Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore 9789814519106

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OF SUCCESS THE MOULDING OF MODERN SINGAPORE

Central Singapore from the helipad of the seventy-three storey Westin Stamford Hotel. (Photograph by the Editors.)

THE MOULDING OF MODERN SINGAPORE Edited by KERNIAL SINGH SANDHU PAUL WHEATLEY WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM

SH.D Huss[J;-.;' ALATAS • W T'\IOi H Y AUWIN • G W BARHIOlOME\1i RALPH C BarA:-"'T. CHAN HrNG CH�F.'. CHENG 500 MA't • CHIA LIN SJEN CHIA 5,0\\.' Yut:. • CHUA Bfd

by horse-drawn vehicles, rickshaws, and pedestrians. The twentieth century saw heavy motorized transport being introduced, and so In the

1920s the roads within 1950s

the mumcipal limits were rebutlt to take the new stresses on them. By the the island had

400

miles of road, generally well built and well maIntaIned.s3 In additIon, there was a railway running north to the Malayan hinterland over the Johor Causeway, which was opened in

1923.

The questIon of transport concerns more than transport: it reveals what officials thought about people, big compames, and the idea of modermty. The obvious early forms of transport were privately owned carnages, gharnes" for hire, and the proverbIal bullock cart. Most people simply walked. In

1880, Japanese-made rickshaws

became very popular and establIShed them­

selves as the first mode of public transport in the colony." Steam trams were introduced

111

1885

but without succe", and ceased operating after a few years.

Electric trams were brought in at the turn of the century, with the incorporatIon of the Singapore Electric Tramways Company in

1905.55 The officials very much

wanted the t ramways to succeed but the company was inefficient and unwilling to update their vehicles. The Municipality had to proVide assistance to public transport by runmng a few buses in

1920.

This move was a failure but it en­

couraged Chinese bus companies to start "mosquito" bus services in the town. These services undercut the Singapore Electric Tramways Company, already in difficulty for other reasons, which went into receivership In 1922.56 But the biggest challenge to the company, and indeed to any large company trying to enter the transport industry, was the ever popular rickshaw. People dislIked taking trams, which only stopped at certain points on the route, and preferred the rickshaw pullers, who could bring them to their doorstep, and for a small fee at that. The number of rickshaws was on the increase, and official hopes that the reverse would occur were disappointed. The officials then decided In 1924 not to issue new rickshaw licences, but modified their decision in 1926 to permit the issue of one new licence for every two cancelledY The number of rickshaws fell from

8,376

In

1925

to

3,693

in

1939.38 Apart

from wantIng to

reduce the threat to any large transport company, the offiCials were also of the view that rickshaws were a thing of the past. This was a time when motor cars. lorries, and buses were more commonly seen, and in comparison with which the rickshaws appeared slow-mOVing, obstrusive, and even dangerous. The motor * Gharry (Hindu gari) denote'i any one of a varlt'ty of carts and carnages, In Southeast ASIa usually the latter.

16

A-Ianagerncnt of Success

vehIcle spelled progre;s and thIs would help the officials project "the showcase image of Singapore as a 'modern city'".59 A new transport enterprise started tn 1925 under the name of the Singapore Traction Company (STC). [t ran trolley buses and petrol-driven buses. It had the blesstng of the Municipal Commission and the aid of the Registrar of Vehicles, who took action to restrict the services of "mosquito" buses.60 As the STC steadily moved into the routes prevIously served by these latter vehicles, official policy towards "mosquito" buses was to persuade their owners to amalgamate and form larger companies so that they could operate bigger buses. This was finally realized in 1935. The "mosquito-bus" operators grouped themselves into eleven Chinese bus companies with 144 buses between them. 6 1 There was still room for improvement tn public transport but World War [[ intervened. After the war, the rickshaw was prohibited and ItS place taken by the trishaw, a bIcycle with a side-car for the passenger(s). There were 9,000 licensed trishaws tn 1947, but theIr numbers started to fall as more taxis and pnvate cars came into use.62 By 1956 the number of trishaws had declined to 4,000. The number of taxis remained fairly constant tn the 19505 at about 1 ,600. The Singapore Traction Company resumed its services after the war, as did the eleven Chtnese bus companies whose fleet had increased to 3 1 8 buses by 195 1 . [n 1956 a CommiSSIon of Enquiry into the state of public transport, chaired by L.c. Hawkins, concluded that it was in need of "drastic replanning" 6J It called for the elimination of "separate ownerships and finanCIal interests" in favour of a single undertaking which would provide "a system of routes planned on an Island basis".6. And it made the characteristic official complatnt against slow­ moving vehicles, of whIch the principal nUIsance at this time was deemed to have been the trishaw. 65 The story of civil aviation in Singapore is an exciting subJcct about which little has bC'en written so far. The British authorities were said to have been initially unenthusiastic-about developing air transport.66 From 191 1 , with the first-ever display flight by a box-kite, to 1933-34, when the aeroplanes of KLM and Imperial Airways put the island on their international routes, there was no civ,] airport, and the Royal Air Force base at Seletar, completed i n 1929, was used instead. This anomaly was corrected with the opening of Kallang Airport in 1937. Kallang was considered the most appropriate site as it was "equally suitable for land planes and for sea planes".6' And Ott was close to the heart of the town"68 - but such a thing would be seen today as a hazard and not an advantage. The Japanese, during the period of their occupation, added to the airport's facilities by bUIlding a concrete landing strip that cut across Grove Road, which was, Ironically, later renamed Mountbatten Road, after the man who accepted the Japanese surrender in 1945. After the war, the breathless sizes to which aeroplanes were built, and the amazing speeds attainable in the new jet age, rendered Kallang A,rport decIdedly antediluvian. A decision was taken in 1951 which bore fruit in 1955 with the opening of a M$37.5 million international

The CO/Oll"'/

17

Legacy

airport at Paya Lebar. I n the years following there flew i n the Fokker

F-27,

the

Bmannia, the Comet IV, the Convair 880, and the Lockheed Electra.69 The development of Internal air services is an Important aspect of the CIVIl aviation achievement in Singapore. In particular, it shows the ability of estabhshed firm' to extend their interests and generate new ventures.7° The first attempt at providing Internal flights was made by an agency firm for motor cars, Wearne Brothers. But Wearne's Air Services, begun in 1937, was not a success. After World War II, the Strait; Steamship Company was the chief shareholder in a collaboration with the Ocean Steam Ship Company (popularly known as the Blue Funnel Line) and the BrItIsh Overseas Airways Corporation in starring Malayan Airways Limited. Mansfield and Company, the managing agent of the Straits Steamship Company, performed the same managerial role for Malayan A irways at the outset. As befits a modern CIty, Singapore had good roads, public transport, civil airports, and air services. In the pertod between the two world wars and im medi· ately after World War II, public works were earned out to provide a piped sewage system, reservoirs (including the Gunung Pulai Reservoir in Johor, operational In December 1929), electric power houses, and street hghting." The essentials and luxuries of modern living were being achieved. In addition. new monumental public buildings graced the landscape and transformed the skyline. Some of the major pubhc buildings and their years of complenon are: the Municipal Building

( 1929),

( 1927), the King Edward VII Collc');e of (1928), Raffles College ( 1928), the Chinese Protectorate (1930), the Railway Station ( 1932), and the Supreme Court ( 1939).'2 The Municipal Building and the Supreme Court next to It were bUilt the Hill Street Police Station

MediCine

(1927),

the General Post Office

to a harmonious plan and with Without equal i n the East".ll

a

view to i mpress all who ,aw them as "an entIty·

It IS against this backdrop of the Impressive colonial CIty that we should con·

sider the next topic, which is the city's ,lums. Provision of housing for the ll1a,> of the population IS an aspect of public policy which reveals a city for what it

is and subjects the responsibility of government to a cmical test. Another pOint that should be stressed at the outset IS that private enterpri,e was not Interested in building homes for the masses;" in fact, private enterprISe had contributed to worsening the condition of the slums. Chinese and Arab ab;enree landlords were given to the praCtIce of dividing and subdividing the space within

a

house

into cubicles in order to maXi mize their profits from rents.'5 The hou,.s were overcrowded, insallltary, and dark, with no ray of sunlight entering. The Labour Commission of 1890 and an Illvestigation by doctors appointed by the MUlllcipality III 1896, III which Dr Lim Boon Keng rook part, brought

the problem to public attention. Appalling death rates in the years from ro

1904

1901

prompted the authorities to mount an enquiry conducted by Professor

W.J. Slll1pSOn, Head of the Department of Hygiene in the University of London. The Simpson Report of

1907 confirmed what

wa, already common knowledge: it

Management 0/ Success

18

was action. not knowledge, that was lacking. Another qUite redundant enquiry wa, conducted in 19 17, and only after this did things start to mO\T. The govern­ ment delegated the task to the Municipal CommiSSIOners. From

1920

to

1927

there was an "improvement trust" set up as a department within the MUnicipality, but

111

1927 it was

made an independent body, the Singapore Improvement Trust

(SIT). The Chairman of the SIT wa, the Chairman of the MU nicipal Commi,­ sion. An improvement rate of

2

per cent was set on all property within the

MuniCipal limits. The work of the SIT was hampered by the greed of property owners, who demanded excessive sums as compensation for their condemned houses, and by the law which favoured the propertil>d classes. A scheme to improve ninety-four houses in Bugis Street Involved the SIT in a protracted legal battle from

1937

1933

to

which went up to the Privy Council where a decision was given favounng

the owners of the houses.'6 Despite the dtfficulties it laboured under, the SIT had some success. It opened up backlanes and built arti>ans' quarters. One of its enduring achievements was the building of a new town at Tiong Bahru, Intended to relieve the congestion in Chinatown It housed

6,600

people and was to have

been the first of a >cries of satellite towns. The 1'iong Bahru project, undertaken in the

1930s.

revealed a gmu deal about the attitudes of people at that time to

mass housing. When the SIT auctioned the sites, few developers came forward to bldJ7 When the SIT had built the flats and shops, there were no buyers and the units had to be put up for rent, not sold off as the SIT had Intended,78 World War Il halted the SIT's functions and presented it afterwards With a truly formidable problem. At the end of the war, houses were destroyed or derelict but the population was on the increase and a baby boom was under way. By 1950 the populatIon had rIsen to well over a million, and wa.sessed the progress of the university Since its incep· tion in

1949, The Carr·Saunders Commission had projected growth over a ten·year penod to a total of 1,000 students: 300 In the Arts·Faculty, 200 in Science, and 500 in Medicine, The actual Increase was faster than thiS, riSing to 1,700 students by the ninth year. However, the desired ratio of Arts achieved· the ratIO

was

only

2,3 : 1

instead of

to

Science students was not

1.5: I. The Aitken Committee was

concerned "at the small number of students studying SCience, too small a number

we think to meet the nec'tls of a developing country",139 and recommended "a vigoro.us attempt" to remedy thiS shortfall. By 1957 the Arts Faculty was fully established; but the Carr·Saunders Commis­

sion had strongly advocated expansion into the field of Social Science, and little

had as yet been done. History and geography we� securely establish� but there was no political science; English literature was offered but no linguistics; social studies but no sociology. Economics existed, of course, but neither accountancy nor business administration. The Aitken CommiSSIOn regretted that so little of the social science programme had been achieved. One bright spot was that a Department of Law 'MIS being started in the 1956-57 session, With the establishment of the University of Malaya, tertiary education was at last available locally, but ,it was limited to students from the English secondary

schools, The fact that there was now a university made no material difference to the students of the Chinese Middle Schools and served·only to deepen their frustration, anger, and despair at the inequalines of life under colonial rule. The university manifestly failed to rise to the challenge presented by the Chinese school students, The Council and Senate were too engrossed with their irrelevant posturing, The professors were absorbed in the improbable exercise of tryl,ng to fashion an English-style university in the tropics, and resorted to labelling the pen ods of the academic year as Michaelmas, Hilary, and Trinity Terms, The Aitken Commission commented on the Chinese school students excluded from the university, It was, first of all, a problem of the university's slowness to appreciate the need of "children emerging from the Chinese speaking Middle Schools". l40 It was a problem of wastage, especially in view of the shortfall of

SCience students: many able boys from the Chinese Middle Schools could have been salvaged to study scientifiC subjects. I" It was a question of taking the'neces­ sary remedial action - "such as the institution of preliminary classes in English or other subjects to facilitate their entry [into the universityJ"."2

Tbe Colomal Legacy

31

Finally, and most important of all, the Aitken Commission saw the failure of the university to admit Chinese Middle School students as a major i nducement to the Chinese community, led by prominent towkay, to establish a Chinese univerSIty. I ;) In fact, the opening of the Nanyang University i n 1956 marked the crowning point of the dual system of education, English and vernacular, that had developed in Singapore under the divisive i mpact of BnlIsh rule MEDICAL SERVICES AND THE MEDICAL SCHOOL Singapore in the early phases of British rule was afflicted with endemic diseases and high death rates but, on the other hand, It was British rule that introduced Western medical science into the country. The popular preference for tradItional medicine was a problem with which the promoters of Western medicine had to contend. It was because of this problem that prominent men from the local com· munity petitioned the government and collected an impressive sum of money to found a medical.school. It was hoped that local men trained in Western medicine would be the medium through which the general popuiallon would be won over to modern medical treatment. The proviSIOn of medical serVIces by the government must be seen in its proper context. In England itself the public-health system developed only in the nineteenth century, and child health received no attentIOn at all, as the stories of Charles Dickens bear out. The principle of laissezjatre was the governing concept here as i n vanous other sectors of life where die state forbore to Intervene. World War II changed all that, and With the implementation of the Bevendge Plan the state "accepted full responsibility for the care and treatment of all sick citizens".I44 Medical policy in Singapore naturally followed the trend set in England. On­ ginally, in the nineteenth century, officials planned to care for only government servants. They gradually extended their services to members of the public but not to everybody in need, and there were many - "the miserable and disgustIng objects to be seen all over town" - who were not cared for at all 145 Officials took the view that the population was largely transitory and people who drifted In and OUt did so at their own risk. But after World War II, Singapore had a Director of Medical Services, Dr W.J. Vickers, who devised the first ever Medical Plan in the history of the colony.H. He advocated medical care for everyone In Singapore "whether he is within our gates ten weeks or ten years".!47 The policy was adopted of providing not a free health service as in Engl and but one at affordable pnces, with the condition that anyone who could not pay would be

treated all the same. The· centres of treatment were, fIrst of all, the General Hospital, which was located at vanous places in the earlier decades of the settlement. Then In 1882 a new building at Sepoy Lines finally gave it a permanent home, where it went through several phases of reconstruction to become by World War II a 7S0-bed hospital. The post-war medical plan aimed at a l ,3so-bed hospital. The Mimi

Managemen{ of Success

32

Wing for children, donated In honour of N.R. Mistri, a member of the tiny but invaluable Parsee community in Singapore, opened in 1955 as a four-storey bUilding accommodating two paediatric wards each of 1 50 beds. l ,g Tan Tock Seng Hospital began as a paupers' hospital founded by a Straits Chinese towkay, after whom the institution was named. Founded In 1846, It was taken over by the government in stages. In 1909 new buildings at a site In Moull]1ein Road were completed mainly at go,'ernment expense, and here the hospital has remained ever Since. After World War II, this hospital was used mainly for the treatment of tuberculosis, the tuberculosis outpatient clinic being the gift of the Rotary Club of Singapore. The development of a maternity hospital at Kandang Kerbau, a relative late­ comer, had to await demographic change. So it was not until 1924 that this hospital started to function, having moved there from a shophou.e in Victoria Street. At this time it had thirty-four beds. A new block erected in 1934 had 120 beds, and a second block In 1940 added another sixty beds. Before World War 11,

maternity cases were treated at Kandang Kerbau Hospital (for free patients) as

well as at the General Hospital (for paying patients). After the war, Kandang Kerbau Hospital became the major specialized hospital for child dehvery. A mere mention must suffice for certain other medical instItutions. These are the Leper Settlement, the Infectious Diseases Hospital, the Venereal Disease Hospital, and the Mental Hospital. The work of the hospital. was supported by health clinics located at variou. places on the island. These health chnics pre-dated World War " but more have been opened since then. In the 1950s t here were fortY-SIx Rural and six City Maternal and Child Health Clinics and three School Health Chmcs.

The distinction betw("'en climcs de�cribed a� "Rural" and Ci t y" cal1s for com� "

ment as it highlights the curious division of labour between the government, which was responsible for health in the rural areas, and the municipality, whIch was responsible for health within the city limits (school health excepted as it came under the government).I" Hospitals were under government control with the exception of the Infectious Diseases Hospital, which was a municipal respons­ ibility. The problem which arose here was the lack of co-ordination between the city clinics and the government hospitals which could, and did, produce fatal

results: "A very high percentage of young children die because they are brought too late" to government hospitals, was the pronouncement of the Carr-Saunders Commission. 1 50 Although parents were in part to blame, it is significant that the Commission put the responsibility on the separation of the Municipal and government services, and asked for "a closer l iaison". 15 1 A word should also be said aboUl the government's provision of dental care. There was, in the 1950s, one dental clinic at the General Hospital and some dental services under the School Health and Maternity and Child Health De­ partments. These services were extremely inadequate" with the result that "the

The Colomal Legacy

33

population has a high canes rate and a high incidence of oral disc'ase and other dental conditlons".1 52 It IS against this background of the medical services provided that we must examine the work of the medical school. The origins of this school should be credited to the prominent Chinese and other Asian leaders who petitioned the government for ItS formation. The leading sIgnatory was the Honourable Tan Jiak Kim. The government in response challenged the petttioners to raise a sum of $71 ,000 and to give their "active co·operation". I S3 The petitioners in fact raised $87,077.'54 The medical school was opened m 1905. The medical school was to serve not only Singapore but Malaya as well, and was called the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States Government Medical SchooLI55 In 1 9 1 2 Its name \vas changed to the King Edward VII Medical School and in 1920 funher revIsed to the King Edward VII College of Medicine. In 1 949 it became the Faculty of Medicine of the UniverSIty of Malaya, whIch was founded in that year. The consequences of being a government medical school from Its inception In 1905 to 1 949 should be noted, for they were conSIderable. The teaching staff were doctors from the Malayan Medical ServIce In other words, government doctors served as pan-time lecturers and a number were designated as professors. This was the first drawback. The second drawback was that the medical school was not furnished with a teaching hospital but was tied to government hospitals, namel y the General Hospital, Tan Tock Seng Hospital, and Kandang Kerbau Hospital. Why were these arrangements disadvantageous? The government doctors who constituted the staff were too overburdened WIth their dual functions to do justice to either one. There was also the attitude of the government doctors towards higher education in the colony, which was not encouraging to say the least. The use of government hospitals as teaching hospItals was another dis· advantage. It was a disadvantage firstly to the hospitals m that the doctors were unable to gIve full attention to the care of the sick 156 And It was bad for the medical school because It meant that medical training was geared to service and routine at the hospitals: 157 teachmg and research became the casualties. This unfortunate tradition of service and routme which began WIth the government medical school was perpetuated long after the Faculty of Medicine was established. The medical school offered a five-year course leading to the Diploma of Licen­ tiate in Medicine and Surgery (LMS Smgapore). In 1 9 1 6 the General MedIcal Counetl of Great Britain recognized thIS diploma. The school attamed another mIlestone in 1925 when the Rockefeller Foundation gave a handsome grant making possible the establishment of chaIrs in bacteriology and biochemistry. As a condition of the grant· the government created a chair I n bIOlogy. A chair in dental surgery was endowed m 1929. The prestige of the school was greatly enhanced when the League of Nations chose it as the venue for courses on malariology, held yearly from 1934 up to the outbreak of war. By the time of

34

Management of Success

World War ll, the school "was generally recognized as having a high standard of undergraduate medIcal education".';' Despite these advances, postgraduate studIes took a back seat: "little or no effort was made to encourage post.graduate education or to permit speclalizatlon".);9 Befoie the war the only postgraduate work available was the malariology course. After ,the war the only kind of postgraduate study instituted was in the field of public health: a one-year course leading to the DIploma in Public Health was instituted i n 1953. But then most students preferred clinical studles.'60 The lack of postgraduate ,tudles was commented on by SUCCessIve CommiSSIons of Enquiry into higher education. The Carr·Saunders CommIssion of 1948 stated that research "requires specIal empha.�is in medicine where profeSSIonal respons·

ibilities are so pressmg and the purely vocational aspects of education so great".'·1 It also stressed that the new UniverSIty of Malaya should be proVIded with a teaching hospital, addmg that: Here It should be noted that in the most dIStinguished "hool, in the United States space for laboratories and offices of the climcal depanmems IS at least equal to that in the wards 10'

The Lindsay·Keir.Commls�lon of 1953 held out the prospect of conducting postgraduate work at Kandang Kerba.u Hospital up to the standard recognized by the Royal College of Obstetricians and GynaecologIsts. An application was made to thIS U.K. body but, after conducting an inspection, the Royal College dechned to accord its recognition to the hospital 1 6J The Aitken Commisston of 1957 again expressed concern about the lack of research and postgraduate work. It put ItS finger on the problem of the over· lapping' functions of the "University staff" and the "Government staff": "the UOIversity staff should have theIr share of routine clinical work kept within hmits, and the Government staff should have their share of teaching kept within limits".'"' The University staff, it said, had the extra duty of teaching and research i n theIr particular fIelds. "Their research should be somethmg more than the recordmg of' cases and the study of case-records . . . . "165 The need could not have been stated more bluntly. What were the reasons for this long·standing dehciency? The chIef cause was finance: government grants would have to be increased substantially if the uni· versity was to get the staff, space, and equIpment needed ' for research. A nother reason was the precedent set by the colonial government of looking to Britain to send out the specialists. In this connection Professor A.A. Sandosham wrote: Study faCIlities for the post·graduate medical man are practically non·existent in thIS country And yet, if we do not desire to perpetuate the practIce of recrUIting most of our speciaI.sts in our Public Services from the United KIngdom and if we arc to fulfil our avowed intention of preparing suttable local students to aspire for thc!)c posts then adequate facilities must be pro­ VIded for post·graduate study The responsibiI.ty for this lie> both with the University and the Government Medical Departments. 1 66

The Coloma! Legacy

35

The third reason which can be adduced is the fact that the British medical profession as a whole was slow to adopt specialization, and this slow progress had an effect on the colontal medical institution in Singapore. For example, the first chair in paediatrics was established in Britain only just before World War II whereas in Europe and A merica paediatrics was recognized as a specialist field in the nineteenth century.167 The chair of paedIatrics in Singapore was endowed only i n 1962. If the college was a non·starter in research, Its forte lay In the training of undergraduate doctors. Under some inspired and well-loved teachers such as G.A. Finlayson, J.G. Harrower, R. Brunei Hawes, and G.A. Ransome, the college bUilt a fine reputation and took pride in ItS bedside instruction. Medical education was inaugurated in 1 905 and completed its first fifty years In 1955. I n this period the number of doctors graduated was 429 with LMS diplomas between 1905 and 1949, and 2 1 6 with MBBS degrees from 1950 to 1955, making a IOtal of 645.1 68 ThiS IS not a very impressive figure for a fifty-year penod. The Lindsay-Kelr CommiSSIOn of 1954 recommended an intake of abour 120 annually with a view to getting about' one hundred qualified doctors from each batch. 169 The intakes in the years 1955 to 1958 were well below that figure, being respectively 83, 77, 89, and 80.170 The doctors trained in this period were not all meant for Singapore but were shared with Penang, Melaka, and the MaLay states. Singapore attracted a n"Jor share, but there was a shortage of doclOrs all the same, although It was not as

severe as in the other states. In S ingapore In 1956 the ratio of doctors l71 to the population was I : 2,400, an unfavourable ratio when compared With the advanced countries of the time. Given this situation in the medical field, it was to be expected that Singapore would not have enough qualified dentists; in fact, there were far too few of them. The ratio of qualified dentists to populatIOn In 1956 was 1 : 20,000.171 No wonder that at this time there was scope for the operations of 251 unqualified but registered dentists. Given the bleak picture so far, it is a foregone conclusion that when it came to specialists in medicine and surgery, Singapore would be abysmal. There was one specialist to 22,500 of the populationY3 Calculated in terms of hospital beds, the ratio was one specialist per 107 beds or one per sixty acute beds. These ratios were far below the standards set by the World Health Organization. The range of specialization was also lImited as there was no one In SIngapore prior to the late 1950s who was qualified In neurosurgery, thoracic surgery, plastic surgery, neurology, urology, or dermatology. Clearly, thOe main thing that the King Edward VII College of Medicine and its successor the Faculty of Medicine could attempt to do, and do well, was to train general practitioners. But even with this chosen priority there was a problem. The Faculty of Medicine in the 1 950s could not train enough doctors to meet the expanding medical services and the groWIng demand by the puolic

36

Management of Success

whose faith in Western medicine had been strengthened by the "wonder drugs" in use in this period. THE POVERTY PROFILE One of the most lasting legacies of Bntish rule in Singapore is seen in the very society and nation that were built up through immigration. Although the govern· ment was happy to let market forces determine the process of immigration, it could not altogether avoid responsibility or plead neutrality. The periodic trade cycles, for example, the slump of the 1 920s and (he Great Depression of the 1 930s, called for government action, which was i n fact forthcoming. Then again, the amcude of the government as expressed in the preference for female immi­ grants to offset the excess of males was to have far-reaching effects through the encouragement of marriages, family formallon, and local residence. As part and parcel of immigrallon there arose problems of sickness and destitution which demanded a response from the state, and this led to the beginnings of Public Assistance and of the Central Provident Fund. In all these ways, British rule left an important social legacy, the significance of which must be seen in the perceptions and attitudes of the rulers towards the issue confronting them, and not merely in the inStltutions created to resolve these issues. It is a well-known fact that the Chinese, Indians, and Indonesians who formed the'bulk of the immigrant population of Singapore were mostly men, and that for a long time few women ever migrated to those shores. The result was that "households· were formed without the presence in them of "families". Such house­ holds consisted of single persons, and this peculiar type of household persisted right up to the 1950s and beyond. The household which was also a family in the sense of a man and his wife and children was not a major phenomenon among the Chinese, Indians, a�d Indonesians until the 1940s and 1950s. For obvious reasons, only the indigenous Malays were hving as a family, the norm dating from a long Ilme back. The British may be said to have had a hand in the formallon of families among the immigrant commumties. During the Great Depression of the 1930s, when schemes to repatriate workers and to restrict immigration were implemented, women were exempted, which is to say they were refused repatriation and not prevented from entering the country. l74 Again in 1 953 when immigration laws were revised, wives and children from China wishing to join their men already in Singapore were not barred from entry into the country. The ratio of males to females in the population was thus helped to attain a more normal level and family life was possible for more people. The normalization of" the sex ratio and the rise in the number of families being formed SOon announced themselves in a major demographic event of the 1950s known as the 'post-war baby boom. Men were the chief income earners in the family and the father was often the sole breadwinner. In the early post-war period labour was scarce and unemployment

71Je Colonial Legacy

37

checked, but in the years between - say, 1947 and 1953 the number of people I une,nployed had risen markedly. ]; The working populatIon consisted of large -

numbers who were hawkers, trishaw riders, taxi drivers, and shop assistants, and it is a question whether these occupations could be regarded as full-time labour. More likely, as was suspected at the time, they represented a species of underemployment or even hidden employment. Another negative aspect was the practice of employing workers on a casual or short-time basis, as was the case with much labour on the docks and in the 1950s. But there

was

m

the budding and construction Industry

still room for optimism, and an expert opinion in

1957 held that unemployment was not expected to be a severe problem In the immediate future, although it was expected to be subsequently when children born after the war would have grown up and new jobs would have to be created for them. 176 The demographic and economic trends noted above formed the baSIS for gov· ernmental action to alleV I ate poverty In the post-war era. Before the war, no government help was available to the needy; there was, however, the Silver Jubilee Fund, a chantable trust set up in 1936 WIth contribution> from the public and

the government. The radical thinkIng on welfare In post·war Britain and the war·ravaged conditions in Singapore caused an important step to be taken, namely, the establIshment of the Department of SOCIal Welfare In June 1946. One of the first things the Department did in order to establish a solid basis for its work was to conduct a social survey. ThIS survey, A SoC/al Survey of Smgapore, 177 published in December 1947, was followed by another on urban Incomes and housing, carried out in 1953-54. The author ohhese surveys was Goh Keng Swee, the then Assistant Director of Social Welfare. These surveys were

a

pioneering effort

of great significance and were clearly rL'garded as authoritative by government committees, as well as by the International Labour Organization, which rehed on their findings and quoted them extensively in their own reports. The survey, Urban Incoml!S alld HOllsmg, was "confined to households in which no earner has an income of $400 a month or more liVing within the city limits of Singapore". 178 It was intended to cover manual workers and lower-grade white-collar workers in the urban population. Some 6,070 households came WIthin its Income limit. After presenting the data on Income, the survey pro­ ceeded to test their adequacy. Two minimum subsistence standards for dIsposable income were established: Standard A, which included food, clothing, housekeep­ ing, and personal expenditures, and Standard B, whIch included in addition the cost of sending

a

child to school. Under Standard A it was found that 1 9 per

cent of the households In the survey were in poverty, and under Standard B the poor households amounted to 2 1 per cent. The households in poverty covered 25 per cent of all people, 30 per cent of the children, and

30

per cent of the

elderly In the urban population. The survey attempted to identify the causes of poverty, the chief of which were found to be interruption of earnings oWing to sickness or unemployment,

Management of SlIccess

38

casual labour, old age, and the death of the family breadwinner. In households

where earnings had not been interrupted, the main cause of poverty was large family sizeY9 The worst cases were widows with young children and house­

holds where all potential earners were unemployed and not receiving public

assistance. t SO

What type of public assistance was available? It took the form prImarily of

a scale of allowances for the aged, disabled, widowed, and orphaned, and for

the unemployed. There was also an allowance for tuberculosis sufferers whose

prognosis was good (a Darwinian "law" at work no doubt) and "whose return

to their former workIng capacity seems likely within a reasonable space of time, provided rest and adequate dIet arc obtained under treatment" . 1 8 1

PublIc assistance did help to relieve social distress but not to the extent that

it lifted the households dependent on it out of poverty. Among the households

partly dependent on public assistance,

53

per cent still lived in poverty. As for

those households wholly dependent on publ tc assistance, 40 per cent were living at a level which was more than 50 per cent below the pOVerty line.1 82 . The problem of poverty touches the whole field of SOCIal-security provIsion,

so some of the other ways designed to protect the worker and his family should

be mentioned, if only in passing. The Workmen's Compensation Act of 1954 provided relIef for occupational dIsease and injury, dIsablement, and death through

aCCIdents at work. The Public Health Services provided medIcal care. In the wards

and out-patient clinics of the government hospitals, free treatment was given

to those who could not afford to pay. However, it should be stated that the health services were wholly inadequate for the task facing them. By far the most slgmftcant measure ever introduced was the Central Provident Fund, legIslated

'in 1953 and put into force on 1 July 1955. This was, and today sull is, a retire­ ment fund based on contributions by employers as well as employees, and has been compared to a savings bank "with compulsory membership and compulsory accumulation of deposIts at intercst". 1 83

It is enlIghtening to look at the ideas and assumptions behind these social security measures. British rule, we need no reminding, was essentially lalssez-jalre. It was the tradition in Singapore for the worker to look to hIS employer and not to the state to provide hIm with medIcal care and other benefits. The state

felt no obligation to protect workers in this sense, and its way of dealing with

unemployment and destitution was to repatnate workers and restrict immigration until good times returned, when once again new arrivals would be welcomed.

This method may be likened to the turning on and off of a tap, and the im­ migrant character of much of the labour force in Singapore and Malaya was

susceptible to Its operation.

After the Pacific War the social revolutIon in Singapore requIred that the state assume greater responsibility, and thIS it dId through forms of public asSIstance.

BUI the underlying notion has persisted, and is seen most notably in the,arrange­

ment whereby the employer contributes to the employee's provident fund. The

77Je Colomal LeW'CY

39

state's perception of the problem of poverty is also very much in character In the key document, U,.ban Incomes and HOl/smg, the cause of poverty was ",,"umed to be the IOdividual and the Immc-ciJate situation in which the poor lived (unemployment, sickness, death, large family). The Report 0/tbe Commzttee on MZnlml/m Standards 0/Lzvelzbood, chaired by Sir Sydney Came in 1957, exhibits the same tendency as does the Report to tbe GlY'vernmellt 0/ Smgapore on SOCIal Securzty Meamres, although thiS report was prepared at the same time by an expert from the International Labour OffIce. In all the official thlOking on poverty, It is clear, the onus was placed on the individual and the immediate .ituation he was in. An alternative view would have been to IOvolve the rest of society and general social and economic constraints as having a part 10 the fashioning of the poverty trap. Those who had a bigger slice of the cake should, on this View, have been prepared to share it with those who clamoured only for the crumbs. Such a solution did cross people's minds, but it was also recognized as not being easy to apply: "The competitive nature of Singapore's economy suggests that any measures for redistributing income should be planned with due regard to their effects on business costs" was the way the Caine Committee put It.'84 CONCLUSION The leitmotiv of Singapore's history is free trade. Free trade is, first of all, an idea thrust forth by the British Industrial Revolution. The idea is that trade knows no barriers that sea or land or man can set in its path. The trader 10 pursuit of his proper objective IS the exemplar of what lIfe on earth is all about. This idea, nurtured 10 the mlOd of Sir Stamford Raffles, was translated into reality on a strategic island, Singapore, which he founded as the entrep6t for Bntlsh trade in Southeast Asia. The Idea, once put into effect, succeeded beyond all expectations. The importance of free trade IS reflected, not least, in the type of government and the laws that took shape in the colony. The Civil Service, the judiciary, the municipality and, from 1867, the legislative Council were all supportive of free trade. They worked together to give the free traders the benefit of efficient, yet light, government, legal rights to their life and property, and a say in matters affecting their interests. The idea of free trade lay at the root of Singapore's prosperity, of the influx of entrepreneurs, capital, and people, and of the institutions created to facilitate the bUYlOg and selling that went on, institutions that were to become part of the character of the free port. The British agency house was the key instrument 10 the trade 10 manufactures and raw materials, and the channel through which Western capital and management skills were applIed to new ventures in rubber planting and i n the banking, shipping, and airline services. The British agency house, in association with Chinese compradore and retail roles, bear eloquent testimony to the efficacy of free trade.

40

Management of Success In order to have trade you had to have government, and In turn government

provIded the framework withm which a whole lot of development. could take

place. British rule In Singapore was the framework withIn which a whole new metropolis of trade and people was built up from scratch. There was the building of a world-class port and harbour furnished with an impressive line of docks and wharves. There was also a modern my built alongside the POrt and harbour, its gateway to the world. The city was Indeed a modern construction. Singapore, even in the days of British rule, lacked historical atmosphere and had few monuments erected for purely commemorauve or decorative purposes. It was a cIty solidly built to facilitate the fu nCtlons of tradIng houses, banks, and government offices. Grace, elegance, and beauty were not altogether absent, but the emphasis of the builders was on the utihtarian and modern father than the aestheuc or antiquarian. So the chief glories of BritlSh ru le, as far as the urban landscape was concerned, must be looked for in such things as piped sewers, ventilating backlanes, impounding reservoirs, power stations, metalled roads, mechamzed publ i c tramport, and civil airports and airline services. The British understood the need to invest in infrastructure and SIngapore was their show-piece, an artefact of colonial design and engineering skIll. The British in Singapore measured success by the amount of trade secured and the mIles of roads paved. But what about schools, hospitals, and low-cost housing? In the matter of schools and hospitals the government invoked laissez­ faire prinCIples and expected philanthropic contributions from private individuals who had benefited from the free trade system. These contributions were not lacking; mdeed. there were umes when the private sector evinced such concern

and gencro�lty as to put the government to shame. Yet,.paradoxically, this served

only to affirm the validity of the lalSsez-jam! style of government. But obviously there are l i m I ts to what private indIviduals can do, and smce the prevalent idea in government and commercial circles alike "'"s laISsez-faire, progress on the socio­ economic front was slow. Schools, hospitals, and homes for the people were either not enough or not up to standard. Private enterprise fought shy of low-cost housmg development, although It was more supportive of schools, hospitals, ana hIgher educauon. However, higher education sufiered additionally from the grudging approval, Jealousy, and foot-dragging of officials. The medical school after fIfty years remained a basic-training institution with no fatiliti.. for advanced chnical research. Another reason why schools, the college, and the university evolved sl!>wly was that Singapore "'"' an entrepot of trade and British adminis­

trators dId not perceive the need in such a place for hIghly trained m anpower. So far we have been concerned with the tangible aspects of British rule. But Bmish rule also had an intangIble, spiritual dimension to it ·which should be noted if we are to arrive at a true perspective,of things. As an example of what \\e mean, we may cIte that quality of panache and pride which we have associated WIth the will and the leglt1macy to rule. The British saw themselves as the

The Colomal Legacy

41

best rulers i n the world, uniquely endowed to administer the diverse races of mankind. It "'a' this belief in their capabilities that sustained the British in their imperial ventures, often in very difficult circumstance, This self-perceived greatness also had its unattractive side as when It was manifested in the Social Darwinian concept of Anglo-Saxon superlonty. But the more beneficial effects of the British perception of themselves as a unique imperial power should not be forgotten. At Its best Bntish rule set standards of justice, efficiency, and incor­ ruptibility which In turn generated feelings of well-being, trust, -and confidence in the subject peoples. The ideal of good clean government is surely one of the most important legaCies bequeathed to the Republic by the Bntish. In Singapore today, thiS legacy IS one of the strengths of its pubhc hfe. Singapore, thanks to its strategic location, came to stand for something more than trade alone. In the Increasingly troubled world of the 1920s and 1930s, Singapore "'as the pivot of British imperial and military strategy in the East. But that role was severely undermined when Britain was at war simultaneously In Europe and in the East. Singapore, the symbol of imperial prestige and im­ pregnability, fel l to the Japanese on 15 February 1942, and was occupied until September 1945 The fall of Singapore carried vast political consequences. It signalled the end of empire, ' not just the British Empire but the empires of every other European nation as well. The myth of the white man's supenority was shattered on that day In Singapore. When the war and the occupation were over, the returning British undertook the restoration of the economic infrastructure. ThiS meant that committees were formed, and the administrator's hfe in the immediate post-"'ar era was "committee­ ridden".'s; A little later the administrator had to put up with another plague in the shape of efficiency experts.1B6 Still, there was leeway for the "gifted amateur" to exercise his initiative as Sir Andrew Gilmour did in his action to rekindle trade with Indonesia through a rather novd device. The shortage of ships was a major factor hindering the revival of thiS trade. Gilmour therefore organized a committee, with himself as chairman, to license unconventional water-borne craft which might not otherwise be permitted to sail.187 Andrew Gilmour be­ heved that the restarting of trade with Indonesia was vital to the pro'perity of Singapore's entrepot commerce. He alw argued in conferences 10 London for a relaxation of the economic controls which were good for the United Kmgdom but bad for Singapore. Singapore lived by trade, never more so than in this period when she had to pull herself up from the ashes of war. But political dissent was also appearing 011 the horizon, and to their credit the British did not try to snuff it out but rather fostered its growth. The men responsible for Singapore at rhis time mcluded the Governor Sir William Goode and the Colomal Secretary, the Rt. Han. Alan Lennox-Boyd, who knew there was no return to the imperial day but that the clock was ticking away to signal its end. So the Bntish introduced elections and constitutional changes and drew up schemes of political union and federation m which Singapore was considered

42

Management of Success

in relation to·the other British territories In Malaya and Borneo. But the passage to self-rule and independence for all of these territories was fraught with danger and difficulty. The British had on their hands an armed commUnIst revolt in Malaya and communist subversion in trade unions and schools In Singapore; and they faced the additional problems posed by communal conflict In the poli tical arena, all exacerbated by the imminence of their departure. The situation would have been dismal indeed had It not been for the fact that educated men who were neither communists nor communalists at heart came forth to take up what was the greatest political challenge of their time. The British held the ring as the various forces jostled for power. They were good at holding the ring as they had performed this function for decades past for traders and merchants. Now, In the political struggle that was coming to a head, the British held the ropes taut until the genuine leaders able to take over from them emerged victorious. SIngapore attained self-government in 1959, and after an inauspicious inter­ lude as part of the Malaysian Federation, became a fully independent nation In 1965. Since 1959 there has been a total restructuring of the island's economy and society. The chief glories of SIngapore today, .as in the past, are in the realm of the utilitarian, but they are now on a scale undreamt of in the colonial era, and they provide new symbols of national pride .and achievement. The year 1981 may well be cited as a landmark in Singapore's post-independence transformation. 1n that year Phase Four of the East Coast Parkway, comprising the Benjamin Sheares Bridge, was opened to traffic, Changi 1nternational Airport was brought into operation, and the new Singapore General Hospital was declared open. The creations of the British period would pale in companson with their counterparts in the 1980s. Then again, the British hegemony should not be assessc..:! in solely material term •. One hundrl·d and forty years or so of British rule have etched on the SIngapore consciousness certa i n prin cipl es and values whIch have become part of the national ethos. Singapore today IS a country where the responsibility of government IS assumed as a sacred trust, where the pnme minister sets the tone of public life as the colonial governor onCe did, where the rule of law prevails, where corruption and graft are·'cnous offences, where Commissions of EnqUIry are appointed when matters of national importance are at stake, where civic­ minded ness IS a liVing reality, and where the public loves justice and fair play. It is thIS combination of the spi ritu al and tangi bl e aspects of our col onial heritage that makes It such a power for good. A final word is offered by way of ep ilogue. In September 1986 the Prime Minister oLSingapore offered an obituary tribute to the late Sir WIlliam Goode, the last Governor of Singapore. The Prime Minister threw light on h,s relations with the late Governor whose work and personality he clearly admired. But the tribute also resonated with the Bntish achievement which was rounded off so happily and smoothly by the late last Governor. Lee Kuan Yew wrote:

The Colomal ugacy

43

HIS Intl'grIty, competence and commitment to a proud code of conduct enjoined him to hand over an admlnl�tratlOn In good working order So I Inhented an administration effcctlve both in improving the llvcs of the people and In dealing with the communists. It made a difference to the hl!>tofY of Singapore 188

NOTES I.

2. 3

4. 5.

6.

7. 8 9.

There IS COpiOUS literature on thiS subject but the follo\\ ing book, will be found useful and stlmulatillg' C.R. Boxer, The DlIlch Seaborne EmpiYl! /600- /800 (London: Hutchinson, 1 965); C.R. Boxer, The Porlllguese Seaborne Empm: /415-1825 (London. Hutchillson, 1969, repnm cd., 1 977); Holden Furber, RIval EmpiYl!s oJ Trade In the anent (Mill neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1976), and K.N. Chaudhun, The Tradmg World oJ AS/a and the East Indza Company /660- 1760 (Cambridge: Cambndge UmverSity Pre"" 1978). Boxer, DlIlch Seaborne EmpIre, pp. 199 and 200-1 ; Furber, RIval EmpIres, pp. 92, 130, and 245-46. Some useful sources on this subject are J. Walker, BntlSh EconomIc and SOCIal HIstory 1700-1980 (Estover, Plymouth: MacDonald and Evans, 1968, 3rd cd., 198 1 , revised by c.w. Munn); C J. Bartlett, cd .. Britam PYI!·Emznerzt: StudIes irz BTIllSh World illfluence m the Nineteenth Centtlry (London: Macmillan, 1969); and Ralph DaVIS. The l1ldustrial Revolutron arld Brittsh Overse.ls Trade (leICester: Leicester UniverSity Press, 1 979). C.M. Turnbull, The Straits Settlements 1826-67' illdlan PY1!Sldency to CrmJJn Colony (London: Athlone Pres>, 1972), p. 58: Sir Fredenck Weld, "The StraitS Settlemems and Bntlsh Malaya" (talk delivered on 10 June 1 984), in HmlOtlrable IntentimlS, Talks on the Bmish EmpIre m SOlllheast Asia Delzvered at tbe Rd, when he asked rhetorically, "Will events turn out exactly the way I envisage [them] at present? Of course not."17 The team is rapidly passIng from the Singapore political scene, and the Prime Minister himself, the last fully active member of the team, is probably in the

66

Manageme'fll of Success

twilight of his remarkable political career. The elements of a new generation of leadership are now in place, but several key questions cannot be answered at this time. The precise confIguration that will eventually emerge is not cenaIn. The heIr apparent, Goh Chok Tong, will be SIngapore's next prime mintster. However, Lee Hsien Loong, son of Pnme Minister Lee Kuan Yew, is clearly on the fast track towards the top, and he exudes the aura of the Lee family name. On the other hand, Singapore voters have already shown some signs of restiveness, and it seems not improbable that the second generation of Il"ders may prove to be more transitional than expected. Much will depend on the leaders themselves, but much of theIr future will depend on forces over which they have little or no control. SIngapore can prosper only so long as the major market economies are also healthy, and a prolonged global economIc downturn could present the new leadership with perhaps Insurmountable political pro­ blems at home. The team brought prosperity to Singapore unmatched elsewhere in Southeast Asia and at a pace perhaps unparalleled anywhere in the world. Singaporeans should be greatly indebted to the accomplishments of the team, and mOSt probably are. However, the second generation may dIscover what many of.their counterparts have learned before: constituents have short memOrIes, and in politics the half-life of a sense of voter indebtedness is very bnef. MaIntaining legitimacy in the eyes of their Singapore constituents may ultimately prove to be the "test of fire" frequently men(1oned by the Prime Minister. Perhaps this, rather than a sensational crisis, may prove to be theIr Long March.

NOTES I am mdebted [0 some of Singapore's most senior leaders, who have been very generous

with their time. Over the past twenty�five years I have met and talked with all mem� bers of the top echelon of leadership, occasionally in the United States but more often In Singapore. I have also had the opportumty of diSCUSSions With several members of the "second generation of leadership" at various times. On several occasions during February-May 1985 three of the four members of' the team shared thelT thoughts about

leader>hip with me at some length.

I

als.a benefited greatly from a leisurely and most

mfarmative dIScussion WIth a key and long-time member of the outer orbit of leadershIp

and from many casual conversations with political particIpants and observers. While

I

have tried to interpret and explaIn the dynamics of leadershIp as objectively as possible,

I

make no claim to infallibihty. Both the process and the personalities are complex.

Singapore's leaders are hIghly intelligent, dnven by theIr dreams and visions, strongly committed to the success of the ISland Republic, and without exception devoted to the commonweaLas they perceive it, Moreover, I am not an insider privy to their pnvate diSCUSSions; rather, I am an outsider trying to understand and interpret a very complex

process. Despite my atter.tpts to be objective the reader should be forewarned that I

continue to stand In awe of the accomphshmenis of this leadershIp over the past tv.enty­

fIve years.

67

Po/wea/ leadmlJlp

I must also record my Indebtedness to the many foundations that have suPPOrted my research and travel I n Southeast Am. At the time the present chapter was researched I was supported by the Earhart Foundation, the Social Science Research Council, and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. On previous visits to the region I have been support.-d by the Fulbnght Program, the American PhilosophICal Society, the National SCience Foundation, and my own university. I have always been accorded the hospitality of ISEAS, for which I am much in the Institute's debt. While these institutions have been generous In their support of my re,earch , they clearly bear no responsibility for my observations and interpretations. 1 . PAP 25th Anniversary Rally, 20 January 1980

2. In thiS es�y I have chosen to exclude senior cIvil servants from my definition of "Ieaders", Their mfluence in some cases was considerable, and CivIl servants often mfluencc (or even make) "politIcal" Jeci�lOns. 3. Although I shall not break thiS essay Into chronological segments, several members of the team have referred to the stresses of particular periods to explain the waxing and waning of the influence of particular members of the outer orbits or to explain their appearance and disappearance f�om the political scene From 1954 to 1959 there was the groping and experimenting of the early, formative years. During 1959-61 the PAP was faced with the realities of governing and Internal skirmishes between the left.' Wing and the moderates. From 1961 to 1963 there were the stresses of merger and continuing struggles with the communists who had emerged from their closet. The stresses of living within MalaYSia dominated the period from 1 963 to 1965, and after 1965 the major problems revolved around the necessity of running a fully Independent state. The two other major strc�scs mentioned by ",orne members of the team Involved the Brilish deCISion of January 1968 to withdraw from Singapore by 1971 and the reali­ zation

m

1975 that the team was soon to face a senous succession problem. Although

1

have decided against such a periodlzation of Smgapore's leadership history m this treatment, my discussion will frequently refer to the events of these various penods.

4. Some observers have been tempted to consider Devan Nair a member of the "team" and thereby in the first orbit of leadership. However, it seems more appropnate to

place him in a second orbit, which he at first occupied alone. He

\\'as

never

:1 t

rue

m'lder, at least in the senSe that the others shared freely With hml all their thoughts

and concerns, as they did among themselves. He was orlgmally regarded as a member of the left-wing faction of the PAP with whom the moderates co-operated but whom they never tru:,too, and after making a definitive commitment to the moderate wing he spent some years in Kuala Lumpur. On the other hand, his work 1 0 restructuring the Singapore labour movement made a major contrIbution to the economic success of the Republic. In this panicular area hiS contribution to the team wa:, crucial, even though he was not one of them. 5. In his National Day Rally address In 1985, Lee referred to the memory of a luncheon conversation with Hon shortly before hiS death that served to encourage the Prime MinIster In the face of the economic crisis Singapore was facing In 1985.

See Stralts

TIIIles, 20 August 1985, p. 8. 6. Certainly all of these observations could apply to u'C, Goh, and Rajaratnam, but Toh's presence for the fll"St fifteen years is not adequately explained by any of these generaliza!lons. Perhaps Toh's longevity can best be explained by his utility to the

68

A1anageme1lt of Success team. He may nor have been as close to the other members of the team, but he very valuable to them "I told my permanent secretary after the fmt call to Ignore the request until he got a second call. When he got the second call I told him to give the PM just a little of whal he wanted. He dIdn't get a thIrd call." "Hi,tory Is Not M.lde the Way Ir Is Written", Speeches 3, no. 8 (February 1980): 7. A,iawcek, 12 October 198;, p. 43. The Prime Mintster In 1984 commented that when Independence was thru't upon Singapore In 1965 the new country could have been destroyed by eliminating "about t1uny people . . , . ten In the political leadershIp, ten in the ciVIl service and judiciary, and another ten in the army and police". Address at a dinner for the Establishment, Mandarin Hotel, 25 September 1984, Speeches 8, no. ; (September/October 1984) : 8-9. Had it not been for the revitalization programme begun in, the 1970" the total In the political sector would have numbered less than ten by 198 1 The thlrd-generatton leader who commands the greatest medIa attentton is Lee Hsien Loong, son of the Prime MinISter. The younger Lee is also Cambridge-educated .. He also attended prestigious servlce' schools In the United States and took an MA at Harvard University. He was one of the fIrst products of Singapore's "soldier-scholar programme", and quickly rose to the rank of BrigadIer-General at the age of thirty­ two. Lee retired from the Army in 1984 and stood for election to Parliament. He IS currently Second MinISter for Defence (Services) and Minister for Trade and Industry, Two other third-generation leaders moving up were also appOinted ministers of state shortly after entering ParlIament - Wong Kan Seng (currently Minister for ForeIgn AffairS and Community Development) and Yeo Chcow Tong (currently Acting Minister for Health and Sentor MUllster of State). ThIS docs nor Include one mintster elected to Parliament In 1979, two in 1980, and one elected only In December 1984 Teh ChIang Wan (born on 3 March 1928 in China) was an archltl'Ct WIth an almost Iwenty-ycar career al the Singapore Improve­ ment Trust and the HOB before enlering Parliament through a by-election In 1979 at the age of fifty-one. Tch, scrvt.'Ci a� Minister for National Development but com­ mitted suiCide In the face of corruption charges on 14 December 1986. Yeo Nlng Hong (born on 3 November 1943), who holds a Ph.D. from Cambridge, was elected to Parhamem in 1980 after three years on the faculty of the U t1Ivcrslty of Singapore and several years In the private sector. He bt.'came Minister for Communications and Information in 1985 and Second M inISter for Defence (Policy) - both positions remaining unchanged In the 1988 Cabinet S. Jayakumar (born on 12 August 1939) holds law degrees from the Untversity of Singapore and Yale University. Although still young, Jayakumar had a dIStingUIShed career at the University of Singapore (where he ultimately served as Dean of the Faculty of Law) and i n the Foreign Service. He stood for Parltament·in 1980, became Minister for Home AffaIrs in the 1985 Cabinet, and concurrently also MinISter for Law in the 1988 Gabinet. RIchard Hu Tsu Tao (born on 30 October 1926) was another late-comer to polt"cs. He is a foreign-trained engineer, earning hIS B.Sc in the United States and his Ph.D, at the University of Birmingham. Hu was recruited from the private sector after nearmg retirement, was electl-d to Parhament 10 1984, and waS Immediately named to the v."a'i

7. 8 9. 10

II.

12.

Po/ztzcai Leadersblp

13.

69

post of Minister for Trade and Indu\try He IS presently Minister for Finance and ChaIrman of the MAS. Perhaps the 010\( striking example is the abandonment of the "graduate mother; polIcy" dealing with the placement of children in Singapore ;chools. The polIc)' had its sceptics within the team, but it was very important to the Pnme ,Minister, and It was approved at all necessary levels because of Lee's ;upport It was not well received by mo>! Singaporeans and the policy, and other genetic policies. bL'Came lS controversial as Singapore society :.tHaws Tony Tan announced the C;:tbmct's dL'CI>lon to abandon the policy dunng the 1985 Slttll1g of Parliament The Prime MiniSter obVIOusly acqUiesced and remained publIcly Silent. Tony Tan also took the lead In espousll1g a cut In th� rate of Central ProVident Fund (CPF) contnbutions, a position strongly supported by labour and the private sector but opposed by the Prime Minister on many earlier occasIOns. Dr Tan made his surprise statement in a speech in late Deccmba 1985, just four months after Prime MIOIster lee sL�med to have dashed all hopes for a cut except "m an economic cnsl� See SImzts Tunes. 19 August 1985, pp. 10- 1 1 for the text of the Pnme MinISter's lengthy National Day Rally speech. which dealt almost exclu;ively with SlOgapore's econonllC difficultie;, and Straits Tlnles. 2 8 December 1985, p. I I for extracts from Dr Tan's televised proposal to CUt the CPF rate. Flrst Deputy Pnme MlOister Goh Chok Tong candidly recogmzed the extent of the Prime MinIster's continUing influence on Cabinet decisions, even If hl� views were lfl the minority In intra-Cabinet discus!:oions. According to Goh, the new generation will probably be able to prevail over the WIShes of the Pnme Mimster unless "the issuc� affect the fundamt:ntals of Singapore security or If he thinks we are makIng a big mIStake". InterView with the New Straits TtlT/es (Kuala Lumpur). reprinted in Stralls TImes, I November 1985, p. 22 In the course of one dISCUSSIOn I likened the PAP's 1959-63 expenence to the Long March and was IOformed that some younger civil servants refer to the old guards as the "long marchcr�" Straits Times, 5 Scptem ber 1988. PAP 25th Anmversary Rally, National Theatre. 20 January 1980. ThIS candid com­ ment wa3 made In [he;; same context that I� di�cussed here - the �t:arch for a new gener.mon of leadershIp 'OJ,

14.

1 5. 16. 17

Editors' note: Subsequent to the death of the author of this chapter In late 1987, minor changes were incorporated into the text in the Itghi of Cabinet changes follOWing the 1988 general election.

3 THE PAP AND THE STRUCT URING OF THE POLIT ICAL SYSTEM CHAN HENG CHEE

. . . the continued extsten�e of the new Asiatic states depends upon whether they are able to carry ollt long overdue re/omls; whether they can wuholl! the communisl rehgwn do all that the communist state can do for the masses. - Lee Kuan Yew I

Societies ilke OJIrJ have no fat to spare. They are "ther lean mid healthy or they die. We have calculated backwards and forwards/or eleven months on an independence we never sought, that our best_ chances lie in a very tightly organised societ),. - Lee Kuan Yew1

Without the PAp, there would be no Smgapore as we know · It today. - Petlr, Editorial'

IAI

fter thirty years In power, the People's Action Party (PAP) has left an indelible imprint upon the city-state of Singa­ pore. The collective leadership, under Prime MinIster Lee Kuan Yew, has been the single most important political force, the engine of-change i n the creation,

transformation, and development of the Singapore society, economy and polity. The PAP has taken the lead in state building, illentity creation, myth formation, mass mobilization, wealth redistribution, and socio-economic transformation. Through the years it has presented itself as· a pragmatic party, one capable of changing and adapting to new polItical contexts and prescribing solutions without

70

The Styucwnng of the PolitICal System

71

surrendering its basic beliefs. Its mode of operation and organization, if not unique, is occasionally cited as a potential model for new states 10 their search for successful development and polItical institutionalization. Whatever response the Stngapore state might evoke, none will ever describe it as a "soft state" or a "broken-back state" lacking capaClly or effectiveness.' This chapter will examine the evolution of the PAP strategy 10 the shaping and managing of political and state structures which accompanied the rapid sociD-economic and polItical developments in the RepublIc. It will focus on the changing contextual demands, the policy objectives, and the eventual political choice of the leadership to throw light on the CIrcumstances, philosophy, and rationale of state buildtng and system structunng. The Singapore political system today is a historical product moulded in two distinct phases by the first-generation PAP leadershIp - between 1959 and 1965 and from 1965 to 1984. It has undergone a third recast in the post-1984 political experiment in the hands of the second-generation leadership, to enable the system to cope with the aspirations, pressures, and responsibilities of the 1990s. The PAP leaders of the mid-1980s and the 1990s are, and will be, different from the generation of foundtng fathers. The new political leadership will have endured a different political experience and emerged with different political reflexes. Several questions naturally arise from this new situation. Will the new political leaders be equally resilient in the face of SWIftly changing events and shifting political ground? WIll they possess the same capitalizing qualities as their predecessors, and will each set of incremental policies adopted add to substantive and qualita­ tive changes 10 the shaping of the political system? The eventual po l itical model to be established in Singapore may pro"e to be a departure from the Western liberal-democratic model but one which is an authentic participatory model SUIted to the needs of states with non-Western cultural traditions in search of rapid economIc growth, and with a rapidly politiCIzed and educated citizenry; or it may prove to be an unsatisfactory stunted compromise which sooner or later WIll be swept aside or corrected to fIt political reality. Whatever the direction and outcome of change, the party tradition and party ideology of the ruling elite will act as a powerful checking mechanism to any hasty, reactive, pragmatic push for change. The place to begin our investigation into the structure of the Singapore political system, its scope, and its limits of change is the party Itself. THE PAP: ORIGINS, IDEOLOGY, AND ORGANIZATION The PAP was formed on 2 1 November 1954 as a consciously radical and anti­ colonial coalition of moderate democratic socialists and left-wing communist forces. The moderate faction, represented by Lee Kuan Yew and his associates, S. Rajararnam, Dr Toh Chtn Chye, Dr Goh Keng Swee, and K. Byrne, appreciated

72

Manageme11l of Success

from the very beginning that they were ridll1g a tiger but it was a necessary gamble to mobilize a mass following in the struggle for independence. The collaboration and the competition between the twO factions had a decisive impact on the Ideology and organization of the PAP. The combination of FabIan socIalism and communism produced a mamfesto whIch changed the political tempo of the tIme, but within the framework of radical socialism was a pragmatic blueprint, one whIch, however, did not use the word "socIalist" in its· text.; As young nationalists 111 London, Lee Kuan Yew and the future PAP core leaders were acutely aware of the overdue reforms needed to effect the socIal change necessary to induce social cohesion." The united front with the communists but· tressed these progressive tendencies. However, 111 the early ideological expositions of party publIcatIOns, the PAP's handling of the "nationalization" issue II1dicated its gradualist, realistic outlook. State take-over of industnes was not considered practicable 111 an island state WIth an entrepot economy. The question was to be postponed until merger with mainland Malaya, an imminent party objective, was achieved.' In propounding multiraclalism, multilingualism, and multiculturalIsm as the main tenets of an integrative strategy for a plural society, the PAP was expressll1g the accommodationist political credo of the day and one held by all serious polItIcal groups. The PAP, however, gave the strategy its own particular cast, one shaped according to political challenges and opportunities and a changll1g vision which was increasingly conditioned by the survival of Singapore 111 an international and regional comexr.' The election manifesto of 1959 entItled The Tasks Ahead was a patently populIst platform promising mass education, jobs, improvement in the welfare of the worke r�, the e manc ipati o n of women, a �ound p u bl ic health system, and housing for the poor.9 The early implementation of these poliCIes after the party was elected created the broadly based support which entrenched the party 111 power for close to three decades and which was the justIfIcation for its claims to the label of a "socialist" party even after the economic strategy of the government had· come out heavily in favour of capital, profIt, free-market ideals, and identi­ fication with the international economic system. I O The lasting impact of the associatIOn with the communists was seen not so much in economic or socIal reform ideas as m political organization. Lee Kuan Yew and the moderate leaders were most profoundly influenced !n their mode of political action, party organ­ IzatIOn and control, and the mobilization of the larger society. More than once, the PAP old·guard leadership paid a backhanded compliment to the communists. Dr Goh Keng Swee recalled in 1976: We were, so to speak, the apprentices to the magicians [the fellow·travellers and communist cadres] who had a far longer experience and expertise than we had m S1ruggle·and polItIcal organisation. TheIr penetration and control of student socIeties) trade unions, farmers' as'\ociatlon�, women's associations and other�, wr.:re marvels of po l i ttcal organisation . . . . As apprentices to tht'

The Structuring of the Pall/iral System

73

magicians, we occupied a vantage POInt from which [0 observe the master's virtuoso performances as he drew thunderous rounds of applause from the mass audiences. More than once we said to oursclvc!>, "Ah, that'!\ how H IS donel" We took these lesson::, of apprenticeship to heart, and later� when the social democrats broke off from the communlm we were able to apply them to good effect. II In fact, the lessons were learnt qUIckly and countervailing measures were adopted even before the 1961 party split between the communists and the democratic socialists The moderate leadership learnt VigIlance, strategy, and the tacuc of poliucal attnUon from the pro-communist activists as the latter tned to wear down the Central Execuuve Committee (CEC) members in long dIalogues and discussions pushing the communist hne. Often they were gruelling tests of deternunation. endurance, and WIll-power to hold to one pos1l10n. 12 The most important lesson came m 1957. At the Fourth Annual Party Conference, the moderate leadership was voted out of the CEC by the communists who had packed the conference with non-party members. The moderates would have lost control of the party but for the timely mtervenuon of the Lim Yew Hock government, which launched police secunty action agamst thirty-five communists and pro-communists for subversive activ1l1es. The consequence was a reduction m the commUnist strength wllhin the PAP. Taking advantage of the respite, Lee Kuan Yew and the moderate leaders SWiftly restructured the membershIp and the election system. Four cat­ egories of membership were created - probationary members, ordinary members, probationary cadre members, and full cadres. Only full cadres were allowed to take part m the election of the CEC. 13 Appointment to cadreship was by a Board of Selection controlled by the moderate leaders. The deep-seated dIstrust of a democratic election process for the party lingers on today among the party leadershIp, and the appointed cadre system of elections IS mil retained. Only twice after 1957 did internal facuonal struggle surface openly, leading to party splits. In 1960, Ong Eng Guan, the mavenck MInister for Nanonal Development and one-rime temperamental PAP Mayor of the City Council, challenged the leadershIp on the issue of intra-party democracy and the righust drift of the party leadership.14 This challenge was not as disastrous to the party as expected. Ong was expelled from the CEC, and later resIgned from the Assembly and party to stand in a by-election. He formed the United People's Party, but could not persuade many to leave the PAP wllh hIm. The most Important Inter­ nal factional struggle between the communists and the non-communists led to the historic PAP split m July 1961 when thirteen PAP Assemblymen and their supporters left the party to form theBarisan Sosialis. ls ThIS event marked the major watershed in party organizational and ideological development, leading to a creative phase in polincal leadership. The moderates, who overnight had lost the existing ,mass base to the new party, were forced to develop new organ­ izational resources. The entire shaping of the poliucal system subsequently and

74

Management 0/ Success

the development of the political style of the PAP government has been a response and a reaction to this experience and the desIre to prevent its repetition. Open expressIon of dissension among party leaders IS unequivocally dIscour­ aged, and faction formation is unacceptable - and indeed unknown - in the post-Barisan PAP A moderate PAP was freed to pursue an idl'Ology of pragmatism to a level of sophistication and application that seemed to imply a JustifIcation of any action taken in the name of national Interest and party survival. Yet the centre of gravity, despite all the shIfts, moved towards a commitment to the general welfare of the popul.uion and, after separation from Malaysia, a prosperous, politically viable and independent Sll1gapore. The new party manifesto issued in 1982 merely reiterated the old ideology with some changes In vocabulary, subtle signlfiers of attitudinal changes. In the onginal manifesto, the PAP had sought to end colonialism and to establish a na­ tional state in which Singapore would be merged with the Federation of Malaya. The new manifesto modifIed this anachronism to preserving, protecting, and defending the independence, sovereIgnty, and territorial integrity of Singapore, objectives more relevant to an Independent Singapore. The new manifesto also revised the Dbjective of abolishing "unjust Inequalities of wealth and opportunity" to the creation of a dynamIC, disciplined, and self-reliant society in which rewards are "in accord with each Singaporean's performance and contribution to sDciety", and the creation of equal opportunities fDr all Singaporeans.'· The mDst im­ pDrtant determll1ing factor i n the develDpment Df the PAP in ' the future will be the pDlitical legacy of the first-generatlDn leaders and whether the ideas and values of this legacy prove to be tenable In a new age. In 1979, on the twenty­ fIfth anniversary of the PAP, Prime Mli1lSter Lee, reflecting on twenty years of experience in government, offered hi.> successors 5lX pn nc i pJ cs which summed up his phIlosophy and strategy of government.17 They were as follows (author's interpretation given within brackets):

1. GIW clear signals: don't confuse people [A remmder to the party not to form cliques and indulge in factionalIsm] 2. Be consIstent· don't chop and change [Strcs;ing the nl....J to keep faith with themselves and theIr supporters]. 3 Stay clean. dismISS the venal [EmphaSIS on a clean and incorruptible govt·rnment]. 4. Wm respect, not pOP4lanty: reject soft options [A party that is tough­

minded].

5 Spread benefits: don't depnve the people [A commltmenI to equitable growth]. 6.

Stnve for success: never gIve up [Keep cool in tile face of great odds; polIt­ ical WIll IS all-important]. THE STRUCTURING OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, 1 959-65

In 1959 when the PAP government came into power 10 an autonomous Singapore,

The Strtlcl/Irmg oj the Political System

75

established pobtical institutions were rudimentary, not gotng much beyond the conventional colonial legislature, Civil Service, judiciary, and police force. Pobt­ ical institutlonabzation, which Implies "the establishment of stipulated rules and procedures and hence pn'!llctable patterns of political behaviour",18 had just been initiated - the era of democratic mass politICS began only 10 the 1950s - and laYIng the foundation of constitutional government was precisely the task of the newly elected government. Right from the start the PAP government showed an understanding of the equation linking legitimacy to performance and performance to state building and political capablbty. In the struggle with the communists it was demonstrable results that mattered, and, without a real organizational base, Prime Minister Lee and the moderates relied on efficiency and effectiveness as their claIms to leadership. The new government was confronted with the realities of serIOUS unemployment, acute housing shortages and labour indiSCIpline as a result of many years of work stoppages, strikes, and demonstrations, most of whIch were communist-led. In the legislative Assembly in October 1959, on the occasion of the re-adoption of the Emergency Regulations, Prime Minister Lee said, "Ulti­ mately it is the economIC, social and political conditions and the battles on these planes that will decide whether Singapore, and indeed Malaya will grow from strength to strength as a democratic state . . . . The .. powers (Emergency laws) commonly provide a temporary damper against those who set out to wreck the democratic state."19. This political outlook which emphasizes a democratic-socIalist bias on the one hand and yet justifIes coercive authoritarianism for reasons of state marks the fIne balance on which the PAP has structured ItS poliCIes and government since that time. The internal party struggle created a need for the PAP moderates to build a base elsewhere and thus, as early as 1960, Lee and the moderates In the leader­ shIp forged af) alliance with the civil servants through the re-soclalizatlon and politicization of the CIvil Service. At the opening of the PolitIcal Study Centre

In 1959, Prime Minister Lee remtnded. members of the CIvil Service that they had a common responslblbty to promote the survival of the democratic system,20 and thIS meant being �in tune with the temper of the people and the political tempo of change". The initial effort to enlist the support of the CIvil servants proved to be a brilliant political move, one which facilitated the subsequent planning and Implementation of economic-growth policies resulting In rapId development and progress for the island Republic in subsequent years. ThIS alliance was one of the key factors that engendered the emergence of an "administrative state" In SIngapore, a theme whIch will be elaborated upon in the next section. In 1959 the SIngapore CivIl ServIce was organized in nine mtnistries: the Attorney-General's Chambers, the Chief Secretary's OffIce, Commerce and In­ dustry, Education, Ftnance, Health, Housing, Lands and Local Government, and Labour and Welfare; with British colonial officmls running the Attorney-Genera!'s Chambers, the ChIef Secretary's OffIce, and the Ministry of Ftnance. The PAP

76

Managementl 0/ Success

government created a new Ministry of Culture, combined Housing and Lands into the single Ministry of National Development, and transferred local govern­ ment Into the hands of the central government. Political will strengthened the administrative branch of government, and was followed by the establishment of visible programmes and targets for m inistries. The creation of statutory boards, a major organizational change, was aimed at enhancing the capacity for im­ plementation. The Public Utilities Board (PUB) was created i n 1959 and the Housing and Development Board (HOB) was Instituted i n 1960, replacing the Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT) to expedite the building programme. In 1961 the Economic Development Board (EDB) was established - following the con­ clusion of the Winsemius Report that Singapore possessed the basic requirements for Industrialization - to promote the island as a manufacturing base for the advanced countnes of the West.2 1 In 1964 the Singapore Tounst Promotion Board (STPB) and the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) were both established. But this was only the beginning. The enlargement of the public sector did not come to full fruition till a decade or more later. As a second-line defence against the communists who were fighting for con­ trol of the PAP, in July 1 960 the moderates in the govern ment pushed for the establishment of the People's Association (PA) to take control of the commUnity centres inherIted from the British colonial government, and laid out a new, · island-wide network of centres as alternative focal points for the mobilization of the rural population, in particular in areas where communist influence was especially strong. Prime Minister Lee and the moderate leadership used these community centres to rebuild support for the PAP at the grass roots, utilizing the centres for information dissemination and policy explanation.12 In the polit­ ical struggle against the left, the PAP relied heavily on bureaucrats in the Civil

Service to deliver effective results on the one hand" and new local leaders not yet under commumst influence on the other. The latter were recruited into the

management committees of the community centres to assist the government as contact points with the political ground. A new network of party branches was rebuilt and new party members re­ cruited, but party branches as organizational units were not accorded the role and prominence they had once enjoyed. Many branch functions were now performed by the community centres and by the Citizens' Consultative Committees (CCCs), local grass-roots institutions established in 1965 to strengthen citizen participation in state institutions at the constituency level. The strengthening of party life and the party organization did not take place till the 1980s, so great was the residual fear that a strong party apparatus could once again be captured by opposing forces. Party self-renewal and the need to forge ties between the party and the new-guard leadership provided the Impetus for a reversal of this situation. The United-front experience left Prime Minister Lee and Rajaratnam fully

conscious of union power.14 Control and consolidation by the moderates began

With the effort in 1959 to eradicate yellow and splinter unIOns through the Trade

The Structuring of the Po/itlcar S)'tem

77

Unions (Amendment) BIll and the centraltzatlon of the union movement with the creation of the Trades Unton Congress (TUC) in 1960, to whICh all registered union, were to be affiltated. The problem of keeping control of the unions within the hands of the non-communists was an IInmediate issue and in 196 1 : when the internal party struggle intensified, the union movement was the arena of contest. The party spltt led to the dissolution of the TUC, with the pro-communist ele­ ments forming the Singapore Association of Trade Unions (SATU). Devan NaIr, acting for the moderate leaders, immedIately formed the National Trades Union Congress (NTUC)15 to counteract pro-communist influence. within organized labour. The NTUC developed the highly centralized framework by which labour was subsequently controlled and disciplined, allOWing representation and particI­ pation in the political system whilst the left-wing trade unions were demobilized and suppressed. Although the NTUC grew from a minority movement to a majority movement between 1961 and 1965, It was only in independent Singapore that the existing corporatist industnal-relations system was fully expanded 26 Tnparltsm, which Involves joint economic deciSIOn-making by employers, unions, and government to promote an Industrial community, was introduced much earlier when labour representation was allowed on public statutory boards such as the EDB and HOB. But tnpartism was fully developed In the creation of the National Wages Council in 1972 whIch brought together the government, employers, and the NTUC in an annual formulation of wage guidelines for wage Increases, wage structure, and incentIve schemes to be Implemented in collective agreements. Perhaps because the early years of PAP government represented a time of great political competitIon and conflict - first against the commUnists, then against both the Barisan Sosialis as the legitimate opposition and the Alliance Government of Malaysia over federal-state issues - It is more accurate to depict this penod as one of experimentation wtth reactive institution-building designed to shore up support rather than as a period In whIch there was an effort system­ atically to implement a clear VISIOn of a political or an administrative system. The personal memoirs and reflections of PAP leaders on this historical phase suggest they were under extreme pressure to counteract opposition initiatives and that they depended principally on theIr political reflexes. In retrospect, the PAP government performed remarkably well in an era of grave polttical challenge. In spIte of the polttical instabiltty engendered by internal sources and externally by the "Confrontation" with Inllonesla, Singapore's average annual rate of real GOP growth between 1960 and 1965 was 5.7 per cent.17 In 1960, a year after the PAP was elected, 9 per cent of the Singapore population were accommodated in public housing; by 1965 the figure had risen to 23 per cent. Whereas the Singapore Improvement Trust in the thtrty-two years of ItS exiStence under the BrItIsh colon ial go,-emment had completed only 23,000 UnItS of flats, the HOB completed {Wlce as many in its fIrSt five years.lS Unemploy­ ment, which stood at 13.2 per cent in 1960, was marginally reduced to 12.3 per

78

Management of Success

cent by 1965, and education conunued to expand from 266,000 students i n 1959 to 302,000 in 1961. The polI!ical system that emerged in the early years of PAP rule already re­ flected tendencies towards centralization of power and bureaucrauzation. Draconian measures developed inItially to deal wah the communists were institutionalized as features of the new political structure. A skeletal framework of grass-roots Institutions had been laid out to facilitate state penetration throughout the island. These baSIC features were attenuated and refined in independent Singapore with clearer emphaSIS on some political aspects. THE RISE

OF

THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE, \965-84

After its separauon from Malaysia Singapore saw the rise of what can most aptly be described as an "administrative state". This concept should nO! be con­ fused WIth Fred RIggs' "bureaucratic polity", which refers to a paradigm of politics within which the parameters of political participation are exceedingly narrow and whose politics is insulated from the mass of the citizenry.29 In a bureaucratic polity, such as Thailand before 1973, politic. was an· allocative game confined to three sets of players - the military, the bureaucrats and politicians (the last aligned closely with the first two), and the Thai monarch at the apex of the system. The term administrative state expounded in thIS paper defInes a poliucal system whIch has two key features:

(I)

depoliticization of the ciuzenry, and (2) an in­

crease in the power and role of bureaucrats, accompanied by the development and expansion of the bureaucratic and administrative sector.30 The second feature need not mean that the power of the politicians in such a system has been wholly usurped: it does, however, point to an enlarged ambit of decision-making placed in the hands of the bureaucrats. Dcpoliucizauon is valued as a desirable polit­ Ical pre-condiuon for economIc growth and competitive political struggle is systematically suppressed. Such an attitude springs from the belief that economic development and societal stability are best promoted by the rational application of scientIfic techniques to production and administration, with a corresponding reduction in the role of politics. But an administrative state, unlike a bureaucratic polity, is goal-oriented, and effIciency and effectiveness are central values in its underlying ideology. An administrative state thus seeks to establish linkages between the government and the wider political arena i n the form either of party branches or grass-roots institutions to guide the implementation of goals and the delivery of political goods and services. In the first twelve months after 9 August 1965, the PAP government was pressured to seek alternative economic opportunities, establish security and diplo­ matic relationships, strengthen the physical infrastructure of nationhood, and create new political myths: in short to give dIrection and meaning to the political process In uncharted territory.

The SlrtlClllnTlg of Ihe Po/illca/ Sysiem

79

Prime MiOlster Lee responded with the creatIon of a "tight socIety", and urged Singaporeans to adapt and adjust to change as a constant in life. The following statement, typical of the tIme, revealed his thinking most lucidly: "What IS re­ qUIred is a rugged, resolute, highly trained, hIghly disciplined community. Create such a community and you wIll survIve here for thousands of years."JI ThIS injunctIon, implemented at the political, bureaucratic, and military levels, had far-reaching organizational consequences ,md produced the polity of the 1970s and 1980s. In-historical perspective it was a logical development. The competitIon against the communists had already set the stage for a tIghtening of the space available to politIcal opponents. Between 1961 and 1 965, political de�ention - fIrst under the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance and then under the I nternal Security Act - was a weapon used to suppress the expansion of communist influence. In 1963, two major police secunty sweeps against Barisan Soszalis leaders effectively disorganIzed the left-wing opposition. The non-commuOlst oppoSItion, which in an)' case was weak and inarticulate, disintegrated. Furthermore, in post-separation Singapore, the PAP won widespread sUppOrt and goodwill from the population. This was primarily for three reasons. Fzrst, in.the quarrel with the federal govern­ ment in Kuala Lumpur, Singaporeans had rallied behind Prime M inister Lee and the PAP In a contest over issues which were laden WIth racial overtones and centre-state rivalry; secondly, the population was obVIously relieved that the twenty-three months of constant cnses and bllter political wranghng, attended by the threat of racial riots, were over; and thirdly, the evident diffIculties of making an independent Smgapore viable were appreciated by the population. The decision by the Barisan Sosialis to withdraw from parliamentary politics in October 1966 left the PAP without.a major political rival and without opposition in PariiamenLJ2 Thus, the sequence of events played its part in facilitating the emergence of a dominant PAP government and party system and the exercIse of authoritarian rule. The absence of serious opposition made the tranSItion to an administrative state all the more smooth. To grapple WIth the mul ti-dImensional tasks of natIon-building, the politicians turned to the CIvil servants, whose support had helped to defeat the commuOlsts. Now they pushed the bureaucrats to play a major part in the promotion of economic growth by assuming, in the absence of SUItable private counterparts, the roles of entrepreneurs in new areas of economic actIvity. The politicians' partnership with the bureaucrats was a natural alliance. When the PAP came to power In 1959, Singapore's indigenous capitalists were few In number. There were a few Chinese in banking and financial circles, a handful of wealthy businessmen WIth plantation and mining interests in Malaya, a limited number of property developers, countless successful traders and retailers, and a score of manufacturers dealing with footwear, beverages, food, and textiles. As a mass party, the PAP did not cultivate support among thIS class until after the electIon, when it was Important to stimulate the economy. The educational background and professional

80

Management of Success

training of Prime MInister Lee and his close associates made it unlikely that they would have been close to the primanly ChInese-educated capitalists; but the Prime Minister found the re-soclalized bureaucrats, by contrast, to be rehable allies. Conversely, senior bureaucrats in Singapore had aSSImilated the national political and economIc objectives enuncIated by the ruling party to their own interests.'" The government proceeded to bUIld upon its previous infrastructure. A formid­ able bureaucracy, aSSIsted by a number of statutory boards, was developed to spearhea� economic development. Among the more significant statutory boards created after 1965 are the Monetary Authority of Singapore (1971), the Post Office Savings Bank ( 1 972), the Urban Development Authority (1974), the Tele­ communicatIon Authority of Singapore ( 1974), the Vocational and Industrial Training Board (1 979), and the National Computer Board (1981). The government also entered Into bUSIness through the agency of three major holding companies: Temasek HoldIngs Pte. Ltd., MND (Ministry of Nanonal Development) HoldIngs Pte. Ltd., and the Sheng-Li Holdings Company Pte. Ltd. and theIr subsidiaries, which are now estimated to be in the region of 450 companies covering activities as diverse as trading, aviation and transportation, a bird park, ship-repairing, construction, tourism, leisure, and farming, to name but a few. The actual extent of government involvement in the economy is difficult to measure. Lawrence Krause, in The Singapore Economy Recomldered, argues that the government's role in the economy, while not totally calculable, IS. not Out of line with that obtaining in other countries such as South Korea or Taiwan." The share of public investment in gross, domestic, fixed-capital formation was moderate, higher than Korea's but below that of Taiwan, but the surplus accu­ mulateo by the statutory boards in government and added to the government revenues was exceedingly high compared with [he same measure for South Korea and Taiwan. The actual role of the government as entrepreneur is less measurable. The government's Interest in risk-taking ventures m the early days encouraged the private sector to invest in unconventional areas of economic activity which it would have otherwise avoided. Economic success as manifested in government surpluses, double-digit growth, and widespread redistribution of the fruits of growth legitimized thIS strategy. Between 1965 and 1984 Singapore achieved high growth rates, overcommg the impact of the closing of the British bases and even the effects of two increases in the pnce of oil which wounded the economies of many countries. The high growth was, furthermore, accompanied by a redistri­ bution of income in the wider society. In 1977/78, 62 per cent of Singapore households had a total income of less than 5$1,000 per month, 2 8 per cent had 5$1 ,000-2,000, and only 9 per cent had more than 5$2,000. By 1983, only 31 per cent had a total family income of less than 5$1 ,000, 36 per cent had 5$ 1 ,0002,000, and 32 per cent had over 5$2,000.34 It t- For

was

only when an unexpectedly

extended comments on the nature and function of the bureaucracy, see Lee Boon Hiok in Chapter 4 of thIS volume.

The Structllring 0/ the Polittcal System

81

deep recession struck Smgapore in 1985 that a review of the economic role of the public sector was undertaken by the government leadershIp, In the environment of growing prosperity, the PAP argued that an OPPOSI­ lion was unnecessary to, and disruptive of, Singapore's development. The ruling party provided grass-roots str�ctures to engender responsive government, and SOCIalized a generation of Singaporeans into a petitionary political culture. In such a culture, polillcal demands are articulated through governmentally established channels for orderly redress, and the resolution and management of issues are scheduled according to national pnonties. Between 1978 and 1 979 Residents' Committees (RCs) were introduced as a move to'refine the system of grass-roots Institutions. As Singapore's population was increaSIngly relocated in HDB estates, the need to create new communilles and mOnItor and resolve the problems of this large constituency of voters became paramount. By 1985, when 84 per cent of SIngapore's population were living in HOB flats,35 housing problems had every possibility of developIng lIltO major political issues. Thus in addition to the Citizens' Consultallve Committees (CCCs), the Community Centre Manage­ ment Committees (CCMCs), and the PAP party branches, 261 RCs were set up in constituencies with HOB populations. Each RC has responsibility for a zone of 500-2,500 housing units.36 Without this sensory system m the body politic. It IS unlIkely that the PAP could have provided effecllve and stable government for over two decades. The strengthening of the administratIve state was accompanied by the rise of a culture of elItism. Achievement-onented criteria were obviously preferable to ascnptive criteria as a measure of worth and a basis for rewards in a multi-ethmc society. The admInistrallve state, with ItS fundamental rational and scientIfic bias, would naturally select its leadership by the sanie yardstick. In the 1 970s it was explicit Singapore policy to recruit the best brains Into the Civil Service. ScholarshIps were provided liberally to enable young men and women to study in the most prestigious umverSlties in the United States, BritaIn, Canada, Auociations were the main grass-roots organizations among some of the ethnic communities dunng the colonial period. Their primary funcnon was to protect narrow communal Interests rather than to represenr a local united front

Vls·a-vzs the colonial adminIstration.

Dunng the

past two decades, the Importance of ethnic clans and associanons has dimInished considerably. Independence fuelled the drive for a nanonal Identity, and several national organizanons were launched to facilitate communication between the governmenr and Its citizens. For example, the CCMCs were created in

1964, and

were followed by the formation of the CCCs one year later.82 However, It IS the RCs which provide the best training ground for people to acquire the skills , necessary for a participatory democracy as they were established in 1978 WIth the main objecnve of providing a

bener channel for communication between reSIdent,:, and the variOUS author­ Ities to obtain feedback IOformatlon and find solutions to the problems of the residents l iVIng in the hOUSing estates,S3

122

Managemetlt of Success

The RCs are committees of people who volunteer their time and skil" to discuss their neighbourhood's problems, to search for avenues through which to obtain the government's help in solvIng these problems, or to find solutions themselves, if pOSSlble.8' But RCs cannot plan or formulate polIcIes, although they can get the government's ear either directly or through their constituency or national networks. RC membership is through co-optation - residents who have manifested interest in the problems of the neighbourhood may be InvIted to Join the neighbourhood's Rc.ss The RCs could become more useful instruments of participatory democracy if their membershIp rules were modified and if they were given more power in makIng decisions at the neighbou rhood level As they stand now, RCs have a rather limited usefulness in this respect, although they are certainly an Improvement over the CCCs and CCMCs. The possibilIty of transforming the RCs Into effective instruments of parti­ cipatory democracy bnngs us to the final queStlon: To what extent may the system of participatory democracy be established in Singapore? There are two ways of searchIng for the answer. The first way IS to focus on how prepared the population is to participate actively in natIOnal decision-making, and with regard to this Singaporeans may only need more practice. The other way is to ascenain If the representative democratic system IS suffIciently flexible to include partlci· pation, in other words to see if the two systems can be combined. Political theorists disagree on whether such a combination IS possibl e and on which of the two systems of democracy is the more feasible. Supporters of representative democracy believe that it IS practically Impossible to govern a modern nation If every cItizen is given a say at every stage of the decision-making process, not only because of the sheer weIght of numbers but also because of the unpredictabIlity and Irrationality of collective bcha,,·iour.Sf. EVIdence quoteJ

in support of �his view often notes that both "Hitler and Mussolini have used participatory crowd support to gain power"."? On the other hand, defenders· of participatory democracy believe that it is possible to implement it by means of networks of small groups or neighbourhoods.88 This is precisely the significance of the RCs in Singapore: with their infrastructure already in place, they can proVIde a primary base from whIch citizens can enjoy participatory democracy. Apart from the RCs, two further tentative steps have been taken towards participatory democracy. First, a bIll was passed in Parliament on 3 1 July 1986 whIch gave the HDB power to repossess a flat if any of its occupants were con­ victed of a "killer-lItter" offence, that is, of throWIng heavy objects out of the flat and injuring or killing passers-by In the process. On 17 August 1986, the M inister for National Development announced that residents of a constituency would be able to appeal this rulIng through thm MP and the M inistry of National Development to the Attorney-General, who would make the final decIsion.89 Moreover, citizen groups such as the RCs,could also make-a collective representa­ tion to the same effect. Such a step would be a good exercIse in participatory democracy at the constituency level.

LzmilS of CO'L'erllmClll Intcrventzon

123

The second step i. expressed In the willingness of the government to establIsh Town Counct!s, which could become the Singapore version of local government m satellIte towns around Singapore. The formation of Town Councils ImplIes the participation of citizens at the neighbourhood level in the election of its members and the monitoring of its activities, and provides an effective avenue for participatory democracy through the scaling down of the size of citizen group,. However, whether Town CouncIls will contribute dIrectly to publIc policy-makmg or whether they will become ineffectual bodies will depend on the actual terms of reference and design of such councils. Regardless of whether the RCs and Town Councils are equIpped with the tools required for participatory democracy, we belIeve that it is possible to combine representative and partiCIpatory democracy

10

Singapore. The mfrastructure

provided by the RCs gIves Singapore a head start over those countries without such grass-roots organIzations. H owever, whether partiCIpatory democracy wIll be combtned with representative democracy in Smgapore will depend on the government itself. Just as the population needs practice in participation, the PAP leaders also need to get accustomed to sharing the dc'CiSlon-making process in the intenms between general elections. In view of their style of government and their uninterrupted tenure in office for the last thirty years, they might find that diffIcult. With reference to the quotation by Lao-tzii at the head of this chapter, the PAP leaders tend to turn the fish too frequently, that is, they over-govern. It might be diffIcult for the old guard to change, but the younger PAP leaders are expected to monitor closely the political pulse of the electorate.90 If these younger leaders listen carefully to the electorate's call for more consulta­ tion and participation in national policy-making, they will soon realIze that a comblOat ion of partIcipatory and representative democracy may be the best formula for political development and for attaining theIr VIsion for 1999.

NOTES 1.

2. 3. 4. 5 6. 7.

Lin Yutang, ed., Ru l i ng a BIg Cou ntry , in The Wisdom of Laotse (New York: Ran­ dom House, 1976), bk. VI, chap 60, p 277. Lao-tzll probably lived in th; late fourth century Be Straits Tunes, 18 August 1986, p. 1. Lee Kuan Yew (1923- ). LIO, ed., op. cit , p 277. Straits T,mes, 18 August 1986, p. 1. Jon S.T. Quah, "The Pubhc Pohcy-Maklng Process 1 0 SlOgapore", ASIan journal of Public Admimstratzon 6 (1984): 1 1 l-12. Jon S.T. Quah, "Singapore 10 1984: leadershIp Transition in an Election Year", ASIan SlIrvey 25 (1985)' 226-27 Jon S.T. Quah, Meet ing the Twin Threats of Communism and Communalism: The Singapore Response , In G be used to evaluate this performance. Must international comparisons be made? If so, are comparable international statistics available? If we go by impressions alone or t,ake only one or two years or one ot two individual sectors of the economy for comparison, are we in danger of ending up like the proverbial blind men, each having a different impression of an elephant" each deriving his notion by touching a different part of the elephant without the gift of sight to view the elephant;as a whole? We need a helicopter perspective. We also need an overall historical view. In other words, for convenience of exposition, we need �q view the econqmy and the period as a wqole" so that we shall not, so to speak, miss the wood for the trees. Without doubt the best and ,most acceptable single index, certain limitations notwit�anding, for comparing international economic-development performance 'The author'would like to thank M r Chan Kok Peng, Research AssiStant in the !::conometnc Studies Unit of the Department of Economics ana Statistics in the National University of Singa. pore, for help in the preparation of, this chapter.

201

202

Management of Success

is real per capita income. Using this overall criterion for the 128 member states of the United Nations with populations of one million or more in 1984, Singapore showed the best performance for the period 1965-84. The ranking order of some of these nations is shown in Table 9.1, which also inCludes the performance of Taiwan. Singapore's cumulative growth rate in'real per capita income of 7.8 per cent per annl!m exceeded,that of South Korea (6.6 per cent) and Hong Kong (6.2 per cent). These two Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs) were among the fastest growing economies in the world. For the corresponding period, Japan, the highest achiever among countries in the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Devel0PlTlent), grew at 4.7 per cent, and West Germany, another very dynamic economy, at 2.7 per cent. In other words, Singapore was able to close considerably the income gap between the rich industrial countries and itself, moving at roughly three times the average speed of these countries. Most Third World countries, as Table 9.1 shows, could not do this. Indeed, their already very wide per capita income gulf has, on the contrary, further widened. Because of Singapore's speCtacular strides in economic advance, by 1984 Singa­ p,?re's per capita income of US$7,260 had eXceeded the per capita income level of Portugal by' 69. per cent, .of Greece by 93 per cent, and of Sp,ain by 64 per cent. Singapore even exceeded that.of Italy ,by 13 per cent, and Italy belongs to the G-7, the group of seven most advanced , and powerful economic entities in the non-communist world. Singapore's small population size of '2.6 million, however, must put it in a different league, particulaily i!l'terms of international influence. Could Singapore have performei:l better in terms of, gr