Management and War: How Organisations Navigate Conflict and Build Peace [1st ed.] 9783030492519, 9783030492526

Citation preview

Joanne Murphy

Management and War

How Organisations Navigate Conflict and Build Peace

Management and War “This book focuses on three areas of conflict, two of which I have personally spent many decades involved with. It examines conflict and peace building from the ground up listening to those on all levels through bitter division and onto possible grounds for establishing peace. Conflict is born out of circumstances not related to logical analysis but events that are allowed to fester and then become unmanageable in a society. The book gives a rare account of the necessary skills of managing strategic goals in dangerous and complex situations and brilliantly describes how hardship must be managed to keep society and life moving forward.” —Bertie Ahern, Former Taoiseach and signatory of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement “Murphy’s highly readable and insightful account articulates new lines of research inquiry in the emerging field of management and peace building. She invites and provokes in equal measure. A critical and accessible resource for all academics and organisational actors interested in ‘managing conflict’.” —Hastings Donnan, Director, Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice “This important book is founded on an ambitious study of the leadership and management of public services, economic renewal, links with NGO’s and the expression of culture and the Arts in violent conflicts in Northern Ireland, Bosnia and the Basque country. These conflicts are often portrayed solely through the eyes of political and security elites. Here the distinctive and additive focus is on the personal accounts of middle and senior managers accommodating and shaping organisational life in and around the conflicts. The book is enriched by a strong conceptual structure and a compelling and accessible writing style which will ensure its impact in academia and beyond.” —Andrew Pettigrew OBE, FBA, Emeritus Professor of Strategy and Organisation, Said Business School, University of Oxford

Joanne Murphy

Management and War How Organisations Navigate Conflict and Build Peace

Joanne Murphy Queen’s Management School Queen’s University Belfast, UK

ISBN 978-3-030-49251-9    ISBN 978-3-030-49252-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49252-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) under, exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the ­publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and ­institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

For Conall

Preface

This work has had a long gestation. As an academic working in the field of leadership and change in extreme environments, my research has tended to focus on the impact of conflict and war on organisational activity, with a particular emphasis on decision-making and transition. Some of it, including a previous book, focused on security sector reform and the change processes that bring aspirations of better policing to fruition. I have been very fortunate to be able to do this. A background in political science and an upbringing in Northern Ireland has certainly smoothed the path. However, while I would like to consider this ‘back catalogue’ of work as a contribution to the body of literature on conflict studies, none of that work had conflict itself as a key focus. Rather, the ambition was to highlight the behaviour of organisations and actors during conflict as a distinct facet of organisational activity. Above all, I was interested in the agency of individuals and organisations as peace-building entrepreneurs: seeking to deliver their organisation’s mission in a way which did not just ‘do no harm’ but actively participated in resolving disputes. This interest emerged from an understanding that ethno-political conflict and war are organisational as well as a political processes, and that moving beyond conflict cannot be successfully achieved without an understanding of organisational actors as key to that resolution process. To date, much of the work around conflict has focused on the political and the community dimensions of what happens during ethno-political clashes. That is extremely important, but I was also curious about the organisational scaffolding around communities and societies. vii

viii 

PREFACE

Research of this type is an emerging area within management and organisational studies, but has been present within other disciplines for some time. Recently, a number of excellent pieces have reached the public domain. These include Organisational Resilience and Fall of France in World War II by Elmer Kutsh, the brilliant Doctors at War by Mark de Rond, Christopher Smith’s The Hidden History of Bletchley Park, Besieged: Life Under Fire in a Sarajevo Street by Barbara Dimmick and Sarajevo Under Siege, Anthropology in Wartime by Ivana Maček. Others have been with us for longer, like Padraig O’Malley’s Biting at the Grave, the Irish Hunger Strikes and the Politics of Despair, but still present unforgettable accounts of how organisations and individuals deal with extraordinary events and extreme circumstances. Hariz Halilovich, in his exemplary Places of Pain, Forced Displacement, Popular Memory and the Trans-local Identities of Bosnian War-Torn Communities, presents a vivid and agonising testament to the aftermath of war and the importance of scholarship to memory, survival, identity and cohesion. Marcus Hällgren and his colleagues have sought to usefully map the dimensions of organisational activity in extreme environments, how they differ from other spaces and what this means for organisational responses. There are also excellent theoretical and practitioner insights, such as David Denyer and Colin Philbeam’s Managing Change in Extreme Contexts, particularly around risk and resilience. All of these works present different disciplinary perspectives on how individuals, organisations and communities (not to mention academics) confront the reality of extreme contexts, and of danger and war. This is not a neutral endeavour. It is impossible not to be moved by the bravery, the dedication and the ingenuity of individual and collective experience. The opportunity to do such work allows us to think about the emotive, sometimes shocking and often disturbing environments faced by individuals and organisations during violence. In doing so the book celebrates the depth of scholarship that already exists and, I believe, underlines the need to explore this area further in an open and interdisciplinary way. In the development of this book, I have been immensely privileged to meet with a number of individuals who have operated, managed and led established organisations and hastily constructed structures in the worst of times. Situations so dangerous that managing at all seems incredible. It has been an enormous privilege to spend time with these people from many countries and indeed my own, who have shown enormous bravery and candour in their willingness to re-live and make sense of dreadful events. I have

 PREFACE 

ix

always believed that organisations and those engaged within them are vital to the building of lasting peace in places riven by conflict. The experience of writing this book has only reinforced that conviction. All of us who have lived in such societies owe them a great debt. Belfast, UK

Joanne Murphy

Acknowledgements

The subject matter contained within these pages is not always an easy read, and this is not a straightforward book on organisations—if such a thing even exists. Rather it is an attempt to fill a gap which I have been aware of within both the theory and the practice of management for 20 years— since I worked in the what is known as the ‘community relations’ sector in Northern Ireland. At that time Northern Ireland was on the cusp of the historic Good Friday Agreement of 1998 and those of us who had grown up with ‘the Troubles’ were beginning to sense that perhaps change was possible. Surrounded by people who were seeking to build peace, I had a perfect opportunity to think about how peacebuilding translates to organisations, to people and to process. The early and inspirational work of colleagues such as Will Glendinning, Tony Langlois and the late Maura Crozier encouraged me to reflect on the structural and organisational aspects of conflict, as well as the cultural. I also began to see through the work of others that peacebuilding and creating change were complex endeavours. Difficult but conceivable. Since then, others have sustained and nurtured this work, including Dr. Roz Goldie and Professor Hastings Donnan, who have both been constant in their reassurance and useful advice. Dr. Sara McDowell, Professor David Denyer and Dr. Jonathan Howarth have all assisted with the development of this manuscript and the clarification of concepts within it, and I remain eternally grateful. The seminal work of Professor Andrew Pettigrew in setting out an agenda of context, process and time in management and organisational studies has been for me the key to unlocking and understanding organisations now and in the future. My colleagues in xi

xii 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Queen’s Management School and particularly in the William J. Clinton Leadership Institute have been a much needed source of encouragement. Maider Maraña was instrumental in facilitating work in the Basque country and introducing me to the unique complexities of that region. I cannot thank enough Professor Adnan Efendic and, through his offices, Edin Pasovic, who gave me and Dr. David Paulson such valuable insight into the history of Bosnia and the extraordinary bravery and ingenuity of its people. I also want to thank Professor Hariz Halilovich. His bravery, candour and scholarship is a guiding light. Many others took time from their busy schedules to talk with me about their experiences and the reality of organisational life during conflict. They are too numerous to name, and while some of those conversations are recent, others go back decades. The British Academy and Queen’s Management School helped with funding, logistics and support during the preparation of this book. Initial work was done during a fellowship at the Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice: a period of time which was immensely beneficial to me and my work. Aspects of the research also represent the output of grants from the Irish Research Council, the Arts and Humanities Research Council and the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s Peace and Reconciliation Funds. I would also like to thank Lumino Works for the geographical images. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the contribution of my family and most importantly my children, Oisin, Clara and Naoise. They continue to be an inspiration.

Contents

1 Introduction: Why It Matters  1 Part I Framework of Analysis: Theory and Context   9 2 Framing an Understanding of Management and War 11 3 Hope and History: The Environmental Antecedents of Conflict and Peacebuilding 33 4 The Lived Experience of Intense Conflict 51 Part II Sectoral Challenges  73 5 Green Shoots: Driving Economic Renewal 75 6 Managing Space: Divided Places, Divided Communities 93 7 For Public Good: Housing, Local Government and the Delivery of Public Services113

xiii

xiv 

CONTENTS

8 The Management of Memory, Heritage and the Arts133 9 Non-governmental Organisations, International Networks and the Paradox of Assistance153 Part III Organisational Activity, Conflict and Peacebuilding 169 10 Liminal Space: Organisational Transition and Conflict171 11 Living in the Grey Zone: Decision-Making in Conflict and Transition193 12 ‘Go Where the Fissures Are’: Organisational Actors as Peacebuilding Entrepreneurs213 13 Conclusion: Managing Through Conflict and Transition233 References237 Index249

About the Author

Joanne  Murphy  is a Senior Lecturer in Queen’s Management School and Academic Director of the William J.  Clinton Leadership Institute. Her research explores leadership, change and organisational development in politically volatile environments, including those affected by ethno-­ political conflict. She is a Fellow of the Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice.

xv

Abbreviations

ALB ARBiH BCC BiH DPA ETA ICTY IEBL IRA MNE NI NIHE NIO PSNI RoI RS VRS

Arm’s Length Body Bosnian Government Defence Forces Belfast City Council Bosnia and Herzegovina Dayton Peace Accords Eustadi ta Askatasuna International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Inter Entity Boundary Line Irish Republican Army (more correctly known as the Provisional IRA) Multi National Enterprises Northern Ireland Northern Ireland Housing Executive Northern Ireland Office Police Service of Northern Ireland Republic of Ireland Republika Srpska Army of Republika Srpska

xvii

List of Figures

Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2 Fig. 3.3 Fig. 6.1 Fig. 8.1

The United Kingdom and Ireland The Basque region Bosnia and Herzegovina Union flag hanging from lamppost, Belfast (2019) A ‘Sarajevo rose’ (2019)

39 42 47 104 143

xix

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Why It Matters

Peace is not enough—we need a future. Bosnian academic, Sarajevo

War and conflict are a reality of life throughout the world. While much is written about the impact of violence and disorder, how people and organisations adapt to these environments is poorly understood. This book tells the often hidden story of organisational actors managing through and beyond violent conflict. It is written for both general readers and academic specialists, combining first-person interviews, insights from witness seminars and informal conversations, with more scholarly research. In this sense it often chooses to privilege the voices of organisational actors in the frontline over more distant academic perspectives. However, I hope it still provides a solid scholarly foundation and a lens of analysis with which to better understand the core dynamics of how people manage through and after conflict. The best way to do this seemed to be to focus on those with decision-making authority within organisations, delivering services, building and maintaining businesses, overseeing community interfaces while simultaneous facing ethno-political violence or handling the transition beyond combat. The individuals and teams engaged in these endeavours are often organisational managers and leaders at different levels of seniority and with different skills and knowledge. Many of those I spoke to had been with the same organisation for their entire careers and had grown up through conflict and its shadow. Their experiences are key because many © The Author(s) 2020 J. Murphy, Management and War, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49252-6_1

1

2 

J. MURPHY

were previously unrecorded or unrecognised. I was struck by how often those who took the time to sit down with me had rarely, if ever, spoken to another academic about their experiences. This is in contrast to the conversations I have with political actors and community leaders. For that reason, this book largely avoids explicit political elites and those operating within community organisations. It does this not because these people are unimportant: it is already recognised that they are vital—which is why so much of the literature around conflict and transition focuses on them. Instead, it strives to explore mid-level policy implementation under duress and the practices of organisational actors at all levels, who inspire and focus their colleagues in the worst of times, and get little recognition for those interventions. it is a story which is rarely sought, but one which holds a wealth of experience on how we can better manage and resolve intractable, long-term violence. In seeking to explore these aspects of organisational life, this work takes the view that both time and context are important. For that reason, it investigates the long-term impact of conflicts which have lasted within states and societies for years, sometimes decades. It understands that time cycles and ‘histories’ are central: as are commemorations, anniversaries and traditional holidays that have taken on another identity associated with loss or violence. We talk about histories, not history, because different communities often have radically different understandings of what past events mean and why they are still relevant. It also starts from the premise that the exercise of individual agency within disrupted, dangerous and damaged environments can make the difference between an organisation continuing to deliver on its core purpose—whether that is housing, health or business development, as well as its ability to proactively peace-build within societies of conflict. Individual decisions and decision-making is central to the exercise of tacit political skill and the construction of policies and practices that build accord. While this is not yet a core area of business and management research, it is a newly emerging subdiscipline. As such, any study of this type needs to draw from existing work which is disparate and spread across business, management and organisation studies and associated research. This also includes analysis from conflict studies itself. When we think about conflict, violence and disorder we tend to focus on both human suffering and economic damage. Some of us see the evidence of violent conflict on our TV screens every day. Others in their streets, their workplaces and their lives. Unfortunately, environments riven by disorder and war seem to be becoming more common, rather than less.

1  INTRODUCTION: WHY IT MATTERS 

3

As we move from the bipolarity of the Cold War, to a unipolar and now a multipolar world, there are good reasons to fear the deterioration of global peace. Conflict spikes in the Middle East and North Africa, the growth and activity of internal terrorism and insurgency movements and a destabilisation of what were regarded as previously established states, all contribute to an international environment where old certainties have been discarded (IEP 2018). The coronavirus pandemic of 2020 will no doubt lead to even greater uncertainty and competition for scarce resources. However, there is another story among these difficult images and broken communities that can also be observed, if not yet fully understood. It is the story of how people within organisations manage and lead during and through periods of turbulence and what this experience tells us about organisations who are able to persist in their purpose in extreme circumstances and contribute to conflict transformation. The aim of this book is to relay some of those experiences and to provide an organisational perspective on conflict and peacebuilding processes. Within that central purpose are two main objectives. The first is to establish a theoretical framework for understanding how organisations, organisational life and decision-making are impacted by violent conflict. The second is to explore the empirical experience of organisational actors in such environments, before drawing some conclusions about how to move forward this area of research. It is important to define the scope of this work because while significant scholarship exists on conflict processes, hardly any has looked at how organisational actors, taking crucial mid-level decisions, navigate, negotiate and influence the reality of conflict and political transitions to stability. This emphasis emerged from an understanding that ethno-­ political conflict and war are organisational as well as a political processes and that moving beyond conflict cannot be successfully achieved without a recognition of organisational actors as key to that resolution process. Much of the work in the area of conflict studies has focused on the political or the community dimensions of what happens during war and violence. This perspective is incredibly important in its own right, but it is only part of the story. Another facet is the organisational scaffolding around communities and societies that sometimes reinforces partisan division and, at other times, actively works against it. In reality, this framework consists of people managing outside the realm of formal authority in a context of extreme uncertainty. To do this, they must weigh the benefits of progress against the risks of personal safety and organisational survival, and act strategically in relation to organisational partners, modes of delivery and even

4 

J. MURPHY

legal and financial matters outside the official approval processes. This book contains many examples of managers demonstrating that they have had to be both accountable officers and peacebuilding entrepreneurs to achieve strategic objectives in complex and challenging operational realities. These risks are often largely obscured by organisational structures and processes and leave actors vulnerable professionally and personally to the vicissitudes of political engagement. Some of these interactions occur at a micro level, others are macro in their sweep and impact. The organisational dimensions of managing through and beyond entrenched political conflict have to date been under analysed and as a consequence, little understood. There is a gap in our knowledge academically and practically. This should concern us for two reasons. Firstly, it would seem that the distinct fields of management and organisation studies (MOS) and conflict studies have an obvious area of overlap or subfield. This subfield can be defined as an area of work that focuses on the environments, and practices, of managing through conflict and transition. The second concern is that unfortunately, the lived experience of organisational life within conflict environments is an area of growth. Everywhere is increasing instability, divergence and ethno-political unrest. Alongside though, we see individuals and organisations delivering services, managing businesses and binding together communities. A clear-sighted understanding of how organisations can manage through violence and turbulence and also contribute to building stability and peace has never been more vital. This book is an attempt to fill that gap. To do that it focuses on the lived experiences of organisational actors within three locations: Northern Ireland, the Basque country and Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia). Each of these areas has experience of ethno-political conflict at varying intensity, over extended timescales. This allows the research to draw on a broad spectrum of public, private and non-profit management experience of violent political conflict and its legacy at community, organisational and political levels. The data relied upon is drawn from over 60 interviews and witness seminars with managers and leaders in the three central locations and additional interviews from other areas. Much use is made of existing research, other primary data sources and some very interesting country- and conflict-specific reports produced by international agencies. The book is structured to first provide a theoretical background to the organisational dimensions of conflict and peacebuilding. Part I outlines a broad sweep of the insightful work which this study draws on. It was important to provide a scholarly overview of the fields of managing

1  INTRODUCTION: WHY IT MATTERS 

5

and leading in extreme contexts, organisational resilience, managing in fragile and conflict-affected states and the challenges of public sector reform in unstable and unsafe environments. Many of these areas will be familiar to those interested in organisational behaviour and organisational studies more generally. Others will be recognisable for those who reach this book from an interest in conflict studies. Drawing these theoretical positions together provides a way to understand where managing in conflict environments sits in both literatures. This first part goes on to offer a brief background analysis and history of the areas and locations featured. It is as detailed as possible but inevitably limited given both the restrictions of space (which unfortunately include even books) and because I have tried not to either overestimate the existing knowledge of the reader or underestimate the complexity of the conflicts featured. Many of those who go on to build peace by small and large initiatives (often quietly, diplomatically and carefully) have begun the journey when the situation around them was much more dangerous and frightening. This part also includes a chapter that was originally unplanned. It is titled ‘Before Peace’ and represents an attempt to convey not the everyday reality of ongoing violence but the experience of those living through acute conflict flares—whether it be in Sarajevo during the Bosnian wars or Northern Ireland at the beginning of the Troubles. I had not originally meant to include this piece, but there seemed to be something grave and important about the phased nature and varying intensity of conflict that those experiences convey and set apart. It is hard to talk to people about peace and its creation without also talking about war, with its terror, its brutality and its fear. I felt that in order to present the most complete picture possible, it was essential to look even briefly at the experience of war as an organisational phenomenon, and as such, the practice of the people within it. So this chapter seeks to present a backdrop to efforts of conflict resolution and peacebuilding within organisations, by providing a different kind of context: the reality of what it is like to be in the midst of war and extreme civil disturbance. In Part II the book goes on to focus on the sectoral challenges and emergent ideas from the data itself, through a series of thematic chapters which focus on policy areas particularly important to organisational life. These include managing space, economic regeneration including the experience of entrepreneurs, the delivery of public services like housing and the provision of utilities, attempts to ‘reimage’ locations of notoriety, and the role of heritage and the arts amid unrest and disorder. Some of

6 

J. MURPHY

these subjects are directly engaged in what might be called conflict management especially through periods of conflict flares. Others deal with the reality of conflict and its legacy tangentially and through the challenges of delivering public services fairly or supporting economic regeneration either as entrepreneurs or as governmental officials. The data includes a diverse range of perspectives from those managing public services, engaged in the third sector and in business and private sector organisations. It is important to say that the research is not spread evenly across all chapters. Readers will see that some parts emphasis one location, or one issue, more than others. That is simply a reflection of the substance of interviews and the inaccessibility of some sectors in some places. The themes themselves are not exhaustive areas of interest but do largely reflect core considerations of how society is organised and managed. I am conscious that taken individually they also represent enormous areas of scholarship in their own right and regret that this work cannot give them the ‘deep dive’ of policyfocused analysis which they deserve. I have largely steered away from subjects that deal directly with policing and security—either in relation to security sector reform projects (as experienced in Northern Ireland and Bosnia1) or in terms of policing’s engagement with insurgent and radical movements (all of our cases), although a brief consideration of some of these issues appears in Part III of the book. This omission is deliberate because of the great deal of work which is already in the public domain about these areas and a recognition that policing and security is generally well considered in such contexts. The purpose of this book is to move beyond orthodox approaches and to provide an understanding of the other factors which are equally important within conflict and conflict transformation. Again, I justify this through a willingness to be led by the data and the voices of those engaged in such complex and nuanced activity. Many of the cases and experiences detailed in these chapters appear along a broad spectrum, from the all-out warzone of Sarajevo under siege to the day-to-day tensions of the flag protests in Belfast and the background rumble of the legacy of the civil war in the Basque country. Through all of this I have tried to keep in mind the words of Scott Bollens (Bollens 2011) and his own declaration that he has approached his

1  For a consideration of the policing change process in Northern Ireland, see my previous book Murphy, J. (2013). Policing for Peace in Northern Ireland: Change, Conflict and Community Confidence, Palgrave Macmillan.

1  INTRODUCTION: WHY IT MATTERS 

7

exemplary scholarship as an “engaged individual with views and feelings” (Bollens 2011: 4). The book goes on in Part III to draw some of these concerns together in an analysis of management challenges in persistently distrustful and often structurally divided societies. To do this it uses three alternate theoretical lenses to understand better organisational activities and practices in conflict and transition. The first of these is the experience of organisations operating in a liminal space between conflict and peace and how ‘threshold’ experiences impact actor behaviour. The second draws on the decision-­making dilemmas of those managing in environments of violence and utilises Primo Levi’s concept of ‘the grey zone’ (Levi 1986) to understand better how organisational actors decision make when there is no good options or outcomes. The third builds on the potential of organisational actors to behave as peacebuilding entrepreneurs, creating networks, brokering relationships and mainstreaming conflict resolution as an organisational activity. The book concludes with some reflections on this area of work and a future research agenda for those interested in the organisational dimensions of conflict and peacebuilding.

References Bollens, S. (2011). City and Soul in Divided Societies. Oxford and New  York: Routledge. IEP. (2018). Global Peace Index. Sydney: Institute for Economics and Peace. Levi, P. (1986). The Drowned and the Saved. London: Abacus. Murphy, J. (2013). Policing for Peace in Northern Ireland:, Conflict and Community ConfidenceChange. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

PART I

Framework of Analysis: Theory and Context

CHAPTER 2

Framing an Understanding of Management and War

Introduction In contested environments, organisational life and violent conflict inevitability overlap, but very little work exists on how one affects the other. There are a number of reasons why such scholarship is scare. Firstly, these are two very different disciplines whose understanding of each other is limited and where there sometimes exists an ideological and scholarly scepticism about the other’s relevance and approach. This difference is compounded by alternative positions on methods and what characterises impactful research. As someone who works in both areas, I am familiar with the quizzical looks of those in management and organisational studies (MOS) when conflict is mentioned, and with the raised eyebrows of conflict specialists when asked about management and organisations. Setting aside individual preferences over research decisions and a lack of historic interaction, this distance seems unfortunate, since many of the approaches in both research areas are similar and draw on comparable methodological styles. Helpfully, there are now emerging areas of theoretical and empirical work that directly or indirectly go some way to building a bridge of understanding between the two disciplines. This chapter draws together that bridging scholarship by doing three things. Firstly, it provides an overview of the existing research on management within contexts of violence and transition and demarcates the boundaries and typologies within the wider literature. Secondly, it situates this work firmly within the intellectual tradition of processual, context-orientated management © The Author(s) 2020 J. Murphy, Management and War, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49252-6_2

11

12 

J. MURPHY

research and draws on some theoretical approaches which are particularly useful to further understand how organisational actors experience and manage through violent conflict. Lastly, it briefly outlines the methodological approach taken for the study and some of the particular challenges of this type of research.

A Jigsaw of Existing Scholarship Before looking at relevant areas in detail, it is helpful to start with some fundamentals. The central focus of this work is managers and managing. The definition of ‘manage’ is straightforward—it is simply to “be in charge of a business, organisation or undertaking” (OUP 2013). Our understanding of the role of a manager flows from that: “a person responsible for controlling or administering an organization or group of staff” (OUP 2013). These are straightforward, simple and easily understood concepts and roles, and yet they are very significant for organisational life. If we deconstruct them, we see the emergence of elements of responsibility (be in charge of; a person responsible for), issues of decision-making (controlling or administrating) and the reality of structures and people (a business, organisation or undertaking; an organisation or group of staff). So while at one level this is simple, at another it is complex, multifaceted and challenging (Smith and Hitt 2007). Leadership is a similar paradox. While multiple definitions abound, most centre on leadership as an influencing and visioning process and on change and changing (Kouzes and Posner 1987). Conflict is an equally contested and multifaceted construction defined by the Heidelberg Institute (2015) as any “positional difference, regarding values relevant to a society, between at least two decisive and directly involved actors, which is … outside established regulatory procedures and threaten core state functions” (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 2015: 8). Concepts of difference, ‘in’ and ‘out’ groups, activity outside normal processes and a threat to core state business are central to our understanding of what conflict is and what it does. When it comes to exploring organisational activity and behaviour during war and transition, the existing academic literature provides many approaches to draw upon. In general, organisations—public, private and third sectors, and the decisions and agency of actors within them are recognised as a significant area in business and management scholarship (Pettigrew et al. 1992; Buchanan and Badham 1999). There is much less

2  FRAMING AN UNDERSTANDING OF MANAGEMENT AND WAR 

13

attention paid to organisations within conflict contexts (Haufler 2015). The organic development of the work which does exist makes the emerging subfield unwieldy and disaggregated, with little or no cohesion, central focus or shared approach. For example, while much of this work can be regarded as sitting within the newly labelled business and peace (B&P) literature (Forrer and Katsos 2015) other research developing on parallel tracks explores how public sector organisations and non-profits play a role in reducing conflict and building peace (Collier et  al. 2008; O’Connor 2014). Still more falls into the emergent ‘extreme contexts’ literature (Hällgren et al. 2017) and relies heavily on core organisational concepts such as sensemaking, social constructions of meaning and the power of framing and reframing alternative approaches. While diversity brings a richness of approach and widens the theoretical lenses to illuminate understanding, it also poses a challenge for scholars trying to make sense of a broad but as yet unfocused body of work.

From ‘Do No Harm’ to ‘Do Some Good’ Within the wider management literature a great deal of scholarship brushes against, without fully engaging with, the role of managers and organisations in conflict environments. Inevitably, the cross and interdisciplinary nature of this research can be off putting for researchers who can be tightly invested in disciplinary and journal silos. Such structures are rightly regarded as crucial for academic advancement but struggle to accommodate more complex and wide ranging theoretically and empirically diffuse work (Bartunek et  al. 2006; Pettigrew 2011). Despite these structural disincentives, an increasing number of colleagues are turning their attention to traditional management themes in conflict environments. Particularly noteworthy is the emerging body of scholarship generally referred to as the business and peace literature. The aim of this literature is to better understand the role played by the international business community within environments of conflict and through conflict transition processes. Oetzel et al.’s comprehensive review acts as a starting point and identifies five ways business can positively affect peace and contribute to peacebuilding processes (Oetzel et al. 2009). This helpfully draws together similar insights from other work and identifies the promotion of economic development, the generation of economic benefit for conflict-affected societies, employment of local workers (Fort and Schipani 2007), important transfers of technology (Spencer 2008), and the facilitation of foreign

14 

J. MURPHY

direct investment (Oetzel et al. 2009; Buckley and Ghauri 2004) as important research themes. As Forrer and Katsos (2015: 439) comment “by providing these basic inputs in conflict-sensitive regions, business helps advance economic development and reduce prospects for violent conflict”. Forrer and Katsos’ work is thought-provoking because they also attempt to build some definition and conceptual clarity in what is recognised as a nascent and emerging area. They and others rightly identify important theoretical observations from the conflict literature, especially the concept of ‘negative peace’ (Galtung 1969): an environment when outright violence is reduced, but ‘structural’ violence remains and has the potential to reignite or flare underlying, persistent contention. By drawing attention to a dichotomy within the conflict literature referred to as a ‘dualistic’ or ‘conflict/post-conflict perspective’, they bring to light the important consideration of time and process within studies of environments of volatility and define an interlocutor period—‘the buffer condition’—where “structural violence remains intense even when overt conflict has ceased” (Forrer and Katsos 2015: 442). There is particular interest in what the private sector can achieve in this ‘buffer period’ (Ford 2015) and how direct engagement can not just ‘do no harm’ but actively assist conflict reduction endeavours (Fort 2015). Such a shift in terminology is interesting and may be worthwhile for some studies. It certainly pinpoints a temporal dynamic in which peace in its totality is rarely achieved. However, shifting this terminology away from conflict and post conflict altogether and focusing instead on ‘conflict transformation’ as a more useful theoretical construct and one which will be employed in this work. Undoubtedly, as Ford states, “any serious notion of ‘inclusivity’ in peacebuilding … cannot omit the private sector” (Ford 2015: 140), but the idea that business actors can play a positive (and active) role as peacebuilders, is relatively new (Katsos and Alkafaji 2019). Given the political and social instability which pervades almost all continents, heightened political skills and an awareness of potential volatility would seem like good business practice as well as a recognition of the role of business in impacting already volatile environments and the potential contribution of ‘corporate diplomacy’ (Kolk and Lenfant 2015). Ford reinforces his message about the significance of business within conflict environments with a differentiation between business conduct aimed at mitigating the risks of triggering or exacerbating conflict (‘do no harm’) and conduct aimed at contributing to short- or long-term conflict prevention and peacebuilding goals where enterprise can ‘do some good’ (Fort and Schipani 2007).

2  FRAMING AN UNDERSTANDING OF MANAGEMENT AND WAR 

15

Oetzel and Miklian (2017) take this further and contend that multinational enterprises (MNEs) who incorporate peacebuilding frameworks into their evaluations of complex environments have a better understanding of how contested contexts affect firm operations and profitability, and give them an advantage over MNEs that do not engage. The same argument in relation to the utility of peacebuilding partnerships is reinforced by Idemudia (2018). Others also focus on the significance of the private sector as an actor in the area of preventative diplomacy (Melin and Koch 2010).

Public Administration Post Conflict Sitting aside and in parallel with this emerging work on business and peace is the equally interesting work on the role of public administration and its development within conflict-affected states. This generally falls within two areas. The first is that which straddles the space between academically informed research which is practitioner orientated—including reports from international bodies such as the UN, EU and international charities (IEP 2018). The second is academic research which is focused on public management and administration which by its nature encounters and details the challenges of managing within conflict (O’Connor 2014). The UN’s work on ‘Reconstructing Public Administration After Conflict’ (United Nations 2010) falls within the first category and is helpful in that it defines the characteristics of conflict-affected environments and the challenges that transition processes present. Concerns of social upheaval, damaged infrastructure, reduced productivity, revenue shortfalls, weakened human resources and diminished security are all recognised and their dimensions mapped. The important point about this literature is that it identifies public administrations and actors as central to any possible processes of economic and social recovery. While it may be criticised for a tendency to present all post-conflict situations as fairly heterogeneous, it does outline opportunities for innovation, particularly in relation to the application of ICT in government and service delivery and how technology has the potential to blunt the polarising and isolating effects of conflict violence and post conflict division. Cities often exemplify an intensification of these pressures and can present both extreme examples of ongoing discord and its innovative management (Bollens 2000; Mcdowell and Braniff 2014; Goldie and Murphy 2015). In this context, public sector leaders often perform the complex role of interpreting policy

16 

J. MURPHY

and implementing it within a contested political space and place, while working through conflict and peacebuilding attempts (Bissessar 2009). The processes that characterise conflict transformation in societies marked by ethno-political violence are well established, but the internal agency of public sector leaders is much less well understood. One of the most interesting areas of literature exploring division and its outcomes for urban environments are the seminal studies of Scott Bollens on divided and conflict-affected urban environments (Bollens 2011). The author has spent time researching, writing about and living in the cities of which his work is the subject, and often reflects on both the scholarly difficulty and the emotional challenge of such research. Bollens’ comments that when engaged in this work. “I function on a continuum from despair to hope—yet both feelings seen as overstatement to personalised because they feel artificial and imposed from the outside” (Bollens 2011: 4). The unique dynamics of divided cities can constitute a “different normal, where urban separations overlap cultural fault lines and were long memories fit into tight spaces” (Bollens 2011: 13). Within public and non-profit literature more generally, we see a focus on institutional development and the interface of public management and violence. For example, Brinkerhoff et al. identify three core functions necessary to the effective stabilisation of fragile and conflict-affected states— all of which have a significant organisational component: security, effective delivery of public goods and services, and managing political participation and accountability (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2002; Brinkerhoff et al. 2012). Successfully achieving these can entail a challenging level of institutional change, the difficulties of which can obstruct stabilisation and peacebuilding processes. Even when realised, there remain the dual complications of sustaining economic recovery and reducing the risk of future conflict flares (Collier et al. 2008). Managing delicate and unstable transitions requires compound approaches to building a multifaceted anti-­ conflict infrastructure. Institutional, legislative and community-based conflict reduction and peacebuilding activities have been the subject of the literature more generally around transition and peacebuilding (Bollens 2000, 2011; Bissessar 2009). Scholars also highlight the importance of good governance processes in establishing peace, pursuing state reconstruction and preventing future conflict (Brinkerhoff and Morgan 2010), as well as the sectoral challenges of economic regeneration, political participation and what is euphemistically termed ‘living with the past’ (Berg and Schaefer 2009). Discrete work on public administration in conflict

2  FRAMING AN UNDERSTANDING OF MANAGEMENT AND WAR 

17

and transition has tended to focus on the role of the bureaucrat in sustaining conflict-managing mechanisms and exploring how elite level administrators influence and skew policies and decision-making processes (O’Connor 2014). Such work often focuses on the ‘internal change agency’ (Buchanan and Boddy 1992) of public managers who utilise noteworthy decision-making discretion in the allocation of resources for conflict-­ resolution-orientated policy implementation. In these circumstances public managers are “actively engaged in the stabilisation and normalisation process” (O’Connor 2014: 82). Again, little is understood about how these conflict management mechanisms are deployed (Bollens 2012; O’Connor 2014), and there exists a frustration with the under-­ studied nature of bureaucracy and public management in the scholarship on ethnic conflict and in the management of contested political issues (O’Connor 2014). Accordingly, there is a research gap around both the implementation process and the mechanisms present during often challenging institutional change, against a backdrop of violent conflict, trauma and resistance to that change. This is despite the centrality of such change to attempts at public reconciliation, administrative stabilisation and security sector reform (Murphy 2013). Peacebuilding itself, in these environments, is often interpreted through a series of change processes at an administrative level and while contested societies also differ from each other in many respects, there is a concern that we need to better understand how change management mechanisms are actually deployed within environments of ongoing, persistent political instability (O’Connor 2014). A very interesting perspective on this is presented by Giangreco et  al. (Giangreco 2010) in their examination of the use of performance appraisal systems in a Palestinian hospital during the second Intifada, extending the existing theoretical framework for human resource engagement to incorporate the realities of a hospital functioning in the midst of conflict. Megheirkouni (2018) takes a different approach looking at management and leadership within the Syrian public sector post the civil war. Recent political developments (and particularly those associated with radical Islamic movements) have resulted in a proliferation of material aimed to managers, especially those in the public sector, who may face potential violence from terrorist actions (Britton 2015). This is much more focused than guidance regarding violence in the workplace generally. Where direction exists on more typical workplace violence, it is concentrated on societies where there is a high level of gun ownership and public shooting incidents (Kirk and Franklin 2003).

18 

J. MURPHY

Leadership, Wicked Problems, Grand Challenges and System-Wide Change In a less obvious manner, recent scholarship on wicked problems, leadership and decision-making provide a useful foil for some of the general assumptions made about conflict and conflict transformation, particularly around leaders, leadership and inherently ambiguous processes. The work of Grint (2005) and more recently Watters (2019) illustrate the dimensions of some of the challenges that high risk environments present for decision-makers and those engaged in managing intractable and somehow insolvable dilemmas. In this, we are not so much interested in military leadership (which is a broad range of scholarship in its own right and aligns heavily to strategy) but rather the process of non-military leading within conflict environments. As Hannah et al. note, it is ironic that while so many leadership narratives focus on ‘overcoming adversity’ and ‘succeeding against the odds’ (Hannah et al. 2009), very little relevant and sufficiently differentiated research exists on how leadership behaviours and practices operate in extreme environments. The lack of an understanding of contextual variations in extremes contexts reinforces the problem (Bass 2008; Hällgren et al. 2017). Dimensions such as temporal ordering, preparation, contextual transitions during and post event, consequences, physical and psychological proximity and form of threat all impact behaviours and have been identified as attenuating and intensifying factors (Hannah et al. 2009). Adaptive capabilities are also defined as significant in the creation of good outcomes for extreme management contexts (Geier 2016; Heifetz et al. 2009). Attempts to understand and address the ‘system-wide’ nature of many societal issues are a useful source of potential relevance (Rittel and Webber 1973). Work on ‘wicked’ and ‘tame’ problems has been enhanced by the addition of ‘critical’ problems (Grint 2010) which allows us to understand the leadership dilemmas thrown up by volatile and highly complex environments. A further understanding of ‘leadership’ ‘management’ and ‘command’ helps to see how different behaviours are readily available for those in positions of authority and how they present an opportunity but also a danger. This reflects the insights of Heifetz (Heifetz et al. 2009) that leadership is ‘adaptive’ work, requiring an ability to address conflicts in values, ambitions and realities. The inherent moral ambiguity within leadership and decision-making in environments of violence is also addressed by those looking at the theoretical, philosophical and the ‘in the

2  FRAMING AN UNDERSTANDING OF MANAGEMENT AND WAR 

19

field’ realities of such situations. Watters (2019) emphases these difficulties in his interesting and thoughtful account of wicked problems within the Bosnian war: a case we will come to later in the book. In his discussion of the ethics of war, he succinctly concludes “as ethical theory provides no absolute answers, thus morality is not fixed, the study of ethics equips the leader with the frameworks for argument and the potential to justify decisions and dirty hands” (Watters 2019: 19). Other work, such as that by Megheirkouni (2018) look at the scope and reality of leadership development during and after conflict with all of the attendant issues of trust, ego, financial challenges and continuing instability. The renewed interest in ‘grand challenges’ has also produced a body of scholarship which recognises that global tasks require approaches emphasising pragmatic, situated, distributed and processual attitudes to problem solving and which draw together multiple powerful actors (Ferraro et al. 2015). How to do this is less obvious and the dearth of scholarship offering insights into the resolution of system wide, intractable enduring conflict should also be a concern to those interested or engaged in this area. One notable example, which outlines that change is possible but continually under tension is recent work outlining the reframing process which lead to the breakthrough of the Northern Ireland peace process after 30 years of conflict. The powerful unlocking of the problem from a position of ‘two tribes’ to ‘three strands’ and the role of framing, communication and individual agency is a useful template for those interested in multilevel change and conflict transformation (Murphy et al. 2020).

Leadership and Resilience in Extreme Contexts Perhaps the most useful focus for research on organisational activity and behaviour during conflict is that of the relatively recent body of work around ‘extreme contexts’ (Hällgren et  al. 2018). While not directly focused on conflict, this diverse body of material has recently been drawn together into a review which begins to demarcate what we mean by extreme contexts in terms of content and the focus. Working from the premise that some of the most significant scholarly contributions to management and organisation studies (MOS) were originally derived from such settings, Hallgren et al. go on to delineate work into risky, emergency and disrupted (RED) environments with a categorisation of all three outlined. They assert that such research has the potential to provide “particularly rich insights into organizational processes of adaptation and

20 

J. MURPHY

prioritization, resilience (following an extreme event), and barriers to inertia (where organizations fail to respond)” (Hällgren et al. 2018: 2). As they describe it, research on US Special Forces operations in Iraq could characterise a risky context, whereas an emergency department of a South Chicago hospital would constitute an emergency context, and a study of the Boston Marathon bombing would illustrate a disrupted one. Drawing on Hannah (Hannah et al. 2009) they define extreme contexts as environments where one or more extreme events are occurring or are likely to occur that may exceed the organisation’s capacity to prevent and result in an extensive and intolerable magnitude of physical, psychological, or material consequences to—or in close physical or psychosocial proximity to—organization members. (Hannah et al. 2009: 898)

This work relies heavily on previous scholarship on resilience and high-reliability organisations (HRO) and builds on that to draw out an understanding of behaviour within more challenging environments. Even within this comprehensive analysis of the field they acknowledge that only two of the papers included examine the active role played by managers in emergency situations. Identifying Beck and Plowman’s (2014) model of middle managers’ role in the process of convergent sensemaking at each unfolding stage of a disaster is one useful example. Recognising that such processes transcend organisational levels, they determine that encouraging multiple actors to organise their actions by communicating subtly and informal about the unfolding situation is key. By defining risky contexts as environments where catastrophic events are likely to happen, they valuably identify the opportunities for researchers to explore everyday organising before a catastrophic event and allow for a broader picture and a more complex understanding of what people do to enact reliability and psychological safety on a daily basis. This emphasis on subtle communicative processes is helpful because it focuses attention on another broad area of scholarship which has relevance to managing in environments of violence and conflict—that of sensemaking. This literature (Weick 1995) provides a rich theoretical arena for understanding organisational actors and their behaviours when faced with the volatility and complexity of conflict. The central focus of sensemaking research and knowledge is a realisation that individuals actively construct their understandings of the world using available cognitive frames that shape the perceptions, thoughts and the actions that follow (Cornelissen and Werner 2014). In this, communication in its many forms is seen as a critical mediating mechanisms for how individuals interpret and ‘frame’ a situation (Cornelissen et  al. 2013) and is

2  FRAMING AN UNDERSTANDING OF MANAGEMENT AND WAR 

21

particularly important when ‘framing’ impacts decision-making ‘under pressure’. Engaging in decision-making of this sort is critical for situations where actors are time poor and the outcome of decisions has the potential to be dangerously impactful (Weick 1988, 2010). Scholarship of this type includes the genre defining Mann Gulch case of firefighters catastrophically caught up by shifting winds and rule-bound procedure (Weick 1993), the Bhopal gas leak (Weick 2010), the ‘friendly fire’ downing of two US army black hawk helicopters of aid workers in 1994 (Snook 2000), the hijacking and downing of United Airlines flight 93 amid the chaos of 9/11 (Quinn and Worline 2008) and Cornelissen et al.’s (2013) investigation into the inquest findings of the killing of the innocent Brazilian commuter Jean Charles de Menezes by armed British police in July 2005. Disrupted contexts are defined as environments impacted by events slightly outside their own sphere of organising is also interesting and useful in that it pulls together work on liminality after catastrophic organisational events (Powley 2009) and what has become known as ‘compassionate organising’ (Shepherd and Williams 2014). This work addresses how individual compassion in response to human pain in organisations becomes socially coordinated through a process of contextual enabling of attention, emotion and trust; agents improvising structures; and symbolic enrichment (Dutton et  al. 2006). However, as much as this categorisation imposes some much needed order onto an array of dispersed literature, it also sits uncomfortably with work specifically looking at management in environments of intractable and persistent violence. ‘Ordinary’ organisational pain is quite different to environments where anxiety, fear and violence exist in the background and sometimes the foreground of normal operations. Often the experience of organisational actors in such contexts refuses to fit neatly into categorisations of extremity. The nature of such experiences are also temporal as organisational environments shift between and across intensities of immediacy, disruption and risk, sometimes very rapidly. From the wider literature Mangwi Ayiasi et al. (2019), in their examination of staff deployment challenges for two large health employers in Northern Uganda, underline the significance of pragmatic decision-­ making and the importance of local autonomy in volatile environments. Maglajlic (Maglajlic and Stubbs 2017) also focus on the role of public managers in the development of welfare reform policies which are often translated from other, less conflict-affected environments and often do not ‘land’ in a meaningful way in less stable contexts. The need to closely align

22 

J. MURPHY

such initiatives to research and practice from the extensive development studies literature is an important point. Brown and Cole (2016) also address some of the management challenges of conflict legacies in their understanding of how fair employment policies are implemented within the local government in Northern Ireland and the difficulties in managing live disputes at the frontline. O’Connor (2014) in his examination of elite level bureaucrats in public management environments provides probably the best existing analysis of the challenges and opportunities that these roles provide.

Adopting an Organisational Perspective: Context, Process and Politics As we have seen above, work which connects organisational activity to environments of conflict comes from a broad range of perspectives and scholarly traditions. Researchers are approaching the subfield of ‘management and conflict’ from positions of institutional theory, economic value, mechanism-based analysis and a concern for the underlying behavioural patterns of actors in contested settings. One of the key characteristics of volatile and disputed contexts is the constant presence of change, either because of ongoing violence or as a part of the transition journey out of it. In this, the literature around change and change practices helps us to make sense of shifting organisational forces. An awareness of change as an underlying organisational dynamic is a theme throughout this work. In more general terms, the following chapters are driven by three concerns. The first is an awareness that the link between formulation and implementation of strategy is not straightforward or linear. This is reinforced by our understanding that in human society and organisational life, the past “projects the present towards the future”; and that interpretations of the past and present are subject to ‘filtering’ through the potent sieve of power and of internal and external politics (Pettigrew 2003). A concern to ‘catch reality in flight’ (Pettigrew et al. 1992) allows for a complex and multi-­ layered consideration of the realities of organisational behaviour and decision-­making in the most extreme environments, with due regard to the past and its impact on the present. Andrew Pollitt in his exposition of the significance of time within social science research commented on the need to go beyond a consideration of the past to a more analytical and complex understanding of the real impact of past states, cultures, conflicts

2  FRAMING AN UNDERSTANDING OF MANAGEMENT AND WAR 

23

and allegiances (Pollitt 2008). There can be few environments where the role of history and the passage of time are more significant than those grappling with the living legacy of ethno-political conflict. Pollit asserts that we must go beyond the point when we simply “assert that ‘the past matters’ but to begin to say how it matters, and to conceptualise and explain temporal relationships” (Pollitt 2008: xiii). In the words of William Faulkner “the past is not dead, it is not even past”. The second consideration is an understanding that both stability and change are achieved though communicative and action inputs from actors who reproduce the system over time (Weick 1987). Actors have interests, resources or positions and the potential to change the system by an exercise of their own agency and their interactions with others (Fligstein 2001; Stone 1989). They do this by securing “enough co-operation among disparate community elements to get things done” (Stone 1989: 227). We also understand in times of change, volatility and uncertainty, new ‘cultural frames’ or ‘logics of action’ come into existence. Individuals frame action and mobilise people in the service of these action frames (Fligstein 2001) (Jasper 2004, 2006; Snow and Benford 1988, 1992). Actors interact with knowledge of one another under a set of common understandings about purpose, relationships and the rules that govern legitimate activity (Mcadam and Scott 2005), developing shared understandings about relationships, opportunities and institutional norms (Scott 1994). These in turn work to establish boundaries and context specific ways of behaving (Lawerence 1999). Socially constructed expectations and practices disseminate and are reproduced, therefore reinforcing the message (Scott 1994, 1995). This book argues that managers and leaders play a unique role in this process through their ability to exercise professional and personal agency in contexts of conflict. Managers embody how the organisations reflect, remember and learn from past initiatives (Akgün et al. 2012; Casey and Olivera 2003; Walsh and Ungson 1991). This expertise and ‘institutional memory’ makes them key agents in conflict transformation (Casey and Olivera 2003; Mcdowell and Braniff 2014). Not only does their presence represent critical continuity in a fluid and volatile environment, but their knowledge, networks and experience are invaluable when facing new, unprecedented challenges. The task then for organisational actors is to draw on the past but also allow learning to shape present and future decisions. In contested organisational spaces, this is often both necessary and unappetising. As Jervis (Jervis 1976) notes, it is telling that “we cannot make sense out of our environment without assuming that, in

24 

J. MURPHY

some sense, the future will resemble the past” (Jervis 1976: 217). Understanding how such individuals and teams are able to sustain and indeed progress projects and policy implementation in such volatility is a question of interest not only in relation to understanding conflict, but also in relation to seeking to better equip managers in the future. Thirdly, managing in conflict also requires an understanding of discontinuous and disorderly processes and a high level of tacit knowledge and enacted political skill (Noordegraaf and Newman 2011). Mid-level decision-­making also situates managers as institutional actors—moving the system in a particular direction (Fligstein 2001) and using ‘priming’ and ‘framing’ mechanisms to drive change (Cornelissen and Werner 2014). Tacit knowledge and political skill goes beyond normal management processes (Murphy et  al. 2018) and takes on a new dimension of immediacy in extreme contexts. Managers are also deeply involved in the establishment of institutional norms to form and maintain behavioural boundaries (Mcadam and Scott 2005), and are central to driving forward or blocking dynamics which may alter the way decision-making functions in divided and conflicted environments. This may involve operating in ‘the grey zone’ (Levi 1986), engaging in leadership practices which are themselves outside the norm and reflective of considerable moral ambiguity.

A Note on the Research Approach The framework of analysis outlined above seeks to explore the process by which organisational actors at multiple levels and working in different areas, interpret and implement policy within contested political space and place, while actively contributing to peacebuilding in societies transitioning from conflict. This process of interpretation and implementation often involves complex institutional change. To conduct any study is to make ontological and methodological decisions. The methodology selected here needed to ensure that diverse views were included and that there were opportunities for individuals who may have retired or moved sectors to be able to participate if they felt that was appropriate. It was also useful to provide a mechanism by which individuals could reflect collectively on events, processes and outcomes as well as traditional one to one interview methods. Data was captured from a number of organisational actors and touched upon events throughout an extended timescale—the early 1970s to 2020. In particular, individuals were sought whose professional activity

2  FRAMING AN UNDERSTANDING OF MANAGEMENT AND WAR 

25

and leadership capacity meant they had experience of service delivery and policy implementation during conflict. These included active engagement with paramilitaries and their representatives during periods of high tension, the development of community level initiatives around spatial interfaces, managing outcomes of community engagement processes, ongoing civil disturbance, demonstrations and rioting, and the need to administer large scale displacement of people as a result of violence or inter/intra community disorder. In all these circumstances, the experience of managers intersects acutely with ongoing conflict-related policy implementation dilemmas and violent events experienced directly or by proxy. The complex contexts and intricate decision-making favoured a narrative-based approach (Davis 2006) which retained the kind of ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973) that is the bedrock of qualitative research and best facilitates the explanation of complex social phenomena. The book draws on three broad sets of data. First, between 2014 and 2020, the author conducted more than 60 formal and many more informal interviews with a variety of individuals. This included retired or serving ‘leaders’ or ‘managers’ at various positions, ranging from those with minor line management responsibility to the most senior organisational levels. The interviewees were located across the three main geographic cases: Northern Ireland, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Basque country, and from a board range of organisations, within the private, public and third sectors. The remainder of the interviews were with members of political parties, representatives of supranational bodies with long-term interests in the case-study regions and individuals who had a view on how organisations were managed and organised in the midst of violence and transition processes. Some examples are included from other cases where data became available serendipitously or the availability of individuals made it possible to acquire additional perspectives. Many people were interviewed on more than one occasion over the period of the research. The second main data collection method utilised was that of witness seminars, developed as a way to allow groups of already engaged individuals to reflect upon an organisational process or event in which they had direct involvement in recent history (Allen et al. 2004; Coakley and Todd 2014). Five witness seminars took place over a two-year period, engaging thirty previous or current public sector managers, with at least one witness seminar in each case-study location. Participation was secured through snowball referral and existing research networks (Saunders and Townsend 2016). Individuals were invited to attend at an early stage and asked to

26 

J. MURPHY

suggest other appropriate attendees. Participants included those from local government, housing, health and social services, further education, arts and heritage, equality, policing and security, the third sector, economic regeneration and business owners. Seminars were held where possible in a neutral venue1 and facilitation was sensitive to the complex nature of ethno-political conflict-related issues. Both the interviews and the seminars were conducted along ethical guidelines, with a particular focus on participant anonymity, data storage and sensitive, knowledgeable facilitation. While the seminars focused on broad questions in relation to the management and provision of services during violent conflict and in the transition away from violence, the interviews concentrated on the experience of managers themselves in relation to events, emerging policy processes, political instability, violence and their own understandings of their role within deeply divided societies. Time periods were clarified and events corroborated with historical data as well as media and press reports. Data was excluded where it was not possible to obtain appropriate corroboration. The third major data set was historical/archival in nature. This included material (e.g. annual reports, press releases, strategy documents) from organisations themselves and documentation in the form of memos, emails, press coverage of major events and, in some cases, material on social media. Considerable thought was given to the sensitive nature of the research. The researcher’s past experience working with divided communities in Northern Ireland made her acutely aware of the difficulties inherent in establishing the research project. The treatment of time is one of the key and recurring themes in research of this type and brings to the fore the polarising issues of history and the impact of the different temporal patterns that occurred simultaneously in the conflict environments within separate communities, and the different interpretations and significance ascribed to them. This means cycles (political, economic or personal) playing out in parallel and each impacting on organisations in their own way (Abbott 1992). While it may be difficult to determine these impacts on a multi-level basis, awareness of the possibilities that surrounds them seemed an important analytical tool. Recognising time as a social construction, as well as a social reality allows us to be aware of how time cycles emerge and 1  In a place without an association to the conflict or affiliation to a particular political group or political position.

2  FRAMING AN UNDERSTANDING OF MANAGEMENT AND WAR 

27

interconnect (Pettigrew et al. 1992). The real lack of meaningful longitudinal research in a public policy context is very significant in this regard (Pollitt 2008; Dawson 2003). As Bollens has observed, “peace in these places teaches me about time. One adopts a longer time horizon (in this lifetime, rather than the next three years)” (Bollens 2011: 4). Time cycles, such as the commemorations of violent events, are often associated with violence flares and destabilisation so cannot be discounted by decision-­ makers and must be planned for. All of these factors require reflection.

References Abbott, A. (1992). From Causes to Events. Sociological Methods & Research, 20, 428–455. Akgün, A. E., Keskin, H., & Byrne, J. (2012). Organizational Emotional Memory. Management Decision, 50, 95–114. Allen, D. C. E. C. S. P., Allen, P., Black, N., Clarke, A., Fulop, N., & Anderson, S. (2004). Studying the Organisation and Delivery of Health Services: Research Methods. London: Taylor & Francis. Bartunek, J. M., Rynes, S. L., & Ireland, R. D. (2006). What Makes Management Research Interesting, and Why Does It Matter? The Academy of Management Journal, 49, 9–15. Bass, B. M. (2008). Bass’ Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research and Managerial Applications. New York: Free Press. Beck, T. E., & Plowman, D. A. (2014). Temporary, Emergent Interorganizational Collaboration in Unexpected Circumstances: A Study of the Columbia Space Shuttle Response Effort. Organization Science, 25, 1234–1252. Berg, M., & Schaefer, B. (2009). Historical Justice in International Perspective: How Societies Are Trying to Right the Wrongs of the Past. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bissessar, A.  M. (2009). Challenges Facing Senior Public Servants in a Plural Society. Public Personnel Management, 38, 1–15. Bollens, S. A. (2000). On Narrow Ground: Urban Policy and Conflict in Jerusalem and Belfast. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Bollens, S. (2011). City and Soul in Divided Societies. London: Routledge. Bollens, S. A. (2012). City and Soul in Divided Societies. Oxford and New York: Routledge. Brinkerhoff, D. W., & Brinkerhoff, J. M. (2002). Governance Reforms and Failed States: Challenges and Implications. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 68, 511–531. Brinkerhoff, D. W., & Morgan, P. J. (2010). Capacity and capacity development: Coping with complexity. Public Administration and Development, 30, 2–10.

28 

J. MURPHY

Brinkerhoff, D.  W., Wetterberg, A., & Dunn, S. (2012). Service Delivery and Legitimacy in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States. Public Management Review, 14, 273–293. Britton, J. (2015). Muslims, Racism and Violence after the Paris Attacks. Sociological Research Online, 20, 207–212. Brown, G., & Cole, M. (2016). The ‘Shared Workplace’ Agenda in Northern Ireland: Lessons from Local Government. Local Government Studies, 42, 557–578. Buchanan, D., & Badham, R. (1999). Politics and Organizational Change: The Lived Experience. Human Relations, 52, 609–629. Buchanan, D.  A., & Boddy, D. (1992). The Expertise of Change Agent: Public Performance and Backstage Activity. London: Prentice Hall. Buckley, P. J., & Ghauri, P. N. (2004). Globalization, Economic Geography and the Strategy of Multinational Enterprises. Journal of International Business Studies, 35(2), 81–98. Casey, A., & Olivera, F. (2003). Learning from the Past: A Review of the Organisational Memory Literature. In Organisational Learning and Knowledge. Lancaster: Lancaster University. Coakley, J., & Todd, J. (2014). Breaking Patterns of Conflict in Northern Ireland: New Perspectives. Irish Political Studies, 29, 1–14. Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., & Söderbom, M. (2008). Post-Conflict Risks. Journal of Peace Research, 45, 461–478. Cornelissen, J.  P., & Werner, M.  D. (2014). Putting Framing in Perspective: A Review of Framing and Frame Analysis Across the Management and Organizational Literature. The Academy of Management Annals, 8, 181–235. Cornelissen, J., Mantere, S., & Vaara, E. (2013). The Contraction of Meaning: The Combined Effect of Communication, Emotions, and Materiality on Sensemaking in the Stockwell Shooting. Journal of Management Studies, 51(5), 699–736. Davis, G.  F. (2006). Mechanisms and the Theory of Organizations. Journal of Management Inquiry, 15, 114–118. Dawson, P. (2003). Reshaping Change: A Processual Perspective. London: Routledge. Dutton, J. E., Worline, M., Frost, P., & Lilius, J. (2006). Explaining Compassion Organizing. Administrative Science Quarterly, 51, 59–96. Ferraro, F., Etzion, D., & Gehman, J. (2015). Tackling Grand Challenges Pragmatically: Robust Action Revisited. Organization Studies, 36(3), 363–390. Fligstein, N. (2001). Social Skill and the Theory of Fields. Sociological Theory, 19, 105–125. Ford, J. (2015). Perspectives on the Evolving “Business and Peace” Debate. The Academy of Management Perspectives, 29, 451–460.

2  FRAMING AN UNDERSTANDING OF MANAGEMENT AND WAR 

29

Forrer, J. J., & Katsos, J. E. (2015). Business and Peace in the Buffer Condition. The Academy of Management Perspectives, 29, 438–450. Fort, T. L. (2015). The Diplomat in the Corner Office: Corporate Foreign Policy. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Fort, T. L., & Schipani, C. A. (2007). An action plan for the role of business in fostering peace. American Business Law Journal, 44, 359–377. Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. Journal of Peace Research, 6, 167–191. Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. New  York: Basic Books. Geier, M.  T. (2016). Leadership in Extreme Contexts: Transformational Leadership, Performance Beyond Expectations? Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies, 23, 234–247. Giangreco, A. (2010). War outside, ceasefire inside: An analysis of the performance appraisal system of a public hospital in a zone of conflict. Evaluation and Program Planning, 35(1), 11. Goldie, R., & Murphy, J. (2015). Belfast Beyond Violence: Flagging Up a Challenge to Local Government? Local Government Studies, 41, 470–488. Grint, K. (2005). Problems, Problems, Problems: The Social Construction of ‘Leadership’. Human Relations, 58, 1467–1494. Grint, K. (2010). Wicked Problems and Clumsy Solutions: The Role of Leadership. In S. Brookes & K. Grint (Eds.), The New Public Leadership Challenge. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Hällgren, M., Rouleau, L., & De Rond, M. (2017). A Matter of Life or Death: How Extreme Context Research Matters for Management and Organization Studies. Academy of Management Annals, 12, 111–153. Hällgren, M., Rouleau, L., & Rond, M. D. (2018). A Matter of Life or Death: How Extreme Context Research Matters for Management and Organization Studies. Academy of Management Annals, 12, 111–153. Hannah, S.  T., Uhl-Bien, M., Avolio, B.  J., & Cavarretta, F.  L. (2009). A Framework for Examining Leadership in Extreme Contexts. The Leadership Quarterly, 20, 897–919. Haufler, V. (2015). Symposium on Conflict, Management, and Peace: Comments from an International Relations Scholar. The Academy of Management Perspectives, 29, 461–468. Heifetz, R.  A., Grashow, A., & Linsky, M. (2009). The Practice of Adaptive Leadership: Tools and Tactics for Changing Your Organization and the World. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press. Idemudia, U. (2018). Shell–NGO Partnership and Peace in Nigeria: Critical Insights and Implications. Organization & Environment, 31, 384–405. IEP. (2018). Global Peace Index. Sydney: Institute for Economics and Peace.

30 

J. MURPHY

Institute, H. (2015). Conflict Barometer. Heidelberg: Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. Jasper, J. (2004). A Strategic Approach to Collective Action. Mobilization, 9, 1–16. Jasper, J. (2006). Getting Your Way: Strategic Dilemmas in the Real World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Katsos, J.  E., & Alkafaji, Y. (2019). Business in War Zones: How Companies Promote Peace in Iraq. Journal of Business Ethics, 155, 41–56. Kirk, D. J., & Franklin, G. M. (2003). Violence in the Workplace: Guidance and Training Advice for Business Owners and Managers. Business and Society Review, 108, 523–537. Kolk, A., & Lenfant, F. (2015). Partnerships for Peace and Development in Fragile States: Identifying Missing Links. Academy of Management Perspectives, 29(4), 422–437. Kouzes, J. M., & Posner, B. Z. (1987). The Leadership Challenge. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Lawerence, T. B. (1999). Institutional Strategy. Journal of Management Inquiry, 25, 161–188. Levi, P. (1986). The Drowned and the Saved. London: Abacus. Maglajlic, R. A., & Stubbs, P. (2017). Occupying Liminal Spaces in Post-Conflict Social Welfare Reform? Local Professionals and International Organisations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The British Journal of Social Work, 48, 37–53. Mangwi Ayiasi, R., Rutebemberwa, E., & Martineau, T. (2019). “Posting Policies Don’t Change Because There Is Peace Or War”: The Staff Deployment Challenges for Two Large Health Employers During and After Conflict in Northern Uganda. Human Resources for Health, 17, 27. Mcadam, D., & Scott, R. W. (2005). Organizations and Movements. In G. F. Davis, D.  Mcadam, R.  W. Scott, & M.  N. Zald (Eds.), Social Movements and Organization Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mcdowell, S., & Braniff, M. (2014). Commemoration as conflict: space, memory and identity in peace processes. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Megheirkouni, M. (2018). Leadership and Management Development Post-War: Exploring Future Trends. International Journal of Organizational Analysis, 26(1), 107–128. Melin, M. M., & Koch, M. T. (2010). Jumping into the Fray: Alliances, Power, Institutions, and the Timing of Conflict Expansion. International Interactions, 36, 1–27. Murphy, J. (2013). Policing for Peace in Northern Ireland: Change, Conflict and Community Confidence. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Murphy, J., Mcdowell, S., Braniff, M., & Denyer, D. (2018). Managing Contested Spaces: Public Managers, Obscured Mechanisms and the Legacy of the Past in Northern Ireland. Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space, 36, 443–459.

2  FRAMING AN UNDERSTANDING OF MANAGEMENT AND WAR 

31

Murphy, J., Denyer, D., & Pettigrew, A. (Early Online, March 2020). The Role of Framing Mechanisms in Explaining System-Wide Change: The Case of the Northern Ireland Conflict and Peace Process. British Journal of Management, n/a. Noordegraaf, M., & Newman, J. (2011). Managing in Disorderly Times: How Cities Deal with Disaster and Restore Social Order. Public Management Review, 13(4), 513–538. O’Connor, K. (2014). Public Administration in Contested Societies. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Oetzel, J., & Miklian, J. (2017). Multinational Enterprises, Risk Management, and the Business and Economics of Peace. Multinational Business Review, 25, 270–286. Oetzel, J., Westermann-Behaylo, M., Koerber, C., Fort, T. L., & Rivera, J. (2009). Business and Peace: Sketching the Terrain. Journal of Business Ethics, 89, 351–373. OUP. (2013). The Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pettigrew, A. (2003). Strategy as Process, Power and Change. In S. A. Cummings & W. David (Eds.), Images of Strategy. Maldon, MA: Blackwell. Pettigrew, A. M. (2011). Scholarship with Impact. British Journal of Management, 22, 347–354. Pettigrew, A., Ferlie, E., & Mckee, L. (1992). Shaping Strategic Change. London: Sage. Pollitt, C. (2008). Time, Policy, Management: Governing With the Past. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Powley, E. H. (2009). Reclaiming Resilience and Safety: Resilience Activation in the Critical Period of Crisis. Human Relations, 62, 1289–1326. Quinn, R. W., & Worline, M. C. (2008). Enabling Courageous Collective Action: Conversations from United Airlines Flight 93. Organization Science, 19, 497–516. Rittel, H.  W. J., & Webber, M.  M. (1973). Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning. Policy Sciences, 4, 155–169. Saunders, M.  N. K., & Townsend, K. (2016). Reporting and Justifying the Number of Interview Participants in Organization and Workplace Research. British Journal of Management, 27, 836–852. Scott, W.  R. (1994). Institution and Organizations: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis. In R. W. Scott & J. Meyer (Eds.), Institutional Environments and Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism. SAGE: Thousand Oaks. Scott, W.  R. 1995. Introduction: Institutional Theory and Organizations. In: Scott, W.  R. & Christensen, S. (eds.) The Institutional Construction of Organization. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.

32 

J. MURPHY

Shepherd, D.  A., & Williams, T.  A. (2014). Local Venturing as Compassion Organizing in the Aftermath of a Natural Disaster: The Role of Localness and Community in Reducing Suffering. Journal of Management Studies, 51, 952–994. Smith, K. G., & Hitt, M. A. (2007). Great Minds in Management: The Process of Theory Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Snook, S. A. (2000). Friendly Fire: The Accidental Shootdown of U.S. Black Hawks Over Northern Iraq. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Snow, D.  A., & Benford, R.  D. (1988). Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization. International Social Movement Research, 1, 197–217. Snow, D. A., & Benford, R. D. (1992). Master frames and cycles of protest. In A.  D. Morris & C.  M. Mueller (Eds.), Frontiers in Social Movement Theory (pp. 133–155). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Spencer, J. (2008). The Impact of Multinational Enterprise Strategy on Indigenous Enterprises: Horizontal Spillovers and Crowding Out in Developing Countries. Academy of Management Review, 33, 341–361. Stone, D. A. (1989). Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas. Political Science Quarterly, 104, 281–300. United Nations. (2010). Reconstructing Public Administration After Conflict: Challenges, Practices and Lessons Learned. New York: United Nations. Walsh, J.  P., & Ungson, G.  R. (1991). Organizational Memory. Academy of Management Review, 16, 57–91. Watters, B. S. (2019). Leadership in the ‘Wicked’ Problem of Bosnia’s Civil War: A Case Study Examining Ethical Decision Making Under Duress. Leadership, 15, 3–26. Weick, K.  E. (1987). Organisational Culture as a Source of High Reliability. Californian Management Review, XXIX, 112–127. Weick, K.  E. (1988). Enacted Sensemaking in Crisis Situations[1]. Journal of Management Studies, 25, 305–317. Weick, K. E. (1993). The Collapse of Sensemaking in Organizations: The Mann Gulch Disaster. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, 628–652. Weick, K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. Weick, K. E. (2010). Reflections on Enacted Sensemaking in the Bhopal Disaster. Journal of Management Studies, 47, 537–550.

CHAPTER 3

Hope and History: The Environmental Antecedents of Conflict and Peacebuilding

War lasted days in Slovenia, a year in Croatia and then four terrible years in Bosnia Academic working in the cultural sector, Bosnia 2019

One of the central aims of this book was to look beyond the theoretical and towards the experience, dilemmas and challenges of managers in violent or conflict-affected contexts. The endeavour to ‘catch reality in flight’ (Pettigrew et al. 1992) requires an understanding of the complex history of our cases and their diverse conflict antecedents. This is best achieved with a brief empirical review of each region setting out the history, protagonists and peace processes which impact on this study. Each case is complex and multifaceted, so what follows below is a brief sketch of each case, rather than an in-depth analysis. In general, however, environments of conflict arise from a number of circumstances: identity, territory, discrimination, historical wrongs and boundary alteration. They are often reinforced over time, fade and flare, and are tenacious in their ability to divide populations and international opinion. These factors are profoundly connected to the history and people in each region and impacted by everyday political events. The cases selected for this study are marked by the enduring nature of violence and division in each region, attempts at resolution and societies living with the legacy of violence.

© The Author(s) 2020 J. Murphy, Management and War, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49252-6_3

33

34 

J. MURPHY

Northern Ireland and ‘the Troubles’ The violent ethno-political conflict which characterised the Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’ has been one of the longest-running clashes in Europe’s recent history. It sits at the centre of a lengthier conflict between Britain and Ireland which stretches back to the twelfth century and a military attempt by King Henry II of England to add Ireland to his kingdom. He succeeded in establishing control of an area around Dublin, known as the Pale. While control over the native Catholic Irish population persisted in the face of the rebellion of Irish clans, it was not until the sixteenth century that a major expansion of English rule took place. This took the form of the ‘plantation’ of Ulster and the introduction of ‘Planters’, who were mostly Protestant by religion, English-speaking, and culturally and politically foreign (Darby 2001). As John Darby asserts in his seminal essay on the subject, the broad outlines of the current conflict in Northern Ireland had been sketched out within fifty years of the plantation: the same territory was occupied by two hostile groups, one believing the land had been usurped and the other believing that their tenure was constantly under threat of rebellion. They often lived in separate quarters. They identified their differences as religious and cultural as well as territorial. (Darby 1995: 14)

This division persisted over the centuries and was compounded on the one hand with attempts at revolt and on the other with a withdrawal of local autonomy and the introduction of measures, such as the penal laws against Catholics and to some extent those who identified as Presbyterians. Insurgencies against British rule were both political in approach—seeking to use the parliamentary system to ‘repeal’ the act of Union—and violent, such as the Easter Rising of 1916. While success was partial, over time emotive elements of Irish republicanism evolved into a focused and resilient ideology—best expressed by the eventual leader of the Easter rising’s often cited funeral oration for a fellow republican in 1915: They think that they have pacified Ireland. They think that they have purchased half of us and intimidated the other half. They think that they have foreseen everything, think that they have provided against everything; but the fools, the fools, the fools!—they have left us our Fenian dead, and while Ireland holds these graves, Ireland unfree shall never be at peace. (Macarthur 2012)

While the Rising of the next year failed, the execution of its leaders elicited a great deal of sympathy for the insurgents. The Irish War of Independence that followed came to an end with the controversial ‘Treaty’ and the Government

3  HOPE AND HISTORY: THE ENVIRONMENTAL ANTECEDENTS… 

35

of Ireland Act in 1920. The legacy of this Treaty and the act of parliament which followed it were to define Irish political life for a century. Just as Irish nationalists and republicans were intent on ending the political dominance of Britain on the island, Ulster Protestants were just as determined to preserve and maintain their relationship and place within the United Kingdom. However, it became clear to them that it would only be possible to maintain the link with Britain within the Northern, majority Protestant counties. The partition of Ireland which reflected this division was enshrined within the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, establishing separate Home Rule institutions within two new subdivisions of Ireland: the six north-eastern counties forming ‘Northern Ireland’, while the larger part of the country made up ‘Southern Ireland’. Agreed by the north but not by the south, the act was followed by the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921 and the creation of an Irish Free State. By retaining six Ulster counties within the United Kingdom and creating an almost permanent political majority for the Protestant, Unionist and British identifying community in Northern Ireland, a political minority status was enforced on the North’s Catholic minority who continued to identify as Irish. However, many Irish republicans’ believed that their task was incomplete and a sporadic Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) border campaign continued through the 1920s, 40s and 50s, with the tacit support of the Irish establishment (Hennessey 1999; Faoleán 2019). The permanent introduction of emergency legislation to deal with the threat and the almost entirely Protestant makeup of the Northern Ireland’s police force reinforced difficulties further. Wider discrimination against the Catholic minority persisted with in particular, concerns around the provision of public housing, jobs and investment. Inspired by the wider political discontent of the 1960s, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights movement took shape. This Association, which was nonviolent and focused on the creation of common rights irrespective of religious and political affiliation, was met with heavy-handed police rebuttal and violence. By the end of the 1960s, increasing violence on the streets ensued in a collapse of local political institutions, a return to Direct Rule from London and an environment of dangerous volatility. The decision to deploy British troops and the resurgence of the previously moribund IRA (now termed Provisional) resulted in well-documented violence on all sides. Internment without trial accelerated anger and internationally documented atrocities such as BloodySunday-fuelled IRA recruitment (Calame and Charlesworth 2009). Loyalist violence against Catholic communities intensified in tandem with Provisional IRA activity. Communities became increasingly polarised down

36 

J. MURPHY

political lines, with religion as a common community identifier. The early years of the ‘Troubles’, as they are often called, saw significant population movement: 60,000 people forced to leave their homes between 1969 and 1973. Around 14,000 homes were destroyed during this time and the combination of these events lead to very significant segregation of the population (Darby 1995). This separation is particularly acute in relation to social housing. The cities of Belfast and Derry became hotbeds of political unrest. Rioting was common and regular bombs, sectarian killings and everyday security threats were a part of life. ‘Peace walls’ were erected to keep waring communities apart and reduce localised violence (Hughes et  al. 2007). Belfast City centre was inaccessible in the evening, and policing became a heavily politicised and dangerous occupation. By 1973, Northern Ireland was the most dangerous place in the world to be a police officer—twice as dangerous as El Salvador, where the risk factor was next highest (Ryder 2000). Both Provisional IRA and loyalist violence against the security forces and the civilian population continued unabated. Violence reached its peak in 1972 when 468 people were killed. By the time of the Belfast or Good Friday Agreement of 1998, Northern Ireland had suffered almost 30 years of intercommunal violence, resulting in almost 3700 deaths and an estimated 40,000 injuries (Fay and INCORE 2001; Smyth and Moore 1996). The theatre of conflict was not confined to Northern Ireland. Associated violence in the form of gun and bomb attacks occurred in Britain, mainland Europe and across the border into the Irish Republic (Hennessey 1999). Initiatives such as the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 failed to bring a resolution. The New Ireland Forum convened in Dublin (1984–1985) attempted reframe the role, response and position of the Irish Government and State to what had become a defining national concern. These initiatives came to fruition with the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 which enshrined for the first time the significance of the relationships between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland and between Ireland and Britain and was significantly boosted by the brokerage of Irish America (Guelke 2012). Covert negotiations including those between Nobel Prize winner John Hume and the leaders of violent republicanism led to a Provisional IRA ceasefire of 1994 and the subsequent loyalist paramilitary cessations of violence shortly after. This reduction in violence and in the paramilitary threat manifested in a staged demilitarisation of Northern Ireland, with a return to barracks for the British Army and a reduction in what had become known as the ‘architecture of the Troubles’—watch towers, fortified police station and border posts. This period also saw the first tentative moves towards police

3  HOPE AND HISTORY: THE ENVIRONMENTAL ANTECEDENTS… 

37

reform (Murphy 2013). After challenging all-party talks with an independent US Chair (Senator George Mitchell), the historic Belfast Agreement was signed on Good Friday, 1998. The peace process in Northern Ireland has been receiving financial support from the European Union (EU) since 1989, through both EU regional policy and EU contributions to the International Fund for Ireland (IFI). Following the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 and on the recommendations of a special Commission Task Force, the EU PEACE I programme (1995–1999) was approved on 28 July 1995. In March 1999, the European Council decided that the special programme should continue until 2004 under the name of PEACE II. The programme was subsequently extended until 2006. PEACE III, covering the 2007–2013 programming period, carried on some of the priorities of the previous programmes and all project activities ceased on 31 December 2015. A declaration of the programme’s closure was submitted to the Commission by 31 March 2017. A new programme (PEACE IV, 2014–2020) was officially launched on 14 January 2016, with a strong emphasis on investment targeted at children and young people. Investment in NI from EU funds totalled 1.3 billion EUR in the period 1995–2013. The PEACE IV programme for the 2014–2020 programming period has a total value of 270 million EUR. Post agreement, significant differences over the ‘decommissioning’ of paramilitary weapons stalled for a time the creation of new democratic institutions in the old Belfast parliament of Stormont. Resurgent republican violence in the form of ‘dissident’ groups has resulted in the deaths of two police officers, two prison officers, a journalist and the life-changing injuries of others. Street violence persists, particularly around community commemorations of past battles. Sectarian violence and segregation continue to be issues of concern (Morrow 2019). The economy of Northern Ireland was significantly affected by violence and political instability. This led to an economic deterioration during the latter half of the twentieth century, compounded by the oil crisis and the decline of traditional manufacturing and heavy industries. The current population of Northern Ireland is 1,810,8631 an increase of 7.5% over the past ten years. Around 90% of school children are educated separately in either Protestant (- controlled) schools or Catholic (- maintained) schools. Many do not meet a member of the other community until they go to university or enter the workforce (Hughes et al. 2007). Public sector housing is almost 1

 As recorded in the 2011 census.

38 

J. MURPHY

entirely separate, with 90% of Northern Ireland Housing Executive estates identified as ‘single identity’. Intermarriage between Catholic and Protestant couples was extremely low throughout the Troubles—at around 5%, although in recent times this has risen to between 8% and 12%2 (Moxon-­Browne 1983). Segregation in the workplace was significant at the beginning of the Troubles, but the introduction of stringent fair employment laws and monitoring bodies to give these force has reduced this over time (Whyte and Fitzgerald 1990). Recently, a drift towards party-political extremes and a polarisation of the democratic process has hollowed out moderates in the political space (Tonge et al. 2014). The recent UK decision to leave the European Union has pulled from underneath the process the powerful EU foundation upon which Ireland’s border became increasingly insignificant (Murphy et  al. 2020). Recent elections have altered the balance in power in the British parliament in Westminster further complicating the landscape and increasing instability. The prospect of a post-Brexit return to border controls with the Republic of Ireland is widely regarded to have the potential to fatally destabilise the peace process (Hayward 2017) (Fig. 3.1).

The Basque Region and Competing Nationalisms Like Northern Ireland, the history of the Basque conflict has long and complex origins. The Basque identity centres around its distinct language which predates Indo-European languages and is unrelated to other vernaculars. The first record of Basque language and culture appears in the tenth century.3 Known as ‘Euskara’ or ‘Euskera’ it has endured through centuries of political and economic upheaval including the Roman and Moorish conquests, as well as countless attempts at forced assimilation. The Basque region (known as ‘Euskal Herri’ in the Basque language), is generally described as the area encompassing ‘seven provinces’ now divided into three administrative entities: the French Basque Country (Iparralde), the Spanish Basque Country (Euskadi) and the autonomous province of Navarre. The three located in France are: Labourd, Basse Navarre and Soule. Euskadi, also known as the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country—Pais Vasco, was formed in 1978 by the union of three Basque provinces: Guipúzcoa, Biscaye and Alava within the wider 2 3

 NI Life and Times survey https://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2005/.  Glosas Emilianenses.

3  HOPE AND HISTORY: THE ENVIRONMENTAL ANTECEDENTS… 

39

Fig. 3.1  The United Kingdom and Ireland

jurisdiction of the Spanish state, with Vitoria or ‘Gasteiz’ as its capital. Navarre forms its own autonomous province within Spain, with its capital—Pamplona, or ‘Iruñea’ in Euskara. While the literal translation of Pais Vasco into English is the ‘Basque Country’, a more comprehensive understanding is of seven provinces linked by a common language and cultural practices. The region in its completeness consists of about 2.9  million people, of whom about 650,000 are native Basque speakers—known as ‘Euskaldunak’. While the division of the Basque country into Spain and France occurred in 1513, the actual international border was established in 1659 with the signing of the Treaty of the Pyrenees. At the centre of Basque tradition and culture is the Guernica Arbola: a symbolic oak first planted in the fifteenth century and representing Basque identity and difference. In the nineteenth century, Basque nationalist Jose Maria Iparraguirre wrote a song dedicated to the tree Gernikako arbola, which has since become an anthem for the Basque people. Modern day Basque regional presidents still swear an oath of loyalty to the Basque people under the tree.

40 

J. MURPHY

The emergence of significant Basque nationalism in the nineteenth century was a result of both the industrialisation which has led to substantial inward immigration into the area and the changing political and cultural environment including the rise of Spanish nationalism (Watson 2007). The establishment of the Spanish 2nd Republic on the 14th of April 1931 was a precursor to one of the most turbulent times in the history of Europe. The Republic lasted six years before the outbreak of the Spanish Civil war in 1936. The war saw the Basque cities of Bilbao and San Sebastian side with the forces of the Spanish Republic, while Navarra and Alava took up anti Republican positions. The brutality of the war and the atrocities that occurred through its duration are still resonant within the Basque community. Most infamously is the blanket bombing of the culturally symbolic town of Guernica in which the ‘Gernikako Arbola’ is located. This atrocity is memorialised in Picasso’s famous painting and has come to symbolise the carnage of modern warfare. It is useful to remember that the purpose and aim of the Francoist forces was to create a homogenous and united Spanish state and the origins of the modern violent Basque nationalism can be found in this period. Attempts to suppress the Basque language and expressions of nationalism were intensified with Francoist control of Basque regions from 1937 onwards. The outbreak of World War II in 1939 accelerated suppression. Resistance took the form of moderates who believed that a resurgence of Spanish democracy would be active after the death of Franco (generally associated with the Basque Nationalist Party, the PNV) and others who looked towards a violent response. Those engaged in resistance coalesced into Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA)—meaning Basque Homeland and Freedom. Established in 1959, it grew out of student activism and a frustration with the conservative positions of the PNV. Using guerrilla tactics, ETA engaged in a strike and counterstrike offensive against the Spanish state (Jack 2015). The campaign continued through Spanish transition to democracy after the death of Franco in 1975. Attempts to appease Basque nationalists in Spain were largely ineffective and widespread disorder followed. In 1977, the Basque provinces and later Navarre were granted pre-autonomous legal and administrative status and autonomy in 1978. This autonomous statute granted the Basque Country exclusive jurisdiction over matters including social security, health, welfare, labour relations, education and cultural activities. Despite this, the Basque Country pays a portion of its taxes into the central Spanish revenue each year.

3  HOPE AND HISTORY: THE ENVIRONMENTAL ANTECEDENTS… 

41

By 1980 the Basque economy was in crisis, with negative GDP growth and the region’s main industries were in decline. Steel, shipyards, machine tools, and capital goods were all collapsing. Between 1975 and 1980, the unemployment rate grew from 3% to more than 13%. GDP per capita fell from 99% of Western European levels in 1975 to 74% five years later (Abadie and Gardeazábal 2003). After growth in the late 1980s, the economy continued to slump in the 1990s before political action to revitalise competitiveness in the region reached the top of the Basque political agenda with significant results. In 2008, the Basque Country had become the autonomous region in Spain with the highest income per capita, 33% above the Spanish average and 36% above the EU average. Unemployment had fallen from 25% in 1993 to less than 4% in 2008, the lowest in Spain and lower than the European average (Abadie and Gardeazábal 2003). Attempts to bring to a close the ongoing ETA campaign continued throughout the 1970s, but their failure resulted in an increasing crackdown on militants and a rise in political prisoners associated with the organisation. From 1978, the rise in violence and civilian casualties created a security situation in which both ETA and state forces were engaged in dirty war of assignation and insurgency. The kidnap of political, policing and business figures became commonplace. Ceasefires in the 1980s and ongoing dialogue with the Spanish government were interminably successful. Between 1976 and 1994 there were 771 killings, which reduced to 98 people between 1995 and 2010, as violence lessened (Mahoney 2018). The kidnap and murder of Migual Ängel Blanco, a young Popular Party councillor in 1997 is regarded by many as a turning point in this process. Street protests in local towns and in Bilbao resulted in the largest-­ ever anti-ETA protest on 12 July 1997. Blanco’s death and the shock and outrage which accompanied it, provoked a response which encompassed both peaceful protest and political activity. The headline in the Spanish centre-right paper El Mundo shortly after conveys the duality ‘A por ellos … Con la paz e la Palabra’—‘We are coming after you with our peace and our words’.4 The ETA ceasefire of 2010 followed by its disarmament in 2018 saw an end to the campaign, although significant issues of concern of remain. These include ongoing indignation and outrage at the treatment of ETA paramilitary prisoners, often incarcerated at great distances from their families, resulting in frequent large public demonstrations and protests. 4

 15 July 1997.

42 

J. MURPHY

Fig. 3.2  The Basque region

The message is reinforced further by the ‘Etxera’ signs (meaning back home) that festoon streets and apartment buildings throughout Bilbao. Issues of legacy in terms of the representation of the conflict and the role of Basque language and culture are still largely contested and appear materially in the signs and graffiti around the old city of San Sebastian, ‘Not French, Not Spanish, but Basque’ (Fig. 3.2)

Bosnia and Herzegovina: “More History Than They Can Consume”5 While the history of the Northern Ireland and Basque conflicts reach far back into history and are peppered with instances of extraordinary brutality, they pale in comparison to the region which encompasses the former state of Yugoslavia (Michail 2012; Taylor 2005). The Balkans has been a site of intercommunal and interethnic strife for centuries and has often 5

 This quotation is often attributed to Winston Churchill.

3  HOPE AND HISTORY: THE ENVIRONMENTAL ANTECEDENTS… 

43

borne the brunt of the struggle between eastern and western Europe (Glenny 1996). Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is the location of our final case, is situated in the western Balkan peninsula and has its capital the historic city of Sarajevo—itself a central focus of twentieth-century world history. The decline of the Ottoman empire in Europe and competing nationalisms between ethnic groups saw the emergence of an ideology of Yugoslavism—a way of uniting southern slavs under one banner. The First Balkan war of 1912 forced the Turks to concede Macedonia and Kosovo to Serbia. The second war expanded Serbian territory. Radical Serbian nationalist movements were calling for the union of Austrian-controlled Bosnia with Serbia and Montenegro. This was the environment in which the World War I began with the assignation of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914. A domino effect of retaliation followed, beginning with the Austrian invasion of Serbia (Michail 2012). After the devastation of World War I, the state of Yugoslavia was created, incorporating Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which also included Bosnia and Montenegro. Albania was declared an independent state. World War II further destabilised the region. Yugoslavia was carved up between the axis powers of Germany and Italy and the Independent state of Croatia, which included modern Croatia, Bosnia and parts of Serbia and Slovenia. Reprisals against the Serbs in particular were brutal. Resistance movements emerged in the form of Serbian Royalist Chetniks and pro-­ communist Partisans. These two groups were in conflict with each other, as well as the Germans and the Ustaše. The behaviour of the Chetniks against Muslim civilians was particularly ruthless. About 10% of the region’s population died during this period. Post World War II, tensions within the region were manifested through the wider dynamic of a bi polar international political landscape and a Soviet sphere of influence. By the 1960s the Albanian majority in Kosovo had begun to protest against Serbian control. These tensions were exploited by Serbian communist party leader Slobodan Milosevic. The autonomy that Kosovo had enjoyed under Yugoslavia’s 1974 constitution was suspended by Milosevic in 1989, leading to increased civil disturbance and unrest. As movements towards democracy began to impact the region, the tension between Belgrade—dominated by Milosevic—and the Republics grew more acute. Slovenia declared independence in 1991 and became the first nation to break away from the Yugoslavian state (Glenny 1996). Croatia also attempted to accede, but the Serbian-dominated Krajina region set up its

44 

J. MURPHY

own state and civil war broke out. Macedonian independence followed. When Bosnian independence was declared on the 3rd of March 1992, a brutal civil war was unleased between its three main ethno-political groupings: Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. One of the most notable and long running events of the war was the siege of Sarajevo—the longest of a capital city in the history of modern warfare. First besieged by the forces of the Yugoslav People’s Army, the city was then set upon by the Army of Republika Srpska from 5 April 1992 to 29 February 1996 (1425 days). The Bosnian Serbs—whose strategic goal was to create a new Bosnian Serb state of Republika Srpska (RS) encircled the city with a force of 13,000 troops. From there, they assaulted the city with artillery, tanks and small arms. The Bosnian government defence forces (ARBiH) inside the besieged city, had some 70,000 troops at their disposal, but were poorly equipped and unable to break the blockade. The siege lasted three times longer than the battle of Stalingrad and more than a year longer than the siege of Leningrad (Maček 2000). The suburb of Dobrinja was hit particularly hard. Situated alongside the airport and built for the Winter Olympics of 1984 it had until the outbreak of war in 1992 been the most extensive district of the city. During the war it became one of the most isolated areas within Sarajevo and especially vulnerable to snipers and shell bombardment (Maček 2000; Berman 2007). About 13,952 people were killed during this time, including 5434 civilians. The ARBiH suffered 6137 fatalities, while Bosnian Serb military saw 2241 soldiers killed. The 1991 census indicates that before the siege the city and its surrounding areas had a population of 525,980. Assessments of the number of people living in Sarajevo after the siege range from between 300,000 and 380,000 (Bassiouni 1994). After the war, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) convicted four Serb officials of crimes against humanity committed during the siege. Stanislav Galić and Dragomir Milošević were sentenced to life imprisonment and 29-year imprisonment respectively. Their superiors, Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, were also convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. The war itself continued to 1995 and resulted in 100,000 deaths, ethnic cleansing and the return of concentration camps and genocide to central Europe, including the shameful murder of over 8000 Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica (Gratz 2011). As Moodie (1995) reflects, A particularly heinous practice was ethnic cleansing, or the forcible expulsion of people of the wrong ethnic background from a given territory through violence and terror including murder, rape, arson, robbery, and beatings. The goal was

3  HOPE AND HISTORY: THE ENVIRONMENTAL ANTECEDENTS… 

45

to create such a feeling of threat in the population that they would want to leave and never return. All sides engaged in the practice, although the Serbs are held to have pursued it most. (Moodie 1995: 108)

The Dayton Peace Accords of 1995 saw Bosnia divided into a loose coupling, with 51% of territory forming into a Croat-Muslim Federation and 49% of the territory going to a new Serbian entity. As well as the territorial division the war saw large displacements of the population caused by ethnic cleansing and internal displacement (Moodie 1995). By 1996, there were 1.2 million Bosnian refugees in exile in 25 countries, on top of 1 million internally displaced people (DI), in a total population of 4.3 million in 1991 (ICG 1997). The Dayton Accords included an annex to rehouse those displaced: Annex VII.  Within its strictures it states, “all refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes of origin”. This was ratified by the constitution of Bosnia which decreed freedom of movement within state borders (Toal et  al. 2011: 172). Unsurprisingly, the return of people and communities to their original homes did not proceed smoothly. As Toal et al. (2011) recognise, fear of returning to places of origin, and to an ethically minority status, after violence resulted in an uneven return of pre-war population patterns (Toal et al. 2011). It is believed that between 1991 and 1996 the Bosniak and Croat population in the RS-controlled territory dropped from 840,000 to 73,000 (Burg and Shoup 1999). The extreme nature of these population displacements led to demographic change across the entire country. Within the capital Sarajevo, many of the refugees who had fled there remained until after the war. In addition to this population displacement and the territorial division of Bosnia into two entities, the city was also challenged to quickly rebuild and to engage in a significant economic shift from a controlled to a capitalist economic model. As Halilovich and Efendic´ (2019) note, “In some instances, the old formal institutions, such as public health, the education system or the employment biros have continued to exist, but in reality have been unable to fulfil their missions in the new post-conflict environment” (Halilovich and Efendic´ 2019: 2). Struggling with a large public sector, limited private wealth creation and an economy based on consumption rather than production, the post-war period did not create the conditions necessary for economic recovery or sustainable economic growth. An under-performing export sector and exports worth only 30% of GDP, a poor business climate, high cost of employment and poor transport connections underscore the widespread economic difficulties faced by the region. Post Dayton, new institutions of

46 

J. MURPHY

government were layered on top of old structures, into what by any standards is an extraordinarily complicated system of government (Kartsonaki 2016). Within the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are 2 semi-­ autonomous substate entities (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska), 10 cantons (within the Federation), 1 ‘district’ (the city of Brčko) and 141 local municipalities. This new political system was determined by three administrative levels in the RS, those of the municipality, the entity and the state, and four levels in the FBiH, with the municipality, the canton, the entity and the state. Executive judicial and legal bodies operate for all of these levels, which is also complicated further by the ‘triple lock’ of Bosniak, Croat and Serb ethnic representation at presidential and ministerial level. (Aquilué and Roca 2016). As Halilovich and Efendic´ (2019: 2) reflect, “Each of these different layers of governance forms one part of a complex, expensive and largely inefficient institutional makeup of contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina”. After the war the international community invested significantly in the region with a focus on humanitarian relief, reconstruction, peacebuilding, the resettlement of refugees, state and institution building, democratisation and economic development.6 From 1996 to 1999, 3.7 billion USD were allocated by 48 countries and 14 international organisations, according to a 2005 IMF report, and on average, Bosnia’s annual aid from 1996 to 2002 amounted to 730 million USD (BCSDN 2017). In the immediate post-war period Bosnia provided 2.6 billion EUR (approximately 3.1 billion USD) for reconstruction and the return of refugees (BCSDN 2017). Despite these interventions, considerable concern exists regarding the weakness of Bosnian institutions, the persistence of corruption and ongoing division. As Kartsonaki (2016) comments of scholarship in the area, The research found that BiH is not in an immediate danger of collapse. BiH remains peaceful, despite the numerous challenges it faces. However, it comprises an alarming amount of causes of conflict that have been mitigated because both international actors and local elites benefit from the current status quo. Thus, BiH finds itself in a peaceful stalemate, which is likely to continue until a structural change occurs that triggers the outbreak of conflict. BiH is, hence, stable and explosive. (Kartsonaki 2016: 508)

6  See https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_bosnia_and_herzegovina.pdf.

3  HOPE AND HISTORY: THE ENVIRONMENTAL ANTECEDENTS… 

47

While the process of Bosnia accession to the EU seems to have stalled, concerns persist both for the stability and prosperity of the state and the future of the unsettled institutions (Fig. 3.3).

Fig. 3.3  Bosnia and Herzegovina

48 

J. MURPHY

References Abadie, A., & Gardeazábal, J. (2003). The Economic Costs of Conflict: a Case Study of the Basque Country. American Economic Review, 93, 113–132. Aquilué, I., & Roca, E. (2016). Urban Development After the Bosnian War: The Division of Sarajevo's Territory and the Construction of East Sarajevo. Cities, 58, 152–163. Bassiouni, C. (1994). Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780. United Nations. BCSDN. (2017). Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Paper. In Western Balkan CSOs for Global Development. Balkan Civil Society Development Network. Berman, D.  M. (2007). The War Schools of Dobrinja: Reading, Writing, and Resistance During the Siege of Sarajevo. San Francisco: Caddo Gap Press. Burg, S.  L., & Shoup, P.  S. (1999). The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe Incorporated. Calame, J., & Charlesworth, E. (2009). Divided Cities; Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, Mostar, and Nicosia. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania. Darby, J. (1995). Conflict in Northern Ireland: A Background Essay. In S. DUNN (Ed.), Facets of the Conflict in Northern Ireland. London: Macmillan Press Ltd. Darby, J. (2001). The Effects of Violence on Peace Processes. Washington, DC: Institute of Peace Press. Faoleán, G. Ó. (2019). A Broad Church: The Provisional IRA in the Republic of Ireland, 1969–1980. Irish Academic Press. Fay, M.  T., & INCORE. (2001). The Cost of the Troubles Study: Report on the Northern Ireland Survey: The Experience and Impact of the Troubles. Londonderry: INCORE. Glenny, M. (1996). The fall of Yugoslavia: the third Balkan war. New  York: Penguin Books. Gratz, D. (2011). Elitocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Its Impact on the Contemporary Understanding of the Crime of Genocide. Nationalities Papers, 39, 409–424. Guelke, A. (2012). Politics in Deeply Divided Societies. London: Wiley. Hayward, K. (2017). Bordering on Brexit: Views from Local Communities in the Central Border Region of Ireland / Northern Ireland. Queen’s University Belfast. Halilovich, H., & Efendić, N. (2019). From Refugees to Trans-local Entrepreneurs: Crossing the Borders Between Formal Institutions and Informal Practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Journal of Refugee Studies. Hennessey, T. (1999). A History of Northern Ireland. New York: St. Martin's Press. Hughes, J., Campbell, A., Hewstone, M., & Cairns, E. (2007). Segregation In Northern Ireland. Policy Studies, 28, 33–53. ICG. (1997). Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in B-H.

3  HOPE AND HISTORY: THE ENVIRONMENTAL ANTECEDENTS… 

49

Jack, E.  P. (2015). From Belfast to Bilbao: The Basque Experience with the Irish Model. Working Papers in Conflict Transformation and Social Justice. Kartsonaki, A. (2016). Twenty Years After Dayton: Bosnia-Herzegovina (Still) Stable and Explosive. Civil Wars, 18, 488–516. Macarthur, B. (2012). The Penguin Book of Modern Speeches. London: Penguin Books. Maček, I. (2000). War Within: Everyday Life in Sarajevo Under Siege. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet. Mahoney, C. W. (2018). End of the Cycle: Assessing ETA’s Strategies of Terrorism. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29, 916–940. Michail, E. (2012). Western Attitudes to War in the Balkans and the Shifting Meanings of Violence, 1912–91. Journal of Contemporary History, 47, 219–239. Moodie, M. (1995). The Balkan Tragedy. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 541, 101–115. Morrow, D. (2019). Sectarianism-A Review. Belfast Northern Ireland: Ulster University. Moxon-Brown, E. (1983). Nation, Class and Northern Ireland. Aldershot: Gowe. Murphy, J. (2013). Policing for Peace in Northern Ireland: Change, Conflict and Community Confidence. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Murphy, J., Denyer, D., & Pettigrew, A. (Early Online, March 2020). The Role of Framing Mechanisms in Explaining System-Wide Change: The Case of the Northern Ireland Conflict and Peace Process. British Journal of Management. Early Online, March 2020. Pettigrew, A., Ferlie, E., & Mckee, L. (1992). Shaping Strategic Change. London: Sage. Ryder, C. (2000). The RUC 1922–2000 A Force Under Fire. London: Arrow Books. Smyth, M., & Moore, R. (1996). Policing and Sectarian Division. Derry: Templegrove Action Research. Taylor, A. J. P. (2005). War by Timetable: How the First World War Began. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books Limited. Toal, G., Tuathail, G. Ó., & Dahlman, C.  T. (2011). Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and Its Reversal. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tonge, J., Braniff, M., Hennessey, T., Mcauley, J. W., & Whiting, S. (2014). The Democratic Unionist Party: From Protest to Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Watson, C. (2007). Basque nationalism and political violence: the ideological and intellectual origins of ETA. Reno: Center for Basque Studies, University of Nevada, Reno. Whyte, J. H., & Fitzgerald, G. (1990). Interpreting Northern Ireland. Belfast: Clarendon Press.

CHAPTER 4

The Lived Experience of Intense Conflict

When I meet people from Bosnia, and they ask me when I was born, and I say 1970 they can’t believe that someone like me is still alive … I have cousins who were killed—one of them was 15. Taken away from his mother. I would reverse everything, all the success, for the ordinary life I would have had without that war. Bosnian refugee and camp survivor I can tell you we had a door which squeaked, and I thought sometime in my life, I’m going to work in this bar and that door will squeak and my stomach won’t tighten. I’ll not have fear in me … The first year was just like hell. Northern Ireland entrepreneur speaking about his first business in the 1970s.

This book seeks to better understand how managers and leaders in organisations deliver services, run companies and build peace in societies dealing with violence and the journey from division. It draws on three case studies of societies in which conflict has scarred both the past and the present, but in which violence has largely been replaced with unsteady peace. Many of the conflagrations are complex and of long duration and require explanation. I have done my best to relate that complexity in as straightforward a way as possible. This Part focuses on organisational life during intense conflict flares. Rather than look thematically at the experience of each location as we do in Part II, it explores the cases in turn to give voice to the © The Author(s) 2020 J. Murphy, Management and War, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49252-6_4

51

52 

J. MURPHY

experiences of individuals who have lived and worked in the most extreme conflict contexts.

Northern Ireland For those in Northern Ireland the early days of the conflict were surreal and frightening. The early 1970s saw the most intense violence and the highest number of deaths, with 476 people killed in 1972 alone. A former civil servant recalled working in ‘bombed-out’ Belfast in the early 1970s, “We would have been out on average twice a week on bomb scares. I once looked out the window and saw someone park a car with a bomb in it. The warning came about a minute later. This was indiscriminate violence—lets bomb this place into submission. You just built up a resilience. I was going in and out of town every day”.1 For this interviewee who was from the Protestant community, working in the city centre also meant that it was his first time encountering people from a Catholic and Nationalist tradition. He recalls his initial shock as he got to know a work colleague, I was sharing an office with young women from a republican background. A very vocal young woman … she worn this long coat and under the lapels were pins turned down. So when she was frisked by the soldiers on her way to work their fingers went into the pins. It takes some anger against the British state to think like that. Friends were saying—you need to be careful what you say … My sense in the 70s was that this was temporary. I never thought it would go on for so long … You did fear for your safety.2

Another local entrepreneur talked of his return to Northern Ireland towards the end of the 1970s and the first years of his business, It was the late 70s. We were in England and my Mum and Dad lent me their life savings. We came back and bought a small pub and discovered almost immediately that paramilitaries had put the previous owner out. The first thing that happened was Special Branch3 came along. Took myself and my dad aside. They told us it was mainly Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and UVF, and said, ‘you gotta keep these people out of the bar’.4  Retired civil servant.  Ibid. 3  Special Branch was the anti-terrorist section of the Royal Ulster Constabulary—often criticised as ‘a force within a force’. BARKER, A. 2004. Shadows: Inside Northern Ireland’s Special Branch, Mainstream. 4  Northern Ireland businessman. 1 2

4  THE LIVED EXPERIENCE OF INTENSE CONFLICT 

53

Our interviewee decided that following police advice was more dangerous to him than following his own instincts, “We decided that we couldn’t bar these people. We couldn’t see how it would be safe for us. The police told us to check our cars and gave us a number we could phone and for the first two weeks, then they left us”. Despite significant ongoing intimidation, the business was able to develop a pattern of working: “I was behind the bar. My then wife did the floor and my mother cooked burgers. And my dad did maintenance and he did the graveyard shift between 3 and 7. My dad was a real character and not really frightened of everyone. He got the respect of the boys”. Eventually this entrepreneur had to confront the long-term political and business reality of functioning in such volatile times, what happened was, we knew some of the people that were coming in and we knew they were trouble. And we also knew that they were the reason better people weren’t coming in—people not connected5 and we absolutely didn’t want to be dependent on them and we didn’t really want to befriend them. So, we started a different thing. If someone came in and swore we would say ‘we can’t serve you’ and it went something like—‘do you know who I am, do you want me to come behind there and rip your throat out?’ It was terrifying but all my money but more importantly my mum and dad’s—every single penny, was tied up in this bar.

The danger was not just psychological and the experienced quickly morphed into physical hazard: “in one incident I was stabbed in the bar by a bloke who is hopefully now dead. I drove a VW beetle and was checking under that.6 You got through with dark mad humour, but we never bent”. The purpose and direction of business was clear and so was the approach to the community and to ongoing conflict related issues, I decided I would run a better bar than anyone else. It was tricky enough but we were starting to make a bit of money. I had one girl who worked for me, I said rather than hide the turnover, I’ll show you exactly what we’re not making. She came from the community but I was telling her we are just about getting by here.

However, despite some stabilisation ongoing issues of paramilitary intimidation still occurred. The issue of ‘protection money’ was one which reared its head and was dealt with in a clever and localised way, 5 6

 Not connected or members of loyalist paramilitary organisations.  Car bombs were a common paramilitary tactic.

54 

J. MURPHY

they came in and said, ‘you pay us x amount we’ll put a doorman on’. I said, ‘no, we don’t need a doorman’. And they said, ‘you really do’. The conversation was between him, my dad and me, and my dad said, ‘there’s no way we’re getting any doormen here—we can look after ourselves’ … but what happened was that we did sponsor the local boxing team and one of the local football teams and they got to know us. An old lady was robbed and we ran a fundraiser and eventually people started to like us and the boys didn’t think it was worth their while. Eventually, one of the higher ups came down and asked us to make a contribution and we said, ‘no, we don’t do that’ and anyway we don’t have any money. We said, ‘if you’re doing something around the Twelfth7 we’ll donate some food, a bottle of drink, something like that’. He was happy he’d got something. So that was that.

The negotiation around political ideology and potentially divisive public holidays led to ongoing issues around the management of symbolic community identifiers such as playing the British National Anthem at closing time (a tradition in some areas) and the display of flags and emblems around the traditional Loyal Order parades of the Twelfth of July. Again, we can see in these recollections that issues are more complex and sometimes less political then they originally seem, “The other thing was the 12th of July. This boy came in. Really bad lad. Said ‘we’ll be putting the flags up. Putting them on (outside) your bar’. I said ‘no, definitely not. If you put them up I’ll be taking them down”. We were back and forward a bit and then he said, “If you don’t let me put the flag on your bar it’ll fuck up my zig zag8 completely”. The juxtaposition of menace and black humour gives us an insight into how people manage such circumstances over time and on a daily basis. The consistently applied nature of the position adopted—essentially the development of a series of acceptable norms and processes and the retention of these norms through periods of intense threat resulted with the proprietor establishing a working relationship with those at the extremes of the conflict. It also meant, that over time business development became easier. “I never got hassle after the first one. People knew what I was like. They talked to each other. Some places they will come to you for protection money before you even open, but never me”. However, it is important to note that even when norms are established this is a constant iteration of risk and negotiation. Our interviewee also spoke about periods of darkness and the reality of the volatility in the environment,  The Twelfth of July.  A zig-zag pattern from one side of the street to the other repeating all the way down the road. 7 8

4  THE LIVED EXPERIENCE OF INTENSE CONFLICT 

55

we had an argument with x from the UVF about barring people. The police told me I was under threat. The UVF wanted a meeting with me and the police said, ‘We’d like you to wear this wire … I just said ‘no way on this earth am I wearing a wire’. They said, ‘we can help you—this could come back on you or your boys’. I didn’t trust the cops and I didn’t trust the paramilitaries. The police came down and said ‘you have got to be more careful’. I was offered a gun, told where to park, change routes, all that sort of thing. I checked (underneath the) car, I stopped picking the kids up. We altered everything. But still my a guy that worked for me was killed—they put a bomb under his van.

These recollections convey the real danger that such environments produce and the risks run by ordinary business owners and managers. One way used by many in this position to mitigate lower level issues was to develop relationships of mutuality with the surrounding community. This tempered difficulties but was only something that could be nurtured over time and in an authentic way, Once I had established who I was, I had periodic problems with paramilitaries, but as I stared to grow I was always working in the community either through schools or employing ex paramilitaries and those elements got to know me. Funnily enough, I probably had more contact with community workers—if we can call them that, than politicians. I never, like my father, hid my views and I’ve always been critical of politicians so most politicians stayed away from me.

There was one other element which is interesting about the experience of this entrepreneur at the early stages of his career. He was not operating by himself—instead, he was surrounded by his family—including his wife and his parents. He was intent of repaying the investment of his parents and that the cost of ‘failing’ would have been personally and financially catastrophic. However, the engagement of family members also means that the threat was a collective one, as was the existence of a support network. In particular, our respondent spoke about the particular impact of his father, “One thing I have to say about my father, My dad was a real character and not really frightened of everyone. He got the respect of the boys. We decided we would not talk about politics in the bar, but sometimes my father … the message never got through. I could hear him saying to them—‘you know this is a load of crap’”. He was philosophical as he concluded our conversation, In my experience threats are common in hospitality, but I think some people in the hospitality industry are unsung heroes throughout the Troubles. Running bars and determined that their bar would be a safe haven for customers. It’s to be admired. Difficult times. But for anyone who has shown weakness—that’s the road to ruin.

56 

J. MURPHY

Daily engagement with paramilitaries was also the experience of many in health and social services in Northern Ireland around the same time period. One former local government worker spoke about the colleagues he encountered and the perverse difficulties of delivering services in a divided and conflict riven environment, I was aware that these were agencies which were trying to deliver a service in the middle of a war zone and how members of staff had to—from the most senior, to the most junior—adapt and change their approach depending on where they were. For example, there were social workers who were mainly Catholic, operating on the Shankill road9 who changed their names, from an obvious Catholic name to a name that sounded more Protestant— trying to anonymise themselves and to reduce the chances of attack.10

The phenomenon of out-group identification by name, school, accent or other indefinable characteristic was a well-known feature of the Troubles especially when individuals needed to be aware of their own personal safety around people who they did not know well.11 Others engaged in economic development and ‘stabilisation’ initiatives recalled particular periods of intense violence and fear, and the reactions and expectations that emerged from that. One such period was the two weeks between the 6th and the 19th of March 1988 which began with the killing of three members of the IRA, shot dead in Gibraltar by British Special Air Service (SAS) soldiers. Their funeral was held on the 16th of March in Milltown cemetery in Belfast. The funeral was very large and attended by prominent republicans. Ulster Defence Association (UDA)12 member Michael Stone approached the funeral and attacked the mourners with an automatic pistol and hand grenades. His attack was caught on camera by media outlets. Stone was pursued by mourners, apprehended, beaten and arrested by police. His actions left a further three people dead. At the funeral of one of those people three days later, a grey Volkswagen Passat inexplicably drove straight at the head of the funeral procession and mounted the pavement. The car was set upon by the crowd, before it became clear the driver was carrying a handgun from which he fired a single shot. The two men in the car were off-duty British Army corporals who had inexplicitly strayed  Regarded as a major Protestant and Loyalist area.  Retired civil servant. 11  This reticence to share information was famously characterised by the Northern Ireland’s Nobel-Prize-winning poet Seamus Heaney in his 1975 poem ‘Whatever You Say, Say Nothing’. 12  A loyalist paramilitary organisation. 9

10

4  THE LIVED EXPERIENCE OF INTENSE CONFLICT 

57

into the funeral procession. The two were eventually dragged from the car, beaten and stripped, before being driven to nearby waste ground where they were shot. All of this again was witnessed by local journalists and photographers, as well as an army helicopter overhead. A local priest Fr Alec Reid who attempted to intervene in the savagery, was himself threatened. He pursued and gave both men the last rights. In an environment as dangerous and volatile as this, civil servants were asked to engage productively with communities. One was incredulous in is recollection, The economy was going down the tubes big time. We had the death of the two corporals in West Belfast and prior to that we had Gibraltar, and Michael Stone’s attack on the graveyard. Ministers panicked big time. They through West Belfast was going to go down the tubes and it was out of control. X and I were asked to go on the ground and create a team … as far as Ministers were concerned it was ‘do anything, experiment. Whatever you do, hold the ground’.13

The almost military-style language (‘hold the ground’) to civilian staff and the danger inherent in the endeavour was not matched by the expectations or latitude granted to individuals working in such circumstances, I suppose the learning we took out of that, we took an absolute hammering in terms of accountability but we were basically told ‘spend, get on the ground, do things differently, engage, but don’t talk to Sinn Fein,14 and do the unthinkable’ and during that time we created the most imaginative and creative examples of how you intervene in a community to change and make impact.15

Even while there was significant unrest, daily violence, bomb attacks, troops on the streets and the ‘hunger strikes’,16 this interviewee comments, “You still had the machinery of government—the structures of Departments were intact. The structures that delivered and maintained social security payments, health services, education service were running. The focus of the Conservative Party was just to keep the thing going”. The aim was management of the status quo, “There was no training on how to deal with conflict”. The intergovernmental Anglo-Irish Agreement17 of 1985 saw another spike in violence and instability and a further challenge to progress on conflict or non-conflict  Retired senior civil servant.  A political party allied to the Provisional IRA. 15  Ibid. 16  The death of 12 republican prisoners on Hunger Strike in the Maze Prison in 1981. 17  An intergovernmental agreement on the status of Northern Ireland bitterly opposed by unionists in NI. 13 14

58 

J. MURPHY

related matters. The retired civil servant recalled the atmosphere and the sense that you were frequently ‘running a gauntlet’ of threatening and out-of-control crowds, “In ‘85 I was still with the Ministers—the Anglo-Irish Agreement fallout—we were hammered, it was awful stuff. At least three times we were going to events and people who are now prominent in political parties were absolutely in mobs throwing themselves at us. Particularly Prior.18 It was very difficult to make policy. It was just keeping the thing running”.19 Dealing with the reality of an environment such as this and engaging with angry and sometimes extremely dangerous individuals requires, as we have seen already, considerable bravery and ingenuity. Formalised processes of supported protection however were not available and not expected, as we can see from the interview exchange below: Interviewer: Interviewee: Interviewee: Interviewee: Interviewer: Interviewee:

What type of help and support did you have? None What type of security did you have? None. Maybe double glazing in your house. Did You Feel It Was Difficult? “Many of the people I engaged with were the very same people I grew up with and were now combatants on both sides. There were no issues for me and I suppose I had a credibility which was important”.20

Others occupied in the delivery of public services recalled similar experiences in the early days of the Troubles. A Northern Ireland Housing Executive manager, who we will hear from again in later chapters, recalls the difficulties of the organisation’s early years, It was horrendous. Don’t forget, all our offices were located within local communities. We had a mixed workforce. We had Catholics working in the Shankill and Protestants working in the Falls.21 When you look at the rent strikes, we were attacked out on the estates, imagine trying to collect rent in a leather rent bag and you’re doing that in the middle of the conflict, where there’s armoured cars, when people are getting shot, our office were blown up in the middle of the town.22

 The British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.  Retired senior civil servant. 20  Ibid. 21  The Shankill rd. and Falls rd. are well known Protestant and Catholic areas, comprised of single identity communities. 22  Senior housing manager, Housing Trust Belfast. 18 19

4  THE LIVED EXPERIENCE OF INTENSE CONFLICT 

59

The need for visible impartiality was paramount and a point made by many of those interviewed, especially around the vexed question of housing, “If your seen to do a favour for one community then you’re on a hiding to nothing. You have to keep a bit of moral courage when it comes to that”.23 The reality of threats and intimidation was a lived experience for both junior and senior staff and there was an attrition rate around staff retention attached to that, “Sometimes you’d have someone say ‘We know about you. We know where you live’, to say you didn’t worry about it—of course you worried about it. And that is psychologically difficult. We have had people who say ‘I’ve had enough of this—its wearing me down’”.24 There was also a view amongst staff that this was the only route possible and that in many ways, this was why the Housing Executive had been set up in the first place. One respondent described it in these terms, There was a resilience—a determination to do this. Not even a duty—people just felt they needed to do it. There was always a sense of purpose around what the organisation was about. It might be because we often saw our communities when they were at their most desperate. When they were made homeless because of a bomb, when they were intimated out of their homes.25

Another spoke of the horror which came after the Good Friday Agreement—the murder of 39 people in the Omagh bomb, Northern Ireland’s worst single atrocity. The need to respond to a catastrophe of this sort in which casualties were not only local but international represented an organisational, diplomatic and emotional challenge. One retired civil servant asked to advise in the immediate aftermath noted, The other snapshot for me was Omagh. I was part of a task force. Again, it was the system saying ‘go and do something. We don’t know what it is but get on the ground’. I was part of a task force that moved in immediately after the bombing. There was no plan, they were trying to pick a number of people they thought they could trust. Who were streetwise enough to do something.

Another manager who had worked in the voluntary sector spoke about the vacuum that existed politically and the impact it had on public administration, “There is this narrative that the public service carried Northern Ireland when the politicians couldn’t. There was a black hole and that black hole was filled by public servants”.26  Senior Manager, Northern Ireland Housing Executive.  Ibid. 25  Ibid. 26  Retired civil servant. 23 24

60 

J. MURPHY

The Basque Country The Basque country experienced a similar ‘low-intensity’ conflict to Northern Ireland, in a political environment where there was expressed alignment and significant contact between the armed group ETA and the IRA.  Basque professionals and the business community often bore the brunt of the intimidatory activity and attack. One member of a local council engaged in regeneration spoke about the impact of this on indigenous business development, “They targeted the business community—a lot of the business community moved to other places. Thousands left the region. About 10 thousand being protected with body guards”.27 Others also commented on the organised nature of conflict and its impact, “At the beginning they targeted policemen and then Guardia Civil and then the business community—they collected money—what was called the ‘revolutionary tax’. Then they went for the politicians. It became a chaotic situation”.28 One local government manager spoke of the early days and the individual tragedies from both ETA violence and state violence, “I was thinking about how I managed when I joined the council. Things like kidnappings. Once 12 youngsters were taken to police station. One—a girl—was tortured and died of her injuries. You could see people not talking to other people. A very clear divide in the town and families who wouldn’t talk to each other. It was a very difficult time”.29 Despite the environment of fear and brutality, local administration was sustained, the Council continued to deliver services despite the horror. For instance, the leisure centre was build the culture department and the youth office. We did it even more so—just because. Because certain people sacrificed. There may have been people who didn’t care but clearly there are two sides in confrontation. We did have instances of terrorist attack connected with infrastructure. For instance, the high speed train. I would like to say something positive about Basque entrepreneurs—very few left. Many were sent letters and asked for ‘revolutionary tax’ and many stood up and said no—there were repercussions for that. They have invested in their community in many ways.30

Even high profile attempts at regeneration were disrupted including the launch of the iconic Guggenheim museum in Bilbao, “The day before the opening ETA set a bomb and one of the Basque policemen was there and  Local Council Manager, San Sebastian.  Basque business representative, Bilbao. 29  Local Council Manager, San Sebastian. 30  Ibid. 27 28

4  THE LIVED EXPERIENCE OF INTENSE CONFLICT 

61

bomb went off and killed him. In the square outside”.31 A distinguishing feature of the Basque situation was the importance of language and its role as a cultural identifier. One respondent spoke of the often misinterpreted position of the language within the conflict, Here perhaps at the middle of the conflict was the language. If you spoke Basque then perhaps you were a nationalist and you were in favour. The language has been much politicised. For example, educational system—here there has been a difference in how you dress, your haircut. We are not segregated there are no ghettos, sometimes in the same block of flats or in the same family even there are people from both sides. But the truth is that we are from the territory which has been hardest hit by violence. I think half of the victims were from here. We were at the top of that terrible podium. We knew we had to make twice as much of an effort as everyone else.32

There was also a strong instinctive response not to talk about the conflict and even its name became contentious—further underlining the combative nature of the division between those who opposed ETA violence and those who saw it as a legitimate attempt to oppose Spanish state coercion. One interviewee who works in the area of museums and heritage reflected, “Violence was a taboo. In families, sometimes prisoners and police are in a family. One can be the target of another. You felt that you couldn’t even say the words. Now even, what do you call if—the Basque conflict? Terrorism?—there is not a real consensus on that”.33 The origins of this reluctance not to engage is traced back by many to the experience of this region in the Spanish Civil War, a conflict which in itself defined the trajectory of modern Spain and which sets up an immediate challenge to memory, memorialisation and the past, We have to go back to the so-called civil war—which was really the military revolting. The vast majority of people here think that we lost that war. And years after that the terrorist organisation—armed band ETA set up. We can’t connect people who fought in that war to protect the rights of the Basque people, we can’t equate those people then, to those who later said that was what they were doing. Why because the first group had legitimacy—but not decades later. We have these warriors who fought in the civil war and we don’t to equate or connect them to a decision made by others. After the dictatorship we had this ‘democracy’ and that’s part of our historical mem Ibid.  Local government official San Sebastian. 33  Museum curator, San Sebastian. 31 32

62 

J. MURPHY

ory. Some of us might think about the past to clean it. Others think that the past can’t be cleaned. We have others who do not even acknowledge that there has been a conflict. You can imagine that memory is a challenge here. I don’t think we will end up with one single memory. And memory will continue to change and evolve. In the citizens for a we try to talk about the past—by describing things that happened without prescribing.34

The ‘foundational’ legacy of this conflict culturally, politically and even physically is still something which affects how administrations operate. One public manager, herself engaged in reconciliation initiatives, spoke about the personal and the professional impacts of engaging in painful discussions that often went to the heart of families experiences, It is very courageous. It would be terrible if we anchored ourselves to the past and not the future. The civil war and the dictatorship was like a void. There was a huge amount of grief and pain from the past that had never been dealt with and we can see the demands, the need very, very clearly. Spain is the second state worldwide after Cambodia where mass killings are still buried— not found. Having that unresolved problem is a greater challenge … that pain and loss and grief has never been managed. And that’s logically coming up. That makes our task harder. The memory is political in nature.35

The materiality of memory is physical as well as psychological and some of the processes engaged in reach places and conclusions which are extremely difficult and traumatic. One of the managers working within a local council close to San Sebastian described the process of enquiry and a grim discovery that she and her colleagues had gone through, Why did we start to work on this? Someone in our town was looking for a relative. They knew this person had been killed and was buried somewhere with other people and there was a brilliant testimony of that time from people who experienced the civil war as children in their neighbourhood. We recorded their testimony. And then some of the corpses that were found, we identified them. From that we published a book. And then we considered, why not have a columbarium in the town to give these poor people some dignity. Those who have not been identified. We pay homage to those people. Little by little.36

The blurring of the line between dealing with the present and the past is a real consideration for those working in public administrations and seeking  Senior manager, San Sebastian.  Senior manager, San Sebastian. 36  Ibid. 34 35

4  THE LIVED EXPERIENCE OF INTENSE CONFLICT 

63

to come to terms with legacy issues. For many this centres around the construction of accurate historic understandings of what occurred in the recent past and how that has formed administration in the present day, At our directorate we are working with historic memory and recent memory. Where is the border? Franco was a dictator who died in bed. I was born during the dictatorship. When I was born the dictator was in power. I wasn’t an adult. My family and my acquaintances have told me about the repression. That border between recent and historic memory is not crystal clear. So many things we have never talked about because they were taboo. A large part of society are ignorant about what happened in public institutions we need to make the most of people who are still alive who experienced those conflicts to disseminate their experience. So we know what happened.37

Another of her colleagues commented, “My granddad never ever talked about the war at home. He just said one thing. He said Franco was really short, from Galicia and a bastard. That is all I ever heard. Why because he wanted to forget that period and not talk about it. It’s important that we collect these memories. Or they will be lost”.38 The drive for institutions— public and non-profit to be facilitators of peacebuilding and community cohesion after conflict was significant within the public sector managers interviewed for this study. There was also a feeling that such work bled into policymaking and implementation in a way that was difficult to quantify, “Violence had polarised society so much that people had to have a position. You had to be for or against especially ETA’s violence—and that polluted everything else. If you wanted to talk about differences or identities or whatever you want to call it. Peace has to be something positive, not just as a cessation of violence”. However, the lack of funding for this type of work was a real concern and the skill required in facilitation of those impacted by violence on both sides was something that all participants were aware of. One interviewee spoke about the delicacy of engaging participants in conversations about the conflict and opening up of intercommunity dialogue after long periods of silence, even within kin groups, “Some of the people that come say, ‘I don’t know why I’m here I don’t have anything to say—I’m not a victim’ but they completely change and say ‘we need to talk about this more, in the family, because we didn’t talk for many, many years’. It’s an intimate thing to do”.39 Like many  Local government manager.  Senior manager. 39  Manager in the cultural sector. 37 38

64 

J. MURPHY

c­ onflict environments, conversations about political violence in the Basque country are punctuated with references to particular atrocities and incidents. The one which comes up often in conversation is that of the murder of the Popular Party councillor Miguel Ángel Blanco—defined by many as an inflection point in the conflict. The 27-year-old Blanco was abducted on 10 July 1997 at 15.30 as he got off a train. He was bundled into a blacked-out car and, three hours later, ETA formally demanded the government—then led by Popular Party president José María Aznar—move the organisation’s prisoners back to the Basque Country. The terrorists said if the government did not ensure the inmates were physically moved by 16.00 on Saturday, 12 July, Blanco would be ‘executed’. ETA’s broadcast its ultimatum with the young councillor tied up in the background. About 50  minutes after the government’s deadline, Blanco was transported in the boot of a car to a piece of wasteland near the town of Lasarte-­ Oria in the Basque province of Guipúzcoa and shot twice in the head, having been forced onto his knees with his hands tied behind his back. He survived and was found by two men who were out walking, but died in hospital 12 hours after being shot. One public manager commented on the wave of anger and outrage that followed Blanco’s death, and their concerns at the time, “20 years ago when Miguel Ángel Blanco was killed that was a moment when society said ‘no, that’s not possible’. That was a big change. For many people who perhaps said, this is something we have to do for our independence, for ourselves, but there was a big change. There was also a big change when organisations mobilised against violence”.40 The strength of feeling was reiterated by another manager working in the heritage sector, who was concerned at both the power of the response and the phenomenon of people once again, out on the streets in a volatile way, Miguel Ángel Blanco was definitely a landmark. And there was definitely a before and an after. The reaction to that event was different to anything we have seen in the past. The streets were taken in a different way, and I worried that we might then come to a conclusion that we had to fight—using violence—that people might think—lets go after them. So it was good on the one hand—that social movement—people were finally brave enough to go out in the street—but I was worried about the ‘let’s go and get them’ kind of thing. I was also concerned about the political use of victims during demonstrations—Miguel Ángel Blanco has been used politically which is a great shame because it blocs any possibility of union between victims on both sides.41  Local Government Manager, San Sebastian.  Local Government manager, San Sebastian.

40 41

4  THE LIVED EXPERIENCE OF INTENSE CONFLICT 

65

The difficulty of managing volatile responses and fast moving public opinion was a concern of another business person—as were the additional barriers built through anger, “‘Basta ya—enough is enough’—we are not going to be pacifists we are going to do something different. That opened another can of worms. Sometimes when you are working against violence you are also building new barriers and walls and not helping with peacebuilding. That’s my memory”.42 Interestingly, for those interviewed the realisation that the ETA violence was at end was greeted with exhaustion and a sadness for the waste of life, “When ETA made the final announcement I felt like a bit of a flop. I felt like saying ‘now, now? Could you have done it earlier for goodness sake’. I felt a void. We celebrated it as if it was New Year’s Eve. Like it was mandatory—right? Like we’ve got to celebrate it. We went and had a glass of champagne. We were kind of happy but it was late. So late”.43

Bosnia In both Northern Ireland and the Basque region we see periods of violence which ebb and flow in their intensity but maintain a steady pressure—a fog, which permeates everyday life (Anderson 2020). Within the Bosnian example the situation is quite different. Instead of the steady drip of pressure and fear, we confront a war which traps and brutalises those within its sphere and revisits the spectre of concentration camps and genocide on Europe. For those inside the city Sarajevo, the experience of siege, blockade and bombardment defined their recollections. Of those outside the capital, the experience was often one of displacement, exile and traumatising capture and confinement. In all instances, very human experiences came to the fore. Hunger and cold, as well as fear and grief were intertwined. The enormity of the loss within this context necessarily eclipses that of our other cases. The following section focuses on the experience of those within Sarajevo itself, before turning briefly to the horror of those outside the dubious protection of the city. The siege of the city of Sarajevo was by any standards a time of horror. It was also a paradoxical environment where, despite shelling, sniper fire, food shortages and constant dangers, individuals and organisations  Basque entrepreneur.  Senior civil servant, San Sebastian.

42 43

66 

J. MURPHY

persisted in delivering services. One of these organisations—the Faculty of Economics of the University of Sarajevo continued to run classes for students throughout the blockade. An administrator in the Faculty spoke of her experiences and the need to keep basic administrative and scholarly activity going, “We felt better if everyday life was going on—it helped us”.44 Structurally, the Faculty and University was spaced out through the city and this impacted the way that work could be organised and classes scheduled, “Different faculties helped each other. Decisions were made by the army and proper channels, like the red cross. People organised themselves as well through private channels. There was a solidarity in the town and in the University”. Importantly, networks of influence and relationships of leverage came into play “when making decisions, the Faculty always had someone in an important position”. In terms of classes and teaching, the Faculty of Economics had a concrete wall at the side of building, which protected parts of the building although only rooms such as the basement and one side of building were usable. There was no glass in the windows. While our interviewee stresses that no one was killed in the building, many died or were injured in its surrounds.45 The normal processes of assessment and examinations were no longer defined by the pre-war norms but did continue and adapted to these extraordinary circumstances, “students came when they could and took exams when they found their professor. All the administration was done appropriately. Large gatherings were forbidden so we had no diplomas awarded, but diplomas were given when they were asked for or required by students”. Going on with everyday life in this way, under constant danger seems almost surreal. Asked why her and her colleagues were determined to carry on, she reflected, “the last salary was paid early in the war … We came to work through employee obligation. We were not forced but we were expected to be at work. If you were not at work, then you were engaged with the military. It was really difficult. I had a five minute trip to work, but I’m lucky to be alive”. She went on, “I was in work every day. We have this word—izdržati—resist. If people felt they could resist then, their everyday life would go on. It was really important to save the capital—the capital and the University. People wanted to be as normal as you could within  Administrator in the Faculty of Economics, Sarajevo.  At this point Sarajevo was experiencing 330 shell impacts a day, although there were periods—such as the summer of 1993—when more than 3500 daily impacts were recorded. LUCIĆ, L. 2016. The Boys of Sarajevo’s War Tunnel. Metropolitics. 44 45

4  THE LIVED EXPERIENCE OF INTENSE CONFLICT 

67

those environments”. This interviewee also made a connection between her and her colleagues as individuals and the wider situation of terror they were confronted with, observing that “the fight has to be fought on a personal level—to get things done” as well as on a military and a political level. Even in these circumstances, the length and the ferocity of the war was a shock, “Absolutely no one thought the war would go on that long, but what we had—we had hope”. While the University of Sarajevo was struggling in the centre of the city, in its suburbs the situation was even more dire. The middle-class ‘Olympic’ district of Dobrinja was almost entirely cut off. One of those in a civilian administrator role in the neighbourhood during the siege had previously worked as an economist and commercial director for a major company in the former Yugoslavia. That role had taken him to other environments where war was more commonplace—such as Bagdad and this was experience he was able to draw on during the devastating early days of the war. With supplies of food, water and electricity cut off, existence became the focus. From eating grass when food supplies ran out in the early days, to cultivating every inch of useable ground, Dobrinja’s engagement in its own survival meant that they expected to harvest 190 tonnes of vegetables in the second year of the siege (Tanner 1993). Reflecting upon this time he spoke of both the philosophical and the practical considerations of leading and managing in such calamitous circumstances, the people will find a way to survive. If you don’t, then you die. The first thing is to survive. After 15 days the food was completely gone. There was no electricity, so food in fridges was spoiled. One professor from the medical school was there. A nutritionist. There were plants so we asked her what can be eaten? She said every flower when the bee lands can be eaten. After two days we ran out of plants. The birds they couldn’t fly so you can catch them and cook them. We could get nothing in the early days. Then supplies stared coming through—we have complete documentation—the food we got and how we distributed it. Nobody died from starvation. That was the most important thing. Only 100 g per person per day. It is ‘impossible’ but it happened. The same with medicines—what you need you have to find a way to get. It is the reality of surviving.46

An early audit of residents in the area and their skills allowed for the development of communal kitchens, schools, a library and a medical centre.  Civilian administrator of Dobrinja.

46

68 

J. MURPHY

Surrounded by enemy fire, Dobrinja was a critical strategic point and comprised an area approximately four squares kilometres, with approximately 7000 apartments and 30,000 people. The first step taken by the military and civilian commands was to requisition all buildings and to begin the development of a network of underground tunnels, to allow people to move between buildings without being subject to shelling and sniper fire. Green areas, such as balconies, were quickly turned into locations to grow food. Operating, and indeed leading, in such an extreme environment requires in the words of our interviewee “a different approach to leadership”. He continues, “You are thinking about how to stop people from dying. Pursuing your obligation towards others. Military methods are very useful to get things done. We built 10 km of tunnels out of necessity. That was part of it. You have to involve people and keep them working. Keep them occupied. Then organise, you assign”. For him, this was a crucial component of an overall strategy, “Organisation is everything. Everything has to be thought of on an organisational level. You need to protect the necessities”. At the centre of all of this decision-making was need for personal and organisational courage, “You do not have enough time. When you do not have enough time you have to make decisions. In order to make decisions, you have to be brave”. This administrator, thrust into an environment of extreme violence, spoke of the upended nature of leadership in such a situation, “it is an inverted pyramid. Not like a normal structure. You are at the bottom. You carry them on your shoulders. You are not that important”. For those outside the city, the horror of war was just as ever present, even if the environment was different. One interviewee had been a medical student at the University of Sarajevo when the war broke out, was detained in the Trnopolje47 camp after a period in hiding. After the war a number of Bosnian Serb officials were convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity for their roles in the camp at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Crimes in Trnopolje were also listed in the ICTY’s indictment of former Serbian President Slobodan Milošević. Our interviewee spoke about his memories of this early period in the conflict, “The war wasn’t actually a war, it was a bunch of thugs with different uniforms, armed to the teeth, robbing people, humiliating people, doing whatever they wanted—it was not like some sort of occupation. 47  The Trnopolje camp near Prijedor was in northern Bosnia and Herzegovina, and was established during the first months of the Bosnian War.

4  THE LIVED EXPERIENCE OF INTENSE CONFLICT 

69

The perpetrators knew their victims”.48 After a period in which he was in hiding, the net began to tighten, It took a while to kill 4000 people and to expel 60,000, so in that process I was lucky really. I didn’t have a plan. I could never have had a plan or to see a way to get out. But then the concentration camps were discovered, I had avoided being captured—my girlfriend lived in the city, her house happened not to be in an area with a Muslim majority but then they became more systematic, they offered deportations for money and stuff. So it was very well organised. You had to give away all your material possessions and leave your property to the Serb Republic. So it took a few months to avoid capture then there was a day when they surrounded the whole area and said that all men from 16 to 60 had to go to Trnopolje and they would be exchanged as prisoners which for me sounded great—just to get away.

The Trnopolje camp was near the town of Prijedor and held between 4000 and 7000 Bosniak and Bosnian Croat inmates at any one time. It also acted as a clearing area for mass deportations, mainly of women, children and elderly men. Between May and November 1992, an estimated 30,000 inmates passed through. Mistreatment was widespread and there were numerous instances of torture, rape and killing; 90 inmates died. In August, the existence of the Prijedor camps was discovered by the Western media, leading to their closure. Our interviewee continues, They got us to Trnopolje … it used to be a primary school and they had a little cultural centre and that was the concentration camp infrastructure they used what they had. It looked like the perfect concentration camp because it was surrounded by a fence, they had the school building. So I ended up there. But there was no exchange happening. The guards would pick up anyone, take them away, beat them. At night, they would shoot. When I got there every spot was occupied, so we ended up creating a shelter—plastic sheets. There were four of us. It was literally mud, it was raining and very dirty. And then at night the guards would shoot from every side, tracer bullets, they would shoot across this ground while we were sleeping, hiding, and you could hear the bullets and smell the plastic sheeting burning as the bullets went through and you would go deeper and deeper into the mud, so we used to have a plan to exchange every night, to swap spots because to be in the middle was safest. You end up there from being a student at 21, to not thinking about anything not knowing what was going to happen.

 Medical student and former camp inmate.

48

70 

J. MURPHY

Trnopolje was transferred into the hands of the International Red Cross (IRC) in mid-­August and closed in November 1992. The intervention of the Red Cross was significant but did not nullify the danger, The Red Cross came and we were registered … as prisoners and that’s what saved us basically, but they (guards) still keep introducing exchanges, putting people on buses and taking them and I was on one of these buses. I wanted to go but my girlfriends brother couldn’t come—he wasn’t on the list so I decided not to go and on these three buses all the men were killed. August 1992. It was just really by some error that I didn’t die on that day.

The intervention of the Red Cross and the UN presence in Bosnia also changed the dynamic of how the camp was run and in time the position of our interviewee, the Red Cross … would come, deliver some food, then they would leave, the guards would come and they would take almost everything. Now I became active in saving myself … I told them I had completed nursing degree and then went to medical school—a Swiss woman, she said, ‘we need you here’ … No dentists survived, no doctors, they killed them. Many of them were not even regarded as Muslims or Bosnians—mixed marriages. So there were no doctors and I was to become a doctor. They brought some things, first aid kits and medicines … and they gave me also a white coat. Doctors’ wear white coats … two of these people who shared the tent with me, they got white coats—one was a carpenter and one was an electrician so we became the medical team. Then I saw much more … we became the centre of what was happening in the camp … That got me into doing something which really helped me cope—mentally and in every way. I had a purpose.

This central understanding of ‘having a purpose’ coupled with the practical skills that could materially help others was extremely important. Ironically, his isolation from his family also contributed to his ability to function and sensemaking in the midst of horror, I was in a really good situation—I didn’t have my mother potentially a rape victim or my sister. That I didn’t have my father who is being robbed of his dignity and tortured. I didn’t have close relatives there. It was only me. That helped a lot. And then having some practical skills that I could use to help other people was also a good feeling … even in such situation which you can’t dream off it made me feel like I had purpose—it gave meaning to me being there. Having purpose, that’s important. Doing something meaningful. I

4  THE LIVED EXPERIENCE OF INTENSE CONFLICT 

71

don’t think you can do anything if you find it meaningless. I felt it was meaningful for me to be there. That my life had value because I could use it. I was not just meat that could be killed. Becoming a leader—seeing how much it meant to people because really I was one of the main guys in the camp.

The taking on of a persona of leadership in such difficult circumstances says a great deal about both the desperation of the situation and the internal and external reserves of strength from this individual—who we must remember was in his early twenties at the time. Perhaps, most insightful, is our interviewee’s ability to recognise and understand the importance of individual agency in a context where brutality had the upper hand and survival was often a matter of chance. Overarching in his account is a acknowledgement that judgement, reasoning and even agency is not enough in such an environment, When I share my story its really about how hard it is to survive in situations like that. It’s not logic. You are a victim. A 22-year-old with a Muslim name in a town called Prijedor … It pushed me forward but it’s not like that saying ‘what doesn’t kill you makes you stronger’. It didn’t make me stronger. I didn’t need that experience. I’d have been happy to be a surgeon here in Bosnia. I lost a whole generation of friends. Literally, I can pick up maybe one or two friends I have from my childhood. They all perished. I was from Srebrenica. When I meet people from Bosnia and they ask me when I was born and I say 1970 they can’t believe that someone like me is still alive … I have cousins who were killed—one of them was 15. Taken away from his mother. I would reverse everything, all the success, for the ordinary life I would have had without that war. But it did change me—it changed everyone. It changed me from being a dreamer, a poet, to being a survivor. To be a survivor you have to think, be active, to exercise agency as we call it now.

References Anderson, D. (2020). Inventory: A River, A City, A Family. New  York: Random House. Tanner, M. (1993, August 9). Team Spirit helps Olympic village to Survive Siege. The Independents.

PART II

Sectoral Challenges

CHAPTER 5

Green Shoots: Driving Economic Renewal

I go into prisons and schools, if I’m asked to give some kid a chance I will. I do that because it’s something I think I should do but it has also allowed me to navigate the insanity of our situation. Entrepreneur in Belfast You don’t get to choose who you do business with. But you do get to choose who you drink coffee with. Bosnian businessman

This is the first part of what represents the central thematic spine of this book. It and its companion chapters are organised to reflect the real-life challenges of managing organisational roles and goals at different stages of conflict intensity. This is done through an analysis of core organisational activities and by drawing on the voices and experiences of organisational actors themselves within our three cases. The part also introduces some of the situations of conflict and organisational dilemmas, which we will return to in Part III. We begin this thematic analysis with a focus on a central issue within our cases: economic regeneration, during and after conflict.

© The Author(s) 2020 J. Murphy, Management and War, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49252-6_5

75

76 

J. MURPHY

Economic Regeneration and Peacebuilding For policymakers, economic development and regeneration has long been thought to act as a stabilisation mechanism within conflict environments (Ray and Esteban 2017). Indeed, it is not unusual for those who see society through an economic lens to argue that conflict itself has origins outside issues of identity, territoriality and past antagonism. Amartya Sen, for example, disputes the idea of a ‘civilian clash’ in international struggles and argues that identities of race or religion often conceal underlying circumstances of poverty and its inevitable social and economic exclusion, which in turn serves to mobilise disaffected groups for sectarian advantage (Sen 1987). Conflict, particularly that of high intensity and long duration, has a devastating impact on local economic and business life. The consequences for the provision of public services and individual job opportunities can be extreme, with lives and life chances often changed irrevocably. While foreign direct investment and international assistance packages are relatively well researched, we know little about the experience of those engaged in indigenous business development in such contexts or the challenge of building and maintaining a commercial enterprise in the face of intercommunal violence, the physical ruin of infrastructure and ongoing community division. But it is clear that during conflict and in the midst of active stabilisation efforts, entrepreneurial individuals and groups are building businesses and pushing an economic agenda, sometimes at great personal risk. There is little research or analysis on their experiences, and more widely, we are only beginning to understand the impact and micro interactions that smaller enterprises have on peacebuilding. This chapter aims to illuminate the experiences of those focused on business development while navigating opportunities through an environment of threat. In doing this it explores three main areas of activity. The first is a brief analysis of the background literature around business and peace, which is an important and emerging area of scholarship. The second is the varied and important role of inward investment within our conflict-affected cases, including state- and suprastate-sponsored economic regeneration. The third is indigenous entrepreneurship, with its economic ‘green shoots’ during and in the transition from conflict.

5  GREEN SHOOTS: DRIVING ECONOMIC RENEWAL 

77

Economic Development and Peacebuilding Economic development as a strategy of stabilisation and engagement becomes even more important as areas move out of conflict and into fragile peace processes. Interventions to encourage economic renewal cover a broad spectrum. They include the enlargement of foreign direct investment, the development of international aid programmes with a focus on economic stability and the creation of structures that foster trade exchanges to nurture indigenous entrepreneurship. As we have seen in Part I, there is a growing body of literature which explores the role of business during and post ethno-political conflict (Haufler 2015; Forrer and Katsos 2015) and the impact of conflict on neighbouring states (Qureshi 2013). Much of this helpful work is focused on the wider implications of developing a stable economy (Ganson and Wennmann 2016) and operates from the premise that economic regeneration is one of the key sectoral challenges for a contested environment (Berg and Schaefer 2009; Bollens 2000, 2011; Bissessar 2009; Collier et  al. 2008). The ‘business and peace’ (sometimes called ‘peace through commerce’) agenda provides a useful framework to understand the role of the private sector as potential peacebuilding mechanism (Katsos and Alkafaji 2019). Often focused on ‘corporate’ initiatives and the potential for business to enhance ‘peace’ by encouraging multi-national enterprises to operate in conflict environments, there is very little systematic qualitative or quantitative research which outlines how this might operate in practice (Katsos and Alkafaji 2019). Scholarship which takes account of the role of partnership initiatives (Idemudia 2017), the activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs) (Oetzel and Miklian 2017) and the role of third parties (Melin 2016) are all seen as significant. Others have identified the promotion of economic development, working through two track diplomacy (conflict brokerage), the promotion of the rule of law by adhering to and promoting international codes of conduct and the enhancement of social cohesion as ways in which international business can contribute to successful transition from violence (Oetzel et al. 2009). There has been some discussion about the staging of conflict transitions and arguments made that investment by multinationals impacts most successfully during what Forrer and Katsos (2015) refer to as the ‘buffer condition’—a period which is characterised as less than ten years from war, with political and economic uncertainty, disrespect for the rule of law, depleted physical and human capital, a damaged financial system and a reliance on foreign aid (Forrer and Katsos

78 

J. MURPHY

2015). Other areas of interest include the ‘black market’ as a potential source of innovation during and post violence, but also a danger zone, resulting in a criminalised wartime economy, with serious consequences for the post-war economic landscape (Andreas 2011). Recent work by Katsos and AlKafaji (2017) in Iraq illustrates that some of these factors— particularly that of anti-corruption activities and enhanced social cohesion were identified as important by private sector actors. Within all of our case studies there have been significant and far reaching attempts at economic regeneration with public and private sector inputs. There also exists a body of emerging work which is looking critically at both inward investment and home grown entrepreneurship within these three locations. As we will see, the reality of investing and building a business in a contested environment is complex and at times laden with considerable risk. Within our Basque example, activities of ETA created hostile conditions for both state-sponsored economic development and individual enterprise. As Douglass et  al. (p.  81) comment, “The tactics employed by ETA have included bank robberies, kidnappings, intimidation, sloganeering through public graffiti, hard-line political posturing through surrogate political parties, exaction of a ‘revolutionary tax’ from targeted Basque businesses, bombings, and assassinations” (Douglass and Zulaika 1990). Entrepreneurship strategies are also of interest. Halilovich and Efendic´ (2019) study of former war refugees who ‘partly’ return to Bosnia and Herzegovina and became significant investors in their local communities is fascinating in both its analysis of the continued administrative challenges of contestation and the nurturing of businesses that are accepting of difference and wide ranging in their strategic intent (Halilovich and Efendic´ 2019). They note that despite significant bureaucratic and infrastructural challenges, “post-war returnees’ businesses are ethnically tolerant and inclusive, sending a powerful message to the formal institutions, which often act in the opposite way” (Halilovich and Efendic´ 2019: 1). They go on to conclude, “It is not a pure profit interest that motivates these investors to come and invest in Bosnia, but also their wish to change these places from being ‘once places of pain to new places of hopes’” (Halilovich and Efendic´ 2019: 15). Work in the Basque country also identifies the difficulties faced by business and entrepreneurs through the brutal ETA campaign and the Spanish governments equally repressive response. Economic turmoil, strikes and ongoing violence had driven many entrepreneurs out of the region and frustrated the activities of those remaining. On study has indicated that ongoing violence through the

5  GREEN SHOOTS: DRIVING ECONOMIC RENEWAL 

79

conflict might have depressed regional GDP by up to 10% in the 1980s (Abadie and Gardeazábal 2003). In spite of this, a ‘collective entrepreneurship’ has seen the Basque region succeed as a model for post-­industrial development and success (Morgan 2016). In Northern Ireland, the heightened dependence on the public sector and a lack of inward investment during the Troubles, only saw change after a period of ceasefires and subsequent peace agreement on Good Friday, 1998 (Rowthorn and Wayne 1988). Interestingly, the Northern Ireland case did see some engagement and interventions from the local and regional business community, although of limited impact (Portland 2007). Two significant, interconnected processes seem to be at work with regard to economic development during and post conflict. The first is that of largescale, regional or government made attempts to economically (and sometimes aesthetically) ‘reframe’ environments in parallel with or as an alternative to official peacebuilding programmes. The second is the existence of smaller scale entrepreneurial activity which persists through conflict and peacebuilding and engages with it social and political change. The sections below will look at each of these engagement processes in turn.

The Centre and the Periphery: Economic Regeneration as a Stabilisation Strategy Structured attempts at economic development in Northern Ireland during the Troubles, operated against a background of significant instability, political engagement at a distance and wider issues of recession and economic change in the United Kingdom and Ireland (Rowthorn 1981). During the Troubles themselves, the most significance economic assistance came from the British exchequer which adopted a policy of normalisation in an effort to steady a worsening security situation (Dixon 2001; Gormally et al. 1993). Difficulties arose as ‘direct rule’ British ministers attempted economic and political stabilisation within a structure which saw them ‘fly in and fly out’ of Northern Ireland. A number of Northern Ireland interviewees drew attention to this way of working. One former civil servant who spent most of his early career in economic development spoke about the context in early 1980s and the difficulty of engaging interest in an economic agenda, “I had the opportunity in the early 80s to work with ministers and the context for that was the economic chaos of DeLorean, the ongoing conflict and the unplugging of the gas line. Added

80 

J. MURPHY

to that you throw into the mix the politics with the hunger strikes and the deaths that occurred around that”.1 The interviewee goes on to reflect that each Secretary of State for Northern Ireland had a different approach which was mirrored by the situation in Westminster, “Did they really want to be there? In some respects, probably not. They were flying ministers trying to hold the place to together at a time when the (UK) government had a very narrow majority—they had to fly back for votes for example. They were really spending a couple of days here—trying to keep a lid on it. Trying to keep employment going”.2 Meanwhile significant industries were struggling and long-term employers looked like they were going out of business, Mackies and Bombardier were draining public funds, just to keep them afloat. There was a hardening of violence and then the dirty protests. So all of that was a nightmare. As I say up to a point they would throw as much money as they could at DeLorean3 and Lear Fan4 but it just wasn’t a goer. The economics of it just wasn’t there. You were trying to keep a sense of normality, burgeoning up the public sector to cushion the economic collapse.

Another issue highlighted were the political and cultural divisions which existed between those within the Northern Ireland Office5 from Northern Ireland itself and others who were working there with a background in Great Britain. As one former NIO civil servant commented, “The NIO housed Northern Ireland people like myself but also people from England and Scotland. Often we were dismissed as we didn’t have a clear view of the politics. Or a certain political lens. A lot of things were identified as ‘GB eyes only—which meant we weren’t able to see it’”. The existence of a ‘hierarchy of region’ within the organisation and its leadership is an interesting example of ‘intra’ political interfaces within conflict zones and illustrative of the issues of communication and trust which often arise in extreme environments. Using government money to shore up a deteriorating political situation is a common strategy. Another interviewee describes exactly that approach, “It wasn’t long after that they put a  Retired senior civil servant, Northern Ireland.  Ibid. 3  The ‘winged car’ of Back to the Future fame, DeLorean Motor Cars cost the British government $130 million and 1700 jobs in West Belfast, Northern Ireland (New York Times, May 27, 1985). 4  Lear Fan Ltd., a British-American venture that received $72 million in grants and loans from the British government to build a fuel-efficient executive jet and create 2800 jobs in Northern Ireland (New York Times, May 27, 1985). 5  NIO. 1 2

5  GREEN SHOOTS: DRIVING ECONOMIC RENEWAL 

81

number of us into Belfast to work on the ground. It was all ‘get out there and do something’. Spend money. There was a great fear that the whole thing was sliding, particularly in west Belfast … It was extraordinary to be honest”.6 The challenges of operating in this way were enormous. Aside from basic concerns around safety and security and an acute awareness of who you were talking to and in what guise, there was also an understanding that there existed very little institutional backup to balance allegation of culpability when strategies went wrong, “The difficulties were you were out of your own. Responsible for millions of pounds. Tasked with doing things differently but still had to be accountable. Political criticism at every turn and you had to be clever at picking off the politics”.7 Post ceasefire, Belfast became the centre of a drive to economic regeneration which saw the city centre in particular transform from its closed and shuttered history to a weekend destination and entertainment hub. As a filming location for epic dramas such as ‘Game of Thrones’, the city has capitalised on its new found place in the digital age. The ‘Titanic’ quarter has been at the heart of this development, building on the city’s industrial heritage and connection to the iconic ship. A building developer who has been engaged in many of these regeneration initiatives reflected on the change in the city, “It has taken a long time and its not been straightforward, but the city is transformed from what it what. I remember when you had to go through mental barricades to go to shops and everyone was searched on the way in—queues of women waiting to have their handbag searched. There is no comparison to the city now. It unrecognisable”.8 Within Bosnia, efforts to further economic reconstruction following the end of the war have resulted in paradoxical outcomes, with successes such as the rehabilitation of infrastructure and the privatisation of the banking sector (Tzifakis and Tsardanidis 2006). The reconstruction of the country and of the economy post war also occurred simultaneously, with a transition away from the economic model of the former socialist period (Efendic et al. 2018). Post Dayton, institutional defects such as political fragmentation and an ongoing dependency on foreign economic aid have all hampered international attempts to revitalise the economy. The dominance of unwieldly and at times, contradictory political structures  Retired senior civil servant, Northern Ireland.  Ibid. 8  Property developer, Northern Ireland 6 7

82 

J. MURPHY

adds a layer of difficulty and complexity to development processes. Interviewees in Bosnia were notably concerned about broader economic issues such as the tendency for well qualified young people to emigrate and what they described as a propensity for economic development and political activity to be intertwined in an environment of ‘in group’ clientelism. One interviewee commented on the links and noted that this “environment is not good for enterprise and business because they people need to be involved in politics to get on”.9 He went to note, “Everyone wants to work in public administration. We have a saying—‘May God take you to the forestry’”. This legacy of both a controlled economy and full employment on the one hand and a vicious war with sectarian genocide on the other creates a hostile environment for externally designed and developed interventionist policies. However, another commented on the need to build on economic progress to date and how much the environment had changed in real terms, “The war was chaos. Economically we work together. Such relationships are part of everyday life. Same river goes in both seas”.10 Within our Basque case, the devolved nature of government allowed for significant decision-making around economic regeneration, funded and therefore controlled largely from within the region itself (Konstantynova 2017). Perhaps the best known and most iconic site of renewal is the former industrial city of Bilbao. One interviewee who was heavily engaged in the economic development of the city, set the scene, Bilbao used to be an industrial city—you know, the port. In the 1970s many of our largest companies had become the property of the Spanish government—state owned. In the 1970s, Spain was under the dictatorship and the Spanish Government were not thinking about the future of industry—rather the issue of death, Franco’s death. In 1975 finally he died, and the government entered into a new era—we called it transition. But again, the government was not thinking about industry because they have this bigger challenge. In 1980, finally, we in the Basque country got our government back.11

The economics difficulties of the 1980s, including the closure of significant commercial concerns and deindustrialisation saw unemployment rise to 25% (Buesa and Baumert 2013). As well as the economic difficulties, the city was ecologically troubled, “We have the worst environmental  Businessman and political actor outside Sarajevo.  Businessman and council employee. 11  Senior manager, a Bilbao regeneration organisation. 9

10

5  GREEN SHOOTS: DRIVING ECONOMIC RENEWAL 

83

situation anywhere in Europe. The river was dead—polluted. Our reputation was very bad. On top of that we had terrorism”.12 Spain’s entrance to the EU and NATO saw the end of a closed and protected economy and “entered in a minute to the most open and competitive market in whole world”. It also presented the leadership of Bilbao with both a problem and an opportunity, “The situation was dire and that gave us the opportunity for our leaders to make bold decisions. That opportunity came from fear and that is one of the very few advantages of living through a very bad time. Out of fear you can make people follow you. During complacent times why change anything?”.13 As well as a political and regional system change which created an opportunity for action, respondents felt that those within Basque region there was an ‘ownership’ of the situation that saw a level of commitment which would not have been available in other circumstances, “They were people who belonged to the country. They felt they had to give the country the very best of themselves. We had the Basque business community, committed to the country so they came to an agreement between the business sector and political community to revitalise the Bilbao area”.14 This unity of approach among political and economic stakeholders was identified as a necessary component which would allow projects to push through administrative and funding challenges, “It is up to the leadership to provide new projects to get attention to make people believe things are going to change. You need solidarity as well as planning”.15 Realising a new vision was a physical challenge, as well as an psychological and economic one. Our interviewee went on to reflect, “the first years of the revitalisation 1990–95—we call those years the years of the mock-ups. Every project needed a blue print, model or a PowerPoint. We selected projects that were easy to achieve. Not too expensive but with impact. To make people believe. In the Catholic tradition of St Thomas. He believed when he saw. That’s just human”. After the completion of the Bilbao metro in 1995 which linked city neighbourhoods together as never before, attention shifted to the major attraction of the Guggenheim “a masterwork by Frank Ghery”.16

 Ibid.  Basque entrepreneur. 14  Ibid. 15  Regeneration manager, Bilbao. 16  Ibid. 12 13

84 

J. MURPHY

This strategy of creation and recreation of the city as a cultural and economic hub has been of significant interest to both researchers and those seeking to replicate Bilbao’s success in other regions (González 2011; Murphy and Mcdowell 2019; Plaza and Haarich 2015). Reinforcing this regional decision-making an investment was a backdrop of EU membership which itself released funds to further advance innovation and competitiveness. Schemes such as the Basque-focused European Regional Development Fund Operational Programme of 2014–2020 which aims to boost sustainable economic growth by creating quality jobs and improve the competitiveness of the regional economy through ‘smart’ and innovative initiatives is just one of the wider supra national initiatives impacting on regional strategy.17 The investment (€452.6 million worth of private investment expected to match public support for innovation or R&D projects) is targeted at enhancing research and innovation infrastructure and capacity as well as developing links and synergies with enterprises, research centres and education, in line with the Basque Regional Innovation Strategy.18 Almost 90% of the resources are targeted at investments in research, innovation, SMEs, ICT and low-carbon economy, with six main priorities of strengthening research, technological development and innovation; supporting the shift towards a low-carbon economy in all sectors; enhancing access to and use and quality of information and communication technologies; enhancing the competitiveness of SMEs; promoting climate change adaptation, risk prevention and management; preserving and protecting the environment and promoting resource efficiency. While these programmes are not specifically focused on peacebuilding, they illustrate the significance placed on economic stability and development within transitional contexts.

From the Ground Up While major stabilisation and infrastructural projects require significant multisectoral encouragement, economic activity is also apparent in all our cases a different level. Entrepreneurship on the ground can be observed through and beyond active conflict, even in circumstances of considerable difficulty. The experience of building a business in the midst of ongoing 17  https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/EN/atlas/programmes/2014-2020/ spain/2014es16rfop021. 18  Ibid.

5  GREEN SHOOTS: DRIVING ECONOMIC RENEWAL 

85

violence is largely unreported and unresearched. We have seen in an earlier chapter the intense challenges of operating under the threat of violence and the degree of personal jeopardy encountered by those who take the risk. As societies begin to move out of active conflict and towards stabilisation and peace processes, agenda and activities change. The inflection point of a ceasefire or peace process often allows a shift in business strategy. One of our respondents (a Belfast businessman) recalls changing his business strategy in just these circumstances but having expansion plans rejected by the local funders who were unconvinced of the opportunities he outlined. The idea of moving into Belfast city centre—previously an economic wasteland which had been physical closed and cut off during much of the Troubles, was indeed radical, “I decided to move the business to Belfast. I thought I’ve got to get into the city centre—that was that. I knew that when I went to the centre of Belfast people would start to come in”.19 However, while there may have been a sense that the environment and business opportunities were shifting in the minds of local entrepreneurs, support was not necessarily forthcoming from regional bodies with business development as a core aim. Our businessman recalls that after his decision to shift his business into Belfast city centre he went to see one such organisation looking for support, “I went to see the Northern Ireland Tourist Board and I outlined my vision. They told me it was never going to work. It was a very short meeting and I haven’t forgotten it. Every time I’m asked to do any public speaking I make sure I mention that”.20 The reality of working and doing business within segregated areas requires decision-making with at its core a set of business principles. Respondents, when asked, were happy to speak confidentially about paramilitary intimidation, organised crime and methods and approaches to work round it. One member of the business community reflected, I’ve always done my own thing and got on. I’ve found that when I have arrived into loyalist areas or nationalist areas people will come in and say ‘if you’re employing doormen will you employ these doormen and it’ll be completely legit and you tell them what your rules and how you would like to run it’ and most things work out ok. That’s totally different to the old days when they would come in and say you need to employ such and such.21

 Northern Ireland businessman.  Ibid. 21  Senior commercial manager, Belfast. 19 20

86 

J. MURPHY

There is also a personal dimension to these appointments. One of the things that is apparent from these conversations is the inherently relationship based nature of these interactions at a micro level and an awareness that individuals, despite their backgrounds, are part of local communities and therefore local economies, “There are a lot who have had a chequered past … a lot want to put back. A lot regret. They have done really bad things”.22 There is a willingness among many entrepreneurs to engage in their local communities. In doing so, they gain a rich understanding of what are complex contexts and the micro dynamics of conflict at a community level. When asked about the knowledge and behaviours necessary to survive and thrive in an environment like this, one NI commentator observed, “You need to understand the environment very well and understand the bad and difficult bits of it. I’ve been involved in low level mediation trying to do things behind the scenes—you know, when workers are being intimidated. If someone’s getting hassle, I would try because I know people. Knowing people is very important”.23 For some though, the business itself draws a certain amount of its activity from the conflict itself. A local businessman, also operating in Belfast and running a public affairs agency acknowledged that his business was ‘political for the start’.24 He went on, “I traded on the conflict on my previous job with a media organisation. I was there to facilitate foreign journalists in their visits to Northern Ireland, especially when the peace process was ramping up. The business was modelled around the conflict—the interest of foreign media organisations interested in Ireland”. The opportunity to start a public relations agency came from that and the first major contract won by the agency involved selling a new image of Northern Ireland abroad. The interviewee was clear about where his business sat, “My business is a post-conflict business. I believe the main conflict is over—I’m defining it as that. Certainly, teenagers now that I came across have no concept of it. They are not thinking about it, or worried about it”. In terms of the impact of the conflict and the political environment on his business activity, he recognises that the political balance of Northern Ireland affects the political balance of his firm, “of course it affects business decisions—I’ve a reasonable sized public affairs business—I’ve got to make decisions based on political affiliation and the political balance of my firm. It’s also affected me in terms of location—I needed to be in a politically neutral space—which is the city  Senior manager, NGO Belfast.  Belfast entrepreneur. 24  Belfast businessman. 22 23

5  GREEN SHOOTS: DRIVING ECONOMIC RENEWAL 

87

centre”. From a wider perspective than simply business development, he believed that his organisation has the opportunity to give some benefit to the wider community, “The firms ethos and culture is about doing some good here. But if I’m honest, these things often have a very beneficial business upshot—there’s a benefit to it along the way”. However, this is also a clear commitment to the region and to continue to investment in its stability and sustained progress. When the conversation turned to recent violent activities by dissident republicans he was unwavering in his view that a deterioration in the security situation would not impact his commitment to Northern Ireland, “If things got worse I’d work harder. I’m far too invested in the community here to give up. I feel so blessed that I don’t carry any baggage from the past, and so many in the nationalist community do. I’ve not lost anyone or had anyone injured. I’m lucky in that sense”. The experience of the Basque business community has also been a very difficult one. The campaign by ETA, the targeting of not just police and military personnel but politicians and business figures created a hostile and dangerous environment. Thousands of those within the business community left the Basque country for their own safety and the safety of their families. The type of extortion and intimidation referenced by our Northern Ireland respondents was also evident within the Basque environment (Mahoney 2018). A public servant involved in regeneration work in Bilbao commented on how the situation developed, “At the beginning they targeted police men and then Guardia Civil and then the business community they collected taxes, what we call the revolutionary tax. Then they went for the politicians”.25 In a seminar with those engaged in business development one participant recalled the extent of the fear and precautions which were taken, “They targeted the business community we have a lot if business community moved to other places. Thousands left the region. About ten thousand were being protected with body guards. You were fearful all the time. You knew what they would do—had done”.26 One interview referred to a recent novel, Patria ‘Homeland’ (Aramburu and Macadam 2019), which caused a sensation after its publication in Spain. He explained that it conveyed as well as anything else the “fear and claustrophobic atmosphere” that existed within the business community while they were under relentless threat. This experience was regarded by  Public manager, Bilbao.  Bilbao businessman.

25 26

88 

J. MURPHY

those within the business community as very significant, underlying both their commitment to building a successful and functioning economy and the many contradictions that exist within politically divided and contested communities (Douglass and Zulaika 1990). Those engaged in regional government within the Basque country recognised the contribution of the business community, “Basque entrepreneurs, they were coerced into the ‘revolutionary tax’ and many refused. There is bravery in that”.27 It is hard to imagine a more evocative location for the difficulties of business development after conflict than the iconic town of Srebrenica, the site of the genocide of the local Bosnian Muslim population in July 1995. Srebrenica, which is now located within the boundaries of the Republika Srpska, derives its name the Serbo-Croatian word Srebro, meaning ‘silver’. The town itself was founded in 1387 after rich deposits of silver and lead were discovered in the surrounding mountains. A Bosnian entrepreneur who was originally from Srebrenica but left as a child refugee spoke about his decision to invest in business development in the town and the surrounding area, “I left Srebrenica in 1995. We have we started off with 4.5 hectares of raspberries and now have 20 hectares and 150 families involved”.28 For him, the history of the area and its inescapable place in the conflict was a vital point to be considered. Asked if the legacy of Srebrenica mattered, he was adamant, “definitely. Srebrenica is not a local, it is a global phenomenon. With evil, you can’t respond with evil, the best revenge is success”. Of course, operating within the town itself means engaging the in complex dynamics of the interentity boundary between the Federation and the Republika Srpska. Taking a decision to engage despite this interwoven set of administrative difficulties (expressed wryly by our respondent as a situation of ‘no state support—just risk’) is about more than just taking advantage of a commercial opportunity, “It is so the town can continue to live on—not as a graveyard. To provide an opportunity for life for those kids that are growing there”. Neither is it about forgetting the past but moving ahead with the past, in tandem with the devastation, “These things are part of history, you have to go forward with them”. Interestingly, this interviewee did not see himself as a leader and rejected the notion that the position he had taken was one of leadership in an environment emerging from conflict. He commented, “I don’t see myself as a leader. It is about relationships and friendships”, however the  Local government manager, Basque region.  Bosnian entrepreneur.

27 28

5  GREEN SHOOTS: DRIVING ECONOMIC RENEWAL 

89

reality of the past was a live issue in his business dealing. While reluctant to speak about his dealings with those who identify as Serbs and with which he does business, “these are private things I keep to myself”, he did volunteer that he was happy to work with anyone, including the Serbian community but qualified his view with this caveat: “as long as people who are Serbian are friendly … if someone crosses the line that should not be crossed, then that is different”. The political demarcations which were an outcome of Dayton, particularly those around the Cantons were also identified by others engaged in business development. One spoke about a rafting businesses which was set up to capitalise on rural environments as leisure opportunities which was stifled because of administrative difficulties, “rivers do not follow lines—it’s a limiting factor on the size of businesses”.29 For those that have left Bosnia permanently as war refugees but have returned as ‘visitor-investors’, the situation is a little different. Undoubtedly, the administrative difficulties do not make it easy or straightforward to engage in business development—either for those on the ground or those who are external to the country but keen to invest for whatever reason. A business consultant who had looked at the position of external investors commented, “Sometimes traditions in Bosnia slows you down and they don’t like that”.30 These difficulties are set aside by the experience of one external investor, a female entrepreneur was put on a bus out of town with her younger brother and sister by her father, the day before the war started, “My father was 49 when he was killed. I didn’t believe he was dead until 1999. That road, Srebrenica to Tulsa. He didn’t make it. I don’t want to be in the prison of that for my whole life”.31 After a period as a refugee in Germany she has since built a successful business in Canada and spoke of a range of challenges for those who sought to return and invest. The first was the significant economic legacy and inheritance from the former communist system. Many saw this combine uncomfortably with post-war processes, “It takes way longer to get a permit lots of administrative problems. It’s just the way things work here. It still works like the system before—a communist system where everyone was employed”. For this reason, she commented, informal agreements to support investment within families are extremely common. She has worked with her brother to secure each other’s investments over time (“We are  Administrator employed by an international development association.  Business consultant. 31  Canadian businesswomen and former Bosnian refugee. 29 30

90 

J. MURPHY

helping each other”.). As for the past, and working with those from another community, this was no longer an issue. She draws attention to the long history of intercommunal and integrated living in the former Yugoslavia, “In Bosnia, we lived all cultures together. It doesn’t matter anymore where people are from its business. If we go over the past it’s going to repeat itself … there’s a generation who had nothing to do with it. Who weren’t even born. It can’t affect business decisions. Nicoli from Serbia? I don’t think like that anymore”. However, the pain and losses of the past were a factor in her and her husband’s decision-making, During the war we lost everything. Now we have a chance to do something. Both of us we had something in us drawing us back to Bosnia. We come every single year. Never missed for the anniversary. Ourselves and other families from Srebrenica. For us, everyone started with zero—nothing. If I just invested all in Canada I would have a way better return … if you take the restaurant … if you employ good people you have to pay them and then there’s nothing left over but I’m good with that.

Other entrepreneurs in the same area but a different sector32 spoke also of the shift from a socialist system to a capitalist one—which was often forgotten in the aftermath of the war; optimistic about opportunities that are now available (“Capitalism has opened my eyes to possibilities”.) but concerned with the challenges it presented to younger people and the ‘brain drain’ of emerging talent from the region. As a former soldier and a member of the Muslim community, he was also more circumspect about business relationship in those from other ethnic groups, “You deal with who you deal with. I work with people who were on other side during war but perhaps I do not drink coffee with them. And there are some people I wouldn’t work with”.33 These sentiments echo those of other individuals engaged in business activities within Sarajevo and the wider the state. An interviewee who had been engaged in the redevelopment and privatisation of Bosnia’s banking system after the war spoke about that period “as a fresh start—everything had been destroyed … New rules, new system, new organisation. Practically everything had changed, so in that sense, every evil has something good in it”.34 He was keen to stress the need to “bring back trust—step by step”. As for the legacy of the past and its  Construction.  Bosnian businessman 34  Former banking director. 32 33

5  GREEN SHOOTS: DRIVING ECONOMIC RENEWAL 

91

current impact on business he was sanguine, again employing the oftenused coffee metaphor so popular in Bosnia, “As your interests bring you closer together, you don’t speak about politics. You don’t get to decide with whom you work. But you get to decide with whom you drink coffee”.

References Abadie, A., & Gardeazábal, J. (2003). The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study of the Basque Country. American Economic Review, 93, 113–132. Andreas, P. (2011). Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Aramburu, F., & Macadam, A. (2019). Homeland: A Novel. New  York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. Berg, M., & Schaefer, B. (2009). Historical Justice in International Perspective: How Societies Are Trying to Right the Wrongs of the Past. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bissessar, A.  M. (2009). Challenges Facing Senior Public Servants in a Plural Society. Public Personnel Management, 38, 1–15. Bollens, S. A. (2000). On Narrow Ground: Urban Policy and Conflict in Jerusalem and Belfast. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Bollens, S. (2011). City and Soul in Divided Societies. Oxford and New  York: Routledge. Buesa, M., & Baumert, T. (2013). Untangling Eta’s Finance: An In-Depth Analysis Of The Basque Terrorist’s Economic Network And The Money It Handles. Defence and Peace Economics, 24, 317–338. Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., & Söderbom, M. (2008). Post-Conflict Risks. Journal of Peace Research, 45, 461–478. Dixon, P. (2001). British Policy Towards Northern Ireland 1969–2000: Continuity, Tactical Adjustment and Consistent ‘Inconsistencies’. The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 3, 340–368. Douglass, W. A., & Zulaika, J. (1990). On the Interpretation of Terrorist Violence: ETA and the Basque Political Process. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 32, 238–257. Efendic, N., Pasovic, E., & Efendic, A. (2018). Understanding The Informal Economy In Practice—Evidence From Bosnia And Herzegovina. Financial Internet Quarterly, 14, 77–89. Forrer, J. J., & Katsos, J. E. (2015). Business and Peace in the Buffer Condition. The Academy of Management Perspectives, 29, 438–450. Ganson, B., & Wennmann, A. (2016). Business in Fragile States: Confronting Risk, Preventing Conflict. London: IISS. González, S. (2011). Bilbao and Barcelona ‘in Motion’. How Urban Regeneration ‘Models’ Travel and Mutate in the Global Flows of Policy Tourism. Urban Studies, 48, 1397–1418.

92 

J. MURPHY

Gormally, B., Mcevoy, K., & Wall, D. (1993). Criminal Justice in a Divided Society: Northern Ireland Prisons. Crime and Justice, 17, 51–135. Halilovich, H., & Efendić, N. (2019). From Refugees to Trans-Local Entrepreneurs: Crossing the Borders Between Formal Institutions and Informal Practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Journal of Refugee Studies. Haufler, V. (2015). Symposium on Conflict, Management, and Peace: Comments from an International Relations Scholar. The Academy of Management Perspectives, 29, 461–468. Idemudia, U. (2017). Shell–NGO Partnership and Peace in Nigeria: Critical Insights and Implications. Organization & Environment, 31, 384–405. Katsos, J., & AlKafaji, Y. (2017). Business in War Zones: How Companies Promote Peace in Iraq. Journal of Business Ethics. Konstantynova, A. (2017). Basque Country Cluster Policy: The Road of 25 Years. Regional Studies, Regional Science, 4, 109–116. Mahoney, C. W. (2018). End of the Cycle: Assessing ETA’s Strategies of Terrorism. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29, 916–940. Melin, M.  M. (2016). Business, Peace, and world Politics: The Role of Third Parties in Conflict Resolution. Business Horizons, 59, 493–501. Morgan, K. (2016). Collective Entrepreneurship: the Basque Model of Innovation. European Planning Studies, 24, 1544–1560. Murphy, J., & Mcdowell, S. (2019). Transitional Optics: Exploring Liminal Spaces After Conflict. Urban Studies, 56, 2499–2514. Oetzel, J., & Miklian, J. (2017). Multinational Enterprises, Risk Management, and the Business and Economics of Peace. Multinational Business Review, 25, 270–286. Oetzel, J., Westermann-Behaylo, M., Koerber, C., Fort, T. L., & Rivera, J. (2009). Business and Peace: Sketching the Terrain. Journal of Business Ethics, 89, 351–373. Plaza, B., & Haarich, S. N. (2015). The Guggenheim Museum Bilbao: Between Regional Embeddedness and Global Networking. European Planning Studies, 23, 1456–1475. Portland. (2007). Economics in Peacemaking: Lessons from Northern Ireland. London: Portland Trust. Qureshi, M. S. (2013). Trade And Thy Neighbor’s War. Journal of Development Economics, 105, 178–195. Ray, D., & Esteban, J. (2017). Conflict and Development. Annual Review of Economics, 9, 263–293. Rowthorn, B. (1981). Northern Ireland: An Economy in Crisis. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 5, 1–31. Rowthorn, B., & Wayne, N. (1988). Northern Ireland: The Political Economy of Conflict. London: Polity Press. Sen, A. K. (1987). On Ethics and Economics. Oxford: Blackwell. Tzifakis, N., & Tsardanidis, C. (2006). Economic Reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Lost Decade. Ethnopolitics, 5, 67–84.

CHAPTER 6

Managing Space: Divided Places, Divided Communities

The built architecture is a conflict response architecture. You go up the Springfield road and you see the houses opposite the Protestant peace line that were built with no windows in the front because the attacks were so bad. Housing policy officer, Belfast, Northern Ireland

Violence and a history of conflict scar physical environments in the same way they affect organisational and political spaces. While there is a range of excellent and insightful sholarship which focuses on the materiality of space and its links to ethnic and political violence, what is missing from many of these accounts is an understanding of the struggle and vicissitudes of those tasked with implementing what are often difficult and sometimes arbitrary decisions around boundaries and space. What is also important is the agency that individual and organisations can have on advancing intergroup tolerance in contested environments. This chapter focuses on the dilemmas and difficulties of managing physical environments dictated and sometimes designed around historic and ongoing conflict processes. In doing so, it looks at formal and informal urban and rural boundaries— sometimes known as ‘interfaces’—the management of flashpoints, historic places and the challenges of commemoration in locations which are still disputed (Goldie and Murphy, 2010; Bollens 2012; O’Connor 2014). While not all conflict affected spaces have visible interfaces or walls, all have locations whose name and topography evoke a history of pain, © The Author(s) 2020 J. Murphy, Management and War, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49252-6_6

93

94 

J. MURPHY

separation and damage (Mcdowell and Braniff 2014; Halilovich 2013). These also include settings in which community division is a legacy of population movement under duress and in which historic sites are not shared spaces (Fay et  al. 2001). In some instances, the management of these dynamics is done by local government organisations. In others, it is the role of central government or public service bodies. Diverse stakeholders are also engaged such as local political actors and members of non-­ governmental organisations. The presence of other individuals and groups with a history of violence often loom large in decision-making.1 The range of interested parties, the variety of stakeholders and the vulnerability of decision-making to outside political interference make this one of the most challenging and dangerous areas of administration during and after conflict. To focus on this intricate area, the chapter draws on a series of conversations with those engaged in the frontline management of conflict at a spatial level2 and the great deal of existing scholarship which also looks at the particular challenges of managing rural and urban landscapes within circumstances of contestation. There are three main considerations. The first is the impact of shifting state and interstate dynamics on the spatial undercurrents of conflict and its management. These effects often relate to the origins of conflicts themselves, decisions taken during conflict agreements and long standing differences over state boundaries, regional identity and independence. Often the legacy of conflict and post-conflict settlements are reflected in spatial divisions which themselves form part of irreconciled traditions and aspirations. The second is what might be called the ‘architecture of division’: physical environments which directly reflect both community discord and the contested nature of space as territory. What can look like structural anomalies in how urban and rural landscapes have evolved or been designed, have their origins in past conflict flares (Mcdowell and Braniff 2014). Things like population shift, violence between opposing groups and communities, and a concern for safety above all else frequently drive decision-making and developmental agendas. Communities regularly inhabit political and physical space where live conflict is less perilous but still present and visible in the architecture 1  Referred to in our Northern Ireland case as ‘community organisers’—a euphemism for current or ex-paramilitaries. 2  It is important to note that most of the experiences related within this chapter focus on low-level conflict flares and the legacy of managing residual division. An analysis of the impact of active violent conflict is dealt with in more detail in Chap. 4, ‘Before Peace’.

6  MANAGING SPACE: DIVIDED PLACES, DIVIDED COMMUNITIES 

95

and street imagery (Switzer and Mcdowell 2009). Within these environments common considerations are interfaces where communities and opposing factions collide, sites of memorialisation and issues around flags, symbols and other territorial identifiers that demarcate community boundaries in sometimes subtle ways. The predicaments inherent in this ‘materiality of space’ engage managers in the ‘messiness’ of realities on the ground. Sometimes this ‘messiness’ relates directly to division, separation and the construction of small degrees of connectedness. On other occasions it manifests in symbols, flags, emblems graffiti, pictures and memorials restating a history of connection and conflicting loyalties. Very often it is simply the implementation of policy which while complicated in its own right, is overlaid with invisible dangers and dynamics. This creates decision-­ making processes which are acutely vulnerable to political events. It is these challenges of implementation and the lived experience of managing spatial division which forms the third part of our chapter analysis.

Formal and Informal Boundaries: Space, Territoriality and the Antecedents of History The natural and constructed boundaries which divide communities often have their origins in the complex backdrop of history. Past wars, contestation over boundaries, identity, language, injustice, poverty and inequality all play their part (Aguilar Fernández 2002; Barkan 2001; Fischer 2011; Kasirova 2014; Mcdowell and Braniff 2014). Each also has its own unique historical and cultural underpinning. On the island of Ireland, the signing of the Government of Ireland Act in 1920 saw the creation of Northern Ireland (NI) as a distinct entity and the division of the island of Ireland into two separate jurisdictions. Coming after the Irish War of Independence and sparking a civil war in what was eventually to become the Republic of Ireland, this political compromise was highly contested from the beginning and created an haphazard border often following rivers or townland boundaries, designed to ensure a sizable majority for the Protestant and Unionist community in the Northern six counties (Bardon 2005). When the ‘Troubles’ began in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Belfast, the largest city in Northern Ireland, experienced what was at that time, the biggest forced migration of people since World War II.  An estimated 60,000 Belfast residents were forced to move from areas which were exposed to dangerous levels of violence, intimidation and attack. Many ‘clustered’

96 

J. MURPHY

into new neighbourhoods where their own religious group was dominant and their original homes destroyed (Byrne and Gormley-Heenan 2014; Calame and Charlesworth 2009). At the same time in both Belfast and Derry/Londonderry,3 areas became no-go zones for the police and army. Barriers erected then and since—known as ‘peace walls’—still separate neighbourhoods where there has been a history of violence and antagonism. What became known as ‘Troubles architecture’ came to dominant streetscapes and rural environments, with watchtowers and heavily fortified police stations and army bases as the norm. Belfast city centre was surrounded by steel barriers and closed in the evening. In Derry, the city was already divided by the River Foyle that runs through its centre, mirroring the makeup and location of its population. The West Bank of the river was and still is predominantly Catholic (with one sizeable Protestant community living under the shadow of the historic city walls) and the East Bank is predominantly Protestant. Until 1984 it was connected by only one bridge.4 The paramilitary ceasefires of the mid-1990s and the 1998 Good Friday or Belfast Multi-Party Agreement saw a demilitarisation and a shift to normalisation of space as well as politics. This was materially evident in the dismantling of security infrastructure around border areas. The significance of the Irish land border as a resilient structural underpinning to conflict is demonstrated by the centrality of border normalisation to the Northern Ireland peace process and present concerns about the impact of Brexit5 on this once open frontier.6 For those charged with the delivery of public services and cross border trade, the prospects of border checks are bleak and represent not just a significant management challenge, but enormous alteration to the post-peace-process status quo. In the context of policing and security on both sides of the boundary, the concern is even more acute as dissident republican violence persists and 3  NI’s second-largest city, referred to as both Derry/Londonderry or sometimes humorously as ‘stroke city’. The names themselves are indicative of division. 4  The city has a population of roughly 100,000. The opening of the second ‘peace bridge’ in 2011 was a response to the increasing population and worsening traffic issues within the city—see MURPHY, J. & MCDOWELL, S. 2019. Transitional optics: Exploring liminal spaces after conflict. Urban Studies, 56, 2499–2514. 5  Brexit—or the exit of the United Kingdom of the Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union represents a significant destabilising force. 6  See Murphy, Denyer & Pettigrew (2020) “The Role of Framing Mechanisms in Explaining System Wide Change: the case of the Northern Ireland Conflict and Peace Process” British Journal of Management, In Press.

6  MANAGING SPACE: DIVIDED PLACES, DIVIDED COMMUNITIES 

97

Northern Ireland police officers become obvious and accessible targets. Both the viability of policing a complex land border and the risk associated with that policing task have been rejected as ‘nigh on impossible’ by the leadership of the Police Service of Northern Ireland.7 While the NI border returns to prominence as a pressing political issue within Northern Ireland and outside it, it is the management of local boundaries, barriers and interfaces within neighbourhoods and the continued visibility of the conflict which we will focus on below. Incongruously, the peace process has seen an increase and not a decrease in the construction of interface barriers and disputes around the public display of flags, emblems and other expressions of community and political identity (Esposito De Vita et al. 2016). Borders and frontiers also represent equally pressing challenges in our other case studies. The disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and the wars that followed the Croatian and Slovenian Declarations of Independence in 1991 resulted in the most significant regional conflict in Europe since World War II.  The Bosnian War of 1992–1995 saw the region trapped in a major conflagration and the city of Sarajevo under siege for 43 months. Despite the establishment of so-called UN safe areas such as Sarajevo, Goradze, Srebrenica and other enclaves, concentration camps and genocide became again a feature of modern day warfare. The US brokered Peace deal of 1995 known as the Dayton Accords divided Bosnia into two self-governing entities: a Bosnian Serb Republic (Republika Srpska) and a Muslim Croat Federation. With a million people driven from their homes in exercises of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and around 102,000 people killed,8 the displacement challenges of population movement and trauma continued to haunt public administration in the region. As Bollens (2002) notes, around 45,000 Serbs now live within the borders of the Sarajevo Canton, in contrast to 139,000 before the war. As we have seen in other locations, cessation of active conflict does not halt the development of further division. A mass exodus of some 62,000 Sarajevo Serbs from the boundaries of Sarajevo City and its suburbs in early 1996 had the consequence of rendering it a mono ethnic city, post war. This was despite efforts by the international community to prevent precisely this scenario and contravening the Rome Statement of 1996, signed by Bosniak, Croat 7  https://www.irishnews.com/news/brexit/2019/10/03/news/not-enough-policeto-cover-300-border-crossings-chief-constable-simon-byrne-told-boris-johnson-1729711/. 8  US Department of State, Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo, 1999 May, vol. 6.

98 

J. MURPHY

and Serb leaders declaring that Sarajevo will be a ‘United City’ (Kumar 1994: 114). The capital and the area around it have become a central focus of international activity and scholarship. Described as a “frontier city—an urban interstice—between opposing political territories” (Bollens 2009), the boundaries specified in Dayton Accords cross what would have been regarded as ‘functional precincts’ of the city. In a mirror image to Bosnia itself, the territory of the former City of Sarajevo was subdivided into two halves: The Canton of Sarajevo and East Sarajevo, again replicating the “clustering” effect present within so many divided contexts (Calame et al. 2011). This included housing on the hills of the Miljacka river valley to facilitate the arrival of Bosniaks from areas occupied by the VRS and later from areas of the Republika Srpska—the area occupied by the Bosnian Serb forces in Autumn 1995. In addition, the displacement of the Serb population towards the area controlled by the RS on the other side of the Inter Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) led to the construction of East Sarajevo (Istočno Sarajevo in Bosnian, Serbian and Croat), and to the municipality of Ilidža, which even during the war formed part of the RS and took the name of ‘Srpsko Sarajevo’ (Serbian Sarajevo). It is estimated that in the Sarajevo of the Federation, Bosniaks make up more than 87% of the population and the remainder formed by a Croat minority. The type of “boundary etching” (Calame et al. 2011) that we see in the Northern Ireland case in which the border follows lines of historical significance is not present here. Instead, the delineation is much more arbitrary and flows the frontlines of the Croat-Muslim offensives in the autumn of 1995. The establishment of the IEBL between Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and the RS has not affected the main urban area but has significantly impacted on the eastern suburban zone because of the formation of East Sarajevo—a new conurbation in the Republika Srpska. One of the greatest challenges lies in the symbolically significant area of Dobrinja—the south-east zone adjacent to what would later become the new urban centre of East Sarajevo. The area had been one of the frontlines of Sarajevo since spring 1992 when the Sarajevo-Romanija forces of the VRS occupied the eastern zone of the neighbourhood. What is really apparent is that this area is a visible interface—with welcome signs to the East—the Republika Srpska (written in Cyrillic)—and to the West—the Canton of Sarajevo (written in the

6  MANAGING SPACE: DIVIDED PLACES, DIVIDED COMMUNITIES 

99

Latin alphabet). The use of the Cyrillic alphabet is an overt reinforcement of Serbian ethnographic identity. This public indication of language and alphabet differentiation highlights the interface and the cultural dimensions of its meaning (Toal et al. 2011: 173). In terms of national borders and boundaries, the Basque country (Euskal Herria) is a space whose precincts and territory operate outside international confines, despite Basque nationalism showing itself to be a potent and resilient political force. Located in the Western Pyrenees, the seven historic provinces identifying as Basque straddle the border between France and Spain. While not a state in legal terms, its distinct linguistic and cultural history and its independent perspective convey a complex and deeply rooted national identity. The development of the region is intrinsically linked to the development of modern Spain and France, with all of the conflicting regional complexities and ideological complications inherent in that (Vicario and Martinez Monje 2003). While history is a factor in all our cases, it is impossible to understand the violent backdrop of politics in the Basque region without first taking note of the lasting devastation of the Spanish Civil War. The destruction of Guernica epitomises the depth of the conflict and its lasting legacy. Ironically, the war was followed by an economic revival of the iron industry in the region, which itself saw a significant growth in the population and influx of new workers with the attendant tensions and pressures on housing and infrastructure (Rice 2013; Woodworth 2001; Jack 2015). Violence and calls for independence continued following the death of Franco and the Spanish transition to a constitutional monarchy in 1979. While the Basque country achieved extensive autonomy, the campaign for independence and ongoing political conflict became more insistent. Nowhere is this seen more than in the redevelopment and reimaging of Bilbao—a historic Basque city, but one which had suffered greatly because of an economic shift away from heavy industry and a history of environmental pollution. The metropolitan area of Bilbao and its 30 municipalities make up almost 50% of the population of the Basque country and as such it has long been the industrial and political centre of Basque life. The period of economic restructuring which saw Bilbao shift from an industrial to a service based economy also precipitated the advent of important urban and spatial regeneration (Murphy and Mcdowell 2019). In addition to economic reform, the establishment of ‘Bilbao Ria 2000’ (Bollens 2011) and later Bilbao Metropoli-30 has played an important role in defining spatial priorities. The emblem of course, is the Guggenheim:

100 

J. MURPHY

an iconic building symbolising the regeneration of the historic waterfront (Mcneill 2000). Equally, significant however, is the establishment of the Bilbao Metro—a development which brought previously diverse and distant neighbourhoods in the city together. In contrast to interface communities in Northern Ireland and the spatial scars of war and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Basque localities are not defined by ethnic, religious or political demarcation. Rather environments are marked by a history of events and the current disputes with posters, flags and protests providing a reminder that does not end with ceasefires and disarmament. Even the Guggenheim is not untainted with the conflict. In the week before its inauguration a number of attacks attempted to disrupt the official opening ceremony including the murder a policeman who died of gunshot wounds after challenging two men unloading plant pots outside the entrance. Urban regeneration has taken place against a backdrop of tense Basque politics and until recently, an ongoing ETA campaign of violence (alongside equally long-running efforts to create peace). The ETA process of disarmament with international verifiers and the announcement of a move towards dissolution in the spring of 2018 were significant junctures in the conflict resolution process. While ETA has announced a disbandment, the dispute between Basque nationalism and the central Spanish state continues to manifest itself in the frequent large and small prisoner protests. The message is visually reinforced by the ‘Etxera’ signs (‘back home’) that festoon streets and apartment buildings throughout the city. They are matched by other signs and graffiti around the iconic buildings and the revived waterways of the old city, ‘Not Spain, Not France, Basque’. It is the urban redevelopment journey of Bilbao and wider region as our focus.

The Management of ‘Violent Space’ The dominance of territoriality and the significance of space and place within conflict environments inevitably seeps into decision-making processes in policymaking and implementation. However, while division may be a dominant characteristic of the environment—and at times the dominant characteristic—that does not mean that those whose professional duty it is manage space in divided communities have any formal expertise or preparation. Indeed, as one local government administrator put it, “there is no training. It not exactly on the job description. But we believed

6  MANAGING SPACE: DIVIDED PLACES, DIVIDED COMMUNITIES 

101

they were part of wider endeavour”.9 Another Basque manager commented, “it is our home and therefore we understand it, but the conflict is difficult to talk about, even for us”.10 This mirrors what we have seen in other sectors and again draws attention to the demands placed on those navigating complexity. In this section we will look at the experience of those who are tasked with the complex spatial division we see outlined above, attempts to develop ‘aspects of connectedness’ and the dilemmas of physical manifestations of conflict such as flags, emblems and commemoration. Three main themes emerge from conversations with organisational actors and we will structure this section around those: spatial barriers and interconnectivity, the management of symbolism and commemoration, and public spaces as political arenas of protest. One of the biggest challenges which comes to the surface during conversations with those tasked with spatial management in conflict zones, is a commonality around visible and invisible barriers and boundaries. The biggest issue is the impact of these divisions on how policy is impacted by these divisions and how implementation has to work around specific and localised constraints. In contemporary Northern Ireland, interface issues are a major concern in the development of and management of urban and rural infrastructure. Within this context, the term ‘interface’ refers to contested physical space, generally in urban settings, which is the site of sectarian hostility and usually delineated by a physical boundary that functions to separate opposing community factions (Jarman 2005). The most obvious of these barriers are the so-called ‘peace walls’ and the huge tracks of security fencing and physical walls that demarcate residential segregation. Interface barriers have been erected over decades of conflict, either at the behest of the local residents, to protect individuals and their property, or on the orders of security forces, to contain civil unrest (Heatley 2004). In conversations with those within local councils and housing organisations in Northern Ireland, managers are very clear as to identify their role as one of a ‘community facilitator’ in relation to the management of division, particularly with regard to ironically named ‘peace walls’. The dominant focus has been is on ‘keeping people safe’ and allowing residents to feel that their local environments were as secure as possible even if this meant perpetuating and reinforcing barriers. This is an important point because it goes to 9

 Local government manager, Belfast, Northern Ireland.  Local government manager, San Sebastian.

10

102 

J. MURPHY

the central dilemma of spatial division and segregation in Northern Ireland, where an estimated 90% for all public or local authority housing is single community. Indeed, Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE), which is a focus in Chap. 7, itself emerged from a history of discrimination and violence in the worst years of the ‘Troubles’. However, it is important to recognise that those engaged in the management of interfaces clearly see the connections with peacebuilding and not just conflict management. They reflect that the recent emphasis has been “being with the community taking down peace walls. The community felt they were ready to take them down and we were there to support them. You can only deal with these things with the support of the community”.11 Interestingly, the impact of the conflict also percolates into how urban environments are structured. For example, the ‘estate codes’ used by the NIHE to allocate housing to those on waiting lists are designated by conflict indicators. As estates are generally segregated by religious domination (which is a crude pointer of community belonging), the allocation of properties to applicants is facilitated by the same indicators, as one manager noted about an area of North Belfast, “Lower Oldpark is right beside Clintonvile Old Park. One’s a Catholic area and one is a Protestant area. In normal terms that would be just ‘Oldpark’ and you would just allocate that. So it’s had a direct impact on the drawing of the boundaries”.12 The same issues are apparently within the redevelopment and revitalisation of these communities post political agreement. A one local government manager has reflected, this has resulted in the emergence of both “Protestant neighbourhood renewal areas and Catholic neighbourhood renewal areas—so it has had a physical impact in that we have had to build 21 of the peace walls ourselves”.13 One of the reasons for this is the timeframe in which a significant amount of public housing in Belfast was constructed. The manager goes on to explain that the largest public housing programme in the 1980s saw the construction of 90,000 units in some of the worst disorders of the conflict. This was a period where people had already taken the decision, or had been forced to move from flashpoint areas into religiously homogeneously zones. The construction of these neighbourhoods has obviously effects for other aspects of infrastructure, such as the road layout, the provision of schools (also largely segregated—see Chap. 7) and other community resources.  Interview with NIHE presentative.  Housing manager, Belfast. 13  Local government manager, Belfast. 11 12

6  MANAGING SPACE: DIVIDED PLACES, DIVIDED COMMUNITIES 

103

The result is a concretisation of social division: physical carving divided communities in urban and rural landscapes through building and planning processes. Those tasked with planning were often fully aware of the consequences of the seeming inevitable move towards separation and a reflection of the reality on the ground. As one manager commented, “The road layout, the secured by design, the architecture of safety was inbuilt into everything we did. We deliver all additional security to homes where an individual has been given a threat against them”.14 There is also an acknowledgement that such issues go to the very heart of managers everyday activities. One remarked: “Its only when we look at how this conflict affects our everyday work that you realise the list is a mile long”.15 One interesting initiative attempting to blunt the edges of community and neighbour separation is that of ‘Urban Villages’. Described as a headline action within the Northern Ireland Executive’s ‘Together: Building a United Community (TBUC) Strategy’, it is designed to improve good relations outcomes and develop thriving places where there has been a history of deprivation and community tension.16 One senior manager, familiar with the initiative, was sceptical about the role of political ministers and described the ongoing process to embedded ‘good relations’ processes and principles within activity, “The origin of urban villages? Bluntly, Ministers dictated where they were but it was officials who shaped what that actually means within those areas. We are still battling with that—how does that improve good relations. We are not trying to reinforce enclaves, but in some ways to do that you need a mindset to work beyond boundaries within the public sector” (Fig. 6.1).17 Despite this complex environment, no specific training exists to facilitate learning around delicate and difficult issues. Concerns are raised about this development vacuum and the worrying dependence on an individual’s own ‘tacit’ knowledge of their environment, political intelligence and clever decision-making. This was seen as being particularly acute for those in the centre of organisational hierarchies and with the potential to facilitate or stifle moves to building wider community cohesion, as one civil servant working in infrastructure commented, “That role of the middle managers. It can be a bit of a lottery. If you have people who are really

 Housing manager, Belfast.  Housing manager, Derry. 16  https://www.executiveoffice-ni.gov.uk/articles/urban-villages-initiative. 17  Senior civil servant, Northern Ireland. 14 15

104 

J. MURPHY

Fig. 6.1  Union flag hanging from lamppost, Belfast (2019)

mobilised they can drive change”.18 This miso-level engagement was regarded as crucial for progressive development as it generally set the tone for a wider analysis of ‘what was possible’ and had the potentially to move agendas strategically through decision-making processes, without overt political scrutiny. One manager, working in the area of urban development and cohesion spoke about the difficulty of engaging those at the highest level in meaningful change, “The Board hardly ever talk strategic issues. It’s all governance”.19 He contrasted that with those working at the coalface, “The innovation is on the ground. It is not sufficiently filtering through and informing departments”.20 Those actively engaged in spatial planning also struggled with the demands of their role. This ‘dilemma of intervention’ directly challenges the foundations of many managers professional practice in a contested environment. Some (as we have seen above) understand their role clearly as having a conflict transformation element, in conjunction with their professional roles as civil servants,  Senior civil servant, NI Assembly.  Senior civil servant, NI Assembly. 20  Ibid. 18 19

6  MANAGING SPACE: DIVIDED PLACES, DIVIDED COMMUNITIES 

105

housing officers, community cohesion workers etc. Others shy away for any direct engagement. One manager who had considerable experience in the area of conflict resolution and public sector policy implementation spoke about accusations of social engineering—“the issue with the planners was that there was a great argument against it. When you spoke to them they contended that you were talking about social engineering. But wasn’t everything social engineering—the development of roads to connect some communities and not others? The Belfast urban motorway decision for example, which totally divided a long standing community”.21 Internal displacement and a need to quickly establish new communities and services has also had a significant impact, on Sarajevo and the surrounding region (Toal et al. 2011). As the city has developed, the process of construction has focused on repairing war damage, reconstructing symbolic buildings and the historic city centre. This has meant that structural concerns linked to ongoing division have stayed obscure and in the background. Significant alarm has been raised by the sustainability of this strategy and the issue of managing spatial division (Aguilar Fernández 2002; Bollens 2009). The former ‘Olympic’ neighbourhood of Dobinja is a good example of these dilemmas. As a ‘threshold zone’ between one entity and another, the interface is a reality visible in street and shop signage. The creation of such “ethically demarcated containers within which the different ethnic groups could continue to exert power” (Bollens 2009: 248) creates very significant issues of management and planning, with some commentators arguing that contrasting processes of homogenisation will further exacerbate division (Aguilar Fernández 2002). As each entity becomes more internally cohesive and less similar to each other, these difficulties intensify. Issues of reconstruction and redevelopment in neighbourhoods still marked by burnt out houses are equally complex. One Mayor in a small town outside Sarajevo complained about these complexities and the difficulties that an unsettled peace brings, “The municipality can’t clean up (burnt out) houses. We only want to do it to have a better town—not to prevent the return of others who were displaced during the war, but some people believe it is a strategy to push out Bosniaks and Serbs”.22 This intense focus on division is not a characteristic of urban life in Basque towns and cities. Instead, division is more hidden and insidious. One city manager commented when recalling the period of conflict,  Member of the voluntary sector and community relations advisor.  Reference Dayton clause.

21 22

106 

J. MURPHY

We are not segregated. There are no ghettos, sometimes in the same block of flats or in the same family even, there are people from both sides of the conflict. But the truth is the Biscaye has been the territory which has been hardest hit by violence. I think half of the victims were from Biscaye. We are at the top of that terrible podium. We knew we had to make twice as much of an effort as everyone else.23

However, as the words above attest, the absence of physical division does not mean that the spatial environment has not been impacted by violence. Instead, the focus is often on revitalisation and the recreation of spaces which have been associated with the shadow of underlying tensions. In Bilbao, those engaged in the development of economic and social revitalisation processes were conscious of both the city’s industrial past and its reputation as the centre of the ongoing ETA campaign. When in 1987, the City Council of Bilbao drew up drew a new city plan their ambitions included an urban regeneration focus that would have the river its centre. This was accompanied by renewed commercial and residential space and an emphasis on accessibility and cultural renewal. While this plan pinpointed the Waterfront (Abandoibarra) and the Central District as main concerns, a later iteration in 1992 reemphasised the importance of culture and cultural identity as a key to social and economic renewal. One of the focuses of that period was the need to both plan and inspire. One of those who participated in this early noted: “The first years of the revitalisation 1990–1995—we call those years the years of the mock-ups. Every project needed a blue print, model or power-point”.24 Interesting, the project identified by managers as being the most significant in terms of community cohesion was not the iconic Guggenheim, but the opening of the Bilbao Metro in 1995. The area of Bilbao has 30 municipalities and “the metro made all the difference because you could move in minutes from your town to another. What the metro did for the area was to help us understand that we belong to one single community”.25 Another focus was the importance of aesthetics within the revitalisation process—including the use of an internationally regarded architect Norman Foster,26 and

 City manager, Basque region.  Senior manager, a regeneration body in Bilbao. 25  Ibid. 26  Entrances to the metro are locally known as Fosteritos. 23 24

6  MANAGING SPACE: DIVIDED PLACES, DIVIDED COMMUNITIES 

107

an emphasis on “making the city more beautiful”27 through another project on regional public art. This was very important because of the city’s previously reputation as a “dirty post-industrial grey place without colour. We wanted Bilbao to look beautiful. Public art to make public space look better. The last mayor had a public project to put art works out in the streets to re-urbanise and revamp public squares and places. We take care of our mountain and hills—our green environment”.28

Cultural and Political Symbols in Public Space One of the biggest challenges identified by managers working in contested space was the reality of boundary indicators, imprinted on the landscape in subtle but insistent ways—sign markers, painted kerbstones, graffiti, murals and other territorial identifiers. The impact of these demarcations, and their role in separating spaces, activities and social practices, was commented upon as significant issue within the management of divided or contested spaces and was particularly relevant within theoretically ‘shared’ public spaces. It was also noted within all of the cases that ‘middle-class’ or more affluent communities did not tend to have murals or other public representations of memory within residential areas (Vacario and Martinez Monje 2003). Managers commented that both informal representation of division (graffiti, murals, etc.) tended to appear in more socially excluded environments and often architectural interpositions were “limited to key public and commercial spaces”29. Within Bosnia and Sarajevo more specifically, post-war controversies centred around both symbolic material artefacts like street names and sites of memorialisation. For example, the change of name of Gavrila Princip Street (the spot where the Archduke was assassinated), was part of a widespread and controversial process of street name revision which included eradicating all trace of Cyrillic (Robinson et al. 2001). The issue of memorialisation of those who died in the city during the siege and outside it— particularly the genocidal atrocities in Srebrenica remain a source of very considerable conflict. It is well established, within contexts emerging from conflict, that the use of political imagery from commemorative monuments, symbols,  Local government manager, Bilbao.  Senior manager, a regeneration body in Bilbao. 29  Manager in Derry, NI. 27 28

108 

J. MURPHY

murals and sloganising—is often a way of weaponing imagery and language which progresses conflict by other means than outright violence (Mcdowell et al. 2017). Language and its deployment often bears symbolic significance and we see that in all of our cases—whether it be the use of Irish language place names in Belfast, to changing street signs on either side of the IEBL in Sarajevo or disputes about the use of Basque in Bilbao and in Spain more generally. Ongoing clashes about historic street names in Bilbao and the Basque country dating back to the Franco regime illustrate an ongoing concern and a struggle which goes beyond the present-­ day Basque conflict. In all three cases, political imagery suggests a dynamic of conflict which has not ended, simply moved to another phase. In addition to the murals and monuments, political posters and graffiti continue to explicitly call for justice and historical inquiries into crimes committed. Language as a conflict signifier is also evident in Bilbao and perceived by many as a symbol of the continuing separatist campaign. A witness seminar participant in Bilbao observed: “We’ve got symbols that are still difficult here. One for example are our languages … the use of the Basque language in our case, has been a barrier the way some people perceive and treat the Basque language and has been a barrier to how some people treat peaceful coexistence”.30 Other participants mentioned the use of Bilbao blue as a cultural signifier and the complex interrelationship between regeneration and peace— each influencing each other. Among most managers who dealt with issues of space and place on a regular basis was the understanding that these were complex, community and sometimes neighbourhood dependent issues, that needed careful and long-term attention. One Belfast housing manager made the point, “What your trying to do is open up a conversation. The real question for us in organisations is how do you enable a dialogue around these things to allow reflection?” They went on to note that of the 700–800 memorials in Northern Ireland, about a 100 are on Northern Ireland Housing Executive property and therefore those within the housing sector are intimately involved in the management, “We are an honest broker. We will have the difficult conversations with you. We know how important it is to be consistent, try to do the right thing within a broad set of parameters. We have developed that from sound foundations”.31 Ongoing political issues are often the subject of public community  Town manager outside Bilbao.  Housing manager, Belfast.

30 31

6  MANAGING SPACE: DIVIDED PLACES, DIVIDED COMMUNITIES 

109

e­ xpression. The recent appearance of flags and street banners in loyalist parts of Belfast commemorating and supporting the British parachute regiment and former British soldiers relates directly to inquiries and prosecution attempts for conflict related activities. In Bilbao too we see a proliferation of signs relating to the relocation and release of ETA prisoners incarcerated in Spanish prisoners, sometimes hundreds of miles from their families. Marches in support of prisoners are advertised and promoted. In all three contexts there has been work done to, as one manager in Belfast put it, “take the heat out of these cultural expressions”. The omnipresent spectacle in Bilbao of both peace flags and ‘Etxera’ signs (literal meaning back (them) home32) and the visible tensions of an unresolved conflict over identity (‘Not French, not Spanish, but Basque’—displayed in English for tourist consumption) and place (Bilbao or Bilbo) illustrate the unsettled nature of the region and the ever-present nature of contestation. Street banners proclaiming alliances, political messages, sometimes referencing individual prisoners and the legacy of past violence are impossible to miss. The anti-violence message of ¡Basta Ya! (Enough is enough!) and the bright yellow peace signs hung from private apartments are a visible representation of an unsettled position with space as a forum for discontent. In Northern Ireland, the display of national flags and the memorabilia were seen as highly contentious and with the potential to incite serious violence. Managers recalled the ‘Flags’ protests of 2012–2013 as an extreme example of the dilemma of managing symbols within contested public spaces. This dispute began as a protest against the democratic decision of Belfast City Council to restrict the existing practice of flying the British Union flag 365 days a year to 18 days designated by law for government buildings. The vote to restrict the flying of the flag led to almost immediate mass protests from unionists and a range of loyalist groupings. It also saw a resurgence of death threats to local politicians, attacks on political party premises, the blocking of major roads, violence, street rioting, personal injury and criminal damage leading to the closure of some businesses and widespread negative international media coverage (Goldie and Murphy 2015). One administrator who had been intimately involved in the decision spoke of their shock and fear as the situation unfolded, “our manager felt very very alone. He was getting heaps of abuse. You can’t rely on one transformational city manager. It’s too much  ‘Them’ being ETA prisoners.

32

110 

J. MURPHY

for one person to do—you need a number of them”.33 They went on to comment about the difficulties of managing a process such as this, “The flag issues had become v transactional and binary. Unionists were hyper allergic to touching anything—doing anything differently. They saw it and the issue of other memorialisation and symbols in City hall as a dilution rather than a reinforcement of identity”.34 Also to the forefront were the professional pressures that such a situation brings (“we were trying to find a win-win for everyone”) and the difficulties that arose when the issue spilled out onto the streets (“politics got out of the control of the politicians”). In Bilbao the ongoing legacy of the civil war itself marked the landscape with the recovery and memorialisation of mass graves and victims remains. This underlying legacy of death and bitterness holds the past in the present. Managers in one witness seminar near San Sebastian recalled the creation of a columbarium’s for those murdered and unidentified during the civil war and the unsettling nature of this foundational experience “the narrative is the real war”.35 Of all the themes that arose within the research, the continued and sometimes increased use of public spaces as ongoing areas of political protest was the most compelling (Aguilar 1998). Sometimes these protests are intrinsically linked to issues of symbols and commemoration as we can see above in the flags protest in Belfast, in others they feed into wider political debates. Participants in Bilbao recalled the kidnap and murder of Miguel Angel Blanco as a demarcation in both the process and the use of public space, “Miguel Angel Blanco was like a landmark. There was a before and an after …. The social reaction to that event was totally different to what we have seen in the past. The streets were taken in a different way”. This can be closely connected to how things like housing policy are implemented and outside normal criminal justice procedures and in environments where civil administration bodies have considerable. As one manager in Belfast commented, “The loss of your home can be the biggest inhibitor of bad behaviour”.36 This can become a very serious issue, especially where there is a threat of violence. Policing and security aside, managers felt that it was inherent for them to take a stand where community safety was compromised, “When there is an issue people come  Local government administrator, Belfast.  Ibid. 35  Local government manager, San Sebastian. 36  Housing manager, Belfast. 33 34

6  MANAGING SPACE: DIVIDED PLACES, DIVIDED COMMUNITIES 

111

to us. Sometimes before or instead of going to the police. They respect us I suppose and they know we are going to do something. We are very serious about community safety and we have never lost a case. It’s about bringing people with you”.37

References Aguilar, P. (1998). The Memory of the Civil War in the Transition to Democracy: The Peculiarity of the Basque Case. West European Politics, 21, 5–25. Aguilar Fernández, P. (2002). Memory and Amnesia: The Role of the Spanish Civil War in the Transition to Democracy. New York: Berghahn Books. Bardon, J. (2005). A History of Ulster. Belfast: Blackstaff Press. Barkan, E. (2001). The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Bollens, S.  A. (2002). Urban Planning and Intergroup Conflict: Confronting a Fractured Public Interest. Journal of the American Planning Association, 68, 22–42. Bollens, S. A. (2009). Intervening in Politically Turbulent Cities: Spaces, Buildings, and Boundaries. Journal of Urban Technology, 16, 79–107. Bollens, S. (2011). City and Soul in Divided Societies. London: Routledge. Bollens, S. A. (2012). City and soul in divided societies. London: Routledge. Byrne, J., & Gormley-Heenan, C. (2014). Beyond the Walls: Dismantling Belfast’s Conflict Architecture. City, 18, 447–454. Calame, J., & Charlesworth, E. R. (2009). Divided cities: Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, Mostar, and Nicosia. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Calame, J., Charlesworth, E., & Woods, L. (2011). Divided Cities: Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, Mostar, and Nicosia. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, Incorporated. Esposito De Vita, G., Trillo, C., & Martinez-Perez, A. (2016). Community Planning and Urban Design in Contested Places. Some insights from Belfast. Journal of Urban Design, 21, 320–334. Fay, M. T., Morrissey, M., Smyth, M., & Wong, T. (2001). The Cost of the Troubles Study: Report on the Northern Ireland Survey: The Experience and Impact of the Troubles. Derry Londonderry: INCORE. Fischer, M. (2011). Civil Society in Conflict Transformation: Strengths and Limitations. In B. Austin, M. Fischer, & H. J. Giessmann (Eds.), Advancing Conflict Transformation: The Berghof Handbook II. Opladen/Framington Hills: Barbara Budrich Publishers.

 Senior housing manager, Belfast.

37

112 

J. MURPHY

Goldie, R. & Murphy, J. (2010). Embedding the peace process: The role of leadership, change and government in implmenting key reforms in policing and local government in Northern Ireland. International Journal of Peace Studies, 15. Goldie, R., & Murphy, J. (2015). Belfast Beyond Violence: Flagging Up a Challenge to Local Government? Local Government Studies, 41, 470–488. Halilovich, H. (2013). Places of Pain: Forced Displacement, Popular Memory and Trans-local Identities in Bosnian War-torn Communities. New  York: Berghahn Books. Jack, E. P. (2015). From Belfast to Bilbao: The Basque Experience with the Irish Model. Working Papers in Conflict Transformation and Social Justice. Jarman, N. (2005). No longer a problem? Sectarian violence in Northern Ireland. University of Ulster: Institute for conflict research. Kasirova, D. (2014). Implementation of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Aid Initiatives: Evidence from Afghanistan. Journal of International Development, 26, 887–914. Kumar, R. (1994). Dying in Sarajevo. Index on Censorship, 23, 180–187. Mcdowell, S., & Braniff, M. (2014). Commemoration as Conflict: Space, Memory and Identity in Peace Processes. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Mcdowell, S., Braniff, M., & Murphy, J. (2017). Zero-Sum Politics in Contested Spaces: The Unintended Consequences of Legislative Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. Political Geography, 61, 193–202. Mcneill, D. (2000). McGuggenisation? National Identity and Globalisation in the Basque Country. Political Geography, 19, 473–494. Murphy, J., & Mcdowell, S. (2019). Transitional Optics: Exploring Liminal Spaces After Conflict. Urban Studies, 56, 2499–2514. O’Connor, K. (2014). Public administration in contested societies. Macmillan UK: Palgrave. Rice, P. (2013). Personal Interview. Interviewed by Eileen Jack [in person] Belfast, 4 November cited in Jack, E. P. (2015). “From Belfast to Bilbao: The Basque Experience with the Irish Model”. Working Papers in Conflict Transformation and Social Justice 6. Robinson, G. M., Engelstoft, S., & Pobric, A. (2001). Remaking Sarajevo: Bosnian Nationalism After the Dayton Accord. Political Geography, 20, 957–980. Switzer, C., & Mcdowell, S. (2009). Redrawing Cognitive Maps of Conflict: Lost Spaces and Forgetting in the Centre of Belfast. Memory Studies, 2, 337–353. Toal, G., Tuathail, G. Ó., & Dahlman, C. T. (2011). Bosnia remade: Ethnic cleansing and its reversal. USA: Oxford University Press. Vicario, L., & Martinez-Monje, P. (2003). Another Guggenheim effect? The gentrification of a potentially gentrifiable neighbourhood in Bilbao. Urban Studies, 40(12), 2383–2400. Woodworth, P. (2001). The Basque Conflict & Ireland. History Ireland, 9(3), 41–47.

CHAPTER 7

For Public Good: Housing, Local Government and the Delivery of Public Services

We have come out of so much darkness and paid a heavy price for peace. I do believe that the only solution is to work together. The only thing to do is the right thing. Manager, Northern Ireland Housing Executive

Within any society, the delivery of basic services such as health, education, security and housing is a core requirement for social stability and economic development. Often during conflict and after it, attention focuses on both the political process to create stabilising structures and institutions, and the community process to assist in preventing conflict flares on the ground. However, it is often forgotten that more prosaic practices are also ongoing. Bins need to be emptied, public spaces need to be kept safe, children need to go to school and students to university. Of course, during extreme violence and war all rules are suspended and simply surviving can be enough. Much of the existing research on this area looks at the challenges of those within weak and fragile states. Brinkerhoff et al. (2012), in their review of service delivery, focus on the issues of legitimacy and the role of service delivery to build valuable legitimacy within states where formal and accepted authority is scarce. They state, “Service delivery, especially when equitable and effective, can provide positive experiences with state actors. This may be a precursor to the legitimation process in situations where the formal state is very weak and has little outreach, and where traditional legitimizing principles (embodied in tribes, elders and/or

© The Author(s) 2020 J. Murphy, Management and War, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49252-6_7

113

114 

J. MURPHY

warlords) outweigh legal-rational ones” (Brinkerhoff et al. 2012: 279). Others such as Vaux et al. (Vaux and Visman 2005) have explored violence as a factor in service delivery with regard to the role of international aid agencies and the potential of early engagement to both to sustain people during conflict and to strengthen capacity for ensuing social and political transition. In particular, they single out education and health as mechanisms to build acceptance as conflict is transformed, Provision of education services to those displaced by conflict can also play an important contribution to strengthening capacity for reconstruction. Health staff trained in emergency humanitarian assistance programmes in Mozambique strengthened national capacity to restore services after the peace agreements. Similarly, health staff trained in refugee camps in the Thai/Cambodia border proved a valuable asset in the reconstruction of Cambodia’s health sector, particularly after the massacre of health professionals under the Khmer Rouge regime. (Vaux and Visman 2005: 2)

In a very interesting piece of research Giangreco et al. (2012) explore the introduction of a performance appraisal system at Hebron public hospital in Palestine during the second Intifada.1 With a conceptualisation of ‘war outside, ceasefire inside’ the authors note the need to maintain order through a process in which ‘peace’ was preserved within the organisational confines. They reflect, “If an organization is under the constant threat of military actions, if the supplies are in constant danger of not arriving, if the employees experience problems of mobility on the territory, there is little chance that a performance appraisal system would motivate or control people. Our study has proven exactly this point: when there is a war outside, we need ceasefire inside” (Giangreco et al. 2012: 167). This underlines that even in the intensity of war, people cleave to organisations, and organisational work goes on. Drawing on these experiences, this chapter introduces some of the key concerns of organisational actors engaged in service provision and provides an overarching analysis of the issues looked at in more detail within the ‘companion’ sections which follow it. It keeps as its focus our three major concerns highlighted earlier: that the formulation and implementation of ‘strategy’ is nonlinear and pulled in different directions by the competing currents of power, time and political activity; that the agency of individual actors is crucial and therefore how people frame activity and action matters greatly; and that tacit knowledge and political skill provides both an environmental awareness and cultural 1

 Around 2000–2002.

7  FOR PUBLIC GOOD: HOUSING, LOCAL GOVERNMENT… 

115

embeddedness which holds potential to endure conflict and build peace. All of these factors feed into the messiness of process during conflict uncertainty. In addition to this central framework, this section also draws attention to the complexities of policy implementation, the reality of political intervention and the personal impact of operating under conditions of both volatility and threat.

Complexities of Implementation First of all we are the victims of an ineffectual system.2

Our case studies represent not only broad areas of complex conflict but also situations of different conflict intensity. While some concerns are shared such as divided communities, histories of violence and long legacies of ill feeling, in other ways they are very different. In both Bosnia and Northern Ireland, territorial markers are common and important—division is a legacy of conflict and place. Religious and ethnic background also operate as community identifiers. Within the Basque country, language and an identification with a wider Basque identity is not defined by place or space and the type of communal division which is so common in Belfast is not replicated in the successionist movement in Bilbao. However, within all of these environments, organisations and their members are struggling with the reality of policy implementation under layers of formal and informal division. These ‘interstitial’ considerations have a major impact on policy outcomes and the journey of policy development (Heimstädt and Reischauer 2019). For example, the political structures which were an outcome of war or conflict in all three of our case studies create unintended consequences which make visioning and implementing change difficult. One Bosnian respondent commented directly on this issue and the structural challenges it brought about, “One of the key parts of the Bosnian constitution are the two entities under 10 different cantons. There are no overarching policies. People lose their rights to social protection”. This has real implications for those implementing policy and those at the mercy of the process. Our respondent goes on to give an example: “‘under the radar’ political structures are counter-productive. The structures inhibit cooperation and create issues in themselves. We are talking about human lives and the lives of children who perhaps have a Serbian  Bosnian civil servant.

2

116 

J. MURPHY

father and a Bosniak mother”.3 This has a significant impact on everyday work and an individual manager’s “ability to implement change”. The political nature of these processes and the stasis described by our interviewee is underlined by other work that has looked at welfare reform in Bosnia and detailed the complexities of local welfare reform and its interactions with international agencies (Maglajlic and Stubbs 2017). One of the important lessons from this work is the need to build engagement around the experience and concerns of local managers, who have a deep understanding of the context and of the intricacies of work on the ground. An interesting characteristic of the Bosnian example is the approach to education within still heavily divided locations and communities. The ‘two schools under one roof’ (Kovač et al. 2017) policy is illustrative of both division and duplication which we will see are characteristics shared by other contested locations. Within Bosnia, the reality of Dayton was a major concern. While many working to deliver public services and manage complex administrative system understood and acknowledged that the settlement had been initially positive, the basic complexity of the system and the layering of separate administrative, political and power structures had a tendency to result in stasis, confusion and frustration. The “functional changes” that respondents felt were required were both difficult to achieve in practice and at times, counter to the already established political structures. The frustration of one official was evident when he described trying to get things done within the institutional complexity as “tilting at windmills—going round and round in circles, with all issues incredibly complex”.4 This is reinforced by an articulated understanding that politics in the “workplace and religion and nationality are the same and intertwined [interviewee makes intertwined fingers gesture]”.5 The divisions that need to be managed in Bosnia are also seen in other environments but in more subtle ways. Violence and its legacy remain firmly in the minds and in the working reality of managers in the Basque country. One interviewee in San Sebastian reflected upon their experience during the conflict: “I was thinking about how I managed—how I did my job … There was a very clear divide in the town and families who wouldn’t talk to each other. It was a very difficult time. And the Council continued to deliver services despite the horror. For instance, the leisure centre was  Bosnian civil servant.  Ibid. 5  Ibid. 3 4

7  FOR PUBLIC GOOD: HOUSING, LOCAL GOVERNMENT… 

117

built with the culture department and the youth office. We did it even more so—just because. There may have been people who didn’t care but there were clearly two sides in confrontation.”6 This is also reflected in the experience of those working within local government in Belfast. A senior manager acknowledged the impact of the conflict on staff: we have had staff killed on service and we have a plague in City Hall to commemorate those who died, but we felt we had to do more. We did lots and lots of training—and we really challenged people’s behaviour. There was nervousness about it. People said to me ‘you need to be really careful—you’re going to have a whole squad of grievances’ and some people in Human Resources nearly had a heart attack. But it was important to get over your own personal preferences. For example, a manager who said she was ‘neutral’—nobody is neutral. But we wanted people to understand where they come from and also the reaching across that needs to happen to promote good relations.7

But there was also opposition within organisations themselves, “People said to us ‘we have spent our time making sure this is a neutral organisation and now you want us to do something else? Is this going to open and entire can of worms with our staff? Are our staff who are mixed going to be able to do this?”.8 In other areas of Northern Ireland, with ongoing paramilitary activity despite the ceasefires and peace process, levels of threat remained high for those working within communities. One manager from a rural local council in Northern reflected, “In our own area, officers are extremely vulnerable and exposed. The week after I arrived to take up my role our Chief Executive received a bullet in the post. There are big problems locally”.9 This interface between local government, local communities and politicians was regarded as critical to the success of initiatives to bring opposing groups together. Often managers refuted the idea that they were able to drive policy change without first engaging in persuasive work within communities, even if this was very difficult. Commenting on these challenges one senior manager in Belfast spoke of the approach and also the need to continue to push for change, even when opposition was considerable, “The expectation that Councils will ever invent a narrative is nonsense. It’s gotta be a process. We need people to create a narrative … But we have a saying when things go  Local council manager, San Sebastian.  Senior manager, Belfast. 8  Ibid. 9  Local government manager, NI. 6 7

118 

J. MURPHY

wrong—‘FIDO—F*** it, drive on’”.10 In engaging in proactive, cross community, good relations work, Belfast City Council took an unusual step within contested environments. They rightly acknowledged that public workplaces were often the first places that people encountered members of the ‘other’ community and were therefore an opportunity for cross community relationship building but also a potential problem if relationships broke down. The process included an internal staff working group, which had a close association with the trade unions—who had their own anti-sectarianism initiatives and were able to transfer across learning and experience. As one individual involved in the programme commented, “the trade unions are very good at this. Their attitude is ‘let’s get into the dirt’. They wanted to make change. They were less scarred”.11 However, the process required not just a commitment to anti sectarianism and the building of ‘good relations’ but also an understanding that this needed to be integrated into thinking, staff training and organisational processes and procedures. The “relentless messaging” required to move the work forward was itself challenging. This type of effort also began to emerge within the housing sector as a direct result of proactive decisions to engage in ‘good relations’ activity, we started the BRIC12 programme and began talking to staff about their experience throughout the Troubles. We brought staff in and a lot of staff— we just don’t talk about it—a lot of staff experienced grief and loss but the issue of the conflict was never brought into the workplace. But BRIC allowed staff to speak about their personal experiences and some found that very hard. Others found it cathartic. It broke down a lot of barriers about where people came from and what their history was. Doing that with people who were skilled was a very interesting way of dealing with it—the first time I’ve ever seen people’s personal circumstances. And for some people that’s good and for some it isn’t—because some people needed some follow up work done—their coping mechanism had been to ignore it.13

It was also unusual and deemed ‘risky’ within Northern Ireland more widely. Within Belfast City Council there was an acknowledgement by managers that engagement with and uptake of the approach was uneven,  Senior manager, Belfast.  Manager from community sector, Belfast. 12   Building Relationships in Communities programme NIHE 2020. The Housing Executive’s COMMUNITY COHESION STRATEGY 2015–2020. 13  Northern Ireland Housing Executive manager. 10 11

7  FOR PUBLIC GOOD: HOUSING, LOCAL GOVERNMENT… 

119

“There are some people who get it and some people who don’t … there are a lot of people across a raft of agencies who have a mindset and a work ethos that understand what they do through the prism of transforming out of conflict”.14 As another manager observed: “That’s not how public service is trained in Northern Ireland—we are trained to be neutral”. They went on, “I’m not convinced about the NI Civil Service—I think the Council is much more entrepreneurial”.15 This ‘neutrality’ extends to symbols and emblems in the workplace—with a few notable, and sometimes controversial, exceptions. Within Bosnian structures there is a carefully balanced recruitment approach, but little evidence of official recognition or regulation around symbols and emblems. In conversations with managers, no dedicated prayer room for Muslims was identified in a main government building in Sarajevo, for example, but informal arrangements were in place. Practising Muslims were allowed to take their break when they might be praying and use that time period for that purpose. There were also informal arrangements for Friday prayers and an understanding that contentious issues needed to be dealt with carefully and discreetly by those with decision-making authority. This is an interesting point and reflects wider issues within contested societies around the administration of public service (O’Connor 2014). One senior civil servant made the point that the inherent contradictions in the position of public administration in Northern Ireland created a new series of problems. By ignoring the Troubles and only engaging in relation to a security response, the administration lacked the institutional capacity to build peace, “Part of what we did around the ‘Troubles’ was we developed public policy which is Troubles blind. ‘Wouldn’t this be a great wee place if it wasn’t for the Troubles’ kind of thing. The Troubles exist, we have to understand and take account of that”.16 They went on, “because the conflict is the conflict, you end up with this even handedness which isn’t public service because public service should be prioritising services to those in need”.17 One of the first organisations to engage with the need to prepare staff for service delivery in a contested environment was the CCETSW,18 a social services training agency who recognised early that the  Manager, Northern Ireland local government.  The region-wide administrative structure. 16  Senior civil servant, NI. 17  Ibid. 18  Central Council for Education and Training in Social Work (NI). 14 15

120 

J. MURPHY

skills and training provided for social workers in NI was inadequate and did not take account of the environments within which staff were engaging. One manager who worked closely with CCETSW on the production of their ground-breaking ‘Getting off the Fence’ report (CCETSW 1999) commented: The question needed to be asked ‘what skills were we providing for a social workers to go and work within the maelstrom of Northern Ireland? If we remain totally neutral then they are not able to have the conversations we need them to have. How are we supporting them to have these conversations? We are they were saying this needs to be included in the organisations training.19

However, this was not replicated in other departments especially those that had responsibility for environment and planning. This respondent also acknowledged that attempts to transfer learning into other sectors was often unsuccessful, “those conversations came to a dead end. The advocates of this work were missing. Just a dead end”.20 While, the type of avoidance identified above may have been a strategy in some instances and for some organisations, local government associations (usually local councils) have had to focus on the delivery of services and therefore the reality of division—a common outworking in which staff are unable to work in some locations because of the extension of a paramilitary threat against them. This may occur when a Protestant member of staff is working in a predominantly Catholic area, or the other way around. This is a difficult and sensitive issue, not least because many organisations—including those in local government, do not have access to sufficient information to substantiate a threat: “Some are genuine. Some are a convenient flag—hard to confirm. We make enquiries—the police will only tell you so much. People do end up being deployed on the basis of orange and green”.21 Existing research on the provision of services in Belfast would also conform that this is an operational reality (Brown 1999). This logistical challenge creates issues in terms of balancing resources in a way that takes account of physical and community nuance and the territorial divides that impact waste collection and management, cleansing, cemeteries, parks and leisure provision. Belfast City Council is attempting to manage the division of leisure services through an innovative strategy in which each service delivery point (such as a leisure centre,  Retired civil servant.  Ibid. 21  Senior manager, Belfast. 19 20

7  FOR PUBLIC GOOD: HOUSING, LOCAL GOVERNMENT… 

121

sports ground or swimming pool) has a unique selling proposition designed to draw people in from all over the city: “the rationale behind that is to create movement across the city. We would be fully linked into infrastructure, which is a challenge”,22 however some difficulties are more intransigent than others: “football in the city is still hugely divided. We try to find ways to unlock communities”.23 Even in matters of the dead, there are considerations: “We need more cemetery provision so one of the things we take on board is where that is or could be—so division effects even that. One of our aspirations is that good relations and a shared city is now at the start of conversations”.24 Another organisation which has had to engage significantly in issues of division and conflict management was the Northern Ireland Housing Executive. Established at the height of the Troubles in 1971, it took over the functions of 65 local authorities and housing bodies in 1973 because of deep seated concerns about fairness of housing allocation—an issue which went to the heart of the NI Civil Rights protests (NIHE 2020). They remain today the largest public sector landlord in the United Kingdom with 86,187 housing units under their management. This includes 800 housing estates and a tenant profile which has 80% of occupants relying on means tested government benefits. With 60,000 people forced to leave their homes between 1969 and 1973, and 14,000 houses destroyed in a paramilitary led ‘scorched earth policy’ which devastated communities, the NIHE was charged with stabilising communities and housing those displaced. It continues to perform this function, managing entrenched and widespread segregation of Northern Ireland’s communities. Housing managers who had been with the organisation for all of their careers reflected on the environment which created the ‘Housing Executive’ and the chaos which surrounded its early days, “We had Roswell flats in Derry, Bloody Sunday happened outside, robberies, bombs. Alongside this there was terrible housing conditions in Derry and we tackled that shortage. Lot of tensions between staff transferring from Councils. We as an organisation were not accepted by Protestant politicians”.25 Another manager expressed similar sentiments,

 Local government manager, Belfast.  Ibid. 24  Ibid. 25  Senior manager, NIHE, north-west NI. 22 23

122 

J. MURPHY

all that were happening, the murder of Jean McConville, the birthplace of the modern IRA, all that was happening in our communities where we were then doing redevelopment, where we were trying to do slum clearance because people were living in appalling conditions, where we were trying to address severe housing need. You couldn’t do that in those communities and not address the wider issues—everything happened on our watch— because we were established at the beginning of the Troubles. And the big thing for us was that we were established to bring a fair and impartial and unbiased view to housing and that resonates very strongly with people who work in the Housing Executive because people joined this organisation to do that. We were allowed to get on and because we were a quango—we were arm’s length there was a certain freedom to get on and do it as long as we were fair and impartial. And that fairness and equality has been at the very centre of the organisation because we have so many staff with very long service—I can’t describe it better than it’s in our DNA.26

Another went on to refer to the black humour so inherent in environments of this type, “We had a community cohesion unit—we called it our paramilitary wing”.27 At the time of writing, 90% of NIHE estates are segregated (94% in Belfast) with the cost of division running into millions for housing providers alone. Intimidation resulting in homelessness is an ongoing issue, the majority of these cases arising from paramilitary intimidation and threat. For staff, confronting these issues is immensely difficult and requires an awareness of the operational, procedural and political nuances of decisions. One senior manager in NIHE spoke of his philosophy and approach: you have to have humility in terms of what you’re about. When people come over28 they say, ‘we through it was difficult where we are, but we don’t have it nearly as bad as you’. Everything is overlaid with the divisions and the need to deliver services fairly. The housing bits are the same everywhere but the context is different and we are in a very very difficult context. You look for elements of good practice. We’ve been in the other jurisdictions and this is different—of course, it is different.29

Considerations such as very careful staff selection, political skill, ability to communicate effectively with different stakeholders and a local embeddedness where all identified as key attributes for good managers. The interviewee went on,  Senior manager, NIHE, Belfast.  Ibid. 28  From other areas of the United Kingdom and Ireland. 29  Retired senior manager, NIHE. 26 27

7  FOR PUBLIC GOOD: HOUSING, LOCAL GOVERNMENT… 

123

So, for example, we have a cohesion strategy. It is a strategy which is addressing post-conflict issues and we find that we have themes, segregation, manifestations of the past—flags, emblems, bonfires, dealing with the race relations issue, dealing with communities in transition—emerging from violence. We set up the unit and the person that led the unit was chosen very specifically for the skills they were able to bring at that peacebuilding element, a meditative approach. We realised very quickly that a lot of the straightforward business the Housing Executive did managing its estates and just dealing with the issues throughout the conflict was peacebuilding and we just didn’t recognise it.30

Interesting, the important additional element into this stage of development was identified as the organisations own leadership and its awareness of the activity as a contribution to peacebuilding, Our managers were doing peacebuilding but we didn’t recognise it but because of the leadership we had, we were able to recognise it. You can’t do that sort of work without leadership. When we started talking about good relations in 2004—when we said we are going to set up a unit to do good relations, those contentious issues and name how we were going to do things we found that our people in communities were doing this work already—they just didn’t call it cohesion work and good relations work. It was just estate management or dealt with through community safety or anti-social behaviour. It was so much a part of what you did that it wasn’t named as such. ‘Patch’ managers were dealing with flags and emblems, things that were creating a ‘chill factor’ with people and marking territory. We proactively engage with locals to get those reimaged and that reimaging programme is ongoing at the moment.31

The persistence of these issues, the seeming intractability of division, the fragility of the peace and the personal toil of managing in such environments was reinforced by another public sector manager in Belfast, “There are issues that keep biting us in the arse—flags parades emblems, bonfires … having applied the same singularity of purpose. We share out, we don’t share and we are incurring costs which in other circumstances are unnecessary and you are depriving citizens of other services which you could have. It’s very personally trying”.32 A local government manager in the Basque city of San Sebastian echoed these sentiments, “For (the managers) it can’t be simply can it. They have to manage their own institutions  Ibid.  Ibid. 32  Local government manager in Belfast. 30 31

124 

J. MURPHY

as well as peaceful coexistence. Peoples difficult life experiences. Trying to solve a problem that they didn’t’ cause”.33

The Reality of Political Intervention No one will stop a minister making a decision. The question is, have they complied with their duty in law? And their duty in law is to go through the process.34

One of the most compelling challenges faced by those focused on service delivery within contested and divided environments is the often dangerous engagement with formal and informal political structures. We can define formal structures in a straightforward way—they present as legislatives, representative chambers and other political environments underpinned by democratic processes. Informal political structures are more complicated and in our cases often represent current or former paramilitary organisations or those intimately connected to them. In many instances these individuals present themselves as ‘community influencers’ and an awareness of their presence is an acute reminder that the legacy and threat of violence is still a factor within decision-making. This section will explore some of the issues that those engaged in policymaking and implementation have with formal and informal political environments. Some respondents regarded their role as acting as the “bridge between politicians—trying to give them the best judgement advice and guidance and that interface with the community. You are a bridge and there are huge expectations from both sides”.35 The skill set required to be this bridge as extensive, “To be an effective manager you need to be really flexible and to spend time understanding the environment your working in”.36 This is as true of the informal power structures as it is of the formal. One former housing officer talked in detail about the complex environment he was expected to navigate within public forums, There’s tenants, public representatives, local influencers as you would call them. In some instances who weren’t even tenants in the area. And some occasions you’re with colleagues and on some occasions you’re own your own. I remember one night going to a public meeting which was about  Local government manager, San Sebastian.  Retired senior civil servant, Belfast. 35  Senior local government manager, Northern Ireland. 36  Local government manager, Basque region. 33 34

7  FOR PUBLIC GOOD: HOUSING, LOCAL GOVERNMENT… 

125

allocations and I thought I was meeting the management committee and it was full of people—police were there—one of the local senior police men was there and there was a mixture of people on the panel and we were talking about drugs and the rest. And I remember the policeman saying to me when the meeting was over ‘I wouldn’t have your job for all the money in the world’. And the police were dealing with life and death and I’m only getting a bit of agro from people, who as far as they are concerned have a legitimate concern and I need to get my message across to them.37

There is also an acknowledgement that decisions taken are inherently political but an awareness of the potential of these decisions to impact on peacebuilding and reconciliation and not always positively, “In a whole myriad of way people in public bodies and councils take decisions which of their essence are political. They are not taking them from a political perspective or with political intent but by their very nature they are political. That can both contribute to reconciliation and peacebuilding but at the same time be detrimental to peacebuilding”.38 The unintended consequences of post-conflict policies and structures are confined not only to a duplication in processes, but also to legislation which is designed to build agreement and interconnectedness but can be used for political purposes to do the opposite. One interviewee talked in detail about equality and ‘good relations’ legislation in Northern Ireland and the unfulfilled promise which it held for reconciliation: The equality legislation and the human rights legislation are hugely important in terms of the substructure of the Agreement. Of its time the most far reaching piece of equality legislation in Western Europe. But if we are serious about developing equality we need to refine our policies for how we address education differentials, health differentials, employment differentials. If we basically say that in a heated political chamber, we have a building or a structure for whatever political reasons we will name that? without thinking through, how did we do it in such a way as to promote better relations and equality of opportunity.

This also presents an enormous responsibility for those working professionally within public administrations to understand the complex dynamics of these processes and to consciously take responsibility for process. The alternative—and what is sometimes the reality is sketched out by one of our interviewees, “The evidence that we are getting through is that  Senior housing manager, Belfast.  Senior manager, NGO, Belfast.

37 38

126 

J. MURPHY

often the decision in a department will be made by the political head and then the civil servants scurry around retrospectively to fit an equality scheme around the decision. That’s a recipe for disaster”. As we have seen above, for some sectors including those providing housing services to communities in areas of social deprivation a decision to actively engage in peacebuilding can also be interpreted by the political environment as an engagement in the ‘politics’ of conflict itself. Those within the NIHE had to confront significant opposition to move forward: “At one point there was quite a bit of opposition to the NIHE stepping into the peacebuilding arena. There was direct political opposition. We were told in no uncertain terms not to enter that arena and the Chief Executive said he would be entering that arena”.39 There are also incidences where the direct politics of division and the duplication of provision emerges into the public arena as a live issue. One respondent recalls a situation in 2001 in Belfast where, in an attempt to rationalise maternity services was heavily attacked by political leaders, “I worked in the Royal Victoria Hospital in 2001 when we were on our third judicial review about the maternity hospital ‘a Catholic hospital for Catholic babies’ as Iris Robinson said. The only thing that really mattered were babies that were ill, but it was a political matter—it was not about proper service delivery”.40 They went to explain, “data provides a convenient cover of rational decision making but it’s actually sectarian decision making”. Providing administrative opposition to the ‘sectarianisation’ of decision-making is not however, easy. The same respondent recalled the price paid by managers and administrators trying to draw attention to such difficulties, “You do see individuals trying to make a difference but they end up being demonised in my experience”. The significance of having ‘someone on the inside’ who was able to exercise appropriate leverage around significant decisions was not lost on those in Sarajevo during the siege. As the university administrator we heard from in Chap. 4 commented, “when making decisions, the Faculty always had someone in an important position”. Officials in Bosnia comment on a similar feeling of the responsibility and the harshness of the system, “There is great difficulty. In different accounts and different levels our colleagues are equally facing difficulty. Changes are falling down at a political level. We have a responsibility to behave professionally but the approach taken is the way it sits for the political  Senior manager, NIHE.  Senior manager, public sector, Belfast.

39 40

7  FOR PUBLIC GOOD: HOUSING, LOCAL GOVERNMENT… 

127

orientation, and it is always your fault”.41 There was also an awareness and recognition of the pervasion nature of politics and the reality that “politics is connected to everything”.42 Like the Basque country, there is a reluctance to speak about past conflict, “we do not speak about the war or the conflict but it is in the background and not allowing us to move forward”. Here again the interstitial layers of post-conflict bureaucracy create an additional challenge, “We have to have a diplomatic approach when we are cooperating with another canton”.43 The need for political dexterity and cautious manoeuvring was not lost on one official, “I was not really skilled when I started but I have had to teach myself it is learnt from previous experience. Sometimes you hit the wall”.44 While most organisations had no recognisable training in place for those expected to navigate such complex territory, there was an acknowledgement that processes of recruitment and early exposure to the challenges to come was a practical way of preparing individuals for the task: So in terms of preparing staff it was through your general training as a housing officer. The fact that everyone was in the position—it wasn’t just one group of people, it was everybody. Also you’ll find that we’re all from the estates—the majority of people who work in housing—it’s not sitting in your ivory tower looking down. The vast majority of Housing Executive staff are from Housing executive estates—there is an empathy with the community that builds and reinforces the values that we have.45

One of the startling things that emerges about the interface between the administration of service delivery and wider formal and informal political processes is the critical and sometimes cynical nature of the interactions between the different processes. One Bosnian commentator reflected, “the war is never, ever finished, key political issues have not been resolved. On an individual level we still have these problems. Elections are the result of hatred”.46 But as others suggest, this is an inescapable part of the job: “That’s part and parcel of what we do. Even from day one, we have always engaged at that level. They are elected representatives. People have elected them to office and if you do it without having the elected reps along with  Senior manager, public sector, Sarajevo.  Ibid. 43  Ibid. 44  Senior manager, Bosnia. 45  Senior housing officer, Belfast. 46  Senior manager, Bosnia. 41 42

128 

J. MURPHY

you, then you are doomed to fail”.47 In Northern Ireland, housing officer adopted a simple position for how they interacted with political areas of influence: The one thing I found that stood to me, in terms of dealing with politicians—I said it as it was. ‘Here what I can do. Here’s what I can’t do’. Issues like allocation of housing and when you think about why we were set up. We were set up to be fair. And impartial and objective and that’s what I am. If there’s a grey area and you can help somebody you will do that, but if its black and white and your entitled to this, then you’re getting it or you’re not entitled to this and you’re not getting it.48

This combination of structural barriers, vested interest and the need for personal and organisational resilience also puts the spotlight on the role of senior managers within service delivery organisations. We have seen above how within housing, leadership decisions against significant political opposition made it possible for the organisation to meaningfully engage in activities which they publicly framed as peace orientated and anti-­sectarian. However, within other structures especially local councils there is a recognition that reinforcement of positive peace strategies takes a critical mass of organisational actors to reinforce approaches and protect each other, “You can’t rely on one transformational manager, you need a network of them”. The nuanced reality of operating within a society engaged in or emerging from conflict is best captured by a senior manager reflected in depth on the challenge confronting himself and his colleagues, Everyone who operates in a place like Northern Ireland understands it as a divided community in which the division will last a very long time. It’s important, I think, to develop ‘a calculus of consciousness’. To have some sense of the fact that you’re doing something. No decision is taken in a test tube—it is not an isolated thing—it is a decision which is going to have consequences. And a lot of the time you want to take decisions which will have consequences. Sometimes even that are provocative without losing your sense of objectivity and impartiality. But if one of your guiding principles is avoiding controversy—risk version—then you will miss opportunities which are part of your job, and you’re not doing your job properly. I think that public managers have the potential to exercise significant influence. One always need to be careful about exercising an influence you have no right to exert, but if you’re not

 Senior local government manager, Belfast.  Housing manager, Belfast.

47 48

7  FOR PUBLIC GOOD: HOUSING, LOCAL GOVERNMENT… 

129

aware of the consequences of your decision then you are not engaging with an important part of your job—especially in Northern Ireland. It’s the politics of prevention and not the politics of possibility.49

Motivation in Conditions of Both Volatility and Threat What we had … we had hope.50

The conditions, experiences and intricacies identified above, undoubtedly create conditions of stress and difficulty. Nowhere is this seen more than in environments of extreme danger, such as the three-and-a-half-year siege of Sarajevo. One education administrator who continued to work throughout the siege spoke about the concept of ‘employee obligation’ through which individuals continued to engage in administration and management in life threatening circumstances. The processes engaged organisationally also involved ensuring that when students are able to attend class, that class took place, that examinations continued to be conducted and the interviewee’s proudest achievement—“all the administration was done appropriately and we could stand over all the diplomas”. While the University continued to teach where possible, large gatherings such as graduations were forbidden because of the acute danger of ongoing shelling so diplomas were awarded as required. Both the loyalty and the professional commitment shown in such circumstances is extraordinary, but on closer analysis it is possible to see that the ‘solidarity’ between the organisation, its members and the wider environment is just as significant a factor. The mixture of the personal and the political and the role of public administration as an extension of resistance was conveyed and expressed “the fight has to be fought on a personal level—to get things done”. It is not the role of this research to ask or probe about the experience of those who risked death themselves and saw others killed and injured. However, the pain of these experiences is evident. Others in less extreme but still conflict affected environments talk about the stress and prevalence of operating in difficult circumstances—“you have got to be professional and spend your time doing the right thing and try to do the right thing but it takes its toll. You go home to your own children with  Retired civil servant, Northern Ireland.  Administrator, University of Sarajevo.

49 50

130 

J. MURPHY

that stress”.51 The process of conflict transformation itself was regarded as stressful. For example, the transition to a more peaceful context in Northern Ireland saw the removal of physical artefacts in public facing office like screens, grills and security. For some individuals on the front line of service delivery, this was uncomfortable and at times frightening. One public sector worker recalled the change in orientation after the paramilitary ceasefires in the mid-90s, “We’ve gone from fortified offices to our counters completely open. A lot of people were uncomfortable with that—the move to normalisation. Mid to late 90s. Things were quieting down then. We used to have security in all our offices—doormen and security. Grills on windows but very few have that now”.52 One of the most evident and recurring themes is a seeming inability to talk about the conflict openly in a meaningful way. This was the case in Bosnia as we have seen above, but also in the Basque country where violence was sometimes characterised by a guerrilla campaign which split families and communities. One administrator in a public sector organisation in the Basque country spoke about the difficulties confronting the conflict both personally and in terms of policy development, “talking of the violence was a taboo in families. I have known families with a prisoner in them and sometimes a member of the police in the family. Really awful situations. Terrible for parents, grandparents. It breaks hearts”.53 She went on, “You felt that you couldn’t even say the words. Now even what do you call it? The Basque conflict? Terrorism? There is not a real consensus on that. Some will say—this is not conflict—this is war, this is terrorism, this is oppression”. The personal toll of engaging in difficult conversations was also a theme in all of the cases. In this the code of conduct was evocatively expressed by a housing manager in Belfast: “Some negotiations might have been challenging but the people on the other end respect you for that. If that’s the way it is, then at least we know what we’re getting is honestly”.54

 Civil servant, Sarajevo.  Housing manager, Belfast. 53  Local government manager, Bilbao. 54  Housing manager, Belfast. 51 52

7  FOR PUBLIC GOOD: HOUSING, LOCAL GOVERNMENT… 

131

References Brinkerhoff, D.  W., Wetterberg, A., & Dunn, S. (2012). Service Delivery and Legitimacy in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States. Public Management Review, 14, 273–293. Brown, D. R. (1999). Ethnic Politics and Public Sector Management in Trinidad and Guyana. Public Administration and Development, 19, 367–379. CCETSW. (1999). Getting Off the Fence: Challenging Sectarianism in Personal Social Services. CCETSW: Belfast. Giangreco, A., Carugati, A., Sebastiano, A., & Tamimi, H.  A. (2012). War Outside, Ceasefire Inside: An Analysis of the Performance Appraisal System of a Public Hospital in a Zone of Conflict. Evaluation and Program Planning, 35, 161–170. Heimstädt, M., & Reischauer, G. (2019). Framing Innovation Practices in Interstitial Issue Fields: Open Innovation in the NYC Administration. Innovation, 21, 128–150. Kovač, V. B., Tveit, A. D., Cameron, D. L., & Jortveit, M. (2017). “Bridging Old Relations”: The (De)Construction of Ethnic Identity in the Educational Context of Bosnia and Herzegovina From the Teachers’ Point of View. Journal of Language, Identity & Education, 16, 32–44. Maglajlic, R., & Stubbs, P. (2017). Occupying Liminal Spaces in Post-Conflict Social Welfare Reform? Local Professionals and International Organisations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The British Journal of Social Work, 48, 37–53. NIHE. (2020). The Housing Executive’s Community Cohesion Strategy 2015–2020. O’Connor, K. (2014). Public Administration in Contested Societies. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Vaux, T., & Visman, E. (2005). Service Delivery In Countries Emerging From Conflict. Bradford: Centre for International Co-operation and Security (CICS), Department of Peace Studies.

CHAPTER 8

The Management of Memory, Heritage and the Arts

Why didn’t we call it a Basque museum of modern art or something? Because you wouldn’t be here. The brand makes all the difference. If you want the world to know we speak Basque, you have to tell them in English. Public administrator in Bilbao Culture can be complementary—not always about conflict. Museum administrator in Sarajevo

The management of heritage is intrinsically linked to issues of identity, history and culture. Other concerns such as the development of tourism and economic growth are often central to the administration of the past in the present. In divided societies and contested communities, the public management of history, the materiality of heritage and the perception of culture itself as a theatre of conflict presents enormous dilemmas and difficulties for those charged with cultural administration (Mcdowell and Braniff 2014). This chapter looks at the experiences of those tasked with managing the past in environments where a lack of consensus can make such an undertaking treacherous. It does this by drawing attention to three distinct but interrelated subsets of cultural administration. The first is the translation of cultural policy into representations of the past within public and private museums in divided contexts. This includes the problem of conveying a conflict’s history without a settled political view on its © The Author(s) 2020 J. Murphy, Management and War, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49252-6_8

133

134 

J. MURPHY

origins, character and protagonists. The second is the dilemma of managing expressions of culture within the community, including public memorialisation of loss as well issues of contested symbols and emblems, and the role of public art and cultural expression as a mechanism for both reconciliation and polarisation. The last is the framing and reframing of cultural expression as a conflict transformation device, the rise of ‘dark tourism’ and an articulated need for managers and leaders to be both authentic in their implementation and ethical in environments where cultural expression can become a dangerous and threateningly coercive force.

The Politics of Memory Group memory of intractable conflict is an important feature of contested environments (Bollens 2000; Guelke 2012). Such memory is often biased, de-legitimising of its rivals, glorifying of the in-group, and can act as an inhibiter of peaceful resolution and intensify division (Nets-Zehngut and Bar-Tal 2013). Yet, desegregating memory is vital for peacebuilding (Ramsbotham et al. 2011). Much of the scholarship relating to the societal consequences of coming to terms with conflict emerges from a political science, sociological, historic or human rights perspective, but within the management and organisational literature, work also exists to illustrate and illuminate aspects of conflict resolution which are otherwise missed. In both organisational and conflict studies researchers are interested in memory processes within organisations and how memory and heritage are used and misused in the public realm (Mcdowell and Braniff 2014; Casey and Olivera 2003). This includes a concern for how organisations have dealt with and continue to cope with the demands of a conflict intensive environment while simultaneously negotiating relationships and interdependencies with external stakeholders (Murphy 2013; Eyben et  al. 2000)—especially important within conflict environments where managers are often called upon to ‘manage’ the past in a way that reduces conflict flares and protects the potential for conflict reduction. Safely reflecting on, interpreting and memorialising the past are elements necessary for fostering public discussion (Berg and Schaefer 2009) and within these discussions are organisations and institutions seeking to understand their own history and place within a changing environment. This chapter draws on those perspectives and seeks to bridge the gap between societal dialogue in relation to past and present conflict and the role of organisational actors in coming to terms with issues of legacy. In this, it sees

8  THE MANAGEMENT OF MEMORY, HERITAGE AND THE ARTS 

135

organisational engagement as a key influencing mechanism within conflict transformation. With regard to our case studies, much useful work exists to frame a discussion on how organisations manage public memory. In their work on the reconstruction of Sarajevo, Garcia and Kotzen give us an insight into both contested urban reality and socio-political complexity (Kotzen and Garcia 2014). They ask the pertinent question, “with its physical environment damaged and its population profile dramatically changed, can reconstruction be an act of repair?” (Kotzen and Garcia 2014: 17). These concerns go to the heart of ‘remaking’ a society post violence—physically as well as socially. In Northern Ireland, a policy paper produced by the Belfast-based Community Relations Council identifies early attempts to understand the dimensions of memorialisation and to outline potential organisational responses. It demonstrates that those concerned with the complexities of commemoration are working from a number of distinct, underlying assumptions, which includes an understanding that “[i]ndividual and collective attempts to deal with the past in societies coming out of conflict are interlinked; memorialisation can bolster national attempts to ‘re-establish’ society and as such can have a healing and restorative dimension; there is a long and extensive history of memorials in Northern Ireland— often extremely divisive” (NICRC 2002). Within the Balkans, others have sought to understand and conceptualise remembrance and reconciliation in relation to the war in Bosnia and its legacy. Asking questions such as “[w]hat are monuments for? What message do they convey? How much do they warn and how much do they threaten?” (Franović and Vukosavljević 2016), those engaged in processes of commemorative work have sought to find a way to collectively acknowledge the past, without reinforcing lasting antagonism. In Basque society it is recognised that ‘globalisation discourses’ have long been understood by Basque nationalists as a tool through which to articulate a nationalist agenda that seeks sovereignty as the end goal (De Cerro Santamaria 2011) and that internationalising Basque identity and distinctiveness is key to building independence. Undoubtedly too, within all our cases, but particularly in the Basque region, the aesthetic dimension of peacebuilding plays an important role in underpinning transition. In many of our cases, we see efforts to beautify previously broken environs and reframe international understanding of conflict contexts. By engaging in these debates, those within the cultural and artistic community framers of new and emerging, post conflict identities (Hocking 2015).

136 

J. MURPHY

Cultural Policy, Museums and Public History It is unsurprising that in the cultural management in divided societies, museums and the public representation of history are a central issue. In conversations with cultural managers, curators and museum administrators, ‘avoidance’ emerged as a dominant concern. While a great many managers felt that coming to terms with and adequately representing competing narratives of the past within conflict environments was a core role of museums and the cultural sector during and post conflict, there was both political pressure to circumvent or ‘skirt around’ controversial issues and a nervousness about what was acceptable and unacceptable when culture itself was at the centre of violent flares. This was apparent in all three cases. Acknowledging this difficulty underlines the complexity of the challenge faced by those charged with professionally representing historically complex and emotionally charged events. It also makes even more difficult the practical challenges of exhibition development. However, most of those directly engaged with museums found it difficult to reconcile the intense and sometimes desperate histories of their environments with what were often sterile and evasion public representations of that past—and their role in this process. One Northern Ireland museum administrator reflected, What’s the role of museums in a divided society? It’s a fundamental question. There was a self-conscious perception among staff of museums as an ‘oasis of calm’. One of the features during the Troubles was the almost peculiar veneer of normality which existed in many parts of Northern Ireland at that time, and how it co-existed with the dysfunction and violence that was also present. But the Troubles could also make interventions that could completely disrupt your normal life in ways that were completely unpredictable. Also, the location of the museums (South Belfast and Cultra1) are not places known for their simmering tension.2

While the obvious political sensitivities of a post conflict context invariably impact museum policy and practice, some Bosnian respondents identified a fundamental contradiction in the role of museums, post conflict. In Sarajevo, the war and siege are minimally represented within the state museums, with earlier history given more prominence and what may appear to outsiders as a peculiar vacuum around the recent conflict. For example, the National Museum in Sarajevo focuses intently on 1 2

 Affluent, middle-class areas.  Museum administrator, Northern Ireland.

8  THE MANAGEMENT OF MEMORY, HERITAGE AND THE ARTS 

137

archaeological and national history, while the Historical Museum, contains a small permanent exhibition of ‘Sarajevo under the siege’. Within this limited space artefacts of the siege are preserved and displayed, including clothing from some of those killed, improvised machinery and an infamous can of ICAR beef—part of international food aid during the siege and largely regarded as rank and out of date by those reduced to eating it. In ironic testimony to this foodstuff, Sarajevo’s have erected a monument close. The inscription reads, ‘Monument to the International Community by the grateful citizens of Sarajevo’. In discussions about representations of the past, one curator drew attention to it as a symbolic demonstration of the difficulty of memorialising conflict, “It’s a modest exhibition. It couldn’t hurt anyone, not very political. Without any ideology”.3 This difficulty around the national question, the legacy of the war and the compromise of the Dayton Accords was ever present in this practical struggle of conveying history without falling into political traps. Commenting on the underlying contradiction, the museum administrator reflected, “how can you have a national museum if you do not know what nationality?” and continued, nobody wants to take responsibility to control that name. Where you do see it (the war), it’s just facts, no content. Museums are supposed to reflect society, unfortunately here they don’t. Their role is to reflect but unfortunately, they can’t do that because of the constitution we have now. Actually, we have a huge political issue which is the national museum. Which nationality is it? The role of national museum right now is just to keep the collections and to expose from time to time something which is not politically harmful to anyone. Not ‘bad’.4

Instead, it is smaller museums run by non-­governmental organisations or private initiatives that present artefacts and narratives associated with events around the war and experience of the siege, in particular. The ‘War Childhood’ Museum in Sarajevo5 is an award-winning example of a social enterprise-based museum model and one which has a freedom to engage in these sensitive debates outside the constraining structure of the state. The reticence observed in public museums in Sarajevo is also apparent in the development of the heritage sector in Northern Ireland. Deep frustration was evident in those who had worked within museums during the  Museum administrator, Bosnia.  Museum administrator, Bosnia. 5  https://www.warchildhood.org. 3 4

138 

J. MURPHY

conflict around the lack of representation of important historical events and debates, and their lack of freedom to engage professionally as they would in other situations. The strange dichotomy of history happening all around but being blocked from public view was particularly acute at times of significant political activity and violence. The danger—both physical and legal—that curators and administrators faced in actively seeking to curate and maintain collections of history ‘in flight’ (Pettigrew et al. 1992) were not lost on interview participants, Within the museum my experience was that curators were collecting the ‘Troubles’, but doing it quietly and secretly sometimes. When the Special Powers Act6 was in force we were collecting and carrying stuff which was illegal but within the higher echelons of management there was always an extreme nervousness. The Ulster Museum after all is a national museum—it is a government institution. You were on your own”.7

Added to potential legal and institutional sanction was the delicate politics of engaging with paramilitary organisations and their representatives, who were themselves not averse to using any arrangement for their own means. The inherently diplomatic nature of this process was conveyed by one curator who told of his experience during the IRA hunger strikes of the early 1980s. This period, characterised by extensive street violence and a harsh security response also saw the production of a great deal of historical artefacts—in particular posters and pamphlets within communities and letters covertly smuggled from the prisons and prisoners themselves. One retired curator remarked, “I remember during the hunger strike, it gave me a real headache because I wanted to collect material relating to the hunger strikes, but we couldn’t—the easy way to have done it would have been to go to Sinn Fein or to one of the Sinn Fein affiliated groups. We couldn’t take that risk because you couldn’t trust that Sinn Fein wouldn’t use that”.8 The result was museum professionals having to walk a tightrope between organisational conventions, personal security and a professional commitment to the collection and storage of relevant historical objects which might otherwise be lost. One former curator observed about this process “to me one of the things about being professional is that you have a set of standards and ethics and notions of good practice that sit above the organisational requirement”.9 The real question identified by interviewees was  Emergency anti-terrorist legislation.  Retired curator, Northern Ireland. 8  Ibid. 9  Retired curator, Belfast. 6 7

8  THE MANAGEMENT OF MEMORY, HERITAGE AND THE ARTS 

139

that of the ‘ownership of narratives’ and where the control of those narratives lie. One respondent observed “whose stories do you tell, that’s the question?”.10 This point came up again and again as an unresolved challenge. In circumstances were material was collected, it often remained deposited but not used because of wider political considerations, “The material is still sitting in the museum—I catalogued most of it. A few bits and pieces are on display but again, there is both the fact they got rid of the core curatorial expertise and the fact that the people who are in there are not curators in the real sense and don’t have the same considerations”.11 However, the development of a peace process did change the external expectations of those with an interest in the materiality of the conflict—“as soon as peace broke out all sorts of people descended on us—social history associations asking, ‘why haven’t we collected more stuff?”.12 Certain techniques are also more appropriate than others in relying the experiences of those caught up in or affected by conflict. In post Troubles Belfast, curators had to think carefully about the opportunities that arose to represent debates on legacy, “Where possible we would use contemporary voices. In the conflict exhibition we had them speaking from a role—policeman, nurse etc. We also had a contemplation area and people had access to comment cards”.13 However, institutional nervousness did not stop at the level of exhibition curation. The respondent went on to say, “It was the biggest evaluation every been done on Ireland in contemporary exhibition and we had limited access to the comment cards. There is gatekeeper syndrome particularly in museums”.14 One notable feature of the work in both Northern Ireland and the Basque country was a focus on the development of objective representations of polarised events and a peacebuilding agenda. A former curator in Belfast revealed, I see it as peacebuilding work. The proviso is that my interest isn’t on the sectarian dichotomy—it would be a wider societal interest and I think here a lot of the conflict is branded as sectarian when in fact there are other underlying causes and that’s part of the historical approach—class, economy, gender, property, and all those things.15  Manager in the cultural sector, Northern Ireland.  Ibid. 12  Retired curator, Belfast. 13  Retired museum administrator, Belfast. 14  Ibid. 15  Former curator, Belfast. 10 11

140 

J. MURPHY

A Basque museum worker also reflected on the difficulties around objectivity, “When people talk about a narrative, I start to worry. I’d rather think about information so the new generations can benefit from this work”.16 Within the Basque context, those seeking to explore and explain history require a longer perspective than most. While the region is emerging from a long peace process and the recent decommissioning of ETA arms, it is also still grappling with the legacy of the Spanish Civil war and re-emergence of civil war hatreds. Institutions such as the Peace Museum in the historic town of Guernica have become the repositories not just of artefacts and archives but a dynamic mechanism for dealing with the past and promoting reconciliation. This represents quite a shift from a position of stasis that had existing previously, “When we started nobody talked about the Spanish civil war. Nobody talked about the bombing of Guernica—I remember we did a project in 2001—‘the path of memory’— from an historical and touristic point of view. For many of years it was completely silenced”.17 The iconic status of the town and its destruction by Franco’s forces was immortalised by Picasso in his famous and startling representation of the horror of modern warfare. This has also made it a central starting point for many interested in memorialisation within the wider Spanish state—“When people think about memory, they think of Guernica”.18 However, the role of the museum is not simply to convey the awfulness of the past—rather it is to focus on accurate reflection and relevance. The administrator went on to imitate, “we do not just want to be a martyr city; we are looking to the future”.19 Moving forward involved taking a conscious decision to change the institutions name from the ‘Guernica Museum’ to the ‘Guernica Peace Museum’—a shift which better reflected the mission and values of the organisation. While education and a clear focus on peacebuilding was important, the difficulty of having a peace museum in Guernica and not talking about the conflict was an obvious contradiction. In the early days, education and development work within the sector was less closely observed and managers had more flexibility and space to use their own professional judgement, through the availability of local funding, “I was able to do what I think we should do—they were not looking over our shoulder. We didn’t have any  Manager in the heritage sector, San Sebastian.  Curator, Guernica. 18  Museum administrator, Guernica. 19  Ibid. 16 17

8  THE MANAGEMENT OF MEMORY, HERITAGE AND THE ARTS 

141

politician interference. We were insignificant for them. We were new— there was a small museum that the city council persuaded them to be part of. But that was it”.20 Even with considerable freedom in terms of professional development there was still a concern about being able to talk about the conflict openly—despite the professional context. One curator revealed, “I was quite afraid, even my family said, ‘are you sure you won’t have problems? Because that is the taboo’. It has been, little by little it’s changing but nobody talked about that”.21 The significance of professional norms and engagement with the wider community was also underlined, “It’s like you’re living in the middle of it, we are in a way used to it, so I was afraid of how it would be accepted. The critics, would they see it from one part or the other. I’m a technician, I’m not a politician. For me that’s very important that the social organisations participated. Now it would be very difficult”.22 Managing and recruiting staff in a context of ongoing conflict is also demanding and requires significant contemplation about training and approach. One interviewee reflected on how the ever-­ present political environment impacted the process, “Talking about the Basque conflict—it has been difficult. We prepare the guides for weeks. We say let’s do it in a respectful and objective way. Guernica a symbol of historical memory”.23 Another continued “So many things we have never talked about because they were taboo. A large part of society are ignorant about what happened in public institutions. We need to make the most of people who are still alive who experienced those conflicts to disseminate their experience. To tell of what happened”.24 There was also considerable concern about the future of museums and the cultural sector in general, especially when culture operates at times, as a conflict proxy. This was also apparent in the Bosnian case, as one respondent observed, “The future of the museums is in huge danger. The political situation and the lack of money. And also, culture can be used against people. It has been in the past and it’s very likely that it will be in the future”.25

 Ibid.  Curator, San Sebastian. 22  Ibid. 23  Museum administrator, Guernica. 24  Local government manager, San Sebastian. 25  Curator, Bosnia. 20 21

142 

J. MURPHY

Memorialisation and the Management of Public Representations of Culture My granddad never ever talked about the war at home. He just said one thing. He said Franco was short, he was from Galicia and he was a bastard. That is all I ever heard. Why? Because he wanted to forget that period and not talk about it. It’s important that we collect these memories, or they will be lost.26

This experience, relayed during a witness seminar by a Basque local government representative expresses sentiment which are not unusual within environments with a history of trauma and violence. While museums may be ‘an oasis of calm’ with the capacity to avoid of the hard realities of violence and division, the public memorialisation of conflict within a community realm and the use of culture as a weapon after violence remains a pressing concern. A Bosnian administrator remarked on culture and identity as a fundamental aspect of the human experience and its expression as a human right, “Culture is connected to human beings who will have a right to talk about himself or about the others. It’s unfair to everyone specially to use culture as capital. Culture is used as a form of aggression”.27 The incorporation of evocative memorisations of loss into the materiality of the city is a characteristic of Sarajevo. The numerous red resin, filled craters known as ‘Sarajevo roses’ each represent the death of at least three people in a motor attack and memorial plaques commemorate individual atrocitiess (Fig. 8.1). However, managers within all sectors are under considerable pressure to take account of the complex realism of political and community life, while engaging in funding and discussion about how the past can be publicly acknowledged. As we have seen above in our Basque example, locations themselves and spatial iconography, can embody past atrocities. In all three of our cases, the names of streets, villages and towns become conflict reference points and take on a meaning which goes beyond their physical location. Discussions about memorials for those who have been affected by conflict are always sensitive. Processes of memorialisation take many forms—from the official homage we see to children killed during the siege in Sarajevo, to the contested and grandiose spectacle that is the ‘Valle de

 Public manager, San Sebastian.  Administrator in Bosnia.

26 27

8  THE MANAGEMENT OF MEMORY, HERITAGE AND THE ARTS 

143

Fig. 8.1  A ‘Sarajevo rose’ (2019)

los Caídos’28 in Spain, to the unofficial memorials in all locations which focus on the experience of individual groups or conflict constituencies. The funding of such memorials often comes from public funds or NGOs and local communities themselves. In some instances, considerable thought is put into how the past can be represented. In others, memorials can become crude valediction or direct triumphalism. Within our Northern Ireland case, guidelines for funding ‘single-identity’ projects and histories are common as are strictures around propagating conflict by another means, “we don’t fund things that are self-referential”.29 Basing funding decisions on the principles of “partnership and participation” and professional ethical standards is equally important, especially when competing sides are ready to criticise positions taken by managers who are encouraging respectful representations of culture and the past. In the Basque country, the political divisions of the conflict also represent themselves within discussions about the past, “The left movement comes here and says everything should be about victims, everything should be about torture. And someone from PPE30 comes and they say ‘I  Valley of the Fallen.  Arts administrator. 30  Popular Party. 28 29

144 

J. MURPHY

don’t understand why you have a panel about torture of prisoners. They are not victims’”.31 Culture is of course, itself as a weapon of war. One Bosnian interviewee reflected on the obliteration of the National Library during the siege of Sarajevo with the destruction of three million books and countless artefacts. The significance of the deliberate targeting of a building with no military significance was seen as an attack on civilisation and social history, It was very interesting for me that they decided not to burn down the National Museum, but they burn down the National Library. They knew that a lot of objects (in the National Museum) were collected in the 1970s from the countryside where the Serb population were in the majority. I am convinced that was the reason—they knew.32

These cultural markers also include the use of language and how it is regulated within conflict zones. We have seen in Chap. 6 how language is an issue in the demarcation of territory and place within many divided environments. The use of language as a marker of cultural and community identity is no less significant within debates about memorialisation and the management of public culture. Football tournaments which saw the Bosnian football team subjected to chants of ‘Knife, Wire, Srebrenica’ caused international outrage and the intervention and sanction of international governing bodies. The difficulties in creating a memorial of those murdered in Srebrenica is compounded by the proximity and institutional legacy left by the killings. One administrator, who lost relatives in the Srebrenica genocide reflected, “The police were involved in ethnic cleansing and now when you go to commemorations, it’s still the police there. It’s very difficult”.33 Within Basque environments, language and identity is also underlying conflict identified, “Here perhaps at the middle of the conflict was the language. If you spoke Basque they perhaps you were a nationalist and you were in favour. The language has been much politicised”. The problems of managing this are significant, “The Basque language has been a problem in terms of peaceful coexistence. Sometimes we just turned a blind eye—business as usual. Trying to manage the situation as well as possible … but when they shut down the newspaper, the only newspaper in Basque that was cultural violence”.34 Similar difficulties are observed among arts administrators in Northern Ireland who are engaged  Local government administrator, San Sebastian.  Museum curator, Bosnia. 33  Administrator, Bosnia. 34  Basque administrator, San Sebastian. 31 32

8  THE MANAGEMENT OF MEMORY, HERITAGE AND THE ARTS 

145

with neighbourhoods seeking to create community art, which in turn sometimes memorialises paramilitary members. Administrators spoke of difficult situations in which grant money had to be recalled because of the inappropriate dedication to public art, gardens or sometimes community benches, often resulting in difficult encounters, “I was in a meeting with two people shouting at me who I knew were in the UDA.35 They wanted the maximum grant. It’s intimidating—it’s meant to be intimidating. You have to know what the boundaries are. Polite, firm and open. Turn things down if they don’t meet artistic standards”.36 These nuanced challenges are common in other environments too—as the distinctions between less contested historical experiences and more recent conflict engagement, When we go back to the so-called civil war—which was really the military revolting. The vast majority of people here think that we lost that war. And years after that the terrorist organisation, the armed band ETA set up. We can’t connect people who fought in that war to protect the rights of the Basque people, we can’t equate those to those who later said that was what they were doing. Why because the first group had legitimacy—but not decades later. We have these warriors who fought in the civil war and we don’t want to equate or connect them to a decision made by others. After the dictatorship we had this ‘democracy’ and that’s part of our historical memory. Some of us might think about the past to clean it. Others think that the past can’t be cleaned. We have others who do not even acknowledge that there has been a conflict. You can imagine that memory is a challenge here. I don’t think we will end up with one single memory. And memory will continue to change and evolve. That is our responsibility.37

Leaders within these organisations have a clear role to play in protecting staff and reinforcing codes of conduct even in difficult circumstances. This was articulated by senior staff who felt that they had a responsibility to ‘patrol the interface’ between coercive elements and more junior colleagues—a particular concern with contentious subject matter—“I’ve always said to staff—if you are not happy going out to meet these people, I will go out. You can’t force people who are paid a lot less than you are”.38 35  The UDA is an illegal (prescribed) loyalist paramilitary organisation responsible for the murder of hundreds of people during the NI Troubles. 36  Arts administrator, Belfast. 37  Administrator, San Sebastian. 38  Arts administrator, Belfast.

146 

J. MURPHY

Despite these difficulties there is an acknowledgement of the role of art as a bridging mechanism in times of difficulty and the experiences of artists themselves engaged in issue-based activism, “The arts are a great vehicle for storytelling and facilitation—they are just not threatening. They are also incredibly important for getting other perspectives—women rather than men and guns and fighting”.39 Undoubtedly, conflict in all our contexts does affect how managers are able to go about their role and the closer they were to conflict interfaces, the more acute that engagement become. One community worker employed in arts administration during the 1990s spoke about the real risks of cross-community dialogue, we invited Mary Robinson who was President of Ireland at the time and it’s an indicator of how the conflict affected work because after that we got death threats. The LVF40 were very active during that period. The police did come, and we had to get security installed in the office and the police said, ‘you must take this seriously’. Of course, there was an element of risk, there always is when you are in the local community and you draw political fire. Staff were nervous, you had to mitigate risks where possible and protect, but once the decision was made the politics kicks in and you’re not really in control of that. In fairness, we never had anyone who said, ‘I’m not coming in to work’.41

It also has to be born in mind that administrators and managers are embedded within their environments and as well as exercising careful political judgements are faced with the realities of their own experiences and those of their families. One Basque local government officer spoke about the challenges that she faced coming to terms with engagement in peacebuilding, The civil war and the dictatorship was like a void. There was a huge amount of grief and pain from the past that had never been dealt with and we can see the demands, the need, very very clearly. Spain is the second state worldwide after Cambodia where mass killings are still buried—bodies not yet found. Having that unresolved problem is a greater challenge—people start mixing things. Different elements because that work has never been done for the previous period. That pain and loss and grief has never been managed. And that’s logically coming up. That makes our task harder. The memory is political in nature.42  Local government administrator, Belfast.  Loyalist Volunteer Force—a particularly brutal loyalist paramilitary group. 41  Arts administrator, Belfast. 42  Civil servant, San Sebastian. 39 40

8  THE MANAGEMENT OF MEMORY, HERITAGE AND THE ARTS 

147

Another spoke about how the past intruded into ‘normal b ­ usiness’ and the difficulties of distinguishing between historic memory and recent events. In some instances cultural concerns were overshadowed by the physical discovery of human remains and the need to engage in community-­ wide conversations as a result, Why did we start to work on this? Someone in our town was looking for a relative. They knew this person had been killed and was buried somewhere with other people and there was a brilliant testimony of that time from people who experienced the civil war as children in their neighbourhood. We recorded them and their testimony. And then when some of the corpses that were found, we identified them. We published a book. We thought why not a columbarium in the town to give these poor people some dignity. Those who have not been identified. We pay homage to those people, little by little.43

In all of our case studies, there was an acknowledgement among organisational actors that a rich knowledge of the environment and of its history was crucial, alongside a core code of content and engagement which both provided for ethical development and for communities to engage in a meaningful way about the past and identity. Some administrators recalled positive engagements with citizenry in which cautious conversations had resulted in significant outcomes, We have had some nice successes—dealing with the custodians, guardians, gatekeepers of the community. It requires careful negotiation and trying to demonstrate that you will keep faith if they keep faith. And knowing when to say ‘no, that’s not good enough’. Through that you can challenge conventional takes on a whole range of issues and that contributes as a consequence to civic dialogue in the public realm. We fund work which is sometimes uncomfortable but non-threatening.44

Reframing the Present While the management of memory is challenging and complex, all of our cases also contain attempts to reframe and re-establish societies away from an association with conflict and violence. A reduction in violence and the establishment of formal and informal ‘peace processes’ assist in the  Local government administrator, San Sebastian.  Arts administrator, Belfast.

43 44

148 

J. MURPHY

development of new approaches—whether they relate to social and economic rejuvenation or active peacebuilding and reconciliation. For some of our managers, these changing times opened up opportunities which would otherwise have been closed off as areas of activity and discussion. One respondent from San Sebastian remarked, Depending on where you went some areas more for or against a particular ideology. I tried not to let it impact me as a manager. In the last few years, since October 2011, we have definitely seen that a lot of barriers are knocked down and people can sit and talk. In the past they wouldn’t even listen to other opinions. Leadership in politics will make a difference but it’s also down to people—citizens.45

But attempts to move away from conflict legacies and towards active reconciliation within a Basque environment have not always been easy or supported. One local manager observed, “For many years there was a lot of controversy. In a way the Spanish government never accepted the conflict or to bring Europe in, so there has been no peace project. There has never been big money”.46 This is in contrast to the significant ‘peace dividends’ including very substantial EU funding to both Northern Ireland and Bosnia. While it was difficult territory Basque respondent felt it was worth the attempt, “I think people are very courageous. It would be terrible if we anchored ourselves to the past and not the future”.47 The connections between peacebuilding work within the Basque country and Ireland were also underlined through an early connection between those in Guernica and the Glencree Centre for Peace and Reconciliation in Ireland, “Everything that started here is because the Basque government decided that they should do work among victims—so they brought them to Glencree—it’s called the Glencree project”.48 They went on to explain, We decided it would be done through the perspective of human rights. Even the worst killer has some human rights. Since 2013 we have a citizen’s laboratories to talk about the Basque conflict with the citizens. We bring people to what is called a memory lab. For us the best is a laboratory of two days. We bring people out to a nice place a house, when 15-20 people are working for two days about the past, what happened, where I was, what I should have done.49  Local government administrator, San Sebastian.  Local government manager, San Sebastian. 47  Ibid. 48  Civil servant, Guernica. 49  Ibid. 45 46

8  THE MANAGEMENT OF MEMORY, HERITAGE AND THE ARTS 

149

We can characterise this type of work as reframing around an agenda of peace and reconciliation. However, attempts to move the public agenda away the conflict and towards other public manifestations of new identities are also present in Basque cities. Perhaps the most obvious is that of the redevelopment and reimaging of Bilbao and in particular the Guggenheim, which presented an opportunity to display a revitalised Basque identity to the world. This in itself was not uncontested, When you mention Guggenheim people think about Bilbao not New York. But Guggenheim is Basque—we were able to open up our identity and take a foreign identity into our own. That was important. Basque people are very proud. We were tired of moving around the world and tired of the terrorist label. The stigma of terrorism—you want to get rid of that. We were anxious to introduce another identity which would introduce us better to the world. At the same time the Guggenheim museum did something for us. You are what you, are no matter where you are.50

This beautification was central to the revitalisation and the reworking of the city’s external identity. This representative went on to comment, “Bilbao was a dirty city, acid rain, without colour. It was a grey city. We wanted it to look beautiful. We needed public art to make public space look better. The last mayor had a public project to put art works out in the streets to re-urbanise and revamp public squares and places”.51 In Northern Ireland too, there have been active attempts to reframe contested spaces and areas marked by aggressive paramilitary murals, painted kerbstones or graffiti as no-go zones for different communities. One housing administrator commented on the process, there was arts council funding, £100,000 a year to help communities to transition from those images. We have memorials on our land. Some with agreement and some not with agreement. About 116 of those. Flags tend to be on road service lampposts people tend not to put flags outside their houses they tend to put them on street furniture, and it tends to be at the entrance to estates as opposed to within the estates.52

Moving people away from aggressive territorial representations of identity and division and towards more positive depictions of their  Business representative, Bilbao.  Ibid. 52  Housing manager, Belfast. 50 51

150 

J. MURPHY

neighbourhoods and communities by removing paramilitary murals and replacing them with depictions of notable local people are common. In a similar way, recasting community loyalties by drawing on local historical knowledge has been an important mechanism for reimaging what neighbourhoods could be and drawing on a more universal historical expression of the past. Iconic experiences such as the building of the Titanic and the sacrifice of World War I are often referenced in such images. For some communities, drawing attention to other international causes has come to be a common way of internationalising and publicising their own political identity. Within republican communities in Northern Ireland this has come to mean murals and flags related to political activity in Palestine, South Africa, the Basque country and Catalonia. For loyalist communities the emphasis is often on Israel and more recently, Trump’s America. However, as one Northern Ireland local government manager commented, “flags tend to persist”. While those in the Basque region felt that the significant investment made in ‘reframing’ their cities away from perceptions of terrorism and environmental decay and towards an aesthetic of architectural mastery and culinary success successfully shifted perceptions of the region’s identity, in Northern Ireland and Bosnia the rise and management of so called ‘dark tourism’ is a recent phenomenon. This sightseeing trend involves visitors travelling to places which have previously been sites of death or suffering. For those managing in the regions, this presented new challenges and sometimes opportunities to broach difficult issues (Light 2017). One Northern Ireland manager commented on attempts to develop specific tourist offerings around sites of prisons and the significant hostility which followed these discussions, “we have opportunities around prisons, but the focus they want is on prison officers. As a professional, it’s not appropriate to tell one set of stories and not another”.53 The ‘attraction management’ issues that sites like these present are considerable. We have seen above the time and energy that goes into the training and development of museum guides in Guernica. Belfast has seen the appearance of extended mural walls—collecting together political imagery as a tourist site in its own right. The need to engage staff in this way illustrates the challenges of balancing conservation and restoration concerns, with a need to protect the authenticity of the places and often of the experiences of those working within them. One member of an international aid organisation spoke about the presence of victims and survivors with personal stories as guides  Museum administrator, Northern Ireland.

53

8  THE MANAGEMENT OF MEMORY, HERITAGE AND THE ARTS 

151

at conflict sites Bosnia, including the ‘war tunnel’ or ‘tunnel of hope’ which ran underneath Sarajevo’s airport runway and was the only conduit into and out of the city during the siege. She reflected, “there are challenges and responsibilities here for funders. When I spoke to one of the guides it was clear that he had been here as a child and had lost in father in the war. You could still see the trauma. I left very uncomfortable at the realisation that he was reliving that”.54

References Berg, M., & Schaefer, B. (2009). Historical Justice in International Perspective: How Societies Are Trying to Right the Wrongs of the Past. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bollens, S. A. (2000). On Narrow Ground: Urban Policy and Conflict in Jerusalem and Belfast. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Casey, A., & Olivera, F. (2003). Learning from the Past: A Review of the Organisational Memory Literature. In Organisational Learning and Knowledge. Lancaster: Lancaster University. De Cerro Santamaria, G. (2011). Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Globalization in Bilbao and the Basque Country. In D. Davis & N. De Duren (Eds.), Cities and Sovereignty: Identity Politics in Urban Spaces. Indiana: Indiana University Press. Eyben, K., Morrow, D., & Wilson, D. (2000). EDI. Belfast: University of Ulster. Franović, I., & Vukosavljević, N. (2016). War Of Memories: Places of Suffering and Remembrance of War in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Sarajevo: Beograd Centre for Nonviolent Action. Guelke, A. (2012). Politics in Deeply Divided Societies. Wiley. Hocking, B. T. (2015). The Great Reimagining: Public Art, Urban Space, and the Symbolic Landscapes of a ‘New’ Northern Ireland. Working Papers In Conflict Transformation And Social Justice 6. Kotzen, B., & Garcia, S. (2014). Reconstructing Sarajevo. LSE Cities Programme, London. Light, D. (2017). Progress in Dark Tourism and Thanatourism Research: An Uneasy Relationship with Heritage Tourism. Tourism Management, 61, 275–301. Mcdowell, S., & Braniff, M. (2014). Commemoration as Conflict: Space, Memory and Identity in Peace Processes. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Murphy, J. (2013). Policing for Peace in Northern Ireland: Change, Conflict and Community Confidence. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

 Manager, International Aid Agency.

54

152 

J. MURPHY

Nets-Zehngut, R., & Bar-Tal, D. (2013). Transformation of the Official Memory of Conflict: A Tentative Model and the Israeli Memory of the 1948 Palestinian Exodus. International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 27(1), 1–25. NICRC. (2002). Mural and Memorials Discussion Paper CRC. In NICRC (Ed.). Pettigrew, A., Ferlie, E., & Mckee, L. (1992). Shaping Strategic Change. London: Sage. Ramsbotham, O., Miall, H., & Woodhouse, T. (2011). Contemporary Conflict Resolution. London: Wiley.

CHAPTER 9

Non-governmental Organisations, International Networks and the Paradox of Assistance

Public and private sector institutions are a critical part of social infrastructure, but sitting between public provision and private enterprise is a highly significant alternative organisational network—that of non-governmental organisations and what is frequently termed civil society (CS) (Brandsen et al. 2015). Wrapped around these structures are international, national and regional systems that have emerged or are designed to serve specific purposes. Within environments of contestation, networks often reflect ongoing conflict disputes and multidimensional efforts at conflict transformation. This chapter takes the opportunity to look at how those organisations, linkages and structures interact, and how the actors within them engage in organisational development and peacebuilding. Often this means looking at engagement of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with other public and private sector organisations, to better assist groups in dealing with the reality of conflict. Three interconnected perspectives help to explore these connections. One state- and suprastate-­sponsored assistance during the process of conflict stabilisation and recovery, including the ubiquitous security sector reform processes which tend to run alongside conflict resolution initiatives. Another is the significance of nongovernmental organisations and their interventions within adjacent organisational environments and institutional fields, and the third, international networks and conflict resolution activities. First however, we will turn to some existing scholarship for an insight into NGOs, networks and the role of civil society. © The Author(s) 2020 J. Murphy, Management and War, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49252-6_9

153

154 

J. MURPHY

NGOs, Networks and Civil Society One of the really interesting characteristics of our three cases are the overlaps and connections between organisations in one area and another, and often among all three. These are often directly related to processes of peacebuilding which attempt to build frameworks of connection and joint capacity between organisations, communities and groups in environments of contestation. Some of this effort is organic and indigenous, but increasingly it emerges or is built from international networks which are funded and supported by state or suprastate bodies. While we have seen examples of national and supranational engagement in the economic regeneration of conflict zones, here we see examples that focus on developing better relationships among people and across conflict groups. They range from the highly political creation of the Forum for Ireland within the Basque country (DPI 2016; Power 2011) to the EU Peace and Reconciliation– funded exchange initiatives between communities in Northern Ireland and Srebrenica through the EU’s PEACE IV Northern Ireland and Border Regions programme, and the development of professional relationships such as the International Network of Museums for Peace (INMP).1 We also see the significance of international networks and brokerage to the development of coalitions of support for peacebuilding (White 2018; Goddard 2012) and the creation of opportunities for diaspora communities to interact and engage (Kent 2006). Professional associations are an important element of this. Local government bodies linking international, housing associations transferring aspects of good practice, community groups linking through wider supranational bodies and state security functions connecting through well-established networks, all create isomorphic pressure encouraging organisations to take account of established sectoral norms (Dimaggio and Powell 1983; Autesserre 2017). Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in conflict zones often focus on ‘soft’ outcomes such as the benefits of creating personal connections and the development of relationships and shared learning between locations with a history of division (Jarman 2016). At the heart of many of these NGO initiatives are attempts to develop strong civil society structures in an effort to mitigate weak states and poor political representation (Morrow 2012; Marchetti and Tocci 2009). In post-war Bosnia, for example, we see the development and strengthening of civil society at the core of 1

 www.museumsforpeace.org.

9  NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS, INTERNATIONAL NETWORKS… 

155

state-building efforts sponsored by the international community (Fagan 2005). The author goes on to note that “practically every international NGO foreign donor organisation and multilateral agency involved in the country makes explicit reference to civil society development is a key objective of their involvement” (Fagan 2005: 406). Ironically, there is also evidence that while appearing as a consolidation instrument, significant international engagement restricts rather than nurtures the development of strong independent civil structures (Belloni 2001). As another author also concerned with the development of civil society in Bosnia reports, “Ultimately, local NGOs are forced to assume the characteristics of interest groups unable to posit an alternative moral vision to that of nationalist fragmentation” (Belloni 2001: 176). In Northern Ireland we see a similar concern for the strengthening of civil structures to further the development of democratic values, manage the legacy of past violence and address issues of current division and economic stagnation (Knox 2011). Criticism of community organisations simply moving from one funded project to project to another without coherent strategic direction is all too evident (Morrow et al. 2018). This raises additional concerns about sustainability and the prevalence of ‘funding-led’, rather than ‘need-led’, work. There is also a growing but controversial argument that extensive international funding over an extended timescale has resulted in little incentive for organisations to create change, when they have a vested interest in maintaining a status quo of contestation rather than a future of positive peace (Mcdowell et  al. 2017). While the Basque region has received no EU monies directly to build peace—unlike NI and Bosnia, it is in receipt of significant resource related to economic development, as we have seen in Chap. 7 and the interlinked nature of political and economic stabilisation is clear. The role of civil society in its many guises was a significant driving force behind peacebuilding initiatives (DPI 2016; Murua 2017) and of bleeding support away from ETA (Murua 2017). We see an array of NGOs and partnership based organisations spread throughout Basque communities, each with individual and sometimes overlapping concerns. These can largely be categorised by their opposing affiliations: those in favour of the Spanish state and those in favour of Basque independence. Types of organisations include victims’ groups, pro-independence associations and bodies specifically working for prisoners. Organisations explicitly seeking peace have also emerged throughout the conflict and particularly after the death of Miguel Àngel Blanco (DPI 2016; Fernández Vázquez 2018), but

156 

J. MURPHY

all have struggled to unite people on what might be called the ‘national question’ of citizenship and independence.

State- and Suprastate-Sponsored Assistance For the populations of our case-study locations, the engagement of the international community within phases of conflict and peace has been a mechanism of development and restriction. Assistance occurs in a number of ways: through direct funding to support institutional and economic development; indirect engagement in the form of technical assistance; and international knowledge transfer. In all cases, state or intra state activity actively appears as a development process. Post the Belfast or Good Friday Agreement in 1998, Northern Ireland has seen significant internal investment and very considerable EU funding designed to support and underpin the peace process. The EU Peace programme has the expressed aim of supporting peace and reconciliation and promoting economic and social progress, not just in Northern Ireland but in the border region of the Republic of Ireland. This financial support from the EU began 1989, through the mechanisms of EU regional policy and EU contributions to the International Fund for Ireland (IFI). Following recommendations from a Special Commission Task Force, the PEACE I Programme (1995–1999) was approved in 1995 (Tveit et  al. 2014). In March 1999, the European Council decided that the special programme should continue until 2004 under the name of Peace II and was subsequently extended until 2006. Peace III, covering the 2007–2013, carried on some of the priorities of the previous programmes, and all project activities ceased on 31 December 2015. A new programme (Peace IV, 2014–2020) was officially launched on 14 January 2016. The Peace programme has been implemented as a cross-border cooperation programme between Ireland and the United Kingdom and has, as its two aims, cohesion between communities involved in the conflict in Northern Ireland and the border counties of Ireland and economic and social stability. Between 1995 and 2013 there were three Peace programmes, with a financial contribution of €1.3 billion. The Peace IV programme for the 2014–2020 programming period has a total value of €270  million. In additional to EU funding, other mechanisms such as the International Funds for Ireland, Atlantic Philanthropies and specific ‘peace and reconciliation’ funding from the UK and Irish governments have all impacted on how organisations and particularly those in the voluntary sector have

9  NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS, INTERNATIONAL NETWORKS… 

157

been able to operate. One of the most obvious outcomes of this focus is the prominence of peacebuilding itself within the lexicon of NGOs and those working within them. A former CEO of an organisation with an explicit mission of reconciliation commented, “One can openly talk about peacebuilding now because of peace monies—it is now legitimate to be part of that and the peace process is lauded right across the world”.2 Others commented on the usefulness of EU-funded international exchanges as a way of developing and exchanging good practice, “We went to South Africa—and it gives you a perspective. Very different but very powerful. It was particularly good for those in the group who would have been politically quite opposed—ex prisoners especially. It gives you pause for thought”.3 In contrast, the role of the EU and international funders in the stabilisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its peace process has been less easily to categorise. Since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, the EU has demonstrated different degrees of involvement. What gradually emerged in the late 90s was a regional approach which saw the establishment of a coordinated set of political and economic ‘conditionalities’ with a focus on infrastructure reconstruction and institutionbuilding. This became linked to the Stalisation and Association process (SAp) for south-eastern Europe in 1999 which was designed to put the countries in the region on the path to eventual European integration. A new programme was launched in 2001 with the goals of peace, the security of the EU, as well as international security and international co-operation. The presence of the EU in the country is complex, the EU Special Representative (EUSR) playing a role closely related to the Office of the High Representative (OHR). Financial assistance to Bosnia under Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance II (IPA II) in the period 2014–2020 amounted to €552.1 million (including funds for the Civil Society Facility (€9.1 million), Regional Housing Programme (€10 million) and special measures following 2014 floods (€51 million). One of the cited priority areas is competitiveness and innovation, particularly “better policy-making and implementation of reforms in the area of economic governance, competitiveness and human resources development” (Commission 2020). The significance of stability within the environment is identified by many respondents in the area as a key issue for inward investment. In a recent media interview Perica Romíc, the ex-mayor of 2 3

 Former CEO—reconciliation body.  Senior manager, Northern Ireland, NGO.

158 

J. MURPHY

the municipality of Kupres, a town about two hours’ drive from Sarajevo, commented on the economic and social difficulties associated with political instability that “pushes away every serious investor”. What we also see in Bosnia is the engagement of other external state-sponsored organisations which are themselves involved in stabilisation and peacebuilding work. For example, the well-publicised work of the British Council in Bosnian schools brings them into contact with the ‘two schools under one roof’ arrangement (Osler and Pandur 2019; Tveit et al. 2014). In doing so, it has had to balance the unanticipated consequences of this engagement, including the pairing of projects over morning and afternoon school sessions to ensure all communities get a chance to engage. As one manager involved in the project noted, “That was something we had to deal with. So each community got the same opportunities, so it can cause those sorts of difficulties that you don’t expect”.4 One area of commonality within both Northern Ireland and Bosnia is the development of what can be termed ‘security sector reform’ processes, which include significant financial and technical assistance. The reform of policing in Northern Ireland was a central concern of the peace process and came about through the utilisation of an independent Commission report and a significant restructuring package, including an eventual voluntary severance bill of almost £1 billion (Murphy 2013). While generally regarded as a success, the policing situation in Northern Ireland, for all its international assistance, is still subject to considerable criticism and under renewed pressure through with the prospect of a return to a ‘hard border’(Murphy 2019). International assistance in that process abounded, but its impact and effectiveness seems to have focused on allowing organisational actors to think about their own environment and circumstance in a different way. One senior officer commented on the significance of international engagement and ‘networking’ visits, “I don’t think this would have happened without the international dimension—in fact I think that it may have collapsed without it”,5 but another was more limited in their assessment, “I don’t think you can map on the conflict to other zones. But I do think that there was a lot of learning here and if you could share that learning it may shorten their time in different phases”.6 More worrying, a still unstable security situation and unsettled political context sees policing  Manager, British Council.  Retired Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) officer. 6  Retired PSNI senior officer. 4 5

9  NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS, INTERNATIONAL NETWORKS… 

159

invariably marred in the legacy of the past. One senior police officer who was involved in the controversial process of police reform and organisational change in Northern Ireland suggested, There is still a siege mentality but that goes hand in hand with the threat … that’s a big challenge for our staff and for us internally—you tell people go out and build confidence. Your job as a policeman is to build confidence— but don’t forget to check under your car for a bomb. It very easy where you’re up the food chain (a senior officer) … but if you’re going out every day in south Armagh or Derry and people are refusing to serve you in a shop that’s v difficult.7

The situation in Bosnia is infinitely more complex and security engagement within the region is a long term reality (Juncos 2018). The EU has been active in Bosnia since the 1990s and has heavily invested in security sector reform since the early 2000s, following the withdrawal of the UN police mission and the establishment of an EU Police Mission (EUPM) in 2003. When the NATO military operation came to an end, the EU launched its operation EUFOR Althea in 2004. Furthermore, in addition to the permanent delegation of the European Commission, the EU founded an EU Special Representative (EUSR) in 2002. The transformation of Bosnia’s security sector became quickly a key EU objective through its involvement in police reform and additional assistance with defence reform (the later under the leadership of NATO). However, identifiable progress on key issues of justice has been sluggish (Bassuener 2015) and there have been suggestions that involvement has in some instances proved counterproductive (Micinski 2016). Issues of weak democratic oversight, accountability and transparency have been compounded by the complexity of the governance structure and the number of ‘veto’ partners (Juncos 2018) within the complex administrative arrangements that following the Dayton accords. Concerns that many members of the security forces have been suspected of war crimes or war-racketeering activities is widespread. A common regional perception of police forces as political instruments in the service of particular ethnic groups also persists. As one local academic and researcher commented of Srebrenica, “If you’re driving through it at night there are very few lights. It is a ghost town and the police—the police were involved in ethnic cleansing and now when you go to commemorations, it’s still the same police there. It’s very difficult”.8 The view 7 8

 Senior member of PSNI.  Management consultant, Bosnia.

160 

J. MURPHY

of those engaged in international security operations is a similarly cynical one, born out of the ongoing and ever changing security dynamics of the region and the paradoxes of international engagement, “It’s a cold peace. They pretend to reform, and we pretend to believe them”.9 Added to that the ongoing danger of 1018  km2 of hazardous areas not yet cleared of munitions, the shadow cast by the war is a long one. International engagement in this process, is itself fraught. One member of a body specialising in international security sector reform spoke of the challenges of translating international good practice into conflict contexts, It often doesn’t survive any contact with the front line. Certainly abstractions don’t. Even if it’s good research it doesn’t have any credibility and doesn’t survive. You cannot just impose generic solutions you’ve brought in your suitcase with you. You have to know what the principles are but to allow other factors to do the heavy lifting.10

He went on to describe the processes that often lie behind these initiatives and the challenges they present for those providing technical assistance in the field, What you sometimes have are handpicked really bright people who are regarded as the future, who are selected by the organisation to be the standard bearers for change. But often those people are very poorly selected. There are gender and ethnic and family dimensions which are nothing to do with competence and that screws the thing from the start.11

He went on, “Some of these organisations that are involved—the OSCE model—known as the ‘organisation for sowing confusion in Europe’ don’t help. What really counts is interactions. You have to spend an enormous amount of time building relationships at a fundamental level. Patient, long term, trustful relationships”. The significant involvement, financial and political, that we see from the EU and international investors within Bosnia and Northern Ireland is much less obvious in the Basque country. The ongoing dispute with Spain in terms of the nature of the conflict has also impacted upon the ability to 9  Member of The European Union Force (EUFOR) Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 10  Security sector reform consultant. 11  Ibid.

9  NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS, INTERNATIONAL NETWORKS… 

161

build an economic dimension to peace. As one Basque workshop participant commented, “there is no Spanish application to EU for help and support. There is meant to be no conflict, so there is no peace process”.12 Outside engagement was also resisted by the Spanish government as an unacceptable infringement of Spanish sovereignty, but Basques had ­nevertheless begun to turn elsewhere for new ideas. The civil society grouping Elkarri invited international experts to visit the Basque country in 2002, including US-based conflict resolution specialists and prominent figures in the peace process in Northern Ireland. Among them was Fr. Alec Reid—the same priest who had followed the mob and gave the last rights to two dead British soldiers in in Belfast in 1988.13 Other international actors included the Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre), which established contact with ETA in late 2003, and the South African lawyer Brian Curran, who himself had significant contacts in Northern Ireland (Whitfield 2015).

NGOs and International Networks In terms of explicit conflict transformation, voluntary sector organisations and NGOs have much greater leeway to embrace and engage in difficult conflict environments than public or private sector actors. In all of our cases, we see non-governmental organisations working as champions for and agents of conflict change. The experience of NGOs within our three cases gives us a perspective on both the dimensions of the role they can play and the significance of national and international networks. Within Bosnia, the unsettled nature of the political environment and the organisation of the entities creates particularly challenges for non-­ governmental organisations. The dominance of international community inspired ‘liberal peace’ initiatives, fixed on democratic governance, civil society (CS) and a free market approach have defined what is funded, and therefore what can survive and thrive in a harsh, post-war environment (Puljek-Shank and Verkoren 2016). There is significant criticism that such an approach privileges ‘professional’ non-governmental organisations (NGOs) while overlooking grassroots institutions, religious organisations and other bodies such as trade unions, community organisations, traditional leadership groupings and informal networks (Howell and Pearce  Witness seminar participant and senior manager, San Sebastian.  See Chap. 2.

12 13

162 

J. MURPHY

2001). There is also a concern of bias in favour of ‘apolitical’, professional NGOs, attentive to delivering services rather than fostering society-state relations (Verkoren and Van Leeuwen 2012). In conflict related processes, the role of NGOs operates along this same agenda, but does have the space to develop conversations and activities which are politically too sensitive for institution-led initiatives. This was an issue raised by one of our interviewees in the heritage sector in Sarajevo, The role of national museum right now is just to keep the collections and to expose from time to time in a way which is not politically harmful to anyone, not ‘bad’. At the same time—there are smaller museums are not controlled by government institutions private museums representing private collections a lot of NGOs like the kids war museum based in Sarajevo.

Another Belfast NGO manager commented, “we can do much more interesting work than a lot of the organisations we engage with. Sometimes they bring us in because we will say things they are too scared to say. We have a freedom to cut to the difficult stuff.14 In Northern Ireland more generally, we have seen very substantial engagement of the community and voluntary sector within peacebuilding activity. One interesting example of this is the commitment of external mediators and community relations professionals in early stage policing reform. For NGOs, engaging with the police and justice field in Northern Ireland was a difficult endeavour (Eyben et al. 2000). An early participant spoke about the reputational risks inherent in a decision of this sort, I didn’t yet fully understand what I had started with the police. I was to learn that. So it’s not like one knows at the start, but I have to say I had an intuition, a very very strong intuition that this was the place to go and work, to go and work on policing. And at the time people were saying to me, it’s too early for that, you shouldn’t do that, you’re going to damage yourselves and I knew we were going to damage ourselves, just like getting involved with parades. I knew we were going to damage ourselves, I knew that we’d make enemies basically but I factored it in. Here were societal issues, conflict, but if I travelled abroad to conferences, people would ask me, not about neighbour to neighbour disputes, not about family rows, they would ask me what are you doing about Northern Ireland? So I had an intuition that there was a conflictual issue here, the relationship between the police and the community was one that needed to be fixed and that mediators could make a contribution.15  Manager, NGO, Belfast.  Professional mediator, Northern Ireland.

14 15

9  NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS, INTERNATIONAL NETWORKS… 

163

It allowed the police to rebut criticism that they were not moving quickly enough towards change (Morrow et al. 2013) and to fill a significant competency gap over ethno-political conflict in the workplace much of which had been previously glossed over or ignored (CCETSW 1999). The PODS programme, as it became known, was in reality a five-year project of mediated dialogues around policing and community relations in Northern Ireland, facilitated by Mediation NI and Future Ways—a charitably funded university of Ulster research programme (Morrow et  al. 2013; Eyben et al. 2000). One purpose was to establish a development group which would sit both within, and at a distance from, the organisation and had a mandate from the Chief Constable to do so. The task was to establish frameworks within which reflection on experience, honesty about the costs of suspicion and challenge from outside could be both articulated, probed and acknowledged, in radical contrast to the normative expectations of a society in conflict. (Morrow et al. 2013: 2)

The length of these engagement processes and the relationships built through them illustrate that such complex institutional engagement, with all its contextual difficulties and fragmented history, requires commitment that goes beyond traditional ‘change agent’ capabilities and limited timeframes. Undoubtedly, the provision of a number of funding streams (EU, Irish government, IFI and Atlantic Philanthropies) facilitated the longitudinal nature of this programme and allowed for the processes to be stabilised over extended periods of time and through shaky periods in the wider peace process. Aside from police reform, we can see significant voluntary sector engagement at other levels of Northern Ireland society contributing to organisational development and change. The role of the trade union movement and its ‘anti-sectarian’ unit Counteract in mediating disputes around emblems in the workplace such as what became known as the ‘poppy dispute’16 within the NI manufacturing sector is particularly significant and noteworthy (Goldie 2020). Within civil structures such as Partnership Boards,17 we can see managers engaged in ensuring both representation of diverse and divergent community interest and the facilitation of cross community dialogue on issues outside direct conflict themes.  A dispute which arose in 1997 around the wearing of lapel badges of poppies for Remembrance Day and black ribbons in memorial to the events of Bloody Sunday. 17  Broadly based social partnership structures which bring together representatives from the community, voluntary, statutory and business community. 16

164 

J. MURPHY

One participate involved in the West Belfast Partnership Board commented about the early years of that experience, When we established the Partnership Board we had to construct a situation on both sides of the divide that it would be representative. We used to get the UDA18 guys in and the republicans in and they would have meetings— you could see them coming and going. Our interface was always the source of riots, so we handed out mobile phones to key workers—so they at least had a communication system and they could intervene early when things got out of hand”.19

This was not always easy and the same individual spoke about the challenges of operating in such a contested space, not long after the Good Friday Agreement, Having to navigate very deep political and paramilitary waters was the biggest challenge I think. So for example, when the windows were broken we claimed compensation—criminal damage compensation from Northern Ireland Office. But it was ‘civil reps’ rather than cops taking the statements. They had backup, but it was different. We were always very conscious about knowing where staff were going, who they were going to meet and taking sensible precautions and by and large people would have welcomed you”.20

Through this mechanism initiatives like the development of a common tourism strategy for West Belfast, which incorporated both Catholic and Protestant areas was developed, as were projects around the understanding of arts and heritage in a divided society. The contribution and significance of the community and voluntary sector was also understood by those in the public sector tasked with engaging them. One public manager, who has significant involvement with NGOs and voluntary sector organisations drew attention to the contribution, “The innovation is on the ground. That is where the change is happening but it is not sufficiently filtering through and informing departments”.21 The Basque country also saw the development of an intricate net of NGOs with a focus on peace and a reduction of violence, from a number  UDA—Ulster Defence Association—a prescribed paramilitary group.  Former manager, West Belfast Partnership Board. 20  Ibid. 21  Senior civil servant, Northern Ireland. 18 19

9  NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS, INTERNATIONAL NETWORKS… 

165

of positions and perspectives. One of the most interesting aspects of this is the growth of work with individuals personally impacted by the conflict— victims and survivors. We also see within this the pivotal and cross-case activities of conflict resolution actors in the process of peace and reconciliation—roles which were often brokered and facilitated by NGOs and citizenship groups. One of the main organisations in this process is the Northern Ireland–based ‘Healing through Remembering’: a voluntary member-led organisation focused on the legacy of the past as it relates to the conflict in and about Northern Ireland. Its background connects to another conflict zone—that of South Africa, and the organisation was established after a visit in 1999 to Northern Ireland by Dr. Alex Boraine, Deputy Chair of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The visit was at the invitation of Victim Support Northern Ireland and the Northern Ireland Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders (NIACRO) and resulted in a report, All Truth Is Bitter, launched in 2000. The report recommended that a wide-ranging community discussion should explore and debate ways of examining the past and remembering so as to build a better future in Northern Ireland. The Healing Through Remembering Project was established as a result in 2001. Existing links between the organisation and Basque groups lead to an initial engagement in an ‘Everyday Objects of Conflict’ panel exhibition at the Gernika Peace Museum and the co-hosted by the mayor of San Sebastian. This led to further work with the Basque Forum on Peace and Human Rights and discussions about what ‘peaceful coexistence’ means in a Basque context. Engagement of this type fed into work within the Basque museum sector and with NGOs on the ground who were keen to explore, in a safe way, issues of the past and people’s experiences. One museum director commented on the significance of this early international engagement, “We are working with Healing through Remembering learning from what others do. It’s very important for us to have international contacts. At a moment when you are not understood you can see that other countries have been through that process”.22 Another reflected “the connection for us has been everything. None of this would have happened otherwise. We recognise that there is a lot to learn from other places”.23 One of the challenges of this engagement was, as we saw earlier, the lack of funding for such work. An organiser reflected on these very real  Museum director, Basque region.  Local government manager, Bilbao.

22 23

166 

J. MURPHY

difficulties, “If you don’t get public money its hard. This is an intimate thing to do. Everything that started here is because the Basque government decided that they should do work among victims”.24 Another reflected, “It’s been the Spanish state in change or everything. Funding, support. They are very quick to say we are not eligible”.25 A similarly well utilised network was with the Centre for Peace in Glencree, Ireland—a grouping with significant experience of hosting and facilitating conversations between those with an interest in ethno-political conflict. The ­development of the Basque MemoriaLab programme, which emerged in 2013 was inspired by such initiatives and began a year and a half after the definitive cessation of armed activity by ETA. The project brings civil society together in the social construction of memory in the Basque country, allowing participants to share their testimonies regarding the impact of politically motivated violence and disruptions to relationships during the conflict. Even with these initiatives, participants and organisers were aware that the process they were engaged in still had significant political obstacles which managers at all levels have tried to overcome. One commented, I don’t think our peace process has been normal. The Basque government has made efforts. It was in touch with South Africa and connected to the South African process to provide guidance. Men like Rolf Meyer and Brian Curran and from Ireland Alec Reid and Harold Good. They had the legitimacy as men of peace. Very good at empathy and facilitating conversations. Brian would say ‘I am only here to make the tea’. Because we didn’t have support from the Spanish state we felt that we needed that umbrella of legitimacy that we have searched abroad.26

References 2008 Irresponsible politics hold the Kupres’ doors locked. The Srpska Times 02.10.2018. Autesserre, S. (2017). International Peacebuilding and Local Success: Assumptions and Effectiveness. International Studies Review, 19, 114–132. Bassuener, K. (2015). The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Unfulfilled Promise. Berlin: Democratization Policy Council. Belloni, R. (2001). Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Journal of Peace Research, 38, 163–180.  Local government manager, San Sebastian.  Local government manager, San Sebastian. 26  Manager, cultural sector, Basque region. 24 25

9  NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS, INTERNATIONAL NETWORKS… 

167

Brandsen, T., Trommel, W., & Verschuere, B. (2015). The State and the Reconstruction of Civil Society. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 83, 676–693. CCETSW. (1999). Getting off the Fence: Challenging Sectarianism in Personal Social Services. Belfast: CCETSW. Commission, E. (2020). Bosnia and Herzegovina—Financial Assistance [Online]. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/instruments/funding-by-country/bosnia-herzegovina_en. Dimaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. American Sociological Review, 48, 147–160. DPI. (2016). The Role of Civil Society in the Basque Country Peace Process. London: Democratic Progress Institute. Eyben, K., Morrow, D., & Wilson, D. (2000). EDI. Belfast: University of Ulster. Fagan, A. (2005). Civil Society in Bosnia Ten Years After Dayton. International Peacekeeping, 12, 406–419. Fernández Vázquez, J. (2018). After the Quarantine: A Closer Look at Monuments to Victims of ETA in the Basque Country and Navarre. Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies, 19, 209–232. Goddard, S. E. (2012). Brokering Peace: Networks, Legitimacy, and the Northern Ireland Peace Process. International Studies Quarterly, 56, 501–515. Goldie, R. (2020). ‘They Say It Like It Is’: The History of CounterAct. In Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice. Belfast: Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice. Howell, J., & Pearce, J. (2001). Civil Society and Development: A Critical Exploration. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Jarman, N. (2016). The Challenge of Peace Building and Conflict Transformation: A Case Study of Northern Ireland. Law and Politics Journal, 2, 117–128. Juncos, A.  E. (2018). EU Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reform or resist? Contemporary Security Policy, 39, 95–118. Kent, G. (2006). Organised Diaspora Networks and Homeland Peacebuilding: The Bosnian World Diaspora Network as a Potential Development Actor. Conflict, Security & Development, 6, 449–469. Knox, C. (2011). Peace Building in Northern Ireland: A Role for Civil Society. Social Policy and Society, 10, 13–28. Marchetti, R., & Tocci, N. (2009). Conflict Society: Understanding the Role of Civil Society in Conflict. Global Change, Peace & Security, 21, 201–217. Mcdowell, S., Braniff, M., & Murphy, J. (2017). Zero-Sum Politics in Contested Spaces: The Unintended Consequences of Legislative Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. Political Geography, 61, 193–202. Micinski, N.  R. (2016). NGO Frequent Flyers: Youth Organisations and the Undermining of Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 11, 99–104.

168 

J. MURPHY

Morrow, D. (2012). Building Bridges: Supporting Peace-Building through Funding Reconciliation—The Example of the IFI Community Bridges Programme. Shared Space, 13, 45–62. Morrow, D., MC Allister, B., Campbell, J. & Wilson, D. (2013). Mediated dialogues and systemic change in Northern Ireland mediated dialogues and systemic change in Northern Ireland-‘Policing our divided society’ (pods) 1996–2003. Belfast. Morrow, D., Faulkner-Byrne, L., & Pettis, S. (2018). Funding Peace: A Report on the Funding of Peace and Reconciliation Work in Northern Ireland and Ireland 2007–2017. Belfast: Corrymeela Community. Murphy, J. (2013). Policing for Peace in Northern Ireland: Change, Conflict and Community Confidence. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Murphy, J. (2019). Leading in Liminal Space: The Challenge of Policing in Northern Ireland. In P. Ramshaw, M. Silvestri, & M. Simpson (Eds.), Police Leadership: Changing Landscapes. Cham: Springer International Publishing. Murua, I. (2017). No More Bullets for ETA: The Loss of Internal Support as a Key Factor in the End of the Basque Group’s Campaign. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 10, 93–114. Osler, A., & Pandur, I. H. (2019). The Right to Intercultural Education: Students’ Perspectives on Schooling and Opportunities for Reconciliation Through Multicultural Engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Intercultural Education, 30, 658–679. Power, M. (2011). Building Peace in Northern Ireland. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. Puljek-Shank, R., & Verkoren, W. (2016). Civil Society in a Divided Society: Linking Legitimacy and Ethnicness of Civil Society Organizations in Bosnia-­ Herzegovina. Cooperation and Conflict, 52, 184–202. Tveit, A. D., Cameron, D. L., & Kovač, V. B. (2014). “Two Schools Under One Roof” in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Exploring the Challenges of Group Identity and Deliberative Values Among Bosniak and Croat Students. International Journal of Educational Research, 66, 103–112. Verkoren, W., & Van Leeuwen, M. (2012). Complexities and Challenges for Civil Society Building in Post-Conflict Settings. Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 7, 81–94. White, T.  J. (2018). American Diplomacy and Economic Aid in the Northern Ireland Peace Process: A Neoliberal Analysis. Open Library of Humanities, 4(3). Whitfield, T. (2015). The Basque Conflict and ETA The Difficulties of an Ending. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

PART III

Organisational Activity, Conflict and Peacebuilding

CHAPTER 10

Liminal Space: Organisational Transition and Conflict

There is an antecedent point which has always struck me and that I keep boring people with. We talk about NI [Northern Ireland] emerging from conflict. Northern Ireland is emerging from violence but living with conflict. Two different policy positions. Equality sector professional in Northern Ireland ‘Knife, Wire, Srebrenica’ An anti-Bosnian chant heard at football matches. HUGHSON, J. & SKILLEN, F. 2015. Football in Southeastern Europe: From Ethnic Homogenization to Reconciliation, Taylor & Francis.

Until this point, this book has focused on the lived experience of those managing organisations within conflict environments. In doing so it has explored the impacts of ethno-political violence and its legacy on service delivery, economic development, spatial division, heritage and the role of the international community and voluntary sector. Now, in these concluding chapters we turn to three alternative perspectives on organising in such spaces. This chapter, the first of the three, will explore the impact of institutional transition and change, which is a common characteristic of transitional political processes. The next will explore the invidious nature of decision-making for organisational actors faced with impossible choices. The last will draw together our understanding of organisational actors as peacebuilding entrepreneurs, delivering conflict transformation alongside other organisational priorities. © The Author(s) 2020 J. Murphy, Management and War, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49252-6_10

171

172 

J. MURPHY

Change and Transition in Conflict Spaces One abiding characteristic of our three case studies is the unsteady and at times impermanent nature of organisational change processes which are necessarily dependent on and responsive to, wider political events. Often the transition from conflict is marked by organisational transitional, reconfiguration and renewal which goes to the core of societal transformation processes. The reform of institutions of security and policing, the redesign of political environments and therefore delivery mechanisms for public services and the institutional treatment of the past through museums and public spaces all represent processes of change which are as organisational, as they are political. We may speak about war and peace, violence and its cessation but in reality all of our case studies sit between these cumbersome dualities. This is liminal space and those managing through and organising in, environments of transition, are operating within that space. They are no longer in the midst at war or conflict, but neither are they yet in a framework of positive peace (Galtung 1969). The aim of this chapter is to explore the nature of that liminality, given what we know and have seen in our sector analysis of Northern Ireland, the Basque country and Bosnia. Further to this, it recognises that despite significant internal and external investment in political, societal and organisational change in divided societies, the legacy of conflict and ongoing threat has the potential to trap organisations within a liminal environment, where organisational life is still defined by past violence and present instability. All our cases have incidences of organisational or institutional change running alongside political transition processes. We see public services striving to integrate more fully into contested environments, economic actors seeking to realign and renew, heritage providers puzzling over the legacy of the past and voluntary organisations often playing a role as change agents and enablers. These important processes of change and peacebuilding are especially vulnerable to a state of permanent liminality, where transition in the wider environment prevents the completion of change in organisations and institutions that form the scaffolding of societal transition. This chapter will explore those contradictions.

10  LIMINAL SPACE: ORGANISATIONAL TRANSITION AND CONFLICT 

173

Liminality as a Lens Liminality is generally defined as a situation of ‘betwixt and between’ that traditionally occurs in rituals or rites of passage intended to transfer an individual from one social position to another. It was first discussed by van Gennep (Van Gennep 1960) and later re-articulated by Turner (Turner et al. 1969), to convey an equivocal, intermediate state, which holds the possibility of and conveys the journey to, a changed reality. Whilst often operationalised at an individual level (Beech 2011), liminality can also be recognised as a collective experience such as that within an organisational change processes, especially the transition from one relatively fixed set of organisational repertoires to another, or environments in which organisational realities change fundamentally (Czarniawska and Mazza 2003). In these studies, the liminal state is described as a period when organisations are somewhat dissociated from ‘norm governed’ action (Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville 2011). Liminality as a concept is of increasing interest to those occupied in work around transitional or emergent change in physical, social and organisational spaces (Czarniawska and Mazza 2003; Söderlund and Borg 2018). We know that such environments can create openings for different thinking or give permission for participants to try out new or alternative ways of interacting (Schirch 2005). These ‘rites of passage’ allow individuals to pass from one identity state to another and are often conceived of as a processual process characterised by an initial stage of separation and detachment; a middle stage of liminality in which the subject or ‘liminar’ moves through a space that is different to both the ‘before’ and ‘after’ states; and a final stage of ‘aggregation’, or consummation of the liminal journey (Beech 2011; Chreim 2002). Powley (2009) has also identified a state which he categorises as ‘liminal suspension’ to describe how crisis temporarily undoes and alters formal relational structures and opens a temporal gap for organisation members to form and renew relationships (Powley 2009). Recently, the apparent paradoxical concept of permanent liminality has become of interest to scholars. Characterised as a ‘fundamental suspension of ordinary social structures’ the notion of permanent liminality has been applied to contexts where overlaps in activities identities and behaviours bleed from one sphere to another and clear distinctions are no longer possible (Johnsen and Sorensen 2015). Johnsen and Sørensen apply this to modern work life balance (or imbalance) but is equally applicable to processes of organisational transition which fail to move forward and get ‘fixed’ in a permanent

174 

J. MURPHY

change state. The ‘institutionalisation’ (Szakolczai 2000; Thomassen 2012) of what was originally conceived of as a transitional process presents a useful way to engage with experiences of organisational change which struggle to move fully through a defined transition period. The possibility of permanent liminality is a significant consideration for those managing within a contested and transitional environment. It is possible to contend that a long running violent political conflict has the potential to create conditions akin to permanent liminality for organisational actors and processes of organisational transition alike. There are two reasons for this. The first relates to our understanding of peace and conflict. In societies emerging from violence, transition is often bound up in the idea that peace can be ultimately achieved. In the same way, organisational adaptation and transition can be described as transforming from a stable to an ambiguous liminal level and then finally consolidating to a more stable period (Lewin 1951; Weick and Quinn 1999). In both situations, transition often evokes or conjures the idea of an endpoint. However, the reality of peace is better understood as something fluid and transient that can change and evolve across time, place and scale (Forrer and Katsos 2015; Koopman 2011, 2017; Mcconnell et al. 2014; Ross 2011). Peace itself can be liminal in the same way that the outcomes of large-scale system wide change are always transient (Murphy et al. 2020). Secondly, we understand that contested environments with a history of violence often conform to definitions of extreme contexts (Hällgren et al. 2017). Such contexts have, as Hannah et al. (2009) explains the “potential to cause massive physical, psychological, or material consequences” to organisation actors, with sometimes “unbearable” effects (p.  898). Importantly, they operate outside the organisation’s sphere of influence. The relatively recent concept of prosthetic memory is also being afforded increasing prominence in studies of culture and conflict (Landsberg 2004). Landsberg highlights the idea of memories which do not come from a person’s actual lived experience but are instead, the recollection of a film or television program which has been blended into an individual’s recall, without actually having been experienced first-hand. This is an idea akin to that of Giorgio Agamben’s ‘zones of indistinction’ (Downey 2009), when life domains lose their differentiated clarity and become ambiguous. Whilst the threat of conflict in all of our case studies has diminished in recent years, we are also aware that organisational actors need not experience extreme events first hand to be affected by them; rather they can be troubled by exposure to those who were physically present at the time, by

10  LIMINAL SPACE: ORGANISATIONAL TRANSITION AND CONFLICT 

175

hearing immediate accounts or by exposure to other’s injuries, for example. Pursuing this line of enquiry, it is possible to extend the availability of prosthetic memories from an individuated experience to a shared, organisational phenomenon. In an organisational environment, new actors inculcate and adopt memories of a previous collective trauma, through organisational storytelling and the promulgation of historic cultural artefacts like symbols and mantras. Those ‘memories’ therefore impact on and direct future decision-making, stalling and trapped change within the conflict context. The next section will look further at the impact of past conflict on organisational life.

Organisational Change, Conflict and Extreme Contexts Scholarship on liminality which focuses on structures and organisations has a useful contribution to make in our understanding of organisational change and transition. Instabilities in social, political and organisational contexts, multiplicity of meanings and the persistent nature of the liminal experience all draw parallels with complex change in contested environments. Existing scholarship on this theme stressed the importance of good governance processes in establishing peace, pursuing state reconstruction and preventing future conflict (Brinkerhoff and Morgan 2010; Berg and Schaefer 2009; Bollens 2000, 2011; Bissessar 2009; Collier et al. 2008; Haufler 2015; Forrer and Katsos 2015). However, while much of this work acknowledges the importance of institutional transformation, it is less helpful in specifying the underpinning mechanisms which characterise change even when their success is central to wider peacebuilding endeavours. The centrality of organisational change to societal change is often overlooked, and yet as a society moves through and beyond violence it is often up to organisations and institutions to navigate the detail of this transformation in real time. This is most obvious and appreciated within security sector reform initiatives, where police and other justice processes undertake a transition, usually with the aim of becoming more representative and objective in their service delivery (Murphy 2013; Ellison 2007). We see shifts of this type in both Northern Ireland and Bosnia, with varying degrees of success. However, these processes are not confined to the arena of policing and justice. As we have seen in the last chapters, organisations and institutions emerging from violence are often managing

176 

J. MURPHY

organisational transition, as well as political modification. Heritage professionals in all three contexts are struggling with the organisational impacts and nervousness of dealing with and representing the past. Service delivers and those managing public space are themselves learning and building new ways of working that takes account of division and attempts to move away from the territorialisation of space and place. Those driving economic renewal often heavily rely on external fiscal and technical support for their endeavours, just as the community and voluntary sector depend on transitional funding and networks to support their work. Successfully achieving these organisational and institutional outcomes entails change, and a failure to change or to be seen to have changed can obstruct stabilisation and peacebuilding.

Organisational Change in a Conflict Context This section looks at three main themes encountered during extended transition from violence. The first deals with the ongoing cultural artefacts of language, symbolism, identity and the management of organisational and environmental history. The second explores structural and legislative configurations that impact organisational processes and actors’ 'behaviour, and the third, the shifting political ecosystem and the ongoing experience of political violence. Within our Basque case, liminality occurs in layers not just around the recent conflict with ETA, but in the unresolved nature of the modern Spanish state. Much of the work that we see within the heritage and museum sectors in the Basque territories relates to historic circumstances as well as more recent trauma. It was noted by one interview participant that files and archives necessary for research around the civil war period were not available or open, particularly those housed in Salamanca and Madrid. Being unable to fully acknowledge the truth of the past presents those charged with narrating and conveying it with a difficult path to traverse. As we have seen in Guernica, the adjustment in name from the Guernica Museum to the Guernica Peace Museum suggests an attempt to move the narrative away from what was described as one heritage professional as a ‘martyr city’, to an organisation which seeks to look to the future in a positive and proactive way. This is an initiative championed and underpinned by heritage professionals, and reinforced by their external professional networks, rather than a political or administrative decision. Underscoring this alignment is the development of a permanent peace

10  LIMINAL SPACE: ORGANISATIONAL TRANSITION AND CONFLICT 

177

exhibit which engages with the reality of the Basque experience, and an acknowledgement, in the words of one museum manager, that “We cannot have a peace museum in Guernica and not talk about the conflict”.1 This also includes an understanding that the very act of talking about the past, allows them to better enable others to have those conversations as well. This is a two stage engagement, with an initial training of those managers in a decision-making capacity and then a cascade of that training to guides and those who are dealing with the public. The challenges of this should not be underestimated in an environment of distrust and legacy, “Talking about the Basque conflict—it has been difficult. We prepare the guides for weeks. We say let’s do it in a respectful and objective way”.2 Outside the museum sector, these issues move and multiply from concerns around the past and the present to more fundamental issues of identity such as language and culture, “We have symbols which are difficult here— language and languages”.3 The connection of ‘memory’ in this environment is inherently political in nature, both historic memory and recent. One participant, who we heard from in an earlier chapter, related this back to the lack of a demarcation between the period of the dictatorship and the ongoing nature of the conflict and political violence in the Basque country itself. Ironically, the ‘law of forgetting’, which saw Spain transition away from totalitarianism, has left unresolved these complex issues of the past. They remain alive in the ongoing management of language, symbols and political identity and more viscerally in ongoing recovery of the bodies of the dead. This struggle to acknowledge and manage the past and its relationship with current organisational life is also apparent in Northern Ireland, where organisational actors are engaged in and engaging with communities deeply affected by past and ongoing violence. Interfaces, as we saw in Chap. 6, are an acute example of this. Housing managers who are tasked with the intricacies of community division and outcomes of aggressive territoriality, have their own experiences which inform and define their understanding. Engaging in a programme of work to acknowledge and better understand how operating within division had affected housing professionals was a significant step forward for a housing body in Northern Ireland and was an internal initiative of managers working at a senior level.  Museum manager, Guernika.  Ibid. 3  Local government manager, Bilbao. 1 2

178 

J. MURPHY

It is useful to go back to the words of one of those managers who spoke about the centrality of that engagement and the challenges which it brought to the organisation, when we started the BRIC programme and began talking to staff about their experience throughout the Troubles, we worked with Tides Training— we brought staff in and a lot of staff, we just don’t talk about it, and a lot of staff experienced grief and loss but the issue of the conflict was never brought into the workplace but BRIC allowed staff to speak about their personal experience and some found that very hard. Others found it cathartic. It broke down a lot of barriers before where people came from and what their history was and doing it with people who were skilled was a very interesting way of dealing with it—the first time I’ve ever seen peoples personal circumstances.4

Having facilitated conversations in this way allowed the organisation to begin to address some of the hidden, obscured challenges of managing in a divided society, even in a sector which on the surface is not focused on division. It is also a reflection of both an organisational maturity which fuels the judgement that such intimate conversations are possible and also a willingness to take risks and to manage those risks at a senior level. An acknowledgement that a process like this will have ‘fallout’ also underscores the sensitive nature of the undertaking and the careful approach of decision-­makers acknowledging that the conflict is alive in the workplace and cannot be ignored, “For some people that’s good and for some it isn’t—because some people needed some follow up work done—their coping mechanism had been to ignore it”. The reality of the public housing in Northern Ireland as a sector ‘born out of the conflict’ is not lost on its managers and staff and continues to be a defining feature of an organisations operating within the wake of the past. The use of language is also a concern—the nomenclature of division is commonplace (Derry/ Londonderry, the North/Northern Ireland, the Province/the six counties) and navigated on a daily basis by those having private and more importantly, professional conversations. An awareness of and an ability to walk this narrow path of political sensitivity is a skill necessary for anyone operating in such an environment. Even in circumstances of horror, such as the Omagh bombing in 1998, which killed 29 people, including a women pregnant with twins and two Spanish students on an exchange trip, language remains a concern. A senior civil servant involved in the 4

 Housing manager, Belfast.

10  LIMINAL SPACE: ORGANISATIONAL TRANSITION AND CONFLICT 

179

aftermath of the bombing recalled, “The language around terrorism created issues for the Spanish government. We needed to navigate that”.5 The linguistic and cultural liminality we see in the Basque county and Northern Ireland is also reflected, and indeed intensified, in our Bosnian case. The war was cultural, as well as political and nationalistic. The destruction of libraries, as well as religious and cultural spaces presents extraordinary challenges to those attempting to craft a plural cultural future. Divisions are manifest and visible in the linguistic separateness of east Sarajevo and the visibility of an environment located in an unsettled and incomplete peace. In museums too, as we have seen, management of heritage without fundamental agreement on the meaning of what that heritage signifies, presents sector managers with an invidious task. As one of our heritage professionals in Bosnia wryly reflected, “how can you have a national museum if you do not know what nationality”.6

Legislative Liminality While issues of culture, language and the past are often regarded as nuanced and sensitive aspects of professional practice, legislative and structural aspects of division create even greater challenges. These sometimes rigid constructions are often the outcome of political compromises in an attempt to manage or resolve ongoing, destructive and disruptive conflict. In all of our cases we see the legislative outcomes of conflict resolution impacting upon how managers and organisational actors do their job, in the knowledge that such positions and requirements are often partial and subject to change and alteration. Sometimes this presents opportunities for independence and cross sectoral working, as we see in the use of provincial funding in the reframing and reimaging of Bilbao. At other times, it requires actors to manoeuvre within badly drawn guidelines of action and activity and to look for opportunities to make progress. The Bilbao example is intriguing in that it contains the persistent political imagery of contested national status, “Not French, Not Spanish, but Basque”, as well as a focus on physical and aesthetic regeneration as a way to ‘change the conversation’ (Murphy and Mcdowell 2019), and persists even while public spaces become sites of political demonstration and discontent. The significance of collective leadership to bring such complex projects to fruition 5 6

 Senior civil servant, Northern Ireland.  Museum curator, Bosnia.

180 

J. MURPHY

was pinpointed by many engaged in the regeneration process—the need for “solidarity not just planning”.7 This was is in contrast to the legislative processes implicated in the shutting down of cultural activity and cultural artefacts—such as the closing of the only Basque-language newspaper—an event which was highlighted by many working in Basque cultural organisations as an example of ‘cultural violence’, “The closing of a newspaper—a symbol of Basque culture, published in Basque—that was violence—terrible violence in closing down the paper. As a result of that there was a social movement that arose that didn’t solve matters, that was an important landmark for me at least”.8 In Northern Ireland, concerns were raised about the barely functioning devolved government apparatus9 and the use of equality and good relations legislation by political actors to both promote peace and perpetuate cultural and political conflict (Mcdowell et al. 2017). Equality legislation, centring on Section 75 of the 1998 Government of Ireland Act is seen by pivotal by many organisational actors in regional and local government with a responsibility to manage its implementation. It contains two main clause—Section 75:1, which deals with equality, and Section 75: 2, which gives regard to the “desirability of promoting good relations between persons of a different religious belief, political opinion or racial group” (ECNI 2015). As one retired civil servant commented of their outcomes, this is not a straightforward task: Existing equality legislation and human rights legislation are hugely important in terms of the subs structure of the (Belfast or Good Friday) Agreement. Of its time the most far reaching piece of equality legislation in western Europe … But the evidence that we are getting through is that often the decision in a Department will be made by the political head and then the civil servants scurry around retrospectively to fit an equality scheme around the decision. That’s a recipe for disaster.10

The onus in this environment is to ensure that process is upheld, even if legislative intention gets lost, “No one will stop a minister making a decision. The question is, have they complied with their duty in law? And their duty in law is to go through the process. If you solely focus on  Business and regeneration manager, Bilbao.  Local government manager, San Sebastian. 9  At the time of writing the Stormont legislature had just returned from a period of suspension that had last almost three years. 10  Retired senior civil servant, Northern Ireland. 7 8

10  LIMINAL SPACE: ORGANISATIONAL TRANSITION AND CONFLICT 

181

compliance, you are missing a trick because that’s not what it’s about”.11 The invidious nature of this decision-making requires capabilities and political awareness in public managers which goes beyond technical competency—it is at its heart, political. As another professional working in the area of equality and diversity reflects, In a whole myriad of ways people in public bodies and councils take decisions which of their essence are political. They are not taking them from a political perspective or with political intent but by their very nature they are political. That can both contribute to reconciliation and peacebuilding but at the same time be detrimental to peacebuilding.12

A normal, bureaucratic tendency to risk aversion is not helpful in these circumstances, in that it further entrenches structural and cultural division and fails to build peace. Managers engaged in conversation and reflection on these issues identified an awareness of the consequential nature of decision-making and the prevalence of this within a divided society as the chief concern. By failing to take into account shared service delivery when the norm is division, or seeking to build partnership working when opportunities exist, public institutions incur costs which is other circumstances are unnecessary and additional services become unattainable (Brown and Cole 2016). Balancing what can be done and what should be within a legislative and administrative structure also presents opportunities for those managers who seek to actively engage, as one Belfast City Council employee reflected on the ‘community relations’ work of the Council, “it was people who knew the rules and knew how to work with them. Section 75 gave licence to those people who believed there was something better—who had a personal belief that there could be a better way. The other one was that it was important to get to resolutions that didn’t just paper over the cracks”.13 This person went on to point out that while they regarded equality legislation as very significant, it had always felt ‘transactional’, however with good relations there seemed to be the ‘potential of transformation’. Legislative guidelines also constrained those in the museum sector who as we have seen, were keen to collect and maintain archives of material throughout the conflict but had to contend with both legislation prohibiting the possession  Ibid.  Retired public manager, Northern Ireland. 13  Local government manager, Belfast. 11 12

182 

J. MURPHY

of proscribed material and the organisations’ senior management, who were understandably nervous at the prospect, whatever the purpose was. Walking this line was a personal, as well as a professional decision made in “an atmosphere of extreme nervousness”.14 The judgements necessary to engage with questions of division, difference and contestation require those at an organisational level to consider their approach to their role in a much more comprehensive way, than may be the case in other jurisdictions without histories of conflict. Our Equality manager went on, You have to develop a ‘calculus of consciousness’. You can’t measure it absolutely but there has to be some sense of the fact that doing something or not doing something is not a decision taken in a test tube—it is not an isolated decision is a decision which is going to have consequences. And a lot of the time you want to take decisions which will have consequences. Sometimes that are provocative without losing your sense of objectivity and impartiality. But if one of your guiding principles is avoiding controversy, then you have gone wrong.15

The legislative liminality which we see in Northern Ireland with its concentric circles of political agreements, power sharing arrangements and the ‘connective tissue’ of equality, good relations and human rights legislation is eclipsed by the size, complexity and contested nature of the governmental framework in Bosnia. Perhaps the most evocative and difficult aspect of this is the ongoing recovery and identification of bodies and the burial of body parts mutilated post death in the disturbance of makeshift graves by perpetrators attempting to avoid culpability (Jugo 2017). Because many bodies were recovered in an incomplete form, families have often attended funerals for their loved ones on more than one occasion (Pollack 2003; Jugo and Wastell 2015). It is hard to think of a more liminal state, than the knowledge that a funeral does not necessary mean laying a loved one to rest. As we saw in Chap. 5, for former refugees who partially return as trans-local investors, anniversaries and particularly the commemoration events at Srebrenica represent powerful rituals of belonging drawing them back. The town’s status as a site of genocide is haunting, but for some, it also represents a challenge to cultivate life by investing and providing a positive opportunity for the area and those who are left. As one investor who had been forced to leave the area as a child reflected, “It  Museum curator, Belfast.  Equality professional, Northern Ireland.

14 15

10  LIMINAL SPACE: ORGANISATIONAL TRANSITION AND CONFLICT 

183

is important so the town can continue to live on—not as a graveyard”.16 Others however, pinpoint clauses in the Dayton Agreement as too restrictive and acting as a block on the redevelopment and renewal. As we saw in Chap. 6, one administrator voiced concerns that activity to clean up and rebuild burnt out houses in the Canton 10, Croat dominated town of Kupres were misinterpreted as a further attempt to ‘push out’ Bosniaks and Serbs. The almost universal concern about the ‘dead hand’ of bureaucracy in a region whose governance structures are hugely complex appears as a leitmotif in conversations with Bosnia organisations. The difficulties of managing and working positively within such complexity were another theme. Most organisational actors employed in governmental structures were deeply frustrated within an inability to get agreement or even a consistently functional system. Managers talked about working ‘under the radar’ to get a resolution of human issues that spanned cantons and sometimes entities. It is useful to recall the words of one about his own responsibilities “The structures inhibit cooperation and create issues in themselves. We are talking about human lives and the lives of children who perhaps have a Serbian father and a Bosniak mother. War is never ever finished, key political issues have not been resolved”.17 The conceptualisation of legislative and political structures as a metaphor of the divisions of war is a power image of impotence and entrapment in the past, but also illustrates the importance of organisational and institutional reform.

Liminality as a Political Reality The fundamentally political nature of transitions out of conflict present their own challenges to organisational actors who are coping with politically shifting sands as well as managerial adaption. Not only are organisations dealing with cultural and legislative ‘in-betweenness’, but they are also often managing stalled political transition by proxy. The intersection between political and organisational processes is variable, but we can see it occurring in our cases in noteworthy and challenging ways. In Bilbao and the Basque jurisdiction, it is apparent at the juncture of sensitive conversations and dialogue around the past and the positions of both victims of violence and ETA prisoners. Managing divergent political positions requires those engaged in organisational processes to balance competing  Businessman, Bosnia.  Government administrator, Bosnia.

16 17

184 

J. MURPHY

political demands and pressures as described by one of our local government administrators in San Sebastian, “The left movement comes here and says, ‘everything should be about victims/everything should be about torture’. And if someone from the Popular Party comes and they say, ‘I don’t understand why you have a panel about torture of prisoners’”.18 The unresolved nature of the history of the Spanish state is a wider concern and arose in most conversations with public sector managers. Dealing with the grief of the past and the visceral reality of historic mass killings makes it difficult to define a boundary between recent violence and that which goes back to the period of the civil war and the dictatorship which followed it (Aguilar 1998). In Bosnia, the translation of the violent war into a political sphere creates not only significant duplication and a complex political administration but the need to take account of ongoing political concerns. As we have seen in previous chapters, managers have described themselves as “victims of an ineffectual system”, forced to “work under the radar … always under the radar” and managing in an environment where there are “no overarching policies” and where as a result of deficiencies in alignment, “people lose their rights to social protection”. With the legacy of the war so prominent in the political structures and the unresolved nature of the intricate and painful compromise of the Dayton Accords still impacting on every aspect of organisational life, the ability to create the change necessary for progress is absent. As one manager commented, “There is great difficulty at all levels. Our colleagues are equally facing difficulty. Changes are falling down at a political level”.19 Interesting, there is an acknowledgement among those in public administration in Bosnia that the complexity of the environment has demanded the development of new skills and a diplomatic approach essential to create any action. The translation of existing skills into a new skills set which takes account of the difficulties is a by-product of the challenges faced, and an example of public managers acting as bricoleurs to create opportunities for progress (Murphy et  al. 2018). It also serves to highlight the invidious nature of the current system, the political legacy of unresolved conflict and the liminal nature of a conflict transformation with no end in sight. In Northern Ireland, the transitional nature of the environment post political agreement has created huge challenges for public managers and those within the non-governmental and private sectors. We saw in an  Local government administrator, San Sebastian.  Senior civil servant, Bosnia.

18 19

10  LIMINAL SPACE: ORGANISATIONAL TRANSITION AND CONFLICT 

185

earlier chapter how the post–Good Friday Agreement atmosphere saw an influx of funding for economic growth, political stabilisation, reconciliation and security sector reform and we heard from some of those whose businesses were significantly impacted and boosted by this period of political movement. However, this was also a profound change in the status quo. One civil servant describe the period of six years between a cessation of violence and a restoration of devolved government in these terms, “I think post ceasefires nobody knew what the hell was going on. You saw all this and then you had a ‘take a breath moment’”.20 Devolution of power from the British parliament at Westminster saw the appointment of a First and a Deputy First Minister, who struggled to come to terms with their responsibilities and powers, and also a civil service, which was plunged into a ‘sea change’ of regional government. One senior manager, who worked in Northern Ireland institutions before and after devolution, described the ‘bridging’ of the new administration in these terms, “You had a devolved government running but … a civil service which was only used to ministers flying in. Ministers who were superb at making decisions, at clearing their box. And then you had new Ministers who were making different decisions, rejecting advice. Huge change. Very difficult”.21 He went on to reflect on the dynamic of a new First and Deputy First Ministers and their relationship to the wider administration, You had these two principals and a big civil service that they couldn’t relate to. Head of Service nowhere to be seen. They22 didn’t trust, wouldn’t trust the wider civil service. The only advice they trusted was coming from their sets of advisors. You still had ongoing issues with decommissioning … All of that was a nightmare to try and function—that period before government.23

But this again gave managers at all levels the chance to translate existing skills of neutrality and resilience through conflict into an environment where local political engagement went from being impossible to a given. One local government actor in Belfast observed three stages of this shift— from neutrality, to careful engagement, to explicit working together to achieve objectives, “We have gone from managers who were extraordinarily neutral, to managers masterful in their choreography, to a more  Senior civil servant, Northern Ireland.  Senior civil servant, Northern Ireland. 22  The First and Deputy First Ministers. 23  Senior civil servant, Northern Ireland. 20 21

186 

J. MURPHY

explicit ‘let’s dance’”.24 This was accompanied by a new understanding that the adoption or implementation of a policy which has an effect on one community more than another community, is not the outworking of neutrality but an example of the pervasive nature of division. Others, within the business sector reflect upon the instability that still exists within the political environment and the recognition that the optimism which following the Belfast or Good Friday Agreement has not survived contact with reality, There was a period just after the Good Friday Agreement where I think that people thought we have genuinely turned a corner and you were doing things that you would never would have thought possible and that created loads of opportunity and space. And then it was quite a struggle when the pendulum moved back. It made it even more complicated in certain areas.25

This transitional reality was reflected in the area of policing and security more than any others, as the incomplete nature of the transition presented significant ongoing threat to life and to the completion of the security reform agenda invested in so heavily through the Independent review process (Hearty 2018). Balancing a security threat to the organisation with a need to police with the community is an incomplete circle which the Police Service of Northern Ireland have not yet closed. One senior retired officer outlines the contradiction, “There is a legitimate security threat but I think the pervasive culture in the organisation is to use the security threat as an excuse not to change”.26 Even outside the ongoing work to make Northern Ireland police more accountable to and representative of the people, senior officers report that managing risk, with a cohort of officers who did not police through the Troubles, is itself a huge challenge, I don’t think we’ve even started to get our heads round the implications of the new police service. We heavily recruited quickly from a younger generation. Ronan Kerr27 was killed despite it being the third under car bobby trap  Local government manager, Belfast.  Businessman, Northern Ireland. 26  Retired PSNI senior officer. 27  Ronan Kerr was a 25-year-old Catholic officer murdered in 2011 by an undercar bomb. Dissident republicans claimed responsibility for his death. See https://www.belfasttelegraph. co.uk/news/nor thern-ireland/ronan-kerr-remembered-seven-years-after-murder-36767855.html. 24 25

10  LIMINAL SPACE: ORGANISATIONAL TRANSITION AND CONFLICT 

187

in so many weeks. And you know that a huge percentage of them wont check under their cars and I don’t understand how you get that message through to people, because people who remember how bad it was, including myself will check their car every morning, because they know the consequences. Getting young people to understand that is something we haven’t got are heads round.28

Ongoing disputes over flags, emblems, legislation and power-sharing mean that such liminality is not confined to policing. This is transitional space, with no end in sight. Such an environment requires significant and nuanced political skill from those engaged in public administration and private and third sector development. An understanding of the realities of political engagement and the nuanced nature of that engagement allows managers to make choices about when to push an agenda and when to choose a different battle. In the words of one senior civil servant, Sometimes you have to take account of the political realities. Not every sleeping dog must be kicked awake. Not every tattered flag must be taken down. You can understand that a city council official or a police superintendent will sometimes think—that is not the priority at the moment and there has to be a degree of judgement. The danger is you make permanent these type of accommodations and you never make people interrogate themselves and the outcomes.29

Organising in a Liminal Space As we have seen above, the reality of transition from violent conflict in organisational spaces is difficult, complex and requires organisational actors to develop skills, behaviours and competencies that go far beyond what less extreme environments expect. A liminal lens allows us to explore the impact of periods of post-conflict transition on organisations and the challenges they create for actors within them. It also allows for an understanding of how those transitions stall and lose momentum when transience itself becomes the norm and develops a carapace of permanence. One of the most marked and significant characteristics of the transitional timeframes in all our cases is there extended duration. These are not short  Senior PSNI officer.  Senior manager, Northern Ireland.

28 29

188 

J. MURPHY

processes—rather they take decades, instead of months or years. The legacy of the past is apparent in all our circumstances, and in many organisations it remains a direct concern of organisational actors long after active conflict has dissipated. A bi product of this extended temporal process externally and socially is the ongoing impact on organisations whose purpose and activity is tied to the development of society. There is also the more general concern of ‘change fatigue’ and the extended duration of organisational commitment to the process. In environments such as these of risk and stasis, standard forces of inertia within an organisation can be enhanced. Political instability, a persistent low-level threat and an inconsistent strategy act as breaks on innovation and the type of change which focuses attention on stability and peacebuilding. Indeed, as we have seen in Bosnia and Northern Ireland, it can not only hamper change but encourage a retrenchment back to initial conflict conditions. Inconsistent dynamics of individual and collective memory are also disrupted in such environments, and vulnerable to interruption and altercation by the external political processes in the wider system. The interaction of risk and disruption outside and an internal legacy of identity change can trap organisations in all sectors within liminal space, where the change is partial, stuck and incomplete. One of the most intriguing themes is interrelationship of historic and present contexts in the memory of organisational actors. Organisational memory is generally established through exposure to collective and personal experiences but can also be transmitted through public and organisational narratives (Murphy et al. 2017). In this way the internal and external contexts connect and merge through organisational interfaces, melding past and current identities. Individuals are critical to the development of how organisations sees their past, present and future. Symbols are also vehicles that help organisational members come to terms with aspects of experiences that are not accessible to conscious thought (Pratt and Rafaeli 1997), just as narratives shape change (Buchanan and Dawson 2007). Akgün et al. comment: “Stories, drawn from the firm’s history, which tell of experiences and events in the organisation, also form a foundation for new narratives” (Akgün et al. 2012: 101). Most importantly though, narrative is closely connected to change and how organisation members explain change to themselves, make sense of them and resist or embrace the change. In this, how organisational actors express memory and emotion in narrative form has an impact on transformation processes—especially those closely tied to external environmental discontinuity. In the words of Buchanan and Dawson (2007): “narratives shape

10  LIMINAL SPACE: ORGANISATIONAL TRANSITION AND CONFLICT 

189

meanings and can act as counters in the game of organisational power and politics around programmes of organisational change” (Buchanan and Dawson 2007: 673). Most studies of ‘contested memory’ post conflict happen at a community, group or national level (Nets-Zehngut and Bar-­ Tal 2013; Simoni 2013; Hackett and Rolston 2009). Our cases illustrate how these processes of contestation can also be organisational and tied to change endeavours. The cultivation of ‘prosthetic memory’ may illuminate why organisational actors are still focused on past loss or conflict engagement and how this organisational memory has been transmitted throughout the organisation. Conflict transformation is itself, a contested practice. While most actors agree on the utility and desirability of reducing conflict flares, the decisions involved in such a process are notoriously disputed. We have identified above manifestations of liminality within organisations in conflict zones. These include; ongoing risky and frequently disrupted environments; processes, both political and organisational, which run out of momentum before becoming transformational; ongoing resistance to change; and the importance of memory in reframing a post-conflict organisational identity. All of these factors feed into the potential for situations of liminality to become permanent, with negative consequences for organisations and peacebuilding alike.

References Aguilar, P. (1998). The Memory of the Civil War in the Transition to Democracy: The Peculiarity of the Basque Case. West European Politics, 21, 5–25. Akgün, A. E., Keskin, H., & Byrne, J. (2012). Organizational emotional memory. Management Decision, 50, 95–114. Beech, N. (2011). Liminality and the practices of identity reconstruction. Human Relations, 64, 285–302. Berg, M., & Schaefer, B. (2009). Historical Justice in International Perspective: How Societies Are Trying to Right the Wrongs of the Past. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bissessar, A.  M. (2009). Challenges Facing Senior Public Servants in a Plural Society. Public Personnel Management, 38, 1–15. Bollens, S. A. (2000). On Narrow Ground: Urban Policy and Conflict in Jerusalem and Belfast. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Bollens, S. (2011). City and Soul in Divided Societies. London: Routledge. Brinkerhoff, D. W., & Morgan, P. J. (2010). Capacity and Capacity Development: Coping with Complexity. Public Administration and Development, 30, 2–10.

190 

J. MURPHY

Brown, G., & Cole, M. (2016). The “Shared Workplace” Agenda in Northern Ireland: Lessons from Local Government. Local Government Studies, 42, 557–578. Buchanan, D., & Dawson, P. (2007). Discourse and Audience: Organizational Change as Multi-Story Process. Journal of Management Studies, 44, 669–686. Chreim, S. (2002). The Continuity–Change Duality in Narrative Texts of Organizational Identity. Journal of Management Studies, 42, 567–593. Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., & Söderbom, M. (2008). Post-Conflict Risks. Journal of Peace Research, 45, 461–478. Czarniawska, B., & Mazza, C. (2003). Consulting as a Liminal Space. Human Relations, 56, 267–290. Downey, A. (2009). Zones of Indistinction: Giorgio Agamben’s ‘Bare Life’ and the Politics of Aesthetics. Third Text, 23, 109–125. ECNI. (2015). Equality Commission advice on Good Relations in Local Councils. Belfast: Equality Commission Northern Ireland. Ellison, G. (2007). A Blueprint for Democratic Policing Anywhere in the World? Police Quarterly, 10, 243–269. Forrer, J. J., & Katsos, J. E. (2015). Business and Peace in the Buffer Condition. The Academy of Management Perspectives, 29, 438–450. Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. Journal of Peace Research, 6, 167–191. Hackett, C., & Rolston, B. (2009). The Burden of Memory: Victims, Storytelling And Resistance in Northern Ireland. Memory Studies, 2, 355–376. Hällgren, M., Rouleau, L., & De Rond, M. (2017). A Matter of Life or Death: How Extreme Context Research Matters for Management and Organization Studies. Academy of Management Annals, 12, 111–153. Hannah, S.  T., Uhl-Bien, M., Avolio, B.  J., & Cavarretta, F.  L. (2009). A Framework for Examining Leadership in Extreme Contexts. The Leadership Quarterly, 20, 897–919. Haufler, V. (2015). Symposium on Conflict, Management, and Peace: Comments from an International Relations Scholar. The Academy of Management Perspectives, 29, 461–468. Hearty, K. (2018). Discourses of Political Policing in Post-Patten Northern Ireland. Critical Criminology, 26, 129–143. Hughson, J., & Skillen, F. (2015). Football in Southeastern Europe: From Ethnic Homogenization to Reconciliation. London: Taylor & Francis. Johnsen, C., & Sorensen, B. (2015). ‘It’s Capitalism on Coke!’: From Temporary to Permanent Liminality in Organization Studies. Culture and Organization, 21, 321–337. Jugo, A. (2017). Artefacts and Personal Effects from Mass Graves in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Symbols of Persons, Forensic Evidence or Public Relics? Les Cahiers Sirice, 19, 21–40. Jugo, A., & Wastell, S. (2015). Disassembling the Pieces, Reassembling the Social: The Forensic and Political Lives of Secondary Mass Graves in Bosnia and

10  LIMINAL SPACE: ORGANISATIONAL TRANSITION AND CONFLICT 

191

Herzegovina. In É. Anstett & J.-M.  Dreyfus (Eds.), Human Remains and Identification: Mass Violence, Genocide, and the ‘Forensic Turn’. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Koopman, S. (2011). Let’s Take Peace to Pieces. Political Geography, 30, 193–194. Koopman, S. (2017). Peace. In The International Encyclopedia of Geography (pp. 1–4). Landsberg, A. (2004). Prosthetic Memory: The Transformation of American Remembrance in the Age of Mass Culture. New York: Columbia University Press. Lewin, K. (1951). Field Theory in Social Science. New York: Harper & Row. Mcconnell, F., Megoran, N., & Williams, P. (2014). Geographies of Peace. London: Tauris. Mcdowell, S., Braniff, M., & Murphy, J. (2017). Zero-Sum Politics in Contested Spaces: The Unintended Consequences of Legislative peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. Political Geography, 61, 193–202. Murphy, J. (2013). Policing for Peace in Northern Ireland: Change, Conflict and Community Confidence. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Murphy, J., & Mcdowell, S. (2019). Transitional Optics: Exploring Liminal Spaces After Conflict. Urban Studies, 56, 2499–2514. Murphy, J., McDowell, S., & Braniff, M. (2017). Historical dialogue and memory in policing change: The case of the police in Northern Ireland. Memory Studies, 10(4), 406–422. Murphy, J., Mcdowell, S., Braniff, M., & Denyer, D. (2018). Managing Contested Spaces: Public Managers, Obscured Mechanisms and the Legacy of the Past in Northern Ireland. Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space, 36, 443–459. Murphy, J., Denyer, D., & Pettigrew, A. (Early Online, March 2020). The Role of Framing Mechanisms in Explaining System Wide Change: The Case of the Northern Ireland Conflict and Peace Process. British Journal of Management. Nets-Zehngut, R., & Bar-Tal, D. (2013). Transformation of the Official Memory of Conflict: A Tentative Model and the Israeli Memory of the 1948 Palestinian Exodus. International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 27(1), 1–25. Parmigiani, A., & Howard-Grenville, J. (2011). Routines Revisited: Exploring the Capabilities and Practice Perspectives. The Academy of Management Annals, 5, 413–453. Pollack, C.  E. (2003). Burial at Srebrenica: Linking Place and Trauma. Social Science & Medicine, 56, 793–801. Powley, E. H. (2009). Reclaiming Resilience and Safety: Resilience Activation in the Critical Period of Crisis. Human Relations, 62, 1289–1326. Pratt, M.  G., & Rafaeli, A. (1997). Organizational Dress as a Symbol of Multilayered Social Identities. The Academy of Management Journal, 40, 862–898. Ross, A. (2011). Geographies of war and the Putative Peace. Political Geography, 30, 197–199.

192 

J. MURPHY

Schirch, L. (2005). Ritual and Symbol in Peacebuilding. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press. Simoni, M. (2013). Israelis and Palestinians seeking, building and representing peace. A historical appraisal,. Quest. Issues in contemporary Jewish history. Journal of Fondazione, Centro di Documentazione Ebraica Contemporanea (CDEC) Söderlund, J., & Borg, E. (2018). Liminality in Management and Organization Studies: Process, Position and Place. International Journal of Management Reviews, 20(4), 880–902. Szakolczai, A. (2000). Reflexive Historical Sociology. London: Routledge. Thomassen, B. (2012). Anthropology and Its Many Modernities: When Concepts Matter. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 18, 160–178. Turner, V., Abrahams, R. D., & Harris, A. (1969). The Ritual Process. New York: Routledge. Van Gennep, A. (1960). The Rites of Passage. London: Routledge. Weick, K., & Quinn, R. (1999). Organisational Change and Development. Annual Review of Psychology, 50(1), 361–386.

CHAPTER 11

Living in the Grey Zone: Decision-Making in Conflict and Transition

Throughout our case studies we see a common theme of ambiguous and compromised decision-making in conflict contexts. Again and again, organisational actors are required to make choices which in other circumstances would neither be procedurally correct, nor morally appropriate. These decisions are made for many reasons, including the need to keep people safe, to dampen down difficult and sometimes dangerous situations, or to save time, energy and leverage for another fight. This chapter seeks to delve more closely into the ambiguous ethics of decision-making in conflict and peacebuilding. It takes as its central focus a concept first developed by Primo Levi in his reflective account of holocaust experiences, The Drowned and the Saved (Levi 1986). In this narrative, Levi introduces us to the ‘the grey zone’ a morally ambiguous space where ideas of right and wrong are no longer absolute or even meaningful. This concept is interesting in that it gives a frame within which to consider the difficulties and challenges of decision-making in volatile, conflict-affected states. To explore it further, we will look first at how such circumstances are addressed within research on extreme contexts and actor behaviours, before turning to two associated ideas that arise from our cases. The first of these is the duality of ‘fear’ and ‘courage’, which we see emerge strongly during conflict and its transformation. In particular we see fearful and courageous engagement in bargaining and communication processes that are vital to safety, stabilisation and progress. Secondly, we look at collective

© The Author(s) 2020 J. Murphy, Management and War, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49252-6_11

193

194 

J. MURPHY

engagement and the importance of a critical mass of support within organisations operates as the ‘connective tissue’ of peacebuilding activity.

The ‘Grey Zone’ in Conflict and Decision-Making In his essay collection The Drowned and the Saved, Italian Holocaust survivor Primo Levi speaks about the moral ambiguity of individuals and groups trapped in an environment of terror and complexity. He described such a place, as ‘the grey zone’: an ill-defined space, where action, in all its forms, is intricate enough to “confuse our need to judge” (Levi 1986: 27). The core of Levi’s argument is the need for observers to resist a simple narrative of right and wrong, which he contends, fails to explain the inherent difficulty of such situations. He reflects, Have we—we who have returned—been able to understand and make others understand our experience? What we commonly mean to ‘understand’ coincides with ‘simplify’: without profound simplification the world around us would be an infinite, undefined tangle that would defy our ability to orient ourselves and decide upon our actions. (Levi 1986: 22)

Levi’s subjects were facing the ultimate horror of Auschwitz (as he was), but this dilemma is a useful starting point for anyone with an interest in decision-making and decision-­taking in ambiguous or contested settings. Framing organisational choices and judgements in this way is helpful in understanding how individuals and groups operate in extreme contexts where ‘wicked problems’ are predominant and ‘binary’ thinking is rendered inadequate (Grint 2010). Such environments of ambiguity give rise to both difficulties of decision-­making and a range of adaptive behaviours and approaches (Heifetz et al. 2002). These contexts signify some of the toughest challenges faced by those managing in contested environments and also confront us with situations in which adaptive ‘leadership’ behaviours are most visible (Heifetz et al. 2009). When there is no obviously correct path to follow, or the consequences are pernicious for both organisational actors and their wider citizenries, choices become blurred, obscured and complex. Managers may make decisions that diverge from regulation, or the rule of law, as well ones which collide with organisational or social norms. Alternatively, they may intervene dynamically in situations where action has the potential to backfire personally and professionally. In such risky, adaptive contexts, good judgement is critical (Heifetz et al. 2002). A concern with the moral ambiguities of extreme

11  LIVING IN THE GREY ZONE: DECISION-MAKING IN CONFLICT… 

195

environments are often associated with the concept of ‘wicked problems’—that is to say, dilemmas with no easy or recognisable solution (Head and Alford 2013). The distinction between of ‘Tame’ (benign) and ‘Wicked’ (malignant) problems was first outlined by Rittel and Webber, who describe tame problems as definable in terms of the scope of the problem, the process for solving the problem and the fact that the solution is self-evident when found (Rittel and Webber 1973). In contrast, wicked problems are unbounded and have no test to validate the solution and no way also to identify the “waves of consequence over an extended—virtually unbounded—period of time” (Rittel and Webber 1973: 163). These persistent dilemmas are also categorised by the ambiguity, complexity and uncertainty of the nature of the problem and the impossible choices which they present to those tasked with managing them (Grint 2010). Others have commented that wicked problems are very often about people and how conventional rules and structures can present impossible choices (Watters 2019). Leadership in such an environment is often collective, rather than a positional in focus (Buchanan and Hällgren 2019), allowing for example, the most qualified individual to emerge and lead, within a high-performing team (Fraher 2011). Scholarship on crisis environments identifies a number of significant leadership competencies that operate at a heightened level within extreme contexts. These include building trust, discouraging risky behaviour, identifying future vulnerabilities, making rapid decisions, taking courageous action and learning from crisis to effect change (James and Wooten 2005). Other research expands on this analysis to include situational awareness, formal and informal authority, sensemaking and an understanding of previous experiences as critical to managing activity in a risky environment (Baran and Scott 2010). Baron and Scott go on to categorise action within these environments as a process of ‘organising ambiguity’ and suggest that “groups within dangerous contexts must continually negotiate the ambiguous nature of their surroundings in an attempt to make sense of what is going on” (Baran and Scott 2010: 61). All of this scholarship leads us to an understanding that operating within extreme contexts requires a different set of behaviours and practices than would be apparent in more ordinary environments.

Fear and Courage In general, this book has attempted to explore the activities and the actions of organisational actors. Chapter 4 deals in some detail with the reality of living and working in and through intense conflict. However, we have not

196 

J. MURPHY

yet explored the visceral nature of these experiences and their impact on decision-making. One word which comes up repeatedly in interviews and conversations with organisational actors in our cases is that of ‘fear’ and the reality of living with fear for extended periods of time. We see this most vividly in Bosnia, where the menace of high-intensity conflict is still recent in memory and the devastation to infrastructure, communities and individuals is almost absolute. We saw in Chap. 4 how a medical student, when captured and imprisoned, transitioned from a position of fear to one of an exercise of personal agency through an ability to help others. In doing so, he also helped himself to survive in conditions and circumstances which are utterly alien and random in their lethal intent. As he says, It helped me mentally. I almost disassociated myself from where I was, that I was in prison, that I could be killed at any minute—that my life wasn’t worth anything to these people … What changed? I was given a role … I didn’t then think about myself … When I share my story its really about how hard it is to survive in situations like that. It’s not logic. You are a victim. A 22-year-old with a Muslim name in a town called Prejedor … Having purpose, that’s important. Doing something meaningful.1

We see too, how during the siege of Sarajevo those engaged in activities of resistance and survival in the enclave neighbourhood of Dobjina were caught within a situation of terror under daily mortar and sniper attack. Managing fear in these circumstances was a strategic imperative for those in leadership positions and was approached in a straightforward organisational way. Limiting discussion, formalising structures and auditing human and other resources were all vital. Decision-making in such an environment is both rapid and militarised in structure. Interviewees talked about the importance of keeping people occupied to take their mind of the situation, of assigning roles and physical tasks like digging trenches and tunnels to allows people to move around out of shot of snipers. Most important was the need to act, and act quickly, “You do not have enough time … When you do not have enough time you have to make decisions … In order to make decisions, you have to be brave”.2 The conceptualisation of leadership in such positions is upended and operates in a strikingly different way to ‘normal’ leadership practices. The same 1 2

 Former medical student and genocide survivor.  Civilian administrator of Dobjina, Sarajevo.

11  LIVING IN THE GREY ZONE: DECISION-MAKING IN CONFLICT… 

197

respondent spoke of the experience of leadership in a situation such as this as an “… inverted pyramid. Instead of being at the top you are at the bottom. You carry them on your shoulders. You are not that important”. The extreme nature of the environment is brought into stark relief by the life-­ and-­death reality of the context, “The important thing is that people find a way to survive. The people have to survive. They find a way”.3 While the conflict in Northern Ireland was low intensity, the pervasive nature of the threat was such that it ‘followed you home’, as one former police officer put it. As we have seen, others within the public service more generally were tasked with engaging in difficult conversation with current and former paramilitaries, with all of the risk that involved pre ceasefires. This was without additional help, support or security. Balancing engagement like this by community affiliation—one Catholic, one Protestant— was noted as a way of ensuring that complex dynamics within communities were understood and managed. Describing the work of himself and a Catholic colleague, one former senior civil servant spoke about a project early in his career when he was engaged in delicate relationship building activities in areas of high conflict intensity, X and I would have been risk takers. And expendable. The dynamic of a Catholic and Protestant. He could go places I couldn’t go, I could go places he couldn’t go. We were seen by a number of commentators as intelligence gathering. But the fact that we were in those communities meant we could provide a better insight to Ministers. Many of the people I engaged with were the very same people I grew up with.4

A willingness to employ both tacit political knowledge and personal networks is a thread that runs through many of these discussions, as was a personal willingness to utilise existing credibility within host communities. The retired civil servant we heard from earlier goes on to talk about the duality of this, There were no issues for me and I suppose a credibility which was important. He had legitimacy on one level and I did on another. We were thrown in because we would wing it—rather than traditional civil servants … Added to that you throw into the mix the politics with the hunger strikes and the

3 4

 Ibid.  Retired senior civil servant, Northern Ireland.

198 

J. MURPHY

deaths … a hardening of violence and then the dirty protests5 … in the midst of all of that you had the start of a dialogue to try to bring republicans away—at its worst time as they were burying the prisoners. So all of that was a nightmare.

The physical proximity to violence and people involved in violent activity, the heightened political tension and the extreme volatility within communities creates a challenging situation, but as our respondent comments, being from those communities himself, having credibility and working within a team all mitigated a concern of vulnerability. Such close proximity to paramilitarily elements and the existence of threat also arose in conversations with housing managers in Northern Ireland—particularly around the interface with what are euphemistically referred to as ‘local influencers’. One housing manager commented wryly, local influencers have influence—physical influence. That’s difficult for people living in that environment. Every community has them—particularly in areas where there is high unemployment, high drug use. We were not different except we had the Troubles wrapped round that. It can be very difficult … You have to keep a bit of moral courage when it comes to that.

He went on to recall the nature of the conversations he had over his career, “To say you didn’t worry about it—of course you worried about it. And that psychologically difficult. Your maybe at a fairly volatile community meeting. And they are saying ‘We know about you, we know where you live’. You have to have moral courage”. The period during the Troubles was described by another housing officer as ‘horrendous’. She recalled the location of offices within local communities and the nature of their ‘mixed’ (Protestant and Catholic) workforce, the rent strikes, attacks on staff “where there’s armoured cars, when people are getting shot, our office was blown up”.6 Over time, organisational approaches to such situations were developed. But in the same way that our former civil servant above did not withdrawn engagement, neither did the housing professionals in similar circumstances. We see similar responses within our Basque 5  The dirty protest (also called the no-wash protest) was part of a five-year protest which began in the late 1980s during the Troubles by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) prisoners held in the Maze Prison and at Armagh Women’s Prison in Northern Ireland. 6  Senior housing officer, Belfast.

11  LIVING IN THE GREY ZONE: DECISION-MAKING IN CONFLICT… 

199

case to intimidation and threat. Withdrawal of service may seem like an obvious response to an environment of fear and menace, but instead, the managers in these situations developed alternative strategies. More senior managers took on leadership roles and attended meetings instead of more junior colleagues. Meetings were held during the day rather than in the evening, when darkness increased feelings of vulnerability. Sometimes, in unusual circumstances, services were temporarily withdrawn and alliances built with community representatives to enable their resumption. Within housing services in Belfast, offices had security and doorman—a feature which was gradually removed as the environment normalised, but that in itself was a concern for staff who were now more exposed but still felt vulnerable. What is extraordinary about these accounts is the normalisation of low-intensity violence, bombing and murder, and the willingness of organisational actors to ‘get on with it’ through periods of significant danger. In Sarajevo we have already noted the persistence of civil structures operating throughout the siege and the pride of one university administrator that she could stand over record keeping and ensure the integrity of university diplomas awarded through this period. We see this too in the private sector, with business owners openly describing the fear inherent in dealing on a daily basis with paramilitary and criminal elements in all three cases. What is interesting in their accounts is an often parallel lack of trust in the law as a protection mechanism and an understanding that they were on their own as individuals and in relation to their businesses. As one commented, “I didn’t trust the cops and I didn’t trust the paramilitaries”.7 Decision-making then, begins to adapt, within a context of acute anxiety. It is worthwhile reflecting back on the experiences of our interviewee above who spoke about the first years of his successful business in Northern Ireland, “I can tell you we had a door which squeaked and I thought sometime in my life I’m going to work in this bar and that door will squeak and my stomach won’t tighten. I’ll not have fear in me. The first year was just like hell … checking under my car. Dark mad humour, but we never bent”.8 Rather than adopting an overtly structured approach, new norms and ways of working were developed that mitigated the worst aspects of paramilitary engagement, while keeping relationships as straightforward as possible. For example, rules against bad language (“if someone came in and swore we would say we can’t serve you and it went something 7 8

 Northern Ireland businessman.  Ibid.

200 

J. MURPHY

like ‘do you know who I am, do you want me to come behind there and rip your throat out’. It was terrifying”) set a tone to what was expected within the establishment. In the same way that the civil servants above utilised political and community knowledge and leveraged existing relationships, this businessman built connections with individuals and local communities as a protective mechanism against organised paramilitarism. New norms such as not playing the National Anthem at the end of the evening (an unusual thing for a bar in a Protestant area at the time) as did an unwillingness to display flags and emblems. It is easy to underestimate the courage that such decisions would have taken at the height of the Troubles, but our respondent is very open about the dread that these choices fostered. He was also clear about the compromises that were made in order to be able to trade successfully. Often these involved the employment of doormen and how these compromises have developed over time, I’ve found that when I have arrived into loyalist areas or nationalist areas people will come in and say ‘if you’re employing doormen, will you employ these doormen and it’ll be completely legit and you tell them what your rules are how you would like to run it’ and most things work out ok. That’s totally different to the old days when they would come in and say ‘you need to employ such and such’.

He also talked about circumstances such as the Ulster Workers Strike where business were either forced or voluntarily closed in protest at the power-sharing Sunningdale Agreement (Bardon 2005): “during the Ulster Workers Strike we dealt with it in a very Irish way, we closed the front door and opened the back”. But these compromises obscured a very firm line in the sand, “for anyone who has shown weakness—that’s the road to ruin. And anyone I’ve known who has joined in, let paramilitaries put machines in, laundered money etc.—its ended in a very bad way”. Fundamentally, survival in such a setting came down to acute situational awareness. As another respondent noted, “You need to understand the environment very well and understand the bad and difficult bits of it”. Others spoke about looking out of a window and seeing a bomb planted and the dread of living with “indiscriminate violence—lets bomb this place into submission”, accompanied by the resilience that was built up alongside fear. One of the most interesting characteristics of the both the Northern Ireland and the Basque case was the commonality of ‘silencing’ as an organisational experience in intercommunal conflict. Many

11  LIVING IN THE GREY ZONE: DECISION-MAKING IN CONFLICT… 

201

respondents talked about a fear of speaking openly, either about politics or just the concern that you would give away information about your identity (“Friends were saying—you need to be careful what you say. People didn’t feel safe. I don’t think that was a wilful thing—I think it was a survival thing”.9). However, the direct targeting of the business community in the Basque country was a more visible and resulted in significant flight of business from the region (Buesa and Baumert 2013). Again, the issue of fear arises in those engaged in both direct post-conflict work around memory and heritage and others whose aim is economic development, “Out of fear you can make people follow you. During complacent times why change anything? Out of fear we got success”.10 For others, making the leap to break taboos and norms of silence was very difficult, “I was quite afraid, even my family said, are you sure you won’t have problems … You felt that you couldn’t even say the words”.11 Operating in such an environment required bravery. One civil servant commented on the work of her colleagues, “It’s very courageous … It would be terrible if we anchored ourselves to the past and not the future”.12

Connectivity and Bargaining It is clear from our case studies that those who manage to navigate conflict environments with a measure of success have an acute understanding of political realities and a situational awareness which allows them to traverse rapidly changing, volatile situations Many spoke about the need to seize opportunities that arose even in the midst of difficulty. One of the Bosnian respondents spoke of the ‘clear slate’ presented by the war and the opportunities afforded by a new economic and political system. Another Northern Irish interviewee talked about the need to seize chances to create change (“take whatever opportunity you can”) and the need to look for ‘win-win’ outcomes to build connections and future influence. Perhaps the most telling is the importance of nuanced local knowledge as a bargaining tool. A senior civil servant who we heard from above was convinced that his localness was a huge advantage as well as presenting a security risk. Asked about difficult and delicate conversations with  Local government manager, Bilbao.  Businessman and regeneration manager, Bilbao. 11  Local government manager, San Sebastian. 12  Senior civil servant, San Sebastian. 9

10

202 

J. MURPHY

‘influencers’ he commented, “Would a British civil servant have been able to do it? No. The vast majority of senior civil servants would need a roadmap to get into west Belfast. We were able to build teams who had roots in those communities. People who understood the community. That was important. Things could happen very quickly at difficult periods”. This also involved a structural change in how work was done, as well as an attitudinal change around outcomes. For those working on the ground in Belfast in the 1980s, the emphasis was on shoring up communities and preventing a complete slide into paramilitarism. The instigation of the first nursery provision, work with the Irish sporting and cultural organisations, and engagement over facilities formed a core of this new structural engagement. Also included were early discussions about Casement park as a sporting venue. A civil servant involved in these early initiatives commented, “It was the first serious support for the Gaelic Athletic Association13 and opened up a dialogue about Casement, with a very prominent lawyer who is now dead14”. A mechanism of top slicing government money to encourage new and inventive approaches was developed, “Much to annoyance and horror of government we top sliced and spent money differently. We were ‘bending spend’ with the rationale that if these communities aren’t benefiting socially and economically why would they engage with us”. However, unorthodox approaches to the allocation of public money come with hazards, “All of that came with risks in terms of accountability. That’s what we were told to do by Direct Rule Ministers—get in and do something. Off course it all came back to bite us in the butt”. These type of hybrid initiatives give us some understanding of the difficulties and opportunities for public service delivery in difficult and challenging contexts (Hodgett and Johnson 2001). The lessons of getting decision-­ making as close to communities and to the issues as possible and the participative management of delivery were regarded as vital (“those were the jewels …”) to those who working within them. The people engaged in this work were also different, “Handpicked … people who came at 13  The Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) is Ireland’s largest sporting organisation and plays an influential role in Irish society that extends far beyond the basic aim of promoting Gaelic games. 14  This comment refers to the high-profile Belfast solicitor Pat Finucane. The 39-year-old Catholic was shot dead by loyalist paramilitaries in 1989. The de Silva report of 2012 conformed that agents of the British state were involved in the killing and that it should have been prevented (MCGOVERN, M. 2016. Informers, agents and the liberal ideology of collusion in Northern Ireland. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 9, 292–311.)

11  LIVING IN THE GREY ZONE: DECISION-MAKING IN CONFLICT… 

203

things differently. Introduced creative thinking, knew communities. Did things differently”,15 but the challenges were enormous and fundamentally defiant of more conventional statutory approaches, Difficulties were you were out of your own. Responsible for millions of pounds. Tasked with doing things differently but still had to be accountable. Political criticism at every turn and you had to be clever at picking off the politics. There was a fair degree of collateral damage. We were rubbing up against conventional government departments. I was running counter interference with departments in terms of that work.16

This concept of ‘running counter interference’ is interesting, in that it gives us an insight into the different approaches of public managers on the ground seeking to stabilise extreme violence and volatility and the conservative administrative bureaucracy they were ultimately accountable to. Add this to managing both formal politics and ‘the politics of the communities’ and a situation evolves which requires significant political skill to keep on track. The need for public managers in such environments to be able to “read where people are coming from—which community or they will create an absolute mess”,17 is a factor rarely spoken of but regarded as absolutely essential by those within these organisations. One interviewee raised a concern that new public management systems may not fully recognise the importance of this political and local knowledge, A lot of public servants who are being fast streamed never get the experience of real life … Its how to introduce into public programmes that there is some structured process of exposing the kind of decisions that you take and the way that they are taken to an understanding of the consequences they have. Its dependent on individuals and therefore there is a real risk of unevenness and discontinuity.18

The lack of a formal learning or development programme dealing with post-conflict issues was regarded by many as an enormous gap. For those directly in the line of fire such as our interviewee from the hospitality industry, the luxury of time to develop political skills was not possible, “all  Local government manager, Belfast.  Retired senior civil servant, Northern Ireland. 17  Senior civil servant, Northern Ireland. 18  Retired senior civil servant, Northern Ireland. 15 16

204 

J. MURPHY

my money but more importantly my mum and dad’s every single penny of my Mum and Dad’s was tied up in this bar”.19 Utilising local contacts had uses in a number of respects, including sharing information about business turnover to indicate that money was in short supply. Negotiations around the use of doorman and security were common to many respondents, and in an effort to manage demands, things like local community sponsorship of boxing and football clubs created connections which would otherwise have been missed. Further engagement within local communities is a shared them from interviewee in all our cases. One ruefully reflected, “Funnily enough, I probably had more contact with ‘community worker’s—can we call them that … than politicians. I never … hid my views and I’ve always been critical of politicians so most politicians stayed away from me”.20 For Basque managers, framing adversity as an opportunity for change was also a characteristic of local connectivity and knowledge. One who described the situation in the city of Bilbao as originally ‘dire’ commented on the overwhelming negativity of the environment as an “opportunity for our leaders to make bold decisions … that is one of the very few advantages of living through a very bad time”.21 But there was another component identified alongside the anxiety induced by low-intensity conflict, “We had fear and very good leadership. They were people who belonged to the country. They felt they had to give the country the very best of themselves. They were not in politics for their own benefit”.22 The connected and localised nature of the leadership meant that those charged with the revitalisation and reframing of Bilbao, were closely aligned and committed to their task. Much has been made of the collective nature of this endeavour (Morgan 2016). The development of an approach which might be paraphrased as’ seeing is believing’, capitalised on the visual drama of their ideas (“We were in the Catholic tradition of St Thomas. He believed when he saw. That’s just human”.) and focuses on a leadership approach which prioritised ‘solidarity’ over planning. In other areas of the Basque region, managers struggled to get to grips with issues of illegality and the Basque language and made significant (and sometimes risky) compromises. “Sometimes we just turned a blind eye—business as usual.  Businessman, Northern Ireland.  Ibid. 21  Businessman, Bilbao. 22  Ibid. 19 20

11  LIVING IN THE GREY ZONE: DECISION-MAKING IN CONFLICT… 

205

Trying to manage the situation as well as possible … Festivals were such a situation”. In Bosnia too, the need for relationships and a diplomatic approach to administer around an ineffectual system was highlighted. The interconnectivity of an extraordinary complex political system within that environment and the legacy of horror make present day attempts to manage public services incredibly challenging. During the Sarajevo siege, a university employee commented on the importance of the political influence of senior academic staff to protect the university structure and to ensure that the role of the organisation continued to be recognised and respected. In modern day Bosnia, cascading a decision through “the level of all of the cantons”23 is both professionally wearing and administratively frustrating. The only approach that was useful in such circumstances was a tactful one which focused on “cooperating with another canton”.24 Again, like Northern Ireland, skills are acquired in role (“I was not really skilled when I started but I have had to teach myself it is learnt from previous experience”.25). The difficulties of ensuring provision often mean balancing competing concerns and is equally apparent for other sectors. We saw in Chap. 9 the experience of an NGO engaged in ICT projects within Bosnian schools and the unforeseen impediments of engagement in an outcome of the ‘two schools under one roof’ system. The ubiquitous nature of this ‘under the radar work’ to move intractable problems forward was a leitmotif in all of the cases, but particularly in Bosnia where significant efforts centred on the politics and organisation of the entities, and their impact on everyday work and managers ability to implement change.

Collective Commitment Our last theme is the importance of collective commitment to the exercise of complex decision-making under duress. It is clear that careful judgement is an important and challenging practice for organisational actors in contested contexts. As we have seen above, the impact of natural fear and anxiety creates a particularly perplexing environment for those tasked with policy implementation and future visioning. All of the respondents we  Senior civil servant, Sarajevo.  Ibid. 25  Ibid. 23 24

206 

J. MURPHY

have heard from are able to identify times of fear and courageous behaviours demonstrated by themselves and their colleagues. We also see a heightened ability to bargain and negotiate, sometimes in situations of danger and under significant time pressure. We have already acknowledged that while all of our cases contain terror and appalling violence, the extreme nature of the Bosnian example operates at a level of conflict intensity and attrition which eclipses both Northern Ireland and the Basque region. The period of the siege of Sarajevo in particular, seems to exemplify collective commitment to managing through conflict. We see such duty exemplified both in the role of those within the University of Sarajevo itself throughout the siege and also within the defence of the Olympic suburb of Dobjina, an experience we have returned to throughout this narrative. In looking at the collective dimension of the organisational processes within the besieged city, we see a number of important inter-connections come to the fore. The first is the political influence and close connections of institutions which enabled them to operate and continue to partially function throughout the war. This solidarity and determination to defy which was so evocatively described in an earlier chapter by one of our interviewee—“we have a word zdržati—resist”26—meant that a collective responsibility motivated different organisations and departments to help each other. Importantly, when making decisions institutions sought out those in positions of influence, as the administrator in the University of Sarajevo commented, “we always had someone in an important position”. The interaction of a personal commitment to “the fight that has to be fought on a personal level”27 and the also to the shared and collective “solidarity in the town and in the university” was a potent combination. In the besieged area of Dobjina we also see management processes which are channelled through the trapped civilian population in military style. Situated at a critical strategic point, those in command developed a system of organisation which became the central protective mechanisms of the civilian population. The civilian commander, who had formally been an economist and commercial director in a major company in Yugoslavia oversaw the construction of ten kilometres of tunnels and the use of green areas such as balconies and verges to grow food. Leadership and management in such an environment takes on a different guise. As he commented, “you are thinking about how to stop people from dying. Pursuing your  Retired administrator, University of Sarajevo.  Ibid.

26 27

11  LIVING IN THE GREY ZONE: DECISION-MAKING IN CONFLICT… 

207

obligation towards others. You have to involve people and keep them working. Keep them occupied”. He went on So we connected all of the building using underground tunnels and other tunnels so the people would be safer and it wasn’t necessary to be above ground and exposed to sniper fire. We were really strict about hygiene and all of the premises that were used were cleaned on a daily basis. All of the green areas, grounds and balconies were being used as agricultural ground for people to grow food for themselves. We organised public services so people didn’t go outside—we provided people with what they needed underground. We shared experience, shared ideas … What is important is that the system worked not who was regarded as the leader.

It is essential to recognise that this was not a benign process—rather it was an extended outworking of what Grint conceptualised as the ‘command’ function, distinct from the tasks of leadership and management (Grint 2007). The availability of ‘military methods’ was significant. In the words of the former civil commander, “you can get people to conform and comply with what you do and there is no negotiation … There is no room for improvisation at the organisational level”. After the trauma of the war, perhaps unsurprisingly, we see the dominance of family networks of trust helping to renew and rebuild, especially in the area of economic development and entrepreneurship. What have been described as ‘trans-local’ entrepreneurs, mostly former refugees, seek to build businesses in their new states and within Bosnia itself to create links back to their original homeland (Halilovich and Efendic´ 2019). The desire to do this and to renew and rebuild old connections that have been savaged by violence speaks powerfully of an enduring collective commitment to future prosperity. Within a Basque context, a collective understanding of the nature of the conflict was difficult to achieve and articulate, but the need for those seeking to transform Basque cities and town to work together was clearly expressed as a “basic ingredient of leadership not leaders. You need a team of leaders who work together, to share ideas and come up with what is important for the city now”.28 These are not individual processes but collective experiences, drawing together those with diverge views but common aims in a collaborative space. Perhaps most remarkably of all, the  Senior regeneration manager.

28

208 

J. MURPHY

development of the Guggenheim saw a new and international brand merge and integrate with the traditional Basque space in a way which translated Basque culture through a new globalised lens (Mcneill 2000). As one interviewee commented, “if you want the world to know we speak Basque, you have to tell them in English”.29 While our respondents articulate the polarisation of Basque society during violence, they also make clear that this had “polluted everything else”.30 Conversely, the cessation of violence allowed managers to “pave the way and understand what we would be doing in a society after conflict”.31 For many of those dialogue and the centrality of universal human rights emerged as an ethical absolute. A collective understanding of the value of discourse and an “acknowledgement that we could talk to enemies”32 was critical. But that methodology and approach had to be found and taken ownership of, before a shared approach could be developed to come to terms with such a divisive past (“A policy can’t be implemented top down. People need to feel that they are part of it. Institutions should also be facilitators”.33). The shift in Basque political opinion is often associated with the murder of Miguel Àngel Blanco and the widespread street protests that followed his death. One commentator remarking on that period reflected, “that was a moment when society said no, that’s not possible. That was a big change”.34 Also interesting, is the proactive development of an international ‘community of practice’ around peacebuilding and international negotiation. The world-wide nature of this collective, collaborative engagement provided both access to other experiences and reassurance that the start-stop nature of the political process was common and that the ethical compromises necessary within the Basque conflict had also arisen in other environments such as South Africa and Northern Ireland. In place of a collaborative relationship with the wider Spanish state, this ‘umbrella of legitimacy’ was found abroad. In Northern Ireland, collective support for decisions is seen through the prism of managing relationships in organisations, communities and political groupings. Within Belfast City Council confidential ‘in camera’ conversations with political actors, facilitated by public managers and  Ibid.  Local government manager, San Sebastian. 31  Ibid. 32  Senior civil servant, San Sebastian. 33  Ibid. 34  Local government manager, San Sebastian. 29 30

11  LIVING IN THE GREY ZONE: DECISION-MAKING IN CONFLICT… 

209

NGOs were described as a “safe space to loosen the pin”35 and to allow politicians to strategise with officers on controversial issues without the public fallout of open discussions. For others, working at a community level, it was about building and maintaining consensus on the introduction of policy and the management of key stakeholder relationships among divided communities. One manager identified the importance of a clear line of sight on the political positions of those communicating with the Council, “My starting point in any conversation when something had happened or we thought something was going to happen was always ‘tell me who we are talking to?’. For me in managing the City, my success was inextricably linked to good strong relationships across the city. That became everything”.36 This avowed necessity of relationship building did not go unchallenged. He commented on the difficulty of sustaining a position, even internally with colleagues, “you have people saying ‘why are you building relationships with those people—you shouldn’t be talking to those people’, but the common thread for me was the ability to handle relationships and the need to triangulate—dealing with a society in conflict and the various groups trust and confidence, you have got to triangulate. So many question marks about who represents who, and who is actually talking for who—the old adage ‘never go to war on the word of one person’”.37 For other service delivery organisations who were proactively engaging in peacebuilding, the need for an ‘all in it together approach’ was identified as an important protection against inevitable accusations of political activity from both sides of the conflict. Reflecting on a difficult decision to engage in the community relations area, one public manger commented, “There was a resilience—a determination to do this. Not even a duty—people just felt they needed to do it”,38 and importantly, “The ethos and value system in the organisation was driven from the top”.39

 Local government manager, Belfast.  Senior manager, Belfast City Council. 37  Ibid. 38  Senior manager, local government, San Sebastian. 39  Senior housing manager, Belfast. 35 36

210 

J. MURPHY

Decision-Making in the Grey Zone The range of decision-making strategies and approaches that we can see above is indicative of the difficulty that organisational actors have navigating contested and violent environments. The impact of trepidation and courage on the choices and practices of actors within extreme contexts is difficult to quantify. We began this chapter with a discussion on decision-­ making and behaviours in environments of extremes. While it is easy to understand theoretically how organisational actors behave over short periods of time and while moving in and out of risky contexts, we understand much less about this as a longer term process and one which bleeds through professional environments and into personal circumstances. Many of those interviewed for this project were frank about the fear engendered by such demanding experiences and the long term anxiety that has to be survived. Many participants felt strongly about the potential of business and public sectors to create stability and opportunity within volatile environments and those transitioning out of conflict. An awareness of the potential volatility of the environment—impacting employment, investment, service delivery and organisational decision-making generally, was clear among all participants. The intensely political nature of the setting and the need for a heightened situational awareness and tacit political knowledge about the present and past nature of the conflicts and division was identified as critical, as was an ability to bargain and negotiate under duress. A belief that pro-social decision-making was not only an individual, but, importantly, also a collective endeavour was imperative. Many participants spoke about the trauma of major incidents and the impact on themselves, their colleagues and customers. Others spoke about the daily nuanced reality around the use of language within ‘mixed’ environments, the avoidance of ‘partisan’ words, phrases and nomenclature and an awareness of deep seated ‘trust’ issues with colleagues. One Northern Ireland participant echoed the words of others when they identified the need to be able to “read the rhythm of the conflict throughout the year and at times of particularly heightened tension”.40 Others commented on the need to be focused on imagery, how this impacted marketing and the cautious use of colours and national symbols. Lastly, it is important to appreciate the collective and collaborative efforts of groups, teams and organisations as a support mechanism for individuals in desperate times and as a way to  Senior manager, local government, Northern Ireland.

40

11  LIVING IN THE GREY ZONE: DECISION-MAKING IN CONFLICT… 

211

development a critical mass of support for change and peacebuilding when violence loosened its grip. Managing and navigating such a complex environment presents challenges for even the most skilled organisational actors.

References Baran, B., & Scott, C. (2010). Organizing Ambiguity: A Grounded Theory of Leadership and Sensemaking Within Dangerous Contexts. Military Psychology, 22, S42–S69. Bardon, J. (2005). A History of Ulster. Bartlett: Blackstaff Press. Buchanan, D.  A., & Hällgren, M. (2019). Surviving a Zombie Apocalypse: Leadership Configurations in Extreme Contexts. Management Learning, 50, 152–170. Buesa, M., & Baumert, T. (2013). Untangling Eta’s Finance: An In-Depth Analysis of the Basque Terrorist’s Economic Network and the Money it Handles. Defence and Peace Economics, 24, 317–338. Fraher, A. (2011). Thinking through Crisis: Improving Teamwork and Leadership in High-Risk Fields. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Grint, K. (2007). Leadership, management and command: rethinking D-Day. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Grint, K. (2010). Wicked Problems and Clumsy Solutions: The Role of Leadership. In S. Brookes & K. Grint (Eds.), The New Public Leadership Challenge. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Halilovich, H., & Efendic´, N. (2019). From Refugees to Trans-local Entrepreneurs: Crossing the Borders Between Formal Institutions and Informal Practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Journal of Refugee Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/ jrs/fey066. Head, B.  W., & Alford, J. (2013). Wicked Problems: Implications for Public Policy and Management. Administration & Society, 47(6), 711–739. Heifetz, R., Heifetz, R. A., Linsky, M., Press, H. B., & Safari, A. O. R. M. C. (2002). Leadership on the Line: Staying Alive Through the Dangers of Leading. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Heifetz, R.  A., Grashow, A., & Linsky, M. (2009). The Practice of Adaptive Leadership: Tools and Tactics for Changing Your Organization and the World. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press. Hodgett, S., & Johnson, D. (2001). Troubles, Partnerships and Possibilities: A Study of the Making Belfast Work Development Initiative in Northern Ireland. Public Administration and Development, 21, 321–332. James, E., & Wooten, L. (2005). Leadership as (Un)usual: How to Display Competence in Times of Crisis. Organizational Dynamics, 34, 141–152. Levi, P. (1986). The Drowned and the Saved. London: Abacus.

212 

J. MURPHY

Mcgovern, M. (2016). Informers, Agents and the Liberal Ideology of Collusion in Northern Ireland. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 9, 292–311. Mcneill, D. (2000). McGuggenisation? National Identity and Globalisation in the Basque Country. Political Geography, 19, 473–494. Morgan, K. (2016). Collective Entrepreneurship: the Basque Model of Innovation. European Planning Studies, 24, 1544–1560. Rittel, H.  W. J., & Webber, M.  M. (1973). Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning. Policy Sciences, 4, 155–169. Watters, B. S. (2019). Leadership in the ‘Wicked’ Problem of Bosnia’s Civil War: A Case Study Examining Ethical Decision Making Under Duress. Leadership, 15, 3–26.

CHAPTER 12

‘Go Where the Fissures Are’: Organisational Actors as Peacebuilding Entrepreneurs

The purpose of this book has been to understand how organisational actors manage through environments of conflict and contribute to building peace. We have seen in our cases the complexity of conflict settings and innovative thinking demonstrated by those seeking to further organisational objectives and improve social relations. This chapter draws together some of the central themes that we have touched upon throughout the book, including the significance of context, the centrality of actor agency and the power of collective action in creating change. It contends that organisational actors can and do play important roles as ‘peacebuilding entrepreneurs’ generating and sustaining conflict transformation efforts. In order to explore this context further it looks at the concepts of peacebuilding as an activity and its relationship to social, bureaucratic and institutional entrepreneurship, before it concludes with a typology of peacebuilding as an organisational enterprise.

Peacebuilding Entrepreneurship Any attempt to construct a definition of organisational actors as peacebuilding entrepreneurs requires a discussion about the nature of both peacebuilding and its relationship to notions of enterprise and agency, within and between organisations and institutions. The concept itself sits within the crowded arena of what used to be termed conflict resolution, and tends now to take the shape of conflict transformation—or an © The Author(s) 2020 J. Murphy, Management and War, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49252-6_12

213

214 

J. MURPHY

understanding that conflicts are rarely ‘resolved’ but can sometimes be ‘transformed’ into less violent and more manageable disputes. The term ‘peacebuilding’ has been resilient to change and is defined as a set of activities and actions to promote and secure stable and lasting accord, within an environment that meets the basic needs of a population and in which conflicts do not reoccur (Lambourne 2004). We can expand this definition to include actions that focus on the root causes of the conflict and support the rebuilding and rehabilitation of all sectors of a conflict affected society, including the repair of damaged relationships and the promotion of enduring solutions (Spence 2001). Outlined in this way, it represents a shift from ‘peacekeeping’—often a military exercise, to an ambitious transformation of political, social and inter group relations (Oberschall 2007). It also adheres closely to the conceptualisation of positive peace elucidated by Galtung (Galtung 1969) and the practice of building peace outlined as actions aimed at creating, strengthening, and solidifying accord (Boutros-­ Ghali 1992) and establishing a degree of security, and economic stabilisation (Autesserre 2017). Increasingly, the private sector is playing a greater role in supporting peacebuilding efforts (Collier et al. 2008) and researchers have become more interested in the interconnections of business behaviour and efforts at stabilisation and peacebuilding in conflict affected states (Forrer and Katsos 2015). However, this study would suggest that the sort of ‘peace entrepreneurship’ outlined by Fort (Fort 2015) in relation to multinational business enterprises, also operates at more intricate micro and miso levels within conflict environments. Interest on entrepreneurship in conflict zones, as a mechanism for peacebuilding activity and enhancement has also been the subject of considerable recent study (Joseph et al. 2019). The social, political and bureaucratic nature of such activity is also reflected in other areas of entrepreneurship scholarship. Work on the behaviour of bureaucrats and city managers in environments of citizen-inspired change illustrates the potential for public managers to fill organisational and institutional vacuums (Teske and Schneider 1994). Bureaucratic entrepreneurship is often closely associated with dynamic, public sector policy change, creative discovery and the creation and exploitation of new opportunities. This ‘purposeful activity’ is seen to be undertaken either in relation to an initiative or with an objective linked to the betterment or reinvention of the organisation itself (Bernier and Hafsi 2007). There is an element of what is generally referred to as ‘social entrepreneurship’ within many of these discussions. The approach is more focused on volunteerism and civic commitment with an objective of

12 ‘GO WHERE THE FISSURES ARE’: ORGANISATIONAL ACTORS… 

215

driving societal transformation through innovative enterprise approaches to creating change (Gandhi and Raina 2018; Mair and Noboa 2006). In addition to these ideas and interconnections, it is also useful to take account of the influential area of work which is generally termed institutional theory, in which the concept of the institutional field is a corner stone and in which ‘institutional entrepreneurship’ operates as a motor for change (Zietsma et al. 2016). Fields are generally defined as a community of organisations that ‘interact together frequently and fatefully’ (Dimaggio and Powell 1983) or as “a collection of diverse, interdependent organizations that participate in a common meaning system” (Scott 2014: 106). Field boundaries are shaped by both the practices and the symbols which shape the institutional logic of the fields themselves (Scott 1995; Suddaby and Greenwood 2005) and institutional change is influenced by these field characteristics (Wijen and Ansari 2007). The field concept is important to an understanding of institutional entrepreneurship because of its close connections to the possibilities of field and therefore sectoral change (Maguire et  al. 2004). Factors that influence change in fields include exogenous shocks, political crisis, natural disasters or environmental actions (Zietsma et al. 2016), and recent work suggests that change can occur through the behaviours of new actors who bring different perspectives, ideas and importantly relationships and understandings to the field (Maguire and Hardy 2009). With an ability to read environments, frame stories and induce cooperation (Fligstein 2001), such individuals take advantage of the flux in institutional field boundaries to develop new political coalitions and facilitate novel social arrangements which previously seemed impossible. Behaving as ‘skilled strategic actors’ (Fligstein 2001: 266) they can be seen to actively leverage conditions of crisis and change to develop new and different agendas within ‘nested’ and interconnected institutional fields (Eisenhardt 1989; Lawrence et  al. 2009). There has been increasing interest in connections between institutional and social entrepreneurship in its various guises and the development of peace in areas of entrenched conflict and poverty (Tobias et  al. 2013), particularly with its potential for pattern breaking change or innovation within fields (Phillips et al. 2014). Termed transformational entrepreneurship, most of this work seeks to unpack underlying mechanisms in which entrepreneurial individuals remove constraints and create new possibilities for themselves and others within society (Rindova et al. 2009). Evans and Kay (2008), for example, explore the role and activities of environmental activists operating at the intersection of multiple fields and creating change

216 

J. MURPHY

in those intersecting and overlapping areas. The idea of ‘points of leverage’ operating as decision-making opportunities (Evan and Kay 2008) gives us an insight into how ‘peacebuilding entrepreneurs’, who are also seeking to create change can operate at an interstitial level to shape and shift agendas towards conflict transformation objectives. These organisational actors often engage in active peacebuilding by traversing their own ‘field’, brokering new relationships, framing new sets of interests (Dimaggio 1988) identifying conflict defaults, and seeking ways to organise to fill gaps and seize opportunities. In environments which are largely without violence but not yet at peace, contexts are interwoven (Pettigrew 1990), requiring significant boundary spanning, brokerage, bargaining and political skill by the actors involved (O’Connor 2014; Murphy 2013). Actively crossing frontiers, bridging divides and harnessing collective support to build new organisational norms related to conflict transformation seem to be significant characteristics of this type of organisational activity. By bringing together overlapping conceptualisations of bureaucratic and social entrepreneurship and building on institutional entrepreneurship as a motor of change, we can begin to develop a working definition of how organisational actors build peace within a context of conflict and transition. The next section will look at a definition of peacebuilding entrepreneurship and a typology of behaviours and practices associated with this activity.

Towards a Definition of Peacebuilding Entrepreneurs and a Typology of Action For the purposes of this work, we define peacebuilding entrepreneurship as organisational activity which seeks to build peace in environments of conflict and contestation. It follows that peacebuilding entrepreneurs are organisational actors, situated in environments of contestation, pursuing opportunities to build peace through inter and intra organisational activity. In these definitions we see organisations as interlinked networks and peacebuilding activity as both an individual and a collective endeavour. While we work from the premise that hybrid entrepreneurship of this type, largely operates in and between conflict-affected environments, it is important of acknowledge that individuals and organisations exogenous to conflict zones may also seek to intervene and build peace.

12 ‘GO WHERE THE FISSURES ARE’: ORGANISATIONAL ACTORS… 

217

Four distinct peacebuilding strategies and practices can be identified within our three area cases, creating a typology of peacebuilding entrepreneurship activity. While they overlap and connect, all are important in understanding the complex activities and interactions within social, political and organisational processes. The first of these is a Social Commitment to Conflict Transformation. This includes a willingness to engage on issues which may be sensitive and controversial and an understanding of peacebuilding as an endeavour which forms part of their professional responsibility. The second is the Exercise of Political Skill resulting from situational knowledge and the ability to use this information to navigate complex problems. The third centres around the Exercise of Professional, Expert or Positional Capital in support of peacebuilding activities, and the fourth is the Cultivation of Intra- and Interorganisational Networks of Support which in turn reinforce and animate wider peacebuilding efforts. We will now turn to an exploration of each of these within our cases.

Social Commitment to Conflict Transformation This first element within our typology goes to the core of peacebuilding activity. For it to be realised, it requires individuals and groups who understand the causal dynamics of conflict and are committed, from an informed position, to actively engage in the betterment, stabilisation and integration of societies in its aftermath. This also includes courage to engage on issues which may be sensitive or controversial and an understand that building a cohesive society, on the basis of positive peace (Galtung 1969) forms part of their professional responsibility. For many of those in our cases, coming to the realisation that peacebuilding was a part of their professional obligation came slowly and was impacted by a growing realisation that the conflict was not external and that to be effective, their work could not be conflict blind. We see within our Basque case organisational actors making clear links between the fear and disruption which characterised the extended period of political violence and an understanding that in order to innovate and create change, collective engagement needed to occur at all levels. A desire for their towns and cities to look ‘beautiful’ was exemplified by the deliberate reframing of Bilbao in particular, away from a ‘grey dirty place’ to a statement of design and the power of aesthetics (Murphy and Mcdowell 2019). Also significant is a realisation that other organisational members need to be sufficiently upskilled to cope with the reality of engagement in the conflict sphere. The need to educate staff is

218 

J. MURPHY

mentioned repeatedly in all cases, whether that is the careful process of engagement which occurs with museum guides in Basque environments looking at issues of memory, or housing officers in Northern Ireland focuses on community safety and cohesion. For many organisations, this is a conscious decision to engage which can be seen to be both personally and professionally risky (“My family were concerned …”) but also as a responsibility which could not be ignored. We also have evidence from the cases of organisational actors advocating for this strategic direction against political opposition within their own organisations. In these situations, leadership at a senior level is vital to give sufficient backing and credibility to those beginning sensitive and difficult conversations. In other environments, public managers are encouraged and motivated to act when events themselves raise difficult and dangerous realities. In the Basque country we saw how the discovery of long buried victims of the Civil war inspire local memory work and the development of respectful, inclusive commemoration. The challenge of new ways of doing things and new systems and processes is just as difficult, if not more so than in more ‘normalised environments’. The requirement to, as one interviewee put it, “develop a calculus of consciousness” around conflict-related matters was raised in our Northern Ireland case, but also appears in other words and in other regions. It describes the realisation that decisions taken, even those which appear to be neutral, have conflict related consequences and that if, as one respondent reflected, “one of your guiding principles is avoiding controversy, then you will miss opportunities which are part of your job and you’re not doing your job properly”. Getting to that point, and understanding that connection was conveyed by many of those interviewed as a journey of realisation and understanding—the need to “cross the alps” and understand the intricate dynamics of social cohesion and the peacebuilding challenge. Very many of those interviewed saw their job— whether it be in service delivery, public management, economic development or the third sector, as peacebuilding work, overlaid by their sector and professional concerns. Many were able to articulate deep connections between issues of community cohesion and development, for example and conflict related problems, and to point directly at organisational strategies that were intimately related to the management and eradication of division (“we have a … strategy which is addressing post-conflict issues and we find that we have themes, segregation, manifestations of the past—flags, emblems, bonfires, dealing with the race relations issue, dealing with communities in transition—emerging from violence”.). Others

12 ‘GO WHERE THE FISSURES ARE’: ORGANISATIONAL ACTORS… 

219

commented on the existence of peacebuilding work which in the past was not recognised or labelled in this way and was simply a demonstration of the organisation engaged in the reality of its environment. For others, peacebuilding came alongside the construction of the best possible business, simply because it made financial sense not to divide your clientele and split your market (“We were way ahead of our time in the Northern Ireland situation. We could have gone the easy route but I knew if we didn’t we could build a better business”.). Very often such individuals were acting alone and outside large organisational structures, with little help and support. This is particular true for ‘trans local entrepreneurs’, returning to Bosnia to invest in areas they formally fled from as refugees. The need to engage in these cases was often articulated beyond an economic opportunity. As one expressed, “I’m just interested in helping people and helping their lives. If you want to do that then your business will grow. I want to give something back—not sit here and do nothing”. For many, it also represented a positive way of creating a way back to a past which was torn from them—even if it was to be as a visitor or a semi resident in the future. Engaging in this type of work requires an appetite for a certain amount of jeopardy. Respondents spoke about “[t]aking risks … managing up and down”. One recalled an incident in which he felt responsible to define and defend his organisation’s position on engagement with paramilitaries, as he was regarded as the knowledgeable person, “I remember there was an issue raised when members of my team were identified … as ‘talking to x, y and z’, when x, y & z were known to be paramilitaries. So interestingly, senior people saying to me, what’s your policy on this? It seemed to be my job to develop the policy”.1 Others spoke about being placed in difficult and sometimes dangerous positions with little back up because they were informed and engaged in a way that other organisational members were not and the need to protect themselves and their team, You find lots and lots of strategic opportunities where you symbolically can do something. You manage the risk of that and sometimes you have to accept that it going to be tipped over and you have to manage that, so you’re not completely vulnerable. There will always be an audit and the people who told you to do it will be gone. You got to be like an iceberg—9/10s of you needs to be below the surface.2

 Senior manager, local government, Northern Ireland.  Senior manager, local government, Belfast.

1 2

220 

J. MURPHY

For many organisational actors, especially those from the third sector, their engagement with peacebuilding as an aspect of organisational activity was one occurrence in a long running commitment to conflict transformation or mediation work. This is interesting, and within many contested environments has the potential to be regarded as a political statement in its own right. To cultivate awareness of and commitment to, the challenges of conflict transformation, external agents took a strategic decision to build relations and facilitate a greater understanding of the contextual issues involved in delivering services in deeply divided societies in what were sometimes difficult and dangerous circumstances. Often, activities of not for profit actors were focused on changing the nature of the interface between the organisation and the conflict, by building awareness, capacity and understanding that organisational and institutional structures could make a positive contribution. The complexity of this engagement is significant. As one Basque senior manager reflected on her role and that of her colleagues, “For (the managers) it can’t be simple can it? They have to manage their own institutions as well as peaceful coexistence. Peoples difficult life experiences. Trying to solve a problem that they didn’t’ cause … You are not working for yourself. What you’re doing will be for the next generation 20 years from now”.3

The Exercise of Political Skill One of the key behaviours we see demonstrated by accomplished and successful organisational actors in all contexts, but particularly within conflict zones, is the exercise of significant political skill. This skill consists of both an understanding of how to communicate ideas and strategies (“… in the Catholic tradition—St Thomas—he believed when he saw … that’s what we did”.4), and an ability to bring together mutually reinforcing coalitions of support and sufficient contextual knowledge to manage the nuanced implementation of strategies. Within the cases we see this variously being described as the exercise of “solidarity”5 and an understanding that the deep knowledge of sector specialists is not necessarily shared by others in decision-making roles, especially politicians (“It’s like you’re living in the middle of it. We are in a way used to it, so I was afraid of how it would be  Senior manager, Basque region.  Basque business executive engaged in regeneration. 5  So described by a Bosnian civil servant. 3 4

12 ‘GO WHERE THE FISSURES ARE’: ORGANISATIONAL ACTORS… 

221

accepted. The critics, would they see it from one part or the other. I’m a technician I’m not a politician”.6). For those in the Basque country the relative isolation of their peace process forced them into a creative position to define and generate their own approach (“We’ve had to find our own methodology”.7). For others it was exercise of intra political dexterity to innovate and create change using whatever leverage was available. This sort of ‘power assisted steering’ (Buchanan and Boddy 1992), was vital to get results when organisational actors were unorthodox and repeatedly challenged about activities (“I was running counter interference with departments in terms of that work … they didn’t like that”.8). The importance of balancing political complexity with good policy arose in all the cases, as well as the lack of specific conflict related developmental frameworks within most organisations who are confronted with these issues. The dependence on individuals and small self-managed groups weighted heavily on the minds of many spoken to for this study, You are depending on individuals because organisations don’t do that—it’s not part of the formulation of organisations as they develop their managers … The leadership is very important—those who are willing to be risk taking and innovative or coy and cautious.9

Such reliance also risks unevenness and discontinuity in the implementation of policy. The real challenge around this is the in judgements necessary when certain issues have to be prioritised over others and not everything can be dealt with at once. It is useful to revisit the words of one public manager as he reflected on the judgemental dilemmas facing those interested in conflict reduction and reconciliation, Sometimes you have to take account of the political realities. Not every sleeping dog must be kicked awake. Not every tattered flag must be taken down. You can understand that a city council official or a police superintendent will sometimes think—that is not the priority at the moment and there has to be a degree of judgement.10  A Basque civil servant working in the area of memory and heritage.  Ibid. 8  Retired senior civil servant in Northern Ireland. 9  Northern Ireland civil servant. 10  Manager in a Northern Ireland ‘arms-length body’ (ALB); ALBs are a specific category of public body that can include executive agencies (EA), non-departmental public bodies 6 7

222 

J. MURPHY

The need to be constantly alert to potential conflict flares, aligns strongly with a concern for situational awareness and sensemaking as live organisational processes (Weick and Quinn 1999; Cornelissen et al. 2013). As one interviewee said, “You should never be confident in a divided society—you should always be on guard”11. Respondents drew attention to the development of these behaviours and practices over time, as processes of organisation learning as well as individual understanding. The ability to manage a wide range of relations from political figures, to communities to former combatants was also pinpointed as a key aptitude (“managing relationships is everything”12), but this involves careful analysis (“triangulation”) of information and the need to listen carefully, and actively seek opportunities. For many engaging regularly with politicians, the need to act as bridges or boundary spanners between hostile political groups was important, even if much of this work was unhelpfully “under the radar”13 in complex and unhelpful political arrangements. Contextual knowledge and situational responsiveness is vital. Managing against conflict flares (Collier et al. 2008) and the reality of issues which are not resolved and may bubble up to the surface at any time was defined by many actors as wearing and exhausting: an unacknowledged reality of managing in conflict environments, as one observed “you take that stress home with you”.14 Evading such ‘flares’ requires roots within communities and “people who understood the community. Things could happen very quickly at difficult periods … Then you had the politics of the communities”.15 It also requires an understanding of organisational dynamics and how external events would play out internally, and a judgement around the resilience within the organisation to adapt and respond to challenge (Duchek 2019). As one senior manager in Belfast reflected, “Context is everything. You manage in the context you’re working in. Your staff are products of the environment you’re living in. Your politicians are instruments within the things that are happening outside, you do have to stress the need to adapt to that. You don’t have one tactic. You have to go where the fissures are in order to make progress”. He went on, (NDPBs) and non-ministerial departments (NMDs). 11  Bosnian education official. 12  A civil servant working in local government in Northern Ireland. 13  A Bosnian civil servant. 14  Ibid. 15  Northern Ireland local government officer.

12 ‘GO WHERE THE FISSURES ARE’: ORGANISATIONAL ACTORS… 

223

I think a good manager works in that grey space in the middle, and they work with implied authorisation from politician’s who they constantly touch base with and you know, they trust you to move into the space with the proviso that’s they’ve being given deniability. The three things that a good officer does in the grey space is he manages the legitimacy of the issue, in other words … what are you actually talking about that could make a difference. What you actually decide to put on the table is critical to whether or not you can broker agreement around it … So how you frame a conversation and what you put on the table at the same time is completely critical to how a debate progresses. And coming back to this deniability bit—you need to give them deniability. You need to understand politics enough to know how to manage the risk of legitimacy. Of knowing that you have potentially got things on the table—how are you going to make it safe for the politicians to talk about it and how are you going to make it safe for your officers to do things that they feel potentially uncomfortable with.16

Within these conversations three types of political space was explored. The first was the need to engage in private communications with political actors in a confidential manner. The second is the movement of these conversations to semi-public space where individuals can engage, before moving into a third public sphere with an agreed understanding that is crucially defendable to the media. This was regarded as critical (“the media never disappoints—will always act as lowest common denominator. Much more now than they used to”.17). Managing the complexity of such conversations in an environment coming out of conflict is complex and demanding. Another manager echoed this sentiment, “People engage with their own context and their own normality. There is a need to protect managers—environment is vicious and unforgiving. It really is at time ‘managing on the edge’”.18

The Exercise of Professional, Expert, Reputational or Positional Capital Many of the organisational actors who engaged with this study had worked within and between significant organisations in their geographic regions for long periods of time. Most had spent their entire careers grappling  Senior manager in NI local government.  Ibid. 18  Northern Ireland civil servant. 16 17

224 

J. MURPHY

with service delivery, innovation and professional development in the midst of violence. This also involved the exercise of professional, positional, reputational or expert capital to influence decision-making around processes of conflict and transition. The exercise of such capital can be seen at a personal level (“We are from these communities”.19), or through the development of a well-known and respected integrity over a long career. One described it as such You serve everyone. You treat everyone the same way. You develop codes of practice which protects the officers and enables them to treat everyone the same. To develop a set of values and ‘patrol those values’ and espouse those values because if those are not the values, then you’re doomed.20

For others, utilising their positions to create change and push forward on ambitious initiatives allowed them to exercise influence through established institutional norms and regulations. The funding of the revitalisation of Bilbao from regional budgets was pinpointed by one senior administrator as an important distinction which transmitted ownership and pride as the projects came to fruition. For not-for-profit actors, seeking to create change by working with organisations in the statutory or business community, the personal integrity of many of the individuals involved was seen as vital. Accessing elites within the institutional structures was only possible because of the individual credibility and veracity of the individuals engaging. This awareness of the intensely political nature of their role and the need for them to have political and professional credibility in difficult environments reinforces Pettigrew’s assertion of the relationships of power, politics and political activity within change agency (Pettigrew 2003). By maintaining, in all circumstances, their credibility and critical distance they were able to sustain a relationship that had a large degree of independence but enough engagement to be of value. Arts funders in Northern Ireland, for example, had to be prepared to recall funding if the resulting artistic output either did not meet artistic standards or was problematic in terms of symbolism or memorialisation. In an environment of change an internal ‘sense-­ making’ mechanism such as this was invaluable (Weick 1999). The requirement of even handedness within a complex context arose again and again  Housing official in Belfast.  Senior manager in NI local government.

19 20

12 ‘GO WHERE THE FISSURES ARE’: ORGANISATIONAL ACTORS… 

225

as did the need for ‘moral courage’ to exercise it. Many organisational actors defined themselves and their organisations as ‘honest brokers’ in difficult circumstances, “We will have the difficult conversations with you”.21 All were conscious that one or two transformational managers were not enough—the exercise of collective agency was what was required to create change. All were aware of the risks associated with a p ­ eacebuilding endeavour and the potential to be significantly damaged by risky engagement or a lack of support. One manager spoke about battling a cynicism which had developed after seeing colleagues and friends come off worst in encounters with politicians and the media, “You do see individuals trying to make a difference but they end up being demonised in my experience”.22 But most acknowledged that these were real issues for organisations and progress could only be made by going forward with them, rather than avoidance. The “responsibility to behave professionally”23 and a concern that blame will always rest with those seeking to bring change arose in all cases. “Tilting at windmills” was a phrase used by one Bosnian manager with regard to the political and institutional complexity facing him and his colleagues. Many of the processes that led to policy change and peacebuilding engagement in our cases were iterative and dependent upon significant interaction and commitment of organisational actors themselves. The length of these engagement processes and the relationships built through them illustrate that complex institutional engagement, with all its contextual difficulties and fragmented history, requires obligation that goes beyond traditional ‘change agent’ capabilities. Longitudinal engagement allowed for the processes to be stabilised over extended periods of time and to continue even in periods when environmental conditions became hostile. The role of these actors, working to frame and reframe relationships, opportunities and linkages between organisations, has been identified within the cases as crucial to the implementation of policies specifically aimed at peacebuilding (Kaplan 2008). By engaging in what were sometimes ‘reputationally risky’ programmes, actors paradoxically placed themselves at risk and moved closer to their own objectives. Existing research suggests that one early characteristic of successful conflict transformation processes is low level contact with external individuals, who are willing to  Basque manager.  A member of police staff in NI. 23  Bosnian civil servant. 21 22

226 

J. MURPHY

act as a challenge against organisational orthodoxy’s (such as journalists and cultural activists for example) and who can assist organisations to break entrenched patterns and open up lines of communication with opposing groups (Mcevoy and Morrison 2002; Mcdowell and Braniff 2014; Murphy 2013; Morrow et al. 2013; Coakley and Todd 2014; Fagan and Sircar 2015). The engagement of voluntary sector peacebuilding entrepreneurs and their contact with those in others sectors in all of our cases would underline the significance of relatively unorthodox approaches and a willingness to bend boundaries. For many individuals and organisations, investment in transfer of knowledge strategies such as educational initiatives with staff and facilitated engagement with citizenries was seen as vital to both tell stories of the past and lay deep-seating conflict issues to rest, even temporarily. It is striking that while those who engaged in this research were determined that conflict should and would be confined to history, almost all acknowledged the possibility that violence may return to their regions and much of their work was about preventing that recurrence. As one Basque participant reflected, “We decided we should invest in learning what our citizens think about politics and how relevant it is for them—so that conflict if it ever arises again, when it arises, it can be solved”.

The Cultivation of Intra- and Interorganisational Networks of Support For all three of our cases, networks of support were vital. Sometimes these were formalised and externally driven, through international funding systems and well defined existing processes. For others, they were developed through necessity or the arrival of an opportunity to create and maintain supportive relationships within their own regions or with others externally. We see for example, Basque participants engaging the development of existing professional support networks around the interpretation of heritage and the management of past trauma. These networks were developed at a local level, “It was a long and very interesting process. The good thing is that it was not just my decision—we were working in a team. Two working teams—one on history, one on teams on peace and Human Rights”,24 and also at an international level in terms of negotiation and disarmament. Such networks develop from organisational spaces to community  Basque cultural activist.

24

12 ‘GO WHERE THE FISSURES ARE’: ORGANISATIONAL ACTORS… 

227

environments where citizenry can also engage on issues of division and loss, “Apart from being trained we have also organised training for citizens in my community. It’s really beautiful. We decided to meet and talk. That’s what’s been happening in our town—citizens for 8–10 people. A facilitator—to talk about all of this. Working a lot on emotions”.25 Externally, the linkages created with international facilitation expertise in South Africa and Northern Ireland created a “legitimacy”26 which was difficult to achieve in other circumstances. For Basques, designing and developing their own processes and networks on many levels was identified as vital to moving peacebuilding forward. In Northern Ireland, the development of structured partnership arrangements saw participative management, actively creating linkages within and between contested communities. For others, the development of networks was really seen as the building of relations in places and environments which has previously been little known, whether that was through a mechanism of public meetings or private conversations. Intra organisational networks were also regarded as significant ways in which organisational history could be transmitted in narrative form and techniques and approaches communicated to new and developing staff, we brought staff in and a lot of staff, we just don’t talk about it, and a lot of staff experienced grief and loss but the issue of the conflict was never brought into the workplace but … it allowed staff to speak about their personal experience and some found that very hard. Others found it cathartic. It broke down a lot of barriers about where people came from and what their history was and doing it with people who were skilled was a very interesting way of dealing with it—the first time I’ve ever seen peoples personal circumstances.27

Inter organisational networks were understood as fulfilling two purposes. The first was a professional mission to improve service delivery, economic conditions or develop new and better ways of working. The second was to identify and cultivate ‘champions’ within other networks to mutually reinforce peacebuilding activity and make the ‘politics of engagement’ easier. Often this was about getting people “round the table with a much more collaborative mind-set”28 or teasing out “unforeseen  Basque civil servant.  Basque senior civil servant. 27  Northern Ireland housing official. 28  Basque economic development officer. 25 26

228 

J. MURPHY

consequences of engagement”29 such as ensuring all communities had opportunities to avail of initiatives and projects. Of course, it’s important to underline that all of these environments—and all of the organisational actors within them, are also dealing with the consequences of the past and any interaction they themselves may have had with violence and loss. For these individuals very specific decisions need to be made around network engagement, often with distinction between who actors were prepared to engage with professionally, as opposed to socially. For example, many Bosnian respondents echoed the views of one interviewee who quantified, “you don’t get to decide with whom you work, but you get to decide with whom you drink coffee”. The organisational actors observed in this study operated at the intersection of multiple institutional fields and used their leverage in those fields to agitate for change. These sectors and social structures intersect and overlap and obviously differ in relation to all of our cases. Many actors, from their diverse perspectives, worked as strategically motivated individuals or as small mutually motivated teams, leveraging connections and influence to move actions and activity closer to peacebuilding agendas. We see this with heritage officials in the Basque provinces and housing officers in Belfast. Often it is an organisational actor’s own position and their conflict transformation motivation which makes them powerful in the management of the networks they engage with. Campbell (2004: 75) points out, ‘entrepreneurs with more diverse social, organisational, and institutional connections tend to have more expansive repertoires with which to work’, and in all our cases we see individuals and groups with multiple connections reinforcing each other’s activity. The ‘under the radar’ movement reflected on by Bosnian respondents is demonstrative of this. Many also display tacit and explicit knowledge of networks, communities and environments which their less motivated colleagues had little access to. Such ‘network penetration’ may in itself be a characteristic of peacebuilding entrepreneurship. For some, there was a recognition that their individual skill set, connections and in some cases community and political background made them valuable as network conduits and illuminated opportunities for change which would otherwise have been overlooked. This additional of network dimension is integral to an understanding of how to build peace and establish organisational and institutional change and is reflective of an understanding that organisational actors utilise both their  Northern Ireland civil servant.

29

12 ‘GO WHERE THE FISSURES ARE’: ORGANISATIONAL ACTORS… 

229

embedded relationships and their ability to traverse networks, fields and corridors of communication, to build connections furthering peacebuilding objectives.

References Autesserre, S. (2017). International Peacebuilding and Local Success: Assumptions and Effectiveness. International Studies Review, 19, 114–132. Bernier, L., & Hafsi, T. (2007). The Changing Nature of Public Entrepreneurship. Public Administration Review, 67, 488–503. Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992). An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping. New York: United Nations. Buchanan, D.  A., & Boddy, D. (1992). The Expertise of Change Agent: Public Performance and Backstage Activity. New York: Prentice Hall. Campbell, J.  L. (2004). Institutional Change and Globalization. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Coakley, J., & Todd, J. (2014). Breaking Patterns of Conflict in Northern Ireland: New Perspectives. Irish Political Studies, 29, 1–14. Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., & Söderbom, M. (2008). Post-Conflict Risks. Journal of Peace Research, 45, 461–478. Cornelissen, J., Mantere, S., & Vaara, E. (2013). The Contraction of Meaning: The Combined Effect of Communication, Emotions, and Materiality on Sensemaking in the Stockwell Shooting. Journal of Management Studies, 51(5), 699–736. Dimaggio, P. (1988). Interest and Agency in Institutional Theory. In L. Zucker (Ed.), Institutional Patterns and Culture. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger. Dimaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. American Sociological Review, 48, 147–160. Duchek, S. (2019). Organizational Resilience: A Capability-Based Conceptualization. Business Research. Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Building Theories from Case Study Research. Academy of Management Review, 14, 532–550. Evans, R., & Kay, T. (2008). How Environmentalists “Greened” Trade Policy: Strategic Action and the Architecture of Field Overlap. American Sociological Review, 73, 970–991. Fagan, A., & Sircar, I. (2015). Europeanisation and Multi-Level Environmental Governance in a Post-Conflict Context: The Gradual Development of Environmental Impact Assessment Processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 33, 919–934.

230 

J. MURPHY

Fligstein, N. (2001). Social Skill and the Theory of Fields. Sociological Theory, 19, 105–125. Forrer, J. J., & Katsos, J. E. (2015). Business and Peace in the Buffer Condition. The Academy of Management Perspectives, 29, 438–450. Fort, T. L. (2015). The Diplomat in the Corner Office: Corporate Foreign Policy. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. Journal of Peace Research, 6, 167–191. Gandhi, T., & Raina, R. (2018). Social Entrepreneurship: The Need, Relevance, Facets and Constraints. Journal of Global Entrepreneurship Research, 8, 9. Joseph, J., Raouf, S., Daou, A., Ali, Z., Reyes, G., & Scott, M. (2019). Entrepreneurship in Conflict Zones: Exploring Transformative Subsistence Entrepreneurship. In British Academy of Management. Birmingham: Aston Business School 3rd to 5th of September 2019. Kaplan, S. (2008). Framing Contests: Strategy Making Under Uncertainty. Organization Science, 19, 729–752. Lambourne, W. (2004). Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Meeting Human Needs for Justice and Reconciliation. Peace, Conflict and Development. Lawrence, T. B., Suddaby, R., & Leca, B. (2009). Institutional Work: Actors and Agency in Institutional Studies of Organizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Maguire, S., & Hardy, C. (2009). Discourse and Deinstitutionalization: The Decline of DDT. Academy of Management Journal, 52, 148–178. Maguire, S., Hardy, C., & Lawrence, T. B. (2004). Institutional Entrepreneurship in Emerging Fields: HIV/AIDS Treatment Advocacy in Canada. The Academy of Management Journal, 47, 657–679. Mair, J., & Noboa, E. (2006). Social Entrepreneurship: How Intentions to Create a Social Venture are Formed. In J. Mair, J. Robinson, & K. Hockerts (Eds.), Social Entrepreneurship. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Mcdowell, S., & Braniff, M. (2014). Commemoration as Conflict: Space, Memory and Identity in Peace Processes. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Mcevoy, K., & Morrison, J. (2002). Beyond the “Constitutional Moment”: Law, Transition, and Peacemaking in Northern Ireland. Fordham International Law Journal, 26, 961. Morrow, D., Mc Allister, B., Campbell, J., & Wilson, D. (2013). Mediated Dialogues And Systemic Change In Northern Ireland Mediated Dialogues And Systemic Change In Northern Ireland – ‘Policing Our Divided Society’ (PODS) 1996–2003. Belfast. Murphy, J. (2013). Policing for Peace in Northern Ireland: Change, Conflict and Community Confidence. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Murphy, J., & Mcdowell, S. (2019). Transitional Optics: Exploring Liminal Spaces After Conflict. Urban Studies, 56, 2499–2514.

12 ‘GO WHERE THE FISSURES ARE’: ORGANISATIONAL ACTORS… 

231

O’Connor, K. (2014). Public Administration in Contested Societies. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Oberschall, A. (2007). Conflict and Peace Building in Divided Societies: Responses to Ethnic Violence. London: Taylor & Francis. Pettigrew, A.  M. (1990). Longitudinal Field Research on Change: Theory and Practice. Organization Science, 1, 267–292. Pettigrew, A. (2003). Strategy as Process, Power and Change. In S. A. Cummings & W. David (Eds.), Images of Strategy. Maldon, MA: Blackwell. Phillips, W., Lee, H., Ghobadian, A., O’regan, N., & James, P. (2014). Social Innovation and Social Entrepreneurship: A Systematic Review. Group & Organization Management, 40(3), 428–461. Rindova, V., Barry, D., & Ketchen, D. J. (2009). Entrepreneuring as Emancipation. Academy of Management Review, 34, 477–491. Scott, W.  R. (1995). Introduction: Institutional Theory and Organizations. In W.  R. Scott & S.  Christensen (Eds.), The Institutional Construction of Organization. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications. Spence, R. (2001). Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Who Determines the Peace? In B.  Evans-Kent & R.  Bleiker (Eds.), Rethinking Humanitarianism (pp. 137–138). St Lucia: University of Queensland. Suddaby, R., & Greenwood, R. (2005). Rhetorical Strategies of Legitimacy. Administrative Science Quarterly, 50, 35–67. Teske, P., & Schneider, M. (1994). The Bureaucratic Entrepreneur: The Case of City Managers. Public Administration Review, 54, 331–340. Tobias, J.  M., Mair, J., & Barbosa-Leiker, C. (2013). Toward a Theory of Transformative Entrepreneuring: Poverty Reduction and Conflict Resolution in Rwanda’s Entrepreneurial Coffee Sector. Journal of Business Venturing, 28, 728–742. Weick, K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. Weick, K., & Quinn, R. (1999). Organisational change and development. Annual Review of Psychology, 50. Wijen, F., & Ansari, S. (2007). Overcoming Inaction Through Collective Institutional Entrepreneurship: Insights from Regime Theory. Organization Studies, 28, 1079–1100. Zietsma, C., Groenewegen, P., Logue, D., & Hinings, C.  R. (2016). Field or fields? Building the scaffolding for cumulation of research on institutional fields. Academy of Management Annals., 11(1), 391–450.

CHAPTER 13

Conclusion: Managing Through Conflict and Transition

This book tells the often hidden story of organisational actors managing through and beyond violent conflict. It has drawn on the experiences of individuals and their organisations in three environments that have lived through and emerged from violence: Northern Ireland, Bosnia and the Basque country. It has sought to make a contribution to the emerging literature on organisations within conflict contexts by focusing not just on multinationals or public sector initiatives, at the experience of organisational actors themselves. The people and groups interviewed for this study were all managers within public, private or third sector organisations, at different levels of seniority and with unique skills and knowledge. I was often struck by how often those I spoke to had rarely, if ever, been approached by another academic about their experiences. This is in contrast to the conversations I had with political actors and community leaders. The conflict experiences of organisational actors are not often sought, but their narratives and insights hold a wealth of knowledge about how we can better manage and resolve intractable, long-term violence. In order to understand these experiences more fully, the book provides a theoretical and contextual framework to allow for a structured exploration of the cases. It looks both at locations individually and at sectors of practice, where common themes can be identified and experiences contrasted across the three settings. These themes—the delivery of public services; economic renewal; the management of space and of memory; and the role of non-governmental organisations, international actors and © The Author(s) 2020 J. Murphy, Management and War, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49252-6_13

233

234 

J. MURPHY

networks—were all identified as significant as the research developed and have been explored in turn. In practice, this meant a sectoral analysis, overlaid with a concern for the present and the past, the importance of actor behaviour, individual agency, collaborative efforts and of the centrality of situational awareness and political skill. In the last three chapters we turn to three alternative perspectives of organisational responses to conflict environments. The first is usefulness of liminality as a lens to illuminate the contradictions and challenges of conflict and organisational change. The second is the decision-making dilemmas which confront managers operating in ambiguous and sometimes dangerous circumstances. The penultimate chapter provides a definition and typology of behaviours and practices which allow us to understand peacebuilding entrepreneurship more fully and to identify it in other contexts. This type of research is complex, not least in that it requires a comparative analysis of diverse organisational processes in context and differing interpretations of what those processes mean. It also requires an engagement in challenging and complex regions, whose history of conflict is both similar and strikingly different. It is important therefore to underline that the conclusions drawn by this study represent an amalgam—a best guess of how organisations and individuals build peace, while delivering on core work within contested states. However, it is possible to see patterns of activity that are suggestive of particular outcomes. The most important of these is the impactful but rarely observed role of organisational actors fulfilling professional responsibilities and also acting as peacebuilders. Drawing attention to this is important because the activities of organisational actors has often been obscured and overlooked by academic research on organisations. It has also been largely missed from conflict studies, which have tended to veer towards community and combatants on one side and elite political actors on the other. Throughout these chapters we have identified a range of important behaviours and practices which contribute to peacebuilding. They include the exercise of tacit political knowledge and a flexibility of approach, adherence to best practice professional standards paired with an understanding that adaptive behaviour was required to manage dangerous encounters, a willingness to engage despite fear of harm, personal and professional credibility, and, most of all, a personal commitment to violence reduction and conflict transformation. Findings of this study suggest that previous work on administration during and post conflict has failed to adequately explain the intra and inter organisational processes at the heart of peacebuilding and that the role of

13  CONCLUSION: MANAGING THROUGH CONFLICT AND TRANSITION 

235

organisational actors, taking mid-level conflict related decisions is more significant that previously suggested. Building an awareness of the underlying mechanisms of conflict transformation and providing a typology of peacebuilding entrepreneurship allows us to look at organisations in these environments in a new way. This alternate lens identifies the purposeful activity of organisational actors as a peacebuilding mechanism in its own right and underlines the role of conflict transformation inspired entrepreneurs constructing a supportive scaffold for difficult, contested change in post-violence volatility. It also illustrates that for those managing during and after conflict, embedding peace is as much an organisational venture as a political one. I hope it goes some way to illuminate those experiences and to engender more discussion about the essential contribution organisations and organisational actors make to peacebuilding.

Taking Forward a Research Agenda on Peacebuilding Entrepreneurship While the reality of working in an environment of violent conflict is outside the experience of many, for significant numbers of people all over the world, ethno-political violence, instability and war are a reality of daily life. Navigating a way out of these conflicts absorbs the attention of national and supra national bodies, academics and NGOs alike. The human cost of such violence is enormous and its legacy cascades down generations, retrenching and reinforcing division. The need for a research agenda to understand better the role of organisations and organisational actors in such environments has never been greater. Those within organisation studies have recently become more cognisant that extreme environments, such as those characterised by violence and political instability can present valuable learning opportunities. The development of a motivated research agenda also requires a degree of clarity about the central concepts important to the investigation, the levels of analysis which would be the focus and the central questions informing empirical enquiry. Within work of this type, the core concern is the relationship between environments of violence, organisational activity and peacebuilding. Our interest is in why, when and how certain actor behaviours contribute to peacebuilding outcomes. Scholarship of this type requires that research be both contextually embedded at multi levels (individual, organisational, regional) and for the passage of time to be regarded as a core variable in its own right. In doing

236 

J. MURPHY

so it may focus on case studies in thematically linked locations as this work has done or be drawn to in-depth and individual experiences of conflict. Whatever methodological approach is adopted it should result in a greater understanding of the patterns that occur when organisations and the actors within them contribute to conflict transformation processes. Only through an analysis of organisational activity, in environments of contestation over extended timescales, can peacebuilding entrepreneurship be understood fully. Such research would reveal the mechanisms that underpin conflict transformation at an organisational level and how this work can be supported and resourced within efforts at resolution more generally. Conflict transformation is an outcome of individual and collective experience, at multiple levels over extended periods. A programme of research of this type must be multi-disciplinary in focus and able to contribute to wider debates and discussions within management and organisation studies more generally. In doing so it would allow those whose scholarly focus is on organisational activity to properly consider the experience of organisational actors operating in ongoing environments of violence and disorder. This would make a significant contribution to existing work on resilience and extreme contexts on the one hand, and to studies of individual cognition, group behaviour and leadership practices on the other. These environments are without doubt challenging for researchers and organisational actors alike. However, they also represent a vital area of engagement if academic research is to be relevant and impactful in the most extreme environments in which organisations operate.

References

2018 Irresponsible Politics Hold the Kupres’ Doors Locked. (2018, October 2). The Srpska Times. Abadie, A., & Gardeazábal, J. (2003). The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study of the Basque Country. American Economic Review, 93, 113–132. Aguilar, P. (1998). The Memory of the Civil War in the Transition to Democracy: The Peculiarity of the Basque Case. West European Politics, 21, 5–25. Aguilar Fernández, P. (2002). Memory and Amnesia: The Role of the Spanish Civil War in the Transition to Democracy. New York: Berghahn Books. Anderson, D. (2020). Inventory: A River, A City, A Family. New  York: Random House. Aquilué, I., & Roca, E. (2016). Urban Development After the Bosnian War: The Division of Sarajevo’s Territory and the Construction of East Sarajevo. Cities, 58, 152–163. Arthur, P. (2000). Special Relationships: Britain, Ireland and the Northern Ireland Problem. Belfast: Blackstaff Press. Autesserre, S. (2017). International Peacebuilding and Local Success: Assumptions and Effectiveness. International Studies Review, 19, 114–132. Baran, B., & Scott, C. (2010). Organizing Ambiguity: A Grounded Theory of Leadership and Sensemaking Within Dangerous Contexts. Military Psychology, 22, S42–S69. Bardon, J. (2005). A History of Ulster. Belfast: Blackstaff Press. Barkan, E. (2001). The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices. Johns Hopkins University Press. Barker, A. (2004). Shadows: Inside Northern Ireland’s Special Branch. Mainstream.

© The Author(s) 2020 J. Murphy, Management and War, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49252-6

237

238 

REFERENCES

Bassiouni, C. (1994). Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780. United Nations. Bassuener, K. (2015). The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Unfulfilled Promise. Berlin: Democratization Policy Council. BCSDN. (2017). Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Paper. In Western Balkan CSOs for Global Development. Balkan Civil Society Development Network. Beech, N. (2011). Liminality and the Practices of Identity Reconstruction. Human Relations, 64, 285–302. Belloni, R. (2001). Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Journal of Peace Research, 38, 163–180. Berg, M., & Schaefer, B. (2009). Historical Justice in International Perspective: How Societies Are Trying to Right the Wrongs of the Past. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Berman, D.  M. (2007). The War Schools of Dobrinja: Reading, Writing, and Resistance During the Siege of Sarajevo. San Francisco: Caddo Gap Press. Bernier, L., & Hafsi, T. (2007). The Changing Nature of Public Entrepreneurship. Public Administration Review, 67, 488–503. Bissessar, A.  M. (2009). Challenges Facing Senior Public Servants in a Plural Society. Public Personnel Management, 38, 1–15. Bollens, S. A. (2000). In State University of New York Press (Ed.), On Narrow Ground: Urban Policy and Conflict in Jerusalem and Belfast. Albany, NY. Bollens, S. A. (2009). Intervening in Politically Turbulent Cities: Spaces, Buildings, and Boundaries. Journal of Urban Technology, 16, 79–107. Bollens, S. (2011). City and Soul in Divided Societies. London, Routledge. Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992). An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping. New York: United Nations. Brandsen, T., Trommel, W., & Verschuere, B. (2015). The State and the Reconstruction of Civil Society. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 83, 676–693. Brinkerhoff, D. W., & Morgan, P. J. (2010). Capacity and Capacity Development: Coping with Complexity. Public Administration and Development, 30, 2–10. Brinkerhoff, D.  W., Wetterberg, A., & Dunn, S. (2012). Service Delivery and Legitimacy in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States. Public Management Review, 14, 273–293. Brown, D. R. (1999). Ethnic Politics and Public Sector Management in Trinidad and Guyana. Public Administration and Development, 19, 367–379. Brown, G., & Cole, M. (2016). The “Shared Workplace” Agenda in Northern Ireland: Lessons from Local Government. Local Government Studies, 42, 557–578. Buchanan, D.  A., & Boddy, D. (1992). The Expertise of Change Agent: Public Performance and Backstage Activity. New York: Prentice Hall.

 REFERENCES 

239

Buchanan, D., & Dawson, P. (2007). Discourse and Audience: Organizational Change as Multi-Story Process. Journal of Management Studies, 44, 669–686. Buchanan, D.  A., & Hällgren, M. (2019). Surviving a Zombie Apocalypse: Leadership Configurations in Extreme Contexts. Management Learning, 50, 152–170. Buesa, M., & Baumert, T. (2013). Untangling Eta’s Finance: An In-Depth Analysis of the Basque Terrorist’s Economic Network and the Money it Handles. Defence and Peace Economics, 24, 317–338. Burg, S.  L., & Shoup, P.  S. (1999). The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. Armonk, NY, M.  E. Sharpe Incorporated. Byrne, J., & Gormley-Heenan, C. (2014). Beyond the Walls: Dismantling Belfast’s Conflict Architecture. City, 18, 447–454. Calame, J., & Charlesworth, E.  R. (2009). Divided Cities; Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, Mostar, and Nicosia. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Calame, J., Charlesworth, E., & Woods, L. (2011). Divided Cities: Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, Mostar, and Nicosia. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, Incorporated. Casey, A., & Olivera, F. (2003). Learning from the Past: A Review of the Organisational Memory Literature. In Organisational Learning and Knowledge. Lancaster: Lancaster University. CCETSW. (1999). Getting Off the Fence: Challenging Sectarianism in Personal Social Services. Belfast: CCETSW. Chreim, S. (2002). The Continuity–Change Duality in Narrative Texts of Organizational Identity. Journal of Management Studies, 42, 567–593. Coakley, J., & Todd, J. (2014). Breaking Patterns of Conflict in Northern Ireland: New Perspectives. Irish Political Studies, 29, 1–14. Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., & Söderbom, M. (2008). Post-Conflict Risks. Journal of Peace Research, 45, 461–478. COMMISSION, E. (2020). Bosnia and Herzegovina—Financial Assistance [Online]. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/instruments/funding-by-country/bosnia-herzegovina_en. Cornelissen, J., Mantere, S., & Vaara, E. (2013). The Contraction of Meaning: The Combined Effect of Communication, Emotions, and Materiality on Sensemaking in the Stockwell Shooting. Journal of Management Studies, 51(5), 699–736. Czarniawska, B., & Mazza, C. (2003). Consulting as a Liminal Space. Human Relations, 56, 267–290. Darby, J. (1995). Conflict in Northern Ireland: A Background Essay. In S. Dunn (Ed.), Facets of the Conflict in Northern Ireland. London: Macmillan Press Ltd. Darby, J. (2001). The Effects of Violence on Peace Processes. Washington, DC: Institute of Peace Press.

240 

REFERENCES

De Cerro Santamaria, G. (2011). Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Globalization in Bilbao and the Basque Country. In D. Davis & N. De Duren (Eds.), Cities and Sovereignty: Identity Politics in Urban Spaces. Indiana: Indiana University Press. Dimaggio, P. (1988). Interest and Agency in Institutional Theory. In L. zucker (Ed.), Institutional Patterns and Culture. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger. Dimaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. American Sociological Review, 48, 147–160. Downey, A. (2009). Zones of Indistinction: Giorgio Agamben’s ‘Bare Life’ and the Politics of Aesthetics. Third Text, 23, 109–125. DPI. (2016). The Role of Civil Society in the Basque Country Peace Process. Democratic Progress Institute. Duchek, S. (2019). Organizational Resilience: A Capability-Based Conceptualization. Business Research. ECNI. (2015). Equality Commission Advice on Good Relations in Local Councils. Belfast: Equality Commission Northern Ireland. Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Building Theories from Case Study Research. Academy of Management Review, 14, 532–550. Ellison, G. (2007). A Blueprint for Democratic Policing Anywhere in the World? Police Quarterly, 10, 243–269. Esposito De Vita, G., Trillo, C., & Martinez-Perez, A. (2016). Community Planning and Urban Design in Contested Places. Some Insights from Belfast. Journal of Urban Design, 21, 320–334. Eyben, K., Morrow, D., & Wilson, D. (2000). EDI. Belfast: University of Ulster. Fagan, A. (2005). Civil Society in Bosnia Ten Years After Dayton. International Peacekeeping, 12, 406–419. Fagan, A., & Sircar, I. (2015). Europeanisation and Multi-Level Environmental Governance in a Post-Conflict Context: The Gradual Development of Environmental Impact Assessment Processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 33, 919–934. Faoleán, G. Ó. (2019). A Broad Church: The Provisional IRA in the Republic of Ireland, 1969–1980. Irish Academic Press. Fay, M.  T., & INCORE. (2001). The Cost of the Troubles Study: Report on the Northern Ireland Survey: The Experience and Impact of the Troubles. INCORE. Fay, M. T., Morrissey, M., Smyth, M., & Wong, T. (2001). The Cost of the Troubles Study: Report on the Northern Ireland Survey: The Experience and Impact of the Troubles. Derry Londonderry: INCORE. Fernández Vázquez, J. (2018). After the Quarantine: A Closer Look at Monuments to Victims of ETA in the Basque Country and Navarre. Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies, 19, 209–232. Fischer, M. (2011). Civil Society in Conflict Transformation: Strengths and Limitations. In B. Austin, M. Fischer, & H. J. Giessmann (Eds.), Advancing

 REFERENCES 

241

Conflict Transformation: The Berghof Handbook II’. Barbara Budrich Publishers: Opladen/Farmington Hills. Fligstein, N. (2001). Social Skill and the Theory of Fields. Sociological Theory, 19, 105–125. Forrer, J. J., & Katsos, J. E. (2015). Business and Peace in the Buffer Condition. The Academy of Management Perspectives, 29, 438–450. Fort, T. L. (2015). The Diplomat in the Corner Office: Corporate Foreign Policy. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Fraher, A. (2011). Thinking through Crisis: Improving Teamwork and Leadership in High-Risk Fields. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Franović, I., & Vukosavljević, N. (2016). WAR OF MEMORIES: Places of suffering and remembrance of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Sarajevo: Beograd Centre for Nonviolent Action. Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. Journal of Peace Research, 6, 167–191. Gandhi, T., & Raina, R. (2018). Social Entrepreneurship: The Need, Relevance, Facets and Constraints. Journal of Global Entrepreneurship Research, 8, 9. Giangreco, A., Carugati, A., Sebastiano, A., & Tamimi, H.  A. (2012). War Outside, Ceasefire Inside: An Analysis of the Performance Appraisal System of a Public Hospital in a Zone of Conflict. Evaluation and Program Planning, 35, 161–170. Glenny, M. (1996). The fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War. London: Penguin Books. Goddard, S. E. (2012). Brokering Peace: Networks, Legitimacy, and the Northern Ireland Peace Process. International Studies Quarterly, 56, 501–515. Goldie, R. (2020). ‘They Say It Like It Is’: The History of CounterAct. In Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice. Belfast: Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice. Goldie, R., & Murphy, J. (2015). Belfast Beyond Violence: Flagging Up a Challenge to Local Government? Local Government Studies, 41, 470–488. Gratz, D. (2011). Elitocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Its Impact on the Contemporary Understanding of the Crime of Genocide. Nationalities Papers, 39, 409–424. Grint, K. (2007). Leadership, Management and Command: Rethinking D-Day. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Grint, K. (2010). Wicked Problems and Clumsy Solutions: The Role of Leadership. In S. Brookes & K. Grint (Eds.), The New Public Leadership Challenge. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Guelke, A. (2012). Politics in Deeply Divided Societies. Oxford: Wiley. Hackett, C., & Rolston, B. (2009). The Burden of Memory: Victims, Storytelling and Resistance in Northern Ireland. Memory Studies, 2, 355–376.

242 

REFERENCES

Halilovich, H. (2013). Places of Pain: Forced Displacement, Popular Memory and Trans-local Identities in Bosnian War-torn Communities. New  York: Berghahn Books. Halilovich, H., & Efendic´, N. (2019). From Refugees to Trans-local Entrepreneurs: Crossing the Borders Between Formal Institutions and Informal Practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Journal of Refugee Studies. Hällgren, M., Rouleau, L., & De Rond, M. (2017). A Matter of Life or Death: How Extreme Context Research Matters for Management and Organization Studies. Academy of Management Annals, 12, 111–153. Hannah, S.  T., Uhl-Bien, M., Avolio, B.  J., & Cavarretta, F.  L. (2009). A Framework for Examining Leadership in Extreme Contexts. The Leadership Quarterly, 20, 897–919. Haufler, V. (2015). Symposium on Conflict, Management, and Peace: Comments from an International Relations Scholar. The Academy of Management Perspectives, 29, 461–468. Head, B.  W., & Alford, J. (2013). Wicked Problems: Implications for Public Policy and Management. Administration & Society, 47(6), 711–739. Hearty, K. (2018). Discourses of Political Policing in Post-Patten Northern Ireland. Critical Criminology, 26, 129–143. Heifetz, R., Heifetz, R. A., Linsky, M., Press, H. B., & Safari, A. O. R. M. C. (2002). Leadership on the Line: Staying Alive Through the Dangers of Leading. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Heifetz, R.  A., Grashow, A., & Linsky, M. (2009). The Practice of Adaptive Leadership: Tools and Tactics for Changing Your Organization and the World. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press. Heimstädt, M., & Reischauer, G. (2019). Framing Innovation Practices in Interstitial Issue Fields: Open Innovation in the NYC Administration. Innovation, 21, 128–150. Hennessey, T. (1999). A History of Northern Ireland. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Hocking, B. T. (2015). The Great Reimagining: Public Art, Urban Space, and the Symbolic Landscapes of a ‘New’ Northern Ireland. Working Papers in Conflict Transformation and Social Justice 6. Hodgett, S., & Johnson, D. (2001). Troubles, Partnerships and Possibilities: A Study of the Making Belfast Work Development Initiative in Northern Ireland. Public Administration and Development, 21, 321–332. Howell, J., & Pearce, J. (2001). Civil Society and Development: A Critical Exploration. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Hughes, J., Campbell, A., Hewstone, M., & Cairns, E. (2007). Segregation in Northern Ireland. Policy Studies, 28, 33–53. Hughson, J., & Skillen, F. (2015). Football in Southeastern Europe: From Ethnic Homogenization to Reconciliation, Taylor & Francis. ICG. (1997). Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in B-H.

 REFERENCES 

243

Jack, E.  P. (2015). From Belfast to Bilbao: The Basque Experience with the Irish Model. Working Papers in Conflict Transformation and Social Justice. James, E., & Wooten, L. (2005). Leadership as (Un)usual: How to Display Competence in Times of Crisis. Organizational Dynamics, 34, 141–152. Jarman, N. (2016). The Challenge of Peace Building and Conflict Transformation: A Case Study of Northern Ireland. Law and Politics Journal, 2, 117–128. Johnsen, C., & Sorensen, B. (2015). ‘It’s Capitalism on Coke!’: From Temporary to Permanent Liminality in Organization Studies. Culture and Organization, 21, 321–337. Joseph, J., Raouf, S., Daou, A., Ali, Z., Reyes, G., & Scott, M. (2019). Entrepreneurship in Conflict Zones: Exploring Transformative Subsistence Entrepreneurship. In British Academy of Management. Birmingham: Aston Business School. Jugo, A. (2017). Artefacts and Personal Effects from Mass Graves in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Symbols of Persons, Forensic Evidence or Public Relics? Les Cahiers Sirice, 19, 21–40. Jugo, A., & Wastell, S. (2015). Disassembling the Pieces, Reassembling the Social: The Forensic and Political Lives of Secondary Mass Graves in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In É. Anstett & J.-M.  Dreyfus (Eds.), Human Remains and Identification: Mass Violence, Genocide, and the ‘Forensic Turn’. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Juncos, A.  E. (2018). EU Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reform or Resist? Contemporary Security Policy, 39, 95–118. Kaplan, S. (2008). Framing Contests: Strategy Making Under Uncertainty. Organization Science, 19, 729–752. Kartsonaki, A. (2016). Twenty Years After Dayton: Bosnia-Herzegovina (Still) Stable and Explosive. Civil Wars, 18, 488–516. Kasirova, D. (2014). Implementation of Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Aid Initiatives: Evidence from Afghanistan. Journal of International Development, 26, 887–914. Kent, G. (2006). Organised Diaspora Networks and Homeland Peacebuilding: The Bosnian World Diaspora Network as a Potential Development Actor. Conflict, Security & Development, 6, 449–469. Knox, C. (2011). Peace Building in Northern Ireland: A Role for Civil Society. Social Policy and Society, 10, 13–28. Koopman, S. (2011). Let’s Take Peace to Pieces. Political Geography, 30, 193–194. Koopman, S. (2017). Peace. The International Encyclopedia of Geography, 1–4. Kotzen, B., & Garcia, S. (2014). Reconstructing Sarajevo. In LSE Cities Programme. London. Kovač, V. B., Tveit, A. D., Cameron, D. L., & Jortveit, M. (2017). “Bridging Old Relations”: The (De)Construction of Ethnic Identity in the Educational Context of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Teachers’ Point of View. Journal of Language, Identity & Education, 16, 32–44.

244 

REFERENCES

Lambourne, W. (2004). Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Meeting Human Needs for Justice and Reconciliation. Peace, Conflict and Development. Landsberg, A. (2004). Prosthetic Memory: The Transformation of American Remembrance in the Age of Mass Culture. New York: Columbia University Press. Lawrence, T. B., Suddaby, R., & Leca, B. (2009). Institutional Work: Actors and Agency in Institutional Studies of Organizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Levi, P. (1986). The Drowned and the Saved. London, Abacus. Lewin, K. (1951). Field Theory in Social Science. New York, Harper & Row. Light, D. (2017). Progress in Dark Tourism and Thanatourism Research: An Uneasy Relationship with Heritage Tourism. Tourism Management, 61, 275–301. Lucić, L. (2016). The Boys of Sarajevo’s War Tunnel. Metropolitics. Macarthur, B. (2012). The Penguin Book of Modern Speeches. London: Penguin Books. MačEK, I. (2000). War Within: Everyday Life in Sarajevo under Siege. Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet. Maglajlic, R., & Stubbs, P. (2017). Occupying Liminal Spaces in Post-Conflict Social Welfare Reform? Local Professionals and International Organisations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The British Journal of Social Work, 48, 37–53. Maguire, S., & Hardy, C. (2009). Discourse and Deinstitutionalization: The Decline of DDT. Academy of Management Journal, 52, 148–178. Maguire, S., Hardy, C., & Lawrence, T. B. (2004). Institutional Entrepreneurship in Emerging Fields: HIV/AIDS Treatment Advocacy in Canada. The Academy of Management Journal, 47, 657–679. Mahoney, C. W. (2018). End of the Cycle: Assessing ETA’s Strategies of Terrorism. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29, 916–940. Mair, J., & Noboa, E. (2006). Social Entrepreneurship: How Intentions to Create a Social Venture are Formed. In J. Mair, J. Robinson, & K. Hockerts (Eds.), Social Entrepreneurship. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Marchetti, R., & Tocci, N. (2009). Conflict Society: Understanding the Role of Civil Society in Conflict. Global Change, Peace & Security, 21, 201–217. Mcconnell, F., Megoran, N., & Williams, P. (2014). Geographies of Peace. London: Tauris. Mcdowell, S., & Braniff, M. (2014). Commemoration as Conflict: Space, Memory and Identity in Peace Processes. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Mcdowell, S., Braniff, M., & Murphy, J. (2017). Zero-Sum Politics in Contested Spaces: The Unintended Consequences of Legislative Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. Political Geography, 61, 193–202. Mcevoy, K., & Morrison, J. (2002). Beyond the “Constitutional Moment”: Law, Transition, and Peacemaking in Northern Ireland. Fordham International Law Journal, 26, 961.

 REFERENCES 

245

Mcgovern, M. (2016). Informers, Agents and the Liberal Ideology of Collusion in Northern Ireland. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 9, 292–311. Mcneill, D. (2000). McGuggenisation? National Identity and Globalisation in the Basque Country. Political Geography, 19, 473–494. Michail, E. (2012). Western Attitudes to War in the Balkans and the Shifting Meanings of Violence, 1912–91. Journal of Contemporary History, 47, 219–239. Micinski, N.  R. (2016). NGO Frequent Flyers: Youth Organisations and the Undermining of Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 11, 99–104. Moodie, M. (1995). The Balkan Tragedy. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 541, 101–115. Morgan, K. (2016). Collective Entrepreneurship: The Basque Model of Innovation. European Planning Studies, 24, 1544–1560. Morrow, D. (2012). Building Bridges: Supporting Peace- Building Through Funding Reconciliation—The Example of the IFI Community Bridges Programme. Shared Space, 13, 45–62. Morrow, D. (2019). Sectarianism-A Review. Belfast Northern Ireland: Ulster University. Morrow, D., Mc Allister, B., Campbell, J., & Wilson, D. (2013). Mediated Dialogues and Systemic Change in Northern Ireland Mediated Dialogues and Systemic Change in Northern Ireland—‘Policing Our Divided Society’ (PODS) 1996–2003. Belfast. Morrow, D., Faulkner-Byrne, L., & Pettis, S. (2018). Funding Peace: A Report on the Funding of Peace and Reconciliation work in Northern Ireland and Ireland 2007–2017. Corrymeela Community. Moxon-Brown, E. (1983). Nation, Class and Northern Ireland. Aldershot: Gower. Murphy, J. (2013). Policing for Peace in Northern Ireland: Change, Conflict and Community Confidence. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Murphy, J. (2019). Leading in Liminal Space: The Challenge of Policing in Northern Ireland. In P. Ramshaw, M. Silvestri, & M. Simpson (Eds.), Police Leadership: Changing Landscapes. Springer International Publishing. Murphy, J., McDowell, S., & Braniff, M. (2017). Historical dialogue and memory in policing change: The case of the police in Northern Ireland. Memory Studies, 10(4), 406–422. Murphy, J., & Mcdowell, S. (2019). Transitional Optics: Exploring Liminal Spaces After Conflict. Urban Studies, 56, 2499–2514. Murphy, J., Mcdowell, S., Braniff, M., & Denyer, D. (2018). Managing Contested Spaces: Public Managers, Obscured Mechanisms and the Legacy of the Past in Northern Ireland. Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space, 36, 443–459. Murphy, J., Denyer, D., & Pettigrew, A. (Early Online, March, 2020). The Role of Framing Mechanisms in Explaining System Wide Change: The Case of the Northern Ireland Conflict and Peace Process. British Journal of Management.

246 

REFERENCES

Murua, I. (2017). No More Bullets for ETA: The Loss of Internal Support as a Key Factor in the End of the Basque Group’s Campaign. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 10, 93–114. Nets-Zehngut, R., & Bar-Tal, D. (2013). Transformation of the Official Memory of Conflict: A Tentative Model and the Israeli Memory of the 1948 Palestinian Exodus. International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 27(1), 1–25. NICRC. (2002). Mural and Memorials Discussion Paper CRC. In: NICRC (Ed.). NIHE. (2020). The Housing Executive’s COMMUNITY COHESION STRATEGY 2015–2020. Oberschall, A. (2007). Conflict and Peace Building in Divided Societies: Responses to Ethnic Violence. Taylor & Francis. O’Connor, K. (2014). Public Administration in Contested Societies. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Osler, A., & Pandur, I. H. (2019). The Right to Intercultural Education: Students’ Perspectives on Schooling and Opportunities for Reconciliation Through Multicultural Engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Intercultural Education, 30, 658–679. Parmigiani, A., & Howard-Grenville, J. (2011). Routines Revisited: Exploring the Capabilities and Practice Perspectives. The Academy of Management Annals, 5, 413–453. Pettigrew, A.  M. (1990). Longitudinal Field Research on Change: Theory and Practice. Organization Science, 1, 267–292. Pettigrew, A., Ferlie, E., & Mckee, L. (1992). Shaping Strategic Change. London: Sage. Phillips, W., Lee, H., Ghobadian, A., O’Regan, N., & James, P. (2014). Social Innovation and Social Entrepreneurship: A Systematic Review. Group & Organization Management, 40(3), 428–461. Pollack, C.  E. (2003). Burial at Srebrenica: Linking Place and Trauma. Social Science & Medicine, 56, 793–801. Power, M. (2011). Building Peace in Northern Ireland. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. Powley, E. H. (2009). Reclaiming Resilience and Safety: Resilience Activation in the Critical Period of Crisis. Human Relations, 62, 1289–1326. Puljek-Shank, R., & Verkoren, W. (2016). Civil Society in a Divided Society: Linking Legitimacy and Ethnicness of Civil Society Organizations in Bosnia-­ Herzegovina. Cooperation and Conflict, 52, 184–202. Ramsbotham, O., Miall, H., & Woodhouse, T. (2011). Contemporary Conflict Resolution. London: Wiley. Rindova, V., Barry, D., & Ketchen, D. J. (2009). Entrepreneuring as Emancipation. Academy of Management Review, 34, 477–491. Rice, P. (2013). Personal Interview. Interviewed by Eileen Jack [in person] Belfast, 4 November cited in Jack, E. P. (2015). “From Belfast to Bilbao: The Basque

 REFERENCES 

247

Experience with the Irish Model”. Working Papers in Conflict Transformation and Social Justice 6. Rittel, H.  W. J., & Webber, M.  M. (1973). Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning. Policy Sciences, 4, 155–169. Robinson, G. M., Engelstoft, S., & Pobric, A. (2001). Remaking Sarajevo: Bosnian Nationalism After the Dayton Accord. Political Geography, 20, 957–980. Ross, A. (2011). Geographies of War and the Putative Peace. Political Geography, 30, 197–199. Schirch, L. (2005). Ritual and Symbol in Peacebuilding. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press. Scott, W.  R. (1995). Introduction: Institutional Theory and Organizations. In W.  R. Scott & S.  Christensen (Eds.), The Institutional Construction of Organization. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications. Simoni, M. (2013). Israelis and Palestinians Seeking, Building and Representing Peace. A Historical Appraisal. Quest. Issues in Contemporary Jewish History. Journal of Fondazione CDEC. Smyth, M., & Moore, R. (1996). Policing and Sectarian Division. Derry: Templegrove Action Research. Söderlund, J., & Borg, E. (2018). Liminality in Management and Organization Studies: Process, Position and Place. International Journal of Management Reviews, 20(4), 880–902. Spence, R. (2001). Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Who Determines the Peace? In B.  Evans-Kent & R.  Bleiker (Eds.), Rethinking Humanitarianism (pp. 137–138). St Lucia: University of Queensland. Suddaby, R., & Greenwood, R. (2005). Rhetorical Strategies of Legitimacy. Administrative Science Quarterly, 50, 35–67. Switzer, C., & Mcdowell, S. (2009). Redrawing Cognitive Maps of Conflict: Lost Spaces and Forgetting in the Centre of Belfast. Memory Studies, 2, 337–353. Szakolczai, A. (2000). Reflexive Historical Sociology. London: Routledge. Tanner, M. (1993, August 9). Team Spirit helps Olympic village to Survive Siege. The Independent. Taylor, A. J. P. (2005). War by Timetable: How the First World War Began. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books Limited. Teske, P., & Schneider, M. (1994). The Bureaucratic Entrepreneur: The Case of City Managers. Public Administration Review, 54, 331–340. Thomassen, B. (2012). Anthropology and Its Many Modernities: When Concepts Matter. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 18, 160–178. Toal, G., Tuathail, G. Ó., & Dahlman, C.  T. (2011). Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and Its Reversal. New York: Oxford University Press. Tobias, J.  M., Mair, J., & Barbosa-Leiker, C. (2013). Toward a Theory of Transformative Entrepreneuring: Poverty Reduction and Conflict Resolution

248 

REFERENCES

in Rwanda’s Entrepreneurial Coffee Sector. Journal of Business Venturing, 28, 728–742. Tonge, J., Braniff, M., Hennessey, T., Mcauley, J. W., & Whiting, S. (2014). The Democratic Unionist Party: From Protest to Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Turner, V., Abrahams, R. D., & Harris, A. (1969). The Ritual Process. New York: Routledge. Tveit, A. D., Cameron, D. L., & Kovač, V. B. (2014). “Two Schools Under One Roof” in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Exploring the Challenges of Group Identity and Deliberative Values Among Bosniak and Croat Students. International Journal of Educational Research, 66, 103–112. Van Gennep, A. (1960). The Rites of Passage. London: Routledge. Vaux, T., & Visman, E. (2005). Service Delivery in Countries Emerging from Conflict. Bradford: Centre for International Co-operation and Security (CICS), Department of Peace Studies. Verkoren, W., & Van Leeuwen, M. (2012). Complexities and Challenges for Civil Society Building in Post-Conflict Settings. Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 7, 81–94. Watson, C. (2007). Basque Nationalism and Political Violence: The Ideological and Intellectual Origins of ETA. Reno: Center for Basque Studies, University of Nevada. Watters, B. S. (2019). Leadership in the ‘Wicked’ Problem of Bosnia’s Civil War: A Case Study Examining Ethical Decision Making Under Duress. Leadership, 15, 3–26. Weick, K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. Weick, K., & Quinn, R. (1999). Organisational Change and Development. Annual Review of Psychology, 50(1), 361–386. White, T.  J. (2018). American Diplomacy and Economic Aid in the Northern Ireland Peace Process: A Neoliberal Analysis. Open Library of Humanities, 4, 3. Whitfield, T. (2015). The Basque Conflict and ETA The Difficulties of an Ending. United States Institute of Peace. Whyte, J. H., & Fitzgerald, G. (1990). Interpreting Northern Ireland. Belfast: Clarendon Press. Wijen, F., & Ansari, S. (2007). Overcoming Inaction Through Collective Institutional Entrepreneurship: Insights from Regime Theory. Organization Studies, 28, 1079–1100. Zietsma, C., Groenewegen, P., Logue, D., & Hinings, C.  R. (2016). Field or Fields? Building the Scaffolding for Cumulation of Research on Institutional Fields. Academy of Management Annals, 11(1), 391–450.

Index

B Basque, 25, 40 Belfast, 36 Bilbao, 41 Blanco, Migual Ängel, 41, 64 Bosniaks, 44 Bosnian, 19 Bosnian Herzegovina, 25 Business, 14 Business and peace (B&P), 13 C Catholic, 37 Change, 17 Civil war, 61 Conflict, 11, 12 D Dayton, 45 Decision-making, 18

Diplomacy, 14 Divided societies, 172 Dobrinja, 44, 67 E Economic, 13 Entrepreneur, 53 ETA, 41 Ethno-political, 1 EU, 37 Extreme contexts, 13, 19–22, 175–176 F Framing, 21 G Good Friday Agreement, 59 Governance, 16 Grand challenges, 19

© The Author(s) 2020 J. Murphy, Management and War, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49252-6

249

250 

INDEX

H Housing, 118 L Leadership, 17, 18 Liminality, 173 M Manage, 12 Manager, 12 Milosevic, 43 Museums, 172 N Negative peace, 14 Northern Ireland, 19, 25 O Organisational, 3 Organisational change, 175–176 P Peace, 3 Peacebuilding, 14 Political, 3 Positive peace, 155 Processual, 11 Protestant, 37

Public Administration, 15 Public management, 16 Public sector, 13 R Republican, 37 Republika Srpska (RS), 44 Resilience, 19–22 S San Sebastian, 42 Sarajevo, 43, 65 Sensemaking, 20 System-wide, 18 T The Troubles, 36, 55, 79 W Wicked problems, 18 Witness seminars, 25 Workplace, 17 Y Yugoslavia, 42 Z Zones of indistinction, 174