Mao and the Cultural Revolution: Battling for China's Future [3] 1623201551, 9781623201555

Citation preview

Mao and the Cultural Revolution

Blank Page

Mao and the Cultural Revolution

Volume 3

Battling for China’s Future

Hu Angang

Published by Enrich Professional Publishing, Inc. Suite 208 Davies Pacific Center 841 Bishop Street Honolulu, HI, 96813 Website: www.enrichprofessional.com A Member of Enrich Culture Group Limited Hong Kong Head Office: Unit A, 17/F, 78 Hung To Road, Kwun Tong, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China China Office: Rm 309, Building A, Central Valley, 16 Haidian Middle Street, Haidian District, Beijing, China Singapore Office: 16L, Enterprise Road, Singapore 627660 Trademarks: SILKROAD PRESS and related trade dress are trademarks or registered trademarks of Enrich Professional Publishing, Inc. and/or its affiliates in the United States and other countries, and may not be used without written permission. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners. © 2017 by Enrich Professional Publishing, Inc. With the title Mao and the Cultural Revolution Volume 3: Battling for China’s Future Edited by Barbara Cao, Glenn Griffith, and H. Y. Poon All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without prior written permission from the Publisher. ISBN (Hardback) ISBN (pdf)

978-1-62320-155-5 978-1-62320-156-2

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional service. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought.

Contents Chapter 6 The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang .................... 1

Qing (1973-1976)

The 10th National Congress of the CPC and the Rise of Wang Hongwen............... 2 Mao Zedong Promoted Deng Xiaoping to Important Positions................................ 21 Attacks against Lin Biao, Confucius, and Zhou Enlai................................................. 28 Political Struggles at the 4th National People’s Congress.......................................... 68 Deng Xiaoping’s Overall Restoration of Order, and Political Fights ....................... 97 with Jiang Qing Critique of Tale of the Marshes and the Campaign against........................................... 131 Deng Xiaoping and the Rightist Tendency Death of Zhou Enlai and the Tiananmen Square Incident ......................................... 148 Mao Zedong’s Last Words and Death............................................................................ 190 The Political Challenge and the Demise of Jiang Qing............................................... 200

Chapter 7 Remarks on the Cultural Revolution................................................. 229 Mao Zedong’s Comments on the Cultural Revolution and Related......................... 233 Historical Remarks Economic Evaluation of the Cultural Revolution........................................................ 238 Social Assessment of the Cultural Revolution.............................................................. 255 Mao Zedong’s Chinese Social Ideals and Economic Reform..................................... 270 China’s International Status............................................................................................ 284 Political Remarks on the Cultural Revolution.............................................................. 288 The Systemic Root Causes of Mao Zedong’s Errors in His Later Years.................... 296 Deng Xiaoping’s Success Following Mao Zedong’s Failure....................................... 317

Postscript ................................................................................................................ 329 Appendix ................................................................................................................ 337 Bibliography ................................................................................................................. 349 Index

................................................................................................................. 365

Blank Page

6

Chapter

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973–1976)

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

The third period of the Cultural Revolution lasted from the 10th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1973 to October 1976. During that period, the moderates in the CPC, led by Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, and the Gang of Four, led by Jiang Qing, underwent a fierce, complex struggle. Mao promoted Wang Hongwen and placed him in important positions; Mao also endorsed Jiang Qing’s campaign of criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius in order to attack Zhou. In view of stability and unity, Mao convened the 4th National People’s Congress, in which Zhou and Deng presided over the State Council. Mao criticized the Gang of Four; however, he also resisted Deng’s attempts to remedy the errors of the Cultural Revolution. Under pressure from Mao Yuanxin, Mao Zedong launched a campaign to criticize Deng Xiaoping and the rightist tendency of whitewashing and overturning past convictions. After Zhou’s death, Mao chosen Hua Guofeng — a beneficiary of the Cultural Revolution — as the acting premier. Indignant at the attacks against Zhou and Deng, the masses launched a large-scale protest, which developed into the April 5 Incident. As a consequence, Mao removed all Deng’s official positions. After Mao’s death, Jiang Qing challenged Hua Guofeng; Hua, Ye Jianying, and others arrested the Gang of Four and brought an end to the 10-year Cultural Revolution.

The 10th National Congress of the CPC and the Rise of Wang Hongwen When the 10th National Congress of the CPC was convened in August 1973, Mao Zedong was approaching his 80s and was very weak and ill. He was left with only two options, which would lead to significantly different political outcomes. One was to terminate the Cultural Revolution and leave the political stage. Mao’s retirement would benefit both himself and China. The other option was to serve another term as chairman of the Central Committee of the CPC and maintain his “philosophy of struggle“ against the new political opponents that he himself had created (Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping) and also against his advanced age and poor physical and mental condition, which would do neither China nor himself good. Mao then considered establishing the Central Consultative Committee, which would have consisted most of the old party officials and be chaired by himself. This was an innovative political concept that Deng Xiaoping had proposed to Mao, and Mao attached great importance to it. However, owing to strong opposition

2

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

from Zhou Enlai and others, this plan was dismissed.1 The Central Committee of the CPC allowed Mao to remain as chairman, yet denied Mao’s possibility of choosing at the first place. Zhou and others had to pay a personal price for this; the Cultural Revolution lasted for another three years and did not end until Mao’s death. By choosing to act as director rather than chairman of the Central Consultative Committee at the 12th National Congress of the CPC in 1982, Deng was well aware of China’s supreme leaders’ life long tenure demerits.2 Deng thus developed his own individual political concept and distinguished himself from Mao. That proved to be a wise move. However, in 1982, nine years been elapsed since Deng first proposed his innovative idea. The Central Committee of the CPC issued the Notice on Convening the Preliminary Meeting for the 10th National Congress of the CPC on August 8, 1973. The notice demanded that all delegation groups attending the congress should hold preliminary meetings to discuss the Report on the 10th National CPC Congress, Report on Amendments to the CPC Constitution and Draft of the Amended CPC Constitution and 1.

Zhou Enlai stated that Deng Xiaoping had declared some old party officials lacked the

physical capacity to properly engage in their work. Chairman Mao paid considerable attention to Deng’s proposal. Mao proposed establishing the Central Consultative Committee, which would be made up of mostly older officials. No such system had previously existed in the CPC. Mao said that he wished to be chairman of the

committee, but that faced a general objections. However, Mao was completely serious in what he said: he planned to take on that role. Mao said that he definitely wanted to

become involved in the work of the committee — not simply as a consultant but toke

responsibility for an active role. When facing oppositions, Mao however said that he

might as well remain the chairman of the CPC Central Committee and devote the rest

of his life to that. (Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1666.) 2.

Deng Xiaoping said that the Central Consultative Committee was a new institution

established to meet the current circumstances of the CPC and that it was a new means of transferring power in the central leadership from the older to the younger generation

with the older retired officials involved. The Central Consultative Committee was in

a sense a transitional organization. Deng said that it was a fundamental necessity for the nation and the party to establish a retirement system. Soon after the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, Deng recognized the necessity of revoking

the life tenure of the party and state leadership and acknowledged that many other countries had a better policy than that of China. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, 5.)

3

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

to study the documents related to the Criticizing Lin and Rectification campaign in preparation for the official convening of the 10th National Congress of the CPC. On August 19, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau to discuss the list of members and alternate members for both the 10th Central Committee of the CPC and the Political Bureau. The next day, another meeting concerning the Political Bureau was held with Mao Zedong’s presence so as to report the results of the previous day’s discussion and to finalize the list of names.3 Zhou Enlai played a key role in the 10th National Congress of the CPC, especially regarding participant’s assignment. Mao and Zhou essentially made joint decisions in this respect. Zhou made various proposals and implemented those with Mao’s consent. On August 20, the CPC Central Committee approved and passed the Investigation Report on the Counter-Revolutionary Crimes of the Lin Biao Anti-party Clique by the Case Inquiry Team. The report concluded that Lin and members of his anti-CPC group were found guilty of the heinous crime of having launched a counter-revolutionary coup against the party and the nation. As a result, this report had revoked the party membership of eight from the 9th Political Bureau.4 Among those individuals, two of the five were the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, seven of the 20 members of the Political Bureau, and one of the four alternate members for the Political Bureau. Between April 1969 and August 1973, the 9th National Congress of the CPC and the 9th Political Bureau membership underwent a complete transformation. This was however more the result of political maneuvering conducted by Mao splitting the governing party

3.

Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of

4.

The CPC Central Committee stated in Investigation Report on the Counter-Revolutionary

Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 613.

Crimes of the Lin Biao Anti-party Clique resolved the following: (1) to revoke the party membership of Lin Biao — capitalist careerist, conspirator, and counter-revolutionary double-dealer, traitor, and collaborationist; (2) to revoke the party membership and all

the official positions within and outside the party of Chen Boda — a key member of

the Lin Biao anti-party clique, anti-CPC agent of the Kuomintang, Trotskyite, traitor,

secret agent, and revisionist; (3) to revoke the party membership of Ye Qun — a key member of the Lin Biao anti-party clique, dissident belonging to another social class, secret agent, traitor, and collaborationist; (4) to revoke the party membership of Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo, and Li Xuefeng — key members of

the Lin Biao anti-party clique and to remove them from all official positions within and outside the party.

4

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

than any counter-revolutionary coup instigated by Lin Biao.5 Mao claimed that this was the 10th Political Line struggle of the CPC and the CPC Central Committee. He proclaimed that this represented a great success of Mao’s proletariat revolutionary course.6 Also on August 20, the CPC Central Committee held a plenary session of the election preparation committee. In accordance with Mao’s wishes, Wang Hongwen was appointed chairman of the election committee; Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, Ye Jianying, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Li Desheng were appointed deputy chairpersons. This was purposely arranged by Mao7 and personally implemented by Zhou.8 With his advanced age, Mao was anxious to select the next successor. Except for Jiang Qing, the other six individuals were elected members of the Standing Committee of the 10th National Congress of the CPC. Wang was ranked third — just behind Mao and Zhou. On August 22, Zhou Enlai reported to Mao Zedong the personnel arrangements for the 10th National Congress and indicated who would be appointed chairman, vice chairman, and secretary-general of the presidium. The two men decided that Dong Biwu and Zhu De would be added to the Standing Committee of the 10th

5.

There was no evidence that Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo

participated in the “Summary of Project 571“ (“571“ signifies an armed uprising) since

they assisted Zhou Enlai in dealing with the September 13 Incident from September 13 to 18. 6.

The Investigation Report on the Counter-Revolutionary Crimes of the Lin Biao Anti-party

Group stated that under the leadership of the CPC Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao, the party, army, and Chinese people defeated the Lin Biao anti-party

group and achieved success in the 10th political line struggle. This dealt the heaviest blow to both class enemies at home and abroad. It also represented a great success of the

Cultural Revolution and a great success of Chairman Mao’s proletariat revolutionary course. 7.

Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 239.

8.

On August 13, 1973, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau to discuss the members of the election preparation committee for the 10th National Congress of

the CPC and the list of names for the 10th Presidium as proposed by the 10th National Congress preparation team, led by Wang Hongwen. Zhou and Wang wrote a joint letter

to Mao, recommending Wang as chairman of the election preparation committee and seven other members of the Political Bureau in to act as chairpersons. Mao read and commented on this letter. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Committee Comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 611.)

5

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Political Bureau.9 On August 23, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of military and government leaders at central and provincial levels to discuss the membership of the central leadership. At that meeting, Zhou said that the report for the 10th National Congress had not been written by himself but by Zhang Chunqiao, stressing that everything included was approved to be in accordance with Chairman Mao’s thoughts and political course. Zhou stated that the report was based on the ideas of Chairman Mao. It was also Chairman Mao’s wish to have Zhou presenting the report.10 On July 7, Mao declared that he basically agreed with the political report concerning the 9th and the 10th CPC National Congresses, drafted by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, whose political influence surpassed that of Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai as report presenters.11 On August 24, Zhou Enlai chaired a preparatory meeting for the 10th CPC National Congress to deliberate over the list of names for the presidium and the conference program. Zhou conveyed Mao Zedong’s direction that the minority should submit to the majority once a decision had been reached based on majority opinion at all levels of the CPC organization.12 Mao hoped to restore the organizational principle of majority rule; however, he did not clarify the implementation of regulations with respect to one person, one vote and majority rule. There was however evident from records of the meetings of the 10th Standing Committee and the 10th Political Bureau that no such majority rule was ever in operation. Many of the decisions were “proposed by Chairman Mao and unanimously passed by the Political Bureau.“ Mao thus enjoyed the privilege of casting the deciding vote. From August 24 to 28, the 10th National Congress of the CPC was convened in Beijing, chaired by Mao Zedong. All 1,249 delegates attended the congress representing the 28 million party members across China. Since Mao had decided to bring forward the date of the 10th National Congress, only three months of time was allowed to prepare from sketch to the official opening. As a consequence, delegates were not elected in representative meetings at all levels: they were elected based on “democratic consultation“ in outreach meetings of CPC committees at provincial, 9. Ibid., 614. 10. Jin ed., A Biography of Zhou Enlai, vol. 4, 2032–2033. 11. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 358.

12. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 615.

6

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

municipal, and autonomous regional levels. There was no qualification review committee to screen the delegates for the 10th National Congress.13 The majority of delegates were from the working class, farmers, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), who accounted for 67%;14 revolutionary intellectuals accounted for only about 5% of the delegates.15 At the 10th National Congress, Mao Zedong was elected chairman of the presidium. Zhou Enlai, Wang Hongwen, Kang Sheng, Ye Jianying, and Li Desheng were elected vice chairmen, and Zhang Chunqiao was elected secretary-general.16 The conference program consisted of three parts: (1) Zhou Enlai made a political report on behalf of the CPC Central Committee; (2) Wang Hongwen presented a report on amending the Party Constitution on behalf of the CPC Central Committee and proposed a draft of that Constitution; (3) the 10th CPC Central Committee was elected. Mao Zedong granted the same power to Wang Hongwen and Zhou Enlai, so they became “equals.“ He also given Zhang Chunqiao the title of “theorist“ for having written 10 important documents, which ensured adherence to the political line of the Cultural Revolution: the collapse of the Lin Biao clique had led to some serious questions about that revolution. Mao thus subtly controlled and balanced the political contest between the Cultural Revolution hardliners and the moderates. The political line of the 10th National Congress was clearly incorrect. 17 This is fully evident in the reports made by Zhou Enlai and Wang Hongwen. The political report presented by Zhou set out to affirm the political and organizational lines of the 9th National Congress.18 In that report, Zhou described Lin Biao and his 13. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 238. 14. “Press Communiqué of the 10th National Congress of the CPC,“ August 29, 1973. 15. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 238. 16. “Press Communiqué of the 10th National Congress of the CPC,“ August 29, 1973. 17. The CPC Central Committee resolved in 1981 that the 10th National Congress continued

the leftist mistakes of the 9th National Congress, whose political influence surpassed

that of Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai as report presenters. (Party Literature Research Center

of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 813.)

18. Zhou Enlai said that the national policy of continuous revolution under a proletarian

dictatorship based on Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism was a summary of the experience of the Cultural Revolution and repudiated the revisionist line of Liu Shaoqi;

it reaffirmed the basic political course and policy of the CPC throughout the history

of socialism. The revolutionary practices since the 9th National Congress of the CPC — especially the struggles against the Lin Biao anti-party clique — proved that the

political and organizational lines of the 9th National Congress had been correct. The

7

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

collaborators as a counter-revolutionary faction.19 Zhou claimed that defeating Lin’s anti-party clique had been the CPC’s greatest success since the 9th National Congress. He described it as dealing a heavy blow to the party’s enemies at home and abroad. The thorniest issue for the 10th National Congress of the CPC was explaining how the Lin Biao clique had been able to develop within the party. Zhou Enlai’s explanation was based on Mao Zedong’s view, which referenced to Marxism and Leninism, internal struggles within the party were a reflection of class struggles in society at large. The fall of the traitors led by Liu Shaoqi, and was followed by the collapse of the Lin Biao anti-party clique. This reflected the intense class struggle taking place both domestically and internationally. As to why the party had been unable to detect the Lin Biao clique earlier, Zhou Enlai declared that Lin was a capitalistic careerist, schemer, and double-dealer. Lin had been secretly lurking in the party for decades. It took time for him to be exposed. Zhou traced Lin’s historical mistakes back to those Gutian Meeting in 1929. It took quite some effort to demonstrate that Lin’s capitalistic spiritualistic worldview had not undergone any fundamental transformation since then. At important moments in the revolutionary cause, Zhou said, Lin had committed the

leadership of the CPC Central Committee under Chairman Mao had also been good and appropriate. (Zhou, “Report to the Tenth National Congress of the CPC,“ People’s Daily, August 31, 1973.)

19. Zhou Enlai stated in the political report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC that

Lin Biao and his handful of collaborators were a counter-revolutionary cabal: they kept the book of Mao’s quotations close at hand, constantly yelled “Long Live Chairman

Mao!“ and uttered sweet words into Mao’s ear, but they tried to stab the chairman in his back. The nature of the counter-revolutionary revisionist line advocated by the Lin Biao clique and their pernicious purpose in launching the counter-revolutionary armed coup was to seize supreme power over the CPC and the country, go against the political

line of the 9th National Congress, and fundamentally change the basic line and policy

of the CPC; they aimed to transform the CPC from directed by Marxism and Leninism to fascist revisionism; they also aimed to topple the dictatorship of the proletariat and restore capitalism. In China, the clique tried to reinstate the ruling of the capitalist

landlord class, which was overthrown by the CPC, the PLA, and the Chinese people

and to restore the fascistic dictatorship of feudalistic compradors. Internationally, they wanted to surrender to the Soviet Union, revisionist socialist imperialism, and to

collaborate with imperialistic, revisionist, opposing forces to fight China, the CPC, and China’s revolutionary cause. (Ibid.)

8

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

rightist mistakes and played a double game to deceive the party and the people.20 Clearly, what Zhou was saying was not internally consistent. Accusations against the two leaders of the Cultural Revolution — Lin Biao and Chen Boda — led to public questioning of the revolution itself.21 Nonetheless, it was true, as Zhou described, that the higher Lin rose to, the more ambitious he became. Lin had been overestimating his own power while underestimating that of the people. However, what applied to Lin also applied to Jiang Qing. This resembled Mao Zedong in his very advanced years very much. Supreme power without any restraints inevitably leads to alienation. With such power, the supreme leader rules the society and expanded his dictatorship to not alone people but also other leaders. Zhou failed to convince himself, let alone the entire CPC. Then what was the basic cause of the Lin Biao clique? Can we regard the elimination of this group as a success? Zhou Enlai reaffirmed the basic political line of the CPC during China’s period of socialism, and he held that this two-line political struggle would continue for a long time: similar incidents could re-occur perhaps 10, 20, or even 30 times.22 In accordance with the political logic of Mao Zedong, the basic task of the CPC was to instigate political line struggles. If, for example, 10 of such struggles occurred within 50-year, 20 of these struggles would take place before 2021 (the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CPC) and 30 would take place before 2071 (the 150th anniversary). This was the true reason behind the actions of the Lin Biao clique. Zhou Enlai was unaware that only a few months later, Mao would launch a campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, which was exactly in keeping with Mao’s political logic. This time, the 11th political struggle would be targeted at Zhou, not Lin. As long as Zhou supported and upheld Mao’s political line, he would have a price to pay. 20. Ibid. 21. Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 361. 22. According to Zhou Enlai, socialism takes place over a very long historical period:

“During this time, conflicts between the classes and class struggles will always exist,

and the struggles between socialism and capitalism will always exist; there will always be the risk of capitalism being restored; the threats of invasion and subversion from

imperialism and socialistic imperialism will always exist. The struggles between the two political lines within the party reflect those conflicts, and these struggles will always continue. Incidents like that with Lin Biao will re-occur — 10, 20, or even 30

times. And people like Lin Biao, Wang Ming, Liu Shaoqi, Peng Dehuai, and Gao Gang

will appear again. This is independent of human will.“ (Zhou, “Report on the 10th

National Congress of the CPC,“ People’s Daily, August 31, 1973.)

9

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

With regard to its national circumstances, Zhou Enlai defined China as an economically poor and developing country. However, the primary task of the CPC was still to resolve class struggle, whereas economic growth was ranked fourth on the to-do list.23 What was Mao Zedong’s general view of those times? Zhou Enlai quoted Mao as saying that the country was still in an era of imperialism and proletarian revolution. Mao was not sensitive or conscious of the fact that it had move on to a new era of scientific revolution and economic globalization; China was left for behind in terms of science and technology. Mao however predicted domestic disorder will eventually develop into international disorder as globalization developed.24 Although China had joined the United Nations and begun to play an important role in the community, Mao clung tightly on his theories regarding world war and world revolution:25 He wanted to convince other with his theory — revolution continues under a dictatorship of the proletariat. This indicates that Mao’s analysis of domestic issues had a direct effect on his evaluation over international issues. However, his dominant policy was related more to exclusionism and isolationism than to revolution and war. Being subjective and close minded, Mao not alone made a wrong assessment of China’s society nature and national circumstance, but also 23. Zhou Enlai detailed the major tasks of the CPC as follows: “(1) Continue the Criticizing

Lin and Rectification campaign; (2) the whole party should carefully study Marxist,

Leninist, and Maoist literature; (3) attach importance to class struggles in the social structure, including all cultural areas, and reform parts of the social structure that fail

to fit with economic foundations; (4) we should adhere to the overall political line of devoting our greatest efforts to establishing socialism with greater, faster, and better economic results — promoting production while still furthering revolution; (5) further strengthen the centralized leadership of the CPC.“ (Ibid.)

24. Zhou Enlai said on behalf of Mao Zedong that the current international situation was characterized by overall chaos: “The wind sweeping through the tower heralds a

storm rising in the mountains. This reflects all the fundamental conflicts in the world as analyzed by Lenin. Abatement can be only a temporary, superficial phenomenon.

Chaos will continue. But such chaos is good, not bad, for our people. Such chaos will

disturb and divide our enemies. It will awaken and energize our people, and it will push the international situation in a direction that is favorable to us and adverse to the imperialist, modern revisionist, and reactionary forces in all countries.“ (Ibid.)

25. Zhou Enlai repeated Mao Zedong’s view on May 20, 1970: “The risk of another world war still exists, and the people of all countries should be prepared for this. However, the dominant tendency in the world is still revolution.“ (Ibid.)

10

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

misjudged internal affairs. He was mistaken not only with regard to his assessment of the national circumstances in China and the nature of Chinese society but also in his judgment of international affairs. He did not visit other countries to learn directly;26 instead, he relied on issues of Reference News, published daily by Xinhua News Agency as an internal reference, to learn about Western countries and the rest of the world.27 As a result, Mao knew little about the world and made no efforts toward an exchange of information with foreign places since he was afraid of open competition. The information sources, knowledge structure, and learning ability of Mao as China’s supreme leader restricted the learning ability of the entire CPC and Chinese society as a whole. The Party Constitution adopted at the 10th National Congress of the CPC inherited the basic principles and content of the Constitution approved at the 9th National Congress. Wang Hongwen declared that the political and organizational lines followed at the 9th National CPC Congress were both correct. The Party Constitution approved at the 9th National Congress adhered to the fundamental principles of the CPC; it reflected the recent experience of the Cultural Revolution, which was launched by the proletariat, and it played an active role in the political life of the party, the army, and the people. The general provisions of the revised Constitution retained the stipulations of those adopted at the 9th National Congress with regard to the nature, guiding thoughts, fundamental creed, and basic political line of the CPC. What was the biggest difference between the Constitutions adopted at the 9th and 10th National Congresses? What was the main purpose in amending the Constitution? How did Wang Hongwen explain these changes in his report about amending the Constitution? Wang said that there had been a paragraph related to Lin Biao in the Constitution adopted at the 9th National Congress and that paragraph had been deleted in light of the demands of the whole party, army, and people. This move became necessary following Lin’s betrayal of the party and the country and Lin’s alienation from the party and the people.28 It may be observed that the sentence “Comrade Lin Biao is the close comrade-in-arms and successor of Comrade Mao Zedong,“ which was put into the general provisions of the Constitution adopted at the 9th National Congress, proved to be a historical 26. Mao Zedong did not visit any other countries after 1957. After June 1966, no Chinese

leaders visited other countries but they allowed the leaders of other countries to come to China.

27. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1712. 28. Wang, “Report on Amendments to the Party Constitution at the 10th National Congress of the CPC,“ People’s Daily, September 2, 1973.

11

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

setback. This sentence was deleted in the Constitution adopted at the 10th National Congress. Compared with the Constitution adopted at the 9th National Congress, some new content was added to the Constitution of the 10th National Congress. This was related to the experience regarding the Lin Biao Incident as summarized by Mao Zedong. Wang Hongwen made a number of insertions. First, based on the definition of the Cultural Revolution made by Mao Zedong, Wang Hongwen added a sentence: “Such revolutions will happen many times in the future“ (quotation from Mao).29 Wang read the sentence as history proven class and line struggles are reflected in the party; in addition, trends in imperialism and social imperialism in the international community are also mirrored in the party.30 Second, Wang Hongwen added the Three Musts and Three Must-Nots to the general provisions.31 This was Mao Zedong’s most important assessment of the Lin Biao Incident. Mao believed that the Three Must-Nots are the culprit of the Cultural Revolution’s failure. 1. Feudalistic dictatorship had prevailed, such as the personality cult, personality dictatorship, and belief in the supreme leader’s words, but this was totally unrelated to Marxism. 2. Political divisions occur constantly in the CPC Central Committee, which to Mao was unavoidable. 29. The Constitution of the CPC stipulated that China’s Cultural Revolution was a political revolution, in which the proletariat fought the capitalist class and all the exploitive

classes under socialistic conditions; it consolidated the dictatorship of the proletariat and safeguarded against the restoration of capitalism. Such revolutions would take

place many times in the future. (“Constitution of the CPC,” People’s Daily, September 2, 1973.)

30. Wang Hongwen said that in 1966, when the Cultural Revolution was launched by the

proletariat, Chairman Mao stated that the purpose was to “put the world in disorder to achieve a new order.“ This process would then be repeated in seven or eight years’

time. The bad elements would then become exposed. This exposure would be inevitable since it was determined by the nature of the social class to which they belonged. “The reality of class struggles has proved and will continue to prove this objective law, as

revealed by Chairman Mao.“ (Wang, “Report on Amendments to the Party Constitution at the 10th National Congress of the CPC,” People’s Daily, September 2, 1973.)

31. The so-called “Three Musts and Three Must-Nots” refers to the quotation from Mao Zedong: “We must stick to Marxism, and we must not carry out revisionism; we must

unite with each other, and we must not be divided; we must be just and honorable, and we must not resort to all sorts of schemes and intrigues.“

12

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

3. There were many kinds of schemes and intrigues being played within the party, and surges of unpredictable political persecutions took place all the time. It can be said that except for Mao Zedong, no member of the central leadership, including Jiang Qing, felt politically safe. There were no rules of conduct for the internal struggles within the CPC. Shortly after the 10th National Congress of the CPC, campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius was initiated, though the actual target of this action was Zhou Enlai. The movement against rightist whitewashing — targeted at Deng Xiaoping — was launched by the end of 1975. In April 1976, Deng was stripped off all official positions both inside and outside the party. Replacing him as the first vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee was Hua Guofeng. In October 1976, the Gang of Four was arrested without undergoing the procedure of discussion and approval at a plenary session of the CPC Central Committee and the National Congress of the CPC. Third, it was necessary to possess the revolutionary spirit even if this went against the general current. Backing with Mao Zedong’s instructions, Wang Hongwen stated that it was a Marxist principle to go against the stream. The Party Constitution stipulated that the party had grown and developed in its struggles against rightist and leftist opportunist political lines. Party members had to possess the revolutionary spirit even if this meant going against the stream.32 This came out of Mao’s experience at the Lushan Meeting in August 1970. Mao always regarded the history of the CPC as the struggle between himself — the correct delegate — and the other delegates, who were wrong, with regard to the political line. The CPC had always been a revolutionary party that was subjected to internal struggles over the political line. Mao was against the idea of establishing internal regulations, democratic systems, or voting systems within the party. Instead, he advocated the spirit of going against the stream and rebellion. Wang also advocated the Five Fear-Nots: do not fear dismissal; do not fear losing party membership; do not fear imprisonment; do not fear execution; do not fear divorce. Instead, Wang declared, it was necessary to have the courage to go against the current.33 Unlike most other rebel leaders across China ending up behind bars, Wang, despite being one of the most active rebels, was promoted to become the third-most important figure in the CPC by Mao. 32. “Constitution of the CPC,“ People’s Daily, September 2, 1973. 33. Wang “Report on Amendments to the Party Constitution at the 10th National Congress of the CPC,“ September 2, 1973.

13

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Fourth, it was necessary to select and promote talented workers and poor farmers to leading posts at all levels, and party officials also had to be cultivated among women and people of minority ethnicities. However, intellectuals and those possessing other specialized talents were to be excluded. In accordance with Mao Zedong’s instructions, a number of party officials were promoted from industrial workers and farmers directly. Representatives of industrial workers, Wang Hongwen, Wu Guixian (aged 35) and Ni Zhifu (aged 40); and representative of farmers, Chen Yonggui (aged 59), were selected to be part of the Political Bureau. These individuals did not follow the steps of the normal political course, but skipped most of those steps and rocketed to high positions during the Cultural Revolution, becoming members or alternate members of the Political Bureau. Mao Zedong did not like people with particular talents or technical expertise but preferred industrial workers and farmers as party officials. This was in contrast to the aims of the Central Committee of Science, which was created by Mao himself in 1956. Such a policy hamstrung the expansion of knowledge and professionalization of CPC Central Committee members. Fifth, it was essential that the centralized leadership of the CPC become stronger. Article 7 of the amended Party Constitution stipulated that government organs, the PLA, and all revolutionary mass organizations had to “accept the centralized leadership of the CPC.“ Wang Hongwen instructed to read centralized leadership in the following 2 lights. First, in terms of the relationship between all organizations at the same level, such as those of industrial workers, farmers, businessmen, students, members of the PLA, and government officials, and the CPC — the CPC had to be above all the other organizations. These two sets of institutions were not parallel to each other, the CPC was certainly not to be subordinated to other organizations. Second, in terms of authority, subordinates had to obey superiors, and the entire party was obliged to obey the central CPC leadership. At all levels, CPC committees had to be well aligned with the central CPC leadership in terms of their thoughts, policies, plans, directions, and actions — based on the revolutionary course determined by Chairman Mao.34 Article 7 was clearly intended to bolster a one-party political system featuring highly centralized power and considerable monopolization. This was a far cry from the political system of CPC leadership, multi-party collaboration, and political consultation established in 1949.35 It amounted to abandoning the basic spirit of the general provisions of the Party Constitution adopted at the 8th National Congress of the

34. Ibid. 35. Hu, History and Theory of China’s Political Economy (1949–1976).

14

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

CPC.36 In terms of the relationship of organizations at the same level, the CPC was superior to all others, where all power were held. With regard to the central organization of the CPC, the power of the supreme leader became further enhanced. The Party Constitution adopted at the 8th National Congress of the CPC did not define the functions and core position of the chairman, but it underlined the core position of the collective leadership of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee.37 According to Article 9, which was passed at the 10th National Congress, several essential functional departments should be established under the leadership of the chairman, vice chairman, and Standing Committee of the Political Bureau to handle the daily work of the CPC, the government, and the PLA. This stipulation removed the system of collective central leadership that was formulated in the Party Constitution during the 8th National Congress of the CPC. This proviso highlighted the core position of the chairman, at the same time reducing the position of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. It negated the core position of the collective leadership of the Political Bureau while strengthening the political power of Mao Zedong as an individual in terms of political procedures, i.e., his supreme authority incorporated that of the CPC, the government, and the PLA. Interestingly, at the early stage of the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong upheld romantic liberalism and ultra-anarchism. He advocated the great democracy of the proletariat and justified rebellion, overall seizure of state power, and destruction of the old state machinery. Instead of relying on and bolstering the leadership of the CPC, Mao tried to reduce and eradicate that leadership, which almost led to the paralysis and failure of CPC organizations at all levels around the country. At that early stage of the Cultural Revolution, Mao relied on his monopoly of public opinion through the newspapers to support his absolute authority and rule the country through supreme orders. Now, he returned to the opposite. He 36. The general provision of the Party Constitution adopted at the 8th National Congress of the CPC stipulated that the party had to consolidate the brotherly alliance of industrial workers and farmers in all aspects, and it had to consolidate the unified front linking

all patriotic forces; it had to consolidate the long-term cooperation between democratic parties and nonparty figures.

37. Article 37 of the Party Constitution adopted at the 8th National Congress of the CPC

stipulated that the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee had to exercise the

functions of the CPC Central Committee during adjournments of the plenary sessions of that committee. The secretariat of the Central Committee was to handle the daily work of that committee under the leadership of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee.

15

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

wanted to re-establish CPC organizations at all levels, and he naturally returned to political conservatism and political centralism. During his re-establishment of CPC organizations at all levels, Mao reinforced his supreme power via adopting a hierarchical structure, i.e., centralized power for the ruling party plus the supreme chairman. It is clear that the Party Constitution adopted at the 10th National Congress of the CPC provided a legal basis for this model of centralized dictatorship to sustain. It was not until 1978 that Deng Xiaoping censured this model. Deng declared that the model had transformed the leadership of the CPC into a monopoly and that the party’s centralized leadership led to confusion regarding identification of the party with the state. He noted that the party was characterized by bureaucracy and over-centralization of power: many major problems were often decided by one or two individuals, and all that others could do was simply to obey.38 On August 28, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of the presidium of the 10th National Congress of the CPC. Zhou proposed to liberate those first secretaries of provincial CPC committees who committed errors during the Cultural Revolution. Zhou suggested that they be promoted as candidates for the new CPC Central Committee as long as they had showed a positive attitude in admitting to their mistakes. Zhou proposed that some of those old party officials who had committed serious mistakes should also be retained and claimed that was a typical case for which Mao Zedong’s policy of education should apply.39 At the 10th National Congress of the CPC, 195 members and 124 alternate members were elected to the CPC Central Committee. Zhou Enlai noted that among the members of the CPC Central Committee, industrial workers, farmers, members of the PLA, and other working people accounted for about 67%, with the remaining 33% being made up of revolutionary cadres — many was members of the PLA.40 Compared with the 9th National Congress, there was an obvious decrease in the proportion of PLA members in the CPC Central Committee, which was a reflection of the direct political impact of the Lin Biao Incident. Some of the members of the CPC Central Committee were young individuals who had joined the CPC at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. As a result, the CPC Central Committee could be described as a combination of old, middle-aged, and young

38. “One individual“ here refers to Mao Zedong and “one or two individuals“ refers to

Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 141–142.)

39. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 616.

40. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1665.

16

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

members.41 Many of those committee members had benefited from the Cultural Revolution and there were also Cultural Revolution hardliners who were part of the Jiang Qing clique. Among others, Deng Xiaoping, Wang Jiaxiang, Tan Zhenlin, Wu Lanfu, Li Jingquan, Su Zhenhua, Yang Yong, Liao Chengzhi, Tao Lujia, and Ye Fei, who had been excluded from the CPC Central Committee during the Cultural Revolution, were reelected as committee members. Also on August 28, Zhou Enlai announced at the closing of the conference, “We will soon hold the 4th National People’s Congress.“ After the 9th CPC National Congress in April 1969, it was proposed that 4th National People’s Congress be convened in September 1970 after the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee. However, the movement of criticizing Chen Boda was also ongoing. It was originally rescheduled to September 1971, but the Lin Biao Incident ends up pushing the schedule back again. Zhou announced that the 4th National People’s Congress would take place in October; however, it was once more delayed owing to Mao Zhedong’s movement of criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius launched back in 1974. The Congress only got to officially convent in January 1975. The convention of the National People’s Congress reflects a period of national chaos created by state administration and ruling prevailed and policies. On August 30, the First Plenary Session of the 10th CPC Central Committee elected the party’s central leadership. Mao Zedong (aged 80) was elected chairman of the CPC Central Committee; Zhou Enlai (aged 75), Wang Hongwen (aged 38), Kang Sheng (aged 75), Ye Jianying (aged 76), and Li Desheng (aged 57) were elected vice chairmen of the committee,42 the number of vice chairmen remained the same as that of the 8th CPC Central Committee. The above six individuals plus Zhu De (aged 87), Zhang Chunqiao (aged 56), and Dong Biwu (aged 87) were elected the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. The Standing Committee of the 9th Political Bureau comprised five members. The average age of the members of the Standing Committee of the 10th Political Bureau was 70.4 years, which was a very old leadership. By September 1976, Dong Biwu (died April 1975), Kang Sheng (died December 1975), Zhou Enlai (died January 1976), Zhu De (died July 1976), and Mao Zedong (died September 1976) had all passed away. As a result, only three of the nine Standing Committee member remains: Wang Hongwen, Ye Jianying, and Zhang Chunqiao — those Mao wanted to train them into his successors. 41. “Press Communiqué of the 10th National Congress of the CPC,” August 29, 1973. 42. After the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee in August 1966, there was only one vice chairman (Lin Biao) in the party’s central leadership; in the 9th Central Committee of the party, there was again only one vice chairman (Lin Biao).

17

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Comparing to the 9th Political Bureau in 1969 with 40% of the members being newly elected, nine out of twenty five (36%) members of the 10th Political Bureau were newly elected.43 Wang Hongwen became the rising political star at this National Congress of the CPC, which shocked China and the world. Before the Cultural Revolution, Wang was merely an ordinary official in a Shanghai factory, but he soared to the third-most important position in the CPC Central Committee — just behind Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai — thanks to his rebellion during the Cultural Revolution. No other leader in the history of the CPC had rocketed to power this way. This was a deliberate political arrangement of Mao’s, implemented by Zhou. Wang being the youngest vice chairman and member of the Political Bureau made him the best candidate becoming Mao’s successor. Wang’s ascent to power violated the tradition of gradual step-by-step promotion in the CPC. As a consequence, Xu Shiyou, a member of the Political Bureau, headed to oppose against Wang’s chairmanship. On the evening of August 23, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of leaders of the CPC, the state, and the PLA under the direct leadership of the CPC Central Committee and all provinces and municipalities and autonomous regions. At the meeting, Zhou presented the details of Wang’s promotion to the CPC Central Committee. Zhou said that after the Lin Biao Incident, Chairman Mao had mentioned many times that Wang, who had formerly been an ordinary worker, should be promoted and trained to work in the CPC Central Committee. Zhou stated that it is his duty to execute Mao’s will, especially he been keep mentioning about it. Under this light, Zhou saw the necessity of attaching importance of the young officials than looking down on them as merely boy scouts.44 Zhou was not politically ambitious, so he always accepted and obeyed Mao’s leadership; vice versa, Mao needed Zhou’s political submission and support. It is obvious that even if Mao personally appointed Wang as the next vice chairman, there would sure be voices against the decision and even protest. Thus, Zhou played an essential role in ensuring Lin Biao be succeeding 43. The 10th Political Bureau consisted of 21 members: Mao Zedong,* Wang Hongwen, Wei Guoqing, Ye Jianying,* Liu Bocheng,* Jiang Qing,* Zhu De,* Xu Shiyou,* Hua Guofeng, Ji Dengkui,* Wu De, Wang Dongxing,** Chen Yonggui, Chen Xilian,* Li Xiannian,* Li Desheng,** Zhang Chunqiao,* Zhou Enlai,* Yao Wenyuan,* Kang Sheng,* and Dong

Biwu*; there were 4 alternate members: Wu Guixian, Su Zhenhua, Ni Zhifu, and Sai Fuding. [Note: * indicates members of the 9th Political Bureau; ** indicates alternate members of the 9th Political Bureau] (Li, From the First to the Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC, vol. 2, 981, 984–985.)

44. Chen, Heavy Attack — Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event, 64.

18

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Mao’s place in the party’s Constitution at the 9th National Congress of the CPC. To reinforce central leadership, Mao prevail over putting young industrial workers and farmers at considerable opposition than intellectuals and professionals. As a result, individuals like Wang Hongwen became prominent in the Cultural Revolution and rapidly ascended to power. Later, in the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun drew on this experience of Mao’s. Deng and Chen promoted leaders who were revolutionary, young, knowledgeable, and professional;45 however, they also supported step-by-step promotion and were against sudden promotion,46 citing the example of Wang Hongwen. Taking advantage of the political vacuum that developed after the fall of the Lin Biao clique, the Jiang Qing clique advanced rapidly within the party, accounting for three members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (Wang Hongwen, Kang Sheng, and Zhang Chunqiao) and two members of the Political Bureau (Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan), and the clique also officially formed the Gang of Four. 47 It was at odds with the moderates, headed by Zhou Enlai.48 For the Gang of Four, 45. In August 1980 at a meeting of Political Bureau, Chen Yun proposed that party officials

should be revolutionary, young, knowledgeable, and professional. (Zhao ed., Chen Yun and Important Events in the History of the Central CPC Leadership, 297.)

46. Deng Xiaoping said that party officials should climb up step by step: “In 1975, I spoke out against wrong practices during the Cultural Revolution. We cannot promote cadres

by suddenly elevating them into top positions.“ (Party Literature Research Center of

the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 324.)

Chen Yun said that step-by-step promotion was good: “This method was proposed by

Comrade Deng Xiaoping. It is necessary to promote cadres one step at a time. They must be promoted just one level every time.“ (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Chen Yun, vol. 3, 301.)

47. The CPC Central Committee’s resolution in 1981 pointed out that the 10th National

Congress of the Party made Wang Hongwen vice chairman of the party’s central committee. Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen

organized themselves into the Gang of Four, which strengthened the power of the antirevolutionary group led by Jiang Qing. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee Comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 813.)

48. Roderick MacFarquhar held that after the radicals headed by Jiang Qing achieved

their success at the 10th National Congress of the CPC, they prepared to attack their

most formidable enemy — Premier Zhou Enlai. (MacFarquhar and Fairbank eds., The

Cambridge History of China: The People’s Republic, Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution (1966–1982), 1998 ed., 358.)

19

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Zhou represented its greatest obstacle to seizing supreme state authority. Mao Zedong wanted to redress the balance of the radicals and moderates within the party so that they could act as a check on the actions of the others. Mao also actively supported those who benefited from the Cultural Revolution and placed them in important positions; many of these individuals became members and alternate members of the Political Bureau. Mao Zedong appeared in public for the last time at the 10th National Congress of the CPC. Later, he retreated to his study owing to old age illness and increasing frailty. He was unable to participate neither meetings of the Political Bureau nor visit different parts of the country. There are only a few reports of his meetings with foreign visitors. However, Mao still possessed supreme authority, and he personally launched and led two large-scale political movements: the movement against Lin Biao and Confucius, which was targeted at Zhou Enlai, and the movement against Deng Xiaoping and rightist whitewashing. The fate of China was dependent on this 80-year-old individual. After the 10th National Congress of the CPC, important reports were drafted by Zhou Enlai and cosigned by Zhou and Wang Hongwen before being submitted to Mao Zedong.49 Mao talked with Wu De and others and officially proposed to the Political Bureau that Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan be promoted. As he did so, Mao pointed to the green vegetables outside the window and said that those comrades should be cultivated like the vegetables. Mao placed great hopes on them.50 This indicates that Mao was training Wang as his successor. However, in light of the experience with Lin Biao, Mao did not officially appoint Wang as his successor. He first needed to train and observe Wang over a period of time. As Deng Xiaoping later remarked, as a national leader Mao Zedong chose his successor in the same manner as a feudal monarch.51 This was a non-institutional practice since in accordance with the Party Constitution, the supreme leader of the CPC had to be officially elected by the CPC Central Committee. Such a noninstitutional practice was random, variable, and unpredictable — and free of any restraints. However, Mao soon became dissatisfied with Wang Hongwen, and selected Deng Xiaoping instead as his successor. Just before Mao died, he officially appointed Hua Guofeng as the first vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee. All of these events took place within three years, just before April 1976. Mao was 49. Pang and Jin eds, A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1679. 50. Zhu, et al. eds., Wu De’s Oral History: A Record of the Ten-Year History of Storms, Some Personal Work Experiences in Beijing, 224.

51. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Committee Comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 7, 347.

20

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

old and found himself in a dilemma regarding the question of his successor. On one hand, he needed a successor designated by himself to inherit his power and causes — especially the Cultural Revolution; on the other hand, he was concerned that this successor would use his support to gain greater political power and pose a challenge to Mao or betray his cause. Therefore, for every political struggle, Mao had to change his successor. This act of changing of successor itself would lead to a new political crisis. The political concept of finding a successor to the Proletariat’s Revolution was corrupt owing to this practice of feudalistic dictatorship. Mao was unable to achieve his goal, but he could not stop himself from attempting to. That was in his character. As supreme leader of the CPC, Mao Zedong was a contradiction. He used the traditional strategy of balancing and checking political forces (which was very undeveloped) to rule the largest ruling party in a modern country. Regardless of the conflicts they had and difference they shared, Mao needed the Jiang Qing clique made up of Cultural Revolution hardliners to keep the Revolution ongoing even after his death. 52

Mao Zedong Promoted Deng Xiaoping to Important Positions By the end of 1973, Mao Zedong had decided to promote Deng Xiaoping to important positions, and granted Deng more power so that he could take over from Zhou Enlai, who was very ill. Mao wanted Deng to rule the country and restore economic and social order, and order in people’s lives. At that time, Mao wanted to end the Cultural Revolution 53 to deal with the various problems in Chinese society. So the question was, how should the revolution be brought to an end? Who would be able conclude it? How should anarchy be transformed into order? For Mao, Deng appeared to be the one who could most appropriately deal with these and related problems. It should be noted that Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying came under severe criticism 52. On December 24, 1980, Jiang Qing defended herself in the first trial of the Special

Tribunal: “I was like Chairman Mao’s dog — a pawn on his political chessboard.“ (Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 323.)

53. President Moussa Traoré of Mali visited China in June 1973 and asked Mao Zedong when the Cultural Revolution would end. Mao Zedong answered: “Not yet.“ (Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1654.)

21

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

before Mao Zedong officially appointed Deng Xiaoping. On November 14, the People’s Daily published a communiqué about Henry Kissinger’s visit to China, which stated that Zhou and Ye had held discussions with Kissinger. Mao and all the members of the Political Bureau in Beijing read and commented on the draft of this communiqué in advance. Zhou went to Mao to report on the communiqué, but he found Mao asleep. Mao thought that Zhou had failed to report to him and flew into a rage. Mao maintained that Zhou and Ye had shown weakness in the Sino-U.S. meeting. On November 17, Mao Zedong addressed a meeting with Zhou Enlai and officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “It is necessary to proceed with caution: we have to be leftist when combating the United States, but rightist when allying with that country.“ Mao also remarked that the Soviet Union “was very ambitious but still lacked sufficient power.“ He proposed convening a Political Bureau meeting to discuss the errors that Zhou had made in the Sino-U.S. talks.54 Among the party leaders, it was up to Mao to decide if one had or had not made mistakes. On November 18, Zhou Enlai, who was very ill, initiated an examination on his mistakes with Mao Zedong, and admitted that he “had not done well“ in the SinoU.S. talks.55 This once again demonstrated the dictatorship of Mao as the leader of the CPC Central Committee. He had the final say on all matters and would not tolerate contrary opinions. On November 21, in accordance with the wishes of Mao Zedong, Wang Hongwen called and chaired meetings of the Political Bureau to criticize Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying. In those meetings, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan, and others attacked Zhou and Ye: they dismissed the Sino-U.S. talks as a “betrayal and humiliation of our country“ and a gesture of surrender; they declared them to have been the 11th political-line struggle. They slandered Zhou Enlai as the leader of the incorrect political line, and claimed that Zhou was only counting the days before he could replace Mao Zedong.56 Although Zhou was enraged by all this, he remained silent.57 After the meeting, Jiang Qing demanded of Mao Zedong that he add her and Yao Wenyuan as members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau.58 Jiang instructed Wang to make a copy of the meeting minutes concerning attacks on Zhou and submit it to Mao. However, Mao responded: “Make no mention of the 11th political-line struggle. Promoting additional members to the Standing 54. Ibid., 1670–1671. 55. Ibid., 1671. 56. Ibid. 57. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 288. 58. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1670–1671.

22

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Committee is out of the question.“59 After the 10th National Congress of the CPC, the Jiang Qing clique started their first wave of attack on Zhou Enlai making use of the instructions given by Mao Zedong. It signified that once again the central leadership was faced with political confrontation and even division. To maintain political unity, which was then very fragile, it was necessary for Mao to criticize Jiang Qing, placate Zhou, and retain the confidence of Ye Jianying. Since the 9th National Congress of the CPC, Mao had been against Jiang to work as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. On November 25, Mao Zedong commented on a letter from an ordinary CPC member that criticized Jiang Qing: “Have it printed and distributed to the comrades in the Political Bureau.“ Mao believed that some opinions were beneficial, and so criticisms should be allowed.60 Mao implied to the members of the Political Bureau that Jiang could be criticized. However, who dared rebuke the domineering Jiang? Even Zhou Enlai had to bow to her. She was the real boss and bully within the CPC. On December 9, in discussions with Zhou Enlai and Wang Hongwen, Mao Zedong first agreed with the Political Bureau meeting’s criticism of Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying, though to protect Zhou he allowed no words on the 11th political-line struggle. Mao criticized Jiang Qing about the “counting the days“ reference.61 Mao also refused Jiang’s request to become a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. In this way, the Political Bureau stopped its criticism of Zhou. This is an indication of how Mao was always in need of and yet dissatisfied with Zhou Enlai. Mao criticized Zhou, but he would not bring Zhou down.62 Zhou 59. Editorial Committee of Biography of Ye Jianying comp., Biography of Ye Jianying, 366–367. 60. This letter, “A Letter from an Ordinary CPC Member,“ made the criticism that Jiang Qing was not at all democratic, she overemphasized the arts and literature, and failed

to follow the policy of letting “a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of

thought contend.“ In this letter, it was contended that the slogan the “Revolutionary

Model Theater Goes Before Everything“ and the exaggeration of Jiang Qing as the

standard bearer of the Cultural Revolution were inappropriate. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee Comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 367.)

61. Mao Zedong said that two mistakes had been made. One was to make the proposal

about the 11th political-line struggle, which was incorrect. The other one was that some (referring to Jiang Qing) accused Premier Zhou of impatiently craving power, which

was also not true: it was in fact she who impatiently craved power. (Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1671.)

62. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 289.

23

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

had no choice but to swallow Mao’s anger, tantrums and try to appease him. Deng Xiaoping respected Mao, but he did not indulge him.63 This also shows the nature of the retaliatory struggles between the two main factions within the CPC Central Committee. They both needed Mao’s support for relative peace to exist with the other faction: otherwise, conflicts could break out at any time, and that was something that Mao wish not to see. With the supreme leader’s dominance over the CPC Central Committee, there was no chance of any one faction prevailing within the party. Only Mao could resolve troubles and maintain unity. After the 10th National Congress of the CPC, Zhou Enlai discussed with Ye Jianying and came to a conclusion that Ye should propose directly to Mao Zedong allowing Deng Xiaoping to join the Political Bureau while concurrently holding a post within the PLA. Mao responded that he would consider the matter. After several months of deliberation, especially after Mao criticized Zhou Enlai, who was still very ill, Mao decided to raise Deng to important positions.64 Mao did in fact replace Zhou with Deng to conduct the routine work of the CPC, the state, and the PLA and to engineer a political balance. On December 12, Mao Zedong stated at a meeting of the Political Bureau that he and Ye Jianying had asked Deng Xiaoping to work as a member of the Central Military Committee. They decided to schedule a discussion at the Second Plenary Session of the 10th CPC Central Committee over the issue if Deng should be a member of the Political Bureau. Mao accepted the suggestions of Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping and made changes to the commanders of China’s eight military areas. Mao made the criticism that the Political Bureau as presided over by Zhou Enlai failed to properly handle politics and that the Military Committee as presided over by Ye Jianying did not properly deal with military affairs.65 Later, the Political Bureau continued that meeting, chaired by Zhou, and it unanimously agreed to allow Deng to sit in on Political Bureau meetings and participate in the bureau’s work; Deng’s membership of the Political Bureau would be submitted for approval at the Second Plenary Session of the 10th CPC Central Committee. Deng 63. Ibid., 286. 64. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 287. 65. Mao Zedong said: “The Political Bureau should discuss political affairs. The Military Committee should discuss both military and political affairs. We need to change the fact that the Military Committee does not discuss military affairs and the Political Bureau does not discuss political affairs. As long as you do not change, I will hold

meetings here. I have no option but to hold meetings and talk to you in person here in

the Political Bureau.“ (Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1672.)

24

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

was promoted as a member of the Central Military Committee, and he participated in the committee’s work and attended its office meetings. The Political Bureau meeting also agreed with the change in the commanders of China’s military areas.66 On December 14, Mao Zedong told the members of the Political Bureau: “I now have a chief strategist, and his name is Deng Xiaoping. The notice has been issued that Deng will become a member of the Political Bureau and Central Military Committee. The Political Bureau is in charge of everything — the CPC, the state, the PLA, the masses, and the students in the north, south, east, west, and central areas. I think the post of secretary-general should be created for the Political Bureau. Since you [Deng] do not wish to accept this title, you should become chief of staff.“67 Mao Zedong gave Deng some advice: “Be firm, but gentle. Have an iron hand, but keep it in a velvet glove. Be gentle and soft, but also be iron-willed.“68 This is an indication that Deng was a leader of principle, which is the moral standard of a statesman and also a mark of Deng’s political maturity. Deng’s most important characteristic was that he worked in the public interest, and Mao was correct in identifying this trait. During the Cultural Revolution, many leaders forsook their principles to retain their positions and adopted a neutral position against their will. Mao looked down upon such individuals. That was why Mao made Deng his chief strategist to lead the country and the PLA. On December 15, Mao Zedong and some Political Bureau officials talked to the commanders of the Beijing, Shenyang, Jinan, and Wuhan military areas, and Mao introduced Deng Xiaoping to them.69 On December 21, Mao held discussions with the members of the Central Military Committee about the change in the commanders of China’s eight military areas. Mao said that all the blame was his: “I am to blame — more than you — and so I have tried to step down several times. At the 8th National Congress, I set up the post of honorary chairman for myself, so that others [Liu Shaoqi] could be chairman. I like him [Deng Xiaoping], though

66. Ibid., 1673. 67. Mao Zedong said: “Now we have a general chief of staff. Some are afraid of him, but

he is quite resolute. His achievements accounted for 70% of his life, with mistakes accounting for 30%. Your old superior is now back at my request — well, not mine

alone, but also that of the Political Bureau.“ Mao said to Deng Xiaoping: “Well, some are afraid of you. But let me give you some advice: be firm, but gentle. Have an iron

hand, but keep it in a velvet glove. Be gentle and soft, but also iron-willed. Your past shortcomings need to be changed somewhat.“ (Ibid., 1672–1673.) 68. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 286–287. 69. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1674–1675.

25

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

some are a little afraid of him.“70 On December 22, Zhou Enlai drafted an official notice on behalf of the CPC Central Committee regarding the appointment of Deng Xiaoping. This stated that Deng would participate in major resolutions of the CPC, the state, and the military, and he would preside over their daily work.71 To a large extend, this can be considered a restraint on Wang Hongwen, who at that time presided over the work of the CPC Central Committee, and it amounted to a strengthening of the moderates. The same day, Deng Xiaoping announced on behalf of the Central Military Committee the order to change the commanders of the eight military areas, requiring that all commanders update all newest posts within 10 days. The commanders of the Beijing and Shenyang military areas exchanged posts, and so did the commanders of the Nanjing and Guangzhou military areas, the commanders of the Jinan and Wuhan military areas, and the commanders of the Fuzhou and Lanzhou military areas.72 70. Ibid. 71. The notice stated that on the recommendation of Chairman Mao, the CPC Central

Committee had decided to appoint Deng Xiaoping as a member of the Political Bureau

and to participate in the leading work of the CPC Central Committee; this would be submitted to the Second Plenary Session of the 10th CPC Central Committee for official

approval. In addition, Deng would be appointed as member of the Central Military Committee and participate in the leading work of the CPC Central Committee and the Military Commission. (Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 287.)

72. The Central Military Committee made the following appointments: Li Desheng,

commander of the Beijing Military Area since January 1971, as commander of the

Shenyang Military Area, and Chen Xilian, commander of the Shenyang Military Area

since October 1959, as commander of the Beijing Military Area; Xu Shiyou, commander

of the Nanjing Military Area since March 1955, as commander of the Guangzhou Military Area, and Ding Sheng, commander of the Guangzhou Military Area since July 1969, as commander of the Nanjing Military Area; Yang Dezhi, commander of the

Jinan Military Area since March 1955, as commander of the Wuhan Military Area, and

Zeng Siyu, commander of the Wuhan Military Area since August 1967, as commander

of the Jinan Military Area; and Pi Dingjun, commander of the Lanzhou Military Area since November 1969, as commander of the Fuzhou Military Area, and Han Xianchu, commander of the Fuzhou Military Area since October 1957, as commander of the

Lanzhou Military Area. (Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China:

Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1003; Qiu ed., Records of the People’s Republic of China — Literature and Research, vol. 5,

26

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Why did Mao Zedong introduce these changes in the command of the eight military areas? The Central Literature Research Office provides information on the historical background. According to the records, Mao asked Zhou Enlai if there were any close comrades in arms like Lin Biao after the Lin Biao Incident; Zhou replied that all Chinese people supported and protected Mao. Mao however responded: “Is that true? I don’t think so. I have persecuted many people. Would these people still protect me after that? Do you believe that they would?“ Mao did not believe that. He felt that there were a number of hidden dangers in the army. Deng helped Mao in bringing forth the change in the commanders of the eight military areas as an answer to the question regarding the danger in the army.73 This tactic was intended to lure the tigers out of the mountains as well as to send a warning; it was also a way to remove some military power from the commanders. Mao Zedong intended to nip any problems in the bud.74 Deng was able to learn from Mao’s superior political wisdom, and he helped Mao with some of his political problems. This move in swapping the military commanders had political implications since it prevented local leaders or high-ranking officials with military power from establishing their own area of authority, and it prevented them from being overpowered. Later, this exchange system was applied to major CPC, state, 93–100.) 73. Li Su, the second son of Li Sheng, was a famous general in the middle period of the Tang dynasty. Li Sheng was a great general during Emperor Dezong’s reign in the Tang

dynasty. He was instrumental during the quelling of Zhu Ci and in the reoccupation of Chang’an. Li Su was a brave general during the Yuanhe period of Emperor Xianzong’s

reign in the Tang dynasty. The major conflicts at this time were the separationist ruling of the warlords after the rebellion of An Lushan and Shi Siming. Among the

separationist warlords, Wu Yuanji in Caizhou was the most powerful and was closest to Luoyang, the eastern capital of the Tang dynasty. Therefore, Wu Yuanji posed the

biggest threat to the Tang government. Wu Shaoyang, father of Wu Yuanji, ruled

Caizhou for five years without paying tribute to the Tang government. After Wu Yuanji rose to power, he appointed himself the governor of Caizhou and ignored orders from

the Tang government. Xianzong, the Tang emperor at the time, determined to send punitive expeditions against Wu, but these were to no avail. Emperor Xianzong won

the support of Pei Du, who determined to quell the rebellion of Caizhou using the strength of the whole country. The government appointed Pei Du as prime minister

and commander of the armed forces to fight the rebel troops in the upper reaches of the Huaihe River.

74. Zheng, “Mao Zedong’s Intention in His Old Age to Ask That Political Bureau Members Read Ancient History,“ Oriental Morning Post, November 18, 2010.

27

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

and PLA leaders. It still runs today to ensure all power is unified and centralized at the central government, and to prevent local areas from taking an independent course, as well as guarding against political divisions in China.75

Attacks against Lin Biao, Confucius, and Zhou Enlai After the 10th National Congress of the CPC, Zhou Enlai started preparations for the 4th National People’s Congress according to Mao Zedong’s instruction. On September 12, Zhou and Wang Hongwen reported the preparation progress to Mao. On the same day, Zhou chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau to discuss preparations for the congress. Three teams were organized within the Political Bureau: one team, led by Wang Hongwen, dealt with organizational work; another team, headed by Kang Sheng and with Zhang Chunqiao as acting team leader, handled constitutional amendments; the third team dealt with drafting government work reports and was headed by Zhou Enlai. It was estimated that the work of the three teams would be completed before October 5. On September 14, Zhou reported to Mao, saying that if the above procedures went well, the 4th National People’s Congress would last about 5 to 6 days. The same day, Mao read and commented on Zhou’s report.76 From October 16 to 19, Zhou chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau to discuss the preparations for the 4th National People’s Congress. At that meeting, the government draft report was passed in principle.77 All necessary preparations were completed for the congress. However, this plan was terminated due to a sudden change — Mao abruptly launched of the movement against Lin Biao and Confucius. As noted above, Zhou was in fact the indirect target of this movement. Change and unpredictability characterized the political situation during this period and were the result of the supreme leader’s personal political resolutions. 75. Deng Xiaoping said in September 1989 that during the late Cultural Revolution, Chairman Mao swapped around the commanders of China’s eight military areas. Mao

knew the art of commanding armed troops: no small spheres of influence or small factions and cliques should be allowed among any PLA members. This tradition still exists in the PLA, with commanders frequently transferred. Outside the PLA, leaders

also often have to be transferred. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, 319.)

76. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 621–622.

77. Ibid., 628.

28

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

After the Lin Biao Incident, Mao Zedong was dissatisfied with the radical leftists being subjected to criticism; instead, he decided to attack the radical rightists. One of the direct causes of this was that Jiang Qing and others discovered Lin Biao’s notebooks in his residence. In those books there were many notes, works of calligraphy, and materials related to Confucius and Mencius. These were submitted to Mao and aroused his considerable interest. Mao was inspired and hence, like Emperor Qin Shi Huang (the First Emperor), Mao developed Project 571 to goad and enrage himself. As a consequence, Mao thought that Lin respected Confucius and was opposed to legalism. Mao mentioned the need to condemn Confucius in many discussions. After Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi reported to Mao on Lin’s interest in the works of Confucius and Mencius, Mao asked them to prepare necessary materials to attack Confucius and Lin Biao.78 Without going through the collective deliberations of the CPC Central Committee, Mao launched the movement against Lin Biao, Confucius, and Emperor Qin Shi Huang after the 10th National Congress of the CPC. This movement was used by Jiang Qing and others to attack Zhou Enlai — member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau — and later to strike on Ye Jianying, also member of the Standing Committee. On August 5, Mao Zedong talked to Jiang Qing about the struggles between Confucianism and legalism in Chinese history. Mao said that all the politicians with achievements and who made substantial contributions in the early period of feudalistic society had been legalists. These people advocated the rule of law, and whoever violated the law had to be punished. They were more concerned about their own times than about the ancient era. By contrast, Confucianists were hypocrites — saints on the outside but devils within. They were more interested in the past than the present. They aimed to reverse the course of history. On August 7, under Mao Zedong’s instructions, the People’s Daily published an article by Yang Rongguo (professor at Zhongshan University) entitled “Confucius, a Thinker Stubbornly Defending Slavery.“79 Professor Yang Rongguo also wrote articles about the struggles between Confucianism and legalism during the era 78. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1012.

79. Yang Rongguo believed that although Confucius preached humanity and ethics and presented himself like a saint, his ideas actually served the interests of the declining

slave-owning noble class. At that time, thinkers who were against Confucius and stood in support of feudalism were Xun Zi and his student Han Fei, as well as other legalists.

The struggles between Confucianism and legalism during the period before Qin Shi Huang reflected a class struggle. (Yang, “Confucius, a Thinker Stubbornly Defending Slavery,“ People’s Daily, August 7, 1973.).

29

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

before Qin Shi Huang that were published in the magazine Red Flag.80 On September 4, the Peking University and Tsinghua University Criticism Team81 wrote “Confucianism and the Reactionary Thoughts of Confucianism.“82 This article was written in form of ancient story to attack the deceased (Lin Biao), and to allude those remain (Zhou Enlai). The Peking University and Tsinghua University Criticism Team was established by Chi Qun (leader of the Science and Education Team under the State Council and secretary of the CPC Tsinghua University Committee) and Xie Jingyi (member of the CPC Central Committee, vice secretary of the CPC Tsinghua University Committee) in the latter half of 1973 under the instructions of the Gang of Four. The Criticism Team consisted of over 30 members, and it was personally directed and controlled by Jiang Qing. This team published articles under the following names: the Big Criticism Team of Two Universities, Liang Xiao, Bai Qing, Gao Lu, Jing Hua, An Jie, Qin Huaiwen, Shi Jun, Guo Ping, Jin Ge, Wan Shanhong, Zhu Xiaozhang, and Liang Xiaozhang.83 80. Yang, “Struggles between the Two Political Lines in the Ideological Sector during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Period,“ Red Flag, December 1 ,1972.

81. The Peking University and Tsinghua University Criticism Team was also called Liangxiao; it was a writing team made up of around 30 students from Peking University

and Tsinghua University, headed by Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi. Mao Zedong gave direct instructions and orders to Xie Jingyi, and these were transmitted and implemented by

Xie Jingyi and Chi Qun. Liangxiao wrote a total of 219 articles, among which 181 were published, and over 30 were used as learning materials.

82. The article stated: “All reactionary forces adopted Confucianism as a spiritual weapon

to quell the people and revolutions. Confucius was the first saint in feudal society — the so-called sage and teacher; Mencius became the second saint — the so-called second

sage. Confucianism-Mencianism became a synonym for feudalism.“ The article also pointed out that politically, the CPC overthrew the reactionary ruling of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism. Culturally, the CPC needed to eradicate the

enslaving imperialism and feudalism that respected Confucius and advocated the

reading of classic Confucian texts, old rites, thoughts, and education. Agents of the

landlord capitalists within the CPC advocated the way of Confucius and Mencius and followed the opportunist line of the surrendering rightist. Liu Shaoqi and Lin

Biao advocated the way of Confucius and Mencius and stood against the systematic theory of Marxism and Leninism regarding class struggle, proletarian dictatorship,

and continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. (Beijing Daily, September 4, 1973.)

83. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 951.

30

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

From September 8 to 11, the Science and Education Team under the State Council convened a symposium in Beijing on the problems that had arisen during the educational system’s attack on Confucius. Professor Yang Rongguo of Zhongshan University in Guangzhou prepared the report “The Struggles between Confucianism and Legalism and the Impact of the Reactionary Thoughts of Confucius.“ Chi Qun declared at the meeting that attacking Confucius amounted to implementing the spirit of the 10th National Congress of the CPC and stated that it was an important task in the campaign against Lin Biao. Chi noted that attacking and criticizing Confucius and incorporating such activities in revolutionary education should involve not only university schools of humanities and the arts but all other kinds of schools.84 Later, Zhou Enlai spoke to Chi and censured him for the unconventional slogans he had used with regard to the education system.85 On September 15, the debut issue of Shanghai-based Learning and Criticism published an article entitled “On the Worship of Confucius and Combating Legalism,“ written by Shi Lun.86 “Shi Lun“ was the pen name of the Writing Team under the Shanghai CPC Committee, which was established in July 1971. The Writing Team and its subordinate teams wrote under such names as Luo Siding, Kang Li, Shi Lun, Zhai Qing, Fang Hai, Qi Yonghong, Liang Lingyi, Qi Chenglou, Jin Ge, Shi Shanghui, Shi Feng, Cao Sifeng, Fang Yanliang, Shi Yige, and Ren Du and had a large number of articles published. The articles under the name of Shi Lun were actually written by Yao Wenyuan. After the September 15 article was published, Yao Wenyuan ordered Red Flag to reprint it. The Two Universities’ 84. Ibid., 953. 85. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 625–626.

86. The article held that Confucianism was a reactionary school of thought of the declining slave-owning nobility and that legalism was a progressive school of thought that represented the interests of the emerging landlord class. The struggle between

Confucianism and legalism was a fierce ideological class struggle between the slave

owners and the landlords. The article stated that burning of the Confucian books and

burial of Confucian scholars was a continuation of the long-term struggle between the emerging landlord class and the declining slave owners; it said that this was a continuation of the centuries of struggles between Confucianism and legalism, that it

was a struggle between the efforts to restore or to overthrow the old ruling class, and

that it was a revolutionary action to quell the restoration of slave owners: “During

the progress of the proletariat revolution, whether or not to criticize the convention of upholding Confucianism and fighting against legalism was an important part of the struggle between the two political routes.“ (Red Flag, issue 10, October 1, 1973.)

31

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Criticism Team published over 1,000 articles and dozens of books. The leader of the writing team said: “Our work involves a fierce struggle from which we can’t flee. We have to be prepared for the possibility of being killed or imprisoned...If we reveal what we do now, we will be killed now. If we reveal it in the future, we will be killed in the future. Each issue of Learning and Criticism is a tombstone for us.“87 On September 23, when receiving the Egyptian vice president, Mao Zedong said: “I am like Emperor Qin Shi Huang. I support Emperor Qin Shi Huang, not Confucius.“88 Zhou Enlai and Wang Hongwen joined the talks. Why did Mao show his favor for this emperor? One direct political reason was that Lin Biao accused Mao of acting like that emperor and “pleaded on behalf of the people“ to “emancipate a large batch.“89 Under Mao’s instructions, Jiang Qing commissioned 87. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 956–957.

88. On September 23, 1973, Mao Zedong received Hussein el-Shafei, vice president of Egypt.

Mao said that Emperor Qin Shi Huang was the famous first emperor in feudalistic society: “I am also a first emperor. Lin Biao accused me of being the first emperor. China’s historians are divided into two camps: one regards Emperor Qin Shi Huang

as good; the other regards him as bad. I am in favor of Emperor Qin, not Confucius.

Emperor Qin Shi Huang unified China for the first time; he unified the language and built good roads. He eliminated many states within one country; he centralized power

into his own hands and that of the central government, which involved sending officials to different places to rule. Those officials underwent changes after several years; so the

positions were not hereditary.“ Mao Zedong stated that Emperor Qin Shi Huang was

responsible for 22 feats. (“Yao Wenyuan Relayed Mao Zedong’s Instructions on the Movement against Confucius,“ January 27, 1974, in Mao Zedong’s “Golden Stick”: Yao Wenyuan and the Cultural Revolution, vol. 2, edited by Sisyphus, 91.)

89. An article written by the Peking University and Tsinghua University Criticism Team stated that Chairman Mao had said: “We should never be benevolent regarding the

reactionary actions of the reactionary forces and classes. Lin Biao and his clique used the old tricks of the ancient slave owners when they tried to restore their rule. In the

Summary of Project 571, Lin Biao attacked the proletariat dictatorship by slandering Emperor Qin, and he upheld the slogan to plead on behalf of the people to ’emancipate

a large batch [of people].’ The ’people’ they represented and the ’large batch’ they

wanted to emancipate were none other than the former landlords, the former rich

farmers, counter-revolutionary elements, bad elements, and rightists quelled by the proletariat dictatorship during the 20 years since the founding of the People’s Republic

of China. Their evil purpose was to overthrow China’s proletariat dictatorship and restore the fascist ruling by big landlords and big capitalists. Like all the restorative

32

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

the writing of articles that praised Emperor Qin Shi Huang’s book burning and the burial of Confucian scholars: this was in fact in defense of the book burning and persecution of scholars during the Cultural Revolution. On September 27, the People’s Daily published an article entitled “Was Confucius an Educator for the Common People?“ by Tang Xiaowen.90 Tang was the name used by a writing team within the Central CPC School established by Kang Sheng. This writing team officially published articles under that name in Red Flag in 1972.91 On September 28, “The Case for Burning the Books and the Burial of Confucian Scholars“ was published under the name of Shi Ding. The article said that the book burning and burial of Confucian scholars was a progressive measure against the restorative forces of the time. The book burning and burial of Confucian scholars by Emperor Qin Shi Huang was part of the struggle between the new ruling landlord class and the slave-owning nobles away from the political stage. They were also part of a resolute action toward new unification under Emperor Qin Shi Huang, by crushing the restorative scheme and safeguarding the new feudal ruling. The effects of such a cruel measure had to be affirmed. The article declared that the burning of Confucian books and burial of Confucian scholars may have played an active role in consolidating the new feudal country and strengthening the centralized government.92 Clearly, the Cultural Revolution was being presented as forces in history, they were bound to fail. This is a law of history.“ (Peking University

and Tsinghua University Criticism Team, “On the Tyranny of Emperor Qin,“ People’s Daily, January 21, 1974.)

90. The article stated that in all respects the educational activities of Confucius served the purpose of restoring the reactionary slavery system of the West Zhou dynasty and that

Confucius himself was at heart a loyal servant of the slave-owning nobles. The socalled educator for the common people was nothing more than a disguise. The reason

that Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao hailed Confucius as an educator for the common people

and advocated that education knows no class distinction was that they were trying to

create a theory for their revisionist education; they wished to remove the proletariat from education and transform schools into places for training the successors to the capitalistic class.

91. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 963–967.

92. Shi Ding’s “The Case for Burning the Confucian Books and the Burial of Confucian Scholars“ maintained that the effects of such actions had to be affirmed. The article

was originally published in the Liaoning Daily, later republished in the People’s Daily,

September 28, 1973, with minor revisions. During the period of Emperor Qin Shi Huang’s rule, some people collected and read books of poetry and all schools of thought;

33

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

a modern version of the book burning and burial of Confucian scholars. Justifying the Cultural Revolution required argumentation using the historical precedent of the measures taken by Emperor Qin Shi Huang. At the same time, the author of that article also publicly supported dictatorship through a centralized government. In October, with the support of Jiang Qing, Chi Qun and others launched the first movement against rightism in Tsinghua University. They had articles published in the Education Revolution Newsletter, stating that there was a trend for attacking and denying the achievements of the Cultural Revolution.93 This movement was some people cursed Emperor Qin Shi Huang and the feudalistic country system that had followed after the book burning and burial of the scholars. However, no Confucian scholars dared publicly criticize current affairs using the standards of ancient dynasties or stood for the system of counties and prefects instead of the centralization of power.

As a result, the system of counties and prefects developed smoothly, and it contributed to the unification of the feudalistic country under the rule of the landlord class. In the

history of China after the Qin dynasty, the feudalistic system of that dynasty exerted a profound influence on the feudalistic society that was to last 2,000 years. Throughout

all the dynasties after the Qin, irrespective of the change in name, the system of counties and prefects remained; regardless of the organizational form of the political systems,

they were basically a development of the centralized political system of the feudalistic dictatorship. Lin Biao — capitalistic careerist, schemer, and counter-revolutionary double-dealer, traitor, and collaborator — and his clique condemned Emperor Qin Shi

Huang for burning the books and burying the Confucian scholars alive. That clique

was inspired by the poem “Books in the Burning Pit“ in making a venomous attack on the CPC and the socialistic system under the dictatorship of the proletariat. The members of that group were sympathetic with Chunyu Yue, Hou Sheng, and the other Confucian scholars that were buried alive: they had been reactionary forces in history

and denied that the progress represented by Emperor Qin Shi Huang’s measures and

his preference of today over yesterday. They distorted history, confused right and

wrong, and attempted to reverse the course of society. This was the proof that the members of that clique were at heart historical idealists. The counter-revolutionary

revisionist line and evil actions that betrayed the CPC and the country pursued by them showed that they tried to rewrite history in the light of idealism; they created

counter-revolutionary theory and wished to sway public opinion for the evil purpose of overthrowing the dictatorship of the proletariat and restoring the rule of capitalists.

The article first appeared in the Liaoning Daily, and later republished in the People’s Daily, with minor revisions.

93. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 631.

34

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

clearly against Zhou Enlai, and it underscores the fact that the focus of the internal struggles within the CPC was the struggle between the forces that affirmed and those that negated the Cultural Revolution. The former won every debate, though the latter later scored a historical victory in 1978. On November 1, the 11th issue of Red Flag published the article “The Struggle between Forces For and Against the Restoration of Old Institutions during the Establishment of the Qin Dynasty — Arguments for the Social Roots of the Controversy between Confucianism and Legalism.“ It appeared under the name of Luo Siding, though it was in fact the work of the writing team of the CPC Shanghai Committee.94 This article criticized Lu Buwei’s eclecticism and made an allusion to the modern political situation. Jiang Qing said, “This article is good since it criticizes Lu Buwei, who was a premier.“95 This was a reference of course to Zhou 94. The article argued that after Emperor Qin Shi Huang came to power, the struggle toward

establishing the dictatorship of the landlord class entered a new stage. Emperor Qin Shi Huang made two strategic steps: one was to eradicate the group led by Lu Buwei to

ensure the victory in the war of unification and the establishment of the Qin dynasty; the other was to take the revolutionary measures of burning the books and burying the Confucian scholars to consolidate the rule of the landlord class. These two historical

incidents were a continuation of the struggle between the emerging class of landlords

and the declining slave-owning nobles; they were also a continuation of the struggle between the forces for and against the restoration of the old order since Shang Yang’s Reform in the State of Qin. The policy of burning the books and burying the scholars

was based on the reasoning that the new emperor would not be respected if the books

relating to and people adept in the six fields of knowledge and skills were not disposed of. The incident was not due to the brutality of Qin Shi Huang, but a necessary result

of the class struggles at that time. Vituperated by all the reactionary forces, ancient and

modern, and in China and abroad — including the revisionists in the Soviet Union

and Lin Biao — Emperor Qin Shi Huang made a historical achievement. He was an expert in and practitioner of legalistic thoughts: he had greater respect for modern times than for the past, and he was a politician of the landlord class who was able to

bring about and maintain the unification of China. That is the historical conclusion.

(Luo, “The Struggle between Forces For and Against the Restoration of Old Institutions during the Establishment of the Qin Dynasty — Arguments for the Social Roots of

the Controversy between Confucianism and Legalism,“ originally printed in Red Flag, issue 11, November 1, 1973; reprinted in the People’s Daily, November 14, 1973.)

95. Central Special Case Group, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique

of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.3,“ September 1977.

35

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Enlai. On January 21, 1974, the People’s Daily published an article entitled “On the Tyranny of Emperor Qin Shi Huang“ by the Peking University and Tsinghua University Criticism Team, which affirmed the role of that emperor.96 The same day, Red Flag published an article titled “Rightist Opportunism and Confucianism“ by Jin Yunge.97 During that period, Red Flag, under Yao Wenyuan, was at the forefront of the ideological battle against Lin Biao and Confucius (Appendix 6.1). On December 7, Yu Huiyong, head of the Ministry of Culture, commented on the report of two musicians from a friendly country being invited to perform in China. This report was read and approved by Zhou Enlai and other central leaders, and stated that such an invitation amounted to inviting thieves into the country. Yu appealed to the public against “untitled music“ and the “counter-revolutionary revisionist line.“ Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan distorted the content of the report and dismissed it as being “without social implications,“ and they launched nationwide criticism on this issue. As evidenced by incomplete statistics, after December 1973 over 100 papers appeared criticizing untitled music.98 Mao Zedong fully affirmed the letter from Zhang Tiesheng of Liaoning and said that university professors should be tested on this issue. He said: “In my opinion, the professors at the eight universities and colleges in Beijing should be made to take such an examination. They always look down on their students.“99 96. The article maintained that Emperor Qin Shi Huang (259 BC–210 BC) effectively swept away the remnants of the slavery system by revolutionary violence, which objectively was in the interests of the people. (Peking University and Tsinghua University Criticism Team, “On the Tyranny of Emperor Qin Shi Huang,“ People’s Daily, January 21 , 1974.)

97. The article said that Lin Biao had inherited the ideas of Confucius in restoring states and clans that had been defeated and promoting forgotten talents; Lin advocated the history of political coups during the thousands of years since the Zhou dynasty

and harbored plans to launch a counter-revolutionary coup against the proletariat dictatorship and restore the rule of the landlord capitalists, which had been struck down by the CPC, PLA, and the people led by Chairman Mao; Lin wished to establish

a comprador fascist monarchy based on his own family. Wang Ming, Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, and the heads of the rightist opportunist line called on the spirit of Confucius to serve the purpose of sabotaging the revolution and restoring capitalism in China.

This highlighted the severity and complexity of the class struggles within the sphere of

ideology. (Jin, “Rightist Opportunism and Confucianism,“ originally printed in the Red Flag, Issue 11, November 1, 1973; reprinted in the People’s Daily, November 22, 1973.)

98. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 994–995.

99. On December 15, 1973, Mao Zedong talked to members of the Political Bureau and

36

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Mao also stated: “Many people look down on the boycotts.“100 On December 30, in accordance with Mao’s instructions, the Science and Education Team of the State Council and the Science and Education Team under the Revolutionary Committee of Beijing Municipality prepared a sudden examination for university and college professors. 613 professors at 17 universities and colleges in Beijing were assembled for a symposium and were made to sit an examination in mathematics, physics, and chemistry. Later, professors in Shanghai and Tianjin were also tested. On January 25, 1974, Xie Jingyi announced in a mobilization meeting concerning the movement against Lin Biao and Confucius that 560 (91.4%) professors had failed the test; with 200 leaving the papers blank; and some averaged of only 0.1 or 0.4 points. At that meeting, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan, and Chi Qun praised this testing.101 This was typical of the intrigues that took place during the Cultural Revolution: not only were the elite in the CPC subject to persecution, but the intellectual elite in society at large were also maltreated. The intellectuals were dismissed as “the stinky 9th.“ On December 28, 1973, the People’s Daily added editorial notes to a letter and journal entries that had appeared in the Beijing Daily by Huang Shuai, a Red Guard and student in class 2 grade 5 of Zhongguancun No. 1 Primary School of the Haidian district of Beijing. The Beijing Daily commented it was important to be constantly aware of the complexity of the struggle between the two political lines and attitudes on the educational front. The newspaper stated that there was considerable contention with regard to such issues as the relationship between politics and specific job requirements and the campaign to persuade educated urban youth to move to rural areas. Similarly contentious areas included the campaign for industrial workers, farmers and soldiers to study at universities, and the Five-Seven Route, open schools, the examination system, the re-education of teachers, and working class leadership of the schools. These areas required continuous effort.102 These issues reflect the disputes that took place between those who supported and those who were opposed to the Cultural Revolution. Political opinion in the public media was dominated by the views of Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan — proponents of the Cultural Revolution. They enjoyed absolute monopoly and capricious dictatorship over ideological discourse for a period of 10 years. However, these views were not supported by the CPC, the PLA, or the people. stated that professors should be made to sit an examination. (Ibid., 1003.) 100. Ibid. 101. Ibid. 102. Huang, “Letter and Journal Entries from a Primary School Student,“ originally printed

in the Beijing Daily, December 12, 1973; reprinted in the People’s Daily, December 28, 1973.

37

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

In December, Mao Zedong personally instructed Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi to examine what Lin Biao had said and written about Confucius and Mencius.103 The Peking University and Tsinghua University Criticism Team put together “Lin Biao and the Thoughts of Confucius and Mencius“ based on the public comments, notes, works of calligraphy, and other materials of Lin Biao, Ye Qun, and Chen Boda. This document amounted to almost 30,000 Chinese characters, and it was divided into eight parts: 1. Materials relating to Confucian self-denial and the restoration of rites for the purpose of bringing back capitalism; 2. Advocating a theory of talent, whereby a person is born to acquire particular knowledge and skills, with the purpose of seizing power over the CPC and the state; 3. Spreading a theory of history whereby the most and least intelligent people are born that way and that this is immutable, which is a slander against the laboring class; 4. Advocating virtue, humanity, loyalty, and tolerance in such a way as to attack the proletarian class; 5. Promoting the “middle way,“ which is a violation of the Marxist philosophy of struggle; 6. Making use of Confucian philosophy for the creation of conspiratorial factions; 7. Advocating the thoughts of the exploitative class whereby white-collar workers should rule over blue-collar workers, which could be used to attack the Five-Seven Route; 8. Teaching children to worship Confucius, read Confucian works, and hope to set up Lin as emperor. What was the purpose behind Mao Zedong compiling such materials? The Peking University and Tsinghua University Criticism Team submitted these materials to Mao, reporting that Lin Biao — a careerist from the capitalist class, schemer, double-dealer, traitor, and collaborator — was a pious follower of Confucius. Like all reactionaries that were doomed to die, he worshipped Confucius and rejected legalism. Lin attacked Emperor Qin Shi Huang, and he used the thoughts of Confucius and Mencius as an ideological weapon in his plan to seize state power and restore capitalist rule. Like Confucius and Mencius, Lin wanted to restore 103. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1012.

38

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

old institutions and reverse the course of history. Lin ordered his subordinates to collect the sayings and theories of Confucius and Mencius, copy them onto cards, and use them to create a counter-revolutionary atmosphere, conduct intrigues, and ferociously attack the proletariat. On January 18, 1974, with the approval of Mao Zedong, the CPC Central Committee issued the notice “Printing and Distribution of Materials by Lin Biao and the Thoughts of Confucius and Mencius“ (CPC issue no. 1, 1974), which signaled the official launch of the movement against Lin Biao and Confucius. Following Mao Zedong’s instructions, Yao Wenyuan wrote a New Year editorial, informing the whole nation of the attack on Lin Biao and Confucius. On January 1, 1974, the People’s Daily, PLA Daily, and Red Flag jointly published this editorial, which emphasized that it would be dangerous for the CPC Central Committee to ignore major issues and bury itself in trivialities since this would lead to revisionism. What, then, were the major issues? The editorial stated that the campaign against Lin Biao should be continued. Historically, the leaders of reactionary forces and opportunism have worshipped Confucius. Therefore, censuring Confucius was part of the criticism of Lin Biao.104 At that point, it had been over two years since Lin Biao died, and Confucius had died over 2,000 years earlier. This movement was clearly targeted at the living figure of Zhou Enlai. However, on December 24, Zhou chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau to discuss how this editorial should be revised.105 This shows that Zhou not only tolerated Mao’s attacks but also followed his instructions completely. Zhou however paid his price for these political intrigues by shortening his life. It was widely known that Zhou died in a tormented state, and that formed the political cause for the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1976. There was a 9.2% increase in industrial and agricultural output in 1973 comparing that to 1972, with agricultural output increasing by 8.4% and industrial 104. The editorial pointed out that Lin Biao’s political stance was a revisionist one: “The

CPC teaches us in its basic guideline for the historical period of socialist society that the struggle against revisionism is a long-term one. For over 20 years, our struggles

against the cliques of Gao Gang, Rao Shushi, Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi, and Lin Biao

have been against revisionism. To state that Lin Biao was an ultra-rightist is a criticism

against revisionism. In history, the leaders of reactionary forces and opportunism have worshipped Confucius. Therefore criticizing Confucius is part of the criticism against

Lin Biao.“ It was printed as New Year’s message of People’s Daily, Red Flag and PLA Daily on January 1, 1974.

105. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 638.

39

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

output rising by 9.5%.106 Zhou Enlai stated that the targets for the major indexes of the national economy in 1973 had been achieved or surpassed.107 At that time, there was a short period of social stability in the country. The CPC Central Committee and all ministries and committees under the State Council had cancelled their Central Military Committee or PLA representatives, and they restored or established leadership by ministers and CPC ministerial committees. That provided the necessary conditions for promoting the national economy. If Mao Zedong had not launched the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, total industrial and agricultural output would have grown further in 1974. However, this political movement disrupted the normal growth of the national economy, and it resulted in a low growth rate. On January 4, 1974, the People’s Daily published an article titled “What Message Was Sent When Confucius Killed Shao Zhengmao?“ by Tang Xiaowen. In this article, Confucius was referred to as premier: “Confucius worked as the minister of justice and acted as the premier in the state of Lu.“ This was an apparent allusion to Zhou Enlai. On January 12, Wang Hongwen and Jiang Qing submitted “Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius“ in addition to a letter, which stated, “We have read ’Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius,’ which was compiled by Peking and Tsinghua Universities, and we find it of great help in the ongoing criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius...We suggest that this document be distributed to the eight military areas, provincial military areas, the PLA, the CPC Central Committee, ministries under the State Council, and all municipalities and provinces as reference material in the movement against Lin Biao and Confucius...We hereby submit this material for your approval.“ Mao Zedong agreed with the content of the letter.108 Mao had apparently instigated and led the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, and Wang Hongwen and Jiang Qing were simply following his instructions.109 The criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius was not targeted at any 106. National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Chinese Yearbook of Statistics (1983), 19.

107. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 640.

108. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 371.

109. The CPC Central Committee resolved in 1981 that in early 1974, Jiang Qing and Wang Hongwen and others initiated the so-called movement against Lin Biao and Confucius.

(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 813.)

40

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

of these individuals but at Zhou Enlai.110 Mao had directed one member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (Wang Hongwen) and a member of the Political Bureau (Jiang Qing) to criticize another member of the Standing Committee (Zhou Enlai). Nonetheless, Zhou Enlai criticized Liu Shaoqing by order of Mao, which was the political price that Zhou had to pay. On January 13, in response to an article issued to criticize Confucius written by the Chemical Defense Company of Army Corps No.22, Jiang Qing wrote a letter to the company. Jiang sent 200 copies of “Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius,“ compiled by Peking and Tsinghua Universities, as well as 200 copies of the appendixes. She asked Xie Jingyi, member of the CPC Central Committee and vice secretary of the CPC committee of Tsinghua University, and Chi Qun, secretary of the CPC committee of Tsinghua University, to personally deliver what she put together to the company.111 On January 25, the CPC Central Committee published the “Report on Learning of Comrade Jiang Qing’s Letter to the Chemical Defense Company of Army Corps No. 22 by the CPC Committee of the Nanjing Military Area,“ the “Letter to Comrade Jiang Qing from the CPC Committee of Army Corps No. 22,“ and the “Letter to Comrade Jiang Qing from All Comrades in the Chemical Defense Company“ as reference material for the party, the state, the PLA, and the people in criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius. This indicates that the CPC Central Committee at that time obeyed the instructions of Jiang Qing or was used by her for her own purposes. Also on January 13, Jiang Qing wrote a letter to Wu De, in which she said that she had asked Xie Jingyi and Chi Qun to provide him with such materials as “Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius." Jiang hoped that the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius initiated by the Cultural Team under the State Council would have an extensive impact.112 On January 14, Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi submitted the document titled “Major 110. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 295. 111. Jiang Qing sent the following documents: (1) “Compiled Words of Reactionary Forces and Landlord Capitalist Scholars in Worship of Confucius and Restoration

of Old Institutions Since the May 4th Movement;“ (2) “The Struggle between Forces

For and Against the Restoration of Old Institutions during the Establishment of the Qin Dynasty;“ (3) “Was Confucius an Educator for the Common People?;“ (4) “The

Way of Juste Milieu of Confucius Is a Philosophy Against Social Revolutions;“ and (5) “Reading Notes of Liu Zongyuan’s ‘On Feudalism.’ “

112. “Speeches Given by Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing, Chi Qun, Xie Jingyi, and Yao Wenyuan at

the Mobilization Meeting of Institutions Directly under the CPC Central Committee and State Organizations against Lin Biao and Confucius,” January 25, 1974.

41

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Problems Exposed in the Current Movement in Peking and Tsinghua Universities“ to Li Xiannian, Ji Dengkui, and Hua Guofeng. In the accompanying letter, Chi said that those problems were like those exposed by ministries and departments under the State Council. One of the most importat conflit arousing question among the two class and two political rules is whether to affirm or deny the Cultural Revoulation. Issues arose under this light, such as how to evaluate the problems occured in the past 17 years, how one should evaluate their own mistakes, and how to regard the series of revolutionary changes that had taken place under the dictatorship of the proletariat, including recent issues.113 Also on January 14, Wang Hongwen, who presided over the daily work of the CPC Central Committee, delivered a report to the Reading Class of that committee in an effort to “inform people about the problems concerning the Cultural Revolution.“ To prove the correctness of that revolution, Wang cited Mao Zedong, “Those people objected to by our enemies are good rather than evil.“114 If Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao had taken power, they would have restored capitalism, and China would have fallen back to a semi-feudalist, semi-colonized society, hence becoming a colony of socialistic, imperialistic Soviet Russia, and tens of thousands of people would have been killed. Wang argued that during the Cultural Revolution, Chairman Mao predicted that the current Cultural Revolution was only the first of many: “The result of this revolution — the question of who will win or lose — will not be known until after a great deal of time has elapsed. If things go badly, capitalism could be restored at any time. The members of our party and the Chinese people at large should not think that peace can come with one, two, three, or four Cultural

113. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 788.

114. Wang Hongwen stated in his “Report Made to the Reading Class of the CPC Central

Committee“ on January 14, 1974 that it was not strange that class enemies at home and abroad should attack the Cultural Revolution: “Chiang Kai-shek denounced the

Cultural Revolution, and the radio and newspapers of the Soviet Union have likewise condemned the Cultural Revolution for seven or eight years. The Lin Biao clique used

the language of the Soviet Union in criticizing the Cultural Revolution in its Summary of Project 571 [which refers to the armed uprising], which was part of the counter-

revolutionary coup. Chairman Mao said that those people objected to by our enemies are good rather than evil, which proves that the Cultural Revolution was correct. The

more we carry out our campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, the more Chiang Kaishek, South Korea, South Vietnam, and the Soviet Union denounce us; that is not at all surprising in terms of the class struggle.”

42

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Revolutions. We should never lose our vigilance.“115 Mao Zedong made the above statement as a result of his misjudgment of the existing conditions in China. The most basic condition was that the country at that time had a large poor population, within which there was a considerable rural population that was unable to feed itself. Zhou Enlai stated in a report related to natural disasters that affected parts of the country had received insufficient food, relief funds, seeds, and fodder, and that they suffered from a serious lack of adequate clothing. Agricultural production was at a low level; agricultural implements were inadequate, and there was a lack of fuel, drinking water, welldrilling equipment, medical teams, and sanitary conditions.116 Such conditions existed in many parts of China, and Zhou was acutely aware of this. However, in volume 13 of Mao Zedong's Works Since the Founding of New China, there is no record of Zhou Enlai reporting to Mao about this matter. There are two possible reasons for this: one was that Zhou deliberately withheld the information according to the principle of reporting only good, not bad, news; the other is that Zhou reported this matter to Mao, but Mao refused to accept the accuracy of the report. Either possibility indicates that Mao did not have a strong political desire to solve the greatest problem: the livelihood of the Chinese people. Mao’s biggest concern was that rich farmers might restore capitalism. Wang Hongwen maintained that the successor should be found using a topdown approach: “The issue of training a successor to Chairman Mao has met with stronger resistance in the PLA and less resistance among local governments. I propose that someone aged about 30 should be appointed commander of a greater military area.“ Wang reiterated Mao Zedong’s philosophy of struggle that rebellion was justified,117 and Mao’s conclusion was that any objection to the Cultural 115. Wang, “Report Made to the Reading Class of the CPC Central Committee,” January 14, 1974.

116. Jin ed., A Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1890–1891. 117. Wang Hongwen said in his “Report Made to the Reading Class of the CPC Central

Committee,“ which was published on January 14, 1974: “The theories of Marxism can be boiled down to one sentence: rebellion is justified, and Marx taught us to rebel. Some dismissed us as grabbing power through rebellion. The Communist Party of

China rebelled against imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism under the leadership of Chairman Mao, and it won the revolutionary wars and seized power.

What’s wrong with that? In the Cultural Revolution, we rebelled against the capitalist class and all exploitative classes, and we consolidated the dictatorship of the proletariat.

What’s so wrong with that?“ (Wang, “Report Made to the Reading Class of the CPC Central Committee,“ January 14, 1974.)

43

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Revolution would lead to a dictatorship of capitalists.118 Wang was the successor who seized power through rebellion and who was personally chosen and carefully cultivated by Mao. On January 18, the CPC Central Committee officially approved and promulgated “Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius“ (CPC Central Committee, Document No. 1, 1974). A notice by the committee declared that this material, compiled by Peking and Tsinghua universities, would be very helpful in further criticizing Lin Biao, exposing Lin Biao’s ultra-rightist political nature, castigating the worship of Confucius and the opposition to legalism, and strengthening political and ideological education. Using historical anecdotes to deliver a political message was one of the political characteristics of the Cultural Revolution. Mao Zedong regarded the Cultural Revolution as a profound historical phenomenon, and he believed that it could be compared to legalism in history. Mao’s campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius was targeted at the so-called followers of Confucius in the party who hindered the social revolution. Jiang Qing and Wang Hongwen launched the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius with the purpose of criticizing the philosophy of selfdenial and the restoration of traditional rituals — specifically, safeguarding against the restoration of capitalism.119 On January 20, the CPC Central Committee issued a supplementary notice. In that notice, the committee stated that the documents and articles listed in Appendix 6.2 should be used in communicate, learn, and analyze CPC Central Committee Document No. 1 1974. The notice particularly recommended three articles by Professor Yang Guorong and one by Professor Feng Youlan: the former actively supported Jiang Qing, whereas the latter was compelled to write the article.120 118. Wang Hongwen said that any opposition against the Cultural Revolution would be

contrary to the 9th and 10th National Congresses of the CPC. Such opposition was not

an ordinary problem, but an attempt to restore capitalism and carry out revisionism. He

said that any objection to the Cultural Revolution would necessarily lead to a capitalist dictatorship. (Ibid.)

119. Editorial, “On Criticizing Self-Denial and Restoration of Rituals — the Reactionary

Guidance of Lin Biao in His Attempt to Restore Capitalism,“ People’s Daily, February 20, 1974.

120. Feng Youlan had two articles published in the Journal of Peking University titled

“Criticizing Confucius and Self-Criticism against My Former Worship of Confucius“ and “The Struggle between Restoration and Anti-Restoration Is that between Two

Political Routes.“ These were republished in full by the Guangming Daily and Beijing Times. Feng Youlan was coerced into writing the article against his own wishes to

44

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

On January 22, Jiang Qing wrote a letter to Su Zhenhua, alternate member of the Political Bureau and the first political commissar, with attachments like “Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius.“121 Two days later, Jinag Qing wrote another letter written to Wang Hongwen, Ye Jianying, Zhang Chunqiao, and Deng Xiaoping. She stated in the letter that based on considerable evidence, there was some imbalance in the campaigns against Lin Biao and rectification, and the campaign against Confucius had even been hindered to some extent. She also stated that the relationship between the ideological system of Lin Biao and Confucius was insufficiently clear. She hence put forward that censuring Lin Biao and Confucius was of paramount importance to the party, the PLA, and the Chinese people. “Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius,“ compiled by Peking and Tsinghua universities, and other materials might be helpful to the entire PLA. The same day, the Central Military Committee officially mobilized the whole country for the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius. Jiang Qing intervened not only affairs of the CPC Central Committee but also those of the Central Military Committee; both committees had to obey her. She being Mao Zhedong’s wife granted her the privileged position in the party. On the afternoon of January 25, Zhou Enlai held a mobilizing conference (hereafter referred to as the January 25 conference) among the organizations directly under the CPC Central Committee and the State Council. At this conference, Zhou introduced the background of the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius and stated that the document titled “Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius“ had been highly praised by Chairman Mao.122 Zhou said that an official in the PLA conform to party authority. He later confessed: “Instead of seeking truth from facts, I wrote balderdash out of hypocrisy instead of sincerity.“ (Feng, The Hall of Three Pines: An Account of My Life.)

121. “Speeches Given by Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing, Chi Qun, Xie Jingyi, and Yao Wenyuan at

the Mobilization Meeting of Institutions Directly under the CPC Central Committee and State Organizations against Lin Biao and Confucius,” January 25, 1974.

122. Zhou Enlai said: “At a meeting convened by the Science and Education Team under the State Council after the 10th National Congress of the CPC last year [1973], Comrade Chi Qun conveyed the message to all the provinces that a movement against Confucius

was about to be launched. He stated that criticism of Confucius was an integral part of the movement against Lin Biao. Censuring Confucius is not a new development at

Peking and Tsinghua universities. Recently, other materials were added to Document No. 1 issued by the CPC Central Committee in 1974. Things thus proceeded in a stepby-step fashion. During this process and with the help and guidance of Comrade Jiang

Qing, the material that indicated how Lin Biao was a confirmed believer in Confucius

45

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

(referring to Zhang Chunqiao, director of the General Politics Department of the PLA) had taken a step before others in criticizing Confucius: “Yesterday, Comrade Chunqiao chaired a conference in West Beijing Hotel. Our Central Committee and State Council have lagged behind. Today, we make up for this by asking the comrades of the Political Bureau in Beijing to attend a mobilizing meeting.“123 Almost all, over 10,000 party and state central leaders and officials, attended the meeting. Jiang Qing planned the January 25 conference together with Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi. She gave advises on Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi’s speeches content.124 Xie Jingyi and Chi Qun explained the process of compiling “Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius.“125 They stated that one of the social phenomena that the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius attacked was the “back-door approach“ to secure advantages126, which was associated with Ye Jianying.127 Yao Wenyuan said going was ’Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius.’ This document was highly praised by Chairman Mao.“ (Ibid.) 123. Ibid. 124. Central Special Case Group, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.1,“ December 1976.

125. Chi Qun said that the compilation of this material involved a writing team, which

Comrade Jiang Qing suggested should be made up of older, middle-aged, and younger members. Some old professors with research background in this field should act as

consultants. Members of the Writing Team at Peking and Tsinghua universities included Feng Youlan, Zhou Yiliang, and Wei Jiangong of Peking University as well as Wang Shimin and Shi Guohong of Tsinghua University. A total of 30–40 older professors were

designated by Jiang Qing. (“Speeches Given by Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing, Chi Qun, Xie

Jingyi, and Yao Wenyuan at the Mobilization Meeting of Institutions Directly under the CPC Central Committee and State Organizations against Lin Biao and Confucius,“ January 25, 1974.)

126. Chi Qun said that there was still a problem with regard to “getting in by the back door.“ He stated that the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius needed to be applied to

the current situation. Otherwise, it would be a total denial of Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism. Xie Jingyi said that the practice of getting in by the back door was totally against China’s socialistic system and the Cultural Revolution: “There is also an issue about whether to stick to Marxism or return to revisionism. To get in by the back door

is to betray Marxism!“ (Special Case Group, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the

Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.1,“ December 1976).

127. Xie Jingyi said that to have his sons and daughters admitted into the PLA or college, the

46

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

against the mainstream was one of the principles of Marxism and Leninism. It was included in the Party Constitution and the political report of the 10th National Congress of the CPC and the report on the Party Constitution: “I remember the spirit of Chairman Mao in swimming across the Yangtze River against the stormy waves as he revealed in his ’Prelude to Water Melody.’ We should carry forth this spirit and continue the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius. A smile remains on my face regardless of the raging storm.“128 With the approval of Mao Zedong, Jiang Qing used the opportunity of the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius to launch a surprise political attack on Zhou Enlai.129 Jiang and Yao Wenyuan pointed out that objecting to the censure of Confucius amounted to an objection to criticizing Lin Biao. They stated that it was an essential safeguard against eclecticism and that all those who advocated juste milieu were wholly immoral.130 Under the pressure of this attack by Jiang, Zhou was forced to acknowledge at a conference, “I am not aware of the circumstances of the Cultural Revolution, and I have not been informed of the current situation. It is admirable that Comrade Jiang Qing is properly informed. I need to reconsider my thoughts on this matter.“131 Most party and state leaders present could not understand why Zhou should admit to Jiang that he had made mistakes. Jiang thus became dizzy her victory and called Zhou a loser.132 In addition, Jiang publicly instructions of some individual leader (referring to Ye Jianying) or approval worked

better than the instructions of Chairman Mao. (“Speeches Given by Zhou Enlai, Jiang

Qing, Chi Qun, Xie Jingyi, and Yao Wenyuan at the Mobilization Meeting of Institutions Directly under the CPC Central Committee and State Organizations against Lin Biao and Confucius,“ January 25, 1974.) 128. Ibid. 129. The CPC Central Committee stated in 1981 that Jiang Qing and others targeted Zhou Enlai. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp.,

Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 813.)

130. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 789.

131. “Speeches Given by Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing, Chi Qun, Xie Jingyi, and Yao Wenyuan at the Mobilization Meeting of Institutions Directly under the CPC Central Committee and State Organizations against Lin Biao and Confucius,” January 25, 1974.

132. Jiang Qing said that in the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, she directed the battle from the front line: “We cornered Zhou Enlai, so that this powerful man had to

acknowledge in public that he had lagged behind. He was no big deal — just a loser,

and we defeated him.” (Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976),

47

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

singled out Guo Moruo with the accusation that his On Ten Criticisms was incorrect since he treated Confucius the same way he treated Lin Biao. This was the so-called January 25 Conference Incident. Also attending the conference, Li Xiannian was also one of the witness of this unusual incident. Li, with a heavy heart under great pressure, was acutely aware that serious consequences would ensue.133 Geng Biao, director of the Central Liaison Department of the CPC, visited Zhou Enlai after the conference to express his extreme dissatisfion concerning how he was singled out for criticism and to express his will to resign. Zhou replied: “First, when people try to bring you down, no matter how hard they try, you cannot let yourself fall. Second, when people try to drive you away, no matter how hard they try, you cannot leave. Third, when people persecute you, no matter how brutal their persecutions, you cannot die by your own hand.“134 This was the philosophy of self-protection that Zhou had adopted during the Cultural Revolution: it explained why he was able to remain in power even though people tried to topple him, why he was able to retain his official position even though people tried to drive him away, and why he survived even though people tried to persecute him. However, during the Cultural Revolution, such a political philosophy of self-protection was insufficient to protect the whole party or its political elite from serious harm. By the time of his death, Zhou was no longer able to bear the persecutions he had to suffer. After Mao Zedong received news of the January 25 conference, he criticized Jiang Qing at a meeting of the Political Bureau for, among other matters, calling the conference and distributing materials without authorization.135 In December 1976, the Central Special Case Group of the CPC Central Committee drew its conclusions about the January 25 Conference Incident.136 vol. 3, 350.) 133. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 789.

134. Chen, Heavy Attack — Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event, 301–302. 135. Pang and Jin eds. A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1685. 136. The materials of the Special Case Group of the CPC Central Committee stated that Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan had carried out immoral activities by trying to seize supreme power over the party and the PLA by criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius. Without the authorization of Chairman Mao, they had convened

a mobilization conference among the military units in Beijing for the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius on January 24, 1974; they organized another such conference

among the central organizations of the state and the party on January 25. These two conferences were actually an attempt to create favorable public opinion for the Gang

48

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Also on January 25, as part of the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, the People’s Publishing House published four books: Compiled Words of Lu Xun against the Way of Confucius and Mencius, Compiled Articles against Lin Biao and Confucius (part I and II), and Compiled Words of Reactionary Forces and Landlord Capitalist Scholars in Worship of Confucius and Restoration of Old Institutions Since the May 4th Movement. These books were distributed around the country. On January 27, Zhou Enlai and members of the Political Bureau interviewed students of the Central Reading Class and delivered speeches on the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius. The points were as follows: 1. The criticisms against Lin Biao and Confucius should be combined, and it was important that the latter be integrated with the former; 2. Criticizing Confucius amounted to eradicating the social roots of old thoughts, old culture, old habits, and old customs; 3. The criticisms of Lin Biao and Confucius represented a long-term, intense ideological struggle.137 This indicates that Zhou was in agreement with Mao Zedong in launching the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, even though he himself was its actual target. Zhou was fully aware that if he did not agree, he would end up like Liu Shaoqi or Lin Biao, whose fall he had facilitated. Zhou did not realize that this time it was his turn to fall. Zhou had no choice but to let people like Jiang Qing make oblique accusations and gnaw away at his own political life. of Four to seize power over the party and state. Through the scheming of the Gang of Four, Wang Hongwen and Jiang Qing attended the conferences as major leaders

of the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius; Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi arrogantly delivered long speeches to incite the masses against Premier Zhou and other central

leaders. In their speeches, they declared that allowing candidates to get in by the back door was a scheme. They stated that this bad practice among people wishing to join the

army or go to college should be stopped. However, at the mobilizing conference for the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, which involved millions of people, such a trivial problem was mentioned purely to create confusion with regard to two kinds of conflicts with totally different natures. The Gang of Four aimed to change the direction

of the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius and to persecute some leaders of

the party, the state, and the PLA who held dissenting opinions. (Central Special Case

Group, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.1,“ December 1976.).

137. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 646–647.

49

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

On January 28, Jiang Qing wrote a letter to Wang Hongwen, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, and others. Accompanying the letter were 500 copies of “Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius,“ Compiled Words of Reactionary Forces and the Land-Owning Capitalist Scholars in Worship of Confucius, Compiled Articles against Lin Biao and Confucius (parts I and II), and Compiled Words of Lu Xun against the Way of Confucius and Mencius. Jiang presented herself as though she were some kind of empress of the PLA. On January 31, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau to discuss the problems of criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius. Zhou proposed that some policies and restrictions should be drafted and approved by Mao Zedong and presented across the country as soon as possible. It was decided at the meeting that the freedom to air one’s views in the form of large posters and great debates should be forbidden in the PLA and party organizations; it was also agreed that the government and CPC organizations should put aside half-days for learning and that schools, factories, and villages in rural areas should not launch or participate in mass movements.138 This showed that with the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, Zhou and others did not want chaotic situations to develop as in the early period of the Cultural Revolution; instead they wanted restrictive policies to be adopted. It was resolved at the meeting that a seven-member team — made up of Zhou Enlai, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan, Hua Guofeng, and Wang Dongxing — should be established to deal with the daily affairs of the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius. In the meantime, a sixmember team of the Central Military Committee would be placed in charge of problems related to the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius. On February 21, the two teams held a joint meeting chaired by Zhou to discuss the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius.139 On February 1, the Peking and Tsinghua University Criticism Team published an article titled “Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius.“140 The article 138. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 289. 139. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 648, 653.

140. The article claimed that the criticism being conducted against Confucius was an important part of the drive against Lin Biao. This was a battle to dig deep into the revisionist cause of the counter-revolutionary activities of Lin Biao. The reactionary ways of Confucius and Mencius were an important source for Lin Biao’s revisionism.

Lin Biao and his followers tried to restore capitalism, tamper with the theoretical foundations of the party, and recruit followers into their counter-revolutionary gang,

and they undertook strategic schemes. They did all this based on the thoughts of

50

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

explained why the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius was launched. Historically, the thoughts of Confucius and Mencius represented the ideology of the declining slave-owning class and the deceptive thought system of the exploitive class. Their nature was to advocate regression and object to progress, stand for conservatism and resist renovation, and fight for the restoration of old institutions and against revolution. This was the way of exploitation and oppression, and it was completely counter-revolutionary. This argument, which was targeted against those who were opposed to the Cultural Revolution in the party and army, regarded that revolution — personally launched and led by Mao Zedong — as progressive, innovative, and radical. This article officially communicated to the country Mao’s view of this movement, which was that not criticizing Confucius and the ideas that Confucius upheld or were against legalism essentially amounted to a failure to castigate Lin Biao. The article also conveyed Mao’s conclusion regarding Lin Biao — the head of the revisionist movement, was a warlord who did not read books, newspapers, or documents.141 On October 20, Mao stated when talking to a foreign visitor that Lin acted like an overlord in the party.142 However, this party overlord and warlord was no match for Mao. On February 2, the People’s Daily published an editorial titled “Continue the Struggle against Lin Biao and Confucius to the End.“ The article began with the statement that a mass-based political struggle against Lin Biao and Confucius, personally launched and led by the great leader Chairman Mao, was being conducted in all sectors. The philosophy of the CPC was one of struggle: “To continue the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, we must continue the struggle against Lin Biao and Confucius to the end. We will progress with this struggle; otherwise, we will regress and fall back to revisionism.“143 This was a further development of Mao Zedong’s philosophy of struggle as articulated by Confucius and Mencius. The article stated that if the painted skin of Lin Biao was torn away, the wicked, ugly heart of a Confucian disciple would be exposed. (Peking

University and Tsinghua University Criticism Team, “Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius,“ originally printed in the Red Flag, issue 2, February 1, 1974; reprinted in the People’s Daily, February 7, 1974.)

141. This conclusion by Mao Zedong was communicated via Jiang Qing in her speech.

(“Speeches Given by Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing, Chi Qun, Xie Jingyi, and Yao Wenyuan at the Mobilization Meeting of Institutions Directly under the CPC Central Committee and State Organizations against Lin Biao and Confucius,“ January 25, 1974.)

142. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 114.

143. People’s Daily, February 2, 1974.

51

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Yao Wenyuan and others. Whenever political struggles arose within the party, this philosophy would repeatedly being emphasized and execute to the extreme. On February 5, the People’s Daily published an article titled “Self-Denial, the Restoration of Old Rituals, and Lin Biao, the Careerist and Schemer.“ The article stated that there will be a time where keeping the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius going would carry paramount importance to the party, the PLA, and all the Chinese people. To criticize Lin Biao required censuring Confucius; to censure Confucius was to better criticize Lin: “We must make a tremendous effort in criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius, and we have to continue this struggle to the end!“144 On February 6, Jiang Qing submitted to Mao Zedong materials against Lin Biao and Confucius that had been prepared by Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi. On February 9, Mao instructed that Jiang should consult with the Political Bureau. At that time, Mao was suffering from a serious medical condition.145 On February 10, Jiang Qing created the so-called Snail Incident in the No. 4 Ministry of Machine-Building Industry. Jiang charged that when the investigation team of the ministry accepted the gift of a glass snail from a color TV camera tube manufacturer in the United States, it was actually “yielding to the pressure of imperialism...worshipping foreign things and fawning on foreign countries.“ Jiang declared: “We reject this color TV production line.“ Zhou Enlai instructed the foreign ministry to inquire into this incident. On February 21, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a report to Zhou on the American gift. Zhou gave his instructions on this matter. Zhou chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau to discuss the Snail Incident, in which it was resolved that Jiang’s comments about the gift should not be printed or distributed; comments that had already been distributed had to be recalled immediately.146 The Snail Incident was a typical case of Jiang’s exclusivism. Later, Jiang created the Fengqing Incident and other incidents. Jiang was acting like a mad political dog. She first bit Zhou Enlai and then Deng Xiaoping; however, Deng did not accept this but fought back against Jiang. After the Sino-U.S. relationship, the Sino-U.K. relationship was restored in 1972. As a consequence, the second wave of introducing equipment from foreign countries after the founding of the PRC took place. Through the active efforts of 144. People’s Daily, February 5, 1974. 145. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 372.

146. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 650.

52

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Zhou Enlai, Li Xiannian, and Chen Yun, equipment worth USD1,259 million was imported in 1973; however, owing to the interference of Jiang Qing and others, that figure fell to USD831 million in 1974 (Table 6.1). The struggle between the two groups was not only a political one; it was also a struggle between opening-up and exclusion, and in this struggle Jiang prevailed. On February 11, the People’s Daily published an open letter in reply to Wang Yazhuo.147 In the editor’s note stated the struggle between the two routes and thoughts was still on going, even in the front line of education: “Should we progress or regress, support revolutions or choose compromises, support and develop fresh phenomena of revolution, or criticize them without studying them first? These are important problems that must be solved to further promote the cause of revolution in education.“148 This incident was perpetrated by Jiang Qing and Chi Qun, and it was essentially a political dictatorship over those who doubted the merits of the Cultural Revolution and a cultural dictatorship over dissent among the common people. Table 6.1

Value of Imported Equipment (1972–1976) (USD1 million)

Petrochemical Steel Fertilizer Coal and electricity Transportation Communications and electronics Nonferrous metals Manufacturing Oil and gas Other* Total

1972 — — — 23 — —

1973 698 — 392 161 — —

1974 114 651 120 46 — —

1975 90 — — — 200 —

1976 136 40 — — — —

— — — 3.5 58

— 8 — — 1259

— — — — 831

— 74 — — 364

— 9 — — 185

Source: The U.S. Joint Economic Committee of Congress, ed., China under the Four Modernizations, vol. 1b, 328.

Note: *Includes cement factories, hotels and office buildings, and caustic soda plants. 147. Wang Yazhuo was the name adopted by Wang Xiaowen, En Yali, and Xing Zhuo from the

19th Regiment of the Production and Construction Corps of Xinjiang. They expressed a

different opinion against “A Letter and Journal Entries of a Primary Student“ (authored by Huang Shuai), which was reprinted in the People’s Daily on December 28, 1973, as well as the corresponding editor’s note. 148. People’s Daily, February 11, 1974.

53

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

On February 12, the People’s Daily published an editorial titled “Criticizing Selfdenial and the Restoration of Old Rituals — Lin Biao’s Reactionary Guidelines to Restore Capitalism.“149 Issue no. 4 of Red Flag published an article titled “On Lu’s Historical Commentaries“ by Luo Siding, and another, “Confucius the Individual,“ by Liang Xiao (the Peking and Tsinghua University Criticism Team). Written under the instructions of Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan, these two articles were directed at Zhou Enlai.150 Other articles published on the orders of Jiang Qing included “Wu Zetian, the Talented Stateswoman in Ancient China“ and “Profile of Legalistic Figures — Empress Lu,“ which aimed to enlist public support for Jiang Qing in her efforts to seize supreme power over the party and state.151 These articles embodied feudalism, not Marxism. The article “On the Policy of Salt and Iron,“ written by the Peking and Tsinghua University Criticism Team, was published in issue no. 5 of Red Flag, having been personally revised and approved by Yao Wenyuan. Following the instructions of Jiang, Yao revised the article such that it alluded to Zhou Enlai.152 At the very beginning, the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius met with 149. The editorial stated that Lin Biao’s political program was to insist on establishing the

position of state president. Lin’s theoretical guideline was his theory of genius. In terms of class struggle, Lin was attempting to reinstate the land-owning capitalist class in China and set up a fascist monarchy based on his family. Lin’s revisionist course, which

was contrary to the revolutionary direction, reflected the wishes of landlords, rich

farmers, reactionary forces, evil elements, rightist forces, imperialists, revisionists, and

counter-revolutionaries in restoring China’s old institutions. (People’s Daily, February

12, 1974.)

150. Central Special Case Group, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.3,“ September 1977.

151. Zhu Yongjia (head of the CPC Shanghai Committee Writing Team) confessed that

“Confucius the Individual“ was an immoral article written by the Peking University and Tsinghua University Criticism Team based on Jiang Qing’s proposal. On March 26, 1974, Jiang personally sent the article to Yao Wenyuan, who replied upon reading

it: “This article is eloquent and publishable.“ This article was an attack on Zhou Enlai under the guise of criticizing Lin Biao. Materials provided by the Red Flag. (Ibid.)

152. When Yao Wenyuan revised this article, he added the following: “They strongly advocated the ideal political atmosphere. During the period of Regent Zhou, all

scholars, wise or not, were allowed to discuss politics.“ This was an allusive attack on Zhou Enlai. Materials provided by the Red Flag. (Ibid.)

54

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

resistance and was disputed in the party. It was targeted both Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying, when Jiang Qing, Chi Qun, and Xie Jingyi attacked the phenomenon of “letting people in through the back door.“ Their actions and such attacks enraged Ye Jianying, so much so that Mao Zedong had to mediate between them. On February 15, Mao Zedong replied to the letter from Ye Jianying.153 Mao stated that biased and excessive views were rampant. Mao said that if an attack were made on the so-called bending of the law to admit disqualified people, the criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius might be diluted and weakened. Mao’s opinion was that the speeches of Xie Jingyi and Chi Qun were flawed and should not be distributed154 Mao stopped the recordings of Xie’s and Chi’s speeches at the January 25 conference from being played around the country. Apparently, Mao was unwilling to incur widespread dissatisfaction within the party. As a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee, and vice chairman of the Central Military Committee, Ye Jianying was influential in the army. This act was a political concession made by Mao in the Cultural Revolution. On February 16, Zhou Enlai told Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi that the rampant biased and excessive views mentioned by Mao Zedong were a criticism of Jiang Qing. Zhou chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau to communicate Mao’s reply to the letter from Ye Jianying.155 When the meeting was over, Jiang Qing returned home and raged over Mao and Zhou.156 On February 18, Jiang wrote a letter to Mao, admitting the fact that she had done something foolish and had let him down; she also promised to learn avoid being biased or own excessive views.157 On February 20, the “Notice on the Issue of the Back Door“ was issued by the CPC Central Committee. It stated that in the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, leading officials of many units had used the “back door“ to have their children enter the army or be admitted to college. Following the instructions of Chairman Mao, the CPC Central Committee deliberated on this problem. 153. On January 31, 1974, Ye Jianying wrote a letter to the CPC Central Committee and Mao

Zedong, stating that he was willing to accept Jiang Qing’s help in the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius; Mao Zedong replied to this.

154. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 377.

155. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 290. 156. Central Special Case Group, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.1,“ December 1976.

157. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 290.

55

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

The committee resolved that those leading officials should be grateful for these criticisms from the masses; more than a million individuals are involved. Those who entered through the back door may have been well qualified and excellent, while those who entered the institutions in the regular manner may not always meet the expected standards and requirements. The committee decided that this problem warranted careful analysis and cautious treatment. The campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius had just started. As in Mao’s letter, the committee stated that if the so-called bending of the law to admit disqualified people were attacked, the criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius might be diluted and weakened. Therefore, the CPC Central Committee held that this problem should be investigated so that a policy could be formulated to deal with these issues in the later period of the campaign. The political confrontation between Ye Jianying and Jiang Qing came to a temporary halt with Mao’s censuring of Jiang. This was the cause of their political enmity, and it was the direct reason for Ye Jianying strongly supporting Hua Guofeng in having Jiang arrested. Also on February 20, the People’s Daily published an editorial titled “Criticizing Self-denial and the Restoration of Old Rituals — Lin Biao’s Reactionary Guidelines toward Restoring Capitalism.“ The editorial emphasized that Lin’s anti-CPC group had to be repudiated for denying the merits of the Cultural Revolution and the basic theories and practices of Chairman Mao with regard to socialist revolution and socialist construction.158 This was targeted at doubts over the Cultural Revolution and at the criticisms of Zhou Enlai and others over the ultra-leftism and errors of the Cultural Revolution. From February to March, Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, and Zhang Chunqiao 158. The editorial argued that criticizing Lin Biao’s problem demanded an association with the class struggle and political direction. Lin’s anti-CPC clique had to be criticized

for repudiating the Cultural Revolution and denying the basic theories and practices of Chairman Mao regarding socialistic revolution and construction, and also for

attempting to restore revisionism: “We should stick to the party’s basic political route

and remain on the course of socialism. The vicious curses of Lin Biao and his followers on the fresh phenomenon of socialism need to be censured. We need to adhere to the

principles of combining younger, middle-aged, and older cadres. Revolutions in such areas as education, literature and the arts, and health care should continue; cadres

should go to the grassroots and educated young people should go to the countryside. Lin Biao is also to be criticized for his attempt to ally with the Soviet Union socialistic

imperialists, yield to other countries, and betray our own country. We should stand on

our own feet, rely on ourselves, and carry forth internationalism and patriotism of the proletariat.“ (People’s Daily, February 20, 1974.)

56

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

voiced their criticisms at campaign meetings of the military and meetings of the leaders of military propaganda units. Qing, Wang, and Zhang declared that the leading organizations of the military had been passive and perfunctory in the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius. They said that the organizations had displayed rightist softness and it was necessary to “set a fire to burn the weeds“ in the PLA so as to bring down those who needed to be brought down politically.159 Jiang’s group took advantage of the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius to attack the PLA, yet faced military resistance. Jiang Qing also made efforts to further her ideas in the area of scientific research. On March 10, she wrote a letter to the Photosensitive Materials Laboratory in the Chemistry Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and sent them an article titled “Liuxia Zhi Criticized Confucius,“ written by Tang Xiaowen. In her letter, she called on the academics to learn from Liuxia Zhi in fighting the followers of Confucius in their laboratory. The same day, Jiang wrote a letter to Zhou Enlai, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Li Xiannian, Ji Dengkui, Hua Guofeng, and Wang Dongxing, saying: “It is our responsibility to support Tang Xiaowen since truth is on the side of the comrades who have written to us.“ She went on describing those capitalist and collaborative capitalist supporters as closeminded: they blatantly attempted to criticize the Cultural Revolution. The Chinese Academy of Sciences held a meeting, during which Liu Xiyao, Wu Heng, and other heads of the academy underwent public criticism.160 The campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius encountered resistance from both within and outside the party; Liang Shuming was considered the most outspoken intellectual among all. From February 22 to 25, Liang Shuming publicly expressed his resistance to the campaign both orally and in writing. In late 1973, when the campaign was initiated, Liang Shuming addressed the December 14 meeting of the Study Teams of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), democratic parties, and the Beijing Federation of Industry and Commerce: “Chairman Mao has repeatedly affirmed that dissent should be allowed...I have reservations about the current campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius...I disagree with the current criticism of Confucius.“ On January 25, 1974, Jiang Qing said at a mobilization meeting for central organizations, “Liang Shuming objects to us and our campaign against Confucius. He worships Confucius...The chairman has said that Confucius was a tyrant and a fascist...Academics like Liang Shuming don’t understand.“ 159. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 654.

160. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 793.

57

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Liang Shuming delivered a speech at study meetings on February 22 and 25 titled “How Should We Evaluate Confucius Today?“ Liang argued that evaluating Confucius required affirming the influence of Confucius in the cultural history of China and acknowledging both his shortcomings and his achievements: “In my eyes, Confucius has his merits and flaws...But my views as expressed in my articles are at odds with the current movement to censure Confucius.“ Liang stated that Confucius had been contributing in China’s 5,000-year culture. He saw this culture playing an important role in the past, and so would it be in the future: “The criticism of the Confucian insistence on self-denial and restoration of old rituals is now prevalent. However, such criticism and arguments are baseless...As to why Lin Biao practiced calligraphy by writing ’Self-denial and the Restoration of Old Rituals’ and what he understood by ’self’ and ’old rituals,’ no one can answer except Lin himself...I believe that Lin should be censured, but Confucius should be spared...Liu Shaoqi made many proposals, and those are openly known. Peng Dehuai also wrote an open letter to Chairman Mao. Both Liu and Peng made many proposals in the interests of the nation. For many years, I have tried to establish a basic common ground in spite of differences with the leaders of the CPC. “For these words, Liang was politically rebuked. He responded at the meeting on September 13: “You may kill the general of the army, but you can’t force me to change my mind.“161 On March 20, Mao Zedong criticized Jiang Qing, saying that despite having access to all the books introducing Marxism and Leninism as well as his own books, Jiang ignored them: “I am now seriously ill. I’m 81 years old, and yet you ignore that too. Now you are enjoying certain privileges. But what will happen to you after I die? You’re just like the others: you disregard the fundamental principles and make a fuss over trivialities.“162 As Mao Zedong became older, weaker, and sicker, his became more and more concern over the fate of Jiang since she was making many enemies. Mao was aware that bad deeds, like good ones, may rebound on the doer. However, Mao was unable to withhold Jiang’s privileges. He criticized her for causing further trouble and attacked Deng Xiaoping, who had just returned to power. In late March, Mao Zedong proposed that Deng Xiaoping should head the Chinese delegation at a special meeting of the United Nations. Mao’s idea had been well considered: he hoped Deng would soon be replace Zhou Enlai in handling 161. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1041–1042.

162. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 372.

58

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

China’s foreign affairs.163 However, Jiang Qing repeatedly objected to this proposal. She was extremely dissatisfied with the fact that Deng had returned to power, and she was even angrier when Deng was placed in important positions. Jiang could not bear the idea that Deng would take the limelight on the world political stage at this special United Nations meeting. Citing security issues and onerous domestic duties, Jiang objected to this proposition at a meeting of the Political Bureau.164 Seeing that Jiang Qing was causing trouble with the Political Bureau, Zhou Enlai instructed Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng to report the matter to Mao Zedong. Wang and Tang became liaison officers for Mao, bridging the communication between Mao and the Political Bureau. On March 26, Zhou chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau, and all the members but Jiang Qing, unanimously agreed to have Deng Xiaoping leading the delegation at this special meeting of the United Nations. Mao instructed Wang and Tang to tell Zhou: “I think that Deng Xiaoping should attend the meeting at the United Nations. But I will not insist on this if the comrades of the Political Bureau object.“ Zhou Enlai responded: “We are all in full agreement with Chairman Mao’s idea.“ On March 27, Mao Zedong angrily wrote a letter to Jiang, saying: “I want Comrade Deng Xiaoping to go abroad. You’d better not objecting this. Be modest and prudent. Do not oppose my idea.“165 This showed that Jiang regarded both Zhou and Deng as her political opponents. Jiang acknowledged that she was acting like a mad dog, but this mad dog had to restrain herself since Mao supported Zhou and Deng. On April 10, the CPC Central Committee issued the “Notice on Several Problems on the Campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius.“ In light of what had occurred earlier in the Cultural Revolution, some restraints and regulations were adopted concerning the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius.166 163. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 298. 164. Ibid., 298–299. 165. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 373.

166. The notice stipulated the following points: first, the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius had to be conducted under the unified leadership of the CPC Central

Committee. Such mass organizations as independent brigades were prohibited, as

was the establishment of links between industries and regions. Organizations that had

been established, such as liaison stations, appeal groups, and report groups, should be persuaded by the CPC committees to return to their own units to participate in the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius as well as participate in the efforts toward revolution, production, and preparing for war. Second, servicemen and servicewomen

had made a huge contribution toward efforts to support the leftist masses as well as

59

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

On May 18, the CPC Central Committee issued “Notice on Policy Problems That Arose in the Campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius“ as revised and approved by Mao Zedong. This notice represented a further regulation of the campaign, especially restraining the campaign in the military.167 In accordance with Mao’s instructions, the notice stated that Chairman Mao had always believed China and its people to be good, and he held the same about the CPC, state organizations, and the PLA: he maintained that they were like pure gold that did not fear the furnace. However, in the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius in 1974, Mao allowed only two leading officials to be liberated, which was the smallest number in years.168 In May, Mao Zedong hosted some foreign visitors, with Wang Hongwen, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhou Enlai also in attendance. Mao intended to provide some training to Wang Hongwen, who was completely inexperienced in foreign affairs; he also wished to observe Deng closely under such circumstances. Mao wished

industrial and agricultural production; they had also made a major contribution in

conducting military control in some places, departments, and units and in the military training of students. Those involved in such efforts need not return to their units to

participate in the campaign. Third, great achievements had been made in the campaign against Lin Biao; however, the campaign against Confucius posed more difficulties. Fourth, CPC committees at all levels should reinforce their leadership, become united

with over 95% of the people and cadres, and make all efforts to continue the movement. 167. The notice stipulated that the problems concerning leaders that required investigation

should be restricted to problems related to the activities of the Lin Biao anti-CPC clique. It further stated that in terms of time, only the problems that arose after the August-

September inspection tour of Chairman Mao in 1971 should be investigated in addition to problems that arose, despite the publication of Document No. 57, 1971, by the CPC

Central Committee. That document declared that the CPC Central Committee would

not readily doubt comrades who had clearly distanced themselves from Lin Biao — irrespective of whatever influences he or she may have received from Lin or whether he or she had made mistakes. Past problems — including severe mistakes — should be ignored as long as the individual confessed their errors to the party and distanced

themselves from the Lin Biao anti-CPC clique. The notice stated that it was necessary to

ensure that among the leading organizations and armies under the level of army corps, only positive education was promoted.

168. This calculation was based on the contents page of Mao Zedong’s Works Since the

Founding of New China, vol. 13, compiled by Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee.

60

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Wang and Deng to form a new team of leadership,169 with Wang presiding over the routine work of the CPC Central Committee instead of Zhou, who was suffering from deteriorating health. Mao wanted Wang to continue the political course he had adopted in the Cultural Revolution; however, Mao was also desirous that Deng become able to rule the country and restore economic growth. In terms of the power structure, such a strong team would be able to ensure a unified, mutually balanced political situation in China. However, in terms of their individual competence, Wang was no match for Deng — particularly in terms of political influence and prestige. Without Mao’s personal support, the Gang of Four would have already been perished.170 On June 12, Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan held a meeting with Chi Qun and others. Jiang asked why it was necessary to launch the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius. She said that it was because Lin, who worshipped Confucius, was a Confucian disciple. Jiang declared that it was essential to criticize and inherit the situation which they found themselves in: the struggle between the forces that aimed to restore old institutions and those that fought against them — and the struggle between progressive and regressive forces — had existed since the slavery and feudalistic societies through to the socialistic one. There were still some people, stated Jiang, who wanted to restore the old institutions: “To do this requires Confucian theories; to conduct our revolution requires criticism and inheriting legalism in history. Everything Confucian is a betrayal of our national interests, and everything legalistic is patriotic.“171 On June 14, Jiang Qing convened a meeting of the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius for the military. She delivered a speech on the so-called history of the struggles between Confucians and Legalists, and she demanded that articles be written to criticize modern Confucians: “Why should we fight against Confucius? Are there any Confucians around nowadays? Confucians abound, and Chiang Kai-shek was the chief one.“172 Later, Jiang ordered Chi Qun to write an article against Zhou Enlai, denouncing Zhou as a modern Confucian.173 From June 17 to 169. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 307–308. 170. Deng Rong believed that Mao Zedong may have believed that the political checks had

basically been put in place. However, such arrangements — even though they had been carefully made — were not at all stable. Mao was over-confident in his belief that such arrangements would ensure a stable political situation after his death. (Ibid., 294.)

171. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1091–1092.

172. Ibid., 1092. 173. “Jiang Qing proposed that my recent perusals of inside materials had led her to ask a

61

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

28, when Jiang visited Tianjin, she talked about the struggles between Confucians and Legalists and the need to expose modern Confucians.174 On July 12, Jiang Qing demanded that the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius be extended to the elementary and junior high schools across the country.175 Since February, Mao Zedong had criticized Jiang Qing six times hoping she would behave; yet she was acting just as reckless as before. Angry and fed up,176 Mao Zedong criticized Jiang Qing on July 17, 1974 at a meeting of the Political question that few had asked before about modern Confucians. It related to the identity

of old Confucians, who are far more than just Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao.“ (Central Special Case Group, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.1,“ December 1976.)

174. On June 19, 1974, Jiang Qing addressed a report meeting about the history of the struggles between Confucians and Legalists in Tianjin. She said that in the history of China, all the forces that had worshipped Confucian theories and fought against legalism since the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods had betrayed the national interests;

all those forces that had worshipped legalism and fought against Confucianism were

patriotic. This was a very important principle. All the legalistic forces in history had

struggled up from the grassroots level; all the great feudalistic figures and emperors — regardless of whether they were established emperors or had inherited the position

— were generally legalistic or close to legalism. In general, the Legalists in history were

patriotic, caring for and encouraging the people; the Confucianists were ruthless and cruel to the people, regardless they were slaves, peasants, or working class. “Don’t

make the mistake of thinking that there are no Confucianists in socialistic societies.

There are quite a few Confucianists in our party. The focus of this campaign is to criticize the Confucianists in the party.” (Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s

Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1093–1094.)

175. On July 12, 1974, Jiang Qing wrote a comment on a letter from Su Wucheng on the

campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius at No. 27 Secondary School in Beijing, and the comment was published in a magazine within the Beijing Daily: “We need to

conduct the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius in schools — even elementary schools. We need to exert influence even from that age. Any delay would harm the

children as they later become teenagers. Such classics as the Three-Character Scripture were written for children. We haven’t paid enough attention to this problem. We would

face a real problem if we didn’t have our children familiar with the basics of Marxism and didn’t educate them against Confucius.“ (Ibid., 1103.)

176. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 309.

62

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Bureau: “You need to take greater care! Others are not happy with your conduct, but they are unable to tell you directly. You’re still unaware of this. Do not make hasty accusations. Don’t make allegations, and don’t organize yourself with others into a Gang of Four [referring to Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan]!“ Mao publicly declared that she did not represent him: she represented only herself.177 Mao said in conclusion about Jiang Qing: “She has both good and bad sides!“ After this, he called the meeting.178 However, Jiang knew that even though Mao had rebuked her, he would never bring her down politically: he needed to protect her as her fate was closely intertwined with the development of the Cultural Revolution, which Mao had launched. The members of the Political Bureau at that time were also aware of this. As a result, Jiang continued along her course with Mao behind her.179 Jiang and her supporters were Cultural Revolution hardliners. Nonetheless, Mao’s criticism on Jiang and her associates acted was like a Sword of Damocles hanging over the heads of the Gang of Four. After Mao’s death, such rebukes would be used by the other members of the Political Bureau to politically bury the Gang of Four. On September 8, the People’s Daily published an article titled “Zhao Gao’s Usurpation of Power and the Doom of the Qin Dynasty.“ This article was read by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, and revised by Yao Wenyuan. Aiming to analyze the struggle between Confucianism and Legalism, the article attacked Zhou Enlai. At the same time, it sang the praises towards Lu Zhi, which amounted to ideological preparation for Jiang Qing to become a modern empress.180 On October 1, Red Flag issue no. 10 published the article “Research on the Historical Experience of the Struggle between Confucianism and Legalism“ by Liang Xiao. This article, which had been planned, revised, and finalized by Yao Wenyuan, made an allusive attack on Zhou Enlai, and stated that Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, who were as dangerous as Zhao Gao and Liu Bi, had sneaked their way into the party. The article declared that under the dictatorship of the proletariat, agents of the capitalist class in the party had adopted the antirevolutionary strategy of “removing the evil people close to the emperor“ to attack the revolutionary force that adhered to the correct course of Chairman Mao.181 This 177. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1693. 178. Gu and Du, The Last Seven Years of Mao Zedong, 188–189. 179. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 309. 180. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1122; Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 309–310.

181. The article argued: “In feudalistic societies, there always existed the struggle between

63

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

article did in fact predict the political fate that would befall the Gang of Four in October 1976. Taking advantage of the fact that Zhou Enlai, her greatest political opponent, was being ill, Jiang Qing struck him further. Earlier, on June 1 in Hospital 205, Zhou Enlai underwent his first big operation. He then spent the last year and a half of his life in hospital. He underwent a total of 14 operations, six were major and eight minor. Even hospitalized, he held 233 meetings: 161 were with central leaders, 55 were with the heads of local areas and departments, and 17 were with people who worked for him.182 The campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius accelerated Zhou’s demise. During that period, Deng Xiaoping acted as vice premier of the State Council and shared some of Zhou’s duties, especially foreign affairs related duties. Wang Hongwen presided over the daily work of the CPC Central Committee. All the leaders had to report to Mao Zedong, who left Beijing for southern China on July 17 for recreational purposes. With the approval of Mao Zedong, the CPC Central Committee announced in July that the problems of Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin, and Fu Chongbi were the result of a frame-up by Lin Biao. Those individuals had been wronged, and it was now time to redress their grievances. Shortly thereafter, Yang, Yu, and Fu were those who worshipped Confucianism and objected to legalism and those who

worshipped legalism and objected to Confucianism; that has continued through to the present time: ’Whether the emergent landlord class retained ruling power depended

on whether it could keep to the legalistic route.’ After Emperor Qin Shi Huang died, Zhao Gao launched a coup to replace legalism with Confucianism, whereby lowly

people would be recommended and placed in important positions; humble people would be promoted, poor people would be enriched, and approaches would be made

to those who had been held at a distance. Bloody vengeance was carried out against the political representatives of the landlord class. After Liu Bang died, generations of

emperors, from Empress Lu to Emperor Wendi, continued the legalism of Liu Bang; Legalists, such as Chao Cuo, Zhang Tang, and Sang Hongyang, were promoted to important positions in the central government. The rule of this legalistic leadership in

the central government ensured adherence to legalism. Liu Bi, king of the Wu State,

furthered the anti-revolutionary strategy of ’removing evil people close to the emperor’ to remove the legalistic figures in the decision-making process and crush the legalistic leadership in the central government; as a result, the legalistic route became replaced.“ (Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1133–1134.) 182. Quan, Zhou Enlai Up Close, 385.

64

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

released and reinstated by the CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Committee.183 On July 31, Zhou Enlai and members of the Political Bureau in Beijing held meetings with Lu Zhengcao, Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin, and Fu Chongbi on behalf of the CPC Central Committee, and the rehabilitation of those individuals was announced. When Zhou talked to Yang of this incident, Zhou said that anyone would feel frustrated in Yang’s circumstances: “When you were brought down in March 1968, the chairman was somewhat hesitant, and so four meetings were held to deal with the matter. Several days later, when the chairman mentioned you, he clenched his fists and said, ’One was a vice admiral and the other was the acting commander in chief; which one do you think I should bring down? At that time, I didn’t have sufficient reason to abandon the vice admiral! I couldn’t account for my actions to the Chinese people!’ The chairman blamed himself because of you. I now blame myself because of you.“ To Yang’s great distress, Zhou informed Yang that his eldest daughter had died as a result of the persecutions.184 Zhou wrote three applications to reinstate Yang. On the previous occasion, Mao lost his temper before it was resolved that Yang be reinstated.185 This indicates that the incident relating to Yang, Yu, and Fu created by Lin Biao and Jiang Qing in March 1968 was not resolved until two years after the fall of the Lin Biao clique as a result of hindrance by Kang Sheng and Jiang Qing. On August 16, Zhou Enlai held a meeting with Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng to obtain a clear picture of the situation when Wang Hongwen supported the Central Military Committee in passing the policy of criticizing that committee’s leaders in the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius.186 This demonstrates how Wang Hongwen took advantage of Zhou’s hospitalization to intervene military affairs and conduct class struggles in the PLA. On September 29, according to a Mao approved plan proposed by Zhou Enlai, the Central Military Committee issued the “Notice on Rehabilitating Comrade He Long.“187 Who then was responsible for He Long being framed? Why should a 183. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1102.

184. Chen, Heavy Attack — Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event, 69. 185. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 673.

186. Ibid., 674. 187. The notice stated that after the September 13 Incident in 1971, the CPC Central

Committee launched a direct investigation into the problem of He Long: “Chairman

Mao has instructed on many occasions that we should not waste any time in

65

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

marshal of the PRC have been persecuted to death? On December 30, 1966, Jiang Qing declared at a mass meeting that Comrade He had problems, and she incited people to rise against him. On January 9, 1967, Lin Biao slandered He Long at a meeting by saying he tried to seize power everywhere, and proposed “exposing the problems of Comrade He.“ Jiang and Lin fabricated the story that He Long had intended to launch the February Mutiny, and they launched violent protests at He’s residence. On February 14, Yan Zhangyan, son of Yan Yunpu (who had been director of Division 2 under the Kuomintang Nanchang Field Headquarters and a teacher in Wuhan Secondary School no. 20), wrote to the Central Cultural Revolution Group. In that letter, Yan concocted the story that He Long had once begged to surrender to Chiang Kai-shek and had thus tried to betray the nation in yielding to the enemy. Following the instructions of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing, an investigation team alleged that He attempted to betray the country and surrender, though he was unsuccessful; they then reported this allegation to the CPC Central Committee on July 12. On September 13, a meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution Group chaired by Zhou Enlai resolved to set up a case team under the direction of Kang Sheng to investigate the He Long case. Kang stated that He’s case involved two betrayals: the February Mutiny of 1966 and the betrayal of history. On June 14, 1968, Office 2 of the Central Special Case Group made He Long a suspect as part of its investigations and put him into custody. On October 13, Mao Zedong announced at the Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee that he would no longer protect He Long. On June 9, 1969, Admiral He Long died without the false charges against him having been cleared. In May 1971, the “Investigation Report on He Long“ by the Central Special Case Group identified Admiral He Long as a collaborationist in the party and the PLA. The report stated that He was an anti-CPC element who had seized military power; it proposed to deprive He’s party membership and declaring him a criminal to some degree in an effort to cleanse his poisonous influence. rehabilitating Comrade He Long. Comrade He Long died of illness on July 9, 1969. Under the leadership of Chairman Mao and the CPC Central Committee, Comrade He

Long was a good comrade; he made great contributions to the revolutionary cause of the party and the people. Therefore, the CPC Central Committee has resolved to reinstate

Comrade He Long. The Central Special Case Group in the CPC Central Committee made a report on September 13, 1974, declaring that Lin Biao, Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng, and others framed Comrade He Long by trumping up charges, fabricating history, and deceiving the party and the people.“

66

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

At the end of February 1973, Mao Zedong told Zhang Chunqiao in the swimming pool of Zhongnanhai: “I believe that He Long was innocent. He killed Xiong Gongqing, the spy sent by Chiang Kai-shek in 1933...I was wrong to have only listened to one side of the case.“ However, Zhang Chunqiao deliberately failed to convey Mao’s opinion to the Political Bureau. On December 21, 1973, when addressing delegates at a meeting of the Central Military Committee, Mao Zedong said He Long’s name should be cleared: “I think I’ve been wrong about Comrade He Long and that I am to blame for what happened to him. I told him that he was different from other officials since he led the army, and I must protect him. We must reverse the verdict on He Long: we can’t continue with the present judgment of him. This situation is all because of Lin Biao: I listened to just one side of the story from Lin Biao and that was a mistake.“188 This misjudgment in the case of He Long shows that, although Mao Zedong promised He Long he would protect him, He died as a result of the struggles within the CPC rather than at the hands of the Kuomintang. This demonstrates that Mao’s theory about the Cultural Revolution was very wrong and that the political conflicts were brutal. However, instead of thoroughly grasping the situation, Mao attributed his mistake to having listened to Lin Biao’s allegation. At that time, Kang Sheng and Jiang Qing, who were responsible for investigating the He Long case, were a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and a member of the Political Bureau, respectively. Why did Mao not think to check their allegations? The notice of the Central Committee retained this wording: “The Central Committee was convinced at that time that it was necessary to investigate and clear the name of Comrade He Long.“ On June 9, 1975, when Zhou Enlai attended the enshrinement ceremony of He Long’s ashes, he confessed to Xue Ming, wife of He Long: “I failed to protect him.“ Zhou bowed seven times to the portrait of the deceased.189 Apparently, Zhou also bore political responsibility for what happened to He. On September 30, Zhou Enlai, though ill, attended the reception celebrating National Day for the last time, and thunderous applause rocked the hall. His toast was interrupted over a dozen times by the applause. In all, 4,500 domestic and foreign guests attended the reception, which indicates that the attacks on Zhou by Jiang Qing and others in the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius were contrary to the wishes of the party, the military, and the people. That National Day reception was presided over by Wang Hongwen; Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and 188. Chen, Heavy Attack — Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event, 74–77. 189. Editorial Committee of Biography of He Long comp., Biography of He Long.

67

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

others were also present. They accelerated their attacks on Zhou. The moderates and the Cultural Revolution hardliners were vying for Mao Zedong’s support in the political contest. Mao tried to strike a balance between the two forces while firmly retain supreme power.

Political Struggles at the 4th National People’s Congress When Mao Zedong launched the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, the national economy suffered from a drastic decline from January to May 1974; comparing with the same period of time in previous year, coal, steel and fertilizer output decreased 2.5%, 9.4% and 3.3% respectively. However, despite the financial revenues shrank by 4 billion yuan, the financial expenditure increased by 2.5 billion yuan.190 Owing to the financial deficit, supplies of agricultural products and byproducts were very tight, so as those daily household articles191 On June 13, Li Xiannian submitted the “Outline Report on Industrial and Agricultural Production by the State Planning Commission and Notice on Strengthening Revolution and Production“ to Wang Hongwen, which Li had drafted on behalf of the CPC Central Committee. On June 18, the Political Bureau listened to the State Planning Commission’s report, and on July 1 the notice was officially issued with Mao Zedong’s approval. The notice acknowledged that some regions and units had failed to fulfill the plans set by the state: there was a severe shortage in output and congestion with rail transport, which affected freight transport across the nation.192 190. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 809.

191. Sun, General Economic History of China (1949–2000), vol. 2, 1786–1788. 192. The notice stated that some regions and units did not fulfill the state plans for industrial production in the first half of 1974. The two weak areas at that time were coal and rail

transport. From January to May, there was a shortfall of 8.35 million tons of coal in China’s major coal mines; in particular, the leading coal mines in Shandong, Anhui, and Jiangsu suffered a drastic reduction in production, which caused national output

to fall. Xuzhou, Changsha, Baotou, and Guiyang suffered frequent rail congestion: this was so severe that the four trunk lines of Tianjin-Pukou, Beijing-Guangzhou, Beijing-

Baotou, and Guiyang-Kunming were impeded, which hampered freight transport

across the nation and caused many enterprises to shut down or reduce production. Output of steel, nonferrous metal, fertilizer, and cement fell short of the plan and so did

military production. Wuhan Steel Company, Baotou Steel Company, and other major

68

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

This indicates that the central leadership, including Mao, was acutely aware of the severe economic consequences of the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius. Why did the economic downturn continue? The notice stated that the basic cause was that the revolutionary activities had not been conducted properly — like the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, a small number of class enemies had taken the opportunity to cause trouble and disruption. The notice said that it was necessary to deliver a heavy blow against the evil elements that had sabotaged production, transport, and the social order; it was necessary to expose and deal with the people who had caused the shutdowns. At the same time, the notice criticized economism.193 The so-called evil elements however was not the key factor for causing rapid national economy decay, the initiators and the against Lin Biao and Confucius campaign itself was the actual culprit. In the era of Mao Zedong, the author concludes that political factors were the major cause of economic fluctuation in China: the fiercer the political struggles, the greater their impact on the economy. The fluctuation coefficient of the growth rate of GDP in the Mao era was 154%, which reflects the unpredictable, uncontrollable dramatic swings.194 In 1974, Mao Zedong felt increasingly dissatisfied with the chaos in the economy, social instability, and political divisions; and hoped to make this right by preparing to convene the 4th People’s National Congress — which had not been held in the eight years since 1966. In accordance with Article 25 of the Constitution of the PRC, the People’s National Congress of China should be held once a year. Such a disparity between the Constitution and the actual situation shows that Mao had severely damaged basic systems of state or essentially disabled them. Only until 1974 would Mao wanted to re-establish this system to restore stability and unity. With Zhou Enlai being so ill, Mao Zedong charged Wang Hongwen with the enterprises suffered a drastic decrease in production. 193. The notice declared that economism was revisionist thought that corrupted the proletariat and undermined the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius: “Leading

comrades and revolutionary masses should enhance their alertness against this evil

spirit of economism. The CPC Central Committee has repeatedly stated that we should focus on the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius. The questions asked by some

people about salaries and economic policies should be set aside until the final stages of

this campaign; at that time, thorough investigations and in-depth analyses should be made to arrive at a unified, coordinated solution.“

194. For detailed discussion, please see Hu, Report on the Economic Fluctuations in China, 185–190.

69

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

task of chairing the daily work of the CPC Central Committee. With Zhou’s role being replaced, that was to manage the daily work of the State Council, aroused a new round of struggle between the two political forces, in spite of the fact that Mao always had the final say. On May 22, the “Temporary Labor Division Plan of the Offices of the State Council“ proposed that Li Xiannian should supervise the daily work of the State Council. Specifically, Li had to head the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Ministry of Foreign Economy, and the Ministry of Light Industries.195 On July 17, Mao Zedong convened a meeting with the Political Bureau, during which he said to Deng Xiaoping: “You are now in charge of Foreign Affairs. Li Xiannian is to act as premier.“ Li Xiannian explained that he was responsible for the affairs of the State Council only during Premier Zhou’s sick leave.196 On August 20, Mao Zedong held a meeting with Li Xiannian, and Mao instructed him to tackle domestic problems as following: 197 This was the first time for Mao to propose the concept of “unity and stability. Li Xiannian immediately communicated the content of this conversation to Zhou Enlai upon his return to Beijing. At a meeting of commanders and political commissars of the eight military areas convened by the Political Bureau, Mao Zedong’s instructions were officially communicated: the Cultural Revolution of the proletariat had lasted for eight years, but now it was necessary to emphasize stability. The party and the PLA had to be united.198 This implicated that Mao was aware of the country being unstable and the PLA were not united; yet, Mao did not mention about the namely class enemies this time. For the first time, he articulated that the Cultural Revolution had dragged on for too long and achieved too little, and would like to call this campaign off. It was a chaotic time where a fine prime minister — one that could restore stability, was in need; and barely anyone disagree that Deng Xiaoping was the best fit among all. In the evening of October 3, the Political Bureau discussed whether to convene the 4th National People’s Congress. In the afternoon of that day, Mao Zedong’s secretary called Wang Hongwen, proposing that Deng Xiaoping should assume the position of first vice premier of the State Council, and asked Wang Hongwen to communicate this proposal to the Political Bureau. Clearly, Mao had decided 195. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 812.

196. Ibid., 813. 197. Ibid. 198. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 402.

70

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

that based on the above political considerations, Deng should replace the ill Zhou Enlai to take charge of the State Council; if Zhou died, Deng should replace him as premier of the State Council. A very important outcome of this was that the decision precluded Jiang Qing from organizing her own cabinet. However, that evening Wang Hongwen failed to communicate this message to the Political Bureau, but delivered it to Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan instead. Wang waited two days before communicating Mao’s instructions to Zhou and the members of the Political Bureau. On October 6, when Zhou Enlai heard of Mao Zedong’s decision, he immediately made an appointment with Deng Xiaoping. Zhou believed that Jiang Qing would be unable to seize power over the State Council as long as Deng was made premier. Zhou thus placed his hopes regarding his unfinished work in Deng. That evening, Jiang talked to Zhou about the participants for the 4th National People’s Congress and the candidates for the position of general chief of staff of the PLA.199 This clearly showed that Jiang aimed to appropriate authority over personnel and military affairs and that she was a true careerist. Zhou did not give her any support.200 On October 11, the CPC Central Committee issued the “Notice on Convening the 4th National People’s Congress,“ which officially updated the whole party Mao Zedong’s latest will on stability and unity.201 This indicates that Mao planned to rebuild China’s fundamental systems as a modern country, restore the National People’s Congress, revise the Constitution of the PRC, and establish the 4th national leadership group and complete its personnel arrangements. This signaled a return to the character of the 1st National People’s Congress, which was held in 1954. The predominant cause was Mao’s rapidly deteriorating physical condition and that he finally gain some insight. He sometimes said: “At 73 or 84, one goes towards death even if death does not come by itself.“ He had to put the nation in order.202 However, a fierce struggle for power was underway. The notice stated that the 4th National People’s Congress would soon be held and that all units should prepare for it. The notice declared that special cases would be investigated and that veteran party officials would be liberated. However, the notice also specified that veteran officials should deal appropriately with the revolutionaries who had put up big posters criticizing them during the Cultural Revolution. The notice stated that retaliations were prohibited. However, this was self-contradictory. Mao Zedong 199. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 316.

200. “Testimony of Wang Hongwen in Court,” November 20, 1980.

201. Mao Zedong said: “The Cultural Revolution of the proletariat has lasted eight years. Now, stability should be emphasized. The party and the PLA should be united.“

202. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 317.

71

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

was afraid that once the veteran officials rose again to power, they would repudiate the Cultural Revolution. Jiang Qing was politically ambitious and eager to form her own cabinet. She stirred up trouble in the State Council and Political Bureau. On October 14, Jiang commented on the report about the Fengqing Steamer Incident:203 “This incident filled me with indignation as a member of the proletariat! Isn’t the transportation ministry one of the state organs of the People’s Republic of China under the leadership of Chairman Mao and the CPC Central Committee? And the State Council is a state institution for the dictatorship of the proletariat. Unfortunately, some individuals in the Ministry of Transport bowed to the foreign forces as collaborators and they tried to dictate to us. Can this demeaning attitude go unchallenged?“ Jiang demanded that the Political Bureau should state its position about this matter and take necessary measures.204 It clearly reflected that Jiang regarded herself as empress over the Central Committee: she acted in a superior, domineering manner without realizing that she was in fact isolated and excluded for her arrogance. As the historian Joseph Needham said, the isolation of the Gang of Four was like ostriches burying their heads in the sand.205 On June 18, Wang Hongwen commented on concerned letters that he had received from ordinary individuals about buying ships from abroad206 being an act of worshiping foreign 203. The Fengqing steamer was a domestically made 10,000-ton cargo vessel, which sailed to Romania and returned to Shanghai on the eve of National Day, 1974.

204. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 678.

205. Needham, “Science Reborn in China: Rise and Fall of the Anti–intellectual ‘Gang.’ “ 206. This refers to the fact that in view of the hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars spent on

renting foreign ships each year, Zhou Enlai instructed in 1970 that during the Fourth

Five-Year Plan, efforts should be made to accelerate the development of China’s own ocean transport fleet. Following investigation and research, Li Xiannian and Yu Qiuli argued that the domestic shipbuilding industry could not meet the demand at that time and that buying ships in the international market would be more effective. On March

8, 1974, Li Xiannian commented that China should largely rely on itself in developing

its shipbuilding industry, which was a basic need, but that it did not preclude the possibility of buying some ships from abroad as appropriate since China was so short

of ships. Deng Xiaoping, Li Fuchun, and Chen Yun agreed with this. On June 6, Li Xiannian stated again that to save time, it would be practicable to buy ships. Therefore,

the strong recommendation was made to purchase a number of ships since their price at the time was not so high, and the purchase would still be worthwhile even if the

ships lasted only 10 years or even five years. (Editorial Committee of Biography of Li

72

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

capitalists and following the revisionist line.207 His words were targeted directly at Zhou Enlai and Li Xiannian. Jiang had thus started another dispute. On the evening of December 17, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan enraged Deng Xiaoping via attacking him with the Fengqing incident.208 This represented a sharp conflict in the Political Bureau between the Cultural Revolution hardliners represented by Jiang, who followed exclusivism, and the healthy forces represented by Deng, who wanted to open up to the outside world. This argument left a mark on Deng, and it was an important political reason in his decision to open up to the outside world in 1978. Later, when Deng recalled this argument, he said seclusion was inappropriate: “I quarreled with the Gang of Four [referring to Jiang Qing] about a ship that was only 10,000 tons. What a fuss they made! When I went to study in France in 1920, I took a 50,000-ton foreign mail steamer.“209 In 1973, Japan was already building 420,000-ton ships. Clearly, Jiang was rather like a frog at the bottom of a deep well that believed the sky to be something very small. Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949–1992), vol. 2, 794–795. 207. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 671–672.

208. Jiang Qing questioned Deng Xiaoping at the meeting of the Political Bureau: “What

do you think of this issue (the Fengqing incident)?“ Deng replied: “I have read the

reports. We need to investigate the matter.“ Jiang Qing asked again what he thought

of the criticism of the collaborators. Deng said that they were equals as members of the Political Bureau when discussing issues and that she should not bully people in that manner: “How could they cooperate under those conditions?“ Deng said that she

was imposing her opinion on him: “Do I have to support your way of thinking?“ Jiang then yelled at him. Deng said in rage: “Without an investigation, you can’t make such

accusations. What kind of meeting is this!“ Deng left. After he left, Zhang Chunqiao

remarked that Deng was against them again. (Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 318–319.)

209. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, 367.

The Wenhui Daily published articles on October 12, 1974 against the collaborators in

the name of criticizing Confucius and Mencius. Deng Xiaoping recalled in December

1977 that he took a 50,000-ton mail steamer when he went abroad in the 1920s: “The Fengqing was less than 10,000 tons. And they made such a fuss about it. When Jiang

Qing berated me, I argued with her. Jiang Qing emphasized only theories and was always domineering.“ (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 245.)

73

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

After that meeting, Zhang Chunqiao remarked that Deng Xiaoping was against them again. Yao Wenyuan wrote in his journal, “The situation has suddenly changed! Comrade Deng Xiaoping yelled at Comrade Jiang Qing...It was like we were back at the Lushan Meeting!“210 That evening, Jiang Qing summoned Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan to a meeting, where she demanded Wang go to Changsha as soon as possible report to Mao that Deng and Zhou would not become first vice premier of the State Council. On October 18, Wang Hongwen went to see Mao Zedong in Changsha and made accusations against Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping: “The atmosphere in Beijing now is just like at the Lushan Meeting...I took a political risk in coming here.“ Wang did not expect that Mao would admonish him: “You should be alert against Jiang Qing and keep your distance from her. Now go back and talk to Premier and Comrade Jianying. Stay united with Comrade Xiaoping.“211 This indicates that Mao hoped to create a new political authority, in which Wang was responsible for the daily work of the Central Committee and Deng took charge of the State Council, with the two of them united and coordinating with each other. Rather than being just general chief of staff of the PLA, Mao expressly ordered Deng to work concurrently in that position as well as taking charge of the State 210. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 319. 211. Zhang Yufeng, Mao Zedong’s secretary, stated that in April 1974, Wang Hongwen went

to Chairman Mao without having informed Premier Zhou and the Political Bureau to

make false accusations against Premier Zhou and other central leaders. Wang accused

Zhou and other leaders of trying to seize supreme authority just as Lin Biao and his supporters did at the Second Plenary Session of the 9th CPC Central Committee. Wang

said: “The atmosphere in Beijing now is very like it was during the Lushan Meeting.

I came to Hunan without telling Premier Zhou and other comrades in the Political Bureau. The four of us [Wang, Zhang, Jiang, and Yao] discussed the situation throughout the night and decided that I should come and report to you. I left when Premier Zhou

took a rest. I took a political risk in coming here.“ Wang continued: “Although Premier Zhou is seriously ill, he was busy talking to people day and night, and those who

often go to his place are Deng Xiaoping, Ye Jianying, and Li Xiannian.“ Wang highly

praised Zhang Chunqiao’s competence, Yao Wenyuan’s interest in reading, and also praised Jiang Qing. Chairman Mao rebuked Wang Hongwen, saying: “You should talk

face to face if you don’t agree! Coming to me is not good! You should be careful with Jiang Qing and keep your distance. Now go back and talk to Premier and Comrade Jianying.“ Zhang Yufeng, October 20, 1976. (Central Special Case Group, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.1,“ December 1976.)

74

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Council. Previously, Ye Jianying had warned Wang Hongwen against following Jiang Qing: Ye said that Wang should choose the correct side and keep his distance from her. However, instead of following Ye’s advice, Wang thought that Ye was trying to alienate him from Jiang, and he became closer to her, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan.212 Mao disliked factions and cliques among the high-ranking officials in the party, and he despised corrupted individuals who were the first to voice complaints. Wang had to write a self-criticizing letter to Mao, which was kept and later became important evidence in Wang’s fall.213 Mao Zedong did not attend the meetings of the Political Bureau, which meant he does not know the complete information, nor the false information conveyed in the meeting. Communication between Mao Zedong and the Political Bureau mostly occurred only with foreign guests’ presence. When Mao interviewed foreign guests, Zhou Enlai, Wang Hongwen, and Deng Xiaoping were also present. This was their best opportunity meeting Mao himself; consult and report to him. After July 17, 1974, when Mao Zedong received foreign guests outside Beijing with Deng Xiaoping and Li Xiannian accompaniment. Mao source of information back then was his personal liaison officers, including Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng who was outside Beijing and the Political Bureau. When Mao Zedong met foreign guests, it was Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng who recorded and translated the talks: Wang and Tang thus knew Mao’s instructions and communicated them directly or indirectly to the Political Bureau. Under Mao’s instructions, Wang and Tang attended meetings of the Political Bureau and were on the list of Political Bureau members for receiving official documents. Wang and Tang functioning 212. Editorial Committee of Biography of Ye Jianying comp., Biography of Ye Jianying, 369. 213. The self-criticizing letter Wang Hongwen wrote to Mao Zedong stated that he had made a serious mistake by going to Changsha to report to Mao about the quarrel between

Comrade Jiang Qing and Comrade Xiaoping about the Fengqing: “It is permissible for Comrade Deng Xiaoping to have different opinions about the candidate for the general

chief of staff. Instead of consulting with the majority of the Political Bureau to solve this issue, I listened to several comrades and wrongly associated the candidacy for the

general chief of staff and Comrade Jiang Qing’s instructions about the Fengqing problem with her quarrel with Comrade Xiaoping. I added my own guesses and assumptions

and drew the wrong conclusion that there might be something else to this matter. As a result, I made my report to the chairman. The fact is that Comrade Xiaoping was

correct, whereas I made a serious mistake.“ “Self-Criticizing Letter by Wang Hongwen

in Changsha,“ December 1974. This letter was not released. (Central Special Case

Group, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.1,“ December 1976.)

75

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

as Mao’s liaison officers was actually an arrangement that violated systems and regulations. Wang and Tang hence became political targets and well-known figures that all forces attempted to influence. Their own biases had a direct bearing towards Mao’s opinions. The two political forces in the CPC vied for the support of Wang and Tang, and they played a key role in Mao’s objection to Jiang Qing’s efforts to organize her own cabinet. A year later, Mao Yuanxin replaced them and became a crucial figure in striking down Deng Xiaoping. On October 19, Jiang Qing summoned Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng, ordering them to report to Mao how the State Council developed a tendency to worship foreign things and fawn over foreign countries; she also told them to criticize Deng Xiaoping’s behavior at the Political Bureau meeting of October 17 as an example of the February Counter-current Forces.214 Jiang Qing did not realize that she reached too far this time. Mao wanted to achieve unity and stability, not chaos, and he needed talents like Deng Xiaoping, highly recommended by Ye Jiangying, to stabilize the country. Also on October 19, Zhou Enlai talked to Hua Guofeng, Ji Dengkui, Li Xiannian, and Deng Xiaoping separately in hospital gain a full view over the argument took place at the Political Bureau meeting two days ago. Zhou also received instructions from Mao, brought by Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng, the same day in the light of investigations. It ends up with an obvious conclusion that Jing Qing twisted the situation while presenting it, and revealed the fact that Dang was schemed in advance. Jiang and her associates had assailed Deng many times, and he had put up with this over a long period.215 Wang and Tang knew what to report to Mao after they listened to Zhou. Who would Mao Zedong listen to since he did not attend Political Bureau meetings? Who provided what information to him? The information communicated by Wang and Tang had a significant influence on Mao. This was why both Jiang and Zhou held discussions with Wang and Tang. It was also on October 19 that Li Xiannian, Ji Dengkui, and Hua Guofeng jointly submitted to Mao Zedong and the CPC Central Committee the “Brief Report on the Current Economic Status,“ which stated that the total agricultural and industrial output in the country from January to September had shown a 2.1% decrease over the same period in the previous year. Coal production and railway transportation were still weak, and that was affecting the whole nation. Since the industrial production plan was not being met, there was a drop in financial revenue, and

214. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1904–1974), vol. 2, 2060.

215. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 298–299.

76

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

expenditure surpassed revenues by 2.7 billion yuan.216 This made Mao realize the severity of China’s economic problems. In addition, the 4th NPC was about to be convened. It was clearly imperative to remedy the economic situation. On November 6, after meeting foreign guests, Mao listened to Li Xiannian’s report on the status of the economy, and he stated: “We need to improve the economy.“ Li Xiannian returned to Beijing to officially communicate Mao’s instructions to the Political Bureau.217 He played a key role in helping Mao formulate his ideas about emphasizing unity and stability and also the need to promote the economy by keeping Mao supplied with accurate information. On October 20, after Mao Zedong met Poul Hartling, the Danish prime minister, in Changsha. Meeting between Mao, Hartling and Deng was held. Unlike Wang Hongwen, who made false accusations against Deng, Deng was smart enough to say no words about Jiang Qing until asked about the quarrel took place at October 17 in the Political Bureau. When Mao asked about amending the national Constitution at the 4th People’s National Congress, he said that his name should not be mentioned in that document. Deng Xiaoping said that Beijing (meaning the Political Bureau) was studying personnel arrangements, and he wanted to hear the chairman’s opinion. Mao said: “I don’t know much about Beijing. I heard that the [4th] National People’s Congress is about to be held. I don’t think that we need to rush. It all depends on the physical condition of the premier and on the preparatory work. I do not wish to voice my opinion. It’s up to you. It’s that simple and clear. Those who once studied in France are good enough.“218 Deng asked: “Should I convey this message back to Beijing?“ Mao nodded in agreement. Deng had the content of discussion checked word by word with the help of the presented, which included Wang Hairong, Tang Wensheng, and Zhang Hanzhi. The next day, Deng wrote a letter to Wang Hongwen about the meeting, as well as informing members of the Political Bureau. 219 This was a clear demonstration of will that Mao would like to have Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping take charge of the State Council. Mao Zedong then listened to Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng’s report on the Political Bureau meeting of October 17. Mao was dissatisfied with the actions of Jiang Qing and her associates, saying that the Fengqing incident was only a small 216. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 817.

217. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1715. 218. ”Those who once studied in France” refers to Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, both of whom went to France to work and study.

219. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1904–1974), vol. 2, 2060–2061.

77

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

issue: Li Xiannian was already handling the situation, and it was wrong for Jiang to make such a commotion about it. Mao Zedong asked Wang and Tang to officially inform Zhou Enlai and Wang Hongwen that the premier was still the premier. If the premier was sufficiently healthy, he and Wang Hongwen could consult all sectors to make a list of appropriate candidates for important positions: “Ye Jianying recommended that Deng Xiaoping should work as first vice premier of the State Council and concurrently as general chief of staff of the PLA,220 and I agreed with him. The military position is honorary in peacetime. Yang Chengwu should work as vice general chief of staff. When Wang Hongwen came, this issue was not clear. Now, I would like it to be decided. The candidates for the positions of chairman and vice chairman of the National People’s Congress need to be selected. Essentially, the guideline is unity and stability.“221 On November 6, Mao talked to Li Xiannian after meeting foreign guests. Li said that there would be no more questions once the problem of Deng was solved. The Political Bureau unanimously supported Mao’s proposal. Mao said: “I agree with Comrade Ye Jianying’s opinion.“ It is thus clear that Ye played a key role in the appointment of Deng: the two men had a mutual understanding. Mao Zedong told Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng to warn Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan against following Jiang Qing.222 The same day, Mao Zedong commented on a letter he had received from Jiang Qing on October 19: “Proceed with caution. Take care to win over the comrades who don’t agree with you.“223 On October 22, Zhou Enlai listened to the report by Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng following their meeting with Mao Zedong. Zhou was very excited. In accordance with Mao’s instructions, Zhou was busy preparing for the 4th National People’s Congress. On October 23, Zhou Enlai held separate meetings with Wang Hongwen, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Qing to convey Mao’s directions. On October 25, Zhou Enlai had a long discussion with Ye Jianying. On October 27, Zhou talked to Li Xiannian. On October 28, Zhou held a meeting with Wang Hongwen. From November 1 to 3, Zhou held meetings with three groups of members of 220. Mao Zedong agreed with Ye Jianying on his recommendation that Deng Xiaoping should work as first vice premier of the State Council and concurrently as general chief of staff of the PLA.

221. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1904–1974), vol. 2, 2060.

222. Ibid., 2060–2061. 223. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 374.

78

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

the Political Bureau in Beijing, including Ye Jianying, to solve the problem of the Fengqing incident.224 Zhou related to them the content of what Mao had said. Zhou was thus continuing to play a key role in the central leadership. At that time, Zhou underwent a major operation. Soon afterward, however, he had to carry out his work, constantly meet people, and mediate the forces in the Political Bureau. On November 1, Red Flag published an article titled “A Brave 32,000 Miles across the Sea — Proud and Elated“ written by the CPC Committee about the Fengqing, and it included a note by the editor. This article was targeted directly at Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, and it claimed that they followed the beliefs of collaborators, landlords, and capitalists who crawled to foreign countries for their favors.225 It is clear that the struggle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing was now half out in the open. Jiang constantly attacked people — with or without the approval of Mao Zedong, resulting with her being isolated and ended up as target of public condemnation. On November 6, Zhou Enlai wrote a letter to Mao Zedong to report on the state of preparations for the 4th National People’s Congress. In that letter, Zhou said that he had voiced his active support for the chairman’s proposal that Deng should concurrently serve as first vice premier and general chief of staff. That day, Mao made the following written comment: “I’ve read this letter and agree with its content.“226 Zhou’s wisdom was evident when he changed Ye Jianying’s proposal into one by Mao so that the Political Bureau would unanimously pass it. Also on November 6, Mao Zedong had a meeting with Li Xiannian after talks with foreign guests. Li said that there would be no more questions once the problem of Deng Xiaoping was solved. The Political Bureau unanimously agreed with Mao’s directions. Chairman Mao said: “I support Comrade Ye Jianying’s

224. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 680–681.

225. CPC Committee of the Fengqing, “A Brave 32,000 Miles across the Sea — Proud and

Elated,“ originally printed in Red Flag, issue 11, November 1, 1974. The magazine included a note from the editor: “This inspiring revolutionary article is well worth

reading. The Fengqing’s successful maiden voyage was a victory for Chairman Mao’s guidance for independence and self-reliance, and it boosted the morale of the proletariat and revolutionary people. This was compelling criticism against the thinking of collaborators, landlords, and capitalists that crawled to foreign countries for their favors. Its significance is not limited to shipbuilding and ocean transport.“

226. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1904–1974), vol. 2, 2064.

79

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

opinion.“227 Mao criticized Jiang Qing: “She opens a store that sells ideological labels...Her steel company is quite prosperous and now she opens a labeling store. She invites resentment from others...She falls out with many people. In her eyes, no one else is important. I have communicated this situation to the Political Bureau, so they understand the situation. I told her not to organize a Shanghai gang, but she went ahead and did it anyway.“228 Wang Dongxing was present at this meeting. It was also on November 6 that Zhou Enlai met Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng, asking them to report to Mao Zedong about his physical condition and the status of the Political Bureau.229 On the evening of November 7, Zhou spoke again with Wang and Tang, who related Mao’s rebuke of Jiang Qing to Zhou. On November 8, Zhou met Li Xiannian and Ji Dengkui; on November 9, Zhou talked to Wang Hongwen; and on November 10, Zhou spoke separately to Deng Xiaoping, Ye Jianying, Wang Hongwen, and Zhang Chunqiao to convey Mao’s opinions.230 On November 12, Deng Xiaoping reported in person to Mao Zedong in Changsha about the argument related to the Fengqing incident at the October 17 meeting, and Deng said that the conditions within the Political Bureau were not normal. Mao approved of Deng’s opinion and actions. Mao declared: “I am not very happy when Jiang Qing imposes her opinions on others.“231 Deng was different from Zhou Enlai since he belonged to the leaders who were bold enough to fight with Jiang Qing; they never gave ground on fundamental problems and would not yield to Jiang’s political pressures. Mao appreciated Deng for these qualities and decided to place him in important positions,232 whereas for her part Jiang grew to hate Deng more. It was also on November 12 that Jiang Qing wrote a letter to Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong wrote in reply: “Do not show up in public too much. Do not approve official documents. Do not organize a cabinet and attempt to be the boss behind 227. Ibid., 2061. 228. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 824.

229. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 682.

230. Ibid. 231. Ibid. 232. Deng Xiaoping told Mao Zedong: “The chairman has announced his decision about my

work. I should not air my concerns anymore, but the responsibilities are very heavy.“

Mao Zedong replied in confidence: “There is no other way but for you to shoulder them!“ He thus encouraged Deng to continue to make his best efforts in his work. (Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 323.)

80

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

the curtain. You have made too many enemies. You need to make peace with the majority. Heed my words. It is important to know yourself.“233 However, the more Mao tried to persuade Jiang, who was at the apex of her power, the more arrogant she became and the more eager to play the mastermind. Mao’s comments in writing formed part of the evidence that eventually led to Jiang’s downfall. On November 18, Zhou Enlai had a meeting with Deng Xiaoping, who reported to Zhou the discussion between Mao Zedong and Deng. The same day, Zhou talked with Ye Jianying and Xu Shiyou.234 On November 19, Jiang Qing wrote a letter to Mao Zedong, in which she said: “I let the chairman down because I lack self-knowledge: I’m unable to recognize reality and cannot analyze myself objectively. Some strange things have occurred, and the thought of them makes me shudder in horror. Since the 9th National Congress of the CPC, I have been pushed out of the loop — particularly at present.“235 After reading Jiang’s letter, Mao commented: “This isn’t self-criticism but a demand for power. Hasn’t she got enough power already?“236 This indicates that Jiang’s purpose in supporting Mao in conducting the Cultural Revolution was to seize political power. Mao understood Jiang, but he could not do anything about her. On November 20, Mao said to Jiang: “Your job is to study current affairs in China and abroad, and that is your biggest task. I’ve talked to you many times. You can’t say that you are out of the loop. Heed my words.“237 Before that, on June 24, Mao asked Jiang to carry out some investigations: “You don’t understand the people and their lives.“238 Jiang Qing and her supporters had always been arrogant and aloof. She had been to the countryside only once, and that was a prearranged trip. She did not know that over 700 million Chinese were living in absolute poverty and that in 233. Mao Zedong’s comment was written on the letter from Jiang Qing on November 12,

1974. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 394.)

234. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 683.

235. Special Case Team, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.1,“

December 1976; Party Literature Research Office of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 376.) 236. Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 249. 237. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 374–375.

238. Ibid., 374.

81

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

many places the people were unable to feed themselves. Mao Zedong was well aware of this weakness of Jiang’s. He referred to her as “one-sided,“ “always complaining,“239 and “privileged.“240 On November 28, the People’s Daily published an editorial titled “Carry on the Campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius.“ The editorial stated that the campaign against Lin Biao, Confucius, and Mencius had not run its course and should be continued. The editorial related the latest instruction from Mao Zedong: “Everything is going well. Should we still make the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius our first priority? Yes. To continue the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius is an important part of the instructions of Chairman Mao and the Central Committee. We should bear in mind the instructions of Chairman Mao that ’political guidance is the key: when the correct political guidance is in order, everything else will fall into place.’ We should focus on major issues and political guidelines.“241 From November to December, when the central leadership was preparing to convene the 4th National People’s Congress and make personnel adjustments for the national authorities, Jiang Qing wrote three letters to Mao Zedong, demanding to make Wang Hongwen and Xie Jingyi the vice chairmen of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress; she also stress her preference on having Chi Qun over Mao Yuanxin as Minister of Education, and suggested Chi Qun, Xie Jingyi, and Jin Zumin should attend be cultivated as successors, hence should be granted permission to sit in the Political Bureau meetings. 242 Mao admonished Jiang: “Jiang Qing is ambitious. She wants to make Wang Hongwen chairman of the National People’s Congress and herself chairperson of the party.“243 Mao Zedong proposed that Song Qingling should be a member of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress after Zhu De and Dong Biwu. Deng Xiaoping, Zhang Chunqiao, Li Xiannian and others should work as vice premiers of the State Council. Other personnel affairs needed to be handled under the leadership of Zhou Enlai.244 Mao Zedong objected to Jiang Qing forming her own cabinet, but he allowed Zhang Chunqiao to enter the cabinet and rank after Deng. Mao was attempting to check 239. Ibid., 373. 240. Ibid., 372. 241. People’s Daily, November 28, 1974. 242. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 824.

243. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 395.

244. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 301.

82

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

the moderates in the party with the Cultural Revolution hardliners. Such were the political mechanics adopted by Mao. On December 12, Zhou Enlai reviewed the list of the delegates to the 4th National People’s Congress and proposed increasing the proportion of veteran party officials. On December 21, Zhou chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau in Beijing to discuss the personnel arrangements for the 4th National People’s Congress.245 Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao tried to place their favorites in important positions. After the meeting, Zhou held a discussion with Li Xiannian and Ji Dengkui, proposing to have Zhou Rongxi take charge of the Ministry of Education; concessions could be made among the candidates for the leading positions in the Ministry of Culture and the State Sports Commission. Zhou and Wang Hongwen jointly drafted three personnel plans and submitted them to Mao for approval. Before Wang Hongwen went to visit Mao Zedong in Changsha, Jiang Qing said to Wang: “You didn’t achieve your goal when you went to Changsha in October, but that’s nothing! Status and power are earned, not given. You need to fight for them again. We cannot be afraid when we do what we do. If you don’t fight for your food, do you wish others to feed you instead? Do you know how much I have thought and how many measures I’ve taken for you to become vice chairman? You should go to Changsha again. Who else but you can do this?“ To this, Wang Hongwen replied: “I would jump into the abyss for this prize. I am ready to pay any price. I will go and talk to Chairman Mao in person and fight for this again.“ Jiang encouraged him: “So long as there’s a trace of hope, we should grasp it. We cannot give up. We must fight for every inch of power. We must strive for it.“246 Jiang Qing was indeed a political careerist. She possessed a strong sense of urgency and crisis — so much so that she wanted to organize her own cabinet even though Mao was still alive. If she failed to do this, she believed that all would be lost. For her, the 4th National People’s Congress appeared to be the last chance. On December 23, when he met Mao, Wang Hongwen voiced his own opinions and Jiang’s suggestions. On hearing his words, Mao said: “Jiang Qing is indeed ambitious, isn’t she? She certainly is to me.“247 245. The meeting was attended by Wang Hongwen, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhang

Chunqiao (members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau) as well as Li

Xiannian, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan, Ji Dengkui, and Wu De (members of the Political

Bureau). Like Mao Zedong, Kang Sheng, Zhu De, and Dong Biwu (members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau) did not attend the meeting. 246. Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 249–250. 247. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp. Mao Zedong’s

83

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

On December 23, Zhou Enlai and Wang Hongwen flew to Changsha to report to Mao Zedong. From December 23 to 27, Mao talked to Zhou and Wang many times. Mao made the Changsha Resolution and defined the personnel arrangements for the 4th National People’s Congress. He proposed again that Deng Xiaoping should work as first vice premier of the State Council, with Zhang Chunqiao and Li Xiannian as vice premiers. The other vice premiers should be appointed by Zhou Enlai.248 On December 24, Mao Zedong repeatedly warned Wang Hongwen: “Stop the activities of the Gang of Four. There are so many people in the central leadership. You must be united with all of them. Don’t organize yourselves into factions, which will lead to your downfall.“249 On the afternoon of that day, Mao stated again when he saw Zhou Enlai and Wang that Jiang Qing was ambitious: “I am well aware of this. I have criticized her many times, but she won’t listen. She just can’t change!“250 Mao said that he was also trying to persuade Jiang to modify three habits: first, criticizing things at will; second, standing in the limelight; third, participating in the government (or organizing a cabinet).251 The implicit meaning was that Jiang had had always had those habits. Mao had made Jiang a member of the Political Bureau, so did he still expect her to suppress all political ambitions? Mao sang the praises of Deng Xiaoping, saying that Deng was an exceptional talent with strong political know-how. Mao pointed at Wang Hongwen, saying: “He is not as talented as Deng Xiaoping.“252 It is thus apparent that Mao Zedong was a politician full of self-contradictions. On the one hand, in November and December 1974, he repeatedly rebuked Jiang Qing, but that was known only to a handful of members of the Political Bureau. That criticism lasted until May 1975. However, those internal criticisms made in a comradely manner became the evidence and grounds for Hua Guofeng and other Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 395; Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 251.

248. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 825.

249. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1711; Party Literature Research Center of the Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong's Works Sincer the

Founding of New China, vol. 13, 395; Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 251.

250. Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 252–253. 251. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1711. 252. Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 252.

84

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

members of the Gang of Four to be arrested in October 1976.253 On the other hand, the instructions Mao announced to the nation involved continuing the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius. However, Mao also felt that the campaign had run its course. Mao was again innovative and proposed new political campaigns to check and balance the opposing forces in the central leadership. December 26 was Mao’s 81st birthday. That evening, he talked alone to Zhou Enlai until the next morning. The discussion had two aspects: one was personnel arrangements and the other was theoretical problems.254 In accordance with Mao’s instructions, Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao published a series of theoretical articles.255 Mao mentioned again that Jiang Qing was ambitious, saying that she was responsible for three things: the campaign against Lin Biao, the campaign against 253. Party Literature Research Center of the Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works

Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 394–397.

The CPC Central Committee forwarded on December 10, 1976 the Document No.1 of

“Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan,“ and then on September 23, 1977, the Document No.3, in which Mao Zedong’s criticisms against the Gang of Four became known to the public.

254. In the minutes arranged by Zhou Enlai and printed by the CPC Central Committee, Mao Zedong communicated the following message concerning theoretical problems: “Lenin said that articles should be written on the dictatorship of capitalists. If this issue

is not clarified, revisionism will ensue. This should be made known to the whole nation.

China is a socialist country. Before 1949, China was similar to capitalist countries. At

present, the eight-tier salary system is still in place. We still carry out distribution according to work and exchange for money, which is not so different from the old

societies. The difference lies in the ownership system. We still have a commodities system, and our salaries are not equal, but we follow the eight-tier salary system. This

can be limited only under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Therefore, if Lin Biao and

his like had gained power, China would have easily turned to capitalism. Therefore, it is necessary for us to read books on Marxism. Lenin said that petty production constantly produces capitalism and capitalists — daily, spontaneously, and on a large scale. This is

also the case among some workers and CPC members. The capitalist lifestyle may also

be found among the proletariat and government workers.“ (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 413–414.)

255. In issue no. 3 1975, Red Flag published Yao Wenyuan’s article titled “On the Social Foundation of the Anti-Party Group of Lin Biao“ and in issue no. 4 Zhang Chunqiao’s article titled “On the Overall Dictatorship over the Capitalists.“

85

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Confucius, and she had worked against backdoor deals, which was confusing: “This mess was kept hidden even from me.“256 Zhou revealed to Mao that Jiang and Zhang Chunqiao had had severe political problems in their personal history. Mao stated that he was already aware of that. However, Zhou reminding him of that made no influence anyways.257 It is clear that Mao was conscious of putting problematic people on important positions. Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao were the ones who had been most supportive of his Cultural Revolution. If Jiang and Zhang were removed from the Political Bureau, that would amount to a denial of the Cultural Revolution — and eventually the denunciation of Mao himself. On December 27, when Wang Hongwen proposed to Mao Zedong that Jiang Qing should be given a job, Mao replied that her job was to study the international situation by reading Reference Materials compiled and printed by Xinhua News Agency. Mao said that he had the same job.258 On the evening of December 27, Zhou Enlai flew back to Beijing. The next day, Zhou chaired a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau259 to convey Mao’s Changsha Decision. Zhou also handed out the list bearing the names of the chairman and vice chairmen for the 4th National People’s Congress as well as those of the vice premiers; the list was drafted by Zhou on December 25 and finalized by Mao on the 27. On December 29, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau, and the above list of names was approved.260 Zhou related Mao’s rebuke of Jiang Qing and others at those two meetings. On December 30, Jiang wrote a letter to Mao, saying she fully supported the instructions and criticisms of the chairman.261 With Mao’s stated position, Jiang was unable to achieve her goal of organizing her own cabinet, and as a result she bore a bitter grudge against Zhou and Deng Xiaoping. During the campaign against Deng and the rightist tendency, she determined to bring Deng down. On January 1, 1975, Zhou Enlai talked to Deng Xiaoping and Li Xiannian and then chaired a Political Bureau meeting to further discuss the participants for the 4th National People’s Congress. That meeting approved the report on candidates 256. Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 255. 257. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 330–331. 258. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1712. 259. Those present at the meeting were Zhou Enlai, Wang Hongwen, Ye Jianying, and Deng

Xiaoping (members of the CPC Central Committee) as well as Zhang Chunqiao. Those absent from the meeting included Kang Sheng, Zhu De, and Dong Biwu (members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau) as well as Mao Zedong.

260. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 303. 261. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1712.

86

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

for the positions of ministers of the State Council, directors of committees, and the chief of the Supreme People’s Court, which was drafted by Deng. This showed that Mao had authorized Deng to be responsible for the personnel arrangement of the State Council.262 On January 4, Zhou and Wang Hongwen reported to Mao on the meetings of the Political Bureau and submitted to him the file regarding personnel arrangements, which had been passed. On January 5, in line with Mao Zedong’s instructions, the CPC Central Committee issued Document No. 1, appointing Deng Xiaoping vice chairman of the Central Military Committee and concurrently the general chief of staff of the PLA; Zhang Chunqiao was made director of the General Political Department of the PLA. At that time, Zhang Chunqiao worked concurrently as the first commissar of the Nanjing Military Area. From January 8 to 10, Zhou Enlai chaired the Second Plenary Session of the 10th CPC Central Committee. At this session, Deng Xiaoping was recognized as a member of the Political Bureau and elected vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee and a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau; Li Desheng was dismissed from the positions of vice chairman of the Central Committee and member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. The meeting adopted the reports on the 4th People’s National Congress and the list of its participants. In summing up the meeting, Zhou officially communicated Mao Zedong’s instructions about unity and stability.263 Chinese society at that time was not stable; likewise, the CPC was not united. All of this could be attributed to the Cultural Revolution, led by Mao, and his theory of continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. From January 13 to 18, at the first meeting of the 4th National People’s Congress, Deng Xiaoping was appointed first vice premier of the State Council and Zhang Chunqiao as second vice premier. Mao Zedong was well aware that Zhang had once betrayed the party, and Mao possessed all the evidence in that regard. However, since Zhang Chunqiao was a Cultural Revolution hardliner and the one who had written the political reports for the 9th and 10th CPC National Congresses, Mao placed him in an important position to ensure the continuation of the Cultural Revolution and to check Deng’s power. However, the two political forces behind 262. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 1.

263. Zhou Enlai said that before the Second Plenary Session came to an end, he asked Chairman Mao for additional instructions, and Mao said: “We should emphasize unity

and stability.“ Therefore, Zhou wished to repeat those words: “Unity and stability should be emphasized.“ (Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 304.)

87

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

the two men were completely hostile to each other.264 It is foreseeable that political confrontation would be inevitable upon Mao’s death. Mao’s strategy to balance the two forces only accelerated the downfall of the Gang of Four. In 1974, as a result of the impact of the political campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, the national economy continued to founder, which caused intense dissatisfaction among the people and was a source of serious concern for Mao Zedong. In view of the instability and hostility in China, Mao stated again in January 1975 that China should restore unity and stability. 265 With regard to the weakening economy, Mao proposed economic development.266 Despite the common weariness and dissatisfaction with the Cultural Revolution, Mao insisted on the guidance of class struggle. This was the first of Mao’s “Three Supreme Instructions,“ and was soon interpreted by Deng Xiaoping as the guidance of the Three Supreme Instructions, which Deng used ingeniously to correct the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution. From January 13 to 17, the first meeting of the 4th National People’s Congress (NPC) was held — 10 years after the first meeting of the Third NPC and 6 years after Mao Zedong proposed convening the 4th NPC after the 9th National Congress of the CPC in 1969. If calculated from July 1966, the NPC and its Standing Committee had been suspended for 8 years, which meant that all the local people’s representative meetings were effectively paralyzed. Therefore, that first meeting of the 4th NPC was hailed as a political opportunity for relaunching the drive toward modernization and rebuilding state organizations. The government work report delivered by Zhou Enlai was drafted under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in accordance with Mao Zedong’s instructions, and it was revised and finalized by Mao and Zhou. Also in line with Mao’s instructions, the essence of the report was Zhou’s repetition of the two-step vision of realizing the Four Modernizations by the end of the twentieth century.267 Later, Deng 264. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 334. 265. When the Second Plenary Session of the 10th CPC Central Committee came to an end

in January 1975, Zhou Enlai relayed Mao Zedong’s appeal for unity and stability. (Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1716.)

266. Ibid., 1722. 267. Following the instructions of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai repeated the two-step conception formed at the Third NPC in December 1964: step one, take 15 years to build

an independent, complete industrial and national economic system before 1980; step

two, achieve overall modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and

science and technology so that our national economy will rank as one of the top world economies. (Zhou, “Government Work Report,“ People’s Daily, January 21, 1975.)

88

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

recalled: “In 1974, Premier Zhou Enlai was sick, so the government work report for the 4th NPC was drafted under my leadership. This was a shift of the focus of our party and the state toward the single-minded construction of the Four Modernizations. As a result of their historical impact — especially with regard to political movements — establishing the Four Modernizations was stopped, which was a setback. Now, we intend to focus on construction unless the international situation changes drastically, such as if war breaks out. This is not a task just for our generation, but for the coming three or four generations. This shift did not really come about until the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee at the end of 1978. This was not the shift of only one individual; it was that of the whole party and the whole nation.“268 The government work report described the international situation as “chaotic and deteriorating.“ It stated that the elements of revolution and war were increasing, which reflected the basic judgment — or assumptions — of Mao Zedong.269 Mao was of advanced age, sick, and weak and could not possibly visit foreign countries. He relied on reading the two issues of reference materials to know what was going 268. Deng Xiaoping said these words when interviewed by a journalist for Courier in Yugoslavia on November 13, 1981. (Deng Xiaoping Study Team under the Party

Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Memoir of Deng Xiaoping, 192.)

269. On October 20, 1974, Mao Zedong held talks with Poul Hartling, the Danish prime

minister, and said that in his eyes the world was not at peace, and it was even worse than it had been in the past. On November 6, when Mao met with Eric Williams, premier of Trinidad and Tobago, he stated that he had witnessed the First and Second World Wars: “Now peace is being discussed everywhere, but I see danger.“ On November 12,

when Mao met with Salim Rubai Ali, president of South Yemen, he declared that the

international situation was even tenser than it had been during the turmoil of four years previous: “And yet people talk about mitigation and peace. The more they talk about

it, the less peaceful the world will be.“ On December 25, when Mao had a meeting with Zhou Enlai in Changsha, he said that the more people talked about peace, the more

they made preparations for war: “We can say that the major tendency around the world is not revolution. We need to emphasize that preparations for war are very intense, and

all peoples should be alert to this.“ On January 16, 1975, when Mao held talks with the West German politician Franz Josef Strauss, he said that people talked about peace

every day but they also made preparations for war every day: “We don’t agree with this so-called peace, mitigation, and friendship.“ (Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” 1141, 1143, 1146, 1159–1160, 1174–1175.)

89

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

on in the world. He was locked into the mindset of revolution and war and was unable to make the shift toward the path of peace and development. On the same day, Zhang Chunqiao, who was leading efforts to revise the Constitution, delivered a report on such amendments at the first meeting of the 4th NPC on behalf of the CPC Central Committee.270 Zhang’s report stated that the task of amending the Constitution reflected the common wish of the Chinese people to continue the revolutionary case under the dictatorship of the proletariat. The newly added preface of the Constitution was a complete rejection of the preface of the 1954 Constitution. The number of articles in the Constitution had been reduced from 106 to 30 between 1954 and 1975. This is a clear indication of disruption caused by the Cultural Revolution on fundamental system. When they were rebuilt in 1975 those systems had artificially regressed or become reduced. The amendment deleted the sentence that “All power belongs to the people,“ and it revoked the position of state president without supplying any reasons. 271 The amendment underscored the military power of the chairman of the CPC Central Committee as an individual, such that instead of the party leading the army, the supreme leader himself led the army. 272 This strengthened the unitary leadership of the party over state organizations. 273 It dramatically reduced the functions of the NPC and its Standing Committee into just five plus seven items.274 The amendment canceled the function of the NPC and its Standing Committee in supervising the 270. People’s Daily, January 20, 1975. 271. Zhang Chunqiao said in explaining the amendment draft that owing to the removal of the national presidency, the draft revised articles relating to state organization set out in

the 1954 Constitution since those articles would help strengthen the unitary leadership of the party over state organizations.

272. Article 15 of the Constitution stipulated that the chairman of the CPC Central Committee would command the country’s armed forces.

273. Article 16 of the Constitution stated that the NPC held supreme power over the nation under the leadership of the CPC.

274. Article 17 of the Constitution decreed that the five functions of the NPC were as follows: amending the Constitution; setting and adopting laws; appointing or removing the

premier and members of the State Council; approving plans for the national economy, national budget, and final settlements; and other functions that the NPC believed it should fulfill at the suggestion of the CPC Central Committee. Article 18 stipulated

that the Standing Committee of the NPC was the standing body of the NPC. Its seven functions were as follows: to hold NPC meetings; interpret laws; create decrees; send

and recall its authorized deputies abroad; receive foreign envoys; approve of and revoke treaties made with foreign countries; and other functions granted by the NPC.

90

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

implementation of the Constitution, and it reduced the rights and functions of the State Council to just five items.275 The amendment retracted the standing committees of local people’s representative meetings and local people’s government, and it established the revolutionary committee of the Cultural Revolution.276 The amendment denied the nature of the PRC as defined in the 1954 Constitution as the people’s democratic country (Article 1), changing it into a socialist country under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and it strengthened the overall dictatorship of the proletariat. 277 The amendment restored the paralyzed legal court system, but it removed the definition in the 1954 Constitution whereby the people’s court would be able to try cases independently (Article 78). The amendment canceled the procuratorial system (Articles 81–84), whose functions were taken over by public security services at all levels (Article 25). The amendment emphasized the existence of classes and the need for continuing revolution in socialist society. 278 275. Article 20 of the Constitution stipulated that the functions of the State Council were to create administrative measures and issue resolutions and orders according to the

Constitution, laws, and decrees; the State Council was to lead ministries, committees, and state organs at all levels; the council was to make and implement plans for the

national economy and national budget; the council was to manage administrative

affairs around the country as well as other duties granted by the NPC and its Standing Committee.

276. Article 22 of the stated that revolutionary committees at all levels outside Beijing

were the standing bodies of local people’s representative meetings, and local people’s governments.

277. Article 12 of the Constitution declared that the proletariat class had to practice dictatorship over the capitalist class in all cultural fields of the superstructure.

Article 14 stipulated that the state should safeguard the socialist system and quell all treasonous and counter-revolutionary activities as well as punish all traitors and

counter-revolutionaries. The state should deprive landlords, rich peasants, reactionary capitalists, and other deleterious elements of their political rights during certain periods

according to the law, and provide them with the means to earn a livelihood so that they

may be transformed into law-abiding, self-reliant citizens through the process of labor. 278. The third paragraph of the preface of the Constitution stated that socialist society

constituted a very long historical stage. During this historical period, classes, conflicts between classes, and class struggles would always exist; the struggles between

socialism and capitalism would always exist; the risk of capitalism being restored would always exist; and the threats of invasion and subversion from imperialist and

socialistic imperialism would always exist. These conflicts could be solved only by the theory and practice of continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

91

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

The amendment denied the four ownerships as defined in the 1954 Constitution (Article 5) and replaced them with two ownerships: state-owned and collectively owned. 279 The amendment revoked the ownerships of individual laborers and capitalists, allowing members of the people’s commune to operate a small patch of land for themselves and to engage in sideline production. Zhang Chunqiao explained that the new stipulations were a complete departure from the household contracting system and the cancelation of commune members being able to own their patch of land, which had been advocated by Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao. In rural areas, the people’s communes were established throughout the country (Article 7). This further legalized the “four activities“ promoted by Mao Zedong during the Cultural Revolution.280 As instructed by Mao himself, Article 28 added that citizens had the freedom to strike and that no citizen could be arrested without the verdict or approval of the people’s court or public security services. In fact, during the Cultural Revolution, all of these practices, including the quelling of the Tiananmen Square Incident in April 1976 and the arrest of the Gang of Four in October 1976, were direct violations of this article. In the new amendment, sentences were deleted relating to how citizens were free to engage in scientific research, cultural and artistic creation, and other cultural activities, and how they were free to choose where they lived. This amendment reflected the cultural dictatorship that existed during the Cultural Revolution: all the major criticisms that were made during the Cultural Revolution were contrary to the 1954 Constitution. Article 85 in the 1954 Constitution, whereby all citizens were equal under the law, was also deleted. The new Constitution was thus a dramatically simplified, diminished document — a badly maimed effort that was certainly not an improvement on the 1954 Constitution; it was grossly worse. The 1954 Constitution, which had been created under Mao’s leadership, came to be repudiated by Mao himself. It is noteworthy that throughout the Cultural Revolution, Zhang Chunqiao was the main drafter of both the Party Constitution and the Constitution of the PRC. Zhang also wrote the political report for the National Congress of the CPC and important articles approved by Mao Zedong. He was Mao’s most loyal speaker and effectively articulated Mao’s wrong theories. The next in line was Yao Wenyuan. The actual role of these two men was more important than those of Jiang Qing and Zhou Enlai — so much so that their words almost destroyed the country. 279. Article 5 of the Constitution stated that there were two forms of ownership with regard to production in the PRC: state-owned and collectively owned.

280. Article 13 of the Constitution stipulated that public discussions, debates, and large posters represented new forms of socialist revolution, and the state guaranteed the people’s right to use these forms.

92

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

On January 17, the 4th NPC elected the new NPC Standing Committee, with Zhu De as chairman; it appointed Zhou Enlai as premier of the State Council and Deng Xiaoping, Zhang Chunqiao, Li Xiannian, Chen Xilian, Ji Dengkui, Hua Guofeng, Chen Yonggui, Wu Guixian, Wang Zhen, Yu Qiuli, Gu Mu, and Sun Jian as vice premiers. Among them, the youngest vice premier was Wu Guixian. The 37 year-old former vice secretary of the Shanxi Provincial Committee of CPC became the first woman vice premier in China’s history. The next youngest was Sun Jian, who had worked as secretary of the CPC Tianjin Committee. Apart from the 29 ministers appointed, Ye Jianying was appointed Minister of National Defense; Yu Qiuli was elected concurrent director of the State Planning Commission and Gu Mu as concurrent director of the State Infrastructure Construction Commission. Zhang Jinfu was appointed Minister of Finance, Wan Li as Minister of Railways, Ye Fei as Minister of Transport, Zhou Rongxin as Minister of Education, Hua Guofeng as concurrent Minister of Public Security, Qiao Guanhua as Minister of Foreign Affairs,281 Yu Huiyong as Minister of Culture, 282 Liu Xiangping (wife of Xie Fuzhi) as Minister of Health Care, 283 and Zhuang Zedong director of the Sports Commission. The last among the above people were the favorites or followers of the Gang of Four. This indicates that within the leadership of the State Council and the ministries, the moderates (led by Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping) politically prevailed, whereas the Cultural Revolution hardliners (headed by Zhang Chunqiao) were at a disadvantage. There were also the beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution, who accounted for six vice premiers: they were subject to the influences of the two hostile political forces, and this gave rise to a complex situation in the power struggle. On January 23, Jiang Qing, who was not prepared to accept defeat, went alone to Changsha to seek a meeting with Mao Zedong in a desperate effort to prevent Mao from approving the “Report on the Duties of the Vice Premiers of the State Council,“ submitted by Zhou Enlai. Jiang Qing waited for 4 days and eventually succeeded in seeing Mao, though the meeting lasted only 15 minutes. She received

281. The third meeting of the Standing Committee of the 4th NPC decided in November 1976 to dismiss Qiao Guanhua from his position as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

282. After the Gang of Four was defeated in October 1976, Yu Huiyong was stripped of all his official positions and subjected to isolated investigation. He killed himself on

August 28, 1977. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Members of the First to Fifteenth CPC Central Committees, 8.)

283. In October 1976, Liu Xiangping was dismissed from her official positions and deprived of her party membership in August 1985.

93

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

a harsh rebuke from Mao and dejectedly returned to Beijing the same day.284 On January 30, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau to discuss the duties of the 12 vice premiers. On February 1, Zhou chaired the first meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, during which he presented Mao Zedong to pass his appraisal toward Deng Xiaoping, stating that Deng had a strong sense of politics and possessed exceptional political talents. The meeting addressed the duties among the vice premiers of the State Council. It was decided that Deng, the first vice premier, should take charge of foreign affairs and should took Zhou’s duty during his ill days — to char meetings and submit major documents to Mao for examination. It was decided that Li Xiannian, Ji Dengkui, and Hua Guofeng would work as standing vice premiers and Zhang Chunqiao would take charge of culture and education. Zhou highly praised the efforts of Li Xiannian.285 Zhou announced that he was physically unfit to continue his job and that the State Council would be led by Deng.286 Also on February 1, Zhou Enlai chaired a plenary session of the State Council and presented the duties of the leadership. He said that he would be unable to attend many such meetings in the future and that Deng Xiaoping would replace him in chairing such meetings. Deng replied that the supreme leader of the State Council was still Premier Zhou and that they all needed to support him in his illness. Deng repeated Mao Zedong’s instruction emphasizing unity and stability as an important message that they had all to heed. Deng stated in particular: “The international situation is favorable to us. We need to make a huge effort to promote the economy.“287 In fact, when Deng reported to Mao on December 17, 1974, he proposed for the first time the concept of doubling total industrial output over the next 10 years, and he talked about maintaining a five-year period of international peace for foreign cooperation and trade. Deng emphasized the importance of unity and stability as called on by Mao. Without stability, production would be

284. Zong, ”In the Swirlpool of the Struggles between Deng Xiaoping and the Gang of Four — Anecdotes of Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng.“

285. Zhou Enlai said it was noteworthy that after the September 13 Incident or even earlier, it had mainly been Li Xiannian that took charge of the State Council; he had never lost

heart since the start of the Cultural Revolution and stuck to his work. He worked in the middle of the oppositions and attacks from the large posters. (Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949–1992), vol. 2, 828–829.)

286. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 15.)

287. Ibid.

94

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

impossible. Mao said that Deng’s idea was excellent.288 This indicates that at that time Mao approved of Deng’s concept of economic growth and social stability. Thus, with Mao’s approval, Deng decided to start overall housecleaning and restoring order. Zhou Enlai wrote a letter to Mao Zedong on February 2 about the duties of the vice premiers of the State Council, and Mao officially approved this. Thereafter, Deng officially started to direct the daily work of the State Council. On February 5, the CPC Central Committee issued the “Notice on the Cancellation of Military Commission Office Meetings and Establishment of the Central Military Committee“; this had been recommended by Ye Jianying in writing to Mao Zedong and received Mao’s approval. There were 11 members of the Standing Committee of the Central Military Committee: Ye Jianying (field marshal); Wang Hongwen, Deng Xiaoping, Zhang Chunqiao, and Liu Bocheng (field marshals); Chen Xilian (admiral); Wang Dongxing and Su Zhenhua (admirals); Xu Xiangqian (field marshal); Nie Rongzhen (field marshal), and Su Yu (senior general). Ye Jianying 288. When explaining the Government Work Report of the Fourth NPC to Mao Zedong,

Deng Xiaoping said that the total industrial output should increase 1.9-fold during 1975–1985 — an average yearly increase of over 11% — which would be ideal. When

speaking of foreign cooperation and trade, Deng said: “It would also be possible for

us not to do anything in this respect, and we would still be able to develop — only at a lower speed. No country can remain isolated from the international community; all

countries try to make up for one another’s deficiencies, including the United States. This international environment could last another five years since the United States will not dare start another war as it engages in extensive world cooperation and trade,

and the Soviet Union will not do so either. We should not waste any time in making the best use of these five years. Fundamentally speaking, we need unity and stability, as instructed by the chairman. Stability is indispensable for construction. To me, the

most important point is having a stable, trusted provincial CPC committee, whose words carry weight — on the premise that those words are correct. It is inappropriate

for the central government to do everything. There have been unsettling whispers and turmoil. For example, the majority of researchers do nothing at all, and it’s not

that they don’t want to work, but they have no choice in the matter. Absenteeism is

not the exception, but the norm. And not all working people are satisfied with their

current status. I am afraid what this boils down to is the priority order of revolution and production. Without stability, production would be impossible. The chairman said that this process would take eight years. And the question is how to build up a trusted,

respected provincial committee of the CPC.“ Mao Zedong said that Deng’s ideas were excellent. (Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1709–1710.)

95

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

worked as chairman of the Standing Committee of the Central Military Committee. In the party, government, and PLA, there were two fiercely hostile political forces: the moderates, headed by Deng Xiaoping, and the radicals, led by Jiang Qing. This situation was even reported in the international media. Time magazine featured Zhou Enlai on its cover and commented that it was no simple matter for Zhou Enlai, who had been premier since October 1949, to once again be appointed premier of the State Council at the age of 70 (Zhou was actually 77). The situation was also difficult for Deng. It was not a simple matter for him being the first vice premier — among the 12 vice premiers — of the State Council. Besides working as first vice premier of the State Council, Deng Xiaoping had two other important official positions: vice chairman of the Central Committee and vice chairman of the Central Military Committee, as well as concurrently being general chief of staff of the PLA. Deng became the only person to be promoted both within the party and the government, and for the first time he had assumed an important military position. Toward this end, Zhou had taken a great deal of trouble. Zhou’s efforts did not end with Deng. Most of the 29 ministers in the State Council were loyal, reliable veteran officials; for example, the 78-year-old Ye Jianying, Minister of National Defense, and the 65-year-old Li Xiannian, who was in charge of finance and trade. The Gang of Four obtained only one position: the Ministry of Culture. These arrangements of Zhou Enlai were regarded by the Gang of Four as part of efforts to restore the old order. Time remarked that in many respects it was fair and appropriate to reinstate the old-generation revolutionary party members.289 Unlike the Cultural Revolution hardliners in 1966, the moderates represented the healthy mainstream power in the CPC that enjoyed wide support; the hardliners represented the evil elements, and they were a minority that basically relied on the support of Mao Zedong. Mao was well aware of this situation. His strategy was to use Wang Hongwen and Zhang Chunqiao to contain Deng Xiaoping and Ye Jianying so as to achieve balance between the two political forces. Why did Mao Zedong choose to balance the political forces? By 1975, the Cultural Revolution had lasted for nearly 9 years. At that point, Mao was in a dilemma. On the one hand, he was unwilling to witness chaos in the country and see the economy floundering as well as declining living standards, widespread dissatisfaction, and plummeting personal authority. On the other hand, he was reluctant to end the Cultural Revolution and for others in the party to repudiate the revolution he had personally launched and led. The Cultural Revolution was for him the political bottom line, and no one was allowed to challenge it. It was because of these complex self-contradictory thoughts that he charged Deng 289. Xinhua News, “Zhou Enlai Seen in the Western Eye: Six-Time Cover of Time Magazine.”

96

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Xiaoping with the work of the State Council and Zhang Chunqiao with that of the Central Military Committee. As noted above, Deng was one of the moderates, whereas Zhang was a Cultural Revolution hardliner. Between these men, there were those that had benefited from the Cultural Revolution who became members of the Political Bureau during that period. They included Hua Guofeng (vice premier of the State Council), Ji Dengkui (vice premier of the State Council), Chen Xilian (vice premier of the State Council), Wu De (vice chairman of the NPC), Chen Yonggui (farmers’ representative, vice premier of the State Council), Wang Dongxing and Wu Guixian (alternate members of the Political Bureau, industrial workers’ representatives, and vice premiers of the State Council), Ni Zhifu (industrial workers’ representative, second secretary of the Beijing CPC Committee, vice director of the Revolutionary Committee of Beijing), Sun Jian (representative of grass-roots party members, vice premier of the State Council), Li Suwen (industrial workers’ representative, vice chairman of the NPC), and Yao Lianwei (industrial workers’ representative, vice chairman of the NPC). These people were different from the Gang of Four, though they supported and implemented Mao’s political policies. Around the time Mao died, many party members found that they were unable to agree with the Gang of Four in continuing the Cultural Revolution, but they were also unable to concur with Deng Xiaoping in repudiating it. They did not approve of the activities carried out by the Gang of Four, but they also did not agree with Deng’s efforts to correct the mistakes made by Mao in his later years, particularly the errors of the Cultural Revolution. There were thus three different political forces within the Political Bureau, and the form of their alliances and struggles characterized politics in the late 1970s.

Deng Xiaoping’s Overall Restoration of Order, and Political Fights with Jiang Qing In May 1979, Deng Xiaoping recalled that from 1974–1975, he was in charge of everything and was thus the major obstacle to the Gang of Four: “They focused their efforts on attacking me, and so within a year’s time I was forced out of power.“290 However, it was in fact Mao Zedong who forced Deng out of power. Since Deng’s policy of overall restoration of order involved correcting the errors of the Cultural Revolution, it amounted to a refutation of that revolution. That was anathema for Mao. 290. Deng Xiaoping Study Team under the Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Memoir of Deng Xiaoping, 169.

97

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

In early 1975, the convening of the 4th NPC and newly established State Council prepared a suitable political atmosphere and important opportunity for Deng Xiaoping to make efforts toward overall restoration of order. The moderates and the beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution cooperated with each other to engage in a political battle with the Cultural Revolution hardliners. On February 10, the CPC Central Committee issued the “Notice on the 1975 National Economy Program,“ which called on the whole party to unite with all those who could be united; it also required the mobilization of all positive elements to boost the national economy, particularly transportation and coal and steel production. To this end, Deng convened a series of meetings, made important speeches, and took drastic reform measures to restore order in the country. The first area was the restoration of railway transport. On January 28, Deng Xiaoping heard the report of Wan Li, Minister of Railway Transport, and Deng demanded that Wan solve the problems facing railway transport in the first half of that year. Deng stated that this matter could not be delayed any longer. China had to undertake rapid and resolute measures to improve the national economy. On February 6, when Deng and others listened to further reports by Wan, Deng instructed the Ministry of Railways to draft a document for solving the problems that rail transport faced.291 This move represented a breakthrough in Deng’s overall restoration efforts. From February 25 to March 8, the CPC Central Committee held a meeting of industrial secretaries in the provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions to tackle the issue of the railways. The meeting was chaired by Wang Zhen, vice premier of the State Council. Deng Xiaoping made a speech at the meeting, in which he proposed boosting the national economy.292 Deng severely criticized the existence of factions in the party. He stated that he heard how some comrades were engaged purely in revolutionary campaigns and were loath to promote production. He noted how they believed that it was politically safe to engage in revolutionary activities, though it was dangerous and risky to encourage industrial production; however, that was totally incorrect.293 291. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 12.

292. Party Literature Research Center of the Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 4–7.

293. Deng Xiaoping said that the CPC Central Committee had decided to try and break

down the factions. The factions in the party also affected larger plans. Rather than dealing with specific problems, this issue had to be resolved: “We need to educate

those involved in factions and fight against their leaders. They have used the chances

98

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

On March 5, the CPC Central Committee issued the “Decision on Improving Rail Transport.“ This Central Document No. 9 was drafted by Wan Li and Fan Weizhong, then finalized by Mao Zedong. Deng Xiaoping wrote in that decision that leading officials and heads who showed capitalist loyalties yet did not alter their position following criticism and education had to be transferred from their official capacities in due course. Any delays would badly affect overall plans.294 After the meeting, Wan Li, the Minister of Rail Transport, began to make major improvements to Xuzhou Railway Station, which was the worst kept in the nation. The second area was restoration of the steel industry. As a result of the impact of the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius, steel output in 1974 fell to 21.119 million tons — a drop of 4.1 million tons from the previous year and 5 million tons short of the planned 26 million tons for 1974. The steel industry was badly hit by the factional struggles, and it also offered a way for Deng Xiaoping to achieve overall restoration of order. On May 21, Deng Xiaoping chaired a meeting of the State Council to discuss the documents submitted at the national steel industry symposium. Deng stated: “It is time we solved the problems that exist in steel production since the conditions are now ripe for improvement. We need to choose those who dare to stick to the principles of the party and who have sufficient resilience to stand up to the risk of being politically attacked — those who are responsible and bold enough to fight their way into the leadership teams. ’I am like a Uygur girl with a lot of pigtails. I make many mistakes and have shortcomings that can be easily exploited by opponents.’“ Deng also declared that socialist construction could not proceed without promoting industrial production as well as science and technology: “We must emphasize productivity and science and technology, which should not be regarded as an overemphasis on productivity.“295 Deng’s political proposition was the opposite of Jiang Qing’s. On May 29, Deng Xiaoping stated at a symposium of the steel industry that that industry had to focus on the following four aspects:

that these factions provide to disrupt the socialist order, damage the construction of the national economy, and become promoted to higher positions by means of political

speculation. We must get rid of these people.” (Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” 143.)

294. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 12.

295. Ibid., 15.

99

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

1. 2. 3. 4.

establishing a resolute leadership team; firmly fighting against factions; carefully implementing related policies; establishing necessary rules and regulations.296

On June 4, the CPC Central Committee issued “On Fulfilling the Plan of Steel Production for 1975“ (Document No. 13). The State Council established a leadership team headed by Gu Mu to restore production in the steel industry. The third area was restoration of order in the financial sector. On January 9, 1975, the State Council issued “On Further Improving the Financial Sector and Strictly Checking Financial Statements in 1974.“ Zhang Jinfu, the Minister of Finance, was in charge of restoring order. Following the instructions of Li Xiannian, the Ministry of Finance on May 18 drafted the “Outline of the Report on Financial Problems“ and “On Solving Several Financial Problems“ (10 financial regulations). The fourth area was restoration of order in industry. On March 5, Deng Xiaoping addressed a meeting of industrial secretaries of the provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions, and he observed that industrial productivity was still low. Industrial production had not been ideal in 1974, and 1975 would be the last year of the 4th Five-Year Plan. If production is not boosted, the implementation of the 5th Five-Year Plan would be seriously affected. Deng declared that the whole party should pursue the main goal of boosting the economy.297 In July, Deng Xiaoping demanded that the State Planning Commission draft the document “On Several Problems in Accelerating Industrial Development“ (18 regulations on industrial development). On August 18, the State Council discussed that document and Deng expressed his opinions on industrial development. Those opinions were as follows: 1. We must raise awareness of agriculture as the foundation of the national economy and we must serve agriculture. 2. We must introduce new technologies and equipment to expand imports and exports. 3. We must improve science and technology research by enterprises. 4. We must restore order in the management of enterprises. 5. We must guarantee the quality of products. 6. We must restore and improve rules and regulations. 296. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 8–11.

297. Ibid., 4–5.

100

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

7. We must stick to the principle of distribution according to labor.298 This document was drafted by the State Planning Commission and revised by Hu Qiaomu, Wu Lengxi, Yu Guangyuan, and Deng Liqun in the Politics Research Office of the State Council. It was printed on September 2 by the Central Office, but was not officially submitted to the CPC Central Committee and State Council.299 Owing to interventions by the Gang of Four, the document was not released. The fifth area was restoration of order in the PLA. Based on statistics from the General Politics Department of the PLA in 1974, there were 1.526 million members of the PLA as well as 467,000 excess staff members. After restructuring and reduction of quotas, another 100,000 would become supernumerary. It was estimated that the number of excess staff could amount to 600,000. At the same time, the leadership in the PLA at all levels had excessively large staffs: 36 staff members was the average for a large military area, though this figure could rise to 44; 38 was the average for provincial military areas, with the figure being up to 58 at most; the figure was 20–40 for army corps, divisions, and even regiments. The average age of the leadership was high: that of a division commander and commissar was 49, while that of a colonel and commissar was 45.300 On January 19, Deng Xiaoping conveyed Mao Zedong’s instruction on restoring order in the PLA to a forum of heads of the big military areas. Deng stated that factions represented a significant problem for the country’s army. He argued that army units that formed factions should be transferred to other regions. He said that the issue of unity and stability was one that also concerned the army. On January 25, Deng Xiaoping once again communicated Mao Zedong’s instruction on restoring order in the PLA in talks with the general chief of staff of the PLA. Why was Mao so keen to overhaul the PLA? Deng explained that since Lin Biao had been responsible for the PLA in 1959, the PLA had been poorly organized — especially during the later period of Lin’s management. Many excellent traditions had been disposed of, and military institutions had become excessively large. The PLA was not lean and tough, and it would not be able to win a war.301 Deng said that restoring order in the PLA required two things: one was improved consciousness of being a member of the CPC rather than being part of 298. Ibid., 28–31. 299. Deng, Account of Deng Liqun: 12 Springs and Autumns (1975–1987), 24–25. 300. Cheng and Xia, Deng Xiaoping in 1975, 417–418. 301. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 8.

101

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

some faction; the other was strengthened discipline.302 From June 24 to July 15, the Central Military Committee convened an expanded meeting.303 At that meeting Deng Xiaoping made a report titled “On the Task of Restoring Order in the PLA.“ He emphasized that it was necessary to address the excessive size, poor organization, extravagance in some areas, and laziness in improving the PLA. Deng also stated that the leadership needed to fight weaknesses, laziness, and slackness.304 Ye Jianying summarized the content of the meeting by saying that no careerists should be allowed to intervene in the PLA and that no scheming should be allowed in the army.305 Ye Jianying also conveyed Mao Zedong’s repeated criticisms against the Shanghai gang — the group of Jiang Qing.306 This meeting fully reflected the direct, sharp hostility between the moderates, headed by Deng Xiaoping and Ye Jianying, and the Cultural Revolution hardliners, led by Jiang Qing. Since Jiang Qing and her supporters were still protected and supported by Mao, Ye Jianying could not get to them; in his words, he was “afraid of burning the house in trying to get rid of the mouse.“ On July 19, with the approval of Mao Zedong, the CPC Central Committee issued the Central Military Committee’s report on that meeting, including the speeches by Deng Xiaoping and Ye Jianying. The Central Military Committee decided to reduce the 1.6 million servicemen and servicewomen in the total quota 302. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 1–3.

303. In all, 70 people attended the meeting. They included the leaders in the Standing

Committee of the Central Military Committee, headquarters staff under the Central Military Committee, and members of the National Defense Science Committee, the

National Defense Industry Office, the Academy of Military Science, and the military colleges and universities directly under the Central Military Committee. The meeting was chaired by Ye Jianying. The “Report on Reducing Military Quotas and Readjusting

the Military System and Replacing Supernumerary Cadres“ was discussed and adopted. On July 15, Ye Jianying made a speech summarizing the content.

304. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 15–24.

305. Ye Jianying said at the meeting, “You should be aware that some people [referring to

Jiang Qing] have been handing out books, materials, and letters to confuse the thinking of the PLA. No one should be allowed to do this without the approval of the Central

Military Committee! No careerists should be allowed to intervene in the party or hatch

any plots.” (Editorial Committee of Biography of Ye Jianying comp., Biography of Ye Jianying, 372.)

306. Cheng and Xia, Deng Xiaoping in 1975, 416–417.

102

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

of the PLA and remove around 600,000 excess staff members. On August 20, Xiao Jinguang, a navy commander, wrote a letter to Deng Xiaoping, reporting to him that Shanghai News had published an article titled “Diao Xiaosan’s Logic“ (Emancipation Daily, July 14, 1975) and “What the 8th Route Looks Like“ (Learning and Criticism, issue no. 7, 1975) to attack the expanded meeting of the Central Military Committee. These two articles were written and published according to the instructions of Zhang Chunqiao, who objected to the program that had been approved at that meeting. With little of support, Zhang had these two articles published so as to voice his objection.307 The sixth area was restoring order in national defense. After having being appointed as director of the National Defense Science Commission, Zhang Aiping led a team to conduct investigations in the Seventh Machinery Industrial Department, where the factional conflicts had been the fiercest. Deng Xiaoping assured Zhang Aiping: “Be bold in your work, and I will be responsible for your mistakes.“ Deng added angrily: “Such struggles in the 7th Machinery Industrial Department show no patriotism, let alone socialism.“308 On June 30, the CPC Central Committee issued the “Report on Solving the Problems in the Seventh Machinery Industrial Department by the National Defense Science Commission.“ In August, the Central Military Committee convened a conference about key industrial enterprises for national defense. For this purpose, Deng Xiaoping wrote a report titled “On Restoring Order in National Defense Industrial Enterprises.“309 In the second half of 1975, China successfully put three artificial satellites into orbit. The seventh area was restoring order in the science community. In 1975, Deng Xiaoping proposed reforms to the Chinese Academy of Sciences. To improve leadership, the CPC Central Committee decided to appoint Hu Yaobang, Li Chang, and Wang Guangwei to the core leading team of the CPC in the Chinese Academy of Sciences (with Guo Moruo as team leader and Hu Yaobang as the first vice team leader). This team would be responsible for drafting “On Several Problems in the Science Community“ (outline report for discussion). On September 26, Deng Xiaoping chaired a meeting of the State Council to discuss the outline report, and he proposed that scientific research be given top

307. Editorial Committee of Biography of Hu Qiaomu comp., The 24 Talks of Deng Xiaoping, 38, 55.

308. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the ”Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1200.

309. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 24–27.

103

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

priority.310 The report fully affirmed the scientific achievements that had been made in the previous 20 years. It stated that the current 4 million workers in science and technology were mostly excellent or good. The report proposed ending China’s exclusion and isolation in the area of science: it was necessary to introduce advanced technologies and equipment from abroad as well as conduct friendly exchanges with the international scientific community. It stated that theoretical and basic research in the natural sciences should not be ignored. Following the instructions of Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang and others revised the outline report many times. Deng submitted this report to Mao Zedong on September 30; however, Mao did not approve the report.311 The main reason was that the “Outline Report by the Chinese Academy of Sciences“ quoted Mao saying that science and technology were critical to productivity: this derived from “Chairman Mao’s Talk on Scientific and Technological Research,“ a pamphlet compiled and printed by the State Science Commission in 1969. That quote was based on “Mao Zedong: Talk after Listening to a Report on the Planning of Scientific and Technological Research, December 1963.“ Based on research by Hu Qiaomu, this was recorded when Mao Zedong heard Nie Rongzhen discussing the 10-year planning of scientific and technological research. Han Guang, Zhang Jinfu, Fan Changjiang, and Yu Guangyuan were also present when Mao said those words. However, Mao denied having said them.312 In August 1976, the Gang of Four criticized Deng Xiaoping for having distorted Mao’s instructions. Mao Zedong’s assertion that science and technology were related to productivity was correct. However, because of the ongoing political struggles — especially when he decided to criticize Deng Xiaoping and the rightists — Mao went back on his own earlier correct idea. Later, Deng developed this idea of Mao’s into “Science and technology are the first elements in productivity.“313 310. Ibid., 32–34. 311. Ministry of Science and Technology of the People’s Republic of China and Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee eds., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Thoughts on Science and Technology (1975–1994), 17.

312. On October 13, 1975, Mao Zedong gave Deng Xiaoping his opinion about the outline report. On October 14, Deng informed Hu Qiaomu about his discussion with Mao. Deng told Hu that he had not professed that science and technology were linked to

productivity, and he did not completely approve of the report. (Cheng and Xia, Deng Xiaoping in 1975, 393–394.)

313. In 1975, Deng Xiaoping said that the first issue was understanding how science and technology were linked to productivity: “The Gang of Four once confused right and

wrong in this issue, and this caused confusion among many people. That science and

104

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

The 8th area was bringing reform to education. On September 3, when Deng Xiaoping talked to the seven leaders of the Politics Research Office of the State Council, he said that there were many problems in education. With low enthusiasm on the part of both teachers and students and low education quality, how could the Four Modernizations be achieved? On September 15, Deng Xiaoping proposed at a meeting that the nation learn from the agricultural model and spirit of Dazhai Village; order also needed to be restored in culture and education.314 He said that the most important task was to redefine education as being the most basic factor in economic construction and for achieving the Four Modernizations. When listening to a report titled “Several Problems in Scientific Research“ by Hu Yaobang and others, Deng sharply rebuked some universities for being no more than secondary technological schools: “With no skills or knowledge of foreign languages or natural sciences, math, physics, and chemistry, how can we scale the mountains of development? We could not even scale small hills. This problem is most probably due to the education community. Science and technology are essential to productivity, and technical and scientific researchers are the equivalent of laborers!“315 Zhou Rongxin, Minister of Education, wrote the “Education Work Outline Report“ in line with the instructions of Deng Xiaoping. This report reaffirmed Mao Zedong’s speech at the first CPPCC meeting on September 9, 1949: “With the growth in economic construction, cultural growth is inevitable. The time when China was regarded as uncivilized is over. We shall stand as a highly civilized nation in the eyes of the world.“316 Zhou Rongxin reaffirmed Mao’s view in 1957 that it takes 100 years to properly educate people.317 The outline report expressly stated that technology are linked to productivity has always been a Marxist idea. What was the

source of the huge development of social productivity and the drastic improvement in efficiency? The primary element was the power of science and technology.“ (Party

Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 86–87.)

314. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Thoughts (1975–1997), 18.

315. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 34.

316. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 5, 3–7.

317. Mao Zedong stated in 1957: “We should build up our own technological ability over

the next 10 years. The so-called 100-year efforts to develop talent should be changed

into 10-year efforts. Socialism cannot be achieved without this. The proletariat will

105

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

China faced a severe problem if it fell behind in education: the dictatorship of the proletariat and progress toward the Four Modernizations would be affected.318 The third version of the report was not finalized until November 10. Before it could be issued, Zhou Rongxin came under attack from Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi. The 9th area was agricultural reform. On July 11, Deng Xiaoping met with Liu Xingyuan, first CPC secretary of Sichuan Province and director of the Sichuan Revolutionary Committee. Deng told Liu that in 1974, the per capita production value of agriculture in Sichuan was the second lowest in China. Many local people lacked sufficient food, and that situation could not lead to stability. Deng said it was necessary to prioritize agriculture. He stated that research should be conducted into agricultural matters, such as pig-raising policies. It was also important that once these policies became introduced they should not be changed: otherwise, people would lose faith in the authorities.319 Deng Xiaoping proposed at a forum of rural workers that it was necessary to restore order in rural areas and to boost agricultural production.320 Deng noted in particular that the grain output in some counties and regions was even lower than immediately after the foundation of the PRC. He said that China was unable to boast about its agricultural production. Deng even debated this issue face to face with Jiang Qing.321 This shows that Deng was well aware of the destitution not succeed without a vast technological, theoretical, and professional force using the thoughts of Marxism.“ (Cheng and Xia, Deng Xiaoping in 1975, 500.) 318. Ibid. 319. Party Literature Research Center of the Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol.1, 67.

320. Party Literature Research Center of the Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 35–37.

321. Deng Xiaoping said: “We cannot brag. Such counties, communes, and production teams

as Dazhai exist across the country; there is a lack of balance. The grain output in some counties and regions is even lower now than immediately after the foundation of the

PRC!“ Deng was interrupted by Jiang Qing, who exclaimed: “That’s not true. Those are very isolated incidents!“ Deng Xiaoping maintained: “Even isolated incidents are worth

our attention!“ He said: “According to statistics of the 23 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions, the per capita production value of the people’s commune

is 124 yuan. The lowest in China is Guizhou, where it is just over 60 yuan; the second

lowest is Sichuan, where it is just over 90 yuan. Can we go on like this? There are still quite a few provinces where the per capital production value is around 100 yuan. We

are talking about production value, not the income of the commune members. People

only get the minimal income, and some are further burdened with debts. Should we be

106

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

and backwardness that existed in rural China during the Cultural Revolution; he was conscious of the fact that the Chinese lacked sufficient food and clothing, especially in the poorest provinces of Guizhou and Sichuan. By contrast, Jiang did not conduct investigations to seek solutions but was single-mindedly engaged in class struggles. In the overall restoration of order in 1975, Deng Xiaoping, Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian, Wang Zhen and other members of the CPC Central Committee and State Council played an important role in the collective leadership. In addition, Wan Li, Hu Yaobang, Zhang Jinfu, Zhou Rongxin and other ministers in the State Council were actively involved in frontline activities. This reflects the fact that by following the wishes of the people, the mainstream force in the CPC in this special political period was engaged in an open political contest with the Jiang Qing clique. As Zhou Enlai said to Deng Xiaoping on September 20: “You have had a wonderful year — much better than I would have had!“322 In July 1985, Deng Xiaoping reviewed the efforts made in restoring order in 1975: “In 1975, I was in charge of the whole nation and undertook some experiments to try to restore order in all sectors. At that time, those efforts had an immediate effect, and all aspects of life greatly improved. And the people were happy — except for the Gang of Four.“323 In the process of restoring order, Deng Xiaoping established a decision-making think tank so as to engage in his political and theoretical struggle with Jiang Qing. At that time, the major newspapers and magazines in China were controlled by the Gang of Four, who cultivated a batch of writers, such as Liang Xiao and Luo Siding. Because of this situation, Deng Xiaoping and Li Xiannian considered establishing a Political Research Office, though Li was concerned that this might be viewed as a team set up to oppose the Gang of Four.324 On January 6, Deng Xiaoping talked to Hu Qiaomu about establishing a writing team to develop some articles against revisionism and imperialism.325 satisfied with these circumstances?” (Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 3, 432.)

322. Party Literature Research Center of the Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol.1, 102.

323. This was what Deng Xiaoping said on July 15, 1985 in talks with George Michael Chambers, prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago. (Party Literature Research Center of the Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 2, 1060.)

324. Deng, Account of Deng Liqun: 12 Springs and Autumns (1975–1987), 13. 325. The team at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse referred to the document drafting team

107

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Deng proposed some themes for research and writing. He said that producing those articles required a proper writing team.326 On June 8, Deng talked to Hu Qiaomu about setting up a Political Research Office in the State Council. On June 15, Deng Xiaoping wrote to Wang Hongwen, stating that the Political Research Office should be established. On July 5, with the approval of Mao Zedong and the CPC Central Committee, the Political Research Office was established under the State Council, and it was under the charge of Hu Qiaomu, Lu Lengxi, Hu Sheng, Xiong Fu, Yu Guangyuan, Li Xin, and Deng Liqun.327 The office had to deal with the following: assisting Deng Xiaoping in efforts to restore order nationwide; compiling the fifth volume of Selected Works of Mao Zedong; conducting research into thought and culture; collecting and submitting appropriate materials to the CPC Central Committee and Mao; participating in drafting and revising documents on restoring order in all sectors, publishing the journal Frontline of Thoughts; and organizing teams for conducting theoretical research. From July to November, Hu Qiaomu made 16 reports to Deng, who for his part assigned tasks to Hu Qiaomu.328 The Political Research Office became Deng’s major think tank, and it played an important role in his campaign to restore order around the country. Later, Deng Liqun recalled that from the very first day the Political Research Office was established, it set out to combat the Gang of Four and its writers.329 On May 29, Deng Xiaoping conveyed three directions of Mao Zedong at the symposium of the steel industry: first, be alert against revisionism; second, maintain stability and unity; and third, boost the national economy. Deng Xiaoping stated: “These three instructions will be the guidelines for our future work for a period of time. They are interrelated and inseparable from one another. None of them should be ignored.“330 On July 4, Deng Xiaoping said when addressing the fourth enrolment of the Central Reading Class: “Comrade Mao Zedong gave us three important instructions, which should serve as our guideline for our current work.“331 This officially established by the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau in February 1963. Its members were Wu Lengxi, Hu Sheng, and Xiong Fu.

326. Editorial Committee of Biography of Hu Qiaomu comp., The 24 Talks of Deng Xiaoping, 11–12.

327. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol.1, 57.

328. Cheng and Xia, Deng Xiaoping in 1975, 213. 329. Deng, Account of Deng Liqun: 12 Springs and Autumns (1975–1987), 13.

330. “Deng Xiaoping’s Speech at the Steel Industry Symposium,” May 29, 1975.

331. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works

108

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

was based on the three instructions stated in the guideline. In October, Mao Zedong denied these instructions when talking to Mao Yuanxin. He stated that the practice of taking his three instructions as some kind of guidance was incorrect. Mao said that maintaining unity and stability did not preclude class struggle: class struggle was the guideline, whereas everything else was a secondary detail.332 On September 10, Deng Xiaoping informed the seven leaders of the Political Research Office of the State Council about overall publicity regarding Mao Zedong’s thoughts. He said that current publicity work was rather biased, with each side taking what they needed from the material. As a result, Mao’s thoughts were not being properly communicated.333 On October 4, Deng Xiaoping declared at a central rural working meeting that Mao Zedong’s thoughts amounted to a complete ideology with rich content: “How could we bias his thinking by highlighting one word or two or one point of view or the other?“ The problem of dissecting Mao’s thoughts was thus not solved.334 These two speeches were targeted at the Gang of Four, which often distorted what Mao had said. The address given by Deng in May 1977 was contrary to Hua Guofeng’s proposition that it was important to support the chairman’s decision and strictly follow his instructions. These talks laid a theoretical foundation for Deng’s drive for reform and opening-up: the system of Mao’s thoughts. Deng Liqun, leader of Political Research Office of the State Council, presided over the drafting of “On the General Outline of Work in the Party and Country.“335 Although this article was not composed under the instructions of Deng Xiaoping, it was written based on the talks and speeches of Deng and other leaders in the State Council. The article cited three of Mao’s instructions, and quoted Mao in “On Coalition Government:“ “The policies and practices of all parties in China and their effects on the Chinese people ultimately depend on whether they are helpful and how helpful they are to the development of the productivity of the Chinese people.“336 Deng Liqun proposed that this should be used as a criterion regarding of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 12. 332. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 486.

333. Editorial Committee of Biography of Hu Qiaomu comp., The 24 Talks of Deng Xiaoping, 63. 334. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 35–37.

335. Those that participated in the drafting of the documents included Hu Jiwei, Yu Zongyan,

Su Pei, and Teng Wensheng in the Political Research Office of the State Council. (Deng, Account of Deng Liqun: 12 Springs and Autumns (1975–1987), 26–27.)

336. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works

109

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

whether a political line was correct or not or practices were socialistic or not. This could be considered using Mao’s words against himself. It reflected the fact that Deng and others were trying to correct the mistakes that Mao had made in his later years and to rebuke the senseless arguments of the Jiang Qing clique by using the correct thoughts of Mao. Subsequently, Jiang Qing openly criticized the three important documents titled “On the General Outline of the Work of the Party and the Country“ by Deng Liqun, “Several Problems on Accelerating Industrial Development“ by Fang Weizhong, member of State Planning Commission, and “Outline Report of Work in the Chinese Academy of Sciences“ by Hu Yaobang. She dismissed these as three poisonous texts and said that “On the General Outline of the Work of the Party and the Country“ was a political manifesto for restoring capitalism.337 Jiang Qing exclaimed that Nikita Khrushchev did the same thing in the years after Stalin’s death, whereas Deng Xiaoping was doing this while Chairman Mao was still alive. She declared that they were worse than Khrushchev.338 Those three documents were in fact an initial attempt to correct the wrongs of the Cultural Revolution, end chaos, and restore order. That was the first full-scale effort to put things right. On May 24, 1977, Deng Xiaoping said to Wang Zhen and Deng Liqun: “I have only recently read ’On the General Outline’ among the three poisonous texts: the article was well written and makes very good points in its arguments. We have tried to adopt the ’Outline Report’ but to no avail. We need to continue discussing and writing articles on some issues. I have read the second draft of the ’22 Regulations on Industries’ but not the other drafts. These articles have their shortcomings. But then, all good things do have their shortcomings.“339 Soon after fighting to restore orders in all sectors, the nation’s economic situation showed to have improved. In all walks of life, it became possible to shake off the stagnation and temporarily enter a period of high growth. Comparing to previous year, the value gross industrial product increased by 14.9% and that of agricultural product increased by 3.7%; which adds up to contribute an 11.5% rise of the overall of Mao Zedong, vol. 3, 1079. 337. In February 1976, Yao Wenyuan remarked with regard to the “General Outline of the

Work of the Party and the Country“ that such an outline targeted at restoring capitalism was very similar to the Summary of Project 571: “Can capitalism be restored at all?

In your dreams!“ (Deng, Account of Deng Liqun: 12 Springs and Autumns (1975–1987),

30–31.)

338. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1280–1281.

339. Deng, Account of Deng Liqun: 12 Springs and Autumns (1975–1987), 31.

110

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

gross product value. Fiscal deficits dropped, and imports and exports reached a new height. This was in complete contrast to the economic decline caused by the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius in 1974. Deng Xiaoping’s efforts to restore order to the nation gain him universal approve and support. The party, the PLA, and the Chinese people began to understand and support Deng.340 This laid an important foundation for Deng’s comeback in 1977 and his drive for reform and opening-up in 1978. Without the trust of the people, there would have been no era of Deng Xiaoping in China. On the one hand, Deng Xiaoping’s work was supported by Mao Zedong and approved by the Political Bureau.341 On the other, his focus on economic development ran against the political grain of the Cultural Revolution. Deng was thus taking a good deal of political risk. First, Mao posed the biggest impediment to Deng’s theories and policies, and Mao also represented a considerable threat to Deng. Second, Deng had to deal with Jiang Qing’s open hostility toward him. Deng and Jiang had been through many political struggles and debates over theory. Each had accumulated wins and losses, which owed less to their own political strength than to the stance of Mao in the particular matter. Both of them tried to convince Mao of their own cause and garner his support, and he in turn used these two political forces for his own purposes. The first political struggle between Deng and Jiang was over Mao’s instructions relating to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan led in the attack against Deng for pursuing the path of capitalism. During the discussions with the Danish prime minister, Poul Hartling, on October 20, 1974, Mao Zedong proposed the theory of socialism and the dictatorship 340. On October 13, 1987, Deng Xiaoping said that in 1975, he was responsible for the routine work of the CPC Central Committee: “My reforms that year were conducted in the name of restoring order so as to boost the economy. The first step was to rehabilitate

production. Wherever such measures were undertaken, they led to considerable effects.

However, I was soon kicked out of power by the Gang of Four. In all, I fell from power but was restored three times. The April 5 movement in 1976 broke out in memory of Premier Zhou, but it was also to show support for me. This proved that the reform

efforts made in 1974 and 1975 were very popular and were in line with the wishes of the people.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, 255.)

341. On September 27, 1975, Deng Xiaoping said at the Central Rural Working Meeting: “I proposed restoring order in certain areas in the Political Bureau, and I reported my proposals to Comrade Mao Zedong. He agreed.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 35.)

111

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

of the proletariat.342 On December 26 1974, which is also Mao’s birthday, Mao warned Zhou Enlai over the discussion of socialism and dictatorship proletariat. He stressed that such issue should be clarified — otherwise China would slide into revisionism. Mao also warned that if Lin Biao and his supporters had gained power, China would have easily turned to capitalism.343 At that point, it had been over 20 years since Mao had begun to build his socialist system. However, he was dissatisfied with the current situation and believed that China then was similar to how it had been before 1949, which was in effect a denunciation of his own efforts. Mao insisted that mandatory measures, such as the dictatorship of the proletariat, should be used to quell capitalism. He believed that it was still possible for capitalism to be restored in China, and quoted Lenin: “Petty production constantly makes capitalism and capitalists — daily, spontaneously, and on a large scale.“ Mao Zedong needed enemies: he believed in the philosophy of struggle and that fighting was enjoyable. Almost all of Mao Zedong’s opponents had been struck down — first Liu Shaoqi and then Lin Biao — neither of whom he regarded as politicians any more but as petty producers acting out of self-interest. Even with the dictatorship of the proletariat, how could he help the 700 million peasants in China? This old, sick man had recently written only a 400-character paragraph, which discussed theoretical problems. He was no longer able to produce new 342. Mao Zedong said: “In a word, China is a socialist country. Before 1949, China was similar to capitalist countries. At present, the eight-tier salary system is still in place.

We still distribute goods according to work needs and in exchange for money, which is not so different from previous societies. The difference lies in the ownership system.”

(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 413.)

343. Mao Zedong said that articles should be written on why Lenin advocated dictatorship over capitalism: “Tell Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan to find Lenin’s arguments on

this in his works and send me a copy. Read those first and then write articles on this. Tell Zhang Chunwiao to write the articles. If this issue is not clarified, revisionism will

ensue. And the whole nation needs to be aware of this. I talked about socialism with the prime minister of Denmark. We still have our commodities system, and our salaries are not equal: we have the eight-tier salary system. This can be rectified only under

a dictatorship of the proletariat. Therefore, if Lin Biao and his sort came to power,

China would soon descend into capitalism. Thus, we need to read books on Marxism. Lenin said that petty production constantly makes capitalism and capitalists — daily, spontaneously, and on a large scale. That applies to some workers and CPC members.

The capitalist lifestyle may also be found among the proletariat and government workers.“ (Ibid.)

112

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

theories or write masterly articles on theory. He had to rely on his most trusted assistants — Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan — in formulating a theoretical system. On January 29, 1975, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan presented Mao a report. The report contained excerpts of Lenin’s arguments on the dictatorship of the proletariat. On February 2, Mao agreed to have this report printed and distributed.344 On February 22, the People’s Daily used 33 quotes in an article titled “Marx, Engels, and Lenin on the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.“ Among those quotes, 23 was by Lenin, among them 20 was found by Zhuang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan. Zhang and Yao did not study the current situation in China but simply referred to books when writing the report. Hence, even they were from Shanghai, they turned a blind eye to those 700 million Chinese who was living in absolute poverty. In compliance with Mao’s request, they sought answers and support in the works of Marx and Lenin. Zhang and Yao were however more than writers of the government; they were also the main malefactors that damaged the party, the country, and the people by driving China’s modernization to an impasse. At that time, they helped Mao in his theoretical interactions. It should be particularly noted that Zhang Chunqiao was an important figure in removing the rights of the capitalist class, which was in line with the thinking of Mao Zedong. On October 13, 1958, Mao Zedong wrote an editorial note for Zhang Chunqiao’s article “Remove the Rights of the Capitalist Class.“ Mao completely agreed with removing the rights of the capitalist class. From that point on, Mao was trapped within the mindset of agricultural socialism.345 Based on his letter to Lin Biao on May 7, 1966, Mao pursued the ideal of the large, highly publicized people’s commune, communal canteens, and large communist schools together with the elimination of old thoughts, old culture, old customs, and old habits. Mao advocated restricting the rights of the capitalist class and establishing a completely pure socialist society. On February 9, the People’s Daily published an editorial — “Study Well the Theory of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.“ This editorial conveyed Mao Zedong’s thoughts on the theoretical problem of why Lenin argued for dictatorship over the 344. Ibid., 420. 345. Wang Xiaoqiang argued that agricultural socialism is at the core of egalitarianism.

This means that eliminating private ownership will help realize egalitarian supply and

a cultural dictatorship; a series of extreme measures will once and for all eradicate the possibility of polarization and land merges; this is related to issues of production, distribution, consumption, and ideology and will ensure the end of petty producers. (Wang, “Criticism of Agricultural Socialism.”)

113

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

capitalist class and why this issue needed to be clarified: “Otherwise, revisionism will ensue. It is necessary for the whole nation to be aware of this.“ The editorial placed particular emphasis on the fact that the struggle against revisionism was a long-term one — not something that could be resolved by a debate or two.346 Also on February 9, the People’s Daily published the article “We Must Establish the Dictatorship of the Proletariats over the Capitalists“ by Liang Xiao. The article claimed that socialist society was a transitional state between capitalistic and communistic societies. To achieve the ideal of communism, it was essential for the proletariat to break free from conventional ownership systems as well as conventional thoughts and ideas. For the proletariat to break free, it was necessary to restrict the rights of capitalists and criticize the way of Confucius and Mencius as well as the ideology of all exploitative classes. This was a long-term task for the whole socialist stage of history.347 On February 11, Zhou Enlai wrote a letter to all Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, namely Wang Hongwen, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhang Chunqiao, proposing to discuss the previously presented directions on theoretical problems with the Political Bureau. The next day, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, which the above four leaders attended in addition to Yao Wenyuan to discuss Mao’s instructions.348 With Mao’s approval, the CPC Central Committee issued the “Notice on Learning the Important Instructions of Chairman Mao on Theoretical Problems“ on February 18. On March 1, the People’s Daily published the article “On the Social Foundations of the Anti-party Group of Lin Biao“ by Yao Wenyuan. This article criticized Lin Biao and his followers for attempting to expand the rights of the capitalist class in a socialist country. This was so that the emerging new capitalists as well as some factions and groups that wished to pursue the course of capitalism, in addition to 346. The article stated that all revisionist elements were trying their best to distort, attack, and eliminate the dictatorship of the proletariat. These elements denied the fact that

the conflicts between proletariats and capitalists and between socialism and capitalism were the major fundamental conflicts in socialist society. These people also denied the

fact that the proletariat class had to exercise a dictatorship over the capitalists in the superstructure, including all cultural sectors. These elements also denied the fact that

the proletariat class had to set necessary limits on the rights of the capitalist class. The

article stated that some party members were confused over this issue and even took some capitalist matters to be socialistic. (People’s Daily, February 9, 1975.) 347. Ibid. 348. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 19.

114

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

landlord capitalists who had been struck down, colluded with one another in an effort to restore capitalism. Lin Biao and his like were the political agents of these people. This article backed with Mao’s instruction and approval after debating at the Political Bureau.349 As a result of Mao’s instruction, Chunqiao addressed a forum of directors of the politics departments of all major units of the PLA on March 1. Zhang stated that the 4th NPC proposed a grand scheme: “By the end of this century, we will have built our country into a strong, prosperous nation and stand among the most powerful countries in the world. What we need in order to achieve this is no more than hundreds of billions of kilograms of grain and tens of millions of tons of steel. However, if the theoretical problems remain unresolved, the mistakes that Stalin made will repeat in China. That country had tens of millions of tons of steel and less grain than us. However, after the Soviet Union sent its satellite into orbit, Stalin was already in disgrace.“350 Zhang had aspirations to become a theorist of the Cultural Revolution, and he was very familiar with Mao’s way of thinking. Mao was indeed concerned that after his death, China would be capable of putting satellites into orbit and that capitalism would took socialism’s place. Subsequently, Deng Xiaoping recalled that there were fierce struggles with the Gang of Four on whether to launch the drive for the Four Modernizations: “The Gang of Four said some nonsense that once the Four Modernizations were achieved, capitalism would be restored.“351 This was part of the violent theoretical struggle between Deng and the Gang of Four, and it also reflected his long-term major dispute with Mao Zedong. What means did Mao Zedong adopt to prevent the restoration of capitalism? He exercised feudalistic dictatorship in the name of the proletariat dictatorship. On behalf of Mao, Zhang Chunqiao showed his supported towards this dictatorship. On April 1, Red Flag published the article “On Overall Dictatorship over the Capitalist Class,“ which proposed exercising complete dictatorship over the capitalist class in all fields and through all stages of revolution and development. This article underscored the functions of the state in exercising dictatorship and quelling riots, and it advocated that the state could practice this dictatorship in a random fashion. This was a political program for state dictatorship, and it predicted 349. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1193.

350. Zhang, “Speech at a Forum of Directors of the Politics Departments of All Major Units of the PLA,” March 1, 1976.

351. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 86.

115

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

an overall dictatorship if the Gang of Four achieved power. This article was fully reprinted and distributed all over the country in newspapers and magazines with Mao’s consent alongside with Yao Wenyuan’s article. These articles explained Mao’s thoughts about learning the theory about the dictatorship of the proletariat, which provided the theoretical basis for the Cultural Revolution. The articles were politically targeted at Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping. When Jiang Qing failed to organize her own cabinet, she prepared theoretical weapons to continue her attacks against Deng and the rightists. On June 21, Mao Zedong held discussions with Pol Pot, general secretary of the Cambodian Communist Party. Mao said: “There were two possibilities for democratic revolution: one was that it would turn to socialism; the other was that it would turn to capitalism. It is still the same now.” This was Mao’s historical summary of his 26 years in power. He also made a prediction about China’s future. He said that in the next 50 years (by 2025) or 100 years (by 2075), there would still be struggles over the two political lines: “It will still be the case in 10,000 years. This is the case in a communist society: if it wasn’t, we wouldn’t be Marxists. In the era of Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, the Soviet Union was different from what it was like in the era of Lenin. However, in the future, the Soviet Union will still return to Leninism.“ According to Mao’s political prediction, China could follow the same course as the Soviet Union. Revisionism could appear in China in the future, but the country would eventually return to Marxism and Leninism: “This country of ours is still a capitalistic country without capitalists, as described by Lenin. Our country protects the rights of capitalists and exercises unequal salary systems. It retains inequalities under the name of equality.“352 Mao Zedong preferred egalitarian poverty to unequal wealth. He judged Chinese society to be a capitalist country without capitalists. Mao did not understand the functions of a modern country in terms of income distribution, personal income tax, social security, financial transactions, and public services. He believed that polarization could be avoided by having people learn his supreme instructions, by launching the Cultural Revolution, and by restricting the rights of the capitalists. He was likewise unaware and failed to mention that China’s basic national problem was that its per capita GNP ranked among the lowest in the world. There is no evidence that during the course of the Cultural Revolution he ever visited rural areas, particularly old revolutionary areas, minority ethnic regions, border areas, and destitute regions. He was so aloof that he was ignorant of the actual conditions that existed in rural areas and of how the peasants lived. 352. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1229.

116

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Mao was likewise ignorant of the fact that hundreds of millions of Chinese were still living in absolute poverty and were unable to feed or clothe themselves. In terms of political targets, he believed egalitarian poverty to be greatly preferable to economic growth and that eliminating the capitalist class was better than eradicating poverty. Mao imposed his own thoughts on the people and his own will on the entire country. In his later years, Mao was increasingly alienated from the fact that China ranked as a low-income nation and also from the needs of the Chinese people — especially the poor peasants — in wanting to shake off poverty and pursue wealth. That was Mao’s particular tragedy. The political route that Liu Shaoqi followed and Mao attacked was based on national circumstances and the ultimate interests of the people. That course was one that led to prosperity and wealth: it was inherited by Deng Xiaoping, who revised it, and eventually it became the mainstream policy of the CPC. The second political struggle took place from March to June 1975. Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan made allusive attacks on Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping for their experience-based approach. This was resolutely stopped by Mao Zedong, who severely criticized the Gang of Four for these attacks. On March 1, 1975, Zhang Chunqiao stated at a forum of directors of the Politics Departments of all major units of the PLA that it was necessary to be alert to the dangers posed by empiricism. The same day, Yao Wenyuan had an article published in Red Flag. In the article, he quoted a paragraph that Mao Zedong wrote in 1959, which emphasized that “the main danger is empiricism.“ Yao claimed that for over 10 years, Chairman Mao had repeated many times the necessity of guarding against this danger. Yao likewise argued that the dominant danger was empiricism and that if certain people achieved power — referring to Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping — China would revert to capitalism. Zhang and Yao attacked others in addition to Deng. An editorial titled “Leading Cadres Should Set an Example in Learning“ was published on March 21 in the People’s Daily. It noted that the past 10 years had demonstrated that empiricism was the assistant of revisionism. Those who subscribed to empiricism ignored theories and the importance of the correct political route as set forth by Chairman Mao. They regarded partial experience as a universal truth. Their practices lacked vision, and they were ready to follow the course of revisionism. The editorial stated that research had to be undertaken with regard to the two classes and the political routes in criticizing revisionism, capitalism, and the rights of capitalists. In mid-April, Jiang Qing propose to criticize empiricism at a Political Bureau meeting and demanded the bureau to discuss over the issue. However, Deng

117

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Xiaoping did not yield to this; instead, he fought back.353 On July 14, when Hu Qiaomu brought materials to Deng against empiricism that had been published in March and April, Deng said: “What’s the meaning of all this? Some of these articles were directed against me!“354 This indicates how Jiang Qing and her supporters conducted a great deal of scheming in the party. On April 18, when Deng Xiaoping reported to Mao Zedong about Jiang Qing’s criticism of empiricism, Mao said that he did not believe empiricism was the major danger back then, hence he now switched and agreed with Deng,355 and once again censured Jiang. Apparently, Mao Zedong thought that Jiang Qing had gone too far, and he was also worried conflicts would develop in the party, which was against his will. Mao was self-contradictory for this. He had to mediate when the conflicts in the party became intense. The struggle between Deng and Jiang depended on Mao’s political preferences. Whomever he supported would win; whomever he objected to would lose. This political contest was not conducted according to rules expressly set down by the party. This was a typical case of Mao’s personal dictatorship. On April 23, Mao Zedong commented on Yao Wenyuan’s report, which stated that it was necessary to resist revisionism, including empiricism and dogmatism. Mao said: “It will not do to ignore these problems. Not many people properly understood Marxism and Leninism. Some individuals thought that they understood, but that was not the case, and they often criticized others in such matters. This amounted to a basic lack of knowledge of Marxism and Leninism.“ Mao proposed to go over this issue with the Political Bureau.356 On April 27, in line with Mao Zedong’s will, Deng Xiaoping and Ye Jianying criticized and quarreled with Jiang Qing’s at a Political Bureau meeting. Deng argued that the rebuke of empiricism was apparently an organized action against Premier Zhou. Jiang declared that the meeting was a surprise attacking her and her followers and just like the Lushan Meeting in 1970. This demonstrated Jiang was acting out of her mind, biting everyone at all opportunity. After the meeting, Wang Hongwen wrote a letter to Mao, claiming that this struggle occurred because Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping expressed what Premier Zhou was not in a position to say in an effort to overthrow the case verdict passed in December 1973. Jiang called 353. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 309. 354. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 69.

355. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 309. 356. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 426.

118

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Mao and telling him that she felt besieged at the Political Bureau meeting.357 This marked the boiling point of among the Political Bureau. On April 29, Zhou Enlai held a meeting with Deng Xiaoping; the next day, Zhou held a discussion with Hua Guofeng. Both of these talks aimed to establish what had happened in the meeting of the Political Bureau. Mao Zedong was displeased receiving Wang Hongwen’s letter. Mao wanted Jiang Qing and the others stop causing trouble, and was well aware that he is the only one capable to put an end to this struggle.358 Late in the evening of May 3, Mao decided to hold a Political Bureau meeting at his residence359 to mediate the conflict within the party and promote unity inside the bureau.360 Mao Zedong knew that Jiang had gone too far and once again he censured her:361 “Disband the 357. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 310. 358. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 356. 359. It had been a long time since Mao Zedong convened a meeting of the Political Bureau. Among those attending the meeting were Zhou Enlai and Xie Jingyi (secretary of the CPC Committee at Peking University; she participated in the work of the Political Bureau although she was not a member. For the details of this meeting, please see Gao et al. eds., Mao Zedong the Historical Figure, 1563–1570.

360. Mao Zedong said: “It has been a long time since we last met. There is a problem that

I’d like to consult with you about. Some people failed to correctly understand some

things, but only a few. I myself made a mistake. In the article titled ’On the Social Foundations of the Anti-party Group of Lin Biao’ by Chunqiao [which was actually

written by Yao Wenyuan — Ed.], I failed to notice the mistake it contained. I listened to

the document once, but I didn’t read it. My eye disease could not allow me to read. It

talked about empiricism and I let it go at that. The document of Xinhua News Agency [referred to the ’Report on Learning the Theory of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat’

— Ed.], Wenyuan showed it to me. It as well as the ten experiences summarized from the Shanghai Machine Tool Plant [referring to the materials against the ten expressions

of empiricism written by the Shanghai Machine Tool Plant on the orders of the Gang of

Four — Ed.] all talked about empiricism instead of Marxism or dogmatism...We need stability and unity. Both empiricism and dogmatism are attempts to revise Marxism

and Leninism. They need to be corrected through education...Some of our comrades who have made mistakes should be criticized. Emphasis has to be placed equally on three aspects: criticism of Lin Biao, criticism of Confucius, and back-door dealing...We need unity and stability. We do not need to rush into censuring dogmatism, empiricism,

revisionism, and the rights of capitalists. Whoever makes haste in these matters will fall.” (Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1731–1732.)

361. Mao Zedong criticized Jiang Qing by saying that she lacked experience of fighting and

119

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Gang of Four. Why don’t you get along with the over 200 members of the Central Committee?“ Mao Zedong even lost his temper, yelling: “Jiang Qing is such a bitch!“ Jiang and Zhang Chunqiao remained composed, though Wang Hongwen and Yao Wenyuan turned pale.362 This indicates the complexity of the relationship between Mao and the Gang of Four. Once Mao had defined Jiang and the others as the Gang of Four, that clique was destined to perish after Mao’s death. Mao’s words became the political basis for Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, and Wang Dongxing to arrest the Gang of Four in October 1976. Mao Zedong was against the formation of factions within the party. The Gang of Four constituted a minority in the CPC Central Committee, and it was isolated from all the rest of the party. Finally, Mao again emphasized the principles of the Three Musts and Three Must-Nots.363 This was the last time for Mao to chair a meeting of the Political Bureau. The principle of the Three Musts and Three Must-Nots was a consistent demand from Mao Zedong which was repeated whenever there was a major irreconcilable political struggle in the party. And this was one faceoff between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing. Even after the 4th NPC, which bring forth good news, Mao was worried about another political rift developing in China. The intense political pressure in the party forced him to mediate the conflict by criticizing Jiang, even though he had no intention leading her to her political downfall.364 It was Mao’s duty to maintain balance between the two forces in the party, yet it was out of his

was unable to write articles. She was not dogmatic but she was an empiricist. In the presence of the members of the Political Bureau, he warned Jiang against arbitrary

actions, and he told her to be cautious. She should not be too self-assertive but needed to consult the Political Bureau when she had a different opinion. He said that documents

had to be issued in the name of the CPC Central Committee, not in her name or in Mao’s name since he would not send any materials to others. (Gao et al. eds., Mao Zedong the Historical Figure, 1568.) 362. Quan, Zhou Enlai Up Close, 390. 363. Mao Zedong said: “I have just three things to say, which is to repeat what was said

at the 9th and 10th National Congresses of the CPC. We must stick to Marxism and

Leninism; we must not have revisionism. We must be united; we must not be divided. We must play fair; we must not resort to trickery.” (Gao et al. eds., Mao Zedong the Historical Figure, 1569.)

364. In 1987, Ji Dengkui remarked that Chairman Mao believed that Jiang Qing and others had made a positive contribution by criticizing Liu Shaoqi. Therefore, Mao did not wish to bring them down politically, but at the same time he did not want to put them in power. (Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1734.)

120

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

power to reconcile the two fundamentally hostile entities.365 Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau on May 4 despite being sick, to hear and implement Mao Zedong’s speech; attending the meeting also included Wang Hongwen, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhang Chunqiao. Zhou drafted the “Opinion on the Work of the Political Bureau,“ which emphasized that the guidelines and political courses adopted at the 9th and 10th National Congresses of the CPC had to be followed. This meant that the principle of the Three Musts and Three Must-Nots had to be adhered to for maintaining unity and stability. For the first time, that document expressly stated that all major issues had to be discussed first at the Political Bureau Standing Committee meeting. All documents drafted — except those related to emergencies in foreign affairs and national defense — had to be submitted two or three days in advance for study and discussion. Unless trivialities or emergencies, if members of the Political Bureau had any propositions to make, they had report to the chairman two or three days in advance before discussed by the Political Bureau. All the documents that needed to be distributed throughout the country need approval from the Political Bureau Standing Committee or competent authorities of the Political Bureau. It was expected that those circulated within the unit for which a particular official was responsible. Documents related to personal opinion should not be issued in the name of any individual or the Political Bureau; all personal correspondence was considered an inappropriate tone of instruction.366 These regulations were apparently set to restrain Jiang Qing and her followers, which had become the fundamental principles for discussion and decision making by the Political Bureau. Unfortunately, those regulations were soon breached by Jiang Qing and others. She had always felt herself to be privileged and above any laws and party regulations — until October 6, 1976, when she was arrested and put under investigation. On May 8, Zhou Enlai chaired a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. Wang Hongwen, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhang Chunqiao were in attendance, and the purpose was to discuss further the implementation of Mao Zedong’s speech of May 3. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai decided on May 17 to have Deng Xiaoping take over the daily routine work of the CPC Central Committee and the Political 365. Deng Rong remarked that Jiang Qing thought nothing of anyone except for Mao Zedong. In actuality, Mao himself was only able to achieve a superficial balance rather

than provide a basic solution to the problem. (Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 357.)

366. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 312.

121

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Bureau;367 so as to chair the meeting devoted to censuring the Gang of Four.368 The next day, Zhou had talks with Deng, who just returned a France visitation. On May 21, Zhou Enlai wrote a letter to all the Political Bureau, providing an account of the proposition of Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan to criticize empiricism. In the letter also stated that a meeting would be held to rebuke the Gang of Four. If the members agreed, the letter would be forwarded to the chairman.369 On May 22, Zhang Chunqiao made the sharp refutation that the letter from the premier was not entirely accurate. On May 27, Zhou wrote another letter to Zhang Chunqiao, arguing against Zhang’s disagreement. Zhang read the letter the same day and remarked: “There’s no need for further revision.“370 It is a solid proof of the total irreconcilable between the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and the Political Bureau. On May 27, Mao Zedong instructed Deng Xiaoping to chair a meeting of the Political Bureau criticizing the Gang of Four — headed by Jiang Qing. Deng said that the speech made by the chairman on May 3 was of great importance to the party since the chairman was addressing the Political Bureau — the core leadership of the CPC: “The chairman proposed that the Political Bureau should be united and stable by following the principle of the Three Musts and Three Must-Nots and that factions within the party and the Gang of Four should be admonished. This is a very important fundamental issue, which should be carefully discussed.“ Deng repudiated the unreasonable accusations that Jiang Qing made in the Political Bureau meeting of April 27. Deng emphasized that there were three issues that had to be clarified: “The first is the 11th political line struggle proposed at the December meeting in 1973. The second is the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius also involved condemning back-door dealings. The final issue is that theories of empiricism have also been attacked. I’d like to ask, why have these things happened? If we allow this situation to continue, we will not be able to achieve any good. Li Xiannian said that the Wenhui Bao and PLA newspapers were wrong to publish articles rebuking Wang Hongwen and acknowledging empiricism as the major danger did not conform to the political course determined at the 9th and 10th National Congresses of the CPC. He also stated that communicating Chairman Mao’s instructions for unity and stability was delayed even though this was meant to quell the mass movement. 367. Ibid., 314. 368. Quan, Zhou Enlai Up Close, 390. 369. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1735. 370. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 707–708.

122

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Li Xiannian declared that it was wrong to speak of the meeting in December 1973 as the 11th political line struggle. He also quoted Mao Zedong when speaking of the Gang of Four: the chairman told them not to make trouble, but they still went ahead and did so.“371 Wu De and Chen Xilian also spoke out against the factional activities of the Gang of Four. This indicates that since Mao Zedong had criticized the Gang of Four, the beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution also stood on the same side as Deng Xiaoping. Three Political Bureau meetings were convened to allow other members to voice their opinions. Ye Jianying gave a long speech on the three issues raised at the previous meeting by Deng Xiaoping and made a number of incisive points.372 Ye described life in the partly lately had been peculiar: “If we allow the existence of illegal organizations, such as the Gang of Four, our unity will be damaged, and the party will become divided.“ Ye also emphasized in particular the necessity of asking for instructions and upholding discipline. He singled out Jiang Qing and her supporters for particular rebuke: “You almost never request instructions, and the reprimands of the chairman and Comrade Xiaoping were completely correct. You need to redress your relationship with individuals and with the party. Any and all major issues have to be submitted to the Political Bureau for discussion.“373 In early June, Jiang Qing visited Deng Xiaoping for a discussion. Mao Zedong made her do so374 since he did not wish internal strife to continue within the Political Bureau. Mao coerced Jiang to concede to Deng Xiaoping in an attempt to help them reach an amiable settlement.375 Even though Mao’s own mediation was unable to lead to unity and stability, the actual source of the party’s inner strife was Mao’s own philosophy of struggle. Jiang made a retreat, though it was only temporary. She had every intention of continuing her battle with Deng. This was a low period in Jiang’s political life. 371. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949–1992), vol. 2, 872.

372. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1735–1737. 373. Editorial Committee of Biography of Ye Jianying comp., Biography of Ye Jianying, 371. 374. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 53.

375. Deng Rong explained that Mao Zedong wished that through this criticism, Jiang

Qing would behave herself and Deng Xiaoping would be satisfied. Mao even wished that Jiang and Deng could forget about the past and even become friendly enough to

cooperate with each other — or at least live in peace. For this purpose, he made Jiang talk to Deng so that they could shake hands. (Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 363.)

123

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

On June 7, Deng Xiaoping reported to Mao Zedong about the Political Bureau meeting and in particular about Jiang Qing’s behavior. Deng received Mao’s political support. Mao believed that Wang Hongwen possessed only a low level of authority, and so Mao decided that Wang should listen closely to Deng. Mao believed that Jiang had made a good contribution in the fight against Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao. However, he thought that she and her supporters had gone too far since they had fought against Premier Zhou, Deng, and Ye Jianying. Now the Political Bureau was going to change. Mao Zedong said: “You need to do your job!“ Deng Xiaoping replied: “With this, I am resolved. There will always be people who object to me. I am certain of that. Mao Zedong said that if a tree stands apart from the wood, it will surely be destroyed by the wind.“376 Previously, Jiang told Mao that she had felt besieged at the meeting of the Political Bureau.377 However, the more Jiang objected, the more Mao supported Deng. This period was Deng’s political peak based on Mao’s political support: without that support, Deng would soon fall. On June 28, Jiang Qing made a written self-criticism to Mao Zedong and the Political Bureau.378 She wrote: “It wasn’t until I came to understand the Gang of 376. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 315–316. 377. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 55.

378. Jiang Qing said: “I apologize to the chairman, to the comrades of the Political Bureau,

and to Comrade Deng Xiaoping.“ She admitted the mistakes she had made in the previous year. The mistakes included the proposition relating to the 11th political line

struggle, the involvement of backdoor dealing in the campaign against Lin Biao and

Confucius, handing out materials without approval, and the proposition that the major current danger was empiricism. She wrote: “It wasn’t until I came to understand the Gang of Four objectively that I realized it had the potential of developing into a faction

that could split the party. And because this is a fundamental issue, the chairman told me about this three or four times both last year and this. The chairman never budges on fundamental issues. I am responsible for my errors, and I am sorry that I involved three

other comrades [Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan] in this matter.

This mistake is serious, and it went against the call of the chairman for unity and stability and his principle of the Three Musts and Three Must-Nots. The cause of these

mistakes was that I did not change my world outlook; I have too much individualism and subjectivity, and I am not cautious or modest. But I now have the confidence and determination to follow the instructions of Chairman Mao and to correct my mistakes

in accordance with the requirements of the party.“ (Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1738.

124

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Four objectively that I realized it had the real potential of developing into a threat of causing the party to split. And because this is a fundamental issue, the chairman told me about this three or four times both last year and this.“379 This was the first time Jiang had written a self-criticizing letter, and she was forced into it more by Mao than by Deng Xiaoping. Mao remarked once to Zhang Yaoci that Jiang Qing was totally isolated. She was in fact a political burden for Mao380 since he could not get rid of her. As long as Mao was in power, Jiang held a privileged position. However, if Jiang suffered, Mao would suffer too, and he was clearly aware of this. He knew what would happen to Jiang after his death. For a period of some months, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping enjoyed a temporary political victory and the Jiang Qing clique had to put up with severe political frustration, which forced them to retreat.381 Deng was their sworn enemy. After Jiang’s self-criticizing letter was given to the members of the Political Bureau in Beijing, Mao Zedong also commented on the letter. The members of the Political Bureau read Jiang’s letter on June 30 at Zhou’s request; Zhou said that Jiang was welcome to criticize herself. Zhou did this to help Jiang, and he knew that Mao wished him to do so. Zhou often performed such acts against his will, but he did not receive any direct political returns for them. Jiang used Mao’s criticism of the novel Tale of the Marshes to attack Zhou as one who had capitulated. The Gang of Four, which was in control of the media, then became even more aggressive. On June 30, the Wenhui Bao newspaper published the article “The Historical Result of the Confucianists in Power — On the Rise and Fall of Xiao Wangzhi,“ written by Cai Ji and Hu Shensheng. The article targeted Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping by criticizing the Confucian master in power who caused the decline of the country. The Political Research Office of the State Council reported the article to Deng. Deng said to Hu Qiaomu: “I already knew about this article. Let them go ahead with it.“382 On July 12, Wenhui Bao published the articles “On the Social Foundations for the Restoration of Zhao Gao“ and “If Confucian Forces Exist, Society Will Not Be Peaceful.“ Under the pretense of commenting on historical events, the articles were actually an attack on Zhou, Deng, and a large number of veteran officials, drawing a parallel with Zhao Gao and the government officials 379. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1232.

380. Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 239. 381. Editorial Committee of Biography of Hu Qiaomu comp., The 24 Talks of Deng Xiaoping, 18. 382. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1232.

125

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

that followed the Confucian route of the Zhao Gao group.383 This form of scheming politics was very prevalent in China at that time. Thus, Jiang had not in fact lost the political struggle. She was ready to attack again. In the eyes of Deng Xiaoping, the Gang of Four was nothing but a pack of crazy political dogs. As long as Mao was still alive, Deng could do nothing but allow Jiang to do what she wanted. Deng was prepared to play a long-term political strategy with the Gang of Four. At that time, Mao Zedong was very disappointed with Wang Hongwen. Mao remarked to Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping that Wang showed low political competence and lacked prestige. Instead of chairing Political Bureau meetings, Wang was transferred to Zhejiang and Shanghai in late June to help with local work, which was in line with Mao’s wishes. On July 1, Ye Jianying wrote a letter to Mao, recommending Deng to chair Political Bureau meetings. Soon with Mao’s approval, Deng began to take charge of the daily work of the CPC Central Committee in early July.384 In terms of power structure, the shift from the Mao-Zhou-Wang to Mao-Zhou-Deng setup was completely Mao’s personal decision, without having to undergo any legal procedure. This power structure was, however, very fragile. Wang said to Deng before he left Beijing: “I’ll see you in 10 years’ time.“ Deng made particular note of this remark, and he said: “Yes. They have advantages in terms of age.“ Wang was then 40 years old, whereas Deng was already 71.385 Four months later on November 15, the pressure of the campaign against rightists obliged Deng to write to Mao, signaling that he wished to be relieved of taking charge of the daily work of the CPC Central Committee.386 This was a typical example of rule by men instead of by law. The third political struggle took place from May to September 1975, when Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing clashed on issues relating to cultural and artistic policies and intellectuals. Mao Zedong supported Deng. Culture had always been an area that was under the control of the Gang of Four. The group used all measures of cultural dictatorship over the intellectual elites.387 This area was the one that was hardest hit in the Cultural Revolution, and it was here that a general dictatorship reigned or secret policing was exercised. During the Cultural Revolution, Yao Wenyuan, on behalf of the Central Revolutionary Team, divided class enemies into eight categories: traitors, spies, capitalist roaders who would not repent, landlords who resisted change, rich farmers, counter-revolutionaries, evil elements, rightists, 383. Ibid., 1237–1238. 384. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1739. 385. Deng, Account of Deng Liqun: 12 Springs and Autumns (1975–1987), 18. 386. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1761. 387. Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 370.

126

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

and counter-revolutionary elements.388 All intellectuals were affected or criticized to different degrees. Despite their high economic status or income, they suffered the lowest political and social status. They were dismissed as the “Stinky 9th.“ Liang Shuming wrote a poem titled “On the Stinky 9th.“ The poem included such lines as “In ancient times, Confucians ranked 9th, just above beggars, / Now they are called the Stinky 9th. In the past, the 9th lived decently, / But today, they are treated worse than dogs. Dictators rose to power owing to ignorance; / Education makes one reactionary. If Marx and Lenin were alive today, They’d also be paraded through the streets.“ As Joseph Needham said, the Gang of Four was anti-intellectual in nature and particularly hostile to science and technology. They would surely have agreed with the French revolutionaries who hanged the chemist Antoine Lavoisier: “Revolutions never need scientists.“ However, the Gang of Four was possibly unaware of Lavoisier.389 On May 3, when Mao Zedong talked to the members of the Political Bureau in Beijing, he said that the following two points could be made regarding the issue of intellectuals. The first was that in the sectors of education, science, the arts, news, and health care, where there was a concentration of intellectuals, there were some good comrades who believed in Marxism and Leninism. The second was that the Stinky 9th had to remain.390 In early July, Mao Zedong held a discussion with Deng Xiaoping. Mao admitted that the Cultural Revolution was in fact a cultural desert — with no wealth of novels, poems, or culture.391 On July 9, Deng talked to Hu Qiaomu and others to convey Mao’s opinions about cultural and artistic work. Mao had said that in addition to diversity and variety, there were other issues to be debated: “Articles in recent years have all followed the same pattern, like the eight-part essays popular in the Ming dynasty. There has been no guidance with regard to variety 388. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 12, 618.

389. Needham, “Science Reborn in China: Rise and Fall of the Anti–intellectual ‘Gang.’ “ 390. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 431.

391. Mao Zedong argued that there were too few model operas and even slight mistakes

would be severely criticized: “There has not been a great variety of cultural and artistic creations. It’s not good when people aren’t allowed to have different opinions.“ When

Deng Xiaoping pointed out that the cultural and artistic sectors were inactive, Mao said that people were afraid of writing articles or dramas. There were no novels or poetry.

(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 64.)

127

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

and diversity, and so culture and the arts have not thrived or prospered.“392 Deng said that basic theories were not being emphasized in the natural sciences, and proper research was not being conducted in applied science: “This will not do if we want to catch up with global levels.“393 Deng demanded that the Political Research Office of the State Council collect materials on the failure to implement guidance related to variety, diversity, and debate in the fields of culture, science, education, and publishing for discussion by the Political Bureau.394 Hu Qiaomu and others submitted many important materials and wrote letters about these issues to Mao and Deng. On July 13, Deng Xiaoping wrote a letter to Mao Zedong, saying that the draft of “On the Ten Major Relationships“ had been prepared and that it was waiting to be finalized and published.395 Mao Zedong replied that this report could be distributed to members of the Political Bureau, but that it should not be published: “It should be handed out for discussion within the party rather than being published.“396 On July 22, Deng chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau to read the draft of “On the Ten Major Relationships.“397 Under the editorial direction of Hu Qiaomu, “On the Ten Major Relationships“ was a representative work on socialist construction by Mao Zedong. Deng Xiaoping and Hu Qiaomu examined the materials and suggested publication of the article since they wanted to preserve the historical memory of Mao Zedong for the whole party. This was Deng’s strategy for remedying the mistakes of Mao Zedong in his later years by using Mao’s own correct thoughts. However, the timing was bad, and Mao disagreed with its publication. When talking to Jiang Qing on July 14, Mao Zedong remarked that the cultural and artistic policy of the party should be modified to allow the expansion of the 392. Ibid., 66. 393. Editorial Committee of Biography of Hu Qiaomu comp., The 24 Talks of Deng Xiaoping, 63. 394. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 26.

395. Deng Xiaoping’s report to Mao Zedong stated: “We all felt that this article was of great

importance and provided targeted theoretical guidance for the present and the future — both to China and the international community, especially the third world. Therefore,

we wanted it to be finalized as soon as possible and published as an important article to promote the learning of theories across the nation. I hereby ask you to consider this.“ (Deng, Account of Deng Liqun: 12 Springs and Autumns (1975–1987), 11–12.)

396. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 444.

397. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 68.

128

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

diversity of cultural and artistic programs over a period of one to three years: “We lack poetry, novels, essays, and critical studies. Writers should be allowed to learn from their past mistakes so as to avoid future ones. As long as they don’t conduct any counter-revolutionary activities, such writers should not be silenced.“398 On July 18, Zhang Tianmin, who scripted the movie Pioneering and who was a screenwriter for Changchun Film Studio, wrote to Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Zhang defended himself against the 10-item accusations of Jiang Qing and the core team of the Ministry of Culture, according to which Pioneering committed serious political and artistic mistakes. Zhang requested that the ban on the movie be revoked. After reading the letter on July 25, which stated that the movie had not made any major mistakes, Mao recommended that it be released and commented: “We shouldn’t be too picky. The 10 accusations were excessive and are not really helpful for the cultural and artistic policies of the party.“399 After receiving Mao’s comments, Deng held a discussion with the seven leaders of the Political Research Office of the State Council. It was concluded that the Ministry of Culture had dealt with affairs too roughly since it would not allow the release of such a good movie as Pioneering. If this kind of approach continued, it would not be possible to expand variety in cultural and artistic creations.400 Later, Jiang Qing stated that Zhang had put forward a good case and that Mao’s comment was a verdict against the Ministry of Culture.401 At that time, Yu Huiyong, who was a favorite of Jiang’s, was the Minister of Culture. On July 29, Mao made favorable comments about the movie Haixia. As a result, Deng decided to allow the movie national release.402 Following the instructions of Deng Xiaoping and based on investigations, Deng Liqun (who worked in the Political Research Office of the State Council) was from July to August in charge of investigating books published during the Cultural Revolution. It was found that a total of 100,000 pamphlets had been published, among which only 20 were of academic value and several were republications. The investigation findings were submitted to Deng and others.403 In 1965, a total of 20,143 books were published; in 1974, that number fell to 11,812 — only 58.6% of 398. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol.13, 446.

399. Ibid., 450. 400. Editorial Committee of Biography of Hu Qiaomu comp., The 24 Talks of Deng Xiaoping, 36. 401. Ibid., 37. 402. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1246.

403. Editorial Committee of Biography of Hu Qiaomu comp., The 24 Talks of Deng Xiaoping, 59.

129

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

the earlier figure.404 On August 8, Li Chunguang, a young teacher in the Composition Theory Department of the Music College of May 7 Arts University, displayed a large poster criticizing China’s artistic and cultural policy. Deng Xiaoping submitted this poster to Mao Zedong, who wrote a comment on it.405 On September 26, when listening to Hu Yaobang report the work of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Deng Xiaoping said that the technical staff of Anshan Steel Company lacked competence. Deng said that such talents as Huang Kun — a researcher in the Institute of Semiconductors at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, whose work was unrelated to what he had studied — were numerous: “Such people should be allowed to do what they excel at. Otherwise, this represents a huge waste for the country. Why shouldn’t this person do what he’s good at?“406 On November 2, Mao Zedong commented on a letter from Mao Xueyin, a famous writer, which was submitted by Hu Qiaomu.407 On October 16, Mao Zedong commented on “Reflections on Older Intellectuals Who Attended the Reception for the National Day Holiday,“ that “The incorrect pursuit of perfectionism should be brought to an end.“408 Mao was clearly at odds with Jiang Qing’s actions against older intellectuals. The temporary cultural policy adjustment brought a welcome breath of fresh air to the cultural sector. However, these moves were overwhelmed by the campaign against the novel Tale of the Marshes and against the rightists. Once again, China found itself entering a political maelstrom.

404. National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004), 87.

405. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 451.

406. Editorial Committee of Biography of Hu Qiaomu comp., The 24 Talks of Deng Xiaoping, 46.

407. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 451.

408. Ibid., 477.

The material was submitted to Deng Xiaoping by Hu Qiaomu, one of the leaders of the

Political Research Office of the State Council on October 13, and Deng Xiaoping passed this on to Mao on October 15.

130

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Critique of Tale of the Marshes and the Campaign against Deng Xiaoping and the Rightist Tendency In August 1975, when Deng Xiaoping, who was in charge of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council, took dramatic measures to restore order across the nation, an improvement began to take shape in all sectors. But then, Mao Zedong suddenly made a political turnaround. He launched the critique of Tale of the Marshes, in which Yao Wenyuan played an important role. The launch of critique also triggered the fourth severe conflict between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing. Later, as a result of lobbying by Mao Yuanxin, Mao Zedong decided to launch a campaign against Deng Xiaoping and the rightist tendency. When talking to members of the Central Military Committee on December 21, 1973, Mao Zedong reproved Zhou Enlai when he said that Tale of the Marshes had not opposed the emperor — only corrupt officials. Later, the outlaws accepted amnesty and surrendered to the government.409 Zhou was aware of Mao’s intention in rebuking Song Jiang. Two years later, Mao once again mentioned this matter. On August 14, 1975, Mao Zedong again commented that Tale of the Marshes fought only against the corrupt officials — not the emperor. Song Jiang surrendered: he followed revisionism and accepted amnesty.410 This discussion was printed and distributed as Document No. 196 in 1975 by the Central Committee Office. After reading the document, Deng Xiaoping suggested to Mao that it be handed out for discussion by the Political Bureau. Mao replied that this was a literary issue — a comment on classic literature. Therefore, it was inappropriate for discussion or distribution.411 Three hours after this discussion, when Yao Wenyuan received Mao’s comment on Tale of the Marshes, he felt as though he had found a great treasure. Yao immediately reported to Mao that he felt this issue to be very important. From the perspective of developing Marxist literary criticism, Yao believed it to be of positive significance in discussing and making comments on Tale of the Marshes as well as criticizing the reconciliation of the classes reflected in the novel and fighting against and preventing revisionism. On August 18, Yao submitted the discussion that appeared in the People’s Daily and Guangming Daily as well as his preliminary plans to Mao. After reading these materials, Mao changed his mind about releasing 409. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1003.

410. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 457.

411. Deng, Account of Deng Liqun: 12 Springs and Autumns (1975–1987), 20.

131

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

the document, and he gave his approval.412 During the political movement against Tale of the Marshes, severe rainstorms hit Henan Province, causing dam breaches on a large scale. The stricken areas included 29 counties, 62,939 production brigades; where 10.36 million people were affected, 5.68 million houses collapsed, and 31,300 people died.413 This news was not officially announced, but it was reported to Mao Zedong in a classified document. After reading the report, he sobbed and said to himself: “I am more and more emotionally fragile. I cannot help feeling sad on hearing about this calamity.“414 However, Mao did not give up on the primacy of class struggles, and he went ahead and launched the political movement against Tale of the Marshes. On August 28, Red Flag published an article which was revised by Yao Wenyuan “Emphasize the Critique of Tale of the Marshes,“ for communicating Mao Zedong’s idea to the public. On September 4, with Mao’s approval, the People’s Daily published an editorial titled “Conducing a Critique of Tale of the Marshes,“ as prepared by Yao Wenyuan,415 who was an expert of arranging fragmentary words, phrases, and sentences into a system and constructing a theory. He developed Mao’s instruction into a political message. The editorial led to the critique of Tale of the Marshes becoming another major battle on China’s political and ideological front, and it was directly targeted at Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping.416 On September 7, when Zhou Enlai met delegates from Romania, he said that he was sick and was unable to work anymore. Zhou stated that Deng Xiaoping would replace him in taking charge of the State Council. By then, the vice premier had already taken over overall responsibility for the council.417 Zhou did not expect at that time that Deng was about to become politically marginalized. He told the foreign visitors that he had received an invitation from Marx to join him. He knew that his days were numbered, though the political prospects for China and for the Chinese people were far from certain. Zhou did not expect that after his death, Jiang Qing and her supporters would ever allow the dead Zhou to overwhelm the living Mao. Their activities led to the shocking Tiananmen Square incident. 412. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 459.

413. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1249.

414. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1747. 415. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 459–460.

416. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 405. 417. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 317.

132

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

On September 12, Jiang Qing said at a meeting with villagers from Dazhai that the essence of Tale of the Marshes was that Chao Gai became excluded and marginalized so that Song Jiang could surrender to the emperor. Song Jiang gathered around him a gang of local lords, immoral gentry, and corrupt officials and put them into important positions. Jiang maintained that to criticize Tale of the Marshes was to warn people that there were CPC members who wanted to surrender.418 In late August, Jiang had held discussions with Yu Huiyong, Minister of Culture, and others, and she said that the chairman’s criticism of Tale of the Marshes had practical significance. The essence of censuring Tale of the Marshes was to marginalize Chao Gai, and at present there were some people in the Political Bureau (meaning Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping) who had tried to make Chairman Mao into a figurehead.419 Jiang’s explanation was an excellent one. Both before and during the Cultural Revolution, Mao did not lead directly and neither did he attend Political Bureau meetings. Mao had to operate via agents, such as Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping.420 However, there was a severe imbalance in information, and so Mao always felt as though he was just a figurehead, and this was something that Jiang well understood. However, she always used any opportunity to elaborate on her own ideas: she constantly used any new words or phrases of Mao in her attacks on other people. On September 15, Zhou Enlai said to others that the Gang of Four had gone too far: “In recent times, they have criticized Tale of the Marshes and have fought against those who would surrender. What they were driving at is perfectly clear. If there were people who surrendered, they should of course be reproved. However, that was not the case. I have made mistakes; but for scores of years, I have always worked hard for the party and for the people.“421 Zhou could not stand allusive political attacks being made against him, and in this way for the first time in his life shortly before his death, he made a strong protest against Mao. On September 17, at the meeting in Dazhai, Jiang Qing described the criticism against her at Political Bureau meetings as a form of persecution: “I was attacked every day. The revisionists were attacking me. Should a communist be afraid of such harassment? I struggled with my persecutors for half a year in Beijing.“422 418. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1751. 419. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 405. 420. Over a very long period, Mao Zedong did not attend meetings of the Political Bureau. He had Liu Shaoqi take charge of the daily work of the Political Bureau. (Huang, Study on Liu Shaoqi, 9.)

421. Liu, The Later Years of Zhou Enlai, 318. 422. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and

133

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

That was the second time for Jiang to visit rural areas. However, Dazhai was no true reflection of the poverty, ignorance, and backwardness that existed over vast areas of rural China. Jiang, though, was not particularly concerned about economic growth or poverty relief; she was interested in class struggles. Since she was alienated from the people, there was all-round satisfaction when she was finally supplanted — even though this occurred in the form of a coup. On September 20, right before Zhou Enlai was wheeled into the operation room for his 13th operation, well aware that he had one foot in his grave, he had received the “Report on the Kuomintang’s Slanderous Publication of the Wuhao Announcement,“ which he had prepared for the campaign meeting against Lin Biao and noted, “September 20, 1975, before entering the operating theater.“ This was the last time Zhou signed his name to a document,423 to prove his political innocence. Deng Rong commented: “This is rather sad.“424 Upon entering the operation room, he yelled: “I have always been loyal to the party and to the people! I am not a capitulant!“ At that time, Deng Xiaoping, Zhang Chunqiao, Li Xiannian, Wang Dongxing, and Deng Yingchao and others were present. Deng Yingchao asked Wang Dongxing, director of the Central Committee Office, to report what had occurred to Mao Zedong.425 This demonstrates that in the last moment of his life, Zhou knew that the Gang of Four would not spare him even after his death. The gang would use the Wu Hao incident to make him out to be a traitor who accepted amnesty. However, the Gang of Four would also use the critique of Tale of the Marshes to describe Zhou as a capitulant who fought against corrupt officials but not the emperor. During the Cultural Revolution, political information was always in the form of comments on ancient history.426 Under Mao’s personal dictatorship, even Zhou — who was a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee, and premier of the State Council — did not feel politically secure. This was the political price of Mao’s philosophy of struggle. Instead of realizing the error of his ways, Mao launched large-scale political actions. It should be noted that Zhou Enlai’s dying words were: “I have always been loyal to the party and to the people!“ He said that rather than “I am loyal to Chairman Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1267. 423. Quan, Zhou Enlai Up Close, 394. 424. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 407; Chen, Heavy Attack — Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event, 352–356.

425. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 721.

426. Goodman, Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Revolution: A Political Biography, 83.

134

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Mao,“ which was something that he had very often stated. This reflects that before his death, Zhou chose the party and the people over Mao. His final declaration was “I am not a capitulant!“ This was a strong protest against the false accusations that had been made against him, and it also explains why he demanded that his ashes not be left behind. Zhou was concerned that he would be made out to be a capitulant. As a great statesman — renowned both in China and overseas — Zhou was distressed, sad, and indignant. Although he kept all of this a secret and the people could not possibly have been aware of this, they felt that Mao was unfair to Zhou, hence the people organized themselves in conducting memorial services for Zhou. By September, the drive to restore overall order, led by Deng Xiaoping, had been in existence for only half a year. However, it had brought new vitality and hope to China and won attention and praise around the world. But then, dramatic changes once again took place on China’s political stage. On September 24, Mao Zedong disclosed three important messages to Le Duan, the first secretary of the communist party of Vietnam. The first was that the poorest country in the world then was not Vietnam, but China. As to the reason, Mao said it was because China had a population of 800 million. How poor was China at that time? Mao did not expound this point — perhaps because he had no detailed figures. In fact, the per capita GDP of China in 1974 was USD835 (referencing 1990 International Dollars), whereas that of Vietnam is USD783, which respectively amounted to 20.4% and 19.1% of the world average. At that time, the populations of China and Vietnam were 900.35 million and 46.9 million respectively.427 China’s per capita GDP was slightly higher than Vietnam’s, but China was still one of the world’s poorest countries. Unlike China, Vietnam had had to fight against the French and the United States in its country — a situation that did not end until 1975. After 26 years of dictatorship, Mao, in September 1975, finally realized that China being one of the world’s poorest nations is its greatest and most basic characteristic. However, Mao did not relinquish his policy of taking class struggles as his primary course, nor did he decide to focus on rebuilding the economy. Deng Xiaoping was present at that meeting with the Vietnamese leader. In view of China’s situation, Deng decided to emphasize economic growth. The second message was that Mao Zedong admitted to the party and the country that he was facing a leadership crisis. Premier Zhou, Kang Sheng, and Ye Jianying — members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau — were in poor physical condition. Mao was 82 and sick. Only Deng Xiaoping was strong and in good health. On April 18, Mao Zedong told Kim Il-sung, president of North 427. Maddison, Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1–2006AD.

135

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Korea, that Dong Biwu had died on April 2 and that Premier Zhou was sick. Mao noted that Kang Sheng and Liu Bocheng were also ill — as was Mao himself. Mao observed that he was already 82 and his days were numbered.428 Zhu De, another member of the Political Bureau Standing Committee, was likewise in his advanced years. This indicated that it was likely that these five members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, including Mao, would not live much longer. This was a cause of great distress and anxiety for Mao. It was a political crisis that had arisen as a result of his life tenure of supreme leadership. Deng was aware that this crisis had not been solved in Mao’s later years. When Mao met Henry Kissinger and George Bush (the latter was chief of the Liaison Office to China) on October 21, the first thing he said was: “I’m going to die soon. I’ve received the invitation from God.“ Even Bush was shocked. He wrote in his autobiography that it was amazing that the leader of the world’s biggest communist country should have said this.429 Deng was also a witness of this incidence.430 The third message was that Mao Zedong believed that in the CPC Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping was both healthy and strong. This showed that up till 24 September, Mao placed great hope in Deng. It may thus be concluded that Mao appreciated and affirmed Deng’s boldness and competence. Mao believed that Deng would be his successor.431 However, three days later — on September 27 — Mao suddenly changed his mind about this. On September 27, when Mao Zedong listened to Deng Xiaoping’s report after his meeting with foreign visitors, Mao was enraged by Jiang Qing’s speech at the Dazhai meeting: “That’s nonsense! What she said was just irrelevant. The purpose of the meeting was to call on farmers to learn from the situation in Dazhai, whereas she made a critique of Tale of the Marshes. She is so ignorant and unreliable. Few people trust her.“ After listening to the report by Hua Guofeng, Mao gave specific instructions to forbid Jiang’s speech from print, distribute, or broadcasted.432 In view of Zhou Enlai’s indignation and Deng’s queries, Mao had to restrain Jiang, and he announced that the criticism of Tale of the Marshes was not targeted at either Zhou or Deng. 428. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1206.

429. Ye, Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek, 478. 430. Those attending the meeting included Deng Xiaoping, the vice premier, Qiao Guanhua,

foreign minister, Huang Zhen, director, Wang Hairong, deputy foreign minister, and

Tang Wensheng and Zhang Hanzhi, deputy chief secretaries. (People’s Daily, October 22, 1975.)

431. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 411–412. 432. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1751.

136

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Deng Xiaoping was politically mature, and so he maintained his silence until the right moment presented itself. He did not attempt any direct fights with Mao Zedong, but Deng did emphasize the political struggle that would ensue after Mao’s departure. Deng’s greatest advantage was that he was much younger and healthier than Mao. His complex relationship with the chairman underwent a change: it became less a matter of political competition and more a question of who would outlive the other: that person would emerge as the true winner. Mao decided to launch a campaign against Deng and the rightist tendency; however, that produced the reverse result of accelerating Mao’s own demise and leading to Deng’s real ascendancy. At the time, of course, no one knew that this would be the outcome. Even Deng did not know that he would fall owing to the political circumstances set up by Mao Yuanxin. On September 27, Mao Yuanxin (CPC secretary of Liaoning Province, deputy director of the Liaoning Provincial Revolution Committee, and political commissar of the Shenyang Military Area) reported that there was a dispute within the senior leadership of the CPC over the Cultural Revolution, and he made false accusations against Deng Xiaoping.433 At that time, Mao Zedong did not conduct any investigations, nor did he place any trust in other leaders, including Jiang Qing. Instead, Mao Zedong attached importance to the report by Mao Yuanxin (his nephew), and Mao Zedong was particularly intolerant of the fact that Deng should dare to repudiate the Cultural Revolution while Mao was still alive. The most prominent characteristics of politics during the era of Mao Zedong were his unpredictability and caprice. Mao could put Deng Xiaoping in or out of power as he wished. He did it to Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao, he could also easily do it to Deng. Mao’s political strategy was always the same. This was the inevitable result of Mao being alienated in supreme authority and enjoying absolute power, and it was also the cause of Mao’s political failure in his later years. 433. Mao Yuanxin reported to Mao Zedong: “A wind is blowing against the Cultural

Revolution, and it would appear to be fiercer than the criticism against the ultra-leftists

in 1972. Questions are asked about the revolution. Was it 70% or 30% good? Disputes are held about this. Should Liu Shaoqi be criticized? Now, the people seem to have forgotten about this matter and have begun to believe in the guidance of the three

instructions. I don’t agree with this. The guidance should be that of class struggle and the struggle over political direction. The three instructions have become simplified into

just one: promote production.“ Mao Yuanxin was afraid that there might be setbacks

and regressions in the CPC Central Committee. (Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 3, 441.)

137

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Subsequently, Mao Yuanxin became Mao Zedong’s personal liaison, the major information source for Mao Zedong, and also the main channel by which the Political Bureau received its instructions from the chairman. Mao Zedong placed Mao Yuanxin into a core leadership position in the CPC Central Committee without going through any legal procedures.434 In terms of information for his decision making, Mao Zedong was alienated from the CPC Central Committee and his source of information became biased and unbalanced; as a result, it was inevitable that he would make a series of poor decisions. In terms of the decision-making mechanism, Mao Zedong violated the party’s organization principle, and he was unable to correct his own mistakes in this regard. Later Ye Jianying commented that abnormalities had arisen in the party: “By the winter of 1975, there came the liaison officer, the baby [Mao Yuanxin], who conveyed Chairman Mao’s opinions, and he also reported on the meetings of the Political Bureau to the chairman.“ Ye once told Chen Yun that although he was vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee, he had no chance meeting Chairman Mao: “This is totally abnormal in the party.“435 This indicates how the central leadership was displeased with the practices of Mao Zedong and regarded them as extremely irregular. However, they were unable to do anything about the situation. On October 19, Mao Zedong held meetings with Li Xiannian and Wang Dongxing, among others. Mao said that some people were now spreading reports that although he had criticized Jiang Qing, she had not repented: “Liu Bing and others from Tsinghua University wrote a letter to me, making accusations against Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi. But their motives were not good. They were trying to attack Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi, but they targeted their condemnation at me. You six [Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, Wang Dongxing, Wu De, Xie Jingyi, and Chi Qun] should have a meeting and examine ways of dealing with this problem.“ On October 23, Deng Xiaoping held a meeting with five other people to discuss what Mao had said. On October 27, Deng, Li Xiannian, Wu De, and Wang Dongxing wrote to Mao Zedong and reported the results of their discussion and their opinions on how to implement Mao’s instructions. They unanimously stated that they believed Chairman Mao’s instructions to be very important. They also declared that the issue they discussed was not an isolated incident since it reflected the struggle 434. Deng Rong said that Mao Yuanxin became the messenger of Mao Zedong, and one

of the very few people who could actually see and talk to Mao Zedong owing to the fact that he was Mao Zedong’s nephew. (Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in Cultural Revolution, 413.)

435. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Chen Yun, vol. 3, 242–245.

138

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

between two different political directions.436 After September 27, when Mao Yuanxin made the false accusations against him, Deng Xiaoping was unable to see Mao Zedong. On October 31, Deng wrote a letter to Mao Zedong, requesting a face-to-face meeting for instructions and lessons.437 On the evening of November 1, Mao Zedong spoke to Deng. Mao Zedong rebuked Deng for having submitted the letter from Liu Bing.438 Liu Bing, Hui Xianjun, and Liu Yi’an of Tsinghua University had written again to Mao Zedong to expose the problem of Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi. This letter was forwarded to Mao by Deng.439 Deng asked Mao whether recent policies and guidance had been correct. Mao affirmed that they were.440 On the afternoon of November 2, Mao Yuanxin once again told Mao Zedong that Deng Xiaoping had repudiated the Cultural Revolution.441 Mao Yuanxin played a 436. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1754. 437. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 413. 438. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 125.

439. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1281.

440. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 413–414. 441. Mao Yuanxin reported to Mao Zedong that since the start of the year, he had worked

in the provinces, and he could sense a force against the Cultural Revolution. First, people were asking how they should assess the revolution: “Should we judge it as

a mainstream development or a tributary? Was it 30% negative and 70% positive —

or was it the other way around? Should we affirm or deny the Cultural Revolution? Second, what should we make of the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius: should

we regard this as a mainstream action or only a subsidiary one? At present, some people are just perfunctorily describing the achievements of the revolution, and they are listing many bad aspects. They have ignored the achievements of the campaign

against Lin Biao and Confucius. The third point is that people are wondering whether the political direction of Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao should continue being a subject of

censure. People seem to have forgotten how essential it is to condemn Liu Shaoqi. Class struggle also seems to have become marginalized. The three instructions have become guidance, but I do not agree with this. Our guidance should be class struggle and the

struggle over political direction. Now, the three instructions have become simplified as one: promote production. Some comrades have always discussed the negative

aspects of the Cultural Revolution, and some even regard the Cultural Revolution as a catastrophe. I have listened carefully to the speeches of Comrade Deng Xiaoping. I felt that he seldom seemed to talk about the achievements of the Cultural Revolution or the

139

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

major role in causing Mao Zedong to make Deng fall — even Jiang Qing could not rival Mao Yuanxin in this regard. This indicates how Mao Zedong believed only his nephew, not the collective leadership of the party. Mao Zedong said to Mao Yuanxin that there were two attitudes toward Cultural Revolution: one was dissatisfaction, and the other was total denial, regarding the revolution as a complete mistake: “They [referring to Liu Bing and others] target their criticisms at me. The issue they discussed is not an isolated one since it reflects the struggle between two political directions. Talk to Deng Xiaoping, Wang Dongxing, and Chen Xilian and express your opinion to them — frankly and directly.“442 Mao Zedong could not tolerate Deng’s rejection of the Cultural Revolution: it was a political baseline that no one could touch. That evening, Mao Yuanxin did as Mao Zedong had told him: “You need to help him [Deng Xiaoping] to improve his understanding.“ However, that was absurd since Mao Yuanxin was nobody compared with Deng Xiaoping in his position as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. Mao Yuanxin spoke to Deng, Wang Dongxing, and Chen Xilian on behalf of Mao Zedong, and he criticized Deng. Deng was obliged to refute his earlier comments.443 He also said that he was willing to criticize himself. On November 3, Mao Yuanxin reported his talk to Mao Zedong, saying that Deng Xiaoping was very agitated and was having difficulty trying to categorize him, Mao Yuanxin. Mao Zedong asked: “What was the Cultural Revolution? It was a class struggle. The general view of the Cultural Revolution is that it was basically correct, though it did have some shortcomings. Now, we need to study its insufficiencies. People do not generally agree that it was 30% negative and 70% positive. Two mistakes were made in the Cultural Revolution: overthrowing everything and sweeping civil strife. With regard to the first mistake, it was correct to do some overthrowing, such as with Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao. But it was wrong to bring some individuals down, such as the many veteran officials. Having said revisionism of Liu Shaoqi. I have not heard him talk about learning theories, criticizing Tale of the Marshes, or revisionism this year.“ (Ibid., 414–415.)

442. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1754–1755. 443. Deng Xiaoping said: “From your description, the central leadership followed a revisionistic course. The central leadership, headed by Chairman Mao, following revisionism? Isn’t that absurd? I began to resume work on March 9, 1975, and I have been in charge of the daily work of the central leadership since July. Since the issuing

of Document No. 9, things have taken a turn both for the better and for the worse. That is something that we need to think about. Facts speak louder than words.“ (Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 3, 442.)

140

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

that, those individuals had made some errors, so it was acceptable to admonish them. When the Civil Revolution began, it had been over 10 years since China had had any experience of war. Thus, the civil strife was a kind of exercise. However, it was unacceptable for people to be beaten to death.“444 Mao Zedong in that period was acting in a noninstitutional and unorganized fashion by communicating his instructions to the members of the Political Bureau via his liaison officer and nephew, Mao Yuanxin;445 he was censuring members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. A meeting was arranged to include the following individuals in addition to the members of the Standing Committee: Li Xiannian, Ji Dengkui, Hua Guofeng, and Zhang Chunqiao. In all, eight individuals would take part in this meeting. It appeared to be Mao’s intention to gradually push Deng Xiaoping out of the picture. On November 3, Wu De, member of the Political Bureau, and first secretary of the CPC Committee of Beijing, conveyed Mao Zedong’s instructions at an expanded meeting of the CPC Committee of Tsinghua University.446 Mao did not trust Deng Xiaoping and believed that he was following the wrong political course, and Mao was even prepared to have Deng ousted. On November 4, in accordance with Mao’s 444. Mao Zedong said that Liu Bing and others at Tsinghua University had made an

accusation against Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi: “In my view, they were driven by the

wrong motive in writing that letter. They were trying to attack Chi Qun, who was secretary of the CPC Central Committee and director of the Revolutionary Committee

of Tsinghua University as well as Xie Jingyi, who was a member of the CPC Central Committee, secretary of the Beijing Committee of the CPC, and deputy secretary of the

CPC Committee of Tsinghua University. But they were actually targeting their criticism at me.“ Mao Zedong believed that Deng Xiaoping took sides with Liu Bing and others

by forwarding the letter. The issue they discussed at Tsinghua University was not an isolated incident since it reflected the struggle between two political directions. (Party

Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 488.)

445. In the second half of 1975, Mao Zedong’s physical condition deteriorated, and he had

difficulty reading, speaking, and moving. Therefore, Mao Zedong decided to have

his nephew, Mao Yuanxin, operate as his liaison officer. Mao Zedong’s opinions were

communicated by the liaison officer, and the meetings of the Political Bureau were reported to Mao Zedong by this person. As a result, even the vice chairman of the CPC

Central Committee was unable to see Mao Zedong. (Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 3, 441.)

446. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 486.

141

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

direction, the eight-member meeting was held to discuss the Cultural Revolution where Zhang Chunqiao and others rebuked Deng Xiaoping.447 That evening, Mao Yuanxin reported to Mao Zedong about the meeting. Mao Zedong commented that the general view of the Cultural Revolution was that it was basically correct, though it did have some shortcomings: “Now, we need to examine its insufficiencies, though opinions do differ here.“448 Mao stated that to maintain unity and stability did not mean that it was necessary to abandon the class struggle: “Class struggle is of primary importance: everything else is secondary.“449 It was Mao’s wish that the meeting be expanded to include other individuals so as to offer help to Deng. On November 7, a second meeting of the eight individuals was held.450 That meeting, which was intended to help Deng, soon developed into one of castigation: that was unavoidable because of Mao Zedong’s thesis of the class struggle. This was not the first time such a thing had happened, but it would be the last time. On November 10, Deng Xiaoping held a discussion with Hu Qiaomu, saying that he was being criticized and that the trigger had been when he forwarded the letter from Liu Bing: “The chairman disparaged me harshly, but he also criticized himself.“ The CPC Central Committee decided that it was not correct to follow the guidance of the three instructions. The political guidance at that time was the class struggle. Deng admitted that he had incorrectly understood the situation.451 Deng had placed too much reliance on Mao Zedong’s support, and he had failed to take Mao’s ambivalence into account. On November 11, an expanded meeting of the Political Bureau was held. In addition to others, Mao Yuanxin, Xie Jingyi, and Chi Qun attended the meeting. On November 13, Mao Zedong suggested that Zhou Rongxin and others should also participate in the meetings to help Deng and that the necessity to help Deng should be communicated to dozens of people in the party. Mao mentioned in particular Deng’s words: “People in the hidden retreat of Peach Blossoms did not know of the Han, let alone the Wei and Jin dynasties.“452 Deng was reaching the stage where he 447. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 127.

448. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1292.

449. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1756. 450. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 127–128.

451. Editorial Committee of Biography of Hu Qiaomu comp., The 24 Talks of Deng Xiaoping, 104.

452. Mao Zedong wrote: “People in the hidden retreat of Peach Blossoms did not know of

142

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

could no longer bear the situation. At that time, Wang Hongwen returned from Shanghai to Beijing. On November 15, Deng Xiaoping was forced to write a report to Mao Zedong, officially proposing that Wang should take charge of the daily work of the CPC Central Committee. Mao Zedong commented on the letter from Deng that evening: “Comrade Xiaoping should remain in his position for the time being. We will discuss this matter later.“453 Mao made Deng chair the meetings of the Political Bureau that were intended to criticize Deng. Later, Mao despised and humiliated Deng by openly declaring that Deng’s promise never to repudiate the Cultural Revolution was unreliable.454 During this period, Kang Sheng told Mao Zedong that Deng Xiaoping disagreed with the Cultural Revolution. Spurred on by this, Mao was determined to make a historical conclusion regarding the Cultural Revolution while he was still alive. In that way, all those who opposed the Cultural Revolution would never be able to deny it.455 On November 20, a meeting of the Political Bureau was held, attended by 17 people, and its purpose was to evaluate the Cultural Revolution.456 Following Mao Zedong’s direction, the Political Bureau asked Mao Yuanxin to tell Deng Xiaoping that he should chair the meeting, whose purpose was to pass an affirmative resolution declaring that the Cultural Revolution had been 70% positive and 30% negative. Deng declined this demand. He said: “It is inappropriate for me to write the Han, let alone the Wei and Jin dynasties. Let this be known to some old comrades, such as Zhou Rongxin, minister of education, Li Chang, vice president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Hu Yaobang, leader of the core CPC team of the Chinese

Academy of Sciences, Hu Qiaomu, leader of the Political Research Office of the State Council, Liu Bing, vice secretary of the CPC Committee of Tsinghua University, and Li Jingquan, member of the CPC Central Committee.“ (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 495.) 453. Ibid., 497. 454. This referred to Deng Xiaoping’s letter to Mao Zedong after listening to the communication relating to the Lin Biao Incident on August 3, 1972. Deng said in the

letter: “I admit to all the self-criticisms I have made, and reaffirm my promise to the

CPC Central Committee that I will never repudiate the Cultural Revolution.“ Deng requested to be allowed to return to his official position. This was the origin of the unreliable promise of Deng’s never to deny the Cultural Revolution. 455. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 426. 456. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong's Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 505.

143

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

this resolution since I am from the hidden retreat of Peach Blossoms and do not know the Han, let alone the Wei and Jin dynasties.“457 Deng Xiaoping refused to chair a meeting to pass a resolution on the Cultural Revolution, and that was a great disappointment for Mao Zedong.458 This prompted Mao to launch a last political battle against Deng.459 For a sick 82-year-old man, this is as if playing his last card politically. Zhou Enlai did not understand why Deng Xiaoping could not just put up with Mao Zedong.460 That was the biggest difference between Deng and Zhou. Deng was steel-willed and would not budge on fundamental issues; in contrast, Zhou conceded to Mao time and again, with the result that the Cultural Revolution lasted 10 years. But this did not of course mean that Zhou was able to escape from political persecution. Zhou was also a victim of the Cultural Revolution. Jiang Qing and others cooked up charges, imprisoned Zhou’s adopted daughter, Sun Weishi, and his brother, Zhou Enshou, and persecuted them to death. Xu Ming, vice director of Zhou Enlai’s office, was forced to commit suicide as a result of Jiang’s persecution. Zhou Jiading, Zhou Enlai’s secretary, was obliged to conceal his identity for having displeased Jiang. On July 1, when Zhou Enlai and Li Xiannian appeared in a group photo with industrial workers after they had met Kukrit Pramoj, prime minister of Thailand, Zhou said: “This is my last photo taken with you. I hope that you won’t

457. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 426–427.

As explained by Ji Dengkui, the series of measures taken by Deng Xiaoping when he

was in power went against the Cultural Revolution. After the incident of Liu Bing’s

letter, Chairman Mao intended that Deng should write a resolution on the Cultural Revolution. Mao even dictated that the revolution should be regarded as 30% negative

and 70% positive. Deng declined this demand. (Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1757.)

458. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1756. 459. Deng Rong stated that Deng Xiaoping’s obstinacy caused Mao Zedong to decide to attack Deng. At the last moment of Mao’s political life, he wanted to protect the

Cultural Revolution. Mao would not bear any criticisms or denial of the revolution. This was the ultimate principle that he adhered to. (Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 427.)

460. Zhang Shuying, deputy leader of Zhou Enlai’s staff, said that after talking to Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping knew immediately that things were not good and that the

results would be severe. Deng drove to Hospital 305 to explain the matter to Zhou. Zhou was upset and stared at Deng, saying: “Can’t you just restrain yourself?“ (Qin, “What Did Zhou Enlai Think of at the Last Stage of His Life?“)

144

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

attempt to have my face erased in the future.“461 Since late November, Mao Zedong had bypassed the CPC Central Committee, and no plenary sessions of the committee had been held. Mao maintained contact with a meeting attended by over 130 leaders of the party, government, and PLA on November 24 by to exchanging messages. That meeting was chaired by Deng Xiaoping. Li Xiannian communicated Mao Zedong’s “Points of Messages to Be Sent.“ The points were arranged based on Mao Yuanxin’s notes on his talks with Mao Zedong. On November 26, the CPC Central Committee officially passed its “Notice on Issuing the Points of Messages to Be Sent.“462 This was the last political struggle to be officially launched by Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong would not allow Deng Xiaoping to rectify the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution. Through noninstitutional practices, such as personal instructions, political liaisons, meetings held by means of exchanging messages, and receiving meeting summaries via messages, Mao launched a campaign against Deng and the rightist tendency to overthrow past verdicts. In the process, China was once more thrown into chaos. The attempts to achieve overall restoration of order conducted in 1975 by Deng Xiaoping had indeed gone against the Cultural Revolution;463 they could be regarded as measures to correct the mistakes made by that revolution and preparatory steps for reform and opening-up in China.464 In June 1966, there was only one drama being played out on China’s political stage, but by November 1975 two totally different dramas were being enacted. Comparison leads to discernment, 461. Ibid. 462. The notice announced that the CPC Central Committee regarded Chairman Mao’s

instruction on the letter from Liu Bing and others as very important: “The issue discussed at Tsinghua University was not an isolated incident since it reflects the struggle between

the two political directions. Denying old verdicts is a rightist tendency. The big debate

at Tsinghua University will definitely affect the whole country. Chairman Mao pointed

out that messages should be sent to some comrades to prevent them making mistakes. (Party Literature Research Center of the Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 505.)

463. Deng Xiaoping recalled: “In fact, the efforts to correct the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution started in 1975. At that time, I took charge of the party and the government, and I undertook a series of corrective measures, which had an immediate effect. Those

measures were indeed contrary to the Cultural Revolution.“ (Party Literature Research

Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Work of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, 81.) 464. Gong, From Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping, 285–287.

145

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

and competition leads to selection. The Chinese people were doing the comparison and selection. Deng could not possibly deny the Cultural Revolution under the prevailing circumstances. His long-term strategy was one of overall rectification, i.e., correcting all the disastrous consequences of the Cultural Revolution. Deng’s policy would inevitably lead to repudiation of that revolution. Mao Zedong would never allow Deng to pose a political challenge to him. The Cultural Revolution was the personal creation of Mao Zedong as an individual. In the final period of Mao’s political life, he made all efforts to preserve the Cultural Revolution. He would not allow any criticisms or rejection of that revolution. This was his ultimate principle and he adhered to it.465 However, Mao Zedong was suffering from a debilitating physical condition. He was also hemmed in by inescapable conflicts.466 Launching another large-scale political movement was an obligation for Mao as an old man. Ultimately, he needed and relied on the Gang of Four. In November, Zhang Chunqiao stated that the Political Research Office of the State Council had been put together for no good purpose. Jiang Qing remarked that the office was a huge rumor-making machine: “Hu Qiaomu is evil, and Deng Xiaoping put him into a position even higher than that of the Political Bureau.“ Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi echoed these sentiments when they said that the office specialized in scheming and plotting. They said that the Political Research Office put together a number of malicious scholars to act as a tool for Deng Xiaoping’s manipulations.467 On December 4, the People’s Daily reprinted the article “The Direction of Education Revolution Will Not Be Distorted,“ which originally appeared in issue no. 12 of Red Flag in 1975. On December 14, the CPC Central Committee issued the “Report on the Big Debate on Education Revolution in Tsinghua University.“ Despite his illness, on December 8 Zhou Enlai met Wang Hongwen and reminded him about Mao Zedong’s warning in his Changsha talk in 1974 that Jiang Qing was ambitious.468 The same day, Deng Xiaoping went to see Zhou in hospital. When Zhou asked: “Will you change your position?“ Deng resolutely replied: “Never!“ Zhou said: “Then I am reassured!“469 Apparently, Zhou adopted Deng’s position 465. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 427. 466. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1761. 467. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1227.

468. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 723.

469. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 430–431.

146

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

before he died: he was opposed to the campaign against the rightist tendency to reverse past verdicts. This shows that Mao had made too many enemies in the party and had become an isolated emperor. On December 9 at a Political Bureau meeting, Jiang Qing reprimanded Deng Xiaoping and some other senior party officials. Wang Hongwen made a systematic attack against Deng’s efforts to restore order in China. Wang declared that Deng’s policies would drag China back to the stage before the Cultural Revolution. Wang said that Deng’s efforts to promote the economy were also misguided. On December 13, the Political Bureau meeting continued criticizing Deng, and Mao Yuanxin communicated Mao Zedong’s instructions. On December 16, Kang Sheng — a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau — died. In August, Kang had talked to Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng, and he reported to Mao Zedong that Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao had betrayed the party; claiming himself had witnessed the process and could attest the fact.470 However, Kang withheld the information until just before his death. Kang acted as a dangerous political element in the party. He persecuted most CPC leaders in the most aggressive manner. However, Mao kept the materials related to Kang locked away in a safe. As a result, Jiang was anxious to get her hands on those archive materials of Mao’s soon after his death. Those materials became the evidence used by Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, Wang Dongxing and others to denounce Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao in October 1976. On December 20, Deng Xiaoping was forced to criticize himself at a meeting of the Political Bureau. He expressed his wish to see Mao Zedong.471 Although Deng was still in charge of the daily work of the CPC Central Committee, Mao refused this request. At the meetings of the Political Bureau on December 29 and 31, Mao Yuanxin conveyed Mao Zedong’s instruction that the greatest danger was that of capitalist roaders in power. Deng Xiaoping chose to talk to neither the Political Bureau nor the State Council, but took sides with the capitalist intellectuals. Mao Yuanxin stated that since such individuals were targets for revolutionization and the rights of capitalists were restricted, they were dissatisfied.472 In December, Zhou Enlai said to Ye Jianying that it was necessary to carefully 470. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1258.

471. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 136–137.

472. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 883.

147

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

select the methods used in political struggles. He further said that whatever the outcome, power should never fall into the hands of the Gang of Four. This was Zhou’s last political statement. During the period from June 1, 1974, when he was hospitalized, to his death, he underwent six major operations and eight minor ones, which was an average of one operation every 40 days.473 Also in December, Zhu De, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, and chairman of the NPC, talked to Zhou Huan, secretary of the Liaoning CPC Committee, and expressed his satisfaction with the work of Deng Xiaoping: “Things are going very well, though people are still not convinced.“ Zhu also commented on the campaign against Deng and the rightist tendency to reverse past verdicts: “Some people are still causing trouble. Efforts to usurp power never succeed. Didn’t Lin Biao fall? Some people want to bring me down. But these matters do not concern me alone. I didn’t want to be in power. I was put in power by the party. If some people want to attack me, they first need to attack the party. There is no other way.“474 As a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, Zhu apparently did not agree with the campaign against Deng, but he was as helpless in this regard as Ye Jianying, and he was unable to restrain Mao Zedong. On December 31, Mao Zedong met Julie, daughter of former U.S. President Nixon, and her husband, David Eisenhower. Mao said that China was undergoing a class struggle: “We are going through a struggle among the people and within the party. There can be no progress or peace without struggle. With 800 million people, what else can we do?“475 This was the philosophy of struggle in which Mao firmly believed: it was his theoretical foundation and logic every time he launched a political struggle. For Mao on the threshold of 1976, there were various questions. Who should he struggle against? For what purpose? What would be the outcome of such a struggle? Could he keep on struggling indefinitely? Would he emerge as the winner as he had in the past? There were no answers to these questions.

Death of Zhou Enlai and the Tiananmen Square Incident The year of 1976 was an eventful one: it was a year of struggles, but it was also one of good fortune for China. With the death of Mao Zedong, the 10-year-long Cultural 473. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1285.

474. Ibid., 1307. 475. Ibid., 1305.

148

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Revolution came to an end. This represented a victory of the laws of nature over the philosophy of struggle. On January 1, two poems by Mao Zedong — “Prelude to Water Melody: Reascending Jinggang Mountain“476 and “Two Birds: A Dialogue to the Tune of Niannujiao“477 — were published in the People’s Daily. The People’s Daily, Red Flag, and PLA Daily published a New Year editorial titled “Where There Is a Will There Is a Way,“ which presented Mao’s latest direction, whereby maintaining unity and stability did not preclude the class struggle: class struggle was the primary aim, with everything else being secondary. The same day, Red Flag published an article titled “On the Practical Significance of Tale of the Marshes,“ by Yi Ming. The article stated that with the development of the struggle between the two classes and two political directions, the practical significance of criticizing Tale of the Marshes had become increasingly clear: revisionism was obviously the major danger at present. The article said that the Party Constitution adopted at the 10th National Congress of the CPC stated: “We need to be especially alert against careerists, schemers, and double-dealers. We have to prevent such evil ones from usurping the leadership of the party and government at all levels. We must ensure that the leadership of the party and the nation is always in the hands of Marxist revolutionaries. If the leadership were 476. “Prelude to Water Melody: Reascending Jinggang Mountain“ by Mao Zedong: “I have long aspired to reach for the clouds / And I again ascend Jinggang Mountain. / Coming from afar to view our old haunt, / I find new scenes replacing the old. / Everywhere

orioles sing, swallows dart, / Streams babble / And the road mounts skyward. / Once

Huangyanggai is passed / No other perilous place demands a glance. / Wind and thunder are stirring, / Flags and banners are flying / Wherever men live. / Thirtyeight years have fled / With a mere snap of the fingers. / We can clasp the moon in

the 9th Heaven / And seize turtles deep down in the Five Seas / Nothing is difficult in

this world / If you dare to scale the heights.“ (First appeared in the Poetry Magazine in January 1976 and the People’s Daily in January 1, 1976.)

477. “Two Birds: A Dialogue to the Tune of Niannujiao“ by Mao Zedong: “The roc wings fanwise, / Soaring ninety thousand li / And rousing a raging cyclone. / The blue sky

on his back, he looks down / To survey man’s world with its towns and cities. / Gunfire

licks the heavens, / Shells pit the earth. / A sparrow in his bush is scared stiff. / ‘This is an awful mess! / I want to flit and fly away.’ / ‘Where, may I ask?’ / The sparrow replies, / ‘To a jeweled palace in Elfland’s hills. / Don’t you know that a trilateral treaty was signed / Under the bright autumn moon two years ago? / There’ll be plenty to eat,

/ Potatoes piping hot, / Beef goulash.’ / ‘Stop your windy nonsense! / Look, the world is being turned upside down.’ (Ibid.)

149

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

not in the hands of the Marxist working class, the proletariat Cultural Revolution would be repudiated; the basic political course of the party would be altered and the verdict on revisionism would be overthrown.“ This article also stated that the practical significance of censuring Tale of the Marshes was to attack Deng Xiaoping, which was a reflection of the allusiveness and trickiness that then existed in politics. Yao Wenyuan, a member of the Political Bureau and the editor of Red Flag, was the most important political fighter. On January 3, Deng Xiaoping underwent self-criticism for the second time at a meeting of the Political Bureau over which he presided. Deng still wished to talk to Chairman Mao in person about his mistakes.478 Mao Yuanxin reported this to Mao Zedong, who was still dissatisfied and once again refused Deng’s request. At that point, Mao Zedong listened only to Mao Yuanxin. On January 7, Jiang rebuked Deng Xiaoping at a Political Bureau meeting, saying that Deng had tried to reverse past verdicts and restore the old order.479 Apparently, Deng’s policies of overall restoration of order had directly affected the interests of the Cultural Revolution hardliners headed by Jiang, as Deng’s policies aimed to rectify the mistakes of that revolution. Once Mao Zedong had decided to criticize Deng, Jiang inevitably attacked Deng. In accordance with Mao Zedong’s directions to criticize and help Deng Xiaoping, the Political Bureau on January 8 compiled Mao’s comments about Deng in a document titled “Important Instructions of Chairman Mao.“ This document was based on Mao Yuanxin’s notes of Mao Zedong’s talks with Mao Yuanxin against Deng Xiaoping and the rightists from October 1975 to January 1976. Mao Yuanxin initiated and carried out this last political movement on behalf of Mao. Mao Yuanxin thus played an even more important role in this regard than Jiang Qing. Mao held the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee in August 1966, there he witness the adoption of the 16 articles that launched the Cultural Revolution. In contrast, Mao Zedong now needed only to authorize Mao Yuanxin to launch the campaign against Deng Xiaoping and the rightist tendency to reverse past verdicts. It was on January 8 that Zhou Enlai died. Deng Xiaoping and Li Xiannian were the first to bid farewell to Zhou. Deng Yingchao told them Zhou’s last three wishes: his ashes should be scattered around the vast land of China; the funeral should be quiet; there should be no memorial meeting or ceremony for people to pay

478. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1997), vol. 1, 140.

479. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 441.

150

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

respect to his remains.480 Li Xiannian and Deng Xiaoping replied that the Chinese people would never agree with this. Deng Yingchao said that she had promised to fulfill Zhou’s three wishes. She had to keep her promise; she said firmly: “He was extremely concerned that I would not be able to fulfill his wishes. He didn’t want any of his ashes to be left behind. Never!“ Finally, the central leadership and Deng Yingchao reached a compromise: the memorial meeting and ceremony for the people to pay their respects to his remains should be held, but Zhou’s ashes would not be kept.481 At three o’clock in the afternoon, Deng Xiaoping chaired a meeting of the Political Bureau to discuss Zhou’s funeral affairs. Deng Xiaoping wrote a letter about this to Mao Zedong, who responded that he agreed.482 Zhou Enlai had worked as head of the Government Administration Council of the Central People’s Government for five years from 1949 to 1954. Zhou had also served as premier of the State Council for 22 years, from 1954 to 1976. He had been premier for 27 years. Zhou Enlai was something of a contradiction. He was both a proponent of the Cultural Revolution launched by Mao Zedong and a statesman who attempted to restrict the chaos caused by that revolution. He played different political roles. First and foremost, Zhou was unconditionally loyal to Mao Zedong, and he advocated Mao’s personality cult. Zhou did his best to maintain Mao’s personal authority, and he conscientiously implemented all of Mao’s instructions, with the result that the Cultural Revolution was protracted and its consequences became more widespread. It is considered that Mao made many mistakes in his late years, so did Zhou. Zhou carried out many things against his will — otherwise he would not be able to survive. If conditions allowed, he would protect individuals who had been attacked and were subject to persecution, including Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Ye Jianying, and Li Xiannian. Zhou died in a state of agony, indignation, and regret. Later, Deng said that the Chinese people would forgive Zhou for his actions.483 480. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 888.

481. Quan, Zhou Enlai Up Close, 410–411. 482. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 141.

483. Deng Xiaoping said that during the Cultural Revolution, Zhou Enlai had been in a very difficult position and so he had said and done many things against his will.

However, the Chinese forgave him. This was because he would not be able to survive and neutralize the consequences of the Cultural Revolution if he had not done so. He

had protected many people. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 348.)

151

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Following Mao Zedong’s instructions as relayed by Mao Yuanxin, on January 9 Yao Wenyuan demanded that Xinhua News Agency not publish any reports about the memorial activities of Zhou Enlai.484 At four o’clock that afternoon, Deng Xiaoping wrote to Mao Zedong: “After the news of the premier’s death was announced, many countries have requested that they send delegates or a delegation to attend the funeral in Beijing. The Political Bureau has discussed this matter and decided to follow the plan approved by Chairman Mao.“ With Mao’s consent, the committee responsible for the funeral affairs announced that no foreign governments, political parties, or friendly parties would be invited to the funeral.485 On January 10, Mao Yuanxin officially communicated Mao Zedong’s instructions to the Political Bureau that the funeral arrangement should be inexpensive; no memorial meetings, mourning halls, black gauze, nor wreaths would be allowed across the country. No foreign delegacies would be invited to the memorial meeting in Beijing. All party members should turn their grief into power and dedicate themselves to revolution, production, and the ongoing struggle against the rightist tendency to reverse past verdicts. Deng Xiaoping asked when the chairman had given those instructions. Zhang Chunqiao explained that they were in a report made by Comrade Yuanxin. After Mao Yuanxin read his report to Chairman Mao on January 9, Mao agreed with the content and asked that the matter be discussed by the Political Bureau. Zhang Chunqiao suggested that Yao Wenyuan should draft a notice following Mao’s instructions and issue this notice in the name of the Funeral Affairs Committee as soon as possible.486 What happened was that Mao Yuanxin created a set of instructions, which, upon approval by Mao Zedong, became the chairman’s instructions on the matter; this would then be presented to the Political Bureau, and it became the decision of the central leadership. In a sense, Mao Yuanxin had become the authority over the Political Bureau. This was the form of the decision-making process at that time, and it was noninstitutional. How could Mao Yuanxin convey such directions from Mao Zedong? Mao was very particular about his role as supreme leader, and he would never allow any other leader in the party to enjoy greater authority and popularity among the people: in the words of Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Mao Yuanxin, he would never allow a dead figure (Zhou Enlai) to overwhelm the living one (Mao Zedong). However, the people were extremely dissatisfied when 484. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1316.

485. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 141–142.

486. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 7–8.

152

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

the central leadership deliberately suppressed the report about Zhou’s death and memorial activities. Such suppression was the political trigger for the Tiananmen Square Incident.487 This incident was targeted at political dictatorship and also at Mao. Late at night, Yao Wenyuan told Lu Ying, editor in chief of the People’s Daily, that some people had tried to exert pressure on the central leadership under the guise of mourning the premier. They wished to disrupt the campaign against the rightist tendency to reverse past verdicts.488 On January 11, the remains of Zhou Enlai were solemnly escorted to Babaoshan for cremation. Along the dozens of kilometers of roads from Chang’an Street to Babaoshan, millions of people braved the piercing wind and stood at the roadside along which Zhou’s hearse passed to pay their respects to their beloved premier. As Li Xiannian recalled later, a huge number of people spontaneously went to the streets to pay their respects to a CPC member and a state leader in their deepest grief. This was an unprecedented act.489 Zhou stood for justice. The Chinese people made a clear stand on what they loved and hated.490 487. Wu De later recalled that these abnormal “should-nots,“ which suppressed the

memorial activities for Premier Zhou and debased Premier Zhou’s achievements, led to strong objections from the people: the greater the suppressions, the stronger the

people’s wish to defy them: “They just dared to defy the despotic power of the Gang

of Four and engaged in struggles with them.“ (Zhu, et al. eds., Wu De’s Oral History: A Record of the Ten-Year History of Storms, Some Personal Work Experiences in Beijing, 203– 204.)

488. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 9. 489. On February 5, 1988, Li Xiannian, then state president, recalled that when the word of

Zhou Enlai’s death spread, hundreds of millions of people wept, and unprecedented mourning crowds appeared in Tiananmen Square for several days in a row. On January 15, 1976, over a million young people, senior citizens, women, and children stood for hours in piercing winds to bid their last farewell to their respected and dear leader.

(Party Literature Research of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Li Xiannian (1935–1988), 492.)

490. In 1981, the CPC Central Committee made a resolution about evaluating Zhou Enlai: “Comrade Zhou Enlai was extremely loyal to the party and the people, and he spared no efforts in fulfilling his duty. He was in a very difficult position during the Cultural

Revolution. He kept his focus on the big picture, and he willingly bore the burden of hard work; he made unremitting efforts to conduct the normal work of the party and

the country so as to minimize the losses caused by the Cultural Revolution and protect

numerous cadres within and outside the party. He engaged in struggles of various

forms with the counter-revolutionary groups of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing. His death caused deepest sorrow among CPC members and the Chinese people of all ethnic

153

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

On January 13, Yao Wenyuan issued three instructions to the Xinhua News Agency: he demanded that the reports on the daily revolutionary and production activities should not be marginalized owing to reports on Zhou’s memorial activities.491 The same day, Yao Wenyuan told Lu Ying, editor in chief of the People’s Daily, that the reports on the death of Premier Zhou should be scaled back, saying: “The typeface for domestic news and comprehensive news should be reduced in size. The reports on the death of Premier Zhou should not be too prominent.“492 On January 14, as arranged by Yao Wenyuan, the People’s Daily published an article titled “Big Debates Produce Big Changes“ by one of its reporters as the front-page headline, and it dealt with the situation at Tsinghua University. This was a deliberate move to enrage the public.493 The fact that Zhou Enlai died and Deng Xiaoping was under attack left a political vacuum in the CPC Central Committee and State Council. That forced Mao Zedong to select a new leader as soon as possible. Zhang Chunqiao was selected to act as premier of the State Council since he was the first in line to succeed in this position. On the afternoon of January 15, Xiao Mu (secretary of both Wang Hongwen and Zhang Chunqiao) told Ma Tianshui, Xu Jingxian, and Wang Xiuzhen (secretaries of the Shanghai CPC Committee) that since Premier Zhou had died, Chairman Mao and the Political Bureau were thinking about his successor: “Comrade Chunqiao sent me back to deliver a message to you. He wanted to know your opinion, and he hoped that Shanghai would respond to this — especially the industrial workers.“ Ma Tianshui said: “Personally, I think that now Premier Zhou has passed away and Deng Xiaoping is under attack, the talk of being premier of the State Council will weigh heavily on the shoulders of Comrade Chunqiao.“ Xu Jingxian made the following proposal: “First, the masses should be mobilized in the form of symposiums, and workers should be encouraged to write letters to the CPC Central backgrounds.“ (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 814.)

491. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1319.

492. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 25. 493. On July 24, 1980, Yao Wenyuan confessed that during that period there were no important articles that criticized the rightists: “The masses and cadres are resisting this

campaign, which is having difficulty continuing. If I delayed any longer, there would be no fighting the rightists anymore. To continue and reinforce news reports on the campaign against rightists, I decided to publish that article as the headline story in the People’s Daily on the 14.“ (Ibid., 26–27.)

154

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Committee, requesting that Comrade Chunqiao should assume the position of premier of the State Council. Second, we must create a publicity campaign to draw public attention to Comrade Chunqiao. Third, the Shanghai CPC Committee should compile such activities of the Shanghai people and their demands into a situation report, which should then be submitted to the Central Committee as an official document of the Shanghai CPC Committee.“494 The same day, the memorial meeting for Zhou Enlai was held in the East Hall of the Great Hall of the People. Deng Yingchao, Deng Xiaoping, and the leading officials waited for Mao Zedong to attend, but he did not appear. Wang Dongxing called Mao’s office only to be informed that the chairman would not attend. The memorial meeting did not start until that point.495 Deng Xiaoping made a memorial speech, in which he retraced Zhou’s life, which was devoted to the causes of revolution and construction in China, and he expressed his high regard for Zhou. The memorial speech was finalized by the Political Bureau and approved by Mao.496 Lu Ying, editor in chief of the People’s Daily, proposed to Yao Wenyuan that to prevent bad elements from causing trouble, it would be better not to publish any articles against rightists for the time being: instead, priority in the newspaper should be given to memorial messages, telegrams, and articles related to Premier Zhou Enlai. However, Yao strongly objected to this. He said to Lu Ying that it was correct at that time to continue the fight: “After the news about the memorial meeting today, all memorial activities about Premier Zhou should be kept out of the media. All the media attention should be focused on articles against the rightists.“497 Yao intended to subdue memorial activities to further provoke the public and create new political struggles. In January, Deng Xiaoping held a meeting with Ye Jianying. Ye Jianying said in rage: “These people are going too far. They are scheming for power now that Premier Zhou has passed away and the chairman is sick. Who knows what they will do next? We need to take effective measures against them soon!“ Deng responded: “There is nothing to be afraid of. I am prepared. The worst that can happen to me is that I get deposed and treated like Luo Mai. My only regret is that I have so much to do, with the economy still in a poor state and many veteran comrades as yet not liberated.“ Ye replied: “The biggest problem at the moment is that the chairman does not listen to us. Instead, Jiang Qing and others have Mao Yuanxin relate lies 494. Ibid., 16–17. 495. Quan, Zhou Enlai Up Close, 412. 496. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 142–143.

497. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 23.

155

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

against us to the chairman.“ Deng continued: “At the end of last year, I talked to the chairman several times alone, and I asked him what he felt about the policies and guidance outlines that I had proposed. He approved of them. Later, the chairman sent Mao Yuanxin to me, who was accusing me of having repudiated the Cultural Revolution. I argued against this, but it was to no avail!“ Ye Jianying suggested: “We suppose to seek for chances talking to the chairman again?“ Deng answered: “I’ve already done so. It’s useless. You know me, I never yield on fundamental issues!“ Ye Jianying said: “As long as there’s hope, we must strive!“ Deng replied: “The Political Bureau has actually suspended me from work. I suppose that the chairman is already determined to make a change in his successor...I am prepared for the worst, but I believe that our cause will be carried forth and that our cause is hopeful...It doesn’t matter if I fall from power. As long as you and the other veteran comrades are here, those clowns will achieve nothing!“ Ye Jianying responded: “As long as we live, we shall fight no matter what!“ Deng Xiaoping concluded: “We should be careful in choosing our methods. That was the last instruction of the premier before he passed away.“498 On January 20, Deng Xiaoping underwent a self-criticism for the third time at a meeting of the Political Bureau. At that meeting, the Gang of Four launched a fierce onslaught against him, but he argued back. He made an official proposal to that bureau: “I am unsuitable to work as the principal figure.“499 On the evening of the same day, Deng wrote to Mao Zedong, noting that it had been two months since the criticism against him, and had no sign of stopping. Hence, he had to resign for the sake of CPC Central Committee: “Therefore, first of all, I again officially propose to the chairman to relieve me of my duties in taking charge of the daily work of the CPC Central Committee. I hope that this request may be granted.“500 On January 21, Mao Zedong had a meeting with Mao Yuanxin. Mao Yuanxin reported Deng Xiaoping’s self-criticism at the Political Bureau meeting the previous day. Mao Zedong said that the matter was still a cause of conflict among people, but that it had been well guided: “It is good not to make him [Deng] an enemy, like Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao. Deng Xiaoping is different from Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao — Deng is willing to criticize himself.“ Mao Yuanxin reported that Hua Guofeng, Ji Dengkui, and Chen Xilian had proposed that new leader of the State 498. Fan, Ye Jianying in 1976, 1st edition, 69–71. 499. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 145; Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 446–447.

500. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol.1, 145.

156

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Council should be appointed, so they could report their specific jobs to whom. Mao therefore instructed: “Then let Hua Guofeng lead the State Council, even though he regards himself as low in political talent. Let Xiaoping take charge of foreign affairs.“501 This was the first time Mao had appointed Hua Guofeng as leader of the State Council. On January 28, Mao Zedong officially proposed to have Hua Guofeng take charge of the daily work of the central leadership.502 On January 24, Wang Hongwen wrote to Mao, exposing Deng Xiaoping’s mistakes. Wang submitted materials written by Ma Tianshui, secretary of the Shanghai CPC Committee and deputy director of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee, which claimed that Deng warned him against taking sides with the Gang of Four on June 12, 1975 and singled Zhang Chunqiao out to be someone wary. Wang added: “I feel that Comrade Xiaoping’s talk was politically wrong and followed his own agenda. This was not a fair act but a scheming ploy.“503 On January 28, the Political Bureau held a meeting to condemn Deng. Wang Hongwen said that although Comrade Xiaoping had not implemented his policy of restoring order over a long period, its influence was felt across a number of different sectors, and it affected a great number of people, many of whom were the leaders of central committees, state councils, provinces, and municipalities. Thus, Deng’s activities had an organizational character. Deng Xiaoping said: “Comrade Hongwen, I need to explain.“ However, Wang interrupted him: “Your explanation will be nothing more than a refutation. That is of course allowed, but I have evidence [referring to the materials Wang submitted to Mao Zedong].“ Zhang Chunqiao also rebuked Deng. Deng made the following repudiation: “According to the logic of Comrade Chunqiao, only revolutionary principles are sufficient for the construction of socialism. Whether my policies were right or wrong is something that has to be judged by history.“ Hua Guofeng criticized Deng Xiaoping: “You have been brought down many times, and you have criticized yourself many times. Even ordinary people say that you are now like a dead pig that is not afraid of boiling water. You need to change your image in terms of concrete actions.“ Mao Yuanxin stated: “The chairman has instructed that the candidacy for the premier should be discussed by the Political Bureau. Jiang Qing believes Zhang Chunqiao to be the most appropriate!“ Zhang Chunqiao responded: “The chairman should make the appointment. Otherwise, we will spend three days and nights discussing 501. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1321.

502. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 146.

503. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 450.

157

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

the matter in the Political Bureau, but that will not yield any results.“504 On January 29, Mao Zedong listened to Mao Yuanxin’s report on the situation at the meetings of the Political Bureau. Mao Yuanxin briefed him that Comrade Hua Guofeng had made the remark that Comrade Deng Xiaoping was like a dead pig that was not afraid of boiling water: Deng always committed the same mistakes. Mao Zedong thought that Deng was not yet a dead pig. Deng had already written two self-criticisms, which showed that he was willing to evaluate himself: “The Political Bureau should help him even if he is already a dead pig. The policy of our party has always been that of curing the sickness to save the patient.“ Mao Yuanxin explained: “Comrade Xiaoping has a new understanding of his own mistakes. He admits that he’s ambitious and wishes to usurp the chairman’s authority when he is in charge of the daily work of the central leadership.“ Mao Zedong said: “That’s an exaggeration. He is ambitious, but not too ambitious.“ Mao Yuanxin responded: “The comrades in the Political Bureau unanimously believe that in view of the mistakes that Comrade Xiaoping has made, he should not assume important positions or be responsible for foreign affairs. Since the Political Bureau began its criticism of Comrade Deng Xiaoping, Comrade Jianying has been on sick leave, and he seldom attends the meetings; when he does, he remains silent. I feel that he seems to be on the side of Comrade Xiaoping.“ Mao Zedong replied: “Deng Xiaoping was recommended by Ye Jianying, so it’s hardly strange that Ye Jianying would be on his side. They have similar thoughts and political ideas: how could they not be friendly and sympathetic?...With supporters, one rules; and with few supporters, one is ruled. Therefore the wise emperor tries to win supporters.“ Mao Zedong continued to explain that a wise emperor controls power. Emperor Qin Shi Huang set up a centralized government on the advice of Han Fei. The CPC should learn from Qin Shi Huang in ruling the country by taking control of state power.505 Qin Shi Huang was Mao Zedong’s political idol. Mao repeatedly said of himself that he was Karl Marx plus Qin Shi Huang. Throughout the Cultural Revolution, the rule was less that of the party than that of a man. The Cultural Revolution was personally launched and led by Mao, and he maintained it for 10 years. For the second time, Mao Zedong proposed that Hua Guofeng should act as premier of the State Council and take charge of the daily work of the CPC Central Committee. Mao referred to Hua as solemn and wise. Mao instructed Hua to publicize himself around the country. In the evening of January 29, a Political Bureau meeting chaired by Wang Hongwen, Mao Yuanxin conveyed Mao Zedong’s urgent message about Hua 504. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol.1, 35–39. 505. Ibid., 43–46.

158

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Guofeng becoming premier of the State Council; but Hua declined, saying that he was not good enough. Deng Xiaoping was the first to express his support towards Mao Zedong’s proposal. Jiang Qing also agreed. Later, the Political Bureau unanimously approved Mao Zedong’s proposal. Mao Yuanxin relayed Mao Zedong’s direction that a meeting of the Political Bureau should be held and that Deng be further helped and criticized: “To continue the struggle against the rightists, we may openly discuss the problem of Comrade Deng Xiaoping and present the chairman’s recent remarks to the whole party. However, the area of criticism should be kept reasonably narrow, and it would be unwise to expose ostensible rightist agents at all levels. Such problems that arise in the lower levels should be dealt with by the CPC Central Committee, and the problems at the level of the Central Committee should be handled by Comrade Xiaoping.“506 The above decision-making procedure by Mao Zedong was wholly arbitrary and did not involve consultation with any other leader. In the past, when Mao chose Lin Biao, Wang Hongwen, and Deng Xiaoping, he did at least confer with Zhou Enlai. Toward the end of his lifetime, Mao became increasingly lonely and subjective in decision making; officializing plans without Central Committee or the NPC plenary session. His only request was to have his nephew, Mao Yuanxin, convey his command to the CPC Central Committee, which in turn issued its notice accordingly. On February 2, the Central Committee officially issued a notice (1976 Document No. 1), which was proposed by Chairman Mao and unanimously passed by the Political Bureau, whereby Hua Guofeng named the premier of the State Council and would be taking charge the Political Bureau work. As proposed by Mao and unanimously passed by the Political Bureau, this document stated while Ye Jianying was ill, Chen Xilian (member of the Political Bureau and Standing Committee of the Central Military Committee; commander and first secretary of the CPC Committee of the Beijing Military Area) would take charge of the Central Military Committee.507 After the notice was issued, Deng Xiaoping became excluded from the leadership of the CPC Central Committee and Ye Jianying was dropped from the leadership of the Central Military Committee.508 Why did Mao Zedong not appoint Wang Hongwen and Zhang Chunqiao — both members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau — to head the Central Military Committee? On October 8, 1976, Hua Guofeng gave an explanation at a 506. Ibid., 56–58. 507. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 146–147.

508. Ibid., 147.

159

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Political Bureau meeting. Considered Ye Jianying was sick and Mao questioned the abilities of Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen, who lacked authority in the military, Mao thus appointed Chen Xilian, who had fought in wars, to take charge of the Central Military Committee. Mao Zedong sent an open message to people both at home and abroad that his successor was no longer the moderate Deng Xiaoping (first in line among the vice premiers in the State Council), the Cultural Revolution hardliner Wang Hongwen (second in line among the vice chairmen of the Central Committee), nor Zhang Chunqiao (member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and third in line among the vice premiers of the State Council), but personally appointed the Cultural Revolution beneficiary Hua Guofeng as his successor. At that time, Hua Guofeng was not a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau — just an ordinary member of the Political Bureau, ranking sixth among the 12 vice premiers. It was therefore inappropriate for him to act as premier of the State Council and be in charge of the daily work of the Central Committee. In terms of the power structure, the transition from the leadership of Mao-Zhou-Deng to that of Mao-Hua-Wang was a completely subjective decision of Mao’s — one that did not go through any legal procedures. Why did Mao Zedong choose Hua Guofeng? The decision was based on Mao’s policy of using different political forces in the party to check and balance one another. Hua Guofeng made a decent candidate to Mao not only because of Mao believed he would be widely accepted in the party, but also because of his loyalty — where he would be committed in carrying out all Mao’s instruction concerning the Cultural Revolution. Mao knew that the Gang of Four, particularly Jiang Qing, had made a lot of enemies in the party, the PLA, and among the people. If any of those people became Mao’s successor, there would inevitably be a negative impact — possibly chaos around the country. Thus, the Gang of Four is out of the question concerning such pose of supreme power at this crucial juncture in China’s history. Mao Zedong’s decision delivered a blow, which might fairly be described as fatal, to the aspirations of the Gang of Four. That group planned for the reinstatement of Wang Hongwen in chairing the daily work of the Central Committee and for Zhang Chunqiao to head the State Council after the gang had deposed Deng Xiaoping. At a meeting of the Political Bureau on October 8, 1976, Ye Jianying said that the Gang of Four had seized some power in the central leadership, but it thirsted for more: the members wanted supreme power of the central leadership. After Deng was ousted, Wang Hongwen was next in line to head the Central Committee and Zhang Chunqiao to assume the post of premier. However, Mao did not grant them that power and chose Hua Guofeng instead.

160

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Craving to be the premier, Zhang Chunqiao was extremely dissatisfied with Mao’s decision, and hence he made a prediction on February 3 that Hua would be just like another Deng Xiaoping, who quickly rose to power and just as quickly fell.509 This staff movement made Hua the Gang of Four’s biggest opponent, and the clique also resented Mao for not having appointed one of them, particularly Zhang, as premier. Zhang’s political ambition were exposed. His supposed fight or precautions against revisionism and the restoration of capitalism was just a political front for him to achieve his political goals. Jiang Qing scorned Hua Guofeng. She wanted to become chairperson or some kind of modern-day Empress Wu Zetian.510 All evidence revealing the forceful political exclusiveness of the Gang of Four was made criminal evidence and hence gave Hua a good reason to arrest them all. The intensifying political struggle in the party led to political turmoil. Party discipline and state laws and regulations were being disregarded; coercive measures and activities of the secret police were rife. The most intrusive organization was the Public Security Ministry. In early February 1976, the “Minutes of the Symposium of Public Security Directors“ (for discussion), which had been convened by the Public Security Ministry, proclaimed that with the deepening of the socialist revolution, class relationships had undergone changes. The result was that capitalist roaders within the party had become a hostile class against workers and poor peasants; the main body and core of the whole capitalist class as well as major forces against the proletariat posed the huge risk of overthrowing the proletarian dictatorship and restoring capitalism. Therefore, class enemies at home and abroad increasingly placed their hopes in the restoration of the capitalist roaders in the party. It was necessary for public security to adapt to this new situation: “We need to watch both the old class enemies and the emerging counter-revolutionaries. In particular, we have to be alert to capitalist class elements and the persistent capitalist roaders in the party. This means that we have to observe the association between counterrevolutionary elements and capitalist roaders in the party; we need to look carefully for evidence of such elements and report cases to party committees. We have to strike hard and quell the destructive counter-revolutionary activities of capitalist roaders. Sabotage efforts of counter-revolutionaries are always closely linked to the efforts of capitalist roaders within the party to restore capitalism. This feature has become increasingly obvious.“ Zhang Chunqiao commented on these minutes: “Be 509. Zhang Chunqiao wrote an article titled “Thoughts on February 3“ on February 3, 1976:

“This is another Document No. 1. A Document No. 1 was already issued last year

[1975]. The person who achieves his ambition is aggressive. However, some people who quickly come to power also quickly fall from power.“

510. Xu, Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1976), 479–482.

161

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

alert to revisionism, especially in the CPC Central Committee.“511 These minutes were clearly not targeted at Hua Guofeng since they were severely censured and withheld by Hua. On February 13, the Guangming Daily published a headline article titled “The Worries of Confucius“ written by Gao Lu (alias of Liang Xiao). The article made allusive attacks against Zhou Enlai, and it expounded the word “worries“: it compared the Chinese people grieving over the death of Zhou to “whining and wailing women.“ The article announced: “Let the whining women of old systems cling on to the skeleton of Confucius [alluding to Zhou Enlai] and whine and wail their worries and woes.“ This was a deliberate act to provoke social and political incidents and public rage. On February 14, the CPC Central Committee held a meeting to prepare a message about the campaign against Deng Xiaoping. After announcing the beginning of the meeting, Wang Hongwen introduced the campaign program and the significance of the meeting. Jiang Qing said: “Deng Xiaoping is not here today since the Central Committee has suspended him and ordered him to review his work.“ Jiang made further attacks on Deng.512 Hua Guofeng said: “The chairman has said that Comrade Deng Xiaoping committed a major mistake in his political direction and the consequences affected the grassroots. As we know, some provincial leaders have presented and implemented some of Deng Xiaoping’s bad ideas. All these problems can be traced back to Comrade Deng Xiaoping. Everyone just needs to relax. There is no need to feel weighed down by numerous problems. I wouldn’t have been this aware of the mistakes made by Comrade Deng Xiaoping if the chairman had not pointed them out.“ Jiang Qing rebuked 511. Central Special Case Group, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.3,“ September 1977.

512. Jiang Qing made fierce attacks against Deng Xiaoping. She said: “Deng Xiaoping is evil! He is ungrateful and without conscience! It was I that recommended him to enter the Political Bureau back in 1974, and he publicly criticized me in 1975. Last year, he

unleashed such vicious spite against me! He was worse than fascists! He schemed and tried to split up the party and to deceive the chairman and frame me! My dear comrades, he shut me up for months last year! I was prohibited from uttering even

one word. He has talked about freedom of speech and a democratic work style. But these are just words. He is arbitrary and patriarchal, and he has his own circle of fascist power. He is a typical warlord. He seized my power and shut me up. Now I am out,

having been released by the chairman! Today, I am here to testify to the crimes he committed.“ (Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 82–83.)

162

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Hua: “The master report you delivered at the agricultural meeting was written by Deng Xiaoping, which I believe should be criticized too!“ Hua Guofeng responded: “That report was deliberated upon collectively by the Political Bureau and revised and approved by the chairman. We can’t attribute that to Deng Xiaoping alone.“513 This confrontation, which amounted to an aggressive political challenge to Hua Guofeng, made Hua into a political enemy of Jiang’s. With her special relationship with Mao, she challenged everyone; hence when Mao was alive, she was isolated, upon Mao’s death, she was made target to be attack. It was foreseeable that she would lose everything without Mao, which was made reality after Mao’s death. On February 16, with Mao Zedong’s approval, the CPC Central Committee issued a document agreeing with the committee’s decision on February 6 to stop implementing the reports and speeches of Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping at the expanded meeting of the Central Military Committee in July 1975. This was the end of the drive to rectify the work style of the PLA. Just one year had elapsed between Mao Zedong’s decision that the PLA needed to be rectified and going back on that decision. On February 17, the People’s Daily published an editorial, “Criticizing the Guidance of the Three Instructions,“ which was an allusive attack against Deng Xiaoping, calling him the capitalist roader who failed to repent. On February 20, Jiang Qing held a meeting with Ma Tianshui, Xu Jingxian, Wang Xiuzhen, and Ding Sheng (commander of the Nanjing Military Area). Jiang said that Deng had tried to build his own independent kingdom and practice fascism: “You need to criticize Deng Xiaoping. Last year, he criticized me for months. I was living like a prisoner. Now that I’ve come back and can speak out, I will prosecute him.“514 Following Mao Zedong’s instruction to criticize Deng Xiaoping, Zhang Chunqiao formulated the notion of “From a Democratic to a Capitalist Roader“ as the basis for criticizing Deng. Back in November 1975 and January 1976, Zhang Chunqiao held two talks with Huang Tao, a member of the Standing Committee of Shanghai CPC Committee. Zhang said that people who supported democratic revolutions received great benefits at the end of the war in 1949, and they were unwilling to support the socialist revolution: although they had participated in the democratic revolution, they opposed the socialist revolution since that would harm their interests. Zhang claimed that the democratic revolution that the party had conducted for 28 years ended with political consensus, whereas the socialist revolution that had gone on for 28 years, paying a huge price and were opposed 513. Ibid., 84. 514. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1329.

163

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

by many. In February, Zhang Chunqiao held talks with Ma Tianshui, Xu Jingxian, Wang Xiuzhen, Huang Tao, and Li Binshan. Zhang concluded that veteran party officials were democratic revolutionaries, which amounted to them being categorized as capitalist roaders. In the evening of February 19, Zhang Chunqiao remarked that veteran cadres were capitalist roaders who were even worse than the old capitalist class. Later, Zhang commented on a letter from Zhu Yongjian: “Be alert to revisionists in the party, especially in the Central Committee.“ During the message-sending meeting in February, Zhang repeatedly called Deng Xiaoping a monopoly capitalist and comprador bourgeoisie who practiced revisionism in the country and capitulationism internationally. Zhang thus gave it all in to politically destroy Deng.515 As Zhang instructed, Red Flag published an article on March 1, “From Democratic Bourgeoisie to Capitalist Roader“ under the name of Chi Heng.516 On December 8, 1980 at a special tribunal of the Supreme People’s Court, Yao Wenyuan admitted to having had Red Flag publish it, but he argued that the “democrat to capitalist roader“ notion was not his but had derived from important talks of Chairman Mao.517 Moreover, Yao stated that the article had appeared with 515. Central Special Case Group, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.3,“ September 1977.

516. The article began with a claim that the great struggle personally launched and led by the great leader Chairman Mao against the rightists was being conducted in the sectors of education, science and technology, and arts: “The campaign is targeted at

capitalist roaders who will not repent that are currently in power in the party. It is a continuation and deepening of the Cultural Revolution, and it represents another

fight between proletariats and capitalists, socialism and capitalism, and Marxism and revisionism in the frontline of ideological battle. It is the capitalist roaders — the source of rightist thoughts — who oppose cooperatives and communes in rural areas and

support the practice of contracting production quotas to individual households; they preach the ridiculous theory that good cats catch mice irrespective of whether they are white or black; they oppose the Cultural Revolution and quelled the movements of revolutionary people and they now attempt to repudiate the Cultural Revolution and

restore capitalist rule. The transformation from a democratic capitalist to a capitalist roader in power, from a party comrade in the democratic revolutionary period to the dissenter in the socialist period, and from the believer in capitalistic democratic

revolution to the believer in revisionism: isn’t this the journey taken by the capitalist

roader who fails to repent?“ (Originally printed in the Red Flag, issue 3, on March 1, 1976; reprinted in the People’s Daily on March 2, 1976.)

517. Mao Zedong remarked that some party officials, mostly veterans, believed in the

164

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

the chairman’s approval.518 In fact, Zhang and Yao were both named authorized political spokesmen by Mao. Mao had correctly predicted Deng’s political stance: he had always believed that Deng would represent the emerging new capitalists and attempt to restore capitalism. Despite his deteriorating physical condition, Mao Zedong still had sufficient strength of will to personally launch this final political movement, which in turn accelerated his death. Even the visiting President Nixon was surprised at Mao’s acuity despite his frailty. Mao Zedong met Nixon and his wife on February 23.519 Later, Nixon would describe the meeting in detail.520 On February 25, the Guangming Daily published an article, “The Guidance of Class Struggles Should Be Followed in Economic Construction — On Lenin’s Discussions of Trade Unions, the Current Situation, and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Bukharin,“ written by Liang Xiao, to make an allusive attack on Zhou Enlai. The same day, the “Important Instructions of Chairman Mao,“ prepared by Mao capitalistic democratic revolution: “They did not understand, resist, or even oppose

socialist revolution. Why? Because they became government officials and wanted to protect the interests of such officials. They’ve got big houses, cars, large salaries, and

even attendants: they are even more privileged than the capitalists. Therefore, when their interests were damaged during the socialist revolution, such as through building

cooperatives, some of them objected to this in the party, and they were displeased at criticisms of capitalist authority. It is wrong not to know of the existence of the capitalist

class in the middle of socialistic revolution. Capitalism has existed in the party and there are capitalistic roaders in power. Capitalist roaders are still going their own way.“

(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 487.) 518. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 29. 519. Meeting attendees included Hua Guofeng (acting premier), Qiao Guanhua (foreign minister), Huang Zhen (director), Wang Hairong (deputy foreign minister), and Tang

Wensheng and Zhang Hanzhi (deputy chief secretaries). (People’s Daily, February 24, 1976.)

520. Nixon said that Mao Zedong moaned and groaned monosyllabic utterances.

Nonetheless, his mind was quick and clear: “He understood what I had said, though

he could not speak. If he thought that the translator misunderstood him, he would impatiently grasp a slip of paper to write down his words. It was painful to see him in

such distress. No matter what people thought of Mao, it was undeniable that he was

a soldier who fought to the last moment of his life. Parkinson’s disease caused Mao’s movements to rigidify. At the end of our meeting, secretaries helped him up from the chair and helped him walk me to the door.“ (Nixon, Leaders, 224–225.)

165

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Yuanxin, was presented at a meeting of leaders of all provinces, municipalities, autonomous regions, and military areas convened by the CPC Central Committee. In February, a speech drafted by Wang Hongwen and delivered at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Central Military Committee argued that the guidance of the Three Instructions was by nature opposed to the guidance of the class struggle initiated by Chairman Mao: “The Three Instructions are against the basic political direction of the party and against the basic theory and practice that our party has had for over 20 years. There is confusion in the relationship between that guidance and secondary tasks as well as between the commander and those being commanded.“521 This indicated that Mao Zedong saw through the political trick being played by Deng Xiaoping, “which set Mao’s spear against Mao’s shield.“ On February 29, the People’s Daily published an article “On Taking the Three Instructions as Guidance“ by Liang Xiao and Ren Ming. The article defined Deng Xiaoping as a capitalist roader who would not repent, and it stated that he adhered to the revisionism of Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao.522 Ironically, just one month earlier (on January 20), Mao Zedong professed that Deng should be judged according to the principle of the internal struggle among the people (see above). On March 1, with the approval of Mao Zedong, the CPC Central Committee determined that during the illness of Vice Premier Li Xiannian, Li Suwen 521. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1333.

522. The article stated that Mao Zedong spoke about using the Three Instructions as a guideline: “To maintain unity is not to cast away class struggle. Class struggle is the

primary guideline: the rest are just secondary.“ This important instruction of Chairman Mao exposed the guideline of the Three Instructions as being a downright revisionist

guideline that denied class struggle. The key link in that guideline was restoring

capitalism: “The guideline of the Three Instructions was proposed by the capitalist roader [Deng Xiaoping] who adhered to Liu Shaoqi’s and Lin Biao’s revisionism

and would not repent without the authorization of Chairman Mao and the CPC Central Committee. The promulgation of the guidance of the Three Instructions has a deep political background. It was targeted against the Cultural Revolution and the

movement against Lin Biao and Confucius. It was a direct opposition to Chairman Mao’s important instructions on theoretical problems. The reason we dismiss it as revisionist is that it betrays the basic theory and practice of class struggle in our party.

Those who created the guideline of the Three Instructions ignored the guidance of class

struggle and the basic political course of the party, focusing instead on productivity and modernization — whatever route should be taken for development.“ (People’s Daily, February 29, 1976.)

166

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

(vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC) would be in charge of departments and ministries involved with finance and trade.523 Thus, Ye Jianying and Deng Xiaoping (members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau) and Li Xiannian (member of the Political Bureau) were relieved from their duties without convening in the CPC Central Committee plenary session. This marked the fifth political shakeup since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. On March 2, Jiang Qing announced at an unauthorized meeting that she called of the 12 provinces and districts during a notification meeting of the CPC Central Committee, that Deng Xiaoping was responsible for spreading many rumors: “He is a downright traitor and has alienated himself from the people. I say that he represents the collaborative capitalist class, compradors, and landlords. Deng Xiaoping is the agent of international capitalists in China. He uses three methods in the Political Bureau. The first is to create close alliances with others; the second is to deceive others; and the third is to strike with great force. When he does strike, he carefully identify his targets. He attacked me. He knows that I am just a pawn, but I am proud of being a pawn in defending the revolutionary course determined by the chairman. And a pawn like me is still able to bring down the commander in chief of counter-revolutionary elements. So he struck out at me first. Some people have accused me of being a cruel queen, and for that I feel honored. Lu was such a cruel queen: she was the uncrowned empress who held supreme power in the state and she followed the legalistic route.“ Jiang Qing claimed that she had played no part in the so-called civil war: “Deng Xiaoping repudiates the Cultural Revolution and everything else too. He is a counter-revolutionary, a double-dealer that plays one side against another, and he creates slander. He has exposed himself faster than Lin Biao did. If Deng gained power, people like me would be killed in the tens of thousands. I have announced at meetings of the Political Bureau that I am psychologically prepared to be killed or imprisoned.“ Later when Deng assumed power, and Jiang was jailed, not killed. Even Chen Yun objected to the death sentence for her: “She got a life sentence in jail. She would be unable to bear the lack of affection or compassion to the point where she might kill herself...524 523. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1335.

524. Xinhua News Agency related on June 4, 1991 that “Jiang Qing, principal member of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing Counter-revolutionary Group” had killed herself in her Beijing

residence in the early morning of May 14, 1991 during medical parole. Jiang had been sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve at a special session of the Supreme People’s

Court in January 1981 and was deprived of political rights for life. In January 1983, she was resentenced to life imprisonment. On May 4, 1984, she was granted medical parole.

167

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

This is an example of the good becoming inevitably successful and the bad being inevitably punished.“ Also on March 2, Mao Zedong listened to a report by Mao Yuanxin where Jiang Qing was warned to keep a low profile.525 Mao Yuanxin explained that Zhang Chunqiao was not satisfied with the words of most members of the Political Bureau. Zhang wanted to invite some academics from Tsinghua University and Peking University to be present at meetings of the Political Bureau to help explain the campaigns against rightist tendencies being conducted at the two universities. Mao Zedong expressed his consent: “More people should be invited and encouraged to talk so that the stereotyped thinking in the Political Bureau can be swept away.“526 On March 3, the article “Criticize Capitalist Roaders in the Party That Will Not Repent,“ which was revised by Yao Wenyuan, appeared in the People’s Daily. The article slandered Deng Xiaoping as a capitalist roader who would not repent: a crazy man who aimed to restore old institutions, attempted to repudiate the Cultural Revolution, and organized restorative activities according to particular theories and guidelines.527 On December 8, 1980, Yao Wenyuan defended himself at a special session of the Supreme People’s Court: “Such charges against Deng Xiaoping presented in the article did not come from me, but from the Political Bureau.“528 On March 3, the CPC Central Committee issued the “Notice on Learning Important Instructions of Chairman Mao,“ which communicated the words of Mao Zedong. The same day, the Central Committee related Hua Guofeng’s speech at a meeting of leaders of provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions and military areas that had been convened by the committee. In accordance with Mao’s instructions, a campaign against Deng Xiaoping’s revisionism was launched within the party. The notice adopted a similar definition to that used for Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping on August 5, 1966 in “Cannon Fired to the Command — My First Big Posters.“ Hua Guofeng also proposed several policies against Deng,529 which 525. Mao Zedong said it was not right to do: “You [Mao Yuanxin] tell Jiang Qing not to

overestimate herself and not to interfere too much. There are vice chairmen and the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. She has no business calling meetings of the Political Bureau. She needs to change her old habits and she should learn to behave.” (Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 94.)

526. Ibid., 96. 527. Ibid., 28. 528. Ibid., 29. 529. Hua Guofeng’s speech was discussed by the Political Bureau and approved by Mao Zedong. The speech emphasized: “Do not expose the agents of Deng Xiaoping at

168

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

were different from those followed by Mao Zedong when he launched the Cultural Revolution in the latter half of 1966. In “Notice on Learning Important Instructions of Chairman Mao,“ Mao stated that Deng Xiaoping’s promise never to reverse the verdict on the Cultural Revolution was unreliable.530 This move was to deprive Deng of political credibility within the party. Second, Mao Zedong criticized Deng Xiaoping’s “cat theory,“ which failed to focus on class struggle.531 Different political philosophies were involved here. Mao advocated the philosophy of struggle, whereas Deng supported the philosophy of construction. The latter was the political consensus and resolution of the 8th National Congress of the CPC, and it later became the political consensus and resolution of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee. Without Mao, the philosophy of construction became the mainstream line of thought for the CPC: it represented the fundamental direction of socialist modernization in China. Third, Deng was very likely to repudiate the Cultural Revolution.532 This different government levels, do not settle old historical issues, and do not become entangled in trivialities. For comrades that have made mistakes [meaning Deng Xiaoping], we should follow the instruction of Chairman Mao to learn from past

mistakes and avoid future ones and also to cure the sickness to save the patient. Do not emphasize old mistakes. Do not sentence people to death for old mistakes.

Some comrades need to self-criticize publicly. Comrades should be allowed to make mistakes and correct them. Our whole drive should not involve nationwide visits by Red Guards or fighting teams. The focus should be on revolution, production, work,

and preparations for war.“ (Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1772.)

530. Mao Zedong quoted Deng Xiaoping’s words saying that ”education was undergoing a

crisis,” and Mao continued: “If students do not read books, neither would he [Deng]. He [Deng] does not understand Marxism and Leninism. He represents capitalism. His

statement about ’never reversing the verdict’ is just unreliable.“ (Editorial of People’s Daily, “Great Victory.“)

531. Mao Zedong said that Deng Xiaoping did not advocate class struggle and he had

not mentioned this guideline. Deng advocated the theory of the white cat and black cat irrespective of whether this was imperialism or Marxism. Mao Zedong said that

there was no class struggle in a socialist country: “What is this adoption of the Three Instructions as the guideline? To maintain unity is not to cast away class struggle. The

class struggle is the primary guideline, with the rest being secondary.“ (Li ed., Deng Xiaoping Entered and Left Zhongnanhai Three Times, 290–292.)

532. Mao Zedong noted that there were two attitudes toward the Cultural Revolution: dissatisfaction and total denial, regarding the revolution as a complete mistake. (Ibid., 291.)

169

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

amounted to a total denial of Mao’s great historical achievement. Fourth, Mao believed that capitalism existed within the party and that capitalist roaders were maintaining their course.533 Mao understood Deng very well. Mao thought that Deng was still by nature a capitalist roader and a representative of the capitalist class. This indicates that the political division between Mao, Liu Shaoqi and Deng had a long history. Mao and Deng followed different political courses, and that obliged Mao to depose Deng just before his death. Objectively, the second campaign of criticism launched by Mao Zedong against Deng Xiaoping helped Deng a great deal. The second, third, and fourth points helped Deng spread his theory, especially that of the black and white cats. It was not clear at that time and it could not have been predicted, but that campaign was the spark that later led to reform and opening-up in China. As a result, no matter how much Hua Guofeng and Wang Dongxing and other Cultural Revolution beneficiaries objected to Deng’s return to power or how much they upheld their policy of believing in whatever Mao said and doing whatever Mao instructed, when Deng returned to power in 1977, he was determined to correct the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution. Deng aimed to return to the policy of “seeking truth from facts,“ which Mao had advocated during the Yan’an period. Deng resolved to drop the guideline of class struggle, adopted by Mao Zedong after 1957, and focused on developing productivity and launching the drive of reform and opening-up, which produced huge social changes in Chinese society.534 It is not hard to understand why it was Deng that initiated and created China’s reform and opening-up — a totally different era from that of the Cultural Revolution. Deng was acutely aware 533. Mao Zedong said: “It is wrong to be unaware that a capitalist class existed in the middle

of the socialistic revolution. Capitalism exists in the party, and there are capitalist roaders in power. The capitalist roaders are still pursuing their course.“ (Ibid.)

534. Deng used to say to foreign visitors with regard to reform: “We experimented with reform from 1974 to 1975. I presided over the routine work of the CPC Central

Committee in 1975. The reform was conducted as a type of house-cleaning — a policy

that emphasized economic development, and the first step was restoring order to production. I was quickly kicked out of power by the Gang of Four. I have fallen from power and risen three times. The reform of 1974 and 1975 was very popular since it

fulfilled people’s wishes. After the fall of the Gang of Four, the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee reestablished ’seeking truth from facts’ as the guideline, and it transferred the focus of our work to developing productivity in the

party and in the country. It was only then that reform could be carried out again.“

(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, 255.)

170

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

after his political fall that China would not go anywhere without reform. He was even more conscious of the fact that Mao’s mistakes were not due only to Mao; they were also the result of severe defects in systems and institutions: “Reform of the leadership system of the party and the state has fundamental significance that may affect the overall long-term stability of China.“535 On March 10, the People’s Daily published an editorial titled “Reversing the Verdict Is Unpopular,“ which was in accordance with the latest instructions from Mao Zedong. The article said that Deng Xiaoping claimed that he would not reverse the verdict, but once he returned to power he would relapse to his former capitalist course: “People like him never were Marxists. As pointed out by Chairman Mao, those people were democratic capitalists whose thoughts remained in the democratic revolutionary period.“536 The editorial was revised and approved by Yao Wenyuan, and it amounted to an open attack against Deng. As instructed by Mao Zedong, Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi from Peking University and Tsinghua University took part in a meeting of the Political Bureau on March 26 to criticize Deng Xiaoping in person. Chi, Xie and others dismissed Deng’s moves, such as exporting petroleum and introducing necessary technical equipment, as being wasteful, collaborative, Westernizing attempts to export the economic crisis. Deng Xiaoping was assailed as the head of all the old and new capitalist elements and all corrupt people both within and outside the party: he had always looked backwards and tried to restore retrogressive systems and institutions. Deng was a schemer and careerist. He had always opposed Maoism, and the class struggle. Deng had tried to advocate materialist incentives and propound his theory of 535. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 333.

536. The editorial said that in around the summer of last year (1976) there had been a rightist campaign: “The person who stirred up the trouble [Deng Xiaoping] objected to the

guideline of the class struggle. He distorted the basic political course of the party and denied the proletariat revolution in education, literature, and the arts; he repudiated

the socialistic revolution in science and technology; he denied combining the old, the middle-aged, and the young; he refuted new phenomena on various fronts of socialism;

he denied the proletariat Cultural Revolution, and he attempted to reverse the verdict

on the Cultural Revolution and point out its mistakes. The great leader Chairman Mao has recently pointed out, ’Reversing the verdict is unpopular.’ Chairman Mao’s words reflect the revolutionary people’s strong objection to the restoration of backward institutions and desire to carry on the revolutionary cause; they reveal the reactionary

nature of the capitalist roader who did not repent [Deng Xiaoping] and still tries to go against the tide of history.“ (People’s Daily, March 10, 1976.)

171

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

black cats and white cats. Zhang Chunqiao concluded that Deng Xiaoping was an opportunist — even worse than Trotsky.537 On the afternoon of March 26, the anti-Deng meeting of the Political Bureau was suddenly interrupted when Wang Hongwen announced that large-scale riots had broken out in Shanghai and Nanjing.538 Following instructions by the Jiang Qing clique, the Shanghai Wenhui Bao newspaper published an article, in which Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping were dismissed as “capitalist roaders who tried to restore capitalism and were once brought down and yet did not repent.“ This took the political struggle among high-level party members into the open and into society. It was this article that triggered the protests in Nanjing, in which slogans like “Protect Zhou Enlai, Bring Down Zhang Chunqiao“ were shouted. Yao Wenyuan read an express telegram by Lu Ying, editor in chief of the People’s Daily. Based on the results of the discussion by the Political Bureau, Yao Wenyuan drafted a telegram for the CPC Central Committee.539 Yao wrote in his journal that a number of large posters had appeared in Shanghai, bearing such slogans as “Expose Careerists Like Nikita Khrushchev“ and “Oppose the Attempt on the Supreme Leadership.“ These posters reflected the intensification of the class struggle. Every time the struggle reached a certain point, the reactionary force would protest and parade. Yao wrote: “Well, let the revolutionary masses see what the reactionary forces looked like. The Political Bureau was too blunt. When the Qingming Festival approached, it was discovered that in Nanjing, Beijing, and Taiyuan some people were trying to take advantage of this occasion of mourning to show their grief and sorrow for the

537. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 116–124. 538. Ibid., 126. 539. The CPC Central Committee’s telegram on March 27, 1976 stated the following: “First, it is known that in recent days, big posters with slogans have appeared that target the

leaders of the CPC Central Committee. This political incident was intended to cause

a split in the Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao and divert attention from

the campaign of criticizing Deng. You must take effective measures to cover up these posters and slogans. It is necessary to communicate with the masses that they should be on the alert for some people with ulterior motives who may attempt to expand the

impact of these actions by stirring up trouble and causing destructive actions. Second, the identity of the person responsible for this political incident has to be thoroughly

investigated. Third, the so-called last words of the late premier were nothing more than a counter-revolutionary rumor: this must be contradicted, and the source of the rumor

has to be traced and identified. Fourth, no one is allowed to attack the railroads.“(Ibid., 132.)

172

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

death of Zhou Enlai and to create social disturbances.“540 On March 29, more large posters appeared declaring “Bring Down Zhang Chunqiao, the Careerist and Schemer“ on Xinjiekou Street in Nanjing, Jiangsu Province. The same day, Hu Gongfu, a Anhui University Chemistry student; Xu Jinrong, a sewing machine factory worker; and Tang Hao, a Chinese teacher at No. 1 Middle School of Wuhu jointly posted a slogan: “How unfortunate that Xiaoping, who promotes the interests of the country and the people and who is to blame for nothing, should have suffered this mishap!“541 On March 30, Wang Hongwen said to an editor of the People’s Daily that the Nanjing Incident was targeted at the CPC Central Committee: those who put up the posters were trying to appeal to the public for their counter-revolutionary restoration of old institutions.542 According to Mao Yuanxin’s proposal, Hua Guofeng chaired an urgent meeting of six of the Political Bureau on the evening of March 31. Yao Wenyuan insisted on drafting an official notice. The next day, he wrote in his journal that the posters in Nanjing singled out Zhang Chunqiao: “It is clear that there is an underground capitalist command at work here.“543 Yao used all the tools of public opinion in his possession to provide biased information to the CPC Central Committee and Mao Zedong. During April, there occurred a surge of mass movements — notably the Tiananmen Square Incident — to mourn Premier Zhou, support Deng Xiaoping, and express opposition towards the Gang of Four, dictatorship, and the personality cult that existed for too long. This movement is regarded as the true voicing of the people’s opinion under special historical conditions. It was also a direct result of the movement against Deng Xiaoping and the rightist tendency to repudiate the Cultural Revolution personally launched by Mao Zedong. However, this situation was totally different from 10 years earlier — People in 1976 was sufficiently informed, mature, and shrewd. After 10 years of chaos and suffering, the people used the name of mourning for Premier Zhou to express their objection towards the Gang of Four. A poem posted in Tiananmen Square stated: “In sorrow, we hear ghosts wailing, and as we cry, jackals are laughing. In tears, we pay respect to our heroes who raised their eyebrows and pulled their swords from their sheaths.“ An ordinary individual stated to the People’s Daily: “China is no longer as it has been, and the Chinese are not as foolish as they once were. The feudalistic society of Emperor Qin Shi Huang no longer exists. We believe in Marxism and Leninism, and 540. Ibid., 133–134. 541. Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 558–559. 542. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1774. 543. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 144.

173

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

let the bookworms [meaning Jiang Qing and others] that castrated Marxism and Leninism go to hell.“544 In 1980, Deng’s explanation towards why this movement erupted was that 97% to 98% of the Chinese people, including party members, PLA members and the Chinese people, resented the crimes committed by the Gang of Four.545 On April 1, with the approval of Mao Zedong, the CPC Central Committee informed Jiangsu and other places in China that the Nanjing Incident was a political act that aimed to cause a division in the CPC Central Committee, headed by Chairman Mao, and divert the direction of the campaign against Deng. The Central Committee demanded an investigation into the person who was behind the incident and into the rumor makers.546 On the evening of April 1, according to Mao Yuanxin’s proposal, the Political Bureau had Hua Goufeng chaired an urgent meeting with five attendants, including Wang Hongwen, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan. Mao Yuanxin was also present and made a record of the meeting minutes.547 The meeting discussed the Nanjing Incident and the situation in other places across the country. It resolved that the CPC Central Committee had to issue a document announcing that the content of the supposed last words of Premier Zhou was just a rumor spread by enemies, who intended to sabotage the current class struggle. It was decided that there an investigation into the matter is needed so the committee would never swallow the bait.548 It was decided to expand the scope of the “Important Instructions of Chairman Mao“ and to further push the movement against Deng and rightist activities. In the early morning of April 2, Mao Yuanxin wrote a report on the op inion of the Political Bureau to Mao Zedong and received his approval.549 This was like pouring oil to the fire of the incidents that continued erupting across the country, and it led to the Tiananmen Square Incident in Beijing. It should be noted that the tarnishing of Deng Xiaoping and the campaign against him and the rightist political course were the true causes of the Tiananmen Square Incident. On April 2, Red Flag published “General Guidance on Restoring Capitalism — Analysis of the General Guideline of the Work in the Party and Country,“ which 544. Worker-peasant-soldier correspondents and staff correspondents of the People’s Daily, ”Counter-revolutionary Incident at the Tiananmen Square.”

545. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 349.

546. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1774. 547. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 144. 548. Ibid., 145. 549. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1774.

174

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

was written by Cheng Yue.550 On the afternoon of that day, there was a telephone call between Lu Ying and Yao Wenyuan, and the content was as follows: “We need to analyze this counter-revolutionary current. It seems that there is someone controlling. This rampant counter-revolutionary counter-current would not be popular among the people simply since it represents classes that are now in decline. There are capitalists at work here, and they make trouble whatever happens.“551 On April 3, Yao Wenyuan wrote in his journal that reactionary slogans had begun to appear in Beijing after Jiangsu and Zhejiang: “Yesterday [April 2], the crowds in the Tiananmen Square dramatically increased. They vented their dissatisfaction over the movement against Deng Xiaoping and the rightist tendency to reverse past verdicts in the name of mourning for Premier Zhou’s death. They made counter-revolutionary speeches and yelled counter-revolutionary slogans. Some even spoke openly against the CPC. This struggle is attacking on the dying China. It shows that if the capitalist roader got power, not only would the revolutionary achievements of socialism be lost but also the revolutionary achievements of democracy. In China, fierce struggles have continued, but there has been no thorough solution to the problems. Why not shoot a batch of counter-revolutionary elements? After all, dictatorship is not as graceful as embroidery.“552 The above is a good expression of modern dictatorship and the best evidence for the artificially manufactured Tiananmen Square Incident. It was also on April 3 that the People’s Daily published an article titled “Confession of the Restoring Forces — On an Article Created on the Order of the Capitalist Roader Who Would Repent“ by the Peking and Tsinghua University Criticism 550. The article said that “On the General Guideline of Work in the Party and in the Country“ used harsher words and thoroughly exposed the fact that using the Three Instructions

as a guideline as advocated by the capitalist roader in the party (Deng Xiaoping) was a recipe for comprehensively restoring capitalism: “To achieve the Four Modernizations

is only one item among the tasks that need to be fulfilled to meet the basic guidelines of our party. Although this is a great task, it is not our basic task or the only task of our

party. In the eyes of the capitalist roader in the party who will not repent, the only task for the present, the next 25 years, and even throughout the whole socialistic period is production and construction — no class struggles or the revolution and dictatorship of

the proletariat. His so-called Four Modernizations are nothing more than a blueprint

for comprehensively restoring capitalism. Our party, our army, and the Chinese people

at large will surely fight against such a revisionist route.“ (Originally printed in the Red Flag, issue 4, on April 1, 1976; reprinted in the People’s Daily on April 5, 1976.) 551. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 157. 552. Ibid., 158–159.

175

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Team. It claimed that the capitalist roader who would not repent in the party (Deng Xiaoping) instructed an article to be written titled “On the General Outline of the Work of the Party and the Country“ the previous year, when rightism prevailed. That article had advocated that the guidance of the Three Instructions should operate as a general outline not only for present work but also for the next 25 years. The People’s Daily article spoke of the article ordered by Deng as a huge poisonous weed spread over 10,000 characters as a typical negative teaching material — a confession by the restoring forces. On the evening of April 3, Deng Xiaoping appeared among the crowds in Tiananmen Square. The people shouted: “Criticizing Deng Is Against the People’s Will!“553 This became the evidence that incriminated Deng as being the mastermind behind the Tiananmen Square Incident. April 4 was the day of the Qingming Festival. Over 2 million people in Beijing and other places gathered in Tiananmen Square to mourn the death of Premier Zhou.554 The people shouted that whoever was against Premier Zhou should be struck down. In the afternoon, the Political Bureau held a meeting in the Great Hall of the People. As Wu De noted, based on incomplete statistics, over 30,000 wreaths had been sent to Tiananmen Square since April 1 and over 5 million people had taken part in the memorial services: “We did not expect that there would be so many people who would gather in Tiananmen Square mourning for Premier Zhou’s death. Our investigation concluded that there were no illegal organizations behind this nor were there any leaders behind this action. Hua Guofeng argued that before in-depth investigations were concluded, no one should be arrested, so no to escalate the event. In addition, the wreaths in Tiananmen Square should not be removed to avoid any misunderstanding on the part of the people.555 However, Yao Wenyuan said: “As far as I understand, what the so-called masses demand is not just that the wreaths stay there a few days longer: they also want to overthrow this Political Bureau and the rule of the CPC.“ Jiang Qing said: “Those wreaths are demonstration provoked by our class enemies. Whoever budges this issue is rightist and a capitulant!“556 Consequently, Yao Wenyuan ordered Lu Ying of the People’s Daily to furnish internal materials and submitted to the Political Bureau. Coerced by Jiang Qing and others, Hua Guofeng gave way. He announced solemnly: “To prevent a handful of class enemies creating trouble in Tiananmen 553. Ibid., 163. 554. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 297. 555. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 170–172. 556. Ibid., 172, 175.

176

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Square and to maintain normal order in the capital, the Political Bureau has resolved the following. 1. Wreaths, elegiac scrolls, and all posters are to be immediately removed. 2. All counter-revolutionary elements that have posted reactionary poems and made reactionary speeches at Tiananmen Square should immediately turn themselves in to the public security bureau for leniency. All those who continue their counter-revolutionary agitations and who flee to escape due punishment will be punished once arrested. 3. No one is allowed to send any wreaths, elegiac scrolls, and big or small posters for any reason to Tiananmen Square. Any violations will be punishable by law.557 The Political Bureau held an emergency meeting without Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, and Li Xiannian,558 whom been excluded from the central decisionmaking process. That meeting defined the Tiananmen Square Incident as a counterrevolutionary action, in which counter-revolutionary forces had attempted to agitate the masses to fight against Chairman Mao and the CPC Central Committee and to disrupt the campaign against Deng Xiaoping.559 Zhang Chunqiao said: “Without the manipulation and orders of those in power, would those people have dared stage such a counter-revolutionary incident?“ Zhang stated that Deng Xiaoping was at Tiananmen Square too. Jiang Qing said no wonder that there were so many people at Tiananmen Square since the counter-revolutionaries had turned savage. Mao Yuanxin asked: “Should this be reported to Chairman Mao?“ Jiang Qing replied: “Yes, of course. Deng Xiaoping is to be blamed for.“560 Mao Yuanxin’s notes at that time read: “It seems to have been planned. Deng Xiaoping made many preparations in manipulating public opinion from 1974 to 1975. Today’s incident was planned by Deng Xiaoping long ago. The nature of the action is clear: it is a counter-revolutionary incident.“561 Thus, Mao Yuanxin had defined Deng Xiaoping as a counter-revolutionary. At five o’clock, April 5, Mao Yuanxin wrote a report to Mao Zedong concerning the large scale gathering in Tiananmen Square; counter-revolutionary speeches were 557. Ibid. 558. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 149.

559. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1775. 560. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 177–178. 561. Ibid., 180.

177

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

being made and even direct attacks on Chairman Mao, which was unprecedented since the founding of the PRC: “This is apparently a planned and organized incident, which took place in other places as well as Beijing. It is an on-going and developing spread of counter-revolutionary rumors to manipulate public opinion. Last year, Deng Xiaoping argued that the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius was an attack against Premier Zhou and that the criticism against empiricism was also directed at Premier Zhou: this was exposed by Ma Tianshui, secretary of the CPC Shanghai Committee. Deng Xiaoping led to spread of many rumors, which are now rampant. The comrades at the Political Bureau have concluded that it is good when class enemies make trouble since they are able to rely on rumors and the figure of the dead premier to agitate people who are unaware of the truth. There seems to be an underground ‘Petofi club,’ which organizes activities in a planned way.“562 Mao Yuanxin provided essential materials to Mao so that he could strike at Deng. In the early morning, as decided in the emergency Political Bureau meeting, the concerned departments removed all the wreaths, banners, and memorial posters in Tiananmen Square and arrested some individuals there. In the late morning, people at Tiananmen Square shouted “Return our wreaths“ and “Return our friends,“ while clashing against the authorities. At the same time, Hua Guofeng held an emergency meeting in Zhejiang Hall of the Great Hall of the People with Deng Xiaoping and Li Xiannian presence. When pictures of a large broadcasting car being smashed and burned being shown, Zhang Chunqiao and others yelled at Deng Xiaoping: “The counterrevolutionaries have turned savage thanks to your support! This riot was your creation; you are its mastermind; you are the Nagy of China.“ Deng remained silent. A dispute arose at the meeting to whether the militia and the armed forces should bear weapons. Zhang Chunqiao said that a class struggle was a life-anddeath fight without any moral principles. Jiang Qing argued for bearing weapons. She said: “Without weapons, how can our militiamen and soldiers destroy the enemies?“ Wang Hongwen disputed this: “You can authorize taking weapons and shooting at people! Don’t count me in on that. Anyone that dares issuing such order, please sign your name here now.“ Hua Guofeng proposed that Mao Yuanxin should immediately report the situation in Tiananmen Square to Chairman Mao. Whatever measures to be taken should be decided by the chairman.563 The same day, when Mao Yuanxin reported to Mao Zedong about the Political Bureau meeting, he said that most of the comrades in the bureau believed that the 562. Ibid., 180–183. 563. Ibid., 192–198.

178

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

Tiananmen Square Incident was an organized, premeditated counter-revolutionary riot — just like that took place in Hungary — and that all was schemed and implemented by Deng Xiaoping. When Mao asked for evidence, Mao Yuanxin replied that Deng had been very active in recent days. Deng asked his children and secretaries to collect information everywhere, he even visited Tiananmen Square himself to show his support to the reactionaries. Mao Yuanxin then asked: “Should we use weapons?“ Mao Zedong answered: “Yes. A man of honor both reasons things out and uses force.“564 It was with those words that pushed Mao Zedong to officially order the use of weapons. At noon, Mao Yuanxin communicated Mao Zedong’s instructions to the Political Bureau. He said that when Chairman Mao listened to the bureau’s report on how to deal with the Tiananmen Square Incident, he gave the following instructions. First, the Tiananmen Square Incident was a premeditated organized counterrevolutionary riot. Second, the Political Bureau must take resolute measures to quell the riot and when necessary, weapons could be use; however, field armies should not be deployed and guns should not be used. Third, considering the fact that Deng Xiaoping was responsible for this counter-revolutionary incident, he is to be isolated for investigation.565 Hua Guofeng presided over the meeting at which the Political Bureau unanimously supported and adopted Mao’s instructions. This shows how the only source of information for Mao Zedong as supreme leader and ultimate decision maker was his nephew, Mao Yuanxin. It was based on the information provided by Mao Yuanxin that Mao Zedong made the final decision to take action in dealing with the Tiananmen Square Incident. According to the material submitted to the CPC Central Committee by Zhang Yufeng in October 1980, the discussion results of the Political Bureau were submitted to Chairman Mao for final deliberation. Being extremely weak, Chairman Mao could do no more than nod to show that messages were well conveyed. It is perhaps inappropriate and unwise to blame a dying patient, who was unable to speak and eat, bedridden, and had difficulty breathing, for the series of mistaken resolutions made by the CPC Central Committee.566 This was the political tragedy of Mao Zedong as an individual. He had enjoyed fighting against other people all his life. Even when the halo around his head began to fade as he lay in bed dying in pain, he still dominated the historical stage in political decision making as the supreme leader. The system he created — especially the system of chairmanship and life tenure of the chairman of the CPC Central Committee — became the fundamental cause of 564. Ibid., 218–219. 565. Ibid., 223. 566. Ibid., 219–220.

179

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

the series of mistakes he made in his later years. This was also a political tragedy for the CPC as the ruling party since it put the destiny of a huge country populated with 1 billion in the hands of a dying man. The party had to pay a tremendously high price for this; all paid in April 1976. The same day, the Political Bureau decided to take action in Tiananmen Square. As scheduled, Wu De (member of the Political Bureau and first secretary of the CPC Beijing Committee) delivered a speech at 6 p.m., and at 8 p.m. the militiamen were called out. Wu De, Ni Zhifu (second secretary of the Beijing CPC Committee), and Wu Zhong (commander of the Beijing Garrison and secretary of the Beijing CPC committee) were in charge of this action, Wu Zhong was appointed the onthe-scene commander.567 At 6:30 pm, Wu De delivered a speech on the radio, saying “In Tiananmen Square, some evil people were causing a disturbance and carrying out counterrevolutionary activities. We need to examine the reactionary nature of this political incident and expose their intrigues.“ Wu ordered the people to immediately leave the square and remain clear-headed despite efforts being made to hoodwink them. At 8 p.m., Hua Guofeng and Chen Xilian, who were in the People’s Auditorium, called Wu De, asking why the militiamen had not been called out.568 At 9:30 p.m., 10,000 militiamen and 3,000 policemen (an additional force of over 20,000 militiamen and five battalions of troops were standing by) closed in on Tiananmen Square,569 beating up those remained and arresting 388. Thorough investigations concluded that no one there was a counter-revolutionary.570 Later, Wu De announced that when Tiananmen Square was cleaned up, no one had died in the process.571 From late in the evening of April 5 to the early morning of the 6, some members of the Political Bureau listened to a report made by Beijing leaders, and the meeting defined the Tiananmen Square Incident as “counter-revolutionary and violent.“ An additional 30,000 militiamen and nine battalions were mobilized to stand by.572 It was proposed at the meeting that this incident be rapidly communicated to the whole country and be openly reported.573 Mao Yuanxin wrote a report on the 567. Zhu, et al. eds., Wu De’s Oral History: A Record of the Ten-Year History of Storms, Some Personal Work Experiences in Beijing, 215.

568. Ibid., 214–215. 569. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 298–299. 570. Xinhua News, November 8, 1978. 571. Zhu, et al. eds., Wu De’s Oral History: A Record of the Ten-Year History of Storms, Some Personal Work Experiences in Beijing, 216.

572. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 299. 573. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1775.

180

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

developments to Mao Zedong at 3 a.m. The report affirmed the action taken on the evening of April 5, and it concluded that the incident was downright counterrevolutionary: “To have demons dancing in broad daylight in Tiananmen Square is something that has never been allowed in history. We finally achieved success, but this incident has taught us a good lesson. The public security bureau should find the underground command of this action. And we should heighten our vigilance against bigger struggles.“574 At 11 a.m., Mao Zedong commented on Mao Yuanxin’s report, agreeing with the decision made by the Political Bureau.575 Mao Zedong said: “It has greatly boosted our morale. It’s good, good, good.“576 On the afternoon of the same day, Jiang Qing reported to Mao Zedong that this whole action was to quell the living person (referring to Mao Zedong) by means of a dead (referring to Zhou Enlai): “Deng Xiaoping is behind all of this. I want to press charges. I suggest kicking Deng Xiaoping out of the party.“ Mao offered no comment on this.577 On April 7, Hua Guofeng presided over a meeting of the Political Bureau. It was attended by 11 people (Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan, Ji Dengkui, Wu De, Chen Xilian, Chen Yonggui, Wu Guixian, and Ni Zhifu), accounting for half of the 22 members of the 10th Political Bureau (including alternate members). Mao Yuanxin was also present. It was proposed that Yao Wenyuan should have the reporters of the People’s Daily write on-the-scene reports about the Tiananmen Square Incident, which should be presented to Mao Zedong by Mao Yuanxin. On the morning of April 7, when Mao Zedong heard Mao Yuanxin’s report, he affirmed the measures taken by the Political Bureau in handling the Tiananmen Square Incident. Mao Zedong proposed that the Political Bureau pass two resolutions. One was to appoint Hua Guofeng as first vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee and premier of the State Council. The other was to depose Deng Xiaoping from all official positions both within and outside the party — his behaviour in future would decide if he could retain his party membership. Mao Zedong said that these two resolutions and reports about the Tiananmen Square Incident should be published and that the following points should be emphasized: first, it had occurred in the national capital; second, it had occurred in Tiananmen Square; and third, a good deal of arson and beatings had taken place. The description 574. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 228–231. 575. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1776. 576. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 232. 577. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1776–1777.

181

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

of the nature of the incident had thus undergone a change.578 On the evening of April 7, a meeting of the Political Bureau was held in the People’s Auditorium. Mao Yuanxin passed Mao Zedong’s instruction according to Zhu De, Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian, and Su Zhenhua, who should not attend. Later, Mao Yuanxin gave a further notification whereby all should participate in the meeting except for Su Zhenhua.579 Mao Yuanxin communicated these instructions to the Political Bureau from Mao Zedong. The bureau unanimously passed a resolution based on Mao Zedong’s directions to remove Deng Xiaoping from official positions within and outside the party, though he could retain his party membership if well behaved. Hua Guofeng was appointed the first vice president of the CPC Central Committee and premier of the State Council. Mao Zedong emphasized that Hua Guofeng should be the first vice chairman of the party; Mao also stated that there should be a resolution to the effect that Hua Guofeng would become his official successor. In June 1977, Li Xiannian explained why Mao Zedong had named the first vice chairman in this manner. Mao Zedong knew that he would soon die and that then, there would be upheaval in the bid for power. In this way, Hua Guofeng was legally announced as the successor to the supreme leader, and if anyone else attempted to grab the supreme power, it would be contravening the law.580 In August 1977, Hua Guofeng explained at the 11th CPC National Congress that it was the first time for the post of first vice chairman to be created in the history of the party. This strategic decision made by Chairman Mao guaranteed the leadership of the party and state such that even when Chairman Mao fell critically ill and died, supreme authority would not be stolen by the Gang of Four.581 Mao Zedong agreed with publishing the report and the speech of Wu De. At 8 p.m. on April 7, it was broadcast by the Central People’s Broadcasting Station and published in all the major newspapers and magazines around the country the next day. On the same day, Yao Wenyuan wrote in his diary describing the incident was a crucial moment to maintain the dictatorship of the proletariat and bring down the leader of the counter-revolutionary incident (Deng Xiaoping); it was also an opportunity to mobilize tens of millions of people to struggle and show the boldness 578. Ibid., 1776. 579. Zhu, et al. eds., Wu De’s Oral History: A Record of the Ten-Year History of Storms, Some Personal Work Experiences in Beijing, 217.

580. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 894–895.

581. Hua Guofeng’s “Report to the 11th National Congress of the CPC,“ was delivered on August 12, 1977, and approved on August 18, 1977.

182

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

and resolution of Chairman Mao as a revolutionary of the proletarian class: “I fully supported the resolution of the chairman. He specially noted that the ’Compiled Summaries of the Situation’ in the recent four issues of the People’s Daily had been revised and published by himself as a historical document.“582 Apparently, the information provided by Yao Wenyuan to Mao Zedong and the Political Bureau became important in decision making. Yao monopolized the information intended for domestic and international audiences. Deng Xiaoping heard the news on the broadcasting station on the evening of April 7. On April 8, Deng Xiaoping wrote to Mao Zedong and the CPC Central Committee to show his full support for the committee’s decision: “I express my heartfelt gratitude to the chairman and the Central Committee for allowing me to stay in the party.“583 However, Deng did not know that Mao Zedong had not agreed with Jiang Qing’s suggestion of kicking him out of the party. It was not until 1981 that the CPC Central Committee handed down a fair verdict on Deng and the Tiananmen Square Incident.584 In September 1977, Deng Xiaoping said: “The resolution on my part in the 1976 Tiananmen Square Incident was also approved by Comrade Mao Zedong. The Tiananmen Square Incident involved so many people and was defined as counter-revolutionary, but that was so wrong! They accused me of being behind the Tiananmen Square Incident, but the fact was that I was totally isolated at the time.“585 Why did Deng Xiaoping allow himself to be ousted instead of solving the problem of the Gang of Four when he criticized them at the behest of Mao Zedong? Ye Jianying offered some explanation at the Political Bureau meeting on October 8, 1976. Ye said that Chairman Mao was the first to refer this group as the Gang of Four, but that was not a criticism as such. The Gang of Four took advantage of the chairman’s illness, making use of his power; however, it was not only the Gang of Four, but also Mao Yuanxin. When Deng Xiaoping was attacked, the chairman 582. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 234. 583. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 150.

584. In June 27, 1981, the CPC Central Committee resolved: “At that time, the Political Bureau and Comrade Mao made incorrect judgments related to the Tiananmen Square

Incident and wrongly deprived Comrade Deng Xiaoping of all official positions within

and outside the party.“ (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee

comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 814.)

585. Deng Xiaoping Study Team under the Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Memoir of Deng Xiaoping, 170.

183

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

was so ill that he could only to listen to the reports and minutes prepared by Mao Yuanxin, who would bridge the communication between the chairman and the Political Bureau. Mao Yuanxin was very opinionated and made additions to or even distorted the chairman’s words. From the above, it is clear that Mao Yuanxin played a crucial role. He provided Mao Zedong with both information and suggestions. As a result, the clique actually consisted of a Gang of Five. Mao Yuanxin was the “emperor’s father“ — an important figure in the Political Bureau, though he was not even a member of the CPC Central Committee. Deeply influenced by the history of feudal emperors, Mao Zedong breached the rules and regulations of the party by placing his own nephew in important positions. In addition, Mao Zedong held supreme authority, and he would not allow anyone in the party to challenge the theory nor any decisions related to the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, when Deng Xiaoping started to make sweeping plans to reform and overhaul that revolution and remedy its mistakes and also when the Tiananmen Square Incident occurred, it was inevitable that Deng would once again be politically deposed by Mao.586 What distinguished Mao Zedong from Jiang Qing was that Mao allowed Deng to retain his membership, which was something that Deng had not expected. Mao Zedong also asked Wang Dongxing to protect Deng. On April 8, the CPC issued a directive via telephone. It demanded that largescale mass gatherings be held in all the provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions so that the resolutions of the CPC Central Committee could be announced. Major leaders would deliver speeches to show clearly understanding of their 586. Deng Rong believed that Mao Zedong adopted a mixed attitude toward Deng Xiaoping.

Mao appointed Deng as one of his potential successors before the Cultural Revolution,

and he did so again when Deng Xiaoping was reinstated during the Cultural Revolution. It could be said that Mao believed Deng to be politically astute, talented, and a good commander. Mao highly appreciated Deng and had high expectations of him. Nonetheless, Deng and Mao failed to agree about the Cultural Revolution, which

was a great disappointment for Mao. His disappointment was bitter, painful, and sad. Deng conducted a comprehensive overhauling of the merits of the Cultural Revolution, and he repudiated it through his actions. As a result, Mao rebuked Deng, though he did

not think of deposing Deng again. Mao always clung to the belief that Deng admitted

his mistakes and would change. Mao did not expect that Deng’s attitude would be vastly different from during the early period of the Cultural Revolution. When the

Tiananmen Square Incident arose, it was a tremendous political disturbance, and it

prompted Mao to topple Deng again. (Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 482–483.)

184

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

position.587 The next day, gatherings and parades were organized in all major cities around the country to show support for the resolution of the CPC Central Committee in expelling Deng Xiaoping. This was a political declaration in compliance with orders, and it reflects one of the characteristics of China at that time: when the CPC Central Committee was correct, the whole country was correct; when the Central Committee made mistakes, the whole country made mistakes. However, the Tiananmen Square Incident educated and awoke the people: putting an end to the Cultural Revolution as quickly as possible began to exert a strong appeal. This incident laid a solid social foundation for demolishing the Gang of Four six months later. That was the punishment that the Gang of Four deserved: crimes do not go unpunished. The People’s Daily on April 8 published an article that characterized the Tiananmen Square Incident as “a premeditated, planned, organized, counterrevolutionary political incident.“ The article also argued that the incident began through efforts to make Deng Xiaoping into a kind of Chinese Imre Nagy.588 It was also on April 8 that Yao Wenyuan wrote in his journal: “The situation is generally good in most places. The counter-revolutionaries still wreak havoc, though that was to be anticipated. Once Deng Xiaoping fell, the landlords, rich farmers, reactionaries, corrupt people, and rightist forces howled in desperation. There is nothing strange about that. We needed only to quell the disturbances stirred up by them. The problems still exist in the party.“589 On April 10, the People’s Daily published an editorial titled “Great Victory,“ which claimed that Deng Xiaoping was the greatest, most relentless capitalist 587. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 300. 588. The article argued that during the first days of April, a handful of class enemies

launched a premeditated, planned, organized counter-revolutionary incident in Tiananmen Square in the name of mourning Premier Zhou as part of the Qingming

Festival. They delivered public reactionary speeches, posted reactionary poems and slogans, handed out reactionary fliers, and called for setting up counter-revolutionary

organizations. They used allusions and expressly counter-revolutionary language.

They shouted: “The era of Emperor Qin Shi Huang is over.“ They upheld the flag

of Deng Xiaoping and targeted their attacks against the great leader Chairman Mao. They tried to create a rift in the CPC Central Committee, headed by Chairman Mao, and to turn the current campaign against Deng and rightist whitewashing activities

and engage in counter-revolutionary actions. (Worker-peasant-soldier correspondents and staff correspondents of the People’s Daily, “Counter-revolutionary Incident at the Tiananmen Square.”)

589. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 1, 237.

185

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

roader in the party. The article also presented Mao Zedong’s political evaluation and definition of Deng, according to which Deng failed to understand Marxism and Leninism and he represented the interests of the capitalist class: “His claim about ’never reversing a verdict’ was just unreliable.“590 The article announced an important piece of background information: based on the counter-revolutionary Tiananmen Square Incident and the recent actions of Deng Xiaoping, the CPC Central Committee had decided that the problem of Deng had become a confrontational conflict. Accordingly, Deng was to lose all official positions. Deng, youngest among the old-generation revolutionaries, was once again demoted from political power, and this time the move appeared to be permanent.591 However, no one, including Deng himself, would ever have imagined that just a year later, he would once again miraculously ascend onto China’s political stage. On April 18, the People’s Daily published the editorial “What Did the Tiananmen Square Incident Tell Us?“ This described Deng Xiaoping as a representative of the interests of the new and old capitalist elements within and outside the party as well as the interests of landlords, rich farmers, counter-revolutionaries, corrupt people,

590. The article argued that over a long period, Deng Xiaoping had opposed Chairman Mao, Maoism, and the revolutionary route of the proletariat as instructed by Chairman Mao. Together with Liu Shaoqi, Deng had advocated revisionism before the Cultural

Revolution; during the early Cultural Revolution, Deng and Liu had quelled the

masses in an effort to spread reactionary capitalism. After being criticized by the masses, Deng expressed his willingness to repent and declared that he would “never reverse the verdict.“ Chairman Mao saved Deng by giving him a new chance to work

in the government. However, instead of benefiting from Chairman Mao’s education and help, Deng relapsed as soon as he had regained his former power: he attempted

to reverse the verdict on the Cultural Revolution and ascribe many poor outcomes to the Cultural Revolution. Deng drafted a revisionist guideline titled “Following the

Three Instructions;“ Deng promoted counter-revolutionary revisionism and launched

a campaign for a rightist judgment of the Cultural Revolution. Chairman Mao had sufficient foresight to detect Deng’s attempt to make a different judgment about the

Cultural Revolution. Chairman Mao stated that Deng “did not support the class struggle. He never mentioned that as a guideline...He does not understand Marxism

and Leninism, and he represents the capitalist class...His statement about ’never reversing the verdict’ is just unreliable.“ Chairman Mao’s words were accurate and

revealed Deng as being of the reactionary class. (Editorial of People’s Daily, “Great Victory.“)

591. Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 375.

186

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

and rightist forces: Deng was the head of all those counter-revolutionaries.592 The article repeated Mao Zedong’s words in his letter to Jiang Qing in July 1966: if rightist forces in China launched a coup, they would not be successful or may only achieve a temporary victory since all the revolutionaries, who represent over 90% of the people’s interests, would not tolerate it. Mao’s assumption was that Jiang Qing and the other rebels — rather than Deng Xiaoping — represented the interests of over 90% of the people. As a result, Deng’s cause would not last long. However, 6 months later, Jiang would become the most short-lived political figure after Mao’s death. Mao was correct in his political logic, but his prediction proved false. On April 28, the People’s Daily published “Deng Xiaoping and the Tiananmen

592. The article claimed that Deng Xiaoping was the biggest relentless capitalist roader in the party: “He is the leader of the rightist whitewashing tendency. The counter-

revolutionary revisionism he preaches represents the interests of the new and old

capitalist elements within and outside the party as well as the landlords, rich farmers, counter-revolutionaries, corrupt people, and rightist forces that have not changed despite our educative efforts. As a result, capitalist forces and all our class enemies

pin their hopes on the restoration of Deng Xiaoping. When Deng Xiaoping preached

his rightist whitewashing theory last summer, those people became so excited.

When the campaign against the rightist whitewashing theory and Deng Xiaoping was launched, those people voiced their grievances and even conducted counterrevolutionary disruptive activities in public. This meant that the struggle against the rightist whitewashing theory had struck a nerve, and the capitalists would surely make

a desperate struggle and launch counterattacks. As a capitalist roader in the party,

Deng Xiaoping became the leader of the capitalistic class and the major force in trying to restore capitalism in China with the aim of beating the proletariat. Chairman Mao was clearly aware of this. Last year [1975], a few people in Tsinghua University [Liu

Bing and others] wrote a letter accusing Chairman Mao. Chairman Mao immediately recognized that Deng Xiaoping was behind the act and that Deng was staging a fullout attack against the proletariat. Chairman Mao pointed out scathingly, ’The problem

of Tsinghua is not isolated. It gives us a glimpse of the current class struggle.’ The

development of the class struggle aptly demonstrated the veracity of Chairman Mao’s

words. The letter of accusation from Tsinghua University and the Tiananmen Square Counter-revolutionary Incident have a deep political background and they reflect the

class struggle, but they were all due to Deng Xiaoping. Our struggle with Deng Xiaoping

is a fierce class struggle.“ (Editorial of People’s Daily, “What Did the Tiananmen Square Incident Tell Us?“)

187

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Square Counter-revolutionary Incident,“ an article by Liang Xiao593 whose publication had been approved by Yao Wenyuan on April 22. Liang proposed that it was necessary to concentrate on criticizing Deng Xiaoping as the general orchestrator of counter-revolutionary public opinion.594 What was the Cultural Revolution? What was the nature of the Cultural Revolution? Yao Wenyuan provided the best explanation for this. On May 7, Yao said to Chen Jide, a member of the writing team of the Shanghai CPC Committee, that the Cultural Revolution was about violence: “The Tiananmen Square Incident was about violence. Future struggles will also take the form of violence to solve problems.“595 In the middle of the campaign against Deng Xiaoping and rightist whitewashing activities, China was once more in a state of turmoil. Wide-scale 593. The article argued that the occurrence of the Tiananmen Square Counter-revolutionary Political Incident was the result of fierce struggles between two classes, two political

directions, and two guidelines. The incident exposed the hideous nature of the counter-

revolutionary capitalists in the party; it was an inevitable outcome of Deng Xiaoping’s

campaign to whitewash revisionism, and it was a dying performance of the corrupt, declining capitalist class. A small number of class enemies had initiated a counterrevolutionary riot in renowned Tiananmen Square to overthrow the dictatorship of the

proletariat and to restore capitalism in China. This was Deng Xiaoping’s dream, plan, and purpose behind promoting rightist whitewashing the previous year, and it was the class nature of the counter-revolutionary revisionism he preached. (Liang, “Deng Xiaoping and the Tiananmen Square Counter-revolutionary Incident.“)

594. This is based on the records of telephone calls made by Yao Wenyuan to Lu Ying, editor in chief of the People’s Daily. “Deng Xiaoping’s Revisionism and the Counter-

revolutionary Incident of Tiananmen Square“ was written by Liang Xiao. It was concise, and in political terms what he wrote was factually accurate: “The party is conducting

class analysis. However, criticism should be of an allusive nature. Fundamentally speaking, Deng Xiaoping represents their interests. This article should help the people

recognize that the cause of the incident was Deng Xiaoping. Since July, August, and

September of last year, some rumors have been circulating, but they were fabricated by Deng. Therefore, it is necessary to concentrate on criticizing Deng. The theme should

be focused, and the title should be concise. It is necessary to reconsider points that have

been emphasized. It is acceptable to describe Deng as a general manager of a counterrevolutionary rumor company.“ (Central Special Case Group, “Proof of the Crimes

Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.3,” September 1977.)

595. Article 46 of the “Indictment against Yao Wenyuan” by the Special Procuratorate under the Supreme People’s Procuratorate.

188

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

activities were launched by the secret police in major cities to arrest counterrevolutionaries — even though this was in blatant violation of the 1975 Constitution, which declared that no citizen could be arrested without the ruling of the People’s Court or the approval of the public security bureau. On May 16, the People’s Daily, Red Flag, and PLA Daily jointly published the editorial “The Cultural Revolution Shines Forever — In Memory of the CPC Notice Promulgated on May 16, 1966.“ The article stated that Deng Xiaoping was a leading revisionist roader, just like Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao. On May 18, the People’s Daily published an article titled “There Are Capitalist Elements in the Party — An Analysis of the Tiananmen Square Counter-revolutionary Incident,“ written by Liang Xiao. This article was the work of the writing team of the People’s Daily in collaboration with Liang Xiao, and the title was formulated according to Yao Wenyuan’s declaration that there was a capitalist agent within the party. Yao made careful revisions to the article and personally added the point that Deng Xiaoping was the one who had organized the counter-revolutionary political incident.596 On June 28, Zhang Chunqiao told the Central CPC Workshop that the April 5 counter-revolutionary incident sent an important message to members of the CPC, the PLA, and the Chinese people: “The class struggle still exists, and capitalist roaders maintain their capitalist course. All revolutionaries should cast away their innocent illusions that the world has become peaceful. The reason Deng Xiaoping dared to put up such resistance is that he has many followers. Some speak up publicly for him; some stay hidden and yet release poisonous arrows. We should carry on the political struggle against the rightist whitewashing activities — and mostly against Deng Xiaoping — to the end. We should launch more, larger-scale actions against the counter-revolutionaries in our country. If we don’t achieve it this year, we will continue it next year. If one year isn’t enough, we’ll take two years, three years, and — if necessary — five years [to 1981] or 10 years [to 1986].“ Following the political logic of the class struggle according to Zhang Chunqiao, Cultural Revolution will have to go on for another 10 years in China. In July, a national planning meeting was held about reducing the output of major industrial products in 1976. From January to May of that year, steel production fell short by 1.23 million tons; there was also a decrease in production of chemical fertilizers and cotton, and financial revenues fell by 2 billion yuan.597 The campaign against Deng and the rightist whitewashing tendency resulted in 596. Central Special Case Group, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.3,“ September 1977.

597. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 292.

189

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

political interference in normal economic activities; this was similar to what had happened with the movement against Lin Biao and Confucius in 1974. China was plunged from booming into recession. There was a 10.3% difference recorded in the GDP between 1975 and 1976, 8.7% and –1.6% respectively. The growth rate of industrial added value also decreased from 16.0% in 1975 to –3.1% in 1976 — a fall of 19.1%.598 The Gang of Four had become the greatest political impediment to China’s economic development. The Cultural Revolution was the biggest political restraint to China’s drive toward modernization. Although Mao Zedong had expelled Deng Xiaoping, he sent Wang Dongxing to protect Deng.599 No one understand the reason behind this political decision. For his part, Deng did not offer any explanation. It is, however, noteworthy that in protecting Deng, Mao was protecting the most important talented in China. There would have been no economic reform and opening-up without Deng.

Mao Zedong’s Last Words and Death As the victor on China’s political stage, Mao Zedong never thought that his final triumph would be that of toppling Deng Xiaoping. It was ironic, however, that that move laid a solid foundation among the Chinese people for the subsequent downfall of the Jiang Qing clique and for Deng to stage his own comeback.600 Mao, though, paid a heavy price for this victory. Sick and advanced in years, Mao Zedong sustained a severe blow in dealing with Deng Xiaoping and the Tiananmen Square Incident. His condition continued to worsen, and he became extremely fragile. Tortured by the severity of his illness and pain, Mao even lost consciousness several times. Most of the time, he was obliged to use an oxygen inhaler. If Mao was to meet a foreign guest, the medical 598. National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004), 11.

599. Deng Xiaoping recalled: “The Gang of Four just had to bring me down and — more than

that — persecute me to death. I lost my official position, but not my CPC membership,

thanks to Chairman Mao. Chairman Mao sent a special cadre [Wang Dongxing] and a special force to protect me, and he announced that no one was to intervene: that is

to say, the Gang of Four should not interfere.“ (Deng Xiaoping Study Team under the

Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Memoir of Deng Xiaoping, 169.)

600. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 814.

190

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

staff would hide the oxygen tank behind a curtain and return it once the guest had left, allowing Mao to use the inhaler again.601 Nonetheless, Mao did not succumb to his disease but insisted meeting foreign visitors. He met the following guests: U.S. President Nixon on February 23; Kaysone Phomvihane, leader of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, on March 17; Vice President Mubarak of Egypt on April 19; New Zealand Prime Minister Robert Muldoon on April 30; Lee Kuan Yew, prime minister of Singapore, on May 12; and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, former prime minister of Pakistan, on May 24. When Mao Zedong met Bhutto, he was barely able to stand. He had to sit on the sofa while extending his welcome to Bhutto, the meeting lasted only 10 minutes.602 Why did Mao Zedong insist on receiving the foreign visitors? He did this for domestic and international reasons, but mostly it was for domestic considerations. The future of China then hinged on Mao as an individual. His physical condition and ability to remain at the helm were both very sensitive political matters. It was only by continuing to meet foreign visitors that he could deliver the message to people at home and abroad that Mao Zedong was still alive and China was stable. Mao was acutely aware of this situation and felt that he had no choice in the matter. People in China saw the pictures of Mao receiving foreign guests — unaware that Mao already had one foot in the grave and could pass away at any moment.603 In addition, Mao intended to demonstrate to the party, the PLA, and the Chinese people his political trust in and support towards Hua Guofeng by including Hua in meetings with foreign guests. On the evening of April 30, as Mao Zedong was listening to Hua Guofeng’s report about talks with foreign visitors, he wrote: “Take your time. Don’t hurry... Follow past guidelines...I am relying on you to do the job. My heart is at rest.“604 This statement was believed to reflect the true thoughts of Chairman Mao: Mao had not only chosen Hua as his successor, he also officially entrusted the power of ruling the country to Hua, who was well aware of his role. If the Gang of Four dared to distort those words of Chairman Mao’s, they were in fact challenging Hua, and would be doomed in such attempts. Early in June, Mao Zedong suffered a myocardial infarction. He underwent 601. Gu and Du, The Last Seven Years of Mao Zedong, 284. 602. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1778. 603. From 1971 to 1976, Mao Zedong fell critically ill several times, and for him death was almost like a shadow, threatening this old man in decrepit health. (Gu and Du, The Last Seven Years of Mao Zedong, 282.)

604. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 538.

191

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

emergency treatment, which took him out of immediate danger. The Chinese government officially announced that Mao would no longer meet foreign visitors. It was obvious that Mao could not carry on much longer. Realizing that death was imminent, he decided to undertake the necessary political arrangements and leave the last words to his successor. On June 15, as Mao Zedong’s condition worsened, he summoned Hua Guofeng, Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Wang Dongxing, Wang Hairong, and others for his injunctions. He knew that his end was near. It was his wish that when he was given a final verdict, people would not just assess him in negative terms. Mao repeated his self-evaluation. He had achieved two things in his lifetime: he had unified China by driving Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan; and launched the Cultural Revolution. He admitted that unlike its numerous objectors, there were not many proponents of the Cultural Revolution. He was worried that coming generations would repudiate the Cultural Revolution and dismiss his political legacy. Mao predicted that peaceful succession might not be possible after his death: “If that’s the case, then let power be transferred in turmoil. In the worst scenario, blood will be shed in this process.“605 This was the last time that Mao showed his concern for Jiang Qing and gave political instructions. At that time, he was indeed powerless and helpless, but his political predictions proved to be highly accurate. Earlier, on March 20, 1974, Mao Zedong wrote to Jiang Qing: “I am now very ill and am already 81 years old. And yet you show no consideration. Now you enjoy a privileged position. But after I die, what will happen to you?“606 Mao foresee Jiang’s political destiny and made predictions for her based on his knowledge of her and her political ambition in the party: she had made a lot of enemies and become a loner.607 If Mao had not put her into an important position and granted 605. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1781–1782. 606. Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 3, 359. 607. On July 17, 1974, Mao Zedong rebuked Jiang Qing at a meeting of the Political Bureau:

“You should take greater care! Other people are not happy about you, but they can’t yet say anything directly to you. You’re still not aware of this. Do not make hasty accusations or label people. It’s not good. You need to pay attention to this. You just change.“ “Minutes of Mao Zedong’s Talk with Members of the Political Bureau in

Beijing,“ July 17, 1974. Mao Zedong wrote to Jiang Qing on November 22, 1974: “Do not show up in public too much. Do not approve of official documents. Do not organize

a cabinet and attempt to be some leader behind the curtain. You have made too many enemies. You need to unite with the majority. Heed my words. It’s important that you understand yourself.“ (Ibid., 367.)

192

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

her privileges, she would have been unable to remain in the party, let alone take the law into her own hands. Mao was clearly aware of the truth of this assessment. Soon after Mao’s death, Hua Guofeng had the Gang of Four arrested. Although Mao Zedong suffered from severe illness before his death, he was iron-willed: he believed that the Cultural Revolution had been politically correct and he also regarded it as the second of his lifetime achievements. Mao knew that by the time the Cultural Revolution had dragged on into its 10th year, it had lost the support of the party, the PLA, and the Chinese people. He felt that he stood alone in the party and was powerless and unsupported. Such was the suffering in Mao’s heart. Although Mao had deprived Deng Xiaoping of all his official positions several months earlier, Mao felt that Deng would return to power. Mao Zedong said to Jiang Qing and the others: “What will happen to you? Heaven knows.“ As noted above, Mao Zedong was by this time very lonely, and as an old statesman he was very isolated. He was over 80 years old, but he was engaged in fierce, complex struggles within the party: he still wished to defeat Deng Xiaoping, who was 11 years younger and much healthier. Mao paid the price for that struggle: he was exhausted and his physical condition worsened. During July and August, he was often in a coma and unable to work.608 He had to fight against both his political opponents and his illness. He was able to beat any political opponent, but he could not defeat the laws of nature. On June 25, when Mao Zedong was talking to Hua Guofeng, he wrote: “Pay attention to domestic problems.“609 Those were the last words he wrote. What did

Mao Zedong said to Zhou Enlai and Wang Hongwen on December 24, 1974, “Jiang

Qing is ambitious. What do you think about that? I know that she is. I know her better than you. I’ve known her for many dozens of years.“ “Mao Zedong’s Talking Points as

Drafted by Zhou Enlai and Communicated at the Meeting of the Standing Committee

of the Political Bureau,“ end of 1974 to early 1975. (Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao

Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1711.)

During the third part of January of 1975, Mao Zedong censured Jiang Qing again: “You

can’t just do what you like. You need to have self-discipline. Be cautious. Do not make your own decisions. Discuss them with the Political Bureau. It’s important that you



know yourself.“ (Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 152.)

Mao Zedong said to Mao Yuanxin on December 10, 1975 that after Jiang Qing became

a member of the Political Bureau, she remained ignorant. She always scolded other people with a stiff face and in a haughty fashion as though they were her slaves. (Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1761.)

608. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1782–1784. 609. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s

193

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

he mean by “domestic problems?“ Mao provided no specific explanation. Wang Hongwen seized upon those words as a pretext to air his own opinion. In July, Wang wrote to Mao, saying: “Since the chairman has instructed us recently ’to pay attention to domestic problems,’ in my view it is still necessary to criticize Deng. Nationwide, campaigns vary in their effectiveness: some go well; some are average; others are beset with problems. The latter two kinds seem to be the most frequent in China. This is a matter that requires action by the leadership — especially in the case of that third category of campaign. That is certainly true in the case of some departments under the State Council and also under the Central Military Committee. As has been carried out in a number of departments, the solution here is to replace the major leaders of those departments.“ Mao did not give any response 610 or authorization to this. He was no longer able to issue his supreme instructions. On July 6, Zhu De, chairman of the PNC, died. Zhu had been hailed as the “Father of the Red Army.“ He became vice chairman of the Central People’s Government and commander in chief of the PLA in 1949. He assumed the role of vice chairman of the PRC in 1954 and rose to became vice chairman of the 8th CPC Central Committee and member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau in 1956; he worked successively as the chairman of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th NPCs. That day, when he heard the news of Zhu’s death, Mao Zedong sighed: “Zhu De and Mao Zedong were inseparable. Now Zhu De is gone, and I be leaving soon too!“ Mao recited in sorrow “On the Withered Tree,“ a poem by Yu Xin, a poet of the Liang and Northern Zhou dynasties in ancient China: “How supple and fresh / the willows newly planted; which turn desolate and dry / over the vast river. Trees die, and so does man.“611 In his old age, Mao was very lonely and sad. He compared himself to a withered tree, which reflected both his emperor-like loneliness and his helplessness against the forces of nature. This was the heavy price he paid for his philosophy of struggle and it was an inevitable outcome of it. In July, the Political Bureau approved of a notice to explain Mao Zedong’s physical condition to high-ranking party officials. The notice, which was drafted by the Gang of Four, claimed that Mao was showing signs of improvement and would soon return to work. When discussing the notice, Ye Jianying, Wang Dongxing, and others strongly objected to such expressions and argued fiercely with Zhang Chunqiao and Jiang Qing. In the notice that was signed and released by Hua Guofeng, phrases relating to improvement and Mao’s imminent return to Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 538. 610. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1782–1784. 611. Ye, A Biography of Jiang Qing.

194

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

work were deleted.612 On July 16, the People’s Daily published the editorial “Brave the Storms — On the 10th Anniversary of the Great Leader Chairman Mao Swimming in the Yangtze River.“613 At the time of publication, Mao was of course unable to swim in the Yangtze as he did 10 years earlier. He was no longer able to lead 800 million people in continuing the Cultural Revolution. However, this editorial presented Mao’s declarations of Mao Zedong: “No progress without struggles“ and “Can we afford not to struggle with 800 million people in this country?“ This was in fact the last spent bullet of the great leader. Mao Zedong did not regret those statements on his deathbed: he still wanted the 800 million Chinese to continue with their struggle. On July 28, a massive earthquake hit the city of Tangshan, Hebei Province, which was a great shock for China and the whole world: 242,000 people were killed and 164,000 were seriously injured. On August 4, Hua Guofeng arrived at the area with over 100,000 troops and over 20,000 medical workers. On August 18, the CPC Central Committee issued the “Notice on the Disaster Relief Efforts in the Fengnan Area of Tangshan.“ When he read this, Mao Zedong burst into tears. 614 This most saddening document was the last document that Mao read and commented upon.615 This earthquake was a sudden catastrophe for the people, and a great blow to Mao. He died one month later. Curiously, the Chinese government not only refused to disclose accurate information about the disaster to the Chinese people, it also declined any international humanitarian aid or financial assistance. Hua Guofeng, the first vice 612. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1373.

613. The article claimed that 10 years earlier (1966), at the critical moment when the Cultural Revolution was first launched: “The great leader Chairman Mao, together with the masses, braved the waves in the Yangtze River. The spirit of Chairman Mao greatly

encouraged the Chinese people to win the grand victories in the storm of class struggle. Today, our celebration of this glorious act will further encourage the whole party, the army, and the Chinese people to adhere to the revolutionary course of the proletariat

class and carry on the campaign against Deng Xiaoping and the rightist whitewashing activities to the end.“ (People’s Daily, July 16, 1976.)

614. Wang Xinde, a member of the medical team for Mao Zedong and an expert in neurology and geratology, recalled: “When the secretary reported to Chairman Mao that this

earthquake had left over 240,000 people dead and caused heavy losses, he burst into tears. That was the first time I ever saw the chairman cry loudly.“ (Gu and Du, The Last Seven Years of Mao Zedong, 284.)

615. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1783.

195

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

chairman of the CPC Central Committee and premier of the State Council, was responsible for this. This shows the severe deficiencies of a centralized political system, where news where blacken out, information blocked and decision-making process is very intransparent. The same process happened during the severe famine of 1959–1961 owing to the failure of the Great Leap Forward. History had repeated itself. From 1976 to 1980, Tangshan received 1.17 billion yuan in disaster relief funds from the central government and 2.2 billion yuan toward infrastructure reconstruction, adding up to a sum of 3.37 billion yuan. Unfortunately, this severe natural disaster did not change the class struggle characteristic of China, nor did it stop the movement against Deng Xiaoping and rightist whitewashing activities. China was still trapped in manmade disasters. On August 11, the People’s Daily published an editorial titled “Further Criticize Deng and Focus on Earthquake Relief,“ stating that where people fought against the disaster was also a battlefield for criticizing Deng: “In our campaign against Deng, we must be motivated to carry out disaster relief work. The leaders of the opportunists in the party have always tried to make use of temporary difficulties caused by natural disasters to turn the tables and restore capitalism.“ This editorial was based on the ideas of Yao Wenyuan.616 On August 23, the People’s Daily published “Grasp the Key Points in Further Criticizing Deng.“ In that article, “General Principles of the Programs of the CPC and the State,“ “Several Problems in Accelerating Industrial Development,“ and “Several Issues in Scientific Work“ were dismissed as “three kinds of anticommunist and anti-Marxist toxic weeds“ that indicated the ultra-rightist counterrevolutionary revisionist route advocated by Deng Xiaoping. The editorial argued that even though Deng had been driven out of power, the struggle had not ended: “We must realize the complexity and persistence of the struggle against capitalism within our party.“ In all, 110 articles and news items criticizing Deng Xiaoping were published by the People’s Daily from August 13 to October 6. From August, tens of millions of the three pamphlets compiled by the Peking and Tsinghua University Criticism Team were distributed. The vast land of China was not mourning victims, showing sympathy, or helping the families, but it was locked in bitter hatred directed at the class enemy — Deng Xiaoping. The campaign against Deng and rightist whitewashing activities was the last political movement to be personally launched and led by Mao Zedong, and — like Mao himself — it had run its course. That campaign would soon come to an end. 616. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 303–304.

196

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

On August 14, Mao Zedong summoned the members of the Political Bureau to his sickbed, and he bid them farewell one by one. Having been informed that Mao was critically ill, the Political Bureau had Yao Wenyuan and Ji Dengkui prepare the memorial speech and obituary notice.617 On August 26, Mao once again suffered a heart attack.618 The same day, Hua Guofeng withheld the news item “Comrade Jiang Qing Visited the People in the Capital on Behalf of Chairman Mao and the CPC Central Committee“ and kept it off the air.619 On September 2, Mao’s condition further deteriorated, and by September 3 his condition had become critical.620 In August, Mao Zedong, knowing that he was fatally ill, mentioned several times his wish to return to Dishuidong in Shaoshan, his hometown. After some deliberations, the Political Bureau finally agreed to this last request of Mao’s. On September 8, Zhang Pinghua (first secretary of the Hunan CPC Committee) phoned the manager of the Dishuidong Hotel to say that in accordance with the wishes of Chairman Mao, the CPC Central Committee had decided to arrange the chairman’s return to Shaoshan on September 15 and stay there for a while. However, at 11 o’clock that evening, the Dishuidong Hotel received an urgent message that halt the preparations of the visit.621 In addition to several severe natural disasters, China experienced over 60 political movements from 1950 to 1976. The class struggle was the one of overriding importance: as the core task of the party, this engine of the class struggle was continuously turning. So what forces could stop it from turning? When could it stop turning? It is now evident to protect the authority of Mao Zedong as an individual, the CPC Central Committee continually made concessions. The party was unable to correct the political mistakes he made in his advanced years and bring the Cultural Revolution to an end. This problem was one that demanded a natural solution. On September 9, Mao Zedong died in Beijing. It had been 33 years since Mao 617. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 7. 618. Gu and Du, The Last Seven Years of Mao Zedong, 286. 619. The news item stated: “On August 26, on behalf of the great leader Chairman Mao

and the CPC Central Committee, led by Chairman Mao, Comrade Jiang Qing, member of the Political Bureau, visited in the rain the masses and cadres at Beijing Xinhua

Printing Factory, Tsinghua University, and Peking University. She participated in collective labor and encouraged the people to carefully learn the series of important

instructions of Chairman Mao, further criticize Deng Xiaoping, and actively participate in revolutionary and production activities to support people in the disaster-hit areas.“ 620. Gu and Du, The Last Seven Years of Mao Zedong, 286. 621. Ibid., 283.

197

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

became the chairman of the CPC Central Committee in May 1943, and 27 of those years were after the foundation of People’s Republic of China. He was the supreme national leader of China and had been in power for a long time. The same day, “A Letter to the Whole Party, the Whole PLA, and All Ethnic Groups in China,“ which was prepared by the Standing Committee of the PNC, the State Council, and the Central Military Committee, sang Mao’s praises. It stated that with the willpower of a proletariat revolutionary, Mao Zedong had fought his illness and led the party, the PLA, and the whole nation until his last breath. An “Open Letter to the People“ was written by Yao Wenyuan and approved by the Political Bureau, which evaluated Mao’s revolutionary life and fully affirmed the “great theory of continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat“ as well as “the great success of the proletarian Cultural Revolution and campaigns against Lin Biao, Confucius, and Deng Xiaoping and rightist whitewashing activities.“622 No one then imagined that with the death of a historic figure, a historic revolution — the Cultural Revolution — would likewise come to a close.623 The same day, Deng Xiaoping and his family set up a shrine for Mao in his house and silently mourned in front of a portrait of the chairman.624 In 1976, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Zhu De — supreme leaders of the party and state — died during their tenure of office. Earlier, Dong Biwu, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and vice chairman of the PNC, had also died because of illness. These men were all the founders of the People’s Republic of China, great leaders of the Chinese people, and leaders of the party and state with the longest tenure in the history of the People’s Republic of China. These facts reflect the features of the centralized political characteristic of China: the lifelong 622. People’s Daily, September 10, 1976. 623. Maurice Meisner commented that 1976 marked not only the end of the era of Mao Zedong but also the end of the historic mission of the first generation of Marxists

in China, who had matured politically and ideologically during the May Fourth Movement. The Cultural Revolution and its catastrophic results had devoured the lives

of many old revolutionaries (and national leaders) — first, the capitalistic roaders (Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping), who were persecuted in the early stage of the Cultural

Revolution, and then the Maoistic leaders, who were the leaders of the Cultural Revolution but then became the victims of the ongoing anti-ultra-leftist movements. Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao, who were once appointed as successors of Mao Zedong, died

in the chaos. (Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic of China,

374.)

624. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 151.

198

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

tenure in leading positions as well as a continuous or infinite term of office. This feature was not based on the personal shortcomings of the above individuals but on severe defects of the system itself. Neither the CPC Charter nor the Constitution stipulated the tenure and retirement of leaders of the CPC and state. The length of their political life depended on their lifespan. As a result, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Dong Biwu gave their all until their hearts stopped beating. However, from an institutional viewpoint, lifetime tenure is a very backward system. As we will see later, the system of lifetime tenure was repealed by Deng Xiaoping. The 1982 Constitution expressly stipulated a two-term tenure for national leaders, and the 13th National Congress of the CPC in 1987 halted the lifetime tenure of party leaders. Lorraine Glennon commented on the death of Mao Zedong in her book Our Times: An Illustrated History of the 20th Century (Sidebar 6.1).

Sidebar 6.1 Mao Zedong Bids Farewell to China (1976) By the time Mao Zedong died, his personality cult had developed to an incredible degree. Mao had become the supreme authority in the hearts of the people. He was worshipped by 800 million Chinese people at all times and in all places. His portrait hung in every household; his words were recited as holy instructions, and his name was blessed thousands of times. However, he was trapped in extreme loneliness. Mao’s death triggered a struggle for supreme power. After the death in January 1976 of Zhou Enlai — premier since 1949 and an influential figure who stabilized the situation in the late Mao era — Hua Guofeng was rapidly made premier. However, this did not solve all the problems. Jiang Qing, Mao’s widow and representative of the ultra-leftists, was a very domineering figure. She was also a member of the Gang of Four. The Cultural Revolution was launched by Mao to purge ideological impurity in China, and at that time the Gang of Four were the four people who directed the Political Bureau. Their opposing force was headed by Deng Xiaoping — also a member of the Political Bureau and a perceptive statesman who saved a desperate situation. He was the opponent of Jiang Qing and her allies. After Zhou died, the Gang of Four once again consigned Deng Xiaoping to limbo. To control the chaotic situation in China, the forces against the Gang of Four launched a forceful attack and had Jiang Qing and her allies arrested in October. By 1977, Deng Xiaoping had emerged as the real power in the party. Hua Guofeng’s authority had declined. Soon the political persecutions stopped, and the Cultural Revolution launched by Mao Zedong also came to an end. Source: Glennon ed., Our Times: An Illustrated History of the 20th Century, 552.

199

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

The Political Challenge and the Demise of Jiang Qing In a country characterized by highly centralized power and personal dictatorship, when the supreme leader is alive, the issue of successor may lead to a political crisis; however, his death can cause a bigger crisis. After Mao Zedong died, an intense power struggle developed in the party. The struggle focused on who would succeed Mao as chairman. Mao had actually appointed Hua Guofeng as his successor, having promoted him from the first vice chairman to chairman of the CPC Central Committee. However, Jiang Qing wanted Hua replaced as chairman of the CPC Central Committee. Hua was forced to challenges and attacks from the Gang of Four. Mao Zedong made two predictions regarding the political situation after his death. The first was made when he wrote “A Letter to Jiang Qing“ on July 8, 1966. He said: “If there was a rightist coup against the CPC, I do not believe that the coup would succeed since all revolutionaries — who represent the interests of over 90% of the Chinese people — would not tolerate it. At such a time, the rightist force may make use of my words to gain temporary power, and the leftist force will surely make use of my other words to bring down the rightist force.“625 The second prediction was made in January 1975, when he said that in the future, Jiang Qing would be unable to cooperate with all other people: “At present, the others are just paying lip service to her. After I die, Jiang Qing will cause troubles.“626 On September 9 Mao Zedong died, and on October 6, the Gang of Four collapsed: less than a month passed between the two events. Thus, Mao’s political predictions were fulfilled. This was both a historical certainty and a contingency: the CPC finally and resolutely made its historical choice. The Chinese people finally gained true historical emancipation. We will now see what caused this political result. By the time of Mao Zedong’s death, the Standing Committee of the 9th Political Bureau, which had had nine members in August 1973, had reduced to only three member, namely Wang Hongwen, Ye Jianying, and Zhang Chunqiao. Hua Guofeng served as first vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee and took charge of its daily work. A mutually intersecting and evenly balanced political situation had developed. However, since conflict was imminent, the tension between the two sides was almost explosive. This was an area of great concern both within and outside the party with respect to the future of the country. The political position 625. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 12, 73.

626. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1717.

200

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

and power of the Gang of Four headed by Jiang Qing had been totally reliant on the protection and support of Mao Zedong, but the clique lacked the support of CPC members, PLA members, and the people at large. Once Mao died, its political life would also come to an end. This reflects the saying “When the tree falls, the monkeys scatter; when the boss falls from power, his lackeys disperse.“ As a result, the Gang of Four instinctively felt that it was doomed — especially Jiang Qing. At the first Political Bureau meeting on September 9, Hua Guofeng led a discussion on distributing “A Letter to the Whole Party, the Whole PLA, and All Ethnic Groups in China“ by the CPC Central Committee, the State Council, and the Central Military Committee. Jiang Qing requested first to continue criticizing Deng Xiaoping, and she proposed that the Political Bureau pass a resolution to immediately expel Deng from the party to safeguard against future troubles. She said that if Deng were allowed to restore capitalism, the results of the proletariat’s Cultural Revolution would be lost. Jiang Qing was acutely aware that her biggest threat after Mao Zedong’s death came from Deng, who was likely to rise to power again. This was the prediction that Mao had made to her in a letter on July 8, 1966. She had to remove this threat: otherwise, she would fall and — more importantly — capitalism would be fully restored in China. Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen supported Jiang’s suggestion. Ye Jianying replied that since Mao had decided on the issue of Deng’s party membership, it was not necessary to discuss the matter further. Wang Hongwen proposed that the Third Plenary Session should be held. Jiang emphasized that the Political Bureau had the mandate to do this. It was the Political Bureau that had resolved to strip Liu Shaoqi and An Ziwen off their CPC membership.627 The Political Bureau meeting passed the above open letter. It also assigned the members of the Funeral Preparation Committee for Chairman Mao Zedong, and it prepared an announcement for memorial ceremonies to be held across the nation as well as an order from the Central Military Committee for the whole PLA to enter top-level combat readiness. Though lacking appropriate authorization, on September 10 Wang Hongwen instructed his secretary, Liao Zukang, to set up a duty room: this was the first step in Wang’s efforts to seize supreme control. On the night of the 11th and on the morning of the 12th, Mi Shiqi followed Wang’s instructions in requiring officials from all the provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions to report to Wang. This move was intended to deprive the General Office of the CCCPC of its power. At 3 a.m. on September 12, Hua Guofeng received an urgent phone call from Zhang Pinghua, first secretary of the Hunan CPC Committee. This caused great consternation for Hua since he realized that Wang was attempting to establish 627. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 8–10.

201

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

another CPC Central Committee. That would of course lead to a division within the party.628 Hua told Wang Dongxing that Wang Hongwen was clearly making a wrong move. The operations of the duty room that Wang Hongwen set up in Zhongnanhai had to cease. The direct telephone link between the General Office to all the provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions had to be restored as soon as possible.629 On October 8, Hua told a meeting of the Political Bureau: “After the death of the chairman, the Gang of Four found itself in the situation where it just could not wait any longer, and it began to panic.“630 CPC Central Committee Document (1976) No. 24 defined the above incident as “the first move taken toward seizing supreme leadership of the party and the state by the Gang of Four after the death of Chairman Mao.“631 At the trial held in a special court in December 1980, this crime was ignored owing to a lack of evidence. However, Wang Hongwen’s actions did in fact represent the first move in his challenge of Hua’s authority, and that put Hua on an alert and stirred him into taking countermeasures. At a meeting of the Political Bureau on the morning of September 11, Jiang Qing proposed that Mao Yuanxin should retain Mao Zedong’s documents, but Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying objected to this. It was finally concluded that Mao’s documents should be put into the charge of the General Office and be sealed by Wang Dongxing.632 Following this, Li Xiannian went out of his way to impress on Hua that it was necessary to ensure that Mao’s documents did not fall into the hands of the Gang of Four. Hua told Li that he had already ordered Wang Dongxing to take proper care of the materials.633 Late in the evening of September 11, Zhang Chunqiao told Ma Tianshui, Xu Jingxian, and Wang Xiuzhen (secretaries of the CPC Shanghai Committee) that without Deng Xiaoping, no one could guarantee that “Li Xiaoping or Liu Xiaoping“ would remain: “You should be prepared in Shanghai for the possibility of revisionism in the CPC Central Committee. Now that the chairman is gone, that is a real possibility.“634 “Li Xiaoping or Liu Xiaoping“ had developed into another name for Hua Guofeng. Zhang Chunqiao was thus targeting a political attack on Hua Guofeng, and he was informing the Shanghai Gang of this. 628. Ibid., 47–48. 629. Ibid., 57. 630. “Hua Guofeng’s Talk at the Meeting of the Political Bureau,“ October 8, 1976. 631. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 49–50. 632. Ibid., 36–37. 633. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 902.

634. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 30.

202

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

It was also on September 11 that Hua Guofeng went to the residence of Li Xiannian. Hua said: “Now that the Gang of Four has set up a hotline with all the provinces, a conflict with that gang is inevitable. Now is the time for action.“ Li asked: “Are you already decided?“ Hua replied: “Yes. We can’t wait any longer. The question is when and how. Think this matter over. If you agree, please visit Field Marshal Ye on my behalf: ask his opinion on the issue and what he thinks about when and how to solve the problem of the Gang of Four.“ Li expressed his full support and approval of Hua’s views and opinions and said he would visit Ye Jianying as soon as possible. On September 12, Li Xiannian and Chen Xilian reached a consensus. Chen said that the Gang of Four was about to take action and that it was necessary to arrest its members. On September 14, Li visited Ye Jianying with a message from Hua Guofeng, who wrote: “This struggle is inevitable.“ Ye responded: “This struggle will result in death or glory.“ Li said: “Please indicate the time and method.“ Ye nodded in agreement and then wrote down the names of Chen and others. Then he added a question mark. Li responded: “They are fully reliable. Please feel assured on that score.“ On the evening of September 14, Li reported back to Hua Guofeng.635 Earlier, on September 13, at a meeting of the Political Bureau, Jiang Qing attacked Hua Guofeng about preserving the remains of Mao Zedong. Yao Wenyuan wrote in his journal: “Jiang Qing proposed to hold a meeting of the Political Bureau. At the meeting, she quarreled with Hua over the remains of Mao Zedong. Her words were vehement and caused dissatisfaction among the members. This is dangerous. Some people already feel alienated by her. I can’t go along with that: I must help and support her to the best of my ability. I must honor the chairman.“ He also wrote: “With the chairman’s passing, some people might take this chance to stir up a riot. We must be alert and prepared.“636 Also on September 13, Wang Hongwen received a letter from the son of Xu Shiyou, commander of the Guangzhou Military Area and a member of the Political Bureau. This letter expressed Xu Shiyou’s view of the political situation: “Since the chairman has passed away, civil disturbances may develop over the supreme leadership. The Shanghai Gang is rotten. With the support of Chairman Mao, they have wielded a big stick of power and carried out evil actions. Now that the chairman has gone, their days are limited.“637 The contents of this letter fully reflected the views of most members of the Political Bureau. Mao’s death marked 635. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 899–901.

636. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 84. 637. Ibid., 86.

203

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

the end of the Jiang Qing clique since it did not have the support of members of the CPC, PLA, or the Chinese people. Wang showed the letter from the son of Xu Shiyou to Mao Yuanxin. Wang said with some trepidation: “It appears that they are going to strike. What would we be doing without the army?“ Mao Yuanxin believed that the Beijing Military Area and its garrison were unreliable: “They would be in danger if an armed conflict arose. The best course would be to transfer two divisions from the Shenyang Military Area.“638 Later, Wang Hongwen informed Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan about the above letter. Zhang replied that Xu Shiyou would launch a mutiny — just like An Lushan did in the Tang dynasty: “This is a sign that they are sharpening their knives, ready to plunge the capital into a bloodbath. I don’t think that the PLA would obey Xu Shiyou. Lin Biao had a far higher position and held far greater power, but what did he achieve? If he [Xu Shiyou] tried to fight against the party and seize power through intrigue, he wouldn’t be able to muster even one guard.“639 However, Zhang forgot one significant difference: in September 1971, Mao Zedong was still alive and in power, and it was Zhou Enlai behind him to help dealt with the Lin Biao Incident. Now that Mao was dead, Xu Shiyou and many more people, such as Ye Jianying, would stand up against the Gang of Four. On September 16, the People’s Daily, Red Flag, and PLA Daily published the editorial “Chairman Mao Will Live Forever in Our Hearts,“ which exhorted “Follow the set guidelines.“ This attracted the concern of Wang Dongxing640 since it was manipulating the deathbed words of Chairman Mao. The Gang of Four undertook this action to present themselves as Mao’s loyal successor, placing a higher value on themselves and attacking Hua Guofeng and other leaders.641 Ye Jianying detected this and informed Hua who further discussed with Wang and instruction given to him [Wang] by Mao was to “follow the past guidelines“ not “follow the set guidelines.“642 Yao Wenyuan wrote in his journal on September 16 that the great danger for 638. Wang Hongwen’s confession during the trial on July 12, 1980. (Ibid., 84.) 639. Ibid., 85–88. 640. Wang Dongxing said: “After Chairman Mao passed away on September 9, the Gang of Four distorted his words, and they published the set guidelines on September 16. At first, I thought that the chairman had perhaps written something to them, but I soon

realized that he did not write to them. Their intrigue has now been exposed. They distorted the injunction of Chairman Mao.” (“Wang Dongxing’s Talk at the National Publicity Meeting,” November 18, 1976.)

641. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 307. 642. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 111–113.

204

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

the proletariat dictatorship was not from such people as Huang Wei and others, but from the capitalist class and capitalist roaders in the party. Yao was referring to Hua Guofeng. It was also on September 16 that Hua Guofeng convened a meeting in the Meeting Hall of the State Council, which was attended by Li Xiannian, Wu De, Chen Xilian, Ji Dengkui, and Chen Yonggui. Hua Guofeng proposed that they needed to solve the problem of the Gang of Four. Some replied that the members of the gang should not all be treated the same. Other participants did not pass an opinion. Hua felt that this issue could not be discussed collectively: it could be discussed only on an individual basis.643 September 16 also had Hua Guofeng convene a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau at the request of Jiang Qing. However, Jiang wanted Yao Wenyuan and Mao Yuanxin to participate rather than Ye Jianying. She also demanded Wang Dongxing to transfer the documents and archives in Mao’s residence to her and Mao Yuanxin.644 Earlier, Jiang Qing had demanded that Zhang Yufeng, Mao Zedong’s secretary, give her Mao Zedong’s documents, and she successfully received two of them. Zhang reported this immediately to Wang Dongxing, who ordered that the two documents be recovered. As a result of these moves, Ye Jianying reminded Wang Dongxing that he should tighten security and increase vigilance to prevent Jiang Qing from taking supreme power over the CPC Central Committee. Ye warned Wang seriously: “When Chairman Mao was alive, you protected him. Now he has passed away, you need to carefully guard his documents and archives. Even though there is no time for sorting through these materials, you need to seal them. Never lose any of them. This has a direct bearing on the core secrets of the party and the state.“645 On September 21, Hua Guofeng officially decided that all Mao’s documents, materials, and books should be sealed and kept by Wang Dongxing.646 Jiang was very dissatisfied with this situation and argued with Hua many times about it.647 This decision foiled Jiang’s attempt to control Mao’s documents and materials. Why was Jiang Qing so anxious to lay her hands on Mao Zedong’s documents? 643. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 902.

644. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 406. 645. Editorial Committee of Biography of Ye Jianying comp., Biography of Ye Jianying, 380. 646. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1415.

647. Zhu, et al. eds., Wu De’s Oral History: A Record of the Ten-Year History of Storms, Some Personal Work Experiences in Beijing, 231.

205

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

When Hua Guofeng talked to Wu De about this, Hua said Jiang’s purpose was to control Mao’s documents so that she could find and distort his words, which she could use to persecute some leading officials in the PLA, government, and party organizations. She aimed to remove obstacles on her way to seizing leadership of the CPC and state.648 In fact, Jiang aimed to find and destroy the materials against her that Mao possessed. Mao held some very sensitive materials relating to all the leaders, such as Wu Hao’s “Revelation against Zhou Enlai,“ the selfcriticism materials of Deng Xiaoping, and the disclosure materials written by Qiao Guanhua and Zhang Hanzhi against Deng Xiaoping. It may well have been that Mao wished to control and decide the political life of all leaders, including Jiang Qing. For example, Kang Sheng summoned Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng in December 1974: Kang demanded them reporting to Mao that in the archives of Zhang Chunqiao and Jiang Qing, there were materials against Jiang Qing confessed by the traitors. Jiang soon heard about this and knew that Mao possessed all those materials.649 She was afraid that such documents would provide evidence that would lead to her political demise after Mao’s death: she was such a vehement political force that her actions had led to the death of Liu Shaoqi and others. In March 1977, the Central Special Case Team exposed the historical problems of Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao using the archive materials of Mao Zedong.650 At that time, no one, including Mao Zedong, suspected that those documents would become a deadly weapon against Jiang. Thus Jiang, who harbored guilty secrets, had to get hold of these materials. On the afternoon of September 18, a memorial meeting was held for Mao Zedong. After the meeting, Yao Wenyuan instructed Deng Gang (director of the Central Broadcasting Administration) and Lu Ying (editor in chief of the People’s Daily) that the news reports should not highlight any individual (meaning Hua Guofeng), but should emphasize the collective leadership. During this period, the chairman’s instructions relating to following the set guidelines should be underlined in all propaganda efforts.651 648. Ibid. 649. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 21. 650. In 1933, Zhang Chunqiao joined the fascist organization Huadi Society, which was under the Kuomintang Fu Hsing Society, and in 1935 he took part in cultural spying

activities. In 1934, Jiang Qing (at that time her name was Li Yungu) confessed this

after she was arrested in Shanghai. (Central Special Case Team, “Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.2,“ March 1977.)

651. Lu Ying’s confession on May 13, 1980. (Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 122–123.)

206

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

On the evening of September 18, Zhang Chunqiao held a discussion with Xiao Mu, Wang Hongwen’s secretary, and the content of this talk was secretly communicated to the Standing Committee of the CPC Shanghai Committee. Zhang said that although Deng Xiaoping had been ousted, the capitalist class still had power, no matter who was leading them: “At present, the capitalist forces have not yet gathered strength. They lack a leader. If revisionism appears again in China, it will arise in the upper levels — in the CPC Central Committee and among capitalist elements in the party. The present is the most difficult period, but we can survive it. Putting someone like Deng Xiaoping into power now would be impossible since the people would rise up against it...652The Comrades in Shanghai should take heart, work hard, and prepare for the struggle.“ However, Zhang drastically underestimated his political opponents, and he was soon imprisoned. On September 21, Field Marshal Nie Rongzhen, a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Military Committee, sent Yang Chengwu to inform Ye Jianying that the problem of the Gang of Four had to be dealt with: “The Gang of Four is nothing more than a band of counter-revolutionary elements, and they will stop at nothing to seize power. We should ward against a preemptive strike by them. If they arrested Ye Jianying and assassinated Deng Xiaoping — or even Hua Guofeng — China would regress dozens of years.“ Nie said that the normal means of inter-party struggle would be useless in solving the problem of the Gang of Four: “Only by striking first and taking resolute measures can we ward against unwanted results.“ Nie urged Ye Jianying to make up his mind as quickly as possible. Ye replied to Yang: “Tell Nie Rongzhen to rest assured.“653 Field Marshal Xu Xiangqian, a member of the Central Military Committee Standing Committee, also urged Ye Jianying indirectly to make a quick decision about handling the Gang of Four.654 This shows that although the members of the Gang of Four held high positions, they were not supported by the majority of CPC and PLA. Dealing with the Gang of Four had to be done by political consensus and tacit agreement among the upper levels of the Central Military Committee. Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao talked to Li Xin, the vice colonel of the Guards Regiment of the CPC Central Committee, on September 16. They tried to control the regiment by promising Li a bright future. Li immediately reported this matter to Wang Dongxing, who promptly informed Hua Guofeng, and this led to Hua 652. Confession of Wang Zhichang (member of the Standing Committee of the Shanghai CPC Committee) on December 14, 1976. (Ibid., 123–125.)

653. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1415.

654. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 307.

207

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

making a decision.655 It was also on September 16 that Ye Jianying visited Hua Guofeng to discuss ways of handling the problem of the Gang of Four. They decided to conduct separate investigations.656 As noted above, Ye Jianying believed that this struggle would end in death or glory: “Either we kill them, or they kill us...657 Neither meetings [of the Political Bureau or CPC Central Committee] nor criticisms nor ideological struggles can solve this problem. Only by using special means can we surprise them and deliver a hard blow.“ Ye mentioned the way that Zhou Enlai had dealt with Lin Biao’s Four Guardian Warriors in September 1971. After the September 13 Incident, in which Lin Biao died in an air crash, his Four Guardian Warriors (Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Qiu Huizuo) remained in the Political Bureau and controlled key departments in the PLA, thereby posing a major threat. Later, Premier Zhou came up with the method of summoning them to the Great Hall of the People for a meeting, where their crimes were suddenly announced and they were immediately arrested and detained. Then, a meeting of the Political Bureau was convened to resolve the situation. This procedure was referred as “taking action first and holding a meeting later.“ Hua Guofeng said that according to Li Xin, Nikita Khrushchev used this method when he arrested Lavrentiy Beria.658 After Mao Zedong’s death, Ye Jianying believed: “Although they [the Gang of Four] are immensely haughty and arrogant now, they cannot possibly control our party or change the history of China. Their days in power are numbered. They will get nowhere.“ 659 Ye was acutely aware that it was wrong to get rid of the mouse (Jiang Qing) by burning down the house (Mao Zedong): “If the Political Bureau is united and determined, it can deliver a destructive blow to the Gang of Four.“660 He believed it was necessary to choose the right moment in dealing with the challenges 655. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee’s Interview with Wang Dongxing in April 1984. (Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 172–173.)

656. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 903.

657. Hua Guofeng said: “Vice Chairman Ye was very firm in the struggle against the Gang

of Four. He visited and consulted with me on this matter. He said that our struggle

against the Gang of Four was one of death or glory. During that period, I talked to a lot of comrades in the Political Bureau, who were making preparations.“ (Editorial Committee of Biography of Ye Jianying comp., Biography of Ye Jianying, 382.) 658. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 190–195. 659. Editorial Committee of Biography of Ye Jianying comp., Biography of Ye Jianying, 381. 660. Ibid., 381–382.

208

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

posed by Jiang Qing. In shouldering this great task, Ye became a historic figure. On September 22, Zhang Chunqiao wrote a letter to Ma Tianshui in Shanghai, asking him to prepare countermeasures. In his letter to Ma, Zhang said: “Shanghai is a city with a glorious history of revolutionary struggles, and it is the origin of the Cultural Revolution launched by Chairman Mao. Chairman Mao always believed Shanghai to be center of hope. Now, Chairman Mao has left us forever. You should be alert against revisionism in the party, especially in the central areas and in the upper level — against people like Lin Biao, whom are still quite large in numbers. I hope that you would prepare countermeasures for this situation.“661 On September 23, Wang Hongwen demanded in a phone call that Shanghai “heighten its vigilance.“ He emphasized in his call to Wang Xiuzhen: “You should heighten your vigilance: the struggle has not ended against the capitalist agents within the party. They have not resigned themselves to defeat and will always want Deng Xiaoping.“662 At that time, Hua Guofeng was determined to remove the Gang of Four. On September 24, Li Xiannian conveyed Hua’s resolve to Ye Jianying: “General Ye should please consider when and how to solve the problem of the Gang of Four.“ Ye responded to Li: “The struggle between us and them is one of death or glory: there is no room at all for reconcile.“663 On the evening of September 26, Hua Guofeng, Li Xiannian, and Wu De discussed possible solutions to the question of the Gang of Four. They agreed that there were two options: one was to arrest them; the other was to expel them from their official positions through a vote in the Political Bureau. They concluded that they would best remedy the situation by means of voting in the Political Bureau; however, they were uncertain whether this vote should extend to the members of the CPC Central Committee. It was necessary, they decided, to conduct an isolated investigation. Hua stated that it was better to do this sooner rather than later, and the sooner the better.664 Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, and Wang Dongxing held a discussion and reached a major resolution: full preparations would be made so that at the right moment — around 10 days after the National Day holiday — the Gang of Four would be summoned to a meeting. They would then be isolated for investigation and a 661. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol.2, 1416.

662. Ibid. 663. Liu ed., Chronicle of Ye Jianying, vol. 2, 111. 664. Zhu, et al. eds., Wu De’s Oral History: A Record of the Ten-Year History of Storms, Some Personal Work Experiences in Beijing, 237–239.

209

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

meeting of the Political Bureau would be convened to announce the news.665 This would be a case of first taking action and later reporting to a meeting. On September 28, Zhang Chunqiao sent his secretary, Xiao Mu, to deliver a message to the Shanghai CPC Standing Committee: the committee should analyze the current situation regarding the class struggles. The committee had to be alert and it had to realize that despite setbacks, the capitalist class retained power — irrespective of its leader: “Now, some individuals may want to attack Shanghai. This is a severe test that Shanghai has yet to go through.“666 Based on Zhang Chunqiao’s instructions about the possibility of war, Xu Jingxian and others planned to launch an armed rebellion in Shanghai.667 According to Jiang Qing’s proposal, a meeting of the Political Bureau was held late in the evening of September 29, being presided over by Hua Guofeng. Jiang was the first to make a move. She said: “Now that Chairman Mao has passed away, what will happen to the leadership of the CPC Central Committee?“ Wang Hongwen and Zhang Chunqiao echoed similar sentiments: Collective leadership should be strengthened to avoid any deviation from the revolutionary route of Chairman Mao. Tonight, let us discuss the work of Jiang Qing. This proposal was immediately opposed by Ye Jianying and others. Hua Guofeng read out a letter written by Mao Yuanxin, saying that agreeing to the suggestion of bring Liaoning back in work. However, Jiang insisted instead that Mao Yuanxin should stay to draft a report and handle the funeral arrangements for Chairman Mao. Hua Guofeng countered this by saying that Jiang had declared that she and Mao Yuanxin would keep out of arrangements for Chairman Mao’s funeral. Jiang Qing yelled: “I never said that. This is a setup! I’ve been framed!“ Wang Dongxing testified that Jiang Qing had declared that she and Mao Yuanxin would stay out of Chairman Mao’s funeral arrangements. Ye Jianying expressed his support for Hua Guofeng, for Mao Yuanxin returning to work in Liaoning and Chairman Mao’s documents being held by the General Office of the CCCPC. Jiang Qing and her supporters objected to this at the Political Bureau meeting, insisting that Mao Yuanxin should draft the report to be presented at the Third Plenary Session. Hua Guofeng stated that Mao Yuanxin should return to Liaoning and that was the resolution of the majority of the members of the Political Bureau: “Even if a report is to be presented to the Third Plenary Session, it should be me who drafts and presents that report. 665. Editorial Committee of Biography of Ye Jianying comp., Biography of Ye Jianying, 385. 666. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1417.

667. Xu Jingxian’s confession on July 24, 1980. (Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 204.)

210

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

The personnel arrangements of the CPC Central Committee should be decided following deliberations of the Political Bureau.“ Hua Guofeng then announced that the meeting was over.668 This shows that the struggle in the CPC Central Committee was on a crescendo, and further boosted Hua and his supporters’ determination on getting one step ahead of the Gang of Four. On the evening of September 30, Hua Guofeng summoned Li Xiannian and Wu De, consulting them over the plans on isolating and investigating the Gang of Four as soon as possible. Li Xiannian and Wu De completely supported Hua Guofeng’s plan.669 On October 1, the People’s Daily published the article “Learn the Thoughts of Mao Zedong and Carry on Chairman Mao’s Unfulfilled Wishes.“ This reiterated the necessity to “follow the set guidelines.“ The same day, Jiang Qing delivered a talk at Tsinghua University. She said that she was pressing charges against Deng Xiaoping at the first meeting of the Political Bureau after the death of Chairman Mao. Jiang also declared that Deng’s party membership should be taken off; however, if this did not happen, she would keep an close eye on Deng in case some individuals (meaning Ye Jianying) made an attempt to conceal his faults: “You young people should do your best to resist such individuals. The struggle between the classes over political direction will last a long time. But that situation is good. What do you think of this situation? Whatever you think, please remain alert.“ On October 2, Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying agreed that the struggle with the Gang of Four had reached a mutually irreconcilable juncture and that a major conflict was inevitable — one that went far beyond normal internal party disputes. Consequently, the situation called for something beyond the usual means of settling party problems. Nonetheless, the case of the Gang of Four had to be dealt with legally so as to avoid political upheaval.670 Following their consultation, the two men decided to call a meeting to announce the isolation and investigation of the Gang of Four.671 It was also on October 2 that Hua Guofeng wrote a comment on a speech transcript: “I checked the quote by Chairman Mao and detected three differences: what Chairman Mao wrote and what I conveyed to the Political Bureau indicated ’follow past guidelines.’ To avoid further mistakes, I deleted that section.“ Zhang Chunqiao suggested that Hua Guofeng’s comment not be communicated to 668. Zhang, Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao, 263–267. 669. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 905.

670. Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 3, 478. 671. Jin, The Outline of Chinese History in 20th Century, vol. 3, 1109.

211

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

avoid any unnecessary disputes.672 Wang Hongwen and Ye Jianying both signaled their agreement with the speech transcript. Zhang Chunqiao also agreed, but he proposed to not pass on Hua Guofeng’s comment so as to avoid unnecessary disputes.673 Hua Guofeng had in fact communicated Mao Zedong’s instruction to “follow past guidelines“ to the Political Bureau on April 30, and he showed this instruction of Mao Zedong’s to Yao Wenyuan. The quotation also appeared in the notes of Yao Wenyuan and Jiang Qing. It is clear that Jiang Qing and her supporters were deliberately changing the instructions of Mao Zedong and presenting this distortion to the public. This put Hua Guofeng on high alert: what were Jiang Qing and her clique attempting to do? This gave greater impetus to Hua’s efforts to remove Jiang Qing and her gang. On October 3, Wang Hongwen delivered a speech in Beijing’s Pinggu County. He said with regard to the revisionists: “What should you do? Bring them down! Beware of Tang Xiaoping and Wang Xiaoping in the future! Stay alert about revisionism.“674 Wang was clearly referring to Hua Guofeng. On October 4, the Guangming Daily carried a large headline article on its front page: “Forever Follow the Set Guidelines of Chairman Mao,“ which was written by Liang Xiao. It announced that the instruction of Chairman Mao was to “act according to the set guidelines,“ which shone and were as valuable as gold: “The capitalist roaders are still keeping to their course.“ The article stated that the direction they followed was the basic course of the opposition party throughout the socialist historical period: overthrowing the dictatorship of the proletariat and restoring capitalism, which they would do by tampering with the set guidelines of Chairman Mao: “To tamper with the set guidelines of Chairman Mao is to betray Marxism and socialism and the theory of ongoing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Any revisionist politician who dares tamper with the set guidelines of Chairman Mao will come to no good end.“675 Published under the direction of Zhang Chunqiao and Jiang Qing, the article was a targeted attack on Hua Guofeng. At 7 p.m. of the same day, Hua Guofeng met Li Xin, and Hua said

672. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 308. 673. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 245. 674. Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 307. 675. This article was written by the Peking University and Tsinghua University Criticism

Team under the direction of Jiang Qing for publication in the People’s Daily. Yao Wenyuan was instructed by Hua Guofeng on October 2 to publish the article in the

Guangming Daily on October 4 instead of the People’s Daily. (Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 247–250.)

212

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

to Li: “They [the Gang of Four] are trying to kill me.“676 Hua Guofeng immediately consulted with Ye Jianying. Ye Jianying decided that the Guangming Daily article signaled the intention of the Gang of Four to seize power over the party and the state: “If we don’t attack the enemy, the enemy will attack first. And if our attack isn’t quick enough, the enemy will win.“ Ye held a meeting with Hua Guofeng and declared: “In view of recent developments, it is now high time for us to solve this problem. They are about to attack. We cannot wait any longer. We must take the bull by the horns.“ The two men decided to take action on October 6 or 7 to destroy the four causes of their ills.677 Chen Xilian hurriedly returned to Beijing from Tangshan and directly to the residence of Hua Guofeng. He mentioned the article published in the Guangming Daily and said that the Gang of Four was ready to take action: “We can’t wait for them to arrest us.“678 The same day, Hua Guofeng conferred with Wang Dongxing and Wu De on how to isolate the Gang of Four and what further actions they should take against the gang.679 In the afternoon, Wang Dongxing formulated an action plan against the Gang of Four. That evening, Hua Guofeng approved that plan.680 Hua then notified Li Xiannian of the time to arrest the Gang of Four, and Li fully agreed.681 On October 5, Ye Jianying ordered the PLA to stay alert and obey orders. Ye instructed Liang Biye, vice director of the General Political Department, that his department should remain vigilant and steady and that it should reinforce the management and education of troops. Ye directed Yang Chengwu, acting chief of the General Staff Headquarters, to exercise tight command over the General Staff, General Political Department, and General Logistics Department in addition to the army, air force, and border defenses; Yang had to maintain combat readiness and ensure that there would be no problems in the PLA. Yang Chengwu replied: “The PLA obeys the CPC and follows the directions of the Central Military Committee.“682 676. Ibid., 253–254. 677. Fan, Ye Jianying in 1976, revised edition, 363–365. 678. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 907.

679. Ibid., 906. 680. Party History Research Center of the CPC Central Committee’s Interview with Wang Dongxing in 1986. (Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 253–254.)

681. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 907.

682. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1420.

213

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

At that juncture, the conflict and struggle intensified between Hua Guofeng and most members of the Political Bureau on the one side and the Gang of Four on the other: on the verge of a decisive battle, the situation was reaching a fever pitch.683 Jiang Qing and her supporters overestimated their political power and were unaware of the fact that without Mao Zedong, their aspirations would amount to nothing.684 On October 8, Ye Jianying said at a meeting of the Political Bureau that after Mao’s death: “The situation quickly deteriorated, and so [Jiang Qing and her supporters] felt they had no choice but to step up their efforts.“ On October 4, the Guangming Daily published the article “Forever Follow the Set Guidelines of Chairman Mao,“ which signaled that the gang was about to take action. The gang’s efforts to control public opinion proved that it was unable to wait any longer. Under these critical circumstances, Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying had to react to the aggressions of Jiang Qing and her clique by arresting the Gang of Four, accelerating its political demise. On the evening of October 6, Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, and Wang Dongxing isolated Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan for investigation in the guise of convening a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. At that point, the CPC Central Committee issued a notice to the effect that recently, following the death of Chairman Mao, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan had conspired to seize control of the CPC and the state and that they had committed a series of anti-CPC and antisocialistic crimes. In view of this situation, the CPC Central Committee decided to isolate and investigate those four individuals.685 When Zhao Yaoci announced 683. Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 3, 475. 684. During the National Publicity Meeting on November 18, 1976, Wang Dongxing said:

“We were afraid; everyone was afraid after Chairman Mao passed away that they

would misjudge the situation and overestimate themselves, as well as underestimate

the people and Comrade Hua Guofeng and the majority of the Political Bureau members led by Hua Guofeng.“

685. Wang Dongxing recalled this action as follows: “On the evening of October 6, 1976, a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau was held in the orchestra

pit of Huaihuitang Auditorium. Comrades Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying were sitting there. A notice about isolating the Gang of Four had been written in advance. This was to be announced by Hua and implemented by me. Zhang Chunqiao was the first to

arrive. He listened to the resolution and said nothing. Wang Hongwen was the second to arrive, and he struggled. When he was 5 meters away, he suddenly made as if to

attack Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying. When there were only 2 meters between them,

our men caught and grabbed him, pushing him to the ground. Yao Wenyuan was at his

214

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

this resolution of the CPC Central Committee, Jiang Qing retorted: “The Central Committee didn’t hold a meeting about this. Whose resolution is it? This is some kind of scheme! You’re launching a coup! The bones of the Chairman are not even laid to rest and you’re already taking action against me! The people will never forgive you!686 Later, she said that Hua Guofeng was being a traitor to Chairman Mao.687 This situation was in accordance with what many people believed: there would have been no Jiang Qing without Mao Zedong, and when Mao Zedong passed away, Jiang Qing fell. At 10 p.m. on October 6, Hua Guofeng convened an urgent meeting of the Political Bureau, which was attended by 11 of the 19 members — those who had stayed in Beijing.688 Hua Guofeng said: “Comrades, I have gathered you here tonight to announce an important incident: Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan used the death of Chairman Mao in conspiracy to seize power of the CPC and the state. To prevent this counter-revolutionary group from bringing a severe calamity on the Chinese people, the CPC Central Committee had to take the resolute measure of isolating and investigating on the Gang of Four at 8 p.m. on October 6.“ Hua described in detail the struggle against the Gang of Four, and he listed Chairman Mao’s criticisms of that group:689 “At that residence, which belonged to the garrison. Therefore, Comrade Wu Zhong was asked to wait for him in his office, and if Yao did not go to Zhongnanhai, Wu was to arrest him

at his home. Then Yao went to his office and was arrested there. When that had been done, I called Wu Zhong and told him to go home. Meanwhile, comrades Zhang Yaoci and Wu Jianhua arrested Jiang Qing and Mao Yuanxin at their homes. They offered no

resistance. The arrest of the Gang of Four started at 8 p.m. and ended before 9:30 p.m. Since the preparations had been done carefully, the CPC resolution was announced

in advance of the arrests. The resolution stated that the CPC Central Committee had

decided to isolate those individuals for investigation because they had committed crimes.“ (Fan, Ye Jianying in 1976, revised edition, 390.) 686. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 318–319. 687. On December 24, 1980, Jiang Qing defended herself against the indictment during her trial: “Thanks to the betrayal by Hua Guofeng — the traitor and villain — you have a temporary victory.”

688. The eight members of the Political Bureau who attended this meeting were Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian, Wang Dongxing, Chen Xilian, Chen Yonggui, Ji Dengkui, and Wu De in addition to three alternate members — Wu Guixian, Su Zhenhua, and Ni Zhifu. (Fan, Ye Jianying in 1976, 2nd revised edition, 395.)

689. Hua Guofeng said, in view of the rampant activities of the Gang of Four, Chairman Mao

instructed the Political Bureau during his illness to discuss this problem. Chairman

215

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

time, General Ye and I did not take immediate action because Chairman Mao was sick. After Chairman Mao passed away, we did not wish to tackle them if they did not act aggressively. However, they were too foolish to respect Chairman Mao and the Political Bureau. They attempted to establish another CPC Central Committee and seize supreme power. According to the intelligence we’ve intercepted, they were prepared to launch a coup on October 10.690 We were aware of the severity of the situation: if their scheme succeeded, the revolutionary cause of the proletariat initiated by Chairman Mao could have been lost, and our party and nation would have declined; capitalism would be restored, and it would have led to the death of thousands of people. Considering this, we decided to take special measures to detain them all for investigation.691 Comrades, we did this to fulfill the unfulfilled wish of Chairman Mao. What we did reflected the fundamental interests and wishes of the whole party, the whole PLA, and Chinese people of all ethnic groups. This victory over the Gang of Four helped our party avoid a major split, major bloodshed, a major catastrophe, and a major setback for our cause.“692 Ye Jianying also delivered a speech. Following Ye’s proposal, the Political Bureau appointed Hua Guofeng chairman of the CPC Central Committee and Central Military Committee. Just before that meeting, Hua and Ye discussed the choice of chairman of the CPC Central Committee. Ye said: “Chairman Mao demanded that you should assume this role.“ Hua recommended that Ye preside over the work of the Central Committee. Ye Jianying said: “You are the successor appointed by Chairman Mao before he passed away.“693 At that time, a number of leaders wanted Ye to preside over the work of the CPC Central Committee. Ye replied: “I am a military officer, and if a military officer presided over the work of the CPC Central Committee, wouldn’t that amount to a political coup?“ Ye insisted on Hua assuming power.694 After the meeting, Wang Dongxing called the other Mao said: “The problem of the Gang of Four will be solved in the second half of this

year if not in the first half; it will be solved next year [1976] if not this year [1975]; it will be solved the year after next [1977] if not next year [1976].“

690. This may refer to the fact that the militia in Shanghai were prepared for sudden changes

in the CPC Central Committee. In fact, the Gang of Four did not possess any military power over the whole nation or part of the nation, so it did not have the power to launch a coup. The members were in fact like rats in a hole.

691. Here, Hua Guofeng recognized that the means adopted were noninstitutional means, i.e., it was a coup.

692. Qing and Fang, Deng Xiaoping in 1976, vol. 2, 348–351. 693. Fan, Ye Jianying in 1976, revised edition, 393–394. 694. Ibid., 402.

216

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

four members of the Political Bureau — Wei Guoqing, Xu Shiyou, Li Desheng, and Sai Fuding — who were not in Beijing and asked for their opinion. They all expressed their support for the decision of the Political Bureau. Ye Jianying immediately recommended that Hua Guofeng should take over the Central News Agency and firmly control the nation’s media. Following the instructions of Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying, Geng Biao took over the Central People’s Broadcasting Station on October 6 evening, and Chi Haotian, vice commissar of the Beijing Military Area, took charge of the People’s Daily. On October 7, the CPC Central Committee submitted its “Resolution on Appointing Comrade Hua Guofeng as Chairman of the CPC Central Committee and Chairman of the Central Military Committee.“ The resolution stated that as arranged by the great leader and mentor, Chairman Mao Zedong, and unanimously passed by the Political Bureau, Hua Guofeng would work as chairman of the CPC Central Committee and Central Military Committee. This resolution was to be presented for approval at a plenary session of the CPC Central Committee. It was also on October 7 that Wu De and Wu Zhong, who was commander of the Beijing Garrison and concurrently secretary of the Beijing CPC Committee, arrested Chi Qun, Xie Jingyi, and Jin Zumin and other individuals during a Beijing CPC Committee meeting. The Beijing Garrison guarded the buildings of the People’s Daily, Xinhua News Agency, the Central Broadcasting Station, the Central Department, Tsinghua University, and Peking University.695 On October 7, Ye Jianying personally notified Deng Xiaoping of the fall of the Gang of Four and communicated to Deng the content of the Political Bureau meeting. Ye arranged for Deng to live in Building No. 25, Xishan.696 The same day, Ye also conveyed this news to Chen Yun, member of the CPC Central Committee and vice chairman of the PNC. Ye thus contacted the only two leaders left of the first generation of national leaders, and this played a critical role in the political return of Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun. On October 10, Deng Xiaoping wrote to Hua Guofeng and the CPC Central Committee, indicating that he was extremely pleased to support the committee’s decision.697 Shortly after, Li Xiannian, Chen Xilian, and Wu De visited Deng with the news. Deng said: “This is wonderful. I can now live peacefully in my old age. This was handled well and efficiently!“698 695. Zhu, et al. eds., Wu De’s Oral History: A Record of the Ten-Year History of Storms, Some Personal Work Experiences in Beijing, 247–250.

696. Fan, Ye Jianying in 1976, 2nd revised edition, 399–400. 697. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 152.

698. Zhu, et al. eds., Wu De’s Oral History: A Record of the Ten-Year History of Storms, Some

217

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

On the evening of October 8, the Political Bureau convened its first meeting at Yuquanshan. The following people attended the meeting: Ma Tianshui (secretary of the CPC Shanghai Committee); Zhou Chunlin (deputy commander of the Nanjing Military Area and commander of the Shanghai Security Area); Peng Chong, Xu Jiatun, Liao Hansheng, and Ding Sheng (leaders of the Jiangsu CPC Committee and of the Nanjing Military Area); Bai Rubing, Yang Dezhi, and Wang Ping (leaders of the Shandong CPC Committee and Jinan Military Area); and Zeng Siyu (leader of the Hubei CPC Committee and Wuhan Military Area). Notification of the CPC Central Committee’s resolution was given at the meeting. The meeting was held in two parts, with the second part being held later the same evening. In the second part of the meeting, everyone supported the resolution of the CPC Central Committee except for Ma Tianshui. Ma defended the Gang of Four, arguing that the reasons given by the CPC Central Committee were not convincing and that the influence of Wang, Zhang, Jiang, and Yao in Shanghai could not be underestimated. Hua Guofeng criticized Ma severely.699 On the evening of October 9, Li Xiannian and Chen Xilian met Zhou Chunlin, who was Li Xiannian’s subordinate during the Red Army period. Li asked Zhou: “After the news of the isolation of the Gang of Four is announced, what do you think their followers in Shanghai will do?“ Zhou answered: “There are three possibilities. One is that they will launch a large-scale uprising; they could also launch a medium-sized uprising; or they could just remain quiet. However, a largescale uprising would not really be possible.“ When Li asked why he thought so, Zhou answered: “Because after arresting Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, they would have lost their flag bearers.“700 On October 8, the CPC Central Committee passed its “Resolution on the Publishing of Selected Works of Mao Zedong and on Preparations to Publish Collected Works of Mao Zedong.“ The same day, the CPC Central Committee, the Standing Committee of the PNC, the State Council, and the Central Military Committee passed the “Decision on Building the Memorial Hall of Chairman Mao Zedong, the Great Leader and Mentor.“ It was decided that after the memorial hall was constructed, a crystal coffin containing the remains of Mao Zedong would be moved into the hall so that the people could admire and pay their respects to the chairman. However, this decision was a direct violation of the initiative signed by Mao and other leaders of the Central CPC Committee on April 27, 1956, which Personal Work Experiences in Beijing, 255. 699. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 956–957.

700. Zhou, Fifty Years through Thick and Thin, 281–282.

218

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

specified cremation rather than interment.701 The Political Bureau convened a “notifying meeting“ on October 8 (the meeting ended on October 15), at which the fall of the Gang of Four was announced. Ye Jianying explained that the “Gang of Four“ term was introduced by Chairman Mao at a Political Bureau meeting on April 17, 1974: “Eradicating the Gang of Four was not just the wish of a few members of the Political Bureau or a last-minute decision. This was a problem that Chairman Mao wanted to tackle though it remained unresolved. We have inherited the wishes of Chairman Mao. If we allowed the Gang of Four to take power, our party and our country would have been placed in great danger. Our party would have been in great danger if we hadn’t overthrown the Gang of Four.“702 It is noteworthy that early in 1975, Mao Zedong criticized Jiang Qing and said: “She will make trouble after I am dead.“ On May 3 of that year, Mao rebuked the Gang of Four at a meeting of the Political Bureau: “The problem of the Gang of Four will be solved in the second half of this year if not in the first half; it will be solved next year if not this year; and it will be solved the year after next if not next year.“ At that time, all members of the Political Bureau paid close heed to Mao’s instruction, which was unfortunately very obscure. It did not provide answers to the following three questions. First, what did Mao mean by “solve“? Did that mean criticizing, repudiating, or overthrowing the gang? Second, who was to solve this problem? Would it be at a plenary session of the CPC Central Committee? Or would it be done by the Political Bureau? Third, how should it be solved? Would it be achieved by voting within the party or by the use of arms? Mao Zedong’s political ambiguity offered great opportunity for political maneuvering by Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying. In August 1977, Hua explained in a report to the 11th National Congress why he officially announced Mao’s two instructions relating to the Gang of Four when the members were arrested. He said: “The announcement showed Chairman Mao’s decision to solve the problem of the Gang of Four. At that critical point, the Political Bureau took firm measures to crush the Gang of Four and their schemes of attaining supreme power over the CPC and the state, and also aimed to realize Chairman Mao’s unfulfilled wish to solve the Gang of Four 701. In view of the prevalence of interment, Mao Zedong and other leaders opted for cremation in April 1956. They issued an initiative during a meeting of the CPC Central

Committee, declaring: “First and foremost, leaders in government organs may choose cremation of their own will.“ On April 27, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu

De, and Deng Xiaoping and others signed their names on the initiative. (Huang, Study on Liu Shaoqi, 312–313.)

702. Fan, Ye Jianying in 1976, revised edition, 397–398.

219

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

problem.“703 Putting the Gang of Four under arrest was never Mao’s political wish, but it was the will of the CPC, the PLA, and the Chinese people in general, and it was fulfilled by Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying. Interestingly, on July 8, 1966, Mao Zedong in a letter to Jiang Qing predicted that after his death, both rightists and leftists would use his words against each other.704 Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying made use of Mao Zedong’s ambiguous instructions, and in the name of inheriting the ideals of Chairman Mao, they arrested the wife and nephew of Mao Zedong without resorting to arms. Ye Jianying later wrote a letter to his youngest daughter, who was living outside Beijing: “On October 6, I watched a drama and ate crabs — three male and one female — in memory of our victory.“705 Ye was thus comparing Jiang to the female crab, which he ate. Jiang came to her political end on October 6, 1976, which was an inevitable fate of hers after all the corrupted acts she carried out. Subsequently, Hu Yaobang on behalf of the CPC Central Committee stated that Ye had played “a decisive role.“706 On October 6, Xu Jingxian and Wang Xiuzhen sent people to Beijing to locate Jiang Qing and her supporters. Xu and Wang convened a meeting, during which they mobilized forces to fight against the militia for 3, 5, or 7 days so as to let the whole world understand what had happened in China. Xu issued the mobilization order to deploy 33,500 militia. Xu and Wang prepared their preliminary plan for armed rebellion. The next day, the Shanghai Militia Command held a meeting of the leaders of the 10 areas and five militia divisions directly under its command. The CPC Central Committee notified Xu and Wang that they had to attend a meeting in Beijing and to return later to Shanghai together with Ma Tianshui and Zhou Chunlin to communicate the content of the Beijing meeting to party members and the people. This move removed those leaders from Shanghai, and it disrupted 703. “Hua Guofeng’s Political Report to the 11th National Congress of the CPC“ was presented on August 12, 1977 and was adopted on August 18, 1977.

704. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 12, 73.

705. Fan, Ye Jianying in 1976, revised edition, 407. 706. Hu Yaobang said in his “Memorial Speech at the Memorial Meeting for Ye Jianying,” held on October 30, 1986, that in the struggle that led to the fall of the Gang of Four,

Ye Jianying played a decisive role: “He and other comrades in the Political Bureau

concentrated the collective wisdom of the people. In line with the opinion of most comrades in the Political Bureau and on behalf of the will of the party and the people,

they made a resolute decision and demolished the counter-revolutionary group of Jiang Qing, and they saved the party in its time of crisis.“

220

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

the plans of the Gang of Four’s supporters to launch an uprising. The Central Military Committee ordered the Nanjing Military Area to be prepared for sudden incidents.707 The Political Bureau decided to send a work team led by Su Zhenhua, Ni Zhifu, and Peng Chongshuai to Shanghai to control the situation.708 On October 12, the uprising planned by the Shanghai Militia Command was thwarted.709 It is evident that the Gang of Four did not have any support among CPC members, the PLA, and the people at large — even in Shanghai, where it was politically based. Once the situation of Shanghai was under control, the CPC Central Committee officially announced the news of the fall of the Gang of Four. On October 14, the CPC Central Committee announced the fall of the Gang of Four. On the 18th, the committee issued the “Notice on the Incident of the Counterrevolutionary Group of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan“ (CPC Central Committee Issue No. 16, 1976), which was immediately distributed to party members. The notice stated that when the great leader and mentor, Chairman Mao, fell sick and died, Wang, Zhang, Jiang, and Yao believed that their time had come to relentlessly attack the party and seize leadership of the party and the state. The CPC Central Committee had to undertake firm measures to thwart this counter-revolutionary scheme, which would have brought calamity to the Chinese people. On October 6, the CPC Central Committee decided to arrest and investigate Wang, Zhang, Jiang, and Yao. The notice declared that the CPC Central Committee was calling upon all party members to be closely united around the committee; it strongly urged comrades who had made mistakes — including those who had made severe errors in following the gang of Wang, Zhang, Jiang, and Yao — to recognize their faults. The struggle against the group of Wang, Zhang, Jiang, and Yao had to be conducted under the direction of the CPC Central Committee: no independent groups were allowed to take part in this struggle. 707. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 2, 1423.

708. Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian comp., Biography of Li Xiannian (1949– 1992), vol. 2, 959.

709. Ruling of the Special Court of the Supreme People’s Court (Special Legal Court No. 1) stated on January 23, 1981 that on October 8, 1976, when Xu Jingxian and Wang

Xiuzhen and others knew that Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan had been imprisoned, they decided to launch an armed uprising. As a result of the forceful

measures of the CPC Central Committee and fighting by the Shanghai people, their

plan of armed rebellion was thwarted. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC

Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 668.)

221

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

On October 20, the CPC Central Committee set up a special case team to investigate the crimes committed by Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan. The special case team consisted of Hua Guofeng and the members of the Political Bureau in Beijing, and the office of the special case team was headed by Wang Dongxing and Li Xin. On October 21, 1.5 million soldiers and civilians held a massive parade in Beijing to celebrate the appointment of Hua Guofeng as chairman of the CPC Central Committee and Central Military Committee; it was also held to celebrate the great victory in thwarting the schemes of the Gang of Four to seize power from the CPC and the state.710 That day, Guo Moruo wrote a poem titled “Prelude to Water Melody: Demolishing the Gang of Four:“ “General satisfaction comes from the fall of the Gang of Four. / The political rogue Wang Hongwen, the literate ruffian Yao Wenyuan, the wicked counselor Zhang Chunqiao, / And the spirit of the white skeleton Jiang Qing, who compared herself to Empress Wu Zetian and swept the nation with an iron broom. / Those who tried to seize supreme leadership of the CPC and the state had only dreamed of power.“711 These actions reflect the level of political criticism and support within and outside the party. It is evident that the Gang of Four committed many malicious acts, which justify the downfall that they deserve.712 Guo said: “Chairman Mao’s successor was a hero, who inherited the chairman’s political ideals and aimed to make great achievements! I support Chairman Hua and the CPC Central Committee. Chairman Hua called the fall of the Gang of Four the eradication of evil in the party as well as the removal of calamity in the nation, and it also fulfills the wish of the people.“ On October 24, millions of soldiers and common people gathered in the capital to celebrate the great victory and express their firm support for the CPC Central Committee’s resolution to appoint Hua Guofeng as chairman of the CPC Central Committee and Central Military Committee. The following members of the Political Bureau attended this large gathering: Hua Guofeng (chairman of the CPC Central Committee); Ye Jianying (vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee and member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau); nine members of the Political Bureau (Li Xiannian, Chen Xilian, Ji Dengkui, Wang Dongxing, Wu De, Xu Shiyou, Wei Guoqing, Li Desheng, and Chen Yonggui); and alternate members of the Political Bureau (such as Wu Guixian, Su Zhenhua, Ni Zhifu, and Sai Fuding). In all, there were 15 members and alternate members of the Political Bureau in attendance. Compared with the 25 members of the 10th Political Bureau 710. People’s Daily, October 22, 1976. 711. Feng, Guo Moruo’s Later Years, 390–391. 712. Guo, Wu Zetian, eps. 4.

222

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

in 1973, the members of the present Political Bureau had thus fallen by 10. Of the members of that 10th Political Bureau, five members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Kang Sheng, and Dong Biwu) had died; Deng Xiaoping had been demoted; and Wang Hongwen, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan had been arrested. Wu De (member of the Political Bureau, first secretary of the CPC Beijing Committee, and director of the Beijing Revolution Committee) announced at the gathering that Comrade Hua Guofeng was the successor who had been personally selected by the great leader, Chairman Mao: “In April 1976, Chairman Mao proposed that Comrade Hua Guofeng be appointed the first vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee and premier of the State Council. On April 30, Chairman Mao wrote to Comrade Hua Guofeng saying ’With you in charge, I can rest easily,’ which expressed Chairman Mao’s infinite trust towards Hua Guofeng. The CPC Central Committee, headed by Comrade Hua Guofeng, took resolute measures after Chairman Mao died; at a critical historical point of China’s revolution, the committee uncovered the counter-revolutionary actions of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, and it saved the revolution and the party.“713 On October 25, the People’s Daily, Red Flag, and PLA Daily published the editorial “A Great Historic Victory,“ announcing Mao Zedong’s criticism against the Gang of Four from July 1974 to May 1975, particularly Mao’s talk to the Political Bureau on May 3, 1975.714 This became the legal grounds for the CPC Central Committee’s arrest of the Gang of Four. The editorial stated that Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan were agents of capitalism in the CPC, relentless capitalist roaders, schemers, and capitalist careerists.715 This was the same political slander that had been imposed on Deng Xiaoping by the Gang of Four, and now just six months later it was being applied to the gang members. On October 27, the Shanghai CPC Committee convened a meeting, during which Su Zhenhua announced the decision of the committee to revoke all official positions 713. People’s Daily, October 25, 1976. 714. On May 3, 1975, Chairman Mao repeated the fundamental principles of the Three Musts and Three Must-Nots and said: “We must adhere to Marxism and we must not

apply revisionism; we must unite with each other, and we must not divide; we must play fair, and we must not become involved in intrigues. The Gang of Four should not continue. Why are you still involved in it? The problem with them will be solved in the

second half of this year if not in the first half; it will be solved next year if not this year; and it will be solved the year after next if not next year.“ (Ibid.) 715. Ibid.

223

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

of Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen in Shanghai. Su Zhenhua, Ni Zhifu, and Peng Chong were appointed first, second, and third secretaries of the committee respectively. The leaders of all provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions sent congratulatory telegrams to Hua Guofeng and the CPC Central Committee and expressed their firm support for the committee, headed by Hua Guofeng. Thus, the 10-year Cultural Revolution had come to an end. The decision made by the Political Bureau on October 6 reflected the political wishes of the CPC, PLA, and the people.716 Why did special measures have to be taken in arresting the Gang of Four? On October 8, Ye Jianying explained at a meeting of the Political Bureau that Jiang Qing was the prime mover in the gang and that Zhang Chunqiao acted as counselor: “When Deng Xiaoping presided over the work of the CPC Central Committee, he tried to rally with them, but it was to no avail. The Gang of Four acted like a cancer within the CPC, and at some point it would attack.“ On March 22, 1977, Ye Jianying said at a working meeting of the CPC Central Committee that the Gang of Four was a minority within the Political Bureau: However, we see that among the members of the Gang of Four, one was a vice chairman of the CPC [Wang Hongwen], one was a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau [Zhang Chunqiao], one was a domineering and ambitious schemer [Jiang Qing], and one was a trumpeter who was in control of all propaganda tools [Yao Wenyuan]. Though they were few in number, they were quite powerful. After Chairman Mao fell sick, he appointed a liaison officer — Mao Yuanxin — who conveyed messages between Mao and the Political Bureau. At that time, the comrades in the Political Bureau allowed major issues to take precedence, and for the sake of Chairman Mao’s health and without breaking fundamental principles, they exercised restraint until Chairman Mao passed away.717 This indicates that most members of the Political Bureau were simply waiting for the right moment to remove the Gang of Four. The death of Mao Zedong was certainly a trigger. However, the Gang of Four challenged Hua Guofeng and the CPC Central Committee, and that was the direct cause that accelerated their political demise. In

716. The CPC Central Committee stated that in the first days of October 1976, the Political Bureau had implemented the mandate of the CPC and the people by eliminating

Jiang Qing’s counter-revolutionary group and ending the catastrophe of the Cultural Revolution. Among the long-term victories of the CPC, PLA, and Chinese of all

ethnicities, this was the greatest. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the

Eleventh CPC Central Committee,” vol. 2, 814.) 717. Li, Research Review of Zhou Enlai, 571–572.

224

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

1980, Deng Xiaoping explained the political background of this decision.718 In terms of organizational procedure, the move against the Gang of Four violated Article 9 of the Party Constitution adopted at the 9th CPC National Congress, and it broke party rules.719 However, the Gang of Four had also broken CPC regulations. Interestingly, the Party Constitution passed at the 10th National Congress of the CPC in 1973, which was amended under the direction of Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen, removed that Article 9. As a result, the decision made by the Political Bureau on April 7 to strip Deng Xiaoping of all official positions both within and outside the CPC was illegal and contrary to party regulations. With regard to the unusual means of dealing with the Gang of Four, Chen Yun (member of the CPC Central Committee and vice chairman of the NPC) was the only leader at the time to question the legality of arresting the Gang of Four. He agreed with adopting the stringent measures to break up the Gang of Four, but he was worried about this move in contravention of party regulations. He said: “This should never be taken as a precedent.“720 In July 1977, the Third Plenary Session of the 10th CPC Central Committee passed the “Resolution on Granting Comrade Hua Guofeng the Title of Chairman of CPC Central Committee and Chairman of the Central Military Committee“ and “Resolution on the Counter-Revolutionary Group of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan.“ It was decided that Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan should lose their CPC membership as well as all official positions. This process was conducted in accordance with all legal procedures. At that meeting, modifications were also made to the central CPC leadership. The Standing Committee of the Political Bureau consisted of Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, and Deng Xiaoping, and the Political Bureau comprised 16 members. 718. Deng Xiaoping said: “Although Chairman Mao appointed a successor [Hua Guofeng], the Gang of Four was not willing to obey him. After Chairman Mao passed away, the

Gang of Four used this opportunity to usurp power and posed a deadly threat. The Gang of Four was so aggressive that it was prepared to overthrow the new leader.

Under such circumstances, most of the comrades in the Political Bureau agreed to fight the Gang of Four.“ (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 349.)

719. Article 9 of the CPC Constitution adopted at the 9th National Congress of the CPC stipulated the Political Bureau, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, and

chairman and vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee were to be elected at a plenary session of the CPC Central Committee. 720. Yang, The Era of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 1, 84.

225

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

In August 1977 at the 11th National Congress of the CPC, Hua Guofeng officially announced the end of the Cultural Revolution. However, Hua had inherited and implemented Mao Zedong’s political course of continuous revolution, and he was thus unable to disclaim the Cultural Revolution. Hua held the power of the CPC, the state, and the PLA, and as such he became the focus of all conflicts and disputes in China: in Mao Zedong’s words, Hua roasted over the fire like Cao Cao in ancient China.721 Hua lacked the ability to solve the consequences of the Cultural Revolution as well as the social conflicts and disputes in China. He also did not possess the vision or resolution to initiate the epoch of reform and opening-up. Hua was a political figure who played a transitional role, and he would soon be replaced by Deng Xiaoping, China’s true statesman. The procedure by which Hua stepped down was different from that decided upon at the Political Bureau meeting on April 7, 1976 and at the emergency meeting on October 6, 1976. It was in strict accordance with CPC regulations as established at the Sixth Plenary Session of 11th CPC Central Committee,722 and it was the first peaceful succession of the supreme leader. When Mao Zedong went on his tour of southern China from August to September 1971, he said that all efforts to divide the party had failed: “This issue is worthy researching on. Such a big nation with such a large population has remained united only because the people and CPC members around the country strongly desire unity. Judging from the history of our party, we have grounds for hope.“723 721. In 1970, Mao Zedong said that there would no longer be a state president and that he did not wish to work in such a position. He provided a historical anecdote at a Political

Bureau meeting in the last days of April. He said that when Sun Quan persuaded Cao Cao to become emperor, Cao Cao replied that Sun Quan was trying to roast him over

the fire. Mao Zedong requested that he not be Cao Cao and the others not be Sun Quan. (Xu, Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1966), 415.)

722. From November 10 to December 5, 1980, it was decided at Political Bureau meetings that it was inappropriate for Hua Guofeng to continue working in his present official position. Hua Guofeng requested to resign. It was resolved at a meeting that a proposal

be made at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee for Hua Guofeng to resign from the posts of chairman of the CPC Central Committee and

chairman of the Central Military Committee. The Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th

CPC Central Committee approved this suggestion, and so Hua officially resigned.

Hu Yaobang was elected chairman of the CPC Central Committee and Deng Xiaoping chairman of the Central Military Committee. (Li, From the First to Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC, vol. 2, 990.)

723. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee, Mao Zedong’s Works

226

The Political Battle between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing (1973-1976)

The Cultural Revolution, launched and led by Mao, deviated from its original political target: it resulted in numerous, persistent political splits in the CPC, and it eventually lost the support of party members, the PLA, and the Chinese people. The CPC was unable to act on this matter when Mao was alive and had to await the right moment and muster its strength to resolutely make its historic decision. As the CPC Central Committee declared in 1981, when Mao Zedong died in September 1976, the counter-revolutionary group of Jiang Qing stepped up its efforts to seize leadership of the party and state. In the first days of October 1976, the Political Bureau implemented the mandate of the CPC and the people by eliminating Jiang Qing’s counter-revolutionary group and ending the catastrophe of the Cultural Revolution. Among the long-term victories of the CPC, PLA, and Chinese people, this was the greatest. In defeating Jiang’s counter-revolutionary group, Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian, and other officials played important roles,724 as did Wang Dongxing, Chen Xilian,725 Wu De,726 Su Zhenhua, and Ni Zhifu, among others. The CPC Central Committee’s resolution also mentioned the special role played by Mao Zedong: although Mao had insisted on the incorrect political route of the Cultural Revolution, he remedied some errors and protected some leading party officials and non-party individuals, which ensured that some responsible officials would return to leading positions. Mao led the defeat of the Lin Biao counterrevolutionary group; he also revealed and criticized the mistakes of Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao and prevented them from appropriating the leadership. These actions played an important role in the party’s subsequent ability to defeat the Gang of Four.727 Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 242. 724. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 814.

725. At that time, Chen Xilian presided over the daily work of the CPC Central Committee

and concurrently worked as commander of the Beijing Military Area. Hua Guofeng

discussed with him how to solve the problem of the Gang of Four on four occasions. (Zhu, et al. eds., Wu De’s Oral History: A Record of the Ten-Year History of Storms, Some Personal Work Experiences in Beijing, 244.)

726. At that time, Wu De worked concurrently as first political commissar of the Beijing Garrison.

727. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 814.

227

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

History is more complex than many people imagine. It proceeds with or without particular individuals, and future generations are smarter than previous generations. As Mao Zedong said at the National Congress of the CPC after handling the incident of Gao Gang and Rao Shushi: “Will the Earth stop revolving without you? The Earth will still revolve, and it may perhaps do so much better than when you were alive.“728 In January 1965, Mao said: “Future generations will be smarter than us.“ The journalist Edgar Snow once asked Mao what future generations in China would do. Mao Zedong said that there were two possibilities: “One is that they will carry on the revolution. The other is that they will go against the revolution, become reconciled with the imperialists, and welcome Chiang Kaishek back to the mainland, and they will go along with the counter-revolutionary elements that presently make up just a few percent of the Chinese population. That is the counter-revolutionary route. Let’s leave future matters to future generations. In the long term, the future generations will be smarter than us — just like people in a capitalist society are smarter and better than those in a feudalistic society.“729 Deng Xiaoping said that during his lifetime, the Cultural Revolution was the harshest period. Nonetheless, when Deng Xiaoping visited the Jinggang Mountains in November 1972, he said: “Our party is good and hopeful. Our people are good and hopeful. Our country is good and hopeful.730 Our party, people, and country remain hopeful in hardship, and they see the sunshine after rain.“ Without Mao Zedong, there would have been no Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution ended along with Mao died. Mao’s death marked not alone the end of the Mao era but also the end of the Cultural Revolution. It is also a milestone of China entering a new times: the start of the Deng Xiaoping period with reform and opening-up. Instead of disruption or termination of China’s socialist modernization, progress was achieved at a faster rate. However, China did not move directly from the era of Mao Zedong to that of Deng Xiaoping: it went through a short transitional period — that of Hua Guofeng, during which time there were changes among those wielding political power. History put Deng onto the political stage again, and he played an epoch-making role as the leader. Once again, China moved forward.

728. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Collected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 6, 412.

729. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Collected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 8, 400.

730. Maomao, My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution, 243.

228

7

Chapter

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Different from other developed and developing countries in terms of its economic and political systems, China is one of a kind. With a powerful central government that was established in 1949, China had the capacity to mobilize social resources — both material and human resources — to improve the rate of investment or accumulation, boost consumption, secure people’s livelihoods, and provide essential low-level, broad-based social services. In addition, China was able to achieve economic and social targets by relying on popular movements. According to an investigative report on China by the World Bank in 1983, China was a low-income country with a unique social and political system that had various advantages and held high potential for future success. However, the unique systems were also capable giving rise to unexpected consequences,1 such as the Cultural Revolution. China’s special politic and economic system made strategic decision making crucial, and which are in hands of the leadership. In other words, making the right move would bring forth massive success, yet poor strategic resolutions would lead to partial or complete failure associated at painful price. The Cultural Revolution signified a special era in China’s political history. Mao Zedong’s theory on continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat was based on his own supreme directives, which were refined by Chen Boda and Yao Wenyuan during the Cultural Revolution. However, the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee approved Mao’s theory on continuing the revolution under the proletariat dictatorship at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee, the enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee, and the 9th and 10th National Congresses of the CPC. By putting the correct theories into practice, it might help China to success. However, 1.

According to a report from the World Bank in 1983, China’s economic system was organized to mobilize material and human resources for such purposes as attaining specific iron and steel production targets and eradicating infectious disease. With this system, the CPC Central Committee had the power to control resources, and thus it

is capable of improving accumulation rate, boost consumption, and secure people’s livelihoods in low-income areas of the country. In rural and urban regions, China had a characteristic rigid organizational hierarchy. With central administration, central

directives could be relayed effectively and basic social services (education, health care, and family planning) could be provided for the masses in a desirable, fruitful manner.

By relying on popular movements to achieve social and economic targets and lift the

will of the masses, China had raised the possibility for future success. Nevertheless, unexpected consequences could also develop radically. (World Bank, China — Socialist Economic Development: The Economy, Statistical System, and Basic Data, 146.)

230

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

following incorrect theories might lead to court disaster. Mao manipulated both the political decisions and theories of the CPC Central Committee; carried out the 10-year-long Cultural Revolution on the basis of an illogical theory, resulting in China being catastrophic. How should we define the nature of the Cultural Revolution that launched and led by Mao Zedong?2 Who were the targets of this revolution? The author addresses these issues from a historical perspective as follows: 1. Mao launched and led the Cultural Revolution against the CPC and the Chinese government, despite the fact that he had formed and headed both. 2. Mao launched and led the Cultural Revolution against the state institutions of the Peoples’ Republic of China, despite the fact that he had established and headed them. 3. Mao launched and led the Cultural Revolution against the human rights of the masses, despite the fact that he loved them and sought to defend them. 4. Mao launched and led the Cultural Revolution against Chinese civilization and culture, despite the fact that he had inherited and respected them. 5. Mao Zedong launched and led the Cultural Revolution against the Mao Zedong Thought, despite the fact that he had created and developed it himself. In April 1956, Mao Zedong said, “It is inevitable that all of us make mistakes. In the process of revolution and construction, all countries — including China — 2.

In March 1927, Mao Zedong, age 33, stated in the “Investigation Report of the Peasant Movements in Hunan” that revolution was actually a form of armed rebellion by

nature through which one class overthrew another class instead of entertaining guests, writing essays, painting pictures, and doing embroidery in a temperate, kind, courteous, restrained, and magnanimous way. (Publishing Committee of Selected Works

of Mao Zedong of the CPC Central Committee, Selected Works of Mao Zedong, 17.)

In April 1970, Kang Sheng, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central

Committee, interpreted the Cultural Revolution as follows: “How should we conduct a revolution in a socialist society? We can find an answer in the Constitution of the Communist Party of China: our Cultural Revolution is a great political revolution through which the proletariat revolts against the bourgeoisie and the exploiting class in the

socialist society. The Cultural Revolution was created by Chairman Mao who called for continuing the revolution and working on solutions for the revolution — the Cultural Revolution.” (Kang, “Speech at the Working Forum on Consolidating and Building the CPC Central Committee and the Army,” April 18, 1970.)

231

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

are bound to make errors. However, if we adopt the proper attitude, we will make fewer mistakes and be able to rectify national errors.”3 This was Mao’s subjective wish, so as a theory he sincerely believed in. However, Mao did made the first disastrous decision with the Great Leap Forward two years later, and it took several years to rectify the faults thereby created and to revive the economy following the deaths of a great many Chinese. Subsequently, Mao made a second major error starting the Cultural Revolution, and the CPC Central Committee did not rectify this until 10 years later, after Mao had died. The Cultural Revolution was in fact more meant to be a self-torture than self-revolution. It is necessary to address the following questions. What kind of losses did Mao Zedong incur from his political faults in his later years? How should we make an objective assessment of such losses in a quantitative fashion? Was China able to achieve its modernization goals in the Cultural Revolution? What economic and social levels did China attain during that revolution? What level of historical progress was China’s industrialization and modernization able to make in the Cultural Revolution? In this period, what were the disparities between China and its counterparts in neighboring countries and territories? We may find solutions to the above questions through an analysis of remarks made by Mao Zedong and those of others. In this way, we might come up with an accurate assessment of the major right and wrong decisions in a systematic fashion. The author will first presents Mao Zedong’s comments on the Cultural Revolution as well as remarks made by the CPC Central Committee at different times. Then the author would examines China’s economic growth, social development, political influence, and international status during the Cultural Revolution based on various forms of data, calculations, and an analysis of the results obtained. Though repudiating the theory and practice of the Cultural Revolution, launched and led by Mao, I objectively affirm the fruits of China’s modernization and the progress it made, and I evaluate various losses — both direct losses (statistical losses) and indirect losses (the loss of opportunities incurred because of Mao’s major fault in instigating the Cultural Revolution). After that, the author analyzes and makes generalizations regarding the fundamental causes of Mao Zedong’s errors in his later years; these included life tenure of the leader, failure of the central democratic and collective decision-making system, and political struggles against dissidents within the party. The author will also conduct an analysis and makes a comparison between Stalin and Mao regarding their errors and those consequences. At last, the author explains how Deng Xiaoping was able to achieve success in reform through having learned from Mao’s failure in his later years, which is the dominant theme 3.

232

Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Collected Works

of Mao Zedong, vol. 7, 65.

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

of this book. It is evident that Mao was wrong in initiating the Cultural Revolution and that it ended in failure. However, having learned from Mao’s mistakes, Deng was able to formulate a viable strategy of reform and opening-up, thereby achieving success.

Mao Zedong’s Comments on the Cultural Revolution and Related Historical Remarks Mao Zedong designed the Cultural Revolution, which provoked a great controversy. So what were Mao’s own views on this revolution? How did his comments vary as the Cultural Revolution progressed? After instigating the Cultural Revolution, Mao quickly announced to apply it throughout the country without first putting it to test as social practice: “The Cultural Revolution is bound to achieve victory.” Actually, he extolled himself in his decision to stage the Cultural Revolution. On August 13 1966, Mao Zedong personally reviewed and approved the “Communiqué of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee”; this Communiqué stressed that Mao’s guideline in carrying out the Cultural Revolution amounted to a reformation of Marxism-Leninism.4 The 16-point “Decision of the CPC Central Committee on the Cultural Revolution” was prepared under Mao’s instruction: “The Cultural Revolution touches the inner soul, and it ushers in a new era in our socialist revolution.” The Communiqué declared that the Cultural Revolution was bound to achieve victory under the leadership of the CPC Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao.5 On August 18, Lin Biao delivered a eulogy at a rally to celebrate the revolution, which was staged in Tiananmen Square: “The Cultural Revolution, launched by Chairman Mao, is a pioneer in the communist movement and socialist revolution.”6 Despite the fact that two years later, the Cultural Revolution was proving to be an unprecedented political catastrophe, Mao Zedong insisted on praising it. 4.

The “Communiqué of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee”

was passed on August 12, 1966. (People’s Daily, August 13, 1966.)

5.

The “Decision of the CPC Central Committee on the Cultural Revolution” was passed

6.

It was written in Lin Biao’s speech, which was delivered at a rally to celebrate the

on August 8, 1966. (People’s Daily, August 9, 1966.)

Cultural Revolution on August 18, 1966. (Xinhua News Agency, “Chairman Mao, Lin

Biao, Zhou Enlai, and Other Leaders Met with Student Representatives and Inspected the Cultural Revolution Parade,” August 19, 1966.)

233

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

On October 31, 1968, the Communiqué of the enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee affirmed the theory and practice of the Cultural Revolution. Mao was convinced by the necessity of conducting the Cultural Revolution quick so as to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and prevent the restoration of capitalism. It is notable that the above Communiqué actually declared the Cultural Revolution as achieving a great, decisive victory.7 On April 1, 1969, the “Report to the 9th National People’s Congress of the CPC” — authored by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan and reviewed by Mao Zedong — was delivered by Lin Biao. The report claimed that it was necessary for the great mentor, Chairman Mao, to quickly conduct and lead the Cultural Revolution. This was based on the theory of continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, thereby making a contribution to the theory and practice of MarxismLeninism.8 Even though the Lin Biao Incident demonstrated the incorrect theory and practice of the Cultural Revolution, Mao still spoke highly of himself in deciding to launch and conduct it. On August 24, 1973, Zhou Enlai delivered the “Report to the 10th National People’s Congress of CPC,” which was coauthored by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao 7.

The “Communiqué of the Enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee” was passed on October 31, 1968: “All the participants reached a consensus

that our great leader, Mao Zedong, had launched and led the Cultural Revolution to revolt against the bourgeoisie and the exploiting class on behalf of the proletariat under a proletarian dictatorship. As Chairman Mao remarked, practice had shown that it was

necessary to quickly conduct the Cultural Revolution to consolidate the dictatorship of

the proletariat, prevent the restoration of the bourgeoisie, and build socialism. Under the guidance of Chairman Mao’s proletarian revolutionary line and the leadership of

the proletarian faction led by Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin Biao, we have finally destroyed the bourgeoisie faction — led by Liu Shaoqi and his allies — which

had the ulterior motive of usurping power over the party, government, and army. We have seized power by conducting a complex, fierce class struggle for two years,

mobilizing millions of revolutionary people and winning the support of the PLA. Except for the province of Taiwan, revolutionary committees have been established

in 29 provinces, cities, and autonomous regions across China. In a word, the Cultural Revolution has achieved a great, decisive victory.” (People’s Daily, November 1, 1968.) 8.

“Lin Biao’s Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC” was delivered on April 1,



The “Report to the 9th National Congress of the CPC” was coauthored by Zhang

1969, and passed on April 14. (People’s Daily on April 28, 1969.)

Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan and personally reviewed and modified by Mao Zedong

eight times. (Zheng and Zhang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 3, 130.)

234

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Wenyuan and reviewed by Mao Zedong. The report declared that the revolutionary practice of carrying on the struggle against the Lin Biao anti-party clique after the 9th National People’s Congress of the CPC had proved the party right in following the political and organizational guidelines given by the congress and the CPC Central Committee, which was headed by Mao.9 Mao Zedong’s comments were relayed across China. He touched on issues related to the Cultural Revolution on many occasions, and he reflected on the errors launching and conducting that revolution at his middle and later stages rather than totally affirming the revolution. On October 14, 1968, Mao Zedong delivered a speech at the enlarged Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee. He said, “The Cultural Revolution may be regarded as merely a historical episode in 50 or 100 years’ time.”10 When he met the commissioner of the Central Committee Standing Presidium of the Communist Party of Romania, Emil Bodnaras, on June 11, 1970, Mao claimed that the Cultural Revolution had plunged the country into turmoil. Mao defined its nature as the continuous civil war between the CPC and the Nationalist Party.11 On June 27, Mao met with a delegation from North Korea, and he mentioned 9.

The report was published in People’s Daily on September 1, 1973. (Zheng and Zhang,

China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 3, 341.)

Mao Zedong issued instructions about “agreeing to the principles” of the report, and

the report was submitted by Zhou Enlai, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan to Mao

Zedong. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 358).

10. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of

Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee, vol. 1, 55.

11. On June 11, 1970, Mao Zedong met with the commissioner of the Central Committee Standing Presidium of the Communist Party of Romania, Emil Bodnaras. With regard

to the Cultural Revolution, Mao said, “China went into a state of turmoil, and rebels shouted slogans about purging Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, and other leaders. In the past,

we failed to unmask class enemies because we seized power by means of military force,

and our class enemies sneaked into the party, the work force, schools, party organs, and

villages. The Cultural Revolution was by nature a continuation of the civil war between the CPC and the Nationalist Party. There was a batch of reactionaries from various countries in Beijing and elsewhere in China. If we are not afraid of turmoil, China will

not go into such a state.” Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, and Huang

Yongsheng were present at the meeting. (Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s

Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,” vol. 1, 596.)

235

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

the turmoil in China caused by the Cultural Revolution.12 On December 18, Mao conversed with the American journalist Edgar Snow and acknowledged, “The Cultural Revolution plunged the country into turmoil.”13 From 1975 to 1976, Mao Zedong remarked on the Cultural Revolution, “We basically followed the correct course, but we had flaws. At present, we need to focus on identifying those errors. Specifically speaking, 70% of what we did in the Cultural Revolution we can regard as achievements, with the remaining 30% having been errors.”14 Mao further conceded that there were two main areas of error with regard to the revolution: purging all the veteran officials and inciting civil unrest.15 However, Mao was positive with respect to the Cultural Revolution and viewed it as his greatest accomplishment. As Hu Qiaomu pointed out, “Mao Zedong was caught in the trap of the Cultural Revolution.”16 In June 1976, shortly before his death, Mao looked back on his life and declared, “I achieved two major feats: I defeated Chiang Kai-shek and founded the new China, and I initiated the Cultural Revolution.” However, Mao acknowledged that most people opposed the Cultural Revolution, which was in sharp contrast to the small number who expressed support for it.17 Mao did in fact fear that future generations would repudiate the Cultural Revolution. The verdict of history would be given by others 12. Mao Zedong met with a delegation from North Korea. With respect to the Cultural Revolution, Mao remarked, “The Cultural Revolution plunged the country into turmoil, and rebels shouted slogans about purging Zhou Enlai, Li Xiannian, and other leaders.

In the past, we failed to understand some issues about the Cultural Revolution. Now, we are beginning to understand that the Capital May 16 Red Guard Corps committed

some evil acts, and they were unmasked in the Cultural Revolution.” Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, Li Xiannian, Wu Faxian, and Qiu Huizuo were present at that meeting. (Ibid., 602–603.)

13. On December 18, 1970, Mao Zedong conceded to Edgar Snow that China went into a state of turmoil through carrying on that violent struggle. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 176.)

14. Ibid., 488–489. 15. Ibid.

16. Wang, The Era of Great Turmoil, 4.

17. Mao Zedong said, “I have achieved two feats in my life. First, with the support of most

people, I fought against Chang Kai-shek for dozens of years and drove him away to an

island. I won the war against Japan, which lasted for eight years. I repelled the Japanese

and formed a new government in Beijing. Second, I staged the Cultural Revolution. Most people were opposed to the Cultural Revolution and few expressed support for it.” (Xu, Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1966), 359.)

236

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

and viewed by posterity rather than through remarks by the participants at the time or the impressions of contemporaries. Even the official remarks made by the CPC Central Committee would soon be superseded by the judgment of history. By October 1978, Deng Xiaoping had become keenly aware that Lin Biao and the Gang of Four had hindered China’s development, causing China to develop a 10-year lag behind other countries: “In the early 1960s, there was a narrow gap between the level of our science and technology and that of the most advanced countries. In recent years, the world has achieved considerable development and thus that gap has widened. Compared with developed countries, our economy may be 20, 30, or even 50 years behind.”18 In March 1981, Deng remarked, “We made a grave and basic error in staging the Cultural Revolution, and the consequences we suffered were catastrophic. The Cultural Revolution destroyed the fate of at least one generation of our people.”19 It is notable that Deng described the Cultural Revolution as a disaster and a 10-year catastrophe.20 At the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, held in June 1981, the CPC Central Committee passed the “Decision on Some Historical Aspects Since the Foundation of the People’s Republic of China.” That document reviewed the history of the Cultural Revolution and commented that the revolution inflicted the most serious setbacks and losses on the party, country, and people. History had clearly demonstration that China’s leaders had wrongly staged the Cultural Revolution, where the counter-revolutionary cliques took advantage of the situation. The outcome was civil unrest, a man-made disaster for the party, country, and people.21 As more and more information concerning the Cultural Revolution has been released, shedding light on this occurrence as well as on reform and opening-up, we are in a better position to examine the history of that revolution. This chapter reviews that history and reflects on those events. In the following sections, the author will make comprehensive remarks on China’s economic growth, social development, political influence, and international status during the Cultural Revolution based on calculations and analysis of the data. 18. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 132.

19. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, 269.

20. Ibid., 227.

21. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of

Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 808–819.

237

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Economic Evaluation of the Cultural Revolution Economic growth During the Cultural Revolution, China’s economy achieved modest growth despite the impact of political movements.22 An average GDP growth rate of 5.1% is recorded from 1966 to 1976, which was lower than the 9.2% recorded from 1952 to 1957 and the 9.7% from 1978 to 2006. The country’s GDP from 1966 to 1976 (based on 1952 prices) increased by 65%: secondary industry achieved the rapid growth rate of 108%; tertiary industry achieved a modest growth rate of 54%; and primary industry achieved a slow growth rate of 25%. Within the 5.1% average growth rate in GDP in 1966–1976, secondary industry contributed 7.6%, tertiary industry contributed for 4.4%, and primary industry contributed 2.3%. Thus, by industrial sector, economic growth was mainly driven by secondary industry, and the GDP growth rate of tertiary and primary industry lagged behind, being lower than the average GDP growth rate (Table 7.1). From the above data, it is evident that the national economy was not on the verge of any collapse.23 However, the 10 years political struggles during the Cultural Revolution did slow China’s economic growth from its growth potential, which results in economic fluctuations. The author will make a detailed analysis in the following section. Table 7.1

GDP and industrial growth, 1966–1976 (%)

Year

GDP

Primary industry

Secondary industry

Tertiary industry

GDP per capita

1966

100

100

100

100

100

1976

165

125

208

154

131

5.1

2.3

7.6

4.4

2.7

Average annual growth rate

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949-2004), 12.

Note: 1966 is taken as the baseline.

22. China’s long-term economic growth potential over the next 50 years was approximately 9%. If we classify economic growth at an average annual GDP growth rate of more than

6% or average annual GDP per capita growth rate of over 4% as rapid and economic growth at an average annual GDP growth rate of up to 6% or average annual GDP per

capita growth rate of up to 4% as moderate, the economic growth in the period of the Cultural Revolution is categorized as moderate.

23. On February 26, 1978, Hua Guofeng stated that the national economy was on the verge

of collapse in the “Report on the Work of the Government” at the 5th National People’s Congress.

238

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Dramatic progress in China’s industrialization The plan after 1949 was to advance China’s industrialization from private sector bases to operate at the national level via mobilizing social resources and state forces. During 1949 to 1976, China reached its initial targets of industrialization by setting up an independent, complete industrial system (affecting all industrial sectors) and a national economic system.24 This laid the industrialized foundation for China’s future economic boom and attracted foreign investment in the 1980s. Proceeding into the 1990s, China is served as the world’s finished-product processing base. As is widely known, China has industrial base advantages like product specialization and processing capacity over other big developing countries with large populations, e.g., India and Indonesia. China became one of the world’s major industrial countries. From 1966 to 1975, its major industrial production capacity increased.25 Taking the purchasing power parity recorded in the World Bank database as a reference, China’s industrial strength accounted for additional 3.4% of value worldwide. In 1978, China got herself among the top 10 nations in the world in terms of product output value.26 Based on an analysis of historical records, Maurice Meisner concluded that the era of Mao Zedong was characterized by rapid industrialization. Whereby comparing with its counterparts, China was able to achieve striking development on the stage of modern history.27 China emulated the industrial pattern of the Soviet Union by prioritizing the growth of heavy industry. From 1928 to 1949, the industrial output value of the Soviet Union increased 5.5-fold, and its heavy industrial output rose 9-fold. Prior to the Second World War, the industrial output of the Soviet Union accounted for 24 Except for Tibet, complete, coordinated industrial systems were set up in China’s provinces. Industrial systems for defense were also established, and there were striking developments in resource exploitation. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC

Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 795, 808.)

25. National Bureau of Statistic of the People’s Republic of China, Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004), 50–52.

26. In 1978, China ranked fifth in the world’s steel output, third in coal output, in the top

eight for crude oil output, the top seven for generating capacity, the top four for cement

output, the top three for fertilizer output, the top eight for sugar output, and it was

the top country for cotton cloth output. (National Bureau of Statistics of China comp., China Statistics Abstract (2007), 224.)

27. Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, 384.

239

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

84% of total national output value.28 From 1965 to 1978, China’s industrial output value showed a 3.53-fold increase: the average annual growth rate was 10.2%, with the heavy industrial output value showing a 4.27-fold rise at an average annual growth rate of 11.8%. China’s proportion of industrial output value to national income increased from 36.4% to 46.8% between 1965 and 1978.29 China’s industrialization denied participation of the private sector, hence suppressing the private economic development potential. In addition, rural industrialization was rejected, and the limited industrialization in urban areas restricted the capacity to create and provide employment. China’s industrialization had a monolithic character, and it was unable to adapt to meet current situations and accommodate the country’s vast territory, large population, abundant labor resources, and regional variations.

Unprecedented development of infrastructure China’s industrialization offered advantages in mobilizing social resources for the national infrastructure. During the Cultural Revolution, China’s rail, road, air transport, telecommunications and urban infrastructure underwent unprecedented development: 1966 to 1976 witnessed the development of modern infrastructure. For example, the laying of pipelines showed the rapid growth rate of 24.6%, hydroelectric power generating capacity increased by 13.7%, overall electricity generating capacity increased by 9.4%, and aviation mileage increased by 9.5%; it was only the length of navigable inland waterways that achieved negative growth (Table 7.2). These moves laid a solid foundation for the economic boom in the era of reform and opening-up.

28. Lu et al. eds., The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 490.

29. National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Statistical Information for the 55 Year Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China, 18, 20.

240

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Table 7.2

Development of infrastructure and growth rates, 1966–1976 1966

1976

33055.0*

44981

Annual average growth rate, 1966–1976 (%) 3.13

39.3

49.1

2.25

Length of roads opened (1,000 km)

543.6

823.4

4.24

Length of navigable inland waterways (1,000 km)

147.2

137.4

–0.70

Aviation mileage (1,000 km)

39.4

97.8

9.52

Pipelines laid (1,000 km)

0.7

6.3

24.6

Water pipes (1,000 km)

19.0

31.9

5.32

Electricity-generating capacity (100 million kWh)

8,250

20,310

9.43

Hydroelectric power-generating capacity (100 million kWh)

1,260

4,560

13.70

Length of postal routes (1,000km)

3,680.6

4,836.0

2.77

Key indicators Irrigated area (1,000 hectares)

Length of rail track opened (1,000 km)

Drainage pipes (1,000 km)

12.9

18.3

3.56

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004), 26, 29, 41, 44, 54.

Note: *Data for 1965.

The start of rural industrialization in the 1970s During the Great Leap Forward, rural industrialization made some progress, though it was halted in line with economic adjustments. A new pattern developed that was characterized by state-owned industry in the cities and five small industries in the counties (iron and steel, chemical, fertilizer, cement, coal and machinery).This was the result of deliberate policies allowing and encouraging rural industrialization being introduced to replace the original monolithic model of industrialization. In August 1970, the State Council convened the Northern Region Agricultural Conference,30 and Zhou Enlai proposed increasing the pace of 30. The conference set the objective for the level of mechanical operations exceeding

70% in state agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, and fisheries. To attain this objective, the conference stated that manufacturing and repairing networks should be

promoted at county, commune, and production team levels. This would help develop

rural communes and production teams in the production of steel, coal, machinery,

241

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

agricultural mechanization.31 In September 1971, the State Council held the National Agricultural Mechanization Conference to establish guidelines for setting up rural communes and production team enterprises and initiating industrialization in rural areas. After 1970, rural communes and production teams underwent rapid development and achieved an average annual output growth rate of 24%. In August 1975, Deng Xiaoping proposed that urban industry should support the small-scale rural industries.32 By the end of 1975, the output value of rural communes and production teams had amounted to CNY19.78 billion; of that, the output value of rural communes accounted for CNY8.68 billion and that of rural production teams CNY11.1 billion, which was correspondingly 30.7%, 29.9% and 13.1% more than the previous year (Table 7.3). On top of that, the proportion of the output value of rural communes and production teams to national industrial output value increased from 3.3% in 1970 to 9.3% in 1975. These figures were significant for them representing rural communes and production teams, which laid a foundation for China’s rural industrialization and underwent rapid development in the era of reform and opening-up.

cement, and fertilizer, which would enhance agricultural mechanization, processing of agricultural products and by-products, refrigeration, and transportation. There

would be an emphasis on manufacturing and supplying small agricultural tools and improved implements.

31. The conference declared that “modern agriculture should use mechanical operations and aim toward mechanization. By relying solely on manual labor, it would be

impossible to boost agricultural productivity, change the agricultural labor structure of 600 million farmers, and redirect labor toward accelerating industrial development.

Chairman Mao once called for ‘basically achieving agricultural mechanization within 25 years,’ and after 15 years of elapse, we should increase the pace for the following 10 years.”

32. On August 18, 1975, Deng Xiaoping requested at a theoretical forum on the planning

work of the State Council, “We should promote the ideology of developing agriculture as the mainstay of our national economy, and we should encourage industry to support agriculture and promote agricultural modernization as a major task. In addition, industrial zones and industrial cities have to help surrounding rural areas

in developing small-scale industry and boosting agricultural production. We need to

incorporate such measures into our plans. Industry and agriculture need to support each other to reinforce the alliance between industrial workers and farmers.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 28–29.)

242

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Table 7.3 Growth in Output value of rural communes and production teams, 1970–1976 Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

Output value of rural communes (CNY100 million) 27.6 39.1 46.0 54.8 66.8 86.8 123.9

Output value of rural production teams (CNY100 million) 40.0 52.9 64.6 71.6 84.5 111.0 119.6

Total output value of rural communes and production teams (CNY100 million) 67.6 92.0 110.6 126.4 151.3 197.8 243.5

Growth rate over the previous year (%) 20.7 36.1 20.2 14.3 19.7 30.7 23.1

Source: Editorial Board of Contemporary China Series ed., Township Enterprises in Contemporary China.

Substantial agricultural input In October 31, 1974, Deng Xiaoping met with Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Con and made an objective evaluation: “Over the past decade, China’s grain yields have shown an average annual increase of 4%, and agriculture has achieved stable development thanks to an effective farmland infrastructure.”33 China had achieved a remarkable feat in solving its food problems. As a large agricultural country, China is subjected to frequent natural disasters, such as droughts and floods, and the Chinese people also suffered from wars in the twentieth century. As the economist Dwight H. Perkins estimated in 1969,34 the total area of irrigated land in China amounted to approximately 21.7 million hectares in 1820 and 20 million hectares in 1952, thereby marking a decrease. After the foundation of the People’s Republic, the Chinese government set a clear goal on controlling floods by irrigating farmland, and Mao Zedong proposed that guidelines be established for water conservation as the lifeblood of agriculture. The area of irrigated land in China expanded after 1952. From 1965 to 1976, the irrigated area increased from 33.1 million to 45 million hectares, and the proportion of land in China under irrigation rose from 31.9 to 45.3% (Table 7.4). In 1978, the country had 86,000 reservoirs and over 200,000 kilometers of levees; China’s 82,000 rural small hydroelectric power stations had a generating capacity of 2.28 million kilowatt-hours. The area of irrigated land in China exceeded that of some developed countries, such as the United States (13%), and some developing 33. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1904–1974), vol. 2, 2062.

34. Perkins, Agricultural Development in China, 1368–1968.

243

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

populous countries, such as India (35%). According to the high praise from the economist Angus Maddison for China’s water conservancy, China put sustainable labor input into major construction projects, ongoing conservancy, and irrigation.35 By promoting water conservancy, China was able to control droughts and floods, hence increase grain yield, which made a significant contribution to resolving China’s problems of food shortage. However, all actions have their pros and cons, and the large number of water-conservation facilities damaged the environment and also led to economic calamities. For instance the Sanmenxia Hydropower Station caused flooding in the Weihe Catchment. Table 7.4 Year 1820a 1952a

Area of irrigated and arable land in China, 1820–1976 Irrigated area (1 million hectares)

Area of arable land (1 million hectares)

Irrigation proportion (%)

33.1 45.0

103.6 99.4

31.9 45.3

21.7 20.0

1965b 1976 b

73.7 107.9

29.4 18.5

Sources: a Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run, 43;

b National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004), 32.

Table 7.5

Agricultural production factors and growth rate, 1965–1978 1965

1978

Average annual growth rate from 1965 to 1978 (%)

Mechanized farming area (1,000 hectares)

15,579

40,670

7.7

Irrigated area (1,000 hectares)

33,055

44,965

2.4

8,093

24,895

9.0

1,942

8,840

12.4

7,436*

82,387

16.2

37.1

253.1

15.9

Indicator

Irrigation of mechanized farming land (1,000 hectares)

Chemical fertilizer consumption (1,000 tons)

Small hydroelectric power stations in rural areas (o. of stations Rural electricity-generating capacity (100 million kWh)

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Chinese Yearbook of Statistics (1981), 182.

Notes: 1. *Data for 1962;

2. Chemical fertilizer consumption: sales for 1965 and consumption in 1978.

35. Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run, 44.

244

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

During the period of the Cultural Revolution, there was an increase in agricultural production factors, and that contributed to agricultural growth. From 1965 to 1978, the area of mechanized farming increased 1.6-fold, with an annual growth rate of 7.7%, and the consumption of chemical fertilizers increased 3.6fold, resulting in a general annual growth rate of 12.4%. From 1962 to 1978, there was an approximately 10-fold increase in the number of small hydroelectric power stations — from over 7,400 to more than 82,000 — and the average annual growth rate in rural electricity consumption attained 15.9% (Table 7.5).

Slow growth in agricultural labor productivity Agricultural labor productivity underwent a process of initial decrease and then increased during the period of the Cultural Revolution (Fig. 7.1). Based on agricultural output value, agricultural labor productivity in 1970 showed a 3.1% decrease over the 1966 figure, which represents an average annual rate of decrease of 0.8% from 1966 to 1970. In contrast, agricultural labor productivity in 1976 showed a 15.7% increase over the 1970 level — an average increase rate of 2.45% from 1970 to 1976. Net agricultural output value reflected that trend: agricultural labor productivity in 1970 presented a 6.3% decrease over the 1966 figure, which was an average annual rate of decrease of 1.6% from 1966 to 1970; agricultural labor productivity in 1976 showed a 10.4% increase over the 1970 level — an average rate of increase of 1.66% from 1970 to 1976. Fig. 7.1

Changes in agricultural labor productivity, 1965–1976

Based on agricultural output

Based on agricultural net output

Source: Indicated in Appendix 7.1. Note: 1965 equals to 100.

245

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Fig. 7.2

Changes in the relative gap between industrial and agriculture labor productivity, 1965–1976 Based on total output value Based on net output value

Sources: 1. Industrial data: National Situation Analysis and Study Group of Chinese

Academy of Sciences, Township and Countryside — Study of China’s Rural and Urban Contradictions and Coordinated Development, 23;

2. Agriculture data is given in Appendix 7.1.

Note: Agriculture equals to 1.

The relative gap between industrial labor productivity and agricultural labor productivity in the period of the Cultural Revolution initially widened and then narrowed. In the 1970s, the relative gap continued to narrow. Based on total output value, industrial labor productivity showed a 14.2-fold increase over agricultural labor productivity in 1966 and a 15.1-fold in 1971; however, the decrease was 12.1fold in 1976. Based on net output value, industrial labor productivity presented a 5.4-fold increase over agricultural labor productivity in 1966 and a 7.35-fold increase in 1969; however, the decrease was 5.41-fold in 1976 (Fig. 7.2). The main causes behind these trends were that the Cultural Revolution intensified segmentation and conflict between two different labor markets; it limited the transfer of agricultural labor to non-agricultural industries in towns and cities as well as the inter-regional transfer of the rural labor force. From 1965 to 1979, the rural labor force accounted for over 80% of China’s total labor force. The proportion began to decrease only in the 1970s; the number of dependents supported per agricultural worker initially decreased and then increased to under dependents (Fig. 7.3); that was lower even than the number for India.

246

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Fig. 7.3

Proportion of workers in agriculture employment and number of dependents per agricultural worker in China, 1965–1976

Proportion of agriculture workers to all employed workers (left axis) Number of dependents supported per agriculture worker (right axis)

Source: Given in Appendix 7.1.

Employment created in urban and rural areas There were 287 million employed people in China in 1965 and 388 million in 1976. That was an increase of 100 million people in an 11-year period — an average annual growth rate of 2.78%, which established a new record for employment growth.36 Within this trend, the number of employed urban people increased from 51.36 million in 1965 to 86.92 million in 1976, which was an average annual growth rate of 4.9% and represented an increase of 69.2%. The number of employed rural people increased from 235.34 million in 1965 to 301.42 million in 1976, which was an average annual growth rate of 2.3% — an increase of 28.1%. The urban employment growth rate was twice that of the rural employment growth rate. As political disturbances spread across China through the Cultural Revolution, huge economic losses were incurred. In his essay entitled “What Is Seen and What Is Unseen,” published in 1850, the French economist Frédéric Bastiat referred to such a development as a “deadweight loss” that signifies the destruction, damage, 36. Employment growth at an average annual growth rate of over 2% is classified as fast growth in China.

247

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

and waste could not increase national wealth.37 I will now adopt the counterfactual analysis approach developed by Robert Fogel to examine China’s deadweight loss and what its economic growth rate would have been if Mao Zedong had not initiated the Cultural Revolution.38

Cumulative economic growth losses of one-fourth to twofifths of GDP in 1976 On December 20, 1977, Li Xiannian, vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee and deputy premier of the State Council, delivered a speech at the National Planning Working Conference. He said, “The Cultural Revolution incurred huge losses of CNY500 billion for the economy and national income. That amounts to 80% of total investment in capital and exceeds the aggregate national fixed assets since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China.”39 The author made a comparison between China’s long-term economic potential output growth rate and actual growth rate. The former displays the combined effect of key factors that affected and determined China’s economic growth, and the latter reflects the actual growth rate. In addition, the gap indicates the degree to which the actual growth rate deviated from the long-term growth rate, which can be viewed as reflecting the economic losses incurred during the Cultural Revolution. Since the foundation of the People’s Republic, the record of China’s economic growth suggests that the country achieved rapid economic growth in the early and late period and slow economic growth in the middle period — from 1952 to 1957, real GDP increased at a rate of 9.2%. From 1978 to 2005, real GDP rose 9.7%. From these data, I estimate that China’s long-term economic growth potential is approximately 9%. Based on the economic growth rate in the early and late period and assuming that the long-term economic growth trend ranged from 7.5% (lower limit) to 9.0% (upper limit), the actual economic growth rate for 1966–1976 was 5.1%; 4% lower than in 1952–1957 and 1978–2005 and less than the long-term economic growth as a result of the Cultural Revolution. I estimate that decision errors incurred economic losses and reduced economic growth rates by one-third to one-half. After 1978, China’s actual economic growth rate was close to, equaled, or even exceeded the long-term economic growth trend or potential (9%). 37. Bastiat, "What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen," in Selected Essays on Political Economy. 38. Fogel, Railroads and American Economic Growth: Essays in Econometric History. 39. Wang, 541.

248

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Table 7.6

Comparison of China’s economic growth performance, (%) GDP growth rate

Population growth rate

GDP per capita growth rate

1952–1957 1966–1976 1978–2005

9.2 5.1 9.7

2.4 2.4 1.5

6.8 2.7 8.2

1966–1976 (Option A) 1966–1976 (Option B)

9.0 7.5

2.4 2.4

6.6 5.1

Actual results

Simulation results

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004), 1–4.

In terms of cumulative economic growth, real GDP in 1976 showed a 1.65-fold increase over 1966, whereas the simulated GDP in 1976 registered a 2.1- to 2.4-fold increase over the 1966 figure. Thus, I estimate that the economic losses incurred as a result of decision errors accounted for approximately one-fourth to two-fifths the simulated GDP in 1976. Evidently when adopting the same approach that the growth rate of real GDP per capita and growth rate of labor productivity were both lower than the simulation results under the same conditions, i.e., constant population growth rate, and employment growth rate (Table 7.6). Simulated results refer to economic growth performance without the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. Option A assumes that the economic growth rate was 9.0% from 1966 to 1976; Option B assumes that the economic growth rate was 7.5% from 1966 to 1976. The simulation results were obtained based on data ranging from the upper limit of Option A and lower limit of Option B. The simulation results reveal that, if the Cultural Revolution had not occurred China, would have achieved rapid economic growth and its long-term growth potential would have extended for at least 9%. Furthermore, China achieved faster economic growth than its counterpart developing countries, with a growth rate approaching those of Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. According to figures pertaining to economic growth following 1978, China had tremendous growth potential, ranging from 9.3% to 9.5%, whereas the actual growth rate in fact reached 9.7%.

Four economic fluctuations as a result of political factors China was subject to marked economic fluctuations during the period of the Cultural Revolution. From 1965 to 1977, China’s economy achieved peaks in 1965,

249

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

1970, 1973, and 1975 and fell to troughs in 1967, 1972, 1974, and 1976 (Fig. 7.4). It is clear that the troughs in the Chinese economy were the result of political factors and that fierce political struggles contributed to the economic fluctuations. In addition, fluctuations in investment coincided with the economic fluctuations during the same period. For example, in 1967, 1968, and 1974, investment achieved negative growth rates of –26.3%, –19.3%, and –1.1%, respectively. As a result of strict price controls during this period, there was no major change in the inflation rate, which presented a different situation to that during the period of reform. From 1966 to 1977, the fluctuation coefficient of the GDP growth rate was 126%, and the GDP growth rate ranged from –5.7% in 1967 to 19.4% in 1970, which amounts to a difference of 25.1%. The fluctuation coefficient of the growth rate of fixed-asset investment was 240%, and the fixed-asset investment growth rate ranged from –26.3% in 1967 to 62.9% in 1969, which amounts to a difference of 25.1%. It is evident that the economic fluctuation range during the period of the Cultural Revolution was narrower than that from 1958 to 1965, when the fluctuation coefficient of GDP growth rate was 245% and the fluctuation coefficient of the fixed-asset investment growth rate was 242%. During the Great Leap Forward, the national economy was on the verge of collapse. Fig. 7.4

China’s economic fluctuation, 1965–1977

GDP Growth Rate

Investment Growth Rate

%

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004).

Note: 1966 is taken as the baseline.

250

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Implementation of the five-year plans severely inhibited by political movements During the Cultural Revolution, the Five-Year Plans failed to be implemented owing to political movements as China went through a period of change that upset economic plans. This was characterized by implementation only of economic controls instead of the formulation of economic plans. Except in the case of the 1st Five-Year Plan (1953–1957), when 94% of the plan targets were basically achieved, the national economy had inadequate or no economic plans. The 3rd Five-Year Plan (1966–1970) and 4th Five-Year Plan (1971–1975) failed to be implemented, and during that period (except for 1969) the Chinese government seldom formulated an annual national economic plan. Thus, China failed to run its economy in a structured fashion during the period of the Cultural Revolution. Almost all CPC leaders failed to anticipate the initiation of political movements by Mao Zedong and what their political impact would be on national economic plans (Table 7.7). Table 7.7

Target fulfillment of five-year plans (1953–1975)

Period

Number of planned targets

Fulfillment (%)

Backdrop

First Five-Year Plan (1953–1957)

18

94

Achieved political stability and unprecedented unity

Second Five-Year Plan (1958–1962)

14

—

Third Five-Year Plan (1966–1970)

11

82

Cultural Revolution

Fourth Five-Year Plan (1971–1975)

12

59

Cultural Revolution

Great Leap Forward

Source: Yan, “Assessment Report of the Implementation of the Tenth Five-Year Plan.”

Cumulative urban and rural consumer welfare losses 15%– 12% of mass consumption in 1976 From 1966 to 1976, the average annual growth rate in consumption by urban residents was 3.32% and that for rural residents was 1.51%. Calculating the opportunity cost based on the growth rates for 1952–1957, the loss in consumption for all residents is estimated at 26.9%: a loss in consumption by rural and urban residents are 15.3% and 24.2% respectively (Table 7.8).

251

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Table 7.8

Consumption growth rates for urban and rural residents All

1952–1957 (growth rate, %) 1966–1976 (growth rate, %) Loss assessment 1966 (CNY) 1976 actual (CNY) 1976 simulated value (CNY) Estimated losses (CNY)

Rural

Urban

residents

residents

residents

4.48 1.96

3.15 1.51

5.66 3.32

139 171 215 46 (26.9%)

111 131 151 20 (15.3%)

262 365 454 89 (24.2%)

Urban/ rural

residents

— — —

2.36 2.79 3.01

—

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004), 14.

Note: The proportion of losses to the simulated values is given in parentheses.

During the Cultural Revolution, China failed to improve people’s livelihoods and it even led to their deterioration. Specifically, grain consumption per capita was 190.28 kilograms in 1976, which was only 0.71 kilograms more than the 1966 figure of 189.57 kilograms, and 14.01 kilograms less than the 204.29 kilograms in 1956. Edible vegetable oil consumption per capita in 1976 was 1.60 kilograms, which was lower than both in 1966 and 1956 –– 1.76 kilograms and 2.57 kilograms respectively. Cloth consumption per capita in 1976 was 23.55 chi (1 chi=1/3 meter), which was slightly more than that in 1966 (19.89 chi), yet less than in 1956 (29.17 chi). During the period of the Cultural Revolution, employees working in stateowned enterprises did not receive a pay rise until 1971; during the 3rd and 4th Five-Year Plans, the average annual growth rate of the salaries of these employees was –1.2% and –0.1%, respectively, their monetary wages and real wage indexes having been lower than that in 1957 and in 1965.40 In 1976, the Engel coefficient of rural households was about 70%, higher than that in 1957. According to data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the Engel coefficient of rural households was 65.7% in 1957, 68.5% in 1965, and 67.7% in 1978.41 The author estimates that in terms of the Engel coefficient, approximately 70% of rural households were below the absolute poverty line (i.e., 60%) during the Cultural Revolution; thus, the whole rural Chinese population was actually living in absolute poverty back then. China’s task therefore should have been to 40. Party History Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., The History of the Communist Party of China: 1949–1978, vol. 2, 969.

41. National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004), 34.

252

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

reduce the grinding poverty of the world’s largest population rather than rooting out capitalism, which was what Mao Zedong demanded. Although most CPC leaders knew nothing of the above economic indicators, Zhou Enlai remained informed about the actual situation in China at that time. On July 16, 1974, Zhou issued instructions regarding the “Report of Disasters in Dingxi and Qingyang, Gansu”: “Your two regions have been hampered by a shortage of grain, relief funds, seed, fodder, agricultural tools and implements, fuel, and drinking water. There is a dire need of clothing. Sideline production has not been developed. Production funds and agricultural loans have not been granted to key departments. Insufficient medical teams were dispatched, and medical and sanitary conditions need to be improved.”42 There is no evidence to suggest that Zhou reported to Mao Zedong about the occurrence of these natural disasters,43 and Zhou did not have the courage to order that the details be made public. At that time, there was official secrecy and a lack of transparency with information about such events. The large impoverished population had to suffer from natural disasters; but it also suffered from the calamities caused by political movements and secrecy, which exacerbated the damage caused by natural catastrophes.

Export losses due to the closed-door policy were 40%–80% of export values in 1976 In 1966, China’s export value accounted for 1.16% of the world’s export value. That figure fell to 0.72% in 1970 dramatically, increased slightly in 1972, and reached 1.01% in 1973 before decreasing to 0.69% in 1976, which was the lowest level in the nation’s history, and much lower than the 2.5% in 1870.44 However, Mao Zedong was not informed of the severity of this situation. It is possible to calculate the opportunity cost losses in export value as a result of the closed-door policy. Assuming that the proportion of China’s export value to the world’s export value remained the same during the Cultural Revolution, the 42. Jin, A Biography of Zhou Enlai, vol. 4, 2099. 43. On July 14, 1974, Zhou Enlai attended a meeting of the Central Political Bureau of the CPC for members in Beijing held at Mao Zedong’s residence. There was no report

about the disasters in Dengxi and Qingyang, Gansu and no record of a speech by Mao

Zedong about them. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee

comp., A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), vol. 2, 672–673; Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1693–1694.)

44. Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy: 1820–1992.

253

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

cumulative real export value was CNY44.03 billion and the cumulative simulated export value was CNY61.36 billion, which was 39.4% higher than the cumulative real export value. Supposing that the proportion of China’s export value to the world’s export value increased by 0.05% annually, the cumulative simulated export value would have been CNY79.42 billion — 80.3% higher than the cumulative real export value. It is clear from this calculation that the closed-door policies suppressed China’s export growth potential; the losses incurred are estimated to have accounted for 40%–80% of the export value in 1976, and the resultant import value losses were 40%–80% of the import value in 1976. By making a comparison between Japan and China’s export values according to international records, Japan’s export value was 4.13 times that of China’s in 1966; it rose to 9.18 times in 1976, then decreased, and finally increased to 9.81 times in 1976 (Table 7.9). Since then, the gap between Japan’s and China’s export values began to narrow, and China’s export value exceeded Japan’s in 2004. This indicates that the closed-door policy widened the gap between China and Japan’s export values. In contrast, the policy of opening-up narrowed the gap. It is estimated that the opportunity costs may have increased owning to the closed-door policy. Thus, Mao Zedong lacked economic knowledge,45 and Jiang Qing and her supporters lacked political vision.

45. The author retrieved the data from Mao Zedong’s Works since the Founding of New China, vol. 12 and vol. 13, since there is elsewhere a lack of related literature and information.

254

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Table 7.9

China’s real and simulated export values, 1966–1976 World

China’s

China’s

export value export value export value export value

Year

(USD100 million)

1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Total

2040 2145 2391 2726 3138 3481 4124 5787 8400 8761 9916 52909

(USD100 million)a 23.7 21.4 21.0 22.0 22.6 26.4 34.4 58.2 69.5 72.6 68.5 440.3

(USD100 million)b 23.7 24.9 27.7 31.6 36.4 40.4 47.8 67.1 97.4 101.6 115.0 613.6

Proportion

Japan’s/

export value

export

China’s

(USD100 million)c

of China’s

to the world

23.7 26.0 30.1 35.7 42.7 49.1 60.2 87.4 133.6 141.1 164.6 794.2

value (%) 1.16 1.00 0.88 0.81 0.72 0.76 0.83 1.01 0.83 0.83 0.69

a

China’s value

(fold) 4.13 4.88 6.18 7.27 8.55 9.10 8.31 6.35 7.99 7.68 9.81

Sources: World export value data: Maddison, The World Economy — A Millennial Perspective, 164;

China’s export value data: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004).

Notes: Real export value; a

b

Simulated export value, assuming a constant proportion of China’s export value to the world export value;

c

Simulated export value, assuming a constant proportion of China’s export value to the world export value.

Social Assessment of the Cultural Revolution In the Cultural Revolution, China was still able to achieve rapid social development, and it made remarkable social progress.

Modern accelerated demographic transition Under the low-income conditions during the Cultural Revolution, China brought about a modern demographic transition from a high birth rate and high mortality rate to a low birth rate and low mortality rate (Table 7.7). In the Cultural Revolution, China’s population policy went through two phases. From 1966 to 1970, China undertook no family planning policy; after 1970, it introduced a family planning policy.

255

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

In 1962, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council issued the “Directive on Seriously Calling for Conducting a Family Planning Policy,” which expressly stipulated, “China advocates birth control and proper control over the natural population growth rate to achieve the marked shift from unplanned to planned birth.” In August 1965, Zhou Enlai proposed family planning to control China’s total population, which was to increase to 800 million over the period from 1966 to 1980.46 In fact, China’s population attained 987 million in 1980 since the Cultural Revolution brought an end to family planning efforts. From 1966 to 1970, births in China went unplanned, and the population increased by over 20 million per year. In the 1970s, the Chinese government embarked on its family planning policy.47 In 1970, the government’s family planning policy took the form of a call for later marriage and supplying oral contraceptive pills, and it stressed that the population was to grow in a planned manner to suit economic development. In 1971, the State Council issued its “Report of Doing a Good Job in Carrying Out the Family Planning Policy,” which was submitted jointly by the National Health and Family Planning Commission, the Ministry of Commerce, and the Ministry of Coal Fuel and Chemicals. The report proposed that urban and rural residents should volunteer to marry later and carry out family planning. In 1973, the State Council incorporated family planning targets into the national economic program: it set up the Family Planning Leader Group to preside over national family planning, and subsequently, family planning agencies began to be established in various regions and at grassroots levels. In February 1974, Mao Zedong met with Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda on his visit to China, and for the first time, Mao publicly acknowledged that the country’s population was excessive. The same year, Mao issued an instruction on urging population control, and he stated, “The population has to grow in a planned manner instead of by unplanned birth.”48 In 1970, China’s birth rate underwent a dramatic reduction. From 1965 to 1970, the birth rate was somewhere in the vicinity of 35%, and it decreased to 20% in 1976. The natural population growth rate decreased from 26% in 1966 to 12.7% in 1976 — a reduction of over 50%. Statistical data at the city and county level point to the same trend (Table 7.10).

46. Jin ed., A Biography of Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), vol. 2, 1629. 47. Xu Dixin and other economists were convinced that party leaders who insisted on the family planning policy did much to change the population structure in the 1970s. (Xu ed., The Population of Contemporary China, 21–22.) 48. People’s Daily, July 9, 1978.

256

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Table 7.10 Population birth, mortality, and national growth rates, 1966–1976 (%) National level City level County level

Birth rate Mortality rate Natural growth rate Birth rate Mortality rate Natural growth rate Birth rate Mortality rate Natural growth rate

1966 35.05 8.83 26.22 20.85 5.59 15.26 36.71 9.47 27.24

1971 30.65 7.32 23.33 21.30 5.35 15.95 31.86 7.57 24.29

1976 19.91 7.25 12.66 13.12 6.60 6.52 20.85 7.35 13.50

Source: Jiang, The Population of Contemporary China, 470.

After the 1970s, the fertility rate decreased rapidly. Before, China’s fertility rate fell slowly from 6.1% in 1965 to 5.8% in 1970 — a decrease of only 0.3% in five years. After 1970, it decreased rapidly, falling to 3.2% in 1976 — a drop of 2.6% over the 1970 figure (Fig. 7.5). The fertility rate of urban and rural women decreased dramatically, and China’s cities and towns notably entered a period of low birth rate (Table 7.11). Fig. 7.5

Fertility rate of Chinese women, 1965–1976

Total Birth Rate

Source: Given in Appendix 7.3.

257

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Table 7.11 Year 1965 1970 1976

Fertility rate of urban and rural women in China, 1965–1976 Nationwide 6.076 5.812 3.235

Rural areas 6.597 6.379 3.582

Source: Zou and Hu, Human, Development, Prospect, Choices, 130.

Urban areas 3.749 3.267 1.608

The rapid decrease in the total fertility rate and population growth rate created favorable demographic conditions for the subsequent reform and opening-up and played a positive role in promoting the welfare of the Chinese people. This was evident in the following ways. 1. Material capital per capita showed a faster growth trend. 2. Pressure for grain supply eased. 3. The decline in the number of children and in the school-age population led to an increase in educational enrollment and the scope of education as well as a rapid rise in per capita educational investment. 4. The proportion of the working-age population (aged 15 to 64 years) to the total population increased rapidly: it approached or even exceeded 60%. This meant that China had entered the demographic bonus stage49 with a resultant tremendous, persistent employment pressure.

Improved elementary and high school education coverage Based on data from the second national population census in 1964 and the third national population census in 1982 (Table 7.12), the author estimates that the average number of years in education for the population aged over 6 was 2.35 years in 1964 and 2.53 years in 1966; that figure rose to 3.70 in 1976. From 1964 to 1976, the annual growth rate of the educated population having an educational background in multiple institutions was greater than the total population growth rate. In particular, the population having a high school and vocational high school education showed the highest growth rate; that was followed by the population with junior high school education background; the population with an associate degree and that with only elementary school education showed the lowest increase in growth rate (Table 7.12). Except for the population with an associate degree, the population with other educational backgrounds increased to a varied extent; China showed especial improvement in its high school education coverage. 49. The author classified the proportion of the population aged 15 to 64 years to the total population at 60% or over as the demographic bonus period and the proportion of

the population aged 15 to 64 years to the total population being below 60% as the demographic debt period.

258

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Table 7.12

Educational background of the national population, 1964–1982 College or above

High school

Elementary

1,319

4,680

28,330

6,779

17,892

35,237

916 3,300 6,834

3,250 12,025 18,037

19,674 25,682 35,523

11.27 11.81

11.52 10.00

2.25 3.34

school

high school

Population (100,000 people) 1964 416 1976 1982 615 Population (100,000 people)

1964 289 1976 385 1982 620 Average annual growth rate (%) 1964–1976 1964–1982

Junior high

and vocational

2.42 4.33

school

Source: The second national population census of 1964 and the third national population census of 1982.

Note: The data for 1976 were estimated by the author.

In the 1970s, China’s elementary and junior high school enrollment rate exceeded that of the majority of developed countries. China’s adult literacy rate exceeded the average rate of low-income countries and was close to that of middleincome countries (Table 7.13). Table 7.13

International comparison of education indicators in the 1970sa (%) Elementary school net

Nation

enrollment ratio

China India Indonesia Sri Lanka Low-income Countries Middle-income Countries All developing countries Industrialized countries

Secondary school gross enrollment

93 64 66 62 56 75d 62 94

ratio c 51 28 21 47 25 28d 26 68

Adult

literacy rate 66 36 62 78 38 71 51 99

Source: World Bank, China — Socialist Economic Development: The Economy, Statistical System, and Basic Data, Table 3.22, 96.

Notes: a Data for China refer to 1979, for other countries to 1975 or 1977; b c d

Proportion of elementary school age group enrolled;

Secondary school enrollment as ratio of secondary school age group; Intermediate middle-income countries.

259

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

The author estimates that in the 1970s, China’s total human capital (product of the population aged 15 to 64 years multiplied by the average number of years in education of the population aged over 15) would take accounted for 17.5% of the world total and would rank first globally; by comparison, India’s total human capital accounted for only 7.3% of the world total. China’s total human capital in the 1970s was thus over twice that of India,50 and this laid a solid foundation for economic growth and social progress in the period of reform. Deng Xiaoping stated that the Cultural Revolution caused the gravest losses owing to its long-term disruptive political impact on the human capital of the population with a higher education and vocational high school education background.51 Since universities stopped enrolling new students for a period of four years during the Cultural Revolution, the number of university students dropped dramatically (Table 7.14). It is estimated that at least 1 million college students and 2 million vocational high school students lost the opportunity to receive schooling; this loss was particularly notable in the case of universities, which ceased enrolling postgraduates during the Cultural Revolution.52 The situation may in fact have been more serious than these figures suggest since the enrollment rate at China’s universities and high schools was much lower than that in other countries at the same income level. In 1979, after college entrance examinations had been restored for three consecutive years, the enrollment rate at Chinese universities was still only 1.2%; that amounts to just half the average university enrollment rate of other low-income countries and one-fourth the average university enrollment rate of all developing countries. China also ceased to enroll overseas students for a period of six years, and that typified the closed-door policy. From 1966 to 1976, there was a total of 1,033 million university graduates, which includes 669,000 high school graduates in 1966–1970. Later in the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong called for selecting university students from among industrial workers, farmers, and 50. Hu, “From a Populous Country to a Country Rich in Human Resource,” 1–10.

51. In July 1978, Deng Xiaoping remarked, “The Cultural Revolution caused severe

disruption and damage to our country and inflicted losses on various industries. Our science and education suffered the most severely. The Cultural Revolution resulted in the failure of education and squandered the talent of a generation of Chinese people,

causing the gap to grow between China’s scientific and technical level and the advanced

level in the world. It was clearly easier to recoup these losses in the areas of agriculture and industry. However, it could take more time to recover these losses in the fields of science, technology, and education.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), vol. 1, 347.) 52. Dong, The Economic History of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 1, 572.

260

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

soldiers: it seemed fair to have such individuals undergo the three-year training system. This was in fact not such an effective move since only 364,000 students were enrolled the universities from 1970 to 1976, and the university enrollment rate was under 0.5% at that time. As a result, an increasing number of universityage students lost the opportunity to receive a university education. Based on the number of university students and graduates, Li Chunbo determined that the population with a background in higher education (associate degree or above) increased by 18.5% from 1966 to 1976 at an average annual growth rate of 1.71%.53 Table 7.14

China’s secondary and higher education, 1965–1976 (10,000 students)

University students

Year 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

Enrollment

Number of graduates

Vocational Vocational Vocational University high University high University high school school school 67.4 53.4 40.9 25.9 10.9 4.8 8.3 19.4 31.4 43.0 50.1 56.5

54.7 47.0 30.8 12.8 3.8 6.4 21.8 34.2 48.2 63.4 70.7 69.0

16.4 — — — — 4.2 4.2 13.4 15.0 16.5 19.1 21.7

20.8 4.6 0.8 1.8 1.3 5.4 21.3 26.8 29.4 32.7 34.4 34.8

18.6 14.1 12.5 15.0 15.0 10.3 0.6 1.7 3.0 4.3 11.9 14.9

9.1 11.9 17.0 19.7 10.3 2.8 8.9 9.5 12.2 16.6 24.8 33.9

Number of overseas students 454 — — — — — 36 259 180 245 277

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004), 80–83.

The Cultural Revolution had a severe impact on vocational high school education, and it resulted in decreased enrollment. Some vocational high schools ceased enrollment, and the number of vocational school students declined dramatically (Table 7.15). In 1979, the number of vocational school students was 1.4 million, which was much lower than the figure in 1965. The number of vocational high school students accounted for only 2.4% of the total number of all high school students, which was much lower than the average proportion of 11% in other developing countries. In 1979, only 0.5% of the labor force had received higher 53. Li, “Study into China’s Regional Human Capital and Economic Development Gap.”

261

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

education and 0.9% had undergone technical or vocational high school education. It is worth mentioning that teachers formed the majority of the educated group.54 Cai Fang and Du Yang calculated the human capital loss as a result of the Cultural Revolution. Owing to changes in human capital stock and the resultant impact on human capital accumulation through the decrease in the total length of schooling from 12 years to 9 or 10 years, the drop in university, college, and vocational high school education, changes in the teaching staff, and the lack of vocational education, the average duration of education for the population aged over 15 was 4.8 years in 1982. If the Cultural Revolution had not taken place, that figure could have been 5.6 years. Thus, the Cultural Revolution caused a 14.3% reduction in the potential human capital stock. Fang and Yang determined that the Cultural Revolution exerted a long-term impact on human capital accumulation and that a great number of unemployed urban workers were victims of the political movement.55 The young students who took part in various political movements during the Cultural Revolution were also victims of the revolutionary rebellion, and their futures were seriously affected as a result of the disruption of human capital investment. Even when those former students reached retirement age, the overwhelming majorities of them were still within the low-income group and found themselves caught in a poverty trap.

Health promotion in urban and rural area During the period of the Cultural Revolution, average life expectancy increased and the infant and maternal mortality rate declined. At that time, China’s healthcare policy had three important characteristics. 1. A policy was introduced that stressed implementing preventative measures and improving health care by vaccinating against chicken pox and controlling infectious disease media. 2. There was an expansion of basic medical services — especially through the use of “barefoot doctors” (i.e., farmers who received minimal basic medical and paramedical training and worked in rural villages. Their purpose was to bring health care to rural areas where urban-trained doctors would not settle). 54. World Bank, China — Socialist Economic Development: The Economy, Statistical System, and Basic Data, 136.

55. Cai and Du, “The Cultural Revolution Caused Destruction on Physical Capital and Human Capital,” 795–806.

262

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

3. There was continued reliance on traditional Chinese medical practice.56 During the period of the Cultural Revolution, there was one qualified Western doctor for every 2,500 Chinese people, which was much higher than the ratio of 9,900:1 of other low-income countries and greater than the ratio of 4,300:1 of middle-income countries. When barefoot doctors are taken into account, the figures for China are even more impressive. Excluding barefoot doctors, the above ratio for China was 900:1; including barefoot doctors, the ratio was 400:1. By comparison, the ratio of other low-income countries was 8,800:1 and that of middle-income countries 1,900:1. China made remarkable progress in improving health. According to data from the World Bank in 2005, the mortality rate of China’s children aged under 5 years was 225% in 1960; that figure fell to 64% in 1980 at an average annual rate of decrease of 6.3%. In addition, the maternal mortality rate in China was about 1.5% in 1960, which fell to 1% in 1980. The World Bank stated that China achieved a great feat by improving health care despite low economic growth (China’s per capita growth in income was 4% from 1960 to 1979). The average life expectancy increased rapidly: before the foundation of the People’s Republic, it was 35 years, which was lower than the world’s average life expectancy of 49 years. As a result of great famine, it fell to 36 years in 1960 and then rose rapidly to 62 years in 1970, which was higher than the world’s average of 58.6 years. In 1980, life expectancy increased to 66.8 years, which was higher than the world average of 62.6 years and the average for middle-income countries of 65.6 years (Table 7.15). From 1950 to 1980, the growth rate of life expectancy in China was higher than the world average and that of developed countries, which indicates that China was following world trends in population health indicators.

56. World Bank, China — Socialist Economic Development: The Economy, Statistical System, and Basic Data, 97.

263

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Table 7.15

International comparison of life expectancy, 1950–1980 (Years)

Nation

1950

1960

1970

1980

China United States United Kingdom France Germany Japan South Korea India Middle-income countries

35.00 68.00 — 65.00 67.00 61.00 — 32.00

36.32 69.77 70.76 70.24 69.54 67.67 54.15 44.33

61.74 70.81 71.67 72.01 70.46 71.95 59.93 49.37

66.84 73.66 73.78 74.18 72.63 76.09 66.84 54.18

Growth for 1950–1980 31.84 5.66 — 9.18 5.63 15.09 — 22.18

—

45.72

61.20

65.64

—

—

68.92

70.86

73.76

—

49.00

50.24

58.63

62.57

13.57

High-income countries

Average world growth

Sources: 1. Date for 1950: Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, Table 1–5a; 2. Data for 1960–1980: World Bank, World Development Indicator 2004.

Urbanization at a standstill The national urban population was 130 million in 1965; that figure increased to 144 million in 1970 and continued to rise to 160 million in 1975. From 1965 to 1975, the average annual growth rate of the national urban population as a proportion of the total population was 2.08%. From 1965 to 1970, the average annual growth rate of the urban population was 2.03%, which was lower than that of the total population. From 1970 to 1975, the average annual growth rate of the urban population was 4.21%, which was higher than the total population. During the Cultural Revolution, China’s urbanization went into reverse. The urbanization rate basically declined instead of increasing owing to the ban on mobility and migration from rural to urban areas. In addition, 17 million urban educated young people were obliged to migrate to rural areas: the proportion of the urban population to the total population remained around 17.5%. As the rate of industrialization increased, the gap between the industrialization rate and urbanization rate widened. In 1977, the industrialization rate was 30% higher than the urbanization rate (Fig. 7.6), which reflected the division between urban and rural areas. Rather than driving urbanization, industrialization actually acted as an impediment to mobility of the population and labor force. This resulted in an increase of agricultural laborers and surplus agricultural laborers; there was

264

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

a widening gap between industrial and agricultural labor productivity as well as between urban and rural labor productivity. The author estimates that there were 58 million surplus agricultural workers in 1965; that number increased to 102 million in 1970 and further rose to 110 million in 1976. The proportion of surplus agricultural workers to the national total of laborers increased from 20% in 1965 to 28% in 1976, which incurred social economic costs through the division between urban and rural areas. Fig. 7.6

China’s industrialization and urbanization rates, 1949–1978 Industrialization rate Urbanlization rate Gap between industrialization rate and urbanlization rate

Source: Appendix 7.2.

Disrupted science and technology The Cultural Revolution resulted in severe disruption in science and technology. Research funding was cut, and there was accordingly a reduction in the proportion of research funding to national income. Until 1969, there was increased research funding as part of national defense to help in preparing for wars (Table 7.16). In addition, many research institutes discontinued research work and some were even closed. As the leading research institution, the Chinese Academy of Sciences had 106 research institutes and employed 21,900 researchers; it basically constituted the scientific research center and boasted the full range of disciplines. During the period of the Cultural Revolution, the majority of research institutes were not affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences. In 1967, there were 47 research institutes

265

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

in the country; they were under the direction of the New Technology Committee, which was responsible for military research and was under the administration of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. In 1972, there were 43 research institutes, which were put under the administration of local governments or local governments and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. In 1973, there were 53 research institutes; they had 35,200 staff, of whom 13,500 researchers worked under the Chinese Academy of Science (including dual mobile units). In 1976, there were 64 research institutes under the Chinese Academy of Sciences, of which 44 research institutes were under the administration of local governments and the academy.57 Table 7.16

Year

State expenditure on scientific research funding, 1965–1976 Total expenditure

Per capita

research funding

funding

on scientific

(CNY100 million) 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

27.17 25.06 15.35 14.80 24.15 29.96 37.68 36.10 34.59 34.65 40.31 39.25

research (CNY) 3.80 3.41 2.03 1.91 3.03 3.66 4.48 4.19 3.92 3.85 4.40 4.22

Proportion of expenditure on research

funding to fiscal expenditure (%) 5.8 4.6 3.5 4.1 4.6 4.6 5.1 4.7 4.3 4.4 4.9 4.9

Proportion of

expenditure on

research funding

to national income (%) 2.0 1.6 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Four Decades of China’s Science and Technology (1949–1989), 202–203.

Severely depleted cultural undertakings In a notice released on May 16, 1966, Mao Zedong proposed the theory of cultural dictatorship, signifying a dictatorship of the proletariat over the social superstructure, which included various cultural fields. The Cultural Revolution 57. National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, Four Decades of China’s Science and Technology (1949–1989), 20–21.

266

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

was launched to reform culture in China. However, Mao’s theory of cultural dictatorship strangled the revival of Chinese culture and diminished its prosperity. The effect of the Cultural Revolution was akin to the destructive efforts in the Qin dynasty that led to the burning of books and the live burial of Confucian scholars. During the Cultural Revolution, there was a dramatic decrease in cultural and intellectual products, and their number was even smaller than that in 1950. In 1965, China published 20,143 books, 790 magazines, and 343 newspapers. The quantity was reduced in the Cultural Revolution: in 1967, 2,925 books were published — just 14.5% of the figure in 1965 (Table 7.17). In 1968, 22 magazines and 42 newspapers were published, which accounted for 2.8% and 12.2%, respectively, of that in 1965. In 1976, the number of books, magazines, and newspapers published amounted to 63.8%, 68.6%, and 53.1%, respectively, of the number in 1965. From 1966 to 1976, China published annually on average 8,006 books, 189 magazines, and 134 newspapers: that was fewer than the number of cultural products in 1950. It is possible to estimate cultural product losses based on opportunity costs. Taking 1965 as the baseline, the reduction in China from 1966 to 1976 was 121,000 books, 6,000 magazines, and 2,090 newspapers (Table 7.17). Table 7.17 Year

Books, magazines, and newspapers published in China, 1950–1976

1950 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1966–1976 Annual average

Books

12,153 20,143 11,055 2,925 3,694 3,964 4,889 7,771 8,829 10,372 11,812 13,716 12,842 80,057 8,006

Magazines 295 790 191 27 22 20 21 72 194 320 382 476 542 1885 189

Newspapers 382 343 49 43 42 42 42 195 185 192 189 180 182 1341 134

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004), 87.

267

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Fig. 7.7

Growth index of books, magazines and newspaper, 1965–1976

Books

Magazines

Newspaper

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004), 87.

Note: Based on 1965’s data as 100.

Cultural undertakings suffered the greatest. During the Cultural Revolution, 800 million Chinese were in the unfortunate position of being able to attend only eight model opera performances. Performances of most traditional arts were forbidden, and the overwhelming majority of the country’s top artists were ordered to undergo reform at cadre schools. All theatrical performances served to eulogize Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution. In the early Cultural Revolution, almost all the leading artists, such as celebrated writers and playwrights, were subjected to political persecution; they included Wu Han, Ba Jin, Lao She, Cao Yu, Luo Guangbin, Zhou Libo, Zhao Shuli, Liu Qing, Yang Mo, Liang Bin, Wu Qiang, Zhou Erfu, Ai Qing, Liu Baiyu, Xia Yan, Ouyang Shan, Ding Ling, Liu Binyan, Tian Han, Wang Meng, Deng Tuo, and Liao Mosha. Among them, Lao She, Luo Guangbin, and Deng Tuo committed suicide — by force or otherwise — and Wu Han, Zhao Shuli, Liu Qing, and Tian Han died in prison. In addition, the eminent painters Qi Baishi and Lin Fengmian, the famous musician He Luting, and a large number of directors and actors were subjected to criticism or persecution.58 58. Macfarquhar and Fairbank eds., The Cambridge History of China: The People’s Republic, Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966–1982, 1992 ed., 629–630, 641.

268

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

During the period of the revolution, cultural institutions were reorganized or dissolved, and the result was a suffocation of literary life.59 Except for an increase in the number of television stations, the number of national cultural institutions declined at first from 1965 to 1976, before increasing (Table 7.18). The purpose of the Cultural Revolution was reform of culture and the arts. Table 7.18

Changing number of national cultural institutions in China, 1965–1976

Art performance troupes Art performance venues  Cultural centers Public libraries Museums Radio stations Television stations

1965 3,458

1970 2,541

1976 2,906

2,943 2,598 577 214 87 12

1,432 2,303 323 182 80 31

1,458 2,609 768 263 89 32

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949-2004), 86.

China’s cultural heritage was destroyed during the Cultural Revolution on a scale that was unprecedented in the country’s history. How did Mao Zedong evaluate the demolition of China’s cultural heritage wrought by the Cultural Revolution? On May 7, 1974, Mao Zedong met with Léopold Sédar Senghor, president of the Republic of Senegal. Senghor expressed his puzzlement over the fact that the Cultural Revolution was leading to the destruction of artifacts and historical relics. Mao failed to clarify Senghor’s puzzlement. Subsequently, Mao suggested conducting a survey and he rashly reckoned that nine-tenths of historical relics had been preserved, whereas one-tenth had been destroyed. In front of Senghor, Zhou Enlai, Wang Hongwen, and Li Xiannian, who were present during the meeting with Senghor, Mao acknowledged that the CPC had had its faults in the Cultural Revolution.60 It is clear that Mao underestimated the severe destruction to Chinese culture and historical relics that was taking place during the Cultural Revolution. In late 1966, China’s traditional cultural heritage spanning thousands of years was ravaged by the Red Guards in the destruction of the Four Olds movement, 59. Ibid., 623. 60. Chen and Du eds., Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,“ vol. 2, 1077.

269

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

which was called for and supported by state leaders. Historical artifacts, ancient scripts, historical relics, temples, tombs, and ancient buildings underwent largescale damage. That brought shame to China’s great civilization, splendid culture and history. It represented an unfilial act and an offense to the country’s ancestors. The CCCPC Party Literature Research Office made the following remark: “The Cultural Revolution disrupted Chinese science and culture, and it resulted in a cultural reverse. History has demonstrated that the Cultural Revolution brought havoc to Chinese culture rather than the virtuous cultural revolution defined by Marxism.”61

Mao Zedong’s Chinese Social Ideals and Economic Reform Mao Zedong’s ideal for Chinese society62 Mao Zedong pursued lofty ideals for Chinese socialist society, though they failed to correspond to China’s actual circumstances and the preliminary stage of socialism. I present below an analysis of Mao’s ideal for Chinese society. Mao Zedong had the ideal of building China into a kind of communist school. This would result in a narrowing of the gap between industry and agriculture; rural and urban areas; and physical and mental work, and ideally produce hundreds of millions of successors to embrace the struggle for communism.63 Mao’s Chinese social ideal was entirely different from the classical Western economic thought of 61. Party History Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., The History of the Communist Party of China: 1949–1978, vol.2, 968.

62. Dong, The Economic History of the People’s Republic of China, vol. 1, 446–451. 63. On August 1, 1966, the People’s Daily published an editorial entitled “The Whole Country Calls for Establishing the Mao Zedong Thought School — Celebrating

the 39th Anniversary of the Founding of the People’s Liberation Army.” It stated, “Complying with the directive of May 7 issued by Comrade Mao Zedong could narrow the gap between industry and agriculture, the gap between rural and urban areas, and the gap between physical and mental work. It avoids abnormal urban and

industrial development and encourages intellectuals to undertake manual work and working people to acquire knowledge. This will help develop hundreds of millions of communist all-around successors with a higher political consciousness.” (People’s Daily, August 1, 1966.)

270

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Adam Smith, who believed that human nature was characterized by selfishness and economic interests — those of the rational economic man, drove that human behavior. By contrast, Mao was eager to promote unselfish communist fighters who were devoted to serving the people.64 It is possible to generalize basic approaches to narrowing the above-mentioned three gaps by learning from the history of world modernization. 1. The gap between industrial labor productivity and agricultural labor productivity can be narrowed by means of industrialization. Nevertheless, from the 1960s to the 1970s, there was a huge gap between China’s industrial labor and agricultural labor productivity, and that gap continued to widen (Fig. 7.2). Additionally, the average number of dependents supported by agricultural workers was small (Fig. 7.3). 2. It is possible to narrow the gap between urban and rural residents’ income and public services by means of urbanization. However, from the 1960s to the 1970s, China’s urbanization made slow progress. This was because the country implemented the world’s strictest household registration control system that restricted migration from rural to urban areas. China also pursued a counter-urbanization or de-urbanization policy by forcibly mobilizing large numbers of urban educated youth — upwards of 16 million — to settle in rural areas. 3. It is possible to narrow the human capital gap between intellectual and manual workers by means of education (investing in human capital). The Cultural Revolution produced unprecedented destruction of China’s education and training systems, science and technology, culture and the arts, and it hindered the increase in the capacity of Chinese laborers and their accumulation of social knowledge. Industrialization is defined as the transfer of agricultural labor to industrial or non-agricultural labor. Urbanization is defined as the migration of the rural population from rural to urban areas. Education is defined as the improvement in cultural quality and the accumulation of social knowledge resources; these resources include investment in R&D, the number of scientific papers published at home and abroad, the number of patents filed and granted at home and abroad, and other parts of the knowledge infrastructure, such as libraries and literature. Thus, these processes refer to the transfer and migration of laborers as the most 64. Wang, Mao Zedong’s Idealism and Deng Xiaoping’s Realism — the Views of U.S. Scholars on China, 313.

271

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

active factor in productivity and in the increase, accumulation, and use of human capital. What is more, industrialization, urbanization, and education interact and support one another. Mao Zedong’s social vision was contradictory to the social development trends since he knew very little about industrialization, urbanization, and education in developed and developing countries. During his 27-year tenure of office, his only journeys overseas were two trips to the Soviet Union, and he examined China’s modernization through self-study, self-innovation, and selfpractice. Firstly, the communist school advocated by Mao Zedong was meant to set up small, self-sufficient, self-reliant communities based on natural economic needs. This meant forming factories, rural areas, schools, and the military into small, integrated, self-sufficient, isolated communities. As a result, China established a unique pattern of isolated small communities. Almost all the large and mediumsized state-owned enterprises, institutions, and military units had their own kindergartens, elementary schools, junior high schools, stores, hospitals, and even universities; almost all universities set up their own factories, stores, hospitals, and elementary and junior high schools. In addition, many Chinese were versatile people and could work as industrial laborers, farmers, soldiers, and students at the same time.65 When choosing his successor, Mao thought highly of Wang Hongwen.66 The editorial of the People’s Daily of August 1, 1966 stated that the 65. On August 1, 1966, the People’s Daily published an editorial entitled “The Whole Country Calls for Establishing the Mao Zedong Thought School — Celebrating the

39th Anniversary of the Founding of the People’s Liberation Army.” It stated, “Our 700 million people will become critics of the old world and builders and defenders

who can do manual work with the hammer, work in farming with the hoe and plow,

fight against enemies with the gun, and write articles with the pen in complying with Comrade Mao Zedong’s directive.” (People’s Daily, August 1, 1966.)

66. Harry Harding deemed that Mao Zedong thought badly of the division of labor and comparative advantage, and he advocated that all departments conduct the same

business and all factories and enterprises build their own stores, hospitals, and schools. Mao hoped for all-round citizens who could serve as farmers, soldiers, and students

at the same time. After the 9th National Congress of the CPC and especially after the

Lushan Conference and the September 13 Incident, Mao proposed the promotion of farmers and industrial workers to positions of chairman and members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC. Among farmer and industrial worker

candidates, Mao counted on Wang Hongwen, who served as farmer, industrial worker, and soldier as well as head of the worker rebels in Shanghai. In accordance with Mao Zedong’s directive, Wang was transferred to Beijing in September 1972. (Harding,

272

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

whole country was devoted to building the school of Mao Zedong Thought and the communist school, which went against the development trends of professions, the division of labor, and industry service. Mao’s Chinese social ideal had its roots in the independent, isolated revolutionary base areas in the Revolutionary War. In the face of blockades by the Kuomintang, the revolutionary base areas had to establish an integrated, self-sufficient, and self-reliant development pattern, which lacked divisions of labor and a service industry. Secondly, Mao Zedong had the social ideal of restricting and suspending the relationship between commodities and currency and pursuing a closed economy. Historically, China shaped its traditional agricultural society based on a selfsufficient peasant economy, in which the commodity economy was underdeveloped and economic policies emphasized agriculture but restricted commerce; the statemonopolized economy was followed, but the commodity economy and private economy were despised. Marx envisaged eradicating the commodity economy and setting up an ownership system whereby all means of production belonged to the whole of society once socialism had been established. That affected Mao’s social ideal to a certain extent. As early as the Great Leap Forward in 1958, Mao considered abolishing the salary system, restoring the military communist-style supply system, and restricting bourgeois rights. Although Mao acknowledged that China was a country that had previously had an underdeveloped commodity economy and it later aimed to boost commodity production and exchange and build socialism following the law of value, he still confused the commodity economy with capitalism. The circumstances in China differed from those in the Soviet Union, where small producers subsisted on agriculture and handicraft production. Mao Zedong frequently quoted Lenin, who said that small producers were the embryo of capitalism and the bourgeoisie,67 and that formed the basis for embracing military communism after the victory of the Russian October Revolution. In 1922, Lenin had to abolish military communism because 80% of the Russian population were farmers and he had to conduct the New Economic Policy. What’s more, Lenin stressed the importance of pursuing this New Economic Policy, which would be integrated with the peasant economy on which millions of farmers subsisted.68 It China's Second Revolution: Reform after Mao, 18.) 67. This was Lenin’s political view as detailed in the article entitled “Left-Wing Communism — An Infantile Disorder.” (Institute of Marxism–Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, Lenin Collected Works, vol. 31, 17).

68. Institute of Marxism–Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, Lenin Collected Works, vol. 32, 402–416.

273

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

should be noted that Mao deliberately avoided pursuing this course of Lenin’s. Mao Zedong regarded free markets, private ownership of land, self-financing, and contract production quotas for individual households, as advocated by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, as a domestic revisionist political program for restoring capitalism. Thus, he called for a crackdown on all political advocacies of such tendencies and a continuation of class struggle. During the Cultural Revolution, individual or private economy in urban community was forbidden. In 1978, there was 150,000 self-employed workers, which accounted for 0.16% of all urban workers in the country.69 Mao predicted at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee that small producers would evolve into the bourgeoisie and become capitalists. The CPC therefore formulated a series of leftist economic policies directing to class struggle for urban and rural areas.70 Thirdly, Mao Zedong had the social ideal of restricting distribution of income according to work and advocating egalitarianism. Mao was concerned that the distribution of income according to work and the salary system might widen the disparity in social income and cause class polarization. Although his concern was reasonable, Mao had little knowledge and experience of regulating the distribution of income and wealth by modern methods (e.g., public financing). Mao’s concept of an ideal social distribution system took root of China’s agricultural society, which is in harmony, equality, and justice prevailed, and was inspired by his experience during the Revolutionary War. Evidentially, Mao Zedong endeavored to tackle issues related to unequal social distribution and social polarization. However, Mao possessed knowledge only related to Chinese history and lacked a proper understanding of the international situation. After rejecting an open policy, he studied and examined socialism and communism in a closed fashion. Facing the problem of China’s low per capita income and large rural population in 1958, Mao developed a Utopian vision of establishing a communism that would be characterized by rich products and high morals with free food, clothing, housing, and public canteens in 10 years’ time. However, this dream was divorced from reality. Mao failed to take China’s economic situation and global conditions into account. Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution to restrict the rights of the bourgeoisie and to prevent revisionism and the restoration of capitalism. After 69. National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, China Labor Statistical Yearbook (2000), 8, 25.

70. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 818.

274

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

having witnessed the dramatic changes that took place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe after Stalin’s death, Mao was concerned that China might follow the course of revisionism and restoration of capitalism of the Soviet Union. On December 26, 1974, Mao Zedong’s 81st birthday, he had a conversation with Zhou Enlai, who was seriously ill, about theoretical issues. Mao addressed issues related to his theory of continuing revolution under a dictatorship of the proletariat. During the conversation, Mao aired his political views on distributing income according to work, currency exchange, and the salary system were a legacy of the old society and that such unequal systems were the based on capitalism, the bourgeoisie, and revisionism. He advocated restricting such systems under a dictatorship of the proletariat.71 After quoting Lenin, who said that small producers were the embryo of capitalism and the bourgeoisie, Mao claimed that some workers, party members, and some civil servants had adopted the bourgeois lifestyle. Mao further reproved the whole party, declaring that it was easy for Lin Biao and other rightists to come to power and advocate capitalism owing to the existence of bourgeois rights in Chinese society.72 He feared that China’s bourgeois right, social hierarchy, and currency exchange might work to widen the gap between rich and poor and thereby lead to social and class polarization. Although China retained the salary grade system, salaries were frozen in the Cultural Revolution. In the 1970s, bonus system was abolished. Instead of improving productivity by means of material incentives, Mao Zedong advocated egalitarianism,73 and he misinterpreted and dogmatized some visions and views in the collected works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin.74 71. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 413.

72. Ibid., 413–414. 73. Riskin, China’s Political Economy: the Quest for Development Since 1949; Harding, China’s Second Revolution: Reform after Mao.

74. The Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee passed the “Resolution

on Some Historical Party Issues after the Foundation of the People’s Republic of China.” Since some visions and views in the collected works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin were misinterpreted and dogmatized; incorrect decisions appeared to have a theoretical basis. For example, Mao Zedong determined that it was appropriate to criticize the principle of distribution of income according to work and that the principle

of material interests advocated by Marx restricted bourgeois rights (e.g., equal rights

to the exchange of equal labor value in distributing consumable goods) in socialist

countries. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC

275

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Fourthly, Mao Zedong had the social ideal of preventing the restoration of capitalism and rooting out private economy and trade. On November 22, 1967, the People’s Daily, Red Flag, and PLA Daily published the article “Two-Line Struggle in China’s Rural Areas,” which was a criticism of rural capitalist trade, and it elucidated the nature of the free market as a stimulus for rampant capitalism in rural China. It stated that such trade was a political tool of the party’s enemies to overthrow socialist collective ownership. On December 18, 1970, Mao said to Edgar Snow, “Rich peasants advocate capitalism, and there is a multitude of petty bourgeois in China — an agricultural country with the largest peasant population in the world.”75 On December 26, 1974, Mao conversed with Zhou Enlai and quoted Lenin, who said that small producers were the embryo of capitalism and the bourgeoisie; some workers and party members had adopted a bourgeois lifestyle.76 Thus, the Cultural Revolution’s principle was modified into rooting out capitalism. There were 37,000 farmers markets in rural areas back in 1965, but that number fell to 29,000 in 1976. The number of self-employed urban businesspeople stood at 1.02 million in 1965, but the number drastically reduced to only 140,000 at the end of 1977 — an 86.3% decrease.77 Mao purged Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Lin Biao, and others he regarded as bourgeoisie sympathizers within the party. He also rooted out the capitalist economic and social base typified by self-employed business people by using measures at the national level to stifle private and individual economy under the dictatorship of the proletariat in order to establish his vision of pure socialism. Lastly, Mao Zedong maintained the social ideal of reforming the education system and changing the system whereby bourgeois intellectuals dominated the nation’s schools. Mao believed that bourgeois intellectuals ruled China’s education system. In March 1966, he delivered a speech at an extended meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, in which he declared that the bourgeoisie, petite bourgeoisie, landlords, and rich farmers dominated China’s universities, junior high schools, and elementary schools.78 On May 7, 1966, he emphasized again his political view in a letter to Lin Biao.79 In December 1970, Mao said to Edgar Snow, Central Committee, vol. 2, 818.

75. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 180.

76. Ibid., 413.

77. State Administration for Industry and Commerce of the People’s Republic of China comp., Chronicle of Administration for Industry and Commerce of New China, vol. 1, 50, 52.

78. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1404. 79. Mao Zedong stated that China had to reform education and change the situation of

276

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

“We don’t have our own university professors and schoolteachers: all the professors and teachers in our universities and schools are the legacy of the Kuomintang. The Cultural Revolution was launched to set that as the first area of reform.”80 The Cultural Revolution in fact marked the start of the education reform, where classes were suspended to carry out the revolution in June 1966. Classes were resumed for revolution sake, (educating urban young people to work in the countryside and mountainous areas in 1967), and worker’s publicity groups and PLA publicity groups were dispatched to universities. Educational reform was carried out in China in 1968. In 1970, industrial workers, farmers, and soldiers were admitted to college. In 1974, the university entrance examination system was abolished. As a result, the development of human capital was disrupted and experienced the greatest broke down in the People’s Republic history. Mao Zedong’s ruling strategy lacked the concept of human capital: he did not understand that human capital and human talent were the major assets for modernization. Since he viewed the world in the light of classes and class struggle, Mao Zedong had a narrow grasp of China’s political situation, which hence affected and limited his understanding of China’s economic situation and human resources. As a populous country that lacked human capital, China had to regard human capital as its prime capital, human resources as its prime resource, and investment in securing people’s livelihoods and developing human resources as the most important state policy. Mao Zedong held different views from Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping with regard to the ideal model for Chinese socialism. In the 1950s, Mao also had different opinions from Liu and Deng regarding China’s current circumstances and its stage of development, such as whether to establish socialism or a new democracy, whether to choose a gradual transition to socialism or quickly embrace it, and whether to avoid rash moves or call for the Great Leap Forward. In the 1960s, the political divergence of these three individuals with respect to China’s social discrepancies and its political situation developed into a disagreement in terms of ruling policies and strategies. Since Mao regarded Liu and Deng as espousing capitalism, it was inevitable that Mao should wage a political and theoretical struggle against them. Mao stated repeatedly that the Cultural Revolution was bourgeois intellectuals ruling the country’s universities and schools. (Party Literature

Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works since the Founding of New China, vol. 12, 54.)

80. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works since the Founding of New China, vol.13, 171; Xu, The Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1976), 365.

277

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

launched to oppose revisionism and prevent the restoration of capitalism. It should be noted that Mao Zedong was good and sincere in his intentions to serve the Chinese people, and he pursued his lifelong political and economic policy in eradicating the economic base for capitalism: that was his rationale and motivation in launching the Cultural Revolution. However, it was unfortunate that he began this revolution on an incorrect theoretical basis, with the result being one of tragedy.

Mao Zedong’s economic system reform After launching the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong aimed to align his national economic plan with the centralized plan, hence to recentralization policy in the early 1960s. In 1965, 10,533 enterprises and institutions operated directly under the control of central ministries; and the number of that reduced by 1,233 in 1957. The industrial output value of those enterprises accounted for 42.2% of the national total in 1965, which exceeded the 39.7 recorded in 1957. These data show that the Chinese government restored the highly centralized economic system. In addition, Mao made preparations for war as a result of the tense international situation, and he requested that local governments become ready to fight independently against enemies in the event of an invasion of China. On March 20, 1966, Mao Zedong delivered a speech concerning the extension of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau: “I want to have a republic with a practical ruler, in which the CPC Central Committee is responsible for establishing policies and guidelines instead of merely implementing them. Toward that end, enterprises are being placed under the direction of a lower administrative level.” Nevertheless, Mao lacked the time to reform the central planned economy owing to the turmoil caused after launching the Cultural Revolution. In 1969, Mao Zedong issued a directive on initiating economic system reform for the second time as a result of the stable domestic political situation. In February of that year, three documents related to fiscal, corporate, and material management were released. Under those stipulations, in terms of fiscal management, remaining incomes were to be redistributed to local authorities (except for corporate income under the direct management of the CPC Central Committee) and remaining expenditures (except for central fiscal expenditure) were included in local budgets. In terms of corporate management, research and design units, universities and colleges under the control of central ministries were placed under the administration of local authorities. Alteration and extension projects came under the administration of production units, and new units (except for key projects)

278

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

were placed under the administration of local authorities. In terms of material management, raw materials and equipment were uniformly distributed by the central government, and remaining materials were managed by local authorities in coordination with one another and with the support of appropriate government departments. In addition, the products manufactured by five small enterprises were not uniformly distributed by the central government. The CPC Central Committee delegated power to local authorities to remedy system defects, such as over-centralized government and overlapping agency authority. In February 1970, the State Council convened the National Planning Work Conference to examine and weaken the direct, exclusive control of enterprise by government ministries, so as to establish a reform program of the economic system by reinforcing local economic autonomy. On March 5, the State Council drafted the “Notice of Industrial and Transportation Enterprises Directly under Various Ministries of the State Council to Be Placed under the Administration of Local Government”; in 1970, the State Council requested all enterprises and institutions directly under ministerial control be placed themselves under the administration of local authorities. Among them, a few enterprises and institutions were placed under the administration of both the central government and a local authority, whereby the local authority was dominant; a small number of enterprises and institutions were placed under the administration of both central government and a local authority, with the central government being dominant. On June 22, 1970, the CPC Central Committee issued instructions in the “Report on Setting up the Core Party Group and Revolutionary Committee by Various Ministries under the State Council,” which called for the delegation of power in stages in the course of that year. By the end of September 1970, 2,237 of 3,082 (73% of the total) enterprises and institutions that had been directly under the administration of industry and transportation sectors of the government were placed under the administration of local authorities. An additional 469 enterprises and institutions came to be placed under the administration of local authorities and 104 were dissolved. To meet the need of achieving combat readiness, China was divided into 10 economic cooperative zones (Southwest China, Northwest China, Central China, South China, East China, North China, Northeast China, Shandong, Fujian and Jiangxi, and Xinjiang). These zones had to develop industries in the following areas in a planned manner: metallurgy; national defense; machinery; power, fuel, and chemical industry; agriculture; light industry; and transport. It is noteworthy that small, complete economic system had to be established in Shandong, Fujian and Jiangxi, and Xinjiang. From February to March 1970, the “Outline of the 4th

279

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Five-Year Plan” was drawn up. The document decreed that various provinces and autonomous regions were to operate a number of small and medium-sized iron and steel enterprises and that some prefectures and counties were to operate their own small coal mines, iron mines, and steel mills; together, this would result in a combination of large-, medium-, and small-sized enterprises and a disseminated steel industry. In addition, the document called for various provinces to be selfsufficient in coal, steel, electricity, agricultural machinery, and light industrial products as well as a change in the situation whereby grain was transported from South China to North China and coal from North China to South China. These reform efforts in the dissolution and consolidation of national authoritative bodies were carried out. On June 22, 1970, the CPC Central Committee approved the “Report on Setting up the Core Party Group and Revolutionary Committee by Various Ministries of the State Council,” and it decided to reorganize ministries, commissions, and institutions directly under the State Council by consolidating 90 departments into 27 departments and downsizing the staff to 82%. Mao Zedong strived to realize his vision of the republic of the practical ruler and pave the way for delegating economic management power and reforming the state bureaucracy. As a result, the number of agencies and staff under the State Council was reduced to its lowest level since the founding of the People’s Republic. However, after 1973, there was a 93% increase in the number of agencies under the State Council: there were 52 in 1978. The majority of enterprises and institutions that had been under direct central government control were placed under the administration of local authorities: the number of enterprises and institutions directly under the central government decreased from 10,533 to 1,674 (an 84% reduction). In addition, the proportion of the industrial output value of enterprises and institutions directly under the central government to total industrial output value decreased from 42.2% to 6%. This represented a shift in the dominant economic pattern from one of direct, exclusive control of enterprises by a government ministry to one of local economic autonomy. With decentralization of industrial enterprises, first-level distribution centers under the Ministry of Commerce were placed under the administration of provincial governments; second-level distribution centers were placed under the administration of prefectural governments. Further, all enterprises under the Ministry of Foreign Trade located in different regions were placed under the administration of both local authorities and the ministry (with the local authorities being dominant), thereby reducing the amount of materials uniformly managed by state and other departments. In all, the 579 kinds of materials that had been uniformly distributed and managed by the state and various ministries in 1966

280

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

were reduced to 217 in 1972 (reduction of over 60%). Among those, there was a decrease in the number of materials distributed by the state from 326 to 49 (reduction of 85%); there was a decline in the number of materials managed by various ministries from 253 to 168 (down by one-third). Moreover, all universities and colleges located in different regions were placed under the administration of local authorities. On December 18, 1970, Mao Zedong stressed to Edgar Snow that China had created both central and local incentives. Thus, the CPC Central Committee needed to avoid acting taking the local authorities’ place wherever possible. Furthermore, Mao claimed that he lacked the capacity to handle all affairs and that it was necessary to learn from the decentralization experience from the United States. It is notable that Mao expressed his dissatisfaction towards the CPC’s failure in making proper use of the central and local incentives over the previous decade and that the road to reform in the world was doomed to meander.81 Nevertheless, the result for China was failure in its reform of the centralized planned economic system. In the mid-1970s, the CPC Central Committee resumed centralization, and the national economy was adjusted and revived. This implied that it was superior in mobilizing state resources and tackling the economic crisis produced by the centralized planned economic system; it also displayed the inherent inertia of centralization. Before China underwent economic reform, its centralization reached a new climax. In 1973, 617 kinds of materials were uniformly distributed and managed by the state and various ministries, which represented a rise to the level witnessed during the Cultural Revolution. In June 1975, the State Council convened a meeting to discuss the planning system for work: the aim was to overhaul the existing planning system and resolve the contradiction between direct, exclusive control of enterprises, and local economic autonomy by managing large enterprises while loosening control over small ones. This was intended to rectify the chaotic economic order, tighten loose economic regulations, and stress centralization. This planning system adopted a top-down approach while granting local economic autonomy. In terms of business management, the following were largely managed by central ministries (with direct exclusive control of enterprise by a particular ministry): inter-provincial railways, telecommunications, power grids, shipping along the Yangtze River, civil aviation, oil pipelines, ocean shipping, major research and design units, professional construction teams, large oil fields, and a few key enterprises and construction projects; the remainder were managed

81. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 181.

281

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

by local authorities rather than delegating power to lower administrative levels.82 In terms of material management, the State Council decided to found the State Reserves Bureau; this was based on the Materials Bureau of the State Planning Commission, which was placed directly under the State Council in November 1975. It thus restored the material management system that had existed before the Cultural Revolution: the State Planning Commission was responsible for uniformly distributing materials in a balanced manner, and the State Reserves Bureau was responsible for organizing distribution. Just like previous reform efforts, decentralization led to an economic leap as well as economic chaos, and China was thus obliged to make economic adjustments. Centralization was a prerequisite for economic adjustment, though it curbed economic vitality and creativity; and it created the situation of decentralization, leading to economic chaos and centralization halting economic development. This phenomenon emerged in the period of the planned economy as well as in the period of economic reform and transition. Governments at different levels excessively intervened in market economic activities by means of direct exclusive control of enterprises and local economic autonomy, which led to market monopolies and barriers. During the Cultural Revolution, China’s financial management system was changed seven times (once every 1.4 years on average), which set a record for economic system’s change frequency, and also reflects the contradiction between centralization and decentralization. From 1966 to 1967, the CPC Central Committee implemented the system of linking revenue with expenditure and sharing total profits. In 1968, the CPC Central Committee imposed the measure of separation of revenue and expenditure, i.e., the total revenue within the budget went to the central government rather than revenue being linked to expenditure. In 1969, production increased, and the CPC Central Committee restored the system of revenue being linked to expenditure, sharing of total profits, and installation of annual quota. Concerning fulfilling and exceeding quotas, local authorities sought to strike a balance between revenue and expenditure, and apportioned profits went to the local authorities. Local authorities were able to receive subsidies from the central government based on the supporting index in the central budget to avoid lowering the expenditure index when fail to meet quotas. In 1970, the CPC Central Committee delegated power to lower administrative levels, and it placed enterprises and institutions under the administration of the central government, provincial governments, and county governments under the unified leadership of the CPC Central Committee. Unlike the economic system in 1969, that of 1970 set 82. Sun, General Economic History of China (1949–2000), vol. 2, 1791–1792.

282

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

quotas on revenue and expenditure. In 1971, various provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions implemented the system of setting annual quotas on revenue and expenditure; this ensured that profits (or deficiency payments) went to the central government, and the central government set the revenue and expenditure budget in a balanced manner. In the event of revenue outstripping expenditure, the revenue went to the central government in the form of quotas; when expenditure exceeding revenue, the central government granted subsidies to make up for the deficit. Furthermore, the apportioned profits and balance went to local authorities, and local authorities sought to achieve a balance between excess revenue and overexpenditure. In 1973, the financial management system underwent change, and some regions imposed the measure of fixed percentage revenue retain, where local authorities retained a fixed percentage of the revenue, apportioned excess revenue, and made expenditure in the form of expenditure quotas. It is unfortunate that this measure was implied only in North China, Northeast China, and Jiangsu Province on a trial basis, but failed to be implied across the country as planned. In 1976, the Ministry of Finance made a decision about implementing a financial management system that set annual quotas on revenue and expenditure. This system linked revenue with expenditure, while the sharing of total profits was to a certain extend linked to the fiscal power and accountability of local authorities, making expenditure accounted as excess revenue. This also played a role in encouraging local authorities to increase revenue and cut expenditure. The CPC Central Committee overhauled the system of planned economy, but its efforts ended in failure. Mao Zedong had good intentions; he suppressed oppositions and launched the Cultural Revolution to overhaul the current system. However, he failed to gain the support of the bureaucracy in the government, and China was plunged into economic recession and chaos owning to the ongoing political movements. During the Cultural Revolution, the CPC Central Committee shifted focus from reform to decentralization by resuming the decentralization reform of 1957–1958 and rectifying the centralization reform that took place in the early 1960s. After the Cultural Revolution, China became a decentralized country: it however differed from China of the early and mid-1950s, as well as from the highly centralized planned economic systems of the Soviet Union and socialist Eastern Europe. The CPC Central Committee begun to establish the planned economic system in the early 1950s. Consequently, the ratio of fiscal revenue and expenditure to GDP dramatically increased: central financial income accounted for 80% of the total and central financial expenditure amounted to 70%. After the first implication of fiscal decentralization reform in 1957, a dramatic decrease in the ratio of central financial

283

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

income to total financial income: from 80.4% in 1958 to 24.4% in 1959 — a reduction of 56% occurred. There was a decline in the ratio of central financial expenditure to total financial expenditure from 71% in 1957 to 44.3% in 1958 — a drop of 26.7%. After 1961, the proportion of central financial income to total financial income and the proportion of central financial expenditure to total financial expenditure increased slightly. In the early 1970s, the CPC Central Committee once again carried out decentralization reform. Consequently, the proportion of central financial income to total financial income fell to 11.8% in 1975, which was the lowest level in the history of both China and the world. Furthermore, central financial expenditure accounted for 49.9% of the total. The above data suggested that China’s economy could not be categorized as demonstration of centralized planned model. China implemented a planned economy that was characterized by decentralization, and thus different from the highly centralized planned economic system of the Soviet Union. Deng Xiaoping followed Mao Zedong’s administrative strategy of decentralization while advocating the development of market economy.

China’s International Status In April 1981, Deng Xiaoping remarked that China had made excellent accomplishments in terms of foreign affairs. Despite domestic civil unrest, China had won international recognition and raised its global status.83 China listed itself among the world’s major political powers. In the 1970s, China regained its legitimate seat on the United Nations Security Council, and it was one of the five nations that had the power of veto along with the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and France. This signified that China had raised its international status and extended its influence in global affairs. China was also among the world’s major military powers. China had succeeded in independently developing its own atomic and hydrogen bombs as well as artificial satellites. Along with the United States, the Soviet Union and France, it became one of four states in the world possessing nuclear weapons, and this strengthened China’s national defenses. From October 16, 1964 to September 1976, China conducted 19 nuclear tests and several missile tests, and launched six artificial satellites. This act played a vital role in breaking up the nuclear monopoly, hegemony, and gain China the ability to blackmail of the two world superpowers, the United States and Soviet Union. 83. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 305.

284

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

China was among the world’s major powers that boasted comprehensive national power. In 1980, it was estimated that China’s comprehensive national power accounted for 4.7% of the world total, ranking itself fourth after the United States (22.5%), the Soviet Union (no figures), and Japan (6.0%), but it was above India (3.4%).84 The above data indicate that China made itself one of the five leading nations in the world and carried weight global politics. As Deng Xiaoping remarked, “China improved its international status and our great country, with nearly one-fourth of the global population, is rising in the world following the foundation of the People’s Republic of China.”85 It should be noted that Mao Zedong made great achievements in mapping out a political strategy toward the United States.86 This encouraged China to open up to Western countries,87 thereby creating favorable conditions for Deng Xiaoping’s pursuit of the opening-up after 1978. The Cultural Revolution had a great impact on China’s diplomatic efforts, and its international image was severely tarnished. From late 1966 to the latter half of 1967, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was attacked by rebels; Minister Chen Yi and other deputy ministers were seized and underwent harassment. In addition, officials responsible for foreign affairs were criticized, and almost all of China’s diplomatic envoys were transferred to China to participate in the Cultural Revolution. In those days, China was embroiled in diplomatic disputes with more than 30 of the over 40 foreign countries with which it had established diplomatic relations.88 China was thus an isolated country, and Mao Zedong called it an angry loner.89 84. Hu and Men, “International Comparison of National Strategic Resources of China, the United States, and Russia — Elucidation of China’s Grand Strategy for Improving People’s Livelihoods and Reinvigorating Our Country.”

85. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 299.

86. Premier Zhou Enlai also played a pivotal role. 87. In March 1979, Deng Xiaoping stated that Mao Zedong had shaped the strategic thinking of the third world and had made pioneer efforts in establishing new relations

with the United States and Japan, thereby laying a foundation for conducting the world struggle against hegemonism and shaping the world’s political future: “Thus, the Chinese people thank Comrade Mao Zedong for his great feats because he created a

favorable international environment for us to achieve the Four Modernizations.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 172.)

88. Chen, History of the People’s Republic of China, 326 89. On January 20, 1969, U.S. President Richard Nixon delivered his inaugural speech, “In

285

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

In terms of international public relations, Mao Zedong conspicuously promoted himself. As reported by Xinhua News Agency on August 4, 1966, the Hanoi-based New Vietnam Chinese Newspaper carried an article stating that the people on the five continents rested hope in the new China. They revered Mao Zedong as the great banner of world revolution and believed that China’s Cultural Revolution had made a great contribution to the international proletarian revolution.90 On March 27, in response to a congratulatory telegram on the 20th anniversary of the armed struggle of the Communist Party of Burma drafted by the International Department of the CPC Central Committee, Mao noted “Please do not mention Mao Zedong Thought or attempt to promote me in any external documents and articles.”91 As early as March 1958 at the Chengdu meeting, Mao criticized the dogmatism and sectarian character of the Central Soviet Area Period after Bolshevik magazine promoted him as being 100% correct.92 In the Cultural Revolution, Mao was the recipient of excessive flattery. Chinese newspapers proclaimed Mao Zedong as the great leader of world revolution. On August 1, 1966, Xinhua News Agency reported that on a welcoming banquet hosted by Shanghai People’s Government deputy mayor, Rathe Deshapriya Senanayake, secretary-general of the Afro-Asian Writers’ Bureau, declared: “Chairman Mao is the greatest mentor of the world’s revolutionary people.”93 The same day, Xinhua News Agency reported the news that Liang Ha’an, acting chairman of the Khmer Writers Association, hailed Chairman Mao as the great leader of the Chinese People, the great mentor of the world’s revolutionary people, and the lighthouse of the world’s people.94 On August 5, Xinhua News Agency published a news item entitled “Chairman Mao, the Sun of the World’s People — the reign of the government, we will present a new image, demonstrating openness and

seeking an open world including an open mind and open exchange of ideas, goods,

and personnel. Irrespective of population size, any nation cannot live in a state of

loneliness in anger.” Mao Zedong remarked on Nixon’s inaugural speech, “From 1949, we were the angry loner that fought against the United States.” He issued instructions

for Nixon’s inaugural speech to appear in the editorials published in the People’s Daily and Red Flag. (Gong, Deng Xiaoping and the United States, 32.)

90. People’s Daily, August 5, 1966.

91. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works since the Founding of New China, vol. 12, 287–288.

92. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Collected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 7, 369–370.

93. People’s Daily, August 2, 1966. 94. Ibid.

286

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Scientists from Four Continents Meet with the Great Leader Chairman Mao.”95 On August 13, Xinhua News Agency reported news that José Garcia and Napoleon Martinez from the Dominica Republic had written articles hailing Chairman Mao as the great leader of contemporary world revolution, and claiming that revering Mao Zedong Thought was an effective tool against U.S. imperialism and modern revisionism.96 On April 6, 1968, Mao Zedong deleted “Chairman Mao, great mentor of the world’s revolutionary people” from a document drafted by the General Staff Headquarters.97 Moves were made for China to proclaim itself the center of world revolution. However, on May 16, 1968, Mao Zedong criticized this proposal in a document, stating that it was inappropriate for the Chinese people to be so self-centered.98 From the above analysis, it showed that China introduced some modern elements into its society, accelerated modernization and industrialization, and introduced demographic changes. In addition, it made progress toward urbanization, the human development index and per capita income developed in tandem. Despite China’s low salaries, its human development index (HDI) increased from the world’s low level (HDI0.5 in 1975).99 These achievements laid a solid foundation for accomplishing modernization in the era of Deng Xiaoping. I have made a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the various losses incurred as a result of Mao Zedong’s faulty decisions, and research findings indicate that China suffered huge losses in economic growth and opportunity cost of human capital. Without such major errors in decision-making, China could have made greater progress by 1978 in terms of economic growth, level of consumption, and human capital accumulation. Despite the turmoil that it caused in China, the Cultural Revolution only impeded the progress of China’s socialist modernization: it did not halt that progress. As Mao Zedong stated, “When the prospects were bright, the road had twists and turns.100 After the era of Mao Zedong, China entered a new era of development, and the twists and turns of the Cultural Revolution paved the way for the subsequent successful reform and opening-up. 95. People’s Daily, August 6, 1966. 96. People’s Daily, August 14, 1966. 97. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works since the Founding of New China, vol. 12, 275.

98. Ibid., 275–276. 99. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2007 Human Development Report.

100. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 4, 1162.

287

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Political Remarks on the Cultural Revolution As the ruling party, the CPC demolished national systems, which underwent selfdestruction during the Cultural Revolution. In February 1980, the “Criteria on Party Political Life” was approved at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee. The document stated that Lin Biao and the Gang of Four plotted to seize control over the party and state power by taking advantage of the party’s decisionmaking errors. They wished to promote feudal fascism, anarchy, and factionalism, thereby violating party rules and regulations, negating the party’s leadership, and damaging the party’s organizations, ideology, traditions, and working style.101 This serious situation went against Mao Zedong’s good intentions. Like all things in the world, it was inevitable that China’s ruling party — the CPC — and socialist China should have both good and bad aspects. It is necessary to examine these good and bad sides in an objective, dialectical, and comprehensive manner. It is necessary to distinguish between major issues and minor issues, hence identify whether such figures as 70% accomplishments or 70% errors — as embodied in the tenets of Mao Zedong Thought — stand up to specific analysis. Mao Zedong seldom carried out surveys for the purpose of analysis; he tended to exaggerate negative elements such that in his later years he viewed his eventual successor as his enemy. The framing and purging of Liu Shaoqi typified this tendency.102 Although Mao Zedong had good intentions in launching the Cultural Revolution, 101. “Criteria on Party Political Life” was approved at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee on February 29, 1980.

102. In Lin Biao’s “Report to the 9th national Congress of the Communist Party of

China,” he declared, “It was proved that Liu Shaoqi defected to the enemies in the

first revolutionary civil war and served as a traitor, scab, and running dog of sinful imperialism, modern revisionism, and Kuomintang reactionaries and worked as a proxy of the capitalist roaders. Over recent years, Liu Shaoqi recruited deserters and

traitors and assembled a gang of traitors, spies, and capitalist roaders, who concealed their counter-revolutionary history and harbored and colluded with one another

to enter the party and state organs and seize central and local power. They actually

plotted to establish an underground capitalist base to revolt against the proletarian base headed by Chairman Mao. Liu Shaoqi and his allies colluded with imperialists,

modern revisionists, and Kuomintang reactionaries and destroyed socialist systems, which U.S. imperialists, Soviet revisionists, and reactionaries from different countries failed to do.”

288

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

that revolution actually destroyed the fundamental systems of the party and state. In the Cultural Revolution, China entered a period of self-destruction. The party and state apparatus failed to function, and the party and state existed in name only, which sparked civil unrest. Party organizations were severely damaged. After launching of the Cultural Revolution, party grassroots organizations in the fields of culture, education, science and technology as well as party and government organizations and leaders were attacked; this was done in the name of revolution, and the leadership of party committees was not reestablished until several months later. From the end of 1966 to the beginning of 1967, majority of the party’s organizations were paralyzed or malfunctioned. This so-called widespread party rectification movement was contrary to all good intentions,103 and it disrupted the party’s guiding ideology, destroyed the party’s democratic centralism and working style, led to reduced discipline, and lowered the party’s prestige and cohesion.104 The party organization had failed to function. In violation of the Party Constitution, the CPC Central Committee failed to convene plenary sessions in 1967, 1971, 1972, and 1976 as scheduled. The Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee failed to function and was subsequently dissolved. The Central Cultural Revolution Group (with Chen Boda as group leader and Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao as deputy leaders) succeeded the CPC Central Committee; the brief meetings of the Central Cultural Revolution Group chaired by Zhou Enlai replaced the meetings of the Political Bureau, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The 9th National Congress of the CPC called for one-party leadership, resulting in the integration of party and government, where party’s leadership replaced government leadership. The First Constitution of the People’s Republic of China was passed at the First Session of the 1st National People’s Congress was severely violated (Sidebar 7.1). Plenary sessions of the CPC Central Committee, sessions of the National People’s Congress and Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the National Political Consultative Congress, the Supreme State Conference, and meetings of the State Council were cancelled; the People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and other judicial bodies failed to function and democratic party organization became defunct. In January 1967, the January Political Storm was launched in Shanghai, and 103. It is from Lin Biao’s “Report to the 9th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,” which was delivered on April 1, 1969 and approved on April 14, 1969.

104. Party History Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., The History of the Communist Party of China: 1949–1978, vol. 2, 970–971.

289

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

national party and government organizations subsequently became paralyzed or semi-paralyzed. On February 19, 1967, the CPC Central Committee issued the notification and request to set up the Revolutionary Committee. From January 1967 to September 1968, the Revolutionary Committee was established in various provinces, cities, and autonomous regions without legislation or democratic election. As a result, the staff in provincial organizations was reduced to 1/20 or even 1/30. The Revolutionary Committee integrated the party and the government, so as the administration and the judiciary. It was hailed as a great achievement of the proletarian struggle for power. In fact, it failed to govern the country.105 During the Cultural Revolution, many CPC leaders and leaders of democratic parties were framed and persecuted. According to the most authoritative data based on the verdicts of the tribunal of the Supreme People’s Court (TFZ No. 1) and the list of framed individuals produced by Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, and Xie Fuzhi in late December 1968,106 103 members and alternate members of the 8th CPC Central Committee (71%) were prosecuted; including 22 members and alternate members of the Political Bureau, 14 general secretaries of the Central Committee, and secretaries and alternate secretaries of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Among them, Liu Shaoqi and Tao Zhu (members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau) and Peng Dehuai (member of the Political Bureau) were persecuted to death. Of the 115 members of the Standing Committee of the 4th National People’s Congress, 52 members (including 1 chairman and 8 vice chairmen) were prosecuted. 12 deputy premiers of the State Council and 6 vice chairmen of the Central Military Committee of the CPC were framed; among them, He Long was persecuted to death. In all, 76 members of the National Committee of the 4th Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and 11 leaders of democratic parties were framed. Persecution resulted in 40 deaths of celebrities. Over 80,000 PLA soldiers were persecuted, and 1,169 soldiers died. 13 leaders of the CPC Beijing Municipal Government and Beijing People’s Government were framed, and 4 of them did not survived. 12 leaders of the CPC Shanghai Municipal Government and Shanghai People’s Government were persecuted, where 2 of them 105. He ed., The History of the People’s Republic of China, 297–298. 106. The list of framed members of the 8th CPC Central Committee was made by Jiang Qing

and Kang Sheng in 1968. In August 1968, Kang Sheng and others fabricated the “Report of the Political Background of Members of the Central Supervision Commission,” the “Report of the Political Background of Members of the Standing Committee of the Third

National People’s Congress,” and the “Report of the Political Background of Members of the National Committee of the Fourth Chinese People’s Political Consultative

Conference.” In December, Xie Fuzhi appeared on the (Marxist-Leninist) False Case List of the CPC.

290

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

were dead. Persecution also killed another 1,565, who worked in public security organizations, People’s Procuratorates, and the People’s Courts at all levels.107 The state president, Liu Shaoqi, lodged a protest, “I serve as president of the People’s Republic of China. It does not matter how you treat me. Nevertheless, I feel obliged to defend the dignity of this position. Who relieved me from my post? Removing me from office has to be approved by the National People’s Congress. Your deeds violate the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China: that Constitution guarantees the rights of citizens, and anyone who violates it shall be punished in compliance with the law.” Records indicate that 28,000 people were implicated and 26,000 cases were brought to trial in connection with Liu Shaoqi.108 Information related to various cases of injustice or false accusation and efforts to redress such cases can also be obtained from documents issued or approved by the CPC Central Committee from 1978 to 1981 (Appendix 7.4).

Sidebar 7.1

The Cultural Revolution Seriously Damaged National Systems

In the Cultural Revolution, national systems were undermined, and national agencies ceased to function. 1. Meetings of the National People’s Congress system were discontinued. From 1966 to 1975, the National People’s Congress and Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress held no meetings and organizations of the National People’s Congress exerted military control. As China’s supreme authority, the National People’s Congress failed to perform its functions, including legislative power, state staff appointment and dismissal, major state affairs decision-making, enforcing the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, and supervising other national agencies, as stipulated in that Constitution. Amendments to the Constitution in 1975 and 1978 violated the stipulation that such amendments had to be approved by two-thirds of deputies to the National People’s Congress as declared in the Constitution of 1954; that stipulation was later rescinded. According to the Constitution of 1954, the chairman was responsible for promulgating laws based on the decisions of the National People’s Congress, but this stipulation was not enforced until 1967. Further, the deputies to the 107. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 654–679.

108. He, The History of the People’s Republic of China, 299.

291

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

National People’s Congress and standing commissioners failed to exercise the right of interpellation, their voting power and privilege of immunity (without legal action), and power of habeas corpus (banning arrests and criminal trials without the permission of the National People’s Congress); local people’s congresses at all levels failed to perform. 2. The system of head of state was first disrupted and then abandoned. Under the Constitution of 1954, the chairman was an independent state agency and shared power as head of state with the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (amounting to a collective head of state based on collective decisions and exercising individual power). In August 1966,

Liu Shaoqi was persecuted and relieved of his position as state president in addition to being deprived of internal power exercised by the president, such as commanding the armed forces, presiding over supreme state conferences to discuss major state affairs, promulgating national laws, exercising the power to issue orders, and appointing and dismissing staff to the State Council. Dong Biwu exercised external power granted to the state president on behalf of Liu Shaoqi. 3. As the supreme administrative authority, the State Council came under attack, and normal work order was disrupted. In 1965, the State Council had a total of 49 ministries and commissions; 22 agencies came directly under the State Council, and there were seven offices, one secretariat, and 79 agencies; the total staff was 41,000. After 1967, various ministries and commissions exerted military control and dispatched military representatives. At the end of 1970, the State Council had only 32 agencies, and a sum of 10,000 staffs; the majority of staff members were sent to the Cadre School (labor camps). 4. The national military system failed to function properly and was abolished. According to the Constitution of 1954, the state president was responsible for commanding the armed forces, and the National Defense Commission was established as an advisory body for the armed forces — rather than operating in some supervisory role. Because Liu Shaoqi served as chairman of the National Defense Commission, it failed to perform its functions during the Cultural Revolution. The Constitution of 1975 and that of 1978 called for the disbanding of the national military commanding body and the National Defense Commission; they stipulated that the Central Military Committee of the CPC was responsible for commanding the armed forces. 5. National judicial systems consisted of the justice system, procuratorial

292

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

system, investigation system, enforcement system, notary system, arbitration system, and lawyer system. After 1967, national People’s Courts and procuratorates failed to perform their functions; China’s four judicial bodies (public and national security, the procuratorates, courts, and judiciary) and three service agencies (notary public offices, arbitral bodies, and lawyers) were essentially paralyzed or dissolved. In violation of the Constitution, the Central Special Case Group was responsible for imposing sentences. After 1967, the chairman and members of the State Council approved appointment by the National People’s Congress or deputies to that congress; the result was that various party and government officials were arrested and imprisoned without legal proceedings being taken.109 The rights of citizens as detailed in the Constitution were severely infringed. The Constitution of 1954 defined the rights and obligations of citizens and their entitlement to equal justice under the law. That Constitution also stated there should be freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, procession, and demonstration for citizens; it stipulated that citizens’ personal freedom and residence would not be violated and that their privacy and rights would be protected. Nevertheless, citizens’ personal freedom and rights were infringed, and the country had no way of protecting citizens during the Cultural Revolution: state systems failed to function. How many people were persecuted in the Cultural Revolution and how many were implicated in such persecutions? The records differ in this regard. According to statistics of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee, 2.3 million party members’ file were opened for reviewed — 19.2% of the 12 million members, in other words. Among those members, 75% of senior officials who ranked deputy minister and deputy governor or above had their files reviewed and over 60,000 were persecuted. Overall, there were over two million cases of injustice, and hundreds of thousands of party members were implicated in such cases.110 Zheng Shiping estimated that 29,885 officials in central and state organizations were removed from office. In 1978, injustice and false accusation ended up redressing 300,000 party officials and other personnel; another 2.9 million people were criticized and persecuted. 34,400 policemen, judges, prosecutors, and judicial officers were criticized and persecuted, among them, 1,100 were killed 109. Li, Chinese Government System. 110. Party History Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., The History of the Communist Party of China: 1949–1978, vol. 2, 967.

293

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

by persecutions and 3,600 were maimed. Headed by Xie Fuzhi, who came under censure, were 225 officials of the Ministry of Public Security. Xie and one of his deputy ministers arrested other deputy ministers.111 According to the data of the CCCPC Party Literature Research Office, 700,000 party officials and ordinary people were persecuted, leading to death of l34,000 individuals. It is estimated that over 100 million people were framed, persecuted, or falsely implicated.112 Records indicated that the public security department, the People’s Procuratorate, and the People’s Court redressed 1.09 million cases of injustice from 1978 to March 1984, most of which occurred during the Cultural Revolution.113 Vice Chairman Yie Jianying said at the closing session of the Central Work Conference on December 13, 1978, “Over 100 million people, including the political elite, intellectual elite, technical elite, industrial workers, farmers, and ordinary people masses were prosecuted and persecuted in the Cultural Revolution. That is one-ninth of our population.114 Li Ruihuan recalled himself working as an industrial worker and corporate official where he was honored as a national model worker and activist for studying Chairman Mao’s works. Nevertheless, he was suddenly denounced as possessing the three evil elements and was detained in a cowshed for over 4 years. According to his description, all relations were simplified as class relations and the relations between revolution and counter-revolution; people with good reputations were denounced as evil and revolutionaries were framed as counter-revolutionaries.115 What was the aim and what were the consequences of Mao Zedong launching the Cultural Revolution? On January 1, 1967, Mao Zedong wrote the editorial on New Year’s Day for the People’s Daily and Red Flag: “The Cultural Revolution has touched the soul of the people and changed their political stance, their worldview, and their revolutionary course as well as the course of Chinese history. As an unprecedented political revolution, it will groom a generation of communists.”116 It is clear that Mao had great political ambitions and lofty political ideals when he launched the Cultural Revolution. 111. Zheng, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China: The Institutional Dilemma, 137–138.

112. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Resolutions

about Serval Historical Issue of the CPC Since the Founding of the New China (with Remarks), 391.

113. Wang, The Era of Great Turmoil, 539. 114. Ibid. 115. Li, “Harmonious Socialist Ideology,” 82. 116. Wang, The Era of Great Turmoil, 2.

294

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Mao Zedong was a staunch revolutionist who devoted himself to the revolutionary cause in the struggle against landlords, bureaucratic capitalists, and imperialists; he wanted to touch the souls of the ruling party, the government and bureaucracy, technocrats, intellectuals, and all people when he created the Cultural Revolution. Like party leaders, the populace believed in Mao Zedong Thought and motives behind the revolution. Nevertheless, it is not easy to define the real nature of the revolution in terms of how it touched people’s souls and its consequences. All the evidence pointing to the fact that Cultural Revolution had been an unprecedented political and social catastrophe for China.117 At great cost to the people and the country, even Lin Biao and Jiang Qing fell victim to the Cultural Revolution and had to pay the penalty. In January 1981, Lin Biao and Jiang Qing were brought to trial as criminals of two counter-revolutionary cliques. Of the 16 defendants,118 13 were members of the Political Bureau, including three vice chairmen and five members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. This was an unprecedented political case in the history of new China and was a rare case in world history.119 Going through the Cultural Revolution, which stressed on class struggle round the clock, the CPC completely repudiated the ruling philosophy that had regarded class struggle as the guideline. Instead, it advocated building harmonious socialism.

117. The verdict of the tribunal of the Supreme People’s Court (TFZ No. 1) stated that

China’s political life went into an abnormal state and that the socialist legal system was severely destroyed in the Cultural Revolution: “The Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques plotted to frame and persecute state leaders, overthrow the government and the army, persecute cadres, intellectuals, and the masses, poison

the mind of young people and endanger the life, property, and autonomy of the people by seizing power and organizing conspiracy for 10 years. Consequently, they brought

a catastrophe to the whole country and people of all nationalities, disrupted the people’s democratic dictatorship system and socialist social order and also damaged

the national economy and other undertakings.” (Party Literature Research Center of

the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 657.)

118. There were 16 defendants in total: Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Wang

Hongwen, Chen Boda, Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo, and Jiang Tengjiao; six defendants who had since died — Lin Biao, Kang Sheng, Xie Fuzhi, Ye Qun, Lin Liguo, and Zhou Yuchi.

119. Xiao, Historical Transition — From Restoration of Order to Reform and Opening-up, 301.

295

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

The Systemic Root Causes of Mao Zedong’s Errors in His Later Years After Mao Zedong’s death, the CPC affirmed his great feats though changing his radical line and arbitrary method of decision-making. It was undeniable that Mao had made errors in decision-making and was primarily responsible for the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. There were, however, problems rooted in the system causing his errors.120 At the end of this book, the author provides a detailed analysis of these causes and the general historical experience of China and its people in Mao Zedong’s later years. These prompted Deng Xiaoping to shape the party and state reform policies so as to avoid a recurrence of the previous catastrophes.

Systemic root causes for the life tenure of leaders After the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong’s successes and errors, his rights and wrongs, feats and flaws were related to his tenure of office. The longer his tenure was, the more errors he made. In his later years, he committed fatal errors. In the Soviet Union, Stalin did the same. Mao Zedong was elected chairman of the CPC Central Committee in March 1943, since then, he remained chairman for 33 years until his death in September 1976. Mao served as leader of China’s ruling party for 27 years since the foundation of the People’s Republic. He had the longest tenure of office of any leader of a socialist country. None of the amendments to the Party Constitution at any National Congress of the CPC (from the 8th National Congress in 1956 to the 10th National Congress in 1973) stipulated the tenure of party leaders. Further, none of the amendments to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China at any National People’s Congress (from the 1st Congress in 1954 to the 4th Congress in 1975) defined the tenure of state leaders. This constituted a major flaw in the leadership systems of both the party and the state. Although Mao’s lifetime tenure did not actually violate the Party Constitution, some backward hidden rule was kept, making Mao’s tenure akin to feudal emperors. In summer 1956, Mao Zedong had imposed a limit to chairmanship’s tenure, proposing that the chairman could be re-elected at most to a second term of office. 120. Deng Xiaoping claimed that Mao Zedong made decision-making errors and that these had system root causes. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 292.)

296

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

He also rejected the idea of being selected as chairman at the next election.121 It appears that Mao planned to retire from the party and state leadership and devote himself in studying as a theorist and philosopher rather than remain political active. In fact, Mao would have been better suited to the former, since it requires innovative attributions and the ability to transcend reality and history, whereas the latter confronts reality, where one had to accept reality’s limitations, and being innovative within bounds. On September 13, 1956, Mao Zedong brought up the question of the central leadership, suggesting that he might resign as chairman and serve instead as honorary chairman.122 In accordance with Article 37 of the Party Constitution approved at the 8th National Congress of the CPC, the Central Committee took the innovative step of creating for Mao Zedong the position of honorary chairman “if necessary." This was in response to Mao’s advocating against lifetime tenure at the Beidaihe meeting. Unfortunately, in his report on amendments to the Party Constitution, Deng Xiaoping did not elaborate on that “if necessary” clause, nor discuss how Mao might move into retirement. In reality, this formal position of honorary chairman existed in name only but never materialized. In April 1957, Mao Zedong handed in his resignation for both state president and chairman of the CPC Central Committee. However, after the anti-rightist campaign, he withdrew his resignation and rejected initiatives to enforce the Constitution. Under his influence, the Central Committee avoided discussions over the matter. Consequently, Article 37 of the Party Constitution existed only in name; it performed no function. In 1969, the 9th National Congress of the CPC amended the Constitution and had this article removed. Owing to the failure of system execution, the necessary restrictions were not imposed. At the 10th National Congress of the CPC in 1973, Deng Xiaoping proposed setting up a Central Advisory Commission of the CPC, and Mao Zedong volunteered as chairman. Yet, with Zhou Enlai and other leaders’ opposition, the Central Committee123 missed this opportunity of abolishing lifetime tenure for leadership. According to the Constitution of the CPC, party leaders (the chairman or general secretary of the CPC Central Committee) had a 5-year tenure and could be elected only up to a second term of office (10 years). Under this Constitution, Mao Zedong’s tenure should have ended in 1959. If Mao had abided by the Constitution, mistakes 121. Xu, Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1976), 31. 122. Ibid. 123. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1666.

297

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

like launching the Cultural Revolution right after the erroneous Great Leap Forward would have been avoided. His life tenure granted him chances to commit the two greatest errors in his political life.

The democratic collective decision-making system failed to function How was Mao Zedong able to launch the Cultural Revolution and continue it for 10 years? Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun, who worked long with, identified the underlying causes. In August, Deng remarked, “It was the abnormal political life in our party and state, patriarchy and paternalism, personality cults, and unhealthy political life, that contributed to the Cultural Revolution.”124 In November, Chen claimed that Chairman Mao had made errors in disrupting democratic centralism, dominating the CPC, and beating any dissidents.125 In July 1981, Hu Yaobang declared that the failures to remedy these fatal errors over such a long period were rooted in the disruption of normal political life in the party, the party’s democratic centralism, and, especially, the central collective leadership of the CPC Central Committee.126 It was inevitable that Mao Zedong would commit errors in his later years. Nevertheless, it those mistakes would have been remedied swiftly. Yet, since the CPC lacked the capacity of restricting Mao’s deeds and correct his errors, Mao was capable in violate and disrupt the party’s democratic centralism and dominate the CPC Central Committee. As Mao Zedong noted in 1968, “It is necessary to learn from history.”127 As early as 1945, Liu Shaoqi stated in the “Report to the Seventh National Congress of the CPC” that the Party Constitution embodied a special kind of system under which everyone was equal rather than some enjoying particular privileges. Liu viewed any violation of the system as anti-democratic despotism.128 From 1949 to 1956, 124. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 345.

125. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Biography of Chen Yun (1905–1995), vol. 2, 260.

126. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 869.

127. People’s Daily, November 25, 1968. 128. In 1945, Liu Shaoqi stated in the “Report to the Seventh National Congress of the CPC,”

298

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Mao strictly obeyed the party’s regulations and occupied a status equal to that of the other leaders. He advocated a democratic working style and accepted the opinions of other people. Under his leadership, the CPC established democratic principles and reached a consensus on major issues, and China’s socialist cause made rapid progress. Nevertheless, when he violated party rules, exerted his personal dictatorship, and disregarded democracy, he began to commit serious errors,129 and that led to great losses to the CPC and to the country. With the extension of his tenure of office, Mao changed his style of ruling the party and the country. Instead of being the core leader of the party’s collective leadership, he became a dictator. The democratic working style became a dictatorship; decisions made by the collective leadership became personal decisions by his single vote; collective leadership thinking gave way to his supreme commands; resulting in a long term impact of feudal despotism.130 “The Constitution of the Communist Party of China and party regulations have to stipulate the party’s fundamental principles, political methods of action of party organizations,

the party’s organizational structure, and rules relating to the party’s political life.” He also criticized privilege: “Some party leaders have misinterpreted its rules and

resolutions as serving the interests of its top leaders enjoying special privileges instead

of being for the common interests of party members. This reflects anti-democratic personal despotism trends and the thoughts of a privileged class within the party.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 1, 316, 360.)

129. Deng Xiaoping remarked that Mao Zedong by and large exercised correct leadership

up to 1957: “After the anti-rightist campaign in 1957, he committed more and more

errors.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 294–295.)

130. The CPC Central Committee stated in its resolution in 1981, “China is a country with a long history of feudalism, and our party has fought against feudalism — especially

the feudal landlord system and despotic gentry. During its anti-feudalism struggle, it

established democracy.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to root out the ideological and political legacy of long-term

feudal autocracy. For various historical reasons, the CPC Central Committee lacked the capacity to institutionalize and legalize party democracy and democratic national

political and social life. Or when it enacted relevant laws and statutes, such laws and statutes failed to perform their proper functions, which resulted in the excessive

concentration of power in the hands of some individuals as well as a totalitarian

dictatorship and personality cult within the party. Therefore, our party and country failed to prevent the Cultural Revolution.” (Party Literature Research Center of the

299

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

The Constitution of the CPC approved at the party’s Seventh National Congress stipulated that the CPC Central Committee had to uphold democracy within the party. Liu Shaoqi offered an explanation of this in his “Report to the Seventh National Congress of the CPC” on behalf of the Central Committee: “No party leaders, including members of the CPC Central Committee, are allowed to air political views on national issues without the permission of the Central Committee.”131 He also criticized anti-democratic personal despotic trends, which had caused great damage to the party.132 During the long, bloody war, the CPC suffered setbacks and failures many times against its strong enemies. This was due to both the weakness of the PLA, and to decision-making errors. Thus, the CPC began to exercise democratic centralism. In 1948, it promoted the concept of collective leadership instead of individuals making crucial decisions.133 Democratic centralism and collective leadership underpinned the CPC’s capacity to build up its strength, achieve power, and exercise leadership in an appropriate manner, thereby gaining the support of the Chinese people and establishing legitimate basic core systems. Within 7 years of the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, the CPC strengthened and perfected democratic centralism within the party. In 1956, Deng Xiaoping reaffirmed collective leadership and the personal accountability system and opposed personal dictatorship in the “Report of Amending the Constitution of the Communist Party of China,” which was presented at the 8th National Congress CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 819.)

131. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 1, 369.

132. Liu Shaoqi criticized some problems within the party: “Disrupting democracy and harmony, exerting dictatorship and implementing obscurantism, carrying on struggles and punishing, expelling, and purging party members is certain to ruin our party.”

(Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi, vol. 1, 369.)

133. In August 1948, the CPC Central Committee imposed the stipulation of “Strengthening

the Party Committee System”: “The party committee system ensures collective

leadership and prevents a totalitarian dictatorship. All major party issues are subject to discussion by the party committee; members of the party committee voice their

opinions, and the party committee makes decisions to be enforced. It is necessary for us to implement both the collective leadership system and individual accountability

system at the same time. This resolution has to be enforced within the party.” (Ibid., 328–329.)

300

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

of the CPC.134 He summarized the historical experiences of, and lessons learned by, communist parties around the world. He stated that evidentially individuals making crucial decisions betrayed the founding principles of communism and would inevitably led to errors.135 Deng also declared that the party congress should be regularly convened across levels so as to properly exercise its function.136 Deng was keenly aware that the CPC had to uphold and perfect democracy and collective decision making as a basic ruling system, and he made a great contribution in improving that system. If the CPC had implemented the above systems, China would have avoided the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Mao Zedong could have avoided his decision-making errors, which were rooted in his violation of basic party principles and formal systems. In the end, Mao’s launching of the Cultural Revolution was clearly contrary to fundamental party principles and formal systems. It was Mao Zedong who altered the party’s collective leadership system and exercised personal dictatorship. By issuing a notification on May 16, 1966, Mao subverted the regulations of the CPC that ensured collective leadership, and this led to the whole party simply obeying the commands of Mao Zedong.137 In the 134. According to Article 19 of the Constitution of the CPC, approved at the 8th National Congress, party organizations at all levels have to exercise collective leadership and implement the personal accountability system at the same time to make crucial decisions

collectively and stress the role of individuals. Deng Xiaoping noted that in practice, the system had defects and that the collective leadership served as a cover for personal dictatorship. He therefore proposed to oppose and remedy such defects and properly

implement the collective leadership system by discussing issues raised at meetings

and allowing participants to lodge objections. In the case of divergent views on nonurgent major issues, discussions should be prolonged, allowing personal negotiations

and obtaining approval from the majority of participants instead of holding hasty votes and reaching rash conclusions.

135. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 1, 229.

136. Deng Xiaoping declared that the national party meetings failed to take the place of the congress of the CPC, and he proposed that party congresses be held every year so

that they could serve as the supreme decision-making and supervisory authority of the party. According to this new system, crucial party decisions would be subject to discussion at party congresses. (Ibid., 232–233.)

137. On April 14, 1966, Mao Zedong issued instructions about “Notification of the CPC Central Committee Revoking the Report Outline on Current Academic.” (Party

Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works

301

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

“Communiqué of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee”

in 1966, Mao changed the party rule of asserting the leadership of the CPC Central Committee into “asserting the leadership of Mao Zedong and the CPC Central Committee.”138 This resulted in personal dictatorship and autocracy, the Mao personality cult, and non-democratic decision- making. Mao Zedong himself willfully destroyed formal systems and adopted hidden rules. During the Cultural Revolution, he set up the Central Cultural Revolution Group and from May 1966 to January 1967 convened brief meetings of the Central Cultural Revolution Group instead of those of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, the Political Bureau, and the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee. Mao invited rebel representatives to participate in the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee in June 1966. As Mao put up the “Bombarding the Headquarters — My First Big Poster” on August 5, 1966 without central collective discussion, he purged of two members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping) and the censuring of one member of the Political Bureau (Chen Yun). Mao’s action in delivering a secret birthday speech without convening a plenary session of the CPC Central Committee on December 26, 1966, led to the purge of Tao Zhu, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. Further, Mao personally appointed Mao Yuanxin (his nephew) as his informal liaison officer with the Political Bureau in October 1975 instead of going through the normal meetings and resolution procedures. In accordance with Mao Zedong’s directive, secret meetings replaced plenary sessions of the CPC Central Committee. Key points of the speeches at these secret meetings were reviewed and approved by Mao rather than being approved as resolutions at a plenary session of the CPC Central Committee. According to a motion proposed by Mao, the Political Bureau unanimously approved the resolution to remove Deng Xiaoping from office and appoint Hu Guofeng (who was not a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau) as first vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee on April 8, 1976. No plenary session of the CPC Central Committee had been convened for this purpose. Though chairman of the CPC Central Committee, Mao Zedong seldom attended meetings of the Political Bureau. On July 17, 1974, Mao convened a meeting with members of the Political Bureau in Beijing before leaving the city on vacation, instead of a plenary session of the CPC Central Committee. On May 3, Mao returned Since the Founding of New China, vol. 12, 43.) 138. Ibid., 96.



302

The Communiqué was approved at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central

Committee on August 12 and published in the People’s Daily on August 14, 1966.

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

to Beijing and chaired one more final meeting of the Political Bureau. Subsequently, members of the Political Bureau only chance to report to Mao or obtain his opinion were when accompanying him to meet foreign guests. Additionally, Mao alone decided to grant Wang Hairong, Tang Wensheng, and Mao Yuanxin right to attend meetings of the Political Bureau. Why did Mao Zedong initially adopt the correct form of leadership but then later make decision-making errors, even leading to an unprecedented historical catastrophe? What caused the split in the collective leadership of the 8th CPC Central Committee? What political responsibility did Mao bear in all this? It is generally better to make observations and pass judgments about China’s leaders based on their actions and the consequences of those actions, rather than based on their utterances. This analysis will comment on Mao Zedong’s errors in the Cultural Revolution while attempting to uphold Maoism by adhering to the principles of seeking truth from facts, and taking practice as the criterion for testing correct and incorrect actions. What lessons did Mao Zedong learn from the Lin Biao incident? Mao advocated the principle of the Three Musts and Three Must-Nots, which were enshrined in the amendment to the Constitution of the CPC in 1973. Here, the adoption of the principle will be examined. In terms of the principle of advocating Marxism instead of revisionism, Mao Zedong believed that he had the sole right to define Marxism and revisionism; he boasted that the theory of continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat made a contribution to Marxism-Leninism. In fact, history reveals that Mao Zedong’s ideas were divorced from the actual situation in China. Further, Mao failed to understand and define revisionism adequately. As a result, the Cultural Revolution lost direction in its efforts to combat and prevent revisionism. Mao was under the wrong impression that he was the personification of correctness. He adopted an opportunistic attitude toward his personality cult by taking advantage of it and supporting it even though he knew at heart that personality cults were wrong. For example, although he knew that Lin Biao’s advancing the theory of innate genius and creating Mao’s personality cult was a betrayal of Marxism, Mao encouraged and supported Lin. Mao even formed a political alliance with Lin to purge Liu Shaoqi before subsequently purging Lin according to Mao’s needs for political struggle. With respect to the principle of encouraging consolidation and avoiding divisions, Mao Zedong held the theory that splits within the party were inevitable. Mao continued to foment political divisions by continuing the two-line struggle instead of having the leading members serve within a united CPC Central Committee.

303

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

With respect to behaving in an open, candid manner rather than organizing conspiracies, Mao Zedong plotted to carry out fierce struggles; he purged his allies and coerced them into accepting his opinions. Mao forced Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun to write self-criticisms for political persecutions use. He encouraged leaders to denounce one another by way of providing testimony for political struggles, and he struck at and purged dissidents as counterrevolutionaries or traitors. Almost all the cases Mao handled were cases of political injustice.139 Just as Deng Xiaoping remarked, Mao committed errors in violation of correct guidelines and policies, and the systemic root causes compounded his errors.140 By disregarding viable systems and implementing authoritarian ones, it was inevitable that Mao would make great mistakes in his later years. In July 1966, Mao Zedong admitted the possession of contradictory attributes of arrogance and cunning; both possessed and lacked confidence; he enjoyed fame, though he found himself not deserving it; he knew himself but was prone to boasting about himself.141 As Mao once said, all things may be lost to the opposition.142 At the pinnacle of his power, Mao was also alienated by power, and it was at the time that his political mistakes also reached an apex. After creating his own personality cult across the whole country, he was doomed to commit errors, and his actions led to political catastrophe.143 It may be said that Mao personally launched the Cultural Revolution as a form of national drill144 and that it ended in failure. 139. Deng Xiaoping remarked that Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution without planning to purge all the veteran party officials, and Lin Biao and the Gang

of Four behind Mao’s back purged some veteran officials. However, Mao purged a large number of officials in his later years, and the result was political tragedy. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 301.) 140. Ibid., 295–296. 141. Mao Zedong wrote, “I am confident but lack confidence. As the saying goes, in the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king. I rule this country in that fashion. I am arrogant and cunning, and arrogance prevails. I quoted the lines from Li Gu’s letter to Huang

Qiong, ‘It is hard to deserve fame.’ As the saying goes, one needs to know oneself. I felt

I did not deserve fame, and I read the lines at the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 12, 72.) 142. Ibid. 143. Ibid. 144. Ibid., 73.

304

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Party disputes escalating into class struggles Since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Mao Zedong diverged from the majority of party leaders (e.g., Liu Shaoqi) in believing in two socialist modernization lines and he continued the two-line struggle. Since Mao carried on the struggle against different lines within the party, most party leaders had no way of airing different views and remedying Mao’s errors, which exacerbated the situation. Mao Zedong was an idealist — perhaps even a Utopian leader — who had ambitiously aimed to build socialism, eradicate private ownership, restrict bourgeois rights, exercise dictatorship over the bourgeoisie, prevent the restoration of revisionism and capitalism, avoid the emergence of a privileged bureaucratic class, shun polarization between the rich and poor, and guard against peaceful evolution in impoverished, backward China. In this regard, Mao had uncompromising attitudes, and he refused to make conciliations on matters of principle. For the most part, Mao rebuked or even denounced Liu Shaoqi, who simply obeyed Mao’s orders and supreme directives.145 Chinese leaders held divergent views about China’s industrialization policy, economic development strategies, and most appropriate economic system. Against the changing political background of the People’s Republic of China, the two-line struggle differed in terms of its content, form, and consequences. It was unfortunate that Mao Zedong diverged markedly from Liu Shaoqi in terms of political views, and this difference ultimately developed into a political struggle. As Deng Xiaoping recalled, Mao Zedong failed to reflect properly on past actions in a profound manner: even though he deliberated on his errors with the Great Leap Forward, he went on engaging in the Cultural Revolution. Mao had good intentions in launching the Cultural Revolution, where he attempted to prevent the restoration of capitalism. However, he misjudged the actual circumstances in China and the appropriate revolutionary targets, and went on to purge those he believed to be capitalists, including veteran revolutionary leaders

145. In July 1951, Mao Zedong censured Liu Shaoqi and the North Bureau of the CPC Central Committee for changing private ownership of the means of production. In line with Mao’s criticism, Liu and Bo Yibo abandoned their advocacy.Mao rebuked Liu Shaiqi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping for proposing to establish a new democratic social order; thereafter, no one put forward such a proposal in a formal party report. (Pang, China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 1, 204–205, 295–296.)

305

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

at all levels like Liu Shaoqi.146 As stated in the “Resolution on Redressing the Liu Shaoqi Injustice Case,” which was approved at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, there had in fact been no counter-revolutionary revisionist line, counter-revolutionary revisionist group nor any bourgeois base related to Liu Shaoqi, and also no group of capitalist roaders with Liu Shaoqi as their leader within the party.147 Mao created these illusory enemies only to sustain his theory of class struggle. Regardless of Mao Zedong’s political motives, the Cultural Revolution clearly caused social tumult and divisions in the ruling party by purging all veteran. Mao admitted that the Cultural Revolution had led to the purging of all veteran officials and had sparked civil unrest.

Comparison between Mao and Stalin As a historical phenomenon, Mao Zedong’s errors with respect to dominating the country and party in his later years paralleled to the actions of Joseph Stalin in his own later years. From a historical perspective, how much did Mao resembled Stalin in their later years? How did Mao view Stalin’s errors? Why did Mao repeat those errors? The following presents a historical comparison to address the above questions. Begin with revealing Mao Zedong’s remarks on Stalin. On November 30, 1956, Mao delivered a speech at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau: “Stalin overemphasized the dictatorship of the proletariat, and he destroyed part of the socialist legal system instead of the entire legal system; in the same way, he followed part of the Constitution, Civil Law, and Criminal Procedure Law. Although Stalin unduly stressed the dictatorship of the proletariat and restricted democracy, it was appropriate to establish that dictatorship and democracy in the Soviet Union.”148 Regardless of the above remarks directed towards Stalin, evidentially Mao himself committed greater errors in launching the Cultural Revolution than Stalin did in his later years. In the Cultural Revolution, Mao advocated and upheld a comprehensive dictatorship instead of implementing a socialist legal system; Mao abandoned the Constitution of 1954 and annulled the 146. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 346.

147. The “Resolution on Redressing the Liu Shaoqi Injustice Case” was approved at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee on February 29, 1980.

148. Wu, A Decade of Polemics — Memoirs of Sino–Soviet Relations 1956–1966, vol. 1, 67.

306

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

majority of laws and statutes passed after the foundation of the People’s Republic. A new Constitution was not enacted until 1975. Mao apparently committed more serious errors in violation of laws and statutes than Stalin did in his later years. Then, by examining their theories in the light of class struggle, Stalin advanced the theory of class struggle in the 1930s, whereas Mao fell under the influence of Stalin and continued the notion of class struggle in a more radical way than Stalin. By 1933, the Soviet Union had basically completed the collectivization of agriculture and it had rooted out the rich farming class, thereby entering the socialist stage after the transitional stage. However, Stalin considered that the class struggle was steadily escalating across the country.149 Although he announced at the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that no hostile classes existed in the Soviet Union and the Constitution of 1936 confirmed his political views, he still believed that class struggle was spreading across the country in 1937.150 He believed that the domestic class struggle was the result of increasing foreign espionage, terrorism, and subversive activities by capitalist countries.151 Let us review the history of their practices against class struggle. Stalin’s theory of class struggle provided a theoretical basis for carrying out political purges, fighting dissidents, serving as a tool in political struggles, and strengthening his own personal dictatorship. From 1934 to 1938, Stalin abused his power and conducted political purges over this four-year period by abusing the socialist legal system, fabricating numerous cases of injustice, and instituting the reign of terror. Of 1,966 deputies to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1934, 1,108 (56.3%) were arrested. Of 139 members and alternate members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 98 (70.5%) were arrested. Of 11 members of the Soviet Politburo, one was forced to commit suicide and two were executed, accounting for 27.2% of the total. Of six alternate members of the Soviet Politburo, three (50%) were executed. Additionally, around 100,000 149. In 1933, Stalin declared that enemies changed the pattern of class struggle from a

frontal attack to underground sabotage and that move escalated the class struggle. Additionally, class was rooted out by strengthening class struggle instead of ceasing

class struggle. (The Central Compilation and Translation Bureau trans., Collected Works of Stalin, vol. 13, 190.)

150. In 1937, Stalin reiterated that the defeated exploiting class would carry out fiercer struggles to endanger the Soviet Union and fight to the death as socialism achieved dramatic progress and was victorious. (The Central Compilation and Translation Bureau trans., Selected Works of Stalin, vol. 1, 129)

151. Lu et al. eds., The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 406–408.

307

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

party officials and party members were executed, and several million people were suppressed or persecuted.152 There were parallels between Mao with the Cultural Revolution and Stalin with his Great Purge. Mao’s class struggle provided the theoretical basis for China’s political campaigns. Mao continued the Cultural Revolution for 10 years, which was longer than the Great Purge carried out by Stalin, and the number of people persecuted in the Cultural Revolution was greater than that in Stalin’s Great Purge. Unlike Stalin, Mao did not execute party members and officials in the Cultural Revolution. In 1956, the 8th National Congress of the CPC discussed the matter of the personality cult of Stalin. Without explicating Stalin’s theory of class struggle and detailing the events of the political purges, the resolution approved at that congress was modified, and Mao’s right to carry on the class struggle was granted at the second meeting of the 8th National Congress in 1958. With the escalating class struggle, Mao abused his power and dominated the country and the party, and his actions resembled those of Stalin in his reign of terror. In November 1956, Mao criticized Stalin for treating his comrades like enemies. Having learned from Stalin, Mao stated, “There are different conflicts within the CPC and among the people, and such conflicts are categorized as conflicts among the people. We should resolve conflicts among the people by means of internal democratic persuasion rather than treating them like enemies.”153 On February 27, 1957, Mao condemned Stalin for carrying out the political purges and confusing conflicts among the people with conflicts between the party and its enemies.154 In March 1963, Mao censured Stalin for his errors in broadening the scope of the class struggle.155 Based on Stalin’s theory of class struggle, Mao developed and 152. Ibid., 414–415. 153. Wu, A Decade of Polemics — Memoirs of Sino–Soviet Relations 1956–1966, vol. 1, 67–68. 154. Xu, Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1976), 66–67.

155. In March 1963, Mao Zedong modified and annotated “Addressing Issues on Carrying on the Struggle against Modern Revisionism”: “Stalin confused conflicts between

his own party and enemies with conflicts among people in the party and non-party struggles; as a result, he handled the two types of conflicts inappropriately. He also

misjudged and mistreated anti-party elements and dissidents among the masses as

counter-revolutionaries who colluded with imperialists and enemies of the people; he

suppressed them, broadening the scope of the political purges, and victimizing many innocent people. [note: Mao later modified “many” to “some”] Stalin also committed serious political and organizational errors [note: Mao deleted “serious” from the

original text.” (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 10, 262–264).

308

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

reformed his theory of the socialist class struggle: he came up with the notion of capitalist roaders, and he maintained that they had a power base within the party. He also believed that the revolution would evolve from turmoil to peace and that this would inevitably result in a split within the party. The party struggles and political campaigns initiated by Mao were more numerous than those launched by Stalin. According to central statistics, Mao engaged in party struggles and launched political campaigns over 60 times between 1950 and 1976. Except for land reform, which was conducted in compliance with the Land Reform Law, other party struggles and political campaigns were launched in accordance with central documents or directives.156 When exercising cultural despotism, Stalin criticized theoretical and academic circles before his political purges in 1934. On December 9, 1930, Stalin delivered a secret speech about philosophy and social sciences in a meeting with party branch committee members at the Institute of Red Professors,157 but the speech was not disclosed until the 1990s. Stalin made remarks and issued directives to members of academic circles in the Soviet Union: “Our opponents have dominated the fields of philosophy, natural sciences, and politics. Thus, we need to direct our criticisms at the area of philosophy and social science. We must do all in our power to continue the party political struggle and class struggle at the same time as carrying out self-criticism in the above fields.”158 Under Stalin’s orders, many celebrated scholars and scientists were criticized and suppressed. Stalin carried out the Great Purge within the party after the Academic Criticism Campaign. Scholars — especially those specializing in social sciences — were persecuted in both the Academic Criticism and Great Purge.159 (Sidebar 7.2).

156. Hu, The Political and Economic History of China (1949–1976). 157. “Stalin’s Conversation with the Party Branch Committee of the Institute of Red Professors on the Situation of Philosophy,” on record in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, Archive Fond 17, Catalogue 120, File 24. 158. Lu et al. eds., The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 440–444. 159. Ibid., 462.

309

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Sidebar 7.2

Characteristics of Stalin’s Ideological and Cultural Authoritarianism

1. Highly Unified Public Opinions: The public opinions of the party and the whole of society were unified by the central government and Stalin. 2. Politicized Academic Issues: Stalin called for directing criticism at capitalist ideological fields, such as political economy, philosophy, history, humanities and social sciences. He set the boundary between socialism and capitalism, and in the process broadened the scope of the capitalist class to incorporate a large number of what were in fact communist or non-communist works in the humanities and social sciences into capitalist ideology. 3. Using Administrative Intervention as a Main Management Tool: Stalin personally initiated and led academic criticism to achieve certain political objectives. Under pressure of large-scale academic criticism, 95.5% of humanities and social science groups, 92.9% of literary and artistic creative groups, 69% of cultural and educational groups, and 48% of natural science and technology institutes suspended activities in the 1930s. Source : Lu et al. eds., The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 485.

In the 1960s, Mao was aware of the catastrophic consequences and adverse international results of Stalin’s outrages in the 1930s. However, Mao emulated Stalin by unifying public opinion before the Cultural Revolution. There were parallels between Mao launching violent attacks against certain ideological and cultural fields and Stalin condemning ideological and cultural fields. In this regard, Mao Zedong perpetrated even more violent outrages than Stalin. Mao believed that capitalist scholars dominated China’s academic and cultural circles. Stalin advanced the theory of comprehensive criticism, and Mao proposed the theory of comprehensive dictatorship. In the early part of the Cultural Revolution, most activities in China’s arts and cultural groups, institutes of science and technology, and higher and secondary education groups were forcibly suspended. Normal development of China’s culture, arts, education, science, and technology was thus severely impeded. There were parallels between Stalin purging a great many of the intellectual elite in the Academic Criticism Campaign in the 1930s and Mao persecuting members of China’s cultural and intellectual elite in the Cultural Revolution. It should be noted that members of the cultural and intellectual elite persecuted in the Cultural Revolution were more than that in the Academic Criticism Campaign, and the Cultural Revolution also lasted longer than the latter campaign. It is well

310

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

known that the Cultural Revolution inflicted incalculable losses in terms of human, intellectual, and cultural capital. Some foreign scholars remarked that there were parallels between Mao starting the Cultural Revolution to purge his close allies and Stalin carrying out the Great Purge from 1936 to 1939.160 Another stated, “Stalin annihilated his political rivals by means of the state apparatus (e.g., secret police) whereas Mao removed his rivals from office by taking advantage of popular movements.”161 Why did Mao perpetrate more violent outrages than Stalin? This was because Mao had greater power than Stalin, China’s population and its party and government officials outnumbered those of the Soviet Union, so China suffered more egregious persecution than did the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Stalin carried out the Great Purge within the party, government, and military to eradicate certain members of the political elite rather than attempting to destroy the party and replace fundamental systems. In contrast, Mao called for the purging of all veteran party officials, seized power, and caused civil unrest. Moreover, Mao became a more popular cult figure in China than Stalin did in the Soviet Union, and Mao made grandiose claims about himself as the third milestone in the history of Marxism, whereas Stalin simply claimed that he had developed Leninism.” Mao’s eradication of institutions in China resembled what Stalin did in the later years of his rule. When Lenin was in control, Lenin stressed that the supreme authority over the party was the National Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Lenin insisted on convening that congress every year. From 1918 to 1923, the Bolshevik Party communicated with the National Congress of the Soviet Union six times. In contrast, Stalin failed to convene the National Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as scheduled except in 1924 and 1925.162 Stalin convened that congress only once between 1939 and 1952, and he failed to convene it between 1941 and 1949.163 It is evident that Stalin dominated the communist party and that led to collapse of the system. In China, Mao subsequently emulated Stalin’s style of dictatorship. The life tenure of leaders was typical of the leadership system in socialist countries, and many socialist leaders died while in office. It was inevitable that ruling party leaders who had a long tenure of office should repeat the historical tragedies of Stalin and Mao. 160. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind: Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change, 135; Getty, Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933–1938, 242.

161. Harry, “The Chinese State in Crisis 1966–1969,” 243. 162. Lu et al. eds., The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 200. 163. Ibid., 478–479.

311

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Stalin declared that the Politburo had full authority,164 but the power of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Soviet Central Committee rested with General Secretary Stalin, who had the power of veto and made final decisions.165 Stalin did in fact betray Leninism. In 1956, Deng Xiaoping addressed this issue in the “Report of Amending the Constitution of the Communist Party of China,” which was approved at the 8th National Congress of the CPC. The report stated that individuals making crucial decisions was a betrayal of the founding principles of communist parties and was certain to result in erroneous decisions. Deng also censured personal dictatorship under the guise of collective leadership.166 In March 1963, Deng rebuked Stalin for having committed errors as part of his personal dictatorship.167 Stalin took the initiative in choosing his successor, and Mao constantly changed his mind about his own successor. Mao decided to choose his own successor after the CPC came to power in 1949, and especially after Khrushchev rose to power in the Soviet Union. The strategy 164. The Central Compilation and Translation Bureau trans., Collected Works of Stalin, vol. 7, 328.

165. Lu et al. eds., The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, revised edition, 478–479. 166. Deng Xiaoping stated that Leninism called for collective decisions on major issues

instead of making individual decisions. The Twenty-Second National Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union elaborated on the significance of asserting collective leadership and opposing personality cults, and this had a great influence

on the Soviet communist party and on communist parties around the world. It was evident that individuals making crucial decisions on major issues was a betrayal of

the founding principles of communist parties and that leaders who made important individual decisions inevitably committed errors. Only a collective leadership that was in close contact with the masses was able to adhere to the party’s principle of democratic centralism and was able to reduce errors. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 1, 229.)

167. In March 1963, Mao modified and annotated “Addressing Issues on Carrying on the Struggle against Modern Revisionism”: “Stalin failed to exercise proletarian democratic centralism in a proper way, or he violated it within party and stage organizations,

mass organizations, and economic organizations. Although the Constitution of the CPC

stipulates the principle of domestic centralism, party committees at all levels actually exercise personal dictatorship instead of abiding by majority rule; state organizations, economic organizations, and mass organizations all exercise personal dictatorship

because Stalin stressed exercising despotism.” As Mao noted, unequal relations were

able to develop within the party, and leaders at all levels enjoyed special privileges. (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, vol. 10, 262–264.)

312

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Mao implemented is a double-sided blade that facilitated the nation’s long-term development, but would also lead to political divisions. Mao’s decision of choosing a successor put him in the paradoxical position of supreme power, which was both arbitrariness and exclusivity. In 1956, Mao designated the Political Bureau as the supreme authority, whereby he served as chairman and supreme commander. The general secretary served as deputy commander. Mao first chose Liu Shaoqi as successor, and then he chose Deng Xiaoping.168 In August 1966, Mao chose Lin Biao as his successor since he was dissatisfied with his own loss of power. In 1970, Mao and Lin had divergent views on whether to re-instate the position of state president. Although Lin said that he did not want to accept the position, Mao still suspected that Lin was keen to take his post.169 After the September 13 Incident in 1971, Mao Zedong had to choose a new successor — Wang Hongwen. When Mao found that Wang had formed the Gang of Four with Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan, Mao promoted Deng Xiaoping once more to the key position, and he supported Deng in rectifying conditions in China. However, since Mao suspected Deng to have repudiated the Cultural Revolution, he chose the trustworthy Hua Guofeng as his final choice as successor. This caused enmity on the part of Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao toward Hua Guofeng. In choosing their successors, other socialist leaders did not change their minds as frequent as Mao Zedong, and the successors in other countries however did not suffer from similar tragical political fate. Mao had long failed to resolve the problem of his successor: although he had to choose one, he could not accept the loss of power. He suspected Liu Shaoqi, who presided over the work of the CPC Central Committee, and Lin Biao, who presided over the work of the Central Military Commission, of wanting to usurp power. Ending up with bringing all his successors a tragic political end. As Deng Xiaoping remarked in 1980, leaders personally choosing their own successors is the practice of feudalism.170 From the perspective of party systems, leaders personally appointing their own successors contravened the Constitution of the CPC, which stipulated that the party’s top leaders were to be elected at the National Congress of the CPC and plenary session of the CPC Central Committee. Personally appointing successor would lead to political uncertainty: a political crisis would ensue regarding who 168. Xu, Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1976), 438. 169. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Mao Zedong’s Works since the Founding of New China, vol. 13, 244–245.

170. Party Literature Research Center in CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 347.

313

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

was appointed, and abnormal changes would take place in the Political Bureau. The crisis of Mao’s successor typified China’s political situation during the era of Mao Zedong. Gao Fang made a profound remark about Stalin: “After the late 1920s, Stalin betrayed Marxism-Leninism. He implemented a state totalitarian political system that featured personal centralization, life tenure system for the leader, and a designated successor. The systems of party and government were integrated. A hierarchy developed among party officials developed a barbaric system of government privileges, which changed the nature of the democratic republic and amounted to a restoration of monarchy. Stalin also introduced a party leadership system, which featured concentration of power in the person of the general secretary, life tenure for the general secretary, a successor designated by the general secretary, supreme authority over the Politburo, an affiliation system for the Central Supervision Commission, and a system for suppressing dissent. This changed the nature of the communist party, transforming it from a democratic party into an authoritarian party for stifling democracy.”171 In 1956, the CPC was able to learn from Stalin’s historical errors.172 However, the party repeated those mistakes by tolerating Mao’s personal decisions and non-institutionalized party practices, which contributed to the launching of the Cultural Revolution. For these reasons, Mao’s efforts to find a successor ended in failure, since he refused to reflect on and correct his own mistakes. He also consistently refused to admit the possibility of other leaders rectifying those errors. Until his death, Mao made no efforts to mend his errors concerning the Cultural Revolution. As the “Resolution on Some Party Historical Issues Since the Foundation of the People’s Republic of China,” which was passed at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee in 1981, stated, “Comrade Mao Zedong should assume prime responsibility for the long-term fatal leftist errors of the Cultural Revolution.”173 The Cultural Revolution was a result of Mao’s poor leadership and other complex social and historical factors that lasted for 10. The resolution 171. Gao, “Whether Soviet Socialist Reform was Doomed to Failure.” 172. “Drawing on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” People’s

Daily, April 5, 1956;“Drawing Again on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” People’s Daily, December 28, 1956; Wu, A Decade of Polemics — Memoirs of Sino–Soviet Relations 1956–1966, vol. 1, 24–30, 83–91.

173. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, 814–815.

314

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

declared that Mao, at the peak of power was arrogant, unrealistic, and isolated from the masses. He exercised personal dictatorship, dominated the CPC Central Committee, and progressively undermined or even seriously damaged the collective leadership system and domestic centralism. The resolution declared that the CPC Central Committee had to assume collective responsibility for its failure to rectify Mao’s errors promptly.174 Hu Qiaomu remarked that the CPC had to be responsible for all party errors from the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee to the end of the Cultural Revolution, when the Gang of Four was ousted from power.175 It would however be unfair to blame all the errors of the Cultural Revolution on Mao Zedong, also it was not true that the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing cliques perpetrated all the crimes. It is unfortunate that the above resolution failed to identify which leaders should assume responsibility for the Cultural Revolution and what responsibility they should shoulder. From the data and analysis presented in this book, Zhou Enlai should bare secondary responsibility for the Cultural Revolution. The reasons for this are as follows:176 1. Zhou served as member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau for 10 years longer than Lin Biao (1966–1971), Chen Boda (1966–1970), Wang Hongwen (1973–1976), and Zhang Chunqiao (1973–1976) during the period of the Cultural Revolution. 2. Lin Biao ranked the Cultural Revolution contributors in the sequence of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing, Chen Boda, and Kang Sheng. Zhou Enlai was ranked second, above the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Owing to his poor health, Lin was ranked below Zhou.177 This ranking 174. Ibid., 818–819. 175. Editorial Committee of Biography of Hu Qiaomu comp., Hu Qiaomu on the History of the CPC, 113.

176. In 1981, the “Resolution of the CPC Central Committee” ascertained only Mao Zedong’s

primary responsibility for the Cultural Revolution; it failed to confirm Zhou Enlai’s secondary political responsibility in that regard. Indeed, Zhou was eulogized for his deeds in that revolution. In fact, Zhou’s errors outweighed his accomplishments: he

made more serious errors in supporting Mao in staging the Cultural Revolution than he made efforts to reduce the losses incurred by that revolution.

177. Lin Biao claimed on October 26, 1968 during his speech at the Second Enlarged Meeting of the Twelfth Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee that, “Chairman Mao personally staged and led the Cultural Revolution, and the Central Cultural

315

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

reflected the actual situation. 3. Zhou played a more important role than Lin and Jiang when Mao made crucial decisions. In fact, Zhou’s errors outweighed his accomplishments, and he committed serious mistakes — only second to Mao in this regard. Deng Yingchao remarked that Zhou never went against Mao but insisted on following his political judgment — even if that judgment was erroneous, Zhou nevertheless followed the course. During the Cultural Revolution, Zhou consistently adhered Mao’s direction without attempting to remain true to the party line. Zhou even displayed servility toward Mao in Mao’s decision-making errors,178 being keen to protect himself in sharing supreme power with Mao and acquiring higher status than Lin. Deng Xiaoping, on the other hand, remained true to his political principles, and was ousted from power only to be reinstated to key positions several times. In March 1956, Deng Xiaoping delivered a speech when the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee discussed the secret report of Khrushchev, who had revolted against Stalin: “Khrushchev mentioned in the secret report that nobody dared revolt against Stalin under the fear of political persecution. That argument is unconvincing. Communists have to uphold the truth by means of a clear-cut stance rather than flatteries. It is unfortunate that nobody dared air divergent political views in the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union — the top party leadership — for fear of political persecution. It was improper of Khrushchev to invent such excuses for their faults — ascribing feats to themselves and imputing errors to Stalin.” Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were present at that meeting.179 To draw a conclusion for all the above events 20 years later, it is inappropriate to ascribe positive feats towards Zhou and assign all the wrong doings of the Cultural Revolution toward Mao. Zhou has to take the blame for the negative aspects of the Cultural Revolution since he failed to uphold the truth: Zhou followed Mao’s false course and supported Mao in launching and prolonging the Cultural Revolution for nearly 10 years, owning to the fear of being persecuted and purged. That outweighed his political protection of veteran officials. Zhou differed from Deng in fear management, and displayed serious shortcomings in his later years — second only Mao. Revolution Group — Premier Zhou Enlai, Comrade Jiang Qing, Comrade Chen Boda,

and Comrade Kang Sheng — presided over the daily work day and night under the directive of Mao Zedong. Owing to poor health, I did little of that work.” 178. Quan, Zhou Enlai Up Close, 342. 179. Wu, A Decade of Polemics — Memoirs of Sino–Soviet Relations 1956–1966, vol. 1, 19.

316

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

To summarize, Mao Zedong was hailed as the great founder and leader of the CPC. However, he also got trampled and hence caused huge damage to the party’s democracy, falling into victim of his own autocracy. Had that not been the case, he might have achieved greater feats, committed fewer historical errors; and China might have made greater progress in terms of economic development and the modernization of its national institutions. Without Mao, no new China would have emerged. It can be said that Mao’s greatest achievement was to have found the new China. However, without Mao, there would have been no Cultural Revolution. It is regrettable that Mao’s most serious flaw was instigating the Cultural Revolution in his later years. Mao ended in failure after having achieved success, and Deng Xiaoping attained success by having learned from Mao’s failure.

Deng Xiaoping’s Success Following Mao Zedong’s Failure Historical development is both certainty and uncertainty; the Cultural Revolution was no exception. The uncertainty refers to a series of unplanned events, and the certainty reflects observable general trends. For decades after the People’s Republic was found, China’s socialist industrialization and modernization steadily progress and boosted China’s long-term prospects. The Cultural Revolution was only a short-term circumstance — a series of impromptu political incidents provoked by Mao Zedong rather than being a historical certainty.180 After Mao’s death, the Cultural Revolution leave almost no lasting historical effect, and China’s socialist modernization once again was back on its general track. Major historical figures should excel in detecting certainty and being able to reinforce particular trends. However, they have no way of reversing historical trends or going against them. Mao Zedong was hailed as a great politician and political prophet. As early as September 1956, Mao was able to make an accurate prediction of China’s future at the 8th National Congress of the CPC. When he met with a delegation from the Communist League of Yugoslavia, he said in a speech, “China has to establish socialism, and it will take 50 or 100 years to build China into a strong country. China’s prospects rest on its development. In the future, China may commit errors 180. Xi Xuan and Jin Chunming considered that not all countries had to go through a

Cultural Revolution after establishing democracy and that there was no historical

certainty in terms of the laws of human social development. (Xi and Jin, A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution, 349.)

317

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

and become corrupt — alternating between an ideal situation and crisis. However, it will never repeat the dark reign of Chiang Kai-shek: it will undergo twists and turns through affirmation, negation, and affirmation.”181 Although he failed to explain what an ideal situation and crisis actually signified and how one state might develop into the other, Mao Zedong believed in the development logic of historical dialectic. Subsequent events have shown that Mao was accurate in his foresight. As he prophesied, China’s modernization now has a bright future, but it did undergo twists and turns. After the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, China entered a golden era of social progress and economic development for the first time, and Mao Zedong’s career reached a brilliant climax. However, the good times do not last long. After 1957, China entered a crisis; Mao committed errors in his later years and he negated his leadership and political line after the foundation of the People’s Republic. In 1978, China entered a new era by rectifying those errors and restoring order. Deng Xiaoping adopted Mao’s approach of seeking truth from facts, and he remedied Mao’s mistakes in his later years, demonstrating that success could grow out of failure. The successes between 1957 and 1977, the first 7 years of the People’s Republic’s establishment, caused the failure that took place twenty some years afterwards, but it was also critical to the thirty some years of success since 1978. How did China came to success after Mao? On October 5, 1968, Mao met with a delegation from the Albanian government and affirmed the merits of the Cultural Revolution: it unveiled the evil of all kinds within the party, the government, the army, and the masses. Mao also optimistically predicted that the Cultural Revolution could bring China 10 to 20 years of peace.182 However, as soon as the Cultural Revolution came to end, peace prevailed in China. Without Mao, there would have been no Cultural Revolution,183 and China would have remained in peace all along. As the saying goes, failure is the mother of success. And in this respect, failure provided a historical wealth of information, though it was necessary to understand and make the best use of this wealth in an appropriate fashion. Deng Xiaoping developed an insight on the where of Mao’s later years error rooted. In June 1980, Deng remarked that it would be impossible for the CPC to tackle problems within the party by simply criticizing Mao for his mistakes: it was necessary to overhaul 181. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Collected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 7, 124.

182. Pang and Jin eds., A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), vol. 2, 1529. 183. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Li Xiannian (1935–1988), 423–424.

318

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

the party’s political institutions. Since Deng worked with Mao over a long period, he witnessed the whole process of Mao committing and compounding his errors with resultant irreversible damage in his later years. Mao categorized mistakes into fundamental ones that are hard to correct and occasional ones that are easily rectified.184 The error of the Cultural Revolution was a fundamental, characterized by path dependence, and it was difficult to remedy. Deng was as well one of the victims to Mao’s errors in his later years and he suffered their devastating consequences, which prompted Deng to find the main factor for those errors. In 1956, Deng made a great contribution to establishing party democracy as stipulated in the Constitution of the CPC approved at the 8th National Congress, and Deng put political institutions in place to prevent personal dictatorship within the party. Nevertheless, all his efforts came to nothing when Mao inflicted tremendous losses on the party and the country. When the Cultural Revolution came to an end, the Chinese people began to reflect on Mao’s errors in his later years, only Deng took the initiative in providing insight into the systemic root causes for those errors (Sidebar 7.3). Following Deng’s way of thinking, how Mao destroyed the basic institutions of the party and country before and during the Cultural Revolution was examined. As Deng Xiaoping said, “Mao Zedong brought about a great catastrophe to the party and country as well as to himself.”

Sidebar 7.3 Deng Xiaoping Learned from Mao Zedong’s Errors in His Later Years (1980) The leaders’ philosophies and work styles maybe one of the factor causing various mistakes made in the CPC history, yet what matters more is the organization’s rules and regulations. A healthy set of rules and regulation could sustain and prevent any acts of violation; whereas a distorted system obstruct the development of the society, and even push the society toward the opposite trend of development. Even great leaders, like Comrade Mao Zedong, was deeply influenced by the distorted system and hence lead to the downfall of himself; of the party; and the country. Stalin severely disrupted socialist legal systems. Comrade Mao Zedong remarked, “Such incidences would never happen in the Western countries, such as those of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States.” Even with well aware of the issue Mao however still failed to resolve the problems in the leadership system. With the contribution of other problems, they added 184. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 2, 447.

319

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

up causing the 10-year havoc — the Cultural Revolution. It was a painful and unforgettable lesson. Mao of course should bear some responsibility, but the root of the problem lies on the leadership system, and the party’s regulation, affecting the country’s stability and long term development. The party and country’s future was tied tightly to the set of defected rules and regulations — there is an urgent need for the party to address and resolve the problem. Source: Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 333.

The Cultural Revolution became Deng Xiaoping’s motivation of Reform and Opening-up, as well as the main reason why China could remain political and social stability after 1978. China’s opening up and reform was no coincident; the culture revolution was the historical cause, so as a factor of the development logic. It followed the logic of things developing reversely after reaching an extreme; lessons learnt would bring forth abundance; and bad will eventually turn good. These are considered the main plus the Cultural Revolution bring forth.185 Deng described the people as “denying” the Cultural Revolution; however, we should not neglect some minor pluses that the Revolution brings forth and its value as a negative example.186 Deng’s biggest political achievement was to “turn bad into good,” where he rectified China’s crisis, turning it into a milestone which marks the beginning of reform and opening-up.187 185. Gong, From Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping, 283–285. 186. Deng Xiaoping remarked, “Without having learned from the Cultural Revolution, it

would have been impossible to shape a series of ideological, political, and organizational line policies after the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee. That

plenary session stipulated that the CPC Central Committee had to shift its focus from class struggle to boosting productivity, achieving the Four Modernizations and winning

the support of all party members and the Chinese people. The Cultural Revolution taught us lessons and became our spiritual wealth.” (Party Literature Research Center in the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, 272.)

187. Deng Xiaoping answered questions raised by the American Reporter Mike Wallace: “The Cultural Revolution taught us a lesson, and it prompted the Chinese people to

reflect on the political issues in China and identify the system root causes of the Cultural

Revolution. To that end, we should learn from the Cultural Revolution and carry out reform to improve China’s political and economic situation, remedy our errors, and boost our prospects.” (Ibid., 172.)

320

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

Based on Mao Zedong’s errors made in his later years, Deng Xiaoping started his project of overhauling with party reform and the country’s leadership system, concurrently reestablished a new set of rules and regulations.188 The system of central collective leadership was restored on the 8th Central Committee in 1956 where the collective succession system was also adopted. From February 23 to 29, 1980, Chen Yun proposed again to set up the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, stressing on the urgency of going through such measures.189 Thus the CPC Central committee decided to establish the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee. Stated in the rules that the Secretariat was responsible for processing all daily work of the Central government under the Political Bureau and the Standing Committee’s supervision. It implements the system of central collective leadership and division of labor. There will be one general secretary, several secretaries and alternate secretaries, all directly elected by the CPC Central Committee.190 With the establishment of the Secretariat, it shared power alongside with the Political Bureau and the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, hence served the function of inter-monitoring. The Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee presided over daily work as the first-line central authority under the supervision of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee, which served as the second-line central authority. Referencing back to Mao’s error made over individual succession, Chan suggested collective succession so if any of those potential successors fall, there would still be another that were ready.191 The 12th National Congress of the CPC abolished the CPC Central Committee chairman, and restored the leadership system that used to exist before 1943 by implementing the post of general secretary of the CPC Central Committee. The general secretary of the CPC Central Committee was as well member of the Central Political Bureau’s Standing Committee, whose duty includes presiding over the work of the Secretariat, and calling meetings of the Political Bureau and the Standing Committee. According to the new Constitution of the CPC, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau was considered the core leadership within the party. In addition to the general secretary, the director of the Central Advisory 188. For more detailed analysis, please refer to Hu, The Political and Economic History of China (1949–1976).

189. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Collected Works of Chen Yun, vol. 3, 508.

190. The “Resolution on Setting up the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee” was passed at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee on February 28, 1980.

191. Yang, Chen Yun in His Later Years, 67.

321

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

Commission, the first secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline, and the chairman of the Central Military Commission were all members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, thereby guaranteeing the collective leadership of the CPC Central Committee.192 The CPC Central Committee implemented the tenure system of the central leadership. According to Article 21 of the Party Constitution, the collective leadership of the CPC Central Committee and central leaders elected by that committee continued to preside over the daily work during the next National Congress of the CPC and continued work until new collective leadership and central leaders were elected.193 The CPC Central Committee eliminated the life tenure system for party leaders. The Party Constitution approved at the 12th National Congress of the CPC stipulated the implementation of the retirement system for party officials, and the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China adopted at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress declared that state leaders could be elected to no more than two terms of office. Chen Yun played a vital role in restoring The Constitution and rebuilding the party’s democracy of collective decision-making system in 1982. As a successful political assistant of Mao Zedong who had witnessed Mao’s successes and failures, Chen served as member of the 8th Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee. In December 1978, Chen was elected member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee, and first secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee. After Chen presided over the work of the Central Commission for Discipline, he engaged in restoring and rebuilding fundamental party systems: he acutely spotted that the failure of the Cultural Revolution lay in Mao destroying the party’s democratic centralism. To prevent an authoritarian regime from developing, Chen presided over the establishment of the “Criteria for the Party’s Political Life,” which consisted of 21 articles. With the lesson learnt from the Cultural Revolution, these criteria upheld domestic centralism, defined important concepts in political and social life, and laid the principles on relationship management within the party. This was done to prevent the recurrence of another Mao in his later years, individuals such as Jiang Qing and Mao Yuanxin operating within the party, bitter struggles and purges, and infringement of the political rights of party members 192. Comrade Hu Qiaomu answered questions on the “Amendment to the Constitution of

the Communist Party of China” raised by a reporter of Xinhua News Agency on 13 September, 1982.

193. The Constitution of the CPC was approved at the 12th National Congress of the CPC on September 6, 1982.

322

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

(Sidebar 7.4). In February 1980, these criteria were officially approved at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee as key party laws and statutes. The Constitution banned all forms of personality cult. The Constitution of the CPC ban all forms of personal cult when it was approved at the 12fth National Congress in 1982. It stated that party leaders would carry out political activities under the supervision of the party and the people, and it safeguarded the prestige of party leaders who acted in the common interests of the party and people.194

Sidebar 7.4

Criteria for the Party’s Political Life (1980)

The CPC shall assert collective leadership, oppose authoritarian rule, and uphold important issues associated with the party’s lines, guidelines, policies, and events. The CPC is responsible for the following: deploy works and tasks; party members’ appointment, dismissal, transfer and punishment; and the interests of the masses. Issues subject to collective decisions made by party committees in accordance with directives from superior authorities shall follow collective discussion and decision by party committees, standing committees, the secretariat, and the party leadership group rather than being implemented by personal dictatorship. Under no circumstances could other organizations replace the leadership of the party committees and standing committees. Any organization conducting work at the behest of a party committee will do so under the leadership of that committee rather than attempting to replace the function of that party committee or even seeking domination. Within party committees, issues shall be settled in accordance to the majority rule. Secretaries and commissioners will not adopt superior-subordinate relations, and the secretary shall be member of the party committee. Dictatorship is strictly prohibited. When discussing important issues, party committees shall allow party members to freely air different views. In case of divergent opinions, party committees shall conscientiously take minority opinions in account instead of holding discussions that do not result in decisions and thereby delay work. The CPC shall promote the image of its leaders based on clear facts. It will not eulogize proletarian leaders using the flattering tactics of the exploiting class, and leaders’ accomplishments should be presented without distorting historical details and fabricating facts. The CPC members shall be loyal to party organizations and adhere to party principles rather than show individual loyalty. No one shall view party officials 194. The Constitution of the CPC was approved at the party’s 12th National Congress on 6 September, 1982.

323

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

as personal assets, change superior-subordinate relations into ones of personal dependence, flatter leaders, report only good news, fabricate facts for trust, honor, or awards. Connive, imply, induce, or force subordinates to tell lies are strictly prohibited. The CPC Central Committee shall establish democracy within the party and treat different views properly. There shall be no framing, denouncing, and purging party members. Exaggeration of errors, framing, and political persecution are also forbidden. The CPC understands that having opposing political views does not mean to challenge those comrades. Similarly, opposition towards some comrades in the authority does not equal to challenging authorities, leaders or even the party. It is normal that party members argue over differences in thought and theories. Except for important political and urgent practical issues, some issues regarding thought and theories that cannot be quickly resolved shall be addressed after further study and implemented as appropriate instead of hasty drawing conclusions. It is necessary to halt disruptive behavior, such as wantonly denouncing comrades for overthrowing socialism or for being evil, capitalists, or revisionists. It is necessary to define the nature of conflicts between allies and enemies, which can lead to the destruction of the party’s peace, give rise to rigid ideology, and even allow anti-party careerist to take advantage; hence disrupting the socialist democratic order. The CPC should guarantee party members’ rights from infringement. Party members have the right to make statements, appeals, charges, and defend themselves at party meetings to superiors, or even to the CPC Central Committee. The CPC should treat its comrades who committed errors in a proper way. When making an analysis of errors, we should distinguish conflicts — whether it was among people or between allies and enemies. Further, we should avoid exaggerating common errors in work and ideology as political errors, common political errors as directional errors, and directional errors in party struggles as being counter-revolutionary conspiracies to overthrow the CPC and socialism. There shall be no fierce struggles within the CPC, and it was prohibited for the party to treating its members in ways that violate party discipline, national laws and statutes. Under no circumstances will there be any denouncements, cruelty, personal insults or persecution, confessions through elicitation or torture, or any implication of relatives and friends. Source: Party Literature Research Center in the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 417–430.

324

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

The “Criteria for the Party’s Political Life” expressly declared that the image of party leaders had to be promoted based on facts — rather than eulogizing with flattery and publicizing those leaders’ feats by distorting history and fabricating facts.195 The Constitution guarantees the right of party members to criticize party leaders. In December 1978, it was stated at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, “The Constitution guarantees the right of party members to criticize leaders at party committees, standing committees of the Political Bureau and at other levels, and rectify any behavior that is violates of the party’s democratic centralism and collective leadership system.196 The CPC Central Committee has learned from the experience of sentencing and executing people who criticized Mao Zedong and Lin Biao as counter-revolutionaries during the Cultural Revolution. For example, Zhang Zhixin, a party official in the Publicity Department of the CPC Liaoning Provincial Committee, was imprisoned in September 1969 and executed in 1975 for criticizing the personality cult of Mao Zedong and the ultra-leftist line. On March 31, 1979, the CPC Liaoning Provincial Committee examined the injustice in Zhang Zhixin’s case and she was posthumously conferred with the honor of revolutionary martyr. Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun refuted the consensus and requested that all party members affirm the fruits of the Chinese revolution, safeguard Mao Zedong’s historical status, and to uphold and further develop on Mao Zedong Thought.197 Deng Xiaoping affirmed that Mao achieved great feats. Without Mao, there would have been no new China and Mao’s accomplishments outweighed his errors. Additionally, Deng stressed that the CPC Central Committee and Chinese people would never emulate Khrushchev in his negation of Stalin.198 The practice indicates 195. The “Criteria for the Party’s Political Life” were approved at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee on February 29, 1980.

196. The “Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee” was approved on 22 December, 1978.

197. Gong, From Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping, 11. 198. Yu, A Major Turning Point: The Political Backdrop of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh

CPC Central Committee, 91–92.

Some scholars were convinced that Deng Xiaoping and other party leaders deemed that the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956,

events in Poland and Hungary, and the tide of anti-communism across the world to have all resulted in Khrushchev having repudiated Stalin. In this regard, China’s top

leaders — especially its veteran revolutionaries — reached a consensus and exercised vigilance. (Xiao, Historical Transition: From Rectifying the Turmoil to Reform and Opening-

325

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

that Deng inherited and developed Mao Zedong Thought. Mao Zedong was a great visionary theorist and thinker who developed coherent theories and bodies of thought, and he had great ambition in wanting to make backward China, with its large population and vast territory, into a strong, modern socialist country. Mao and the CPC thus faced challenges in promoting social development and going through a complicated, difficult reform process. At the Second Plenary Session of the 7th CPC Central Committee in 1949, Mao told all party members that the party had to study its tasks and shift the focus from rural revolution to urban work. Mao Zedong was committed to applying Marxism or Marxism-Leninism to his backward socialist country in combination with China’s historical and cultural heritage.199 Marxism, or Marxism-Leninism, rooted in Western industrialized countries, and developed in response to the challenges faced by Western capitalist countries. In terms of its circumstances, however, China differed from Western industrialized countries, and it was impossible for Marxism or Marxism-Leninism to provide a fundamental development theory, a basic framework for institution building which could provide specific practical experience for the Chinese context. Further, Marxism argued against the contradictions and problems in early Western capitalist society under the influence of Western culture and civilization, and it offered only a theoretical vision for socialist society. Even Lenin was able to answer only basic questions on how Russia built socialism, and Russia and China varied greatly in their circumstances. In 1956, Mao Zedong presided over setting the correct socialist course for modernization — one that was adapted to China’s current circumstances. However, unfortunately Mao himself went against this course, thereby ending the first golden era of China’s modernization. The country thus suffered a serious setback.200 Although the CPC made the shift from revolutionary to ruling up, 271–272.) 199. MacFarquhar and Fairbank eds., The Cambridge History of China: The People's Republic, The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1949–1965, 1.

200. After having reviewed historical developments, Deng Xiaoping stated that the 8th National Congress of the CPC set forth the correct political direction. Nevertheless, this

correct political direction and other positive suggestions could not be implemented owing to lack of preparation for building socialism in the party in a comprehensive manner. After the 8th National Congress of the CPC, the party made great achievements

in socialist construction, though it also suffered serious setbacks. (Party Literature

Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, 2.)

326

Remarks on the Cultural Revolution

party, Mao failed to divert his emphasis from revolution, rebellion, and struggle toward construction, development, and harmony. He thus hindered the CPC to transforming its function.201 Mao was a great proletarian revolutionary. Through his errors in his later years,202 he showed the course that needed to be avoided and thus bequeathed China with invaluable historical wealth. Since they had different insights into development challenges and had different attitudes toward them, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping conducted their efforts toward reform and building socialism in different ways. Nevertheless, they had some parallel characteristics in that both of them pioneering a new form of socialism and created a new society. Reform inevitably leads to either success or failure, yet failure is the mother of success. Without learning from Mao’s failure, Deng Xiaoping could not achieve success with his own reform efforts. Mao conducted his reform in an idealistic, radical way whereas Deng achieved his goals with a practical, progressive approach. Although they embarked on different courses, Mao’s errors contributed to Deng’s success. When he served as leading member of the second generation of the central collective leadership, Deng avoided Mao’s major errors in his later years and rectified the minor errors, which promoted China’s economic and social development. Deng Xiaoping brought about China’s rapid integration into the world economy by pursuing the policy of reform and opening-up. He seized the opportunity of economic globalization and accelerated China’s modernization by employing modern science and technology, and in the process he ushered in the second era of China’s modernization.203

201. In May 1983, Hu Qiaomu made note of Mao Zedong’s errors in his later years: “Chairman Mao committed errors because of inertia. Comrade Mao Zedong grew up in the revolutionary war and achieved victory by means of armed struggle. Even after the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong and other cadres who also came of age in the revolutionary war became accustomed to carrying on the struggle

and failed to shift emphasis from struggle to construction. If a train fails to swerve around a bend, it will continue to move forward as a result of inertia: it will derail.

That was the underlying cause of the Cultural Revolution.” (Editorial Committee of Biography of Hu Qiaomu comp., Hu Qiaomu on the History of the CPC, 212.)

202. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee comp., Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, vol. 2, 818–819.

203. For more detailed analysis, please refer to Hu, The Political and Economic History of China (1977–1992).

327

Blank Page

Postscript

Postscript Drawing Lessons from History to See the Future: The Reason Why I Wrote Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution In order to foresee a nation’s rise or fall, one must know the nation’s history. That is the essence of China’s political heritage. It is believed that by studying, thus learning from, the history of a nation, the best means to govern and stabilize the nation will be found, as well as provide the means to solve the various social contradictions within it. To adequately write about modern Chinese history could be considered a difficult task, and writing on the Great Proletarian Culture Revolution of China is practically difficult. One of the reasons is due to the political atmosphere of the time. In 1981, the Party Central Committee passed the Political Resolution, in which Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun put forward the “general rather than specific” principle. As a result, only about 6,500 words of the Political Resolution were dedicated to the Cultural Revolution—less than one fifth of the total 34,000 words. Since then, many Chinese scholars have published studies on the topic over the Cultural Revolution. However, considering the significance of that particular decade of Chinese history, the number of studies pertaining to it is still relatively minor. On top of that, only a handful of those studies have enough depth to constitute a comprehensive history monograph, nor can they present a panoramic look at the true sociopolitical and economic environments of this period in Chinese history. In the light of academic essay writing, those studies also lack detailed annotations, clear references of related works and data sources. They paid little attention to the academic format. Professional quantitative analysis and analytical frameworks based on social scientific theories are also noticeably absent from these studies. Thanks to the Party’s Central Committee releasing a significant amount of historical documents, we now are able to reverse the “general rather than specific” principle and put together a much more complete and comprehensive picture of the Cultural Revolution by reviewing its major events and major figures and reevaluating their impact on the political environment over that decade. Furthermore, we are now capable of incorporating social scientific theories and various other research methods into our studies, and hence propose a theoretical analytical framework of the Great Cultural Revolution, while conducting empirical analysis

329

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

and hypothesis verification thereby quantitatively evaluating the major political decisions made during that period, and their aftereffects. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is the ideal case for a study of modern Chinese history for it compromised a series of significant historical events, yet it is rather a challenging subject to take on. This is, however, a great opportunity for historians to conduct original social scientific studies, especially those that can provide profound insight of the modern Chinese government’s decision-making process. This is because the Revolution is the most ideal period to use for a study of modern Chinese history as that period of the Revolution was comprised of a series of significant historical events. Personally speaking, writing Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution was by no means my pre-designed academic goal from the start, and the fruition was beyond my own expectations. Though I am passionate about history, I am not a historian by training but an economist, and my area of expertise lies in modern China public policy studies. To be more specific, I focus on China’s macro-economy, presenting more systematic and comprehensive insights into China’s course of development, especially the challenges that China’s development is facing. I provide background research, designing and consultation services for the nation’s long-term development strategies, Five Year Plans, and other important strategic policies. I was closely involved in the design of The Outline for China’s Tenth Five-Year Plans (2001), The Outline for China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plans (2006), The Outline for China’s Medium-Term and Long-Term Education Reform from 2010 to 2020 (2010), The Outline for China’s Medium-Term and Long-Term Talent Development Design from 2010 to 2020 (2010), and am currently participating in the design of The Outline for China’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan. It is through my direct participation in the study of national development background, public policy debates and consultation on major political decisions that I realize China’s success as a nation depends almost entirely upon its major political decisions. Therefore, ensuring success and avoiding failure in major political decisions is one of the key aspects of China’s political form of economics. In order to effectively avoid mistakes made in China’s major political decisions, not only do we need to learn and improve through trial and error, but also learn from past experiences, especially those considered unsuccessful. This is necessary for further reform and improvement on our decision-making mechanism, which is rooted in democratic centralism, so that it fits the condition of our nation perfectly. Between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, when I was doing research on China’s economic development and policies, I summarized and commented on Mao Zedong’s three major mistakes in his political decisions:

330

Postscript

the Great Leap Forward, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and the policies on population control. Since then, I have focused on the core issue of China’s political decision-making mechanism and been dedicated in evaluating the changes of China’s major policies after 1949 as well as their aftereffects. In my book The Report on Economic Fluctuation (Liaoning People’s Press), I dug deep into movements such as the Great Leap Forward and conducted quantitative analysis on the failed decision-making mechanism, then calculated the aftermath. In May 2005, I completed the final draft of Theory of China’s Political Economic History (19491976) and submitted it to Tsinghua University Press for publication (officially published in Sep. 2007, with the 2nd edition coming out in 2008). Later, I expanded on Chapter Six of that manuscript, writing Theory of the Great Cultural Revolution History (in four columns) and internally published in the National State Report (special issue) for the eyes of China’s lead policy-makers so that they could better learn from Mao’s mistake in his later years. Some members of the Party leadership have commented that today’s enormous, complex, and ever-changing China could afford no political mistake in governing like the ones Mao made. Given China’s current political decision-making mechanism, it is, in fact, quite unlikely for Mao’s mistakes to be repeated today. In April and May of 2006, I gave four lectures at the school of public administration of Tsinghua University over the Cultural Revolution, which were likely the only open lectures of this kind given in Beijing during the 40th anniversary of the Cultural Revolution. To my surprise and delight, the lectures were well received by students from both Tsinghua University and other local schools such as Peking University, with a total turnout of over 1200 people. I was quite honored to be given such an opportunity to educate those excellent students on such an important event in modern Chinese history and help them gain a better understanding of its political, economic, and cultural significance. I then expanded on the core content of the lectures and eventually published Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution in November of 2008 in Hongkong (Dafeng Press). Later, I received commentaries on the book by four overseas experts forwarded to me by Tsinghua University professors Tang Shaojie and Xia Yafeng. As thankful as I was for their professional and constructive criticism and suggestions, I respectfully redressed their arguments regarding incorrect references and false facts in the book, as well as responded to their questions and doubts. Additionally, I took this opportunity to do further reading, digging deeper for certain information, reinforcing some parts of my theoretical analysis, and eventually expanding into a second edition to a total of 790,000 words. In July 2010, the second edition of the book was internally published under the name of the Institute for Contemporary

331

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

China Studies for China’s lead policy-makers and secretaries of provincial Party committees (future leadership candidates). It was also delivered to the National Library of China and other major university libraries to keep as an unofficial publication. Though the Great Cultural Revolution took place in China over a period of ten years, meaning all Chinese scholars over the age of fifty today experienced this extraordinary historic event, most of the studies on the Cultural Revolution were completed overseas. Take the book Mao Zedong’s Last Revolution by MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals as an example; the 752-page work, with 1,962 annotations, was considered one of the most comprehensive works completed by foreigners on the topic of the Revolution. I only managed to read this book after completing my own work, therefore I did not have a chance to reference it in my work. However, I was quite relieved by the fact that, as a Chinese scholar, I displayed more depth and more originality with the study I prepared for my book, which spans 826 pages and includes a total of 2,243 annotations. In comparison, I also completed a more thorough quantitative analysis in my work, with 34 tables, 7 charts, and 18 columns. It was the first ever quantitative research into the topic of the Great Cultural Revolution in the field. For example, the economic damage amounts to between 1/4 and 1/5 of the simulated GDP of China in 1976; consumer welfare of urban and rural residents was down by between 15% and 27% of that in 1976; and the damage in exports was between 40% and 80% of the export amount in 1976; and all of these strongly sustained the conclusion of the qualitative analysis. This, to a large extent, conforms to the research and thinking style I employ when studying modern China, which is an overall manifestation of how I view history in general. In the grand scheme of things, studying history will always be an applicable lesson to learn from the past to future endeavors. The reason that I study the Great Cultural Revolution specifically is to contribute to the historical process and ideals of democracy, science, and institutionalism in China’s political decision-making mechanism, and for later generations to better understand this part of Chinese history. Unlike foreign scholars who study the Cultural Revolution, my work published in the National State Report is specifically directed at China’s policymakers, and important members of the Party leadership. Therefore, I made every effort to think from their perspective and answer the questions they might ask while I was writing, so that they could benefit from looking back across history in order to make better political decisions for China’s future. This book begins by laying down an analytical framework for studying China’s particular political decision-making mechanism at the time, which entails two types

332

Postscript

of asymmetries. The first of these is the degree of asymmetry and uncertainty in information and knowledge among the leadership group, which directly influences decision-makers’ information structure and the quality of their decisions. The second is the degree of asymmetry and uncertainty in power among the leadership group which can affect the decision-making process, and thereby the degree of information sharing and their political decisions at the end of the day. I concluded in short that throughout the Great Cultural Revolution, in his late years, Mao’s mistakes in political decisions basically all stemmed from the malfunction of his information structure and decision-making process (pages 9-12). Unlike previous narratives of the Cultural Revolution, which are mostly descriptive and lacking in theoretical structure, the discussion of how Mao’s information structure and decision-making process malfunctioned is threaded throughout this book. Such an analytical framework not only displays originality in terms of decision-making theories, but it is suitable for analyzing China’s particular political decision-making mechanism. I am fully in favor of CPC’s democratic centralism system, because it not only functions, but it functions well in China’s mechanism, which greatly reduces the two types of asymmetries mentioned above. It is only logical to surmise that Mao and the leadership group owe their success in political decision-making to Mao’s obeying the democratic centralism system he founded at the first place. On the other hand, Mao’s eventual failure was due to him violating the system he created himself. The same can also be said for the Great Leap Forward movement. Such a narrative is beyond the superficial “power struggle” discussion and is much closer to the true cause of the history, for it also explains why after the Reform and OpeningUp in 1978, Deng Xiaoping was adamant about rebuilding and improving the system instead of abolishing it, as well as explaining the success in China’s political decision-making that followed. I argue that, to ensure future success in decisionmaking and avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, CPC has to implement the democratic centralism system at full scale. This is an important conclusion to come to after learning from the successful and unsuccessful experiences of CPC’s 60 years of administration. As for how it will hold up in the future, only time will tell. Further, this book hopes to exhibit innovation of a quantitative angle that aims to dissect and evaluate the political decision-making during the Great Cultural Revolution, including economic evaluation, social evaluation, political evaluation, as well as international standing evaluation, which separates it from the qualitative descriptions in previous related studies. This book lets statistics and facts speak for themselves (18 data tables and 6 charts), asking questions such as “What is the opportunity cost of the Great Cultural Revolution and what would be the

333

MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION VOLUME 3

status of the Chinese economy otherwise?” My answer is that China would have enjoyed the economic boom as early as in the mid-60s. As for the narrative style of the book, it exhibits more professionalism and specificity than vague and hollow descriptions of the history. To Chinese readers, especially the leadership members of the Party, introducing a quantitative policy evaluation method is greatly beneficial in improving political decision-making. The most recent success story was in October of 2005 when independent evaluation for the 11th Five-Year Plan was conducted by our institute as a third party, which was taken very seriously by policy-makers, and the key points of the evaluation report were then included into Chapter 48 of the Outline for Nation’s 11th Five-Year Plan (approved by the National People’s Congress in March 2006). In August of 2008, we officially began the mid-term evaluation process for the 11th Five-Year Plan. Through these actions we can make timely policy adjustments when decision mistakes occurred so as to avoid compounding mistakes like those of the Cultural Revolution. Furthermore, this book presents the evolution within CPC’s administrative system over the past few decades in a clear cut fashion so as to demonstrate how Mao Zedong led the demolition of the democratic centralism system within the Party right before the Cultural Revolution, as well as how the check and balance mechanism within the Party gradually went out of order. This further explains how Mao was able to start the Revolution and further destroy the democratic centralism system, setting up personal despotism, as well as why the Revolution lasted for a decade and only ended with the natural death of Mao. It is my belief that the mistakes that Mao committed in his later years were the inevitable result of abandoning a system that was working perfectly, and instead implementing a faulty one. The lesson here is that China’s political decision-makers should continue with policies which have shown success in the past, building upon them for a better future. The modernization of a nation’s system is the basis of the modernization of a nation, and as such the modernization of the decision-making system is the policy-making basis of the modernization of a nation’s system. This process should be ever-evolving, constantly improving and adjustable, not reset back to square one to start anew like Mao did. In the end, the book states with historical logic that the improvement in the process of China’s political decision-making mechanism is one that has benefited from past experiences. Mao’s failure during the Cultural Revolution set up the success of Deng Xiaoping’s reform, and what was most admirable about Deng was that he turned a political and economic disaster into a great opportunity for China to open up and embrace growth. He started with reforming the Party and the leadership group’s decision-making process, thereby initiating a series of systematic

334

Postscript

redevelopment and innovation . This serves to show that the course of history is two-sided. Just as Mao aptly put it himself: “Under the right circumstances, bad things can give birth to good things, and good things can in turn give birth to bad things.” This book is the reflection and introspection of an earnest Chinese scholar, the sole purpose of which is to help turn bad things into good ones. China owes its great success in reform to Deng Xiaoping and other leaders learning from past failures, which shows that the more we understand about our failures, the more chance we have of succeeding in the future. That is why the ancient Chinese liked to think of history as a mirror for future behaviors, and it is now upon us to carry on that virtue. I sincerely hope that studying the Great Cultural Revolution could serve as a good example for China’s social science academia as a whole, with faithfulness to the lessons of history, fulfilling a responsibility as scholarly cornerstones for generations to come. I will continue to revise the book in the future, potentially leading to third and fourth revised editions. It is my mission in life to go beyond my limitations and leave a true masterpiece of history monograph, one which can withstand the test of time and the scrutinizing eyes of other historians and experts. For that purpose, I truly welcome all criticism and suggestions from common readers and experts alike. Angang Hu August, 2011

335

Blank Page

Appendix

Appendix Appendix 6.1

Articles Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius Published in Red Flag, 1972–1974

Author

Title

Publishing Date

Shi Lun

Arguments for Revering Confucianism and Opposing Legalism

October 1, 1973

Luo Siding

The Struggle between Forces For and Against the Restoration of Old Institutions during the Establishment of the Qin Dynasty — Arguments for the Social Roots of the Controversy between Confucianism and Legalism

November 1, 1973

Jin Yunge

Rightist Opportunism and Confucianism

November 1, 1973

Tang Xiaowen Tian Kai

Was Confucius a Educator for the Common People? The Working People Have Historically Conducted the Struggle against Confucius

December 1, 1973

Niu Zhigong

How did Confucius Safeguard Slavery by His Compilation of History? Confucius in Moscow

January 1, 1974

Criticism Group of Peking University and Tsinghua University

Lin Biao and the Philosophy of Confucius and Mencius

February 1, 1974

Hong Qun

Irrefutable Proof—Uncovering the Reactionary Philosophy of Confucius and Mencius by Studying the Evil of Confucius

February 1, 1974

Luo Siding

Probe into the Political Reform Carried out by Wang Anshi [Reformer in the Northern Song Dynasty] in Studying the Development of the Controversy between Confucianism and Legalism

February 1, 1974

Zhou Yilang

Examining Feudalism by Liu Zongyuan

February 1, 1974

Yang Guorong

Kang Li

Two-Line Ideological Struggle in the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period — Examining Social Reform in the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period from the Perspective of the Controversy between Confucianism and Legalism

December 1, 1972

January 1, 1974

January 1, 1974

337

Appendix

(Cont’d) Author Kang Li

Title Reviewing the Advocacy of Holding Confucius in Reverence—What Was the Implication of Chiang Kai-shek's Proclamation on New Year’s Day?

Publishing Date February 1, 1974

Kang Li

Both Confucius and Lin Biao Were Political Swindlers Confucius

March 1, 1974

Luo Siding

Examining Liu's Commentaries on History (Lu Shi Chun Qiu)

April 1, 1974

Liang Xiao

Examining Debates on Salt and Iron—A Political Debate between Confucianism and Legalism in the Middle Western Han Dynasty.

May 1, 1974

Yu Fan

Failure of Lin Biao’s Counter-revolutionary Strategies—Criticizing a Reactionary Note Virtues and Morality Preached by Confucius and the Revisionist Line Advocated by Lin Biao

May 1, 1974

Criticism Group of Peking University and Tsinghua University

Yan Feng Gan Qing

Liang Xiao Jin Nan Tian Li Zai Ping Luo Siding Li Qun Chen Jin Zhong Da Shi Ping

338

April 1, 1974

June 1, 1974

Hold the People’s Heroes in Reverence— Criticizing the Advocates of Confucianism for Distorting History and Defaming Liu Xiazhi [Rebel Leader)] Comments on Shang Yang [Reformer in the Qin Dynasty] Uncovering Lin Biao’s Careerist World View from His Bedside Banner Inscribed with Pegasus Meng Ke—Advocate of the Restoration of Slavery

June 1, 1974

Is the Struggle between Confucianism and Legalism a Dogfight? Investigation into the Class Struggle in the Qin and Han Dynasties Struggle between Confucianism and Legalism and Scientific and Technological Development in Ancient China Holding Confucius in Reverence and Fawning on Foreigners

August 1, 1974

Comments on Wang Chong’s Struggle against Confucianism Hiding One's Light under a Bushel—Lin Biao’s Conspiracy for Restoration

June 1, 1974 June 1, 1974 July 1, 1974

August 1, 1974 August 1, 1974 August 1, 1974 August 1, 1974 August 1, 1974

Appendix

(Cont’d) Author

Title

Publishing Date

Liang Lingyi

Master of Qin Legalism—Comments on Books on Legalism

September 1, 1974

Zhong Zhou

Rebel Troops Headed by Li Zicheng Directed Criticism at Cheng Ying and Cheng Yi [Confucius in the Northern Song Dynasty]

September 1, 1974

Shi Lun

Comments on the Populace

October 1, 1974

Hong Shansi

Forum at the White Tiger Temple and Bai Hu Tong

October 1, 1974

Luo Siding

Exploring the Struggle between Patriotism and National Betrayal in the Northern Song Dynasty

November 1, 1974

Bian Shizhong

Criticizing the Ideology of Ruling the World with Half of The Analects

November 1, 1974

Wu Chang

Confucianism Is an Executioner That Killed Many People

December 1, 1974

Wei Li

Two Military Line Struggles between Confucianism and Legalism in the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warning States Period

December 1, 1974

339

Appendix

Appendix 6.2 Documents and Articles to be Studied in the Campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius (1974) Author

Title

Publishing Date

My Advice

August 31, 1970

Mao Zedong

Chairman Mao’s Letter to Comrade Jiang Qing

July 8, 1966

The CPC Central Committee

Summary of Chairman Mao’s Conversations with Local Heads When Touring outside Beijing

March 17, 1972

Lin Biao; Zhou En’lai

Political report to the 9th and 10th National Congress of the CPC

April 1, 1969; August 24, 1973

Lu Xun

Compiled Words of Lu Xun against the Way of Confucius and Mencius

January 27, 1974

Part 2 The CPC Central Committee

Smashing Lin Biao’s Anti-Party Clique, Counter-Revolutionary Coup (Document No. 1–3)

December 11, 1971; January 13, 1972; July 2, 1972

Part 3 The CPC Central Committee

Compiled Words of Reactionary Forces and Landlord Capitalist Scholars in Worship of Confucius and Restoration of Old Institutions Since the May 4th Movement

January 27, 1974

Yang Rongguo

Confucius, a Thinker Stubbornly Defending Slavery

August 7, 1973

Yang Rongguo

The Struggle between Materialism and Idealism during the Western and Eastern Han Eras

August 13, 1973

Tang Xiaowen

Was Confucius an Educator for the Common People?

September 27, 1973

Luo Siding

November 1, The Struggle between Forces For and Against the Restoration of Old Institutions 1973 during the Establishment of the Qin Dynasty — Arguments for the Social Roots of the Controversy between Confucianism and Legalism

Feng Youlan

Criticizing Confucius and Self-Criticism against My Former Worship of Confucius

December 3, 1973

Gao Heng

What Slavery Systems Did Confucius Defend?

December 13, 1973

Shi Zhong, Beijing Normal University

The Worship of Legalism and the Fight against Confucius in On Feudalism

December 25, 1973

Zhe Jun, Peking University

The Way of Juste Milieu of Confucius Is a Philosophy against Social Revolutions

January 13, 1974

Yang Rongguo

A Saint of the Reactionary Class — Confucius

December 1973

Part 1 Mao Zedong

340

Appendix

Appendix 7.1 Changes in China’s Agriculture, 1965–1976

Year

1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1965– 1970 1970– 1976

Agricultural workers as % of total workforce

Average number of dependents per agricultural worker

Agricultural labor productivity based on total output value (1965=100)

Agricultural labor productivity based on net output value (1965=100)

81.60 81.50 81.70 81.70 81.60 80.80 79.70 78.90 78.70 78.20 77.20 75.80

3.100 3.068 3.035 3.013 2.975 2.984 3.001 3.082 3.091 3.110 3.138 3.183

100.0 105.5 100.6 97.3 90.9 102.2 103.1 102.1 109.7 112.5 116.5 118.2

100.0 104.1 102.2 96.5 93.6 97.5 96.7 95.5 103.4 106.1 108.0 107.6

—

—

0.44%

–0.51%

—

—

2.45%

1.66%

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Chinese Yearbook of Statistics (1988 & 1989).

341

Appendix

Appendix 7.2 Comparison between Industrialization and Urbanization Rate, 1949–1978 (%) Year 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

Industrialization rate 12.57 14.08 16.90 19.52 22.00 23.26 22.72 24.04 28.30 35.87 43.13 46.31 34.64 32.79 33.70 36.19 36.41 38.21 33.96 31.73 36.30 40.97 42.90 44.10 44.00 43.23 46.02 45.57 47.77 49.40

Urbanization rate 10.64 11.17 11.78 12.46 13.31 13.69 13.48 14.62 15.39 16.25 18.41 19.75 19.29 17.33 16.84 18.37 17.98 17.86 17.74 17.62 17.50 17.38 17.26 17.13 17.20 17.16 17.34 17.44 17.55 17.92

Difference 1.93 2.91 5.12 7.06 8.69 9.57 9.24 9.42 12.91 19.62 24.72 26.56 15.35 15.46 16.86 17.82 18.43 20.35 16.22 14.11 18.80 23.59 25.64 26.97 26.80 26.07 28.68 28.13 30.22 31.48

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China comp., Chinese Yearbook of Statistics (1993), 35, 81.

Note: The urbanization rate signifies the proportion of the urban population to the total population; the industrialization rate signifies the proportion of the income of the industrial sector to that of national income.

342

Appendix

Appendix 7.3 Changes in the national birth rate and fertility rate, 1965–1976 Year

Number of births (per 10,000 people)

Birth rate (‰)

Total fertility rate

Gross reproduction rate

1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

2,704 2,579 2,563 2,757 2,715 2,736 2,567 2,566 2,463 2,235 2,109 1,853

37.88 35.05 33.96 35.59 34.11 33.43 30.65 29.77 27.93 24.82 23.01 19.91

6.08 6.26 5.31 6.45 5.72 5.81 5.44 4.98 4.54 4.17 3.57 3.24

2.92 3.00 2.55 3.10 2.75 2.79 2.61 2.39 2.18 2.00 1.73 1.56

Source: Li, China’s Population and Economic Development, 34.

343

Appendix

Appendix 7.4 Some Documents of the CPC Central Committee on Redressing Cases of Injustice, 1978–1981 Date

Contents

November 26, 1978

Approved and forwarded “The Report on Handling the July 20 Political Incident,” submitted by the CPC Hubei Provincial Committee, Hubei Provincial Revolutionary Committee, and Wuhan Military Region Party Committee

December 16, 1978

Approved and forwarded the “Report on Investigating the 61-Renegade Case,” submitted by the Central Organization Department

January 4, 1979

Approved and forwarded the “Report on Addressing the Issue of the January Revolution,” submitted by the CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee

January 11, 1979

The Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee issued the “Report on Redressing the Case of Denouncing the General Publicity Department as the Palace of Hell,” approved by the CPC Central Committee

January 17, 1979

Approved and forwarded the “Report on Carrying out the Policy for the Kuomintang Uprising and Defecting Officers,” submitted by No. 6 Division of the Central United Front Work Department

February 3, 1979

Approval of the “Report on Redressing the Case of Denouncing the National United Front and Ethnic and Religious Departments for Following Capitulationism,” submitted by the Central United Front Work Department

February 17, 1979

Notification on “Redressing the Peng Zhen Case of Injustice”

February 26, 1979

Decision on “Redressing the Case of Denouncing the Ministry of Culture as the Old Ministry of Culture, the Emperor, and Courtiers Department, the Romantic Department, and the Dead Foreigner Department”

March 5, 1979

Approval of the “Report on Reviewing the Xiao Jinguang Case,” submitted by the General Political Department

March 9, 1979

Notification of “Redressing the Case of Denouncing the International Liaison Department of the CPC Central Committee for Seeking Reconciliation with Imperialism, Revisionism, and Reactionary Elements, Surrendering to Imperialism, Revisionism, and Reactionary Elements, and Annihilating the National Liberation Movement”

March 19, 1979

Approved and forwarded the “Report on the Ministry of Education Suggesting that the CPC Central Committee Revoke Two Documents”

344

Appendix

(Cont’d) Date

Content

March 21, 1979

The “Report on Redressing the Case of Denouncing the General Political Department as the Palace of Hell,” submitted by the General Political Department, “Decision on Redressing the Case of Denouncing the General Political Department as the Palace of Hell” and “Decision on Redressing the Unjust Case of the Tan Zheng Anti-Party Clique” approved and forwarded by the CPC Central Committee and Central Military Commission

March 28, 1979

Notification of “Redressing the Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin, and Fu Chongbi Case of Injustice”

May 3, 1979

Approval of the “Report on Revoking the Minutes of the Military Literary Work Forum in February 1966,” submitted by the General Political Department

May 26, 1979

Notification of “Redressing the Anti-party and Anti-socialism Black Line in the Archival Work Unjust Case,” issued by the General Office of the CPC Central Committee

June 8, 1979

Approved and forwarded the “Report on Reviewing the Lu Dingyi Unjust Case,” issued by the Central Organization Department

June 29, 1979

Approval of the “Report on Redressing the Deng Tuo, Wu Han, and Liao Mosha Unjust Case,” submitted by the CPC Beijing Municipal Committee

July 13, 1979

Notification of “Redressing and Rectifying the Injustice Rights Opportunist Case”

August 4, 1979

Approved and forwarded the Notification on “Redressing the Novel Liu Zhidan Case of Injustice,” issued by the Central Organization Department

August 24, 1979

Approved and forwarded the “Report on Reviewing the Yuan Shengping Case of Injustice,” submitted by the General Political Department

September 19, 1979

Approved and forwarded the “Review Conclusion and Report of the Third Enlarged Meeting Held by the All-China Federation of Trade Unions Party Committee,” submitted by the All-China Federation of Trade Unions Party Committee

October 14, 1979

Approved and forwarded the “Report on Redressing a Local Nationalist Case of Injustice,” submitted by the Central United Front Work Department

345

Appendix

(Cont’d) Date

Content

November 12, 1978

The CPC Central Committee and State Council approved and forwarded the “Report on Reviewing the College and University Reactionary Students Case,” submitted by the Party Committee of the Ministry of Education

December 6, 1979

Notification of “Redressing the So-Called Northern China Sectarianism Case of Injustice”

January 19, 1980

Notification of “Redressing the Tan Zhenlin Case of Injustice”

February 25, 1980

Notification of “Redressing the Xi Zhongxun Anti-party Clique Case of Injustice”

February 29, 1980

Resolution on “Redressing the Liu Shaoqi Case of Injustice,” approved at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee

May 20, 1980

Notification of “Redressing the Luo Ruiqing Case of Injustice”

June 11, 1980

Approved and forwarded the “Report on Reviewing the Patriotic Rightist Case,” submitted by the Central United Front Work Department

June 14, 1980

Approved and forwarded the “Report on Redressing the Xinjiang Ma Mingfang Case of Injustice,” submitted by the Central Organization Department and General Political Department

June 19, 1980

Notification of “Handling Cadres Criticized by Newspapers and Telegrams in the Cultural Revolution”

July 15, 1980

The Central Organization Department forwarded the “Report on Redressing and Vindicating the Central Organization Department,” approved by the CPC Central Committee before 1966

July 24, 1980

Notification of “Redressing the Xiao Hua Case of Injustice”

August 26, 1980

The CPC Central Committee and Central Military Commission approved and forwarded the “Report on Redressing the Li Desheng Case of Injustice,” submitted by the General Political Department

September 22, 1980

Approved and forwarded the “Report on Opinions about Reviewing and Redressing Wrongful Death Penalty Conviction Cases in the Cultural Revolution,” submitted by the Party Committee of the Supreme People’s Court

September 29, 1980

Approved and forwarded the “Report on Reviewing the Hu Feng Anti-party Clique Case,” submitted by the Party Committee of the Ministry of Public Security, Supreme People’s Court, and Supreme People’s Procuratorate

346

Appendix

(Cont’d) Date

Content

October 19, 1980

The General Office of the CPC Central Committee forwarded the “Report on Reviewing the Qu Qiubai Case of Arrest,” submitted by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection

October 23, 1980

The General Office of the CPC Central Committee forwarded the “Report on Redressing the Former General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the Yang Shangkun Case of Injustice,” approved by the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee

December 18, 1980

The Central Supervision Commission of the CPC issued the “Report on Redressing and Vindicating the Central Supervision Commission,” approved by the CPC Central Committee

March 9, 1981

The General Office of the CPC Central Committee forwarded the “Report on Redressing the Deng Zihui Case of Injustice,” submitted by the Party Committee of the State Agricultural Commission

Source: Yang ed., Cultural Revolution Museum (1966–1976), vol. 2, 586.

347

Blank Page

Bibliography

Bibliography Chinese materials:

Cai Fang 蔡昉, and Du Yang 都陽. “ ‘Wenhua dageming’ dui wuzhi ziben he renli ziben de pohuai“ 「文化大革命」對物質資本和人力資本的破壞 [The Cultural Revolution Caused Destruction on Physical Capital and Human Capital]. Jingji xui (jikan) 經濟學(季刊) [China Economic Journal], 2(4) (2003): 795–806. Central Special Case Group 中央專案組. “Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jing Qing, Yao wenyuan fan dang jituan zuizheng (cailiao zhi yi)“ 王洪 文、張春橋、江青、姚文元反黨集團罪證 (材料之一) [Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.1]. December 10, 1976. ———. “Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jing Qing, Yao wenyuan fan dang jituan zuizheng (cailiao zhi er)“ 王洪文、張春橋、江青、姚文元反黨集團 罪證 (材料之二) [Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.2]. March 1977. ———. “Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jing Qing, Yao wenyuan fan dang jituan zuizheng (cailiao zhi san)“ 王洪文、張春橋、江青、姚文元反黨集團 罪證 (材料之三) [Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan, Document No.3]. September 1977. Chen Donglin 陳東林, and Du Pu 杜蒲 eds. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo shi lu: Nei luan yu kang zheng — “Wenhua geming“ de shi nian (shang ce) 中華人民共和國 實錄:內亂與抗爭一「文化革命」的十年(上冊) [Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,“ Vol. 1]. Changchun: Jilin People’s Publishing House, 1994. ———. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo shi lu: Nei luan yu kang zheng — “Wenhua geming“ de shi nian (xia ce) 中華人民共和國實錄:內亂與抗爭一「文化革命」 的十年(下冊) [Documents of the People’s Republic of China: Domestic Turmoil and Resistance — The 10 Years of the “Great Cultural Revolution,“ Vol. 2]. Changchun: Jilin People’s Publishing House, 1994. Chen Shu 陳述. Zhonghua Renmin Gonghegou shi 中華人民共和國史 [History of the People’s Republic of China]. Beijing: People’s Press, 2009. Chen Yangyong 陳揚勇. Zhongquan chuji: Zhou Enlai zai “jiu yi san“ shijian zhi hou 重 拳出擊：周恩來在「九一三」事件之後 [Heavy Attack — Zhou Enlai after the September 13 Event]. Chongqing: Chongqing Press, 2006.

349

Bibliography

Cheng Zhongyuan 程中原, and Xia Xingzhen 夏杏珍. Deng Xiaoping zai 1975 鄧小 平在1975 [Deng Xiaoping in 1975]. Beijing: China Youth Publishing House, 2004. Deng Liqun 鄧力群. Deng Liqun zishu: Shier ge chunqiu (1975–1987) 鄧力群自述: 十 二個春秋 [Account of Deng Liquin: 12 Springs and Autumns (1975–1987)]. Hong Kong: Dafeng Publishing House, 2006. Deng Xiaoping Study Team under the Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee 中共中央文獻研究室鄧小平研究組 comp. Deng Xiaoping Zishu 鄧小平自述 [Memoir of Deng Xiaoping]. Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Press, 2005. Dong Fureng 董輔礽 ed. Zhonghua renmin gonghegou jingji shi (shang juan) 中華人 民共和國經濟史(上卷) [The Economic History of the People’s Republic of China, Vol. 1]. Beijing: Economic Science Press, 1999. Editorial Board of Contemporary China Series 當代中國叢書編輯部 ed. Dangdai Zhongguo de xiang zhen qiye 當代中國的鄉鎮企業 [Township Enterprises in Contemporary China]. Beijing: Contemporary China Publishing House, 1991. Editorial Committee of Biography of He Long 《賀龍傳》編寫組 comp. He Long zhuan 賀龍傳 [Biography of He Long] Beijing: Contemporary China Press, 2007. Editorial Committee of Biography of Hu Qiaomu 《胡喬木傳》編寫組 comp. Deng Xiaoping de Ershisi ci tanhua 鄧小平的二十四次談話 [The 24 Talks of Deng Xiaoping]. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2004. ———. Hu Qiaomu tan Zhong gong dang shi 胡喬木談中共黨史 [Hu Qiaomu on the History of the CPC]. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1999 Editorial Committee of Biography of Li Xiannian 《李先念傳》編寫組 comp. Li Xiannian zhuan (1949–1992) xia ce 李先念傳（1949–1992）下冊 [Biography of Li Xiannian] (1940–1992), Vol. 2]. Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 2009. Editorial Committee of Biography of Ye Jianying 《葉劍英傳》編寫組 comp. Ye Jianying zhuan 葉劍英傳 [Biography of Ye Jianying]. Beijing: Contemporary China Publishing House, 2006. Editorial. “Tiananmen guangchang shijian shuoming le shenme?” 天安門廣場事 件說明了什麼 [What Did the Tiananmen Square Incident Tell Us?]. People’s Daily 人民日報, April 18, 1976. Editorial. ”Weida de shengli” 偉大的勝利 [Great Victory]. People’s Daily 人民日報, April 10, 1976. Fan Shuo 范碩. Ye Jianying zai 1976 葉劍英在1976 [Ye Jianying in 1976]. Beijing: CPC Central School Press, 1991. ———. Ye Jianying zai 1976 葉劍英在1976 [Ye Jianying in 1976]. Revised edition. Beijing: CPC Central School Press, 1995.

350

Bibliography

———. Ye Jianying zai 1976 葉劍英在1976 [Ye Jianying in 1976]. 2nd revised edition. Beijing: CPC Central School Press, 1998. Feng Xigang 馮錫剛. Guo Moruo de wannian suiyue 郭沫若的晚年歲月 [Guo Moruo’s Later Years]. Beijing: Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 2004. Feng Youlan 馮友蘭. San song tang zixu 三松堂自序 [The Hall of Three Pines: An Account of My Life]. Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1984. Gao Fang 高放. Sulian de shehui zhuyi gaige shifou biran shibai 蘇聯的社會主義改革 是否必然失敗 [Whether Soviet Socialist Reform Was Doomed to Failure], 1999. http://rwxy.tsinghua.edu.cn/rwfg/lk/lk2/lk2–28–1.htm. Gao Shu 高樹 et al. eds. Lishi juren Mao Zedong 歷史巨人毛澤東 [Mao Zedong the Historical Figure]. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 1993. Gong Li 宮力. Deng Xiaoping yu Meigou 鄧小平與美國 [Deng Xiaoping and the United States]. Beijing: CCCPC Party History Publishing House, 2004. Gong Yuzhi 龔育之. Cong Mao Zedong dao Deng Xiaoping 從毛澤東到鄧小平 [From Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping]. Beijing: CPC History Press, 1994.Gou Moruo 郭沫若. Wu Zetian, di si mu 武則天, 第四幕 [Wu Zetian, eps. 4]. Beijing: China Drama Press, 1962. Gu Baozi 顧保孜, and Du Xiuxian 杜修賢. Mao Zedong zui hou qi nian feng yu lu 毛澤 東最后七年風雨路 [The Last Seven Years of Mao Zedong]. Beijing: People’s Literature Press, 2010 He Qin 何沁 ed. Zhonghua Renmin Gonghegou shi 中華人民共和國史 [The History of the People’s Republic of China]. Beijing: High Education Press, 1997. Hu Angang 胡鞍鋼. “Cong renkou daguo dao renli ziyuan qiangguo“ 從人口大國 到人力資源強國 [From a Populous Country to a Country Rich in Human Resource]. Chinese Journal of Population 中國人口科學, (1)(2003): 1–10. ———. Zhongguo jingji bodong baogao 中國經濟波動報告 [Report on the Economic Fluctuations in China]. Shenyang: Liaoning People’s Press, 1994. ———. Zhonggou Zhengzhi Jingji shilun (1949–1976) 中國政治經濟史論（1949–1976）[The Political and Economic History of China (1949–1976)]. Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 2007. Hu Angang 胡鞍鋼 and Men Honghua 門洪華. “Zhong Mei Mei Yin E Goujia Zhanlue Ziyuan de guoji bijiao — jian lun fumin qiangguo de zhonggou da zhalue“ 中美美印俄國家戢略資源的國際比較—兼論富民強國的中國大 戰略 [International Comparison of National Strategic Resources of China, the United States, and Russia — Elucidation of China’s Grand Strategy for Improving People’s Livelihoods and Reinvigorating Our Country]. Zhanlue yu guanli 戰略與管理 [Strategy and Management], (2)(2002). Hua Goufeng 華國鋒. Zhounggou gongchandang di shiyi quanguo dai qing dahuishang de zhengzhi baogao 中國共產黨第十一全國代青大會上的政治報告 [Report at the Eleventh National Congress of the CPC]. 1977.

351

Bibliography

Huang Shuai 黃帥.“Yige xiaoxuesheng de laixin he riji zhaichao“ 一個小學生的來 信和日記摘抄 [Letter and Journal Entries from a Primary School Student]. Beijing Daily 北京日報, December 12, 1973. Huang Zheng 黃崢. Liu Shaoqi yanjiu 劉少奇研究 [Study on Liu Shaoqi]. Beijing: Chinese Communist Party History Publishing House, 2008. Jiang Weiping 姜衛平 ed. Dangdai Zhonggou de renkou 當代中國的人口 [The Population of Contemporary China]. Beijing: China Social Science Press, 1988. Jin Chongji 金冲及 ed. Ershi shiji Zhongguo shi gang (di san juan) 二十世紀中國史 綱（第三卷） [The Outline of Chinese History in 20th Century, Vol. 3]. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2009. ——— . Zhou Enlai zhuan di si ce 周恩來傳第四冊 [A Biography of Zhou Enlai, Vol. 4]. Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 1998. ——— . Zhou Enlai zhuan (1898–1976) xia juan 周恩來傳(1898–1976)下卷 [Biography of Zhou Enlai, (1898–1976), Vol. 2]. Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 2008. Jin Yunge 勁雲戈. “Youqing jihui zhuyi he kongzi sixiang“ 右傾機會主羗和孔子思 想 [Rightist Opportunism and Confucianism]. Red Flag 紅旗, November 1, 1973. Kang Sheng 康生. “Kang Sheng jiejian chuxi zhongyang he quan jun zheng dang jian dang gongzuo zuotanhui quanti tongzhi shi de jianghua“ 康生接見出席 中央和全軍整黨建黨工作座談會全體同志時的講話 [Speech at the Working Forum on Consolidating and Building the CPC Central Committee and the Army]. Working Forum on Consolidating and Building the CPC Central Committee and the Army, Beijing, April 18, 1970. Li Chunbo 李春波. “Zhongua ge diqu renli ziben yu jingji fazhan chaju yanjiu“ 中國各地區人力資本與經濟發展差距研究 [Study into China’s Regional Human Capital and Economic Development Gap]. PhD diss., Tsinghua University, 2001. Li Haiwen 李海文. Zhou Enlai yanjiu pingshu 周恩來研究評述 [Research Review of Zhou Enlai]. Beijing: Central Literature Press, 1997. Li Jian 李健 ed. Deng Xiaoping san jin san chu Zhongnanhai 鄧小平三進三出中南 海 [Deng Xiaoping Entered and Left Zhongnanhai Three Times]. Beijing: China Land Press, 1993. Li Ruihuan 李瑞. “ ‘He’ de sixiang“ 「和」的思想 [Harmonious Socialist Ideology]. Wushi Qiuli 務實求理 [Practical Rationale]. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2010. Li Shouchu 李壽初 ed. Zhongguo zhengfu zhidu 中國政府制度 [Chinese Government System]. Beijing: Central University of Nationalities Press, 1997.

352

Bibliography

Li Ying 李穎. Cong yi da dao shiliu da xia ce 從一大到十六大下冊 [From the First to the Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC, Vol. 2]. Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 2003. Li Zhongsheng 李仲生. Zhongguo de renkou yu jingji fazhan 中國的人口與經濟發 展 [China’s Population and Economic Development]. Beijing: Peking University Press, 2004. Liang Xiao 梁效. “Deng Xiaoping yu Tiananmen guangchang fan geming shijian” 鄧小平與天安門廣場反革命事件 [Deng Xiaoping and the Tiananmen Square Counter-revolutionary Incident]. People’s Daily 人民日報, April 28, 1976. Liu Jixian 劉繼賢 ed. Ye Jianying nianpu xia 葉劍英年譜(下) [Chronicle of Yi Jianying, Vol. 2]. Beijing: Central Literature Press, 2007. Liu Wusheng 劉武生. Zhou Enlai de wannian suiyue 周恩來的晚年歲月 [The Later Years of Zhou Enlai]. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2006. Lu Nanquan 陸南泉 et al. eds. Sulian xingwang shi lun 蘇聯興亡史論 [The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union]. Revised ed. Beijing: People’s Press, 2004. Luo Siding 羅思鼎. “Qin wangchao jianli guocheng zhong fubi yu fanfu bi de donzheng — jian lun rufa lunzheng de shehui jichu“ 秦王朝建立過程中 復闢與反復辟的鬥爭─兼論儒法論爭的社會基礎 [The Struggle between Forces For and Against the Restoration of Old Institutions during the Establishment of the Qin Dynasty — Arguments for the Social Roots of the Controversy between Confucianism and Legalism]. Red Flag 紅旗, November 1, 1973. Ma Shanlong 馬閃龍. Sulian wenhua tizhi yange shi 蘇聯文化體制沿革史 [History of the Sovient Cultural System]. Beijing: China Social Science Press, 1966. Maomao 毛毛. Wo de fuqin Deng Xiaoping “wenge“ suiyue 我的父親鄧小平「文 革」嵗月 [My Father Deng Xiaoping in the Cultural Revolution]. Beijing: Central Literature Press, 2000. Mao Zedong 毛澤東. Mao zhuxi shi ci 毛主席詩詞 [Chairman Mao’s Poems]. Beijing: People’s Literature Publishing House, 1963. Ministry of Science and Technology of the People’s Republic of China 科學技術 部, and Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee 中 共中央文獻研究室 eds. Deng Xiaoping keji sixiang nianpu (1975–1994) 鄧小 平科技思想年譜(1975–1994) [ A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Thoughts on Science and Technology (1975–1994)]. Beijing: Central Literature Press, 2004. National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China 國家統計局 comp. Xin Zhongguo wushi wu nian tongji ziliao huibian (1949–2004) 新中國五十五年 統計資料彙編(1949–2004) [Compilation of 55 Years of Statistic Materials in New China (1949–2004)]. Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2005.

353

Bibliography

———. Zhongguo kexue jishu sishi nian (1949–1989) 中國科學技術四十年(1949– 1989) [Four Decades of China’s Science and Technology (1949–1989)]. Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1990. ———. Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian (2000) 中國勞動統計年鑒(2000) [China Labor Statistical Yearbook (2000)]. Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2000. ———. Zhongguo tongji nianjian (1981) 中國統計年鑒(1981) [Chinese Yearbook of Statistics (1981)]. Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1982. ———. Zhongguo tongji nianjian (1983) 中國統計年鑒(1983) [Chinese Yearbook of Statistics (1983)]. Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1983. ———. Zhongguo tongji nianjian (1988) 中國統計年鑒(1988) [Chinese Yearbook of Statistics (1988)]. Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1988. ———. Zhongguo tongji nianjian (1989) 中國統計年鑒(1989) [Chinese Yearbook of Statistics (1989)]. Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1989. ———. Zhongguo tongji nianjian (1993) 中國統計年鑒(1993) [Chinese Yearbook of Statistics (1993)]. Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1993. ———. Zhongguo tongji zhaiyao (2007) 中國統計摘要(2007) [China Statistics Abstract (2007)]. Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2007. National Situation Analysis and Study Group of Chinese Academy of Science 中 國科學院國情分析研究小組. Chenshi yu xiangcun — Zhongguo chengxiang maodun yu xietiao fazhan yanjiu 城市與鄉村—中國城鄉矛盾協調發展研 究 [Township and Countryside — Study of China’s Rural and Urban Contradictions and Coordinated Development]. Beijing: Science Press, 1994. Pang Song 龐松. Mao Zedong shidai de Zhongguo (1949–1976) (yi) 毛澤東時代的中 國(1949–1976)(一) [China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), Vol. 1]. Beijing: CCCPC Party Literature Publishing House, 2003. Pang Xianzhi 逄先知, and Jin Chongji 金沖及 eds. Mao Zedong zhuan (1949–1976) xia juan 毛澤東傳(1949–1976)下卷 [A Biography of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), Vol. 2]. Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 2003. Party History Research Center of the CPC Central Committee 中共中央黨史研究 室 comp. Zhongguo gongchandang lishi: 1949–1978 (di er juan) 中國共產黨 歷史:1949–1978(第二卷) [The History of the Communist Party of China: 1949–1978, Vol.2]. Beijing: CPC History Publishing House, 2011. Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee 中共中央文獻 研究室 comp. Chen Wen nen pu 1905–1995 (xia juan) 陳雲年譜1905–1995 （下卷） [Biography of Chen Yun (1905–1995), Vol. 2]. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1986. ———. Chen Yun wen ji di san juan 陳雲文集第三卷 [Collected Works of Chen Yun, Vol. 3]. Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 2005.

354

Bibliography

———. Chen Yun wen xuan di san juan 陳雲文選第三卷 [Selected Works of Chen Yun, Vol. 3]. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1994. ———. Chen Yun wen xuan di ba juan 陳雲文選第八卷 [Selected Works of Chen Yun, Vol. 8]. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1986. ———. Deng Xiaoping nian pu (1904–1974) xia juan 鄧小平年譜(1904–1974)下卷 [A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1904–1974), Vol. 2]. Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 2009. ———. Deng Xiaoping nian pu (1975–1997) xia juan 鄧小平年譜(1975–1997)上卷 [A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), Vol. 1]. Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 2004. ———. Deng Xiaoping nian pu (1975–1997) xia juan 鄧小平年譜(1975–1997)下卷 [A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Life (1975–1997), Vol. 2]. Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 2004. ———. Deng Xiaoping wen xuan di yi juan 鄧小平文選第一卷 [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 1], 2nd ed. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1994. ———. Deng Xiaoping wen xuan di er juan 鄧小平文選第二卷 [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 2], 2nd ed. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1994. ———. Deng Xiaoping wen xuan di san juan 鄧小平文選第三卷 [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3]. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1993. ———. Guanyu jian guo yi lai dang de ruogan lishi wenti de jueyi (zhu yi ben) 關 於建國以來黨的若干歷史問題的決議(注譯本) [Resolutions about Several Historical Issues of the CPC Since the Founding of the New China (with Remarks)]. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1981. ———. Jianguo yi lai Mao Zedong wengao di shi ce 建國以來毛澤東文稿第十冊 [Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, Vol. 10]. Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 1998. ———. Jianguo yi lai Mao Zedong wengao di shier ce 建國以來毛澤東文稿第十二冊 [Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, Vol. 12]. Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 1998. ———. Jianguo yi lai Mao Zedong wengao di shisan ce 建國以來毛澤東文稿第十三冊 [Mao Zedong’s Works Since the Founding of New China, Vol. 13]. Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 1998. ———. Li Xiannian wenxuan (1935–1988) 李先念文選(1935–1988) [Selected Works of Li Xiannian (1935–1988)]. Beijing: People’s Press, 1989. ———. Liu Shaoqi xuan ji shang juan 劉少奇選集（上卷） [Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi, Vol. 1]. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1981. ———. Mao Zedong xuan ji di yi juan 毛澤東選集第一卷 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 1]. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1991. ———. Mao Zedong xuan ji di er juan 毛澤東選集第二卷 [Selected Works of Mao

355

Bibliography

Zedong, Vol. 2]. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1977. ———. Mao Zedong xuan ji di san juan 毛澤東選集第三卷 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 3]. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1991. ———. Mao Zedong xuan ji di si juan 毛澤東選集第四卷 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 4]. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1991. ———. Mao Zedong xuan ji di wu juan 毛澤東選集第五卷 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 5]. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1977. ———. Mao Zedong wenji (di liu juan) 毛澤東文集（第六卷） [Collected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 6]. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1999. ———. Mao Zedong wenji (di qi juan) 毛澤東文集（第七卷） [Collected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 7]. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1999. ———. Mao Zedong wenji (di ba juan) 毛澤東文集（第八卷） [Collected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 8]. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1999. ———. San zhong quan hui yi lai zhongyao wenxian xuan bian shang juan 三中全會 以來重要文獻選編上卷 [Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee, Vol. 1]. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1982. ———. San zhong quan hui yi lai zhongyao wenxian xuan bian xia juan 三中全會以來 重要文獻選編下卷 [Compilation of Important Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee, Vol. 2]. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1982. ———. Zhong gong di yi jie zhi shiwu jie zhongyang weiyuan 中共第一屆至十五屆中央 委員 [Members of the First to Fifteenth CPC Central Committees]. Beijing: Central Literature Press, 2001. ———. Zhou Enlai nian pu (1949–1976) xia juan 周恩來年譜（1949–1976）下卷 [A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976), Vol. 2]. Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 1997. Publishing Committee of Selected Works of Mao Zedong 毛澤東選集出版委員會 comp. Mao Zedong xuanji 毛澤東選集 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong]. One-Volume Ed. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1964. Qin Jiufeng 秦九鳳. “Zhou Enlai zai shengming de zuihou jieduan xiangdao shenme?“ 周恩來在生命的最後階段想到什麼? [What did Zhou Enlai Think of at the Last Stage of His Life?]. cpc.people.com.cn. 人民網—中國共產黨新 聞網. January 7, 2010. Qing Ye 青野 and Fang Lei 方雷. Deng Xiaoping zai 1976 (shang juan) 鄧小平在 1976（上卷） [Deng Xiaoping in 1976, Vol. 1]. Shenyang: Spring Wind Literature Press, 1993. ———. Deng Xiaoping zai 1976 (xia juan) 鄧小平在1976（下卷） [Deng Xiaoping in 1976, Vol. 2]. Shenyang: Spring Wind Literature Press, 1993.

356

Bibliography

Qiu Deshen 丘德燊 ed. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo shi lu: wenxian yu yanjiu di wu juan 中華人民共和國實錄：文獻與研究第五卷 [Records of the People’s Republic of China: Literature and Research, Vol. 5]. Changchun: Jilin People’s Press, 1994. Quan Yanchi 權延赤. Zou jin Zhou Enlai 走近周恩來 [Zhou Enlai Up Close]. Beijing: People’s Daily Publishing House, 2010. Sisyphus, John 約翰·西西弗斯. Mao Zedong de “jin gunzi”: Yao Wenyuan yu wenge (xia) 毛澤東的金棍子：姚文元與「文革」（下） [Mao Zedong’s “Golden Stick”: Yao Wenyuan and the Cultural Revolution, Vol. 2]. Taipei: Sisyphus Publisher, 2016. State Administration for Industry and Commerce of the People’s Republic of China 中華人民共和國國家工商行政管理總局 comp. Xin Zhongguo gongshang xingzheng guanli shi zhi shang juan 新中國工商行政管理史志上卷 [Chronicle of Administration for Industry and Commerce of New China, Vol. 1]. Beijing: China Industry and Commerce Press, 2009. Sun Jian 孫健. Zhongguo jingji tongshi (1949–2000) xia juan 中國經濟通史下卷(1949– 2000) [General Economic History of China (1949–2000), Vol. 2]. Beijing: Renmin University Press, 2000. The Bejing University and Tsinghua University Critism Team 北京大學、清華大 學大批判組. “Linbiao yu kongmengzhidao“ 林彪與孔孟之道 [Lin Biao and the Way of Confucius and Mencius]. Red Flag 紅旗, February 7, 1974. ———. “Lue lun Qinshihuang de baoli“ 略論秦始皇的暴力 [On the Tyranny of Emperor Qin]. People’s Daily 人民日報, January 21, 1974. The U.S. Joint Economic Committee of Congress 美國國會聯合經濟委員會 ed. Xiang si ge xiandaihua qianjin de Zhongguo (di yi juan xia) 向四個現代化前進的中國 （第一卷下） [China under the Four Modernizations, Vol. 1b].Translated by Guo Zhongyan 郭忠言 et al. Beijing: China Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Press, 1986. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 聯合國計劃開發署. 2007 nian renlei fazhan baogao 2007年人類發展報告 [2007 Human Development Report]. Beijing: UNDP, 2008. Wang Hongwen 王洪文. “Zai zhonggong shi da shang guanyu xiugai dangzhang de baogao“ 在中共十大上關於修改黨章的報告 [Report on Amendments to the Party Constitution at the 10th National Congress of the CPC]. People’s Daily 人民日報, September 2, 1973. ———. “Zai zhongyang dushu ban de baogao“ 在中央讀書班的報告 [Report Made to the Reading Class of the CPC Central Committee]. January 14, 1974. Wang Jinglun 王景倫. Mao Zedong de lixiang zhuyi he Deng Xiaoping de xianshi zhuyi — meiguo xuezhe lun zhongguo 毛澤東的理想主義和鄧小平的現實主義—美

357

Bibliography

國學者論中國 [Mao Zedong’s Idealism and Deng Xiaoping’s Realism — the Views of U.S. Scholars on China]. Beijing: Current Affairs Publishing House, 1996. Wang Nianyi 王年一. Da dong luan nian dai 大動亂年代 [The Era of Great Turmoil]. Zhengzhou: Henan People’s Publishing House, 1988. Wang Xiaoqiang 王小強. “Nongye shehui zhuyi pipan“ 農業社會主義批判 [Criticism of Agricultural Socialism]. Preprints 未定稿, (49), December 15, 1979. Worker-peasant-soldier correspondents and staff correspondents of the People’s Daily 《人民日報》工農兵通訊員、《人民日報》記者. “Tiananmen guangchang de fan geming shijian“ 天安門廣場的反革命事件 [Counterrevolutionary Incident at the Tiananmen Square]. People’s Daily 人民日報, April 8, 1976. Wu Lengxi 吳冷西. Shi nian lun zhan: 1956–1966 Zhong Su guanxi huiyilu shang juan 十年論戰：1956–1966中蘇關係回憶錄上卷 [A Decade of Polemics — Memoirs of Sino–Soviet Relations 1956–1966, Vol. 1]. Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 1999. ———. Shi nian lun zhan: 1956–1966 Zhong Su guanxi huiyilu xia juan 十年論 戰：1956–1966中蘇關係回憶錄下卷 [A Decade of Polemics — Memoirs of Sino–Soviet Relations 1956–1966, Vol. 2]. Beijing: Central Party Literature Press, 1999. Xi Xuan 席宣, and Jin Chunming 金春明. “Wenhua da geming“ jian shi 「文化大 革命」簡史 [A Brief History of the Cultural Revolution]. Beijing: Chinese Communist Party History Publishing House, 1996. Xiao Donglian 蕭冬連. Lishi de zhuangui — cong boluan fanzheng dao gaige kaifang 歷史 的轉軌—從撥亂反正到改革開放 [Historical Transition — From Restoration of Order to Reform and Opening–up]. Hong Kong: Research Center for Contemporary Chinese Culture of the Chinese University of China, 2008. Xinhua News 新華網. “Liu shang Shidai fengmian ‘xiyangjing’ zhong kan Zhou Enlai” 六上《時代》封面「西洋鏡」中看周恩來 [Zhou Enlai Seen in the Western Eyes: Six-Time Cover of Time Magazine]. November 17, 2009. Xu Dixin 許滌新 ed. Dangdai Zhongguo de renkou 當代中國的人口 [The Population of Contemporary China]. Beijing: China Social Science Press, 1988. Xu Quanxing 許全興. Mao Zedong wannian de lilun yu shijian (1956–1976) 毛澤東 晚年的理論與實踐（1956–1976） [Theories and Practices of Mao Zedong in His Later Years (1956–1976)]. Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 1995. Yan Yilong 鄢一龍. “ ‘Shi wu’ jihua shishi qingkuang pinggu baogao” 「十五」計劃 實施情況評估報告 [Assessment Report of the Implementation of the Tenth

358

Bibliography

Five-Year Plan]. Master’s thesis, Tsinghua University, December 2005. Yang Jisheng 楊繼繩. Deng Xiaoping shidai (shang juan) 鄧小平時代（上卷） [The Era of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 1]. Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press, 1998. Yang kelin 楊克林. Wenhua da geming bowugan (1966–1976) xia ce 文化大革命博物 館（1966–1976）下冊 [Cultural Revolution Museum (1966–1976), Vol.2]. Hong Kong: Cosmos Books Ltd. & Asian Art Blooming Publishing Ltd., 2002. Yang Mingwei 陽明偉. Chen Yun wannian suiyue 陳雲晚年歲月 [Chen Yun in His Later Years]. Beijing: People’s Press, 2005. Yang Rongguo 陽榮國. “Chunqiu zhanguo shiqi sixiang lingyu nei liang tiao luxian de douzheng — cong rufa luzheng kan chunqiu zhanguo shiqi de shehui biange“ 春秋戰國時期思想領域內兩條路綫的鬥爭—從儒法論爭看春秋戰國 時期的社會變革 [Struggles between the Two Political Lines in the Ideology Sector during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Period]. Red Flag 紅旗, (12)(1972). ———. “Kongzi — wangu di weihu nuli zhi de sixiangjia“ 孔子—頑固地維護奴 隸的思想家 [Confucius, a Thinker Stubbornly Defending Slavery]. People’s Daily 人民日報, August 7, 1973. Ye Yonglie 葉永烈. Jiang Qing zhuan 江青傳 [A Biography of Jiang Qing]. Beijing: The Writers Publishing House, 1993. ———. Mao Zedong yu Jiang Jieshi 毛澤東與蔣介石 [Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai– shek]. Hefei: Anhui Education Press, 2009. Yu Guangyuan 于光遠. Dai zhuanzhe: Shiyi jie san zhong quanhui de tai qian muhou 大轉折：十一屆三中全會的台前幕後 [A Major Turning Point: The Political Backdrop of the Third Plentary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee]. Beijing: Central Compilation and Translation Press, 2008. Zhang Chunqiao 張春穚. “Zai quanjun ge da danwei zhengzhi bu zhuren zuotanhui shang de jianghua“ 在全軍各大單位政治部主任座談會上的講話 [Speech at a Forum of Directors of the Politics Departments of All Major Units of the PLA]. Beijing, March 1, 1976. Zhang Yaoci 張耀祠. Zhang Yaoci huiyi lu — zai Mao zhuxi shenbian de rizi 張耀 祠回憶錄—在毛主席身邊的日子 [Zhang Yaoci Memoirs — My Days with Chairman Mao]. Beijing: Chinese Communist Party History Publishing House, 2008. Zhao Shigang 趙士剛 ed. Chen Yun yu zhongyang dangshi zhongda shijian 陳雲與 中央黨史重大事件 [Chen Yun and Important Events in the History of the Central CPC Leadership]. Beijing: Central Literature Press, 2001. Zheng Qian 鄭謙, and Zhang Hua 張化. Mao Zedong shidai de Zhongguo (1949–1976)

359

Bibliography

(di san ce) 毛澤東時代的中國(1949–1976)（第三冊） [China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976), Vol. 3]. Beijing: Chinese Communist Party History Publishing House, 2003. “Zhongguo gongchandang di ba jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di shiyi ci quanti huiyi gongbao“ 中國共產黨第八届中央委員會第十一次全體會議公報 [Communiqué of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee]. People’s Daily 人民日報, 1966. “Zhongguo gongchandang di shi ci quanguo daibiao dahui xinwen gongbao” 中國共 產黨十次全國代表大會新聞公報 [Press Communiqué of the Tenth National Congress of the CPC]. August 29, 1973. Zhou Chulin 周純麟. Fengyu wushi nian 風雨五十年 [Fifty Years through Thick and Thin]. Guiyang: Guizhou People’s Press, 1988. Zhou Enlai 周恩來. “Zai Zhounguo gongchandang di shi ci quanguodaibiao dahui shang de baogao“ 在中國共產黨第十次全國代表大會上的報告 [Report to the Tenth National Congress of the CPC]. People’s Daily 人民日報, August 31, 1973. ———. “Zhengfu gongzuo baogao“ 政府工作報告 [Government Work Report]. People’s Daily 人民日報, January 21, 1975. ———. “Zhou Enlai zai zhongyang zhishu jiguan he guojia jiguan pi Lin pin Kong dongyuan dahui de jianghua“周恩來在中央直屬機關和國家機關批林批 孔動員大會的講話 [Speech at the Mobilization Meeting of Institutions Directly under the CPC Central Committee and State Organizations against Lin Biao and Confucius]. Speech, Beijing, January 25, 1974. Zhu Yuanshi 朱元石 eds. Wu De koushu: Shi nian fengyu jishi — wo zai Beijing gongzuo de yixie jingli 吳德口述：十年風雨紀事—我在北京工作的一些經 歷 [Wu De’s Oral History: A Record of the Ten-Year History of Storms, Some Personal Work Experiences in Beijing]. Beijing: Contemporary China Publishing House, 2004. Zong Daoyi 宗道一. “Zai Deng Xiaoping yu ‘si ren bang’ douzheng de xuanwo li — Wang Hairong, Tang Wensheng er san shi” 在鄧小平與“四人幫”鬥爭的漩 渦里 — 王海榮、唐聞生二三事 [In the Swirlpool of the Struggles between Deng Xiaoping and the Gang of Four — Anecdotes of Wang Hairong and Tang Wensheng]. Over the Party History 黨史縱橫, (12) (1998). Zou ping 鄒平, and Hu Angang 胡鞍鋼. Renlei, fazhan, qianjing, jeze 人類‧發展‧ 前景‧抉擇 [Human, Development, Prospect, Choices]. Beijing: Publishing house of Academic Publications, 1990.

360

Bibliography

English materials:

Fogel, Robert. Railroads and American Economic Growth: Essays in Econometric History. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970. Getty, J. Archibald. Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933–1938. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Goodman, David S. G. Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Revolution: A Political Biography. London & New York: Routledge, 1994. Harding, Harry. China's Second Revolution: Reform after Mao. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987. ———. “The Chinese State in Crisis 1966–1969.” In The Politics of China, 1949–1989. Edited by Roderick Macfarquhar. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Hu Angang.The Political and Economic History of China (1977–1992). 3-Volume Set. Hong Kong: Enrich Professional Publishing, forthcoming. Maddison, Angus. Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1–2006AD, March 2009. ———. Monitoring the World Economy: 1820–1992. Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1995. ———. The World Economy: A Millenial Perspective. Beijing: China Reform Publishing Limited, 1997. Needham, Joseph. “Science Reborn in China: Rise and Fall of the Anti–intellectual ‘Gang.’ “ Nature, 274 (5674) (1978). Perkins, Dwight H. Agricultural Development in China, 1368–1968. Chicago: Aldine, 1969. Riskin, Carl. China’s Political Economy: The Quest for Development Since 1949. London: Oxford Press, 1987. Tucker, Robert C. The Soviet Political Mind: Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change. Revised edition. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1971. World Bank. China — Socialist Economic Development: The Economy, Statistical System, and Basic Data. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1983. http:// documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/192611468769173749/The– economy–statistical–system–and–basic–data. ———. Education Sector Policy. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1980. http:// documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/366981468182955979/Education– sector–policy. ———. World Development Indicator 2004. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2004. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/517231468762935046/ World-development-indicators-2004. ———. World Development Report 1980. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1980. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/430051469672162445/

361

Bibliography

World–development–report–1980. Zhen Shiping. Party vs. State in Post-1949 China: The Institutional Dilemma. London: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Translated Materials:

Bastiat, Frédéric. Selected Essays on Political Economy. Translated by Seymour Cain. Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: The Foundation for Economic Education, Inc., 1995. Also available online at http://www.econlib.org/library/Bastiat/ basEss1.html. Glennon, Lorraine ed. 20 shiji renlei quan jilu 20 世紀人類全紀錄（1900–1999） [Our Times: An Illustrated History of the 20th Century]. Translated by Yu Jixiao 餘吉孝. Beijing: China Friendship Press, 2000. Institute of Marxism–Leninism of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee. Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 31. Translated from the Russian and edited by Julius Katzer. Mosco: Progress Publisher, 2012. ———. Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 32. Translated from the Russian and edited by Yuri Sdobnikov. Mosco: Progress Publisher, 2012. Macfarquhar, Roderick, and John K. Fairbank eds. Jianqiao Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shi: Geming de Zhongguo de Xingqi (1949–1965) 劍橋中華人民共 和國史：革命的中國的興起（1949–1965） [The Cambridge History of China: The People’s Republic, The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1949–1965]. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1998. ———. Jianqiao Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shi: Zhongguo geming neibu de geming (1966–1982) 劍橋中華人民共和國史：中國革命內部的革命（1966–1982 ） [The Cambridge History of China: The People’s Republic, Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966–1982]. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1992, 1998. Maddison, Angus. Zhongguo jingji de changyuan weilai 中國經濟的長遠未來 [Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run]. Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House, 1999. Meisner, Maurice. Mao Zedong de Zhongguo ji qi hou — Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo shi 毛澤東的中國及其後—中華人民共和國史 [Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic]. 3rd edition. Translated by Chu Shunping 楚順平, and Wu Xiangsong 吳祥松. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2005. Nixon, Richard. Lingxiu men 領袖們 [Leaders]. Translated by Shi Yanhua 施燕華. Haikou: Hainan Press, 2008. The Central Compliation and Translation Bureau 中央編譯局 trans. Sidalin quanji di qi juan 斯大林全集第七卷 [Collected Works of Stalin, Vol. 7]. Beijing:

362

Bibliography

People’s Press, 1958. ———. Sidalin quanji di shisan juan 斯大林全集第十三卷 [Collected Works of Stalin, Vol. 13]. Beijing: People’s Press, 1956. ———. Sidalin wenxuan (shang) 斯大林文選（上） [Selected Works of Stalin, Vol. 1]. Beijing: People’s Press, 1962. The U.S. Joint Economic Committee of Congress ed. Xiang si ge xiandaihua qianjin de Zhongguo 向四個現代化前進的中國 [China Moving to the Four Modernizations]. Vol. 1b. Translated by Guo Zhongyan 郭忠言. Beijing: China Foreign Economy and Trade Press, 1986.

363

Blank Page

Index Academic Criticism Campaign 309–10 agriculture 88, 100, 106, 242–43, 246, 260, 270, 273, 279, 307 campaign, anti-rightist 297, 299 capitalism 9, 38, 42, 85, 91, 110–112, 114–17, 164–65, 169–70, 196, 201, 216, 223, 253, 275–76 restoration of 12, 44, 115, 161, 234, 274–76, 278, 305 capitalist class 12, 38, 43, 63, 91, 113–15, 117, 161, 165, 170, 186, 205, 207, 210, 310 capitalist roaders 126, 147, 161, 163–66, 168, 170–72, 175–76, 187, 189, 205, 212, 288, 306, 309 Central Cultural Revolution Group 66, 289, 302, 315 Central Military Committee 24–26, 40, 45, 50, 55, 65, 67, 87, 95–97, 102–03, 159–60, 201, 207, 217–18, 225–26 Central Special Case Group 35, 46, 48–49, 54–55, 62, 66, 74–75, 162, 164, 188–89, 293 China’s socialist modernization 228, 287, 317 Chinese Academy of Sciences 57, 103–04, 110, 130, 143, 265–66 class struggle 8–10, 29–30, 35–36, 109, 134–35, 139–40, 142, 148–49, 165–66, 169–72, 174–75, 186–87, 189, 197, 305–09 communist school 270, 272–73 Confucian scholars 31, 33–35, 267 Confucianism 29–31, 35, 62–64, 337–40

Confucianists 29, 62, 125 Confucians 61–62, 127 Confucius 2, 17, 28–33, 36, 38–41, 44–45, 47–48, 50–52, 54, 57–58, 60–62, 82, 86, 162, 337–40 counter-revolutionaries 8, 51, 54, 91, 126, 161, 167, 175, 177–78, 180–81, 183, 185–89, 294, 304, 308 counter-revolutionary activities 4–5, 36, 42, 50, 91, 129, 177, 180, 185, 223, 340 counter-revolutionary cliques 50, 153, 215, 237, 295 counter-revolutionary incident 174, 177, 179, 182, 185, 189 counter-revolutionary revisionism 187–88 country developing 10, 230, 239, 249, 259–61, 272 low-income 230, 259–60, 263 middle-income 259, 263 CPC Central Committee, 7th 2nd Plenary Session 326 CPC Central Committee, 8th 17, 194, 290, 303 11th Plenary Session 17, 150, 230, 233, 302, 315 12th Plenary Session 66, 230, 234–35, 315 CPC Central Committee, 9th 2nd Plenary Session 17, 74 CPC Central Committee, 10th 4, 7 1st Plenary Session 17 2nd Plenary Session 24, 26, 87–88 3rd Plenary Session 225 CPC Central Committee, 11th 3rd Plenary Session 3, 89, 169–70, 320, 322,325

365

Index

5th Plenary Session 288, 306, 321, 323, 325, 346 6th Plenary Session 226, 237, 274, 314 Criticizing Confucius 31, 39, 46, 49, 51, 73 Criticizing Deng 147, 163, 172, 176, 188, 196 cultural dictatorship 53, 92, 113, 126, 266–67 Cultural Revolution 2–12, 14–26, 32–38, 40–44, 50–68, 86–94, 96–100, 118–34, 136–40, 142–48, 166–74, 184–86, 192–202, 226–327, 329–35 cultural revolution hardliners 7, 17, 21, 63, 68, 73, 83, 93, 96, 98, 102, 150 decision-making process 64, 152, 196, 330, 333–34 democratic revolution 116, 163–65 Deng Xiaoping 19–21, 24–26, 70–84, 94–111, 123–28, 130–48, 150–59, 161–79, 181–90, 195–99, 201–04, 206–13, 223–26, 284–86, 316–21 dictatorship 8–10, 12, 22, 30, 34–35, 42–43, 85, 90–91, 111–16, 175, 212, 234, 275–76, 306, 314 dogmatism 118–19, 286 economic fluctuations 69, 238, 249–50, 331 economic growth 10, 61, 95, 117, 134–35, 232, 237–38, 248–49, 260, 287 economic system 230, 279, 282, 305 education 16, 30, 33, 53, 56, 82–83, 93–94, 99, 105–06, 119, 127–28, 258, 260, 262, 271–72 Emperor Qin Shi Huang 29, 32–36, 64, 173, 185 empiricism 117–19, 122, 124, 178

366

February Mutiny 66 Fengqing Incident 52, 73, 77, 79–80 fertility rate 257–58, 343 feudalism 29–30, 43, 299, 313, 340 Five Fear-Nots 13 Five-Seven Route 37–38 Five-Year Plan 100, 251–52, 280, 334 Four Modernizations 88–89, 105–06, 115, 175, 285, 320 Gang of Four 2, 63–64, 92–94, 96–97, 107–09, 115–17, 119–20, 122–27, 160–161, 182–83, 190–91, 199–205, 207–09, 211, 213–25 Great Leap Forward 196, 232, 241, 249–51, 273, 277, 296, 298, 301, 305, 331, 333 Great Purge 308–09, 311 health care 56, 93, 127, 230, 262–63 human capital 260, 262, 271–72, 277, 287 ideology 36, 51, 109, 113–14, 242, 288–89, 294, 310, 324, 339 industrialization 239, 241, 264, 271–72, 287 infrastructure 93, 196, 240–41, 243, 271 January 25 conference 45–46, 48, 55 Jiang Qing clique 17, 19, 21, 23, 107, 110, 125, 172, 190, 204, 220, 227 landlords 31–32, 34–35, 54, 64, 79, 126, 167, 185–87, 276, 295 leftist 7, 13, 22, 29, 59, 137, 198–200, 220, 274, 314, 325 legalism 29, 31, 35, 44, 51, 62–64, 337–40 legalists 29, 61–62, 64 Lenin 10, 85, 112–13, 116, 127, 165, 273–

Index

75, 311 Leninism 7–8, 30, 46–47, 58, 116, 118–20, 127, 169, 173–74, 186, 233–34, 273, 303, 311–12, 326 Lin Biao and Confucius 9, 13, 20, 28, 36–37, 39–42, 44–52, 54–57, 59–62, 64–65, 67–69, 82, 85, 88, 139 Lin Biao anti-party clique 4–5, 7–8, 85, 114, 119, 235 Lin Biao Incident 12, 16–18, 27, 29, 204, 234 Lushan Meeting 74, 118 Mao Zedong Thought 109, 118, 158, 231, 270, 272–73, 286, 288, 295, 325 Mao Zedong’s errors 171, 233, 296, 315, 319, 321, 327, 331, 333 Mao Zedong’s instructions 13–14, 28–29, 32, 37, 39, 60, 70–71, 75, 77–78, 85, 87–88, 101, 114–15, 147, 151–52 Mao Zedong’s death 2–3, 63, 88, 120, 148, 163, 187, 193, 199, 202–03, 206, 211, 214–15, 224, 228, 317 Marxism 7, 12, 43, 46, 54, 62, 85, 106, 112, 119, 164, 169, 212, 303, 326 Marxism and Leninism 8, 30, 47, 58, 116, 118–20, 127, 169, 173, 186, 233–34, 303, 326 Mencius 29–30, 38–41, 44–46, 49–51, 73, 82, 114, 337, 340 National Congress of the CPC 7th 298, 300 8th 14–15, 17, 25, 169, 296–97, 300–01, 308, 312, 317, 319, 326 9th 4, 6–8, 11–12, 16–17, 19, 23, 44, 81, 87–88, 120–22, 225, 230, 234, 272, 288–89, 297, 319, 340

10th 2–8, 10–13, 15–20, 23–24, 28–29, 31, 44–45, 47, 87, 120–22, 149, 225, 230, 296–97, 340 11th 182, 219–20, 226 12th 3, 321–23 13th 199 Nanjing Military Area 26, 41, 87, 163, 218, 221 party disputes 211, 305 party struggles 309, 324 Peking University and Tsinghua University Criticism Team 30, 32–33, 36, 38, 51, 54 PLA (People’s Liberation Army) 7–8, 14–16, 24–25, 28, 36–37, 40–41, 45–46, 48–50, 57, 65–66, 70–71, 101–03, 206–08, 213, 226–27 planned economic system 281, 283–84 policy closed-door 253–54, 260 family planning 255–56 Political Bureau 4–6, 17–20, 22–26, 70–75, 77–80, 118–25, 140–43, 150–52, 154–60, 167–68, 176–84, 197–203, 208–11, 214–25, 302–04 9th 4, 17–18, 200 10th 5–6, 17–18, 181, 222–23 standing committee of 15, 22–23, 83, 86–87, 94, 114, 121–22, 134–36, 140–41, 147–48, 159–60, 167–68, 222–25, 302, 321–22 political struggles 9, 21, 52, 68–69, 88, 104, 111, 126, 137, 148, 161, 172, 189, 303–05, 307–09 Premier Zhou, death of 154, 176 productivity 99, 104–05, 109, 166, 272, 341 proletariat 8, 10–12, 33–34, 42–43, 69–72,

367

Index

85, 90–91, 105–6, 111–14, 186–88, 212, 234, 275–76, 306, 314 proletariat dictatorship 32, 36, 115, 205, 230 proletariat revolution 31, 171 Proof of the Crimes Committed by the Anti-Party Clique of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Yao Wenyuan 35, 46, 49, 54–55, 62, 74–75, 81, 85, 162, 164, 188–89, 206 revisionism 39, 50–51, 107–08, 112, 114, 116–20, 131, 140, 149–50, 161–62, 164, 166, 186–88, 274–75, 303 rightist tendency 2, 86, 131, 137, 145, 147–48, 150, 152–53, 173, 175 rightist whitewashing 13, 20, 185, 187–89, 195–96, 198 rightists 13, 22, 32, 104, 116, 126, 130, 150, 154–55, 159, 164, 174, 176, 188, 200 self-criticism 44, 81, 124, 150, 156, 206, 309, 340 Shanghai Gang 80, 102, 202–03 Snail Incident 52 socialism 7, 9, 56, 91, 103, 105, 111–12, 114, 116, 157, 164, 171, 273, 276–77, 326– 27 Soviet Union 8, 22, 42, 56, 95, 115–16, 239–40, 272–73, 275, 283–85, 296, 306–07, 309–12, 316, 325 Stalin 115, 232, 275, 296, 306–12, 314, 316, 319, 325 State Planning Commission 68, 100–01, 110, 282 Stinky 9th 37, 127 struggles internal 8, 13, 35, 166 philosophy of 2, 43, 51, 112, 123, 134,

368

148–49, 169, 194 two-line 303, 305 successor 11, 17, 20–21, 33, 43–44, 82, 136, 154, 156, 160, 182, 191–92, 200, 270, 312–14 Tale of the Marshes 125, 130–34, 136, 140, 149–50 tenure demerits 3 Three Instructions 108–09, 137, 139, 142, 154, 163, 166, 169, 175–76, 186 Three Musts and Three Must-Nots 12, 120–22, 124, 303 three supreme instructions 88 Tiananmen Square Incident 39, 148, 153, 173–74, 176–77, 179–81, 183–88, 190 urbanization 264, 271–72, 287 urbanization rate 264–65, 342

Blank Page

Blank Page