Maoist and other armed conflicts 9780143415565, 0143415565

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PENGUIN BOOKS

MAOIST AND OTHER ARMED CONFLICTS Professor Anuradha M. Chenoy teaches in the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Her books include Militarism and Women in South Asia and Human Security: Concepts and Principles (co-authored). Dr Kamal A. Mitra Chenoy is Professor and Chair, Centre for Comparative Politics and Political theory, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He has been a Member, Indian Counci of Social Science research and a social activist and commentator. He has authored several reports, based on his extensive travel in areas of insurgencies and conflicts, that have been published in Indian and international journals.

Maoist and Other Armed Conflicts Anuradha M. Chenoy Kamal A. Mitra Chenoy

PENGUIN BOOKS

Cont ent s

Acknowledgments 1. Introduction 2. Conflict Models and their relevance 3. Armed Conflicts in India: an Overview 4. State responses 5. The Political Economy of Conflict 6. Human rights, Militarization and alienation 7. Gender and armed Conflicts 8. Civil Society Interventions in armed Conflicts 9. Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index

Ac k nowledgm ent s Writing the book has been challenging, but we were greatly helped by family and friends in this endeavour. ayesha, archit and Ishaan were a constant source of encouragement and support. thanks to ritu, Nitin, Medha and Gyanesh for their support. the conversations with our many friends have enriched the book more than they can imagine; thanks in particular to rajeev and tani Bhargava, achin Vanaik and Pam, Seema Mustafa, Praful Bidwai, rajan Kumar, Khushhal, Nandini Sundar, and Zoya and Mushirul hasan. We are grateful to our many students and activist friends for their comments on several ideas that went into the making of this book. We are grateful to ranjana Sengupta and Kamini Mahadevan for their careful comments. We fondly remember Chandershekhar Prasad, with whom we discussed the Maoist movement and Indian politics in great detail. the responsibility for the opinions expressed here is wholly ours.

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I nt roduc t ion

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ne-sixth of India’s citizens live in areas of armed conflicts. There are the insurgencies of the Northeast, the secessionism and conflict in Kashmir, and the Maoist insurgencies and struggles to capture power in several regions of India. Besides these are the past insurgencies of Punjab and Mizoram that have been resolved but have left a deep impact on people and state structures. What are these armed conflicts? Why do these insurgencies happen? What are the factors that fuel armed conflict? What is their impact? These are some of the basic issues that this book addresses. Armed conflict is the use of armed violence by groups of people to resolve disputes or fulfil demands that have a political/economic/cultural/social origin. The Uppsala University Conflict Data Program defines armed conflict as: ‘An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battlerelated deaths in one calendar year.’1 This book critically looks at the

various debates on the root causes of armed conflict, in order to situate those occurring in India. It also seeks to discuss whether any of the available models are appropriate for understanding and resolving such conflicts. The goals or social transformation that armed conflicts seek to achieve may originate from contesting claims. Terrorism or violence may be used as a tactic or sometimes as a statement of communication. Conflicts can be between groups, or between groups and the state, over control of political power and resources. It often originates because of and sustains itself on the deprivation of rights and is aggravated by conditions of poor human security. Armed conflict is different from war, since it can be of lower intensity and sustained over longer periods of time.2 Armed conflicts can encompass insurgency, violent political struggles, violent liberation movements and violent movements for social change. Political or economic demands, grievances and disagreements, or belief in certain rights—like the right to self-determination—or the struggle for a change in the structure of power may act as a trigger. These demands could be interpreted as being for more autonomy or even independence, and thus be met with force by the state. Armed conflicts may not be continuous but sporadic, rising repeatedly over similar issues, with differing levels of violence at different times. They may also shift from one community/issue to another. Such conflicts also involve many human rights violations which become part of the collective memory of grievances. The Geneva Conventions describe armed conflicts as intra-state conflicts of non-international character and lay down rules of behaviour for them, which are addressed by the additional protocols of the Conventions. To avoid using these Conventions, states do not recognize internal armed conflicts officially and term them as militancy, insurgency or terrorism. Besides, most conflicts, even when confined within a state, have some forms of linkages outside their boundaries, by way of moral or material assistance. Conflicts in Kashmir, the Northeast and Punjab have received material and political support from neighbouring countries. Pakistan justifies

support to Kashmiri militants; Bangladesh, Myanmar and Bhutan have had camps that harboured militants. **** States look at armed conflicts through the paradigm of national security. National security is the primary concern of the modern state and is the basis of its domestic and foreign policy. The paramount task of the state is perceived as creating and maintaining political, economic, social and other structures to ensure its survival. The notion of state security is linked to its legitimacy and strategic vision. Realist theories provide the dominant, mainstream theoretical foundation of the prevailing concepts of national security. National security is based on military force, and state power is seen as the core of security in times of conflict or potential strife. National security is also used as a cover to justify policies and actions by regimes and to curb accountability and dissent. Realists argue that since states are the primary providers of security, an individual’s security is ensured by virtue of membership of the state. The individual’s security is tied to the state’s because the latter is bound to protect and preserve the social order, and to protect individuals from outsiders and from internal strife.3 In other words, individual security ‘trickles down’ from state security. From this perspective, individuals are not the appropriate starting point in thinking about security. Power is seen in terms of a hierarchy dominated by men who can influence others, when necessary by force, and society is organized on this basis. For the neo-realists, the main actors are men who exercise rational choice. Increasingly, states of the South, including India, have based their theories of security on such realist and neo-realist doctrines of national security. National security doctrines rely on militarism and justify it in the name of national interest which is seen as the ‘supreme interest’ of the nation. The use of military power by the civilian leadership ‘to save the nation’ and to solve political problems, citing instances of instability or sectarian strife, legitimizes authoritarianism and militarizes society.

Militarized values are when the belief and need for force to assert power are justified and when power is equated with force and manliness. Militarization is not just an outcome of a large, standing and capable army but of specific national security policies and the militarist response by state and non-state actors. During insurgency and armed conflict, the ideology of militarization becomes dominant for both the insurgents and the state. Militarization involves cultural as well as institutional, ideological and economic transformations.4 Political systems keep militarism alive through their decision-making rather than by tradition or culture. Militarization exists during peace and war, and can occur in any part of society, even that not controlled by the military; thus virtually anything can be militarized—toys, scientific research, motherhood and curriculum.5 A state does not have to be dominated by the military to be militarist. Democratic states often use militarist methods to deal with other states in their foreign policy, or with opposition and internal dissent. When used by states to deal with dissent, militarization may intersect with other ideologies and is termed as anti-national, or even as terrorism. National security acts may be used indiscriminately. Defence spending and military ideas gain ascendancy even in peace times in a militarized set-up or wherever there is armed conflict. The state then uses a large part of its resources to beef up its security which is at the cost of social expenditure on health and education. This book argues that we need to revisit the dominant realist paradigms which inform mainstream theories of nationalism. State security has to be democratized and broadened to include gendered human security which must also privilege the subaltern sections of society. This would necessitate a democratization of policy-making and the expansion and protection of human rights. International law in general, apart from international humanitarian and human rights law in particular, should be respected and the international laws that states have signed like the human rights conventions should be made part of domestic laws and carefully implemented. This book looks at insurgencies from different points of view. It looks at the

state response but also focuses on the impact and response of civilians. Chapter 1, the introduction, lays down the hypothesis that in large areas where armed conflicts persist, the state has limited hegemony and consent and thus resorts to the doctrine of force. Chapter 2 analyses the theoretical models of armed conflicts and their relevance in studying conflicts in India. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the genesis of armed conflicts, without detailing every event that marks their history, and also the main trends. It probes the root causes of these conflicts and examines the demands, structure and ideology of insurgent groups. Chapter 4 looks at the response of the state, which has become the primary actor in the armed conflict, and the laws that they use. The Indian state views armed conflicts through the lens of national security and use of force but has also offered conditional negotiations with insurgents. Chapter 5 looks at the political economy of conflicts and how these are funded. Is there a linkage between conflict and the way the economy functions in these conflict regions? Armed conflicts weave their own distinct political economies which is turn give rise to and sustain armed conflicts. In South Asian, and especially Indian, conflicts, it is not easy to track down the precise source of funding, but the non-state militias have access to funds and weapons that make them formidable. The state uses massive resources to counter them and ratchets up its defence spending and its forces. Chapter 6 looks at human rights, militarization and alienation. It examines the immense impact of armed conflict and shows how it varies depending on the location, vulnerability and relation of individuals and groups to the armed conflict. The effect on the general social and economic development, environment and health of the societies and state where conflicts takes place is also studied. Chapter 7 discusses the gendered dimensions of conflict as well as the impact of this on the affected men, women and children. It shows why women are joining these conflicts in large numbers and relates some of their experiences.

Chapter 8 is on civil society and its role in armed conflict. In India, despite armed conflict, civil society has grown and functions primarily because of the existence of democratic structures. Civil society has reacted to the insurgencies and has taken steps through the use of non-governmental organizations and other groups to work towards peaceful solutions of these conflicts. Chapter 9 concludes that ultimately armed conflicts in India can only be resolved through political negotiations and with political will. The book does not look into the complex of conflict resolution theories, but looks at the status of negotiations around the ongoing conflicts. It argues for a human security approach and political negotiations with all sides, in order to resolve these armed conflicts. This book argues that ongoing conflicts are essentially political and, therefore, resolution of these conflicts will also have to be political rather than predominantly military and repressive. This book looks at armed conflicts and their peaceful resolution through the paradigm of human security. A popularly accepted conceptualization of human security is security at the level of the individual; that is addressing the factors that can make a person’s life insecure. The different aspects that can be incorporated in an understanding of human security are: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, political security.6 In the words of the United Nations, human security is freedom from want and freedom from fear. Human rights are critical for human security and both are dialectically linked, in that human rights are not possible without human security and human security is based on human rights. Thus, civil society has an important role in armed conflicts and their resolution. **** This book is based on our extensive travel to regions of armed conflicts over the years, where we conducted many interviews. In the Northeast, we were helped by several of our students who come from these areas. We were able to interview fifty-five men and fifty-

five women, many of whom had links with the conflicts in Nagaland and Manipur. In Kashmir and elsewhere we met large numbers of victims, activists and others. We have included our experiences in each of these conflict areas. Besides our observations from primary research, we have drawn on readings of local papers, reports by civil society groups, news items in the national press, books and official documents.

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Conf lic t M odels and T heir Relevanc e the last few decades, 90 per cent of armed conflicts have been I nintra-state: civil wars, insurgencies and movements opposed to the state. There has been much research on why they occur, what the root causes are, and on their resolution, because an incomplete understanding can lead to newer and more intractable inequalities, grievances and recurrence of conflicts. This chapter analyses conflict theories and marks out some issues that need to be factored in when examining conflicts in India and elsewhere. Clearly, there are multiple and complex reasons that give rise to conflicts, and we argue for applying a rights-based and human security approach. The Security Council has noted that ‘the quest for peace requires comprehensive, concerted and determined approach that addresses root causes of conflicts, including their economic and social dimensions.’ (Security Council, SC/7014, 20 February 2001) There have been several important research projects that attempt to identify and analyse conflicts. The greed and grievance models have been adapted by Paul Collier, William Easterly, Francis Stewart, Valpy

Fitzgerald and others. Liberal peace is another way at looking at creating peaceful societies. The radical and the human security approaches critique the liberal and greed and grievance models.

The Greed and Grievance Models The greed model is not new. Plato linked economic inequality with conflict: ‘We maintain that if a state is to avoid the greatest plague of all —I mean civil war, though civil disintegration would be a better term— extreme poverty and wealth must not be allowed to arise in any section of the citizen-body, because both lead to both these disasters.’ (Plato),1 Collier, Jeffrey Sachs and Easterly, link underdevelopment, poverty and conflict and say that specific ‘traps’ lead to conflicts. These traps are: poor nutrition, debilitating disease, terrible infrastructure and high fertility. Collier adds dependence on natural resource extraction, poor governance and isolation from market. Research by the World Bank and the International Peace Academy argues that after the Cold War economic reasons rather than political motivations have been the cause of wars in order to grab power and resources.2 War, for these theorists, is a continuation of economics by other means. This is a variation of Clausewitz’s argument that war is continuation of politics by other means. This implies that conflict is a method of accumulation. The greed model links conflicts with ‘resource wars’ and consider that when poor countries have mineral/oil wealth it becomes a ‘resource curse’. This is shown by the correlation that in the last decade, 43 per cent of the countries in the lower half of the human development index (HDI) were at risk of war, while only 5 per cent of countries in the top third of the HDI were in conflict. Secondary factors like a dispersed population and a difficult terrain make it hard for a government to control war. Collier also shows that wars recur in regions where there is a history of wars. He argues that diasporas and their long-distance nationalism assist in fuelling armed conflicts in home territories. For Collier, ethnic dominance of one group and exploitation of others can enhance the risk of war whereas religious diversity can

actually avert this risk because no one group is big enough to dominate the country, and people do not feel unequal. Collier equates most rebellions and even liberation movements as primarily greed-based, with the motivation of looting assets. These rebellions, he states, use the language of protest to recruit cadre and justify their own actions. Collier says that while the leadership talks of oppression, it is they in fact who are responsible for increasing grievances while the real motive all along remains looting.3 The greed analysis shows that regions with young unemployed men, low average incomes, low growth and high export of primary commodities such as oil and timber were prone to civil conflict.4 Such a mix provides availability of manpower and resources to fund the conflicts. David Keen argues that war occurs because of the profit motive and not because of the breakdown of development.5 Others like Anke Hoeffler agree that poverty in itself is a crucial structural cause of conflict. Similarly, Valpy Fitzgerald supports the view that structural inequalities lead to conflicts.6 For conflict resolution, greed analysts believe that increasing education levels and growth rates reduces the risk of conflicts. They also focus on good governance, advocate minority rights, arms control policies and respect for human rights and democracy. Clearly, these are important interventions. But the question that arises is: was not the lack of these very human rights and equity issues the very basic reason for the conflict in the first place? Collier however believes that ‘addressing objective grievances is not usually an effective way to achieve this goal.’7 He advocates that governments along with the international community reduce risk factors making it difficult for rebel groups to get established, by improving basic services and not allowing rebels to sell resources in the international market. Macartan Humphreys argues that statistical research has not found evidence of a relationship between economic inequality and conflict and thus concludes that there is no evidence to suggest that the structural adjustment policies (SAPs) led to an increase in conflict.8 Other research has shown that economic shocks are destabilizing and promote conflict situations. All indicators have proved that SAPs lead to inequalities. That there are conflicts in some places where SAPs are in

place (though not in all) shows that economic inequality is a variable, while obviously not the only one. Models that focus on conflict as a consequence of grievances, like Francis Stewart’s, broaden the greed analysis to show that horizontal inequality, weak institutions, poverty, lack of social services are the root causes of conflicts. Power inequalities, inequalities between ethnic and religious groups are also seen to aggravate conflicts. 9 Stewart’s arguments have much strength when they show how political leaderships mobilize cultural differences when inequalities exist. Stewart’s argument has been widely accepted and been used for the development of backward regions. Academic debate has become polarized around the greed and grievance dichotomy, with analysts divided between ‘loot-seeking’ and ‘justice-seeking’. As a consequence, policies for resolution or for development seek solutions along these lines, often pouring in aid or promoting growth through market methods.

Problems with the Greed and Grievance Theories Several problems arise when we apply the greed and grievance theories to study armed conflicts. 1. All reasons for war and insecurity cannot be measured in econometric terms. The greed and grievance theories are unable to explain why in similar circumstances in two poor regions, one may be entirely peaceful and another has an armed conflict. For example, why in the case of India, is there a conflict in Kashmir but not in central Uttar Pradesh where there is more poverty, more unemployed young men, and different resources? Difficult geographical terrain does not necessarily lead to conflict. For example, there is no conflict in the Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir though it has the most arduous terrain. 2. The greed model does not take into account historical memory of grievances or victimization. It does not look into the construction of the ‘other’: the creation of stereotypes, the mobilization of ethnic subnationalism and the creation of a nationalist consciousness, the

demonization of the other. It does not connect how grievances get militarized and how leaders use grievances to mobilize and sustain mass support. It does not look at local cultural processes or structures of local exploitation and instead reduces all these factors to greed. The belief that conflicts recur in the same places does not hold in all cases as European conflicts have shown. 3. Diasporas cannot be seen as an independent reason in fuelling conflict. It also depends on nationalism and other multiple factors. Thus, the Chinese or Gujarati diasporas do not fuel conflicts but the Tamil and Kosovar diasporas have helped the insurgencies in their countries of origin. 4. Collier’s argument that religious diversity can offset conflicts is partially true. Many examples have also shown that ethnic and religious diversity if not accommodated within a plural system and multiple institutions can lead to armed conflict. 5. Often genuine discrimination and oppression leads to protest movements and form the basis of conflicts. These conflicts often degenerate, especially if pervaded by violence and greed. For example, the Maoist movement in Nepal or the opposition movements of 2008 and 2010 in Thailand show that it is simply untrue to label all these as purely based on greed. Both these movements channelized popular discontent against the prevailing regimes. 6. Greed theories do not accept structural inequalities and historical injustices that translate into grievances, and leave out the factor of alienation amongst people. The role and nexus of local contractors, politicians, corporate interests and police that appropriate mineral and land resources and displace tribals is a major reason for armed conflicts. Here it is the greed of powerful contractors and functionaries that is primary. The lack of institutions and economic and social exploitation do not form part of the fundamental reason for the greed analysis. Even if greed is an aspect of some conflicts, the mass support and legitimacy of the leaders is often based on a rights issue. For example, the cadres of the Nepal Maoist movement and the Naga movements carried out extortions and levelled illegal taxes. But much of their support base justified this as necessary for sustaining the movement and as struggles against the ‘“greed” of others’ i.e.

transnational companies, corrupt local governments, uncaring state policies, etcetera 7. Both the greed and grievance theories underplay the role of the state and of state militia and the biases of regimes.10 There is overwhelming evidence to show that in many of the intra-state conflicts, the state has been far from neutral, and has generally sided with one community, especially against the minority. Collier thus confuses legality with legitimacy and gives far too much power to the state. In Assam, for example, even when the economic situation improved after 2000 there was still no turnaround in the conflict.11 8. The problem with greed and grievance theories is that they believe that growth and a market can solve all problems. They advocate one model of development that links development with growth and increase in the GDP of a state. In this model, the benefits of growth are to trickle down to the dispossessed. Yet the development agenda advocated by the Stewart model has in some cases led to new conflicts or sharpening of the existing ones. That is because when development is left primarily to an unregulated market it leads to the exclusion of some already excluded communities. It leads to displacement as new dams and Special Economic Zones push out settled tribal and agricultural communities and in addition privatize the commons or communal assets. It accepts the same model of development that privileges markets and growth without equity. In every conflict, the issue of citizenship rights matches that of increased inequality. Diminishing welfare and social-sectors benefits also need to be looked at when viewing grievances. 9. The grievance theories do not look at the linkages that insurgencies have with the ruling regime and government, nor does it examine the insurgency–civil society linkages. It does not look sufficiently at the role of ideologies and how nationalism/subnationalism/militarization work in tandem to mobilize support and sustain these insurgencies/armed conflicts. It does not analyse the perceived historical injustices that communities feel and that contribute to their alienation from the polity. 10. These models under-analyse the role of state, though new research is looking at the failed state model. Biases in economic and political institutions and biased state policies form an important part of

root causes for grievances that work into construction of the enemy ‘other’. Inadequate governance, which is the technical aspect, is blamed as a reason for conflict whilst politics and political mobilization are not adequately questioned. 11. The greed and grievance models do not look at strategic imperatives in armed conflicts, e.g. in the North West Frontier provinces (NWFP) and its contiguous regions in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, the role of great powers, the reasons for states to expand their resource base in other states, or what radicals call imperialist imperatives. Thus the impact of the international system, historically, and contemporarily, is rarely inquired into. There is inadequate attention to the role of international trade by big corporations or countries, and the role and ethics and policies of multinational corporations. 12. Though the role of militias and violence are taken into account, the structural violence that impacts communities and the daily militarization of life are parameters that ought to be included as causes of conflict. 13. These models do not address the phenomenon of alienation; the role of patriarchal structures and their intersection with militarist and nationalist ideologies. The greed and grievance analyses have some strengths and have been widely used, but the problem is that they are at best partial if not simplistic. The causes for conflict are thus complex.12 It would be appropriate to use the rights-based human security approach to view armed struggles.

Liberal Peace The concept of the ‘Liberal Peace’ or democratic peace that derives from Kant’s argument that democracies enable peace is widely accepted. The Kantian argument has three components: (1) Democracies are accountable to citizens and generally have to take their consent before going to war. (2) In democracies, internal peace is dependent on external peace. (3) The interest of commerce

necessitates peace. All three points are based on the interest of the democratic coalition in power.13 There are several exclusions in the liberal peace argument. Most importantly, it ignores the linkage between democracies and colonialism and, indeed, imperialism. Democracies may have internal peace but have imposed wars for colonial extraction. ‘Trade following flag’ and the use of force have also been features of post-colonial expansion by democratic states. Marx, Hobson, Lenin and other critical thinkers have thus critiqued the liberal peace arguments. Inherent in the latter are the possibilities of accepting a hegemonic and therefore unsustainable peace. Another aspect liberal peace does not take into account is the many modern intra-state conflicts within democracies, including internal lowintensity wars. This is because war in the West has been usually analysed in the context of the World Wars and most theories of conflict research have been developed on the basis of the African armed conflicts. There has been lesser research and a corresponding paucity of theoretical models that draw on the Asian, and especially the South Asian, contexts. To sum up, we may cite Amartya Sen who argues against economic reductionism and says that the link of poverty and conflict is a probability but not inevitability. He supports the view that there is a complex system that leads to conflict.14 Lack of development or poverty in itself do not directly cause conflict, but poor socio-economic conditions and lack of democratic institutions, can increase social tensions as well as reduce a society’s capacity to manage these nonviolently. Poverty and unemployment provides cadres who are willing to engage in violence, crime and terrorism. But these require other factors to turn them into conflicts. John Galtung also theorizes on the ‘conflict triangle’ that includes motives, cognitive structures and behavioural dynamics.

Hegemonic or People’s Peace

Defining peace as the absence of war has been questioned and the idea of a culture of peace where violence is rejected and conflicts resolved by tackling their root cause through dialogue and negotiation (UN, 2000) is more or less universally accepted. The liberal peace model combines peace, democracy and free markets. This mixture however, easily yields to a hegemonic peace as status quo and stability with markets. A victor’s peace does not deny either democracy or markets but does not ensure justice or address the root causes that started the conflict. Such peace can be unstable and lead to new conflicts. Liberal-hegemonic peace can be a victor’s peace imposed by force over another country or region within a country: for example, Sri Lanka’s peace in the North after the civil war was won or the peace thrust by the Burmese junta on the people, etcetera. All these states want peace without any significant change in social relations, and just based on some elements of formal democracy and functioning markets. Following the concept of a hegemonic peace, the security established trickles down from the state to the individuals and focuses on maintaining law and order.

Radical Theory Radical theorists believe that class analysis, economic exploitation, injustice and imperialism need to be factored in to understand armed conflicts. In the era of globalization, similarly, the need for hegemony and access to resources, protected by state force should be considered. This enhances our understanding of conflicts, but within limits. Intra-state conflicts are attributed primarily to economic reasons. Internal wars are justified by the right to self-determination and the idea of internal colonialism, though the role of ethnicity and identity conflicts is not given due attention. Mary Kaldor and others cite cases from the 1990s wars in Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia and their collapsing states to show that neo-liberal shifts and globalization have generated new conflicts and exacerbated old ones. Ted Gurr focuses on minorities and uses a political economy framework and subscribes to the idea that it is relative deprivation but

not inequality in itself that leads to conflict.15 Crammer after examining data and applying new indices, argues that the idea that economic inequality leads to conflict can neither be accepted nor rejected. Experience establishes that economic inequality is only one of the many variables for conflict and overdependence on it is likely to lead to economic essentialism and determinism.

The Lens of Terrorism Labelling conflicts as ‘terrorism’ takes away from analysing their root cause. Terrorism is a method, a tactic, and not a reason for conflict. Nelson Mandela was labelled a terrorist: in another example, Maoists in Nepal were labelled terrorists. So it is better to analyse armed conflicts through their ideology, structure, organizations, demands, mass support, etcetera, rather than label them terrorist. Labelling prevents analysis and prevents conflict resolution. When the analysis of root causes excludes major reasons for the conflict and depends on labels and military force then solutions to these conflicts also get stunted. Solutions are boiled down to improving infrastructure, governance, accessibility to markets and policy measures. Foreign aid is then based on such parameters. Aid impacts differently when used for geo-strategic purposes and for market reforms as opposed to aid for human security.

Explaining Conflicts Holistically Most conflicts can neither be explained nor resolved by linear and narrow paradigms, and more holistic explanations and resolutions are necessary. The reality is that each conflict has multiple causes that are rooted in their individual histories, social relations, economic processes and the perceptions and claims of the rights of communities/nations. Human rights abuse, denial of justice and lack of inclusive negotiation get wrapped up with these causes. This creates alienation, a collective feeling of ‘not belonging’ or ‘not being part of’ and, in turn, becomes

part of those root causes that create conflict. Poverty adds to conflict but is not the only trigger. Equally important are perception and lack of justice. When adding the availability of young men for inciting conflict, one has to actually examine the system of masculinity and patriarchal structures as also militarism. Besides, more women are becoming combatants. Further, research has shown that educated middle-class men and women also join conflicts, depending on what are their root causes. Conflicts often have the support of the communities wherever they occur and this has to be explained. Experience has shown that merely countering underdevelopment or any one ‘trap’ will not resolve the conflict. By equating democracy with the market, the root cause for backwardness and oppression is overlooked. The very forces that sustain markets and cause inequality cannot be expected to yield solutions for this. The international causes of internal conflicts need to be identified and addressed. Further, politics that is often omitted by the idea of governance, which pursues technicalities, should be taken into account. Those who were already excluded from the market and state power remain so, and in the long run become the excluded communities and minorities. Conflicts when ‘managed’ but not justly resolved tend to resurface.

The Human Security Approach to Armed Conflict The human security way to understanding conflicts combines various approaches, broadens them to include a rights-based approach and argues that looking at conflicts through the lens of national security or simply underdevelopment is insufficient. The human security concept of peace and security emphasizes a process that is founded on dignity, justice, rights, inclusion and human development. It emphasizes that state security be broadened so that people are part of security concerns. The human security paradigm of peace and security is possible only if states see their own security as inclusive of the security of individuals and communities, even if these communities are in opposition to the state. The role of the state does not end with the conducting of elections and the creation of a market. It begins from

there as the state empowers individuals and decentralizes institutions and is seen to provide a semblance of justice. The state delivers equal rights to dissident minorities, negotiates their demands and allows for creative solutions. However, many states/political parties see their minorities and dissidents as ‘national security threats’ since they do not conform to the constructed image of a homogenized majority. They assume that granting such people rights or freedoms will risk the security and sovereignty of the nation state. Sri Lankan President Rajapakse’s statement is an example: ‘Federalism is out; just don’t talk about it. Historically, the word is suspect and is linked with separatism.’16 The tendency is to endorse majority sentiment over minorities. He adds: ‘In any peace settlement I have to carry the Sinhala voters with me. I cannot unilaterally impose a settlement.’17 Likewise, is the ‘autonomy proposal’ rejected by the Indian government, though passed unanimously in the Jammu and Kashmir assembly in July 2000 by popular vote. The perception of the Indian government has been that this is a separatist demand. But the Kashmir state assembly sees it as a way to counter the separatist insurgency demand by getting greater autonomy within the Indian Union. The attempt to impose the will of a majority is the basis of many chauvinist political parties that want the majority to prevail over minority citizenship rights. Such dominations form the basis of conflicts between groups and communities. Peace and development that are sustainable are dialectically linked with people at all levels. The human security approach broadens national security to include individual rights, is based on justice, equity and sustainable development and looks at structural inequalities. The human security discussion on root causes of armed conflicts would address the following issues: 1. Development policies: Have they led to inequalities, marginalization and displacement, or helped growth that is inclusive and sustainable? 2. The impact of the international system on the local situation: Has it led to increased unemployment, inequality and a diminishing welfare and social sector? If so, how can these be altered?

3. State policies: Are they discriminatory toward ethnic/ religious or any minorities? Do they support corporate interests over local interests? Do state policies have legitimacy and are they acceptable to local people? 4. Identity issues: are the minority and excluded communities, like tribals and dalits, included in all institutions of state, economic decision making and public life or are they alienated from the state process? 5. Militarization: To what extent is the daily life of people militarized? How many disarmament measures at the macro and micro levels have been institutionalized? 6. Violence: What are the forms of violence, physical, gendered and structural, that the community uses and faces? What are the peace negotiations taking place to resolve such violence? 7. Are the social, economic and political histories of the people and communities reflected in state and party policies? Are local customs and diversities reflected in policy and decision making? When society breaks down, those who are excluded are further devalued and forced out of the market and governance. The private sector does not participate in infrastructure rehabilitation especially when they see few profits. Further, the value of assets declines and distress sales impoverish large numbers of people, especially the weaker classes, women, and excluded communities. There is overwhelming evidence that local ownership is necessary for reconstruction. Economic and social stability is an input to peace but inappropriate economic policies cause conflicts and undermine peacebuilding. The neo-liberal proposals that have been used for postconflict societies have to be replaced by human development. Political will is necessary for understanding and addressing conflicts. A human security approach looks at alienation of people from the polity as well as implications for civil society. State and Human Security Approaches Security Issues

Human Security [How Human State Security [How States Security/Peace Activists Approach Security] Approach Security]

Security for Security for state and Whom? regime

Security for people, communities and individuals.

Methods of Power of force and state Security? machinery like military.

Power of mass mobilization; civil use of debate and justice

Threat from other states Security and non-state actors Threats from militarism, from What (terrorism) Construction of chauvinism, sectarianism, Threats? threat perception. (From patriarchy, poverty, etc. ‘other’ communities) Goals of Security?

Safeguard state interests, territory and sovereignty Maintains hegemony control, retention of power/territory

Urge for democratization, social justice, human rights, equity; freedom Necessity of secularism

Discourse National security discourse Based on human security, of Security that is state-centred. opposition to militarism Laws of Security

National security laws; minimum or opportunist use of of international law

Laws based on social justice and civil liberties; acceptance of international laws and conventions

Increases in defence Minimized defence Economics budgets and high military expenditure and increased of Security expenditure, acquisition of social sector spending missile technologies. Regional military Global organizations like NATO Connection Joint military exercises s of Marginalization of United Security Nations Security Approach to Conflict

Seen as law and order problem Repressed/controlled through military/police

International peace and social movements Democratization of multilateral institutions Dialogue, discussions, justice; inclusion and rights-based solution. Politics oftruth and reconciliation.Knowing the ‘Other.’

force; national security acts. Theoretical Theories of Realism, Neo- Based on human security, Foundation Realism, militarized linked with ethics in s of nationalism. international affairs. Security Arena of Security

State and inter-state. With With public discourse and in multilateral and public forums. international organizations

Impact of Security Policies

Increasing authoritarian policies (even in democratic states); violation of human rights; censorship; militarization; re-enforced patriarchy; marginalization of many sections of people.

Increasing democratization decentralization, people’s intervention on foreign policy and security; introduction of creative concepts like divisible sovereignty, shared territoriality; non-violent resolution, etc.

In all these conflicts civil society remains divided, where some sections support the state and all its actions. Large sections remain neutral and are subject to contesting legitimizing and de-legitimizing forces. Some sections of civil society are sympathetic to demands of these movements, critical of human rights violations and state policies, and especially the ‘right-wing’ movements. States that use state-centred and militarist methods of security have failed to solve conflicts with just resolutions, they have only ‘managed’ or controlled conflicts. The alternative social and peace movements seek thus needs to question the security paradigm of states. Several methods of alternative security have been assessed by experts that range from comprehensive security and non-traditional security to human security.18 We show the difference between the state security and human security approaches below.

Conclusion

The continuation of conflicts, millions of deaths and displaced, child soldiers, women raped and humiliated, inter-community violence, increased defence expenditure at the cost of social and developmental sectors indicate that conflict and development paradigms need radical revision. Development assistance that is given to states in conflict may be used by the regime in power to further specific agenda. It has been found that security expenditure is higher than social sector expenditure and this necessitates security sector reform. In areas of armed conflict, the ratio of security to human security should be 10:90. Millions of dollars worth of development assistance has not led to the right kind of development of some states and in others, the process of development itself has been reversed when conflicts have risen and remain unresolved. Human security is a concept that offers long-term solutions by incorporating entitlements to the traditional concepts of state security. The success of concepts like human security rests with civil society activists, NGOs and social movements. A robust civil society is more effective in influencing foreign policy where a human security perspective is operative. It is evident that human security is a necessary and empowering idea with potential to improve the terms of human existence when accepted by states. Human development cannot be ensured without human security. Such a paradigmatic shift will clarify how militarized notions of security add to insecurity of people and states. For this, it is essential for civil society to discuss people-related security issues. To safeguard people’s security is a way to ensuring state security: for this it is necessary to broaden and humanize the concept of security itself. ‘We are unavoidably side by side’ is a truism voiced by philosopher Immanuel Kant, but this co-existence can only come when democratization deepens, secularization occurs, decision-making is decentralized, gender equality is a reality, and equity and multiculturalism are ensured. These are indivisible aspects of the security discourse, and only human security and peace ideals can ensure this.

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Arm ed Conf lict s in I ndia: An O v erv iew Indian history is replete with insurgencies and armed M odern conflicts grounded in pluralities, hierarchies and socio-economic inequities. These conflicts have had varying origins and demands, ranging from identity rights as in Kashmir, the Northeast and Punjab to class-based, ideological struggles as in the Maoist–Naxalite movement in some of the poorest districts in rural India. Occurring at different times and in different regional locations, and often unconnected to each other, they are culturally unique, each with a distinct language, religion and tradition. Ethnic identity, security, development, injustice, unemployment, migration, human rights and environmental degradation are some of the underlying dimensions of these conflicts. Some conflicts characterized by links to neighbouring countries in the region also have geo-strategic and foreign policy implications. These conflicts impact the state and government structures, the communities and people where they are located, and are linked to international processes. The history of armed conflicts in India reveals that despite variations, there are also commonalities in

modes and praxis. The process of modernization and uneven development have sharpened antagonisms and given them new forms. Their main protagonist is the Indian state, but in the course of these conflicts, contradictions develop within the insurgent groups, their peers and often with the very communities that they seek to represent. This chapter examines the nature of the armed conflicts in India, contextualizing them in their social and regional milieu. Without going into events in detail, it seeks to bring out their diverse histories and specificities, to understand the root causes. Analysed here are the conflicts in the Northeast—with emphasis on Manipur, the Naga conflict and insurgency in Assam, Jammu and Kashmir, the Khalistan movement in Punjab, and the Maoists. They are not connected to each other but have regional ramifications, in that particular locations and communities are sites of these conflicts. Special laws not applicable in the rest of India are in force here and large numbers of paramilitary are deployed. There are human rights violations and a militarization which is not so apparent to the rest of India. Since these conflicts are not part of the Indian growth story, the communities affected by them are not the visible, upper-caste elite, their stories and voices are not part of mainstream discourse.

Nature of Conflicts Northeast The Northeast, comprising the seven states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Tripura, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland, has witnessed armed conflicts for decades. The anti-state movements in several of these regions including Mizoram, Assam, Tripura, Nagaland and Manipur are called ‘national liberation’ movements, while the Indian government labels them ‘insurgencies’ and their cadre as extremists or militants. The combatants in armed conflicts and their close supporters call themselves ‘freedom fighters’ or

‘national liberators’ because they glorify their struggle and justify their militant methods. In mainstream discourse, the same insurgents are referred to as ‘the underground’, since they live in the shadows of the state structure and their organizations are illegal. Militarist and right-wing analysts prefer to call them terrorists, who should be annihilated at any cost and without the necessary recourse to justice since terrorism is unjustifiable. The record of armed resistance in the Northeast has been varied. In Mizoram, the Mizo Accord, 1986, a memorandum of settlement was signed between the Government of India and Mizo National Front after which arms were laid down and the statehood demand accepted. The Shillong Accord of 1975 was essentially a ceasefire agreement; no demands of the local people were acceded to. In another part of Assam, following the Bodo Accord in 2004, active conflict decreased. In Assam, several movements like the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) continue to periodically indulge in armed attacks and even terrorist violence. In the two states of Nagaland and Manipur the long-drawn-out and intense armed conflict remains unresolved, though a ‘ceasefire agreement’ has been signed between the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isaac–Muivah), NSCN (I-M), and National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Khaplang), the NSCN (K) and the Government of India. India does not accept the concept of ‘indigenous people’ and the official position is that there are only religious and linguistic minorities. Partly as a reaction to British colonialism and the construction of the Indian nation, the nationalistic discourse is profoundly homogenizing. Though cultural variations are recognized and within limits celebrated, there is a notion of ‘composite culture’ incorporating strands from all of India’s diverse cultures, rather than recognition of a multiplicity or plurality of cultures corresponding to different nationalities or nascent nationality formations. An extreme expression of this mainstream tendency is Hindutva, that desires a fusion of all nationalities under an elitist Hindu tradition, and which is resisted by all those who are part of the secular tradition. An example of cultural elitism is Article 351 of the Constitution that promotes the spread of Hindi language with a particular emphasis on

Sanskrit. Minority cultural and political assertions are therefore subordinated to elitist upper class/caste ideologies. Such ideas have shaped the Indian state’s response to movements for autonomy or self-determination which are seen as ‘identity politics and that have given rise to local nationalisms in the Northeast and Kashmir, and earlier in Punjab.1 The use of the armed forces in the Northeast and the national media’s response to popular assertions which are perceived as threatening India’s integrity are shaped by the same nationalist ideology. There is therefore a cultural and ideological basis to India’s militarism which makes the phenomenon so pervasive and resilient. Ninety-eight per cent of the borders in the Northeast region are international and the connectivity to the rest of India is tenuous. This makes it possible for insurgents to cross borders illegally and thus the government views all problems in the area as threats to national security.

THE NAGA MOVEMENT The Nagas comprise multiple tribes and sub-tribes spread over several states of the Northeast. For example, the northern, eastern and western hills of Manipur state are demographically dominated by Naga tribes, and some of these tribes live on the borders of Myanmar. The Nagas believe that they constitute a separate nation and did not accept unification with the Indian Union. As early as 1929, some Naga representation was made for self-rule when the reorganization of India was being discussed by the British. Their demand for self-determination has led to conflict between the Naga National Council (NNC) and India since 1947. Led by Angami Zapu Phizo, the Naga National Council resolved to create a sovereign Naga state. The Naga tribes held a referendum in 1951, which got the support of 99 per cent of the people, and then boycotted the 1952 Indian general elections. The Assam Maintenance of Public

Order (Autonomous District) Act was enacted in 1953 and under it the armed police arrested the leaders of the NNC. In 1954, a special army, the Assam Rifles, entered the Naga villages. In 1955 the Assam Disturbed Areas Act was introduced. In 1956 the Naga Hills were handed over to the army. Faced with this harsh state response, the Naga movement went underground in 1956 and set up a Naga Federal Government and an underground Naga Federal Army (NFA). Subsequently, the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (1958) was enforced in this region. In 1963 the union state of Nagaland was formed, followed by attempted negotiations with the Naga underground to bring about a political settlement. A ceasefire was declared between the two sides and six rounds of talks held without any results. The peace mission was wound up in 1967. The Indian government banned the Naga underground associations in 1972, and followed this by massive military operations until dialogue was re-initiated and the Indian government and the NNC signed the Shillong Accord in 1975. This deeply divided the Nagas, who broke up into factions; and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) contested the Accord. This group again broke into two factions in 1988, one led by S.S. Khaplang NSCN (K) and the other led by Isaac C. Swu and Thuengaling Muivah NSCN (I-M). Both these factions ran parallel governments in different parts of Nagaland.2 The NSCN became a powerful militant outfit in the region. With the death of Phizo in 1990, the movement faced other problems of factionalism. The Naga movement was not just a movement of ethnic dissent as a result of uneven development. Historical and cultural factors played a major role. The military crackdown widened the gulf. The human rights violations heightened personal tragedies and created a collective psyche of victimhood. The gap between the Indian ‘nation’ and the Nagas became more perceptible. The establishment of the state of Nagaland did not serve as compensation as it divided the Nagas between those who wanted to participate in the Indian Union and others who were determined to continue with their selfdetermination struggle. Furthermore, many Naga tribes were left

outside the boundaries of the new Nagaland. They came to be included in Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. The idea of a Naga nation stood contested and this further alienated the tribes. Simultaneously, large sections of the younger generations became supporters; others moved away. The Indian state has used several approaches to deal with the problem. The dominant one has been that of national security, whereby movements like the Naga struggle are seen as a threat to Indian sovereignty and that have to be crushed. The other approach has been to pursue development by providing funds for several infrastructure projects like road building, dams and mineral extraction that have been initiated in the states of Assam, Nagaland and Manipur. On the down side, however, small sections of the elite have gained from these projects but ordinary people do not perceive substantive gain. The government has also offered talks after several years of insurgency to armed groups like ULFA and NSCN (I-M) and NSCN (K). Further to its national security approach, the Government of India passed national security legislation with which it has countered the Naga movement. Such laws have been used in most regions where the government faced insurgent movements. The Assam Maintenance of Public Order (Autonomous District) Act, 1953 and the Assam Disturbed Areas Act, 1955 have been mentioned above. The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) in 1958 and 1973 have followed. In addition, the government used the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA), 1987, and later enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), 2002. All these national security acts have draconian features that give the military and paramilitary wide-ranging powers with little accountability, grossly restricting civil liberties. These Acts are one of the most obvious reasons for the militarization of these regions and the deep alienation of the people. While Nagaland has an elected government, featuring some mainstream and regional parties, the parallel governments of the NSCN argue that they represent the ‘Naga Nation’. They maintain signifiers like a flag, a small underground army that replicates army

protocol, and other state symbols. Nevertheless, the ‘nation’ is fractured by deep factionalism and in-fighting between the groups; the lack of deep links between the tribes or ‘tribal particularism and inter-tribal rivalry’;3 multiple dialects, rivalry between different types of churches and most of all, the pressure and repression by the Indian state. The factional feud between the two underground Naga groups, NSCN (I-M) and NSCN (K) has caused loss of life and bitterness and has been deeply gendered as women became victims of rival forces: the state, the underground and the community.4 This region is heavily armed with a high presence of security personnel which is seen as one of the chief reasons for the ordinary people’s insecurity. Since April 1995 all of Nagaland has been under the AFSPA, which virtually places the region under constant emergency provision and under central rule. Despite the July 1997 ceasefire between the NSCN groups and the Indian government, the national security legislation and sense of fear persist. The Government of India and the NSCN (I-M) have had over forty rounds of talks and discussed various options for the creation of a greater Nagaland, a peace treaty and new federal framework, but there is little change in the status quo. The Meiteis oppose any break up of Manipur to accommodate the Naga demand of bringing together Naga tribes in one state. This has aggravated Naga–Meitei hostility, to the extent that in May 2010 the Meiteis and the state government blockaded Muivah from going to his hometown in Manipur. The Naga Students Association of Manipur retaliated in the same vein. For two months they blocked the main entry points into Manipur state, causing a severe economic crisis and increasing inter-ethnic hostility.

MANIPUR

The state of Manipur faces multiple conflicts and is the most insurgency-ridden with almost thirty armed groups. The southern region like Churachandpur has Kuki–Mizo tribes that have clashed in the past. The hill districts of Manipur like Ukhrul, Senapati and Tamenlong are inhabited by Nagas who share the aspirations of a greater Nagaland. They are in conflict with the Indian state and face opposition from the Meiteis of Manipur Valley who are opposed to the greater Naga Nation concept. The Meiteis are primarily Hindu but see themselves as culturally distinct to the rest of India and want to safeguard the integrity of the state of Manipur. There are several Meitei underground groups like the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the United National Liberation Front, the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) and others that oppose the Indian state and seek self-determination. These groups do not accept the Manipur Agreement of 21 September 1949 under which the state acceded to the Indian Union. Manipur shares an international border with Myanmar. Through the border towns illegal trade and trafficking, including in small arms, takes place with groups in the hills of Myanmar and South-West China. Small arms, ammunition and all kinds of goods are available. Drug trafficking is allegedly high, and globalization has led to an increase in the illegal operations and connections between the ‘underground’ of the Northeast with those of Thailand, Bhutan, Myanmar and Bangladesh. At the same time, many middle-class Meiteis accept the mainstream political parties of India and have affiliations with them. The rift between the Nagas and Kukis in the hill districts peaked from 1992 to 1996 and more than 2,000 lives were lost. There has been rivalry and conflict between the Kukis and Paites tribes that resulted in killings in 1997–1998. The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (1958, amended in 1973) has been in place in Manipur for decades and there is a popular people’s struggle against it. Meanwhile, Manipur is one of the most militarized states in India, with little to show in terms of development or governance as the later chapters show. Government reports suggest that militant organizations are virtually running a parallel government in many

districts of Manipur.5 This is a case of a failed state within the Indian Union.

ASSAM Assamese sub-nationalism started as a linguistic movement, as British India treated it as the land frontier of Bengal. The protest primarily was against the influx of non-Assamese people who came to work in the tea gardens. Throughout, the linguistic dispute remained prominent. As Sanjib Baruah has argued: ‘… the cultural policies of the Assamese and resistance to treat as the land frontier of Bengal became the two central themes in the conflict of subnational policies of Assam in post-colonial times too’.6 The assertion of the autonomy and distinctiveness of Assamese language and culture is historical. In independent India the tension between Assamese ‘subnationalism’ and ‘Pan-Indianism’ reached a crisis point on the question of settlement of Hindu refugees from East Bengal (now Bangladesh) and there was a popular demand for administrative measures to curtail the non-Assamese migration.7 Fear of demographic changes culminated in the language riots before and after the passing of the Official Language Bill and resulted in many deaths. This ethnic violence ended with a compromise formula which allowed for the continuation of English and removal of any compulsion on the matter of colleges switching to Assamese. The Assam Official Language Act raised fear and suspicion in the minds of the different hill tribes and accelerated tribal separatism in Assam.8 From 1960 onwards, the territory of Assam shrunk rapidly following ethnic assertions by Nagas, Mizos and Khasis, all of whom demanded the right to self-determination. Assamese found this reorganization of the Indian state questionable.9

Uneven economic developments, regional disparities and a porous border with Bangladesh that has led to periodic influx of large numbers of immigrants in search of jobs, have put pressure on Assam’s economy. Chinese claims on border territory, combined with regional and sectarian dissatisfaction, gave impetus for agitation by bodies like the All Assam Gana Sangam Parishad (AAGSP) and All Assam Student’s Union (AASU) that harvested the politics of cultural identity. Initially activists of these movements were looked upon by the Assamese people as ‘our boys’ and local Robin Hoods. Through the 1970s and 1980s, massive acts of violence that included massacres/harassment of ‘outsiders’, blockading of oil pipes and damage to state property became part of the movement. The central government’s response, invoking the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, strengthened the military’s hand as the law enforcement authority, for the sake of ensuring the continuous extraction of crude oil and functioning of the oil pipelines. Following the horrific ethnic massacre in Nellie in 1983, then prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi signed the Assam Accord in 1985, which made significant promises on cultural and economic development concerns.10 On the thorny issue of immigrant ‘foreigners’, it was agreed that they would be classified based on the date of their entry into India. Accordingly, some were given citizenship rights, others were disenfranchised temporarily, and the remaining were to be deported. These measures were, however, difficult to implement, as Sanjib Baruah argues, because of the technical and legal problem of identifying a ‘foreigner’. The Assam Accord did not succeed in addressing the Assamese people’s sense of alienation, economic deprivation and cultural and social insecurity. With the Accord falling through, people’s disaffection with the central government led to the insurgency movements of the ULFA and Bodos.11 Two new parties emerged out of the Assam movement. The Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) that recognized the Indian Constitution, whereas the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) considered Assam independent of it. The AGP’s popularity declined with the charges of corruption and failure to resolve the immigrants’ problem.

ULFA came to occupy the centre stage in Assam’s politics. Its professed aim was to liberate Assam and the Assamese people from the shackles of Indian imperialism.12 ULFA’s ‘chairman’, Arabinda Rajkhowa, and its armed wing led by Paresh Barua claimed that Assam was never a part of India, giving the Assamese subnationalism a radical and militaristic turn. ULFA maintained close relations with groups in Myanmar, Bhutan, Pakistan and Bangladesh. It mobilized people against others, like migrant Bengalis and Bihari labour, calling them ‘infiltrators’ and creating a communal atmosphere.13 Under Indian diplomatic pressure, Bhutan and Bangladesh agreed to co-operate but insurgents were able to move through these regions. Former Assam chief minister, Prafulla Kumar Mahanta appealed to the central government in 2003 to start the peace process with ULFA at the earliest with an ‘open mind’, even if the ULFA wanted to discuss the ‘sovereignty’ of Assam. The proposal to negotiate with the militant outfits of Assam along the lines of talks with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland has been rejected by the ULFA, stating that since thousands of lives had already been lost, the struggle for sovereignty could not be abandoned. Ever since then the political uncertainty in the state continues. Militancy has always been met with a heavy hand by the Indian government. To flush out the militants, a joint operation with Assam was carried out in the Garo Hills area of Meghalaya, where ULFA and Bodo rebels had intensified their activities. There have been Indo-Bhutan offensives and retaliations by ULFA. Since 2004, the number of ambushes, fake encounters, custodial deaths and extrajudicial killings by armed personnel has also been on the rise, perhaps in response to ULFA’s intensified activities. Torture used on civilians actually increased alienation.14 Dialogue between ULFA and the government has been unsuccessful. In 2009, ULFA leaders like Arabinda Rajkhowa, Sasha Chaudhury, their ‘foreign secretary’, and others who had sought sanctuary in Bangladesh surrendered. Their commander-in-chief, Paresh Barua, opposed talks, and remains underground. But the surrendered ULFA

or Surrendered United Liberation Front of Assam (SULFA) cadres have been used for counter-insurgency, increasing the ruthless violence. ULFA strikes at key events; for example, in April 2009, just as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was to tour the state in connection with the general elections. To counter this, the chief ministers asked for additional security forces for Assam. The violent means adopted by ULFA and their undemocratic methods have eroded public support for them in the region.15 But people in Assam still do not have confidence in the Centre and feel that some of the issues raised by the insurgents need to be addressed. Assam’s reduced cultural heterogeneity since the creation of separate tribal states has sharply heightened tensions between the Assamese and other communities, including the Bengalis, the Biharis and other migrant labour who feel the wrath of ULFA and others, as hostility to the ‘outsider’ in Assam continues. Despite this increasing militarization, no clear solution is in sight. It is evident that civil society and members of the larger community have to become stakeholders in order to isolate the chauvinist elements in Assam.

BODO MILITANCY Inter-ethnic hostility and insularity has increased in Assam. The minority tribal Bodos’ demand for ethnic recognition have got increasingly identified with extremist groups in regions like Kokrajhar and Bongaigaon districts. The All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) spearheaded the demand for Bodoland in 1987. The ABSU accused the AGP for imposition of Assamese language and culture and started intensive political mobilization in support of the Bodoland demand. Militant groups like the Bodo Security Force that emerged in the mid-1980s and outfits such as the Bodoland Army, Bodo Liberation Tiger Front and more recently, National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) have been carrying out violence in the state.

Other tribal organizations such as Birsa Commando Force and All Santhal Cobra Force have also added to this fear and violence.16 There are many strands to this violence: underground or guerilla warfare against the state; ethnic riots between communities; communal mobilization based on threat perceptions of migrants; retribution and violent control by the military and paramilitary; incidents of terrorism; targetted and stray killing of leaders, activists and lay people of the other community; rapes and violence against women of the other community and ethnic cleansing.17 A Memorandum of Settlement on Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC), was signed in 2003, between the Government of India, Government of Assam and the Bodo Liberation Tigers. The objective has been to create an autonomous self-governing body within the state of Assam and to provide full constitutional protection under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution.18 While this has been a step forward, the Bodo people still want full statehood. In March 2010, 10,000 Bodo militant cadres surrendered before the Government of Assam in exchange for the quick implementation of the demand for an autonomous region. Smaller tribal groups like the Karbis, Rabhas, Kamtapur Liberation Army, and the Garos have been making similar demands.

TRIPURA AND MIZORAM Tripura, that has a large tribal population, faced an armed tribal insurgency. Nearly half the region was labelled ‘disturbed’ and placed under the AFSPA (1958). Migration of Bengalis to the region since the late nineteenth century and their relatively higher positions of power has been one of the causes for the divide. Bengali migration increased during and after the Bangladesh movement and India–Pakistan 1971 war. As a result, the tribals have been reduced to a minority status. The tribal communal mode of agriculture has been disrupted, despite the attempts of the government to stop the

alienation of tribal lands. Tribal movements both overground and underground have been widespread, with concomitant violence and militancy. The main political parties have been unable to address the tribal unrest. In Mizoram too, militarization occurred in the mid1950s, and villages were strafed and bombed, but later an accord was signed between the Mizos and the Government of India. The insurgencies of the Northeast have common features. All of them are built around ethnic or tribal identities that exalt their collective identity and build stereotypes against other communities that are then demonized and constructed as the enemy ‘other’. All believe that a separate statehood or independent status is the only way of getting their rights. Characteristic of their ideologies is a mix of self-determination and a vague construction of community socialism. They oppose the mainstream political establishment, from the Indian state and central government to the state government and local governance agencies (unless they are in control). Their leadership comprises those who first articulated demands for autonomy. Young cadres often are male students and unemployed youth. Women have joined the movement in various ways. They have their own small armed militias. The conflict zones are underdeveloped, but development or rights are not their main demand, which remains autonomy. The central and state government seeks to counter most of the insurgencies by force. Negotiations and peace dialogues are attempted once the area is considered ‘disturbed’. But these dialogues are viewed cynically by both sides.

Kashmir Kashmir (shorthand for Jammu and Kashmir) acceded to the Indian Union under special circumstances at Independence in 1947, when India was partitioned and Pakistan made a claim on Kashmir on account of its Muslim-majority status. Pakistani-backed tribal raiders invaded Kashmir and the ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh was obliged to

seek the services of the Indian army to repulse them. With the help of Sheikh Abdullah, the most popular leader in the state, who rallied the Kashmiri people in supporting the accession to India, Kashmir was formally incorporated as a special part of the Indian Union, a fact that Pakistan has contested since then. Pakistan’s raids into the northern part of Kashmir led to the division of Kashmir into Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) and the Indian parts of Kashmir, divided by the contentious Line of Control (LoC). This has led to unending hostilities between India and Pakistan that range from low-level conflicts to wars. Families and communities have been divided along this border for decades with little communication possible. Pakistan has demanded that Kashmir be part of Pakistan, since it is a Muslim-majority state. India considers Kashmir as part of the Indian secular state. Pakistan is committed to self-determination of Kashmiri people, and views its mission as part of the ‘unfinished agenda’ of the Partition of India in 1947. The people of Kashmir have been caught between what Pakistan considers ‘a dispute’ and India, having held Kashmir de jure since 1947, considers an ‘integral part’ of Indian territory. India recognized the unique nature of Kashmir and in 1949 incorporated provisions to this effect into the Indian Constitution. The special Article 370 granted most governing powers to the Kashmiris, except for some critical powers such as defence, foreign affairs, currency and communications, which remained vested with the federal government. Kashmiris were to have their own Constitution and flag. The Kashmir assembly was to decide which, if any, Indian laws it would permit to be extended to Kashmir. These concessions were remarkable exceptions to the Indian Constitution. The powers of the Kashmir Constitution, however, did not last long. By 1953, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru could no longer accept the popular Kashmiri Prime Minister Sheikh Abdullah’s assertions of Kashmir’s autonomy or even independence from India. He was a separatist leader and popularized the demand for plebiscite and contested the Indian position on Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah was summarily removed and placed under house arrest from 1953 onwards, on grounds of suspicion of pro-Pakistani

sentiments. He was released only after the Indira Gandhi–Sheikh Abdullah Accord of 1975, when the National Conference ended its separatist demand and became a mainstream regional party. But the Sheikh had not prepared the people of Kashmir for this Accord and Congress leader Swaran Singh stated in Parliament in 1975: ‘that there was an influential section of public opinion in J&K which still was not in the mainstream of Indian nationalism.’19 People felt betrayed as they had not been taken into confidence. For twentythree years, they had been fed on the promise of plebiscite. A separatist ideology had been instilled in them. Even after the Accord, the Centre continued to erode the autonomy of the state and further attempted to destabilize the locally elected governments. This worked well for the Indian government for some time. In the interim period, making use of pliable governments elected in what were generally believed to have been elections rigged in favour of the ruling party, the greater part of the autonomy given to the state was systematically taken away by successive central governments. The Congress party put pressure repeatedly on the National Conference and after Sheikh Abdullah’s death, his successor and son Farooq Abdullah made alliances with the Congress so as to complete his term as chief minister. During this period, Nyla Ali Khan writes that the Indira Gandhi regime characterized every demand for local empowerment as being potentially insurgent, discouraging the growth of a progressive generation of Kashmiris.20 Popular leader Yousuf Tarigami states: ‘This led to the rupture of emotional integration of the state with the Union of India. It cost India loss of prestige and credibility in the international community. Not content with erosion of Article 370, the Government of India from time to time abetted rigging in Assembly and Parliament elections. Democracy became a mockery.’21 Such acts deepened the popular alienation in the Valley and increased anti-India sentiments. Pakistan supported secessionist forces from 1947 onwards, but the critical event that led to heightened alienation was the hanging of Maqbool Bhat of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) in 1984.

The growing Kashmiri alienation did not become militarized until the 1987 elections, wherein the opposition Muslim United Front candidates were robbed of a significant number of seats in the Valley while counting agents and candidates were beaten and thrown out of counting centres. For example, in Maisuma, Srinagar, Syed Salahuddin (who later became chief of the Hizbul Mujahideen) was supported by the local people against National Conference party leader, G.M. Shah, who was declared winner after the rigged election. Yasin Malik (later chief of the JKLF), the counting agent, was witness to this. Ever since then, there has been hardly any turnout in elections in this area, which is known for its protests and clashes against the Indian army. By then the Kashmiris had had enough and, by 1989, a popular movement for ‘Azadi’ (freedom) began to support the militancy. This movement had the spiritual and material support of Pakistan that encouraged Pakistani-trained militants to infiltrate into Indian Kashmir and target the Indian security forces. In the entire Kashmir conflict, some 50,000 to 80,000 people, primarily Kashmiris, have been killed.22 As militancy in the Valley increased, the traditional identity of ‘Kashmiriyat’ was gradually reconstructed. Identity may be shaped by traditions but is continuously reconstructed and re-interpreted to adapt to the modernizing aspiration of communities. In the case of Kashmir, the conflict and demands for separatism gradually challenged the secular traditions of the Valley. Fundamentalist forces from both the Muslim and Hindu communities were in the fray, emphasizing the resentments between the communities and downplaying the harmonious relations. In a situation where the Kashmiri Pundits (upper-caste Hindus) were a minority in the Valley and 2 per cent of this community owned 30 per cent of land and had bonds with the institutions of the state, the Muslim peasantry felt deprived. The rising Muslim middle classes lacked opportunities and felt distanced from the state. The manipulation by the central government of the electoral processes and its failure to uphold the promises increased Muslim

alienation. Jagmohan, former governor of Jammu and Kashmir, homogenized the Kashmiri identity as a ‘militant other’: ‘Every Muslim in Kashmir is a militant today. All of them are for secession from India. I am scuttling Srinagar’s Doordarshan’s (TV) programmes because everyone there is a militant … . The bullet is the only solution for Kashmir. Unless the militants are fully wiped out, normalcy can’t return to the Valley.’23 Militant forces had a similar approach. The Hindu right wing questioned Kashmiri Muslims’ patriotism and the Kashmiri Pundits were encouraged to move out to camps in Jammu. This move hit the special Kashmiri culture and lifestyle as Anuradha Bhasin points out: ‘The displacement of Pundits from the Valley has been the prime tool of Indian officials, politicians and media in the propaganda war over Kashmir since 1990.’24 Secular Islam in the Valley began to be replaced by militant Islam. This increased alienation in the Valley and a demand for selfdetermination backed by Pakistan became the basis of conflict and terrorism. The Hurriyat Conference, a conglomerate of several secessionist parties was formed in March 1993 as a political front to further the cause of Kashmiri separatism. There have been differences within the Hurriyat, wherein groups like the JKLF want independence for the region while others are in favour of joining Pakistan. The Indian state responded by clamping down against the militants and others by declaring the area as ‘disturbed’ and using laws that gave the police and paramilitary extrajudicial powers that violate civil freedoms. Reports from Amnesty International state: ‘The arbitrary arrest and detention of those peacefully voicing dissent appears to have become more widespread in Jammu and Kashmir with the Public Safety Act increasingly being used to punish those who speak out against the government’.25 There had been occasions where the Kashmiri Hindus had been targetted by militants as in Anantnag district, but records showed that militancy has taken the lives of both communities. In these circumstances, it was the responsibility of the government to talk to the militants, initiate steps towards confidence building rather than taking recourse

to force and separating the two communities. This separation affected communal relations in the rest of India as the impact of the conflict spilled over. Since 1947 the Kashmir dispute has bedevilled relations between Pakistan and India, leading to three wars in 1947, 1965, and 1971, and military conflict in Kargil in 1999. Both countries have tested and possess nuclear weapons, and their hostility has repercussions for South Asia. The core tension is the confrontation between their two nationalisms: Pakistani nationalism theorized in the ‘two-nation theory,’ where a Muslim state like Kashmir is necessary for Pakistan’s Muslim identity; on the other hand, Indian nationalism where Kashmir, with a sizeable Muslim majority, stays with India as a potent symbol of Indian secularism. Kashmir has become hostage to these bitterly contending nationalisms. Several solutions have been offered, including one from India that argues for no territorial changes but the possibility of a ‘soft’ border where people can engage with each other. Another proposal is of bifurcating Kashmir into various ethnic regions.26 Others suggest the Valley as an autonomous region with internal self-government but with external and defence being held jointly by India and Pakistan.27 None of these have been accepted, as talks are attempted but mired on the issue of terrorism and India does not want to resume a composite dialogue until it gets a commitment from Pakistan. Internationally corroborated evidence shows that jihadi groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Hizbul Mujahideen have links to forces within the Pakistan military-Intelligence establishment and use terror tactics to force India to accept a solution palatable to Pakistan. India-Pakistan relations have been further complicated by Pakistan’s role in the Afghan conflict and the American-led intervention. Pakistan is leveraging its influence in Afghanistan to get gains on its eastern border. Though Pakistan suffers increasing domestic terrorism which led to the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, it continues to distinguish between its internal terrorism from that in India. As this stalemate continues civilians in Jammu and Kashmir

have been caught in the crossfire between the extremists and the army. Thus there have been many recorded human rights abuses, which have become an integral part of the disturbed situation that prevails there.

Problems of Regional Autonomy in Jammu and Kashmir The central government’s lack of recognition of the demand for regional autonomy in Kashmir has been an important reason for resentment in Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh. An attempt to draft a regional autonomy report by journalist Balraj Puri was scuttled.28 Puri wrote: ‘Indian nationalism had lost much of its moral élan and had developed tendencies towards uniformity and centralization. Kashmiri nationalism, on the other hand, acquired a fresh sense of importance as the option to decide Kashmir’s final affiliation remained open for a long period …’29 Kashmir itself has differences on internal autonomy issues. For example, people of Poonch, in Jammu region, are resentful of Jammu. Groups in Ladakh want Union Territory status. So apart from ‘jihadi’ and ‘azadi’ other regional aspirations have largely ignored by both Srinagar and Delhi. The National Conference government got detailed resolutions for state and regional autonomy passed unanimously in the Kashmir Assembly but the BJP-led NDA government ignored them. The BJP also opposed restoration of Article 370 to its original status of 1952. Regional and sub-regional autonomy is a critical question in the solution of the Kashmir conflict. Canada has given Quebec autonomy. In the US, each state has its own Constitution and flag, and a powerful elected governor. In India, the federation with a bias towards the Centre obstructs the autonomy that states like Jammu and Kashmir need. This will have to be re-negotiated. Without such discussion and resolution, there can be no major progress in solving the Kashmir problem.

The Kashmir Saga Continues There have been periods when violence has declined sharply in the Valley, as people suffer conflict fatigue and do not see it leading to any solution. But the nature of the discourse is similar even as tactics have changed. The new forms of the Kashmir movement range from mass strikes, demonstrations, closures and ‘stone throwing’ that reveal the nature of the ‘freedom movement’. Meanwhile, every new controversy heightens tensions and increases alienation and divisions in the region. For example, in June/July 2008, the agreement of the state government to transfer land to the Hindu Amarnath Shrine Board sparked off huge protests. The unresolved rape and murder of two women in Shopian Village led to mass protests as various entirely different versions of the incident came out from the police, the CBI and people’s enquires. Any incident leads to deep divisions between groups, communities, political parties and civil society—a feature that is an outcome of conflict and alienation. The November 2008 elections for the Jammu and Kashmir state assembly were opposed by the political society of Jammu and Kashmir, and the Hurriyat Conference factions tried to organize a boycott that was resisted by the state machinery. The ruling Congress party planned to work with the National Conference. This only endorsed what former governor B.K. Nehru had written that the Kashmiri chief ministers ‘had been nominees of Delhi’ who won power ‘by the holding of farcical and totally rigged elections’.30 The turnout for these elections was over 60 per cent. Most people in the Valley agreed that this turnout was for local issues, while the demand for self-determination and justice on human rights violations remained as important for the Kashmiris as before. Alienation is the most striking aspect of the present situation in Kashmir. The Kashmiris do not feel part of the state or mainstream India. In addition, they feel discriminated against and excluded. This touches all aspects of their existence, whether personal life or governance from ‘outside’.31 Most top police posts are held by non-

Muslims. Most senior civil servants and police officers are Hindu. The mainstream Kashmiri parties do not risk annoying New Delhi, whether on issues of torture, release of detainees, withdrawal of the army from prized lands, etcetera.32 The consequence is that there is no middle ground. Meanwhile, the human tragedy continues. Besides the dead and misssing, according to the 2001 census, unemployment was high, increasing over 7 per cent over the last few years. Militancy is the main outlet of popular alienation which, ultimately, has local causes. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence has taken advantage of this alienation.33 Meanwhile the Kashmiri people suffer as does the Indian state on its account.

Punjab The conflict that shook Punjab in the 1980s revealed the politics of militancy and state force. At the heart of this conflict was the Sikh community’s demand for a separate ethnic state. The main political party of the Sikhs, the Alkali Dal had led an agitation for a ‘Punjabi Suba’ since the 1960s. The Congress government did not accede to this demand since they believed that this would communally divide the Hindus and the Sikhs in the state. When Mrs Gandhi became prime minister in 1966, the Shah Commission was appointed to divide the Punjab state, and its recommendations led to the demarcation of the borders of Punjab, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh. Chandigarh became a Union Territory and the common capital of both Punjab and Haryana. The Alkali Dal was unhappy with the decision and focused on Sikh identity politics. Writers like Kuldip Nayyar, Khushwant Singh and others attribute the rise of the militancy in Punjab to both political and economic causes.34 They argue that the Green Revolution increased the prosperity of rich farmers that could not be channelized because of the lack of industrialization and other opportunities; it increased inequity between sections of the peasantry and raised expectations for a new nation that would fulfil the aspirations of Sikh nationality.

Identity-based mobilization and growing unemployment of youth made them easy instruments for fundamentalist and militant movements. Sikh separatism was articulated in the 1973 Anandpur Sahib Resolution that demanded greater autonomy for Punjab, Chandigarh as the sole capital of Punjab, readjustment of state boundaries and better allocation of river waters. This developed into a full-fledged demand for an independent Khalistan as the local gurdwaras and priests started intervening in politics. To counter Akali monopoly over the gurdwaras and local politics, the Congress party started backing one articulate gurdwara priest—Jarnail Singh Bhindranwala. He used this support to become an independent force and symbol of ‘the most effective instrument of renaissance of Sikh fundamentalism’.35 Bhindranwala advocated communal politics, proposed an independent state of Khalistan and practised militant politics. He stated: ‘To be armed is the birthright of every Sikh.’36 He built up groups of extremists, levied taxes on villagers and took over as head of the Golden Temple (the holiest of Sikh shrines) in Amritsar. Militant organizations under Bhindranwala like the All-India Sikh Federation gave the call for religious war, and banned the use of tobacco and sale of liquor in Amritsar in 1981.37 The Khalistan movement typified a militant movement, which used terrorist methods and had a militarist ideology and organization, and attempted to create communal tension. The agenda was to drive Hindus from Punjab and create a communal situation that would bring Sikhs living outside Punjab back to the ‘home’ state.38 The movement did not tolerate dissent within its ranks and did not hesitate to kill and terrorize other Sikh leaders and movements, like the Niranakaris and the communists. Women were to be subservient to the demands of the movement; they were ordered to adhere to traditional norms, to dress according to Sikh customs, covering their heads. Having closed all options, including avenues for peaceful negotiations, the Union Government responded with a strategy of brutal and military force, to flush out the terrorists through wide-

ranging military operations.39 Civilian government was suspended and President’s Rule imposed. The army operation in Punjab in 1984, Operation Blue Star, was the largest civilian action of the military since 1947. It included an assault on the Golden Temple and flushing out terrorists from the villages throughout the state. In October 1984, after the assassination of Mrs Gandhi by Sikh security guards, widespread communal rioting followed, with a virtual pogrom against Sikhs in northern India, especially Delhi. The Government of India took some political measures and conducted a set of meetings with the Akali Dal delegates under the leadership of Sant Longowal between October 1981 and 1984. There were also some tripartite meetings that included representatives of opposition parties. The central government dismissed the Punjab government a second time in 1987 on the grounds that it was not able to maintain law and order. President’s Rule was imposed. Ordinary people were caught between the two extremes, the militants and the police (state).40 These years saw a trail of bloodshed as the Sikh militants targetted the Punjab police and committed random acts of terror, and the police retaliated with counter-insurgency measures based on maximum force. The Punjab government did announce some socioeconomic measures and programmes to generate employment in order to bring ‘misguided’ youth back into the mainstream. Peace committees were also formed as were groups for social harmony. But though Sikh militancy was wiped out, and some accords, like the one in July 1985, were signed between the Sikhs and the Indian government, militancy left a permanent scar on the Sikhs and the history of the country.

Maoist Movement: The Naxalites Low-intensity armed conflict between extreme left-wing Maoist cadres and the Indian state forces has been going on for over four decades in various regions. These Maoist groups called the

‘Naxalites’/ ‘Naxals’ get their name from Naxalbari, West Bengal, where their movement first began. The movement that had been first concentrated in West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh declined due to a combination of factors: state force, land reforms by the state governments and internal factionalism and splits within the Naxalites. But part of the Maoist cadre remained intact. They started their political operations in new districts, especially in forested areas, where there was clear evidence of exploitation of people by the contractor–local politician–local bureaucrat nexus. Maoist groups like the People’s War Group (PWG), Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), the Red Flag and others arose again and spread to the tribal areas. These streams came together in September 2004 to form the Communist Party of India (Maoists). The ‘Naxal infected areas’ as the Indian government calls them, fall mainly in the Fifth Schedule areas that have special status in the Indian Constitution, meant to preserve the tribals’ existence. The Government claims that almost one-fourth of the 600 districts in twelve Indian states, consisting of 7,000 villages and 19 per cent of India’s forests, are ‘extremism-affected’. This makes left-wing extremism led by the Maoists or Naxalites the fastest-growing movement in India. Between 2005 and 2008, there has been a threefold increase in the Maoists’ armed cadres. The main support to them comes from tribals (adivasis) and dalits (scheduled castes), the poorest and most deprived sections of the Indian people who face economic, social and political exclusion, denial of justice, unresolved land disputes, non-payment of minimum wages, eviction from their land on account of mining and other projects, attacks from upper castes, contractor lobbies, etcetera.41 Reports show that violence against them has been increasing.42 The Maoists work in areas where the district administration has failed to perform or is absent. The non-functioning schools and primary health centres, the lack of access to justice and the ineffective local administration are indicators of this. The Maoists use this vacuum to establish their alternate system of power.

The root causes for the spread of this Maoist movement are recognized by some government reports that show that the inequalities accompanying India’s growth, the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, have meant that ‘a large section of people are angry and feel alienated from the polity.’43 Further, ‘the contradiction between the tribal community and the state itself has become sharper, translating itself into open conflict in many areas … ’44 The tribal people thus feel a deep sense of ‘exclusion and alienation, which has been manifesting itself in different forms’.45 Members of the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA) like Congress general secretary, Digvijay Singh and opposition leaders like chief minister of Bihar, Nitish Kumar have reiterated this.46 Others, especially from the right-wing parties, advocate that the Maoists be ‘annihilated’. The Indian government has talked about a holistic solution and eliminating the ‘virus’ of Maoism. The Maoists are banned by the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, and also branded terrorists. The Maoists ideology is based on their simplified interpretation of Marxism and Maoism that argues that the Indian state is capitalist and exploitative; it is led by a comprador bourgeoisie and semifeudal landlord class; is an agent of American imperialism and should be overthrown by a people’s revolution, where only the Maoists can lead.47 They do not believe in the Indian Constitution since it reinforces a class-divided society and exploitation. They see the local police as representative of the Indian state and the local landlord/ contractor as the class enemy who is dispensable, especially if they establish that he has committed a crime against the people. They are especially critical of the neo-liberal policies and the range of Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) signed by the governments with mining companies that give away thousands of acres of forest land which has been the livelihood and resource of the tribals. Maoists want to construct a socialist state through a people’s revolution where tribals have rights to ‘jal, jungle and zameen’(water, forests and land), and land to the tiller. The Maoist agenda of overthrowing the state is not the same as that of the

tribals, who want access to their own land. The Maoists have superimposed their agenda on the tribals’ alienation. The Maoists justify violence as necessary to counter state terror, as retaliation against police or ‘informers’, to seize arms, ‘to protect tribals’, as a statement of their power and control, and for their own survival. They argue that ‘annihilation is the last choice’ but in the same breath argue that there is a class war and they have to counter state terror. On some civilian killings they state: ‘Our boys also make mistakes’.48 Their tactic is to communicate their power by blowing up police stations, railway tracks, government building and schools, especially when these house police forces. The Maoists organize mass protests, closures and demonstrations, attended by thousands of the landless poor. They get new cadre through their grass roots and ideological work but also through force which includes abducting young people and even children as recruits.49 The Maoists have a group of highly dedicated cadre from across these states that move through and set up camp wherever they can get some support from the local people. They target the leadership and cadre of various political parties, but in West Bengal, especially the Communist Party of India (Marxist), which has in 2009–2010 lost almost 200 of their cadre to Maoist violence. The Maoists have set up parallel institutions in areas where they operate, to send out the message that they constitute the alternative authority. How far these bodies actually deliver is contested. Wherever state institutions are weak or have been discredited in the eyes of the local people, the Maoists seize the opportunity. For example, in Jharkhand, no panchayat elections have been held between 1978 and 2010 as the case over reservation of the chairpersons’ posts for tribals went to the High Court and Supreme Court. Police officer Gourishankar stated: ‘If they are held, government funds will also not be pilfered.’50 For three decades, panchayats have been administered by junior state officials, and local people have had no access to justice while touts have mushroomed and a ‘mining mafia’ has become powerful. Local people have no voice: ‘If the officials related with development were

doing their jobs, our jobs would be easier,’ said Shailendra Singh Burnwal, Deputy Superintendent of Police.51 Ministers declare that development funds allocated to these districts are not properly utilized and grossly misused.52 Two-thirds of the forests have been off-limits to government staff. In many districts, police posts are unfilled and a quarter of doctors’ positions are vacant. The Maoists term the flaws of the district administration as the failure of the state as a whole. This helps Maoists and their alternative systems. The Maoist organizational structure has at the base the smallest ‘two man’ village unit; then area secretary and area commander. The sub-zonal committee is overseen by the zonal committee and zonal commander. There is a People’s Revolutionary Committee called the Janatanam Sarkar (JS) elected by a cluster of three to five villages. Maoists have regional bureaus which send representatives to the central committee and the highest body being the politburo. The Maoists have their armed militia, the special guerilla squads —‘Dalams’ and the People’s Revolutionary Guerrilla Army (PLGA), with a claimed strength of 50,000 militia men and 10,000 PLGA members.53 These comprise locals but there are also outsiders in the leadership. The Maoists have an unofficial body called the ‘Sangham’ in the villages to check the events in the village. In the absence of effective state bodies, the Maoists conduct parallel judicial and executive structures, the Jan Adalat (peoples’ court) and the militia: ‘the jan adalat decides and jan militia executes’ and ‘we punish those who violate party norms and deserters ourselves. Regional committees give capital punishment.’54 Official reports acknowledge that on dispute resolution ‘the contribution of the Naxalite movement has been significant’.55 People who would have been evicted from forest areas have managed to stay on there on account of Naxalite presence. Maoists state that unlike the police, they do not target women and thus have more women cadres, both as leaders and in their armed squads. Since the tribal work culture and economy centres around women, they are easy recruits and perform politicization roles.56

The Maoists engaged in small-time, development activities, like running some schools and foodgrain banks, and building check dams, to underline their alternate programme.57 They hire labour and pay wages. Maoist intellectuals like Ghandy assert that they have raised wages for tribal forest workers many times over. But other analysts argue that these wages are still less than minimum wages of the state.58 In the absence of government infrastructure and lack of legitimacy of the police, the Maoists have some degree of local-level support without which they would not be able to survive.59 The Maoists have linked up with the local struggles for livelihood. Where the local people see some significant effort by the government, the Maoists are not popular. Who would want to go to a Maoists’ school if the government school functioned? People argue that they are caught between the ‘Maowadi and Khaowadi’ (The Maoists and the corrupt police).60 Anyone working in these areas, from the local members of parliament, members of state legislature, contractors or businessmen, have some link with the Maoists. How else are elections held? And how else are contracts completed? The Naxals argue: ‘in our zones anyone can go if their identity is clear’. They attempt to establish ‘zones of influence’ or ‘base areas’ where they co-exist with others. In Lalgarh, in West Bengal, in June 2009, the Maoists claimed to have liberated the area for a few days before the police re-entered it and claimed control. The Maoists argue that the police exaggerate their strength and anyone who gets caught is labelled as a zonal commander and fake ‘encounter’ killings are carried out. But the Maoists themselves have given their numbers as tens of thousands.61 Human rights groups claim hundreds of encounters, in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh area alone in the last few years. Repression and fear is widespread since the police keeps track of people and labels all those not known to them as Maoists. In many districts, Maoist cadres operate openly, negotiate cuts from development expenditure from the local administration and carry out local work.

Militias, Militarization and Militant Activity Each of the insurgencies in India have armed militias that are well equipped with small arms, light weapons, landmines and grenades. They often use force indiscriminately where security forces, civilians, women and children get killed and hurt. They regret civilian killing but target the police. They attack the moderate groups within their community. They homogenize themselves as superior and vilify the ‘other’. They are known to deal violently with dissent. Militants have attacked moderate Kashmir politicians, and ruthlessly quashed dissent or pluralism within their ranks; similarly, Sikh militants attacked moderate Sikh leaders like Sant Longowal. Most militant ideology in Kashmir (with some exceptions) is based on a communal understanding of a vision for the state, based on Islamic personal laws which would alienate other minority communities. During the Khalistan Movement, the Sikh militants worked on imposing religious and traditional norms. Ideologically, the frequent statements by militant leadership and religious bodies equate the secessionist movement in Kashmir with jihad or holy war which has only given an impetus to militancy. Fundamentalism from within the movements in Kashmir and that emanating from Pakistan have tended to merge. The Kashmiri militants do not deny the Pakistan link.62 Militants called for Islamization in the Valley in 1990, with an order to shut down all cinema halls and liquor stores. A change has been imposed on the very traditions and culture of the Valley, from one of a liberal syncretic Islam to one of jihad, influenced by the sects that founded the Taliban.63 Militants, and the Pakistan government, have argued that in the case of Kashmir, the special concept of jihad or holy war applies, which supersedes all international humanitarian law, not to speak of Indian law. This form of Islamist tradition has had the deepest impact on minorities in particular, and women in general. The combination of militancy, security forces, a crippled infrastructure, and one which is unproductive, has led to a distortion and militarization of structures of everyday life for women, children and men.

Engaged in asymmetrical warfare, this militia has unconventional modes of combat. Besides terror and indiscriminate tactics like bombing and laying landmines, it also uses psychological and political means. The state forces are often unable to counter these measures and provide security to ordinary citizens. Groups that are targetted then also use extraordinary measures. Smaller ethnic communities targetted also take up arms and create smaller militias.64 Sub-groups take up arms. Individuals also seek gun licences and pay for protection; in a sense the entire region gets militarized.

Comparative Assessment of Armed Conflicts There are several commonalities as well as differences between these insurgencies/conflicts. The Maoist conflicts are essentially ideological peasant-, adivasi-based class movements, among others, but the separatist insurgencies in Kashmir, Northeast and earlier in Punjab, have some common features and tactics that make them distinct, as we shall see below. The separatist insurgencies are all based on ethnic identity subnationalisms. They have constructed a history and memory of ‘separateness’ on the basis of myths around their nationality and movements against the Indian state and violations of human rights. The idea of historic enmity is often built upon and transmitted through various ways of socialization. The separatists of Kashmir, Manipur, Assam and the NSCN see themselves as distinct national identities that have a right to statehood and political power and their movement as one of liberation and resistance. The separatist insurgencies have been located in border-states, distant from the Centre. This has given the insurgents access to bordering countries. Separatists of Kashmir have links with Pakistan while those in the Northeast have had bases of support in Bhutan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. All these movements have aggravated tensions in the border areas. The Maoist movement is located in the

heartland of India, but supports other insurgencies as movements for the right to self-determination and liberation. The insurgencies in India are different from those in Africa because they operate within the ambit of a strong state that has democratic, secular and multicultural credentials. They cannot have the kind of overground rebel armies that threaten the sovereignty or legitimacy of the state, but they function in remote regions where the state as represented by the district administration has not been able to deliver many of its promises. The presence of minority communities in areas like Kashmir, Punjab and the Naga region increases the sensitiveness of dealing with insurgencies there. Right-wing forces attempt to link religion with nationalism and patriotism, whereas these insurgencies aim at specific ethnic and identity assertion; religion is used but is not the main issue. The separatist as well as the Maoist conflicts are located in regions of backwardness, economic neglect, and regional underdevelopment. The local institutions of the state have a very low presence in most of these conflict zones. Government schools and health facilities are grossly lacking. A small political, security and bureaucratic elite is seen to have usurped the gains of development funds. Everyone with any access gets a share of the development funds from the insurgent group to sections of the district administration. These taxes or ‘cuts’ are often negotiated and only after that are the rest of the funds distributed, whether for employment schemes, housing or grain for public distribution. There is evident exploitation of natural resources, be they minerals or forest products, by the local elite which is linked to influential ‘outsiders’. Clearly, however, the root causes of separatism are not only economic and it is not possible to resolve these conflicts by just development projects. The root causes are a complex mix of denial of rights and justice, issues of identity and human rights violations. The reality and perception of denials of rights and justice leads to a sense of collective victimhood and narratives of oppression identified with a community. This collective victimization heightens identity consciousness. It also leads to an alienation from the state or larger ‘national’ community. Leaders and ideologies offer to

transform victimhood into agency either through violent or nonviolent methods. Insurgencies, with some exceptions, have justified violence for the ‘greater cause of liberation’.65 The state has little time to deal with such collective grievances, and the use of force by the government becomes part of the collective victimhood that gives rise to anger and feelings of revenge, leading to the unending spiral of violence that engulfs most of these conflicts. The leadership of most of the insurgent groups consists of their original ideologues. While most of them are representatives of their ethnic/tribal community, the Maoist leadership like Ganapathy, Koteshwar Rao, Kishenji and Kobad Ghandy hail from different regions of Andhra Pradesh and elsewhere, for example, and moved to the forests of Dandakaranya in Bastar district to work amongst the tribals. Once chosen, this leadership remains largely unchallenged and is permanent. It appropriates the right to represent and become the sole ‘voice’ of that particular community. For example, the Maoist leadership claims to speak on behalf of the ‘people’.66 At war with the state, its functioning, however, is not marked by democratic methods. The fulfillment of democracy and socialism are thus left for some distant future, after the political goal has been achieved. All insurgencies focus on recruitment of young cadres. The Maoists and insurgents in the Northeast have large numbers of women supporters. The use of ideals, identities, group solidarity and preservation of cultures contributes to building the ranks of young cadres as self-righteous indignation wells up. Gendered ideas of honour and protection of women is part of the insurgency discourse, where masculinity and physical challenge is valorized and anger used as reason for retribution. The desperation to recruit cadres has meant that several of the insurgent groups like the Maoists now include and indoctrinate children. Each of the separatist movements and insurgencies, including the Maoists, have underground units as well as overground support. They have connections with youth and student groups, women’s groups, and political parties. All these mass organizations claim

autonomy and sometimes do have differences with the underground. But at the same time they do engage with each other. Militancies can be successful and survive only when they are embedded in the communities where they operate. They have a complex relation with the people of the area where they function without whom they cannot survive and function. For example, in some tribal areas, the Maoists are sheltered by local people; many people in the Kashmir Valley see the separatists as their natural leaders and obey their calls to dissent; the Naga and Meitei students and women’s groups have supported the demands of the separatists for withdrawal of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act. The community sees them as ‘our boys’, but at the same time may develop conflict fatigue. Though the community sympathizes with the demands the ‘boys’ articulate and the attention they receive, the constant use of violence is disliked. It is not force alone but the withdrawal of community support and delegitimization at the local level that contributes significantly to conflict resolution. Sometimes the demands of the community are similar to the demand of the insurgents/rebels but the community does not support the tactics and violent methods of the insurgents. Generally, the insurgents use the collective grievance and victimhood to articulate their sectarian demands. But the security forces club the victims, the community and the insurgents together and deal with all of them without making any distinction. The inter-linkage between separatists/insurgents and the community they represent aggravates the perception of the security forces that tend to homogenize everyone in the conflict zone as a collective ‘enemy’. The representatives of the state, i.e. the security forces/ police lose their legitimacy and are seen as ‘outsiders’. The middle ground and spaces necessary for conflict resolution then gets diminished. All the insurgent groups have factions based on differences in ideology, programme and strategy. These differences have sometimes led to factional warfare and annihilation as evident in the Naga, Maoist, Khalistani and Manipuri groups. The Kashmiri separatists are divided between the JKLF, who argue for independence, and the Mirwaiz Farooq and Syed Ali Shah Gilani

factions that want to join Pakistan and so on. In some cases, factions have increased because of a macho-egoism and access to weapons and small arms, as in the case of the thirty armed groups in Manipur Valley. The Indian government uses this factionalism in different ways, but especially to maintain the status quo and prevent the separatists from getting their demands through force. Dissent is barely tolerated in most of these insurgent groups and they are known to annihilate those who oppose them or have ‘betrayed’ them. The Maoists, for example, are known to kill informers or former associates since they claim to be fighting a guerrilla war against the state. These groups are hierarchical and are themselves based on militarization, using the very values that they oppose in the state that they are fighting. Several of the separatist groups like in Manipur, Assam and, earlier, in Punjab tolerate lumpen behaviour and are thus termed ‘degenerated insurgencies’. This is on account of illegal forms of extraction of money and theft of arms, authoritarian control over their cadres and communities, disregard for the lives of others and disregard of any state institution. All these insurgencies/conflicts are asymmetrical in that as smaller groups they are up against the force of a powerful state. The methods employed by insurgents are unconventional by nature and they use terror tactics as well as political and psychological warfare. Terrorist methods are a form of communication, retaliation and retribution against the state, even though often it is innocent people who are killed and hurt. Some groups like the JKLF have abandoned violence and now support mass action and mass mobilization. The belief that people are drawn to militancy and violence because of poverty and lack of education, or psychiatric abnormality, is incorrect. Militants in all the insurgencies are a mix, coming from different classes, education levels, genders, castes, tribes and social backgrounds. People become insurgents/militants because of a complex combination of personal, contextual and socio-economic factors, when there is a breakdown of their social and symbolic order and a sense of alienation, and there is anger and the desire for

retribution against perceived injustice.67 They may also be convinced of the possibility of an alternative vision of liberation and ideals which may take the form of a new state or ‘Azadi’. The state administration in these zones of conflict has been unable to provide security. In fact, the national security laws instil fear, intimidate and harm rather than protect and provide security. Local people use all kinds of means for security, ranging from paying armed groups for protection, keeping small arms which are proliferating, sending the youth away to keep them out of trouble, to confining women indoors and marrying them off as quickly as possible and/or migrating from the conflict zone. The district-level administration is particularly weak and perceived as almost absent in most conflict zones. Public schools and primary health centres that symbolize state intervention barely function. The local administration is marked by corruption and absenteeism. Local administrative and security forces lack basic facilities and, to survive, either negotiate or compromise with the insurgent groups. The insurgents and Maoists use this vacuum to influence or create parallel structures. It is commonly accepted that those wielding power in these zones will take their own ‘cuts’ or taxes which are negotiated between the district and insurgents. The aim of Maoists is to create an alternative structure to the local administration, in accordance with their state model. Several theories, especially those that emanate from India’s rightwing ideologies, equate the minority content of these conflicts and their border location entirely to a foreign or outside source. In the case of Kashmir and earlier Punjab, separatists have been linked to Pakistan and have received material as well as ‘spiritual’ support from here. The Northeast was earlier linked to the Chinese, sometimes to Christian missionaries and more recently to support from Bangladesh. Thus, all the citizens of these regions are seen as suspect, anti-national and under the influence of ‘foreign ideologies and material benefits’ and basically as anti-patriotic. This is far from the truth. The source of these conflicts is local grievances that remain unaddressed. External forces like Pakistan have helped fuel

the fire through their admitted ‘moral and spiritual support’ and the export of trained jihadis, especially to Kashmir. This foreign-assisted jihadi policy could only operate because of the local alienation and movement and not vice versa. External militancy cannot function without local support or if the local movement is quelled. Theories that identify minorities with outside forces and see them as nonnational, or seek to homogenize them, are not only xenophobic but factually incorrect. The multiple characteristics of insurgencies and armed conflicts have given rise to various divergent theories and analyses that can be misleading, but when policies are based on incomplete understanding, they can sharpen these conflicts, leading to even great victimization and alienation. For example, if a conflict is termed as terrorism, no clear analysis of the root cause takes place. If the reason for conflict is seen just as a problem of development and then addressed by leasing out mines and creating industrialized zones, this, too, may not end the conflict. Conflicts thus need to be contextualized and seen holistically.

Conclusion The conflicts in the regions of Jammu and Kashmir, the Northeast as well as in the Maoist-affected regions have multiple dimensions and variations. The longest standing conflict is between the underground/militants and the state. There are factional conflicts between the underground groups; there are ethnic clashes in Manipur between the Nagas and Meities, and Nagas and Kukis. There are killings between factions of Kashmiri militants, encounter killings and inter-communal violence. The Maoists target security forces and local opposition. Each of these conflicts entails illegal killing, kidnapping, rape and sexual abuse, and extortion. In addition, there is wide-scale militarization and the easy availability of small arms. This deeply affects all aspects of society and the very development process gets distorted. Each of the groups involved in

the conflicts is militarized and uses militarist methods and tactics to deal with essentially civil society issues. This impacts every aspect of civil society which gets marginalized and intermediate spaces are lost to partisan opinion.

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St at e Res pons es

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tates view national security as their primary concern, forming the basis for their internal security and foreign policy. Armed struggles are considered an assault on the state. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has called the Maoist movement the greatest internal security threat. That people’s security trickles down from that of the state and political class is central to the notion of national security. This is prevalent even while the paramount task of the state should be to create and maintain political, economic, social and other structures to ensure that citizens lead the best possible life, with entitlements. The modern state has the legitimate right to violence and force to maintain its rule based on the consent of its citizens. As Walter Benjamin pointed out ‘Lawmaking is power making and to that extent, an immediate manifestation of violence.’1 This chapter analyses the manner in which the state responds to armed conflicts. It also looks at the national security laws of the Indian state and shows how force is variously used to handle insurgencies and armed struggles.

The Indian government uses several strategies and paradigms to tackle insurgencies and armed conflicts. The dominant strategy is based on the security paradigm. It consists of maintaining the status quo and putting down insurgencies with the use of force to regain control and establish law and order. Other strategies include initiating development projects and schemes like employment generation, loan waivers etcetera.2 It makes offers for engaging hostile groups in talks, if they end violence and come to the negotiating table; and if talks are initiated, it negotiates ceasefires and peace accords. The cultural representation of the troubled regions in the Indian discourse on security has impacted the government’s thinking. In the dominant mindset, regions like the Northeast, Kashmir and tribal heartlands are distinct from the Indian ‘mainstream’. The ‘mainstream’ is then representative of the North Indian Hindu, which others must join at some stage. For example, the home secretary stated that the Maoist hold on a small section of tribals could be seen to be decreasing because these tribals celebrated the Hindu festival of Dussehra.3 A dominant, mainstream model undoes the very idea of multiple modes of living and diversity. It excludes the real demands from these regions for justice, dignity, equity, opportunity and rights, and is, therefore, contested by people in conflict zones. The colonial discourse on the Northeast, Bhagat Oinam argues, has been carried over by the Indian state, ignoring the narrative of neglect.4 K.S. Subramanian, a police officer who had served in Manipur writes: ‘The general assumption of the army and the paramilitary officers posted in Manipur, then and now, is that the Manipuris are anti-national.’5 The tribal culture and customs are unfamiliar to the outsiders who come to govern this region. Nandini Sundar shows that the official Bastar website states, amongst other things, that the Gonds have a ‘pro-fertility mentality’, and how interpretations like this are used to mark them as ‘savages’ and uncivilized.6 This mindset has led to the politics of militarization and state repression of dissent movements.

Even though in recent times the official Indian policy is to view regions like the Northeast not as ‘periphery’ but as ‘the centre of a thriving and integrated economic space …’, as Sanjib Baruah points out, when it comes to the festering low-intensity armed conflicts ‘there are few overt signs of a policy reorientation’.7 A visitor to the Northeast or Kashmir is hit by the locals’ feeling of being ‘outsiders’ in India and this is reflected even in their day-to-day conversation. This is particularly disturbing because the pluralities, regional variations and differences get marginalized and are not tolerated. The legitimatization of national security laws and their judicial sanction are based on the dominant Indian nationalist ideology that is essentially homogenizing and exclusive. The minority cultures, though accepted, are celebrated within limits, but do not have equal status. Movements for self-determination are seen as foreign inspired. Movements to change the structure of the state are seen as anti-state and defined as anti-national, terrorist and disruptive. The Indian government denies that there are any armed conflicts in India.8 But it uses phrases like ‘disturbed areas’, ‘insurgency infested’, ‘law and order problems’, etcetera. This is because once an area is declared an armed conflict region, the Geneva Conventions and international laws can apply. But India wants to deal with such conflicts on its own terms. The result is that international norms and standards on human rights are not observed in treating combatants, non-combatants—including women and children—prisoners and alleged insurgents in conflict zones. Dissent movements for self-determination, demands for autonomy, and movements arising from ethnic nationalism, underdevelopment and human rights issues are initially ignored as there is no system outside the law and order mechanism to deal with them. Demands for justice, negotiations, or civil society interventions are treated with bureaucratic disdain and left to the local police to handle at their level. When these dissent movements get violent, they are typecast as ‘law and order’ matters and political dissidents are seen in the same light as criminals.

The Indian position on internal conflicts is explained as follows: ‘The situation was entirely different in internal armed conflict. The situations were basically law and order problems which were within the domestic jurisdiction of each state.’9 On the question of political dissenters, Indian representatives have argued: ‘It was illogical and illegal to ask a state to treat its citizens differently according to whether they were accused of criminal or political offences.’10 However, treating political offences on par with criminal further alienates the political activists as well as the people who are affected in these conflict zones. When these dissent movements turn into insurgencies and violent armed struggles, the Indian state (regardless of the party in power) dubs them as threats to sovereignty and comes down on them with force. Senior police officers who have been in charge of conflict areas have argued for ‘well-directed violence’ as the main method of tackling the movements.11 Others have advocated that the root causes be considered; for example, former Border Security Force (BSF) director-general, E.N. Rammohan, has repeatedly stated: ‘Why are the adivasis ambushing security forces? That is because we have not satisfied them on basic issues of land and forest reforms and they are being forced to commit criminal acts such as that at Dantewada.’12 Once the paramilitary and security forces are in place, at the ground level, brutal violence against any suspect becomes the norm. The bureaucracy and military and police have multi-layered mechanisms to deal with armed conflict and dissent. The empowered group of ministers, headed by the Union home minister, is followed by the coordination centre led by the home secretary and chief secretaries. Next in line come the director-generals of police of the affected states. Besides this, there is a special task force and an inter-ministerial group. The Centre has to coordinate with the states and the districts involved. Large numbers of police and paramilitary are engaged to ensure security in conflict zones and lack of coordination has led to tragic killings. The E.N. Rammohan report on Maoist attacks on the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in

Dantewada in May 2010 specifically cites lack of coordination between the various police and paramilitary forces.13 The government does not provide figures of the forces deployed in insurgency regions so analysts can only make estimates. In Kashmir, at the height of insurgency in 1998, for example, there were an estimated 500,000 army troops and other federal security forces in the Valley, including those positioned on the LoC. This equals roughly one soldier for every ten Kashmiris.14 In 2010, 145 battalions of paramilitary forces are deployed (one battalion has about 1,000 men under a commanding officer), besides five divisions of the army. The numbers of forces being deployed in the Maoist zones are estimated to be sixty-seven battalions, covering nine of the affected states.15 One district of Gadchiroli at the Chhattisgarh–Andhra Pradesh border has eighteen companies of central paramilitary forces. Similar reports have emerged from other regions like Bastar, with 20,000 troops that are part of Operation Green Hunt, a term denied by the home minister. Most senior security personnel believe that the use of force is an integral part of anti-insurgency operations. Former home secretaries like N.N. Vohra and Madhav Godbole have critiqued the dilution of the role of the home ministry in administration and in managing conflict. Others like T.C.A. Srinivasavardhan and senior police officers have supported development activity.16 At the same time, it has to be said they also believe in political solutions and that the healing touch is essential.17 Discussed below are the state’s multiple responses to situations that challenge its security.

Counter-Insurgency Methods Counter-insurgency tactics are based on ruthless militarist and gendered traditions designed to destroy the will of the people through ‘psychological operations’.18 Humiliating and destroying the honour of an individual or community is a common method because the concept of honour is an important aspect of psyche in traditional societies, including India. Various means that include encounter

killings, disappearance, rape and destruction of livelihood have been employed to punish insurgents. The entire region affected by insurgency is regarded by the army as a ‘special security zone’ and the human loss and impact seen as ‘collateral damage’. All people in the ‘disturbed area’ are seen as linked to the underground and thus no one is above suspicion. Movement of many local people gets restricted because of lack of identification proof. Body and house searches are common. A senior police officer who had served in Kashmir said the force there had a policy—if one soldier or BSF official was killed by terrorists, five young men were executed in retaliation.19 In a situation of low-intensity conflict the army uses counterinsurgency tactics designed to destroy infrastructure.20 Army officers argue that since insurgents are embedded with civilians they have no option.21 For example, in Manipur, the local people and the press have repeatedly stated: ‘A “habit” of the security forces is to target innocent villagers after every attack of militants to compensate for injury to Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF).’22 People feel the wrath of the counter-insurgency, especially if the security forces have failed to resist an attack by militants. Instances of indiscipline and corruption in police and paramilitary ranks are known, and they allegedly become more rampant in regions of conflict because of the often unaccountable access to discretionary counter-insurgency funds and their additional powers to arrest and use force under national security laws. It is well known that torture takes place to extract information. In this process, both insurgents and innocent civilians get affected. During the Punjab conflict, for instance, interviews with guerrilla fighters established that many youth who went underground had been tortured first. As Pettigrew shows, ‘All who became guerrillas have gone underground because of police harassment. If they are lucky to survive the police torture, they are released on payment of substantial amount of money.’23 Similar are the testimonies from the Northeast, Kashmir and the Maoist insurgency areas. The police and paramilitary indulge in all kinds of methods of torture and humiliation once they capture

militants alive. Since everyone proclaims innocence, with little to no evidence, it is not easy to distinguish between innocents and insurgents. Moreover, the police being outsiders to the region generally see the entire community as rebellious and use the harshest measures against it at the slightest pretext. This method, in fact, turns ordinary citizens against the paramilitary and police and makes them sympathetic to the rebels.

National Security Laws The Indian government (like governments elsewhere in the world) has passed several acts, both at the Centre and state levels, to tackle insurgencies. The objective of such acts is to give the armed forces special powers not available under the Indian Constitution, so that they can deal with such exceptional situations. In other words, in areas where these acts are used, rights generally available under the Constitution do not apply. Human rights and claims of individual life, liberty and security of people within the area stand suspended under the acts and security forces are granted extraordinary powers over citizens under the guise of protecting the state. When in force for long periods of time, it has been found the acts tend to become the norm rather than exceptions. A brief explanation of some of these acts follows. Constitutional provisions for a Proclamation of Emergency and President’s Rule underpin India’s authoritarian powers. Over the years, a number of acts have been passed in India such as The Disturbed Areas Act (1955), Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA, 1958), the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967; Preventive Detention Act (PDA), Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA), the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA, 1985), The Public Safety Act, etcetera. The MISA was passed by parliament after an assurance that it would not be used to suppress the legitimate aspirations of the people, while the TADA many years later, in fact conferred wide discretionary powers to the

law-enforcing authorities. Both laws were invariably misused. To date, all these laws lapsed because of the weight of popular opposition. Nevertheless, in each case, a variant of that law has been brought back under one pretext or another. In September 1997, the Jammu and Kashmir government ratified the Disturbed Areas Act, originally promulgated under decree during President’s Rule in 1955 that gave the security forces full powers of shoot-to-kill as well as search and seizure without fear of prosecution or accountability.31 The Preventive Detention Act passed in 1950 remained in force until 1969. The Defense of India Act after the Proclamation of Emergency provided for preventive detention of individuals who had acted or who were likely to act in a manner detrimental to public order and national security.

Preventive Detention Act 1950 In an environment of aspiring democracy and civil liberties, the framers of the Indian Constitution incorporated Article 22 (clauses 1– 7) of preventive detention as a ‘precautionary measure’ in case of subversion, sabotage and anti-social activities.24 In addition, they also laid down ‘reasonable’ restrictions to exercise rights granted by Article 19 and 21 of the Constitution. These ‘antithetical’ constitutional developments made it possible to continue the colonial regime’s preventive detention law though subject to certain constitutional safeguards. According to the provisions of the preventive detention law, if they so believe, the government can declare any area as ‘disturbed’. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, who passed the Madras Suppression of Disturbance Act (1948) to contain the communist activities in the Telangana area of Andhra Pradesh, himself found the provisions of the Act repugnant to the high ideals of free India.25 Bhim Rao Ambedkar, chairman of the Constituent Assembly, explained the necessity of the preventive detention in the Constitution, saying that

the exigency of the liberty of the individual cannot be placed above the interest of the state.26 Although clauses 1 and 2 of Article 22 respectively provide that anyone arrested under the Act will have the right to be defended legally and produced before a magistrate in twenty-four hours, other clauses of the same Act give wide discretion to make exceptions to these rules. The Act in Article 22 establishes that the executive and legislature can legally take away the right which the Constitution provides under the same Article. A senior Supreme Court judge commented on the Article on preventive detention by saying that, ‘no country in the world that I am aware of has made this an integral part of their constitutions as has been done in India. This is unfortunate … to make such a drastic provision in the Constitution itself, which cannot but be regarded as a most unwholesome encroachment upon the liberties of the people’.27 Preventive detention laws thus give huge powers to officers to maintain law and order.28 After Independence, the Preventive Detention Act was the first legislation to deal with insurgency situations and the non-state actors in Nagaland, Manipur, Assam and parts of Tripura. Later, in 1990, a version was used for Jammu and Kashmir. The Act was meant to remain in force only for a period of one year after enactment in 1950, but it was extended from time to time until December 1969. In between, the government in 1958 enacted the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act which was modelled on the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Ordinance promulgated on 15 August, 1942 to suppress the Quit India Movement. In November 1962, the President issued an order under article 359 (1) of the Constitution, suspending the right of any person to move to any court for the encroachment of the rights conferred by the Articles 21 and 22, ‘if such person has been deprived of any such right under the Defence of India Ordinance, 1962, or any rule or order made there under’.29 In the same month, the order was amended so as to include suspension with respect to the equality rights conferred by Article 14 of the Constitution. The mentioned order not only remained in force until the Proclamation of

Emergency, but also along with Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA), was a principle instrument for detaining political opponents without bringing them to trial. The provisions of the Defence of India Rules (DIR) (1962) were primarily used to detain political activists suspected of being involved in extreme Left activities, particularly the CPI sympathizers who opposed the government’s stand in the India-China war of 1962. In the early 1970s, the majority of ‘Naxalites’ who were from West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and Bihar were arrested under DIR (1962). Most of the detainees or arrestees were affiliated to CPI (Marxist–Leninist).30 The Defence of India Rules (DIR) (1962) provisions were used during the Bangladesh War. Later, they were invoked to make arrests during the nationwide railways strike in 1974, among other instances. It was only in September 1977, six months after the revocation of the state of Emergency, that the DIR (1962) was allowed to lapse.

The Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) 1971 The Maintenance of Internal Security Act (1971) provided for preventive detention. This was revamped during the 1975–77 Emergency to allow the government to arrest individuals without declaring charges. A large number of politicians and workers from the opposition parties were arrested under the Defence of India Rules (DIR) (1962) and the MISA, including leaders of the future Janata Party government. Soon after the Janata government came into power in 1977, parliament passed the 44th Amendment that revised the domestic circumstances cited in Article 352 from ‘internal disturbance’ to ‘armed rebellion’. The parliament also went on to repeal the Defence of India Rules and the MISA. But the Congress’s return to power in 1980 saw it pass the National Security Act, authorizing security forces to arrest individuals without warrant for suspicion of action that subverts

national security, public order and essential economic services. The Essential Services Maintenance Act (ESMA) of 1981 allowed the government to ban strikes and lockouts in sixteen economic sectors that provided critically important goods and services. The 59th Amendment in 1988 restored ‘internal disturbance’ in place of ‘armed rebellion’ as sufficient cause for any Proclamation of Emergency. The Khalistan movement (in Punjab) during the 1980s saw additional authoritarian laws being framed. In 1984, the parliament passed the National Security Amendment Act that allowed security forces to detain prisoners for up to one year. The 1984 Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Ordinance sanctioned security forces in Punjab getting almost unlimited powers for detention, and permitted secret tribunals to try suspected terrorists. This gave the police and the paramilitary excessive powers.

Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) 1985 The TADA (on whose framework later anti-insurgency acts have been framed), first introduced in 1985, gave governments and police officials such sweeping powers that any alleged terrorist could be arrested and kept behind bars for years on end without allowing him to seek normal judicial intervention. The TADA provided for capital punishment and empowered authorities to tap telephones, censor mail and conduct raids on individuals allegedly posing a threat to the unity and sovereignty of the nation. The law renewing the TADA in 1987 provided for in-camera trials, and reversed the legal presumption of innocence, if the government produced specific evidence linking a suspect to any terrorist act. Section 21 of TADA provides that if the prosecution proves that arms or explosives were recovered from the accused, and establishes that those arms were used in committing the offence, or that the fingerprints of the accused had been found on the scene of the crime, the court will presume guilt, unless the contrary was proved.

In March 1988, the 59th Amendment raised the period that a Proclamation of Emergency could be in effect without legislative approval from six months to three years. It did away with the assurance of due process of law and protection of life and liberty with regard to Punjab (Articles 20 and 21). These rights were only restored in 1989 by the 63rd Amendment. Past records actually show that police forces incapable of controlling crime often employed the TADA in ordinary cases. Statistics reveal that as many as two out of three TADA detainees had to be acquitted for want of evidence and that only 1.1 per cent of those who were tried could be awarded punishment for some crime or the other. That even these were terrorists, moreover, seems doubtful. During 1985–93, the maximum conviction rate of those arrested was 0.89 per cent.32 An instance of TADA’s working can be cited from an example of 11 March 1994, when nearly nine years after the introduction of TADA, the Supreme Court disposed of some 400 writ petitions, special leave petitions and appeals challenging the constitutionality of TADA. The judgments invoked the alleged threats to sovereignty and national security. This threat was evidently accepted as widespread. The areas notified under TADA as terroristaffected were expanded from the original four states and two Union Territories to cover twenty-three of the twenty-five states in India. Despite severe national and international criticism of the Act, under which 52,998 persons were arrested up to March 1993, the majority judgment upheld virtually all its harsh provisions and sections. The TADA and its procedures are exceptions or ultra vires of various key articles of the Constitution, including fundamental rights guaranteed in Article 14 (right to equal protection under the law) and Article 21 (right to life and liberty). Experts in the UN Human Rights Committee have held that the provisions of this Act violated the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights to which India is a signatory. In the past, the chairperson of the National Human Rights Commission, Justice Ranganath Mishra, had demanded the repeal of TADA and written to members of parliament that the Act should not be extended. Many chief ministers have reviewed arrests under

this Act because the inability to obtain convictions under TADA has further weakened its legitimacy. Of the 52,998 persons arrested under the Act until March 1993, for example, only 434 (8 per cent) were convicted. Of these not a single one was under the section relating to ‘terrorist activity’. There were more than 1,800 persons under detention under the TADA, which was allowed to lapse in May 1995, though other similar Acts like POTA that we examine below replaced it.

Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) 2002 In 2002, the NDA government introduced a wide-ranging national security legislation known as the Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act (POTA) which is similar to TADA. The National Human Rights Commission opposed this legislation as being unnecessary. Under POTA, mechanisms were established to deal with political opposition. After defining terrorism to include acts committed with a lethal weapon, even addressing a gathering of terrorist sympathizers was considered an offence, among other things, under the law. For example, any political demonstration could be branded as terrorist activity through the use of the allegation of ‘agent provocateurs’. POTA also included clauses concerning the press. Journalists were obliged to pass on to the police any information concerning ‘terrorist activities’, or face a maximum sentence of three years in jail. Those who refused to supply information or who gave false information were liable to a one-year sentence. Both clauses are in contradiction with journalists’ right to protect their sources and could severely restrict the work of the media in areas where armed groups are in conflict with the Indian army.

Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) 1958

The AFSPA’s predecessor—the Armed Forces Special Powers Ordinance (AFSPO) of 1942—had been enacted to counter the Quit India Movement. Its present avatar inherits the same punitive force. First used to put down the uprisings in the Naga Hills of Assam in 1958, the Act is one of the most feared, wherever it has been used. The Act permits arrest without warrant, with whatever force necessary, of any person against whom suspicion exists. This has provided the basis for indiscriminate arrests and the use of brutal force, including firing, against innocent civilians. It authorizes the entry and search, without warrant, of any premises to make arrests or to recover any person or confiscate any property. For military personnel operating in a culturally alien terrain, ‘beliefs’ and ‘reasonable suspicions’ are often wholly unfounded, and may lead to human rights abuses, as documented by many human rights reports. The state legislature has absolutely no jurisdiction in the matter and the AFSPA thus bypasses civil authority. Officers guilty of rights violation thus often get impunity because of this Act, instilling a deep sense of collective grievance within the community. The Act has facilitated grave human rights abuses, including extrajudicial execution, disappearance, rape and torture and, since inception has had deplorable effects on the human rights of minorities and vulnerable communities in areas where it is in force.33 Several sections of the AFSPA are, in fact, found to be incompatible with the articles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966), which the Indian government has ratified. Similarly, too, the Public Safety Act and the National Security Act have also been found in violation of Articles 6, 7, 9 and 14 of the ICCPR. Further, the UN Human Rights Committee has objected that Clause 19 of the Protection of Human Rights Act prevents the National Human Rights Commission from directly investigating complaints of rights violations by the armed forces, including the paramilitary forces. They have also stated that the oneyear time limit imposed on complaints to the Commission prevents it from looking into past violations.

The experts in the UN Human Rights Committee which met in Geneva in March 1991 were categorical that the AFSPA violates several articles in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as the Indian Constitution. Despite this, the apex court upheld the AFSPA on 27 November 1997 and this Act continues to be used. The state governments have enacted similar national security acts, like the Chhattisgarh Public Security Act, The Punjab Security of State Act, 1953, etcetera. These have similar provisions to the TADA and AFSPA. The power of such Acts is described by a former police officer who wrote: ‘Every Major of the army posted in the state (Manipur) had direct access to the Chief Secretary and could dictate to him … (about imposition of emergency orders) in a district.’34 Such feelings are commonly voiced in areas where there have been ethnic and insurgency movements. In 2008, the government introduced two other bills in parliament: one, to set up a National Investigation Agency, and another, to amend the law to bring in more stringent provisions to deal with terror crimes under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act. The latter had provisions such as detention without bail for up to 180 days. It must be said that the increase in the number of national security laws as also their stringency has, however, not significantly helped decrease insurgencies and armed conflicts.

During Martial Law National security and martial laws have conferred unfettered powers to the armed forces to operate under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act and they have been invariably committing serious cognizable offences in the course of their arrests, detentions, interrogations, searches, seizures and raids.35 In Assam, for example, where one of the tasks of the military was to ensure the continuous extraction of crude oil and functioning of the oil pipelines from this oil-rich region, the AFSPA was used. The security forces

often engaged in terrorizing the local population and the least vulnerable became easy victims. The Gauhati High Court (Assam) has repeatedly pulled up the army for the torture, arrest and harassment of civilians. In July 1991, the Supreme Court ordered that army officers making arrests of women under the AFSPA should follow procedures which guarantee various rights and protections to women and children.36 Advocate Nandita Haksar argues that ‘these violations of human rights cannot be treated as isolated incidents of abuse of the Act, they are an accumulation of identical or analogous breaches which are sufficiently numerous and inter-connected to amount to a pattern or system’.37 Further, in 1997, undeclared army rule was imposed in Assam in the name of the Unified Command Structure (UCS). Under UCS, army authorities have been handed over unprecedented overriding and unaccountable executive powers vis-à-vis the civil administration. The central government’s response of invoking the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act in Assam strengthened the hand of the military as the law enforcement authority. The United Liberation Force of Asom (ULFA) was banned under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. With the launching of Operation Bajrang on 27 November 1990 and Operation Rhino—2 on 14 September 1991 in the state, the security forces with the police forces and the insurgency outfits together became the source for unprecedented terror and counterterror in the state. The state claimed the surrender of many ULFA militants, but sources in Assam said that this surrender was superficial; the bulk of ULFA just remained underground.38 Analysts in regions where the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act is in place agree that this response of the central government towards the militia groups has been more militaristic than political. The insurgency and counter-insurgency operations have led to a structural pattern of state-backed violence and a vicious circle of counter-violence. Such martial law has not helped the state to either lessen or resolve the conflict.

The Mechanisms of Fear It is evident that state officials are permitted to commit all kinds of violence that is legitimized in the name of countering violence by non-state individuals and groups. Former Joint Director, Intelligence Bureau M.K. Dhar writes in his autobiography that in the police ‘operation’ is equivalent to physical elimination. He writes: ‘On a number of occasions innocent youths were picked up in police style and mercilessly interrogated. They often disappeared; killed and dumped in isolated and mass graves.’39 This violence is ideologically mystified through a complex process of state-sponsored consentbuilding mechanisms that demonize those opposed to the status quo of the state.40 As Sim and Tombs show, one aspect that is not much talked about is the ‘mechanism of fear’; that the state has the capability to mobilize fear both inside and outside places of detention, police stations, etcetera in order to discipline, regulate, oppress and in some cases destroy those at the centre of the state’s punitive gaze.41 These are the deaths in police custody, where no officer is found guilty or convicted. These are the cases of torture, the missing, and the victims at the hands of the irregular forces in command of the state. States thus have various mechanisms to curb insurgencies, but since they do not have mechanisms to distinguish between insurgents and ordinary people, innocent civilians face the wrath of the state equally.

Crackdowns An example of fear mechanism is the use of crackdowns in disturbed areas. The dictionary definition of crackdown is ‘an act or example of forceful regulation, repression or restraint. Stifling of dissent, quelling a rebellion’, but legal experts describe it as illegitimate, high-handed and atrocious. In the Naga Hills of Manipur and in Jammu and Kashmir crackdown is a cordon-and-search operation in which security forces surround neighbourhoods or villages and compel all

male adults and teenage boys to assemble for identification. An informer works with security forces to point out alleged militants or sympathizers or even relatives of militants and those who may have some information about the militants. All these persons may be detained without any warrant of arrest memo. These crackdowns are linked to disappearances and encounters. The threat to the lives of common people increases and cannot be justified. Even the Supreme Court has said that arrests should not be carried out on suspicion alone, but should have an objective basis so that they can be reviewed by the judiciary.42

Encounters India has an unusual practice of ‘encounter killings’. The police kill a suspect at sight or after capture and then report it as an ‘encounter’ between the militants with the police. The official justification is that the suspect was attempting to escape and got killed in a gunfight with the police. Encounter deaths and custodial deaths, where suspects die in strange circumstances while in police custody, are commonly observed in all regions of armed conflict in India. The police logic for encounters is explained by Julio Rebeiro, expolice chief, Mumbai: ‘The judicial system does not deliver’, though he adds that this is ‘akin to murder’. The police commonly believe that ‘there is public support to this kind of measures because the middle class feels threatened …’ With reference to Mumbai, (on encounter killings) Julio Rebeiro argued: ‘I can say that there was political approval. Though there are no such written orders, such approvals give legitimacy to encounter specialists, who are worshipped as heroes.’43 This scenario is corroborated by M.K. Dhar, while speaking of encounter killings in Manipur, Nagaland and Assam. The police use encounters because they look for shortcuts from the judicial process that tends to be long and arduous in India. Instead of rectifying this process, the officials sanction violation of judicial norms, the Constitution and rule of law.

M. K. Dhar, has argued: ‘I have witnessed innumerable “encounter killings” in Manipur, Nagaland and Assam. It is futile to log such incidents and count body bags. Somewhere in the labyrinth of government records, these figures have been fudged and lost. Incidents of army, paramilitary and police forces picking up mere suspects and eliminating them were daily occurrences. Logging such incidents was considered “unprofessional and tactless performance” … officers who assumed total powers as intelligence operator, investor, interceptor and liquidator were given the highest awards’.44 This is extralegal killing where the murderer gets impunity. As Dhar, says, no force can assume the role of ‘total justice dispensers’ and the political leadership has even spoken in favour of using ‘terrorising tools to destroy the terrorists’.45 This kind of counterterror is often done, with officers working as vigilantes and the state conniving with them. This has been a pattern against Naxalites, beginning in 1966–67 with the Maoist violence in West Bengal. Similar ‘annihilation’ plans are used for Maoists today.46 In the Maoist areas of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, encounters have become common. A tribal woman, Madiyam Soni from village Ponjer, whose son’s body was found in another unknown village, Santoshpur, with eleven other bodies after such an encounter said: ‘How can we hope to approach the police when some of their own have committed the crime?’47 The police pay off local informers and then carry out ‘encounter killings’ with little verification. Tribal youth are picked up by the police and charged with being Maoists and are then either incarcerated or killed in encounters that are justified in terms of anti-terrorism. No First Information Reports (FIRs) are allowed to be registered nor any compensation paid to families. Women are picked up on the claim of their being Maoist supporters and beating and torture is routine. Two militias are working in the areas, one of the militants and insurgents, the other on behalf of the state. The fear of these contesting militias has led to villages being divided and internal displacement, where villagers are forcefully evacuated to live in camps, leading to personal tragedies.

There are no official records for encounter killings making the numbers impossible to assess. Till 2004, the National Human Rights Commission of India (NHRC) had investigated about 258 reported cases of ‘fake encounter deaths’, committed by the Andhra Pradesh police force alone, in connection with anti-Naxalite operations.48 In these cases, the NHRC stated that there had been no evidence to show that the police had made any attempt to arrest the deceased persons, and nor did any police officer receive any injury. Further, no attempt was even made to enquire into the action of the police officer that caused the deaths. Several human rights organizations show, for example, that under the loose category of ‘Police Firing’ in ‘AntiDacoit Operations’ and ’Anti-Extremists & Terrorists Operations’ the figures are significantly higher, being at 334 and 183 respectively for 2007 alone. And this refers to just police operations.49 Besides this, paramilitary and the armed forces also use this method in civilian areas where they are deployed. Clearly, encounter killings are extrajudicial killings and lead to even more retribution because of the lack of justice involved. One of the early well-known examples of encounter killings came from Punjab in the 1990s, where large number of ‘alleged’ militants had disappeared between the years 1984–1994. On receiving such complaints, the Supreme Court ordered an inquiry by the Central Bureau of Investigation in September 1995. In December 1996, the CBI report based on the records of three crematoria in three districts of Amritsar confirmed the enforced disappearances and also showed that the Punjab security forces from 1984 to 1994 had apprehended and tortured people, ostensibly militants, and carried out secret cremations. 2,097 bodies appear to have been cremated illegally and in secret, without informing the families of those dead. Of those cremated over a thousand remained unidentified, while the others were identified or partially identified. The Supreme Court instructed the Human Rights Commission (HRC) to examine and determine all the issues that arose from what the Court termed as: ‘flagrant violations of human rights on a mass scale’.50

Independent human rights activists have shown that even the NHRC, after years of investigation, restricted themselves into looking at only some specific cases, and their method of judging the extent and impact of rights violation remained restricted and incomplete. For instance, the NHRC, when developing criteria for monetary compensation, did not take into account the experience of the victims or the psychological damage they suffered and consequences for their families. Thus, surviving family members of many refused to accept the proposals for compensation on the terms marked out by the National and State Human Rights Commissions. Encounter killings have become an unwritten part of state policy. The practice was intended as a means of dealing with insurgents, but has been used even for petty criminals. (Sheikh Sohrabuddin Case, Gujarat, 2007) Police officers say that in ‘disturbed areas’ there is ‘pressure’ ‘to do something’. To justify they were ‘doing something’, police officers in Delhi for example, shot dead two businessmen in the central shopping area of Connaught Place in March 2007. Police now often ‘simulate encounters’ in that they get alleged insurgents to a pre-planned spot and then shoot them, as if in an encounter. Often the press also gets a notice to say that an encounter is likely to happen. A 2010 case involves bodies of three young men found in Kashmir. Investigations have revealed that the army paid ‘irregulars’ a small sum of money to carry out these ‘encounter’ killings and then bury the bodies.51 Such activity shows the disregard for law and order that the security forces are supposed to look after. Encounter killings have been used in other countries during periods of lawlessness and militarized rule. In Chile, more than 100 soldiers were convicted after hundreds of extrajudicial killings during the army rule of 1976–83. In Mexico, 600 disappearances and killings of students were recorded in 1968. In Argentina’s ‘dirty war’ of 1976–1983, 30,000 were killed and these cases reopened after long struggles on the part of civil society and the relatives of victims.

Enforced Disappearances In all areas of conflict in India, especially where the AFSPA is in place, there have been thousands of ‘enforced disappearances’, where persons have been picked up by the police on suspicion of being involved in anti-national activities and their whereabouts never revealed, leading to enormous trauma for the families. Since whether the person is dead or alive is often not known, it has given rise to the peculiar cases of ‘half widows’, i.e. women whose husbands were missing but their deaths were not officially certified and hence they could not be declared as widows. Enforced disappearances have also been linked to encounter killings and deaths in custody where the body is then cremated without any information to relatives.52 This kind of operation requires that a distinction be made between civilians and terrorists. This is never so clear, and lawful citizens get mistaken for terrorists. Wrongful confinement, torture and rape are used to extract information about suspects. At times village vendettas, property disputes, and local animosities get mixed up in these operations. The system of terror leads not only to excesses and the abuse of human rights but to gender crimes as well.

Special Police Officers (SPOs) Special police officers (SPOs) have been liberally used by the police in all areas of armed conflict in India. These are former insurgents who have quit their groups for a variety of reasons and become police informers. The police recruit SPOs to wean them away from the insurgency and also use them for extrajudicial killing. It is common knowledge that in the Kashmir Valley, the troubled spots in the Northeast and the Maoist-affected areas, the police forces have encouraged young militants to surrender and promised them rehabilitation with normal jobs. But these men instead were given placements as territorial army personnel and special police officers.53 The army uses surrendered militants to infiltrate and

attack militants. In this process a number of civilians also get targetted. Village vendettas are resolved as trigger-happy militia of the army and the militants become unconstitutional and unofficial hit men.54 In Jammu and Kashmir, the Special Operations Group (SOG) was established in 1994. It is reported that by 2006 it had 23,000 special police officers on board. However, neither the army nor Border Security Force (BSF) nor state officials admit that they are being used. The numbers killed in encounters are thus not revealed; some of these men are part of the police forces but others not. The general policy is that a militant starts working for an agency to which he has surrendered. The police believe that former militants make good counter-insurgency operatives, as they have a good intelligence network, besides guerrilla training. Generally, they constitute the ‘irregulars’ on the police payroll.55 The SPOs spread terror because they enjoy official patronage. Once they join the police, it is virtually impossible for them to leave. Deserters face police torture and have little option but to cross over to the militants. Poorly treated and paid, acting as shields between militants and the security forces, the SPOs’ sole loyalty is to their own survival. The lack of transparency in counter-insurgency operations leads to its own set of problems and scams that includes fake killings, cover-ups and all kinds of corruption. Double-crossing costs the police heavy as several cases have shown. Some SPOs work as informers and spies. They also unleash a reign of terror in several villages. There are many complaints by the public to police stations, human rights commissions and the local press about cases of extortion, rapes and forced marriages by the SPOs, but none of these have ever been redressed. The situation in Doda district in Jammu is a case in point. Ninety per cent of the 6,000 serving SPOs, sources say, are surrendered ultras. The inspector-general of police, Jammu, admitted that they use surrendered militants, who are ‘a double-edged weapon’. It is also an open secret that double-crossing, desertion, going back to

insurgents, encounters, human rights violations, rapes, and torture are also part of the SPO phenomenon.56 Making things worse are the village defence committees (VDCs) that have been set up in Doda, Rajouri, Poonch, Ramban, Mahore, Gool, etcetera in Jammu and Kashmir. These are groups of villagers handpicked by the army and given arms for self-defence. Undemocratic and unaccountable, they have only served to increase the ethnic and communal divide in Jammu and Kashmir because often one ethnic/ religious group (Hindus) is given preference over the other in making up the committees.57 These VDCs have helped security forces to some extent, but they have also used their special status and gun power to settle village scores, land disputes, local feuds and rivalries. It is also clear that there are tensions and rivalries between armed groups, like between SPOs, the surrendered militants and VDCs. For example, in the case of Hill Kaka (in Surankote tehsil of Poonch district), where the VDC played an important role in the Indian army’s Sarpvinash Operation against militants, 200 militants were claimed to have been killed. Later, it was found that the militants numbered only twenty-eight, while the rest were village labourers and couriers used by militants. But VDCs have been strengthened and women have also joined and been armed. This has further deepened the divide between ethnic communities like the Paharis and Gujjars. The Gujjars have been given guns and branded patriots, to oppose the ‘other’, thereby creating inter-ethnic rivalry. A year after the Sarpvinash operation, militants mowed down eleven villagers, including children and women, who were part of VDC families. The Hindu Right (especially the BJP and Sangh Parivar) is in favour of VDCs. The bullet for bullet policy has been tried, tested and failed, the local papers say, but the state and central authorities think otherwise. It seems that for any solution, demilitarization is imperative: first an end should be put to these incidents and then there should be a phased withdrawal of the security forces.

Special Officers Groups in Assam Assam has about 5,000 special police officers who were former militants from ULFA, NDFB etcetera. The state government decided in May 2008 to constitute a 1,000 man ‘crack team’, mostly of former militants ‘who have already training in arms’, to tackle other militant groups. Thirty per cent of the new force would be from the Home Guards and 70 per cent would be former militants. Justifying this step, the chief minister pointed out that the shortage of security forces in North Cachar Hills had led to at least twenty-three people being killed by insurgent groups in 2008.58 The surrendered ULFA, or SULFA, act as informers and irregulars in the police force. Known for their indulgence in illegal activities and lawlessness, they threaten local activists and others. As a result, ordinary citizens have to face violations; there is little accountability and the insurgency continues unabated.

Strategic Hamletting and Salwa Judum The tactic of ‘strategic hamletting’ has been adopted since the insurgency began in the Northeast. It involves emptying people from remote villages to designated camps, cutting the supply lines of the rebels, and launching fresh strikes in their strongholds. Once the villages are emptied, all those left behind can be identified as enemy combatants and any force used against them can then be justified. This strategy is now used in some of the Maoist-affected regions. The Salwa Judum (SJ) is a new form of the use of special police officers and strategic hamletting. It is important to analyse this model, since it is being used in many areas of insurgency. The Salwa Judum was launched in June 2005, in the villages of Dantewada district, Chhattisgarh after the Maoists killed eight villagers in Kotrapal village. Mahendra Karma, a Congress MLA, is said to have been one of its chief organizers, but the Salwa Judum is backed by Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) chief minister, Raman

Singh, and sections of the Congress Party. They claim that Salwa Judum is a ‘peace force’ of villagers that has arisen spontaneously out of village meetings on measures to counter Maoists. The record of the Salwa Judum tells a different story. Within a month of its launch, 15,000 tribals were forced to migrate to camps from Dantewada. Though the government denied it, such a large transfer could only be possible with their force. Those left behind were subject to violence from the Salwa Judum activists. Despite evidence, no FIR was lodged. In Kota Nedra village, in a Salwa Judum attack in 2006, small children were killed while bathing in the village pond and one three-month-old child burnt alive. Subsequently, more villages were emptied and the number of internally displaced persons increased to hundreds of thousands. Investigations into the Salwa Judum by the Independent Citizens’ Initiative, a civil society organization of eminent individuals, confirm these facts. According to them, meetings ‘consist of Salwa Judum activists, in combination with the security forces, going to villages, threatening to burn them if they did not join the Salwa Judum, and then acting on this threat’.59 Police messages intercepted by Maoists, confirmed by human rights activists and journalists, affirm that the police have ordered encounter killings of not only Maoists but ‘if any journalist comes to report on Naxalites—kill them’.60 Thus people just resisting Salwa Judum have been killed. Burning villages and food stocks and looting livestock, thereby causing economic loss, is a major part of the Salwa Judum mode of operation.61 In the name of the Maoist militancy anything goes in these areas. The sarpanch of Santoshpur, himself a SPO, in an interview stated that the SPOs and district police force killed six villagers in front of him, and two of them were just peasant cultivators. The rest were Sangham (Maoist-band) members. They were not armed. This was exposed by Dr Binayak Sen, who was general secretary of the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), Chhattisgarh, at the time. Sen was shortly arrested under the Public Safety and Unlawful Activities Prevention Act and languished in jail for two years, from May 2007 to April 2009.

Officials, including the political advisor to the state government, former inspector-general of police (IGP) of Punjab, K.P.S. Gill, call Salwa Judum a ‘peaceful Gandhian movement’, ignoring the fact that Salwa Judum volunteers are armed and force is used at the first instance. The reality is that the Salwa Judum is an armed vigilante group, killing and threatening all those who do not agree with them. Further, they are unaccountable to anyone, and its ‘leaders’ have large funds to manage camps. When one of the authors went with a group of university students to Dantewada district in May 2005, they were threatened by armed groups in the name of special police officers of the Salwa Judum. Despite the so-called Maoist threat, however, the group conducted detailed social audits on the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. Clearly, the Maoists did not intervene in such positive development schemes. On the other hand, charges of murder/rape against Salwa Judum activists and the paramilitary are well documented by human rights groups and periodically appear in the local and national press. In Salwa Judum areas teenagers with bows and arrows guard roadblocks and Indian paramilitary forces patrol the refugee camps. While the paramilitary say the tribals came to the camps to escape the Maoists, the tribals retort that the camps are, in reality, prisons. Reports show that select conflict zones are ‘cleansed’, the homes of those used by left-wing guerrillas are destroyed and their owners brought to the camps. Fear stalks the camps as men have to report daily to the police station, queue up for a roll call and a drill. Families are supposed to build their own makeshift houses. The displaced villagers say that anyone who can work is forced to do so for fifty rupees a day, digging roads through the forest. Meanwhile, many states are getting politically divided. Chhattisgarh for instance is polarized between ‘Red’ (Naxalites) and ‘Saffron’ (BJP). As commentator Praful Bidwai told us: ‘If the Chhattisgarh government has proved bankrupt in dealing with Naxalism, the Centre fares no better. By relying solely on brute force to fight Naxalism, it is inviting disaster.’ The December 2008 assembly elections in Chhattisgarh saw a narrow victory for the Bharatiya Janata Party, who then declared it as a victory for their

policies of Salwa Judum vigilante politics. Many did not vote and the election commissioner stated: ‘I would say this is tougher than Kashmir or the Northeast’;62 thus government policies of force and vigilantism have if anything only increased the grip of the Maoist movement. The Salwa Judum is accompanied by the dreaded Chhattisgarh Special Powers Security Act (CSPSA) and some of the provisions of this are harsher than the AFSPA. It directly targets journalists and activists who report on Maoist activity. The argument is that those not with the state are against it. Any dissent is dubbed as being ‘Naxalite’ here, as the detention of Dr Binayak Sen shows. The central and state government has encouraged these ‘groups’ of armed militia. Meanwhile, the Salwa Judum model is being applied in other areas like Jharkhand where the Nagrik Rakshak Samiti (Narsu) is operating. All local sources testify to its unpopularity and criminality.

Government Support to Salwa Judum? The government is ambivalent in admitting its support to Salwa Judum. In its annual reports from 2003 to 2006, the home ministry mentions the ‘creation of resistance groups at the grass roots level’ and ‘encouraging local resistance groups’ as potential counter strategy.63 The district collectors interviewed by the Independent Citizens’ Initiative and by the authors confirmed government support, by way of sponsoring and training the SPOs who form the backbone of the Salwa Judum. In an appearance before the Supreme Court in the Public Interest Litigation (PIL) asking for a ban on the Salwa Judum, the central government’s counsel actively argued that the government was forced to rely on civilian SPOs because the regular police were supposedly too scared to take on the Maoists. These SPOs campaign against the Maoists and solicit support for Salwa Judum, yet they are not officially listed in any government document. Nor is there transparency about their actions or the

budget for them. This makes the government unaccountable for any actions and gives the Salwa Judum ‘… impunity to operate outside the law of the land with assurance of state protection.’64 Some sources say that the Salwa Judum is supported by industrial organizations like the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII), Chhattisgarh Chapter and by the local contractors, besides the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and state government. The Congress is split over the Salwa Judum, since a former chief minister, Ajit Jogi, is opposed to it. During his election campaign in November 2008 in Chhattisgarh, he promised to dissolve and ban the Salwa Judum. Local officials admit off the record that it was the state government that armed people to fight militants and protect themselves. Shailendra Singh Burnwal, deputy superintendent of police involved in anti-rebel operations stated: ‘It was the biggest experiment by villagers. It was their local initiative. We gave the arms licences.’65 This state-armed, unofficial militia has caused much harm and turned more people to insurgency. The Naxalites say that they have recruited many more people in areas where there are Salwa Judum campaigns. This has been confirmed by the tribal welfare secretary of the state.66 Such measures help militarize society, where children now dream of guns, and the use of force is the accepted method of negotiation. The Union home secretary, V.K.S. Duggal, in a 2006 report on measures to strengthen anti-Naxalite operations, said about the Salwa Judum effort in Chhattisgarh, that it was a people’s movement and served its purpose. Asked about alleged human rights violation, he said: ‘We are proud of having the utmost respect for human rights. In large operations, some aberrations may take place but there has been no deliberate intended human rights violation.’67 Local reports deny this and talk mainly of the abuses by Salwa Judum activists. Once an area is declared ‘Naxalite affected’ all normal security, rule of law, fundamental rights no longer apply. The rule of the gun takes over, with the government protecting their vigilantes as

opposed to the ‘other side’, that include unarmed civilians, who become part of collateral damage. Even when mistakes occur and a civilian is fired upon, these are labelled as ‘Naxalite sympathizers’. The government continues with this policy despite what a Supreme Court judge stated on 31 March 2008, that when government uses untrained civilians to commit crimes this makes the government ‘guilty of abetment’. The net result is widespread alienation of civilians who care neither for the state, political parties or insurgents. Even after a Public Interest Litigation was filed in the Supreme Court and it asked the National Human Rights Commission to enquire into the Salwa Judum, the NHRC appointed former police officers and state-sponsored activists to the committee. While making its report, the testimonies of the villagers were ignored, on the burning of villages and other atrocities, and the responses of the Salwa Judum activists accepted.68 This action caused further disquiet amongst the local people. The police have little knowledge of the Maoists’ functioning except when they are caught and then stamped as high-ranking cadres, whatever their real status. Thus the local people often suffer police brutalities since there is little to distinguish between them. This is especially so in Jharkhand, where Maoists are more local and integrated within tribal pockets. The government policy to deal with Naxalites has been outlined in the home ministry’s status paper in May 2006 and repeated thereafter. It consists of a mix of stern action and addressing the root causes of underdevelopment. Stern action includes better coordination between state and central government and the security forces involved, supplementary security and creation of resistance. Development for the government is a mixture of welfare measures and industrialization of the region by creating Special Economic Zones and leasing out mines to private parties in this mineral-rich area. This form of development that displaces tribals generates alienation and anger, providing ground for Maoist mobilization. The policies of hiring special police forces like Salwa Judum are contested within the government and between political parties. Some

ministers in the central and state government have stated that they do not support the Salwa Judum and Naxalites should not be labelled as criminals.69 However, so far it remains clear that the government continues to prioritize force rather than development when dealing with the Naxalites. Holistic methods or winning over local people so that they become stakeholders in government policies is planned but not yet practised.

Politician-Militant Nexus Insurgents have links with select members of political society including the ruling alliance in conflict zones. Politicians who are in power and in opposition are known to use insurgents at the grassroots level, especially when their own capacity or base is weak. This leads to confusion between policymakers and gives cover to insurgents. In Kashmir, the Peoples Democratic Party has links with the separatists. Ex-housing minister, Ghulam Hassan Mir, and MLA for the ruling PDP (Progressive Democratic Party) coalition, offered special prayers at the graves of the militants.70 Local cadres of sections of the Hurriyat, National Conference and the Progressive Democratic Party of Mufti Sayeed have worked together on several political issues. The UPA’s defence minister, A.K. Antony, has stated in October 2007 that in Jammu and Kashmir suicides among the army are alarming and the government will consider recommending a ‘high powered committee on troop reduction’ and in the meantime the government will relocate security forces from all schools, government buildings and orchards.71 The security forces were asked by the minister to restrict collateral damage. On the same day this statement appeared, the governor of Jammu and Kashmir, Lieutenant General S.K. Sinha, said that the situation was not conducive for a troop cut. ‘They [politicians] are talking and they are only few. They talk what Musharraf (Pakistan military chief and president) says to them. Who listens to them?’72 Such confusing and

contradictory statements only serve to reinforce the local people’s view that the government is not serious about resolving issues. In the Northeast, the links between the governments and the insurgents are commonly accepted and exposed by the press and in reports. The governments in Manipur (irrespective of the party in power) have helped fund the underground and used them during elections and on political issues. Chief Minister Ibobi Singh supported the Meitei underground when they blockaded the entry of NSCN (IM) chief Muivah into Manipur. Ved Marwah, former police chief and governor, says: ‘There are hardly any politicians in Manipur of any stature who do not have links with insurgent groups. At times, we have had good evidence to indicate politicians in Manipur paying off insurgent groups and also enlisting their help to win elections’. Marwah also points out, that unlike insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir, there is very little foreign funding for these separatists. ‘Extortion is the only way these groups can fund their activities. Therefore, most politicians have to pay for these private armies.’73 Similarly, analysts in Assam have shown that the state machinery, especially politicians, use their own group of insurgents. It is probably with this in mind that former Union minister Subodh Kant Sahay once said that ‘… the whole state machinery is with ULFA’.74 In West Bengal, the ruling CPI(M) repeatedly claimed that the opposition leader Mamata Banerjee and her party workers have links with the Maoists and built joint fronts with them in the agitations against land acquisition in Nandigram, Singur and Lalgarh. A Maoistbacked People’s Committee Against Police Atrocities (PCAPA) was formed in 2008, in Lalgarh. This committee, endorsed by Mamata Banerjee, issued leaflets announcing trials and held kangaroo courts to try police informers. There was open war: over 100 cadres of the CPI (M) were killed, and the Maoists killed in return. The CPI (M) cadres have been backed by the state police and the Maoists have the sympathy of the Trinamool Party cadres.75 When Maoists allegedly derailed passenger and goods trains in June 2010, the official statement of Mamata Banerjee as rail minister implied that the CPI (M) and not the Maoists might be responsible. She has

stated that ‘there are no Maoists in West Bengal’ and all violence is done by the CPI (M). Maoist violence has been repeatedly condoned by her. This kind of linkage for political gain makes a mockery of state policies in conflict zones. Many reports from Jharkhand claimed that former chief minister Shibu Soren and his party, the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM), were assisted by the Maoist cadres in the 2009 state elections, and in return they were allowed to co-exist and operate for the five months he was in power, till June 2010. During this time, violence between the Maoists and the state of Jharkhand decreased. These kinds of alliances reveal the contradictions in state policy in dealing with the realities of armed struggles. When such alliances between insurgents and politicians are possible, why not negotiations to resolve the issues? Why is civil society blamed for sheltering Maoists? Clearly, the government has let problems fester for so long that they are unable to take clear political decisions to address these conflicts.

The State and Peace Negotiations The government has held peace negotiations with several insurgent groups, generally after bloodshed and the fallout of enforcing national security laws. In the Northeast, the Assam Accord, the Mizo Accord, the Akbar Hydari Agreement and the Shillong Accord stand out. In Punjab, there was the Rajiv–Longowal Accord with the Akali Dal. The Government and Sheikh Abdullah signed the Kashmir Accord. There have also been agreements signed between the Government of India and smaller groups, but these have been primarily ceasefire agreements with the NSCN (I-M), NSCN (K), the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT-NB), and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland. Nine smaller outfits out of thirty, like Kuki, Zomi Revolutionary Army and United Socialist Revolutionary Army, too, have stepped forward to make deals. The Government of India and the Government of West Bengal signed a tripartite

agreement with the Gorkha National Liberation Front (1998). There was an attempt by the Andhra Pradesh state government to negotiate with the Maoists. These agreements are basically ground rules ‘for suspension of operations’. In many cases, the ceasefire agreements do not lead to any demilitarization or surrender of arms by insurgent groups. Nor does it mean the acceptance of the insurgents’ demands by the government. In some cases, autonomous councils for the subregional groups have been set up. It is just the first step of a proposed peace process. Peace talks, as those between the Indian government and the NSCN (I-M) and NSCN (K) show, are a slow and tedious process and one that the government has the capacity to stall. Mrinay Terran, a Karbi Anglong activist, stated that accords have a long history in the Northeast, but not all of them yield a lasting or sustainable solution.76 This instills a conflict fatigue in these smaller groups and their supporters, which the government then can use to its own advantage. At the same time, the ceasefire agreements are important because they reduce the mutual suspicion between parties and can lead to the initiation of confidence-building measures, once a dialogue is started. The larger civil society and peace processes and groups can also be involved in the process. The experience of the ceasefire agreements and negotiations has been that a greater understanding is reached about the nature of the insurgency and problem. Nevertheless, it has been found that as the talks are often long and inconclusive, frustration sets in and the insurgents go back to armed conflict.

Human Rights Commissions All states have human rights commissions that look into human rights violations and represent the victims of violence and make inquiries in to rights violations. The National Human Rights Commission, which was established under the Protection of Human

Rights Act (PHRA) in 1993, has played a significant role in monitoring and investigating human rights violations in the country. It also advises the government on human rights issues and works to further human rights awareness. However, section 19 of the PHRA, specifying that it is not empowered to investigate allegations of human rights violations by the armed forces, restricts the mandate of the NHRC. These violations can be merely reported by the NHRC, but not investigated, and the central government should furnish information on the action taken within three months. This seriously impairs the functioning and the credibility of the NHRC and the state. Besides this, the existing commissions lack resources for effective functioning; the appointees to the commissions are often political, comprising of retired police and civil service officers, and thus are often not objective, especially in cases against state bodies. (Till 2010, there is not a single woman in any national or state human rights commission in India.) Victims often get neither justice nor any compensation.

Conclusion The Indian government over the years has argued that force is necessary against insurgents because they use violent methods that harm citizens, and destroy government and private property. Labelling insurgents as anti-national, the government justifies its actions in the name of protecting the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It must be said here that some use of force is acceptable, if matched with simultaneous political negotiations, use of democratic institutions and the judiciary, handling of the issue as a political crisis and where the maximum care is taken to ensure and safeguard civilians and human rights of non-combatants. Official reports of the Indian government recognize that most conflicts have yet to be resolved, and that in some cases the resolution of one conflict has resulted in other new conflicts. A report of the Administrative Reforms Commission states that there has

been a ‘failure to implement the Accords and agreements faithfully and in the spirit in which they were arrived at. Above all, there has been a tendency to take a minimalist, wait and see, approach resulting in intensification of violence.’77 Holistic steps have not been taken by the successive Indian governments in regions of armed conflicts. Instead, the essentially political issues have been allowed to simmer, because of the belief that the continuation of the status quo will ultimately favour the government. Many a government report admits that it is critical to recognize that dissent or expression of dissatisfaction is a positive feature of democracy. And that unrest often puts pressure on government to make things work. In practice, however even the government’s own report admits: ‘… the right to protest, even peacefully, is often not recognized by the authorities and even non-violent agitations are met with severe repression’.78 And in addition ‘governments have in practice treated unrest merely as a law and order problem’.79 A policy of ‘maximum force’ has been followed. It is believed that such maximum force helped quell the Punjab insurgency and thus should be used in the Kashmir Valley and the Maoist-affected regions, of course, forgetting how different these scenarios are and the political negotiations that took place in Punjab. Any number of senior civil servants and police officers have admitted that force is not a solution. For example, one senior police officer writes: ‘Dilly-dallying and dithering by the policymakers cannot put an end to such violations. Militancy itself is a response to the use of military force in local conflict management, in place of democratic arrangements which are available for this very purpose.’80 He further tells of how an attempt to provide for humane conflict management through an inter-ministerial mechanism was sabotaged on security grounds by the ministry of defence. This is evident in the fact that despite the use of maximum force, the government is nowhere near resolving any of these issues, and armed conflicts of different gradations continue.

The vast majority of people who live in insurgency-ridden areas see both the actions of the insurgents and the reaction of government as damaging to human rights, as our next chapter shows. The refusal of both parties to negotiate a political solution has led to a situation where force and violence follow their own logic. The consequence is deep-rooted militarization of both state and society.

{5}

T he Polit ic al Ec onom y of Conf lic t today there is a bitter contest for resources; between guns I nandIndia butter in the name of security; over land, minerals, forests, oil and water resources in the name of development. In this process the corporate interests are gaining access to resources while the poor are getting excluded. This unequal distribution of resources spurs mass alienation and leads to different types of struggles. The spiral of conflict and militarization also gets a boost because insurgents need resources and arms to sustain their movements and they use force and illegal means to acquire them. Backwardness and unequal distribution of resources mark most conflict regions. Punjab, and to some extent, Kashmir, are exceptions, with higher human development indices than the Northeast and the tribal regions of central India. Years of conflict, violence, breakdown of rule of law and military presence impedes the development of the already backward economy in conflict zones. Inequality in land distribution and dispossession because of the profit-driven development pursued has led to tremendous alienation. New methods of corporate land and resource appropriation are

accentuating these differences. Unemployment and underemployment especially, amongst youth, is rampant. These youth become ready recruits for sub-nationalist, identity, and sectarian movements, or followers of revolutionary ideologies that promise a new system of political power and entitlements. Resources are needed to sustain the conflicts. In this scenario, an entire political economy of conflict develops that benefits some sections of society who are then interested in prolonging the conflict, while the mass of people suffers the consequences of economic deprivation, destroyed infrastructure and low human development.

Armed Conflict and Economic Life The Northeast has the lowest per capita income amongst Indian states and is a largely rural economy (85 per cent). The land–person ratio is very low and the tribal population is rapidly losing land—their only asset. Despite high literacy rates, these states are marked by low utilization of human resources, low consumption and inadequate health facilities.1 The Northeast has one-third of the country’s biodiversity but poor ecological management. Denuded forests and receding water resources have increased the burden on women as they walk miles to collect water and firewood. Mining for coal in the Northeast and oil in Assam provide another dimension to the conflict, that of natural resources. The Northeast is a case of people in poverty amidst plentiful resources. Unemployment and underemployment is very high in all regions of conflict. Registered rural unemployment in the Northeast is 7.64 per cent, which is three times more than the national average. More women are unemployed than men.2 In Manipur, for example, of the 400,000 registered unemployed in 2004, 100,000 are women. It is common knowledge that graduates ply cycle rickshaws on the streets of the capital, Imphal, with their faces masked. There are more than 600,000 educated unemployed in the state, and many join

the underground. Rural poverty in the region is high and the scenario throughout the Northeast can be described as dismal. In Kashmir, Wajahat Habibullah has argued that though poverty rates are lower than the national average, thanks to the land reforms in the time of Sheikh Abdullah, the state’s economy is growing slowly. This is because of rampant fear, lack of industrialization, outflow of capital and poor infrastructure. There are no all-weather roads within the state, except for the one connecting Srinagar to Jammu. Besides, it is believed that the many natural resources of Kashmir are not being properly used. There is a feeling of ‘economic neglect and discrimination in the perception of the affected masses’. Even when funds are allocated, they do not reach the people.3 Lack of social spending is evident in Kashmir Valley where 58 per cent of government-run schools have no toilet facilities and over 40 per cent are without drinking water. Kashmiris feel that they have lost economic opportunities and had misguided development policies.4 The loss of land and displacement add to Kashmiri alienation. The militarization of the land in Kashmir Valley stands out as the army has taken over huge swathes of land. Bashir Assad states that: ‘… land remains the epicenter of the present insurgency and those regions within the state most effected have low levels of development and poor governance’.5 People have been displaced, and migration of all communities out of the Valley has crippled the economy. By 1993, almost 150,000 Kashmiri Hindus were in refugee camps, living in abysmal conditions. The Kashmir Council for Human Rights reports that 15 per cent of the people have had to migrate in search of work.6 This also provides a basis for recruitment of youth in militancy or countermilitancy operations, angry street protests and other such activities. The tourist, handicraft and agro industries have suffered greatly. People face the daily overt violence of militancy as well as the structural violence that comes with poverty, unemployment and lack of infrastructure facilities. Government expenditure on security keeps increasing; India’s expense on maintaining forces at Siachen Glacier is Rs 1,440 crore a year. Thus, more than Rs 20,000 crore has been

spent on this exercise till 2006, in fifteen years.7 People feel that while all this has gone for military expenditure, why have areas like health and education not improved? It appears as if the state is collectively punishing them.

Land, Resources and Conflict Landlessness is an important root of poverty but not the only issue. For land as a resource, the main questions are: how it is actually distributed, how it is acquired, who acquires it and the treatment of people who are deprived of it. All studies indicate a trend towards commercialization of land by corporate interests and the alienation of land from the poor to the richer peasantry. D. Bandyopadhyay, former secretary to the Government of India, argues that there is a five-pronged attack on the peasantry. First, corporate interests want to create large land banks and the government is allowing this. Most states in India have changed their land ceiling laws to favour such transfers. The West Bengal Left Front government has amended the Land Ceiling Act to relax provisions for the corporate sector. Second, contract farming has been introduced that increases exploitative relations with the peasantry. Third, indebtedness has increased according to all official figures, and despite variations between states, the Indian average is 48.60 per cent. Fourth, the introduction of genetically modified seeds has increased the hold of transnational corporations on Indian farmers. Fifth, the government’s growth policies has lead to the displacement of farmers.8 Many intellectuals thus argue that the peasantry is fighting back this assault in different ways.9 In all tribal areas that are conflict-affected (including Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, Assam, Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhattisgarh and tribal parts of Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala), a Planning Commission report admits that severe poverty, deprivation, and exclusion make the tribal people feel a deep sense of alienation.10 The areas that are Naxalite-affected are part of the 187 forest

districts that cover 63 per cent of dense forests covered by the Fifth and Sixth Schedules of the Constitution. These regions have major mineral resources, like coal, tin, bauxite and iron ore.11 The commercial and industrial exploitation of forest produce and mining of minerals is the core issue of the Maoist insurgency. In 2005–06, the Chhattisgarh government signed contracts for $1.6 billion with power industries. This move coincided with the start of the Salwa Judum, when tribals were forcefully evicted from their villages. One hundred Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) have been signed with mostly private parties who will reap huge profits at the cost of the local people and environment.12 In Orissa, it is alleged that an illegal outflow of iron ore, estimated at nearly Rs 8,000 crore, has gone on since 2004.13 The government–industry nexus shows up in deals like Vedanta where an MoU was signed with maximum benefits to the company, with the tribals losing out. In Jharkhand, around thirty coal and iron blocks fall in the forest areas where most of the illegal mining takes place. The Jharkhand government signed contracts with the Tatas, Birlas, Essar and other groups for aluminum and iron-ore plants.14 In June 2008, the government awarded the contract for iron-ore mining to Arcelor Mittal in the tribal belt of Jharkhand (Karampada with 65 million tonnes of iron-ore deposit), over Indian public sector companies.15 There were demonstrations of almost 200,000 people when the Essar steel plant was set up. Then on 11 June 2008, the Maoists attacked the plant, and blasted the power transmission. Two days after that, the former home minister, Shivraj Patil, asked industrialists to invest in Naxal-affected areas, without taking people there into confidence. In Chhattisgarh, for each industrial worker employed by the Jindals, 124 persons will be deprived of drinking water. The Tatas have been assured of more than sufficient water for their steel plant, while 50 per cent of the people have no drinking water. In Dhuruli and Vanshi villages in Dantewada, due to operations of the Essar company, more than 80,000 people will not have any source of drinking water.16 The issue people are raising is: how is water being

distributed and used. Who gets a water surplus and who is denied even drinking water? This inequity over water has fuelled conflict. Civil-society activist Arun Agarwal argues that the popularity of the Maoists coincides with the rise in iron-ore mining profits, which increased from around Rs 50 per tonne to over Rs 5,000 per tonne between 2000 and 2010. While the contractors/corporate houses raked in a profit of over Rs 200,000 crore through legal and illegal mining, mostly in the iron-ore sector, the royalty paid to the government on iron ore was not revised and remained at a ridiculous Rs 7 to 27 per tonne (depending on the type and grade of iron ore), with the average of around Rs 15 per tonne, for years. Moreover, this royalty was neither made ad valorem nor was it revised from year 2000 onwards when the international price of iron ore rose to dizzy levels. The people in these districts were given no share in these profits.17 The inequity behind this extraction and the strong interests that protect and safeguard mineral extraction is an important part of the political economy of these conflict zones. Microfinance schemes have hardly come to Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh and rural credit is almost entirely based on private moneylending at high rates, and many are indebted. Communications, infrastructure and irrigation facilities are very poor and there is little access to markets.18 Government institutions barely function, and the health and education facilities available for the tribals here are thus much lower than the national average. This, while the infant mortality rates are the highest compared to any other part of India.19 The tribals’ right to use the village commons and make local brew from Mahua trees have been restricted. The rural commons is being given to private interests for commercial farming of bio-fuel crops like jatropha, and foreign liquor shops have come up. With such extreme pauperization, many tribals told us that they have only one of two options: ‘Marna ya marna’ (to kill or be killed). The contractor–politician–mining–transportation nexus and the huge profits being made from mining is part of local knowledge and frustration. The Maoists are able to take advantage of this exploitation and failure of government institutions.

The Maoists have used rural distress to mobilize tribals and create an armed force ‘to protect the people and resources’. In their Ninth Congress, they stated that mega-projects and Special Economic Zones will be ‘resisted’ since they were leading to ‘massive displacement and marginalization’ of the tribals and peasantry. This call attracted some of the displaced and desperate tribals to their side, even as projects go on. Maoist blockades have sometimes paralysed these states as they are supported by local people. At the same time, the Maoists levy taxes on these contractors as we see below. The Planning Commission says that rural distress in areas affected by extremist challenge, ‘is not merely relative, it is absolute’.20 Minimum wages are not implemented, handicraft and handloom production has declined, labour laws do not exist.21 The Naxalites in some regions ensure payment of minimum wages but take a 5 per cent levy, just as the contractors do. In several areas, this is how the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) functions. Development projects like dams and Special Economic Zones (SEZs) etcetera have led to the displacement of millions of people, most of who have not been rehabilitated. Official numbers for displaced tribals vary.22 The Planning Commission report cites 60 million displaced between 1947 and 2004, involving 25 million hectares, which includes 7 million hectares of forests and 6 million hectares of other common property resources. Whereas tribals constitute 8.08 per cent of the country’s population they form 40 per cent of the displaced. Twenty per cent of the others displaced are dalits and another 20 per cent are Other Backward Classes (OBCs).23 In Andhra Pradesh, where new contracts for bauxite mining have been given to corporates like the Jindals and the Anrak Group, mining operations will displace about 100,000 tribals and employ only 400 of them. This is cause for the affected to be anxious and to mobilize themselves. The setting up of SEZs and other projects have been resisted by the tribals; for example, in Nandigram, in West Bengal in March 2007, and for four months in Orissa in 2010, against the

proposed Posco mega-steel plant. Here protesters were fired upon by the police. In report after report the government recognizes that development policies have led to tribal alienation.24 These reports are often repetitive but their recommendations remain unimplemented. A recent report states that in the tribal hinterlands: ‘problems of poverty and alienation, of marginalization of entire communities from the economic mainstream and of dispossession of land and displacement from forest habitats and livelihood sources have all combined to create fertile ground for the spread of the movement which hold out promises of equity, justice and livelihood’.25 There is a failure to deliver basic livelihoods and give justice to a large number of communities. Violent movements seek to use this alienation and turn it into anger and retribution. The 130th report of the home ministry states that ‘Naxalism is no longer the problem of one state … . As part of the holistic approach, the private economic sector also needs to be protected … the economic development of Naxalite areas can happen only if the private sector also contributes to this’. The ‘holistic approach’ is likely to take time; meanwhile the use of force is being ratcheted up. The home ministry has advocated a special force to protect the SEZs and private industries from the Maoists. Paramilitary in these areas is being increased as the government contemplates the use of armed force. Land grabbed by the army has been an issue in Jammu and Kashmir since 1989 when it took over 4,000 kanals of land belonging to 20,000 peasants from twenty villages in central Kashmir and Budgam district near the Srinagar airport. The army has 51,459 acres private land and 205 sq. kms of government land under its control, in addition to 1,600 buildings. The low rentals were raised in 2008, but the villagers want their land back and have gone to the high court, where the case has been pending for years.26 Government policy has in recent years encouraged entry of the corporate sector into Indian agriculture in multiple ways, as we have shown above. Powerful corporate, private interests have an interest

in increasing land holdings and penetrating agriculture. It is evident from the figures of indebtedness and farmer suicides that the peasantry is in distress. Mining has increased greatly in all traditional tribal areas. Illegal mining activity and state leasing of mines at very low rates has also led to forced displacement of tribals with the help of local contractors and police. The method of appropriation of resources, where local people are excluded rather than made stakeholders, has become a root cause of conflict. The common people’s alienation and dispossession from their land is a trend in all conflict zones.

Sources of Insurgency Funding Funding for insurgencies come from diverse sources. Collections from local people are a small but important part since this helps the insurgents popularize their cause. Young boys and women engage in this collection as a method of increasing their support base. This house-to-house collection tells them who their supporters are and helps them to keep in touch with their mass base. The collections from these sources are not large, but politically important, since it helps mobilization of overground supporters, especially youth and women cadres, as well as enrolment of new cadres. In some cases of insurgency, foreign funding has been an important source. This was especially the case in the Kashmir movement and Punjab Khalistan insurgency. In both instances, ethnic Kashmiris and Sikhs settled abroad made regular contributions. The gurdwaras abroad made collections for victims of police atrocities during the Punjab armed conflict. In Pakistan in the 1980s, mosques often had a box for fund collections towards jihad, part of which came to subsidize Kashmiri militants. Support from foreign agencies has also been blamed as a contributory factor in helping prolong such conflict. Besides monetary contributions, support in the form of small arms and RDX is also obtained from external sources.

In the armed conflict regions of the Northeast and Maoist-affected areas people pay double taxes—one to the state and the other, unofficially, to insurgents. Extortion on the highways is a common phenomenon, with confiscation of goods and money by state officials, paramilitary forces and insurgency commandos. In insurgency-affected areas pressure is exerted by insurgent groups on commercial institutions. For example, in Assam, different commercial and regional banks had sanctioned loans of Rs 86.51 crore to the surrendered insurgents of ULFA (SULFA) youths that have never been recovered. Further, insurgents cause losses by blowing up pipelines that carry oil and gas, oil refineries, and facilities in other energy sectors.27 Insurgency has hit schools and there is absenteeism by teachers and students. There has been a sharp rise in the cases of kidnapping, extortions and ransom; even the teachers have to pay the militant outfits.28 Non-payment can be fatal.29 In Manipur, it is reported that local government officials’ salary cheques have two deductions, one from the government and other from the underground. Government contractors pay up to 15 per cent to the underground. Rebel approval is needed to build schools, roads, buildings, etcetera. Thus, many contracts are given out without bidding or tenders according to the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG). Government reports state that underground groups influence the decisions of the Manipur state government in awarding contracts, supply orders and appointments in government service.30 In many cases, the cheques are given to beneficiary committees for executing public works but there is no follow-up and no reports, so the CAG cannot ascertain ‘if work has been done at all’.31 Hazarika has noted the nefarious ways in which the militias of the Northeast coerce government officials for payments. He says that all officials pay not less than 24 per cent annual tax. This, Hazarika argues, is ‘a measure of the state government’s abdication of responsibility as well as the power of the insurgent groups’.32

In Imphal, the NSCN (I-M) sent out a stern directive that no contract works in Naga areas of the state would be allowed to be taken up without its permission. The NSCN (I-M) warned that ‘zero tolerance’ would be exercised or enforced against anyone defying this directive. The NSCN (I-M) had complained that the Meiteis who live in the plains cornered most of the contracts at a cost to the Nagas. Thus: ‘No contract works sans recommendations from the Government of the People’s Republic of Nagaland (GPRN) in Naga areas shall be allowed under any circumstances. Consequences, thereafter, for violation shall be serious with dimensions and sideeffects. Ongoing works in the hill areas, if found without the recommendations of the GPRN, shall face action.’33 The Council stated that the Meitei insurgent groups are no better than the politicians when it comes to exploiting hill people. They accuse the government of serving people from the valley only. In order to sustain themselves they have to take such steps. As Hazarika has shown, the chief minister of Nagaland even defended the insurgents with this refrain: ‘The people pay them with trust. When people want to pay, how can the state government stop them?’34 In all regions of conflict, local people complain that the ‘official’ state government and administration have a ‘nexus’ with the underground groups. These groups are known to have penetrated the local administration in many areas in both Nagaland and Manipur. Money is made through civil contracts and the contractors are linked to the underground. The former Union defence minister, Pranab Mukherjee in an interview stated that: ‘I was recently shown receipts of Rs 1 lakh paid up to insurgents in Manipur by a former chief minister, Rs 2 lakhs paid by a former deputy chief minister and 1 lakh receipt paid up to them by an ex-MLA—(Member of Legislative Assembly).’35 There are reports that Manipur’s chief minister, Ibobi Singh, donated Rs 1.5 crore to two banned separatist groups in his state in early 2005. Union defence minister Pranab Mukherjee stated that the government ‘was seized of the matter’. But such things ‘do affect the morale of the army’. Army chief, J.J. Singh, forwarded two receipts

from the Manipur government, where the state chief minister gave Rs 1 crore to two militant groups in 2005 which was accounted for as ‘contributions to national movement’.36 This exposes the links between the politicians and militant outfits in the Northeast. The police chief in Manipur, Yumnam Joykumar Singh, has stated that the insurgency also gets money from funds dedicated to development schemes. ‘Whatever the underground is getting, is provided by the central government.’37 This is because a part of the central government funds are diverted to the militants as pay-offs and part taken by contractors and others. The actual project funds are drastically reduced. Activists for the rural employment schemes —like the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act—have told the authors that they risk getting killed if they do not pay the insurgents and underground groups. In Manipur, the local press repeatedly states that drug money that comes especially from the Manipur–Myanmar border is used to fund insurgency and small arms. State officials have not been able to control this. Insurgents use these funds to sustain themselves and their cadres as they are able to pay wages and conduct guerrilla camps. They buy small arms, landmines and are part of arms trafficking. They also use these funds for local development, to gain and sustain the goodwill of local people. A report by a one-man enquiry committee in April 2007 revealed how Assam loses huge sums of money because trucks entering the state are looted every day. The government did not act on this report until a Right to Information application was filed. The trucks’ loads are under-assessed (violating rules, so traders overload trucks) and people ranging from government employees to political leaders, ministers and underground outfits and self-styled NGOs benefit by way of bribes and extortions at the gates of Baxirhat and Srirampur on the Assam–West Bengal border. The report said: ‘On an average the state government appears to be losing several hundred crore a year due to corruption at these two checkpoints. What is more surprising is the apparent silence on the part of senior officers … . to stop this’. The report said that both government and non-government

groups have been extorting money in the name of various taxes. Every overloaded truck is supposed to pay penalty. All these trucks go through after paying extortion money. One checkpoint that belongs to the National Democratic Front of Bodoland takes Rs 400 a truck. Another checkpoint of Adivasi Cobra militants further takes off Rs 100 a truck. Later police outposts also collect money.38 Collecting bribes from trucks and transport moving across borders is common practice in the Northeast. In May–June 2010, when Naga students lifted the two-month blockade from the Manipur border, trucks refused to go back to work unless they were promised safe passage and freedom from extortions. Underground groups, by their own admission, have large amounts of funds and control critical parts of the region’s economy. For instance, the proscribed United National Liberation Front (UNLF) of Manipur publicly stated that they had in the past collected more than Rs 300 million and had procured ‘modern sophisticated weapons’.39 The organization talked of their dependence on the ‘contract/supply’ system, by which they had benefited, but also that certain cadres had become millionaires overnight and the ‘revolutionary culture seriously eroded’ and the struggle is ‘on the verge of being swallowed’.40 Militant groups in Manipur openly issue press releases naming their office holders and whom the government officials have to deal with. The government is practically the only employer as almost all industries have shut down. Many government officials do not go to work if posted outside the Imphal Valley. Citizens take their grievances to the rebels, not to the police or courts. It is said in Manipur that two dozen militant groups practically run the state. Economic life and movement is disrupted in all conflict zones due to emergency orders, curfews and restrictions. Economic activity comes to a standstill and millions of rupees are lost during days of prolonged closures. Project reports on bandhs in Assam, for example, show that seventy-three bandhs were called by different organizations in one year—June 1997–98. These were sometimes called by insurgents and at other times by political parties.41 The loss

per day was estimated at Rs 4,479 lakhs. The total loss in 1997 was calculated as Rs 1,255 crore.42 This has been repeated for years and continues to be so. This clearly indicates that the state in several of the conflict zones is facing collapse. Analysts call this a crisis of governance, but in reality it is a crisis of politics where institutions have either collapsed or got distorted, to become shadows of what they were or should be. The state itself has become either non-existent or a predator of its own citizens; militancy is the excuse but the corruption and misuse of state institutions cannot be blamed on insurgency. There is a huge volume of illegal trade between the Northeast and the neighbouring countries and analysts from the region are now arguing that this trade needs to be recognized and made legal.43 The Government of India has adopted the new ‘Look East Policy’ by which they propose to link the Northeast to the rest of South-East Asia by road links, to facilitate trade and geo-strategic relations and perhaps give legitimacy to the connections that exist so far. In Kashmir, tour operators, orchard owners and small shopkeepers admitted to paying ‘protection money’ to militants in order to safeguard their interests. People who have not paid up have faced consequences. For example, Ircon engineer, Sudhir Kumar Pundir, an employee of the Indian railways, was murdered in July 2004 in Kashmir, after he refused to pay out large amounts of protection money to militant groups like the Hizbul Mujahideen.44 This kind of underground militarized economy develops vested interests that keep the conflict from resolution. Classified data of banks that were seized in Kashmir, for example, show that hundreds of thousands of rupees are looted from them.45 Very often local vendettas, land disputes etcetera are resolved by paying off militants. Such criminal acts, called ‘degenerated insurgencies’, have been common in all armed conflict situations in India. Between 1990 and 2009, Kashmir witnessed 1,536 shutdowns sponsored by separatists, besides the thousands of demonstrations and blockades, that took a heavy toll on the economy.

In Maoist-influence areas likewise, the Maoists levy taxes and extort money from contractors and local people, in order to sustain themselves and for procuring the wide range of weapons they possess. The Maoists admit that they levy a tax on all profitable enterprises. In other words, they are almost officially part of the extortions racket in the region’s economy. The Maoists argue that this money is used for their armed squads, for medical camps, schools, land banks, food, development work, wages for their cadres and for workers, etcetera. Some officials we interviewed said that the Maoists have collected crores of rupees in the last few years. All big contracts in Jharkhand were taxed by the Maoists. Even politicians pay them, to get access to their constituencies when they come to campaign. There is an unstated collusion between various political and underground forces. There have been differing estimates of the Maoists’ budget, with some citing figures running into several tens of crores. In Orissa’s mineral belt of Keonjhar and Sundergarh, there have been reports of Maoists attacking construction companies for money, but no report of attacks on the mining mafia. Part of the official government funding, it is alleged, leaks to the insurgents. In 2004–05 the government provided Rs 2,475 crore in financial assistance to fifty-five Maoist-affected districts in nine states, for social development measures. Security experts estimate that 10–20 per cent of the funds may have been diverted to militants who became richer by Rs 500 crore.46 Gauri Shankar Rath, additional director-general of police in Jharkhand, said, ‘On the conservative side, the Maoists are raising up to Rs 60 crore a year from Jharkhand in levies—from the iron ore, coal, forest goods, transportation, MP and MLA funds, and development work.’47 Newspaper reports state that illegal mining in Jharkhand amounts to at least Rs 200–250 crore; and of this about Rs 40–50 crore goes to the Maoists and the rest is distributed between contractors, corporate interests, police and mining officers.48 Some district collectors we interviewed in the region, who do not wish to be named, confirmed this. ‘How else can the MLAs and industrialists go and function in these areas, where others cannot go? They do so by

paying protection fees to the Maoists.’49 Other unconfirmed reports show, for instance, that the Maoists decided to earmark Rs 30 crore (7.57 million dollars) a year for improving the firepower of their cadres who are engaged in guerrilla warfare in parts of five states— Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Jharkhand. Further, from information culled from Maoist documents and interrogation of recently arrested rebels, intelligence agencies estimate that the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA), the main force of the Maoists, consists of more than twenty-nine companies, equivalent to three battalions. This is in addition to thousands of secondary forces and militia members.50 Government reports recognize this nexus: ‘The extensive contractor–transporter–extremist nexus and its links with illegal mining and collection of forest produce in the entire region of left extremism yields a huge volume of funds for the extremists.’51 But the government has not been able to take any action against this and there is no clear policy in sight. Meanwhile the government spends hundreds of crores in counter-insurgency. The local people feel aggrieved that very little is being spent to improve their livelihood or give them justice.

Dependence on Central Government Funds The central government allocates resources for security, defence and development in conflict-affected states. The budget for defence has been increasing every year.52 Just maintaining forces at the Siachen Glacier costs Rs 1,440 crore a year and more than Rs 20,000 crore has been spent on this exercise in fifteen years, till 2006.53 Even the former defence secretary believes that this exponential rise can be envisaged ‘only by constricting the flow to the social development sectors’.54 Funds for internal security and border management come under the home ministry. The amounts allotted for this are seen as insufficient; and the strength of central paramilitary forces (CPMFS) has been rising steadily and is

expected to reach a million men by 2010–2011. Without matching social expenditure, this is leading to militarization at the grass-roots level. The central government’s policies of giving grants-in-aid and packages to conflict zones, has made these areas heavily dependent on such funding. The central government believes conflicts can be resolved by such financial assistance. Successive governments have poured in huge funds for development to the Northeast, Kashmir and, recently, to Maoist-affected regions; however, the institutional arrangements for the proper utilization and accountability for funds are lacking. Funds are often siphoned off, returned, or underutilized. Very little reaches those affected and the people at the grass roots are aware of this lacuna, since there is no local participation in utilization of funds. In the last three decades, the state governments allotted the job of ‘anti-Naxalite operations’ to the police and paramilitary forces. Law and order is a state subject, but the Centre assists the state governments and has spent Rs 100 crore on this till 2007. Newspaper reports show that in just one year (2005–06), the development funds of Rs 2,700 crore distributed by the central government for extremist–Naxalite-affected districts were not spent in the financial year. The central government did little to monitor implementation of the projects for which they had given funds. This happens frequently since there is no mechanism for social audits, where people can be engaged in monitoring how government funds are utilized. A visit to the areas shows that there is no evidence of even the most basic facilities like drinking water, electricity, or functioning schools.55 Despite this, in 2007–08, the government decided to raise ten new police battalions to counter insurgency. This underlines the absence of institutional capacity, breakdown of governance and lack of interest in development projects. This gap between development and security expenditure hurts those affected. The Indian government pours in money into Jammu and Kashmir. For example, between 1989 and 2003, Rs 2,711 crore were paid.

Khurshid Ahmad Ganai, principle secretary, general administration of Jammu and Kashmir, has stated: ‘So much money is coming in from the Government of India but our capacity to spend, and spend well, is still not very good.’56 Jammu and Kashmir, for instance, got Rs 119 crore in 2006 to provide homes and employment for the food-forwork schemes. But the government spent only Rs 58 crore. In 2007, an economic survey of Jammu and Kashmir showed Kashmir’s average annual rate of growth at 5.5 per cent compared to 7 per cent, the national average. The survey showed the severity of infrastructure problems due to the ‘disturbed’ conditions and underlined the presence of corruption, nepotism and a top-heavy and bureaucratized administrative structure. The system of administration in Kashmir has been known to be corrupt and the insurgency after 1989 has worsened economic conditions. At the same time, property and infrastructure are destroyed by militants, and in the crossfire with the army. In Kashmir, in just one year (1990), 802 public buildings, including 129 schools, 172 bridges and 501 other buildings were destroyed. This has continued to happen every year. Former prime minister, I.K. Gujral, had perhaps correctly stated that: ‘Delhi spends more in Kashmir than on Kashmir.’ The people of Kashmir affirm this feeling. In Manipur, for two and half years, till 2007, thousands of employees were not paid their salaries by the state government. Until 2007, the state government assumed that their employees numbered 80,000 rather than the actual figure of 61,000. There were thousands of fake appointments. In the education department alone, 17,000 people were shown as drawing salaries, whereas only 12,000 were actually employed. Five thousand people shown as drawing pensions had died.57 Security-related expenditure of the Union government is on a perpetual increase. The records of the ministry of rural development state that in the ‘extremism-affected’ districts the police have a carte blanche on ‘security-related expenditure.’ The Comptroller and Auditor General’s (CAG) Report 2006–07 showed the misuse of this security-related expenditure at times. In Jammu and Kashmir, for

example, it was spent for developing lawns, renovating kitchens and toilets, furniture, police uniforms, building police homes, etcetera. Despite this, the ministry of home affairs insisted: ‘No irregularity in the spending (of) money has been brought to the Centre by the CAG.’58 Thus, while the militancy is blamed for lack of development, the state government has much to account for.

Conclusion All conflict zones have high unemployment, rural distress, ecological damage and poor human resource utilization. At the same time, most of the tribal conflict zones have huge mineral, forest and other resources. Corporate and political interests want uninterrupted access to these resources. Mineral extraction, timber felling and commercial agriculture have produced huge profits for a small nexus of corporates, contractors, politicians, and transporters. They have to rely on local mining and police officers. This nexus superimposes itself on local institutions and actors to form a formidable and unchallenged lobby. It is the tribals and the dalits who get exploited by the nexus of caste and class, and which underlies the widespread human security. In large parts of conflict zones the government administration has failed to deliver basic justice and governance. In other parts, the security and administrative personnel are corrupt and are not trusted by the local people. Insurgents work in these areas and mobilize people and resources, to create alternate sources of resource collection. Insurgents collect money from the corporate–contractor– politician–transporter networks and allow them to work in these forests. People in conflict zones are under further duress as they pay taxes to both the state and insurgents. There is an ordered chaos in this conflict that allows an illegal economy to flourish and extraction to go on. The government has made attempts to develop these areas by giving funds for schools, primary health care and employment schemes. It also promotes

development by giving out mining leases and making Special Economic Zones to invite big capital. This development has led to massive displacement and has not led to any perceived benefit for the local people. The local people, especially the tribals, are victims rather than beneficiaries of development. The increasing inequity of resources, grabbing of resources by an economic and political elite, poverty amidst plenty, lack of social, educational or medical facilities, inability to get justice, and absence of rights, leads those affected to respond. Some of them accommodate while others join insurgencies and counter-insurgencies. The Indian government recognizes tribal alienation and provides funds and schemes to redress the situation. All these conflict zones get ample central government grants-in-aid and other security assistance. These are, however, poorly utilized and the affected areas continue to suffer neglect. This has made these areas heavily dependant on the Centre but has not helped curb the insurgency. Insurgency is leading to economic insecurity just as much as insecurity is leading to insurgency. These conflicts are only partially resource conflicts and should not be understood as a ‘resource curse’. Rather it is the unequal and illegal use of resources that seeks to benefit some and exploit the rest that creates the political economy at the heart of these conflicts. The issues of justice and human rights are also equally part of the conflict. It is evident that to resolve armed conflicts the economic issues will have to be tackled along with the issues of justice and rights.

{6}

Hum an Right s , M ilit ariz at ion and Alienat ion of armed conflict have a heavy presence of security forces R egions as well as armed non-state actors and consequently are marked by militarization. Power is associated with force and the gun and miltarist values pervade even public spaces. Human rights violations take place in areas of insecurity and militarization. The States Human Rights Commissions (SHRCs) have restricted powers to investigate cases but not to punish violators. But neither the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) nor the SHRCs are allowed to investigate alleged human rights violations by the paramilitary and military. The NHRC can only ask for a copy of the report carried internally by the military and paramilitary. This leads to long delays in redressing grievances and many complaints go unaddressed. Reflecting this militarization, it is, forexample, commonplace in Manipur to see in any week’s newspaper reports of murders, kidnappings and disappearances (by both the militants and the security forces); rape, molestation, cases of child abuse; sit-ins, strikes, and bandhs by student and women organizations.1 The dailies in Kashmir,

on the other hand, constantly report on disappearances, street protests, army mishandling, ‘stone-throwing discourse’, etcetera. The sheer repetitiveness of such tragedies is no longer considered unusual but part of a ‘normalized’ situation. This chapter shows the social and political implications of human rights abuses because of militarization. It argues that these human rights violations lead to a collective feeling of alienation and disconnect from the ‘national’ collective and from the state. It marks exclusion of people from citizenship and from the normal functioning of public life. All these in turn become roots of conflict. This chapter also discusses why societies torn apart by armed conflict seek de-militarization.

The Legal Framework The Constitution firmly prohibits the state from showing special preference or indulgence in any discrimination against citizens on the basis of religion, sect, belief or creed. The fundamental rights incorporated in Part III of the Constitution, comprising Articles 12–35, are inviolable rights of the individual against the state. Any action by the state or private persons cannot deprive a citizen of his freedom and fundamental rights. These are in addition reinforced by India being a signatory to and having ratified several international treaties and conventions on human rights such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and so on.2 The Indian Constitution also lays down certain fundamental duties for Indian citizens that complement the exercise of fundamental rights. These can be challenged in the court of law and declared as unconstitutional and invalid, unless it is covered by any of the restrictions mentioned in the Constitution. The Directive Principles of State Policy are another unique characteristic of the Indian Constitution. In general they address social and economic rights. While not enforceable, the courts have read some of these principles into Article 21, for example, the fundamental right to

life. They have been interpreted over time as being applicable, since they are conceptualized as ideals which the state must strive to achieve through policy formulation and implementation. These principles along with the Fundamental Rights in Part III are accepted as part of the nonamendable ‘basic structure of the Constitution’ and the fundamental principles for the governance of the country.3 Besides these two parts, other provisions of the Constitution also provide equal opportunity to citizens of India, including minorities, without any discrimination. However, there are significant restrictions as we have seen in Chapter 5. All of the rights in Part III can be curtailed. For example, in the case of Article 19, on the freedom of speech and expression et al., a stated caveat that ‘in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality, reasonable restrictions’ may be permitted. Further, legislation like the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 has been enacted for protecting and promoting rights. The Supreme Court by a process of constructive interpretation has also vitalized some fundamental rights. India thus has a basis on which a culture of human rights can be built. However, areas of armed conflict have become exceptions to this legal framework because of the national security laws. Deaths due to action of the armed forces, deaths in custody and disappearances after custody are endemic in these regions. Victims look to the judicial institutions and to human rights commissions for redressing grievances but justice is delayed and often denied.

Militarization and Human Rights In Jammu and Kashmir some 500,000 Indian security forces primarily tasked with fighting an estimated 3,000 militants (currently estimated at 600–800) are engaged more in maintaining law and order in the face of increasing street protests. The situation is similar in the Northeast where millions are spent on counter-insurgency operations and the numbers of battalions have been increasing regularly. The number of paramilitary and police forces have been increased in all areas where there is Maoist activity. Every time there is a Maoist attack, the government decides to increase patrolling and constitutes a special

force to deal with the problem. All of this has led to an increased militarization though not much respite from the conflict. In Kashmir, the long postings in non-family stations and situations of low-intensity conflict mean that security forces are on ‘continuous alert’. They sleep with their weapons beside them, ever ready to pull the trigger. The tension has led to some soldiers becoming increasingly violent at the smallest pretext. Officers admit that there have even been instances where ‘our boys’ have assaulted their officers, and turned rogue.4 Rape and abuse have been used by some of them as instruments of retribution. On the other hand, the militancy in Jammu and Kashmir has increased every year since 1990, amounting to about 63,387 cases in a ten-year period.5 Official figures show a decline in 2009–2010, though mass street protests have risen. An atmosphere of fear and despair stalks the state. Likewise, the militancy in the Maoistaffected areas has also increased and instances of insurgency-related incidents in the Northeast, especially Manipur, continue to remain high.

Human Rights Abuses In general the pattern of human rights violations in all regions of armed conflict has been fairly consistent. These include: (a) Extrajudicial killings and abductions that lead to disappearances. (b) Extrajudicial deprivations of the liberty of people especially in villages due to: (i) crackdowns and grouping of villagers and villages (ii) illegally imposing curfews (iii) detention for long periods at army posts and campuses (iv) use of civilian places like schools, etcetera as detention or interrogation centres. (c) Rape, molestation and sexual harassment of women. (d) All types of torture and threats. (d) Desecration of religious sites (churches in the Northeast, etcetera) (e) Forced labour (in Northeast). (f) Large-scale looting of homes, burning villages (Northeast, Salwa Judum). (g) Use and abuse of children as combatants.

Each of these abuses has a long-term impact on the individual and the affected community as we show below.

Violent Deaths The first and foremost consequence of armed conflict and the militarized response is complete victimization and death. Press reports and human rights groups claim 50,000 to 80,000 dead in Kashmir between 1989 and 2009. Figures from 2004–05 show there were around 30–40,000 young widows and about the same number of orphans.6 According to recent reports from Assam, though violent actions by armed groups declined in 2003–04, the number of killings went up in the same period.7 According to the home ministry, the total number of security forces personnel killed in Maoist violence in 2005– 2007 was more than those killed in Jammu and Kashmir or even the Northeast. The total number of Maoists killed by security forces is far less than the number of militants in Northeast or Kashmir.8 The highest number of dead were in the Maoist-affected areas where civilian, security and insurgent deaths were a total of 892 in 2005, 759 in 2006 and 998 in 2009, showing a steady increase.9 As the Independent Citizens’ Initiative shows, the Maoists and the police regard each other ‘as fair game’.10 The figures of people killed in the armed conflict zones are shown in Table 1. Table 1 : Deaths in Insurgent Violence (1994–2010) Civilian Security Forces Militants/ Naxals Total s Jammu and Kashmir 11,135 5,223

19,273

35,63 1

Northeast

8,660

2,221

7,000

17,88 1

Naxalite

1,569

1,1184

1,440

4,193

Total

21364

8,628

27 713

57705

Rounded

22,000 8,600

28,000

58,00 0

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal; Times of India, 19 May 2010. The trend from Table 1 reveals that all the zones of conflict are losing large numbers of civilians and security forces. Large numbers of insurgents are also being killed. International organizations put down the figure of 200 killed every year for a situation to qualify as an armed conflict situation. All these zones continue to be epicentres of violent conflict and civilians form a high one-third of the casualties. It would appear that militant groups continue to get enough recruits to thrive despite the casualties. The security forces are taking heavy casualties (15 per cent) but the tactics and strategy of security forces and militants do not appear to have changed. The killings in the Maoist regions have increased since 2004 when the Maoists and the People’s War Group (PWG) merged. From 2005 to 2010, 1,600 civilians and 1,100 security personnel have been killed in Maoist-affected regions. There have been a large number of custodial killings in all these conflict zones. The pattern in most cases is similar, even though the perpetrators may be from different forces serving the Indian state. Insurgents retaliate by targetting local police and people linked to the state. Areas of armed conflict have several militias. The state security forces are supplemented by special security forces that are not official and wield gun power and are often responsible for extrajudicial killings, for example the Ikwans in Jammu and Kashmir, the Salwa Judum in Chhattisgarh, etcetera. The insurgent groups often have several militias that may represent different ethnic/sectarian groups or factions and indulge in opportunistic violence as we have shown in earlier chapters. A Public Interest Litigation in the Supreme Court (22 May 2007) states that at least 540 innocent people have been killed by the Salwa Judum and the security forces between 2005 and 2007, including women and children. The numbers may be larger as many cases go unreported and unrecorded. Besides this, Naxalites have killed 550 civilians and

policemen during the same time in retaliatory action. At least 2,825 houses have been burnt and at least 99 women have been raped.11 As the atrocities keep adding up, the focus shifts to violent acts and the roots causes and long-term impact of violence is missed out of the larger debate.

The Missing As already discussed in the section on ‘enforced disappearances’ in Chapter 4, the phenomenon of the ‘missing’ is a common occurrence in armed conflict situations. People (usually young men) are picked up for interrogation by the police and then never found. In other instances, young boys leave home and join insurgencies or the ‘underground’ and resistance movements. In all these cases, the whereabouts are unknown. Several thousand civilians have been detained under the Public Safety Act and the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act.12 The Jammu and Kashmir state government claims that 3,000 men are missing, but human rights groups show the figure of missing men and youth to be between 8,000 and 10,000.13 The International People’s Tribunal on Kashmir in December 2009 gave evidence of 2,373 unidentified graves containing 2,943 bodies in fifty-five villages of three districts. This report has been submitted to the state government. It says that 4,500 alleged militants in Kashmir have been kept in jails for years without trial.14 The disappearance of men has led to the phenomenon of ‘half widows’ in Kashmir since there is no closure to these cases.15 During the agitation for Khalistan in Punjab in the period 1984–1994, there had been similar disappearances. This was confirmed by a recent report based on the State Human Rights Commission that showed that remains of over 2,059 bodies were identified in Amritsar district and over 1,000 were still lying there, besides the large number in other districts. Internationally, disappearances and ‘custodial deaths’ fall within the definition of ‘torture’. Prohibition of torture and ill-treatment is underlined by its non-derogable status in human rights laws. No state can justify such an act.

With underground activity in Assam, the frequency and intensity of army atrocities multiplied manifold and the number of enforced or involuntary disappearances (EID) cases increased in the state. Many individuals ‘disappeared’ from the custody of the security forces in the 1990s. Such unlawful termination of individuals (no matter whether they were involved in unlawful activities or not) has been seen as deliberate terror tactics by the state.16 The Assam State Human Rights Commission received 6,500 complaints from 1993 to 2008, many of which are still pending. Amnesty International has given a number of instances when the Special Operation Group (SOG) has fired on peaceful demonstrators in Jammu and Kashmir.17 Many people have been reported missing after the Salwa Judum operations in Chhattisgarh, when people were removed from villages and sent to camps. Human rights groups in Jharkhand say that it is the special police officers who kill the members of the ‘Sanghams’ or committees, ostensibly unarmed, set up by Maoists in villages to just oversee events.18 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has often raised concerns on living conditions and treatment of Kashmiri prisoners lodged in various jails. Disappearances are a violation of fundamental human rights, like the right to liberty, personal security and humane treatment (including freedom from torture), the right to a fair trial, to legal counsel and to equal protection under the law, and the right of presumption of innocence, among others. The families of the missing persons, who often spend the rest of their lives searching for information on them, are also victims. There are clear international conventions on enforced disappearances and the state is under obligation to investigate such acts.

During Crackdowns During the regular crackdowns by the police, some state they have been tortured, and others have died in custody or disappeared. Human rights organizations like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and even the State Human Rights Commissions (SHRC) have

documented cases where people have been detained during crackdowns, only to be killed later in custody. Crackdowns have increased the sense of alienation because security forces target all the people in the ‘disturbed area’. One human rights activist in Jammu and Kashmir stated: ‘Even today (2007) houses are combed without reserve and inhabitants savagely beaten and threatened …’ In general, a common person in any part of Jammu and Kashmir has to experience deep humiliation when caught in a crackdown. Senior police officials and the SOG admit that crackdown is a human rights violation that increases the hatred of people towards security forces. Kashmir’s local leader Nizamuddin Bhat said: ‘For restoring peace with dignity, every such operation must stop. There are various ways to conduct search operations.’19

Encounters The phenomenon of ‘encounter’ (extrajudicial) deaths described in Chapter 4, now widely prevalent in various troubled parts of the country, has its origins in Andhra Pradesh where it was used as a means of eliminating the Maoists who targetted the police, as class enemies. Encounters take place because the security forces are under pressure to eliminate terrorists. Their promotions and awards are linked to these killings. Officers pay the irregular forces to kill alleged terrorists and security laws give them impunity. Many innocent people have been killed in the bargain. A recent case shows the pattern: In January 2009, police killed fifteen alleged Maoists in Bastar district of Chhattisgarh, but villagers from those areas gave a different report to the press and to the activists who went to the spot.20 The case is revealing for several reasons. Firstly, while the villagers claimed that all the people shot were locals, there was no proof as to how many of them were in fact Maoists. Secondly, the police along with Salwa Judum members and SPOs surrounded these people, shot them dead, took videos and left without taking the bodies. Thirdly, once the villagers started a protest and the issue was reported in the national press, the police ordered an inquiry by the sub-divisional magistrate. Fourthly, no bodies could later be

found by the police. Fifthly, the situation became so tense that scores of other villagers and tribals left their villages and migrated to other areas. This is just one in a series of such brutalized killings in encounters and cover-ups by the police. Another encounter similar in pattern took place on 30 April 2010, when three young men in Machil, Kupwara district of Kashmir were shot dead and buried with the help of local villagers. The army claimed these men had infiltrated from the Line of Control and gave an award of Rs 60,000 to the killer officers.21 The families of the three men who had disappeared filed an FIR at the local police station on 10 May 2010. The men had been seen in the company of a counter-insurgent earlier. Public pressure forced the chief minister to order a magisterial enquiry. The police exhumed the bodies and found them to be of the three missing civilian young men and not militants. This encounter had been carried out by special police officers paid by an army major and a colonel of the 4th Rajputana Rifles. The army has also ordered an enquiry. The police in this case showed that the youths had been shot in their heads.22 This case has both similarities and differences with many of the earlier encounters. It is similar because encounter killings have been a common method adopted by security forces and irregular or special police officers; the system of giving awards for ‘killings’ continues in the system of impunity for the security forces; people, especially young boys continue to disappear and their families file FIRs but are given no information. The case of April–May 2010 in Kashmir is different because mass public pressure led to the immediate magisterial enquiry and the police were forced to exhume the bodies and identify the victims as civilians and not insurgents; the state government reacted to public anger with alacrity; the police force involved was ready to expose the army officers and special security. The army ordered a probe and the major of the 4th Rajputana Rifles who ordered the killing was removed. This revealed that mass protest was a significant means of pressure for getting justice. ‘Encounters’ have resulted in many innocents losing their lives, often shot at point-blank range. Such extra-legal killings have been often supported by security forces and sections of society on the pretext that there seemed to be no other way of eliminating the threat and were

justified in the name of self-defence, patriotism or national security. Encounter killings thus continue as common practice by the police and paramilitary.23

Minorities, Migrations and Displacement Armed conflict leads to large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. The IDPs, caught between the insurgents and state, generally come from the excluded communities like tribals, dalits, Other Backward Classes and minorities. Men, women and children are forced to leave—recently more women have been migrating. These communities are often seen as the ‘other’ and sought to be ‘cleansed’ out of these areas. Highlighted here are case studies of the Kashmiri Pundits, the tribals and dalits displaced from other mineral-rich but conflict-prone areas, and the Muslim minority in Manipur. The Bihari and Bengali labour being targetted in Assam are also discussed.

The Kashmiri Pundits The most tragic human rights violation in the Kashmir Valley has been the forced migration of the 150,000 Kashmiri Pundits (upper-caste Hindus) since 1990. The Pundits had been employed in administration and education. In fact, for the 1,144 Kashmiri Pundit teachers who left at the time, replacements have still not been found.24 The exodus had a psychological impact as well, since it was feared that there would be a clampdown on the Pundits that remained. Only a small number, about 15,000, stayed back. Despite repeated promises, no viable measures have yet been taken to bring the Pundits back to the Valley. Even today others occupy erstwhile Pundit homes. Health care and education in the camps where the Pundits have been rehabilitated are very limited; there is a shortage of materials and lack of basic amenities.25 Each family has one tent which serves as the space for cooking and sleeping. There is one toilet for every twenty persons and sanitation is very poor. Even after years

of displacement, in 2004, there were only fifteen specialist doctors to cater to a population of 43,000 Kashmiri migrants. Health officials reveal that these displaced people suffered from many stress-related disorders. A survey in 2005 showed that the Kashmiri Pundits have made distress sales of almost 85 per cent of the properties owned by them in the Valley.26 The Indian government has come up with proposals to resettle them in the Valley, but in many cases, this has been too little too late. The Kashmir Pundits remain ‘more bitter’ and blame the government for their plight, citing a collapse of state authority in Jammu and Kashmir and the government’s lack of a strategy in this matter. That the displacement of the Kashmiri Pundits has impacted the secular traditions that the Valley was historically known for is now acknowledged. The culture of extremism that filled the vacuum is being again challenged by social and political groups. Various minority groups and tribes in Jammu and Kashmir, for example the Gujjars and Bakriwals, the Bot, Beda and others, have been severely marginalized ever since the conflict began. No mechanism was put in place for the welfare of these communities, who were seen as being subservient to the others. In 1991 they were granted the status of scheduled tribes.

Minorities in Manipur According to the 2001 census, 6.9 per cent of the population in Manipur is Muslim. Backward, largely employed in rural areas and educated in religious institutions, Muslims do not avail of the mainstream education facilities because of which they get deprived of jobs that require certain levels of education. Muslim women are mainly engaged in handicraft and the rural economy. In May 1993, more than ninety people were killed in clashes between Meiteis and Pangals (Muslims) in Thoubal and Imphal districts. Reports stated that the People’s Republican Army instigated the communal clashes, the first in Manipur history. After that some Muslim insurgency groups like the North East Minority Front (NEMF), United Islamic Liberation Army (UILA), and People’s United Liberation Front (PULF) sprang up to protect the community.

Sometimes the army has protected some minority tribes in Manipur like the Kukis who have then come into conflict with the Nagas. The Kuki National Army chief involved in the clashes claimed ‘moral and material support’ from the various agencies of the government of India.27 This is an old colonial tactic of dividing and inflaming intercommunal and inter-tribal rivalries and pitting communities against ‘anti-national’ communities. Though the Naga–Kuki clashes are well known, the Nellie massacre in Assam is another instance of inter-group clashes and rivalry.

Tribal IDPs from Chhattisgarh The civil unrest because of the confrontation between the Maoists and Salwa Judum activists who work for the security forces, primarily in Dantewada and Bijapur districts of Chhattisgarh, has increased since 2005. The Salwa Judum has forced thousand of families to flee. One set of people have been placed in camps in Chhattisgarh guarded by the Salwa Judum, and another group of almost 30,000 to 50,000 people have become refugees in districts of Andhra Pradesh in Warangal, Khammam and East Godavari districts. The National Commission for the Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR), an autonomous body of the Government of India, conducted public hearings and reported on the status of these IDPs.28 The report clearly stated that everyone who testified spoke of the extreme violence committed against them, their families and property by all three forces in the conflict: the Maoists, the Salwa Judum, the security forces. This included killing, rape, violence and pillage of their assets. For the locals, there was little difference between the three groups. They had no choice but to move to the neighbouring districts of Andhra Pradesh. The report also talked of the extreme penury and distress of the people and the great pressure on infrastructure such as water and housing. These IDPs had no alternate livelihoods and were neglected by the host administration that already has to provide for the local people, and this further aggravated poverty, ill health and despair.

Salwa Judum operations forced out some 50,000 primarily adivasi villagers from about 650 villages and placed them in twenty-three relief camps that are makeshift shelters on the roadside. This operation was done by extrajudicial forces with the backing of the state politicians as the adivasis are guarded by the police and paramilitary forces. In just one year (2007), 750 of them died in clashes alone. Mahendra Karma, leader of Salwa Judum states: ‘We are fighting for victory and small things [like displacement] do not bother us.’29 Press reports confirm the confrontation between the three groups, the security forces and their militia versus the Maoist militia: ‘These villages have become sites for bloodbaths. Many Naxalites were gored with arrows, and their bodies slashed with axes. The militants retaliated.’30 As a consequence, villagers became more vulnerable to gruesome revenge attacks by militants, the special police officers and the Maoists. Further, the Salwa Judum activists who are armed with minimum training and guidance, have used these arms on each other to gain power and to resolve village disputes, occupy land illegally, etcetera. The aim is to fight Maoists by vacating villages and placing the adivasis, who are seen as protecting the Maoists, close to police posts. But hundreds of tribals have died in the years of this proxy civil war, and tens of thousands are staying away from their homes as villages are ravaged and burnt. The tribals have been deprived of their livelihood like never before. The government has argued that the displacement of tribals from villages to camps is inevitable, voluntary and to ensure their safety. But as Anoop Saha states, the pattern and method of displacement points to the contrary.31 As mentioned in Chapter 4, the Salwa Judum started on 4 June 2005. By November, people from a hundred villages were moved to camps. Human rights groups argue that force, killings and rape were used. Despite the evidence, not a single FIR was launched against the special police officers or the Salwa Judum. In relief camps, the residents sit idle with no work, no source of income, surviving on government rations and handouts. Sometimes there are reports of tribals escaping and moving out from these camps. The only work they can get is contract labour or to enrol as special police officers. Tribals, who were earlier part of forest and agriculture, have become just coolies or untrained shields for a private militia. Despite such

hardships, reports show that the people want to return home once the situation becomes normal. The Chhattisgarh state government claimed that all displaced adivasis were living in camps and that out of a total of 1,350 villages, 644 supported the Salwa Judum. But as Saha and others showed, the total population of these 644 villages would be about 350,000. If there are only 50,000 tribals in camps, where were the rest of the 300,000 villagers? Either they were still in villages, backing the Maoists at the ratio of 6 to 1, or they had migrated to neighbouring states, away from the ghettoized camps.32 The capture of resources and use of land is a major reason for displacement as we showed in Chapter 5. Access to resources and land banks that corporations demand in exchange for industrialization, infrastructure and big dams has led to policies resulting in evacuation of settled populations for small compensation. The loss of livelihood, fragmentation of communities and breakdown of culture has been resisted at all displacement sites but with little result since the government, the political class, the local bureaucracy and the judiciary all support corporate-led development. This displacement is a violation of the right to livelihood but the internally displaced (IDPs) are not recognized as refugees either by the state or international humanitarian agencies and face an acute crisis of survival.

Children in Armed Conflict: As Combatants and Subjects of Child Abuse Children are the most vulnerable and easy victims of armed conflict and are affected by it in many ways. Children get killed, hurt and maimed and become part of ‘collateral damage’, an impersonal term used to describe a situation of absolute victimization. Children lose their parents, relatives and become orphaned and are left without care. Their homes and schools are destroyed, and their education disrupted. Children also become combatants and are ruthlessly engaged as child soldiers; and in the civil wars they are used as couriers, human shields and child labour. They get involved in narcotics and small-arms trade.

They become part of prostitution and trafficking rackets. Brutalized and militarized by all this, their childhood is lost, and they treat society as inhumanly as it treats them. According to a 2003 study, children constituted about 38 per cent of Jammu and Kashmir state’s population and of these over 3 per cent were orphans, destitute or neglected and did not get basic needs for their protection: health care, food, education, love and affection, security, learning and safe environment.33 The number of orphans was put at about 50,000. With only a handful of private orphanages, it was a struggle to deal with a calamity of this scale.34 According to the 2001 census, there are over 175,000 children working as labour in Jammu and Kashmir. The 2005 earthquake and the militancy added to these numbers. Facing a life of continuous instability and destitution, these children were increasingly vulnerable to abuse. Professor Madhosh’s study Women and Children Under Armed Conflict in Kashmir revealed that many of the orphaned children were inclined towards violence, militancy, revenge and retribution. These children were frequent dropouts or did not go to school; economic compulsions forced them into child labour, making them highly vulnerable to physical and sexual exploitation.35 As social norms break down, families have to bear the burdens of the traumatized and alienated youth. Alcoholism and drug abuse among them is very common in areas of the Northeast and Kashmir. So is mental illness in Kashmir. These children are the potential recruits for militancy. We sum up below some of the findings of the Joseph Gathia Committee Report 1995 on children in Jammu and Kashmir and other such surveys that show children are the biggest victims there: 1. Bomb blasts took place in schools, killing many children there.36 Hundreds of schools were gutted in the turmoil, until 1995. 2. In Kashmir, 60 per cent of children between the ages of the and fourteen are deprived of education because of the violence-filled environment. 3. A large number of school buildings have been occupied by the paramilitary. In the mid-1990s, hundreds of schools became

4. 5.

6. 7.

8.

9.

10.

security camps. Till 2007, more than fifty-three schools were still occupied by the military. The presence of paramilitary in and around the educational institutions was creating fear psychosis among the schoolchildren. With the Kashmir agitation, working days dramatically decreased. For example, for several years, schools were closed for 207 out of 229 working days a year. Sixty per cent of the days were lost because of strikes. In 1990, for example, teachers went on strike for seventy-three days to protest the ‘atrocities of security forces’.37 In 1990 teachers responded to 125 strike calls by militants and this was described in the regional press as ‘phenomenal response from public’. In 1992 there were 148 strike calls. In 2007, they came down to thirty, all of which cut into the school days. The accountability factor in schools was also low, and standards declined. Educational infrastructure had been badly hit since 1994. Over 400 school buildings were reduced to ashes. This was because the paramilitary had camps near schools, especially in Anantnag and Pulwama districts. Out of a total 714 school buildings gutted so far, 161 buildings were in Anantnag alone, while 146 were in Pulwama. In Srinagar, 87 school buildings were gutted by fires and bombings. Officials claim that these schools have been rebuilt. But the burning and bombing of schools has a terrible psychological impact. The confidence and psyche of children was destroyed. Over 142,800 students bore the direct brunt of consequences of armed conflict. Reports continuously showed that girl students and teachers alleged molestation by paramilitary men posted in and around schools. Records showed that orphanages in the Valley could take care of only 10 per cent of orphans but since there are just twenty orphanages with about 1,000 children, many live unknown and destitute lives.38

Prolonged conflict in Jammu and Kashmire has meant the continuation of high dropout rates among children. Though figures

show that only 5.7 per cent of children between the ages of six and fourteen [1.12 lakh] are out of school, yet the dropout rate in primary school is 23 per cent and in middle school it stands at 33 per cent. This is despite schemes such as the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan.39 Yet children remain practically out of sight in the mainstream media reporting on Kashmir. Some NGOs work with children, but they are not able to even remotely manage the scale of the tragedy. Human Rights Watch and other reports say the conflict in Chhattisgarh has also severely impaired children’s access to education. Once Salwa Judum began its operations in mid-2005, many children stopped attending school for fear of abduction. The security forces use school buildings for shelter and the Naxalites have destroyed many schools, to prevent their use for military or Salwa Judum operations. Schools have been relocated to camps, where displaced children study in crowded conditions and many of them are separated from their families. Those camp residents who want to return to their home villages do not have access to schooling facilities. Children who fled across the state boundary to Andhra Pradesh seeking refuge from the violence in Chhattisgarh have been forced to drop out of school due to the language barrier in the Telugu-medium public schools.40 These findings confirm those of the team of the National Commission for the Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) that had earlier visited Dantewada (Chhattisgarh) and Khammam (Andhra Pradesh) from 17 to 19 December 2007, in order to assess the status of children’s health and education.41 In other conflict areas, too, children have been impacted. The Naga mothers worry about the impact of gun culture on their children. In Manipur it is commonly said ‘all children born after 1980 in the state have been innocent victims of a state of siege and have never known the meaning of peace’.42 Children have been witnesses and survivors of conflict. In the Northeast and in the Maoist-dominated areas, too, schools function poorly. The social welfare department functions only partially. Funds for teaching aids are not properly distributed. Right of children to education in their own language is not available. The violent political context thus affects the implementation of an entire range of social and other services. In remote areas where access is difficult, not

only does schooling and education suffer but children get hooked to drugs and smuggling. The largest number of new drug addicts in Manipur and some areas of Naga conflict are children. One of the most tragic consequences of armed conflict is the use of children as combatants. The fear of insurgents recruiting children is a major problem in all conflict zones.Especially in cases where children have disappeared, there are fears that they have been abducted by insurgents. Reports of many human rights organizations, for example, Amnesty International in 2007–08, have shown that the Maoists have been inducting children as cadres. Further evidence is the arrest in 2008 of twenty children recruited by Maoists in Bihar. This trend is seen in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa and other states. The children are used to gather intelligence, as guards, to plant landmines and bombs. The children are organized as members of Bal Sanghams and given ideological as well as guerilla training. Raids on camps have resulted in the recovery of many teenagers. These children are then beaten and tortured by the police for information. The counter-insurgency force of irregulars, such as in the Salwa Judum, have also used young boys below the age of eighteen as vigilantes.43 The Chhattisgarh state police admit that they had recruited children under eighteen as special police officers due to the absence of documentation for proof of age, but claim that all of them have been removed from their ranks. However, Human Rights Watch investigators in Chhattisgarh found that since 2005 almost 3,500 underage special police officers continue to serve with the police and are used in counter-Naxalite combing operations.44 Other human rights groups have witnessed dozens of children dressed in police uniform carrying guns. Camp residents have recounted how police and Salwa Judum members urged them and other children to enrol as special police officers and how they recognized children who were school dropouts and had joined their ranks. This is a violation of international law. In July 2008, the home ministry denied as ‘absolutely false’ the Human Rights Watch’s finding that children were used in Salwa Judum as combatants. This denial contradicted the Chhattisgarh police’s admissions both to the ministry and to government bodies such as the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights that they had

recruited underage special police officers. The fallout was that the Maoists began to target these children. In Kashmir, the government has no clear or precise estimate of the number of children affected. NGOs claim it is up to 40,000. One BBC report said that children orphaned by conflict in Jammu and Kashmir are about 100,000. Another study, as we have seen earlier, put them at 50,000. Official reports say thirteen of the fourteen districts in the state (except Leh) are affected by the conflict and provide some easy converts to militancy. The structural violence, the collapsed economy, lack of human development especially impact children. The humiliation meted out to parents, the brutalization of men and the violence against women in homes also have a similar effect on young minds. Besides this, there are cases of child molestation, rape, early child marriages, stress, anxiety, serious psychiatric disorders, and suicides. Removal from school, incomplete education, especially of daughters, leads to them engaging in domestic labour. Besides this, there are violations of basic health and education rights of children. In its report to the Commission on Child Rights in 1997, for instance, the government makes reference to the impact of armed conflict on children in Jammu and Kashmir, apart from Punjab, though being silent about the Northeast. The government acknowledged in 2001 that almost 40 per cent of the civilians in regions affected by armed conflict are children.45 Since then the area of armed conflict has increased. Children thus are particularly vulnerable and voiceless during armed conflicts. Yet reports show: ‘an atmosphere of institutional indifference and apparent lack of serious concern on the part of official agencies over the impact of armed conflict on women and children’.46 Lack of political influence and voice add to vulnerability. The dominant approach to women and children has been welfare-oriented rather than rights-based. Despite Signing the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), little positive action has been taken. Statistics can only partly capture the state of children affected by armed conflict. These figures cannot measure the psychological impact on them. The emotional growth of children that has to be nurtured is destroyed in disturbed situations. Families become dysfunctional and

divided. The impact of conflict on children thus needs much more study and public concern.

Intellectuals and Journalists Intellectuals, including journalists and faculty in Kashmir University, are wary and even scared of speaking openly, particularly against the militants and the army since even innocuous comments on occasion have had serious, even fatal, consequences. Two leading doctors, Dr A.A. Guru and Dr Mehraj-ud-Din, were arrested and jailed and allegedly tortured for their support to militants. There have been protests from hospital staff that were violently suppressed. Dr Guru was later shot dead by unknown gunmen. Many employees in institutions have been killed. In 1990, there were instances of firing in hospitals, like the Sheri-Kashmir Institute of Medical Sciences in Soura, Srinagar. Intellectuals or journalists engaged in human rights work in Maoistaffected areas and elsewhere are suspected of being Maoists. They are then shadowed by the police and even arrested as in the case of T.G. Ajay, a film maker, who was released after several months, and Dr Binayak Sen, who was in jail for more than two years. Sudha Bharadwaj and the Chhattisgarh Mukti Morcha, a trade union, have been targetted by the state police. In Andhra Pradesh activists K.G. Kannabiran and his daughter Kalpana Kannabiran have faced enquiries from the intelligence and police. Police officials in Chhattisgarh have targetted academics and activists Nandini Sundar, Himanshu Kumar, Medha Patkar and Arundhati Roy. In Punjab Jaswant Singh Khalra who was looking into ‘disappearances’ himself disappeared in 1995 and remains ‘missing’. Expecting people to be ‘either with them or against them’, the state allows little to no room for criticism and discussion in conflict zones. In Manipur and Assam many intellectuals are either branded ‘pro-underground’ or ‘pro-state’. The inter-ethnic distrust in this region leads to public hostility. Intellectual life is thus stifled in all these regions. A number of young journalists have been killed in the Northeast, especially in Assam and Manipur. Any critique or investigative reporting

is seen as a threat by both the sides and the journalists have to pay for this with their lives. A well-known case is that of journalist Rishikanta from the Free Imphal Press, who was gunned down in November 2008. A meeting of the All Manipur Working Journalists’ Union (AMWJU) took this as a violation of the code of conduct that had been agreed to by the various armed and unarmed organizations. According to it, all armed and unarmed groups and government authorities should first contact and inform the journalists’ body in the event of any grievances with journalists. In this case, the AMWJU decided to suspend the publications until the state government found out and arrested the murderers. The body also expressed suspicion on the involvement of security personnel in the murder.47 This again showed the hopelessness of the situation and the breakdown of trust in all institutions of the state.

Health and Trauma People who live in areas of prolonged armed conflict are known to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorders (PTSD) and a variety of illnesses. The mental health situation in Kashmir comes across as particularly distressing, as cited in one report: ‘80 to 90 per cent of my patients are depressed’ states a senior physician; ‘All Kashmiris are depressed’ (senior government official); ‘All of us are wearing a mask’ (chief medical officer, Srinagar, Kashmir).48 There are also a large number of cases of functional somatic symptoms and use of psychotropic drugs. The number of psychiatric cases has risen from 5,000 in 1999 to 60,000 in 2008. Fifty-eight per cent of the Valley’s people have been exposed to traumatic events and 15 per cent of them suffer from PTSD. Missile injuries have been very high in the Kashmir Valley, especially between 1992 and 1997. In just one hospital, Sher-iKashmir Institute of Medical Sciences (SKIMS), for example, there were 25,000 accident cases during this time, with 32 per cent of them being missile-related spinal wounds, affecting people from five to seventy-three years.49

The Human Rights Watch report of September 2006 spoke of gross human rights violations in Kashmir on the part of both the state and the militants. Suspicion and fear continue to permeate the Kashmir Valley, and the report added that: ‘The psychological trauma related to the violence has been enormous, as life itself is constantly under threat … creating among the civilian population a pervasive climate of fear, distrust, and sadness.’50 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Holland, released a damning report in November 2006: ‘Our findings indicate that mental and physical health needs are high, while coping mechanisms of individuals are predominantly dysfunctional.’ All individuals reported a ‘general exposure to violence since start of the conflict in 1989’. The MSF survey showed that during crackdown on villages, 99 per cent of the people were rounded up during raids and suffered fear and trauma. It revealed that nearly one in ten people reported having lost one or more members of their immediate family due to violence in the period 1989–2005. Almost half of the respondents (48.1 per cent) felt safe only occasionally or never. Respondents had high levels of anxiety, stress, and so on. The survey reported that interviewees witnessing (73.3 per cent) and directly experiencing (44.1 per cent) physical and psychological mistreatment, such as humiliation and threats, had caused extensive damage to their psychological health. Almost two-thirds of those interviewed by MSF had heard about a case of rape, while one in seven had witnessed it. Despite such high numbers, basic mental health facilities are not available.51 For example, at least ten hospitals in Kashmir Valley have been occupied by the army.52 The hospitals are plagued with the chronic shortage of staff, material and medicines. Besides, a large number of good doctors, especially Kashmiri Pundits, have left.

Judicial Institutions Lack of justice is one of the most important reasons for alienation and insurgency. The best-known if not sole legal remedy on right to life as guaranteed by Article 21 of the Indian Constitution is the writ of habeas corpus. In such cases, the writ is filed and the Supreme Court of India

is to respond and enquire into the case. However, any number of cases from the Northeast to Kashmir show that official institutions have not helped victims to get justice. Without going into the myriad cases and their legal terminology, it is sufficient to quote the Supreme Court in their decision based on one case: ‘the freedom of an individual must yield to the security of the state’.53 This is a clear instance where the Supreme Court rules in favour of the state over the rights of an individual, even when the state is in the wrong. Thus, the Court endorses prioritizing state security, even to the exclusion of individuals’ security; state security is viewed as being parallel to human security. Given this mindset, the draconian national security legislation continues to be the guiding law in conflict regions and gives immunity to the armed forces while there is little the ordinary citizens can do, even when denied their basic rights. The habeas corpus is itself problematic in that the state high court is powerless to intervene since the case goes to the overburdened Supreme Court. The high court is unable to expedite the case, pass clear and decisive final orders or do anything other than order the registration of a First Information Report (FIR). Thus, after years of litigation by families whose members have disappeared, all that they got by way of justice was the order for registration of the FIR. It was found that in Jammu and Kashmir, in over 57 per cent of cases in which there was a clear finding against someone identified from the security forces, the court was unable to do anything more than this.54 A citizens’ report by advocate Ashok Aggarwal, on the Writ of Habeas Corpus in Jammu and Kashmir: 1900–2004, shows, that registration of the FIR was seen by all concerned as a formality, the ‘completion of which would enable the system to wash its hands off the matter’.55 It enabled the payment of some ex-gratia compensation to the families of those who had disappeared but there was little evidence of regret from the ‘system’. The behaviour of the court was callous, in that it did not heed its earlier orders or the earlier proceedings and each hearing was dealt with afresh. The respondents and the lawyers took advantage of this kind of amnesia-ridden way of functioning. There were years of delay and victims’ families spent huge amounts of time and money with little results. The court staff brazenly ignored instructions or directions of the judges. The security men guilty had little

regard for judicial decisions. In most cases, they did not reply to enquiries. They were scornful of both the victims and the judicial process and critical of human rights organizations and NGOs. The citizen’s report confirmed through the detailing of innumerable cases from Jammu and Kashmir that the habeas corpus has been a ‘complete failure’.56 It did not protect the right to life of citizens who had disappeared. The only purpose of habeas corpus, this report says, was to: ‘merely perpetuate the myth of justice and, the myth of a functioning judiciary.’ Dozens of people told the authors that the police had obstructed their efforts to file FIRs and that they were not able to get justice for years.57 Human rights violations can only end through resolute political will to reform the system and to get rid of this lawless impunity, so that as Montesquieu argued, ‘Law should be like death, which spares no one.’ In Manipur, the state judicial institutions were so weak that in many cases the underground insurgents provided the system for delivering justice. We were told of many instances where cases of domestic violence, petty crime etcetera were taken to the underground and sometimes to the women’s groups for resolution. Likewise in the Naga areas, local cases were resolved by the Naga Councils rather than taken to state institutions. In the Maoist areas, the Maoists held people’s courts, a kind of kangaroo court, to decide judicial matters. Biased in favour of the Maoists, these courts passed judgments on informers, and for their annihilation. In the absence of formal institutions, a government report admitted, such ‘informal, rough and ready forums of dispute resolution did in a way respond to the felt need’.58 In Jharkhand a stay on local councils or panchayats has been ordered by the Supreme Court. The existing mechanisms for delivering justice are clearly inadequate. More independent and autonomous bodies need to be set up to provide the healing touch. At some levels, the judiciary (especially at higher levels) has intervened in favour of human rights. During Operation Rhino and Operation Bajrang in Assam, the Gauhati High Court repeatedly pulled up the army for the torture, arrest and harassment of civilians. In July 1991, the Supreme Court ordered that army officers making arrests of women under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958

should follow procedures, which guarantee various rights and protections to women and children.59 But the judiciary has also not remained unaffected by militarist ideology. Since a number of groups in the Northeast are secessionist, virtually all dissent has been labelled as ‘anti-national’ and often ‘foreign-inspired’. Political pressure has resulted in judicial delays and unfavourable judgments, with the benefit of the doubt going to state agencies. Other government institutions have also declined in the way they function and deliver governance. Though the panchayat elections were held in Jammu and Kashmir in 2000, from 1994 there has been a steady erosion of democratic institutions that accounts for the decline of people’s civil and political rights.60 This not only causes delays in justice and judicial administration, it adds to the grievances of the local people and thus to the sense of both alienation and despair. It is one of the reasons for the prolonging of conflict.

Institutions for Human Rights The Indian government has formal institutions to look into human rights abuses: the National and State Human Rights Commissions. Enquiry committees are also instituted; however violations continue. More than seventy-nine official enquiry commissions have been constituted in Jammu and Kashmir to probe allegations of custodial killings since the 1990s, but none of their recommendations have been carried out. This reveals the complacency of the government at both the state and central levels, despite their promises.61 In Jammu and Kashmir, Justice A.Q. Parrey stated that the SHRC was toothless and not empowered to take steps against those found guilty; the armed and central forces were beyond purview of the commission. In July 2006, Justice Mir resigned from the SHRC to protest against ‘growing human rights violations in the state and non-implementation of the commission’s recommendations.’ He stated: ‘… that the government is not serious about the commission’. He further said: ‘During my tenure, not a single recommendation made by the commission was implemented. SHRC

has not been able to accomplish the object for which it was established.’62 From 1997, the year of its inception, till 2008, the SHRC in Kashmir had received 3,333 complaints of human rights abuses. Of these, 2,179 were disposed off to provide relief. For the rest, people were either left without redressal, or in some instances, resorted to seeking justice on their own. For example, in Bandipora after a rape case, residents ‘resorted to deliverance of justice by themselves after finding the government wanting after a rape attempt by security men’.63 When cases of rape and murder happened, as in Shopian, in May 2009, the entire Valley was shut down by raging protests for weeks. Such a sorry state of justice cannot deliver peace and leads instead to a deep sense of alienation from the body politic and desperate people then take desperate steps. Generally, senior army officials dismiss human rights activists as naïve busybodies at best and agents of anti-national forces as worst. Armed forces spokespersons have repeatedly denied reports of human rights violations as ‘unfounded’, ‘baseless’, or ‘highly exaggerated’. These reports are usually put down as ‘pro-insurgent propaganda’, and often of being ‘foreign inspired’. Driven by chauvinist nationalist sentiment, official spokespersons have almost invariably questioned the patriotism of critics of militarism and human rights violations. There is an instance of a press conference called at the height of human rights violations in the Northeast in 1995 by the additional director-general of military operations, Major-General A.B. Masih, in Delhi. He stated that a total of twenty-three columns were called out four times in Assam and said: ‘We seem to be buckling under human rights, a Western rights concept. There are far more human rights violations in the West.’ He then regretted that the media never highlighted violations of traffic rules the way it allegedly blew up the aberrations of the army jawans under extreme provocation.64 This statement reveals various elements of the militarist ideology. Patriotism is invoked and the army lauded. International movements on human rights are shown to be hypocritical. Human rights are trivialized and equated with traffic violations. And all this is used in an attempt to question the credentials of the media and to pressurize it not to report human rights violations. As we shall see in the section of civil society,

such pressure has been very effective. In a few cases, the armed forces have taken action against their own personnel for human rights violation. This has increased over the years, especially after 2000, when the pressure of civil society increased. The National Human Rights Commission has stated that some 60 per cent of all arrests made by the police are unnecessary and unjustifiable. The power to arrest is part of the institutionalized corruption. Extrajudicial killings, summary executions and false encounters are an established pattern. Impunity and delays in judicial procedure are systemic. This forms the basis of human rights abuse.

Collective Punishment In response to insurgency, the government often retaliates against entire villages that are seen to support insurgents. The following examples show instances of collective punishment by the government. All health and education facilities were stopped to those villages in Chhattisgarh, considered strongholds of Maoist rebels. The sarpanches sent a letter on 24 May 2005 from these villages stating that all essential services had been suspended from thousands of villages since the launch of Salwa Judum.65 For two years there was no power in 248 villages. The Chhattisgarh government argued that the Maoists had crippled the power supply, but was silent about why it had not been restored in two years. The fact was, as the Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board chairman stated, that electricity was being given only to those villages that had Salwa Judum camps.66 Maoists had opposed the Salwa Judum and assaulted and killed villagers, but whether the state is justified in responding by punishing everyone in the villages in this collective manner is questionable. In the name of fighting Maoists, the government has until recently been focusing primarily on security forces and diverting attention from lack of development and governance. Home Minister Ram Vichar Netam claims: ‘Government has managed to win back Bastar from the Naxalites.’ But this is questionable. Local officials have not completed the computerization of land records even in seventeen years. From

2001 to 2005, of the 31,900 posts of teachers in Chhattisgarh, 22,200 were not filled. In Jharkhand, 76 per cent patients left the hospitals against medical advice because of lack of facilities between 2001 and 2006. More than 1,020 schools in Jharkhand had no buildings, 3,562 schools had no drinking water, 17,523 schools had no toilets, 2,965 schools had no electricity and 50 per cent schools were understaffed. Nearly 80 per cent of rural households in Bastar remained without electricity, toilets and clean drinking water.67 People have little faith in the police since they have not helped victims in many cases. In Kashmir, parents of the missing show that the police do not help in filing FIRs. Madiyam Soni, a tribal woman who lost her son in an encounter killing of twelve tribals at Santoshpur village, Chhattisgarh, in March 2007 said: ‘How can we hope to approach the police when some of their own have committed the crime?’68 People have no faith in the local institutions and little access to justice. Differences are observed in the human rights violations in various regions. In many places, despite torture, no alleged hardcore insurgents have been apprehended or any hard evidence obtained. On the other hand, there have been instances of armed forces trying to destroy evidence of human rights violations. Ramachandra Guha argues about Chhattisgarh that ‘had the central and state governments not treated adivasis as worse than sub-human, by denying them access to education and health care while at the same time taking away their lands and forests for the benefit of the urban-industrial economy, the Naxalite movement would never have got off the ground.’69

Environmental Hazards Environmental hazards and depletion of scarce resources aggravate conflicts and, in turn, armed conflicts result in incalculable long-term environmental hazards. These of course vary according to the type of conflicts. As far as Kashmir and the Northeast are concerned, construction of the army camps and insurgent hideouts has led to heavy environmental degradation and deforestation, which translates

into reduction of natural resources needed for human existence. In the Northeast, women and girls often walk far to fetch water because of severe water shortages, to collect firewood and to work in the fields, which heightens the peril of facing sexual abuse. The constant presence of security forces in the area and cases of molestation has created fear among the women, who feel impeded in their activities.70 Environmental damage is also wrought by troop deployment in army camps, as for example in Siachen. The base camp, which is one of the sites of the India–Pakistan dispute, is situated at 12,000 feet and the farthest post is 105 kilometres away, at Se Le at 21,000 feet. It takes up to twenty-eight days for soldiers to get there from the base camp, mainly due to the problem of acclimatization. With each climb of thousand feet, they have to rest for a few days. Once there, they stay for ninety days before being pulled back. The Kargil War and the military buildup involved laying landmines in large parts of the area. Villages around the border were evacuated. After the ceasefire, many of these landmines were not cleared and posed a major hazard for the farmers and villagers of the area. After the Kargil conflict, cordite was found in drinking water sources in the area, a sign of environmental degradation. The heavy increase in mining activity and leasing out of mines in many states and regions throughout the country to private bodies are causing damage to the environment, besides the displacement and loss of livelihoods of tribals, as we have shown earlier. A report of the Centre for Science and Environment shows the negative impact that mining policies have had on people and forests.71

Alienation The local population in areas of armed conflict suffers from a deep sense of discontent and alienation. Alienation is a feeling of powerlessness to influence the course of events that is affecting every aspect of their lives, not least their personal security. Alienation is not merely an issue of exclusion by the state and the elite politics. It has many sides to it. The problems of these excluded

individuals or communities—the killings, human rights abuses, economic neglect, social oppressions, political marginalization—remain outside the mainstream discourses and outside the realm of privileged government policies. Though ‘insiders’, these communities thus become virtual ‘outsiders’ or the ‘other’. They feel ‘cast out’ and unable to make a difference to their lives or condition, despite any suffering they go through or demands that they make. In Jammu and Kashmir, the word alienation is commonplace. Alienation is: ‘When you are not part of [the nation state] … . We feel that.’72 Militancy is seen as the main outlet for alienation, which is born of many local grievances. Balraj Puri argues: ‘While alienation in Kashmir seeks an outlet in secession, militancy or religious orthodoxy, in Jammu its traditional outlets have been communalism or ultra nationalism.’73 There is a furore over the actions by the SOG and security forces, and public response is always described in the press thus: ‘There is a definite pattern how the anger against government forces ultimately boils down to alienation from India and vice versa.’74 Similarly, there is a feeling that the rest of India does not feel the pain of Kashmir. Former economic advisor to the state government of Jammu and Kashmir, Haseeb Drabu, stated at a national-level seminar that mainstream economists ‘always alienated themselves from the economic problems faced by J& K.’75 Alienation here is psycho-social, economic and a collective feeling of distance from the state. Reports on the Naxalite areas show that almost all over ‘tribal people seem to feel a deep sense of exclusion and alienation. Which has been manifesting itself in different forms.’76 Experts have shown that: ‘Poverty creates deprivation but other factors like denial of justice, human dignity cause alienation resulting in the conviction that relief can be had outside the system by breaking the current order asunder.’77 Land alienation has increased the social and political alienation of tribals.78 Tribals all over India, from the Northeast to central India, are described today as being deeply alienated and having a deep sense of exclusion. They have a feeling of disempowerment and deprivation, besides cultural humiliation and political marginalization.

The ‘Victimized State’ There has been much concern about police and army officials who have been killed or injured when carrying out state duties, when violence is used against those who maintain state power. This is construed as a hit on the state itself as well as rights violation. However, the death of a state official has different theoretical and political implications from that of a victim of that violence. Sims and Tomb delineate several differences. Personnel of the state in conflict zones have elements of risks built into the service or occupational hazards. When state servants are killed the state honours them as martyrs. Compensation is part of the package their relatives receive. And further state victims of violence are seen as ‘respectable victims’.79 There is thus a difference between victims who are part of the state and get the respectability that all victims deserve and those who are not even compensated.

Conclusion In situations where security forces dominate public spaces and use extra-legal powers, encounter killings and disappearances take place, civil institutions play a lesser role; insurgent militia use terror to combat local brutality and establish their presence, violence and militarization becomes reciprocal. Human rights violations are serious and common. In the conflict zones of the Northeast, Jammu and Kashmir and the Maoist-influence areas, many types of violence intersect. There is violence of the state, of the insurgents and other localized violence. Insurgents and militants live outside the rule of law and state. Force is part of their strategy and often replaces their ideology. The state responds directly and by using surrendered militants and extrajudicial methods. Violence gets generalized and trivialized and the rights of people are not given priority. There is a broad canvas of various violations of human rights over decades and there is little evidence of relief and remedies. The government response amounts to little. It is here the state has to

answer in large measure for its indifference, deficiencies and neglect. In Kashmir and the Northeast civilians blame the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (1958) that has been in force for decades. This Act has been misused and is being misused wherever it is made applicable. It has facilitated grave human rights abuses, including ‘disappearances’, by the very nature of the power bestowed on the armed forces. Special police officers from the Salwa Judum, Ikwanis, Sulfa and other surrendered militants used by the security forces are the most likely to use illegal methods and violence. Any abuse of powers by the armed forces is a criminal offence. It should promptly be investigated by an agency independent of the armed forces, followed by impartial prosecution, but institutions of the state have not done this. The State Human Rights Commissions have no power to give justice and punish the guilty. The judiciary takes years before any human rights case is addressed. The UN General Assembly in 2006 adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances. Article 2 of the Declaration says that, ‘the prohibition’ of ‘disappearances’ is absolute and no state can find an excuse to justify such disappearances. The state’s liability becomes absolute, and India needs to implement the ‘zero tolerance’ against human rights abuses that the political leadership has stated. In all conflict zones the police/paramilitary and surrendered militants and insurgents have flouted Indian laws and the rules of war. As a consequence, large numbers of civilians have died, including women and children. Women, including young girls, have been harassed, raped and gang-raped, and children in their early teens shot. The judicial machinery has barely functioned. A number of cases filed in the district and high courts have been pending for years and there are numerous cases of lack of judicial action taken, in terms of awarding compensation and instructing the security forces to produce the disappeared and so forth. People have little faith in the police since the FIRs filed by the families that were distorted by the police to accuse the victims. The State Human Rights Commissions have no power to investigate paramilitary and military excesses, though they are empowered to

request investigation reports of the enquiry by the paramilitary and the military forces. The SHRCS seems to have failed to exercise their powers proactively to provide justice to the victims. The general tendency is for the state as well as the central government to ignore the recommendations made by these Commissions. Many of the human rights abuses in India appear to be shocking and cold-blooded. Cases of torture, massacres, encounter killings and disappearances have become common over the years, so that their extraordinariness is hardly questioned. Meanwhile the bitter, long and low-intensity conflicts between insurgents and the Indian state are leading to democratic spaces shrinking, and internal wars and authoritarian responses are reinforcing each other. Human rights abuse is increasing the alienation of already alienated groups in conflictridden areas and the cumulative grievances are becoming a cause for the sustained low-intensity conflicts, differentiated from, and yet adding to the root cause of the conflict. There is a base for a democratic and rights-based culture in India. Originating from the Freedom Movement, it has evolved with other simultaneous and later movements that took up the struggles for different sections of society. So the women’s movements, the movements for the empowerment of dalits and tribals, movements against child labour and others have gradually gathered strength in this country. A small but vocal human rights movement has also carved out a space in the political culture of India. The problem of human rights and the challenges it poses remain of immense importance. Any attempt to further the rights agenda requires an analysis of the state of human rights and how the rights discourse should be deepened in order to make the government more responsive. None of the conflicts in India can be justly resolved without addressing human rights.

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G ender and Arm ed Conf lic t s conflict is an expression of violence, supported by the A rmed ideology of militarism and notions of patriarchal power, and which is believed to have greater value than dialogue and negotiation. These values define gender and situate men and women in socially determined roles during armed conflict. Women increasingly play multiple roles, as combatants, protestors and peacemakers, but they are valued less than men. Women do not have key roles in decisionmaking structures and leadership of the state or amongst insurgent groups. Traditionally viewed as unequal and lesser to men, women have little independent status, autonomy or agency, as their identity has been linked to that of their fathers/husbands. Societies perceive women primarily in gender-stereotyped roles and this image gets strengthened when there is identity politics or social conflict. At such times controls over women and violence against them increase. In this chapter, for the sake of conceptualization, we take up Connell’s argument, that gender be viewed as social practice and not just related to the condition of an individual.1 There is a version of femininity and masculinity that is emphasized and projected in the

public sphere. This hegemonic masculinity is the publicly preferred model of manliness and is the cultural manifestation of men’s superiority over women. It is this homogenized model that is given a universal legitimacy, even if it is challenged individually. This difference is the basis of unequal power relations and coincides with the use of force or violence. Connell states: ‘What it means to be masculine is, quite literally, to embody force.’2 Men are taught to display strength and assertiveness to control the public and private spheres. Femininity is meant to complement, support and supplement this version of masculinity, to safeguard and give public face to it, even though they may be victims of violence and oppression. These roles are accentuated during times of armed conflict. This chapter draws on data and observations from our engagement with men and women in all the conflict areas over several years. In Manipur and Nagaland, we also conducted a questionnaire survey with fifty-five men and an equal number of women in 2003–04. Subsequently, we have had many conversations with women and men in conflict zones.

Masculinity at Times of Armed Conflict Armed conflict has contradictory effects on gender relations as men are called upon to display an overt masculinity. Macho powers that may not be tested at times of peace are tested during conflict. The soldier/insurgent is trained to be hard, aggressive and tough, with the ability to dominate and kill. This identity is clothed and justified in terms of nationalism. The language of nationalism and war is heavily gendered. Men and young boys are called upon to join as combatants and to protect their home and motherland and that includes protection of their women. Men who talk peace are termed as wimps or womanly, as ‘wearing bangles’ and as ‘eunuchs’. This discourse enters the public domain in the words of leaders. For example, one insurgent group in Manipur sees its task ‘to protect the

integrities and independence of our Motherland’.3 In October 2001, when relations were tense between India and Pakistan, President Musharraf gave a message to the Indian leadership: ‘We in Pakistan have not worn bangles and we can fight India on our own.’4 Prime Minister Vajpayee replied to this statement: ‘In Punjab where bangles are popular, people also wear kada (steel bangle).’5 Militarist nationalism makes war and decision-making into a boys’ club at times of both conflict and peace. Men see themselves as protectors of their homeland that they equate with motherland, conflating the images of women/ mothers/homeland. This is common in both traditional and revolutionary discourse. Poet Gaddar, viewed as the people’s poet by Maoists, glorifies motherhood and has disparaging verses on womanhood. Maoists have carried on with this discourse.6 The Maoists see themselves as protectors of tribal land and community. Justifying their physical defence of them as moral, they believe it is appropriate for them to take the law into their own hands. Wrongdoing, enforcing ideas and using muscle to get material and other support for their struggle is linked to this image of masculine crusaders. These views are common if not more stereotyped in other conflict zones. Interestingly, 87 per cent of the men we interviewed in the conflict areas of Manipur and Nagaland saw their role as ‘protectors of homeland’. 50 per cent men were also convinced that they had greater roles in conflict situations while only 22 per cent felt that men and women had different roles during conflict. More men supported armed conflict than did women; for instance in Manipur and Nagaland of the fifty-five young men we interviewed, 45 per cent had either supported the insurgency or had participated in it in a variety of ways. Men’s perceptions of their own roles were specifically more physical (47 per cent). They believed their role to be in the public sphere (27 per cent) and 20 per cent felt that men’s role in society were definitely more valuable than those of women. Masculinity as an identity stereotypes femininity. Our survey revealed that while 42 per cent men interviewed felt women were

mainly responsible for the home, the rest—58 per cent—believed that women could be simultaneously responsible for political/public activism and the home. Not even one of the men we interviewed accepted that women be activists without household responsibilities. At the same time, men wanted to restrict their role to the public sphere as protectors and not help shoulder the responsibility of child care and the household. Even as women increased their participation in activism, men did not envisage a critical role for women in peace negotiations. Thus in our survey, while 85 per cent believed that women should be part of peace negotiations, only 40 per cent at the same time believed that women could be policymakers during conflict or liberation movements. Seventy per cent did not believe that women could be better at peace making or that they negotiated differently during conflict situations. Clearly, men wanted women to have supporting roles in keeping with the stereotyped images. Situations of armed conflict, where the armed forces and police wield greater powers, were characterized by contesting masculinities. Masculinities (like those of the armed forces) gained dominance on one hand, while on the other hand masculinities (of ordinary citizens) got challenged. Many men stated that the presence of the military did not limit their roles and actions, but men in Manipur and Naga areas felt ‘less like a man’ in conflict situations. One reason for this loss of masculinity was the inability to protect the home and family during conflict; 30 per cent of the men we interviewed felt this loss, while 40 per cent men felt more insecure with the army around. When aggression cannot be directed towards its target because of fear or risk of retribution, other ways are found to express anger and contempt. Women thus become surrogate targets at home and for the outsider. This is even more so when an outsider/occupier wields control. Ninety-five per cent of the men we spoke with for the survey said that during the conflict they felt more angry and violent. They were unequivocal (92 per cent) that militarization of society leads to more violence against women.7

Psychologist Sadaqat Rehman in Kashmir confirmed that cases of molestation were on the increase because the soldier has the gun and the woman is defenceless. Inside a house, isolated from others ‘the soldier is like a lion: outside he is running scared’.8 There is a fear of being ‘unmanned’ or losing masculinity that male victims have in Kashmir. Harassment, threat and torture by security forces are part of the aggressive masculinity between men in this ongoing conflict. Analysts like Renuka Dagar have argued that during the militancy in Punjab men’s masculinity was undermined in the public sphere, which had become an arena of competitive masculinity. Women became particularly vulnerable to violence from their husbands. Collectively the Sikhs were under siege to protect their women and instances of sexual abuse abounded. It challenged the manliness and honour of a society that prides itself on protecting its women and thereby safeguarding family honour. And when this conception was challenged, it was a violation of manhood. Renuka Dagar’s study reveals that 75.6 and 73.1 per cent men amongst Hindus and Sikhs stated that an important aspect of being manly was protecting the weak. The study showed that men who are unable to exercise control over other men indulged in greater violence over their women.9 Domestic violence against women became a norm rather than an aberration. The problem of masculinity is not confined to males but is a women’s issue also. Armed struggle privileges men and muscle. Women call upon men to take on their masculine roles of protection and martyrdom.10 A war widow of the Kargil War stated: ‘Had I been blessed by a son instead of a daughter by the almighty, I would have sent him to the front to fight against the enemies’.11 Such statements valorize men, masculinity and war, and equate force with power, while devaluing women and dismissing rationality and negotiation. Women support the public face of their husband’s masculinity when it is challenged in a militarized/conflict situation and when masculinity becomes competitive in the public sphere. This has been the case in all the conflict situations that we focused on. When men

in turn became more violent at home, women understood and accepted this violence. The macho masculinity is socially represented in public spaces through symbols of power that range from display of weapons and guns, to army-like dress codes (wearing fatigues), being aggressive and assertive, using unacceptable language and expletives, and so on. Women and men romanticize militancy and violence. As leader of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Force, Yasin Malik stated: ‘Such romanticizing legitimizes the militarization, violence and a macho conception of power that undermines social institutions and de-politicizes movements.’12 The increase of women cadres in militant movements like the Maoists and increased enrolment of women in the police and security cadre is slowly changing the nature of masculinity to some extent. Maoists are keen to show that their women cadres are empowered, that men also undertake the responsibility to cook and nurture.

Conceptualizing Women in Areas of Armed Conflict The image of women in armed conflict areas has changed dramatically in recent times as evident from the photographs that appear on the front pages of newspapers and on television. Some of these were: a ‘Maoist Tribal Woman’ killed and trussed up on a bamboo pole held by two policemen, much like an animal after a hunt;13 the naked Manipuri women who protested against rape;14 and the hundreds of women protesting on the streets in Kashmir, representing the disquiet of the Valley. These images reflect that women are engaged in these struggles as victims, combatants, activists, sympathizers, rebels and bystanders, that they are humiliated and feel dishonoured and the desire for revenge is rising amongst them. Yet have these roles changed the status and place of women even within these conflicts and in the larger society where they are

embedded? An interesting debate in which feminist activists engaged with the Maoist leadership in Andhra Pradesh in 2004 ultimately revealed that, despite the revolutionary nature of their ideology, women’s issues were secondary to their cause of capturing state power.15 Vasanth and Kalpana Kannabiran and Volga’s interaction with the Maoist leadership showed that despite the distribution of literature that supports women’s liberation, and a presence of women cadres, women were absent from key decisionmaking structures and especially the upper echelons of the Maoist political structure and leadership, which was essentially male. Even while they might wield arms, women were conceptualized as being weak and were not given a chance to participate in intellectual and political discussion and action. The Maoists had not adequately theorized gender relations and the women’s question that were ‘dismissed as devoid of ideology and political perspective’.16 K. Ajitha, who was arrested as a Naxalite in the 1960s, talked of her idealism when joining the movement but also of exclusion from any of its decision making.17 Krishna Bandyopadhyay, who joined the movement in West Bengal in the 1970s, performed the tasks of giving shelter, preparing tea, nursing and acting as a courier for revolutionaries. ‘We began to feel very insignificant,’ she states, ‘was there really much difference between my pishima (aunty) and these people? If there wasn’t, then what was the point of continuing with them?’18 Women who joined this movement for justice and empowerment were disappointed. The Maoist leadership in Andhra Pradesh acknowledged in 2004 that the internal structure of their party remained patriarchal but argued that there were ‘practical problems’ in women’s situation arising from ‘natural factors’ that constrained women’s full and equal participation in their party leadership. The feminists who raised these questions with the Maoists believed that the leadership’s view was grounded in their masculine understanding and unfamiliarity with the feminist discourse.19 The bearing of arms led to the Naxalites mirroring the state in many ways. There has been some change in recent years as the Maoists have increased their women cadres.

Krantikari Adivasi Mahila Sangathan (KAMS) is their women’s organization and some have reached the ranks of commanders in their military squads. A woman intellectual, Anuradha Ghandy, who died of malaria, was part of their top decision making and a member of the central committee. However, their top structures of power continue to be dominated by a select group of men. Their commitment to the use of force to capture state power links power, violence and masculinity that endorse patriarchy. There is a commonality in the way women are conceptualized in our societies. Take for example Manipur. Social norms of Manipuri Meiteis are based on patriarchal structures and the joint family system is common, increasing women’s dependence on the larger patriarchal family. Women remain dependent on husbands even though, historically, Manipuri women have played an important role in the agrarian economy, often being the breadwinners. In 1939, Manipuri women started a historic mass militant movement, the ‘Nupi Lan’, against British colonialism and the feudal regime of the king. Yet, according to traditional beliefs, women are still considered as inferior and subordinate. Women are carriers of cultural symbols, and values and family rituals like Mangba–Sengba (pure–impure) amongst the Manipuri Meiteis are to be carried out by the daughter-in-law under strict supervision of the mother-in-law.20 Women bear the complete responsibility for all housework and childbearing and care. Dowry continues in different forms like gifts and women are viewed as a ‘burden’ or ‘belonging’ to their matrimonial home. The women’s place in the family is secondary to the males. Polygamy, though illegal, is practised in Manipuri society. There have been cases where men ‘caught misbehaving’ with a woman have been forced to marry her, despite already being married.21 So the accused is punished with the right of polygamy while the victim is made to believe that by marriage to the perpetrator of the crime, she has received justice. For Naga women discrimination begins at birth. The birth of a male child is considered more auspicious than that of a girl because of the perception that men are the breadwinners and protectors of society

and women are subordinate to their husbands. But analysts believe that Naga women have more equality because ‘she participates freely in singing and dancing in festivals, chooses her own partner and controls domestic affairs’.22 But customary law permits only males to inherit property.23 Thus women work, can get gifts, but do not inherit. Writers have argued that modernity and Christianity has led to more participation of women in society.24 But in this sphere too, their value is not the same as men and social/patriarchal controls on them continue.25 Naga women play an active role in the economy and society but complain that Naga customary laws being codified by the government are gender discriminatory. Women are not represented to a large extent in their village Ho Ho (councils) of their tribes and at the district level, so their concerns are not articulated.26 Amongst the Assamese, the Bodo, the Karbi-Long and other tribes, women, too, are carriers of their culture and identity. The role and status of Kashmiri women is shaped by a combination of ideas of women under Islamic laws with those of a special Kashmiri tradition of Sufism. Kashmiri Pundit society conceptualizes women as Hindus outside the Valley do. Men are privileged from birth, while women seen as a burden.27 This discrimination follows her through every aspect of life. Despite constitutional guarantees, women are not considered equal citizens. An instance was the attempt by the Jammu and Kashmir legislature to pass the Jammu and Kashmir Permanent Residence Status (Disqualification) Bill 2004. This bill would bar a Kashmiri woman from inheriting, passing on the inheritance, selling or alienating property if she married an ‘outsider’ (non-Kashmiri). No such law is applicable to men. This bill was supported by the People’s Democratic Party and the Peoples Conference. Women’s groups in the Valley also supported the bill and argued that it was in keeping with Article 370 of the Constitution that gave Jammu and Kashmir special status and protected its identity. The politics around this bill show that women’s identity is bound to that of her husband in the eyes of law and society. Women who symbolize a nation’s honour

and identity clearly can do so as long as patriarchal structures will let them. Such conceptualization of women leads to their devaluation and abuse in armed conflict areas. Rape and sexual abuse is a weapon of war to ‘dishonour’ or punish an entire community that is identified as an enemy ‘other’. Examples of such sexual violence can be cited from the Maoist-affected areas, the Northeast and Jammu and Kashmir as we show below. Women accept the gendered roles in most circumstances but also challenge them. For example, most women, 94.11 per cent of respondents in our survey in Nagaland and Manipur affirmed this restriction.28 The presence of those who challenge this ideology is limited to civil society movements and supporters. The gendered nationalism and conflicts in all these regions reinforce concepts like ‘brotherhood’, ‘martyrdom’ ‘manhood’ and ‘need to love motherland and its culture’ and place emphasis on women as cultural symbols. At the same time conditions of conflict increases women’s insecurity and restricts their autonomy.29 National security laws like the AFSPA (in use in the Northeast and Kashmir) give unlimited powers to the paramilitary to curb women’s physical mobility and threaten their life even when they are not involved in the conflict. The body searches that are routine in such areas often lead to molestation and sexual harassment, and women and the community feel violated, humiliated and dishonoured. Women and girls get confined to their homes. At the same time, the insurgents in the Northeast and militants in Kashmir have also imposed restrictions on women by way of insistence on traditional dress codes. In Manipur, underground groups have declared that this dress code for women symbolizes their cultural identity and ‘instills a sense of nationalism’ and ‘spirit of patriotism’ necessary to save the state from outside influence.30 State ministers at public meetings have supported the dress code for women: ‘Our noble practices of our forefathers are carried forward.’31 Patriarchy thus continues to manifest itself in private and public domains.

It is, however, necessary to add that women also identify themselves with such cultural codes. In fact 71.42 per cent of the women we interviewed in Nagaland felt that the dress restrictions were positive while 5.9 per cent were indifferent, and 28.6 per cent felt restrictions were negative. 64.7 per cent of the respondents felt that the national liberation movement did not reinforce traditional roles for women. One social activist argued: ‘Local handloom and weavers prosper out of such a restriction on Indian clothes, and at the same time we can preserve our culture and identity by being what we are and by wearing our clothes.’32 Most of them felt that the portrayal of women as the symbol and custodian of tradition and culture is a ‘fortunate blessing’ and they did not consider it as a burden. The point is that cultural identity is a positive aspect so long as it is not enforced and controlled by others. Insurgents try and confine women to their traditional roles, while using them as shields. In October 1989 some militant groups in the Kashmir Valley opposed sterilization and abortion. Banners and leaflets to this effect were pasted all over the hospitals The militant group Hizbul Mujahideen decreed that women must not visit restaurants, hotels and parks and the Lashkar-e-Toiba decreed that Kashmiri-women should either ‘wear burqa (veils) or face bullets’.33 Their argument was that this ‘protected women’. But women have increasingly contested such orders as more of them join street protests instead. Some militant women’s organizations, like the lone woman outfit the Dukhtaran-e-Millat, had called upon Muslim women in the Valley to observe strict purdah34 They supported militants who threw acid on women’s faces for violating the dress code and Asiya Andrabi, leader of Dukhtaran-e-Millat, declared: ‘I am happy that 80 per cent of women in Kashmir Valley have adopted Islamic dress code.’35 Others have not responded to decrees that demand change in their life styles. But in the winter of 2004, there was what can be described as a ‘purdah wave’. Wearing hijab had become so common in the Valley, that there were hardly any women seen

without it.36 By 2009 this has changed once again as women have become more active in mass movements. Women were important symbols during the Khalistan movement. The militant leadership linked to the conservative Akali factions issued orders from time to time on women’s behaviour and dress which was to be ‘modest’.37 The militants thus wanted to portray a particular image of women as symbols of Khalistani nationalism in their appearance, dress and behaviour.38

Women Victims The commonest image of women in all conflict zones is as victims. Sexual violence occurs even though it is recognized as a crime. Tribals complained of rape by Salwa Judum activists and paramilitary against alleged Maoist women.39 Nandini Sundar has recorded testimonies of women raped in Salwa Judum camps.40 In Kashmir, public anger continues over old and new cases of rape, from the 1991 mass rape in the district of Konan Poshpura, to recent ones in Shopian, where the victims and their relatives still await justice.41 Similar cases can be cited from the Maoist-affected areas, especially where the special security forces are allowed a free hand. Incidents of rape have been cited by many reports.42 Activists have tried to report cases of rape and police brutality, but have had little success. There are many instances of rape in Manipur like that of Thangjam Manorma Devi, who was picked up by the paramilitary group, the Assam Rifles, on suspicion of being linked with insurgents.43 Manorma was allegedly raped and killed and the enquiry revealed the gendered nature of the crime. Manorma’s rape and killing was meant to humiliate and collectively punish the Meitei community. But it had the opposite effect, when a group of women demonstrated naked asking the soldiers to rape them. This sparked off a mass movement in July–August 2004, the most organized of its kind, led

by the students’ and women’s organizations against the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act. Naga women have been raped by security men and recently by Meitei insurgents in inter-ethnic discord. In rape cases, the army has often questioned the testimony of the victims, blaming them for ‘maligning’ it and alleging that they are either relatives of a militant or sympathizers. Such biased probes not only add to the injury of the victims, but stigmatize them through life while the accused go free. Nandini Sundar has argued that rape in armed conflict zones are carried out by special police officers and security forces.44 There is little record of rape by insurgents. Insurgents see themselves as protectors of land and women, while security forces have felt free to violate enemy women. The consequence of such rape is that more women and men are joining militant movements as we show below. Raped victims are doubly victimized because both state and society hardly help in rehabilitation or providing justice and compensation. For example, in the Konan Poshpura rape cases, once the protests were over and security men officially absolved of the crime, the village women were abandoned and remained unmarried, or had to be married only to a victim’s relative. As Kulsum, victim of such a rape stated: ‘I don’t get the same respect that other daughters-in-law command because of my past. My mother-in-law and sister-in-law always pass sarcastic remarks that hurt me like hell and I cry in silence.’45 To escape being stigmatized, victims had to hide the fact of being raped. For instance, after the mass rapes in Konan Poshpura and later in Wawoosa town, eight kilometres from Srinagar, in 1997, the victims were reluctant to talk about them. Victims told us: ‘We don’t want our sons to know of this humiliation or they will join the militancy.’46 This problem of honour and stigma is constant. Another victim said: ‘I will not fight. What will come out of it? I have two daughters of marriageable age; their chances of marriage will be spoilt.’47 Thus state and society have similar biases, each manifested in different but always gendered ways.

Violence against women increases during war. In Punjab this is particularly true, where the ten-year-long conflict over Khalistan reinforced traditional male preference patterns.48 Studies on Punjab by the Institute for Development and Communication confirm census figures that show a decline in the sex ratio between males and females. In Punjab, female foeticide increased during this period, both on account of easy availability of these clinics49 and the atmosphere then prevailing in Punjab. Domestic violence increases during conflict as society gets militarized. In conflict, men get brutalized and force replaces arguments and consequently all types of violence are perpetrated. All the women we have talked to in Nagaland and Manipur stated they ‘knew of someone’ who suffered domestic violence.50 Many women, however, do not complain against ‘their men’ in circumstances where there is a national liberation struggle. In Manipur society, violence against women is incredibly high and 99 per cent of the maintenance cases filed under section 125 of the Indian Criminal Procedure code in the family courts there are the result of domestic violence or polygamy. Sophia Rajkumari reports that: ‘I have seen almost all men beating, abusing their wives in Manipur’; even when women are financially independent, matrimonial violence is pervasive. Women who left their matrimonial home for any reason were not accepted by their family or by society.51 Many of the women cadres from insurgent groups in Manipur stated that they had intervened in cases of domestic violence.52 Little wonder why women had allegiance to them, in the absence of state institutions or local police who women did not trust.53 A large number of women interviewed (72 per cent) felt that ‘the presence of national liberators’ had helped reduce domestic violence against them since they punished the men and took quicker and harsher action than the recourse to law. However 21 per cent felt that the presence of the national liberation forces made no difference and 9 per cent felt that their presence had actually escalated the situation.54 It was clear that complaints of domestic violence were being made to insurgents

who exercised local authority along with or even opposed to government authority. This local control has been used for other types of social control and moral policing. In Assam, a report on the Situational Analysis of Women and Girls in Assam showed that the overall crime rate in the state increased by approximately 36 per cent over the period 1997–2002, years when conflict grew in the state. The crime rates against women recorded have been very high in some of the districts. Beside this, one out of six married women in Assam has experienced domestic violence in the form of beatings or physical maltreatment. A report of the state Women’s Commission has revealed that the rate of the crime against women has increased more than five times since 1995.55 Sadaqat Rehman argues that women in situations of armed conflict are perpetually on tenterhooks. Almost all women feel they will be subject to the violence or atrocities of the security forces some day. ‘In Kashmir men lose their lives but women here die a thousand deaths every day.’56 Women were raped, sexually abused and killed during the conflicts in Punjab by the militants and the army. Journalists’ accounts of Operation Blue Star and custody deaths by the army show how brutal they were towards suspected militants and those linked to them. No women constables were assigned to look after women prisoners and, though denied by women, there were many rumours of rape.57 Similarly, militants were equally ruthless to all those who betrayed them, including women. A woman extremist was of the opinion that it was not desirable for girls to join the extremists, since it was impossible to get out: ‘If at all a girl wants to leave them, they would not leave her alive.’58 Women were thus victims of both state and extremist terrorism. Women are the long-term casualties of war as widows, caretakers and wives of missing persons. The situation of widows in Kashmir is desperate. Thousands of widows and orphaned children are in a state of destitution and neglect in the villages and districts of Kashmir since the conflict began and continue to be neglected to date. Studies in Kashmir revealed that the widows, emotionally

stressed, had to deal with denial of inheritance rights, sexual harassment and social undesirability. Rabya, a twenty-two-year-old widow from Deever, Kupwara, said: ‘Being young I am a target of both security forces personnel and local youth, because of which I am not able to take up a job.’59 A woman who has lost the protection of a man is seen as vulnerable and easy prey by young men even within her own community. Widows in Kashmir have to contend with problems of economic sustenance, loss of control over their children, in addition to loneliness, physical insecurity and the excessive burden of domestic chores. Though their first priority was getting children educated, 60 per cent of them could not manage this. The ‘enforced disappearances’ of men in conflict, as we have seen, leaves their wives as ‘half widows’. Neither the state nor society provides them with relief or rehabilitation. A survey of 1,500 ‘half widows’ in Kashmir showed that only 18 per cent chose to stay with relatives, 15 per cent went back to their parents and became dependants and only 8 per cent remarried.60 The denial of legal status as wife or widow debars them from inheritance rights or remarriage, or even divorce. They become dependants and vulnerable, living a life of uncertainty. Both in the private and public spheres, they are dogged by their identity as ‘half widows’. Some amongst them who rebelled and remarried have fallen from grace and are labelled as ‘depraved’. A major demand from Kashmir is to address these cases.61 In refugee camps in Jammu, where Kashmiri Hindu Pundits have lived for more than ten years after they were evicted from the state, women have the complete responsibility for children and the elderly. As they try to rebuild their lives in the camps, they complain that the government has done little to address basic issues like education, health care, sanitation or employment. In 1991, they formed groups like the Migrant Women’s Association to press for their grievances to be redressed. The Mahila Mandal had been formed to fight corruption in the camps. Women reported that aid and assistance that could be used for schools had been siphoned away. The state, news agencies and most groups have forgotten these women. Some

right-wing groups use their plight to mobilize political support for themselves. When women are victims, cultural significance is given more weight than agency. For instance, in cases of widowhood, it is ‘helplessness’, ‘burden’, ‘honour’ and ‘martyrdom’ that is highlighted. But methods of rehabilitation, trauma counseling, property rights, citizenship and other such rights are barely discussed. Women’s victimhood is used as a factor to invoke nationalism as her hurt is depicted as the collective hurt of the community. Women conceptualize themselves in this role and find that it is more effective to use motherhood to negotiate with patriarchal structures. Thus one activist Meira Paibi who was threatened for opposing a kidnapping case in 2003 said: ‘They call us mothers yet threaten to kill us.’62 Widows of men killed during armed conflicts have often become victim-heroines or political symbols, depending on the situation. For instance, Bimal Khalsa, the widow of one of the assassins of Indira Gandhi, stood for elections and won with a high margin of votes in two constituencies in the May 1985 elections to the Punjab legislature. The widow of Jatinder Singh Ghuman, a terrorist who was shot in 1987, was made member of the Gurdaspur district committee by the Punjab government to give jobs to ‘misguided Sikh youth’.63 Both these widows became symbols of the ‘Sikh hurt’. Punjab widows organized themselves and demanded that the courts punish the guilty. Many fought court cases for human rights and refused compensation from the state. There is thus a politics of collective memory where the martyr or victim aspect is remembered.

Women as Supporters and Combatants In the histories of armed conflicts till the 1970s, women appeared primarily as victims. Feminists and women’s movements challenged this image, especially as women’s participation in civil society movements and as combatants increased. We briefly show how women supported armed struggles and took to arms.

Women have increasingly been opting to become armed combatants and joining underground forces and armed militias. This has been the experience in various armed struggles in Asia, like in Sri Lanka with the LTTE and in the Maoist movement in Nepal. In India, women are present in ‘armed squads’ in the Maoist Naxalite movement and form part of the militant groups in the Northeast. Women are supporters and sympathizers of militant groups in Kashmir but have not taken up arms and become actual combatants. Several militant groups make a conscious effort to recruit women and believe that women cadres increase their legitimacy. Left-wing militants showcase women’s presence as part of their progressive and broad-based agenda. Women are often used in the frontline of civilian-based, low-intensity combat since it is easier for them to disguise themselves as peasant women and sneak into high-security areas. Women have in different ways supported the Naxalite movements in all their incarnations. During the late 1960s several women had joined the Naxalite movements. We have cited the experiences of women like Ajitha and Krishna Bandyopadhyay earlier in this chapter. According to their figures, women’s recruitment in the People’s War Group (PWG) increased from 15 per cent in 1994 to 35 per cent in 2002; its merger with the CPI (Maoist) helped increase its cadre. Earlier women had held limited leadership roles as combatants. Singu Chandrakala (called Bharatakka) was a district committee member of the PWG in Telengana district, until her arrest. Her husband, a Naxalite leader, had been slain earlier. She came into the movement with him. However, women like Singu acquired leadership positions after establishing their militant and organizational credentials. Women combatants got the same training and roles as the men, but the special gender needs of women were not considered an issue amongst cadres. Like other militia movements, the ‘cause’ of ultimate liberation was seen as important; in this case the revolution against the semi-feudal bourgeois state and anti-imperialism. In this process, gender issues were not taken seriously.

The Maoist leadership has made attempts to rectify gender relations in recent times. They see women as an important part of their cadre, and one that gives them legitimacy and confirms their mass support. They have made special attempts to recruit women and bring them into the local decision-making committees. They argue that their work in the tribal areas has been particularly effective in recruiting young women since tribal culture is based on strong community ties and women have an important place in all activities. Women join Maoist rebel groups for reasons that combine an idealism of a better collective life and a commitment to the larger community, often buttressed by personal exploitation or tragedy and denial of justice. Awareness of great inequality, displacement because of development, a sense of exploitation and being witness to police atrocities leads to anger and an urge for retribution. In addition, for women, the possibility of personal liberation from social and family controls that they sometimes theorize as patriarchal is almost always an important element.64 This is true of the Maoist women cadres like Reena, Munni, and Nirmala Akka and many others. The Maoists’ promise of a collective and personal liberation is what attracts young women. The presence of women cadres in recent attacks by the Maoists shows that they are an active part of this insurgency and have acquired agency through it. In areas like Dandakaranya, Madhya Pradesh, it is reported that of the 70 guerrilla outfits and 30 military dalams (squads), several have women commanders. These women are between the ages of sixteen and thirty-five and were enrolled through special recruitment drives and trained in the forests where the Maoists have a hold. The absence of government structures and mechanisms to deliver justice, as we have shown earlier, helps the Maoists recruit children who are trained as cadres through ideological schools and military training. The state government’s gestures to address the issue of women’s empowerment stand in stark contrast to those of the Maoists. For example, in Jharkhand, the state government announced in 2006 that women cadres would be rehabilitated

through the Kanyadan scheme (a grant for their marriage), ironical, indeed, for those who were trained to fight for their rights with guns. The Meira Paibis in Manipur believe their focus has been to ‘check the excesses, random detention and harassment of men, especially youth, at the hands of security personnel’. The movement took off with the demand for release of a youth who had been detained by the army in December 1980 and then it began to spread. Women (in Nagaland) increasingly joined the insurgency because ‘they [are] unable to bear the open injustice and harassment’.65 This sentiment is as true today as it was in 2004, when we conducted our interviews, and is common to most of the insurgencies, from the NSCN to the Maoist. The effort to transform victimization to agency is common to many women in the underground. In Nagaland and Manipur most of the insurgent and support groups have a significant number of women cadres. Though war and armed conflict are seen as male domains, women cadres stated they felt as capable as men, except for ‘some biological differences’. In Manipur and Nagaland, most of the women cadres are educated, ranging from high school to graduates. These women joined liberation organizations for reasons ranging from nationalism and ideological appeal to their concern with the region’s social and political conditions and their strategic location. For several of them, victimization and bad experiences had kindled a sense of injustice and drawn them to the underground.66 Fighting ‘for the motherland’ was also a reason cited by some combatants.67 Sustained human rights abuses led to bands of women joining the Nationalist Socialist Women’s Organization (NSWN) of Nagaland, with its commitment of supporting the cause of Nagalim (the Naga homeland). This militant women’s organization was concerned with promoting a women’s army, creating a women’s federation and giving awards to heroes and martyrs. Women cadres stated that ‘their way of thinking changed’ after joining and they became more ideological and political. Most women considered their organizations were gendersensitive but many of the cadres admitted that they still faced gender discrimination.

The function of the women cadres depended on the nature of the unit to which they belonged. Leadership hinged on their capability and length of service. Decision making they conceded, was restricted to the (male) leaders (executive members of the central committees), unless women were part of these committees. Some of the women cadres stated that ‘women do not appear in the top structure but they did have indirect and important role to play’.68 The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur has several women cadres at higher positions, like A. Mema Devi, who was member of the central committee of PLA and was arrested in March 2003. The PLA reported that other women fighters like lance corporals N. Surkala, Bala and Ranita were killed during the armed conflict in 1998.69 Women in the Naga and Meitei movements felt that they could move up the hierarchy, depending on their discipline and activities. But domestic responsibilities remained theirs. They accepted these roles since ‘it was his or her normal task’ and to go against it would ‘break the balance of tradition.’70 At the same time, they also admitted that the physiological differences to some extent effected and ‘limited’ women. For example, the chairperson of the NSWN stated that household chores traditionally are women’s tasks and ‘… you will always be who you are though you want to deny it.’71 Most women combatants felt ‘empowered’ after joining underground movements and felt that joining such movements liberated women and gave them responsibility. They believed that women joining insurgency would lead to a decrease of violence against them.72 Several of the women combatants stated that they began by ‘running errands’ for the insurgents and then joined the movement. Women cadres said that they had the autonomy to make personal choices like marriage, raising a family, as long as it did ‘not harm the organization’ and was ‘preferably within the organization’.73 The responsibility of children and domestic chores however ‘always fell back on women’s shoulders’.74 Thus they could socialize with friends but organizational matters were best shared with fellow cadres. The women cadres said that while they did face problems

that ‘were specific to women’ there were no ‘grievance cells’ for women-related issues. Everyone had to follow a ‘codified conduct’ and the organizations were against gender discrimination. Thus the party committees looked into any problem and dispensed justice.75 Most of the women cadres were for more women joining the liberation movement to ensure the victory of their movement and were against the laying down of arms even if there were peace talks or ceasefire, until a political solution was reached.76 However, most activists supported the ceasefire and wanted a just solution. For the women cadres, nationalism preceded women’s issues and rights. Their commitment was to the ‘motherland’ and they followed the same codes and discipline as men, even though they also had to carry out roles that were confined to women. They did not challenge male hierarchy or patriarchal privilege. For many of these women cadres, empowerment meant a replay of masculine and militarist roles. Women cadres then, tended to use the same methods as their male counterparts, of maximum force and violence. Women in conflict regions in the Northeast also joined the militia believing they could live a relatively respectable life instead of remaining helpless. However, things did not change much for them. Many therefore began deserting their camps, unable to bear the torturous life and the lack of basic amenities and privacy in the forests. They revealed that contrary to expectations, their life in the conflict area was hard and torturous, unlike the posh and luxurious life enjoyed by their leaders in some South Asian cities. They appealed: ‘We want to start life afresh and hope the people forgive us for the mistake that we committed by choosing the path of violence.’77 In Punjab, women became committed to the idea of Khalistan. For instance, Gurwinder Kaur, who had been labelled ‘a leading extremist woman’, stated her husband was wanted by the police for murder but she also had ‘identical views’ on the question of Khalistan.78 Women relatives of militants provided support by giving them shelter and played an active role, despite the severe consequences they would suffer if the police/army discovered their

linkages to them. The two main underground organizations of women militants during the Khalistan movement were the Mai Bhago Regiment headed by Bhag Kaur and The Khalistan Commando Force’s women’s wing headed by Gurwinder Kaur. These groups functioned in a militarist manner and the women leaders were addressed as ‘general’. Despite these leaders, testimonies from women terrorists showed that it was the male leadership that allocated them roles. For instance, Gurwinder Kaur described her role as an extremist: ‘Myself and some other girlfriends had only one job: transportation of arms from one place to another.’ She did this job over two hundred times, taking orders from the senior extremists. It is not surprising that Kaur remarked that it was her heart’s desire that ‘some accord be reached so that extremism might come to an end’.79 The Khalistan movement did not see women’s support roles as being peripheral. They were legitimized as part of Sikh values, where each member had to fulfil her role, in this case of supporting her husband/son/community. An official intelligence report confirms that most of the women terrorists either carried guns or messages for the organization.80 Clearly, women who became militants were not assured of special powers or leadership positions. In Kashmir, there have been fewer cases of women insurgents, though some women responded to state militarism by becoming activists of groups that support militants like Dukhtaran-e-Millat (Daughters of Faith) and the Khawateen-e-Markaz (KEM) (Council of Muslim Women) that advocate the politics of jihad and revenge. Cultural politics is part of their responsibility and they have engaged in active moral policing. They have carried on an aggressive campaign for enforcing burqa (veil). They seek to spread their version of the ‘true’ form of Islam as opposed to other Kashmiri traditions.81 Initiated as social service organizations in 1986, both these Kashmiri women’s groups took up cases of rape and massacre by the security forces and they have also played a role in indoctrinating women into accepting the rigours of militancy.82 They have provided

shelter for the militants, defied security forces, and acted as couriers and information gatherers. The Khawateen-e-Markaz has advocated an independent Kashmir, while the Dukhtaran-e-Millat has talked about a merger of Kashmir with Pakistan. The latter organization was banned because of its aggressive campaigns. In Kashmir, women mainly confine themselves to supporting the jihad as non-combatants. For instance, the Kashmir Mass Movement (KMM) led by Ms Fareeda, who was charged with various offences, was active in mobilizing support for the burqa. Otherwise, there is little proof of women combatants in militant organizations, though there have been the odd cases of women militants being arrested by the army. But as Ashima Kaul argued: ‘While men become martyrs and are buried at Mazar-e-Shouda, women’s sacrifices and contributions are not even mentioned.’83 Women militants in the Valley have largely confined themselves to secondary roles, like nursing, caregiving and mobilizing, working politically within the confines of existing cultural patterns. For instance, Shamshad Begum was arrested by Indian security forces in October 2001 for acting as a guide and identifying safe travel routes for the Hizbul Mujahadeen. Women have acted most often as couriers for the militant groups, and take up social issues as their politics. Very few assume leadership roles, and women like Mehbooba Mufti are exceptions. Women are not likely to have significant presence or representation in the peace talks, as and when they are held. Women play an active role in propagating militant ideology. Many Maoist women like the late Anuradha Ghandy were known for educating women cadres. Kashmiri women have played a role in socializing their children but have also guarded their children from joining insurgency. Saira, wife of a slain non-militant member of Hizbul Mujahideen said: ‘The child of a freedom fighter will be a freedom fighter.’84 But others do not want to lose their sons in these struggles. After Operation Blue Star, when the holiest of Sikh shrines, the Akal Takht, was badly damaged, journalists reported that while all present at the scene wept, ‘women swore revenge and

offered their sons for the Sikh cause’.85 After this incident, thousands of youth in Punjab took to the gun and joined ranks with the extremists. The role of women as mothers producing and training sons to fight for their motherland and Sikh values was celebrated.

Women’s Involvement as Relatives of Combatants Women’s involvement in armed conflict can be strategic, circumstantial, nationalist and political. But often women relatives of militants and security forces have no choice but to be part of the ‘infrastructure’ in conflict situations. Tribal women in Maoist-affected areas have been inducted into Maoist ideology in the absence of any mechanism that can redress their grievances. Women in these regions have given shelter and provided small services for combatants for payment and sometimes because of lack of an alternative. Many women cadres join the Maoist movement through their relatives while some are attracted to the ideology of liberation, where revolution is given priority to women’s liberation. In other conflicts too, women’s relation to the armed struggle is linked to their roles as wives on mothers. As Kashmir Women’s Commission member Girija Dhar said: ‘Women have to perform the role of wife, mother and daughter, all rolled into one … . If her husband or son picks up a gun, she has no choice but to protect them. She does not want to go against them. She has to abide by them, at times she does it willingly and at times she is forced to … She has no choice’.86 These women get classified as combatants by their sheer location. This is not to rule out the sense of injustice women feel. Most women activists in Nagaland and Manipur came to support the underground either because of relatives or out of the sense of deep injustice prevailing in their society.87 Women relatives of state officials, like police and army wives, have been termed by analysts as the forgotten and invisible ‘other’ who have to grapple with trauma, widowhood and tragedy.88 State and society treat relatives of victims in different ways, depending on their

status. Stereotypical images of armed conflict—the ‘sacrifice’ of the son, the grief of the mother/widow—are replayed by both sides to garner support. Mothers of disappeared and dead sons evoke feelings of collective grief and humiliation and have become icons of motherhood and patriotism in all these conflicts. The leadership of militant movements does not take gender issues seriously. Women’s rights and gender equality may be theoretically acceptable but are kept on the backburner as the movement focuses on its goal of first attaining political power. The consequence of such politics is that women who join because they support the cause and seek personal liberation from oppressive circumstances become instruments in this struggle that continues to be dominated and controlled by men. Some women do feel personal empowerment, especially when they choose to replicate patriarchal values. But most women cadres’ autonomy is controlled and restricted in different ways as militarized and patriarchal institutions form part of most of the insurgent movements as well. For instance, women cadres in many of these movements have been told which ‘comrades’ they can marry. Women cadres in the PWG have been asked to marry specified men as soon as they join. Men who have abused women within the movement are rarely punished. Human rights activist Balagopal says: ‘I have not come across a single instance when a man has been punished severely for being nasty to his female comrade.’89 Thus women who join these movements to empower themselves remain within the limits of choices made for them by their compatriot men. These limitations are justified for the ‘greater cause’ of liberation. What is unfortunate is that this gender sacrifice is generally confined to women. The phenomenon of women as combatants is clearly culturespecific, endorsed by social and religious beliefs, and especially endorsed by men. In the tribal areas, including in the Northeast, women are active participants and women combatants are on the rise. Here, women ‘feel that Christianity has given them the right to “work alongside” with men’.90 Men in armed conflict roles now

recognize that women can have a public role, as long as they simultaneously fulfil their private and traditional roles. The extent of women’s roles as combatants varies widely in these societies, but what is common to all of them is that men sanction and ultimately control these roles. Women who have become combatants feel empowered because their choices increase, and yet they have to continue to play their traditional roles. The question whether the new militarized roles for women empowers them is of deep concern for the women’s movements. The debate on this issue becomes clearer when women’s roles as peace activists is highlighted. Women become combatants because women and men share the same political objectives and goals and ideas of liberation through militancy. Women have found militancy as empowering and enhancing their capability to protect themselves and others. Retribution and revenge also form an important aspect in their becoming militants, suicide bombers or terrorists and they become victimized participants. The concept of honour is deep in the psyche of all South Asian communities, and when women are dishonoured by the enemy ‘other’ the sense of shame that in earlier periods led to suicides or mental breakdowns transforms women into combatants these days. The earlier helplessness and shame has given way to anger and defiance. The concepts of martyrdom and sacrifice are deeply ingrained in women, and this can drive them towards becoming combatants, at great personal risk. Women are used to sacrificing for their husbands and children, and sisters are taught to sacrifice for their brothers. This is a cultural norm and role that women learn to play for their family and community. If a woman has been dishonoured, martyrdom is one thing that will endear her to the community/family that has rejected her. This act also brings back the collective honour of a dishonoured community. Recall the Sikh and Punjabi women who jumped into the well during Partition in 1947, rather than be raped at the hands of the enemy. Women thus do not find it difficult to become combatants. What has deterred them so far has been, firstly, the denial of public spaces, and thus, political roles; secondly, their primary responsibility as mothers and homemakers; and thirdly, men deciding whether

women who join militant movements should play support, combatant or lead roles. As a consequence of women’s changing role in Indian society, the demands for empowerment from mainstream women’s movement, the availability of information and spread of mass media, the trend of an increase in women combatants and women taking on greater and leadership roles in militant movements is gaining ground. Women are pushing for greater roles within their organizations, they question leaders when they are given household chores or support roles within the organization. They raise issues like sexual harassment and object to control and insist on agency. Clearly, women’s roles in militancy are likely to grow with the rise of militant movements.

Conclusion During armed conflicts institutional structures break down. The public language and practice of politics and media becomes a weapon of conflict as terms such as ‘brotherhood’, ‘martyrdom’, ‘honour’, ‘brave hearts’, and ‘sacrifice for the motherland’ dominate the discourse and marginalize feminist values. Masculinity and force are privileged and the notion of power derived from them. Those who advocate peace efforts are seen as ‘weak’ and womanly. In such circumstances, women’s identities are constructed to intersect with the needs of militarized nationalism. State structures and institutions get militarized and patriarchal, as the army and paramilitary forces take control. In the case of all these conflicts,—Maoists, Northeast, Punjab and Kashmir—women have been constructed as cultural symbols. They are signifiers of the ‘honour’ of their community, and stereotyped as weak and with practical difficulties. They are then either seen as subjects to be protected and confined to the private sphere, or violated as symbols of the enemy ‘other’. Women’s roles get bracketed in identity politics linked to either the nation or their relatives like ‘mother of the nation’, ‘rape victim’, ‘martyr’s mother’,

‘half widow’ or ‘war widow’ that symbolize shared victimhood and solidarity, necessary for retribution and nationalism. Women’s agency is undervalued as their identity is held hostage to militarist values and they are subject to greater control then at normal times. Situations of conflict enhance domestic and other violence against women. The phenomenon of women combatants has seen an increase in most of the armed conflict regions where women find this a method of empowerment, retribution and fulfilling their sense of nationalism. The structure of power and hierarchy remains similar in organizations engaged in conflict. Women combatants maintain the myth of male supremacy and work in the belief that power is related to force and leadership is synonymous with masculinity. Women’s roles in armed conflict and the criminalization of sexual violence against women has been expressed in many Security Council resolutions like 1325, 1820 and others. Both the state and insurgents must adhere to these resolutions to ensure the dignity of women. Increasing women’s participation in the decision-making and peace processes is an important step in this direction.

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Civil Soc iet y I nt erv ent ions in Arm ed Conf lic t s

C

ivil society is understood as the non-state sphere of political life. An essential component of a democracy, civil society is weak and ineffectual in authoritarian, militarist and nondemocratic states. It represents the domain of society where ideas are publicly exchanged, associations are freely formed, interests are organized, economic activity functions autonomously and legally protected rights and institutions of everyday life and social organizations are developed. It provides the buffer between the individual and the state. Civil society is the site where actions of the state can be discussed, influenced and resisted. For Gramsci, foremost theorist of the concept of civil society after Hegel and Locke, it was an important part of the state, though political society was its visible manifestation.1 Political society was the space where populations were governed, with or without civic norms. Political society and civil society had an intricate and organic relationship that enabled some strata of civil society to gain and

maintain dominance within the state.2 Parallel but separate from the state, civil society, as Gramsci portrayed it, was a nucleus of independent political activity, crucial in countering the tyranny of the state. In other words, civil society plays a critical role in giving legitimacy (consent) to the state and also gives rise to movements that delegitimize it. State policies and laws generally emerge out of civil society and are effective only when they are endorsed and accepted there. A well-developed civil society can protect the state from economic and political crisis. A well-founded civil society simultaneously safeguards the autonomy of the individual, facilitates communities and gives legitimacy to the state. Divisions within the civil society reflect ultimately on state formation. Since the private and the public are delineated in civil society and security of individuals and communities ultimately determined here, citizens have a vested interest in strengthening and maintaining well-founded civil societies. But a word of caution is in order here. The concept of civil society has to be used with care as it is elastic enough to include everything from environment, culture, and economy to alternatives, autonomy, and so on, otherwise it can begin to lose meaning. Further, civil society is not some kind of benign or neutral zone where different elements of society function, compete freely and on equal terms, regardless of who holds power in government. In fact civil society is divided on many issues, especially on armed conflict, and scholars like Partha Chatterjee regard civil society as a preserve of the elite.3 Location and culture also influence the nature of civil society. It is not static; and new groups like the tribals and dalits are beginning to intervene in civil society debates. Many of the armed conflicts in India began as sub-nationalist movements in civil society as we showed in Chapter 3 of this book. These feelings of sub-nationalism came into clash with the state and some groups used these contradictions to mobilize political movements for self-determination. Other groups have used protest movements to intervene between the state and political groups for

peace, mediation, conflict transformation and as an appeal for negotiated settlements for rights. Sub-nationalist/insurgency movements and their antidote are thus both embedded in civil society. It is not easy for civil society to function in areas of armed conflict, since those critical of the state’s position get classified as enemies. Yet in all conflict areas in India, people’s movements, civil society organizations (CSOs), human rights groups and NGOs have become increasingly active over the years. These include bodies at both the local and national level. They play important roles in advocacy, recording human rights violations, informing the media, and mobilizing public opinion locally, regionally, nationally and even internationally. Depending on their nature, these groups have single and sometimes multiple interests, and have a complex relationship with the state and the insurgency movements. Many of these CSOs are ignored by the state at best, and branded as anti-national/pro-insurgency at worst, because of their criticism of state policies and actions. Home Minister Chidambaram, in response to Maoists killings of paramilitary (Central Reserve Police Force, CRPF) men in May 2010, attacked civil society saying that they had tied down the security forces (by raising human rights issues). He stated: ‘There is a lot for which civil society organizations have to answer.’4 Implicit in all this is the stand that the state should be allowed to violate human rights in its fight against insurgency without any public criticism. Earlier, Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman Singh had declared that those who were in Salwa Judum camps are ‘with us’. Local police officials followed in the same vein and alleged that academics and activists like Nandini Sundar and Medha Patkar had links with the Maoists. Civil society groups and individuals like Arundhati Roy have been personally targetted for the positions they have taken on the Maoist and other conflicts. At the same time, diverse debates, reflecting the spectrum of opinions in civil society, have also been publicly recorded.5 The ‘with us or against us’ thesis that states like to use to condemn civil society is dangerous. This binary simplifies and

homogenizes the conflict; it ignores the root causes, the history and the impact of the conflict; it focuses on loyalty to the regime and state; it does not consider human rights and human security; it does not recognize the lapses and violations by the state. By attacking civil society, the government loses the opportunity to use people as actors and as mediators. Further, it inculcates a sense of anger, hurt, humiliation and ultimately alienation amongst them which actually exacerbates conflicts. It thus loses the battle for ‘winning hearts and minds’, necessary for any conflict resolution and strengthening of the state’s hegemony. But insurgent groups, in turn, on occasion attack CSOs or individual members of civil society, as for example during the first phase of the Jammu and Kashmir insurgency from 1989 to 1994, when prominent civil society activists like H.N. Wanchoo were assassinated. The Kashmiri Pundits were singled out for attack and coercive measures were adopted by some of the insurgent groups, especially the Hizbul Mujahideen, to force them to leave the Kashmir Valley. The vast majority of the 150,000 people who left then have never been able to return. Similarly, the ULFA had in its earlier days opposed autonomous opinions. In Manipur, the various insurgent groups divided on both political and ethnic lines have sought to control or at least influence the women activists—the Meira Paibis. The Meitei insurgents do not tolerate criticism from autonomous individuals or the press. There is similar evidence of sustained pressure on the Naga Hoho and the Naga Mothers by the NSCN (IM) to follow their position.6 The Maoists have publicly selected some individuals acceptable to them as potential negotiators and thus undermined their autonomy in the eyes of an already biased public. They have ignored human rights groups that condemn Maoist killings of tribal informers and civilians.

Kashmir Conflict and Civil Society

Despite the evident militarization that has taken place over the past few decades in Kashmir, a nascent civil society has emerged that acts as a watchdog and a vibrant advocate of rights. Every time there is a violation of rights, a youth is killed, a young man disappears or a woman is raped, activists and ordinary people are on the streets protesting, demonstrating and striking. These protests are sometimes spontaneous, but also often called for and organized by activist civil society groups, as well as supported by politicians and leaders of the opposition, like the Hurriyat Conference. The government takes these protests, now routine, not that seriously and this exacerbates the alienation between civil society and the state. Civilians can be co-opted by both state and militants but civil society maintains autonomy from both. Despite this, a healthy civil society exists, though at times it does get entangled with state politics. For over six decades, the Valley shuts down every year on 27 October, as a mark of protest against the landing of armed forces in Kashmir in 1947. On this day, civil society, NGOs and groups all call for solidarity, but the leadership is provided by the Hurriyat Conference. At the same time, civil society also protests when there are deaths at the hands of militants—though they reverently look after militants’ graves. Hameeda Nayeem, English professor at Kashmir University, argues that all Kashmiris should not be labelled militants. Arguing for the right to self-determination, she condemns killing of civilians by militants.7 Though supporting some of the views of certain insurgent groups, members remain part of civil society. Several civil society groups function through the independent centres and institutes they establish. For example, the Institute of Kashmir Studies, in Srinagar, has brought out regular reports on human rights violations, the disappearances and rapes since the 1990s.8 Another group, the Association of the Parents of the Disappeared (APDP), has for years led a campaign to focus on the thousands whose whereabouts remain unknown. Led by Parveena Ahangar, whose son is still missing, this organization has brought together hundreds of families of mothers/half widows and others whose children have disappeared. They have campaigned from

Srinagar to Delhi and as Parveena said on one such trip—‘no one has been able to help us, but we will continue our struggle’. That civil society wants to be heard and engage in a dialogue came out in the JKLF chief Yasin Malik’s campaign for selfdetermination in September 2007. Over 113 days, 6,500 villages were covered and over fifteen lakh signatures of people of Jammu and Kashmir were secured. The local press reported: ‘Never had anyone, anywhere in India, undertaken so thorough a mass contact programme in so select an area.’9 The intention was to involve Kashmiri people in a dialogue, to present their opposition to any settlement by India and Pakistan which ignored their voices. Other issues in which civil society has been active in Kashmir are: opposing the detention of political prisoners held without being charged, making trips across the Line of Control easier and focusing on human rights abuses. The government has argued that the successful conclusion of the 2008 state assembly elections implied the inclusion of people in the political process. This was only partially true as people came out in large numbers to vote for day-to-day issues like water/ power/ roads etcetera. The elections did not address the issues of alienation, human rights or even autonomy. This was despite Article 370 of the Indian Constitution being revisited by the government for the sake of examining the civil society’s demand for state autonomy. It is sometimes said that civil society intervention in Kashmir is communal; the Azad Kashmir Movement is sometimes seen as pitting Muslims against Hindus. Such an accusation is highly questionable. The core of the movement is about Kashmiryat, though at times it may have also got communalized. Some sections of the Hurriyat Conference do have an Islamic agenda. Besides, there are Pakistan-backed insurgents and Indian-sponsored surrendered militant groups. Nevertheless, in 1947, when India was ravaged by the Partition riots, the Kashmir Valley was quiet and there was communal amity. In 1990, many times Kashmiri Muslims came out in support of Pundits, when anyone was killed; likewise they did in the 2003 violence in Nadimarg. Kashmiri civil society

cannot be said to be communal. Some insurgents may target Hindus —but Muslims are also not spared. Civilian groups and individuals have played a determined role in pressurizing India and Pakistan to hold talks for peace, for a solution to Kashmir and against militarization. Groups like the Pakistan–India Forum for Peace and Democracy, South Asia Human Rights Forum and others have worked since the 1990s and continue to do so to date.10 Petitions have been signed and human rights groups have demanded that a commission be set up on disappearances in Jammu and Kashmir but there is little response from the government. On the international day of the disappeared in 2005, the Association of Parents of the Disappeared visited New Delhi to mobilize support for an inquiry into their cause. Resolutions have been given to the prime minister and Kashmiri civil society has also asked for the removal of Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA), but to no avail. The government’s claim, that post the 2008 election a ‘sense of security’ prevails, is not true and street and civil society protests have only increased. Civil society in Kashmir is frustrated with the lack of response from political authorities at the Centre but has not given up their struggle for human rights.

Civil Society, Salwa Judum and Maoist Movements In the Maoist areas, every time there is an encounter killing or a disappearance, the villagers mobilize themselves and protest. Protests are also organized by various political parties and CSOs on issues of Special Economic Zones, land and forest rights. Though unreported by the media, for instance, a two-lakh strong rally took place in Jagdalpur in November 2007 to protest against the Salwa Judum and land acquisition by the Tatas and Essar. Nandini Sundar argues that since Chhattisgarh lacks a tribal middle class or density of civil/political society organizations,11 there is little to shield tribals there from the violence of the state. There are civil society groups

like the Campaign for Peace and Justice in Chhattisgarh (CPJC) that conducted public hearings in Delhi on 4 September 2007, where young boys deposed how force had been used against them. They were forcibly made to wear Maoist uniforms by the Salwa Judum and arrested. Many were kept in Jagdalpur jail. Many (twelve murdered in Santoshpur village and elsewhere by SPOs) were incarcerated and tortured. The CPJC makes statements against police atrocities and have appealed to the human rights commissions and judiciary, but they function under great constraints. Activist lawyers, doctors, trade unionists and others who work at the grass-roots level often suffer the wrath of the police officials and authorities, as seen in the case of Dr Binayak Sen and others. The police demolished a Gandhian ashram run by activist Himanshu Kumar in 2009. Himanshu stated that after Salwa Judum ‘… in front of me people are being assaulted for talking to an official fact-finding team’. He added, ‘the government does not want peace; it wants land’.12 In Ghatsila town, on the Jharkhand border with West Bengal, lawyer Deepti Singh succeeded in getting the acquittal of twenty-six people, including three women—all imprisoned on fake terrorism charges. People are being blackmailed; if they do not pay up, they risk being labelled as Maoists by the police, she says.13 Himanshu Kumar says that when activists went for a peace mission after Salwa Judum the government called them Maoists: ‘This is how the state works—they drive you to the wall, they harass you, and then call you a Naxalite.’14 The arrest of Dr Binayak Sen under the Chhattisgarh Special Public Security Act led to an international campaign for his release but there was little response from the state government. Even on his getting bail from the Supreme Court on 25 May 2009, after two years in jail, the Chhattisgarh government reiterated its determination to strive for conviction on the criminal charges leveled against him. Journalist Sai Reddy highlighted the problems of journalists working in conflict zones. He revealed how civilians caught between the Naxalites and the police become hostages to both. The Maoists had earlier threatened to kill him and had blown up his house. Later the

Salwa Judum plotted to arrest him, according to the state unit president of the Indian Federation of Working Journalists (IFWJ).15 People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) state executive member, photo-journalist and film maker Ajay T.G. was booked under this antiterror Act. He was released later, after civil society activists from all over India took up his case. No evidence was found against him. PUCL leader Rajender Sail says fifty-two people have been detained under this Act until 2009. There are cases against sixty-seven others, who are absconding. Of these, seven are ostensibly Naxalite cadres. Others include small businessmen, NGO workers, nineteen agricultural workers, all of whom have nothing to do with the Maoists.16 While hearing a writ against killings in the state, the Supreme Court in September 2008 endorsed the view of the Public Interest Litigation that killings, arson and looting had been carried out during Salwa Judum and directed that the state take remedial measures. It has thus become clear that large numbers of people are terrorized, arrested and tortured without any real evidence against them, reinforcing their sense of alienation, anger, hurt and despair. There has been vociferous protest against abuse of human rights —on 14 November 2006, 7,000 adivasis in Dantewada held a rally. Writers and activists reporting on the violation of human rights have been branded as ‘sympathizers’ or active supporters of the Maoists. Anyone—this has included the former chief minister, Ajit Jogi—who opposes Salwa Judum is branded as ‘representative of the Naxalites’. As journalist Siddharth Varadarajan said: ‘The Indian Maoists and security forces have entered a holding pattern. Each side’s capacity to inflict pain on the other may be growing but a knockout punch is out of the question.’17 The police however say they ‘have to show results’ and so mistakes are made.18 The consequence is that civil society suffers. A petition has been filed in the Supreme Court by Nandini Sundar and Ramachandra Guha, followed by a PIL by Manish Kunjam and others, that argues that the Salwa Judum violates basic fundamental rights of tribal people.19 The Supreme Court stated in its arguments

in this petition: ‘What is wrong in arming local people to counter the Maoists menace?’ The state government argues that the Salwa Judum is a ‘spontaneous movement’ for peace of adivasis against the tyranny of the Maoists. The Supreme Court asked the National Human Rights Commission to enquire into these rights violations. Unfortunately, the NHRC team, that included former police officers as well, took the official view of the Salwa Judum rather than the claims made by the affected tribals, despite their depositions to it. The excesses of the Salwa Judum are visible in the camps and amongst the displaced. They have been recorded by activists like Anoop Saha and others who have pointed out that the first meeting of the Salwa Judum was held on the very same day (4 June 2005) that the government signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Tata Steel, to set up a steel plant in Bastar. Displacement without compensation is being cloaked by raising the Naxalite threat. It has become a convenient excuse to arm a local militia, outsource violence, give them impunity and then bear no responsibility for the disastrous outcome. Independent initiatives by citizens, human right groups as well as media reports have shown that this ‘uprising’ of Salwa Judum has led to daily killings of civilians, enforced disappearances, destruction of homes and forced migration. Contrary to official claims of a spontaneous ‘uprising’, the Salwa Judum is a state-sponsored counter-insurgency programme. The beneficiaries of mineral extraction have turned against civil society activism. International organizations like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), have also been working in Chhattisgarh. Though critical and dismissive of their findings, the government, a democratically elected one, has to give the international civil society organizations like them some access. Though they have been working in Kashmir for years, the ICRC came to Bastar for the first time in 2008. International humanitarian organizations like Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders) have a presence in Dantewada district. The chief minister Raman Singh has claimed, ‘We have no problem even if such organizations provide medical assistance to Naxalites injured in

encounters with security forces,’20 but senior officials in the state have been resistant. They maintain: ‘The presence of the ICRC can portray the Naxalite problem in the region as a major conflict, rather than a socio-economic and law and order problem as has been maintained so far by successive governments.’21 Conflicting signals from different quarters in the government stymie the smooth functioning of these organizations. An active civil society movement was instrumental in negotiating peace talks between the government of Andhra Pradesh and the Naxalite parties. Called the Committee of Concerned Citizens, Hyderabad, and led by R.S. Sankaran (retired civil servant), many of its members comprised those from civil liberties and human rights organizations, people like K.G. Kannabiran and Professor Haragopal. This group, representing democratic sections of society that were tired of being ‘mute spectators’ of the growing violence and fear created by the conflicts between the state and revolutionary parties, came together spontaneously in 1997. They looked at the problem in larger terms than just violence and counter-violence, and attempted to bring the issue of people to centre stage. Having interacted with various sections of the CPI (M-L)–People’s War Group for over a decade, it mediated between the government of Andhra Pradesh and the Maoists in a series of peace talks.22 In 2002, the government and the Maoist groups agreed in principle for talks. The People’s War Group declared a ceasefire and the government agreed to create conducive conditions for the talks. The truce survived two rounds of talks but encounter killings involving members of the People’s War Group led to a resumption of violence on both sides. In the state elections of 2004, Maoism appeared as a key issue in the manifestoes of the main political parties. The Congress Party and its coalition partners stated that force was not an effective strategy and argued for a holistic solution based on a larger socioeconomic perspective. In fact their manifesto also stated that ‘the Congress firmly believes that violence has no place in a democracy. The Congress Party therefore is committed to resolving this issue

through a process of dialogue and consultation’.23 Consequent on winning the elections, the Congress chief minister announced that a congenial atmosphere for talks would be created. The Committee of Concerned Citizens welcomed this initiative and a ceasefire between the parties was agreed upon in 2004. The convener of the citizens’ group was to be the mediator. The peace talks held in October 2004 included issues like that of withdrawal of cases against people during public agitations, controlling mafia elements, removing the price on the heads of revolutionary leaders etcetera, apart from land reforms, with land to be given to the landless and tribals. The government’s non-committal response left the Naxalites disappointed. It also wanted the Naxalites to give up arms and join the mainstream. For six months of the talks there was no violence between the two sides. Thereafter, several statements by both the government and the Naxalites led to deterioration of relations and in January 2005, the CPI (Maoist) and the CPI (M-L) announced a withdrawal from the talks. The ban on the CPI (M-L)– People’s War Group was reimposed, encounter killings started and the talks failed. The Committee of Concerned Citizens concluded that the state continued to see the Naxalite movement as a law and order problem, to be handled by brutal force, and was unwilling to take any measures that would threaten the status quo.24 Human rights activists critiqued the talks as farcical and argued that people of these areas wanted peace but also wanted the Maoists to be around since they protected the poor.25 In Delhi, civil rights activist Swami Agnivesh attempted to start peace talks between the Maoists and the government recently, after he received a letter from the home minister indicating willingness for talks. However, Maoist leader Azad who carried their letter to the leadership was killed in an encounter. Swami Agnivesh stated in July 2010 that the home minister suddenly seemed to have changed his attitude towards talks. Civil society groups over the years have conducted public hearings on issues linked with the conflicts like displacement, mining, Special Economic Zones and human rights.26 But they have

been harassed in different ways. For example, twenty-three false cases have been slapped on Abhay Sahoo, the leader of the nonviolent Posco Pratirodh Sangram Samiti in Kalinga Nagar, Orissa. Other such movements face a similar response from state actors. Such actions force activists to examine different options of resistance. In areas where the conflict between the Maoists and the security forces is acute like Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and parts of West Bengal like Lalgarh, local activists have linked up with activists nationally. Conventions, statements and protests against army actions are held locally and in metropolises of Delhi, Kolkata and Mumbai. Citizens’ groups for the protection of democratic rights have been formed that bring attention to root causes, issues of displacement, police atrocities and rights violations and garner support against army intervention.

Civil Society During the Punjab Conflict Civil society and political society were particularly active during the Punjab conflict. This helped to prevent the conflict from turning communal, pitting Sikhs against the Punjabi Hindus in Punjab. After the killing of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984 by her two Sikh bodyguards, there was a wave of communal killing and massacre of thousands of Sikhs outside Punjab, most notably in Delhi. Their properties all over India were destroyed and desecrated and a large number of Sikhs, for the sake of their own security, decided to go back to Punjab. Many NGOs collected evidence about the Sikh killings and tried to help the Sikhs in getting justice. Besides, human rights groups and NGOs also reported on human rights violations and the excessive use of force during the counter-insurgency operations in Punjab.27 Human Rights Watch, the People’s Union of Civil Liberties and a local group, Ensaaf, conducted their own enquiries and demanded that the Centre institute a commission of enquiry to hold accountable

members of the security forces who killed, ‘disappeared’ and tortured thousands of Sikhs. These reports described the impunity enjoyed by the officials allegedly responsible for violations and the near total failure of India’s judicial and state institutions, from the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). There was the case of Jaswant Singh Khalra, a leading human rights defender in Punjab, who was abducted and then murdered in October 1995, allegedly by government officials after being held in illegal detention for two months. The Ensaaf report, Protecting the Killers, stated that former director-general of police, K.P.S. Gill, was directly involved in interrogating Khalra just days before the murder. The CBI refused to prosecute Gill.28 The cases of ‘mass cremations’, where the security forces were implicated in thousands of killings and secret cremations throughout Punjab, were revealed in these reports. Such cases were before NHRC but the ‘NHRC has inexplicably failed in its duties to investigate and establish exactly what happened in Punjab’ said Brad Adams of Human Rights Watch.29

Civil Society in the Northeast The Northeast has a rich tradition of local initiatives and institutions. Most villages have clubs, women’s groups and youth groups. One example is the Young Mizo Association that has over 600 branches. Though many of these focus on local festivals and cultural issues, some are also involved in development and human rights work. As conflict in these regions has mounted, these groups have been engaged in mediation, development and conflict resolution in different ways. The village groups are generally supported by grants from the local public and self-help of volunteers. Social activist Sanjoy Ghose, who was allegedly abducted and killed by the ULFA, had argued that in states like Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram the lines separating social work from politics were blurred.30 This led to some level of accountability to the local community, but also to

suspicions that village groups might be linked to different insurgent groups. Civil society groups have gradually developed over the years and achieved status and legitimacy in Naga society. Civil society and traditional groups like the Naga Hoho and the Naga Mothers have been particularly active in appealing to the two NSCN groups to stop fighting. In April 2008, a report from Kohima showed that the NSCN groups were engaged in a battle over control of Dimapur, the commercial capital of Nagaland. The report also pointed to the rampant gun running and extortion in the name of the Naga struggle. The Naga Students’ Associations and the Naga Peoples Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR) has been active in popularizing the cause of a united Naga nation and the struggle against the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act. In recent times there has been an active internet campaign and the construction of a virtual Naga nation. In Assam, too, a nascent civil society has been active. The Northeast People’s Forum (NEPF), a conglomeration of sixteen groups in the region, has been pressurizing the ULFA to hold talks with the Union Government. To further the peace process, the Assam government extended the period of amnesty to cadres of the terrorist organizations of the Dima Halim Daoga, to enable them to surrender. Prominent Assamese citizens including the Jnanpith Award winner, Indira Raisom Goswami, and Jahnu Barua called upon the outfit in 2005 for an urgent dialogue with the Government of India in order to end violence and confrontations. Since then they have repeatedly called for peace through negotiation in Assam. On 25 May 2005, an accord was signed between the Centre and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), which was a step in neutralizing violence in Assam. According to the accord, NDFB, in return for a cessation of operations against them, would not carry out hostile acts or assist any other militant group and would stay in designated camps, provide lists of members and weapons to the Assam police, and not carry arms or move about in uniforms.31

Thus, civil society interventions can be used to bring such peace in many of the conflict zones. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has repeatedly stated to civil society groups that the UPA government in New Delhi could talk peace with insurgent groups, but would not let terror hold development initiatives to ransom. This has yet to be translated into practice as the ULFA continues insurgency operations. The government, however, has not helped in the negotiations or the negotiators. For example, Lachit Bordoloi, the Assamese journalist and writer who actually helped the government to establish contact with the ULFA, was arrested in February 2007 under the National Security Act (NSA). This sent out a poor message to the rebels and to the people and civil society at large and it also marked a reversal of the policy for negotiations. Several NGOs like the Institute for Conflict Management (New Delhi), the umbrella organizations of NGOs in Manipur called the United NGO Mission Manipur, ActionAid and others have been working on issues of conflict resolution in the Northeast. They have developed a pool of trainers for peace training and development work in the region. Their tasks include documentation of violence and rights violations, advocacy of resources and laws available to address these, strengthening of networks and groups working on these issues; undertaking literacy and political campaigns on the issues of rights. The awareness of the need for rights and an alternative to armed conflicts has thus grown and gained legitimacy in these conflict-torn societies.

Role of Media The media has sometimes highlighted, sensationalized, analysed and sometimes ignored armed conflicts. The primary interest of the media is the analysis of atrocities and violent incidents that make up 90 per cent of stories and headlines in the local press in conflict areas, like in the Dandakarnya Samachar (Chhattisgarh), Kashmir

Times, Sangai Express, etcetera. For example, in 1989, 1,500 violent incidents, including bomb blasts in Kashmir, were reported in the local dailies. Very few caught the attention of the national press. Between 1992 and 1996 there were over 5,000 such incidents reported. After 2000, these figures came down, but still remain at about 1,000 or so a year. Again, in Kashmir, the press showed that in 1990 there were sixty-five demonstrations, while post-1990 to 2010, these went up to almost 300 a year, mostly against illegal occupation, rape, staged encounters where civilians got killed and disappearances and the like. In Manipur where civil society and the local press are active we find reports of similar figures. As we have seen earlier, local journalists have had to suffer the wrath of the local police and others when they expose the human rights violations in their areas. The Maoist conflicts appear to be of special interest to most of the press, especially the photo-ops of atrocities committed by both state and insurgents. The role the media plays is very mixed; large sections accept government handouts, police stories and carry these without analysing or verifying the information. There is an element of sensational reporting and trial by press in almost all cases, whether it is the arrest of a doctor on charges of Maoism or a young Muslim caught under national security laws, or a rape of a Manipuri woman. Most of the television channels tend to support a vision of statecentric nationalism. In urban India, such stories have little resonance with many young people. Besides, a fatigue or desensitization sets in because of the bombardment of confusing messages from various channels; the sufferings of ordinary people are ignored.

Women as Peacemakers, Activists and Organizers Women become civil society activists and support peace processes in different ways during conflicts: from their homes, in community interactions and as active negotiators. Additionally, in all conflict

zones across India, women have actively engaged in street protests and been involved in activism. The method and agency of women is culturally driven, flexible and changing with the increased flow of information and greater politicization. We have already examined women’s roles as combatants. This section will examine women’s roles in civil society, which are also uneven and related to the independent role of civil society within armed conflict regions. Women’s roles in the conflicts clearly show that even as women are active in civil society as peace activists, they are excluded from the decision-making bodies in both state and traditional village councils and tribal parliaments. Yet they have found other ways to voice their stories and emerge as mediators in conflicts that affect their being in such fundamental ways. We highlight some experiences from the activism of the Meira Paibis and the Naga Mothers. The Meira Paibis (torchbearers) in Manipur, also known as Mothers, represent a unique response to the situation brought on by conflict and militarization. Like many other women’s movements, they initially took up social issues but soon turned to political concerns as well. Their activities broadened after December 1980 when they campaigned against insurgency-related violence. In 2010 these women constitute a resource against the militarization of society. The Meira Paibis have opposed the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) consistently by public demonstrations, hunger fasts by individual members and protest meetings. Meira Paibi groups formed an apex body, the Manipur Nupi Kanglup (AKMIL), and held meetings and distributed pamphlets against the army rule in the region. Ironically, this has led the government to see the Meira Paibis as ‘pro-insurgent’, ruling out their use in any conflict resolution or engagement with civil society. The case of Manipuri Sharmila Chanu’s ‘fast unto death’ since September 2001—and still continuing, in 2010—against the AFSPA is well known. She has become a symbol of non-violent resistance

and human rights even as she lies in hospital and is force-fed. The women’s groups have supported this resistance. Women’s groups have gained a status in Manipuri society and in many instances run parallel systems in the absence of state institutions. They work closely with the students’ unions and have confronted the army on several occasions. Sections of the Meira Paibis were attacked by the army in Imphal in September 1998 and twenty-two women were injured. This did not deter them, and women’s organizations along with local committees staged protests and roadblocks in 2000 for the release of jailed leaders of the All Manipur Students Union.32 The extraordinary protest on 15 July 2004 by a naked group of Meira Paibis sparked off by the custodial rape of Manorma in a counter-insurgency operation in Manipur is legend.33 But they have used their position as ‘mother’ and mediated with the armed forces and organized public meetings with them, whenever necessary.34 Meira Paibis also participated and organized peace rallies when riots broke out in Imphal Valley on the issue of a Greater Nagaland, a demand of the Naga movements. However, in April 2010, when the Manipur underground and politicians opposed NSCN leader T. Muivah’s visit to his traditional village in Ukhrul, Manipur, the Meira Paibis watched in silence. There has been a distancing between Naga and Manipuri women’s groups, both of whom have identified with their ethnic groups. This shows again that women privilege their ethnic and community identity above solidarity with women of another community. The Meira Paibis thus play multiple roles and their political activities are issue-based and situational. In some cases they support peace and peace negotiations but also state that ‘sometimes militancy is necessary’.35 Through such involvement, the Meira Paibis have become effective in the art of intervention in situations of violence, though at times their organizations, rooted in various localities, have got caught up in the factional politics of the Manipur conflict.

Women have played an important role in civil society in the Naga movement. Naga women’s groups and voluntary associations like Leishiyar Tangkhul Women’s Society and Tangkhul Shanao Long, established in the 1970s, were among the first to get involved in political activism. The Naga Mothers’ association (NMA) was formed in February 1984, constituted by the Naga Hoho. The aim of the organization was to ‘uphold womanhood’ and articulate the Naga women’s fight ‘against social evils prevailing in the state’.36 They were involved in drug rehabilitaion and addressing environmental concerns. The NMA initiated an inquiry and submitted a memorandum to the National Human Rights Commission into cases like the Mokokchung firing by the army in December 1994 where many innocent civilians were killed. The Mothers initiated campaigns on ‘Shed No More Blood’ and ‘No More Violence’ as an appeal to take up issues peacefully.37 They came out strongly against the imposition of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (1972) on Nagaland and insisted that any incident involving the army, violence and women and children be referred to them. They addressed the issue of women’s participation in the peace process to both their own society and the government: ‘We are puzzled if this is the consensus decision of the Naga leaders. If not the voice of the mothers/ women who constitute 50 per cent of the Naga population cannot be ignored.’38 Such memoranda challenged patriarchal processes of decision making at all levels. The Naga Mothers steered clear of the politics of revenge and retribution and stated in their resolutions and pamphlets: ‘The ways in which our society is being run whether by the overground government or the underground government have become simply intolerable.’39 Taking an objective view, former president of the NMA, Neiduono Angami, stated that they were critical of ‘… the amount of human rights violations in our society both by the Indian security forces and the different factional Naga national workers’.40 They appealed to both the state and the militant leadership to ‘reflect and be wise’ in the absence of which peace would not be possible. They feared that ‘underground factions are likely to take full advantage of

the absence of security forces in all their effort to capture power by way of increased extortion and elimination’.41 Their critique of factionalism within the Naga Movement and their strong appeals for peace and non-violence enhanced their positions as mediators and peacemakers. The NMA built alliances with other likeminded organizations like the Naga Women’s Union, Manipur, and the Naga Peoples Movement for Human Rights, and journeyed to various towns and cities in India for building up their support. The Naga Mothers met the EMMA (Eramdam Manipur Mothers’ Association) in March 2003, for peaceful co-existence between neighbours. The Mothers are proactive as mediators between the various factions of Naga society and between civil society and the governing authorities. They also do not hesitate to approach both the army and civil authorities. In this difficult process of peace-building, the Naga Mothers viewed their role as ‘objective forces’. Neiduono Angami stated: ‘Our role is not to take decisions. We have left this to the NSCN.’ She continually stressed that, ‘The decision (for peace/conflict) is theirs. We are only enabling.’42 The Naga Mothers never asserted their right to be negotiators in the peace talks. ‘It is not our role to participate in political negotiations. Those on the negotiating table represent all of us.’43 The Naga Mothers clearly accepted that the two entities that have been party to the conflict need to negotiate the terms of peace and that theirs was the traditional role, of being part of the background.44 They believe that women’s rights and ‘everything’ will follow if there is a political solution. Their strategy is to retain their role as transformative agencies that address social and political issues together as part of a common process. Analyst Rita Manchanda contends that the Naga Mothers’ movement has been a major contribution ‘in keeping open the channels of communication between warring factions and across intercommunity, in defusing tensions and paving the way for reconciliation’.45 She has argued that new spaces were created for women because the ‘protracted experience of living under the virtual rule of the Indian security forces, had emasculated Naga men’s self-

perception of their role as protectors’.46 Naga women have thus used the language of motherhood to negotiate spaces for themselves and talk peace in civil society. Yet, in Nagaland and Manipur, women have mixed feelings about the effect of the liberation struggle on their status. In fact most women believe that there is no correlation between the two.47 Women activists are in favour of peace negotiations and are firm about the removal of the AFSPA and demilitarization of the region. They do not feel that the military can resolve political issues and want the government to be inclusive and proactive in talks. Women use their status as mothers to negotiate between warring groups. This reinforces patriarchal stereotypes and power structures where women are excluded from peace talks. Women have increased their space as peacemakers, but society continues to see their role as homemakers. Women thus have added new roles to their lives where they work for peace and continue to bear the responsibility for the home. Their work in the public space is based on community support.

Women’s Organizations There has been a great proliferation of various types of women’s organizations and non-governmental organizations in some areas of armed conflict. Most of them have faced obstacles and external interference, primarily from the government, in their functioning. They have been constantly accused by the officials, army and politicians of being ‘front organizations’ of the insurgents. For example, in 2003, former minister of state in the home ministry, I.D. Swami, informed the Lok Sabha that five NGOs—Manab Adhikar Sangram Samiti (MASS), North East Coordination Committee on Human Rights (NECOHR), United Committee, Manipur (UCM), Naga Peoples Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR) and Naga Students’ Federation (NSF)—have clandestine links with terrorist organizations in the Northeast. He said that these organizations reportedly

maintain discreet links with terrorist outfits. Several of these organizations were seen as terrorist.48 Such allegations are not unusual in conflict regions, especially made by right-wing parties that privilege national security and see dissent as being sponsored by an outside enemy state. In the eyes of national security groups, all human rights and many civil society organizations become sympathizers of the extremists. Women’s groups, as we have shown, back several issues supported by other groups including the militants, but advocate different methods. Thus for instance, the decisions of the NSCN (IM), especially those supported by the Naga Hoho, were backed by Naga Women’s Association and All Naga Student Union, Manipur.49 These women’s groups have legitimacy in these societies but since they have taken up the cause of people’s rights and opposed the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, they risk being indicted as collaborators. Women in conflict zones have faith in women’s groups and organizations. They neither want to join the underground or sit passively at home but seek alternate ways to enhance their roles. In Kashmir, women have spontaneously and consistently come out on the streets to protest killings, rape, disappearances and other human right abuses. Women are active members of groups like The Association of Parents of Missing Persons. They are a small part of political movements and parties, but, as Girija Dhar has stated, the Kashmiri women do not have a large and organized women’s movement.50 Women play an active role in socializing children, despite their grief; women continue to prepare their children to be ‘martyrs’ or peace activists. The dilemma faced by women reveals the contradictions and ambiguities of their position. In Kashmir, women have increasingly become part of civil society mass mobilization through street protests and are looking for negotiated solutions to the conflict. Outside the discourse of protests in Kashmir, however, there is little action. The reason is, as some young student stated: ‘the only collective activity possible in Kashmir is participation in weddings or attending prayers at the mosque’.51 Even for young students, there

are no cultural activities, no students unions and even the old Kashmiri festivals are not celebrated. Civil society groups from Delhi like Anhad and WISCOMP have now linked up with Kashmiri youth and women.52 In Jammu, too, women’s groups have initiated movements and organizations for specifically women’s rights. The displaced Kashmiri Pundit women organized their first women’s convention in January 2005, as a wing of the Panun Kashmir Movement, with their goal for a homeland in a special sanitized zone within Kashmir. As women from Jammu and Kashmir seek political empowerment there is resistance to these moves from many quarters. The 33 per cent reservation for women in civic bodies in India was put into effect in Kashmir also. However, the civic elections for the first time witnessed significant participation of women only in the 2005 civic polls, when 200 women stood for elections in the Valley. The state itself has been tardy in involving women in decision-making processes. Political parties have not encouraged women leaders. Mehbooba Mufti, daughter of the former chief minister Mufti Sayeed, is an exception. Her initial rise in the PDP was because of her family background. She has thereafter proved her capacity for political mobilization in mass politics and achieved electoral successes and legitimacy. Nevertheless, the gradual civil and political empowerment of women has brought more of them into public life. In Jammu and Kashmir, groups like the J&K Mahila Sehyog Mandal and others hold meetings and demand women’s rights. Women NGOs work on issues of development, empowerment, training and teaching, and peace activities. But despite gradual politicization and their participation in street protests, their domain remains restricted to social concerns linked to health and well being of family, husband, and children. In the tribal regions, women work alongside men in protesting and resisting local oppressions. They have formed women’s fronts and peace fronts, working collectively with civil society activists, human

rights organizations, academics and writers who have identified with their oppression. Women’s activism always coincides with their multiple roles, including in the private spheres. The need for ‘balance’ between home and outside falls squarely on them. As one activist in Manipur remarked: ‘Our neighbors joke with us … whether we can run a family if both of us are going out’.53 Women’s activism begins with social concerns and moves to political actions. Women’s groups and actions maintain the link between the social and family-oriented issues, and their link with political society emerges from this. This enables them to intervene and act as mediators between opposing sides. They emphasize that they have nothing to do with underground organizations, but have to protect people caught in the crossfire between militants and security forces. Women’s role and agency in activism is culturally determined and varies according to the norms in their society. Women’s movements, leaders and activists emerge from these informal civil society structures. Despite their presence and effectiveness in these informal structures, they are denied roles in formal decision-making structures and governance. Women raise issues that are inclusive, and look for long-term social transformation because of their holistic experience rather than the quick-fix solutions of conflict management.

Conclusion Civil society in India is unequally developed, with especially large gaps and gradations between developed urban areas, rural and tribal areas, and armed conflict zones. In the case of conflict zones, the nexus between corporate interests, mining lobbies, contractors, local politicians on the one hand, and the control of the armed militias and insurgents on the other, curbs the growth of autonomous organizations. Government is identified with protecting this order rather than people. The police and security forces are a source of

this continuum of threat. Draconian laws give the police, paramilitary and security forces large powers over ordinary people. Counterinsurgency operations involve the use of irregular forces and methods that work outside constitutional and judicial norms. This fuels an atmosphere of oppression, fear, threat and insecurity and makes it difficult to develop an independent civil society. This also leads to a binary vision where people are identified as either with the state or with the insurgents. Civil society gets isolated in circumstances of conflict and crises. They are targetted by the state as pro-insurgent when they talk about rights violations, state and structural violence, peaceful negotiations and alternatives. They are viewed as unpatriotic and anti-national, when insurgent violence takes place. Despite these adverse conditions, civil society has developed in these areas of conflict, albeit unevenly. The local civil society has been developing linkages with that of other places and with groups and individuals in urban centres. Zones of armed conflict are a challenge for the state and civil society leaders. Civil society is an important yet underutilized resource for understanding armed conflict and in conflict resolution. At the same time, autonomous forces in civil society are growing in the broad arena of human rights and demands for greater autonomy in a centralized federal system are gaining ground. Human rights violations are being highlighted as never before because of their tireless efforts, leading to pressure on the state to uphold its constitutional obligations and law.

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Conc lus ion is an immediate need to address the armed conflicts raging T here in large parts of India. For this purpose, the political, social and historical nature of the demands and the contexts in which they are embedded must be understood. The root causes for the conflicts lie in regional, ethnic, class and gender inequalities, human rights violations and denial of justice, historical grievances linked to political aspirations and exclusion from political and economic decision making. These root causes have not been holistically addressed and have led to a deep alienation of communities that live in the shadows of armed conflicts. The kind of development that India has seen has led to wide regional and income disparities and the rural-urban divide is acute and growing. An exclusive elite consisting of a social and political class that derives the benefits of growth and development while others remain excluded and victims of development is part of the discourse of the conflicts. Each conflict has its own reasons and grievances, so the specific concerns of each conflict have to be addressed even while there can be common methods for conflict resolution.

The conflicts in the Northeast, Kashmir and in Punjab have been primarily based on nationality formation, where specific ethnic communities believe that they have a distinct identity and rights (including the right to self-determination). These have their origin in the issue of state formation and the merger of these states with the Indian Union. In these three regions, the major political formations with the backing of the people had reservations about joining the Indian Union. All of them had movements for the recognition of rights that ranged from more autonomy to complete independence. The Maoist conflicts are fuelled by primarily economic and social justice issues related to land distribution, displacements and evictions, illegal mining, access to forest products and oppression due to the nexus between the police, officials, local contractors and politicians, that results in the perversion of politics and governance. The report of the National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector headed by Arjun Sengupta has shown that 77 per cent of people in India live on less than Rs 20 a day.1 Most of those below the poverty line belong to scheduled tribes, dalits, OBCs and minorities. Such serious inequity and injustice provides room for contradictions and conflicts. All the insurgent groups have challenged the state’s monopoly over coercive force, and work outside the parameters of effective state control. They have the capacity to disrupt normal functioning of large areas through the use of violent means, street protests and local mobilization. Funding is mobilized through legal as well as illegal means. Many of the armed groups have a close linkage with the local politicians and contractors and all these forces function in an atmosphere of a stable anarchy. They have some level of popular support in the absence of which they would be isolated. The state has primarily focused on dealing with conflict in the zones rather than engaging with people. Its policy has been one of enforcing the status quo and law and order by using force from the perspective of safeguarding national security. Many promises made during peace negotiations have not been kept. The rights violations remain unaddressed, and impunity given to security forces has

affected the entire community that collectively feels it cannot get justice from the state and thus uses different channels of resistance. The Government of India has produced many reports that recognize this fact: ‘Ad hoc solutions have added to the cycle of conflicts in the region.’2 However, it has still not adopted policies that go beyond immediate conflict management to conflict resolution through delivering social justice. The Union home minister presented a fourteen-point policy to the parliament on 13 March 2006 that included political, social, developmental and administrative measures. But at the ground level people feel no impact of this policy. The central government believes that by giving grants-in-aid to these regions conflicts can be resolved. However, instead of livelihood-generating projects these regions have become heavily dependent on central government funding. No institutional arrangements for the funds to be properly utilized and absorbed have been made. There is no accountability for the leakages, corruption and diversions of these funds and little local participation in their utilization. Mechanisms of publicly accountable social audit have been restricted to select programmes instead of being universalized. Moreover, people in these regions feel that economic packages are not a substitute for a democratic solution. The benefits have failed to percolate to the affected people but reinforced the local power nexus. This has created a stable anarchy and a situation of organized chaos, where institutions of governance are subverted directly or through collusive arrangements to serve personal or partisan ends of the militants. The government is ambivalent about human rights violations and groups that raise them. Even though the Administrative Reforms Commission states: ‘these disadvantaged groups have been subjected to atrocities, exploitation, discrimination and alienation that have prevented them from exercising their rights freely, enjoying privileges due to them and leading a life of dignity and a feeling of self worth’.3 Killing of civilians by security forces in the name of encounters continues in all conflict zones and security forces get

impunity. Yet, state institutions like the National and the State Human Rights Commissions have not yet been given the requisite powers to rectify these injustices. Judicial delays and technical entanglements have denied victims the justice they have been striving to get in all courts, and people have come to believe that the state cannot give them justice. The government has argued that: ‘A fortiori police action over a long period is counter-productive: it is likely to affect the innocent more than the extremists.’4 Yet a force of 50,000 more paramilitary is being prepared for dealing with internal conflicts. Some insurgencies have been put down by the state, but new ones are on the rise in these very areas. The state response to conflicts has been largely reactive, to use force. The government fails to take remedial steps on the basis of its own critique. Several governments reports have argued that the surest way to restore confidence is through a process of multi-stakeholder dialogues. But the dialogues have been exclusive, enveloped in secrecy and limited. In fact one of the reasons given for the failure of some accords is precisely that communities in conflict zones do not have faith in the system and civil society has not been taken into confidence. Civil society organizations can play and have played an important role in conflict areas by documenting and analysing reasons for conflict, assisting victims of human rights abuse, bringing their plight to the notice of the larger community and outside the region of conflict and by showing up the multiple impacts of conflict on women, children and men as well as on the infrastructure and environment. NGOs and civil society and women’s organizations have conflict resolution workshops, mediate between the security and the citizens, produce reports, and appeal to the courts. The government and its institutions generally disregard the work of the NGOs and CSOs and are suspicious of human rights organizations. They do not take the work of these organizations seriously and believe that most of these organizations have leftist ideological orientation (without necessarily sharing the violent objectives of the extremists) and, in some cases, they may even be

fronts for the extremists themselves. The political right argue that activists who critique security force actions are merely proxies for the militant extremists and demoralize the security forces. It is of utmost importance for the state officials and government policy to have a process of consultation with NGOs and civil society organizations, especially the larger peace initiatives and others. Civil society groups have condemned the violation of human rights by armed groups. They have consistently stood for a non-violent approach to resolving political issues. They have argued that all liberation movements must follow democratic and human rights practices and they examine any action for social change in the light of these practices. To address these conflicts, policies and perceptions will have to change radically. The wait and watch approach increases conflict intensity. The first step for conflict resolution is to identify the reasons for the conflicts holistically, from their root causes to the historical developments and the incidents that mark the turning points in the development of the conflicts. The grievances of the local people and the human rights violations will have to be addressed. Without justice being granted to the victims, recognition of those who are missing, closure of cases, and punishment of the guilty and compensation to families, it is difficult to win any lasting confidence. Negotiations are critical. Government reports admit this: ‘Negotiations have a definite ameliorative role under the circumstances; this is the experience the world over.’5 Yet in most cases negotiations with rebel groups are either yet to start or were started and put in cold storage. Some initiatives failed to keep old promises and yield the necessary result or, were very slow and got stuck on some point for ages, leading to a sense of frustration. As far as some groups go, the government has called for dialogue and asked them to give up violence and arms, which the Maoists have not accepted.6 International mediating groups have shown that it is important to negotiate with armed groups even when they do not lay down arms, in order to protect civilians. The Indian government plan includes the promotion of local resistance groups and for armed counter-

insurgency militia like the Salwa Judum. These kinds of forces increase the atmosphere of illegality, violence and extrajudicial killing and threat. The government articulates that their twin policy is security and development. This again shows that there is not going to be much change in the way armed conflicts will be dealt with. Glaring contradictions exist between what the government states and what it does and how it delivers.

The Way Out: Some Suggestions Practices of conflict resolution and the literature around it have shown that it is important to engage with armed groups in order to protect local populations and to remove socio-economic conditions that have led to alienation. This engagement increases the chance of a settlement process, whereas its absence strengthens hardliners. There is thus the need to think creatively, to create an environment for this engagement. Much remains to be done and the Indian government has in most cases failed to address the issues of alienation and injustice and to provide institutions for grievances to be redressed. In Kashmir, Assam and Manipur, for instance, the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act must be withdrawn as it is a symbol of militarization, of rights abuse and impunity. In Kashmir, local people feel that the number of military men have not been decreased because they keep a check on popular movements like the one against the Amarnath Shrine Board, more than on the insurgency. For a more proactive conflict resolution, negotiations and people-friendly development and autonomy should be given priority over law and order, which, of course, should be looked after. All cases where people have been declared missing must be urgently addressed. It is the responsibility of the government to bring a decent closure to them. This will have a positive psychological impact and help confidence building. The Salwa Judum and other vigilante groups like the special police officers should be disbanded and not be replicated in other states.

The home ministry should not support local resistance groups and appoint armed civilians as special police officers for counterinsurgency campaigns. The government must recognize the killings by the special police officers, Salwa Judum and other vigilante forces, the security forces and the insurgents and begin prosecution proceedings. Compensation should be given to relatives and rehabilitation of those affected should get priority. At present compensation is given only to those killed by insurgents. Many of the insurgencies in India, like the ones in Assam and several in Manipur, have lost their previous popularity and legitimacy. People in these regions are tired of the bomb attacks and landmines targetting innocent civilians, of paying double taxes and being held hostage to extortions and kidnapping, and of the daily insecurity. The degenerated insurgencies can be defeated by winning back legitimacy from the people and isolating the insurgents. In Kashmir, the huge presence of troops makes people feel that they are in occupied territory. People are ready to become stakeholders with the government, as the voter turnout in the successful 2008 Jammu and Kashmir assembly elections showed. However, this support to the government is incumbent on its ensuring human security, where priority is given not just to law and order and physical security, but also to economic security, human rights, security of identity and community rights and basic needs. Governance has to be based on human security and in consultation with local people through institutions. The sense of injustice that leads to alienation will have to be addressed. A holistic solution implies strong political, social, economic and psychological measures. The political measures would include steps like strengthening local institutions like the panchayati raj institutions and expanding the judicial system that delivers justice without delays. The central government should respect measures for autonomy proposed by the Jammu and Kashmir state legislature rather than overturning them as they did in 2000. All the Kashmirbased political parties have put forth different variations of this demand. The acceptance of such an interim solution will be the true test of democracy and commitment to the Kashmiri people. This is

not implausible. In its talks with the National Socialist Council of Nagalim, the body of the Naga tribes that fought long for independence, the Indian government has discussed solutions outside the currently framed Constitution. They have recognized the special history of the Naga people and the right of Nagas to live together, even though the Meiteis resist the break-up of the state. This has helped in the process of dialogue and the government must keep its commitments to the Nagas. With political will and realism, these two conflicts can be resolved. Local political society, political actors, women’s and civil society representatives must be part of negotiations. India has accepted Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 that mandate the participation of women in conflict resolution and peacemaking. The Manmohan Singh government appointed five working groups and round table commissions on Kashmir. The first group was on centrestate relations. Other groups were on confidence-building measures (CBMs), good governance, relations across the LoC and economic growth. Meetings were held in 2006 and 2008. But the popular perception in the Valley was one of scepticism as these groups consisted of leaders of mainstream parties and some nominees of New Delhi. The recommendations of these groups were seen as ‘political gimmickry’. The first group, marked by divergent views, failed to produce a report. Hardly any recommendations of the groups were implemented.7 Attention needs to be paid to governance as the Human Development Report on South Asia shows this region ‘as one of the most poorly governed regions in the world, with exclusion of the voiceless majority …’8 To address this, government institutions need to be inclusive and work with people, not over them. To assuage local opinion and build capacity for conflict resolution, the central government should not intervene in the electoral decisions of the state government (as they did in Kashmir for years). As stated before, local institutions of the judiciary and panchayati raj institutions should be accountable and deliver quick justice. The states’ human rights commissions should be given the teeth to make

their recommendations, including the right to inquire into alleged violations by the paramilitary and military, binding. The military and paramilitary should be gradually removed and replaced by a local police force that is accountable and sensitized. Social measures should include the delivery of health, education, justice and social inclusion. The government is dedicating large amount of funds to the conflict zones. It must ensure that there is continuous social auditing of these funds in order to make sure that they reach their targets and are not usurped by the local corrupt nexus. Land reform and resource reform has to be part of the economic agenda. Resource and land reform will change social and political relations and empower the poor. Their aim is to change access and tenure relationship. The need is to target the culture of exclusion so that the poor can get access to credit, technology and other productive services. Further the poor need to be part of the development process.9 These reforms are political processes and involve intervention in local power relations. The local elite nexus will resist and oppose these and there will be political and social backlashes from them. Consequently it can mean an initial increase in political dissent but it is important for long-term stability and social cohesion. Independent bodies for judicial inquiry need to be put in place. Police and judicial reforms that have been advocated by several government-appointed commissions should be implemented without delay. Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which India has ratified but not implemented, India’s national security laws contravene these conventions. Every terror attack leads to demands for fresh laws that violate the ICCPR, leading to more human rights violations and alienation. Anyone who raises the issue of human rights is promptly repressed or marginalized. Such oppression leads to serious questioning in civil society about the uneven nature of democracy in India and particularly the priority given for sustainable development of the rural areas and conflict zones.

The demilitarization of these areas, where sometimes there is one armed personnel for every ten persons, will also facilitate conflict resolution. The civil society in Kashmir has been calling for such a step for confidence building but with little success. Being constantly on the boil, any issue or rights violations in Kashmir leads to weeks of protests and resuscitation of the demands for independence. There seem to be contrary voices in government on the issue of demilitarization and use of army in conflict zones. Different ministers in the same government formation have taken contrary positions on Kashmir, the Northeast and on the Maoists. In short, the process of peace building should be seriously started. Talks with the leadership of these armed struggles should be put on fast track, local militia demobilized, and institutions of governance and democracy restored. The basis of peace building must be human security that is essentially based on the human rights approach and not merely packages and government handouts. At the moment these ideas may seem like a wish list. But the same was true for the Indian struggle for independence. Civil society will have to lead the way by vigorously combating national chauvinism and strengthening the forces of peace and justice. This is critical for national integration, social justice and a fully democratic India. There is no other way.

Not es Chapter 1 1. Uppsala Universitet, Conflict Data Program available at: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/links_faq/faq.htm 2. Jo Boyden, Jo de Berry, Thomas Feeny and Jason Hart, ‘Children Affected by Armed Conflict in South Asia: A Review of Trends and Issues Identified through Secondary Research,’ Refugee Centre Studies, Working Paper No. 7, Queen Elizabeth House, International Development Centre, University of Oxford, 2002. Available at: paper 7” http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/PDFS/working paper7. pdf 3. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1991, pp. 38–39. 4. Cynthia Enloe, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives, p. 3. 5. Cynthia Enloe, Does Khaki Become You? The Militarization of Women’s Lives. 6. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha Chenoy, Human Security Concept and Implications, p. 14.

Chapter 2 1. Christopher Cramer, ‘Inequality and Conflict: A Review of an Age Old Concern’, Programme Paper, Number 11, October 2005,

New York: UN Research Institute for Social Development, UN, 2005, p.1. 2. Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil War. 3. Paul Collier, ‘Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy’, in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (eds.), Turbulent Peace: the Challenges of Managing International Conflict, p. 155. 4. Ian Bannon and Marie C. Correia, The Other Half of Gender, Men’s Issues in Development, available at: \l‘PPP1,M1’ http://books.google.co.in/books? id=Dg_qI1j8MAAC&pg=PA181&lpg=PA181&dq=unemployed+young +men+and+conflict&source=web&ots=4Lj3dg9T_D&sig=Ofc0L1z6T Tr5xikiJoDYbtSSO1s&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=7&ct=r esult#PPP1,M1 5. David Keen, ‘A Rational Kind of Madness’, Oxford Development Studies, pp. 67–74. 6. Frances Stewart and Valpy Fitzgerald (eds.), War and Underdevelopment, Vol. I, Economic and Social Consequences of Conflict. 7. Paul Collier, ‘Economic Causes of Civil Conflict’, in Turbulent Peace: the Challenges of Managing International Conflict, (eds.) Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, p. 156. 8. Macartan Humphreys, Economics and Violent Conflict, available at: http://www.preventconflcit.org/portal/economics 9. Frances Stewart, ‘Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities’, Queen Elizabeth House, Working Paper, Series 33. 10. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha Chenoy, Human Security Concept and Implications, p. 147. 11. Indian Express, 23 October 2008. 12. Planning Commission, Government of India, ‘Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas’, Report of an Expert Group to the Planning Commission, April 2008, available at: http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/publications/rep_dce.pdf 13. Immanuel Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace, A Philosophical Sketch’, in I. Kant, Political Writings, translated and edited by Hans Reiss.

14. Amartya Sen, ‘Global Inequality and Persistent Conflicts’, Paper presented at the Nobel Peace Prize Symposium in Oslo. 15. Ted Gurr, ‘A Causal Modal of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices’, American Political Science Review, Vol 6, No., 4, 1968, pp. 1104–1124. 16. President Mahinda Rajapakse, Interview, 19 February 2008. At: http://www.lankanewspapers.com/news/2008/2/24892.html 17. President Mahinda Rajapakse, Interview, 2 September 2007. At: http://indiainteracts.com/columnist/2007/09/02/Tamil-aspirationsare-fine-but-Sinhala-votes-are-crucial-Rajapakse/ 18. Kanti Bajpai, ‘Human Security: Concept and Measurement’, The Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, Occasional Paper, 19, August 2000, 33 pages Available at http://www.nd.edu/~krocinst/ocpapers/op_19_1.PDF

Chapter 3 1. Sanjib Baruah, Durable Disorder: Understanding the Politics of Northeast India, p. 123. 2. Ram Narayan Kumar and Laxmi Murthy, Four Years of the Ceasefire Agreement Between the Government of India and the Naga Socialist Council of Nagalim: Promises and Pitfalls, A Report, New Delhi: Civil Society Initiative on the Naga Peace Process and The Other Media, 2002. 3. S.K. Chaube, Electoral Politics in North-East India, p. 63. 4. Authors’ interviews with women from the Naga underground, Nagaland and Manipur, March 2004. 5. Government of India, Report of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission: Capacity Building for Conflict Resolution, New Delhi, February 2008, p. 147. 6. Sanjib Baruah, India Against Itself—Assam and the Politics of Nationality, p. 43. 7. Dinesh Kotwal, ‘Insurgency in Assam: The Demographic Dimensions’, Strategic Digest, XXV, No. 2, May 2001, available at:

http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/683173_758077589_794965337.p df 8. Cited in Robert C. Cosselink, ‘Minority Rights and Ethnic Conflict in Assam, India’, Boston College Third World Law Journal, Vol. XIV, No. 1, Winter, 1994, p. 92. 9. Sanjib Baruah, India Against Itself, p. 112. 10. Assam Accord, 1985, available at: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/document s/papers/assam_accord_1985.htm 11. Monirul Hussain, ‘Terrorism in Post Colonial Assam’,The Eastern Anthropologist, Vol. 52, No. 1, January–March 1999, p. 22. 12. Lt. General V. K. Nayar, Threat from Within, p. 119. 13. Jaideep Saikia, Terror Sans Frontiers: Islamist Militancy in North-East India, p. 14. See also South Asia Terrorism portal, available at: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/terrorist_ outfits/ulfa.htm (accessed on 1January 2009) 14. National Campaign Committee Against Militarization and Repeal of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, Where Peacekeepers Have Declared War, A Report on Violations of Democratic Rights by Security Forces, New Delhi, April 1997, p. 50. 15. Udayon Misra, ‘ULFA: Beginning of the End’, Economic and Political Weekly, 26 December 2009, pp. 13–16. 16. Anindita Dasgupta, ‘Small Arms Proliferation in India’s NorthEast—a Case Study of Assam’, Economic and Political Weekly, 6 January 2001, pp. 59–65. 17. In July 1994, the northern parts of Barpeta district in lower Assam witnessed the massacre of non-Assamese Muslim peasants by a group of Bodo militants where mostly women and children were killed and many villages were reduced to ashes. 18. The Bodoland Territorial Accord, (2003) available at: http://cdpsindia.org/btc_accord.asp (accessed on 15 February 2009) 19. R.M. Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, pp. 143– 144. 20. Nyla Ali Khan (Granddaughter of Sheikh Abdullah), ‘Tearing the Valley’, Kashmir Times, 11 February 2007.

21. Yousuf Tarigami, (Member of the Kashmir Legislative Assembly), interview with authors, 18 September 2008. 22. These numbers are estimates that are commonly accepted. In the last two weeks of June 2010, for example, 8 people have been killed by security forces during street protests. 23. R.M. Jagmohan, Interview, Current, May 1990, quoted in Anuradha Bhasin Jamwal, ‘Prejudice in Paradise, II’, Kashmir Times, Jammu, 3 February 2005, p. 9. 24. Anuradha Bhasin Jamwal, ‘Prejudice in Paradise III’, Kashmir Times, 4 February 2005, p. 9. 25. Amnesty International, India, Punitive Use of Preventive Detention Legislation in Jammu and Kashmir, London: Amnesty International, AI Index: ASA 20/10/00, May 2000. Also, (Amnesty International, India, Abuse of Public Safety Act in Jammu and Kashmir, London, AI Index: ASA 20/13/00, (5 April 2000). 26. Alistair Lamb, Incomplete Partition: The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute 1947–1948, pp. 43–92. 27. Kashmir Study Group, Kashmir: A Way Forward, 2005, available at: http://www.kashmirstudygroup.net/ 28. Balraj Puri, ‘Jammu and Kashmir: The Issue of Regional Autonomy’, Economic and Political Weekly, 23 August 2008, pp. 8– 11. 29. Balraj Puri, Kashmir Insurgency and After, p. 23. 30. A.G. Noorani, ‘A Marriage is Arranged’, Dawn, (Pakistan), 15 November 2008. 31. Hindustan Times, 17 August 2008. 32. A. G. Noorani, Dawn, November 2008, op. cit. 33. Balraj Puri, Economic and Political Weekly, 23 August 2008, op.cit. 34. Kuldip Nayyar and Khushwant Singh, Tragedy of Punjab, Operation Blue Star and After, pp. 22–23. Also see, Amrik Singh (ed.), Punjab in Indian Politics, Issues and Trends. 35. Nayyar and Singh, Ibid., p. 25. 36. Ibid., p. 74. 37. Birinder Pal Singh, Violence as Political Discourse, p. 126.

38. Apurba Kundu, Militarism in India: The Army and Civil Society in Consensus, p. 173. 39. J.J.M. Pettigrew, The Sikhs of the Punjab: Unheard Voices of State and Guerrilla Violence. 40. Birinder Pal Singh, op. cit., p. 143. 41. 28th Report of the Commissioner of Scheduled Castes/ Scheduled Tribes, Government of India, New Delhi, 1988. 42. Total cases of violence in 1991 were 8,029; in 1999, it was 115,878; in 2000, it was 116,131. Government of India, National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Reports, New Delhi: Government of India, 1991, 1999–2000 and 2000–2001. 43. Planning Commission, Government of India, Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas, Report of an Expert Group to the Planning Commission, New Delhi: Government of India, April 2008, available at: http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/publications/rep_dce.pdf 44. Planning Commission, April 2008, op. cit. 45. Ibid, also Government of India, Report of the Expert Group on Prevention of Alienation of Tribal Land and its Restoration, New Delhi: Ministry of Rural Development, New Delhi, 2004. 46. Digvijay Singh, quoted in Economic Times, 14 May 2010; Nitish Kumar, quoted in Hindu, 17 February 2010. 47. Maoist ideas are available on the website: http://www.bannedthought.net/; See for example, Alpa Shah, ‘Annihilation is the Last Choice’, Interview with Gopalji, CPI (Maoist) Spokesperson, Economic and Political Weekly, 8 May 2010, Vol. XLV, No. 19: 24–28. 48. Interviews with Maoist sympathizers, op.cit. 49. Neelesh Mishra and Nagendra Sharma, ‘The Making of a Militant’, Hindustan Times, 4 July 2007, p. 11. 50. Neelesh Mishra and Nagendra Sharma, ‘Choking off Democracy in Jharkhand villages’, Hindustan Times, 10 July 2007. 51. Neelesh Mishra and Nagendra Sharma, ‘Sleeping on the Job? Blame Militants’, Hindustan Times, 3 July 2007. 52. Suhas Chakma, ‘Guns and Talks in India’s Wretched of the Earth’, Kashmir Times, 19 October 2004.

53.Arundhati Roy, ‘Walking With the Comrades’, Outlook, 29 March 2010: 24–59; and Gautam Navlakha, ‘Days and Nights in the Maoist Heartland’, Economic and Political Weekly, 17 April 2010. 54. Interviews with Maoist sympathizers and activists in Dantewada, Chhattisgarh, May 2006; in Jharkhand, May 2007. 55. Planning Commission, April 2008, op. cit. 56. Interviews with Maoist sympathizers, op. cit.; see also Nirmalangshu Mukherji, ‘Arms Over People’, Outlook, 19 May 2010, also available at: http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?265485 57. Kobad Ghandy, ‘Interview with Suvojit Bagchi’, BBC South Asia, 23 September 2008. 58. Nirmalangshu Mukherji, ‘Arms Over the People: What Have the Maoists Achieved in Dandakaranya?’ Economic and Political Weekly, 19 June 2010, pp. 16–20. 59. Arundhati Roy and Gautam Navlakha, op.cit. Also, Jan Myrdal, interview with CPI (M) leader Ganapathy, available at: http://ajadhind.wordpress.com/2010/04/09/jan-myrdal-interviewscpimaoist-leader-ganapathy/ (accessed on 18 May 2010) 60. Interviews with Maoists sympathizers and activists in Dantewada, Chhattisgarh, May 2006; in Jharkhand, May 2007. 61. Roy and Navlakha, op. cit. 62. Tapan Bose, ‘Kashmir: The Theatre of Militarization’, in Ranabir Samaddar (ed.), Cannons into Ploughshares: Militarization and Prospects for Peace in South Asia, p. 142. 63. Firdous Syed, ‘Identity Formation of Indian Muslims’, Hope, New Hope, Srinagar, April 2003, p. 3. 64. Archana Upadhyay, ‘Terrorism in the North East: Linkages and Implications,’ Economic and Political Weekly, 2 December 2006. 65. R.L. Kapur and Biswajit Sen, A Psychosocial Study of Alienation Amongst Indian Youth; and Shobna Sonpar, Violent Activism, A Psychosocial Study of Ex-Militants in Jammu and Kashmir. 66. Aditya Nigam, ‘The Rumour of Maoism’, Seminar, 607, March 2010: 75–81. 67. Ibid.

Chapter 4 1. Walter Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, in P. Demtz, (ed.), Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, p. 295. 2. For example, the government sanctioned Rs 96 crores in 2009– 2010 for Maoist-affected areas. 3. Home Secretary, Government of India, quoted in Times of India, 30 May 2010. 4. Bhagat Oinam, ‘Preparing for a Cohesive “Northeast”: Problems of Discourse’, in Sanjib Baruah (ed.), Beyond Counter-Insurgency: Breaking the Impasse in Northeast India, p. 171. 5. K.S. Subramanian, ‘Manipur Fiasco and the Crisis of Human Rights in the North-East’, Mainstream, 18 September 2004. 6. Nandini Sundar, ‘Bastar, Maoism and Salwa Judum’, Economic and Political Weekly, 22 July 2006, pp. 3187–3192. Official Bastar website: www.bastar.nic.in 7. Sanjib Baruah, Introduction, in Sanjib Baruah, Beyond Counterinsurgency, op. cit., p. 2. 8. Government of India, Response to Security Council, UN, CEDAW Committee, 37th session, 15 January–2 February, 2007. 9. Geneva Conventions, 39th Plenary Meetings, General Comment made by the Indian Delegation on Additional Protocols II of the Geneva Convention,.Available at: http://mail.google.com/mail? ui=1&view+att&th=11d7c372d822a87b&attid=0.1s&disp=v. 10. Ibid. 11. K.P.S. Gill (former Punjab director-general of police) quoted in Hindu, 7 November 2000. 12. E. N. Rammohan, quoted in Mail Today, 22 May 2010. 13. Mail Today, 22 May 2010. 14. Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 August 1998, London; similar figures are cited currently, Hindustan Times, 30 May 2010. 15. Hindustan Times, 30 May 2010. 16. K.S. Subramanian, Political Violence and the Police in India, p. 50; Madhav Godbole, Unfinished Innings, New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1996.

17. Maloy Krishna Dhar, Open Secrets, India’s Intelligence Unveiled, p. 353. 18. General K.V. Krishna Rao, PVSM, ‘The Genesis of Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir, and in the Northeast, and Future Prospects’, USI National Security Lectures, 1997, p. 22. 19. Hindustan Times, 5 May 2007. 20. Editorial, Sangai Express, 26 January 2000, p. 1 21. Statement by army personnel in a seminar organized by the army in Imphal on 23 February 2000, Sangai Express (Imphal), 24 February 2000. 22. Sangai Express, 26 January 2000, editorial, p. 1. 23. J.J.M. Pettigrew, The Sikhs of Punjab, op. cit., p. 140. 24. Times of India, 19 January 2003. 25.Ujjwal Kumar Singh, The State, Democracy and Anti-terror Laws in India, pp. 32–33. 26. Cited in Constituent Assembly Debates (Proceedings), Vol. IX, 5 September 1949; available at: http://164.100.47.134/newls/constituent/vol9p35a.html 27. Cited in Mathew Abraham, ‘India–An Overview’, in Andrew Harding and John Hatchard (eds.), Preventive Detention and Security Law: A Comparative Survey, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993, p. 60; Also see, S. R. Sharma, Encyclopedia of Constitution Law, pp. 24–25. 28. Articles 19 and 21, which provide right to freedom of speech and expression and right to life to the citizens of India, are also restricted by the clauses 3, 4 and 5 of Article 19(1). The state governments also have such powers. 29. H. R. Khanna, Making of India’s Constitution, p. 480. 30. Ujjwal Kumar Singh, ‘Penal Strategies and Political Resistance in Colonial and Independent India’, in Kalpana Kannabiran and Ranbir Singh (eds.), Challenging the Rules of Law: Colonialism, Criminology and Human Rights in India, p. 239. 31. ‘Black Laws Have No Place In Democratic Governance’, Statement of the Association of Indian Progressive Study Groups New York, 31 October 1997, available at: http://www.snsm.org.my/h_right/black.htm

32. Rajindar Sachar, ‘Human Rights in India—Different Facets’, Social Action, Vol. 21, April-June 2001, p. 105. 33. Amnesty International, India-Briefing on the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, 2005, available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA20/025/2005/en/domASA200252005en.pdf, Also see, South Asian Human Rights Documentation Centre, ‘Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act: A Study in National Security Tyranny’, available at: http://www.hrdc.net/sahrdc/resources/armed_forces.htm. 34. K.S. Subramanian, ‘Manipur Fiasco and the Crisis of Human Rights in the North East’, Mainstream, 18 September 2004. 35. Nandita Haksar, Armed Force (Special Powers) Act 1958—A Report on Human Rights Violations in North-East, at India International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights–Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, New York, March 1991, p. 3. In 1991, ninety-nine habeas corpus petitions were filed on behalf of the people arrested and tortured by the armed forces. The team of the Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights (CPDR) which visited Assam in February 1991 gathered information on 49 cases of torture, 13 cases of rape, 8 cases of extra judiciary executions, and 1 case of disappearance in army operations against the ULFA just a few months after Assam was declared a ‘disturbed area’ by the Central government. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Peoples Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR), ‘Armed Forces. Rule of Law and Democratic Rights’, Convention Papers, New Delhi: PUDR, September 1997. 39. Maloy Krishna Dhar, Open Secrets: India’s Intelligence Unveiled, p. 320. 40.Joe Sim and Steve Tombs, ‘State Talk, State Silence: Work and Violence in the UK’, Leo Panitch and Colin Leys (eds.), Violence Today: Actually Existing Barbarism, pp. 88–104. 41. Ibid. 42. Kashmir Times, 22 April 2007.

43. Hindustan Times, 5 May 2007. A popular Hindi film (Ab Tak Chappan) glorified such encounter killings. 44. Maloy Krishna Dhar, ‘In the Name of Law’, Hindustan Times, 30 May 2007. 45. Maloy Krishna Dhar, 2000, op.cit., p. 275. 46. Dhar, op. cit., Hindustan Times, 30 May 2007. 47. Indian Express, 10 May 2007. 48. It is reported that about eighty Maoist leaders have been killed in encounters between 2005 and 2009. The list is displayed on the South Asia Terrorism Portal, available at: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/data_sheets/ma oistleaderkilled.htm 49. Press Release, Coordination for Democratic Rights Organizations, available at: http://www.sacw.net/article1112.html, accessed on 30 May 2010. 50. The Committee for Coordination on Disappearances in Punjab (Chandigarh, Punjab), Documents, Chandigarh: December, 2000. 51. Indian Express, 31 May 2010. 52. The authors heard the testimonies of many parents and ‘half widows’ of the disappeared in Kashmir Valley on 20 and 21 February 2010, in Srinagar. These people complained that, despite huge efforts, they received no news about their sons/husbands. 53. Athar Parvaiz, ‘Human Rights: A Failing State Human Rights Commission, Spiraling Graph of Abuse’, Kashmir Times, 14 January 2008, p. 1. 54. For example, the Village Volunteer Force was one such force in the Northeast. 55. Wajahat Habibullah, ‘The Political Economy of Kashmir Conflict, II: Economic Dimensions of the Conflict’, Kashmir Times, 12 August 2004, p. 7, op. cit. The SOG had men like Mohammed Yousuf (Kuka) Parray who later used central government funding to form their own political party (the Jammu and Kashmir Awami League). 56. Anuradha Bhasin Jamwal and Arun Kumar Gupta, ‘Has Use of Surrendered Ultras as SPOs Been a Boon for Police?’ Kashmir Times, 12 December 2006.

57. Luv Puri, Militancy in Jammu and Kashmir: the Uncovered Face, p. 70. 58. Indian Express, 21 May 2008 59.Independent Citizens’ Initiative, ‘War in the Heart of India: An Enquiry into the Ground Situation in Dantewada District’, Chhattisgarh, 20 July 2006, p. 10. 60. Ibid., p. 12. 61. Public Interest Litigation filed in the Supreme Court of India in 2007 by Nandini Sundar, Ramachandra Guha, E.A.S. Sarma versus the State of Chhattisgarh. 62. Nandini Sundar, ‘Non-State Actors and the Rule of Law’, Hindu, 29 January 2008. 63. Government of India, Ministry of Home, Annual Report, 2005– 06, at: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/papers/Intern alSecurity05.pdf 64. Ibid. 65. Neelesh Mishra and Nagendra Sharma, ‘Citizens versus Militants: A Battle Gone Wrong’, Hindustan Times, 5 July 2007, p. 11. 66. Independent Citizens’ Initiative, op. cit. 67. The Statesman, 29 December 2006. 68. Nandini Sundar, ‘Non-State Actors and the Rule of Law’, Hindu, 29 January 2008. 69. Bihar chief minister Nitish Kumar and deputy chief minister Sushil Modi stated that they do not consider the Naxalites as criminals and dealt ‘sympathetically’ with them. Indian Express, 25 November 2008 and April 2010. 70. Indian Express, 27 October 2007, p. 1. 71. Kashmir Times, 28 October 2007. 72. Anuradha Bhasin Jamwal, ‘First Step to De-militarization’, Kashmir Times, 28 December 2006. 73. Outlook, 12 December 2005, available at http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?229503 (accessed on 1 June 2010.)

74. Sanjoy Hazarika, Stranger in the Mist: Tales of War and Peace from India’s Northeast, p. 190. 75. Dola Mitra, ‘The Umbrella Lady’, Outlook, 14 June 2010, pp. 37–38. 76. Northeast Peoples’ Initiative, Accords, Peace Processes and Prospects of Civil Society Peace Initiatives, Report of a Seminar organized by Northeast Peoples’ Initiative (NEPI), 2007. 77. Government of India, Report of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission: Capacity Building for Conflict Resolution, New Delhi: Government of India, February 2008, pp. 11–12. 78. Government of India, Planning Commission, Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas, Report of an Expert Group to the Planning Commission, New Delhi: Government of India, April 2008, available at: http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/publications/rep_dce.pdf 79. Ibid. 80. K.S. Subramanian, ‘Manipur Fiasco and the Crisis of Human Rights in the North-East’, Mainstream, 18 September 2004. Similar arguments are made by former civil servant Nari Rustomji, Enchanted Frontiers: Sikkim, Bhutan and India’s North-eastern Borderlands; M.K. Dhar, Open Secrets, India’s Intelligence Unveiled, op. cit.

Chapter 5 1. National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER), East India: Human Development Report, p. 98. 2. National Sample Survey, 55th Round, Government of India, 2004. 3. Wajahat Habibullah, ‘The Political Economy of Kashmir Conflict, II: Economic Dimensions of the Conflict’, Kashmir Times, 12 August 2004, p. 7. 4. Wajahat Habibullah, Ibid. 5. Bashir Assad, ‘Kashmir Economy: Progress and Current Scenario’, Kashmir Times, 22 August 2007.

6. Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, ‘Rape in Kashmir: A Crime of War’, London, May 1993; Also Michael Cranna (ed.), The True Cost of Conflict, p. 63. 7. Kashmir Times, 20 March 2007. 8. D. Bandyopadhyay, ‘Answers From History’, The Journal, Centre for Policy Analysis, Vol. 4, 15 May 2010, pp. 23–29. 9. Amit Bhaduri, ‘Killing Democracy in Defence of Democracy’, The Journal, Centre for Policy Analysis, Vol. 4, 15 May 2010, pp. 30– 35; K.B. Saxena, ‘A Wake Up Call’, The Journal, Centre for Policy Analysis, Vol. 4, 15 May 2010, pp. 16–22. 10. Government of India, Planning Commission, Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas, Report of an Expert Group to the Planning Commission, Government of India, April 2008, available at: http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/publications/rep_dce.pdf 11. Government of Chhattisgarh, Human Development Report of Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh, 2005, p. 10. 12. The only resistance has come from the Ministry of Environment because the forest cover that will be affected. Times of India, 7 June 2010. 13. The Orissa Jana Samilani has filed a Public Interest Litigation on this in the Supreme Court. The CAG Report also takes this up. Of the 598 mining leases given out by the state, 307 are in forest lands. They do not have the permission of the Forest Conservation Act (1980). 14. In 2000–01 India exported iron ore worth just Rs 358 crore. By 2008–09, this went up to Rs 21,725 crore, a sixtyfold jump in just seven years. The Lok Ayukta Report on Bellary mines, Karnataka, shows that even as price of extraction remained low, the profits increased. Which meant that the state government got a mere Rs 250 per tonne, while the contractor-politicians, who were given the mining lease, made a neat profit of Rs 1,073 per tonne. The Planning Commission Report on Mining (2006) suggested increase in royalty to 10 per cent. There was an attempt to implement this in 2009. A huge gap continues between profits and state government taxes. This is where the sleaze and politician–contractors nexus

takes place. This provides funds for the Maoists who are the closest watchers of these operations. See Shankar Raghuraman, ‘Iron’ic? Story of the Great Indian Loot’, Times of India, 5 June 2010. 15. Former chief minister Madhu Koda and his close aides received Rs 4,000 crore for just recommending mining leases during his two-year term, 2006–08, while the state exchequer got a total revenue of Rs 10,000 in nine years. 16. http://www.chhattisgarh.nic.in/govtpolicy/new%20english.hmt 17. Arun Kumar Agarwal, letter to Home Minister Chidambaram, May 2010, Countercurrents.org at: http://www.countercurrents.org/agrawal240510.htm (accessed 1 June 2010.) 18. Institute for Human Development, Food Security Atlas of Rural Bihar, Institute for Human Development, New Delhi, 2008. 19. Ibid., Planning Commission, 2008. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. Government of India, Capacity Building for Conflict Resolution, Second Administrative Reforms Commission, Seventh Report, February 2008. 23. Planning Commission, 2008; also Walter Fernandes, ‘The Human Cost of Development-Induced Displacement’, in India: Social Development Report 2008. 24. Government of India reports include: Report of the Policy Planning Division of the Ministry of Home Affairs, in 1960s; Manmohan Singh Committee relating to rural unrest in Bihar and Andhra Pradesh in mid-1980s; V.C. Pandey chaired Report on Naxalite Violence, late 1980s; Report of the Expert Group on Prevention of Alienation of Tribal Lands and its Restoration, in 2004, New Delhi: Ministry of Rural Development. 25. Government of India, Report of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission, Capacity Building for Conflict Resolution, New Delhi: Government of India, February 2008, p. 13. 26. Kashmir Times, 14 April 2008; and Bashir Assad, ‘Kashmir Economy: Progress and Current Scenario’, Kashmir Times, 22 August 2007; also available at

http://kashmirtimes.pressmart.com/blog/labels/srinagar.html (accessed 5 June 2010.) 27. The explosion set off by extremists at a five-million-litre petrol reservoir at Digboi Refinery, on 8 March 2003 in Tinsukia district, caused a huge loss of approximately Rs 200 million to the Indian Oil Corporation. In another attack, they damaged a gas pipeline facility at Kathalguri, in the same district, in a blast. 28. On 15 August 2004, a powerful IED planted by the extremists exploded at the venue of an Independence Day celebration at Dhemaji College ground in which sixteen innocent schoolchildren including nine girls were killed and forty people got serious injuries. 29. Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (a banned organization in Manipur) claimed responsibility for the killing of chief engineer of Loktak project in January 2000, for refusing to pay those taxes. 30. Government of India, Report of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission, op. cit., p. 148. 31. Neelesh Misra, ‘Manipur: Going, Going Gone’, Hindustan Times, 8 July 2007. 32. Sanjoy Hazarika, ‘Land of Conflict, Identity in India’s NorthEast: Negotiating the Future’, Futures, 36 (6–7), August-September, 2004, p. 773. 33. Hindustan Times, 5 November 2007. 34. Hazarika, ‘Land of Conflict, Identity in India’s North-East’, Futures, op. cit., p. 773 35. Interview with Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee by Rashme Sehgal in Kashmir Times, 19 August 2004, p. 7. 36. Outlook, 12 December 2005, available at: http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?229503 and.Kashmir Times, 19 August 2004, p. 7. 37. Neelesh Mishra and Nagendra Sharma, Hindustan Times, 2 July 2007, op.cit. 38. Indian Express, 22 May 2008. 39. UNLF of Manipur, on its 39th foundation day statement, published in Sangai Express, 28 November 2003. 40. Ibid.

41.North-Eastern Development Finance Corporation, Project Report on Bandhs in Assam, New Delhi: NEDFC, 1999. 42. Ibid. 43. Sanjoy Hazarika, Strangers of the Mist, op. cit.; Ved Marwah, Uncivil Wars, Pathology of Terrorism in India, pp. 224–316. 44. Praveen Swami, ‘Murder Probe Exposes Protection Racket’, Hindu, 13 July 2004, p. 9. 45. In 2003, Rs 2,657,440 was looted. In 2002, Rs 3,55,965 was looted. Praveen Swami, ‘How Taxpayers Subsidize Terror’, Hindu, 13 July 2004. 46. The Economic Times, 27 August 2006. 47. Neelesh Mishra and Nagendra Sharma, Hindustan Times, 2 July 2007, op. cit. 48. Sanjay Ojha, ‘Centre, State Collude in Corporate War’, Times of India, 5 June 2010. 49. Interview with authors, Chhattisgarh May–June 2006, and Jharkhand, June 2007. 50. Hindu, 2 December 2007. 51. Government of India, Report of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission, 2008, op. cit., p. 31. 52. In 2009–10, India’s defence allocation was Rs 1,41,703 crore. 53. Kashmir Times, 20 March 2007. 54. N.N. Vohra, former defence secretary, 26 August 1996, quoted in Pavan Nair, ‘An Evaluation of India’s Defence Expenditure’, Economic and Political Weekly, 19 December 2009, p. 40. 55. Neelesh Mishra and Nagendar Sharma, Hindustan Times, 2 July 2007, op. cit. 56. Neelesh Mishra and Nagendar Sharma, ibid. 57. Neelesh Misra, Hindustan Times, 8 July 2007, op. cit. 58. Neelesh Mishra and Nagendar Sharma, Hindustan Times, 2 July 2007, op. cit.

Chapter 6

1. Headlines from the Sangai Express, 2003: 10 October, ‘Meira Paibis stage dharna’; 23 October, ‘Naga bodies condemn rape of girl by NSCK (K) cadre’; 5 and 6 November, ‘Election minister’s 12-yearold daughter kidnapped’; 7 November, ‘Kuki Mothers appeal for child’s release’; 13 November, ‘Cold-blooded murder of kidnapped child: Curfew imposed indefinitely’; 8 November, ‘10 cadres of PREPAK killed in underground clashes’; 22 November, ‘Women’s bodies decry underground clashes, calls for unity’; ‘… . Students sit in, Roads blocked … .’ 2. South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre (SAHRDC), Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Developments in Indian and International Law, p. 40. 3 P.M. Bakshi, The Constitution of India, p. 34. 4. Interviews with officers in Akhnoor, Jammu and Kashmir, 2005. 5. Kamal Mitra Chenoy, ‘Human Rights Violations in Jammu & Kashmir—A Report’, Social Action, Vol. 51, April-June, 2001, pp. 192–209; also see Sushobha Barve, ‘Kashmir: The Moral Dimension’, Communalism Combat, January–February, 2002, p. 24. Even after the ceasefire there were over 4,000 militancy-related incidents between November 2002 and February 2004. Syed Nazakat, ‘Valley Under Fire’, 13 March 2004. 6. Kamal Mitra Chenoy, ‘Human Rights Violations in Jammu & Kashmir—A Report’, Social Action, 2001, op. cit., pp. 192–209. Indian sources cite 40,000 dead and the Hurriyat cites 100,000. In 2003 alone 3,000 people were killed. ‘Special Report Kashmir’, The Economist, 14–20 February 2004, p. 21. 7. Asian Centre for Human Rights, Report on Assam, 2005, available at: http://www.achrweb.org/reports/india/AR05/assam.htm (accessed on 1 June, 2010.) 8. Indian Express, 22 July 2007. 9. Hindu, 12 January 2007; Times of India, 19 May 2010; South Asia Terrorism Portal. 10. Independent Citizens’ Initiative, ‘War in the Heart of India: An Enquiry into the Ground Situation in Dantewada District’, Chhattisgarh, 20 July 2006, p. 10.

11. Nandini Sundar,‘Out of Sight,Out of Mind’,Hindustan Times, 22 November 2007. Also Indian Express, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/take-jobs-not-guns-to-naxalareas-sc/419968. 12. Michael Cranna (ed.), The True Cost of Conflict, p. 61. 13. ‘Special Report Kashmir’, The Economist, 14–20 February 2004, p. 21, and interview with Parveena Ahangar, Chairperson of the Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons (APDP), 21 February 2010. 14. Angana P. Chatterji, Parvez Imroz, Gautam Navlakha, Zahirud-Din, Mihir Desai and Khurram Parvez, Buried Evidence: Unknown, Unmarked, and Mass Graves in Indian-administered Kashmir: A Report, International People’s Tribunal on Human Rights and Justice, December 2009. Available at www.kashmirprocess.org 15. The authors met many of the parents and wives of the disappeared at an Independent People’s Tribunal in Srinagar, Kashmir, 20–21 February 2010. See also Asiya Jeelani’s article in Kashmir Times, 22 April 2004, p. 7. Asiya was killed in an IED landmine blast during the elections in 2004. 16. Manab Adikar Sangram Samiti (MASS), Where All They Have Gone?—A Report of Some of Disappearance Cases in Assam. MASS has documented some cases of EID during the phase 1991– 97. Bipul Nazir, Prafulla Gogoi, Salil Das Rudra, Deka Surbarna Konwar, Pradip Barua, Biswajit Bora, Putul Medhi, Charan Sing Bordoloi, Hiranya Barua, Hamen Nath, Mohan Nath, Biplab Gohain, Kiran Chaharia, Pintu Saikia, Kula Gogoi, Abhijit Kalita, Purna Kachari and Padum Nath are some such select cases from amongst scores that have come to public notice in recent years. 17. As in Anantnag in April 2000. 18. Independent Citizens’ Initiative, War in the Heart of India, An Enquiry into the Ground Situation in Dantewada District. op. cit. 19. Kashmir Times, 22 April 2007. 20. Indian Express, 13 January 2009 21. People’s Union for Democratic Rights, available at: www.pudr.org 22. Reports in Hindu and Kashmir Times, 3 May to 10 June 2010.

23. Moloy Krishna Dhar, ‘In the name of Law’, Hindustan Times, 30 May 2007; E.N. Rammohan, interview in Tehelka with Shoma Chaudhury, available at: http://www.tehelka.com/story_main45.asp? filename=Ne120610bringing_on.asp (accessed on 10 June 2010.) 24. Athar Parvaiz, ‘Erosion of Education Under the Shadow of Conflict’, Kashmir Times, 28 November 2007. 25. Women’s Initiative, The Green of the Valley is Khaki: Women’s Testimonies from Kashmir. 26. Kashmir Times, 12 January 2005. 27. Hindu, 24 March 1993. 28. National Commission for the Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR), Report of Fact-finding Visit, 17–19 December 2007, to Dantewada (Chhattisgarh) and Khammam (Andhra Pradesh), to Assess the Status of Children’s Health and Education in the Situation of Civil Unrest in Dantewada district, New Delhi, 2007. 29. Neelesh Mishra and Nagendra Sharma, ‘Citizens Versus Militants: A Battle Gone Wrong’, Hindustan Times, 5 July 2007. 30. Ibid. 31. Anoop Saha, ‘The Myths of Salwa Judum’, Kashmir Times, 29 September 2007. 32. Ibid. 33. Sarwar Kashani, Idress Kanth and Gowhar Fazili, The Impact of Violence on the Student Community in Kashmir, Oxfam (India) Trust, p. 36. 34. Yasmin Ali, ‘Victims of Violence’, Hope, New Hope, (Srinagar) Vol. 1, No. 2, March-April 2000, p. 3. 35. A.G. Madhosh, Women and Children in Armed Conflict in Kashmir; Also Bashir Ahmed Dabla, Impact of Conflict Situation on Children and Women in Kashmir. 36. Kashmir Times, 24 November 1990. 37. Kashmir Times, 29 November 1990. 38. Kashmir Times, 24 May 2008. 39. Kashmir Times, 10 January 2008. 40. Human Rights Watch Press Release: India: All Sides Using Children in Chhattisgarh Conflict, Rehabilitate Children in Armed Groups, New York, September 5, 2008, available at: ‘Dangerous

Duty: Children and the Chhattisgarh Conflict,’http://hrw.org/reports/2008/naxalite0908/naxalite0908web.p df] 41. The National Commission for the Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) 2007, op. cit. 42. Interviews by author, Imphal, Manipur, September 2008. 43. Human Rights Watch Press Release, 2008, op. cit. 44. Ibid. 45. Jo Boyden et al, ‘Children Affected by Armed Conflict in South Asia: A Review of Trends and Issues Identified through Secondary Research’, available at http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/PDFs/workingpaper7.pdf (accessed on 7 December 2008.) 46. Dr. K.S. Subramanian, ‘Human Rights of Children Affected by Armed Conflict in India: Analysis and Policy’. 47. E-Pao News, available at: http://epao.net/epRelatedNews.asp?heading=16&src=191108 48. Voluntary Health Association of India, A Report, New Delhi, 1998, mimeo. 49. Athar Parvaiz, ‘Impact of Kashmir Conflict on Health and Health Care’, Kashmir Times, 18 December 2007; and Athar Parvaiz, ‘Human Rights: A Failing State Human Rights Commission, Spiraling Graph of Abuse’, Kashmir Times, 14 January 2008. 50. Human Rights Watch report, quoted in Athar Parvaiz, Kashmir Times, 28 November 2007. 51. Editorial, Kashmir Times, 18 December 2007. 52. Ibid. 53. D.K. Basu vs. State of West Bengal and others; AIR 1997, SC 3047. 54. Ashok Aggarwal, In Search of Vanished Blood, the Writ of Habeas Corpus in Jammu and Kashmir: 1900–2004, p. 18. 55. Ibid. p.18. 56. Ibid. p.146. 57. Testimonies of victims to the Independent People’s Tribunal, Human Rights Violations in Kashmir, 2010, Interim Report, 20–21 February, Srinagar.

58. Planning Commission, Development Challenges, 2008, op.cit. 59. Kamal Mitra Chenoy, ‘Human Rights Violations in Jammu & Kashmir—A Report’, Social Action, 2001, op. cit. 60. Shekhar Gupta, ‘India-Pakistan Relations: On a Short Fuse’, India Today, 15 March 1994. 61. Kashmir Times, 14 January 2008. 62. Ibid. 63. Ibid. 64. Times of India, 1 January 1995. 65. Ibid. 66. Indian Express, 8 October 2007. 67. Neelesh Mishra and Nagendra Sharma, Hindustan Times, 2 July 2007, p. 1. 68. Indian Express, 20 May 2007. 69. Ramachandra Guha, ‘A History of Abuse’, Hindustan Times, 27 May 2008. 70.The Centre for Science and Environment, The State of India’s Environment, 1984–5: The Second Citizens’ Report. 71. The Centre for Science and Environment, ‘Rich Lands, Poor People: Is Sustainable Mining Possible?’ The State of the Environment: The Sixth Citizens’ Report. 72. Interview with Yusuf Tarigami, Member of the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly, 1 September 2008. 73. Balraj Puri, ‘Jammu and Kashmir: The Issue of Regional Autonomy’, Economic and Political Weekly, 23 August 2008, pp. 8– 11. 74. Kashmir Times, editorial 18 December 2007. 75. Kashmir Times, 28 October 2007. 76. Development Challenges in Extremist-Affected Areas, Report of an Expert Group, Planning Commission, Government of India, 2008, New Delhi, p. 8., available at: planningcommission.nic.in/reports/publications/rep_dce.pdf 77. Ibid. 78. Government of India, Report of the Expert Group on Prevention of Alienation of Tribal Land and its Restoration, New Delhi: Ministry of Rural Development, 2004.

79. Joe Sim and Steve Tombs, ‘State Talk, State Silence: Work and Violence in the UK’, in Violence Today by Leo Panitch and Colin Leys (eds.), pp. 88–104.

Chapter 7 1. R.W. Connell, Gender and Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics, p. 140. 2. Ibid. p. 140. 3. Statement of United Liberation Front (UNLF), Manipur, Sangai Express, (Manipur), 23 November 2003. 4. Tribune, 23 October 2001. 5. Tribune, 1 November 2001. 6. Kalpana Kannabiran, Volga and Vasanth Kannabiran, ‘Negotiating Peace: Feminist Reflections’, in Paula Banerjee (ed.), Women in Peace Politics, pp. 185. 7. Survey and interviews in Manipur with the authors and team in April–May 2005. 8. Quoted in ‘Stress, Psychological Trauma Taking Heavy Toll in Kashmir’, Kashmir Times, 21 June 2001, p. 8. 9. Renuka Dagar, Gender Violence: Construction of Masculinities, Report, Chandigarh: Institute of Development and Communication, 2003, p. 5 onwards. 10. A Kashmiri slogan in the 1990s was ‘Marde mujahid, jag zara ab, Vakt shahadt aya hai’ (Manly warrior, now rise, the time has come for martyrdom). Rita Manchanda, ‘Guns and Burqa: Women in the Kashmir Conflict’, in Rita Manchanda (ed.), Women, War and Peace in South Asia, pp. 42–101. 11. Tribune, 7 July 1999. 12. Yasin Malik, leader of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), interview with authors, May 2005 13. Times of India, 17 June 2010. 14. Nagaland Post, 16 July 2004. 15. Vasanth Kannabiran, Volga, Kalpana Kannabiran, ‘Andhra Pradesh: Women’s Rights and Naxalite Groups’, Economic and

Political Weekly, 6 November 2004, available at: http://naxalrevolution.blogspot.com/2006/10/from-epw-archivesandhra-pradesh-womens.html 16. Ibid. 17. K. Ajitha, ‘Being a Naxalite Woman’, Week, 11 June 2006. 18. Krishna Bandyopadhyay, ‘Naxalbari Politics: A Feminist Narrative’, Economic and Political Weekly, 5 April 2008, p. 54. 19. Kannabiran, et al., ‘Andhra Pradesh: Women’s Rights and Naxalite Groups’, 2004, op. cit. 20. K. Bimola Devi, The Educated Elite Women in Manipur, p. 10. 21. Sophia Rajkumari, ‘Equal Status a Rhetoric’, Sangai Express (Imphal, Manipur), 10 September 2003. 22. Lucy T.V. Zehol, ‘The Tangkhul Women Today’, in Lucy Zehol (ed.), Women in Naga Society, pp. 20–29. 23. The Tangkhuls are the second largest among the Naga tribes of Manipur. 24. Zehol, op.cit., p. 2. 25. Sophia Rajkumari, 10 September 2003, op.cit. 26. Report of Naga Mothers’ Association Workshop, 6 October 1994. Documents of the Naga Mothers’ Association (NMA) 6th General Assembly, Dimapur, Nagaland, 15–16 September 1998, p. 55. 27. Kshama Kaul, ‘A Pandit Story’, in Urvashi Butalia (ed.), Speaking Peace: Women’s Voices from Kashmir pp. 185–186. 28. Interviews conducted by authors with their team in Nagaland and Manipur, December 2003. 29. Roshmi Goswami, ‘Reinforcing Subordination, An Analysis of Women in Armed Conflict Situations’, available at: http//www.Isis/ Women in Action/Table of Contents 3:1999/Focus: Women, Peace and Justice. 30. Sangai Express, 11 November 2002. 31. Sangai Express, 11 October 1999, p. 1. 32. Interviews conducted by authors with their team in Nagaland and Manipur, December 2003; Sangai Express, 11 November 2002. 33. Hindustan Times, 10 September 2000. 34. Times of India, 25 February 1999.

35. Reuters News Agency, 29 August 2001. 36. Kashmir Times, 20 January 2004. 37. Dang, op. cit., pp. 72–76, 145. 38. Inderjit Sing Jaijee, Politics of Genocide: Punjab 1984–1998, p. 176; Also Reports on Human Rights Violations, prepared by the Jammu and Kashmir Human Rights Awareness and Documentation Centre, Srinagar, 1993, 1994; Amnesty International Report 2000; India: Punitive Use of Preventive Detention Legislation in Jammu and Kashmir, Amnesty International, AI Index: ASA 20/10/2000, May 2000. 39. Independent Citizens’ Initiative, ‘War in the Heart of India: An Enquiry into the Ground Situation in Dantewada District’, Chhattisgarh, 20 July 2006, p. 10. 40. Ibid. See also, Nandini Sundar, ‘The Trophies of Operation’, Outlook, 5 July 2010, pp. 22–23. 41. Interviews with victims and relatives of women raped in Konan Poshpura and Shopian by authors during Independent People’s Tribunal, 20–21 February 2010, Srinagar. 42. Independent Citizens’ Initiative, op. cit., 2006. 43. The Nagaland Post (Kohima), 16 July 2004. 44. Sundar, ‘The Trophies of Operation’, Outlook, 5 July 2010. 45. Interview with Kulsum by Asiya Jeelani, ‘An Era of Silence’, Kashmir Times (Jammu), 24 April 2004, p. 7. 46. Talk with author, Srinagar, Kashmir, 21 February 2010. 47. Pardeep Kalla, ‘Turmoil Turns Lolab Village Into Land of Widows’, Kashmir Times, 14 July 2004, p. 1. 48. It has been estimated that Punjab had half a million females less than it should have in the age group of 0–6 years during this period. 49. Sex determination and abortion clinics advertised on their billboards: ‘Why Pay More Later? When We Can Help Now!’ 50. Interviews with authors, 2004. 51. Sophia Rajkumari, 10 September 2003, op. cit. 52. Interviews conducted by the authors and their team with women cadres in Nagaland and Manipur. December 2003.

53. Interviews conducted by authors and their team in Nagaland and Manipur. December 2003. 54. Ibid. 55. Roshmi Goswami, ‘An Analysis of Women in Armed Conflict Situations’, Women in Action, Vol. 3, 1999. 56. Kashmir Times, 21 June 2001. 57. Brahma Chellany, ‘An Eye-witness Account’, Annexure-F, in Kuldip Nayyar and Khushwant Singh, op. cit., pp. 160–166; also Inderjit Sing Jaijee, op. cit., p. 176. 58. Hind Samachar, 22 January 1987; also Satyapal Dang, Genesis of Terrorism, An Analytical Study of Punjab Terrorists, pp. 72–76. 59. Pardeep Kalla, 14 July 2004, op. cit. We heard similar testimonies in 2010. 60. Survey of Half-widows, Save the Children Fund, UK, in Tehelka, 6 March 2004, p. 27. 61. Independent People’s Tribunal, Srinagar, February, 2010 62. Interviews of authors with Meira Paibis, Manipur, December 2003. 63. Tribune, 19 June 1987. 64. Interviews with authors, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh 2007; also Shruba Mukherjee, Women Cadres of the PWG: Conflict Mongers or Managers, Wiscomp Discussion Paper 2, New Delhi: WISCOMP, 2002, pp. 5–20 65. Interview of authors with Aphy and Martha, deputy secretary, National Socialist Women’s Organization of Nagaland (NSWN), March 2004. 66. Interview of authors and team with Martha and Aphy, deputy secretary, NSWN, March 2004. See also, Khatoli Khala, The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act and its Impact on Women in Nagaland, New Delhi: Wiscomp Perspectives, 2003, p. 33 67. Interview of authors and team with Toto and Mary, sergeant majors, NSWN, March 2004. 68. Ibid. 69. Revolutionary People’s Front Newsletter, Imphal, Manipur, Vol. 1, Issue 3, July 1998, p. 1.

70. Ibid. 71. Interview of authors and team with Y.S. Salm, Chairperson, NSWN, March 2004, Dimapur, Nagaland. 72. Ibid. 73. Ibid. 74. Ibid. 75. Ibid. 76. Ibid. 77. Rupa Barua, who joined ULFA in 1991, married a fellow cadre in 1997 and had a baby from him. She escaped from the outfit’s main camp from Bhutan in 2001. 78. Ibid. 79. Dang, op. cit., pp. 72–76. 80. Dang, op. cit., p. 145 81. Shiraz Sidhva, ‘Dukhtaran-e-Millat: Profile of a Militant Fundamentalist Women’s Organization’, in Kamla Bhasin, Ritu Menon and Nighat S. Khan, Against All Odds, pp. 123–131. 82. Ibid. p.127. 83. Ashima Kaul, ‘Her Master’s Voice’, Hindustan Times, 29 October 2003. 84. Women’s Initiative, 1994, op. cit., p. 1. 85. Harinder Baweja, ‘Living by the Gun’, Seminar, No. 398, October 1992, p. 30. 86. Girija Dhar, Interview with Ashima Kaul Bhatia, Times of India (New Delhi), 7 July 2000. 87. Interviews conducted by authors in Nagaland and Manipur, December 2003. 88. Roshmi Goswami, 1999, op. cit. 89. Quoted in Shruba Mukherji, 2002, op. cit., p. 11. 90. Interviews conducted by authors in Nagaland and Manipur, December 2003.

Chapter 8

1. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks, pp. 260– 263. 2. Joseph A Buttigieg, ‘Gramsci on Civil Society’, Boundary, 2, Vol. 22, No. 3, Autumn, 1995, pp. 1–32; Partha Chatterjee, ‘Democracy and Political Transformation in India’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 43, No. 16, 19–25 April 2008. 3. Partha Chatterjee, The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World. 4. P. Chidambaram, Interview on NDTV, 17 May 2010. 5. Outlook magazine, April to June 2010 issues. 6. Members of the Ao tribe have told us that the NSCN does not accept their criticisms. 7. Interviews with Hameeda Nayeem, English Department, Kashmir University, Srinagar, September 2007 and February 2010. 8. Institute of Kashmir Studies, Unabated Arson and Agony in Kashmir, A Report on Arson and Agony inflicted by Army and B.S.F. in Kashmir during the month of May, 1993, Srinagar, 1993. 9. Kashmir Times, 13 September 2007. 10. Pakistan–India Forum for Peace and Democracy, available at: http://www.pipfpd.org/ (accessed 1 June 2010). The authors have been founder-members of this group. 11. Hindustan Times, 22 July 2007. 12. Himanshu Kumar (noted Gandhian activist), ‘Who is the Problem? The Maoists or the Indian State?’ The Movement of India, October-December, 2009, pp. 5–7. 13. Neelesh Mishra and Nagendra Sharma, ‘The Making of a Militant’, Hindustan Times, 4 July 2007, p. 11. 14. Himanshu Kumar, ‘Who is the Problem? The Maoists or the Indian State?’, op. cit. 15. Indian Express, 11 June 2008. 16. Ibid. 17. Siddharth Varadarajan, ‘A Lessen in Statecraft, From Nepal to India’, Hindu, 25 April 2008. 18. Neelesh Mishra and Nagendra Sharma, ‘The Making of a Militant’, op. cit.

19. Nandini Sundar, Ramachandra Guha et al., Writ Petition to the Supreme Court, Order, 19 September 2008. 20. Indian Express, 10 June 2008. 21. Ibid. 22. Committee of Concerned Citizens, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, ‘Negotiating Peace: Peace Talks Between Government of Andhra Pradesh and the Naxalite Parties’, Hyderabad, December 2006. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. K. Balagopal, ‘Maoist Movement in Andhra Pradesh’, Combat Law, Vol. 1. Issue 1, January 2010, pp. 8–12. 26. See for example, Displacement Juggernaut, Case Studies from States, Delhi Forum, 2008; Independent People’s Tribunal, Development, Displacement and Repression in Jharkhand Today, Report, Indian Social Action Forum, 2009. 27. Protecting the Killers: A Policy of Impunity in Punjab: 1984– 1995, A Report, Ensaaf, Punjab, 2007, available at: lib.ohchr.org/ …/UPR/…/ENS_IND_UPR_S1_2008anx_PunjabImpunity.pdf, (accessed on 20 June 2010.). 28. Ibid. 29. Asian Age, 19 October 2007. 30. Sanjoy Ghose, ‘Civil Society in North East’, Mainstream, 7 June 1997, p. 34. 31. Tribune, 28 May 2005. 32. Sangai Express, 19 February 2000, p. 2. 33. Manjusri Chakri-Sircar, Feminism in a Traditional Society: Women of the Manipur Valley. 34. Sangai Express, 4 January 2003. 35. Interviews conducted by authors with their team in Nagaland and Manipur, December 2003. 36. ‘Introduction’, Collection of Documents of Naga Mothers’ (NMA) 6th General Assembly: Nagaland, 15–16 September 1998. 37. ‘Observation of NMA Mourning Day’, 5 August 1994; op. cit, p. 58.

38. Memorandum submitted to Governor of Nagaland and Lt. General K.L. Seth, April 1995, op. cit, pp. 48–49. 39. ‘A Call from the Mothers of the Land’, 25 May 1995, Kohima, op.cit, p. 46. 40. Speech of Neiduono Angami, President, NMA, 2 October 1995. 41. Resolution of the Executive Committee of the Naga Mothers’ Association, Dimapur, 14 September 1996, in Documents of the Naga Mothers’ Association (NMA) 6th General Assembly, Dimapur, Nagaland, 15–16 September 1998, p. 36. 42. Interview of authors with Neiduono Angami, former president and advisor, Naga Mothers’ Association, 16 June 2004. 43. Ibid. 44. Monalisa Chankija-Longkumer, ‘A General Look at Naga Society—Women’s View’, Naga Peoples Movement for Human Rights, Conference on Human Rights, official report, Kohima, 2–3 November 1990, p. 24. 45. Rita Manchanda, We Do More Because We Can: Naga Women in the Peace Process. 46. Ibid. 47. Interviews conducted by authors with their team in Nagaland and Manipur, December 2003. 48. Sangai Express, 18 February 2003. 49. Sangai Express, 26 January 2003, p. 1. 50. Girija Dhar, Interview with Ashima Kaul Bhatia, Times of India, 7 July 2000. 51. Sarwar Kashani, Idress Kanth and Gowhar Fazili, The Impact of Violence on the Student Community in Kashmir, p. 31. 52. Anhad works with youth in Kashmir, website: http://www.anhadin.net/; Women for Security and Conflict Management for Peace (WISCOMP) works with women in Kashmir, http://www.wiscomp.org/ (accessed 1 June 2010). 53. Nomita Khongtabatam, Interview with Chingdinliu, social worker and activist, Manipur, Sangai Express, 19 December 1999, p. 6.

Chapter 9 1. Government of India, Report of the National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector, Chairman, Arjun Sengupta, New Delhi, 2004. 2. Government of India, Report of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission: Capacity Building for Conflict Resolution, New Delhi: Government of India, February 2008, p. 13. 3. Ibid., p. 12. 4. Ibid., p. 23. 5. Government of India, Administrative Reforms Report, 2008, op cit., p. 23. 6. Ibid. 7. Kashmir Times, 14 April 2008. 8. Human Development in South Asia, 1999, ‘The Crisis of Governance’, New Delhi: Oxford, 1999, p. 3. 9. D. Bandyopadhyay, ‘Answers From History’, The Journal, Centre for Policy Analysis, Volume 4, 15 May 2010, pp. 23–29.

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I ndex Abdullah, Farooq, 46 Abdullah, Sheikh, 44–46, 110, 117 died, 46 house arrest of, 46 ActionAid, 231 Adams, Brad, 229 Adivasi Cobra militants, 128 Administrative Reforms Commission, 113, 247 Agarwal, Arun, 120 Aggarwal, Ashok, 166 Ahangar, Parveena, 219 Ajay, T.G., 163, 223 Ajitha, K., 187, 200 Akal Takht, 207 Akali Dal, 53, 55, 110 Akbar Hydari Agreement, 110 All Assam Gana Sangam Parishad (AAGSP), 39 All Assam Student’s Union (AASU), 39 All Bodo Students Union (ABSU), 42 All India Sikh Federation, 54 All Manipur Students Union, 235 All Manipur Working Journalists’ Union (AMWJU), 163 All Santhal Cobra Force, 42 Amarnath Shrine Board, 52, 250 Ambedkar, Bhim Rao, 81 Amnesty International, 49, 146, 147, 160, 225 Anandpur Sahib Resolution, 54 Andrabi, Asiya, 192 Angami, Neiduono, 237 Anhad, 240

Anti-Naxalite operations, 94, 106, 134 fake encounter deaths in, 94–95 Antony, A.K., 108 Armed Conflict/insurgencies, causes of, 2–3, 12–28 comparative assessment of, 64–71 conceptualization of women in, 186–187 condition of children in, 155–156 custodial killings in, 144 deaths in, 143 defined, 1–3 and demand for self-determination, 2, 19, 32–34, 37, 39, 44, 45, 49, 52, 64, 75, 216, 219, 245 and displacements, 121–122 Planning Commission report on, 122 and economic inequality relationship, 12 and economic life, 116–118 in Kashmir, 117 in Northeast, 116–117 environmental degradation by, 173–175 by troops in Siachen, 173 in Northeast, 175 factionalism in, 68 failure of habeas corpus in, 165–167 forces deployment in, 77 gendered dimensions of, 6 genesis of, 5 Geneva Conventions description of, 2 greed and grievance models, 9–16 problems with, 13–14 holistic explanations of, 20–21 and human rights violations in, 2, 27, 30, 34, 52, 65, 99, 112, 138, 139, 142, 164, 167, 169–173, 176, 177, 216, 219, 229, 233, 237, 243, 244, 247, 249, 254 human security approach to, 21–27 issues in, 23–26 and issue of national security, 3–4 impact on, health, 164–165 intellectuals, 162–164 in India, 29–72 and Africa, 65

government position on, 76–77 government denial to, 75 nature of, 30–62 origin of, 29–30 layered mechanisms for, 77 local support to, 67 masculinity dimension of, 181–186 in Manipur and Nagaland, 182–184 models of, 9–28 multiple dimensions of, 71–72 and phenomenon of the ‘missing’, 145–146 political economy of, 6, 115–137 recruitments in, 66 and refugees, 149–150 resolution of, 6–7 as resource wars, 10 role of, civil society in, 27, 214–244 media in, 232–233 women in, 180–213, 239 women’s organizations in, 239–242 root causes of, 244–245 rural distress by, 119–122 source of, 69–71 state response to, 5–6, 73–114 as terrorism, 19–20 theoretical models of, 5 Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (1958), 33, 35–37, 39, 43, 67, 80, 82, 87– 91, 104, 168, 177, 191, 193, 221, 230, 234, 236, 238, 250 Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (1958, amended in 1973), 37 Armed Forces Special Powers Ordinance (AFSPO) of 1942, 82, 87 Assam Accord of 1985, 39, 110 Assam Disturbed Areas Act, 33, 35 Assam Maintenance of Public Order (Autonomous District) Act, 33, 35 Assam Official Language Act, 38 Assam, 15, 30, 31, 33–35, 38–43, 63, 69, 82, 87, 90, 93, 100, 109, 116, 119, 125, 128, 129, 143, 146, 150, 152, 163, 168, 189, 196, 230–231, 250, 251 cause of conflict in, 37–42 crime rates against women, 196 ethnic massacre in 1983, 39 immigrants in, 39

as land frontier of Bengal, 38 sub-nationalism in, 38 Association of Parents of Missing Persons, 240 Association of the Parents of the Disappeared (APDP), 219 Azad Kashmir Movement, 220 Balagopal, 209 Bandyopadhyay, D., 118 Bandyopadhyay, Krishna, 187, 200 Banerjee, Mamata, 109, 110 Bangladesh War, 83 Barua, Jahnu, 231 Barua, Paresh, 40, 41 Baruah, Sanjib, 38, 39, 75 Begum, Shamshad, 207 Benjamin, Walter, 73 Bharadwaj, Sudha, 163 Bhasin, Anuradha, 48 Bhat, Maqbool, 47 Bhat, Nizamuddin, 147 Bhindranwala, Jarnail Singh, 54 Bhutto, Benazir, 50 Bidwai, Praful, 104 Birsa Commando Force, 42 Bodo Accord of 2004, 31 Bodo Liberation Tiger Front, 42 Bodo Militancy, 42–43 and demand of Bodoland, 42 objective of, 42–43 strands to, 42 Bodoland Army, 42 Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC), 42 Bordoloi, Lachit, 231 Burnwal, Shailendra Singh, 60, 105 Campaign for Peace and Justice in Chhattisgarh (CPJC), 222 Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), 52, 95, 229 Central Government Funds, 127, 133–136 for anti-Naxalite operations, 134 for defence, 133–136 dependence on, 133–136 for Jammu and Kashmir, 134–135

Centre for Science and Environment, 174 Chandrakala, Singu, 200 Chanu, Sharmila, 234 Chaudhury, Sasha, 41 Chhattisgarh, 6 2, 7 7, 8 9, 94, 101–106, 119–121, 132, 144, 146, 148, 152, 154, 158–163, 171–173, 216, 221–225, 228, 232 displacement of tribal from, 154–155 encounters in, 94 ‘Red’ and ‘Saffron’ armies in, 104 tribal IDPs of, 152–155 Chhattisgarh Public Security Act, 89 Chhattisgarh Special Powers Security Act (CSPSA), 104 Chidambaram, P., 216 Children in conflict areas, as combatants, 160 impact of gun culture on, 159 in Jammu and Kashmir, 156 Joseph Gathia Committee Report on, 156–158 Madhosh’s study on, 156 number affected in, 161 in Nagaland, 159–160 Civil Society, 6–8, 15, 26–28, 42, 72, 76, 97, 102, 110, 111, 120, 171, 199, 214–244, 247, 248, 252, 254 in Chhattisgarh, 222–223 in Kashmir Conflict, 218–221 in Maoist areas, 221–228 in the Northeast, 229–232 during Punjab conflict, 228–229 and its role, 6, 214–243, 247–249 as watchdog, 218 with us or against us thesis for, 217 women’s role in, 232–239 Clausewitz’s argument, 10 Collective punishment, 171–173 Collier, Paul, 9–13, 15 Committee of Concerned Citizens, 226, 227 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 162 Communist Party of India (Maoists), 57, 109, 110, 200, 227 Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist), 83, 226, 227 Conflict resolution, 11–12, 20, 67, 217, 230, 232, 234, 243, 244–254 role of international mediating groups, 249

role of negotiations in, 249 some suggestions for, 11–12, 249–254 steps for, 248–249 Conflict triangle, 18 Connell’s argument, 180–181 Contractor–transporter–extremist nexus, 132 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 162 Counter-insurgency tactics, 78–80 Crackdowns, 92, 142, 147 definition of, 92 a human rights violation, 147 use of, 92 Crammer, 19 Dagar, Renuka, 184 Dalam guerilla squads, 60 Dandakarnya Samachar (Chhattisgarh), 232 Dantewada, 77, 101, 103, 120, 152, 159, 223, 225 adivasis rally in, 223 Maoist attacks on CRPF in, 77, 216 Daoga, Dima Halim, 231 Defence of India Ordinance, 1962, 83 Defence of India Rules (DIR) (1962), 83, 84 repeal of, 83, 84 Defense of India Act, 81 Degenerated insurgencies, 69, 131, 251 Democratic peace, 17 Devi, A. Mema, 203 Devi, Thangjam Manorma, 193, 235 rape and killing of, 193, 235 Dhar, Girija, 208, 240 Dhar, M.K., 91, 93 Directive Principles of State Policy, 140 Disturbed Areas Act (1955), 80, 81 Drabu, Haseeb, 175 Duggal, V.K.S., 106 Dukhtaran-e-Millat, 192, 206 Easterly, William, 9, 10 Encounter killings, 62, 78, 92–97, 102, 147–149, 176, 226, 227 in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, 94

in Kupwara, 148 in Northeast, 93 in other countries, 96–97 in Punjab, 95 police logic for, 93 reasons of, 147 reported cases of, 94–95 as state policy, 96 of two businessmen in Connaught Place, 96 Enforced disappearances, 95, 97, 145–146, 177, 197, 225 Ensaaf, 229 Essential Services Maintenance Act (ESMA), 84 Farooq, Mirwaiz, 68 Fitzgerald, Valpy, 9, 11 Gaddar, 182 Galtung, John, 18 Ganai, Khurshid Ahmad, 134 Gandhi, Indira, 46, 53, 55, 228 assassination of, 55, 228 massacre of Sikhs after, 228 Gandhi, Mahatma, 122, 128 Gandhi, Rajiv, 39 Geneva Conventions, 2, 75 Ghandy, Anuradha, 188, 207 Ghandy, Kobad, 61, 65 Ghose, Sanjoy, 230 Ghuman, Jatinder Singh, 199 Gilani, Syed Ali Shah, 68 Gill, K.P.S., 103, 229 Godbole, Madhav, 78 Gorkha National Liberation Front, 111 Goswami, Indira Raisom, 231 Government–industry nexus, 119 Gramsci, 214 Guha, Ramachandra, 173, 224 Gujral, I.K., 135 Gurr, Ted, 19 Guru, A.A. (Dr), 162

Habibullah, Wajahat, 117 Haksar, Nandita, 90 Half widows, 97, 145, 197, 198, 219 Hazarika, 126 Hegel, 214 Hegemonic peace model, 18 Hizbul Mujahideen, 47, 50, 130, 192, 207, 217 Hoeffler, Anke, 11 Human Rights Commissions, 96, 99, 112, 138, 141, 147, 169, 177, 178, 222, 247, 253 Human Rights Watch, 147, 158, 160, 164, 225, 229 Humphreys, Macartan, 12 Hurriyat Conference, 49, 52, 218–220 Ikwans, 144 Independent Citizens’ Initiative, 143 Indian Constitution, 32, 40, 45, 57, 58, 80–82, 86, 89, 139, 140, 165, 220 Article 14, 83 Article 19, 81 Article 21, 81, 139, 165 Article 22 (clauses 1–7), 81 Article 351, 32 Article 359 (1), 82 Article 370, 45, 190, 220 Fifth Schedule , 57, 119 sixth schedule of, 43, 119 Indian Federation of Working Journalists (IFWJ), 223 Indira Gandhi–Sheikh Abdullah Accord of 1975, 46 Institute for Conflict Management, 231 Institute for Development and Communication, 195 Insurgency funding, 124–133 in Assam, 128 in Kashmir, 130–131 in Manipur, 125–126, 129 in Maoist-influence areas, 131 in Northeast, 125 sources of, 124–133 Internally displaced persons (IDPs), 102, 149, 152, 153, 155 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 146, 225 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 139

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 88, 139, 253, 254 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 139 International Peace Academy, 10 J&K Mahila Sehyog Mandal, 241 Jagdalpur rally, 221–222 Jagmohan, 48 Jaish-e-Mohammed, 50 Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), 47, 49, 68, 69, 219 Jan Adalat, 60–61 Janatanam Sarkar (JS), 60 Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM), 110 Jogi, Ajit, 105, 224 Kaldor, Mary, 19 Kannabiran, K.G., 163, 226 Kannabiran, Kalpana, 163, 186 Kant, Immanuel, 17, 28 Kantian argument, 17 three components of, 17 Kanyadan scheme, 202 Kargil War, 49, 174, 185 Karma, Mahendra, 101, 153 Kashmir, alienation in, 53 Amnesty International report on, 49 autonomy proposal for, 22, 45–46, 51 beginning of militancy in, 47–48 decree on women, 192 displacement of Pundits from, 48 government expenditure on security in, 118 migrations from, 117–118 movement for ‘Azadi’ began, 47 muslim alienation in, 48 new forms of movements in, 52 Pakistan’s claim on, 44–45 purdah wave in, 192 rise in psychiatric cases in, 164 situation of widows in, 197–198 solutions offered for, 50 three wars in, 49

Kashmir Accord, 110 Kashmir Council for Human Rights, 117 Kashmir Mass Movement (KMM), 207 Kashmir Permanent Residence Status (Disqualification) Bill 2004, 190 Kashmir Times, 232 Kashmiri militants, 3, 63, 71, 125 Pakistani support to, 3, 63 Kashmiri Pundits, 48, 150–151, 165, 217 forced migration of, 48, 150–151, 165, 217 Kaur, Bhag, 205 Kaur, Gurwinder, 205 Keen, David, 11 Khalistan movement, 30, 54, 55, 63, 68, 84, 125, 145, 192, 195, 205–206 women’s role in, 205–206 Khalra, Jaswant Singh, 163, 229 Khalsa, Bimal, 199 Khan, Nyla Ali, 46 Khaplang, S.S., 34 Khawateen-e-Markaz (KEM), 206 Kishenji, 65 Konan Poshpura rape case, 193, 194 Krantikari Adivasi Mahila Sangathan (KAMS), 187–188 Kulsum, victim of rape, 194 Kumar, Himanshu, 163, 222 Kumar, Nitish, 58 Kunjam, Manish, 224 Lashkar-e-Taiba, 50 Leishiyar Tangkhul Women’s Society, 236 Liberal Peace concept, 9, 17–18 critiques of, 17 exclusions in, 17 Locke, 214 Look East Policy, 130 Low-intensity conflict, 79, 141, 178, 179 LTTE, 199 Madras Suppression of Disturbance Act (1948), 81 Mahanta, Prafulla Kumar, 40 Maharaja Hari Singh, 44

Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), 122, 128 Mai Bhago Regiment, 205 Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) 1971, 80, 83–84 Malik , Yasin, 47, 185, 219 Manab Adhikar Sangram Samiti (MASS), 239 Manchanda, Rita, 238 Mandela, Nelson, 19 Manipur, 7, 30–38, 64, 68–71, 74, 79, 89, 92, 93, 109, 116, 119, 125–129, 135, 138, 142, 150–152, 159, 163, 167, 181–195, 202, 203, 208, 217, 230– 242, 250, 251 a failed state, 38 Meitei underground groups in, 37 minorities in, 151–152 multiple conflicts in, 36 Nagas and Kukis conflict in, 37 violence against women, 195 Manipur Agreement of 1949, 37 Manipur Nupi Kanglup (AKMIL), 234 Maoism, 58, 226, 233 Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), 57 Maoist conflicts (movement), 14, 56–62, 64, 65, 73, 199, 208, 221, 233, 245 activities of, 59–60 attack on CRPF, 216 development activities of, 61 ideology of, 58–60 increase in, 57 local support to, 61–62 location of, 65 in Nepal, 14, 19, 199 organizational structure of, 60 root cause for, 57–58, 65 and Salwa Judum, confrontation between, 152–154 women cadres of , 201 Marwah, Ved, 109 Marxism, 58 Masih, A.B. (Major-General), 170 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), 164–165, 225 Mehraj-ud-Din (Dr), 162 Meira Paibis, 202, 218, 234–236 attack on, 235

multiple roles of, 235–236 protest against rape of Manorma, 235 Migrant Women’s Association, 198 Mir, Ghulam Hassan, 108 Mishra, Ranganath (Justice), 86 Mizo Accord, 1986, 31, 110 Mizoram, 1, 30, 31, 43, 230 militarization in, 43 Mokokchung firing, 236 Mufti, Mehbooba, 207, 241 Mufti, Sayeed, 108, 241 Muivah, Thuengaling, 31, 34, 36, 109, 235 Musharraf, 108, 182 Nadimarg violence, 220 Naga Hoho, 218, 230, 236, 240 Naga Mothers’ association (NMA), 159, 218, 230, 234, 236–238 campaigns of, 236 peace-building efforts of, 237 role as ‘objective forces’, 237 Naga movement, 14, 32–36, 235–237 causes of, 34–36 demands of, 33–34 peace mission of, 33–34 Naga National Council (NNC), 33 Naga Peoples Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR), 230, 237, 239 Naga Students’ Federation (NSF), 239 Naga Women’s Union, 237 Naga–Kuki clashes, 152 Nagaland, 30–37, 82, 93, 119, 126, 127, 181, 182, 190, 191, 195, 202, 208, 230, 235, 236, 238 encounter killings in, 93 formation of, 33, 34 issue of a Greater Nagaland, 36, 37, 235 parallel governments of the NSCN in, 35 talks with Government of India, 36 under the AFSPA, 36 Nagalim, 31, 203, 251 Naga–Meitei hostility, 36 National Commission for Enterprises, 245 National Commission for the Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR), 152, 159

National Conference, 46, 47, 51, 52, 108 National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), 42, 111, 128, 231 National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), 86–88, 94, 106, 112, 138, 171, 224, 229, 236 National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT–NB), 111 National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 103, 122, 128 National Security Amendment Act, 84 National Security Laws, 24, 73, 75, 79, 80, 89, 110, 140, 191, 233, 254 National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), 31, 34–36, 64, 109, 111, 126, 202, 218, 230, 235, 237, 240 peace negotiations with, 111 National Socialist Council of Nagalim, 31, 251 Nationalist Socialist Women’s Organization (NSWN), 202 Naxalites, 30, 56–57, 83, 94, 102, 104, 105, 107, 122, 144, 153, 158, ‘172, 187, 223–225, 227 government policy to deal with, 107 and Naxal infected areas, 57 Nayeem, Hameeda, 219 Nayyar, Kuldip, 53 Nehru, B.K., 52 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 45 Nellie massacre, 152 Netam, Ram Vichar, 172 North East Coordination Committee on Human Rights (NECOHR), 239 North East Minority Front (NEMF), 152 Northeast, 1, 3, 7, 29–32, 37, 43–44, 64, 66, 70, 74, 79, 98, 101, 108, 110, 115–117, 125–130, 133, 141–143, 156, 159, 161, 163, 166, 168, 170, 173– 177, 190–191, 199, 205, 210, 229–232, 239, 244, 254 armed resistance in, 30–32 civil society initiatives in, 229–232 colonial discourse on, 74 common features of insurgencies in, 43–44 human rights violations in , 170 illegal trade with neighbouring countries, 130 killing of journalists in, 163 lowest per capita income in, 116 militarization of, 141 peace negotiations in, 110–111 poor ecological management in, 116, 173 rural unemployment in, 116–117 sexual violence in, 190–191

use of ‘strategic hamletting’ in, 101 women as militant, 205, 210 Northeast People’s Forum (NEPF), 230 NSCN (I-M), 31, 34–36, 111, 126, 218, 240 NSCN (K), 31, 34–36, 111 Nupi Lan movement, 188 Oinam, Bhagat, 74 Operation Bajrang, 90, 168 Operation Blue Star, 55, 196, 207 Operation Green Hunt, 78 Operation Rhino, 90, 168 Pakistan–India Forum for Peace and Democracy, 221 Panun Kashmir movement, 241 Parrey, A.Q. (Justice), 169 Patel, Vallabhbhai, 81 Patil, Shivraj, 120 Patkar, Medha, 163, 217 Peasantry, five-pronged attack on, 118–119 People’s Committee Against Police Atrocities (PCAPA), 109 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 37, 203 People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA), 132 People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), 37 People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), 102, 223, 229 People’s United Liberation Front (PULF), 152 People’s War Group (PWG), 57, 144, 200, 226 Peoples Revolutionary Guerrilla Army (PLGA), 60 Pettigrew, 79 Phizo, Angami Zapu, 33 Plato , 10 Politician-militant nexus, 108–110, 127 in Jharkhand, 110 in Kashmir, 108 in Northeast, 108–109 in West Bengal, 109–110 Posco Pratirodh Sangram Samiti, 228 Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) 2002, 35, 87 provision of, 87 Preventive Detention Act (PDA), 80–83 Proclamation of Emergency, 80, 81, 83–85

Professor Haragopal, 226 Protection money, 130 Protection of Human Rights Act (PHRA), 1993, 88, 112, 140 Psychological operations, 78 Public Safety Act, 49, 80, 88, 145 Pundir, Sudhir Kumar, 130 Punjab Security of State Act, 1953, 89 Punjab, 1, 3, 29–32, 53–56, 64, 65, 69, 70, 79, 84, 85, 103, 110, 114, 115, 125, 145, 161, 163, 182, 184, 194–196, 199, 205–208, 211, 212, 228–229, 244 activities of civil society in, 228–229 agitation for a Punjabi Suba in, 53 army operation in, 55 causes of militancy in, 54–55 conflict in, 53 decline of sex ratio in, 195 female foeticide in, 195 Khalistan agitation in, 30, 54, 55, 63, 68, 84, 125, 145, 192, 195, 205–206 President’s Rule in, 56 Sikh separatism in, 54 trail of bloodshed in, 56 Violence against women in, 194–196 women militants in, 205–208 Puri, Balraj, 51, 175 Quit India Movement, 82, 87 Radical theory, 19 Rajapakse, 22 Rajiv–Longowal Accord, 110 Rajkhowa, Arabinda, 40, 41 Rajkumari, Sophia, 195 Rammohan, E.N., 76, 77 report on Dantewada, 77 Rao, Koteshwar, 65 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), 105 Rath, Gauri Shankar, 132 Rebeiro, Julio, 93 Red Flag, 57 Reddy, Sai, 223 Rehman, Sadaqat, 184, 196

Resource curse, 10, 137 Roy, Arundhati, 163, 217 Sachs, Jeffrey, 10 Saha, Anoop, 154, 224 Sahay, Subodh Kant, 109 Sahoo, Abhay, 228 Sail, Rajender, 223 Salahuddin, Syed, 47 Salwa Judum, 101–107, 119, 142, 144, 146, 148, 152–154, 158, 160, 171, 172, 177, 193, 216, 221–225, 249, 250 in Chhattisgarh, 106 excesses of, 224–225 government support to, 104–105 industries support to, 105 launch of, 101 mode of operation, 102–103 opposition to, 106–107 people killed by, 144 violation of human rights by, 224 Sangai Express, 232 Sangham (Maoist-band), 60, 102, 146, 160 Sankaran, R.S., 226 Sant Longowal, 55, 63 Sarpvinash Operation, 100 Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820, 213, 252 Sen, Amartya, 17 Sen, Binayak (Dr), 102, 104, 163, 222 arrest of, 102, 222 Sengupta, Arjun, 245 Shah Commission, 53 Shah, G.M., 47 Sheikh Sohrabuddin Case, 96 Shillong Accord of 1975, 31, 33, 110 Shopian case, 52, 170, 193 Sim and Tombs, 91 Singh, Deepti, 222 Singh, Digvijay, 58 Singh, Ibobi, 109, 127 Singh, J.J., 127 Singh, Khushwant, 53

Singh, Manmohan, 41, 73, 231, 252 Singh, Raman, 101, 216, 225 Singh, Swaran, 46 Singh, Yumnam Joykumar, 127 Sinha, S.K., 108 Soren, Shibu, 110 South Asia Human Rights Forum, 221 Special Operation Group (SOG), 98, 146, 147, 175 Special police officers (SPOs), 97–98, 100, 101, 103, 146, 148, 149, 153, 154, 160, 161, 177, 194, 250 in Assam, 100–101 in Jammu and Kashmir, 98–99 terror of, 98–99 Srinivasavardhan, T.C.A., 78 Stewart model, 15 Stewart, Francis, 9, 12, 15 Strategic hamletting, 101 Subramanian, K.S., 74 Sundar, Nandini, 74, 163, 193, 194, 217, 221, 224 Surrendered United Liberation Front of Assam (SULFA), 41, 101, 125, 177 Swami Agnivesh, 227 Swami, I.D., 239 Swu, Isaac C., 34 Taliban, 63 Tangkhul Shanao Long, 236 Tarigami, Yousuf, 46 Terran, Mrinay, 111 Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Ordinance, 84 Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) 1985, 35, 80, 84– 87, 89, 145 demand for repeal of, 86 provisions of, 85 Tribal alienation, 123, 137 Tripura, 30, 43, 82, 111, 119 problem of Bengali migration, 43 tribal insurgency in, 43 UN General Assembly, 177 UN Human Rights Committee, 86, 88, 89 Unified Command Structure (UCS), 90

United Committee, Manipur (UCM), 239 United Islamic Liberation Army (UILA), 152 United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), 31, 35, 40–41, 90, 100, 101, 109, 125, 177, 217, 230, 231 activities of, 41 aim of, 40 hostility to the outsiders, 40–42 United National Liberation Front, 37, 129 United NGO Mission Manipur, 231 Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, 58, 80–90 Uppsala University Conflict Data Program, 1 Varadarajan, Siddharth, 224 Victimized staste, 176 Village defence committees (VDCs), 99–100 support to, 100 Violent deaths, 142–144 during crackdowns, 147 in Kashmir, 142–143 Vohra, N.N., 78 Wanchoo, H.N., 217 WISCOMP, 240 Women, abuse in conflict area, 190–194 as civil society activists, 233–239 changing roles of, 211–212 as combatants, 199–212 dress code for, 191–192 during Indian Partition, 211 during Khalistan movement, 192–193, 205, 206 in Manipuri society, 188–189 in Maoist Naxalite movement, 199–202 in Nagaland, 189 as peacemakers, 233–239 as relatives of combatants, 208–212 recruitment in People’s War Group, 200 restrictions on, 191–191 role and status in Kashmir, 189–190 as victim-heroines, 199 as victims in conflict areas, 193–194

violence against during war, 194–198 Women cadres, 61, 124, 186, 187, 195, 200–204, 207–209 controlled autonomy of, 209 functions of, 203 in Kashmir, 206–207 in Khalistan Commando Force, 205–206 in Nagaland and Manipur, 202–203 in Northeast, 205 World Bank, 10 Young Mizo Association, 230

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First published by Penguin Books India 2010 This Collection Published by 2018 Copyright © Anuradha M. Chenoy and Kamal A. Mitra Chenoy 2010 The moral right of the author has been asserted ISBN: 978-0-143-41556-5 This digital edition published in 2018. e-ISBN: 978-9-387-62523-5 This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, resold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher’s prior written consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser and without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and the above-mentioned publisher of this book.