Manila 1900-1941. Social Change in a Late Colonial Metropolis 9711130424

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MANILA, 1900-1941

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325; RGGPI, 1919 and 19Z4»I933, and Manila City Directory: 1932»33, p. 5 and 1939-40, pp. 9»10.

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14

MANILA, 19004941

By contrast, Manila's ethnically discrete commercial communities re-

tained as a group, a near monopoly of the handling of imported goods (figure 2) and thus also of wholesaling and distributing, which proceeded through a regular

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hierarchy of urban centers and business organizational levels. Reported imports landed at Manila regularly exceeded 85 percent of the national total. Thus, although after 1919 the export volume handled by MHuuWnemusln much less rapidly than that of the major provincial ports as a group, its volume of imports tended to grow with the expansion of export earnings for the entire country.

The Internal Redistributive Economy A .substantial proportion of ManileNos was supported directly or indirectly economy (as that term is used by Polanyi). Taxes collected from persons all over the archipelago were redistributed to support government personnel, the largest group of whom' worked in the capital. These funds were also used to employ workers in the construction of government buildings, transportation facilities, and other public works in the city. An even larger number of urban dwellers was supported indirectly in the same redistribuNve system by providing goods and services to those employed by the government. Philippine government expenditures expanded about twice as rapidly as national population growth duriNg the period in question. As the government payroll went increasingly to Filipinos, its multiplier effect on the urban economy grew. Foreign employees, after all, tended to be the source of sizeable remittances out of the country, while Filipinos tended to spend or invest their funds in Manila. In any case, the redistribution of tax revenues was an extremely important part of the urban economy. As we shall see in chapter 3, direct government employment was one of the most dynamic aspects of the city's occupational structure before World War II. We shall also discover that it was not independent of the commercial economy, because government revenues were in part a reflection of the booms' and busts of the commodities export . economy.

be a redistributive

One might argue that the hierarchically organized activities of the Catholic church also served to reallocate resources from the provinces to Manila.

Although its clergy were hardly supporting families, the Church nonetheless employed some lay persons and also hired temporary workers for its occasional construction projects. Many others were indirectly supported Br providing goods and services to' church workers and employees. In fact, however, the picture is not so clear. Many activities of the Church had been supported by direct government stipends during the Spanish period, ahd .others were supported ultimately by the production of cash crops on estates owned by the Church,

particularly by some of its religious orders. The financing of'Cburch activities was thrown into a prolonged crisis by the abrupt American imposition of a separation between church and state. Furthermore, the change of colonial regimes, with its attendant change in language, also disturbed many of the

schools En on a tuition basis by the Church in the capital. In the lgtfis and 19305, however, when the switch to English as the language of in . v

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Fig. 2. The foreign trade of Iloilo and Cebu as compared with that of Manila, 1900»1940' Exports

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'The trade of the Iloilo and Cebu customs zones is expreszacd as percentage

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Sowrcesz Calculated from SBPI, 1919, pp. 118-1 19 and 1919, p. ISO and Yearbook, 1940, p. 411.

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16

I

MANILA, 1900-1941

already been accomplished, these seconaaqf sChools and. colleges were *L,,,,,,, successful in attracting students from the provinces, I th their tuition fees and living allowances. in these senses the church did make some contribution to employment in the city; but in a strictly economic, rather than in a spiritual and ceremonial sense, the Church was not a primary reason for the city's growth during the early twentieth century, and it is not clear to what degree contributions made to the Church were redistributed .to persons living in the city.

Manufacturing in a Commodities Export Economy . Production of all kinds and at all scales of investment and degrees of formal versus informal organization (the format of a modern firm versus ego»

tiated prices, irregular hours, family or Self employment, etc.) was an important part of the urban economy throughout the period under consideration. Bur despite its significance to the urban employment structure, the constraints on manufacturing growth were (as they still are) among the city's and the nation's most intractable probletns. As with the Philippine economy in general, prosperity in Manila was highly dependent upon American prices and the total volume of demand for export commodities. Since the experience of the Great Depression, Philippine economic policy has publicly sought to promote development and to ameliorate the impact of sudden downturns in external demand for particular commodities

-

by manufacturing more of its consumer goods domestically thereby simulta» neously creating domestic urban employment and (in theory) lessening its dependence on the terms of trade set abroad. 11 Recently the Philippines has also sought to promote the export of manufactured goods. As we shall see, both policies were discussed before Independence, but neither was vigorously pure sued, for two reasons. First, the indigenous land»and sugar~mill-owning elite wanted free, even preferential, access to American markets for their commodities. (Resident Spanish and American investors shared this desire.) Second, colonial policy makers and some American manufacturers and politicians wanted to promote and protect the Philippines as a market for American

manufactured goods. i z Given the power of these interests on both sides, mutual free trade was a feasible policy. Those Filipinos who benefitted most from the

_

export economy, i.e., those who could afford. to buy imported manufactured goods, also had the further advantage of the lack of duty on expensive items such as automobiles. The result was a lack of dynamism in establishing an industrial sector. This was particularly true. of industries that might represented a breaking out of the pattern of commodities export dependency 5articipat'ihg in coreperiphery trade did allow the Philippines some benefits of international specialization, and export demand did encourage the development of more efficient transportation and processing capabilities. But it did not create a more dynamic effect because investment was not concentrated in areas of above average productivity per worker. A full accounting of export production would ,

-

find large concentrations of low productivity handwork activities in sugar

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17

EMPLOYMENT AND EXPORTS

planting and harvesting, abaca growing and stripping, copra processing, cigar-

making, and embroidering. Thus, there was a profound lack of dynamic development in the sense of significant productivity gains, technological spin» offs, and across the board (as opposed to class specific) improvement in standards of living." Reciprocal free trade produced a classic commodities export, or dependent, economy in which the lion's share of the capital generated by export production or invested directly by foreign sources was captured by something other than new or expanding industries with above average productivity and above average probability of stimulating growth in other sectors. Three different but related expressions of this situation can be seen in the stagnation of the feeble textile industry, in the rise and decline of two handicraft export industries (the Manila»centered factory system of cigar manufacture and the Manila-based but dispersed system of embroidery production), and in the domestic rnanufac» tune of chinelas. ,

Textile Manufacturing Textile manufacturing is a case in point. Machine»made textiles imported from Britain during the middle and later nineteenth century led to a general decline in native textile production in the rural Philippines. Although handweav-

ing was still a significant, if much diminished female task in some provinces in 1906, the population's textile requirements were primarily being met by imported mass-produced cloth - part of the pattern of growing dependency on imported goods to meet consumer Needs. 14 .One had to have cash or its equivalent in order to secure cloth, and the price of cloth was largely set by the foreign manufacturer, the cost of shipping, and the judgment of the middleman»distributor. Thus, the Filipino consumer's access to both cash and

cloth was ultimately dependent upon the price offered for Philippine colnrnodi» ties by the more industrialized countries. There was, however, one modern steam-powered spinning and weaving mill operating in the archipelago in 1900, the British-owned Tondo and

Malabon Cotton Mill in Manila. This exception to the pattern of rnanufachxres being imported proves the rule. In the late 18905 and early 1900s this mill employed at least 220 Filipino workers. Their primary product was coarse white

shitting made from imported American cotton with some admixture of Philippine short staple fiber. This shifting enjoyed wide repute among local cloth merchants. Although mechanized weaving was more productive per unit of labor than handicraft methods, it was still a moderately labor intensive industry and thus the lower wage scales of Manila might have given the city a comparative advantage over production in more industrialized and therefore higher wage economies. Indeed, in both 1913 and 1916, Manila-based entrepreneurs publ i l y discussed setting up other factories for the manufacture of cotton goods. But

these plans were not realized and the original factory was closed

in

1923.

Whether caused bY the simple inability to undersell imports or by that inability compounded by mismanagement, there was no employment in the modem textile industry in the country throughout the prolonged boom of the l920s. 15 The Philippine market was not one of America's largest markets, but it was nonetheless an important one for specific manufactured goods, and some in

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18

MANILA. 1900-1941

the U.S. saw it as essential in the attempt to offset the negative trade balance with tropical areas that resulted from massive imports of sugar, rubber, coffee, and similar comtnodities Textiles made up at least a fifth of all Philippine

1.

imports by value in almost every year during the period under consideration, and in some years the total approached 30 percent. They were often the single leading category of imports. Arnericawrnade textiles began to displace British textiles in the Philippine market immediately following the enactment of the Fayre tariff bill of 1909. During the late 19105, for example, the U.S. provided 70 percent of Philippine textile imports, American textile manufacturers and some of the senators who represented states with important textile industries were soon aware of the value of the Philippine market. Qver time, free trade between the Philippines and the United States came to mean tariiis against competitors.~During the 1920s and early 1930s. several Philippine commodities were increasingly protected from Cuban and Asian competitors, and American manufactures likewise received some help against Japanese competition in the Philippine market. is The textile trode underwent two important changes after World War I, but neither produced more employment for Filipinos. A marked change took place in the middle l 920s. Formerly, a few European-owned business houses imported and stocked large quantities of American-made textiles for sale to Chinese distributors. By 1926 these houses had been largely bypassed by Manila-based Chinese firms which ordered directly from manufacturers' representatives and thus saved both the sales tax and the commission formerly paid to the European middleman." Chinese firms, once confined to distributing, had now console dated their role in both importing and distributing. The American manufacturer-exporter's task became more complex, with a dozen or more Chinese firms to deal with instead of a few Western ones, but this did not undermine his effective market penetration. In 1925, 13.5 percent of American cotton textile exports and 30 percent of the important bleached-cloth subcategory went to the

Philippines. In the late 1920s when free trade' with

the

islands began to be

attacked in the U.S. by a growing consortium of disparate interests, Filipinos pointed out that their country was the largest external gninnlnnn cotton cloth (to say nothing of cigarettes, canned milk an_. a v a n l z e c l

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iron

roofing sheets). Some American textile companies also lob real against an end to I

free trade in hearings on Philippine independence. The second change was the growing Japanese penetration of the Fhilipf pine cotton textile market. This was achieved through improved product design, particularly in the printed cloth category, and by a growing low wage, low cost advantage vis-a»vis the United States. In the early 19305. and again during 1934-37, Japanese competition reduced the American share to half or less of the Philippine market for imported textiles. So in the l930s, growing lapanese penetration of the Philippine market produced tariffs and quotas, but left Manila's Filipino employment structure little changed." The old Tondo mill was reopened by the Vicente Madrigal interests in the 1930s, h § i w as not profitable, and employment in the textile industry languished until 1938-41, when Japanese companies built two small weaving mills and when the National Development Company, a Philippine Common'

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19

EMPLOYMENT AND EXPORTS

wealth government subsidiary, began production in its new Manila spinning and weaving plant. In early 1939, before the NDC plant began production, there were still only 251 textile industry workers in the metropolitan area - about the same number as had been employed in the industry in 1905. 19 . Ask in numerous other colonial dependencies,.it took the disaster of the Great Depression to make some of the landowning elite realize the advantages of a domestic industrial base, but even then they preferred to have the government run the risk of low return. The prolonged failure to establish a Philippine textile industry meant that employment in a technologically undemanding, but nonetheless essential and highly productive industry remained in the more industrialized trade partners of the Philippines. In this period, the textile industry never got oil the ground. Problems with raw materials supply and lags in technology and productivity have plagued the protected Philippine textile industry established in the 19505, but in the pre-World War II environment, the major problem was. that-the abundant capital generated during the sugar and other export booms was more attracted to export commodities production and processing and to speculation than to manufacturing. One perceptive observer has labeled this the "lIJom ;o JaqLunn

(spuesnom) :801 SAQ0 Jo>IJOM

..

Worker Days Lost in Strikes and Lockouts

Strikes Settled with Adjustments *Favorable" to Workers

I

Percent

100

,

50

01

1930

an

1940

Source: Labor Bulletin (September 1939), pp. 442-43 and Yearbook, I946, pp.

211-121 'The data for 193841 reflect the growing use .of. compulsory arbitration procedures, not a heightened level of class conflict. Very few worker days were actually lost in 1938.

"Percent of strikes, not percent of' strikers. Any eventually positive results of disputes referred to court during 1937-41 are not available.

121

CAREERS AND MOBILITY

against Manila cigar and cigarette factories during 1912»13, both the incidence of strikes and the likelihood of positive outcome declined over the next three years. Again, economic variables offer an adequate predictive background. A sharp deterioration in foreign demand for Philippine exports during 1913 inflicted an extended period of economic depression on the dependency (figure 4). Fortunately, the average price of rice in the city fell during 1913 by 30 percent. As a result, if they had work workers could actually absorb a modest pay cut that year and live no worse than in 1911 or 1912. There were few strikes until the export depression abated; one was lucky to have a regular wage during such times. . . Although workers' wages were routinely adjusted downward by factory managers during periods of economic slump and deflation, workers themselves |

typically had to initiate action to secure nominal wage increases during periods of boom and rising prices. Inflation in living costs was very high during 1916-19,

and once a high level of employment had become an established feature of the late World War I boom, strikes became commonplace. Most of these resulted in nominal pay raises. More than 10,000 men and 1,000 women participated in Manila's 63 strikes during 1918, a massive outpouring by earlier standards (figure 16). Although the continuation of galloping inflation was the immediate cause,

collective mobilization on such a scale was made possible by further develop'ments in union organization. The printers' strike in particular illustrates the

growth of organizational and tactical sophistication. In October 1918 the printers' union struck 14 separate shops simultaneously. Armed with a "considerable" strike fund, they struck only against `

11-

such establishments as have refused to conform, or even to reply to the arrangements demanded by the . . union. The reason for such refusal was mainly that many of the employers . . did not like to recognize the

.

personality of the

...

.

union and did not like to deal with its rep-

resentatives.5°

The strike was quickly settled in the workers' favor. The result was a collective labor contract covering both printing firms and newspapers. The new contract

provided for a union shop, confirmation of the eight-hour work day (already standard in the printing industry), time-and-a»half payment for overtime, a common minimum salary, a list of qualifications for apprentices, and the establishment of two»stage process for hearing and arbitrating labors management disputes. . The conciliation and arbitration arrangements incorporated in the printers' contract were pioneered earlier in the year in the agreement negotiated by then Senate President Manuel L. Quezon between the Union de Tabaqueros and the Manila Tobacco Association, the organization of factory owners. Signed in May, the agreement was first tested in ]uly 1918 when Quezon arbitrated a

dispute between more than 700 workers and the owners of La Flor de la Isabel cigar factory. The limited success of this agreement was enough to significantly lower the incidence in strikes during 1919, despite a sharp decline in the .real

wages of both skilled and unskilled workers during that year (figures 14 and 16). The Bureau of Labor celebrated "the emergence of a new willingness to

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122

MANILA, 19004941

recognize labor unions and deal with wage worlders tlmrougli their union rep-

r e S e n t a t i v e s . A secondary reason for-the lower incidence of strikes in 1919 may have been the existence of an. unaccustomed opportunity to switch jobs caused by Elle unusually high level of labor demand obtaining in the city. This allowed some upper circuit manual workers to satisfy their needs by changing to more attractive alternative jobs just as white»collar workers were doing. Many workers also coped with inflation by putting more family members to work; at . least work was available. The demand for labor during the great export cigar boom led for a time to the near realization of some long-held goals of worker organizations. In March 1920, the Manila Tobacco Association announced that all of its member factories had begun paying standardized wages (i.e., they would stop competing among themselves for workers) and that, in return for a performance bond guaranteeing an end to both centrally»led and wildcat strikes, they were ready to

sign a one year contract setting uniform "wages, hours of labor, and other important matters."52 Union leaders had worked to achieve these contract provisions, but said they could not sign because' they could not sufficiently control the actions of all tobacco workers and factors based affiliates, and thus stood to lose the required bond. Nice months later, as export demand collapsed, 12,000 cigar workers were laid off. A number were later rehired on a part-time, shared work basis, but cigar workers were never again 'to enjoy so powerful a . bargaining position. By the end of World War I, multifunctional unions had replaced mutual benefit associations as the most significant organizations in proletarian life for workers in .the major industries and shipping companies of Manila's formal sector. Nevertheless, mutual benefit associations continued to operate in the city and to flourish in the major provincial ports. In 1919, at least half of the

members claimed by major worker associations in Manila were affiliated with organizations which were trying to protect and advance the day-to-day economic interests of their members. DeSpite some successes, the unions had difficulty presenting a common front, and electoral politics often found them divided. Certainly capitalists understood that rival unions could be "played against each other." Most manual workers, including almost all of those in the

lower circuit and others, such as servants, did not belong to such organizations.

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In 1928, 44 registered "unions" claimed a total membership. of 30,000 men and 5,000 women in the city." The major tobacco workers' union was easily the largest of these. Registered mutual benefit societies claimed 14,000 urban members in the same year. But there must have been at least 120,000 maniac» turing, mechanical, construction, transportation, and commercial workers in the city in 1928; perhaps 3 in 10 of these were claimed as members by bunion. Many others worked in the domestic and personal service sector. Union affiliation, much less dues>paying membership, was thus the norm only in certain industries and shipping companies. Except for those working in the cigar and cigarette factories, few women belonged to unions. Within the smaller

cigarette factories, women sometimes ran their own Union de Cigarilleras, in affiliation with a larger overarching union organization. Still, union organiza-

tions substantially altered the labor relations environment in some lines of work. I

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CAREERS AND MOBILITY

123 .

They facilitated worker resistance and gave an opportunity for some to challenge the circumstances of their lives. Strikes and Class Consciousness Strikes reflect discontent. Whether they are triggered by economic hard» ship, .rising expectations, threats to employment- security, or some Other cause, they are expressions of collectively felt grievances - class grievances in the

sense of wage laborers contending a work control or livelihood issue with owners and managers. But strikes also critically reflect organization for collective

mobilization. This in turn is possible because of shared consciousness. These three elernents.- consciousness, organization, and strikes - interact dynami» cally, but not linearly. In Manila they produced a pattern of strike behavior which resembles the Western experience in some important aspects. First, the general level of participation in strikes was subject .to major outbursts at

intervals: 1918, 192I»22, and 1934 in Manila; 1921 and especially 1930-31 in Iloilo. Second, though the timing may have been predictable in economic terms, each of the major clusters of strikes tended to be associated with significant innovations in union structure and strategy. Finally, shared consciousness as it is revealed in the propensity to strike was highly differentiated by occupational group. Cigarrnakers and printers had high propensities to strike.;

seamen and stevedores each struck several times during the period; utility and modern land transportation workers struck only occasionally, while restaurant, sales, and domestic workers rarely participated. 54

The varying propensity of certain occupational groups to strike fits some of the generalizations advanced by those who see the organization of work as having a highly discriminating effect on the ability of workers to fashion sufficient communal bonds to generate and sustain a strike action. Cigarrnak» ers worked at their own individual paces, but they labored together in groups often at long. tables. There was abundant opportunity to become welT acquainted with fellow workers. Among the printing trades, typesetters and bookbinders also worked at an individual pace and had considerable opportunity

for mutual interaction. Through their literacy and trade, printers presumably had greater access to information and ideas than other manual workers. Al»

though many tobacco and printing industry workers were involved in handicraft forms of production, they labored in factories and shops and resemble the earlier generations of English proletarians described by Lockwood. They 'certainly shared "strong attachments to primary work groups that possess a considerable autonomy.7755 The same may be said of stevedores and seamen. One may argue that such workers formed occupationally based social communities. in boom times, male cigarrnakers were sometimes accused of leaving work early, together, to gamble and enjoy themselves at the cockpit. The important place of this activity in proletarian life is suggested in the incomparable cartoon style of the Bagong Lipari Kalabdw, figure 17. The artist captures not only the idea of workers going together to the cockpit (galleria) , but also the difference in class interests as the absentee workers thumb their noses at the well-dressed and threatening factory official." At another level of expressed community, the printers union was successful in gathering workers from different

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124

MANILA, 1900-1941

shops to march together in funeral processions. And both stevedores and seamen participated together in the activities of the Magdaragats, partially described above. Although some occupational groups, such as stevedores, gave evidence of fairly concentrated residential patterns, most such "communities" did not form separate neighborhoods. Indeed cigarrnalters could be found residing in practically every district of the city. At the opposite pole from such characteristics were the thousands of household servants and private drivers or coachmen. Since they labored separately, often lived in the houses or compounds of their employers, and enjoyed very little autonomy, they also tended not- to form strong attachments to a sizeable primary work group or to take collective action. In this they resembled the servants of England, whom Lockwood places Io a social category labeled

. The impulse to collective organization and to strike was rooted then in the in the degree to which persons in various occupations organization of work came .to view themselves as sharing strong interests and bonds with their fellow workers. Less organized workers were also less likely to strike. As in the West during the same decades, the changing forms of collective organization represent a learning process, and in turn, major outbursts of strikes tended ta Hi QM? crated with breakthroughs in union structure and strategy."58 Aside from "deferential traditional.!!5?

,

-

cultural setting, the overriding difference between Manila and the twentiethcentury Westerri experience in these matters lay in the inability to achieve A

significant gains for workers in an economy of chronic labor Surplus. This i n u r n made it more difficult to institutionalize union organization and to hold participants inithe union between strikes .

Strikes involving 11000 or more workers had been unusual before World War I. After1920 they became increasiNgly common. Such strikes came first in the cigar industry, and for good reason. When the industry was revived after the crash of 1921, it was done by filling the niche in the American market for the cheapest cigars. That fact, . together with the long decline in overseas sales which followed (figure 3), led to reduced levels of employment and considerable pressure to depress wages. The result was predictable. . The walkout of more than 5,000,tobacco workers (most of those still s

employed in the industry) in March 1921 came when wages were cut by managers in response to the abrupt deflation and temporary collapse of American demand for Philippine cigars. Deflation or not, after several years of struggle .to win raises sufficient to compensate forthe earlier rapid rise in costs for food and housing, tobacco workers were not inclined to accept a 20 percent cut in their nominal rates of compensation. Unfortunately, the wage data are not available to judge whether real compensation rates rose or declined that year,

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but few workers can have had full time jobs and thus the purchasing power of wages actually received undoubtedly declined." The strikes during the mid-1920s often had to do with whether unions or management would set the rules on how the diminished work available was to be shared among the regular workers, with the manner in which unions would be allowed to operate in the factories, with the firing of union leaders, aNd similar

issues. Wage reductions during these years were also followed by strikes. In the

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126

MANILA, 1900-1941

midst Of relative prosperity, an estimated 265,000 worker days of labor were lost during just four disputes in Manila cigar and cigarette factories during 1925 and 1926. The largest of 'these involved Tabacalera's La Flor de la Isabel tobacco factory and an associated facility where about 2,800 workers struck for a month over the management's firing of three Worker-ollicials of the struggling Union de Tabaqueros. Two strikes by smaller numbers of cigar workers in 1926 lasted at least two months each, and there were 12 more cigar factory strikes in 1927 in part over the issue of bow the available work would be apportioned among each factory's workers. With the sharp deflation of food prices during 1930, the purchasing power of cigar workers improved marginally (figures 5 and 14). But when nominal wages were reduced again the following year, the results were

-

predictable

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127

CAREERS AND MOBILITY

.the total number of cigarmakerS, their daily wages [have] necessarily been diminished.1t63 Instead forcing several thousand tobacco workers into the

or

abyss of complete unemployment, the reduction in factory employment resulted in a much larger number earning only some fraction of their full-time wages .in a

system of shared poverty which students of peasant societies in Southeast Asia will readily recognize as an authentic expression of indigenous values and crisis coping behavior. While it fit well with Filipino values, worksharing by union members was hardly unique to Asian cities, since it was regularly practiced by

mine workers and some others in the United States as welLs'* If Manila's cigarrnakers preferred the solidarity of underemployment for many, as opposed to unemployment for some, they also deeply resented the combination of cuts in nominal wage rates and the imposition of part-time work. The strike began in mid-August .with a triggering incident at the Al» hambra Cigar Factory in Tondo and spread immediately to four other sizeable urban factories. It grew quickly into a social phenomenon of considerable momentum involving perhaps 11,500 tobacco workers and the near complete shutdown of 19 cigar and cigarette manufacturing firms (29 factories) for six weeks.65 Although the -strike was spread through more or less organized diffusion

-

tactics mass marches of Alhambra and other strikers to sister factories and worksites in the city and suburbs, aimed at convincing more workers to join in a general strike - the subsequent walkouts themselves reflect a .mass contagion resulting from the existence of a strong predisposition to action. Many of these subsequent walkouts took place without the sanction of the leaders of the old line union or of its affiliates. For a few days, events simply overran these leaders and their organization. The strike grew out of direct economic causes. and also out of a larger zeitgeist, including a growing inclination toward radical action among some urban workers and among many landless laborers and tenants in the southern provinces of the Central Plain from which many cigar workers came. The strike was remarkable in its magnitude (more than 400,000 worker days lost), militancy, breadth of participation, and for the issues publicly' raised bY

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various groups of strikers. *I

In synopsis, the idea of a strike was first discussed in May and ]one, but was dropped then because of a disagreement between radicals and more conservative union leaders. Radical -unionists associated with the Kaisahan fig mg Mangy

gawa fig Tabasco (Organization of Tobacco Workers) wanted to confront the Factory owners directly, bypassing government involvement. Old line unionists wanted to bring in the Bureau (later the new Department) of Labor imMedi-

ately. The long-discussed strike was eventually begun Br radical fajinantes (unskilled workers) following the rejection of their demand for a return to the pay scale of.1930 by the management of the Alhambra Cigar Factory. In many ways the strike resembled those conducted by the IWW (International Workers of the World) in early twentieth-century America: the tactics were dramatic rather than cautious; the radicals for some time refused any attempt at negotiate

sons; like the IWW, they scorned "large strike funds, relying instead on mass appeals for aid [and] -on the workers' own spirit of sacriflce.n66 The more conservative unionists who were propelled into joining the strike would have

preferred to have a large strike fund, but did not yet have one; would have

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MANILA, 1900-1941

preferred early negotiations, but didn't get them; and would have preferred to seize the leadership of the overall strike committee, the Lupon so Pangkalaha» tang Aklasan (People's Strike Committee), but weren't able to until .more than a 'month into the strike, when the radicals' audaciousness and a serious lapse in police restraint resulted in a bloody clash Thereafter, some of the

-

radical leadership were jailed or driven underground. After a few weeks more, the strikers returned to work, with only some of them having won substantial raises, and with capitalist control intact. The long duration of the strike was in many ways a function of its evident success in tapping workers' grievances. Authorities were inclined to respect the action because of the large number of strikers involved in militant (but generally peaceful) picketing, marches, and public rneetingsin the plazas of the city, and because of the New Deal inspired social policy then in effect. Such massive demonstrations may have reinforced this policy of restraint. They also kept a

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large body of strikers actively involved, week after week, and were a successful technique for maintaining optimism and enthusiasm. So sizeable and militant a phenomenon could not be undercut by increasing production in plants still in operation, since all the large, and most of the medium-sized factories had been struck, nor could' it simply be ignored. In' response to the strikers' consistent position that the hiring of strikebreakers would trigger violence, Secretary of Labor Torres, early on, sought to dissuade the factory owners from hiring the replacement workers who were, the managers said, "available at even lower wages."' This was a critical step for the success of the strike. New workers could be trained for most 'jobs in the industry in a few weeks, and it was this characteristic, in an environment of chronic labor surplus, which made wholesale replacement a practical policy for the owners." One might conclude that the threat of massive violence and acute social disorder induced the government to persuade the capitalists to refrain from drawing upon the unemployeder the reserve army of casual workers and simply replacing the strikers. Certainly the cigar strike of 1934 was a mark of the degree to Which strikes were capable of altering the labor relations environment. But the comparative restraint of the government, while it lasted, was also highly typical of the personal philosophy and executive style of then Governor General Frank Murphy.

Since the unions had not assembled substantial strike funds before the walkouts, many observers were puzzled at the strikers' staying power. There were reports of strikers simply tightening their belts and going without meals some days, and many other reports concerning campaigns for donations in cash or in food, and of support by the larger community. The Tiribime reported that "people who see the situation of the poor [strikers] freely aid them with meals or small gifts of money." Even the mayor gave two pesos to hungry strikers who came to him for a' meeting permit. Almost a month into the strike, unnamed city officials reported that "many . . . who are in sympathy with the strikers give them material help."68 Though strikers and their families were often hungry, . lack of sustenance did not disrupt the movement. If the strike movement was sustained by the indirect participation of many who were supporters or simply compassionate, it was propelled lay the active

participation of an impressive variety of workers; women and men, the least

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CAREERS AND MOBILITY

skilled and the highly skilled, and radicals, conservative unionists, and hangers on. Women were often said to be less likely to challenge managerial authority, but just as women were prominent on the low end of the wage scale in the tobacco industry, so they were prominently involved in every aspect of the strike . except its highest leadership. Women picketed, marched, attended and ad» dressed mass rallies, were on the delegation which discussed the strike with

Governor General Murphy, were wounded and arrested in the "police-striker riot" in front of the La Minerva factory, and stood trial for sedition along with the men." Also participating in the strike was a confusing variety of organizations, leaders, and participants who agreed on the need for substantial raises (ideally, a return to the wage scales of 1930), on the need to sustain the strike in order to secure such raises, and on little else. Radical unionists were centrally involved in beginning the strike and in directing the successful early diffusion of walkouts as well as many of the mass meetings and marches through the city. Their principal organization was the Kaisahan fig mg Manggagawa fig Tabasco, which was said ,

to have a "scattered following in most of the factories . . . [especially] among the unskilled workers.1370 (This may be an understatement.) Some cigarmakers, and in particular those from the Alhambra factory, also belonged to the outlawed Katipunan fig mg Anak Pawls sa Filipinas ( Philippine Society of the Laboring Class), a radical labor federation whose leaders were involved in founding the Philippine Communist Party in1930 and as a consequence were in jail during the 1934 strike. On the third day of the walkout and with many of its members already in the streets, the leadership of the old line union in the industry, the Union de Tabaqueros de Filipinas (presumably much weakened by the 1928 departure of its radical members and locals) decided to declare its own strike and to petition for a general increase in wages and "their standardization at the level of 1930 in the factories affiliated with the union."" Despite the

decline of employment in the tobacco industry, the Union de Tabaqueros was nominally one of die largest in the city and served as the' central union of affiliation for local worker organizations in a number of factories. From the point of view of the authorities and the press, the participants in the strike could now be separated into "unionist" and "radical," but it was also clear that a great many

rank and file workers from factories nominally organized by the Union de Tabaqueros were quite willing to side with the radicals in the mass activities of the strike. Several single-factory unions also joined the strike, including the Taka»

querns Unidos, whose 300 members were based in El Oriente factory. They were said tO be among the most highly skilled and best paid cigannakers in the city,

and they stayed with the strike to the end. The 2,000 workers of La Flor de la Isabel, whose cigarmakers also were paid well above the mean, likewise joined

the strike.

.

Several hundred workers in non-tobaCco plants were persuaded to declare sympathy walkouts in an attempt to bring about a general strike - common tactic in the early labor movement in America, and one which had brought

a

great pressure to bear on the sugar milling and shipping interests of the Western Visayas in 1931. These allied walkouts included the employees of two Chi.I

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MANILA, 1900-1941

nose-owned lumber mills, a coconut oil plant, and an embroidery concern. The workers of a large candy factory were also on strike. Despite these gains, the strikers were not successful in getting large numbers of other upper circuit workers to join the strike, although officials of the unionized stevedores, carpenters, and mariners did speak at the strikers' mass meetings, as did members of radical peasants' organizations. The Fact-Finding Board reported that at least some cigarette workers also declined to join the walkout. Still, the strike became generalwithin the cigar industry- lt was notable for its fractious but effective cooperation amoNg a broad spectrum of participants: men and women' radicals,

old line unionists, and unaffiliated; highly skilled and unskilled; and, as it turned out, both young and old, for one of the strikers fatally wounded by police in I.

front of La Minerva was a cigarrnaker in his late 50s. A number of issues were raised by the strike which help us to better grasp the impetus towards new organizational and idealogical forms. The first and foremost issue was the moral right of workers to receive wages sufficient to cover basic family expenses. This issue was raised by all participants and in a variety of ways. A woman striker was quoted as saying, . r

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We can not live on our wages. . . We are lighting for home and food. We can not pay our rents. We can not sleep on the ground, so we must move from place to place, devising means to hoodwink the landlords. We eat food that does not satisfy us. What can we' do? We have got to live.

I

After 500 strikers met with the director of the Bureau of Labor, he reiterated their view that the "struggle is motivated by

the pitiful condition of their

families who are barely able to subsist from their meager earnings."72 In its petition to the factories for a general raise, the Union de Tabaquetos said:

The earnings capacity of the cigar makers as well as that of the other laborers employed in the cigar and cigarette factory is not sufficient to

afford their families . . . the necessities of life. The earnings of the majority Of the laborers (about 85 percent) range from 40 to 60 centavos [per day]. . . . The expenses of the said laborers are [roughly] estimated [at .95 to 1. 18 pesos per day for a family of'Hve, not including] the expenses

I

.

for household equipments, medical attention . ., social participation, recreation, and the expenses for the education of their children. 73

I

The union also stated this issue in moral terms:

.

The earning capacity of the laborers employed in the . . cigar and cigarette factories is neither morally just nor economically sound. . [It] is not enough for a sufficiency of food, clothing, shelter and does not permit them an adequate provision for unforeseen events." .

..

As the strike got underway, the Herald printed a translation of a manifesto which it Said was issued by the Communist Parry of the Philippines a month

before the strikes'

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CAREERS AND MOBILITY

At present our situation is becoming worse and worse. With the lapse of time, the exploitation and oppression of the capitalists became more acute; the cutting down of wages continues; machinery continuously replaces the workers and unemployment is on the increase. Because of the unemployment, competition among us becomes keener, and the employ~ ers take advantage of this competition to further exploit and oppress us in every way possible. . . While we, the workers, are starving and living in misery; we can hardly pay the rent on our homes, not because we do not want to, but because of the meagerness of our wages, which also is the cause why our children, who will be our support in our old age, grow up in

.

ignorance. 75

Lack of income resulting in a poor diet, inability to pay for housing, and a threat to long range security when one's children cannot be kept in school summarize the basic economic issue. . Closely related to the issue of wages was that of class conflict. The Herald, which opposed the strike, nevertheless editorialized at the outset that "there are predatory interests [in Manila] whose main concern is to grab while they neglect

the men who dO all the work for them. In such cases a strike has the e'EeCt of bringing the grabbers back to their Senses." On the other hand, the Herald insisted,

The moment it is established that men of cornrnunistic ideas are behind the current strike of cigarrnakers, the duty of the government is to eliminate those men. . . . If the strikers refuse to separate from the agitators, the government must impose an iron hand. . We want our laborers [note the use of the possessive] to forget that they are a class by themselves invested with rights different from ours. . . We want them to think only of the common good, not their special good, and to regard capital not as their enemy but as their friend and partner.

. .

.

But whether radical or rice-and»flsh unionist, the strikers had experienced too high a level of class inequity and want to be dissuaded. The radical strikers began with

9

perception much like that voiced in the

first portion of the Herald's editorial: it centered on exploitation and the conflict of class interests. 4

.

If we examine the matter, we will find that [the factory owners] pay very cheaply for the labor we furnish . and chat raw materials are very cheap also, but the prices in the market remain stationary, especially with respect to cigarettes, and in the case of cigars, if the prices were lowered, it is only about 10 percent, while the wages of the cigarrrrakers have been cut down by 50 percent. Therefore, their profits must be enormous. For this

. .

reason, they live in prosperity and comfort; they can rebuild their While we, the workers, are starving and living in misery. factories .

..

The more conservative unionistswere less oriented to a struggle against

capitalism, per se, than were the radicals. But, increasingly, unionists also dwelt

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MANILA, 1900-1941

on the theme of class inequity -and on their willingness to engage in a higher degree of militancy and conflict than heretofore.

.

The abundance and prosperity of the .few have existed side by Side with poverty and dire distress of the many. These extremes are evident at the present time. The conservatism] of the past generation is now in the discard. Radicalism is indicating a strong change of attitude." The union officials may have had the factory owners in mind here, but the disparity in earnings between the cigar workers and the bureaucratic middle class

also grew noticeably during the early 19305. Both had suffered through a severe loss of purchasing power during the high inflation that accompanied World War I, and both had been active in publicly protesting rent gouging by the city's

landlords in early 1920. But during the Great Depression, slumping export demand gave manual workers little leverage against wage reductions, while `ar the same time the real compensation of bureaucrats fairly soared (figures 12 and 14). As the Philippine Congressional Appropriation Committee took up the question of reducing civil service salaries in 1934, Secretary of Labor Torres testified that a standardized Wage reduction was needed to help "dissipate the belief of the masses that government officials and employees are of the privileged classes.1979 The issue was exploitation and the increasingly skewed distribution of wealth. "To drive this point home the strikers demanded and nearly got a nonpartisan loosE at- fefactories' books.. The third issue was implied in the I-lerald's editorial comment on "predaB

everyone Be interests" but was never explicitly reported in the press. concerned knew already, the factory owners were almost all foreigners: gpaniards, Americans, or Chinese. The only ethnic Filipino in the Manila Tobacco

Association was former Representative Manuel V. Gallego, President of Kato» busan, the factory origiNally begun by worker subscription. With more than 200 workers, the central Katubusan factory was one of the largest in the city not shut down by the strike, although its branch in Pasay was affected. It was surely no accident that the owners chose Gallego as their official spokesman. He' shared their view that the strike was the work of "communist agitators," not of

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"discontented laborers. v8O Nevertheless, economic nationalism was increasingly apparent among middle~class and technically educated Filipinos in government and the universities during the early 19305 (chapter 1), and it may well have played an important role in motivating the restraint shown by public officials during the strike. It may also have helped persuade Rafael Palma, former president of the University of the Philippines, to become the principal defense attorney for the leading strikers put on trial following the riot and fusillade at La Minerva. . The fourth issue dealt with the rights of assembly and free speech in public for disapproved»of groups. In 1931, after several years of more or less open development of Marxist thought among some Filipino union leaders, urban workers, and peasants, the National elite moved to ban both the new communist party and its affiliated union. In that year, the threat of radical speech to public

order was held to be so great that a May Day parade permit issued in suburban

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CAREERS AND MOBILITY

Caloocan was cancelled at the last minute andlthe leader (printer Crisanto

Evangelista) and some other members of. the Katipunan fig mg Anak Pawis were arrested after uttering a mere phrase or two.81 By contrast, during the strike of 1934 .mass meetings with radical leadership and participation took place in the downtown Botanical Gardens and in various plazas of the city for a month, without Undue damage to public order. That is until September lil, when the

desire to reconvince a few score of former strikers who had broken ranks and gone back to work at La Minerva led to the clash with the police who were barring the facto1"y's gate. So long as the massive strike lasted, the rights of public speech and assembly were usually observed. This difference in environment was crucial to the way the strike developed, and it was notdue simply to the organizational cohesion and militancy of the strikers, but also to the civil libertarian policies advocated by New Dealer Frank Murphy in Manila in 1934 as in Detroit in 1931, and again later in the great General Motors sit-down strike in Michigan in 1937.82

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In the end, the strikers endured much hardship and prolonged the work stoppage into the seventh week, 'until they had assurances of a substantial, if temporary, raise in piecework rates at some of the factories with the lowest pre-strike pay scales. Radicals were not comfortable with the more Conservative union people, and vice versa, but both persisted in pursuit of the primary goal. The strikers convincingly demonstrated their dissatisfaction with their lot in the system and their willingness and ability to enter into mass, if limited, conflict to secure abettor share of the wealth they were creating. In this case their militancy was sufficiently cohesive that it elirectively interfered with the ability of factory managers to set wages on a supply and demand principle:-Broad support of the strike through small gifts, and the public speeches by stevedores, seamen, carpenters, aNd peasant group leaders all point to a broader class consciousness, even if that consciousness stopped well short of produciNg a general strike in Manila. Another result of the strike was the decision to break the chain of ever more organized and ideologically charged strike outbursts. By their very. nature, well organized strikes are political weapons. Members of the elite were not prepared to tolerate significant opposition and so demanded compulsory arbitra»

son. Legislation to this effect was passed during 1934, vetoed by Governor General Murphy, and repassed in 1936 soon after the Commonwealth was establ shed. The extraordinarily low number of worker days lost to strikes after 1936 (figure 16) was due to this new legal environment, not to greater worker satisfaction with their lot in the system.

Group action in the lower circuit.

Strikes could have some ameliorative

effect, even if they could not alter the basic facts of labor abundance and :he poor rate of generation of modem employment. By massive organization and carefully restrained threats of violence, workers for large firms in the upper circuit could improve their situation, and did achieve wages said to be well above those paid in some other Asian ports.The unemployed, the reserve army, and the mass of workers in the lower circuit lacked such opportunities. But.over time, as upper circuit workers developed better organizational tools, so too did

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MANILA, 1900-1941

the members of some large occupational groups in the lower circuit. In general,

o

these made their appearance in response to disadvantages placed on lower circuit activities* by the middle class and the affluent through the instrument of city ordinances. . As automobiles and taxis became common, there were. increasing attempts to limit the streets and bridges over which calesas could operate. These measures threatened to seriously disrupt the livelihood of thousands of cocheros and calesa owners. They responded with public demonstrations and effective. attempts to influence the positions on this issue of candidates for the city council. Likewise,

blue laws were enacted which reflected affluent sensibilities and which threatened to seriously impede the ability of market vendors and small shopkeepers to make a living. Complaints by these persons and by upper circuit workers who patronized them were successful at least in legalizing the sale of fish and other supplies outside of public markets-on some amelioration was won in those cases which affected large numbers of adults working at the same occupation and possessing some capacity for collective organization, in other cases the state continued to make things harder for those who were most vulnerable. Many families tried to cope with hard times by withdrawing one or more children from school. These children were often expected to contribute to the family's survival by generating at least some income in the informal sector. But their attempts to work as vendors, shoeshine boys, and the like all too often led to their being detained as "juvenile

h i l e y s . 8 4 W S u n d a

delinquents." In 1934, for example, "hundreds of boys" Were arrested in Manila

I

for such petty infractions as "selling ice-drop [confections] near [a] school," "Obstruction by bootblacking, " "distributing bread without a license, " "peddling in a prohibited place," "begging," "selling wine after midnight," and other similar lower circuit pursuits.85 Persons working at these sorts of decentralized activities had poor contact with fellow workers and made no headway in challenging the imposed regulations or winning alternative opportunities. This

kind of conflict between rrliddle»class and police interests and modem government policy on the one hand, and the essential activities of lower circuit workers on the other, was to intensify after the war. All of this demonstrates that many manual workers were prepared, under stress, to voice their proletarian or proto proletarian class interests, E0 conceive of themselves as members of a group suitable for action, and to evolve appropriate organizational structures to pursue their goals. Summary

With the notable exception of the Great Depression, there were substan» rial occupational opportunities in modem transportation, printing, shoemaking, carpentering, and some other lines of work for skilled and literate Filipinos' during the period 1900-1941. But opportunities for manual. work in general declined relative to white-collar positions during the epoch as a whole. After 1920, an absolute decline was experienced in cigar and cigarette making, long

the leading source of laborintensive industrial employment. It is difficult to discern long term trends in the lower circuit versus the upper circuit of modem

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CAREERS AND MQBILITY

firms and the bureaucracy, but there was clearly considerable cyclical variation as the former absorbed some of the persons no longer wanted in the modern economy during periods of downturn in export demand and during the off-season in construction and freight handling. The gains in manual employment, aside from those associated with simple growth, may be traced to partial restrictions On Chinese immigration, to technological change, and to the improved educational attainments of some ,

Filipino manual workers. Increasingly over time, one had to have acquired certain levels of schooling in order to qualify for the best manual jobs. Illiterates were overconcentrated in occupations in the lower circuit and in the least skilled and least remuherative jobs in the modern economy. These were also the

least stable jobs - so much so, that some, such as stevedores, construction workers of all kinds, and casual laborers, can be associated with the concept of a reserve army of staNdby workers. While many of these shuttled between upper and lower circuit employment in the city, some others circulated between urban

and rural work.

.

.

As demonstrated above, manual occupations may be usefully distinguished on the basis of wages, vulnerability to periods of prolonged unemployment, and required education. Men in the small group of occupations dealing withutilities, modem transportation, and printing enjoyed much higher wages and lower vulnerability to unemployment than most other employees. They also tended to

be more educated than other manual and sales workers. Since lower wages and periodic unemployment drastically reduced the chances of one's offspring grad» rating from high school, we may assume that upward mobility into these most . . desirable manual jobs was difficult to achieve. . Careers in the upper circuit seem to have been pursued primarily within industries and occupational categories and within firms not just because that

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was normative behavior in a modern firm, but also because this was an economy of scarce opportunity and a society that placed great emphasis on .the establish» rent of stable, lon»terrn personal connections. Advancement might require objective measures of skill and experience, but it often depended on the

particularistic operation of social networks as well. Men invested considerable effort and time in building up social relationships with fellow workers, foretnen, and others in the hope that these relationships could, on occasion, be counted I

a

upon to tide family over .a crisis, and also to give the best chance to advance a rung or two on the occupational ladder within the firm. Longevity pay reinforced this pattern in some lines of work. The greatest exceptions to this pattern of labor force stability within firms were likely found during the most pronounced booms in the urban economy (such as those of 1909-12. and 1918-early 1920), when the opportunities for changing jobs were at maximum:86 High turnover was more characteristic of occupational groups comprised primarily of young women. The rapid turnover of female servants, waitresses, hairdressers, and laborers in the shoe factories as they left to begin family careers as mothers and hom ernakers was quite uncharacteristic of many male occupational groups (with rife exception of servants) most of the time. The-labor of such women as leaf strippers in the cigar and cigarette factories made possible large savings for factory nganagers in the cost of productioh, and their work as domestics was essential to the lifestyle of middle~class families. Unpaid work as

.

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MANILA, 1900-1941

mothers and hometnakers was also economically important, for in addition to reproducing the labor force the best chance for economic improvement or retirement rested .on the successful raising of several offspring who would subsequently contribute to the support of the parents. Regular career ladders formed within modem firms employing skilled workers, with some employees moving from lower to higher levels of skill and responsibility by rational and predictable routes (though again the question of which particular workers were chosen from among those technically qualified for

advancement may well have been answered on the basis of one's particular support network). For these workers, the trajectories of careers were much like those of white-collar employees. For less fortunate workers, urban careers were either 'confined to the lower circuit or would have included several sojourns

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there during extended seasonal and cyclical layoffs. . Manila received a flow of migrants throughout the period. The net flow, however, was probably significantly higher during the periodic boom cycles in the export economy. Immigrants entered the urban occupational system at every level, but were overconcentrated in the lower strata as servants, stevedores, construction laborers and the like. This suggests that native Manileiios benefited from the longer period in which to develop personal support networks and from better educational opportunities, and as a result gained access to a slightly more desirable set of jobs than did in-migrants. This tendency parallels the migration-mobility hypothesis proposed by Lipset and Bendix for industrialized societies. Migrants who became manual workers in the city were particularly likely to come. from the Tagalog and Pampangan provinces just north of the city. But the migration field also broadened over time, so that by the end of the' period persons from the central islands of the archipelago, -the Visayas, were becoming a more Significant part of the manual workforce. New forms of worker organization evolved continuously during the prewar

era. These began with mutual aid societies based on indigenous principles (especially while unions with even a Vague political agenda were suppressed) and evolved over time, so that unions emerged that were concerned primarily with wages and conditions of work. In the late 1920s and 19305, organizations of less skilled w'Orkers dedicated to more fundamental change also appeared

-- in

the

city as in some of the nearby agricultural areas. Although there was great year-to-year variation, the magnitude of participation in strikes increased over time until the enactment of compulsory arbitration in 1936. The .exact t i m i n g ) strikes was highly correlated with two kinds of events in the economy upsurges in employment, which gave wouldfbe Strikers greater hope for success, and nominal wage cuts during periods of deflation and declining labor demand. The unions were sufficiently powerful in many cases to win short term raises and to otherwise limit the employers' freedom of action as in the question of work Sharing. They were not sufficiently powerful to alter the basic stratification of society. The evolving structures of collective action and the strike experiences of many workers 'were both symptomatic . . Q _a at the same time group experiences which brought a a heightened sense of inequity and class consciousness. Under the pressure of ordinances restricting their right to work,

occupational groups in the lower circuit Were also sometimes well enough organized to win modest arneliorarive change.

.

Conclusion

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Lome observers have acquired the idea that mobility, except of the rural sort, has not been a prominent feature of Third World _._ societies. Admittedly, the indigenous elites have often proved highly adept at maintaining their class position and limiting entry .to others, and

Ito urban

many examples of particular-istic hiring criteria could be cited. But during the period 1900»l941, urban Filipino social structure was progressively reshaped during longer episodes and cycles of change; These episodes attracted many migrants to the city, may well have raised the position of many formerly subsistent urbanites, and at least doubled the proportionate size of the depen» . dent middle classes. . The most rigid characteristic of this remarkably fluid social system was the position of the established land-owning elite. The members of this elite owed their position to the wealth extracted by controlling land and labor in the production of exhort commodities= The new colonial regime not only gave them preferential access to American commodities markets, but also allowed them to establish (or reestablish) and extend their political control of the archipelago.

Because it was the locus of political power, as well as for its amenities and the increasing ease of transportation within the archipelago, Manila became the center for this national elite. The economic interests of the class broadened over time to include high government' position, sugar milling, and even urban development. Although dominated by the land-owning elite, the upper class of Manila was augmented by a few whose career vehicles were medicine, law, or

entrepreneurship. Though the barriers to mobility into upper status were high (but not complete), the flow into ahd within the broad middle range of society Was much less restricted. . . .

1

c

There is no doubt that rapidly increasing access to education at all levels, coupled with increasingly technical job requirements and the use of examiner sons and diplomas to establish a candidate's eligibility, led to increased levels of socioeconomic mobility. This increase is readily observable in individual careers , and in the changing structure of`Manila society. The desire for both education and modern occupational opportunity antedated the establishment of American rule, indeed numerous discussions Of the need and general desire for education

may be found in the newspapers of the Philippine Revolution. . The peculiar ideology of American imperialism led to the rapid expansion of education as a basis for citizenship. When it quickly became apparent that relatively few

Americans were interested in making a career in the colonial bureaucracy, civil I

l

138

MANILA, 1900-1941

service employment was progressively thrown open~to Filipinos. Wholesale indigenization as a policy emerged a decade later during the Woodrow Wilson .

administration.

Despite a long standing interest in education, financial and political barriers during the final generation of the former Spanish regime prevented the formation of an adequate pool of well»educated Filipinos. As a result, the new civil service and public teacher corps had to be staffed initially .with persons

holding less than a high school diploma, often much less. This provided an unparalleled opportunity for persons of modest background to secure employ-

ment at the clerk or junior teacher level, to attend night school in the city and, in a number of cases, to secure government scholarships for further study, and to advance rapidly with the expansion of the service and with the progressive

replacement Of" expatriates. The experience of these early, highly mobile wllite-eollar worlders in turn had a powerful demonstration effect on subsequent cohorts.

.

As the export economy expanded following the establishment of virtual

free trade with the United States, analogous Modem career routes were opened up for white-collar workers in business organizations. Foreign ownership and

control, however, Usually meant that Filipinos were less likely to reach the higher echelons of business organizations than of government. bureaus. But even here there was comparatively rapid movement for a time, particularly during the

late World War I boom. There were also increased technical requirements and demand for professionals of all kinds. Here too Filipinos became predominant .

within niches previously occupied by foreigners. ExchaNge mobility into rapidly expanding middle-class positions in the

bureaucracy, business, and the professions was high by earlier (and later) standards. But it was also highly variable over time in accordance with the periods of economic expansion generated by cyclical foreign demand for Philip» pine commodities. It is a tenable hypothesis that the same was true of the rates of intergenerational mobility at First, but aside from parental status as a predictor of high school graduation, too little is known about the parental status background of the new middle classes to form a basis for a careful analysis. The rapid expansion of the Filipino bureaucracy during 1910-19, coupled with aN extraordinary rate of promotions during 1918-21, created an unusual opportunity for mobility (though the accompanying gains in real income were somewhat delayed due to inflation). This is the period when the Filipino bureaucracy matured and achieved its great relative importance in the urban economy. Naturally this pace of bureaucratic expansion could not be maintained without diverting the entire urban workforce to government employment. Except for episodes of mOderate expansion during the mid-1920s and late 1930s, mobility into various levels of the civil service declined after 1920. Inter-generational mobility rates very likely declined even more. Mobility within thecivil servicedeclined in part because the civil service itself was growing more slowly or not at all. But it also declined because of the increased educational attainment of the Philippine population. As educational attainment rose, it became easier to fill various bureaucratic positions with persons who had already completed an appropriate education. increasingly one

1

CONCLUSION

139

had to finance one's education, or at least more of it than had heretofore been the case, before taking up permanent employment. Increasingly persons trying to begin dreir careers with less than a high school, degree found themselves either unable to secure the desired entry position or unable to advance because the way was blocked by persons who were educationally better qualified. The opportunity for middle~class employment was increasingly restricted to those who could afford (or who chose to make an heroic sacrifice to achieve) the required education. In effect, this opportunity was increasingly restricted by

parental status. That the rate of intergenerational mobility declined can hardly be doubted - only 15 children of common laborers graduated from all Manila high schools in 1925. And the children of many clerks entering the job market during the 1920s and 19305 found it very difficult to duplicate the occupational success of their parents without a much longer. period of education. Thereafter the urban middle classes remained proportionately t o r e numerous than at the

I

tum of the century, but the hump of the historic transition was past. This change was increasingly apparent even before the.Great Depression stalled the whole system. The civil service and public schools then were essential institu» sons in the formation of a large urban middle class.

Hans»Dieter Eyers has argued that mobility within the Thai civil service also declined after a prolonged period of expansion during the early twentieth century. Eyers reasons that middle level Thai bureaucrats secured access to the highest positions following the Revolution of 1932 by displacing members of the extended royal family and then restricting entry to the bureaucratic ladder. They did this by favoring dieir kinsmen for government subsidy of university education abroad while at the same time requiring such overseas training for entry into the upper middle ranks of the civil service. Evers argues that this allowed the new class formed by the rapid expansion of the bureaucracy to consolidate its ` . membership and position! The Filipino bureaucracy also went through a period of rapid expansion followed by lower rates off both exchange and- inter-génerational mobility into

various levels of the service; it also employed an internal labor market for filling most of the hierarchy Of positions, and demographically it could also have been increasingly staffed in the 19305 by the offspring of expansion era bureaucrats.

But in the

absence of systematic data on parental status backgrounds, it appears

that access to various levels of the, Filipino civil service did not become as restricted as in Eyers' view of the Thai case. First, secondary and higher education was increasingly available in Manila and "only" economic security or

minor affluence was required toattend, and this was by no means a monopoly of high civil servants, .At the same time, the sons of the wealthy were probably far more likely to acquire a foreign education than the offspring of upper middle bureaucrats. Second, to the extent that the examination system worked, it conferred civil service eligibility on talented Filipinos who had been able to adord the right training, without regard to mother tongue or specific family background. Finally, the changing ethnic division of labor allowed more opportunities, more pathways for middle and upper level indigenous careers in. Manila than in Bangkok. Wholesaling, higher retailing, and.sorne specialized industries and business firms may have been controlled by Chinese, ]apanese,

1

.

140

3

MANILA, 19004941

Americans, or Spaniards, but there were a number of other possibilities for educated and aspiring Filipinos. In Some eras, most notably during the inflation of late World War l, relative advantage. (lower opportunity cost) led a great many talented Filipinos out of the government bureaucracy and into business organizations. Voluntary turnover in the Filipino civil service was negligible only during the Great Depression when the purchasing power of government salaries was unbelievably high by historical standards. and when there were relatively few attractive alternatives anywherein the economy. . The early decades of the twentieth century also led to important opportunities for manual workers. Some of these came with changes in the ethnic division of labor following the partial restriction of Chinese immigration.

Greater opportunities were produced by the upgrading processes which accor ponied the introduction of new technologies. The establishment of modern utilities, rail transit, bus systems, automotive repair facilities, and the expansion of the printing industry all led to some upgrading of manual work. The operation of valuable and coinpleg machinery required a skilled workforce of greater

r

educational background and keenness of judgment than had heretofore been required. To attract such a workforce, proprietors and managers offered more I

stable employment and higher wages. Such favored manual workers pursued occupational careers which were often structured by rational ladders of increasing skill, experience, and responsibility. Such opportunities were especially notable in the startup of the streetcar .system and the modern electric utility at the beginning of the century and during the economic expansions of 190942

and 1918-20. The same booms also produced historic employment expansion for somewhat less skilled workers in the export-oriented cigar aNd" coconut oil industries. Thereafter, mobility opportunities for manual workers became less abundant as the urban employment system was slowed by the massive disloca~ sons in the cigar, coconut oil, and textile industries following World War l. This was the case again during the Great Depression when export demand (except for sugar shipped from provincial ports) and consumer expenditures declined, and when the invasion of American cigarettes further depressed the Philippine tobacco industry. ' . Henretta's review of the Irish and Italian immigrant experience in nine-

teenthf century American cities reminds us that to .assume that all manual workers had intergenerational mobility for their own children as2. a primary goal

is to mistakenly assume the primacy of individualist values. Many ethnic proletarian families in fact placed a higher priority on a combination of other objectives: fidelity to relatives in the place 'of origin demonstrated through remittances, group solidarity through support of church institutions, greater security through home ownership, and, in the case of Italians, high moral standards through prolonged horne supervision of daughters. Henretta's admonition also applies directly to the study of social change in Manila and other Third World cities. Beyond physical survival and reproduction, the highest priorities

of Filipino workingmetfs families cannot be stated with precision, hut in most cases they would have included Edality to close relatives in the city and in the ptovincq up origin, and investment in personal support networks both for cultural reasonS and- for the security and opportunities they offered. Like*the

1

I

1

CONCLUSION

l

141

cook who went into debt "because I am accustomed to give money to my relatives whenever' they come to Manila to-visit me," many manual workers remitted part of their earnings to relatives in the provinces or helped to finance further education of younger siblings or Nieces and nephews in the city.3 If contemporary stories are any guide, ManileNos also stereotyped each other on the basis of presumed differences between ethnodinguistic groups in this regard. Ilocanos were believed to place the highest value on intergenerational mobility

achieved through education and Visayans the least. Unfortunately, a controlled comparison of the actual behavior of such categories of urban residents in the past is beyond the limits of the surviving record.

Despite prolonged episodes of dynamism during the Iirst two decades, by the 19205 Manila was increasingly suffering from the. classic Third World economic problem - a slow rate of modem job creation. It was a problem in the international division of labor and in the strategies which Filipinos and the colonial govemrnent adopted to cope with it. The long-term decline of PhitippiNe cigar and cigarette production in the face of New manufacturing processes;

style changes, and the impact of modern advertising underlines the continuing vulnerability of the commodity production regions in international exchange. in such an environment it would have been extraordinarily difficult to generate a rate of modern job creation which exceeded the rate of urbanization. Given the lack of a sustained attack on the problem, poor results are to he expected. So, to the problem of cyclical downturns in the export-led economy was added the problem of insufficient long-term growth. The result perforce was the prolifera» son of worker career patterns which featured movements into and then out of employment in the modern sector or which were wholly confined to work in the labor absorbing lower circuit. Copihg with the shortage of remunerative work was a major problem of life in the city as well aS in the countryside, and the family strategies for doing so were. many; Workfsharing, mutual aid, odd jobs, fishing, scavenging, and borrowing were among the methods which the many less than fully employed families used to tide themselves over. Cutting expenses for housing and food were important. Financial stringehcy also frequently forced workers to withdraw some me all of their minor children from school. This was very serious, for education was one of the hest routes for inter-generational mobility and, because some of the future earnings of the child would be crucial to the support of the . patents in their -old age. Workers in many occupations were not only vulnerable to long periods unemployment but also to a curtailed work week. Work-sharing became the standard response in the forrrial sector to a lack of work on order during either industry-specific or general export downturns. In stevedoring, irnaNagers at» tempted to . spread the work around by alternating work crews. In factory production, this might be accomplished by scheduling workers three days on and three days off, or by sharing the work to be done so that few worked a full day. Where workers were organized and managers did not voluntarily introduce such a pattern, workers usually demanded it through petitions and strikes. Such job-sharing fit the workers' survival ethic and sense of solidarity. lt amounted to spreading involution from the informal to the modern sector.` It also left workers

or

l

I

142

MANILA, 1900-1941

with very low weekly wages, which heightened thecontrast between production work, stevedoring, and construction on the one hand and the more desirable jobs in modem transportation and the utilities, on the other. Many in the lower circuit could always work, but received very poor returns for the time spent. In the households of most manual workers, supplemental income was essential. In the late 19305, almost four in ten Manila households had at least three gainilully . " employed workers. The classic response to the slow rate of expansion of modem employment is a kind of unionism that goes beyond subsistence and individual crisis assis-

tance goals to attempt to change the larger political and economic system. By the early 1930s thousands of urban workers and peasants were participating in radical organizations. The great cigar strike of 1934, at a time when colonial policy gave great latitude for public organization and expressions of discontent, was an important step in crystallizing a broader sense of proletarian class consciousness. Although the strike itself was aimed at an industry almost wholly controlled by foreign capitalists, the indigenous elite was also sufficiently frightened to seek to control the power of proletarian organizations by enacting and enforcing compulsory arbitration legislation. As a personal political touch and enticement, Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon added a great deal of rhetoric about ameliorative changes for the general benefit of manual workers. But few important changes were possible in such an economy if the elite were to maintain its privileges intact

I n rapid rate a Philippine population growth was an autonomous condition which -greatly exacerbated the national problem of a slow rate of creating productive employment. Obviously, if there had been no population increase, any net creation of productive employment would have been helpful. Early in the century the seasonal demand for urban cargo and commodity handling and for building and road construction seems to have required seasonal in-migration from the Tagalog and Pampangan agricultural areas whose wet season labor requirements for rice cultivation and harvesting were so neatly meshed with Manila's dry season peak. Such seasonal circular migrations have continued to the present day, but from 1921 to the end of the period, one may doubt that. they were essential to getting the city's work. accomplished. Experts once liked to say that there was no serious unemployment problem in Manila,

for the unemployed were either tided over by their relatives or they returned to their rural areas of origin to engage in subsistence production. But many

ManileNos came from nearby provinces with very little available land and with high rates of tenancy. From sometime in the 1920s through the end of the period (indeed to the present), the numbers of outright unemployed and of those by

necessity absorbed into the informal sector have greatly exceeded the number needed to maintain a stable reserve army of potential modern sector workers. As the time went on, this situation came to be ecognized as a severe social problem. .. If the urban society was highly dynamic for a ting the existence of an absorptive agricultural frontier was one important reason why. The agrarian as

frontier facilitated an expanding volume of commodities production; it kept the

national arable»land-to»farm-worker ratio higher for a time and fulfilled' the

1

l

CONCLUSION

143

u

dream of many to carve out their own farm. It absorbed a great number of llocarios in central and northern Luzon, Tagalogs in southern Luzon and Mindoro, and Visayans in Mindanao, and may be credited with constricting the flow of migrants to the city The urban-based administration in return saw to the

land survey and occasional construction of rural roads which helped open up new areas to settlement and to the world commodities markets. Government provided certain effective public health' measures which increased life eXpec-

.¢

tancy and the national rural population growth rate. The government also administered a national system of education which reached into a great many barrios. And it was responsible for several measures which helped regional and provincial cities: reopening several ports to direct world trade and building up their wharfage and land transportation facilities, setting up provincial secondary and trade schools, and promoting the distribution of banking and communications services. None of this produced a less primate, a less Manila dominated, hierarchy of urban centers, and all of these measures together were not remotely as effective as a large agrarian frontier in creating alternatives to metropolitan *in-migration in a Manila centered Philippines. . . . And SO cigar workers and many thousands of urban laborers and workmen commonly earned one»third or one»fourf:h as much as a typical clerk in business Or government, only two or three percent as much as the chief of a medium-sized commercial firm, and still less by far when compared with members of the elite.`* In addition they had to cope with periods of unemployment or part-time work which interrupted the schooling and curtailed the life .chances of their offspring. And they had to cope continually with the competition of new migrants. The Philippines was not uniquely disadvantaged by the Great Depression, but it Was economically connected to the United States and thus sheltered

disproportionately during these years as compared to the dependencies of ]apart or even Great Britain.5 But it was also a time when employed white»collar workers enjoyed a great rise in real income. They might lose their homes because of the problem of making fixed mortgage payments in deflated currency, but in general their purchasing power fairly soared. in stark Contrast, a great many manual workers were then involved in various involutionary processes designed . to keep the greatest number alive, if only barely.

Why in the face of such deprivation was there no radical revolution? First, because the Philippine sugar "interests" won their competition with the Cuban sugar lobby in the American Congress, and the resultant temporary ballooning of sugar exports to the United States provided a timely, if highly imperfect,

- Safety valve at. precisely the crucial 'rnomentf5 Second, Marxist»Leninist ideas concerning the overthrow of an existing order by a general proletarian move» rent led by well-developed party Cadres were still new and not very familiar to rnost'Filipinos, and Maoist ideas about the leading role of the poorer peasantry in such a movement had not yet swept the Chinese and Vietnamese revolution» any parties to power. Philippine society was not highly polarized along class lines except in parts of the Central Plain of Luzon, where the patron-client bonds of landlord and tenant had severely eroded, and where considerable ideological and mobilizational work was then going on. 7 SOme of this work also went on in the city and indeed began in the city, but progress was less spectacular than one

l

l

a

144

MANILA, 19604941

might have supposed given the objective conditions. The vertical support networks that are still so much a part of Philippine life cut across class lines. One can see this most clearly in electoral politics in which leaders and factions of the "labor movement" vied with each other, and even when they won election,

found themselves unable to .cope effectively with the power of the landed elite." Third, the earlier periods of higher mobility left a long. lasting demonstration effect. If things were bad right now, then at least in the long run one might get a child through high school and into secure employment. And fourth, if one were to select prominent "villains" in the city, one may guess that most Filipino

union members might have pointed to the thro-classes of foreign factory owners and businessmen to individual Americans and Spaniards, and to the more numerous Chinese retailers. The everlasting national political preoccupa-

-

I

~.

a.

tion with independence and with plans for economic indigenization and the way in which the United States ultimately made good on its long standing pledge to return sovereignty meant that anti»colonialist discontent was too poorly devel~ oped for radicals to benefit much from it. That Manila provided an opportunity for real mobility and attainment during parts of the period under Study is tO be lauded. In its middle and upper manual reaches, Manila was, for a time, a more fluid indigenous society than one might have expected to encounter in colonial city. That does not mean that it was also an equitable society. The highest rungs of status and power were all but closed and thousands of urban Filipino families were literally trapped in positions

of prolonged poverty and vulnerability. A great many cigar workers and other collectively organized proletarians were ready for radical change. But a larger number of poor manual workers had. not yet developed such strong organizational and ideological traditions. Accepted by immediate relatives, wrapped in personal support networks, aided by mutual benefit societies and religious beliefs, and in a few instances materially assisted by charitable institutions, it

was the unusual ManileNo who found himself or herself in such isolated and desperate straits as Lao She's famous rickshaw puller Hsiang Tzu.8 To duplicate

Hsiang Tzu's fatal individualism in Manila (or even in his native Beijing, I suspect) one would have needed a warped talent for avoiding meaningful human relationships.

.

It is a truism that the expansion of the world market economy brought change in the international division of labor and left Third World societies more vulnerable in some ways than they had been before. But despite considerable interest in generalizing about these subjects, there has been little work which seeks to specify the exact relationships between the rhythm of boom and bust and the pace and character of domestic investment, job formation, and socio-

economic mobility. I have sought to marshal facts about careers and exchange I

mobility in Metropolitan Manila into meaningful patterns in the context of cyclical variation and secular change in the export economy, and at the same time to be sensitive to institutional contexts and autoNomous initiatives. Manila's economy was (and is) strongly influenced by the character and r a n i » rude of export demand, but it was also complex and differentiated enough to

render simplistic the notion of reflexive dependency.

I

I

I

•

Notes

I

Certain citations in the notes have been shortened following the abbreviations listed below. Particulars of these and other sources are found in the bibliography.

Abbreviations t

American Chamber of' Commerce local (Manila) Philippine Islands, Bureaulof Customs Annual Report

ACC] ARICC

Collector

ARBCS

of Customs

of the Insular

Philippine Islands, Bureau of Civil Service, Annual Report Bureau

ARBL

of Civil

of

the

Service

Philippine Islands, Bureau of Labor, Annual Report of' the Bureau of

Mor

.

ARBPW

Philippine Islands, Bureau of Public Welfare, Annual Report

of the

ARCCS

Philippines, Commonwealth; Bureau of Civil Service, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Civil Service Philippine Islands, Bureau of Education, Annuaf Report of the Director

Bureau of Public Welfare

ARDE

.

of Education

'

.

ARDPW

Philippines,

AROPWC

Philippine Islands, Office of the Public Welfare Commissioner, Annual Report . . Philippine Islands, Bureau of Labor, Bulletin of :lie Bureau of Labor

Commonwealth,

Report .of the Director

BBL BPS

Bureau of Public Welfare, Annual

of Public Welfare

Philippines, Commonwealth; Dept. .of Agriculture and Natural Re» sources, Statistics Division, Bulletin

Bd.

.

of Ed.

of Philippine Statistics

Fhilippine islands, Board of Educational Survey-, A Survey of the

Ce1*Lsus,. 1903

Educational System of the Philippine IslandS (Manila: Bureau of Print» ing, 1925) United States, Bureau of the Census, Census of the Philippine Islands:

1918

1903 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1905) Philippine Islands, Census Oiiice of the Philippine Islands, Census of

Survgy

CHTISHS,

Census, 1939

EDCC Herald

the Philippines, 1918 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1920) Philippines, Commonwealth; Commission of the Census, Census of the Philippines, 1939 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1940). Economzk: Development and Caliwral Cfiange

The Philippines Herald

of the American Asiatic Association

JAAA MDB

Iouimaf

MT

Manila Times

Manila Daily Bulletin 1 1

.

148

NOTES

PSR

Fhilippines, Commonwealth; Dept of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Statistics Division, Philippine Statistical Review Philippine Social Science Review . United States, 'War Dept., Bureau of Insular A:;irs, Report of

PSSR RGGPI

-

Governor General of the Philippine Islands (Washington, fig.;

RFC

United States, War Dept., Bureau of Insular Affairs, Report c Philippine Commission (Washington, ac.; Geo) "" Philippine Islands, %urea of Commerce, Statistical Bulletin of the i n

»

SBPI

.

Yearbook

Philippine Islands l Philippines, Commonwealth; Bureau of the Census and Statistics,

.

Yearbook of Philippine Statistics

Notes to the Introduction 1 On these concepts, see David W. Plath "Careers and Life Cycles in ]apart," Items 34 (March 1980): 8-11 and Robert A. LeVine, "Adulthood and Aging in Cross-Cultural Perspective," Items 31/32 (March 1978)

1-5

.

Z On this subject, see Robert R. Reed, Colonial Manila and Daniel F. Doeppers, "The Development of Philippine Cities Before I900," jouinai o}'Asian Studies 31 (August . 1972): 769»92. 3 E. J. Taaffe, R. L. Morrill, and P. R. Gould. "Transportation Expansion in 'Underdeveloped Countries," Geographical Review 53 (1963): 503.29 and Norton S. Ginsburg, "The Great City in Southeast Asia,"'American Journal of Sociology 60 (1955):

455462.

.

_

4 On the concept of national economic dependency, see André Gunner Frank, Capitalism and Uncleroletuelopment in Latin America; Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 60 (May 1970); N

231816, and ]ares D. Cockcroft; André Gander Frank, and Dale L. Johnson, Dependence and Untlercleixefopment. On the core, periphery, and semi-periphery concepts, see ltnrnanuel Wallersteiii, "The Rise and. Future Demise oF' the World Capitalist System," .

Comparative Studies in Society and History 16 (September 1974): 387-415. 5 Glenn A. May, Social Engineering in the Philippines, 166-Y0.

6 Donald K. Emmerson, "Issues in Southeast Asian History/," '_loitfnal

of Asian

Studies 40. (November 1980): 43-68. Mary R. Hollnsteiner, The Dynamics of Power in a Philippine Municipality; Frank Lynch, compiler, Four Readings on Philippine Values; Ronald

S. Himes, "Cognitive Mapping in the Tagalog Area (It)," in Modemizaaon, pp. 125-68; Richard L. Stone, "Private Transitory Ownership of Public Property, in Modernization, pp. 53.-63; Mary Dorita Clifford, "Iglesia Filipina Independiente: The Revolutionary

Church" and R. L. Deals, "Nicolas Zamora: Religious Nationalist" in G. H. Anderson, ed., Studies in Philippine Church History, pp- 223-55 and 32536, respectively, and Peter G. Gowing, IslandS Under the Cross, chapter 7. On the informal or lower circuit of the economy, see Maria Cristina Blanc Szanton, A Right .to Survi-ue; William G. Davis, Social

Relations In a Philippine Market, Self Interest and Subjectivity; and Milton Santos, The Shared Space.

. 7' See for example, Stephan Thernstrorn, The Other Bostonians; Peter Knights,

The Plain People

of

Boston, 1830»1860; and R. M. Pritchard Housing and the Spatial

Structure of the City. . 8 Studies of early twentieth-century American cities have encouNtered similar difficulties in dealing with the "floating proletariat: people who moved about so frequently that we know little about them at all. . ." Charles Stephenson, "Tracing Those

.

L

1

149

.NOTES

of Urban History 1 (November 1974): ?3-84, quote from page 82. 9 May, Social Engineering; Onofre .D. Corpus, The Bureaucracy in the Philippines; Thomas B. Bin berg and Stephen A. Res rick, Colonial Development; Melinda Tria Kerkvliet, Mutual Aid and Manila Unions; and Alfred W. McCoy, "Culture and Consciousness in a Philippine City," Philippine Stucfies 30 (Znd qtr. 1982): 157-203 and "A Queen Dies Slowly," in Philippine Social History. Ed. C. de Jesus and A. W. McCoy, eds. Who Left," journal

10. "Rosenstock's Manila City Directories, 1903-1941," The CORMOSEA Bulle-

of

rin 10

(December 1979): 1-9 and Union Catalogue Selected Bureau Repcrrts and Other Ojcicikil Seriafs of the Philippines, f908-l94l (Madison: University of Wisconsin, Wisconsin Papers on Southeast Asia,

no. 4,

1980). A third guide, this one oN biographical

reference works, has been initiated in cooperation With Michael Cullinane.

.Notes to Chapter 1

\.

I For these and other casual empirical tests, see Irving B. Kravis, "The Role of Exports in Nineteenth Century United States Growth" EDCC 20 (April 1972): 387405 and "Trade as a Handmaiden of Growth Similarities between the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," The Economic _loral 80 (December 1970): 850-?2. 2 .lames S. Allen, "Who Owns the Philippinesl", The Nation 144. (24 April ` ' 1937): 463-65, quote on p. 464. 3 These trade zones have tended to persist, (Edward L. Ullman, "Trade Centers and Tributary Areas in the Philippines," Geographical Review 50 [April, 19601: 203»18). 4 On the decline of decentralized indigenous handicraft production and its replacement by .imported manufactures

as a consequence of involvement in world

commodities markets, see Stephen A. Res rick, "The Decline of Rural Industry Under Export Expansion," journal of Economic History 30 (l970)~ 51-73. ]ares C. Scott details how the loss of such secondary occupations increased the economic vulnerability of the peasantry during downturns in the market economy in The Moral Economy of the Peasant, pp. 61-65. Norman G. Owen finds the impact to be highly variable be craft, place, and time. "Kabikolan in the Nineteenth Century" (Ph. D. diss, University of Michigan,

1976), pp. 248 and 258-97. On the earlier expansion and drastic decline of production in one of the major regional centers of handweaving, see Alfred W. McCoy, "A Queen Dies Slowly;" in Pl1ilippineSocial History; A. W. McCoy and Ed. C. de ]sus, eds., pp. 30137.

5 Walter Robb, "U.S. Trade over Philippine Roads," ACC) I I (December 1931): 3-7 and 18 and "The Philippines with-Relation to the Future Commerce of the

. 6 An analysis of railroad cargo from the Central Plain and waterborne commod-

United States,"L¢L'\A 12 (February 1912), p. 23-

ity flows during tlte 1920s illustrates the inagnitude of Manila's domestic trade. During that period Manila received a reported annual average of 138 million kilos of rice by rail from the Central Flair (half from the province of Nueva Ecija alone). It also received rice by truck from various areas of Luzon and by ship from Saigon. Manila then

distributed 128 million kilos of rice by coastal steamer. and received in turn an annual average of 224 million kilos of export commodities: abaca (43 percent), copra (34 percent), sugar (14 percent), and leaf tobacco (9 percent) as well as 65 million board feet of lumber. Calculated from data found in SBPI, l9Z3»29 (1926-29 for rail shipments). Rice imports averaged 79 million kilos per year during 1923-29. Presumably about two-thirds of that total was landed at Manila (Leon Mears, et al., Rice Economy of the Philippines, pp 163 and 330; "Rice Distribution in the Philippines and the Tutuljan Rice Exchange, " Fliilippfne jourNal of Commerce 12 [April 19361, pp. 13 and 36, and-"Railroad Has Not Been Able to Compete with Trucks . .," [Manila] T-rilmne, I April 1939). Tlie rice surplus and rice deficit provinces of 1930-34 are depicted in Albert Kolb, "Die

_

.

\

r

150

NOTES

Reislandschaft auf den Philippinen," Petermanfzs Geogr. Mitneilungen 86 (1940), Tafel 13. 7 The correlation coefficient between the log of real Philippine exports and the log Of real U.S. gross national product during 1903-38 is .897 (r2 r-- .804). For Further details on the temporal relationships see chapter 2.

8 During the boom year of 1911-12, for example, the Port of Manila handled 82 percent of all reported Philippine abacaexports by value, 99 percent of outgoing tobacco, and 69 percent of the copra, but only 34 percent of sugar exports (ARICC, 1911-12, p. 72) 9 Sugar had been the leading export by value for Some years until abaca surged

.

ahead in 1887, and it regained the lead briefly during 1892 and 1893. The essential political context of sugar's remarkable rise is . well told in Theodore Friend's "The Philippine Sugar Industry and the Politics of Independence, 1929-1935," journal of Asian Studies 22 (1963)~ 179-92. During the 1925»26 and 1926-27 crop years only 27 percent of all centrifugal sugar production took place in Luz oh and Mindoro. Most of the remainder was produced in Negros and Panay (SBPI, 1926, p. 34). 10. During 1926-29, sugar made up 85 to 92 percent of Iloilo's exports. In 1934, good year for sugar, Cebu's exports by value were: sugar, 34 percent; copra, 32 percent; abaca, 14 percent; coconut oil, 8 percent; and lumber and timber, 4 percent. Calculated

a

from SBPI, 1919, pp. Il8»19 and 1929, p. 100; Yearbook, 1940, p. 411; "lloilo Boasts of Historic Commercial Growth," MDB, Southern Islands Weekly Supplement, 24 January 1934, p. 2, and "The Growth and Activities of the Port of Cebu," Tribune, 2 April l 935, sect. VIII. On the complex set of technical and labor organizational changes which resulted in Negros sugar being exported directly rather than through Iloilo, see McCoy,

"A Queen'Dies Slowly," pp. 297-358. See also Walter Robb, "The CommerCial Future of Cebu," ACCJ, 5 ]one 1925, pp. 8-9, I I Frank H. Golan, The Philippines, Public Policy and National Economic Developmem; Richard W. Hooley, "Long Term Growth of the Philippine Economy, 1902»1961," Philippine Economic Ioumal 7 (1968); I-24; ]ohn H. Power and Gerardo P. Sic at, The Philippines, pp. 12, 19, 28, and 39, and Vicente B. ValdepeNas, ]r. and Gemilino M. Bautista, The Emergence of the Philiippine Economy, chapter 5. 12 See, for example, Bonifacio S. Salarrianca, The Filipino Reaction to American Rule, 1901-1913, chapter 7; May, Social Engineering in the Philippines, pp. 149»58 and. 166-71; Richard H. Werking, "Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and the Philippines," Pacific

Historical Review 42 (May 1973): 234-40, and Friend, "The Politics of Independence." 13 I believe that conclusions to the contrary, such as those advanced by Hartendotp,overernphasize agricultural processing, such as centrifugal sugar extraction, and other innovations which may have been important, but did little to break the pattern of exporting commodities rather than articles with a higher value added ratio. See A. V. H.

Hartendorp, HNtoty of industry and Trade of the Philippines. 14 Again, see McCoy, "A Queen Dies Slowly," pp. 301 ,

and Owen, "Kahiko-'

an," pp. 258-97. . 15 The Tondo spinning and weaving mill began operating in 1897. In 1905, it had 7,420 spindles, 222 looms, and 220 to 240 Filipino employees. lt was owned by the

Manila Trading Co., Wise and Co., agents. The factory's interior may be seen in a photograph included in the 1903 census (vol. 4, facing p. 466). The hill was closed during part of 1903 because of the high cost of cotton, most of which then came from the United States. Management reported at that time that the low wages paid to the factory's Filipino workers did not adequately offset the high cost of fire insurance, taxes, imported coal, and the lower productivity (as compared to 'unspecified workers elsewhere) of the workforce employed. The major competition then, before the establishment of a free trade zone with the United States, was said to come from ]apanese yarns. and Madras cotton cloth. In 1915 the factory employed 105 men, 100 women, and 8 children On an

151

NOTES

11-hour shift. The American Chamber of Commerce in Manila said the Tondo textile mill failed because its owners were speculating in cotton at what turned out to be very high prices with the onset of the deflation of 1921-22. Fidel Reyes, Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry, told an interested German company in 1925 that the mill had closed because of "its inability to undersell imported articles." He said nothing about speculation, but the two statements are not necessarily in conflict. Reyes went on to advise that:

.

.

if you think through expert management and large scale production you can reduce the cost of operation of your factory so low as to undersell imported textiles, your, plans to establish a. factory here may be realized. [But] at Present the Government is not interested in embarking into this adventure.

No local partners for the German venture were found, and apparently there was no employment in the modem textile industry in the country throughout the I920s. In 1930, the Vicente Madrigal interests reopened the antiquated Tondo mill. Some

intellectuals and even Governor General Roosevelt called for the establishment of an import substitution policy favoring textile manufacturing. But the Madrigals found the return on the old textile mill to be the least rewarding of their multifarious investments less than interisland shipping or the manufacture of cement, for example, and further private Filipino capital was not attracted during the sugar and gold booms of the 19305. Fidel A. Reyes, letter to Siewensen 61. Co., Hamburg, 16 December 1925, copy round in U.S. War Dept., Bureau of Insular Affairs (hereafter BIA) file 6023-42, now in

-.-.-

the U.S. National Archives, Record Group 350. See also Victor S. Clark, "Labor Conditions in the Philippines," Bulletin of the IU. S.] Bureau o3'Labo'r, ho. 58 (May 1905), pp. 809-10; SBPI, 1918, p. 48; "Wheels oflndustry," ACC] (October 1930), p. 10; letter of the Executive Secretary to the Wm. B. Dana Co., 8 September 1905, BIA file 5357;

Daily Consular and Trade Report of 2.4 November 1913. .BIA file 5357-28; BIA letter to R. S. Mebane, Fresident of Republic Cotton'Mills, Great Falls, S. Carolina, 13 ]one 1916, BIA file 602348, and other iterhs in BIA file 6023; Lawrence David Stifel, The Textile industry, pp. 34.37 (on the Madrigals), and Report of the Gotfemor General, 1932-1933, pp. 27-33. For useful comparative material, see Thomas B. Birnberg and

Stephen A. Res rick, Colonial Development; Samir Rad van, Capital Formation in Egyptian Industry and Agriculture, 18824967, esp. pp. 173-88, and Stephen Kenny, "Sub»regional Specialization

in the Lancashire Cotton Industry, 1884»I914," journal

of

Historical

Geography 8 (january 1982)1 41-63. 16 Bin berg and Res rick, esp. pp. 215-26 and 234-39; Maximo M. Kalaw,."Our

Economic 'Strangulation,' " PSSR 5 (january I933): 46-70 Shirley Ienkins, American Economic Policy Towards the.Fhilippines, pp. 3467; and Friend, "The Philippine Sugar I

l

Industry and the Politics of Independence." Perhaps the strongest and most grotesquely self-interested statement of the value of the Philippine market for American manufacf tores is found in Fhilippine Trade: Our Eastern Base. See also "Philippines Market for Flour, " MT, 4 March 1910; "The Philippines with Relation to the Future Commerce of the United States," IAAA 12 (February 1912): 21-25; "Trade Between the Philippines and the United States," ]AAA 12 (May 1912), p. 115; Robb, "U.S. Trade over Philippine Roads," and Theodore Friend, Between Two Empires, chapter 7 and pp. 259-60. 17 "Philippine Islands Big Textile Buyers," Iowmal of Commerce (New York), 21 December 1925 (BIA file 6023-44) and "Noted British Firm Closes. Office Here," . MDB, 31 September 1926, p. 1. Findlay, Richardson and COmpany of Glasgow was the firm in question. .

18 See the testimony of Manuel Roxas in the Senate Tariff Hearings of 15-18 July

1

152

NOTES

1929, p. 247 and that of ]. F. Comins of Kumzner, Cornins (Si Co. in the Senate Philippine Independence Hearings, pt. 2, 3 February 1930, pp. 20948, found in BIA files C-1582-with 152 and 364~with47'3, respectively, and Kalaw, "Economic 'Strangulation'," pp. 64765. In 1935 the resident American Trade Commissioner thought the new quota on Japanese cotton cloth was "permitting= American goods at least.to retain a

foothold in the market," though they were now badly beaten in the printed, dyed, and unbleached categories. .Japanese rayon was underselling "duty»free American cotton

shirting and dress goods even after paying a duty of about 105 percent. . . ." Manila City Directory, 1936-37, pp. 9-10, For a time the ]apanese partially evaded the quota by exporting through Hong Kong merchants. For a succinct overview, see Milagros C. Guerrero, A Survey of Iapanese Trade and InvestmeNts in the Fhilippfnes, pp. 23»29. 19 Stifel, pp. 34-37 and Census, 1939. Guerrero (p. 43) describes one of the ]apanese. mills, "the Oriental Industrial Company (Kinkwa Meriyasu)," as being "equipped with 40 Shimano non-automatic looms, [with which] it produced staple grades

of cotton piece goods" out of yarns imported from ]apart. The company was l e d t o establish this mill because ithaca not been awarded part of the quota .fOo Japanese goods enterin g the Philipp in market. . \

20 'Remarks by Morton }. Netzorg while chairing the panel on Philippine Business History, Philippine Studies Assn. Conference, Kalamazoo, 29 May 1980. During the mining craze year of 1937, for example, 35 percent of the subscribed capital for all new corporations in the Philippines went into mining; 13 percent went into merchandizing (to market imported manufactured consumer goods), and only 5.5 percent was earmarked for "manufacturing" (BPS, 1938, 1st and 2nd qtrs., p. 50). For a useful analysis of the textile industry after World War II, see Stifel, The Textile Industry. 21 On the cigar industry see Edilberto C. de ]sus, "Manila's First Factories," Philippine Historical Review (1971)': 97-109 and The Tobacco Monopoly in the Philippines. 22 john Foreman, The Philippine IslandS, pp. 295-96 and "Factories in P. I. Will Grow," MT, 4 March 1917. For descriptions of the larger, mostly foreign-owned cigar companies and a sense of their. euphoric profitability following open access to the

American market, see the "Investors and Settlers Edition" of the MT, February 1910, as well as "Cigar Exports Under Payne Bill," "Factory Refused to Sell," and "Germinal Increases Capital," all in the MT, 6 ]anuary 1910, 13 January 1910, and 31 January 1910, respectively. In early 1914, 41 cigar and cigarette factories employed about 10,000 workers, but by the later months of the same year, more than 2,000 were said to be without work (ARBL, 1915, p. 21 and 1914, p. 28). It is quite possible that many of these worked only part time. At the end of 1918, cigar and cigarette factories in Manila proper employed 13,520 workers. Another 460 workers were employed in the contiguous towns of Rizal Province, primarily in Catoocan (Census, 1918, IV, pt. 1, p. 395). For , 1934, see Tribune, 21 September 1934. 23 MT, 5 ] anuary 1917. . . 24 "Cheap Market Regaihed," MDB, 5 ]anuaqt 1923; P. A. Meyers monthly "TobacCo Review," ACCI, e.g., April 1930; "Cigar Slump Causes Alarm," Tribune, 28 May 1930; "Cheap Cigars in Demand in U.S.," Tribune, 31 August 1934; "[U.S.] Manufactures Hit Importation' of P.1. Cigars," Tribune, 30 September 1934; and RGGP1 for various years including 1932, p. 61. In 1939 there were 4,933 cigar and cigarette makers in Manila and an additional 3,759 in suburban Rizal about a thousand fewer

-

than in early 1914 before the _great boom in cigar exports. On the smoking habits of elite

Filipinas, see "Women and a Cigarette," Herald, 19 August I93?. 25 "Tobacco Farmers Hit Hard," Tn'bune, 27 March 1931, and Tribune, 28 March and 2 April 1931; Manila City Directory, 193657, p. 7; Allen, "Who. Owns the Philippines?", p. 464, and Mariano E. Gutierrez, "The Tobacco Industry in Transition,"

* "1

I

153

NOTES

in A Half-Century of Philippine Agriculture, pp. 202-13.. In 1930, an organization known as the Sarnahang Kapuluang Magdaragat denied responsibility for assaults said to be connected with a boycott orc American cigarettes. "Racketeering Flourishes . . .," Tribune, 6 April 1930. Gutierrez reports that the already ascendent American cigarettes "became supreme'.' in the Philippine market immediately after World War II and that it took specific import controls in 1950 to breathe life into a cigaretteérnanufacturing industry. Even then the new factories Were using American leaf material. 26 On the roots of the Bureau of Education's manual training policy and the lack of demand for its trainees in fumituremaking and some other lines of manual work, see Glenn A. May, "Social Engineering in the Philippines:The Aims and Execution of American Educational Policy, 1900-1913," Philippine Studies24 (1976): 13681 27 "Fhilippine Embroideries' MT, 15 September 1918. See also "Work Equal to World's Best," MT, 7 March 1913 and Philippine Islands, Bureau of Education, Bulletin, ' No. 9, Lace-Making and Embroidery, esp. pp. 10-12. 28 "New Embroidery Factory Assured," MDB, 11 January 1923. In 1938, more than half of the Philippines' 1,126 embroidery "establishments" were said to be located in Manila (BPS, 1939, No. 4, pp. 135 and 170). The 1939 census reported 7,011 embroiderers and dressmakers in Manila and an additional 10,674 in suburban and rural

Rizal.

29 Francois Boucher, 20,000 Years of Fashion, pp- 411»16. I am indebted to Lorraine Cadwallader for bringing this work to my attention. 30 SBPI, 1918, p. 48 and Labor Bulletin (March-April 1940), pp- 124-25. 1919, most chinelaS manufacturing shops were concentrated in the Santa CruzBinondo-Tondo portion of the urban area. Labor, Boletin Trimestral de la Ojcicina del Trabaqo, No. 6 (]one 1920), pp. 88-89. 31 Rafael Palma, Alma Mater (Manila: 1930), pp. 108-9, quoted in Joseph Ralston Hayden, The Philippines, p. 928. See also Hayden, pp. 522-23. 32 H. W. Foster, "Copra and Copra Products in the Philippine Islands," in SBP1, 1918, pp. 20»21; SBPI, 1923, unpaginated graph; Hartendorp, pp. 31»32; "Fallows to Start Oil Co. ," MT, 9 September 1918; "Oil Workers to Ask Increases," MT, 13 September 1918; "Hamilton in 2 Big Plants," MT, 18 September 1918; "Nor Enough Copra to Supply Oil Factories, Says Araneta," MT, 30 October 1918; Census, 1918, IV, pt. 1, pp. 366 and 409; Stanley PQ Johnson, "Reports and ConditionS," MDB, 27 March ` 1920; and MDB, 19 January 1921. ,

,

.r

as

33 On the scandals associated with the loan operations of the new Philippine

National Bank during 1917-20, see Pete1-\X/. Stanley, A Nation in 48, and F. B. Harrison, The Comer-Stone of Philippine Independence, F*

ul

pp.

232-

34 Ang Til:»ay began' in 1910 as a' small shop making chinelas for sale to cigar. workers (from the same factory where owner Toribio Teodoro had worked as a youth) and subsequently expanded into a rriodem mechanized shoe manufacturing operation em. ploying 200 workers. 35 On the concept of national economic dependency see André Gunder Frank, CapitalisM and Underdevelop"ent in Latin America; Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," American EConomic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 60 (May 1970): 231-36, and James D. Cockcroft, André Gunder Frank, and Dale L. ]ohnson. Depen' dence and Underdevelopment. 36 1 claim no special expertise in these matters, and I leave the building of. proper counterfactual models to the economic historians and ecOnometricians. The quote is from Dos Santos, p. 236. Obviously, any signal improvement in product per capita would have required a lower rate of population growth than that experienced during the 19205

and 19305.

l.

a

I

154

NOTES 37 A related problem was the well-known Standard Oil tactic

of gaining

near

monopoly market control by selling at a loss until competitors gave up. For its interna-

tional application see "Trust Control," Manila American, 1 May 1906, p. 1 and Irvine H. Anderson, jr. , The' Standard-Vacuum Oil Company and United States - East Asian Policy, 1933-1941, chapter 2. 38 Hoinobono Marino, "Problems in Economics in the Philippine Islands," PSSR 6 (April 1934): 114 and 138. Expatriate businessman Horace B. Pond asserted in 1929 that "there is no large body of Filipino public opinion on economic questions. . . ." Pond. "Filipinos" Neglect of Business," Philippine Finance Review 2 (August 1929), p. 13. 39 "Roads to Relief" (editorial), MDB, 11 December 1920, and W. W. Weston, letter the editor, MDB, 16 December 1920. Weston dealt in auto supplies and phonographic equipment. His business was sold to Gonzalo Putt later in the 19205. 40 Cornelio Balmaceda, "Unequal Gains Under the Free Trade," Philippine

to

a'

Finance Review 1 (October 1928), pp. 8-9 and 31; Pastor Kirnpo, "Revising Our Tariff

Law," Philippine Economic Review 1 (October 1928): 10-11, 29, and 37, quotes on p. 29, and ]use P. Apostol, "The American~Philippine Tariff," PSSR 3 (May 1931): 254-63, quote on p. 259. Apostol's essay reviews both Balmaceda and Kimpo, cited above. See also the series of articles growing out of the Harvard Club of the Philippines' consideration of "Necessary Changes in Our Tarim Law" by Salvador Araneta and Comelio Balrnaceda, Philippine Finance Review 2 (September-November 1929). 41 Quotes from Florencio Tarnesis, "The Need for Industrial Diversification"

Commerce and Industry journal 9 (lanuanf 1933): 5»6, and "Industrialization of Country is

Urged by Chemist . . .," Tribune, 17 August 1934, respectively. See also M. V! Arguelles, "Biologic Products of Private Laboratories," National Research Council, Bulletin (February 1935), pp. 331-33. ms ` . 42 V. G. Lava, "SOme Solutions to the Problem of the Philippine Coconut Industry," PSSR 11 (February 1939); 1-25, quotes on pp. 16 and 17. Another manifestation of this belated interest in industrial employment was the proposal for a wharf area free tradezone in Manila Comelio Balmaceda, Manila -.- Trade EntrepOt of the Far East, p. 13. For eloquent postwar statements 'on the need for Philippine industrialization, see Claro M. Recto, "A .Realistic Philippine Economic Polity," reprinted in Zoilo M.

-

Galang, ed., Encyclopedia of the Philippines, 3rd ed, pp. 459»85 and Renato Constantine, .. The Filipinos and Other Essays, pp. 81-101. 43 Andres V. Castillo (Centro Escolar), "A Tariff Policy for an Independent Philippines," PSSR 4 (April 1932): 164»81; "Bocobo Defends Speaker Roxas," Tribune, 28 March 1931; Manuel L. Roxas, " 'Let Us Reduce Our Importations of Farm Products' .- :" ," Philippine Finance Review 4 (February _1931): 16-17; Manuel L. Rotas,

.

"A Scientific Approach to the Problems of our National Economy," PSSR 4 (lanuary

n'

1932): 3?»40, and Philippine Economic Association, Economic Problems of :he Philippines, chapter 8. On the economic drain of agricultural imports, see also Miguel Cuadetno (acting General Manager of the Philippine National Bank), "Our Real Economic Problem," Philippine Finance Review 2 (September 1929): 14-15. 44 Economic Problems of the Philippines, chapter IZ, quote on p. 203; Maximo M. . Kalaw, "The Proposed Reactionary Measures as Viewed From Our Past Tariff Relations

With America," Philippine Finance RevieW 2 (March 1929): 12-13; Maximo M. Kalaw, "Economic 'Strangulation,' " pp. 46-703 Allen, "Who Owns the Philippines?," p. 463, and E. D. Hester. "Footnotes to Philippine Economics," PSSR 12 (May 1940); 131-41, quote on p. 137.

45 "Made in the Philippines Week,"Tribune, 12 August 1934; " 'Made-in»P.I.' Week," Tribune, 1? August 1934; and Herald, 17 August 1934; "Balrnaceda Talks at Far Eastern U-," T-riburie_ 22 August 1934; "National Economic Protectionism Sequence

155

NOTES

I

[Sequel?] of Katipunan's Work . . .," Tribune, 21 August 1934; "Buy Filipino," Herald, 1? August 1934; and Tribune, 17 August 1934; and "[Kahirup] club celebrating lath anniversary at Manila Hotel," Tribune, 28 October 1934.

46 "L. R. Aguinaldo Sends Petition . , .," Tribune, 30 August 1934, p. 2; "Reciprocity Drive to Start," Tribune, 18 August 1934, pp. 1 and 8, and "Gomez Pleads for Protection . . .," Tribune, 18 August 1934. See also the recommendations of the Philippine Economic Association's committee on foreign trade (which Gomez chaired) in Economic Problems of the Philippines, pp. 211713. 47 ] a n Posadas, , "Are We Accumulating Capital?" 'Philippine Finance Review 2 (]one 1929): 8-9, quotes on p. 8, Tarnesis, ". . . Industrial Diversification," p. 5; Roxas,

or.

"A Scientific Approach . . .," pp. 37-38; Guerrero, p. 59, and Constantino, "The

Corrupt Society," Sunday Times Magazine, 10 August 1958, reprinted in The Filipinos and Other Essays, pp. 81-101. See also "DL Roxas Speaks before Delegates," Tribune, 29 August 1934, p. 2; "Filipino Corporations" (editorial), Tribune, 19 September 1934,

p. 4; "industrialization Plans Are Revealed," Tribune, 2 October 1934, p. 8, and "Why Wealthy Filipinos Won't Invest Capital," Manila Town Topics, 1 October 1904, p. 5. 48 Roxas, "A Scientific Approach . . .," pp; 3738 and Florencia Tarnesis, "Problems of, and Adjustments in, the Lumber Industry," National Research Council, Bulletin (September 1938), pp. 30-32. 49 Harrison, p. 262 and Stanley, pp. 232-48, quote on p. 236. In 1934, 77 . percent of the ProB's outstanding funds were said to be loaned to the sugar interests. Allen, "Who Owns the Philippines?," p. 463. 50 Ramon Racelis, interview, 25 May 1982. Racelis came. to this position after 10 years as a bank examiner and more than three years (1936»39) as the manager of La Previsora Mutual Building andLoan Association. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank

'absorbed the assets of the former Postal Savings Bank.

Notes to Chapter 2

1 It is'beyond my purpose here to provide an econometric exploration of this relationship. Interested readers may consult Thomas B. Birnberg and Steven A. Res rick, . Colonial Development. 2 Theodore Friend, "The Philippine Sugar Industry and the Politics of Indepen-

dence, 1929-1935," Journal of Asian Studies 22 (1963): 179-92. 3 Norman G. Owen, "Kabikolanin the Nineteenth Century" (Ph-D. diss., University of Michigan., 1926) and lames

Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant.

4 Pemia estimates that roughly 33.4 percent or 216,000 of the total population increase of Metropolitan Manila from 1903 to 1939 was due to net in~rhigration, but as he notes, this may well be understated. If the reported birth and death rates for the city have even limited utility as a guide, crude natural increase of the magnitude estirnatedby Pemia (24.57 per 1,000 began to be experienced only in the mid-19205. Ernesto M. Pemia, A Method of Decomposing Population Growth and An Application to Philippine Dara,

pp. 13 and 22. See also SBPl:.1920, p. 17; 1922, p. 12; 1925, p. I2; 1929, p. .26 and RGGPI, 1925, p. 46 and 1934, p. 128. 5 Most Philippine rice tenants then grew only one crop per year and expended

-

69 percent of their annual orvlarrn labor during two concentrated periods in land preparation in the mohth following the first substantial rains (which often began in mid-may) and during two weeks of harvesting about six months later (November). Much of the harvesting was done be non»tenants on a share basis. This schedule, which is

156

NOTES

typical for Central Luzon, left December through May, or in some cases, January through ]one, largely free of farrnwork. Not surprisingly, more than 80 percent of the rice tenants located in provinces near Manila also had secondary occupations. Many worked as 2

general laborers, but some were also carpenters or cocheros. Surveys reveal that tenants worked 68 days a year (if one assumes a nine-hour work day) at these secondary occupations. July, August, September, and November were the four lowest months for

railroad passenger travel oh Luzon in every year during 192934 and 1936-39. Con» Verses, Pllpril and May were among the four highest months in all ten years, while the other two were made up of some combination of January, March, and December. Evert D. Hester, Pablo Mabbun, et al. , "Some Economic and Social Aspects of Philippine Rice Tenancies, " The Philippine AgNeulturalist 12 . (February 1924): 3 8 9 4 and 424 and Philippine Islands/Philippines, Commonwealth, Manila Railroad Co., Report of the General Manager, 1929 through 1939-40. On the schedules and strategies of farm families in these provinces more recently, see Brian Fagan, "Folk-Capitalism" (Ph. D. diss., Yale University, 1979). 6 Fidel Villarroel, O. P., "The UST Main Building, A Witness to HiStory,"

Unites 50 (December I97?), p. 121 and Census, /939 vol. 1, Manila and Rizal, pp. Il0» 39 and 106-34, respectively. For modem studies of circular migration between Central Luzon and Manila, see Otto D. van den Muijzenberg, Horizontals Mobiliteit in Centraal Luzon and several essays. by A. W. Stretton, including "The Building industry and

Urbanization in Third World Countries: A Philippine Case Study," EDCC 29 (January 1981): 325-39. See also Victor S. Clark, "Labor Conditions in the Philippines," Bulletin of the [U. SJ Bureau of Labor, no. 58 (May 1905): 833-34. 7 "War Boosts Prices," MDB, 23 February 1916 and "1919 Rice Crisis," RGGPI, 1919, pp. 201»4. The 1919 rice crop was also poor in Thailand, another rnaior exporter. . 8 "New Salary Law , . .," MT, 12 September 1918; "City Bonus Is Offered," MT, 26 September 1918; "Fix Salaries of City Posts," MT, 1 October 1918; "Laborers of City Raised," MT, 23 November 1918; "City Laborers Get Wages Increased," MT, 16 _lanufary 1920;"'Raise Engineers Pay to Hold Them" MT, 23 .Alanuary 1920; "Poor Pay Driving U.P. Professors to Positions Elsewhere," MT, 18 january 1920; and "Many Teachers Leaving Schools," MDB, 29 March 1920. 9 Yearbook, 1946, p. 211; "[Coconut] Oil Workers to Ask Increases," MT, 13 September 1918; "Printers on Short Strike," MT, 30 October 1918; "Non-union '

Printer Badly Manhandled," MT, 30 January 1919; "Another Labor Armistice Signed," MT, 5 April 1919; "Meralco [Street] Carmen Receive Bonuses," MT, 14 April 1919; "Ir"s More Pay or,Port Strike Stevedores Say," MDB, 12 january 1920. On the successful demands of various groups of stevedores see MT, 12]anuary 1920 and 28 February 1920, and MDB, 28 February 1920; 15 March 1920; 'and 18 March 19.20. Many cigarrnakers received a 10 percent piecework raise on 1 March 1920. Employers insisted it led to absenteeism. See "Quit Work to See Cock Fights, " MDB, 16 March 1920 and also MDB, . 19 March 1920 and 29 March 1920. 10 RPC, 1912, facing p. 150; 1918 Census, IV, pt. 1, p. 20 for 1903, 1911, 1917,

and 1918, and SBPI, 1925, pp. 48»51. On the proposals of the plantation owners, see "Immigration is Denounced, Labor Holds Big Meeting at: Opera House Against Chinese," MT, 29 September 1918 and MDB, Z, 4, 6, 7, and 11 September 1920. One should accept the difference in peso wages as a general rather than a precise guide to

differences in levels of living. Inquiries conducted in the still disturbed economy of 1903 indicate that the cost of living for Manila workers may then have been twice as high as that of provincial laborers (Clark, "Labor Conditions," p. 842). The 1912 data indicate a wide variance in rates of pay for unskilled workers between provinces, with rates at or near that of Manila prevailing in several nearby Tagalog provinces. Extraordinarily low wages

I

L57

NOTES

were being paid in locos, the Central Plain, and some parts of the Visayas.. In i928 the minimum wage of common laborers in the employ of the Bureau of Public Works was 54 ' percent higher in Manila than in the highest minimum wage provinces. It was more than double the minimum paid anywhere in the Visayas or locos and wasalso higher than the average agricultural wage in any province. BBL, (1929), pp. 140»42. ]ust prior to World War II, rural wages were said to average 58 percent of manufacturing wages iN Manila . (BPS, 1939, 4th quarter, pp. 135 and 170). 11 At that time, land was still available on the agrarian frontier, and the surge of .migrants to Manila was simultaneously paralleled by another to pioneer Mindanao (SBPI ,

1919, p. 16). 12 Because the immigration of.Chinese has always been a subject of considerable

political interest among Filipinos and because they were a special source of tax revenue, fairly close accounts were kept of those who entered and left legally, the greater number of Chinese migrants during these years. More than 90 percent of all Chinese arrivals landed in Manila, most of these resided in the city for a time, and more than half became longsterm residents there. The depth of the 1931 outflow, during the early depression, is exaggerated compared to the magnitude of the decline in exports. This may have been a result of a race riot in a provincial city that year which had Chinese who were involved in small-scale neighborhood retailing as its principal target.

13 During 1908-9, a year of almost equal inflow and outflow, 83.5 percent of all Chinese landed in the Philippines were said to have resided there previously. About two-thirds of 1,500 Chinese arriving in Manila during May 1930 were also said to be returnees. Both of these may he overstated because of the need to meet entry- require». merits, ARICC, 1908»9, p. 121 and Tribune, 1930: 1 May, 9 May, and 24 May. 14 "Smallpox No Menace Now," MT, 19 October 1918. On mortality during this epidemic, see "7 Typhoid Cases Daily Reported," MDB., 3 _lanuarv 1923 and the Welfare Advocate, December 1934, p. 4. 15 "Rice is Hurt by Trancazo," MT, 27 NoveMber 1918. See also MT, 11 and 16 November 1918. 16 Excluding 1918, the city averaged 8,544 reported deaths per year during , 1915-21. The reported total for 1918 was 14,445 or 169 percent of the usual number. Mortality among Filipino Civil servants (primarily located in Manila) for 1918 was 172 percent of the average rate for 1915-17. Reported deaths exceeded reported births in Manila only three times during the period from 19018 through 1940; by 5,362 in 1918, bylll,602 in fiscal 19089, and by 6'?7 in 1907-8. The relative frequency and severity of these mortality crises represented an improvement over the cholera-plagued late nine-

teendi century (SBPI, 1918, p. 895 1920, p. 17; 1922, p. IZ, and 1927, D. 18, Yearbook, 1940, p. 70, Census, 1918, II, p. 1017; Census, I903, vol. 8, pp. 11»16, and Peter C. Smith, "Crisis Mortality in the Nineteenth-Century Philippines, " journal of Asian Studies 38 [November 1978}: 5 1 6 ) . See "Cholera Cause of Labor,Lack" on the tendency of urban workers, in this case in Iloilo, to go to the barrios in hopes of avoiding epidemic . . disease . (MT, 5 ]anuar*y 1917). 17 "Samar and Leyte People Suilering, Little for Hemp and Food is High," MT, 30 April 1919 and "Hemp Grower's Loss is 4pI20,000,000 .. . .," MT, 3 May' 1919. 18 "Devising Plan to Give Cigar Makers Employment," MT, 20 january 1921; "Cigar Makers will Return to Benches at Wage Reduction," MT, 2? February 1921;

Stanley P. ']ohnson, "Reports and Conditions," MDB, 27 March 1920; "No Wage Increase .

.

. for Road Employees,"

MT, 3 February 1921 (also MT, 11 April 1919);

"Shipping Strike is Threatened," MDB, 3 ]anuary 1921; "Allow Yangco to Withdraw Vessels," MT, 5 March 1921; and "Will Accept Ships' Pay Cut," MDB, 31 March 1921 Many of the coconut oil mills were driven into liquidation.

.

I

I.

158 1921,

NOTES 19 On the close brush with Financial panic,see "Business Conditions," SBPI, ; Qankers Optimistic in Rotary Speeches," MT, 25 February 1921, and

Peter W. Stanley, A Nation in the Making, p. 247. On colonial policy and urbanization, see Stephen Low, "The Effect of Colonial Rule on Population Distribution in he Philippines, 1898»1941" (Ph.D. diss., Fletcher School Of Law and Diplomacy, 1956), . pp. 206-55,and 24748. 20 The raw annual data on real estate sales are given by P. D. Carman in "Real Estate," ACCJ, ]anuary 1937. p. 43 and February 1941, p. 32. These data have been transformed by use of the Birnbetg and Res rick import price deflator on the grounds that the cost of construction was closely tied to the cost of imported construction materials which are included in the import index and further, that imported consumer goods, vehicles, and machinery constituted a major potential alternative use of capital which was used to acquire real estate. In the absence of a comprehensive deflator for the domestic cost of- living, it is clear that the import deflator at least captures the major ingationary (1916»20) and deflationary (1921 and 1930-34) trends as revealed by various rice and composite food costs indexes; see figure 5.§

eal Estate Mart Active," Tribune, 11 April 1930 and "Real Estate Business

Dull," Tribune, 22 May 1930. 22 Sales of property .in Binondo, which contained a significant portion of the CBD, comprised from 6 to 30 percent of annual city transfers by value during the 1922-4 I period. In only six years didBinondo's proportion of all transfers exceed 15 percent. These included 1925, 1931 (29.5 percent), 1936, 1937, and 1940. No doubt the 15 percent threshold was also exceeded in 1919. Calculated from data compiled by Ms. Connie Ruidera from realtor P. D. Carman's monthly column of real estate statistics, ACCJ, . August 1921 through December 1941. 23 Using the log of real exports for 1902-36 and the log of real construction for 1904-38 results in a maximum correlation (11) of .729. The two-year lag also produced the best fit of the residual fluctuations after the secular trends have been removed. Note that the actual lag between peak turning points increased from less than a year in 1903 to three years in 1929-32. The strong materials construction time series is based on building permits issued by the City of Manila and reported in sources listed in D. F. Doeppers, "Construction Cycles in Pre-War Manila," Philippine Economic Journal 20 (1981 ): 44-57. The current peso figures for 1902.5-1938 were deflated by the Birnberg and Res rick import price index on the grounds. that many construction supplies were included in the import index. The general validity of using the import deflator is confirmed by a comparison With the price index for selected construction materials for 1931 ~40, the l i m :

of the available data (fig. 5). Construction in light 'materials is ignored here because it was less frequently reported over time. Construction in the contiguous suburban munici. palities is not included because the data are largely unavailable. 24 "Land Sales Show a 100 per cent ]u.rnp," MT, 6 January 1920; "Plan Business Block Costing Many Millions," MDB, 9 january 1920; (The property owner-planners in this'case were Antonio Melian, an Ayala family in law active in real estate development and finance; Gregorio Araneta; Sen. Vicente Singsong Encamacion; Eliseo Sendres of the Bank of Philippine Islands, and H. B. Pond of Pacific Commercial); "Predict New Offices Now" (another Melian project) and "Dru Burke to Do Building," both MT, 13 ]anuary 1920 (Burke was identified as a "wealthy MaNila real estate man")»; "Escolta Property on Calls David Sold at ?950,000 A. Melian I.s Purchaser," MDB, 13 ]anuar'y 1920; "New Hotel Financed by Filipino Capital Soon to be Reality," Cablenews, 14 ]anuary 1920 ("sttgar and rice magnate," Gregorio Nieva and others); "will Construct Big Home

...

Hotel," MDB, 16 ]anuary 1920 ("Ayala-Melian interests"); "Million Peso Opera House

Is in Sight," MT, 22 _lanuary"19ZO (The Opera house committee was identified as

I

F

159

NOTES

Maurice Lowenstein of Pacific Commercial; "Vicente Madrigal, shipping man and

manufacturer; juan Alegre, businessman; Thomas Earnshaw, partner in Earnshaw Slip» ways, and Mauro Prieto, of the Germinal [cigar] factory"); "Roselin Plans New Hotel for Manila," Cablenetus, 22 Ianuavy 1920 and "Escolta Property Sold at ?450,000," MDB, . 21 February 1920. . 25 RGGPI, 1932, p.. 89. On investments in new cot'porations,- see PSR, 1936, p. 2,62 and BPS, 1939, 4th quarter, p. 104. Such new investments were also high in 1930 and 1936. This relationship does not appear to hold true for '1913-20 (MDB, 19 lanuaw 1921). I lack data for the 1920s. .

L

26 D. F. Doeppers, "Mortgage Loans and Lending InstitutioNs in Pre-War Manila," Philippine Studies, in press. 27

The

cycles of strong materials construction demonstrate several prominent

similarities with construction data for cities in industrialized countries and in other

I

dependent economies during the same decades, including. high amplitudes and the concurrent operation of cycles of varying wave lengths. But only with difficulty does not identify in the value of strong materials construction, replications of the 17 to 25 year "long cycles" which were so universally apparent in the construction time series for British, North American, Japanese, and even Argentine cities during the same period. There may be too few years here to fairly judge, and, in any case a great many external factors (e.8., warfare and crop failure) in addition to the basic external export demand regulator thoroughly disrupted the normal Processes of the economy during the first decade of the series. The greatest apparent regularity in the standardized value of construction data is a high amplitude cycle with a mean duration of between 8.5 and 9 years. This interval approximates Schumpeter's "]uglar cycle" much more closely than the alternate trade cycles or long cycle identified by Habakkuk and many others. By this light the Manila pattern indicates either less speculative overbuilding in each cycle, SO that demand exceeded the available supply in the next']uglar, or a very rapid rate of population and demand increase, so that the same erect is achieved, or both. H. J. Habakkuk, "Fluctuations in House-Building in Britain and the United States in the

Nineteenth Century," journal of Economic History 22 (1962): 198-230 and C. D. Long, ]r., Building Cycles and the Theory of Investment, esp. pp. 129-36, and 158-59. See also L. Grumbler et al. , Capital Formation in Residential Real Estate; B. Weber, "A New Index of Residential Construction and Long Cycles in. House Building in Great Britain, 1838-1950," Scottish local of Political Economy 2 (]one 1955): 104-33; Brinkley Thomas, Migration and Economic Growth, esp. pp. 176-78; Henry Rosovsky, Capitol ForMation in Japan, 1868-1940, p. 261; Charles S. Sargent, The. Spatial Evolution

of Greater

Buenos

Aires, Argentina, 1870-1930, p. 86, and ]o.seplt A. Schumpeter, Business Cycles, 2. vols.,

pp. 170-71. 28 More than two-thirds of the three top months for construction applications during twelve annual cycles fell in the January through May do season. About half of the three lowest months coincided with the June through September peak of the rainy season. Sources' RPC, 1903, pt. 1, p. 87; RPC, 1905, pt. 1, p. 525; P. D. Carman, "Real Estate," ACCJ, 10 (April 1930), p. 32; PSR, 1937, 4thquarter,p. 445 and 1938, 4th quarter, p. 273; "City Real Estate Sales," Tribune, 24 January 1940; and P. D. Carman, "Real Estate Sales in $940," MDB, 14 Ianuary 1941. During the 19205, three-foutths of all rice shipments by rail were received in Manila during the December through March portion of the dry season. In the I930s, all of the three annual top months of general railroad freight movements fell during the same months just after the rice harvest and sugar milling seasons of the Central Plain. Conversely, most of the three annual least active months during the 19305 and half

-

during the 1920s fell during June through October. Calculated from SBP1, 1923,

I

160

NOTES

PP- 9:95; i998, P- 101; 1927,pp. 154-55, and 1929, PP- 9? and 1?3 and aes, 1939, 4th quarter, pp. 99 and 102. The receipt of abaca by coastal steamer and -the production of cigars did not conform to this schedule. BPS, 1939, 4th quarter, p. 98 and Yearbook, .

I940, p.- 156. u. 29 Long, p. 155; Thomas, p. 186 and G. H. Moore, ed., Business Cycle Indicators, vol. 1, chapters 3 and 10. 0

NOtes to Chapter 3 1 The 'following offer a good introduction to the broad literature on sevelaml minority communities during the period and, by implication at least, to the ethnic division of labor as well: Antonio S. Tan, The Chinese in the Philippine; 1898>l935; jacques Amyot, SJ., The Manila Chinese; John T. Omohundro, Chinese Merchant Fantilzles in lfoilo; Serafin D. Quiason, "Some Notes on the Japanese Community in Manila, 1898-l941," Solidarity (September 1968): 3968; "Alien Labor in Manila," Labor Bulletin (September 1939): 50I»4; Lewis E. Gleek, ]r. , American Business and Philippine Economic Development; and A. V. H. Hartendorp, History of Industry and Trade of the Philippines. On the Spanish period see Edgar Wickberg, The Chinese in Fhiiippiae Life, 18504898. On contemporary intermarriage among Filipinos from different cultu1~al»Iinguistic groups, see D. F. Doeppers, " 'Ethnic Urbanism' and Philippine Cities," Annals of the Association of American Geographers 64 (December 1974): 54969. . . 2 For an insightful case study of the emergence of important provincial elites, see Michael Cullinane, "The Changing. Nature. of the Cebu ,Urban Elite in die 1-9th Century," in Philippine Social History, Alfred W. McCoy and Edilberto de ]sus, eds.; john A. Larkin, The Pampangans, pp. 84-99, and Norman G. Owen, "Kabikolan in the Nineteenth Century" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1976), pp. 166-67, 338, 347-48, and 377-81. See also Edgar Wickberg, "The Chinese Mestizo in Philippine History, " jowmal of Southeast Asian History 5 (March 1964): 62»100 and john ]. Carroll,

I

S.]., Changing Patterns of Social Stnicture in the Fhilippines, pp. 3031. 3 See ]ohn N. Schurnachei-'s thoughtful review in "Recent Perspectives on the. Revolution," Philippine Studies 30 (4th quarter 1982): 485-89 and also his discussion of the colonial decision no bar Filipino priests from the doctoral program in theology at the

University of Santo Tomas in Horacio de la Costa, S. J. and John N. Schumacher, S. ]. , The Filipino Clergy, pp. 92-96. The long decline in the number of seminarians at the San

Carlos Seminary in Manila after 1877 was also related to the attempt to restrict the role of Filipinos in the church. In Cebu City, by contrast, the number of seminarians continued to increase through the 1890s. Annual enrollments in civil law, medicine, pharmacy, and theology increased rapidly at the University of Santo Tomas after the middle 1880s, but relatively few graduated - apparently fewer than 50 per year after 1882, though this may have been due to a switch from. granting bachelor's degrees to awarding licentiates. The number of pharmacy licentiates awarded annually peaked at 18 in 1889 and then declined. The number graduating from the Normal School for Men, a non-elite institution, also declined after several notable peaks during the 187.05 (Evarista Fernandez Arias, Memofria Hilstovrica-Estadistica Sobre La Ensefianza Secimdaria y Superior en

Filipinos, cuadros 20.-21; Encarnacion Alzona, A History

of Education in the Philippines,

1565-1930, pp. 73 and 14243; Lorenzo Rodriguez, O. P., "A' Century Progress," Acta Manilatia 2 [February 1972]: 14-19, and D- F. Doeppers, "Geographical Dimensions of Philippine Social History," in ]ohn A. Larkin, ed., Perspectiiues on Philippine HiStonhgraphy,

pp. .17-181-

.

'

J

».

|.

161

NOTES

4 See, for. example, Norman G. Owen, ed., Compacire Colonialism; Peter W.

Stanley.`A NatiOn In the Making. chapter 9; lose

Endriga, "The Friar Land Settlement'

Promise and Performance," Philippine Journal of Fublic Administration 14 (October 1970) : 397-413, and Larkin, The Pampangans. in terms of economic power and ongoing family identification with the county-, it would be artiNeial to exclude a handful of the most affluent who happened to be Spaniards or Spanish Creoles and whose primary interests lay in such areas as brewing, shipping, finance, insurance, urban real estate development, and other fields in addition to commodities production. '

-'5 Wickberg, "The Chinese Mestizo," p. 93. 6 Larkin, The Pampangans, pp. 229-33, 29899, and 311; john A. Larkin, "The Causes of an Involute Society- A Theoretical Approach to Rural Southeast Asian History," journal. of Asian Studies 30 (August I971): 794, and Benedict J. Kerkvliet, The Hut Rebellion, chapter 2 and R. L. Pendleton, "The Bicol Region," The Fhilippine Agriculmtmist 23 (September 1934): 248.

L

.

7 On Teodoro, see Balmaceda, "Rises Qbscure Life of a Cigar Maker to One of Foremost Filipino Industrialists," Philippine _loznnal of Cornmen:e 7 (193 I): 5-6 and 17 and chapter 1, above. On "furniture king" Putt, see Alma Luisa Nerf, "Unable to Get a. ]ob iN Government, He Became Manufacturer," Philippine Finance ReView 3 (February 193 I ): 9 and 22. The most interesting of the Filipino-owned factories was the ,

Katubusan cigar factory. Katubusan, which means redemption with both its supernatural and Financial connotations, was founded and partially financed by the Manila -labor movement; At least some in the colonial govemrnent saw it as a thinly disguised "revolutionary society" whose prominent "members" included former officers of the Philippine Revolution and Me staff o f El Renncimiento (a vociferous, pro-independence, Filipino newspaper) and whose workers wore the striped cloth and distinctive hat of the

former Philippine arrngr. In the 19305, Katubusan was owned bY a small group of wealthy Filipinos (unsigned memorandum, 27 September 1909,.BIA file 21488; Melinda Tria Kerkvliet, Mutual Aid and Manila Unions; Tribune, 1 April 1933; and "Emergence and Development of Labor Unions in the Philippines," Labor Review 1 Uuly 1964]: 45»46). On Philippine National Bank loans to the already well-to-do, see Stanley, chapter 9. 8 John T. Carroll, SJ., The Filipino Manufacturing Entrepreneur. 9 It is instructive that Aguihaldo achieved major success only after resigning his

r

partnership in a small manufacturing company and turning CO importing and distributing

(Galang, ed., Encyclopedia, vol. 17, PP- 1344 and vol. 18, pp. 213-15). Another exception was hardware retailer Herirnenegildo Reyes (C. Balmaceda, "Filipino Merchant Builds Retail Store in Manila's 'Chinatown,` " Philippine join-nal of Commerce 7 [February

1931]= 5 and 16).

.

'

.

10 ARDE-, 1915, pp. i6»17 and RPC, 1901, pt. 2, pp. 30342; O. L. Villacorta, "Economic Problems of the Medical- Practitioner," journal of the Philippine Islands Medical Association 14 (1934): 55»6l; Galang, ed., vol. 17, pp. 44-45 and vol. 18, pp. 2 2 2 4 , and E. Arsenio Manuel Dictionary of Philippine Biography, vol. I, pp. 468-71. 11 Carroll, Changing Pacferris, pp. 3I>32. See also James A. LeRoy, Philippine Life in Town and Country, p. 55 and Owen, "Kabikolan," pp. 154-55 and 355-66. On what is "middle class' in a more recent Philippine context, see Carol Holtzman Cespedes, "Away from the Land: The EvolUtion of a Middle Class in. a Pangasinan Town" (Ph.D. diss.,

Claremont Graduate School, California, 1971). 12 RPC, 1900, p. 105; Alzona, especially the analysis of late nineteenth century primary-texts presented in chapter 7; Andrew W. Cain, "History of the Spanish Normal

School for Men Teachers in Manila, 1865-1905," Philippine local of Science 9 (1914):

123-69, and Frederick Fox, SJ-. "Philippine Vocational Education' 1860-1898," Philip» pine Studies 24 (1976); 26137.

1.

I

162

NOTES

13 Glenn A. May, "Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims and Execution of American Educational Policy, 1900-1913," Philippine Studies 24 (1976): 135-83; Be. of Ed, Sur-vey, also known as the Monroe Survey after its chairman, Paul Monroe; Bonifacio S. Salamanca, The Filipino.Reaction to American Rule, 1901-1913, pp. 81-82,

and ARDE, 1923, p. 11. In 1939, almost half of the national population over age nine was said to be literate (Census, 1939, vol. 2, p. 290). 14 john N. Schumacher, S.]., Readings in Philippine Church History, pp. 350-51. See also the "Memorandum" on the problems of English language instruction in ]suit»mn educational institutions written in 1908 by James P. Monoghan, S.]. and quoted in Schumacher, pp- 351-52; Bri. of Ed. Survey (pp. 512-14) on the strengths of several Catholic secondary schools and universities in Manila during the 1920s, and Philippine Islands, Dept. of Public Instruction, Annual Report on Private Schools and

Colleges of the Philippine Islands, 1910»11 and 191142. Of the 56 highest-ranking and mostly Catholic Filipino civil servants in 1931, 33 were sending or had sent their progeny to public schools (Ralston Hayden, "Higher Officials in the Philippine Civil Service,"

The American Political Science Review 27 [April 1933]: 219). 15 RPC, 1901, pt. 1, pp. 138-40, quote on page 139, and 1903, pt. 1, pp. 66831. 16 ARDE, 191041, p.. 28. In 1908 an American ] s u i t educator wrote that the students of the School of Commerce "receive thorough instruction in all the branches necessary for business life, and become proficient in the use of the English language." The graduates of this school secure lucrative positions with the greatest ease . . .," Monoghan, quoted in Schumacher, Readings, p. 351. 1? RPC, 1901, pt. 1, p. 140. Spanish sources agree that the low financial status of teachers was a substantial obstacle to recruiting and retaining male normal school graduates in the teaching profession (Cain, "Spanish Normal School," pp. 146»47). 18 RFC, 1901, pt. 1, p. 140 and 1903, pt. 1, pp. 668571, and ARDE: 1908-9 through 1939. In 1929, 69.4 percent of Manila's public school teachers were women. In 1918 Manila's public and private schools employed 1,594 Filipino teachers (Census, 1918, vol. 4, pt. 2, p. 217). 19 This is not to deny that some Filipinos found employment in the burgeoning

s

a

Spanish bureaucracy of the late nineteenth century. Felipe Buencarnino, for example,

amassed "a little fortune" as a provincial judge and registrador during the late Spanish periods This opportunity was unusual but not unique. After appointment to the new Civil Service Board in 1902, Buencamino lived in Manila rather than on his lands in Central Luzon (Galang, ed., vol. 3, pp. 335-37). See also Owen, "Kabikolan," pp. 71»

'18, 336-41, and 553 and Alzona, p. 143. 20 SBP1: 1920, p. 316; 1925, p. 53; 1929, p. SY; and PSR, 3rd quarter, 1934, p.. 144. Corpuz remarks that after 1913 it was no longer "a colonial service" in the orthodox sense. Onofre D. Corpuz, The Bureaucracy in the Philippines, p. 202. Unlike Corpuz and the American Democrats, Republicans insisted. that the Filipinization program had proceeded with unreasonable haste. For highly contradictory interpreter»

sons, see Hayden, The Philippines, pp. 95-99 and chapters 4-6; F. B. Harrison, The Comer-Stone of Philippine Independence, chapter 6; Maximo M. Kalaw, The Development of Philippine Politics, 1872»1920, chapter 12; W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands , chapter 21, and Daniel R. Williams, The UniteciStates and the Philippines, chapters 7-8 ("The Wrecking of a Government"). ARBCS and, after, 1935, ARCCS give the employment breakdown by bureau, but not by location. Part of the growth of the civil service may have represented absorption of existing government employees rather than new job creation. . 21 Bin berg and Res rick, Colonial Development, esp. pp. 40-42, 62, 78, and 84 and Harold E. Wilson, Social Engineering in Singapore, p. 253

.---

data for 1918-38,

I

I

NOTES

163

Expenditures for "public instruction, public works, sanitation, welfare and other social projects" under Spanish administration of the Philippines grew from 1.4 percent of the budget in Fiscal 1881 to 4.7 percent in fiscal 1895 (Corpus, pp. 139-40). 22 Corpuz, PP~ 206, 23?-38, and 245-46, quote on p. 246 and Hans-Dieter Eyers, "The Formation of a Social Class Structure: Urbanization, Bureaucratization and Social . Mobility in Thailand," American Sociological Review 31 (August 1966): 480-88. The Filipino civil service was severely disrupted by the Japanese occupation, by the high inflation .of the immediate post-war era, and by the rise of the spoils system as a regular part of factional politics. See also "Favoritism Is Confirmed," Tribune, 23 April 1930 and ARCCS, 1936, pp. 1-9. Obviously it is easier to promote the merit system during periods of rapid expansion in the bureaucracy. In the Malaysian bureaucracy this phenomenon was apparent when expatriots were replaced during the early 1.9605 (Gayle D. Ness, "The Malay Bureaucracy," paper read at the annual meetings of the Association for Asian Studies, New York, 4 April 1966). . 23 "Acting Attorney General Formerly a School Teacher, " MT, 23 January 1.921; Isidro L. RetizoS and D. H- Soriano, Fhilippines W'ho's Who, pp. 310-I1; Galang, ed. ,

vol. 18, pP.. 152-53; "50 Pensionados To Be Chosen," MDB, 16 February 1921; and' Felipe Estella, "Finances of the University of the Philippines," PSSR 4 (]anuavy 1932)63. For a list of early pensionados and some of their accomplishments, see William A. Sutherland, Not by Might. By deliberate policy, some of the earliest pensionadoS were from affluent and influential families. 24 Be. of Ed..Sutruey, p. 422 and ARDE, 1929, p. 28.

25 ARDE: 1912-13, pp.26»2i"; 1914, p. 130; 1915, p. 47; and 1929, p. 19; Be. of Ed. Survey, pp. 33236, and Manuel L. Carreon, "Aims of Our Secondary Education," PSSR 5 (April 1933): 112. The four-year data on graduates are for the class of 1921 from five provincial high schools; the eight-year data are for the class of 1918 from nine provincial high schools.

26 On the rise of many of the new professions, see the series of articles in the National Research Council Bulletin, nos. 3»T (February 1935) and A. Tulio, "The Profession of Accountancy, u PSSR 4 (January I932): 48-54. Most professions were "regulated" by laws patterned after those of the United States which established a professional board in each case to issue rules governing standards of public practice and to conduct examinations to determine which applicants would be licensed. In both lloilo and Cebu, journalists and dramatists came to play leading roles in the development of organizations of workers (Alfred W. McCoy, "Culture and ConsciOusness in a Philippine City," Philippine Studies 30 (1982): 184 and Michael Cullinane, personal communication).

27 Quotations from Arno ]. Mayer, "The Lower Middle Class as Historical Problem," journal Of' Modem History 47 (1975): 441 and 41? and editorial, MT, 25 ]anuar'y 1920, respectively. See also E. P. Patanne, "There is No Middle Class in this Country," Variety [Manila], 14 July 1968, p. 3. Mayer's "lower middle class" term might adequately describe the income and status of many clerks and technicians in Manila during this period, but it would be quite misleading to apply this term to most professionals. 28 May, "Social Engineering," and May, Social Engineering in the Philippines.

of Ed. Survey, pp. 319-20; ARDE, January-]une, 1939, and Census, 1939, vol. 2, pp. 212-13. Some of the poblacion-barrio difference is due to the extremely low levels of rural education in the Muslim provinces. In the 1930s, Dean Conrado Benita calculated that only about 14 percent of those who enrolled in grade 1 nationally 29 Bd.

continued on in school beyond grade 7. Reported in Kenneth K. Kurihara, Labor in the Philippine Economy, p. 21. On the chronic shortage of suitable school buildings in Manila as a limiting factor in access to public education, see "More School Houses Needed," MDB, 19 January 1921. .

164

NOTES

30 Tnlnme, l May 1931. Night classes were offered by both public and private institutions. In 1919 an "exceptionally large" number of evening students were enrolled in elementary and secoNdary courses in the public schools, stenography and bookkeeping courses in the Philippine School of Commerce, and in trade courses at the Philippine

School of Arts and Trades (ARDE, 1919, pp. 15-16). 31 ARDE, 1918, p. 88; Bd. 0fEd. Survey, pp. 320-22 and 329; BFS, 1939, nos. I

and 2, 9 292, and Census, 1939, vol. 2, pp. 195-96. I attribute some of the difference in age of first marriage to the same cause - women dropped out of school disproportionately

I

and married earlier than males because relatively fewer jobs requiring education were

open to them then. 32 Actually the survey included only the freshman and senior classes (BGL of Ed. Survey, pp. 323 and 325). The vague categories employed in the 1918 census frustrate any attempt to calculate the rate of school enrollment by parental occupation.

33 Status rankings of such occupational groupings can only be highly approximate due to the inherent limited reality of an undimensional scale, to the lack of a detailed

\

occupational listing in the original sources, and to the problems associated with applying present rankings to the past. Nevertheless, drawing on Lauby's scaling, the approximate

occupational group rankings are, in the order listed in table I I : 641, 755, 512, 582, 514,

384, and 214. These yield an r2 of .729 (Jennifer Lau by, "Indicators of Social Mobility,"

I.

in Measuring Philippine Development, Report o the Social Indicators Project, Maher Mangahas, ed., pp. 440-46). Substantial agreement exists 'among the several attempts to scale occupational prestige in the Philippines since 1957. For a discussion of this, see -Jaime Valera, "The Influence of Location Development Level on Socioeconomic Achievement in the Philippines" (Ph. D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1979), pp. 45-53. The 1925 survey included three public high schools (543 seniors), five "private adventure" high schools (641 seniors), and 12 sectarian high schools (336 seniors). Non-Manilefios were said to comprise 86 percent of the students of the private and sectarian high schools and 25 percent of the public high school students. In the latter case these non-ManileNos may have been especially over-represented in the farm~owner category. . 34 On the instituting of tuition charges see ARDE: 1926, pp. 84-86; 1928, pp, 16 and 24, and 1929, p. 54 and also Hayden, The Philippines, p. 529. Bw/I929, tuition was

being collected in 42 provinces. Manila's public schools did charge book rental and

matriculation fees during the 1930s. These were sometimes waived for the children of poor families affected by major disasters. (Tribune, 17 August 1934 and ARDPW, 1938,

p~34%

.

'

35 Be. of Ed. Survey, pp. 319-20; BPS, 1939, nos. 1 and 2, p. 292; G. ]. Nieuwenhuis, "Education Systems of Philippines and of .lava Compared," MT,

10 February 192I; Gail P. Kelly, Franco-Vietnamese Schools, 1918-1938 and ARDE, 1928, p. 23. Hayden (The Philippines, p. 495) faulted the Dutch system for "not producing among Indonesians . . . the capacity for self government. . . -" Average daily attendance in Manila's public secondary schools increased from less than 760 in 1911 to 8,210 in 1928. Thereafter, and presumably in part as a result of shifting governmental priorities, it expanded more slowly to a peak of 9,354 in 1932 and then declined intermittently during the Great Depression before entering an era of renewed high growth. Attendance surpassed 18,000 in 1940 after the elimination of seventh grade. Several American observers deplored this attempt to educate a greater number to a lesser standard. There was no eighth grade to begin with, and this may distort the comparison

with other countries (ARDE: 1910-11, 1912, and 1928 through 1939; Yearbook, I940, p. 21, and George A. Malcolm, An American Colonial Careerist, p.- 208). 36 Calculated from Bd. of Ed. Survey, p. 326, table 30. 37 Valera, Ph.D. diss. The age-sex structure of a population also affects the rate at which occupational positions are created or become available.

r

165

NOTES

38 james Tobin, "Comment," Journal of Political Economy 81 (March-April 1923);

278.. ARDE: 1910-11, p. 69 and 1931, pp. 174»81; Hayden, The Philippines, p. 527; editorial, Philippine Finance Review I (]anL\ary 1929), p. 19, and Tribune, 29 March 1931, 24 April 1931, and 12 May 1931. Between 1925 and 1930 the number of Manila elementary teachers with some, but less than four years of secondary education declined by 67 percent (ARDE, 1925, pp. 114-21 and 1930, pp. I30»37). In 1930 the Bureau of Education was formulating a plan to dismiss experienced teachers for "lack of sufficient academic training. " Tribune, 17 April 1930. In 1931 the Commissioner of Private Education was directed to require all teachers who lacked a college teaching .degree to secure a permit "before being allowed to teach" ("]bless Face Hard Winter," Tribune, 24 April 1931). Requirements for entering various courses of study at reputable institutions tightened up during the same years. For example, in 1930 nursing schools began requiring a high school diploma (ACCI [April 1930}, p. I I and "Normal School Tightening Up," MDB, 19 February 1925). 39 Hayden, "Higher Gfficials," pp. 215-16. See also Galang, ed., vol. 17, pp. 264-66, Hernandez was from Librnanan, Carnarines Sur. He was posted to the Bureau of Audits in Manila after passing the initial examination. While working in Manila, he attended classes at the Philippine School of Commerce and passed the hoc-kkeepers examination iN 1916, whereupon he Was promoted to deputy and then full district auditor and rotated through -aSsignments in four different provinces. He returned to Manila in 1922, was made manager of the department of provincial and municipal audits in 1925, was graduated from law school and admitted to the bar in 1926, took on a second job as a professor of law, and served as Auditor General from 1935-41. He was subsequently made Secretary of Finance by Fresident OsrneNa. 40 "White Collar ]ob Seekers Disappointed," Tribune, 1 may 1931. At the time of the suspension in May, there were 465 (45 L male and 14 -female) "eligibles" for second-class clerical positions who were without a permanent position in the bureau-

cracy; I 10 of these were said to be entirely unemployed. Newspaper accounts of the layoff of a civil engineer in the City Engineer Qfiice make no reference to a rank or seniority principle being used to decide whom to lay off ("Auditor Warns City Hall Idlers,"

Tribune, 17-18 August 1934.

41 ARBCS 1906-07, pp. 1.18-20 and 1908-9, p. 9. On the Filipinization policy` J

sec footnote 20 above.

42 Hayden, "Higher Officials," pp- 213i17. 43 Hayden, The Philippines, p. 190, etc. See also May's excellent treatment of the policy conflict between Director of Education David Barrows, who favored universal

primary education in reading, writing, and arithmetic on the one hand, and later Governor General.W. Cameron Forbes and subsequent Director Frank R. White, who favored manual training and who cut back on both barrio schools and the amount of classroom time devoted to English and arithmetic. White also argued that a reduction in the number of teachers was necessary to facilitate higher salaries for a better educated teacher corps. May, "Social Engineering," pp. 164-83. While these changes constituted a serious blow to the important goal of universal primary education, May appears to underestimate the value of the resultant public school system, and particularly secondary education, to both socioeconomic mobility and the Philippine economy. 44 Stratified random samples were taken of Filipino males listed in the "Residents" section of the Manila directories for the years indicated. I am grateful to Connie

Ruidera, Evangie Tandaguen, and Mrs. Brenda Orpilla, all &on the Institute of Philippine Culture, for their help in recording, linking, and encoding these samples. The full samples average approximately 1,000 each. Table 8 includes only those potential household heads who were listed as clerks or some highevranking occupation (these comprised 74 to 78 percent of those in the sample), whose occupations were given, and

166

NOTES

who could be traced in Metropolitan Manila for five years. Unfortunately, ordinary policemen and elementary teachers could not be -included in the tabulations because directory coverage of these occupations was curtailed after the 1921 edition. It is possible .that directory coverage is better for employees of medium and large organizations than for modestly successful, self-employed, non-professionals. The sample periods were chosen to fit the incomplete availability of annual directories and to avoid =the change in coverage between 1921 and 1922. I had inteNded to include a 1906 sample in this comparative analysis, but suitable breadth of coverage of Filipinos was not available in the earliest directories. On the questions of coverage and publication history, see D. F.

Doeppers, "Roseristock's Manila City Directories, 1903-1941," THE CORMOSEA Bulletin 10 (December 1979): 1-9. The directories constitute the only suitable source for such broad-based samples. Manuscript census returns were destroyed long ago (the 1903 census schedules were sold as scrap. in 1910), and in any event, the official enumerations were too widely and unevenly spaced to be useful for linkage analysis. 45 The list of automobile owners as of March 1914 is given in Philippine Islands, Bureau of Public Works, Quarterly Bulletin, 3 (April 1914); 46658. lt is likely that 1914 is too early in the process of Filipinization -for the affluence of Filipino non-lawyer bureaucrats to be clearly differentiated from that of clerks. By the end of the World War I

boom, the difference should have been manifest, but by. that time, the Quarterly Bulletin no longer printed such lists. 46 The calculated mobility rates for clerks may be overstated for both the 1926 and 1936 cohorts as .compared to that for 1916, because after the 1921 edition of the directory, economy measures resulted in some reduction in coverage of lower-ranking clerks, and these may have been less likely to change occupational categories by promotion in the next five»year period. In boom times, however, they may have been more likely to resign and change fields. Since the directories do not include personal data such as age or education, there is no way to standardize for these important variables. Suicide is comparatively uncommon but not unknown in Philippine society. Among males in Manila in the 19205, "worry" and "poverty" were two of the major causes. In one notable case, a successful bureaucrat who had risen to the rank of chief clerk in 11 years and graduated from law school, took his own life.after failing the bar exam. Fortunately the struggle for advancement did not often generate such destructive

pressure. MDB, 6 February 1925, and Pablo Anzures, "An Analytical Study of . . . Suicide," _loral of the Philippine Islands Medical Association, (July 1927), pp. 235-42. An

intense desire to succeed in the examination process also produced some notable attempts to illegally purchase a passing score allegedly from relatives of Supreme Court Justices.

-

See MDB, 11-22 September 1928; Herald, 29 August and 20 October-2 November 1928,

and La Opinion, 1, 10, and 28 September 1928.

.

47 A 193136 linked sample of 223 clerks yielded a gross upward mobility rate of 2.2 percent. Since some clerks were laid off' during this period, we may assume that the actual net rate was negative. 48 It is possible that the bonus is not included in the data on which figure I I is

r

based, but the bonuses- 25 percent, for those earning less than ?2,400 per year in 1920

-

and 15 percent for those earning more than ?2,400 were not sufficient to alter the basic pattern of gross decline in real income (Cablenews, 8 January 1920, p. 1). Before the great inflation, the civil service had deplored the fact that ineligibles sometimes worked for years in "temporary" status. By 1919, real salaries for temporary civil servants had fallen so low and the rate of new appointment to the regular service had risen so high that several persons were passing through each temporary position during the course of a year. Figure 12 and ARBCS, 1916, p. 25 and 1919, p. 12. 49 ARBCS, 1917, p. 11. 1

11

167

NOTES

50 This willingness of civil servants to. make career changes in search of advantages continued on a diminished scale during the 1920s. At one point the Director of Education claimed that the slow pace of promotions he had been allowed to make had resulted in the offices of his provincial superintendents becoming "training camp[s] for provincial clerks" as the clerks of his bureau transferred to "other provincial offices, such as those of the district engineer, the district auditor, and the provincial treasurer" where the rates of promotion and pay were more attractive. ARDE, 192T, p. 37. \

51 ARBCS, 1919, p. 14. 52 Hayden, "Higher Officials . . .," p. 214. See also "An Outstanding Financial Leader," Philippine Finance Review 1 (October 1928): I ? and 34. 53 "Many Teachers Leaving Schools," MDB, 29 March 1920. See also MT, 1? February 1920. A 1931 survey of municipal elementary teachers in suburban Rizal found that they were mostly female, averaged 25 years of age, and were typically part of a family of 6.5 persons which they helped to support (Tribune, 29 March 1931). 54 The ofiClcial "turnover rate" in the corps of Manila public school teachers reached a nadir in 1933, averaged about four percent annually during 1931-37, and then rose sharply to 5.4 percent in fiscal 1939-40. (ARDE, 1931-39/40)~ . 55 Quotes from ARBCS, 1921, p.' 13 and ".Annual Report of the Bureau of Posts," in ms. RGGPI, 1921, pp. 2647»48, respectively. See also ARBF in ms. RGGPI, 1922, p. 3101. There were modest cuts in nominal public sector salaries during 1933 and 1934

(10 percent for city officials), but these still left real compensation very high by historical

standards (Herald, 3 January 1933 and MDB, 24 ]anuary 1935). 56 MDB, 13 Ianuaw 1934 and ARBCS, 1926, p. 18 and ms.; 1933, pp. 14-15. Involuntary separation figures for the civil service include deaths as well as terminations

for cause and reductions in force.

57 Rebecca Parrish, "God Given Courage," undated booklet, pp. 2-4. In 1935, 57 percent of all traceable members of the Marv Johnston graduating classes of 1910 through 1934 (N = z48) were found to be professionally employed; ANnual report, Mary Johnston Hospital, 1935, p. 9. . 58 Galang, ed. Encyclopedia, 3rd ed. and Biographical Data and Bibliography of the Vltofrks of the Members and Associates of the National Research Council of the Philippine ' Islands, NRC, Bulletin, No. To (February 1935). 59 May, Social Engineering, appendix A. 60 Akira Takahashi, Land and Peasants in Central Luzon, pp. 36-41. For the case of a highly successful Manila barber who was able to buy a few hectares of rice land in his native province during the 19205 boom, see Walter Robb, "Little Biographies of Men in I

the Crowd," ACC] (December 1929): 15 and 17.

.

61 See, for example, the . notices' of dances and other events sponsored bY immigrants from Catbalogan, Calbayog, and Villareal, Samar given in the Tribune, 16 August-7 September 1934. The Calbayog Association dance was to be held at the

elite Philippine Columbian Club. 62 Calculated from data given in Census, 1903, vol. 2, tables 49 and 50Notes to Chapter 4

1 I use the categorical term "manual workers" because the alternative, "lower class," obscures the brocesses which have produced this segment/these segments of society, because (unlike the middle classes) different groups of workers differ profoundly in the role formal education plays in securing their livelihoods, and because such logical

refinements as upper- and lower-lower class compound the problem by typically relying

l..

168

NOTES

on minor differences in possessions (which defy historical reconstruction) rather than on structural and processual characteristics. The reader can judge whether the glasslike formations I adopt here are any more helpful. See also "Classes and the ConstitUtion," Tribune, 17 August 19.34.

I

.

2 Milton Santos, The Shared Space; T. G. McGee, "An Invitation to the 'Ball': Dress Formal or Informal," pp. 3-2?, in Peter ]. GRimmer, D. W. Drakakis-Smith and T. G. McGee, eds. , Food, Shelter, and Transport in Southeast Asia and the Pacific; T.G. McGee, "The Persistence of the Proto-Proletariat," Progress in Geography 9 (1976), pp. 238; and Chris Gerry, Petty Producers and the Urban Economy. Both McGee and Santos provide extensive surveys of the relevant literature. 3 For careful studies of the operations of Filipino traders in the lower circuit, see Maria Cristina Blanc Stanton, A Right to Survive and William G. Davis, Social Relations in

a Philippine Market, Self Interest and Subjecri-uity.

4 Gerry, Perry Producers.

.

5 McGee, "An Invitation." 6 Chris Gerry, paper summarized in McGee, ibid., p. 18. 7- Elias T. Ramos, Philippine Labor Movement in Transition, p. 1.Ramos draws here on Adolf Sturmthal, "Economic Development and the Labour Movement," in lndustrial.Relations and EConomic Development, Arthur M. Ross, ed. (London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1966): 165-81. ..

8 Morton Netzorg, interview, 10 December 1981. Through such devices, bosses of Manila stevedoring gangs actually received six to eight times as much as entry level stevedores in the 1960s. Randolf S. David, "Human Relations on the Waterfront: The Caro System," Philippine Sociological Review, 15 (July 1967): 135»40. The same system, then known as the padrone system, was in operation in Manila before 1905 (Victor S. Clark, "Labor Conditions in the Philippines," Bulletin of the [U.S.] Bureau of Labor, no. 58 [May 19051, p. 833). 9 John Sharpless and John Rory, "The Political Economy of Women's Work," Social Science History 4 (Summer 1980): 31746, esp. p. 320. 10 "Special Inquiry into the Socio»Ecor1omic Conditions of Tobacco Workers in

the City of Manila," BBL, no. 27 (1929). pp. 90-96 and 170»73, quote on page 90. No comment is included on the procedure used by investigators in their attempt to achieve a random sample. |

u

11 ARBL, 1915, p. 21. 12 Melinda Tria Kerkvliet, Mutual Aid and Manila Unions. 13 "Women and Child Labor Inspection, I928," BBL, no. 27 (1929), pp. 31-35

and 129-31, quotes on pp. 32 and 33, respectively. Tobacco workers comprised 76 percent of all young women discovered in this city-wide survey of 23 formal sector industries. In 1903, girls and womeN cigarrnakers were "almost exclusively" assigned to the production of lower quality domestic cigars, while men made most of the higher grade and export model cigars. X/omen were also then employed as leaf sorters and strippers, in packing, and in cigarette manufacture. Clark, "Labor Conditions," p. 825.

14 "Special Inquiry . . .," BBL, no. 27 (1929), p. 93. On the same subject, see Labor Bulletin (May-june 1940), p. 178. 15 Census, 1939, vol. 1, Manila, table 29. 16 A Bureau of Labor survey in Manila during 1914 reported that 6,004 of 7,913 cigar workers and 2,382 of 2,891 mariners had no experience in alternative lines of work. Lack of data prevents us from discovering if this pattern was more or less common among 'younger

workers (ARBL, 1914, pp. 32 and 35).

17 Walter Robb, "Little Biographies of Men of the Crowd,"'ACCJ (Dec. 1929): 15 and 17 and Rebecca Parrish, "Her Maste1°'s Voice," undated homily, from a copy

I.

.

I

NOTES

169

kindly loaned by Prof. Kenton ]. Clymer. Dr. Parrish was a medical missionary in Tondo from 1906 until 1933. On rural community standards concerning the age at which married women can take out of the home work and still maintain their good reputations, see Brian Fegan, "FolkfCapitalismz Economic Strategies of Peasants in a Philippines Wet-Rice Village" (Ph. D. diss., Yale University, 1979). 18 Herbert S. Pames, Research on Labor Mobility, pp. 162-74. The same values could also occasionally lead to mayhem, as when a unit of 77 constabulary troopers attacked and slaughtered a number of Manila policemen in retaliation for the fatal shooting of one of their comrades. See their testimony in "Soldiers Say They Were Out for Revenge" (MDB, 7 January 1921). Friendship ties were often strengthened by establishing ritual kinship. . 19 A recent survey'of a poor neighborhood in the Tondo foreshore, for example, found that many more male than female residents could be classed as workers and that 70.5 percent of the working women were self-employed (probably working in the informal sector) as opposed to only 30 percent of the working men (Medeleine A. Serrano, et al "Case Studies on the Improvement of Slum, Squatter, and Rural Settlements: The Philippines," Final Report to U.N. Center for Housing, Building, and Planning by the Institute of Philippine Culture, Ateneo de Manila University, October 1977).

20 M. T. Kerkvliet, Mutual Aid and ARBL, 1918, p. 73. On the program Of apprentice instruction on the Bureau of Printing, see Philippine Islands, The Bureau of Printing (place n/g: Panama Pacific International Exposition pamphlet, 1915), pp. 10-

17. The number of Filipino employees of the bureau increased from 175 in 1903 tO 464 in 1913. 21 RGGPI, 1925, p. 96. Cigar worlders also struck La Prueba over the same issue in 1909 (ARBL, 1909/1910, p. 24). In 1903, most of the "maestros or foremen" in the larger cigar factories were still "nearly all Cubans or Cuban trained." Clark, "Labor . Conditions," p. 825. 22 Alan Stretton, "Independent Foretnen and the Construction of Formal Sector Housing in the Greater Manila Area," in Rimrner, et al., eds., pp. 155-69, quote on

p. 160, and Stretton, "The Building Industry and Urbanization in Third World Countries: A Philippine Case Study," EDCC, 29 (June 1981): 325-39. 23 Allied Geographical Section, Manila City, Terrain Handbook 41A, Philippine Series, 6 December 1944, p. 53; Clark, "Labor Conditions," pp. 811, 813-14, and 819; Ciriaco' Pedrosa, O.P., "When the Main Building Was 'The University's," Unites, 50

(March 19?7), p. 108, and Fidel Viliarroel, O.P., "The UST Main Building, A Witness to History," Unit's, 50 (December 1977), p. 121. .

ZN Morton Netzorg, interview, 10 December 1981 and "Racketeering Flmirislies," Tribune, 6 April 1930. See also other accounts in the Tribune during April and May 1930 and the several essays Br McCoy on the cargo handlers of Iloilo City. A postwar study confirms that most stevedoring work gang leaders, foramen, and supervisors came up through the ranks (David, "Human Relations on the \X/aterfront"). Samaban Kapul-uang Magdaragat may be translated in this ease as the National, or Archipelagic, Association

. of Maritime Workers. 25 On the abduction and virtual sale of girls for work as prostitutes, see Clark, "Labor Conditions," p. 837. On the recruiting of prostitutes by private "employment agencies," see Labotr Bulletin (March-April 1940), pp. 134-35 and (]afar*y-February 1941 ) , p. 10 and Tribttrle, 5 September 19.34. Like other portions of the informal sector, illiteracy was reported to be "high" among the 1,458 Manila "taxi»dancers" interviewed be the Department of Labor in 1937 ("Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 193?," .

mimeo, p. 9). "Taxi-dancers" worked in a few large cabarets located just outside the city

170

NOTES

limits. They danced with male customers. Some or many of them, particularly those who were not ManileNos, augmented their earnings by taking customers home for the night. 26 R. Villafranca and M. C. Icasiano, "Tuberculosis in Dusty Trades," Proceedings of the First National Congress on Tuberculosis, p. 166. 27 Census, 1939, vol. 1, p. xvii. 28 Calculated' from data given in Philippine Islands, Manila Railroad Company,

Report of the General Manager, 1930-33. 29 Tribune, 19 September 1934 on the career of Apolonio de los Santos, one of four striking cigar workers killed in a clash with police. See also Proceedings of the First National Congress on Tuberculosis, pp- 35.-51, 92-106, and 147-76; Proceso Gabriel, "Mortalidad de] Distrito de To-ndo," Revista Filipino de MediciNe y Farrnacia (1910): 274-84; lose Fabella, "Public Health and Welfare Problems in the Philippines," 'Welfare Advocate (October-December 1934): 4»5, and SocOrro S. Diaz, "A Social Disintegrator," 'Welfare Advocate (April-May 1941): 61-62. 30 Quotes from "Unemployment in the Philippine Islands," BBL, no. 27 (1929), p. 103; "Fact Finders Meet Today," T'ril7un€, 15 September 1934, and Labor Bulletin (May-]une 1940), pp. 190-91, respectively. See also "Devising Plan to Give Cigar Makers Employment," MT, 30 ]anuary 1921; "Cigar Makers Will Return to Benches at Wage Reduction," MT, 27 February 1921, and "Tobacco Strike Less Probable," MDB,

-

16 March 1921. On the in-migration of unemployed farmers from drought stricken

Central Luzon at a time of high unemployment in Manila, see "No Work in Manila . . .," Tribune, 23 January 1941. 31 Quotes from the BBL, no. 9 (March 1921), p. 16 and no. 27 (1929), p. 103, respectively. See also Clark, "Labor Conditions," p. 834. 32 RPC, 1906/07, pt. 3, p. 1.10.

,`

33 BBL, no. 27 (1929), p. 100. See also Diaz, "Social Disintegrator", "Public Works ]obs Extensive," MDB, 28 September 1920, and Census, 1939, vol. 1, Manila, pp. 110-39 and Rival, pp. 106-34- During the 19205 previous withdrawal was one of the two leading causes of "averageness" among public school students nationally and was occasionally the leading cause at the secondary level (ARDE, 1925, p. 35). 34 Unpublished annual reports of the Bureau of Public Welfare, 1932 and 1934; quote 1934, p. 11. Other "charities" aided by the government in the 1930s included the settlement house in Pace-operated by the Associacion de Damas Filipinas which gave temporary care and shelter to between 300 and 400 children a d women a year (up from 200 in= 1922), and the Gota de Leche which, for an amount equal to the wages of 102 cigar workers. managed to provide fresh milk formula and some medical care to fewer

than 75 babies a month during 1932 (down from 120 per month during 1921-23). These

|

organizations began as charities initiated Br members of the elite, were subsequently assisted by the government through the Public Welfare Commission during the 1920s and became quasi official units it the new Bureau of Public Welfare in the 1930s. The Associacion de Damas Filipinas, for example, was founded in 1913 by the "Wives of the first members of the Philippine Columbian Club" in order to extend aid to poor mothers . in the city. It began receiving a variable government subsidy in 1916 and opened its settlement house in 1919. After 1934 the subsidy was replaced by income from the charity sweepstakes (ARDPW, 1938, pp. 52-53). See also Welfare Advocate (}ulyDecember 1933), pp. .10 and 23 and (January-March 1934), p. 8.

35 "Racketeering Flourishes .

. .,"

Tribune, 6 April 1930 and other articles on

the Magdaragats published in the same newspaper during April and May 1930. " 36 BBL, no. 2? (1929), p. 103; "Sec. Torres Urges Establishment of Colonies," Tribune, 30 September 1934; Manila City Directory, 1941, p. 11; and Census, 1939, tables 16 and 22, respectively. See also "No Work in Manila . . .," Tribune, 23 January 1941 ,

I

171

NOTES

I

"The Unemployed" (editorial), Tribune, 25 January 1941; and "25,000 in Wage Cut Protest," Tribune, 13 February 1941. 37 S. M. Lipset and R. Bendix, Social Mobility in lnclust-rial Society. Hans»Dieter Eyers has suggested that this is also true for Thai Society. 38 Clark, "Labor Conditions," p. 833.. Another interpretation of course is that this particular foreman was a member of another language group and simply preferred to hire his own language and province mates. 39 Labor, Bulletin Trimestral de la Oficina del Trabajo, no. 4 (December 1919), pp. 80»91 and RPC, 1903, pt. 1, pp. 395-97. 40 Milton Santos, The Shared Space, p. 92 and Joan Nelson, Migrrants, Urban Poverty, and Instability in Developing Countries, p. 16. ` 41 In the early years of the century, Pampangans working for the Manila Railroad were entitled to free transportation between Manila and their home province (RPC, 1914, p. 211). 42 AROPW/'C, 1923, pp. 13768. One account reported that money lenders operating in Manila'spublic markets in 1941 charged "as much as20 percentperday on loans to vendors who are in need of capital to stay in business." "Mayor Will Go After Usurers," Tribune, l9]anuary 1941. On conditions in Tondo, see also Gabriel, "Mortalidad". 43 john N. Schumacher, S.l.. Readings in Philippine Church History, p. 368. It is

-not my' purpose to write a detailed bistory of urban workers' organizations during this period, for in any case that will not be possible until Melinda Tria Kerkvliefs dissertation project and William Henry Scott's research onlsabelo de los Reyes are completed. In the meantime, one may consult: ]olln l- Carroll, 5.].,. "Philippine Labor Unions," Philippine

A

Studies 9 (April 1961): 220»54' Clark, "Labor Conditions"; "Emergence and Develop» men of Labor Unions in the Philippines." Labor Review 1 (July 1964): 41-66; Kerkvliet, Mutual Aid; Kenneth K. Kurihara, Labor in the Philippine Economy; Ramos, Philippine Labor Movement; and David Wurfel, "Trade Union Development and Labor Relations Policy in the Philippines," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 12 (July 1959): 582-608, and two recent essays by Alfred W. McCoy: "Culture and Consciousness in a Philippine City, i s Philippine Studies 30 (1982); 157-203 and "A Queen Dies Slowly: The Rise and Decline of' Iloilo City," in de Jesus and McCoy, eds., Philippine Social History, . pp. 297-358. 44 Kerkvliet, Mutual Aid. See also the list of mutual aid society names given in ARBL, 1918, pp. 42-46. 45 Kerkvliet, Mutual Aid. Organizations functioning both as guilds for promoting religious observances and as mutual aid societies also operated during century. Ramos, Philippine Labor Movement, p. 15 and etc.

he later nineteenth .

46 McCoy. "Culture and Consciousness," pp. 157»203. On the relationship between the multiplicity of associations found in cities and the propensity towards collective action, see Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly, Strikes in France, 1830-1968, . esp. chapter 10.

4? ARBL, 1909/1910, pp. 2,»26 and "Marine Guild Now On Strike." MT, l March 1910. 48 For an excellent review of this subject see James E. Cronin, "Theories of Strikes; Why Can't They Explain the British Experience" journal of Social History 12. (Fall 1978): 194»220. 49 Kcrkvliet, Mutual Aid. On the strikes of 1912 and 1913 see RPC, 1912, pp. 17178 and 1913, pp. 20l»2; and MT, 27 February 1913 and 4 March1913. . 50 "Printers on Short Strike," MT, 30 October 1918. On the contract, see ARBL, 1918, p. 73. Although the rapid rise of cost of living was the most general cause of strikes during this period, an intelligence officer reported that the officers and crews of

\

1

172 1

NOTES

inter-island ships went on strike in May 1918 because "they were aware of large profits being made" .. result of the general rise in shipping charges while equipment payments and wages remained relatively fixed. Bureau of Insular Affairs, General Series Record Card 1937, RG350, National Archives and Records Service. 51 RGGFI, 1919, p.. 199. On the tobacco industry contract, see ARBL, 1918, pp. 69372. Potenciano G. Salita was the union's president. 52 "Cigarmen's Pay Is Standardized," MDB, 2,9 March 1920. This standardization involved a 10 Percent raise in piece rates for many cigar makers (MDB, 16 March 1920 and 19 March 1920). 53 Governor General of P.l., extract from cable, 8 ]uly 1919, Bureau of Insular Affairs file 1937-99, RG350, National Archives and Records Service (quote) and BBL no. 27 (1929), pp. 152-53. See also "Notas Biographicas de los Presidentes de las

Asociaciones Obreras de Filipinas," Labor, Bulletin Trimestral de la Oficina del Trabajo, No. 4 (December 1919), pp. 80»91. The number and claimed membership of registered unions fluctuated greatly from year to year. -Many associations were layered in the sense that workers were affiliated with a larger union, such as the Union de Tabaqueros de Filipinos and at the same time contributed to a local branch, or gremio, whose members had regular face»to-face contact in the same workplace. . 54 Again, see Cronin, "Theories of Strikes" .and Shorter and Tilly. 55 David Lockwood, "Sources of Variation in \Y/orking~Class Images Of Society," . Sociological Review 14 (1966): 249»67, quote on p. 250. 56 "Quit Work to See Cock Fights," MDB, 16 March 1920- The "Pintakasi" referred to in the cartoon was a series of cockfights lasting several days which accompanied a town festival as in the case of Caloocan, whose cockpits were iocatednear Torido , just beyond the Manila city limits. 57 Lockwood, "Sources of Variation."

58 Cronin, "Theories of Strikes," p. 212. '59 MDB, 14-3l'Marcl'i 1921 and chapter 2, note 18ai:iove. Similar conditions precipitated the first dockworkers' strike in Iloilo later in the same year. McCoy, "Culture and Consciousness," p.. 191. . . 60 RGGPI: 1925, pp. 95-96; 1926, p. 261, and 1927, pp. 299-300; McCoy, "Culture and Consciousness" and "A Queen Dies Slowly," pp. 340-43. 61 T'ril3une, 11 August 1934. This was also one of' the record years for strikes in the United States, particularly for textile workers, and accounts of these conflicts regularly

appeared in Manila. newspapers. -62 While domestic demand for class A cigars declined by 25 percent between

1930 and 1933, the decline for the cheaper B and C grade cigars was almost two-thirds.

This suggests that

less affluent Filipinos increasingly gave up cigars for cheaper cigarettes

which could be purchased one or two at a time from sari-sun' stores (unpublished "Report of the Fact-Finding Board {on the Great Cigar Strike of 19341," 19 January 1935, pp. 16-17, Bureau of Insular Affairs file 193?~145, RG350, National Archives and Record Service). 63 Quoted in "Strikers Tum Down Raise .O{¥er," Tribune, 6 September 1934. 64 David Montgomery and Ronald Schantz, "Facing Layouts" in Montgomergfs W/'orlcers' Control in Ame~rica, pp. 139-52. I thank David Ward for bringing this work to ' my attention. 65 Estimates of the strike's size are given in the Herald, ZN August 1934, and `

Tribune, 21 and 26 September 1934. 66 Montgomery Worker's Control, p. 92. According to

"Report of the Factflzinding Board" (pp. 2-3 and 19), the strike was begun by 48 unskilled workers, fajinances. The Director of the Bureau of Labor said that it was begun by 1,500 Alhambra

173

NOTES

cigar workers affiliated with the "Kapisanan fig mg Anak Pawis" (reported in Soledad V. Thaddieous, "Labor Problems in the Cigar and Cigarette Factories in the Philippines," [M. S. thesis, Far Eastern University, 1939, p. 2241).

67 Quote from Tribune, 21 August 1934; see also 23 August and 12 September. Only 12.5 percent of the sample of cigar workers interviewed .in 1929 were apprentices for longer than three months. Many had been trained in two weeks ("Special Inquiry," BBL, no. 27 [19291, p. 92).

68 Quotations from Tribune, I t September 1934 and 12 September 1934, respeclively; see also 22 August 1934. .

69 Tribune, all 1934: 21 August; 4 September; 11 September; 16 September; 18 September; 20 September; and 26 September; and Herald, 3 September 1934. The Tribune labeled the La Minerva incident a "police-strikers riot," -

_

2 October 1934. For a

list of the wounded-and their injuries, see the report of the Philippine General'Hospital in Bureau of Insular Affairs file 4865»190, RG350, National Archives and Records Service.

"

70 Tribune, 8 September 1934. The strong local union of the Alhambra workers had been known as Tabaqueros Radical at least fifteen years before the 1934 strike. 71 Tribune, 19 August 1934 and 21 August 1934; see also Herald, 17 August 1934.. On the Katipunan fig mg Anak Pawls, see. Alfredo B. Saulo, Communism in the Philippines, pp. 21-22, 27,.and 100401. T2 Tiribuneg 22 August 1934 and Z9 August 1934, respectively. Another striker interviewedwhile on picket duty was less serious: "Well, this is a gamble. It's like going

to the cockpit. If you win, you go home with plenty of money. If you lose, well. . . ." (Tribune , Aug. 22, 1934). 73 Tribune, 23 August 1934. A contemporary Red Cross study indicated that a family of fwc needed an income of six pesos per week, or one peso per work day, if its mernberslwere to avoid serious health difficulties due to malnutrition (cited in "Report of the Fact-Finding Board," pp. 9-14).

74 75 76 77

Tribune, 28 August 1934. Herald, 20 August 1934. . "Eliminate the Reds" (editorial), Herald, 18 August 1934. Herald, 20 August 1934. . 78 Tribune, 28 August 1934. V79 Tribune, 11 August 1934. See also Herald, 9 August 1934. 80 Tribune, 19 August 1934, see also Kurihara,Labofr. p. 12. 81 "Police Wall Watch as Jobless Match

. . .,"

and "Parade Permit Cancelled,"

Tnlbune, 1 May 1931; "Mob Is Cowed as Soldiers, Cops Charge," Tribune, Z May 1931, and "Reds Are Closely Watched in Rizal," Tribune, 31 March 1931. See also Saulo, ComMurdsm pp. 26- 27.

-.

82 As Mayor of Detroit in the early Depression, Mushy resolutely protected speech and assembly in public places, and even assigned police protection for Communist rallies. Throughout his public career, Murphy consistently demonstrated a deep concern

for the rights of the downtrodden. The newly liberalized policy in the Philippines concerning free speech and assembly for radicals, articulated by Secretary of the Interior Teoiilo Sis of during 1933, was taken nearly verbatim from Murphy. As governor of Michigan in 1937, Murphy used the militia in Flint to prevent further violence official and otherwise, against the sit-down strikers and in general helped to create an atmosphere coNducive to collective bargaining. Although Murphy's role in this famous strike has been widely chronicled, it has only been occasionally seen, as in Sidney Fine's book (Sit-Down: The General Motors Strike of 1936-1937) in light of his experiences with the

Manila cigarmakers' strike of 1934:

I

l

174

NOTES Murphy learned in Detroit and the Philippines that police forces tend to have a life

of their own and that it was sometimes difficult for the Chief executive of a governmental unit to control their operations. In the GM strike he was deter» mined to keep control of major policing activities so as to provide the 'wise policing' that would prevent the sort of tragedy that had occurred during the Manila cigar strike and that must have weighed heavily on his conscience (p. 154).

See also Sec. Sison's report in RGGPI, 1933, p. 112; M. A. Hallgren, "Detroit's Liberal Mayor," Nation, 132 (May 13, 1931): 526-28, and ]. Woodford Howard ]r., Mr. justice Murphy, A Political Biography, p. 40 and chapters 2-4 and 7. Murphy served in the Philippines from ]one 1933 through ]uly 1936. He was subsequently appointed attorney general of the United States (1939) and associate justice of the U. S. Supreme Court (1940-49)83 "Report of the Fact-Finding Board" and Wurfel, "Trade Union Development",

pp. 586-87.

:

84 See the editorial Nom La Defema summarized inMDB, 31 March 1921; "Cocheros Will Make Whoopee Over 'Victor'," Tribune, 27 March 1931; "Blue Sunday Ordinance is Amended," Tribune, 9 April 1931; "Blue Sunday Law Stirs Conflicting Interests," TOnne, 26 April 1931, and "Manila Not Ready to Elect Mayor, Says Also," Tribune, 19 August 1934. Councilman Albo was an advocate of legislation restricting the informal sector. 85 Quotation from "Saving Manila's Reputation" (editorial), Welfare Advocate (julyfSeptember 1934). PP- 12-13. 86 After 1,090 strikers were discharged by E1 Oriented, many "succeeded in obtaining work in other cigar factories, in view of the great demand for bands in all . factories due to the passage of the Payne Bill. ." ARBL, 1909/1910, p. 26.

.

Notes to the Conclusion

I

Hans~Dieter Eyers, "The Formation of a Social Class Structure: llbanization,

y Bureaucratization and Social Mobility in Thailand," American Sociological Review

31 (August 1966): 480-88. 2 James A. Hem-etta, "The Study of' Social Mobility: Ideological AssUmptions and Conceptual Bias," Labor History 18 (Spring 1977): 165-?8.

3 ARBL, 1909/1910, p. 66

,

4 Fig. 14, above and Labor, Bulletin Trimestraf,.no. 1 (March 1919), p. 22.

'

5

Birnherg and Res rick, Colonial Development. 6 james S. Allen, "Who Owns the Philippines?"

The Nation, 144 (24 April

1937); 463-65. 7 Benedict I_' Kerkvliet, The Hut Rebellion and Alfred W. McCoy, "Culture and

Consciousness in a Fhilippine City," Philippine Studies 30 (Znd quarter 1982): 157-203. 8 Lao She [Shu, Ching-ch'un], Ricl(5lla~w: the Novel Lo-t'o Hsiang Tzu, J- M. Jones, trans. There are

3

few recorded instancesof isolated individuals, such as Marcos

David, and these tendril support my point. David, age 60, died alone, without job, home or family, while seeking shelter in a public market building. The police reported that he showetlsigns olsenillny (Tribune, 15 August 1934).

.\

q.

l.

I

Glossary \

Abuloy

(Tagalog) a voluntary contribution of money or help.

Anak paws

(Tagalog) literally, 'child of sweat'; plural and mg ana the proletariat, the laboring class. paws

-

--»--

Barrio

(Spanish) village or township; rural settlement in general.

Cacique

(Spanish) a large scale landowner and dominating {inure in

local and provincial affairs; one of the landed rich. l

Calesa

(Spanish) a horse-drawn cart.

Capatace/kapatas

(Spanish Tagalog, from Spanish) foreman; the individual who recruits and supervises a work gang in construction or stevedoring. J

Chinelas

(Spanish) thong sandal; slippers.

Circular migration

An impermanent migration or series of migrations followed by relocation back to the point of beginning (not commuting), e.g., a barrio dweller spends the dry season working on a construction gang in Manila and then returns EO

his barrio.

Cochero

(Spanish) horsecart driver.

Exchange mobility

Intragenerational mobility observed by following a cohort: through some interval of their. occupational and status

careers. Faji r a t e

(Spanish) unskilled worker, particularly in a cigar factory. |"

Greater Manila Hustrado

Synonymous with Metropolitan Manila (Spanish) a` person who was highly educated during the years when such attainment was rare.

175

176

GLOSSARY

Internal labor market

A unit or sector of employment which typically hires and promotes from within rather Chan searching broadly for

1

possible candidates from other fielcls. Istambay

(Tagalog, from English) casual worker; one who stands by waiting for work.

Katubusan

(Tagalog) redemption, liberation; a Manila cigar factory begun by worker subscription.

Magdaragat

(Tagalogllirerally, 'one who goes to the sea for his liveli» hood'; especially sailors, *"""--*--*""°'°""' llinwnnanuunauaiunun in general; specifically a I

luang Magdaragat, a voluntary association oistevedores sailors, and some others wlfic-E was 5116ge6 to-liave Tween operating extortion rackets in Manila in the 19305. Mahirap

(Tagalog) poor; difficult; lower class.

Manggagawa

(Tagalog) worker.

.

Manilerio Mestizo

I

(Spanish) a resident of Manila.

(Spanish) in the Philippines usually refers to a person of

mixed Filipino and Chinese or Spanish extraction. .»'

Metropolitan Manila

The entire urbanized area of the metropolis. In 1903 this was contained within the boundaries of the oiheial city of Manila. To this may be added Pasay (by 1912), Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Quezon City, and Caloocan, except Novaliches (all before 1939). This term is not meant to refer to the larger metropolitan jurisdiction stab»

r

lashed at the outbreak of World War H or to that estab-

lished under martial law in the 19705. Nominal wage

The actual wage in cash or equivalent.

Gpportunity cost

The cost of sacrificing one opportunity in order to take another, e.g., the cost of giving up one job in order to take another.

Pensionado

(Spanish) one holding an academic fellowship financed bY ` the government.

Primate city

The phenomenon of one city in a system (e.8., The Philippines) being several times as populous as the second

177

GLOSSARY I

largest city or even the second and third largest cities combined. l

Putting out

A coordinated but decentralized system of handicraft production featuring considerable division of labor; a system in which materials such as yarn or cloth are put out to specialized home workers such weavers or embroiderers and aler collected in a central location for finishing and

as

distribution.

Poblacion

I

(Spanish) county-seat; town; the urban or built up portion

of a provincial capital.

Provinciaxio

(Spanish) someone from the provinces; a rural person; . rustle.

Real wage

The value of the cash wage received stated in terms of its purchasing power relative to some base year, i.e., the amount of the wage connected for inflation deflation so that it can becompared to wages received in other years.

Redistribution

The distribution from a center of goods collected from a wider group by customary appropriation.

.

SElI'i.'SE1Ili

store

Tabaquero

Taco-tayo larnang

(Tagalog) a neighborhood store selling assorted convenience items, usually on a very small scale.

(Spanish) cigarmaker. (Tagalog) literally, 'we only'; the moral value of favoring

members of one's own group and support network over others. |

L

0

V

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