Manufacturing Terrorism in Africa: The Securitisation of South African Muslims [1st ed.] 9789811556258, 9789811556265

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ISLAM AND GLOBAL STUDIES

Manufacturing Terrorism in Africa The Securitisation of South African Muslims

Mohamed Natheem Hendricks

Islam and Global Studies Series Editors Deina Abdelkader University of Massachusetts Lowell Wilmington, MA, USA Nassef Manabilang Adiong Institute of Islamic Studies University of the Philippines Diliman Quezon City, Central Luzon, Philippines Raffaele Mauriello Pelake 36 YousefAbad, Khiyabane Bisotoun Tehran, Iran

Islam and Global Studies series provides a platform for the progression of knowledge through academic exchanges based on multidisciplinary socio-­ political theory that studies the human condition and human interaction from a global perspective. It publishes monographs and edited volumes that are multidisciplinary and theoretically grounded and that address, in particular, non-state actors, Islamic polity, social and international justice, democracy, geopolitics and global diplomacy. The focus is on the human condition and human interaction at large. Thus cross-national, cross-­ cultural, minority and identity studies compose the building block of this series; sub-areas of study to which Islamic theory and socio-political praxis can provide an alternative and critical lens of inquiry. It explores Islam in history and in the contemporary world through studies that: a) p  rovide comprehensive insights of the intellectual developments that have defined Islam and Muslim societies both in history and in the contemporary world; b) delineate connections of pre-colonial Muslim experiences to their responses, adaptations and transformations toward modernity; c) evaluate old paradigms and emerging trends that affect Muslims’ experiences in terms of political state system, democracy, secularization, gender, radicalism, media portrayals, etc.; d)  show empirical cases of intra-Muslim and Muslim–Non-Muslim relations. More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/16205

Mohamed Natheem Hendricks

Manufacturing Terrorism in Africa The Securitisation of South African Muslims

Mohamed Natheem Hendricks Cape Town, South Africa

ISSN 2524-7328     ISSN 2524-7336 (electronic) Islam and Global Studies ISBN 978-981-15-5625-8    ISBN 978-981-15-5626-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5626-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-­01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

To my late father Achmat Hendricks, mother Gouwa Hendricks and grandfather Tape Hendricks: because I owe it all to you. May Allah have mercy on you as you had mercy on me when I was small.

Foreword

The publication of this book is an historic event: certainly, in the study of Security Studies in South Africa. This is a big claim, to be sure. The message of the book needs to be read against the backdrop that this field (and its root-discipline, International Relations) has always been a white, masculine mode of enquiry. It was also bound up with another unchallenged assumption, that Western-centred thinking on security was embedded in the Judeo-Christian belief system. With few exceptions, until the ending of apartheid, the pre-occupation of those who published in the field of Security Studies in (and on) South Africa was how to maintain a white state in Africa. Borrowing from canon, writers in the field reinforced the then common-sensical understanding that the security interests of the West and South Africa were one. Indeed, during the 1970s, there was an academic cottage industry which argued that the West had ‘legitimate’ security interests in the apartheid state notwithstanding that the system itself had been declared a crime against humanity. Indeed, my own doctoral thesis, which was researched in the United Kingdom and presented in 1980, was a product of this Cold War approach (see Vale, 1980). Given this, it was plain that on the ending of apartheid, the dominant way of thinking could continue. After all, there had been no revolution by which Western ‘interests’—security and economic—were suddenly lost. The moment was assisted by the integration and regrouping of what the Stellenbosch academic Willie Breytenbach famously called the vii

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‘Securocrats’ into the post-apartheid state (Pottinger, 1998, p. x). Their rise to authority remains one of the great untold stories of South Africa’s transition to democracy. In these years, their writings continued to follow the Western template of security thinking, and accordingly replicated the West’s ‘othering’ of Muslims at the global level—even before 9/11 quickened its reckless pace. These paragraphs are essential background to the book presently in your hands. They reinforce the notion that what the West said about security in South Africa has mattered more than any other ideas, and very often more than the facts themselves! Of course, there were many, many other stories of security and its making in South Africa. But, the very history of the country is a tale of policy insiders who fashioned security to serve their own interests—and did so, by the familiar binaries of ‘self’ and ‘other’. What the book shows is that borrowing from the set routines of Western-oriented Security Studies, the purported ‘threat posed by Muslims gained currency in the post-apartheid state. Its endless reportage in the press and its uncritical use by a think-tank community—often in search of foreign funding—made it not only accepted academic knowledge but a species of common sense, too. These pages expose the limits of common sense and, in publishing it, Dr Hendricks has pointed why it is that critique is essential to understanding security. Pretoria, South Africa

Peter Vale

References Pottinger, B. (1988). The imperial presidency: P.W.  Botha, the first ten years. Johannesburg, South Africa: Southern Book Publishers. Vale, P. (1980). The Atlantic Nations ad South Africa: Economic constraints and community fracture. PhD thesis presented to the University of Leicester, 466 pp.

Acknowledgements

This book results from my doctoral thesis, ‘Received truth: Security, Securitisation and South African Muslims’ at the University of Johannesburg which was supervised by Professor Peter Vale. I have benefited enormously from his guidance and advice. I express a very special thanks to Anneli Botha, Hussein Solomon, Adam Habib and Ronnie Kasrils who willingly permitted me to interview them. Thanks to all my friends who listened to my unpopular or non-­ mainstream perspectives related to the topic Terrorism and its construction in Africa and South Africa. You encouraged me to persevere and complete this inquiry. You know who you are: Shamil Manie, Muafia Jonas, Ighsaan Abrahams, Lucy Alaxander, Nandipha Matchanda, Achmat and Yusuf Saloogy, Terry Volbrecht and Rahmat Omar. I am hugely grateful to my wife, Nurjehaan Daniels, and my children, Thaakier, Gouwa and Yusuf, who provided me with the necessary moral and emotional support and who have tolerated me while I worked on this publication.

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Praise for Manufacturing Terrorism in Africa “Research on terrorism remains deeply Eurocentric and there is a real gap in our understanding of the material and discursive impact of the war on terror on Africa. Manufacturing Terrorism in Africa provides a much-needed critical analysis of the ways in which the war on terror discourse has come to dominate security discussions in South Africa, and the important actors involved in the securitisation of Muslims. Theoretically sophisticated, empirically rich and always interesting, this book adds greatly to our knowledge of the globally dominant terrorism discourse and its damaging effects on community relations and counterterrorism policy-­ making. Highly recommended.” —Professor Richard Jackson, Director, The National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, New Zealand “In this timely monograph Natheem Hendricks challenges the sensationalist media hysteria on so-called ‘Islamic terror in South Africa’. He also presents a much-­ needed corrective to a small coterie of so-called experts who spew Islamophobic tropes about a growing ‘Islamic terror threat in South Africa’. This book is essential reading for anyone interested in an alternative perspective to the hegemonic view that official state representatives have greater leverage in manufacturing terror over that of media and so-called counter terrorism research institutes”. —Dr. A. Rashied Omar, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, USA

Contents

1 Prolegomenon: The White Widow—The Kenyan Westgate Mall Attack  1 2 The United States: Pivotal in the Terrorism Debate in Africa 17 3 Conceptualising Securitisation 45 4 The Invisible College 59 5 Expertise, Epistemes and the Construction of a Suspect Community 93 6 Writing Insecurity: Representations of Muslims and Islam in the South African Print Media137 7 Conclusion177 Appendixes201 References209 Index245 xiii

Acronyms

AEI American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research AFRICOM United States of America African Command ARNTACT African Research Network on Terrorism and Counter Terrorism AU African Union BIIA British Institute of International Affairs CDA Critical Discourse Analysis CFR Council on Foreign Relations CIA Central Intelligence Agency (United States of America) CiPS Centre for International Political Studies COIN Counterinsurgency CS Copenhagen School CSS Critical Security Studies CSTPV Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence CT Critical Theory EU European Union FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FIS Islamic Salvation Front GCTF Global Counterterrorism Forum GLORIA Global Research in International Affairs Center GWOT Global War on Terror IR International Relations ISS Institute for Security Studies NIA National Intelligence Agency (South Africa) OAU Organisation of African Unity PAC Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa

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PAGAD PRISM RAND RIIA RIMA SAIIA SAP SAPS TRI UIC US

People Against Gangsterism and Drugs Project for the Research of Islamist Movements Research and Development Corporation Royal Institute of International Affairs Research on Islam and Muslims in Africa South African Institute of International Affairs South African Police South African Police Services Terrorism Research Initiative Union of Islamic Courts United States

CHAPTER 1

Prolegomenon: The White Widow—The Kenyan Westgate Mall Attack

This introductory chapter provides preliminary remarks which the rest of the book discusses in more detail. It analyses a publicly aired documentary, The Kenyan Attack, to show how terrorism knowledge and expertise are manufactured in an era of the ‘Global War on Terror’. Above all, it aims to illustrate that the construction of African and South African Muslims as a societal threat is brought about by associating them with terror in a manner that replicates Western discourses on Muslims and terrorism. Confirming that knowledge and power interface in processes by which social and moral order are constructed, this chapter draws attention to how non-state actors, such as a terrorism ‘expert’ and the media (the Carte Blanche documentary in his instance), participate in the political act of constructing South African Muslims as a source of terror and contributors in global terror networks. We now proceed to analyse, from a historical perspective, the South African Carte Blanche documentary, The Kenyan Attack, which was aired on 29 September 2013. Carte Blanche is M-Net’s prime-time current affairs programme, broadcast throughout southern Africa on a Sunday evening to over 500,000 people each week (DStv, Undated). This investigative journalistic series, produced by Combined Artistic Production, was first aired on 21 August 1988.

© The Author(s) 2020 M. N. Hendricks, Manufacturing Terrorism in Africa, Islam and Global Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5626-5_1

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The purpose of this analysis is to show how Carte Blanche used the documentary genre to depict and perpetuate the idea of an association between Muslims and terrorism. At this point it is necessary to comment on the documentary as social practice. It is often assumed that documentaries present the truth or reality in contrast to films that focus on fictional narratives. Bill Nichols’ (1991) book Representing Reality and Patricia Aufderheider’s (2007, in Werner, 2014, p. 325) assertion that a documentary ‘tells a story of real life, with claims to truthfulness’ reinforce such an understanding. However, a documentary is not ideologically neutral as it has the potential to be a political tool. In practice, power and interest are central in the production and dissemination of a documentary. So, unlike footage collected by surveillance cameras, a documentary presents the arguments and/or the point of view of the filmmakers by combining the ‘representation of actuality with the presentation of an argument or point’ (Werner, 2014, p. 325, emphasis in original). The presentation of the documentary, The Kenyan Attack, will be analysed here because the way the Carte Blanche team reported the context and outcome of their investigation illustrates the main theme of this book, namely, the processes by which the South African mainstream media and South African-based security think-tank experts have constructed perceptions of Islam and Muslims as a source of subversive violence and a threat to the safety of South African citizens. The documentary investigated the alleged South African link to the military attack of the ‘part-Israeli owned’ Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, on 21 September 2013 (Carte Blanche, 2013a, Part 1, 01:30). In this account, a woman called Samantha Lewthwaite was said to be the leader and/or one of the perpetrators of the attack, which was allegedly carried out under the command of the armed Somali guerrilla group al Shabab. According to the documentary, al Shabab attempted to overthrow the Western-installed Somali government. Introducing Lewthwaite, Carte Blanche informed viewers that she was a British citizen who had converted to Islam and was married to a person called Germaine Lindsay. The narrator emphasised that Lindsay was ‘one of the four bombers of the July 2005 terror attacks in London’, which killed fifty-two people and injured ‘hundreds’. It is alleged that Lindsay killed himself during the London attacks, resulting in Lewthwaite becoming a widow. Because of this, and her being ethnically a European, Western media nicknamed her, ‘the White Widow’ (Potgieter, 2014, pp. 175–6).

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We must ask why it was necessary to introduce Lewthwaite as a Muslim convert. I maintain that doing so was part of a process that constructed Muslims as a ‘suspect community’ (Hillyard, 1973, p.  7). Germaine Lindsay, in the Carte Blanche narration, served as so-called ‘evidence’ that Muslims are dangerous because they have the inclination to commit ‘acts of terrorism’. This notion of ‘terrorism’ is one that is already pervasive in popular mythology and has been deliberately and consistently perpetuated by media, which disseminates the prejudiced idea of an association between Muslims and calculated acts of random violence against innocent citizens. Before commencing with a full analysis of the documentary in question, it is necessary to locate it within the broader frame of the idea of a ‘Global War on Terror’. Through his declaration that the US ‘will call together freedom-loving people to fight terrorism’, and to conduct a ‘war against terrorism’ (Bush, 2001b, no pagination), the former US President George W. Bush declared a global emergency. This declaration constructed the idea of ‘terrorism’ as an existential threat to the United States and the ‘free world’ that urgently required extraordinary actions to counter it. The Carte Blanche sequence suggested that ‘terrorism’ became securitised (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998; Wæver, 2003): the ‘Speech-Act’ or the utterance of the emergency was essential in the construction of the threat itself. This move relates to securitisation theory, in that ‘by labelling something a security issue, it becomes one’ (Wæver, 2004, quoted in Taureck, 2006a, p. 55). To reiterate this intellectual move: ‘the utterance itself is the act’ (Wæver, 1995, p. 55, emphasis in original). This construction, certainly theoretically, suggests that any actor can securitise any and every issue. However, in actuality, successful securitisation is limited to those who have the appropriate power and capability as well as the means to construct a threat socially and politically (Taureck, 2006a, p. 55). When ‘security’ is uttered by an appropriate securitising agent—say, the US President—he is also declaring a ‘special right to use whatever means necessary to block it’ (Wæver, 2003, pp.  10–11). However, securitisation does not necessarily imply that an issue is an objective security threat. Instead, as we have noted, it implies that an issue has been constructed as a threat by an appropriate ‘securitizing agent’, who has articulated the nature of the threat, within the accepted rules (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 24). According to these rules, the securitising agent has the capability and power to construct the threat as well as the institutional authority and means to block the constructed threat.

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Locating the analysis of the Carte Blanche documentary in a wider discourse is not simply a digression into abstract understandings of securitisation; rather, a critical engagement with this discourse will permeate this book which, to repeat, is concerned with the securitisation of Islam and Muslims by associating African Muslims with terrorism. We will now return to a historically contextualized analysis of the Carte Blanche documentary which is the focus of this Prolegomenon. Part 1 of the documentary opened with the singing of a Christian hymn intended to symbolise the grief of Kenyans. One could ask why the grief of Muslim Kenyans was not shown. The sense of grief was reinforced by the narrator’s statement that Kenyans were in mourning and ‘devastated, shattered, grief stricken, by the terrorist attack …; but as a nation they [were] not broken’ (Carte Blanche, 2013a, Part 1, 00:07). However, the narrator continued, ‘the situation on the ground’ is tense, with ‘scores still unaccounted for’. An anonymous voice then appealed, both to his compatriots and the viewer, for people not to point ‘fingers at any religion’, since ‘(w)e are one … we Kenyans. Let us love each other, let us protect each other’ (00: 35). In contrast to this voice of reason and reconciliation, the ‘attackers’ were introduced as ‘terrorists’ who aimed to establish an ‘Islamic state’. Here is a verbatim clip: The deadly four-day siege was claimed by al Qaeda linked terrorist group, al Shabab. Al Shabab is an Islamist militant group who is fighting to overthrow the Somali government and establish an Islamic state. On Saturday a group of attackers stormed the up-market, part-Israeli owned, Westgate Mall […]. (Carte Blanche, 2013a, Part 1, 1:28)

Confirming that over sixty civilians died in the ‘siege’, the documentary suggested that the ‘Shabab terrorists’ killed indiscriminately. Carte Blanche dramatised this by interviewing Zachary Yach, an eighteen-year-old South African, who was in the Westgate Mall during the attack. In his reconstruction of the course of events, Yach said that he witnessed a ‘huge explosion’ which he experienced as a ‘gust of wind onto your face; like a sand storm; like a huge crack; like an ear piercing sound. … For the initial 20 to 30 minutes it was just constant bomb blasts; grenades being thrown over; … gunshots’ (interviewed on Carte Blanche, 2013a, Part 1, 1:56–2:25).

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By choosing to privilege this particular account, the documentary highlighted the personal and immediate dangers which individuals encountered on the scene. Simultaneously, it also allowed the investigative team to construct al Shabab as a threat to countries beyond Kenya. By presenting South Africans, like Yach, as victims and/or potential victims of ‘terrorism’, Carte Blanche constructed ‘terrorism’ as a threat to all South Africans. In other words, it securitised ‘terrorism’. The implication of this portrayal was that, since the Carte Blanche team lacked the institutional capability and authority to block this constructed threat, the documentary needed to convince those in power—the South African government—to take urgent action against ‘terrorism’. Accordingly, this securitising move should be viewed as an attempt to convince South African policymakers to urgently block ‘terrorism’, and that dealing with this threat might involve the South African authorities in becoming actively involved in pursuing perpetrators of attacks like the Nairobi Westgate Mall siege. This interpretation is consistent with Huha Vuori’s (2008, pp. 76–77) argument that actors with sufficient ‘social capital’ but lacking state authority and powers can also use securitisation moves to achieve political aims. However, in such instances, these securitisation moves are limited to ensuring that an issue is placed on the agenda of politicians and/or state bureaucrats concerned with security policy matters. At the time, the perspective that South Africa pursue perpetrators of terrorism was consistent with George W. Bush’s appeal, in his September 2001 ‘Joint Session of Congress, and the American people’, in which he declared that all nations should participate in his ‘Global War on Terror’ since ‘if this terror goes unpunished …their own cities, their own citizens may be next. ... Terror unanswered … can bring down legitimate governments’ (Bush, 2001b, no pagination). So the attempt by the Carte Blanche team to encourage South Africa to pursue the perpetrators of the Westgate Mall siege was simultaneously advocating that the country become a partner in the ‘Global War on Terror’ under the leadership of the US. Informed reflection on the structure and direction of the narrative presented in this documentary reveals that Huntington’s (1993, 1996) ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis was drawn on as a conceptual framework. To explain: in 1996, as the Cold War was ending, the Harvard-based political scientist Samuel P. Huntington argued that ‘relations between states and groups from different civilizations will be … antagonistic’ and that Islam and the West would be two of the primary conflicting civilisations in future (1996, p. 183).

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Expanding on this idea, Western and Islamic civilisations were counterposed throughout the Carte Blanche documentary. Western civilisation, as we have noted, was depicted by the singing of the hymn and the voice begging for reconciliation and love amongst Kenyans. Interestingly, Israelis were included within the Western cohort, as was evident in the narrator’s claim that the Westgate Mall was ‘part-Israeli owned’. This prompts the following question: was the reference to the Israeli ownership deliberately made to reinforce a manufactured perception that Israelis are, generally, victims of ‘terrorism’? In contrast to the construction of Western civilisation as ‘good’ because its representatives prayed and called for reconciliation, the second group, those representing Islamic civilisation, was demonised as its antithesis. For example, it was alleged that al Shabab celebrated death and destruction and intended establishing something different—‘the Islamic state’ (Carte Blanche, 2013a, Part 1, 1:28). This process of demonisation was strengthened by visual images depicting al Shabab involved in military training, in combat and engaged in shootings. The narrator was insistent that ‘it is not the first time that these Islamist fighters have attacked countries which support African peace-­ keeping forces in Somalia’. The voice went on to say ‘on the eleventh of July 2010, al Shabab attacked [Ugandan] spectators watching the World Cup final in Kampala. Seventy-nine people were killed’ (Carte Blanche, 2013a, Part 1, 06: 38–58). Even though the narrator recognised that ‘Kenya invaded southern Somalia to attack al Shabab bases two years ago’ (06: 32), no attempt was made to provide a background to these events or to situate them politically. The average viewer would therefore not have been aware that Kenya and Uganda, in collaboration with Western military forces, were involved in a war with al Shabab (Keenan, 2008). This point was clarified, but only at the end of the documentary, by a Political Studies professor, who was described as a ‘terrorism expert’ (Carte Blanche, 2013b, Part 2, 00:54) affiliated with the University of Witwatersrand. Responding to the interviewer, the professor noted: ‘This is payback time for the atrocities … that the Kenyan army inflicted on Somalis … with the assistance of the American and Europeans. The politics of the Horn of Africa, with Somalia at the heart of it, cannot be ignored’ (interviewed on Carte Blanche, 2013b, Part 2, 8:59–9:11). At this point it is necessary to ask why Carte Blanche identified and presented the Political Studies professor as a ‘terrorism expert’ even though he had never published on the subject, and his current research

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did not focus on terrorism at all. Responding to an email question about his fields of expertise, the professor informed the author of this publication: ‘My writing is not on terrorism as such, but rather on African security more broadly’ (personal email correspondence, 26 March 2015). By portraying the Political Studies professor as a ‘terrorism expert’, were the producers of Carte Blanche not trying to provide credibility for a specific narrative, as well as reinforcing a particular representation? Focusing on the scholarship of the professor is not a proxy to argue that he is unqualified to comment on issues related to African terrorism. Instead, concentrating on his research and publication record highlights the media’s—Carte Blanche in this instance—role of appropriating the authority to anoint their preferred scholars as terrorism experts. The media then continues to use such experts with the platform to make and propagate knowledge claims that are consistent with their political agenda. Further implications of this move are examined and discussed in the pages that follow. It is already evident that the Carte Blanche documentary, as a cultural product, was not a neutral conveyer of information. Instead, the analysis, thus far, suggests that this documentary, as a definer, container and carrier of information, became implicated in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). GWOT can be regarded as a ‘war’ of ‘images’ (Hammond, 2003, p. 23) and a war over ideas (to win hearts and minds), since terror and risk are abstract terms, within which ‘information becomes the war’ (Crosbie, 2014, p.103, emphasis in original). Taking sides in this war, the Carte Blanche documentary actively became a participant and contributor to battles that were fought in media theatres. Earlier in this discussion, it was noted that Carte Blanche constructed al Shabab as a threat to Western civilisation, but this line of thinking did not end there: the associates and supporters of al Shabab were, equally, constructed as a threat to Western civilisation. This was clear when attention was turned towards South Africa, where Samantha Lewthwaite, the focus of the Carte Blanche documentary, had allegedly resided between 2008 and 2012. The shift of focus to Samantha Lewthwaite began when the Carte Blanche narrator asked these two leading questions: How did Samantha Lewthwaite, a British-born, mother of three and Muslim convert, come to be suspected of leading or, at least, being one of the shooters in the Mall attacks? And what was the 29-year-old doing in South Africa

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between 2008 and 2012 living under the radar …using the name… Natalie Faye Webb; and using false identity documents? (2013b, Part 2, 00:17–36)

In response, the Carte Blanche-anointed terrorism expert expressed his surprise at Lewthwaite’s alleged involvement in the attacks: ‘We did not anticipate or expect this kind of involvement …. But what I do think we take away from this is that al Shabab, seemingly isolated or located in East Africa, has an international network it can rely on’ (interviewed on Carte Blanche, 2013b, Part 2, 2:20–31). What does this tell us about the purpose of the documentary and its method of enquiry? It certainly confirms how easily generalisations are arrived at. The ‘terrorism expert’, who acknowledged that his research does not focus on ‘terrorism’, unhesitatingly suggested that al Shabab enjoyed the benefit of an international network that extended into South Africa. The documentary’s format did not provide an opportunity for him to explain how it was that he arrived at this conclusion. More importantly, it dramatically illustrated how the statements of acknowledged authority create knowledge on security. Utterances like these, by a figure of authority and expertise, are a leading theme in this book, as we shall see. For present purposes, we will continue with a focus on the narrator’s assertion that Lewthwaite, ‘the White Widow’, was ‘suspected of leading or, at least, being one of the shooters’ at the Westgate Mall. We might ask who suspected her of playing this role. An alternative question might be: why was no empirical evidence of her involvement in the siege offered in the programme? The only ‘evidence’ offered was this statement from the narrator: ‘Witnesses claimed that amongst the attackers was a woman who spoke fluent English. In the past week it has been reported that Samantha Lewthwaite, dubbed “the white widow”, is one of the terrorists’ (Carte Blanche, 2013a, Part 1, 05:11–23). But how can we be certain that this English-speaking woman was Lewthwaite? And who confirmed that she was one of the attackers? Even though the documentary claimed that ‘Interpol issued a Red Notice for her arrest’ for being ‘wanted for possession of explosives and conspiracy’, as well as being an ‘alleged member of the Somali Islamic militant group, al Shabab’ (2013b, Part 2, 02:40–55), no substantial evidence of Interpol’s charge was provided—nor, indeed, was anything beyond hearsay provided to support Lewthwaite’s alleged participation in the siege.

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It is plausible that ‘a white woman’ might well have participated in the attacks, but had eyewitnesses actually identified Lewthwaite? On this issue, the narrator produced an ambiguous statement: ‘there [was] no absolute confirmation of Samantha’s involvement in the Mall shooting’ (Carte Blanche, 2013b, Part 2, 2:33–37). In view of this admission, why was it alleged that she was ‘one of the terrorists’? And why did Carte Blanche speculate further around this? One reasonable explanation is that it allowed Carte Blanche (and its supposed ‘expert’) to raise questions about the reliability of South Africa’s support for George W.  Bush’s GWOT, and further, to raise questions about whether the country had become a ‘sanctuary for Islamic terrorists’. The implication was that common sense dictated that South Africa should be a reliable partner in the GWOT, even though (or perhaps because) the country had not formally declared its position. This speculative direction enabled Carte Blanche to suggest that the Department of Home Affairs—the South African governmental department responsible for these matters—did not possess the competence to protect the integrity of the country’s identity documentation. This was important because the passport Lewthwaite is said to have used had allegedly been issued by the South African Department of Home Affairs (Pandor, 2013, press conference, reported by Carte Blanche, 2013b, Part 2) and was said to have been fraudulently obtained. To reinforce this, the Political Studies professor commented: ‘Our [South Africa’s] security is not always as sharp as it should be. Home Affairs, for many, many years were a frontline department in protecting us and it didn’t do the job very well’ (interviewed by Carte Blanche, 2013b, Part 2, 0:57). But how did he arrive at this conclusion? This discussion about South Africa’s role in the GWOT and its failure to protect the validity of its identity documents suggests competing epistemological claims around South Africa’s identity in the world: is South Africa a country integral to the ideological West? If so, then does it follow that South Africa is a reliable partner in the GWOT? The possibility also exists that South Africa is forging a different and independent identity that challenges this dominant narrative of international relations. At least one of these different identities, in South Africa, exhibits an Africanist orientation which is motivated by Black Consciousness (see Vale & Maseko, 1998, p. 281). As will become clear, these competing, sometimes confusing, positions are important in the discussion this book presents.

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After confirming that South Africa was an unreliable partner in the GWOT, Carte Blanche presented the narrative that the country had become a safe haven for ‘terrorists’. It informed its viewers that their terrorism expert (the Political Studies professor) ‘sees South Africa’s diversity as a draw-card for minority groups looking for a safe haven’ (2013b, Part 2, 1:01). In his own words, ‘You’ll find all shades of politics or ideology in different parts of South Africa. And so you can find a community that will harbour you; that will protect you’ (interviewed by Carte Blanche, 2013b, Part 2, 01:03). But was this expert insight based on empirical study or an assumption, or was this an insight imported into the South African security discourse? Investigation of these questions is critical, because the Political Studies professor’s suggestion, that ‘you can find a community that will harbour you; that will protect you’ is closely associated with the concept of a ‘terrorist safe haven’ and of its synonym ‘terrorist sanctuary’, which are pivotal concepts within the ‘terrorism’ discourse. These and other phrases, as Richard Jackson has pointed out, have a genealogy associated with ‘the language and knowledge of Terrorism Studies’ and ‘Western counter-­ insurgency doctrine during the Cold War’ (Jackson, 2006b, no pagination). The field of Terrorism Studies gives anointed ‘experts’ the authority to construct and reinterpret ‘terrorism’ knowledge, despite the criticisms levelled against research within this field. Review exercises that have assessed the quality of ‘terrorism’ knowledge production have concluded that ‘Terrorism Studies’ research is, in general, methodologically and analytically weak (Jackson 2007a). These weaknesses ‘include amongst others: a reliance on poor research methods and procedures, an over-reliance on secondary information and a general failure to undertake primary research’ (p. 244). At this point it is necessary to define and explore the connotations of the term ‘Terrorism Studies’. According to Michael Blain (2005, p. 6), the political concept of ‘terror’ first appeared in English in the 1790s, during the course of the French Revolution (1789–1795). One of the concepts associated with ‘terror’ is the notion ‘Reign of Terror’ which is explained in the Oxford English Dictionary (1801) as: […] a state of things within which the general community live in dread of death or outrage; esp. (with capital initials) French Hist. the period of the First Red Terror, when the ruling faction remorselessly shed the blood of

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persons of both sexes and all ages and conditions whom they regarded as obnoxious. (quoted in Blain, 2005, p. 11)

This makes it plain that during the French Revolution ‘terror’ referred to forms of political violence committed by the ‘ruling faction’ against the ‘general community’: in other words, the state was the perpetrator of terror. While Martha Crenshaw (1981, p.  379) acknowledges that ‘terror’ has been used in the context of protecting state interests, she also asserts that terrorism is a form of violent resistance against the state. However, after conceding that states do commit ‘terror’, Crenshaw’s discussion of why ‘terror’ is perpetrated is limited to terrorism against the state and its interests. This state-centric perspective is a common feature of Terrorism Studies, according to scholars associated with the field of Critical Terrorism Studies (Gunning, 2007; Jackson, 2007a, 2007b; 2009a; Smyth, 2007). Jackson, for example, maintains that those engaged in Terrorism Studies have become state-centric to the point where they refuse to recognise that states can—and do—commit terrorism (Jackson, 2009a, p.  75). State-­ centric bias became hegemonic within the contemporary Terrorism discourse as a result of the persistent influence of the ‘well-established networks’ of terrorism experts and policy-makers on the issue (Jackson, 2007a, pp. 398–9). More revealingly, within this discourse, it has become standard practice by many governments to label opponents of the state as ‘terrorists’. For example, political opponents of British and French colonialism were frequently denounced by successive governments in both London and Paris as ‘terrorists’ (Blain, 2005, p. 13). Similarly, activists during the South African liberation struggle were denounced as ‘terrorists’ by the apartheid regime. Indeed, a vicious piece of security legislation which carried the death penalty was called the ‘Terrorism Act’ (Republic of South Africa, 1967, Terrorism Act 83 of 1967). The invention of the term ‘Global War on Terror’ was another step in the unfolding genealogy of the discourse on ‘terror’ as a social phenomenon. Integral to the fashioning of thought around its GWOT, successive US national administrations have had funds allocated for fighting ‘International Terrorism with Social Science Knowledge’ (Ebner, 2005, in Blain, 2005, p. 17). However, social science researchers who have accessed such funding frequently have ignored the ethical and moral implications of being involved in such research. Blain reports that the leader of one of the research teams, Gary LaFree, said: ‘This might be the social science equivalent of the Manhattan Project.’ And, he continued, ‘Too often,

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policy-makers have had to counter terrorism on the basis of assumptions and guesstimates. Our job will be to give them solid information to work with’ (quoted in Blain, 2005, p. 17). The Manhattan Project was a top-secret undertaking of the US government, which, between 1942 and 1945, aimed to build the first atomic bomb. As the objective of this mission was to make the USA the pre-­ eminent military power, the work on the Manhattan Project was not subjected to Congressional or any other form of oversight (Yang & Oppenheimer, 2007, p. 200). Equating research supportive of the GWOT with the Manhattan Project suggests that knowledge emanating from such research will, of necessity, be uncritical of Western definitions of terrorists or ‘terrorism’ and is likely to condone any military action against those defined as ‘terrorists’. Indeed, according to Jackson (2007a, 2007b, p. 45), since ‘terrorism’ experts and scholars have developed a dependent ideological, financial and political relationship with state institutions, the distinction between the ‘state and academic spheres’ is likely to be obscured. In considering aspects of the genealogy of ‘terrorism’, an aim of this publication is to challenge the assumption that Terrorism Studies is a value-free and objective form of research, and to expose it as a contrived, subjective and ideologically biased field of study. It has already been pointed out how easily ‘expertise’ is accorded public legitimacy, and how readily social science can be co-opted by sponsorship. We now continue with an analysis of the documentary. On the thorny issue of the recruitment of ‘terrorists’, the Carte Blanche documentary included a sequence in which Hillary Clinton, the former US Secretary of State, says: ‘Al Shabab is recruiting young Somalis from South Africa, […] to become suicide bombers’ (Clinton, 2009, insert in Carte Blanche, 2013a, Part 2, 8: 42–49). Although entirely unsubstantiated, this claim is another instance of a Speech-Act which simultaneously constructs and makes security—the utterance makes the act (Wæver, 1995). Following Clinton’s statement, the narrator claimed that the South African Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (known as the Hawks) had confirmed that they had been conducting long-term investigations into al Shabab’s South African activities. In linking the Clinton comment to the alleged Hawks investigation the insert constituted a Speech-Act which did not require additional evidence because Clinton had the political authority to name the organisation and make an unsubstantiated claim about its activities. This is a good example of the type of claim examined

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earlier, that ‘terrorism’ knowledge is state-centric: it is easy to name things when in a position of political authority. However, evidence suggests that it is problematic to accept state-­centric claims at face value. For example, a number of high-profile ‘terrorism’ plots reported in the UK media between 2003 and 2008 were mostly unsubstantiated or were ‘proved false’ (Matthews, 2013, p. 296). In fact, Jamie Matthews suggests that the ‘foiled plots were deliberately misrepresented by [government sources] in an attempt to accentuate the severity of the threat from Islamist terrorists’ (p.  296). Misrepresentations like these have also been used to justify war. Consider this example: in mid-­ November 2002, the British Intelligence Agency, M15, arrested six men, who, it was claimed, planned to attack the London Underground. It was further alleged that they were ‘members of an al Qaida1 network operating in Europe’ (London, Sunday Times, 17 November 2002, quoted in Fekete, 2004, p. 16). At the subsequent trial, no allegations of possession of explosives or chemicals were made, or of plans to make a bomb, since it was shown that ‘the bottles and flasks containing what police claimed were explosives and chemical products, held cologne, olive oil, honey, household ammonia and washing powder’. Accordingly, the trial collapsed and the (then) British Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott ‘admitted that there was no evidence of any plan for a gas bomb attack’. However, despite the legal outcome of their trial, the former US Secretary of State Colin Powell used the arrest of these men as evidence to argue, before the United Nations, that there was a link between ‘Baghdad and bin Laden’ in order to justify the US invasion of Iraq (Fekete, 2004, p. 16). A further theme that ran through the Carte Blanche documentary was that the wider Muslim community posed a threat because they were directly involved in ‘terrorism’, or were potential terrorists or because they protected terrorists. This became particularly evident during Part 2 of the documentary. The Carte Blanche team had established that, while living in Johannesburg, Lewthwaite had rented two houses: one of these was in Randburg; the other was in Mayfair. At the first address, a neighbour said that Lewthwaite had ‘kept to herself’ (2013b Part 2, 3:36). Following up, the interviewer asked: ‘How was she usually dressed’? The neighbour responded: ‘With a Muslim outfit’ (3:40). It was obviously important for Carte Blanche to establish that Lewthwaite was Muslim, as this established the association between  The spelling of al Qaeda changes as different authors have their preference.

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Muslims and ‘terrorism’, and insinuated that South Africa was a sanctuary for ‘terrorists’. In contrast to the circumstances in Randburg, the narrative around Mayfair positioned the local Muslims as collaborators, since (it was suggested) they provided Lewthwaite with protection and sanctuary. However, aside from those who confirmed that she had, indeed, lived in Mayfair, the makers of the documentary struggled to find any local Muslim resident who had interacted with her. Individuals such as the caretaker of the Mayfair mosque as well as residents at the house she allegedly resided at, in Mayfair, were interviewed during the documentary, but these interviewees did not interact with her. This is an indication of the flimsy nature of the evidence against Lewthwaite. Of course, a different intention on the part of the documentary makers might have been to imply that Carte Blanche wanted to show that local Muslims might be protecting one of their own. The continued attempts to find a Muslim who had interacted with Lewthwaite, as well as the inference that Muslims are devious, are forms of racial profiling. The message that the programme was communicating was that if you look like a Muslim and dress like a Muslim, you must be a terrorist—or at least, you must sympathise with terrorists! While interviews were conducted with Muslims, the local mosque in Mayfair, a suburb within the Johannesburg municipality, was used in the documentary as a key landmark. It could reasonably be assumed that the prominence of the mosque was to confirm that Lewthwaite had lived in its vicinity. However, the dominance of the mosque during the interviews with its caretaker, and with a person called Saffiya Surtee raises questions about whether the mosque was used as a symbol of an ideology, as well as a community, which was implicated in ‘terrorism’. It was not a coincidence that the interview with Surtee, given credence by the reference to the University of Johannesburg, was conducted inside the mosque, in contrast to the interview with the other expert, the Political Studies professor, which was conducted in his office. The interview with the second expert did not attempt to ascertain whether or not she was aware of Lewthwaite’s activities; instead, Surtee was presented as a Muslim, and, was, accordingly, expected to either defend or condemn the actions of her fellow South African Muslims. However, when it was suggested that Lewthwaite was a leading figure in the Westgate Mall attack, Surtee challenged that perspective by adopting an explicitly feminist stance in her reply:

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Some of it might be based on a rather sexist or patriarchal view that says she is one of our women and she has now gone over to the other side. And not only that, she has taken on the extreme view from the other side. Much in the same way, when we look at organisations like al Shabab we should ask: why would they allow a woman, for example, to mastermind the attacks when they are largely a patriarchal and male dominated organisation? (Surtee, 2013, interviewed by Carte Blanche, 2013b, Part 2, 5:36–6:03)

While the Surtee challenge suggested that the focus on Lewthwaite was based on a patriarchal view of society, she also signalled that such a focus touched on the fundamental issue of identity. Whilst Surtee was making a specific point about Lewthwaite’s identity—‘one of our women’ who had ‘gone over to the other side’ and had taken on its ‘extreme view’—the interviewee concurrently introduced the issue of South Africa’s identity. This reinforced an earlier point about South Africa’s place in the world: Is South Africa a country of the West or has South Africa gone over to the other side, the side of extremism and ‘terror’? Following Surtee’s rebuttal, the Carte Blanche narrator stated: Samantha [Lewthwaite], the white widow, is not the first suspected international […] terrorist to have South African links. In 2007, we revealed another South African link in the liquid bomb plot of 2006 which threw Heathrow Airport onto high alert, resulting in a ban of passengers bringing liquids onto flights. The plot was foiled and twenty-four suspects were arrested, one of them the seventeen-year-old son of Mohamed Patel, who lived in Brixton, [Johannesburg]. (2013b, Part 2, 7:32–57)

At the presentation of this point as ‘evidence’, Surtee offered an expected response: Of course that is an abominable action; it is an atrocity that was undertaken by people who claim themselves Muslims. I think all Muslims distance themselves, particularly in the South African context, from that kind of behaviour. (Surtee, 2013, interviewed by Carte Blanche, 2013b, Part 2, 7:57–8:11)

Further reflection on the documentary makes it clear that it was based on a ‘truth’ that had been imported into a particular South African political discourse to reinforce the idea that Muslims, or sections of this particular community, were a security threat.

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As we have argued, an issue becomes securitised (Buzan et al., 1998; Wæver, 1995, 2003) when a ‘securitizing agent’ with the appropriate power and authority constructs the nature of the existential threat, within the accepted ‘rules of conduct’ (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 24; Wæver, 1995, p. 55). To summarise the points already made: Hillary Clinton, the former US Secretary of State, declared that: ‘Al Shabab is recruiting young Somalis from South Africa, […] to become suicide bombers’ (Clinton insert, included in Carte Blanche, 2013b). This declaration needed no substantiation since she had the assumed power and authority to state this as ‘fact’. After this, the appropriate securitising agencies, i.e. the media and security ‘experts’, transferred ‘knowledge of the threat’ to relevant audiences. The latter role was played by the Political Studies professor from the University of Witwatersrand. The Carte Blanche documentary is not the only instance of the securitisation of South Africa’s Muslim community. The narrative of the Carte Blanche documentary, while it was historically specific to characters and places, cannot be separated from the wider discourse that has continued to construct Muslims as constituting ‘terrorist’ threats. Instead, ‘experts’ and journalists draw on and repeat one another’s claims and assertions in their construction of this discourse. The 2014 publication Black Widow, White Widow: Is Al-Qaeda operating in South Africa? by De Wet Potgieter, an established investigative journalist with close relationships to apartheid-era police and military intelligence (see South African History Archive 2014, 12 April), continuously reinforces this point. Indeed, his account is a direct reflection of the Carte Blanche narrative of the ‘White Widow’. The pages that follows draw on the ideas presented in this Prolegomenon to investigate how and why the South African media and think-tank ‘experts’ have constructed Muslims as potential terrorists, thus a security threat in South Africa specifically, and Africa in general.

CHAPTER 2

The United States: Pivotal in the Terrorism Debate in Africa

It is no exaggeration to say that Islam is presented by Western media as a threat to their societies and their way of life. This is evident in the targeted practices that place Muslims under increased security surveillance (Spalek & Imtoual, 2007; Spalek & Lambert, 2008). This is Islamophobia and it is characterised by hostile attitudes and practices throughout the world (Bloul, 2008; Hödl, 2010; Kadir, 2006; Larsson, 2005) and the association of ‘terrorism’ and extremism with Islam (Gunarantna, 2004; Nichiporuk, 2003). This chapter sets the scene for a theoretical debate around security and ‘terrorism’ in Africa—a debate which parallels Western ways of thinking about Islam. It is however necessary to begin by situating the United States of America (US) within this debate as the globalisation of the ‘War on Terror’ was initiated there. Equating ‘terrorism’ with Islam clearly became more widespread as a result of the events known as ‘9/11’ (Enders & Sandler, 2005, p. 260). These attacks became the rationale for President George W. Bush’s declaration of a Global War on Terror (GWOT) in which he announced that the US would ‘call together freedom loving people to fight terrorism’ and to conduct a ‘war against terrorism’ (Bush, 2001a). Later, in his 2002 State of the Union Address, he broadened the rationale for and urgency of the GWOT by stating that: ‘Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder … are now spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning’ (Bush, 2002). © The Author(s) 2020 M. N. Hendricks, Manufacturing Terrorism in Africa, Islam and Global Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5626-5_2

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In his declaration of the GWOT, George W. Bush (2001a) constructed ‘terrorism’ as a threat that needed to be resisted, urgently. Bush also equated ‘terrorism’ with Islam within these remarks: ‘This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while’ (Bush, 2001a). By introducing the image of the crusade—with its genealogy associated with the military expeditions undertaken by European Christians to ‘recover’ the ‘Holy Lands’ (Barin, 2010, p. 10) from Muslims, the first being in 1099—Bush equated his GWOT with a crusade against Islam. Faliz Barin narrates (2010, p. 37) that: In the Middle Ages, the Crusades largely determined the perception of Muslim Turks for the West. […] in 1095, Pope Urban II launched a military campaign to push back Turkish forces from … [Christian] Holy Lands, which had been taken by the Muslims. As a result of this bellicose encounter of Muslims and Christians in the First Crusade of 1099, the Turks became to be stereotyped as ‘immoral barbarians’.

In Bush’s associating of ‘terrorism’ with Islam it was not unexpected that mainstream Western representations of Muslims, particularly after the 9/11 attacks, depicted them as ‘barbaric people’ (Kadir, 2006, p. 315); as the threatening ‘Other’ (Muscati, 2003); and as a people who were involved in ‘an all-out war against the West’ (Sikand, 2005, p. 135). These representations were reinforced in a declaration by Tony Blair, the then British Prime Minister, that the peril of Islamic militancy needed to be resisted since it ‘is wrong in its methods, it’s wrong in its ideas, it’s wrong in its ideology, it’s wrong in every wretched reactionary thing about it’ (quoted in the New York Times, 29 July 2006). Similarly, the statement by Willy Claes, then the General Secretary of NATO, that ‘Islamic militancy had emerged as perhaps the single gravest threat to the alliance [North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)] and Western security’ (Noorani, 2000, p. 4, quoting Claes) and the description of Islam, by Neil Boortz, an American syndicated radio host with an audiences of over 3.75 million listeners, as ‘a deadly virus that is spreading throughout Europe and the West’ (Boortz, 2006, quoted in Steuter & Wills, 2008, p. xii) advocate and reinforce the idea that Islam is a threat.

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Construction of Muslims as Security Threats Claims which construct Muslims as security threats are not without intellectual foundation in Western political thinking. Indeed, the association of Islam with inherent violence and danger is frequently based on Samuel P.  Huntington’s (1993, 1996) thesis of a ‘Clash of Civilizations’. Here Huntington argued that ideology per se is likely to be less significant in future world conflicts. Instead, he suggested that differences in culture will drive global conflict: ‘The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics [and the] fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future’ (Huntington, 1993, p. 22). Huntington’s argument portrays the values of Islam as hostile to those of liberal Western civilisation and that Islamic extremism would become the greatest threat to world peace. Many critical observers predicted that this would happen because of the Western construction of the exotic and the Oriental ‘Other’. Huntington’s argument can thus be viewed as the continuation of a historical process defined as ‘Orientalism’. In his seminal book, Orientalism, Edward Said (1979) speculated that the West (especially Britain and France, and later the US), through its colonial and imperial projects, constructed an image of the Orient as different and as its opposite—its ‘Other’. This construction became the basis and rationale for colonial oppression in places such as Africa and the Middle East, in particular. Through the lens of Orientalism, the ‘East’ is constructed as the negative opposite of the ‘West’: accordingly, a rational, progressive and civilised West constructs its opposite as superstitious, backward and barbaric (Steuter & Wills, 2008, p. 24). Said’s theorisation provides substance to an assertion that Huntington’s (1993, 1996) argument is a continuation of the Western imperialist project: Orientalism, according to Said (1979), is a discourse that creates and subordinates the Orient as inferior, while simultaneously confirming the supremacy of the West (Koddenbrock, 2015, p. 248).

Huntington’s Theories in South Africa Eleven years after Huntington (1993) published this thesis; his arguments were reawakened and imported into African and South African security discourse. Steven Morrison and Princeton N.  Lyman, the former US Ambassador to South Africa, claimed that South Africa was threatened by a ‘rising Islamist extremism’ (Lyman & Morrison, 2004, p. 82). Another

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so-called ‘terrorism’ analyst with links to the US intelligence community, Josh Lefkowitz (2004, no pagination), the Co-founder and Chief Executive Officer of Flashpoint—an organisation that provides intelligence-­ related information on security and ‘terrorist’ groups—alleged that South Africa was ‘a key node in the War on Terror’ because ‘radical Islam has … a foothold in South Africa’, and that South African Muslims, with links to al Qaeda, were plotting ‘to attack a number of targets in South Africa’. A researcher who focuses on security, Anneli Botha of the South African-based Institute for Security Studies (ISS), suggested that the threat of Islamic ‘terrorism’ in South Africa is ‘surprisingly real’ because ‘there are a number of indigenous [South African] Islamic networks that have the potential to engage in serious acts of terrorism, either on their own or in conjunction with international terrorists’ (2005, no pagination). Later, Hussein Solomon, while he was still at the University of Pretoria, suggested in a newspaper article that South Africa had become a place of choice to ‘train and support international terror’ (Solomon, Sunday Times, March 23, 2008a). These are a few of the voices of ‘expertise’ and ‘authority’ that shaped the debate which linked Islam and ‘terrorism’ in South Africa. To understand why this is important, it is necessary to explore what it means to be an expert.

Defining and Discussing the Concept of Expert Knowledge People who have acquired specialised skills and knowledge relevant to a particular academic discipline, occupation, policy or subject area, take on the authority of ‘expert’, especially if relied upon for their mastery on a specific topic. Experts, accordingly, ‘constitute an authoritative minority’ who, as the result of their focussed formative education and experience, have, in general, superior insight into a topic ‘than those of the public at large’ (Nichols, 2017, p. 64). Since experts have acquired specialisation, they are usually seen as purveyors of credentialed knowledge. However, this does not suggest that experts ‘know everything’ or that they are ‘always right’ (Nichols, 2017, p. 64). So, it is necessary to examine the extent to which their pronouncements can be regarded as legitimate, or how their command of knowledge becomes regarded as expertise.

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In earlier times, an expert was seen as someone who possessed ‘all knowledge’, including specific technical skills relevant to a specialised area, which they applied in an ‘unbiased’ manner (Blok, Jensen, & Kaltoft, 2008, p.  204). It was assumed that advice provided by experts was technical and value-neutral. From this perspective, experts were trusted to provide advice and guidance to governments, and to educate the public in their respective fields. Proponents of the idea that policy-makers should draw on the authority of experts warn that it would be improper for policy-makers to ignore the expertise on offer, since contemporary social policies, in most instances, involve techno-scientific dimensions which is imparted by the experts (Limoges, 1993, p. 417). Predictably, then, in environments characterised by social and political uncertainty, policy-makers increasingly require expert advice in their formulation of policies. However, this common perception that expert knowledge contributes to the improvement of public policy is challenged by Boswell (2009) who argues that policy-makers utilise expert knowledge, either to give credence to their arguments or to indicate their competence in arriving at sound decisions. From this we can infer that policy-makers can use expert knowledge to further their personal political agendas. Apart from the technical nature of policy options, many maintain that experts are essential in the process of strengthening democratic governance by: • acting as an alternative, authoritative source of truth; • clarifying technical issues related to a debate—this includes framing the nature of the debate and explaining the implications of different policy options, as well as ascertaining and making known findings relating to policy issues. In doing this, experts empower both ‘legislators and the general public to engage effectively in democratic decision-making’ (Schudson, 2006, p. 500); and • being able to ‘diagnose opportunity and diagnose injustice’ as these relate to questions of policy (p. 500). Despite the fact that the demand for expertise increased exponentially, the nature of expertise is hotly contested. In 1927, the American philosopher John Dewey warned that experts ultimately promote their private interests rather than those of the public (cited in Schudson, 2006, p. 491). Some social critics insist that providing experts with political authority is

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fundamentally undemocratic, because the knowledge they produce is used to ‘exercise power over others’ (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2001, p. 73, emphasis in original). Experts also establish the public agenda and decide which voices to include or exclude, since they occupy positions of authority in the knowledge production process (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2001, p. 71). When they use their expertise to influence public debate and/or set the public agenda, they effectively subvert democracy. These views suggest that the idea ‘expertise’ needs to be questioned, not only for its undue influence on political decision-making, but also for its tendency to introduce ‘biased and incorrect propositions into the political arena’ (Schröder, 2006, p. 471). Consider the following example: in 2003, the government of the United Kingdom decided to participate in the war against Iraq because of erroneous expert testimony which maintained that ‘Iraq could launch chemical or biological weapons within forty-five minutes of an order to do so’ (Schröder, 2006, p. 476). Another criticism of experts is that they distort reality by distancing themselves from those who ‘experience [this reality] through their own lived, subjectivity’ (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2001, p.  74). Furthermore, since experts are entrusted to adjudicate and legitimate dominant forms of knowledge, other forms of knowledges are frequently subjugated. It is often—quite erroneously—assumed that expert knowledge is always superior to local knowledge. Yet, Yearley (2000, p.  105) found that where expert knowledge conflicted with that of local people, the former was routinely defective due to its insensitivity to local realities. Constructivist thinkers have challenged the notion of expert knowledge at a more fundamental level. While they do not deny the reality of the material world, they argue that inter-subjective conditions such as shared knowledge, norms and identities influence how the reality of the social and material world is conceived. For them, power is a critical capability for constructing knowledge, since power is the authority to legitimate what constitutes valid knowledge (Frederking, 2000, p. 11). Accordingly, constructivists maintain that all knowledge is value-laden and is always historically and culturally situated (Ogbor, 2000, p.  605). This implies that different social, historical and cultural contexts ‘facilitate and/or undermine the expression of expertise’ (Kerr, Cunningham-Burley, & Tutton, 2007, p. 387). This means that expert knowledge is itself always historically and contextually situated (Schudson, 2006, p. 494). Theorists drawing on Michel Foucault’s (1980) ‘knowledge/power’ inter-relationship have also critiqued expert knowledge for its role in

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legitimising and reinforcing dominant societal ideologies (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2001; Schudson, 2006). Here, the starting point is that knowledge and power cannot be separated because these are both inextricably intertwined and interdependent (Schudson, 2006, p.  493). Because of this interlocking relationship, Foucault (1980) problematised the notion of truth as value-laden, since it is: a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraints. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is the types of discourse which it accepts and makes to function as true; […]; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. (Foucault 1980, p. 131)

A consequence of Foucault’s problematisation of truth was the insight that the knowledge/power inter-relationship creates particular kinds of subjects that are silenced through regimes of truth which act as constraints on the definitions of knowledge (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2001, p.  72). Another insight to be drawn from Foucault’s thinking relates to the idea that experts are privileged within discourses which give them the status and authority to make ‘truth claims’ (Foucault, 1980, p. 131). This is not to deny that in some contexts the experts, as scientists, may have a stronger claim to truth than the knowledge of those who claim ‘common-sense’ as the basis for their knowledge. The underlying question is this: ‘Under what conditions can or does expertise become untrustworthy?’ Recognising that knowledge claims are often contested and to guard against incorrect propositions that may arise due to ideological or ‘confirmation bias’, scientists and researchers within the academy usually first ensure that their findings are sufficiently robust, after which they subject these findings to qualified peer-review (Nichols, 2017, p. 66). However, as Tom Nichols (p. 66) warns, such a system is generally absent ‘outside the academy’, and accordingly, propositions advanced by experts, in such contexts, are usually not subjected to external review or any other form of accountability.

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Applying the Discussion of Expertise to the South African Situation The foregoing discussion of experts and expertise is important to a publication which attempts to ascertain how expert knowledge, which securitises Muslims and Islam in Africa, is constructed and disseminated to policy-makers and to the public. Securitisation, which is defined as the process of constructing an issue as a security threat, is examined in detail in the chapter that follows. This book, specifically, explores how experts frame the ‘terrorism’ debate; whether they provide a range of policy options; and which voices they legitimise and which they silence. More importantly, are the propositions advanced by terrorism experts in Africa subjected to external review and are these sufficiently robust? In examining the proposition made by analysts and experts that Islam and Muslims are a threat in Africa, it is necessary to begin by questioning their justification for this statement, and by interrogating accepted interpretations of security and how they occur in everyday discourse. The persistent representation of Islam as a security threat in Africa, despite the absence of a systematic empirical study, prompts the question: Why and how are Islam and Muslims securitised—constructed as a security threat? This book’s goal is to draw on securitisation theory to investigate the extent to which Islam has been constructed as a threat to South African society, by analysing its representations. In particular, it aims to: • determine if portrayals of Muslims in South Africa are being securitised in popular media representations; and • determine whether South African security think-tanks and ‘experts’ facilitate the securitisation of Muslims. Accordingly, this publication is interested in asking the following questions: • Does the association of Muslims and Islam with ‘terrorism’ result in the wider Muslim community being perceived as an enemy that must be defeated in the Global War on Terror? • How much do certain ‘experts’ know about Islam and the Muslim community in South Africa?

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This book aims to show that a construction of the ‘Other’ as a security threat is a poor guide to policy, as it allows for partisan interests to dominate political debate and vilifies groups of people. Furthermore, the book aims to explore the significance of the above issues in the South African context: to provide evidence that the security concerns are based within a binary rationale that constructs a model of the world which is uncritically imported (totally) from the Global North into South African security discourse. Through this binary, Muslims are conceived as the ‘Other’—and presented as destructive, as a threat, as an insidious danger and as a purveyor of ‘terrorism’. It is the hope of this work that all members of society can be encouraged to question the dominant narratives that shape their consciousness and to ask why Muslims have been identified as the enemy in the ‘Global War on Terror’.

Methodological Framework Methodologically, this publication draws on Critical Theory (CT). As a theory, CT promotes knowledge that contributes to the improvement of the human condition and recognises that theory is shaped by human beings. It is for this reason that the founding theorists associated with CT emphasised that human knowledge is socially, culturally and politically constituted as it is influenced and shaped by human interests (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 200). This insight suggests that knowledge is not simply natural and/or uncontested. Instead, it is created by human activity and reflects the social interests of its creators. And, as humans experience the world in multiple ways, they are affected and influenced, thus shaped differently. Consequently, due to the power differentials in society, hegemonic knowledge, generally, reflects understandings of those who are dominant, whereas alternative interpretations represent counter-hegemonic perspectives that are subjugated. For Adorno (1981, p. 126), hegemonic knowledge is ideological in that it presents itself as neutral and objectively true—with an ‘overbearing matter-of-factness’—nominally unaffected by social interest. This type of theory is frequently associated with critiquing strategies employed by social elites to maintain their hegemony over the process of defining ‘legitimate’ knowledge. Since elite social groups might construct knowledge in their interests, this publication critiques the knowledge/ power nexus as this relates to the construction of the identity of Muslims and Islam in South Africa. Accordingly, this book systematically examines

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and interrogates perspectives about Muslims and Islam as these relate to the security problematique that are presented by the social and political elite as self-evident. As proposed, this publication has utilised CT as the theoretical lens through which to describe, interpret and assess Why and how Islam and Muslims have been securitised in South Africa? The application of CT has made it possible to identify tensions and contradictions inherent in the process of securitisation of Islam and Muslims in South Africa, and to discover the interests and agendas of groups involved in promoting the perception that Islam and Muslims pose a security threat. The relationship between Critical Security Studies and Critical Theory will be discussed now.

Critical Security Studies Embedded in the post-positivist ontology of critical constructivism, Critical Security Studies (CSS) maintains that theory and practice are inseparable. In theorising an issue, the theorist is not observing the world objectively, but draws on existing cultural knowledge and is located within a specific context ‘responding to a set of historically specific circumstances’ (Fierke, 2010, no pagination). Thus, CSS holds that the construction of a ‘threat’ is a political act that is influenced by history, culture, communication, ideology and perceived power. Security, within CSS, is thus conceived of as value-laden and political. Recognising the political implications of threat construction, CSS sets out to make explicit the assumptions of traditional Realist security studies in order to make the field more transparent to ‘greater theoretical scrutiny and debate’ (C.A.S.E.  Collective, 2006, p. 448). Accordingly, it primarily critiques political Realism’s epistemological, ontological and normative assumptions that the state is the main object of security and that war is the main threat to it (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p. 4). CSS is guided by both the politics and the ethics of security. The politics of security is concerned with how threats are represented. Accepting that threats to security are socially produced, CSS maintains that security threats are constructed through political processes and actors. For example, the USA’s representations of threat in the context of the Global War on Terror facilitated its ‘expeditionary military intervention, violation of

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civil liberties and the suspension of obligations to enemy combatants’ (Browning & McDonald, 2011, p. 240, citing Jackson, 2005). The critical literature recognises that the nature and emergence of socio-political processes significantly influence and structure political questions and institutions in society. The guiding research question for the critical scholar in the field of security is thus: ‘How, from a welter of information and interaction passing among states and their representatives, are threats constructed and mobilized against?’ (Krause, 1998, p. 307). This understanding challenges the critical analyst to ask the following question: Given the multiplicity of threats, why are specific issues/phenomena constructed as ‘threats’, ‘crises’, ‘problems’ or ‘risks’, and others are not? The ethics of security is concerned with ‘the meaning of progress regarding security’ (Browning & McDonald, 2011, p. 244). As we have noted, the Welsh School’s approach to security is committed to emancipation, which is contrary to traditional approaches to security that privileged states and their preservation, instead of individual and/or social groups. Emancipation is understood as ‘the securing of people from those oppressions that stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do, compatible with the freedom of others’ (Booth, 2007, p. 112). However, human emancipation is understood to be broader than the liberation of individuals and groups from military threats; instead, emancipation applied equally to non-military threats which limit the freedom of individuals. These might include environmental threats, xenophobia, poverty and state-based oppression. With regard to the relationship between CT and CSS, there are multiple ways by which security becomes ‘critical’. Despite the variety of critical approaches to conceptualising and practising security, critical analysts agree that, at a fundamental level, security does not have a stable and/or finite meaning. What binds the critical approaches is the fact that, contrary to a traditional view of security within which its meaning is accepted as apolitical and static, ‘critical theory takes the question of change as its foundation, in both an explanatory and evaluative sense’ (Krause & Williams, 1997, p. xii).

Data Collection Two primary research sites were selected for collecting data that gave insights into the processes relating to how and why Islam and Muslims are securitised in Africa and South Africa. As we have already noted, these sites

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were South African-based think-tanks and South African newspapers. Think-tanks and newspapers, as sites of data collection, were informed by their importance as ‘members’ who collectively constituted what this publication—from other work—calls an ‘invisible security college’. This club of experts acted as an epistemic community that promoted specific kinds of ideological knowledge through activities that connected academia with military, intelligence and government agencies such as security agencies and media (see Miller & Mills, 2009). Before commencing with a discussion of the data collection process, a few preliminary comments are necessary. The problematique of Muslims as a security threat is situated in a constructed reality that had many contributory factors, such as political, academic and popular texts, which included television news and documentaries, films, political speeches, research reports and newspaper articles. However, for reasons associated with accessibility and practicability, data gathering was limited to newspapers and security think-tanks. Data gathering at the above sites was guided by these questions: • How have South African security think-tanks/experts and newspapers covered and represented Islam and Muslims? • What are the predominant discourses about Islam and Muslims that have been constructed? South African Think-Tanks The first site for data collection was South African-based security think-­ tanks. Chapter 4 examines how security think-tanks present themselves as institutions that perform a role in identifying current and future security ‘threats’. It also examines their claims that they are uniquely qualified to describe the nature of the threat, and capable of advising on how they can be neutralised. Because of these ‘strategic’ functions and their ‘expertise’, think-tanks advocate and promote their opinions among media, politicians and members of the security and intelligence communities. The print media also frequently draw on their apparent expertise as a source for newspaper articles on security matters. Such collaborations between the media and think-tanks ensure that their perceptions are widely circulated. Theoretically, this publication, contrary to the original architects of securitisation theory, includes think-tanks and terrorism experts as securitising actors, instead of limiting Speech-Acts to state actors. In this sense,

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by examining the behaviour of think-tanks, the power-practices of research institutes which are often regarded as neutral observers are exposed as active constructors of security knowledge. The literature that focuses on epistemic communities is used as a lens to examine and critique how security think-tanks facilitate the securitisation of Muslims and Islam in Africa and South Africa. Specifically, Chap. 5 exposes how non-state actors— think-tanks—participate in multiple political acts that construct South African Muslims as a threat, a source of terror and participants in global terror networks. Chapter 5 also reveals and analyses the actual dynamics— the political and contextual conditions, the processes, and goals—of the securitisation moves made by think-tanks. Such critical reflexive practices result in the sharpening of our understanding of how think-tanks construct security knowledge and how such knowledge is underpinned by unequal power relations. Selecting the Think-Tanks South Africa is home to a number of security think-tanks. However, very few of these research institutes have consistently focused on the issue of terrorism. For purposes of this study, four security think-tanks have been selected. An essential criterion for selecting a security research institute for this inquiry was that the think-tank, on continuous and consistent basis, commented on the terrorism problematique in South Africa and Africa. So, the selected think-tanks have developed a dominant public profile because their staff members were frequently quoted and/or interviewed in the print and electronic media on matters related to terrorism. Or they have published in academic and popular journals on the topic Terrorism. They are the South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA); the Institute for Security Studies (ISS); the Centre for International Policy Studies (CiPS) and the Brenthurst Foundation. Chapter 2 provides a more detailed historic and evolutionary account of the selected think-tanks in order to provide a deeper sense of their epistemic origins and contributions to South African security knowledge. Popular, as well as scholarly, publications by these think-tanks were used as key texts for the analysis. This suggests that Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is part of the research methodology (van Dijk, 1993). Accordingly, approximately sixty texts were selected that focused on Islam and Muslims, produced by the identified think-tanks and/or their staff members. Most of these texts were gathered by searching the Internet

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websites hosted by them, using the keywords ‘terrorism’; ‘Islamic fundamentalist’; ‘jihad’; ‘Muslim extremists’ and ‘Muslim fundamentalist’. Articles selected through the website searches were primarily authored by Hussein Solomon, Greg Mills, Anneli Botha and Kurt Shillinger. These names prompted a Google search within which the same keywords were used in combination with the identified authors. This process was continued until the names of all these authors were exhausted in the search. The Google search led to different sites and the name ‘Hussein Solomon’ led to the website of the Israeli-based think-tank Research on Islam and Muslims in Africa (RIMA). Since Hussein Solomon was identified as an associate of RIMA, which describes him as ‘an expert on Islamic terrorism’ located in Africa (http://muslimsinafrica.wordpress.com/2013/o2/19/ professor-hussein-solomon/); RIMA’s website was also searched for articles published by him. The RIMA website also advertised Hussein Solomon’s book Jihad: A South African Perspective (2013c), which was then included as part of the textual data for this inquiry. The original plan was to analyse four to ten articles per selected think-­ tank. However, as the data-gathering process advanced, it became evident that specific researchers and analysts within each think-tank focused on matters pertaining to Muslims, Islam and terrorism. In order to gain insight into how the selected authors arrived at their conclusions about the relationship between Islam, Muslims and terrorism, the researcher intended to interview them. However, attempts to secure interviews with these authors were successful only with Hussein Solomon and Anneli Botha: an email request sent to Greg Mills via the Brenthurst Foundation’s website received an automatic acknowledgement but the target failed to respond to the request for an interview. A month later an email was sent to his personal email address, which again failed to elicit a response. An attempt was made to contact Kurt Shillinger via a SAIIA email address, but the reply from SAIIA indicated that Shillinger had left their employ and that they did not have a forwarding address for him. The interviews with Botha and Solomon were guided by the following themes: • their perspectives on the security threat posed by Islam and Muslims; • the nature and sources of evidence that informed these understandings; • their formal qualifications for conducting research on security-­ related issues; • their language competence in Arabic;

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• the extent of their collaboration and/or networking with other South African-based security think-tanks; and • the extent of their collaboration with international security experts, networks and think-tanks. A further issue that this inquiry has raised is that of donor funding. South African security think-tanks receive donor funding both from local and foreign sources. This is important because the scholarly literature suggests that funders often set the ideological and political agendas pursued by think-tanks, especially when the existence of think-tanks is threatened (Abelson, 2000; Hearn, 2007; Stone, 2007). Moreover, funders utilise think-tanks to ‘achieve indirect societal impact on public opinion and policy agendas’ (Stone, 2007, p. 344). It seems logical then that think-tanks might be disinclined to criticise the policies of those providing them with support. The annual reports of the four organisations, which were available on their websites, were used to gather information on their funders and their research. Hussein Solomon and Anneli Botha were also asked, during their interviews, who funded their institutions and their research on Muslims and terrorism. The section that follows discusses the data collection conducted at the second research site: South African newspapers. South African Newspapers’ Representations of Islam and Muslims The media, as a societal institution, reports on and informs society about everyday issues so that citizens may be empowered to participate meaningfully in affairs affecting them. However, what the media focus on, and the way information about an event is conveyed, is not ideologically neutral. Strategically situated as a site of authority and power—to control the access, ordering and ranking of news—the media not only transfers information and ideas but also has the potential to shape societal opinions and particular versions of reality (Gurevitch, Bennett, Curran, & Woolacott, 1995; see also Herman & Chomsky, 2002). Newspapers are uniquely placed to inform society and to mould public opinion and perception about everyday issues. This includes promoting specific ideological and/or political interests, especially when they are controlled by agencies with special interests. Indeed, in an overview study of the American press, Irwin (1911, cited in Sproule, 1987, p. 61) concluded

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that the press suppresses or alters news to favour their benefactors such as advertisers; that it receives bribes from large corporations; and that its ‘publishers and editors’ share the ‘attitudes’ of those with whom they socialise. This conclusion was challenged by some media scholars who found that journalists did strive to report news objectively (Luther & Miller, 2005). However, some researchers conceded that the way journalists frame issues often reflects societal power relations. Despite attempts by journalists to report news objectively, research has established that their approaches are often ‘influenced by the frames sponsored by multiple social actors, including corporate and political elites, advocates and social movements’ (Luther & Miller 2005, p.  76). However, since the political and economic elites have greater capacity for successful sponsorship, the ‘news media [were] inclined to reflect corporate and governmental interests’ and mirror the needs of the political and economic elites (p. 76). From this it can be concluded that the independence of news media is questionable and that they might promote elite interests. But do the media have the capacity to influence their audience’s perceptions of the news? Scholars agree that while the news media’s ability to constantly determine how people think about an issue might be limited, they do set the agenda for what issues people should think and talk about (Chari, 2010, p. 335). This perspective is consistent with McCombs and Shaw’s ‘agenda-setting’ theory (1972), which concluded that there was a significant relationship between the prominence given to an issue by the media and the importance the media audience ascribed to it. In the context of how and why Muslims are securitised, it will become evident that the media have ensured that associating Islam with terrorism is a topic that South African audiences think about and discuss. However, the media is doing more than this: it also has the capacity to influence how people think about an event or object (Vu, Guo, & McCombs, 2014), a process known to media scholars as second-level ‘agenda-setting’. Theoretically, this proposes that when the media cover an event, public opinion about it is dependent on ‘the type of coverage the news gives to […] specific attributes’ (Rill & Davis 2008, p. 611). Thus, whether the media coverage has a positive, negative or neutral tone towards an event, it can influence how the public feels about the issues covered (p. 611). In exploring how Islam and Muslims are securitised through the media, we examine whether attributes used in the coverage are done in positive, negative or neutral tones.

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Rill and Davis (2008) also suggest that media framing provides an insight into second-level ‘agenda setting’. As a strategy, media framing privileges particular versions of reality while ignoring others. Entman (1993, p. 52) points out that media framing, which is an acknowledged form of bias, is the selection of a perceived reality that is given more prominence in a ‘communication text’. So, framing is a form of persuasion brought about through the strategic presentation and organisation of ‘issues, events and news objects’ (Chari, 2010, p. 335). Framing is exercised when the news media provide ‘a field of meaning within which [events and activities] are [to be] understood’ (Severin & Tankard, 1992, p. 209). For example, the media’s prioritising of certain interpretations of an issue while ignoring others is a form of framing which can develop into the construction of specific ideological orientations in society. Framing is thus a strategy and technique to invent specific realities. Noam Chomsky (1989) and Herman and Chomsky (2002) have documented how the public media within democracies have manufactured public opinion and consent through the use of strategies such as agenda-setting, second-level agenda-setting and framing. Since the media are powerful instruments of discourse construction, this inquiry examines and analyses the social depiction within selected public South African newspapers of Muslims, Islam and political violence. The analysis also focuses on how, whenever the mainstream media cover political violence, they draw on the views of terrorism experts. The influence of these experts has become pervasive across the globe since the events of 9/11. As in the case of think-tanks, the South African press is theorised as an actor capable of making securitising moves. Chapter 4 explores the securitising moves of the local press and concludes that South African media transfers, imports and replicates US and western European security discourses which associate Muslims and terrorism. This, the media facilitates by associating Islam with inherent violence and danger while the West is constructed as inherently virtuous. But, the binary which the South African media has constructed as a heuristic device to explain the relationship between Islam and the West is politically and historically invested: its intellectual foundation is to be found within Western political thinking and has infamously been articulated by Samuel P.  Huntington’s (1993, 1996) thesis as a ‘Clash of Civilizations’. This chapter, earlier, examined and critiqued the political implications of the Huntington argument for security knowledge. This conversation, supported by evidence that the South African press uses the Huntington’s Thesis (1996) in the local context, is taken forward in Chap. 6.

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Accessing Newspaper Data To gather newspaper data, the researcher used the SA Media database, which is hosted and maintained by the South African University of the Free State, to search for articles that associate Islam and Muslims with a security threat. Using the keywords Islam, Islamic terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic extremism, the SA Media database generated a number of relevant newspaper articles. The database host was also requested to forward any additional articles that were relevant. The selected articles were restricted to the period September 2001 to April 2014. Selection of the articles was based on their relevance to the inquiry. Qualitative Interviews The interviews for this study were conducted in the form of informal rather than highly structured conversations as this allowed for the development of relationships with the interviewee. This approach facilitated a conducive atmosphere for discussing the sensitive topic of why Islam and Muslims are being securitised in South Africa, and it also gave insights into how the respondents interpreted their relational worlds. The interviews were used to support and/or provide additional perspectives to the existing data; to provide contextual data; and/or to allow a respondent to explain a specific issue raised in the data. To this end, security ‘experts’ were interviewed to gain insight into their contextual worlds, to understand what motivates them to act as security analysts, to gain an insight into their formative qualifications and networks and to identify whether their views were sought by South African security agencies. (See Appendix 1: Interview Schedule.) One of the interviews was conducted with the former South African Minister of Intelligence, Ronnie Kasrils, to allow him to respond to the assertion that South African security bureaucrats have ignored Muslim-­ inspired terrorism. In addition, this interview sought his perspective on the ideological independence of South African security think-tanks in terms of their analysis and assessment of the security threat faced by South Africa, as this was relevant to contemporary perceptions about terrorism. This included his perspective on the view expressed by some security think-tanks that South Africa should become a more reliable partner to the West. Furthermore, this interview elicited his assessment on whether or not the representation of Muslims and Islam as a security threat in

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South Africa could be justified. (See Appendix 2 for Interview schedule with Ronnie Kasrils.) All the interviews were recorded using an MP3 player and transcribed in full. While pseudonyms could have been used to ensure the anonymity of interviewees, in consultation with the key interviewees, it was decided to use their actual names. Kasrils agreed to this as the issues that prompted the interviews were already in the public domain. In the case of Hussein Solomon and Anneli Botha, we mutually agreed that their names would be used in the study as it discussed and analysed their publicly available articles. They had no objections to their names being attached to the views they expressed during the interviews.

Data Analysis: Representations of Islam and Muslims in South Africa As stated, Securitisation Theory and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (van Dijk, 1993) have been used to gain insights into whether and, if so, how Islam and Muslims are constructed as a threat by the dominant print media and security think-tanks. Whilst securitisation theory provides the analytical framework for data analysis, CDA is used to gain deeper insights into the texts that were analysed. Critical Discourse Analysis Within social and cultural research, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is concerned with how meaning is constructed through language. Within discourse theory, language is not seen simply as a means of reflecting or describing the world; instead, it is conceptualised as a productive tool that constitutes experiences rather than being ‘representational or reflective’ (Tonkiss, 2004, p.  373). In other words, language is not regarded as a reflection ‘of intrinsic and defining features of entities; instead, [language] bring[s] into being the objects it describes’ (Willig, 1999, p.  2), which constitutes and is constituted by discourse. Accordingly, language constructs how reality is experienced and perceived. The selection of words or expressions to explain perceptions and experiences are not necessarily arbitrary; on the contrary, such selections construct particular interpretations of reality. So,

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The aim [of CDA] is to uncover how different agents frame arguments, the processes by which arguments are contested in public space (e.g. media) and ways in which this contributes to social shaping of reality. Thus […] the main concern is analysing how issues become socially manufactured, and this benefits from an analysis of the language used in different framings of the matters at stake. (p. 2)

For this reason, CDA was an appropriate means for unlocking the different conceptions of reality with regard to the securitisation of Islam and Muslims. CDA is a systematic approach that describes and critiques specific processes by which the print media discourse and the security think-­ tank discourse construct and represent Muslims and Islam in South Africa. The strength of CDA is that it focuses on obscure as well as obvious ‘structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language’ (Wodak, 1995, p. 204). CDA is concerned with both formal (phonological and syntactic) aspects of language use as well as with the social action that results from it. This book has employed CDA in a limited fashion, since its primary interest lies in the social action achieved by language users, which is situated culturally and socially. Using discourse analysis as a foundation, the primary concern of CDA research is to develop an awareness and understanding of how text and talk, in social and political contexts, employ strategies to achieve, reproduce and resist social power, abuse, dominance and inequality. Consistent with its Critical Theory orientation, CDA recognises that knowledge is not value-free; accordingly, critical discourse analysts maintain that their explicit research aims are to ‘understand, expose and ultimately resist [social] inequality’ (van Dijk, 2001, p. 352). A critical analysis of selected media was therefore conducted to examine the main frames used by the media in their representation of Islam and Muslims after September 11, 2001. Each document (newspaper article, academic article, research report) was read at least three times. The purpose of the first reading was to classify the documents into the following predetermined thematic frames: the portrayal of Islam and/or Muslims as hostile and aggressive; the equating of Islam and/or Muslims with global terrorism; the supposed threat that Islam poses to South African cultures and values; the perception that Western political action is benevolent, whereas Islamic political action is malevolent; and lastly, the belief that Muslims are by nature fanatical, unreasonable and extremist.

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During the second reading, the focus was on key phrases, words, sentences and discursive techniques that illustrated the six thematic frames identified above. After this reading, the documents that best illustrated the selected frames were chosen for intensive analysis. Accordingly, the third and subsequent readings of the document involved systematic and critical analysis. Guidance was obtained from Jackson (2007b, p.  396), who advised that representative texts be examined, firstly, for the ‘labels, assumptions, narratives, predicates, metaphors, inferences, and argument they deployed’ and, secondly, for how these are consistent with ‘existing [hegemonic] cultural-political narratives’. This analysis resulted in a number of findings. During the next reading, these initial findings were subjected to an ideological critique in order to expose the discourse’s ‘internal contradiction, mistakes and misconceptions’ (Jackson, 2007b, p.  397). This critique countered dominant interpretations and exposed perspectives on which the discourse was silent. The six thematic frames became the conceptual aids that assisted in the analysis of whether Islam and Muslims are being securitised. Accordingly, these frames became pivotal in the further analysis. The data collected through the identified sites focused on those who constructed the security threats and those who circulated these views as common sense. It therefore provides insight into how and why Muslims and Islam have been securitised. Both Afrikaans and English newspapers were selected to gather data for this study. The author of this publication translated the Afrikaans newspaper articles into English, assuming that not all readers will understand Afrikaans. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 discuss and analyses the findings from this data.

Topic Selection and Biographical Context I was first drawn to the topic of this publication after stumbling upon a research report, Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources and Strategies, authored by Cheryl Benard (2003). In this report Benard (2003, p. ix) stated that the conflict internal to Islam has severe ‘costs and economic, social, political, and security implications for the rest of the world’. As a consequence of this internal Islamic conflict, the author continued, the West is exploring ways of ‘influence[ing] the outcome of this struggle’.

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In reflecting on the report, I realised that its purpose was not to disseminate research findings or new knowledge, but to re-engineer an understanding of Islam that conforms to, and is compatible with, the strategic objectives of the US. At this point, it is necessary to question what Cheryl Benard represents. Benard is an associate of the US-based RAND (Research and Development) Corporation. The RAND Corporation, from its inception, was a secretive organisation, and employees needed to be vetted by intelligence agencies such as the US Department of Defense and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (Brodie, 2011, p. 650). Brodie suggested that in protecting the vital military and strategic interests of the US, secrecy was essential since the social sciences research conducted by RAND was highly ideological. She wrote: In addition to the establishment of protocols for maintaining secrecy through the classification of people and materials, secrecy became an intellectual preoccupation at RAND, particularly among the first cohort of social scientists who sought to understand and use the secrets of the unconscious, secret ways to manipulate populations – enemy, allied, and United States – and ways to wage secret psychological warfare. (p. 655)

Writing in 1997, David Hounshell suggested that RAND’s research in the social sciences was guided by the ideological imperative to defend the strategic interests of the US. He stated that RAND’s research was viewed as a contribution to the US developing its ‘science of warfare’, which was almost exclusively motivated by the Cold War understanding that the purpose of research was to aid the US in ‘defending the nation from the Soviet Union’ (1997, p. 244). So, the purpose of RAND’s research into the Soviet Union ‘was to know the enemy and to incorporate that knowledge into the Air Force’s overall strategy’ (pp. 261–2). In considering Benard’s (2003) proposal that the US should facilitate a process of re-directing Islam, I was concerned that this proposal was to be carried out by an entity with no specific interest in Islam as a system of religious practice and belief. Benard stated (p. ix): There is no question that contemporary Islam is in a volatile state, engaged in an internal and external struggle over its values, its identity, and its place in the world. Rival versions are contending for spiritual and political dominance. This conflict has serious costs and economic, social, political, and

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security implications for the rest of the world. Consequently, the West is making an increased effort to come to terms with, to understand, and to influence the outcome of this struggle. Clearly, the United States, the modern industrialized world, and indeed the international community as a whole would prefer an Islamic world that is compatible with the rest of the system: democratic, economically viable, politically stable, socially progressive, and which follows the rules and norms of international conduct.

In this passage, Benard states that the West actively seeks to influence the process of transforming Islam into a religion that is ‘compatible’ with Western expectations. She underlines this by stating: ‘It is no easy matter to transform a major world religion. If nation-building is a daunting task, religion-building is immeasurably more perilous and complex. Islam is neither a homogeneous entity nor a simple system’ (p. 3). A second factor which drew me to this topic was my membership and activism within the Call of Islam during the 1980s and early 1990s. This anti-apartheid social movement contested and challenged the legitimacy of the apartheid state and advocated a political system based on social equity, social justice, liberty, and freedom of association and expression (See Esack, 1988; Jhazbhay, 2002a, 2002b). Furthermore, it viewed the US as an imperialist power that supported the apartheid state and Israel. Accordingly, US policies towards South Africa in particular, Africa in general, and the Middle East, were opposed by the Call of Islam. This is confirmed in its pamphlet Campus Call, UWC (undated) which constructed world imperialism as a unitary system: There is no difference to what the Zionists are doing in Palestine and what the U.S. is doing in Nicaragua – supplying [arms] to the Contras to overthrow the people’s government. There is no difference in Menachem Begin’s slaughter of Palestinians in Deir Yasin and the U.S. slaughter in Vietnam. […] No wonder Israel and South Africa are [such] good friends […]. They are part of the world imperialist body.

After the end of apartheid, I reduced my active participation in organised national politics and my involvement in issues affecting the Muslim community. However, the Benard (2003) publication and other media reports that equated Islam with ‘terrorism’ challenged me to explore how and why Islam was being identified as a security threat in Western societies.

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Organisation of Book Chapters Prolegomenon: The White Widow—The Kenyan Westgate Mall Attack This introductory chapter provides preliminary remarks which the rest of the book discusses in more detail. It analyses a publicly aired documentary to show how terrorism knowledge and expertise are manufactured in an era of the ‘Global War on Terror’. This introductory essay analysed the South African Digital Satellite Television (DStv) Carte Blanche documentary, The Kenyan Attack, which was aired on September 29, 2013. The documentary investigated the alleged South African link to the military attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, on 21 September 2013. The Kenyan Attack was analysed because the way the Carte Blanche team reported the context and outcome of their investigation illustrated the main theme of this book, namely, the processes by which the South African mainstream media and think-tank experts have constructed perceptions of Islam and Muslims as a threat in Africa and South Africa. Chapter 2: The United States: Pivotal in the Terrorism Debate in Africa Chapter 2 seeks to position the United States of America (US) at the centre of security and terrorism debates in Africa. This is because the former US President George W. Bush (2001a) initiated the internationalisation of the ‘Global War on Terror’. His utterance—after the events known as ‘9/11’—reinforced the equation of Islam with the idea of terror (Bush, 2001b), and successfully securitised both Islam and Muslims. This association was neither an ‘error’ nor was it value-neutral. Instead, this equation of Islam with terrorism resonates with Samuel P.  Huntington’s (1993, 1996) ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis. This chapter further explains why Critical Theory has been selected to conduct the study underpinning this publication. In using CT as a lens, security is conceived as socially constituted— meaning that ‘its nature is a product of contexts, circumstances, intentions’ and that it is ‘dependent upon social, cultural, legal, and political processes of interpretation’ (Jackson, 2009b, p.  4). So, it is this, rather than security as a settled ontological ‘fact’ that was under investigation.

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Furthermore, the chapter explains that the empirical data was gathered from both the national newspapers and security think-tanks. It continues and justifies why these institutions were selected as research sites. Methodologically, these research sites were selected because they were important components of the so-called ‘invisible security college’. This college of experts acts as an epistemic community that promotes specific kinds of ideologically-inclined knowledge through activities that connect academia with military, intelligence and government agencies such as security agencies and media (Miller & Mills, 2009). Chapter 3: Conceptualising Securitisation Chapter 3 presents and discusses the conceptualisation of securitisation theory. Because, this notion—securitisation—is central to understand how the construction of Muslims as a threat is a security concern within the study of International Relations. Consequently, this chapter reviews the literature on securitisation. The review begins with an examination of the different meanings associated with the concepts ‘security’ and ‘securitisation’, to ascertain what constitutes a ‘security threat’. The review is followed by a specific historic example of its actual application in South Africa. The case of the People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) helps to illustrate how security concerns are imported into the South African security discourse. It shows further how the legacy of sustained political violence during the apartheid years ‘normalised’ the use of violence to resolve conflict. The PAGAD narrative also shows how the South African media and security analysts failed to communicate, and/ or ignored sociological factors and local context in favour of an ideologically driven narrative that constructed PAGAD as the South African version of an international ‘Islamic’ threat. Chapter 4: The Invisible College This chapter uses the literature to frame an understanding of think-tanks and its role in politics. It further explores where think-tanks come from historically and explains the work they do. This is followed by a focused discussion on four South African think-­ tanks that are influencing security knowledge locally. The chapter provides

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a historical/evolutionary account of each selected local think-tank in terms of their epistemic origins and contributions to South African security discussions. Chapter 5: Expertise, Epistemes and the Construction of a Suspect Community This chapter argues that South African security experts, within local think-­ tanks, have constructed Muslims as the new ‘suspect community’ in Africa. It provides important evidence and material to reinforce the position this book articulated in its introductory and conceptual chapters. South African-based security think-tanks have been pivotal in the securitisation of Islam and Muslims in Africa, especially in South Africa. In order to succeed, they have had to import a Western, particularly US, security agenda into the local security discourse. They have done this by associating Islam and the local Muslim community with violence and terrorism and making the local congruent with the US’s ‘Global War on Terror’. South African-based security think-tank experts have drawn their insights from epistemic networks that have their roots in Terrorism Studies and counterinsurgency. These networks have been sponsored by the United States (US) government in the 1970s. One of the arguments in this chapter is that local security experts have introduced a particular Western narrative on the origins of contemporary terrorism and have appropriated this narrative into African and South African security discourses. Chapter 6: WWriting Insecurity: Representations of Muslims and Islam in the South African Print Media This chapter argues that South African Press has been pivotal in the securitisation of Islam and Muslims. Like think-tanks, they have uncritically transferred the security priorities, concerns and policy agendas of the West into South Africa. As a result, they have endorsed the discourse and practices that construct Islam as an existential threat to Western civilisation, and, by implication, to South African society. It mobilises evidence and discourse analysis to frame the challenges of Muslims and Islam in the country.

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Chapter 7: Concluding Comments This chapter revisited the earlier chapters to confirm that both the national press and security experts were crucial actors in the securitisation of Islam and Muslims in South Africa. In this role, they uncritically imported security concerns from the Global North into the local security discourse. It further argued that the construction of Islam and Muslim as a threat in South Africa is a ‘received truth’ (Collins, 2009) in that it copied perspectives initiated by former US President George W. Bush (2001a, 2001b, 2001c) and Samuel P. Huntington.

CHAPTER 3

Conceptualising Securitisation

This chapter presents and discusses the conceptualisation of securitisation theory. Because, this notion—securitisation—is central to understanding how the construction of Muslims as a threat is a security concern within the study of International Relations. Consequently, this chapter reviews the literature on securitisation. The review begins with an examination of the different meanings associated with the concepts ‘security’ and ‘securitisation’, to ascertain what constitutes a ‘security threat’.

International Relations as a Field of Study International Relations (IR) scholars disagree over the exact purpose of the field. Some maintain that IR theorises and explains the diplomatic, military and strategic interrelationships among states, particularly nation-­ states, since states are the principal units of political organisation and power (Cox, 1999, p. 85). Others claim that IR is much broader than an exclusive focus on states. This is because non-governmental and non-state actors and organisations also influence what constitute the international. For them, IR scholarship includes all ‘interactions between state-based actors across state boundaries’ (Lawson, 2015, p. 11). Still others, recognising that the ending of the Cold War put sociological questions onto the IR agenda, propose that IR focuses its study on an international system which is not limited to a ‘politico-military construct’ but includes ‘economic, sociological, and historical’ questions (Buzan & Little, 2001, p. 21). © The Author(s) 2020 M. N. Hendricks, Manufacturing Terrorism in Africa, Islam and Global Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5626-5_3

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British scholars Barry Buzan and Richard Little argue that the popularity of the concept ‘globalisation’ among IR writers suggests that the international system be conceived of as relationships among nation-states as well as ‘an entire system network of interactions that bind people together’ (pp. 20–1). Within this understanding, IR takes as its focus ‘how humankind is organised politically, economically, socially and ecologically and how the different aspects of its organisation play into each other’ (p. 22). While the state has been central in traditional IR, the field consists of much more than relationships between states. Indeed, Lawson (2015, p. 16) concludes that in addition to relationships amongst states, ‘world politics’ and ‘global politics’ are the general subject matter of IR. It is generally understood that IR as an academic discipline had its origins immediately after World War I, when it was perceived as necessary to ‘scientifically study’ international affairs including ways to ensure collective security and to maintain world peace (Lawson, 2015, p. 75). However, this ‘idealistic’ narrative of IR’s origins is challenged by the suggestion that the discipline of IR was closely linked to the maintenance and strengthening of British power in the world (Schmidt, 1998; Thakur, Davis, & Vale, 2017). Indeed, instead of being primarily concerned with security, war and peace as the idealists have it—these critical scholars suggest that IR’s genesis was motivated by the questions of race and empire (Thakur et al., 2017). This publication falls within the general field of International Relations with a specific interest in Security Studies, and this sub-field will now engage our attention. Security Studies has a focused interest in ‘understanding and explaining why and how [… states …] use force’ (Kolodziej, 2005, p.  17). While there are numerous theories about why and how states do so, the discourse of international politics in the post-1945 period has been dominated by the notion of Realism which lends itself particularly well to the sub-field of Security Studies (Dunne & Wheeler, 2004, p. 11). Realism assumes that the state is the primary actor within the international system, and is responsible for protecting its institutions, ideology and citizens against various external threats. Realism conceives of international interactions amongst nation-states as conflictual, and focuses on state power, military force and war (Nye & Lynn-Jones, 1988; Walt, 1991). A leading early theorist of Realism, Hans J. Morgenthau (1948, p. 52) argued that power is central in international interaction since the ultimate aim of international politics is ‘the struggle for power and peace’,

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which is essential for protecting and expanding state borders and influence. This makes plain the idea that Realism positions the state as the main referent object of security, and war as the primary threat. Definition of Security Everyday phrases like ‘personal security’ and ‘social security’ are indications that security is a concern all people share and that they take seriously. In this sense, security means the absence of a threat to an individual or society. However, within IR, multiple competing notions are accommodated under the label security—ranging from state-centric security to comprehensive security (Álvarez 2006, p. 62). In addition to focusing on state security, the latter includes ‘political, social, environmental and cultural dimension’ in its focus. Even though security defies a single definition, it is an essential and powerful political construct and is central to the ‘academic international relations project’ (Booth, 2004, p. 5). The American thinker Walter Lippmann defined security from a Realist perspective in 1943: ‘a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid a war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war’ (quoted in Dunne & Wheeler, 2004, p. 11). In this sense, security is a derivative of the idea of power: ‘an actor with enough power to reach a dominating position would acquire security as a result’ (Buzan, 1991, p. 2). Realism theorises that states are physical entities which are the most important referent object of security. However, Barry Buzan questions whether the state is a ‘physical organism’. Instead, he proposes that it is an ideational construct ‘held in common by a group of people’ (p. 63). If the state is mainly an idea, as Buzan proposes, then ‘the state as a natural entity, born out of an anarchic international system seems to start losing validity, and turns into a fabrication’ (Alvarez, 2006, p. 65). Such a fundamental inconsistency in Realism’s conceptualisation has been challenged by alternative schools of IR. Critical perspectives on security, in particular, critique the idea of security, starting with Thomas Hobbes’s (1588–1679) interpretation of ‘the state of nature’ since it is this explanation that justifies the existence of the modern state, as a physical entity, as well as it having the indispensable responsibility as the provider of security. Such critiques confirm and ‘make visible the mutually constituted character of security’ (Alvarez, 2006, p. 67).

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Critical Security Studies Critiques, such as those outlined in the previous section, gave rise to Critical Security Studies (CSS) which challenges the fundamental assumptions underpinning the state-centric and military focus of Realist-centred security studies. CSS holds that threat construction is a highly political activity that is tainted by history, culture, communication, ideology and perceived power—in other words, it is embedded in sociology and history. The search for security within CSS is thus conceived of as value-laden and a highly political exercise. Recognising the political implications of threat construction, CSS sets out to make explicit the assumptions of orthodox security as a way of encouraging ‘greater theoretical scrutiny and debate’ about the nature of security (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006, p. 448). The guiding question for the critical IR scholar is: How, in the context of massive information and interaction available to states and state officials, ‘are threats constructed and mobilized against?’ (Krause, 1998, p.  307). In other words, contrary to the conception of security which perceives threat as an objective phenomenon, critical analysts research this issue: given the multiplicity of threats, how do specific phenomena come to be constituted as ‘threats’, ‘crises’, ‘problems’ or ‘risks’? (Fierke, 2010, no pagination). This is the focus of this publication: If a threat is not an objective phenomenon, how are Islam and Muslims constructed as a threat? This book will show that the view that Islam poses a threat is rooted in orthodox IR, in which security is invariably associated with Realist power politics and security is ‘always implicitly central to […] every […] analytical framework’ (Workman, 1993, p.  2). An alternative approach to the study of security without security being reduced to a ‘political statement on the part of an analyst’ (Taureck, 2006a, p. 55, emphasis in original), is provided by securitisation theory which provides analytical tools to identify instances of securitisation.

Securitisation Theory Securitisation theory, introduced by scholars associated with the so-called Copenhagen School (CS) of Security Studies (Buzan et al., 1990; Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998; Wæver, 1995), provides an insight into the processes and implications of security discourse. While the idea of securitisation might be highly contentious (Knudsen, 2001; McSweeney, 1996),

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it is acknowledged that securitisation theory is an ‘innovative’ (Williams, 2003, p.  511) and very influential ‘contribution to the theoretical discourse on security’ (Stritzel, 2007, p. 357). The significance of securitisation theory lies in its ability to set a research agenda across the field of Security Studies, and its ability to explore and account systematically for ‘the implications of widening [the] security agenda’ (Williams, 2003, p. 511). Security, according to securitisation theorists (Buzan et al., 1990, 1998; Wæver, 1995), is an inter-subjective rhetorical practice and, accordingly, a non-static concept (Viera, 2007). Securitisation is based on the fundamental assumption that the utterance of security itself ‘creates a new social order’ (Balzacq, 2005, p. 171) and justifies the introduction of emergency measures and state actions that suspend normal political procedures and practices. How does this play out? Securitisation involves a number of unfolding processes that start with an utterance—the ‘Speech-Act’ (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969)—that signals an issue as a ‘security’ concern. A successful move in this direction implies that the security issue has been socially and politically accepted as such, and is removed from ‘normal day-to-day politics’, casting it as an ‘existential threat’ which calls for and justifies extreme measures (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006, p. 453). Jef Huysmans (2002, p. 45) explains that successful securitisation entails three elements: Firstly, it ‘requires practices’ of uttering security through the mobilisation of security knowledge within a specific political context; secondly, it requires the construction of the security field which ‘integrates problem definitions, institutional processes and expectations under a security umbrella’; and finally, securitisation requires a ‘logic’ or a constellation of rules, that ‘organizes practices as security practices’ into a security formation. Each of these elements is unique, as a security formation links specific themes to security theories and practices (Huysmans, 2002, p.  46). Security—as an utterance—is void of any specific meaning; rather, its meaning is dependent on what a securitising actor says it is—a socially constructed concept—‘with the meaning of security dependent on what is done with it’ (Taureck, 2006b, p. 3). In other words, ‘security’, following securitisation theory, is not an objective condition, but results from ‘a specific process’ (Williams, 2003, p. 523). This conception suggests that securitisation theory broadens the field of analysis and so potentially might result in an indefinite expansion of the

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security agenda. However, despite its expansive potential, securitisation theory simultaneously limits the security agenda through its specific structure, which includes constraining those actors who can utter security: something becomes a security issue ‘when the elites’, speaking in an institutional voice, ‘declare it to be so’ (Wæver, 1995, p. 54). Buzan et al. (1998) and Wæver (2003) agree that a necessary condition for securitisation is the construction of ‘a shared understanding [involving both the securitising agent and the supposedly threatened audience] of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat’ (Wæver, 2003, p. 10). Here, Wæver (2003, pp. 10–11) suggests that the ‘Speech-­ Act’ is essential in the construction of the shared understanding that the threat is—as it were—a threat since only ‘by labelling something a security issue’ would the issue become a security concern. Drawing on the idea of a Speech-Act, Wæver (1995, p. 55) posits that ‘the utterance [of security] itself is the act’. Because, when ‘security’ is uttered by an appropriate securitising agent, a state representative with the necessary and appropriate institutional authority and power ‘claims a special right to use whatever means necessary to block it’ (p.  55). The formulation of security as a Speech-Act suggests that the construction of security knowledge and action ‘[is] part of a single moment of both naming and making’ security (Vale, 2003, p. 164). However, and this is the point of this publication, successful securitisation does not necessarily imply that an issue is an objective security threat. This is because, as noted above, securitisation is limited to a ‘securitising agent’ with the appropriate power and authority to articulate the nature of the existential threat, within accepted ‘rules’ (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 24). Thus, within securitisation theory, securitisation is a ‘particular kind of social accomplishment’ because ‘security’ results from ‘a specific social process’ which includes using Speech-Acts to socially construct specific forms of security threats (Abrahamsen, 2005, p. 57). While the approach of the Copenhagen School limits the actors who can construct ‘security’ to ‘dominant actors’, such as political leaders and ‘voices institutionally legitimate’ to speak on behalf of the state (McDonald, 2008, p. 564), this publication will argue that such a restriction narrows the act of securitisation. Indeed, this book will provide evidence that while South African security ‘experts’ and the media are not state representatives who speak ‘in an institutional [state] voice’ (Wæver, 1995, p. 57), their utterances of ‘security’, nonetheless, do securitise South African Muslims and Islam.

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This is consistent with Huha Vuori’s (2008, pp. 76–77) assertion that actors with ‘sufficient social capital’ but without the necessary state authority and powers also have the capacity to use securitisation moves to achieve political aims. In such instances their securitising moves are limited, but their intervention, in the process, ensures that the issue is placed on the security agenda of politicians and/or state bureaucrats (Vuori, 2008). Furthermore, this publication will show that while the securitisation framework focuses on the moment of intervention and suggests that the act of uttering ‘security’ instantaneously produces ‘security’, the securitisation of Muslims and Islam in South Africa materialises incrementally, rather than instantly. This supports McDonald’s (2008, p. 564) argument that while there are examples where the process of securitisation happens instantaneously, there are also instances where ‘security’ is constructed over time. This publication enlarges the existing literature that drives globalisation of securitisation theory. It confirms that there is a universal securitisation dynamics which is equally applicable throughout the globe. However, the specifics of the South African contexts provide insights into securitisation theory that differ from that which is familiar in Western Europe. Accordingly, the empirical contribution of this publication is significant as it reveals power-practices in Africa and South Africa where Critical Theory and Critical Security Studies are embryonic and thus not as yet fully established.

Securitisation of South African Muslims We have seen in the analysis of the Carte Blanche (2013, 29th September) documentary discussed in the Prolegomenon how the utterance of US President George W.  Bush (2001a) calling for a Global War on Terror introduced an emergency which constructed Islam and Muslims as a threat which required extraordinary action. By uttering the word ‘terror’, Bush claimed the right, without observing normal political procedure and practices, to use any means to eliminate this perceived threat (see Wæver, 2003). It should be recognised then, that uttering ‘security’ is not value-­ free: instead, it is a political act that ‘introduces security questions in a publicly contested area’ (Huysmans, 2002, p. 45). In focusing on the securitisation of Islam and Muslims, this publication does not situate the religion of Islam as a specific sector of securitisation

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(Sheikh, 2014). Instead, its focus is limited to instances where Islam and Muslims are presented as security concerns in Africa.

The Case of PAGAD The case of the People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) helps to illustrate how security concerns are imported into the South African security discourse. It shows further how the legacy of sustained political violence during the apartheid years ‘normalised’ the use of violence to resolve conflict; it reveals too, how ‘structural violence’ (Galtung, 1991) facilitated the ‘emergence of everyday reactionary violence’ (Winton, 2004, p. 167); and, thirdly, it reveals how frustration with crime, gangsterism, drug abuse and the ineffectiveness of the state in eradicating these social ills resulted in political challenges to state authority. Interestingly, too, the PAGAD narrative also shows how the South African media and security analysts failed to communicate, and/or ignored sociological factors and local context in favour of an ideologically driven narrative that constructed PAGAD as the South African version of an international ‘Islamic’ threat. PAGAD is important because it foreshadows the story this publication tells. It shows how easily an international perspective that associates Islam and Muslims with violence and terror can be transported and imported into the local suggesting how easily Islam and Muslims can be securitised. More significantly, the events around PAGAD were foundational in that they helped to localise an international narrative around Muslims and Islam. This narrative shows all of the characteristics of the above-­mentioned binary rationale, such as the basic approach, the outlines and the perceptions, that explain the subsequent construction of Islam and Muslims as a threat in South Africa. The growth of crime, gangsterism and the drug problem on the Cape Flats of South Africa prior to and after the 1994 democratic elections in that country were key factors that motivated the isolated and vulnerable groups to establish an anti-gangsterism and anti-drug network called People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), in 1995. While PAGAD was established as a response to the police authority’s inability to ‘eradicate [drug] dealings’ (Ousman, 2004, p. 83), it was the space created by the ending of apartheid in 1994 that assisted in PAGAD’s formation as the new democratic dispensation invited community participation in finding solutions to societal problems.

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Social groups that founded PAGAD originated in the Cape Town suburbs of Salt River, Bo Kaap, Wynberg, Kensington, Athlone and Surrey Estate. Even though, at the time, Muslims constituted approximately 8% of the ‘coloured’ population of South Africa (Vahed & Jeppie, 2006), they made up about a third of the ‘coloured’ population in the Cape Town metropole (Haffajee, 2000). Initially, PAGAD was not an exclusively Muslim network. However, the fact that it started in residential areas with significant Muslim populations partly explains the predominance of Muslims within the network. PAGAD was popular, especially within those ‘coloured’ townships which experienced gangster activities and the proliferation of drugs (Baderoon, 2005, 2007; Boshoff, Botha, & Schönteich, 2001; Dixon & Johns, 2001; Gottschalk, 2005; Pillay, 2002; Vahed & Jeppie, 2006). However, the predominance of Muslims within its public marches and the drawing on selected Islamic symbols—such as referring to leaders as amir and inviting their activists to iftaar—led voices, especially in the popular media, to associate PAGAD with Islam and eventually with the international Islamic threat (Bangstad, 2005). Securitisation of PAGAD and the Muslim Community Prior to 1996, Muslims and Islam received limited visibility in the South African media. However, the violent killing on 4 August 1996 of a man called Rashaad Staggie—the alleged co-leader of a local gang called the Hard Livings—by supporters of PAGAD dramatically changed representations of Muslims in South Africa (on the issue of gangsterism in Cape Town, see Pinnock, 1984; and Mohamed, 1990). Representations of Muslims and Islam were increasingly associated with notions of urban terror and extremism (see Hough, 2000; Dixon & Johns, 2001; Boshoff et al., 2001). Such representations escalated further following a bombing incident that killed two people and injured twenty-eight at Cape Town’s Planet Hollywood Restaurant in August 1998. A local ‘expert’, Mike Hough (2000, p. 68) did not hesitate to argue that the Planet Hollywood incident, as well as the prior ‘wave of bombings [in the Western Cape], seemed initially part of an international terrorist campaign’. Other ‘experts’ associated with the (then relatively new) South African Institute for Security Studies also suggested that the Planet Hollywood bombing had been perpetrated in retaliation for American bombings in Sudan and Afghanistan in August 1998 (Boshoff et al., 2001, p. 37). In

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making these assertions, Mike Hough (2000) and Boshoff et al. (2001) suggested that PAGAD was the local representative of an emerging international Islamic threat. Indeed, Hough (2000, p. 69) cited an unnamed ‘police source’, and went as far as asserting that the ‘pipe bomb is the Islamic signature in the Western Cape’. But he failed to provide an explanation of what was meant by an ‘Islamic signature’. Apart from generalising wildly, the assertions of these ‘experts’ securitised PAGAD and, by implication, called for extreme measures to stop the threat posed by it. While recognising that multiple motives might have inspired the Western Cape bombings, Hough privileged the view that the bombings were ‘part of an attempt at an Islamic revolution in South Africa’ (2000, p. 69). This view was echoed by Boshoff et al. (2001), who suggested that PAGAD was a front for the Muslim militant anti-apartheid movement Qibla, which was established in 1980. However, linking Qibla and PAGAD was not done objectively. Instead, it situated PAGAD, because of its averred association with Qibla, as an anti-US ‘terrorist’ organisation that exploited societal grievances to further its political agenda. Because of this constructed linkage, it is necessary to explore the origins of Qibla. Origins of Qibla, PAGAD and Continuities in Security Thinking The Qibla movement was established by Achmat Cassiem, an anti-­ apartheid activist and ex-Robben Island prisoner, for two reasons. Firstly, the 1979 Iranian Revolution stimulated a resurgence of South African Muslim activism after a period of political dormancy following the death in custody of Imam Abdullah Haron in 1969, and the general persecution of political opponents by the apartheid state. Secondly, worker and community struggles and student uprisings in South Africa re-emerged and intensified during the 1980s through the establishment of the South African United Democratic Front (UDF). These reasons suggest why it is only partly correct that Qibla’s establishment was motivated by the Iranian Revolution (Boshoff et al., 2001; Haron, 2014). From its inception Qibla aligned itself with the Black Consciousness Movement and the South African Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). In fact, the latter organised and facilitated the process that resulted in some Qibla activists receiving military training in Libya, Iran and Sudan (Boshoff et al., 2001, p. 27). Thus, contrary to Boshoff, Botha, and Schönteich’s assertion (2001, p. 27) that Qibla was ‘created to promote the aims and ideals of the Iranian revolution in South Africa’, Qibla’s access to Iran was

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facilitated by a third party, namely the PAC.  Its association with Black Consciousness in the 1980s and 1990s was an indication that South African liberation remained its priority. Some scholars have argued that Qibla expressed admiration for the Iranian Revolution and that they have ‘mooted the possibility of an ‘Islamic revolution in South Africa’ (Haron, 2014, pp. 326–7). They have also stated that Qibla advocated ‘an Islamic Revolution’ as the only solution to the emancipation of South Africans (Boshoff et al., 2001, p. 27). However, these arguments ignored the fact that Qibla’s call for an Islamic revolution must be viewed in the context of the South African liberation struggle: In the 1980s, the Iranian Revolution was an inspiration to numerous South African political activists, especially Muslim activists. Accordingly, drawing on the symbolism provided by the Iranian Revolution was an appropriate strategy to mobilise and galvanise Muslim support in the local South African liberation struggle. The question that is of immediate relevance to this publication is: Why have some analysts focused on Qibla’s alleged allegiance to revolutionary Iran? We do know that revolutionary Iran was high on the US’s security agenda in the 1980s: in fact, the Iranian Revolution had a decisive effect on ‘U.S. thinking and policy towards political Islam’ (Gerges, 1999, p. 60; see also Wise, 2011). Indeed, the US’s loss of Iran as a political ally was strategically catastrophic as Iran was its appointed ‘policeman’ in the Persian Gulf (Gerges, 1999, p.  60). In responding to this loss, the US initiated a campaign to portray Iran as being associated with ‘terrorism and the promotion of subversive activities’ and with ‘revolutionary Islam’ (p. 69). Thus, during the South African liberation struggle, Qibla’s members were charged and jailed under South African terrorism legislation. Qibla had used the symbolism of the Iranian Revolution, in the Muslim community, as a strategy to mobilise politically for their primary cause, which was the political liberation of South Africa. However, these were not sufficient reasons to conclude that Qibla was the local representative of ‘revolutionary Islam’. So, the assertion by Boshoff et al. (2001, p. 27) that PAGAD, through its alleged bombing campaign, aimed to create ‘an Islamic revolution in South Africa’ should be viewed as an instance of securitisation. The utterance was an attempt to generate fear and to imply that South Africa was threatened by PAGAD and Islam. However, these assertions also point to

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the continuities in security thinking: in the 1980s Qibla was associated with revolutionary Iran, which was demonised by the US. Since apartheid South Africa was a US ally, Qibla was constructed as the representative of revolutionary Islam in South Africa by the local politicians. In the 1990s, PAGAD was portrayed as a local threat—they were accused of aiming to create an Islamic Revolution in South Africa—because security ‘experts’ alleged that they were associated with Qibla. The success of the securitising of PAGAD continued into the post-­ apartheid period when the late Minister of Safety and Security Steve Tshwete and the former Minister of Justice Penuell Maduna linked PAGAD to the threat posed by Islam. Die Burger (12 September 2000) reported that, according to Tshwete, the PAGAD attacks were directed at the state and ‘indications that P[AGAD] and members of its G-Force are responsible for the terror and assassinations in the Peninsula are so strong that the security forces are not considering other possibilities’. Maduna went further, claiming that PAGAD members ‘had been trained in Libya and had links with the Lebanese Hizbollah’ (Cape Times, 14 September 2000). Similar allegations were made about Qibla activists in the 1980s (Boshoff et al., 2001, p. 27). Maduna (Cape Times, 14 September 2000) was either referring to the same Qibla activists who acted as PAGAD members, or was adopting apartheid security thinking. The above also signals the continuing influence of the Cold War security thinking in the local security discourse. Apartheid security thinking was significantly influenced by the Cold War. As an ally of the West, the South African apartheid state shared the western construct that the Cold War represented a zero-sum struggle against attempts by communism to destroy Western civilisation (Buzan, 2006, p. 1101). As we have seen, the reaction to the rise of PAGAD were extensions of security thinking which had their origins in the Cold War. In South Africa, the PAGAD story became the vehicle through which a western hegemonic perspective about Islam converged with Cold War security thinking in the late 1990s. PAGAD became known to the majority of South Africans through ‘journalistic accounts’ that used concepts such as ‘fundamentalist’, ‘holy war’ and ‘suicide bombers’ (Pillay, 2002, p. 52). But these concepts did not originate in South Africa; they had derived from Huntington’s (1993, 1996) ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis. As we shall see in Chap. 5, during the Cold War the US recruited and encouraged Muslims to fight in the ‘war’ against communism. This

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included the US training of the Mujahideen, which were later transformed into the Taliban (see Mamdani, 2002). Actually, Zbigniew Brezinski, one-­ time security adviser to former US President Jimmy Carter, states that at least six months before the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on 28 December 1978, President Carter signed a directive on 3 July 1979 to secretly fund ‘opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul’ in order to ‘induce a Soviet military intervention’ in Afghanistan (quoted in Gasper, 2001, pp.  3–4). These opponents became known as the Afghan Mujahideen. So, soon after the Soviet occupation of that country, the US significantly increased its military support to the Afghan Mujahideen which included weaponry and advisors under CIA supervision (Gasper, 2001, p.  4). For the US, the Afghan Mujahideen became a Cold War proxy in the struggle against the Soviet Union. The record suggests that this occupation contributed to the weakening of the Soviet Union, and Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was a step towards its own disintegration and the end of the Cold War (see Mendelson, 1993). As previously stated, Samuel P. Huntington (1993, 1996) developed his argument as the Cold War was ending. The Cold War (1945–1989) was constructed in the West, especially in the US, as a zero-sum generational struggle between the West and the Soviet Union. However, the ending of Cold War antagonisms resulted in the US experiencing a ‘threat deficit’: the threat of communism had been essential for the process by which it was able to maintain, ‘reassert and legitimize its leadership of global security’ (Buzan, 2006, p.  1101). The continued hostility of the US towards revolutionary Iran and its ideology of Islam therefore served the same purpose. Consistent with Huntington’s thesis (1993, 1996) and the need of the US for an enemy, the local media moved away from framing ‘global’ conflict in Cold War terms to one that constructed Islam as the principal source of conflict. This became evident in their substitution of Tehran for Moscow in the ‘PAGAD story’ (Pillay, 2002, p. 52). In addition to constructing Islam as a major source of conflict, Islam was also equated with ‘terrorism’. So, the headline for an article in the Cape Argus ‘Blast brings terrorism close to home’ (Josephs, 1998, quoted in Pillay, 2002, p. 53) suggested that ‘terrorism’, which usually occurred in other countries— since South Africa had become a democracy—was now experienced in Cape Town. Through the narrative of PAGAD, Muslims and Islam in South Africa became associated with violence and ‘terrorism’ because journalists

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working on the PAGAD story failed to make a distinction between Islam and PAGAD. In explaining this failure, they maintained that making such a distinction was difficult ‘because they [PAGAD activists] were almost exclusively Muslim […]. The rhetoric that went out, with one or two exceptions, was from Muslims or Islamic scholars […]. It was very difficult to make a distinction’ (Van Zilla, 2003, quoted in Baderoon, 2005, p. 99). The foregoing illustrates that the South African media, security analysts and government security officials have failed to communicate historical and sociological factors and contexts when they explained the PAGAD movement in South Africa. Instead, they turned to Huntington’s (1993, 1996) ‘clash of civilizations’ theory, which postulated the ‘inevitable’ clash between Islam and ‘the West’ as their primary analytical frame. Applying this ideologically driven approach uncritically, they constructed Islam as the principal source of conflict and PAGAD as the South African representative of this international Islamic threat. Based on this, PAGAD was accused of aiming to create ‘an Islamic revolution in South Africa’ (Hough, 2000, p. 69) and that it and ‘members of its G-Force [were] responsible for the terror and assassinations in the Peninsula’ (Coetzee & Brits, 2000, citing the former Minister of Safety and Security Steve Tshwete). However, to deliberately reinforce the point, these securitising actions were performed without locating the analysis within historical or sociological contexts and without verifiable evidence. The PAGAD narrative suggests how easily an international perspective that associates Islam and Muslims with violence and ‘terrorism’ was imported into the South African media and academic discourse—and how seamlessly it is used to securitise Islam and Muslims. This analysis has shown that the convergence of security perceptions associated with revolutionary Iran and security thinking during apartheid and Cold War hostilities continue to dominate contemporary security discourses locally. So, while there are continuities in security thinking, the dominant continuity is drawn from the US’s need for an enemy: the Cold War was structured around specific enemies, and when it ended it became necessary to find new enemies. The publication will show that securitisation of Islam post-9/11, in Africa and South Africa, is a continuation and an intensification of the foregoing PAGAD narrative.

CHAPTER 4

The Invisible College

This chapter provides a critical overview of the significance of think-tanks within public policy processes. It starts with a clarification of the concept ‘think-tank’; it identifies examples of prototype think-tanks; and it examines the strategies devised by them in order to transfer policy advice to the policymakers, the media and the general public. It further scrutinises the motivation that drives individuals to become or act as policy experts. Think-tanks and think-tank based experts concerned with security-­ related matters are increasingly known as policy entrepreneurs. These are defined as ‘political actors who promote policy ideas’ (Mintrom, 1997, p. 739) seeking to influence and shape the security policy agenda and foster its implementation processes. The debate within the popular media, which focuses on terrorism in Africa and/or South Africa, is an instance of this. Authoritative opinions and analyses are sought from security or terrorism experts who are members of think-tanks such as the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), the Brenthurst Foundation, the South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA), or the Centre for International Political Studies (CiPS), University of Pretoria (see for example, Sunday Tribune, August 31, 2008; Mail and Guardian, 7 April 2011; Cape Argus, October 12, 2009). As we have established, the South African security experts within think-tanks are central to this inquiry, which seeks to show how such actors constitute the voices of ‘authority’ and ‘expertise’ that transport and shape knowledge about terrorism in order to securitise Muslims and Islam in South Africa. © The Author(s) 2020 M. N. Hendricks, Manufacturing Terrorism in Africa, Islam and Global Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5626-5_4

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In complex political and social environments, policymakers and journalists, amongst others, increasingly draw on specialist advice, usually on offer by think-tanks or experts. However, as has been established in Chap. 2, security think-tank expertise has been questioned for its undue influence in political decision-making as well as for advocating partial and/or incorrect propositions (Schröder, 2006, p.  471). Furthermore, as also emerged earlier, constructivists and critical theorists have questioned the nature of the so-called expert knowledge that legitimates and reinforces dominant societal ideologies. The same theorists have emphasised that expert knowledge is located within particular understandings because it is nearly impossible to find value-free or neutral knowledge (Schudson, 2006, p. 493). In an investigation of think-tanks in South Africa, Jonathan Carter (2008, p. 43) contends that these establish government policy-­development capacity by acting as bridges that helped to translate expert knowledge into policy and provided capacity-building opportunities for policymakers. But, what are think-tanks? Are they as neutral as Carter suggests? Alternatively, are think-tanks trying to influence the nature and limits of public debate by actively exercising an agenda-setting role within the policy development process? By responding to these questions, this publication will demonstrate that South African security think-tanks and/or security experts are pivotal in the securitisation of Islam and Muslims in Africa, in general, and in South Africa, specifically. This is because South African security think-­ tanks are significant and enthusiastic actors in the transmission of the security agenda which promotes Western, and particularly American, security interests into the South African security discourse. For example, the assertion that Africa has the ‘potential to become a breeding ground for new terrorist threats’ (Mills, 2004, p. 158), which can be equated to ‘a cancer growing in the middle of nowhere’ (p.  159, citing US Air Force Gen. Jeffrey Kohler), is typical of the uncritical approach of security experts affiliated to South African-based security think-tanks. This chapter prepares the ground for the argument presented in the next chapter (Chap. 5) that local security experts have introduced a particular Western narrative on Islam and Muslims and that this understanding has been appropriated into African and South African security discourses by think-tanks.

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So, this chapter examines the activities, practices and associates of think-­ tanks in the policy development processes in order to discover how these institutions influence policy development and contribute to the setting of the policy agenda. It starts with exploring conceptions of, and perspectives on, what think-tanks are.

Think-Tanks: Conceptions and Perspectives The scholarly literature on think-tanks fails to provide a precise definition as to what a think-tank is. For example, Anver Versi (2016, p. 54), a journalist and former editor of the London-based African Business, suggests that a think-tank is a ‘research institute or organisation employed to solve complex problems or predict or plan future developments, as in military, political or social areas’. Conversely, Winand Gellner (1995, p.  499) argues that a political think-tank is a public policy research institute which is closely connected to government with the primary aim to ‘influence the policy process with [its] ideas’. The first conception suggests that think-­ tanks are research institutions, with relevant expertise which strives to obtain and present policy-related knowledge objectively. The latter suggests that think-tanks are active participants in the contestation over political ideas and, accordingly, offer only partial knowledge to the policy-making process which is consistent with their interests. These contrasting perceptions of think-tanks are explored further in the next section. But first it is necessary to look at the history and origins of the term ‘think-tank’. The Origin of the Notion of ‘Think-Tanks’ The term ‘think-tank’ has its origins in American World War II terminology when it was used to refer to a secure room where war plans and strategies were discussed (Smith, 1993). But the term’s current meaning can be traced to the 1950s when it was used to describe contract-research organisations such as the RAND Corporation, which was established by the US Air Force to conduct research of a military-inclined nature (Smith, 1993). So, RAND is a non-profit corporation with civilian researchers that was established during the Cold War to advise the US military on national security matters as well as social and economic policy (Hounshell, 1997, p. 240). The roots of the RAND Corporation can be traced to the involvement of civilian scientists and technologists in advising the US military on

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weapons development in ‘radar and anti-submarine warfare’ during World War II (Elliott, 2010, p. 1). The defining event in the evolution of RAND is, perhaps, the involvement of civilian scientists that worked collaboratively with the US Army Air Force on the B-29 Special Bombardment Project. In 1944, Edward L. Bowls, then a consultant to the US Army Air Force Chief, introduced a project in order to investigate ways of increasing the ‘effectiveness’ of the B-29 bomber (Hounshell, 1997). This research, according to Mai Elliott (2010, p. 2), ‘succeeded beyond expectations’, which became evident in the Army Air Force’s acceptance of its recommendations. As a result, the US War Department and its Office of Scientific Research initiated discussions to explore ways of preserving research collaboration between the military and civilian scientists. The consequence was the establishment of Project RAND in 1946 as a division of the Douglas Aircraft Corporation with a contract to ‘provide the Air Force with independent objective analysis’ (quoted in Hounshell, 1997, p. 241). However, due to concerns raised by competitors about a conflict of interest, Project RAND was transformed into the RAND Corporation, which was independent of Douglas Aircraft Corporation (Elliott, 2010). On 4 November 1948, the new think-tank concluded a contract with the Air Force to continue to provide research and development services to the military. During the Cold War this work was conducted in an environment that was characterised by secrecy and confidentiality. A consequence of working in such an environment was that the RAND Corporation became virtually synonymous with the notion think-tank. In effect, the ‘RAND became the prototype for a method of organizing and financing research, development, and technical evaluation that would be done at the behest of government agencies, but carried out by privately run nonprofit centers’ (Smith, 1993, p. xiv). International Relations Think-Tanks Think-tanks are not unfamiliar to International Relations. Indeed, the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) are regarded as the first International Relations think-­ tanks (Abelson, 2014). Both were initially conceived as the British and American branches of (what was to be called) the ‘Institute of International Affairs’ (Parmar, 2004, p. 25) which would concern itself with the then embryonic field of International Relations.

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The conventional narrative of the founding of the discipline of International Relations has it that the seeds for the establishment of a research institute to educate, inform and advise future political leaders about the ‘causes and consequences of war’ were sown after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles on 28 June 1919 (Abelson, 2014, p. 125; also see Bostock, 1984; Parmar, 2004). The idea of such a research institute matured under the leadership of Lionel Curtis, a protégé of Sir Alfred Milner who was South Africa’s former High Commissioner (1897–1905) and the British Secretary of War (1918) (Parmar, 2004, p. 26). Curtis, a pivotal member of Milner’s so-called Kindergarten in South Africa, proposed the formation of a single Anglo-American research institute with two branches, which ‘could explore international problems and advocate policy solutions’ as well as serve as a ‘forum for both policy-makers and prominent policy experts in the leading western powers’ to discuss matters relevant to ‘international affairs’ (p. 26.). He also believed that within a changing world, experts are required to systematically research foreign affairs in order to provide ‘political leaders with the requisite facts with which to make policy and “sound” public opinion’ (p. 28). Furthermore, in a joint statement with the American Whitney Shepardson, Curtis noted that ‘[r]ight public opinion … was mainly produced by a small number of people in real contact with the facts who had thought out the issues involved’ (Dockrill, 1980, p. 74, quoted in Parmar, 2004, p. 28). Initially however, the RIIA and CFR were not successful in influencing British and US foreign policy. But, over time both these institutes became: … the most important, respected, ‘influential’ and prestigious organisations for the continuous study of foreign affairs in their respective nations. They publish highly respected quarterly reviews, Foreign Affairs (CFR) and International Affairs (RIIA). They were consulted by officials who make foreign policy in regard to international treaties and conferences in the interwar years and mobilised for war in 1938 and 1939. They played key roles in advance preparation and planning for the postwar world order. They were, and are, core components of their respective nations’ foreign policy establishments and, some would claim, of an Anglo-American establishment. (Parmar, 2004, p. 3)

As the primary aim of think-tanks was to influence policy development, the achievements of RIIA and CFR, as assessed by Parmar (2004), are testimony of the effectiveness of two think-tanks associated with the field

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of International Relations in its earliest dates. It also confirms a few common characteristics of typical think-tanks which include educating policy makers; publishing their research; and nurturing, building and participating in elite networks of influence. We will continue to focus on RIIA since it provides an additional window into the practices of think-tanks. The Royal Institute of International Affairs RIIA was launched on 5 July 1920 as the British Institute of International Affairs (BIIA), but it changed its name to the Royal Institute of International Affairs after it gained a Royal Charter in 1926. Contrary to the account that locates the roots of RIIA in the unofficial deliberations among British and American delegates and advisors involved in the 1919 Peace Conference in Paris, RIIA’s roots can be traced to the Round Table Movement. This movement had its origins in Sir Alfred Milner’s ‘Kindergarten’, a group of young Oxford graduates recruited to help reconstruct South Africa after the 1899–1902 South African War (Potter, 2007, p. 105; see also Thakur, Davis, & Vale, 2017). This group aimed to promote the imperialist interests of Britain. Actually, it was Sir Alfred Milner, with funds from the Rhodes Estate, who founded the Round Table Movement in 1910 (Parmar, 2004, p.  26). An arch-imperialist, Cecil John Rhodes (1858–1902) had dedicated his life to promoting the interests of the British Empire. So, leaving funds in his will for ‘the creation of an organisation to preserve and extend the Empire – the Round Table’ (Parmar, 2004, p.  26)—was not inconsistent with his imperialist ideology. Lionel Curtis and Philip Kerr (later Lord Lothian), the British ambassador to the US (1939–40), were pivotal members that provided leadership to the Round Table Movement. As members of Milner’s Kindergarten, both were instrumental in the process that led to the political unification of South Africa, which brought together two antagonistic white minority communities (Potter, 2007, p.  106). This experience was foundational with, particularly Curtis, advocating the idea of federal imperialism among members of the British Dominions. The Round Table Movement was the vehicle to achieve this outcome. As noted, Whitney Shepardson, a leading member of the American group, proposed the formation of the (joint US-British) Institute of International Affairs with Lionel Curtis being the British leader. But Shepardson was no stranger to the Round Table

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Movement. In fact, he had been an American correspondent of the Round Table and had also been at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar in 1910 (Parmar, 2004, p. 27). He was not the only member of the American delegation that had an association with the Round Table. So, the formation of both RIIA and CFR predated the 1919 Paris Peace Conference: importantly, too, the foregoing signals the centrality of social networks and shared ideologies in the promotion and solidification of social ideas in the field of International Relations. So, RIIA’s ability to influence British foreign policy during the inter-­ war years was no accident. Some attribute this influence to its ability to attract the skills of experts who were able to conduct research and translate the findings of such research into ‘useful knowledge’, which policymakers might use as the basis for making foreign policy decisions (Parmar, 2004, p.  4). Others explain RIIA’s power to influence to its establishing International Relations as an accepted academic discipline which sanctioned both the knowledge and a language to comprehend the national interest and foreign relations (p. 4); or to its establishing numerous publications aimed at newspaper editors, scholars, Members of Parliament, policy makers, journalist and the public which included memoranda and monographs, an annual Survey of International Affairs, and its journal— International Affairs—and British Yearbook of International Law and a Bulletin of International News (Parmar, 2004). While these certainly fostered and advanced its capability to influence policy outcomes, the decisive factor was that RIIA was increasingly positioned at the heart of the British foreign policy establishment, which means that it was integral to an ‘elite network that connects corporate wealth, universities, philanthropic foundations, and official policymakers’ (p. 3). RIIA’s original listing confirms that it drew its membership from ‘the most active elements of the British establishment’ which included high ranking military officers; Members of Parliament; Foreign Office officials; academics; titled members; and officers and commanders of the British Empire (p. 32). RIIA’s intimate relationship with the establishment assisted Lionel Curtis in his attempts to garner funds for its operations and programmes. Its financial sponsors initially included, among others, the banker JP Morgan; Lord Astor, the owner of two British newspapers—The Times and Observer; the South African mine owner Sir Abe Bailey; the Bank of England; John D. Rockefeller, philanthropist and founder of the American Standard Oil Company; the Carnegie UK Trustees; and the Rockefeller Foundation (pp. 31–32).

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But these benefactors might not have funded RIIA solely motivated by altruism. Instead, Inderjeet Parmar (2004, p.  4) suggests that RIIA research was biased towards the elite and big business interests ‘which wanted to ensure a post-war world order safe for capitalism and Anglo American domination’. Think-Tanks, Funders and Ideological Interests Today, public policy research institutions or organisations are loosely referred to as ‘think-tanks’. This explanation enables some to maintain that think-tanks are autonomous policy research institutions which are established as non-profit organisations with visibility in the policy process (Krastev, 2001; Stone, 2000). But scholars such as Andrew Rich (2004) point out that it is almost impossible to draw a definite distinction between think-tanks and other similar organisations. While, for pragmatic reasons, think-tanks can be defined as ‘independent, non–interest-based, non-profit organizations that produce and principally rely on expertise and ideas to obtain support and to influence the policymaking process’ (p. 11, italics in original), a distinction must be drawn between their operational and political activities. Operationally, think-tanks are non-profit organisations conducting and disseminating research and ideas on public policy issues, whereas politically, they are institutions that aggressively seek credibility from, and political access to, policy-making communities in order to advocate and promote their ideas with the intention of influencing outcomes. Understandably, this is not how think-tanks perceive themselves. They present themselves as bridges that link academic communities with policymaking by promoting the idea that they conduct systematic and reliable research that is understandable and accessible for policy-makers and the public. The literature maintains that think-tanks translate research into relevant and practical ideas for public policy, serve the public interest through stimulating debate, educate the citizenry and conduct research aims to improve public policy (Stone, 2007, p. 261). However, the example of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) suggests differently. Its membership, as we have seen, was limited to the social and economic elite. It ‘operated in secret or semi-secret’ conditions because it questioned the capacities of the wider community to meaningfully contribute to the policy processes (Parmar, 2004, p. 4). Indeed, as stated earlier, Lionel Curtis, the leading architect during the formation of RIIA, believed that valid

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opinion is mainly the product of ‘a small number of people in real contact with the facts who had thought out the issues involved’ (p. 28). Writing on South African think-tanks, Vale and Carter (2008) express the same scepticism. They question the dominant purpose of think-tanks as well as the quality of their contributions to the policy-making process. Vale and Carter confirm the view that think-tanks are in reality policy entrepreneurs that promote specific policy outcomes where politics and management connect. But, they argue that these outcomes are promoted mainly through emulation. On the quality of think-tank contributions to the policy-making process, they maintain that despite proponents arguing that their strength is their capacity to tackle, out of necessity, the demands of modern society with technical expertise, contemporary think-tanks fail to provide any new insight. Abelson (2000, p. 220) shares the above scepticism but goes further and claims that think-tanks promote and advocate the implementation of policies compatible with their ideological beliefs and those shared by their generous benefactors. From the RIIA example, it can be confirmed that despite the accumulation of artefacts associated with scholarship, RIIA’s research had pre-determined outcomes which were based in an ideology that required the preservation of the status quo. This was, as we have recorded, the continuation of capitalism under Anglo-American domination—an outcome that was in the interest of, as well as shared by, its benefactors. The fact that RIIA pursued the political interests of their funders is not irregular. Instead, think-tanks that are dependent on donor funding are vulnerable to the pressures from philanthropic foundations since they must ensure that their positions are congruent with the standpoints of those who fund them (Abelson, 2000, p. 231). Concurring with this perspective, Stone warns that funders utilise think-tanks to ‘achieve indirect societal impact on public opinion and policy agenda’ (2007, p.  344). Similarly, Roy Culpeper, the President of the Canadian-based North-­ South Institute, suggests that because of their financial vulnerability, think-tanks are often hesitant to overtly pass judgement on policies their donors support (cited in Abelson, 2000, p. 231). This view, which focuses on the relationship between think-tanks and their donors, suggests that the former with limited funds, or those whose existence is threatened, might be open to be manipulated by funders to adopt specific political and ideological agendas.

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‘The New Missionaries’ Offering a radical perspective of the issue in the context of Africa, Julie Hearn (2007) warns that think-tanks might be the new missionaries seeking to re-colonise the continent. She argues that development aid is used by the donors in the Global North to entice institutions such as NGOs and think-tanks, to facilitate and promote the introduction of policy agendas which are consistent with the North’s primary goals in Africa. Even though her focus is on NGOs, her argument has relevance for theorising the relationship between African think-tanks and foreign donors. Drawing on Fowler (1991) and Hanlon (1991), who locate Northern development aid destined for the Global South within a broader historical and political context, Hearn (2007, p. 1100) argues that development aid is used by the Global North as a strategy by which to re-colonise Africa. In the analysis, she equates contemporary NGOs/think-tanks with the role played by missionaries during the period of colonisation. To support her stance, she argues that NGOs ‘represent a continuity of the work of their precursors, the missionaries and voluntary organizations that co-operated in Europe’s colonization and control of Africa’ (p. 1100). In a striking footnote, she makes her view explicit, arguing that while it is important to recognise that the relationship between colonialism and missionaries had significant complexities, ‘missions were absolutely central to the project of colonialism’ (p. 1100, footnote 6). She maintains that the relationship between missions and colonialism was ‘symbiotic’ as well as ‘dialectic’, which was evident in the ‘missionary organizations’ taking on the vanguard role on behalf of colonialism by ‘actively calling for greater intervention and using Western occupation for their own ends’. For their part, colonialists used the missionary organisations in support of their own causes (footnote 6). By making these observations, Hearn is suggesting that think-tanks are essential in the neo-colonial project by acting as proxies and promoters of imperial interests. Hearn (2007) goes on to show that the African NGO sector is (and by extension think-tanks are) highly dependent on Northern funding and that the development agendas of recipient NGOs are mostly external in their orientation. Her work confirms that local, as well as foreign, NGOs in Kenya relied on foreign aid for 90% of their funds during 1989/90; and in 1995, thirty-two out of sixty-two NGOs and grassroots organisations (GROs) depended on foreign aid for between 75% and 100% of their income (p.  1103). Due to such high level of dependence on Northern

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funds, African think-tanks and NGOs are forced to ‘comply with northern agendas, creating a set of dependent organizations, not a vibrant and independent sector’ (Wallace, 2003, in Hearn, 2007, p. 1103). Given that think-tanks are dependent on foreign funds for their existence, this chapter is interested in the extent to which African security think-tanks rely on donors, especially foreign ones. Such dependency suggests asymmetrical power relationships between those entities that control the funds and political agendas, and those who are the recipients. In other words, in situations of dependency, the potential of funders/donors to set the political agendas is often exploited. However, this view does not deny the possible agency of the think-tanks. ‘Rather it recognises the hierarchies in international relations and their implications for the power of African agency’ (Hearn, 2007, p. 1104). Think-Tanks, the Media and Advocacy The media are crucial for advocacy as well as for the shaping of public dialogue. For this reason, think-tanks work hard to enhance their media exposure through disseminating op-ed-type articles to newspapers and, increasingly, to online news outlets. Think-tanks also encourage the development of personal relationships with journalists to ensure that their opinions and perspectives are sought. Even though media exposure, by itself, is not a sufficiently strong indicator of policy influence, think-tank directors frequently draw on this when they calculate their ‘influence’ as the media can play an important role in creating the illusion of policy influence. Regular media citations have the potential to impress existing and ‘potential donors’ (Abelson, 2000, pp.  5). This points to the fact that think-tanks always want to impress their benefactors. In order to authenticate themselves, think-tanks often propagate the idea that their primary concern is the promotion of the public interest. This they do by educating the community ‘with their policy analysis’ (Stone, 2007, p. 269). For example, they cite their interaction with civil society as educational initiatives that contribute to democracy and social development. They introduce their policy options in the name of public awareness and so limit and frame how the public discusses the policy options. However, think-tanks are often silent on why they have appointed themselves as representatives of the public interest. This is a critical concern because think-tanks seldom demonstrate that ‘public debate has been “enlightened” by their research’ (Stone, 2007, p. 269). On the contrary,

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think-tanks are not necessarily a ‘benign force within civil society’ (Stone, 2000, p. 169). In the words of Diane Stone: Think tanks can reflect, reinforce and amplify division in society and exaggerate societal tensions. It is equally possible for think tanks to act as a force to limit and contain civil society pressures. They do not inevitably establish dynamics for democratisation, participation and public inclusive debate. In short, social capital can be “preserved” and issues of power and conflict come to the fore.

The scholarly literature shows that think-tanks are entities with specific ‘material interests’ and constitute ‘ideational forces that are skilled in the art of persuasion, agenda setting and advocacy’ (p. 153). In other words, despite claims to the contrary, think-tanks are not value-free; we have observed this in the case of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA). Instead, think-tanks promote particular ideological positions which become evident in the way they formulate and/or analyse the public policy issues. However, such ideological orientation and positioning means that think-tanks produce specific outcomes because their insights and analyses are invariably clouded by specific biases that marginalise some interests, while advantaging others. Despite these biases, the ideas and the work of think-tanks are seen as genuine because they are associated with the rituals of the research process. Claiming that their findings are the product of ‘research’ provides them with the authority to articulate their insights with conviction. Furthermore, their specialised skills to persuade and to advocate afford them distinct advantages in the marketplace of competitive social ideas. In most contexts, think-tanks and policymakers are engaged in a symbiotic relationship. On one hand, the authority and status of think-tanks are enhanced when policymakers draw on the research and guidance they offer. On the other hand, policymakers also require the public legitimation which is offered by the work of think-tanks. But invariably, policymakers consult only those think-tanks whose advice is consistent with their needs because policymakers have ‘little time to react to the demands of their job’ (Rich, 2004, p. 86). As a result, divergent policy advice is not sufficiently evaluated and/or critically assessed. However, think-tanks have neither the power nor the authority to translate their ideas directly into public policy. Ultimately, state bureaucracies and their policymakers both make and decide on policy detail; whereas,

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politicians and journalists ‘politicise’ research and use it in their interests (Rich, 2004, p. 89). So, an issue that needs explanation is how ideas produced within think-­ tanks are transferred to the policy-making communities. Policy ideas are not necessarily transferred directly to policymakers. One of the indirect ways in which think-tanks transfer ideas is by ensuring that the policy-development agenda is set and framed by their ideas. Furthermore, because they are (mostly informally) ‘organised’ into a ‘sector’ and, by working together, cohorts of think-tanks exercise atmospheric influence over the policy agenda. To do this, members of think-tanks participate in conferences, seminars, workshops and exchange emails, all of which contribute to self-interested debates about policy choices. However, these debates are not promoted in order to consider the implications or validity of the options, but rather to place limitations on the range of policy options. In this sense think-tanks become part of an ‘invisible college’ that provides spaces for ‘intellectual exchange and information flow’ (Stone, 2001, p. 347) as well as setting and framing the political agenda relevant to a specific policy issue. Participating in an epistemic community or ‘a thought network’ can enhance a think-tank’s influence. The relationship between think-tanks and an epistemic community will become clearer in the conversation that now follows.

Epistemic Communities The idea of the epistemic community requires exploration in order to comprehend how membership enhances think-tank influence in relation to the policy-making process. The first reported usage of the concept ‘epistemic communities’ within International Relations (IR) is credited to John Ruggie (1972) who built on Foucault’s (1970) concept ‘episteme’ to conceive the idea of ‘epistemic communities’ (Antoniades, 2003, p. 23). In such knowledge communities or thought networks, members organise themselves around a knowledge question, or an episteme. However, participation in an epistemic community is limited to those who meet the criterion that they are knowledgeable and regarded as an authority on the episteme around which the network organises itself. Accordingly, membership of the epistemic community is both facilitated and constrained by members sharing the ‘“proper” construction of reality’ (Antoniades, 2003, p. 23, citing Ruggie, 1972).

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After Ruggie’s initial introduction, the concept remained marginal within IR during the 1980s and early 1990s until its re-introduction in the 1992 special issue of International Organization which focused on the subject: ‘Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination’. Motivated by the perspective that policy ‘actors can learn new patterns of reasoning and may consequently begin to pursue new state interests’ when faced with uncertainty, Peter Haas (1992, p. 2) suggested that ‘networks of knowledge-based experts—epistemic communities’—might help states to identify their own interests. In his introductory essay, Haas (p. 3) defined an epistemic community as ‘a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area’. It is important to note that Adler and Haas (1992, p. 368) emphasise that epistemic communities are neither a ‘“new” international actor [n]or a unit of analysis’. Rather, they are a ‘vehicle for the development of insightful theoretical premises about the creation of collective interpretation and choice’ (p.  368). This suggests that it is the epistemic community that constructs and produces the ‘knowledge’ rather than discovering of an objective reality. Even though, as we have seen, Ruggie is credited with introducing the concept of epistemic community to IR (Antoniades, 2003), the practice of a ‘thought collective’ concerned with international relations is found perhaps in the work of the Round Table Movement (Parmar, 2004, p. 26). As discussed, for Lionel Curtis, the Round Table advocated for a federal parliament that had the power to decide military and diplomatic matters and consist of representatives from Britain and each of its Dominions (Potter, 2007, p. 106). This idea of ‘Empire’ constituted the central episteme around which members of the Round Table Movement organised themselves (p. 106). Members of the Round Table were recruited from the British Dominions and the movement ‘published a journal, the Round Table, to discuss imperial issues from a common political viewpoint and …, it was hoped, lead opinion’ (p. 106). However, this was not the only collective which has focused on international issues. Another thought collective which significantly impacted the field of IR was the Mont Pélerin Society which was established in 1947. This anti-collectivist, anti-socialist epistemic community concerned itself with the development of ‘an agenda diverging from classical liberalism’ (Phehwe, 2009, p. 6), with the aim of establishing of ‘neo-liberalism’ as an alternative political and economic programme and practice. The

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cumulative success of this collective’s endeavours is evident in the words of a scholar who concluded that neo-liberalism is ‘one of the most powerful bodies of political knowledge of the current era’ (p.  3). While the Mont Pélerin Society was (strictly speaking) not a focused IR thought collective, it serves as an excellent illustration of how an initially unpopular idea—liberalism after the Great Depression—became hegemonic to the point where one commentator referred to ‘neo-liberalism’ as ‘a universal ideology’ (p. 3). The reason why the Mont Pélerin Society is relevant to an enquiry into epistemic communities is that if ‘neo-liberalism is approached primarily as a historic “thought collective” of increasing global proportions’ (p. 4), it will become clear that the episteme of neo-liberalism has been facilitated, nurtured, transported and protected by the Society over time. As such, in shaping the development of neo-liberalism, the Mont Pélerin Society, with its theorists, think-tanks and related networks, generated ‘survey data’, organised ‘academic conferences’, sounded ‘early warnings’ and campaigned ‘against perceived threats to the neo-liberal cause’ (p. 4). As an epistemic community, the Mont Pélerin Society provided an insight into how knowledge became sedimented; how it was transported; and how power and authority were implicated in the authoring of hegemonic knowledge. As with most social concepts, a so-called epistemic community does not have universal acceptance. Notwithstanding its critics, this publication maintains that this notion—epistemic communities—as collectives of national and international ‘experts’ can contribute significantly to creating a shared understanding of how a policy issue should be viewed. Another example directly relevant to IR is provided by Adler (1992) who documents how an American epistemic community contributed to the creation of a shared understanding and approach to practice in relation to nuclear arms issues during the Cold War period. He notes that when US scientists and strategists became aware that a nuclear attack could result in ‘mutual destruction’ of both the US and the USSR, they constituted themselves as a US epistemic community to consider the possible policy options (pp. 101–2). Based on their deliberations and analysis, this epistemic community argued that superpower collaboration to ‘stabilize the nuclear balance through arms control’ could enhance the US’s national security as well as avoid nuclear war. As this community developed ‘their shared epistemic criteria about the causes of war, the effect of technological change on the arms race and the need for adversaries to cooperate’

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(p. 102), its members ensured that their insights reached the minds of the decision-makers in order for their ideas to become national security policy. The same community became ‘instrumental in diffusing’ their ideas about collaboration with the Soviet Union, which became the foundation on which US-Soviet negotiations were based—in Adler’s words, the ‘Soviets agreed to negotiate with the Americans on the basis of this understanding, and it has formed the foundation of U.S.-Soviet cooperation over the last thirty years’ (p. 102). This example illustrates that expert advice can shape policy outcomes and, in particular, shows that by constituting themselves into a community, experts were able to influence how nuclear arms were viewed by both the US and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the example also shows that both through framing and through consensus, the experts were subjugating and/or eliminating alternative knowledge(s) of, and insights into, viewing/interpreting the issue. This highlights the ever-present knowledge/power dynamic in the sanctioning and establishing of ‘hegemonic knowledge’. The foregoing discussion suggests that while epistemic community has significant legitimacy as a concept within IR, the original definition provided by Peter Haas (1992) has been interpreted too narrowly by IR practitioners. This notwithstanding, Davis Cross (2013, p. 147) is assured that epistemic communities are ‘making an increasing contribution to the development of preferences and worldviews of states and international regimes’. For this reason, he reconceptualises Haas’s original definition of epistemic communities in this way: [A]ctors that comprise epistemic communities can be governmental or non-­ governmental, scientific or non-scientific, and their persuasiveness rests in large part on their degree of internal cohesion and professionalism. […]. This internal cohesion ultimately provides the group with an episteme, a shared worldview that derives from their mutual socialisation and shared knowledge. Moreover, when a group of professionals with recognised expertise is able to speak with one voice, that voice is often seen as more legitimate because it is based on a well-reasoned consensus among those in the best position to know. (p. 147)

This amended definition confirms that the knowledge produced by the network of professionals is both socially constructed and inter-subjective since the definition is explicit that the ‘persuasiveness’ of the knowledge is

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dependent on the ‘internal cohesion and professionalism’ of the participating members. Moreover, it is this ‘internal cohesion’ which allows the group to agree upon ‘an episteme, a shared worldview’ (p.  147.). Furthermore, this understanding recognises the possibility of competing worldviews. Accordingly, to ensure that the specific epistemic community’s worldview gains acceptance and remains hegemonic, it is proposed that the community ‘speak with one voice’ to make certain that the community’s episteme is ‘seen as more legitimate’ than competing ones (p. 147). Returning to the issue of relationship between think-tanks and an epistemic community: A think-tank is a local policy research and development institution whose members are primarily those involved in research. An epistemic community is a forum or network that focuses on a specific episteme, for example, the phenomenon of terrorism. Multiple institutions such as think-tanks and government agencies might be involved in issues related to terrorism. However, membership of the epistemic community focusing on terrorism will be limited to those with the accepted credentials. This means that not all think-tanks or their researchers will become members of the terrorism knowledge network. But the outcomes of their deliberations are made available to all actors in the field, ensuring that the views of the epistemic community become the dominant perspective on the issue.

Think-Tanks as Providers of Reliable Advice Consistent with their assumed strategic location within the policy-making arena, think-tanks, as so-called scientific establishments, create the impression that their insights are based on careful study, analysis and examination, and that their findings and recommendations have considered the recent knowledge. For this reason, they propagate their insights with authority and conviction. However, this self-representation, associating think-tanks with a search for the ‘truth’, has not gone unchallenged. Peter Vale and Jonathan Carter (2008) question the belief that think-­ tanks are scientific establishments doing serious scholarly research. While recognising that they produce knowledge that resembles and is consistent with scholarly conventions, they maintain that ‘the search for truth – said to be the purpose of all serious scholarship – is of little concern within the think-tank community’. Instead, ‘[f]reed from their obligation of public trust, think tanks proselytise and promote self-interested forms of

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knowledge’. Another critic points out that even though think-tanks follow accepted research protocols and practices, and make ‘practically orientated recommendations’, the proposals that emerge from their research, on occasion, ‘seem impractical, politically unrealistic, or arcane’ (Smith, 1993, p. xii). Thus, perhaps it is best to view think-tanks as ideological entrepreneurs who either sustain or legitimate an ‘existing “climate of ideas”’, or act as the ‘catalysts for a new one’ (Gamble, 1998, p. v). This criticism of the quality of think-tank recommendations is not to suggest that their advice is totally questionable. Instead, while experts might have a positive influence, one needs to be suspicious when knowledge and expertise are used to claim political influence. Such suspicion includes questioning the motivations of policy experts. Motives of Policy Experts Some experts are motivated to provide policy advice in the hope that they might gain exposure and become influential within the corridors of power. These experts imagine that their involvement in policy-related research might provide them with recognition which confers political authority. This is particularly so in the US, where policy experts have often been approached to fill important government positions owing to their association with think-tanks as scholars and researchers (Abelson, 2000; Smith, 1993). Experts are also sometimes approached to become personal political advisors (Stone, 2001) to the US executive. However, not all policy experts are interested in gaining access to political power. Some academics offer their services to policy think-tanks as a way of remaining active within the policy-development processes (Stone, 2000, p. 160). Another group, who have acquired their education at institutions abroad and who are familiar with think-tanks in these countries, ‘seek to import and adapt the form [think-tank model] to their own country’ (p. 160). Such policy entrepreneurs ensure that they network with other think-tanks in order to establish and/or develop regional and international links to increase their visibility. Accordingly, their advice is primarily for ‘more self-interested reasons’ such as seeking visibility abroad, providing informal entrée into decision-making forums, and providing policy experience and personal contacts through networking that frequently positions them to make beneficial career moves (p. 160). The radical work of Julie Hearn (2007) has already been highlighted. She maintains that because some NGOs and think-tanks are financially

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dependent on Northern donors, they offer themselves as agents of international capital against the interests of indigenous classes. In her view, directors of such NGOs and think-tanks are no different from the ‘comprador Southern bourgeoisie’, which is ‘dependent’ on the global ruling class for ‘its resources and position’ (p. 1098). Drawing on dependency theory (see Chirot & Hall, 1982), Hearn (2007, p. 1106) concludes that a ‘new comprador group which depends on foreign interest for its wealth and power’ is establishing itself in Africa. Because these experts are dependent on resources and power which they gain because of their relationship with Northern donors, they are motivated to become compradors—agents for the re-colonisers. In this role, their primary function is ‘to divert attention from the root causes of African poverty, to pacify and peddle Western values and civilisation’ (p. 1106). Having explored various concepts of what constitutes ‘think-tanks’, having examined their significance within the public policy processes through epistemic communities, and having discussed the strategies they adopt to transfer policy advice, the section that follows introduces four carefully selected South African security think-tanks whose policy-related research and advocacy include a focus on Islam, Muslims and security in Africa.

South African-Based IR Think-Tanks Chapter 2 explained why four South African think-tanks were selected as sites to gather data. To remind the reader they are: the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA); the Institute for Security Studies (ISS); the Centre for International Policy Studies (CiPS), University of Pretoria; and the Brenthurst Foundation. In examining the origins and purpose of each of these bodies, it will become apparent that even though they share perspectives on the threat of contemporary terrorism in South Africa, separately these think-tanks pursue divergent knowledge projects. What immediately follows is an introductory exploration of SAIIA, the most longstanding South African think-tank with an interest in international relations. South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) On its website, the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) represents itself as an ‘independent non-governmental think-tank’ which

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is regarded as ‘South Africa’s premier research institute on international relations’. It claims that its key purpose is to encourage ‘wider and more informed awareness of the importance of international affairs’ (SAIIA, http://www.saiia.org.za/about). But who and/or what gave SAIIA the mandate and authority to educate the public about ‘the importance of international affairs’? Reflecting on the origins of SAIIA might provide an answer to this question. In earlier discussion, it was stated that the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) and SAIIA shared a common origin. So, the starting point of the SAIIA can be traced to the discussions that took place between some members of the British and US delegations attending the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference (Abelson, 2014; Bostock, 1984; Parmar, 2004). An examination of the history of both SAIIA and RIIA will confirm that these two institutes have had an intimate ‘daughter-parent’ relationship. The British Royal Charter of 1926 tasked the RIIA to ‘encourage and facilitate the formation of branches and committees throughout [the British] Dominions’ (Bostock, 1984, p. 4). So, even though RIIA could be regarded as the parent in this relationship, Whitney Shepardson, a US delegate to the Versailles Conference, and one of the proposers of the Institute of International Affairs, claimed that the origins of the idea to establish an Anglo-American Institute of International Relations had its beginnings in South Africa (Bostock, 1984, p. 1; see also Parmar, 2004; Potter, 2007; Thakur et al., 2017). As we have noted, it was Lionel Curtis, a member of the Milner Kindergarten, a selected group who assisted Lord Milner in South Africa after the Second Anglo-Boer War, who made and drove the proposal for the establishment of the Institute (Bostock, 1984; Parmar, 2004; Potter, 2007). In addition, Abe Bailey, a South African mining magnate, provided a yearly endowment of £5000 to the Institute up until 1926 (Bostock, 1984, p. 3). Therefore, on January 1928, Sir James Beattie, the then Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cape Town, made a request to RIIA that ‘an association for the study of problems of African peoples’ be established in South Africa (Beattie, 1928, quoted in Bostock, 1984, p. 6). This request was motivated by the pending South African legislation on the so-called ‘Native Problem’, which was to be enacted without reference to how other African colonies had dealt with similar ‘problems’ (p. 7). Aside from South Africa’s strategic importance on the African continent, the Beattie request held the promise that ‘Africa, South of the Sahara, from a political point of view [could be] studied as a whole’ and that such studies

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might benefit ‘countries where these things were not being studied’ (Shepardson, 1948, quoted in Bostock, 1984, p. 4). So, the Beattie proposal which intended to focus on the ‘Native Problem’ was definitely consistent with RIIA’s goals of maintaining and managing the British Empire (See Parmar, 2004; Potter, 2007). Although they supported the request, RIIA indicated that their African Study Group had studied and published articles on ‘native problems’ and that they did have members residing in South Africa. Based on this, they advised that a South African branch of RIIA be established (Bostock, 1984, p. 7) instead. Despite such positive endorsement, the initiative initially failed to gain sufficient traction. What explains this? About two years before Beattie made the proposal to form a RIIA branch in South Africa, General J.B.M. Hertzog, the Afrikaner and leader of the National Party, became Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa. At that time, British citizens’ involvement in the affairs of the Unions was treated with suspicion by Hertzog. So, when preparations were made for the 1933 British Commonwealth Relations Conference in Canada, Charles Manning (1894–1978)—the South African born Rhodes Scholar who participated in the Preparatory Committee as the South African representative—was encouraged by the committee to advocate for South Africa’s participation in the Conference. He was also advised to consult widely, including with the then South African Prime Minister, J.B.M. Hertzog. Manning succeeded in meeting with Hertzog to explain the purpose of the conference (Manning, 1977 in Bostock, 1984). While Hertzog did not object to South Africa’s participation in the British Commonwealth Relations Conference there was uncertainty whether Manning’s efforts were successful. But, securing financial support from the Carnegie Corporation to fund a South African delegation had been decisive in the South African decision to participate in the Conference (Bostock, 1984, p. 7). This delegation was led by Senator F.  S. Malan, another Afrikaner leader. So, the actual spark that resulted in the establishment of the SAIIA can be attributed to South Africa’s participation in both the 1932 Preparatory (Programme) Committee for the first British Commonwealth Relations Conference as well as its participation in the 1933 Conference (p. 7). Furthermore, co-opting Senator Malan to lead the delegation was significant as it created the conditions for an Afrikaner leader to advocate for SAIIA’s formation as will be seen now.

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On their return, the South African delegates called for the establishment of its own institute of international affairs (p. 9). This resulted in the launch on 12 May 1934 of the South African Institute of International Affairs with significant support from the South African political elite and the establishment intelligentsia. The founding members of the newly launched SAIIA included ‘members of both Houses of Parliament, staff of the Universities of Cape Town and Stellenbosch, and the editorial staff of leading Cape Town newspapers’ (Minutes of Founding meeting held on 12 May 1934, quoted in Bostock, 1984, p. 9). At its founding meeting, the delegates indicated that affiliation to RIIA would be ‘highly desirable’ (Bostock, 1984, p. 11). The establishment press celebrated the founding of SAIIA as an indication that ‘foreign affairs’ in ‘democratic states’ have shifted from being ‘matters of high policy’ and secrecy to a recognition that ‘the man in the street was now more interested in international affairs’ (Cape Argus 12 May 1934 cited in Bostock, 1984, p. 11). However, what the Cape Argus failed to inform its readers was that SAIIA took on the task of representing their voice and took the initiative to set the international affairs agenda regarding which issue/s ‘the man in the street’ should be concerned about, and to frame how these issue/s ought to be viewed. At this point it is necessary to pause and reflect on this historical narrative to ascertain the meaning of the SAIIA for South Africa. The Historical Perspective on the SAIIA In the 1930s South Africa enjoyed status as a Dominion within the British Empire. Being a Dominion, at that time, meant that states were completely autonomous when it came to their internal affairs, but they were compelled to subject their foreign policies to that of the empire (Thakur, 2014, p.  58). However, since South Africa’s internal political authority had shifted towards the Afrikaners during the 1920s, the new South African political elite viewed with suspicion attempts by ‘British’ South African citizens to introduce matters relating to foreign affairs, which had the potential to strengthen British hegemony locally. Such misgivings on the part of Afrikaners about being incorporated into the ‘international’ under British hegemony were not unfounded. We will see in these pages that SAIIA became the carrier and constructor of knowledge about the ‘international’ that privileged British interests. As such, it (re)presented what was considered international by acting as an

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intermediary for British hegemony. SAIIA’s history informs us that questions relating to what was deemed international were frequently referred to RIIA and its affiliates. For example, the speech by General Jan Smuts in Cape Town on 9 February 1935 was important because Smuts designated SAIIA as the local RIIA representative. He also expressed the expectation that it imitate RIIA’s role of becoming the ‘centre of study, of discussion and of enlightenment in international affairs’ and constructing knowledge about the international and sharing such ‘political education’ with South Africa (cited in Bostock, 1984, pp.  13–14). These proposals were not innocent. Instead, the ideas propagated by Smuts were integral to a ‘network of people and institutions across the British Empire that were associated with the Round Table Movement’ (Thakur et al., 2017, p. 4). This network aimed to reshape the ‘Empire into an alliance of states that would share the responsibility of Imperial defence’ at a time when the political hegemony of the British Empire was threatened by Japan, Germany and the US (p. 6). In addition, under Lionel ‘Curtis’s Scheme’ of ‘Imperial Unity’, Dominions were to have more sovereign authority to decide on ‘domestic and foreign matters, and in governing the Empire itself’ (p. 7). The international of ‘Curtis’s Scheme’ existed within a constructed Realist world—a social world that conceives ‘sovereignty as the central organising/founding principle’ (Vale, 2014, p. 132) and state anarchy as the ‘natural’ condition of the international system. This system, in the contemporary world, necessitates the constant defence and identification of threats to state sovereignty. The creation of numerous ‘emergencies’, whether in the form of the ‘Cold War’ or the ‘Global War on Terror’, requires the public to be educated about the international. Such a role is performed by the ‘disciplinary gatekeepers’, which in South Africa’s case is taken on by SAIIA through their circulating and re-circulating the founding tropes of Realism (p. 133). This critique challenges the declared independent status of SAIIA. It can be argued that SAIIA emphasises its independent status in order to convince the public that its policy research, analysis and findings are credible and trustworthy and that its research agenda and outcomes have not been influenced and/or contaminated by external interests and/or inducements. While representing itself as an ‘independent’ institution, SAIIA simultaneously highlights its purpose as a value-free research institution that is primarily concerned with educating, informing and translating policy concerns/implications as these impinge upon international relations. Accordingly, through its self-representation, SAIIA wants to

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ensure that it is not viewed as an advocacy, lobby or pressure group. Instead, it wants to be viewed as a serious policy research institution that makes its scholarly research findings available through its publications, its education and policy development programmes, and by means of its organising and participating role in conferences, seminars and workshops. As a policy research institution, it entered into an association with the University of the Witwatersrand, which led to SAIIA locating itself within the Jan Smuts House at that University (SAIIA, http://saiia.org.za/ General/history-of-saiia). Its location and association with this university introduced it to the trappings of the academy and elevated its status to that of a member among a community of scholars. As an academic institution at the university, SAIIR established the Department of International Relations; this university-based department both conducted research and trained students—both under-graduate and post-graduate—in the field of International Relations. Together, both the SAIIA and the university-­ based department participated in an academic network which facilitated ‘international intellectual exchanges’ regarded as crucial for fostering ‘links with over eighty similar organisations, academic departments and libraries’ (SAIIA, http://saiia.org.za/General/history-of-saiia). The SAIIA also established an academic journal, South African Journal of International Affairs, which was initially published in-house. SAIIA is funded by foreign governments, charitable foundations, companies, individual donors, and its corporate, diplomatic and (what it calls) ‘institutional members’. An assessment of its publicly declared donors and partners reveals that it primarily accesses Western sources of funding which include: Western governments and development agencies; and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) (SAIIA, http://www. saiia.org.za/General/funders). Anglo American Corporation was a local donor and Harry Oppenheimer served as SAIIA’s Life-time Chairman. As we have noted, foreign funding is often integral to strategies by which a country conducts its foreign relations, and is obvious thus that funding is not a value-neutral activity. Few would dispute that US philanthropic foundations and USAID, in particular—actively and intentionally—use foreign aid to construct US hegemony internationally (Hills, 2006; Parmar, 2002). In a study that explores American foundations and international knowledge networks, Parmar (2002, p. 24) concludes that these foundations mirror the objectives of US official foreign policy and they use their financial resources to construct an international knowledge

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network which follows a research agenda that promotes US geopolitical interests. This chapter now turns to introduce the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). Institute for Security Studies (ISS) The Institute for Security Studies (ISS), which was founded in 1991 as the Institute for Defence Politics, changed its name in 1996. The ISS presents itself as an institution that conducts ‘independent and authoritative research, provides expert policy advice, and delivers practical and technical assistance’ to African states (Institute for Security Studies, http://www. issafrica.org/about-us/how-we-work). Jakkie Cilliers, its co-founder and former Executive Director, explains that the ISS has its roots in the May 1990 meeting hosted by the African National Congress in Lusaka, Zambia, between its liberation army, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), and ‘concerned’ South African security specialists and analysts (Centre for Security Studies 2014). Is this claim perhaps made to appeal for political legitimacy? ISS states that it is an institute which aims to enhance human security in Africa (http://www.issafrica.org/about-us/how-we-work). But human security, as advocated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) prioritises the security and wellbeing of people. The UNDP (1994, no pagination) maintains that the concept of security should include a concern for individual security as most people experience insecurity that has its origin in everyday concerns rather than worrying about the ‘dread of a cataclysmic world event’. Human security, according to the UNDP, responds to and addresses societal issues such as: unemployment (‘job security’); the degradation in the quality of health (‘health security’) and environment (‘environmental security’); and crime. But, a scrutiny of the philosophical orientation of Jakkie Cilliers and knowledge of his intimate association with the military suggest that he is far more inclined towards a Clausewitzean interpretation of security which regards the ‘military as a rational instrument of state policy’ (Pretorius, 2008, p. 37). So, what is his background? Cilliers joined the military in 1974 immediately after matriculation from school, and it can be inferred that he was methodically trained as a professional soldier who was destined to occupy a senior leadership position within the South African Defence Force (SADF). This is clear in his ‘LinkedIn’ profile which states that he:

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Did a BMil degree at the Military Academy in Saldana Bay (1974–1976), joined the South African Artillery and, after completing Phase 4, was posted to 4 Field Regiment in Potchefstroom, also serving at 61 Mechanised Battalion Group based at Omuthiya. Various stints at School of Artillery, Chief of Staff Operations and 61 Mechanised Battalion Group during which I did a Hons BA, MA and then a DLitt et Phil. Asked to be posted to the State Security Council. (http://www.linkedin.com/pub/jakkiecilliers/25a9b/a74)

This life-long association with the military is important since it not only suggests the nature of his leadership of ISS, but it also explains his modernist model of state which is based within a Weberian understanding that the state has the monopoly over the legitimate use of organised violence. This model, which in turn is derived from a Clauewitzean interpretation of what ‘constitutes stable civil-military relations in a democracy’ (Pretorius, 2008, p. 37), is evident in Cilliers’ 1994 argument. Here he argued that the apartheid-trained South African Defence Force (SADF) personnel are indispensable in a democratic South African defence force, while the integration of liberation army members into it is to provide legitimacy—in other words, their primary function is ‘political’ instead of ‘professional’ (Cilliers, 1994, p. 386). A human security orientation would have recognised that after South Africa’s emergence from apartheid and with no ‘foreseeable military threat’, socio-economic threats are the main security concerns which confront the majority of South Africans (Pretorius, 2008, p. 39). Instead, his military bias (Cilliers, 1994) might have prevented him from comprehending that the military’s role might also include contributing towards alleviating underdevelopment and poverty which are consistent with the discourse on human security. The inconsistency in its articulated security orientation (human security) and its security praxis (state-centric security) allows the ISS to pursue an entrepreneurial knowledge project. This suggests that the ‘research’ foci of the institute are determined by the security priorities in which financial resources are made available for research, education and advocacy. This entrepreneurial orientation is confirmed by Cilliers in his statement that the ISS:

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… not only played a key role in helping transition South Africa into a genuine democracy, it also started to spread its wings and successfully worked in fields such as crime and justice, the control of small arms, etc. The ISS, after dedicating its energies to aiding and abetting South Africa’s political transition from 1991 through 1996, then assumed a regional orientation which ultimately resulted in the thriving multi-­ dimensional continental organization that it is today. (Center for Security Studies, 3 June 2014)

In other words, even though the ISS initially focused on the security policy concerns as South Africa transitioned from an apartheid state, it transformed itself into a policy research institute that focused on security concerns affecting the entire African continent. For this, and to facilitate its entrepreneurial knowledge project, the ISS had made arrangements which included maintaining its head office in Pretoria, South Africa, and establishing regional offices in Cape Town (RSA), Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Dakar (Senegal) and Nairobi (Kenya) (ISS, http://issafrica.org/aboutus/how-we-work). Moreover, in 2003 it formed a cooperation partnership with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). IGAD is one of the African Union’s designated Regional Economic Communities whose mission it is to ‘assist and complement’ the political/ development work of states in the Horn of Africa. In 2006 this special ISS-­IGAD partnership led to the establishment of the ‘IGAD Capacity Building Programme against Terrorism (ICPAT)’ with ISS playing a leading role in the partnership (ISS, http://www.issafrica.org/about-us/ press-releases/presses-release-press-release-iss-and-igad-to-coperatethe-horn-of-africa). As with the SAIIA, ISS is funded primarily by Western governments and government agencies (see list of ‘Development partners’ at http:// www.issafrica.org/about-us/how-we-work). Investigating who the donors of think-tanks are, is important because, as we have discussed earlier, think-tanks frequently frame or select policy research issues on the basis of the ideological agenda of their benefactors. Funders, on their part, use think-tanks to exercise indirect influence on policy development and the policy agenda (see Abelson, 2000; Hearn 2007; Stone, 2007). ISS’s funders, in addition to Western governments, are USAID; the government of Japan; the Ford Foundation; the Geneva Centre for Security Policy; the Gesellschat für Internationale Zusammenarbeit; the

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Open Society Foundation for South Africa; the World Bank; and United Nations Development Programme. The fact that ISS has located its regional offices in specific countries might not have been incidental if its donors are considered. Three of these countries are identical to those the US has identified as key countries to be influenced in its goal of fighting terrorism in Africa—Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya and Ethiopia (Hills, 2006, p. 636). This signals that the ISS might be a proxy for US influence in these countries. The Brenthurst Foundation The Brenthurst Foundation was established in October 2004 by the Oppenheimer family in order to introduce ‘new ideas and innovative action for strengthening Africa’s economic performance’ (https://www. facebook.com/thebrenthurstfoundation). This aim seems to be a continuation of the role the Oppenheimer family had played in Africa, including South Africa, as the founders of the Anglo American Group of companies. Under the leadership of the Oppenheimer family, the Anglo American Corporation (hereafter Anglo) developed into one of the most powerful economic forces in Africa, particularly in South Africa from whence its interest extended ‘deep into the heart of Africa’ (Innes, 1984, p. 13). Anglo’s dominant position, however, had not been accidentally achieved. Instead, it ‘emerged both as a product of the evolving social relations in South Africa and as an [agent who had an] important influence on [these social relations]’ (p. 16). In other words, apart from benefiting from the colonialisation of Africa and under apartheid South Africa, Anglo also took active steps to influence the social relations that would eventually benefit it, and others, involved in the mining sector. In addition, since Anglo maintained a monopoly in Africa’s diamond industry up to the early 1990s, and a near-monopoly in southern Africa’s gold, copper, finance and manufacturing industries (Innes, 1984; Kaplan, 1983; Kennedy, 1986; Spar, 2006), moves to strengthen Africa’s economy automatically strengthened Anglo as well. The Brenthurst Foundation states that it communicates ‘new ideas and innovative actions’ to governments and other interested parties by means of forums such as private seminars, conferences and private meetings. Such gatherings enable decision-makers and experts, to exchange experiences and insights. Furthermore, this foundation claims that it sets out to produce relevant and practical policy advice to benefit governments and to

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generate ‘new thinking’ and ‘thought-leadership’ to respond to Africa’s need for political and socio-economic development (www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/brenthurst-story.htm). Based on this, it can be assumed that government bureaucracies/ decision-­makers and policy experts constitute the target audience for the foundation’s policy initiatives. These benign goals construct the Brenthurst Foundation as a benevolent and altruistic institution since its policy work seems essentially concerned with Africa’s economic development. But based on an examination of the historical understanding of the growth of monopoly capital and Anglo’s own history in Africa, and in South Africa, in particular, this publication suggests that the primary purpose of the Brenthurst Foundation is to consolidate, promote and spread capitalism on the continent in order to reinforce and grow Anglo’s economic interests. To appreciate this, it is necessary to explore the development of monopoly capitalism in South Africa and to examine the role played by the Oppenheimer family in this process. Why Do We Consider the History Important to This Inquiry? The Oppenheimer family has become synonymous with the South African diamond industry as well as with diamond trade internationally because they owned 100% of the South African diamond mines by the end of the 1970s (Gupta, Polonsky, Woodside, & Webster, 2010). They reached this dominant position after the Anglo American Corporation took over the De Beers Group of Companies (Fine, 1994), established in 1888 by Cecil Rhodes. While numerous corporations were involved in the diamond industry, De Beers evolved into and maintained a near monopoly within the uncut diamond market in Africa, and effectively controlled this market up to the early 1990s (see Gupta et  al., 2010; Innes, 1984; Kaplan, 1983; Spar, 2006). This dominant position within the industry had been achieved as a result of its ‘long-term partnership arrangements with other mines and with governments of countries where diamonds were found’ (Gupta et al., 2010, p. 204). Notwithstanding its success in gaining support for its mining initiatives from successive South African governments, a key barrier to the maximisation of its mining profits was the ‘unreliability’ and ‘expense’ of mining labour.

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The formation and development of the Anglo American Corporation in South Africa and Africa, it will be shown, serve as evidence that Ernest Oppenheimer actively sought to influence states as to how the corporation ought to be viewed by them. In preparing the political and economic grounds for the establishment of the Anglo American Corporation in South Africa, Ernest Oppenheimer presented the then Prime Minister, General J.  C. Smuts, with a ‘confidential statement outlining “the American Connection”’ (Innes, 1984, p.  92). This secretive statement sought Smuts’s support in a South African government’s decision to sanction the establishment of the Corporation at a time when the new company was viewed as an attempt, by American capital, to dominate South Africa’s natural resources (p.  92). Similarly, the former South African Finance Minister, F.  C. Hull, an Anglo director in the 1920s, secretly negotiated with the South African government to secure a Namibian diamond company for the Anglo Group (p. 98). Such secretive interaction with decision-makers also occurred during the process that led to the dissolution of the Central African Federation and just before political independence in Zambia (see Cohen, 2008). What Anglo’s history suggests is that perhaps the Oppenheimers were concerned primarily with the growth and protection of the capitalist class to the detriment of the African proletariat which experienced various forms of oppression under their watch. Based on this history, it is not difficult to imagine that the Brenthurst Foundation’s function is to continue this legacy. This researcher was constrained in gaining a textured insight into the Brenthurst Foundation as its director was unavailable for an interview, as was explained in Chap. 2. The Centre for International Policy Studies (CiPS) The Centre for International Policy Studies (CiPS), University of Pretoria, is a multi-disciplinary Centre engaged in academic, practical, teaching and research activities. The Centre is situated within the School of Social Science at the University of Pretoria. From its inception, the CiPS, unlike university departments, was to be a self-funded entity (Hussein Solomon, January 20, 2015, email communication). According to its self-representation, the CiPS aims to conduct and ‘disseminate research’ in order to develop the capacity of state and non-state institutions. It claims that it does research on political, social, cultural and

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related aspects in an international context, with an emphasis on politics; it also ‘does academic liaison and […] disseminat[es] […] research findings through public lectures, conferences, seminars, symposia, workshops and publications’ (CiPS, http://www.briledge.com/webportfolio/CIPS/ index.htm). In order to locate the CiPS contextually and historically, it is necessary to gain insight into its foundational roots and associations. Situated within the School of Social Science at the University of Pretoria, CiPS was established in 1999 five years after the demise of apartheid. CiPS and the Institute for Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria (ISSUP) were both linked to the Department of Political Sciences through the active involvement of its staff in research activities of the two institutes (http:// www.up.ac.za/en/political-sciences/article/19676/meer-oor-politiekewetenskappe). In 2010, these institutes merged to be reconstituted as the Institute for Strategic and Political Affairs (ISPA). Thus, even though CiPS and ISSUP were formally two institutes, this book suggests that CiPS was strategically established due to the close association the ISSUP has had with the apartheid establishment. This will be explained now. Even though ISSUP was established in 1974, its first major public symposium in 1977 followed the 1973 Durban labour strike wave, the liberation of Mozambique and Angola in 1975 from Portuguese colonial rule (Rich, 1984), and the 1976 Soweto student uprising. These events contributed to the apartheid regime’s focused reconsideration of its security options. With the liberation of Mozambique and Angola and their adoption of a socialist developmental path, South Africa effectively lost a geographical barrier—the so-called cordon sanitaire—against possible military infiltration (p. 68). More importantly, these countries offered the military wings of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congress (PAC) opportunities of establishing their military bases in these liberated countries. As mentioned, politically, labour and the youth became politically restive, after more than two decades of dormancy subsequent to the banning of the ANC, PAC and other liberation formations that followed the 21 March 1960 Sharpeville massacre. The Sharpeville massacre and the Soweto uprising, according to Patrick O’Meara (1981, p. 567), were momentous events in the history of South African politics and liberation struggle as these resulted in ‘widespread international pressure and criticism’ of the apartheid regime. With the political and military contexts shifting rapidly in the latter part of the 1970s, the apartheid regime was open to consider a range of policy

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options as these had relevance to its security. We will see that an inviting strategic plan, in terms of its security calculations, was for South Africa to present itself as a bulwark against the spread of communism in southern Africa. As the so-called ‘spread’ of communism was a major concern for the US during the Cold War. One of the germinating ideas, which had its origin in the US’s National Security Act of 1947, that found favour within apartheid regime elite circles was the notion of ‘national security’ or ‘state security’ (Vale, 2003, p. 65). This notion was given substance by the South African government support for the 1965 publication of Anthony Harrigan’s book Defence Against Total Attack (Vale, 2003, p. 65). This publication presented white South Africa as being involved in an existential struggle against ‘barbarism’ (Harrigan, 1965, cited in Vale, 2003, p. 66) and Marxism. Moreover, the Harrington publication maintained that South Africa was under ‘Total Attack’, meaning that the threat it faced was not limited to military aspects of security. So, it was no coincidence that the political doctrine that guided security thinking during the P. W. Botha’s presidency was known as the ‘Total Strategy’ (p.  66), signalling that its security strategy sets out to counter what Harrigan named a ‘Total Attack’. ISSUP in 1977 took on the challenge to articulate, justify and provide policy options for the ‘Total Strategy’. This is captured by Peter Vale (p. 68) as follows: ‘construction of a total onslaught against the Republic of South Africa as a discourse of regional security’ that ‘linked apartheid, the Cold War, and southern Africa was drawn together in 1977  in the creation of … [ISSUP]’. Also, the publication that emanated from the Symposium on National Security held in Pretoria from 31 March to 1 April 1977 and edited by Michael Louw (1978), a professor in International Relations, repeated the idea that security is not limited to defence, safety and military matters, but security also includes diplomacy, political, economic and ideological matters (Naude, 1978, no pagination). Concurring with this perspective, another professor of International Relations Charles Nieuwoudt (1978, no pagination) emphasised that the ISSUP agreed that ‘National Security [is] a total effort, not only the duty of the armed forces’. Being so pivotal and closely aligned with the politics of apartheid and its security had consequences for the relevance of ISSUP in a new political dispensation, post-1994. So, CiPS was established in 1999 to also work on issues related to International Relations. In this role, CiPS adopted the theme Islam and Muslims among its research foci after September 2001.

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Specifically, ‘Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Africa’ and ‘Political Islam in South Africa’ were two focus research areas of CiPS. In their conception however, terrorism seems to have become synonymous and/or associated with Islam and Muslims. On 24 March 2004 the institute mounted an international conference with the title ‘Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa’. The themes at this conference explored the nature of the threat posed by terrorists and how to respond to the lessons learnt about terrorism locally and regionally (CiPS, www.cips.up.a.za/ old/Conf_2005.html). However, based on the papers presented, it was clear that the organisers associated terrorism with Islam. For instance, Hussein Solomon and Gerrie Swart delivered the paper ‘Political Islam and the State in Africa’. Anneli Botha and Col. Loona Naisho made PowerPoint presentations which focused on ‘SADC and the Fight against Terrorism’ and ‘Responding to terror: The case of Kenya’, respectively (CiPS, http://www.briledge. com/webportfolio/CIPS/terrorism-conf.htm). On 30 July 2005 the CiPS, in collaboration with the School of Politics at the University of Kwa-Zulu Natal offered a workshop on ‘Political Islam in South Africa’. The press statement after the workshop, which was issued by both sponsors of the conference, stated that: The aim of the workshop was to create a critical space in an effort to generate vibrant and dynamic debate, reflecting on the development of political Islam in South Africa as well as linking the discourse to an international context. There were four diverse themes ranging from an overview of Political Islam in South Africa, to Political Participation, Governance and South African Muslims, Community Activism and Political Islam in South Africa and finally, a reflection on South African Muslims and Challenging Global Imperialism. (www.cips.up.za/old/Publications/2005/pressrelease-on-political-islam-in-sa-workshop.pdf)

It will become evident in Chap. 5 how through hosting events such as the one above, the CiPS was setting the political agenda and framing the debate about Islam and Muslims in South Africa. In addition, these events formed part of a broader strategy that contributed to creating the appropriate environment for the acceptance of a policy agenda that securitised Muslims and Islam in South Africa. In other words, Muslims and Islam were presented ‘as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and

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justifying action outside the normal bounds of political procedure’ (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 23–24). Since the CiPS was to be self-funded, it undertook contract work and also raised funds from a number of donors. These donors included the British High Commission, the Canadian High Commission, Green Cross International, Gorbachev Foundation, Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the United States Embassy, and the Royal Netherlands Embassy, amongst others. The discussion on the history of CiPS is limited because very little has been published on its history. This chapter has tried to show that even though the four selected South African think-tanks are involved in security-related matters, they differ in their primary functions and purposes. Recognising that think-tanks play a part in the export and transfer of policy lessons and ideas (Stone, 2001, p.  356) from the North to the South, the next chapter will argue that South African security think-tanks and policy experts import a Western perspective which associates and equates Islam with terrorism. To this end, South African security think-­ tanks and experts contribute significantly to the construction of South African Muslims as a ‘suspect community’ (Hillyard, 1973) in an era that has designated Islamic fundamentalism as the ‘greatest threat to Western liberal democracy’ (Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009, p. 646).

CHAPTER 5

Expertise, Epistemes and the Construction of a Suspect Community

This chapter sets out to show that South African-based security think-tank experts draw their insights from epistemic networks that have their roots in Terrorism Studies and Counterinsurgency which are rooted in the Global North. It will illustrate that these networks, at foundation, have been sponsored by the United States (US) which has facilitated and chaperoned the US-based RAND Corporation to evolve into the ‘fountainhead’ of contemporary Terrorism knowledge (see Stampnitzky, 2013). Accordingly, the chapter argues that local security experts have introduced a particular Western narrative on the origins of contemporary Terrorism. It will be shown that this approach to understanding Terrorism has been adopted into African and South African security discourses by think-tanks such as the Institute for Security Studies (Jakkie Cilliers and Anneli Botha), the Centre for International Political Studies, University of Pretoria (Hussein Solomon), the South African Institute of International Affairs (Greg Mills) and the Brenthurst Foundation (Greg Mills). Furthermore, it will become apparent that these experts not only share the same narrative, but they also propagate and defend this imported discourse using a common language—English—and a conceptual template inherited from Cold War and apartheid approaches to the issue of security. To increase the perceived credibility of their pronouncements, it will become evident that South African experts have formed a local node within a global epistemic network, which, on its part, has incorporated some local experts. © The Author(s) 2020 M. N. Hendricks, Manufacturing Terrorism in Africa, Islam and Global Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5626-5_5

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This chapter argues further that South African-based experts play a pivotal role in securitising Muslims and Islam. By analysing and deconstructing published texts that associate Muslims and Islam with terrorism, this chapter exposes the strategies used by Terrorism ‘experts’ to securitise them. While the primary focus of this book is on the securitisation of Islam and Muslims in South Africa, this chapter first examines and analyses publications on the topic of ‘Terrorism in Africa’ written by South Africa-­ based Terrorism ‘experts’. This is done because the collected data on which this chapter is based suggest that these experts have selected this topic as a significant field to be researched and explored. An assessment of their publications, seminar and conference titles and themes, as well as newspaper articles that focus on ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Africa, confirms that Terrorism is a major area of interest to them. (See Appendix 3, which lists the conferences, seminars and workshops on Terrorism organised by South African think-tanks as well as Appendix 4, which lists selected publications of security ‘experts’ on the same theme.) This chapter then shifts its focus to explore how these experts construct South African Muslims as a security threat. It will become evident that a key strategy used by them is to associate Terrorism with local Muslims. Following this, the chapter presents an analysis and assessment of the publications of experts to show how they promote Western interests. And, finally, it will show that South African experts are actors in the global Terrorism epistemic community. Membership in such a thought network not only enhances their status, but it also ensures that their perspectives on Terrorism are regarded as authentic.

Patrolling the Borders of Terrorism Knowledge The invention and evolution of the contemporary hegemonic conception of Terrorism did not occur organically. Instead it occurred under the guidance of an ‘invisible college’ which was nurtured and abetted by the US government (Stampnitzky, 2013, p. 49). Brian Jenkins, a former head of the Terrorism programme at the RAND Corporation, in 1979 confirmed the existence of such an epistemic network with the statement: ‘[an] informal, international network of scholars and government officials with interest or responsibilities in the area of terrorism [… a] “college-without-campus” has emerged’ (quoted in Stampnitzky, 2013, p. 42).

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The former US President Richard Nixon (1968–1974) initiated this epistemic network in the 1970s by establishing the ‘US government body charged with focusing on the terrorism problem’ (p. 27). It was this initiative that sponsored multiple conferences and research projects that focused on Terrorism, with the RAND Corporation becoming the centre of ‘terrorism studies’ (p.  28). So, while Terrorism experts in the 1970s were almost non-existent and unorganised, by the 1980s their presence became prolific at US conferences. Participation at these conferences facilitated the development of ‘a highly complex’ system of ‘overlapping connections’ between the conference presenters (p. 37, see also Miller & Mills, 2009, p. 429)—this view supports the ‘terrorism invisible college’ thesis (Stampnitzky, 2013, p. 42). Critical scholars (Burnette & Whyte, 2005; Jackson, 2009a; Ranstorp, 2009; Raphael, 2009) have criticised the quality of Terrorism knowledge produced by those associated with this invisible college. First, these Terrorism experts operate as ‘closed and circular research systems [… relying] on each other’s work which [is] synthesized and functioned in a constantly reinforcing feedback loop’ (Ranstorp, 2009, p. 22). Second, a core set of these experts constituted themselves as a Terrorism ‘epistemic community’ with the authority to determine ‘research agendas’; they recruit ‘new members’; secure ‘funding opportunities’; sponsor ‘conferences’; maintain ‘informal contact’ and establish databases (p. 49). Third, these epistemic community members are closely associated with government interests and rely on government funding which could explain them functioning as an ‘uncritical mouthpiece of state interests’ (p.  22). Fourth, knowledge emanating from this epistemic network is politically invested as core members of the network, such as the US-based RAND Corporation, have imposed their influence upon the Terrorism discourse, knowledge production and dissemination (Burnette & Whyte, 2005, p.  8). RAND was pivotal in the 1994 founding of the University of St Andrews’s Centre for Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) in Scotland, the first European-based centre to study terrorism and violence (CSTPV, Undated). This relationship was strengthened by their collaboration in the establishment of the ‘RAND-St Andrews database of international Terrorism incidents, widely recognised authoritative sources of data on international terrorism’ (pp.  8–9). Moreover, the RAND-St Andrews partnership influence as the focal point of terrorism studies is undisputed: Experts based in both these institutions played pivotal roles in academic publishing on Terrorism; members of both the CSTPV and of RAND

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occupy key editorial positions on the editorial teams of Terrorism and Political Violence and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism which are regarded the leading academic journals that focus on terrorism and political violence (p. 9). A consequence of this arrangement is that peer-reviewed publications on Terrorism are controlled by academics ‘connected by this nexus of influence’ (p. 9) and on the other hand, the marginalisation of voices critical of the dominant Terrorism discourse (Jackson, 2009a, p.  81). Five, this epistemic community refuses to accept that states do commit Terrorism as it defines, in practice, Terrorism as a form of illegitimate non-state violence (p. 70). Six, this hegemonic discourse propagates the idea that in the current era, Terrorism is the greatest security threat which the Western world in general and US security in particular is confronted with (p. 71). And final, this knowledge network rejects the notion that those designated Terrorists are rational actors or that their attacks are based on rational purposes (Stampnitzky, 2013, p. 4). The above critique establishes the RAND Corporation as the ‘fountainhead’ of Terrorism Studies which constructs and marshals knowledge in pursuit of hegemonic agendas. Confirming this, it is important to note that the RAND Corporation is representative of a bigger phenomenon of think-tanking that supports frames and maintains discourses that enable the US to act with impunity in the world. The resulting partial and one-sided nature of the ‘expertise’ of Terrorism ‘specialists’ is well captured by the phrase ‘embedded experts’ (Burnette & Whyte, 2005). This signals that such expertise is derived from a limited ‘network of knowledge’ associated with powerful institutions such as the police, the military, intelligence agency, and the arms, security and media industries (Miller & Mills, 2009, p. 418). Moreover, embedded experts are an integral part of ‘hegemonic processes […] which contribute to the reproduction of the “common sense” consensus of policy and other elite fora (including the mainstream media)’ (p. 418). Despite knowledge about Terrorism being ideologically biased, Terrorism experts are regarded as essential to policy-makers and the news media. They are called upon to comment on and analyse political violence, despite the absence of full information, or on the basis of deficient information within the public domain. We now turn to an analysis of the work of South African-based think-­ tank terrorism ‘experts’.

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Establishing Themselves as Experts This publication argues that South African security experts have constructed Muslims as the new ‘suspect community’ in Africa as the first step in securitising them. The notion of a ‘suspect community’ originated in Paddy Hillyard’s (1973) study which showed the devastating impact on the ‘Irish people’ of the 1994 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act and its amendments. This Act, in addition to British legislation already in place, was integral to a ‘much longer line of exceptional measures’ which constructed the Irish as ‘dangerous’ (Hillyard, 1973, p. 2). The label ‘suspect community’ is not unique to the Irish, though. The South African oppressed population and those accused of being ‘communists’ were also constructed as ‘suspect communities’ during the era of apartheid. Constructing them as suspect by the apartheid regime was done to delegitimise and criminalise the voices that opposed apartheid policies and laws that subjugated sections of the South African population (Abel, 1995, p. 527; see also Adler & Webster, 1995; Gurney, 2000). Moreover, leaders of the oppressed and communists were often associated with Terrorism by the apartheid regime because they articulated a vision for South Africa that promised an anti-racist and non-exploitative future for the country (see Malan, 1985; Rich, 1984). Are the activities and practices of Muslims also delegitimised and criminalised? Are Muslims also named and/or associated with Terrorism by ‘experts’ who construct them as a ‘suspect community’? These questions will be discussed in the pages that follow. By initially focusing their attention on African Muslims and linking Terrorism with the African Muslim community, South African security analysts established themselves as Terrorism ‘experts’. However, the identification of Muslims as a security issue by associating them and their religion with Terrorism carries significant political consequences. Actually, creating Muslims as a suspect community ‘changes the legitimate mode of engagement with the particular problem’ (Abrahamsen, 2004, p. 680). Labelling groups or individuals as Terrorists is pejorative since the term Terrorism has intrinsic negative connotations which are used when referring to enemies and/or opponents. Therefore, constructing Muslims as Terrorists—a danger or threat to societal security—is a securitisation move that targets Muslims. Muslims are designated as the ‘new’ suspect community through several techniques which include the repetitive construction of them as

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inherently violent, dangerous and a Terrorism threat, and through the creation of a perspective that Africa and South Africa are the preferred locations for so-called Islamic Terrorists in which to establish their logistical bases and/or to find sanctuary (see Solomon, 2012, for example). How has this happened? Jakkie Cilliers (2003), the founding director of the (South African) Institute for Security Studies (ISS), locates the roots of contemporary African Terrorism in the ‘covert alliance’ directed by the US’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with groups such as the Mujahideen in order to expel the Soviet Union from Afghanistan during the 1980s. This alliance, he argues, had ‘long-term unintended consequences’. The training of Muslim ‘liberators’ ‘became the terrorist training for a new international guerrilla brotherhood’. In this narrative, Cilliers (2003, p. 94) uses a trope that would be repeated often by security experts, viz., Islamic Terrorism in Africa targets the ‘United States, Israel and […] their allies’. (In presenting this trope, Cilliers (2003, p. 94) fails to explain why members of the ‘covert alliance’ has targeted the US, Israel and their allies.) Moreover, Cilliers claims that the ‘battle-hardened Algerian nationals’ formed the nucleus for this new ‘terrorism movement’ which motivated ‘terrorist attacks in South Africa in the late 1990s (through PAGAD) and a series of attacks in East Africa’ (p. 94). It might appear as if the notion ‘brotherhood’ was innocently selected by Cilliers. However, this notion’s genealogy can be traced to the discourse that constructs Muslims with ‘extremism’. To understand this, we must turn to Egypt. That country’s al Ighwan al Muslimun or Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 with the aim of fusing religious revival with the anti-imperialism sentiments of that time (Leiken & Brooke, 2007, p. 108). Because of these aims, it was alleged that they nurtured contemporary ‘Islamic extremism’ and ‘fundamentalism’ under the leadership of Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966). As a leader and ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood’, Sayyid Qutb, according to David Zeidan (2001, p. 28), was responsible for the ‘rise of radical Islamic groups’ as he reinterpreted Islamic concepts that ‘justify a violent takeover of the state’. In referencing the claims that associate Algerian nationals with a new Terrorism movement, Cilliers (2003, p. 102), in footnote 12, stated that his analysis on Algeria was ‘based on G Swart, H Solomon and A Botha, “Algeria: The Politics of Fundamentalism and Extremism”, an unpublished paper, Pretoria, 2003’. As this paper was unpublished, the quality of its findings in terms of robustness, credibility and validity are questionable.

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Despite this lack of authentication, Cilliers (2003) used its claims uncritically and continued to present these views as brute facts. This kind of ‘scholarship’ confirms the critique offered by Critical Terrorism theorists that orthodox Terrorism Studies is a closed and ‘circular research system’ within which members draw on one another’s work and which functions as a ‘constantly reinforcing feedback loop’ (Ranstorp, 2009, p. 22). Furthermore, Cilliers (2003) demonstrates limitations in his understanding of Terrorism—by confining his definition to non-state actors; he fails to question the extent to which the state itself contributes to spreading ‘terror’. Finally, he reveals his ideological bias in naming perpetrators of political violence committed in support of US interests ‘liberators’, but labels the same actors ‘terrorists’ when they have used political violence against US interests (Cilliers, 2003, p. 94). This also confirms that constructing the Terrorism threat is highly political and is influenced by ideological and contextual factors. Following Cilliers’s claim that the Algerian veterans of the Afghanistan-­ Soviet war were responsible for forming the core of contemporary Terrorism in Africa, Anneli Botha (2008a), a senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), initiated an investigation into the causes of political violence in Algeria. In this investigation, Botha (2008a) concludes that while Muslims are obligated to be obedient to their political rulers, disobedience to despotic rulers is permitted in Islam. She further recognises that political rulers in a number of Muslim countries are illegitimate and autocratic and do not tolerate diversity (p. 20). Reflecting further, she concedes that the deteriorating socio-economic conditions in Algeria prior to its 1991/1992 municipal elections contributed significantly to the popular protests and uprisings against the country’s rulers (p.  26). Moreover, she appears to accept that these protests were brutally suppressed by the Algerian military, and acknowledges that the cancellation of the first round of the 1991/1992 elections results by the Algerian army caused the ‘security situation [to] deteriorate rapidly’ (p. 29), which increased the legitimacy crisis faced by the ruling regime even further. Despite concluding that the Algerian military regime was (in her view) illegitimate, autocratic, despotic and brutally oppressive, Botha (2008a) frames the Algerian security situation within a narrative of Terrorism. She associates blame for the political violence almost exclusively with Muslim formations which had opposed the military regime. Actually, Botha (pp. 32–33) asserts that Algerian veterans of the anti-Soviet war ‘preached

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radicalism’ and shared their ‘military knowledge’ mostly with the ‘socially disadvantaged and marginalised youth’ affiliated to the ‘fundamentalist/ extremist’ ‘umbrella organisation’ the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) (p. 33). She continues to state that it was the FIS, with its ‘paramilitary activists’ that ‘launched an open confrontation with the [Algerian] government in June 1991’ (p. 33). Here Botha is using the rhetoric of survival and war: She uses Speech-Acts, in asserting that Algerian veterans ‘preached radicalism’ and shared their ‘military knowledge’ with youth affiliated to a ‘fundamentalist/extremist’ organisation, to securitise both the Algerian veterans of the Afghanistan-Soviet war as well as the FIS activists. As her utterances securitise FIS activists and their associates, her Speech-Acts simultaneously introduce an emergency which call for the ‘fundamentalist/extremist’ FIS to be stopped urgently through the use of counter measure. Here Jef Huysmans’ (1995, p. 59) society-garden analogy helps to visualise the centrality of counter measures during securitisation. For the prosperous growth of the garden (the Algerian society) weed (the FIS) that threatens this growth must by necessity be eliminated. Assigning responsibility for the political violence in Algeria almost exclusively to Muslim formations opposing the military regime seems inconsistent with the way Botha (2008a) presents the Algerian situation. Because, by doing so she ignores contextual factors such as the military’s role in violently suppressing protest against the regime (p.  26), and/or ignores the regime’s contribution in the deteriorating security situation in the country (p.  29). Furthermore, establishing that Muslim formations are solely responsible for the political violence is inconsistent with her recognition that some states do commit acts of ‘Terrorism’ against their populations (interview with Anneli Botha July 11, 2014) and her acceptance that citizens have the right to revolt against state persecution. As this publication argues that contemporary South African security discourse, as discussed above, has its roots in apartheid and Cold War security doctrines, it is necessary to reflect on these historical security calculations and perceptions. Chapter 4 has argued that the apartheid state’s approach to security in the 1970s was guided by its ‘Total Strategy’ which was a response to Anthony Harrigan’s assessment of South Africa’s security situation which he presented in the 1965 publication Defence Against Total Attack (Vale, 2003). Resistance to apartheid rule intensified in the 1980s which the South African security and political establishment construed as a ‘total onslaught’ against the status quo. General Magnus Malan, the South

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African apartheid Minister of Defence, perceived this ‘onslaught’ as a ‘physical and psychological battle’ by which ‘the [e]nemy seek[s] to subvert’, ‘overthrow’ and ‘destroy’ the ‘establish[ed] order’ and ‘fabric of society’ (Malan, 1985, no pagination). It is impossible to determine the extent to which this construction of the ‘enemy’ has influenced Anneli Botha’s thinking, nor can we conclude whether she shared such a construction, but we do know that she joined the South African Police (SAP) in 1993 (Interview with Botha, July 11, 2014). The SAP, as late as the early 1990s, was integral to the apartheid security system which regarded Terrorism as the method ascribed to an enemy whose objective was said to be the destruction of this society, i.e. they were integral to the ‘Total Onslaught’ thinking. We will come to understand that this institutional culture had not changed significantly by the time Botha joined the SAP. Not only was the apartheid security system in place, but significant continuities from apartheid security practices remained in place. We have focused on this because Botha’s move from the South African Police Services (SAPS) to ISS is consistent with those of Terrorism experts whose status as state employees establishes a relationship that secures their allegiance to ‘state interests’ (Raphael, 2009, p. 22). It is noteworthy that Botha joined the SAPS when the process of political transition to democracy had already started. However, this process did not necessarily change the ideology and philosophy which directed practices within the security institutions of the country initially, since the core personnel remained in their posts. In negotiating this transition, the South African African National Congress (ANC) accepted the so-called ‘sunset clauses’ which committed the new government to ‘guarantee security of job tenure for senior civil servants and security officials for five years into the new democracy’ (Mangcu, 2003, p. 105). This is important since apartheid South Africa was an ally, a proxy and ‘junior partner’ of the US during the Cold War (Mamdani, 2002, p. 768). As we have already established, the ideology that guided the security community viewed opposition to the apartheid state as an attempt to destroy the country and to put in its place a communist government (see Malan, 1985). Indeed, this was the essence of the ‘Total Onslaught’. On the basis of Botha’s biography and the historical and political contexts within which she was located, did the SAP institutional culture—of which she was a member—influence her to the extent that she shares some association with traditional terror experts? We have seen that her analysis

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of Terrorism is Algeria is state-centric (Botha, 2008a) and that her ideological roots can be traced to Cold War politics. This seems consistent with David Miller and Tom Mills’s (2009) description of orthodox Terrorism expertise which is closely associated with the theory and practice of Western counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency was a practice initiated by Western colonial powers during the 1950s and 1960s as a counter measure against demands for decolonization. From this theory and practice emerged Terrorism Studies as an academic interest. But the focus of Terrorism Studies was not primarily the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake; instead, the knowledge was used by orthodox Terrorism experts to provide advice to ‘Western governments on counterinsurgency operations, policing and legislating against “subversives”’ (p.  414). Accordingly, it is no coincidence that prominent ideas found in orthodox Terrorism Studies have their ‘roots in counterinsurgency doctrine and practice’ or that Terrorism experts are ‘ideologically committed and practically engaged in supporting Western State power’ (pp. 414–5). Botha’s historical association with the South African police and her contemporary position as an ISS researcher that focuses on Terrorism in Africa, we will come to understand, have located her strategically to educate members of African police services on the subject Terrorism in Africa: ‘I work a lot with the police … 80% [of my working time] is practical training … the police on the [African] continent’ (Interview with Anneli Botha July 11, 2014). We now return to analysts’ efforts to establish themselves as ‘Terrorism experts’. Hussein Solomon (2013a), in writing about the failure of US counter-­ terrorism initiatives in Africa, noted that in January 2012 the Tuareg nationalists in Mali overpowered the national army in a military offensive which ‘was quickly overtaken by Islamist elements’ who transformed northern Mali into a ‘terrorist enclave as it attracted thousands of jihadists from other countries’ (p. 428). For these reasons, according to Solomon (p. 428) the Malian ‘terrorism enclave’ can become a staging ground for Terrorism and since ‘thousands of jihadists’ were attracted to it, the ‘terrorist enclave’ posed a threat that must urgently be annihilated. Here, Solomon (2013a) uses the Speech-Act to declare that ‘Islamist elements’ hijacked the Tuareg’s struggle for self-determination and created for themselves a ‘terrorist enclave’. As suggested earlier, through the

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use of a Speech-Act Solomon simultaneously called for immediate action to stop the threat. This technique suggests an association with orthodox Terrorism and counterinsurgency studies. The latter notion, as explained earlier, has an important historical association within the discourse on Terrorism (Jackson, 2006a). Its genealogy is to be found within the discourse of ‘Western counter-insurgency doctrine during the cold war’. This discourse holds that weak and failed states are ideal locations to serve as Terrorist sanctuaries. As such they are geographically remote, lawless and ‘can function as a staging ground or haven for terrorism’ (Jackson, 2006a, no pagination). The idea of a ‘failed state’ assumes that a political body is unable to carry out its sovereign responsibilities such as exercising physical and political control over its geographical area. But, this notion is highly politically invested. This narrative of ‘failed states’ is a recent development which can be traced to the 9/11 attacks in the US (Stewart, 2007). Previously, Western governments regarded such states as a ‘humanitarian matter’ (p. 645) if they were unable to exercise their sovereign responsibilities. However, after the 9/11 attacks, allegedly planned from the typical failed state—Afghanistan, the former US President George W.  Bush declared that America was threatened more by failing states than Terrorism (p. 645). Kurt Shillinger (2006b), a research fellow focusing on ‘Security and Terrorism in Africa’ at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), uses a version of ‘terrorist sanctuary’, namely, ‘terrorist safe haven’ to securitise African Muslims. Supporting the joint Ethiopian and US military expulsion of the Somalian ‘Union of Islamic Courts’ (UIC), he expresses his astonishment that many African Muslims view the UIC’s expulsion as a way of waging ‘war against Islamic governance’ (p. 133). So, Shillinger argues that instead of being thankful that the installation of the new government would contribute to ‘stabilizing Somalia’, African Muslims perceive the expulsion of the UIC as the removal of a ‘potential safe haven and logistical hub for transnational terror’ (p. 133). Again, Shillinger warns that according to an unnamed US military officer, Washington has placed Africa third on its list of ‘areas of concern with regard to transnational terrorism’ as ‘Jihadi influences and related activities are spreading in Africa’ (2014, no pagination). By using this Speech-­ Act, Shillinger (2014) declares that Muslim war efforts are spreading in Africa and that these efforts must be terminated. However, the quality of Shillinger’s (2014) scholarship is questionable. He vaguely references a

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US military officer and continues to use this unnamed informant to securitise African Muslims even though the implications of such uncorroborated analysis might have severe consequences for African Muslims. These three examples illustrate that South African Terrorism ‘experts’ have established themselves as knowledgeable on the topic of Terrorism by commenting on political violence in Africa. Their message is consistent and constructs African Muslims as associated with Terrorism. But their scholarship is suspect: They draw on research that is questionable in terms of robustness, credibility and validity (see Cilliers, 2003, p.  102); their analysis ignores data that contradicts their ideological agenda (see Botha, 2008a, pp. 32–33); and they use claims of unnamed sources in their analysis without verifying the claims (see Shillinger, 2014). Some local experts (Botha, 2008a; Mills & Herbst, 2007; Shillinger, 2006a, 2014; Solomon, 2013a) have constructed a reality which equates and associates African and South African Muslims with violence and Terrorism. For them, for example Anneli Botha and Hussein Solomon (2005), it seems that being Muslim is sufficient reason to merit being associated with Terrorism. In order to emphasise and convince an audience of the urgency of the alleged security problem the ‘enemy’ (Muslims and Islam) presents in Africa, they draw attention to the large numbers of Muslims on the continent. This will become apparent later in these pages. But, for now, it is necessary to indicate that these experts focus on the large numbers of Muslims in Africa to argue that since all Muslims are potential Terrorists or supporters of Terrorism, Africa faces an enormous security threat. In making a case for the presence of a dedicated US military command which focuses on Africa, namely the US African Command (AFRICOM), Greg Mills, the former Director of SAIIA and currently the Director of the Brenthurst Foundation, and Jeffrey Herbst, an American political scientist who specialises in African affairs (Herbst, 1990, p. 17, 1996–97), argue that ‘Muslim support for terrorists must be confronted directly’ and that the claim they ‘may give sanctuary to terrorists’ cannot be ignored (Mills & Herbst, 2007, p. 44). Of course such a possibility should not be ignored. However, one needs to question why ‘Muslim communities’ were isolated and labelled as supporters of ‘terrorists’ in their analysis. Even though Mills and Herbst (2007) failed to provide empirical evidence to support their assertions, they instead attempted to give their speculative statements the appearance of fact. Such practices surely compromise the credibility of their scholarship. They effectively suggested,

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despite lacking empirical evidence, that Muslims must be treated as if they are giving sanctuary to Terrorists since they have the potential to do that. This is another instance of the suspect scholarship of Terrorism ‘experts’. Constructing the entire African Muslim community as suspect in the absence of empirical evidence suggests that these experts are pursuing an ideological agenda that requires Muslims to be regarded as the ‘enemy’. As we have suggested earlier, these experts do this by echoing each other and by sharing a similar narrative. This narrative views the large number of Muslims in Africa as potentially threatening (Herbst & Mills, 2003). So, the whole Muslim community is constructed suspect because, even those Muslims that do not support international Terrorism, according to Mills and Herbst (2007, p. 42), may nonetheless give sanctuary to fellow Muslims. South Africa’s Muslim population is explicitly named as integral to this suspect community because, as a ‘small but cohesive Muslim population, [it constitutes] a possible haven for terrorists’ (p. 42). Reinforcing this narrative, Botha and Solomon (2005, p. 3) state that because Africa has a large Muslim population it ‘presents fertile ground for the growth and spread of violence and terrorism associated with Islam’. Here they securitise Muslims and Islam by the implicit argument that since Muslims are potential Terrorists and the numbers of Muslims in Africa is so enormous, terrorism and violence associated with Islam in Africa can only escalate. Moreover, here African Muslims are securitised because they are potential Terrorists, while Islam is securitised because it supposedly provides the ideology that sustains so-called Islamic Terrorism. As in the case of Mills and Herbst (2007) that manufactured an ideological-­ based reality that African Muslims are associated with Terrorism, Botha and Solomon (2005, p. 3) reinforced this reality by their argument that: Only 8% of international acts of terrorism were committed on African soil from 1995 till 2001, making it the fifth most targeted continent… this trend will change as a result of the ‘war against terrorism’, as terror groups and network (sic) look for more ‘suitable targets’. African countries […] lack the resources to prevent acts of terrorism, making it a ‘suitable’ playing field, although the primary target might be the United States, Israel and the Western world. (p. 3)

The foregoing quotation underscore Botha and Solomon’s ideologically motivated analysis on the ‘threat’ posed by African Muslims: They

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initially inferred that the presence of Muslims automatically gives rise to ‘the growth and spread of violence and terrorism’ (p.  3). This suggests that violence and Terrorism are inherent attributes of Muslims. This is followed by the quotation above. In the quotation they use the rhetorical device of hyperbole to exaggerate the relative danger faced by Africa as a result of local Terrorism. While only ‘8% of international acts of terrorism’ occurred in Africa (p. 3), Botha and Solomon conclude that Africa is ‘the fifth most targeted continent’. Instead, their own statistics and scale suggest that Africa is the continent/region where the third fewest incidents of ‘international terrorist acts occurred from 1995 to 2001’. Furthermore, perhaps to justify their ‘error’, they speculate that the figures would change because Africa has more ‘suitable targets’ and ‘lacks the resources to prevent acts of terrorism’. This example once again points to the questionable scholarly practices of Terrorism ‘experts’. Earlier in this chapter reference was made to the trope introduced by Cilliers (2003, p. 94) that the target of Muslim Terrorists is the ‘United States, Israel and those perceived to be their allies’. This is constantly repeated by terror experts, so it is not unexpected to see this trope being repeated by Solomon and Botha (2005, p. 3). Even though Anneli Botha and Hussein Solomon were jointly recognised as authors of the article ‘Terrorism in Africa’ that was published by the Centre for International Political Studies in 2005, Botha maintains that she never published with Solomon (interview with author, 11 July 2014). But to claim that she never collaborated with him on a publication is factually incorrect since she, Gerrie Swart and Hussein Solomon wrote a paper in 2003 which Cilliers (2003) referenced. Why would she deny that she collaborated with Solomon on a publication? We do know that Hussein Solomon was her supervisor for her doctoral studies (see Botha, 2017, p. ix). We have already shown that these local experts do echo and reinforce each other’s understandings on the African Terrorism issue. Is it perhaps that Terrorism experts operate as a closed network that patrol the boundaries of local Terrorism knowledge? Similarly to Botha and Solomon (2005), Herbst and Mills (2003, p. 13) exaggerate the enormity of an assumed Muslim threat by noting that ‘40 per cent of Africa’s 700 million people are Muslim, [which highlights] the danger posed by the pathology of violent, fundamentalist Islam to Western interest(s)’. By pathologising the alleged danger ‘fundamentalist Islam’ presents to Western interests, they declare an emergency and by this Speech-Act, they simultaneously demand the urgent introduction of

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extraordinary security measures to terminate the ‘threat’ which, as it were, is potentially threatening the survival of ‘Western Civilisation’. They reinforce their claim with another Speech-Act: ‘[t]here is no doubt that alienated and radicalized, Africa’s 250 million Muslims could make the continent ungovernable’ (p. 14). This utterance is reinforced by Greg Mills in his claim that Africa’s millions of Muslims represent a condition ‘that give(s) rise to domestic [African] terror’ (2004, p. 161). Based on such understandings, Mills and Herbst (2007, p.  41) conclude that Islamic groups may recruit ‘angry, marginalized and anti-American [Muslim] youth from Somalia to Senegal, … Cape Town to Casablanca’ for Terrorist activities. It is clear Mills (2004) and Mills and Herbst (2007) deliberately emphasise the narrative that Muslims are synonymous with violence and terror. Additionally, and congruent with Botha and Solomon’s (2005, p. 3) statement that the ‘United States, Israel and the Western world’ are the primary targets of terrorism in Africa, Mills and Herbst (2007) insinuate that anti-Americanism and opposition to Western interests in Africa are the motivating factors that facilitate the recruitment of Muslims for Terrorist activities. Emphasising that South Africa has not been excluded from the ‘radicalisation in Africa’, Solomon (2013b) warns that ‘radical Islamism’ is ‘spreading in South Africa’—and insists that nothing is done to check it. He further states that international analysts, such as the Washington D.C.based John Solomon (Director Threat Finance Research WorldCheck), are concerned about the ‘internationalization of the Islamist discourse by local [South African] Muslims’ which is, according to the US source, even apparent amongst South Africa’s Muslim ‘opinion leaders’ who have accepted, implicitly, the ‘jihadi discourse’ (Solomon, 2013b). In an ongoing process that pejoratively constructs Muslims, Botha and Solomon (2005, p.  1) state that Muslims are not completely honest in their self-representation as the marginalised in Africa. Does this mean that a more fitting representation would be that Muslims are underhanded? ... Islam represented itself as the religion of the underdog against corrupt elites. ... [but] Muslim influence has been insidious in its spread and often accomplished by the “behind-the scenes” supply of finances and arms to various tribes and factions that are already in conflict. (p.1)

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Again, without providing evidence to support their claims, they state that ‘Islamic “advisors” from Iran and Lebanon’ provided ‘weapons and explosives to various African groups’ (p. 1) and that African governments struggle to withstand the pressure from amongst Muslims demanding an Islamic government, which is ‘usually achieved through’ violent behaviour. ‘Islamic militancy’, they note, is different from ‘other forms of religious militancy or violence’ since this militancy is a ‘universal occurrence’ that ignores geographical borders (p.2). Here Botha and Solomon (p.2) use the Speech-Act to construct the security threat as both physical/material (weapons, explosives and use of physical violence) as well as ideological (to replace the existing order). Their implication is that emergency measures should be used to respond to both threats. On an Israeli Internet site, hosted by an organisation called ‘Research on Islam and Muslims in Africa’ (RIMA), Solomon (2013b, no pagination) raises a further alarm, viz., that the security threat emanating from radical Muslims is increasing ‘as interconnections between a variety of Islamists’ from different southern African countries have occurred. To reinforce the urgency of the issue, he alleges that trained Muslim militant ‘graduates’ from Mozambican ‘jihadi’ camps have already ‘infiltrated’ South Africa. For Solomon (2013c), Terrorism is not the only issue that makes South African Muslims a security threat. A more significant threat is the propagation of ‘radical violent interpretations of Islam – Islamism’ (p. 26) because, Solomon maintains, ‘Islamism’ is already established in South Africa as is evident in the centrality of South African Muslims in the global ‘terrorist support networks’. He, further warns that because of South Africa’s involvement in these networks, the country’s ‘own security is compromised’ (p. 26). This analysis begs important questions. Does Solomon (2013c) fear that South Africa might be in danger of being exposed to similar Western reprisals as witnessed in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) as a result of being perceived to be a sanctuary for ‘Islamists’? This question is important because the former US President George W. Bush had warned that the US ‘will pursue nations that provide aid or safe havens to terrorism’ (quoted in Jackson, 2006a, n. p.). In light of such a threat, Solomon’s assertion that trained jihadists have infiltrated South Africa and that South African ‘Islamists’ are central facilitators

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within the global Terrorism network, aims at influencing South Africa’s security policy. What emerges from this kind of analysis is that securitisation of African and South African Muslims is not limited to the construction of Muslims as inherently predisposed to political violence. As has been shown, some experts promote the idea that South Africa has become a sanctuary for Islamic transnational Terrorists.

South Africa as a Sanctuary for Transnational Terrorists The characterisation of African countries as a ‘growing transnational threat to international security’ (Botha & Solomon, 2005, p.  1) is echoed by Kurt Shillinger’s (2006a) speculation that since al Qaeda had lost its training and logistical camps in Afghanistan, it is searching for new sanctuaries for its operatives. Drawing on comments by the US State Department, Shillinger (2006a) identifies South Africa as a possible Terrorist sanctuary. After Herbst and Mills (2003, p.  13) have earlier asserted that weak states in Africa ‘offer sanctuary and succour to terror movements’, they seem to reconsider this, as it relates to South Africa. In a more recent reflection they argue that ‘entirely ungoverned areas may not be ideal for international terrorists’ as Terrorists require logistical services such as transport as well as a receptive community (Mills & Herbst, 2007, p. 42). Why this significant change in interpretation? This is because, seemingly, South Africa did not qualify as a failed state: however, the US has identified the country as a security concern. Susan Rice, the former US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, asserted that South Africa is a great concern to the US as ‘Islam’s most radical and anti-American adherents are increasingly active’ there (quoted in Herbst & Mills, 2003, p.  14). This intervention prompted Mills and Herbst (2007, p. 42) to argue that Terrorists are attracted to South Africa because—despite its relatively good governance regime, its quality banking system and transport links to international destinations—its police are unable to ‘monitor all the [financial] transactions’. So, they conclude that Terrorists are attracted to countries with good logistical services but ‘little government oversight’. Following this, they designate South Africa with its ‘cohesive Muslim population’ as a possible haven for Terrorists. (p. 42).

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In this example, Mills and Herbst (2007) transported and broadcasted a ‘received truth’ about security and, in this fashion, they acted as surrogate securitisers. Shillinger (2006a), Botha (2007a) and Solomon (2013b) echo the assertion that South Africa has been implicated in transnational Terrorism. The latter work reinforces this idea by stating that South Africa is pivotal in ‘global jihadi networks’ as it provides sanctuary and identity documents, facilitates the movement of funds and provides paramilitary training facilities ‘for local and foreign jihadis’ (Solomon, 2013b, no pagination). Foreign terrorists, he maintains further, use their South African ‘operational base’ to plan ‘attacks’ against European countries (Solomon, 2013b). While Solomon (2012, p.  144) does not directly label Muslims as a suspect community, his claims suggest that this is the intention. He asserts that even though Terrorist-related activities have occurred in South Africa, the number of Muslim persons who were arrested for Terrorism was negligible. The reason for this, he maintains, is that the South African government had ‘little desire to investigate its own Muslim community’ (Solomon, 2012, p. 144, drawing on Shillinger, 2005). Solomon (2012) does not explain why the Muslim community should be investigated instead of specific individuals suspected of Terrorism. This logic is certainly faulty: are we to believe that if a Muslim commits a crime, the entire community must be investigated? Such reasoning is surely the basis of racial profiling.

An Unreliable Partner in the War on Terror Even though South Africa has not formally partnered within the US’s ‘Global War on Terror’, security experts are unanimous that it would be an unreliable partner. In support of this, they have claimed that South Africa’s anti-terrorism legislation is not effective enough to act as a deterrent against Terrorists and their supporters. Solomon (2012, p. 143) is disturbed by the ‘incompetence’ of South African security bureaucrats as this has relevance to counter-terrorism. He claims that ‘[p]olitical correctness’, even at a ministerial level, ‘undermines the fight against the scourge of terrorism’ (Solomon, 2012, p.  143). Supporting this claim, he quotes South Africa’s former Minister of Intelligence Ronnie Kasrils, who has warned that South Africans should not uncritically support a ‘rising international hysteria which serves to

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portray all Muslims’ as terrorist suspects (quoted in Solomon, 2012, p. 143). In this appeal, Kasrils pointed out that: ‘The cry of a “terrorist in every Madrassah” echoes the “red under the bed” and the “swart gevaar” [black danger] phobia of the Cold War and the apartheid era. We must never repeat such witch-hunts in our country’ (quoted in Solomon, 2012, p. 143). Kasrils’s comment suggests that analysis of threat assessment in contemporary South Africa is restricted by an analytical frame that has its roots in Cold War and apartheid security discourses which were ideologically motivated and based on racial profiling to construct enemies. Although the foregoing would be read by those familiar with South Africa’s apartheid-era history as rational, reasonable and a fair understanding of the parallels, Solomon (2012, pp. 143–4) accuses Kasrils of ‘ideological blindness’ and criticises him for his failure to recognise that the South African armed struggle was qualitatively different to the ‘current global jihadist scourge’. According to Solomon the ‘radical Islamists’ have ‘global ambitions’ which seek ‘to establish a global Muslim caliphate’ (p. 144). This assertion might be true for some ‘Islamists’, but it seems incorrect to suggest that all South African Muslims share such a perspective. Furthermore, Solomon (2012) is silent on whether he has investigated the motivation of ‘radical Islamists’ to arrive at his conclusion. Despite consistent attempts by experts to securitise Muslims and Islam, the former South African Minister of Intelligence Ronnie Kasrils maintains that there is ‘no justification whatsoever’ for representing Muslims/Islam as a security threat to South Africa and argues that advocates of such a construction are: fawning apologists for the West’s modern day crusade against Islam. They play into the plague of Islamophobia which has been so damaging to relations between the West and the Muslim world. (email communication, October 23, 2014)

Kasrils questions the independence of local security experts’ analyses of the threat faced by South Africa. He asserts that most of them suffer from a westernised bias which ‘creates conceptual problems [in the] Western power approach to, for instance, the convulsions in MENA (Middle East and North Africa)’ (Kasrils, October 23, 2014, email correspondence). Because of their bias, Kasrils warns that he ‘would be extremely wary of their prescriptions’. Challenging the accusation that South Africa is an

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unreliable partner in the ‘War on Terror’, Kasrils claims the government of South Africa: ... has given positive advice on such problems as Libya, and Israel’s actions in Palestine. Such advice would have benefited the West who has created a horrendous mess; and hypocritical dealings which have provided impunity for Israeli occupation and aggression. The latter wrongheaded approach to what constitutes terrorism has fuelled radicalism throughout the MENA and beyond. (2014)

Annette Hübschele, a senior researcher in the Organised Crime and Money Laundering Programme, which is based at the Institute for Security Studies, maintains that South Africa’s anti-terrorism legislation is not severe enough to act as a deterrent against Terrorists and their supporters. She notes that this legislation is ‘by far the most liberal and least restrictive anti-terror law’ (2005, p.  107) when compared to similar legislation in Africa, Britain and the US. Her assertions are based on her assessment of the efficacy of the South African anti-terror legislation, The Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act, 2004 (Act 33 of 2004) (President of RSA, 2005). Hübschele (2005) explains that Act 33 of 2004 had its genesis in the need to abolish apartheid security legislation and the need to replace this with principles, standards and requirements that were consistent with, and that did not infringe upon, the 1996 South African Constitution. Moreover, she suggests that the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and the Pentagon accelerated the enactment of this Act. Prompted by the US, anti-terrorism became a priority on the international security agenda and resulted in the United Nations Security Council adopting Resolution 1373 which encourages each member to introduce anti-terrorism legislation and to make it a requirement that all states cooperate fully with one another on matters related to Terrorism. The adoption of Act 33 of 2004 (President of RSA, 2005) presents a number of negative consequences for South Africa. Critics (Powell, 2005) have pointed out that this Act is inconsistent with fundamental rights guaranteed in the 1996 South African Constitution (President of RSA, 1996). And that it fails to define when an activity is actually ‘terrorism’ (Jazbhay, Undated). Instead, the critics point out that the South African 2004 Terrorism Act vaguely lists conditions that transform a criminal activity into a ‘terrorist activity’. More importantly, South Africa’s sovereignty is effectively compromised

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whenever it has to list Terrorists groups as prescribed by Act 33 of 2004 (President of RSA, 2005). Section 25 of Act 33 of 2004 requires that the State President, without the option to use any discretion, make a proclamation whenever the Security Council has listed a Terrorist group. This makes the South African President an instrument of the Security Council. As, it is through the State President that the Security Council effects local law on which groups are to be designated and regarded as Terrorist groups in South Africa (Powell, 2005, p. 156). Pursuing a comparative framing, Hübschele (2005) asserts that British anti-terrorism legislation prior to 2005 was ineffective: despite the existing terror legislation, a bomb blast occurred on 7 July 2005 in London. She states that due to this ‘legislative failure’, British citizens supported tougher anti-terrorism measures even though these measures implied they had to sacrifice some civil liberties, including, ‘freedom of association, religion, media and expression and basic rights to privacy and a fair trial’ in order to prevent future Terrorist attacks (p. 105). However, her pursuit of this narrative fails to acknowledge that British civil organisations have criticised these anti-terror laws for being ‘draconian’ and ineffective in securing Britain, or that Muslim communities were particularly outraged as they felt ‘unfairly targeted’ by the legislation (Spalek & Lambert, 2008, p. 12). Indeed, British Muslims felt that the legislation and regulations reinforced the general construction of them as the enemy since the regulations ‘encourage[d] internal community surveillance’ and created the expectation that they should report their fellow Muslim community members to the authorities if these were suspected of involvement in actual or perceived terror activities (Steuter & Wills, 2009b, p. 155). Contrary to Hübschele’s (2005, p. 106) example, South African legislators confronted significant opposition during the process of drafting the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorism and Related Activities Act (Act 33 of 2004). Opposition to the proposed legislation was primarily motivated by concerns that civil liberties and human rights could be threatened. In expressing her displeasure that the protection of civil liberties and human rights outweighed concerns over the dangers of Terrorism, Hübschele poses this rhetorical question: ‘What is more important to a person in the street: protection against potential terrorist attacks or a guarantee of his or her constitutional civil liberties (p. 107)?’ For her, the British provided the obvious answer after the 7 July 2005 London bombings in that they—she maintains—were prepared to ‘surrender some

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of their rights’ in exchange for a country safe from ‘terrorist attacks’. This understanding is echoed by Solomon (2012, p. 144) in his assertion that Terrorists deny the most fundamental right—‘that is the right to life’. Similarly, Botha (2010, no pagination) argues that South Africa is too ‘obsessed with protecting’ fundamental human rights, ‘rights that would be exploited by international terrorists working in tandem with local militants’. These ‘experts’, in effect, advocate that South Africa ignores its own Constitution by their implicit recommendations for torture and the potential for abuse of human rights. It seems that they ignore that some individuals, accused of being Terrorists or their associates, are completely innocent. These outcomes suggest that these ‘experts’ are not pursuing knowledge for its own sake, instead, they apply Terrorism knowledge, which is ideologically invested, in a way that ‘reflect(s) the priorities and values of certain social interests’ (Miller & Mills, 2009, p. 415).

Promoting Western Interests An analysis of the publications produced by the South African Terrorism ‘experts’ reveals that they promote Western hegemony through favouring Western interests and/or values, as this chapter has already shown. Selected publications of both Hussein Solomon and Greg Mills were used to explore the above issue. Both these experts insist that the ‘Global War on Terror’ should be conceptualised as a war for ‘hearts and minds’ of society, meaning that this so-called war should be treated as an ideological battle that needs to be fought at an ideational level, rather than the current focus on the coercive strategy which relies on military and intelligence means (Mills, 2006; Mills & Richards, 2010; Solomon, 2013a, 2013c). Here the ‘war’ metaphor is utilised to differentiate between friends and enemies. This book maintains that the ideas that associated Muslims with Terrorism/extremism advocated by local Terrorism ‘experts’ are imported into the South African security discourse. So, we will now show that Hussein Solomon’s understanding of a ‘civil Muslim’ is copied from Cheryl Benard (2003), the social strategist who is associated with the RAND Corporation. In the Introduction of his book Jihad: A South African Perspective, Hussein Solomon (2013c) uses a quotation from Abdel Medded, which runs:

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It is part of a writer’s role to point out the drift of his or her own people and to help open their eyes to what blinds them. I insist, as the saying goes, on starting by sweeping in front of my own door. (Medded, 2003 quoted in Solomon, 2013c, p. 1)

By privileging this quotation, Solomon suggests that his ‘own people’—i.e. Muslims—are drifting away from the ‘correct’ Islamic teachings. Thus, presumably, he regards it as his responsibility to guide this community onto the ‘correct path’. In undertaking this responsibility, Solomon argues, the ‘struggle against global terrorism is truly a contest between competing ideologies’ within Islam (p. 9). So, he advises that the emphasis on the ‘militarisation of US counter-terrorism policy’ in the current ‘War on Terror’ is misdirected since such ‘strategies focus on the symptoms of terror not its causes’ (p. 9). Solomon continues: it is important to ‘understand how ordinary Muslims are socialised or, more accurately radicalised’ which ‘could lead to acts of terrorism’ (p. 10, emphasis in original). Solomon implies support for Western perspectives on these issues by remarking that ‘Indeed the life expectancy of Islamist militants seems to be diminishing thanks to US unmanned aerial vehicles’ (p.  5). But, he remains silent on the fact that the US’s unmanned aerial vehicle strikes that have resulted in civilian deaths and injuries in Afghanistan and Pakistan, or that indiscriminate killing caused by such attacks have contributed to radicalisation within the targeted communities (Amnesty International, 2013, p. 7). Equally revealing is Solomon’s fulfilment of Benard’s (2003, p. 62) recommendation that ‘individuals and positions associated with extremist Islam’ should be de-legitimised. This should be done, Benard maintained, through publicising ‘the immoral and hypocritical deeds and statements of self-styled fundamentalist authorities’ (p.  62). Benard’s case for de-­ legitimising so-called fundamentalists and traditionalists is as follows: Fundamentalists and traditionalists commonly allege … [that] an Islamic order would ensure morality, strong families, and low crime. Iran is a striking counter-argument to these assertions. After decades of strict Islamic governance, Iran is at least as plagued by the problems of the age as any “decadent” Western country. Drug addiction has skyrocketed. Prostitution is a huge problem, so much so that the government seriously contemplated the installation of state-run brothels, officiated over by mullahs, … The fail-

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ures of Islamic governance in Iran should be publicized widely, as these facts are not generally known to Islamic audiences. (pp. 26–27)

Following this guidance, Solomon claims: Where Islamists do capture power, as in Shiite Iran or Sunni Afghanistan, to create a paradise on earth with none of the social ills of the decadent West, they rapidly find that the Islamist state is no panacea for society’s ills. In 2003, the Iranian newspaper Entekhabo pointed to the following statistics: • there are 84,000 prostitutes operating in Tehran • there are also 250 brothels in the Islamic Republic’s capital – including some which are linked to senior officials • 60 new runaway girls are hitting Teheran’s streets every day • Forty percent of all female drug-addicts in Iranian prisons have AIDS. (Solomon, 2013c, p. 17)

A comparison between the Benard’s (2003) strategy and Solomon’s (2013c) claim above may lead to the questions: Have these authors used the same data? Has Solomon followed the advice of Benard (2003) pertaining to the situation in Iran? But if so, why does Solomon not acknowledge that he drew on Benard’s (2003) work, in this instance? Instead, Solomon (2013c, p. 17) references the Iranian newspaper Entekhabo as his source. And, in an interview with this author he acknowledges that he does not speak or read Farsi, but that ‘a friend’ had translated the newspaper (Interview with Hussein Solomon on July 6, 2014). At this point, it should be clear that Hussein Solomon’s independence as a Terrorism ‘expert’ and analyst can be questioned: in particular, whether his research pursues a political agenda that is biased towards Western interests. Apart from the limitations discussed above, Solomon also exploits speculation by others to securitise Muslims. The following examples will suffice in establishing this: Solomon (2013c, p.  23) states that (unnamed) ‘terror experts’ have questioned ‘the purpose of structures like Majlisul Ulama of South Africa (MUSA)’. MUSA, which he claims, is ‘a grouping of radical teachers who are thought to be close to Hezbollah’ and asserts that schools affiliated to MUSA are used as sites for ‘indoctrination and recruitment purposes’. Apart from the assertion that MUSA teachers are ‘thought to be close to Hezbollah’, no evidence was presented to support

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these claims. Moreover, even though not all Muslim schools are MUSA members, he implies that all Muslim schools are being used for ‘indoctrination and recruitment purposes’. Solomon continues with this kind of speculative narrative by citing a Washington Post (October 2003) article which alleges that students from ‘radical madrassas’ in Pakistan have ‘fled to South Africa’ and have taken up teaching ‘positions at Islamic schools that sprang up in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban’ (Solomon, 2013c, p. 23). The evidence suggests, however, that not even one madrassah principal, educator or administrator in Durban, Johannesburg or Cape Town was interviewed to verify whether they had employed any of the alleged Pakistani-trained teachers (Dadoo & Osman, 2013, p. 375). In another instance, Solomon (2013c, p. 31) reports that on 19 July 2004, the South African Farida Ahmed was arrested in the US for travelling without a visa. She was also charged with illegal entry, falsifying information in her passport. The US authorities also suspected her of being associated with terror groups. Subsequently, Ahmed declared her guilt as an ‘illegal immigrant’ and according to Solomon she ‘was deported to South Africa’. Does this suggest that the US authorities were satisfied that she was not involved in or associated with Terrorism? However, Solomon was dissatisfied with this outcome and quoted an unnamed US official who said that ‘South Africa is “… becoming a breeding ground for terrorists”’ (p. 32). In a similar manner Solomon (p.  32) lists the case of Shafique Ur-Rehman, who was detained at London’s Heathrow Airport for being in possession of ‘too much money’ and ‘having lied about who he was going to visit’. On this basis, he was deported back to South Africa and questioned by local authorities for possible ‘ties to PAGAD or al-Qaeda’. Ur-Rehman was subsequently released and, according to the ‘South African Home Affairs [former] spokesperson Mantshele Tau, this was […] a case of mistaken identity’. In another incident, the Pakistani authorities cleared the names of Feroze Abubaker Ganchi and Zubair Ismail ‘from any involvement in terrorist activities’ (ISS Editorial Team, 2005). In the same matter, the South African National Intelligence Agency (NIA) Director-General at the time, Vusi Mavimbela, stated that ‘[the NIA] found that there was no evidence [of any plans to attack South Africa]’ (Quoted in Solomon, 2013c, p. 29), after the NIA had interviewed these men in August 2004. Despite this clarification, Solomon questioned the outcome by suggesting that an

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irregular agreement might have been reached between the NIA and Feroze Abubaker Ganchi. These examples suggest a pattern in Solomon’s modus operandi: a charge, suspicion or accusation that a Muslim individual is involved in Terrorism is sufficient reason for him to regard that individual either as a Terrorist or as somehow involved with Terrorism, irrespective of the final outcome of the investigations. Continuing to explore whether Terrorism ‘experts’ promote Western political interests in Africa and South Africa, we now turn to consider the work of Greg Mills. While they share generally similar perspectives on Muslim Terrorism in Africa and South Africa, Greg Mills and Hussein Solomon’s primary political projects seem different. As we have shown in the course of the previous analysis, Hussein Solomon’s work aims to re-construct Islam in order to make it serve Western interests. Greg Mills, for his part, is a contributor to a project that aims at re-colonising Africa. An implication of such an approach to the issue is that the securitisation of African and South African Muslims by associating them with Terrorism is little more than a ruse. This means that the securitisation of African and South African Muslims by associating them with Terrorism is a ploy to justify US and/or Western military intervention and occupation on the African continent. The analysis of Greg Mills’s publications offered earlier in this chapter confirms that he, stereotypically, constructs Muslims as both violent and threat. However, contrary to these earlier constructions, Mills (2004, p.  167) has argued that state-building in Africa should simultaneously ‘reach out to Africa’s Muslim communities and negate the stereotyping … that Islam is a force only for militancy’. Instead, he argues that Islam is practised in Africa in multiple ways which reflects its divergent historical traditions and geographic origins, and that ‘radical’ Islam is supported by a minority in Africa. Despite this, he maintains that ‘continued moderation will require a need to enhance enduring traditions of tolerance among the continent’s religious communities to avoid divisions and radicalization’ (p. 167). This seeming contradiction in Mills’s (2004) thinking on this issue requires a closer analysis. The publications, which were discussed earlier, suggest that he might act more as a political strategist for Western interests, than as a scholar contributing to the production of independent knowledge.

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During the US occupation of Afghanistan, Greg Mills (2006, p.  18) had argued that the mission to that country must be transformed from a ‘peace-support mission’ to a ‘counter-insurgency operation’—one that involves ‘robust military action’ as well as psychological initiatives to win ‘hearts and minds’. The genealogy of the notion ‘counterinsurgency’ (COIN) has its origins in French imperial warfare, in its colonies, as early as the 1870s (Porch, 2011). However, US politicians and its military first used the term—‘counter-insurgency’—in 1962 to describe colonial warfare against liberation movements during the Cold War (Dixon, 2009, p. 356). The British amended the COIN doctrine, at least theoretically, to rely less on the use of coercive force and more on the introduction of strategies to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of subjugated people (p.  357). Critics have questioned whether the British approach to COIN has been successful as claimed by some (Dixon, 2009; Porch, 2011). To return to Mills (2004): His surprising reconciliatory approach towards African Muslims should be reassessed as it opens up the possibility that this approach is perhaps part of a COIN strategy to win their ‘hearts and minds’. What is certain, though, is that he is a proponent and advocate of counterinsurgency: as we have already noted, this approach to social control, as became evident earlier, is closely associated with the maintenance and protection of colonialism. Mills’s (2006) advocacy of COIN is evident in his proposal that counterinsurgency practices, as applied by the British in Malaya during its colonial period, be used as a model of how to respond to political violence in Afghanistan. In his article ‘Calibrating Ink Spots: Filling Afghanistan’s Ungoverned Spaces’, his role as a political strategist emerges: here, Mills (2006) is unequivocal in proposing the application of a COIN strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq arguing that the ‘enemy’ should be denied the opportunity to win support ‘from within the population’ (p. 19). This strategy is a counter-response to guerrilla warfare theory, which had argued that ‘armed resistance against an enemy who is [militarily] superior’ (Munkler, 2003, p. 7) could be successful if the guerrilla fighters are supported by the population and are able (to use Mao’s words) to ‘move freely within the population like fish in the water’ (p. 11). The strategy Mills proposes sets out to render the guerrilla fighters vulnerable to attack. Other instances in which Mills propagated this counterinsurgency position include his contributions to publications such as Victory Among People: Lessons from Countering Insurgency and Stabilising Fragile States (Mills & Richards, 2011).

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While Mills was on ‘secondment’ in Afghanistan, he functioned as an advocate for the building of Western hegemony. His regular ‘news briefs’ from Afghanistan were posted on the Brenthurst Foundation’s website (http://thebrenthurstfoundation.org). In a Brenthurst News Release dated 4 November 2012, Mills declared that he had been to Afghanistan with the ‘British forces’ on three occasions and that these had taught him that ‘international peace support missions’ are inherently difficult requiring outsiders to sacrifice their lives and lifestyles ‘amidst long-term deployment in often grim and unsafe conditions’. The report sought to justify the NATO and other international forces’ occupation of Afghanistan as a ‘peace support mission’. In order to construct the Afghanistan Project as an ethical and moral project, Mills suggested that participation in the mission meant significant sacrifices for the US and the British. These include the loss of life, and the deployment of a significant percentage of their future military resources, a ‘commitment that many armies would have found unsustainable’. His reflections lead him to question why African states were officially not participating in the Afghanistan Project (News Brief 18, November 2012). He speculates that Africans may perceive the occupation as ‘not their war’; or they may hold the view that Africa has its own problems with its own requirements for peace-keeping missions; or some Africans might reject collaboration with the West because of its colonial past. In responding to these speculations, Mills (News Brief 18) exposes his ideological stance. What could be regarded as rational arguments for Africa’s non-­ participation, for example, Africa’s perception that Western occupation of Afghanistan is a stage towards the colonisation of the country, Mills dismisses as short-sighted. Instead, he argues that if Africans expected help for peace-building missions on the continent they need to reciprocate and participate in missions like the Afghanistan Project. This, he maintains, would be in Africa’s interests because during such missions Africans might learn to work on ‘cutting edge military operations’ which might expose them to high level skills, techniques, and opportunities to use the latest technologies; their participation might also allow them to introduce the African approach to peace-building with those currently involved in Afghanistan; and Africa’s participation in such a mission would ‘assist in furthering the transformation and image of the continent as a problem to be solved’ and present the continent as a partner (News Brief 18). In this way, the building of technical competencies is linked to the transformation

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of the continent. Entirely absent from his deliberations are matters of principle or an ideological critique of Western hegemony. Reflecting on Mills’ ideological agenda is crucial since it shows how the work of think-tank influences perceptions in public policy circles on security issues. This is well illustrated by analysing Mills’s position on AFRICOM, the United States African Command. Two of his points of entry into this issue are central. Firstly, Mills justifies the creation and establishment of AFRICOM on the basis that ‘counter-terrorism’ could be ‘one of [AFRICOM’s] central missions’ (Mills & Herbst, 2007, p. 40). Secondly, Mills’s position promotes US political and economic interests. Contrary to the African Union’s (AU) position which initially opposes the establishment of AFRICOM (Jamieson, 2009), Mills is an active advocate and supporter of AFRICOM (Mills & Herbst, 2007; Mills, McNamee, de Lorenzo, & Uttley, 2007). Writing with Herbst in 2007, Mills both defends and justifies AFRICOM as a counter-terrorist opportunity citing four concerns with regard to Africa and international Terrorism (Mills & Herbst, 2007). First, they suggest that Africa is a ‘relatively ... easy place [from which to] hit the United States, European countries and Israel’ (p.  40). Second, they claim that Africa’s ‘angry, marginalized and anti-­ American youth’ is vulnerable to Terrorist recruitment (p.  41). Third, they indicate that some African countries may provide sanctuary for ‘international terrorists’ (p. 41). And finally, they note that Africa’s ‘very large ‘ungoverned spaces’ […] seem ideal havens for terrorists’ (p.  42). So, according to Mills and Herbst (2007) Terrorism in Africa, directed against American, European and Israeli interests, seems to be the primary justification for the creation of AFRICOM. What is revealing though is that they fail to consider how Africans perceive their security needs and/or whether AFRICOM is congruent with such concerns. In a ‘Brenthurst Discussion Paper’ (4/2007) Greg Mills, T. McNamee, M. De Lorenzo, and M. Uttley (2007) reveal that ‘Africa is currently part of the area of responsibility (AOR) of three U.S. combatant commands’. They continue approvingly, pointing out that the establishment of AFRICOM would be sensible and would serve US military interests, as it relates to Africa, more efficiently: [f]or the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), the creation of a single combatant command for Africa (AFRICOM) is primarily an internal bureaucratic shift, a more efficient and sensible way of organizing the U.S. military’s relations with Africa. (2007, p. 1)

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In this fashion, Mills et al. (2007) present AFRICOM as a technical, neutral and bureaucratic facility that will allow the US to perform its military and development aid in Africa ‘more consistently, coherently and (at greater) depth’(p. 1). In so doing, they present AFRICOM as a natural and common-sensical idea since the US has been engaged in similar kinds of activity in different regions of the world. They, however, acknowledge that ‘many African observers’ are unconvinced that AFRICOM’s intentions are benign and concede that these observers view AFRICOM as a US ‘tool to secure better access to Africa’s natural resources’ and to limit ‘China’s growing influence’ in Africa (p. 2). Yet, despite this ‘negative’ distrust about the aims of AFRICOM, Mills et al. (2007, p. 3) prefer to emphasise that African leaders—like former President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia—supported its establishment. Quoting Sirleaf, they note that AFRICOM indicates ‘the growing importance of Africa to the U.S. national security interests’ and recognises that African security relies on the US empowering its partners ‘to develop a healthy security environment’. But how reliable are these impressions? While security observers agree that the US has national security interests in Africa, the assumption that Africa’s security and development is dependent on US protection is questionable, and many African states, for example South Africa (Jamieson, 2009) and Nigeria (African Faith and Justice Network, 2007), disagree with such a proposition. As we have seen, however, this perspective is not shared by Mills and his colleagues (2007, p. 5), who insist that AFRICOM ‘must be perceived by Africans as an agent of security and development’. Is there any substance in the position of those who are sceptical of AFRICOM? This question is important because a key argument Mills uses to justify and defend AFRICOM’s establishment (Mills & Herbst, 2007; Mills et al., 2007) is that it will serve as a counter-terrorist facility on a continent whose Muslim population is either inclined towards Terrorism or it gives sanctuary to Muslim Terrorists (Mills & Herbst, 2007, p. 44). In other words, in securitising African Muslims, AFRICOM is proposed as the military solution that will stop this threat. But, is this the reason for AFRICOM’s establishment? Anthropologist Jeremy Keenan (2008, p.  18) and the South Africa Navy Captain D.  G. Jamieson (2009, p.  315) concur that amongst the US’s strategic interests in Africa are its need to secure the continent’s natural resources, and to challenge China’s increasing investment and influence. Keenan (2008, p. 18) asserts that the Global War on Terror and

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the US ‘security development discourse’ were used to justify the establishment of AFRICOM, and that ‘local-regional outbreaks of civil unrest and rebellion (‘incursions’) […] continue to be used to help legitimize US military presence’ on African soil. He provides the following example: on 7 January 2007, three weeks after AFRICOM had been authorised by the former US President G. W. Bush, US forces attacked and killed Somalian fighters and civilians. This operation was widely publicised by the US to remind the world that its ‘presence sought to resolve conflicts in Africa by brute military intervention’ (p. 18). Consider the case of the Northern Sahel region. US planning for the establishment of AFRICOM started in 1997 when the US, among other reasons, realised that its dependency on foreign oil has reached crisis level which poses a national security threat (Keenan, 2015). In seeking solutions to this threat, the National Energy Policy Group, under the Chairmanship of former US Vice-President Dick Cheney, identified ‘sub-­ Sahara Africa as a key source of future US oil supplies’ (p. 145). Realising the value of African oil to the US, the Bush Administration continued to define it ‘strategic national interest’ (Volman, 2005, quoted in Keenan, 2015). This means that the US would be prepared to go to war to control African oil. However, even though the so-called Global War on Terror (GWOT) could have been used as a pretext for the militarisation of sub-­ Sahara, the US had a problem as Terrorism activities in this region was limited prior to and immediately after 2001. So, did the US fabricate Terrorism in the Sahel to justify its militarisation of this region? According to Keenan (2015, p. 6), this is the case: Through … a number of subsequent fabricated incidents in Northern Sahel regions of Mali, Niger and Chad during the course of 2003–2004, the Bush administration was able to justify the launch of … a “second front” in the GWOT in Africa.

Other scholars have supported the argument that the US uses the GWOT to disguise its real interest in Africa, which is to protect its oil supply (Jamieson, 2009, p.  321) and that, despite US official pronouncements, AFRICOM ‘reflects a redefining of US interests’ on the continent (p. 322). The debates on whether AFRICOM is beneficial to Africa, and on actions taken by some African states in relation to this question, have exposed political ruptures which threaten the unity within Africa (p. 324).

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Botswana considered offering rights to AFRICOM to establish bases, while South Africa opposed such a move. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) publicly objected to the ‘presence of American soldiers’ in countries under its ‘jurisdiction’ (African Faith and Justice Network, 2007, no pagination). Similarly, Nigeria is opposing the erection of a US military base in West Africa (Jamieson, 2009, p.  324) Conversely, Liberia and the Seychelles allowed the US military to operate from their territories, which included providing basing rights to the US’s ‘Maritime Patrol Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles’; and Tanzania cooperated with the US regarding rights to establish military bases. These disagreements amongst African states with regard to AFRICOM have the potential to ‘precipitate a break up in SADC and the undermining of the AU’ which may threaten regional stability (p.324). We now return to the advisory function performed by Greg Mills within Africa, because, despite warnings against AFRICOM’s presence in Africa that we have seen, he continues to advocate that it will be a benefit to the continent. Actually, Mills (2008, p. 226) maintains that Africa ‘merits a US military command of its own’ for several reasons—including that the US wants to fight Terrorism in Africa; wants to limit China’s economic role on the continent; Africa’s economy shows signs that it is developing; and the US is concerned about Africa’s ‘need for development as a precursor to stability’. But absent from his consideration is what Africa thinks of this conclusion. What is unexpected is that Mills (2008) includes limiting China’s economic role in Africa as a reason for why the continent ‘merits’ AFRICOM. Actually, Mills (2008, p.  225) perceives China’s economic activities in Africa, such as it being a significant investor on the continent and that it limits the US from accessing Africa’s oil (p. 226), as a threat to ‘Western norms and interests’ (p. 225). This again confirms that promoting US interests is a priority for Mills (2008). We have ascertained, through an analysis of the publications produced by South African security experts, that they advocate and promote Western hegemony by favouring Western interests and/or values at an ideational level. In summary, the discussion concerns two ideas promoting significant negative consequences for Muslims/Islam and for African sovereignty. Firstly, with reference to Muslims/Islam, security experts promote the idea that a contestation internal to Islam has significant consequences for

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world stability and it also threaten Western interests. Accordingly, they encourage the idea that Islam can be reconstructed because it presently supports and sustains ‘Islamo-fascists’, ‘fundamentalists’, ‘extremists’, ‘jihadists’ and ‘terrorist’ Muslims (Solomon, 2013c). Secondly, security experts promote AFRICOM as a benign and benevolent resource to counter Islamic Terrorism on the continent, despite the African Union’s opposition and the warning of security scholars that AFRICOM might endanger African social and political stability. This has a bearing on understandings of African sovereignty.

Experts and Epistemic Communities The evidence we have discussed reveals that South African Terrorism ‘experts’ are active members of epistemic communities which have contributed to the construction of security knowledge that securitises South African Muslims and Islam. We will now show that some of these Terrorism ‘experts’ have organised themselves around an episteme in order to develop and strengthen the ‘internal cohesion’ amongst themselves as community members. Membership of such knowledge networks facilitates ‘mutual socialisation’ which ultimately results in members acquiring/constructing shared knowledge and shared world views as these relate to the episteme they contribute to (Davis Cross, 2013, p.  147). Being constituted as thought networks with recognised expertise allows members ‘to speak with one voice’ and ensure that their perspectives are viewed as more ‘legitimate because it is based on a well-reasoned consensus among those in the best position to know’ (p. 147). We will establish that South African experts are important actors within international thought networks that link African Muslims, Islam and Terrorism. These transnational epistemic communities are powerful sites for the construction of knowledge on Terrorism which provides the conceptual frame/s, idioms, and ideological agendas within which Islam, Muslims and Terrorism are theorised as linked. As these conceptual frames and agendas become solidified within the epistemic communities, they are transported, circulated, and popularised within the African security policy discourses. Analysing specific publications of Anneli Botha and Hussein Solomon, other than those already explored earlier, will illustrate the role of experts in epistemic communities. Anneli Botha is active in a thought network that problem-solves and conceptualises around the theme ‘Conceptions

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and Impact of Terrorism in Africa’. Hussein Solomon is involved in a transnational thought network that endeavours to solidify a link between Islam and Terrorism and consequently problem-solves around the theme ‘Radical Islam and Terrorism in Africa’. These epistemic communities are not formally known by these names, nor would members necessarily consider themselves as members of such thought networks. The epistemic community should be viewed as a heuristic device that illustrates how knowledge about Terrorism is theorised, constructed, nurtured and propagated. Episteme: Understanding Terrorism in Africa This publication shows that a transnational epistemic community which endeavours to promote an African perspective on Terrorism in Africa has been established under the influence of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). The ISS’s communiqué announcing the seminar ‘Towards Understanding Terrorism in Africa’, which was held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on 20–21 March 2006, asserts that participation is by ‘invitation only’ (http://www.issafrica.org/events/iss-seminar-towards-understanding-terrorism-in-africa). Since epistemic communities, by definition, restrict membership to those recognised as knowledgeable on the relevant episteme, limiting participation to the seminar confirms that an epistemic community was in the process of formation by early 2006. Justifying the thought network, the invitation to the event stated that conceptions of Terrorism had changed after the US 9/11 attacks, necessitating ‘new strategies and tactics [to respond to] terrorist attacks in the world’. The communiqué further maintained that in contrast to the responses to the US 9/11 attacks, the 1998 attacks in Kenya and Tanzania had not ‘elicited’ equivalent reaction from the world community. It also contended that African analysts, until this point, had limited ‘opportunity to share and exchange views and assessments’ on the topic Terrorism, amongst themselves. For these reasons, the seminar gathered African scholars in order to develop a collective conception of the notion Terrorism and assess how its ‘impacts are perceived across the [African] continent’ (http://www.issafrica.org/events/iss-seminar-towards-understandingterrorism-in-africa). The March 2006 seminar was followed by a series consisting of four seminars organised under the overarching theme ‘Understanding Terrorism in Africa’. The first seminar in this series took place on 6–7

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November 2006 in Benoni, South Africa. At this seminar, the episteme of the thought network became solidified: In the foreword to the seminar report, Understanding Terrorism in Africa: In search of an African Voice, Wafula Okumu (2007), the head of the African Security Analysis Programme at the ISS, suggests that the episteme that provided the network with its raison d’être is ‘conceptions and impact of terrorism in Africa’ so that the ‘African Voice’ is included in the ‘global debate’ that conceptualises and defines Terrorism (Okumu, 2007, p. vii). The second seminar in the series, ‘Understanding Terrorism: Building Bridges and Overcoming the Gaps’, was held on 19–20 May 2007  in Cairo, Egypt. This event explored ‘ways of building bridges’ between ‘North and sub-Saharan Africa, between Africa and the West, and between practitioners, scholars or researchers, civil society and the general public’ in order to ‘prevent and combat terrorism in Africa’ (Okumu, 2008, p. vi). As will be established, Anneli Botha, as a member of the ISS team, became a leading role-player in hosting the seminars and provided leadership and stability to the formation of the ‘thought network’ of African researchers, known as the African Research Network on Terrorism and Counter Terrorism (ARNTACT) (p. vi). Botha’s contribution to this epistemic community went beyond co-editing the seminar reports such as ‘Understanding Terrorism in Africa: In search of an African Voice’ (2007b) and ‘Understanding Terrorism: Building Bridges and Overcoming the Gaps’ (2008). She played a key role in organising the seminars (Okumu, 2007, p. viii, 2008, p. vii) which included the construction of the conceptual agenda that framed the seminar series. Furthermore, she contributed to, and provided leadership in, conceptualising the notion of Terrorism in Africa, which became clear in her seminar presentations. At the Benoni seminar, Botha (2007b) presented a paper entitled ‘Africa’s vulnerability to terrorism and its ability to combat it’. At the Cairo seminar Botha offered two papers: ‘Challenges in understanding terrorism in Africa’ (2008b) and ‘Initiatives to Prevent and Combat Terrorism in Southern Africa’ (2008a). In reflecting on her role in this epistemic community Botha states: We had a series of seminars a few years ago on ‘Understanding terrorism in Africa’. … The reason for that was that terrorism [scholarship] … has been influenced greatly from the Western world, … and we wanted to … encourage African scholars … to write … [about terrorism] from [their] perspectives. … I found some of the more interesting African scholars to write

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about terrorism. … we published three books out of that. (Interview with Botha, July 11, 2014)

Even though the seminar series was concerned with inserting the ‘African Voice’ within the global debate about Terrorism and provided an opportunity for African analysts and scholars to develop a clearer understanding of the threat and impact of Terrorism in Africa (Okumu, 2007, p. vii), it will become noticeable that the Western agenda of the GWOT remained a primary interest. A reading of the panel themes and presentations of the first seminar, ‘In search of an African Voice’, (Okumu & Botha, 2007) suggests that this seminar remained true to its aims. The presentations focused on the African continent and its concerns, which were clear in themes such as: the African understanding of Terrorism (Yoroms, 2007); the impact of Terrorism in Africa (Botha, 2007b); the challenges of preventing and combating Terrorism in Africa (Wilson, 2007). But, the ideological orientation of the second seminar became apparent as its focus was on ‘Bridging Gaps in Understanding the Impact of War on Terrorism’ (Okumu & Botha, 2008). This shift sought to frame the African discourse on Terrorism within an understanding of the GWOT signalled the omnipotence and influence of the US ideological/political agenda within this ‘African’ conversation about Terrorism. What happened to the independent ‘African Voice’? Is it possible that this agenda had been influenced by those who funded these seminars? The Norwegian Government was the primary donor of the seminar series (Okumu, 2007, p. back cover), with additional funding from the US Embassy (Okumu, 2007, 2008). If the seminar series provided the opportunity for African voices to make their understanding of Terrorism visible, and yet the seminars were funded primarily by Western sources, asking critical questions about the political/ideological agenda being promoted by this epistemic community is appropriate. This publication is unable to provide a definitive insight into whether the dominant Western perspectives on Terrorism in Africa were also the hegemonic perspectives within this epistemic community. It can however point out that Anneli Botha is a member of the ‘Global Counterterrorism Forum’ (GCTF)—a forum that aims to ‘use the information [shared in the network] towards understanding and also developing strategies to counter the terrorism phenomenon’ (Interview with Anneli Botha, July 11, 2014). The GCTF is an international forum of 29 countries and the

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European Union that was launched at a Ministerial Plenary Meeting in New York on 22 September 2011 to promote a long-term approach to countering Terrorism and extremism (https://www.thegctf.org/ About-us/Background-and-Mission). Even though the GCTF is an international forum, its political agenda is set and led by ‘the US, Canada, a few Scandinavian countries and a few European countries’ (interview with Anneli Botha, July 11, 2014). The GCTF was launched after the African epistemic community, under discussion, was established and Anneli Botha’s membership in this forum is a continuation of her participation in similar informal networks that focused on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in the West. She also enjoys a professional status with the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), University of St Andrews, Scotland, in the Terrorism Research Initiative (http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/ index.php/pot/pages/view/participants) which is hosted by the journal Perspectives on Terrorism. So, her association with CSTPV suggests that she had been accepted within a wider Terrorism Studies epistemic community which has exercised a considerable influence over the discipline’s discourse. As we discussed earlier, the CSTPV and the RAND Corporation have been pivotal and founding members of this Terrorism network. More correctly, this CSTPV-RAND partnership had been at the ‘epicentre of the academic study of terrorism’ (Burnette & Whyte, 2005, p.  9). Did similar Western networks apprentice and nurture her as a Terrorism expert to become a vehicle by which ideas advocated by them were to be transported to an epistemic community such as ‘Understanding Terrorism in Africa’? Earlier in this chapter we have argued that the RAND Corporation, with the support of the US, has developed into the ‘fountainhead’ of contemporary Terrorism knowledge. Furthermore, we have shown that the RAND-St Andrews partnership is at the epicentre of the study of Terrorism. Accordingly, Botha’s membership and her professional association with this Terrorism network, together with her being a key role-player in the African Research Network on Terrorism and Counter Terrorism epistemic community, suggest that she has adopted the role of ‘mini-fountainhead’ on Terrorism knowledge in the local African thought networks.

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Episteme: Radical Islam and Terrorism in Africa In exploring the second episteme, ‘Radical Islam and Terrorism in Africa’, selected publications of Hussein Solomon are used to illustrate the functioning of this thought network. Solomon’s membership of the Israeli-­ based think-tank, ‘Research on Islam and Muslims in Africa’ (RIMA) means that he contributes to a transnational think-tank that focuses on ‘Islamic radicalism/extremism/terrorism’ in Africa. But can the RIMA be viewed as an epistemic community? RIMA’s activities reveal that it is an interest group, an advocacy network and a think-tank. It will be shown that while RIMA is a transnational advocacy think-tank, the nature of its linkages and advocacy activities qualify it also to be viewed as an epistemic community. For such an insight one needs to draw on Ruggie’s initial conception of an epistemic community as a ‘thought network’ and as a ‘cognitive international institutionalisation’ which organises around an episteme (Antoniades, 2003, p.  23, citing Ruggie, 1972). But before reflecting on whether RIMA is an epistemic community, its nature and association with similar think-tanks in Israel are to be explored. RIMA’s founding director is Moshe Terdiman (RIMA, 2013). Prior to its founding, Terdiman had been the Director of the Islam in Africa Project (Moosa, 2013) within the Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM) (www.e-prism.org). PRISM, on its part, is a project within the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, which is based at an Israeli institution of higher learning at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya (GLORIA Center, www.gloria-center.org/about-2/). GLORIA hosts the journal Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), which, as will be revealed shortly, has an ideological bias towards American and Israeli hegemonic positions, in particular as these relate to the question of Palestine and Middle Eastern Arabs. This is confirmed in a review of articles published in MERIA. This chapter will discuss three articles as illustrative of MERIA’s bias. These articles were selected by conducting a Google Scholar search, using the key words: ‘Middle East Review of International Affairs’ and ‘Palestine’. The three articles selected for analysis were the first three relevant articles (‘hits’) from the first results page in the search. The articles are: (1) ‘Islamists and anti-Americanism’ (Paz, 2003) in which the author posits that ‘radical Islamism’, which promotes anti-Americanism, regards the US as its

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‘strongest and principal enemy’ (p. 53) and accordingly radical Muslims demonise the US constantly; (2) ‘Middle East Islamism in the European Arena’ (Paz, 2002), which argues that an innovative development within Middle Eastern politics is the migration of Middle Eastern movements (such as the ‘jihad movement’) and their ideologies to other parts of the world, especially Europe (p. 67). In other words, the author warns that ‘jihadi’ ideologies are being exported from the Middle East to the rest of the World; and (3) ‘The Hizballah-Syria-Iran Triangle’ (Amidror, 2007), which argues that even though the Shi’a and Sunnis are antagonistic towards each other, they would assist one another against the US or Israel, because Israel is the common enemy of both groups. This limited sample provides a tentative insight into the ideological bias of MERIA.  We now consider whether this bias extend to GLORIA, to PRISM and to RIMA. According to its mission statement, RIMA aims to ‘promote research on Islam in Africa as well as Muslim countries and communities in Africa and the Diaspora – in the past and present’ (msinafrica.wordpress.com/ about/). A reflection on Moshe Terdiman’s role within PRISM provides a clue to the ideological orientation of RIMA. As the PRISM director, Terdiman’s research and advocacy focused on, amongst other elements, ‘radical Islamic and Islamic movements’; the financing of ‘radical Islamist groups’; sponsoring by Islamic states of Islamist radicalism and Terrorism; Islamic communities in the West; the ‘Culture of Global Jihad’ and its attitude toward Western civilization, Israel, and the Jews (Project For the Research of Islamic Movements, www.eprism.org). In his personal profile, Moshe Terdiman declared that he is an ‘expert [in] Middle Eastern Studies, Islam in Africa and the Caribbean’ (https://pcdnetwork.org/ members/moshe-tediman/). He further confirms that he is the director of RIMA which he founded in 2013. In other words, Terdiman’s ‘scholarship’ within PRISM is ideological as it nurtured and contributed towards the manufacturing of Islam as a threat to ‘Western civilisation, Israel and Jews’. Due to its lineage, RIMA’s research can be seen as a continuation and extension of such research. Introducing Hussein Solomon as its research associate, RIMA states that Solomon is one of its ‘anchor experts on “Islamic extremism” … [who will focus on] radical Islam and terrorism throughout Africa’ (http:// muslimsinafrica.wordpress.com/2013/02/19/proffessor-husseinsolomon/). This expertise was further endorsed by Terdiman (2013b, p. v)

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in the foreword of Hussein Solomon’s book (2013c) Jihad: A South African Perspective: Jihad: A South African Perspective is a very important, timely and informed book as well as the most comprehensive one yet dealing with radical Islam and terrorism in South Africa. Hussein Solomon raises critical questions that have long concerned experts in terrorism (sic) and radical Islam in connection with South Africa.

In this endorsement, Terdiman (2013b) establishes Hussein Solomon as an expert on the topic ‘Terrorism and radical Islam in South Africa’. Following the discussion on the nature and antecedents of RIMA, we can now return to the question of whether the nature of Solomon’s participation in RIMA and the relationship this signals constitute an epistemic community. RIMA provides a facility and an opportunity to popularise and institutionalise an internationally recognisable type of understanding that associates Islam with radicalism and Terrorism throughout Africa. The episteme of the Solomon mandate within RIMA is ‘radical Islam and Terrorism throughout Africa’. However, it must be conceded that the way this thought network is constituted is different from that of Haas (1992) which conceives of an epistemic community as a ‘network(s) of knowledge-­ based experts’ (p. 2). In the case of the Solomon/RIMA ‘network’, RIMA provides the forum through which the recognised knowledge-based expert makes his (Solomon) expertise available in a network interested in the episteme. In this instance, the epistemic community is constituted with Solomon as the primary source of expertise (a so-called ‘fountainhead’) interacting with others in a teacher-student relationship. In addition, this book maintains that RIMA, as the primary partner hosting the epistemic community, might moderate and sanction which knowledge/ perspectives are authorised and which are subjugated. This means that RIMA might act as the gatekeeper of knowledge related to radical Islam and Terrorism throughout Africa. Such a perspective draws on the Foucauldian proposition that knowledge and power are inseparably intertwined (Foucault, 1970), and a recognition that the Solomon/RIMA relationship has the power to promote and marginalise hegemonic and counter-hegemonic knowledge, respectively.

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As a RIMA associate, Solomon focuses on radical Islam and Terrorism in Africa and responds to related questions. The RIMA website hosts a facility that allows scholars as well as members of society to pose questions to experts, i.e. ‘Ask the expert’. The RIMA website has a link to the posting—‘Ask the Expert: Professor Hussein Solomon on Radical Islam in South Africa’ (RIMA TAGS, 2013, May 9, 2013). In this posting, Solomon responds to questions that focus on: Whether radical Islamic groups are active in South Africa; the factors which contribute to radical Islamic ideologies and movements in South Africa; the attitude of the South African government towards radical groups; the regional dimensions of radical Islamic activities in South Africa; and the best ways to respond to radical Islam and terrorism in South Africa (RIMA TAGS, 2013, May 9, 2013). The presentation of Solomon as the RIMA expert as well as the nature of the questions posed within ‘Ask the Expert’ results in the framing of a political agenda that is limited to how Islam and Muslims in Africa are perceived. In such a frame, Islam and, by implication, Muslims are associated with radicalism and Terrorism, which implies that Islam within Africa is viewed as a security threat and securitised. These perspectives are reinforced by Solomon’s numerous postings on the RIMA website: For example, he (Solomon, 2013e) presents Boko Haram as an ‘Islamist’ Terrorist group that poses a danger to the entire Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS). Because of this assumed regional threat, Solomon advises that a regional as well as an African strategy be devised to respond to the threat urgently and further recommends that Nigeria ‘accept the assistance of the international community’ (Solomon, 2013e) which means that Nigeria should allow the US to pursue the threat and so continue its GWOT on Nigerian soil. But presenting ‘Boko Haram’ as an ‘Islamist’ terrorist group seems inconsistent with the perspective he shares in an email communication: […] it is important to separate different Islams and the rhetoric from the reality. For instance, in northern Nigeria, if we look at Boko Haram it is merely a cover for Hausa-Fulani ethno-centric nationalism, … So you need to dig deeper – more than what newspapers say, more [than] what the West says, more than what so-called experts like myself say, ... (Hussein Solomon, May 12, 2014, email correspondence)

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The above extract from Solomon’s email suggests that there are rational reasons and specific contexts that drive political violence perpetrated by groups such as ‘Boko Haram’ and that Islam is ‘merely a political vehicle’ towards their ultimate aim. In a further RIMA posting Solomon (2014, n. p.) suggests that violence and authoritarianism are inherent in Islam because: ‘In Islam there is no common citizenship  – no clear separation between Muslims and non-Muslims’. Is he proposing that the failure of the Islamic world to accept a separation between the secular and religious continues to serve as a barrier to the acceptance of such common citizenship? Furthermore, he argues that differences between Islam and others are viewed as ‘a threat to the ummah and must be stamped out’. In considering the title of his paper, it might be reasonable to assume that ‘stamp out’ implies that any ‘threat to the ummah’ will be responded to by violent means. This perspective then prompts him to ask: ‘should we be surprised with the razing of churches in northern Nigeria by Boko Haram […]? How can a democratic state emerge in an Islamic country in this context (Solomon, 2014, no pagination)?’ He accordingly advocates that urgent action be taken. If not, he concludes: ‘the scourge of Islamic violence will continue to take its toll’. Does Solomon’s ‘urgent action’ against Islam include changing the fundamentals of Islam? If so, then Solomon’s (2014) pontification about Islam’s ‘inherent failure’ to separate religion from the secular needs to be treated with caution since, as has already been suggested in this chapter, he participates in a project that aims to reconstruct an Islam that is compliant with Western political needs and interests. The Solomon/RIMA relationship and its interaction with a community of scholars, researchers and practitioners constitute a special type of epistemic community. This relationship, by which Solomon is authorised as Terrorism expert on the topic ‘Terrorism in Africa’ by an ideologically invested interest group, viz., RIMA, provides insight into how a South African-based security expert and Israeli-based think-tank have used an electronic platform as a transnational network to enhance and promote their perspectives which securitise Islam and Muslims. But this relationship can also be viewed as a vehicle to import into the African security discourse concerns originating elsewhere. The sub-section that follows introduces the final issue: How has membership of epistemic communities enhanced South African security experts’ and think-tanks’ capacity to construct security knowledge that securitises South African Muslims and Islam?

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This publication confirms that South Africa’s security experts have enhanced their capacity to securitise Islam and Muslims through their associations with transnational epistemic communities. In the case of the ISS, Anneli Botha has become pivotal in the conceptualisation of terrorism knowledge in Africa through participation in an epistemic community that has constituted itself as the African Research Network on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism. Her membership in this thought-collective provides legitimacy for her conception of Terrorism and, consequently, her status as an analyst and an educator in the field in relation to Terrorism, as well as the status of the ISS, as an African think-tank, has been enhanced. This is clear in the central role she has played in the formulation and construction of the African Union’s policy on Terrorism (personal communication with Solomon, January 2, 2015). This has also given her legitimacy and access to train (educate) members of the African police services on how to understand and respond to issues related to Terrorism (Interview with Anneli Botha July 11, 2014). Her association with the African epistemic community has enhanced her status and access to the African policy community as well. Even though she maintains that it is generally difficult to assess ‘personal impact’, she states: ‘I do think I did have an impact. If not in terms of writing, but I do quite a lot of training. I spend time with police, with defence, […] in some cases even with advisors to the Members [of Parliament] on how to understand terrorism’ (Interview with Anneli Botha, July 11, 2014.). Furthermore, Anneli Botha’s academic expertise in the field of Terrorism has been recognised by the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) by her being the recipient of its 2015 ‘Winner of the Best Ph.D. Thesis 2014 Award’ in the field of ‘Terrorism and Counter Terrorism Studies’ (http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/ view/466/html). However, no specific criteria were provided to indicate on what basis the TRI Award was issued other than a statement by Alex P. Schmid (2015, p. 167), the ‘chairman’ on behalf of the TRI Award jury: The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) seeks to enhance the quality of research in the field of Terrorism Studies. … Theses should be submitted in electronic form to the chairman of the jury … together with a cover letter (1–3 pp.), explaining the merits of the submitted PhD thesis as seen by the author.

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Similarly, by networking with RIMA, Hussein Solomon has enhanced his visibility and legitimated his membership in a transnational network whose objective it is to securitise Islam and Muslims. This chapter has established that through their respective associations within thought networks, these security experts are promoted as credentialed authorities: this status enhances the chances that their perspectives and pronouncements will be regarded as more authentic by African and South African audiences than opposing voices not associated with such thought networks. This chapter has shown that South African security think-tanks and experts are pivotal in the securitisation of Islam and Muslims both in Africa and South Africa. It has revealed how South African security think-tanks have transported a security agenda which favours Western, and particularly US, security interests into the South African security discourse. It has shown that South African security think-tanks have imported a Western perspective that associates and equates Islam with terrorism. To this end they have contributed to the construction of African Muslims as the ‘new’ suspect community in an era that has designated the Global War on Terror as the principal conflict and Islamic fundamentalism as the ‘greatest threat to Western liberal democracy’ (Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009, p. 646). Lastly, this chapter has established that South African-based security experts are members of epistemic communities which enhance their capacity to securitise Islam and Muslim in South Africa and Africa. We have confirmed that security experts have, incrementally, securitised Muslims and Islam in South Africa. Because these experts use the mainstream print media to propagate their perspectives, it can be argued that the print media have been pivotal in contributing to the securitisation of Islam and Muslims in South Africa. It is to this issue to which we now turn our attention.

CHAPTER 6

Writing Insecurity: Representations of Muslims and Islam in the South African Print Media

This chapter aims to show that the South African mainstream print media (national newspapers) have been pivotal in the securitisation of Islam. It will demonstrate how they have, uncritically, transferred the security priorities, concerns and policy agendas of the political and economic elite within Western societies into South Africa (SA). SA national newspapers have unquestionably endorsed the discourse and practices that construct Islam as an existential threat to Western civilisation, and, by implication, to South African society. The importation of this threat discourse has been presented as apolitical, ahistorical and independent of social contexts—a discourse that emerged as natural and common-sense. My intention is to show, in the case of the ‘Global War on Terror’, how the media’s ideological work constructs Western motives as being ‘noble’ while portraying motives of Muslims as dishonourable. In short, it aims to confirm that Islam and Muslims are (re)presented in SA national newspapers as evil, dangerous, a menace, and a threat. How is this possible? Why is this important? This ideological work is performed by the media in the ‘public sphere’ (Habermas, 1991). Jürgen Habermas, a contemporary social theorist who was born in 1929 and a member of the second generation of the Frankfurt School, theorised the notion ‘public sphere’ as the arena of social interaction that falls outside formal governance institutions (1991). This arena is the public’s space to critique and propose policy options; for debating © The Author(s) 2020 M. N. Hendricks, Manufacturing Terrorism in Africa, Islam and Global Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5626-5_6

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thoughts and ideas; and even initiating subsequent action. The press is a powerful actor in the public sphere because it exercises a controlling effect on public debate due to its capacity for ‘agenda-setting’. An example of this is its capacity to privilege selected perspectives while ignoring others. In this agenda-setting role, the press in effect reduces society’s options to consider all possible solutions and explanations in debates. Similarly, it diminishes the range of possible actions and/or privileges specific actions. Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937), with relevance to the public sphere, theorised the notion of ‘hegemony’ as the process by which the dominant class exercised its leadership with the consent of subordinate classes (Cox, 1999, p. 126). Hegemony is established by using both coercive means as well as through contesting ideas. But constituting hegemony through ideas is more thorough. Indeed, Daniel Kendie (2006, p. 93) maintains that the contestation for hegemony is the ‘struggle of ideas’. So, consistent with the theory of hegemony which proposes that societal and economic elite manufacture, preserve and maintain ‘ideological [consensual] unity’ in excising their political leadership by the ‘popularization of [their] worldview’ (Bates, 1975, p. 352); it is noted that the media as an ‘agent of socialization’ (Kendie, 2006, p. 90) plays a pivotal role in manufacturing ‘consent’ and legitimises the reproduction of cultural life (Heywood, 1994, p. 101). It is through this kind of hegemony that elites preserve and maintain societal ‘ideological unity’ and ensures that it exercises consensual political leadership. This chapter will confirm that South African national newspapers disseminate and popularise political worldviews and condone the use of political violence that establishes and sustains Western hegemony. As discussed in Chap. 3, securitisation requires that a threat is constructed, labelled and made known. It assumes that the utterance of security itself ‘creates a new social order’ (Balzacq, 2005, p.  171) which requires immediate state action, including the introduction of emergency measures. The utterance—the Speech-Act—labels an issue a security concern. Successful securitisation implies that the security issue has been socially and politically accepted as such and is removed from ‘normal day-to-day politics’, and constructed as an ‘existential threat’ which calls for and justifies extreme measures (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006, p. 453). Furthermore, securitisation requires practices such as uttering security and mobilising security knowledge within specific political contexts (Huysmans, 2002, p. 45). However, these political contexts seldom evolve naturally. Instead, these contexts are systematically created and sustained by institutions such as the press.

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It will become clear in this chapter that the media is a powerful actor in the public sphere securitising Islam and Muslims. And, as we have suggested in Chap. 2, Samuel P. Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ (1993, 1996) argument—which asserts that the most intense civilisational conflicts will be between ‘Muslim societies’ and the ‘West’ (Huntington, 1996, p. 183)—has been used by the media as a basis to propagate negative perceptions about Islam and Muslims. Accordingly, it will be shown that South African national newspapers, drawing on insights derived from the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ argument, have constructed Islam as ‘the Enemy’. In this assumed conflict, the national newspapers have situated themselves as the advocates of Western interests. It will become apparent how South African newspapers, in general, assume the superiority of ‘We’ (the West) and the inferiority of the ‘Other’ (Islam and Muslims). This chapter will argue that the uncritical acceptance of this superiority/inferiority dichotomy is essential to the maintenance— indeed strengthening—of Western hegemony which they (the media) endorse. In order to achieve these ends, the South African national newspapers readily associate Islam and Muslims with terrorism and extremism—without providing evidence for such associations. They do this through several strategies: by continually suggesting that foreign Muslim Terrorists plan to attack Western interests in South Africa, thus exposing the country and its citizens to danger; by implying that South African Muslims are providing sanctuary to local as well as foreign Terrorists; by suggesting that South African Muslims are potential Terrorist recruits; and by claiming that South African Muslims are directly involved in Terrorist activities. My approach is to analyse how South African newspapers’ construction of Muslims and Islam as inferior to the dominant West facilitates their securitisation. This chapter accordingly examines: the national newspapers’ framing strategies such as privileging particular versions of reality while ignoring others; how the press persuades through the strategic presentation and organisation of news objects related to Islam, Muslims and the West; and how it provides a limited field of meaning within which events and activities associated with Muslims and Islam are to be understood (Severin & Tankard, 1992, p. 209). In other words, this chapter is concerned with how the national newspapers attempt to manufacture public opinion that views Islam and Muslims as a threat through the use of strategies such as ‘agenda-setting’ and framing.

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Cultivating Western Hegemony This section will present data on how Muslims and Islam have been reported on in the press. It will show that SA newspapers not only accept, but also actively contribute to the establishment, and the reinforcement, of Western hegemony as the international norm within the South African security discourse. In accepting the putative Western moral order, they have also taken to constructing South Africa as integral to this order, and this includes an obligation to defend it. Consistent with the discourse of domination, South African newspapers endorse and facilitate the assumed power and authority of the West to define and establish the international ‘moral order’. As it is not sufficient to assert the assumed superiority/ inferiority dichotomy sporadically in order to maintain Western hegemony, national newspapers also seek to sustain and justify a constructed antagonistic schism between the West and Islam. Constructing the Moral Order Invariably the West, particularly the US, is presented as reluctant—though necessary—participants in the ‘Global War on Terror’. In policing the international ‘moral order’, the West is portrayed as protecting and defending the Western civilisational project of which South Africa is an integral part. This includes the promotion and establishment of ‘liberal’ values such as democracy, freedom of association, equality, and the protection of human rights. In validating the authority of the West, South African national newspapers legitimatise the ‘moral order’ normatively by portraying it as being in opposition to the ‘immorality’ of an ‘evil’ aberrant Islamic ‘Other’ (Graham, Keenan, & Dowd, 2004; Lazar & Lazar, 2004). The press uses this designation of ‘immorality’ to justify their identification of the perpetrators of evil and their call for the annihilation of the ‘Other’ (the threat) (Lazar & Lazar, 2004). As part of the process of integrating the South African public into the Western ‘moral order’, the Afrikaans newspaper Die Burger (September 12, 2003) confirms the US’s self-portrayal that it is morally superior to the rest of the world. It reinforces this by suggesting that the US has limited its involvement in international politics. Here, Die Burger is silent on the US’s involvement in the two World Wars, the Vietnam War, and its responsibility for the near destruction of the Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki with its atomic bombs in 1945 which some scholars regard as

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war crimes because they were carried out for non-military purposes (Yagama, 2009; also see Walker, 1990, 1995): The Americans, since becoming independent in 1776-1779, perceived themselves as morally superior to the rest of the world and, in general, did not want to contaminate themselves by a too significant international presence. (Burger, September 12, 2003)

To confirm and emphasise the US’s reluctance to become embroiled in war, another Afrikaans newspaper, Die Beeld (May 29, 2012), represented the American perspective on history: ‘Even though America was reluctant to participate in the Second World War, it was forced to enter the war due to the Japanese’s surprise attack on its navy base, Pearl Harbour, Hawaii’. Using the phrase ‘it [America] was forced’ suggests that the US had no alternative and was morally justified in entering World War II. Moreover, evoking the iconic moment associated with the name ‘Pearl Harbour’ plays a specific role in the argument by establishing and reminding readers of America’s moral stance pertaining to war, in general. So, when the US was attacked on September 11, 2001, the paper argued that this ‘attack […] reminded Americans of Pearl Harbour’ (Die Beeld, May 29, 2012). So, Die Beeld, by linking the 9/11 attacks in the US with Pearl Harbour, suggested that the US was morally justified and had no alternative but ‘to decisively crush the Islamic terror organisation Al Qaeda and its host, the Taliban regime of Afghanistan’. The content of both Die Beeld (May 29, 2012) and Die Burger (September 12, 2003) articles are instances of securitisation and will be analysed later in these pages. Similarly, the Saturday Star (September 10, 2011) noted that it was appropriate to recognise the 11 September 2001 attacks in New York as a ‘tragedy’, since what happened was nothing short of ‘cold-blooded murder’: ‘Terrorism pure and simple’. After having labelled the event as ‘cold-blooded murder’ and ‘Terrorism’, the Saturday Star (September 10, 2011) called the perpetrators of the act ‘extremists opposed to the American way [who] have twisted the tenets of a great religion, Islam, to inspire hatred and provide martyrs for some supposed Jihad’. This perspective is echoed by Die Beeld (May 29, 2012) to justify the American response and to remind readers that the US’s actions were for an ultimately good cause, one that was contrary to the immorality of the evil ‘Other’:

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The Taliban, due to its cruel religious orthodoxy, was exceedingly unpopular, which resulted in the NATO forces being optimistically welcomed in most parts of the country – recognising that support in the south was less. (Die Beeld, May 29, 2012)

The above narrative about the American response to 9/11 and how NATO forces were received in Afghanistan confirms the basic premise of the theory of hegemony (Gramsci, 1971), as we have seen: The media, as a pivotal ‘agent of socialization’ (Kendie, 2006, p.  90), preserves and manufactures ideological consent by popularising the worldviews of the political elite (Bates, 1975, p. 352). While the media operate primarily in the realm of ideas, in this case confirming and protecting the ‘legitimacy’ of the Western ‘moral order’, it simultaneously warns about the consequence for challenging this moral order. Following from this, delinquency can expect retribution in the form of ‘devastating violence’ and/or to be crushed ‘decisively’ (Die Beeld, May 29, 2012). The tactic of appealing to national mythology, for example using iconic historic events such as the attacks on ‘Pearl Harbour’, to raise the consciousness of the reader is a well-established mechanism of appealing for solidarity and action (Graham et al., 2004, p. 209). Graham, Keenan and Dowd (2004) maintain that in order for people to understand what their political leader wants them to do, what is said by the leader must be connected to ‘popular perceptions of what has previously occurred within the social system’. In this presentation, they refer to how political leaders appeal to history in their speeches, as a strategy to garner support for specific action. Newspapers, like politicians,—drawing on national myths to ‘integrate’ the individual into the hegemonic culture of society (Herman & Chomsky, 2002, p. 1)—do have the ability to change the behaviour of individuals and nations. This insight applies unmistakeably to how the media appealed for ideological support in their construction and justification of America’s leadership and response to the September 11, 2001 attacks. In addition to cultivating Western hegemony, the newspaper articles cited above make securitising moves by pronouncing an ‘Emergency’. Here, the utterances—that the US has been attacked by an ‘Islamic terror organisation’ (Die Beeld, May 29, 2012); and that the attacks were ‘cold-­ blooded murder’ and ‘terrorism’ (Saturday Star September 10, 2011) reinforced the securitising move of the US President George W.  Bush

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(2001a) which constructed ‘terrorism’ as a threat that needed to be resisted, and urgently, too. By emphasising Bush’s (2001a) securitising move, Die Beeld (May 29, 2012) and Saturday Star (September 10, 2011) strengthened the notion that further political debate on the issue was unnecessary as it has been transformed into a security concern. As the 9/11 attacks were presented in these newspapers as ‘an existential threat requiring emergency measures’ (Buzan et  al., 1998, 23–24), Die Beeld (May 29, 2012) justified the US’s actions of ‘crush[ing]’ the Islamic terror organisation and ‘its host, the Taliban regime of Afghanistan’. Die Burger (September 12, 2003) is more direct and to the point: ‘any country in the future, if perceived by the American government as a possible threat, whether the threat is real or not, should expect a devastating reckoning’. These are instances of securitisation. The national press labelled ‘Islamic terror organisation’ and ‘terrorism’ as security threats that could not be left to normal politics. Instead, urgent action was justified since failure to stop these threats would have resulted in the loss of ‘everything’—‘it will be too late’ (Wæver, 2014). It has been argued earlier, that the national press disperses and popularises political ideas and justifications of the application of force that establishes and sustains renditions of events given by the West. The Cape Argus (January 22, 2013) provides an exemplar of how Western violence is represented as beneficent and acting in the interests of a civil humanity. It also suggests, by using the image of a British Royalty, that South Africa is an integral part of the political and cultural West. In an article entitled ‘“I’ve killed” – Prince Harry: Attack Pilot: “Took life to save a life”, says playboy prince’ was accompanied by a picture that dominates the front page of the Cape Argus (January 22, 2013). The caption to the picture reads: ‘“Action Man”: Prince Harry […] races out with crew members to scramble his Apache helicopter at Camp Bastion in Afghanistan’. The article continues on page three and is accompanied by a much smaller picture of the British Prince, depicting him with his technical pilot’s helmet on, ready for any action. The caption to this picture reads: ‘Eagle eye: Prince Harry in the cockpit of his helicopter’. The first picture represents Prince Harry and his fellow combatants as athletic, on the move and determined to accomplish a task as if in a sporting event. The second picture (p. 3)—of a person with a high-tech helmet on his head in the cockpit of a military helicopter with a caption indicating that it is Prince Harry—gives the impression that the task to be performed is of a highly technical nature, and because Prince Harry has the relevant

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expertise, the task he has to perform is or will be executed ‘cleanly’ and innocently; even if it ultimately involves killing humans. The Cape Argus (January 22, 2013) reports: Prince Harry […] admitted he killed for the first time. Thoughtful but unrepentant, he said soldiers sometimes had to ‘take a life to save a life’. Asked if he had killed from the cockpit of his aircraft, the prince, 28, said: ‘Yeah, so lots of people have. The squadron’s been out here. Everyone’s fired a certain amount. If there’s people trying to do bad stuff to our guys, then we’ll take them out of the game. […] our job out here is to make sure the guys are safe on the ground and if it means shooting someone who is shooting them, then we will do it.’ […] he prefers to live by his own motto: ‘Work hard, play hard’ (emphasis added to highlight the sporting metaphor).

The above narrative reinforces the perspective that Western motives are pure, for a greater good, and that killing is a technical process. Indeed, as social relations become more technical, killing is becoming a technical activity. What is missing from this narrative is the perspective of those marginalised due to the actions of Prince Harry. But, as discussed previously, the role of the media is to preserve and justify the worldview of the elite. However, it needs to be noted that the Cape Argus (January 22, 2013) article about Prince Harry is a copy of a story that originated in Britain. Actually, the British online version of The Guardian (January 22, 2013) reported that the story was orchestrated by Buckingham Palace as a public relations exercise that worked successfully as British ‘papers carried the same staged picture of the prince “scrambling” for his helicopter at Camp Bastion’. It further reported that these articles were mostly based ‘around quotes from his arranged interview in which he admitted to having been responsible for killing the enemy’. This example serves as confirmation of Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky’s (2002) propaganda model. This model, which seeks to explain the behaviour of the media in democratic capitalist economies, argues that ‘the raw material of news’ passes through multiple filters to ensure that the news content audiences receive serves the interests of established power (p. 2). One of these filters is the media’s reliance on information provided by official sources—in this case, British Royalty. In the preceding section it became evident that the national press constructed South Africa as integral to the Western civilisational project and

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tried to incorporate South Africa into the hegemony of the West. So, when Islam was constructed as a security threat in the West, Islam locally was likewise securitised. Representations of the Moral Order The South African newspapers’ representation of Western ‘morality’ as beyond reproach has been a consistent one. So, if, or when, violence needs to be employed to defend it, this violence is portrayed as necessary and targeted to defending and protecting what is morally good. Simultaneously, it is implied that the West has the authority to protect the ‘moral order’ against all who intend to disrupt it. As a consequence, those who oppose the Western-centred order and use political violence in this process are depicted as immoral, extremist and evil. Wayne Kopping, a South African documentary film producer, whose work focuses on (what he calls) ‘Islamic fundamentalism’, emphasised the immorality of the ‘enemy’ in the following way: We in the West have a hard time wrapping our heads around the fact that there are people who really hate us and want to kill us. And not only that, but they teach their children to hate us. (Saturday Star, December 2, 2006)

This illustrates how the narrator uses inclusive and plural personal pronouns to construct himself and other South Africans as belonging to the West. It follows that if South Africa belongs to the ideological West, then it shares its values and accepts the political leadership provided by the US. Die Burger (September 12, 2003) reminded its readers that the Western moral project, ‘under American leadership, is not only [to] protect freedom and democracy, but […] also [to] establish freedom and democracy across the entire planet’. This is an illustration of how the maintenance and protection of Western ‘moral order’, as a global project, are discussed approvingly in the national press. Essentially, Die Burger (September 12, 2003) is propagating ideas that advance Western interests. This is another instance which confirms Gramsci’s theory of hegemony (1971). As discussed previously, the contestation for hegemony is the struggle of ideas. So, we note that Die Burger (September 12, 2003) asserts that America’s political leadership strives for the maintenance and protection of a ‘moral good’. This idea presupposes that other competing ideas aim to promote the ‘bad’ and/or have less altruistic motives. This move is consistent with

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the theory of hegemony which proposes that societal and economic elites manufacture, preserve and maintain ‘ideological [consensual] unity’ in exercising their political leadership through the ‘popularization of [their] worldview’ (Bates, 1975, p. 352) and legitimise the reproduction of cultural life (Heywood, 1994, p. 101). In Die Burger (September 12, 2003) it is evident that media is performing its ideological function in approvingly offering a perspective that preserves Western interests. Another example of the way the national press strengthens Western hegemony is that SA newspapers legitimate the Western culture’s authority to define the ‘international moral order’ by applauding the determination of the United States to rise up after a calamity and, simultaneously, to encourage South Africans to show empathy and solidarity with such a spirit. A Business Day (January 26, 2004) headline read: ‘Rising from the ashes of the twin towers’. The article informs readers that ‘no company suffered as much human loss as Cantor (the name of the company): 658 of its 1000 New York employees died in the [11 September 2001 World Trade Centre] attacks’. Yet, despite this loss, the company survived. The paper went on to invite readers to associate themselves with such triumph since ‘the sheer willpower and endeavour portrayed will serve as an inspiration’. Similarly, Die Volksblad (February 6, 2006) presents a motivating narrative of inspirational humanity and an undying spirit in overcoming adversity and catastrophe: Amongst the numerous heroic acts performed on [11 September 2001] one cannot ignore but has to name the actions of Frank de Martini, Pablo Ortiz, Pete Negron and Carlos Da-Costa. From the moment the first aeroplane hit the northern tower, they, without any fear, helped from other people. With a crowbar, a torch and brute force they broke lift doors, […] removed burning barriers so that others could get away. More than 70 people escaped the hellish inferno due to their selfless action. Not one of these ordinary people who had no responsibility to anyone, survived. (Die Volksblad, February 6, 2006)

These quotations (Business Day, January 26, 2004 and Die Volksblad, February 6, 2006) employ three rhetorical strategies to draw the reader into the political process. The first appeals directly to the reader: ‘Even if

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you are not interested […], the sheer willpower and endeavour portrayed will serve as an inspiration’ (Die Volksblad, February 6, 2006). A second rhetorical strategy uses a conversational style. Readers are positioned as active participants in the conversation and so an ‘imagined community’ of readers is constituted that solidifies ‘we’ (those who subscribe to the moral order as defined by the West) versus the evil ‘Other’ (Islamic extremists). In theorising the development of the notions ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’, Benedict Anderson (1983) introduced the concept of ‘imagined communities’ in recognition that these notions are social-­ cultural constructs. But, he points out that nationalism and nation should not be viewed as arbitrary inventions or fabrications (Anderson, 1983, p.  49). Instead, nations are communities that become or are created as nations ‘by the style in which they are imagined’ (p.49). Nations, accordingly, are ‘imagined political communit[ies]’ in the sense that it is highly unlikely that members of a nation will ever know, meet or hear the majority of their fellow-members, but conceptually they share the ‘image of their communion’. In other words, while a nation is a socio-cultural construct, it exists in the mind of each individual claiming membership to a particular nation. Anderson (1983, pp.  53–6) further shows that the media, particularly the printing press, was a powerful tool in the construction of nations. The selections from Business Day (January 26, 2004) and Die Volksblad (February 6, 2006) are further examples of the use of the second rhetorical strategy: constructing the reader as a good citizen by positioning her/ him alongside individuals who have triumphed in the face of overwhelming adversity. Similarly, the quotation below constructs the reader as a good citizen: Sombre ceremonies were held around the world yesterday to mark the 10th anniversary of the September 11 attacks, when 19 al Qaeda members hijacked four passenger jets, and aimed them at the heart of America. […] The fourth [jet] failed to find its mark –the US Capitol – after the passengers, in an unimaginable act of self-sacrifice, stormed the cockpit and forced the plane to crash in the field in Pennsylvania. (Cape Argus, September 12, 2011)

The use of the word ‘sombre’ depicts a solemn atmosphere—i.e. one filled with grief. The Cape Argus suggests that people around the world were grieving in solidarity with the pain Americans experienced when

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attacked by al Qaeda. It informed its readers that the attack was aimed at the ‘heart of America’ with intent to annihilate and destroy. Note the word selection in the phrase describing ‘an unimaginable act of self-­ sacrifice’ by the heroic passengers who offered themselves to protect others. This should be contrasted with the ‘suicides of the malicious terrorists’. The third rhetorical strategy is repetition across time and in different outlets. Repetition is the foundation of all articles appearing in the press; despite variations, there is a structural unity which ensures that pieces selected for publication, by necessity. are reinforced by a shared ideology and language. The following quotations illustrate the rhetorical strategy of ‘repetition’. The title of the selected article in Die Burger (September 11, 2002) is: ‘Phoenix rises from rubble’. This headline mirrors a British Daily Telegraph (January 19, 2002) article, ‘Pentagon phoenix rises from the rubble’. The link between international stories and articles in the national press is highlighted again in order to confirm that certain stories originate in the Global North and are transported into the South African political and media discourses, often using the same tropes. Drawing again on the image of pain and suffering of Americans as depicted in the Cape Argus (September 12, 2011), after the 11 September 2001 attacks, Die Burger (September 11, 2002) suggests that Americans are triumphant eventually: Just on this side of the Potomac River a phoenix has risen from the rubble, flames, and human destruction of 11 September 2001. For the last year more than 3000 construction workers laboured day and night to restore the Pentagon before 11 September 2002. Initially, workers worked seven days a week, night and day to demolish the damaged section of the Pentagon and to clear the site of 57 000 tons of rubble. A project that normally would take six months, only took one month, according to Mr. Evey, the leader of the Pentagon Repair Project. The hardened war veteran had a tremor in his voice and with tears in his eyes as he related how the construction workers, amongst whom were immigrants from more than 30 countries, refused, over the last year, to take off on holidays and weekends. They threatened their supervisors with violence when they were requested to take just one day’s leave. The attitude was: They have done this to us in our backyard. And we are going to repair it. (Die Burger, September 11, 2002)

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This narrative constitutes the readers as good citizens by ‘forcing’ them to identify with the key narrator’s masculinity: Mr Evey is depicted as a ‘real man’ who does not show emotion lightly because he is a ‘hardened war veteran’. However, the context of the situation produced ‘a tremor in his voice and with tears in his eyes as he related’ how the workers sacrificed their time in order to restore the symbol of American military might. And what made the sacrifice of the workers even greater and significant was that among the construction workers were ‘immigrants, from more than 30 countries’. This suggests that most people of the world are welcomed and are made to feel welcome in the US to the point where these immigrants were prepared to sacrifice themselves in protecting the integrity of their adopted country. The implied invitation to readers is: ‘Are you also prepared to support and sacrifice your time for the honour of democracy?’ In other words, the aim of this rhetorical strategy is to incorporate local readers, with their active consent, into a political discourse that justifies US political and ideological leadership. Notwithstanding the consistency of employing repetition as a rhetorical device, ideological contradictions have crept into the SA print media on these issues. However, these do not necessarily challenge the structural unity that has already been established. Instead, these contradictions should be viewed as gestures to strengthen such a moral order since occasional contradictory perspectives give the appearance of balance and fairness in newspaper reportage (Herman & Chomsky, 2002). While Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky argue that the function of the media is to ‘integrate’ individuals into hegemonic culture of society (2002, p. 1), they concede that the media ‘allow(s) some measure of dissent’ to show that the ‘system is not monolithic’ but ensure that such dissent is not too large to interfere with the dominant agenda (p. xii). Herman goes further arguing that ‘there are often differences within the elite which open up space for some debate and even occasional (but very rare) attacks on … the tactical means of achieving elite ends’ (Herman, 1996, quoted in Klaehn & Mullen, 2010, p. 12). Newspaper articles that contradict the structural unity which integrate individuals and social groups into the hegemonic culture of society have appeared in the national press. These include the following examples: An article in City Press (September 9, 2012) entitled—‘Pain of September 11 does not belong to the US alone’ challenges the unequal treatment victims of violence are given in the press by lamenting that no newspaper has considered publishing the names of those who ‘perished’ in

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Iraq and Afghanistan in the ‘War on Terror’. Yet, all the names victims of the 9/11 attack were printed in the New York Times (City Press, September 9, 2012). The City Press article also highlights why a prominent South African— Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu—continues to oppose the immorality of the killings during the US-led Iraqi invasion. Actually, his opposition to the Iraqi invasion was so intense that he refused to share a stage with the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair when both were invited, as special guests, to attend the Discovery Invest Leadership Summit in Johannesburg in August 2012. The Archbishop withdrew from this summit because he regarded Blair’s support for the US-led invasion of Iraq as morally indefensible (City Press, September 9, 2012). City Press (September 9, 2012) reported on this matter as follows: Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu explained that he refused to share a platform with Tony Blair because ‘more than 110 000 Iraqis have died in the conflict since 2003 and millions have been displaced’.

Furthermore, City Press charged that the US, through its CIA, has a history of supporting coups against countries who oppose its hegemony. It names specific countries and the specific atrocities committed by the US: American participation in war is not that pious; its history in South America is evidence of that: on 11 September 1973  in Chile General Augusto Pinochet, in a Central Intelligence Agency–backed coup, overthrew the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende. Subsequently, thousands of people were killed, ‘disappeared’, and concentration camps and torture chambers became commonplace across Chile. Chile was not the only South American nation to have fallen victim to the US.  The others include Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. (City Press, September 9, 2012)

Another article that contradicts the ideological structural unity established through repetition appeared in the Mail and Guardian (April 12, 2007). This asked whether secularism was possible under Islam and whether ‘Islam is compatible with democracy’. In answering this question, Shamil Jeppie, a historian based at the University of Cape Town, responded:

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Would you bother to ask, ‘Is Roman Catholicism compatible with democracy?’ The NG Kerk provided a Christian rationale for one of the most undemocratic states [South Africa] of the 20th century. Does this mean that we must be suspicious of Christianity as a global threat to democracy? […] How democratic were Western nations during their colonial expansionist era? […]. And what genuine allegiance do Western democracies have to the democratic values they claim to espouse, when they support tin-pot dictatorships, as they routinely do when it serves their strategic and material interests?

Here Jeppie draws attention to the double standards of Western morality: i.e. it (the West, its instruments of propaganda) is quick to identify and criticise the assumed limitations of Islam, but is silent on its own failings. This section has shown that local voices, in general, have accepted that South Africa is an integral component of the ideological West and accordingly shares its ‘moral order’. We now move to explore how the national press constructs the enemy that questions the Western moral order.

Articulating the Threat Annita Lazar and Michelle Lazar (2004, p. 227) assert that naming the ‘enemy’ is critical to ‘defining, establishing and maintaining a moral order’, as the enemy disobeys and defies ‘our’ ‘values’. Historically, whenever political leaders have called their citizens to arms, two features remained constant: first, the threat was uttered and second, the enemy was constructed (Graham et al., 2004, p. 211). The South African national newspapers’ articulation of the ‘threat of Islamic terror’ is defined in two ways: firstly, as resistance, opposition or hostility to Western moral order and, secondly, that South Africa is a ‘sanctuary’ for international ‘Islamic extremists’. And, as discussed previously, since the national newspapers have constructed South Africa as integral to Western civilisation, the threat is understood as a danger to the values shared by South Africans as fellow ‘Westerners’. In other words, as these pages have already emphasised, the national press constructs South Africans as part of Western civilisation. The Saturday Star (September 10, 2011), in reference to the perpetrators of the 11 September 2001 attacks, describes the threat as Islamic ‘extremism’.

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The next example illustrates the relationship between the media and think-tank experts. Anneli Botha, from the Institute for Security Studies, writes in the Mail and Guardian (December 8, 2011) that the ‘threat of [Islamic] extremism is still lurking’. She goes on to warn that the ultimate objective of ‘Islamic extremism’ is to ‘return to the former glory of the Islamic Empire’. And this is precisely why ‘not everyone supports the [Arab Spring] uprising, especially since there are concerns that religious [Islamic] extremists might use the opportunity to strengthen their position. [Such lack of support is partly based on] fearing a repeat of the Iranian revolution, […] which saw the fall of the Western backed Shah of Iran in 1979’ (Mail and Guardian, April 7, 2011). However, these assertions are made without any verification. While she speculates that support for the 2011 North African and Arab uprisings might strengthen Islamic extremism, she is silent on the negative consequences of economic neo-­ liberal policies in these regions which were significant in their contribution to the Arab Spring (see Dixon, 2011, p. 309). Instead, Botha (Mail and Guardian, April 7, 2011) exposes her ideological bias by recalling the image of the 1979 Iranian Revolution to suggest that Western support for these uprisings might result in its political interests being marginalised. And, as we have discussed in Chap. 2, contemporay continuities in secutity thinking, which has its roots in apartheid and Cold War politics, persist: The US demonised Iran after the1979 Iranian Revolution. Since aparthied, South Africa was a Cold War partner of US at that time, and Iran was constructed as a South African enemy after the Revolution. This expert analysis in a national newspaper ignores the historical, socio-political and economic causes that have given rise to the ‘Arab Spring’. By disregarding such influences, expertise is used, in effect, to discredit the possible forces behind or reasons for the uprising in favour of an interpretation that ensures that Western interests are protected. Such biased analysis substantiates the perspective that evidence plays no part when ‘experts’ and national newspapers report on social issues that are ideologically invested. This form of reporting on, and analysing, social issues involving Muslims and Islam was not limited to the Mail and Guardian (April 7, 2011). The Star (July 30, 2012) advocates that there is an urgency to recognise the threat and risk faced by the African continent since three ‘[Islamic] extremist groups [have] joined forces’. Similarly, the Mail and Guardian (July 5, 2012) explains that the ‘Islamists pose [a] new threat [in Africa]’ as Africa’s three ‘most dangerous Islamist militant groups are

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striving to co-ordinate their operations’. This, according to the Mail and Guardian (July 5, 2012), is evidence that the ‘security threat on the continent’ is intensifying. As is obvious, both these reports are ahistorical and lack the necessary detail to assist in the process of verification, at a level of substance as well as interpretation. Propagating an ideological agenda that attempted to include South Africa within the Western hegemonic order, a Pretoria News (October 11, 2001) editorial read: The South African government has finally been pressed into nailing its colours to the mast regarding the United States-led strikes in Afghanistan. The attacks, noted Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Aziz Pahad, […] were in line with the US’s right to self-defence and to seek those responsible for the September 11 terror. […] he finally labelled the Taliban regime ‘obnoxious’ and implied that it should be rooted out. That places South Africa firmly, if uncomfortably, in the American camp in a world increasingly polarised by this conflict. As we have noted […] before, there is no place for neutrals in this war. (Pretoria News, October 11, 2001)

This echoes George W. Bush’s (2001a) refrain: ‘Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists’, which expresses the view that all nations need to take sides in the GWOT. Here Bush (2001a) repeats a Cold War canard—but in this instance, Islam has replaced communism as the Enemy. Pahad’s statement is uncritically interpreted as support for the American side against the Afghanistan regime, the Taliban, which should be annihilated. But it needs to be noted that in this instance, Aziz Pahad was not committing South Africa to partner with the US in its GWOT. Instead, he acknowledged, consistent with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations (1945), that nations have the right to self-defence and to pursue threats to their security. However, exercising this right is limited to the conditions of necessity and proportionality according to the International Court of Justice (1996, p. 226, para. 41). After the US’s declaration of the ‘GWOT’ the South African media transported and popularised a Western perspective of this ‘War’ within the local media discourse. In doing this, the national press created a trope that linked extremism and terrorism in Afghanistan, with that in South Africa. This link assumed that the US military action in Afghanistan had disrupted al Qaeda’s safe haven in that country, which forced it to seek alternative sanctuaries from where it could pursue its assumed violent activities. The

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local press, accordingly, started to propagate the idea that South Africa had become one such sanctuary. The notion that an ‘Islamic Terrorist’ organisation, al Qaeda, had found a sanctuary locally was a securitising move. This is actually the position of Kurt Shillinger (2006a), the SAIIA’s Terrorism expert, as we have noted in Chap. 5. As in the case of Afghanistan, the national newspapers constructed the threat as Islamic extremists recruiting local members and launching Terror attacks against Western interests from South Africa. The Saturday Star’s (May 29, 2004) headline read: ‘SA could be host to more al Qaeda cells’. The implications of this were made visible: ‘It is believed that the men [three suspected al Qaeda men arrested] would have used chemical weapons and explosives to target US companies such as McDonalds operating in South Africa’ (The Saturday Star, May 29, 2004). Similarly, The Saturday Weekend Argus (October 3, 2004) raised the alarm of danger with the headline: ‘Al Qaeda leaders “hiding in SA”: Top militants may be operating “from Cape Town to Durban; from Eastern Cape to Gauteng”’. Furthermore, The Saturday Weekend Argus (October 3, 2004) warned of a growing security threat in South Africa since, even though the arrested militants were foreign, they ‘drew upon local support and relied upon sympathetic figures in the local and immigrant Muslim communities’. This warning of a ‘threat’ was intensified by the assertion that the Islamic extremist ‘movement was proving to be regenerative, with new operatives springing up’, which ‘suggests that al Qaeda and the mysterious network facilitating its access to South Africa had been actively recruiting from the local Islamic community’ (Saturday Weekend Argus, October 3, 2004). While the previous article proposed that only a section of the Muslim community—extremists associated with al Qaeda—are the enemy, The Citizen (September 8, 2005) identified all Muslims as the enemy. It stated that ‘Muslims are again in the public eye for alleged bombings and rebel activities’. Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu was thus correct in stating later that Muslims have been constructed as the enemy: Tutu said that everyone united to condemn the perpetrators of the attacks [9/11 attacks]. But the moment was lost when the attackers were labelled ‘Muslim terrorists and evil personified was given a Muslim face. We were told that these Muslim terrorists were aided and abetted by Muslim countries. Clearly, this logic went, Muslims were not to be trusted …Adherents of the Muslim faith were harassed and humiliated across the world’. (Pretoria News, September 12, 2011)

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The narrative of the 9/11 attacks and the pronouncement of a ‘Global War on Terror’ represent two phases. Immediately after it became known that the US had been attacked without provocation, the United Nations, almost unanimously, condemned the attacks and expressed their solidarity with the citizens of the US. This phase was characterised by the acknowledgement that all people share a common humanity which should not be violated. Phase two followed the US’s unilateral declaration of the GWOT and its mobilisation of support for its war efforts in Afghanistan. The intentions, methods and motives of the US’s unilateral actions were being challenged and questioned by numerous governments as well as civil society, social movements and public intellectuals. The quotation, attributed to Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu in the Pretoria News, illustrates these two phases: Initially the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks were unanimously condemned. In the second phase the US exploited widespread sympathy to construct the attacks in terms of a clash of civilization (see Huntington, 1996). The South African press paid little attention to these phases and continued to propagate the idea that individuals associated with Islam were involved in an inter-civilisational conflict with the West. The Daily Dispatch (May 4, 2011) labelled Osama bin Laden the ‘enemy’ because he had been identified as ‘the author of the 9/11 atrocities in the United States and various lesser terrorist outrages elsewhere’. Die Beeld (May 5, 2011) concurred that bin Laden personified the ‘enemy’ as the ‘9/11 attacks, with Muslim terrorists [piloting], elevated Osama bin Laden as enemy number one for a large portion of the world’. Even though Die Beeld (May 5, 2011) qualified the identity of the specific Muslims, i.e. Muslim ‘terrorists’, it made sure that readers were informed that the pilots (of the planes that crashed into the World Trade Centre) were Muslims. The persona ‘bin Laden’ was taken to be the embodiment of al Qaeda. Accordingly, al Qaeda was spoken of as the ‘enemy’. This became clearer in the reports of bin Laden’s assassination/execution by American troops. Former American President Barack Obama, was quoted as having issued a warning that the ‘death of Bin Laden marks the most significant achievement to date in our nation’s effort to defeat al-Qaeda. Yet his death does not mark the end of our effort. There is no doubt that al-Qaeda will continue to pursue attacks against us’ (The Daily Dispatch, May 4, 2011). The way the media constructed al Qaeda, at that time—i.e. the ‘enemy’— lent the group an omnipresent character. Its presence mushroomed in national newspapers: whenever social groups associated with Islam provided

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physical and/or ideological opposition to Western interests, they were identified with al Qaeda. Accordingly, City Press (May 23, 2010) identified the Somali militant opposition, al-Shabab as an al Qaeda-­linked group. Similarly, the Mail and Guardian (July 5, 2012) branded an ‘Islamist’ group allegedly operative in the Sahel region (North Africa) as ‘Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, an affiliate of al-Qaeda based in North Africa’. In this narrative, al Qaeda was used as a label to link all opposition to Western interests associated with Islam. But al Qaeda also played a symbolic and rhetorical role in this narrative. Symbolically, al Qaeda represented an Islamic enemy bent on establishing a global Muslim community through violent means. Rhetorically, the label ‘al Qaeda’ was used to maintain a sense of repetition across time and over different national newspapers in order for the reader to accept that the threat was pervasive and continuously growing and therefore needed to be stopped immediately. Even though it was al Qaeda that was explicitly identified as the ‘enemy’, the media used negative defining adjectives such as ‘extremist’, ‘radical’, ‘fanatical’ in association with Muslims and Islam. These adjectives were used to create the impression that there was something inherently amiss within Islam and that it had to be mended otherwise organisations like al Qaeda would continue to come into existence. This suggests that al Qaeda is actually not the ultimate target for elimination or change. Instead, underlying the press’s construction of organisations such as al Qaeda, is an assumption that ‘radical’ perspectives among Muslims originate within and are nourished by Islam. Accordingly, from the perspective of the national press, Islam needs to be reconstructed so that extremism and radicalism are banished from it. Advocating the idea that Islam needs to be reconstructed, Themba Sono, former president of the South African Institute of Race Relations— but not a local expert on security, wrote in City Press (November 4, 2011) under the headline: ‘“Radical rethink by Muslims a priority”: A Muslim author calls for a fundamental questioning of the way Islam is practised’. Quoting Amir Taheri—the Iranian-born, European-based ‘terrorism expert’—Sono wrote: to claim that the 9/11 attacks have nothing to do with Islam amounts to a whitewash. It is not only disingenuous but also a disservice to Muslims who need […] to cast a critical glance at the way their faith is taught, lived and practised. Even worse, the refusal to subject Islam to rational analysis is a recipe for further fanaticism. […] What is needed is a critique of Islam as an existential reality. The September 11 tragedies should trigger a rethink of

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the way Muslims live Islam. We should start with condemning those attacks without ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’ shunning the hypocrisy … Sadly, the way we Muslims live Islam today is a far cry from the way our ancestors lived it … when Islam was a builder of civilization, not a force of repression, terror and destruction. (City Press, November 4, 2011)

The above shows how easily local South Africans are being domesticated into a discourse which proposes that something is amiss within Islam and in urgent need of attention. But, proposing that Islam must be reconstructed is not new. Indeed, this publication argues that the proposed strategy to make modifications to Islam confirms that the national press reinforces understandings which local and international think-tanks have advanced about the need to reconstruct Islam. In Chap. 5, it has been pointed out that Hussein Solomon, a South African Terrorism ‘expert’, participated in an epistemic community intent on reconstructing Islam. Also, the same chapter has argued that the aim of this coordinated strategy was to ensure that the reconstructed Islam conforms to Western interests. And here we see that the media has been contributing to the same agenda. This chapter now turns to explore how the South African media is constructing Islam as the enemy. Constructing the Enemy The events of 11 September 2001 prompted multiple myths that drew on civilisational differences in order to explain political conflict, particularly the myth which represented Islam stereotypically and which drew on ‘a broader “Orientalist imaginary” as is found in the period of high colonialism’ (Rizvi, 2011, p. 228). Edward Said (1979), in his book Orientalism, explained how the West constructed an image of the mythical Orient as the opposite of itself—its ‘Other’—in order to support, enable and justify its history of imperialism and colonial occupation (Steuter & Wills, 2008, p. 24). Through the lens of ‘Orientalism’, the West constructed the East, particularly Arabs, Muslims and Islam, as ‘primitive’, ‘superstitious’, ‘barbaric’, ‘overtly hostile’ and ‘violent’. It was this myth of stereotypical Islam that Western media used to account for the occurrence of 9/11, ‘in religious rather than political and economic terms’. (p. 24) This stereotype of Islam became the foundation of a cognitive schema which equated and associated Islam with violence and international conflict and which became pivotal in the processes of securitisation. The South African media actively

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contributed to present Islam and Muslims stereotypically and used dehumanisation; criminalisation; Orientalisation; and vilification to do that. Dehumanising the ‘Other’ A construction of dehumanising through the use of animal-like features has been exploited as a trope in the local press. So, Die Beeld (May 5, 2011) reported that ‘a revengeful America …[was]… leading…[a]… hunt … on bin Laden’. Referring to bin Laden’s assassination in May 2011, Die Beeld (May 5, 2011) reported that the headlines in more than one European newspaper read: ‘The snake is beheaded’. The Sunday Times (October 20, 2002) reported that al Qaeda is transforming itself to survive and ‘has become a multi-headed monster’. Dehumanisation of Muslims has also been evident and has been given form through the publication of stories that suggesting that Muslim ‘extremists’ have no humanity because they have been abusing children for political and ideological purposes. Some of these stories have been accepted from international news agencies—uncritically and without verifying their content. The Mail and Guardian (July 1, 2011) reported on a story of a ‘nine-year-old girl who was ... strapped into a suicide vest’ by Pakistani militants. This particular girl was subsequently returned to her family after the Pakistani police intervened. This story became public when the Pakistani police produced the girl at a news conference where she was asked to explain how she was kidnapped and how she was forced to wear a suicide vest which was intended to be exploded at a security checkpoint. This story was already shown to be false by the online newspaper The Blaze (June 21, 2011), founded in 2011 by the conservative talk show host—Glen Beck (The Blaze.com, Undated), by the time the Mail and Guardian (July 1, 2011) published its account of the story in South Africa. The Blaze reported that the abduction story was a fabrication. It went further to report that ‘official sources’ in Pakistan often deliberately fed the media with false stories (The Blaze.com). But such practices are not limited to Pakistan. The British media has also been fed disinformation on occasion in order to create alarm and distort the nature of threats faced by Britain (Fekete, 2004, p. 14). Another example of dehumanising Muslims appeared in the Saturday Star (December 2, 2006). In this report the newspaper presented the Enemy’s lack of ‘humanity’ as irrational, bordering on the absurd, and devoid of moral conscience. In reviewing a documentary that depicted

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‘the hatred of fundamentalist Muslims for the West’, the producer said that the most troubling aspect of the documentary was material that shows how Muslim children were ‘indoctrinated by radical Islamic rhetoric to feel hatred’: On Abu Dhabi Television, a sweet-faced girl from Bahrain says unemotionally: ‘I hope Bush dies in flames, and I want to go to Ariel Sharon and kill him with a gun and stab him with a sword […]’. (Saturday Star, December 2, 2006)

This narrative suggests that ‘fundamentalists’ indoctrinate their young with hatred and encourage the killing of the opponents of Muslims. The construction is meant to emphasise that ‘fundamentalist’ Muslims are devoid of any humanity. The Saturday Star (December 2, 2006) further reported that the original clips for the documentary were accessed from two Israeli organisations that recorded and translated ‘hundreds of hours’ of Arab television and newspaper content from organisations which make the translated transcripts ‘available on the Internet’. The credibility of translation services is often suspect. We introduce this matter of translation not to question the accuracy of such services per se, but because these are illustrative of a concern about the validity of sources drawn on by the local media. While the Arabic translations used in the above documentary might well be accurate, translations should be treated with caution because, even though the translated version might be linguistically ‘accurate’, they can ‘mystify’, ‘mislead’ and/or distort (Baker, 2010, p. 347). Some translation services such as the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) is ideologically invested (see Baker, 2010). MEMRI is a pro-Israeli advocacy group, established in February 1998 and has a direct association with Israeli intelligence (Bonney, 2008, p. 104). It is one of the ‘heavily funded translation programmes’ (Baker, 2010, p. 348) that makes their translations available for free on the internet. Criminalisation Invoking criminality is a further way of constructing the enemy in a manner that indicates that the normative ‘moral order’ has been violated. Through this, the ‘Other’ is rendered as illegitimate.

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The Mail and Guardian (July 5, 2012) explicitly presented the ‘Enemy’ as criminals: ‘Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, an affiliate of al-Qaeda […], is mainly a criminal organisation […]. It kidnaps Westerners for ransom and fuels Africa’s drug trade’. Relying on speculation, a headline in Die Burger (July 14, 2012) read: ‘Al Shabab “murders” Ethiopians in Western Cape [province of South Africa]’ even though Dan Plato, the then Western Cape Member of the Executive Committee responsible for Community Safety, stated that only ‘limited information is available’ on this particular matter. Referring to the killing of the American diplomats in Bengazi, Libya, Rami Khouri, Director of Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University, Beirut, wrote in the City Press (September 23, 2012): ‘We must remember that Muslim extremists behind the recent violence are criminals […]. The criminal tragedy of the death of four diplomats in Bengazi, Libya, rightly captured the attention of the world and raised questions whether attacks against embassies are reasonable ways for people to manifest their anger (they are not)’. Here, political assassination has been distorted and misrepresented as crime. Orientalisation As discussed in the earlier chapter, the Palestinian-American writer Edward Said (1979, p. 188) defined Orientalism as the Western discourse of representing and/or producing knowledge about the Eastern ‘Other’. This construction represents Muslims and the ‘Arab’ as exotic, mysterious and dangerous. Orientalism can be perceived as a disciplinary discourse that is ‘pivotal in the reproduction of relations of domination and subordination’ (Edmunds, 2012, p. 69). And, it is through orientalisation that the West legitimises and controls the uncivilized ‘Other’. Orientalism, as a discourse, should be viewed in Foucauldian ‘power/knowledge’ terms or should be conceived as a ‘heavily bounded area of social knowledge’ according to Ameli et  al. (2007, p.  23), because it is a ‘heavily policed cognitive system which controls and delimits both the mode and the means or representation in a given society’. Orientalism only becomes conceivable through discourse—an ‘ideologically loaded’ notion, yet, ‘independent of individual judgement’ (p. 23). As we have seen, an analysis of the South African media confirms that Islam and Muslims are frequently orientalised. Claims are made that the West has evolved so as to become civil and follow normative rules during conflict. This suggests that (‘extremist’)

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Muslims are the opposite, viz. uncivil: for example, The Citizen (October 4, 2012) claimed that, ‘Al-Qaeda doesn’t play by the same rules of deliberation and consultation’. It continued: ‘In the Mali city of Timbuktu there has been systematic, wilful destruction of Sufi shrines and other priceless treasures’. This particular representation suggested that some Muslims have not evolved to the level of the assumed superior normative practices in Western societies such as appreciating the value of protecting historic and cultural artefacts for future generations. In this representation, too, it is the West that decides what art is and what needs preservation. (Re)presenting Muslims as inherently ‘barbaric’ and fanatical are other strategies that have been employed in orientalising Islam. To return to the Saturday Star (December 2, 2006) which once again reported how ‘Muslim children are indoctrinated […] to feel hatred [towards the West]’. Barbarism is also associated with Islam by stating that: ‘Islam is spread through the sword. How do you spread through the sword? Submit or die. The ultimate sword is to bring the world to its knees or die’ (Saturday Star December 2, 2006). Incrementally, voices such as these construct Islam as dangerous and as a threat to a ‘familiar’ world—a world constructed by a Western epistemology. If nothing is done about such a threat, no one will live to witness the consequences of the failure to immediately stop the threat. Consistent with the idea that Islam is spread through violence, the Weekend Post (September 23, 2006) wrote that ‘Prophet Muhammad had brought the world “evil and inhuman things such as his command to spread [Islam] by the sword”’. This statement suggests that Muslims were commanded to spread Islam through violence. However, such an assertion ignores—or is ignorant of—the Quranic injunction that instructs Muslims not to compel anyone to accept Islam: ‘There shall be no coercion in matters of faith’ (Quran, 2:256). Defamation Dichotomising ‘good and evil’ is the frame used to defame the enemy. The association of the ‘Other’ with the label ‘Evil’ results in its expulsion from the moral order that is ‘good and godly’ and by implication requires that evil be destroyed. The ‘enemy’ is defamed through the representation of its beliefs and values as abnormal and morally repugnant. The headline of The Citizen’s (September 8, 2005) review of Mamdani’s (2004) book Good Muslim, Bad Muslim – America, the Cold War and the

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Roots of Terror reads: ‘Are Muslims as evil as they are made out to be?’ By asking this question, the headline suggested that in the local popular consciousness, Muslims are perceived as ‘evil’. The Saturday Weekend Argus (May 29, 2004), in turn, associated ‘evil’ with ‘extremist’ Muslims by connecting horrific actions with them. In a report about the arrest of three ‘suspected al Qaeda operatives’, the Saturday Weekend Argus wrote: ‘It is believed the men would have used chemical weapons and explosives’, and that ‘If the men had been allowed to carry out their actions they would have maimed and killed hundreds of innocent South Africans’. This article securitised the al Qaeda operatives and emphasised that if the threat which they posed were not immediately stopped, the negative consequences for the country would be substantial. Similarly, a Sunday Independent (February 5, 2006) article constructed Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi—a leading Muslim theologian who is regarded by some as ‘the most progressive force for change in the Muslim world’— as evil personified. The article commented that he ‘sympathises with the judicial killings of homosexuals and wants rejection of dialogue with Jews in favour of the “sword and rifle”’. ‘He is very keen on suicide bombings, especially if the people who blow themselves up are children – “we have the child bomb,” he is reported to have said’ (Sunday Independent, February 5, 2006). In this narrative, the article created the impression that if the ‘most progressive force for change in the Muslim world’ is so ‘evil’, then the threat ‘radical’ or ‘extremist’ Muslims offer is surely far worse. However, the article failed to provide the specific political context within which al Qaradawi made the statement, and thus reinforced a construction that Muslims actions are cruel and irrational. The South African press has frequently constructed Muslims as evil by its suggestion that they force their women to wear either the niqab, burka or hijab (different forms of coverings). Sunday Tribune (September 6, 2009) reported on a local community newspaper editorial which compared the ‘traditional hijab attire to a bin bag’. It went on to explain that the editor of this local paper stated that the Muslim community ‘prefer their women fully encased in bin bags lest they spoil in the light’. Attempting to give a balanced picture of the debate about headscarves and veiling, the Sunday Tribune stated that South African Muslim women insist that ‘wearing a burka, hijab, niqab or a scarf is liberating’. It then quoted the chairperson of the Muslim Cultural Group, who is reported to have said: ‘… people [in South Africa] have freedom of choice, but we still get Muslim women being looked down on for wearing their traditional

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dress.’ The article ended with a perspective that some women had been forced to wear the veil either by their fathers or their husbands: I hate wearing the burka. Nothing in Islam prescribes it. […] I’ve given in to it simply because it was too much to fight, but at first I rebelled. […] [My father] even beat me into submission. He kept saying it was for my own good […] to protect me, as a woman from rape and the advances of strangers. […] I didn’t want to wear it because I thought it was oppressive. (Sunday Tribune, August 2, 2009)

This created the impression that the Sunday Tribune was treating the issue of Muslim women’s veiling in a balanced way. However, it employed the classic ‘sandwich’ approach to reporting by presenting different perspectives. In the introductory section of the article, the former French President Nicolas Sarkozy was reported to have said that the burka is a symbol of women’s subservience, which the article confirmed in the concluding section when it drew on a local Muslim woman informant to verify that she detested wearing the burka; that she had been forced and disciplined into wearing it; and that she regarded the burka as oppressive. Sandwiched between these two, the article provided an alternative perspective: ‘No one forces Muslim women to don their garb’. However, in general, when readers scan newspaper articles, they frequently focus initially only on the introductory and concluding sections. In such instances readers are left with a construction that perceives the veil as a symbol of Muslim women’s subservience and oppression.

The Threat of ‘Islamic’ Terrorism What now follows will show that when the media have associated Muslims and Islam with terror activities and have claimed that there is a risk of a catastrophic attack in South Africa, such claims have been integral to the Global North’s strategy of the ‘War on Terror’. Al Qaeda has been named as the leading organisation providing logistical infrastructure, financial and technical support, other resources, and ideological leadership to an international ‘Islamic’ Terrorist movement. It will become evident that South African national newspapers have adopted the perspective that al Qaeda was the primary target in the GWOT. They have advocated this perspective uncritically even though security analysts such as Burnette and Whyte (2005) have reservations

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about the actual existence of al Qaeda as a ‘tangible structure’ and argue that it is nearly impossible to categorise it. Al Qaeda, they continue, is best understood as an ‘aim of a movement or a tactic’ to which ‘small groups of individuals’ pledge their ‘temporary allegiance’ (p. 1). But, despite the limited actual knowledge about the existence and nature of al Qaeda, experts continued to pontificate and present: … highly dubious conjecture as ‘truth’. If one thing is certain, however, it is that al Qaeda has been created as a new class of global folk devil, readily invoked to legitimise military action … for conducting a war on terror (Burnette & Whyte, 2005, p. 1).

South Africa: A Sanctuary for Al Qaeda and Associates National newspapers continuously speculate that the country has (or will) become a sanctuary and launching pad for international Islamic extremists, although such reports have not shown that South Africa’s constitutional, physical and/or geographical integrity have been under direct threat as a result of terrorist activities. Instead, the newspapers have suggested that such a possibility should not be excluded. As previously shown, a headline of the Saturday Weekend Argus (October 3, 2004) read: ‘Al Qaeda leaders “hiding in SA”: Top militants may be operating “from Cape Town to Durban; from Eastern Cape to Gauteng.”’ The primary source of this information, according to the article, is the ‘US Central Intelligence Agency’. It went on to state that local intelligence sources had confirmed that while these alleged al Qaeda operatives were foreign, they were assisted by local and foreign-looking Muslim people. Moreover, it is reported that ‘corrupt’ South African Home Affairs officials assisted them to obtain ‘false identity documents’. The article referred to ‘intelligence sources’ to give credence to what they were reporting. It further suggested that international Muslim Terrorists were hiding in the country with the assistance and collaboration of local and immigrant Muslims, as well as with the support of South African Home Affairs officials. Similarly, City Press (May 23, 2010) alleged that ‘Al-Shabaab infiltrates SA’. This allegation also emanated from anonymous ‘Intelligence agencies’ who ‘had reportedly intercepted a call from al-Shabaab members in Cape Town to their counterparts in Somalia in which they discussed a plot to attack US interests in South Africa’. In another newspaper article that

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focuses on al-Shabaab, Die Burger (July 14, 2012) reported that ‘al-­ Shabaab, an international extremist group’ was murdering Ethiopians in the Western Cape. But, according to the same article, the police were unable to confirm this. Propagating such statements aims to create animosity between local Muslims and Christians and to perpetuate the myth that these two communities are hostile to one another. Hussein Solomon was called upon to confirm the reliability of claims that terror groups were using South Africa as a sanctuary. Die Beeld (January 26, 2011) reported that Solomon had warned that South Africa has become a convenient hiding place for various terror groups and a pivotal location from where they planned their international terror-related activities. But is Solomon a reliable witness? Has he been shown to be wrong in previous assessments of Terrorism activities related and/or relevant to South Africa? According to the Sunday Tribune (August 31, 2008), Solomon stated that South Africa was ‘exporting terrorism’. This particular statement was based on an earlier claim made in August, 2008, that ‘two South African Muslim men were arrested in Uganda by the Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force for alleged involvement in terrorism activities’. However, hours after the release of his report, the then South African Department of Foreign Affairs (now the Department of International Relations and Cooperation) announced that the arrested men had been released without being charged. This suggests that these men were mistakenly arrested on suspicion of Terrorism. Also, the Sunday Tribune (August 31, 2008) reported that at the conference of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism in Herzliya, Israel, ‘Solomon said that South African Muslim organisations were used for military training and were breeding grounds for terrorism’. But Solomon failed to provide evidence for his claim. As a result, he was later sued for defamation by the Association of Islamic Schools (Sunday Tribune August 31, 2008). In a telephone interview with Mohamed Dokrat, the chairperson of the Association of Islamic Schools, it emerged that Solomon, through his lawyer, had apologised and undertook not to repeat this (Personal communication with Mohamed Dokrat, 18 April 2017). Furthermore, prior to the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, Solomon called for urgency in stopping the threat of Terrorism. With this collaboration, the Cape Argus (October 12, 2009) securitised the idea of ‘Islamic militancy’ by maintaining that the local security agencies lacked the capacity to prevent militants from establishing a presence in the country:

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An expert on Islamic militancy has warned that the South African intelligence services are ‘woefully inadequately prepared’ for the potential threat of terrorism during the World Cup next year. Hussein Solomon … said militants had already established cells in South Africa.

Again, Solomon was wrong in this instance. The FIFA 2010 Soccer World Cup took place without any violent incident associated with Islamic militants. Solomon explained that the event was incident-free because of the presence of Western intelligence operatives in the country (interview with Hussein Solomon, July 6, 2014; Die Beeld, January 26, 2011). This chapter has previously discussed the arrest of three suspected al Qaeda members who allegedly ‘would have used chemical weapons and explosives’ and ‘would have maimed and killed hundreds of innocent South Africans’ (Saturday Weekend Argus, May 29, 2004). The South African Police Services (SAPS) Commissioner informed a parliamentary sub-committee that the men ‘had evil intentions against the country’ but ‘we got them to leave’ (The Herald (EP Herald), June 3, 2004). One may question why, despite the Saturday Weekend Argus’s ‘evidence’ that the men had intended to commit these crimes, these men were not prosecuted in terms of South African legislation such as the Internal Security Act (1982), and the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and related Activities Act 33 of 2004 (President of RSA, 2005). Obviously there was no evidence. Contrary to the Saturday Weekend Argus (May 29, 2004) version, the Sunday Tribune (August 31, 2008) reported on the same matter: ‘A few months later, in August 2004, [former] government spokesman Joel Netshitenezhe, the then National Intelligence Agency Director-general Vusi Mavimbela and Ray Lalla, denied South Africa had been targeted by Al Qaeda’. Based on the preceding narratives, it is clear that assertions about an al-Qaeda threat in South Africa have been used incrementally as a securitisation move by national newspapers’. This occurred in the following way: • Allegations emanating from the CIA that al-Qaeda and associates have infiltrated South Africa with the assistance of the local and immigrant Muslim community; • By hiding in SA, al-Qaeda plans terrorist activities against the US and others, which include murder and the use of extremely dangerous weaponry;

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• Local security ‘experts’ are drawn on to confirm the modus operandi of these international ‘extremists’; • Even though the primary targets of al-Qaeda are Western interests, ‘innocent’ South Africans would ultimately be the victims of al-­ Qaeda terrorist activities locally; • Accordingly, South Africa is under threat of a significant al Qaeda-­ planned terrorist attack. In order to maintain the media narrative about the imminent and increasing al Qaeda threat locally, national newspapers carried articles claiming that al Qaeda is recruiting South African Muslims. Al Qaeda Recruits Local Operatives for Terrorism National newspapers have also reported that local Muslims were being recruited to Terrorism. For example, the Saturday Weekend Argus (October 3, 2004) stated that al Qaeda ‘was proving to be “regenerative”, with new operatives springing up’, and ‘al Qaeda and the mysterious network facilitating its access to South Africa had been actively recruiting from the local Islamic community’. The Saturday Weekend Argus (October 3, 2004) sought support for this view through a reference to ‘detention after heated gun battles with Pakistani security forces of two South Africans, Feroz Ganchi and Zubair Ismail, who were identified as al Qaeda recruits’. However, these two individuals were released without charges in Pakistan, and were not charged on their return to South Africa. National newspapers have not limited their representation of Terrorism as the work of foreign Muslim ‘extremists’ only. On the contrary, they have also constructed South African Muslims as potential terrorists who might pose a danger to South African society directly. The Citizen’s (February 17, 2003) headline read: ‘Muslims “a bigger threat”’ and reported that according to Martin Schönteich, former senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and one-time Parliamentary Affairs Manager of the South African Institute of Race Relations, ‘South Africa faces a greater threat from radical Islamic terrorism than from the white right-wing’. In support of his argument, Schönteich stated that: The threat of Islamic terrorism is linked directly to rising fundamentalist sympathy in the Muslim community. Polarisation will see more radical sec-

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tions within that community coming to the fore with even traditionally moderate Muslim leaders becoming increasingly outspoken over the Middle East, American foreign policy and support for Israel. (The Citizen, February 17, 2003)

Schönteich (The Citizen, February 17, 2003) goes on to draw on the notion of ‘fundamentalist’ and its relationship with South African Muslims and position it in the context of Middle Eastern politics. He associates ‘Islamic terrorism’ with fundamentalism without providing an explanation as to how such association had been established. Schönteich further predicts an increase in radicalism amongst members of the Muslim community because ‘moderate Muslims leaders’ are critical of US foreign policy in the Middle East, particularly America’s support for Israel. So, to be critical of the US’s policies in the Middle East, for Schönteich, equates with being radical. Moreover, he associates such radicalism with the threat of Terrorism. Schönteich’s reasoning, in this instance, is consistent with counterinsurgency philosophy of the 1970s in South Africa as well as in the West—during the Cold War period—when it was customary for the counter-insurgency agents ‘to make crude links between labour disputes, popular protest movements, and ‘terrorist’ activity’ (Burnette & Whyte, 2005, p. 11). In this case, Schönteich drew links between ‘Islamic terrorism’, being critical of US foreign policy and opposing US support for Israel. South Africa as a Location for Islamic Terrorist Training and Attacks The South African Press has even suggested that local Muslim schools are institutions that indoctrinate its pupils to become ‘extremists’. A headline of The Herald (EP Herald) (March 26, 2007) read: ‘Fears over “terror camp” near Bay [Port Elizabeth]’. The article went on to state that: ‘South African and foreign intelligence agencies have been monitoring an alleged training camp linked to Muslim fundamentalists at [a place called] Greenbushes, Port Elizabeth’. In addition to the alleged training camp they had identified, The Herald further reported that terrorist training camps were also operative in ‘Gauteng, KwaZulu Natal, and the Western Cape’ (March 26, 2007). In effect, The Herald (March 26, 2007) used a Speech-Act to introduce an ‘Emergency’ by reporting this issue. In this move, The Herald simultaneously called for urgent action to eliminate the constructed threat.

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However, since The Herald did not have the institutional authority to make security pronouncements—in terms of Securitisation theory—it tried to convince policymakers that the threat was real and urgent. The Cape Argus article provides a further example of a securitising move. ‘Somali terrorists’, according to unnamed sources, had identified South Africa as a more opportune location than other places to ‘take on the US […] because it was easier than fighting the superpower in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Somalia’ (The Cape Argus, October 12, 2009). Drawing a connection between the Cape Town-based Somali ‘extremists’ and al Qaeda cells in Somalia, the paper quoted an unnamed ‘source’: We have established that most al-Qaeda operatives are relocating from Afghanistan. […] Our information is that there is a trail that links Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and […] Mozambique where Somalis have formed an anti-US cell already. Our interception revealed that these people plan to move en masse to here (SA) in 2010 to attack American interests. […] South Africa is not a target, but if South Africans are caught in the crossfire, then that will be unfortunate. (The Cape Argus, October 12, 2009)

This kind of speculation is difficult to verify. However, the report about Somalis planning to move en masse to South Africa to attack US interests requires questioning. If the Cape Argus (October 12, 2009) story was credible, why have these Somalis not been apprehended? Such stories are used to create fear, with the aim of convincing local readers and especially security policy makers that ‘Islamic extremists’ pose a significant security threat. A similarly alarmist story unfolded in a Sunday Tribune (October 18, 2009) in which Hussein Solomon said that ‘al-Qaeda-linked extremists are planning an attack on the World Cup’. The content of this story has been discussed earlier. It is repeated here as this article emphasised the authority of the informant to make truth claims. This Sunday Tribune story suggested that Solomon is an authority because he is a professor within the ‘Department of Political Science at the University of Pretoria and a Visiting Fellow at the London School of Economics, [and] is an expert on Islamic extremism’. Reinforcing this perspective, the newspaper went on to inform its readers that ‘in an academic paper’, delivered in 2007, ‘Solomon claimed that the Muslim community of South Africa are potential supporters of “radical Islam”’. These comments suggested that

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due to his academic authority and credibility, Solomon’s claims and academic scholarship should be taken seriously. Soon after South Africa won the bid to host the FIFA 2010 Soccer World Cup, newspapers increasingly raised the possibility of a terrorist attack. Initially, the issue was discussed in a generalised way, but as the tournament drew closer, the possibility of such an attack became more focused. Some articles even identified a date and location for the attacks, as well as its nature. Once again, credentialed voices were called on to provide credibility to the securitisation of threat. Rapport (October 15, 2006) drew on the authority of Bjørn Møller, a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies, who stated that the: ‘South African government should be worried about the possibility that such a huge sporting tournament offers terrorists. Thousands of people from across the world will gather here. The execution of a terror attack will exclusively depend on the security regulations for the tournament’. He suggested further that if terrorists were planning attacks, ‘they are already here’. Thus, ‘[t]he groups must now be infiltrated. This is the only way to obtain credible information’. Møller presented his assessment in a rational, non-alarmist fashion and suggested how the security community may respond and plan to counter any possibility of an attack. He even argued what Rapport (October 15, 2006) called a ‘controversial perspective’, that ‘the danger which terrorism presents worldwide […], is in general exaggerated’. This assessment differed from that of Solomon’s claim that ‘local al-­ Qaeda-­linked Islamic extremists are planning an attack on the World Cup’ (Sunday Tribune, October 18, 2009). Solomon had failed to produce evidence for this. He seems to have relied on knowledge emanating from Western security intelligence agencies (see Beeld January 26, 2011). If this is the case, should Solomon not be regarded as an ‘embedded’ Terrorism expert (Burnette & Whyte, 2005, pp. 13–14) who purveys selected security knowledge sanctioned by his sources? In January 2010 the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) warned of a ‘very real terror threat to the Fifa 2010 Soccer World Cup’ (Digital Journal, January 14, 2010). What made this claim perplexing was that the SAIRR, historically, was not a think-tank concerned with security matters; rather their primary focus was inter-race relations. Despite this, it alerted the world that:

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The terror threat facing the tournament in South Africa […] revolves around the possibility that an Al Qaeda aligned movement may use the tournament as a platform upon which to launch a massive strike against a Western target in South Africa. South Africa is particularly vulnerable to such a threat with all the circumstances or pre-conditions to stage such an attack. (Digital Journal, January 14, 2010)

Even though South African government officials denied this claim, it nevertheless received significant media coverage locally. This SAIRR utterance supports the argument this publication makes, that the security discourse is pervasive and invades all areas of knowledge. Furthermore, big events, such as a World Cup, allow for an environment where issues such as security threats can be discussed. In the weeks before the Soccer World Cup, the urgency of responding to a terrorist threat to the tournament escalated. The Citizen (May 20, 2010) alleged that ‘Al-Qaeda planned to target Soccer City using car bombs laced with rat poison to make victims bleed to death more quickly and armed terrorists with machine guns to mow down anyone who attempted to help the injured’. The level of drama in this narrative forced one to question the credibility of such a story. It was thus not surprising that the South African Police Services said that they have no information of the arrest of the ‘rogue’ Saudi army officer who […had…] reportedly been an al-Qaeda operative in Iraq’ who volunteered the information after his arrest. Even an embedded observer, Hussein Solomon, warned that ‘caution should be exercised in evaluating Iraqi claims’ (Citizen, May 20, 2010). The incident-free Soccer World Cup has not silenced terrorism experts. On the contrary, Die Beeld (January 26, 2011) reported that Solomon had warned that: South Africa must realise that it is not immune against terrorism. […] According to Solomon there has been the increasing tendency for extremists to use South Africa as a transit route or sanctuary. ‘Taking into account the weapons-hiding places discovered; the politicisation of the intelligence service; and a lack of skills; the long-term prognosis for South Africa makes me very scared. The safety during the WC 2010 was to a large extent the result of the presence of other countries’ security experts. This led to a false sense of security amongst South Africans and the security officials’.

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To be clear: no country can claim to be immune to terror. Nor can any country be assured that potential or actual terrorists are not within its borders. Risk is an integral part of modern society, and security services ought to consider all possible risks. However, Solomon’s persistence in discrediting the South African security services, that had secured a mega-­ sporting event, suggests that he might have another agenda in mind. Iqbal Jassat from the Media Review Network has suggested that Solomon’s ‘attempts to fuel alarm about South African Muslims’ terrorist leanings are designed to enable the country to become—in his words—‘a credible international partner against global terror’ (Sunday Tribune, August 31, 2008).

Discrediting the Ideological Basis of Opposition Voices In an opinion piece entitled ‘The brutal rise of Islamism is forcing Muslims to confront the enemy within’, Solomon wrote: ‘Forget the “Clash of Civilisations” thesis; the battle lines within Islam have been drawn’ (Cape Times, December 16, 2008). By using the negative adjective ‘brutal’, whose synonyms include ruthless, cruel, inhumane and violent, to describe it, Solomon discredited Islamism as the ‘enemy’ within the faith. Accordingly, Solomon argued that Islam was internally threatened with conflict between those who advocated ‘tolerance and compassion’ and those who advocated ‘extremisms and distortions of [Islam]’. […] Muslims were coming to terms with the enemy within—those who seek to subvert the noble ideals of a great religion into one which would justify brutal massacre of innocents’. In this formulation Solomon echoed Cheryl Benard (2003, p.  1), of the RAND Corporation, who recommend that the West ‘foster’ an interpretation of Islam that ‘calls for a more moderate, democratic, peaceful, and tolerant social order’. In an article which appeared in the Die Volksblad Solomon reinforced Benard’s (2003) advice: ‘The ideological battle between freedom and authoritarianism is actually far from over; as a result we witness a clash between competing ideologies across the world.’ He added that the conflict is not between civilisations. […]. ‘A gigantic struggle is happening in Islam between moderates, who in my view are the real Muslims, and Islamic fascists. This is a conflict that non-­

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Muslims cannot view as an internal conflict. They must actively support moderate Muslims. (Solomon, quoted in Die Volksblad, September 18, 2012)

Similarly, a British journalist, Martin Wolf (Business Day, August 18, 2005) also questioned the authenticity of militancy as being integral to Islam. He asked: ‘Does the ideology that animates Islamist terrorism have much or anything, to do with Islam?’ In response to his question, Wolf stated that, ‘contemporary Islamism is a modern revolutionary ideology. It is, in this way, socially and psychologically similar to communism’. He further suggested that Islamism, which he regarded as foreign to Islam, strove to return to the Islamic caliphate; regarded Islam as having sovereignty over secular states; justified terrorism as an ‘obligation to save souls from damnation’; ‘argues for the supremacy of sharia law; and […] calls for the forcible spread of Islam across the world’. The sub-conversation which the notion ‘caliphate’ introduces is a challenge to political Realism as it negates conventional interpretations of the ‘state’. Indeed, it threatens the ‘state’. The security challenge this notion introduces is that, contrary to Realist conceptions that focus on external military threats, the threat posed by the ‘caliphate’ is ideological in nature and it acts domestically (Rubin, 2015, p. 39; see also Abraham, 2005). And, to return, since for Wolf, Islamism is not a part of Islam, he argued that: Muslims must decide where they stand on Islamism, both in word and deed. It is an interpretation of the faith by people who claim to speak and act on its behalf. If the ideology is unrepresentative, Muslims must struggle to ensure that it fails. […] Determined help from the [Muslims] is needed if we are to defeat the former [Islamism]. (Business Day, August 18, 2005)

Not only did Wolf presume to inform Muslims what authentic Islam is, he also equated political Islam with communism, which he called an autocratic ideology; and further informed Muslims what Islamism does and believes. But equating Islamism with communism is not politically neutral. Instead, it securitises a form of political Islam since communism, in the Western collective consciousness, has, until recently, represented the most dangerous threat facing the West. Communism, during the Cold War period, was constructed as the antagonistic ideology that threatened to change the West. Indeed, the hostility between communism and the West dominated the ‘fears of mankind’ as this hostility threatened ‘the blowing

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up [of] the planet’ (Schlesinger, 1967, p. 22). So, to equate Islamism with communism is to warn that the threat of Islamism is equivalent to the existential threat posed by communism during the Cold War and, accordingly, must be stopped urgently. This is another instance of securitising Islam. The perspective that the US has supported a movement that calls for the reconstruction of Islam into a more tolerant religion, as advocated by Benard (2003) and echoed by Solomon (Cape Times, December 16, 2008; quoted in Die Volksblad, September 18, 2012) and Wolf (Business Day, August 18, 2005), has not been confined to these authors. Instead, this chapter has identified similar voices such as those of Temba Sono (City Press, 4 November 2011) and Amir Taheri (City Press, 4 November 2011). Their purpose has been to support and advocate the claim that Islam, in South Africa, has been nourishing a violent movement that aims to annihilate Western economic and political interests. While this continues, Islam is being securitised in South Africa.

Conclusion This chapter has shown that the security threat discourse, which the national press has contributed to in South Africa, has often been presented as common-sense, and thus not in need of being historicised or contextualised. In this, the newspapers have performed their ‘critical ideological work’ (Hall, 1983, p.  29, cited in Wood, 1998, p.  403) of presenting Western motives, pertaining to the ‘Global War on Terror’, as being ‘noble’, while portraying Islamic motives as evil, dangerous, a menace, and a threat and as detrimental to societal stability and progress. This ideological work has been performed in the public sphere to construct and maintain Western hegemony. Accordingly, this chapter has shown how the South African press has exercised a controlling effect on public debate through agenda setting and framing the issues relevant to the security discourse in South Africa. This has been done by its privileging of selected perspectives that reinforce Western interests while ignoring others. In this, the South African media have ensured that the West’s political and economic elite has preserved and maintained societal ‘ideological unity’ and ensured that they exercise consensual political leadership. Furthermore, this chapter has exposed how the South African press, in general, has assumed the superiority of ‘We’ (the West) and the inferiority of the ‘Other’ (Islam and Muslims). This chapter has accordingly

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argued that the uncritical acceptance of this superiority/inferiority dichotomy is essential to the maintenance—indeed strengthening—of Western hegemony in South Africa and the construction of the ‘Other’ as the threat. The evidence which has been presented has confirmed that the media have dispersed and popularised certain political worldviews and condoned the use of political violence seeking to establish and sustain Western hegemony. Conversely, it has shown and analysed the media’s role in securitising Islam and Muslims in South Africa. As securitisation has required that a threat be constructed, labelled and made known, this chapter identified, discussed and examined the processes through which Islam and Muslims have been labelled as the threat—‘the Enemy’. Securitisation theory argued that the utterance of security itself ‘creates a new social order’ (Balzacq, 2005, p.  171) that requires immediate state action and the introduction of emergency measures. This chapter provided numerous instances when Islam and Muslims have been securitised by the press. Indeed, this argument has confirmed that the media has securitised Islam and Muslims by drawing on Samuel P. Huntington’s (1993, 1996) ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis which asserted that Islam and the West are destined to be in perpetual conflict. In this purported conflict, the local press has positioned itself as the advocate of Western interests. In constructing Muslims and Islam as an existential threat, the press has made extensive use of security ‘experts’—several of which are associated with South African think-tanks. It has used their views and the credentialed authority they have offered to justify narratives which have associated sections of the South African Muslim community with terrorism. Now that this chapter, which has focused on how the national press wrote ‘insecurity’ through its representations of Muslims and Islam within the South African context, has been concluded, the final chapter summarises and concludes this publication.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

The aims of this book were to unveil the continuous practices and complicated processes involved in the securitisation of Islam and Muslims in Africa and South Africa and to understand how and why this has happened. The unique contribution this publication makes to the scholarly literature is its use of securitisation theory to analyse the construction of Islam and Muslims as a threat in South Africa by security think-tanks and national newspapers. In doing this, the publication constitutes part of a growing body of academic literature that uses securitisation theory as an analytical framework to understand how security has been constructed within International Politics. Specifically, this publication brings securitisation theory to a South African context in order to account for how and why Muslims have been securitised in the wake of 9/11. The data consists of interviews with South African terrorism experts, newspaper articles, documentaries, conferences, workshops and publications on the topic of terrorism published by influential think-tanks. Discourse analytical tools have been used to operationalise the theory and to identify how the securitisation of Muslims has taken place. In contributing to the literature that conceives the globalisation of securitisation theory, this publication confirms that there is a universal securitisation dynamics, which applies equally around the globe, and which is somehow stronger than the contextual specifics that really matters according to other authors who have contributed to discussions on © The Author(s) 2020 M. N. Hendricks, Manufacturing Terrorism in Africa, Islam and Global Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5626-5_7

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securitisation in the non-West. It reveals power-practices in a region, that is Africa, where critical security theory is yet not so established as in for instance western Europe. The analysis of securitisation instances in this publication showcase problematic power-practices and threat constructions, which confirm that the security claims coming out of South African think-tanks are not based on objective observations but have a subjective nature. This criticism of power-practices is relevant to critical studies on security that reiterate the main ideas of securitisation theory: that ‘more security’ is not an unambiguous good, threats are not objective observations, but rather they are narratives about an existential life threat that enable extraordinary action. Theoretically, this publication makes a contribution to debates on how to define the securitising actor. It widens the concept by identifying think-­ tanks, the popular press and terrorism experts as securitising actors, instead of focusing exclusively on the Speech-Acts of state actors. While the theory as such does not define a securitising actor in narrow terms, it is sometimes applied narrowly reiterating the direction that security analysts always look: namely at the behaviour of states and state actors. The chapters in this publication interrupt this convention, and introduce a perspective on the power-practices of institutions, viz. the think-tanks and the press, that are often regarded as neutral observers when it comes to the construction of security.

Securitisation of Islam and Muslims Securitisation theory conceives of security as an intersubjective rhetorical practice which highlights that the concept, security, is a non-static one (Viera, 2007). The rhetorical act of uttering security itself, ‘creates a new social order’, (Balzacq, 2005, p.  171) and justifies the introduction of emergency measures to stop or defeat the threat declared by the utterance. In other words, security, as conceived by securitisation theorists (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998; Wæver, 1995), is a ‘Speech-Act’; the utterance of the word ‘security’ is an act that constructs, instead of reflects, the reality that an issue is threatening (Wæver, 1995, p. 55), and must be stopped urgently. So, uttering ‘security’ is politically invested and thus not value-­ free. It is a political act which ‘introduces security questions in a public contested arena’ (Huysmans, 2002, p. 45). Theorising security as a social construct implies that political and normative concerns influence and determine whether the issue should be

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treated as a security threat or not (Abrahamsen, 2005, p. 57). So, labelling Islam as a matter of security is not necessarily based on objective conditions. Indeed, designating it as a security concern results from specific political processes. Such a process begins when state representatives utter, in institutional—state—voices, that Islam is a matter which concerns security. In pronouncing security, these institutional voices mobilise security knowledge that is situated within a specific political and historical context. Contrary to this form of theorisation, which suggests that an issue becomes a security concern if, and only if, state representatives, speaking in institutional voices, ‘declare it to be so’ (Wæver, 1995, p. 54), this publication has shown that non-state institutions, such as think-tanks and national newspapers, can also contribute to the process of securitisation. Indeed, this finding is consistent with Huha Vuori’s (2008, p.  76–77) assertion that actors without state authority and powers can also use securitisation moves to achieve political aims. However, their aim might be limited to ensuring that an issue is placed on the agenda of politicians and/or state bureaucrats concerned with security policy matters. But, in such instances they should have appropriate and ‘sufficient social capital’ to raise the issue onto the agenda (p. 77). Moreover, the securitisation of Islam and Muslims in South Africa did not occur instantaneously, as the theory suggested. Instead, they were constructed as security threats over an extended period (see McDonald, 2005). In addition, chapters in this book have shown that the securitisation of Islam and Muslims in South Africa reproduces knowledge which is constructed in Western societies to promote specific security interests. This form of knowledge is uncritically transferred into the South African security episteme, the media and other academic discourses by South African think-tanks and national newspapers. Our attention now turns to elaborate on these issues by sequentially summarising each chapter. Prolegomenon This introductory essay analysed the DStv Carte Blanche documentary, The Kenyan Attack, which was aired on September 29, 2013. The documentary investigated the alleged South African link to the military attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, on 21 September 2013 (Carte Blanche September 29, Part 1, 01:30). In the documentary, a woman called Samantha Lewthwaite was presented as the lead perpetrator of the

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attack, which was allegedly carried out under the command of the armed Somali guerrilla group, al Shabab. The Kenyan Attack was analysed because the way the Carte Blanche team reported the context and outcome of their investigation illustrated the main theme of this publication, namely, the processes by which the South African mainstream media and think-tank experts have constructed perceptions of Islam and Muslims as a threat in South Africa. Part 1 of the documentary revealed that Huntington’s (1993, 1996) ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis was used as a framework to confirm that Islam and the West are natural antagonists (Huntington, 1996, p. 183). Western and Islamic civilisations were accordingly counterposed, with the West being presented as godly, while the ‘Islamic civilisation’ was demonised as its antithesis. In order to provide credibility to a specific narrative and to reinforce its representation of an Islamic group—al Shabab—Carte Blanche (29 September 2013) identified and presented the professor from the Department of Political Studies associated with the University of Witwatersrand as a terrorism expert even though terrorism was not a focus of his scholarly work. In shifting the focus of its narrative to Samantha Lewthwaite, the Carte Blanche narrator suggested that this ‘British’, ‘Muslim’ and terrorism suspect had been living in South Africa for at least four years (Carte Blanche 2013, 29 September). In this, the documentary drew on the authority of its constructed expert, the Political Studies professor, to confirm that an international terrorism network was operative from South Africa (interviewed on Carte Blanche, September 29, 2013, Part 2, 2:20–31). This confirms how easy it is for experts to make generalisations. It illustrates that statements of acknowledged authority create knowledge on security. It further allows Carte Blanche (and its supposed ‘experts’) to raise questions about the reliability of South Africa’s support for the Global War on Terror, and raises questions about whether the country had become a ‘sanctuary for Islamic terrorists’. The Prolegomenon considered the genealogy of ‘terrorism’ to challenge the assumption that Terrorism Studies is a value-free and objective form of research, and to expose it as a contrived, subjective and ideologically biased field of study. On the issue of the recruitment of ‘terrorists’, the Carte Blanche documentary included a sequence in which Hillary Clinton, the former US Secretary of State, asserted—without any substantiation—that al Shabab recruited young Somalis from South Africa for

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suicide attacks (Clinton, 2009, insert in Carte Blanche 29 September 2013, Part 2, 8: 42–49). This claim was an instance of a Speech-Act which simultaneously constructs and makes security—the utterance makes the act (Wæver, 1995). A central theme in the Carte Blanche documentary was that the wider Muslim community poses a threat because Muslims were directly involved in ‘terrorism’, or were potential terrorists or protected terrorists: So, it became important for Carte Blanche to verify that Lewthwaite was Muslim. In this, a neighbour had to confirm that she dressed as a ‘Muslim’ (Part 2, 3:40) in order to establish the association between Muslims and ‘terrorism’, and to insinuate that South Africa was indeed a terrorist sanctuary. This, in turn, was used to present local Muslims as collaborators, as they provided Lewthwaite with protection. It is clear that Carte Blanche documentary (2013, September 29) intended to reinforce the notion that Muslims, or sections of this particular community, were a security threat to South Africa. Indeed, it wanted to securitise them. This occurs when a ‘securitizing agent’ with the appropriate power and authority constructs the nature of the existential threat, within the accepted ‘rules of conduct’ (Wæver, 1995, p. 55, Buzan et al., 1998, p. 24). In the documentary, to repeat, Hillary Clinton, the former US Secretary of State, declared that al Shabab recruited Somalis in South Africa for suicide attacks (insert, included in Carte Blanche 29 September 2013). This declaration needed no substantiation since she had the assumed power and authority to state this as ‘fact’. Thereafter the appropriate securitising agencies, i.e. the media and security ‘experts’, transferred ‘knowledge of the threat’ to relevant audiences. The latter role was played by a Political Studies professor from the University of Witwatersrand. Chapter 2 Chapter 2 seeks to position the United States of America (US) at the centre of security and terrorism debates in South Africa. This is because the former US President George W. Bush initiated the internationalisation of the ‘Global War on Terror’. His utterance—after the events known as ‘9/11’—reinforced the equation of Islam with the idea of terror (Bush, 2001b), and successfully securitised both Islam and Muslims. Neither was this association an ‘error’ nor was it value-neutral. Instead, this equation of Islam with terrorism resonates with Samuel P.  Huntington’s (1993, 1996) ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis which argued that future global

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conflict will have its origin in the idea of conflict between ‘civilizations’ (1993, p. 22)—in which Islam and the West were to be the primary antagonists. By locating future conflict within the notion of ‘civilizations’, Huntington gives this notion an assumed explanatory capability to account for the social-political antagonisms between the West and the Muslim ‘Other’ especially. This is an ideological move which conflates politics, histories, and cultures of Muslims, internationally, and unifies these into a ‘negative conception of an essentialized Islam’ (Mehdi, 2010, p. 257). Depicting Islam and the West as hostile enemies, as Huntington (1993) set out to do, is an ideological move that can be understood as a continuation of the historical process known as ‘orientalism’ (Said, 1979). Edward Said (1979) theorised ‘Orientalism’ as a discourse that acts as justification for Western imperialism: in this the West creates and subordinates the Orient as inferior, primitive, superstitious and violent while it constructs itself as rational, principled and superior. Emad El-Din Aysha (2003, p.  17) argues that Huntington’s (1993, 1996) position promotes US geopolitical interests in that this position recognises that the US might disintegrate, as a nation-state, in the absence of an external enemy. Supporting the argument that the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ theory promotes US interests, Barry Buzan (2006, p. 1101) claims that the US needed an enemy to justify and assert its leadership of ‘global security’ after the ending of the Cold War. Islam is this ‘enemy’ that fills the strategic needs of the US. Huntington’s position on these issues travelled to South Africa, after the events of 9/11, with the claims that the country was threatened by Islamic extremism (Lyman & Morrison 2004, p. 82); that local Muslims, linked to al Qaeda, planned to attack local targets (Lefkowitz, 2004); that South African Islamic networks have the capacity to commit acts of terrorism (Botha, 2005); and that international terrorists were using South Africa as a sanctuary (Solomon, Sunday Times, March 23, 2008a). These became the voices of expertise and authority which attempted to shape the debate on terror and foster the emerging field of Terrorism Studies in Africa. Despite the force of these emerging voices, Chapter 2 cautioned that expertise, sometimes, reinforces dominant societal ideologies (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2001; Schudson 2006) and introduced ‘biased and incorrect propositions into the political arena’ (Schröder, 2006, p. 471). Accordingly, a theory of knowledge is needed to evaluate truth claims. The search for this is the focus of what follows.

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Epistemologically, this inquiry shares the view that knowledge is culturally, historically and politically constituted. Instead of it being simply natural, knowledge is influenced and shaped by human activity and interests (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 200). This understanding is at the core of Critical Theory (CT) which fosters knowledge that contributes to the improvement of the human condition, and which recognises that ‘science is shaped by human beings and filtered through human consciousness’ (Ihylor, 1998, p.  358). Ontologically, then, the study rejects the notion that a researcher is an objective observer of the world. Instead, it views the researcher as situated contextually and historically, and it recognises that a researcher responds to specific contextual and historical circumstances (Fierke, 2010). In using CT as a lens, security is conceived as socially constituted— meaning that ‘its nature is a product of contexts, circumstances, intentions’ and that it is ‘dependent upon social, cultural, legal, and political processes of interpretation’ (Jackson, 2009a, p.  4). So, it is this, rather than security as a settled ontological ‘fact’ that was under investigation. Empirical data was gathered from both the national newspapers and security think-tanks. These institutions were selected because they are used by the social and economic elites to disseminate and popularise political views that sustain hegemonic ideas. The press, in particular, was influential because it contributed towards the development of normative ‘behaviour and expectations consistent with the hegemonic social order’ (Cox, 1999, p. 126). On the issue of the securitisation of Islam, the chapter was concerned with exposing ideological knowledge because this is the stuff of ‘myth’ (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1997, p. xiv): a process which ‘purifies’ things, ‘makes them innocent […] gives them a clarity which is not that of an explanation but a statement of fact’ (Barthes, 1972, 143). The chapter isolated instances where ‘truth’ was presented as ahistorical and independent of social and political context since it was during these representations of the social world that myths were peddled as legitimate knowledge (Barthes, 1972). Methodologically, research sites were selected because they were important components of the so-called ‘invisible security college’. This ‘invisible college’ of experts acts as an epistemic community that promotes specific kinds of ideologically inclined knowledge through activities that connect academia with military, intelligence and government agencies such as security agencies and media (Miller & Mills, 2009).

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This publication assumes that knowledge that securitises Islam and Muslims in Western societies was uncritically transmitted into the South African academic, political and media discourses primarily through locally based think-tanks and national newspapers. Chapter 4 initiates the process that reveals how this knowledge readily travelled to South Africa. Chapter 3: Conceptualising Securitisation This chapter conceptualised and problematised securitisation theory through a review of the relevant literature. As already stated earlier in this chapter, securitisation theory conceives of security as an intersubjective rhetorical practice which, through the act of uttering security, a new social order comes into existence that provides justification for extraordinary measures to urgently stop or defeat the declared threat. But, uttering ‘security’ is a political act which ‘introduces security questions in a public contested arena’ (Huysmans, 2002, p. 45). The architects of securitisation theory propose that the utterances of ‘security’ is limited to state representatives employing their institutional voices to make securitising moves. However, this publication confirms that non-institutional voices, such as think-tanks experts, also have the capacity to make securitising moves. Chapter 4: The Invisible College This chapter examines the meaning of the notion ‘think-tank’. A precise definition of a think-tank is elusive. For some, it is a research institute that solves social ‘problems or predict or plan future developments’ (Versi, 2016, p.  54); others define it as a public policy research institute that primarily aims to influence policy processes (Gellner, 1995). Andrew Rich (2004) maintains that operationally, think-tanks are non-­ profit organisations conducting and disseminating research on public policy issues. However, politically, they are ‘aggressive institutions’ that seek credibility and political access to the policy-making processes in order to advocate and promote their ideas (p. 11). Two research institutes considered as the prototype think-tanks in the field of International Relations are the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) (Abelson, 2014). The London-based RIIA and the New  York-based CFR were established after the signing of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. Their stated purpose was to educate, inform and advise future leaders in international

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relations. The origins of both can be traced to so called, ‘Kindergarten’ in South Africa created by Sir Alfred Milner, the South African High Commissioner (1897–1905) and British Secretary of War (1918). Under the leadership of Lionel Curtis, this closed grouping proposed the establishment of a single Anglo-American institute to research and explore ‘international problems’, advocate ‘policy solutions’ and serve as a forum for ‘policy-makers’ and ‘policy experts’ in the West to discuss matters relevant to ‘international affairs’ (Parmar, 2004, p. 26). The idea of a single Anglo-American institute to facilitate and nurture a ‘World Commonwealth’ to ensure world peace was based on the process that led to the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 (Thakur, Davis, & Vale, 2017, p. 5). This process which was guided by Milner’s ‘Kindergarten’, through its use of ‘knowledge and the instruments of propagation (institutions, journals, the formal exchange of ideas)’, coerced the political and intellectual elite of four southern African colonies to relinquish their ‘individual sovereignties’ to be reconstituted into a singular union, after the Second Anglo-­ Boer War (1899–1902) (p. 5). RIIA and CFR evolved into the ‘most respected, “influential” and prestigious’ foreign affairs research institutes in their respective countries (Parmar, 2004, p. 3), publishing two of the most respected journals in the field, namely, Foreign Affairs (CFR) and International Affairs (RIIA). Officials responsible for foreign policy issues consulted them on matters of war, and they were important advisors on preparation and planning for the ‘postwar world’ (p. 3). These organisations maintained intimate relationships with their respective national establishments who assisted them to access financial support from the national political and business elite (Parmar, 2004). But, financial support like this is not unconditional. RIIA’s research, in particular, was premised on ensuring that the post-war world order was safe for ‘capitalism’ and ‘Anglo American domination’ (Parmar, 2004, p. 4). Based on these examples, it is clear that think-tanks associated with IR educate policy-makers, publish their research, and nurture, build and participate in elite networks of influence. And, despite the accumulation of artefacts associated with scholarship, their research had pre-determined outcomes that rested on ideology rather than on finding the truth (Abelson, 2000, p. 220). This suggests that think-tanks are vulnerable to pressures from vested interests since they must ensure that their research outcomes are congruent with the views of those who fund them (Abelson, 2000, p. 231). This understanding prompted Julie Hearn (2007, p. 1098)

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to argue, in the context of Africa, that since non-governmental organisations (NGOs)—and, by extension, think-tanks—are often ‘dependent on the international bourgeoisie for their resources and position’ they offer themselves as agents of international capital against the interests of indigenous classes. In influencing outcomes, think-tanks employ various strategies such as propagating the idea that they ‘serve the public interest’ by educating the community ‘with their policy analysis’ (Stone, 2007, p. 269). They also use op-ed like articles in newspapers and develop personal relationships with journalists in an effort to carry their ideas into the public arena and to ‘impress potential donors’ (Abelson, 2000, p. 225). Think-tanks are certainly not benevolent institutions: they have the potential to amplify and exaggerate societal tensions while simultaneously they can ‘act as a force to limit and contain societal pressure’ (Stone, 2000, p. 169). As we have noted, they have specific material interests and promote particular ideological positions which become evident in the way they formulate and/or analyse the public policy issues. Despite these restrictions, their works—and the ideas that follow—are regarded as legitimate forms of knowledge because they are associated with the rituals of so-called research. Policy-makers and think-tanks are invariably involved in symbiotic relationships. On the one hand, the authority and status of think-tanks are enhanced when policymakers draw upon the research they offer. On the other hand, policymakers also require legitimation offered by the think-­ tank. However, policymakers invariably consult only those think-tanks whose advice is consistent with their needs. The policy ideas of think-tanks are indirectly transferred to policymakers through a policy-development agenda which is set by the former. Framing such agenda-setting is however a circular process which is facilitated by think-tanks organising themselves into a ‘sector’ and working together to exercise influence over the policy agenda by, amongst other things, placing limitations on the range of policy options presented. In this fashion they constitute an ‘invisible college’ that provides spaces for ‘intellectual exchange and information flow’ (Stone, 2001, p. 347). They also participate in closed groupings to enhance their influence. Such epistemic communities are networks of ‘professionals with recognised expertise’ and ‘authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge’ within specific domains (Haas 1992, p.  3). The epistemic community becomes the site for the ‘creation of collective interpretation and choice’ (Adler & Haas, 1992,

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p.  368) which suggests that it constructs and produces the knowledge rather than discovering an objective reality. The Round Table Movement, which grew out of Milner’s Kindergarten (Parmar, 2004), is perhaps the earliest epistemic community in International Relations. This thought network consisted of representatives from Britain and each of its Dominions and advocated for a federal parliament of the British people with the power to decide military and diplomatic matters (Potter, 2007, p. 106). The idea of ‘empire’ constituted the central episteme or idea around which this movement came to organise itself. Think-tanks promote the idea that their insights are the product of systematic investigation, analysis and examination which are grounded within recent knowledge on the policy issue. However, scholars have criticised them for promoting ‘self-interested forms of knowledge’ (Vale & Carter, 2008); for producing research recommendations that are ‘impractical’ and ‘politically unrealistic’ (Smith, 1993, p. xii); and for either sustaining or legitimating an ‘existing climate of ideas’ (Gamble, 1998, p. v). In this chapter, four South African-based think-tanks were chosen as sites to gather data for this inquiry. These are the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), regarded as South Africa’s premier think-­ tank on international relations; the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), founded in 1991; the Brenthurst Foundation which was established in October 2004 by the Oppenheimer family; and the Centre for International Policy Studies (CiPS), University of Pretoria. The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) is associated with a proposal to establish an institute of foreign affairs by British and US delegates at the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference (Abelson, 2014; Bostock, 1984; Parmar, 2004). As we have noted, from this idea the British launched the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) which later carried out a mandate to establish branches throughout the British’s Dominions, including South Africa (Bostock, 1984, p. 4). From 1928, attempts were made to establish a RIIA branch in South Africa (Bostock, 1984). However, these attempts were unsuccessful. A reason for its failure might have been that Barry Hertzog, Afrikaner leader and the then Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, was suspicious of British involvement in the foreign affairs of the country. He distrusted the idea of being incorporated into the ‘international’ under British hegemony as they viewed such incorporation as an attempt to enlist the

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‘public’ in order to ‘domesticate the emerging polity into the international system’ (Vale, 2014, p. 124). The event that helped establish the SAIIA was South Africa’s participation in the first British Commonwealth Relations Conference which was held in Toronto, Canada in 1933 (Bostock, 1984, p. 7). On their return, the South African delegates initiated a process that led to the launch of SAIIA on 12 May 1934 (p. 9). In South Africa, the SAIIA became the carrier and constructor of knowledge about the ‘international’. This notion itself is highly political because it exists within a constructed Realist world that conceives of ‘sovereignty as the central organising/founding principle’ (Vale, 2014, p. 132), and promotes the idea that anarchy is the ‘natural’ condition of the inter-state system. This condition necessitates the constant defence and identification of threats to state sovereignty. The creation of numerous ‘emergencies’, whether in the form of the ‘Cold War’ or the ‘Global War on Terror’, requires the public to be educated about the limitations offered by the idea of the international. SAIIA itself is located in the campus of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, and together with this university, established the Department of International Relations in 1969. Its activities include conducting research, organising conferences and symposia, and publishing its academic journal—South African Journal of International Affairs. It is funded by Western governments, charitable foundations, individual donors, and its corporate, diplomatic and institutional members. Examples of its funders include the US Agency for International Development (USAID); Bradlow Foundation; and Anglo-American Corporation (SAIIA, http://www.saiia.org.za/General/funders). The Institute for Security Studies(ISS) provides policy advice, and offers practical and technical assistance to African states (Institute for Security Studies, http://www.issafrica.org/about-us/how-we-work). As a strategy to claim political legitimacy, ISS continues to emphasise that its origins are to be found in the May 1990 meeting hosted by the African National Congress in Lusaka, Zambia between Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and ‘concerned’ South African security specialists and analysts (Center for Security Studies, 2014). ISS pursues a knowledge project that focuses on security-related issues which affect the entire African continent (ISS, http://www.issafrica.org. about-us/how-we-work). In 2003, ISS formed a cooperative partnership

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with the African Union’s Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to ‘assist and complement’ the political/development work of states in the Horn of Africa (ISS, http://www.issafrica.org/about-us/ press-releases/presses-release-press-release-iss-and-igad-to-coperate-thehorn-of-africa). The ISS is funded primarily by Western governments and other agencies, including USAID; the government of Japan; the Ford Foundation; the Geneva Centre for Security Policy; the Gesellschat für Internationale Zusammenarbeit; the Open Society Foundation for South Africa; the World Bank; and United Nations Development Programme. In October 2004 the Brenthurst Foundation was launched by the Oppenheimer family in order to introduce and explore ways of strengthening and/or increasing Africa’s economic growth (https://www.facebook.com/thebrenthurstfoundation. This family has had a long association with the economic development on the African continent which was marked in its founding of the Anglo American Corporation (hereafter Anglo). Under the Oppenheimer family’s leadership, Anglo developed into the most powerful economic and political force in Africa, particularly in South Africa from whence its interests extended ‘deep into the heart of Africa’ (Innes, 1984, p. 13). Anglo, with its near-monopoly in Africa’s diamond industry as well as its dominant position in southern Africa’s gold, copper, finance and manufacturing industries, benefited from the social system in existence in Africa and under apartheid South Africa and it took active steps to influence the social relations to its benefit (Innes, 1984; Kaplan, 1983; Kennedy, 1986; Spar, 2006). So, the Brenthurst Foundation’s aims, which seek to increase Africa’s economic performance, are consistent with the political and economic needs of the Anglo American Corporation. The Centre for International Policy Studies (CiPS), unlike regular university departments, was a self-funded entity during the late 1990s and early 2000s (Hussein Solomon, January 20, 2015, email communication). CiPS conducted and ‘disseminated research’ in order to develop the policy, associated with the capacity of state and non-state institutions in the field of international relations (CiPS, http://www.briledge.com/webportfolio/CIPS/index.htm). CiPS, established in 1999, was situated within the School for Social Science at the University of Pretoria (http://www.briledge.com/webportfolio/CIPS/index.htm). CiPS and the Institute for Strategic Studies

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at the University of Pretoria (ISSUP) were linked to the Department of Political Sciences (http://www.up.ac.za/en/political-sciences/article/19676/meer-oor-politieke-wetenskappe). These two institutes merged in 2010 to form the Institute for Strategic and Political Affairs (ISPA). This publication suggests that even though CiPS and ISSUP were formally two institutes, the CiPS was strategically established due to the ISSUP’s close historical association with the apartheid establishment. ISSUP was established in 1974 (Naude, 1978) and its first major public symposium was offered in 1977 (Vale, 2003). The symposium followed the 1973 Durban labour strike wave, the Mozambique’s and Angola’s liberation in 1975 from colonial rule (Rich, 1984), and the 1976 Soweto student uprising. The liberation of Mozambique and Angola, both having adopted a developmental path along socialist lines, was a setback for apartheid South Africa as it lost a geographical barrier—the so-called cordon sanitaire—against possible military infiltration (Rich, 1984, p. 68). These liberated countries offered the South African liberation movements opportunities of establishing their military bases in these countries. Simultaneously, labour and youth formations in South Africa became politically restive, and, added to these, international pressure and criticism of the apartheid policies increased exponentially (O’Meara, 1981). With the national and international political and military contexts shifting during the 1970s, the apartheid regime was open to consider different security policy options. This was on offer from ISSUP who constructed the challenge as a ‘total onslaught against the Republic of South Africa’ (Vale, 2003, p. 68) and proposed that South Africa adopt a ‘Total Strategy’ that linked apartheid, the Cold War, and southern Africa (Louw, 1978; Naude, 1978; Niewoudt, 1978). Being so pivotal and closely aligned with the politics of apartheid and its security solutions had consequences for the relevance of ISSUP in a new political dispensation, post-1994. CiPS was established to work on issues related to International Relations. In this role, CiPS adopted the theme Islam and Muslims among its research foci after September 2001. So, ‘Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Africa’ (2004) and ‘Political Islam in South Africa’ (2005) were two of its research areas. By hosting workshops and symposia on these themes, CiPS hoped to set the political agenda and to frame the debate about Islam and Muslims in South Africa. This work was funded by donors such as the British High Commission, the Canadian High Commission, Green Cross International,

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Gorbachev Foundation, Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the United States Embassy, and the Royal Netherlands Embassy. As numerous authorities have pointed out, funding is integral to a strategy by which a country conducts its foreign relations (Hills, 2006; Parmar, 2002). USAID, in particular, has used foreign aid to construct US hegemony in international relations (Hills 2006; Parmar, 2002). This became a greater priority in the age of the ‘Global War on Terror’ as the US drew an explicit link between its security needs and providing foreign assistance (Howell & Lind, 2009). Condoleezza Rice, the former US Secretary of State, reinforced this link in January 2006 with the statement that the US’s ‘security interests’, its ‘development goals’ and its ‘democratic ideals’ are interrelated (quoted in Howell & Lind 2009, p. 1285). Therefore, she announced, USAID ‘would be required to work more closely with the [US] State Department’ (Hills, 2006, p. 629). Since Africa, in the post-9/11 world, has evolved into a growing concern to the US, the focus and goal of USAID was to enhance, what it claimed, Africa’s ‘capacity to fight terrorism and create favourable conditions for US and African trade’ (USAID 2005, in Hills, 2006, p. 636). Reflecting in the light of the foregoing, an obvious question over the credibility of the South African-based think-tanks is their reliance on Western foreign aid. Are they able to act independently, as they claim, or do they promote the interests of their benefactors? Chapter 5: Expertise, Epistemes and the Construction of a Suspect Community South African-based security think-tanks have been pivotal in the securitisation of Islam and Muslims in Africa, especially in South Africa. In order to succeed, they have had to import a Western, particularly US, security agenda into the local security discourse. They have done this by associating Islam and the local Muslim community with violence and terrorism and making the local congruent with the US’s ‘Global War on Terror’. How has this happened? South African-based security think-tank experts have drawn their insights from epistemic networks that have their roots in Terrorism Studies and counterinsurgency. These networks have been sponsored by the United States (US) government in the 1970s. One of the arguments in this chapter is that local security experts have introduced a particular Western narrative on the origins of contemporary terrorism and have

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appropriated this narrative into African and South African security discourses. This was possible as these experts were associated with think-­ tanks such as the Institute for Security Studies (Jakkie Cilliers and Annali Botha), the Centre for International Political Studies, University of Pretoria (Hussein Solomon), and the Brenthurst Foundation (Gregg Mills). This imported narrative—that was transferred by Jakkie Cilliers (2003) into the South African security discourse—was shared, propagated and defended by other local experts using the common language of English and a common conceptual template inherited from Cold War and apartheid security discourses. In this narrative Cilliers (2003) maintained that contemporary African terrorism had its origin in the alliance, under the leadership of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which fought against the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan during the 1980s. It was this alliance which included Muslims ‘liberators’, who, he argued, became the core of contemporary Islamic terrorist groups whose target became the ‘United States, Israel and […] their allies’ (p. 94). More specifically, Cilliers claimed that ‘Algerian nationals’ formed the nucleus of this new ‘terrorism movement’ who were responsible for ‘terrorist attacks in South Africa in the late 1990s (through PAGAD) and attacks in East Africa’ (p. 94). As a strategy to increase the perceived credibility of security experts’ pronouncements, these experts created a local node within a global terrorism epistemic network into which some of them became incorporated. At a pragmatic level, these experts turned South African Muslims into a ‘new’ suspect community (Hillyard, 1973). This process was initiated by declaring the topic ‘terrorism in Africa’ as a research field. By focusing on this, they were able to establish themselves as ‘terrorism experts’ whose so-called specialist knowledge qualified them to guide public policy in South Africa. One way to do this has been to maintain that African countries, particularly South Africa, are ready locations for ‘Islamic terrorists’ to establish their bases in and to plan their attacks on Western targets. The ‘large numbers of Muslims in Africa’ became a familiar trope in supporting the view that Africa is ‘fertile’ ‘for the growth’ of ‘violence and terrorism’ (Botha & Solomon, 2005, p. 3). The same consideration led to the speculation that Muslims not directly involved in terrorism, potentially, ‘may’ well provide ‘terrorists’ with ‘sanctuary’ (Mills & Herbst, 2007, p. 44); and, even more tenuously, the claim that since Muslims act in solidarity with one another,

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any military action directed at ‘terrorists’ may strengthen their affinity and support for their ‘co-religionists’ (Shillinger, 2006a). But, the declaration that associates terrorism with Muslims and Islam is a highly political act that carries obvious social consequences. Consider, for example, the allegation that African Muslims posed a danger to the world because they ‘could make the [African] continent ungovernable’ (Herbst & Mills, 2003, p. 14). Security ‘experts’ have also drawn on speculative thinking that Islamic groups ‘may recruit’ ‘anti-American [Muslim] youth from […] Cape Town to Casablanca’ for terrorist activities (Mills & Herbst, 2007, 41). This was strengthened by an assertion that ‘radical violent interpretations of Islam’ was well established in South Africa (Solomon 2013c, p.  26). Furthermore, it was suggested that South African Muslims were central in global ‘terrorist support networks’ (p. 26) and that al Qaeda was searching for new sanctuaries in South Africa which could be hosted by local Muslims. Local security experts forged thought networks that enabled them to speak in unison. These effectively crowded out alternative voices as expert voices are seen as more ‘legitimate because it is based on a well-reasoned consensus among those in the best position to know’ (Davis Cross, 2013, p. 147). Operating in a ‘circular research system’ these terrorism experts depended on one another’s work as their research system functioned as a ‘reinforcing feedback loop’ (Ranstorp, 2009, p. 22). This issue was analysed in Chap. 5. Local security experts also participated in thought networks that drew on particular readings of issues. The themes of ‘Understanding Terrorism in Africa’ (Anneli Botha) and ‘Radical Islam and Terrorism in Africa’ (Hussein Solomon) are examples of epistemes local experts utilised as participants in the same thought/knowledge networks. Knowledge networks, like these, facilitated ‘mutual socialisation’ which ultimately resulted in  local members contributing African knowledge to a global episteme they subscribe to (Davis Cross, 2013, p. 147). Even though South African security think-tanks maintained that they acted independently as researchers, their practices revealed the opposite. They draw upon meta-theoretical understandings which bias western interests to position themselves at the global level, and to reinforce their local expertise. As noted, this is often done with support from the outside. One such case is the appropriation and tactical use of the ideas of Terrorism Studies as an academic enterprise.

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The goal of this field of study was to produce knowledge to be used by orthodox terrorism experts to advise and guide counterinsurgency operations, policing and legislating against so-called subversives. It is for this reason that orthodox terrorism experts were, ‘ideologically, committed and practically engaged in supporting Western State power’ (Miller & Mills, 2009, pp. 414–5). In South Africa, the broad tenets of Terrorism Studies have been used to entrench the idea that this is an acceptable way of interpreting the world. Most disturbingly, local security expertise has drawn on the authority of Western intelligence and governmental sources to make truth claims. An example was Kurt Shillinger’s (2014) claims, based on the authority of the US State Department, that the US was concerned about ‘transnational terrorism’; that ‘Jihadi influences’ were spreading in Africa; and that South Africa was a possible sanctuary for al Qaeda operatives. It is important to recognise that political change in South Africa, after the end of apartheid, did not bring a decisive break with historical security practices and their philosophy of control. As argued in Chap. 5, both Anneli Botha and Jakkie Cilliers were deeply rooted in the discourse of apartheid security. Greg Mills, it has emerged, was also an advocate of counterinsurgency as a strategy to respond to ‘subversives’ during the Cold War period, as his publications such as Victory Among People: Lessons from Countering Insurgency and Stabilising Fragile States (Mills & Richards 2011) confirm. Chapter 6: Writing Insecurity—Representations of Muslims and Islam in the South African Print Media South African national newspapers have been pivotal in the securitisation of Islam and Muslims because, like think-tanks, they have uncritically transferred the security priorities, concerns and policy agendas of the West into South Africa. As a result, they have endorsed the discourse and practices that construct Islam as an existential threat to Western civilisation, and, by implication, to South African society. After the US’s declaration of the ‘Global War on Terror’, the national press warned that South Africa has become an alternative sanctuary for ‘Islamic terrorists’. Newspapers pronounced that ‘SA could be host to more al Qaeda cells’ (The Saturday Star, May 29, 2004); and that foreign ‘militants’ have received support from ‘local and immigrant Muslim communities’ (The Saturday Weekend Argus, October 3, 2004). They also

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propagated the view that Muslims and radical ‘Islamic terrorism’ were bigger threats to South Africa than the ‘white right-wing’ (The Citizen, February 17, 2003, quoting Martin Schonteich, a former ISS as well as SAIIA ‘expert’). Such declarations, in effect, declared an emergency which call for urgent state action. In order to give credibility to the threat discourse, South African national newspapers perform the ideological work of constructing Western purposes as being ‘noble’ while portraying Islamic ones as the opposite. In accepting the putative Western moral order, they constructed South Africa as integral to this same order, which implies an obligation to defend it. Understandably, then, South African newspapers constructed any challenge to Western hegemony, whether real or perceived, as a security threat to South African society. Consistent with the self-portrayal of the US that it is morally superior to the rest of the world, the South African press has reinforced the understanding that the US had limited its involvement in international politics to prevent it from being contaminated by a ‘too significant international presence’ (Die Burger, September 12, 2003). In propagating this position, however, the press ignores the US’s involvement in numerous global wars and that it was responsible for the near destruction of the Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. In cases when these papers do refer to the US’s involvement in the Second World War, for instance, they argue that this involvement in war was forced onto the US as a result of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1947 (Die Beeld, May 29, 2012). However, by naming an iconic moment—like, Pearl Harbour—these reports both establish and remind their readers of America’s moral stance pertaining to the issue of war, in general. So, when the US was attacked on September 11, 2001, the South African press sought to establish a link between the event called 9/11 and Pearl Harbour (Die Beeld, May 29, 2012). The linking of these two events acted as justification for the US’s subsequent military action because, as in the case of Pearl Harbor, the events of 9/11, according to Die Beeld (May 29, 2012), were unprovoked. Not only was the link established to explain immediate military action, but it also served as justification for military action that might result from the US’s response. In the main, South African newspapers presented the 9/11 attacks as ‘cold-blooded murder’ and ‘terrorism’ perpetrated by ‘Islamic extremists’ who were opposed to the values and the achievements of the US (Saturday Star, September 10, 2011).

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In their approach, South Africa’s national newspapers positioned themselves as the champions of Western interests: a stance that assumes the superiority of ‘We’ (i.e. the West) and the inferiority of the ‘Other’ (Islam and Muslims). This is a process of othering which is critiqued by Edward Said’s work on Orientalism (Said, 1979). The uncritical acceptance of the resulting superiority/inferiority dichotomy is integral to the maintenance—indeed strengthening—of Western hegemony. South African newspapers’ adoption of a moral stance that champions Western interests confirms that these newspapers have used Samuel P. Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ (1993; 1996) argument to propagate negative perceptions about Islam and Muslims and to present them as the ‘enemy’. While these positions contribute to maintaining Western political and intellectual hegemony, they must also be viewed as integral to the securitisation of Muslims and Islam in South Africa. Assertions that the 9/11 attacks were an existential threat to Western civilization suggested that an emergency response was required (Buzan et al., 1998, 23–24) because a failure to respond to these threats could result in the loss of ‘everything’— ‘it will be too late’ (Wæver, 2014). As we have stated, national newspapers have a symbiotic relationship with local security experts. The former use the latter to give credibility to their perspectives, and vice versa: Martin Schonteich, a former ISS senior researcher, was called on by The Citizen (February 17, 2003) to ‘confirm’ that Muslims are a ‘greater threat’ in South Africa than the ‘white right-­ wing’. The Mail and Guardian (December 8, 2011) used Anneli Botha, senior ISS researcher, to argue that the threat of Islamic ‘extremism’ is ever present and to confirm that the aim of Islamic extremists is to re-­ establish their lost ‘Islamic Empire’; the Cape Argus (October, 2009) declared that Hussein Solomon is an ‘expert on Islamic militancy’, after which they asked him to confirm that South African security agencies lack the capacity to respond to the terrorism threat during the 2010 World Cup which was held in South Africa. It was noted that the national press repeated assertions by Herbst and Greg Mills (2003), Kurt Shillinger (2006a), Anneli Botha (2005), and Hussein Solomon (2008a) that South Africa had become an alternative sanctuary for international ‘terrorists’ after their alleged Afghani bases were destroyed due to US military action; another confirmation of its symbiotic relationship with think-tanks. Additional strategies to position Muslims and Islam outside the Western ‘moral order’ include criminalisation (Mail and Guardian, July 5, 2015;

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Die Burger, April 7, 2011), orientalisation (the Citizen, October 4, 2012; Saturday Star, December 2, 2006) and vilification (The Citizen, September 8, 2005; Sunday Tribune, September 6, 2009). Even though serious reservations were expressed in the scholarly literature about whether al Qaeda actually exists as a ‘tangible structure’ (Burnette & Whyte, 2005, p. 1), the South African press took no notice of this, identifying it as the primary enemy in the Global War on Terror. Both US and South African intelligence sources were drawn on by the same press to claim that al Qaeda leaders were ‘hiding in South Africa’ with the assistance of local Muslims (Saturday Weekend Argus, October 3, 2004). And relying on an anonymous source referred to as ‘Intelligence agencies’, City Press (May 23, 2010) alleged that al Shabab, an affiliate of al Qaeda, had ‘infiltrated’ South Africa.

Concluding Comments This publication has shown that both the national press and security experts were crucial actors in the securitisation of Islam and Muslims in South Africa. In this role, they uncritically imported security concerns from the Global North into the local security discourse. The book has argued that the construction of Islam and Muslim as a threat in South Africa is a ‘received truth’. While the former US President George W.  Bush’s (2001c) utterance that the US will conduct a ‘War against Terrorism’ did not initiate the process that securitised Islam and Muslims within Western societies, it certainly enhanced and facilitated this process because it constructed ‘terrorism’ as an existential threat which justified Emergency measures to eradicate it. With the appropriate power and authority, the then US President securitised Terrorism. Bush’s (2001c) labelling ‘Terrorism’ a security issue ensured that it became one (Taureck 2006a): ‘the utterance [security] itself is the act’ (Wæver, 2005, p.  55, emphasis in original). Since ‘terrorism’ in Western societies has been equated with Islam and Muslims within the contemporary security discourse (Gunarantna, 2004; Nichiporuk, 2003), Islam became securitised in these societies. This was evident in increased hostilities towards and against Muslims (Bloul, 2008; Hödl, 2010; Kadir, 2006; Larsson, 2005); in the targeted practices that placed Muslims under increased security surveillance (Spalek & Imtoual 2007); and in associating Islam and Muslims with ‘terrorism’, fundamentalism, and ‘reactive violence’ (Jackson 2010, 6).

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This publication has shown that significant sections of the South African society identify and associate themselves with Western ‘civilisational’ norms, practices and values; they even perceive South Africa as integral to Western society. Given this, it is not unexpected to find that local newspapers and experts have accepted, propagated and contributed to establishing and nurturing Western hegemony in South Africa. In this, they have endorsed and facilitated the notion that the West has the authority and power to define and establish the international ‘moral order’. Consistent with the act of securitisation, South African media and security experts have articulated the threat as resistance to and/or hostility towards Western hegemony and/or the recruitment of individuals to launch ‘terror’ attacks against Western interests. This kind of threat construction initiates the securitisation process. This perspective is consistent with Graham, Keenan and Dowd’s (2004) argument that articulating the threat and constructing the enemy are critical when calling citizens to conflict. The argument and evidence have shown that associating and/or equating Islam and Muslims with ‘terrorism’ was a central theme in the process of the securitisation of Muslims. Here, the utterance, ‘terrorism’, as a security concern, took numerous forms. Firstly, South Africa was presented as an unreliable partner in the ‘Global War on Terror’. Secondly, South African Muslims were presented as supporters of ‘terrorism’ and South Africa was constructed as a sanctuary for so-called transnational terrorists. Some experts argued that South Africa is an ‘especially welcoming place for terrorists’, since, as they have suggested, it has a ‘cohesive Muslim population’ (Mills & Herbst, 2007, p. 42). Thirdly, South Africa was presented as a location for terrorist training and recruitment. This publication has demonstrated that South African security experts were members of closed epistemic communities which constructed a particular kind of knowledge. These experts were important actors within international networks concerned with African Muslims, terrorism and counterinsurgency. These transnational epistemic communities were powerful sites for the construction of terrorism knowledge which legitimated conceptual frame/s, perspectives and ideological agendas within which Islam, Muslims and ‘terrorism’ were theorised as linked. These frames, perspectives and agendas were then transported and circulated within the South Africa security policy discourse by the local experts. This book has pointed out a number of limitations with these perspectives which securitise Muslims and Islam in South Africa, in particular with

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the propositions which constructed ‘terrorism’ as a contemporary South African security concern. If this trajectory, in popular and scholarly understandings, is continued, the securitisation of Islam and Muslims will continue and intensify. This is so, more than ever in the light of recent developments such as: the advent of the US President Donald Trump and his travel ban (see The Guardian International Edition, 25 September 2017) and the rise of the Far Right (see Angouri & Wodak, 2014; Yilmaz, 2012) in various Western countries which acted as catalyst for the growing popular securitisation of Muslims in these countries. Accordingly, security and ‘terrorism’ scholars in South Africa need to contribute in changing this narrative. A start in this direction would include conducting primary research, instead of recycling data which they have gathered from other sites of security knowledge. Local researchers must cease the practice of speculation and provide evidence for their understandings and explanations. They need to dissociate their theorisation from ‘terrorism’ knowledge which is aligned with orthodox terrorism scholarship and counterinsurgency due the ideological bias and historical roots of these in apartheid and Cold War ideology; resist peddling information that is factually inaccurate to support specific ideological propositions; and ensure that their scholarship is independent from funding interests and the interests of knowledge networks that are integrated into powerful institutions such as the police, the military, and the intelligence agencies. By presenting South Africa as a case-study, this publication contributed to a wider literature on security, securitisation and international politics. This publication also signals the importance of including securitisation theory within International Relations curricula and/or academic programmes concerned with teaching those involved in foreign relations. Moreover, it also signals the need to include Critical Terrorism Studies within the curricula of Security Studies.



Appendixes

Appendix 1 Interview Schedule: Terrorism Experts Thank you for your agreement to be interviewed. 1. What has prepared you for this field that focuses on terrorism and terror-related activity? 2. Have you worked with other security experts whose work focuses on terrorism in South Africa? 3. Have you published with other experts on the same topic? 4. What in your formative academic qualifications prepared you to become an expert in the field of terrorism? 5. What were some of the seminal conferences that you participated in, or that you took a leading role in its organisation? 6. Why is the Western voice so dominant in the African and South African conversation that focuses on terrorism? 7. In terms of ‘Islamic terrorism’, are there certain things and/or social issues that drive the perpetrators of terrorist activities in Africa and South Africa? 8. What would you say are the three most critical issues South African policy makers need to know about public terrorism locally?

© The Author(s) 2020 M. N. Hendricks, Manufacturing Terrorism in Africa, Islam and Global Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5626-5

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9. Are there any indications that South Africa is threatened by Islamic terrorism? 10. How has work on terrorism impacted the South African and African policy development? 11. Who are your audiences for the messages you propagate? 12. Are you a member of a transnational terrorism studies network? 13. Are there opportunities in South Africa where the local think-tanks that focus on terrorism come together? 14. Are you able to speak, read or write Arabic? Thank you very much—it is highly appreciated.

Appendix 2 Interview Questions to Ronnie Kasrils 1. In your view, how independent are South African security think-­ tanks in their analysis of the security threat faced by the country as this has relevance to contemporary terrorism? 2. How would you respond to the advice offered by security think-­ tanks that South Africa should become a more reliable partner in the ‘War on Terror’? 3. Why, based on your insight into the security questions faced by South Africa, are Muslims and Islam represented as a security threat in this country by think-tank experts? 4. Think-tanks security analysts have claimed that political correctness, including at ministerial level, undermines the fight against terrorism. How do you respond to such a charge and what do you think motivate such a collective perspective?

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Appendix 3 Conferences, Seminars and Workshops by Selected South African Think-Tanks from 2001 to 2010 Name of think-tank South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)

Conference/seminar/workshop

Chapter 1. The SAIIA Security and Crime Cluster was established to focus on ‘the critical challenges facing the continent’s many weak and fragile states and societies in dealing with endemic conflict, organised crime and terrorism’ (www.saiia.org.za/safpad/ security-conflict-resolution). SAIIA says that the purpose of their research is ‘to assist and inform African policymakers and important African partners’ on how to respond to the problems of conflict, organised crime and terrorism and associated ‘challenges facing African societies’ (ibid.). Chapter 2. 8 February 2010. Public Seminar: ‘Choices for Africa’ address by Dr. Greg Mills who heads the Brenthurst Foundation. In the seminar invitation SAIIA notes that Mills was stationed in Kabul where he served as the ‘special advisor to the Commander of NATO Forces in Afghanistan […] and as head of the strategic analysis of “Prism Group” of, the ninth International Security Assistance Force’ (http://www.saiia.org.za/events/ address-by-dr-greg-mills-choices-for-africa). Institute for PROLEGOMENON 20–21 March 2006: Seminar in Cape Town Security Studies and Nairobi, the ISS Offices on ‘Terrorism in Africa’. The ISS’s (ISS) announcement of the seminar states that ‘scholars and analysts from North, West, East and Southern Africa […] will commence a process of developing’ terrorism knowledge as perceived in Africa (http://www.iss.org/Pubs/Newsletter/Terrorism/issue6Mar06. htm). PROLEGOMENON ISS publishes a quarterly newsletter: African Terrorism Bulletin. In its March 2006 issue 005 the editorial states that the news bulletin aims ‘to provide balanced information, analysis, and critical perspectives regarding terrorism and counter-­ terrorism strategies on the African continent’ (http://www.iss.org/ Pubs/Newsletter/Terrorism/issue6Mar06.htm). Centre for Conference 2004: Terrorism and Counter Terrorism in Africa. International Policy Conference 30 July 2005: Political Islam in South Africa. Studies (CiPS) Co-hosted in association with School of Politics, University of KwaZulu-Natal. Conference 4 October 2005: Perspectives on Terrorism. In association with the Royal Netherlands Embassy.

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Name of think-tank

Conference/seminar/workshop

Brenthurst foundation

Tswalu Dialogue: Africa and International Terrorism, 25–17 January 2007. Thought Leadership: Peace Building and Counter Insurgency, 2006. The Brenthurst Foundation reports on its website (www. thebrenthurstfoundation.org/peacebuilding.htm) that it engages with experts and practitioners involved in ‘international peace building operations’. Consistent with this understanding the Foundation seconded Greg Mills, as part of the ‘NATO-led International Security Assistant Force (ISAF)’ to Kabul in mid-2006 and again in 2010 as advisor to the overall commander and to head the ‘Prism Group analysis section embedded in Afghanistan within the headquarters’. In addition, Terrence McNamee was seconded to conduct research for the Prism Group in 2006.

Appendix 4 Selected Publications on Terrorism Authored by Selected South African Security ‘Experts’ Hussein Solomon 1. Solomon H. 2014. Failed Counter-Terrorism Initiatives linked to Myth of Security Reform in Africa, RIMA Occasional Papers, 2(4), http://muslimsinafrica.wor dpr ess.com/2014/04/01/ failed-counter-terrorism-iniitatives-linked-to-myth-of-securityrefrom-in-africa 2. Solomon H. 2013. Combating Islamist radicalisation in South Africa, African Security Review: 1–17, DOI: https://doi.org/1 0.1080/10246029.2013.862171 3. Solomon H. 2013. Jihaad: A South Africa Perspective, Boemfontein: Sun Media. 4. Solomon H. 2013. Exploring the Nexus between Ethnicity and Terrorism in Africa, Accord, Conflict Trends, Issue 3:31–37. 5. Solomon H. 2013. Coming to Grips with Islamist Radicalization in South Africa, RIMA Occasional Papers, 1(7), [http://muslimsinafrica.files.wordpres.com/2013/03/topbanner_isl_mus_ afr9.jpg].

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6. Solomon H. 2013. South Africa and Global Terrorism, Southern African Peace and Security–Blog, www.saccps.blogspot. com/2013/10/south-africa-and-global-terrorism.html 7. Solomon H. 2012. Researching Terrorism in South Africa: More questions than answers, Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, 40(2): 142–165. 8. Solomon H. 2012. Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria: Responding to Boko Haram, RUSI Journal, 152 (4) 9. Caromba L. and Solomon H. 2008. Understanding Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, African Security Review 17.3: 119–124. 10. Solomon H. 2008. “South Africa: Playing Ostrich in the Face of Global Jihad”, Centre for International Political Studies, Electronic Briefing Papers, No.15/2008. 11. Solomon H. 2005. “Terrorism: Critical Reflections,” presented to a meeting of the Union of Jewish Women. Johannesburg, November 7, 2005. 12. Solomon H. 2005. “Contextualizing Islamic radicalism within state-society relations,” paper presented to the symposium On Terrorism October 27, 2005. Hosted by the South African National Defense Force College and the Public and Defence Management Programme, University of Witwatersrand. Johannesburg. 13. Solomon H. 2005. “Countering Network Terrorism and Beyond,” paper presented to the conference Perspectives on Terror. Hosted by the Centre for International Political Studies, University of Pretoria. South African Army College. Pretoria. 6 October 2005. 14. Solomon H. 2005. “South African Muslims Challenging Imperialism,” presented to the workshop Political Islam in South Africa, co-hosted by the Centre for the International Political Studies, University of Pretoria and the School of Politics, University of KwaZulu-Natal. Durban, 30 July 2005. 15. Solomon H. 2005. Islam: Between Traditionalism and Radicalism  – A View from Southern Africa,” paper presented to the Indiana University-Purdue University 16. International Affairs Forum. Fort Wayne, Indiana, USA, April 12, 2005. 17. Solomon H. 2005. “Islam and the Prevailing World Order: From Violent Confrontation to Critical Engagement”, CiPS Electronic Briefing Paper Series, 01/2005.

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18. Solomon H. 2005. “Myths of Terror?”, CiPS Electronic Briefing Paper Series, 23/2005. 19. Solomon H. 2005. “Reflections of a South African Muslim on a visit to Israel/Palestine”, CiPS Electronic Briefing Paper Series, 53/2005. 20. Swart G., Solomon H. and Botha A. 2003. Egypt: Pharaohs and Fundamentalists, African Insights, 33(4): 78–82. Anneli Botha 1. Botha A. 2008. Terrorism in the Maghreb: The Transnationalisation of Domestic Terrorism, in Assessment of Counter-Terrorism Strategies, Monograph 144Chapter 6, Pretoria, Tshane: Institute for Security Studies. 2. Botha A. 2007. Africa’s vulnerability to terrorism and its ability to combat it, in Ukumu W. and Botha A. (Eds.) Understanding Terrorism in Africa: In search of an African Voice, Pretoria/Tshane, Institute for Security Studies 3. Botha A. 2007. Relationship between Africa and International Terrorism: Causes and Linkages, presented at the conference on Southern African and International Terrorism, Dialogue hosted by the Brenthurst Foundation Tswalu, 25–27 January 2007. 4. Botha A. 2006. “Politics and Terrorism: An Assessment of the Origins of Terrorism in Egypt, ISS Paper, 131, Institute for Security Studies. 5. Botha A. and Solomon H. undated. Terrorism in Africa, Centre for International Political studies.www.cips.up.ac.za/files/pdf/uafspublications/TERRORISM%2520in%2520AFRICA.pdf 6. Boshoff H., Botha A., and Schonteich M. 2001.Fear in the City, Urban Terrorism in South Africa, Monograph 63, Pretoria, Tshane: Institute for Security Studies. 7 . Botha A.2008.Challenges in understanding terrorism in Africa: A human security perspective, African Security Review, 17.2: 28€-41.

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Greg Mills 1. Mills G. and Anthony Arnott2012.“Time to avoid a USSR-style Afghan exit”, Brenthurst News release [129965], December 12, 2012, ­(wwwthebrenthurstfoundation.org/a_sndmsd/news_view. asp?I=129965andPG=227). The key message in this press release is that the presence of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan ensured that economic progress and security returned to Afghanistan. However, if the level of funding to the Afghanistani military is not maintained and the enabling conditions for the private sector are reduced or eliminated, support for the Taliban will return as in the USSR era. 2. Mills G., McNamee T., De Lorenzo M., and Uttley M. 2007. “AFRICOM and African Security: The Globalisation of Security or the Militarisation of Globalisation? Brenthurst discussion Paper, 4/2007 3. Mills G., and Herbst J. 2007. Africa, Terrorism and AFRICOM, RUSI Journal, 152(2): 40–44. 4. Mills G. 2005. Mideast in best, worst of times: The region has seen some promising developments, and some causes for fear, The Star, March 8, 2005. 5. Mills G. and Shillinger K. 2005. “Chasm Between How Westerners and Muslims View the Conflict that Binds Them”, Sunday Independent, July 10, 2005. 6. Mills G. 2004. Africa’s New Strategic Significance, The Washington Quarterly, 27 (4): 57–169. 7. Abraham A., Battersby J., Cleary S., Dlamini K., Edmonds M., Katzenellenbogen J., Mills G., Sidiropoulos E., Smith B and Spence J. 2002. A New World Order? The implications of 11 September 2001,Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs. Kurt Shillinger • Shillinger K. 2007. The role of the International Community and counter-terrorism in Africa, in Ukumu W. and Botha A. (Eds.) Understanding Terrorism in Africa: In search of an African Voice, Pretoria/Tshane, Institute for Security Studies.

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• Shillinger K. and Westcott A. 2006. “Looking for Clues in Al-­ Zarqawi’s Wake”, Business Day, June 14, 2006. • Shillinger K. 2005. “Global Terror: Africa Not Immune to Terror”, Business Day, October 7, 2005. • Shillinger K. 2005. “Rival insurgencies shatters myth of monolithic terrorist network”, Sunday Independent, May 7, 2005. • Shillinger K. 2006. Al-Qaida in southern Africa: The emergence of a new front in the war on terrorism, Armed Forces Journal, February, 1, 2006, http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/al-qaida-in-southern-africa/ [accessed 24 February 2012].

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Index

A African Research Network on Terrorism and Counter Terrorism (ARNTACT), 127, 129, 135 African Union (AU), 85, 121, 124, 125, 135, 189 African Voice, 127, 128 Agenda-setting, 32, 33, 60, 138, 139, 186 Apartheid security, 56, 101, 111, 112, 192, 194 B Brenthurst Foundation, 203, 204, 206 C Clash of Civilizations thesis, 5, 40, 56, 175, 180, 181 Cold War, vii, 5, 10, 38, 45, 56–58, 61, 62, 73, 81, 90, 93, 100–103, 111, 119, 153, 168, 173, 174, 182, 188, 190, 192, 194, 199

Counter-insurgency, 10, 103, 168 Counter-terrorism, 12, 102, 110, 115, 121, 129 Critical Security Studies (CSS), 26–27, 48 Critical terrorism studies, 11, 199 Critical Theory (CT), 25–27, 36, 40, 51, 183 Crusade, 18, 111 D Discourse on ‘terror,’ 11 E Episteme, 42, 71–75, 93–136, 179, 187, 191–194 Epistemic community, 28, 29, 41, 71–75, 77, 94–96, 125–136, 157, 183, 186, 187, 198 Epistemic networks, 42, 93–95, 191, 192 Epistemological claims, 9

© The Author(s) 2020 M. N. Hendricks, Manufacturing Terrorism in Africa, Islam and Global Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5626-5

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246 

INDEX

Existential threat, 3, 16, 42, 49, 50, 91, 137, 138, 143, 174, 175, 181, 194, 196, 197 Expert, 2, 7, 9, 10, 14, 16, 20–24, 28, 30, 31, 33, 34, 40–43, 50, 53, 54, 56, 59, 60, 63, 65, 73, 74, 76–77, 83, 86, 87, 92–111, 114, 124–136, 152, 156, 164, 166, 167, 169, 171, 175, 180, 181, 183, 184, 191–193, 195–198 Expert knowledge, 20–24, 60 Extraordinary action, 3, 51, 178 F Failed state, 103, 109 G Genealogy of ‘terrorism, 12, 180 Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), 128, 129 Global War on Terror (GWOT), 1, 3, 5, 7, 9–12, 17, 18, 24–26, 40, 42, 51, 81, 110, 114, 122, 123, 128, 133, 136, 137, 140, 153, 155, 163, 174, 180, 181, 188, 191, 194, 197, 198 H Hegemonic knowledge, 25, 73, 74 Hegemony, 25, 80–82, 114, 120, 121, 124, 138–151, 174, 175, 187, 191, 195, 196, 198 Huntington, Samuel P., 5, 19–20, 33, 40, 43, 56–58, 139, 155, 175, 180–182, 196

I Institute for Security Studies, xv, 203, 206, 207 Invisible college, 41–42, 59–92, 94, 95, 183–191 Islamic extremism, 19, 34, 98, 131, 152, 169, 182 Islamic terrorists, 9, 98, 163, 168–172, 180, 192, 194 Islamophobia, 17, 111 J Jihadists, 102, 108, 111, 125 K The Kenyan Attack, 1, 2, 40, 179, 180 Knowledge/power, viii, 1–3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 16, 20–23, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31–33, 36, 38, 39, 41–42, 45–50, 59–61, 65, 69–77, 80–83, 93–96, 102, 111, 114, 116, 118, 125, 126, 129, 132, 134, 135, 138, 140, 144, 160, 164, 170, 171, 179–188, 192–194, 197–199 M Manhattan Project, 11, 12 O Orientalism, 19, 157, 160, 182, 196 P People Against Gangsterism and Drug’s (PAGAD), 41, 52–58, 98, 117, 192

 INDEX 

R Racial profiling, 14, 110, 111 RAND Corporation, 38, 61, 62, 93–96, 114, 129, 172 RAND-St Andrews, 95, 129 Reign of Terror, 10 Research institute, 29, 61, 63, 78, 85, 184, 185 Research on Islam and Muslims in Africa (RIMA), 30, 108, 130–134, 136 S Said, Edward, 19, 157, 160, 182, 196 Securitisation theory, 3, 24, 28, 35, 41, 45, 48–51, 169, 175, 177, 178, 184, 199 Securitising actor, 28, 49, 178 Security surveillance, 17, 197 Security think-tank experts, 2, 42, 60, 93, 191 Security think-tanks, 24, 28, 29, 31, 34–36, 41, 42, 60, 69, 77, 92, 136, 177, 183, 191, 193 Security threat, 3, 15, 16, 19, 24–26, 28, 30, 34, 37, 39, 41, 45, 50, 94, 96, 104, 108, 111, 123, 133, 143, 145, 153, 154, 169, 171, 174, 179, 181, 195 Speech-Act, 3, 12, 28, 49, 50, 100, 102, 103, 106–108, 138, 168, 178, 181

247

State-centric, 11, 13, 47, 48, 84, 102 Suspect community, 3, 42, 92–136, 191–194 T Terrorism, 1, 17, 55, 59, 93, 139, 180 Terrorism expert, 6–8, 10–12, 24, 28, 33, 59, 95, 96, 101, 102, 106, 129, 134, 154, 156, 170, 171, 177, 178, 180, 192–194 Terrorism Studies, 10–12, 42, 93, 95, 96, 99, 102, 129, 135, 180, 182, 191, 193, 194 Terrorist enclave, 102 Terrorist sanctuary, 10, 103, 109, 181 Total Onslaught, 90, 100, 101, 190 Total Strategy, 90, 100, 190 Transnational terrorism, 103, 110, 194 U Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), 103 US African Command (AFRICOM), 104, 121–125 W Western imperialist project, 19 White widow, 1–16, 40