Marxism in the Philippines: Second Series

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MARXISM

Sm.ond Series ।hi.I World Studies Center I

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I'hiliiilMlWI

Notes on Authors

Armando Malay Jr. is with the Asian Center, University of the Philippines.' He undertook an extensive study of the formation of the Com­ munist Party of the Philippines-ML which he submitted to the Universite de Paris-Sorbonne.

Mario Bolasco

is Associate Professor of Philosophy at St. Scholastica’s Col­ lege. He has co-authored a book on church-state relations in the Philippines and has published several scholarly papers on radical Christian praxis in the Philippine context.

Patricio N. Abinales is Deputy Director for Administration of the Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines. He has published a number of studies on the Philippine military and the Filipino Left.

Alexander R. Magno

is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of the Philippines and Deputy Director for Publications of the Third World Studies Center. He has published several papers on the political economy of the Philippines and participated in the social mode debate within the Filipino Left.

Copyright O 1988 by Third World Studies Center, Room 428, Palma Hall, University of the Philippines. All rights reserved. Any part of this publication may be reproduced provided however, that these are properly credited. ISBN 971 -91111-1'9

Bede’s Publishing House, Inc. 136 Malakas St. Diliman, Quezon City

Contents

Foreword......................... , .. ............................ Randolf S. David

vii

The Dialectics of Kaluwagan: Echoes of a 1978 Debate..................................... 1 Armando Malay Jr.

Rapporteur’s Report: Open Forum on the Malay Lecture....................................... 22 The Left and Other Forces: The Nature and Dynamics of Pre -1986 Coalition Politics................ 26 P.N. Abinales

Rapporteur’s Report: Open Forum on the Abinales Lecture................................... 50 Harmony and Contradiction: The Marxist - Christian Dialogue Since the Christians for National Liberation ........................................................ 56 Mario Bolasco Rapporteur’s Report: Open Forum on the Bolasco Lecture..................................... 71

The Filipino Left at the Crossroads: Current Debates on Strategy and Revolution .... 76 Alexander R. Magno

Rapporteur’s Report: Open Forum on the Magno Lecture ..................................... 96

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MARXISM

Philippines

Edited by Third World Studies Center Cover design by Cricku

[^ Third World Studies Center University of the Philippines

dered because of an ingrained dogmatism are assessed from the vantage point of an alternative praxis, whose terms are only now beginning to be made explicit. As in the first volume, Marxism in the Philippines, we have transcribed the open forum which followed every lecture. The interventions from the floor reveal the partici­ pation of a fairly broad range of activists from the Philip­ pine Left. The attendance at these lectures was extra­ ordinary, and served to dramatize the urgent need to consolidate the lessons that recent events in the country are teaching progressive people everywhere, and to re­ invent politics accordingly. This small book is just one more attempt to contri­ bute to that goal.

Randolf S. David April 1988

fiii

The Dialectics of Kaluwagan: Echoes of a 1978 Debate Armando Malay Jr.

The revival by the government last May 5, 1987 of Republic Act 1700 (the “Anti-Subversion Act” out­ lawing the Communist Party and penalizing membership therein) elicited a variety of reactions ranging from the approbatory to the indignant, depending on the ideological persuasions of the sources. The Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, which considers itself a legal party, has called for the immediate repeal of this “patently undemocratic and unconstitutional” legislation.1 But what about the other Party, the illegal one whose armed insurgency is obviously the main object of the revival of the 30-year old Act? The CPP’s official silence heretofore on the matter might be taken as confirmation of its long-standing atti­ tude of disdain for the legal status which is “enjoyed” by its counterparts in liberal democratic societies whose respective States “grant” it. But one might venture further and hypothesize that for the Party, RA 1700 and the whole anti-communist

1

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Marxism in the Philippines II

spirit of the ruling classes, by demonstrating the repres­ sive nature of the State, serve precisely to justify the Party’s decision to carry out its revolutionary project outside of the pale of the laws of the State. Hence the futility, in the eyes of the CPP, of arguing about a question which partakes of a “chicken or egg” nature (viz., is radical action necessary because the presently constituted State is inherently reactionary and incapable of reforming itself, or is the State simply availing of the prerogative of self-preservation by proscribing a radical organization sworn to destroy that State?) In any event, the debate has been conveniently settled by the Aquino government for the benefit of the CPP. With RA 1700’s revival, commu­ nism as ideology and more, as praxis, is officially declared subversive. Which, in the opinion of the CPP (I extra­ polate), is as should be. It would be foolhardy to rule out the possibility of initiatives from below taken in view of submitting this a priori judgment to a critique. Such interrogations have indeed cropped up, especially in the light of the February 1986 events and their protracted aftermath. Proponents of a reassessment stop short, however, of an overt call for legalization, as if in cognizance of the limitations inherent in this option. Clearly, the chances of the CPP’s voluntary acceptance of legal status seem foreclosed by currently obtaining objective conditions and by the Party’s historical preference for illegality and all the concomitant courses of action made imperative thereby.

II To resume the Party’s brief for extra-legal (literally, “outlaw”) status, a number of points are worth under­ scoring. Firstly, the CPP’s literal reading of the MarxistLeninist idea as applicable to the Philippine situation led it to take an impatient view of reformism. From its very inception, the party assumed, wholly and without reserve, the subversive import of Marxism-Leninism, its capacity for disrupting the status quo and overthrowing the State. The acceptance of subversiveness as dialectically-imposed condition implied, in turn, the obligation to regard in a

The Dialectics of Kaluwagan

3

positive light constraints and restrictions on open political activity: “freedom is the recognition of necessity” became a tacitly internalized axiom for the duration of the Marcos regime, and above all during martial law. Patient and clan­ destine insurrectionary work, carried out in a tight socio­ political space which, by mid-1971 - the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus - was becoming more and more of a reality, appeared as an obvious attribute of the revolu­ tionary project, as the price to pay for the ultimate victory of the revolution. As the party expected, Marcos, not satisfied with halfway measures, proceeded towards a maximum possible compression of this space by declaring martial law and institutionalizing dictatorship. Secondly, the CPP’s major choices were invariably taken with the PKP’s “negative example” in mind. The latter’s espousal of the legal struggle as the main form during the early 1970s led it to denounce as leftist adven­ turism the voluntarist strategy and tactics of the new party, and to warn it against “provoking” Marcos into resorting to martial rule. Behind these expressions of anxiety lay the PKP’s genuine fear of having to undergo persecution once again, just when it was more or less suc­ ceeding in its reinsertion into legal status under a regime that had gone a relatively long way in making communism less forbidding, in any case more psychologically accessible (for example, by allowing several Filipino opinion makers to cross the “iron” and “bamboo curtains” and to report, without censorship, that Marxist-Leninist societies were free from hunger, disease, discontent, etc.). The Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism in fact was embol­ dened by the recommendations of the Enverga Mission (1967) to propose, in its 1969 programme, the teaching of “scientific socialism” at all levels of the country’s educa­ tional systems? Making the most out of the relative thaw of the late 1960s, the PKP could envisage a way out, through peaceful struggle, of the isolation it had been forced into more than a decade earlier. Pending a theore­ tical “revolutionary situation” that would necessitate thd revalorisation of armed struggle, the PKP found adequate satisfaction in its freedom to propagate its reassuringly non-subversive message.

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Marxism in the Philippines II

Before the imposition of martial law, the CPP also resorted to legal struggle through abundant use of the bourgeois media and other venues. But it made no secret of its preference for the more “productive”, and more exciting, arena of guerrilla warfare in the countryside and its urban counterpart which consisted, then, mainly of underground organizational, education, and propaganda work in the cities. Before the coup, the State itself had contributed to confer a romantically dangerous character even in legal militancy: had the Kabataang Makabayan not been outlawed, at the conclusion of the Nilo Tayag case in September 1970, as a subversive organization? This verdict certainly played into the hands of the Left: having been declared illegal, the KM could proceed to function in a quasi-conspiratorial manner, unobliged more than ever to abide by the ethics of bourgeois society. Thanks to a regional trial judge’s decision, the risks inherent in the act of joining, or maintaining membership in the KM could henceforth be compensated by the satisfaction of an ideo­ logical and political commitment lived to the maximum. Repression not only bred resistance; in the heady premartial law period, it enhanced the challenge of revolu­ tionary idealism and nourished the revolutionary myth. To be revolutionary was to invite reprisal, ftom this point of view; and to be tolerated by the State constituted proof of harmlessness, if not of collaborationism (of Omnibus Reply, P- 40: “While the Lava revisionist renegades openly confirm their supposed involvement in the underground, they are not subjected to violent repression by the State”).’

Ill

It is in the context of the construction of the revolu­ tionary myth that Amado Guerrero’s book review in 1971, of William Pomeroy’s novel, The Forest (1963), takes on its fullest significance. Based on the author’s brief experience in the Huks’ armed struggle, The Forest was written, or in any case was published at a crucial moment in the PKP’s trajectory: viz., the intensified drive it was making to project peaceful

The Dialectics of Kaluwagan

5

struggle as a legitimate Marxist-Leninist option in the Philippines. The import, at that particular juncture, of Pomeroy’s novel was not lost on Amado Guerrero eight years later: the maverick founder of the CPP had in the interval succeeded in matching rhetoric with action by helping to found the New People’s Army. In his polemical book review entitled “Pomeroy’s Forest Nightmare", Amado Guerrero singled out a number of introspective passages that do not so much depict the physical, tangible setting of the armed struggle as they reveal the narrator’s psychological - nay ideological -­ frame of mind. This frame of mind, which had originally apprehended the forest as a protective “fortress” during the high tide of the armed struggle, later came to see it in the period of flux (roughly dating from the arrest of the “Polit-buro-In” in Manila) as a “breached wall through which the government troops pour at their will”. During the dark days of the defensive, Pomeroy would articulate his melancholy reflections in such passages as the follow­ ing: Here in the primeval forest, I have never felt so over­ whelmingly that human insignificance. Life means nothing in this geological immensity.

“Immensity” or confining prison? In any case, a certain penchant for defeatism spoke for itself in the novel. Where the combatant-critic Amado Guerrero was concerned, the passage in question was significant of a pernicious ideological prejudice: Pomeroy, he charged, therein identified the main contradiction in Philippine society as being a simple one between man (represented by the narrator) and nature (the forest).4 Pomeroy’s description of the rain as “the enemy that follows us for­ ever, striking upon all the trails and besieging every hut” elicited the sarcasm of Guerrero: “Here is a sham revolu­ tionary who hates and does not appreciate tropical forest and rain as advantageous conditions for fighting the real enemy.”5 When the claustrophobic narrator yearns for “the open world where there are horizons”, the obvious antithesis is again the forest, described as

6

Marxism in the Philippines II a strange place for freedom to live. Where one would turn there is the wall of trees. It is a wall to all sides and a wall above, shutting out the sky.

“Bourgeois pessimism”, an accusation often levelled by the Chinese press during the Cultural Revolution against contemporary Soviet writers, constituted A.G.’s main criticism of the The Forest: in effect, according to the latter, Pomeroy’s “vile purpose” in writing it was to frighten people away from armed revolution and to convince them that it is hopeless. He employs the cheap method of posing himself as a tragic hero against the forest and makes the forest loom larger as his enemy than U.S. imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capital­ ism.6

At this point, it is useful to recall that for the NPA, jungles and heavily forested terrain theoretically represent the vast strategic space where an outnumbered and illequipped guerrilla army has the best chances of turning the tables on the enemy; and that, in general, the wide expanse of countryside promises quasi-unlimited latitude of military maneuver; whereas, the urban areas overwhelming­ ly favor the enemy forces where mobility and communica­ tions facilities are concerned. IV The basic premises of Amado Guerrero’s polemic against The Forest took on added pertinence with the imposition of martial law. Under the state of emergency, leftwing militants afflicted with political claustrophobia could very well fear the worst; for those who, like the CPP’s shock troops, had nothing to lose and possibly everything to gain from a compression of indefinite duration of the margin of maneuver that was guaranteed by pre-coup political pro­ cesses, the state of emergency presented an excellent opportunity for testing the validity of insurrectionary strategy and tactics. In the sudden absence of Western­ type “checks and balances”, in the constricted combus­ tion chamber of undisguised dictatorship, would the spark of revolution ignite more efficiently? In any case, practi-

The Dialectics of Kaluwagan

7

cally without lifting a finger, the CPP after September 21, 1972 found itself the only political force of any national and ideological significance having the capacity and the willingness to resist the dictatorship for a protracted period. As the Central Committee triumphantly put it, In the new situation, there are three things that stand out. First, the CPP is the most prepared to lead the revolutionary struggle that calls for the armed overthrow of the fascist government. Second, the party has the strongest and most experienced revolutionary army, the New People’s Army. Third, the ranks of the revolutionary movement have greatly expanded and fighting cadres as well as allies are all over the archipelago determined to conduct people’s war. These things would not have stood out as clearly as now were it not for the fascist viciousness of the US-Marcos dictatorship.7

The last element for the waging of a protracted people’s war had fallen in place; the mask of liberal democracy had fallen at last. The Marcos regime itself had given the revo­ lution the final shove beyond the point of no return. (The Plaza Miranda incident of August 21,1971 had apparently not sufficed in this regard.) The party thus declared that: conditions for revolutionary armed struggle in the countryside have been tremendously enhanced by the emergence of the US-Marcos dictatorship. Whereas before Proclamation 1081, only certain limited areas of the country were battlefields, these can now be boldly expanded throughout the archipelago.8

Swiftly carried out by an army unwilling or unable to resist the drift towards dictatorship, the coup insured the elimination, for an indefinite duration, of the anti-Marcos politicians, media personalities, intellectuals and civil libertarians from the political scene. The whole spectrum of the legal opposition was immobilized. But the corres­ ponding “loss” to the radical Left was minimal, for the latter had shrewdly taken its precautions and developed a sophisticated underground network which, in the after­ math of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in 1971, had already proved its impermeability to enemy offensives.’ And in 1978, the CPP’s founders claim that

8

Marxism in the Philippines II The longer (the Marcos dictatorship) continues in power, the more fertile the ground becomes for our people's war. By negative example, Marcos has stood as the best teacher of the people on State and revolution. In this sense, he is our best propagandist.'0

If going “underground” was an option that could be postponed indefinitely or rejected outright by most mili­ tants before the coup, it became imperative for all but a few in the period following the imposition of martial law. “Going underground" after the coup meant fuller integra­ tion into the revolutionary myth; “proletarian values” of discipline, sacrifice, abnegation, simple living, etc., flourished more easily in such an atmosphere where com­ mitment to a belief meant an hourly and daily possibility of capture, torture, rape, violent death. To be part of the revolution was to become “relevant", to transcend one’s bourgeois or petty-bourgeois prejudices, to defy the greatest superpower on earth, to participate in the making of history. In retrospect, it appears obvious that these manifestations of heroic commitment would have been impossible to replicate outside the compression chamber that was martial law. V The dictator was not unaware that by harping on the theme of “it’s either Marcos or the communists", he could count on the sympathetic ear of Washington; and as I have suggested, even the Party was not necessarily prejudiced by this de facto polarization which perpetrated its mono­ poly of a nationwide resistance movement. (I exclude from this discussion the MNLF, which carried out its national liberation struggle outside of the framework of the “NorthFilipino nation’’.) The big loser in this balance of forces was the unorganized group, remaining in the Philippines, of ex-politicians; civic and religious leaders who had played such an important role in the pre-martial law civil society as opinion makers, guardians of public morality, foci of the opposition, in short, as vehicles of the bourgeois liberal “heritage" which Marcos had unilaterally and remorseless­ ly set out to destroy.

The Dialectics of Kaluwagan

9

Disenfranchised and disempowered by the coup, this group chafed under the restraints of the state of emer­ gency and with all the more reason as the communists, thanks to the dictatorship, were steadily gaining ground even among sectors which, like the Church and certain ethnic minorities, had hitherto been insulated from the message of Marxism-Leninism. In effect, this group’s anti­ Marcos position, one they roughly corresponded to the Christian social democratic ideology, was also conditioned by its anti-communist reflexes (however, I am not suggest­ ing that individual members of this group were all rabid anti-communists then, or even today, when their “middle way” was in power). In 1975, three years after the coup, this embryonic “third force” finally articulated its anti-Marcos, anti­ communist stance with the pamphlet, A Message of Hope to Filipinos Who Care.11 The concept of a “third alterna­ tive” was further explored in 1977 by the ad hoc move­ ment set up to boycott the referendum of that year, the Katipunan ng Bayan para sa Kalayaan (KABAKA), most of whose members were signatories of the 1975 “message”.11 However, it was only in 1978, when the dictatorship made a show of “normalizing” political pro­ cesses by organizing elections for the Interim Batasang Pambansa -- the first such exercise under martial law - that the “third alternative” had the opportunity to be trans­ lated into a concrete project. This is to suggest that the third alternative freedom of maneuver was contingent only on such latitude as Marcos would allow. Even then, the anti-communist aspect of the third alternative had to take a backseat in favor of the anti­ Marcos effort during the 1978 electoral campaign. LABAN, the opposition party that chose to take up the dictatorship’s challenge by contesting the Imelda Marcos led KBL ticket in Metro Manila, even projected the unitedfront idea with the Left as far as taking in four non-traditional politicians, left-leaning personalities in its team (led by B. Aquino Jr. Including T. Guingona, R. Mitra, A. Pimentel, E. Maceda, etc.) As expected, the KBLgovernment tandem did not fail to make anti-communist propaganda out of the presence of Barican, Boncayao,

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Marxism in the Philippines II

Herrera and Planas in the LABAN slate. Just as expected, the KBL won by the proverbial landslide in Metro Manila.

VI The opposition’s defeat was also a defeat for the Party’s Manila-Rizal regional committee which had defied the Komite Sentral's directive by supporting LABAN and participating (behind the scenes) in the elections. The predictable outcome of the IBP elections conferred on the KS a sort of moral - not to mention political -- ascendancy over the maverick KT-MR. However, democratic central­ ism was not invoked to impose silence on the KT-MR, which was given the opportunity to counter the KS arguments. The result was a lively debate, adding up to some 360 pages in all, more than Philippine Society and Revolution. The real origins of the contention date back to 1975 (the same year that saw the publication of A Message of Hope), when the KT-MR began arguing that the Party’s long-standing prejudice against legal struggle should be reexamined and eventually put to the test. Manila-Rizal’s contention was based on its dim reading of the situation in the capital region, where the general level of political consciousness of the population was low and the “masses” unprepared for radical action, after three years of the state of emergency. The most appropriate tactical slogans likely to motivate the urban population in these conditions, according to the KT-MR, were “lift martial law” and “demand national, democratic and anti-fascist elections”. These would surely be “de­ fended to the death” by the masses, especially working class masses, in the KT-MR’s optimistic argument. Specifically where the projected elections were concerned, the KT-MR admitted that “it is true that the anti-fascist centrist forces, the bourgeois liberals, the minor anti­ Marcos reactionaries (‘maliliit na anti-Marcos na reaksyonaryo') and the progressive elements of the Church were more interested” by this prospect than were the workers and poor masses.13 Yet this did not inhibit the KT-MR from propound­ ing the (for the CPP) heretical view that these elections

The Dialectics of Kaluwagan

11

represented “the last legal alternative at the disposal of the majority of the masses in the region to change the regime, . . . the last alternative for a ‘peaceful revolution’, before the majority of the masses understand and support the only true alternative,. ,. the armed revolution for national democracy”?4 Carried away by its enthusiasm, the KT-MR even evoked two possibilities: 1) that of defeating the Marcos dictatorship through elections, and 2) that of having the Party represented in a bourgeois parliament that would then be set-up, wherein the CPP’s representa­ tives would more easily “unmask the rotten nature of the reactionary regime and explain the uselessness of parlia­ mentarism?’1 1

Later in the year, these heresies earned for the KT-MR the KS’ observation that “there have been instances of Right Opportunism in a certain region”, and the explicit warning that Manila-Rizal “should not be flattered and should not remain complacent about being the biggest single Party organization”? 6 But the show­ down would come only after the debacle of 1978, in the harsh light of reality. Contrary to the KT-MR’s expectation it was the bour­ geois opposition, not the “masses”, which took to the streets of the capital to denounce the barefaced frauds perpetrated by the Marcosian machine. But even in a best-case scenario where the LABAN ticket would have won a clearcut victory in Metro Manila, could the Marcos dictatorship have been dealt a crippling blow? Could the ascendancy in the capital region of the “third alterna­ tive”, thereby promoted into a real “third force”, have served the national democratic revolution at a stage where the armed struggle was inching closer and closer towards the so-called “advanced substage of the strategic defensive” (which the Party claimed to have been uppermost in the minds of the KS members before and during the 1978 elections)?17 Where the hypothetical question of demo­ cratic space was concerned, the KS took a very candid position which could not fail to recall A. Guerrero’s critique of The Forest and his description of Marcos as the Party’s best propagandist? 8

12

Marxism in the Philippines /I (D)ahil sa ibayong pagsasamantala at pang-aapi ng mga naghaharing uri sa malawak na masa ng sambayanan, napakainam ang mga kondisyon sa pagsulong ng pam bansang demokratikong rebolusyon. Iba naman ang pagtingin ng kalihim at iba pang kagawad ng KTMR, Naghahanap sila ng kaluwagan at inaasam asam nilang mabalik tayox^a kalagayan bago magbatas militar, nang may relatibong kaluwagan sa paglulunsad ng mga martsa at iba pang aksyong masa, sa pamamahagi ng ating mga polyeto’t iba pang babasahin, sa paggamit sa mga barges na pabatirang madia upang maipalaganap ang pambansang demokratikong propaganda.

Hindi nila matanggap ang realidad. Naiinip sila sa paghihigpit at panggigipit sa Halim ng betas militar kung kaya pinapangarap nila ang isang "liberal'’ na pamahalaan ng mga reaksyonaryong anti-Marcos. [(B)ecause of the heightened exploitation and oppres­ sion exercised by the ruling classes on the broad masses of people, conditions for the advance of the national democratic revolution are excellent.

A different point of view is upheld by the secretary and other officers of the KT-MR. They are seeking libe­ rality and are yearning for our return to pre-martial law conditions, when there was relative liberality to carry out marches and other mass actions, to hand out leaflets and other reading matter, to make use of the bourgeois mass media for the dissemination of national democratic propaganda.

They can’t accept the reality they are chafing under the constraints of martial law, thef hence they dream of a “liberal" regime under the anti-Marcos reactionaries.]

It is difficult to establish beyond the shadow of a doubt whether this prejudice against pre-martial law politics, and by extension against kaluwagan, shaped the CPP’s official decision to boycott both the 1984 and 1986 elections. What is clear is that in 1978, the KS’ intransi­ gence drastically stood in contradiction with previously enunciated positions: 1. After the Plaza Miranda bombing incident of August 21,1971, the KS had declared that the Party would “always be interested in any serious rupture among the reactionary classes and would always take advantage of

The Dialectics of Kaluwagan

13

them to widen the united front and isolate the diehard reactionaries”.1 9 2. On September 15, 1977, the KS had termed the forthcoming IBP elections “an occasion to condemn, before the masses, the fascist dictatorial regime . . . and to take advantage of contradictions between the reactionaries and even among certain Marcos lieutenants.”20 Over and above the Manila-Rizal vs. KS polemic, hovered the strategic question of the urban-based struggle. The Manila-Rizal partisans of participation in the IBP elections were aware of the Party’s prejudice against this “secondary form”, which still bore the “stigma” attached to it by the PKP’s gradualist politics. The KS’ post-election critique of the KT-MR’s argument in favor of participation - dating back to 1975, as we know - accorded a certain prominence to this question: 1) The KT-MR was accused of mistaking the revo­ lutionary “ebb” specific then to Manila-Rizal as being symptomatic of the general situation in the rest of the archipelago in 1975. The KS informed the KT-MR that on the contrary, between ’72 and ’74 there had been an un­ ceasing rate of growth of guerrilla zones and of firepower outside of Manila-Rizal.21 As for the capital region, there had admittedly been an “ebb” during the first two months of the state of emergency. But in November 1972, the urban underground network had began to recover. By way of concluding its discussion of this point, the KS declared that The KT-MR is mistaken if it bases its prognosis of the progress or the retrogression of the Philippine revolu­ tion on urban phenomena alone. The first criterion is not the movement of the revolutionary struggle in the cities but rather in that of the countryside.

The KT-MR is even more seriously mistaken if its only criterion ... is the launching or non-launching of big mass actions.22

The KT-MR was also reproached for having allowed its organizational capacity to be weakened by the electoral campaign: it could not even mobilize the “masses” for the demonstrations of May 1st, Independence Day, and the

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Marxism in the Philippines II

September 21 anniversary of the imposition of martial law?3 i 2) The KT-MR was charged with the error of under­ estimating the armed struggle and the supreme objective of the revolution, viz. that of “leading the people toward the conquest of political power”. By its participation in the electoral struggle, the urban committee would have helped in the eventual accession into power of “reaction­ ary pro-imperialists”; and once these were entrenched in power, the KS wanted to know: “How are we going to convince the people to overthrow them on the grounds that they are essentially no different from Marcos?”1 * Indeed, the KS had difficulty comprehending LABAN’s anti­ Marcos posture: “it can never be a question of expecting them to become solid and loyal collaborators in the anti­ fascist revolutionary movement.”15 And in any case, to promote the elections because of a perceived popular desire of the electorate to “vote for anybody except Marcos”, as the KT-MR seemed to be saying, was tanta­ mount to reformism in the KS’ opinion? 6 In a sarcastic tirade reminiscent of an earlier CPP critique against the PKP?7 the KS accused the rebellious committee of more or less consciously acting out a “Russian” scenario, to wit: Marcos is the tsar. The anti-Marcos reactionaries are the bourgeois Russian Socialist Revolutionaries and Men­ sheviks. Marcos' fall is the equivalent of the tsar’s fall. Enter now the anti-Marcos reactionaries who function as Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. Then, the KTMR (like Lenin and other Bolsheviks) will call for the overthrow of the regime of anti-Marcos reactionaries (like the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks) be­ cause it is unresponsive to the demands and desires of the people. And throw out the reactionary regime (like in the October Revolution). Victory!18

Both sides of this polemic made liberal use of Leninist references to legitimize their respective positions. Crucial to the KT-MR’s justification for participation was the following passage, from "Leftwing Communism, an Infantile Disorder: The more powerful enemy can be vanquished only by exerting the utmost effort, and without fail, most tho­ roughly, carefully, attentively, and skilfully using every,

The Dialectics of Kaluwagan

15

even the smallest, ‘rift’ among the enemies, of every antagonism of interest among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various countries, by taking advantage of every, even the smallest, opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally be temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable, and conditional. Those who fail to understand this fail to understand even a particle of Marxism, or of scientific, modern Socialism in general.2 9

The KS’ riposte took exception to the KT-MR’s inter­ pretation of Lenin’s message, alleging that a difference between (1) “lahat” (the KS version) and ^bawat" (the KT-MR version), (2) between “obligatorily” (KS) and “walangpalya” (without fail: KT-MR version). KS: It is true that we must obligatorily take advantage of any rift manifesting itself in the enemy’s ranks. But it isn’t true that we must make use ‘without fail’ of each rift or all rifts in their ranks. According to the distorted translations of the KT-MR, that would mean that we are to spend our energy on every rift between Marcos and Enrile, between Marcos and Imelda, between Enrile and Imelda, etc. According to Lenin’s teaching, we have the possibility of choosing the rifts which we can take advantage of and we must not waste our effort on inconsequential rifts. Totoong obligadong gamitin natin ang alinmang hidwaan sa hanay ng kaaway ngunit Hindi totoong “walang palyang” dapat gamitin natin ang bawat o lahat ng hidwaan sa hanay ng kaaway. Ayon sa baluktot na pagsasalin ng KT-MR, nangangahulugan na pagbubuhusan pa natin ng pagod ang bawat hidwaan sa pagitan ni Marcos at ni Enrile, sa pagitan ni Marcos at ni Imelda, sa pagitan ni Enrile at ni Imelda, atbp. Ayon sa turo ni Lenin, maari tayong mamili ng mga hidwaang gagamitin natin at hindi na natin dapat pag-aaksayahan ng pagod ang mga di-makabuluhang hidwaan.30

VII

In the light of the radical Left’s controversial boycott of the 1986 snap election, a case might be made out of the recurrence of a certain behavior pattern: the “left adven-

16

Marxism in the Philippines II

turist” KS prevailing over the “non-dogmatic” KT-MR in 1978. Indeed, many bones of contention brought up by the February 1986 events were already present in the previous debate (not surprisingly, Lenin’s observations on “rifts” were revived by a refractory Party group: see “Against the Snap Election Boycott”, Praktika, Vol. 1 No. 1). However, it must not be forgotten that the KS was not alone in calling for a boycott in 1978. The Civil Liberties Union had, independently of the CPP, actively campaigned against the elections, citing three reasons: 1) the useless­ ness of the projected IBP; 2) the squandering of taxpayers’ money on an exercise where the opposition had no chances of winning; 3) and the obvious interests of the US underlying the “normalization” process.31 The CLU’s objective endorsement of the KS position gave the latter an opportunity to evoke an imaginary Lenin (read: the KS) fulminating against the KT-MR in this manner: “Our differences on this matter boil down to this: we are marching side by side with the revolutionary national bourgeoisie, while you are marching side by side with the anti-Marcos reactionaries, and you have even joined their ranks.”3 2 In the intra-party polemics, the CLU (unknown perhaps to its leaders) was praised by the KS as a genuine anti-imperialist and anti-fascist force, in glaring contrast to the LABAN politicians who were described as “pretend­ ing to be anti-fascist”, “making many concessions to the Marcos regime”, “plotting with the regime against the masses”, etc. Moreover, from the viewpoint of the KS the civil libertarians had the additional virtue of “accepting the maximum anti-imperialist and the minimum anti-feudal programme of the party”, and more -- the KS certainly overstated the case here - of accepting the “necessity of armed struggle and the building of a people’s democratic dictatorship”. In the main, the CLU was adjudged “revolu­ tionary” by the KS, which however took note of its “bourgeois character”, making it the “small and elitist” organization it had hitherto remained? 3 A number of observations about the 1978 debate remain to be brought into focus in the inevitable light of the February 1986 events. 1) The problematique of kagipitan/panggigipit starts

The Dialectics of Kaluwagan

17

with the recognition that it was an objective condition imposed by the dictatorship. That kagipitan dovetailed with the Party’s tactics for over a decade is beside the point here. The point is that Marcos gratuitously offered to the Party “on a silver platter”, so to speak, the bonus of an incipient revolutionary situation by imposing martial law and smashing the liberal-democratic mold in which the institutions of the Republic had been cast. Could the CPP have been expected, in 1971-72, to reject this once in a lifetime opportunity to illustrate the bankruptcy of the parody of western-style democracy that passed for the “norm” before the coup, and translate this bankruptcy into a frontal attack on the state’s most visible defenses? This interrogation, which is anything but innocent, does not deny. 2) Even if it could be proven that an abhorrence for kaluwagan, and a preference for its antithesis over­ determined the KS’ reflexes towards the snap elections of 1986, there would still subsist the other factor that pre­ cluded, in its wholehearted adherence to the Leninist injunction about “no compromises”, the basic lack of ideological differences between the politicians “in” and “out” of power. That the KS took this quasi-structural feature of Philippine national and local politics as a con­ venient pretext among Others for a non-Leninist boycott in February 1986 can be easily inferred from the 1978 debate. In addition, the KS was extremely wary of a united front, with the anti-Marcos opposition in the “white zone” that was Manila-Rizal. This elementary reflex may almost certainly be ascribed to the party’s previous experience with local (provincial, regional) officials outside of Metro Manila. In the 1978 debate, the KS said: Sa pangkalahatan, ang kinikilala ng mga reaksyonaryo sa kanilang pakikipagkasundo sa atin ay yaon lamang sandatang pampulitikang lakas natin. Kung hindi dahil dito’y maaaring bastusin at pagtawanan lang nila tayo.

Sa kalagayang wala pa tayong malaking sandatahang puiersa sa loob mismo ng MR, di natin mabisang masasagkaan ang pananabotahe at iba pang masasamang tangka ng mga reaksyonaryo.34

18

Marxism in the Philippines II [In general, what the reactionaries respect in their rela­ tions with us is only our political armed strength. In its absence they might treat us with disrespect and ridicule.

In the present situation where we still do not have a big armed force inside Manila-Rizal, we cannot efficiently counter the sabotage and other evil designs of the reactionaries.

3) Was the KS still operating under these assump­ tions before and during the events of February 1986? The KS was proven right in its intransigent “no compromise” position in 1978 but not in 1986. And the setback it suffered in 1986 is beyond compare with that of the KTMR in 1978. One is reminded of Lenin’s words: “Every new form of struggle which brings new perils and sacrifices inevitably ‘disorganizes’ an organization ill-prepared for the new form of struggle.”3 s The continued existence today of the CPP as the only revolutionary force of any significant influence and number would indicate that the “disorganization” immediately manifest before and after EDSA has been surmounted. In the new situation, which however in many aspects is becoming less and less new, what should the Marxist-Leninist response take into account? The party’s (grudging) recognition of Madame Aquino’s popularity would seem to illustrate the absence of a revolutionary situation that would justify resorting to the “old” form of struggle. Yet little imagination is needed to realize that several seeds have been sown these past few months which might all together sprout into what could amount to a revolutionary situation again: the President’s indecisiveness on land reform, the contradic­ tions of big landowners and the government over land reform, the return of old-type traditional politicians to power and of oligarchs to their sets of privilege, conflicts between politicians and the military. Patience, and a keen sense for the resolution of contradictions, seem to be the key factors in the “new” situation. Will the historical intransigence of CPP get in the way?

The Dialectics of Kaluwagan

19

Notes: 1 See the PKP Political Bureau’s statement “R.A. 1700: Sword of Damocles Against all Dissenters’’, Malaya, 6 June 1987,

2Talahidkain ng M.A.N.: Ang Demokratikong Pilipinong Ulnong (Malaya Books, 1969), p. 42.

3 Omnibus Reply (On Lavaite Propaganda for Revisionism and Fascism), 1972, p. 40. ’in Ang Bayan, 1 November 1971, p. 11.

sIbid. 6

Ibid. p. 10.

7 “Overthrow the U.S.-Marcos Dictatorship to Achieve National Freedom and Democracy*’, Ang Bayan, 1 October 1972 issue, reprinted in Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 2 No. 4, 1972, pp. 458-459. *Ibid., p. 460.

9 “On the Partial Lifting of the Writ Suspension”, ibid., 20 September 1971, p. 2: “Experience under the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus has shown that ... a single communist -cannot be definitely identified . . . The effectiveness of our under­ ground is well tested and proven.”

10 Amado Guerrero, Specific Characteristics of Our People's War (1974), p. 26.

1 ‘Published by “a representative group of citizens devoted to the cause of truth, justice and freedom”, Manila, 1 October 1975. Among the signatories were Jovito Salonga, Joaquin Roces, Fran­ cisco Rodrigo, Joker Arroyo, Horacio de la Costa, Cirilo Rigos, Aurora Aquino, Rene Saguisag, Eva Kalaw. 12The text of the KABAKA “Citizens Manifesto” was pub­ lished in toto in the Philippine Collegian, 15 December 1977.

13 KT-MR, “Ang Ating Taktikal na Islogan Para sa Kasalukuyang Yugto ng Rebolusyon” (14, 11, mimeo), August 1975,

"Ibid., p. 10. lsIbid.,p. 5.

20

Marxism in the Philippines II

“"Our Urgent Tasks”, in Revolution, Vol. 1 No. 1 (1 July 1976), p. 11. 17 This may be gleaned from the NDF’s statement in Libera­ tion, February 1982, p. 5: “The important event of 1981 was the armed struggle’s entry to the upper substage of the strategic defen­ sive phase.’* 1 iIbid„ p. 6.

190mnibus Reply, p. 152. 2°AngBayan, 15 September 1977, p. 1.

2 ^T-KS, “Hinggil sa Dokumentong ‘Ang Taktikal na Islogan Para sa Kasalukuyang Yugto ng Rebolusyon’ ” (32, 11, mimeo, n.d.), p. 23.

22“Hinggil sa Dokumentong ‘Ang Taktikal . . .’ ” p. 3. 23Ibid., p. 4. 24KT-KS, “Hinggil sa ‘Ang Parlyamentaryong Pakikibaka Bilang Unibersal na Taktika ng Proletaryado’ ” (19, 11, mimeo, n.d.) p. 10. 2 5 “Hinggil sa Dokumentong ‘Ang Taktikal. . .’ ’’ pp. 21-22, 26Ibid., p. 11.

2 7 Omnibus Reply, p. 107: The “Revisionist renegades imagine themselves to be in an imperialist country like tsarist Russia neg­ lecting the possibilities of protracted people’s war. 28“Hinggil sa Dokumentong ‘AngTaktikal. . .*’, pp. 21-22. 29

V.I. Lenin. “Left-Wing” Communism: An Infantile Dis­ order. Foreign Languages Press (Peking edition), Second Printing, 1970, p. 67.

3oKT-KS, “Hinggil sa ‘Unibersal na Halaga ng Taktikang Pakikipagkasundo at Pakikipag-isang Prente” (22, 11, mimeo, n.d.) p. G 17. Civil Liberties Union Statement, “American Imperialism, Martial Law, and the Coming ‘Elections’, Nationalist Interpreta­ tion’’ (12, 11 mimeo, 2 February 1978).

The Dialectics of Kaluwagan

21

3z“HinggiI sa‘Unibersal. ..’ ”p. G 19.

3 3Ibid,, pp. G 13-G 14. 34“Hinggil sa ‘Ang Parlyamentaryo. . .’ ” p. E 9 35Quoted in G. Lukacs, Lenin: A Study on the Unity of His Thought, (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press edition, 1974), p. 91.

Rapporteur’s Report: Open Forum on the Malay Lecture

The first question set the tone for the open forum by probing the lecturer on the main lines of “fundamental ideological differences” within the CPP-ML. Prof. Malay pleaded unfamiliarity with contemporary debates and expressed preference for a “historian’s point of view”. Having no access to intra-party discussions, the lecturer requires a certain distance, mostly in terms of time, to do analysis. The second question pointed out that the lecture seemed to suggest that the Central Committee was correct in its decision to boycott the 1978 elections but was erroneous in its decision to adopt the same position regard­ ing the 1986 elections. What premises and what criteria guided the lecturer towards such an evaluation? Malay responded that given the conditions pertaining in 1978, participation would have served only to legitimize the Marcos dictatorship. The dictator needed the electoral exercise to substantiate his claim of political “normaliza22

Rapporteur’s Report

23

tion” largely for the benefit of an international audience. He did not elaborate further. The third interrogation, a follow up on the first, asked whether the CPP is now veering away from strict ad­ herence to the ideological line of “Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse Tung Thought” (MLMTT). There are reports alleging that Ang Bayan specifically had been trying to depart from the MLMTT framework. Malay confirmed that in 1985 - 86, there was expect­ ation that the Ang Bayan masthead would drop “Mao Tse Tung Thought”. But the phrase continued to be retained. At any rate, Malay pointed out, Ang Bayan is a news­ paper and not the theoretical journal of the CPP. Would the KT-MR (Executive Committee, ManilaRizal) and the KT-KS (Executive Committee, Central Committee) have different views regarding the possible legalization of the CPP? In the context of the 1978 debates, the KT-MR argued for opening the option of parliamentary struggle. The implication of KT-MR’s position was that should the dic­ tatorship be displaced by a liberal government, the Party ought to consider the possibility of coming out into the open and participating in elections. The KT-MR considered the possibility, in fact, of continuing the revolutionary struggle from elective positions of power. Malay noted that there has seemed to be a “built-in conflictual situation” between the central Party leadership and the metropolitan organs of the Party since the second world war, even before the establishment of the new Party. During the anti-Japanese resistance, the KT-MR of the PKP refused to accept the Central Committee’s and the Polit­ buro’s directives implementing the “retreat-for-defense” policy. The KT-MR during this time, was expelled from its positions. The pattern seems to have been repeated during the 70s and the 80s. This could indicate something structural in the relationship between the central leader­ ship and metropolitan organs. In a situation where there has been substantial poli­ tical changes, shouldn’t it be necessary for a revolutionary movement to reverse its strategy and tactics?

24

Marxism in the Philippines II

The debate, according to Malay, revolves precisely around the need to specify what may be considered mini­ mum conditions for a radically changed situation that would warrant a revolutionary party that has been histori­ cally engaged in armed struggle to substantially retain or even change its strategy. At the moment, few revolution­ aries question the need for the Party to retain its armed capability at least for defensive purposes. Outside Metro Manila the political situation remains very much un­ changed. Although some amount of “kaluwagan ” present­ ly pertains, there is no clarity and consensus on the long-term consequences of this. Pressed on the matter of whether there has been qua­ litative changes in the situation in the aftermath of Feb­ ruary 1986, Malay said that fundamental conditions do not as yet warrant changes in revolutionary strategy and tactics. Changes cannot occur overnight in the type of ‘civil society’ pertaining in the Philippines. How has the Left’s participation in the last congres­ sional elections been assessed? Is it true that there was a directive ordering revolutionary cadres to pull out of the electoral campaign at the last stage? Malay notes that there appears to be a deep-rooted prejudice against elections among those who joined the national democratic movement. It may be that the Left participated without any serious intention of winning. This introduces an aspect that is usually glossed over in the study of social movements: a particular mentality, a particular temperament is seemingly attracted to a parti­ cular type of political action. In the case of the national democrats, the mentality dictates that elections are meant not to be won, but to politicize the people. How is “kaluwagan ” defined in precise terms? The term, according to Malay, was first used by the KT-KS in its polemical exchanges with the KT-MR. Deducing from the arguments, particularly of the KT-MR, it was a condition characterized by the presence of a par­ liament, free press, and constitutional guarantee of free speech and academic freedom. It referred generally to a certain amount of democratic space.

Rapporteur’s Report

25

Again the matter about mentality, temperament comes back in. For the national democrats, freedom — the democratic space, is never given. It must be fought for. But the point is, during the Marcos period, there was a certain amount of space. Discussions such as this one were possible. Essentially, then, it is a matter of how you approach the question of democratic space. Were the debates between the KT-KS and the KT-MR basically a debate between two organs of the CPP, or did the debate and its effects go down the lower levels? Was it just an internal debate or did the effects of this mani­ fest outside of the Party organs? Did the debates reach a point that a mini-rectification movement became necessary? It appears, according to the lecturer, that the debate had little effect outside the KT-KS/KT-MR context. The slogans and calls of the KT-MR were not carried by the other regional committees. What seems incontrovertible is that before and during the 1978 elections, the KT-MR acted on its own in full defiance of the central committee. Through this period, there was no attempt on the part of the KS to restrain the KT-MR from extensive participation in the Laban campaign. It was as if the KS allowed the KTMR to realize its mistake. While the debate between the KT-MR and the KT-KS was going on, there was polarization among cadres and activists down the line in the metropolitan region. One point to be noted concerns the sociological profile of the KT-MR leadership from 1976-78. Most were very young cadres coming straight from university activism to key positions in a very important region. One would expect dogmatic and extremist behavior from such a group. But during the debate, it was the KS that took the left-extremist position.

The Left and Other Forces: The Nature and Dynamics of Pre-1986 Coalition Politics P.N. Abinales

“I have made a ceaseless effort not to ridicule, not to bewail, nor scorn human actions, but to understand them. ” „ . Spinoza

It is an irony that while the Philippines has one of the most enduring leftist movements in the entire Third World, it remains plagued by a never-ending failure of integrating other forces and movements which, in varying degrees, share a common aspiration with its revolutionary project. By itself, radicals have much to be proud of the specta­ cular growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP-ML) and its allied organizations in terms of deve­ loping a resilient guerrilla force and evolving a capacity to establish and support viable national democratic organiza­ tions of various shades. But in the sphere of coalition politics, the most dominant leftist group has met little success. While the NDF is formally in place, it remains a united front body of organizations set up and still led by CPP-ML cadres. No non-Party organization - underground or above-ground - has, as of this writing, signified its intention to become formally part of the NDF even as the latter boasts of

26

27

The Left and Other Forces

having the moat comprehensive program among the various groups in opposition today. Past united front setbacks have caused considerable strain among those involved and merely diluted serious efforts at determining the answers to the questions of why the broad Philippine Left remains splintered and why it has failed to sustain a viable alliance with moderate groups. There has been too much ‘bad blood’ between convenors and participants of these united front experiments such that each view tends to be clouded by the superficial biases and prejudices that emerged out of the past. It is easy to root everything to that detestable concept “sectarianism”. But the way the label has been used to describe the causes of every united front failure smacks more of a simplistic reaction rather than one based on an objective understanding of the problem.

I Those who bemoan the “sectarianism of the Left” partly attribute it to their direct experiences with the ND movement. What most critics of Left sectarianism tend to forget is that the tendency to dominate has its ideolo­ gical foundations. It is in the nature and view of the CPPML as the self-professed vanguard party of the Filipino proletariat, imbued with the mission of completing the national democratic revolution, that its ideas of linkage with other forces originated. To go back to basics means returning to the original writings of CPP-ML founder Amado Guerrero. Says Guerrero of the united front, The national united front is a component part of the [CPP’s] political line [and which] also serves [this] political line ... It is one of the weapons of the revolu­ tion, the other being the armed struggle.1

Furthermore, [t]hrough the national united front, the Party extends widely its political influence and gains the widest support of the masses and other progressive classes and strata as it establishes the independent strength of the

28

Marxism in the Philippines II leading class, the proletariat, through a national war or an agrarian revolution supported mainly by the peasantry.]

The existence of a national united front is premised on the earlier formation of what Guerrero refers to as the “basic alliance of the working class and the peasantry under the leadership of the working class and the Commu­ nist Party of the Philippines”. The NUF shall then strive to include the other “progressive classes and strata” through a political program that “should correspond to the general line and program of the Party” (underscoring mine). Success in building the national united front is, of course, dependent on the extent to which the Party has made inroads in organizing the basic masses. It is this “basic alliance of the workers and the peasantry” that effectively meets “any betrayal or compromise with the enemy that the national bourgeoisie might make due to its dual character”,2

Some have suggested that the Guerrero formulation did not exactly conform with Marxist-Leninist notions of united front politics. An anonymous Filipino revolution­ ary interviewed after the Aquino assassination had this to say about the CPP-ML founding chairman’s version: [T]he term 'united front’ is used without the qualifying phrases ‘from above’ or ‘from below’. This ambiguity conceals a critical distinction between the two formulas. Much of the conflicts that frustrated united front building efforts in the Philippines since the war involved conflicts between the two formulas, bearing the common title of ‘united front'.3

A second look, however, at the Guerrero formulation may lead one to another conclusion: that the ex-CPP-ML chairman may have qualified (or revised?) the definition of ‘united front from below’ as to mean principally organ­ izing the “basic alliance of workers and peasants” before proceeding to establish a ‘united front from above’ with

The Left and Other Forces

29

other forces and ‘middle classes’. Extremely sensitive of the past experiences of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) in united front building, Guerrero and the CPP-ML were not exactly enthusiastic over immediately forming ties of cooperation with other groups unless a mass base among the oppressed and exploited majority has been established. The CPP-ML’s Maoist orientation (particularly the notion of the “mass line”) cannot be ignored as another factor in the conception of this formulation. Its revolu­ tionary project made it imperative for the CPP-ML to immerse itself among the peasant masses while at the same time initiating organizing efforts among the industrial working class to ensure proletarian leadership in the agrarian-based armed struggle. While making special mention to the role played by student radicals in the early formation of the Party, Guerrero was Marxist-Leninist enough to realize, that sustaining the revolution meant taking roots among the ‘basic masses’.

Concrete reality likewise may also provide us with an answer as to why this formulation was adopted by the CPP-ML. The young Party was growing in a context where it had to engage in a conflict for ideological hegemony with the PKP and the social democrats at the same time as it was trying to re-establish a radical opposition to the neo­ colonial state. This competition was fierce and intense given the unique nature of the split in the communist movement in the 60s, the influence of Chinese-Soviet polemics on the CPP-ML and the efforts of the social democrats to undermine a resurgent radicalism by charting a moderate ‘third way’ out of the Philippine crisis. Infected by the ‘spirit’ of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, ND organizations supportive or sympathetic to the CPP-ML’s program engaged these rivals in unceasing polemics, and were successful in winning over some of them (especially the social democrats) to the ND cause. Alliances (such as the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism and later on, the Movement for a Democratic Philippines) failed to prosper as a result of the schism in the progressive movement.

30

Marxism in the Philippines II

II The authoritarian dispensation broke the power and influence of the anti-Marcos elite politicians and estab­ lished the likes of Aquino, Manglapus, Macapagal and Salonga firmly on the side of the anti-fascist movement. The repression also forced the social democrats to veer away from these moderate politics toward more radical options, while the PKP split further with the MarxistLeninist Group breakaway in 1972. The Marcos coup and its attendant effects on the general mass movement thus presented opportunities for the formation of a united coalition against the dictatorship. The CPP-ML recognized the new situation and raised the appropriate call for the establishment of a “broad anti­ fascist, anti-feudal and anti-imperialist united front”. It took the first steps in forming the NDF to serve as the umbrella organization by which to bring together all forces in opposition to the dictatorship. But the CPP-ML’s insistence that other forces conform to its united front program made it difficult to establish viable long-term alliances with these forces. Thus, when the preparatory commission for the National Democratic Front (NDF) presented its first program in April 1973, the earlier Guerrero statement that the national united front “should correspond to the general line and program of the Party” loomed heavily in the minds of the other groups leading to criticisms that the program was “virtually echoing the CPP’s political lines, thus stirring up disputes over certain theoretical formu­ lations”.4 With the case of the “anti-Marcos reactionaries” instead of devising the appropriate tactics towards estab­ lishing tactical ties with this disenfranchised faction of the elite, the CPP-ML took a cynical view of the dictator’s political rivals. According to the authors of “Our Urgent Tasks” (OUT): The alliance of the Macapagal, Aquino, Lopez, and Manglapus groups is not idle. Though U.S. imperialism continues to get what it wants from the Marcos fascist dictatorship, it has already assured the alliance that it

The Left and Other Forces

31

should do what it can to stand in reserve in the face of Marcos’ gross unpopularity.5

The early policy of the leadership which was tanta­ mount to a refusal to collaborate with the anti-Marcos elites did not necessarily find receptive ears among the CPP-ML’s lower organs. The OUT made mention of a right opportunist trend in a certain region manifested in the “proposal to superimpose the slogan demanding general elections in the country on other slogans asserting the democratic rights and interests of the basic masses”.6 The group referred to here obviously was the Manila-Rizal regional committee (KT-MR) which showed signs of deviating from the Guerrero formulation by showing its agreement with the calls of the bourgeois opposition and using its being the biggest party organization to continue with its maverick tactics. Objective conditions also posed as obstacles to an earlier formation of an anti-dictatorship coalition. For example, leaders of the other forces were being incar­ cerated by the regime and their organizations put in disarray. This was particularly true of the elite opposition whose leaders and power bases were totally eliminated by the regime. Problems of survival also hounded the other progres­ sive groups, that section of the anti-fascist movement that could have easily established ties with the CPP-ML. On the one hand, the Marxist-Leninist Group - which earlier expressed its openness to enter into an alliance with the CPP-ML -- was suffering from the double repression by the dictatorship and the brutal reprisals of the Lavaites who had by then surrendered to Marcos. On the other hand, the social democrats began to shift confusingly towards a more militant form of resistance. The wounds of the premartial law schism with the NDs nurtured among SDs that lingering suspicion of its more radical counterpart and allowed an anti-communist tendency to dominate the erstwhile moderate group. While painstaking organizational work and the policy of “centralized leadership, decentralized operations” made the CPP-ML grow “by leaps and bounds", its united front

32

Marxism in the Philippines II

project remained in the formative and preparatory stage. Perhaps the main reason for this was exigency. The Party saw it fit to devote most of its cadres to the building of its guerrilla fronts and the urban underground network rather than immediately attend to united front work with other groups, notwithstanding the OUT. This was perfectly rationalized also within the frame­ work of building the “basic alliance of the workers and the peasantry”. Without such a basic alliance, the Party realis­ tically saw that no meaningful coalition with the elite opposition and other groups would last. Moreover, as the Philippine Society and Revolution insisted in the late 60s, the early stages of building the national united front need not necessarily be through a formal organization. One cannot also discount the fact that by 1975, its original leadership was one by one being caught by the regime, prompting rapid and constant turnover among its equally competent second liners. It was only by the mid-70s that the CPP-ML started setting up ties with other groups, beginning with the anti­ Marcos elites in the Manila-Rizal region. Both groups informally started working together against the series of sham referenda and plebiscites that the dictatorship foisted to legitimize itself.

Ill The attempts of the dictatorship at political ‘normal­ ization’ through the electoral process in 1978 rekindled the hopes among the anti-Marcos politicians and the social democrats to re-insert themselves in the opposition arena which was by then the sole domain of the national democrats. The electoral process opened up by the regime revived these groups’ machineries and/or organized new ones. The resurrection of the non-ND groups and political parties spurred the ND movement to conduct a “clear and repeated class analysis” of the new situation. The concept “anti-Marcos reactionaries” emerged out of CPPML writing to describe those

The Left and Other Forces

33

big landlords, big businessmen and bourgeois politicians who are dissatisfied with Marcos’ continuing monopoly of power and the way he has used this power to run roughshod over their economic interests (but have shown) neither the determination nor the leadership to work for the overthrow of the Marcos regime.6

These anti-Marcos reactionaries, accordingly, had “begun to openly call for a change in the fascist dictator­ ship and to rebuild or form their political organizations” between the period 1976-78. But with Marcos firmly entrenched in power, they had “little or no chance of maneuvering themselves peacefully into power”. The option this group chose then was to “win the favor of US imperialism to bring about the collapse of the regime” by trying “their best to exploit possible sources of conflict with Marcos and the US”. Thus, the Ang Bayan (AB) warning: In all their actions against the Marcos regime, their main purpose is to secure privileges for themselves, not to push forward the basic rights of the people. Some of them are riding on the great popular discontent against the fascist regime, but only to strengthen their bargain­ ing hand with the dictator and US imperialism,

Upon unveiling their ‘true nature’, AB proceeded to state the general position the CPP-ML and the ND move­ ment should take towards the anti-Marcos reactionaries, viz., Our stand is to unite with them, when they fight the fascist dictatorship, to egg them to make real their professions of concern for the people’s welfare and to criticize them when they move towards collusion or submission to the fascist regime or lend themselves as tools for imperialist interventions. Only the most die­ hard among them, in particular, those who consistently disrupt and destroy the unity of the anti-fascist forces, should be isolated.7

A modus vivendi was struck between these antiMarcos reactionaries and the stronger NDs - in preparation for the 1978 Interim Batasang Pambansa elections. In Manila, this led to the formation of the Laban Party. ND

34

Marxism in the Philippines II

cadres also established ties with the social democratic formations, likewise the first ever since their pre-martial law schism. All three groups were brought together in the first working coalition of opposition forces since Sep­ tember 21.

IV The IBP elections, however, became the occasion for an intense internal debate between the Central Committee (KT-KS) and its disobedient KT-MR over how, among others, the ND movement was to relate to the “antiMarcos reactionaries”. Apparently, the regional committee refused to imple­ ment this last line of the above policy and contented itself with actualizing the call for a broad anti-fascist unity. The recalcitrant MR position was dictated by a different view it took towards the “anti-Marcos reactionaries”. Although the KT-MR accepted the basic definition, it argued for a continuation of the Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) alliance up to the electoral period in order to preserve its first working coalition project. It even reportedly hoped for a possible opposition win in spite of the Marcos cheating machinery for, as its argument went, with oppositionists in the IBP, the struggle in the urban mass movement would be con­ siderably enhanced (and to extend the argument, so would the entire revolutionary process).8 The regional committee ideologically defended itself with passages coming from Lenin rather than from Mao, specifically citing that famous Leninist dictum of “thoroughly, carefully, attentively and skilfully taking advantage of every, even the smallest, *rift’ among the enemies, of every antagonism of interest among the bourgeoisie”. Come election day, the KT-MR continued to insist on the rightness of its position in relation to the anti-Marcos reactionaries but by then the energy and effort spent on the debate (plus the confusion wrought by different policies on the lower levels) had undermined the CPP-ML’s capacity to sustain its participation in the IBP elections. The debate was resolved immediately after the elections in

The Left and Other Forces

35

the favor of the Central Committee and the KT-MR was disbanded and its leading members sent to the countryside for re-education. Did the national democrats err in this first coalition project with the anti-Marcos politicians? The CPP-ML thought so. And by castigating the KT-MR, it reaffirmed the tactical and temporary nature of the alliance with the anti-Marcos reactionaries. The KT-KS further charged as a right opportunist deviation the KT-MR’s 1975 compromise in favor of the reactionaries’ slogans (general elections). It also questioned severely some of the presuppositions of the KT-MR, especially the idea that the Party could help usher in a post-Marcos bourgeois liberal interregnum where it can participate in the legal process. Yet, the debate also reflected the increasing difficulty in applying the Guerrero formulation to explain a quali­ tatively different political condition. Even as the CPP-ML criticized its biggest regional committee for falling under the opportunist trap of the anti-Marcos reactionaries, it could not provide a systematic analysis of the objective reality that the authoritarian context demanded of every force to establish an enduring unity - even on a tactical plane - and give the anti-dictatorship movement a multi­ class and multi-sectoral character. The CPP-ML would admit later that it still could not ignore the anti-Marcos politicians’ capacity to mobilize sections of the population which the ND movement had failed to reach.9 But eight years later, the same problematique would crop up, this time raised by cadres who could not see any wisdom in the 1986 boycott policy of the Party, perhaps attesting to CPP-ML failure to clearly resolve the issue of coalition politics with the anti-Marcos reactionaries.

V The post-electoral period also saw the national democrats involved in another political break with the social democrats. The old enmity between these two groups, the national democrats and the social democrats, was never really resolved. Political pragmatism dictated their 1978 unity and it was a short-term unity at that.

36

Marxism in the Philippines II

The NDs continued to regard the SDs as ‘clerico-fascists’ out to derail the revolution through its pseudo-radical alternative. The latter retained its fear and apprehension of the extremism of the ND position which it believes to have been borne out of its ‘totalitarian’ praxis. After the IBP elections, when the electoral coalition failed, the hostility between nat-dem and soc-dem once more surfaced. The December 1978 AB issue described the United Philippine Democratic Socialist Party as a “counter-revolu­ tionary outfit” that “(tries) to capitalize on the people’s hatred of the Marcos fascist regime but in reality . . . (serves) the same reactionary ruling classes to which the Marcos clique belongs”. Worming their way “into the ranks of the masses”, AB accused the social democrats of creating “intrigues to sow disunity among the masses, such as slandering militant revolutionary organizations and leaders and corrupting and bribing a few people to become their followers and do their dirty work”.1 0 The AB staff, in a later 1980 issue cited a “Political Directive No. 1 (Series of 1978)” allegedly authored by Jesuit Romeo Intengan and Norberto Gonzales which stated that even as more militant actions would be com­ mitted by the SDs, the post-Marcos regime to their liking would “draw its manpower and capabilities largely from the rightist opposition”. It, therefore, became important for the SDs to maintain “strategic and tactical” relations with the anti-Marcos reactionaries.11 In short, (the SDs) want no basic change in society but merely to return to the conditions that prevailed before martial law, that is, a society lorded over by U.S. imper­ ialism and its local henchmen, the comprador capitalists and the landlords, much as it is today.

Even when the PDSP split in 1980 over the failure of the Intengan-Gonzales group to provide real leadership, the CPP-ML position remained reminiscent of its premartial attitude towards the breakaway SDs. While it is imperative to expose and oppose Social Democracy for what it really is, a bourgeois line hiding behind the cloak of Christianity, seeking to perpetuate

The Left and Other Forces

37

the semi-colonial and semi-feudal character of the Philippines, and trying to hold back the advance of the . . . Revolution, it is basic to remember that we isolate the diehards of the Soc-dem elements and neutralize the non-diehards in an attempt to win them over to the correctness of the national democratic line. The history of many soc-dem organizations . . . shows how their mass members rectified and shifted to the (ND) line upon realizing and recognizing its firmness and correct­ ness.1 2

By insisting that only when an SD becomes an ND can meaningful radical change occur within the ranks of these ‘clerico-fascists’, the CPP-ML merely constricted the movement of the breakaway SDs, thereby lessening the chances of the latter being integrated into the NDF. The critique - as can be gauged from the above statement - did not in any way view the possibility of an SD radicalizing within his/her own ideological framework. As the 1980 SD split would attest, the democratic socialist breakaway groups that eventually found solace in the coalition BISIG remained firmly committed to some of the basic social democratic principles, while shedding off their past Christ­ ian reformism. Why this ‘attitude’? Perhaps the answer lies in the historically-determined belief in the bankruptcy of social democratic praxis. But it also revealed once more the same problem in approaching alliance work with other forces; the tendency to let a changing reality conform to the old formula rather than vice-versa. The formation of a left­ wing faction (and a breakaway at that) in the social democratic movement could have signalled the NDF preparatory commission to initiate major changes in its national united front program to accommodate the former. It took three more years and the Aquino assassi­ nation before revisions were made in the ND praxis of coalition politics. VI The year 1980 was a relatively different political situation. The ND movement successfully grew in spite of severe repression by the State (attesting partly to the line

38

Marxism in the Philippines II

that Marcos was indeed the revolutionary movement’s biggest recruiter). Party statements of the period were optimistic of a potential qualitative breakthrough in the revolutionary process. Within the CPP-ML, debates and dis­ cussions over new strategic and tactical possibilities were sounded off in anticipation of the unfolding of the “advanced substage of the strategic defensive”. lae ND movement also took exception that the other forces managed to retain their bearing, and in fact, had grown. Special mention was made of “other independent progressive forces moving to intensify their struggle against the US-Marcos dictatorship” which included the MNLF-BMA, the reactivated MLG, and the breakaway social democratic faction.1 3 ND enthusiasm over the new progressive forces and the possibilities of cooperation in the new decade was however dampened by a reversal to the old Guerrero formulation. While it welcomed the formation, revival, and radicalization of these new forces, the CPP-ML reiterated that a basic prerequisite for cooperation with the ND movement was that these groups must answer both the national . . . and democratic question(s) at the same time, uncompromisingly (and that a coalition must) be based on the wholehearted acceptance of nothing less than the 10 Point Program of the NDF.14

Demanding that these groups could only meaningfully work through the NDF framework betrayed once more the CPP-ML’s inability to adjust to a situation which it even acknowledged as new and opportune for broadening the struggle. In spite of this tendency, legal coalition politics experienced some degree of r tactical success with the 1981 presidential election boycott jointly staged by antiMarcos politicians, nationalists, liberals, and the national democrats. The Right and the ‘middle forces’ - seeing no hope of challenging Marcos — decided not to accept regime offers of participation and joined the left-led mass move­ ment in a boycott movement which made considerable

The Left and Other Forces

39

gains that seriously eroded the credibility of the 1981 presidential polls.

VII The Aquino assassination and the protest movement that it catalyzed considerably reconfigured the political scene with the emergence of newly politicized and organ­ ized forces as well as the re-invigoration of old ones. The NDs, who did not anticipate the massive outpour of protest over the assassination, were forced to once more reassess the situation and their own positions.1 5 The CPP-ML’s “Urgent Message to the Filipino People” displayed a less sectarian attitude towards the different forces that rose out of the post-assassination protests. CPP-ML views toward even the “anti-Marcos reactionaries” showed signs of positive accommodation especially with that faction it referred to as the “bour­ geois reformists” (BRs). The BRs were now being regarded as an “important force in exposing and splitting the dictatorship ... in mobilizing that section of the popula­ tion which is politically inactive” although this recognition was accompanied by the warning of their vacillating tendency. Surprisingly, the social democrats were categorized under the label BRs, with no clear explanation at all. One can only infer that this classification (or re-classification?) arose out of the 1978 SD position to support the anti­ Marcos politicians and their favoring a government domi­ nated by the bourgeois Right.16 The ND movement was more enthusiastic towards the broader democratic movement and the groups it cast under the rubric “liberal democrats”. It even seemingly encouraged some ‘reformist’ tactics employed by the newly politicized and organized forces. These organiza­ tions’ participation in the “Marcos Resign” movement was viewed by the NDs as an effort to "thoroughly expose and weaken the regime” and “broaden and invigorate the anti-dictatorship movement by rousing and mobilizing as many as possible among the politically timid and inactive sectors of society, and encouraging various types of mass

40

Marxism in the Philippines II

actions, including multisectoral ones”. In a sense there­ fore, these forces help and become an integral part of the whole people’s struggles against the US-Marcos dictator­ ship. The policy statement, however, seemed to be negated by practice as the democratic movement advanced. Legal ND organizations unreasonably re-insisted on the standard national democratic line and united front formulations and thereby split broad alliances like the Justice for Aquino, Justice for All Movement (JAJA) and other alliances which sprung out of it.17 It was when the NDs - in their own words - “moved swiftly to unify the newly activated elements and groups and provide direction for their efforts”18 that the post­ August 21 coalitions lost their momentum and broke down. The “Marcos Resign” movement which brought under its umbrella a diversity of groups, personalities, and people was abandoned by both the capitulationist Right and the Left, and in the words of a fraternal critic of the Left, was transformed what used to be a potent core of a broad popular front into an impotent vacuum inhabited only by the most stubborn marginal groups. The newlypoliticized forces lost their medium for political articu­ lation. 1 9

VIII The post-assassination broad front further split with the Batasan elections of early 1984 when a right-middle coalition opted to participate in the electoral process while the Left and the left-wing of the Middle opted for boycott. CPP-ML assessment of the split was clearly in favor of the boycott positions and critical, yet reconciliatory, of the participationists for the sake of unity.20 But a month later, the Party reversed its position towards the latter when it resurrected once more the basic question of Philippine society and revolution. To quote, In form, the struggle was between boycott and partici­ pation. In essence, it was a struggle to influence the course of the anti-dictatorship front. Will the anti-

The Left and Other Forces

41

dictatorship forces persevere in the militant, resolute democratic struggle , . .; will they continue to push beyond the restrictions and limits imposed by the ruling classes or will they confine themselves within these? Clearly then, the struggle boiled down to the question of the existence of the entire semi-colonial and semi-feudal system, whose principal guardian today is the Marcos puppet regime.21

Towards the non-participanonists, the NDs sought to “raise the level of unity by clarifying and unifying. . . respective views on important questions” by resolving in “a principled manner” and through “genuine respect for one another” the different views among the anti-dictator­ ship forces.2 2 Of interest was the statement which ap­ peared to have deviated from the Guerrero formula of putting principal emphasis on the armed resistance, to wit, Considering the characteristics of the dictatorship, it can only be overthrown through a combination of armed and unarmed, legal and illegal, covert and open, struggles.

But alas, what seemed to be a major revision in revo­ lutionary theory was apparently made only as a tactical compromise. For, to continue with the statement, This combination is what we refer to as the revolu­ tionary people’s war, with the armed struggle raging across the archipelago as the main component.

Thus, while recognizing the growing importance of the urban-based, unarmed and legal resistance to which majority, if not all of the non-ND groups in the anti­ dictatorship front belonged, this qualification of the CPPML position merely created contradictions that already emerged over which strategy and tactic would assume primacy in a particular conjuncture where coalition poli­ tics was the most effective means to advance the struggle.

IX Radical interpretations of the events of 1983 did not exactly follow a single line. As the situation became more complicated, there were efforts of revising the pre-martial law formula and developing new categories that could best

42

Marxism in the Philippines II

pinpoint a viable strategy for the anti-dictatorship move­ ment. Two months after the assassination, a group which described itself as “politically active, middle class profes­ sionals struggling peacefully for reforms but open to the revolutionary option” published Plaridel Papers which sought to suggest how a balance can be achieved in the multifaceted anti-dictatorship movement. The editors acknowledged the strong reformist character of the move­ ment yet also recognized its revolutionary potentials. The proper attitude then for both reformist and radical organ­ izations immersed in the protests would have been to "agree on a common tactical program to achieve the central political task at hand - to replace the Marcos government with a government we can trust and sup­ port.”1 3 In another issue, the editors elaborated on the poli­ tical effects of the 1984 elections. Departing from the earlier posture of establishing a broad anti-fascist alliance of all forces (including the clandestine, armed opposition represented by the NDF), the editors explained the importance of a complementary relationship between the clandestine armed resistance and the legal opposition and the indicated formation of a new popular coalition that may even include the traditional opposition.14 Such assertions are normally regarded as heretical within the ND movement. To imagine, much more put to practice, a long-term anti-fascist alliance that would give even equal rights to the traditionally opportunist bour­ geois opposition was an idea which violated the natdem mindset on coalition politics. Such an alliance may also involve compromises in the general ND program which would violate the policy of giving the struggle a compre­ hensive political line. A similar opinion was expressed by alleged NDF chairman Horacio Morales in an interview he gave in mid’84 when talks of a possible post-Marcos regime pervaded the air. Asked about the possible adoption by a coalition government of the NDF 10-Point Program, Morales replied:

43

The Left and Other Forces Since the coalition would include quite a mixture of forces, we cannot expect any outright adoption of a proposal by a single group or even of an alliance as formidable as the NDF. But the main lines of democracy and nationalism should not be difficult to accept. We can see a trend toward convergence on these key points . , .2 5

As to which sector would play the vanguard role, Morales in an uncharacteristically natdem way refused to answer it in strict ideological terms and rather limited himself to a pragmatic response: That is a question only actual practice will answer. In broad terms, of course, the NDF has posed the choice between bourgeois and proletarian leadership. In either case, the petty bourgeoisie (middle class) would want an adequate share in the leadership. But. . .a lot depends on the timing and method of coming to power, not to mention the balance of forces within the Philippines and also internationally.

These ideas of the Plaridel Papers writers and the alleged NDF chairman did not exactly veer away from the orthodox position taken by most natdems on united front politics. But neither did they adhere uncritically to the ND formulation. The fact that the above personalities were open to alliances where the natdem movement was just one of the actors, and even entertained the never-con­ ceived idea of a shorter process of ousting the dictator­ ship with the non-armed aspect determinant, may be regarded as deviations of the highest order.2 6 While we have yet to possess any record of a response (critical or supportive) from the more essentialist nat­ dems, it would not be erroneous to infer that these ‘here­ sies’ did generate a mild uproar and even debates within the tendency. Neither were the questions and suggestions proposed by these mavericks immediately to find satis­ factory answers, as indicated by their resurrection after the February Uprising.2 7

X As the anti-dictatorship movement approached the mid-80s, the national democrats started to prepare their

44

Marxism in the Philippines II

legal forces for higher forms of militant actions, the most significant of which was the welgang bayan.2 8 The first experiments successfully worked out in regional centers like Davao, but in major urban areas like Metro Manila, the welgang bayan failed to elicit support as massive as that for the provincial strikes. The so-called subjective forces and sectoral movements were indeed wellplaced but one crucial element failed to fully develop: the necessary support from the “middle forces’’, the “petitbourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie”. The strike failed to even incite any spontaneous support from the un­ organized masses so that the catalysts were left on their own to sustain what was started. The fruits of the failures of earlier coalition politics began to be felt at this time particularly in the major urban center. By early 1985, ND pronouncements on the suc­ cesses of the welgang bayan gave way to a sober assessment of the need to once more achieve viable united coalition with smaller groups. Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN) was formed in May 1985 but promptly split up on the second day of its founding congress. The social democrats were the first to leave and later formed Bansang Nagkakaisa sa Diwa at Layunin (BANDILA), while a smaller group which called itself the “Independent Caucus” persisted for a time but also left the coalition to eventually form the core of the Bukluran sa Ikauunlad ng Sosyalistang Isip at Gawa (BISIG). The three leading personalities who represented each major group in the coalition were later interviewed but provided evasive answers as to the reasons of the BAY AN fiasco and the real reasons remain unexpressed up to this writing? ’

XI The Left’s experiences in coalition politics during the Marcos era has raised a number of issues, including the following: (a) Are the categories on united front politics developed by prominent Left theoreticians like Amado Guerrero still valid today, given changes in the political situation? To be more daring, are these, in the first place,

The Left and Other Forces

45

the right categories in determining class relations in society as well as the nature and balance of the political forces? (For example, the category of “national bourgeoisie” has even been questioned by national democrats themselves. Will this controversial category still be employed in assessing the anti-fascist capitalists?) (b) Just which organizations could possibly become part of a Left-led united front? The interviewed anony­ mous Filipino revolutionary raised valid points when he/ she stated: [W]e must put a stop to the practice of labeling other opposition groups and personalities as ‘reformist’ while reserving the adjective ‘revolutionary’ only for those groups and personalities adhering to a Marxist frame­ work, or worse, only for the party and party-led organ­ izations. The Social Democrats, for one, have a definite­ ly revolutionary program for the transformation of Philippine society and probably a better appreciation of the need to struggle for political democracy even under a socialist system . . . Anyway the Nicaraguan and Salva­ dorean experiences show us that it is possible to form a working and lasting relationship with Social Demo­ crats.3

(c) How does one dialectically approach the problem of the relationship between a comprehensive united front program and programs based on tactical alliances? For a coalition to meaningfully function, must it be necessary that one group’s entire comprehensive line be adopted hook-line-and-sinker by other groups in the coali­ tion? Can a tactical line for the coalition win at a parti­ cular conjuncture? Recently, this position was seriously questioned by contributors to the CPP-ML theoretical journal Praktika in the light of the Left’s boycott debacle and succeeding ‘errors’ in confronting the Aquino govern­ ment. (d) What exactly should be the proper relationship between a pre-eminent Marxist vanguard and other groups? Again the anonymous revolutionary raised very valid points when he/she argues that the vanguard party Will try to achieve ideological hegemony in the united front, just like other forces in it. Hence, a non-antagonistic ideological struggle must take place in an atmos-

46

Marxism in the Philippines II phere of free debate and mutual respect for different ideas and opinions. Each group must know when to make compromises regarding non-basic points in the greater interest of maintaining the united front.

(e) Given other revolutionary experiences with building successful united front organizations, should the dominant left tendency remain a prisoner to the Guerrero formula? Morales cited three successful struggles as useful references for Filipino efforts at building coalitions: Vietnam, with its experience of being able to set up a provi­ sional government even before full liberation; Iran, where a massive popular protest with “relatively lower levels of armed struggle” managed to overthrow the Shah; and Nicaragua, where a coalition of revolutionaries, middle class Christians and even part of the elite opposition won the revolution.3 1 (f) Should the coalition initially take the form of a unity of different Left forces? Should not the various strands of the Filipino Left seek to establish a unified Left presence in society as a prerequisite for a broader united front? The CPP-ML averred to the idea in mid-’86 when it floated a near-similar idea of a “national revolutionary united front” that shall bring together communists, national democrats, and “middle sector” forces (“the various ‘socialist trends’, the April 6th Liberation Move­ ment, and the liberal democrats in government, political parties, and broad alliance organizations”) in coalition against potential fascist resurgence.3 2 At this particular interregnum where neither of the major political forces command a decisive influence over society, the necessity of a review of the past experiences in coalition politics cries out for answers given the current state of flux of Philippine society, especially in light of a politico-military offensive by the Right and a moralideological hegemony seized from the Left by the liberal Center. This is a task no responsible member of any Left tendency in the Philippines can avoid.

The Left and Other Forces

47

Notes: 1 “Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party”. Reprinted by the Filipino Support Group, London, n.d., pp. 42 43. In Philippine Society and Revolution, Guerrero refers to the united front as the shield that shall protect and advance the armed struggle.

2 Ibid. 3 “Sectarianism is the Blight: An Exclusive Interview with a Filipino Revolutionary”, Longer View, Vol. II, No. 2, pp. 1-2, 4 Francisco Nemenzo, “Rectification Process in the Philippine Communist Movement”, in Armed Communist Movements in Southeast Asia. Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S. (eds.) Singapore: Insti­ tute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984, pp. 89.

5 “Our Urgent Tasks”. Published by the Ang Rebolusyon: Internal Theoretical Organ of the Communist Party of the Philip­ pines, 1 July 1976 as reprinted by the Solidarity Publishing House, Manila, 1978, p. 8. OUT, however, did not make mention of the other radical and non-elite groups; thus, we have to content ourselves with the elite opposition as examples. 6 Ibid,, p. 29. As Malay would later point out, the continued deviation of the Manila-Rizal regional committee would later lead to a debate with the Central Committee on issues surrounding the nature of the revolutionary struggle, particularly in the urban areas. See Armando S. Malay, Jr., “The Dialectics of Kaluwagan: Echoes of a 1978 Debate”, First Lecture of the Marxism in the Philippines Series Part II, sponsored by the Third World Studies Center, 7 July 1987, University of the Philippines.

7 Ang Bayan (AB), 3 March 1978 (Special Issue on the Interim Batasang Pambansa ‘Elections’), pp, 4-5. 8 Malay, op. cit. 9 AB, June 1983, pp. 8-9.

1 0 AB, 15 December 1978, pp. 10-11.

11 AB, 29 March 1980. Fer the more radical posture of the SDs, the Political Directive -- as quoted in AB - had this to say: “We have adopted the strategy of urban action - of destroying the stabilizing foundations of the dictatorship through continuous and intensifying political action in

Marxism in the Philippines II

48

Metro Manila and its outskirts. More particularly, our political action shall be in the form of economic sabo­ tage, massive civil disobedience and paramilitary opera­ tions.” 12 AB, 15 April 1980, p. 11.

1 3 AB, 29 March 1980. pp. 8-9, 31 August, 1980, p. 11. 14 Ibid., 29 March 1980. In a later issue, AB reiterated its desires to establish “mutual cooperation” with other groups along­ side the “step-by-step” development of the “organs of democratic power in the countryside” which have a united front character. The Party organ also repeated its warnings that cadres safeguard their “independence and initiative” to ensure that “its proletarian stand­ point is not diluted by the welter of programs that various organiza­ tions and groups have been coming up with.” 15 The CPP-ML made a 180 degree turn in its assessment of Aquino, the erstwhile “capitulationist” (see AB, 29 March 1980). In its statement on the assassination (dated 25 August 1983), the Party Central Committee made mention that

“May pagkakaiba kami ng dating senador hinggil sa usapin ng pagpapabagsak sa pasistang rehimeng Marcos. Tinatanggap namin iyon, Ngunit ang layunin ng magkabilang panig - wakasan ang kinamumuhiang rehimen -ay magkaagapay. Sa maraming paraan, ang mga pagsisikap niya at ang amin ay nagkakatulungan habang sabay na nilalabanan ang iisang kaaway ng sambayanang Pilipino.”

16 Central Committee, Communist Party of the Philippines, “Overthrow the U.S.-Marcos Fascist Dictatorship, Establish A Revolutionary Coalition Government: An Urgent Message to the Filipino People”, AB, 7 October 1983.

17 Pending access to other primary sources, the role of the natdems in the failure of J^JA could be inferred from the state meat of the editorial board of Praktika that as a result of the “secta­ rianism of proletarian revolutionaries as seen in the unreasonable assertions of the domination of the national democrats in legal democratic alliances, coalition politics suffered and the opportuni­ ties presented by the Aquino assassination lost.” See "When a Zigzag Turn is Shorter than a Straight Route,” Praktika: Theoretical Journal of the Party National Urban Center, Vol. 1, No, 1, 14 May 1986, pp. 21-22. 18 AB, August 1984,

The Left and Other Forces

49

19 Alexander R. Magno, “Chaos in Search of a Paradigm”, Diliman Review, Vol. 32, No. 6. November-December 1984, p. 7.

20 AB, April 1984. 21 AB, May 1984, pp. 2-3.

22 AB, June 1984, p. 5. 2 3 “In Search of a Credible and Effective Alternative to Marcos”, Plaridel Papers, No. 1, October 1983, p. 13. 2 4“The Opposition: Lines of Fragmentation, Lines of Coali­ tion”, Reprinted in the New Philippine Review: A Quarterly on Theory and Current Affairs, Vol. 1. No. 3. January 1985, pp. 9-11.

2 5 Ibid., Vol. 1. No. 1. May-July 1984, p. 7. 2 b Ibid., p. 9.

2 7 See for example, the papers in Praktika, op. cit. 2 8 AB, December 1984, p, 2. The Welgang Bayan was supposed Io be the “climactic upsurge in the current revolutionary situation.” In operation, it was described as “a general and coordinated multinorloral form of struggle in the cities and may also encompass part nl' the countryside. Its most distinct form and immediate effect is Ilie paralyzation of the normal activities of society and the shaking • ■I I hr economic and political foundations of the fascist state”. 2 9 See Aida Manansala, “Polarization in Philippine Politics: Interviews with Leandro Alejandro [BAYAN Secretary-General], Ihuinuel V. Soriano [BANDILA Executive Vice President] and Mr Inn C. David [KAAKBAY UP Chapter Chairperson], Diliman llcvlew, Vol 34, No. 1. January - February 1986. ' ” "Sectarianism . . .

op. cit.

'1 The New Philippine Review, op. cit. p. 10.

52 AB, July 1986, p. 6.

Rapporteur’s Report: Open Forum on the Abinales Lecture

The lecture drew an immediate response iri the form of this question: Are the national democrats alone, or for the most part, responsible for the failure of the various left forces to unite in a single united front? Abinales contended that this is not necessarily the case. There is, for instance, in the social democratic prog­ ram, a line that states that this movement refuses to ally with the extreme Left. This puts unreasonable constraints on the extent the SDs can have relations with the NDs. A lot of attempts to build united front mechanisms, however, failed because ND groups which are vastly superior in num­ ber tried to overly dominate the coalitions. An illustrative instance of this was the case of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN) founding congress in 1985.

The manner by which the big tradition relates with the little traditions has always been problematic: shall the big tradition dictate or shall it compromise?

50

Rapporteur's Report

51

A comment was offered regarding the failure of the paper to locate the operational categories of the revolu­ tionary movement within the framework of its overall strategy. Considering that the CPP maintains the strategic view that puts primacy on armed struggle, united ftont involvement cannot but be subordinated to the need to sustain the armed struggle. Unless there is a significant departure from this strategic view, there shall really be very little interest on the part of the CPP to enter into a united front on a strategic basis with other progressive forces. Abinales noted that while there is constant affirma­ tion of the principal role of armed struggle, legal mass struggles have come to enjoy greater importance. The issue of strategy is an open one. In the course of the struggle against dictatorship, the paper notes, the social democrats have tended to uncriti­ cally ally with the reactionary anti-Marcos forces. Is not the dominant ND attitude towards the SDs justified inso­ far as the latter have tended to objectively align with the counter-revolutionary rather than the revolutionary forces? The social democratic movement, according to Abinales, is not to be seen as a monolith. When martial law was imposed, the movement could not agree on a common strategy. It has tended to factionalize. An intense debate us late as 1980 led to a major split in the movement. Is the ND insistence on armed struggle against the Marcos dictatorship and now against the Aquino govern­ ment premised on valid analysis? The national democrats have, according to the lec­ turer, favored a combination of forms of struggle. The armed struggle is not to be understood as a purely military effort. The NPA functions also as a political and educa­ tional arm of the movement. The increased frequency of tactical offensives may be unfairly judged as an indication of growing militarism. It is also an expression of greater political confidence in the consolidated areas. The assertion that the Aquino government is basically similar to the Marcos regime needs further review. It might be unfair to expect the revolutionary Left to lay down its arms considering the armed strength of the

52

Marxism in the Philippines II

right-wing of this political arrangement. Also, while state power may be taken in an unarmed way, it will have to be ultimately defended with arms. Wasn’t the NDF created to topple the dictatorship? Has it now lost its political validity? The NDF, the lecturer clarified, was formed not only to spearhead the anti-dictatorship struggle but also to lead in the realization of an alternative social order. Isn’t the task of the little traditions, instead of making appeals to the NDs, to make themselves into indis­ pensable revolutionary forces, and in so doing, require the NDs to deal with them? The NDs themselves recognize the necessity for the other progressive groups to develop. But, pending relative parity, it is important to cultivate attitudes of openness and mutual respect between the big and little traditions. Why the hostility between the social democrats and the national democrats? The two ideological trends have viewed each other with suspicion. The NDs have seen the SDs as “clericofascists”. Historical wounds heal very slowly. The NDs should not now feel threatened by the SDs. They must generally open up to the variety of progressive ideas. Fili­ pino Marxists ought to be open to non-Marxist contribu tions to the over-all development of Philippine revolution ary theory and practice. Isn’t it central to Marxist-Leninist theory that th< revolutionary party play a vanguard role and educate thi reformist parties? Does not this drive to achieve ideolo gical and political hegemony over other forces run agains the grain of the united front project? The lecturer preferred to refrain from confronting, t the moment, the preceding questions. A comment was raised from the floor regarding th unreliability of documentary evidence in studying tl behavior of an essentially clandestine party. The publishe views fail to accurately convey the initiatives and practic of the clandestine party towards actualizing coalitic policies. This is a methodological difficulty for scholai " ■-■--■—i „„„„.,„+c nmvide only the tip of the iceberg.

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This comment provoked an extended and lively debate revolving around the difficulty encountered by potential allies in judging the intents, motives, and sincerity of a revolutionary party considering the gap between published views and private negotiating positions. The enthusiasm for the discussion notwithstanding, a commentator inquired into the actual necessity for a united front. Such a front is not organized for its own sake. It demands some necessity for a unity of action among ideologically diverse groups. Is there such a neces­ sity pertaining? The lecturer remarked that a united front is necessary for the broad Left to gain a meaningful presence. The achievement of a progressive hegemony requires that various left streams act with some harmony. A second commentator added that the continuing economic crisis provides an objective basis of unity due to a renewed political and class polarization. The different forces may be drawn together not because of the magnani­ mity of the bigger forces but because of the sharpness of the progressive forces in reading the ongoing changes in the social structure and the accompanying polarizations. There is, continued the commentator, no need for a united front mechanism to exist all the time. The basis for unity is not always clear for different revolutionary forces. There are contradicting definitions, for instance, of social revolution. One looks at it as a continuing process of change in social relations, the other as the actual seizure of slate power. The necessity for united front building comes when the moment demands it, when history calls for it. A third commentator noted that the archetype for a united front here is the anti-fascist front built during the second world war. When the decision to forge a united front came, the participating parties submerged their differences. In the case of the NDF, theoretically a united front mechanism, the urgency was posed by the imposition of martial law. It assumed that all forces fighting the Marcos dictatorship submit their own political agenda to the united front. The united front mechanism is something distinct and definable: a conciliatory attitude towards

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fraternal movements and parties, or the formalization of a broad progressive sensibility. A fourth commentator noted the concept of a united front in China which involves the historical unity of anti­ imperialist social classes. This notion was criticized by other discussants insistent on treating the united front question as a political and not an interclass question. A fifth commentator noted that there are two reasons for which a united front is advocated. One is practicality, the reason of joining forces in order to improve chances of winning. The other calls for the formation of a united front as a matter of political principle. In the second, there seems to be a connection between united front policies and the belief that freedom of thought must be sustained. A political party which is capable of making a united front even before a revolution prefigures a post-revolutionary situation in which there is less conflict on the question of freedom of thought. . Looking at the agenda of the NDF, one commen­ tator noted that two concepts are prominent: anti-imper­ ialism and democracy. The concept of democracy, during the 70s was understood in the sense of being antifeudal. It is proposed that the concept now be enriched beyond the liquidation of landlordism to the democratization of every aspect of our social life — political life, economic life — and democratization in terms of pluralism even with­ in the leftist community. In other words, an increase in intellectual tolerance and an end to bigotry and dog­ matism. Another commentator noted that only the NDF, it seems, is serious about building their organizations within the various basic social sectors. Other groups must culti­ vate the same seriousness in order to set the foundations for progressive pluralism in the future. A student pointed out the necessity for openness in united front work within the Left. Sectarianism has been a serious obstacle to effective united front work. As a final point, it was noted that over the last few years of struggle against the Marcos dictatorship, there

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have been numerous instances of broad cooperation. These provide rich experiences in the value of united front politics, the failures in establishing a formal mechanism notwithstanding. Perhaps united front politics will have to be understood outside its very specific meaning in Marx­ ist-Leninist usage.

Harmony and Contradiction: The Marxist-Christian Dialogue since the Christians for National Liberation Mario Bolasco

Since the February Revolution, a number of para­ doxes has visited the Marxist-Christian dialogue. While the pivotal intervention of the institutional church during the February days virtually marginalized radical clerics and religious, the Christians for National Liberation (CNL) has claimed that its membership has increased to 4,000, up from 1,500 before the Revolution. Judging from the tone of the CNL national congress in November 1986 and one provincial and three regional congresses in the first quarter of 1987, the linkage with Marxists seems to be holding firm despite Cardinal Sin’s declaration that the church’s erstwhile tolerance of leftist clerics during the Marcos regime has been rescinded with the ouster of the dictator. Finally while radical religious discourse seems to have greatly diminished purchase in the Catholic church, the radical currency has appreciated in certain key Protestant churches. This paper examines the process that catapulted the

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The Marxist-Christian Dialogue

57

church to the dizzying heights it occupied in February and the consequent, albeit also self-inflicted, marginalization of radical religious. It also tries to account for the renewed vigor of radical religious in the aftermath of February by the very same process that tried to exclude them. Finally using mainly the four issues of Pilipinas, the revived official publication of the CNL, we will assess the CNL’s response to the present conjuncture, paying special atten­ tion to the beneficent or baneful impact of certain stances io Philippine Marxism on such orientations.

« to become big. It has constantly stressed this, especially after IIIH3 But alongside their growth, I think there is still the necessity tor linlli traditions to keep on relating with each other. That relation would more or less establish the viability or non-viability of coaliilon between these groups and the bigger ND forces. So, I think In the case of the ‘little traditions', the principle of allowing

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them independence to carry on with their attempts and initiatives still applies. But I would like to stress that in the process of growing along parallel lines, there is a need to constantly relate to each other on a more mature way based on mutual respect on commonality and diversity of opinions. In the past, there was none. Worse, a lot of sectarianism destroyed efforts at interaction. Whatever organiza­ tional fora that afforded communication opportunities ended up in recriminations and even splits.

Q: Central to one of Nemenzo’s papers was the argument that the death of the PKP marked the rebirth of the Philippine communist movement. Should a split occur in the CPP today, what would its implications be on the united front project, and the balance of forces? A: I think the united front project would benefit a lot should a split occur within the CPP-ML. Meaning, you have now new “little traditions” emanating out of the “big tradition” that is the Party. All these traditions, by force of circumstances (i.e., to survive a rightwing or bourgeois liberal onslaught), will find it more urgent to relate to each other.

However, in terms of the balance of forces, a split within the CPP now will lead to an imbalance in favor of the Right and the socalled Center, and the diminution of Left influence and participa­ tion in Philippine politics. I sincerely hope that this will not happen. Q: Why are the Filipino NDs attacking the local SDs? Whereas in Europe, the NDs are courting the SDs? How would you react to the allegation that the increasing conflict between the NDs and the SDs is due to the fact that the latter, as an ideological and political force, is becoming a big threat to the former? A: I don’t know much about European politics. The attack of the NDs on the SDs I think, has recently decreased. Some NDs we interviewed were open to the idea that the term ‘clerico-fascist’ was an unfair category to describe the SDs. There are some NDs now who are open to a more strategic relationship with their erst­ while ideological opponents. Ed dela Torre, for example, in his popular democratic assertions, expressed his intentions to relate with the SDs, with the aim of forming a more lasting formal demo­ cratic coalition.

But in spite of these changes, i.e., the non-sectarian attitude towards the SDs, vestiges of the old formulation toward the SD

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movement stitl persist principally because of the fact that the wounds of history heal very slow. These were aggravated by the conflicts between the two during the Marcos dictatorship. They remained hostile to each other even as some SDs seem to have adopted some of the ND categories.

NDF solidarity with social democratic groups in Europe, I think, is dictated more by pragmatism. The NDF recognizes that the SDs are influential in Europe such that it has to tone down its criticisms of social democracy, social democratic government and parties in exchange for the possibility that these parties and govern­ ments may recognize the NDF in the near future. I think this position of the NDs to view the SDs as a threat should be revised. Any serious and honest Marxist must not feel threatened by ideas which are quite progressive, but which do not fall strictly within the Marxist-Leninist, or even the Maoist frame­ work. That anonymous Filipino revolutionary who was interviewed stated that it would be un-Marxist for a Marxist to shut off ideas and formulations that did not come from the Marxist tradition. It is precisely by integrating and systematizing these ideas that Marxists can test their ideas and political positions. NDs should not feel apprehensive over the SDs as an ideological and political threat. Rather, they must be mature and broad-minded enough to mt this as a non-Marxist contribution to the overall development of Philippine revolutionary theory and practice. Q: But isn’t it a cardinal maxim in Marxist-Leninist theory that n revolutionary party must constantly play a leading ideological role? That it’s part of the burden of the revolutionary party toedumii' the reformist parties and to lead these parties?

A Yes. Marxist-Leninists as revolutionaries are supposed to achieve hegemony over other forces. But how to achieve this poliilenl and ideological hegemony over the other forces is another question.

Q Is there not a fundamental contradiction then between what Leninism demands, and what united front building demands? A

In the case of the Nicaraguan revolution, yes.

9 A footnote to the methodological approach is the difficulty of reiving on documentary evidence, especially if you’re studying Ure dynamics of a Party whose main activity for a long time has been rlandi'itlne work. You will never really be able to capture the dy-

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namics and the complexity of the problems, the twists and turns of the struggle. My point is that maybe we should be careful in making conclusions by relying mainly on texts and documentary evidence, as seen, for instance, in official publications. If you are familiar with the kinds of practices and initiatives pursued by the Left in trying to actualize coalition politics, you will be amazed. Some of the initiatives made are simply unthinkable. And these are not reflected in any way in the official documents. I am simply saying that there are a number of works simply tied down to studying, as it were, the tip of the iceberg. Maybe this will need a far more de­ tailed kind of research to really understand what I already referred to as the dynamics and complexity of the problem we are trying to clarify here. Secondly, in trying to conceptualize the concepts and prac­ tice of coalition politics, you were dealing here with groups which are very clearly ideologically defined — groups like the NDs and the SDs. While it cannot be said that the elite oppositionist politicians may also have a well-articulated kind of ideology, they at least have one unifying thread that runs through their practice, and it is a very grievous threat: anti-communism. The point then is, to under­ stand the concept and practice of coalition politics in Philippine experience, you have to take careful notice of these material cons­ traints. Expecting groups and organizations which are very clearly ideological, having specific programmes to try to come together, raises a hell lot of a problems. What may not possibly happen here in the country is a form of coalition politics where you have various groups of different ideolo­ gies actually coming together, forming part of a formal structure of whatever name. Precisely because of the material constraints, it is really difficult to agree even on the most basic terms. If your poten­ tial units in united front politics are, to begin with, highly ideologi­ cal, one possibility may be a kind of coalition where the revolution­ ary party in fact stresses the strengthening of its own basic for­ ces. Then, what will happen is the establishment of a united front or coalition with ideological groups outside the framework of a formal structure. We already know from several experiences the problems encountered in coalitions conceptualized within a structure; why these coalitions’ lives were short-lived. When you want to bring together as broad a coalition of forces as possible, but at the same time, the party or the organization undertaking that has a clearly defined program and ideology, what sort of compromises are involved in that kind of politics?

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A: I agree with you on the ideological premises that dictate a re­ volutionary party’s relations with other groups. But sectarianism is definitely not ideological. It is an ideological deviation which is a major problem of the Left. For example, a writer in Praktika said, and I quote: Many times since the Aquino assassination, the prole­ tarian revolutionary displayed sectarianism in advancing the open mass-movement, and in developing broad legal alliances, due to the dogmatic insistence on the ND line, and also due to unreasonable assertions of the domination of the ND in legal democratic alliances.

This means that people from the ND tendency, while taking into account the comprehensive ideological position of the ND, took cognizance of the fact that it can impose certain limitations on coalition politics. Maybe the problem of coalitions during the Marcos era was that the Left approached coalition politics in too comprehensive a manner. There were a lot of issues which groups ■ an work upon while mindful of the differences in the ideological posture, and the comprehensiveness of each other’s programmes. Of course, it’s more difficult now because a different type of government is in place. Some of the forces which the Left tried to win over, or tried to relate to — badly — in the Marcos era, are now part of what the Left considers as a reactionary regime.

l'omment(C): The point raised here is interesting, not only from a nivtliodological point of view. The issue raised by the question is: i bin you really draw certain conclusions if the data you are using are Imically documentary material like Ang Bayan? I would agree that I h