Maritime Rights Movement/Univ Microfilm: A Study in Canadian Regionalism 9780773560710

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This book provides the first full account of a major social and political movement of the interwar years in Canada: the campaign for "Maritime Rights" twhich erupted in the Atlantic provinces after World War I. Ernest R. Forbes traces the history of the movement from its origins in the decline in relative status and influence of the Maritimes that accompanied the rise of the West and the growing dominance of the Central Canadian metropolises. Maritimers saw their political influence reduced, the underpinnings of their economy — especially in the critical areas of tariffs, freight rates, and subsidies — whittled away, and Canada defined in terms that seemed to exclude them. Adopting a strategy characteristic of the progressive movements of the period, they attempted through organization and agitation to restore their position. Farmers, fishermen, manufacturers, and organized labour articulated their demands through the provincial press, boards of trade, union locals, educational conferences, and mass delegations to Ottawa. Professor Forbes challenges traditional assumptions in his emphasis upon a vigorous Maritime progressivism that transcended party affiliations. All the political parties tried to use the protest movement, but none had created it, nor had it a specific founder or leader. The agitation was in fact a spontaneous expression of the economic and social frustrations of the Maritime people. Although their efforts were largely defeated by the conflicting interests of stronger regions, and by the King government's adroitness in defusing protest through a policy of study and delay, the author believes that the aroused Maritimers had succeeded in establishing their difficulties in the public's mind as a national problem. Ernest R. Forbes is a member of the Department of History of the University of New Brunswick.

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THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1919-1927 A Study in Canadian Regionalism

Ernest R. Forbes

McGILL-QUEEN S UNIVERSITY MONTREAL

PRESS

© McGill-Queen's University Press 1979 ISBN 0-7735-0321-8 (cloth) ISBN 0-7735-0330-7 (paper) Legal Deposit first quarter 1979 Bibliotheque nationale du Quebec Paperbound edition reprinted 1980, 1987 This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Social Science Research Federation of Canada using funds provided by the Canada Council Printed in Canada on acid-free paper. Design by Richard Hendel

CONTENTS

Preface vii ONE Division in Diversity 1 TWO The Birth of a Region !3 THREE

Crosscurrents: The Farmer-Labour Movement 38 FOUR

The Impact of Depression 54 FIVE

The Campaign Emerges 73

six A National Appeal 96 SEVEN

The Politics of Maritime Rights 124

EIGHT

Defusing the Agitation 158 NINE

Raking the Embers 182 Abbreviations !93 Notes !95 Bibliography 229 Index 238 MAP

Railways Serving the Maritime Provinces xii

PREFACE

"Maritime Rights" was the slogan of a regional protest movement which erupted in the Maritime provinces after World War I. The movement originated in the decline in relative status and influence of the Maritimes which accompanied the rise of the West and the growing dominance of the Central Canadian metropolises. Particularly after 1900, Maritimers saw their political influence reduced, the underpinnings of their economy whittled away, and Canada defined in terms which seemed to exclude them. Adopting a strategy characteristic of the progressive movements of the period, they attempted through organization and agitation to restore their position. But regional decline continued, accelerated by a crushing economic depression. The efforts of Maritimers to redress their grievances within the traditional political parties were largely frustrated by the conflicting interests of stronger regions. Nevertheless they did succeed in establishing their difficulties in the public's mind as a national problem. In 1926 a federal royal commission devised a program for Maritime economic rehabilitation, only to have the federal government turn it into a program for political pacification. The movement died before the end of the decade, as the optimism which had sustained it gave way to a cynical appreciation of the region's weakness. This study differs from traditional interpretations chiefly in its perception of the Maritime Rights movement and in the assertion of a vigorous Maritime progressivism.1 Previous scholars have focused upon the activities of politicians. Indeed some have left the impression that the movement was born in the summer of 1922 in the attempts of certain Halifax residents to revive a moribund Conservative party.2 To attribute the movement to the Conservatives, however, is to ignore the fact that the agitation on the basic issues in the movement had begun at least three years earlier. Prior to the elections in 1920, provincial governments had used the agitation on subsidies and vn

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freight rates to demonstrate regional solidarity and to divert from themselves criticism for the failure to implement progressive reforms. Liberal candidates in the federal election of 1921 tried to channel the agitation against the federal government and Liberal organizer H. J. Logan specifically proclaimed the term "Maritime Rights" as the slogan of the movement. There was some truth in later complaints by the Liberals that the Conservatives had "broken into our pantry and stole our prize bone."3 Although all parties tried to use the Maritime Rights agitation, none had created it. The agitation was a spontaneous expression of the economic and social frustrations of the Maritime people. As such, the movement had no specific founder and no single leader. As farmers, labour, and manufacturers and other businessmen perceived their postwar aspirations blocked by the disabilities of the region, they began to demand their alleviation as a matter of right. The agitation emerged before the end of 1919 as they articulated their demands through boards of trade, trade union locals, educational conferences, and the provincial legislatures. While individuals such as sometime labour journalist Charles Lunn of Truro, H. S. Congdon of Dartmouth, a former teacher and journalist, and A. P. Patterson of Saint John, a wholesale merchant, were especially prominent in the rationalization and publicity of certain issues in the Maritime case, they were but three of the many who were involved. Of these some were politicians. But in helping to organize and in seeking to channel the agitation, politicians were responding to, much more than they were creating, the popular movement. In this sense the Maritime Rights agitation might be called a social movement. It was not, however, an outgrowth of class struggle. There was class conflict in the Maritimes coincident with the regional agitation, but the two were not directly related. Although each occupational group tended to define "Maritime Rights" in terms of its own particular interest, all associated in a common, albeit amorphous, campaign for the defence of the region. Only in the case of the Cape Breton coal miners, increasingly preoccupied with their war against the capitalists controlling their industry, did social conflict inhibit participation in the regional campaign.4 This is not to suggest an occupational equality in representation among the leaders of the movement; these were predominantly businessmen and professionals. But businessmen and professionals were the public leaders in most Maritime communities. Even at the peak of their occupational "class" consciousness, farmer-labour conviii

PREFACE

ventions might look to these groups for political representatives.5 The role of a traditional elite in the Maritime Rights movement was further enhanced by the strategic importance of boards of trade. Formed for purposes of regional defence and promotion, the Maritime Board of Trade provided a logical vehicle for organizing and expressing regional protest. Labouring groups were prepared to support such leadership so long as it appeared to be in their interests to do so. In short, the leadership of the Maritime Rights movement reflected the social realities of the Maritimes in that period. This study's portrayal of Maritime attitudes to the tariff also contradicts traditional assumptions. Studies of Maritime protests in the 186os, 188os, and 1930$ have appeared to confirm the impression of a consistent and dominant continentalist bias.6 Yet recent scholarship, which has emphasized the economic and political importance to the Maritime Provinces of mining and manufacturing industries developed under the protective blanket of Canada's "national policy," suggests an alternative view.7 Most Maritimers were protectionist in their regional goals by the mid-19205. Having recently been excluded from the benefits of the national policy blanket, their immediate reaction was to try to get back under. Only after this approach had failed to save their industries did a majority seek to wrest the blanket from others. The tradition of Maritime conservatism is more formidable to challenge. Contemporaries from outside the region have frequently attested to its existence. Scholars whose own memories date back to the 19305 affirm it unequivocally.8 Until recent years students of such progressive trends as the social gospel or radical politics, apparently unable to conceive of such phenomena in the "conservative" Maritimes, have virtually omitted that region from their studies.9 The term conservative implies a comparison, but few scholars applying the term to the Maritimes have actually compared this region with others in any direct or explicit fashion. In some periods the Maritimes may have been more conservative. Mildred Schwartz, for example, finds a higher degree of political cynicism in the Maritimes in the 19605 than in other Canadian regions.10 Yet one must beware of reading history backwards. Maritime society in the decade of the Great War, if judged in terms of other periods, was anything but conservative. This was an era when a progressive ideology was sweeping across North America.11 All groups in society tended to imbibe the heady reform brew of "progressivism" and sought to apply it in their own interests. The churches accepted the optimistic theology of the social ix

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

gospel, farmers and labour experimented with new forms of cooperative, union, and political organization, and businessmen sought more efficient or businesslike governments. Maritime Rights was born amid a climate of optimism and progressive thinking. Only gradually as the decade unfolded would there develop signs of the disillusionment, cynicism, and pessimism traditionally associated with the region. This work is based upon an earlier study undertaken at Queen's University. My debts in its preparation have been many. Archivists and librarians in the Maritimes, Ottawa, and Kingston have been courteous and helpful. I owe even more to the many individuals and private institutions who gave me access to the correspondence and records in their possession and shared orally their knowledge and memories of the subject. To all I express my sincere gratitude. Among these I must give special thanks to three, without whose assistance this study would have been a much less complete and more speculative account. Mr. and Mrs. H. H. Congdon, then of Huntsville, Ontario, admitted me freely to his father's valuable papers, offered my wife and myself the hospitality of their home while we perused them, and gave hours of their time in recalling events in which his father had participated. At Moncton Mr. Craig Dixon of the Atlantic Provinces Transportation Commission interrupted the routine of a busy office to allow me full use of its library and the papers and records of the commission. I am also grateful for instruction and advice from teachers at Queen's and Dalhousie Universities and colleagues at the Universities of Victoria and of New Brunswick. I would like to thank in particular Professors William Acheson, J. Murray Beck, Philip Buckner, Frederick Gibson, Tony MacKenzie, George Rawlyk, and Patricia Roy for reading and criticizing the manuscript. Professor Roger Graham of Queen's University has been most helpful in his criticism and suggestions. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Irene, who has participated in all stages of the preparation but the actual writing, and has worked to keep the author sane through the process.

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Railways Serving the Maritime Provinces

CHAPTER ONE

Division in Diversity

Maritime regionalism or regional consciousness was weak and imperfectly developed at the beginning of the twentieth century. Physically, the three provinces, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island, form a natural region with well-defined boundaries isolated by rugged terrain from the population centres of Central Canada and bearing an affinity to the ocean which all but surrounds it. But the identification of the people with the region as a whole was slow to materialize. In fact, the major thrust of historical development for more than three hundred years was directed against the coalescence of the area as a distinct regional unit.1 Politically, the territory was almost continually divided: up to 1763 by the conflicting jurisdictions and claims of French and British imperial interests; after 1784 by the decision of colonial administrators in London. A brief flurry of interest among journalists and politicians in political union in the midnineteenth century was quickly defused by the fruition of the more ambitious scheme for a union of all the British North American colonies. At a national level Confederation promised to meet the political and economic aspirations of those ambitious for unity while preserving existing colonial divisions in the form of separate provinces. Economically, too, division had been the rule. Under French rule, different sections entered to a greater or lesser degree the economic orbits of metropolitan centres in France, Quebec, and New England.2 After the American Revolution the people were divided over whether economic integration within the Empire or with the United States should be the avenue for successful development.3 Confederation offered a third option which drew some parts of the 1

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

region into the orbit of Central Canada. Divided in allegiance economically among at least three metropolitan centres, London, Boston, and Montreal, the Maritimes also failed to develop a central metropolis of its own. Halifax's aspirations were strongly resisted by the outports of Nova Scotia, while Saint John was no more successful in dominating the competing river systems of its own province.4 Diverse settlement patterns likewise contributed to prevent the development of a common historical tradition. Descendants of the Acadian French looked back to a "golden age" before the expulsion of 1755 disrupted their society and left the remainder a refugee minority in their own territory. The descendants of pre-loyalist settlers in Halifax and western Nova Scotia fixed upon the 1749 founding of that city and the victory of the English over the French as the crucial period in the establishment of their society.5 New Brunswickers, particularly in the lower Saint John River valley, exalted the loyalists as the founders of their province and portrayed their values and virtues as deserving of emulation.6 In the eastern half of Nova Scotia the Scottish myth reigned supreme, as its residents celebrated the landing of the Hector at Pictou in 1773 and extolled the Scottish pioneers for introducing the best features of the provincial character.7 Thus there was relatively little in the long history of the Maritimes to provide a truly collective historical experience, either actual or mythical, through which the people might develop a strong regional consciousness. A variety of cultural, economic, and political traditions and interests were created which would have to be reconciled before a genuine regional consciousness could emerge. The political and economic integration of the Maritimes with the rest of Canada initially seemed to remove the need for a regional focus. The "national policies" of Sir John A. Macdonald and Sir Wilfrid Laurier received strong support from the people of the region.8 That Maritimers shared fully in the intellectual currents which accompanied the "rise of national feeling" is suggested by their prominence in various manifestations of imperialism, now identified as variants of Canadian nationalism, and in their contributions to a nationalistic literature through such notable representatives as Charles G. D. Roberts and Bliss Carman.9 The identification with the nation at the higher level and with the cultural group, economic interest, province, or local community at the lower seemed to leave little reason for interest in or loyalty to a Maritime region.10 Division and diversity were still the outstanding characteristics of the Maritime economy, culture, and politics in the early twentieth 2

DIVISION IN DIVERSITY

century. The basic economic division lay between those industries whose products sold at prices determined largely in an international market and those which received tariff or other assistance in marketing their products nationally. In the former category were the first three of what S. A. Saunders calls the four "cornerstones" of the Maritime economy—fishing, lumbering, and agriculture.11 In the latter was the fourth pillar, mining, closely associated with an increasingly important manufacturing complex. The dichotomy in outlook in the nineteenth century between those Nova Scotians engaged in the old economy of mercantile activity and primary production and those anticipating industrial development based upon large coal reserves and an effective integration with the Canadian economy has already been explored.12 The expectations of the nineteenth century were partly realized in the first two decades of the twentieth. Coal production, centred largely in the major fields of Cape Breton, Cumberland and Pictou counties, increased nearly threefold from the turn of the century, averaged 7,520,535 short tons annually from 1911 to 1915, and by 1920 directly employed 12,276 men.13 Its growth reflected in part the demands of a rapidly expanding manufacturing complex. Between 1900 and 1920 capital investment in manufacturing in Nova Scotia rose over 400 per cent to $148.3 million. In 1920 manufacturing ranked a close second to agriculture and accounted for 31.9 per cent of the net value of production in the province. Part of the manufactures, such as the products of sawmills and fish-canning plants, were closely associated with the old extractive industries. But, even excluding these, manufactures accounted for 23.3 per cent of the total value of production and together with the mines represented 41.7 per cent of the total output of the province. Manufacturing also grew rapidly in New Brunswick, as capital investment increased fivefold to $109.5 milli°n in 1920. It accounted for 31.4 per cent of production, of which all but 13.3 per cent was in the field of resource industries, notably forestry.14 The growth of the iron and steel industry, which mushroomed between the beginning of the century and the outbreak of the war, provided the most spectacular example of the expansion of manufacturing in the Maritime provinces. Pig iron production in Nova Scotia multiplied seventeen times from 25,119 long tons in 1900 to 428,632 in 1913.15 By the latter year the iron, steel, and coal industries were organized under two large corporations. The Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Corporation operated the colleries at Stellarton in Pictou County, and at Sydney Mines, Cape Breton, where in slightly over a 3

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

decade it had built all the facilities necessary for the primary production of iron and steel—blast furnaces, open hearth furnaces, and coking ovens. At New Glasgow it erected elaborate facilities for the manufacture of the finished product—furnaces, forges, rolling mills, axle works, and all the machinery for the production of the components of metal railway cars and, after 1911, the cars themselves.16 Almost simultaneously, the Dominion Iron and Steel Corporation, which operated the coal mines of Springhill and Glace Bay, established at Sydney the furnaces for the production of a considerably greater volume of iron and steel. It gradually added the forges and shops for finished products such as steel rails, wire rods, and steel plate.17 By 1907 the two corporations produced 56 per cent of the pig iron manufactures in the country and were marketing their products nationwide.18 The growth in the iron and steel industry was accompanied by a marked expansion in other manufactures. Traditional industries such as textiles, boots and shoes, brushes, furniture, and foundries enjoyed a revitalized existence, and new factories were established for the production of a variety of more sophisticated commodities such as generators, marine engines, pianos, gramophones, and, for brief periods, automobiles and farm tractors.19 Such expansion had been encouraged by the buoyant national economy of the Laurier era. Aided by the protective tariff and a favourable system of freight rates, Maritime manufacturers were able to compete successfully with those of Central Canada in supplying the settlers of the rapidly growing West. The Maritimes had finally acquired a hinterland which permitted a volume of production necessary for effective competition and industrial survival. The tariff had also assisted Maritime coal producers to capture a substantial share of the Quebec market. At the beginning of the World War 38.6 per cent of their total production was shipped to St. Lawrence ports.20 With the iron and steel industry likewise built up under a system of bounties and tariffs, the mining and nonextractive manufacturing industries of the Maritimes had a strong vested interest in the maintenance of the tariff system and the close integration of the Maritime and Central Canadian economies. The new industrial growth tended to follow a linear pattern from Saint John eastward through Moncton, Amherst, Truro, and the towns of Pictou and Cape Breton counties. The expansion was reflected in figures for both population and capital investment in manufacturing. Between 1901 and 1921, for example, the combined 4

DIVISION IN DIVERSITY

populations of the four urban centres of Moncton, Amherst, New Glasgow, and Sydney more than doubled. 21 In 1920 capital investment in these communities surpassed by ten million dollars the total investment in manufacturing for the whole Maritime region at the beginning of the century.22 Economic interest, however, drew the outlying areas to a more continentalist or international orientation. Here the people were involved primarily in the traditional staples of agriculture, fisheries, and forestry and their related manufactures. As these industries tended to be much more dependent upon international markets, the benefits of the "national policy" were frequently less apparent to their participants than its disadvantages in raising the cost of production. Thus there tended to be a latent but fundamental division in the region on basic economic policy—a division which contributed to the sharpness and consistency of political divisions among and within the various constituencies. The diversity of interest was dictated not only by the concentration of different industries in different sections but also by the variety of specializations within each industry. Agriculture, which with its related manufactures accounted for 45.5 per cent of the total value of production in the Maritime provinces23 was located in more or less clearly defined areas. In Nova Scotia the arable sections lay in the northern counties, from Digby in the west to Inverness county in the east. In New Brunswick they followed the river valleys and included the Fundy lowlands of Westmorland and Albert counties, as well as a number of isolated portions along the coast. In Prince Edward Island, agriculture, encompassing 81 per cent of the total production, was dominant throughout.24 But the agricultural areas differed markedly both in the nature of production and the market sought. In counties such as Pictou, Hants, Cumberland, and Colchester in Nova Scotia and Westmorland and Kings in New Brunswick, dairy farming predominated, with its chief market in the local urban centres. In the other fertile sections the farmers tended to rely to a greater extent on the production of a few basic staples for export. The Annapolis and Cornwallis valleys, rich in soil and sheltered in climate, ran through the counties of Kings and Annapolis, giving to them a virtual monopoly of the province's multimillion dollar apple industry which found its principal market in the United Kingdom.25 In New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island the potato emerged as the chief agricultural export, mainly to the American and West Indian markets. In the less fertile areas, such as the the southern counties of Nova 5

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

Scotia and the northern counties of New Brunswick, subsistence farming was often combined with fishing or lumbering. The forest industry was concentrated in New Brunswick, where in 1920 it accounted for 35.4 per cent of the total value of production (compared to 8.7 per cent in Nova Scotia and 4.2 per cent in Prince Edward Island). In the census of 1921, despite the recession, 4,357 listed their primary occupation as loggers, 4,423 were employed in saw and planing mills, while "wood and paper industries" provided jobs for 4,193 more.26 These figures, of course, did not include the men who worked part time in the industry or cut timber from privately owned woodlots. Crown lands leased to more than a hundred logging companies yielded almost a million dollars annually, the largest source of revenue for the provincial government. An incipient pulp industry in the northern towns had attained an estimated annual net yield of five million dollars by i92i. 27 Both pulp and lumber industries were primarily dependent on foreign markets, largely in the United States and Great Britain. In Nova Scotia the output of the forests was considerable, ranking ahead of the fisheries in value of production. Yet logging and sawmill activities provided full-time employment to a relatively small proportion of the labour force. Much of the production came from privately owned woodlots and provided a supplemental income for farmers and fishermen. Perhaps for this reason it was not taken very seriously by provincial governments. Compared with that of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia's revenue from crown timber lands was insignificant, totaling a paltry $52,050 for ig2O.28 Employing 8.3 per cent of the work force on a full or part-time basis, the fisheries formed an important element in the economy of all three provinces. For the peak year 1919, 22,083 fishermen resided in Nova Scotia, 10,876 in New Brunswick and 3,391 in Prince Edward Island.29 In Nova Scotia they were concentrated in those counties which had the least arable soil and usually slight industrial development. Led by Lunenburg, Shelburne, and Halifax in that order, ten of the counties were home to more than 89 per cent of the fishermen of the province.30 In New Brunswick the industry was located on the east and north shores, the Bay of Fundy, and the Grand Manan islands at the entrance to the bay. The fisheries also varied sharply in kind, organization and markets. There was a basic division between the salt and fresh fisheries. The former was the traditional industry of the region. Cod, haddock, and a variety of ground fish were sun-dried or pickled in brine for export, 6

DIVISION IN DIVERSITY

primarily to the West Indies. This was the principal product of the famous Lunenburg fishing fleet which, organized on a semicooperative basis and composed of about ninety large schooners owned and operated by local residents, produced nearly 50 per cent of the salt cod of the province.31 The remainder of the salt fishery was in the hands of the independent fishermen of the villages which dotted the Maritime coasts. They frequently combined subsistence farming with seasonal fishing and engaged in the latter with gear which might vary from a small rowboat to a full-size schooner. They caught cod, haddock, and other species which they cured and sold to the half-dozen large fish merchants who controlled the trade locally.32 Smaller in value and volume but more profitable to the fishermen having rapid access to Canadian or American centres was the fresh fish industry. This was a product of improved techniques of refrigeration. In 1908 the federal government sought to encourage a fledgling trade in fresh fish by subsidizing one-third of the cost of less than carload lots on fast freight trains from Mulgrave, on the strait of Canso, to Montreal. By 1919, when it was discontinued, the subsidy was costing the federal government about fifty thousand dollars annually.33 In western Nova Scotia the fishermen looked to the United States as the primary outlet for both fresh and cured fish. This traditional market had been rendered unusually attractive by the reduction of the American tariff in 1913, its removal from fresh and unprocessed fish, and the elimination in 1917 of a regulation prohibiting the landing and sale of fish directly by Canadian fishermen at American ports.34 For the small independent fishermen the twomonth lobster seasons, which opened in successive periods along different parts of the coast, provided important accessions of cash from that always saleable but usually scarce commodity. Most were canned for export but a few were maintained in "pounds" and shipped live to the cities of Central Canada and New England. In the Bay of Fundy region, small herring or sardines provided the basis of a separate industry as the local inhabitants used the forty-foot tides to trap the herring in large weirs. They sold their catch by the hogshead to the expanding sardine factory at Black's Harbour near Grand Manan island. Another local variation in New Brunswick was the salmon fisheries of the Restigouche and the Miramichi. For a few weeks each year residents were permitted to net salmon in the bays and lower sections of the rivers. The leasing of the upper reaches to wealthy sport fishermen provided an additional source of provincial revenue and encouraged the development of a resort industry. 7

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

On the whole, the fisheries emphasized independence and diversity rather than cooperation. The local interests of a community might centre upon the issue of a breakwater or a wharf. While picayune indeed to the external observer, the location of a breakwater might be literally a matter of life and livelihood to the fishermen of the area, who frequently documented their claims for one with references to lives lost or vessels destroyed because of its absence.35 Such needs created an acute issue for local politicians and encouraged local rivalries rather than regional cooperation. This diversity of economic interest was a major factor in the development of independent and parochial attitudes on the part of the politicians. For one constituency the fundamental concern of the inhabitants might be cheaper access to the United States market for lumber and fish, for another it might be bounties and tariffs for coal and steel, and for still another, the location in their area of badly needed wharfage and breakwater facilities. In trying to represent the diverse interests of their constituents Maritime politicians were often found quarrelling among themselves and attempting to influence national policy in different directions. This left them at a definite disadvantage at the national level in competing with regions having more clearly defined communities of interest. Probably the most serious division had its origins in the similarity rather than differences in the economies of the ports of Halifax and Saint John. Both owed their importance as major cities to their harbours, which were ice-free the year around. Both contained the eastern terminals of major railway systems—the Intercolonial at Halifax and the Canadian Pacific Railway at Saint John. Both aspired to the winter trade of the vast Canadian hinterland when the Central Canadian ports were closed. This apparent commonality of interest was overshadowed by the competition of their businessmen for every ton of freight or dollar of business available. In fact, the jealousy of their representatives in fighting any policy which might appear to give one port some advantage over the other became a byword in Canadian political circles. Their continual bickering over issues such as mail contracts and steamship routings left the Maritime representatives bitterly divided at the federal level and even disrupted the regional association of Maritime boards of trade.36 Economic rivalry and division in the Maritimes were compounded by the persistence of distinct cultural identities based on language, religion, ethnic origin, or historical experience. The Acadian French, composed largely of descendants of the original Acadian settlers who 8

DIVISION IN DIVERSITY

had either escaped the expulsion of 1755 or had subsequently found their way back to the region, formed the most distinctive group. By 1921 the Acadians made up 18 per cent of the population of the three Maritime provinces. They tended to occupy the northern counties in New Brunswick and the western and eastern extremities of Nova Scotia, as well as small pockets of settlement along the south shore. Their location gave them a common economic base in fishing, lumbering, and farming, and sufficient concentration for a majority position in several political ridings. In New Brunswick they formed overwhelming majorities in Gloucester, Kent, and Madawaska counties, a smaller majority in Restigouche and percentages of between 22 and 39 in Westmorland, Northumberland, and Victoria. In Nova Scotia they maintained slim majorities in Digby and Richmond counties, while in Prince Edward Island they were concentrated in the county of Prince, although they formed considerably less than half the population of that county.37 Through much of the nineteenth century the Acadians remained a generally passive and politically inarticulate group. 38 In New Brunswick, aided by a high birth rate and a stronger resistance to pressure for emigration than their English-speaking neighbours, their proportion of the population had grown rapidly, from 15.7 per cent in 1871 to 24.3 per cent in 1901 and 31.2 per cent in i92i. 39 It was a growth disturbing to the English-speaking population, who were reluctant to concede to the French the political and cultural recognition which their numbers seemed to warrant. Aroused from their political lethargy by the New Brunswick Common Schools Act of 1871, and stimulated by a developing French-Canadian nationalism in Quebec, the Acadians in the latter decades of the nineteenth century began a drive for unity, recognition, and an improved status in the three provinces. In "national conventions" at Memramcook in 1881 and Miscouche, P.E.I., in 1884, representatives from all three provinces demonstrated their intention of preserving a nationalite clearly distinct from that of the French Canadians in the rest of Canada by choosing a different patron saint, feast day, flag, and "national" anthem. 40 The mythology of the new nationalism was also distinctive, for the Acadians focused their attention not on the conquest but on the expulsion. The injustice and cruelty of this event, which had already been portrayed by a number of French and English writers, particularly in the dramatic poetry of Longfellow's Evangeline, received elaborate embellishment from local historians.41 By 1889 a formal organization, la Societe Nationale de 1'Assomption, 9

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

combined the organization of Acadian conventions and celebrations with a persistent agitation for the improvement of the Acadian position in the educational, religious, and political life of their provinces. After 1903 its efforts were ably seconded by la Societe Mutuelle de 1'Assomption, a mutual insurance and benefit organization and an instrument for the maintenance and advancement of Acadian culture.42 The struggle was directed not only against the Protestant majority, as in the case of public schools, but also against the English-speaking minority within the Roman Catholic Church. In the early nineteenth century the more numerous and politically vigorous Irish Catholics had become firmly entrenched in the hierarchy of the province. Some Irish bishops, less than enthusiastic about the survival of Acadian culture, took the view that the persistence of a French-speaking Catholic group in New Brunswick served to intensify local opposition to the Catholic church. The relative growth of the Acadian element in the church in New Brunswick, from 47 per cent of the adherents in 1870 to 71 per cent in 1921,43 and their distrust of the Irish clergy on the question of cultural survival led to a determined agitation by the Acadian leaders for the appointment of their own bishops. The struggle came to successful fruition in 1919 with the appointment of Acadian bishops at Moncton and Chatham. A similar struggle for cultural recognition continued in the realm of politics as Acadians demanded representation commensurate with their numbers in all phases of government activity. Pressure for senatorial appointments, judgeships, and cabinet posts became issues of cultural concern tending to isolate the Acadians politically. The other cultural groups of the Maritimes, although not so clearly defined as the Acadians, likewise tended to combine a common religious persuasion, ethnic background, and geographic location. Of primary importance in maintaining the distinction were the strong religious affiliations which characterized Maritimersof the period. As Learned and Sills wrote in 1921, "people, including the men, go to church."44 For the English-speaking Catholic population of New Brunswick, which was largely of Irish origin, the gulf of language which separated them from the Acadians was only slightly more difficult to bridge than the gulf of religion which separated them from their Protestant neighbours. In areas of concentration, such as the city of Saint John, the Irish Catholics preserved a closely integrated group identity, which made them a factor of critical importance in elections.45 10

DIVISION IN DIVERSITY

Universities or colleges frequently provided the central focus for the various religious and cultural groups. Altogether fifteen such institutions served the Maritime provinces, which in 1921 had a population of about a million. For the Acadians their three colleges, at Memramcook and Bathurst in New Brunswick and Pointe d'Eglise in Nova Scotia, acted as primary agencies in their cultural resurgence. Saint Francis Xavier University and the diocesan headquarters together made Antigonish the cultural metropolis for the 95,398 Catholics of mainly Scottish origin in the eastern counties of Nova Scotia.46 At Halifax, Saint Mary's College and another see served the needs of the 32,340 mainly Irish Catholics of that county. The Protestants were divided into four more or less distinct cultural groups, each with its own university centre. Acadia at Wolfville, Nova Scotia, provided a central headquarters for the 178,403 Baptists of the region. These were largely of pre-loyalist ancestry and were located chiefly in the western counties of Nova Scotia and the southern and western counties of New Brunswick. The 137,678 Anglicans, with strong loyalist or British traditions, were concentrated in the Saint John River Valley, Halifax, and the western counties of Nova Scotia. The dioceses of the two provinces cooperated in the maintenance of King's University at Windsor, Nova Scotia. The Methodists, at 105,349 the smallest of the major religious denominations in the region, united in the maintenance of Mount Allison at Sackville, New Brunswick. The 177,022 Presbyterians, who were mainly of Scottish origin and had their greatest concentrations in Pictou and Cape Breton counties, did not maintain a university of their own. With their theological college at Halifax supplying the men's residence for Dalhousie University, they were content to "adopt" that nonsectarian institution as their own and their sons and daughters formed a narrow majority of its undergraduate population.47 Other cultural and local needs were served by the Catholic Saint Dunstan's University in Charlottetown and two nondenominational institutions, Prince of Wales College of that city and the University of New Brunswick at Fredericton. The very existence of this multiplicity of education services, maintained for the most part by private subscription, bore mute testimony to local division and the strength of the Maritimers' cultural loyalties. All these economic and cultural divisions, expressed politically, gave to each constituency political and economic goals and interests either peculiar to it or shared by usually no more than a minority of other constituencies. This contributed to the development of a style of 11

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

politics of a distinctly parochial but strongly partisan nature. With residents of each constituency focusing their attention primarily upon their own peculiar economic and cultural interests, politics became the art of obtaining and dispensing local favours. These were usually regarded as the reward for loyal and consistent party service, and since the rewards could only be reaped by'the party in power, a tradition of party loyalty was developed which was probably as intense as anywhere else in the Dominion. Such loyalties in themselves formed a bond of unity with groups outside the region while imposing a major barrier to unity within it. Working within the party structure, the traditional parochial approach weakened the voice of Maritime representatives even on issues of potential concern to the whole region. With local differences so apparent in the Maritimes and common interests so obscure, it is not surprising that in 1910 a visitor seeking support for Maritime Union finally concluded that the Maritimes and the Maritimer did not really exist but were the artificial invention of outsiders unfamiliar with the area!48 Clearly it would require issues of considerable magnitude and a fundamental change in traditional patterns of thought before the Maritimes could be expected to unite in a viable expression of common regional sentiment. Just such a transformation was well under way by the beginning of the 19208.

12

CHAPTER TWO

The Birth of a Region

The drawing together of the various cultural and economic groups in the Maritimes came slowly but steadily in the face of the bitterness and frustration produced by the decline of the region's influence in the Canadian Dominion. Maritimers united to fight losses in political representation, to increase subsidies, and to defend vital interests in national transportation policy. In each case their efforts brought them into conflict with other regions and this in turn heightened their own regional awareness. The effect of external threats in bridging traditional divisions was enhanced from within as many Maritimers, imbued with the progressive ideology of the period, embraced unity in their search for reform.

The reductions in federal representation which followed each census from 1891 to 1921 reminded Maritimers of their region's decline and usually produced fresh efforts to reverse that process. The redistribution of 1892, by which the Maritimes lost four seats in the House of Commons, was followed in 1895 by the amalgamation of their boards of trade in a single stronger regional organization.1 The removal of another four seats a decade later resulted in a more direct protest, as the three provinces demanded the retention of a representation at least equivalent to that accorded at Confederation.2 In contesting the redistribution of 1903, the New Brunswick government based its claim on section 51 of the British North America Act, which provided that no province's representation could be re13

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

duced unless its population relative to the "aggregate population of Canada" had declined by "one-twentieth or upwards since the previous census." "Canada," it argued, in such calculations meant only the four original provinces; the accession of the west should not be allowed to undermine the original agreement. Prince Edward Island, failing to qualify as one of the four original provinces, advanced a separate claim. Its case rested upon the contention that the original award of six seats to the island, like those to Manitoba and British Columbia, was intended to be an arbitrarily fixed minimum. 3 The New Brunswick case received enthusiastic support from Maritime members in the House of Commons and won the cautious approval of Opposition leader Robert Borden. For Prime Minister Laurier, however, it had the insurmountable objection of upsetting the balance between Quebec and Ontario. By the Maritimers' interpretation of the act the latter province would be permitted to retain seats which it was due to lose under the formula for redistribution then current.4 Both claims were rejected by the minister of justice, the Supreme Court of Canada, and finally, in 1905, by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.5 Defeated on a legal and technical consideration of their claims, the Maritimers returned to the attack early in 1907 with a broad appeal to the "spirit of the constitution." Representatives from the three provinces argued that the British North America Act should be amended to insure to each, as a basic minimum of representation, the seats accorded on their entry into Confederation. This, the Maritimers alleged, was the intention of the fathers of Confederation and the popular understanding at the time. They advanced a variety of additional arguments. Several suggested that extensions of the Quebec boundary invalidated the use of that province's population as the basic unit in allotting representation. Others cited the precedents of the abandonment of representation by population in dealing with the western provinces in the early period of their development, and the policies of Australia and the United States in fixing floors below which a state's representation would not be permitted to fall.6 The construction of a quasi-constitutional case for greater Maritime representation provided a concrete issue on which Maritimers might vent the vague frustrations and fears provoked by their slumping status. Their relative decline, it now appeared, was not solely the result of the inevitable and natural development of the nation. At least part of it was attributable to the action of the federal government, presumably influenced by other regions of the country, in taking 14

THE BIRTH OF A REGION

from the Maritime provinces the representation which was justly if not legally theirs. As J. W. Daniels, Conservative MP for Saint John, stated in a forceful speech in the 1907 debate, the question of representation had become "a burning and important one" in the Maritimes. "It would unite the people . . . in a way that nothing else had been able to" and if it remained unsettled the Maritime provinces would "become welded together in one party, determined to secure what they believe to be their rights and what they understood was given them at the time of confederation."7 The following year a call for a "united Acadia" fighting to maintain its federal representation was the theme of a speech by New Brunswick's Premier J. D. Hazen at a public gathering in Halifax. Early in 1909 the Methodist Wesleyan urged the Maritime representatives to more vigorous action and "every Maritime journal to discuss the matter and agitate for a safeguard against the threatened peril."8 The debates on representation in the House of Commons reveal a hardening of regional attitudes. L. G. McCarthy (North Simcoe), in moving to close the 1907 debate declared the belief of "some of us in the province of Ontario" that the federal government had already dealt with the Maritimes "more than generously in a great many ways." In 1909 W. S. Fielding cited the opposition of "the good people of Ontario" in warning Maritimers not to expect an early settlement of the issue.9 When the question of representation was raised again in 1910 the strongest objections came not from Ontario but from Prairie MPs made sensitive by their own regional grievances. By this time the Maritimers had reduced their demands from a return to the representation accorded at Confederation to a guarantee of their existing allotment as a basic minimum. While the lower figure might potentially be more palatable to the other members, the abandonment of their previous position'undoubtedly weakened their theoretical case. J. G. Turriff (Assiniboia) accused G. W. Kyte (Richmond) of being "a most nervy man" for daring to present a proposition which would confer special privileges upon the Maritime provinces, leaving "the west and Quebec . . . in a degraded and inferior position." His Saskatchewan constituents, "the best people from Ontario, Quebec, the lower provinces, Great Britain and the United States ... would not stand for one minute for accepting a position in confederation that would be inferior to the position held by any other province in the Dominion of Canada." In replying for his Maritime colleague, J. W. Daniels (Saint John) displayed the nativist bias of the period which undoubtedly contributed to the Maritime sense of grievance. It 15

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

hardly seemed credible that any government would take away representation from the old settlers and give it to a bunch of foreigners. "The people we represent in the Maritime provinces," Daniels declared "are the descendants of the early settlers—English, Scotch, Irish and French. But whom does my honourable friend represent? He represents, to a large extent, Galicians, Lithuanians, Ruthenians, Buckowinians and possibly Dukhobors, all new comers, a great many exceedingly illiterate, not able to speak the language of the country and unacquainted with its constitution."10 Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the prime minister, had expressed sympathy for the Maritime position but maintained that since Confederation was a compact among the provinces, it would not be proper to amend the act without their consent.11 In an apparent effort to meet this objection and perhaps secure additional allies in their struggle, the three Maritime governments cooperated in the presentation of their case in 1910 to an interprovincial conference called specifically to discuss the issue of Maritime representation. Here they had no more success than in Parliament and the conference adjourned without agreement. Three years later, with redistribution again threatening their provinces' representation, the three premiers presented their case at another interprovincial conference. After a resolution for a return to the representation accorded by Confederation failed to secure support, they replaced it by one establishing existing representation as a permanent minimum. When the latter proved no more fruitful they withdrew it in favour of one in support of the separate claims of Prince Edward Island. At this point the exasperated delegates resolved that they were "not representing the provinces for the purposes of this matter of representation."12 The question was again thrown back into the federal arena with Maritimers left as isolated as before. "THE MARITIMES FAIL TO RECEIVE JUSTICE FROM OTHER PARTS OF THE DOMINION," proclaimed the headlines of a bitter Saint John Standard in reporting the results of the conference.13 In presenting his bill for redistribution in 1914, Prime Minister Borden, who in opposition had frequently expressed support for the Maritime case, restricted his concern to the plight of Prince Edward Island, which was about to have its seats reduced to three. Pointing out that the unit of representation on the island was already higher than most rural constituencies in the country, Borden suggested that its representation be determined by the committee responsible for working out units of representation and constituency boundaries 16

THE BIRTH OF A REGION

within the various provinces. The committee, however, decided that such a course of action was unconstitutional—Prince Edward Island was after all still a province—and unanimously recommended an amendment to the British North America Act which would fix the number of Senate seats for each province as the basic minimum for its representation in the House of Commons. Since it only affected one seat at this time, and perhaps also because it was accompanied by another amendment giving the Western provinces a regional block of twenty-four in the Senate, this proposal was implemented without opposition.14

Before this "settlement" of the question of Maritime representation, the issue had already merged with what Maritimers believed was a result of their declining representation—the failure to secure a "fair" adjustment of their subsidies comparable to those of other provinces. This was a concrete issue which affected not only provincial governments but influential social groups whose reform aspirations seemed to be blocked by the financial disabilities of the local governments. The disparity in subsidies which underlay the Maritime complaint arose initially from the unusually generous financial settlement accorded the new provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1905. Political expediency and fiscal need had traditionally been the bases for adjusting the supposedly "final and unalterable" financial terms of Confederation. Such alterations were usually concealed under the guise of meeting some special claim by a province upon the Dominion, thus maintaining the fiction that the original settlement was still intact. Undoubtedly the terms accorded the new provinces were a realistic recognition of the increased financial responsibilities of a province in the twentieth century. It strained credulity, however, to suggest, as did the federal government, that these increased revenues were in accord with the original settlement. The new provinces were given the usual per capita subsidy and grants. But then, as though their people were entering the country for the first time and had not benefited from the national debt, they received a full per capita debt allowance equal to that of the original provinces. A further subsidy of $375,000, which would increase through several gradations with the growth of population, was provided in lieu of crown lands.15 Still further revenue would flow into provincial coffers from the two sections of land which had been 17

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

reserved in each township for educational purposes. The land was held in trust and sold from time to time by the Dominion, providing a steadily increasing income for the three Prairie provinces. By 1920, for example, Saskatchewan's share amounted to over $800,000 annually.16 Even excluding the revenue from school lands, the two new provinces began their existence with subsidies exceeding those of Quebec and nearly tripling those of Nova Scotia, a province of approximately twice the population of Saskatchewan.17 The general subsidy revision following the interprovincial conference of 1906 did little to improve the Maritime position. In fact, the removal of the 400,000 ceiling on population in calculating provincial subsidies left it relatively weaker. Not only did the larger provinces of Quebec and Ontario secure much greater increases, both in actual amounts and percentages, but a new structure had been introduced by which the subsidies would advance automatically in provinces of expanding population while those of the Maritimes would remain relatively static. The smaller provinces at this conference had "made a poor bargain" and soon fell back upon the traditional practice of negotiating individually with the federal government, basing their demands upon special claims which they might discover or invent and which theoretically would not disrupt the "principle" of the general settlement.18 Manitoba's success in this regard was most spectacular. Its subsidies and territory were nearly doubled in 1912, to give it a position of "equality" with Saskatchewan and Alberta. An added bonus of more than two million dollars was included, as the settlement was made retroactive to 1908. Once again considerable juggling was required to maintain the fiction that the "principle" of the general revision of 1906 was still intact. For example, some crown lands transferred to the province in 1885 were returned to the Dominion so that Manitoba would be entitled to additional subsidies in lieu of them!19 The special claim of the three Maritime provinces developed out of the debates in the House of Commons on the territorial and financial claims of Manitoba. In 1908 several Maritime speakers suggested that the Maritimes were entitled to some form of compensation for the proposed extensions of the Manitoba, Quebec, and Ontario boundaries. Most seemed to be thinking in terms of guarantees with respect to representation. G. W. Fowler (Kings-Albert), however, put the case on a directly financial basis. To his mind there was little difference between a subsidy in money from the treasury of the Dominion and a subsidy of potentially valuable land from the public domain. Since the 18

THE BIRTH OF A REGION

Maritimes were not in a position to receive grants of land they were entitled to a grant of money in lieu of it.20 The argument was further developed by Maritime members of both parties in the session of 1911-12. W. M. Pugsley of Saint John, a Liberal, stated the case forcefully in demanding for the Maritimes financial compensation for the territorial expansion of the other provinces. "Prince Rupert's land," he asserted, "was purchased by the Dominion of Canada.... It is not the property of any one province." The government was operating "upon an entirely wrong principle" when it recognized Manitoba's claim to the land. Pugsley went on to cite the American precedent of the Louisiana Purchase, "by which a very large proportion of the lands obtained in the purchase was reserved for the original states and they received the benefit of it." Fowler, a Conservative, criticized Pugsley's failure to take such a position while a member of the Laurier government and welcomed the latter's return "to the fold of those loyal and patriotic men in the Maritime provinces who are always prepared to stand up for the interest of those provinces." Fowler concluded that, although a supporter of the government, he would "oppose any resolutions that come down here giving territory to the western provinces which do not make ample provision for the rights of the Maritime provinces." A. A. McLean, MP for Queens, Prince Edward Island, spoke along similar lines and E. M. Macdonald of Pictou, Nova Scotia, asked to "be associated with them in their efforts."21 Although the Maritimes failed to secure the settlement of their claims as part of the federal government's great real estate potlatch of 1912 involving Ontario, Quebec, and Manitoba, they did secure a statement from Prime Minister Borden that their "just rights" in connection with such transfers would "be taken into consideration."22 In seeking to persuade Borden to implement his vague promise; the three Maritime provincial governments sent their representatives to Ottawa in January 1913 to present a joint memorial of their claims to the cabinet. Their argument was based on the participation of the Maritimers in the original purchase of the land and their subsequent contribution to its development.23 Included in their claim was compensation for the territorial expansion of the other provinces, for the school land held in trust for the Prairie provinces and for the transfer to the provinces of Dominion land within the provinces themselves. They cited the statute by which the government was empowered to change provincial boundaries, which also contained a clause enabling it "to make provision respecting the effect and operation of any such 19

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

increase or diminution or alteration of territory in relation to any province affected thereby." They outlined in some detail the American precedent by which Congress made grants of land for purposes of education and "in every case where a particular state was unable to get lands or extend its boundaries by reason of its geographical situation compensation was made in the nature of scrip." Attorney-general W. C. H. Grimmer of New Brunswick even suggested the employment of a formula for assessing compensation allegedly followed by the Americans. This included the multiplication of the acres of land by an arbitrary estimate of value and dividing the total by the number of representatives for each province in the Senate and House of Commons. The Maritime share by his arithmetic would yield in interest calculated at 5 per cent annual payments of $135,000 for Prince Edward Island, $334,000 for New Brunswick and $470,000 for Nova Scotia.24 Apart from the legal and quasi-legal arguments of the memorial, a large part of the Maritime case as developed under cross-examination by members of the government was simply that, because the Maritime provinces were not being treated fairly in relation to the Western provinces, they lacked the financial means to develop as they should. The most glaring example of such inequality was the decline of educational services in the Maritimes, which were losing their best teachers to the Western provinces largely because the school land and other subsidies to the latter permitted a salary scale totally beyond their resources. The Maritime case was weakened to the extent that it claimed a quid pro quo for territorial expansion which had already taken place. Ontario, Quebec, and Manitoba considered the boundary question settled and could see little advantage for themselves in according compensation for something which was already in their possession. It was injured still further by its association with the case of the Prairie premiers for the transfer of their crown lands and natural resources. R. L. Borden, before the election of 1911, had promised to hand over control of the crown lands and natural resources to the Prairie governments. Near the end of 1913 the three Western premiers issued a joint statement offering to take over these lands if they could retain their full annual subsidies as compensation for the lands already alienated. The Maritime and Prairie claims were mutually exclusive and led to direct confrontation between the two regions. The Prairie case rested on the contention that the public lands had always belonged legally to the provinces, the Maritime one on the assumption 20

THE BIRTH OF A REGION

that they had belonged to the Dominion. The Maritime representatives wanted to avoid antagonizing the Western provinces but, having experienced the futility of trying to secure anything ex post facto the boundary settlement of 1912, they were forced to insist that no further public domain be alienated to other provinces until their claims had been met.25 Robert Borden failed to act on the Maritime claims, and the outbreak of war removed the subsidy question from immediate consideration. At the conclusion of the war he took the attitude that the Maritime and Prairie cases were "co-relative," and should be settled at the same time. 26 At the Dominion-Provincial conference of November 1918 the Prairie provinces again demanded both the transfer of the crown lands and the retention of the subsidies. This seemed too much like a classic case of eating one's cake and having it too for acceptance by the other provinces. The Maritime representatives associated themselves with Quebec and Ontario in a demand that the retention of special subsidies by the Prairies would require a general proportional increase in the subsidies of all the provinces plus the consideration of the special claims of the Maritime provinces.27 This the Prairie provinces refused to accept. Prime Minister Borden, mindful of the extraordinary expenditures incurred by the federal government during the war, ruled that a general upward revision of the subsidies was out of the question. Thus the subsidies remained frozen in a tangle of claims and counter-claims—a serious situation for Maritimers, whose subsidies lagged approximately one full round of adjustments behind those of most other provinces. With the end of the war in sight, agitation in support of their claims quickly resumed in the Maritimes. In August 1918, O. T. Daniels, attorney-general for Nova Scotia, gave a detailed explanation of the Maritime case in an address to a Maritime education convention at Moncton. The speech was then printed in pamphlet form for circulation throughout the region. A year later, a Catholic conference for educational reform sponsored by Saint Francis Xavier University gave unanimous approval to a resolution asserting the Maritime proprietary interest in Dominion lands and requesting that both provincial and federal representatives "press the claims of Nova Scotia for this Province's just share of said lands, or in lieu thereof an annual cash subsidy to be used exclusively for educational purposes." Papers presented examined the abysmally low salaries in Nova Scotia, the loss of qualified male teachers to the Western provinces, and the Maritimes' long neglected claims for subsidies in lieu of territorial 21

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

expansion. As Colin MacKenzie, a Sydney lawyer, remarked in outlining the Maritime case, it was "urgent that the matter be settled promptly. The Western Provinces are growing in population faster than the Maritime Provinces, and the longer readjustment is delayed the less will be the chances of an equitable adjustment." The conference appointed a committee to have the papers and resolutions printed in pamphlet form and distributed throughout the province.28 In the Nova Scotia legislature J. C. Tory, Liberal MLA for Guysborough and an early champion of the cause, presented in 1919 a resolution reasserting Maritime claims for subsidies in lieu of crown lands. 29 It was enthusiastically received by the Conservative Halifax Herald, which called for the immediate organization of a "maritime popular league ... with provincial and county and town and village branches in all parts of the maritime provinces, until the whole country has been enlightened, aroused and arrayed in support of the resolution unanimously adopted by the Nova Scotia legislature." A year later Tory amplified and repeated his resolution, calling for joint action by the three provinces in pressing their "just claims ... against the Federal Government." At this time he was publicizing a policy already agreed to by the three provincial governments; his restatement of the Maritime grievance was carried by the press and printed in pamphlet form for further distribution.30

By 1919 a potentially more explosive issue had thrust its way into the centre of Maritime agitation. This was the loss of a large measure of regional autonomy in the operation and policies of the Intercolonial Railway. Over the years Maritimers had grown acutely sensitive to the constant reiteration of the myth of corruption, mismanagement, and deficits which surrounded the line almost from its origin. Like many myths, that of the Intercolonial had a solid grounding in fact, particularly in the early years of the road. But as G. R. Stevens has pointed out, the myth also owed much to George Brown and the Toronto Globe who had fought the original project from its inception and for whom it became, like the Grand Trunk in previous decades, a bete noire.31 The Maritime representatives' own contribution to the myth was considerable, as at practically every session some Maritime members of the opposition would repeat charges of mismanagement and patronage against the government's handling of the road. The railway was certainly vulnerable. For reasons of imperial 22

THE BIRTH OF A REGION strategy and political expediency the original line followed a circuitous route which its builder, Sandford Fleming, estimated was two hundred and fifty miles longer than necessary.32 Added to this economic burden was the difficulty of developing a sufficient volume of traffic to meet operating expenses. As volume increased with the maintenance of a relatively low and flexible rate structure the jealousy of people in the other regions was aroused at the special treatment accorded the Maritimes in the matter of freight rates. Thus, as the financial accounts of the road were examined publicly each year, it was subjected to attack from a variety of motives, among which political partisanship, regional jealousy, and opposition to the principle of government ownership were all conspicuous. It was not surprising that by the early twentieth century the unfavourable Intercolonial stereotype was widely and uncritically accepted, even by governments in power. The element of the myth most infuriating to Maritimers was the suggestion that the Intercolonial was a special project maintained at the expense of the Dominion as a whole for the exclusive benefit of the Maritime provinces. It was a suggestion which rubbed upon the raw wound of yet another Maritime grievance, the shift of industry and commercial institutions from the Maritimes to the metropolitan centres of Central Canada. Far from operating to the exclusive benefit of the lower provinces, the Maritimers argued, the Intercolonial had worked to the detriment of their region in opening it to the competition of Central Canadian producers. The result had been metropolitan consolidation and the building up of Toronto, Montreal, and other centres at the expense of the Maritimes. The argument was stated bitterly and succinctly in 1911 in a series of editorials in the pro-Liberal Halifax Morning Chronicle, which sought to mobilize a rising tide of Maritime resentment in support of Reciprocity: The Intercolonial Railway was all that the Maritime Provinces got out of confederation. That railway has been the means of enabling the upper Provinces to steal away our trade and undersell our people in their own markets. . . . Yet we are insulted year after year by Ontario representatives who, when there is a deficit in the revenue of the Intercolonial declare from their places in Parliament that it is incurred for our sole benefit and never grow weary of describing this Province as a pauper member of the Dominion. Another editorial referred to the taunts of the "Western Tories" regarding the Intercolonial and continued:

23

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

Our wholesale trade has been sucked away from us by the favored Big Cities and Big Interests of the West. Our industrial interests have been crushed out—by Ontario and Quebec combines. Even our banking institutions have been taken from us. Our farmers have been crippled by Ontario combines, and Ontario competition.33 On the other hand, as W. C. H. Grimmer argued in presenting the Maritime case for additional subsidies in 1913, the Maritime taxpayers had contributed their share to a host of other national projects in other parts of Canada from which they received little or no direct benefit: the canal system on the St. Lawrence River, which operated toll free and continually incurred a deficit; the Grand Trunk Pacific, which was likely to reach twice the cost of the Intercolonial; and the projected Hudson Bay Railway, which would actually draw potential business away from Maritime ports. With these Grimmer listed the Intercolonial as a project for which the Dominion paid but which benefited the people of other regions more than those of the Maritimes. He cited as an example the $5 million in agricultural produce which in 1911 passed over the road into New Brunswick to compete with the output of the local farmers. In his view Maritimers were more entitled to compensation than reproach for any deficit incurred by the Intercolonial.34 The appointment of "outsiders" to executive positions on the Intercolonial became another sensitive issue after the appointment of F. P. Gutelius as general manager in 1913. The wholesale firing and hiring which had traditionally accompanied changes in government had been largely eliminated by an agreement with the railway unions.35 Nevertheless local politicians believed that they should be consulted in the filling of posts which did become vacant. Gutelius's policy of bringing in people from other railways not only offended government supporters locally but seemed to threaten the structure of seniority and expectation of promotion among the employees of the road. The suggestion that locally trained railwaymen were not competent to fill executive positions was also regarded as a gratuitous insult to the people of the region. Two brothers, Frank and John Stanfield, representatives of Colchester County and residents of Truro, the major railway centre of Nova Scotia, brought the issue forcefully to the attention of the public with a dramatic protest in 1916. When their nominee for promotion to assistant traffic manager was passed over for an employee of the 24

THE BIRTH OF A REGION

Grand Trunk, both tendered their resignations to the local Conservative Association; Frank from a seat in the Nova Scotia Legislature and John from the House of Commons. The Stanfields won their point, temporarily at least, and early in the session of 1917 a resolution was passed that "employees on the Government railway should be promoted to official positions on that line before allowing the general manager to employ strangers."36 During the debate, however, R. B. Bennett, speaking "as a western man," delivered a slashing attack upon the Intercolonial and the burden of its deficits upon the Canadian taxpayer. Bennett claimed that rates in the Maritimes were "from 25 to 78 per cent less than those we pay upon the plains for the same services" and demanded that the Intercolonial be brought under the Railway Commission.37 Later in the session the government introduced an amendment to the Government Railway Act to do just that. The bill naturally encountered strong resistance among opposition members from the Maritimes. The latter protested bitterly that their people had not been given sufficient warning of a measure which would have a profound impact upon business in their region. The measure would place the regulation of the Intercolonial, they argued, under an external body lacking intimate knowledge of the particular needs of either the railway or industries within the Maritime region. It would be a serious inconvenience for Maritime businessmen to be forced continually to make the long trek to Ottawa in an attempt to preserve or secure rates suitable for the movement of their products.38 The real intention of the bill, as the Maritimers saw it, was the creation of a "new tyrant" or a "wicked partner" behind which the government might hide to escape the odium of freight rate increases. E. M. Macdonald was particularly vigorous in chastising the Ontario representatives and press for the hypocrisy of their agitation against the lower freight rates of the Intercolonial while the Dominion maintained the Ontario canal system toll free.39 The bill passed all three readings in the House of Commons but with an election approaching was not proclaimed and was permitted to lapse. This apparent victory by the Maritimers was again largely illusory. In April 1917 the Dray ton-Acworth Report had recommended the integration of the Intercolonial with a government system of railways which would include the virtually bankrupt Canadian Northern, Grand Trunk, and their subsidiaries. In November 1918 an order in council placed the Intercolonial under the management of the Canadian Northern with its headquarters at Toronto.40 This was 25

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

confirmed in the session of 1919 when the Railway Act was amended to provide for the integration of the government railways in a single unit. Maritime representatives proposed an amendment to exclude the Intercolonial from the new organization but without success. They argued that the inclusion of the Intercolonial meant its destruction as a separate unit and as such was a violation of the "Confederation pact." They were assured by the minister of railways that this was not the case; a separate system of accounting would be maintained for the Intercolonial and none of the indebtedness incurred by the other roads would be charged against it.41 The latter provision, however, was largely window-dressing. In practice, although technically independent of the Railway Commission, the Intercolonial received in full the increases recommended by the commission for other lines. By 1919 the process was already under way of levelling up freight rates in the Maritimes to put them on a par with freight rates in Ontario and Quebec. At the same time the headquarters at Moncton was disbanded, with higher echelons of management transferred to other lines.42 It is difficult to imagine an action better calculated to offend regional sensibilities in the Maritimes. The removal of the headquarters to Toronto was a direct blow to the amour propre of the region and from the Maritime point of view a glaring example of metropolitan consolidation at its worst. The city of Moncton was faced with the economic loss of railway clerical staff and a potential decline or removal of the repair*shops. Manufacturers, farmers, fishermen, lumbermen, and other producers were threatened by the disruption of traditional freight schedules. The seniority of Intercolonial employees again seemed to be in jeopardy, while local politicians appeared to lose still further influence in dispensing patronage within their own region. Another danger loomed upon the horizon with the federal government's acquisition of the Grand Trunk. It had long been a dream of the ports of Halifax and Saint John to capture the major share of the winter trade of Canada while the St. Lawrence was frozen over. For the fulfilment of this dream, they had been promised repeatedly the cooperation of the federal government in the construction of suitable terminals and port facilities and the adoption of policies which would encourage the channelling of Canadian trade through Canadian ports.43 But with the takeover of the Grand Trunk, the Dominion government had secured a vested interest in Portland, Maine—a major competitor of the Maritimes' ports for Canada's winter trade. Finally the government's persistence in the implemen26

THE BIRTH OF A REGION

tation of a railway policy so hostile to Maritime interests in the face of strong Maritime opposition was a graphic illustration of the decline of Maritime influence in the formation of Dominion policy. While most Maritimers would only gradually perceive the full implications of the federal railway policy, the response of a few was prompt and vigorous. In June 1919 a delegation of representatives of several Maritime boards of trade travelled to Ottawa to protest the changed status of the Intercolonial and call for the return of some degree of regional autonomy. On their return they proceeded to revive the Maritime Board of Trade as an agency to lead the battle in defence of regional interests.44 The resolution passed unanimously by the Maritime Board of Trade on September 17, 1919 outlined what was to be the railway policy consistently demanded by Maritimers for the next decade. The Intercolonial was "part and parcel of the contract of Confederation entered into by Canada with the Maritime Provinces." The merger of the Intercolonial with the other roads meant "its extinction as an integral unit" and thus a "breach in the spirit of the contract of Confederation." Already the process of transferring staff to "central Canadian cities" had begun, which meant "virtually . . . the dismantling of the I.C.R. in the Maritime Provinces." The resolution promised full support of the boards of trade for the CNR and endorsed the principle of eliminating "every shadow of politics" from the new line. But its key demand was that the headquarters of the section from Montreal eastwards be located within the Maritimes and that it be given sufficient autonomy to conduct the "ordinary business of the road . . . without reference to headquarters."45

The sense of frustration and resentment which Maritimers were developing by the end of the war was intensified by a feeling of lack of representation in the government. Until 1911 the Maritimes traditionally had been represented by three or four ministers in the cabinet. In the Borden government they had only two: Robert Borden, sitting for Halifax, and J. D. Hazen, minister of marine and fisheries and MP for Saint John. As prime minister, Borden was in no position to play the role of a regional or provincial leader, especially during the hectic period of war and its aftermath. This lack of a spokesman for Nova Scotia perhaps accounts for the extreme actions by the Stanfield brothers in 1916 in forcing their views upon the 27

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

attention of the government. Nova Scotia did secure the appointment of a representative of ministerial rank in that year, when F. B. McCurdy, MP for Shelburne and Queens, became parliamentary secretary of the Department of Militia and Defence, but he was not admitted to the cabinet.46 The formation of the Union government aggravated the problem. In the election of 1917 the Maritimes generally returned either Conservatives or Laurier Liberals. Only seven Liberal-Unionists were elected. Nevertheless Prime Minister Borden, in meeting the conditions of N. W. Rowell for Liberal-Unionist cabinet representation, dismissed J. D. Hazen and appointed two Liberal-Unionists, Frank Carvell (Carleton) and A. K. MacLean (Halifax). 47 Carvell's appointment aroused particularly strong resentment in New Brunswick, where he had earned the titles of "Fighting Frank" and the "Lord High Executioner" for his attacks on Conservative opponents.48 He also enjoyed the doubtful distinction of being the only Maritime member to support bringing the Intercolonial under the Railway Commission in the session of 1917. Prominent Conservatives locally pleaded for his removal and the restoration of Hazen.49 Conservatives were little happier with the Nova Scotia representative. In September 1918 F. B. McCurdy resigned from his ministerial position, complaining that the Conservative element in the province was being completely ignored.50 The reservations which some Maritimers had about their new representatives appeared to be justified by the latter's failure to protect regional interests, especially in the case of the Intercolonial. But this representation, however ineffective, was obviously better than what followed. When, in the disintegration of the Union government after the war, Carvell resigned in August 1919 and MacLean in the following February, they were not replaced. The Maritimes went without representation in the cabinet for ten months.51

The gradual perception by Maritimers of their declining influence in the Dominion and its actual or potential economic and social effects on their way of life created a feeling of resentment and grievance which became common throughout the area. The struggle for greater representation, larger subsidies, and a restoration of the Intercolonial led directly to attempts at provincial cooperation. From the joint claims prepared and arguments advanced came the popularization of a variety of myths of persecution and injustice which portrayed the 28

THE BIRTH OF A REGION

whole Maritime region as the victim. At the national level the battles had been highlighted by regional confrontation and these emphasized to Maritimers the regional nature of the Canadian political system. By 1919 the belief was rapidly gaining currency among people in all parts of the Maritimes that they shared common interests which were threatened and could only be defended by vigorous and united action. Maritime unity was unquestionably the dominant theme of the Maritime Board of Trade convention held in Moncton in September 1919, with delegates from Saint John, Halifax, Charlottetown, and most of the larger centres of the region in attendance. The delegates established the keynote of their meeting by choosing as president Hance J. Logan, ex-Liberal MP, former mayor of Springhill, and for more than sixteen years an advocate of the political union of the three Maritime provinces. During the course of their deliberations, the delegates reminded each other that it was a hostile and selfish world in which they lived. The Maritimes had been the victim of a regional struggle within the country. They had lost their fair share of representation in Parliament. Even the "compact of Confederation" had failed to protect them, as the Intercolonial was taken from them and turned into a commercial road. While their own longstanding interests and rights were taken away, they were taxed to pay for expensive developments in other parts of the country and were ignored even in such mundane operations of government as the promotion of immigration and the geological survey. There were villains aplenty. The province of Ontario and the city of Toronto were both singled out as being particularly hostile to Maritime interests and H. J. Logan was reported to have declared, amid a round of applause, that "the upper provinces" had "stolen the heritage of the Maritime Provinces for fifty years." But the real purpose of such rhetoric was to emphasize the need for unity in defending Maritime interests. The explanation of the Maritime problem was simple. In the perpetual regional struggle which characterized the Canadian nation other regions were winning because they were united. The Maritimes were losing because they were not. Logan sought to drive this point home in a subsequent "message" to the people of the Maritime provinces: Ontario has three million of people united. Ontario has free canals. The Maritime Provinces have one million people divided, and they are compelled to pay exorbitant rates upon what today is misnamed the Peoples' Railway. To make the matter even worse, owing to united people in other parts of Canada forcing 29

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

the Federal Government to take over bankrupt roads, in order that their portions of Canada should have better rail transportation, we, in the Maritime Provinces will be compelled to pay annually our portion of many millions of railway deficits.52 Unity, the speakers agreed, was needed at a variety of levels. A strong and united Maritime Board of Trade was essential "in order to command sufficient attention at Ottawa." Previous weakness caused by such divisions as the Halifax-Saint John feud were criticized and eschewed for the future. A greater unity would have to be maintained among the Maritime representatives at Ottawa, supported by the united efforts of the provincial governments. Some of the delegates proposed a shortcut to unity by reviving the hoary scheme for a legislative union of the three provinces.The Bathurst and Amherst boards of trade sponsored a resolution to that effect which drew the unanimous support of the New Brunswickers and Nova Scotians present. It proved too strong, however, for delegates from Prince Edward Island whose province traditionally viewed such schemes as "annexation" and had consistently opposed them.53 Although a few islanders such as J. O. Hyndman, later president of Prince Edward Island's associated boards of trade, expressed themselves as personally favourable to some such scheme, they carefully distinguished between Maritime unity or cooperation, which they believed all could support, and legislative union, which they felt was still deeply suspect on the island.54 Thus, although discussion of the union scheme continued, the delegates gradually shifted their emphasis to the development of Maritime unity.

The growth of reform sentiment in the Maritimes during the first two decades of the twentieth century was another powerful stimulus to regionalism. The reform ideology which swept North America in this period — progressivism, American historians have called it — stressed social as opposed to individual action. Progressives looked to legislation, education, and practical, piecemeal reforms as the means of creating a new society in which order and efficiency would prevail.55 To those imbued with the reforming vision the multiplicity of divisions within the Maritimes frequently appeared as anachronistic barriers to social and economic progress. Their attacks upon these 30

THE BIRTH OF A REGION

added materially to the development of a more cohesive and selfconscious Maritime community. The revival of interest in Maritime union was itself a typically progressive phenomenon. In his articles advocating legislative union mAcadiensis, a literary and historical journal whose first issue in 1901 proclaimed it "A Quarterly Devoted to the Interests of the Maritime Provinces of Canada," Halifax lawyer R. V. Harris touted Maritime union as affording greater uniformity in laws, efficiency in administration, and opportunity for political reform.56 In 1920 the editor of The Busy East of Canada, a magazine established in New Brunswick in 1910 for purposes of regional promotion, suggested that legislative union was required by the "New Spirit of the Age." Quoting from an article by W. B. Munro in the Canadian Municipal Journal he referred to the "social revoltution" in "the minds of the people" which led them to "a new ideal of community happiness and welfare." "The community — city, country, state, nation — must," Munro had stated, "step in and take over a great many economic and humanitarian enterprises hitherto furnished privately or not at all." Yet, the editor pointed out, Maritime governments were already "exhausted in their efforts to maintain adequate service." Clearly a more effective regional organization would be necessary if government in the Maritimes was to play the role that reformers thought it should.57 Other advocates of the scheme spelled out the possibilities for progressive development through Maritime union. According to H. J. Logan, union would facilitate the creation or expansion of technical and agricultural colleges, experimental farms, government laboratories, and trunk roads. To Frank McGee, Westmorland MLA, one of its principal attractions lay in making possible extensive hydro development under government auspices.58 A revitalized movement for legislative union was but one of several manifestations of a unifying trend within the regions which might be linked to progressive ideology. Between 1903 and 1912 the major Protestant denominations in the Maritimes endorsed the social gospel, a progressive creed which suggested the possibility of creating a new and perfect society based upon Christian principles. By 1909 all cooperated in the formation of moral and social reform councils in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. These supported the drive for prohibition and pressed provincial governments to establish institutions for the mentally ill, the retarded, the deaf, and young delinquents. Such cooperation tended to lessen sectarian division within the region and in the case of Methodists, Presbyterians, and Congregationalists led the way to actual union.59 31

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

Many progressive reformers regarded education as the key to the regeneration of their communities.With such goals apparently in mind, the Nova Scotia government between 1906 and 1908 created new facilities for their agricultural college and a new technical college. Under the leadership of Dr. Melville Cummings, assisted by a new corps of field workers, the agricultural college sought to combat the effects of depopulation and community disintegration in rural areas. Associated with the technical college and led by Dr. F. H. Sexton was a new program of adult vocational education — the first such program in Canada — which was expected to accelerate industrial development and provide new opportunities for social progress in urban communities. In keeping with their progressive goals both colleges had a regional orientation; the agricultural college invited students from the three provinces while the technical college was managed jointly by the major Maritime universities.60 Such progressive successes, made possible by buoyant provincial revenues in the first decade of the century, were sharply curtailed by financial stringency in succeeding decades. Educational services appeared even to decline as experienced teachers, attracted by better salaries elsewhere, left the provinces in large numbers. In 1916 an anonymous pamphlet on educational reform claimed that there were only 256 male teachers left in the whole of Nova Scotia.61 As on other issues, the pressure for reforms was directed initially at provincial governments. Gradually, however, progressives, apparently accepting the pleas of local governments that they lacked the financial capacity which these reforms required, lent their support to provincial attempts to secure additional revenues. Thus local and regional educational conferences endorsed Maritime claims for increased subsidies in lieu of grants of land and religious journals agitated for Maritimers to fight for their rights in the matter of additional subsidies.62 Obviously some of the energies of progressive reform were being channelled directly into the regional protest. Progressivism was also manifest in a movement for the unification of Maritime universities. This was a frontal attack, more basic, perhaps, than the proposal for Maritime union, on major strongholds of local and cultural particularism. Before the war Maritime university presidents had adopted the practice of holding annual meetings to discuss problems of mutual concern. In 1914 they decided to invite representatives of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching to investigate university education in the Maritimes and recommend a program of reform. Action was postponed by the 32

THE BIRTH OF A REGION

outbreak of the war, but an investigating team arrived in 1921 in the persons of W. S. Learned and K. C. M. Sills. After a tour of the universities and consultation with the educational leaders of the three provinces, the investigators presented a report which recommended the unification of the six major English-speaking universities and their location at Halifax, Nova Scotia.63 Although their plan was never realized — only King's College, its buildings destroyed by fire, was prepared to forsake its traditional campus in the interests of educational reform — the plan drew a surprising amount of support outside of Halifax.64 The reform pressure had also been directed against political partisanship, another source of division within the region. The reformers, in attempting to marshal public opinion to force governments to act on particular issues, had frequently found their efforts frustrated by popular adherence to traditional party loyalties. "Partisanship" and "corruption" became consistent objects of attack at annual synods and conventions of several of the Protestant churches. In the battle for prohibition, for example, reformers' tactics varied from endorsing independent reform candidates to "pledging" candidates of both parties or supporting openly whichever party accepted their program. Their consistent theme and goal was the attainment of a united popular will behind their proposals, undiluted by party ties. It is doubtful if the reform influence would have had much effect by itself in breaking down patterns of party affiliation had it not been accompanied by the formation of a Union government for the more effective prosecution of the war. The joining of Conservatives and some Liberals in support of a victory which was supposed to usher in a "new era" for mankind conformed, in theory at least, to the reform ideal. Reform rhetoric in the denunciation of "partisanship" received strong reinforcement from the press as an electioneering slogan for the new government. The formation and functioning of the government itself undermined party affiliation and organization. The bewildered rank and file of both parties were urged by their leaders to support political rivals of many years' standing, while traditional heroes were numbered among the wayward and misdirected. To this confusion of identity was added the disruption of normal channels of patronage. In a situation where "partisanship" had become not only publicly reprehensible but privately unrewarding, a larger proportion of the populace than ever before was left free to unite politically in the defence of regional interests. Of course one could easily exaggerate the cultural and political 33

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

cohesion achieved in the Maritimes by 1920. Divisions were deep and basic attitudes slow to change. Religious and educational leaders were often far in advance of many of their constituents in placing cooperation ahead of local or cultural loyalties, as the battles over church union and the failure of university union would later show. The gulf between Acadians and English-speaking Maritimers was widened rather than narrowed by the conscription crisis and election of 1917. This was particularly true in New Brunswick, where the political divisions took place almost directly on linguistic lines and invective was exchanged in the press which would not soon be forgotten. Nevertheless, despite a continued preoccupation with their own battle for cultural recognition, the Acadians tended to align themselves closely with English-speaking Maritimers on the questions of the decline of the region's influence within the Dominion and possible remedies which might be applied. In 191 gL'Acadien gave a favourable report of Frank Magee's proposal for a united Acadia, suggesting that the French would support Maritime union providing the constitution was acceptable to them. The scheme found an unqualified supporter in P. Noel McLaughlin, who engaged in a lengthy controversy on the issue with Emile Soucy in L'Evangeline during the summer of 1921. Acadian supporters of Maritime union listed most of the arguments employed by their English-speaking contemporaries. It could be a means of regional defence and internal development. In addition it might be the means of improving the lot of the smaller Acadian minorities in Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island. Acadian opponents of the scheme argued that the Acadians of New Brunswick would lose the position of political influence they were winning through force of numbers and be reduced once more to a small and ineffectual minority.65 Obviously the effect on their struggle for cultural recognition would be a most important criterion in determining the Acadians' response to regional issues. It was equally clear, however, that Acadians shared the resentment of other Maritimers at their region's decline. Acadian spokesmen in the press and the legislature suggested that it might become necessary "sortir de la Confederation" if the Maritime demands were not met, and urged the need for agitation to impress Maritime claims "upon the minds of those men [at Ottawa] who seem to have turned their backs upon the Maritime Provinces."66 The "national" Congress of Acadians, celebrating thefite de I'Assomption at Pointe de 1'Eglise, Nova Scotia, in 1921, endorsed a resolution claiming that national railway policy was a violation of "le pacte de la Confederation" and affirming that the 34

THE BIRTH OF A REGION

Congress "se joint aux Legislatures de 1'Ile du Prince Edouard, la Nouvelle Ecosse et du Nouveau Brunswick pour demander le reetablissement des conditions existant avant ramalgamation de ces chemins de fer."67

By the beginning of the 19205 a few perceptive Maritimers were beginning to see the decline of their region in a wider perspective than dollars and cents, injured pride, or the frustration of prospective reform. With the rise of the Canadian West, the latter's regional myths, borrowed in many cases from the United States, had come to define the Canadian nation. These tended to exclude the Maritime provinces. "Canada," as the propaganda of the federal immigration offices, railways, and western provinces, territories, and towns proclaimed, was a land of free homesteads and opportunity. "Canada's Century" was to be realized through the development of the West and the "wheat economy." The thesis which was then becoming widely accepted, that independence, economic and social progress, and even democracy itself were the products of a new and dynamic agrarian frontier, implied an unflattering role for the Maritimes. Even the alleged success of the Westerners in rapidly assimilating people of a variety of cultures and making "Canadians" of them suggested an unpatriotic comparison with the Maritimers who tended to cling to their cultural and local loyalties. As long as the criteria for assessing "Canadianism" were established by other regions, Maritimers would be relegated to a position of inferiority. Before they could hope to escape from the situation they would have to assert a definition of the Canadian nation which had some relevance for themselves. To do this it would be essential to develop a recognition and awareness of their own distinct regional values and aspirations. This theme was developed most lucidly by R. V. Sharp of the Sydney Record late in 1919 in an article entitled "Do you know who we are?" According to Sharp, the stereotyped Westerner and Maritimer were quite different. In the West the idea of the "melting pot" reigned supreme. "A few years" in the West were sufficient to turn "Scotsmen and Irishmen and Englishmen and Greeks and Scandinavians and Germans and Austrians and Italians and, it may be, even Jugo Slavs" into "Canadians" of the western type — "Big-hearted, breezy, bluffing, strongheaded and good to know" — but still bearing "the common imprint of the pot." Maritimers had been produced by a 35

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

different process, "the slow hard moulding of years acting upon generation after generation born and raised in one spot." The result was the production of not one type but many, each retaining a profound attachment to his distinctive cultural heritage. Since Maritimers had been contributing to the political and cultural development of the nation for several centuries, they could hardly be Considered less "Canadian" than their newly arrived counterparts in Western Canada. They were just different — a difference which would have to be realized and asserted. A country such as these Maritimes, a race of Canadians such as these eastern men of pioneer breed have no need to turn to the provinces of the melting pot for their conceptions of Canada and Canadians. It is time the east came out from behind the skirts of the west and made it clear to the world that there is more to Canada than gigantic farms, more than great sweeps of prairie, more than Rocky Mountains and mushroom cities and immigrant citizens — that there is a Canada, distinct and individual from this, a Canada with a definite past as old as any in America, a Canada with a definite future which is not at all the future of the country of golden grain. Canada cannot be served by bending the old to the new. Each must go its way; and the east must realize itself, even as the west has done. For this purpose, while respecting their distinctive cultures, Maritimers should unite for the realization and promotion of a common regional tradition. It is time for Maritime men to turn from consideration of themselves as Englishmen and Scotsmen and Frenchmen to realize that they are Canadians, and more than that, a special kind of Canadian — "Maritimers." Let the old pride of ancestry be bent to the new realization. Let us have old home weeks and stories and poetry and moving pictures and more local history in our schools and colleges and anything else that will bring this great fact of Maritime Canadianism home to our hearths and bosoms as it never came before The Canada that has been advertised is not our Canada nor are the famous "melting pot" Canadians, our Canadians. But we have a Canada and Canadians here in the east of which we are nothing afraid to speak. It is a "different" Canada — one our fathers made themselves — and we are thinking of adding considerably to it on our own responsiblity. "Self Determination for the Maritimes" — that is something 36

THE BIRTH OF A REGION

which might be preached about, and along with it might also be mentioned the industrial and commercial future which is knocking at the doors of these old provinces. The future is here, and slowly but surely, as the world turns to reconstruction today, the Maritimers are discovering that they are not weary old pioneers outdistanced by a younger west, but modern sturdy Canadians with a gigantic harvest to reap. The eastern provinces are waking from their dream. And yet, waken as they may — and this is the best part of the story, for this is what makes and keeps the real flame of patriotism alive — waken as they may, they will always remain, ALONE AND DISTINCTIVE, THE MARITIME PROVINCES. When factories

thunder in every city and town and skyscrapers touch the heavens, men will still be found in these provinces by the sea, eating their beans on Saturday night.68 The strong assertion of regionalism which had developed in the Maritime provinces by the beginning of the 19205 was not the creation of "hard times" so frequently associated with previous periods of "unrest" in these provinces. The two previous decades were among the most prosperous in their history and the down-turn in the economic cycle would not take place until the spring of ig2o.69 Nor was it merely a ploy by politicians to win support or damage their opponents. The politicians were in large measure responding to the vociferous demands of the leading social and economic organizations within the community. The movement, which would become known for its slogan "Maritime Rights," had its roots firmly grounded among the deepest concerns and aspirations of the people — aspirations of a political, economic, social, and cultural nature which were seriously threatened by the relative decline of the Maritime provinces in the Canadian Dominion.

37

CHAPTER THREE

Crosscurrents: The Farmer-Labour Movement

For a brief period in 1919 and 1920 the spectacular protests of farmer and labouring groups obscured the growth of regional consciousness in the Maritimes. Allied with and sometimes dominated by similar groups from outside the region, the local movements appeared as cross currents in the thrust for regional expression. But a closer view suggests that farmers and labourers in the Maritimes realized that they too had a stake in the achievement of regional goals. Their regionalism, conflicting with that of their external allies, partially accounts for the failure of the farmer-labour political movement in the Maritimes, especially at the federal level. Canadian scholars have tended to ascribe this failure to an innate Maritime conservatism. They have implied a sharp contrast between the Westerner's radicalism or progressivism and the Maritimer's "steady ways," strong party allegiance, and presumed rejection of the advanced social thought which underlay the Prairie movement.1 This interpretation overlooks two important factors: the strength of progressive sentiment in the Maritimes at the beginning of the Twenties and the contrasting role of regional sentiment in the two parts of the country. Progressivism, of course, was not the monopoly of any group or class; each tended to emphasize those aspects of reform ideology which best served their own interests. To professionals, progressivism might be an expression of humanitarian concern and/or an attempt to expand their role in government bureaucracies. To the business-oriented it might mean a search for efficiency, the replacement of old-fashioned party structures, and the development of governments which would more effectively serve the interests of the entrepreneur. To farmers and labour it usually meant an attempt to improve the lot of the weak and exploited, namely themselves.2 In the Maritimes as in Western 38

THE FARMER-LABOUR MOVEMENT

Canada their efforts towards this end found expression in cooperative, social gospel, militant trade union, syndicalist, socialist, and independent farmer and labour political movements. In the West, where progressive sentiment was popularly identified with the region and conservative reaction with eastern big business, regionalism and the farmer-labour movements were mutually reinforcing. Dominated by its Western adherents, the Progressive Party provided a vehicle for the expression of regional interests. Its "real character," as W. L. Morton pointed out, was that of "an agrarian and sectional bloc from the continental West, the representation of the monolithic wheat economy."3 In the Maritimes the "national" farmer and labour political movements conflicted with regional sentiment. When Maritimers realized that these movements could not serve their regional aspirations, many withdrew their support in favour of a campaign for Maritime Rights.

The farmer-labour movement in the Maritimes, as elsewhere, rose upon a groundswell of expectations encouraged by the spread of millennial ideas in both secular and religious thought. Increasingly the war itself had been associated with the attainment of the millenium — "a war to end all wars," which would introduce "a new era" of "liberty," "democracy," and "brotherhood."4 Yet the war's end saw the continuation of the old realities of galloping inflation, rural depopulation, and governments unresponsive to farmer and labour demands. Dissatisfaction with existing conditions and hope of improvement through positive reform activity found expression in a mushrooming of farm and labour organizations and in their eventual resort to political action.5 The coal miners of Nova Scotia formed the hard core of the labour movement in the Maritimes. Influenced by Scottish immigrants and by their own bitter experience with the large corporations which controlled the mines, they developed a greater militancy than the international organizations with which they were affiliated. Throughout a series of strikes between 1909 and 1911, which formed part of their battle to secure affiliation with the United Mine Workers of America, the miners had been subjected to vigorous repression from the operators who seemed to command the support of judiciary, army, and federal and provincial cabinets almost at will. During the war, however, the militants took advantage of government fear of 39

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

work stoppage to create their own organization and force its amalgamation with that of the older union. By the war's end they had consolidated their leadership and won an overwhelming vote in favour of affiliation with the United Mine Workers of America. In 1919 UMW District No. 26 reported a membership of 13,365, the largest cohesive body of organized labour in the country.6 The emergence of District No. 26 coincided with a general expansion of union activity throughout the Maritimes. In 1915 the three provinces had a total of 198 union organizations: 107 in Nova Scotia, 87 in New Brunswick, and 4 in Prince Edward Island. About one-half of these gave membership figures of just over nine thousand. Before the end of 1920 the number of organizations had grown to 319. Of these 204 reported nearly forty thousand members. Union activity was most prominent among the building and metal trades, but included textile, pulp and paper workers, longshoremen, and, in a few isolated cases, hotel clerks, lumbermen, and fishermen.7 In both Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, workers organized provincial federations of labour. President Clifford C. Dane of the Nova Scotia federation, a boiler-maker originally from Australia, was particularly effective in organizing trade union councils in the towns and bringing together previous unorganized workers such as bakers and coalhandlers in locals of the provincial federation.8 Organization was facilitated by the development of an active labour press. By early 1920 the Trades and Labour Councils of Sydney, Pictou County, Halifax, and Saint John each had a local organ: at Sydney the Canadian Labour Leader which opened there in 1917; at New Glasgow the Eastern Federationist, which began publication in May 1918 under the editorship of veteran journalist C. W. Lunn; at Moncton the Union Worker, from June 1920 the official organ of the Trades and Labour Council of Saint John; and at Halifax the Citizen, edited initially by printer E. E. Pride and later by Neil Herman, a Methodist clergyman from Dartmouth.9 The movement also drew support from the social gospel wing of the churches in the Maritimes. Some leaders, such as Clifford Rose of New Glasgow, president of the local carpenters' union, had been awakened to a concern for social problems through the church brotherhoods, while others carefully sought to fit their concept of social reform into a Christian context.10 Their journals featured the sermons of clergymen from a variety of denominations in support of the labour movement. In industrial centres a few clergymen were directly involved in promoting industrial and political organization. W. H. Jenkins of Clyde Avenue Baptist Church, Sydney Mines, and 40

THE FARMER-LABOUR MOVEMENT

Neil Herman of Grace Methodist Church, Dartmouth, were two such organizers and both popular speakers in labour's behalf.11 In its newly achieved sense of power, labour in the Maritimes discussed and experimented with a variety of methods of achieving its goals. These included the tactics of industrial unionism, sympathetic strikes, and direct political action. In March 1919 a "great mass meeting" in Sydney endorsed a resolution by C. C. Dane for a strike of all Nova Scotia workers if the provincial government failed to enact legislation for an eight-hour day. On May 20 a locally organized industrial union, the Amherst Federation of Labour, called "a general strike" of organized labour in that town, partly in sympathy with the workers of the Canadian Car and Foundry Company who had failed to secure parity in wages with the Montreal branch, and partly to back demands for an eight-hour day, union recognition, and improved working conditions in individual plants. With two exceptions, the strike included workers in all the major industries of the town: foundries, engineering works, textile mills, shoe, luggage, and woodworking factories, and even the local garage.12 As with their counterparts in the Winnipeg strike then in progress, Amherst workers combined pragmatic labour demands with a rhetoric suggestive of broader goals. Labour reporters described the federation as a local "One Big Union" and President Frank Burke of Dane Lodge, in an address to an open air meeting of the workers in Victoria Square, "championed the One Big Union Idea" and predicted that "the time would come speedily when the Union would have full power from the Atlantic to the Pacific."13 Although the corporations refused to recognize the federation or meet with its representatives, by the end of May Mayor H. W. Rogers had persuaded both sides to accept a compromise under which management representatives would negotiate directly with their employees in individual plants but agreements would require the approval of the federation before the men returned to work. On June 13 the federation ordered the men back to work in several corporations in which satisfactory concessions had been achieved and the "general" nature of the strike disappeared.14 Some of the strongest opposition to industrial unionism came from the international unions. The Trades and Labour Congress vigorously denounced the One Big Union movement and threatened to expel those unions whose members continued to support it. The Nova Scotia Federation of Labour was an early victim of the TLC's wrath. Forced to withdraw from the TLC early in 1920, it secured incorporation by provincial statute as the Nova Scotia Independent Federa41

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

tion of Labour. Like the western OBU, however, its membership rapidly fell off; in 1923 it reported only two locals, both in Halifax.15 The executive of UMW District No. 26, unwilling to jeopardize their recently acquired International affiliation by openly supporting the OBU, nevertheless made no secret of their anger at the tactics used against it. Led by the radical socialist, J. B. MacLachlan, they voted in the summer of 1919 to boycott the interprovincial conference on labour legislation because the members of District No. 18 in British Columbia, many of whom had joined the OBU, were not permitted to choose their own delegates. Their action was later endorsed by the district convention, which denounced the policies of both the TLC and the federal government.16 Meanwhile the rank and file vigorously discussed the merits of OBU tactics. For example, C. W. Lunn, who may have been personally sympathetic to the movement, reported that at labour meetings in Pictou county each reference to "One Big Union" was greeted with cheers.17 However, as the OBU succumbed to the pressure of its opponents, even the radicals saw little attraction in leaving traditional unions for an experiment already showing signs of failure. Both radicals and the supporters of traditional unionism were united in their call for the election of labour representatives at all levels of government. No strangers to political action, the miners and steelworkers of Cape Breton had reacted favourably to the Trades and Labour Congress decision to run labour candidates in the federal election of 1917. In that election Robert Baxter and John A. Gillis were two of a very few labour candidates in English Canada to retain a substantial share of the labour vote against the pressures for conscription and Union government.18 Under J. B. MacLachlan's leadership the Cape Breton Independent Labour Party maintained its organization after the election and early in 1918 called for the creation of a provincial party. In Pictou county radicals such as Dan Livingstone, a Westville miner, proclaimed the imminence of revolution — but a revolution to be brought about peacefully through the use of the ballot. In Halifax the Citizen took its stand for a political party patterned after the British model. In New Brunswick the cautious Union Worker eschewed "The One Big Union, Red Anarchy, Socialism, Bolshevism or any other of the fool isms now rampant in the country" but declared for the realization of a "new democracy" through an Independent Labour Party. The provincial labour conventions of 1919 in both New Brunswick and Nova Scotia passed resolutions which indicated that they still sought to influence existing parties. But they also approved statements affirming the 42

THE FARMER-LABOUR MOVEMENT

existence of labour as a "class" and favouring its representation by a separate party.19 Whatever their goals — whether a society rebuilt on Christian principles, a "new democracy," a socialist state, or merely a more powerful union structure — workers in the Maritimes saw themselves as part of a broad national or international movement. Traditional unionists, OBU supporters, and radical socialists sought allies and inspiration in other regions of the country, the United States, Great Britain, and Europe. Nevertheless, even at its crest, the labour movement in the Maritimes tended to reveal a regional concern cutting sharply acrosss class lines. Early in 1919 the Eastern Federationist asserted that the sharp increase in freight rates was a violation of the "rights of the Maritime Provinces' people under the terms of confederation." After the Amherst strike the paper was particularly incensed by reports that the Canadian Car Company was planning to transfer its Amherst operations to Montreal. The thrust of the editor's bitterness was not only against the capitalists involved but against a trend towards metropolitan consolidation which offered a continual threat to industry and jobs in the Maritimes.20 At Halifax the Citizen supported the activities of H. J. Logan in seeking Maritime union. The editor was highly critical of the loss of railway headquarters from Moncton and warned of new dangers facing the Maritimes with the shift in the centre of power westward. Bitterness and pessimism combined in his conclusion that there was "very little hope or any justice for us under present conditions." The Citizen returned to the same theme in September and thereafter remained a consistent defender of Maritime "rights."21 At the UMW Convention of 1919, the miners of Inverness presented a resolution affirming the Maritimes' right of compensation in lieu of school lands. This was referred to the TLC for consideration.22 Earlier the same year the union executive requested the restoration of higher levels of protection on Maritime coal. In August the Eastern Federatimist called for retaliation in kind if the western farmers carried through with a threatened boycott of protected goods.23 Clearly Maritime labour had strong regional aspirations not shared by and potentially in conflict with their allies in other parts of the country.

The farmers' activity was stimulated by motives similar to those of labour — a wish to improve their economic status, a distrust of the old party system, and the anticipation of "a new era" of reform after the 43

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

war. Although not subject to the confrontations with corporations which embittered labour, they were suspicious of the profiteering of business groups — especially of the middlemen with whom they had to deal. Rural depopulation and community disintegration had also become serious, following the urbanization and westward migration of the early decades of the century.24 As with labour, the farmers' response to their problems was to seek more vigorous organization. In all three provinces they had provincial associations which met annually and passed resolutions to influence governmental policy. There were also local agricultural societies and a scattering of producer, marketing, and distributing cooperatives.25 The most substantial of the cooperatives were the United Fruit Companies of Nova Scotia, which had been organized from several independent units in 1911 and by 1920 controlled between one-quarter and one-third of the province's multimillion dollar apple industry, and the Canadian Farm Products Company Ltd. of Prince Edward Island, initiated in 1913 and by 1920 marketing produce, mainly eggs and poultry, valued at $4oo,ooo.26 The war's end saw increased activity in cooperative and other farm organization in the Maritimes and the desire among some to emulate the political and economic tactics of farmers elsewhere in the country. In February 1918 some farmers at Pembroke and Wakefield, little communities in western New Brunswick, sent a committee to investigate the United Farmers of Ontario whose organization they thought offered a "broader approach to farmers' problems." After the committee's favourable report, a new organization was instituted in their own and nearby communities. In April farmers from three neighbouring counties, Carleton, York, and Victoria, met at Woodstock to form a new provincial association, the United Farmers of New Brunswick. Within a year membership had grown to an estimated 7,000 in more than one hundred branches.27 Farmers in Nova Scotia followed more slowly. The years 1918-20 were active ones for cooperative organization, encouraged by government agents and a socially concerned clergy. By the end of 1918 farmers in the Annapolis Valley were considering the nomination of "farmer" candidates at the next election.28 In January 1920, following a regular meeting of the Nova Scotia Agricultural Association, a committee was appointed to explore the feasibility of a new political organization, patterned on those of the other provinces. In April the United Farmers of Nova Scotia was firmly established and within a year reported a membership of 2,5oo.29 44

THE FARMER-LABOUR

MOVEMENT

The new type of organization made its smallest impact in Prince Edward Island. In a province which was overwhelmingly agricultural, all parties cultivated the farmers and it was difficult for anyone to make a case of politicians being unresponsive to rural sentiment. The threat of a separate "farmers' party" was also undercut when local Liberals endorsed a new "progressive policy" which included the adoption of the platform of the Canadian Council of Agriculture. When a new farmers' organization was finally launched in January 1921, dissidents found little to agitate against but the state of the ferry service and the need for standard-gauge railways, issues which the Liberals had long made their own.30 The distinguishing feature of the new movement was its concept of farmers as a distinct group or class. This was reflected in the decision to run farmer candidates in elections and in a rhetoric of prejudice against the professional and business classes, especially the "big interests" whose baleful influence provided the explanation for most of the problems of the country.31 Class consciousness was also a factor in the aggressive expansion of cooperatives. In 1918 the United Farmers of New Brunswick organized the United Farmers' Co-operative Companies, a centrally controlled purchasing and distributing cooperative which by 1920 had fourteen branches located largely in Carleton, York, and Westmorland counties. With Nova Scotia's entry into the movement, the name was changed to the Maritime United Farmers Co-operative Limited and farmers' stores in Nova Scotia were invited to join. By the end of 1920 the number of branches had grown to twenty-one with warehouses at Moncton and Woodstock and total assets of $424,321.83.32 Like labour, the farmers in the Maritimes saw themselves as forming a part of a broad class movement. Their ties with farmers outside the region were obvious. Farm leaders from Ontario and the Prairies — J. J. Morrison, R. W. E. Burnaby, George Chipman, T. A. Crerar, and William Irvine — appeared on Maritime platforms and the writings of Irvine, Hopkins Moorhouse, and Edward Porritt contributed to the literature of their movement.33 In the summer of 1920 the United Farmers' Associations of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia joined the Canadian Council of Agriculture.34 The main source of external influence was a new farm journal, the United Farmers' Guide. The western Progressives, in contemplating political action at the federal level, had been anxious to acquire allies in all parts of the country. As reports reached the West of incipient farmer activity in the Maritimes, an ex-Nova Scotian, George Chip45

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT man, editor of the influential Grain Growers' Guide, toured the region with authorization from his directors to establish there a companion to the Guide. Both the United Fruit Companies of Nova Scotia and the New Brunswick Co-operative Companies invested in the venture, but the main financial responsibility and effective control of the new journal remained with George Chipman and his associates from Manitoba.35 In the summer of i g2ojohn M. Pratt of Winnipeg seems to have made the United Farmers' Guide a base for full-time organizational work in the Maritimes. Contacts between Prairie and Maritime movements were further cemented as Fred Chipman, George's brother and an employee of the United Fruit Companies, was elected secretary of the United Farmers of Nova Scotia.36 External direction proved a serious liability for the agrarian movement in the Maritimes. The Maritime Farmer of Sussex, New Brunswick, resenting competition in what had been its own exclusive preserve, greeted *the new farm journal with an editorial broadside centred on the issue of Western control and the incompatibility of Western and Maritime interests. The Maritime Farmer charged that Westerners dominated the journal and the political movement. Maritimers had had no part in the creation or revision of the political platform of the Canadian Council of Agriculture, which, it claimed, was tailored exclusively to Western needs. As an example both of Western bias and the divergence of Maritime and Prairie interests, the Maritime Farmer cited the council's support for the Canadian Wheat Board, which the paper claimed had kept up grain prices and increased costs for Maritime farmers.37 The United Farmers' Guide's sensitivity to the charges was reflected in its long and laboured replies. There was an obvious tendency to protest too much in its offer of $ i ,000 if the Maritime Farmer could prove any of five critical statements about the farmers' movement or the Guide's role in it. As George Chipman assured T. A. Crerar, the statements were so worded that the Guide was in no danger of losing any money. The Liberal government of Premier W. E. Foster of New Brunswick, worried by the spread of the movement in areas of its traditional support, circulated copies of the Maritime Farmer free of charge.38 The Maritime Farmer's charges were rendered serious by the Guide's obvious Western bias. The Guide conspicuously ignored Maritime regional problems except when they lent support for Prairie goals. It treated the railway problem without any mention of the Intercolonial, the loss of regional headquarters, or the much higher rate increases in 46

THE FARMER-LABOUR MOVEMENT

the Maritimes. It ascribed rural depopulation to shipbuilding subsidies — an unlikely Maritime grievance. On the issue of the tariff it showed scant sympathy for those Nova Scotian farmers concerned about the future of local markets.39

Regional conflict, latent in the farmer-labour movement, did not emerge in time to prevent initial political successes. A federal byelection in Victoria and Carleton in November 1919 resulted in the election of T. W. Caldwell, president of the United Farmers' Association of New Brunswick. It was an auspicious constituency for such a beginning. Here the passage of the Liberal incumbent, Frank Carvell, into the Union government had caused maximum confusion among the adherents of the traditional parties. Here also the new farmers' movement had made its earliest and deepest penetration. Caldwell's majority of over 3,500 votes was the largest ever recorded in the two counties in any federal election.40 The next political test came in Nova Scotia as the wily Liberal premier, George Murray, called a surprise election for July 27, 1920, in the farmers' busiest season. Farmer and labour organizations drew up platforms but let local constituencies decide whether or not to run candidates. Joint action between the two groups proved difficult to achieve. At the Nova Scotia farmers' convention of April 1920, an exchange of insults between farmer and labour representatives preceded a decision not to cooperate at the provincial level. Locally, however, they managed to avoid duplication in all but one constituency. The farmer-labour parties made a respectable showing in the election. In a 43-seat house, the farmers elected 7 of 14 candidates, labour 4 of 12, and together they polled 30.9 per cent of the popular vote. The eleven successful candidates replaced the Conservatives as the official opposition.41 The extent of class support for their candidates was considerably higher than the general figures show. By failing to involve fishermen in their movement, they conceded to their opponents the half-dozen predominantly fishing counties and a substantial segment of votes in other constituencies. Nevertheless, with two notable exceptions, they won or came close to winning in the leading industrial and agricultural sections of the province.42 They piled up large majorities in the counties of Cape Breton and Cumberland, won handily in Colchester, split Hants, and were close contenders in Antigonish and Pictou. 47

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

From a narrow base and in a relatively primitive stage of organization, they had leap-frogged into second place among the parties of the province. With more time to spread their ideas and develop their organization, they confidently anticipated victory in the next provincial election. In a report to the Canadian Council of Agriculture soon after the election, George Chipman predicted that the membership of the United Farmers of Nova Scotia would expand to between 15,000 and 20,000 within the next two months.43 The Colchester by-election of September 20, 1920, which forced voters to choose between regional and class aspirations, effectively checked such enthusiasm. F. B. McCurdy's appointment, providing, after a ten-month absence, a Maritime voice in the cabinet, was the occasion of the election — a fact which gave scant encouragement to opposition parties to oppose him. Maritimers had complained of lack of representation. Offered such in the form of the strategic public works portfolio, could they be expected to reject it by defeating McCurdy? Local liberals thought not and resisted pressure from Mackenzie King to field a candidate. The Colchester farmers, however, urged on by the United Farmers' Guide, decided to do so.44 The farmers were far from united on the question. G. N. Allen, farmer ML A for Cumberland, called it a reckless decision, one which would have serious repercussions for the whole movement and should have been left to the provincial executive. Replying to the Guide's insinuation that he was a dupe of the Tories, Allen reiterated that it would be folly from a local and regional viewpoint to defeat McCurdy.45 McCurdy's campaign emphasized the strength of his position. Refusing to be drawn into a defence of the government's record or to debate local issues, he and his supporters constantly played upon a single theme: that Nova Scotia needed representation in the cabinet at a time when decisions were being made of critical importance to its future.46 It was a particularly effective approach in a railway centre such as Truro, where residents were worried about jobs, seniority, and freight rate increases as a result of the railway integration. Michael Dwyer, a prominent Halifax Liberal, echoed this theme in a letter to the people of Colchester which was given a broad spread on the front page of the Halifax Herald. From several visits to Ottawa, Dwyer had concluded that Nova Scotia was "not of much account up there." In part this was because of a tendency to "deliver our votes just as our fathers did before us, no matter whether we think our interests have been neglected or not" and in part because "many of our representatives . . . very quickly become absorbed in the larger life up 48

THE FARMER-LABOUR MOVEMENT

there and are very much inclined to forget the interests of their native province." The situation by 1920 had become too serious for normal political considerations. At stake was the question of whether Portland or Halifax would emerge as the eastern terminus of the government railway system: "once the traffic commences to flow to Portland it will continue flowing there. . . . We will have to fight, and fight hard, to prevent the old Intercolonial Railway from becoming . . . a merely local road, and the beginning of the fight... is to get a representative like Mr. McCurdy into the cabinet."47 McCurdy won the election handily as the farmer-labour majority of less than three months before turned into a majority of 1,444 f°r tne government candidate. Many Colchester residents had obviously reached the pragmatic conclusion that, in this case at least, their needs could only be served outside the farmer-labour parties. The farmer-labour showing in the October provincial election in New Brunswick also suggested that the movement had passed its peak. The New Brunswick Federation of Labour decided not to contest the election, offering the lame excuse that their organization was insufficiently advanced — a sharp turnabout from their brave declarations earlier that year. The Halifax Citizen attributed their decision to orders from railway bosses and municipal governments that their employees were not to engage in politics.48 It is equally probable, however, that the railway brotherhoods, incensed over die transferral of the Intercolonial headquarters from Moncton, with its attendant loss of employment and seniority and its threat to the future of the remaining facilities, were reluctant to challenge the party which was then leading a crusade on their behalf. Only four labour candidates were put forward by local constituencies and two were elected, both of whom, on winning election, expressed their support for the government.49 Despite an earlier start in New Brunswick, the new farmers' organization remained limited to a relatively few counties and their party elected only six to a house of 48.50 The year 1921 saw the decline and to a considerable extent disintegration of the farmer-labour movement in the Maritimes. Part of the reason was economic. In a period of serious recession, with unemployment in excess of 10 per cent, the trade union movement received a severe setback. Many workers emigrated from the Maritimes and those remaining were in a weak position to maintain their organizations in the face of corporation pressure. By 1923, 172 unions gave their total membership as 20,014, a little over one-half of that reported three years before.51 The commercial wing of the 49

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

farmers' movement also experienced difficulties. Retail stores ran into the double problem of sales reduced by recession and inventory values undercut by deflation. So many of these were in trouble by 1922 that the United Farmers Co-operative Company was forced to reorganize on a less centralized basis.52 Economic stringency tended to dampen political enthusiasm. As economic conditions worsened, the need for quick and practical reform became urgent. Politically, Maritimers could no longer afford the luxury of waiting for a distant and ill-defined transformation of society. They required immediate changes in federal policies to help save struggling industries and to provide financial aid for reform in areas of provincial responsibility. For achieving these goals the farmer-labour parties had shown themselves to be singularly implausible agents. Indeed, at the national level their policies tended to conflict directly with those sought by farmers and workers in the Maritimes. Labour conventions in Western Canada endorsed a policy of freer trade at a time when Maritime workers were seeking greater protection on steel and coal. Western farmers urged "equalization" of freight rates — the Prairie rationale for shifting the burden of freight rates eastward.53 Early in 1921 T. A. Crerar undercut his supporters in the Maritimes on the subsidy question when he declared for an immediate political settlement of the Prairie claims while leaving the Maritime claims to be submitted to the courts for judicial consideration at some later date. The farmers in the Maritimes also became dubious about Prairie policies of free trade. In its representations before the Tariff Commission in the fall of 1920, the Nova Scotia executive departed so far from the "original memo" prepared for them by the Western organizers that J. M. Pratt charged they were "dominated by the Tory element in the province."54 Farmer-labour leaders did try to mobilize regional sentiment to their own advantage. Their main criticism of the traditional parties was that the latter were controlled by the big business interests of "Upper Canada."55 By 1921, however, farmers in the Maritimes were beginning to wonder whether a party dominated by the Prairies, and offering no concessions to Maritime regional interests, provided a satisfactory alternative. The political wing of the Maritime farmers' movement had become little more than a hollow shell before the federal election in December. The circulation of the United Farmers' Guide declined to the point where its deficit for the year, borne by the parent Grain Growers' Guide, approximated $22,000. In both New Brunswick and Nova Scotia the 50

THE FARMER-LABOUR MOVEMENT

commercial organizations were disenchanted with their journal. President S. H. Hagerman advised George Chipman not to allow the Maritime Co-operative Companies to use the United Farmers' Guide as collateral for a loan, as there were so many dissatisfied with the journal that they might default in order to get rid of it.56 Both the journal and the political organization were kept alive until after the election. Sixteen candidates ran as Progressives, polling less than 12 per cent of the popular vote. Only one was victorious: T. W. Caldwell was re-elected in Carleton-Victoria, but by a greatly reduced majority. Labour ran four candidates; none was successful. Only in Cape Breton County did a significant core of labour support remain, but here, too, it had declined from the provincial election in the previous year.57 By 1925 even these pockets of farmer and labour support had virtually disappeared as Maritimers turned first to the Liberals and then to the Conservatives in seeking help for their problems.

Regionalism played an important role in the defeat of farmerlabour forces in the Maritimes. Here, as in Western Canada, regional discontent had been a factor in popular disillusionment with the two older parties. These parties, however, were adept in at least promising to remedy grievances. The farmer-labour party proved unable to harness the acute regional concern of even that segment of the community to which they directed their appeal. The labour press lashed out at the lack of concern for Maritime interests at the federal level but failed to suggest how this would be alleviated by a labour government. Divided regionally on the tariff and with little expectation of gaining power, a scattered group of labour and socialist parties offered scant prospects of help in meeting urgent Maritime problems. J. S. Woods worth's election in Manitoba more strongly identified labour politically with Western Canada. In the first of a series of "Ottawa Notes" for the Workers' Weekly, Woodsworth remarked on the development of a "regional psychology" in Canada which saw "the ideals of the Maritime Provinces apparently at the poles from those of Western Canada." In his view, much of the fault lay with the Maritimes. "What could be more arrogant," he asked, "than the demand from Nova Scotia members that Nova Scotia should be given a fixed number of representatives, irrespective of the relationship of the population to that of the country at large?" Woodsworth's later 51

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

attacks on the British Empire Coal and Steel Corporation and concern for the workers' plight during a series of bitter strikes undoubtedly struck a favourable chord in the Maritimes. But the subsequent outspoken opposition by his colleague, A. A. Heaps, to the implementation of the transportation clauses of the Duncan Commission tended to confirm the impression that their movement was hostile to the regional interests of the Maritime provinces.58 The Progressives not only failed to take advantage of regional discontent in the Maritimes but displayed a regionalism of their own which frequently ran counter to the interests of the Maritime farmer. On the key issues of lower freight rates and higher subsidies their attitude was directly hostile. Even their rigid stand on the tariff gave second thoughts to fruit farmers and those dependent for their markets on the local industrial towns. The United Farmers' Guide argued that regionalism was incited by the "big interests" in order to destroy their movement.59 But such incitement was hardly necessary. From the beginning both Maritime and Prairie agrarian protests included strong regional aspirations which could only have been reconciled by flexible and far-sighted leadership. The Prairie representatives who controlled the Guide were not prepared to modify their program in any way for the alleviation of Maritime problems. Instead they launched a kind of missionary movement to convince Maritimers that what was desired by the West was good for everyone. As is so often the case with "foreign missions," they displayed an element of cultural and political imperialism which soon became distasteful to the natives. The United Farmers' Guide frequently ignored or only belatedly recognized local attempts at cooperative or other reform activity in the Maritimes, while trumpeting the accomplishments of the progressive West. The exigencies of local politics were neglected for the goals of the "national" party, sometimes, as in the case of the Colchester by-election, with disastrous results. By 19222 the Guide ceased publication and the "missionaries" went home, apparently unaware of any defects in their message or its delivery but firmly convinced of the incorrigible conservatism of the "heathen" with whom they had to deal. The decline of the farmer-labour political movements did not stifle the reform thrust in the Maritimes which for a brief period was embodied in it. Indeed, rural organization steadily continued. At Antigonish, Saint Francis Xavier University launched a series of people's schools to promote adult education. Encouraged by clergymen, government agents, and agricultural associations, cooperative 52

THE FARMER-LABOUR MOVEMENT

organization expanded rapidly during the 19205. By 1928 the marketing section alone had a membership of over 16,000 and an annual business turnover of more than $2.5 million.60 But in a drive for reform, efforts at self-help had their limitations. Agriculture and other industries were profoundly affected by policies at the national level. Reform initiatives by the provinces cost money which they could not easily raise. In urban areas the rehabilitation of sick industries became of primary importance to social reformers. Working conditions, unless unusually harsh, assumed a lesser urgency than the problem of no work at all. Concern for the economic and social conditions of the people led prominent farmer-labour leaders and their supporters into the drive for Maritime Rights. C. W. Lunn, a labour journalist, was one of the early popularizers of the Maritime case for lower freight rates and a separate management for the Intercolonial.61 A. E. McMahon, vicepresident of the United Farmers of Nova Scotia and general manager of the United Fruit Company, succeeded H. J. Logan as president of the Maritime Board of Trade and helped organize the Maritime Development Association of which he became the first chairman.62 Neil Herman, social gospel preacher, labour organizer and journalist, was an executive and founding member of the Maritime Club of Halifax and in 1924 accompanied H. S. Congdon in his travels to secure journalistic support for the movement in Central Canada.63 Although not always apparent in the sometimes cynical manoeuvring of the politicians, the Maritime Rights movement encompassed a strong core of positive reform goals which appealed to many of the same people who had supported the farmer-labour alliance. Had the latter provided a satisfactory vehicle for achieving regional goals, as did its counterpart on the Prairies, it would probably have retained their allegiance. As it was, they were forced to turn to the traditional parties for promised help in coping with Maritime problems. Their landslide shifts in voting support, from farmer-labour in 1920 to the Liberals in 1921 and then to the Conservatives in 1925, were not a reflection of Maritimers' "steady ways" nor of a strong commitment to party ties. Indeed, they indicated the very opposite, as Maritimers displayed a rational concern for regional self-interest in voting for the party which came closest to meeting their demands and punishing those which failed to respond to them.

53

CHAPTER FOUR

The Impact of Depression

The postwar recession did not cause the Maritime Rights movement but it did profoundly affect its development. The cyclical decline exposed flaws in the Maritime economy which caused it to fall far behind that of the rest of Canada during the 19205. Fishing, lumbering, mining, agriculture, and manufacturing all entered a period of crisis which left near-destitution in its wake. Indeed, if Maritimers remember the 19308 as the period of their "Great Depression," it is only because in the earlier decade they were able to mitigate the effects of their industries' collapse through wholesale emigration. The causes of the regional depression were complex and largely beyond the control of Canadians. But some of the problems which developed were the direct responsibility of the federal government. As their political influence declined, Maritimers were no longer able to secure the maintenance of the railway, tariff, and other policies which had been of critical importance in their industrial development. The role of federal policies in intensifying Maritime difficulties seemed to vindicate the earlier call of Maritime Rights leaders for vigorous and united action to restore the region's political influence in the Dominion. The Maritime Rights movement became a medium for the constructive expression and channelling of the anger and discontent provoked by the depression, and thus secured the support of a large majority of Maritimers in the early years of the decade. The recession began in the late spring and summer of 1920. The end of the war in Canada, as in Great Britain and the United States, had been followed within a few months by a boom and spiralling inflation. Intense consumer demand led to speculation and the hoarding of wholesale goods and raw materials. The upward spiral broke in May 1920. Prices fell rapidly as large inventories were 54

THE IMPACT OF DEPRESSION

thrown on the market. In Canada the wholesale price index dropped from 203.2 in 1920 to 143.4 in 1921 and reached a low of 126.8 in 1922. Wood and iron products bottomed out in 1922 after declines of 30 per cent and 38 per cent respectively. Textiles reached their low early, having declined 45 per cent in one year, while animal and vegetable products continued their slide into 1923 for total losses of 50 and 34 per cent respectively. Canadian exports declined by slightly more than one-third in value and imports by nearly 40 per cent.1 Trade unions reported unemployment rates among their membership of 16.5 per cent in the spring of 1921. The number of business failures increased from 755 in 1919 to 3,695 in 1922.2 The business recession provoked a protectionist response from the United States which intensified its impact on Canada. The FordneyMicumber tariff of 1921, which affected fish, lumber, coal and agricultural products, struck hard at Canadian exports. Total exports to the United States declined 46 per cent between 1921 and 1922^ The recession also initiated a heavy exodus from the country. Since the United States was affected less severely by the recession and emerged from it more quickly than did Canada, there was considerable emigration southward.4 In a five-year period beginning June 30, 1920, more than half-a-million Newfoundland and Canadian residents emigrated to the United States, with a peak of over 200,000 in ig24.5 Maritime industries were among the most severely affected by the recession. The fishery was one of the first in trouble. The war's end saw a revival of the fisheries of Britain, France, and Portugal and the aggressive pursuit of new markets by Iceland and Norway, whose fisheries were subsidized by national governments. Forced out of their markets in Europe, Newfoundland fishermen invaded traditional Maritime markets in the West Indies — markets which were already constricted by a collapse of sugar prices resulting from the revival of sugar-beet production in Europe. In 1920 the price of salt cod dropped by one-quarter. A year later it was down to one-half the 1919 level.6 Conditions were little better in the fresh and frozen fish trade. On July 15, 1921, the Americans cancelled the modus vivendi which had permitted Canadian fishermen to market their fish directly at American ports and forced Maritime fishermen to bring their fish to their home ports for transshipment. To the extra costs of handling and transportation which this entailed was added the burden of the new tariffs. These amounted to about i cent per pound on common and 2 cents per pound on higher grades of fish — an effective barrier of 30 55

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

per cent to 50 per cent or higher, calculated on the prices paid to the fishermen.7 The result for the fishing communities of the west coast of Nova Scotia was little short of disastrous. The Yarmouth halibut fleet (16 of 18 vessels) moved their headquarters to Gloucester, Massachusetts.8 Other fishermen followed in such numbers that a witness before the Duncan Commission claimed that the goal of the American fisheries policy was not so much the protection of the American industry as the theft of the Canadian fishermen.9 Even the fresh fish markets of Central Canada posed new problems for the Maritime fishermen. At the end of 1919 the Canadian government terminated its transportation bonus to the east coast fishermen. A year later freight and express rates on railways in Eastern Canada increased by over 40 per cent.10 The shore fishermen, meanwhile, encountered increasing competition from the trawlers of the large fish companies. With a fraction of the labour required in more traditional ventures, these vessels furnished in the winter months the volume which the companies claimed was necessary to maintain a steady supply for the market.11 In the summer they tended to glut the markets with an inferior grade, driving prices below the level which would provide a reasonable wage for the individual fishermen.12 The difficulties of both the fresh and salt trade were reflected in the sharp drop in numbers of those regularly employed in the fisheries. In 1919, 17,583 fishermen in the Maritime provinces were eligible for the federal bounty. In 1920 the number had fallen to 14,020 and by 1923 to only 12,395. The number of fishing vessels of over ten tons declined from 737 in 1919 to 504 in 1924. And there was a drop of about i ,800 in the number of boats in full-time service.13 Some of the fishermen in northern New Brunswick were reported to have turned to "making pulp." Others were apparently trying to scratch a living from their little plots of land. The commonest tale was simply that they had gone to the United States. Those who remained faced a sharp deterioration in living standards, with reports of destitution common in counties such as Guysborough, Nova Scotia, and Kent, New Brunswick, which were heavily dependent on the fisheries.14 The forestry industry was also in trouble. Local markets declined sharply with the collapse of the construction boom. Building permits in the Maritimes dwindled in estimated value from $23 million in 1919 to $9 million in 1921. In Halifax, where reconstruction after the 1917 explosion had made the boom particularly intense, total building permits dropped from $5 million in 1919 to $378,699 in 1923-15 Shipbuilding in the Maritimes, which totalled 47,203 tons in 1919, 56

THE IMPACT OF DEPRESSION

about half of which was wooden, declined over 75 per cent by the end of 1921.16 While exports to the United States suffered from higher freight rates and the Fordney-Micumber tariff, the most serious problem for the Maritime lumberman was the introduction of new and crippling competition from the west coast. Although the Panama Canal was completed in 1914, high ocean freight rates and a scarcity of shipping during the war proved an effective barrier to trade in eastern and European markets. Shipping surpluses made available by the trade recession caused ocean rates to plummet and western lumber flooded eastern markets. The 2oo-year-old Maritime industry was in no position to compete effectively with the virgin stands of giant timber available to the lumberman on the west coast. In 1920 Maritime lumber mills employed 8,007 men» a year later only 4,569. At the same time, the estimated value of their product dropped from $28 to $14 million. By 1925 the industry had recovered slightly but employment in the mills remained at three-quarters of the 1920 level.17 The pulp and paper industry, far from taking up the slack, encountered marketing problems of its own. In one year its estimated value of production declined by 50 per cent and the numbers employed from 2,000 to 1,300. Despite the addition of a new papermill at Bathurst, the industry employed 171 fewer hands in 1925 than at the beginning of the decade.18 The difficulties of the coal industry were equally serious, although more complex. By the 19205 coal as a source of fuel and industrial energy faced growing competition from oil and hydro-electric power. Per capita consumption of coal in Canada levelled off and even began a slight decline.19 The Nova Scotia industry was under serious disadvantages in competing for its share of the constricted market. During the war it had been cut off from the ports of the St. Lawrence, its largest external consumer, by the disruption of shipping. In 1916, sixteen vessels employed by the industry were no longer available. Seven of these had been requisitioned by the British admiralty and were not restored until after the 1919 season.20 With the fleet's return the operators faced the problem of dislodging Virginia and Pennsylvania coal, which was by then firmly entrenched in the Montreal market. Like the lumbermen, the miners had to compete with younger and more efficient rivals. Some of the Nova Scotia mines had been in operation for more than fifty years and had underground shafts running two miles beneath the sea. Every foot of distance meant higher costs, and the submarine nature of the mines further reduced

57

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

efficiency by limiting the amount of coal which might safely be removed.21 In 1926 coal production in Nova Scotia mines averaged 2.26 tons per man-day compared with 4.37 and 4.90 tons for those of Pennsylvania and Virginia respectively. Not only was the American coal produced more cheaply, it tended to be a "cleaner" variety which did not disintegrate as easily in handling and transit. Although exemption from the 53 cent tariff on bituminous coal and the advantage of cheaper water transportation helped to compensate for the higher costs of production, Maritime producers were still forced to undercut their competitors by nearly $ i .00 a ton in order to sell their product.22 Early in 1920 the shareholders of two major steel and coal corporations were offered an apparent solution to some of their problems through a merger with two of the leading shipping companies in Eastern Canada, the Halifax Shipyards and the Canada Steamship lines.23 The giant merger, its supporters argued, would strengthen the industries involved, provide new capital for modernization and terminate a potentially costly legal squabble over coal leases.24 According to Grant Morden, a British MP and former Canadian financier who had originally promoted the scheme, the workers would benefit from a new and comprehensive labour policy which would include labour representatives on the board of directors. Morden's proposal drew favourable comments from labour newspapers and he sought, though unsuccessfully, to obtain the assistance of opposition leader W. L. Mackenzie King in drafting his program.25 The emergence of the British Empire Steel and Coal Corporation under the presidency of R. M. Wolvin, a former traffic expert from Duluth, Minnesota, who was then a Montreal financier, failed to cushion the effects of the depression on the coal and steel industries of the Maritimes. Indeed, on balance, the merger might be included among the factors leading to their decline. Its adverse effect on public opinion was particularly serious. In the capitalization of the new corporation, more than $18 million was added in stock bonuses. The myth became widely circulated that the earnings of the steel and coal industries were thus being siphoned off to pay dividends on "watered" stock.26 That the myth was largely false was of slight consequence. Its effect was to undermine public confidence at a time when the industries were seeking tariff and other concessions from the federal government, and to help destroy the credibility of the new organization among the workers.27 The merger did enjoy some success in maintaining coal prices in 58

THE IMPACT OF DEPRESSION

Nova Scotia. Here Besco enforced its near monopoly by withholding supplies from coal dealers who cut prices or imported coal or coke from the United States. To the indignant residents, the cost of the monopoly appeared greater than it actually was, as consumers compared the retail cost of coal delivered at home with the prices which Besco was charging in Montreal in its attempt to dislodge American competition. Thus the Besco merger rapidly created hostility for the industry within the local region.28 The merger also aggravated rather than lessened conflict with labour. Morden's vague proposals were never implemented and Besco became infamous for its reactionary labour policies. In their first contract negotiations with the coal miners, the Wolvin management announced a wage reduction of 37.5 per cent effective at the beginning of 1922. The Duncan Commission later declared the cut unjustified and it certainly appeared so to the miners at the time.29 While it was true that the coal industry had entered a slump in 1921, the previous year had been a prosperous one. So great was the demand for coal in 1920, particularly from European countries, that the federal government had placed an embargo on coal exports until local needs had been met.30 The financial statement of the Dominion Coal Company at the end of the fiscal year had shown earnings on invested capital of 13.2 per cent.31 A drop in the cost of living had added materially to the real wages of the miners, but these gains had been largely offset by previous losses. Following a period of restraint imposed by the war and heavy losses from inflation, the miners were seeking, in the words of the royal commission, "a better standard of life."32 They fiercely resisted the wage cut and through slowdowns, strikes, and conciliation reduced it to 20 per cent.33 In the course of their struggle they exchanged the moderate leadership of Robert Baxter and Silby Barrett for the radical variety offered by Dan Livingstone and J. B. MacLachlan. The district convention of June 1922 endorsed a radical program, including a resolution to affiliate with the Red International.34 At a critical time for the Nova Scotia industry the mutual distrust of miners and management had solidified. In succeeding years the bogies of Besco and Bolshevism tended to prevent a realistic assessment of the basic problems of the coal and steel industries in the Maritimes. The demand for coal continued to decline in 1922. A temporary revival in 1923, aided by a brief recovery in the steel industry and the effects of a lengthy coal strike in the United States during the previous year, did not improve labour-management relations. When the coal 59

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

miners struck in the summer of 1923 in support of striking steel workers, the provincial government arrested Livingstone and MacLachlan for sedition and the International of the United Mine Workers suspended the District No. 26 executive for their allegedly revolutionary tendencies and for striking while a contract was in force. At the end of the year the "provisional" executive imposed by the International was confronted with another 20 per cent wage cut. After a month-long strike early in 1924, they succeeded in turning the reduction into an increase of 6 to 8 per cent.35 But as the year drew to a close Besco was back on the offensive with its inevitable demand for a 20 per cent reduction in wages. I n 1924 the coal industry was again in a serious slump and the year's end saw little prospect of improvement. The less efficient mines were taken out of production for the winter or, as in the case of Glace Bay collieries number 2, 4, and 6, were worked a few shifts a week to provide relief for the miners. This was supplemented by credit from the company stores. The average shifts for the men working dropped from 263 in 1923 to 202 in 1924. In 1925 the men continued to work without a contract until March, when Besco cancelled credit at the company stores. This precipitated the strike, already pending over the wage dispute, and tied up the mines for more than five months.36 It is easy to exaggerate the role of poor management in the acute labour strife of the early 19208. Basically the trouble was caused by the recession's impact on the coal and steel industry and the deterioration in the Nova Scotian industry's ability to sell its products. Besco was fighting to remain solvent, the miners to maintain their standard of living. Neither succeeded. The full effects of the depression were delayed by a good year in 1920 and a temporary revival in 1923. Its impact, however, was ultimately no less severe than on other industries. Work stoppages and irregular shifts cut into the miners' wages just as surely as the formal wage cuts by Besco. Because of the specialized nature of their skills and the less than buoyant condition of the industry elsewhere, coal miners tended to be less mobile than Maritimers in other occupations. Unlike those employed in forestry and the fisheries, few miners had small farms or plots of land which would enable them to subsist when their main source of income was cut off. After the 1925 strike had been under way for about a month, more than 12,000 were reported on relief in the mining towns. Indeed, it is probable that only the unprecedented relief effort by trade unions and service, church, and welfare associations at the national level prevented wholesale starvation.37 60

THE IMPACT OF DEPRESSION

In August the miners accepted 6 to 8 per cent cuts in wages and returned to work. Despite a heavy emigration during the strike, many still worked part-time through the winter of 1925. In the mining towns merchants failed, taxes remained unpaid, and municipal employees were months behind in collecting their wages. J. W. McLeod, District No. 26 president, had little trouble in carrying out his undertaking before the coal commission of 1925 to "prove the grim reality of poverty, hunger, and destitution that is now the lot of the miners. Men, women and children, hungry, ill-clad, undernourished, sick, despondent — A pitiful sordid tale of living on short rations without any decency or comfort, without sufficient clothing, shoes, bedding, bed clothing or all that is ordinarily required in the daily life of human beings."38 By the end of 1925 Besco was itself on the verge of bankruptcy. Part of the problem of shrinking coal markets had been caused by the crisis in the steel industry and secondary manufacturing generally. The production of a ton of pig iron consumed between i and 1.5 tons of coal; of a ton of steel, 2 to 3 tons.39 Pig iron production in Nova Scotia, which after 1906 had exceeded 300,000 tons every year but one, dropped to 254,542 in 1919 and reached a low of i2o,769.40 Maritime steel producers had concentrated heavily on munitions. After the war, when innovations such as the automobile created a demand for new lines of steel, market prospects offered little incentive for Maritime producers to diversify. Besco's Central Canadian rivals had expanded their steel capacity during the war, and as a result of freight rate increases enjoyed a much greater advantage in transportation costs.41 Besco paid its last dividend on first preference shares early in 1924. Cash reserves were consumed in 1924 and 1925 in meeting interest on the bonds of its steel-producing subsidiary, the Dominion Iron and Steel Company. On July 2, 1926, "Disco" went into receivership and its new manager, the National Trust Company, subsequently began litigation to "wind up" the parent corporation.42 Meanwhile production costs were pared to the bone. The Sydney Mines plant and furnaces were closed altogether. In 1922 wages in the Sydney plant were cut from $5.20 to $3.58 per day. In the summer of 1923 a strike for union recognition and a three-shift system was vigorously repressed. In 1924 lay-offs in the New Glasgow and Trenton plants alone included more than 600 men with 3,403 dependents.43 Other secondary manufacturing in the Maritimes experienced similar problems. In 1921 the Amherst plant of the Canadian Car and Foundry Company, which before the war employed 1,300 workers in 61

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

the largest manufactory of railway cars in the country, closed down as the company consolidated car production and other metal work at Montreal.44 In the same year the Maritime Nail Company of Saint John began to transfer its machinery to a plant in Montreal. Between 1921 and 1925 the total number of employees in the iron and steel industries of Nova Scotia declined from 7,913 to 1,190. In New Brunswick those industries which had employed 2,559 m X921 were by 1924 no longer included among the ten leading manufacturers of the province.45 Some problems of the more sophisticated manufacturing industries were illustrated in D. W. Robb's detailed explanation of his firm's difficulties before the Duncan Commission of 1926. In the early twentieth century the main line of production for the Robb Engineering Company at Amherst was electric engines and small generator plants. The latter were rendered obsolete by the advent of the steam turbine and the development of hydro-electric power. The firm also produced steam boilers and during the war was employed at full capacity in the manufacture of marine engines and munitions. At the end of the war the company prepared to move into a new line, kerosene-powered farm tractors. An arrangement was worked out with the Dominion Bridge Company of Montreal to provide, through its Winnipeg branch, the frames and final assembly while Amherst furnished engines, gears, and the other more intricate parts. The new venture coincided with the complete removal of protection from the smaller lines of farm tractors and sharp increases in freight rates. Unable to compete with American imports, the firm halted production after about 100 tractors were sold. A shift to mining machinery coincided with difficulties of the local coal mining industry. By 1926 the plant which had employed about 400 highly skilled workers retained only 50, engaged primarily in the servicing of machinery already in use. The others, Robb reported, had found employment in the United States.46 The textile industry suffered severely in the Maritimes, as elsewhere in Canada, from international competition, particularly by Great Britain. In 1923 Stanfield's Limited closed down the 46 looms of its Amherst branch. Later in the decade the Oxford Manufacturing Company, with 27 looms, was reported to have gone out of production "temporarily." In New Brunswick the St. Croix Woollen Mills were also idle and J. Humphrey and Son of Moncton carried on at considerably less than full capacity.47 62

THE IMPACT OF DEPRESSION

The total labour force employed in manufacturing in the Maritime provinces declined from 46,004 in 1919 to 27,855 in 1921. By 1925 it had partly recovered and the net value of production was 45 per cent of the total for 1919. The decline was most striking in areas of the highest concentration of secondary manufacturing. 48 The spectacular growth of the central towns of the region was dramatically reversed in the 19208. In the leading industrial cities and towns the number employed in manufacturing dropped by almost one-half between 1920 and ig26.49 Altogether, the Maritimes' share of the total gross value of manufacturing in Canada declined from 7 per cent in 1920 to 4.5 per cent by the end of the decade.50 The industrial decline was reflected in other activities of importance to the local economies. Maritime ports suffered not only relative but absolute declines in activity. Halifax, for example, was Canada's leading port in 1919, handling five million tons of shipping or about one and one-half million more than Montreal and 20.3 per cent of the national total. By 1921 shipping in Halifax had dropped below prewar totals and fallen behind that of Montreal, Vancouver, and Victoria. Halifax's share of shipping in Canadian ports declined to 10.5 per cent in 1923 and 8.7 per cent in 1926. Saint John fared little better. Similarly below prewar totals in 1921 with about two million tons, its volume had increased by 1925 to only 2.2 million.51 The Maritime ports had fallen far behind their American rivals in the battle for Canada's winter trade. During the war all ocean traffic had been arbitrarily distributed among "Canadian" ports (including Portland, Maine) by the British Ministry of Shipping.52 With the return of the troops to Canada, traffic routing reverted to the vagaries of a market influenced by the canvassing and promotion of railways and shipping lines. In open competition, the disadvantages of the Maritime ports were many. Trade through Halifax had to pay a i cent per hundredweight differential on railway freight rates. Ships calling at Saint John were penalized by higher insurance rates.53 Portland had traditionally had an advantage in the promotion and vigorous canvass for traffic from the Grand Trunk Railway, which enjoyed a monopoly of all trade channelled through it. With the acquisition of the Grand Trunk in 1919, the Canadian government lost much of its incentive for implementing an earlier "National Policy" design of routing trade through Canadian ports.54 Competing not only with Halifax and Saint John but with New York as well, the new management continued the promotion and development of Portland, where 63

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

it owned, in the words of CNR Vice-President J. E. Dalrymple, "all of the terminals, the elevators, freight sheds, stockyards . . . the whole shooting match."55 A similar promotion of Halifax and Saint John by the government railways was much slower to develop. The sales manager of the Canadian Wheat Pool testified in 1926 that the previous year's canvass for grain shipments through Halifax was "the first in his experience." Halifax, he stated, was "an unknown port." The railway's success in routing 800,000 bushels of grain through the port in 1925 merely served to emphasize the inadequacy of its terminal facilities. Lack of elevator space did not permit the storing of the variety of grades of wheat necessary to take advantage of the different markets available. The single loading berth created a risk of demurrage if more than one steamer contracting for delivery arrived at the same time. Saint John was better served, thanks largely to the activities of the CPR, but it too suffered from a shortage of berthing space which would assure steamers of prompt loading service.56 With a smaller volume and variety of local cargoes available as a result of the depression, Halifax and Saint John became less attractive as ports of call for ocean steamers. The fewer the ships and the less expectation of full or complementary cargoes, the higher rose the average ocean rates charged.57 Thus the Maritime ports were caught in a vicious downward spiral relative to their competitors which the removal of their initial disadvantages would not completely check. The disruption of other staple industries and especially the decline of the industrial towns had severe repercussions for Maritime agriculture. The latter had suffered from the freight rate increases which affected the farmer both in buying feeds, fertilizers, and implements and in selling his products. Profits from the American markets were also sharply reduced by the Fordney-Micumber tariff. But the critical problem, according to Dr. Melville Cummings, principal of the Nova Scotia Agricultural College, was the sharp constriction of local markets; this eliminated many farmers' "cash crops" — the steady local demand for vegetables, poultry, and other products which had provided from 25 to 40 per cent of their total income.58 The loss of this market dealt a hard blow, not only to the dairy and mixed farmers in the central areas of the region, but also to the apple producers in the Annapolis Valley and the potato growers of Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick. Without a dependable local market as a base, the latter were ill-equipped to withstand the sharp 64

THE IMPACT OF DEPRESSION

fluctuations in the export markets of Great Britain or the West Indies. In the period 1921-31 the number of occupied farms in the Maritimes dropped by about 12 per cent. The trend was not new; there had been a decline of 0.8 per cent in 1901-11 and 6.3 per cent in 1911-21.59 But in the earlier decades the rural migration had helped build up the towns and cities of the Maritimes. Undoubtedly urbanization continued to be a factor in the decline of farming in the 19205 but now the towns and cities receiving the majority of the migrants were located outside of the Maritime provinces. The economic depression was reflected in a virtual cessation of population growth in the region. Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island experienced actual losses and New Brunswick's slight increase was largely confined to the Acadian population of the northern counties.60 Decennial census data alone, however, fail to indicate the magnitude or the abruptness of the exodus. Dominion Bureau of Statistics calculations indicate that at least 147,000 Maritime residents left the region in the period 1921-31, compared with 93,000 in the previous decade. But the peak period of economic dislocation was that of 1920-25. The inclusion of part of this period in the 1911-21 figure tends to blur the magnitude of the postwar exodus. The totals for the earlier decade were also inflated by the DBS treatment of the victims of war, the influenza epidemic, and the Halifax explosion as "emigrants."61 Comprehensive data on the Maritime exodus are unfortunately lacking. Canadian authorities kept no records of regional or interprovincial migration and the Americans were concerned only with national residency of those who entered the United States. The records of American immigration offices in the Maritimes were by no means comprehensive — immigrants could also obtain permits on landing at American ports, or from any of the border stations between the two countries — but do indicate a trend. The Yarmouth and Halifax offices issued about 7,500 permits in 1920 and 1921, i.e. the first two years of the recession. The total dropped to 2,000 in 1922 but, as economic conditions continued to deteriorate, rose again to 6,800 in 1923 and 7,700 in ig24.62 The migration from the Maritimes was the major factor in providing immediate relief from the unemployment and destitution created by the collapse or decline of Maritime industries. Its long-range effects, however, were not so beneficial. The migrants included a high proportion of the more productive elements in society. At a time of 65

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mushrooming demand for increased government services and social welfare, the portion of society which would have to pay for these services had diminished sharply. The overall decline of the Maritimes' economy in the 19205 can be explained to a considerable degree by broad trends over which Canadians had little control. The war's disruption of traditional trading patterns, the growth of international protectionism, and the decline in the relative efficiency of their industries undoubtedly contributed to Maritime difficulties. But a major factor in undermining their competitive position was the federal government's abandonment of traditional policies favourable to the region. By the early 19208 the Maritimes had been to a considerable degree excluded from the so-called "national policies" of regional integration through tariffs and transportation developed in the Macdonald and Laurier eras. Key Maritime products gradually lost their protection from the tariff and the Intercolonial Railway was abandoned as an instrument for overcoming geographical barriers. It was a process that, with the steady movement of the centre of population and power westward, the Maritimes seemed powerless to prevent. In the 19205 Maritime industry faced a Darwinian struggle for survival without the basic compensations for geographical handicaps under which it had initially developed. Loss in tariff protection was an important factor in undermining the coal and steel industries in the Maritimes. The coal tariff, Nova Scotia's principal quid pro quo in the National Policy tariffs of 1879, provided in 1897 protection equivalent to an ad valorem tariff of 65 per cent, calculated on the pit-head selling price of the American product.63 Although restricted to bituminous coal, the tariff helped the Maritime product penetrate the St. Lawrence market and gave the region, as the possessor of the only coal resources in Eastern Canada, an important advantage in developing an iron and steel industry. Iron and steel products were also the recipients of substantial protection through a variety of duties, specific and ad valorem, as well as government bounties. With the growth of antiprotectionist sentiment in Western Canada the tide turned against the tariff. Held constant at 53 cents per ton through the periods of prewar and wartime inflation, the actual protection on coal was allowed to fall between 1879 and 1924 by over two-thirds.64 Iron and steel lost much of its protection, both through 66

THE IMPACT OF DEPRESSION

inflation and direct reductions, as early in the century the government adopted the practice of reducing tariffs on farm machinery and implements while compensating the manufacturers with tariff reductions on primary materials. In 1897 the Laurier government lowered the tariff on pig iron from $4.00 to $2.50 per ton. On basic steel products it dropped from $5.00 to $2.00. There was no immediate loss to the industry, however, as part of the indirect subsidy represented by the tariff was replaced by a direct subsidy or bounty of $3.00 per ton on both pig iron and steel products. But with Prairie pressure continuing to grow, these were abandoned in igi2. 65 More serious for the Maritime producers was the tendency of Canadian governments to compensate Ontario producers for losses in protection by the removal of the advantages of their Maritime competitors. In 1907 the general tariff on farm machinery was reduced, the free list was extended and the manufacturers were allowed a drawback of 99 per cent on some of their primary materials. At the same time a drawback of 99 per cent was given on "Bituminous coal imported by proprietors of smelting works and converted at the works into coke for the smelting of metals from ores." In 1914, after further reductions in the tariff, the clause was amended by the addition of the phrase "and in the melting of metals." Ontario steel producers were thus permitted to import bituminous coal virtually tariff-free, both for the production of pig iron and for its further manufacture into steel and a variety of secondary products. One of the basic advantages which had encouraged the development of the iron and steel industry in the Maritimes was thus eliminated.66 Of much broader impact on Maritime industry were the changes in the freight rate structure in the second decade of the century. The first step in the erosion of the Maritime position came in 1912 when the railways eliminated a "differential" or difference in eastbound over westbound rates of about 12 per cent between Montreal and the Maritimes. 67 The lower rates on westbound traffic had helped Maritime producers to penetrate western markets while giving the railways full revenue on traffic eastward. Its removal was a political concession to Central Canadian producers, made more conspicuous by the departure from rate-making principles common to Canada and the United States.68 In the latter, the differential was successfully defended before the Inter-State Commerce Commission as necessary "to assist New England manufacturers in competing with manufacturers west of the Hudson River in the large Western market." It remained in effect on American lines, on Canadian lines in the United 67

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States, and on traffic originating at American points, for example, Boston to Montreal.69 With the loss of the differential, the problems of the Maritime shipper were just beginning. Acute pressure for increased freight rates in Eastern Canada came from two sources. The railway operators demanded increases to keep up with rising expenses and diminishing profits as the inevitable cost of the duplication and overexpansion of the previous decade became more apparent. At the same time, farm and other organizations in Western Canada maintained insistent pressure for the reduction of the burden of freight rates on their region. Their slogan, "equalization of freight rates," was an indirect attack on the eastern rates, which in both Canada and the United States were relatively lower, partly as a result of competition from the St. Lawrence—Great Lakes waterways. The principle of equalization gradually came to be accepted by the Board of Railway Commissioners.70 It seldom led to decreases in the West, but as the commissioners yielded to the railways' demands for higher rates, the advances became relatively greater in Eastern Canada. In 1916 selective increases of about 5 per cent were applied more heavily on eastern lines. In 1918 the railways were granted increases of 15 per cent in Eastern Canada and 10 per cent in the West. Before the end of that year another increase of 25 per cent was applied in the East, with slightly lower increases in Western Canada. In September 1920 the rates were raised 40 per cent in Eastern Canada and 35 per cent in the West.71 The increases on Eastern Canadian lines totalled 111 per cent in four years. Compared with wholesale price increases of 138 per cent in the same period, the rate increases were probably not excessive. The problem came with deflation. By 1922 wholesale prices were down to 49 per cent above prewar levels while freight rates remained 89 per cent higher.72 But the increases in Maritime rates had been much greater again. Traditionally these rates had ranged, depending on the distance, from 20 per cent to 50 per cent lower than similar rates in force in Ontario and Quebec. The levelling up of the Maritime rates, coinciding with the general increases, meant a jump in Maritime Standard Mileage or maximum rates of from 140 to 216 per cent.73 Hardest hit were the manufacturers, who had regarded the Maritime to Montreal portion of their long-haul rates as fixed "arbitraries," protecting their position in Western markets relative to that of their Central Canadian competitors. With the indiscriminate applica68

THE IMPACT OF DEPRESSION

tion of the increases to include the "arbitraries" their disadvantage in transportation costs relative to that of a Montreal competitor increased 125 per cent in less than four years.74 And the largest increases came after profits were already narrowed by the business recession. Their effect on the Maritime producer was almost as if he had been suddenly thrust a thousand miles out into the Atlantic. A few examples from the detailed statements presented to the Board of Railway Commissioners in 1922 provided specific evidence of sudden deterioration in the competitive position of Maritime firms vis-a-vis their more centrally located competitors. In 1914, on actual sales of confectionery products in Western Canada, Moirs Limited of Halifax had to absorb $4,188.75 more in transportation costs than its Toronto competitors. In 1921 the difference on the same volume was $7,605.75. For Simms and Company, brush manufacturers of Saint John, the figures were $526 in 1914, and $1,387 in 1921 and for Enterprise Stoves of Sackville, N.B., $1,986 in 1914 and $3,436 in 1921.75 It was not only the increases in rates that hurt the Maritime producers. With the integration of the Intercolonial into the national system they lost the flexibility and close cooperation of a railway which had proved an important ally in the development of their industries. In August 1918 the Intercolonial was placed under the management of the board of directors appointed for the Canadian Northern. Even earlier, the government had begun following the advice of the Board of Railway Commissioners in adjusting rates on the Intercolonial, and in the summer of 1920 the railway passed, for rate-making purposes, under the jurisdiction of the board.76 The contrast in rate-making principles between the commissioners and the "old" Intercolonial management could not have been more striking. The former constantly reiterated that freight rates could not be justified on the grounds of lessening geographical disadvantages77 or of encouraging industrial development.78 The only deviation from the goal of an absolute nation-wide symmetry in rates that they seemed prepared to accept was the need of meeting outside competition. Other exceptions might result in claims of "discrimination" which would have to be "ironed out," either by raising the rates in the offending area or lowering them everywhere else in the country. Thus rate exceptions could not be tolerated even when they appeared to work to the advantage of both railway and shipper. Such a creed was the very antithesis of that upon which the Intercolonial had developed. To the old management, industrial develop69

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

ment and the lessening of geographical barriers were basic to the development of an adequate volume of traffic. Special rates based upon "what the traffic would bear" appeared to have been the rule rather than the exception. Not only could such rates be set at the Moncton headquarters, but even local station agents were given a wide discretion in setting special rates on distances of up to a hundred miles in order to move shipments of logs, potatoes, fish, or other local produce. As the CNR vice-president, J. E. Dalrymple, sarcastically observed in 1926, under the old system "practically every Tom, Dick and Harry down in the Maritimes could make any rate he wanted to make ... the agent himself had the right to quote his friends any old figure for the transportation of the goods."79 After integration, requests for special rates had to be submitted to Montreal for a ruling as to whether or not they could be interpreted elsewhere as possible "discrimination." A. T. Weldon, traffic manager on the Atlantic section of the CNR, remarked in 1926 that his staff had learned from "sad experience" that they could not grant rates which were lower than those in force in other parts of the country.80 The removal of countless sources of "discrimination" in Maritime rates was a major feature in the process of railway integration. The standard mileage rates were not the only ones affected. Town distributing rates in the Maritimes, which had facilitated the distribution of less than carload lots from local centres, were raised to the Ontario level. This came as a serious blow to the wholesalers of Halifax and Saint John, as the increased local rates tended to encourage direct shipments from Montreal and Toronto.81 Several "special commodity rates" were also cancelled, which led to spectacular increases on the items involved. Sugar, for example, which up until 1918 had travelled to Montreal from the two large refineries at Halifax and Saint John at the "special commodity rate" of 18 cents per hundredweight, was given a "class" rate of 42 cents. This was temporarily amended to 32 cents for the duration of the war. Early in 1919, however, the commissioners reaffirmed their earlier judgement that the lower rates on sugar from Maritime refineries constituted "unlawful discrimination" against the Central Canadian refineries and raised the rate to 42 cents.82 Combined with the 40 per cent increase of 1920, this represented a tripling of rates for the Maritime producer in just over two years. Before the end of 1921 the refineries had cut back heavily in production, leaving their employees working broken time. After similar advances on molasses, shipments of that commodity declined from 130 cars in 1916 to 17 cars in 1924. According to the Halifax 70

THE IMPACT OF DEPRESSION

producer, H. R. Silver, the increases had shifted the centre of distribution from the Maritimes to Montreal.83 It is very doubtful that the "sound principles of rate making" introduced by the board improved the economic position of Maritime railways. Under the old system the Intercolonial may have been subject to abuse and political pressures, as its critics alleged. But throughout its period of independent management, it had contributed constructive service to the community at relatively small cost to the tax-payer. In forty years of operation the total net operating deficit of the Intercolonial was less than $6 million.84 In the first year after official integration in the CNR the operating deficit of the Atlantic section was $5 million. Deficits for the three years 1923 to 1925 exceeded $12 million.85 The railways in the Maritimes were the victims of depression and dwindling traffic which their new rate schedules and rigidity of operation had helped to create. The chief—and perhaps only—beneficiaries of the submergence of the Intercolonial were the business interests of Central Canada. The manufacturers gained from the elimination or lessening of troublesome competition. Metropolitan centres were the recipients of Maritime plants and machinery. These benefits were of long-term duration as the higher transportation costs helped to eliminate Maritime centres as competitors for the location of new industry. Central Canadian wholesalers also took advantage of the new rates to expand their distribution services in the Maritimes. In short, with the absorption of the Intercolonial into the Canadian National Railways, a major agency for independent regional development was extinguished and the metropolitan domination of the Maritime economy firmly consolidated. In observing the virtual collapse of their economy in the early 1920$, Maritimers were undoubtedly aware that many factors besides freight rates and tariffs were involved. But it was only natural that they should concentrate their bitterness on those over which their government had some control. Their anger was rendered all the more intense by their previous optimism. With the economic collapse and emigration of the early 19205 went the dreams of industrial grandeur which predated Confederation and had continued to bolster Maritime pride even after the loss of relative stature with the rise of the West. Where expectations had been the highest—in the industrial towns and port cities—disappointment was naturally the most severe. 71

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

The regional protest movement, which had begun as a drive for reform and economic development, rapidly gained momentum as virtually all sections of the population sought solutions to their problems, both through programs of self-help and in attempting to force federal governments to reverse or modify policies which had so seriously aggravated their difficulties. While initially a stimulant to the Maritime Rights movement, the long-range impact of the depression was not so positive. As one disappointment followed another, it was difficult for Maritimers to keep alive the optimism necessary for positive action. Indeed, as the decade progressed it was this element which the Maritime Rights leaders were fighting hardest to preserve against a background of disillusionment and despair.

72

CHAPTER FIVE

The Campaign Emerges

The first phase of the campaign for Maritime Rights rested upon the optimistic assumption that if Maritimers could submerge their local differences and present a united front to the rest of the Dominion they could force the federal government to concede their demands. They rallied behind a common series of claims, rationalizations, and rhetoric, which their governments and commercial organizations presented to the federal government. When their demands were overlooked by one government, they united to defeat it and elect another which promised to be more responsive to their wishes. But once again their claims, which came into open conflict with those of larger regions, were passed over.

The main rationale of the campaign for Maritime Rights was widely articulated throughout the three provinces before the end of 1921. The two grievances common to all were the still unsettled demand for subsidies in lieu of crown lands and the incorporation of the Intercolonial in the Canadian National Railways. With these were associated others of more local application—the failure to nationalize a revenue-draining Saint John and Quebec railway, to provide adequate car ferry facilities and replace narrow gauge railways in Prince Edward Island, to expand facilities and encourage the use of Maritime ports, and to give the rural communities of the region a greater share in national programs to attract immigrants. The railway grievance was at once the most important and the most difficult to articulate. Anger at the transfer of the Intercolonial's headquarters to Toronto derived from regional pride and such con73

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

crete issues as supply purchasing,1 employment opportunities, and seniority. Of greatest concern to the whole region was the increase in freight rates. But the technicalities of rates and rate-making were of such complexity as to be imperfectly understood, even by the businessmen most directly affected. Nonetheless the various strands of the railway grievance were brought together and reduced to a formula suitable for popular agitation by the development of a variation of the then-fashionable "compact" theory of Confederation. Maritime spokesmen repeatedly argued that the Intercolonial, as the chief quid pro quo of the Maritimes' entry into Confederation, formed an integral part of the compact among the provinces upon which the federal union was based. Section 145 of the British North American Act had proclaimed the construction of the road to be "essential to the consolidation of the Union and to the assent thereto of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick." In their public utterances the Fathers of Confederation had further explained the purposes of the road as the development of interprovincial trade and the provision of national outlets for the central provinces on the Atlantic.2 These purposes, either stated or implied in the Confederation pact, were, the Maritimers contended, largely political and could not be fulfilled by a commercial railway. Until the war the political role had been paramount; the compact had been honoured. The road was built at public expense, no attempt was made to secure a return on capital invested, and operating revenues frequently fell short of expenditures. But in 1918 appointees from the Canadian Northern had taken charge and applied to the Intercolonial the principles of operation and rate-making which had evolved to meet the needs of private capital and commercial lines in Western and Central Canada. These proved quite inappropriate for both the railway and region, and created serious barriers to interprovincial trade. The introduction of such methods, the Maritimers argued, repudiated the intentions of the Fathers in creating the railway and violated the "rights" of the Maritime Provinces under the compact of Confederation, which required either the separation of the Intercolonial from the CNR or its inclusion in a separate unit with sufficient autonomy to fix rates and adopt practices which would meet local needs and encourage interprovincial trade. Essentially it would necessitate the restoration of the headquarters at Moncton under management knowledgeable of and sympathetic to local conditions and independent of the jurisdiction of the Board of Railway Commissioners. 74

THE CAMPAIGN EMERGES

Similarly the defenders of Maritime ports claimed a commitment in the "compact" to make Halifax and Saint John the chief outlets for Canada's winter trade on the Atlantic. Here too they cited the "promises" of the Fathers in the negotiations preceding Confederation as constituting part of the understanding upon which the Maritimers had been persuaded to enter. Their demands included a more rapid development of their ports and an adjustment of freight rates to channel trade through them rather than Portland or New York.3 Prince Edward Islanders also invoked the compact thesis in their call for a second railway car ferry. That province had been successful on previous occasions in securing recognition of the federal responsibility of maintaining the "continuous communication" promised the island on its entry.4 In 1917 the steamers which fulfilled this function were replaced by an ice-breaking railway car ferry. Within three years the island's expanding trade with the mainland taxed that facility to the utmost. As they grew more dependent upon the ferry, islanders became alarmed at the effect on their trade of any interruption of service. Their vulnerability in depending on a single ship was underlined late in 1919 when government officials proposed diverting the ferry to aid a vessel trapped in the ice at the entrance to the St. Lawrence. Prince Edward Island producers protested vigorously and redoubled their efforts to secure a second car ferry as a further guarantee of "continuous communication."5 The extraordinary slowness in the widening of the Prince Edward Island railways was a related grievance for it prevented island residents from taking advantage of the direct freight transport which the ferry allowed. Although the federal government had begun the standardization of the line in 1912, they had completed only fifty miles in nine years. Most of the farmers still faced the delay and inconvenience of having all their freight shifted from one car to another before it reached its destination.6 New Brunswick's claim for relief from responsibility for the Saint John and Quebec Railway rested partly on the argument that changes in federal policy accounted for the latter's financial difficulties and partly on a demand for equality in treatment with the Western provinces. In 1912 New Brunswick had entered a complex agreement with the federal government for the construction and operation of a railway running from Saint John to Grand Falls on the National Transcontinental. The province guaranteed bonds of more than $7 million for the road's construction. On its completion the government railways would operate the road in return for 60 per cent of the gross

75

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

revenue. In 1916 the federal government, under the pressure of wartime expenditure, cancelled the first agreement, which would have necessitated an expenditure of $3 million on bridges, arid persuaded the province to settle fora less efficient route. The provincial government accepted the compromise, the New Brunswickers claimed, out of a realization of the need for wartime economy and in the expectation that the road would be taken over by the federal government at the end of the war. As a local road the Saint John and Quebec Railway paid but a quarter of the bond interest for which the New Brunswick government was responsible. The province held the federal government liable for the failure of the road to develop as a part of the Transcontinental and for the additional investment required by the province in building the road to Transcontinental specifications. They also compared their position to that of the Western provinces, which had been relieved of liabilities of more than $ i oo million by the government takeover of the Canadian Northern and the Grand Trunk. Surely, New Brunswickers argued, it would be no more than justice if their province were bailed out in similar fashion.7

Early in 1920 the legislatures of the Maritime Provinces resolved on joint action in presenting their claims and their representatives met in Halifax to coordinate strategy.8 Freight rates posed a dilemma. The three governments did not want to recognize the jurisdiction of the Board of Railway Commissioners over the Intercolonial. But although the road was still technically outside the board's control, Railway Minister J. D. Reid had already been applying its judgements to Maritime lines.9 The Maritime leaders realized that they could no longer afford to remain unrepresented before a board which was making basic decisions affecting their region. In August 1920 the two larger provinces, in cooperation with the Maritime Board of Trade, sent a delegation to the Ottawa hearings on a proposed 40 per cent rate increase. The delegation, consisting of E. M. Macdonald, former MP for Pictou, R. E. Finn, Nova Scotia's minister of public works, and R. B. Armstrong of the Saint John Board of Trade, opposed the increase and attempted to prevent its application to the Intercolonial. Their case focused primarily on the magnitude of the increases already imposed on the Maritimes, the potential damage to local industry, and the "peculiar" nature of the Intercolonial as a noncommercial road. The 40 per cent increase, 76

THE CAMPAIGN EMERGES

E. M. Macdonald claimed, would represent a jump in first-class rates on traffic to Ontario of from 20 cents prior to 1916 to 48.5 cents when the new rate took effect. Increases on the Montreal arbitraries already meant that "the Maritime Provinces can no longer successfully compete in the markets of Central and Western Canada which they are obliged to do to market their surplus production." Further increases would "put some Maritime industries out of existence or force them to locate elsewhere."10 The Intercolonial, Macdonald contended, was never intended to be operated solely on commercial principles; its purpose was the consolidation of Confederation and the development of interprovincial trade. It was, as John A. Macdonald had called it, "a political consequence of a political union." "From 1874 to 1916," Macdonald stated, "every political party in power in this country, every Minister of Railways, everyone who had anything to do with the operation of the railway recognized that it was a railway that should be dealt with on that basis."11 The Maritime delegates appealed to the board to consider the rates on the Intercolonial from the perspective of its purpose and function in Confederation, rather than on strict commercial principles. Specifically, R. E. Finn urged the commissioners to "divorce themselves absolutely from the position taken by Sir Henry Drayton" that freight rates "could not be made for the purpose of removing geographical distances."12 The board was not impressed and imposed the full 40 per cent increase in the Maritimes. In December 1920 the Maritime governments launched a formal complaint before the board calling for a "restoration of the arbitraries" and "revision" of the other rate structures to, from, and within the Maritime provinces.13 In the preliminary hearing the commissioners flatly rejected the main element of the Maritime case, the claim for special consideration because of the national or political purposes of the Intercolonial. "We have nothing to do with any of the political conditions, or with very much of the past history," stated Frank Carvell, the chief commissioner, "we are trying to consider this matter purely from legal and business standpoints."14 For other aspects of the case they would have to "go to the government." Go to the government they did in the summer of 1921. First, they arranged a display of regional support for their demands. In their spring sessions, the New Brunswick and Nova Scotia legislatures addressed identical resolutions to the federal cabinet, stating their case for lower freight rates and a separate management for the Intercolonial Railway. The New Brunswick legislature added a second resolution on the Saint John and Quebec Railway. Prince Edward 77

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

Island contented itself with a memorial to the federal government requesting a second car ferry and the completion of the widening of their railway.15 At Moncton a conference of Maritime organizations, meeting to consider methods of encouraging regional promotion and industrial development, issued a strong statement of the Intercolonial^ right to special status and proposed that a delegation formally present the Maritime case to the federal cabinet. Represented at the conference were Maritime boards of trade, shipper and manufacturing associations, cooperative and farmers' groups (including the United Farmers of New Brunswick), and various government departments of the two larger provinces. The resolution, which passed unanimously, affirmed that the "Intercolonial Railway should be operated directly under the Department of Railways and that the freight and passenger rates . . . should be made in accordance with the terms and promises under which Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island entered Confederation." The conference called upon "civil, commercial, labour and agricultural organizations" to send delegates to Ottawa in support of the Maritime case.16 Approximately fifty delegates were on hand at the meeting with the federal cabinet on June i, 1921. Hance J. Logan outlined in some detail the historical argument underlying their case. Quoting extensively from statements by John A. Macdonald, George-Etienne Cartier, George Brown, E. P. Tache, and other Fathers of Confederation, he tried to show that the Intercolonial was originally understood to be a military and political rather than commercial railway. Indeed, he observed, some had predicted that it "would never pay for the grease on the axles of the carriages." R. E. Finn recounted the Maritimes' unhappy experience before the Board of Railway Commissioners, which had refused to consider the original purpose of the road or regional needs in the setting of rates, and requested the exemption of the Intercolonial from the rulings of the board and the restoration of the railway's headquarters to the Maritimes under a management "in sympathy to the aspirations of the people of the Maritime Provinces . . . who will so adjust the freight rates as to permit the industries of the Maritime Provinces to ... get into the competitive markets of Canada."17 In less measured tones, H. R. McLennan, representing the New Brunswick Commercial Club, complained of the steady encroachment of the central provinces on Maritime rights under the compact of Confederation. The fault lay partly with Maritime representatives' 78

THE CAMPAIGN EMERGES

slavish adherence to party politics and partly with the narrow preoccupation of representatives of other regions who failed to "supervise the needs of those portions of Canada other than" their own. Nevertheless Maritimers were undergoing "an intellectual awakening" and would no longer tolerate a continued denial of their "rights." They were, MacLennan asserted, appealing to the country as a whole for relief from "that autocracy which has been displayed by Ontario and Quebec." If this appeal failed, "those who are responsible... must take their political lives in their hands."18 Ironically enough, unknown to McLennan and other Maritimers, some of the strongest support for the Maritime position came from A. E. Kemp, minister without portfolio from Toronto. Kemp committed his views to paper in a private letter to Arthur Meighen and included a memorandum for circulation among the other members of the government. Beginning with the assumption that "the object of Confederation was principally to build up a strong nation and bind it together by inter-provincial trade," Kemp was highly critical of the railway commissioners' failure "to differentiate where territorial necessity demanded" in the application of the rate increases. This, he stated, was in sharp contrast to the "recent advances" by the Interstate Commission in the United States which allowed the rates to "vary according to national and territorial necessities." The railways, too, were to blame. In their "anxiety . . . to secure more revenue" they had "entirely overlooked" the fact that "only by the encouragement of the railways" were Maritime manufacturers "able to obtain markets for their products which are now found in all the Western Provinces of the Dominion." Kemp suggested that perhaps the commissioners had "assumed that it was not within the scope of their duty to deal with a matter of general or broad national policy." In any case it was "now the responsibility of the Government." Kemp recommended that, if "radical" changes were impractical, they should at least exempt the long-haul traffic of the Maritimes from the 40 per cent increase.19 Kemp's views did not prevail in the cabinet. The only answer to their delegation which expectant Maritimers received came in a press release from Conservative Party headquarters at Ottawa. Essentially it was a point by point rebuttal of a garbled version of the Maritime case. The Intercolonial claim to special rates, it argued, could not come from government ownership; most of the railways were now government-owned. It could not come from the Confederation pact since the B.N.A. Act mentioned only the construction of the road and said nothing of its operation. There was no parallel with the toll-free 79

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

Ontario canals because the charges on these had been removed by international treaty. Complaints against the freight increases, it conceded, were widespread so that "A general reduction may be necessary in the public interest, but it would be rank sectionalism to lower rates in one part.of the country and keep them up in another." The dispatch concluded with the suggestion that such outrageous demands must have been politically motivated.20 Whatever debating points the Conservatives may have scored in the rest of the country, their response appeared needlessly provocative in the Maritimes. H. R. McLennan suggested that the government's reply left the Maritimes two choices: "fighting the case by instructing our people as to their rights and having the Maritime Provinces co-operate in sending respresentatives to fight for them" or forming "a colony of our own under British protection. We can not do worse and the chances of doing better are many." The traditionally Conservative Saint John Standard, explaining the governments' callous response as dictated by a fear of further inciting the more populous West, predicted that it would lead to the party's defeat in the Maritimes in the next election.21 The Maritimers were no more successful in pressing for subsidies in lieu of grants of crown land. In 1920 the three legislatures had passed resolutions repeating their demands. These were discussed in the Maritime premiers' conference in Halifax and were mentioned again in various Speeches from the Throne in ig2i. 22 Prime Minister Meighen assigned the task of investigating their claims to J. D. Reid, minister of railways from Ontario. The report which Reid submitted to the cabinet in April 1921 was a remarkable document. It rejected the Maritime claims to compensation, not because the provincial governments lacked a proprietary interest in the Dominion lands, but because the Canadian government never had any. Canada had not purchased Rupert's Land from the Hudson's Bay Company; it merely paid to facilitate the extinction of the company's claims. All proprietary interest had reverted to the British Crown. The Rupert's Land Act and the order in council of June 23, 1870, which admitted the North-West Territory to the Dominion, conveyed no proprietary right but only the authority to administer these areas for "the future welfare and good government of the territory," and for the "Peace, Order and Good Government of Her Majesty's subjects and others therein. . . ." In enlarging the boundaries of Quebec and Ontario the Canadian government was not, Reid concluded, conveying proprietary interest, but merely ar80

THE CAMPAIGN EMERGES

ranging for the "good government of Patricia and Ungava." Since the action primarily involved "good government," it affected only the people of the area and provinces immediately concerned. The rights of the Maritimes had been in no way infringed. A similar line of argument was employed in the case of the school and crown lands of the Prairie provinces. Until Maritimers could prove that the federal government actually had a proprietary interest in the lands and that the land sales and transference were not concerned with the good government of the people in them, they could have no claim to compensation.23 The purpose of such legalistic rationalization is not difficult to surmise. The attempt by the Maritimes to secure a closer equity in subsidies with the Western provinces by attaching their claims to those of the Prairies was resented by Prairie leaders and posed an embarrassment in devising a formula for the transfer of the crown lands to the Prairie governments. The subsidy claims of the two regions were mutually exclusive. Reid's obvious intent was not merely to destroy the Maritime case but to do so in a fashion which would facilitate a future settlement with the Prairies. Reid's total lack of sympathy for the Maritime position was even more apparent in the memorandum which he appended to his report for the consideration of the prime minister. Here he suggested, rightly enough, that fiscal need underlay the Maritime demands. His solution, however, was not an increase in subsidies but rather to allow financial difficulties to lead the three provinces to political union. "In business affairs a concentration of effort on the part of the management can sometimes" lead to "such a reduction of overhead charges that prosperity follows instead of threatened bankruptcy." In totalling all subsidies and revenues from crown domains in the three Maritime provinces, Reid found that they were roughly equivalent to those of Saskatchewan, the most populous western province, which had about three-quarters of the population of the Maritimes. If the extra costs of three separate administrations were removed, such a sum, he believed, should be quite adequate for Maritime needs.24

The cabinet's insensitivity to Maritime problems resulted in the demoralization of the Conservative Party in the region and largely explains its inability to marshal an effective organization for the election of 1921. Regional anger had created a force stronger than 81

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

party loyalty. Until it could offer Maritimers a reasonable expectation that their grievances would be adjusted by a Conservative government, the party held little attraction for any but the most dedicated supporters. In the Nova Scotia provincial election of July 1920, a Conservative stalwart, W. H. Dennis, publisher and managing director of the Halifax Herald, Mail, and Sunday Leader, reported the "absolute lethargy of influential Conservative leaders." Four months later J. A. Macdonald of Amherst, a wealthy industrialist, outlined in a tactful letter to Meighen the prospects for party organization in the province. But first, he stated, they would need "three months of adjusting old grievances." The attention to "old grievances" was not forthcoming. In mid-September 1921, with the election less than three months away, Dennis reported that they were "without organization and in many constituencies suitable men were not in sight as candidates." "A newspaper campaign," he continued, "would be useless unless backed up with thorough organization and immediate attention given to great injustices to our people."25 For Maritime Liberals the motives of regional concern and political ambition neatly coalesced. In associating themselves with the movement for Maritime Rights they could not lose. If the government yielded to Maritime demands their region would benefit; if it did not their party would be in a position to ride the resulting wave of popular anger to power. It is thus not surprising that Liberal leadership predominated in the campaign. Hance J. Logan of Amherst, whose pre-eminence in the Maritime Rights movement was recognized by two consecutive elections as president of the Maritime Board of Trade, was a former Liberal MP (1896-1908). In 1920 local Liberals made him president of their organization in Nova Scotia.26 E. M. Macdonald of Pictou, also a veteran parliamentarian (1904-1917) and leading party strategist in that province, had established himself publicly as the regional spokesman on railways. Other Liberals prominent in the campaign included J. C. Tory, MLA for Guysborough, noted for his contribution to the Maritime case for subsidies in lieu of crown lands, New Brunswick Premier W. E. Foster of Saint John, who publicized the Maritime case both in the legislature and in national magazines, and Acadian leader P. J. Veniot of Bathurst, the New Brunswick minister of public works, who chaired the committee on Maritime claims at their nationaiy^te of 1921. Liberals sought to capitalize on their association with the movement by proclaiming their party the Maritime Rights party in the election of December 6, 1921. E. M. Macdonald struck the keynote early in the 82

THE CAMPAIGN EMERGES

campaign when, having denounced at length the Conservative government's sins against the region, he called upon Maritimers to "rally round the Liberal banner . . . so that we may . . . regain our proper prestige and participation in the business of this dominion."27 Liberals were also encouraged in their regional stance by the activity and statements of their federal leader, W. L. Mackenzie King. King at this time was technically a Maritimer, having re-entered Parliament in 1919 as a member for Prince Edward Island. The offer of the nomination to the new Liberal leader was itself a bid by the Liberals of the island for local and regional recognition. With only four representatives in the House of Commons, the islanders were quick to seize upon any political leverage available. By securing the leader of the opposition as their representative, they could hope to make him better acquainted with their problems and place him under an obligation which might pay dividends when he came to power. Before long they had reason to feel pleased with their choice. King took up such local causes as cold-storage plants for fox-meat, lower freight rates on mussel-mud, and the demand for a second car ferry.28 More gratifying to other Maritimers was his apparent interest in the whole region. He launched a speaking and organizational tour of the three provinces early in 1920 and based his first motion of nonconfidence on the lack of Maritime representation in the cabinet.29 The tour was repeated in October of the following year in preparation for the election. King's speeches on these occasions, although usually negative and ambiguous in their criticism of the government, gave ample scope for his listeners to believe that they heard in them the promises they wished to hear, particularly after they had been interpreted by the candidates and the Liberal press. His criticism of the government's centralization of the railways at Toronto was regarded in the Maritimes as a commitment to regional control.30 In reporting the Liberal convention of October 5 at Amherst, the Halifax Morning Chronicle was highly laudatory of King's address as "the greatest he has yet delivered in this part of the country." But the reporter had little else to say about it. Most of the article dealt with H. J. Logan's speech advocating regional management of the Intercolonial, a "national coal policy," and a vigorous defence of Maritime interests. "Maritime rights must be our motto," Logan had stated. "In Parliament I pledge myself to advocate and stand by Maritime rights first, last and all the time." The reporter's skill in interweaving Logan's statements in a report of King's speech conveyed the impression that the regional 83

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protest had the leader's full support. The article even confused the Canadian Annual Review of that year, which quoted Logan's pronouncements on the tariff as coming from Mackenzie King.31 Locally the Liberals worked to confirm the impression of regional concern provided by the leader's visit. At Truro, Logan told his audience that he had given up plans to run as an independent Maritime Rights candidate only after King's promises respecting the Intercolonial had convinced him that Maritime needs could best be achieved within the Liberal Party.32 The Liberal's attempt to monopolize regional sentiment did not go unchallenged. In Nova Scotia the W. H. Dennis papers sought to maintain the credibility of their regional concern by commending the efforts of Logan, Tory, and the boards of trade. J. B. M. Baxter, leader of the Conserative opposition in New Brunswick, was also careful to make public his role in helping to draft the joint New Brunswick-Nova Scotia resolutions on the Intercolonial.33 But local Conservatives could do little in competing with the Liberals for support from the movement without cooperation from the federal government, and this was not forthcoming until the election campaign had actually begun. Arthur Meighen took a step in that direction in the cabinet shuffle of late September when he replaced R. W. Wigmore, tainted by a year's association with a cabinet unresponsive to Maritime demands, with J. B. M. Baxter, a former Saint John alderman known for his commitment to port and region.34 At the same time Meighen permitted the announcement of a new policy of regional management for the Canadian National Railways. On September 24 F. B. McCurdy criticized the local Liberal proposals to take the Intercolonial out of the Canadian National Railways and suggested that Maritimers should instead seek to retain the advantages of participation in a "great transportation system" while maintaining regional control through the creation of an eastern unit with its headquarters in the Maritimes. Baxter followed with a similar suggestion, adding that the headquarters of the unit should be located at Moncton.35 In the course of his tour of the Maritimes in October, Meighen encountered intense pressure for a firmer commitment on railway policy. In an editorial in the Herald on the eve of his arrival, W. H. Dennis tried to impress Meighen with the importance of the railway issue in the campaign, while publicly defending his failure to act sooner on the matter. One could not expect a busy prime minister to "follow, day and day, the details of management of such a colossal 84

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transportation system." But once he became acquainted with the "true conditions" one would expect that "the just grievances of the maritimes" would "meet with his sympathetic consideration." Control of the Intercolonial "must be taken from under the unsympathetic pushbuttons of Toronto and localized at Moncton." The railway issue/ was the "daily talk and conversation of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island" and the prime minister, Dennis promised, would "be acquainted with these facts during his visit."36 From Nova Scotia Meighen cabled railway leaders for their comment on a proposed statement that "upon formal taking of Grand Trunk into National system a policy of decentralization will be followed under which eastern end of amalgamated system will be operated from Moncton with necessary organization there for that purpose." Their response was far from encouraging. J. A. Stewart and J. D. Reid, respectively new and retired railway ministers, stressed the "necessity for strong central control" and warned of possible adverse political effects of such an announcement in other parts of the country. Sir Joseph Flavelle, the Toronto financier in charge of the Grand Trunk who had recently advanced his own scheme for railway organization, was flatly opposed. It would, he telegraphed, "lead to misunderstanding and create difficult situation for railway executive when appointed."37 Nevertheless Meighen proceeded as planned and at Moncton gave a firm pledge that the CNR would establish a regional division with its headquarters at Moncton.38 The Dennis papers in Halifax took advantage of the new policy to charge to the forefront of the Maritime Rights movement, trying to convey the impression that they and their party had been there all the time. In November W. H. Dennis polled local candidates for their views on the railway issue. His statement referred to "the campaign which our newspapers have consistently supported for the restoration of Maritime Rights in connection with the C.N.R." and explained regional demands on the issue in terms very close to the new policy announced by the government.39 But the government's sudden concern for Maritime interests came too late. With no concrete evidence before the election that a new railway policy was in fact being implemented, Meighen's promise was simply not believed. In the last days of the campaign the prime minister was besieged with telegrams from party workers seeking a denial of rumours circulating among local railwaymen that the division of the lines had been "indefinitely postponed."40 The striking change in voting patterns in the election of 1921 was 85

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an indication of the Maritimers' attempt to secure their "rights" through a change in government. In Nova Scotia the Liberals won every seat and the Conservative popular vote dropped to 32 per cent or about 10 per cent below their previous low of 1874. Liberals were also victorious in the four seats in Prince Edward Island and led their Conservative opponents by 8.5 percent of the popular vote — the first time that more than 2 per cent had separated the two parties in a federal election in nearly thirty-five years. In New Brunswick, still strongly polarized between French and English, Liberal majorities increased in largely Acadian constituencies and Conservative majorities dwindled or were eliminated in the remainder.41 The role of regional issues was particularly apparent in the constituencies along the Intercolonial. In Westmorland county, which had formerly contained the railway headquarters, A. B. Copp's majority rose by 6,099 votes or by considerably more than onequarter of the total votes cast. Hance J. Logan swept the former Conservative constituency of Cumberland by 5,355 votes and both his opponents forfeited their deposits. In Colchester F. B. McCurdy's i,444-vote majority of only a year before disappeared as he was defeated by a freshman candidate, Harold Putnam. 42 In Halifax, where both the railway and ports were important issues, Liberal candidates won majorities of about 5,000 or half again more than their Conservative rivals. The regional issues were, of course, not the only ones, nor were they necessarily the most important in all constituencies. In Acadian counties the Conservative organization had been destroyed by conscription and the threat of imperialisme was kept alive by Acadian newspapers, particularly after Arthur Meighen became prime minister.43 In the predominately English-speaking counties of New Brunswick the old cries of race and religion were played up to divert attention from economic or regional questions embarrassing to the party in power. In the May 1921 by-election in York-Sunbury, for example, R. B. Hanson appealed directly to the Protestants of the constituency and applied to H. C. Hockin, grand master of the Orange Order in Canada, to send down the grand organizer to help in establishing the religious issue in the campaign.44 Sectarian strife was also apparent in the two-member constituency of Saint JohnAlbert where Mackenzie King, in his October visit, reported the religious division to be working against the Liberals. The situation, he recorded, was "as bad as can be, like Killkenny cats fighting each other, Irish Catholics & English Protestant, and the feuds of 1917 and 86

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earlier years perpetuated."45 Yet here, too, the impact of regional economic issues was apparent. The Conservative majority, which had exceeded 4,000 for R. W. Wigmore in 1920, all but disappeared in 1921. One Conservative candidate, Murray MacLaren, won by a narrow margin of 370 votes and even the highly respected Baxter secured a majority of only 1,115. Despite the presence of other issues in the campaign, regional grievances, rendered acute by economic recession, largely accounted for the sweeping Liberal gains throughout the Maritime provinces.

After the election, Maritimers quickly discovered that the realization of regional goals was not simply a matter of electing a new government, even when supported by a regional bloc from the Maritimes. They found, in fact, that their representatives were in a relatively weak position. The election produced a new Liberal government but a government dependent for its survival upon a much larger regional bloc of Progressives from the Prairies and rural Ontario.46 The Progressives, like other Prairie representatives before them, were hostile to the Maritime position on subsidies, railways, the use of Maritime ports, and the preservation of the tariff on steel and coal. In his discussions with the prime minister on Christmas Eve 1921, Progressive leader T. A. Crerar called for the reduction of Nova Scotia's representation in the cabinet.47 In any contest of influence with the Progressives the Maritimers were at a serious disadvantage. Deficient in numbers — the Liberals held 25 of 31 Maritime seats but the Progressives had elected 64 members — and bound by party discipline, the Maritimers lacked the Progressives' ultimate weapon in bargaining, the threat to defeat the government should their demands not be met. Furthermore, despite all their talk of regional unity the Maritime Liberals formed an even less cohesive group than did the Progressives. The wedge upon which they tended to divide was the tariff. Unlike Prairie regionalism, firmly rooted in a common agricultural base, the Maritime variety had to span the conflicting interests of a more diversified economy. The Liberals were able to sweep the Maritimes on regional issues only by obscuring fundamental differences in economic interest and ideology. Their strategy had been to announce as their economic policy a return to the "Fielding tariff."48 This was interpreted as the protective tariff in the central towns and as reciprocity with the United States in

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outlying farm and fishing communities. At Sydney, for example, the Liberal press headlined Mackenzie King's promises that the Liberal tariff would not harm the coal and steel industries. "It is our policy to conserve and develop, not to shake, these great basic industries," he had stated. Attributing the original industrial development to "a Liberal tariff— Fielding tariff," King promised that "the new 'Liberal tariff " would bring "a return to the general prosperity enjoyed by Canada after 1896." A Conservative party worker returning from a trip along the east shore of Nova Scotia reported that there the Liberal candidates had "actually got many people to believe that real free trade with the U.S. is in sight."49 Such contradictory aspirations predominating within different Maritime constituencies almost inevitably found expression in divisions among their representatives at the federal level as some joined the high and others the low tariff factions within the Liberal caucus. Even the apparent advantage of an unusually large Maritime representation in government was deceptive. W. S. Fielding, the senior member of the Maritime quartet in the cabinet,50 was far more a representative of Central Canada than of the Maritimes, which he had left a quarter of a century before. After his defeat in 1911, he had become part-owner and editor of a Quebec business journal, the Daily Journal of Commerce. Like other Central Canadian businessmen, he was alarmed by the political revolt of the Prairies but had little understanding of or sympathy for the Maritime protest.51 Even in his private correspondence with Nova Scotia Premier E. H. Armstrong, he was not prepared to concede any basis for Maritime complaint. "It would not be easy," Fielding wrote, "to put one's finger upon any matter within the control of this Government in which injustice has been done to the Maritime Provinces." Fielding's view was shared neither by his colleagues resident in the Maritimes nor by the large majority of their constituents.52 In the conflict between the Maritimers and the Progressives there was no question which side Mackenzie King would take. The cultivation of the Progressives became a central feature of his government's strategy for survival. In pursuing this policy, he found the Maritime demands an embarrassing nuisance. His sympathies were quite apparent in the rationalizations of which his diaries are so largely composed. King liked to justify his decisions on moral grounds with himself appearing on the side of the angels. After the election of 1921 he implicitly defended his lack of response to Maritime discontent in a continual disparagement of the motives, character, and ability of the 88

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chief exponents of Maritime Rights. When the Maritime Liberal members called for immediate action on their railway demands in a special meeting with the prime minister before the opening of Parliament, they were quickly put on the defensive. Led by Hance J. Logan and E. M. Macdonald, they reminded Mackenzie King of his promises in the Maritimes and requested the immediate restoration of the Intercolonial to independent management. They "came in an ugly and Belligerent spirit," King's diary recorded. I opened fire on Logan & told before the entire delegation of his intention to run as an Independent not as a Liberal until he had seen how things were going & that I had made no promise to any one to induce him to run. My own belief is that Logan had the article he referred to inserted in the Amherst [Halifax?] paper at the time & used it to serve his own ends at my expense. I am instinctively revolted vs such behaviour. It is apparent to me that both McDonald & Logan are resentful at not having been taken into the cabinet & intend to cause trouble. McDonald spoke of not wanting to stay in public life etc. etc. I shall recall this later when question of Cabinet appointments come up. A man like McDonald is not to be trusted in any way. I reminded the deputation the Liberal party had not a majority in the house & that on the Ry. Comm. there was room for the farmers & the lories to combine.53 King's scolding was followed by a lecture from the Liberal Toronto Star. The Star accused the Maritime liberals of "sectionalism" and "political blackmail," reminded them of their relative weakness in numbers which would become even greater after the next redistribution, and warned that their region could easily become the victim of similar tactics from others. "If they set this fashion," the Star warned, "the West or Ontario may imitate with demands which the Maritime Provinces acutely dislike," and might insist, for example, that "in order to save paying heavy freight rates, Portland should be made more use of as a winter port."54 The prime minister's initial response on the railway issue served notice how little help Maritimers might expect from the government in securing any of their "rights." Maritime subsidy claims received even less consideration from the new administration than from the old. Like their predecessors, the Liberals sought to isolate the Western claims and dispose of them in a fashion which would enable them to avoid a general readjustment of subsidies. In a letter to T. A. Crerar 89

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early in 1922, W. S. Fielding urged the Prairie provinces to state their claims for subsidies and the transfer of crown lands in a manner which would not encourage claims by the other provinces. Mackenzie King made the same point in his letter to the three Prairie premiers later in the same month. Emphasizing that the subsidies in lieu of lands would cease with the transfer, King offered "an accounting between the Dominion and the Provinces from the beginning, by an independent tribunal" to see if any money was due the provinces from the management of the resources. Any award by the tribunal could be "capitalized and the interest adjusted in connection with the annual provincial subsidy." King was, in fact, accepting the fine distinction between subsidies in lieu of lands and subsidies as compensation for previous "unjust" treatment which the Prairie governments had by then begun to draw.55 In their replies the premiers made quite clear that, prior to any judgement, the federal government would have to accept responsiblity in the broadest sense for the monetary value of all land alienated while administered by the Dominion. However rationalized, it was obvious from their letters that no Prairie government was prepared to accept any decrease in subsidies in return for control of their natural resources. Indeed, from the breadth of their claims it is probable that they were hoping to increase them. This was not surprising. The real purpose of the subsidies had been to meet genuine fiscal needs. The need had not decreased. But if the financial problems for the Prairies were serious, those of the Maritimes, virtually excluded from the subsidy increases of 1906-11, were critical. The federal policy of dealing with the claims of the more powerful region as a separate case meant that, whatever happened there, Maritime needs and claims would remain unattended. Government silence in the face of Progressive hostility also characterized the debate on the Maritime case for federal assistance in directing trade through Canadian ports. The subject was introduced in a resolution, presented by H. J. Logan in cooperation with J. B. M. Baxter, which proposed that "the British tariff preference should be confined to goods brought into Canada through Canadian seaports." The measure Logan argued, would help both national ports and national railways and would honour a promise made by Sir Wilfrid Laurier in 1903 and reaffirmed in igoy.56 He did not, he explained, want to force the issue to a vote but rather to test sentiment in the house in the hope of persuading the government to include some such measure in the budget.57 Progressives and low-tariff Liberals, however, seemed to see the proposal as a dark plot by "protected 90

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interests" to subvert the British preference. Progressive John Evans (Saskatoon) called it "a camouflage of intent to curtail British competition." Crerar condemned the resolution in principle because it would "throw trade out of its normal, natural channel into an artificial channel created by this government." Liberal James Malcolm (North Bruce) shifted the grounds for attack slightly in claiming that the measure meant "discrimination" against Portland, which as a result of the government takeover of the Grank Trunk had become a "national asset" and should be developed accordingly.58 Only two voices in favour of the resolution came from nonMaritime members, L. J. Ladner (Vancouver South) and W. F. Maclean (South York), both Conservatives. Indeed, amid the chorus of outraged free trade principles provoked by the proposal came a quavering cry from within the Maritimes. A freshman Liberal MP, L. H. Martell (Hants), in a brief impromptu statement near the close of the debate, declared that he personally could not support anything which might increase the cost of food to the people of his constituency. In his budget a few weeks later, Fielding made no mention of any attempt to direct imperial trade through Canadian ports. The closest the Maritimers came to a victory of any kind in the first year of the new government was on the issue of freight rates. The matter received a full airing in the house in the dispute occasioned by the imminent lapse of legislation suspending the Crowsnest Pass rates. In return for a federal subsidy in building a line through the Crowsnest Pass, the CPR in 1897 had reduced freight rates on grain and flour moving eastward, and on a variety of westbound commodities required by the settlers. The rates remained operative until 1918 when they were suspended by order in council to permit the railway to cope with wartime inflation. In 1919 the suspension was extended for an additional three-year period. A return to the old rates in 1922 would have been expensive for the railways, which claimed it would prevent the implementation of a "voluntary" 20 per cent reduction on basic commodities across the country.59 The Progressives, undoubtedly aware that their case for the renewal of the special rates stood little or no chance before the Board of Railway Commissioners, expressed their lack of confidence in that body and sought a political settlement in the house. They won an initial victory when the government referred the matter to a Special Committee on Transportation Costs.60 In the lengthy hearings before the committee, Maritime representatives called for a repeal of the earlier increases in the Maritimes as 91

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disruptive of interprovincial trade guaranteed by the Confederation agreement. British Columbians cited their own terms of union in demanding an equalization of their rates with those of the Prairies. Prairie representatives demanded the return of the Crowsnest Pass rates as necessary to provide their region the same protection against excessive rate increases which the Eastern provinces derived from competitive water rates and American railways.61 The ultimate report of the committee was determined less by the content of arguments than the exigencies of political power. Within the committee E. M. Macdonald led the attack on the Progressive position, arguing that the reductions should be applied to the basic commodities of the whole country rather than those of a single region. Realizing that he could not carry the committee in a complete restoration of the Crowsnest Pass rates, T. A. Crerar proposed their limitation to grain and flour only. Such a compromise, he suggested, would still leave room for reductions on other commodities on a national basis. Although narrowly voted down, Crerar's suggestion effectively divided the Liberal members in the committee, as such low-tariff sympathizers as W. D. Euler, James Malcolm, and even A. E. MacLean of Prince Edward Island voted with the Progressives. The split became even wider in the Liberal caucus as some of the low-tariff wing were reported to have used the rhetoric of a revolt against "Montreal domination" in supporting the Progressive compromise. Aided by Progressive lobbying and threats of "a determined opposition," the pro-Progressive faction won the vote in the Liberal caucus. The committee was hastily reassembled (though the Conservatives refused to associate further with a body whose decisions were determined elsewhere) and changed its recommendations to include the restoration of the Crowsnest Pass rates on grain and flour. The committee also declared "a general reduction in railway rates" to be "essential to the economic life of the country," but left this matter, as well as the claims of the Maritimes and British Columbia, for consideration by the Board of Railway Commissioners.62 The committee's decision, endorsed by the government, acutely embarrassed the Liberal exponents of Maritime Rights. E. M. Macdonald could not reveal the bitter fight which he had waged in the committee or the Liberal caucus without attacking the position ultimately taken by his party. In Parliament he gave a lengthy exposition of the Maritime case for lower freight rates but lamely concluded with the pious hope that the minister of railways would deal "speedily" with the Maritime case. It remained for J. B. M. Baxter to point out the 92

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added sense of regional injustice which the government's policy would create in the Maritimes and the interpretation which would be placed upon the Maritime Liberals' apparent support of it. There seemed to be, he stated, "two absolutely separate freight rate tribunals in Canada, one for the gentlemen with whom it is desirous to continue a political alliance, the other for the people who are absolutely in opposition or whose loyalty is so unquestioned or unquestionable that it is known in advance that they will swallow this or any other dose in the name of docile support to their leaders."63 The cost of the Prairie victory became apparent in the meagreness of the reductions awarded on other commodities. The railway commissioners, taking the cost-revenue figures of the CPR as their criterion, calculated that there was a $8,338,469 surplus available for rate reductions. But $7,159,537 of this would be absorbed by the restoration of the old rates on grain and flour. The remainder, they ruled, would permit a reduction of only 7.5 more percentage points in the original 40 per cent increase.64 Meanwhile the lengthy and detailed submission which the Maritime representatives had completed before the board early in 1922 finally bore fruit in a favourable decision on one aspect of their case. The commissioners still did not accept the Maritime claim for fixed arbitraries to protect the competitive position of Maritime industry, nor did they find any obligation to maintain low rates in the Confederation pact. But they did rule that the Montreal-Saint John portion of the rates of traffic to and from points west of Winnipeg was too high and "did not indicate an equitable continuation of a long haul rate." Their recommendation that such rates should be reduced from 42.5 cents to 24 cents first class was a virtual restoration of one group of arbitraries as they had existed prior to 1918.65 The final disillusionment of those who had looked to a Liberal government for recognition of Maritime railway claims came with the regional division of the CNR. The Liberal railway statement contained in the speech from the throne in 1922 called for a "fair trial" for public ownership. More specific declarations of policy had to await the appointment of a new board of directors, which was not completed until October. By the end of the year the board had adopted the policy of maintaining strong central control of the railways but permitting the organization of five regional divisions. They shifted the general headquarters from Toronto to Montreal and established a local headquarters for the Atlantic region at Moncton.66 Whatever credit the Liberals might have derived from this partial 93

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concession to Maritime sentiment was largely destroyed by the board's decision to terminate the Maritime division not at Montreal, the western terminus of the Intercolonial since its extension in 1897, but 200 miles eastward at Riviere du Loup. The loss of control of a few hundred miles of railway was not the primary cause of renewed Maritime anger. The truncation of the Intercolonial assumed such great importance because it finally brought home to the Maritime public that the creation of a regional division did not imply anything like a return to the condition of regional independence which had prevailed prior to integration. Not only could they not regain control of rates to Montreal, but Maritimers would soon discover that they had little influence over rates within their own region. Furthermore, the drain in railway personnel from Moncton to the metropolitan headquarters continued.67 Reminded of the brave promises by Liberal candidates before the election, Harold Putnam (Colchester) tacitly admitted the failure to implement them and remarked that, like Joseph Howe with Confederation, they chose to "make the very best of a bad bargain."68 Like Howe's anti-Confederation supporters, however, the protesters of the igaos proved less philosophical than their leaders in the acceptance of "bad bargains." Convinced of the betrayal of their interests by the Liberals, they would take their revenge at the polls at the earliest opportunity.

By the end of 1922 one phase of the campaign for Maritime Rights had come to a close. Maritimers had begun the decade on an optimistic note, proclaiming that they could restore their region to its "rightful" position in the Dominion through unity and organization. The three Maritime governments had adopted a common case and coordinated their strategy in presenting it. They received the public support of the representatives and newspapers of all political parties and the vociferous endorsation of the leading commercial associations in their region. Snubbed by the Meighen government, the movement had demonstrated its strength by helping to produce a greater shift in the Maritime popular vote than in any previous election. But still it failed. The reason for the failure had less to do with Maritime methods than with the clash of interests and imbalance of regional forces at the federal level. In the early 19205 the Maritimes and the Prairies were both in revolt against the central metropolises. Both shared common 94

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interests in their need for higher provincial subsidies and lower freight rates. The two central provinces, with the large tax base from a growing consolidation of industry within their borders and less dependent upon long-haul transportation, were concerned with guarding the federal treasury against the costs of either subsidies or freight rate reductions. The conventional approach taken by the Maritimes and the Prairies of preparing individual "special cases" for subsidy and freight rates changes brought them into conflict and facilitated the strategy of the railways and the Central Canadian politicians in playing one off against the other. The urgency of the Maritime plight, especially on the railway issue, was apparent to some Central Canadian ministers and under normal circumstances might have yielded concessions. But the Central Canadian business community was badly frightened by the spectre of the Prairie revolt on the tariff. Unwilling to pay the price necessary to conciliate the Prairies, the Meighen government avoided even the appearance of concessions to the Maritimes. This policy changed little with the new government. Indeed, the irony persisted of the two regional protests against the metropolitan region dissipating their firepower against each other instead of cooperating against a common enemy. Mackenzie King's government presided over the struggle like a referee at a wrestling match, but interfering occasionally to adjust the rules in favour of the stronger contender. The contest frustrated Maritime observers, whose champions under the rules of the game appeared doomed to perpetual defeat. By the following year they were desperately searching for some means of changing the rules and threatening to withdraw from the game altogether.

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CHAPTER SIX

A National Appeal

Disillusioned with the Liberal government as an avenue for the redress of their grievances, the Maritimes appealed their case over the head of Parliament to the people of Canada. Boards of trade, regional clubs, community associations, and even municipal councils mounted delegations, organized speaking tours, circulated pamphlets, published letters in national journals, and canvassed prominent figures throughout the country. The economic diversity of the region gave a variety of emphases to a campaign whose breadth and spontaneity contributed to its confusion in strategy and goals. Nevertheless a common theme, an emphasis on economic nationalism, was predominant in three major wings of the campaign. The port cities of Halifax and Saint John stressed the need for a national transportation policy to channel Canadian trade through Canadian ports; the industrial towns of eastern Nova Scotia a national fuel policy to limit Canada's dependence on foreign coal; and rural communities a national program of immigration and colonization which would include the Maritime provinces. Even the references to the secession movement and the proposal for regional economic independence which succeeded it were made by Maritime Rights leaders more to dramatize the urgency of their difficulties than as desirable solutions in themselves. Although they achieved little in the way of legislative action, they did establish their difficulties as a national problem evoking widespread, if general, expressions of support from across the country. The basic structure of the campaign was created by the regional organizations which proliferated rapidly in the early 19205. The boards of trade in Prince Edward Island, allying themselves in a new 96

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organization, the Associated Boards of Trade of Prince Edward Island, launched a drive for new members.1 A similar structure was adopted by the towns of Cape Breton. In May 1922, the Halifax and Saint John boards appointed a joint committee to work out a program for united action on regional issues. One of its chief recommendations was the creation of a broader base through cooperation in the Maritime Board of Trade.2 Early in 1923 the Commercial, Progressive, and Gyro clubs of Halifax agreed to join with their local board of trade in support of Maritime demands and urged other community organizations in the province to do likewise.3 This increased regional activity by existing organizations coincided with the formation of a new network of Maritime Clubs. The parent body was established in Moncton in 1923. By the end of the year affiliated groups reported a membership of 577 and were extending their organization beyond the Maritimes to include expatriates in the United States and Western Canada. In 1924 clubs were established in Halifax and Truro and the formation of a third was reported under way in Sydney.4 The purpose of the new groups was regional promotion or, in the words of the Moncton president, George H. Beaman, "to do everything possible to further the interests of the Maritime Provinces." While they tended to duplicate the efforts of the boards of trade, through their exclusive focus on the region, the clubs gave the Maritime Rights movement greater visibility. Furthermore, they extended the opportunity for involvement and leadership beyond that afforded by the boards, which in the major centres at least tended to be dominated by representatives of the larger businesses. The Maritime Club of Halifax, for example, was composed largely of small businessmen and professionals.5 With few exceptions, the leading newspapers in the Maritimes supported the agitation. Its most vigorous proponents included the Halifax Herald, the Saint John Telegraph-Journal, the Moncton Times, and the Charlottetown Patriot. W. H. Dennis's Sunday Leader, which pursued the campaign for Maritime Rights to the virtual exclusion of other issues, became the official organ of the Maritime Club of Moncton. Early in 1925, the Halifax club established its own publication, Maritime Rights, under the editorship of the president, H. S. Congdon.6

The search for allies outside the Maritimes helped to change the focus and increase the complexity of Maritime claims. Basically the 97

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Maritimers were seeking pragmatic reforms for the rehabilitation of their region. As they became aware of their weakness when acting in regional isolation, they sought to modify their demands or at least emphasize those most likely to win acceptance elsewhere in the country. The Maritime claims for representation and subsidies in lieu of school lands and territorial expansion, claims which had antagonized the Prairies, were largely muted. Even the railway issue lost its position as the focal point of Maritime propaganda. Maritime leaders dropped their demand for a return of the Intercolonial to independent status, and worked instead to maximize the region's influence in its operations and to restore more competitive rates for their exports westward. Since these issues had little interest for non-Maritimers, they received less emphasis in the propaganda.7 The clarity of the railway issue was also blunted by the public relation tactics of the ever-genial Sir Henry Thornton. With the presidency of the CNR, Thornton assumed the unenviable tasks of attempting to pacify the angry Maritimers and restoring traffic on Maritime lines. But his general instructions and the rigidity of the federal transportation structure left him little opportunity to do either. The government ordered him to run the railway strictly as a business proposition and to reduce deficits as rapidly as possible.8 While selective rate reductions in the Maritimes might have made good business sense, the Railway Act as interpreted by the Board of Railway Commissioners would not permit noncompetitive alteration in rates which did not apply throughout the whole system. Similarly, business principles dictated that the CNR should favour Portland rather than Halifax or Saint John as Canada's winter port. At Portland they had a monopoly over all railway traffic, a shorter haul to Montreal, and better terminal facilities. Thornton could only try to divert Maritime anger with minor concessions and assurances of concern. It was a role that he played well. The many Maritime delegations to Thornton during his first two years in office were met with lavish hospitality, voluble expressions of sympathy, and extravagant, if vague, promises of action in their behalf. The initial confrontation of the Maritimers with Sir Henry occurred on the question of the regional divisions. His proposal that the Atlantic section terminate at Brockville, Ontario, was opposed by Maritime MPs who feared that in such a large section their region's influence would be overshadowed by that of Quebec.9 The division at Riviere du Loup was attacked by Maritime boards of trade because it 98

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split the Intercolonial. Sir Henry rejected their counter-proposal for the inclusion of the whole Intercolonial in the Atlantic division as "poor railroading."10 A succession of board of trade delegations to Thornton in the spring of 1923 received promises and pleas for more time, but little in the way of concrete action. In March delegates A. K. MacLean and R. E. Finn reported Thornton as stating that "he himself considered the grievances of the Maritime Provinces justified and if he was left with a free hand, without any political influence, he would see that the grievances were wiped out." A united demand by Maritime MPs, boards of trade and provincial premiers did secure the appointment of L. S. Brown as the manager of the Atlantic Division, but on the major issues of the restoration of regional freight rates and the truncation of the Intercolonial, they made scant progress.11 The deterioration of Moncton's position as a railway headquarters continued; in the summer of 1923 another forty-two officials were transferred to Montreal. Although no longer so clearly outlined in the forefront of Maritime propaganda, the railway question continued to fester as the primary source of Maritime grievance.12 By 1923 the channelling of Canada's winter trade through Halifax and Saint John, instead of the American outlets of Portland and New London, surpassed the original railway claims in the Maritime agitation. In part this was a result of the greater prominence of HalifaxDartmouth and Saint John organizations in the movement. But more important was the prospect which it offered of winning external allies. Quebec City, too, was angry at the failure of the highly touted National Transcontinental to route western grain through Canadian ports. In 1921 Quebec's representations had resulted in the appointment of a Senate committee to study the problem. Its report deplored the practice of routing the bulk of Canadian grain through American outlets and recommended measures, such as the reduction of export grain rates, to divert the flow through Canadian ports. "After all the sacrifices that Canada has made in building three transcontinental railways," stated the committee, "it is impossible that we should go on allowing our seaports to be deprived of their legitimate traffic, to obtain which our people have been and are being so heavily taxed."13 Although the federal government failed to act upon the committee's recommendations, it did respond to the growing agitation for a greater use of Canadian ports. In his 1923 budget, W. S. Fielding increased by a further ten per cent the tariff advantage afforded under 99

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the imperial preference on trade which entered Canada by way of Canadian ports. The government was conceding the substance of Hance J. Logan's resolution of the previous year, while undercutting Prairie opposition with a reduction in the tariff.14 The Maritime ports also made significant progress in overtaking their rivals in port charges and export rates. Late in 1923 the CNR, in response to the Halifax agitation, removed that city's handicap of a one cent per hundredweight differential in export grain rates over Saint John and Portland. Similarly, representations by the Saint John Board of Trade led to an investigation by the Imperial Shipping Committee of insurance rates at Atlantic coast ports which resulted in the reduction of Saint John's rates by an estimated $1,000 per steamer, per call.15 But rate parity was of little significance unless the trade could be diverted from American channels. Encouraged by their limited successes and highly suspicious of the government's intentions for Portland, Maritime MPs and boards of trade demanded that the CNR withdraw from American ports, or at least impose a differential against them which would force more of the traffic through Canadian outlets. They justified their demands on the grounds of economic nationalism and pledges made to the Maritimes in the "compact of Confederation," during the construction of the National Transcontinental, and when awarding grants of financial assistance to the Grand Trunk and Canadian Northern railways.16 The Maritimers' propaganda, which they presented to the country in parliamentary addresses, letters to national journals, speaking tours and pamphlets, evoked a counter-campaign. The elevator interests of Buffalo were quick to resent any attack on their position as the chief milling and storage centre for Canadian grain exports. This concerned not only the Americans of that city but also influential Canadian investors such as the Prairie cooperative grain companies.17 A. A. Wright of Toronto, whom the Maritimers believed to be a representative of the Buffalo elevator interests, proved to be their most persistent opponent. In a spate of letters to leading Canadian newspapers between 1923 and 1926, Wright warned of dire repercussions if any of the Maritime-Quebec proposals were implemented. He cited the huge burden upon the taxpayer already posed by the public railway—a burden which he claimed would be increased enormously by any attempt to reduce traffic through Portland or to channel grain by the longer route through the Maritimes. Discrimination against American outlets, Wright predicted, would provoke American retaliation against Montreal and probably spark a rate-cutting war between 100

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Canadian and American lines. Yet these catastrophic disruptions would be of only trifling benefit to the Maritimes, since grain added little to the economy of the ports through which it was shipped.18 Wright's letters were effective propaganda against the Maritime campaign. Although Maritimers corrected his mileage figures, demonstrated the minimal cost of increased mileage in the carriage of grain, scoffed at the threat of American retaliation, and multiplied by several times his estimate of the trade's contribution to a port's economy, they could not erase the impression left that the implementation of Maritime demands might, in some way, pose a threat to Central Canadian interests.19

Paralleling the Halifax-Saint John campaign on the use of Canadian seaports was the agitation by the boards of trade and newspapers of eastern Nova Scotia and Cape Breton for a "national policy" on coal and steel. In the spring of 1923 the Sydney Post demanded lower freight rates, regional control of railway policy, and greater use of Maritime seaports. But to the Post the chief injustice was the virtual exclusion of the coal and steel industries from the protective tariff: "... scores of Ontario industries have flourished, under a fair measure of protection, while the Nova Scotia coal industry has struggled along, with intermittent periods of unemployment, under the absurdly inadequate protective duty of 53 cents a ton the protection and development of the Nova Scotia trade must be made as vital features of national policy as the fostering of the industries and commerce of Central Canada."20 Like the port interests, the leaders of the agitation for tariff protection took their rhetoric and part of their program from a campaign which had originated in Central Canada. A. V. White, consulting engineer of the Conservation Commission of Canada, was the author of more than a dozen pamphlets and published addresses between 1917 and 1920 arguing the need for Canadian self-sufficiency in fuel production. "There is," he wrote, "no menace to Canada's economic and general welfare at all comparable to the fact that she is at present so largely dependent upon a foreign country for her fuel needs."21 White's warnings seemed to be borne out in the skyrocketing coal prices of 1920, when the Canadian government intervened to ban Canadian exports until local needs were met, and to an even greater degree in 1922, when as a result of the American coal strikes, the 101

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American government limited anthracite exports to about sixty per cent of normal Canadian requirements.22 The anxiety of Central Canadian consumers was reflected in the resolution early in 1923 by a Toronto MP, T. L. Church, that the government intervene in the production and transportation of Canadian coals so that no part of the country be left dependent upon the American product. After a series of public hearings, the Select Standing Committee on Mines and Minerals, to which the resolution was referred, agreed on the need for a national fuel policy and tentatively recommended the replacement of imported anthracite with Canadian-made coke. The government, it suggested, should encourage this through a massive educational campaign, cheaper freight rates on bituminous coal, and the subsidization of coking plants at central locations throughout the country.23 Alberta and Nova Scotia representatives enthusiastically endorsed the committee's findings and attempted to exploit to their industry's advantage the feats of the Central Canadian consumer. The Nova Scotia legislature called for a national policy which would also include increased tariffs on "slack coal," or coal dust screenings, and American coke. Unfortunately for the producing regions, the coal shortage disappeared before the federal government could be prodded into action. In the federal session of 1924 the Nova Scotia and Alberta members waged their campaign for the implementation of the committee's recommendations against a background of declining public concern. In the summer of 1924 federal and provincial representatives from Nova Scotia proposed freight subventions of one dollar per ton on its coal moving west of Montreal and a guaranteed annual return on investment in coking plants of between five and ten per cent. By such measures, they reckoned, the Canadian government could provide additional markets for approximately two million tons of Maritime coal annually.24 The government's "national fuel policy," adopted late in 1924, proved a token and temporary gesture. It consisted solely of a rail subsidy of one-fifth of one cent per ton per mile on bituminous coal, limited in total to the amount voted in the annual appropriations.25 In the fall of 1924, with the further deterioration in markets for coal and steel, municipal and board of trade leaders in the coal towns launched a delegation to the federal government in behalf of their industries. After several delays, a meeting was arranged on December 2 between the cabinet and a delegation of twenty-seven representatives of "all parties and classes" in coal and steel towns.26 Their 102

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demands, as presented by Premier E. H. Armstrong, were relatively modest. They proposed to plug the loophole in the tariff through which slack coal was entering the country at a rate of only fourteen cents a ton; they called for a greater use by the CNR of steel rails and freight cars produced in Nova Scotia; and they urged the extension of the coal subventions to include shipments by water as well as rail and their increase from one-fifth to two-fifths of a cent per ton mile.27 In support of the delegation, the Associated Boards of Trade of Cape Breton circulated in pamphlet form a collection of favourable editorials from "prominent Canadian newspapers." The editorials tended to identify Maritime "sectionalism" with the difficulties in the coal and steel industries and, according to the Associated Boards, demonstrated the need for "readjustments" in coal, iron, and steel tariff schedules. The general theme of the pamphlet was the advantage of a national policy which would provide Central Canadian consumers with security against shortages or monopoly prices on these commodities when imported from the United States, while at the same time providing relief for major Maritime industries and thereby undermining a serious threat to national unity.28

Like the leaders of the agitation in the port cities and coal towns, business and professional leaders of a rural orientation sought to plug into a national movement in their fight against depression and rural depopulation. Many Maritimers shared the belief, common in business and farm circles in English Canada, that immigrants, preferably immigrants with capital, would provide the necessary antidote to the postwar recession. Therefore they sought to emulate the Alberta Industrial Development Association whose offspring, the Western Canada Colonization Association, received financial backing from Central Canadian businessmen, the federal government, the railways, and the British Overseas Settlement Board.29 In 1921 farm leaders at the Moncton conference proposed a Maritime colonization association. Two years later the Maritime Board of Trade at its Halifax convention appointed an organizational committee. By the time of its incorporation in May 1924, the Canadian Maritime Provinces Development Association had the support of approximately sixty businessmen and a directorate of eighteen—six from each province. Early in 1925 Col. Robert Innes, a former "colonizer" with the Soldier Settlement Board, was appointed full-time 103

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manager and permanent headquarters were opened at Kentville, Nova Scotia.30 Under the pressure of local criticism the focus of the proposed association changed from immigration to colonization and development in the broadest sense. The debate on the merits of immigration in the Maritimes had resembled that in Canada as a whole. Organized labour was unenthusiastic; the Acadians were actively hostile. Alfred Roy, editor ofL'Evangeline, compared Maritime efforts to imitate the West in seeking immigrants to a child who saw another taking medicine and wanted some for himself. Roy proposed opening new areas to colonization by resident or expatriate Maritimers, specifically "des terres superbes dans le Restigouche... dans le Gloucester et dans Northumberland."31 Nova Scotia's deputy minister of agriculture, Melville Cummings, voiced a more pragmatic objection against schemes which expected "impractical young men from different parts of Europe" to succeed on land where more experienced farmers had already failed. Nevertheless persistent support for immigration continued in Prince Edward Island, predominantly English-speaking parts of rural New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia's Annapolis Valley.32 Attracting immigrants continued to be one goal of the new organization but association leaders, such as the president, A. E. McMahon, tended to emphasize its broader role as a leader and coordinator in a wholesale attack by Maritimers upon the economic difficulties of their region. How to hold what people we have, how to repatriate our sons and daughters, how to induce others to assist in building up the Maritimes agriculturally, industrially, and commercially, how to improve conditions for our farmers, merchants and manufacturers, how to bring about more optimism and less pessimism and how to improve the transporation and marketing facilities of the Maritime Provinces, are some of the problems the Association working in co-operation with existing agencies (Governmental and otherwise), will endeavour to solve.33 Its initial project was an investigation by a "citizens' Research Committee" to diagnose the problems of the Maritimes, and then to push for specific remedial action.34 The Maritimers' dream of securing financial support from external business interests and government was not fulfilled. Central Canadian industrialists readily identified the development of the wheat economy of the Prairies with their own prosperity; the Maritimes held 104

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out no such promise. The railways failed to contribute as expected.35 A request for aid from the federal government met curt refusal on the grounds that "the aims and objects" of the association were "really provincial." Pressed on the issue by a delegation of Maritime MPs, Finance Minister J. A. Robb informed them that the matter would be considered further only after he could assess the extent of the provincial contribution. As a diversionary tactic, Robb's gambit worked well. When asked for aid, Prince Edward Island made its contribution conditional on that of the larger provinces, New Brunswick upon that of Nova Scotia, and Nova Scotia inquired as to the response of the other two. The association, left to carry on with the resources of its own membership, gave up the struggle before the end of igas-36 Financial difficulties, however, were not the primary reason for the association's failure. Some Liberals, perhaps fearing the threat to their governments posed by the agitation in the Maritimes, attacked the organization as politically motivated. When the association tried to implement a proposal by Sir Henry Thornton for a conference of representative Maritimers to meet with him on the problems of the region, they learned that the personnel of their executive was unacceptable to him.37 With the association tainted by controversy, the Maritimers found it expedient to seek the same goals through other agencies. In Nova Scotia the association and its program were virtually absorbed by the Conservative administration which took office in July 1925. Premier E. N. Rhodes assigned responsibility for immigration, colonization, and the investigation of rural resources to a newly created Department of Natural Resources and Provincial Development, and appointed Col. Robert Innes, the association's manager, as deputy minister.38

Related to all the Maritimers' campaigns for external support was the realization of the need to improve their region's image in the rest of the country. As long as the myths of backwardness and political corruption were accepted as an explanation of their problems, they could expect scant popular sympathy outside the Maritimes. The undisputed leader of this aspect of the movement was H. S. Congdon, a former high school principal and journalist of Dartmouth, Nova Scotia. Congdon's broad experience outside the Maritimes, in journalism in Dawson City, mining promotion in England, and extensive travels in Canada and the United States, made him particularly sensi105

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live to the importance of public relations. In 1923, in semi-retirement at the age of sixty-seven, Congdon plunged into the campaign for Maritime rights with a fervour and single-minded devotion which won for him public acknowledgement as the "champion" of the movement.39 Although most prominent in the ports campaign, Congdon's interests covered the whole spectrum of Maritime agitation. He worked feverishly to compile reliable information on any scheme that might improve Maritime life. His promotional activity included cooperative marketing, an immigrant settlement in the Annapolis valley, tuberculin testing of cattle, improved grading of apples, public hydro development, and an attempted revival of the Bay of Fundy power project.40 A major contribution was his unrelenting campaign to eliminate pejorative statements about the Maritimes from the national press and to persuade newspaper editors and other prominent figures to respond sympathetically to the Maritime cause. A passionate Maritime and Canadian patriot, Congdon preached a brand of economic nationalism which readily lent itself to the support of the Maritime campaign. National transportation and tariff policies were, in his view, the sinews that bound the country together. The threat to the nation's integrity came chiefly from two sources: the "insufferable egotism" of the people of Ontario who manipulated the national policies of the country to their exclusive advantage, thus driving the outlying regions into revolt and disaffection, and the ever-increasing economic and cultural penetration from the United States.41 To counteract the latter, he proposed strengthening economic and cultural ties with Great Britain and government intervention on behalf of Canadian interests wherever necessary; for the former, he favoured regional agitation to make the people of Ontario realize that they had little to gain and perhaps much to lose from antagonizing smaller regions by ignoring their rights or angering their people by slights and ridicule.42 Congdon's interchange of letters with the editors of Maclean's Magazine was typical of his correspondence with newspaper editors and other public figures. He opened the correspondence with the editor, J. Vernon Mackenzie, to protest an inaccurate portrayal of the Maritimes in John Nelson's survey of Canadian provincial problems published by Maclean's in the summer of.ig23.43 Mackenzie replied with an appeal for more information on the region, particularly "why so many people comparatively recently are writing me from the Maritimes complaining of conditions there?" One Halifax corres106

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pondent, he noted, had attributed Nova Scotia's problems to the apathetic character of its people and predicted that the province would "sink into the sea from sheer inanition." "I have never seen such pessimistic backboneless sort of people," the correspondent had written. "They moan and wail over the depression, but they do absolutely nothing to try to improve matters; instead they set their faces against newcomers, new industries and new ideas."44 Congdon assured Mackenzie that the decline in Maritime morale was a result rather than the cause of economic conditions. He correctly identified the source of the attack which Mackenzie had quoted as a disgruntled British immigrant, and remarked, "the Englishman at home [is] a splendid fellow, but God preserve me from most of them when they settle out here." Maritimers were leaving in large numbers because increased freight rates and industrial consolidation in Central Canada had left "no diversity of employment." Oft-bitten as a result of past business failures, local capital had become very shy indeed. This was hardly surprising in a province where "only three industrials [sic] of any size at all are paying their way." Such conditions created a popular bitterness against the rest of the country which posed a direct threat to the national interest. They are getting sour that is a fact. There is widespread dissatisfaction, if not disaffection. It would be no trouble whatsoever to fan the embers into an all-consuming flame. Personally I think conditions are bad and that the Dominion Government has not kept faith. That the situation will soon be serious [sic] but I think also there should be an honest inquiry as to the cause of our decadence. It will not pay Canada to have these provinces destroyed and I really don't think they will stand for it.45 Congdon was pleased with Mackenzie's expression of further interest and continued his efforts to educate his new contact with bi-weekly analyses of Maritime events. His illusions of progress were abruptly shattered, however, with the appearance early in 1924 of an article by Grattan O'Leary. Purporting to be an attack on the "pork barrel" nature of federal expenditures nation-wide, most of its examples were taken from the Maritimes. The feature exhibit, a breakdown of the estimates for dredging, wharfage, and breakwater repairs in ports and fishing communities of the Maritimes, was framed in black face type in the middle of a page. To Congdon the expenditures in question were not only overdue and badly needed, but the article's focus upon relatively modest appropriations for the Maritimes while 107

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ignoring the much greater expenditures on the branch lines of Western Canada and the canals of Ontario was an act of "gross unfairness." It was "the old time-honoured fling at the profligacy of Nova Scotia." Such slanted journalism, Congdon argued, served no positive end, and by fanning the flames of Maritime anger against Ontario, both encouraged the movement for a boycott of Ontario products and tended to push Maritimers closer to an alliance with the low-tariff Westerners.46 Congdon's reports of Maritime antagonism towards Ontario contained little exaggeration. Maritimers were convinced they were being treated as second-class citizens and ranked Ontarians among the chief offenders. They found evidence of discrimination not only in their region's failure to secure their "rights" but also in everyday governmental and business relationships. For example, Premier Armstrong was quick to resent as an insult to the province an alleged slight to Nova Scotia's deputy minister of agriculture, Melville Cummings, who claimed to have received less than courtesy from the federal minister, W. R. Motherwell. Similarly, New Brunswick fruit growers attributed their inability to obtain satisfactory nursling stock from Ontario producers to the latter's belief that scrub stock was good enough for the Maritimes.47 The patronizing manner and easy expertise with which some "Upper Canadians" approached Maritime problems did nothing to disarm resentment. Before the Young Men's Canadian Club of Montreal, R. L. Calder, a local barrister, attributed Maritime difficulties to the lethargy and backwardness of their people, who rather than helping themselves preferred "to sit on the country store steps and chew apples and talk politics." He proposed to "stir them up" by offending their pride. Although seldom so explicitly stated, his view was obviously shared by other Central Canadian visitors to the Maritimes. After one "stirring" address, by P. E. Doolittle of Toronto, before a Rotary Club in Halifax, Congdon warned that another such speaker would be fortunate to escape with his life. People here might be willing to listen to any well informed man from the West and take a scalding dose without winking, but not again from Ontario. They blame Ontario for nearly all their ills. The manufacturers of Ontario are charged with all sorts of mean things in order to close budding industries. We all feel that Quebec and Ontario are sucking the life blood out of us, in that they take the whole of the tariff.48 108

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Other prominent figures who bore the brunt of Congdon's persistent persuasion included Mackenzie King, Arthur Meighen, the premiers of Ontario, Quebec, and Saskatchewan, George Chipman, John W. Dafoe, T. A. Crerar, Robert Forke, C. H. Cahan, Sir Robert Falconer, president of the University of Toronto, Sir Arthur Currie, principal of McGill, and E. W. Beatty, president of the CPR. For each he managed to emphasize some aspect of the Maritime campaign which suggested a common interest for the recipient. To Meighen, for example, it was an opportunity for winning political support in the Maritimes by backing their demands, to Forke the possibility of Maritime—Prairie cooperation, to Premier Ferguson of Ontario, the need for a cold-storage plant at Halifax for the year-round export of Ontario fruit and vegetables, and to Beatty, a campaign for CPR running rights over the Intercolonial. It was shrewd public relations and usually evoked interest if not always cooperation.49 The value of Congdon's campaign was recognized by other Maritime Rights workers. In 1924 W. H. Dennis and the Halifax Maritime Club sponsored his tour of Central Canadian centres to explain the Maritime case. He met with politicians and other leaders and addressed a few public meetings, but as usual his main focus was upon the press. On his return he reported that his reception had been "extremely cordial," that he had been given promises of "the strongest support for our propaganda" from the editors of La Presse, the Star, and the Gazette of Montreal, that the Toronto papers were "friendly" and that the London Free Press was whole-heartedly behind the Maritime case, "hitting it up at every opportunity."50 Congdon followed up his personal campaign with letters thanking the papers for favourable editorials or reiterating his warnings of a rejection of the National Policy by the Maritimes unless Maritimers were permitted to enjoy some of its benefits.51 For newspapers which proved impervious to verbal persuasion, Congdon sought other means. In the fall of 1924 he protested bitterly to Arthur Meighen about the misleading and offensive treatment of the Maritimes by a Conservative journal. Meighen assured him of his opposition to such attacks, that he would "speak again to the individuals involved" and would do everything he could "to prevent anything but sympathetic consideration of what Maritime people believe to be their rights."52 Another element in the strategy which Congdon and other Maritime Rights workers employed in dramatizing discontent in their region was a warning of the growth and strength of a separatist movement in the Maritimes. Secession and repeal were familiar themes in 109

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the Maritimes, especially in Nova Scotia. In 1867 repeal candidates swept both federal and provincial constituencies in that province and the movement was only defused by the entry of Joseph Howe into the federal cabinet after a face-saving acceptance of "better terms." In the depression of the i88os James A. Fraser, a proyicial MLA, revived the issue by proposing secession if the province's demands were not met. In 1886 the W. S. Fielding government sponsored a resolution for the secession of the three Maritime provinces and their union as a selfgoverning British colony, and swept to victory in the subsequent election.53 Although the province received no formal concessions from the federal government, the agitation helped secure freight rate reductions, railway construction and other public works before the federal election in iSSy.54 Undoubtedly such episodes were in the minds of many Maritimers who threatened secession, particularly after their federal representatives had so dismally failed to win redress of their grievances in the session of 1922. By the spring of 1923 there was widespread talk of secession in both Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. According to the Saint]ohnjournal, "the anti-Confederation feeling" had revived "to an alarming extent. One meets with men who openly damn Confederation, others who whisper about their anti-confederation feelings as though they were speaking in the presence of the dead and few if any" who would defend the "replacing of the Union Jack with the Canadian ensign as having been a commercial success."55 In Nova Scotia secession received a major public airing in the debate on a resolution by H. W. Corning, Conservative house leader, who recounted Maritime grievances over the truncation of the Intercolonial, high freight rates, the failure to develop trade through Maritime ports, and the high cost of protective tariffs, and proposed a referendum on the establishment of Nova Scotia as an "independent self-governing British dominion." Outside the house, James A. Fraser, the eighty-two year-old but still peppery editor of the New Glasgow Eastern Chronicle, declared again for secession: "My opinion has not changed in forty years," he told H. S. Congdon, "Nova Scotia will never know real prosperity under present Canadian fiscal laws." From Yarmouth, Robert Blauveldt carried on an agitation in the press under such headings as "Wanted more Reds for Nova Scotia," advocating a greater militancy among Maritimers culminating in secession if their demands were not met. As a lawyer, Blauveldt argued that the Maritimers' withdrawal from Canada would be quite legal. "Any contract obtained by fraud, or by false representation or by duress is voidable upon the application of 110

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the party himself aggrieved." Confederation, he suggested, had been brought about by all three.56 As endorsed by its strongest public advocates, however, secession remained largely a tactic in the battle to change federal policy. That Confederation could be made to work to the Martitimes' satisfaction was implied in James A. Eraser's reference to "present" fiscal policy. Similarly Blauveldt, after a tirade against Confederation as it had operated over "the last sixty years," concluded that Confederation, if implemented along the lines originally set out in the Confederation conferences, might yet work. "Personally," he stated, "I should like to see Confederation tried as it was intended by the Imperial authorities, but if the Canadians are not agreeable to this, then there is only one thing, and that is secession, followed by some form of Maritime union or failing that annexation to the United States."57 As a device for arousing external concern for Maritime problems, secession threats were of doubtful value. Canadians in Central and Western Canada were also aware of parallels with past movements which many regarded as cynical manoeuvres to obtain political favours. Furthermore, the prevailing stereotype of all-pervasive Maritime conservatism did not permit them to accept the view that the movement could be serious. Only gradually would they come to perceive the depth of bitterness underlying the secession rhetoric. Indeed, the use made of the rhetoric probably helped to conceal the real strength of the movement. Many of the farmers, fishermen and unemployed workers who spoke of secession were grimly serious. For some of the fishermen of western Nova Scotia, access to the Boston market was crucial to their livelihood. There is little doubt that they would have taken their province or region out of the Dominion to achieve such access had it been within their power to do so. Many did "vote with their feet" for secession by joining the exodus to the United States. As previously suggested, this was no "normal" migration of youth seeking greener pastures but a major uprooting of established families, sometimes taking with them the fishing fleets which had been the mainstay of their communities. That the secession movement failed to manifest itself in more concrete form was the result of several factors. The heavy exodus itself served as an escape valve, sharply reducing the percentage of those available to support the more radical remedies. By mid-decade continentalist supporters of regional protest had largely abandoned talk of secession to rally behind a demand for constitutional reform which would permit regional or provincial control of tariff policy. The 111

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resort to a call for some kind of economic autonomy also tended to replace the less plausible secession threat in the strategy of the Maritime Rights workers seeking to arouse outside concern for their grievances. Potentially the chief beneficiaries of separation, the fishermen, were the least organized of any of the major occupational groups in Maritime society. Their influence in the organizations which came to embody the Maritime protest was minimal. The boards of trade and Maritime clubs were dominated by the representatives of the cities and towns. Although their anger might be no less than that of the fishermen, these groups saw no comparable solution to their problems in access to American markets. Indeed, most of their proposals for the relief of Maritime difficulties lay in the direction of a closer integration into the national economy.

Early in 1925 the main initiative in the campaign for Maritime Rights shifted to Saint John under the leadership of J. D. MacKenna, a former resident of Dartmouth, who had had his introduction to journalism in the print shop of Congdon's Atlantic Weekly.56 Their careers had long since diverged; MacKenna had taken employment in Saint John, joined the Liberal party, and in 1925 was Liberal MLA for the city and president of the Telegraph-Journal, the largest newspaper in the province. Nevertheless MacKenna seemed to be following the lead of his former mentor in appealing the Maritime case to the people of the whole country. On January 24 the Telegraph-Journal published a manifesto calling for East-West cooperation in the routing of Canadian trade through Canadian ports. On the same day MacKenna and his editor, A. B. Belding, with the blessing of the local board of trade, set out on separate tours of Central and Western Canada to spread the gospel of Maritime Rights.59 Like Congdon, they appealed first to any local self-interest which might be related to their campaign and secondly to the national interest in Maritime rehabilitation. In the manufacturing centres they pointed out the importance of the Maritimers as customers and the "very doubtful advertising" such communities were receiving from CNR officials, who in defending their failure to obtain more trade for Maritime ports had "repeatedly stated in the Maritime Provinces that Ontario businessmen insisted on routing goods through U.S. Ports." Predictably, the manufacturers, anxious to disclaim any antiMaritime animus, passed the blame back to the railways and ex112

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pressed their sympathy and support for the Maritime case. For example, W. R. Campbell of the Ford Motor Company claimed to have been acting on the advice of government officials in employing New London for that firm's exports and promised that henceforth all his company's trade would be confined to Canadian ports — a pledge reiterated in a public letter to the Telegraph-Journal. Formal resolutions endorsing the Maritime position were passed by boards of trade in Woodstock, Guelph, and Peterborough.60 In the Prairies the response was more equivocal, as there all agreed that wheat would follow the cheapest route no matter how marginal the difference in cost. Some were receptive, however, to the argument that the original promises with respect to the National Transcontinental as a grain route should be honoured by a reduction in grain rates. The Brandon Board of Trade formally approved the use of Canadian ports "so far as possible," a position endorsed by Manitoba premier John Bracken and by the Manitoba Free Press, fielding also reported an enthusiastic reception from the Maritime Provinces Association of Winnipeg, and a favourable response from the Regina Canadian Club and the editors of the Estevan Fryman, the Edmonton Bulletin, and the Vancouver Province. So much public comment on Maritime problems was generated that the railways minister, G. P. Graham, found it expedient to reassure a convention of the Ottawa—St. Lawrence Federation of Liberal Women that the government was working to solve the region's difficulties.61 Meanwhile the Saint John Board of Trade began the organization of a large Maritime Rights delegation to Ottawa to take advantage of the sympathetic climate which fielding and MacKenna had reported. The Halifax City Council and Board of Trade agreed to cooperate in inviting all Maritime boards and municipalities to send delegates.62 A. B. fielding was commissioned to secure Western representatives and an advance committee, consisting of J. D. MacKenna and W. S. Fisher of Saint John and Mayor John Murphy of Halifax, set out to confer with Quebec and Montreal boards to make the final arrangements.63 They lined up an appointment with the cabinet for February 25 and persuaded the CPR to schedule a special train to bring New Brunswick delgates into Ottawa early on the morning of the 25th. The Nova Scotians, travelling by CNR, would join with the Quebec and Montreal delegates before proceeding to rendezvous with the Vancouver delegates at the Chateau Laurier on the evening of the 24th. Altogether an estimated 300 delegates set out from the Maritimes to support their demands for Maritime Rights. 113

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While carefully coordinating the physical arrangements for the delegation, the Maritime leaders seem to have paid scant attention to the actual program to be presented. The Saint John board had proposed concentration on the single issue of channelling trade through Canadian ports, demanding first that the preferential tariff be confined exclusively to goods shipped through Canadian ports and secondly that the railways be required to route their exports through Canadian channels. But just before the departure of the Nova Scotia section, W. H. Dennis learned that 99.2 per cent of all British goods admitted under the preference were already entering by Canadian ports.64 Confusion was compounded when on arriving in Ottawa the delegates discovered that the Montreal and Vancouver boards of trade were adamant in their opposition to the second part of the program because it might lead to American reprisals. The strongest resolution that the Montreal delegates could be persuaded to accept was a vague call for port development: "that Canadian ports, east and west, be developed to take care of Canadian exports and imports, and ways and means found by which this will be accomplished to the general advantage of Canada." The resolution was "perfectly safe," complained some Maritimers, while others suggested that they "might as well go home."65 With the New Brunswick delegates not expected until an hour before the meeting with the cabinet, there was little time to formulate new strategy. In a hurried consultation on their arrival, Mayor Murphy reported the dilemma and suggested the elimination of any mention of the Imperial Preference from their statement. The New Brunswickers turned the responsibility for presenting the case over to Murphy and set out for the meeting. According to Congdon, among the six hundred delegates, politicians, and reporters who crowded into the Railway Committee room at eleven o'clock that morning were some Maritimers who were already contemplating alibis to prove that they had never been associated with such a fiasco.66 The situation was saved from a Maritime viewpoint by an unexpectedly effective presentation of their case by Mayor Murphy, which afforded the frustrated delegates an opportunity to express their emotions in a demonstration startling to the non-Maritimers present. After the Montreal delegates had presented the resolution agreed upon, Murphy, described by one observer as a "slender, medium height, black-haired and black-eyed Irishman, who looks as though he were going into a decline,"67 threw away the script and launched into an eloquent and wide-ranging statement of Maritime grievances.

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His peroration was interrupted by a spontaneous outburst of cheering and applause from the Maritime delegates, which, Congdon reported, threatened the security of the roof and "lasted fully five minutes." The outburst was triggered by Murphy's statement that if it were found that the Maritimes could not be "made a prosperous partner of the Dominion under the present fiscal arrangements then no objection can be raised nor ill-will in permitting us to deal with whatever market we can relieved of the restrictions which now surround us."68 The Maritimers appeared to be threatening a revolt against federal control of fiscal policy unless their grievances were alleviated. In an evening session J. D. McKenna, Premier Veniot, and James E. Tighe of the Saint John Local of the International Longshoremen's Association addressed the members of Parliament at the conclusion of what the press called "Maritime Day" at Ottawa.69 On their return home the delegates agreed that their mission had been a success after all. True, they had received little encouragement from the government. Mackenzie King stood upon the government's record in applying the Imperial Preference to Canadian ports, promised the elimination of "discrimination against Canadian ports" in the matter of ocean rates, and read the delegates a stern lecture on the foolishness of talking secession. Privately he rejoiced that "the bottom was knocked out of a deputation which owed its origin to Tory sources."70 More objective observers disagreed with King's assessment of the delegation's failure. T. A. Crerar, for example, described its presentation as "interesting and impressive." Newspapers across the country focused upon the Murphy speech and the depth of Maritime discontent as expressed in the lengthy applause for what many reporters interpreted as a threat of secession. Despite the confusion and the danger of ridicule so narrowly avoided, the delegates had at least extended the public awareness of Maritime anger.71

The delegation had also brought home to the Maritimers the need of coordinating their program and strategy before making further appeals for support to other parts of the country. This too was the message of A. B. Belding on his return from his travels late in March. "What do the Maritimers want?" was the question he reported encountering practically everywhere he spoke. Top priority, he argued, should be given to a conference of Maritime leaders to hammer out more specific and coordinated answers. This was particularly urgent, 115

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he suggested, in view of a proposed convention of Canadian boards of trade at Winnipeg which would provide a national forum for the presentation of the Maritime case.72 For the next year, much of the Maritime Rights activity was channelled into a series of conferences to define Maritime needs and to state them more coherently to the rest of the country. The first such conference, the Maritime Economic Conference, was called by the Maritime Board of Trade to meet at Moncton in midJuly. Here about sixty delegates nominated by boards of trade and a few farm and community groups met to discuss their problems. The conference decided to divide these into four categories for special study: transportation, the Confederation agreement, immigration, and industrial development.The first would be the responsibility of a joint committee representing the three provinces; the remainder would be examined by separate provincial committees. All would report back to another general conference at Charlottetown early in November which would attempt to formulate a "Maritime policy" to be presented at the Winnipeg Conference.73 Meanwhile the committees' activities were facilitated by the acquisition of professional assistance. In March the Saint John Board of Trade imported F. MacLure Sclanders, a former organizer with the Windsor (Ontario) and Saskatoon boards, as its permanent secretary or "commissioner."74 The Transportation Committee also achieved a long-standing goal of Maritime leaders by securing a full-time "expert" to examine freight rates as applied to the Maritimes and to aid in the preparation of the Maritime case for presentation to the Board of Railway Commissioners. The appointment was originally urged by E. M. Macdonald and approved "in principle" in 1923 by the Maritime Board of Trade and the three provincial premiers. But further action on the issue remained stalled, perhaps because of the reluctance of the provincial administrations to encourage a public agitation which might embarrass their party federally.75 The three provincial governments agreed to finance the appointment only after a federal order in council in the summer of 1925 called for a general investigation of the whole rate structure of the country. The committee's first choice, C. M. Hayes, was unable to serve but he suggested F. C. Cornell, shipping agent for the Canadian Millers' Association. By early September Cornell had been interviewed, approved by the three governments, and was at work for the committee at its headquarters in the board of trade offices at Moncton.76 The committees reported to the Charlottetown conference of 116

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November 4-5, which reduced their recommendations to an eightpoint program for regional rehabilitation. These called for lower freight and express rates for exports from the Maritimes, a ten-year "aggressive immigration policy specifically for the Maritime Provinces," improved port facilities, greater expenditure on fisheries development, the creation of coking plants to provide an alternative to American anthracite coal, improved communications with Prince Edward Island, the negotiation of new trade treaties, and the appointment of more trade commissioners.77 Although the new charter of "rights" included recommendations for action on most issues of Maritime concern,78 it was conspicuously lacking in any reference to the tariff, either its high cost to Maritime consumers or its failure to provide adequate protection on coal and steel. The omission was deliberate. Not only were Maritimers divided upon the issue on the basis of economic interest, but the question was so closely identified with the historic and contemporary argument between Liberals and Conservatives as to place too great a strain upon all-party unity in the movement. As H. S. Congdon remarked in a letter to George Chipman, the issue was "so charged with electricity" that "no one seems to have any sense at all once the tariff is mentioned." F. B. McCurdy, noting the absence of a committee on the tariff in a letter to the Saint John Board of Trade, argued that the tariff was an economic issue of such significance to the Maritimes that it should not be ignored in any program for regional rehabilitation. The board replied that a final conclusion on the tariff was premature: "If satisfactory freight rate adjustments were achieved the tariff might not then appeal as prominently as it otherwise would."79 The program provided the basic statement of the Maritime case at the Dominion Conference of Boards of Trade held at Winnipeg from November 16 to 18. There the Maritime delegates discovered that they had been over-sanguine in expecting their proposals to receive the backing of the conference. Already angered by references to their resolutions as sectional and not in keeping with the harmony desired for the national meeting, the Maritimers walked out when the chairman inadvertently cut short the discussion of their problems. A delegate found them in separate caucus, debating an immediate return home, and arranged a meeting with the chairman. A hastily scheduled session on Maritime difficulties culminated in the unanimous passage of a resolution declaring the economic situation in the Maritimes to be "a menace to the welfare of the Dominion of Canada as a whole and therefore a matter of concern to all Canadians." The 117

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resolution urged the federal government to "immediately take such steps as may be necessary and justifiable by the circumstances as will remedy the economic disabilities which now prevent the Maritime Provinces from realizing those advantages which, under Confederation and the subsequent development of the Dominion of Canada, should have accrued to them." Although vaguer than the Maritimers would have liked, it did suggest national support for their demands. According to L. M. Simms, president of the Saint John board, the "incident" had turned out "very desirably indeed" in helping to convince "the rest of the delegates of the earnestness of the Maritime men and the urgency of their needs."80 Still another conference on Maritime problems met at Montreal in January 1926 under the auspices of Sir Henry Thornton. Late in 1924 Thornton, with customary flamboyance, had displayed his concern for Maritime difficulties in a two-week tour of the region accompanied by five CNR directors and eleven senior officials. At that time he had recommended a commission of Maritimers representing various occupational groups in the region to diagnose the nature of their problems and offered "to come to the Maritimes and sit with that commission just as long as is necessary." Although some Maritimers were sceptical — F. B. McCurdy, for example, had noted that such a body would have "no more authority than a mock-Parliament" —81 the leaders of the Canadian Maritime Provinces Development Association had in fact tried to arrange such a conference, only to discover that they were suspected of partisan intent. The boards of trade had then staged their own conferences without Thornton's guidance. After the federal election of November 1925, H. S. Congdon began to campaign for a parliamentary investigation of Sir Henry's failure to route trade through Maritime ports.82 Thornton's immediate response was an invitation to the Halifax and Saint John boards to meet with him at Montreal to consider this question. The Maritime boards, with some reluctance, agreed to attend. Having previously experienced the force of Thornton's hospitality, the delegates resolved to provide their own refreshments and to caucus among themselves when not in formal session. The conference opened with the all too familiar statements from the railway officials. Efforts to channel trade through Maritime ports were doomed to failure; trade would always seek the cheapest route and any attempt by Canadian lines to undercut their American rivals or otherwise restrict shipments to American ports could lead to a rate war or retailation against Canadian ports. The tone of the discussions altered 118

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sharply, however, after the noon recess. Maritimers ascribed the change to their refusal of Thornton's invitation to lunch. This snub, they believed, more than anything else made it clear to Thornton that they were serious in their rejection of his officials' explanations. For whatever reason, in the afternoon session Thornton returned to his role as the affable dispenser of promises, pledging specifically to direct traffic through Canadian channels, to expand facilities at Maritime ports, to secure sufficient shipping to handle such traffic, and to canvass grain and other traders to use Canadian ports.83 The Maritimers came away from the conference cheered by the fact that Thornton seemed to be taking them seriously but doubtful of his promises being fulfilled.84 They also took pleasure from their demolition, to their satisfaction at least, of the arguments of A. A. Wright, their most vocal opponent on the ports issue, who had attended the meeting as an observer only to be dragged in to explain his "pathetically inaccurate" figures and statements in the Central Canadian newspapers.85 The Montreal conference necessitated another at Quebec. The chief objection which the Maritimers had raised to attending Thornton's conference was the danger of allowing themselves to be isolated from their allies, and it was with Quebec City that they believed they had most in common on the ports question. Shortly after the conference at Montreal they secured an invitation to a meeting with the Quebec harbour commission. Their delegation, consisting of F. M. Sclanders, F. C. Cornell, and E. A. Saunders, president of the Halifax board, met at Quebec with Premier Taschereau, the members of the commission, and "other prominent men" with whom they exchanged promises of cooperation and mutual support. According to Sclanders, the plans for common action were not as closely coordinated as they might have been because of the unexpected verbosity of the Maritimes' new freight rate expert. "There was little opportunity for anyone to say much. Mr. Cornell simply talked and talked — and talked, irrepressibly." Nevertheless the two groups did reach an understanding that they would seek to present the common aspect of their cases to the Board of Railway Commissioners at about the same time and "that we support Quebec and vice versa."86

On the coal question, Maritimers also sought and won outside sup119

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port, although in this case sympathy was evoked less by their propaganda campaign than by the spectacular nature of their difficulties. The repeated sending of troops into the mining areas, the arrest of the union leaders, the strikes every year after 1921, culminating in the "great" five-month strike of 1925 with its rioting and bloodshed, could not help but focus the eyes of the country upon Nova Scotia. Visitors such as the Ontario Progressive MP, Agnes MacPhail, recounted horrendous tales of deprivation and starvation in the mining towns. And by this time the glib explanation of the strikes as the work of "Communist agitators," the earlier resort of Labour Minister James Murdock, had lost credence.87 Within the Maritimes, labour advocates took advantage of the mounting regionalism to portray their struggle less as a conflict between capital and labour than as the oppression of Nova Scotia workers by outsiders. They stressed the native origin of the miners as opposed to Besco with its "foreign" management and head office in Montreal. The 1925 strike was particularly susceptible to interpretation as a regional conflict. Labour sympathizers coupled the remarks of Besco's Vice-President McLurg that the strike would be brief because of the miners' inability to "stand the gaff" with the corporation's cancellation of relief credit at the company stores in order to portray a deliberate attempt by a foreign management to starve Maritime workers into submission. "Standing the gaff became the slogan of the miners and their sympathizers in seeking the financial aid necessary for them to continue the strike. Indeed, so strong was the support for the miners locally, that the provincial government's failure to contribute to their aid and Premier Armstrong's discouragement of others doing so became a major issue against the Liberals in the provincial election of June 1925-88 The election of a government hostile to Besco brought provincial policy into line with public sentiment. But if the corporation had been uncooperative with a friendly Liberal government's efforts to end the strike, its belligerence after the election knew no bounds. At this point President Wolvin added a refusal to maintain the "check-off or the company's collection of union dues to the earlier demand for a reduction in wages. The provincial government found itself in a relatively weak position in dealing with Besco. Wolvin had little to lose but his position in a nearly bankrupt corporation. Yet he held hostage two industries of critical importance to the prosperity of the province.89 No government at that time could contemplate offending investors with legislation which might be considered confiscatory. Nor could 120

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Nova Scotians expect help from the federal government, which had taken advantage of the court's decision that the federal Industrial Disputes Act was ultra vires to wash its hands of the whole affair.90 In their dilemma, they appealed to Sir Joseph Flavelle, president of the National Securities Corporation and an elder statesman of Canadian finance.91 Flavelle considered himself a dedicated nationalist and deeply deplored the sectionalism which he saw developing in outlying regions of the country. In the spring of 1925 he became sufficiently disturbed by the Maritime agitation to visit the region. Although he had little sympathy for the Maritime perspective — F. B. McCurdy he regarded as "too long in the influence of his own locality'' and the Halifax Board of Trade he dismissed as a group of "somewhat cowardly businessmen who do not relish being uncomfortable" — he did strike up a friendship with W. H. Dennis to whom he offered his services in trying to rehabilitate the region.92 The appeal to Flavelle was more than just a haphazard overture for support from Central Canadian business interests. Sir Joseph was chairman of the board of the Canadian Bank of Commerce, where the coal company carried on its short-term financing during the strike. The Nova Scotians were seeking the application of a banker's pressure upon a hard-pressed client to bring Wolvin to terms. In his reply, Flavelle was careful to explain that it would be unethical for a bank to "coerce" a client. "You wrill know, of course," he wrote, "banks must not coerce customers. They can advise them, go fairly close to commanding them if they are in a position to do so, but they have no mandate to coerce." Nevertheless, that night, after a conference with Flavelle, the bank's president, Sir John Aird, set out for Montreal. Flavelle assured the anxious Nova Scotians that Aird would "confer writh the most influential people there, whose names I need not mention, and will do everything that is legitimately possible to be of service in this matter." Two days later the company accepted the government's terms and the five-month-old strike came to an end.93 Further support for the coal-steel side of the Maritime Rights movement came from the royal commission investigation of the coal mines w7hich had been promised in the provisional settlement. The provincial government emphasized the impartiality of the commission by appointing two of its three members from outside the region. The chairman, Sir Andrew Rae Duncan, a former coal controller for the United Kingdom, was chosen by the British cabinet at Nova Scotia's request. The others were Hume Cronyn, an ex-MP and insurance executive from London, Ontario, and Hugh MacPherson, 121

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president of Saint Francis Xavier University, the lone Maritimer. The commissioners fully endorsed the Nova Scotian drive for new coal markets. Reporting that the tests conducted by the Dominion Fuel Advisory Board indicated that Cape Breton coal yielded "satisfactory coke for domestic purposes," the commissioners urged that coking stations be established at major centres in Ontario and Quebec to provide an alternative to American anthracite.94 An addendum to the report went much further. Indeed, it was essentially an appeal by Cronyn to his compatriots in Ontario and Quebec to accept the need for federal assistance to coking plants and "substantial" increases in the tariff on bituminous coal and anthracite screenings to restore a Nova Scotian industry whose collapse was "little less than a national calamity." Cronyn based his appeal on the grounds of national unity. As a disciple of the "Manchester School," he was prepared to concede that such support could not be justified on economic grounds. But, there are considerations involved in this problem which transcend cold-blooded political economy or even the losses which may fall on the more thickly settled portions of Canada We in Ontario are accustomed, if not hardened, to the accusations made in the Prairie Provinces that the East treats the West unfairly, but the sense of grievance unredressed which prompts this charge is nothing to the depth of feeling which exists in the Maritimes against the Central Provinces of Ontario and Quebec. . . . If then we of the Central Provinces are unwilling to sacrifice something of our prosperity on the altar of common citizenship to aid, perhaps even to save, the main industry of Nova Scotia we may witness an estrangement of far-reaching consequences. Furthermore, such altruism would bring its own reward; by encouraging the Nova Scotia industry, Ontario manufacturers would protect themselves against a future "day of reckoning" when American anthracite resources were exhausted.95

Although none of the various segments of their campaign had secured implementation of their proposals, by 1926 Maritimers had created in the rest of the country a climate of opinion conducive to governmental action on their behalf. There were still relatively few 122

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newspapers, businessmen, or politicians who would unequivocally endorse their principal demands. But even those who opposed them on individual issues conceded the urgency of their economic plight and the need to find some means of alleviating their discontent. Indeed, it had become politically reprehensible outside of the Maritimes for a federal government to fail to act to defuse the agitaton. The external concern was perhaps best illustrated at the interprovincial conference of 1926, where Maritime subsidy claims, which usually provoked rigid opposition from Central Canada, met expressions of sympathy. Here the representatives of Ontario and Quebec took the initiative in moving and seconding a resolution urging that the federal government should afford to "those Provinces which by reason of conditions peculiar to them, have not progressed as anticipated . . . relief... in a form that will ameliorate these conditions."96 The appointment of a royal commission to investigate Maritime claims and King's uncharacteristically strong commitment to implement its findings were, of course, not dictated by vague expressions of sympathy from outside the Maritimes. Their motive force came from the political side of the Maritime Rights movement. But when King's belated perception of political realities in the Maritimes indicated the need for substantial concessions to that region, he found the ground for their acceptance already prepared by the campaign which during the previous three years had established Maritime difficulties as a national problem in the minds of the Canadian people.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

The Politics of Maritime Rights

The primary criterion by which Maritimers judged political parties in the igzos was their effectiveness in representing the region's interests. Unable to persuade their government to fulfil the expectations which they had helped to arouse, the Maritime Liberals found themselves at a hopeless disadvantage in competing for popular support. The Conservatives became the party of Maritime Rights. But they were divided on basic strategy and goals. One faction led by F. B. McCurdy sought regional control of fiscal policy through a political coalition at the provincial level. Another, represented by W. H. Dennis, believed Maritime interests could best be served by a regional bloc working within the machinery of the national party. The Dennis view prevailed; the Conservatives won their regional bloc, only to discover its limitations in an Ontario-dominated party.

In 1923 the Conservatives replaced the Liberals in the forefront of agitation. At Ottawa, with H. J. Logan temporarily driven from public life by a serious illness and E. M. Macdonald drawn into the cabinet's stifling embrace, J. B. M. Baxter became the leading parliamentary spokesman for Maritime Rights.1 In Nova Scotia the Conservative house leader, Howard Corning, advertised his party as a possible vehicle of regional protest with a resolution contemplating the province's withdrawal from Confederation. This and an accompanying attack on the tariff seemed to indicate a willingness by the local party to pursue regional goals to their ultimate ends, irrespective of the sacred shibboleths of the national party. This impression was not 124

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entirely merited. A hastily called meeting of the provincial executive formally disavowed secession, although endorsing the promotion of Maritime Rights. But that was done in private. Publicly the Conservatives were on record as entertaining secession as a possible solution to regional difficulties.2 The effectiveness of Coming's ploy was greatly enhanced by the fumbling response of E. H. Armstrong, who three months earlier had succeeded George Murray as premier. Armstrong replied to the resolution with an amendment blaming Maritime difficulties upon past Conservative governments and including an ill-conceived and poorly timed expression of "confidence in the good will and the earnest desire of the Federal Government to co-operate in. . . promoting the welfare of the people of this Province."3 Not only was the blatant appeal to party prejudice incompatible with the public's concern for regional unity, but the rash defence of the federal government, at a time of growing disillusionment with its Maritime policies, destroyed the credibility of the provincial administration's fight for regional interests. At one stroke, Coming's resolution discredited the provincial Liberals in the leadership of the Nova Scotia portion of the Maritime Rights movement and established the Conservatives as possible alternatives. The Halifax federal by-election of December 1923 recorded, in spectacular fashion, the shift in sentiment against the Liberals as a result of their failure to implement regional demands.4 In the light of traditional political practice the Conservative party's choice of W. A. Black was an unusual one. Seventy-six years of age, he was running against "his doctor's advice, his wife's fears and his family's opposition." He had little previous experience as a political candidate and was a man who hated "to make — or rather attempt to make — a speech." With such a candidate, Conservative strategy was to avoid public meetings while "attempting to run a fair show by arranging to get our vote out."5 Nevertheless Black was well suited to a campaign based on regional issues. As head of Pickford and Black, one of the largest shipping firms in the Maritimes, he was known to have a major economic commitment to the region and to the Port of Halifax. He had neither the obvious party allegiance of a professional politician nor any need for the economic security of a judgeship or a senatorship which might lead him to toe the party line at the expense of his constituents. With Black as their candidate the Conservatives could press home their charge that the overriding partisanship of the "solid 125

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sixteen" Liberals was a barrier to the achievement of Maritime Rights. Maritime Rights propaganda rose to a crescendo in the month before the by-election, as the Dennis papers focused upon the threat to Halifax of the apparent consolidation of Portland as the winter terminus of the CNR and the total ineffectiveness of the "solid sixteen" in winning the redress of the grievances for which they had been elected. J. B. M. Baxter, imported as the feature speaker for the Conservatives, hammered at similar themes — the neglect of Maritime ports and especially the tame acceptance by the Maritime Liberals of the restoration of the Crowsnest Pass rates without an adequate quid pro quo for the Maritimes. Their campaign was so exclusively concentrated upon the issue of regional discontent as to arouse misgivings among more traditional Conservatives that they might be "creating an Ireland in the Dominion."6 Meanwhile, completely outflanked as the party of protest, the Liberals flooded the city with speakers and fell back upon the gambit of promised largesse — a new grain elevator, a shipping pier, a railway siding, cattle sheds, and fishing stations. With the election only days away, Liberal organizers managed to have the steamer bearing Mackenzie King from the Imperial conference diverted so that the prime minister might address a Liberal rally at Halifax. All such efforts were in vain; the Conservatives won the seat by a majority of 1,932 votes.7 In subsequent attempts to minimize the election as a judgement against the government's Maritime policy, the Liberals attributed their defeat to faulty organization resulting from factional strife within the party locally.8 That there was such strife there is no doubt. After the political crisis of 1917 the party had been split between the supporters of A. K. MacLean and the Union government, "the machine" as they were known, and the so-called "Laurier Liberals." Lacking Conservative opposition, the rival factions had been able to afford the luxury of separate candidates in a by-election in 1922. At the convention of 1923, after a squabble over credentials, the "Laurier" faction wrested control from the "machine" delegates to secure the nomination of their own candidate, G. A. Redmond.9 This conflict could not but dampen the enthusiasm of the losing faction. Yet organizational difficulties were more a symptom than the cause of the Liberal defeat. The victory of the Redmond faction was itself indicative of dissatisfaction with the record of the Halifax MPs. The Liberal organization of 1923 suffered from much the same problem as did the Conservative in 1921. Faced with the task of defending a government whose policies appeared adverse to the region, party 126

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workers became "apathetic" if not invisible. As in the previous election, many Halifax residents by voting against the party in power were attempting to strike a blow for Maritime Rights. While the Halifax by-election provided a measure of urban discontent, the by-election in Kent, N.B., three weeks later indicated rural dissatisfaction. Three-quarters Acadian, Kent County did not offer the best fighting ground for a Meighen candidate in 1923. When urged by Meighen early in November to make the effort, local organizers agreed that the exercise would be good for the party workers but suggested that they should not be expected to win.10 Nevertheless, feeding upon the local discontent, their campaign accelerated rapidly. The Moncton Times struck the keynote early in November with an attack on A. B. Copp, the New Brunswick cabinet minister, for his failure to prevent the truncation of the Intercolonial or to stem the continued exodus from the province. Conservative speakers such as D. V. Landry, F. J. Robidoux, and J. B. M. Baxter also stressed the theme of Maritime Rights. Whereas in Halifax the favouritism shown toward Portland had been the key issue, in Kent speakers dwelt upon the decline of railway activity which was of particular concern in the southern part of the constituency. Along the coast the Conservatives were handed another issue by the federal government's ill-timed dispatch of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to enforce regulations respecting the lobster season.11 As in Halifax, the marshalling of all forms of discontent was facilitated by the low profile assumed by the national party. The relatively nonpartisan nature of the campaign was implied in the choice of Alexandre Doucet as candidate. Doucet, who had run in the election of 1921 as an independent farmer, was also active in La Societe de I'Assomption.12 The local organizer, R. O'Leary, astonished at how smoothly the organization fell together, exclaimed to Arthur Meighen shortly after the Halifax results were announced, "Upon my word, I am beginning to believe that we may win out here." And win they did by a majority of 208 votes. Once again the determining factor was the protest vote mobilized behind the demand for regional rights. As A. R. Landry explained to Meighen, the decision was against the Liberals rather than for the Conservatives. To regard the victory in any other light than a crushing verdict of the Maritime Provinces in criticism of the non-recognition of this present government of Maritime Provinces rights ... would not be an accurate interpretation of our victory . . . it is only a 127

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Conservative victory in so far as the people of Kent resented so much the Liberal way of doing things that they considered a Liberal defeat necessary.13

The Conservative victories in Halifax and Kent destroyed the Liberals' narrow majority in the house, and dealt a serious blow to the prestige of the party's young and inexperienced leader.14 But unfortunately for the Maritimes, the by-elections, rather than directing Mackenzie King's attention to Maritime problems, merely made him more responsive to the Prairies. King was furious at the election results, which he blamed upon the Maritime members. "The more I think of the Halifax election," he wrote, "the more I feel incensed at Mr. Fielding, McLean, MacDonald & the rest." He resolved to strengthen his position by a more direct alliance with the Progressives. At the first meeting of the cabinet after the Halifax election he outlined his plan of tailoring government policy to meet their demands. "I got silent unanimous consent to the understanding that this agreed — not to try to satisfy the extreme progressive wing — the Alberta radicals — but so shape our course to win the 'moderates' to our side." If protectionist Sir Lomer Gouin gave "silent consent" as King suggested the effort must have been hard on his constitution; he submitted his resignation at the close of the meeting, ostensibly on the grounds of ill-health. What the Halifax and Kent defeats had in fact done was to provide the excuse, if not the cause, for a realignment of parliamentary and cabinet forces which robbed the Maritimes of a potential ally against adverse Prairie demands on the tariff and virtually destroyed what little regional influence the Maritime Liberals may have possessed.15 Maritimers soon felt the effects of the new policy. In the session of 1924, J. A. Robb's budget lowered the tariff on a broad array of farm implements and machinery but compensated the largely Central Canadian manufacturers with the removal of the tariff on raw materials used in their manufacture. 16 This, of course, was another blow to the already tottering steel and coal industries of Nova Scotia. Further setbacks were experienced in freight rates as the government allowed the partial suspension of the Crowsnest Pass rates to expire in the summer of 1924. To the special rates on grain and flour eastbound were added lower rates on a variety of commodities westbound. Not only did this consume the revenue which the railways might have been 128

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forced to employ in a general rate reduction, but the new rates, as interpreted by the railways, applied only as far east as Megantic, Quebec, and thus further undercut the competitive position of the Maritime manufacturer in Western markets.17 King's preoccupation with the Prairies left little room for attention to Maritime problems. He refused New Brunswick Premier P. J. Veniot's invitation to visit the region in 1924 on the grounds that he needed the time to spend in the West.18 When a delegation of members of Parliament from Nova Scotia coal-producing constituencies requested urgent relief for the "critical coal situation," King promised a one-fifth of a cent per ton subsidy on the movement of coal by rail; only later did they discover that the subsidy was limited in total to $50,ooo.19 Further delegations in behalf of the coal-steel industry in December and March received little more satisfaction; an increase in the tariff on slack coal was achieved only at the cost of a reduction in the general coal tariff and the termination of the subsidy. At about the same time King received the members of the "Great Delegation" of February 1925 so coldly as to indicate that he was scoring debating points against political opponents rather than attempting to reassure his supporters in the Maritimes.20 While King's policy might be understandable as short-term strategy for maintaining Prairie support, less clear was his apparent willingness to concede the Maritimes to his opponents in future elections. Certainly he was not lacking in accurate appraisals of the situation from his Maritime supporters. For example, Onesiphore Turgeon, an Acadian senator and longtime MP for Gloucester, coupled a lucid exposition of Maritime grievances regarding railway administration and the failure to route grain through Maritime ports with the warning: ". . . you cannot afford to lose 75% of your maritime support, notwithstanding the prospective gains in the West." King may have been misled by the popular stereotype of the Maritime voter into thinking that patronage and organization would in themselves be sufficient to retain a modicum of Maritime support. He was probably encouraged in this belief by the Liberal victory in Northumberland in the fall of 1924. At King's request, P. J. Veniot threw the full provincial organizatin into the fray. He told the "two Provincial Government organizers to camp in Northumberland County until the election is over" and "issued orders to all local Government officials that they must do all they can to insure Mr. Snowball's election."21 A libel suit by R. B. Hanson against the Fredericton Gleaner prevented both Hanson and J. B. M. Baxter, who represented him, from taking part in the 129

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campaign. Local Conservatives attributed the result to the party's neglect of the English-Protestant portion of the electorate.22 Whatever the cause, the Liberals retained the seat by a majority of 639, which probably seemed to Mackenzie King a vindication of his strategy. King's apparent misreading of the Maritime mood and his continued failure to accord the region any substantive concessions virtually forced Maritime Rights supporters to turn to the Conservatives as their only hope of redress.

For the Conservatives the chief impediment to reaping the political benefits of their involvement in Maritime Rights came from their own dissident members who, led by the former cabinet minister and wealthy Halifax financier, F. B. McCurdy, sought to channel the movement in a direction unacceptable to the national party. After a year in the Meighen cabinet, McCurdy was convinced that both the federal structure and the party system prevented any fundamental redress of Maritime grievances. When the former Canadian Northern officials had first taken over the Intercolonial in 1918, he had interviewed the railway president, D. B. Hanna, at Toronto and pointed out the inevitable grievance which would follow the failure to appoint "a single Intercolonial trained man on its directing staff." His advice was ignored. Nevertheless McCurdy won the Colchester byelection, he believed, because his constituents regarded him "as strong enough to afford some relief in the railway grievance." But for a year he had been unable to influence government policy in the matter. Not until "dissolution was decided upon" did the government agree to create an "Eastern Unit" and even then it refused to provide concrete evidence of good faith, either by making McCurdy the minister responsible as he suggested, or by starting the reorganization prior to the election. Indeed, in a hurried trip to Ottawa just two weeks before the election McCurdy had found "the idea . . . prevalent, and encouraged by the Toronto management, that the Intercolonial employees were contented and satisfied with existing conditions." McCurdy's suggestions had been ignored and his colleagues had fallen into the "too common error of taking their political advice from other than those who were politically responsible." His inability to represent his province's interests in the government had been to a large degree responsible for his party's poor showing in Nova Scotia in the election and for his own defeat. What was the point of acting as a regional 130

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representative in a government which had so little respect for the diversity of regional interest in the country? 23 McCurdy resumed an active role in the party's reorganization in Nova Scotia but in 1923, hinting at policy differences between himself and his leader, refused to seek the Halifax nomination. 24 In a letter to Arthur Meighen, he referred to the urgency of his province's plight, asserting that "Economically . . . Nova Scotia is bleeding to death." Citing a previous conversation with Meighen in which he had "outlined the difficulties of her position, and from which the present fiscal arrangements of the Dominion prevent a recovery," he suggested that there was no use in riding discontent to power unless the Conservatives had solutions for Maritime problems and were prepared to apply them. "I am satisfied," he concluded, "that anyone who embarks on politics now without a remedy for existing local ills will only be serving an exasperated public and will enjoy a very brief tenure of office — not worth the effort."25 A few months later McCurdy advanced in vague terms his own thoughts on a plan for Maritime rehabilitation. It should begin with the "creation of a united voice" which "would take time" and require a genuinely nonpartisan agitation. "Many strong men of Liberal traditions have expressed themselves as ready to co-operate, but they would not, of course, become enmeshed in any Tory scheme." The changes demanded would have to "go pretty deep" and the Maritimers could expect "opposition from the other parts of Canada who are profiting from the partnership."26 As McCurdy solicited the opinion of other prominent Maritimers on the question, he revealed that the changes he favoured were primarily concerned with the tariff. His succinct analysis of Nova Scotia's problems tended to minimize the possibility of developing markets for Maritime products in Central Canada and to emphasize the burden of the tariff on the majority of local producers. He told one correspondent: If we except the Steel Company, and perhaps, four manufacturing establishments, the people of the province must buy their manufactured articles for consumption from the comparatively highly industrialized districts of Ontario, Montreal, etc., who, with their mass production, have steadily, over a term of years, driven our smaller factories out of business. Their mass production is sold throughout Canada behind a tariff wall of 10% to 45%. But in Nova Scotia it is sold for cash only, because when the consumers of the province undertake to pay for the imported 131

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manufactured goods, they find that they have nothing that the industrialized area referred to will, or indeed can, take in exchange. Ontario and Quebec are our competitors in all our production; potatoes, fruit, farm produce, lumber, etc., secure as against us by reason of long railway hauls and high freight rates and even in fish can only take a small quantity. To make payments, therefore, our producers must fall back on sales on a foreign competitive market to secure the cash with which to pay for the imports. 27 In August 1924, through a letter to the Halifax Herald, McCurdy launched a public attack on the fiscal policy of Canada. "We who live in Nova Scotia must pay tribute to Ontario and Quebec exacted by the so-called 'National' policy, but when it comes to a question of protecting our interests and our ports, that, we are told, is another matter" What the Maritimes needed was "an opportunity to live our own lives . . . under fiscal arrangements that are suitable to our needs."28 Essentially McCurdy wanted some kind of looser federalism which would permit Nova Scotia to control its own tariff. This was the burden of his address to the Canadian Club of Toronto in April 1925 — an address which he had printed and circulated in pamphlet form. What may be good for the Central Provinces is not necessarily good, I submit, for a distant and maritime Province like Nova Scotia. We do not ask, we do not suggest, that they should change their policy to suit our needs, but rather, and with all respect to them and their needs, that we may be permitted to work out some form of trade regulation better suited to our geographical position. McCurdy did not believe the new federalism, or for that matter any comprehensive redress of Maritime grievances, could be achieved through the traditional party system. Nova Scotians "cannot look to either of the parties and expect its leaders to adopt, as a national plan, an economic policy that will suit the particular needs of Nova Scotia." They would have to unite behind a provincial government, which, he predicted, in the future would no longer be "influenced and controlled . . . by federal standards" and would "restrict their interest and concern more largely to the problems of the Province."29 As McCurdy's campaign unfolded it spread consternation through Conservative circles. H. S. Congdon, who looked to a closer economic integration nationally as a solution to regional difficulties, was 132

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strongly critical. Amendments to the British North America Act, he argued, required the unanimous consent of the provinces which McCurdy's proposal had little chance of obtaining. Nova Scotia could not achieve fiscal independence without leaving the country. To Congdon, McCurdy's scheme was merely a thinly disguised continuation of the movement for secession. He also objected to any strategy for Maritime Rights which tended to take the focus from the region to that of a single province.30 But the main objections to McCurdy's schemes were political. Aided by their Maritime Rights cry, the depression, and the labourmanagement problems in the coal and steel industry, the Conservatives had reason to be confident of victory in the election of 1925. Moreover, they regarded provincial success as the stepping-stone to victory at the federal level.31 They had everything to lose and nothing to gain if the Maritime protest movement were diverted into the all-party alliance which McCurdy envisioned. McCurdy's statements created further embarrassment at the national level. J. S. Willison, in his analysis of Canadian events for the London Times, reported that some of the Conservatives in the Maritimes were "blaspheming protection" and had "openly flirted with secession." To Robert Borden's indignant objection, Willison replied: "Outside of Nova Scotia McCurdy is accepted as a Conservative leader."32 The Conservatives could not repudiate McCurdy publicly without destroying the party's independent image in the Maritimes. McCurdy, in calling for regional or provincial control of the tariff, was voicing a popular sentiment. One of the central planks of the provincial party platform called for an investigation of the effects of "the economic system of Canada" upon "the business interests and prospects of Nova Scotia" and a possible referendum to back a provincial demand that the federal government "modify or relax its arrangements on the subject of taxation, trade, and the fisheries which may be found to prejudice the business and industrial interests of the people and province of Nova Scotia."33 The problem of McCurdy's heresy was aggravated by the lack of prominent Conservatives in the province who could challenge his influence. The official leader in provincial politics, W. L. Hall, was a virtual unknown at the national level and was returned to the post after the debacle of 1920 largely because no more acceptable candidate had wanted the job.34 His status was further diminished by his proclivity for "going on a bust." According to Congdon, not only was 133

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he unreliable because of his drinking habits, but he lacked the energy to formulate and carry out the kind of reform program that the province needed to lead it out of its depression. In November 1924 Congdon declared that as far as he was concerned "Lawrence Hall is out of the leadership. His latest escapade finished him." "The successor," he concluded, "has not been selected."35 With the leadership in doubt, orthodox Conservatives viewed McCurdy's activities with a suspicion bordering at times upon hysteria. Early in 1925 the inner circles of the party were buzzing with rumours that McCurdy was seeking the leadership. Condon had been unable to learn anything definite from McCurdy himself but ventured the opinion that he was "hatching something." A few weeks later he reported to W. A. Black: "The rumor persists that McCurdy will run in Hants and if successful will have the premiership of the Province." From further afield, W. M. MacDonald, of Amherst Pianos, warned Arthur Meighen that the local manufacturers had collected "a big fund" which they had withheld and were even considering offering to the Liberals because of the "uncertainty regarding Conservative party affairs."36 W. H. Dennis sought to grasp the nettle by urging Meighen to send in a strong leader to take control of the provincial party and pilot it into safer channels.37 Dennis's choice for this task was E. N. Rhodes, an ex-member for Cumberland and former speaker of the House of Commons. Rhodes had entered business full-time in Ontario as president of the British American Nickel Corporation and had not reoffered for election in 1921. By 1925 the failure of his company had again freed him for political service.38 Although Meighen agreed to a visit by Rhodes, he suggested that Rhodes's ambitions and his own plans for him were of a federal nature. But Dennis continued to proclaim the existence of a "diabolical" internal conspiracy so serious that it not only threatened the party's chances in the provincial election but could lead to Nova Scotia's secession from Confederation. Two or three prominent men — it is not necessary to mention names — who are not friends of yours, have carried on a most insidious campaign against Hall among the Conservative people throughout the Province,with the sole object of so thoroughly discrediting him that the Conservative Party would get down on their knees and pick the leader of the group to take over the leadership. You have no conception of the intrigue that has been going on. It has been diabolical. . . . Unless Nova Scotia is given real men now to grapple with the 134

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perplexing problems that confront us, men actuated from patriotic motives, who will think only of the good of this province and the good of our people, then I am of the firm conviction that intriguing schemers will secure control, that unrest and dissension will increase, and that Nova Scotia within ten years will be out of the Canadian Confederation. Desperate men with desperate methods, who care nothing for a united Canada, are willing to lead a secession movement in this Province for their own selfish ends. Really Mr. Meighen, this is more than a Provincial question — the thin edge of the wedge for the separation of this Dominion in now being entered down here by the sea. A full realization of what is going on and a firm determination to check it, will be of great benefit to this Dominion.39 Rhodes, after a preliminary visit to the province in March and some persuasion from his leader, was still reluctant "to take on the big task." An obvious stumbling block was the effect on public opinion of "Hall surrendering on the eve of an election a duty entrusted to him by a convention." Meighen passed on a suggestion that they might announce that the "matter of the leadership" would be submitted to the ML As for decision immediately after the election. This was an unlikely expedient at any time but quite impossible in the face of Hall's steadfast resistance to all suggestions that he should voluntarily step down. Nevertheless Rhodes returned to the province in April, at the invitation of the provincial executive, to assist in the campaign. It is doubtful if many Conservatives, besides W. H. Dennis, W. A. Black, and possibly the provincial president, Frank Stanfield, knew of the real reason for his return. J. A. Walker, an active participant in the Maritime Club and vice-president of the Conservative organization, later stated categorically that the executive had no knowledge of any plan to make Rhodes leader when it issued the invitation.40 The Dennis faction was probably rendered more fearful of McCurdy's campaign by the local Liberals' sudden shift to support Maritime Rights early in 1925. The change was a striking one, since Armstrong's strategy on regional issues had apparently been to try to "earn" concessions from the national leaders by conspicuous and unwavering loyalty. Although privately voicing his government's dissatisfaction with federal policies, Armstrong publicly expressed his confidence in the King government and stalled requests for provincial aid in developing the regional agitation.41 The new strategy was proposed early in February by E. M. Macdonald, who suggested that Armstrong take a tack on Maritime Rights "that would steal the 135

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thunder of the other people [the Dennis faction?] and would pave the way for the support of the influences we spoke about [McCurdy?]." Armstrong initially refused. "We have some problems and some difficulties but these so-called Maritime Rights are so vague and so ill-defined that I have no patience with them and I don't think anyone else has." But in the legislature in April, he introduced a resolution which read like a watered-down version of a McCurdy pamphlet. Attributing Maritime problems primarily to the tariff, it urged that "subject to Section 121 of the said British North America Act, the regulation and control of taxation, trade and fisheries of this Province should be relaxed and modified by the Government and Parliament of Canada in such a manner that the interests of Nova Scotia may be prejudiced no longer in such matters."42 The apparent Liberal endorsement of McCurdy's policy, his "unConservative" stance on the tariff, and his close relationship by marriage to the owner of the Morning Chronicle constituted for some party members a prima facie case that McCurdy had "gone over to the Liberals."43 The provincial leadership was finally removed beyond McCurdy's reach when a mysterious attack on Hall provided the opportunity for replacing him with Rhodes without unduly disturbing the rank and file of the party or destroying its image as the champion of Maritime Rights. On May 11 Hall reported being beaten and robbed late at night on the St. Margaret's Bay Road near Halifax. Whether the "mugging" was mere coincidence and happened as Hall claimed, whether he was a victim of his own indiscretion as his rivals within the party alleged,44 or whether the incident was engineered by the Dennis faction as a prominent Liberal later suggested is not clear from the evidence available.45 What is clear is the rapidity with which party notables took advantage of the incident to remove him from the leadership. On the evening after the "mugging," party president Frank Stanfield arrived at Hall's home to receive his resignation, presumably on the grounds that his version of what happened would not be accepted by the public and might cost the party the election. But it was the Dennis newspapers which led the way in casting doubts upon Hall's story. They emphasized, for example, that no report of the alleged robbery had been made to the police and that Hall was unable to furnish any information about his assailant. Privately the rumour circulated along the party grapevine that Hall had been keeping company with a negro's wife and the negro had caught him and beaten him up.46 A more damaging slander in Nova Scotia in that period would be difficult to imagine. 136

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Ten days later Rhodes was officially chosen provincial leader at a meeting of the party executive and prospective provincial candidates. The meeting was a stormy one as Hall, his face discoloured with bruises, denied the slanderous gossip, denounced the elements in the party, who, he alleged, had long been working for his removal, and left the meeting threatening to reveal the whole affair to the Liberal newspapers.47 He was eventually pacified with the help of F. J. D. Barnjum, wealthy timber magnate, conservationist, and, temporarily at least, a party organizer. Hall accepted employment as his legal adviser and was promised a cabinet post in the new government. The meeting elected Rhodes in a secret ballot vote and passed a resolution giving him a free hand in drafting party policy.48 The replacement of Hall, a local politician duly elected by the provincial convention, by an "outsider," an Ontario businessman who had not resided in the province for nearly a decade,49 and the latter's subsequent election on a platform of Maritime Rights were one of the supreme ironies of the period. That the transition could have been brought off so smoothly — only a couple of Conservative candidates resigned on the issue —50 testifies to the political astuteness, if not the ethics, of the Dennis faction in their management of Hall's removal. Because of the earlier gossip about his drinking habits, Hall was vulnerable. When offered a juicy tale of liquor and sex, with racial overtones thrown in for good measure, few party members would pay much attention to Hall's explanations or charges of a conspiracy against him. Nor would the Liberal press of Halifax, the Chronicle and the Echo, have any greater success in their attempts to convince the public that Rhodes' return and the transition in leadership represented a Conservative betrayal of Maritime Rights to the protectionist interests of Ontario.51 They received ample information on the events surrounding Hall's dismissal from disgruntled Hall supporters, but no longer enjoyed enough public respect for their version to carry conviction. For three years they had maintained a blind allegiance to the federal party and an insensitivity to shifts in public sentiment which had left them far behind the Herald and the Mail in both circulation and influence. For example, while the Dennis papers had been making a bid for labour's support, the Chronicle was busy, as one Liberal put it, trying to persuade "decent Conservatives" to become involved in a campaign against "Bolshevism."52 When the Conservatives rode Maritime Rights to victory in the Halifax by-election, the Chronicle, instead of trying to come to terms with the movement, proclaimed 137

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"mentally defective" the Halifax voters who could "only expect to be laughed at until restored to sanity."53 The Chronicle's conversion to the Maritime Rights movement was so belated and so blatantly partisan, when it did occur, that it offered a weak foundation for attacking the Conservatives.54 Newspaper subscriptions in Nova Scotia reflected both the superior strategy of the Dennis papers and a shift in sentiment against the Liberals which would later be mirrored in the elections. In 1926 W. H. Dennis reported that an independent audit of his newspapers had revealed a net gain of over 75 per cent in subscriptions between 1921 and igaG.55 The decline in the Chronicle's circulation was probably of a similar proportion, as the company was in serious economic difficulties by 1925 and had to be bailed out by donations from the Liberal party.56 Although his appointment reassured Conservatives that the Nova Scotians would not stray too far from the federal party line, Rhodes was careful not to interfere with the local party's position on Maritime Rights which had already proven so successful. The regional planks in the Conservative platform, which called for an end to "federal influence and domination in provincial affairs," the "maintenance of Nova Scotia rights" in "national enterprises," and a comprehensive inquiry into the "conditions . . . of business," the "status . . . of the Intercolonial Railway," and the effect upon Nova Scotia of "the economic system of Canada" (i.e. the tariff), remained unchanged. Indeed the device of an investigation permitted the Conservatives to maintain a neat straddle on a potentially divisive issue by promising to press for whatever tariff solution the inquiry found to be in the best interests of the province. Rhodes merely added a personal manifesto concerned mainly with other issues, and dealt with the campaign for Maritime Rights in a vague and emotional fashion, promising, for example, to end the exodus from the province and to "bring the boys back home."57 A few weeks before the election, in a last-ditch effort to win Maritime Rights support and to exploit the divisions in Conservative ranks, the Armstrong government appointed a Commission of Inquiry headed by F. B. McCurdy to investigate Maritime disabilities and to suggest policies for their alleviation. But since the Conservatives won the election the commissioners met only once before their resignations were accepted by the new government.58 McCurdy and his supporters had been effectively isolated from any political or governmental structure from which to propagate their doctrines. The belated gestures in the direction of Maritime Rights by the 138

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Armstrong government came much too late to threaten the Conservatives' position in the movement. In the provincial election of June 1925 the latter more than doubled their share of the popular vote, which rose from 24.7 per cent in 1920 to 60.9 per cent, and captured 40 out of 43 seats.59 Once again the voters had swung decisively behind the party which most persuasively promised to work for regional reform and the redress of regional grievances.

In New Brunswick, Premier P. J. Veniot, an early advocate of Maritime Rights, was also compromised by too obvious an affiliation with the federal Liberal party. Unlike Armstrong, Veniot had maintained his stance as a Maritime Rights worker by encouraging and participating in the regional agitation. Privately he tried to dispel King's notion that the movement was some kind of Tory plot. After succeeding W. E. Foster as premier early in 1923, he informed King that he had "looked carefully into the movement" and that it was "purely non-political and embraces efforts of all classes to obtain what is sincerely considered fair play for Maritime Provinces."60 His image as a champion of Maritime Rights was somewhat tarnished by his use of the provincial organization to support federal candidates in the Kent and Northumberland by-elections.61 When a provincial byelection was called at Moncton late in 1924, the Conservative candidate, E. A. Reilly, lumped the provincial and federal administrations together and fought the election on the Liberals' failure to respond to Maritime grievances. Both Liberal and Conservative analysts agreed that Maritime Rights was the key factor in Reilly's victory. As Veniot explained to the prime minister, the by-election was really a test of federal policy; provincial issues were hardly mentioned. The whole cry was that of Maritime rights, the neglect of the East by the Federal Government in order to curry favour with the West, the discrimination against the lower Provinces in connection with the administration of the Canadian National Railways, and especially the removal of a large number of employees from Moncton to Montreal, as well as the placing of the western limits of the Eastern Region at Riviere du Loup instead of Montreal. The Moncton Tory Press never ceased to hold up our friend Copp to ridicule, pointing out that he was powerless to do anything, and when he did try to do anything he found that he had no pull with his own party. 139

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Veniot went on to warn "that unless some greater effort is made to facilitate transportation at the winter port of Saint John and cut down the shipments through the port of Portland ... you will not carry more than two seats in this province next election. . . . Something must be done."62 The "something" was not done and the anti-Liberal trend carried on into the provincial election of August 1925 — an election which saw the Conservatives strengthened by the return of J. B. M. Baxter to provincial politics. Although Maritime Rights was not the obvious issue in the campaign — Baxter and Veniot agreed on the region's basic demands — there can be little doubt that the discontent with the federal Liberals took its toll of provincial support. An outstanding feature of the campaign was the defection of Liberal lumber magnates. Ostensibly the cause of their discontent was a quarrel over stumpage rates and their distrust of the Veniot government's hydroelectric policies for the Grand Falls of the St. John River.63 But the lumbermen were also deeply disturbed by high freight rates and other federal policies which they considered harmful to their industry. Angus MacLean, president of a large lumber and pulp company in Bathurst, continued to appeal within his party for reduced freight rates until 1925, when he threw his not inconsiderable resources and influence behind the Conservatives. Donald and Archie Fraser of Fraser Companies, second only to the Bathurst Company in the scope of its operations in New Brunswick, changed sides at about the same time. They, too, were concerned with regional grievances and were reported to be "strongly in favour of working up something in the line of a Maritime Province Party."64 Whatever the precise motivation, their efforts were regarded by Conservative analysts as critical to the party's victory. "His [MacLean's] newspaper articles and his huge contributions played a most important part in winning the local election," reported one party worker. "It was only through the support of people like the Fraser's [sic] and MacLean that we were able to defeat Veniot," asserted another. The Conservatives won thirty-seven of the forty-eight seats.65 A complicating factor in any assessment of the election was the "racial" origin of the premier; this was the first test of an Acadian leader in an election in the history of the province. But a comparison of the results with those in Nova Scotia and in the federal election in New Brunswick in the same year suggests that Veniot's Acadian background probably helped to ameliorate the impact of regional issues. Nine of the eleven seats won by the Liberals were in predomi140

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antly French-speaking counties where Acadian nationalism and Veniot's personal prestige may have been responsible for checking the regional trend.66

Until 1925 the Conservatives had worked to gain the support of the Maritime Rights movement with little reference to Arthur Meighen or the national party. From time to time they sought statements from Meighen indicating sympathy and support for the movement but for the most part they waged their campaign against the Liberals on the basis of their own promised independence in defence of regional interests. In his maiden address to the House of Commons W. A. Black announced his determination to break with his leader should the need arise.67 As the focus shifted directly to the national arena in 1925, the pressure on federal leaders for definite commitments on Maritime issues became more intense. Meighen, conscious of his ignorance of the Maritimes, approached the issue of their "rights" with considerable caution. If some local Conservatives were embarrassed by association with the policies of the national leader, the feeling was mutual; Meighen wanted no identification with the local party's flirtation with secession. As he told J. B. M. Baxter before the Halifax by-election, "owing to the present state of our friends there" he preferred to stay away. In an earlier visit to Halifax he had been a model of circumspection. His defence of the CNR before a combined meeting of the Commercial Club and Board of Trade and his plea for patience were undoubtedly sound statesmanship from a Central Canadian perspective but gave little encouragement to his audience to look to him for redress of their grievances.68 Maintaining his caution, he rejected calls from Baxter and Dennis for statements to use in the by-elections of 1923 and deferred comment on letters and pamphlets from H. S. Congdon until after a longer visit to the Maritimes in 1924-69 When it did emerge his program was an attempt to meet the aspirations of the outlying regions with promises of lower freight rates as part of a broad national policy of protection. His reply to Congdon rejected the Maritime thesis that the public statements of the Fathers of Confederation were in any sense legally binding, although he did concede that they expressed "what the spirit of Confederation really was; what in broad terms was the goal to be set and what principles should animate public policy if Confederation were consummated." 141

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As his own remedy for the region's ills, he proposed to "bring the maritime provinces closer to our central markets" and to "give our Canadian trade routes greater advantage over American routes for export trade." But these policies, he suggested, in an oblique reference to the need for higher tariffs, were dependent upon "the greater commercial strength of the country."70 A broader statement of his policy was contained in a resolution which he prepared early in 1925 for presentation to the House of Commons. To a lengthy statement on the tariff, the essence of which was an "immediate revision of the Canadian tariff on a definitely and consistently protective basis," he added the provision that "to enable the products of the western and Maritime provinces to reach more readily the markets so developed the special transportation burdens borne by those provinces should be shared by the whole Dominion either by contribution to long haul freight costs or by assistance in some other form."71 Congdon was unhappy at Meighen's easy dismissal of Maritime Rights under the compact thesis and was apprehensive about his excessive emphasis on protection. He bluntly informed Meighen that his letter would not "carry much conviction in the Maritimes" and embarked on a campaign to push the leader into a stronger and more definite commitment. In a series of letters to W. A. Black, Congdon spoke enthusiastically of the opportunity of Conservative gains if only Meighen would take up the cause of Maritime Rights. There was no excuse for not doing so. He had "had a far better chance to be informed than Mr. King" and if he did not "come across with something definite" he would "get very little assistance here." It was also important that he make his views known early. "These deathbed repentances are not looked upon as very reliable." Congdon scornfully rejected Meighen's complaint of the vagueness of the Maritime claims; the problem was not one of knowledge but of unwillingness to concede Maritime demands.72 Congdon also criticized Meighen's excessive focus on the tariff. To Congdon, the economic interest of the country would not permit a radical revision of the tariff in either direction. In a letter to C. H. Cahan he attributed Meighen's protective tendencies to his Ontario background. "The chief trouble with Mr. Meighen is that he was born in Ontario. They have more insufferable egoism than any people I know."73 Congdon's criticism, at least that addressed to Black in the knowledge that it would probably be shown to Meighen, was designed to wring from the leader the strongest possible commitment to Maritime Rights. Publicly Congdon endorsed Meighen's position as 142

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far in advance of that of the other national leaders and therefore deserving of Maritime support.74

In actual fact Meighen did not have to promise very much to appear ahead of King on the issue. With King's open backing of the Prairies and virtual disregard for Maritime interests, the plight of the local Liberal members of Parliament, particularly those who had been elected on the Maritime Rights cry, became increasingly desperate. Unable to move King to implement the basic Maritime demands, some MPs attempted to divert the aspirations of Maritimers into channels which King might be prepared to accept. Hance J. Logan's efforts in this direction were most imaginative. He returned from an extended vacation at Nassau in the Bahamas, where he had gone in a successful attempt to recover his health, with a "new" solution for Maritime difficulties through the increased development of trade with the West Indies. As he enthusiastically informed the House of Commons on March 10, 1924: We looked, in days gone by, to the United States. That market is closed to us by the Fordney tariff. We then looked to central and western Canada for trade. That market is closed to us by the freight tariff. Where are we to look now? We are to look to the place where we always should have looked, namely across water transportation to the countries to the south of us. Export trade with the West Indies and with South America should be encouraged in every possible way. By Logan's account, the neglected trade opportunities with the West Indies were spectacular. American trade with the region amounted to $814,703,262 — Canada's only $54,999,429. Of all the 2,000,000 stems of bananas consumed in Canada, only 2,300 entered directly from the West Indies.75 Government trade commissioners were either responsible for too large a territory or were absent altogether. Mackenzie King was pleased with the new approach and sent Logan off on a junket through the islands in the winter of 1924-25 to investigate trade conditions and invite representatives of the British West Indies to Canada to discuss a new trade agreement.76 Curiously enough the least enthusiasm for the new scheme came from those who were supposedly its most direct beneficiaries. A bipartisan West Indies Committee of the Halifax Board of Trade and 143

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its Saint John counterpart were unimpressed by the glorious prospects for expanded trade which Logan held out to them. What Logan had failed to point out, they noted, was that of the Americans' $814,703,250 trade with the West Indies, $761,585,818 was with Cuba, Haiti, Puerto Rico, and San Domingo, states which the United States owned or dominated economically, or with which it enjoyed a special trading status which would be very difficult to disrupt. Cuba and the United States, for example, were bound by treaty "to give each other a preferential tariff twenty per cent lower than to any other country." British West Indian trade with Canada was about 40 per cent less than with the United States, but the possibilities of expansion were not great. Canadian manufactured goods had to met the competition from British manufacturers without the protection of the tariff. American branch plants in Canada were reluctant to compete in external markets against their parent companies. The fish trade was limited by competition from Newfoundland, which presumably would be included in any treaty. Even the banana trade about which Logan had waxed so eloquent offered little for Halifax and Saint John. If the monopoly of the American Fruit Company were broken, bananas would still require special heating arrangements which prevented their being combined with cargoes of sugar, the main staple in the Maritime-West Indies trade, and they could not be safely unloaded in temperatures below 10 degrees.77 The merchants of Halifax and Saint John saw the possibility of few gains and some very real losses from the focus on West Indian trade advocated by those who knew so little about it. The expansion of the government merchant marine to include regular service to the West Indies, as Logan proposed, would cut into the trade of existing lines. Either the more experienced carriers would be put out of business or they would have to be permitted higher rates in order to survive with less volume. Either result would be detrimental to the Maritimes. But their chief worry was that, under the guise of helping the Maritimes, another victory would be chalked up for the port of Montreal. Maritime merchants and producers had learned from bitter experience that their "superior geographical position" for international trade was largely an illusion. Ocean rates were so much cheaper than rail rates that the port closest to the centres of population enjoyed the real geographical advantage. From 1889 subsidized steamship services had been maintained between Halifax, Saint John, and the West Indies. But by 1924 the West Indian producers, faced with high rail 144

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rates in reaching Central Canadian markets, proposed that the service be extended directly to Montreal except in the winter months. To the Halifax and Saint John boards such a change would be little short of disastrous.78 The apprehension of the Halifax and Saint John boards was not unfounded. Logan's report, which abounded with optimistic generalizations about the "large profits in operation" accruing to a new government shipping service because of "improved trade that is bound to come between Canada and these southern islands," was followed by a Canada-West Indies Conference in June to which the Maritime boards were not invited.79 The representative whom they sent anyway was neither admitted to the conference nor consulted by the government. The result, according to some Maritime merchants, was an agreement in which their shrewd counterparts from the West Indies outmanoeuvred the Canadian officials in almost every clause. And one clause—the most serious for the Maritimes—contained the provision for a government-sponsored shipping service on a fortnightly basis between the West Indies and Montreal. The agreement did not eliminate stops at Halifax and Saint John during the summer months, but it did remove their advantage in the trade which had been encouraged by national policy for more than three decades. Although the government's attention to West Indian trade and the impending agreement would be cited by Liberal candidates as evidence of their government's concern for the Maritimes, to those best informed on the subject such arguments were a cruel joke.80 The Maritimers were also angered by what they believed was a thinly disguised political ploy to win support in British Columbia by settling that province's freight claims exparte the general freight rates investigation then under way. The King government had launched an investigation in June to consider the claims of the various regions with respect to freight rates, with the hearings not to begin until early 1926. Vancouver interests meanwhile appealed for a more rapid settlement of their case. Despite a resolution by the majority of the Board of Railway Commissioners that Vancouver's case be considered only as part of the general rate investigation, two commissioners issued a separate order lowering westward grain rates to the level of eastbound rates under the Crowsnest Pass agreement. The New Brunswick and Nova Scotia governments protested that the ruling prejudiced their case by removing revenues available for subsequent reductions. The commissioners divided evenly in a later hearing on 145

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the protests and the lower rates remained in effect. To Maritimers it was just another example of governmental discrimination in favour of the West.81

By the time the two national party leaders had extended their campaign to the Maritimes, in mid-September 1925, opinion in that region had already swung solidly against the Liberals. Meighen was able to acquit himself fairly well on the Maritime Rights issue. Building upon the groundwork laid by his earlier resolution, he promised lower freight rates, greater encouragement for trade through Maritime ports, higher steel and coal tariffs, and the extension of the Atlantic section of the Canadian National Railways to Montreal.82 Such promises enabled the local candidates to proclaim their party the party of Maritime Rights and the Halifax Herald hailed all Conservative candidates in the region as Maritime Rights candidates ,83 Amid the enthusiastic rhetoric with which Conservative candidates pledged to fight, independently if necessary, for Maritime Rights, a warning note by F. B. McCurdy went virtually unnoticed. In refusing to stand for the Conservative nomination in Colchester, he reminded his former constituents in an open letter that by accepting a party nomination a candidate bound himself to the "measures and undertakings that are provided for in the national platform and the decisions of his party caucus."84 Mackenzie King, on the other hand, made no major commitments. Having offered little in the way of help for his candidates, he inadvertently provided the slogan for their opponents to use against them. Speaking at Kentville, he addressed himself to regional protest with the rhetorical question: "What are Maritime Rights? Let us know what they are so we may fight for them."85 The Conservative papers promptly pounced on the question as showing just how little attention Mackenzie King had paid to the region if he still did not know what Maritime Rights were, and what a poor job the Liberal MPs must have done in failing to tell him.86 King's Maritime tour proved an unpleasant personal experience. He was reaping the bitter fruit of what his biographer, Blair Neatby, has called "a complete disregard for the interests of the Atlantic provinces." After four years of such treatment the candidates were unhappy, the organization a shambles, and the rank and file disenchanted. As King remarked after his second day in Nova Scotia, 146

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"almost every candidate in this province has a grouch or a difficult situation." The organization was reduced to the dedicated and desperate, those loyal to the party despite all and those trying to salvage some economic security from the wreckage. Practically everywhere he went King was confronted by wrangles over senatorships, judgeships, and other forms of patronage. The crowds which came to hear him were frequently unenthusiastic, if not hostile. At Moncton, for example, he found himself "in the way of fighting or arguing with the audience."87 As usual, King accepted no personal responsibility for the situation. Certainly the whole of Nova Scotia is in a demoralized condition and it is taking some effort to bring back the fighting & winning spirit. We shall be lucky if we carry half the seats of the province. It is doubtful if we will, not because we have not a good cause but lack of leadership. The old men too long at the head of affairs— party business controlled too largely as a monopoly of a favoured few. In New Brunswick he blamed A. B. Copp. After the Moncton meeting at which the latter announced his resignation, King recorded that "Copp was received with great coldness, there is a sort of contempt for him & rightly so, he has neglected everything & everybody, let his province go to the dogs.. . . New Brunswick is in bad shape throughout & I wd not be surprised if we got only 4 seats."88

Regional discontent marshalled under the banner of Maritime Rights carried the Conservatives in October 1925 to the widest margin of victory they had every experienced in the Maritimes. In Nova Scotia they won eleven out of fourteen seats and a record 56.4 per cent of the popular vote. Both totals could have been even higher but for local issues. In Queens-Lunenburg, W. L. Hall's stamping ground, Rhodes's failure to honour the promise of a > cabinet post for Hall reopened old wounds. Hall and Frank Stanfield, a party to the promise, withdrew their services from the federal campaign in protest. The Queens County executive refused to meet with its Lunenburg counterpart to prepare for the federal election. YarmouthShelburne, which had been a source of low tariff and secessionist sentiment within the Conservative party provincially, was apparently unwilling to adjust to the protectionism of the national party. The 147

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Yarmouth vote was sufficient to turn the tide to the Liberals by a 382 majority.89 A third Liberal constituency, Antigonish-Guysborough, included the only county, Antigonish, to remain Liberal in the provincial election. Thus E. M. Macdonald, aware that he stood little chance of re-election in the industrial constituency of Pictou, where as minister of militia he was held responsible for the repeated dispatch of troops to the mining towns and as a cabinet minister was blamed for his party's failure to implement Maritime Rights, shifted his candidacy to Antigonish-Guysborough. Securing the nomination by the simple expedient of a telegram to the incumbent over Mackenzie King's signature requesting that he step aside in Macdonald's favour, the latter carried the seat by 580 votes.90 In New Brunswick the Conservatives won ten of eleven seats on a whopping 59.7 per cent of the popular vote. There was a conspicuous unanimity between English and French in their rejection of the Liberals. When the Conservatives nominated an "Anglais unilingue" in Restigouche-Madawaska, L'Evangeline protested that they must have "perdu la tete."91 Yet they overcame a 5,870 vote deficit to carry the seat by a majority of 1,470. In fact they won all the Acadian constituencies but one, Gloucester, P. J. Veniot's home county, and even here the Liberal majority was reduced by approximately four thousand. Only Prince Edward Island defied the overwhelming swing to the Conservatives. There the seats split evenly with the Liberals retaining a two per cent advantage in the popular vote. On the island the Maritime Rights movement appeared to lack the intensity evident in the other two provinces. The island's economic decline had largely predated the 19205. Nor had islanders experienced the sudden collapse in manufacturing which afflicted their sister provinces.92 Board of trade leaders cautiously eschewed any talk of secession either as a goal or as a tactic in the campaign and played only limited roles in such demonstrations of discontent as the so-called "Great Delegation" to Ottawa in February 1925. According to the Charlottetown Guardian, island representation on that occasion was limited to Nelson Rattenberry, who "like the wise 'Brer Rabbit' we have always known him to be . . . 'lay low and said nuffin'."93 Even more significant in explaining the election results was the failure of either party to establish itself as the party of Maritime Rights. The Conservatives won the provincial election of 1923 without noticeable reference to regional rights. In October 1925, Conservative Premier J. D. Stewart lined up with Rhodes and Baxter in ajoint 148

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declaration of regional solidarity and endorsed the federal party as the chief hope for the redress of their grievances.94 But his efforts to associate the movement with the Conservatives suffered from the contrary policy followed by the leading Conservative journal. In an unusual reversal of roles, the Conservative Guardian consistently ignored the Maritime Rights movement or criticized its secessionist overtones, while the Liberal Patriot continued to promote the agitation even though its party was in power. Strongly partisan, the Patriot remained confident that the King government would eventually attend to Maritime grievances. During the election campaign party loyalty prevailed and the issue was largely muted. The Patriot confined its discussion of Maritime Rights to ridicule of Arthur Meighen's lack of precision on the question—the only thing definite in his program was higher tariffs—and the argument that an expanded trade with the West Indies was also a Maritime "right."95 Although neither party established itself as the Maritime Rights party on the island, the issue was clearly important for individual candidates. A. E. MacLean, a strong Maritime Rights advocate who had been prominent in the "Great Delegation," increased his 1,200 vote majority in Prince by about one-quarter; J. E. Sinclair, who as minister without portfolio in the King government could not escape the responsibility for the region's neglect, received about one-third fewer votes than his Liberal running-mate in Queen's and lost his seat.

Nationally the regionalization of the three parties in the election was most striking. All but two of the Progressives' 24 seats came from the Prairies, the Liberals split 79 of their 99 seats between Quebec (59) and the Prairies (20), and the Conservatives divided 91 of their 116 seats between Ontario (68) and the Maritimes (23).96 Although the Liberals were able to carry on the government with Progressive support, their disaster in the Maritimes and their precarious position in the house finally impressed King and his associates with the need to alleviate Maritime discontent. Early in 1926 the government announced the appointment of a royal commission to investigate Maritime claims. In April the personnel of the commission were announced as Sir Andrew Rae Duncan, who had earlier investigated the coal industry, Cyrus Macmillan, a McGill professor, and W. B. Wallace, a Nova Scotia judge. The commission began its public hearings in July.97 149

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While the Liberals were thus attempting to regain the initiative on Maritime Rights, Conservative MPs were discovering along with their constituents the difficulty of reconciling the goals of the regional agitation with the policy of their leader and of an Ontario-dominated caucus. The initial divergence of party and regional interest developed on the question of an alliance, however limited in scope, with the Prairie Progressives. Maritime Rights leaders had long aspired to a Maritime-Prairie alliance, at least in their mutual concern for cheaper transportation. They had invited the Progressive MPs to tour the Maritimes in 1924 and again in 1925. The Progressives were responsive, particularly on their first visit, expressing astonishment at the similarity of Maritime and Prairie problems and the hope for some kind of cooperation in Parliament. H. S. Congdon had been personally impressed with the sympathy expressed by the Progressive leader, Robert Forke, both on the latter's visits to the Maritimes and on Congdon's trips to Ottawa. Indeed, Forke had gone so far as to offer a special caucus of Progressive members to discuss Maritime problems when Congdon visited Ottawa in the spring of 1925-98 Before the election of 1925, Congdon had urged Black to investigate the possibility of turning Progressive "sympathy" into practical cooperation. Black's response was not encouraging: "So far as the Progressives are concerned, they are out-and-out Free Traders—Liberals to the hilt—and so long as they can get reduction in tariff as well as cheap freight rates they do not consider anybody else. I often talk with them, and am quite friendly with them, and enjoy them, but they are just as strong in their belief as I in mine and you in yours."99 On the arrival of the so-called Maritime Rights members in Ottawa early in 1926, the Progressives took the initiative in inviting them to a joint caucus. Their discussions quickly bogged down in an argument over the tariff. The Progressives blamed the conference's failure on the Maritimers, who they claimed were more interested in partisan goals than in cooperation, and the Maritimers made a similar complaint about the Progressives.100 A disappointed Congdon compared accounts of the meeting from the various MPs, finally identifying R. B. Hanson as the culprit who had interjected the divisive issue of the tariff.101 Whatever might be said about the Progressives' attitude, it was the Maritimers who had broken the contact. The Colchester MP, G. T. MacNutt, reported to Congdon that the Progressives had asked to be invited to a caucus called by the Maritime members, "but thus far we have not done so as utterances and actions in the House indicate that they are there not as Progressives but as Liberals." Congdon 150

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remarked to W. H. Dennis, who also favoured the interregional discussions, that the Maritimers had nothing to complain about since they themselves were so obviously "Conservatives first & M. Righters second."102 The divergence in thinking between the Ottawa MPs and the leaders of the agitation in the Maritimes became even more apparent in their response to the appointment of a royal commission. Arthur Meighen sounded the keynote of party policy by rejecting the commission as a Liberal device to escape responsibility for meeting Maritime demands. Most Maritime MPs followed Meighen's lead in attacking the commission.103 Privately they defended their position by arguing that its appointment was just a hollow device by the Liberals to regain Maritime support without seriously attending to their grievances. As G. T. MacNutt explained to Congdon, Mr. Macmillan, one of the members of the commission, is a political partisan who goes into Prince Edward Island at every election and speaks for the Liberal candidates. It is not necessary for me to tell you what Judge Wallace is, and our opinion is that this commission will only report to the government what the government wishes it to report. The government will then agree to fulfill and carry out the recommendations made by this commission and this will be held up to the people of those provinces as an election kite ("Vote for us and we will give the Maritime Provinces the redress that the commission has suggested").104 Nevertheless Maritime Rights leaders back home, with the exception of F. B. McCurdy, regarded the commission as at least a step in the right direction and were particularly gratified by the appointment of Duncan as chairman. When the personnel and terms of reference of the commission were announced in April, the Halifax Herald proclaimed its appointment "a great victory for the earnest, devoted men and women of the Maritimes who persisted in their fight against indifference and discrimination abroad and discouraging propaganda at home." Dennis urged all Maritimers to "forget politics" and support the commission. "Let them assume that there is sincerity and earnestness behind the appointment of this commission. And let them speak and act in a manner that will destroy all possibility of the criticism that they are not prepared to cooperate in any and all movements in Maritime interests." A few weeks later the Maritime Committee of the Saint John Board of Trade rebuked the Conservatives for their opposition, noting that the commission was just what 151

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they themselves had asked for: ". . . it was the Maritime Committee that suggested the appointment of such a Commission. Further it was the Committee that suggested the appointment of an Imperial Jurist as the Chairman of the Royal Commission."105 In the opinion of H. S. Congdon, the Conservatives had allowed themselves to become outflanked on both sides of the Maritime Rights issue. King was offering the possibility of constructive action nationally, while locally McCurdy and some Liberals were espousing the radical alternatives which Congdon had labelled "secessionist." To regain the initiative the Conservatives needed a stronger and more definite commitment to Maritime Rights by their national leader or at least a firm promise to support the recommendations of the royal commission.106 Such a pronouncement would put the Conservatives in the vanguard of the movement and leave King "to toddle on behind." Meighen was reluctant to issue such a blank check. The commission would have to recommend "concrete and definite articles of legislation, not merely indefinite aspirations." He would have to have a list of expected recommendations "in the most definite and concrete shape" before he could commit himself to their support.107 Meighen's reply, especially his reference to "indefinite aspirations" continued to rankle with Congdon who angrily declared that Meighen would have to drop his "quibbling" or he would "never get any worthwhile support in the Maritimes."108 A more serious split developed between the Maritime Rights leaders and their Conservative representatives over the response to the Liberal budget, specifically to the issue of lower automobile tariffs. The Herald had greeted the proposed reductions with approbation. When Meighen complained that the editorial "made the position of the Maritime Conservatives rather difficult," Dennis bluntly advised him this was one issue on which the Maritime members would have to display regional independence. The Herald and prominent Conservatives such as W. A. Black had long been on record as opposed to the high tariff on automobiles. The subject had become a "distinct issue" in the province. Unless the Conservatives remained consistent they would lose their credibility. The budget is popular in Nova Scotia, there can be no doubt of that. So popular is it here that the votes of our own members on the Budget will in our judgement, greatly influence their future in public life. If they vote against this budget, they run a very serious risk of defeat in the next election— Apart from the tariff 152

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changes in line with the West Indies Treaty (which after all, is a matter dealt with in the treaty itself) and the evidences of a continued nibbling at the steel tariff, there is nothing in the Budget inimical to the interest of Nova Scotia, and a very great deal in it favourable to the interests of this Province. . . . Beyond question, it has strengthened the Government down this way. The people of Nova Scotia criticize this Budget because it does nothing for steel and coal. They do not criticize it for what it contains, but for what it does not contain. . . . The people of Nova Scotia have voted for a change on two occasions withfin] one year. They voted to have men at Ottawa who would think first of Nova Scotia. They were weary of electing voting-machines. The conditions in this Province are truly alarming. Our people are still leaving in whole families. The exodus has not been checked. Something has to be done for Nova Scotia; the people realize this; and they will have no patience with representatives who will not stand up in Parliament and give expression to the attitude of the constituencies that elect them. For our own members to take an arbitrary and hostile stand in relation to the Budget would be fatal And certainly the Herald could not follow them in such a stand. Despite Dennis's warnings, the Maritime members held firmly to the party line and supported a resolution by R. J. Manion criticizing the budget for changing the tariff without prior reference to the Tariff Advisory Board.109 W. H. Dennis and the Maritime members were discovering the naivete, earlier suggested by F. B. McCurdy, of their assumption that they could belong to the party caucus and still adopt an independent policy on regional issues. Meighen made it clear in his reply to Dennis's protest that no such independence would be tolerated. "If the party should show disintegration you seem to advise on this occasion, i.e. if the maritime members should deflect from our stand, then it would seem to me that my position as leader would be untenable." After the vote on the Manion resolution, Dennis continued to warn Meighen that unless the party was more considerate of the Maritime position it would destroy itself in that region. His remarks, Dennis stated, were not intended as "personal criticism." It was a question of being "on the ground and understanding local conditions. . . . ordinary political standards do not apply here. This Province is fighting for its existence. The exodus from Nova Scotia is as bad as it ever was, possibly more serious this Spring than before. The minds of Nova 153

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Scotians are agitated not by political, but by economic considerations." Under such circumstances, Dennis continued, they could not be expected to be unduly concerned about the automobile manufacturers of Ontario. They have gone on year after year, decade after decade, voting for national policies, the advantages of which have been reaped largely by other provinces. . . . They have done their share for Confederation, but others have failed to live up to the bargain. Highly industrialized and vastly strengthened Ontario and Quebec had forgotten that Nova Scotia existed until the fact was brought sharply to their attention. This Province has been sidtracked and its only link with Federated Canada — the old I.C.R. — obliterated as a Maritime institution and a Maritime aid. In the opinion of the people of Nova Scotia it is time for Central Canada to substitute deeds for words Frankly they cannot understand why they should have to be asked, at this date, and after all they have suffered, to join in a purely Ontario agitation, with its centre over a thousand miles away when they are confronted with the spectacle of what I have tried to picture. . . . I personally very much regret that the views of the Herald are contrary to the views of the Nova Scotia members We had hoped that the situation would work out satisfactorily to all concerned, and even now do not despair of that possibility. But we have not been satisfied with the way matters have been going and the writer is of the opinion that it would be folly to blind our eyes to the circumstances and the possible effect. Our members went to Ottawa as a result of definite pledges to their constituents. These pledges embodied the principles of Nova Scotia First. If they fall short of this standard, they run grave chances of failure.110

The coming of the Conservatives to power in June, following the maturation of the customs scandal, gave no indication of significant shifts in policy towards the Maritimes. The Conservatives continued the services of the royal commission which the Liberals had appointed, the only change being the replacement of its secretaries, A. F. MacDonald, editor of the Morning Chronicle, and Norman McLeod Rogers, by F. McLure Sclanders, on loan from the Saint John Board of Trade.111 As leader of the opposition, King followed up the successful gambit 154

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of the royal commission with the promise that a Liberal government would implement whatever legislation the commission recommended.112 Locally the Liberals also sought to re-establish themselves on the issue of Maritime Rights by adopting positions of greater militancy than their opponents. For this the royal commission hearings provided a useful forum. Hance J. Logan, for example, outlined Maritime demands and called for secession if they were not met. In Pictou County the Liberal convention proclaimed its radical stance by nominating James A. Fraser, an eighty-five-year-old symbol of secession.113 The Conservatives, too, continued to emphasize regional issues in the election of 1926. Much of their energy was devoted to reminding Maritimers of the past Liberal neglect. Although Arthur Meighen did not match King's sweeping promise to implement the recommendations of the commission, he did interject a new element shortly before the election by the appointment of W. A. Black as minister of railways and canals. The regional alignment which this implied was in sharp contrast to that of the Liberals; Mackenzie King had previously given the post to Charles Dunning who early in 1926 had resigned as premier of Saskatchewan to accept the portfolio. A flier issued by Conservative headquarters at Halifax, entitled "Black or Dunning: The People of Nova Scotia must decide," scored King's pro-western bias — "The record of the Mackenzie King administration with its everlasting granting of concessions to the west" — and featured a definition of Maritime Rights allegedly given by Dunning at Regina on July 23, 1926: "I believe it correct to say that in the Maritimes there are a number of matters of importance. The first is being born, the second is a free ride on the Intercolonial, the third is marriage, and the last is death." The flier commented: "And this is the man who would handle Nova Scotia's transportation problems if Mackenzie King were returned to power."114 Although it is impossible to assess precisely the impact of issues such as the customs scandal and the constitutional controversy on voters in the federal election of 1926, the Maritime results can be explained at least partially in regional terms.115 Maritimers would not soon forget the neglect of the Liberals under Mackenzie King, nor would they again be stampeded by his promises, no matter how sweeping. But the Maritime Conservatives had in a few months in Parliament dissipated much of the illusion of regional independence which they had so carefully nurtured over the previous four years. The election was still a Conservative victory regionally but there was a loss of five seats and a 155

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major decline in their popular vote. In Nova Scotia the only exceptions to the trend were QueensLunenburg and Antigonish-Guysborough. The outcome in the former appeared to be a direct result of the final act in the provincial leadership dispute which saw W. L. Hall enter the local cabinet as attorney-general.116 This assuaged the bitterness of the Queens Conservatives and permitted the constituency to share, belatedly, in the anti-Liberal swing which had characterized the previous election. Their candidate won by 789 votes. The Conservative victory in Antigonish-Guysborough seems to have been the result of one of the more remarkable personal campaigns of the decade, as J. C. Douglas of Glace Bay, turned loose from the provincial cabinet to make room for Hall, invaded the federal constituency with a horde of personal followers from Cape Breton. Though Methodist and Conservative, he won by a majority of 143 votes a constituency that was Catholic, and had been Liberal since Confederation, defeating in the process a respected Catholic physician, C. F. Mclsaac.117 But in every other constituency the shift was in the opposite direction as the Conservatives lost nearly three per cent of the popular vote. Only their previous unusually large majorities kept their losses to a single seat, HantsKings, where the young J. L. Ilsley made his political debut. In New Brunswick the shift in votes was more substantial, close to six per cent, and resulted in a loss of three seats as the Acadian constituencies returned solidly to the Liberal fold. In Prince Edward Island a milder loss of less than one per cent allowed J. E. Sinclair in Queens to recover his seat.

Responding to pressure from below, Maritime politicians in the 192os desperately sought some means of increasing their influence at the federal level. The Liberals failed and thereafter could only seek to rationalize their position in a vain attempt to hold their seats. Among the Conservatives, F. B. McCurdy had the clearest understanding of how difficult it would be for a small minority of Maritimers to significantly influence policy within a federal party caucus or cabinet. His proposal to force some kind of constitutional revision by working through an all-party alliance at the provincial level — though implausible in retrospect — had the merit of being previously untried. Certainly it would draw attention to the Maritime plight in a way nothing else had done. Its principal weakness, however, lay in the 156

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fundamental division of economic interest in the region. McCurdy called for a "united voice" while at the same time taking a stance on the tariff that would inevitably alienate substantial elements in the regional agitation. This factor, probably more than any fear of his radicalism or even the ties of traditional party loyalties, led to McCurdy's political isolation. W. H. Dennis, though much more skilful in reconciling local attitudes on the tariff, displayed a naive optimism regarding the role of a small regional bloc within a national party. Maritime candidates had promised an independent stance on regional issues but they, like Dennis, had little understanding of the pressure for conformity within a party caucus. If the Maritimers broke away on a majority decision by the members, how could they expect to remain within the caucus? What would be the effect of their divergence on the prestige of the leader then struggling to secure office? And if the party could not gain power, how could it do anything for the Maritimers? On the other hand, if, the Maritimers could exert so little influence in the party while in opposition, could they expect to do any better once in power? Their dilemma was real enough but predictable; their original promises probably stemmed less from an intent to deceive their constituents than from their own inexperience. With the party's veterans drawn off into provincial politics, W. A. Black, a political amateur, was leading a contingent of rookies in the house. Although the Conservatives' Maritime policy was never put to the test of a sustained period in office, a few months in opposition were sufficient to disabuse Dennis and many other Maritimers of the notion that they could expect much from their "independent" regional bloc.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

Defusing the Agitation

The Royal Commission on Maritime Claims was the core of the federal government's program to defuse the Maritime agitation. Its purpose, as outlined by Mackenzie King, was to find "practicable remedies" to Maritime problems and to "focus the discussion into a practicable program."1 "Practicable" in this context meant policies which would aid the Maritimes and also be acceptable to the more influential regions or interest groups in the country. Within these limits the commission offered a substantive program for Maritime rehabilitation. Unfortunately for the Maritimes, the King government turned it into a program for political pacification; only gradually would Maritimers realize how much of the substance of Sir Andrew Rae Ducan's program had been removed in its supposed implementation.

The personnel of the commission were of obvious importance in establishing at the outset public confidence in the investigation. The government was fortunate to have a man of Duncan's credentials to act as chairman. Duncan's legal training and broad industrial experience in Great Britain seemed perfectly suited to a judicial investigation of industrial problems. Although only in his early forties, he had already held the offices of coal controller, chairman of the Advisory Committee of the Coal Mines Department and vice-president of the Ship-building Employers' Federation. His previous investigation of the coal mines for Nova Scotia demonstrated the pragmatic approach which the federal government was seeking in the wider investigation. 158

DEFUSING THE AGITATION Indeed, his achievement of a friendly rapport with the suspicious and embittered miners while winning approval for his recommendations from government and business interests was an impressive display of public relations.2 Finally, as an Englishman, he met the essential criterion of impartiality; he was obviously free from the regional bias of which any Canadian would inevitably have been suspect. The bonafides of his colleagues, W. B. Wallace, a Halifax judge, and Cyrus MacMillan, a McGill professor of English, was more questionable. Mackenzie King stressed their judicial and academic detachment; the Conservatives, their Liberal affiliations.3 Here too residence was an important factor. A Maritimer and a Central Canadian presided over by an outsider gave the impression of a well-balanced board. In the public functions of the commission, however, Judge Wallace and Professor Macmillan virtually disappeared behind the forceful personality of the chairman. Not until the second week of hearings did Wallace venture the first of a very few innocuous questions, while MacMillan remained silent until the hearings were half over.4 Working sixteen to twenty hours a day under a "virtually untireable" chairman, the commissioners completed their task in less than three months. Duncan arrived in July and submitted his report in September. Critics of the commission would later use an imputation of haste and the confusion of a period which included a federal election and two changes in government to discredit the commission's findings.5 There is little evidence, however, that these factors materially detracted from the investigation. Such critics overlooked the intensity with which the commissioners applied themselves and the fact that they were dealing primarily with levels of government undisturbed by the election. Moreover, civil servants in both the federal and provincial governments had already prepared a variety of studies of Maritime problems before Duncan's arrival. A lengthy memorandum by the Dominion statistician, R. H. Coats, the culmination of several years of meeting requests for data on the Maritimes, later became the basis of a separate publication, The Maritime Provinces Since Confederation.6 The Nova Scotian memorandum, begun in March, embodied the research of such specialists as Robert Innis on immigration and colonization, F. C. Cornell on freight rates, H. P. Duchemin on coal and steel, Melville Cummings on agriculture, A. S. Barnstead on provincial finance, and H. F. Munro on historical background.7 Although frequently unreliable, obviously biased, and varying in quality of presentation, Nova Scotia's submission was a coherent summary of most Maritime grie-

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vances, claims, and rationalizations.8 Such material, supplemented by the testimony of more than a hundred witnesses at the public hearings, was checked against data supplied by federal departments, independent auditors, "representative men" in Ottawa, Montreal, and Winnipeg, and special confidential memoranda commissioned by the chairman.

The concern to alleviate Maritime difficulties without arousing opposition elsewhere was apparent in the commissioners' recommendations and supporting arguments. The language of the report was much more impressive for its tact and diplomacy than for precision and consistency. In their introduction, for example, the commissioners sought to deflate Maritime recrimination by assigning the blame for the region's difficulties to broad economic trends "unrelated to Confederation." Yet the role of national policies had also to be conceded as the basis for future reform. They apologized for the federal government's failure to have done "all for the Maritime Provinces which it should have done," since the "colossal" task of developing such a huge country made inequities in the application of national policy inevitable. A "period of stocktaking" was required to redress the balance; hence the appointment of the commission.9 A similar discretion was apparent in the commissioners' attempt to justify subsidy increments for the Maritimes without offending Central Canada or the Prairies. Of all the rationalizations for receiving more money which the Maritime governments threw at the commission—alleged inequalities in subsidies and debt allowances dating from Confederation, claims for compensation in lieu of school lands and territorial expansion, and analogies with the American and Australian experience— Duncan was most impressed by the argument of fiscal need. Nova Scotia's counsel, E. C. Phinney, explained that as provincial responsibilities grew, smaller provinces encountered particularly great difficulty in securing the revenue to pay for them. The Maritimes were now unable to maintain essential services.10 Duncan suggested two other criteria in applying the doctrine of fiscal need. The provinces must demonstrate that they had not been extravagant and that their people were bearing a fair share of taxation. With R. H. Coats's help he applied these tests to the Maritimes and found their costs of government were "surprisingly low," while their rate of taxation was 160

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more than 16 per cent above the national average based upon gross value of production.11 Sensible as Duncan's formula might be for demonstrating fiscal need, he could not rely too heavily upon it in recommending higher subsidies for the Maritimes. The general principle of fiscal need had been carefully eschewed in previous rounds of subsidy adjustment and was likely to arouse opposition from Ontario and Quebec.12 Leaving the responsibility of revising the basis for subsidy adjustment to the federal government, the Duncan Commission urged it to give immediate attention to the question as it affected the Maritimes. In the meantime the commission recommended immediate increments of $875,000, $600,000, and $125,000 respectively for the three provinces.13 In defending the grants, Duncan followed the traditional course of citing specific inequities which justified the payment of financial compensation to the Maritimes, while maintaining the fiction that the general principle of per capita subsidies was still intact. But in invoking the traditional claims Duncan had to be careful to avoid confrontation with the Prairies. As R. V. MacDonald pointed out in a confidential memorandum to the commission, the Maritimers were quite prepared to concede Prairie claims to crown lands and subsidies, provided they themselves received compensation; but, logically, it was not that simple. The two claims were incompatible. If the Dominion had really owned the public lands of the old North West, as the Maritimers alleged, the Prairie claim was invalid; if the lands had belonged instead to the local inhabitants, as Chester Martin and the Prairie premiers argued, the Maritimes had no case. To avoid offending the Prairies, Duncan had to discuss Maritime land claims in deliberately vague terms, suggesting, for example, that there was no real need "to reach any final conclusion" on the question of proprietary right. Invoking the Maritime interest in the public domain alienated to Quebec and Ontario, the anomaly of giving the Prairie provinces full debt allowances, and the failure to compensate Prince Edward Island sufficiently for its original lack of crown land, Duncan concluded that the Maritimes had a "genuine claim" to subsidy readjustment. He further suggested their "territorial limitations" entitled them to additional grants in any future adjustments.14 Translated from the hollow rationalization of subsidy negotiation, Duncan's proposals implied a recognition that the Maritimes had been one round of subsidy increments behind, that the special grants would bring them up to a level roughly equal to the other provinces, and that 161

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they would still require a further excuse to share in the next round of adjustments if the basic criteria remained unaltered.

The commission's recommendations on transportation were another exercise in the fine art of the possible. There seemed to be no doubt about the problem. Maritime spokesmen for fishing, manufacturing, agricultural, and lumbering industries cited higher freight rates as a critical factor in their difficulties. F. C. Cornell, who presented the technical aspects of the case, documented the disproportionate increases in the Maritimes in relation to the rest of Canada—increases which began in 1912 and culminated with the integration of the Intercolonial into the Canadian National Railways. The imposition upon the Intercolonial of commercial principles devised largely to meet the needs of railway development in Western Canada forced that road, the Maritimers charged, into a role for which it was never intended. Political rather than economic motives were responsible for its original construction, namely the achievement of Confederation and the development of interprovincial trade; strategic and political rather than economic considerations had dictated its circuitous route; and political considerations had remained an important factor in ratemaking before integration. The sudden switch to commercial principles was unfair, a disaster for Maritime industry, and a violation of the spirit of the Confederation agreement.15 Any alleviation of the problem was greatly complicated by the general inflexibility of the national rate structure. If rates were rolled back in the Maritimes, the equalization principle of the Railway Act would necessitate reductions throughout the whole country. But this, Canadian National Railways officials protested, would "seriously endanger the operating efficiency of the National Railway system." Concessions to the Maritimes "would raise a clamor which would be difficult to arrest for similar assistance elsewhere" and "might well seriously affect and perhaps disrupt, not only the freight structure of Canada but the freight rate structure of the North American Continent."16 To avoid these and other catastrophes envisioned by the railway, the Maritimers tried to devise a case for lower rates which would give the least possible basis for claims elsewhere. Thus F. C. Cornell sought to base the Maritime claim to reductions largely on two long-established principles of the North American freight rate structure—the arbitrary and the differential. Arbitrary 162

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rates, which bore little relation to mileage, were used to minimize and render stable the relative transportation advantage between competing industries. They were in effect, for example, on the roads joining principal milling towns in the Ontario peninsula to the main lines between Fort William and Montreal. Although distances from the trunk lines might vary from 153 (Peterborough) to 492 miles (Port Colborne), all were given a common rate on grain and flour, for "charges for haul out of the direct line," which remained fixed even through the period of the wartime increases. According to Cornell, the rates between the Maritimes and Montreal had also been arbitrary ones based upon competition and had permitted goods to reach Montreal at roughly the same rate as goods from Toronto. As such, they should never have been changed. Cornell proposed that the arbitraries be "restored" and the Saint John-Montreal rate equalized with that of Toronto-Montreal.17 He also called for the restoration of the differential, a difference in eastbound over westbound rates which had existed in the Maritimes before 1912 and was still maintained on traffic originating from the United States. By lowering the rates one way only, any losses to the railway would be halved while Maritime industry would avoid exposure to fresh competition from Central Canada.18 By basing their case essentially on a return to practices which they claimed should never have been discontinued, the Maritimers were presenting the commissioners with a rationalization for rate changes, should they care to use it, which might be restricted to the Maritimes alone. Besides minimizing the effect of Maritime reductions on the national rate structure, Cornell set out to persuade Duncan that such a settlement would be accepted by the rest of the country. Here his trump card was a letter from the Toronto Board of Trade to the Board of Railway Commissioners earlier that spring endorsing the Maritime case for a differential.19 Unable to shake any substantial portion of Cornell's testimony in rebuttal, the railway officials took a new tack. Agreeing that the Maritime and national interests might require lower rates in that region, Sir Henry Thornton proposed a federal subsidy. The subsidy, he stated, "has the same effect as reducing freight rates, but wraps it up in a pleasanter package from some points of view, and might guide us over the difficulties I have just outlined with respect to general freight rate reduction."20 Certainly from the railway viewpoint, federal subsidies were a "pleasanter package." Thornton's proposal would mean additional revenue for the railways without directly jeopardizing rates elsewhere in the 163

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country. By incorporating the railway's subsidy proposal into their recommendations, the commissioners obviously hoped to turn a formidable opponent into an active supporter of reform and thus help bring reduced rates for the Maritimes into the realm of "practicable remedies." In the report the commissioners agreed that the change in the operating principles of the Intercolonial to those of a commercial road was unjustified. The statement of the original surveyor, Sir Sandford Fleming, that the road was 250 miles longer than necessary because of "imperial, national and strategic" considerations, they regarded as concrete evidence of its nature and intent. Calculating the disproportion in increases between the Maritimes and the rest of Canada at about 20 per cent of the rates then in force, they recommended general reductions of that amount on all rates within the Maritimes. They also included the differential which the Maritimes had requested: a 20 per cent reduction applied on the Maritime to Levis portion of long-haul rates westward but not on similar distances eastward. Since the reductions were to be based upon national rather than commercial considerations, their cost would be borne not by the railways but by the national treasury. And since they were to be statutory, they could not be used as a basis for claims by other regions before the Board of Railway Commissioners.21 While envisioning the reductions as the immediate answer to the Maritime grievance, Duncan believed the railway should also play an important role in Maritime recovery by adopting a more positive approach to regional development. While he held no brief for those who simply ignored the needs of revenue in calling for reduced freight rates, Duncan recognized the excessive rigidity in the precedents established by the Board of Railway Commissioners which forebade the setting of rates to overcome geographic disadvantage or encourage industrial development—a sharp divergence in railway policy from that of the United States. After perusal of a confidential memorandum on the subject and discussions with the commissioners, Duncan recommended discretionary powers for the Board of Railway Commissioners in setting special rates to encourage the growth and protection of outlying industry. These rates, he believed, could be used for promoting both regional development and greater traffic for the road.22

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Unlike subsidies and transportation, the question of channelling trade through Maritime ports failed to yield a "practicable" solution at all close to meeting the Maritime demands. Instead, virtually all of this section of the report was devoted to persuading Maritimers to drop their crusade for a fundamental diversion of the grain trade and to content themselves with developing facilities for a more diversified traffic in the future. Here the effect of Duncan's discussions with the Prairie elevator and Montreal port interests was apparent. The Prairie shippers' viewpoint came through clearly in the commissioners' statement that the merchanting of the grain crops of the West in the markets of the world has been built up on a delicate mechanism which cannot be suddenly or violently disturbed without creating chaos, and even disaster. The routing has been determined not by reference to railway haul entirely but by the need for concentrating the grain at a key position [Buffalo?] which commands a range of ports where—because of the quantity and variety of ocean tonnage available—the shipper can be sure of finding cargo space within the shortest possible time for the quantity and destination of his shipment, at any given moment. Montreal's concern was voiced in the commission's deprecation of the slogan "Canadian trade for Canadian ports," since at some Canadian ports "considerable tonnage is being handled which is not Canadian either in origin or in destination." Whatever the merits of the Maritime case, no measure would be "practicable" which aroused the hostility of both Prairie and Montreal commercial interests.23 Instead, Duncan argued for the creation of federal harbour commissions at Halifax and Saint John to develop and organize port facilities. Such improvements were necessary, for even were it possible to channel trade through the two city ports, they lacked facilities to handle it. Develop the harbours first, Duncan counselled; then, with a group of "business and experienced persons" in charge, new markets could be secured abroad, production stimulated at home and a larger and more diversified trade gradually developed.24

Devising "practicable" solutions to Maritime problems on the general question of trade and tariffs would have defied Solomon himself. Not only was it a contentious issue among regions and political parties in

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Canada but Maritimers, as always, were themselves divided upon the issue. Nova Scotia called for restoration of the diminished protection on coal and steel, a position defended in detail by spokesmen for these industries.25 New Brunswick endorsed its lumbermen's policy in seeking reciprocity with the United States, a need echoed by fishing interests from Yarmouth.26 F. B. McCurdy and the League for the Economic Independence of Nova Scotia, which had begun to organize at Kentville a few months before, cited the tariff as the fundamental cause of Maritime woes and argued for a revised federalism in which the region would control its own tariff and fishery policy.27 Duncan was careful to avoid coming down on the side of either protection or reciprocity. The report sympathetically reviewed the claims of the coal and steel industries for greater protection but, recognizing that any decision would have repercussions far beyond the Maritimes, referred the matter to the Tariff Advisory Board. Similarly, after considering the requests of lumber and fishing interests for greater federal efforts to secure reciprocity, it referred the question to the federal government.28 Nevertheless Duncan strongly opposed the suggestion for a regional control of trade and fisheries. In presenting the League for the Economic Independence of Nova Scotia's brief, President C. L. Baker tried to establish Maritime problems in the anti-Confederation and secessionist traditions of the 186os and i88os. Regional difficulties were the inevitable result of Confederation which, as Joseph Howe had warned in 1867 "with prophetic wisdom," put the control of Nova Scotia's trade policy "in the hands of those who live above the tide, and who will know little of and care less for our interests or our experiences." The resulting high tariffs stifled trade and worked to the disadvantage of basic Maritime industries. This situation could not be corrected by lower freight rates, Baker argued, since the real markets for Maritime products lay outside the country. Furthermore, Maritimers had to be on guard against attempts to bribe them with palliatives which would make them more subservient to the "dictation of those who live above the tide." For this reason he would "repudiate and abhor any plans and policies which have as their object the perpetuation or the expansion of any system of bonuses, subsidies, subventions, doles from the national treasury of Canada as an exchange and compensation for a truly great birthright—the right to develop the unsurpassed resources of this loved province in the interests of her sons and daughters." Without a revised federalism to restore to the Maritimes the control of their trade and fisheries policy, secession became their "sole alternative."29 166

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Duncan was less than sympathetic to a scheme which could only arouse hostility elsewhere in the country and which challenged the work of the commission in seeking more limited correctives. His aggressive questioning quickly revealed weaknesses in the proposal. Baker conceded that a regional tariff could work only with the support of the three Maritime governments and the agreement of the other regions of the country. Why the latter would consent to such a scheme was less than clear. He also admitted that he knew of no country where a regional tariff had been attempted and was extremely vague as to how the scheme might work in Canada.30 F. B. McCurdy, who had previously outlined a similar proposal in his pamphlets, proved worthier of Duncan's steel. He put the onus on the commission for assessing the impact of the tariff upon the Maritimes, pointing out that the necessary data were simply not available to the private individual. He went on, however, to give some rough estimates, claiming that there was $10 million more protection on goods imported from other parts of Canada than on those produced in the Maritimes. By adding this figure to the amount actually paid in custom duties, McCurdy estimated the total cost of the tariff for the region at about $25 million per annum. This cost, he argued, undermined basic Maritime industries by making them noncompetitive in international markets. McCurdy accepted Duncan's thesis that metropolitan consolidation based upon technological change, industrialization, mass production, and improved communication had taken a severe toll of Maritime commerce but he argued that its effect would not necessarily have been negative had it not been for Central Canada's manipulation of trade policy. In the case of shipbuilding, for example, the decline of the wooden industry would normally have given rise to the development of one based on iron and steam, but the tariff had so inflated the cost of labour and materials that the Maritimes could not compete internationally. The "national policy," dictated by the needs of Central Canada, was a "non-Maritime" policy which located industry in the centre of the country. McCurdy conceded that the federal government was in a better position than the provinces to devise policies for the development of basic Maritime industries. But, he suggested, one would be "an optimist to say the least" to expect any government to run counter to the interests of Central Canada in adopting trade policies which would help the Maritimes. To Duncan's suggestion that he was too pessimistic, McCurdy replied: "We have had a long experience."31 McCurdy was on shakier ground in his argument that external 167

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markets, opened somehow or other by local control of the tariff, provided the best solution to the problems of Maritime industry. If this were so, the industrialists themselves did not appear aware of it, for, as Duncan pointed out, the majority of farmers, manufacturers, coal producers, and even fish merchants and shippers focused their demands on lower freight rates and greater access to the Canadian market. McCurdy retorted that the commission was not "getting what is in the minds of the people," that Nova Scotians were reluctant to appear before a "court" and that several well-known Nova Scotians had "expressed the view that the Commissioners, instead of sitting and receiving evidence tendered before them, should be going out and seeking information."32 The thrust struck home and Duncan was diverted into an elaboration and defence of the activities of the commission. The interview ended with the debating honours about even. But the fact remained that McCurdy had been unable to show that his scheme had the support of any of the "basic industries" it was supposed to help. In their report the commissioners rejected the Baker-McCurdy thesis out of hand. The old anti-Confederate secessionist mythology that Maritime problems were the result of Confederation was obviously too simplistic; it neglected the role of the abrogation of reciprocity, the end of the American Civil War, and the effect of broad economic trends on Maritime industries. The solution proposed, regional or provincial fiscal autonomy, was not practicable "within the spirit or the structure of Confederation." Even if it could be implemented, "separate provincial negotiations" afforded less chance of achieving tariff concessions from other countries than those conducted by the federal government.33 Duncan's failure to identify the tariff as the key to Maritime difficulties later formed part of a Liberal myth in Nova Scotia that he had been forbidden to do so by Arthur Meighen during the latter's brief period in office. Whether such a tale had any basis beyond providing a rationale for the Liberal attempt to revive the Maritime Rights cry in the 19305 is doubtful.34 What is clear, however, is that such instructions, if given, had no effect on Duncan's recommendations. The bulk of the Maritime evidence, from both governments and private individuals, favoured national integration as the outlet for Maritime products. Moreover, by tinkering with the tariff, Duncan would have completely abandoned the policy set out by King and followed elsewhere in the report of seeking "practicable" solutions. 168

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To have entered the tariff controversies directly would have accomplished little and possibly prejudiced the report as a whole.

In addition to the four general subjects of major concern—subsidies, freight rates, ports, and trade policy—the report contained numerous recommendations in aid of particular sections or industries. Having waited several hours for his automobile to be loaded and unloaded from the ferry on a lengthy trip to Charlottetown, and having seen for himself the dilapidated condition of railroads and carriages on the island, Duncan was sympathetic to the residents' complaints about transportation. He made no effort to mask his feelings in leading Prince Edward Island witnesses to describe for the record the poor quality of service and he vigorously cross-examined railway officials who attempted to defend existing policy. For example, a comment from W. U. Appleton, general manager of the CNR's Atlantic region, that railway facilities in Prince Edward Island were "perhaps satisfactory considering the volume of traffic that is there," drew the following sharp queries: Q. Are you keeping in mind that the Island is a Province? A. No, I cannot say that I am. Q. And that they have the dignity of a province. A. That might mean considerable. Q. Are you keeping in mind that there have been obligations entered into as a province, in respect of the Province? Or are you regarding the Island, may I quite frankly say, as a little side-line? A. No sir. Q. Then in the light of the whole situation I repeat the question; Do you consider that railway conditions are satisfactory?35 Duncan clearly did not. Besides obtaining promises from the railway to complete the widening of the road and to improve service, particularly for perishable commodities, the commissioners recommended a special parliamentary grant to speed the renovation of the island roads and the addition of a second car ferry.36 For the coal and steel industry, Duncan reiterated his earlier suggestion for the construction of federally subsidized coking plants and urged that steel products from locally mined coal be given the same fifty cents a ton subsidy as had been indirectly accorded the steel 169

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produced from foreign coals through the institution of a 99 per cent rebate of the coal tariff. He also urged a restoration of coal subventions to increase the penetration of coal beyond St. Lawrence ports. Other recommendations included cooperation between the two levels of government for the more active advertisement abroad of the attractions and advantages of the Maritime provinces, more active trade commissioners, the appointment of a deputy minister concerned only with fisheries, increased educational work in the fisheries along the lines already developed in agriculture, and improvements in potato-handling facilities at Dominion-owned ports on Prince Edward Island.37 The commission also made it clear that the investigation of Maritime problems should be a continuing process. It referred the question of coal and steel tariffs and bounties to the tariff advisory board with a reminder of the urgency of the problem. The issues of allowing CPR traffic on the Intercolonial, and establishing lower long-distance rates on natural products and export and import rates through Maritime ports were left for the Board of Railway Commissioners. Having failed to acquire sufficient data on the question of the Saint John and Quebec Railway, the commissioners recommended examination by a special ad hoc tribunal.38

Despite his caution in seeking "practicable" remedies, Duncan, who had a keen appreciation of Maritime difficulties, recommended the most fundamental remedies he believed political realities would allow. In his consideration of the subsidies and railway policy he correctly identified basic weaknesses in federal institutions: a chaotic subsidy system which starved the smaller provinces of revenues required to encourage economic development and to meet social needs, and the rigidity in railway policy which contributed to Maritime difficulties and destroyed the Intercolonial's effectiveness as an instrument for regional development. Duncan's program was much more than a device to subdue Maritime agitation; it was a real attempt to attack the basic problems of the region. From Prime Minister King's perspective the question was strictly political. What was required was a scheme to deflate Maritime demands and to assure the rest of the country that Maritime problems were receiving attention. For King, as events would show, the illusion was more important than the substance. Nevertheless, for a brief 170

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period the Maritime needs and King's political aspirations appeared to coincide. King was delighted with the "rough outline" of the report the commissioners submitted on September 23. The report was, he declared, "a real state paper" and Duncan a man with "a well informed brilliant mind and charming manner." King was already calculating the political chickens he expected the implementation of the report would hatch in the Maritimes. "All I need to do is to stand firm on this report, and count on getting back Maritime support to keep us strong in future years where we may lose a little in Quebec and elsewhere." King had previously been working on a plan for the party's rehabilitation in the Maritimes. The day before his interview with Duncan, he approached J. L. Ralston "to undertake the leadership of the Liberal Party in that province [Nova Scotia] and form a new rallying centre."39 Ralston was an excellent choice as cabinet minister and local leader. He was active among a group of young Liberals, including Angus L. Macdonald, J. L. Ilsley and L. D. Currie, who were trying to divest the party of its image as the partner of Besco and other "big interests" of the province.40 He was also highly respected by the Conservatives for his war record, his ability as a lawyer, and his brilliance as a public speaker. W. H. Dennis's Leader, in damning the partisanship and regional neglect shown by other Liberals, was always careful to exempt Ralston. Early in 1926 the three Conservative premiers in the Maritimes selected Ralston to defend their case in the General Rates Investigation. This he did in an eloquent and meticulously prepared presentation before the board at a public hearing at Moncton.41 In Ralston, King was getting a man of outstanding ability who already enjoyed the confidence of Maritimers as a defender of their rights. For his New Brunswick representative, King chose P. J. Veniot, Acadian leader and longtime Maritime Rights advocate. The admission to the cabinet of this plain-spoken politician, whom King had so frequently damned in his diary, was a further indication that King was prepared to make substantial concessions to win back the Maritimes.42 The commissioners' acceptance of many Maritime demands, the prime minister's statement to Duncan that the government would implement their recommendations—a promise reported to the Maritime Boards of Trade by the commission's secretary, F. M. Sclanders—43 and the appointment of strong regional advocates to the cabinet, reassured Maritimers that their grievances would finally receive attention. Most of them seemed delighted with the report. The Halifax Herald hailed it as a "Maritime Magna Carta," a phrase 171

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which became hackneyed through repetition in the reports of favourable opinion from around the province. The Saint John Board of Trade formally decided to rest their agitation until the government had had an opportunity to implement the recommendations.44 The only local opposition came from the exponents of regional tariff autonomy who insisted that the investigation was a means of diverting attention from the real problems of the region. As Baker's Kentville Advertiser scathingly put it, Nova Scotia lies under observation in the pathological ward of the National Hospital. Anaesthetic has been administered in the form of the Report of the Royal Commission. She is soon to be stretched on the table for a series of operations at the hands of the National Doctors. It's only her nose that's out of joint the M.D.'s say in Alberta. In Ontario and Quebec they diagnose it nerves, mere psychological autointoxication. But there are doctors in plenty to insist on the knife. Certain things presumably are keeping her underweight, like tonsils, adenoids and appendicitis. These must be ripped from her person and the holes chinked with monkey-glands. Poor Nova Scotia! When all she wants is a change of air! And it's dollars to doughnuts that what she won't get is the air she needs. The air of freedom to conduct her own trade affairs.45 Meanwhile the outlines of the report (the full text was not released until December) aroused vigorous comment elsewhere in the country. Only two major newspapers were actively critical. The Montreal Gazette, on learning the scope of the commissioners' recommendations, immediately reverted to an earlier view that Maritimers should not look to outsiders for help but should by "diligence and selfreliance solve their problems with the aid of their own considerable resources." This was the prelude to a series of attacks on the report itself, including a warning to Parliament "to approach the Duncan programme with extreme caution if some very deep and dangerous waters are to be avoided."46 So conspicuous was this hostility that the Montreal Board of Trade wrote to the Maritime boards dissociating itself from the Gazette's comments.47 The Winnipeg Free Press was also less than satisfied with a report that failed to show the real basis of Maritime problems in the tariff. In not too subtle fashion it warned that concessions to the Maritimes would result in new demands from the Prairies.48 On the whole, press reaction, though cautious, was favourable. The 172

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Montreal Herald sharply chided its rival for giving a "false impression" of Montreal attitudes.49 The Financial Post criticized those who condemned the report without even having studied it and predicted that the "dismay" from Central and Western Canada at its sweeping recommendations would "vary adversely with the amount of accurate knowledge of Maritime handicaps."50 Other favourable comments came from Quebec's LeSoleil, Montreal's LaPresse, the Toronto Globe, the Winnipeg Tribune, the Calgary Herald, and the Vancouver Province?1 Each suggested the report be implemented, at least to the extent that it would be practicable to do so. All based their advocacy on one or more of three themes: the Maritimes were entitled to concessions on the basis of equity; the severity of their economic plight could no longer be ignored; and the persistence of a large pocket of discontent within the country was contrary to the national interest. Soothed by such public comment, Maritimers were ill-prepared for the sudden backlash against the report which emanated from Ottawa early in 1927. The Halifax Herald was the first to raise the alarm, citing the story of a businessman just returned from Montreal that unspecified "big interests" were raising a large fund to fight the report.52 On this issue the Herald was a poor witness. Dennis, who denounced all local criticism of the report as part of some great secessionist conspiracy to discredit it, had cried "wolf too often. A critical analysis of the report by W. Russell Maxwell, a young economics professor at King's College, evoked the demand from the Herald that the university publicly repudiate his "secessionist" views. The Chronicle complained, with validity, that the Herald's approach made rational discussion difficult. 53 Dennis's alarmist tale of new opposition, intermingled with a reiteration of his theme of local conspiracy, was neither coherent nor convincing. Nevertheless a very real threat to the implementation of the report emerged within the federal cabinet. J. A. Robb, minister of finance and MP for Valleyfield, Quebec, led the attack with a memorandum which was less a cost estimate than an exaggerated brief against implementation. For example, in arriving at the cost of the additional subsidies, Robb divided the recommended increases by the amount the three provinces were already receiving to show an increase of 85 per cent. Applying this percentage to all subsidies in effect in the rest of the country, he suggested the annual outlay in implementing this one section of the report would be $ 10,661,701.76. He also estimated that it would cost $10 million to upgrade Prince Edward Island railways; $11 million for coking plants; and from $13 to $45 millions 173

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for each of the new harbour commissions at Halifax and Saint John, based upon amounts already spent on the national ports of Vancouver, Quebec, and Montreal. The railway subsidy was comparatively modest, a mere $2,680,000 per year, although Robb noted that this would rise with the volume of traffic.54 As a device for placing Maritime supporters within the cabinet on the defensive, Robb's memorandum was undoubtedly effective; when "leaked" to the newspapers and presented to a public unlikely to have read the report for themselves, it was devastating. Late in January the press reported serious dissension in the cabinet over the cost of the Duncan recommendations and suggested that the key recommendation on freight rates would have to be discarded, at least for the present. This was followed by a more detailed analysis of "costs" in the Financial Post. According to the Post, the phenomenal expense of the report as calculated by a subcommittee of the cabinet had changed "a fairly unanimous opinion that it ought to be accepted" into a "challenging attitude." The choice lay directly "between accepting the Duncan recommendations and being able to reduce taxation."55 Not satisfied with Robb's inflated figures to drive home its point, the Post concocted a few more of its own. The most remarkable computation began with the Kent Northern Railway. That privately owned line, twenty-seven miles in length, had previously rejected a $60,000 offer from the government railways to buy it out. Because of complaints of local inhabitants about service, Duncan suggested in passing that the CNR reopen negotiations. From this brief note in the report, the Post picked up the figure of $60,000 which it multiplied by the length of the railway to produce a "cost" of $1,620,000. Obviously pleased with this calculation, it then multiplied the $60,000 by the length of the Saint John and Quebec railway, yielding an additional figure of $6 million. Finally, it threw in the road's past deficits of $1,500,000 and reminded the reader of possible future deficits of $250,000 a year. The/Ws figures were repeated by other newspapers, even those which seemed favourable to implementing the report, leaving the inescapable impression that the public would be paying extraordinarily large sums for Maritime relief.56 The sudden and very damaging attack upon "their" report abruptly shattered the Maritime leaders' complacency. F. M. Sclanders, now secretary of a reorganized Maritime Board of Trade, sent a bulletin to all thirty-six participating boards requesting them to revive their agitation immediately, and to urge Maritimers to write to their local M\Ps, cabinet ministers, and the prime minister, calling for the 174

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rapid adoption of the freight rate and other recommendations of the report. Meanwhile Sclanders himself set off for Ottawa to try to find out what was going on.57 After several days of interviews, he reported that the sources of opposition appeared to be J. A. Robb, a "somewhat vain" individual who was anxious to make a reputation for himself by reducing taxes, and the railways, which were apparently still concerned that rate reductions in the Maritimes might lead to more costly reductions elsewhere. J. L. Ralston and P. J. Veniot, he noted, gave no indication of wavering in their determination to fight for the report nor any sign of the change in attitude which so often characterized regional representatives once they entered the government. Ralston and Veniot were, of course, anxious to discover what underlay the sudden revival of agitation in the Maritimes. Ralston in particular, he reported, had been "distinctly hot"—taking umbrage at their seeming lack of confidence and blaming the board for "stirring things up on a basis so unsubstantial." Sclanders had replied that the board's action represented "merely a subdued reflection of the actual feeling of the people of the Maritimes which was tensed to a degree discounted by no prudent individual." Ralston, Sclanders suggested, would require "diplomatic handling."58 While Sclanders was in Ottawa, various boards of trade took the initiative in calling for more concrete action. An emergency meeting of the Sydney board affirmed the railway recommendations as the very essence of the report and endorsed the sending of a "strong emergency delegation to Ottawa" to press this view upon the government. Sclanders returned to find the Halifax board already at work organizing a mass delegation. He persuaded its executive, however, to await Ralston's direction in the matter; they resolved instead to take whatever action Ralston believed would "assist him in his efforts to secure the adoption of the Duncan recommendations in their entirety."59 The two ministers continued to meet strong opposition in their battle for the report's implementation. A month after Sclanders's visit, the cabinet had still not agreed on any of the principal recommendations and Mackenzie King showed signs of wavering in his support. "The work," he told his diary, "has been very much one sided. The arguments against the Maritimes contentions have never been properly put. Duncan has just delivered the Government over to them." Ominous noises were also forthcoming from Liberal back-benchers within the house. A Quebec MP, S. W. Jacobs (Cartier), though 175

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conceding he had not read the report, criticized the Conservatives for having failed to appoint a federal counsel to defend the government's interests before the commission.60 With pressure mounting for some statement of government policy, King noted a breakthrough of sorts by the Maritimers. We are coming around, to a point of view never before entertained—except at the outset when I took the view the Duncan Commission's report should be accepted in its entirety—of voting both the 20 per cent reduction in freight rates, and the grants in nature of interim lump payments, tho confining the later [sic] to what may be determined by a conference. The suggestion now is to agree to pay these amounts if the [Dominion—Provincial] Conference approves & our accounting so authorizes. In this way to keep faith with carrying out all recommendat'ns.61 The compromise finally accepted by Ralston and Veniot was far short of "carrying out all recommendat'ns." The cabinet, in fact, changed Duncan's program for Maritime rehabilitation into a plan for Maritime pacification—a pacification to be achieved with the fewest possible concessions. They ignored Duncan's suggestions on fiscal need and rigidity in transportation but conceded enough of the more prominent recommendations to permit the claim that they were implementing the report. They granted the 20 per cent freight rate reduction but pared it down to exclude traffic on international lines or that entering through Maritime ports. They also conceded the subsidy increases—Ralston and Veniot flatly refused to accept any delay on that issue—but presented them only as temporary grants conditional upon Maritime good behavior. Their uncertain status, King noted, would protect the government against additional claims at the conference and provide "insurance against further demands from steel and coal industries which are in a bad way."62 King's statement to Parliament, nevertheless, appeared to be a very positive response to the Duncan report. The government, he announced, would provide the 20 per cent reduction in freight rates, subsidy increments, harbour commissions, and aid for new coking plants. Other recommendations were not rejected but merely delayed for further consideration. The investigation of the Saint John and Quebec Railway, for example, would have to await a government assessment of the impact of freight rate increases. The fifty-cent subsidy on steel produced from Canadian coal would not be granted 176

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immediately, "owing to the existing uncertainty of conditions surrounding the iron and steel industry in the Maritimes." A survey would be undertaken of Prince Edward Island's railway and ferry needs, the question of coal and steel tariffs was already before the Tariff Advisory Board, and the appointment of a minister to Washington, King suggested, was a move in the direction of reciprocity. Altogether, King stated, the government's program constituted the implementation of the commission's recommendations "virtually in their entirety."63 King's statement was accepted at face value by the newspapers both in the Maritimes and elsewhere across the country. Their reports left a distinct impression that the Duncan report had been accepted by the government and would be implemented. Hard upon King's statement of policy, the appropriate ministers rolled out the legislation to implement it. Separate individual acts created three-men harbour commissions at Halifax and Saint John with powers to expropriate property, fix rates, borrow money, and coordinate policy generally within the ports; a Domestic Fuel Act subsidized the construction of any new "by-product coking plants" which committed themselves to use at least 70 per cent Canadian coal in the operation; a Maritime Freight Rates Act cancelled as of July i all tariffs on "preferred movements" of traffic within the "select territory" and replaced them with rates "approximately twenty per cent" lower; and the Supplementary Appropriations Act included increased subsidies.64 All slipped smoothly through a Parliament anxious to adjourn before Easter. Ralston described the legislation as a necessary concession for Maritime prosperity, a concession not unlike those afforded from time to time to every other region in the country, and asked that it be accepted in that spirit. We in the maritime provinces have had no quarrel with the rest of Canada in anything that this Dominion has done to benefit other sections of the country.... When the province of Quebec added to her domain what was virtually an empire, when her railways were subsidized, her canals deepened, and Montreal made an ocean port; when Ontario had her area trebled and her canals built; when Manitoba was doubled in area and means were afforded whereby the products of that province could be marketed at a cost 25 per cent lower than could the products of the country immediately to the south; when Alberta and Saskatchewan, in view of special circumstances, received substantial annual subsidies to facilitate their entry into the Dominion in at least com177

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parative affluence; when, in the interests of British Columbia the construction of three transcontinental railways was authorized and that province had extended to her certain special treatment in relation to railways; when all these benefits were received by the other provinces of Canada the people of the maritimes gladly acknowledged the right of their fellow citizens to generous treatment. It is in the same spirit of justice that the maritime provinces appeal to the House today to recognize the claims now made and to support the legislation now being brought down implementing the recommendations of the Duncan commission. Conservative house leader Hugh Guthrie agreed with Ralston's sentiments and offered to facilitate the passage of the legislation.65 The only opposition came from the depleted ranks of the Progressive-Labour contingent, who apparently seized this opportunity to reassert themselves as the guardians of western interest against Maritime "favouritism" from supposedly eastern-dominated parties. John Evans (Rosetown) began the attack on the Duncan Commission at the opening of the session, taunting the Maritimes that by accepting its recommendations they would be "reduced to the status of paupers in the Dominion and become wards of this nation." Robert Gardiner (Acadia) zeroed in on the freight rate reductions, which he saw as quite different from the restoration of the Crow's Nest Pass rates—the latter a "paying proposition," the former a government "handout." He further deprecated the government's failure to attack "the basic problems" of the Maritimes, namely the centralization of banking and the tariff. A. A. Heaps (North Winnipeg), claiming that the West was as hard hit by the recession as the Maritimes, denounced the rate reductions as special privilege which would not help "the masses of the people." G. G. Coote (McLeod) was prepared to accept reductions on long distance rates but objected to the "preferential treatment" embodied in reduced local rates. The opposition was strong enough to remind Maritimers that their position was still none too secure; the legislation had yet to be implemented by a government, some of whose members, including Charles Dunning who had introduced the freight rate legislation, were vulnerable to Progressive propaganda in their own constituencies.66 Though it had stopped well short of implementing the entire report, Maritimers found it hard to attack the government program. The latter did contain substantial concessions with respect to freight 178

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rates, subsidies, and port development—their most widely shared grievances—and thus tended to undermine the foundations of the regional agitation. The neglected recommendations were on the whole of a more local nature. R. B. Hanson (York-Sunbury) pointed out that the exclusion of international rates from the twenty per cent reductions gave no relief to New Brunswick lumbermen who marketed their products in the United States. Similarly Thomas Cantley (Pictou) complained that nothing was heard from the Tariff Advisory Board on steel and coal tariffs, nor had the government conceded even the specific recommendation of the report for a subsidy to restore the fifty cents advantage on Canadian coal used in steel making.67 Both Hanson and Cantley were concerned lest the public be persuaded that the report had been adopted without relieving the primary grievances of their constituencies. Both found themselves isolated; MPs from Halifax and Saint John argued that appreciation rather than recrimination was in order and dissociated themselves from their colleagues' criticism.68 The majority's action seemed, in part, to reflect a desire by leaders of the Maritime Rights movement, acting from a variety of motives, to wind down the agitation. Some no doubt felt the need to consolidate their still tentative gains before trying for more. Cantley complained to his Pictou constituents that Halifax and Saint John were "afraid to criticize" government legislation lest it jeopardize the implementation of their own concessions.69 The Liberal ministers, too, had become a conservative force. If they were to rebuild their party locally, they had to convince Maritimers that their goals had been achieved in the compromise secured. Thus they stressed the importance of what had been done and repeated or elaborated on the somewhat dubious rationalizations given by Mackenzie King for the failure to act on recommendations stilLunimplemented. At Sydney, Ralston explained how dangerous it would be, with litigation pending over the control of Besco, for the government to decide on the fifty-cent subsidy for Canadian coal used in the production of steel. A favourable pronouncement would encourage the litigation; an unfavourable one, the "possibility of exploiting the industry on a sacrificial basis." In New Brunswick Veniot explained that any application of the 20 per cent reduction in freight rates on the Canadian portion of international lines would be matched by similar increases on the American portion. Negotiations between Canadian and American railways on the question were, he claimed, already in progress.70 The fear of "secessionists" gaining control of further agitation may 179

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have been a factor in the enthusiasm with which some acclaimed the new legislation. The Dennis papers, almost hysterical in their denunciation of secessionist conspiracies, became staunch defenders of the government's position. They hailed King's program as "the triumph of Maritime Rights" and commended the government for going "as far as it reasonably can be expected to go for the present." They accepted the ministers' rationale for failing to aid the coal-steel industry and suggested it would "be time enough to criticise the Government on this score if the Government, at the proper time, fails to give effect to the recommendations of the Duncan Report respecting assistance for steel."71 Perhaps the most important factor in the ready acceptance of the government program by newspapers, boards of trade, and other regional or community organizations was the desire to attract outside investment during a period of buoyancy in the national economy. The traditional role of such agencies was to exude optimism in advertising the possibilities for progress and growth in their communities. Yet, for more than half a decade, the extraordinary difficulties of their region had involved them in a campaign which advertised the damage to their economy from unfavourable national policies and inevitably left an impression of poverty and stagnation. It was an image which they realized had to be changed if they were to attract new capital. The partial implementation of the Duncan report gave them an opportunity to transform their image from one of poverty to one of progress. The new legislation, they claimed, removed the fundamental disadvantages holding back the development of their region; their battle was won, prosperity was imminent, and all were invited to invest in it. "Maritime Provinces are Now Throbbing With New Hope" was the headline of an optimistic analysis of the economic impact of the new legislation by a "Maritime Correspondent" in the Financial Times. The Financial Post dwelt upon a similar theme in a special issue on the economic possibilities of the region.72 Locally the Saint John Board of Trade sponsored a large banquet to pay tribute to Ralston's and Veniot's efforts on behalf of the Maritimes. J. B. M. Baxter led off with an eulogistic toast. The two ministers reiterated that the essential features of the Duncan report had been implemented. Board of trade leaders joined in thanking everyone who had made their victory possible.73 Whatever its value in improving Maritime morale and the local climate for investment, such self-congratulatory rejoicing severely undercut the basis for further agitation. Logically Maritimers could 180

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not claim victory while maintaining that their rights were still unfulfilled. Unwittingly they had severely damaged the weapons by which their limited gains had been achieved. The Maritimers had forced attention to their plight by forging a united movement which applied strong political pressure locally while awakening popular sympathies in other parts of the country. Now, prematurely, they were releasing the pressure on politicians and apparently confirming the impression conveyed by the government nationally that whatever wrongs Maritimers may have suffered had been redressed. As Maritime leaders discovered how limited and deceptive the government program actually was, they would attempt to revive the Maritime Rights agitation. They would discover, however, that the program, aided in part by their own actions, had defused their movement. Its unity was impaired, its national support compromised, and the status of Maritime Rights as a political issue hopelessly clouded. The government's strategy of pacification had succeeded; Maritime Rights, once the expression of social aspirations of the large mass of Maritimers, was reduced to a narrow and sporadic agitation by a few board of trade leaders. During the next three years the federal government would maintain its vigilance to ensure that the embers of discontent would not again be permitted to flare up in a politically dangerous expression of regional protest.

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CHAPTER NINE

Raking the Embers

Having broken through the centre of the Maritime agitation with the Duncan Commission and subsequent concessions on freight rates, subsidies, and port development, the federal government followed with "mop up" operations designed to isolate and divert the remnants of popular discontent. In each case the pattern was the same. With expressions of acute concern, the government referred each matter to a group of "experts" for study or decision — to a royal commission, the courts, or some similar body. These in turn raised a complexity of issues difficult for the layman to follow and provided an excuse for further delay. By the time a decision was forthcoming, usually several years later, the intensity of popular concern with that grievance had largely dissipated.

Unable to sell a bumper catch of fish at a price which would provide them with "the necessities of life,"1 Maritime fishermen now constituted one of the most serious elements of discontent. An appeal in their behalf by parish priests in the summer of 1927 brought prompt government action — the appointment of another royal commission to investigate their problems.2 Meeting in every fishing district in the Maritime provinces over a period of five months from the fall of 1927 to the spring of 1928, the five-man commission afforded every fisherman an opportunity to explain his grievance. The hearings themselves were more important, probably, than the commission's recommendations. In part, they were cathartic; somebody listened and really did care. In part they were educational; 182

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through the press the fishermen read, albeit sceptically, the experts' explanations as to how better care in the preparation of fish might improve marketing. Such accounts also gave publicity to new "short courses" in the treatment of fish offered by Dalhousie and Saint Francis Xavier Univeristies.3 Most important, perhaps, was the effect of newspaper reports in encouraging group consciousness. In almost every village throughout the Maritimes the fishermen articulated the same basic grievances: the low price which they received for their product (one to two cents a pound, compared with retail prices of from 25 to 35 cents in Montreal), their need for safer harbour facilities, and above all the "unfair" competition provided by the beam trawlers operated by the large fish companies.4 As the hearings proceeded, one group after another took up the call for a common organization — a fisherman's union which would, like the farmers' cooperatives, assist in marketing, self-education, and government lobbying.5

While the royal commission diverted the fishermen, the Tariff Advisory Board involved another major source of dissatisfaction, the coal and steel communities, in a seemingly interminable investigation of claims for protection on coal and steel. At the beginning of the hearings in April 1926, Besco presented the first of a series of briefs (later supplemented by those of the National Trust Company, receiver for the Dominion Iron and Steel Corporation) outlining the deterioration of protection provided by the fixed duties, partly through inflation and partly through an increasing number of exemptions which discriminated against the Maritime products.6 Specifically they called for the restoration of the equivalent of an ad valorem rate on steel and the imposition of tariffs on coke, coal used in the production of coke for metallurgical purposes, and anthracite screenings.7 The latter claims, supported by the Associated Boards of Trade of Cape Breton and the Alberta Coal Council, drew opposing submissions from companies which imported coal from the United States, such as Algoma Steel, and from the Crow's Nest Pass Coal Company, which faced retaliatory tariffs on its exports to the United States.8 The Maritime companies prepared counter-briefs, their opponents answered in turn, and the argument continued on into the next decade.9 The Maritime public were further bemused by the struggle for 183

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control of their industry by the giants of Central Canadian finance. In the spring of 1926 the Canadian Bank of Commerce and the Bank of Montreal refused the Dominion Iron and Steel Company further credit, alleging uncertainty as to whether the bondholders or the bank would have first claim on assets in case of default. Unable to meet the interest on its bonds, Disco entered receivership under the National Trust Company. From the Bank of Commerce's point of view it was a cosy arrangement: Sir Joseph Flavelle was chairman of the board of one and president of the other. Once in control of the steel section, the National Trust began suit to liquidate not only Disco but the larger holding company, Besco, alleging "impairment of capital, loss of substratum and loss of confidence in the management."10 Besco submitted its own scheme for reorganization, which the National Trust attacked as leading to the closure of the less profitable elements of the industry.11 The litigation was finally terminated early in 1928 with the purchase of the Wolvin group's bondholdings by a syndicate friendly to the National Trust, a group which included such notable Canadian financiers as J. H. Gundy, C. B. McNaught, and H. S. Holt. The Nova Scotia government provided a new charter and changed the name to the Dominion Steel and Coal Company. Great predictions followed of the success which the industry might expect under such "pillars of Canadian finance." The Halifax Herald added the reorganization of the coal and steel industries to its long list of reasons for Maritime optimism. In actual fact, however, the steel company, although showing steadily increasing profits, remained in receivership until the completion of the Besco reorganization in the summer of 1929. Even then the publicity given the reorganization was largely a public relations ploy. As the National Trust counsel, F. R. MacKelcan, remarked to Sir Joseph Flavelle, "from the strictly logical stand point the only change . . . will be that the new company will take Besco's place."12 With the end of the litigation, Ralston's appeal to the cabinet for tariff assistance on coal and steel and the implementation of the Duncan Commission's recommendation for a bounty on steel produced from Canadian coal met a firm rejection. King noted in his diary: I also spoke out very strongly of the Cabinet being a Liberal Cabinet & that we were not going to yeild to the protectionist sentiment further without some real concessions to the lower tariff group. . . . Yesterday I told Gundy & McNaught it wd be 184

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completely impossible & today I told Ralston so and made it plain Govt. wd not consider further legislation of the kind. It was painful having to differ so strongly with so strong an advocate as Ralston, but I had the solid backing of Dunning, Stewart, Forke and Robb — while Lapointe wd have been the same had he spoken.13 Having refused more substantive concessions for the industry, the government did attempt to maintain the illusion of activity on its behalf with the announcement of a "test rate" on coal from the Maritimes patterned after similar experiments on the Prairies.14 Meagre but more concrete assistance was given through an increase from fifty to seventy-five cents per ton in the maximum freight subvention on Maritime coal moving west of Montreal. By 1929 this subvention was costing the federal government approximately $200,000 a year.15 Despite the failure of the mining and industrial communities to achieve their main goals, the broad popular agitation in the coal and steel towns had largely abated by the end of 1928. Disillusionment with the efficacy of the organized protest probably had more to do with the declining popular involvement than any return of "good times" or the expectation that their industry's prosperity would be restored by the new operators. Certainly this was true of labour. W. A. Mackintosh, after a brief investigation of the coal industry for the Tariff Advisory Board in 1928, reported a cynicism and apathy among workers which found expression in absenteeism, carelessness, and wildcat strikes. Their deep-rooted suspicion of all "outside" management presented so serious an impediment to the industry's success from the operator's viewpoint that one of the "high officials in the company" urged that they get rid of the native workers and replace them with foreigners.16

The question of further subsidy adjustments for the Maritimes, left open by the Duncan recommendations, was pursued most vigorously by the government of Prince Edward Island, whose financial resources were the least elastic and needs the most acute. The new subsidy had proved far from sufficient to meet the growing provincial responsibilities, especially in the field of social services. Indeed, new pressures were added by the federal government's old age pension 185

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scheme which could only be implemented by provinces which met half the cost. This scheme was within the reach of the Western provinces with their relatively young populations but totally beyond the resources of the Maritimes with several times the proportion of aged eligible to receive them. At the Dominion-Provincial conference, in November, Prince Edward Island's newly elected Liberal premier, A. C. Saunders, outlined the island's desperate need for further increases. Publicly he issued a revised statement of claims based on past inequities of one kind or another, interpreted in light of the Duncan report. Privately he stressed fiscal and social need as the criterion for further assistance. As he explained to King in a confidential memorandum, We have only two sources of revenue, namely the subsidy we receive from Ottawa and direct taxation. Notwithstanding our frugal expenditure we are unable to make revenue and expenditures meet. All this is bad enough, but to add to our unfortunate conditions, we have never been able in the history of this Province to do anything for public health. We have today over 700 cases of persons suffering from tuberculosis, with no Sanitorium or other place to take care of them or give them proper treatment. We are losing on an average about i oo persons annually dying from this disease. We have about 88 blind people in the Province, with no place to take them for assistance and instruction, and the same is true regarding our deaf and dumb. We have about 60 persons out of i ,000 over 70 years of age, many of whom are to a large extent helpless; while in the Province of Alberta they have about 11 per thousand. We have many old and helpless and with our very limited resources, we are unable to take advantage of the Federal Old Age Pension Scheme. . . . Our people today are asking the Government to build a Sanitorium. It will cost about $3,000 per bed, and a 100 bed Sanitorium would cost our Government at least $ 125,000 per annum to operate. How can this worthy institution be undertaken? We positively have not the revenue to undertake it and we naturally must suffer as a result.17 Although King had scant sympathy for the island's plaint — "a terrible piece of mendicancy, unworthy of manhood" he had called Saunders's earlier presentation at the conference — he skilfully used the province's financial plight to detach it from regional agitation. The success of his government's strategy was revealed in a letter from 186

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Saunders to J. A. Robb in 1929 concerning a proposed visit to Ottawa "for the purpose of securing such a final adjustment in subsidies as was contemplated by the Duncan Commission." Saunders wrote: When I saw you in Ottawa last spring, in company with Messrs. Sinclair and MacLean, we discussed this matter, and you advised me to come to Ottawa this fall, at which time you would appoint a committee of experts from your Department to hear our representations. . . . You further suggested, last spring, that this province should come alone, rather than in conjunction with the other Maritimes. Accordingly, I have on different occasions declined to cooperate with Premier Rhodes and Premier Baxter in a joint presentation. I also declined to have anything to do with a proposed meeting of the Maritime Boards of Trade in this connection.18 A "Board of Audit" appointed by the Treasury Board early in 1930 reported eight months later that "an equitable reassessment of the three Maritime Provinces" was not possible without "a complete investigation of the various forms of taxation which prevail throughout Canada."19 And there the matter rested. With a few vague promises which cost nothing to implement, the federal government broke the united front on subsidies which the Maritimers had forged over the previous two decades.

The intensity of still another issue of the campaign — the channelling of trade through Maritime ports — was eventually dissipated in lengthy contests in the courts and before the Board of Railway Commissioners. Initially diverted from their campaign for lower grain rates to Maritime ports by the Duncan Commission, the Maritimers suddenly appeared to achieve a breakthrough when the Board of Railway Commissioners, citing as the reason the lower grain rates promised national ports with the construction of the National Transcontinental, dropped the Winnipeg-Quebec rates from 34.5 cents to 18.34 cents Per hundredweight.20 Since Halifax and Saint John enjoyed a differential of one cent per hundredweight over Quebec, they naturally assumed that they would receive a similar reduction. This, however, was not forthcoming; the railways retained the old rates and cancelled the differential. As J. W. Dafoe later explained, the railway 187

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did not mind giving Quebec the lower rate; very little grain could move under it since water transportation was still cheaper and the Quebec port was closed while the St. Lawrence was frozen over.21 The Maritime ice-free ports, however, were a different proposition. The Maritimes' request for the restoration of the differential, officially filed with the Board of Railway Commissioners in July 1928, met delaying tactics from the railways, initially on the technicality that they had not received proper notice and later through two appeals to the Supreme Court respecting the Quebec order. Finally, late in 1930, with the railways joined in opposition by the Montreal Corn Exchange, the board, with two commissioners dissenting, disallowed the Maritime application.22

The letdown in popular agitaton which followed the government's apparent acceptance of the Duncan recommendations had earlier undercut the Maritime Board of Trade's campaign on transportation. Believing that their main goals had been achieved, some local boards and the provincial governments withdrew their financial support. Prince Edward Island complained that the services of the freight rate expert had gone mainly to the larger provinces; others, including members of local governments, held up their hands in horror at the $30,000 expense account submitted by F. C. Cornell. Although Sclanders and businessmen most knowledgeable of freight rate issues attacked the false economy involved, in mid-1927 the Maritime Rights Transportation Committee was dissolved and the Maritime transportation effort was left "in abeyance."23 The need to resume their struggle was driven home to Maritime leaders by the gradual realization of just how restricted were the reductions provided by the railways under their interpretation of the Maritime Freight Rates Act. For example, Maritime long-haul rates, normally calculated in terms of the distance to Montreal, were applied by the railway only on the portion to Levis and Diamond Junction; the full rate based on mileage was charged on the remainder of the distance to Montreal. Thus Maritimers discovered that the 20 per cent reduction, in fact, approximated only 15 per cent on the critical Maritime-Montreal portion of their long-distance rates.24 The percentage was further undercut by the railway's policy of applying the reductions to Standard Mileage Rates rather than to any competitive rates which might be in force. In summer months it had been the 188

RAKING THE EMBERS

railways' practice to reduce rates slightly to meet direct competition from ocean traffic through the St. Lawrence. With the advent of the new rates this practice was terminated; the railway received the full subsidy of 20 per cent while the actual reduction might be considerably less. As competition developed from auto-transport and greater portions of the total railway traffic of the country travelled under competitive rather than maximum rates, the Maritime Freight Rates Act would become increasingly a subsidy to the railways without comparable benefit to the Maritime region. The Maritime leaders claimed that they had been short-changed; government spokesmen vehemently asserted that they had received the 20 per cent the law specified.25 Another source of recrimination involved the elimination of alternative routing from the Intercolonial via the CPR. In 1925 the CNR closed the traditional links to the CPR Line. The Maritimers appealed the action to the Board of Railway Commissioners and secured a largely favourable decision; the commissioners left one connecting outlet from Saint John closed but ordered a second, the Saint Rosalie Gateway, immediately reopened to serve traffic from most of the remainder of the region. To the indignation of the Maritime leaders, the railway ignored the commissioners' decision while appealing the matter to the Supreme Court.26 The government, too, was obviously dragging its feet on the recommended expenditures for Prince Edward Island transportation. In 1928 the standardization of the railway was still not completed and the matter of a second car ferry still "under study." Not until late in the course of a debate on a Conservative resolution deploring the government's failure to implement the Duncan Commission did the minister of railways belatedly promise to include a million dollars toward the construction of a new car ferry in the supplementary estimates.27 As Maritime leaders awakened to how little had actually been achieved respecting transportation, despite the government's vaunted implementation of the Duncan Commission, they reorganized their committee and attempted to revive the agitation. The provincial premiers, overcoming their aversion to Cornell and his formidable expense accounts, lent their governments' financial support to the reestablishment in the spring of 1928 of a Maritime Board of Trade Freight Rates Commission.28 While this reborn commission maintained the fight in the courts and before the railway commissioners on a variety of issues, Sclanders 189

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

and Commission President A. P. Patterson of Saint John sought to revive popular support, both in the Maritimes and across the country. Once again they eschewed the technical details of their claims for an appeal to Maritime rights under the compact of Confederation.29 Although Patterson lectured the public on the violation of Maritime rights in speeches, pamphlets, and newspaper articles for the next three years, he appeared to arouse little popular response. His proposed "Maritime League" to finance and spread propaganda never got off the ground. Maritime Rights as a broad popular movement was dead and could not be revived by a few individuals within the board of trade.30 One factor in its demise was the restoration of a relatively buoyant economy in the Maritimes. At a time of booming growth in the rest of the continent, the region was successful in its efforts to attract capital investment. The new investment did not mean the recovery of secondary manufacturing in the industrial towns; the damage here was permanent. It flowed instead into a new tourist trade or industries closely associated with primary production. In 1927 the CPR, allied with local capital, began construction of a major luxury hotel at Halifax, "The Lord Nelson." The spirit of competition immediately awakened the interest of the CNR, which announced its plans for the construction of "The Nova Scotian."31 A year later work began on major resorts near Pictou and Digby.32 In the same year the Royal Securities Corporation began construction of a pulp and paper mill at Liverpool, with the provincial government providing a complementary multimillion dollar hydro development on the Mersey River. In New Brunswick the International Pulp and Paper Company developed the Grand Falls of the Saint John River, a $5 million pulp and paper mill and hydro project was undertaken at Bathurst, and significant provincial capital was freed as the CNR finally agreed to take over the Saint John and Quebec Railway.33 In both Saint John and Halifax extensive construction had begun on port facilities. Thus much of the Maritimes was involved in a substantial if temporary construction boom before the end of igag. 34 Nevertheless, relative prosperity, real or anticipated, was not the basic factor in the dissolution of Maritime Rights. In simplest terms the people had lost confidence in the slogan and the movement which it represented. At the beginning of the 19208 Maritimers, imbued with the optimism of the period, set out to regenerate their society and restore the region's slumping status within the Dominion. For nearly a decade their hopes were alternatively raised and disappointed. Ini190

RAKING THE EMBERS

tially many had turned to a new farmer-labour political movement seeking fundamental social and economic change, only to find some of its goals running counter to the interests of their regions. Then they and others had sought the election of a regional bloc with more limited objectives, only to be frustrated by their weakness at the national level. Finally they had pinned their hopes upon unrelenting political pressure, supplemented by an appeal for justice from the rest of the country. The Duncan Commission had narrowed but sharpened their expectations, with its focus on practical "remedies," and hopes again peaked in the federal government's apparent acceptance of its program. In fact, however the government's strategy of halfmeasure, delay, and "further study" brought ultimate disillusionment. As Maritimers gradually discovered the deception in the government's claims, the flame of popular optimism in the Maritime Rights Movement, so often rekindled, gradually died out. The embers of popular hope which remained were raked over and finally dispersed in the various commissions and studies of the last years of the decade. The struggle for Maritime Rights, once an optimistic movement for progressive reform, terminated in a mood of cynicism and apathy so deeply ingrained that Maritimers would not readily respond again to promises of regional, social, or economic reform dependent upon help from the rest of the country.

The Maritime Rights movement was the most intensive expression of regionalism which the Maritime provinces have ever experienced. In little more than two decades Maritimers progressed from virtual unconsciousness of regionality to a concerted drive for regional recognition. This came about largely because the various members of the community — businessmen, farmers, academics, and some labourers became convinced that their economic and social aspirations were linked to the problems of the area as a whole. When this regional focus failed to yield the expected results their interest waned. With it waned the explicit expression of popular regional consciousness which had characterized the movement. But the Maritime Rights movement was not without lasting consequence. The movement's all-pervasive propaganda in the 19208 emphasized two themes, the value of unity, organization, and political agitation in remedying regional problems and the severe injustices inflicted upon the Maritimes by the federal government and other regions of the country. From the former 191

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT

theme emerged a tradition of positive activity exemplified in the Maritime Provinces Freight Rates Commission (later the Atlantic Provinces Transportation Commission) and, more recently, the Council of Maritime Premiers. But this tradition remained a weak one. Much stronger was the tradition of regional injustice which the Maritime Rights movement helped to inspire. This sense of injustice, fuelled by new and recurring grievances, has been one of the most conspicuous aspects of a continuing Maritime regional consciousness.

192

ABBREVIATIONS

APTC DUA DLL DANS NBM NSLL PHA PAC PANB PANS PAPEI QUA SFXUA VLAU

Atlantic Provinces Transportation Commission Dalhousie University Archives Department of Labour Library Diocesan Archives of Nova Scotia New Brunswick Museum Nova Scotia Legislative Library Pine Hill Archives Public Archives of Canada Public Archives of New Brunswick Public Archives of Nova Scotia Public Archives of Prince Edward Island Queen's University Archives Saint Francis Xavier University Archives Vaughn Library, Acadia University

193

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NOTES

PREFACE

1. J. M. Beck, The Government of Nova Scotia (Toronto, 1957), pp. 338-40; Roger Graham, Arthur Meighen, vol. 2, And Fortune Fled (Toronto, 1963), chap, n; H. B. Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, vol. 2,1924-29: The Lonely Heights (Toronto, 1963), pp. 220-24; K. A. McKirdy, "Regionalism: Canada and Australia" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1959), pp. 245-50; G. A. Rawlyk, "The Maritimes and the Canadian Community," in M. Wade, ed., Regionalism in the Canadian Community, 1867-1967 (Toronto, 1969), pp. 113-15; E. R. Forbes, "The Rise and Fall of the Conservative Party in the Provincial Politics of Nova Scotia, 1922-1933" (M.A. thesis, Dalhousie University, 1967) and Michael Hatfield, "J. B. M. Baxter and the Maritime Rights Movement" (B.A. honours essay, Mount Allison University, 1969). 2. See especially Rawlyk, p. 114. 3. J. A. Walker recalled this charge being levelled at his party by a Liberal friend on the morning after the Halifax by-election of 1923. J. A. Walker, interview, Halifax, July 18, 1966. 4. See also E. R. Forbes, "The Origins of the Maritime Rights Movement," Acadiensis, 5, no. i (Autumn 1975): 54-66. 5. J. K. Chapman, "Henry Harvey Stuart (1873-1952): New Brunswick Reformer," Acadiensis, 5, no. 2 (Spring 1976): 101; A. A. Mackenzie, "The Rise and Fall of the Farmer-Labour Party in Nova Scotia" (M.A. thesis, Dalhousie University, 1969), pp. 31, 90. 6. J. H. S. Reid, Kenneth McNaught, H. S. Crowe, eds.,A Sourcebook of Canadian History (Toronto, 1964) pp. 284-89. J. M. Beck attributed the "peculiar turn" of the Maritime Rights movement on the tariff in the 1920$ to the influence of the Conservatives. Beck, The Government of Nova Scotia, pp. 338-41. 7. D. A. Muise, "Elections and Constituencies: Federal Politics in Nova Scotia, 18671878", (Ph.D. thesis, University of Western Ontario, 1971); T. W. Acheson, "The National Policy and the Industrialization of the Maritimes, 1880-1910," Acadiensis i, no. 2 (Spring 1973):3-28. 8. J. M. Beck, "The Party System in Nova Scotia: Tradition and Conservatism," in Martin Robin, ed., Canadian Provincial Politics (Scarborough, Ont., 1972), pp. 168-87; C. L. Cleverdon, The Women Suffrage Movement in Canada (Toronto, 1950). Chap. 6 is entitled "The Maritime Provinces: Stronghold of Conservatism."

195

NOTES TO PAGES ix-2

9. Martin Robin, Radical Politics and Canadian Labor (Kingston, 1968); Richard Allen, The Social Passion (Toronto, 1971); see also my review of the latter work in Acadiensis 2, no. i (Autumn 1972):94-99. 10. M.A. Schwartz, Politics and Territory: The Sociology of Regional Persistence in Canada (Montreal and London, 1974), p. 211. 11. The anlysis of "progressivism" in Canada in still in its infancy. For brief analyses of the scholarship on the American phenomenon, see D. W. Noble, The Progressive Mind, 1890-1917 (Chicago, 1970); and O. L. Graham, Jr., Perspectives on 20th Century America (New York and Toronto, 1973)-

CHAPTER ONE

1. The concepts of region and regionalism have defied social scientists' attempts to sharpen them for objective and scientific use. In summing up the work of his discipline, geographer Richard Harthshorne defined a region as "an area of specific location which is in some way distinctive from other areas and which extends as far as that distinction extends. The nature of the distinction is determined by the student using the term." Perspectives on the Nature of Geography (Chicago, 1959), p. 130. Nevertheless scholars in a variety of disciplines still agree on the concepts' importance in the study of human activity. This is particularly true among Canadian historians. See J. M. S. Careless, "Limited Identities in Canada," Canadian Historical Review i, no. i (March 1969): 1-10; W. L. Morton, "Some Thoughts on Understanding Canadian History," Acadiensis 2, no. 2 (Spring 1973): 100-7; and G. Friesen, "The Western Canadian Identity," Canadian Historical Association Historical Papers 1973, pp. 13-19The criterion for region in this study rests chiefly upon the perception of the people living in the three Maritime provinces. Maritimers belonged to a region to the extent that they believed they did, that they felt they had in common distinctive interests and character traits which coincided with their territorial location. Maritimers also tended to identify at least two other major regional divisions: "Central Canada," which included Ontario and Quebec, and the "West," by which they usually meant the three Prairie provinces. For a description of this type of regional consciousness or regionalism, see sociologist Louis Wirth, "Limitations of Regionalism," in Merill Jensen, ed., Regionalism in America (Madison, Wis., 1952), pp. 391-92. 2. A. H. Clark, Acadia: The Geography of Early Nova Scotia to 1760 (Madison, Wis., 1968), pp. 179-80, 381. 3. D. C. Harvey, ed., "A Blue Print for Nova Scotia in 1818," Canadian Historical Review 14 (December io43):4o8. 4. W. S. MacNutt, The Atlantic Provinces: The Emergence of Colonial Society 1712-1857 (Toronto, 1965), p. 268; and J. M. S. Careless, "Aspects of Metropolitanism in Atlantic Canada," in M. Wade, ed., Regionalism in the Canadian Community 18671967 (Toronto, 1969), p. 119. 5. Beamish Murdoch, A History of Nova-Scotia or Acadia (Halifax, 1867), 3:xi-xiii. 6. Murray Barkley, "The Loyalist Tradition in New Brunswick: The Growth and Evolution of an Historical Myth, 1825-1914," Acadiensis 4, no. 2 (Spring »975):3~45-

196

NOTES TO PAGES 2-7

7. D. E. Hamilton, The Maritime Provinces (Toronto, 1927), p. 149; and J. M. Gow, Cape Breton Illustrated (Toronto, 1893), pp. 347, 363. 8. Macdonald's administration won an overall majority of seats in the Maritimes in every election after his inauguration of the "national policy" in the 18705. Laurier's "national policy" met with a similar reception there in federal elections from 1900 to 1911. See J. M. Beck, Pendulum of Power (Toronto, 1967), passim. 9. Carl Berger, The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism 1867-1914 (Toronto, 1970)^. 9; and A. G. Bailey, Culture and Nationality (Toronto, 1972), p. 71-'

10. The structure of Confederation was supposed to contain the potentiality for a regional focus in the creation of the Senate as a guardian of regional interests. As political appointees of the federal government the senators failed to play this role. 11. S. A. Saunders, The Economic History oflhe Maritime Provinces, A Study prepared for the Royal Commission on Dominion Provincial Relations (Ottawa, 1939), p. 59. 12. D. A. Muise, "Elections and Constituencies: Federal Politics in Nova Scotia, 18671878." 13. Calculated from Saunders, p. 134; and "Report of the Mines of Nova Scotia 1921," Journals and Proceedings of the House of Assembly of the Province of Nova Scotia, 192 2, app. 6, p. 9 (hereafter cited as N. S., Journals). 14. Canada Year Book, 1922-23, pp. 220, 415-16 (hereafter cited as CYB). 15. Saunders, p. 115. 16. W.J. A. Donald, The Canadian Iron and Steel Industry (New York, 1915), pp. 195-98. 17. Ibid., pp. 205-8. 18. Calculated from Saunders, p. 115. 19. SeeW. H.McCurdy, The McKay Motor Car: Nova Scotia's First Production Car (Halifax, 1967); and see below, chap. 4, n. 46. 20. Calculated from Report of the Royal Commission Respecting the Coal Mines oftheProvince of Nova Scotia (Halifax, 1925), p. 60. 21. Sixth Census of Canada, 1921, i:table 10. 22. CYB, 1922-23, p. 438. 23. Calculated from ibid., p. 220. 24. Saunders, p. 60; and CYB, 1922-23, p. 220. 25. W. V. Longley,SomeEconomicAspectsof the Apple Industry of Nova Scotia, Department of Agriculture Bulletin No. 113 (Halifax, 1932), pp. 13, 125, 139. 26. CYB, 1922-23, p. 220; and Sixth Census of Canada, 1921, 4:table 4. 27. "Sixty-first Annual Report of the Crown Land Department," igai, Journals of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of New Brunswick, pp. 8,21-22 (hereafter cited as N. B., Journals); and CYB, 1922-23, p. 334. 28. "Annual Report of the Commissioner of Crown Lands of the Province of Nova Scotia," 1920, N. S., Journals, 1921, app. 9, p. 6; and CYB, 1922-23, p. 328. 29. M. C. Urquhart and K. A. H. Buckley, eds., Historical Statistics of Canada (Toronto, 1965). P- 396. 30. The remaining counties in order were Richmond, Digby, Guysborough, Yarmouth, Cumberland, Cape Breton, and Inverness. The above percentage was calculated from figures for the total labour force in the Sixth Census of Canada, 1921,4: table 4, and the distribution of fishermen by counties in Report of the Royal Commission Investigating the Fisheries of the Maritime Provinces and the Magdalen Islands (Ottawa, 1928), p. 96. 31. Report of the Royal Commission Investigating the Fisheries, pp. 40, 123.

197

NOTES TO PAGES 7-14

32. R. F. Grant, The Canadian Atlantic Fishery (Toronto, 1934), pp. 74-7533. Canada, Parliament, Sessional Papers, 1919, no. 39, pp. 13-14, and 1921, no. 40, p. 11 (hereafter cited as Sessional Papers). 34. Ibid., 1919, no. 39, pp. 7-9. 35. "Proceedings of the Royal Commission Investigating the Fisheries of the Maritime Provinces and the Magdalen Islands" (typescript), pp. 291, 313, 481-82, and 445, APTC. 36. Fielding to L. G. Power, Oct. 4, 1897, W. S. Fielding Papers, Letterbook no. vii, p. 439, PANS; Halifax Morning Chronicle, Aug. 17, 1906 and Saint John Standard, Dec. 20, 1913. 37. Calculated from Sixth Census of Canada, 1921, i:tables 23, 27. 38. H. G. Thornburn, Politics in New Brunswick (Toronto, 1961), p. 23. 39. Calculated from Seventh Census of Canada, 1931, irtable 35. 40. Robert Rumilly, Histoire des Acadiens (Montreal, 1955), 2:752-58 and F. J. Robidoux, Conventions Nationals des Acadiens (Shediac, 1907), 1:45-81. 41. See, for example, E. Richard, Acadia: Missing Links of a Lost Chapter (Montreal, 1895), 1:18-19. 42. A. J. Leger, Les Grandes Lignes de FHistoire de la Societe de l'Assomption (Quebec, 1933). P- «• 43. Calculated from Seventh Census of Canada, 1931, i:tables 42, 35. This calculation assumes the population of French origin to be 100 per cent Roman Catholic. 44. W. S. Learned and K. C. M. Sills, Education in the Maritime Provinces of Canada (New York, 1922), p. 14. 45. Thorburn, p. 60. 46. Sixth Census of Canada, 1921, table 38. 47. Learned and Sills, p. 18. 48. Toronto Globe, Jan. 5, 1911, quoted inj. M. Beck, The History of Maritime Union: A Study in Frustration (Fredericton, 1969), p. 39. CHAPTER TWO 1. Sackville Busy East of Canada, September 1919. 2. Maritime Representation in House of Commons:

Nova Scotia New Brunswick Prince Edward Island Total in House

1867

1873

1882

1892

19 15

21

21

20

18

16

16

6 206

14

13

211

5 213

4 214

181

6

1903

1914

1924

16 H 11 11 4(3) 4 235 245

The figures are from Statutes of Canada for the above years. See also K. A. McKirdy, "Regionalism: Canada and Australia" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1959), p. 112. 3. New Brunswick, "Minute in Council," in Sessional Papers, 1910, no. 100, pp. 4-5, 6-9. 4. Canada, Debates of the House of Commons, 1903, pp. 1214-18, 1286-87 (hereafter cited as Debates). 5. Sessional Papers, 1910, no. 100, pp. 9-12. ^.Debates, 1906-7, pp. 2153, 2157, 2183, 2202.

198

NOTES TO PAGES 15-22

7. Ibid., p. 2157. 8. Halifax Morning Chronicle, Aug. 20, 1908; Halifax Wesleyan, May 12, 1909. 9. Debates, 1906-7, pp. 2203-4, and ibid., 1909-10, p. 656. 10. Ibid., 1911-12, pp. 2732-34, 2754; see also editorial, Morning Chronicle, Jan. 6, 190311. Debates, 1906-7, p. 2199. 12. Dominion-Provincial and Interprovincial Conferences from 1887 to 1926 (Ottawa, 1927), pp. 67, 82-83. 13. Saint John Standard, Oct. 30, 1913. 14. Debates, 1914, pp. 616-17, 5304. 15. J. A. Maxwell, Federal Subsidies to the Provincial Governments in Canada (Cambridge, Mass., 1937), pp. 120-22. 16. "Report Re Claims of the Maritime provinces...," Arthur Meighen Papers, p. 023 405, PAC (hereafter cited as Meighen Papers, PAC). See also M. C. Urquhart and K. A. Buckley, Historical Statistics, p. 323. 17. The following figures given in thousands for the subsidies paid the different provinces show the discrepancy which developed: Fiscal Year

Ont. Que.

1905-1906 1907-1908 1912-1913

L339 2,128 2,396 2,396

1920-1921

1,086 1,686 1,967 1.969

N.S. N.B. Man. B.C. P.E.I. Sask. Alb.

43« 49 i 608 610 621 75 i 636 637 3»643 636 637 1,470

307 522 732 623

211 1,124

1,124

28l 1,217 1,212 38l L555 1.259 38l

1.753

1,621

Taken from W. Eggleston and C. T. Kraft, Dominion-Provincial Subsidies and Grants, A Study prepared for the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Ottawa, 1939), pp. 188-89. 18. Maxwell, p. 113. 19. Eggleston and Kraft, pp. 143-44. 20. Debates, 1907-8, pp. 12816-19. The Maritime claims and agitation for increased subsidies between 1907 and 1921 have been ignored in the three general studies of the subsidy question. A. W. Boos, The Financial Arrangements between the Provinces and the Dominion (Toronto, 1930); Maxwell; Eggleston and Kraft. si.Debates, 1911-12, pp. 781-89. 22. Ibid., pp. 6156-57; and J. K. Fleming to Borden, Mar. 25, 1912, R. L. Borden Papers, PAC (hereafter Borden Papers, PAC). 23. For obvious reasons, Prince Edward Islanders emphasized the latter. 24. "Presentation to His Royal Highness in Council...," Jan. 29, 1913, Papers of the Royal Commission on Financial Arrangements between the Dominion and the Maritime Provinces, 1935, vol. 3, PAC. 25. Walter Scott, R. P. Roblin, and Arthur Sifton to R. L. Borden, Dec. 2, 1913, Borden Papers, PAC; Fielding to G. H. Murray, Jan. 12, 1914, W. S. Fielding Papers, box 11, PANS. 26. Borden to F. B. Carvell, Nov. 9, 1918, Borden Papers, PAC. 27. Dominion-Provincial and Interprovincial Conferences from 1887 to 1926, p. 98. 28. O. T. Daniels, The Claims of the Maritime Provinces for Federal Subsidies in Lieu of Western Lands (Halifax, 1918); Proceedings of the Second Annual Educational Conference, Antigonish (Antigonish, August 1919), pp. 92, 14, 25. 29. N. S.,Journals, 1919, p. 7 and Nova Scotia, Debates and Proceedings of the House of Assembly, 1916, pp. 327-29.

199

NOTES TO PAGES 22-30

30. Halifax Herald, May 10, 1919; Province of Nova Scotia, Speech of Mr. James C. Tory an The Claims of Nova Scotia Respecting Western Lands (Halifax, 1920). 31. G. R. Stevens, Canadian National Railways, vol. 2, Towards the Inevitable (Toronto, 1962), p. 275. 32. S. Fleming, The Intercolonial: A Historical Sketch (Montreal, 1876), p. 78. 33. Morning Chronicle, July 26, Sept. 18, 1911, A. G. Brown, "Nova Scotia and the Reciprocity Election of 1911" (M.A. thesis, Dalhousie University, 1971), pp. 185, »9434. "Presentation to His Royal Highness. . . ," pp. 11-12. 35. See David Pottinger to Frank Cochrane, Nov. 4, 1912, Intercolonial Letterbooks, Canadian National Railways Papers, PAC; Pottinger to A. W. Campbell, Jan. 29, 1913, ibid.; and "Being an Address by Mr. Geo. W. Yates, assistant Deputy Minister of Railways before the History and Political Science Club of Western Ontario, February 16, 1923," Meighen Papers, pp. 157485-89, PAC. 36. Debates, 1917, pp. 777~79» 75937. Ibid., p. 787. 38. Ibid., pp. 4339, 4377. 39. Ibid., pp. 4354, 4349. 40. Report of the Royal Commission to Inquire into Railways and Transportation (Ottawa, 1917), pp. Ixvi—Ixix; R. A. C. Henry and Associates, Railway Freight Rates in Canada, A Study prepared for the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Ottawa, 1939), p. 21. 41. Debates, 1919, pp. 2133, 2135. 42. For a graphic illustration of the relative rate changes see Henry, pp. 266-80. F. B. McCurdy inquired in June 1919 if the rate structure necessary for the survival of established industries in the Maritime provinces would be preserved. He was curtly informed that increases could be appealed to the Board of Railway Commissioners or at last resort to the Governor in Council. Debates, 1919, p. 4171. 43. See "Transcripts of hearings of the Royal Commission on the Transportation of Canadian Products through Canadian Ports," 1904, vol. i, p. 2 (typescript), PAC. 44. Busy East of Canada, September 1919. 45. Ibid. 46. PAC, Guide to Canadian Ministries since Confederation (Ottawa, 1957), p. 34. 47. F. B. McCurdy to Borden, Sept. 11,1918,BordenPapers, PAC; Borden to Senator W. H. Thorne, Oct. 13, 1917, ibid. 48. C. G. D. Roberts and A. L. Tunnell, eds.,A Standard Dictionary of Canadian Biography (Toronto, 1934), p. 105; Debates, 1917, p. 4340. 49. See F. J. Robidoux to J. D. Hazen, Oct. 18, 1917, Borden Papers, PAC; R. W. Wigmore to Borden, Nov. 2,1919, ibid.; Borden to W. H. Thorne, Nov. 7,1917, ibid. 50. McCurdy to Borden, Sept. 11 and 17, 1918, ibid.; Debates, 1919, pp. 4676-81. 51. Guide to Canadian Ministries, pp. 35-42. This is again to exclude Borden, whose papers fail to reveal awareness, much less representation, of Maritime regional concerns. Borden did invite Hazen to return to the government but the latter refused. H. Borden, ed., Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs (Toronto, 1938), pp. 986, 1015. 52. Busy East of Canada, September 1919. The Busy East included reports of statements by

200

NOTES TO PAGES 30-38

individuals at the convention, the reports of delegates to their various boards of trade, and contemporary newspaper accounts of reaction to the meetings. 53. F. W. P. Bolger, Canada's Smallest Province. A History of Prince Edward Island (Charlottetown, 1973), pp. 138-41. 54. Busy East of Canada, September 1919. 55. R. H. Wiebe, The Searchfor Order, i877-ig2o(New York, 1967); Gabriel Kolko.Tfo? Triumph of Conservatism: A Re-interpretation of American History, 1900-1916 (New York, 1963); D. W. Noble, The Progressive Mind 1890-1917 (Chicago, 1970). 56. R. V. Harris, "The Union of the Maritime Provinces," Acadiensis 6 (July and October 1906): 172-84, 247-59; R. V. Harris, "The Advantages of the Union of the Maritime Provinces," Acadiensis 8 (October 1908) 1238-49; see alsoj. M. Beck, History of Maritime Union, pp. 33-36. 57. Busy East of Canada, February 1920. 58. Ibid..January 1920; New Brunswick, Synoptic Report of the Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of New Brunswick, 1920, p. 157. 59. E. R. Forbes, "Prohibition and the Social Gospel in Nova Scotia," Acadiensis i, no. i (Autumn 1971): 11-36. 60. Canadian Annual Review, 1907, pp. 618, 620-2 (hereafter cited as CAR); Morning Chronicle, Aug. 17, 1906; Halifax Daily Echo, May 24, 1913; CAR, 1908, p. 434. 61. Educational Reform, the Need of The Hour [Halifax, 1916], p. 7. 62. See above, nn. 8 and 30 and Antigonish Casket, July 7, 14, Aug. 24, 1919. 63. George B. Cutten to H. P. MacPherson, Aug. 3, 1914, H. P. MacPherson Papers, SFXUA; W. S. Learned and K. C. M. Sills, Education in the Maritime Provinces (New York, 1922), passim. 64. Minutes of the Second Conference of Representatives of the Universities, Colleges and Governments of the Maritime Provinces and Newfoundland (Halifax, 1922) andCAR, 1927-28, p. 439. 65. Moncton L'Acodien, Nov. 18, 1919; Moncton L'Evangeline, May 5, 23, June 20 and 23, 1921. 66. L'Evangeline, June 13, 1921; New Brunswick, Synoptic Report.. . Legislative Assembly, 1920, p. 102. 67. "Rapport de la Commission sur le Commerce et 1'Industrie," L'Evangeline, Aug. 22, 1921. 68. Busy East of Canada, December 1919. 69. See below, chap. 4, n. i. CHAPTER THREE i. W. L. Morton, inThe Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto, 1950), p. 12 7, described the Liberal victory of 1921 as follows: "The conservative parts of Canada had reasserted their hold on the party, revealing it once more as at base the party of minorities and marginal areas, the conservative bulwark of the racialism of Quebec, and of the steady ways of the Maritime Provinces." Richard Allen, in The Social Passion (Toronto, 1971), p. no, was also guided by the stereotype in rashly concluding that the social gospel had "virtually no impact" in the Maritimes before 1919. Martin Robin was apparently so convinced of the absence of radicalism in the Maritimes that his Radical Politics and Canadian Labor (Kingston, 1968) ignored the activities of District No. 26 of the United Mine Workers of 201

NOTES TO PAGES 38-41

America, at that time the largest and one of the more radical unions in the country. Walter D. \oungsAnatomy of a Party (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), p. 288, ascribed the C.C.F. failure in the Maritimes to the latter's "rigid traditionalism in politics and an isolationism that prevented any real progress despite the generally depressed state of the economy." 2. See above, chap. 2, n. 55. 3. Morton, p. 129. 4. Such terminology was commonly employed by labour spokesmen and the labour press in the Maritimes. Sydney Canadian Labour Leader, Feb. 9, 1918; New Glasgow Eastern Federatianist, Apr. 19, 26, July 12, 1919; Sydney Labour Leader, Jan. 18, 1919; and Moncton Union Worker, February 1920. Expectations had also been increased by a tendency of management and governments to suggest or promise a fulfilment of labour's demands "after the War." See testimony of UMW organizer, David Rees, in "Proceedings Before the Royal Commission on Industrial Relations," Sydney, N. S., June 9, 1919, p. 176, DLL. 5. Inflation, which was cited as a major cause of unrest by virtually every labour representative before the commission, is indicated by the Labour Gazette's figures for the cost per week of staple foods for an average family in the Maritimes in the month of July.

Nova Scotia Prince Edward Island New Brunswick

1914

1915

1916

1917

1919

1920

7.24 6-59 7.07

7-63 6.60 7-45

8.47

11.58 13-M 14.04 9-69 11.38 12 •23 11.07 12.81 13 .26

17.09

7-37 8.41

1918

14.52 16.63

Canada, Department of Labour, Labour Gazette, January 1921, p. 117 (hereafter Labour Gazette). 6. E. Forsey, Economic and Social Aspects of the Nova Scotia Coallndustry, McGill University Economic Studies, no. 5 (Toronto, 1928), pp. 21-28; C. B. Wade, "History of the United Mine Workers of America, District 26, 1919-1941," microfilm of manuscript, no pagination, PANS; Canada, Department of Labour, Tenth Annual Report on Labour Organization in Canada, 1920 (Ottawa, 192i), p. 273 and passim. J. Fifth Annual Report on Labour Organization, 1916, pp. 206-7,anc' Tenth Annual Report on Labour Organization, 1920, p. 279. 8. Eastern Federationist, May 17,1919, and Clifford Rose, "Four Years with the Demon Rum 1925-29," New Glasgow, 1947, pp. 4-5, manuscript in the A. J. Crockett Papers, VLAU. 9. Eastern Federationist, Sept. 27, 1919; Halifax Citizen, May 14, 1920, and Stellarton Workers' Weekly, Oct. 13, 1923. (The Workers' Weekly succeeded the Eastern Federationist as a spokesman for organized labour in Pictou County.) 10. Clifford Rose, "Four Years with the Demon Rum," p. 5. See AFL organizer H. N. Goodwin's declaration of a social gospel manifesto in the Truro Canadian Labour Leader, Oct. 26, 1912, and the Union Worker's invitation to clergymen to submit letters (February 1920). 11. Jenkins to Woodsworth, June 2, i926,J.S. Woodsworth Papers, PAC, and Workers' Weekly, June i, Oct. 12, 1923. Others include Presbyterian A. A. MacLeod of Trenton (see his sermon "The Social Unrest and the Kingdom" in the Halifax Presbyterian Witness, Apr. 24, 1920) and Father Mclnnis of Holy Redeemer Church, Sydney (see his address to the metal workers in the Canadian Labour Leader, Feb. 16, 1918). 202

NOTES TO PAGES 41-43

ia.Eastern Federationist, Apr. 26, June 14, 1919; ibid., May 24, 1919; see also Nolan Reilly, "The Origins of the Amherst General Strike, 1890-1919" (paper presented at Canadian Historical Association meeting, June 1977). 13. Amherst Daily News, May si, 1919. 14. Ibid., May 31, 1919. On June 13 workers at Amherst Boot and Shoes, Amherst Foundry, Christie Bros. Trunk and Bag Company, and Victor Woodworkers returned to work. Robb Engineering and Amherst Pianos had kept their plants in operation throughout the strike. (D. W. Robb at the outset agreed to many of the workers' demands "in principle" and in the salary negotiations opened the company's books to the workers' committee. See Robb's testimony before the Mathers Commission, as reported in ibid., June 10, 1919.) Workers at the Canadian Car Company, Rhodes Curry, Stanfield's Woollens, and the BarkerMacLean garage remained without a union settlement. Ibid., June 13, 1919. 15. Tenth Annual Report of Trade Union Organization, 1920, p. 28; Statutes of Nova Scotia, 10-1 Geo. v, c. 201; E. J. Shields, "The History of Trade Unionism in Nova Scotia" (M.A. thesis, Dalhousie University, 1945), pp. 22—24. 16. See a report of die district convention and copies of correspondence between J. B. MacLachlan and Presidents Tom Moore and J.L. Lewis of the TLC and UMW respectively, in the Eastern Federationist, Sept. 6,1919. In a recent article, "Labour Radicalism and the Western Industrial Frontier: 1897-1919," Canadian Historical Reivew 58, no. 2 (June 1977): 154-75, Professor D. J. Bercuson has questioned the strength of genuine radical sentiment among Nova Scotia coal miners for the period 1897-1919. Whatever might be said for such an argument for the earlier period, in 1919 and the early 19205 there was no mistaking the polarization between "radicals" led by J. B. MacLachlan and "progressives" led by Robert Baxter — terms which were accurately employed by the leaders themselves and by the labour press of that day. At the convention of June 1922 the radicals were clearly in control, voting to send a delegate to the Red International of Trade Unions in Moscow and issuing the statement "we proclaim openly to all the world that we are out for the complete overthrow of the capitalist state, peaceable if we may, forceable if we must, and we call on all workers, soldiers and minor law officers in Canada to join us in liberating labour." Both radicals and progressives ran full slates of candidates for the district executive in the August election. The radicals won the election by majorities of approximately four to one. Workers' Weekly, June 30, Aug. 19, 1922. 17. Ibid., July 19, 1919; see also ibid., Aug. 9 and 16. 18. A. A. MacKenzie, "The Rise and Fall of the Farmer-Labour Party in Nova Scotia," pp. 35-39. Baxter and Gillis received 3,667 and 3,615 votes respectively, compared with over 7,500 votes for the Conservatives and nearly 6,000 for the Liberals. Labour candidates in Hamilton East and Hamilton West received higher totals (4,588 and 3,678) but they were without Liberal opposition. Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1919, pp- 223, 200-1. 19. Canadian Labour Leader, Feb. 2, 1918; see report of Livingstone's speech in the Eastern Federationist, Apr. 19, 1919, and his statement in "Proceedings Before the Royal Commission on Industrial Relations," New Glasgow, June 5,1919, p. 167, DLL; Citizen, May 9, 1919; Union Worker, February 1920; Eastern Federationist, Mar. 8,15,1919; and Labour Gazette, April 1920, pp. 432-33. The term "class" was used frequently by Maritimers in this period but seldom in any clear Marxian sense. Usually it was employed to refer to fairly broad occupational interest groups.

on*

NOTES TO PAGES 43-47

20. Eastern Federationist, Mar. S.June 7, 1919. 21. Citizen, May 21, Sept. 10, 1920. 22. Eastern Federationist, Sept. 6, 1919. 23. Labour Gazette, March 1919, p. 308; Eastern Federationist, Aug. 2, 191924. L. A. Wood, A History of Farmers' Movements in Canada (Toronto, 1924), p. 301; Sixth Census of Canada, 1921, table 8. 25. Eleven cooperative organizations founded in the Maritimes before 1918 were still in existence in 1931. Undoubtedly many others had failed to survive the two depressions. Canada, Department of Labour, Fourth Annual Report on Cooperative Associations in Canada 1931 (Ottawa, 1931), passim. 26. W. V. Longley,The Economic Aspects of the Apple Industry of Nova Scotia (Halifax, 1932), p. 39; Moncton United Farmers' Guide, Dec. 8, 1920. 27. United Farmers' Guide, Apr. 21, 1920. 28. Fred Chipman to George Chipman, Dec. 4,1918, George F. Chipman Papers, QUA. 29. Wood, p. 303. 30. Journal of the Legislative Assembly of Prince Edward Island, 1919, p. 217 (hereafter cited as P.E.I., Journals); CAR, 1921, pp. 737-38. 31. Mackenzie, pp. 7-9. 32. United Farmers'Guide, Nov. 10,1920; S. H. Hagerman toCrerar, May 27, 1921, T.A. Crerar Papers, QUA (hereafter cited as Crerar Papers, QUA). 33. United Farmers'Guide, Apr. 28, July 5, 1920; G. G. Archibald to Crerar, Oct. 4, 1920, Crerar Papers, QUA. Deep Furrows was given as a bonus for selling subscriptions to the United Farmers' Guide. See also Fred Chipman to George Chipman, Apr. 3, 1920, George Chipman Papers, QUA and United Farmers' Guide, Oct. 6, 1920. 34. "Minutes of the Canadian Council of Agriculture," pp. 222, 232, George Chipman Papers, QUA. 35. Memo from directors' meeting of the Grain Growers' Guide, Nov. 26, 1919, Crerar Papers, QUA. By the end of February 1922, investments in the United Farmers' Guide were reported as follows: United Fruit Companies United Farmers Co-op Co. The Grain Growers' Guide

$6,000.00 $4,500.00 $46,232.56

George F. Chipman to F. W. Bishop, Mar. 18, 1922, Crerar Papers, QUA. The directors of the United Farmers' Guide were G. F. Chipman, editor of the Grain Growers' Guide; T.A. Crerar and C. Rice Jones, respectively president and vicepresident of the United Grain Growers of Manitoba; F. W. Bishop, president of the United Fruit Companies of Nova Scotia and C. Ashley George, a director of the United Farmers' Co-operative Company of New Brunswick. C. F. Chipman to the Editor, Maritime Farmer, Mar. 13, 1920, ibid. 36. CAR, 1920, p. 677. J. M. Pratt planned the organization for the Colchester byelection and his name occurred frequently in reports of local organizational meetings in both New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. See G. G. Archibald to Crerar, Sept. 19, 1920, ibid., and United Farmers' Guide, June 9, Aug. 25, 1920. 37. Sussex Maritime Farmer and Co-operative Dairyman, Mar. 2, 16, 1920. 38. George Chipman to Crerar, Mar. 10, 1920, Crerar Papers, QUA; United Farmers' Guide, Apr. 27, 1920; Synoptic Report of the Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of New Brunswick, 1921, p. 71. 39. See, for examples, United Farmers' Guide, Aug. 25, Sept. 15, Oct. 20, 1920.

204

NOTES TO PAGES 47-50

40. Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1925, p. 285. 41. Mackenzie, pp. 24-29 and app. D. 42. The exceptions were the Annapolis Valley and Halifax. The former offers an interesting parallel with the fruit-growing sections of British Columbia. The UFBC, fearing competition from early-ripening American fruit and vegetables, rejected the "New National Policy" and was barred from membership in the Canadian Council of Agriculture. The UFNS joined the council but failed to gain the support of its fruit-farming constituencies. 43. "Minutes of the Canadian Council of Agriculture," July 3, 1920, p. 232, George Chipman Papers, QUA. 44. Mackenzie King to H.J. Logan, Sept. 16, 1920, and Logan to King, July 21, 1920, W. L. Mackenzie King Papers, pp. 7379-78, PAC (hereafter cited as King Papers, pAC); United Farmers'Guide, Aug. 11 and 18, 1920. Crerar himself had opposed running candidates provincially, since he did not want to antagonize the Liberals with whom he hoped to cooperate at the federal level. He was anxious, however, to challenge Arthur Meighen's new government at every opportunity. See Crerar to T. W. Caldwell, Sept. 28, 1920, and Caldwell to Crerar, Oct. 11, 1920, Crerar Papers, QUA. 45. United Farmers' Guide, Aug. 25, Sept. 15, 1920. 46. Halifax Herald, Sept. 13 and 25, 1920. 47. Ibid., Sept. 18, 1920. 48. Union Worker, September and April 1920; Citizen, Sept. 24, 1920. 49. CAR, 1920, p. 717. 50. In the absence of complete official returns, estimates of farmers' candidates elected has varied, from the Canadian Annual Review's six (1920, p. 717) to labour organizer H. H. Stewart's nine. J. K. Chapman, "Henry Harvey Stuart (1873-1952): New Brunswick Reformer," Acadiensis 5, no. 2 (Spring 1976): i oo. The problem is aggravated by the deliberate ambiguity of old-line party candidates in running as "farmers" when that was their occupation but not their political affiliation. From an analysis of the voting behaviour of candidates after the election as part of his research for a doctoral thesis on New Brunswick politics of this period, Michael Hatfield has found the Canadian Annual Review's estimate the more accurate one. 51. The percentage of unemployment in the trade unions reporting in the spring and summer months of 1921 averaged about 13 per cent for Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island and i o per cent for New Brunswick, compared with less than one half of one per cent for the same period of the previous year. Labour Gazette, 1920, p. 1399; Fourteenth Annual Report on Labour Organization in Canada, 1923, pp. 84-90, 257. 52. Wood, p. 304. For a detailed financial statement of the cooperatives see G. F. Chipman to T. A. Crerar, July 18, 1921, Crerar Papers, QUA. See also S. H. Hagerman to Crerar, Jan. 13, 1921, ibid. 53. Robin, p. 228, and'CAR, 1921, p. 509; "Proceedings of the Board of Railway Commissioners for Canada," 1920, pp. 8517-18, PAC (hereafter cited as Evidence, Board of Railway Commissioners, PAC). 54. Synoptic Report of the Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of New Brunswick, 1921, p. 31, and Moncton United Fanners' Guide, Jan. 5,1921; Pratt to T. A. Crerar, Nov. 9, 1920, Crerar Papers, QUA. 55. See, for example, F. A. Chipman's statement in United Farmers'Guide, Jan. 2, 1922.

205

NOTES TO PAGES 51-56

56. See the auditor's report in G. Durnford & Co. to Directors and Shareholders, July 21,192i,Crerar Papers,QUA; Hagerman toG. F. Chipman.June 18,1921,ibid. 57. J. M. Beck, Pendulum of Power, p. 161. 58. Workers' Weekly, Feb. 23, 1923; K. McNaught,yi Prophet in Politics (Toronto, 1959), pp. 73-79; see below, chap. 8, n. 3. 59. United Farmers' Guide, May 5, 1920, p. 5. 60. J. F. Glasgow, The Role of Educational and Rural Conferences in the Development of the Extension Department of St. F. X. University (Antigonish, 1947), p. 3; First Annual Report on Co-operative Associations in Canada 1928 (Ottawa, 1928), pp. 8, 65-68. 61. H. J. Logan referred to Lunn as "a man who above all others had brought to the knowledge of the public the facts regarding the Intercolonial and the strength of the Maritime claim to retain it as a separate unit." Halifax Morning Chronicle, Nov. 16, 1921. For his own account of his role see Lunn to H. S. Congdon, Apr. 13, 1929, H. S. Congdon Papers, courtesy of H. H. Congdon, Huntsville, Ontario. (In August 1977 the Congdon Papers were deposited in PANS.) 62. Halifax Sunday Leader, Sept. 23, 1923. 63. Undated, untitled memorandum on the Maritime Rights movement, Congdon Papers, PANS. CHAPTER FOUR

1. Economic Fluctuations in the United States and the United Kingdom 1918-1922 (Geneva: League of Nations, 1942), pp. 18-20, 78-79; calculated from M. C. Urquhart and K. A. Buckley, eds., Historical Statistics of Canada, pp. 293-94, 1732. W. A. Mackintosh, The Economic Background of Dominion-Provincial Relations, A Study prepared for the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Ottawa, 1939), p. 38; Urquhart and Buckley, p. 659. 3. CYB, 1924, p. 456. The proposed American tariff schedules and an estimate of the value of trade affected by each were printed in The National Liberal and Conservative Bulletin, May 28, 1921. 4. Malach dates the beginning of Canada's economic revival from July 1921, but qualifies this conclusion with the statement: "So slow was the first half of the Canadian upswing on the whole that it amounted to a relapse in some quarters." V. W. Malach, International Cycles and Canada's Balance of Payments 1921-33 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954), p. 118, n. 2, and p. 11. 5. The total was 526,853, of whom 22,980 had departed by the end of that period. United States of America, Statistical Abstract of the UnitedStates, 1925 (Washington, 1926), p. 86. L. W. Truesdell, in The Canadian Born in the United States (New Haven, 1943), p. 99, estimates the net migration from Canada to the United States at 239,243 for the decade. According to the Canada Year Book, 1938, p. 21 o, 76,766 Canadians returned from the United States in the years 1924-30. 6. R. F. Grant, The Canadian Atlantic Fishery, p. 31; H. A. Innis, The Cod Fisheries (Toronto, 1940), p. 468; Report of the Royal Commission Investigating the Fisheries of the Maritime Provinces and the Magdalen Islands (Ottawa, 1928), p. 125. 7. Ibid., p. 64; Evidence, Board of Railway Commissioners, 1924, p. 347, PAC 8. Evidence, Fisheries Commission, p. 3476, APTC. 9. Transcript of evidence before the Royal Commission on Maritime Claims, p. 2068 (typescript), APTC (hereafter cited as Evidence, Royal Commission on Maritime

206

NOTES TO PAGES 56-59

Claims, APTC). 10. "Fifty-third Annual Report of the Fisheries Branch ... 1919," Sessional Papers, 1921, no. 40, p. 11. 11. Halifax Herald, May 15, 1928. The beam trawlers caught their fish by dragging a large funnel-shaped net. In 1919 there were six trawlers based in Nova Scotia, by 1926 there were eleven. See Report of the Royal Commission Investigating the Fisheries, p. 105. 12. Evidence, Fisheries Commission, 1927, pp. 1107, 1258, APTC. 13. "Fifty-third Annual Report of the Fisheries Branch ... 1919," Sessional Papers, 1921, no. 40, p. 21 and "Fifty-seventh Annual Report," ibid., 1925, no. 29, p. 10. The number of boats dropped from 5,849 to 4,493 in Nova Scotia, 611 to 362 in New Brunswick, and 917 to 695 in Prince Edward Island. 14. Evidence, Fisheries Commission, 1928, pp. 157, 362, 1262, APTC; J. J. Tompkins to MacPherson, July 29, 1926, H. P. MacPherson Papers, SFXUA. 15. CYB, 1922-23, p. 462 and 1925, pp. 440-41. 16. "Report of the Deputy Minister of Marine and Fisheries," Sessional Papers, 1922, no. 21, p. 18. 17. S. A. Saunders, Economic History, p. 36; Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, The Maritime Provinces since Confederation (Ottawa, 1927), p. 62. 18. Maritime Provinces since Confederation p. 63, and CAR, 1923, p. 667. 19. CYB, 1926, p. 355. 20. Mark Workman to R. L. Borden, Apr. 19, 1916, Borden Papers, PAC, and "Memorandum for Sir Robert Borden on behalf of the Dominion Steel Corporation," 1919, ibid. 21. F. W. Gray, Mining Coal under the Sea in Nova Scotia, a Paper to be discussed at the. . . Second (Triennial) Empire Mining and Metallurgical Congress, Sept. 9-10,1927, p. 5. 22. W. R. Maxwell, "The Competitive Position of Canadian Coal," a confidential report in the Papers of the Advisory Board on Tariff and Taxation, vol. 9, ref. 3-17, pp. 3-5, PAC. 23. The latter dropped out with the beginning of the recession. 24. Press opinions of Empire Steel (British Empire Steel Corporation, July i, 1920), especially pp. i, 3, and 7. The coal leases had originally been awarded in a chequerboard fashion. By 1920 both Dominion and Scotia faced the problem of mines worked underground to the edge of their rivals' leases. 25. Moncton Union Worker, July 1920; Morden to King, May 2, 1920, King Papers, PAC. 26. See, for example, Halifax Wesleyan, Apr. i, 1925. 27. Besco paid dividends on its first preference stock up to February i, 1924, but never paid any dividends on second preference and common. "A statement on the financial position of Besco and its constituent companies by Price, Waterhouse and Co.," Apr. 26, 1927, in Papers of the Advisory Board on Tariff and Taxation, vol. 4, ref. 2-34, PAC. 28. Submission by S. Cunard and Co. of Halifax, Sept. 25, 1928 in ibid., vol. 9, ref. 3-8, PAC; E. H. Armstrong to A. Dick, June 2, 1921, E. H. Armstrong Papers, vol. 8, PANS (hereafter cited as Armstrong Papers, PANS) and H. S. Congdon to Arthur Congdon, May 18, 1925, Congdon Papers, PANS. 29. Transcripts of evidence before the Royal Commission to inquire into the Coal Mining Industry of the Province of Nova Scotia, 1925, p. 32 (typescript), NSLL (hereafter cited as Evidence, Coal Commission, NSLL)', Report of the Royal Commission Respecting the Coal Mines of the Province of Nova Scotia, 1925 (Halifax, 1926),

207

NOTES TO PAGES 59-62

p. 20. 30. Evidence, Board of Railway Commissioners, 1920, p. 9808, PAC. 31. Report of the Royal Commission Respecting the Coal Mines, p. 30. 32. Ibid., p. 19; see also Official Report of Evidence taken during the Session of 1921 Respecting the Future Fuel Supply of Canada by a Special Committee of the House of Commons (Ottawa, 1921), p. 477. 33. Evidence, Coal Commission, p. 245, NSLL. Detailed accounts of the labourmanagement conflict are included in E. Forsey, The Economic and Social Aspects of the Nova Scotia Coal Industry (Toronto, 1928); C. B. Wade, "History of United Mine Workers of America, District No. 26, 1919-41" (microfilm of typescript), PANS; and D. MacGillivray, "Industrial Unrest in Cape Breton, 1919-1925" (M.A. thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1971). 34. For text of resolutions see Stellarton Workers' Weekly, June 30, 1922. 35. A. Dick to E. H. Armstrong, May 3,1922, Armstrong Papers, vol. 8, PANS; see text of letter from J. L. Lewis to Dan Livingstone in the Workers' Weekly, June 20, 1923; Evidence, Coal Commission, p. 33, NSLL. Because of the variety and complexity of wage rates, estimates given of proposed increases and reductions are approximate averages. 36. Sydney Post, Mar. 5, 1925; Saunders, p. 145; Evidence, Coal Commission, p. 45, NSLL. 37. K. Crone, "Twelve Thousand on Rations," Canadian Congress Journal, April 1925, pp. 13, 16. Workers were not eligible for strike benefits from the UMW until after the strike had lasted a month. 38. Ibid., p. 14; Evidence, Coal Commission, p. 56, NSLL. 39. "Memo for the Chairman," in Papers of the Advisory Board on Tariffs and Taxation, vol. 9, ref. 3-18, PAC. 40. Saunders, p. 115. 41. W. Kilbourn, The Elements Combined (Toronto, 1960), pp. 105, 111; Evidence, Royal Commission on Maritime Claims, pp. 1518-19, APTC. For example, in competing with Algoma Steel in Harriston, Quebec, in 1916, Trenton products had to absorb $4.37 additional transportation costs per ton; in 1926 the difference was $8.55. 42. Forsey, p. 47; Herald, Apr. 2, 1927. 43. Report of Commission to inquire into the Industrial Unrest among the Steel Wvrkers at Sydney, N. S., p. 19, printed as a supplement to the Labour Gazette, February 1924; "Comparative statement of the employment situation in the Steel Plant," Armstrong Papers, vol. nb, PANS. 44. T. W. Acheson, "The National Policy and the Industrialization of the Maritimes, 1880-1910," Acadiensis i, no. 2 (Spring ig72):26; D. W. Robb, in "A Brief History of Industrial Development in Amherst," Sackville Busy East of Canada, February 1921, p. 14, described the Amherst works as then having "a capacity of twenty cars per day" and including "iron foundries, rolling mills, [an] axle forging plant and a large malleable iron works which supply the other plants of the Canadian Car & Foundry Co. throughout Canada." 45. Evidence, Board of Railway Commissioners, 1922, p. 486; Sixth Census of Canada, 1921, 4:140, 167 andCYB, 1927-28, p. 431. 46. In 1920 farm tractors costing less than $ 1400 were added to the "free list."Debates, 1920, p. 2566; Evidence, Royal Commission on Maritime Claims, pp. 2031-37, APTC.

208

NOTES TO PAGES 62-66

47. "Survey of Conditions in Cloth Mills in Canada," in Papers of the Advisory Board on Tariffs and Taxation, vol. 23, ref. 42 PAC. 48. Calculated fromCFB, 1929^.401. The decline in primary manufacturing was of a more temporary nature. In P.E.I, the number employed in manufacturing increased by nearly i ,000, owing largely to the expansion there of the fishprocessing industry. CYB, 1929, p. 403, 1926, p. 401. 49. Employed in Manufacturing: 1920 1926 Amherst Dartmouth Halifax New Glasgow Sydney Truro Moncton Saint John

2,267 1.581 7.1?1 2,610 2,929 i ,080 3,061 4>63°

735 946 3.287 611 2,053 778 2,133 3'394

CYB, 1922-23, p. 438, 1929, pp. 453-54. 50. Saunders, p. 93. 51. Calculated from CYB, various years 1912 to 1927-26. 52. Evidence, Royal Commission on Maritime Claims, p. 2234, APTC. 53. Halifax Commercial News, July 1923; Minutes, Saint John Board of Trade, Nov. 13, 1924, NBM. 54. Such a policy was invoked by the Laurier government in justifying its railway policy in 1903 (Debates, 1903, pp. 7670-75, 7694), formed the theme of a royal commission in the period 1903 to 1905 (Report of the Royal Commission on the Transportation of Canadian Products through Canadian Ports, PAC), and was reaffirmed in the resolution to restrict the Imperial preference to trade entering through Canadian ports in 1907. See Debates, 1922, pp. 708—9 and ibid., 1926, pp. 2308-9. 55. Evidence, Royal Commission on Maritime Claims, p. 2173, APTC. See also Halifax Morning Chronicle, Oct. 11, 1921. 56. Evidence, Royal Commission on Maritime Claims, pp. 2159-63, 2170, APTC. 57. Ibid., p. 2230. 58. Proceedings of the Select Special Committee of the House of Commons to Inquire into Agricultural Conditions (Ottawa, 1924), pp. 475-76, 1379. See also Evidence, Royal Commission on Maritime Claims, pp. 726-27, APTC. 59. Calculated from Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, The Maritime Provinces in their Relation to the National Economy of Canada (Ottawa, 1948), p. 45. 60. New Brunswick population increased by 20,343; that of French origin by 15,888. Seventh Census of Canada, 1931, 1:712-15. 61. The Maritime Provinces in their Relation to the National Economy, pp. 7, 10. 62. W. B. MacCoy to E. H. Armstrong, Mar. 16, 1925, Armstrong Papers, vol. 4, PANS. 63. Calculated on the cost of producing the coal, the percentage of assistance appeared even more impressive as the estimated pit-head cost in Nova Scotia rose from 75 cents per ton in 1897 to $4.00 per ton in 1924. Glace Bay Board of Trade, Coal, Steel and the Maritimes (Glace Bay, 1926), p. 6.

209

NOTES TO PAGES 66-69

64. Calculated from ibid. 65. O. J. McDiarmid, Commercial Policy in the Canadian Economy, (Cambridge, 1946), pp. 206-7, 256. 66. Ibid., p. 220 and "Memorandum of Successive Changes in Tariff item 1049 showing Progressive Enlargement of its Scope," Papers of the Advisory Board on Tariff and Taxation, vol. 8, ref. 3, PAC. 67. Rate schedules before and after the change are given in Province of Nova Scotia, A Submission of its Claims with Respect to Maritime Disabilities within Confederation as presented to the Royal Commission (Halifax, 1926), p. 119. 68. The Montreal Board of Trade had long complained of the Intercolonial's "discrimination" in favour of Maritime shippers. Forty-sixth Annual Report of the Halifax Board of Trade, 1911, pp. 27-29. 69. Quoted by Col. J. L. Ralston from evidence by the Assistant General Freight Agent of the Boston and Maine Railroad before the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1925, in Evidence, Board of Railway Commissioners, 1926, p. 6693, PAC. For a more complete explanation of the east-west differential see presentation by Ralston under cross-examination by the commissioners and representatives of the railways in ibid., pp. 6676-6701. Alistair Fraser, in presenting a rebuttal to Ralston's case in behalf of the CNR, suggested that the initial purpose of the differential was to build up certain ports. Ibid., p. 6885; F. C. Cornell, Memorandum re the Transportation Problems and Freight Rate Structure of the Province of Nova Scotia, 1926, p. 6. 70. The board stated in its decision in the Eastern Rates Case of 1916: "There is no doubt but what the [Railway] Act requires and the public interest of the country as a whole demands that, if practicable, eastern rates should be advanced so that the different schedules may more nearly approach to a parity. . . . An absolute parity is impracticable, but as conditions become similar, a reasonable parity ought to be obtained." Quoted in A. W. Currie, Economics of Canadian Transportation (Toronto, 1954), p. 60. 71. Evidence, Board of Railway Commissioners, 1926, p. 6602, PAC, and Currie, p. 62. 72. Calculated from Urquhart and Buckley, p. 293, and Evidence, Board of Railway Commissioners, 1926, p. 6602, PAC. 73. Calculated from R. A. C. Henry and Associates, Railway Freight Rates in Canada, pp. 266, 268. 74. Evidence, Royal Commission on Maritime Claims, pp. 462-65, APTC. The above figure was calculated from the rate schedule in the Submissions of the Governments of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island re the All-Rail Class Rate Structure of the Maritime Provinces, 1925, Board of Railway Commissioners' Exhibit, no. i, p. 9, APTC. 75. "Exhibits presented to the Commission at Halifax and Saint John, Jan. 17-19," Evidence, Board of Railway Commissioners, 1922, pp. 7, 22-24, 32~34> PACThese figures do not include the relatively higher burden sometimes imposed by the freight rates in the movement of raw materials. 76. The chief commissioner told Nova Scotia representatives in December 1920, that "the Minister of Railways wrote the Board a letter along in the early part of last summer stating that he wished us to treat the Transcontinental Railways as though they were under this board for rate-making purposes, and if anything remained for him to do as Minister he would gladly do it; in other words, he wanted us to treat the Government Railways the same as though the Order-

210

NOTES TO PAGES 69-77

in-Council had been passed bringing them under the Canadian National Railways System." Evidence, Board of Railway Commissioners, 1920, pp. 11, 703, PAC. 77. See, for example, the judgement of the Board of Railway Commissioners, March 26, 1919, in the Borden Papers, p. 131066, PAC, which reads in part, "Railway rates under the Railway Act cannot be made for the purpose of removing geographical disadvantage or, on the other hand, of removing geographical advantages." 78. "The Board, under the Railway Act, has no profit or loss responsibility, and its intervention in the matter of rates, as has been indicated, be [sic] concerned with matters falling within the broad categories of reasonableness and unjust discrimination, and not with policies of developing industries through rate adjustments." Orders and Rulings of the Board of Railway Commissioners,[vol. 13, p. 260, quoted in Evidence, Board of Railway Commissioners, p. 6901, PAC. 79. Evidence, Royal Commission on Maritime Claims, pp. 2129-30, APTC. 80. Evidence, Board of Railway Commissioners, p. 6927, PAC. 81. A comparison of specific rates and percentages increase is given in Province of Nova Scotia, Submission of its claims with respect to Maritime Disabilities within Confederation as presented to the Royal Commission, 1926, pp. 122-23. See also Evidence, Royal Commission on Maritime Claims, pp. 440-43, APTC. 82. "Judgement" of the Board of Railway Commissioners, Mar. 15, 1919, in the Borden Papers, pp. 131068-72, PAC. 83. Evidence, Board of Railway Commissioners, 1926, pp. 6765-67, PAC. 84. Calculated from "Annual Report of the Department of Railways and Canals . . . 1916," Sessional Papers, 1917, no. 20, p. 401. For the period 1899to 1917 l^e Intercolonial enjoyed a net operating surplus of $320,334. 85. Evidence, Board of Railway Commissioners, 1926, pp. 6635, 6889-90, PAC.

CHAPTER FIVE

1. E. M. Macdonald to W. L. M. King, Dec. 8, 1922, King Papers, PAC. 2. It is not clear who first developed the compact thesis with respect to the railway. It was used in 1919 by Maritime MPs, newspapers, and boards of trade in opposing integration. 3. "Minutes," Halifax Board of Trade, Jan. 24, 1922, PANS. 4. M. K. Cullen, "The Transportation Issue 1873-1973," in F. W. P. Bolger, ed., Canada's Smallest Province (Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island: Centennial Commission, 1973), p. 251. 5. Premier Bell to J. D. Reid et al., Dec. 31, 1919, in "Reports of Board of Trade Council Meetings, Charlottetown, P.E.I.," in the possession of A. W. Gaudet, Charlottetown; P.E.I. Journals, 1919, pp. 127-28. 6. "Reports of Board of Trade Council Meetings", Feb. 17,1921, and P.E.I. Journals, 1921, p. 26. 7. W. E. Foster, "Justice for the Maritime*," Maclean's Magazine, July 1921, pp. 30-31. 8. N. S., Journals, 1921, p. 7. 9. See above, chap. 4, n. 76. 10. Evidence, Board of Railway Commissioners, 1920, pp. 5323-24. 11. Ibid., p. 5336.

211

NOTES TO PAGES 77-85

12. Ibid., p. 5478. 13. Ibid., p. 11701. 14. Ibid., pp. 11704-5. 15. N. B.,Journals, 1921, pp. 146-9; N.S.,Journals, 1921, pp. 357-61; P.E.I.,Journals, pp. 26-27. 16. Sackville Busy East of Canada, May 1921. 17. "Report of Meeting with the Prime Minister and the members of the the Government, Delegation from the Maritime Provinces, June ist., 1921," R.B. Bennett Papers, pp. 10139-43, PAC. 18. Ibid., pp. 10147-48. 19. A.E. Kemp to Arthur Meighen, Sept. 27, 1920, Meighen Papers, PAC. 20. Saint John Standard, June 7, 1921. 21. Ibid. 22. See N.S., Journals, 1920, pp. 11-12, 1921, p. 7; N.B.,Journals, 1920, p. 3,1921, p. 5; P.E.I., Journals, 1920, pp. 41-42, 1921, p. 5. 23. "In re claims of Maritime Provinces for compensation in connection with grants made from public domain to other provinces," Apr. 18,1921, Meighen Papers, p. 023384, PAC. Reid was obviously employing against the Maritimes' case the ingenious rationalizations developed by Chester Martin in a historical justification of Manitoba's claims commissioned by the Manitoba government two years before. Chester Martin, "The Natural Resources Question": The Historical Basis of Provincial Claims (Winnipeg, 1920). 24. J.D. Reid also announced at this time the postponement of work on the island railway until "next year." Debates, 1921, p. 4568. 25. Dennis to Arthur Meighen, July 29, 1920, Meighen Papers, PAC; Macdonald to Meighen, Nov. 23, 1920, ibid., Dennis to Meighen, Sept. 16, 1921, ibid. 26. Logan to Mackenzie King, Mar. 24, 1920, King Papers, PAC. 27. New Glasgow Eastern Chronicle, Oct. 7, 1921. 28. Charlottetown Patriot, May 26, 1920. 29. W.L.M. King Diaries, Jan. 11, 1920 (typescript), PAC (hereafter cited as King Diaries, PAC); Debates, 1920, p. 33. 30. Amherst J9 155 persistence of wartime feuds in, 86, 126 division on tariff, 87-88, 91, 92 regional wing and Maritime Rights, 87-94, !24' !27-3°> J43» *46 in Halifax and Kent by-elections, 126-27, 128 in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick elections, 138-41 attempts to regain initiative, 150, 1 54-55 and big business image, 171 Livingstone, Dan, 42, 59 Logan, H.J. on Maritime Rights, viii, 83-84, 89, 90, 100 president of Maritime Board of Trade, 29, 53,82 on Maritime Union, 29, 31,43 president of Nova Scotia Liberal organization, 82 MP for Cumberland, 86 illness of, i24 on West Indies trade, 143-44, 222n8o proposes secession, 155 on Lunn, ao6n6i Loyalists, 2,11 Lunn.C.W. labour journalist, 40, 42, 53 publicist for Maritime Rights, viii, 53 Lyons, J. M., 2i4n7 McCurdy, F. B. parliamentary secretary, 28 in Colchester by-election, 48

on regionalization of CNR, 84, 130 defeat in 1921 election, 86, 130 seeks regional tariff autonomy, 117, 124,156, 167-68 on Thornton's proposed commission, 118 Flavelleon, 121 alienated from federal Conservatives, 130-33 seeks provincial leadership, 134 heads commission of inquiry, 138 response to Duncan Commission, 151,167-68 questions freight rate increases, 2Oon42 Macdonald, Angus L., 171 Macdonald, E. M. on compensation for Maritimes, 19 regional spokesman on railways, 25,82 on freight rate increase, 76-77 demands King restore Intercolonial, 89 attacks Crowsnest Pass rates, 92 proposes hiring freight rate expert, 116 enters cabinet, 124 King's anger at, 128 suggests new tack on Maritime Rights, 135 switches constituencies, 148 on coal delegation, 215n26 in "great" delegation, 2i7n7o McDougall, D. H., 22in58 McGee, Frank, 31, 34 McKean,W. K., 22in 5 8 MacKennaJ. D., 112, 113, 115, 2^70 MacLachlan, J. B., 42, 59, 60 MacLaren, Murray, 87 McLean, A. A., 19 MacLean, A. E., 92, 149, 187, 2i7n7o MacLean, A. K., 28, 99, 126, 128 MacLean, Angus, 140 Maclean's Magazine, j6n, 106-8 McLennan, H. R., 78, 79, 80 McLurg.J.E., n6n, 120 McMahon, A. E., 53, 104, 22in58 Macmillan, Cyrus, 149, 151, 159 MacNutt, G. T., 150, 151, and notes passim

242

INDEX Manufacturing, 3-4, 61-63, 108 Maritime Board of Trade vehicle for regional protest, ix disrupted by Saint John-Halifax feud, 8 founded, 13 revival, 27 convention of, 29-30 and economic conferences, 116-19 freight rate committee of, 116, 188 on Duncan Commission, 151, 171 revives agitation, 174, 188-90 Maritime Club, 53, 97, 109 Maritime Farmer, 46 Maritime Freight Rates Act, 177, 188-89 Maritime Freight Rates Committee (Commission), 116, 188, 189, 192 Maritime ports fall behind in winter trade, 63-64 in Maritime Rights agitation, 75, 90-91, 96, 99-100, 103, 106, 112-13 provoke counter-campaign, 100-101 focus of "great" delegation, 114 conferences on, 118-19 Duncan on, 164-65 harbour commissions for, 165, 174, 177, 179 Maritime Provinces Development Association, 53, 103-5, 118 Maritime Rights, 97, 2i7n64, and notes passim Maritime Rights movement definition of, vii-x, 117, 139 role in elections federal, viii, 51, 53, 85-87, 147-49, 155-56 provincial, 49, 138-39, 140 by-elections, 48-49, 125-28, 129-31' J 39 delegations to Ottawa, 19, 27, 76-77, 78-79>99. !°3. 113-15, 129 conferences, 29-30, 78, 116-17, 118, J1

9 early uses of term, 43, 83-84 statement of program, 73-76, 117 organization of, 96-97 strategy of, 94, 96, 98, 99, 105, 109, 1 12

speaking tours in, 112-13

decline of, 180-83, *89-91 Maritime union, 29-30, 43 Martell, L. H.,87^91 Meighen, Arthur on regionalization of CNR, 84-85 and Acadians, 86, 127 on Maritime Rights, 109, 141-43, 146, 1

55

and McCurdy, 130, 134-35 on Duncan Commission, 151-52 and Maritime response to 1926 budget 152-54 Metropolitan consolidation Intercolonial in, 23-24 formation of CNR in, 26-27, 70-71 as threat to labour, 43 manufacturers and, 61-62, 107, 108 West Indies treaty encourages, 145 Moncton industrial growth and problems in, 4, 62 loss of Intercolonial headquarters, 26, 69 drain of railway personnel from, 26,94 headquarters for CNR's Atlantic division, 85, 93 Maritime Club of, 97, 109 economic conferences at, 78, 116-17 Moncton Times, 97, 127, and notes passim Moncton Union Worker, 40, 42 Montreal Gazette, 109, 172 Montreal Herald, 172 Montreal La Presse, 109, 173 Moore, Tom, 2O3ni6 Morden, Grant, 58, 59 Munro, H. F., 159 Munro, W. B., 31 Murphy,John, 113, 114-15, 2i7n7o Murray, George, 47, 125 National policy of Macdonald and Laurier, 2, 66-67 Maritimes excluded from, 66-71, 109 on fuel, 83, 96, 101-2 McCurdy on, 132 Meighen's, 141-42 National Trust Company, 61, 121, 183-84

243

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT New Brunswick as part of region, i and Loyalist myth, 2 on federal representation, 13-14 union organization in, 40 iron and steel industry of, 62 textile industry of, 62 on railway policy, 77,84 issues of race and religion in, 86 on Maritime Development Association, 105 politics of, 139-41 tariff policy of, 166 New Glasgow Eastern Chronicle, no, and notes passim Nova Scotia as part of region, i Scottish myth in, 2 union organization in, 39-40 iron and steel industry of, 62 on railway policy, 77,84 on Maritime Development Association, 105 politics of, 131-39 submission to Duncan Commission, 159-60 Nova Scotia Federation of Labour, 40,41 Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Corporation, 3.58 One Big Union, 41, 42, 43 Ontario, 67, 79, 112 dislike of, 106, 108, 122, 123, 142 Patterson, A. P., viii, 190 Phinney, E.G., 160 Pratt, J. M.,46, 50 Pride, E. E., 40 Portland, Maine rivalry with Halifax and Saint John, 26,49,63-64,89, 98, 100, 126 Prince Edward Island as part of region, i agriculture dominant in, 5 on federal representation, 14, 16-17 distrusts Maritime union, 30 union organization in, 40 cooperative activity in, 44 fanners' political movement in, 45

ferry needs, 45, 73, 75, 78, 117, 2121124 problems of potato growers, 64 decline in population of, 65 King as MP for, 83 elections in, 86, 148-49, 156 board of trade in, 97 support for immigration in, 104 on Maritime Development Association, 105 and Maritime Rights movement, 148-49, 187 Duncan on needs of, 169, 170 delay in improving transportation, 173, 177, 188, 189 financial problems of, 185-87 manufacturing in, 2091148 Progressive party expresses Prairie regionalism, 39, 52 hostile to Maritime interests, 87, 90,91 King's alliance with, 128, 149 proposed Maritime alliance with, »5»— 51 Progress!vism, vii, ix, x, 30-33, 38,45, igo-Q1 Pugsley, W. M., 19 Putnam, Harold, 86, 94 Quebec LeSoleil, 173 Ralston, J. L. invited to lead Nova Scotia Liberals, 171 supports Duncan recommendations, »75-76 presents legislation, 177-78 defends government compromise, 179 before Board of Railway Commissioners, 21 on6g Regionalism, Maritime definition of, 1-3 development of, 12, 13, 30 and Prairie regionalism, 39,43,46, 5oi5»-53«87 and Ontario regionalism, 106, 108, 150 in elections, 147, 149 proposed Maritime-Prairie alliance,

244

INDEX H9-52

decline of, 190-91 Reid, J.D., 76, 80, 81,85 Representation, Maritime, 98 in Parliament, 13-17 in cabinet, 27-28 Rhodes, E. N. premier of Nova Scotia, 105, 147 called to lead party, 134-35 replaces Hall as leader, 136-37 strategy on Maritime Rights, 138 Robb, D. W., 62 Robb.J. A., 105 opposes Duncan recommendations, 1 73-74. 175 breaks united front on subsidies, 187 Rogers, H. W., 41 Rogers, N. M., 155 Royal Commission on the Coal Mines of Nova Scotia, 59, 121,158, and notes passim Royal Commission on the Fisheries of the Maritime Provinces and the Magdalen Islands, 182-83, anc' notes passim Royal Commission on Maritime Claims (Duncan Commission) appointment of, 149, 151-52, 154 proceedings and recommendations of, 158-72 report of public response to, 172-73 backlash against, 173-75 compromise on, 176-77 implementation of, 177-79, 180, 188, 189, 191 historiography on, 224n5 Saint John metropolitan aspirations of, 2, 70 rivalry with Halifax, 8, 30 labour activity and, 40, 115 port of, 63-64, 75, 96, 98, 100 manufacturers' problems in, 62, 69 in Maritime Rights agitation, 112-14 Dominion Harbour Commission for, 165, 173, 177, 179 See also Maritime ports Saint John Board of Trade

in Maritime Board, 29 cooperates with Halifax board, 97 endorses speaking tours on Maritime Rights, 112 organizes "great" delegation, 113 on tariff, 117 at Winnipeg conference, 118 on West Indian trade, 144-45 sponsors victory banquet, 180 Saint John and Quebec Railway, 75-76, 77, 170, 174, 176, 190 SaintJohn Journal, no Saint John Standard, 16,80 Saint John Telegraph-Journal, 97, 112-13, and notes passim Saunders, A. C., 186-87 Sclanders, F. MacLure, 119, 188, 189-90 secretary, Saint John Board of Trade, 116 secretary, Duncan Commission, 154, 171 investigates backlash against, 174-75 Scots, 2, 11, 16 Secession, 80, 109-12, 115 Sexton, Dr. F. H., 32 Sharp, F. V., 35 Sills, K. C. M., 10,32 Sinclair, J. E., 149, 156, 187, 2i3n5o Social gospel, 31,33,40 Socie"t£ Nationale de 1'Assomption, 9-10,34, 127 Stanfield, Frank, 24, 135, 136, 147 Stanfield, John, 24 Stewart, J. D., 149 Subsidies Maritime agitation on, 17-22,80-81, 89-90, 2i8n78 on transporting fish, 56, 98 on transporting coal, 129, 185 Duncan's recommendations on, 160-61, 170 and freight rate reductions, 163-64, 174.*77>188-89 Maritime unity on disrupted, 185-87 Sydney, 5,61, 101, 179 Sydney Post, 101 Tariff Advisory Board, 177, 183, 185 Tariffs, 100 Maritime division on, ix, 87, 117, 157,

245

THE MARITIME RIGHTS MOVEMENT 166

Vancouver Province, 113, 173 Veniot, P.J. chairs Maritime claims committee, 82 in "great" delegation, 115, 2 i7n7o invites King to visit Maritimes, 129 explains Maritime Rights movement, i39-4 role of ethnicity of, 140 enters cabinet, 171 on implementing Duncan report, 1 75-7°, »79' l8°

Fordney-Micumber, 55, 57, 64 on coal and steel, 66-67, 83, 101, 103, 128, 169, 183, 184-85 of Fielding, 88,99 Congdon on, 108, 142 McCurdyon, 117, 157, 167-68 Dennis on, 152-54 Duncan on, 165-68 See also Imperial preference Thornton, Sir Henry, 98-99, 105, 118-19, 163 TigheJ.E., 115 Toronto Globe, 173 Toronto Star, 89 Tory,J. C., 22, 82 Turgeon, On^siphore, 129 United Fanner's Guide, 45-46,48, 50,52 United Farmers of New Brunswick, 44, 45 United Farmers of Nova Scotia, 44,45 United Farmers of Prince Edward Island, 45 United Fruit Companies of Nova Scotia, 44-45 United Mine Workers of America, 39-40,42,59-60,61 University union, 32-33, 34

Walker, J. A., 135, i95n3, 2 2in 4 7 Wallace, W. B., 149, 159 West Indies trade, 77, 55, 143-45 White, A. V., 101 Whitman, A. H., 2211158 Wigmore, R. W., 84, 87 Winnipeg Free Press, 113, 172 Winnipeg Tribune, 173 Wolvin, R. M., 58, 120, 184 Woodsworth, J. S., 51 Workers' Weekly, 51, 2O2ng Wright, A. A., 100-101, 119 Yarmouth loses halibut fleet, 56 American immigration office at, 65 secessionist sentiment in, no, 147 on tariff, 166

246