist transformation - discussion takes place, for example, about the relationship between parliamentary and soviet-type institutions" in practice it expresses the difficulty of any socialist politics in the 1970s and 1980s. Just as the . -

inter-war slump Finally dampened down the class struggle of the years after 1918, SO the recessions of recent years overtook the radicalisa-

tion of the late l960s. The threat to economic security has, if anything, strengthened the conservatism of major sections of the working class in the advanced capitalist countries. Although the programme of the left is for dismantling the authoritarian state, disarming its nuclear apparatus, and democratising its social institutions, its practice is very much concerned with limiting the escalation of repression, rearmament and authoritarianism. Perry Anderson, who identifies with a fairly classical Marxist politics, has accused E.P. Thompson of holding out no greater hope for the coming decades than that of democratic control over the authoritarian state." The

264

Marxist Sociology Revisited

point, intended as critical, may however have identified the nature of the problem as it is widely perceived, given the formidable power of the state and the balance of social forces which favours it. CONCLUSION: MARXISM AND BRITISH POLITICS In this context, Marxism has largely ceased to represent an independent political viewpoint, linked to autonomous practice and organisation, and has become a theoretical resource for a wider democratic socialist left. Nowhere (except perhaps in North America) is this

truer than in Britain, where the independent revolutionary left has been wholly marginalised, the Communist Party has lost the small national role it once possessed, and the Marxist sects such as Militant are only a small part of a much wider new left in the Labour Party. British marxists, accustomed since Marx to thinking of Britain as a typical capitalist economy, have belatedly recognised that it is an increasingly archaic, declining variety of capitalism. While some have tried to account for this in simple economic terms, most have advanced social and institutional explanations for the British crisis.26 It is increasingly recognised that Britain presents a particularly acute, and possibly exceptional, form of the political contradictions of Western capitalist societies. Britain's early industrialisation created the conditions for imperial hegemony as well as economic supremacy. British imperialism distorted the domestic economy, helping Britain to fall behind the most aim

mi

_

M

in

dynamic capitalist economies from the late 19th century. Later, Britain's geopolitical role - no longer dominant, but as the support of emerging US hegemony .-- led to victory in two wars. This, too, had the paradoxical effect of. assisting economic decline: first, because there was no total economic and institutional modernisation comparable to that of Germany and Japan, and second because Britain retained an exaggerated political and military role which drained and distorted its economy. Britain's imperial history also produced peculiar political results: a late-developing and conservative labour movement, which nevertheless became a dominant political force after 1945, when it finally mobilised enough of the working class majority in the population. Britain's social democracy became deeply entrenched in the welfare state consensus it helped to achieve, accepting as we have already

seen the international commitments of the British state.

Marxism, the State and Politics

265

Because of Britain's wartime experience, Labour became a central part of the state establishment under the post-war settlement, initially the trade unions were incorporated into this. But Britain's economic decline brought the organised workers into conflict with the state, making economic and legal control of unions a central problem of both Labour and Tory governments. Marxists have analysed the attempts at corporatist solutions, culminating in 1979 in the mutual defeat of the Labour Party and the unions and the victory

of the new Conservatism, abandoning overt corporatism in favour of economic discipline and legal repression." In 1945 a peculiarly British form of social democracy, which Miliband has called Labourism, was a popular, hegemonic ideology . In 1979, the decay o f Labourism over three decades, and with it of the welfare consensus, led to the triumph of a new popular politics of the Right. For Marxists such as Stuart Hall, Thatcherism is a form of authoritarian populism, born of economic and social crisis and imposing repressive, inegalitarian and militarist solutions." lt has polarised politics to the right, :MH while unable to win a convincing majority of voters, has thrown Labour into sufficient disarray to enable it to produce an overwhelming electoral victory. While psephologists have stressed the changing socio-economic make-up of the electorate - the decline of male manual workers from three-quarters in 1945 to less than half today - this would seem an incomplete explanation. A similar trend, if not generally quite as sharp, has occurred throughout Western societies, without a corre-

sponding political change. It is more relevant that the Conservatives I

have exploited specific developments which have been concomitant with the social changes . - above all, the trend towards home owner-

ship which has been cleverly identified with private property in general - and that Labour and the unions remain over-identified with the male, manual sections which are a declining proportion of the working class. Thatcherism has also revived the strong patriotic undertow from the world wars and Britain's imperial past. In these ways it has achieved a political reaction which is quite exceptional in Western Europe. Thatcherism is distinguished by the nature of its appeal to a mass middle and working class base. It has accentuated certain aspects of the state at the expense of others: expenditure on the armed forces, police and social security has risen while that on housing, education and social services has declined. It intervenes economically to manipulate taxation, control wages through the public sector, and to

266

Marxist Sociology Revisited

subsidise or protect certain markets, while 'privatising' major stateowned industries. Its policies have benefitted sections of capital, as they have hurt workers (but not all equally - hence the Tory electoral success and Labour marginalisation). But Thatcher has shaped British capitalism, as well as serving it- She has taken certain features of the British economy and state, and sharpened them. It is by no means certain that she has given them permanent form, since there are powerful cross-currents and contradictions which she may find it impossible to ride in the longer term. . The contradictions arise, as our general discussion would indicate, both from the external and internal contexts of the British State. Externally, Britain is in the middle of powerful economic and geopolitical rifts between Western Europe and the United States, as well as between the Western peace movements and their governments, and of course between NATO and the Soviet Union, As these rifts widen, it may be more difficult for Britain to remain a Western European state, to be the closest ally of the US, and to pursue the illusion of quasi-imperial independence, all at the same time. There are powerful economic constraints on military expansion in any case." Internally, Tory policies show no serious signs of bringing economic growth overall, whatever the benefits to some sectors. Many policies, in the economic and social fields, will only stoke up very widewanging opposition, which in the longer term could lead to political reversal of much of Thatcherism. Even today, there are substantial political constraints on Tory policy. Whether the contradictions of Thatcherism can be exploited by the left depends on whether it can develop a popular alternative. A relevant conception of the state, which can be based neither on the social~democratic identification with a centralised state nor on a classical revolutionary commitment to its overthrow, is certainly necessary to this task. A socialist programme will certainly echo the Marxist aim of abolishing the militarist and repressive functions of the state, but in the shorter term it must aim at limiting and controlling them. It will also aim at transforming mechanisms of economic planning, social security and welfare into fully democratic, controllable social processes, compatible with the widest possible individual choice. A socialist alternative today must recognise that the state is not just a resection of the problem of capitalism, but a massive, complex and in some senses exceptionally dangerous problem in itself. A sensitive conception of a different form of state in the

here-and-now, imperfect as such a state may be by the simpler

Marxism, the State and Politics

267

standards of classical Marxism, may be a precondition for ever putting the idea of a non-coercive, stateless and classless society back on the agenda.

NOTES AND REFERENCES 1. See Ralph Miliband, 'Marx and the State', The Socialist Register 1965, pp. 278-96, and at greater length, Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, Cambridge University Press, 1968, and Hal Draper, Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution, London, Monthly Review Press. Some major points are also summarised in my article, 'The Theory of the State and Politics: a Central Paradox of Marxism',

Economy and Society, 3 4 Nov. 1974, pp. 429-50. Where detailed references are not given for Marx and Engels' ideas, the reader should refer to these sources. . 2. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, in Marx~ Engels Selected Works, vol. I, London, Lawrence & Wis fart, 1950, p. 35. 3. For views sometimes labelled 'instrumentalist' and 'structuralist', see Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Socfezy, London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1968; Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, London, New Left Books/Sheed and Ward, 1973; and the debate

between them in Robin Blackburn (ed.), Ideology in Social Science, London, Fontana, 1972. For 'state derivation' theories see John Holloway and Sol Picciotto (ed.), State and Capital: a Marxist Debate, London, Edward Arnold, 19784. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: a Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China, Cambridge University Press 1979, p. 27. Cited by Ralph Miliband, Class Power and State Power, London, Verso, 1983, p. 70. Midband, OP- cit., P~ 72. 5.6. For an interesting exploration of this problem see Ronald A-ronson, The Dialectics of Disaster, London, Verso, 1983.

7. Leon Trotsky, 'Not by Politics Alone', in Problems of Everyday Life, London, Pathfinder, 1973, p. 15. This paradox is explored in my article quoted above . 8. This point is made, it now seems to me correctly, by Ralph Miliband, 'Lenin's The State and Revolution', The Socialist Register I970, e.g. pp. 315-16 9. The state is 'a compulsory organisation with a territorial basis. . . . the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it'. Max Weber, The Theory of Economic and Soeiai Organization, Glencoe, Free Press, 1964, p. 156. 10. Otto Hinze, 'The Formation of States and Constitutional Development', in Felix Gilbert, (ed.), The Historical Essays on Ono Hirzrze,

New York, OUP, 1975, p. 160.

268

Marxist Sociology Revisited

11. See my 'Introduction: War and Social Theory' to Shaw (ed.), War, State and Society, London, Macmillan, 1984, pp. 1-19.

12. See my 'War, Imperialism and the State-system', in ibid., pp. 47-70 . 13. See, respectively, Holloway and Picciotto, op. cit., and Peter Binns and Mike Haynes, 'New Theories of Eastern European Class Societies', International Socialism 7, Winter 1980, pp. 18-50. 14. Nikolai Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy, London, Merlin, 1972. 15. These ideas are explained in my 'The theory of the state and politics',

op. cit. 16. Rosa Luxemburg, The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions, in Mary-Aljce Waters (ed.), Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, London, Pathfinder, 1970, pp. 153-219. 17. Skocpol, op. cit., p. 32. 18. Ibid., p. 37.

19. Antonio Gran sci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, London, Lawrence 8; Wis fart, 1971, and discussions in e.g. Anne Showstack Sassoon, Gram,sci's Polaitics, London, Croom - - - ~ - - - 5 1980, Perry Anderson, 'The Antinomies of Antonio Gran sci', New Left Review, 100, Winter 1976-77. 20. A text which helps to re»establish the context of Gramsci's work is

Christine Bus-Glucksmann, Gran sci and the State, London, Lawrence & Wis fart, 1980. 21. The record is outlined in GOran Therborn, 'The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy', New Left Review 103, May-June, 1977. 22. Ralph Midband, Capitalist Democracy in Britain, Oxford University

Press 1982. 23. Milihand, Marxism and Politics, Oxford University Press, 1977, Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism, London, Verso, 1978. 24. Geoff Hodgson, Socialism and Parliamentary Democracy, Nottingham

Spokesman, 1977. 25. Perry Anderson, Arguments Within English Marxism, London, Ver-

son, 1980, pp. 204--5. 26. For an example of an economic account, Andrew Glyn and Bob Sutcliffe, British Capitalism, Workers and the Profits Squeeze, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1972, for more complex cultural and institutional arguments see the early 'Origins of the Present Crisis' by Perry

Anderson, in Anderson and Robin Blackburn (eds), Towards Social ism, London, Fontana, 1965, and Tom Nairn, The Break-Up o)"Britain , London, New Left Books, 1977. 27. See Bob Jessop, 'The Transformation of the State in Post~war Britain', in Richard Scase (ed.), The State in Western Europe, London, Croom Helm, 1980, and for an international comparison, Leo Par itch, 'Trade Unions and the Capitalist State'. New Left Review, 125, Jan.-Feb., 1981. 28. Stuart Hall, 'The Great Moving Right Show', in Hall & Martin Jacques (eds), The Politics of Thatcherism, London, Lawrence & Wis fart,

1983. 29. Dan Smith, 'The Political Economy of British Defense Poli¢y', in Shaw

(ed.), War, Stare and Society, op. cit.

Index Abraham, K., 233 Abrams, P., 35 Adler, A., 214, 225-9, 232, 233,

234, 238, 241 Adler, M., 147 Adler, V-, 147

Adorne, T., 158, 233, 234~5 Africa, development in, 53, 61. Afro-Caribbeans, see West Indians 'aggregation and heterogeneity'

(urbanisation), 38-40

Ala vi, H., 65, 66, 67 alienation, 215 and religion and labour, 216~25 and psychology, 225-32 Althusser, L., 10, 144, 184 Althusserianism, 26, 31, 56 Amin, S., 52, 53, 57, 67, 76 Anderson, B., 136-7 Anderson, P., 6, 9, 10-12, 18, 263 anti~comlnunisin, 144 anti-semitisrn, 146, 147-58, 173-4 Aronson, R., 13 Asians, in Britain, 143, 160, 167,

Barratt, M., 238

Bauer, O., 6, 101, 113, 123, 12532, 133, 134, 136, 137, 147, 149-50, 171

Bedouins (Marx on), 110 Bebel, A., 150-1 black identity, 169-70 black movement, 16 Black Power, 164, 165 black self-determination, 162-4 black working class, 168-71 Blumenfeld, E., 187 Bolsheviks, and national question, 119-22, 123, 128 Break Up of Britain, The (Nairn),

_

100, 134 Brenner, R-,.@§§ Briffault, R., 234 British Em£ire., %1onialism, 159 ,

Mai.

British politics, 264-7 Brown, P., 241 Bukharin, N., 64, 255 bureaucracy, and socialism, 259-61

168,171

Atlanticism, 254, 262, see also

capital, and state, 254

Social Democracy 'authoritarian consensus' (Hall), 170 Authoritarian Personality, The

Capita! (Marx), 75, 82, 112, 218, 219, 224, 236 capitalism, advanced, 195

(Adorno et at.) 158, 192, 233, 235 authoritarianism, 215 autonomy, of state, etc., 5, 248-9

'

Bachofen, J. , 234

Banaji, J., 65 Bangledeshis, in Britain, see Asians

Capitalism and Slavery (Williams), 144, 161 capitalist class, see ruling class

Cardoso, H., 52, 57 Castells, M-, 21, 24-30, 31, 33-4, 36, 41 on urban ideology, 25-6 on collective consumption, 26-9 on urban social movements, 29-30

Barton,

Chicago School, 25-6, 36

Barnardo, Dr, 199

child rearing, 187-8, 196-204 269

270

Index

institutional forms, 197-201, 204 and civil society, 201-4 Chinese (Marx on), 110 Chinese Revolution (1925), 258 Chomsky, N., 221

Critical Theory, 235-9 Critique of Hegel Philosophy of Right (Marx), 227 culture, 10, 18, 132-, 231 national, see national culture

Christianity, see religion citizenship, 202-3

Cummings, I , 107

city, cities, 38, 39, 41, 42 civil liberties movement, 16 civil rights movement, 164 civil society, 201-4 Civilization and its Dzlsconrenzs (Freud), 236

Darwin, C., 219, 220 Davies, H., 123, 126 democracy, democracies (Western) , 261-3 dependency theory, 51-8

Warren's challenge, 58-63

class, sociology of, 13, 17-18, 73

Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, The (Darwin) ,

Cockburn, C., 27 Cohen, G., 51, 78 Cold War, 262 'collective consumption' (Castells), 26-9, 30 Colonial Immigrants in a British City (Rex and Tomlinson), 167

220 development, development sociology, 50-98

empirical research in, 69-70 Die Moder re Nationalitéit (Kautsky), 115

colonialism, 61, 171

Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, The (Gouldner), 1, 5, 7 Commission on Racial Equality, 166 Communism

Marx on, 225 Castells on, 27-8 Communist International, 8, see

also Third International

{

Die National tater Frame and die So zialdem o kratfe (Bauer), 126 'differentiation and specialisation' (urbanisation), 37-8 Dobb, M., 4, 65 domestic labour, 181, 184-8 Dubois, W.E.B., 160, 162, 164 Dunleavy, P., 334 Eastern Europe, 258

Communist Menu"esto, The (Marx and Engels), 182, 217

see also Soviet-type states ecology movement, 16

Communist movement, 9

Economic and Philosophical

Community Party

Britain, 265 France, 11, 29 Italy, 11 Spain, 11

M'anuscript3 (Marx), see Paris Maniiscripts

Edholm, Felicity, 189 Education of the Black Child in Britain, The (Stone), 165 electorate, British, 265

Elliott, B., 25, 35 community of fate' (Bauer) Connor, W., 136

Empire Strikes Back, The (Centre for Contemporary Cultural

Conservative Party, see Tories consumption, see 'collective ' consumption'

Endless Pressure (Pryce), 167

Corrigan, P., 219

Coward, R., 239

Studies), 171 Engels, F., 7, 21, 116, 148-9, 181, 214, 219, 224, 230, 236, 257

on the family, 182-4, 188

Index on labour and origins of man, 220-2

Giddens, A., . Glass, R., 25

on national question, 102-13 on state and politics, 247-51

Goldmann, L.,

271

e :in

Gorz, A., 23 Gouldner, A.,

ethnic minorities (Britain), see Asians, West Indians Eurocommunism, 16, 31, 263 Eysenck, H., 232

7

Green movement, 16

Chenada,167 Guettel, C., 241

Guyana, 167 family (and capitalism), 181-213

and civil society, 201 and working class, 204-6 in Marx and Engels, 182-4 in pre~capitalist societies, 183 nuclear, 203 sexual divisions within, 206 fascism, 239-41, 261 Fascism and the Working Class (O'neill), 173, 238 father, in family, 193-4 Fear of Freedom (Fromm), 158 feminism, feminists, 14 Marxist, 190, 238, 239, 241 Feuerbach, L., 217, 223 Fischer, C., 39 Frank, A.G., 52-4, 56, 57, 63, 645, 67, 74, 133 Frankfurt School, 6, 9, 158, 177,

180, 184, 214, 215, 232, 236, 237 on the family, 192-6, 205 on psychology, 233-5 Frazer, J., 234 freedom (Marx), 225 French Revolution, 103-5, 133, 256 Freud, S., 214, 215, 225, 226-8, 231, 234, 236, 238 Freudianism, see psychoanalysis Fromm, E., 158, 192, 193, 233-5 functionalism (in Marxism), 78-9,

186 Gamble, A., 219 Garvey, M., 161, 162 Gemeiraschaft and Gesellschaft (Tunnies), 128

Germs, N., 223 German Ideology, The (Marx and

Engels), 219, 223, 236

Hall, S., 170, 171, 265 Hammond, J. & B., 22, 23 Harloe, M., 25, 31 Harris'. M., 144 Hartmann, H., 191 Harvey, D., 21, 41 Hechter, M., 133 Hegel, G.W.F., 106, 108-9, 111, 216, 219 Hertzl, T., 162

1

Hill, F., 198-9 Hindess, B., 51, 75, 78 Hintze, O., 252 Hirst, P., Sl, 75 history, and sociology, 34 'historyless peoples' (Marx and Engels), 107-11 Hitler, A., 147, 152, 174 Hobbes, T., 215 Hoggart, R., 10, 24

Horkheimer, M., 192-3, 196, 235 humanism, 9-10 Humphries, J., 205

idealism, see materialism ideology, 218, 230, 261 sociology as, 2, 4 ndersoh,

B), 136 ............... .immigration (Britain), 159 ummm.:

imperialism, British, 264, see also British Empire Indians, in Britain, see Asians Industrial Revolution, 197 informal sector, 70 Import-Substitution Tndustrialiszation (Isl), 55-6

Inglis, F., 49

272

_

Index

Institut fair Sozialforschung, see

Frankfurt School Institute of Race Relations, 144 Ireland, 112, 115

-

Logic, (Hegel), 217 Lojkine, I., * a 524, 41

Lowy, M., 123-4

Lueger, K., 147 Lukacs, G . - » ,

m, 116-18,

Luxemburg, R.,l

Mensch, E.R., 240 Jamaica, 167

163, 261

128,

James, C.L.R., 160, 162-4 »

194

in Central Europe, 143, 146,

174 l _in 147-58, Vienna, 154-7

]oncs,E.,233

'

m/f, 190 McCrone, D., II Maclntyre, A., 237 MacLellan, D., 218 Malinowski, B., 234 Mandel, E., 11

Kant, I., 216

Manley, M., 1111

Kautsky, K., 112-6, 120, 128, 132, 135 Kelly, G., 232 King, Martin Luther, 164 Kolakowski, L., 126 Korsch, K., 4, 6, 8-9

Mann, S., 187 Marcuse, H., 1, 23, 42, 233, 237 market, in urbanism, 42-4

l a b o r , in origins of man, 220-1 Labour and Racism (Phizaclea and Miles), 1'72 Labour Party, and racism, 174 blacks in, 167 defeat (1983), 266 in post-war state, 265 left, 16

labour process, and family, 196-7,

um.z

Marx, K., 5, 7, 8, 21, 57, 64, 65, 66, 67, 75, 81, 114, 116, 181, 214, 215, 228, 229-31, 233, 236, 247, 256, 257, 264 on alienation and religion, 216-25 on the family, 182-4 on national question, 102-13 on state and politics, 247-51 Marxism, marxists Anglo-Saxon, 1

as sociology, 9-17

British, 264-7

Laclau, E., 63, 64-5, 70, 71, 81

classical, 10 core of, 7, 8, 9, 10, 50-1, 57 'crisis' of, 2, 7, 11

language, 221-2

failure of political economy, 15-

199-201 Labourism, ' 265

Lasalle, F., 110

16, 73-4

Lasch, C., 184

feminist critique of, 14

Latin America, development in, 52-8, 63, 65 Lab&& E . , 2 5 Lefebvre, H., 10, 21, 23, 24, 31, 34, 36, 42 Lenin, V.I., 57, 64, 76, 112, 11922, 124, 125, 127, 128, 132, 134, 135, 251, 253, 261 Leninism, 62, 126

functionalism in, 78-9, 186 historical explanations of, 8 influenced by sociology, 6 integrated theory, 5, 6 Latin, 11 multiplicty of, 7 of 'long bourn', 23 peace movement critique of, 14

Plain 1 scientific-izritical divide in, 7-8

Less Developed Countries (LDCs) , 73, 76

Stalinism and, I -, 12

Local Stare, The (Cockburn), 27

Western, 6, 9-11, 14-15, 18

in

Index For Marxism and nationalism, see nationalism, etc. Marxism and Social Science (Shaw) , 11

Mason, P., 144

__ - _

f

Luxemburg on, 116-18 Marx and Engels on, 102-13 Stalin on, 122-5 national self-determination, Lenin on, U ..-.... black, 162-4 nationalism, 99-142 -:so

_

_

-

*

'May Events' (France, 1968), 11, 24, 28, 34, 258

Meillassoux, C., 70

-

273

deHned,10l

pan-African, 162 NATO, 266 Nava, M., 188 Nazism, 9, 149, 158 New Right, 262, see also

Man Kampf (Hitler) Mexicans (Marx on) ,

Miles, R., 172 ... Miliband, R., 249-50, 262 rnilitarism, 14, 262-3, see also war,

Thatcherism

state

military expenditure, 254, 266 Mills, C.W., 1 Mitchell, J., 190 mode(s) of production, 15, 17-18, 75-7, 218, 239 colonial, 66-7 debate on in development sociology, 63-9 . Morawetz, D., 54

I rI 7 51 O'Nci11, N., 173 I Origin of the Family, Private

Molyneux, M., 185 Monod, J., 221-2

Pakistanis (in Britain), see Asians pan-Africanism, 162 Paris Commune (1871), 256, 257 Paris' Manuscripts of /844 (Marx),

Mori, K., 57 Mosley, O., 159 Mothers, The (Briffault), 234 Mouffe, C., 127 Multi~Cultural Education, 165-6,

169, 174

Property and the State, The

(Engels), 182-3, 188

Origin of the Species, The (Darwin), 219, 221

Pahl, R., 25, 27, 31, 34

217, 218, 219, 233 parliamentary democracy, see

democracy Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man,

Nairn, T., 100, 134, 135 nation, defined, 101, 118

The (Engels), 220-1 patriarchy, 188-91

'modern' (Marx and Engels), 102-3, 106 'non-historical' (Marx and Engels), 107-11 nation-state, 257, see also state 'national character' (Bauer), 128-9 national culture, 125, 127, 132-3,

135 national minorities (Engels on), 111 national question, national phenomena, defined, 101 Bauer on, ii M

Bolsheviks on, 118-*22

Kautsky on, 113-16

Patterns o)"Dominance (Mason), 145 Patterns

of Race

in the Americas

(Harris), 145 peace movement, 14, 16 peasants, research on, 69-72 Phenomenology (Hegel), 217

Phizaclea, A., 172 Pickvance, C., 25, 31 Policing the Crisis (Hall et aL), 170 political economy, failure of, 15-16, 73-4, 79-80 politics, political theory, 246-7,

250-1

274

Index

British, 264-7

Poor Law, 197-9 , 197, 201 Report of Commissioners, 198

Portuguese Revolution (1974-5), 258 -

Rodney, W., 53, 167 Rosdolsky, R., 105, 111 Rostov, W., 133 ruling class, 248-50

Russian Revolutions (1905, 1917), 256, 257

Poulantzas, N., 135-6, 137, 144

production, relations of, 229 mode of, see mode(s) of production productive forces, development of, 13 proletariat, 217, see also working class Preface to T/'ze Critique 0/ Political Economy (Marx), 214, 229 Pryce, K., 165 psychoanalysis, 192, 214, 227, 231 Pulzer, P., 148, 152-4

Saunders,P.,31-3,34,36 Sayer, A., 32 Sayer, I) 219

Scandinavians (Marx on), 109 Seabrook, J., 24 Second International, 101, 113,

117, 127, 132, 157, see also Social Democracy

Senior, Mrs, 198-9

Seve, L., 241 Sex and Repression in Savage Society (Malinowski), 234

sezdsrn, 239 Race and Class, 162

race relations, sociology of, 143-5,

158--60 in Britain, 158-60 in USA, 160 Race Relations (Barton), 145 racism, in Britain, 146, 158-73 recession, effect of, 4, 15 'redistribution with growth', 73 reformism, 11, 263

Reich, W., 192, 233, 237 religion (Marx on), 216-25 reproduction, 188-91 revolution, concepts of, 250-1

revolutions, 257-9, see also

Chinese, French, Portuguese, Russian Revolutionary Jews from Marx to

Trotsky (Wistrich), 150 revolutionary left, politics, 7, 11, 13, 263, 264, 266 Rex, J., 27, 31, 34, 167-70 Rey, L., 70 Right of Nations to SelfDetermination, The (Lenin), 120-2 Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in

sexuality, 228, 233-4, 240-1 SkocpoL'T.,257 Smith, A.D., 134 'social character' (Fromm), 234 Social Democracy, 8-9, 214, 266, see also Second International

Atlanticist, 254, 262 Austrian, 127, 150, 157, 174 British, 265, see also Labour Party

Labourist, 265 'social patriots' (Luxemburg), 117 socialisation, see childrearing socialism, and bureaucracy, 259-61

Socialism, and the Jews (Wistrich), 147, 150 sociologists, Marxist, 2 sociology as ideology, 2, 4 as intellectual field, 4 British, 1, 9-10

classical, 10 'crisis' of, 1 divorce from economics, 5 European, relationship to Western Marxism, 9-10

Germany and Austria, The

in Bauer, 131 influence on Marxism, 6

(Pultzer), 152

Marist critique of, 3-7, 16-17

275

Index For sociology of family, see under family, ere. Soviet-type states, 259-61 Soviet Union, 25961, 266 soviets, 263 space, in urban sociology, 31-4 Spaniards (Marx on), 109 Stalin, J.V., 112, 122-5, 128, 134, 259 Stalinism, 9, 12, 14, 27, 258 state(s) , and capital, 254 as nation-state, 257 autonomy, 2 4 9 British, 265-6 bureaucracies, 255-6 classical Marrcists on, 247-51 expenditure, 253--4 in national economies, 253-6 'integral' (Gran sci), 261 management, 255

'military-democratic', overthrow, 255-6

262

Third World, see development Thompson, E.P. , 263 Tomlinson, S., 167 Ton ties, F., 24, 128, 131 Tories, 266 Trotsky, L., 10, 11, 162-3, 259-60, 261

Trotskyism, 11, 162-3 underdevelopment, see

development unequal exchange, 71 United States, 265-6 black marxists in, 162-4 race relations in, 166

urban agglomeration, 41-2 'Urban Change and Conflict' (Open University), 33 'urban ideology' (Castells), 25-6 urban land, 40-1 urban question, 30, 36 Urban Question, The (Castells), 26,

27

ownership, 254

urban research, 28, 39

power (Castells), 28

socialist policy towards, 266 system, 252 territorial basis, 252 withering away, 255-6 see also politics, political theory »

war State and Revolution, The (Lenin), 251 'state-language-nation' (Marx and Engels), 102-6

Stone, M,, 165

'urban revolution' (Lefebvre), 24 'urban social movements' (Castells), 29-30 urban sociology,

Marzdst, 22, 35 non-spatial, 30-3 urbanisation, 21-2, 36--42

Vienna, Jews in workforce of, 154-7

Von Schoenerer, G., 147

student movement, 13

Sweezy, P., 65 Swingewood, A. , 4 Taiwan, 60 teleology, 219, 222 Thatcher, M., 266 Thatcherism, 265-6 Therborn, G., 256 Theses on Feuerbach (Marx), 222-3 Third International, 101, 113, 127,

Wagner, R., 146 Wallerstein, I., 51 Walton, P., 219 war(s), 252, 255, 257-8, see also militarism, state, World Wars

I, II Warren, B., 51, 53, 58-63, 64, 67, 68, 69, 74, 75-6, 77, 80-2 Washington, B., 162 Way, L., 228

132, see also Communist

Weber, M-, 5, 6, 151, 231, 252

International

Weisskopf, T., 54

276

Index

West Indians, Afro~Caribbean communities, in Britain, 143, 160, 161, 164, 166-7, 168, 171 West Indies, 6, 9-11, 14-15, 18, 163-5, 167 Williams, E., 144,l161 Williams, R., 10, 21, 23, 234, 35, M Wirth, L., 36 Wistrich, R., 147, 150 Wolpe, H., 69 women, subordination of, 183

women's movement, 16, 181 working class and civil society, 202 and family, 204-6 and racism, 172-3 as revolutionary force, 13, 15 black, 168-71 Jewish, 154-7

World War I, 262 World War II, 262

Zionism, 162