Malaysia: State and Civil Society in Transition 9781626373846

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MALAYSIA

MALAYSIA STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN TRANSITION VIDHU VERMA

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

Published in the United States of America in 2002 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2002 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Verma, Vidhu, 1961– Malaysia, state and civil society in transition / by Vidhu Verma. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-58826-091-7 (alk. paper) 1. Malaysia—Politics and government. 2. Civil society—Malaysia. 3. Democratization—Malaysia. 4. Islam—Malaysia. I. Title. JQ1062.A58 V47 2002 320.9595'09'05—dc21 2002017813 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

∞

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984. 5 4 3 2 1

For my mother

Contents

Preface

ix

1 Introduction

1

2 Nationalism and Nation-building

17

3 Citizenship and the New Economic Policy

53

4 Islam and the Malay Community

89

5 State, Authoritarianism, and Plural Society

127

6 Debating Human Rights

167

7 Conclusion

207

Glossary List of Abbreviations and Acronyms Bibliography Index About the Book

217 219 223 245 253

vii

Preface

This book grew out of years of observation and research on the Malaysian state, Malaysian society, and the revival of the Islamic ethos in Malaysia. It has not been an easy project. There is a notable absence of primary sources on the origins, activities, and ideologies of nongovernmental groups in Malaysia, including various Islamic groups. This lack of reliable information is compounded by the minimal and biased coverage of opposition groups, political parties, and other nongovernmental groups in the government-controlled mass media. These limitations are challenging for anyone conducting research on the country. Nevertheless, I have attempted here to identify and explore the major themes in Malaysian politics, with an emphasis on the development of civil society. The common thread is the nature and character of the state in Malaysia, as well as the principal economic, political, and ideological changes in the Malay community since independence. (Throughout, I use the term Malaysia in reference to the Federation of Malaysia, established in 1963 and incorporating the Federation of Malaya; I use the term Malaya in reference to the Federation of Malaya prior to 1963.) I hope that the book will increase interest in the subject of political science in universities and colleges within Malaysia, at the same time that it fills a conspicuous gap in studies of contemporary Malaysian politics. *** Many people have given me their invaluable support, and I would like to acknowledge their encouragement at various stages of my research. These include Baladas Ghoshal, visiting professor from Jawaharlal University, at the University of Malaya, and Chandra Muzaffar, who was kind enough to share his time and his knowledge on this subject. I am deeply indebted to Khoo Kay Kim for the many hours he spent explaining the nature of ix

x

Preface

Malaysian politics; although we disagreed on many aspects of my research, his encouragement during the initial stages of this project was very valuable. Both Sumit Guha and Indrani Chatterjee offered many valuable suggestions regarding the manuscript. I would also like to thank Ivy Josiah, Sharifah Zuriah Aljeffri, and Pauline Jasudason for clarifying many sensitive aspects of Malaysian history and politics. I am indebted to the helpful officials and staff of the National University Library, the University of Malaya Library, the British Council Library, and the Asian and Pacific Development Center—all in Kuala Lumpur—and the Nehru Memorial Library in New Delhi. I would never have completed this study without the help of Marty Logan, who read drafts of all the chapters, made detailed comments, and took great care to weed out errors. Special thanks to Leanne Anderson, my editor at Lynne Rienner Publishers, for her patience and enthusiasm. Only I, of course, am to be held responsible for the views articulated here. The idea for this book arose from discussions with my husband, Ranjan; all thanks to him for encouraging me to complete it. Finally, without my son, Aman, who provided pleasant distraction, I would not have had the motivation to carry the project through. — Vidhu Verma

1 Introduction

In this book I describe and analyze the role of state and civil society in Malaysia in two contexts: globalization and changes in the concept of nation-state. Today globalization is changing economic relations among individuals, corporations, and nation-states by integrating markets and technologies to an extent never witnessed before; it signifies changes in national economies through the creation of a more interconnected world.1 The process of economic globalization has given rise to uncontrollable market forces and institutions like transnational corporations that owe loyalty to no nation-state. It is crucial to understand how this trend influences states and societies; to understand politics in the context of globalization is to understand the state and its relation to civil society. Many globalization theorists assert the need to reevaluate the modern nation-state as a political, economic, and cultural unit because it is widely acknowledged that we live in an age when national cultures, national economies, and national sovereignty are fluid.2 This assertion has special significance in Southeast Asia, especially Malaysia, where the concept of nation never provided an adequate analytical mode for conceptualizing social relations. Thus the claim that the nation-state is being rendered obsolete by contemporary developments does not hold true. At the same time, change is occurring via the dynamics of the global economy, as well as the rapid growth of transnational links that has implications for the growth of civil society and democracy: regional and global interconnectedness impacts key notions of accountability, popular participation, and the rights and duties of citizens. The idea of civil society has a long intellectual tradition in Western political theory and is associated with autonomous space in society, distinct from and independent of the authority of the state.3 But not until the 1980s and 1990s did the concept of civil society find common usage due to the collapse of totalitarianism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; thereafter it was proclaimed a necessary condition for any transition to democracy. 1

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Currently, the role of civil society is popularly reinterpreted as protecting individual liberty and is broadly identified as an arena of freedom outside the state—a space for individual autonomy, voluntary associations, and plurality in an era marked by market economies and political democracies. John Keane has formulated the recent trends in political theory: The emerging consensus that civil society is a realm of freedom correctly highlights its basic value as a condition of democracy; where there is no civil society there cannot be citizens with capacities to choose their identities, entitlements and duties within a political-legal framework. (Keane 1998, 114)

In contemporary political discourse, the idea of civil society represents a spontaneous order, a set of associations and communal bodies that acts as a buffer between state power and its citizens. Under this understanding of participatory democracy, civil society would include associations—soccer teams, theater groups, households, trade unions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and religious groups—irrespective of their goals, aims, and relationship to individual freedoms. This participatory conception of civil society is popular with social activists, modern libertarian radicals, and free-market believers who, despite other disagreements, converge on the aim to protect civil society from encroachment by the state and bureaucratic administrations.4 In another rights-based conception, civil society is defined as the domain of institutions and associations that exist outside the state but possess a legal and institutional structure of their own like hospitals, schools, and neighborhood councils. They proceed within the boundaries of the rule of law and seek to institute equal rights of citizenship. Thus the concept of civil society has been proposed as a source of as well as an arena for democratic associations separate from and opposed to the interests of the state. Despite these two broad conceptions, the term civil society is fairly ambiguous and has raised many contentious issues about its internal boundaries, constituents (NGOs, political parties, associations, etc.), basic principles, separation from the state, and relationship with religious and political institutions. Moreover, because both state and civil society organizations are made up of large, complex organizations, the boundaries between the two are not always crystal-clear. What is broadly agreed upon is that the differences between state and civil society that emerge from this debate are a special characteristic of the countries of the West, for example France, the United States, and United Kingdom, where there is a well-developed tradition of democratic rights and limited state power. More recently, Robert Putnam has proposed the existence of “social capital” as the mechanism through which civil society was created and maintained by emphasizing features of social organization

Introduction

3

which improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions— such as trust, norms and networks (Putnam 1993, 169).5 Just as there are differences in the development of civil society and social capital within countries in the West, so too are there differences in patterns of consolidating democracy in other parts of the world. Countries in Southeast Asia share some but not all the processes that accompanied the emergence of the modern state and civil society in the West: the erosion of traditional norms, rapid industrialization and urbanization, and rapid population growth. Spurred by recent work, many observers contend that the lagging democratization in countries like Malaysia is due to the absence or stunting of a civil society and its corresponding political culture. Some even dismiss its potential for the evolution of a democratic society. Such assertions will be critically examined here to argue that Malaysia is currently going through civil society–building and democratization. But the democracy that evolves out of this process will be shaped and conditioned by a different set of institutions and religious norms from those found in the West. I endorse the widely accepted view that the development of civil society in the West is part of the same historical process that saw the rise of modern democracy. The concept of civil society is based on the following premises: The ultimate unit of social life is the individual, who is also the sovereign in making choices about the organizations, associations, and institutions he wishes to join; social and political associations in a society are autonomous; and pluralism is defined by identities freely chosen and not defined by religious moral bonds. But given the contemporary transformation of the world in the age of globalization, any consideration should also take into account those parts of the world where historical bonds and premises can be only partly established. There are several reasons why the comparative historical tradition of research on civil society appears to offer a foundation for constructing a satisfactory theoretical account of the conditions of democracy. Although civil society unfolded simultaneously with the process of industrialization, urbanization, and the rise of citizenship and the modern nation-state in the West, it also has considerable analytical usefulness in studying democratization in many non-Western countries. First, recent scholarship tells us that the distinction between civil society and state in the Western tradition is relevant because the unfettered expansion of the state that posed an obvious threat to civil society also becomes one of its safeguards (see Hall 1995, 20–21). Given that the Malaysian state is too dominant in reorganizing its citizens’ lives, this distinction is relevant in understanding how the balance of power between state and society can be altered and the process of democratization can be established and sustained.

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Second, in the case of Malaysian society I argue that there is a web of social and political associations independent of the state; these have an effect on public policy. Yet there is a tendency for many intermediary organizations to become co-opted by the state to such an extent that the distinction between society and government no longer is expressed in the dynamics of policymaking. By co-opting interest groups and associations in the past, the state has shielded itself from spontaneous popular impulses. Civil society exists in a minimal sense and is weak because it is submerged or eclipsed by the way autonomy of institutions is circumscribed by the state. Thus problems of a different order arise in conceptualizing “civil society” where a fully developed capitalism exists along with authoritarian controls by the state. Over the years, the expanding powers of the executive eliminated all kinds of political challenges and established an explicit political space that could be reclaimed by religious-based organizations and religious-based political parties. They did so through a theoretical position that recognized an unfinished agenda of identity politics inadequately addressed by nationalist ruling parties. Therefore, while endorsing the usefulness of the concept of civil society in analyzing the transition to democracy in Malaysia I also point out the problems regarding how this concept has been closely intertwined with a liberal political agenda that obstructs an understanding of the contradictions in civil societies. Features of associational life that are thought to be reflecting a set of liberal values are seen as incompatible with civil societies that emphasize religious organizations in the public sphere. The question is, if civil society is closely connected with liberal politics of the West, should it be modified to account for a different set of associations in the intermediate realm between family and state, or should we discard it as a weak concept? I argue for the need to broaden the concept in order to analyze the associational life characteristic of a variety of civil societies. In countries like Malaysia—despite the relatively early introduction of liberal political institutions—the distribution of political, civil, and socioeconomic rights was uneven and restricted. Although it was one of the few countries that started industrialization relatively late, it nevertheless approached and became part of the so-called developed world. An effective and interventionist state apparatus played a crucial role in unleashing the forces of modernity that reinforced the religion-based ethos, which partly explains the current surge of Islamism in politics. Since the late 1990s there has been a pronounced reaction against authoritarianism in Malaysia; the establishment and consolidation of NGOs, religious organizations, and women’s groups became a major weapon in the forces against state control. Because civil society now encompasses a range of organizations and associations, the implications of its democratic usage are even more problematic.

Introduction

5

In a highly centralized state like Malaysia, without the protection offered by individual rights, the danger is that the increasing power of religious groups and their political parties represents a serious threat to the autonomy of many associations and institutions. Some exponents of Islam propose some form of an Islamic state, others an Islamic-based state or a state that enforces Islamic teachings.6 One of the principal charges leveled against religious parties who want to establish an Islamic state is that such states endanger democratic freedoms by disregarding the rights of women and minority groups. Instead of promoting equality, freedom, and justice and incorporating participatory forms of democracy, civil society may play an increasingly conservative role in the transition to a new political order. It may be argued that in Islamic philosophy the idea of civil society as a domain of groups and institutions that mediate between the individual or family and the state has always been present. But in contemporary politics this means using Islamic language, values, and texts to promote and justify the need for pluralist democracy. Some exponents of Islamic philosophy attempt to make the Arabic term al-mujtama al-madani a politically and culturally established equivalent for the Western phrase “civil society,” whereas others focus on developing masyarakat madani (these two phrases are defined and interpreted below). A novel political discourse has grown around Mohammad Khatami’s theory of political development as hokumate qanun (rule of law) in Iran. He articulates the central problem for Muslims as “that important aspects of our culture belong to a civilization whose time has long passed, and our life is influenced by modern civilization which requires a culture appropriate for it” (Khatami 1998, 84). Khatami positively redefines Islam by articulating its tradition with forms of religious associations that Alexis de Tocqueville had seen as responsible for the maintenance of public order in the United States. Broadly, masyarakat madani is a universal concept that uses the first Islamic government of Muhammad the prophet as a model. When Muhammad the prophet was persecuted in his home city of Mecca, he fled to Madinah with his band of followers. There he set up and led an Islamic government that used the masjid (place for worship) as the center of administration. The term madani itself refers to the city of Madinah. Some of the prominent features of this model are tolerance for Jews and Christians, as well as the quest for knowledge and development of the masjid as a center for thinking, learning, faith-building, and administration. Although this model does not have a set method or rigid organizational structure, it claims that a society must embody the principles of masyarakat madani—put simply, the principles of tolerance, justice, and fairness with the masjid at the center of the people’s lives.7 As Islam faces challenges in the twenty-first century, masyarakat madani is interpreted as a symbiosis of practicing Islamic

6

Malaysia

values and translating religion into the modern world. Cultural diversity and a strong tradition of intellectualism are emphasized in the path toward establishing an ideal Islamic society. In the Islamic order, the significance of a parallel voluntary sector of autonomous associations to that of the government and commercial sectors also needs to be recognized; the Quran and hadith (sayings attributed to the Prophet) exhort Muslims to give sadaqah (alms) spontaneously to the poor or suggest other methods in resource mobilization for community development. At the same time, Islam uses the voluntary sector and its institutions like zakat (wealth tax) and waqf (charitable endowments) for the economic well-being of the umma (community of believers) and for protection and promotion of Islam. This includes better facilities for offering prayers, increased publication of Islamic literature, and more educational institutions that include Islamic courses. The various forms of the voluntary sector “reinforce the vision that an Islamic society is a co-operative affair in which every individual, once he has ensured the fulfillment of his own needs . . . volunteers to take care of the needs of other fellow humans” (Mohamed Ariff 1991, 21). Within Malaysia, the debate among Islamic traditionalists, communitarians, nationalists, feminists, and intellectual reformers is about working within the Islamic framework to make a transition to democratic social practices and values. There are competing Islamic interpretations of the concept of civil society. In Malaysia most current uses of the concept of masyarakat madani refer vaguely to spiritual norms and values of associational life and its rich diversity that would “enhance the position of the human being as the steward of God” (Chandra 1998b, 46). However, such assessments of civil society rest on shaky ground. This concept can be grasped only by looking carefully at what its constituent structures do, how they are organized; simply understanding it as a nonstate sphere of public activity is not enough to help us make distinctions among types of associations. Even the appearance of religious and/or social associations that create networks and lines of communication and generate cooperation among members of the Muslim community across different spheres does not mean a fundamental move toward democracy. Moreover, religious and political associations are poorly organized and dependent on the patronage of religious or nationalist elites. Some of the conceptual problems in this context relate to the status of Muslim members within the community and their relation with members outside the community. Thus even though some traditional Islamists in Malaysia encourage members to stand in an equal relation to one another and create the sort of moral preconditions that engage its members, it is pertinent to ask whether associations of some contemporary Islamic groups in Malaysia create the moral preconditions required for a viable civil society.8 Although associations and development work contribute

Introduction

7

to the vitalization of civil society, they do not generate dynamic politics of democratization by themselves. In Malaysia, traditional Islamic and secular leaders have manipulated religious and cultural symbols in the struggle for democracy. But Malaysia’s democratic potential depends upon its society’s rich precedents regarding tolerance and civility. Thus the emergence of independent sites of protest against authoritarianism does not imply the transition to a strong civil society.9 I now turn to the development of the nation-state and its response to civil society in Southeast Asia.

Democracy and the Nation-state in Southeast Asia Never before in human history have there been so many nation-states and international organizations striving to create a new world that is economically and politically more open, cooperative, and interdependent. Yet at the center of the debate about democracy today is the changing role of the nation-state. Profound political developments in the last century consolidated the nation-state as the main source of political authority. Its dominance as the most powerful form of organization rose from the virtual collapse of colonial empires. Naturally, economic development and the state were entwined in many newly liberated countries of Southeast Asia. However, scholarly work on Southeast Asian history and these new institutions and social practices was limited. Although many scholars devoted research to this region, the lack of in-depth analyses of various countries underlined political scientists’ lack of contribution to this subject. Some reasons are obvious, that is, skepticism about the role of people in this region to shape their own destinies, evident in how some scholars viewed the course of economic and social development as shaped by external factors emanating from Europe.10 The conservative colonial administrators and the imperialist school of historians paid great attention to cultural contact with European powers—Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, French, and British—and how their commercial interests and strategic considerations led to the creation of colonies.11 Scholars trained in Indology or Sinology tended to view history shaped by the cultural influence from India.12 The character of this influence, and the way it was transmitted through commerce, colonization, and/or conquest, were important aspects of this history. Valuable as these studies are, they investigate from a single historical point in time and provide static views of what is essentially a dynamic region. With the end of World War II came changes in approach and methods of study. This was illustrated in attempts to view the states of Southeast Asia on their own terms as well as through forces and concepts developed within the

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region.13 The dissolution of colonial rule and empires and the creation of new national borders stimulated the study of political history from different perspectives. The impact of India and China was not to be ignored, but the essential right of Southeast Asian countries to be considered as culturally independent was established. Thus the study of politics in Malaysia was able to develop only after decolonization and the rise of national movements and constitutional governments within the region. Consequently, the earliest research focused on questions of state, nationalism, and the political system; other issues such as religion, ethnicity, and communism were seen as contributing to or obstructing nationalism.14 Later on, a dominant theme became politics as a derivative of the region’s cultures and social structures. The influence of U.S. behaviorist scholarship was evident in the studies’ overall concern with social solidarity and political stability in the newly liberated countries. Although this theme generated many new insights, the scholars’ main concern was to understand the failure of constitutional democracy to establish itself as the dominant pattern in the region.15 Since the 1980s, the region’s political economies have been explored with great interest. The remarkable economic growth achieved by Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Taiwan during the 1970s and 1980s, as well as their rising living standards, was posited as a possible model for other newly industrializing economies. Increasingly, political economists looked toward Southeast Asia for solutions to development problems elsewhere in the world. Many analysts speculated on the success of authoritarian regimes that compel structural changes from above.16 Such speculations were shortlived, however, because faith crashed along with the region’s economies in late 1997 and early 1998. The debate soon shifted to the need to prioritize political rights and democracy. It was believed that public involvement of citizens, along with electoral and judicial reform of institutions, would help create more viable economies for the future. As a result there is a trend toward competitive multiparty elections, constitutionalism, assertive judicial bodies, and vibrant civil societies in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Constitutionally grounded agencies are enforcing human rights guarantees, and there is widespread concern for greater transparency and accountability in government. In the immediate aftermath of these democratic transitions, there are pressing concerns about how to strengthen and stabilize new regimes. However, the government in Malaysia remains authoritarian, and careful observers note that democratization is still an uncertain prospect. In this book I try to identify the current trends and movements toward democratization in Malaysia, highlighting some of the important ways in which the foundations for a nonauthoritarian government are being laid even as key obstacles remain and setbacks continue to occur.

Introduction

9

Current Issues in Malaysia Formed in 1963, the Federation of Malaysia comprises Peninsular Malaysia—made up of eleven states and the Borneo territories of Sabah and Sarawak. Malaysia is a plural society of Malays, Chinese, Indians, and indigenous groups such as the Orang Asli (the indigenous minority peoples of Peninsular Malaysia).17 Malay Muslims constitute the majority of the population; the rest of the population is Chinese (Buddhist or Christian, around 30 percent), Indians (predominantly Hindu, 9.8 percent), and others (mostly non-Muslims, 2.8 percent). The United Malays National Organization (UMNO) is the dominant political party in the Barisan Nasional (BN; National Front) and has been ruling the government through an accommodation system with other parties, some of which represent the main ethnic groups. Malays are the predominant ethnic group. The constitutional definition provided in article 160(2) states that a Malay is a Muslim if he habitually speaks the Malay language and follows Malay adat (customary law) and is legally synonymous with being a Muslim, though a Muslim is not always a Malay. Together with other indigenous groups they are the bumiputra (sons of soil, i.e., Malays and other indigenous groups), granted special privileges in the constitution because they are seen as economically backward compared to other ethnic groups. They have been the political constituency for the UMNO, but an Islamic party, the Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS), is currently challenging their hold on the Malay community. Our analysis must also discuss the political leadership of Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad. For two decades, Mahathir has governed Malaysia with determination, vision, and ambition. As the rest of the world grapples with interethnic strife and challenges to nation-states, Mahathir’s resilience has transformed the country into a modern capitalist state; also, his acute sensitivity to the forces of globalization and the economic domination of the industrialized West has led Malaysia out of economic recession. Considerable evidence illustrates how his personal rule and style dominate Malaysian politics. His book The Malay Dilemma inspired many of the ideas of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1970, which reorganized the economy in order to alleviate the economic backwardness of the Malays. In reality those plans have gone a long way toward creating a commercial and industrial elite that cuts across all ethnic communities, one that owns, controls, and manages an expanding share of the economy thanks to Mahathir’s political patronage. They have led to a pattern of personal rule in which the cabinet, parliament, and constitution are bypassed and elections are contested with government control over the mass media. In more recent years Mahathir has led an attack on the loss of control over national economic programs due to globalization. He claims that the

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internationalization of production, finance, and other economic resources has eroded the capacity of developing countries to control their economic futures and make decisions in transnational organizations. This critique has been taken to uphold national sovereignty, but it serves two main purposes: immunity from jurisdiction, and immunity from accountability. By arguing that globalization threatens to control the economies of the developing world, Mahathir is able to protect and isolate markets, the decisionmaking process, and national laws from international legal scrutiny; he is also able to control the diverse and potentially conflicting demands of civil society that could challenge authoritarianism.18 Since Mahathir’s reelection as prime minister in 1999, there has been increasing talk of going beyond a “Mahathir era.”19 Many believe that the prime minister is losing control over UMNO, especially after his sacking of Anwar Ibrahim from the government in 1998. This appears a bit far-fetched given that Mahathir has survived attempts to topple him from the party and national polls (1987–1990), overcome two major economic recessions (in 1985–1986 and 1997–1998), and rebutted Western-controlled media for their disparaging accounts of his regime. Although it appears politics in Malaysia will be decided by the twists, turns, and dramas associated with Mahathir’s political style and UMNO for some time, structural changes in Malaysian society since the 1999 elections have produced new sociopolitical forces that are contesting the authoritarian nature of the state. Besides the Anwar crisis, the party is under pressure from PAS, as well as from a newly emboldened Chinese community that feels it bailed out the UMNOled coalition in the last general election. I focus on five central themes in the contemporary discourse in Malaysia: (1) secular nationalism, (2) citizenship, (3) Islam, (4) democracy and authoritarianism, and (5) human rights. I engage recent debates in liberal political theory on state and civil society. To have a better understanding of the context of these debates, I refer to Malay history, political culture, the political philosophy of the constitution, policies of the government, and the ambiguities of the Malay-Islam identity. The primary question is this: What has propelled these five themes to center stage given so many divergent political agendas? To answer this question we need to reflect on the last decades of the twentieth century, which witnessed new configurations with important consequences. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union focused widespread attention on the demise of the nation-state. The collapse of many other communist states in both Europe and Asia opened the door for political and economic experiments and created opportunities for citizens to demand political concessions and democratic practices. People grappled with new political arrangements, but in dismantling structures laboriously built since World War II, old conflicts and antagonisms buried

Introduction

11

under international treaties and boundaries resurfaced. This is particularly pertinent in the area of culture and ethnicity where we see new or renewed claims by ethnic minorities within some states for forms of cultural autonomy or political independence.20 Such claims are supported by the process of globalization, which incorporates separate, clashing cultures into a single dominant culture; this increasing contact, however, also leads to the compression of local cultures with different interpretations of the world. In the current scenario, state-sponsored development—crucial to the ideology of twentieth-century nationalism—has been replaced by the retreat of the state from many areas of the economy. In some cases the dominant alternative to nationalism in some countries is that of civilizational movements—the most important one being that of Islam.21 Scholars like Sami Zubaida caution against considering the variety of social and political forms of modern Islam as “variations on a common model of an essential Muslim society” (1990, 151). Others focus on how contemporary developments, notably communications technology, “have added on a new dimension to these global cultural flows, in particular as they give expression to Muslim cultural politics in the form of resistance to Western imperialism whether economic, political or cultural” (Bloul 1998, 146).22 Throughout the world, structures of Western modernity have altered the basis of community due to their indifference to cultural distinctions—with devastating social consequences. These social changes, partly resulting from the impact of European imperialism, environmental degradation, and the collapse of communist states, engendered a crisis of tradition. The emergence of the Islamic movement in countries like Malaysia has to be located within this crisis of tradition. As media and computer networks create a single global pool of information in a global economy, there is a renewed effort to construct new moral boundaries based on religion.23 This leads us to ask: What impact do these developments have on politics in Malaysia? My main argument is that two processes have occurred simultaneously in the past decade: on the one hand, democratic aspirations have been raised; on the other, the PAS has emerged as a major political force in Malaysian politics. I argue that these processes are determined by the interaction of three factors: state developmental capacity, globalization processes, and the historical legacy of religious institutions. I start with a familiar debate in contemporary literature: whether the secular-nationalist project, which saw the nation-state as an agency of social change, was a viable one.24 Nationalism in Malaysia was a protracted process in political integration and mainly a product of nation-building that was engineered by the intellectual and aristocratic elites. It was the result of a process by which people gradually shifted some of their loyalties from the village, region, or the monarch to the nation-state.25 However, this process

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was not simply synthetic but exposed deeply embedded primordial religious and ethnic loyalties. Today, these loyalties have taken on an autonomy that cannot be comprehended with any pregiven sociological concepts and categories. Rather than existing as independent, a priori categories, ethnicity, culture, and religion inhabit the same space in Malay identity, with each functioning to influence and redefine the parameters of the nation-state. As a result, the recent Islamic resurgence is the manifestation of a complex dynamic: the contesting forces of nationhood.26 In the past, the Malaysian state has been characterized as a “semi-” or “quasi-” democracy and its civil society as weak compared to other neighboring countries.27 Mahathir’s claim that the state protects communitarian rights that are more respected in Asia than in the West—and that citizens should be more aware of their duties than rights—has highlighted shortcomings in the Western liberal democratic model. The result has been an ongoing debate on Asian versus Western concepts of individual and community rights. The debate as to whether human rights laws should regulate relations among persons raises complex issues related to the Malaysian constitution. First, from its inception, the constitution departed from many principles of liberal theory and practice due to the challenge of arriving at an agreed form of national government—a basic issue concerned with such matters as which ethnic groups in the political community should hold power and under what limitations. Second, the constitution safeguards the special position of Malays even while arguing for a common nationality for all citizens. Therefore it attempts to reconcile the fundamental right of equality before law for all citizens with the special position of Malays. Third, the constitution did not declare a theocratic state but accepted Islam as the state religion. But because it granted rights of citizenship to all the ethnic groups, it assured them the freedom to establish religious and educational institutions in the public sphere of their choice. There is no doubt that the Islamic resurgence within the Malay community since the 1970s has propelled new social and political forces in Malaysian society. These forces correspond to a feeling that people must fashion political, economic, and social systems to fit their own culture. Some religious groups couch their demands in the language of Islam. Yet assertions about Islamic religion and its practices, as well as the critique of a secular, development-oriented elite, are set against the background of authoritarianism—the erosion of civil liberties, the decline of political institutions, and the abuses of executive power together with an unfair electoral system. Demands to restructure the boundaries of civil society have multiple sources—historical, spiritual, conceptual. They reflect the failure of developmentalism and modernism, which purported to provide economic well-being

Introduction

13

for all social groups. Paradoxically, unprecedented socioeconomic growth gave rise to the search for Islamic “authenticity” and for more legitimate foundations of the nation-state.28 The fast pace of modernization, implemented in the late 1980s, by a modern, somewhat secular and semi-authoritarian government culminated in the financial crisis of 1997. Apart from modernization, therefore, a political crisis of authoritarianism—one based on elitist political pacts and crony capitalism—shifted political identities among communities and gave birth to Malaysian democracy. This forms the backdrop of my analysis. In Chapter 2, I examine the changing character of the Malaysian state and its response to the various challenges of the last decade—globalization, the demise of the nation-state, and an Islamic resurgence. In Chapter 3, I examine issues of citizenship and the way the NEP restructured Malaysian society. In Chapter 4, I examine the contesting nature of nationhood with special reference to the political developments that have encouraged the growth of Islam within the Malay community. Although this is largely a theoretical discussion of the debates on multiculturalism, it will also highlight the changing role of Islam in expanding civil society. In Chapter 5, I look at problems in conceptualizing Malaysian democracy, including the contradictions evident in the Malaysian constitution, which espouses certain liberal principles of a democratic state as well as the tenets of Islam. I focus on the debate over democracy and authoritarianism and their relationship with economic development from Malaysian independence to the aftermath of the removal from office of the deputy prime minister. In Chapter 6, I examine cultural arguments advanced by the nationalists, traditionalists, feminists, and communitarians to challenge the liberal democratic model and a universal theory of human rights. I also discuss the implications this has for developing a theory of women’s rights and a greater role for civil society. In the Conclusion (Chapter 7), I explore the political limits of democratization in Malaysia and argue that recent developments in Malaysian politics, particularly the general elections in November 1999, show that despite years of political struggle for democracy, civil society is quite fragile and susceptible to the dangers of religious fundamentalism.

Notes 1. I follow Petras’s general definition that globalization refers to “the crossnational flows of goods, investment, production and technology” with its own institutions and configurations of power that have replaced the structures associated with the nation-state (Petras 1991, 3). 2. David Held has defended this argument (1991c, 138). 3. For the historical suppositions underlying civil society, see J. A. Hall (1995,

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3–7). For shared understanding on civil society in liberal and socialist traditions, see John Ehrenberg (1999). 4. For a defense of this approach, see Hirst (1994); Keane (1998). For critique of recent literature on civil society, see Dunn and Hann (1996) and Mahajan (1999). 5. Influenced by the French political theorist Alexis de Tocqueville, Robert D. Putnam has argued that associational experience will nurture the need to cooperate with others. Unlike Tocqueville, he claims that social capital is generated by a rich web of nonpolitical associations that include soccer clubs, hiking clubs, bird-watching groups, and more. Some of these formulations are relevant to our discussion because Islam plays a very important role in creating the moral capacity to act and collaborate with fellow members. Recently Putnam advanced the more complex argument that Americans are disengaged psychologically from politics and government and their traditional forms of civil organizations (Putnam 2000). 6. I am careful in analyzing differences among Islamic movements as well as their contrasting attitudes toward democratic values. Cultural themes are assigned different meaning in different sociohistorical contexts. There are fundamental differences between radical Islamists who advocate the use of violence and fundamentalist militant-terrorist groups like the Palestinian Hamas, al-Jihad, and alQaeda in the Middle East. Due to a range of Islamic movements all over the world and the confusion in terminology, I make a distinction between Islamism and fundamentalism in the case of Malaysia. I am wary of the word fundamentalism because in Western culture it implies a strict belief in the word of God and the antithesis of secular Western democracy. I use the term traditionalists for PAS, although they incorporate a great deal of modernity and orthodoxy in their rhetoric. They also urge adherence to literal readings of the sacred texts. They are more rigid than the communitarians in their interpretation of the shari’a and non-Islamic cultures. Communitarian Islamists and Islamist reformers are those who urge use of their religious doctrine to reform the social order. All these groups favor participation in the electoral process as the way of taking control of the state and are engaged in a lively debate on Islam and modernity in Malaysia. 7. I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for alerting me to this point. I also acknowledge my debt to Pauline Jasudason for providing information related to this section. For more discussion on the Islamist discourse, see Nakamura Mitsuo (2001). 8. At no stage should my argument be seen as similar to scholars like J. A. Hall (1995, 14) who view Islam as a rival form of social order to civil society. 9. Many of these observations are influenced by recent events in Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim nation. An Islamic democratic movement emerged to overthrow the Suharto regime in 1998. Since then, Indonesia’s Islamic reform movement has repudiated the goal of an Islamic state and championed democratic ideals. In Indonesia masyarakat madani is fairly popular and is used to describe those associations, groups, and movements that strive to maintain autonomy from the state. See also Ahmad Baso (1999). 10. It is argued that the course of Southeast Asia’s economic and political development after 1800 was determined by factors emanating from industrial Europe. These include the extension of modern communications, economic enterprise, investment, and a host of scientific discoveries to the local economies in the region. For this view, see Tate (1979); Steinberg (1975). 11. Prime examples are the engaging works of Nicholas Tarling (1969) and Rupert Emerson (1979) that focus on British colonial history and its impact on Malaya. John R.W. Smail (1961) warned of the dangers of this preoccupation and argued for

Introduction

15

building an autonomous history of Southeast Asia. For a critical review of the earlier approaches, see D. K. Emmerson (1980); Andaya and Andaya (1995). 12. The cultural influence of India was apparent in the language, in the general style of architectural remains, and in the religious ideas of Hinduism and Buddhism in the region. However, the character and extent of this influence were a major subject of debate among scholars. Winstedt (1966, 24) and Coedes (1968) examine the “Hindu millennium” and Indian conquest of many parts of Southeast Asia. 13. See part 3 in Hall (1968) as an example of this work. He was concerned to move away from the “Europecentric” view of earlier studies, but he still believed that the association with Europeans provided a starting point for understanding the region. 14. Religious-oriented nationalists played a dominant role against colonialism in Indonesia, Malaya, and Burma. William Roff (1980, 56–90) in his seminal work illustrates this in the case of Malaya. 15. Studies on modernization and the failure of constitutional democracy in this period include Robert Kearney (1975); Rabushka and Shepsle (1972). 16. For critical accounts of economic growth achieved by some of these countries refer to Bernard (1996); Muscat (1994). 17. According to the 1980 census Malays comprised 55.3 percent of Peninsular Malaysia’s population, the Chinese 33.8 percent, the Indians 10.2 percent, and others 0.7 percent. Within Sabah there are at least thirty-nine indigenous groups, but these are not always enumerated in the census. The main groups are the Bajau (Muslim), Kadazan (formerly Dusun and non-Muslim), Chinese Murut, and Lotud. The Dayaks form the largest indigenous group in Sarawak. The rest are bidayuhs, the Melanaus and the Orang Ulus. The information from the 2000 census questionnaire is being processed. Detailed data about the Malaysian population have not yet been released. Moreover, the constitutional definition of a “Malay”—one who speaks the Malay language and follows the Malay adat—ignores many groups within Malaysia. The nonindigenous population includes groups such as the Arabs, Armenians, and Eurasians. 18. For Mahathir’s comments on a borderless world and its limitations, see his speeches (1999d, 1999e). All speeches are from the website located at www.smpke. jpm.my. 19. I borrow the term Mahathir era from Khoo Boo Teik (1995, 2). 20. See Burgess’s analysis of issues arising out of ethnicity and culture in an earlier period (1978, 265). 21. According to Samuel Huntington, in the post–Cold War period the most important distinctions among people are not ideological, political, or economic but cultural (1997, 21). Daniel Bell (1980) and Alvin Toffler (1980) believe that national cultures are subordinate to technological processes. Thus development in information technology will result in uniformity of sociocultural systems following the collapse of the nation-state. For contrasting discussion on globalization and changes in cultures, see Featherstone (1995, 6). 22. This is not to overlook the resurgence of more active forms of political participation in this region (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1989, vol. 3). For more recent changes in this region, see Hewison, Robison, and Rodan (1993) and Laothamatas (1997). 23. For example, PAS has an ambitious four-year plan to wire its 800,000 members to make them Internet-dependent for news. See Wan Hamidi Hamid (2000c) on this attempt to win the minds of the Malays. Harakah, the official PAS newsletter, is already a popular opposition website.

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24. Partha Chatterjee (1996) provides a useful critique of the establishment of a secular nationalist project in postcolonial states. 25. Tarling (1998) presents an overview of the history of the Southeast Asian region and development of nation-states. 26. Hussin Mutalib presents similar ideas on this (1990, 2). 27. See Zakaria Haji Ahmad (1989, 347) and Harold Crouch (1993, 135). 28. I found Robert D. Lee’s use of “authenticity” useful in this context (1997, 1).

2 Nationalism and Nation-building

Since 1980, new frames of reference related to cultural and religious identity have emerged along with local, regional, and global interconnectedness; this has helped to redraw the cultural and political boundaries of people worldwide. A surge of constitutional reforms and democratic initiatives in many parts of Southeast Asia has also led to a trend that questions the validity and usefulness of a homogenous nation-state and highlights the value of diversity and difference. In a time marked by contrary patterns—integration and dissolution of nation-states, economic liberalization and structural adjustment—notions like nationalism, citizenship, ethnicity, and culture are filled with tension and contradiction. How do these patterns impinge on the nature of the nation-state in Malaysia? And how do they affect the political identity of the dominant Malay community? The story of nation-building in the Malay Peninsula, as it was once called, stretches through civilizations and shares a history with Indonesia and parts of Thailand.1 Most scholars claim that Malaysia did not constitute a composite national unit at the time of independence. This premise led to a conceptual rigidity in the analyses of nationalism. Nationalism was not analyzed in its ideological forms; neither was there any attempt to distinguish among various manifestations of nationalism that emerged during the colonial period. For the most part the function of these studies was to record past glories of traditional authority and social order or to focus on state power, structures of administration, and political institutions. Thus these analyses were either narrowly political in subject matter or looked at other nonpolitical processes as part of a struggle for power among elites.2 A fundamental assumption of these studies—that one can understand politics primarily by reference to the nation-state or nationalism—is being challenged today by the nature of global interconnections and their impact on national communities. According to David Held, the significance of these 17

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developments is that global interconnectedness can lead to a “decline or crisis of state autonomy, and the requirement of nation-states to co-operate and collaborate intensively with one another” (Held 1991c, 145).3 Within the region represented by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) this has significance, because increases in migration, transactions in goods and services, technology, and cultural interchange have resulted in an inability to strictly control state borders. Moreover, in the context of a highly interconnected global order, many of the traditional domains of state activity (security, communications, administration, legal affairs) cannot be fulfilled without international cooperation and advice.4 My starting point is an inquiry into the changing nature of the state and ideas on nation-building. This analysis is different from earlier histories that focus on the state before independence or obediently follow the political events after independence. More specifically, I discuss these developments in light of changes in the Malay identity vis-à-vis other ethnic communities. With the globalization of policymaking, issues and areas under national jurisdiction increasingly come under the jurisdiction of international organizations, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In the period following the Asian economic crisis (1997–1998), technological developments, mergers and acquisitions of major companies, and the development of new financial institutions have had a major impact on the Malaysian economy; yet the circulation of global communications has transformed people’s very identities within the nation-state. A study in state and nation-building in contemporary Malaysia is crucial because the state is a vehicle for modernization and nationalism. State intervention and political patronage have played an important role in economic development since independence. I argue that the state has presented itself as a multiethnic entity—promoting a range of interests to all ethnic communities—while building up its monoethnic character.5 In reality that state has been controlled by a small corporate elite content to carry out their own economic projects while building up an “imagined” national community.6 Of course there is much more to the concept of a national community than imagination. These issues have been brought sharply into focus by scholarly work that views religion and ethnicity as important and significant in contemporary Malay society and politics.7 These analyses argue that the reasons for social and political change in Malaysia are found in the structures and processes internal to society—ethnic communities, plural society, religious differences. Consequently, these factors are understood by examining three features of Malay identity: Islam, political culture, and ethnic nationalism.8 These analyses constitute a direct challenge to many presuppositions of historians and social scientists writing state-oriented Malaysian histories without, however, modifying the premises of the earlier work.

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19

These recent approaches fail to relate complex issues that arise within nonMalay groups to the recent trends on globalization. In general, a consequence of the domination of a nationalist paradigm among scholars has been the subordination of certain questions related to civil society and political identity. In this inquiry, I depart from both kinds of analyses—nationalist and society-oriented—of Malaysian politics. From my perspective, the important questions are: Is the Malaysian nation an invented phenomenon that is likely to fade with globalization and Islamic revivalism? Or does the Malaysian state represent a departure from recent trends in other parts of the world? By addressing these questions, I hope to uncover the elements and components of the process of nation-building in Malaysia and to elucidate the nature of changing political identities. Although the processes of globalization are altering the boundaries of many nations, it is doubtful whether the state as the dominant form of political organization is being challenged in Malaysia. This is not to deny the deep tensions within Malay society between the exclusive cultural claims of ethnic nationalism and the universalistic expectations raised by Islam. Nevertheless, it is possible to argue that nationalism has proved to be an extraordinary force to justify and mobilize political activity while being challenged and redefined by the different ethnic communities. What emerges is that the main challenge to the state does not come from territorial claims made by ethnic minorities but from the competing claims within the Malay community. Globalization is a complex phenomenon and will not be examined in great detail here.9 I focus on the nationalist discourse on globalization in Malaysia in order to reveal its contradictions. Since the 1990s Mahathir has been associated with an anti-Western stance in his critique of globalization. Issues of globalization are integral to this discussion on nationalism because the government draws upon nationalist sentiments for support of its policies. I focus on the function of this political discourse and its relationship to ideas on nationalism. Although my purpose in this chapter is to set out unresolved problems that today are part of the nationalist discourse, I hope to offer constructive remarks on the relationship between the preponderant role of the state and the weakness of civil society. All this has a bearing on subsequent chapters.

Ideas on Malayan Nationalism The twentieth century’s anticolonial struggles coincided with the onset of nationalism. These new ideologies of political nationalism, inspired by development of nationalism in the West, required all members of a nation-state to be politically united and culturally homogenous.

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According to the classical model, nationalism and national culture are a reflection of an essentialist, almost autochthonous, cultural tradition codified in the institution of the nation-state. History reveals a variety of states following this model in Europe, and perhaps the only common factor is the acceptance of the main tenets of modernity. The main features of the classical model of nationalism are: (1) The nation-state is the sovereign actor in world politics; (2) it is sovereign in its territory, subordinating all intermediate authorities—regional, religious, class—to its lawmaking powers; (3) it is culturally unique; (4) it is based on a homogenous citizenry that has political rights in the nation. Exponents of this model argue that the growth of nationalism in Europe was congruent with major social and economic developments that produced the nation-state.10 Nationalism is an essential accompaniment of industrialization and modernization, according to this view, associated primarily with the work of E. Gellner.11 The second claim is that nationalism is fabrication. Regarding the authenticity of nationalism’s appeal to “tradition,” Gellner argues that “the cultures it claims to defend and revive are often its own inventions, or are modified out of all recognition” (Gellner 1983a, 56).12 Common to analyses that follow this model is the conviction that nationalism is fabrication; it is not what it seems. Following from this is an instrumental view that ignores the role of people or what today is called “social history.” Gellner argues that the nationalist imagining of the past— the symbols and metaphors of nationalist mobilization—in the final analysis are instrumental on behalf only of elites involved in the process. More recent research has expanded the theoretical scope of this analysis, although differences remain. Benedict Anderson questions these assertions about nationalism as fabrications that ignore the actual historical process of nation formation. Nations, says Anderson, are not to be distinguished by their falsity or genuineness but by the form in which they are imagined. A nation, he writes, is an imagined political community because its members will mostly never have face-to-face relationships, yet the image of their communion exists.13 I return to this point in detail in the next section. The classical model stresses the cultural similarity of the nation-state’s citizens, and by implication it draws boundaries to exclude or include members. Such a formulation detracts from understanding the phenomenon of ethnic groups because it begs all the critical questions: It implies a preconceived view of the significant factors in the structure and function of ethnic groups; more critically, it assumes the maintenance of fixed ethnic boundaries or cultures. Another premise of the classical model is that multiethnic countries like Malaysia cannot be nations and therefore cannot be states for very long given the tendency of ethnic-based groups to claim self-determination with time.14 Below I critically appraise some of these concepts and formulations as they

Nationalism and Nation-building

21

relate to the substantive problems of nationalism and nation-building in Malaysia. Interpretations of any country’s status as a nation turn on how the term nationalism is defined. In the postcolonial situation, nationalism assumed a different form from the classical model because the assertion of national identity was a form of struggle against colonial rule and economic exploitation. In the context of colonial states, nationalism and national movements, on the one hand, denied the inferiority felt by the colonized people and, on the other, asserted that modernization and cultural identity could develop together. In this task, they produced a discourse that challenged the colonial claim to political domination while also accepting the intellectual premises of Western models of modernity.15 Another feature of this model is the distinction between state-building and nation-building.16 Even when nationalism did not appear as a distinct ideology in many Asian countries, it affected the path of nation-building they were to follow in the postcolonial period.17 Whereas some countries like India, Indonesia, and Burma developed their nationalism in the face of external threats, others like Cambodia, Malaysia, and Singapore began in earnest after independence. Yet all these countries were united in proposing visions of social and economic progress as part of a larger project for modernity: the emphasis was on the need to reform or reconstruct society and its traditions along modern lines. Both these features are useful when studying the case of Malaysia because there was no political unit, kingdom, or empire known as “Malaysia” or “Melayu Raya” (Greater Malaya).18 As a noted scholar points out, before the advent of European colonialism “one can speak culturally of a Malay world covering Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, the Philippines, most of Indonesia and the south of Thailand” (Jomo 1989, 2). The territorial scope of the present-day Malaysian state was defined much later by colonial boundaries. But there are peculiarities in the history of Malaya that made the development of nationalism very unusual: the lack of effective consolidation of its territories, the limited economic content of the movements for nationalism, and the different approach toward nationalism among its ethnic groups. The first point is that the country of Malaya had no political continuity in its history that contributed to a sense of nationality. Moreover, the modern geographical notion of a nation-state as a grounded entity with fixed boundaries was quite unknown. Malaysia was fragmented into states that were not uniformly rooted in the allegiances of its people or politically unified under a single leader. Loyalties were mostly what can be called “primordial”—where the self is defined by blood, race, language, and religion and where political affiliation is founded upon status and rank. Subjects were expected to give absolute loyalty and unqualified obedience to

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their local leader, regardless of the ethical, moral, or other dimensions of their actions.19 Although this had much to do with the mercantile economy of the state of Malacca, which was vulnerable to international trade as well as a volatile system characterized by a constant rearrangement of personal loyalties and social boundaries, many explain this in terms of culture. In more specific terms, Anthony Milner explains the loyalty to the raja (prince or ruler): “Malays owed their primary allegiance not to a territorially defined state, or even an ethnic or religious unity, but rather to a royal personage. They defined themselves as subjects of a sultan” (Milner 1995, 26). For many years the notion prevailed that Malayan nationalism is difficult to define because Malay consciousness is a recent development that arose only at the time of World War II.20 According to Judith Nagata the rise of the twentieth century “saw a progressive trend towards a clearer conception of Malayness” (Nagata 1984, 12). Before that, nationalism existed neither as a blind and exclusive identity for the people settled in Malaya nor as a demand for subject nationalities. Only in the 1930s, when the Malay community felt itself besieged by the British and immigrants, did there develop elements of an exclusivist nationalism directed against foreigners within the territory. The evolution of a common national identity within Malaya was an unlikely prospect under the British before the 1930s, because at that time they controlled broadly three groups of territories with divergent political and economic developments: Straits Settlements (SS—Penang, Malacca, and Singapore), Federated Malay States (FMS—Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, and Pahang), and Unfederated Malay States (UMS—Kelantan, Terengganu, Perlis, Kedah, and Johor). Compared to other countries in this region, like Burma and the Philippines, Malaya was somewhat out of step—it faced a less uniform colonial rule and less effective consolidation of British power over its territory. Within these frontiers, nationalism was given theoretical elaboration in the writings of religious radicals and the intelligentsia in the early twentieth century. Elite groups and voluntary associations offered an implicit challenge to the traditional status quo in their contributions to the development of a Malay nationalism. They conceived the nation as one in opposition to colonial rule as well as to the demands of other ethnic groups, giving the concept a critical edge and a new political significance. The second point is that this emergent nationalism had both a politicalideological and an ethnocultural character because of the large immigrant population in Malaya. After the Japanese occupation in 1941 and World War II, the Malay community awakened to the prospect of being overwhelmed by a non-Malay population. In contrast to this awakening, the immigrant population was badly divided along ideological and religious grounds and had different aspirations for the nationalist movement. Immigrants were also subjected to economic pressures and political changes in

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their respective homelands. Thus some scholars concluded, for example, that “Malayan nationalism is really a modified or attenuated Malay nationalism” (see Wang Gungwu 1992, 193). In contrast to this view K. S. Jomo argues that the 1930s saw the emergence of “Malayan nationalisms,” that is, nationalisms with colonial Malaya as their reference point (Jomo 1989, 4). Despite various strands and contradictions in the nationalist movement, all the communities contributed to the formation of a Malayan nationalism. Indeed, the nation-state that was built after independence was an heir to decades of state-building and the gradual development of national consciousness within all ethnic groups. Within Malayan nationalism, many scholars describe the origins of what is called “ethnic nationalism” among the Malay community (R.L.M. Lee 1990, 484). This has been defined as the “close attachment that Malays accord to the safeguarding of their Malay ethnic primordial ties or parochial interests in their dealings with others, specially non-Malays” (Hussin Mutalib 1990, 1). The ascription of Melayu (Malay) as an ethnic bond was a very gradual process traced to the heightened awareness of differences, by origin and tradition, in the influx of immigrants and migration of populations within Malaya, and also in the influence of ideas about a fixed geopolitical state based on citizenship without reference to personal loyalty or a royal patron. It is useful to recall Walker Connor’s argument that when an ethnic group becomes “self-differentiating,” or when a sizeable percentage of its members become aware or believe that “one’s own group is unique in a most vital sense,” it acquires nationhood (Connor 1972, 337). In Malaysia’s case, before independence Malays differentiated themselves from other communities on ethnic and religious grounds and thus demanded certain special rights in the political and economic arena. However, this was carried forward by a state-centered nationalism after independence, and it transformed the Malays into a self-conscious political entity.21 The third point, at the conceptual level, is that Malay society was structurally and/or culturally differentiated even when external factors contributed to the development of nationalist sentiment. Structural inequalities existed in the Malay countryside, leading the rural laborers, tenants, peasantry, farmers, and traders to find enough in common to differentiate themselves from the Malay aristocracy.22 But it is the long-term divisions in Malay society, as pointed out by Anthony Milner, that were based on competing notions of community—the monarchical, the religious, the ethnic— that provide “a point of departure for assessing significant divisions in Malay society and its changing political identity not only in the colonial but also in the post-colonial period” (Milner 1995, 4). According to Milner, there have been three ideological orientations—in no sense fixed positions on nationalism—that promote allegiance respectively to three distinct forms of community in Malay society: the kerajaan

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(government), the umat (community of believers), and the bangsa (race). They are each transformed in dialogue with one another. These contrasting allegiances contributed to the formation of a political and national tradition in the Malay world. However, these ideas on Malay community provide only a general and somewhat obscurely stated formulation of the problem of Malayan nationalism that can be better illustrated if we shift our sights from general theoretical treatments to the state and society in Malaysia. To sharpen it, one must examine the historical background of Malaysia.

Colonialism, Ethnic Groups, and Plural Society In this section I trace the multiethnic construction of Malaysian society so as to provide, in the next section, a detailed analysis and critique of the way the postcolonial state constructed and utilized this identity.23 Here I examine the claim that British colonial policy contributed to the development of ethnic divisions and that colonial rule and its policies were partly responsible for the creation of a plural society and for divergent trends in nationalism.24 The process of transforming communities based on ethnic groupings to those founded on juridical notions of citizenship is usually associated with the early stages of modernization in multiethnic societies. But this process is never complete: ethnic categories are still evident in many postindustrial and developing societies.25 In this new setting, ethnic groups operate as interest groups to improve their economic position or assert cultural rights in the political system. This involves the articulation and acquisition of social, economic, and political rights for the social group as a whole. There are numerous studies confirming that ethnicity does not disappear despite modernization and that ethnic consciousness and conflicts, or “ethnonationalism,” cannot be seen as ephemeral phenomena that will disappear with modernization because loyalties such as class do not eclipse ethnic ones.26 These points must be kept in mind while understanding the nature of Malaysian society today. The plural society that finally evolved to meet the competitive demands of a colonial economy consisted of three ethnic divisions that continue even today: Malay, Chinese, and Indian. Though simplistic and illdefined, these were the categories through which the British ruled in Malaya. Original ethnic divisions did not disappear by the formation of a single anticolonial front but were reinforced with the formation of political parties and interest groups representing their positions. Three salient political developments during the colonial rule defined the pattern for nationalism and nation-building: (1) immigration policy, (2) constitutional developments, (3) party formations. Although Malayan

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nationalism initially did not indicate an awareness of a common bond centered on a territory, it came to represent sentiments cherished by members of the Malay community toward one another; nationalist sentiments were expressed through the medium of a common ethnic background, a common religion, and national pride in traditional institutions. Although other factors might have been important, the development of nationalism within the Malay community is linked to how the claims of the other ethnic communities and their terms of association were defined by these three developments. Immigration Policy One of the features of colonial rule in Malaya, as elsewhere, was the economic dynamism created by encouraging competitive market economies. Immigration was an important part of this transition from quasifeudalistic to market economies.27 The colonial drive to accumulate capital through labor-intensive extraction of commodities not only drew people into the world economy for the first time; it introduced new relationships of cooperation and conflict among those groups.28 Of course, immigration is as old as Malaya’s history. In this maritime region, waves of migration gave rise to a common culture and tradition along the coasts of Malaya, Sumatra, Borneo, and parts of Java. But because the immigrant communities played a vital role, particularly in commerce, labor migration expanded rapidly in the nineteenth century when the country came under British colonial rule. The development of plantations, tin mines, roads and railways, and the distribution and services sectors all depended on immigrant labor from India, China, and Indonesia. The expansion of agriculture and tin mining in the Malay states and eastern Sumatra in the last quarter of the nineteenth century brought an influx of Chinese immigrants. Malaya offered a niche for them in areas of business that indigenous entrepreneurs were unwilling to occupy. The salient role of the Chinese in the Malayan economy has been attributed to several advantages, including concepts of business organization, technological skills, entrepreneurial expertise, and secret society organizations.29 Groups of unskilled immigrants of Tamil origin from southern India and Ceylon also came to Malaya during the nineteenth century. Recruited from the poorest levels of society, they were more amenable to discipline and more willing to work for lower wages. But the heaviest influx of Indians came in the first two decades of the twentieth century in response to demand for labor for rubber estates and the construction of roads and railways. These Indian immigrants, numerically much smaller than the Chinese, constituted a severely disadvantaged and deprived class. Brought in as indentured labor, they were deprived of education and health facilities and denied occupational mobility.

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One of the main outcomes of British colonial policy was the emergence of a so-called plural society with separate economic spheres. Divided by language, custom, religion, dietary laws, marriage, and funeral ceremonies, the Indian, Chinese, and European immigrants did not merge with the local population or with one another. There were exceptions, such as intermarriages between Malays and Chinese, which produced a mixed SinoMalay, or “Baba,” society with its own cultural habits and mores. But on the whole racial communities were segregated geographically and by employment. Malays kept to traditional agricultural activities, such as rice cultivation, fishing, and cottage industries. Their preference for a traditional way of life was consolidated by land reservation schemes introduced in 1913 to protect Malays from losing their plots to encroachments by the rubber industry.30 The favorable climate for commerce benefited the Chinese, who invested in tin mining and in plantation agriculture or who became shopkeepers in the new trading towns. Later they diversified into banking, a move that strengthened the position of Chinese traders, who now had access to credit and financial guarantees.31 According to Victor Purcell, because a section of the Chinese controlled a considerable sector of the entrepreneurial activities of both Malaya and Borneo territories, “there arose an economic gulf between the Chinese and the Malays” (Purcell 1964, 194). The predominant share of the Chinese in the economy can be gauged from the fact that the European share of capital outlay in commercial tin mining lagged behind the Chinese share until the former introduced new technology in mining in the 1930s. New policies during the British period promoting urbanization and secular education contributed to Malay self-awareness as an ethnic group visà-vis others. For the first time Malays found they were outnumbered because of the open-door immigration policy. The identification of race and economic activity had already begun during this period.32 The British policy of maintaining Malays in traditional roles as sultans, aristocrats, and farmers while allowing Indian and Chinese immigrants to meet the demands of wage labor and trading faced a tough challenge during World War II. The assumption that governed preindependent colonial policy—that immigrant communities played a vital role in commerce and were indispensable—was questioned on nationalist grounds. Some early Malay nationalists found that the immigrant communities presented major problems in cultural assimilation and political integration. Constitutional Developments: British Malaya to the Federation of Malaya Although the British extended their administrative control gradually over Malaya between 1874 and World War II, it is important to bear in mind that

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parts of the peninsula were not colonized. Whereas the Straits Settlements were under the British colonial office, the nine Malay states were autonomous in legal affairs.33 Each state had its own civil service, although supervised by the British resident or adviser, and the government functioned in the name of the Malay sultan. The British achieved control over these areas by progressively assuming many governmental functions that did not displace the nominal authority of Malay sultans, who retained power over the structure of adat and shari’a (Islamic law), as well as land reservations. These relationships were established by a series of treaties and agreements between the Malay rulers and the Crown. British control was made possible by maintaining the fiction of Malay royal sovereignty through the creation of a residential system. The Malay sultans had signed treaties according to which each Malay ruler would accept a British officer, whose advice would prevail on all questions “other than touching on Malay Religion and Custom” (Vasil 1979, 12). This formed the basis of the Protectorate System in Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, and Pahang, which became the Federated Malay States in 1896. The expansion of British control over other parts of Malaya was facilitated by the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909, according to which the Siamese Empire ceded all rights and suzerainty over the states of Kelantan, Terengganu, Perlis, and Kedah. Along with Johor these states were referred to as the Unfederated Malay States, and they accepted the appointment of a British adviser. Even though for all practical purposes the British administration was powerful, it was careful to maintain the position, authority, and prestige of Malay rulers. Indirect rule over Malays gave the impression that sultans still controlled the affairs of state and that Malays enjoyed political supremacy over non-Malays. The assumptions underlying agreements with Malay rulers were that Malay states belonged exclusively to Malays and that the ruler was sovereign within his own state. Since Malay states were sovereign states, English law was not formally introduced as it was in the Straits Settlements. Despite variations in the application of Muslim law in the various states, there was general acceptance of shari’a as a general law for the Malays. British rulers were conscious of their lack of direct control over the sovereignty of Malay states. Thus in the 1920s and 1930s they advocated the need to foster administrative uniformity. British residents acquired more power to make decisions over questions related to public order, administration, and religion.34 The British colonial administration became increasingly centralized, and British Malaya became a formal political entity. The Japanese invasion of Malaya in December 1941 was a catalyst for political change. This resulted in a long process of Malay self-appraisal and was marked by two interrelated developments. First, Japanese occupation produced different brands of nationalism and cultivated dissension among ethnic communities in Malaya.35 Second, the Japanese left a legacy of

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physical destruction and political upheaval that eroded the power and prestige of the British. The Japanese fanned anti-Chinese feelings by deploying military units of Malays to fight Chinese resistance groups. The Japanese treated the Chinese most harshly and killed many with the help of paramilitary units composed mainly of Malays to fight the Chinese. But by fostering patriotism among Malays against the Chinese, the Japanese stirred up nationalist and anticolonial sentiments that could later be turned against the British. The Japanese occupation brought the Malays increased political power and in the process gave them a new confidence. The other communities felt neglected and realized the need to assert themselves. Meanwhile, because the Chinese had offered the most resistance, they earned British sympathy when the colonizers returned to Malaya postwar. The Chinese underground and its experience in guerrilla tactics laid the foundation for the communist insurgency in later years.36 Indeed, after the defeat of the Japanese, the communist-led Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army held sway for a couple of weeks before the British resumed authority. The most important thing to note is that among the main ethnic groups, World War II produced different nationalist tendencies and different perceptions about the future of Malaysia. Before the war Malays had been content—provided they retained political supremacy—to leave the economy to the British and the immigrants. After the Japanese defeat, however, Malays realized that the British supported the claims of other communities for equal political status and had changed the prewar approach of recognizing the sovereignty of the Malay sultans. As late as the 1930s the overwhelming majority of Chinese in Malaya continued to regard China as home and were politically involved with events on mainland China; the great issue dividing the Chinese community in Malaya was the battle between the nationalists and communists in China. Although political activity never reached the degree of turbulence observed in Burma and the Philippines during this period, the Chinese-dominated communist groups in Malaya that fought bitterly against the Japanese aroused nationalist feelings. Different nationalist currents were visible as well within the Indian immigrant population, aroused by the anti-British rhetoric of the independence movement and the Indian National Army, led by Subhas Chandra Bose—a movement supported by fascist powers in the region.37 Along with the boost in Malay nationalism triggered by wartime events, postwar constitutional developments also occurred. To reinforce their authority after the war, the British launched a new constitutional scheme called the Malayan Union, which was inaugurated on 1 April 1946. The Malay elite reacted with hostility to what they saw as an eclipse of the powers of

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the Malay community.38 The Malayan Union lasted only until 1948, when it was replaced by another scheme called the Federation of Malaya. The failure of the Malayan Union can be attributed to two factors: the position of the Malay sultans, and the question of citizenship. Malay opposition to British proposals in the Malayan Union was based on two concerns. The first was a fear that if sultans forfeited their sovereignty and Malaya was administered centrally, then the states were bound to lose their “relative autonomy as well as some of their highly valued and distinctive characteristics” (Stubbs 1990, 23–24).39 Second, the prospect of extending political rights to non-Malays caused unease because the process would eventually culminate in automatically granting citizenship to non-Malays. Such opposition developed slowly, because before World War II Malays felt more loyalty to individual states than to Malaya as a country. They were not bound by a central government or by a single religious organization. Yet loyalty to the sultans and Islam were the distinguishing features of Malay subjecthood; these gradually became symbols of nationalism. A loose alliance of political groups, led by Onn bin Ja’afar from Johor, provided leadership and inspiration for the intense nationalism generated among Malays to oppose the proposal for a Malayan Union. Onn bin Ja’afar was instrumental in the formation of the first Malay organization, the United Malays National Organization, in 1946; its concerns were limited to the preservation of the position of the sultans and to mobilizing Malay opposition to the Malayan Union. Prominent leaders led a merdeka (independence) mission to London and argued for independence as soon as possible. Facing opposition from the Malay community, the British abandoned the Malayan Union and sought new proposals for a federation agreement under a working committee. The 1957 constitution, derived from the so-called Federation Agreement of 1948, remains in force to this day. The new federation had a strong central government that was committed to the development of self-government. The most important change embodied in the Federation Agreement of 1948 was the idea of general citizenship for all communities while asserting the special rights and protections for the Malays. The constitution endorsed Malay hegemony by accepting Malays’ claims for special treatment in language, religion, reservations and quotas, and admission to public services. The new federation had barely come into being when Malaya was plunged into a state of emergency after a communist revolt broke out in June 1948. However, by following the hearts-and-minds approach, a Malayan Communist Party (MCP)–led insurrection of communists (predominantly Chinese), left-wing Malay nationalists, former wartime partisans, and workers was crushed.40 The insurrection, which started with the murders of three British planters in June 1948, failed partly because, by

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the early 1950s, the worst postwar hardships were over and the opportunity to exploit general misery had faded, partly because the MCP appeared to be exclusively Chinese. Rejecting the Chinese insurrection showed a general revulsion to accepting immigrants as citizens and to accepting foreign ideologies to direct the national movement. Trends in Nationalism: Ethnic-based Political Formations The Federation of Malaya became independent on 31 August 1957 after intense debate on the constitution. The principal negotiators of the bargain of 1957 were the so-called Alliance formed by UMNO, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the newly formed Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), signaling the inception of an elite accommodation system. The three most important political parties of the Alliance were communal, claiming to represent the interests of their ethnic communities. Whether the result of British policy or the ethnic divide among the communities, currents of nationalism failed to generate a powerful movement that included all ethnic groups on a single platform. How do we explain the absence of an anticolonial front representing the interests of different ethnic communities? In addition to undermining their prestige, British defeat at the hands of the Japanese during World War II was a catalyst for nationalism and the political consciousness of the people of Malaya. Political organizations dominated by communists, Chinese, Indians, and Malays emerged during these years. Unfortunately, according to James P. Ongkili, in most of the political activities “there was no cohesion among the various ethnic groups.” He argues that the idea of a “Malayan nation was perhaps already there in the minds of some of the more radical Malay leaders but its shape and dimensions were not very clear” (Ongkili 1985, 19). There is no doubt that for the Malays the conceptual fusion of an impending nation-state and monarchy shaped the national consciousness. The success of Malays in articulating their many demands against the Malayan Union owed to this factor; other communities could not coalesce around any common platform—the only symbol of any use was anticolonialism. However, at a time when Malay organizations were worried about the danger of Chinese supremacy, the success of any proposal for a multiethnic organization appeared remote. The postwar multiethnic failure can also be attributed to the different levels of political urgency and ideological commitment among the ethnic communities. The Malayan Democratic Union (MDU) and the Malay Nationalist Party (MNP) were anti-imperialist and left-wing in orientation. Although multiethnic in composition, they could not mobilize enough Malays to oppose the constitutional proposals. T. H. Silcock and Ungku Abdul Aziz argue that the MNP was supported by only a few Malay intellectuals,

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manifested in its failure “to stir up anti-British activities among the Malays” (1973, 314). Other initiatives in this direction include an alliance between the People’s Forces Center and the All Malaya Council of Joint Action, seen as the first major Malayan nationalist alternative to British proposals. These parties incorporated Malays’ interests but could not win them over for a people’s constitution as the basis for immediate independence. Therefore it is plausible to endorse the argument of some scholars that Malay support for the postwar initiatives was not forthcoming because of the threat of Chinese supremacy. Malays’ distrust of the Chinese had several sources: the Chinese amassed wealth in commercial enterprises, had far superior education, and had shown no significant attachment to Malaya as a country until the war. The initiatives lost momentum when a state of emergency was declared in 1948, driving many opposition members underground. Another reason for the lack of a multiethnic nationalist front could be that the new Malay leaders were the product of a nascent Malay nationalism that originated only in the twentieth century. Many elite groups among the Malays arose during this period, distinguished by social origins and by educational (and hence cultural-political) orientations—the Islamic, the radical nationalist, and the elitist-administrative groups.41 Apart from them, many voluntary associations existed, but none gained a mass following, especially among rural Malays. They were mostly “social, cultural and economic in character and intent,” but none “sought to exercise direct political influence or suggested that they spoke for a political as distinct from a socio-cultural group” (Roff 1980, 187). In part, this self-restraint and desire to act within the laws of the state is explained by some scholars as having “sprung from a deep-rooted, peasant-Malay deference to established authority and a recognition that politics was dangerous, even an improper pursuit better left to others with greater knowledge of how to go about it” (Roff 1980, 187). A unique feature of Malay nationalists was that they exalted the aristocracy and courted royal patronage. The presence of a traditional elite was paralleled by an absence of peasant involvement in the growing export economy controlled by Arab, Chinese, southern Indian, and Sumatran traders. W. R. Roff argues that because the changes introduced by the British were “neither radical in extent, nor structural in implication” in the countryside, they did not lead to major political upheavals (Roff 1980, 252). This maintenance of the status quo shielded peasant society from the disruptive effects of a new economic order as well as any possible social discontent that would follow. Another factor is the salience and persistence of ethnic and religious sentiments among the people. Since Malays realized their minority status, following the 1921 census, they came together to protect their community, first against the British Malayan Union scheme, then later against attempts

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to mobilize other non-Malays.42 Onn bin Ja’afar’s proposal to include nonMalays in a multicommunal alliance—the Independence of Malay Party— to oppose the British was met with great skepticism. Indeed, other attempts to form a political party not confined to Malays were doomed to failure because militant and communal Malays failed to endorse them.43 Despite these obstacles to a single multiethnic organization, by 1953– 1954 the Alliance formed by UMNO, MCA, and MIC gave new hope for an independent Malaysian government. This intercommunal coalition was termed a “constitutional contract” because it was to be the nucleus through which independence would be accomplished and a constitution prepared for the new political system (Von Vorys 1976, 122). Despite being divided by political ideologies, state loyalties, and ethnic groups, the Alliance could claim to represent the interests of the three major ethnic groups and could thus compel the British to organize a smooth transition to independence. Significantly, the coalition could not claim the allegiance of the entire Malay community: the political groupings of the Malay elite were always too diverse to agree on issues like the administration of Islam, Chinese hegemony, and economic advancement of the Malays. Two competing groups appeared out of the elite: the Western-educated Malay nationalists, and the radical nationalists educated in the vernacular. Many leaders in UMNO’s bureau of religious affairs were dissatisfied with Onn bin Ja’afar’s British policy, as well as the party’s approach to Islam. A faction broke away from UMNO to form the Majlis Agama Tertinggi Malaya (MATA) that was transformed a year later, in 1948, into Malaysia’s first Islamic party.44 It represented the convergence of elements that wished to establish an Islamic state. Since its inception, UMNO had viewed the formation of an Islamic party as a major threat to its popularity within the Malay community. And even though the Islamic party had faded by the end of 1949, these developments encouraged Islamic radicals within UMNO to break away. In 1951, the Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) was formed under the leadership of Haji Fuad bin Hassan, who had been head of the UMNO bureau of religious affairs. In this way—although the two non-Malay political parties, MIC and MCA, were not religiously inspired—UMNO had to incorporate a religious program to compete with its formidable foe, PAS. Decades later, PAS would become UMNO’s major challenger at the national level.45

The Politics of Nation-building From our previous discussion we can make several conclusions: The colonial policy of importing workers from different communities set up potential conflict between immigrants and indigenous peoples; ethnic and Malay

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groups were locked in dispute regarding the nature of the Malaysian state; nationalism was associated with questions of reform and protection of the Malay community and its traditions; and Malaysia became independent as a consequence of constitutional bargaining between colonial rulers and nationalist elites and was not the product of popular uprising.46 In this section I examine the postindependent efforts of the Malaysian state to infuse a sense of homogeneity and community in a society based on cultural pluralism. I will focus in very broad terms on the project of nationbuilding to note how Malayan nationalism changed after independence and how it provided ingredients for an ideology of the state that could legitimize the privileges of the Malay community. Many of these issues will be linked to the debate on citizenship in Chapter 3. I argue that the nation-state model as it developed in Malaysia faces a different challenge from those in other multicultural states in Southeast Asia. Although the state played a major role in modernization and has been transformed into a monoethnic state, its main challenges come from the emergence of Islam as a political force within the Malay community, as well as from democratic currents within all communities. I also argue that another challenge has arisen from the emergence of a politicized, modern and semimodern middle class that seeks to preserve special privileges in politics and economy disproportionate to its size. The details of this challenge will become clear in subsequent chapters. After independence, the national and local elites in Malaysia undertook the task of shedding their colonial or neocolonial identities and replacing them with available alternatives. One was to resort to a traditional identity by reviving a long and proud cultural tradition through an appeal to a golden past. Thus the classic ideal of one nation, one state could be achieved by dominating or excluding members who were not part of the indigenous population. The second alternative was a secular identity whereby different cultural communities could reside as citizens together. This secular state could be based on the principles of individual liberties and fundamental rights of all citizens in the public sphere. Put simply it was based on a set of equal political rights and privileges for all citizens, embodying an ameliorative program of building society by discarding feudal shackles. Underlying this model was a restricted idea of cultural pluralism—that a nation-state could live with many cultures and that a new national culture could be enriched if its citizens assimilated and integrated within a national framework. Neither of these two was completely adopted in Malaysia at the time of independence. The political elites formulated a third model that fundamentally departed from the Western experience in the way it conceptualized the basis of citizenship. Within it, an expanded idea of cultural pluralism was to be preserved by the politics of accommodation among communities

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and special protection for the economically backward indigenous Malay community. Like other nation-states in the third world, Malaysia faced the task of nation-building and inculcating commitment and loyalty toward the state among its citizens. According to the constitution, individuals from ethnic communities, primarily immigrants from India and China, were to be given equal citizenship rights. The transition from an ethnocultural conception of nation—under the colonial period it was known as the Malaya Peninsula— to a political-cultural conception of nation—now known as Malaysia—was facilitated by extending the principle of citizenship to the non-Malay communities while forcing linguistic homogeneity within its territory. Within this framework, the non-Malay communities could preserve ethnic lifestyles, cuisines, and costumes; organize political parties; and form ethnic schools, but only by accepting the special position of the Malays. Although the constitution prescribed a universal set of rights, the state gradually emerged as a strong protector of Malay interests and traditions and, with time, created a culturally majoritarian and politically hegemonic entity. This was possible for two reasons: The state played a key role in preserving Malay privileges in key sectors of the administration and economy; and individual liberties guaranteed in the constitution were subordinated to the idea of accommodation between ethnic communities. Over the years, powerful cultural symbols of the Malay community were mobilized, individual liberties overridden, and cultural identities of other communities subjected to cultural redefinition. A national identity was forged from indigenous and Western-modern elements and rested upon the unique qualities of an Asian value system. Two Phases of Nation-building After independence the tasks involved in nation-building were explored. The people had given a mandate and sanctioned the idea of providing special rights for Malays in the constitution, which they did in the federal elections, held in 1955, electing the Alliance. Although it was based on the cooperation of three ethnic parties—MIC, MCA, and UMNO—the Malays had the largest role in policymaking; their interests dominated the Alliance. The growth of the postcolonial state, with its complex, mixed polity, did not follow any coherent assessment of nation-building until the question of territorial and cultural boundaries was broached. In 1961, Malaysia’s first prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, proposed an expanded nation that would politically integrate the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo (Sabah), and Sarawak.47 After World War II, Malaya and Singapore were politically separate; the former achieved independence in 1957, the latter achieved internal self-government from the

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British in 1959.48 The problems of including Singapore in a new federation were formidable: Singapore had a predominantly Chinese population and could destroy the ethnic balance if it were included in Malaya, and since 1948 its government increasingly reflected radical and left-wing ideas. Nevertheless, Tunku felt that by simultaneously including the Borneo territories—with their non-Chinese populations—Malays’ fears of being swamped by the Chinese could be assuaged. On 16 September 1963, Tunku’s proposal of a Malaysia consisting of the eleven states of the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak bore fruit. But differences soon arose with the Peoples’ Action Party (PAP) of Singapore over representation in the parliament and cabinet, internal security, and parliamentary elections. The political ambitions of the PAP became clear when Lee Kuan Yew criticized Yang di-Pertuan Agong’s 1964 official address in parliament. He was also critical of the legal measures for uplifting Malays’ socioeconomic status and proposed to resist Malay hegemony by creating a “Malaysian Malaysia,” not a “Malay Malaysia” (Lee Kuan Yew 1998, 17).49 The government acted swiftly to meet these challenges and agreed to Singapore’s secession from the federation in 1965. This caused concern in Sabah and Sarawak, which had joined Malaysia on the assumption they would have room to maneuver. The two states had been given nearly all their stipulated conditions for entry, including a higher proportion of representation in the parliament than any Malay state and retention of English as an official language. But they were still sensitive to several issues: the Malaysianization of the civil service, the status of Islam, special rights for the indigenous people, and economic development. On all these issues the federal government wanted speedy implementation of uniform policies. The main problem was that only a minority in the two new states was Malay, although they were composed of indigenous people who spoke dialects close to the Malay language. Muslims formed a small proportion of the population in these states. Malaysia’s plan for political integration and centralization was also challenged by Indonesia and the Philippines, which voiced opposition to the federation on the grounds that Sabah and Sarawak belonged to them. With time the Philippines dropped its claim to Sabah, and the confrontation with Indonesia was averted with the downfall of President Achmed Sukarno. Not surprisingly, despite the constitutional privileges for the Malay community, UMNO leadership under Tunku Abdul Rahman increasingly realized that communal compromises with other ethnic communities were necessary if it was to stay in political power at the federal and state levels.50 In the first decade after independence until the race riots of 1969, state expansion as well as accommodation of immigrant groups was evident in official education and language policy, designed to integrate the interests of

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other groups in society. On the one hand, linguistic unity was advocated as indispensable to Malaysian citizenship; the aim was to devise a standardized curriculum for the entire country with Malay as the national language. On the other hand, although Malay became the national language, English could be used in an official capacity. Chinese and Tamil schools that taught subjects in the vernacular were allowed to exist. To fulfill the idea of linguistic unity, national Malay-medium secondary schools were founded; the Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka (Literary and Language Agency) was established to encourage the use of Malay in commerce, higher education, technology, and science; and the spelling and terminology used in Malaysia and Indonesia were standardized.51 By 1965 the government made major changes in the educational policy to ensure the dominance of the Malay language in the educational system, including adopting Malay to complement English as a medium in the school certificate exam to determine entry into university. UMNO leaders, concerned with their political legitimacy within the Malay community, also gave great attention to Malay heritage. Malay language and culture were propagated as the primary vehicle for creating a new Malaysian identity, no doubt to the dismay of non-Malays. However, the government’s language and educational policies were a source of discontent within the Malay community and partly contributed to the ethnic disturbances in May 1969.52 Nation-building Under Mahathir The second phase of nation-building (i.e., after 1970) has been directed toward furthering the identity of a rapidly expanding Malay middle class that emerged as a result of the New Economic Policy. The NEP was the government’s blueprint for Malay ethnic particularism and replaced the strategy of multiethnic compromise followed by Tunku Abdul Rahman. The entire government program, after the race riots in 1969, revolved around the philosophy that if the Malays were provided with more and better opportunities—more scholarships for higher education and reserved jobs in the government—then in time they would attain the economic status of the Chinese.53 This, however, would not mean complete parity of Chinese and Malay. Indeed, during this period government policies (i.e., promoting symbolic forms of Islam and organizing Malay-based cultural activities) were coupled with the NEP and its economic aims. A department of national unity was set up under the leadership of Ghazali Shafie that eventually drafted the rukunegara (articles of faith) as a statement and definition of nationalism. The basic principles of this national ideology are belief in God, loyalty to king and country, allegiance to the constitution and the rule of law, and good behavior and morality.54

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But the increasing size and complexity of the state under the NEP made the functions of the executive increasingly important. The Malaysian state, since Mahathir Mohamad became prime minister in 1981, commands a large presence in people’s lives to a much greater extent than ever in Malayan history. The impressive economic growth of Malaysia under Mahathir depended upon membership in Western organizations during the Cold War, openness to foreign trade in the Asia-Pacific, and an exportoriented economic strategy. Mahathir advocated capitalist growth and a free market (although for a long time he favored the Japanese model of heavy state intervention as opposed to laissez faire). As the economy grew, the Malay community benefited most under a sweeping affirmative action program that gave it huge preferences in business contracts, jobs, education, housing, and bank loans. But this also increased the functions of the prime minister in a political system based on patronage and reward; the difference is that under Mahathir it became an institutionalized system of rewarding loyalty and political support (see Chapter 5). The prime minister came to power with a coherent nationalist ideology that he expanded in The Malay Dilemma. However, in nation-building Mahathir did not depend on any single policy or on coercion; rather he relied on a leadership style characterized by centralization of power and subtle accommodation among different ethnic elites through ideological processes of control (i.e., controlling agendas for economic development, the media, and education). Because of such controls some describe Mahathir’s leadership style as “being a kind of tutelary populism which sought to join a purposeful mass mobilisation to an enlightened leadership” (Khoo Boo Teik 1995, 273). Elaborating this point, Khoo Boo Teik claims that “this mass-oriented appeal” distinguished Mahathir’s approach from “the laissez faire mood of the Tunku’s era, and the state-directed character of NEP implementation under Razak and Hussein Onn” (Khoo Boo Teik 1995, 273). Unlike his predecessors he had a “populist aura, appeared to be all things to all men, and to have something to say to different sections of Malaysian society” (Khoo Boo Teik 1995, 273). Such popular appeal was evident throughout the 1980s and late 1990s when Mahathir attacked the Western model of democracy in favor of an Asian model of democracy. For this purpose he embarked on spectacular campaigns from time to time. In 1981, he took a tough stance against the former colonizer with his “Buy British Last” campaign, resulting in a significant boycott of British goods. In his so-called Look East policy his nationalism evolved into a “more Malaysian and less Malay . . . variety” (Khoo Boo Teik 1995, 273). Since the 1997–1998 financial crisis, Mahathir has launched vitriolic attacks on globalization, another important element of his strategy of ideological control. By embarking on such campaigns Mahathir departs from his predecessors, fueling nationalism via a broad Malaysian cultural identity that has

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contradicted the ideology underlying the NEP. Below I highlight some of the contradictions in the assimilation approach followed by the government that identifies Malay culture as the predominant ingredient of national culture and in Mahathir’s recent critique of Western values and trends in globalization. In his speeches and writings and popular campaigns Mahathir has tried to create the “other”—in this case a West of decadent values (but not one as to science and technology). Mahathir argues that Western values are stagnant, degenerate, and incapable of progressing any farther. Such nationalism on the one hand assumes a common destiny for the people of Malaysia and reaffirms a sense of national purpose; on the other it demonstrates the falsity of the claim that the Malays are backward and culturally incapable of sustaining their values in the modern world. Since the financial crisis Mahathir has used every available international and domestic forum to rail against “the movement to turn all Asian economies” into “Anglo-Saxon laissez faire market economies” (Mahathir 1999b). Economically, Malaysia still remains a free-market economy despite some aspects of control on currency and the fixed exchange regime it adopted in 1998 to halt the slide of the ringgit. But politically Mahathir’s voice has emerged as the loudest in Asia against globalization as he accuses the World Bank and the IMF of being culturally insensitive and instruments of neocolonialism; for their part the “currency traders,” by devaluing currencies, transformed “the so-called East Asian economic tigers suddenly into meowing cats” (Mahathir 2000a).55 These attacks are conducted with due consideration for the restructuring of global capitalism resulting from changes in the technologies of production. According to Mahathir, under globalization free flows of capital— “the new gunship of the rich”—have led to serious abuses (Mahathir 2000a). Thus globalization is not a panacea for economic ills; it can enrich the poor, but it can also impoverish and even destroy the economies of countries and regions. The most important factor is the relative strengths of the players in the global world. Those countries that have emerged from colonialism should be careful lest they again become subordinate to the West. At the same time, the prime minister has argued that if globalization is “properly interpreted and practiced it can result in a more equitable world order where wealth is more evenly distributed between the rich and the poor” (Mahathir 2000a). To a large extent his attack on the global economy is part of a larger condemnation of Western intervention in Malaysia as a bid to recolonize and destabilize the country; it increasingly identifies the Malaysians as a single community.56 Despite Malaysia’s dependence on foreign direct investment and manufacturing exports, Mahathir’s attacks on foreign influence and global economic trends seem contradictory. These attacks mask irresolvable tensions at the heart of Mahathir’s policy of nationalism.

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Since 1981 Mahathir has promoted a strategy for creating a bumiputra capitalist class through the privatization of state-owned industries. The evolution of the NEP took shape as it allowed large Chinese trading conglomerates to increasingly cultivate close ties with the UMNO. The government bureaucracy shielded close ties between business and politics during this period and protected corporate activity from public scrutiny. In the post–Cold War world, as the main thrust of his economic policy shifted toward increased liberalization, privatization, and deregulation, Mahathir attacked greedy currency speculators and the financial institutions of globalization. Although it has links to the anticolonial theme that dominated nationalist discourse after independence, as well as the critique of Western democracy in the late 1980s, this critique of globalization represents a new direction. It rests squarely within the context of economic crisis, Islamic resurgence, and the growth of democratization in the ASEAN region. Mahathir claims that an international system of production, distribution, and exchange, as well as institutions like the IMF, limit the choices of the state and economy. It has led to loss of control over the process of determining policy directions in the international division of labor, its place in power blocs, as well as in major international organizations. National governments, he argues, no longer have a free hand to give preferential treatment to their citizens or to protect domestic industries against foreign competitors: To a large extent Mahathir’s argument is correct; in privatization and deregulation, control and power are not always yielded to markets but to large, foreign, hierarchically controlled organizations and private companies. But I would argue that Mahathir’s attack on economic globalization is linked to his political concern: if multinational and foreign firms gain control over the economy, then they are bound to raise questions related to transparency in management and accounts. Put simply, under globalization crony capitalism and Mahathir’s patronage system will come under international scrutiny.57 Thus by attacking globalization Mahathir emphasizes the role of Malaysia in the international community and moves away from the issue of Malay identity within a multiethnic society. However, the recent attack on globalization also helps to focus once again on an external threat to the Malay community in order to avoid further splits within them; it is used in part to discredit the policies of Anwar Ibrahim, the former deputy prime minister of Malaysia, who supported liberal economic policies, particularly those of the IMF. Globalization thus becomes an easy target for problems and dissatisfactions in the Malay community. Finally, it could be argued that under Mahathir’s leadership the Malaysian state, like many other postcolonial states in the process of nation-building, tends to be Janus-faced. The core narrative of progress and civilization is found in the way aspects of modernity are celebrated and rejected. Building

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Malaysia as a modernized country also requires ideological resources from tradition in order to reinforce the rule of the party and its leader. The state selects aspects of tradition from the past and reconstitutes elements identified as possible sources of stability while also orienting citizens toward achieving future goals that will incorporate key components of identity. It is illustrated in one of Mahathir’s earliest policies: building national identity by glorifying Asian values in contrast to Western values and materialism.58 The need to reconstruct Malay identity by reviving Malay dance, music and song, as well as other symbols of a traditional, village-based, feudalistic, and patriarchal Malay culture, appeals to a large section of the new Malay middle class.59 The state-controlled media designs elaborate mobilization campaigns like Malaysia Boleh (Malaysia Can) to enhance patriotism and social cohesion. There is no attempt to speak in terms of a bumiputra culture. Ethnic group referents are used as cultural categories. What the government has done is draw upon Malay values, norms, and traditions to establish a political culture and endorse political behavior emphasizing order and respect for authority. My argument is that even though nation-building involves manipulation and deliberate fabrication, it also is influenced and shaped by what Eric Hobsbawm has called, in a different context, the “proto-national bonds”—in short, by citizens and their political identities.60 Failing to appreciate this subtlety, many are led to argue within the old framework and with older models of nationalism. It is not surprising, therefore, how scholars argue that Malaysia has a relatively weak sense of nationalism because of the people’s stronger ethnic, religious, and regional affiliations. Many point out that the country has yet to develop a “progressive nationalist as opposed to ethno-popularist or neo-colonial globalist agenda” that would enhance national unity. It is argued that the nationalist project so far has been guided by the principles of “ethno-populism”—promoted by the ethnically based dominant parties of the ruling coalition or by principles of “ethnic corporatism” that are inimical to national corporatism (Jomo 1994, 86; 1989, 9–11). Others see Malaysia’s survival as a political entity dependent on its ability “to make ethnic identifications redundant and to create an acceptable new identity” (Andaya and Andaya 1982, 303). Such arguments are based on two premises. First, multiculturalism in Malaysia is simply rhetoric that disguises inequality or is a means of marking groups as minorities so that they can be controlled, manipulated, or subjected to unequal treatment. Second, the failure of Malaysians to culturally unite indicates their failure as a nation. Implicit in these arguments is the modern identification of nation with nation-state, as well as its corollary: a nation that is not culturally united or strives to be then suffers. This leads to a question: To what extent was ethnicity and culture a pregiven, and how was culture socially constructed in the project of nationbuilding in Malaysia?

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In contrast to a model of a culturally homogenous nation-state, statebacked nationalism in Malaysia gradually developed based on the institutionalization of at least three ethnic divisions in society: Malay, Chinese, and Indian. These divisions had evolved and developed as part of the system of British colonial rule and racial classification. There are several reasons: The land of Malaya was multiethnic in character, yet the factors that gave rise to the state in 1957 were instrumental in promoting the identification of the state with the majority ethnic community; ethnic minority groups were not excluded from full membership as citizens of the state, yet senior positions in the state machinery were designed to be monopolized by the dominant ethnic majority group—Malay; more important, the ideological character of the state, and therefore its national identity, became associated with the language, culture, and values of the dominant community. Thus, whereas society was plural or multiethnic, the state was monoethnic; in other words, it came to be identified predominantly with the Malay community.

Nationalism and Globalization In light of the foregoing, another question arises: How substantive can state-backed nationalism and nation-building in Malaysia be, given the way that recent trends in globalization are influencing ideas on culture, religion, and identity? In answering this question, I present arguments to show why, in all likelihood, nation-building in Malaysia has ruled out any major challenge by ethnic communities. I then explain the major contradictions of this model and the challenges it may face in the future. There are four aspects to the process of absorption of minority groups and their interests in Malaysia. First, unlike in other states, accommodating the interests of ethnic groups forms part of the official framework of economic and political power in the constitution of Malaysia. Since independence, a great part of the country’s political organization has been formally institutionalized as the Alliance and then as the Barisan Nasional. The three main ethnic groups share power together at the national level, thereby ruling out party formations drawing people from all ethnic groups. The success of the BN as an elite accommodation system that controls diversity on the basis of Malay hegemony, without alienating other ethnic groups, is evident in the comfortable majorities it attained in elections under Tun Abdul Razak Hussein and Tun Hussein Onn (1970–1981) and the current prime minister, Mahathir (1981–1999). Second, in a national transformation (i.e., from a colonial pluralist system to a monoethnic state) involving a quest for congruence among state, territory, and historic community, the government led by Mahathir both regulates and co-opts ethnic dissent. Apart from being the undisputed leader of

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his party, UMNO, he is leader of the BN, a group of parties from various ethnic groups. The monoethnic character of the state, but not the government, means that state expansion attempts to introduce the values and institutions of the dominant ethnic group into the other communities; but integrative policies are likely to favor UMNO constituents even while the government seems neutral. For example, since 1970 the government has tried to seek assimilation of other ethnic communities by stressing the ideas of a common cultural identity and Asian values along with what Will Kymlicka has called “polyethnic rights,” thereby avoiding the emotional overtones of racial origins, biological heritage, and political competition (see Kymlicka 2001, 51). Third, Mahathir’s policy has been to encourage the perception of the Malaysian state as a modern state—a protective agency that will make all communities equally prosperous—yet also to be cautious that centralization does not lead to disruption of communal authority structures. Removing such structures (e.g., ranks, honors, titles, and adat, or ceremonies, within the Malay community, ethnic-based political parties, kinship networks, and religious organizations of minorities) would have shifted and undermined the support and legitimacy bases of ethnic groups. Since independence, the process of incorporation into, and penetration by, the state is a major situational change for the immigrant communities; it has produced major changes in their ethnic groups. The ethnic communities have come to see the expanding state as the dominant influence, and have come to identify themselves in relation to the Malay community and its politics. Because the Chinese and Indian communities were labeled as immigrant groups at the time of independence and were subject to citizenship policies that regulated their religion, language, and community, their sense of identity came to be modified. Indeed, ethnic communities endorsed the theory that oppression and disadvantage were linked to the Malay group, and the special protections in the constitution were justified on the grounds of Malays’ exclusion from economic resources and benefits. Therefore economic deprivation did not provide the sense of minority identity that might have existed among the economically backward Indian or Chinese groups. Last, Mahathir’s critique of globalization has been instrumental in raising the Malaysian consciousness about the negative impact of free capital flows in the world. He has time and again warned about the West and its machinations in destroying Malaysia’s economy. But more important, in creating an external enemy against which all Malaysians must struggle, he has reinforced the Malaysian identity. In the international context, Mahathir’s critique of globalization has established the sovereignty of the Malaysian state. By virtue of that argument he has established the need for immunity from scrutiny in the formal conduct of states toward one another. The upshot of this view is that the

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Malaysian state is not subject to international moral requirements in democracy or human rights because other states are discrete political orders with no oversight authority. In emphasizing the Malaysian nation-state he is able to discredit the ideas of the international political community on individual rights and civil society; moreover, controversial public matters like the verdict on Anwar Ibrahim can be placed beyond public debate. There are theoretical problems with this model. First, there is the assumption that the development of a modern scientific state will always be compatible with the goals of Malaysian nationalism. In the past, the state has drawn attention of its citizens to the construction of a new technocratic order in the modern Malaysian state (i.e., the trend toward materialistic accumulation and a productivist orientation).61 To legitimize the multiethnic state in the postcolonial situation, however, also involves a re-creation of culture, an attempt by the elite to prevent the erosion of what it perceives as components of an “Eastern culture” by the individualistic emphasis on Western values. Western values are seen as the inevitable result of Western technology and innovations. This is illustrated in Mahathir’s Look East policy, through which he began a search for “a development strategy that fused or assimilated the Islamic values of Malaysians with the work and saving ethics of the Japanese and the Koreans” (Zakaria Haji Ahmad 1993, 158).62 Therefore in Malaysia a strong sense of nation has developed within the context of a modern and technocratic state and established ethnic differences.63 In recent years this assumption has been exposed as deeply flawed because the context of nationalism has changed. The main contradiction is that political and economic policies (including the state’s policy toward religion) along with the NEP have transformed the Malay ethnic group into a self-conscious political identity; the Malay community has searched for a religious basis for that identity. Therefore the resurgence of Islam within the Malay community, and the popularity of PAS, have questioned a citizen-based loyalty to a territorially defined state. The second fallacy is to assume that the Chinese and Indian communities have no democratic aspirations. Increasing numbers of middle-class and technologically literate Malaysians—journalists, public servants, researchers, professionals, students—as part of the government’s Vision 2020 policy are establishing a variety of “transnational relationships” that provide more information about human rights, religious movements, and development (Mee 1998, 232). Possibly they can draw upon the universalistic and normative principles formulated in the constitution that regulate relations among communities. I would argue that although the project of building a monoethnic state in a multiethnic society does not imply any escalation in political tensions as long as the central government has the capacity to control the expansion of cross-cultural party formations and associations, it is also true that the politics of consensus in a multicultural society acts as

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barrier to the rise of a fully blown Islamic state in Malaysia in the near future. Apart from nationalism, the political identities of other ethnic groups have been undergoing change. Ethnic identities are cultural markers susceptible to change and variation.64 When ethnic immigrants arrived in Malaya, they had to contend with the authority of British colonialism. After the war, the need to identify with the local indigenous population was difficult because they were not prepared to accept a new identity based on anticolonialism and modern principles of nation-building. Another reason was that the Chinese as well as the Indians had a historical identity based on their countries of origin and were conscious of that. In addition, the Chinese were composed of subethnic groups (Hokkien, Cantonese, Hakka, Foochows, and Hailam) who came from the two southern Chinese provinces of Guangdong and Fujian. However, as a consequence of the politics of accommodation, Chinese Malaysians developed a local identity for political purposes—unprecedented in this region. No other Chinese community was large enough to share power with the indigenous population. Thus several possible meanings appear to operate simultaneously for individuals with ethnic identification in Malaysia.65 Similarly, under colonial rule the term Malay was understood to distinguish Malay-speaking Muslims residing on the peninsula from other immigrant groups. After independence, many indigenous groups from Sabah and Sarawak were included, and the term bumiputra (sons of soil) was created to refer to groups of Orang Asli and the Malays. After the dakwah (call or invitation to the faith) of the 1970s, Islam has been an important cultural marker for Malays. To meet the challenge arising out of these fluctuations in political identities, UMNO intellectuals constructed a new kind of Malay, Melayu Baru (New Malay), a concept now extended to all of Malaysia’s ethnic groups. Many scholars describe these transformations as “being accompanied by significant shifts in the discursive processes through which individuals and groups construct cultural identity” (Kahn 1998, 23). Therefore ethnic groups are not merely or necessarily based on the occupation of exclusive territories but on the different ways in which they are maintained—not only by a once-and-for-all labeling but also by continual expression and validation.66

Conclusion Current developments in globalization compel us to reconsider the role of the state and the sovereignty of the nation-state. In this chapter I assessed the extent to which current forms of identity politics are in some sense new phenomena rather than a resurgence of earlier kinds of nationalist and

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ethnic sentiments. There is evidence of an erosion of “protonational” bonds of classical nationalism as well as their reassertion, thereby leading to a reconstitution of ethnic identities. In the global environment of rapid social change some reformulations are urgently needed in the context of Malaysia. The first is that state-building, nationalism, and nation-building are different historical processes. The emergence of the Malaysian state was an outcome of several trends in Malayan nationalism. But the formation of the Malaysian state did not necessarily mean the formation of a nation-state. Nation-building touched a composite plurality of coexisting cultures, conscious interest groupings, and political organizations. The period of nation-building was marked by competing versions of nationhood, evidenced by Malaysia’s trouble in accepting Singapore in the 1960s, territorial disputes over Sabah and Sarawak, the fierce clash of interests among the major ethnic communities in 1969, the rise of religious identities in the late 1970s, and democratic aspirations after the sacking of Anwar. I suggest that Malaysian nationalism, despite such challenges, has deep historical and social roots; the interests projected through them are enduring. Although initially based on the principles of modernity and progress, many states like Malaysia in the era of globalization assert the need for not only scientific and technological innovations but also a social and cultural heritage. Supported by a new if still weak sense of national identity, nationalism is being reformulated in Malaysia as an important integrating factor in society, most especially for the educated elite and for the urban masses of the ethnic communities. In addition to the sense of a national culture—whether expressed in the vocabulary of Islam or of state nationalism—value patterns are articulated in such a way that social structures do not mirror the cultural patterns endorsed by the state in a straightforward way. The processes leading to the crystallization of a monoethnic state are marked by an overwhelming majority of Malaysians internalizing a set of shared values, the most important being the preservation and enrichment of plural cultural traditions and identities. During independence the ethnic bonds of Malays became the basis of political mobilization for group demands that were ultimately incorporated into the constitution. In recent years the primordial or protonational attachment to religion has provided a basis for an identity to the Malay community. The paradox is that as the political articulation of their special ethnic interests is persistently reformulated within the Malay community, the ongoing so-called struggle between the bangsa-minded (nationalists under the banner of UMNO) and the shari’a-minded (fundamentalists in the PAS) has been intense.67 In it, the former are often accused of following secular, unIslamic laws; the latter are accused of being dogmatic and bigoted.

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These are general claims, for democratic aspirations are being articulated at the same time. To assess the real extent of the discourse within the Malay community depends on the precise terms of the debate in which all the contending ethnic groups—Malay, Indian, and Chinese—are engaged. Undoubtedly, the terms of debate are changing and carry implications for the ideological as well as social divisions in Malay society. In Chapter 3 I will examine the terms of these debates in greater detail.

Notes 1. For a brief overview of the development of states in this region, see Tarling (1998). 2. Some of these historical studies present a national chronicle, a historiography modern in premises but based upon traditional perceptions of the nationalist past. For those who define their work within this paradigm, see: Andaya and Andaya (1982); Silcock and Aziz (1973); J. M. Gullick (1988); Ongkili (1985); Larson et al. (1977). 3. For the Malaysian context, see articles by Martin Khor (2000). 4. For limitations in this approach, see the section on nationalism and globalization. 5. I use the term monoethnic to describe a situation in which the state promotes the interests of the majority ethnic community. The role of the state in the Malaysian economy is undoubtedly more complex than I present here. In the later 1990s, when the New Economic Policy had sponsored a respectable bumiputra presence in the Malaysian economy, Mahathir proposed the need for a private sector as an alternative to the state’s expansionary role (Mahathir 1997). Many scholars view this alliance as the material basis for a partnership between Malay state and Malay capital leading a “non-Malay capital” (Khoo Boo Teik 1995, 136). More recently Mahathir has turned against politically connected conglomerates and is willing to grant the state a greater role than before in restructuring the economy (Jayasankaran 2001b). 6. Here I draw upon Benedict Anderson’s definition of the nation as an imagined community (1983, 15). 7. I look at the scholarly work of Zainah Anwar (1987), Hussin Mutalib (1990), and Chandra Muzaffar (1986) in Chapter 4. 8. Hussin Mutalib argues that Islam coalesces with Malay ethnic sentiments and this fusion of forces in Malay identity in turn affects politics. I leave to one side my reservations about his general argument, but I draw upon many aspects of Malay identity from his book. Chandra Muzaffar is an exception in the above-mentioned group because he has also been writing and working on issues related to globalization and culture. 9. See Featherstone (1995). For more details related to Malaysia, see Camilleri (1998, 10). 10. For discussions on the classical model of nationalism, see Hutchinson (1994, 134); Kamenka (1976, 2–20). 11. According to Gellner “nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (Gellner 1983a, 1). 12. For the view that nationalism is fabrication, see Hobsbawm and Ranger (1984); Hobsbawm (1990); Miliband (1991). 13. More specifically the nation is imagined as limited, as sovereign, and as community (Anderson 1983, 15–17).

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14. For the debate on the classic case of nationalism and its deviant cases, see Chatterjee (1996, 7–9). 15. In the Indian context Partha Chatterjee argues that the most significant feature of this model is that anticolonial nationalism creates its own domain of sovereignty by “dividing the world of social institutions and practices into two domains—the material and the spiritual” (1995, 6). The material is the domain in which the West had proved its superiority. The spiritual is an inner domain, bearing the marks of cultural identity. 16. For differences in these notions, see Hall (1986). 17. Michael Freeden (1998) has a useful discussion on nationalism as ideology that has bearing on this section. 18. Wang Gungwu advances this view in his introduction (Wang 1964, 16). Others like Silcock assert that Malaya was incapable of existing as a political entity (Silcock 1961, 10). 19. There are differences in viewpoints among scholars on the notion of power, loyalty, and subjecthood. The most important analysis of indigenous Malay political systems, the study by J. M. Gullick, suggests that there was a disjunction between the formal and practical aspects of government. The sultan enjoyed a position of great dignity but not in most cases of power (Gullick 1988, 44). The ruler was the “apex of the political system,” but real power was divided among district chiefs who ruled over river-based territories. Milner argues that the raja played a moral, religious, and political role in the life of his subjects. In short, men considered themselves to be living not in states or governments but in a kerajaan, “in the condition of having a raja” (Milner 1982, 114). 20. Wang Gungwu develops this argument in his essays on community and nation (1992, 187). 21. In this section I rely upon some ideas and formulations on ethnic identity formation developed by Brass (1991, 20). 22. This is pointed out by Roff (1980, 29–31). 23. I do not examine the historical background to colonialism in great detail. I only mention certain points as a background to my argument in the next section on changes in Malay identity. 24. For similar views, see Andaya and Andaya (1982, 253); Ratnam (1965, 40). 25. The debate on the concept of ethnicity reflects a long-standing uncertainty about the sources of community in urban societies and its impact on particular identities (Hutchinson and Smith 1996). Clifford Geertz proposes a primordial view of ethnicity that is essentially about bonds, feelings, and attachments (Geertz 1963b, 105–157). This view has been subject to criticism and also been defended (Eller and Coughlan 1993; Grosby 1994). In contrast to both these views, many scholars argue that people emphasize ethnic allegiances as the most meaningful basis of identity when it is in their social and economic interest to do so (Burgess 1978; Lal 1983; Glazer and Moynihan 1976; Brass 1991). 26. See Connor (1972) for discussion on ethnonationalism. For more, see Mutalib (1990, 25); Glazer and Moynihan (1976); Strauch (1981); Melucci (1989). Some of the ideas in this section are inspired by the work of Clifford Geertz (1961), though in a different context. 27. For a review and critique of various positions on the nature of feudalism in precolonial Malaya, see Cheah Boon Kheng (1994). 28. Due to the limited focus of this chapter, I have not examined the origins of colonialism in Malaya. One can go back to the Portuguese, who captured Malacca in 1511 but lost their dominant position to the Dutch, who took over Malacca in 1641. During the first half of the eighteenth century the British defeated Dutch and

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Siamese attempts to gain control over the southern part of the Malayan Peninsula, but the East India Company refused to accept any responsibility for the internal affairs of the peninsula. British territorial interest in Malaya dates only from 1786, when the East India Company secured Penang for several reasons, the first being that successful naval operations in the Bay of Bengal, and the safety of the East India Company’s factories there, demanded that a harbor on the eastern side of the bay should be permanently available to the English fleet. The second important factor was the growth in the size of the East India Company’s China trade. The traditional policy of nonintervention in the peninsula was abandoned for one of active interference. Thus a number of factors created changes favorable to this intervention—changes in trade patterns, increased commercial interest in the peninsula, the disintegration of local Malay authority, and the need of the British settlements to take steps to protect their own internal security. See Cowan (1961); Turnbull (1981); Tarling (1993). 29. I do not go into the reasons cited for the economic success of the Chinese community in Malaya. Some scholars attribute this to their commercial orientation (Jesudason 1990, 31). Lim Teck Ghee has argued that the Chinese society was essentially “bourgeoisie, convivial, speculative and modern” (1977, 235). Osborne refutes such generalizations about Chinese “commercial skill” or the “innate capacity” to succeed. He argues that Chinese immigrants filled “roles” in society that others could not (Osborne 1979, 96). For more of this discussion on noncultural factors in their commercial success, see Andaya and Andaya (1982, 136). 30. The Malay Reservation Enactment of 1913 prohibited the sale of certain kinds of land to non-Malays. The value of such land was depressed to levels below that of nonreserved land. This helped the Malay elite but discouraged the peasantry from selling their land and migrating. 31. This is pointed out by Jesudason (1990, 33–35). 32. See C. A. Vlieland’s report on the 1931 census that established the increasing number of immigrants, cited in Ian Morrison (1949, 240). 33. Thomas Stamford Raffles took possession of Singapore for the British Crown in 1819 and made it a commercial success and center for international trade. Within a few decades the Chinese were the predominant majority of the population. 34. For details regarding British administration and law during this period, see Hooker (1984). 35. Andaya and Andaya (1982, 253) endorse this view. 36. For different and contrasting views on the guerrilla combat in Malaya, see Hanrahan (1971); Pye (1956); Stubbs (1990); Andaya and Andaya (1982). 37. I do not look into Chinese or Indian nationalism in Malaya because that would detract from my overview of the Malay community. Moreover, it is a fairly complex nationalism involving religious and ethnic strands (R.L.M. Lee 1990, 486). For Chinese nationalism and the influence of Chinese secret societies among immigrant Chinese, see Silcock and Aziz (1973); Wang Gungwu (1992, 187). There was a reform movement within the Tamils in Malaysia along with nationalism (Ampalavanar 1981, 5–7). For a very early account of Indian immigrants, see Sandhu (1969). 38. See Lau (1991). For different views on the British withdrawal from Malaya and the factors that dominated British interests during this period, see Allen (1963); Milne (1963). 39. Today Malaysia is made up of states, each ruled by a sultan who is a hereditary ruler in the classical Islamic tradition. He is the head of Islam within his state, in charge of a form of shari’a that varies from state to state, and enjoys considerable feudal authority. For more see Milner (1982; 1995).

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40. The term hearts and minds was coined by British High Commissioner Sir Gerald Templer to describe the counterguerrilla warfare in Malaya between 1948 and 1960, commonly referred to as the Emergency. It focused on cutting the link between the guerrillas and the local population (Stubbs 1990, 1–3). 41. William Roff makes a distinction between the “Kaum Muda,” the reformists of the early twentieth century, and “Kaum Tua.” For more on this, see Roff (1980, 57–90). 42. This is pointed out by Hussin Mutalib (1990, 32). 43. Thus strained relations among the communities over who would control political power and the rise of militants within UMNO were some factors that obstructed development of a united anticolonial movement (Von Vorys 1976, 104). According to Gordon Means, Onn lost support for various reasons, one being that UMNO condemned the rioters in the Maria Hertog riots. For more on this incident, see Means (1976, 125–127). 44. For more on the formation of PAS, see Alias Mohamad (1994). 45. Opposition under the banner of PAS has emerged in the Malay states of Peninsular Malaysia in the past decade. Social scientists have pondered the reasons for the party’s success. Institutional factors are considered crucial for this political development. Some attribute the differences in political styles followed by leaders in these regions; others view the existence of indigenous Islamic education systems and the fact that many of the PAS-led states were formerly not under direct British influence. See Wang Gungwu’s excellent reflection on Malaysian elites (1992, 216–235). 46. For purposes of this discussion nation-building refers to a process of cultural standardization and homogenization within national borders. In third world countries this attempt has faced challenges in recent years, and the project of nationbuilding is being redefined by taking into account heterogeneity of minority cultures and languages. For an example of this attempt by political elites to redefine nationalism to make it responsive to the new technologies and ideologies reshaping the globe, see Ramos (1998). 47. For some aspects of this proposal, see Milne (1963). The Borneo territories of Sarawak, Brunei, and Sabah (North Borneo) have a different history from the peninsula, and I do not deal with them in detail here. For details regarding this period, see Ongkili (1985, chapters 1 and 5); for issues on federal politics, see Means (1976, chapter 20); and for more recent events on the Kadazan or Dusun identities in Sabah, see Reid (1997). 48. The events of this period are complex and documented by experts on the history of Singapore. Briefly, the main persons and parties involved include David Marshall, the founder of the Labor Front, formed in 1954. He was elected to the Singapore legislative assembly and became chief minister. He was succeeded as chief minister by Lim Yew Hock. Both wanted a merger with the federation. The People’s Action Party, founded in 1954 by Lee Kuan Yew, came to power in the elections of May 1959. From the outset it consisted of moderates, radicals, and communists and held different views on merger with Malaysia. 49. Lee Kuan Yew was accused of inciting non-Malays to demand the abolition of Malay rights. He in turn refutes these charges and argues that there was a campaign by UMNO leaders to work up a sense of grievance among Malays over specific issues (Lee Kuan Yew 1998, 553). 50. For an interpretation of politics in this period, see Means (1991, 9); Andaya and Andaya (1982, 271–271). 51. For these developments in culture, see Andaya and Andaya (1982, 281–282).

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52. The prime minister was accused of giving in to the Chinese on cultural issues (Means 1991, 7–9). See Chapter 3 in this book for more on the 1969 riots. 53. For a general account of the New Economic Policy, see Young, Bussink, and Hasan (1980). For critiques of NEP, see Jomo (1989 and 1999). 54. Ghazali Shafie was a civil servant and cabinet minister for many years and responsible for formulating the principles of rukunegara (articles of faith of the state). He defines nation-building as the “creation and consolidation of a people belonging to a political entity, and the relationship in terms of that entity within itself and to the neighboring countries that make up this region” (1985, 56; also see 58–59, 68–69). 55. For related ideas, see other speeches by Mahathir (1999a; 2000b). 56. For a further defense of his policies linked to this point after the economic crisis, see the speech by Mahathir (1999d). 57. Resistance to globalization has emerged in the case of the national car, Proton, which has occupied a place of pride in Malaysia. Proton evolved from cars inspired by Mitsubishi models; its fully developed model, Waja, has already rolled off the line. It now controls 60 percent of the market. But over the years the global automobile industry moved with great speed; unprecedented mergers and buy-outs have left Ford, Daimler Chrysler, and Renault in control of South Korea’s automakers. In such a world Malaysia realizes that its flagship automaker has an uncertain future, more so because the country may have to roll back massive tariffs that keep foreign cars out of reach of most Malaysians, forcing them to buy Protons at uncompetitive prices. When Asian nations tried to roll back car tariffs, Malaysia recently succeeded in blocking that because Proton would lose half its market in Asia. For more on this, see L. Holland (2000). 58. See Mahathir (1995b). Even recently (1999b) he reiterated some of these ideas on Asia though they have a more global aspect. 59. The Malaysian government organizes an annual rainforest world music festival in Sarawak Cultural Village. Traditional instruments like the boat lute, jaw harp, and nose flute are revived through this process, but these festivals cater mainly to the upwardly mobile middle class. 60. I draw some of these ideas from Hobsbawm (1990, 46) and Lee (1990, 484). 61. Some aspects of the relationship between the state and the new technological order are discussed in Lee (1990, 495–496). 62. For similar analysis, see Milne and Mauzy (1986, 83–84). 63. See, for instance, Mee (1998, 251) and Kessler (1992, 134). This is a contentious matter and might change in the future. It is useful here to examine the differences between liberal and illiberal nationalism labeled as “civic” and “ethnic” nationalism. For more see Kymlicka (2001, 41). 64. A basic problem in many writings in Malaysia is the confusion between ethnic group and ethnicity. M. E. Burgess advances a working definition of ethnicity as “the character, quality, or condition of ethnic group membership, based on an identity with/or a consciousness of group belonging that is differentiated from others by symbolic markers (including cultural, biological or territorial) and is rooted in bonds of a shared past and perceived ethnic interests” (Burgess 1978, 270). However, this definition would be challenged in the context of Malaysia, where identities are in a constant state of flux and need more in-depth research. 65. The Chinese in Southeast Asia are a heterogeneous but fairly successful group (Gosling and Lim 1983, vol. 2). For a recent analysis that distinguishes the Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan from the other overseas Chinese in Southeast

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Asia, see Suryadinata (1997). For the transformation of the Chinese immigrants and their culture in Sabah, see Wong Tze-Ken (1998). 66. For differences between the notion of plural society and multicultural society, see Rex (1996). 67. According to A. C. Milner the disputes form the foundations of a unifying discourse of conflict so that the debate within the Malay community actually draws them together (Milner 1993, 115–116; 1995, 282–294). This analysis is in contrast to the conclusions of Hussin Mutalib (1990) and Judith Nagata (1984) that Islam divides the Islam community and ethnicity unites it.

3 Citizenship and the New Economic Policy

In this chapter I examine the foundation of nation-states—citizenship—because it provides a framework for individuals to participate in a political community as equals.1 A striking feature of citizenship today is that more ethnic groups are seeking independence even though human activity is being organized more and more on a global level. Immigrant populations and indigenous people are replacing the idea of homogenous citizenship with that of multicultural citizenship. Citizenship today not only is based upon loyalty to the nation-state and concepts like national sovereignty but also depends upon local, cultural, and regional loyalties and the concept of group rights. The proliferation of rights claims based on cultural identities stems from the weakening of notions of citizenship associated with the classical model of the nation-state. As a consequence of the dual pressures on the nation-state—calls for heterogeneity at the local level and interconnectedness at an international level—the homogenous national cultural identity that defined legal citizenship in many countries in the mid–twentieth century is disintegrating. If one assumes, then, that the concept of nation-state is in crisis, the changing nature of citizenship in many Western states today represents an important debate. Indeed, some scholars go so far as to say that citizenship in its new expressions will not be founded “exclusively on the basis of ‘national sovereignty’ but will depend upon new international obligations” (Andrews 1991, 11).2 There are compelling reasons why we should look at Southeast Asia in this context. Its countries are in varying degrees of transition from authoritarian rule to democratic politics. The multiethnic societies of Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines face the prospects and dangers of pluralist politics. A common feature of the territorial claims of the people of Timor and Aceh in Indonesia, the separatist movements of the Moro in the Philippines, and the similar claims of the Karens and Pattani Malays in southern 53

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Thailand is that they confront traditional notions of citizenship. Despite cultural and ethnic diversity, many of these peoples share similarities, the most significant being that they see their customs, religion, and language threatened by the state and its people. In this chapter, I examine the development of citizenship in Malaysia, a multiethnic, multicultural, and multireligious society where different theorizations and political practices determined the inclusion of ethnic groups as well as their rights in the constitution.3 This idea of multiculturalism rejects the idea of cultural integration and assimilation of communities as well as the idea of one nation, one state; instead it proposes accommodation of minorities and the protection of an economically backward majority community. After 1970, a new multicultural ideal of citizenship based upon assimilation of communities replaced the earlier goal of accommodation of rights of communities. An elite alliance that revised the nature of citizenship rights marginalized the politics of this idea of multiculturalism. But within this model lurk two potentially fatal weaknesses. First, the rapid implementation of the New Economic Policy consolidated Malay dominance in politics and culture and ruled out multicultural rights of citizenship being promoted in the future. No doubt the need to improve the economic lot of Malays is consonant with the principles underlying affirmative policies all over the world. But by conceding the legitimacy and priority of ethnic groups and their demands in politics, the Malaysian political system stifled the growth of civil and political liberties. A second weakness is that a state-sponsored civil society left the door wide open for predominantly Islamist-based parties to occupy a space that legitimately belongs to all kinds of organizations in civil society. The liberal tradition of citizenship rests on an abstract appeal to universalism that ignores historic forms, especially ethnicity and race. A juridical notion of citizenship entails universal principles of citizenship in the public sphere, based on civil and political rights, that are allowed a diversity of cultural practices based upon group loyalties and ethnic affinities in private matters.4 In Malaysia, by contrast, the public sphere is a space where ethnic and religious allegiances are dominant and remain largely unchallenged. At the time of independence, the constitution rejected the model of a secular, pluralist Malaysia based on equal rights of all citizens by providing special privileges to Malays, who not only form the majority community but historically enjoyed political power.5 In return for ceding this special position to Malays, their language, and their religion, the Chinese and Indian immigrants who were already permanently settled in the Malayan Federation were accepted as citizens. With this built-in bias in the legal system, it is not surprising that Malay dominance in government and state affairs has increased over the years.

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The provisions incorporated in the constitution of 1957 (i.e., for religious and cultural rights of the different ethnic communities) deviate from a liberal constitution committed to the juridical notion of citizenship and a universal set of rights. Whereas Western liberal democracies attempted assimilation and accommodation of ethnic and minority groups, countries like Malaysia encouraged diversity in religious and cultural practices by different groups in the public domain. As countries face challenges from minorities and ethnic groups, they realize that community membership is relevant to defining citizenship. Therefore the Malaysian constitution’s different citizenship rights reflect the contemporary political concerns of liberal democracies. Special privileges for the Malay community might be at odds with an ideal of multiculturalism, yet the Malays’ special provisions by no means led to the disappearance of other ethnic communities, their religions, or their cultures. Neither did this unequal treatment of different ethnic groups spur the development of communal consciousness for separate territorial claims as elsewhere in Southeast Asia. I have already explained in Chapter 2 that the powerful economic and political elites of the Chinese and Indian communities find it to their advantage to cooperate in power-sharing arrangements at the national level with Malays and to accept the language and political symbols of the dominant ethnic group in order to share power. This cooperation has led to differences among ethnic communities, but differences have not developed into territorial claims and are unlikely to in the future. To understand theories of citizenship and their relevance to countries like Malaysia, I examine the relationship between the citizen and nation-state. The history of citizenship rights is linked to industrialization and European nationalism, combined with social structures to produce different patterns of citizenship. What was common in France and the United Kingdom was the exclusion of women, ethnic groups, and other minorities from equal rights. Within the European tradition in the post-Enlightenment period, ideas of universalism enhanced the possibilities of defining citizenship in secular and general terms. With time, the growth of mass democracy and education made it possible for many others to participate in the political arena; they could then appeal for greater political and civil rights. To overcome the harsh consequences of industrial capitalism and market forces, state intervention in the twentieth century took many forms, and a catalog of socioeconomic rights was introduced linking citizens to governments in education, health care, and social welfare. The three assertions of citizens’ rights—political, social, and economic—correspond to the three elements of modern citizenship described by T. H. Marshall in his work, Citizenship and Social Class (1950). In recent years a prevailing definition of legal citizenship that marginalizes many social groups is being questioned by feminists, blacks, environmentalists, and indigenous peoples. New issues include homosexual rights,

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social rights related to people with HIV/AIDS, and the rights of children. The right to development is asserted by indigenous peoples who face some form of assimilation into existing state structures. All of these movements not only seek an extension of legal rights from the state but also challenge the normative concept of public space—the patriarchal and racist structures of state power—and engage in a wider practice that Iris Young says could foster the conception of a “heterogeneous public” based on “recognition and appreciation of differences” (I. Young 1986, 116–117).6 Several factors propelled citizenship to the top of the political agenda. The 1970s and 1980s saw economic decline in the United States and Europe; contradictions in the welfare state became apparent. This led to the dismantling of the welfare state, including entitlements to health care and unemployment compensation, thus weakening national bonds. Since 1990 globalization has led many to question the national interest and the concept of national community; the importance of local, regional, and ethnic groups was heightened. This led to an erosion of national citizenship defined in universal, classless, and nonethnic terms and made it possible for culturally and ethnically defined notions of citizenship to develop.7 Before I set out my arguments in this chapter, let me anticipate some of the basic criticisms that could be leveled against attempts to discuss Asian societies in the framework of liberal theories of citizenship.8 The formulation of a juridical notion of citizenship is based on the past experience of some Western states and has been criticized on several grounds: Anglocentrism, evolutionism, and the underdeveloped account of the state and the political conditions required for the emergence and maintenance of citizenship. Beneath this account of the status of citizenship and the rights and duties it entails is the model of the self-governing community of citizens in a democratic republic inherited from the ideal of civil republicanism of early modern Europe.9 The first criticism relates to the teleological character of an evolutionary view of citizenship. It can be argued that modern forms of citizenship in Europe emerged as a response to secular social membership different from the global notion of citizenship in the Islamic world. Globalization puts strains on the institutions of citizenship in Europe insofar as traditional forms of citizenship are grounded in the nation-state. But how would it affect models that rely on Islamic notions of citizenship? Another problem is that the juridical notion provides a historical description of the evolution of rights linked to the rise of social classes and social movements in some Western countries. But it could be argued that whereas people in Malaysia have achieved a level of social and economic rights, many of their civil and political rights are underdeveloped. Thus, different social groups may experience “the rate of social change in very

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different ways and within a different sequential order” (Turner 1993b, 8). Moreover, in Malaysia the Islamic resurgence since the 1970s has expanded the limits of the public sphere and implicitly raised issues of democracy. The rise of Islamic religious groups has also questioned sovereign political order with supreme jurisdiction over a territory. Also, in many liberal democratic states industrialization called forth individualism with the rise of capitalism. But in many Southeast Asian countries industrialization has not led to an extended public sphere invested with the same meaning. Instead, values manifesting exclusive dedication to economic activity and values of the dominating political elites have infused this space. Moreover, the expansion of the public sphere has not been accompanied by a formulation of political and civil rights; indeed, the latter have to compete on an equal plane with the particularisms of clan, ethnic, and religious groupings. Usually the values carried by political parties and status groups infuse the public sphere with ideas of legal citizenship. But in Malaysia, where the Malay feudal aristocracy, Malay sultans, and their titles, ranks, and honors still remain significant, values such as duty, service, loyalty, obedience, and respect for social hierarchies are prevalent. The expanding economic opportunities for the Malay bourgeoisie failed to break down the values of the aristocracy or primordial loyalties of ethnic groups. Duties and obligations of citizens to participate in the betterment of their own communities are prominent but commensurate with deference to the state. Thus, a cultivation of feudal values, as well as the privileges and values of the upper class, continues to dominate the public sphere. Citizenship rights in France and the United States developed within a revolutionary struggle for entitlements to civil and political rights. In many Asian countries anticolonial movements, peasant struggles, and workingclass movements were instrumental in promoting political, social, and economic rights. By contrast, in Malaysia the emergence of political and civil rights has been associated with and developed by the constitution and became identified with state power. Handed down from above, and circumscribed by a limited public space, citizenship has assumed a passive and rather negative form instead of developing notions of “civic responsibility, social trust and egalitarianism” (Kalberg 1993, 107).10 Thus one can conclude that citizenship can be traced through the nationalism as well as the national cultures of different regions and nationstates. This raises the question of whether there is only one theory of citizenship. Are there diverse and different formulations of the citizenship principle in different social and cultural traditions? The following sections argue that a single theory of citizenship is inappropriate and that different formulations of citizenship could evolve under different circumstances of political and social modernization in societies like contemporary Malaysia.11

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Principles of Citizenship in Malaysia In Chapter 2, I argued that Malaysia challenged earlier models by following a different path of nation-building and proposing new principles of citizenship. The main purpose of the citizenship provisions in the constitution was to create a specific “Malayan political community” to stimulate a “common Malayan consciousness and the concept of a Malayan nation” (Ratnam 1965, 66). This purpose was to be achieved by shifting the loyalties of the immigrant population from China or India and those of the Malays from region, village, or tribe to the Federation of Malaya. This model of citizenship was followed because of the massive immigrant population from India and China. The government had to deal with two challenges. The first was related to demands for progress, a rising standard of living, and social justice. The second was related to the search for political identity, or multiculturalism. This dual challenge meant initiating policies that mitigated political, social, and economic differences among the ethnic communities while accommodating and negotiating cultural differences. The framers of the constitution addressed the first problem by focusing largely on the backwardness of the Malay community; the solution to the second problem was resolved by eventually granting citizenship rights to the immigrants. In the subsequent years the primary focus of the debate on identity—language and education—was about how far cultural differences should be tolerated or encouraged. I argue that the debate was resolved by claiming that cultural diversity would be recognized only to the extent that it was compatible with and did not undermine institutions that guaranteed special privileges and political dominance for Malays. Two justifications are used to support the claim for providing special privileges to the Malays. The first is the principle of maintaining economic balance among communities, or parity among ethnic groups; the second is the principle of national integration, or national unity. The first justification is based on the following arguments: (1) Political discrimination follows from economic backwardness; and (2) special consideration to the Malay community will minimize its economic disadvantages vis-à-vis other groups. Nowhere in the constitution is it suggested that the special position of the Malays followed from their status as indigenous people; the bases were economic backwardness and social disadvantage. Many years later, in The Malay Dilemma, Prime Minister Mahathir articulated the Malays’ claim as the original or indigenous people of Malaya to justify preferential treatment; this argument continues in a less attenuated form. The commission set up to draft the constitution of 1957 identified four areas in which Malays historically enjoyed a special position; they were later incorporated into the constitution. They are: reservations of land designated as Malay land; quotas for admission to the public services; quotas

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in respect of the issuing of licenses or permits for operating business; and preferential treatment in the granting of scholarships, bursaries, and state aid. Acknowledging the tension between the principles of equality and special claims, the commission stated “that in due course the present preferences should be reduced and should ultimately cease so that there should then be no discrimination between races or communities” (quoted in Vasil 1979, 42–43; Malaysia 1957, 71–72). The second justification became important after the 1969 race riots. The Second Malaysia Plan stated that “national unity is unattainable without greater equity and balance among Malaysia’s social and ethnic groups in their participation in the development of the country” (Malaysia 1971, 3–4). It was soon claimed that additional privileges for Malays were essential to preserving national unity, that the Malays needed assistance to attain parity with non-Malays in order to forge a “Malayan Nation of Equals.”12 These two justifications for the privileges of the Malays form the basis of an understanding among the ethnic groups and helped forge a bargain among their respective parties in the national government. Elite Accommodation of Citizenship Rights See Chapter 2 for background on the independent Federation of Malaya and the constitution that came into being on 31 August 1957.13 Though described as a federal constitution, the document has provisions that indicate that the drafters were more concerned with the powers to be allocated to the “various racial components of Malaysian society, especially on communal interests,” than with an appropriate distribution of powers between the center and the state (H. P. Lee 1995, 4). The Malay states and their rulers were significant more in terms of their symbolic importance than in the actual powers and functions provided them. The powers of the states were limited, with the legislative and executive competence of the center extending to dominant areas of life. Except for matters of Muslim law, the judicial power resided largely in the federal government, apart from the right of state rulers to grant pardons and reprieves.14 The constitution provided the basis for Malaysia’s diverse groups, culturally and ethnically distinct from one another, to come together as a national community. This was secured by a bargain granting liberal citizenship opportunities to non-Malays in return for some form of recognition of the special position of Malays as well as Malay political supremacy. The constitution made few demands on citizens in their private domain because they were not required to affirm any state-sponsored conception of what defines the good life. Nation-building, ideally, was to take place within a context that respected and affirmed people’s commitments to their ethnic groups and religious beliefs.

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Below I explore why the constitution sought to include rights of immigrants as well as special provisions for Malays. The movement to include citizenship rights for the immigrant groups had several reasons. The first relates to British colonial policy, under which a large influx of Chinese and Indians had immigrated to work, respectively, in Malaysia’s tin mines and rubber estates, thus fundamentally altering the demographic balance of the colony. Historically, relations among the communities were influenced and determined by external forces—the British and the Japanese colonial powers. According to some scholars, the entry of many Chinese immigrants caused great concern to Malays, who realized they had become a minority in their own country.15 This realization of being outnumbered came during the first stirrings of Malay nationalism, articulated through the activities and writings of secular and religious leaders, vernacular-educated teachers, aristocratic bureaucrats, and students and alumni of Malay educational institutions like the Sultan Idris Training College and the Malay College in Kuala Kangsar. After World War II Malay opposition to Britain’s Malayan Union proposal succeeded mainly because the community was unified in UMNO; the Chinese and Indians remained divided on various ideological and religious grounds.16 By the time the first election was held in 1952, the party system had been organized to mobilize voters along ethnic lines with the formation of the Malaysian Chinese Association. The bargaining over citizenship rights and privileges became a fundamental principle of ethnic compromise under a new elite accommodation system, the Alliance (UMNO, MCA, and MIC) that formed the government after the elections. The consolidation of the political community and the process of changing society to the point that a strong national government could take precedence over local, state, and regional loyalties faced many challenges. Under the new constitution, the provisions regarding federal citizenship were some of the most controversial. The difficulties arose because Malays realized that once citizenship provisions were liberalized their claim as the predominant community would have to be relinquished. Non-Malays felt that given the peculiar situation where no community had an overwhelming majority in Malaya, their numerical and economic strength should assure them a place as citizens of the new nation. In the period 1948–1956 the debates revolved around issues related to: (1) the principle of equal rights for all races, (2) granting citizenship on the principle of jus soli (law of the soil/by birth), and (3) the concept of multilingualism. Of these, only (2) was fully accepted; the other two were accepted in modified form (see Ongkili 1985, chapters 1 and 2). The bargain regarding citizenship that led the civic incorporation of second-generation immigrants was a response to the incipient nationalism of the Chinese and the Indians, via party formation, in the 1950s.17 The federal constitution

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would accede partly to the demand for acquisition of citizenship—from Merdeka (Independence) Day onward, citizenship would be based solely on a person’s birth in Malaya. It was agreed that “all who are citizens before Merdeka Day should continue to be citizens, and that all those born in the federation on or after Merdeka Day should be citizens by operation of law” (see Ongkili 1985, 113). The acceptance of the principle of jus soli was later seen as a demonstration of the spirit of compromise among the leaders of the Alliance.18

Factors Leading to the New Economic Policy After independence, the most serious challenge to legal citizenship was overcome by severing ties to Singapore, but other challenges remained. The Alliance government recognized issues like language, education, and culture as factors in ethnic-group identification and tried to impose uniform policies. The government’s language and education policies prompted many non-Malays to vote against the Alliance in the federal elections of 1969. These differences in perceptions about the role of different communities erupted in the race riots of 1969.19 Not surprisingly, these events increased the pressure on UMNO to overturn Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman’s policy of soft-pedaling the Malay question. The political parties contesting the 1969 elections were the same as in 1955, 1959, and 1964, with the exception of the Democratic Action Party (DAP—the newly formed Chinese party), the Malaysian People’s Movement (the Gerakan party), and the People’s Progressive Party (PPP). The main opposition parties gained collective strength as the Alliance gradually lost its percentage of the vote from 81.7 percent in 1955 to 58.4 percent in 1964 (see Means 1991, 4). In the 1969 elections, held on 10 May, all of the opposition parties maintained close links and decided not to field candidates against one another. They were united in opposing the special position of Malays and advocated greater use of the Chinese, Tamil, and English languages as “mediums of instruction in the system of education” (Ongkili 1985, 201). Although the Alliance did not lose the election, it failed to acquire a twothirds majority in the House of Representatives, and the MCA (the Chinese component of the Alliance) lost twenty of its thirty-three seats. Overall the opposition made major inroads into many Alliance strongholds, and many prominent Alliance leaders lost their seats, including the current prime minister, Mahathir. The reasons for the 13 May riots in Kuala Lumpur a few days after the elections are still unclear; many attribute the violence to the inflammatory speeches made by political candidates during campaigning and to the victory possessions staged after the elections. The clashes,

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between the Chinese and Malay communities, came as a huge shock to the government and led to a reassessment of policies on nation-building and citizenship.20 To handle the race-riot crisis, a proclamation of emergency was issued under article 150 of the federal constitution. By virtue of the Emergency Ordinance of 1969, all powers and authorities conferred on the king by the constitution were delegated to a director of operations. Tun Abdul Razak, the deputy prime minister during this period, was appointed as director of operations. The National Operations Council (NOC), consisting of the heads of the police, the armed forces, the public service, the foreign service, and some political leaders, was set up to assist him. The definition of citizenship enshrined in the constitution was reformulated to provide greater social entitlements to the Malay community and indigenous groups. Interracial Inequality Many scholars have attributed the riots of 1969 to the economic backwardness of the Malays, which is further attributed to colonial policies. Under colonialism, economic activity had been identified with race, interracial inequality of wealth was exacerbated, and there was a large incidence of poverty among the Malays. After political independence in 1957, despite steady economic growth and low inflation, social and economic progress among Malays was slow and poverty was widespread. These historical imbalances were not challenged because the Alliance government headed by Tunku Abdul Rahman relied on a policy of giving priority to multiracialism rather than to structural changes to remove interracial poverty. The First Malaysia Plan of 1966–1970 stated that one of its objectives was to increase the well-being of rural inhabitants and other low-income groups, primarily by raising the productivity of resources in the rural economy.21 Subsequent development plans gave priority to developing the economic infrastructure and to public works such as rural roads, land development, drainage and irrigation, agriculture, rubber planting, and health care.22 Despite the continued exhortations for development, rural poverty, unemployment, and migration to urban areas were on the rise. The disparities between the urban and rural centers, which coincided with the location of the non-bumiputra and bumiputra communities, prevailed throughout the 1960s. Studies during the 1970s concluded that of the total households living below the poverty line 75 percent were Malay.23 It was widely acknowledged that Malays held perhaps 1 percent of investment in registered businesses and that Malay unemployment was the highest among the communities; economic backwardness had continued despite the quotas reserving jobs for Malays to the exclusion of non-Malays. Alex Lee, a member of MCA, summed up this situation:

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The twelve years following Merdeka did not, in fact, bring forth the wealth and power which the Malays had expected. They found themselves still to be the rural people with control of the towns very much in the hands of the non-Malays. . . . Their control of the civil service was also being eroded by the influx of many non-Malays into the government services and their supremacy in the police force was reduced by the recruitment of non-Malay officers during the Emergency. Their only area of control, therefore, was in the political arena, especially in Parliament where they controlled two-thirds of the seats. However, the 1969 elections results gave the impression that even this political control was being threatened, and in some States the balance of power seemed to shift to political parties which appealed to Chinese chauvinism. (Alex Lee, 1971–1972, 562–563)

The NOC reflected some of the same sentiments while assessing the race riots of 1969. But it explained the unbalanced multiracial nature of the country as the direct result of British economic policy before the war that encouraged mass non-Malay immigration. The colonial government exploited Malaysia’s vast economic potential and the liberal, tolerant attitude of the Malay community, which partly explained some of the difficulties in nation-building.24 After parliament reconvened and passed the 1971 constitutional amendments, the NOC excluded certain sensitive provisions of the constitution from public discussion and parliamentary debate. It forbade discussion on articles pertaining to citizenship, the federal guarantee of the constitution of each state, the rights and prerogatives of the Malay rulers, the Malay language as the national language, and the responsibility of the king to safeguard the special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of other communities. Most provisions could be amended by a two-thirds majority in parliament, but amendments to provisions relating to Malay rulers (articles 38, 70, and 71) and the special position of the Malays (article 152) needed the consent of the Conference of Rulers.25 Karl von Vorys described this move to establish a “constitutional contract” that sets out the terms of intercommunal relations as a mechanism designed to “de-radicalise democratic politics” (Von Vorys 1976, 434). While parliament was suspended, Tun Abdul Razak persuaded several opposition parties to reconstruct a new multiethnic national coalition in place of the Alliance and its three ethnically based parties. In contrast to the Alliance system, the Barisan Nasional would possess more powers; with the ruling coalition having a wider political base and a reduced opposition in parliament, the government led by the new prime minister enjoyed a strong political position and political will to implement the economic policies. It is significant to note that the BN operated by a different set of principles of elite bargaining. The multilateral elite bargaining and consultative style of the cabinet was replaced by bilateral negotiations between the

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prime minister and the leaders of constituent parties in the BN coalition. Cabinet meetings also became more regulated, with less debate. Indeed, elite bargaining continued, but “it became focused on the role of the prime minister who dispensed favors, patronage and occasional policy concessions in a web of bilateral arrangements and agreements designed to further the policy agenda of the prime minister” (Means 1991, 286). The Malay Dilemma Mahathir Mohamad, in his book The Malay Dilemma, put forward many ideas that later inspired the New Economic Policy during his political exile. In the 1969 election, Mahathir, a UMNO candidate, had lost his Kota Star Selatan seat to the PAS candidate, Haji Yusof Rawa. After the riots broke out in 1969, Mahathir, along with some UMNO leaders, called for the prime minister’s resignation from office. He believed that Tunku Abdul Rahman’s pro-Chinese policies had led to the defeat of UMNO. In a famous open letter Mahathir demanded a UMNO-dominated government with a clear pro-Malay policy in order to win back the Malay constituency.26 For these criticisms and actions Mahathir was expelled from UMNO. Many observers view the expulsion, followed by political exile, as a turning point in Mahathir’s political career because it “transformed him from being a failed electoral candidate into a living symbol of Malay nationalism” (Khoo Boo Teik 1995, 23). Although Mahathir has written a great deal on Malaysian politics, I shall refer mainly to his earliest work here. Many proposals contained in The Malay Dilemma have been modified, but it still contains the most compelling argument for granting privileges to the Malay community. It is also important because it made him famous as a Malay extremist and nationalist. His main claim is that the economic backwardness of Malays and the economic inequality among the different ethnic communities led to discrimination against the Malays. He explained that the motive behind preferential treatment is not to put Malays in a superior position but to bring them up to the level of non-Malays; unless legal measures were adopted, Malays would become outsiders in their own country. “The Malay dilemma is whether they should be proud to be the poor citizens of a prosperous country or whether they should try to get at some of the riches that this country boasts of, even if it blurs the economic picture of Malaysia a little” (Mahathir 1970, 61). He defined the Malay dilemma: Malays seem to be torn between the desire to assert their rights, to arrogate to themselves what they consider to be theirs, and the overwhelming desire to be polite, courteous, and thoughtful of the rights of the immigrants; no matter what they decided to do, Malays were becoming dispossessed in their own land.27

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This claim was linked to a second claim about the legal rights to citizenship. Mahathir linked citizenship to state membership and nationhood by arguing that the Malays “are the rightful owners of Malaya, and that if citizenship is conferred on races other than the Malays, it is because the Malays consent to this. That consent is conditional” (1970, 126). He further espoused the basis of a legal notion of citizenship: being “the original or indigenous people of Malaya” confers on the Malays “certain inalienable rights over the forms and obligations of citizenship which can be imposed on citizens of non-indigenous origin” (1970, 133). This theme of national citizenship as preeminent over the political, linguistic, and cultural claims of other immigrant communities is reiterated when he says that “increase in the number of non-Malay speaking citizens is by consent of the Malays on the tacit understanding that the criteria of citizenship should not only be followed, but should remain unalterable” (1970, 137). The right of the Malay community to their land is contrasted with the rights of immigrants. The mere fact of contribution to development and prosperity is not the criterion for claiming that the contributor owns the country, says Mahathir. To be truly indigenous one must be truly identified with a single country. He questions the hasty way in which citizenship was conferred upon communities in Malaysia. In other countries, immigrants were forced to adopt the language and culture of the dominant group. If citizenship is conferred on those who have settled down and made their home in Malay, it is the Malays who must decide the form of citizenship, the privileges and the obligations. On becoming citizens, the non-Malays share with the Malays not only the ownership of Malaysia, but the specifications of what is a citizen, what is a condition of citizenship itself, and what is therefore not to be changed by the new citizens. (1970, 121)

Many of the proposals to improve the position of Malays suggested by Mahathir in The Malay Dilemma found fulfillment in the policies enunciated by UMNO in the 1970s.28 The administration under Tun Abdul Razak Hussein and Tun Hussein Onn was geared to overcome some of the anxieties of the Malay community by diluting Chinese economic hegemony. Meanwhile Mahathir’s political career took several leaps as in a short span he became a cabinet minister (1974), deputy prime minister (1976), and president of UMNO (1981). By the time he became prime minister in 1981, many of his ideas on citizenship had been modified, but his earlier concern that Malays had to be rehabilitated remained at the top of his political agenda. Apart from developing an ethnic Malay identity or Malay nationalism, and manipulating this to his advantage, Mahathir used the fact of Chinese control over the economy coupled with the official narrative of the Chinese “other” in his control strategy over the various communities: while relying

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on the cooperation of the Chinese economic elite, he also relied on threats to disenfranchise the entire community. After all, he had argued that citizenship is not “an immigrant’s right” but “a form of recognition that can only be conferred when the original people feel that an immigrant has demonstrated loyalty and has truly identified himself with the definitive people” (Mahathir 1970, 147).29 I shall examine more of the impact of his strategy on state and authoritarianism in Chapter 5. Education, Language, and Culture Challenges to citizenship rights in education, language, and culture also led to the formulation of an affirmative action program for the Malays in the 1970s. During the early years of nation-building, the main strategy for integrating Malaysians from diverse ethnic, linguistic, and cultural backgrounds into a single nationality was being formulated, although it was not based on any coherent nationalist ideology. The controversy was whether a single language was an essential basis for national integration. Later the discussion revolved around the need for a national system of education. After World War II, British policy was to intensify measures for establishing a common language, namely, English. These education initiatives were necessary because under the colonial government, and later under Japanese occupation, variations in the system of education arose; there was a disparity in the aims, terms of service, and curriculum of schools in Malaya.30 The Barnes Report, released in 1951, emphasized the need for establishing a system of national schools in which primary schools taught only in English and Malay in order to build a common “Malayan nationality.” Due to criticism from various quarters, two experts on Chinese education gave their views in the Fen-Wu Report. While supporting the Barnes Report’s claim for an education system that would support the development of a Malayan nation, the Fen-Wu Report recommended that Chinese vernacular schools be retained.31 Its main objective was to secure a legitimate place for Chinese schools within the national education system. The leaders of the Chinese education movement, drawn from Dongjiaozong (the United Chinese Schools Teachers’ Association) protested the policies of the British and the political elite then involved in negotiating independence. The Chinese education movement, through demonstrations, public campaigns, and private negotiations, opposed government proposals for leaning toward a unitary vision of the nation and articulated a pluralistic approach by retaining the Chinese language in primary and secondary schools. In 1955 negotiations among Dongjiaozong, UMNO, and MCA leaders led to the agreement that the language issue would not be raised until after the federal elections. Gordon Means argues that the UMNO leaders

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accepted the principle of jus soli in return for the acceptance by the MCA of an educational policy that would gradually develop a Malayan curriculum for the different schools (Means 1976, 198). In 1956, the Razak Committee, headed by Abdul Razak Hussein, the minister of education, recommended a common curriculum within a national system of education in order to foster a common loyalty to the nation. The committee’s recommendations were presented in the form of the Malayan Education Ordinance of 1957, which explained the government aim to establish a national system of education with the Malay language as the national language. Despite differences in opinion, the committee recommended retaining primary schools that used Chinese and Tamil as languages of instruction. In this way the Chinese and Tamil schools in Malaysia existed within as well as outside the national system. Many scholars argue that the timing between discussions on a new education policy and the constitutional provisions on citizenship resulted in “decisions on education becoming entangled with the constitutional compromises which were struck between UMNO and MCA leaders on the eve of Merdeka” (Tan 1997, 166). It was through this historic bargain that the vernacular primary schools won a permanent place within the national system of education.32 Despite this bargain it soon became apparent to Chinese associations that the government had a different opinion on national education. After winning the 1959 elections the Alliance appointed the Talib Committee to review education policy. It stated that the pluralist aspirations of the various communities were incompatible with the creation of a national consciousness. The most controversial aspect of the government’s education policy was the enforcement of Bahasa Malaysia (Malay language) as the medium of instruction in schools and universities. It recommended that all national secondary schools teach in either English or Malay; this meant that Chinese secondary schools would have to change their medium of instruction. The policy, the government argued, was designed to reduce racial disparities and improve national unity.33 The prevailing view among some government leaders was that Chinese schools were barriers to the integration of the Chinese community into Malaysian society. Although the special claims of the Malay language had been already recognized by proclaiming it as the national language, article 152(2) in the constitution allowed that for a period of ten years after independence the English language could be used in the federal and state assemblies and for official purposes. Meanwhile, in order to standardize the work of compiling new words in the Malay language, the Literary and Language Agency (Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka) was incorporated in 1959 and given the following tasks: to develop and enrich the national language; to develop literary talent, particularly in the national language; to print or publish or assist in the

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printing or publication of books, magazines, pamphlets, and other forms of literature in the national language and other languages; to standardize spelling and pronunciation; and to prepare and publish a national-language dictionary. At the end of ten years, under the National Language Act 1967, Malay replaced English language in all walks of life.34 Bahasa Malaysia even became the medium of instruction in English-medium primary schools. Within ten years all primary and secondary schools in Peninsular Malaysia, with the exception of the Chinese and Tamil schools, were using Bahasa Malaysia fully. However, throughout Malaysia subjects such as English, Chinese, and Tamil continued to be taught in national-type schools, even though they were not the medium of instruction.35 The policy of making Malay the national and sole official language of the federation ruled out a multilingual state in Malaysia. Apart from revealing tensions in the UMNO-MCA alliance, the policy raised several questions. The Chinese groups viewed the introduction of the Malay language as another manifestation of discrimination, whereas Malay radicals within UMNO felt that there should be a reassessment of non-Malays and their rights to citizenship if they did not agree to these changes. Many critics regarded the Malay language as inadequate to perform the functions of an official language in a modern state; others argued that all of the main languages spoken in Malaya should have official recognition in a multiracial and multilingual society. There is no doubt that in the 1970s Malays still suffered a great disadvantage in access to education. As a result of their regional and rural backgrounds, the proportion of Malays receiving primary and secondary education was far lower than the other ethnic communities. After the NEP was introduced great efforts were made by the government to end these disadvantages. These policies materialized in a rapid increase in the level of Malay education and enabled a higher participation of Malays in the modern sectors of the economy.36

Economic Growth and Restructuring of the Economy Due to the existence of interracial inequality the government set out to remove economic backwardness among the Malay community. The decision to incorporate the NEP as part of the Second Malaysia Plan was due to the government’s realization that “poverty is a major cause of social discontent” and “can disrupt national unity” (Malaysia 1971, 4).37 In response, the government under Prime Minister Tun Razak set itself two main objectives: (1) to eradicate poverty by raising income levels and increasing employment

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opportunities, and (2) to accelerate the process of restructuring Malaysian society to correct economic imbalance so as to reduce and eliminate the identification of race with economic function. In practical terms these objectives meant increasing the share of equity ownership and employment in the corporate sector among the bumiputra community. The two problems with this policy were that it focused on interracial income disparity and not class disparities, as Malays were concentrated in certain occupations while the Chinese dominated the economy; and it approached poverty eradication on the premise that poverty was predominantly a rural phenomenon and the bumiputra lived predominantly in the countryside. Thus poverty was viewed as primarily a bumiputra phenomenon. In the foreword to the Second Malaysia Plan the government justified these objectives on the grounds of social justice and national unity as they were to be seen “as a great opportunity to participate in the whole process of social change and nation-building” (Malaysia 1971, 1). The strategy was to assist Malays to progressively gain control of corporate ownership, secure their proportionate share of employment, improve their education and skill levels, and facilitate migration from rural to urban areas. This entailed massive modernization of the economy, modernization of rural life, a rapid and balanced growth of urban activities, and the creation of a Malay commercial and industrial community in all categories so that “Malays and other indigenous people will become full partners in all aspects of the economic life of the nation” (Malaysia 1971, 1).38 The political-economic system that has developed since the 1970s was a new phase of development characterized by three processes: exportoriented industrialization, a rapidly growing state sector assisted by financial public enterprises, and the emergence of party capitalism.39 The New Economic Policy spelled out a new role for the Malaysian state as the initiator and guardian of the economy. It was to play the leading role in laying the agenda with private and foreign capital. Implementation gave rise to a technocratic and bureaucratic class that was in favor of sponsoring Malay interests and thus in fostering a Malay capitalist class. It affected the social structure by creating a more differentiated Malay community, in particular a capitalist stratum and bureaucratic elite including big capitalists, small capitalists, and federal and state bureaucracies.40 New institutions were set up to create a Malay entrepreneurial community. The Mid-term Review of the Second Malaysian Plan defined these as “wide-ranging” and explained that they comprise the development of modern commercial and industrial activities in rural areas, new growth centers, and existing urban centers. They played an important role in expanding opportunities for participation by Malays and other indigenous people. Government agencies extended credit to small-scale agro-based industries and

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developed acres of land—representing 81 percent of the original Second Malaysian Plan target—to accelerate the movement of rural farmers from traditional to modern agriculture.41 There is no doubt that the NEP, adopted as a twenty-year socioeconomic restructuring plan favoring Malays, had an impact on the internal development of backward areas and ethnic groups. Through state subsidies, scholarships, job quotas, licensing regulations, and a range of preferences, the two most important aspects of restructuring involved “wealth redistribution and bumiputra human resource development—that is, enhanced educational employment and promotional opportunities” (Mehmet 1990, 155). Much of the focus was on opportunities for, and access to, tertiary education that led to “an overrepresentation of Malays throughout the Peninsular Malaysian education system compared to the proportion of the Malay population” (Jomo 1990 –1991, 475). The success of the NEP can be gauged by the fact that the official poverty line dropped from 49 percent in 1970 to 17 percent in 1987 for Peninsular Malaysia; the proportion of bumiputra groups exceeded 25 percent in the major sectors and occupational categories of the economy, including administrative and managerial as well as sales-related occupations. Scholarship policies since the 1970s restructured employment possibilities by ensuring bumiputra representation among lucrative professions such as medicine, law, engineering, accounting, and architecture (Jomo 1990–1991, 472–475). A paradox inherent in the NEP was that the policy, although strong political commitment was necessary to initiate it, could not be effectively implemented without widespread participation by the intended beneficiaries— Malays. But those whose political commitment was necessary realized that the policy could not be sustained without creating a political base with new interest groups. The NEP not only tended to equalize economic assets among the ethnic communities by increasing Malay ownership of corporate assets through bumiputra trust agencies but also provided a more powerful political base to the government. By 1988 the government succeeded in locating a quarter of share capital in limited companies in bumiputra hands. At the same time, the missing link in the growth strategy was “management accountability” in bumiputra agencies; this allowed few to prosper, thereby triggering a corrupting influence in the form of “money politics” that exchanged nepotism and favoritism for party loyalty (Mehmet 1990, 155; Shamsul 1986a, 214). Over the years the success of the NEP owes to the fact that its prime beneficiaries are drawn from the ranks of the politically connected Malay middle class and business communities that influence policymaking and implementation. Some scholars argue that a very small percentage of funds for poverty reduction actually reached the target groups.42 They attribute this to politicalbureaucratic middlemen entrusted with implementation “who not only lacked

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business experience, but even more importantly, were primarily interested in self-enrichment” (Mehmet 1990, 155). Therefore, despite reducing interethnic economic disparities, the NEP did not meet its distributive intent because equity restructuring, along with patronage and sponsorship, ensured continuation of elite control and management of the economy and the political system. Non-Malay bumiputra such as the Orang Asli and other groups in Sabah and Sarawak complain that they have been “neglected” by the existing poverty eradication policy (see Jomo 1990–1991, 478–480). Others view the New Economic Policy trusteeship as a “highly centralized, top-down system concentrating decision-making over budget allocations and development priorities in the hands of centrist elites” (Mehmet 1990, 153). Therefore many scholars are of the view that restructuring efforts under the NEP took precedence over poverty reduction efforts. Although it is now established that the gains from equity corporate acquisition are not available to the entire Malay community, it is also argued that the growth of the public sector and state intervention under the NEP favored the politically influential by advancing their business interests, especially Malays in UMNO, the main political party in the National Front coalition, and the non-Malays of the MCA. Under Mahathir, government intervention in the economy and rapid expansion of the public sector facilitated UMNO in expanding its business interests. E. T. Gomez attributes UMNO’s rapid investments and involvement in the corporate sector to government patronage.43 This phenomenon has been termed party capitalism: it describes “a range of practices whereby the benefits of State economic sponsorship and protection are channeled to individuals, groups and private companies associated with the ruling parties, in particular, UMNO,” and it has resulted in the “blurring of state and UMNO business interests and the increasing dominance of UMNO and UMNO associated enterprises in the economy” (Kahn and Loh, 1992, 2). Research on rural areas demonstrates that the district development machinery, through which NEP was implemented, became an integral part of the ruling party apparatus and operated within the context of the political factions and cleavages within UMNO. The funds allocated for poverty eradication were usually for construction works and agricultural enterprises that further depended on lucrative government contracts. The distribution of projects was usually based on political and personal ties and subsequently fostered a new rural elite of local-based Malays. In this way, the district machinery became the most effective instrument for claiming a large pool of material rewards, for “suppressing opposition from other political parties,” and “for dealing with factions within UMNO” (Shamsul 1986a). After the NEP completed twenty years, a new policy—Vision 2020— seeking social and technological progress was instituted. Although there are many new aspects to a post-NEP strategy, its emphasis on affirmative

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action for Malays continues to this day. Development of state capitalism and the growth of a Malay capitalist class (as part of a national bourgeoisie and rural elite) have great implications for patterns of class formation in Malaysia.44 I briefly draw on some political and economic changes resulting from the NEP that have divided the Malay community. The rapid expansion of the middle class due to major growth in public enterprise can be seen as an impetus to liberalization and democratization in Malaysia. It has given rise to a consumer culture and a lifestyle dominated by shopping malls, restaurants, and Western-owned fast-food outlets. However, because structural changes in the middle classes have been consciously shaped by a Malay-dominated government, Malaysians tend to react differently in the political and cultural spheres. Most members of the Malay middle class (including technocrats and bureaucrats) are dependent on government policies of special protection and are more committed to the government than middle-class non-Malays, who generally resent such policies as discrimination. At the same time, the expansion of educational opportunities, within the country and overseas, has fostered alienation within Malay middle classes. The rural exodus to urban areas has given rise to an Islamic resurgence that stresses traditional Islamic and family ties. It has given rise to several NGOs that have been critical of government policies.45 The structural changes in the middle class have an ambivalent impact on the nature of the regime. On the one hand, the middle class “provided the government with a solid base of support as long as its interests were taken into account.” But on the other hand, “The various ethnic groups that made up the middle class constituted significant checks on the government’s power since they could be activated if their interests were disregarded” (see Crouch 1993, 144). The new Malay business class is a creature of government sponsorship and patronage under NEP policies. The government’s equity guidelines ensure 30 percent Malay participation in companies and enterprises. Most of the members of this class have close ties with UMNO and are determined to preserve their commercial interests. The Chinese business class, although indispensable for the Malaysian economy, has shared its interests with the developing Malay business community. However, small and medium-sized Malay capitalists, many of them contractors, have complained about patronage abuses and corruption in government. Since they are hit harder by recession, tight credit policies, and cutbacks in government expenditures, they can play an increasing role in political dissent at the state level. Many of the structural changes in the middle classes manifest in party politics and culture: pressures within the party, the clash over money politics in UMNO, and major ideological cleavages between PAS and UMNO. The small Chinese business class suffers equally in times of economic recession and from preferential policies for Malays.46

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Culture and Rights of Indigenous People The New Economic Policy formed the ideological framework for nationbuilding after 1970. Its major assumptions were that special privileges for Malays would eventually establish economic parity among ethnic communities and create national unity. Multiculturalism was not viewed as a public good; indeed, a multiethnic and plural society was seen as a major stumbling block to national unity. This was apparent in the government policy of promoting Malay language and culture. Thus emphasis was given to generating support for the government and building consensus for its policies. An important plank in the NEP’s ideological framework was the rukunegara (articles of faith) articulated by Ghazali Shafie as the basis for cultural unity. It was propagated as embodying the country’s social compact, the minimum consensus necessary to sustain the social order. Formally proclaimed on 31 August 1970, it proposed five principles to guide citizens and nation. Its stated objective was creating a country in which members are free to practice and profess their own religions, customs, and cultures consistent with the requirements of national unity and nation-building. In general, rights to citizenship and ethnic affiliations seemed to operate in separate spheres after the controversy over language and education was laid to rest. But since the 1980s the attempt to constitute a culturally homogenous state by creating a political culture for all ethnic groups in Malaysia was challenged by ethnic minorities. I provide three examples related to: (1) educational institutions, (2) cultural rights, and (3) right to development. Educational Institutions Article 12(1) of the constitution provides a right of admission to educational institutions without discrimination on grounds of religion, race, descent, or place of birth. From 1957 until 1969, this provision guaranteed the right to admission to any pupil who fulfilled the educational qualifications for an institution. Under this scheme, Chinese, Tamil, and Malay schools were set up along with government-aided institutions in which the medium of instruction was English. Admission to university education was based on academic qualifications. Malays, compared to other ethnic communities, represented a smaller proportion in higher institutions due to their disadvantaged socioeconomic condition and the limited educational opportunities in the rural areas. Article 153 of the constitution provided for the special position of Malays and the natives of the states of Sabah and Sarawak. However, it was felt that this provision would be reviewed in the future to determine whether it was still needed. After 1971, major changes in the educational policy were announced to ensure greater Malay participation in higher education. Article 153 was

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amended to introduce the quota system to institutions of higher learning with the aim of bringing about a more proportional representation of the Malays in higher education, thereby furthering the cause of national unity. The constitution does not explicitly recognize a right to education, but this right is implicit in article 12(2), which allows every religious group to establish and maintain institutions for the education of children in its own religion; and in article 152(1), which provides that Malay shall be the national language but guarantees that the federal government shall not prohibit the use and study of any language. The constitutional provisions were challenged in the 1987 case of Merdeka University Berhad v. Government of Malaysia, which raised the question of the Chinese community’s right to establish a private university. The Merdeka University campaign was a protest against ethnic quotas for admission to institutions of higher learning. It raised issues of cultural pluralism until the federal court ruled out the possibility of a Chinese-language university in July 1982. The grounds for rejecting the petition to set up the university were as follows: The use of the Chinese language as the medium of instruction in the university was unconstitutional; reliance on the private sector for financial support to bear the cost of running the university would be unreliable; and it would admit Chinese students from independent schools to the exclusion of other students.47 The objective of the government in rejecting Merdeka University must be seen in terms of the longterm objective of absorbing immigrant ethnic groups. However, policies following this decision have restricted educational opportunities for nonMalays in admission to local universities, and have compelled vast numbers of non-Malays to pursue studies in privately funded institutions as well as abroad. Cultural Rights The Chinese education movement, Dongjiaozong, articulated an alternative vision of a democratic multiethnic nation in which majority languages and cultures are given equal rights. Although the leaders of this movement were to break from the MCA, the major Chinese party in the ruling coalition, the struggle on behalf of the Chinese language carried on but with different objectives and aims. Since 1970 the movement has seen changing composition among its leadership as well as more utilitarian factors driving people to adopt or reject state policies on education and culture. Ten years after the cultural policy was proposed under the rukunegara, it was attacked in the Chinese Cultural Congress held on 23 March 1983. Scholars and experts took part and presented a joint memorandum of their proceedings to Minister of Culture, Youth, and Sports Anwar Ibrahim, who was later to become deputy prime minister (see Chapter 4).48 Critics attacked

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the policy because it seemed bent on assimilating non-Malay cultures. They objected to the national culture policy on three principles: National culture must be based on the indigenous culture of this region; suitable elements from the other cultures can be accepted as part of the national culture; and Islam is an important component in the molding of a national culture. The congress proposed an alternative formulation of national culture that included the need to view all ethnic groups on the basis of equality and the need to express common cultural values through multiethnic forums. It questioned the way in which Islamic values and teachings were seen as the dominant aspect of the national culture. Many scholars involved in this debate viewed cultural pluralism and establishment of Chinese schools as a fundamental democratic human right, whereas others saw Chinese vernacular schools as segregationist and incompatible with a national culture. More than a decade later, the Education Act of 1996 abolished the distinction between schools within the national system supported by public funds and those outside the system that were relatively free of state control but had to rely on private funding. Now all schools were placed within the national system. However, although the act proposed that Malay should be the main medium of instruction, it was open to interpretation because some schools continued to teach in the vernacular language. The distinction between national primary schools teaching in Malay and those teaching in Chinese and Tamil (known as national-type primary schools) continues today. The main distinction lies in the fact that the national-type Chinese primary schools use Mandarin as the medium of instruction. At the secondary level there are independent Chinese schools that teach mainly, but not completely, in Mandarin. They are not part of the national system and are entirely supported by the Chinese communities. In addition there are national-type secondary schools that no longer teach in Mandarin since they were absorbed into the national system in the 1960s. These schools are funded by the state and their main medium of instruction in Malay, but they are still popularly regarded as “Chinese schools because Chinese is still taught as a language within the curriculum, the internal culture of the school remains identifiably Chinese, and the schools have retained strong links with the local Chinese community” (see Tan 1997, 2). In mid-2000, the cabinet decided that a “vision school” concept should be initiated in which 1,298 existing Chinese primary schools would be given the choice of joining the scheme or remaining status quo. Under this concept three primary schools with different mediums of instruction are placed in one complex, sharing common resources like playing fields, courtyards, libraries, canteens, and staff rooms. These schools would have their own administration, but pupils would share activities and facilities. The main objective is to provide opportunities for children of different ethnic groups to interact with and understand one another.

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Once again this has aroused fears among minority ethnic communities that the vision-school concept will eventually erode the character and identity of their schools. Chinese education bodies like Dongjiaozong have expressed the concern that the characteristics of the Chinese schools would be altered under the vision concept and called for its abandonment.49 Another controversial proposal is affirmative action. Before the 1999 elections the Malaysian Chinese Organizations Elections Appeals Committee (Suqiu) presented a seventeen-point proposal calling for reforms in business, government, and the media. Apart from abolishing bumiputra and non-bumiputra status in favor of a system based on need, other demands include human rights, upholding justice, fair economic policies, and a liberal education policy. While projecting support for fundamental rights of the Chinese, these proposals clearly steered clear of suggesting that they were against the special position of Malays enshrined in article 153. All the Chinese-based parties in the ruling BN expressed agreement with Suqiu and recommended that the discussion be continued in the National Economic Consultative Council (NECC), which devises proposals for Malaysia’s next ten-year development plan; cabinet ministers who headed three predominantly Chinese parties in the ruling coalition met Suqiu members and accepted the appeals and apparently agreed (see Crisp and Oorjitham 2000b) that Malaysia’s membership in the WTO made race-based allocation, allotment, and quotas untenable in a globalized world. The controversy began when David Chua, deputy secretary-general of the associated Chinese chambers of commerce and industry and deputy chairman of NECC, called for competition in society based on merit and argued that liberalization and competition were needed for the economy. His proposal provoked UMNO’s deputy chief and other members of Malay associations to demand an apology from the Chinese associations for raising the special rights issue.50 Although the special position of the Malays has been reviewed periodically, it has never been fundamentally changed. But the Asian economic crisis and the rise of the Internet have made it clear to many Malaysians that policies discriminating against the non-Malays are curtailing growth in the economy. The financial crisis highlighted the fragility of many Malayrun companies, which fared less well than Chinese firms. And because Chinese parties and voters contributed more to Mahathir’s ruling coalition in the last general elections than Malays, it has emboldened the former to ask for more changes related to citizenship rights.51 Right to Development In recent years the debate on national culture has extended to the rights of indigenous groups. The first challenge is to the way the terms bumiputra

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and indigenous people have changed since independence to reflect the policies of assimilation and integration via development. Although bumiputra emerged as the preferred reference for the indigenous population, Malay and bumiputra became interchangeable with reference to Peninsular Malaysia, where a great majority of bumiputra are Malays.52 This contrasts with Sabah and Sarawak, where there are many indigenous ethnic groups (nonMalays) to which the term bumiputra can be applied.53 The debate on defining citizens was raised in the first phase of nationbuilding. After the inclusion of Singapore in 1963, the Malays of Peninsular Malaysia no longer formed the majority of the population in the new federation. Due to different perceptions of the nature of the Malaysian state, Singapore withdrew from the federation. The 1971 constitutional amendment reflected these changes by making three categories of indigenous persons eligible for special rights: Malays, aborigines, and natives of Sabah and Sarawak. Further changes were evident after the Fourth Malaysia Plan, where the term bumiputra was used instead of “Malays and other indigenous people” (Siddique and Suryadinata 1981–1982, 674). The second challenge is to the idea of a homogenous nation-state wherein policies aimed at cultural integration have eroded indigenous identity and status. Although indigenous groups possess cultural rights under the Aboriginal Peoples Ordinance of 1954 (amended in 1967), they are far from enjoying equal citizenship rights. Many are barely represented in the country’s political institutions, and their economic interests are marginalized in the development plans. The Orang Asli are the indigenous minority peoples of Peninsular Malaysia. Orang Asli encompass three basic groups: the Negeritos, traditionally nomadic hunters and gatherers of the northern forests; the Senoi of the central highlands; and the proto-Malays of the south who are fishermen and cultivators. All these groups have distinct languages, varied occupations, and cultural practices.54 The important feature that unites indigenous groups in Malaysia is that they consider themselves to be the original inhabitants of a territory now claimed by others. Most of them have a special relationship to their land because it is the basis of their “social organization, economic system and cultural identification” (Nicholas 1996a, 1). Historically, the Orang Asli played an important role during the emergency period (1948–1960).55 Their assistance to communist insurgents hiding in the jungles led the government to adopt many measures. It set up the Department of Orang Asli Affairs (JHEOA) and established health and education facilities. The Aboriginal Peoples Ordinance of 1954, enacted to protect rights to cultural practices and to reserved land and areas, also acknowledges that they have the same civic rights as all citizens. The main issues concern the rights of indigenous people over their land, cultural practices, and cultural identity.56 Spread over Sabah and

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Sarawak and parts of Peninsular Malaysia, these communities constitute approximately 10 percent of the population and are socially and economically marginalized. Most Orang Asli lands have a “reserved” status, and the 1954 ordinance provides for compensation in case the community is asked to move. However, only about 15 percent of the 776 villages are Orang Asli areas or reserves. This means the majority of Orang Asli land is state land. Generally, for most Orang Asli lands that are not viewed as reserves, it has been difficult for the communities to resist pressures to relocate. For example, the Orang Asli community at Cameron Highland Road was displaced once the area was planted with rubber and fruit trees and acknowledged as Malay reserve land. After much confrontation and negotiation, extremely low compensation was given.57 It has been alleged that much of Orang Asli reserve lands has been gradually taken by states in this manner.58 The proposed Orang Asli Reservation Act is a response to the inadequacies of the Aboriginal Peoples Ordinance. In order to better represent their claims to land the Orang Asli have formed the Peninsular Malaysia Orang Asli Association. Its main objective is to articulate claims to customary lands, clarify titles to lands legally viewed as Orang Asli reserves, and increase Orang Asli rights to resources on such lands. Another set of problems arises in the context of development that ignores the role that indigenous institutions and practices have played in the past. In the name of development, indigenous people have lost lands to government land schemes, private plantations, mining, highways, dams, housing projects, recreation areas, new townships, and sites for universities. Large-scale deforestation and government plans to develop backward areas have led to destruction of traditional beliefs and practices. These changes affect livelihoods as the Orang Asli are increasingly pushed toward a cash economy as laborers in towns or as settlers in land schemes. Related to this is the disruption of their ways of life, as well as whether resettlement can provide the same quality and type of life they are accustomed to. The central issue is cultural rights and cultural identity. The state policy of assimilation is evident from enforcement of an education system with a national Malay-based curriculum and in the powers of JHEOA officials to decide the future of the community. Since the 1970s, the policy of integration has taken on the dimension of spiritual development of Orang Asli. Many of these people in Peninsular Malaysia are animists who believe in natural forces and their spiritual powers. Instead of respecting their indigenous religious beliefs, the JHEOA aims to integrate these people into the Malay community. In more recent times, this has taken on a new dimension by attempting to convert them to Islam and by reformulating and amending the definition of “Malay” to include Orang Asli who embrace Islam, speak Malay, and follow the Malay culture and tradition.59

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By including the term aborigine separately from the definition of “Malay” in article 160(2), the constitution at the time of independence assumed that the indigenous political community was culturally heterogenous. In Chapter 4, I examine the way an Islamic resurgence in the 1970s radically transformed the Malay community; the Malays reasserted their cultural membership through a religious identity. It is important to understand that the cultural structure is being recognized as a context of choice for Malays but not for other indigenous communities. Challenges to bumiputra Malay rights are criticized, but challenges to the livelihood, cultures, and languages of the Orang Asli and bumiputra in Sabah and Sarawak are ignored. Today, the culture of the indigenous groups is threatened with extinction or assimilation into other cultures. Unlike the dominant cultures around it, the very existence of the culture of indigenous groups is vulnerable to the decisions of others. They could lose control over resources crucial to the survival of their communities. As a result, they have to spend some of their scant resources on securing the cultural membership of their community, something that other communities get for free. They are thus doubly disadvantaged in this situation.60

Conclusion The development of a legal notion of citizenship was a key force in the process of nation-building in Malaysia. It was not a juridical notion of citizenship because the constitution did not propose the idea of equal rights to all the communities. Indeed, nation-building was achieved through reservations for Malays, preservation of the Malay language, and creation of a national culture; these were the vital ingredients of the conceptual apparatus for creating a national community in Malaysia. Communal hostility among the ethnic groups reached a breaking point on 13 May 1969. This prompted the federal government to adopt a more decisive approach toward identifying and ordering the priorities of the country and meeting the needs of the Malay community. Constitutional provisions favoring the Malays, along with the political and economic bargain among the communities, had not sufficiently served the twin goals of economic balance among different communities and national unity. Thus the NEP provided various measures for Malays—access to loans, credits, licenses, and contracts—and pressured the Chinese and foreign firms to take on ethnic Malay business partners. The implementation of the NEP led to economic growth and structural changes in the economy and society. But this involved more than mere changes in the nature of employment for Malays; it transformed their way

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of life, residence, and network of kinship ties, along with the duties and obligations that characterized Malay society. Although economic growth helped establish Malay hegemony in vital sectors of society, it also accompanied and precipitated a breakdown of traditional social and cultural ties crossing religious boundaries as they were defined within an expanding modern sector, as well as the emergence of a modern paradoxically elitist version of religion that acts as a political ideology but also compensates for the loss of faith in the urban and rural population of the Malay community. The transformation of the economy must be seen along with the rapid consolidation of executive powers within a constitutional framework, ostensibly to maintain national unity. Although parliament, the constitution, and other institutions had been molded into compliance by 1971, under Mahathir political institutions saw rapid erosion of their power. By giving priority to racial balance and economic parity among ethnic communities, certain contradictions in the constitution were never resolved. Consequently, in modern Malaysian history the legal notion of citizenship holds three significant features, or component parts, in tension. Some of the contradictions arise because the constitution did not follow the definition of a juridical notion of citizenship (equal political and civil rights), but neither did it accommodate the cultural rights of the ethnic communities. Although enabling a significant number of non-Malays to acquire legal citizenship, the constitution included the notion that the Malays needed special protection. In this notion, the ideas and ideals sketched out in the constitution were riddled with internal tensions and contradictions. The three salient bases of citizenship rights—religion, ethnicity, and culture—stand in continuous tension with the statist, or legal, conception of citizenship that purports to promote national unity by transcending all such foundations of diversity. First, the idea of providing a common nationality for all the states and people of the federation rested on the norms of egalitarian membership of all communities and required the admission of long-term residents to full citizenship. But economic backwardness and national integrity were used to justify a series of restrictive preconditions for admission and special privileges for the Malays. It must be noted that it was not the immigrants’ but the Malays’ social, economic, and cultural marginalization that determined Malays’ weak position in the labor market, education system, and consequently their life chances. The constitution operated on the premise that economic inequality among communities would lead to unequal treatment of the Malay community in the social and political sphere. Malays were viewed as an economically disadvantaged group unable to compete on equal terms with other ethnic groups. These premises—further strengthened by the New Economic Policy after 1970—were to counter the future possibility that Malays would

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be socially and politically excluded on account of their low-income group and educational backwardness. The irony is that they were the numerical majority. Over the years this special consideration has translated into cultural domination by the Malays over other communities. And in the absence of any well-defined policy for economically backward non-Malays, it has left inequalities in well-being as well as social injustice unattended to. Second, the model of nation-state membership in the constitution was not ambivalent with respect to the admission of immigrants into legal citizenship (an ongoing debate in Western Europe today). Indeed, accepting the citizenship rights of immigrants created new definitions of citizenship and political community. But it was ambivalent regarding the assimilation or integration of their cultural rights. Religious solidarities, for example, were not important as legal standing as the basis of civic distinctions in Malaysia; the accommodation of multiple faiths was the spirit behind the constitution. However, the absence of religious definitions in political rights and obligations of citizenship did not eliminate the continued salience of Islam in the public sphere. In the process of nation-building the policy of accommodating multiple faiths gave rise to demands for accommodating cultural rights—including that of language and culture. This preoccupation with cultural rights left little room for individual civil and political rights. The state was soon embroiled in sorting out issues of multiculturalism and thus set aside debate on evolving a rights-based conception of citizenship. The questions that arise are these: Will it be possible to fundamentally break with the superimposition of legal citizenship to accommodate demands of multiculturalism and cultural identity in the future? What are the possible challenges to the contemporary meaning of citizenship in Malaysia? In answering these questions I look at three possible challenges. The first is what I call the civil society challenge, namely, that some kind of intermediate group among the individual, family, and the state becomes increasingly necessary to provide the individual with group support; individuals need the cultural ideals that their group offers, but they need to have solidarity with others on a nonethnic/noncultural basis in their fight for rights as consumers, for an ecologically sound society, and for civil and political liberties. Thus if disadvantaged non-Malay groups wish to engage in the struggle for political liberties, then they must necessarily interact and form alliances with other groups outside their community. For example, after independence the Dongjiaozong failed to include other minorities in its campaign for an alternative approach to nation-building; by bargaining with the political elite it gave legitimacy to politics defined in ethnic terms. The principles of citizenship in Malaysia reveal that a plural society composed of several separate and segregated thriving cultures might not foster multiculturalism. This is not to say that the government does not pay lip service to the demands of multiculturalism or to deny that a measure of

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socioculturalism has been preserved because the promotion of Malay as a national language has not curtailed the viability of vernacular languages, tribal customs, and laws in some communities and adat and shari’a in the states. However, the weight placed on the need for ethnic balance among communities (in economic terms), as opposed to freedom and democracy for individuals, rules out the possibility of viewing multiculturalism as a public good. Moreover, as long as authoritarian controls are exercised under the current leadership, a challenge from civil society may not materialize in changing the principles of citizenship. The second challenge depends on developing a republican view of citizenship that regards rights as the products of the political process and defines the moral framework of politics by a duty to participate in collective decisionmaking. According to this line of reasoning, because the rights and liberties available to us depend upon the priorities, norms, and laws of the society in which we live, we shall be free to the extent that we share in determining the character of that society. In Malaysia rapid economic growth and capitalist enterprises have given rise to a consumer culture as well as to values of individualism. However, as Stephen Kalberg points out, “a strong and participation-oriented individualism constitutes a necessity if persons are to possess the capacity to stand up for their political and civil rights and to defend the rights of others” (Kalberg 1993, 108). In the context of Malaysia, then, one has to be cautious of reading too much in the values of individualism; indeed, there is no guarantee that vast urbanization, advanced industrialization, and consumer cultures will extend to civic consciousness. It is very likely that individualism has oriented many Malaysians to personal interests and material goods. The third challenge is social justice and the changing nature of its beneficiaries. The principles of citizenship in the constitution, although done in a spirit of accommodation among communities, were based on ethnic lines. Policies for alleviating the Malay community’s economic backwardness have gone a long way toward creating a bumiputra commercial and industrial elite that owns, controls, and manages an expanding share of the economy. The privileges given to the Malay community have resulted in a disadvantaged position for some sections of the ethnic minorities that is largely independent of formal citizenship status given by universal franchise. A more comprehensive program is needed to deal with the poverty of economically backward Indian and Chinese groups.61 Policies emanating from affirmative action for Malays have operated on the principle of fixed identities. But ethnicity is not a static concept. It is important to see identity with a specific ethnicity as that which is constantly reinvented and renegotiated. In today’s context of Malay political dominance, there is good reason to believe that the notion of citizenship is undergoing changes. In order to look at some more challenges in establishing

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a multicultural democracy in Malaysia, I turn to the Islamic resurgence in Chapter 4.

Notes 1. I follow Will Kymlicka (1989, 135) and his use of political community as that which is not coextensive with one cultural community because the good society is understood as a framework of rights and duties within which people may pursue their separate ends. For details on the notion of “societal culture” relevant more to the Canadian situation, see Kymlicka (2001, 53). 2. In contrast to T. H. Marshall’s rights-based theory of citizenship, scholars now focus on citizen participation in institutions, associations, and local communities. For examples of this work, see Keane (1998); Habermas (1992); Cohen and Arato (1995). 3. I am not examining the differences in models of multiculturalism represented by the French or Canadian ideal of assimilation or the U.S. ideal of integration. For a discussion on related matters, see Kymlicka (2001); Turner and Hamilton (1994). 4. In the Malaysian context I use the term legal citizenship in order to highlight the formal character of its provisions and lack of enforcement. 5. Here I refer to the point that the Malay sultans were always considered sovereign in their states even after British imposed their rule in Malaya. 6. See Benhabib and Cornell (1987), a helpful discussion that questions universal moral and political theories in order to take seriously the claims of community and gender. Unlike Iris Young, Benhabib (1987, 8) sees in the identification of the moral point of view with the standpoint of the generalized other the source of an incoherent conception of self and a faulty notion of autonomy. 7. For a fuller treatment of these issues, see David Held, who points out the weaknesses of a purely statist conception of citizenship (Held 1991a, 14). For clarification on recent theoretical debates on “liberal culturalism,” see Kymlicka (2001, 21–22). 8. It is argued that U.S. citizenship focuses on civil rights of its members whereas the British political system focuses on social rights (Oomen 1997, 32). Bryan S. Turner identifies four different forms of citizenship in Europe (Turner 1993b). For understanding the basis of different policies toward immigrants following from different theories of citizenship, see Joppke (1988). 9. For criticisms of assumptions of recent theories of citizenship, see Mann (1987); Turner (1993b); Barbalet (1989; 1988). J.G.A. Pocock tries to “historicize” the idea of citizenship. He draws attention to the emergence in Italy, at the end of the fourteenth century, of a tradition of involvement in public life. He assumes the task of explaining how this philosophy became operative in England in a hostile environment dominated by monarchical, legal, and theological concepts (Pocock 1975). A. Milner (1995, 128) examines his ideas on citizenship in the context of colonial Malaya. 10. Kalberg (1993, 93–94) makes these observations in a different context, but they are pertinent to this analysis. 11. For a development of citizenship in various forms in Western countries, see articles in Turner and Hamilton (1994); Rex (1996). Obviously there are several patterns of migration that have influenced the history and practice of citizenship, and

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there are dangers in generalizing about these problems. For issues related to Europe in general, see Eihorn, Kaldor, and Kavan (1996). 12. This statement by E.E.C. Thuraisingham is quoted in James P. Ongkili (1985, 217). 13. I use the term elite accommodation in this book to highlight the pattern of Malaysian politics during this period. I argue that the bargains and compromises made under the guise of accommodation eventually led to the dominance of UMNO and establishment of a monoethnic state. 14. The constitutional crisis of 1983—in which the federal government rolled back the powers of the Malay sultans in the guise of reform of feudal politics—has further tilted the balance in favor of central authority in the federation. For more on traditional elements of the constitution, see Tun Mohd Salleh Bin Abas (1986, 2–5). 15. The Aliens Ordinance Act of 1933 restricted the intake of immigrants, but it was already too late because the Malay percentage of the populations stood at 44.7 percent in 1931 and the Chinese accounted for 39.0 percent. See C. A. Vlieland, A Report on the 1931 Census and on Certain Problems of Vital Statistics (Singapore, 1932); Malayan Union Gazette, quoted in Morrison (1949). 16. For differences in Chinese and Indian strands of nationalism, see note 37 in Chapter 2. 17. The non-Malays rallied under the All-Malaya Council of Joint Action formed in 1946, with Tan Cheng Lock as chairman, to press for their revisions of the Malayan Union scheme. The intense bargaining and negotiations that went on during this period are too complex to explore here. For more details, see Ongkili (1985, 59–62). 18. My aim in this chapter is not to go through the details of the contested proposals on citizenship. They have been adequately discussed in Ongkili (1985); Ratnam (1965). 19. For some of these challenges, see Lee (1995, 11–13); Andaya and Andaya (1982, 280). 20. Official figures indicate that 196 persons lost their lives, 180 were wounded by firearms, and 259 by other weapons. For an account of this event, see Karl Von Vorys (1976, 363–365, chapters 13 and 14); for the emergency that followed this, see Means (1991, 5–10). 21. For details, see Malaysia (1966, 5, 28–29). 22. The improvement of the rural sector was uppermost in the minds of government leaders during these years as part of the nationalist project of modernity. 23. I draw this inference from Hussin Mutalib (1990, 56). The research findings by Faaland, Parkinson, and Saniman (1990, 42–45) highlighted mass Malay poverty and the racial economic imbalance in the country. 24. Some of these arguments were put forward in the report produced by the National Operations Council on the May Tragedy cited in Ongkili (1985). 25. For some of the constitutional changes after 1970, see Tun Mohd Salleh Bin Abas (1986, 13); Rais Yatim (1995). 26. The details of the confrontation within UMNO and the reasons for Mahathir’s letter to the prime minister can be found in Von Vorys (1976, 371–373); Khoo Boo Teik (1995, 22–23). 27. Throughout this section I draw from Mahathir’s book The Malay Dilemma (1970). 28. Khoo Kay Jin argues that the economic proposals in Mahathir’s book had already been raised in the economic congress organized by government bureaucrats (the Bumiputra Economic Congress). See his footnote 16 (1992, 49).

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29. The purpose of this section was to examine Mahathir’s ideas on legal citizenship. For more complex issues related to Mahathir’s ideas on imperialism, Islam, and nationalism and their transformation, see Khoo Boo Teik (1995). 30. For more on differences between the Christian missionary, Chinese, and Malay schools system, see R.H.K. Wong (1964). 31. For more on these reports and the response by the Chinese community, see Purcell (1953). 32. A detailed reconstruction of the Chinese education movement of this period lies outside the scope of this study. For the purpose of my argument Tan Liok Ee’s general claim that the survival of Chinese language and culture is linked to its value in terms of socioeconomic mobility and educational opportunities is a valid one (1997, 198). It is also argued that MCA was willing to concede issues of great concern to the Chinese community to UMNO so that its leaders could have a greater role in the economy. The majority of the Chinese shunned MCA for its political stance in 1969. 33. The two objectives of the national language policy were national identity and national integration. For an elaboration of this viewpoint, see Asmah Haji Omar (1987). 34. For debates on education in general, see Visu Sinnadurai (1986); and for Malaya language, see Wan Hamid (1964, 187–88); Ratnam (1965, 136). 35. Due to the limited focus of this chapter I do not examine state politics and education policies during this period in Sabah and Sarawak. For discussion about these states, see Milne and Ratnam (1974); Ongkili (1985, 226); Reid (1997). 36. In 1963 the combined total Malay enrollment in the Universities of Malaya and Singapore was only 11 percent, although the community constituted half of the total population (Hussin Mutalib 1990, 58). By 1972 the government’s interest in sponsoring Malays and other bumiputra to attend overseas educational institutions had shown positive results. However, the language nationalists did not anticipate that with globalization, economic policies, and privatization there would be an unprecedented resurgence of the English language in the job market during the early 1990s. A whole generation of Malay graduates of public tertiary institutions will be at a disadvantage for jobs in the global corporate sector that will be beyond their reach. 37. Most of the analysis in the section is based on information from The Second Malaysia Plan, 1971–1975. 38. For some development issues related to the NEP in this period, see Jomo (1990–91, 469–475). 39. Import substitution strategies for manufacturing dominated economic thinking in the 1960s, not only reflecting the development economics at that time but also appealing to nationalist sentiments and the interest of nascent classes. By the late 1960s this strategy was beginning to reach a saturation point, particularly in consumer goods, and gave way to export-oriented industrialization. For some of these changes, see K. S. Jomo (1989); Higgott (1987). 40. Khoo Kay Jin (1992, 60–64) discusses some of the economic differences between the big and small capitalists. He also argues that small Malay capitalists are more articulate about corruption in the system at UMNO gatherings. 41. Most of the material is drawn from the Mid-term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan (1973, 7–8, 14–15). 42. Unfortunately many beneficiaries in the government’s poverty reduction programs were not necessarily poor. See Jomo (1990, 473). 43. According to E. T. Gomez (1990, 166–169), through its holding companies, the Fleet Holdings Sdn Bhd and Hatibudi Nominees Sdn Bhd, UMNO has acquired equity in several companies since 1972.

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44. For changes in the middle classes, see Crouch (1993, 140–144). 45. For changes in structure of industries related to technology and the impact on social stratification, see Robison and Goodman (1996); and for alienation in Malay middle classes, see Chandra (1986); Anwar (1987). 46. In the coming years they might support a party like DAP. But the Islamic scare from PAS might also push the Chinese to vote for Mahathir and UMNO in the next general elections. It is well known that their votes changed the power balance in the general elections of 1999. 47. See the observations made by Sinnadurai (1986, 56) in this regard. 48. The Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sports asked for feedback from all the communities for a ten-year review of the National Culture Policy (formulated at the National Culture Congress a decade earlier) in 1981. For an idea of this debate, see articles in the New Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur) in July and August 1983 and Kua Kia Soong (1985). 49. Throughout August 2000 the debate on vision schools was evident in local newspapers. See Joceline Tan (2000d). This debate also throws some light on MCA’s relationship with UMNO. See David Chew’s (2000) letter to the editor about how the MCA leaders conceded issues of concern to the Chinese, to UMNO. 50. Utusan Malaysia, the newspaper regarded as the standard-bearer of Malay rights, reported David Chua’s statement in the FEER in an article by Gilley (2000). For an analysis of this incident, see Netto (2000). This debate took an interesting turn, with the prime minister being reported to have said on Merdeka Day in a speech that the actions of Suqiu were similar to those of the communist radicals. 51. For more on this debate, see Crisp and Oorjitham (2000b); Jayasankaran and Holland (2000). 52. For the development of these terms in Malaysian history and party politics, see Siddique and Suryadinata (1981–1982). 53. Sabah is generally considered to be the richest state in the federation in terms of natural resources, but it also has one of the highest percentages of poor households in the country. It is estimated that thirty-nine different ethnic communities make up 66.8 percent of Sabah’s population. Sarawak also has a diverse population, with the Dayaks forming a majority of 50 percent. Development in this region has led to opening up of land that was under customary tenure. Investments for estate development, construction of dams, and agricultural development have led to dislocation and resettlement of the local people. 54. For example, some of the northern groups like the Senoi and Negeritos speak languages that suggest a historical link with indigenous peoples in Burma, Thailand, and Indochina. For more details, see Nicholas (1996b, chapter 11). 55. T. N. Harper (1997, 17–18) traces this part of their history. 56. See, for recent issues, Murugasu (1999a; 1999b). 57. For a discussion of this, see Murugasu (1999b); Nicholas (1996b, 167–169). 58. JHEOA is an important but rather weak player in this regard, having little power to protect the Orang Asli and their interests. For cases in Pahang and Perak, see Denton et al. (1997, 111). 59. The government’s Islamization program has been successful, although some converts are Muslims in name only. They do not understand Islamic doctrine and follow few Islamic practices. For more, see Carey (1976, 63); Amran Kasimin (1991). 60. Arguments about protecting the character of a cultural community are different from arguments that identify, protect, and promote cultural membership. In this context the need for rights in special circumstances for indigenous people arises

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from their social environment or natural endowments that are not their responsibility. Such circumstances are arbitrary from the moral point of view. The indigenous group’s argument for special rights is grounded in unequal circumstances. For related ideas, see Kymlicka (1989, 186). 61. This point is pertinent given the Kampung Medan clashes in March 2001 between Malays and Indians living in depressed conditions in the squatter shacks of Petaling Jaya that left many dead and injured. For more, see analysis by Wong Chun Wai (2001).

4 Islam and the Malay Community

In Chapters 2 and 3, I argued that nation-building was necessary for state cohesion, economic development, and political legitimacy as well as for assimilation of different immigrant groups. However, a commitment to economic modernization and prosperity for all groups is insufficient for nationbuilding; economic development has to be weighed against equally compelling ties of ethnicity and religion as well as the demand for democratization amid growth of civil society. Although the crisis over the legitimacy of the Malaysian state and parties representing it continues, the debates over Islam and its relation to the country’s different communities are most salient today. Many social scientists perceive the process of modernization in postcolonial states as one of fundamental change from a traditional sociopolitical order to a modern one. Scholars from liberal and Marxist traditions argue that modernization generates new integrative symbols and structures and fosters the process of secularization; in short, religion and religious values are destined to lose their place with the advent of modernization.1 Yet discourse among Islamist movements and parties worldwide today questions these perspectives and focuses on Islamization, or the call for an authentic Islam.2 Although calls for Islamization display similarities, it would be wrong to analyze them as a homogenous movement. Therefore old perspectives and frameworks—modern versus traditional, liberal versus Marxist—help little in explaining the resurgence of religious movements like Islam and their growing political strength. For our purpose, the current Islamic revival, in all parts of the Muslim world, and its anti-Western fervor should be seen in the context of globalization and the spontaneous process of Islamic cultural identity that goes beyond any nation-state. Many factors explain the changing role of Islam in politics after an Islamic revolution overthrew the monarchy in Iran in 1979. Since the 1970s there has been growing disenchantment with prevailing secular nationalist 89

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ideologies and theories of development—the ideals of many newly liberated countries in the early part of the twentieth century. The first challenge is to the concept of a secular nation-state. Those who question this viewpoint voice a profound dilemma: How can the universalism of Islam be reconciled with the reality of the nation-state, the embodiment of modernity[?] The Islamic world-view, shaped by the oneness of God and the indivisibility of the umma [community of believers], is confronted by nationalism, the ideology of the nation-state. (Mehmet 1990, 1)

Thus for some Muslim scholars in a self-proclaimed Islamic state it is not possible to think in terms of boundaries of national territory but rather those of the Islamic world. To a large extent this challenge draws on a critique of the modern Western world and the twin ideals of the Enlightenment, often characterized as universalism and homogenization.3 These twin ideals give rise to notions of rights, development, and social change detached from cultural foundations. Along with this critique is growing disenchantment with Western materialism (i.e., conspicuous consumption) and with the West’s competitive approach to learning, which has led to a questioning of the very premises on which Western values rest: individual autonomy, rights, and freedom.4 This second challenge has gained momentum from globalization. If rapid developments in communications technology, transportation, and information have brought the world closer, they have also raised debates over government actions and democratization. Unlike the economic contacts of previous centuries, cultural flows among nations characterize the current conflicts in the globalization process. A good example is the controversy surrounding Salman Rushdie and the publication of The Satanic Verses. A more recent example is the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan (an action taken in response to the terrorist attacks on the symbols of U.S. economic and military might), which has provided a rallying point for many Muslim groups throughout the world.5 Although Islam has become a player in international politics due to these challenges, it is important to stress that Islam has always played an important role in the public life of Muslims by evoking a strong bond of social solidarity that cuts across classes.6 More subtle are recent changes in some Muslims’ attitudes toward their own culture and lifestyle and their renewed sense of historical tradition and identity in the context of globalization. In their wish to distinguish themselves from a world of modernity based upon Western civilization, many have focused on rediscovering their religious-cultural identity. Many others have used newly acquired knowledge to develop Islamic responses to political and social problems in their countries. Yet the resurgence is also a product of indigenous concepts of democracy that have been generated within Islam as a result of, and in

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response to, profound changes triggered by globalization. Thus the Islamic revival in politics should be seen as a complex phenomenon that encompasses demands for cultural authenticity and not only fundamentalist impulses. One contentious issue is the relationship among forces of Islamic resurgence and the development of democratic political systems.7 Recent claims for democratization are accompanied by greater demands for participation, empowerment, and recognition of cultural identities that are related in the way they represent the aspirations of individuals and communities to gain greater control over institutions. Although such assertions take many forms, they embody a rejection of the enforced homogeneity of state institutions and the rigidity of modern bureaucratic methods. Because democracy is seen primarily as a Western concept, there is an attempt to reconceptualize terms within the Islamic tradition in order to create more effective methods for increased popular participation in many Islamic countries. In the countries of Southeast Asia, many Islamist separatist movements have emerged, like the Aceh Merdeka in Aceh (Indonesia) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Mindanao and the neighboring southern Philippines), arguing for autonomy, even independence. The Abu Sayyaf group split from the Moro National Liberation Front in 1991 and since then has financed its operations mainly through robbery, piracy, and ransom kidnappings. Although based exclusively in the southern islands, it has established ties with terrorist organizations around the world, including Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda.8 In Malaysia the opposition Islamic Parti Islam SeMalaysia governs two states. Although it does not have secessionist or terrorist leanings, it is committed to establishing an Islamic state in Malaysia. The Islamic government’s actions at the state level are provoking new questions about the nature of the state and the future of multicultural democracy in Malaysia. In this chapter, I focus on how Malay identity has been shaped by global events while confronting and coping with changes to its own tradition, culture, and value system through the resurgence of Islam.9 I address the party struggles and ideological formulations of Muslim perspectives and groups but say less on the universal teachings of Islam. I also examine a question raised by Judith Nagata (1994, 69): Can political Islam in Malaysia adopt laws that evolved in the unique historical and cultural context of seventhcentury Arabia to the needs of a developed country in Southeast Asia? I argue that Islamist parties and groups have to develop an appropriate form of democracy suited to the multicultural nature of Malaysian society. Islam as a growing political force in Malaysia after the financial crisis of 1997 has given rise to debates over the position of secularism and fundamentalism, especially in the last general elections held in November 1999. Although the dakwah movement in the 1970s was viewed primarily

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as a religious ideology, perceptions of it have changed after the 1998–1999 reformasi movement (the call to resurrect the forces of civil society). It is recognized that Islamist-based parties and organizations do not have adequate resources to capture political power at the national level but that their strength lies in the ability to create a political-cultural identity for Malays in a multiracial society, to expand the frontiers of civil society, and to thereby destabilize the government by denying it the religious legitimacy it seeks.

Malay Society and the Role of Religion Now to our first set of elementary questions: What is the place of Islam in contemporary Malaysia? What is the nature of the Malay community and how is it related to religion? Two opposing theses have emerged on the role of Islam and its impact on political integration. The first gives scant attention to Islam as a political force in the development of independent Malaysia. Scholars adhering to this view emphasize the harmony of Malay society and fail to account for entrenched religious divisions and factions within the Malay Muslim community. These scholars explain that “Islam was not to any significant extent a state religion,” although “Malay” and “Muslim” were synonymous terms (Gullick 1988, 139). They acknowledge that to undergo conversion to Islam was in fact to masok Melayu, that is, “to enter the fold of Malaydom” (Roff 1980, 67). There was no priesthood that formed a caste apart from the community, yet the sense of being Muslims played a part in uniting peoples otherwise divided by cultural differences. Islam is thus described as a common amalgam by which Malays of all classes are united rather than divided.10 This thesis relies upon a narrow definition of Islam that derives from a stateoriented conception of colonial history focusing on state and institutions. It grasps only a small part of a larger process through which Islamic groups played an important role in shaping Malay nationalism in the face of the large influx of immigrants and the imposition of colonial rule. A second set of assertions addresses divisions based upon rank or class within Malay society during the colonial period. Many commentaries on Malay history define the term Melayu originally with stratification or rank and hierarchy rather than with ethnicity (Nagata 1984, 2). Malay identity under the sultans was defined by loyalty to a ruler and was characterized as classically patron-client. In this we perceive the roots of the “protector” relationship, wherein the leader or ruler demanded subservience from his followers (Chandra 1979, 7–12). In a recent study, Anthony Milner establishes three visions in the Malay community: the monarchical, one based upon a community of Allah, and the other based upon Malay ethnicity. These

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competing visions are the source of constant debate and division within the Malay community.11 After independence, divisions within the Malay community were studied on the basis of many variables, but mostly those issues related to the party system. Based on his study of the state of Kelantan, Manning Nash claimed the importance of nonclass interests, that is, religious bonds that led to tensions and cleavages among Malays. In contrast, Clive Kessler argued that the success of Islamic parties in Kelantan was a manifestation of class conflict.12 Since the 1970s the debate has shifted to the causes and consequences of Islamic resurgence in Malaysia and how this affected Malay identity. Some of the questions raised were: Is it a purely religious revival, or does it also encompass a nationalist feeling? To what extent is this integrating and restoring a Malay identity? Whereas Zainah Anwar correlates Islamic revivalism with the quest for ethnic expression on the part of Malay students, Hussin Mutalib and Judith Nagata explained Malaysian politics as ethnic communal bargaining.13 They were in agreement that when the two interact the Malay, and not the Islamic, identity emerges as the more potent force. Nagata devotes her attention to Islam’s important role in determining the boundaries of Malay ethnic identity in a plural society. Referring to the dakwah in the 1970s, she argues that “it continues to be in large measure, a closing of ranks against the non-Malay . . . a nativistic affirmation of Malayness in a new form” (Nagata 1984, 234). Further changes in the sociopolitical scenario followed the removal of Anwar Ibrahim, the former deputy prime minister of Malaysia. Such changes must be understood in the framework above and in the context of growing class distinctions within the Malay bloc. With economic development, the division of Malay society into aristocrats, peasants, and civil servants has been accompanied by the growth of a middle class of professionals and white-collar workers. Islamic resurgence and its impact on the unity of the Malay community and the political process have reached another crucial stage. In the last general elections held on 29 November 1999, a section of the Malays rejected UMNO’s leadership and opted for PAS. At least half of the ethnic Malays, the country’s most important group, voted for the opposition.14 This proves that development and nationalism are not enough to unite Malays, and the need for a more spiritual meaning in religion, as well as the urge for political liberties, might be the driving force for further change. New questions arise: Will these changes lead to the establishment of an Islamic state, or will religion end up as an instrument of struggle between the ruling elites and their opposition? To what extent can Islamic revivalism expand the boundaries of civil society, citizenship, and public participation? Can this spiritual dissatisfaction be transformed into a demand for greater accountability of institutions and strengthening of the nation-state? (See Chapters 5 and 6.)

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Here my perspective is that Islam provides the Malay community a focal point of identity and social solidarity because large areas of Malay culture are intimately associated with religion. The social institutions, personal laws, customs, traditions, and history that mold the individual and social existence are closely related to (even if from non-Islamic origins) Islam. But the evolution of Islam and its resurgence cannot be understood outside cultural pluralism; in the case of the Malay community ethnic difference is increasingly expressed through religious identity. Religious symbols are accentuated but also shifted or dispensed with in response to other ethnic communities. The Islamic resurgence is not only an expression of spiritual dissatisfaction but also is linked to the drive toward building civil society organizations for greater popular participation in the political process. An important point is that besides being an expression of political opposition and social discontent, Islam is being used to acquire and sustain political legitimacy and to mobilize masses. The way these two stories of Islam are combined in the future will be a testing point for Malaysia.

Religion, Citizenship, and Democracy Below I summarize five aspects of Malay identity that are particularly relevant to our inquiry into the relationship among religion, democratization, and citizenship. The first is the idea of cultural pluralism in which various religious and ethnic identities come together. Islam in Malaysia derives strength from Malays being an ethnic group in a multicultural society. Malays form an ethnic community separate from non-Malay communities, but Islam is an “ethnic boundary marker” or an “identity tag” that strives to exclude the category of non-Muslims from its fold.15 The second aspect is the close attachment that Malays have to their sultans and cultural heritage based on adat (customs), nama (name, reputation, or title), and obedience. It is generally assumed that the Malays were converted to Islam during the fifteenth century, but remnants of Hinduism embedded in Malay adat survive.16 Some Malays believe in magic, superstition, spirit worship, and taboos and resort to the power of evil spirits in their daily life. The result has been “a kind of hybrid or variegated Islamic doctrine, consisting of a heavy mixture of both Islamic and un-Islamic practices which was adopted by the Malays” (Hussin Mutalib 1990, 13). Third, the Islamic worldview is shaped by a universal view of God. Many Islamic traditionalists reject the concept of national sovereignty because sovereignty belongs only to God. A tension is evident in this interpretation between, on the one hand, the need for people to express their national character and, on the other, their need to cooperate with Muslims

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in other Islamic states.17 Indeed, some scholars ask where the Malay loyalty lies—Islam, race, or state?18 Fourth, the concern of the state (illustrated by the implementation of the NEP) has been to redress the economic imbalances and protect the interests of the Malay community as an ethnic community. However, it is the wider philosophical dimensions of Islam, such as its emphasis on justice, equity, and universality in the context of a plural society, that are being raised today in the Malay community. For the majority of Muslims, Islam is associated with a conception of the good spiritual life, and Islamist parties like PAS have enlarged the boundaries of public life by addressing such religious dimensions.19 Finally, although in Muslim countries the participation of Islamic parties in electoral politics is a recent phenomenon, Islamist parties in Malaysia have been active in the political process since independence and are strong contenders for political power at the state level. Having support in states, where the traditional forms of Islamic education and sultan’s religious councils are strongest, PAS’s main challenge to the ruling coalition, the Barisan Nasional, has been as defender of the Islamic faith. UMNO, the dominant party within the BN, and its leader, Mahathir, have followed a policy of accommodation and control toward Islamist groups and organizations. However, these initiatives have given greater legitimacy to many Islamist groups like PAS, which have created a political constituency by uniting Malays on a religious platform as Muslims. Much of the success of PAS as a legitimate opposition party is attributed to the uneven development of regions that have lagged behind despite being resource-rich. The credibility of the development critique of PAS arises from the fact that it addresses the arbitrary exercise of official powers and corruptions and scandals in UMNO-led governments in states such as Terengganu. Many middle-class Malays, disillusioned by false promises of modernization and technological advancement, endeavor to seek personal fulfillment in religion. Another success factor is the way in which Islamization was pursued by the federal state to appease Islamic groups and gain support from the Malay community. Finally, the political crisis in Malaysia following the Asian financial crisis became linked to PAS’s success in revealing the antidemocratic and repressive aspects of the regime under Mahathir. To understand the role of Islam in recent years it is essential to comprehend the position of Islam in the constitution.

Liberal Theory, the Constitution, and Islam The Malaysian constitution is an amalgam of diverse elements inspired by liberal principles but was determined by the political realities of a multicultural

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society. Although Malaysia theoretically is a secular state, with Islam as its official religion, the constitution claims tolerance for other forms of belief and worship. Below I examine how the constitution upholds principles of liberal theory yet departs from it for historical and pragmatic reasons. The guidelines of the constitution are simple and unambiguous but hide the fact that the document is an uneasy compromise after a long struggle in which Malays pushed for special privileges. At the time of independence, British proposals for a Malayan Union that included equal citizenship rights for all ethnic communities united Malays in opposition and compelled their political organizations to seek accommodation with other groups on the future of Malaya.20 The pattern of elite accommodation of ethnic groups led to compromises on issues like religion, citizenship, and special protection in the constitution for Malays. For these reasons and due to the constraints of multicultural society, Islam was declared the official religion in the constitution, which also guaranteed freedom to practice other religions. Until independence, Malaya consisted of nine Malay sultanates that performed the ceremonial role as protectors of Malay religion and custom. By accepting Islam as an official religion, the federation at independence not only drew together Islam, royalty, and Malayness but also included the immigrant populations by declaring in article 3(1): “Islam is the religion of the Federation; but other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation” (Groves 1964, 212).21 Although the framers of the constitution seem to confine Islam to ceremonial purposes, over time it has been viewed differently. Freedom of religion was safeguarded by the constitution, but the document also left intact the administration of shari’a by the religious courts under the authority of the sultans in their states. This implied the fracturing of traditional religious authority as opposed to a centralized Islamic state. There is a national religious organization at the ministry level, but each of the Malay states, under a sultan, has its Majlis Agama (religious bureau) and keeper of Malay custom. Thus there are nine courts of Islamic judges for the adjudication of disputes relating to Muslim family law and the trial of Muslim offenses but whose rulings are not consistent.22 It is not surprising, then, that given the long-standing exposure to Islam certain states like Kelantan under PAS could enact laws in the past, such as the hudud (quranic criminal punishment), contrary to the laws of the federation, in order to consolidate an electoral hold on its political constituency. Such provisions impact federal-state politics because there is some contiguity between geopolitical boundaries and religious groups. Some states, notably in the north, are predominantly Muslim, so an Islamic party in power— as is now the case in Kelantan and Terengganu—can make Islam the state religion. Other states like Perlis, Pahang, and Kedah are Malay-dominated but

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are still under the ruling party, UMNO. This places the relationship between predominantly Malay states and the others at a crucial position in defining Malaysia’s federalism as region becomes yet another divider along with ethnicity, culture, and religion. Another contradiction arises from the practice of borrowing and then modifying liberal constitutional principles, for example, by providing rights of Western derivation but placing them alongside the right to religion for different ethnic communities. This is different from the right to individual conscience because it emphasizes an individual’s community identity. Article 11 on freedom of religion gives each religious group the right to manage its own religious affairs, establish and maintain institutions for religious or charitable purposes, acquire and own property, and hold and administer it in accordance with law. Similarly, article 12(1)–(2) on rights in education prevents discrimination on religious grounds and gives every religious group “the right to establish and maintain institutions for the education of children in its own religion” and also provides that no person shall be required to receive instruction in or to take part in any ceremony or act of worship of a religion other than his own (Groves 1964, 198). Although there is a distinction between political and religious rights, it is possible to argue the latter’s importance limits the operation of democracy. To the extent that the constitution focuses on differences in religious and ethnic identity, it has the effect of modifying individualism inherent in political rights. The model of multiculturalism followed in Malaysia was based on commitment to tolerance and differences of ethnic identity. But eventually the Malaysian constitution has come to privilege religious rights over and above individual rights. Religious rights must be studied next to the privileges for the Malay community under article 153. By making reservations for Malays in public service, scholarships, and grants, and other educational facilities, this article violates the equality and liberty principle inherent in the constitution. This becomes more important where the Malay community is predominantly Islamic. Because Islam is the religion of the federation, the government is able to establish and assist Islamic institutions with money. The problem is that in the long run such practices are bound to undermine the principle of religious freedom for non-Malay Muslim groups, as illustrated in the case of Teoh Eng Huat in 1990.23 Thus the restriction on propagating non-Islamic religions among Muslims and state propaganda of Islamic doctrine are contrary to the spirit of religious pluralism propounded in article 12. For this purpose article 12(2) was amended by the Amendment Act of 1976 to allow the federation or a state “to establish or maintain or assist in establishing or maintaining Islamic institutions or in providing instruction in the religion of Islam and incur such expenditure as may be necessary for the purpose” (Groves 1979, 29).

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Religious rights of communities are given primacy over language and education rights, which I call “cultural rights.” Under the National Language Act of 1967, Malay was declared the national language for official purposes, even though other languages could be taught and learned. The conflict between the right to use language, for example, in education was explored in the controversial case Merdeka University Bhd v. Government of Malaysia (see Chapter 3 for more on this). The Malaysian constitution does not explicitly recognize a concept of cultural rights, but they are implicit in the right to religion under article 12 that allows religious groups to maintain institutions for education. To summarize: one of the distinctive features of contemporary liberal theory is its emphasis on neutrality—the view that the state should not promote any particular conception of the good life but rather should provide a “neutral framework” within which conflicting conceptions of the good life can be pursued and fulfilled.24 And one of the most important principles for justifying neutrality is pluralism and disagreement in social life, which justify liberal neutrality by two arguments. The first links liberalism as a political doctrine to the ideal of freedom. By emphasizing neutrality of states toward conceptions of the good, liberalism emphasizes equal freedom that all persons should pursue for conceptions of the good. The second argument says individuals must work out goals and ideas in life for themselves. Liberals believe that individual autonomy ensures religious freedom and tolerance and that cultural heterogeneity follows from the liberty granted to individuals to pursue their own way of life. The second feature of liberal neutrality is that the state governs public relations between persons and the state but not private relations among individuals. The liberal state deals with religious differences and religious rights by restricting religion to the private sphere, assuming that religious beliefs and cultural practices are a matter of personal belief. Although the Malaysian constitution incorporates the main idea of the liberal juridical model—that uniform laws and rules apply to all citizens equally—it does make an attempt to promote the culture or ideals of any one community. It assumes that equal treatment of all ethnic communities could not be ensured by applying uniform laws to all groups. Thus the constitution questions the ideal of individual autonomy and the principle of a culture-neutral public realm embodied in liberalism. By including special privileges for the Malay community and by granting religious rights on the basis of group rights and not on the basis of individual autonomy, the constitution swerves away from the ideals of classical liberalism. In addition, it does not separate religion and state. On the contrary, it affirms the need for locating religion in community and hence political affairs. There are problems with the neutral-state argument. The proposition that state, morality, or education should be independent of religion has lost

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its meaning today; it carries conceptual dangers of postulating the thesis of the autonomy of the state. It also ignores the fact that every state tends to support particular groups and is unlikely to be neutral in policymaking. Despite these problems, differences between the liberal neutral state and Islamic state remain. The need to uphold the conviction that Islam is din wa dawla (method of combining faith and state politics) implies that it is both religion and state. According to Tibi Bassam, what distinguishes the West from Islam “is that Western civilization has undergone processes of secularization, and in the process has instituted a separation of religion and politics in society” (1998, 201). Furthermore, in secular societies “religion has a social function, but no longer determines the entire character of the social system” (Bassam 1998, 201). My purpose here is to highlight the contradictions that emerge in the Malaysian constitution in its positing rights based upon juridical and universal assumptions whereby citizens are conceived independently of their particularities, and by asserting collective identities via the rights of ethnic groups to their religion. Laudable as these two ideas were at the time of independence, protecting the Malay community meant religious considerations could not be discouraged in the political arena because all Malays by definition were Muslims.25 Like any other developed country, the Malaysian state has undertaken to manage the economy and redistribute wealth to its disadvantaged ethnic group, the Malays, but at the same time it has pursued goals of Islamization. To suggest that state action causes the politicization of religious issues begs the question of why the constitution should provide unequal rights to groups in the first place. For one thing, Islamization by the state has been a function of the mobilization of religious consciousness, especially in the context of a worldwide surge in Islamic militancy, a by-product of the NEP, the rise of disgruntled middle classes, and authoritarianism. This is not to deny that in Malaysia cultural and religious differences are not effaced from public life. But it is also true that attention is paid to the manner in which Islam is represented. In the face of an upsurge in Islam it is not surprising that religion has become a political issue and the secular state contentious.

The Islamic Resurgence Much has been said about Islamization in Malaysia since the 1970s, yet there is no unanimity on this controversial subject. Many factors coalesced to produce an Islamic revival, which began in the early 1970s in response to the triple challenge of multiculturalism within Malaysia, Western values, and modernity. Events in the Muslim world such as the Arab-Israeli War

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(1967), the Arab oil embargo (1973), the Islamization program in Pakistan (1977–1988), and Iran’s Islamic revolution (1978–1979) brought an outpouring of popular Islamic sentiment all over the world. Malay Muslim students who were sent overseas to complete higher education were exposed to the social and cultural crisis that swept societies in the West, which included a general disillusionment with Western society and its values. In the 1970s the NEP was implemented to uplift Malays who as a group were socially, educationally, and economically deprived. The religious movement that followed represented the aspirations of the rising middle class that was alienated by the state’s project of modernity.26 The generic term dakwah is defined as “call” or “invitation” to the faith. Its goal is to revive the spirit, zeal, and devotion of its members. The manifestations of this resurgence can be seen today in the meticulous observance of prayers, fasting, and laws governing personal morality, as well as in government-aided public policies promoting Islam. In everyday life it is manifested in the dress worn by a majority of Malay women—a tele-kung (white praying veil) and hijab (long, loose robe) worn over the Malay baju (dress/shirt). The causes for this resurgence at one level were the culmination of issues and conflicts that went unresolved in the quest for Malay identity—the essential nature of Malayness and the status of Malays in a multicultural society.27 At another level the revival of Islamic religion can be traced to a breakdown of consensus among the ethnic communities in 1969.28 Along with other issues—Malay poverty, corruption—the controversy over language and the education system exacerbated ethnic differences between Malays and the Chinese and culminated in polarization. The broad objective of the NEP was to restructure Malaysian society so that identification of race with economic function would be eliminated; but it also appeased Malay nationalism and its ethnic identity in which Islam plays a major role. The most significant explanation for the revival of Islam is that modernization led to a demand for more equitable development. The interventionist strategies of state capitalism enriched and empowered ruling elites but failed to bring social justice to the masses. Islamic resurgence was a “grass-roots response to a top-down cultural and economic restructuring imposed by authoritarian national elites” (Mehmet 1990, 97). Furthermore, the secularizing tendencies of the modern nation-state were reflected, after the riots of 1969, in an “increasing trend towards materialistic accumulation influenced by this-worldly orientation and premised on the development of power for social and political manipulation” (R.L.M. Lee 1990, 496). There were subtle changes in Malay attitudes toward their culture and lifestyle and a renewed sense of historical tradition and identity. The growth of the Malay middle class was so gradual and so widespread as to be hardly noticeable to the average observer. Paradoxically, the same policies that gave Malay youth opportunities to overcome their backwardness—primarily

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via overseas education—led them to find solace in the Islamic cause. Furthermore, the government’s efforts to create a new class of entrepreneurs and professionals led to Malays’ increased awareness of their identity, rights, and position in society. One feature of this resurgence was its expression in ethnic identity. For Malays, language and culture have been powerful channels for asserting their identity and separateness as indigenous people. By 1982, because of the government’s new policy on education, the medium of instruction in secondary and tertiary institutions was predominantly the Malay language. According to some scholars, Malay language ceased to play the role of a distinguishing identity symbol, because the Malay education system created a new generation of non-Malays who were fluent in the language. Therefore one effect of the religious revival was to project an exclusive identity for the Malays as the “Malay non-Malay” identity gradually became the “Muslim non-Muslim dichotomy” (Zainah Anwar 1987, 82). It is important to understand that the rise of the dakwah movement also represented a religious impulse linked to the spiritual needs of the newly emerging Malay middle class. This is apparent in how Islamic activists questioned Western, secular, and material ideologies and values. They proclaimed an Islamic alternative to the excesses of capitalism and socialism and focused on Islam as a comprehensive way of life, in which religion was integral to politics, state, law, and society.29 An important impetus to Islamic revivalism came from the thousands of Malaysian students who studied at various foreign universities and technical institutes as part of the government’s policy of education for Malays. Increasingly, a large number of educated and urbanized students were exposed to an alien Western environment with its liberal social and moral values and to Islamic developments in other parts of the world. In this context, Islam provided them with a “distinctive language and vocabulary, with shared images, ideas and ideals, and a highly structured world view for them to cling to and to believe in” (Zainah Anwar 1987, 26). Given the integral role of Islam in the Malay worldview, it was not surprising that the students were influenced by the writing and thinking of Islamic activists from other countries and the worldwide resurgence of Islam during the 1979–1980 period.30 In this regard Islamic resurgence was also linked to urbanization following the implementation of the NEP. It drew the Malay masses from their secure rural environments to what were largely non-Malay, non-Muslim cities, where economic disparities were stark. Moreover, life in the city alienated them from their kampung (village) and created a spiritual vacuum that could be fulfilled only by religion. In this predicament, Malays turned to inner renewal and Islam.31 The Islamic resurgence of the 1970s has been given many interpretations, but most scholars agree on two features. First, it was not a monolithic

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movement with any clear program or strategy. In fact it included a multiplicity of organizations with differing philosophies and aims, usually dependent on a charismatic leader.32 Second, the various expressions of dakwah changed the political identity of Malays and redefined the social and political life of all Malaysians and their party formations.33

State, Society, and Islam (1970–1998) The Arabic and religiously educated group in Islamic organizations, and urban youths educated in Malaysia and overseas, were largely responsible for the change in direction for Islam during the 1970s.34 In this section I will review three Islamization campaigns dominated by these groups in the post-1970 period. Among the prominent Islamist organizations to emerge during this period were the Darul Arqam (House of Arqam) and Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM—the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement) and alternative groups that were not so relevant in political terms, including Jemaah Tabligh (Lecture Group) and the Jemaah Islah Malaysia (Malaysian Muslim Reform Movement).35 The activities of Darul Arqam and ABIM are described to examine two different kinds of responses by the state to popular support for Islam. In the late 1970s a tacit alliance between ABIM and the main Islamist party, PAS, gave the resurgence greater political momentum. I trace the rise of PAS from that period to its role as a major political force in mainstream politics in 1999. Darul Arqam Founded in 1968 by Ashaari Muhammad, a government religious teacher, Darul Arqam professed its aim was to set up an Islamic society. This implied adhering to Islamic principles and ideals in the policies and activities of the organization and in the personal behavior and actions of members. The group believed in eliminating “elements of jahiliyah [ignorance] in Malay society” and the creation of “a society based on revealed religion” (Abu Bakar 1981, 1049). From its inception, the organization was critical of the government’s limited focus on Islamic education and teachings. Darul Arqam sought to rectify this by establishing a model of Islamic communities with their own madrasah (school), clinic, mosque, and shopping center. In this model society, courses in quranic exegesis, theology, and jurisprudence were held to educate people about the need for implementing Islamic law. The movement aimed to develop business enterprises in a manner consistent with Islamic principles and independent of Chinese and foreign control. In putting some of

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these ideas into practice, it succeeded in developing and managing various educational, social, and economic projects in the Islamic way. It achieved noteworthy success in its dakwah work by furthering Islamic learning among its members and by holding mass meetings for government servants and primary teachers.36 In the early 1980s its leader left the country and went into self-imposed exile in Thailand. Darul Arqam became a wealthy organization with international branches. It had by that time set up around forty-eight communities in Malaysia, including schools, medical clinics, and shopping centers. Although public servants had been prevented from joining the sect in 1990, Darul Arqam claimed a following of around 7,000 employees in the federal government.37 To meet the challenge of the growing popularity of the organization and its leader, the government initiated a campaign against them: it accused Ashaari of training holy warriors in Thailand and of mistreating female members of the sect. Soon after, it banned Darul Arqam in 1994 for illegal activities and labeled it a deviationist cult. The leader and some of his followers were deported from Thailand and detained under Malaysia’s Internal Security Act. Later in the year they made a public confession on national television, and the sect was eventually disbanded. According to some observers, the central issue in the determined stand against Darul Arqam by the local ulama (religious scholars) and government was Ashaari’s Sufi teachings, which were deemed “contradictory to Muslims aqidah [beliefs] where it put a person on an equal status to that of a prophet” (Kamarulnizam Abdullah 1999, 272). However, others alleged that the ban was not only theological but also political in nature. Opposition parties maintained that the government was suppressing Islamic missionary work in Malaysia for political reasons (see Kamarulnizam Abdullah 1999, 273). Darul Arqam had earned the wrath of both the government and other religious organizations, including the Department of Islamic Development, by making criticisms and remarks that provoked the latter to discredit the movement. When it was banned in 1994, Darul Arqam’s sprawling business empire had assets estimated at 300 million ringgit. Its foreign interests were not so affected by the ban, but its domestic business was disrupted as followers disbanded and outlets and products were denied use of the familiar logo. Businesses included herbal cosmetics, restaurant and catering chains, supermarket and minimart chains, audio-video production, and information technology. Today, many years after it was banned, the remnants of the former movement have made a fresh start in Rawang, twenty kilometers from Kuala Lumpur. Ashaari and his four wives, thirty-seven children, and more than 140 grandchildren are prominent members of the new township. Ashaari

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reportedly suffers from a nerve disorder that has impeded his speech. However, he is a central and powerful figure in the community and is still addressed reverently as abuyah (father of all).38 Former key followers have begun new business enterprises under a company named Rufaqa Corporation Sdn Bhd. They live unobtrusively in the close-knit Rawang community and concentrate on business and commerce. Religious doctrines have changed little and polygamy is practiced. Involving members in the business and providing them with free medical care, housing, and schooling encourage the communal lifestyle. The community and its work are closely monitored by the authorities, who are concerned that it may be a cloaked attempt to revive the former movement, even though Ashaari, in a company statement, asserted that Rufaqa “is never intended to revive Arqam”; instead its main aim “is to build an Islamic way of life through business.”39 The Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement Another successful movement that finally lost momentum due to being coopted by the government was also the most politically effective during this period: ABIM. In 1971–1972 ABIM was launched to provide an organizational platform for young Muslim graduates to spread Islam and revitalize the Muslim community in Malaysia. Composed of young, Western-educated members of the middle class who turned to Islam as a modern religiouscultural alternative to Westernization and the conservative Islam of the older generation, it believed that “Islam offered an indigenous, authentic identity and way of life that combined concern for religious ritual with social and economic reform” (Esposito and Voll 1996, 130). To study Islam ABIM formed study groups, ran orientation programs, conducted seminars, and undertook community projects. It was involved with the translation and distribution of “the writings of international activists such as Egypt’s Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, and Pakistan’s Mawlana Maududi into Malay” that gave rise to an Islamically informed Malay nationalism (Esposito and Voll 1996, 132). Anwar Ibrahim emerged as the charismatic leader of ABIM. Once a student in the Malay Studies Department, president of the University of Malaya Malay Language Society, and president of the National Union of Malaysian Muslim Students, he was involved in the two most influential Malay-based student societies that led the campus campaign against the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman.40 Anwar was a powerful speaker with strong organizational skills that were evident when ABIM swept student elections in 1974, then rose to the height of its power, which included an alliance with PAS. Zainah Anwar summarizes ABIM’s role as the first wave in the Islamic revivalism movement:

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It was progressive in appeal. It did not see Islam in the black and white manner that the later dakwah adherents did. While it was critical of the government and of government policies that it considered unjust and oppressive, it never vociferously called for the creation of an Islamic state. It believed in Islamising the umma first along a gradual, moderate and progressive path. (Zainah Anwar 1987, 24)

Another significant aspect of this movement was that it remained consistent on three fronts: in its recognition that Malaysia would continue to be a multiethnic and multireligious state; in denouncing corruption, poverty, and unequal distribution of wealth; and in acknowledging the need for greater political freedom and respect for human rights. This was clear in ABIM’s critique of narrow expressions of Malay nationalism and Islam, in particular the UMNO-dominated government’s promotion of a bumiputra policy. Anwar denounced discrimination because it is “contradictory to the Islamic call to unite different communities.”41 On all these fronts he advocated the need for building a democratic, multicultural civil society and the rule of law; these were key elements in his brand of constitutional politics, a sharp contrast to contemporary traditionalist Islamist discourse in Malaysia. Almost a decade later Anwar (1996b) would point out the need for discovering sources for an Asian renaissance. He drew on the multicultural approach exemplified in the lives of men such as Jose Rizal, Mohamad Iqbal, and Rabindranath Tagore to argue that Asian countries must have the political will to sustain economic growth guided by moral ideals. The Asian worldview, Anwar argued, would shape civil society at its own pace with historical experiences and cultural diversity. The organizing principle of this social compact was justice and the rule of law. He deplored the fact that some societies making rapid strides in economic and social development had “not achieved a comparable progress in building the institutions of civil society, particularly in the realm of justice and good governance” (Anwar 1996a, 62). Anwar outlined the main features of a civil society he envisaged for Asia. First, the creation of civil society will be a gradual process in tune with preservation of a social order and discipline. Second, civil society will be based on moral principles that include the concept of man as a moral being with a transcendent dimension. But in order for civic organizations to develop there was a need to “retrieve, revive, reinvigorate the spirit of liberty, individualism, humanism and tolerance in society” (Anwar Ibrahim 1996a, 51).42 Third, unlike the vision of civil society that derives from the social philosophy of Enlightenment, the Asian vision sees religion and civil society as intrinsically compatible with the other’s ideals. Finally, the Asian world’s intellectual sources will shape civil society. These sources will be derived from a concept of moral man endowed with inalienable rights and a set of individual responsibilities “to God, to family, to fellow humans and to nature” (Anwar Ibrahim 1996a, 51).

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Back in the 1980s, sensing the changing mood, Mahathir invited Anwar Ibrahim to join his government. Viewed as one of the biggest coups ever achieved by the UMNO-led government, this move managed to split the Islamist opposition.43 Although Anwar’s acceptance surprised and disappointed many people within ABIM, others believed that he had decided to work for the Islamization of society from within government. He silenced many critics by rising steadily within UMNO as the party’s youth president, vice president, and then upward through several cabinet positions: minister of youth, of sports and culture, of agriculture, of education, and, finally, minister of finance and deputy prime minister, where he stayed until his removal in 1998. Under Anwar’s influence the government adopted an Islamization policy, established an Islamic Bank, and established an Islamic university along with research centers and museums. Anwar’s defenders said that ABIM’s strategy was to infiltrate UMNO and work from within the government to Islamize the country. Anwar himself said publicly that he would not abandon the principles and ideals for which he had fought. But once Anwar left, ABIM suffered a credibility problem among the dakwah, and many of its members gradually joined PAS. Parti Islam SeMalaysia PAS is Malaysia’s oldest and largest Islamic party. Its origins can be traced to the UMNO bureau of religious affairs in the 1950s when a radical group of religious leaders broke away from UMNO to form their own organization under the leadership of Haji Ahmad Fuad bin Hassan. But it was only under the radical nationalist and Islamist thinker Dr. Burhanuddin Al-Helm, who became president of PAS at its fifth conference in December 1956, that the party gained ideological cohesion and achieved status as a national party. With support in the rural areas and in the conservative ulama throughout this period, its main objective was the pursuit of the goal of a Melayu Raya (Greater Malaya), which was primarily to translate as a land of Muslims. PAS was perceived as a party that fought for Malay dominance and whose main objective was to implement the ideals of Islamic religion and political democracy.44 Between 1970 and 1982, PAS, then under the leadership of Haji Mohamad Asri, was persuaded by Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak to join the ruling BN coalition. PAS was a component party of BN for around five years (1973–1978). During this period there were differences within the leadership of PAS regarding corruption and abuse of power in Kelantan. The crisis culminated when the federal government declared a state of emergency in Kelantan, which was lifted in 1978. By the time Haji Mohamad Asri stepped down in 1982, significant changes had already taken place in PAS due to the alliance with ABIM. By

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1982 a new generation of Islamist leaders infiltrated the party from ABIM, initially led by Anwar Ibrahim, and took over. When Anwar joined UMNO after Mahathir became prime minister, many more ABIM members became disillusioned, and they joined the ranks of PAS. The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the transformation and radicalization of PAS politics under a new group of leaders like Nik Aziz Nik Mat, Fadzil Mohamed Noor, and Haji Abdul Hadi Awang. In addition, PAS became more confrontative and intransigent as more militant activists, some of whom were graduates of Islamic universities in the Middle East, “pressured the PAS leadership to adopt a purer, more systematic Islamic stance” and focused on “organization, cadre training and political action in order to create an Islamic republic, as had occurred in Iran” (Esposito and Voll 1996, 134). During this period PAS for the first time declared its stand as an Islamic party with the objective of creating an Islamic state. Although PAS governed the northern states of Kelantan and Terengganu for some years during the 1950s and 1960s, its major offensive against UMNO started in the 1990 elections when it formed a coalition under the name Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (APU, Muslim Unity Front). The coalition swept the polls, winning thirty-nine state assembly seats and all seven parliamentary seats in Kelantan. With the support of Semangat 46 (Spirit of ’46), a UMNO breakaway group led by Tengku Razaleigh, it also won several seats in Terengganu. Over the years the party has evolved ideologically and organizationally. It is made up of a new group of religious leaders whose rhetoric reflects the changing times and mood of the people. Unlike the earlier focus on Malay nationalism, the new leaders have adopted a more Islamic stance in politics and developed the party as a vehicle for political activism.45 In the 1999 elections PAS challenged the UMNO-led coalition government and the state apparatus on the grounds that they were secular, un-Islamic, and working in league with Western and Zionist interests.46 During political campaigns in the last decade party leaders exhorted the people to use their votes as part of a jihad (holy war) to remove the UMNO-led government. Since then, PAS has chosen to wage its ideological and political struggles in the terrain of culture, radically altering the everyday life of people in the states of Kelantan and Terengganu. Its activities are geared toward rebuilding and strengthening its power base and expanding its cultural-political constituency. The party focuses on a host of activities, including the sponsorship of religious colleges and schools. Its deliberate patronage of Islamic educational, legal, and financial institutions; application of Islamic principles of governance; and promotion of Islamic dress and cultural mores reinforce cultural symbols associated with the Malay-Muslim community. Indeed, to a large extent PAS has managed to identify Islam with the Malay community. This differs from the early years

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of independence when Malayness derived largely from ethnic identity. Consequently, PAS has contributed to changes in Malay political identity by defining it as a religious community in a multiracial society. Moreover, the code of public morality raised by PAS contributes to solidifying the institutional and cultural bases of its support because Islam, unlike liberal politics, makes no distinction between the public and private spheres. By condemning the UMNO elite as leading a decadent lifestyle, PAS leadership is able to raise questions of public morality and penetrate the public and private spheres.47 State Policy Toward Islam Although inspired by developments in the Middle East in the 1970s, the path of Islamization followed by Mahathir should be distinguished from the path followed by governments in Egypt and Libya. His policy has been to co-opt the values of Islam in the government in order to grant it legitimacy and even use it for developing more disciplined work ethics.48 Despite the dissimilarities, there are common features because all these governments attempted a selective revival of certain features of Islamic programs. Broadly, it was a strategic measure, a concession to groups demanding Islamization in hopes of relegating Islam to a marginal role in politics. By contrast, in Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan the philosophies shaping the government programs reflected a more fundamentalist outlook, including a theocratic model of government in which clerics played a dominant role in all spheres. Thus it should be clear that Islam has been invoked in Malaysia for several reasons, but it has also performed an instrumental role as an ideology to give legitimacy to government. In the 1980s Mahathir, along with other UMNO leaders, decided to meet the challenge of Islam by simply coopting influential opponents, opposition parties, and their ideas into government. He did this by publicly supporting the development of Islam, as well as by launching policies to counter the rising popularity of PAS in rural areas. The government took symbolic measures that included building more mosques, daily broadcasts of azan (Muslim call to prayer) over radio and television, and giving UMNO leaders a high public profile in Islamic activities and festivals. Previously viewed as a secular party dedicated to development, UMNO was now trying to portray itself as “Malaysia’s oldest and the world’s third largest Islamic party” (Milne and Mauzy 1986, 90). The government combined modernization with spiritual regeneration in the form of the Look East policy and strengthened its relationship with other Islamic countries. In retrospect, the move to co-opt Anwar assisted UMNO in its claim to be the only party that could project the interests of the Muslim Malay

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community. According to noted scholar Farish Noor, the presence of Anwar “gave the policies of the government much of its Islamist credentials” (Farish Noor 1999b, 3). He argues that as long as Anwar was in the cabinet, policies that the government pursued were somehow regarded to be Islamically correct and thus acceptable. In this context, Anwar’s role in endorsing many state campaigns against Islamist opposition movements, like the Darul Arqam, was quite crucial: Anwar’s presence in the government gave legitimacy to UMNO that it was lacking earlier; and it gave them an opportunity to use him to contain the challenge of Islamists. Although it cannot be denied that Mahathir’s government wanted to impose its own brand of Islam that was progressive and rational in outlook, the problem was that his policy, which proceeded as a by-product of the resurgence, led to Islam becoming an essential part of the discourse of political parties, cult groups, and alternative movements. And because Mahathir was also intolerant of political criticism, his policy entailed the eventual defeat of secular and liberal forces that were disposed to resist fundamentalism.49

Islam, Reformasi, and Civil Society During the late 1990s, Malaysian society faced a new set of challenges following the Asian economic crisis, globalization, and the revival of cultural politics.50 The contemporaneous revival of Islamic principles and ideals did not imply that Islam submerged other components of Malay identity, namely, Malay ethnicity and nationalism. Nevertheless, the resurgence of Islamic values and state policy toward Islam gave rise to a more heightened religious consciousness in everyday life within the Malay community. The UMNO-led government responded to this revival by supporting the social policy of Islamization. In politics, the resurgence of Islamic groups and ideas in the so-called realm of civil society compelled the government, and UMNO in particular, to assume an Islamic veneer and to incorporate varying Islamic elements in its programs. This propelled Islam to the center stage of politics, where demands rapidly increased. These demands made clear that Islam should not be read in instrumental terms but as a comprehensive system of values that should encompass all spheres of human activity. These demands reached a crescendo and adopted a different form in the midst of one of the most dramatic events in Malaysian history—the dismissal of Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim from government. The dismissal of Anwar brought to the fore the dichotomy between the religious and secular streams in party formation, illuminating the political disagreements and fragmentations present within the Malay community. By displacing Anwar, UMNO lost its claim to being Islamic, and the state lost

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its legitimacy in addressing the spiritual needs of its Malay constituency. Finally, these gathering forces culminated in the reformasi—the clarion call to resurrect the forces of civil society. The Anwar Crisis and General Elections of 1999 In the late 1990s Malaysia faced social unrest and political turmoil. For many people the unrest was similar to an event that happened more than a decade before, in October 1987—Operasi Lalang (Operation Lalang), a struggle for power among elements of the governing elite. This time it was a battle between Mahathir and Anwar Ibrahim for control over UMNO and the government.51 At one level, this appeared as just another fight for succession. After all, Anwar had served in Mahathir’s government for sixteen years with little sign of pushing his radical agenda of Islamization. Keenly involved with the succession of Mahathir, UMNO was deeply divided in 1993, when Anwar, along with his Vision Team, challenged the UMNO deputy president and deputy prime minister, Ghafar Baba. The latter was eventually defeated by a huge margin in the party’s general assembly (see Chapter 5). The recent crisis was triggered by the expulsion of Anwar, due to differences on economic policy, as deputy prime minister and finance minister on 2 September 1998. This was followed by the removal of Anwar, a day later, from his post as UMNO deputy president. On 20 September Anwar led a rally of some 50,000 people outside the national mosque, calling for Mahathir to resign.52 That same night, commandos stormed his house and arrested him. Subsequently, he was accused of sexual offenses, corruption, and abuse of the legal system. Initially detained under the infamous Internal Security Act (ISA), he was assaulted by a senior police officer while in custody and was denied medical attention for five days.53 Later Anwar alleged that he was also poisoned.54 On 14 April 1999 Anwar’s first trial ended when he was found guilty on corruption charges and sentenced to six years in prison. Near the time of the announcement of general elections to be held in November, Anwar’s second trial, on sodomy charges, was suspended. During his defense, Anwar began revealing an alleged conspiracy at the highest level of government to frame him because he had halted many projects, including the controversial Bakun Dam.55 He also maintained that his persecution illustrated Mahathir’s willingness to abuse state institutions to retain personal power. The government did not want him or the trial to be in the spotlight during the upcoming election campaign. There was also a new mood among the people, questioning the ways in which the political process was being controlled. Following Anwar’s arrest, supporters and sympathizers took to the streets in reformasi demonstrations.

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Marking the first anniversary of Anwar’s arrest, Parti Keadilan Nasional (National Justice Party), chanting “Reformasi!” pledged to continue the struggle, dubbed Sumpah Keramat (Sacred Declaration). Consequently, the vice president and the youth chief of Keadilan were arrested for alleged involvement in a calm gathering of more than 10,000 supporters (L. Charles and Khoo 1999). Anwar’s trial on corruption charges, and the overlapping inquiry into his beating and poisoning while in custody, undermined the credibility of Malaysian institutions, especially the police force, judiciary, and the election commission. In this atmosphere and in the run-up to the elections, UMNO leaders realized they could no longer claim to represent the aspirations of the Muslim majority. They used all their resources, including extensive advertisements in the print and electronic media, to defeat the opposition. Most of the full-page advertisements were blunt, nasty, and aggressive. Some depicted the violence that took place during the reformasi demonstrations. The opposition reacted with endless name-calling in which Mahathir was compared to a cruel pharaoh (Wong Chun Wai 1999b).56 In the general elections held on 29 November 1999, the BN defeated the opposition, called Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Coalition, BA), which included the PAS; Keadilan, led by Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, Anwar’s wife; the mainly Chinese DAP; and the socialist-oriented PRM. Despite their differences, the opposition united to promise change and a “just” and “democratic” Malaysia by abolishing “oppression, corruption, cronyism and nepotism.”57 The BN won 148 out of 193 parliamentary seats, winning a two-thirds majority in parliament. In seven states, the BN made a clean sweep of the parliamentary constituencies; the opposition won in two states. The BN showing among racially mixed constituencies again showed its strength among the non-bumiputra community. Overall the BN received around 56 percent of the popular vote, less than the 65 percent they won in 1995. UMNO’s parliament members were reduced from ninety-four to seventytwo. Losses were in the northern Malay-dominated states of Terengganu and Kelantan, where PAS made inroads. Among the opposition parties, the seven-month-old Keadilan suffered. It contested sixty-three parliamentary seats and won only five. The party’s president, Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, won by more than 7,000 votes in Permatang Pauh, also the home base of her husband, Anwar Ibrahim, who had held the seat for four terms.58 PAS emerged as the biggest winner, increasing its seven parliamentary seats to twenty-seven. For the first time in thirty years, the leader of the opposition in the new parliament was PAS. The party swept the seven parliamentary seats in Terengganu and twenty-eight out of its thirty-two state assembly seats. Even Mahathir, considered invincible in Kubang Pasu, Kedah, his constituency since 1974, received fewer votes than in 1995. In

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Kedah, Mahathir’s home state, the BN fared its worst in years, losing seats in the state assembly and parliamentary seats. Therefore, even though the BN regained political power, PAS emerged with a moral victory in these elections. It was the major opposition party in the government and the party that gained the maximum number of seats, twenty-seven parliamentary and ninety-eight state assembly seats, within the opposition. The questions that arise are: What are the effects of reformasi on party formations and Malay society? Will these changes lead to any meaningful step toward democracy? The short-term effects might not be democratic because of the continuity in administration and leadership at the national level. For example, in early 2000 many opposition leaders were arrested. The PAS’s official newspaper, Harakah, was reduced from eight issues per month to two. The weekly tabloid Exclusif and monthly teen magazine Al-Wasilah were banned.59 But in the long run, the articulation of public opinion and expansion in the participatory base of electoral democracy that were witnessed in the 1999 elections are bound to bring results. The impact of the Anwar crisis and the reformasi that followed it changed the relation between state and civil society in three ways. First, the election campaign and reformasi demonstrations showed that while people understood that this was another power struggle among the political elites, differences arose regarding the approach toward politics. There was a general feeling among the people that certain principles and institutions of Malaysian society had been undermined both in the government’s handling of Anwar and in the way BN, and especially Mahathir, had consolidated power. The expulsion of Anwar galvanized the people against Mahathir’s authoritarian personal rule and the UMNO. Therefore the 1999 elections signaled a transition to a different political terrain in which political dissent was organized in party formations; this could lead to the gradual evolution of a more competitive party system. It may also give rise to a competitive party system based on intraracial issues like justice, good governance, transparency in government, and economic management that could influence the voters’ choice in the next elections. Although Mahathir had contributed much to national development and elevated Malaysia to a respected member among developed countries, he also consolidated personal power, protected cronies, and expanded the powers of the executive. Increasing powers in the hands of the executive diminished the space within which individual freedom and civil society could flourish. Besides, the uncritical attitude of the government-backed media had rendered Malaysia being a “semi-democracy” or “quasi-democracy” as deeply flawed and contestable. In addition, Mahathir had miscalculated the personal appeal of Anwar. Unlike his former foes within UMNO, whom he vanquished quite admirably,

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Mahathir forgot that by sacking Anwar he had sent him back to his former constituency—the urban youth and professionals—among whom he had made his mark as a student leader back in the 1970s and 1980s. In an effort to kill any prospect of Anwar succeeding him, Mahathir inflicted heavy damage on his own popularity; by imprisoning and humiliating Anwar, Mahathir made him a martyr and symbol of change to Malaysians. Finally, the presence of Anwar in the government had given credence to UMNO’s claim as being committed to Islam. After his departure these claims lost credibility. Mahathir’s sacking of Anwar gave rise to a wave of accusations of corruption and of his being un-Islamic and autocratic. All this contrasted with the image of the former deputy, who was depicted as a pious Muslim committed to the cause of social justice. Meanwhile, the loss of Anwar meant that PAS could enter mainstream politics and claim the political constituency of the Malays; while appealing against authoritarianism, corrupt development policies, and the crass materialism of UMNO, PAS could aspire to political power at the national level in the next general elections. Problems of Islamization Today the UMNO-led federal government and PAS are pursuing their own models of Islamization in order to outdo one another. Given that Islam is inextricably intertwined with Malay identity, the contest to win over the Malay constituency can be seen in the way UMNO and PAS, once again, after the 1999 elections, are vying to become the standard-bearer for the Muslim faith. The results of the 1999 elections brought pressure on UMNO to embrace PAS’s goal of an Islamic nation—something UMNO had done in the past after Anwar was co-opted by the ruling party in 1982. UMNO is trying to look more Islamic because it has come to the conclusion that PAS gained ground because of its Islamic credentials. Meanwhile, PAS’s economic critique of the uneven development achieved by UMNO has appeal among the people. Instead of the earlier emphasis on morality and values of Islamic law and Malay nationalism, PAS is unequivocal in rejecting nationalism and stresses its commitment to an “authentic” Islam. Gradually the leaders of PAS are transforming sociocultural life in the northern states it governs, introducing legal and social reforms under a new leadership according to Islamic principles and politics.60 The question that arises is this: What impact will PAS control of Kelantan and Terengganu have on Malay society when Islamic consciousness within the Malay community is already more pervasive than in any other period in history? Soon after Haji Abdul Hadi Awang of the PAS took over as the chief minister of Terengganu, he attempted to show how an Islamic party’s appeal derived from the ability to present sectional interests in a morally sanctioned

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fashion. He proposed a series of legal directives designed to set into motion the process of a religious rather than a properly ethnic identification, undergirding an impatient groping for a pan-Islamic identity. These legal reforms included imposing kharaj (special Islamic taxes) on non-Muslims and a new law that defines a dress code for Muslim women in the public sphere. Meanwhile, in neighboring Kelantan the chief minister, Nik Aziz Nik Mat, proposed to introduce legal reforms in the spirit of the shari’a. The government has already stopped issuing gambling licenses; banned modern and traditional cultural practices like rock concerts, stage shows, concerts, and fashion shows within hotels; and issued directions for Muslim women to wear the tudung (cover, head scarf) in public. In an effort to better PAS, the federal government introduced Islamic measures after the 1999 elections, including the creation of the National Islamic Action Council, which coordinates the activity of explaining Islam to the people, and the Malaysian Islamic Welfare Council, consisting of about eighty NGOs involved in Muslim activities. It also introduced compulsory religious classes for government workers and launched a new UMNO monthly called Al-Haq (The Truth). The UMNO government in Johor has introduced new shari’a laws covering such offenses as sodomy, prostitution, premarital sex, and lesbianism; Perlis passed measures to punish “deviationism,” with penalties being up to a year in reeducation centers.61 Despite these measures, the reformasi that followed the Anwar crisis has no doubt fortified PAS’s Islamic platform and convictions, but PAS still needs to clarify, first, that it aims to set up an Islamic state, and second, that it views all non-Muslim communities equally.62 Several ideological formulations of the shari’a have been proposed by PAS since 1990 in order to consolidate its own power and unseat UMNO. In most cases it has stressed honest government, accountability of public officials, and social justice while expanding religious instruction in public schools. Many scholars see PAS’s rule as providing opportunities for transforming Malay political culture. Uncritical acceptance of state authority, unquestioning loyalty to leaders, and ostentatious living by the UMNO elite have been questioned by PAS leaders. It is argued that these feudal traditions and habits would be diluted with time and give rise to a new political culture.63 The main problem is that PAS is trying to transform the shari’a, which is a body of legal rules for governing the polity, into a political ideology for reorganizing society. The shari’a was constructed by jurists around A.D. 750, more than a century after the death of the Prophet. In order to understand how Islamic tradition is evolving in contemporary forms in Malaysia, it is not enough to simply analyze Islamic tradition in its historical form as some sort of static body of knowledge. Islamic tradition has been evolving for centuries and been given various dynamic interpretations according to the historical

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context. The diversity of legal schools, techniques, and rules within Islam always allowed explicit protective status for Christians and Jews. Instead of bridging scriptural respect for other religious persuasions, PAS is trying to enforce the model of an Islamic state by implementing the principles of shari’a within a modern legal system. The transformation is based on a selective revival of certain features of the shari’a that fit the immediate political cause. However, the shari’a accords strictly defined but unequal rights to categories of people classified by religion and gender. Thus in this conversion the shari’a has become simplified and politicized, especially on the matter of converting the hudud penal code into laws. There are two main difficulties with this approach. First, the current demand for implementing historical formulations of the shari’a through a legislative program is misconceived because it converts Islamic texts in a literal manner into codes of positive law for all religious communities. In the current context, such ideological formulations of the shari’a could be seen as a commitment to reinforcing patriarchal values of the family, imposing discriminatory restrictions on religious minorities, and curbing freedom of Muslim dissidents. These Islamic programs are exclusivist by nature because they are accompanied by censorship policies directed at silencing Muslim dissidents who are condemned as kafirs (infidels) or hypocrites. Although in their formulations shari’a laws are directed against crimes like theft, fornication, and use of alcohol, Islam is also presented as the rationale for prohibiting abortion and restricting women’s participation from the public sphere (examples include standing for elections, competitive sports, and coeducational schools). After all, PAS is interested not only in maintaining law and order but also establishing public virtue: adultery, drinking, gambling, obscene literature, and vulgar songs have been banned. Second, in light of Malaysia’s multicultural society, PAS’s aim of setting up an Islamic state is bound to create problems in alliances with other parties. In the 1999 election, the biggest problem facing the alternative coalition was agreeing to a collective manifesto. After months of interparty bargaining it agreed on many aspects, but PAS issued separate manifestos for Kelantan and Terengganu. Moreover, while the concept of an Islamic state has been a boon for PAS in the last elections, in which it competed with UMNO for the Muslim vote, it has set back the party among nonMuslims.64 PAS is now moving toward constituencies that have substantial non-Malay voters. The opening of the party to non-Muslims could change the perception of it being a traditionalist-fundamentalist party. At the same time, such a move could dilute PAS’s image as an Islamic party, which to some degree has given it the edge over UMNO. This dilemma was resolved for the time being when the party rejected the proposal in the forty-sixth muktamar (general assembly).65

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Today there is support for some of the broader PAS goals, especially among rural Malays in Kelantan and Terengganu; but the party is evasive and vague about the specifics of an Islamic state.66 Any revelation of details might weaken its position and undermine its popularity. Implementing an Islamic state, along with a constitution and laws, means that clerics will play a dominant role in all spheres of life. Moreover, it will have to constantly contend with the borrowed ideals of liberal democratic principles of the Malaysian constitution. The growing popularity of PAS among Malays lies in its appeal to the idea of an authentic Islam—a comprehensive system of values that encompass all spheres of social, cultural, economic, and political activity. The success of its religious appeal lies in presenting the party as the vehicle of a popular (i.e., Malay Muslim) will while casting UMNO into the role of a protector of un-Islamic interests. Its increasing role in politics lies also in the way its program was linked to the democratic movement associated with the sacking of Anwar Ibrahim and in the way it is being used to contest an authoritarian state under Mahathir. Although the increase in its popularity has proceeded as a by-product of the Islamic resurgence and authoritarianism—a regime intolerant of criticism that harasses its foes—the Islamists’ claim for a genuine divine project has paved the way for greater Islamization of Malay society in both appearance and form. This is evident in the growing number of cult groups in Malaysia. A well-organized arms heist by the members of the Al-Ma’unah group (Brotherhood of Inner Peace) in northwestern Perak highlighted the dangers of how religion can be used and manipulated. Al-Ma’unah was registered as a society in 1998, and its website reports that it teaches martial arts and Islamic traditional medicine. After a tragic hostage crisis, the leader of the group, Mohamed Amin Mohamed Razali, along with his followers, were arrested and tried for treason. Although they were branded as Muslim “deviationists” and “militants,” many observers see this incident as an outcome of the Islamic revivalism in this country.67 The changing character of PAS became more evident during the U.S. war in Afghanistan. After the 11 September attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., the Malaysian government pledged its support for U.S. investigations yet criticized the attacks. In this way the ruling party gained support for its crackdown on Islamic militants, and Mahathir alerted the people to the dangers of religious extremism. These Islamic militants, five of whom were teachers in religious schools, were accused of involvement with the Malaysian Mujahideen Group and arrested under ISA, which allows detention without trial. In turn PAS accused the government of making political hay out of the September incident. But PAS only fueled the fears of Islamic radicalism by claiming that Muslims wanting to show solidarity against the U.S.-led strikes should be allowed to travel to Afghanistan.68

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Officials within the party clarified that they have endorsed calls for a jihad in Afghanistan but only in terms of aid, financial support, and prayers. Thus it follows that there is a need to reveal the complex nature of the PAS arguments following from its aims to establish an Islamic state and to treat all communities equally. The arguments are deeply flawed and impossible in practice in Malaysia today. However, like all religious traditions, Islam has many conceptual and ideological resources for democracy that need to be explored; by revising key political concepts or by defining and reinterpreting Islamic principles in a more flexible manner, there is greater possibility of involving all citizens of society (see Chapter 6). The overlap between religion and state forestalls any judicial and legislative autonomy needed for a multicultural democracy. Thus appropriate distance between the two could be a way out of this impasse. Unfortunately, fearful of radical changes that might disturb the status quo, the government under Mahathir has either encouraged the Islamization of society or suppressed Islamic movements and parties in their attempt to gain legitimacy. Either way these reactions strengthen the hands of the Islamists. Entrenched in political power, Mahathir might create an Islamist peril and use it, even as other threats loom larger, like challenges from within UMNO. He might encourage or co-opt according to his agenda, for he has been instrumental in creating the environment in which Islamism grew and flourished, as well as the environment in which corruption, nepotism, and gross disparities of wealth have multiplied. Mahathir has been able to gain the support of elites within the governing coalition for this task. However, today the challenge comes from the expanding boundaries of civil society. Mahathir can rely on coercion, subtle control strategies, negative comments, economic prosperity, and nationalist sentiments, but he can never heal the wounds to the Malay identity opened by the Anwar crisis. Let me summarize: it is evident that during and after the colonial period, and in modern Malaysia, different kinds of protest are interwoven with Islam and modernity. The relationship between ethnic nationalism and Islam has been redefined, giving rise to a fluid Malay identity. Thus the religious appeals of PAS cannot be neatly separated from its political appeals. For practical purposes we may distinguish four levels of the role that religion plays in Malaysia. The first is the functional level, where Islam, like any other religion, can be used to mobilize believers for aims derived from an external source. In this way Islam is a part of the political protest, for instance, as a defense against colonialism, for the protection of the rights of sultans, and, under reformasi, as a demand for civil society. The second is the cultural level, where there may be forms of indigenous protest or interpretations within the Muslim community, in particular by specific religious groups and religious sectors, like the Darul Arqam and ABIM, or protests linked to an external enemy for worldwide Islam. The third is the

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spiritual level in which the specific norms and values of Islam are asserted to protest against religious deprivation. The fourth is the ideological power of Islam used for instrumental or political purposes by the state and political leaders in seeking legitimacy in their task for nation-building. I have argued that the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia is more than a religious ideology; it is articulated at the functional, cultural, and spiritual levels in civil society. It performs an integrative function by laying down a bond of unity among different classes in the Malay community. In the 1990s the Anwar episode became a crisis because it brought forth troubling questions about the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, and the professionalism of the police. In the movement for reformasi there was a clamor for social justice and reform, along lines not always resembling ethnic or religious boundaries. Much of the public discourse in this period can be understood as a reaction against modernity and authoritarianism: uneven economic growth, Western values, and political and social injustice. In short, uneven economic growth accelerated the social forces for creating an autonomous civil society; by alienating many sections of the Malay community the state served only to activate them on a new platform. Reformasi brought into the political process many NGOs, students, new Malay businesspeople, and professionals from all communities—Malay, Chinese, Indian. Islam enabled many mainstream Malays, not associated with PAS but from UMNO, most of whom were disenchanted with Mahathir for various reasons, to fraternize with the PAS and the other opposition parties. Although PAS has bolstered its following after the Anwar crisis, its grassroots support does not indicate it will be voted into power in the near future.69 Insofar as PAS accepts the universal values of Islam, it always has to seek quranic justification. But there is an evolution of thinking found in the younger generation and non-Malay communities in Malaysia, that is, a concern for democracy, pluralism, human rights, and religious tolerance. By and large PAS might find it difficult to propose ideological purity of the universal values of the Quran in such a context in the future.

Conclusion Unlike the West and other third world countries that have seen a rise in social movements, Malaysia has seen very weak union, youth, women’s, and community movements because all social and political participation falls under state control. From our standpoint, recent developments, most notably the dakwah movement in the 1970s and the development of new social and political forces under the reformasi, mark a transition to a more active civil society. A good case can be made that the rapid expansion of autonomous associations and citizen participation provides telling testimony: the Malaysian

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people have a strong commitment to democracy, and conditions are ripe for the emergence of a more confident civil society. I would argue that even though the tone of recent protest is mostly religious in the way the people congregate in large numbers in the mosques and increase the following of the PAS, the development of new social and political forces under the reformasi improves prospects for a viable democracy. The reformulations of religion and nationalism have expanded the public space by weakening existing ethnic-based associations and encouraging new solidarities. But there are problems. There are two conceptions of civil society, one associated with participatory democracy, the other focusing on a rights-based civil society (see Chapter 1). Many analysts of politics in Malaysia have focused on the gathering forces of change under the term civil society.70 Within the Malaysian context this coming-together of diverse organizations and community structures under the rubric of civil society poses a special problem. Although it is tempting to restrict Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, with its emphasis on associations and decentralized government, as part of the story of civil society in the United States, there is much to suggest that his analysis reveals a great deal about the problems of a pluralist society. He saw the development of voluntary associations of citizens as a check on central government and as enclaves of freedom and protorepublican life. Based on his observations, he argued that associations had a tremendous effect on the inner moral life of those who participate, enhancing their sympathy for fellow beings; they also have an external effect, nurturing engagement with a wider community of purposes.71 Although he was optimistic regarding the growth of public liberty under these conditions, his overriding fear was the tendency in democratic society for following the authority of the majority. Moreover, if the majority propagates religious interests rather than individual liberty, it raises pertinent questions: In a society where membership of the Malay Islamic community determines the framework of rights for its members, to what extent does this expand the freedoms of individuals in other ethnic communities and their participation? To what extent does it recognize equal rights of all communities and equal rights for members within its community (e.g., the rights of women)?72 In Malaysia, where religion plays an important part in both the private and public spheres, it is important to raise questions regarding the nature of associations that pervade civil society and their distance from the state. Religious and political associations empower citizens to sometimes question state authority, but they might not always qualify as builders of associational life with members of other communities.73 It follows that endorsing a participation-based conception of democracy, or one that encourages all kinds of associations—something that has great popularity in the West today—has its pitfalls and might not strengthen democratic forces in Malaysia.

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The strength of a democratic polity lies in the extent to which civil society and state acknowledge the claims of equal citizenship rights. Therefore respect for a uniform set of rights is not a sufficient condition for strengthening civil society where community membership can be the source of discrimination in society. Indeed, it might be more accurate to focus on a rights-based civil society in Malaysia than on a participatory form of civil society that encourages all kinds of associations. There is a need to establish and consolidate countless platforms of opposition independent of the state. But this should be followed by attempts to empower individuals with civil and political rights so that they can participate more fully in civil society and enlarge it. Armed with individual and cultural (i.e., religious and educational) rights contained in the constitution, democracy in Malaysia can lead to greater engagement by all communities in the political sphere. However, a rights-based polity must also acknowledge the claims of equal citizenship. The third way, then, is to develop a new concept of civil society by focusing on the conceptual and ideological resources within Islam for the democratization of Malaysian society. Instead of a conservative interpretation of Islamic law based on the Quran, an independent ulama can assert the need for ijtihad (independent judgment) that allows religious leaders and people to implement God’s will in any given time or place not specifically stated in the Quran. These conceptions and alternatives are discussed in Chapter 6.

Notes 1. I refer to the writings of scholars like Karl W. Deutsch who claimed that political development would weaken old clusters of social, economic, and psychological commitments and lead to the development of a more secular culture (Deutsch 1961). Thus people became available for new patterns of socialization and behavior. For Marx’s position, see Marx (1975b). It is important to clarify that only a stream of Islam has questioned the premises of modernity and development (Esposito 1980). 2. According to Robert D. Lee the concern for authenticity began in the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau as a reaction to the Enlightenment and the industrial revolution. It reflects the fear that modernity would threaten the uniqueness of the individual and his beliefs. In this chapter I refer to the Islamic interest in authenticity that began with the Iranian revolution (Lee 1997, 7–13). The purpose of this section is to give an overview of Islam for the general reader. It does not deny the richness of Islamic culture or its contributions to science and philosophy from the ninth to the twelfth centuries. Its purpose is to assert that human rights, authentic Islam, and democracy are all intricately interlinked with modernity; many Islamists are making intensive use of modernity while condemning its intrusion into their cause (Bassam 1998, 199). 3. For criticism of those who view enlightenment in these terms, see Schmidt (2000).

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4. I use the term Western to describe ideas on liberalism, democracy, and rights in the developed world while acknowledging that it contains a plurality of positions and values. Similarly there is a wide range of Islamic movements, fundamentalist and traditionalist, that incorporate a great deal of “Western” modernity and innovation. I believe that although there is borrowing of Western technology, it is Western values that are under greater attack in Malaysia. See also Ahmed and Donnan (1994). 5. In October 2001 the United States undertook military action against Afghanistan, including significant air and ground campaigns, for supporting and harboring terrorists who planned the attacks against the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon outside Washington, D.C., that killed some 3,000 people. For similar events and their response in the past, see the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on Kosovo that expressed concern over the war in Commentary (June 1998), and Iran’s fatwa in imposing a death sentence on Salman Rushdie. Due to the limited focus of this chapter I do not examine questions related to the ideals of the Islamic state, its nonterritorial character, and impact on politics in the modern era. Of course this is not to say that nationalism is not unknown in the states following Islam. 6. It is interesting to note that Islam is the official religion of more than twenty-four states; the religion of more than 90 percent of the peoples of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Bangladesh; and the dominant faith in Indonesia and Turkey. In this book I do not examine the view of some writers (Gellner 1983b) who emphasize the picture of a weak state vulnerable to threats from a community under ulama leadership. This framework of analysis does not apply in Malaysia, where there is a strong authoritarian state. 7. The need for distinguishing among Islamist, fundamentalist, and terrorist ideologies is especially useful in light of the September 2001 terrorist attacks. For a concern with democratization in Islam, see Esposito and Voll (1996, 3–7); D. Hirst (2000); and for fears on radical Islam, see Mitton (2001). 8. See Farish Noor (2001) for the U.S. military attack against Afghanistan and its impact on Malaysian politics. For more on Abu Sayyaf and the hostage crisis in May 2000, see CNN.com. 9. I endorse Chandra Muzaffar’s (1986) reasons for using the term resurgence in the 1970s in place of reassertion or revivalism because it means the “act of rising again.” 10. See Gullick’s rejoinder to his critics (1988, preface) for discussion and clarification on this point. 11. For more, see Milner (1995, 282–284). 12. See Nash (1974, 243–258); Kessler (1974, 276). 13. For Islam in the 1970s, see Zainah Anwar (1987); Hussin Mutalib (1990); Nagata (1984). 14. For more on the elections, see Oorjitham (2000d); Hussin Mutalib (2000). 15. I borrow the term ethnic boundary marker from Nagata (1984, 12) and the term identity tag from Mehmet (1990, 3). 16. See Coedes (1986) for impact of the Hindu empire. 17. This is pointed out by Esposito and Voll (1996, 21) and illustrated recently in the PAS call for a jihad against the United States. 18. For some answers to this question, see Mehmet (1990, 3). Although many of the arguments are outdated, his book gives an insight into earlier debates on Islam and modernization. 19. For related arguments on Islam in 1980s, see Nash (1994, 731). There are scholars like Hussin Mutalib (1990, 156–157) and Chandra Muzaffar (1999b, 30) who deplore the lack of interest in social justice and spiritualism in Islam.

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20. I am not examining the early development of Islam in Malaysia in my study. Many historians have done in-depth analysis of this period. For various aspects, see Milner (1982; 1995); Hussin Mutalib (1990); Roff (1980); Khasnor (1981). For our purpose it is adequate to know that Islam was introduced to the Malay Archipelago very gradually. From the fifteenth century this faith transformed key aspects of Malay life and culture, which would include the old Malay kinship system, the kerajaan. However, the impact of Islam was determined by many factors that include the traditional norms and practices commonly referred to as adat, the emergence of plural society with the arrival of immigrants, and the rule of Malay sultans. After Dutch Malacca was handed over to British forces in 1795, the British promised not to interfere in matters affecting Malay custom and religion. Although in comparison to the Portuguese and Dutch policies, British policies were more sympathetic to Islam, under British Malaya the sultans became only symbols of Malay political sovereignty but without any authority to make decisions; the advice of the British officials was to be taken and acted upon in all matters, including Islam and Malay culture. In addition, British colonial rulers introduced the idea of a distinction between religion and state, a civil administration, and a legal system distinct from indigenous institutions. For different nationalist and religious streams in Malaysian politics during the 1930s, see Roff (1980). 21. It is interesting to note that the rulers of the Malay states opposed the enactment for an official religion because they saw it as conflicting with their own position. For more on this, see Ahmad Ibrahim (1979). 22. For the period before 1970, see Hooker (1984, 130–165). In most states apart from the head of the Department of Religious Affairs, the highest religious official is the mufti (religious official), whose principal function is to issue fatwas. Also see Nash (1994, 730). 23. Teoh Eng Huat v. Kadhi of Pasir Mas, Kelantan and Majlis Ugama Islam dan Adat Istiadat Melayu. This case was about Susie Teoh, a Chinese girl who was converted to Islam of her own free will at the age of seventeen years, eight months. Her father sued the kadhi (priest) who converted her, for he as the parent had the right to decide her religion. The court later held that a person less than eighteen years does not have a constitutional right to choose his or her religion. For more, see Harding (1996, chapter 12). 24. For the rich debate on neutrality, see Rawls (1973); Raz (1986). For criticisms of the neutral state, see Benhabib and Cornell (1987); Young (1986). I would acknowledge criticism that the concept of the secular state is contentious because not even in Western states has the concept triumphed so easily and readily. This is also not to deny the role that religion plays in the United States, United Kingdom, and Scandinavian countries. 25. There are some scholars like Hussin Mutalib (1990, 23) who would disagree with my analysis. They criticize the constitution for not paying enough attention to Islamic principles. For more on my argument, see distinction between secularism and secularization in Bassam (1998). For more on the constitution, see Groves and Sheridan (1987); Lee and Trindade (1986); Mohammad Suffian, Lee, and Trindade (1979); Harding (1996). 26. In this section I mainly rely upon empirical work already done on Islam in Malaysia. 27. Judith Nagata (1986, 115) traces the religious revivalism of the 1970s to the 1920s. According to Zainah Anwar (1987, 5) there is a difference, though issues may be overlapping.

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28. Underlying the 1969 riots were the big election losses suffered by the ruling Alliance and the tension that ensued as a result. For more, see Von Vorys (1976, 342–345) and Chapter 3. 29. For more on this point, see Zainah Anwar (1987, introduction). 30. For more on these developments, see Cudsi and Dessouki (1981). 31. For a discussion of alienation among Muslims, see Chandra (1986, 162–163). 32. I do not examine here whether this had a culturally specific meaning in Malaysia or was primarily religiosity rather than Islamicity. For more, see Shamsul (1986b, 135). 33. For contrasting views on their political implications, see Mohamad Abu Bakar (1981, 1044); Milne and Mauzy (1986, 88). 34. Mohamad Abu Bakar traces their influence to the years soon after Merdeka (1981, 1041). Hassan Karim (2000) argues that since many of the former opposition parties were with the BN during 1972–1978, there was an enormous vacuum created by the decline of parliamentary opposition. Student organizations filled this vacuum. 35. For other student groups not discussed in this section, see Shamsul (1994, 107–109). 36. For its success in business and dakwah, see Nash (1994, 712); Abu Bakar (1981, 1049). 37. For more on state response to Islamic resurgence, see Camroux (1996, 864–865). 38 For this report, see Joceline Tan (2000b). 39. Cited in Joceline Tan (2000c). 40. For a sympathetic analysis of the ABIM, see Zainah Anwar (1987, 12). 41. This is cited in Esposito and Voll (1996, 132). For change in Anwar’s position in the debate on culture when he was a minister in the government, see Kua Kia Soong (1985). 42. For related ideas, see Anwar Ibrahim (1996b). 43. I borrow this phrase from Farish A. Noor (1999b, 2). 44. Due to the limited focus of this chapter I do not examine the earlier history of the pan-Malayan Islamic Party, now called the PAS. For more details, see Alias Mohamed (1994). PAS’s constitution had four objectives in the early years: to realize a union of Islamic brotherhood, to unify the constitutions and religious administrations all over Malaya, to safeguard the honor of religion and the Islamic umma, and to cooperate with other political organizations for attaining democracy and social justice. 45. See reports on the 1999 elections by Vatikiotis (1999); S. Suh and Oorjitham (2000). 46. For more on this debate, see Farish Noor (2000a). 47. I rely on Farish Noor (1999b) for these explanations. 48. I refer to the way the military has played a greater role in Egypt and Libya. In the latter case Islamization was just one of many symbolic measures to glorify Arab culture and legitimize the military regime. Mahathir’s approach has been more complex; he tried to link Islamic values to material success. 49. I develop this argument in Chapter 5. Here I use “fundamentalism” in a very broad way to imply organizations and groups that use religion as the only basis for explaining politics. 50. Here the word reformasi is associated with the movement for reform initiated by Anwar’s removal from government. The main reformasi demonstrations during this period took place in October-November 1998, following Anwar’s arrest in September 1998.

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51. For earlier power struggles within the UMNO and the government, see Zakaria Haji Ahmad (1989). 52. For details on this crisis and a chronology of his conviction, see Suh, Ranawana, and Oorjitham (1999); for reformasi demonstrations soon after Anwar’s arrest, see Suh and Ranawana (1998). 53. Suh, Ranawana, and Oorjitham (1999). 54. It was reported that a urine sample sent to Gribble pathology laboratory in Perth, Australia, showed 230 mg/1 mg of arsenic. The government tests showed, however, that Anwar had no clinical signs of arsenic poisoning. For opposing viewpoints on this matter, see Joceline Tan (1999). 55. In his defense against the sodomy charges, Anwar claimed that there was a conspiracy to topple him from office. Anwar told the high court that “bad blood” between him and Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin led to the fabrication of the sodomy charges against him. For more, see Dalilah Ibrahim (1999); C. Kaur (1999). 56. Anwar’s trial resembled a TV court drama offering all the ingredients: sex, glamour, and money. Azizan Abu Bakar, chauffeur of Wan Azizah, signed a sworn statement saying he had been sodomized by Anwar. Other “sodomy victims” included Munawar Anees, former speechwriter of Anwar; Sukma Darmawan, Indonesian-born adopted brother of Anwar; and Hairany Mohamed Naffis, former political science instructor. Ummi Hafida Ali, sister of Anwar’s private secretary, Mohamed Azmin Ali, wrote a letter to Mahathir alleging that Anwar had an affair with Azmin’s wife, Shamsidar Taharin. Ironically all these astounding allegations led to greater public sympathy for Anwar during the elections. For more, see general report, “Who’s Who in the Circus,” Asiaweek, 23 April 1999. 57. See Common Manifesto “Towards a Just Malaysia” (1999) released by the opposition parties before the general elections on 24 October. Personal copy. 58. Unfortunately Keadilan’s well-known activists and top leaders—deputy president Chandra Muzaffar, vice president Marina Yusof, supreme council member Zainur Zakaria, and youth chief Ezam Mohd Nor—lost in fairly close fights. The other loser was PRM, which did not win a single seat in the elections. 59. L. Charles and Benjamin (2000a). See report on the banning of magazines, “Journalist Body Slams Banning of ‘Eksclusif’ and ‘Wasilah,’” at Malaysiakini.com (8 September 2000). 60. See Oorjitham’s interview (2000b) with Hadi Awang, the chief minister of Terengganu, on the competition between UMNO and PAS for the Malay vote. 61. The material is drawn from Suh and Oorjitham (2000). 62. These are signs that the race over Islamization is going to reflect on legislation in the future. For more on the apostasy bill, see Oorjitham (2000e); Jayasankaran (2000a). 63. Chandra Muzaffar (1999a). 64. J. Tan (2000a). At the annual congress of the Democratic Action Party, the secretary-general argued that an Islamic state is not a practical proposition in multiracial and multireligious Malaysia because it infringes on the freedom of nonMuslims. See also Joceline Tan (2001). 65. For this decision in the PAS’s forty-sixth general assembly, see Farid Jamaludin and Mustafa Kamak Basri (2000); Wan Hamidi Hamid (2000b). 66. See Oorjitham’s interview (2000b) with Hadi Awang on this issue. 67. For the arms heist between June and July 2000 and the specter of Islamic terrorism in Malaysia, see Crisp and Oorjitham (2000a); Farish A. Noor (2000b). 68. For these events, see Jayasankaran and Holland (2001); “Malaysian Islamic Party Rallies Anti-strikes Support,” CNN.com (10 October 2001).

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69. I make this observation by distinguishing the rise of an Islamic movement and political party from the process of Islamization. Here I also point out that the new generation of Malays is not keen to maintain its Islam identity at a symbolic level but is eager to translate it into political action. Thus while reformasi might generate antiauthoritarian feelings among the people, it may well also encourage them to endorse the policies of PAS. 70. I refer to the work of Tadashi Yamamoto (1996) that views NGOs and other organizations as “community-building” in countries like Malaysia. 71. For a discussion see Tocqueville (1966, 485–488). For his views on the tyranny of the majority, see pp. 234–239. 72. I refer to the way PAS leaders are gender-insensitive. See Wong Chun Wai (1999a) on how NGOs were silent on the statements made by Kelantan chief minister Nik Mat Nik Aziz over the position of women in the state. The first controversy was over his directive that the state government should discourage the employment of beautiful women because they could easily get married and therefore have a man to support them. In addition, the party was adamant that women should not contest elections under the party banner. However, women form almost half of the party’s claimed 800,000 members. Some women have been appointed to the Dewan Negara (senate) and local councils, but during the forty-sixth general assembly women criticized the party’s double standards in barring female leaders from being seated on stage with male leaders; see Tham (2000). 73. I would make similar reservations for any party or association based only on religion and religious values. For issues related to hudud and the rights of women and minorities, see Ismail (1995); Othman (1994). In the West individuals are well endowed with freedoms, and religious-based parties cannot make a similar dent in the freedoms of individuals or minorities as in Malaysia. For Malaysia’s weak legal institutions and individual rights, see Chapter 5.

5 State, Authoritarianism, and Plural Society

Democratic reform has visited many parts of the world since the early 1980s. Military rule in some countries of Latin America and Asia was replaced by multiparty electoral systems, the communist bloc in Eastern Europe was overthrown, and martial law regimes in the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and South Korea were replaced with democratic systems. However, much continues to be written about the lack of consolidation of democracy in Asia.1 Despite obstacles to establishing democratic governments, and the general belief that democracy does not always lead to development, reduce corruption, or deliver material goods to the people, creating and sustaining democratic political practices has become an urgent priority in the world today.2 Given the immense variety in the democratic practices of Western and Asian democracies, as well as the fact that democracy is a term applied so widely that it has become vague, it is necessary to survey changes in the conception of democracy.3 The approach that strictly defined democracy with competitive party systems has today been replaced by analyses of political systems in terms of good governance. The former is the classical liberal model. It relates democracy to a form of government that depends upon certain institutions and procedures for arriving at decisions. This is also a structural-procedural definition of democracy, summed up by J. Schumpeter in his classic work Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy as “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will” (Schumpeter 1950, 250).4 This approach, first, gives primacy to constitutionalism and entails the development of a legal-political tradition devoted to the rights of citizens (freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and movement) along with particular organizational forms—legislative and executive institutions—and 127

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the sanctity of the rule of law; and second, to a competitive party system in which free and fair elections are held regularly. This definition focuses on factors and processes affecting prospects for the institutionalization of democracy. Apart from this definition, classical liberal democracy proposes a view of the self tied to individual freedom and autonomy in making basic political decisions. For this reason, the concerns of political theorists are the forms of legitimate government and the conditions in which individuals can enjoy rights. According to philosopher John Locke, the formation of the state entails the transfer of the power to make laws and enforce rights from the community to an executive; but this is conditional upon the state adhering to its basic purpose—the preservation of “lives, liberties and estates” (Locke 1980, 66). The central idea justifying limited public authority is its necessity in ensuring individual freedom or liberty against an absolutist state and the arbitrary use of authority. In other words, liberal democracy rests on an individualist conception of liberty. There are two claims in this argument for individual liberty and the way it is threatened. One is the threat to the liberty of the individual inherent in the institution of the state. The other is the idea that because unanimity does not exist the “will of the people” is in fact the will of the majority of the people. Many political theorists have warned that this implies the potential tyranny of the majority against a minority.5 In the face of this argument it would be satisfactory to maintain that for liberal democracy to consolidate itself there should be some limitations upon government. Two major challenges to these premises of liberal democratic theory arise from theories of communication and citizenship. The key notion in both is that successful liberal democracy requires more than the interaction of individuals—it requires individuals to become citizens. Therefore democracy is not reducible to procedures and majority decisions; individuals must feel that they are citizens and must participate in the construction of a collective life.6 Even those who disagree with these critiques of classical democracy cannot deny that the more we delve deeper into democracy, the less possible it is to produce general explanatory accounts of it. Recent studies are more concerned with the normative ideal of democracy. Elections, although an important feature of the political process, are only a political manifestation of democratization. The normative appeal of democratization lies in the idea of “concrete and active agents capable of pursuing their interests with a measure of autonomy from entrenched structures of dominance and privilege” (Jalal 1996, 3). Confused definitions of democracy led scholars to argue that states in the Southeast Asian region should be more accurately termed “semidemocratic” because none matches the definition of liberal democracy that posits

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competitive elections, citizen participation, and civil liberties.7 Although it is acknowledged that Malaysia’s political system includes most of the institutions and practices commonly associated with democracy—political parties, free elections, parliament, a national leader who answers to the legislature—it is asserted that Malaysia fits the definition of an “Asian democracy” (Neher and Marlay 1995, 110). The pattern of democracy in this region includes the following characteristics: Confucianism, patron-client communitarianism, personalism, authority, a dominant political party, and strong states.8 Since the general elections of 1999, one notes increasing political competition between political parties and growing citizen participation in civil society. Is Malaysia now more democratic? Despite changes, UMNO and its leader, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, still hold sway over the economy, politics, and the media. Moreover, many analysts deplore the treatment of the opposition and that civil society has developed less rapidly compared to neighbors like Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Can one conclude that Malaysia’s path toward democratization is being blocked—that the state is authoritarian? In order to address this question I propose an alternative interpretation of Malaysia’s political history since 1957. In most studies Malaysia stands as one of the sovereign entities that emerged from the domination of colonial rule. Malaysian history and politics came to be cast in the Eurocentric mold, a frame of reference that assigns primacy to what the colonial and postcolonial political elites did rather than to the effects of their actions on citizens and citizen responses to policies. This perspective views citizen responses to elite accommodation in terms of challenges for nation-building, political stability, and economic prosperity. I consider Malaysia’s political trajectory since 1957 in terms of its own history and the development of civil society. From this perspective the decades since independence can be seen as an encounter among modernity, globalization, and political identity. My perspective focuses on the way ethnic, religious, and political boundaries of the Malay community have been modified and changed by the economic and social transformations of society. How does this perspective assist in explaining the rise and consolidation of a form of authoritarianism in Malaysia and its possible demise? Contemporary Malaysian politics is dominated by Mahathir, and its direction is determined by the agenda put forth by him and UMNO, the dominant party since independence. Although the Malaysian government has permitted opposition parties, associations, and cause-oriented groups to exist, they have diminished capacity to mobilize masses to impact policymaking. The state has either sought to eliminate groups mediating between the individual and the state or to control such groups to cut off competition for power. This has undermined the possibility of group influence on policymaking. As

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far as the state/civil society problematic is concerned, I contend that populist leaders like Mahathir undermine intermediary bodies controlling the state apparatus; therefore civil society loses its ability to check state arbitrariness from above or undemocratic forces from below.9 I discuss more of this problematic in Chapter 6. To support my argument, I recall my earlier claim that racial and ethnic contradictions affect the functioning of the state because it is presented as a symbol of unity among contradictory forces; a corollary is that underdevelopment of the main productive classes in Malaysian society (following from the nature of a plural society), notably the Malay bourgeoisie, means that its belated entry into capitalist production had to be assisted by the state bureaucracy and government machinery. Thus the distinctive configuration of Malaysian society has promoted the institution of the state as a unifying force for development and modernization. I also assert that a populist mode of politics entails organizational forms easily malleable by a charismatic leader, like Mahathir, who is able to bypass intermediaries and appeal directly to the people. Party members derive authority from above, from the leader’s charisma, rather than from below, and this has encouraged the simple equation of state and society. The blurring of lines between party and government enables UMNO to give its cadres the power of internal allocation of resources and to occupy an enormous political space that marginalizes other parties. In the past, UMNO emphasized its role as defender of Malay nationalism and multiculturalism. But given the recent shifts in the idea of the nation-state in the era of globalization, parties like UMNO, which define their historic mission with reference to nationalism, are being challenged. The political process is in a state of flux given that the idea of a centrist party that protects the interests of all communities is challenged by the PAS, which is responsive to the shifting ethnic and religious loyalties of Malays. The future of Mahathir, the party system, and Malaysian politics depends on how they handle this challenge and how civil society accommodates these changes. Against this background my main purpose in this chapter is to first review approaches that postulate a link between political democracy and economic development in order to understand the debate on democratization. The main points in the theoretical debate in Malaysia are criticized. I then explore the factors that gave rise to authoritarianism in Malaysia and to those that sustain it. I examine the extent to which political institutions and their control by a populist leader have contributed to this rise. Overall I reject explanations that view political stability, multiethnic bargaining, or economic development as justification for accepting restraints on democracy.

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Alternative Views on Democracy and Authoritarianism Scholars who have explored issues related to democracy and authoritarianism disagree about the connection between economic development and political democracy. Several claims support the thesis of transition from traditional society to modern (i.e., pluralist) social order. One is that the emergence of liberal democracy has a direct correlation to economic development: once a country achieves a certain level of gross national product, pluralism follows. Another claim in this thesis is that economic development is best promoted when there is a high degree of political stability and order: democracy is not possible when institutions are under pressure from groups in society. Despite their differences protagonists in this debate view citizen participation and political and civil liberties as irrelevant in the early and difficult stages of economic development. A second thesis sees the authoritarian regimes that emerged in many states in Southeast Asia as an aberration from normal democratic conditions.10 But all these explanations are extremely general and fail to account for why politics has taken the twists and turns it has in Malaysia as compared to other countries that are moving toward some democratic regime. The second thesis states a weak claim that liberal democracy is appropriate only for certain cultures under a limited set of social and economic conditions; it is challenged by the extent to which democracy has rapidly spread throughout the world. The brute existence of India is in itself an important challenge to this thesis. The idea that poverty and desperate economic conditions require non–liberal-democratic regimes is disputed.11 What emerges from these analyses is that there are overwhelming methodological problems in coming up with a universal set of conditions to establish democracy. Indeed, there are many countries that move between the categories of semidemocratic and semiauthoritarian.12 Modernity and Democracy The correlation among levels of economic development and political democracy received great attention from scholars in the modernization tradition in political theory. The unit of analysis of this school was usually the nation-state; nations of the third world were placed on an evolutionary scale. At the apex were Western countries that provided an idealized pattern of development, which, if followed in the third world, would allow the latter to emulate the features of modernization in the West.13 More specifically, theorists claimed that economic growth led to political transformation that was highly favorable to the existence of democratic government. Their work recognized a pattern among levels of economic development and the

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degree of democratization: as the economic bases of the bourgeoisie and labor force were strengthened, the state was pressured into granting political rights and liberties. Greater degrees of social mobilization, urbanization, and improved communications were all associated with economic development. It followed that countries with more economic development would also have greater degrees of political democracy.14 Seymour Martin Lipset’s classic statement, inspired by the work of Schumpeter, was an example of this approach. He defined democracy as a political system that supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials. It is a social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decision-making among conflicting interest groups which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence these decisions. (Lipset 1959, 71)15

Subsequent studies influenced by modernization theory employed different assumptions, but they implicitly approved of the trend toward Western, capitalist modernity, a view shared by the theory of productive forces in orthodox Marxism. It is worth noting several similarities in these distinct perspectives. They all arose from a body of thought embedded in the European experience and perceived the third world from an evolutionary position of development, seeing capitalist modernity as a distinct step in this direction. Both viewed economic development as inevitably linked to some idea of progress. The main difference was that underdevelopment was explained, in Marxist theory, by reference to a theory of exploitation based on the structural position of third world societies in the global economy, and not, as in modernization theory, by the backwardness of peoples or traditions, the lack of an educated elite, and the absence of values conducive to capitalist development.16 By the late 1960s modernization theory was buried under collapsing democracies in many developing countries. Samuel Huntington claimed that modernization was not producing a political culture close to democracy in most developing countries; on the contrary, in weakly institutionalized political systems economic development and the resulting social mobilization produced what he called “preaetorianism,” which favored the rise of authoritarianism (see Huntington 1969). Guillermo O’Donnell’s pathbreaking thesis correlated higher levels of modernization with the emergence of new forms of authoritarianism in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay.17 Subsequent studies refined the indicators for democracy because these analyses caused reassessments of theories positing a basic contradiction between political authoritarianism and the forward march of societies toward modernity: authoritarianism, it was argued, may be a necessary or inevitable stage on the road to modernity. In the mid-1990s, however, modernization theory

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encountered difficulties from a worldwide “third wave” of democratization and the trend toward globalization.18 The emergence of multiparty electoral systems in Africa, the former communist states of Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Central America tell a different story about democracy. In poor countries like Mozambique and India, democratization has come to precede economic development. Given the methodological problems faced by various studies on political development and the related growth of social mobilization and political participation and the empirical trend toward democratization in the rest of the world, Southeast Asia for many scholars represented a “theoretical puzzle” (Thompson 1996, 626). Both the assumptions of the structural definition of democracy—that democracy is measured by the number of political parties and voter turnout and that there exists a positive correlation among economic development and democracy—are challenged. The correlation is imperfect—the poorest countries of Southeast Asia, the Philippines, and Thailand are too democratic, whereas Malaysia and Singapore—the more developed states—along with Vietnam and Burma—the low-income states—are authoritarian. Thus there is continuing debate about the relative importance of a range of variables influencing modernization and development. Instead of asking one question—What is the connection between economic development and democracy?—I shift to a different set of questions: How crucial are social, political, and class structures in the process of democratic change? What role do individuals and indigenous political cultures play in the rise of authoritarianism? Explanations for the Rise of Authoritarianism in Malaysia While answering these two questions, many observers describe the rise of Malaysian authoritarianism as a consequence of pressures from below— from ethnic or class conflict—after the race riots of 1969. This view has its origins in two approaches—the first includes the cultural diversity approach (CDA) and the consociational politics approach (CPA), and the second is the class conflict approach (CCA).19 Before examining these critically, I look at the definitions of “plural society” and “political integration” propounded by sociologists and political scientists, respectively, because this is central to the first approach and had a profound impact on research in the region. A recurring assumption in this research is that mutual interaction and understanding of different persons of different communities led to political stability. Although none of these scholars shared a common notion of the concepts they used, or concurred in the political implications of this approach, they all pointed to a similar conclusion: Because ethnic groups are less flexible and disparate than other social groupings, the central problem was establishing a unified

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political community or national community in Malaysia; any excessive power or authority enforced by the state could consequently be justified to contain such disparate trends. J. S. Furnivall introduced the concept of plural society in depicting colonial societies in Southeast Asia. He defined it as “comprising two or more elements or social orders that live side by side, yet without mingling, in one political unit” (Furnivall 1956, 304).20 He claimed that a plural society was divided vertically into different “communal groups” that were in turn conceived as homogenous entities capable of acting corporately; a polyethnic society was integrated in the marketplace under the control of a state system dominated by one of the groups because all groups were similar in their economic wants, but it left large areas of diversity in the cultural, religious, and domestic sectors of activity. Such societies were composed of internally autonomous and inclusive political units ruled by institutionally distinct numerical minorities. In short, a plural society was one lacking consensus, and there was a general assumption that tensions and conflicts were bound to occur. While studying the development of the modern Malaysian state, many scholars of CDA, influenced by the plural society paradigm, characterized Malaysian society by such terms as plural, communal, and segmental because it was composed of several ethnic-cultural groups, each of which tended to live in distinct communities with a distinctive lifestyle, each tending to monopolize certain sectors of the economic or political system.21 Furnivall’s observations were reformulated and sharpened by M. G. Smith, who also distinguished between culturally homogenous societies with normative integration and societies deeply divided along ethnic and cultural lines and held together mainly by coercion (see M. Smith 1965, 86). These reformulations led some scholars to argue that in contrast to Western democracies, where pluralism is primarily a product of functional specialization and diversification within society, Malaysian society is characterized by “multiple communal structures that are a product of diverse ethnic and cultural-linguistic traditions” (Means 1976, 444–445). In the former, “compromise” and “adjustment” may be likely because all issues are not fought along the same axis; consequently, in the former, “where the social structure reflects great functional pluralism, democracy is facilitated,” whereas in the latter, communal pluralism intensifies conflicts (Means 1976, 444–445). The underlying proposition was that in social structures where the overwhelming preponderance of political conflicts is perceived in ethnic terms there is no objective basis for democracy; it gives the political system a far more rigid and inflexible character than the diversified pluralism of modern industrial societies.22 Although I concur with many of these observations, my argument so far is that a plural society with many cultural differences can also lead to different kinds of state-society rela-

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tionships; in the case of Malaysia it led to a centralized state and weak civil society. Another set of scholars emphasized the role of the governing elite in making ethnic conflicts less salient in economic and political life. Although some of the premises of the cultural diversity school were altered to account for the patterns of conflict in society as well as elite cooperation, the CPA produced the same characterization of Malaysian society: a plural society with strict boundaries among ethnic and cultural communities. These scholars, accepting the first claim of CDA, separate ethnic communities inclined toward conflictual behavior but go on to reject the second claim that force rather than consensus maintains social order. The CPA school claims that the authoritarian or democratic character of a state is indicated by the extent to which governing elites “consult with, respond to and are electorally replaced by the leaders of organised segments of civil society” (Case 1996, 6–7). The main argument is that although the creation of a national identity might be based upon the cultural attributes of a particular group (in this case Malays), the interests of other groups were also being catered to. This was possible by the consociational attitudes and practices of elites. Deeply influenced by the work of Giovanni Sartori and Arend Lijphart’s consociational model, they point out that predictions of democratic breakdown made by Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle have been avoided in Malaysia.23 Whereas the earlier theorists of the cultural diversity approach focused on the failure to establish a political community, the consociationalist theorists tried to explain the conditions of stability in highly divided plural societies. The latter claim that the effective functioning of these systems is due to conflict-regulating practices being followed by elites—in short, in the maintenance of consensus within a nonconsensual social and political context. The existence and importance of game rules for consensual elite unity are seen in these writings. Rules are quietly manifested in political behavior in “tacit understandings,” “pacts,” and “settlements and they may be formally recorded in organization by-laws and constitutions” (Case 1996, 10). Hence, while consensually unified elites compete for political power and positions, mutually acceptable rules dissuade them from undertaking decisive strategies. In a similar vein others argue that given the continued legitimacy of ethnicity, religion, and traditional political authority, along with the phenomenon of globalization, the form and practice of democracy in Asian societies embody compromises among social and political interests. In this view, democracy is “a political accommodation” that “reflects and essentially underpins the prevailing hierarchies of power embodied in the social order” (Hewison, Rodan, and Robison 1993, 6).24 The problem is that this approach relies on a structural definition of democracy and disassociates the procedural and substantive variables to judge

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democracy. Although some scholars acknowledge the need to adopt a framework that is sensitive “to the structural sources of social or socio-economic cleavage that may impact upon elite autonomy and strategies” (Case 1996, 9), they give explanatory primacy to elite relations over civil society formations. Even if this explanatory primacy is conceded, the contention that game rules discourage rule-bound elites “from mobilising mass constituents in ways that would seriously threaten other elites and provoke retaliatory violence” (Case 1996, 11) is questionable.25 It is an established fact that Mahathir uses the threat of violence in election campaigns. Race or religion is constantly raised to distract voters from a serious evaluation of the real issue in elections. The prospect of PAS getting more votes in the 1999 elections in the state of Kelantan prompted repeated warnings from the ruling coalition that gains by the Islamic party could cause racial discord among the majority Malays and minority ethnic Chinese and Indians. Furthermore, the various factions in the Barisan Nasional, the coalition led by Mahathir’s UMNO, are widely perceived as failing to adopt procedural game rules. Most of the factions deeply distrust one another as they compete for state power in ruthless and violent ways. A recent example is the clash between Mahathir and Anwar within the ruling party UMNO.26 Indeed, one could argue that in reality the elites involved in consociationalism, by maintaining and consolidating the existing social relations of production, actually contribute to the politicization of ethnic divisions. The state’s emphasis on management of interethnic conflict led CPA scholars to argue that from 1957 to 1969 the accommodation system worked through the Alliance (Von Vorys 1976, 21). But as Malaysian society became more complex, “the spirit of accommodation wore away,” and this led to “the suspension of Malaysia’s modified form of democracy” that dramatically changed the political system (Neher and Marlay 1995, 99–100).27 Others saw the events of 1969 as justification for the ruling elites to give up their commitment to democracy and representative government and to amend the country’s laws and constitution to ensure Malay dominance.28 What follows from these analyses is that authoritarianism was a by-product of Malaysian plural society and a response to the primordial loyalties and ethnic particularism of the masses. The class-conflict approach explains the Malaysian state with reference to the nature of the ruling elite. The latter were accommodationists because it was in the class interest to be so. The rising communalism in society was the result of false consciousness on the part of the various classes, as well as of ideological manipulation by the Malaysian ruling class. Those who used this approach characterized pre-1969 events differently than scholars using the plural society approach but nonetheless analyzed the response of the state in similar ways. Compromises among the top ethnic leaders resulted first in a laissez faire economic framework between 1957 and 1969 and then in the New Economic Policy for greater Malay

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control over the economy. One acclaimed study argues that the role of the state was constrained by ethnic contention—in particular the split between the Malays and the Chinese over political and economic control.29 The study concluded that since 1969 the state’s expanding role was a product of the Malay leaders’ twin goals of consolidating political power and realizing the deep cultural aspirations of elevating the relative economic power of their ethnic group in society. In short, the “over-burdened state was a product of a long history of inter-ethnic comparison of power and status” (Jesudason 1990, 124–125). Other writers working within the Marxist tradition focused on the classes that constituted Malaysian society. Although the emphasis differed in these formulations regarding the role of the state and its autonomy from the ruling class, all seemed to endorse that in the last analysis a bureaucratic or administrative state—the cause for authoritarianism—was working in collusion with local aristocrats, bureaucrats, urban capitalists, and rural landlords, and even with demands of international capital, in exploiting the peasant and working classes.30 Generally, racial conflict in the Malaysian social formation was seen to have its origins in the struggle among classes, and the compromises and alliances among the elites were characterized as an unstable situation that had potential for greater social conflict.31 These approaches underscore the need for a decline of both ethnic and cultural identities in order to consolidate the nation-state, democracy, and nationalism. Influenced by work on plural society, many scholars saw the major problem facing Malaysia as the transition from pluralism to the homogeneity required for the transformation of groups into a cohesive national unit; in other words the main challenge was the subordination of primordial sentiments to the requirements of civil politics. Since the nationstate was the legal basis of sovereignty, loyalty to other identities and groups was seen to undermine the legitimacy of the state.32 Over the years, modernization introduced increasing cultural diversity within each community, partially blurring the lines of ethnic compartmentalization. Yet Malaysian society continued to be defined by rigid cultural-ethnic divisions and was characterized by an inadequate system of interest articulation that discouraged participation in functionally specific groups. There are two difficulties. The first relates to the conception of identity as something static or as a state of false consciousness. Divisions within each ethnic group are mostly ignored; the existence of each ethnic group and its culture is seen as fixed and immutable. I would argue it is more plausible to view the fluid nature of the identities of each ethnic group in the context of modernity and globalization.33 Given this premise of shifting identities, we can examine how Malay ethnic identity, along with the identities of other social groups, is being reworked by new cultural symbols— the state, women’s groups, environmental groups, human activists, consumerists, and Islamic groups—all of whom are redefining their space in

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plural society. It is possible to also accept the pluralist idea of primordial identity where the self remains bound up with blood, race, religion, and tradition. The second difficulty is that these approaches fail to locate the Islamic resurgence since the 1970s as a response to authoritarianism. Most do not see any long-term convergence of interests between Islam and democracy. I have argued that the New Economic Policy, which guaranteed a certain amount of economic control to Malays and other bumiputras, produced structural changes that led to differentiation in Malaysian society. In particular, a middle class has emerged, creating political implications; bureaucrats, professionals, and aspiring businesspersons are the potential modernizers and the source of rising ethnic tensions given the competition among one another. They have provided a cultural vision based on Islam in order to define their cultural identity and distinguish themselves from other ethnic groups and from the nation-state.34

Factors Leading to the Rise of Authoritarianism in Malaysia Thus far we have critically examined pluralism as the main cause of authoritarianism in Malaysia. What are the factors that sustain and ensure continuity of undemocratic procedures and institutions? The most remarkable fact about Malaysia since independence is the stability of its political regime. But political stability is a necessary but not sufficient condition for authoritarianism. I would argue that it is a condition for perpetuating a form of government, political style, and tradition but is not the cause for the rise of authoritarianism. It is useful to distinguish among situations where democratic and authoritarian solutions alternate and where there is a stable authoritarian rule backed by a system of authoritative democracy.35 I am not arguing that political stability produces authoritarianism but that it sustains authoritarianism when there are no changes in the form of government and its rule by a dominant political party. Malaysia is a country ruled by a strong executive and a ruling party that has never been defeated in a general election. An entire generation of Malaysians has experienced no other polity than BN, UMNO, and Mahathir. Compared to countries like Thailand and Indonesia, Malaysia has enjoyed more than four decades of civilian rule. Military forces have not played an important part in politics, one reason being that the withdrawal of colonial power was not the result of a civil war or violent movement for liberation. Indeed, the main resistance to British colonial rule occurred due to the unfavorable terms set out for Malays and the reduced power allocated to the sultans in the constitution. Moreover, it should be noted that whatever the nature of internal changes, the postindependent Malaysian

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state and its territorial boundaries have rarely been invaded, although diplomatic rows and disputes have been common with neighbors.36 By emphasizing political stability, I wish to highlight the way traditional, colonial, and ethnic factors shape the criteria by which authority is evaluated, sustained, and derived from a consociational model of politics and the BN system. At the apex of that system stands Mahathir, who has imposed and strengthened many forms of authoritarian control. Initially he appeared to offer only paradoxes; his political moves were unrelated to any clear policy or strategic issues but simply devoted to the logic of political survival.37 Eventually this pragmatic approach weakened political institutions and altered the structure of Malaysian politics. The strong political will asserted by Mahathir not only “made the most of the structures he inherited” but also imprinted the future course of executive authority in Malaysia, because the structural changes indicate the control that could be possibly wielded by his successors (Milne and Mauzy 1999, 1). Even though the 1999 elections raised issues of democracy more than ever before, those expecting the consolidation of a full-fledged liberal democracy in Malaysia are likely to be disappointed. Free and fair elections in no way guarantee constitutionalism and the rule of law because Malaysians are not guaranteed elementary civil liberties.38 If there are major changes in the political system in the near future, a new government will have to develop within the framework of an authoritarian system. Consequently, important elements from the past will impede the processes of democratization. Constitutional Traditions The character of the merdeka (independence) constitution was influenced by the emergency order at the end of colonial rule. Initially the emergency was declared to deal with a communist insurgency in British Malaya, and many scholars claim that authoritarian trends in the Malaysian state were influenced by what happened during that period (1948–1960). The government’s use of systematic and selective coercion, developed during these years, set the course for the nature of political institutions. The demands of fighting a coordinated counterguerrilla campaign, directed against an underground communist party and other leftist organizations, most of which were overwhelmingly non-Malay in membership, contributed to the development of a highly centralized federal system. The assertion for state rights, which came to the fore after the Malayan Union was replaced by the Federation of Malaya Agreement of 1948, was eventually reduced as the necessity for cooperation through an elite accommodation system became evident to all. Thus upon independence the Alliance government inherited a sophisticated coercive machine developed by the British to counter the challenge of communist insurgency as well as radical Malay nationalism. It

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comprised a developed, highly organized, well-trained security apparatus of the police, the armed forces, and the special branch.39 As the basis for constitutional developments after independence, the 1948 federation agreement is important insofar as it provides for a strong central government in a federal setting. Authoritarian impulses are also rooted in the strong executive enshrined in the Malaysian constitution and were strengthened as executive power escalated after independence through constitutional amendment. Furthermore, the fact that the government in power since independence has commanded more than two-thirds of the seats of both houses of the federal parliament has provided the executive a constitutional tradition that legitimates the exercise of executive prerogatives and emergency powers. The government has also been able to dictate legislation due to its overwhelming majority. Therefore, although democratic procedures are outwardly followed, the roles and functions of both houses of parliament are limited because of BN’s large majorities. Executive powers increased thanks to constitutional amendments that paralleled the rapid deterioration of individual liberties enshrined in the constitution (see Chapter 6). The constitution enumerates fundamental individual rights that can be limited or suspended by ordinary legislative enactment. Article 10(2) and, later, article 10(4) were introduced by the 1971 rukunegara (articles of faith) amendments in order to impose restrictions in the interest of federation security. The constitution also provides extraordinary powers to the government for dealing with crises: article 149 provides for legislation against subversion, and article 150 invests the Yang diPertuan Agong (king) with the authority to proclaim an emergency unless and until parliament is in session.40 During an emergency the separation of the federal and state executives is in effect suspended, because the executive authority of the federation extends to any matter within the legislative authority of the state. However, the emergency laws do not extend to Islamic law or Malay custom, religion, citizenship, and language. The Malaysian state rapidly moved in an authoritarian direction after parliament was suspended under an emergency imposed due to the race riots of 1969. Although parliament was restored in 1971, increasing restrictions were imposed on political activity, which made it impossible for any opposition group or political party to raise objections.41 During this period of new education and economic policies, the government justified its restrictions on democracy as necessary for national unity.42 Under Mahathir the rollback of sultans’ power in 1983, presented as an overdue reform of feudal politics, further tilted the balance in favor of central authority. Authoritarian means used earlier to bolster the government’s position in times of crisis now became indispensable; the vast police machinery became an important tool of the state and the government to be used against political opponents and the public. Events such as Operasi

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Lalang in October 1987, the use of state security forces during riots and demonstrations in detention centers, and actions against demonstrators during the 1998–1999 crisis that followed the arrest of Anwar eroded the image and standing of the security forces. One of the biggest setbacks to the independence of the judiciary and legal institutions was the treatment of Anwar (he was assaulted while in police custody, blindfolded by the former inspector general of police; he was later sentenced to fifteen years after being found guilty of corruption and sexual misconduct).43 The Politics of Consociationalism Although I concur that Malaysia’s path to authoritarianism has its roots in the emergency years, the politics of consociationalism and the UMNO system have also contributed to the rise of a strong executive. Some scholars view the period after independence as the consociational period, in which procedural mechanisms were employed to control potential social conflict. Theorists of consociational democracy claim that elite accommodation bridges the ethnic cleavages that characterize Malaysian society and that in practice the accommodation among elites of the participating ethnic groups allows for democratic politics. However, the emphasis upon multiethnic cooperation, as epitomized first by the ruling Alliance and then the BN, has drawn attention away from the breakdown of accommodationist patterns of elite behavior and policies of class containment. Whereas an interethnic coalition provides political stability in mediating ethnic demands, in this system the rules of consociationalism are so tightly drawn that contenders for power have little room to alter or propose political boundaries by posing issues in nonethnic terms or “in terms of pushing their issues too hard” (Zakaria Haji Ahmad 1989, 370). Even if other factors play a role, the existence of political conflict is always interpreted in ethnic terms. To a large extent this gives the preeminent role to political leaders in settling conflicts among the major blocs and limits participation by the rank-and-file. Arrangements that promote accommodation among all ethnic communities, although laudable, sustain the authority of a strong executive and his party machine. Therefore accommodation of community-based interests is limited by two conditions: Malay political hegemony, and preservation of class and ethnic harmony. These arrangements are described as “hegemonic consociationalism” (Milne and Mauzy 1999, 18). This kind of politics has been instrumental in promoting a consensus in which hard issues are not raised; civil society is unable to develop and expand. This eventually sustains authoritarianism. Looking at history we find that the ruling Alliance that came to power in 1955 and won three election victories (1959, 1964, and 1969) was a multiracial alliance among UMNO, MCA, and MIC. It incorporated the ruling parties in Sarawak and Sabah after those two states were included in the

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Federation of Malaysia in 1963. The government shared some of the elements that Lijphart describes in his notion of consociational democracy because the three major groups of Malaysian society were in power. The situation has been described as one in which two or more ethnic blocs, roughly equal in power, cooperated, in spite of remaining substantially separate in their activities, through agreement between their leaders, who at the same time were able to retain the support of their followers. (Milne and Mauzy 1978, 355)

UMNO’s role as a dominant party in this multiethnic coalition had political and historical bases. Before independence the party defended Malay special rights against British attempts to repeal them, becoming the community’s protector. In fact the surprisingly rapid political mobilization of large segments of Malay society by UMNO so upset the political balance that negotiations took place to replace the Malayan Union constitution by one containing greater concessions to Malay interests. In the transition to independence, accommodation of ethnic interests became an important factor. The near-universal appeal to Malayan nationalism by all political groups helped to conceal internal differences. In fact, under the banner of nationalism, the most unusual and divergent elite groups—Malay aristocrats, Chinese capitalists, and the Indian petite bourgeoisie—formed a temporary national front that purported to represent Malaysian nationalism. Alliance-staged mass demonstrations provoked a constitutional crisis and advanced its demands for constitutional reform. Once in office the Alliance became much less militant and worked with colonial authorities, as it had become more concerned with a smooth transition from self-government to complete independence than with arousing anticolonial passions. By becoming the first party to construct a mass base of support, the Alliance not only gained office but also acquired the power to define the constitutional arrangements, which were drafted with some concern for reinforcing UMNO’s dominant position with Malays. By dominating the center of this political spectrum, UMNO could guide and dictate the Federation of Malaya Agreement of 1948 that entrenched the status of Malay sultans, Malay privileges, and the Malay language. Citizenship rights were granted to non-Malays only in return for their acceptance of special rights for Malays. Until 1969 consociational politics provided political pluralism and stability. Paternalism, as well as the strong links between the bureaucracy and the top elites in UMNO, exposed the need for conflict management. However, before 1969 this process was fluid “in that it relied mainly on the informal agreements hammered out within the Alliance intercommunal alliance,” whereas after 1971 the process became more “specific and controlled because the bargaining between the BN components was based on rules set to satisfy UMNO as the senior partner” (Zakaria Haji Ahmad 1989, 372). Although

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UMNO always maintained the overall goal was ensuring Malay dominance in government, increasingly under Mahathir, who became prime minister in 1981, it claimed to know how to best maintain Malay dominance while protecting the interests of the Chinese and the Indian communities. I return to this point later in this chapter. The UMNO Party System UMNO’s success is traced to historical and political factors. But it is important to note that the party has also evolved and changed its role and aim according to circumstances. UMNO’s dominance in the ruling BN coalition after 1971 was ensured when it declared itself protector of the Malay majority, instituting affirmative action in civil service, the armed services, and education. But after Mahathir became prime minister, UMNO developed an image devoted to power-sharing in order to benefit non-Malay elites as well. There was a general understanding that UMNO’s hold on state political power would not impinge upon Chinese control of the economy. Given the fundamental role of the state in the economic development of the country, UMNO leaders were in a position to distribute state licenses and contracts that sustained Chinese business in return for campaign contributions, secret funds, and memberships on the boards of Chinese-owned companies. The Chinese community was given a political voice in the governing alliance through MCA.44 Furthermore, it was rewarded with ministerial appointments in finance, commerce, and industry. When the political process of the past four decades is surveyed it becomes clear that a kind of short-term balance among communities’ competing claims was attained thanks to the New Economic Policy, which transferred corporate ownership to Malays.45 By transferring wealth the NEP made it possible for UMNO to reduce its financial dependence on ethnic Chinese supporters. Apart from retaining its image and moral worth of the party of multiracial society, UMNO retained what William Case describes as the “patrimonial organisation of Malay political power, an unquestioning loyalty, a culture of deference and obligatory followership” along with the policy of co-opting political dissidents (Case 1995, 84). Tunku Abdul Rahman, a prince from the state of Kedah, served as UMNO president and Malaysia’s prime minister until the riots of 1969. Although his personal authority eroded when Malay support in the 1969 general election slipped to PAS, his style of politics appealed to the so-called old guard.46 His style was personal: appointments were made without consultation, decisions were made without communication, and personal loyalty was prized.47 The inability of his government to respond to Malay grievances is evident from the fact that the Alliance lost its two-thirds majority in parliament

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in 1969 for the first time. Prior to 1969, Malays were politically dominant, but government policies were perceived to be more favorable to nonMalays. The UMNO radicals that came to the fore in 1969 were critical of these policies. Thereafter the government under Tun Razak heralded major structural changes via the NEP, which ensured the material aspirations and special rights of the Malays. The period between 1971 and 1981 was a transition to quasiauthoritarianism, which would become entrenched during Mahathir’s tenure. In this phase, under the leadership of Tun Razak and later Tun Hussein Onn, the governing style was one of instituting reforms by co-opting opposition elites.48 It was during Tun Razak’s tenure that the NOC (1969–1971) ruled by emergency powers, and the three party-alliance was broadened into the BN. The interim arrangement led to the establishment of a coalition government, including former opposition parties, that enhanced UMNO’s claim to be acting in the interests of all communities while its alliance with PAS established its claim to leadership of the Malay community. Thus UMNO’s strategy in the post-1969 period must be seen as an attempt to regain its decisive governing role in Malaysian politics.49 After Tun Razak’s death in 1976, Tun Hussein Onn, son of Onn bin Ja’afar, held the post of prime minister for six years and consolidated his style of government. But when Mahathir and his deputy, Musa Hitam (the so-called 2-M government), took over in 1981, the change in style embedded quasidemocratic features into the system; chronic factionalism within UMNO became obvious. A novel aspect of UMNO has been the manner in which political dissent is co-opted and succession battles confronted. From 1975, Tun Razak, the new prime minister, and his technocratic team (Hussein Onn, Mahathir, Musa Hitam, and Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah) were challenged by two factions—one headed by Harun Idris, the powerful mentri besar (chief minister) of Selangor, the other by Tunku Abdul Rahman. In this power struggle within UMNO, elite traditions and authority were discarded: corruption charges, expulsion, allegations, and confessions leading to purges followed. While Harun Idris was given six years in prison Tunku was invited to address the general assembly, ending the elite struggle for power and future challenges to Hussein Onn.50 During the mid-1980s, factionalism between Team A (led by Mahathir) and Team B (led by Razaleigh) reached a new height. The roots of this split lay in the personal rivalries of these UMNO leaders.51 After the 1986 general elections a possible Razaleigh-Musa front to contest the presidency and deputy presidency of UMNO in the next General Assembly arose.52 In a bid to outdo his opponents, Mahathir ordered the high court to deregister UMNO. During the ensuing power struggle (Operasi Lalang in October 1987) political leaders and public-interest-group leaders were arrested and newspapers shut down. Later prominent members of the judiciary, including

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Lord President Salleh Abbas and two supreme court judges, were suspended (see Zakaria Haji Ahmad 1993, 158–159). Article 125 of the constitution was amended in 1988, followed by tribunal proceedings against Salleh Abbas, resulting in his dismissal from office. Mahathir, recognizing the intrinsic authority of UMNO vis-à-vis the Malay community, formed a successor party called UMNO Baru (New UMNO). Meanwhile, Razaleigh set up Semangat 46 and created an opposition front with the PAS and the primarily Chinese DAP. As a result, in the 1990 elections BN confronted an alliance of opposition parties for the first time and won only narrowly.53 Almost a decade later another crisis was triggered by the expulsion of Anwar Ibrahim. It was also a period when an economic crisis was sweeping across Malaysia and the entire region. At one level this was another battle of succession within UMNO. Keenly involved with succeeding Mahathir, Anwar, along with his Vision Team, challenged UMNO’s deputy president, Ghafar Baba, in the party’s 1993 general assembly election. He made a clean sweep of the deputy president post, the three vice president seats, and the youth leader post. Anwar’s victory was ensured because he had forged links with a new group of bumiputra corporate-cum-political leaders and had steadily gained control of the media, namely, the New Straits Times. It was also alleged that Anwar had close links with the Hong Leong Group and firms such as Sapura Holdings, involved in telecommunications.54 From that point on, Mahathir steadily worked to regain his hold over government, business, and the party apparatus, blocking Anwar’s team and his supporters in the parliament and cabinet.55 This conflict also brought out the two men’s different economic policies. Anwar emerged from the crisis as a person compelled by moral conviction and democratic aspirations. In these circumstances his stand within the party against Daim Zainuddin, the head of the national economic council, and against Mahathir over economic liberalization, infrastructure projects, patronage, and solutions to the 1997 financial crisis exacerbated the tensions. What must have irked the prime minister is the manner in which Anwar had gained new standing among countries and financial institutions of the West, along with his popularity among the governments of Southeast Asia and the Muslim world. The rift became public in the UMNO general assembly of June 1998. Copies of a book entitled Fifty Reasons Why Anwar Cannot Be Prime Minister were distributed to all 1,900 assembly delegates (Jayasankaran 1998a). During the assembly the UMNO youth leader, Zahid Hamidi, a known Anwar supporter, brought up the issue of corruption, collusion, and nepotism in the allocation of government contracts. Mahathir responded by making public lists of persons and companies that had benefited through government contracts, privatization, and special share allocations. It included the names of Mahathir’s family as well as Anwar’s. Although the

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assembly ended on a conciliatory note, Mahathir steadily worked thereafter to push Anwar out of government. Anwar was sacked on 20 September 1998 after addressing a crowd of 50,000 at the national mosque in Kuala Lumpur. Soon he was arrested under the Internal Security Act, then charged with corruption and sexual misconduct, charges he was found guilty of in separate trials. Although this succession battle was similar to earlier struggles, it was significant in that it included greater political participation by the forces of civil society and noticeably damaged the credibility of UMNO and Mahathir. Although the significance of the Anwar crisis has been tempered by Mahathir’s victory in the 1999 elections, the government perceived the citizen response as threatening to the system. The UMNO party machine worked to tame opponents and erode personal reputations, yet opponents continue to draw upon UMNO authority. Because UMNO follows the strategy of coopting influential opponents, many see factions within the party as indistinguishable in the long run—as indicated by the ease with which dissidents are reabsorbed. In 1996 Tengku Razaleigh and his followers rejoined UMNO in the spirit of Malay unity, but Mahathir never rewarded him. He was wooed only to become UMNO division chief in his home state of Kelantan during the 1999 elections. Razaleigh was to again challenge Mahathir in the UMNO general assembly in May 2000, again unsuccessfully. Many promising leaders who followed Razaleigh when he set up Semangat 46 or were in opposition have returned to the UMNO fold. They include Zainal Abidin Zin, Rahmah Osman, Illani Ishak, Shahrir Samad, and Rais Yatim. These events demonstrate the extent to which the party’s politics revolve around patronage and Mahathir, as well as how the UMNO system sustains executive powers in the government and assists the executive— who is also the president of UMNO—in surmounting challenges within the party (Jayasankaran 1998b). Despite the debacle it faced in the last elections, the party is still unwilling to take criticism or dissent. At the May 2000 general assembly the UMNO supreme council advised party divisions that there should be no contest for the posts of president and deputy president to prevent disunity within the party.56 The lack of political competition. UMNO’s dominance of the political process in the past meant that it was the main party against which other parties were defined; elections were not seriously competitive and were marked by low citizen participation. The conduct of regular elections in Malaysia suggests some democratic aspects, but free elections, independent political judgments, and individual protection from state abuse are allowed only if the position of the ruling elite is not seriously threatened. Apart from being the dominant party in the ruling alliance, UMNO has owed its electoral success to a strategy that favored the Malay community.

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It is alleged that the number of voters in predominantly non-Malay urban constituencies is always much larger than in predominantly Malay rural constituencies; although Malays constituted only 57 percent of the population in the 1980s, they made up majorities in 70 percent of the peninsular seats, guaranteeing heavy Malay overrepresentation in parliament (Crouch 1993, 137). As long as UMNO retained majority support in the Malay community, the success of the BN was ensured. In this way, “in each election the government was returned to power with substantial majorities through a combination of genuine popularity, manipulation of the electoral system and authoritarian controls” (Crouch 1993, 139). Although UMNO has dominated politics for decades, the November 1999 elections called into question the one-party model. The voters had a choice, albeit one between the parties of the omnipresent BN and its ideologically divided opposition, the Barisan Alternatif. But the factional struggles within UMNO were not a simple tussle over succession; they were an outward manifestation of large-scale shifts within Malaysian politics. They represented the crystallization of forces in civil society that helped propel the establishment of the new Keadilan party and the formation of BA, both of which focused on social and political reform. Although opposition parties like PAS, Keadilan, DAP, and the socialist-oriented Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM) had major policy differences, they had a tremendous edge due to the resentment of Mahathir and his government for their treatment of Anwar; PAS for instance, saw its membership rise dramatically after the sacking of Anwar. However, the BA could not translate this resentment into enough votes in all states to deny BN its customary two-thirds majority in parliament.57 The patronage system. Apart from the lack of political competition, UMNO’s success is rooted in its support of the majority of the Malay community. One of the bases of this support is its “control over patronage distribution at all levels” (Crouch 1993, 138)—contracts for businesspeople, promotions for bureaucrats, land for peasants, and scholarships for higher education. Although UMNO has pursued discrimination in favor of Malays in business, civil service, education, and rural development programs, it has not ignored the interests of non-Malay constituents, particularly the Chinese, in business, language, and customs. Therefore through control of patronage distribution, it has relied on an image of power-sharing that benefits non-Malays as well. This appeal contains implicit protection against threats of racial violence. Over the years UMNO has drawn support equally from all parts of the political spectrum and owes its success to both Malay and non-Malay communities. The new nexus between business and politics was strengthened under Mahathir, who believed not only in acquiring and retaining assets but also

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in developing capable bumiputra capitalists. According to Edmund Terence Gomez, there were three reasons for this involvement: to control the hitherto foreign-controlled publishing media, to gain financial independence from UMNO’s mainly Chinese contributors, and to secure funds for the party’s headquarters.58 Through a stream of executive postings, funds, and programs, UMNO sought to breed Malay capitalists to challenge Chinese economic dominance. This opportunity was exploited by penetrating financial services, property development, and media ownership. Finally, many Malay businessmen grew powerful enough to influence UMNO’s decisionmaking—bidding for nominations and influencing policies—thereby fusing government and business in Malaysia. Although these business dealings and political patronage involved corruption, economic inefficiencies, violations of shareholders’ rights, and creation of Malay millionaires, the patronage of the Malay middle class did increase the community’s sense of worth. Indeed, the economic stake that UMNO gave to Malays lessened the potential for interethnic encounters and gave rise to intra-Malay tensions.59 In recent years UMNO’s decline has been linked to the rise of money politics, also referred to as “vote buying” (Milne and Mauzy 1999, 26).60 The tangled web of business and politics since the 1980s eventually created a party dominated by entrepreneurs and business interests. This increases chances that officials will be reelected to UMNO’s top offices and thus strengthens their chances to be appointed to high government positions. At the May 2000 UMNO general assembly many delegates claimed that money politics had been introduced by Anwar. Despite intense discussions on the issue, there was no resolution passed on money politics. UMNO and nation-building. It can be argued that UMNO lives on by ensuring Malay dominance and authority. But the party has another appeal: champion of Malaysian identity. Here again, by stressing national unity, the party manages to appeal to the country’s different ethnic communities simultaneously. At one level the government proposes a national culture policy that heavily favors the values of the indigenous race. But at another level it declares respect for a multiracial Malaysia. As governors of a monoethnic state the BN has refrained from waging a campaign of zealous assimilation of non-Malay customs and educational practices. But thanks to the global resurgence of Islam, PAS has become a serious contender in national politics. The reason is easy to see: PAS offers a spiritual solution. UMNO has been and is today associated with a nationalist-secularist discourse in which the boundaries of the nation were sacrosanct.61 Now that those boundaries, which include economic security, have been secured, Malays have renewed their search for meaning in life. UMNO, with its secular orientation, is no longer paramount in the lives of Malays.

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Since the 1990s, cleavages within the Malay community have overshadowed the country’s interethnic rivalries, producing what one scholar has called “strain points” (Case 1995, 80).62 Even though—or perhaps because—UMNO has given Malays new positions in the economy and confidence in their community, Malay identities are in a state of flux. The new middle class, exceedingly modern, is engaged in reinventing tradition and putting religion at the center of life. Therefore in coming years UMNO’s main goal and source of power—protecting Malays—may no longer guarantee loyalty from the Malay community. And UMNO’s supremacy cannot be ensured even if it allows for an appreciation of non-Malay interests. As a nationalist Malay party, it cannot afford to back down in the Islamization standoff with PAS. To do so would be a betrayal of Islamic interests and would cost UMNO the Malay constituency. Yet if UMNO decides to become more Islamic, it would intensify the Islamization of Malay society.63 State, Economic Growth, and Authoritarianism I now summarize the causal role that certain elements of Malaysian politics played—apart from societal pluralism, political stability, and the UMNO party system—in the rise of some features of authoritarianism. The dominant role of the state is important to understand the rapid economic growth and consolidation of executive rule in Malaysia. The state’s intervention in the economy was not merely to invest, rapidly accumulate, or protect domestic capital; its overall goal was maintaining Malay hegemony in government and elevating Malay economic power. Rapid economic change was accompanied by far-reaching structural changes that brought about a transformation of the class structure. At the time of independence the Malay business class was underdeveloped, there was no significant working class, and hence there was no objective basis for a mass party to represent their interests. A Malay bureaucratic elite and a Chinese business class dominated Malaysian society. The white-collar middle class was small and overwhelmingly non-Malay, whereas most Malays were peasants and rural workers. Due to an underdeveloped Malay bourgeoisie, capitalist transformation in Malaysia had to rely on foreign, especially Chinese, capital.64 Under the NEP the approach to economic growth through governmentowned enterprises was based on the premise that poverty was primarily a bumiputra phenomenon that needed immediate attention. The combined effect of these policies was the growth of a Malay capitalist class. The other section consisted of small and medium-sized capitalists, many of them contractors dependent on the state for their existence. A noted scholar goes so far as to say that the “new Malay business class was in fact a creation of the government. Malay business people were not entrepreneurs who set up new

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enterprises but clients of politicians who were given business opportunities as rewards for political support” (Crouch 1993, 146). Thus the creation of differentiated capitalist and bureaucratic elites that resulted from the NEP was not simply a consequence of economic growth but was shaped by a Malay-dominated UMNO government. The policy of Malay ethnic particularism in structuring the political basis of the state assisted UMNO in the long run in maintaining its hold over a multiracial society. The increasing involvement of the state in the economy led investors to lobby influential Malay politicians and bureaucrats and to offer them stock options or directorships on the boards of companies. Government institutional backing was further expanded by legislation like the Petroleum Development Act (1974) and the Industrial Coordination Act (1975); the former put the country’s petroleum resources under the control of a national oil agency, Petronas, and the latter ruled that unexempted companies must ensure 30 percent bumiputra participation. Although rapid economic growth was successful in generating national income and diversifying the economy, foreign and Chinese capital gradually lost its once powerful grip on certain sectors.65 As Chinese influence waned the new Chinese capitalists who emerged in the 1980s were more closely associated with leading “Malay patrons, capitalists or politicians” rather than independent businessmen (Jomo and Gomez 1999, 181).66 Thus successful state-driven economic growth, as well as the marginalization of Chinese and foreign business groups, kept most of the Malay bourgeoisie loyal to the state. Moreover, UMNO’s ability to keep the Chinese business class out of the political inner circle ensured loyalty from a state-promoted Malay bourgeoisie. Finally, under the development state the blurring of lines among UMNO, political institutions, and the government shaped social mobilization. Every significant expansion and every step into civil society had the potential for expanding the coercive ability of the state. Authoritarianism was easier to establish and sustain because the state did not face an old and established labor movement; export-oriented industrialization could be launched through demobilization of unions and a closer linking of labor to the development plans of the state.67

Populist Authoritarianism The combination of societal pluralism and elite consociational politics gave rise to the state as principal unifying symbol. The underdevelopment of the Malay bourgeoisie allowed the state to lead the economy to fulfill its goals of development and modernization. It could be argued that those goals were divorced from consideration of social justice or democracy and were measured

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by growth of national income and Malay political dominance. However, it would be far too facile to attribute the strengthening of authoritarian controls exclusively to societal pluralism or consociationalism of elite politics; a strong executive takes shape slowly and effectively, by thought, style, and action. It is influenced by individual personality as well as by the political system, party machine, and political culture. The degeneration of political activity that accompanied the rise of the authoritarian state assumed specific forms under the rule of Mahathir. According to some scholars, after Mahathir’s accession in 1981 “new ideas and ways of doing things” were “introduced in the political system and the society revealing the will of a strong executive” (Zakaria Haji Ahmad 1993, 153). There is no doubt that Mahathir is distinguished by an extraordinary leadership style that defies easy characterization. Many scholars use the term populist authoritarianism to refer to his personal style of leadership.68 Populism involves the creation of an ideology that can be used to manipulate the populace through many subtle forms. Specifically, according to Nicos Poulantzas, the term refers to a form of state domination that contains, apart from the nature of repressive institutions, an ideological aspect.69 On the concrete level of analysis, the classic mediation of a populist ideology is found in a charismatic leader like Mahathir who communicates directly to the people, bypassing institutions and organizations of the state through domination and control. There are many ideological forms through which he appeals to the people. I focus on some of the implications that this style of leadership has for sustaining authoritarianism in Malaysia. The first major change Mahathir introduced in the economy was to replace UMNO’s heritage of economic patrimonialism with a new commercial and technocratic culture, administered by efficient state bureaucrats, Malay entrepreneurs, and a disciplined workforce. This technocratic and bureaucratic approach to policymaking contrasted with a more democratic approach responsive to economic and political demands raised by different elements of society (political parties, election campaigns, labor unions, etc.). Mahathir pushed his vision of modern Malaysia based on a private sector–led, export-oriented, and heavy industrialized economy; after a decade of the NEP, state economic interventionism had led to the proliferation of nonfinancial public enterprises characterized by inefficiency, lack of accountability, and poor management.70 His early campaigns for a clean, efficient, and trustworthy administration implied the need for discipline, hard work, and productivity as well as changes in culture, values, and motivation. Comments on his style of government referred to his managerial qualities, including a sense of urgency and his call for a knowledge-based system. Mahathir’s management approach was illustrated by specific changes: insistence that civil servants should arrive at the office on time, nametags for civil servants, an emphasis on information-based decisionmaking.

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Most striking, ambitious and visible national projects were launched in tandem with populist appeals. The Look East policy initially rested on the argument that new models of economic progress and success were needed and that Japan and South Korea could provide these. Later Mahathir linked the campaign to the need to introduce Japanese-style work ethics and management structures to increase productivity (see Milne and Mauzy 1986, 83; 1999, 55–57). These appeals were based on the claim that Western countries, or at least their form of social organization, were no longer appropriate either materially or culturally for Malaysians. For the most part, however, Mahathir was cautious enough to mention such Japanese qualities as loyalty, unselfishness, diligence, efficiency, cleanliness, thrift, and—most frequently—hard work and discipline. He argued that Japanese “cultural values are akin to the kind of morals and ethics that we have in this country or would like to acquire in this country” (Das 1982b, 38). Emulation of the Japanese and Korean models, he stressed, did not imply total imitation.71 Similarly, Mahathir’s campaign for Malaysia Incorporated proposed to bridge differences between the private and the public sectors. During the 1990s the overburdened state turned to privatization and foreign capital to generate industrial development; the capitalist restructuring that took place under Mahathir was rationalized as a means to divest the state of huge economic burdens while improving the efficiency of many state agencies. Two principal stages were identified: corporatization and privatization. By instituting structural adjustment policies Mahathir imposed a restraint on public spending and development expenditures. In mid-1991 the government announced the National Development Policy, which shifted away from the redistributive goals of the NEP and supported the private sector at the expense of the public sector. In the same year he also presented his “Vision 2020” plan of long-term objectives for industrialization, growth, and modernization. In this manner Mahathir endeavored to address economic development of Malaysian society through populist slogans and implement them using a technocratic approach. The second change that sustains authoritarianism is found in the steady growth of executive powers under statutes curtailing judicial independence. The judiciary, legal process, constitution, and electoral system have played an important part in Mahathir’s attempts to gain supremacy over the institutions of government and garner legitimacy for his actions. Since 1983 Mahathir has used the rule of law to justify his actions. In a major controversy, he circumscribed the powers of Malay rulers via the Constitution (Amendment) Act of 1983.72 Until 1988, Malaysia’s constitution provided for the separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary. In that year, after a series of judicial decisions unfavorable to his government, Mahathir suspended six supreme court judges. Three were subsequently removed, including Lord President Salleh Abas. The constitution

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was amended to eliminate the powers and jurisdiction of courts and their independence from the executive. A 2000 report on the judiciary even claimed that this “assault” transformed the judiciary into an arm of the legislature, an instrument of the executive.73 The independence of the judiciary received its greatest blow during Anwar’s trials for corruption and sexual misconduct, which Mahathir used to physically constrain, delegitimize, and marginalize his former deputy. Anwar was first sentenced to six years for abuse of power and then to another nine years on charges of sodomy— unnatural sex being a criminal offense. This effectively removed him from the political arena until 2015.74 Mahathir’s justification for blocking citizens’ freedoms is also based on the need to curb the influence of pressure groups and NGOs, which he considers to be the worst aspects of democracy. Some of the laws revised or amended during his tenure and that have implications for civil and political rights include: the Official Secrets Act of 1972 (amended in 1984), Police Act of 1967 (1981), Printing Presses and Publication Act (1984), and the Trades Union Act of 1959 (1981; see Chapter 6). Most notorious is the Internal Security Act (ISA), which provides for detention without trial. Most claims used in repressing individual freedom focus on communitarian aspects of Asian culture and values. Mahathir has demonstrated that emphasis on individual rights at the expense of moral values has contributed to social malaise in the West.75 Mahathir has become an extraordinarily powerful individual, but the source of his power today derives from the nature of the political structure and political institutions, which ironically he has gradually weakened. Besides dominating the media and strengthening executive powers, he has tightened his grip on UMNO by stifling leadership challenges. He put loyalists in control of the youth and women’s wings, both of which were dominated by Anwar supporters. The federal structure of UMNO has been gradually destroyed, giving rise to a more centralized but less effective party apparatus. The electoral process also legitimizes his political rule. To strengthen his mandate Mahathir calls for regular elections and represents their results as reflecting the popular will. But government restrictions on open assembly and the brevity of the campaign period give him a distinct advantage over opponents (he gives barely two weeks’ notice of election). The process of electing the BN is associated with guaranteeing stability, order, and economic growth yet is a citizen ritual with a predictable outcome. The government-controlled media that portrays rival parties as extremist on ethnic or religious grounds also aids him. Finally, elections legitimize the ruling BN with a popular endorsement that modifies the state’s authoritarian character. The third remarkable feature of Mahathir’s rule is his ability to balance group interests in a multiethnic society by linking their needs to economic

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growth, political stability, and the capitalist transformation of Malaysian society. Mahathir’s moral claim to state power has rested on his ability to promote Malay unity, protection, and dominance, a mission that itself derives morally from the community’s indigenous standing. While playing the role of protector of the Malays he has tried to persuade the Chinese and Indians that his government responsibly checks Malay chauvinism.76 The institutional basis for striking this balance—redressing Malay grievances while respecting non-Malay identities and property rights—is realized in the patronage system that distributes to all the communities. Mahathir’s grandiose projects for economic growth parallel transformations in the middle class and consumer aspirations. His personal interest in elite-level patronage and urban amenities, as well as Islamic programs, has done much to increase his popularity in all communities. His support for corporatization of public services and a private-sector approach has increased his own power in a market economy. Even the recovery of Malaysia from the 1997–1998 economic crisis was portrayed as a personal victory because his policy of economic control, imposed in September 1998, protected Malaysia from the whims of outside investors. By bringing an end to capital flight, capital controls allowed the government to lower interest rates and pump cash into the economy. And the government’s attempt to encourage financial institutions to continue lending to companies, many of them politically connected, has been a success in the short term. After Daim Zainuddin resigned as finance minister in June 2001, Mahathir once again hastened to restructure the economy and win the confidence of foreign investors. Although preferential treatment for Malays will continue, Mahathir realizes that protecting troubled corporate favorites is harmful to the economy and his political future.77 The Protector Ideology But this analysis of the powers of the executive and the lack of organized political dissent does not entirely explain the consolidation of a semidemocratic, semiauthoritarian, or illiberal regime in the Malaysian context. The factors that gave rise to authoritarianism are far more complex and reflect the specific economic, social, and cultural structures of Malaysian society. There are limits to the term populist authoritarianism because it focuses on an individual or the ideological apparatus that consolidates authoritarianism while overlooking the other factors that sustain authoritarianism. Indeed, some factors that maintain an executive in power are the product of entrenched attitudes sanctioned by time and tradition. As in other postcolonial societies, political culture in Malaysia is marked by a shared cultural frame of reference among the rulers and the ruled. The historical development of the state has had a profound effect on

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the outlook of its people. According to Clive Kessler, Malay society and culture rests upon certain political institutions—“upon people having and being subjects of a raja, a ruler. The polity, a kerajaan, is not only a ruler’s domain but his subject’s socio-cultural condition, that of having a raja” (Kessler 1992, 136).78 Indeed, adherence to this cultural order reaffirms Malay social identity. Traditions and values have ensured the political survival of leaders who emphasize order over conflict and loyalty to Asian values over individual freedom and needs, even though they are themselves involved in power struggles. According to some historians the bond between the ruler and the ruled in traditional Malay society was of the classic patron-client variety; the expressive form was woven into a web of ceremonies glorifying the ruler.79 This relationship rested upon loyalty, labor, and services of the subject in return for certain rewards and protection by the head of state. Implicit is the claim that Malaysia’s political culture has a relational aspect—a sense of obligation and reward among elites, as well as between elites and the masses (see Case 1995, 82–84). In this we can perceive the roots of the feudal relationship and mentality of the “protector” ideology as described by Chandra Muzaffar (1979). The cultural significance of titles, ranks, and honors, as well as the highly ceremonial form of all political occasions, is evident today. One of the abiding characteristics of Malaysian political culture is the “unquestioning acceptance of, and acquiescence with, the authority of the state and of the man at the helm of government” (Chandra 1998a, 1). According to Chandra this relationship between ruler and ruled was “reinforced by [the Malay community’s] deep psychological need for a protector to look after the community’s interests in the face of the competition posed by the economically better-off Chinese minority” (Chandra 1998a, 1).80 The paradox is that the most traditional of all Malay political values—obligatory followership essential to the principle of loyalty—has been mobilized within UMNO to ensure the political survival of Mahathir, a modern and technocratic leader who has shown strong dislike for the feudal system but has nevertheless made use of it.81 This has implications for the way democratic practices are defined under authoritarianism in Malaysia. It is a democracy that resolves conflict “through deferring to a representative executive elite that employs authority (power plus wisdom) in pursuit of the aggregate interests of its electoral constituency” (Barber 1984, 140). Democracy in Malaysia is deficient because, first, it is dependent on “representative politics,” which becomes a surrogate for “activity in politics,” or an “engaged citizenry”; second, this system has little place for citizenship because its politics only allows for selection of elites through representative politics. The relevant point is that the government’s posture is centralized and active and the citizens’ posture is deferential and fragmented.

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Challenges to Authoritarianism Although the government is a stable regime, rapid economic growth and evolving political and religious identities during an era of globalization are modifying and shaping political authority. What could possibly lead to democratic politics effectively loosening the state’s grip over civil society? Against the background of rapid modernization and economic crisis, four major challenges to Mahathir’s style of populist authoritarianism have taken shape. These are related to political corruption, the decline of UMNO, the resurgence of Islam, and multiracial politics. The state is a vital instrument for wealth accumulation, and individuals’ access to economic resources is contingent upon political access and influence. Mahathir’s administration has faced several financial scandals since 1981, with hints of political corruption. Misuse of public funds, official positions, and information has been widespread (see Milne and Mauzy 1999, 68). This has involved prestigious institutions, industries, and government agencies in scandals related to Bumiputera Malaysia Finance (BMF), Pan Electric Industries, the North-South Highway project, and deposit-taking cooperatives (see Khoo Boo Teik 1997, 64–65). Meanwhile Mahathir’s closest associate, Daim (appointed minister of finance in 1984), was named the leading figure in a major scandal revealed by journalists of the Asian Wall Street Journal in 1986 (for which the newspaper was temporarily banned).82 In the public’s view, the principle of ministerial responsibility did not operate, and government did not act against the alleged transgressors. The fact that influential and wealthy businessmen by the 1990s were also those closest to the prime minister and Daim suggests that the creation and disbursement or allocation of resources and their protection have been crucial for continued political hegemony (see Jomo and Gomez 1999, 126–130). Reports of mismanagement of megaprojects and deficiencies in the banking system have been common.83 Mahathir’s pet industrialization projects have been condemned as exorbitant and unprofitable. In 1988 the government-owned Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia joint ventures for auto manufacture Proton and for a steel complex, Perwaja, were plagued by serious problems. Critics regarded the heavy industrialization policy as illconceived from the outset—projects like the Dayabhumi Complex, the Penang Bridge, the Twin Towers, a new capital (Putrajaya), and a Formula One track have not been spared. Apart from corruption in government, UMNO is facing a rapid decline in popularity. This was evident in the last general elections when the party failed to hold together its traditional supporters. In 1999 UMNO managed to retain a three-quarters majority in parliament, but its share of the popular vote slid to 56 percent from 65 percent in the 1995 polls (Oorjitham

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2000d). The party has been unable to rely on its traditional power support— civil servants, teachers, and rural voters—or in newly found support—university students, women, and professionals. Another significant reason for the party’s decline is that while it has introduced exclusively Malay-oriented policies a large proportion of state funds has not reached the grassroots. This has created considerable anguish among people who feel they have been neglected by UMNO. Others see the party as suffering from disgust over sokong-dan setuju (support-and-agree) syndrome, money politics, and the erosion of Malay support.84 Taking his cue from neighboring Indonesia, Mahathir now aims to reform UMNO but has stopped short of creating a system of checks and balances whereby members of government would be accountable to parliament and directly answerable to the people in courts of law.85 It is possible that the rise of an Islamic party as the main opposition in parliament points to an erosion of Mahathir’s popularity and a transition toward political Islam. After all, at least one-half of ethnic Malays, the country’s most important voter group, voted for the opposition. In the future such results will pressure UMNO to embrace PAS’s goal of an Islamic nation. The problem is that such a move would give legitimacy to all kinds of cult groups and alternative movements, delineating boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims and making it difficult for secular-minded civil society activists to project their concerns. After the Anwar verdict, support for PAS leaders is growing, and this is bound to become a greater challenge in years to come. The UMNO-led BN suffered major losses in the northern states of Terengganu and Kelantan. The political implications of UMNO’s restricted social base in the Malay community have deepened Mahathir’s nervousness about the intentions of Islamic groups (PAS in particular) and pushed the government to compete with PAS as keepers of the faith. In recent years the government’s justification of development yet again changed to stress that economic development should not be devoid of spiritual purpose and should contribute to a disciplined and morally upright society.86 However, any changes in government are going to be dictated by multiracial politics. A move toward further Islamization is unlikely to be accepted by minorities—the Chinese and Indians—who constitute 30 percent and 9 percent of Malaysia’s population. Because the imprisonment of Anwar divided the dominant Malay community, which had supported the BN in the past, the Chinese vote tilted the balance in many constituencies in 1999. These votes cannot unseat the ruling coalition from parliament but can help it maintain the two-thirds majority it has held for decades. In 1990, following a recession and a split in UMNO, only 35–40 percent Chinese supported Mahathir’s coalition. In the 1999 elections the DAP’s low standing was seen as a rejection by traditional

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Chinese supporters, who are Buddhist or Christian, over its association with PAS in the BA. This resulted in a resounding victory for the MCA, the main Chinese party in the BN, possibly because the majority of the middle class and business class in the Chinese community appreciate political stability.87 Chinese voters in Malaysian politics might support UMNO against the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, but they might reduce their support if UMNO goes too far in trying to win the Muslim vote.88 Caught in the wave of new and emerging discrepancies between the structural context and his own populist initiatives, Mahathir may come to rely more heavily on the coercive instruments of state authority. As long as he manages to remain at the helm of the state he could also offset UMNO’s organizational weaknesses by extending patronage to the different groups in the BN or by impelling the opposition to cross over to his side. But populist sentiments unmatched by an effective party organization might prove to be fatal in the next general elections (expected to take place in 2004). Neither Mahathir’s personal style nor the coercive instruments of the state could save a situation where the opposition unites in a great show of strength. However, whether authoritarian trends will decline depends not only on personal leadership and structural constraints but also on the development of fundamental liberties and civil society.

Conclusion There are compelling arguments for liberal democracy that are now becoming accepted in many parts of the world with different political cultures. But one cannot ignore the context in which authoritarianism exists. It is no longer a world sealed by frontiers and iron curtains but an integrated global system. I argued that from the perspective of civil society there is a perceptible trend toward democratization in Malaysia. Increasingly competitive multiparty elections, assertive judicial bodies, and strengthened NGOs are indicators. It is also manifest in the widespread concern for greater transparency and accountability in government and the UMNO. The process of democratization remains largely unconsolidated, but citizens and groups have mounted an attack on official arbitrariness, corruption, and money politics. It is widely held that primordial loyalties based on ethnic identities, or the need for political stability and economic growth, stand in the way of democratization and nationalism in Malaysia. Such is not the case. It is not the nature of a multicultural society that gives rise to authoritarianism but the fact that individual liberty and freedom are never seen as important; accommodation of the interests of ethnic groups sets the tone for the dominance of UMNO and Mahathir. Moreover, Malays and the Chinese have promoted and benefited from rapid economic growth. The Malay community’s

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cultural ethos, derived from the kampung world, differs from that of the Chinese, who are more steeped in a modern materialistic culture; yet both indigenous and immigrant communities are enmeshed in the capitalist economy, which has become the main source of social interaction and behavior. Still the Malay community has time and again raised the need for cultural identity. The main challenge to authoritarianism has come from the emerging Malay middle class that has benefited from the NEP, in the form of an Islamic resurgence in the face of globalization. Basic political institutions—the judiciary, parliament, the constitutional monarchy—were set up, but these institutions operated in a context where the party system never became competitive. The process toward democratization is slow. First, populist authoritarianism supported by a party machine has undermined the claims of ethnic communities via the political strategy of containment. Authoritarianism has been backed by institutional arrangements associated with consociational democracy. A grand coalition consisting of representatives of all the ethnic communities has been secure in power thanks to a strong executive backed by a UMNO-led government and the business classes. Whatever accommodations exist were determined by the boundaries of this pact. Under Mahathir accommodation has become restricted by a one-party system. In the call to national unity all ethnic communities are expected to subordinate their interests to the cause of political stability. The major flaw in this model is that in giving primacy to the reconciliation of ethnic interests the leaders of ethnic communities have subordinated individual rights and civil liberties in favor of religious-community rights (see Chapter 6). Second, populist authoritarianism has led to a gradual decline of political institutions, which has become more pronounced since Mahathir took power in 1981. Since then a pattern of incremental executive encroachment on the other branches of government has transpired thanks to repeated amendment of the constitution. All this has facilitated implementation of key economic policies, efficacy of the developmental role of the state, and the political patronage that comes with it. The most harmful impact has been to the election process. The last four elections followed the same pattern: anxiety over election dates, threats of ethnic conflict and political instability, and manipulations of the media. The Official Secrets Act, the ISA, and government-controlled media have been used to control political opposition, public interest groups, NGOs, and trade unions (see Wang Lay Kim 1998). Thus, because Mahathir has little commitment to democratic governance, the constitution, parliament, civil societies, and other key institutions of democratic politics remain fragile. The persistence of harsh laws, hostile courts, and government restrictions on the media imposes additional limits on the media’s ability to play watchdog.

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Third, all societal and political participation by citizens is mandated under state control, which extends to the articulation of politically relevant opinion. The difficulty of resisting centralization is compounded by the fact that institutions lack autonomy from executive control and do not have constitutionally protected powers. The state has either sponsored new private organizations (Islamic organizations and research institutes) or taken over existing ones (trade unions, human rights commissions). Such an approach has the long-term effect of destroying mass organizations and weakening any opposition to the state. Today Malaysia has many formal institutions of democracy and organizations, but they do not enjoy autonomy from the state, are not based on a rule of law, and do not respond to the needs and interests of civil society.89 In order to oppose authoritarian controls there is a need to increase the quality of democratic judgments through widespread citizen participation in multiple public spheres, both within and among the institutions of state and civil society. But this task has to be reconciled to the interests of movements, organizations, and elites committed to establishing rights based on Islamic justice. I examine these in Chapter 6.

Notes 1. For example, countries like Pakistan and Fiji established military governments after overthrowing elected democratic governments. 2. On this trend, see general report on World Bank conference held in Seoul in February 1999, “Democracy and Crisis,” Asiaweek (9 April). 3. For attempts to resolve competing disagreements on democracy, see Rawls (1973); Connolly (1983); Benhabib (1996). 4. For a classic defense of liberal democracy and its function in promoting individual self-determination, see Dahl (1998, 45); and for the view that the competitive model is better suited to the pluralist nature of modern society, see Bobbio (1987). For traditions of democratic thought in America and Britain, see Roper (1989); John Dewey (1952, 18–19). 5. This argument can be found in Tocqueville (1966, 234–239) and Mill (1976, 131–132). 6. For these challenges, see Habermas (1973); Barber (1984); Touraine (1997); Benhabib (1996); Kymlicka (2001). 7. For arguments supporting these claims in Malaysia, see Zakaria Haji Ahmad (1989, 347); Case (1993, 183); Crouch (1993, 133). 8. These characteristics of Asian-style democracy are proposed by Neher and Marlay (1995, 13). 9. For a development of this viewpoint, see Mouzelis (1998, 57–82). 10. As an example of this work, see Rostow (1960); Apter (1965). 11. Georg Sorenson (1993, 63–75) compares the cases of India and China to invalidate this argument. In the past some scholars incorrectly believed that there is no reason for democracy to develop in Southeast Asia because modernization is shaped and conditioned by its very different traditional heritage (Tregonning 1967, 330).

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12. I refer to a pendulum situation wherein democratic and authoritarian solutions keep alternating, as in Argentina. Sorenson also classifies three types of authoritarian regimes: authoritarian development regimes, authoritarian growth regimes, and authoritarian state elite enrichment regimes. The problems in the typology of authoritarian regimes given by Sorenson (1993, 76) are quite evident. 13. As an example of this school, see Eisenstadt (1966); Apter (1965). 14. Modernization theory here refers to several perspectives that were applied to the third world by social scientists, planners, and politicians in the 1950s and 1960s. This argument is present in books influenced by the modernization paradigm published in the late 1970s on this region (Kearney 1975). 15. See also S. M. Lipset’s (1994) presidential address published in American Political Science Review. He argues that because new democracies have low levels of legitimacy there is a need for caution about the long-term prospects for their stability. 16. I refer to an interpretation of Marxism found in Cohen’s (1978) earlier work on Marx. For theories of development related to the third world, see Frank (1969). 17. O’Donnell outlined a pathbreaking thesis about the emergence of new forms of authoritarianism in Latin America (1973). Later he changed his argument that higher levels of modernization block democratization in an essay about transitions from authoritarian rule (1986). For a general assessment of this work, see Most (1980, 174). 18. Huntington popularized the term third wave to imply the democratization that many countries experienced, especially in the developing world (Huntington 1991). In a few years the pace of democratization slowed down and even reversed in some cases, leading scholars to ask about the quality and nature of these democracies (Diamond 1996). 19. In this section I draw upon some ideas from Joel S. Kahn and Loh Kok Wah (1992, 9–11). 20. J. S. Furnivall (1956) was a noted economist and colonial administrator who studied the tropical dependencies in Burma and Siam (Thailand). 21. For earlier views on communal compartmentalization in Malaysian society, see Rabushka and Shepsle (1972, 8); Von Vorys (1976, 21–23); Ratnam (1965, 25). There are others like Maurice Friedman who asserted that nationalism did not abolish ethnocentrism but merely modernized it (Friedman 1960, 158–168). 22. See Rabushka and Shepsle (1972, 20–21). Due to lack of space I do not examine the differences in the work of political scientists like Karl Deutsch and S. M. Lipset on multiple group membership, although they form part of my analysis. They viewed plural society as less politically integrated and democratic compared to homogenous societies. Their first argument is that cultural differences cause conflict and inhibit the establishment of coalitions and compromise among various cultural groups. These differences obstruct the development of multiple crosscutting group memberships that are held to be essential to the development of democratic institutions. Therefore plural societies would tend to be less democratic than culturally homogenous societies. The second argument is that cultural pluralism involves vertical forms of association based on linguistic, religious, and ethnic differences. These forms of associations also obstruct the process of coalition-formation across cultural groups (Lipset 1963; Deutsch 1961). 23. Sartori (1976) initially applied the term consociational democracy to small Western European countries, particularly the Netherlands, that coped with problems of cultural pluralism. For a review of his work, see Daalder (1974); and for criticism, see Milne and Mauzy (1999, 17–19).

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24. Hewison, Rodan, and Robison (1993, 6) describe democracy in terms of “certain objectives and guarantees” that include legal guarantees for citizens to participate in the formulation of policies, the institutionalization of political freedoms, legitimacy of political contestation, and popular accountability. 25. The view that I criticize is ably defended by Case (1996) in his work on consociational democracy in Malaysia. I disagree with some aspects of his argument that rely exclusively on an interpretation of elite relations and their political behavior in a plural society. 26. For factions within UMNO and the UMNO split, see Milne and Mauzy (1999, 39–45). Political parties such as DAP complain that BN leaders use all occasions to raise the specter of the May 13 incident. See the media statement issued by DAP on 28 June 1999. 27. Khoo Boo Teik also advances a similar thesis, although he focuses on the interplay of class, ethnicity, and capitalism (1997, 54). 28. For this view, see Vasil (1979, 2); Zakaria Haji Ahmad (1989, 352). 29. The works of Jesudason (1990, 1–12, 123–124) and Husin Ali (1984, 1–31) are examples of this approach. 30. See Brennan (1982, 190, 203) and Lim Mah Hui (1980, 149) for such views. 31. See Brennan (1982, 209–210); Lim Mah Hui (1980, 149). 32. For a defense of this view, see K. S. Jomo (1989, 9–11). 33. See Chapter 2 for an elaboration of these points. Also see Strauch (1984); Suryadinata (1997). 34. For more on changes in Malay cultural identity, see Kahn and Loh Kok Wah (1992, introduction). 35. I endorse Neumann’s argument that a belief in the rule of law and the supremacy of the legislature is a precondition for liberal capitalist democracy (Neumann 1957). Both these conditions are lacking in the Malaysian political system. However, I would not see Mahathir’s rule as “totalitarian,” even though it subjugates law to the commands of the state and eradicates the notion of human freedom, because totalitarian rule is by force and not by consent. The idea of consent cannot be ruled out in this case because BN has come to power through elections and huge majorities. For a discussion of related conceptual issues, see Halberstam (1999). 36. I use the term political stability in a very restricted sense and acknowledge problems in making generalizations. Here I refer only to the way threats to the government or political changes have not disrupted the centralized form of government. The military forces have played an important role in the rise of authoritarianism, but in Malaysia, by playing a minimal role, they have contributed to political stability. It is difficult to generalize these findings because Burma has been under continuous authoritarian rule backed by the military since 1962. However, Burma does not share Malaysia’s high economic performance and political stability. There were instances when this political stability seemed to break down for other reasons. The background to Malaysia’s confrontation with Singapore and Indonesia is discussed in Chapter 2. Indonesian aggression took the form of sea- and airborne landings and sabotage activities on Malaysian territory. There was a fear of greater hostilities developing, although these dissipated very soon due to internal challenges within Indonesia. 37. According to Khoo Boo Teik (1995), Mahathir’s ideas constitute a coherent political ideology. Although broadly agreeing with the research contents of his book, I disagree with his main thesis that the five components of Mahathirism—nationalism, capitalism, Islam, populism, and authoritarianism—display a degree of consistency. On the contrary, I would argue that Mahathir’s pragmatism and ambiguity toward these issues make him a powerful leader today.

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38. Since independence in 1957, general elections have been held regularly, the first being in August 1959. Elections were also held in 1964, 1969, 1974, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1995, and 1999; the next elections are expected to take place in 2004. 39. Richard Stubbs (1990, 260–261) proposes this view. See also Barraclough (1985, 800). 40. See Groves (1979). The first postindependence emergency was proclaimed on grounds of national security to meet armed aggression by Indonesia in 1964. There was an emergency in September 1966 in Sarawak due to political tensions among the governments in joining Malaysia. Stephen Kalong Ningkan, the chief minister at the time, was subsequently dismissed. Emergency was again declared when race riots broke out in 1969. Finally in 1977 the federal government invoked emergency powers to deal with a political crisis in the state of Kelantan. 41. See Crouch’s (1993) analysis for this period. 42. Zakaria Haji Ahmad describes the development toward a restricted democracy during the Interregnum 1969–1971 (1993, 149–151). 43. Even the Royal Commission of Inquiry said that it was wrong to handcuff Anwar after he was in the police lockup. See “Panel: Cops Wrong to Handcuff Anwar,” The Star, 15 April 1999. For more articulate views on the judiciary, see interview of Sulaiman Abdullah, the newly elected chairman of the Bar Council, by Elegant and Jayasankaran (2000a). 44. For more on this, see William Case (1995, 89). 45. For an analysis of this short-term balance, see Case (1995, 95–97). 46. I borrow the term old guard from William Case (1995, 97). 47. About the feudal political style of Tunku, see Milne and Mauzy (1978, 357). 48. See Zakaria Haji Ahmad (1993, 153). I think it would be more appropriate to view this phase as one of semiauthoritarianism, as parliament was suspended, several opposition leaders detained without trial, and others arrested. 49. The idea of a democracy in the Malaysian mold was proposed by both Prime Minister Tun Razak and Ghazali Shafie. For discussion on the increasing authoritarian nature of the government after the 1970s, see Zakaria Haji Ahmad (1989, 365); Crouch (1992, 21); Jomo and Gomez (1999, 1–9). 50. For details of these events, see Case (1995, 98). 51. According to Harold Crouch (1993, 154) this conflict also reflected the economic crisis of the mid-1980s. See also Jomo and Gomez (1999, 122–123). 52. In the mid-1980s the practice of political patronage and the influence of money politics curtailed business opportunities. The government was forced to sharply cut back contracts, credits, and concessions that were promised to Malay businessmen under the NEP. Dissatisfaction within the party was expressed in the support for Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, a Malay aristocrat from the northern state of Kelantan, who set up Semangat 46 in 1989. The latter represented small and medium-sized Malay businesses that were unhappy about patronage abuses and wanted to continue the state-centered policies of the NEP, whereas Mahathir and his faction supported bigger business interests, privatization, deregulation, and internationalization. For more, see Khoo Kay Jin (1992, 62–63), who is also of the view that the split was not due to personalities, personal styles, or personal greed for power but instead suggests that underlying the conflict in 1987 was a real difference of policy issues within UMNO. 53. For more on this, see Milne and Mauzy (1999, 39–49). 54. Although a strong critic of political ties with business, Anwar is alleged to have close links with many businessmen (Jomo and Gomez 1999, 70–73, 124–127).

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55. After Anwar’s impressive performance in the general assembly, Mahathir decided to tighten procedures for UMNO elections. In 1993, the nominations made by UMNO divisions for the party deputy presidency ran heavily in favor of Anwar. So in 1996, candidates had to register directly with party headquarters, entering a list that could only be endorsed by divisions. Thus, Mahathir removed the power of the divisions to make nominations. For more, see Case (1977). 56. This despite calls for UMNO to rejuvenate; see Leong (2000). On 30 October UMNO’s supreme council approved a set of proposals to scrap party elections, which implied that the prime minister and party president would not face another leadership test in the lifetime of the current parliament. For more, see Jayasankaran (2000b). 57. For more on the 1999 general elections, see Joseph Liow (2000). 58. For more details, see Gomez (1990, 166). 59. Some observations are drawn from Case (1995, 104–105). 60. Money politics was criticized in the UMNO general assembly back in 1996, but nothing came out of it; see Mitton (1996). For more recent discussions in the fifty-fourth UMNO general assembly, see Elias (2000). 61. In the 1999 UMNO general assembly Mahathir went so far as to say that without a strong UMNO there would not be a credible Malaysian government because UMNO was the only defense of the country’s sovereignty. See Mahathir’s speech (1999c) and the report in The Star, 18 June 1999, 19–23. 62. Case argues that since the 1970s the UMNO-led government’s legitimacy has faced three strain points in history, but it has never slipped into a legitimacy crisis. I disagree with his thesis in light of recent developments in Malaysia. The claims that mark the UMNO-led government as the rightful holder of state power are being challenged (Case 1995, 80–81). 63. For the recent arms heist by an Islamic cult as reflecting this trend, see Chapter 4, endnote 67. 64. For some of the arguments in this section I rely on Jesudason (1990) and Crouch (1993). For an analysis of the class character of the state, see Khoo Boo Teik (1997, 52, 79). He argues that the Alliance that ruled between 1957 and 1969 was composed of foreign capitalists, Malay aristocrats, Chinese capitalists, and Indian petite bourgeoisie. This changed after 1969. 65. This is with special reference to the rapid decline of Chinese and foreign influence in the banking sector. See Jomo and Gomez (1999, 62). 66. Some of these are Vincent Tan Chee Yioun, Danny Tan Chee Sing, Ting Pek Khiing, Robert Tan Hua Choon, and T. K. Lim. Gomez does not accept the widespread belief that the Chinese control much of the economy even though Lim Goh Tong, who owns Genting Berhad and Resorts World, and Robert Kuok Hock Nien, the hotel and media tycoon, belong to the Chinese community (Gomez 2000). 67. According to M. R. Thompson, in times of economic crisis under authoritarianism the working class has often found allies among the business class for the restoration of democracy, as in South America. But the economic success of Malaysia is tied up with authoritarian controls that put political fetters on labor and capital alike (Thompson 1996, 633). For decline of trade unions in Malaysia, see Jomo and Todd (1994). 68. For an elaboration of this view, see Khoo Boo Teik (1995, 198–200); Anne Munro-Kua (1996, 5). 69. For more on this argument, see Poulantzas (1976). 70. Khoo Boo Teik states that only 269 out of more than 900 nonfinancial public enterprises submitted their annual returns to the Ministry of Public Enterprises in 1984 (1997, 55). 71. Quoted in Milne and Mauzy (1986, 85).

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72. All bills passed by parliament require royal assent before they become laws (article 66). A major controversy surrounded the constitutional amendments in 1983 in which the king apparently refused to give assent to the constitution (amendment) bill of 1983. The amended bill provided that a king should assent to a bill within fifteen days after being presented to him. The rulers’ powers were further circumscribed in 1993 (Milne and Mauzy 1999, 31–38). 73. I refer to the 121-page report (“Justice in Jeopardy: Malaysia in 2000”) issued jointly by four legal organizations: the International Bar Association, the Center for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers of the International Commission of Jurists, the Commonwealth Lawyers’ Association, and the International Lawyers’ Association. See Ching (2000a). 74. One of the startling pieces of testimony that damaged the credibility of the government during the trial was that of Shafie Yahaya, the former head of the government’s Anti-Corruption Agency. He testified that Mahathir personally ordered him to halt an investigation of the chief of the Economic Planning Unit, who supervises privatization projects. Elegant and Jayasankaran (2000b). 75. For a conceptual discussion on the nature of legal rights in Southeast Asia, see Jayasuriya (1996). 76. A recent example is the way Mahathir said that UMNO should accept that in the future the country might have a non-Malay prime minister. See “Dr M: UMNO Should Accept Non-Malay PM in Future,” The Sun, 18 June 2000. 77. For an overview of the Asian economic crisis, see Jomo (1998) and Jayasankaran and Hiebert (1998); for Mahathir’s recent attempts at corporate debtrestructuring, see Jayasankaran (2001c). 78. In his excellent book Milner (1982, 113) argues: “Not only were personal status and behaviour defined in terms of the Raja, but he was the prism through which men became acquainted with the wider world.” The raja, he argues, plays a moral, religious, and political role in the life of his subjects. 79. Gullick (1988, 134–137); Case (1995, 82–84). 80. For related views, see Chandra’s article (1999a). For earlier discussions on the Asian concept of authority, see Pye (1985). 81. For Mahathir’s role in the crisis with the monarchy, see Milne and Mauzy (1999, 38) and endnote 79 above. 82. Two foreign journalists from Asian Wall Street Journal were charged under the ISA, fined RM10,000, and expelled from the country for their investigation into the BMF affair as well as that involving the finance minister. It was suggested that Daim had benefited from the sale of shares in the United Malayan Banking Corporation to the state agency Pernas (Milne and Mauzy 1999, 71). See also Wang Lay Kim for other cases (1998, 77). The single enduring figure at Mahathir’s side for the past two decades has been Daim. However, disagreements between the two were evident on appointments, bailouts, and corporate issues. See Elegant (2000a). For differences on major corporate players that finally led Daim to resign in June 2001, see S. Jayasankaran (2001b). 83. On the way banks were being bailed out in Malaysia, see Jayasankaran (1999). A more critical account of privatization plan started in the 1990s is Fuller (2000b). 84. For interview with Musa Hitam, see Oorjitham (2000c). 85. For debate on money politics in UMNO, see Oorjitham (2000a). 86. Mahathir has argued that a totally secular society cannot be built in Malaysia because religion will always play a role (1999f). 87. Mahathir and UMNO have tried to woo the Chinese minority in every election because their vote can tilt the balance. See Hiebert (1999) for similar tactics in previous elections.

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88. The dissatisfaction is clear from the way Suqiu (the Malaysian Chinese Election Appeals Committee) raised the demand for the abolition of bumiputra and non-bumiputra status. See Crisp and Oorjitham (2000b). 89. Malaysia has several civil society organizations for children and juveniles, women and youth, economic and political development, environment, health, senior citizens, welfare, and human rights. See AIDCOM directory of NGOs and Chapter 6 for more.

6 Debating Human Rights

As a result of domestic and external pressures against authoritarian rule, many states in Southeast Asia have become electoral democracies. But political liberalization has triggered other kinds of conflicts; in countries dominated by Muslim populations, the dual aspirations of Islamization and democratization have established a framework for resolving the debate on cultural and religious rights.1 People in Aceh, Melanesian tribesmen in the province of Irian Jaya in Indonesia, the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) in southern Thailand, and Islamic groups fighting for the Muslim-dominated island of Mindanao in the Philippines are increasingly active, making states’ physical borders fragile.2 The surge for democratic change, accompanied by changes in political identity, have challenged the nationalist project based upon a theory of rights, national sovereignty, and citizenship.3 The revival of cultural groups and communities means our discussion of liberal democracy and human rights cannot be stated only in universal terms: special rights of indigenous, religious, and cultural groups need to be recognized insofar as they determine important human practices, traditions, and ways of life.4 Amid these changes the concept of state sovereignty continues to be hailed by political elites, but it is less applicable given new realities following the globalization of markets and cultures. These developments along with trends in globalization add impetus to cooperation in the region to stop the spread of civil unrest; however, they also give credibility to states trying to control and ride roughshod over human rights. The debate on the universal validity of human rights has concerned many countries in Asia, where governments with different ideological positions have used the right to national self-determination as a defense against other states attempting to interfere in their affairs.5 These countries have called for a system of human rights based on Asian values, which also justify their claims to a different sort of political development. Such ideological claims are treated with skepticism by social scientists and may or 167

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may not enjoy support among the general public. But they serve the purpose of drawing cultural boundaries between the West and Asian countries and mask the competition for power among states in Southeast Asia, where leaders struggle to stabilize economies and rebuild people’s confidence in their mandate. There are some common issues that need to be grappled with in these competing arguments about cultural rights. The liberal democratic model has been criticized, and in Malaysia many justify radically different political projects using the communitarian argument. They all defend the cultural particularity, uniqueness, and specificity of their communities compared to Western societies and demand for special treatment. According to Mahathir bin Mohamad the crisis of liberal democracy is its lack of cultural values. He highlights the importance of a political model based on Asian values instead of individual rights. He also appeals to widespread fear that an active civil society erodes authority and political order.6 Methodological and substantive criticisms have already been raised against these views. I argue that the false alternatives—between democracy and political stability, between democracy and economic growth—which often translate into authoritarian demands for disciplinary order and social control, need to be questioned (see Chapter 5). Here I focus on the cultural explanations given by Mahathir to challenge political rights, Western democracy, and globalization. Some traditional leaders in the Parti Islam SeMalaysia have drawn upon the textual sources of Islamic law to give them a social embodiment in the contemporary political context. Law is a central component of Islam, so it is not surprising that their attempts to come to terms with human rights should center on legal issues. But in seeking to reform the legal foundations for the implementation of a modern shari’a, they face challenges from modern constitutionalism and the universal concept of human rights. Meanwhile liberal Muslim reformers and communitarian scholars argue that cross-cultural values emanating from religious and spiritual philosophies must be incorporated into a theory of human rights. If that is to happen, then institutional mechanisms must guarantee legal enforcement of rights. In this chapter I explore the background of the principle of noninterference in ASEAN countries.7 These countries face a wave of democratization in the political process, but the organization’s cardinal principle—do not interfere in members’ domestic affairs—has in the past circumscribed the debate on formalizing more democratic and transparent processes in response to changes in civil society. I then examine the legal and institutional conditions obstructing the expansion of individual rights in Malaysia. I argue that even though political institutions based on the principle of universal adult franchise and representative government exist in Malaysia, they are not backed by a commitment to individual rights. I also examine

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the epistemological basis for the rejection of the universal theory of rights within three groups—nationalists, communitarians, and traditionalists—and the political implications for authoritarianism and citizenship. Finally, I examine the impact of this debate upon the rights of women in the context of democratization of Islamic law and the growth of civil society.

ASEAN and Human Rights Tradition Natural and human rights apply with respect to all human beings.8 They are said to be universal rather than contextual and are therefore different from positive (i.e., legal) rights, which are limited to territorial jurisdictions, and moral rights, which are premised on moral and ethical codes.9 To justify universal claims about these rights it is argued that they inhere in human beings, not societies and states; they exist in order to protect individuals from the state.10 In the international human rights system, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly on 10 December 1948 (UDHR) stands as a foundation and symbol, outlining the basic institutional structure for the protection of human rights against injustices of the modern era.11 The remarkable thing about the UDHR is that despite huge cultural differences among countries that ratified it, member states of the UN General Assembly claimed to meet certain standards safeguarding basic civil rights, such as the right to a fair trial, political rights, and freedom of expression against arbitrary interference by government.12 Over the years the philosophical basis and practical utility of the UDHR have been questioned. The assertion that human rights inhere in all human beings irrespective of religious belief and social custom is a sweeping one. To be effective, the concept of human rights must be formulated broadly enough to cover all political and economic systems, and the three generations of human rights advanced by the French jurist Karel Vasak help.13 These rights illustrate how human rights are not stagnant but subject to modification and expansion to meet historical conditions and the decline of the nation-state in the late twentieth century. But increasingly the concept has been questioned within various Islamic countries and Asian states. The charter of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), to which many Muslim countries belong, affirms members’ commitment to the UN Charter as well as treaties on human rights. Yet representatives of Islamic countries claimed that even though human rights were universal it was necessary that they take into account diverse political systems. Many Islamic countries put forward ideas that were incorporated in the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, adopted by the OIC in August 1990.14 For the most part, the provisions of the Cairo Declaration subject human

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rights and freedoms to the Islamic shari’a. Overall, Islamic legal principles throw up questions regarding the relationship between religion and universal human rights and that between Islamic law and international human rights conventions. Together with Lee Kwan Yew, former prime minister of Singapore, Mahathir has been one of the most visible and outspoken critics of the concept of democracy, rights, and individualism underlying the Western liberal democratic model in Southeast Asia. They claim that the stress on political rights was culturally inappropriate to countries organized on communitarian ideals of harmony and consensus.15 On the basis of community values (i.e., Asian values), they promoted political pluralism and cultural rights. In political terms, however, this discourse claimed that no legitimate crosscultural standards were available for evaluating political models in the region. In the following sections I contend that along with this cultural nationalist discourse, ASEAN’s cardinal principle of noninterference has served as an ideological refuge for authoritarian rule in an era of globalization by providing a theoretical basis for nonscrutiny in internal affairs. Regional Protection System The UN Human Rights Commission realized that responsibility for implementing human rights rests with the states. Moreover, implementation depends on a country’s political system, economic development, and political ideology. Thus, strengthening national capacities in the field of human rights has been viewed as the strongest basis for regional cooperation, including the Asia-Pacific. The trend in the field of human rights has been to develop national and regional human rights protection systems to ensure the implementation of human rights covenants and instruments. At the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993 at Vienna, foreign ministers from some seventy Asian and African states battled U.S. delegates over the criteria of human rights and their abuses.16 At the Twenty-sixth ASEAN ministerial meeting held in Singapore (23–24 July 1993), the ASEAN foreign ministers reaffirmed commitment to and respect for human rights as set out in the Vienna Declaration of 25 June, which included recognition of political, social, and economic rights along with the right to development.17 However, they cautioned that promotion of human rights should respect national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and noninterference in affairs of state. More significant, they agreed that ASEAN should also consider the establishment of an appropriate regional mechanism on human rights.18 Among ASEAN countries, the Philippines and Thailand have established human rights commissions, Malaysia established a commission in 2000, and Thailand is in the process.19 The absence of a human rights protection system in the other ASEAN countries is due to many reasons. The existence of an institution at the regional level may affect their national

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sovereignty. There is also a recent trend whereby developed countries link development and trade policies to human rights. In reaction, ASEAN states declared the right to development to be a fundamental inalienable right in section 17 of ASEAN’s 1993 Bangkok Declaration.20 Finally, the idea that human rights be limited to national jurisdiction in consideration for the different political, cultural, and social conditions is another major obstacle to establishing a subregional protection system at the ASEAN level. The fact that ASEAN nations unilaterally established human rights commissions is an achievement given that promotion of human rights did not constitute one of the founding purposes of ASEAN.21 ASEAN’s low priority for protecting human rights compared to trade and security issues is reflected in its ambivalence on the issue as well as the types of violations it condemns.22 Economic interests are more important in this region than any commitment to civil and political rights. Events in the late 1990s and early 2000s, however, challenged ASEAN insularity. The end of the Cold War altered security in the region and opened new horizons in strategic cooperation. The 1997 economic crisis increased migration, transnational crime (including piracy and drug-trafficking), and the HIV-AIDS crisis; pressures of competing in trade, information, and technology have pushed member states toward increased interest in neighbors’ activities.23 At the ASEAN foreign ministers annual meeting in Bangkok, Thai prime minister Chuan Leekpai reiterated the need for “ASEAN to evolve into a concert of relevance, dynamism and coherence— relevant not only to itself, but also to the outside world” (Crispin 2000). Ironically, weakened ASEAN economies, some under elected governments, cause members to criticize one another. The cardinal principle of noninterference has become strained given the group’s ineffectiveness to grapple with problems like Indonesia wildfires, Islamic revivalism, and democratization. Although a nonintervention policy is still followed and affirmed by most states, cleavages in ASEAN solidarity opened when the heads of two states criticized the Malaysian government for the arrest and ill treatment of former deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim. Both Joseph Estrada and B. J. Habibie of the Philippines and Indonesia questioned Anwar’s dismissal and subsequent torture (Fuller 1998). Even Lee Kuan Yee, the Singapore senior minister who is acutely sensitive to the delicate balance in Singapore-Malaysia affairs, described the circumstances that led to Anwar’s sacking as an “unmitigated disaster” (Ismail 2000).24 He spoke of errors of judgment and the series of blunders that occurred before and after Anwar was placed under detention. Human Rights in Malaysia I discussed in Chapter 5 that Malaysia, unlike many authoritarian regimes, provides fundamental rights in its constitution, yet constitutional limitations—

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based on religion or national security—on individual rights exist on the grounds of safeguarding community rights.25 Moreover, the executive has restricted fundamental liberties by linking the communitarian discourse at ASEAN to the national communitarian discourse on human rights in Malaysia. Mahathir’s dominance over government and public policy is due to the system of populist authoritarianism. This requires community support for the economic development of the state. Moreover, his dominance over the electoral process, UMNO, and representative institutions has made it easy to control organizations of civil society and manipulate its growth in the declared national and community interests. The hegemony of the state is underpinned by ideological formulations based on political stability, social order, national security, and modernization. Finally, like other authoritarian leaders, Mahathir seeks legitimacy based upon constitutional and parliamentary processes. He has used the national constitution and the judicial process to effect social control by means of tightly managed general elections, a controlled parliamentary process, limitations upon mass political activity, and trials of political dissidents. Recent events have changed the relationship between the state and civil society in Malaysia. First, a section of the new middle class is demanding devolution of control and more democracy in the political process. Second, the average Malaysian, now exposed to more developments around the world via the Internet, reads alternative views and does not blindly accept what the government or mainstream newspapers write. Moreover, democratization and cultural flows among ASEAN nations have expanded the boundaries of civil society. Human rights NGOs are active in this region, and many have undertaken training, education, advocacy, and supervisory roles. However, the rules determining the extent of political space for such activities are still determined by the state. In this context, Malaysia set up the National Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) in July 1999.26 Besides hearing complaints of infringements of rights, the commission’s purpose is to promote awareness, advance human rights education, and advise the government in formulating human rights legislation. The commission’s mandate defines “human rights” as those fundamental liberties enshrined in Part 2 of the federal constitution. Some thirty-four NGOs, including Hakam, argued that this definition of human rights is inadequate because human rights are guaranteed only to the extent they are consistent with the federal constitution. This is a restrictive definition because fundamental liberties are subject to parliamentary laws such as the Sedition Act, Internal Security Act, Police Act, and the Official Secrets Act. Therefore, it is argued, there is a need to review the definition of human rights by the commission so that it embodies universal standards.27 Some organizations have argued that the constitution should be

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amended to provide adequate protection for human rights in conformity with international standards like those in the UDHR. Others have called for Malaysia to ratify international human rights instruments, in particular the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, as well as the UN Covenant Against Torture.28 Apart from state dominance there is a sense in which the existence of human rights may be construed as consisting in certain positive institutional conditions. In this sense, human rights exist—that is, persons have human rights—when and insofar as there is social recognition of and legal enforcement of entitlements and fundamental rights in the constitution. Fundamental liberties in the Malaysian constitution can be placed in two categories: individual rights and group rights. Article 5 provides fundamental individual liberties that include personal liberties and freedom of movement, speech, association, and assembly. But fundamental liberties must be interpreted alongside other provisions. Article 149 (Special Powers Against Subversion and Emergency Powers) permits suspension of fundamental rights; during a proclamation of emergency, parliament can override all provisions of the constitution, except those pertaining to any matter of Islamic law and Malay customs, citizenship, and language. Thus primacy is given to religious rights of Malay citizens (i.e., group rights) over individual rights when the security of the state is involved (see Groves 1979, 30). The constitution attempts to be neutral regarding religious rights in a society where ethnic-religious differences are keys to determining the affiliation of one individual to a group. The right to practice religion is set out in article 11(1), which states that every person has the right to profess and practice his religion and to propagate it. All persons have the right to not receive instruction in or to take part in any ceremony or act of worship of a religion other than one’s own. These provisions involve the right of each person to religious beliefs and customs. But a shift away from individual rights to religion is observed in the focus on rights of religious groups; every religious group is allowed to manage its own religious affairs, to establish and maintain institutions for religious or charitable purposes, and to acquire and own property and hold and administer it in accordance with law. Article 11(5) restricts freedom of religion by providing that article 11 does not authorize any act contrary to any general law relating to public order, health, or morality.29 Therefore the guarantee of religious rights for individuals does not imply equal religious rights to all ethnic communities. The important fact to recognize about article 11 is that it was an appropriate response to the fact that people in Malaysia belong to different religious communities, a fact that is not given sufficient recognition in many constitutions of liberal democratic states.30 However, in the Malaysian constitution group rights are not advanced as cultural rights, although they are implicit in various ways. For example, they are manifest in the way article

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152(1) provides for Malay as a national language but immediately states that no person shall be prohibited or prevented from teaching or learning any other language; and that the federal or state government shall not be prevented in use and study of any other language. Language is a culture’s medium of expression. As becomes clear from the National Language Act of 1967 and from Merdeka University Bhd v. Government of Malaysia, Malay culture has been given primacy; the linguistic and cultural rights of other minorities and communities have been correspondingly reduced.31 Thus the philosophy and language of the constitution restrict individual rights and liberties. The equality principle is violated not only by the special privileges of the Malay community (see article 153) but also the legislation differentiating people by ethnicity and religion. Moreover, individual rights are measured and restricted by the existence of group rights, whether for Malays as a backward group or for religious groups of all communities. Moreover, the constitution imposes no limitation upon the legislature for the deprivation of personal liberty in times of emergency, but articles 149 and 150 invest parliament and, indirectly, the executive with the broadest powers to meet the threat of subversion and other emergencies. Article 149 allows parliament to pass laws that negate the rights to freedom of speech, assembly, and association merely by stating that the action has been taken due to fear of organized violence against persons and property. It provides a basis for laws that justify detention without trial, such as the Internal Security Act, the Dangerous Drugs Act, and the Emergency Ordinance Act (Public Order and Prevention of Crime). The ISA was intended to combat the communist insurrection and political instability following the race riots of 1969. Although those threats no longer exist, the government argues that laws allowing detention without trial are still needed to provide peace and security. The use of the ISA against opposition leaders, social activists, and religious leaders since 1987 has deterred opposition to the ruling coalition. The most publicized cases under the ISA relate to the detention of fourteen members of radical religious group Darul Arqam in the mid-1990s and of Anwar in September 1998. Affidavits of ISA detainees arrested during Operasi Lalang in 1987 allege police torture.32 There continue to be reports of maltreatment of prisoners and detainees by police, the latest victim being Anwar while under ISA detention in September 1998. Although former inspector general of police Rahim Noor was sentenced to two months for assaulting Anwar in a police lockup, he has yet to spend a day in jail and is appealing the conviction.33 In February 2001, twenty-six NGOs handed a joint memorandum to the inspector of police to protest police brutality against attendees of a ceramah (lecture) in Jitra, Kedah.34 After its standing slipped among the Malay community in the 1999 general elections, the government has relied on these laws more frequently

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to control political dissent. Zulkifli Sulong, the editor of Harakah, and Karpal Singh, deputy leader of the DAP and Anwar’s lawyer, were arrested under the Sedition Act (L. Charles and Benjamin 2000a). The Keadilan youth chief was arrested under the Official Secrets Act for being in possession of classified government documents.35 Although the government agreed to set up the National Human Rights Commission, it still remains suspicious of political demonstrations. It did not allow people to demonstrate on 4 August 2000 at the verdict of Anwar Ibrahim’s sodomy trial because it wanted to prevent tension. There was a war of words between the commission chairman, Musa Hitam, and UMNO politicians over the right of assembly for Malaysians on this occasion.36 The other law that is frequently used to stifle dissent is the Universities and University Colleges Act of 1971, which controls the content of statements that can be issued and the kind of demonstrations and meetings that can be conducted on campuses. Another act that has not been withdrawn despite recent protests from the media is the Printing Presses and Publications Act of 1948 (PPA), which requires publications to apply for an annual renewable license.37 The act provides for jail sentences up to three years and fines up to RM20,000. All these laws are used to intimidate students, activists, opposition leaders, and NGOs from speaking out. Former member of parliament Lim Guan Eng was convicted in 1995 under the ISA and PPA for criticizing the government’s handling of allegations of statutory rape against a UMNO politician.38 Similarly, social activist and director of the NGO Tenaganita, Irene Fernandez, was persecuted under the PPA for maliciously publishing a memorandum entitled “Abuse, Torture, and Dehumanized Treatment of Migrant Workers at Detention Camps” (Idrus 1999). Several laws impinge on media freedoms. The Broadcasting Act regulates licensing for radio and television stations. Independent journalists and publishers have found it impossible to secure licenses to operate daily newspapers. There are two private television channels, but both have close ties to the ruling party (see Wang Lay Kim 1998, 66–70). After the 1999 elections a top editor of the New Straits Times was fired for being critical of UMNO.39 Under these laws, the state also extends control over foreign publications perceived as prejudicial to the national interest, public order, and bilateral relations. The most publicized case was that of Murray Hiebert of Far Eastern Economic Review in 1999; he was sent to prison for four weeks as a result of a story he wrote that was critical of the Malaysian judiciary (Chelsea 1999). The government has also warned it would imprison those mounting criticism and antiestablishment propaganda on cyberspace under the Communication and Multimedia Act.40 Another trend is the growing use of multimillion-ringgit libel actions by the government against the media (see Pereira 2000b).

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Civil and political rights are not adequately protected in Malaysia and are curbed by several factors related to the state–civil society relationship, constitutional provisions, and the priority given to community rights. Moreover, the supremacy granted to the executive through the law and legal process guarantees its control over political institutions and civil society. In contrast to the individual rights approach, a community rights approach has been common in legislation and in public discourse. I now examine the paradoxes of this discourse.

Debating Modernity and Human Rights in Malaysia The primary question about human rights is their normative justification. In this sense it is pertinent to ask whether there are conclusive moral reasons that justify the nature of human rights. The cultural critique of human rights made by ASEAN states has several links to the communitarian critique of Western hegemony and the values of Western culture made by the government and scholars in the Malaysian context. In recent years the functioning of state and society has been shaped by constructs of local culture and religion deployed as bulwarks against international human rights. However, in this section I focus only on three distinct schools of thought regarding traditional institutions and cultural values because they can be easily identified in the contemporary discourse on human rights and democracy. According to the nationalist and communitarian schools, traditional social structures and their values offer an alternative to modern systems of rationality and a liberal democratic model of politics. But these schools maintain that community identities are compatible with modernization. Whereas the former argues that Malaysian society must reflect and build upon Asian values, the latter emphasizes the idea of human dignity.41 The traditionalist attack on the idea of human rights is premised on absolutist universal terms in a general rejection of Western civilization, secularism, and modernity. It gives literal interpretations of the Quran with the objective of rendering certain policies in the contemporary period as having moral force and being based on universal principles. By extolling the virtues of the patriarchal state and traditional family structure, nationalists and traditionalists provide a perspective about the lack of rights for women, ethnic minorities, and indigenous groups; the discourse on Asian values and the Islamization of society reinforces conservative beliefs and means that, for example, the feminist schools arguing for gender equality and institutional safeguards are not accorded priority. Indeed, in the context of party politics among UMNO and PAS, where community rights are being reinforced, it may well be that women’s rights will face greater constraints in the future.42

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The distinctive feature of all these schools is that they draw upon the experience of the Western world in order to evaluate state and society in the light of modernity. Their main critique both of a liberal democratic model of politics and individual rights as reflecting Western hegemony is based upon empirical and cultural grounds. Common to these perspectives are at least three criticisms of human rights. First, human rights claim to provide a foundation for moral and political thinking for people having different political and cultural identities. But by asserting there are human rights, to which all people everywhere accede, it is assumed that some social practices and customs are universal, irrespective of their acceptance by specific cultures and nations.43 Second, human rights presuppose an ideology of possessive individualism. By focusing on the individual as the autonomous possessor of his own person and capacity, human rights ignore the value placed on the individual vis-à-vis the social unit of which he is a part; neither for that matter is there any attention paid to “the inner freedom of the person qua person in terms which might make appeal to the larger telos of human nature, or to the harmonious order of the universe, and so on” (Bilimoria 1993, 35).44 Third, religious faith in public policy is inconsistent with the promotion of human rights. This claim, along with the modern concept of the secular nation-state, represents the historical development of the powerful medieval European state.45 Western societies have secularized while granting almost unlimited individual freedom in public life. In the context of Malaysia it has been argued that the fusion of religious and political authority in public life would help avoid the moral decadence of the West and contribute to tolerance of different religions. Viewing developments in Malaysian society from these perspectives, nationalists, traditionalists, and communitarians emphasize the need to affirm Asian values, Islamic values, and human dignity, respectively. Although the meanings of these terms overlap, for the purpose of this section I examine only their differences. Asian political elites and intellectuals of the nationalist school challenge the concept of human rights on specific grounds. The discourse on the “Asian way” provoked important questions about cultural pluralism, the nature of social and political power, and the modernization of Malaysian society. From this discussion we can summarize three versions of the nationalist challenge to human rights: (1) Human rights follow from the selfdetermination of nations; (2) there are universal human rights, but substantial differences exist between international human rights norms and customs in this region; and (3) civil liberties are possible only after economic development is achieved. Significantly, these claims have been reinforced in the context of globalization. Because I have already examined Mahathir’s critique of globalization as related to nationalism, I shall mainly focus on the issues arising out of the second and third points regarding the

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growth of civil society and its role in ensuring accountability and transparency in developing good governance. The claim that economic development and economic and social rights are prerequisites to the development of civil and political liberties is based on two arguments: As a developing nation Malaysia has not yet achieved the desired economic status to allow full realization of human rights; and Asian communities give greater importance to community values and moral beliefs, hence, collective rights should be given precedence over civil and political rights. This leads proponents of the nationalist school to conclude that features of democracy in non-Western countries should be based upon a set of Asian values and that economic development requires a constrained democracy.46 Treading the grounds of cultural relativism, Mahathir has listed the most important values of East Asian societies to be orderly society, societal harmony, accountability of public officials (openness to new ideas, freedom of expression, respect for authority).47 This obscures the reality of state-society relations and conceals the character of capitalist development followed in this region. The focus on Asian values and the attack on globalization led many unwary analysts to ask the wrong questions about differences between Asia and the West. The best-known adherents of this school (Mahathir and Lee Kuan Yew) have been in control for at least two decades, and their interpretations of human rights have validity only in that context. To assume a correspondence among their views and those of citizens would be grossly distorting. In posing a statist view of self-determination, these leaders forget that governments are the authoritative representatives of people, that it is ultimately the legitimacy of the interests of the people they represent that is the underlying ground of their validity.48 Therefore they misconstrue the relationship between the rules of effective governance and the concept of legitimacy; policies that assert cultural and disciplined values of tradition cannot be legitimate without consent and public debate. Time and again Mahathir has exposed contradictions in the West’s policies on human rights, especially concerning China and Bosnia; but he also accepted the priority of rights in the liberal democratic tradition: “On the one hand, non-Western governments are threatened because of some minor breach of human rights; on the other hand, when Western interests are not at stake, they are prepared to allow the most brutal violation of human rights to take place before their very eyes” (Mahathir 1994). However, it is incorrect for Mahathir to assert that tolerance and freedom are important parts of the Western tradition only; indeed, they have strong roots in Asia and predate the Enlightenment notion of individual rights. Just as the proponents of the Asian values theory encounter difficulties in explaining society’s contradictions, their own caricature of the West is not helpful to the analysis.

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The nationalist discourse on Asian values also obscures the actual roots of economic growth as well as the indigenous roots of democracy that are highlighted by the communitarian school.49 In Malaysia, the government directed a form of industrialization that led to the rise of a Malay capitalist class. Along with Singapore and Indonesia, Malaysia forged close associations among government, technocratic bureaucrats, and corporate interests, all backed by the dominance of a single party. As a consequence of industrialization and urbanization Malaysian society is moving toward individualism; the nuclear family is becoming self-centered. Even though this is different from Western individualism, there is no doubt that traditions are being undermined in the process of modernization (see Christie 1995, 211). The capitalist path followed by the government is based on the exploitation of nonrenewable resources and an obsessive desire for economic growth, which has been achieved only by ignoring the rights of indigenous peoples to their lands and their own paths of development. Moreover, stateled growth has been very destructive of traditional communities and their values. The Orang Asli, with reportedly 80 percent living below the poverty line and with few educational and health facilities, still lag behind the other communities.50 Japan served as a model for Asian economic growth, including in Malaysia.51 Initially Mahathir was less concerned with the importance of maintaining cultural traditions than with finding a regional variation upon the existing paths to capitalism. Later the basis of the Look East policy espoused by Mahathir became a critique of the West as well as an exaltation of indigenous values. Whatever its strengths, this approach has its own contradictions and weaknesses in terms of pluralism and democratization. I would argue that his main purpose in introducing the concept was to adopt Japanese work ethics in order to make Malaysians work harder and identify themselves with the interests of their employers, thus discouraging workers from forming class-based organizations.52 Similarly, Mahathir’s attack in the 1990s on the free flows of capital under globalization has sufficient grounds because it highlights abuses of current trends in the world economy. He shares this critique with the communitarian school, which has also criticized the economic aspects of globalization for leading to a less democratic world. But whereas Mahathir calls for international financial mechanisms to control capital flows, the communitarian school points out the need for diverse religions to come together in an expanded form of civil society. In Mahathir’s attack, the contraction of developing countries’ public sectors, rapid transfers of financial capital, and calls for liberalization are techniques to undermine the power of nation-states in order to replace them with Western-dominated financial institutions. But his claim that allowing elected governments to surrender societal care to the market is similar to

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having “wolves . . . guard sheep” is linked to another political concern (Mahathir 1999e).53 At the core of his concern with globalization is an antidemocratic refusal of the mediating influence of the institutions of civil society in public policy, including a role of civil society in ensuring transparency and accountability and preventing crony capitalism. Although globalization is a complex phenomenon, Mahathir’s claims about the danger of human rights, it can be argued, are attempts to restrain challenges to the political status quo; while pushing forward the path of capitalist development, they allude to strategies to maintain traditional subservience to authority.54 Facing the nationalist school are the ideologues and political leaders of the traditionalist school, who are not content with pointing out the disjunction between the East and West and the consequent loss of moral legitimacy in the West. First, their main claim is that cultural differences between the West and non-Western countries validate the interpretation that Asian countries accord less value to political and civil liberties underpinning the liberal model. They base this claim on the argument that the values of harmony, consensus, community, and family are more important than the rights of individuals. Second, they claim that Asian cultures are based on duties and not on rights. Human dignity of the individual is achieved by excelling in the fulfillment of one’s duty or obligation by following Islam. The traditionalist school shares these two claims with the communitarian school. However, the similarities end there. Traditionalists are guided by narrow, literal interpretations of the Quran and are driven by the need for codification of outdated religious laws. By doing so they reinforce the conservative cultural traditions of an ahistoric Islam that features the “ideal woman” and “ideal family” as the normative model. The most crucial institution in molding human character and potentially the most effective instrument for transmitting traditional patterns, the family, is endowed with great religious honor.55 Set against this discourse is the debate between UMNO and PAS over whether the Malaysian state is fundamentally a secular or Islamic entity. While not going into the reasons why this debate is being nurtured at this point, it is important to see the underlying logic that frames the contest. Traditionalists can be identified with the party members and sympathizers of PAS who have distinguished themselves by proposing a religious-political project predicated on the values, beliefs, and metaphysics of Islam found in the sacred narrative of the Quran. I argue that the issues have moved to a complex level involving the non-Islamic and non-Malay communities as well. Here I focus only on questions about human rights related to the individual right to religion in an Islamic state, the rights of women in Islam, and the rights of indigenous communities. I briefly mention the first two points (the third is examined in Chapter 3).

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Although there is a lack of understanding among Western scholars regarding human rights within Islam, there are three problems with the traditionalists’ approach that arise from their call for a return to an authentic Islam. First, although they believe in equal rights for all without discrimination on grounds such as gender and religion, shari’a grants unequal rights to categories of people classified by religion and gender.56 For example, the shari’a family law governs the life of Muslims in the context of marriage, divorce, custody of children, inheritance, and related matters, and many of its provisions make women dependent on the will of their husbands. Thus there cannot be complete equality for women in matters related to personal law unless the law itself is reinterpreted. Second, there is no possibility of equal rights for women unless Islamic political and legal thought transforms and adapts itself to the radically different modern context in its administration of criminal justice. The application of hudud—amputations and floggings for theft, robbery, and fornication—can be seen as cruel and degrading; we also find that the testimony of non-Muslims and women in the application of these punishments is either inadmissible or is given less weight than the testimony of a Muslim male. Finally, the imposition of the death penalty for ridda (apostasy) is a total repudiation of freedom of religion and belief (see Ismail 1995). Since all rights in the Quran are limited by this classification in terms of religion and gender, there can be no foundation for a universal theory of human rights based on liberalism within Islam. These dilemmas cannot be resolved easily because they throw up important questions related to the rights of women and non-Muslims. Although sharing some claims about the existence of indigenous values with the other two schools, communitarians acknowledge the moral equivalence of religious and philosophical traditions throughout the world. Proponents of communitarian politics differ from traditionalists, who use the politics of difference as a political strategy in mobilizing the people. Setting forth the specificity of their culture and way of life, communitarians demand recognition of cultural identities to reinforce differences. Islamists in PAS, in contrast, make demands to defend and promote the cultural rights of their Malay constituency. However, it must be noted that their politicalcultural discourse, unlike the communitarian discourse, is embedded in an all-encompassing religious discourse. Some protagonists of the communitarian school criticize the shari’a as an obscurantist body of arcane answers to the contextual, actual contemporary problems while trying to seek alternatives with the “axioms and assumptions of the traditions and worldviews of Asia” (Sardar 1996, 247). They defend the search for alternatives by using concepts and categories of thought and analysis that are intrinsic to the Islamic heritage. Islamic alternatives are seen as embedded in an entire civilizational project that includes

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a distinct view of human rights and a system of community “ummatic organization for the enjoyment and securing of rights for all people” (Sardar 1996, 246). Scholars like Chandra Muzaffar have extended this argument by discussing common grounds among religions and suggesting strategies for accommodation and cooperation across these differences.57 He makes three main claims about human rights: They are related to questions about human beings; they are guided by universal moral and spiritual values; and they are based on a holistic vision of human dignity (see Chandra 1999b, 29). Chandra argues that the role of the human being, according to Islam, is mainly as “vice-regent or trustee of God.” As God’s trustee, the human being lives life according to clearly established spiritual and moral values and principles. The rights one possesses, like the responsibilities one undertakes, must be guided by these values and principles. What this means is that human rights and human freedoms are part of a larger spiritual and moral worldview. . . . The individual and the community must both submit to spiritual and moral values which transcend both individual and community. (Chandra 1999b, 29)

The biggest challenge according to him is to develop a vision of human dignity drawn from the various “religious and spiritual philosophies into a comprehensive charter of values and principles, responsibilities and rights, roles and relationships acceptable to human beings everywhere” (Chandra 1999b, 30). Chandra highlights the similarities of spiritual traditions that are of direct relevance to equality, that is, a common humanity. Although he recognizes that equality expresses itself differently, he argues that the spirit of equality of all human beings has been central to spiritual tradition. Furthermore, there is an unambiguous acknowledgment of a moral authority that transcends the human being. Recognition of this transcendent moral authority implies a willingness to live with certain values, which determines the idea of personal freedom and freedom of choice.58 He also disengages the spiritual values of Islam from the roots of authoritarianism, a position distinct from that of the nationalist school. In Islam, he argues, the freedom to espouse the cause of justice is recognized not only as a right but also a responsibility. He asks whether the vested interests of the ruling elites make them blind to “the exalted position of freedom in their own spiritual traditions,” or “is it possible that these elites who are often estranged from their own traditions do not realize that freedom and dissent are sacred values which should be accorded due respect?” (Chandra 1997b, 65). We have discussed how the view of protagonists of universal human rights has been challenged in contemporary Malaysian society on cultural

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grounds.59 The former seek to separate right from good and seek to come up with a set of human rights valid for all societies. For them, as for most thinkers, human rights are a historical product of the Enlightenment and universally valid for all societies.60 Responding to the charge of individualism, some liberal political theorists argue that human rights and cultural rights can be combined only with great risk to the essential character of human rights.61 In the context of Malaysia a strong challenge to the universalist position comes from communitarians who situate rights within the context of a particular community that promotes certain values. It is a strong challenge because arguments of other schools are deeply flawed. When proponents of the nationalist school (such as Mahathir or Lee Kuan Yew) speak out on human rights they express an essentially narrow concern for the political status quo. This view is shared by other political authorities in the region. The sharing of government strategies and tactics that infringe on human rights is representative of a regional style of internal control that is today being challenged. For the traditionalists all power of the ruler in an Islamic state is held in trust, and the trustee of power is also its owner in name only. All power and authority belong to God. Thus no subject could justify possessing a set of human rights because the ruler himself refuses to claim any power over anyone and chooses to conduct the affairs of the realm in accordance with the teachings of the Quran. From the communitarian perspective, rights emerge as secondary rather than primary principles. Instead of being prior to the good, rights operate in order to guide a given way of life motivated by a certain conception of the good. Rights must also be able to claim links between rights and the good, between the theory of basic rights and the conceptions of good that people pursue. However, the communitarian approach has several shortcomings. Communitarians often stress the cultural constitution of the subject, the way an individual forms a sense of self and an identity. But the concept of community remains vague. Is it historical, cultural, or national? If the national state is seen as an adequate unit of political integration and democratic self-determination, how are we to combine the moral requirements of a universalist notion of Islam with the requirements of radical democracy and different ways of life? Furthermore, by postulating the internal homogeneity of cultures, the historical role of violence in the construction of communities is ignored; communities are thought to be harmonious and constructed without structural antagonism and class conflict. Instead, the idea of shared meanings, of shared cognitive and normative frames and interpretations, is stressed. Moreover, communitarian suppositions about the social homogeneity of cultures have been challenged by social movements struggling for the rights of women and ethnic minorities as well as campaigns on behalf of

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rights for children and the environment. It is not clear how the politics of indigenous communities, environmental groups, and women’s groups would be concerned with similar cultural and spiritual values.62 Even if we concede the universal values of all spiritual traditions, including social movements, the idea of universal values of the Quran appeals to people’s conscience and policy proposals designed to encourage compliance with basic social conventions.63 This solution is based on an essential view of human identity that is contestable. Such arguments do not account for the fact that the individual is a complex, multifaceted bundle of capacities and subject to a pattern of evolution while being interwoven with other groups and communities. Of course, communitarians are aware of this aspect of culture; cultures derive coherence from communicative practices that renew and reaffirm the spiritual values of participants. What is overlooked here is that reactivation of traditional or spiritual institutions leads to their influence in other domains of political life; so if values and attachments of one’s cultural identity lead to coherence, it also militates against self-questioning of one’s culture and the capacity to reflect upon the determinate boundaries of cultural particularity. The main problem in Malaysian politics is this: How can one resist the arbitrary power of the state by appealing to all social forces that have competing notions of the rights of the individual? How can one resist the onslaught of organizations that do not posit the existence of basic rights for individuals? In practical terms, communitarians assert a pluralistic understanding of Malaysian culture; non-Muslims worry that these ideological alternatives fulfill the aspirations of Muslims who believe in imposing not a common Asian culture but an Asian Islamic culture. After the 1999 elections there were differences within the Barisan Alternatif on interpretations of Malaysian culture. Both DAP and Keadilan tread shaky ground in their pact with PAS and had to clarify their stand on many aspects of the latter’s agenda. Despite assurances to non-Muslims through an interpretation of Islam that emphasizes pluralism, harmony, moderation, and tolerance, the communitarian attempt to combine indigenous spiritual values with material development is bound to be risky. Polarization between UMNO and PAS has left little ground for debate about principles such as gender equality. Some women have found themselves in a situation where supporting the political opposition means siding with religious conservatism.64

Religion, Politics, and Women’s Rights Above I discuss the cultural relativist claims of three schools and those of ASEAN states that human rights interfere with their rights to culture in this region.65 What are the implications of these arguments for developing a theory of women’s rights?

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A reinterpretation of the universal theory of human rights using a gender perspective is based upon two separate claims about the principles of universality and difference in which the rights of women are pitted against the ideas of cultural relativism and the self-determination of nations. The first claim relates to the inadequacies of the equality principle because it does not recognize women’s experiences and rights as different from men’s experiences. The second claim is more controversial because it locates women’s rights against the right to self-determination of certain states and challenges the hegemony of the nation-state and the sanctity of its sovereign borders. Until the UN Third World Conference on Women in Nairobi in July 1985, called to mark the end of the UN Decade for Women (1975–1985), the United Nations concentrated primarily on the themes of equality, development, and peace. During the Decade for Women the United Nations had three conferences exploring these themes—Mexico City (1975), Copenhagen (1980), and Nairobi (1985). It was only in 1991 that the UN Economic and Social Council and the UN Commission on the Status of Women took certain initiatives to combat the problem of violence against women. At the Vienna Conference (1993) the women’s lobby succeeded in inserting an article into the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action that called for the adoption of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW).66 The UN General Assembly adopted the declaration in December 1993. The few Muslim countries that later ratified DEVAW raised reservations about its provisions on the basis of Islamic cultural particularism. Some of them maintained that respect for human rights cannot override the indigenous religious norms set by Islamic law.67 One should bear in mind that women’s groups at the international level also question a universal theory of rights but on different grounds than Islamic particularism. They cite problems with existing human rights institutions and their conceptual basis: Human rights mechanisms are state-based and do not view nonstate actors as responsible for abuses against women; and rights emphasize violations in the public domain and ignore issues of domestic violence, rape, and sexual harassment. Therefore, they argue, there is a need for a fresh interpretation of the existing principle of equality in the human rights doctrine so that women’s experiences are respected and incorporated into the general theory of human rights (see Coomaraswamy 1999, 175–177). These rights refer to women’s control over sexuality and access to health care and reproductive technologies. Even though the first principle of equality is endorsed, the main problem lies in enforcing the second, under which international standards on women’s rights are seen to collide with the cultural and religious movements at the national level.68 The other problem is that enforcing women’s rights means that special attention be given to the private sphere. But this implies reinterpreting the notions of female dignity, autonomy, bodily integrity, and

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sexuality that are embedded in the religious and cultural norms and institutions defined by religion. Although the distinction between public and private action in the context of violence against women is not useful because it obscures state responsibility toward such acts, asserting these rights in the abstract ignores the fact that they arise from practices related to religion and culture. In multiethnic states like Malaysia the government has allowed personal laws for different communities; thus issues related to marriage, divorce, custody of children, inheritance, and maintenance are decided by specific laws governing each community. Because there is no liberal distinction between the public and private sphere in Islam, family law is defined by the shari’a. Therefore Islam provides the religious and cultural context within which Malay women’s rights are applied. In Malay society there is little space for public discourse, but efforts to challenge the denial of civil and political rights to women have been made by many scholars and NGO activists. Secular feminists and reformists who wish to overlook Islamic notions in the formulation and implementation of women’s rights are dismissed as Western and inauthentic because human rights and women’s rights are viewed as contradictory to Islamic principles of gender relations. Some scholars claim that roles guiding sexual segregation should not be seen as an obstacle to sexual equality. Based on their observations on the economic autonomy of women in the countryside, along with women’s control over material resources, they see rapid modernization as a source of mental and material security that leads to women’s self-realization. Historically, given the Malay cultural tradition of adat (custom), many scholars believe that Malay women have enjoyed rights and roles that are far more egalitarian compared to other Muslim societies. According to them, women participate in the labor force and in nation-building on the basis of Islamic principles, values, and norms.69 However, I argue that issues related to gender identity and culture are complex and determined by several factors: class, accessibility to material resources, legal rights, and economic processes. Malaysia’s rapid economic growth since the mid-1980s, along with changes brought about by modernization and urbanization, has increased women’s literacy and economic participation. The New Economic Policy was instrumental in changing the economic status of the Malay community, but it brought about a significant change in the role of Malay women as well. Structural changes under the NEP favored female employment in export-oriented manufacturing, community and personal services, trade and tourism, manufacturing, and electronics. But together with the economic transformation of Malay society and the social mobility of Malay women, there has been a rapid resurgence of Islamization that has consequences for

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the status and position of Malay women. Norani Othman argues that gender relations in Malaysia are “intertwined with the politics of Islamisation, nationalism, state-building and the rejuvenation of Asian values and culture” (Othman 1998, 176). Within this project “women are linked to the ‘demand’ for modernization and progress, yet are also charged with ensuring cultural continuity as the basis of society’s moral integrity” (Othman 1998, 176). Since 1990, even more so since the financial crisis of 1997, sexual segregation, patriarchal values, and role identification defined by the traditionalist school have led to gender subordination and control that have circumscribed the participation of women in the public sphere. Backed by strict laws, traditionalists have tried to define the role of women in politics and the public sphere. This has given rise to an understanding that human rights must interact in a “mutually constitutive relationship with other frameworks of belief,” including religion (Rao 1999, 119). A more plausible theory of human rights, then, would recognize that in Islam, women are an important symbol of social life. Recognizing this fact, in Malaysia some scholars use the Islamic text in support for equality for women and try to combine sociopolitical and cultural realities between Islamic and human rights discourses. Sisters in Islam (SIS) emerged in the late 1980s to provide an alternative voice within the Muslim community that would understand and interpret the Quran from women’s perspective. The group’s objectives are to develop and promote a framework of women’s rights in Islam that takes into consideration women’s experiences and realities, as well as a reinterpretation of the foundational textual sources of Islam and cultural practices of Muslims that would reinforce the democratic principles and equality of persons. Most of their publications have been in the form of a discourse with the prevailing interpretation of the Quran.70 SIS’s main claim is that interpreters and jurists of Islamic law are human beings, products of social and cultural circumstances; different interpretations are bound to arise. Also, diverse interpretations of the same text should be considered in light of other verses related to the same topic. Hence, words or texts should not be read in isolation from one another. According to Fathi Osman: Tolerating different views does not mean necessarily that they are equally valid or convincing. It is the responsibility of and the challenge of the human intellect, in any time and place, to figure out the Qura’nic idea, according to the intellectual merits and capability on one side, and to the existing cultural and social circumstances on the other, since an interpretation of a Quranic text is not merely a linguistic or formal exercise. The Quran is a living guidance that continuously reveals new angles of interpretation according to the development of individual intelligence and social experience. (Fathi Osman 1996, 42)

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In addition, the group makes a distinction between principles and cultural practices in Islam. SIS argues that Islam is a religion that gives rights to women, but the principles of Islam, including the shari’a, are not the sole determinant of Muslim behavior, which is conditioned by economic, social, and political factors; conservative interpretations of the Quran are mostly influenced by cultural practices and values that regard women as inferior and subordinate to men. It is not Islam that oppresses women but rather human beings, who with all their weaknesses have failed to understand Allah’s intentions. Therefore they argue that the standard concepts and practices of Muslims cannot be separated from their cultural and social environment. Quranic verses are mistakenly presented and interpreted to support a husband’s authority over his wife in all aspects of life, whereas divine teachings about justice and kindness, mutual consent, and consultation between spouses are disregarded. This feminist interpretation of Malaysian society is different from those of the nationalist, traditionalist, and communitarian schools, whose cultural relativism on human rights assigns women the role of bearers of cultural values and traditions of the community. Yet these schools contain contradictory views on gender rights and equality, manifested in the legislation on women’s rights. Since independence the federal government has implemented policies conducive to industrialization as well as the Islamization of society. Despite the formal separation of powers between federal and state administrations, such attempts have given rise to conflicts over competing jurisdictions concerning Islamic religious matters. This was evident in the way the Muslim Family Law Act of 1984 faced resistance from many states that deliberately adopted it slowly or amended legislation unilaterally. Apart from the lack of uniformity among the states’ Islamic family laws, there are complaints about the shari’a court system, including delays in bureaucratic procedures and male bias in the administration of law.71 Norani Othman is of the view that the government’s approach “is an Islamisation approach which aims to reassert and strengthen the primacy of historical shari’ah as the basis of, and the main legal or jurisprudential reference for, Malay community life and its gender relations” (Othman 1998, 186). Although there are points of convergence among nationalists and traditionalists on the need to actualize Islamic modernity and fix the Malay family as an icon of community, I believe there are differences in the extent to which they pursue a nationaliststate project or an Islamic state. The federal government under Mahathir has passed laws that appear to show regard for women’s rights, such as liberalizing exceptions to the crime of abortion, allowing mothers to be official guardians of their children, increasing the penalty for rape, and introducing the law on domestic violence and sexual harassment. These laws apply to all persons regardless of religion. The government has proposed a program of reformulation of

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Islamic family laws resting on secure quranic foundations to ensure gender equality among Muslims. The National Council of Women’s Organizations focused on lobbying and legal reforms in both civil and Muslim family laws to end discrimination against women. With regard to PAS’s desire to implement the shari’a (hudud in particular), Mahathir declared that these systems conform to an interpretation of Islam by PAS, but “it does not become part of the teachings of Islam that must be accepted by all Muslims. . . . Hence, PAS cannot claim that its law is accurate and part of Islamic teachings. Even the validity of PAS cannot yet be ascertained. They may be judged against the teachings of Islam” (Mahathir 1995, 65). Although the federal parliament eventually rejected the implementation of hudud in Kelantan, it did so on grounds that the country was not ready for such laws, not on grounds of multiculturalism and pluralism.72 Since then the government has continued to espouse a reformist understanding of Islam and its law, both to meet PAS’s political challenge and to enforce women’s role in national development and modernization. I briefly illustrate their approach by focusing on areas in which these differences emerge and where women’s organizations and NGOs have made an impact on public policy, the Domestic Violence Act (DVA), sexuality and reproductive health, hudud laws, and the code for preventing sexual harassment. The Domestic Violence Act The Draft Platform for Action, released at the UN’s 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, affirmed the importance of reproductive health and rights of women by including them as an integral part of human rights recognized in international documents. It also recognized violence against women in the private and public spheres as a violation of women’s human rights to bodily integrity. Sexual health and sexual rights are seen as crucial components of reproductive health and reproductive rights. Women’s organizations in Malaysia campaigned for a domestic violence bill for more than eleven years before it was implemented in June 1996. This was primarily the initiative of the Joint Action Group against Violence Against Women, comprising individual women and five organizations—the Women’s Aid Organization, Association of Women’s Lawyers, Malaysian Trade Unions Congress Women’s Section, University Women’s Association (University of Malaya), and the Selangor and Federal Territory Consumers Association. The campaign for the Domestic Violence Act was a response to the low status accorded to women within the family in Malaysian society and the limited legal remedies available to victims of domestic violence.73 Under the DVA, “domestic violence” is defined as an act that places the victim in fear of or causes physical injury; compels the victim by force or threat to

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engage in any conduct, sexual or otherwise, from which the victim has a right to abstain; detains the victim against his or her will; and causes mischief or damage to property with the intent of causing distress to the victim.74 Although the aims of this act were to provide additional assistance to survivors of domestic violence and to grant civil and criminal remedies irrespective of religious or cultural consideration, it has faced obstacles on both counts. A detailed analysis reveals that it falls short because it does not apply equally to Muslims and non-Muslims. Under the federal constitution Muslims are governed by shari’a in all matters related to personal law. Traditionalists have criticized the DVA because it allows a Muslim woman to invoke legal protection that will supersede the authority of the shari’a court in matters of marriage. Including civil remedies in the DVA was also challenged on the grounds that for Muslims domestic violence proceedings fall under shari’a jurisdiction. Women’s organizations, in their response, maintained that although shari’a has jurisdiction over all family matters for Muslims, criminal matters fall under the administration of the federal government and civil law applies equally to Muslims and non-Muslims. Therefore attaching domestic violence to the criminal procedure and penal code enabled domestic violence to be classified as “criminal behavior” while ensuring its applicability to all communities in Malaysia. Although obstacles have been overcome to an extent, problems in implementation still remain. The original drafters of the act wanted to classify domestic violence as a crime in itself rather than simply as an attachment to the penal code. However, in the final draft of the DVA, it remains attached to the penal code; in short it remains attached to definitions and procedures for harm, criminal force, and assault. The offender can be charged only under the penal code.75 Reproductive Rights According to the federal constitution, each state has its own Islamic religious authority, usually known as the Islamic Religious Council of the State; the personal and family law of persons is under the legislative jurisdiction of the state. In the matter of reproductive rights and with regard to family planning among Muslims, the National Council for Islamic Affairs as well as Islamic Religious Councils have issued fatwas (religious edicts) on abortion, contraception, and family planning. For example, in 1965 the Islamic Religious Council of Kelantan viewed the Family Planning Program as an attempt to restrict the freedom of Islamic family life. Studies show that Malay women, who form the vast majority of Malaysia’s Muslim population and are on par with women of similar socioeconomic

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level in the same subregion, have the lowest contraceptive use. This is attributed to perceptions about religion. The increase in the fertility rates of Malay women is said to be due not only to the reproductive decisions of Malays but also to the political decision of the federal government to go slow on family planning, to accommodate the popularity of PAS, and in recognition of the need for a larger labor force. Reproductive rights must be placed within the framework of gender equality. But advocates for an increase in population have subjugated these rights to the needs of demography and development, whereas the traditionalist school has restricted them according to religion. Hudud The peak of conservatism within the Malay community regarding women’s rights was evident in an attempt by the Kelantan state assembly to introduce hudud laws. Under the PAS-led government, the assembly passed the Shari’a Criminal Code Bill in November 1993 introducing hudud criminal laws in the state.76 The hudud offenses appeared under six headings: theft, highway robbery, unlawful carnal intercourse (zina), accusation of zina (qazaf ), wine-drinking, and apostasy. Many organizations such as SIS submitted memorandums to the government arguing that the implementation of hudud would marginalize the role of women in the legal process. There were also constitutional constraints blocking the bill. Part 6 of the federal constitution limits the rights of states to legislate matters contained in the state list and the concurrent list. Mahathir argued that hudud is the result of an understanding and interpretation of the Quran and does not comply fully with the law, spirit, and attributes ingrained in Islam. He also pointed out the unfairness and rigidity of these laws for non-Muslims.77 Eventually the federal government did not agree to the law’s implementation, and it was not enforced. However, hudud laws continue to be contentious because they require public punishment of the convicted offender; they also disqualify women from being eyewitnesses and downgrade their testimony in court. For example, under hudud four devout adult males have to have witnessed and give evidence that an act of rape has been committed before a woman can prove her innocence. Even if the woman registers a complaint, her testimony is disregarded. This law derives from the general principle in Islamic jurisprudence that although both men and women are capable of giving evidence, women do not give eyewitness evidence in hudud. This is echoed in the criminal code bill (1993) of Kelantan.78 Since the 1999 general elections PAS has introduced a series of legal reforms designed to set the course of Islamization for Malay society. Measures such as promotion of Islamic laws, Islamic dress, and education are

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building-blocks of an Islamist political system. Despite the controversy raging within the opposition, Islamists are pressing their reforms, which will further restrict women’s access to the public sphere.79 Sexual Harassment in the Workplace The code for prevention and eradication of sexual harassment was made effective by the human resource ministry in August 1999. It defines “sexual harassment” as any unwarranted sexual conduct in verbal, nonverbal, psychological, or physical form that is unwelcome to the recipient. Under this code, sexual harassment is divided into two categories: sexual coercion and sexual annoyance. The first is harassment that is a direct consequence of the victim’s employment, for example, where a supervisor makes raises and promotions contingent upon sexual favors. The second is sexually related conduct that is offensive, hostile, or intimidating to the victim but has no link to job benefits. The code also covers any employment-related sexual harassment occurring outside the workplace during social functions, job assignments, conferences, and training sessions. The code guides employers in setting up a comprehensive in-house mechanism that defines, regulates, investigates, and penalizes incidents of sexual harassment. Although it is not easy for a victim to seek justice and compensation, the code serves as a reference to define sexual harassment and could possibly lead to amendments in the penal code that would place offenses within the jurisdiction of the criminal courts.80 Despite the implementation of some progressive laws, the inadequate representation of women in the major political parties in Malaysia—less than 50 percent of all members even though they make up about half the total population—is deplorable. Malaysian women play a supporting role in the party system in that their mobilization and demands are mostly confined to women’s wings. Low representation is found in parliament and the state assemblies. Many religious and cultural prohibitions discourage women from becoming politically active. Another reason for the low political participation of women is that Malaysian politics emphasizes ethnic issues (see Chapter 3); a significant amount of political consciousness is determined by one’s ethnic background, and this obstructs formations on the basis of other political interests or attachments.81

State, Rights, and Civil Society The communitarian critique of a universal theory of human rights leads to restricted rights for women and minorities. I shall now link these criticisms to the arguments I made about civil society in Chapter 4.

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There has been a growing awareness of the importance of civil society. This is motivated by the search for models of democratization that would emphasize greater participation by people and processes against authoritarianism. In my perspective, civil society, as the domain of political participation, includes diverse institutions: local councils, voluntary associations, NGOs, hospitals, schools, and professional associations. Broadly, civil society is an autonomous sphere of nonstate associations and institutions that empower citizens. It focuses attention on state ideological controls and on the need to set proper limits on the authority of the state; it also advocates pluralism in society as a weapon against authoritarianism. Moreover, the program of civil and political education incorporates the elements of positive citizenship and knowledge of the political rights and duties of citizenship. To what extent has this role of civil society been fulfilled in Malaysia? Many scholars maintain that a global “associational revolution” is taking place, referring to the massive array of self-governing private organizations in Malaysia (see Yamamoto 1996). I argued against such assessments, as civil society has not developed an autonomous space because of the government’s dominance over most institutions. Centralization of power and the state’s capacity to repress, co-opt, and neutralize political activity of all kinds have led to a weak civil society. The state-society relationship has been defined in the way the three ethnic communities participated in the national agenda through political parties or defined issues related to their communities on culture, education, and religion. Not all associations and organizations are the same. Associations can be differentiated on many grounds, but for our purposes they can be political or nonpolitical, hierarchical or egalitarian. In each case it is interesting to find out whether they engage the members of the political community in creating the habits and conventions required for cooperation with others. I argue that the development of political and legal institutions and the priority granted to rights of religious communities over and above civil liberties in Malaysia follow a different pattern than that taken by countries with effective civil societies. This disconcerting picture is complicated by government-run or -initiated organizations and institutes that function largely through the support, funds, and donations of the ruling party.82 Policy research in major institutions is conducted under tight government control and regulation. Thus the influence of research institutions on public policy has been limited to informal and personal relationships among intellectuals and government leaders and policymakers. Many significant institutions boost heavy participation of national government leaders in their program and legitimate the government’s sociopolitical agenda (examples are the Malaysian Institute for Islamic Understanding, the Institute of Policy Research, the Malaysian Institute of Economic Research, and Institute for Strategic and International Studies).

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Due to a lack of institution-building, NGOs in Malaysia have become a legitimate channel for social and political participation and for influencing policy formation and public opinion. But in dealing with NGOs the Malaysian government has always maintained that it places national security above all other concerns. Because it views NGOs as government harassers out to foment discontent, the state always keeps a close watch on their activities. Although there is no formal policy to control the activities of NGOs, under the Amendment to the Societies Act of 1981 they are treated as societies and are required to obtain approval from the Registrar of Societies for affiliation and finances.83 Thus hundreds of registered societies, from religious groups and merchant guilds to consumer and educational associations, are banded together. The government also seeks to co-opt the activities of NGOs by filling the available space in civil society with state-sponsored institutions in order to preempt the entry of citizens into the civic realm. Within a co-optive policy environment, the government seeks to regulate independent and semiindependent NGO initiatives by adopting legislation that requires NGOs to seek prior approval for all their projects as well as by legislation limiting access to public information and human rights.84 Despite these constraints, many NGOs have flourished and are playing an increasing role in public policy. Their growing advocacy work in policy and media circles has led to some notable successes (the Domestic Violence Act and setting up the Human Rights Commission are recent examples). Their ongoing participation in the fields of consumer protection, economic and social development, women’s rights, the environment, and human rights has enabled them to operate effectively and to communicate with the government, media, and other institutions.85 Signs of change started to appear during the reformasi period following the arrest of Anwar. The contribution that Malaysia’s nascent civil society made to the antiauthoritarian struggles of the early 1990s is widely recognized today. Since then, students, intellectuals, professional associations, religious groups, and opposition parties have been raising questions regarding the authoritarian nature of the government. In the process some groups have begun to adopt a more radical stance on issues of human rights and judicial reform, whereas others are keen to concentrate on deliberation and consensus in dealing with the government. Despite the variety in background, outlook, organization, and practice, some NGOs have specific concerns and objectives about the individualistic emphasis inherent in liberal democratic ideology. Organizations like National Human Rights Society, Suaram, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch developed committees to look into rights violations in this region and are guided by the liberal notion of rights.86 Women’s organizations and NGOs like the Women’s Aid Organization (WAO), the All Women’s Action Society (AWAM), and the Women’s Crisis Center (WCC) in Penang

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have expanded the breadth and scope of women’s rights by setting up research centers, community-based clinics, day-care centers, legal services, and socioeconomic projects in remote parts of the country. They are part of a larger activist group of women’s organizations that have been working for legislation on women’s rights since the 1980s. The Women’s Agenda for Change, which details long-standing concerns on gender equality and sustainable development for both men and women, has been endorsed by more than sixty-five NGOs.87 Some organizations seek to foster democratic participation in accord with indigenous values. Muslim scholars, traditionalists, communitarians, and feminist scholars are defining the democratic aspects of Islam.88 SIS has located women’s rights in the cultural context and demonstrated that there is more success in working within the Islam religion and its cultural paradigm than by adopting a Western paradigm. Similarly the International Movement for a Just World, set up by Chandra Muzaffar, has articulated theoretical ideas on developing an alternative social order from a communitarian-democratic perspective. The government-NGO relationship is characterized by collaboration on issues such as the environment, welfare, women, youths, and child development. The government has involved organizations such as the Federation of Malaysian Consumers Association, the National Council of Women’s Organizations, the United Chinese Schools Committees Association, and others to participate in the debate on development and public policy. NGOs that collaborate most successfully with the government are nonpolitical, like the Malaysian AIDS Council, the Malaysian Nature Society (MNS), and the World Wide Fund Nature for Malaysia (WWF), although recently NGOs related to human rights like Suaram, Aliran, and Hakam have been invited to meetings of the Human Rights Commission. NGOs and institutes in Sabah such as the Partners of Community Organizations (PACOS) lack the capacity to influence public policies but, along with the Center of Orang Asli Concerns (COAC) and the Peninsular Malaysia Orang Asli Association (POASM), have been able to communicate ideas to the government regarding the condition of Orang Asli and their cultures.89 With the recent political changes in Malaysia and neighboring countries, NGOs have become more active and are playing a role in fostering democratic governance and pluralism. However, in not addressing matters directly concerned with the power structure and ideology of the Malaysian state, many NGOs have been unable to develop a high level of institutional autonomy that would discipline the state and protect the individual. This has raised doubts as to whether NGOs can achieve any significant effect on democratization of civil society. First, there is ambiguity regarding the role of religious and political NGOs under an authoritarian government. The state has often shown enthusiasm and support, lumping together all kinds of organizations under the

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category of NGOs. The definition contained in the Societies Act is premised on the fact that civil society is a provider of key services in religion, health, public interest, and charity. Therefore they are bound to be organizations that emphasize helping others along with spiritual well-being and the collective good of the community.90 By laying down strict rules under the Societies Act for all kinds of organizations and by failing to distinguish among religious cults, religious associations, and civil groups, the government has been responsible for letting the former occupy the political space reserved for citizens’ groups. Second, because there are few political groups with any degree of independence from the ruling coalition, many NGO activists believe that they should protect the principle of participation by becoming involved in policymaking. To enhance the relationship between the NGOs and the federal government, as well as to encourage a supportive legislative and regulatory framework, NGOs have sponsored talks, made submissions, and raised the general profile of civil society organizations in Malaysia. Although NGOs have an impact on the state by influencing policy formation and public opinion in various fields, these efforts need to be distinguished from NGO participation in the electoral and party system that poses problems for developing a more democratic opposition front.91 For example, former ABIM members like the president, Fadzil Mohamed Noor, former head of Dakwah, and former ABIM Terengganu head Haji Abdul Hadi Awang have become part of the PAS party machine. In the last elections participation by NGOs was more obvious because officeholders in Keadilan were drawn mostly from such organizations: Keadilan deputy president Chandra Muzaffar is also president of JUST; vice president Tian Chua is linked to Suaram; and Keadilan secretary-general Mohamad Anuar Tahir is a former ABIM leader. Human rights organizations like Suaram and Tenaganita are intertwined with the opposition because of the violation of political and civil liberties during and after the elections. The problem is that by being aligned with the opposition, NGOs are not always in a position to criticize the objectives and programs of these parties when they eventually come to power. Moreover, interlocking membership of NGOs and political parties can lead to problems of credibility and transparency.

Conclusion Universal moral principles underlying human rights are insensitive to important variations in the contexts in which they can be applied: they fail to capture the complex, dynamic cultural processes in many regions of the world. Within Malaysia the nationalist, traditionalist, communitarian, and

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feminist schools doubt whether individuals can act solely on the basis of rational considerations that abstract from their sense of identity as persons holding and possessing certain cultural attachments. Despite agreement on certain points among these schools, I argued that the prime advocates and proponents of the Asian way—the nationalist school—have been those holding power, whose positions make them critical of civil society. Mahathir’s style of authoritarian political governance is an attractive model for many other countries in Asia and Africa. The economic rise of Malaysia provided substance to his comprehensive critique of a postEnlightenment Western democratic model of politics; the adverbial aspects of liberal politics and participatory democracy were criticized on cultural grounds as being ill-suited to countries with multiethnic and multireligious groups. In recent years, given the economic crisis and global trends, charges of corruption in the government, and money politics within UMNO, these critiques, on grounds of cultural relativism, have been found lacking. In addition, analyses focusing on the relation between economic development and political democracy are no longer valid; neither are the voices that once praised Asian authoritarianism, including those of the World Bank. It is increasingly realized that only through the simultaneous establishment of good governance with open markets can genuine social development be achieved.92 Since it has been alleged that cronyism, graft, and lack of transparency may have been important factors for the economic crisis in Southeast Asia, it is argued that more political and civil rights should improve governance. The unprecedented flow of information in the current stage of globalization has rendered nations more transparent and more permeable to new ideas. Thus it becomes more difficult to conceal human rights violations or justify them on the basis of community identity, rights, and responsibilities. Finally, recent trends in globalization have brought forth disagreements about what modernization has meant to postcolonial societies like Malaysia. There is considerable doubt that modernization has brought about progress in general. Some scholars maintain that a nation-state can be a highly efficient and rational system in terms of organizing technology but also a means of retarding social development in some developing countries, especially in Southeast Asia. Similarly, the development of local bureaucracies may not turn out to be embodiments of Weberian rationality fostering modernity but instead instruments of corruption.93 Following the general elections in 1999 and the Anwar verdict in early 2000 there was greater activity among Malaysia’s civil society organizations. There was also renewed vigor in parties like PAS that interpreted election results to mean that democracy, cultural identity, and faith went hand in hand with Islam-inspired sociopolitical demands and economic reforms. PAS has participated in the political process by power-sharing with

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other democratic parties in the elections, but their agenda regarding the establishment of an Islamic state raises many queries. ASEAN countries are faced with the intentional killing of civilians, bombings, indiscriminate attacks, kidnapping, and use of unlawful weapons, activities that are difficult to reconcile with any moral or religious code. The question is whether religious precepts have any part to play in the respect and recognition for individual rights or minority rights in a country like Malaysia. By raising issues related to arbitrary power of the state, the Islamic resurgence has played a great role in the democratization of civil society. However, does this also sustain social pluralism and tolerance and equal rights for all communities in Malaysia? This question points out difficulties with the civil society argument. Any undermining of the nationalist school’s rhetoric on cultural rights does not compel recognition of the value of civil liberties for individuals and the rights of minority groups. Much depends on how the historical and structural connection is drawn between democracy and Islam in Malaysia. I allude to the dangers of a conceptual strategy that focuses on assigning the free space of civil society to all kinds of associations; the danger is that a weak civil society in Malaysia has created new modes of domination and coercion. One way of understanding this is to examine the historical conditions that gave rise to a new social power—the religious elite—that stands in opposition to the authoritarian state and relocates and appropriates some of its legal functions in the private sphere. Democratization and expansion of civil society have given power to traditionalist ideologues in PAS and many other Muslim sects in the Malay community. No authoritarian ruler could ever penetrate the personal spiritual lives of its subject in this manner. Moreover, common appeal to Islam might drown voices, interpretations, and political strategies within civil society. Hence civil society is in principle the sphere of freedom and voluntary action, but with the rise of militant religious groups one of the principal functions of the state— legal procedures and practices—has been centralized and appropriated by traditionalists. Civil society has made citizens more aware of civil liberties and alerted them to the dangers of state oppression, but it has also disguised new forms of domination and obscured the ways oppression can be rooted in civil society itself. Many scholars argue that human rights can be developed within an Islamic framework: the rich source material and the complex legacy of Islamic civilization offer many avenues for meshing human rights law with Islamic values. Consequently, there have been many ideological formulations of the shari’a by Muslims from different sociopolitical contexts. According to John Esposito and John Voll (1996, 7), “Islam has a full spectrum of potential symbols and concepts for support of absolutism and hierarchy, as well as foundations for liberty and equality.” As for democracy within an Islamic

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framework considerable attention is given to concepts of shurah (consultation), ijma (consensus), and ijtihad (independent interpretive judgment). For many communitarian scholars, a common core of ethical values provides an effective foundation for understanding the relationship between Islam and other religions. Within the Muslim world these terms are contested, but they claim to provide a foundation for understanding the relationship between Islam and democracy in the contemporary world.94 Those rethinking human rights maintain that religion may be a device for enforcing a set of cultural patterns for women and for promoting communitarianism. But I argue that it provides a shared moral background of understanding among participants and contains conflict and meaningful dialogue with other or different cultures. Militant Islamization programs often end up as political strategies that return to allegedly local cultural roots. For this reason it is not unusual to see them aimed at silencing Muslim dissidents and curbing rights of religious minorities.95 Moreover, to argue for a conception of human rights to work in conjunction with religious laws is to risk reaffirming the marginalization of women. It is to risk reinforcing claims like those undergirding the PAS version of women’s role in the family, the flip side of which is the marginalization of women in the public sphere. These theoretical obstacles to developing women’s citizenship rights must be seen alongside the global rise in fundamentalism and terrorism that have become the centerpiece of their program for reasserting cultural controls over women.96 Religious texts continue to be interpreted as providing authority for the exclusion of women from public life, as well as discrimination in health, education, and family laws (adultery, divorce, and custody of children). Adherents of democracy have a daunting task ahead, because the mere reformulation of democratic principles in Islamic idioms cannot be adapted to institutions of modern society. To understand Islamization movements one needs to view them historically within their sociopolitical context. Despite the compatibility of some terms and strong affinities between Islam and democracy, there are many challenges to be overcome in the establishment of an Islamic state in a multicultural society.

Notes 1. Between July and August 2000 there were three minor incidents involving Muslim groups that had interstate implications: an arms heist by Al-Ma’unah cult members in Perak, Malaysia; the hostage crisis in Jolo Island, Philippines; and the car-bombing at the residence of Manila’s ambassador in Indonesia. For different versions of these incidents, see “Deviationist Groups a Confused Lot, Says Musa,” The Sun, 9 July 2000; “Economics, Not Islamic Militancy Behind Problems,” New Straits Times, 29 July 2000; and Chandrasekaran (2000).

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2. PULO is trying to win autonomy for four of Thailand’s southern provinces. See Falk (1988, 18) for theoretical aspects of these developments elsewhere. But state sovereignty is a highly contested concept. Some argue that it is possibly changing and not weakening and that we can expect the state to remain a central form of political organization in the world. For a defense of this view, see Barkin (2001). 3. Promotion of a national political community and an independent nationstate were some of the themes prominent in the discourse of national liberation projects in Asia. 4. Many liberal political theorists argue for a priority of rights. For various positions, see Dworkin (1977); Rawls (1973); Galston (1980). For a critique of the politics of culturalism and for the impact of its revision in liberal political theory, see Walker (1997); Kymlicka (1989 and 2001). 5. Many social scientists have discussed these aspects; see Bell (1996); Moody (1996). However, they emphasize this debate as restricted to national political elites. My argument is different because it takes into consideration the communitarian critique by other social groups in society. It also does not reduce all criticisms made by governments of human rights to only cultural arguments. I tend to see these analyses of human rights as critiques of modernity and of Western economic and political hegemony. I also argue that the crisis of modernity in countries like Malaysia is far more complex as political elites voice a critique of Westernization and the liberal model of democracy while favoring rapid economic growth and development (Mahathir 1995c; 1999b). 6. See indirect references to this theme on rights and democracy in speeches by Mahathir (1994; 1995d). All references to Mahathir’s speeches are available online at www.smpke.jpm.my. 7. ASEAN is an association of Southeast Asian states; its current member states are Brunei, Burma, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia. The aims and purposes as outlined in the ASEAN declaration, signed on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, reflect concern for economic growth and regional peace and stability. See ASEAN (1967), available online at www.aseansec.org. 8. Throughout this chapter I view the universal theory of rights and human rights as sharing overlapping concerns. 9. I agree that although international documents have lent credence to the declaration of human rights, as a moral category the very notion of rights and their ethical justification has been questioned. For related ideas, see Bilimoria (1993). 10. In the nineteenth century the idea of inalienable rights was challenged by utilitarians and Marxists, although on different grounds. For a discussion on Bentham’s views, see Lyons (1985). For Marx’s critique of individual basis of rights, see Marx (1975a). 11. On the development of human rights in response to Nazi atrocities in Europe during World War II, see Buergenthal (1997). 12. For further discussion of human rights and world politics, see Forsythe (1983); James Tang (1995). 13. In contrast to the negative nature of the first generation of political rights expressed in the ICCPR, the ICESCR stresses positive state intervention for the purpose of ensuring equitable distribution in production and distribution of goods and in the achievement of material and spiritual conditions that ensure life with dignity for every individual. In the 1950s many newly liberated states advanced the third generation of human rights: the right to development, peace, a healthy and ecologically balanced environment, and one’s cultural practices. For a discussion of these rights and their problems, see Rich (1988, 41).

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14. For a discussion of these aspects, see Mayer (1999). 15. Despite similarities in political style and ideas there are differences. Mahathir has been more articulate and coherent than Lee Kuan Yew in his attack on globalization and its impact on developing countries. 16. For details on the UN-sponsored Vienna Conference in 1993, see “Debate over Rights: Rejecting Western Pressure, Asia Tables Its Own Definition,” Asiaweek, 30 June 1993. 17. See, under human rights, sections 16, 17, and 18 in ASEAN (1993b). For more, see ASEAN (1999). 18. After this policy initiative there has been little enthusiasm for implementing the proposal in Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar. Until these countries set up national institutions, the regional mechanism is unlikely to be established. 19. To this day, government initiatives in developing an infrastructure for human rights protection in ASEAN have focused on the development of national institutions. Regional developments have been encouraging but slow in this regard. Significant work is done by organizations like the Law Association for Asia and the Pacific (LAWASIA). Starting in 1995 with support from the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, the LAWASIA human rights committee organized a series of meetings in the region to discuss proposals for a human rights mechanism in Southeast Asia. See Padman (1999a). 20. See ASEAN (1993a, sections 13–18), issued at an intergovernmental meeting at the regional conference prior to the UN World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. 21. Human rights do not even fall within the provisions of the recently established ASEAN-related institutions or forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The inaugural meeting of ARF was held in Bangkok on 25 July 1994. It was the first regional multilateral forum for government-level consultations on security issues. Its members include, among others, Australia, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, the United States, and Russia. See ASEAN (1994). 22. This approach draws its strength from the provisions of the Treaty on Amity and Cooperation signed in Bali, Indonesia, on 24 February 1976. It is based on the principles of mutual respect for noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations (see www.aseansec.org/history). Based on this it is instructive to recall that ASEAN accepted Burma into the fold despite continuing human rights abuses. Its approach rejected criticism in favor of dialogue but also went a long way in furthering and expanding ASEAN ties with Burma. It has also refused to comment on the deeds of the Marcos administration. In general, ASEAN countries have protected one another on human rights abuses. A conference on East Timor in Kuala Lumpur in 1996 was disrupted. See “Melee over a Meeting,” Asiaweek, 22 November 1996. 23. Many of their concerns on handling transnational crime in this region were incorporated in ASEAN (2001). For a general overview of ASEAN since the economic crisis, see Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Ghoshal (1999). 24. Within Malaysia there was criticism of countries that questioned the Anwar trial and the verdict. See Spaeth (2000). 25. Some of the material on the constitution in this section is drawn from Suffian, Lee, and Trindade (1979). 26. Even if there are doubts about the role of the Malaysian Human Rights Commission and its autonomy from the government, this was a positive move. See Shahanaaz Sher Habib and Kumar (1999). On lack of information about human rights in this region and the role that the press can play in highlighting it, see Zainon Ahmad (2000).

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27. The Human Rights Commission was criticized on several grounds by NGOs like Hakam, Suaram, Era Consumer, and the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism. See Koshy (2000); Faezah Ismail (2000). 28. Here I draw attention to the 1 September 1999 memorandum on the proposed Malaysian National Human Rights Commission submitted by several NGOs to the government of Malaysia. 29. For more, see Harding (1996, chapter 12). 30. For a theoretical discussion on these issues in liberal democratic theory, see Kymlicka (1989; 2001). 31. For a fuller discussion, see Harding (1996, chapter 12) and Chapter 3. 32. For more on events leading to Operation Lalang, see Chapter 5; Chong J. (2000). 33. The Asian Human Rights Commission is an independent body that monitors violations throughout this region. They made an appeal to look into torture of Anwar. See 1998 Asian Human Rights Commission appeal to the Malaysian government. In 2001, they also sent a petition to the Malaysian government to release all ISA detainees and to repeal the ISA. For more, see www.ahrchk.net/ua/malaysia/ petition.htm. For the recent detention of students under ISA and its criticism, see Holland (2001). 34. See Loone (2001) for this incident on 14 February. 35. He was arrested under the Official Secrets Act for his admission and distribution of classified government documents to the media. See Charles and Benjamin (2000b). 36. Pereira (2000a); see also “Musa Slams Aziz for Criticizing Statement,” The Sun, 5 August 2000. The UMNO youth leader had likened Musa Hitam’s statement allowing people to assemble on this occasion to giving knives to children. 37. See memorandum containing 581 signatures from journalists and editors handed to the home minister. “Malaysian Journalists Call for Repeal of Act,” Commentary, 3 May 1999. 38. Lim Guan Eng criticized the attorney general for not prosecuting the chief minister, Rahim Tamby Chik, in 1994, when the latter had charged fifteen other men for the crime. For details, see Suaram (1998, 225–226) in Malaysian Human Rights Report. 39. See report by Fuller (2000a) on Kadir Jasin’s removal from New Straits Times. 40. See “KL Declares It Will Imprison Net Offenders,” The Straits Times (Singapore) (TST) website, 31 July 2000. 41. Many analysts interpret Mahathir’s views as based on communitarianism. Please note that the aim of this section is to distinguish his nationalist (i.e., communitarian) arguments from the communitarian school’s democratic arguments. 42. For more on these differences, see Chapter 4. 43. In light of several criticisms of a foundational approach toward rights, political philosophers have attempted to give what is known as a “constructivist” account of rights. J. Rawls (1993) derives rights from assumptions about rationality without appealing to a theological basis or to metaphysical assumptions. But because he attributes a thin theory of rationality to all human beings, his theory is not strong enough to justify rights violation in all cases. For another account of human agency, see Gewirth (1984). 44. For similar criticisms, see Kothari and Sethi (1991, 4–5); Chandra (1999b, 29). 45. See Sardar (1996, 252); Allahbukhsh Brohi (1982, 252).

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46. Some aspects of this argument are present in Mahathir’s speech (1995a). 47. See speech by Mahathir (1995a), where he draws readily from a study by David Hitchcock, the former director for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the U.S. Information Agency. He conducted a survey on comparative values. 48. For a discussion of some of these ideas, see Kim Dae Jung (1994, 193). 49. For secondary arguments on the universal and relativist debate on human rights, see Lingle (1996, 396–397); Robison (1996, 313–315); Freeman (1993). 50. For these facts, see Suaram (1998, 128–130), in Malaysian Human Rights Report. 51. For balance between global and domestic factors in shaping industrial efforts, see Machado (1989–1990, 506–507). 52. The fact that Japan emerged as an economic superpower has been a source of pride for many in Southeast Asia. Mahathir was impressed with its industrialization strategies and management techniques. But he initially justified this on the basis of morals and ethics and later with efficiency in his Look East policy. See interview by Das (1982b). He still views Japan as an “invaluable friend” (Mahathir 1999b) and admires it for following an independent path of economic development. 53. This argument is presented in different ways in Mahathir (2000a). 54. This is evident in the government’s approach toward trade unions and workers’ rights (Jomo and Todd 1994). 55. For a discussion of the traditionalists and their role in defining family, see Othman (1998, 180–181); Moghadam (1994, 393). 56. For various approaches to these issues, see Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im (1990); Othman (1994, 74–75); Amina Wadud-Muhsin (1992). 57. Chandra Muzaffar is one of Malaysia’s most prominent academics. He was founder-president of the NGO Aliran from 1977 to 1991. In 1987 his outspokenness against the government landed him in prison for fifty-two days. A decade later he was once again in trouble with the government. The University of Malaya did not renew his contract after February 1999, for he was seen to be close to Anwar. Currently he is the president of the International Movement for a Just World (JUST). After the university’s decision not to employ him, Chandra joined Keadilan, the party formed by Anwar’s wife. 58. I would think that the argument is more complex than Chandra develops in another work. He differentiates between “freedom of choice exercised on the basis of individual sovereignty and freedom of choice circumscribed by a religious philosophy with a notion of right and wrong” (1997a, 4). 59. I refer here both to the universal theory of human rights and the fundamental rights of individuals in the Malaysian constitution. 60. For a defense of this view, see Donnelly (1985, 9); Kamenka and Tay (1978). 61. According to Donnelly the concern for human goods and human dignity in Islam is not equivalent to a concern for, or recognition of, human rights (1982, 306–307). 62. I refer to Chandra’s optimism about these various movements in his essay on the spiritual vision of the human being (1997b, 64–68). 63. The idea of quranic universalism is drawn from Chandra (1998b; 1982, 9). 64. For the controversy on establishing an Islamic state in Malaysia, see Tan (2001) and Elegant (2000b). For general challenges to women in the Islamic world, see Weiss (1994). 65. I use the term women’s rights to mean that the arguments in a theory and practice of human rights for women have different philosophical grounds from human rights for (abstract) individuals.

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66. For a general discussion, see Stamatopoulou (1995, 39–41). 67. I refer here to reservations raised by Bangladesh, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia regarding these rights. I borrow the term cultural particularism from Ann Elizabeth Mayer (1995, 118). It implies an examination of the production of law through culture and the places in which the boundaries between culture and law become fuzzy (i.e., where religion constitutes itself as law). 68. For contrasting views on the role of religion and human rights, see Rao (1999); Mayer (1999). Rao argues that a conception of human rights need not treat religion’s tenets as eternal and unchanging. Even though she sees dangers in this argument, she argues for the use of religion in human rights. Mayer is more conscious of the risks involved in viewing women as channels for culture. 69. For a defense of this view, see Rudie (1983); Wazir-Jahan Begum Karim (1992); Haji Faisal Bin Haji Othman (1993). For the lack of gender sensitivity in women’s studies on Malaysia, see Stivens (1992). 70. The Sisters in Islam was formed in 1988 and registered in 1991. Advocacy for reform on issues of justice and equality in Islam is an important aspect of its activity. It has submitted important memoranda to the government that influenced government policy and legal reform. Some important pamphlets published by SIS include “Are Women and Men Equal Before Allah?” (1991a); “Are Muslim Men Allowed to Beat Their Wives?” (1991b). 71. For a general idea of the bureaucratization of Islamic religious affairs, see Sharifah Zaleha Syed Hassan (1986). 72. See Ismail (1995, 175) for the government’s views on this legislation. 73. See report by Sharifah Hamzah (1999) that in Malaysia there are 4.1. cases of rape reported daily; Loone (2000); Grace Chin (1999) on physical abuse of women. 74. This section is drawn from the report titled “Monitoring the Domestic Violence Act 1994 Malaysia [the DVA],” published by the Women’s Aid Organization in 1997. For details, see section 2, Laws of Malaysia: Domestic Violence Act 1994 (Act 521). 75. See Women’s Aid Organization, “Monitoring the Domestic Violence Act” (1997, 10). For details, see section 13. 76. For a fuller discussion of the issues related to hudud, see Ismail (1995). 77. Many scholars have argued that the hudud bill fails to reflect the multireligious nature of Malaysian society and politics and should not be applied. At one level, it charted a course for citizens in Kelantan and overlooked the violation of similar laws in other states because these laws could not be applied if a resident of a neighboring state committed a similar offense. At another level the bill failed to show care and compassion or to provide an opportunity for those who might be ready to repent and reform themselves; see Ismail (1995). 78. For details, see Salbiah Ahmad (1995). 79. The debate on modesty with the Kelantan state government headed by PAS is an old one and addressed similar issues. It was argued that although dress is part of identity and cultural expression, a woman’s right to decide her own form of dress is not denied by the Quran. See SIS letters to the editor, “Of Dress and Muslim Women,” New Straits Times, 14 November 1991, 13; “Modesty According to the Qur’an,” New Straits Times, 9 August 1997, 11. This debate has taken another twist in recent years. The PAS-led governments in Kelantan and Terengganu have imposed various conditions on Muslim women and men in public places. Female workers are advised to wear the tudung (cover, veil) while at work, and Muslim men and women are required to queue at separate counters in grocery stores.

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80. See report by Lam Li (1999) and letter to the editor from Dr. Prema Devaraj (2000), Executive Committee Aliran, for greater sensitization in gender issues. 81. In the last general elections women’s groups were far more visible. The Women’s Candidacy Initiative was formed to encourage the participation of women in politics so women could be directly represented in decisionmaking positions. The need for independent female candidates arose in order to move away from the norm of race-based politics in Malaysia. 82. On the increasing role of NGOs, see Berfield (1996, 20) and Lev (1990). 83. For resistance to the 1981 Societies Act, see Das (1982a). It must be noted that the controversial amendments to the Societies Act were drafted when Hussein Onn was prime minister. However, Mahathir remains very critical of NGOs, especially those on human rights, and complains that they obstruct the government’s work (Mahathir 1994, Keynote Address). Although I treat them as NGOs in their functions, Tenaganita, SIS, and Suaram are not registered under the Societies Act but under the Companies Act, which gives organizations more freedom from the state. 84. NGOs have experienced operational difficulties when the government is intolerant of dissent. In such a situation the relations between NGOs and the government were very strained. For more, see Heyzer, Riker, and Quizon (1995). 85. For the different kind of NGOs in Malaysia, see Asian Institute of Development Communication (1999), Directory of Non-Profit Organizations in Malaysia. 86. For a universalist position on rights in the context of Malaysia, see Cumaraswamy (1997). 87. For a comprehensive summary, see Padman (1999b). 88. For attempts to adapt religious doctrines in democratic projects, see Chandra and Camilleri (1998). 89. The actual role of these organizations in policymaking is very limited. However, I wish to stress that their initiative to work with the government through meetings and conferences has highlighted the plight of indigenous tribes. 90. I think this aspect of Islam is significant for engaging members of the community. See the Introduction (Chapter 1) for these aspects. See also Mohamed Ariff (1991); Suh and Oorjitham (2000). To meet the PAS challenge, UMNO created the Malaysian Islamic Welfare Council, consisting of some eighty NGOs involved in Muslim activities. 91. Many women’s NGOs and human rights organizations were active in reformasi demonstrations and the election campaign in 1999. Ivy Josiah, director of a leading women’s organization that works closely and critically with the government, is also a member of the PRM. Sivarasa Rasiah is on the board of Suaram and a member of PRM. 92. In 1993 the World Bank issued its report on economic growth in the Southeast Asian region. For a reversal of these views, see the special report in Asiaweek, 8 April 1999. 93. See the work of Shiva (1988) on the destruction of nature, women, and culture. 94. It is interesting to note that despite having a population that is more than 80 percent Muslim, Indonesia failed to amend its constitution to include shari’a laws. See report by Shamsul Akmar (2000). 95. For ambiguous statements by PAS on this issue, see the interview of Hadi Awang, in Oorjitham (2000b). 96. Scholars like Tibi Bassam (1998, 199) make a useful distinction between traditionalists and fundamentalists. He argues that fundamentalists are not traditionalists because they evaluate tradition in light of modernity. Fundamentalism is

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further viewed as an ideology contributing to a war of civilizations that is different from the Islamic “faith.” It is also seen as the most serious challenge to secular democracy because its proponents aim to replace secularity with a divine order. He also disagrees with Esposito, who refers to Islamization of democracy as a process of democratization. In the case of Malaysia I use the term traditionalists for PAS even though I argue that its interpretation of Islam is based on the mobilization of identities in relation to modernity. Its ambiguous statements on the nature of state and society deter me from calling them “fundamentalists” at this point. Also see endnote 8 in the Introduction (Chapter 1) for this classification.

7 Conclusion

The collapse of authoritarianism in many countries of Southeast Asia has given rise to the process of building democracies. Mass uprisings against unpopular governments in the Philippines (1986), Myanmar (1988), Thailand (1992), and Indonesia (1998) symbolized the tide of democratic reforms sweeping this region. Speculating on the future development of state, democracy, and civil society in Malaysia requires a realistic appraisal of the likely effects of the Mahathir era. Although a thorough assessment cannot be made within the limited scope of this account, some of the pressing problems facing the country can be identified and some potential consequences of government policy can be mentioned. The next general elections (expected to take place in 2004) will be critical for Malaysians as they weigh options for the political direction they intend to follow. There could be a sense of uncertainty as the nation confronts a demanding political and economic agenda. But we could also see some finer moments in Malaysian politics that would lead to a more open, more transparent, and perhaps more flexible political structure. I have argued in this book that the process of globalization has drawn together many countries like Malaysia by intensifying economic, cultural, and social relations among nations. Although globalization is tied to a decrease in the sovereignty of nation-states by opening up the economy to international markets, privatization, and liberalization of the economy, it also influences opinions about democratic reform, human rights, and cultural identity. As one observes the awakening of Islamic communities in different parts of Southeast Asia, one cannot ignore the context in which identity issues arise. The U.S. attack on Afghanistan in response to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September has given rise to demagogic and xenophobic ideas transforming the legitimate desire to affirm identity into a more aggressive attitude. On the positive 207

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side, the attempt by certain religious groups to assert their identity and culture can be regarded as strategies for challenging oppression and social injustice.1 On the flip side, militant action for recognition and being different tends to make such assertions slide into intolerance for other ways and forms of life. In the case of third world societies in Asia, the struggle to establish a multicultural society that respects different ways of life has been a long and arduous one.2 I argued that due to different historical and cultural conditions than those in Europe, Malaysia followed a different path toward nation-building. Colonialism introduced a politics of difference in which differences such as race, class, gender, religion, and ethnic particulars functioned to foster antagonisms among member groups. The Malaysian state faced the unenviable task of establishing the terms of multiracial cooperation in a postcolonial state wedded to the goals of modernization and rapid economic progress. Although initially the government claimed neutrality on the cultural claims of the three ethnic communities, from 1970 onward the leadership began to focus on the need to reverse the economic backwardness of Malays through the implementation of the New Economic Policy. This gradually gave rise to a monoethnic state in which the government became closely identified with promoting Malay interests; language, culture, and politics of the Malay community began to dominate other ethnic groups, particularly the Chinese. I have argued that the Malaysian state functions through a high degree of control and integration of institutions of state and civil society. Under Mahathir, the successful co-opting of political dissent accompanied the marginalization of political space for liberal discourse. Today many of the issues, such as corruption, the independence of the judiciary, human rights, and even change in leadership, are being openly discussed. But these discussions take place within the arena of institutionalized repressive tolerance and narrow political space. The ground rules determining this space emphatically assert accommodation with the current government. Thus few areas in the public sphere remain free from state domination. In recent years this trend has been challenged by the effects of globalization in Southeast Asia. Apart from the Islamic resurgence, secular nationstates are under attack all over the world because cultural fragmentation undercuts the idea of a culturally homogenous state. Modern nationalism has been questioned all over the world for aligning political boundaries with the boundaries of a culturally dominant community. In Anglo-Saxon states the debates on the relation between the state and collectivities revolve around not only the pluralism of needs and interests of groups but also the pluralism of people’s histories and backgrounds. Malaysia, which is flanked by neighbors battling cultural and religious movements along with financial reform, has peaceful ethnic relations, steady

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economic growth, and control over Islamic forces. It has survived trends that have swept democratic ideas across national boundaries throughout the region. Led by a strong executive, the government has relied upon subtle ideological control and nationalist sentiments to maintain an authoritarian structure and face the challenge of rising Islamic consciousness. Since the early 1980s, Islam has taken center stage in Malaysian politics. The political co-optation of the Islamic opposition and the government’s invitation to Anwar to join the UMNO were attempts to strengthen the government’s legitimacy within the Malay community. But the Islamic resurgence in the late 1990s is quite different from its earlier incarnation, and understanding the nature of this difference is essential in coming to terms with the new political terrain. The mechanisms through which this change has occurred include a combination of authoritarian and global politics, changes in Malay identity, and popular mobilization. I have argued that Islamic resurgence, among other things, represents an appropriation of political space opened by the authoritarian politics of Mahathir. Authoritarianism and increasing executive control over political institutions, the judiciary, and the police force led to fewer credible political leaders within UMNO and other political parties. Moreover, individuals and groups who were known to uphold the rule of law and who were committed to the independence of the judiciary were gradually eliminated from the system. Today Islam unifies the Malay community by providing laws and institutions that emphasize their superiority and distinctiveness over other faiths. It also becomes a rallying point in moments of perceived non-Muslim threat in a multicultural society and in a global world. In this situation Islam offers a suitable identity for the Malay community—for demarcating one’s group and strengthening their position among other religious and cultural groups. But modernists, nationalists, traditionalists, feminists, and communitarians within the Malay community have proposed diverse interpretations of their political and cultural identity. Within these are contesting perceptions and definitions of Islam. Thus the Malay identity, with its emphasis on culture and Islam, is changing, and this is bound to affect the positions and roles of the other ethnic groups. In a broader sense it means that the focus on ethnic differences among the communities based on culture or language has gradually given way to religious identity in the Malay community. I have argued that because ethnic perceptions are relational, variable, and shifting, this has consequences for Malaysian politics. The political discourse that has focused on Malay economic and political rights will be replaced by a preoccupation with Islam and religious laws. Therefore Malays will rely less upon UMNO to protect them in a multiethnic community and will themselves turn toward the religious politics of PAS. In this way UMNO’s traditional power will be undermined.

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All these changes raise questions regarding the identity politics that is emerging with the rise of PAS; although identity politics may say a lot about the cultural differentiation among the masses, the members of the middle class, enriched by the NEP, have redefined the contours of this debate. The first is a change in the political thinking among the younger generation of Malays that has challenged the formal notion of citizenship. Ordinary Malays are redefining their ideas and perceptions of political leadership largely as a result of the events following the expulsion of Anwar from government and UMNO. Anwar was dismissed in September 1998 following differences over economic policy. He was expelled from UMNO after leading the biggest antigovernment protests in decades and was later convicted on charges of corruption and sodomy. Many international organizations and countries denounced the verdict and sentence as a legal travesty.3 The conviction of Anwar brought a wave of accusations directed at Mahathir for being unIslamic and authoritarian. And because UMNO was closely associated with its leader, it was bound to face the wrath of the new assertive Malay citizen. There are already signs that powerful leaders within UMNO would be pleased to see Mahathir step down from the presidency. Whether this happens or not, there is every prospect for the maintenance of the current structures of hegemony to enable a gradual transfer of state power to the heir chosen by Mahathir. The big question is: When does the post-Mahathir era begin, or has it already begun? Through the Internet and websites, Malaysians now have greater access to information and can form balanced views of events happening outside and even in Malaysia. The current challenge to the authority of the state in the public sphere of women, professional groups, students, and NGOs can be explained partly by the growing confidence of the middle class. As Joel Kahn rightly points out, the extent to which regime maintenance does require ideological cooption of subaltern groups is generally achieved through and/or mediated by members of the middle strata, who may in turn challenge regime legitimacy by mobilizing the voices of the dominated as part of their struggle against political elites. This rather specific role played by the middle classes in both legitimation of and resistance to regimes of power is clearly evident in the recent political conflicts in Malaysia. (Kahn 1996, 70)

The prevailing situation raises some difficult questions for the next general elections: How far can the current government go to meet the challenge of a radical Islam?4 To what extent does the rise of parties like PAS assist in the process of expanding the political sphere? After enjoying a near-monopoly of power for almost four decades, UMNO is on the decline because it is unable to recover the basis of an

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idealistic Malay nationalism. In the UMNO general assembly held in 1999 there was discussion of the growing role of PAS in Malaysian politics; but there also was an increasing focus on the decline of UMNO and the challenges it faces from losing a substantial portion of the Malay community to the opposition. The opposition camp is a mishmash of parties with separate and contradictory agendas that came together just before the elections in 1999 on common issues with the aim of preventing the BN from securing a twothirds majority in parliament. The opposition (PAS, DAP, PRM, and the newly formed Keadilan) has to work out the common ground for the next elections because of their different political ideologies. PAS’s membership and its public profile rose dramatically since Malaysia’s economic slump in 1997 and the Anwar crisis. It claims that religion is the only unifying factor for all Malays that can move the community forward, strengthen their resolve, and fend off degenerate values. However, PAS in its religious fervor is also seen as caught up in dogmatism. Its brand of Islam is perceived as segregating the community, as only Malays who are PAS members are accepted as true Muslims. Apart from PAS, other opposition parties have not been able to take advantage of the decline of UMNO. Keadilan was hastily formed before the elections in 1999 by Anwar’s wife, Dr. Wan Azizah Wan Ismail. The organization does not extend beyond the office-bearers for now. Its most outstanding officeholders come from the NGOs: deputy president Chandra Muzaffar is the president of JUST; vice president Tian Chua is a social activist linked to Suaram; secretary-general Mohd Anuar Tahir is former ABIM leader. Most of them have a following among the middle class in the urban areas but could not win any seats in the last elections. The party has been criticized for a lack of clear leadership, factionalism, and poor finances.5 Given the weak organization of the Keadilan and the reduced number of seats for DAP in the last general elections, PAS will be the backbone of any proposed alternative in the next elections because it has the best party machine and organization. PAS is gradually transforming not merely the ideals of the Malaysian state but also the political rhetoric by challenging the epistemology of the ruling nationalist elite. But given the multiracial character of Malaysian politics, it is still difficult for PAS to gain power on its own at the federal level. They will have to come to terms with the reality of a plural society. Non-Malays currently form more than 40 percent of the Malaysian population, and they have sufficient numbers to turn the tables when Malay votes are split. Moreover, PAS’s reluctance to confront issues like economics, taxes, education policy, and health care makes it look confused and out of touch.6 As UMNO dukes it out with PAS for the Malay vote in the 2004 elections, an equally intense battle for the hearts and minds of Chinese voters is

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bound to take place. The Chinese community (about 30 percent of the voters) and its voice will be crucial, particularly in close-fought Malay constituencies. To win Chinese votes, parties like Keadilan that are multiracial and embrace members belonging to different religions need to explain how it is different from UMNO with a similar affirmative action program. The biggest hurdle for Keadilan and DAP is their cooperation with PAS, which has openly stated its objectives of setting up an Islamic state. Moreover, the opposition has to propose a sound economic program to a set of voters who associate UMNO and Mahathir with political and economic stability. Keadilan is also the weakest group in the opposition in terms of party machinery and organization; it also has no charismatic leaders apart from Anwar’s wife as compared to the PAS, which can boast of leaders like Haji Abdul Hadi Awang, Nik Aziz Nik Mat, and Fadzil Mohamed Noor. During the U.S. war in Afghanistan PAS was able to voice concerns, finding for Malays a common ground in what has been a decades-long campaign for an Islamic state. The growth of a conservative and more reactionary Islam that has no room for dissenting Muslims and minorities is on the rise. The DAP quit the Alternative Front, an opposition coalition that includes Keadilan and PAS. This move was largely a result of DAP frustration at PAS’s aim of keeping the Islamic state as its goal. This move ended a brief experiment by the opposition to rise above the race-based politics that has long characterized Malaysia (Ranawana 2001). A weakened opposition strengthened the ruling government, which quickly condemned the terrorist attacks. The radicalization of Muslims and the split in the opposition over Islamic extremism led to increasing support for UMNO. Mahathir also gained support for the crackdown on Islamic militants in which several PAS and other Muslim leaders were imprisoned under the ISA for plotting to overthrow the government (Jayasankaran and Holland 2001). Meanwhile, to win the battle for the Malay soul UMNO is also trying to reform itself. In order to maintain its control over Malays the government is unlikely to change its stand on special quotas, privileges, and preferential income-allocation schemes for Malays. However, UMNO is bound to adopt more Islamic policies in response to the PAS challenge, although it is difficult to estimate the significance in religious terms of a vote for UMNO. What may be occurring within the Malay community is a shift that could usher in major changes without a change of government. What implications do these developments have for the future of democracy in Malaysia? Market forces driven by huge profits are part of the trend in globalization, but they bring growing demands for democratization and human rights. These two demands are perhaps the strongest forces that influence ethical standards for judging political systems. Differences in democratic systems might be debated and are most likely to be tolerated, but a failure to promote the development of a healthy and workable

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civil society will lead to criticism. Because growing demands for a healthy civil society can be solved only by introducing structural change, which requires a change in ideological orientation, the question arises: To what extent is Malaysia adequately equipped to adjust to such historical circumstances? A new generation of politicians and middle-class citizens will soon arrive whose visions for a free Malaysia were forged in the late 1990s. For years they worked in a system that derived power from patronage and populist policies. Now they realize the need to create a government where rulers are accountable to the public and rule of law. Moreover, the financial crisis of 1997 broke the bond between a strong centralized government and the silent Malay community, even though globalization was attacked as the main culprit. The folly of government-business cronyism and the dominance of vested private interests has been the focus of public outrage. Of course no one expects an authoritarian nation to be magically transformed into a liberal democracy overnight. Uprooting vested political and business interests and establishing a legal framework are bound to be gradual processes. Three areas vital to democratic governance that promise change are: (1) the resurrection of parliament, (2) an emphasis on constitutional government, (3) pluralism in civil society. Multipartyism and the gradual decline of UMNO are bound to make it possible for genuine parliamentary opposition to emerge in time. A twoparty coalition system that institutionalizes pluralist, balanced, and fair electoral competition can be foreseen in the next elections. No opposition party by itself can challenge UMNO, and thus a coalition will be necessary. Such a group supported by UMNO dissidents could be a way out of the impasse. However, most of the opposition parties have yet to combine multipartyism with grassroots participation and engagement of citizens. This is an important consideration in view of the fact that UMNO has party machinery at the federal and state levels in Malaysia. At the most basic level, the weakness of the Malaysian parliament stems from the persisting culture of authoritarianism. Regardless of constitutional provisions, the prevailing BN controls more than two-thirds of the seats, resulting in de facto marginalization of parliament in lawmaking. Mahathir has always viewed parliament as an institution to grant him legitimacy, but not as an arena for real policymaking; it could not develop as a serious counterweight to executive power. Although there will always be a penchant for a strong leader to replace Mahathir, one who could evade effective checks and balances, a more articulate judiciary, independent human rights commissions, and NGOs are bound to press for an improved parliament as a key institution for public policy. Some observers have also argued for a new liberal constitution that could improve the legal and political status of parliament by equipping it with greater powers.

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By emphasizing the multiethnic character of the opposition, Malaysian society could start experimenting with new political forms to replace authoritarian structures. But even in this new scenario a major obstacle is the overlap between the religious sphere and the state, something that might forestall the judicial and legislative separation necessary for pluralist politics. The evolution of an appropriate distance between the two could lead to guaranteed rights for minorities. Because of a general disenchantment with national secular ideologies in contemporary Malaysia, there is support for policies applying Islamic law that question a theory of human rights. Apart from the traditionalists within PAS, communitarian scholars and feminist organizations within Malaysia have pointed out the dangers of selective interpretation and enforcement of a theory of universal rights based on individual freedom and autonomy. Instead rights need to be translated into the language of their historical context. Such a culturally relativist position has the merits of drawing attention to the fact that Islamic cultural heritage lacks a tradition of individual entitlements and autonomy and that the philosophical grounds for rights of individuals derive from tenets of Islam. Because many of the cultural arguments presented by nationalists have been discredited, an exploration of the rich heritage of democracy-oriented traditions and philosophies within religions should provide foundations for democratic ideals and institutions. This strategy faces several conceptual problems—how to obtain universal agreement on the essentials of a community, as well as how to make respect for individual (religious) rights at least as compelling as a belief in one another’s communities and their moral worth in a multicultural society. Thus the effort to accommodate the concepts of Islam to those of democracy is a challenging, complex, and incomplete task because it involves a rethinking of the major ethical and legal precepts of Islam. As long as religious-based parties and religious associations accept the principle of pluralism, there is nothing intrinsically undemocratic in them that contradicts the codes of civil society or democratic society. But in a weak civil society there is a need to abide by the rule of law in order to protect citizens from state arbitrariness and nonstate interest and religious groups. The ideal conditions would be a balanced pluralism among civil society interests where there is no domination by a particular cultural or religious group. In countries like Malaysia, where a well-defined civil society does not exist, where the culture, history, and politics of different communities are at variance with one another, it is relevant to start defining the framework of human rights. In the context of a decline in political institutions and the rise of political consciousness, most of the rights in Malaysia are focused against the state in respect to violation of constitutional rights and civil liberties. But there are others, including women’s rights, cultural rights, rights

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of minorities, and the rights of indigenous groups to their lifestyle, that involve redefining citizen rights to include control of resources, individual freedom, and religious freedom. It is important not to fall into the trap of thinking that one set of rights has greater relevance than the other. Indeed, the procedural and social democratic dimensions of rights are interdependent, and a universal human rights framework must be the starting point from which common solutions to these problems are addressed.

Notes 1. I refer to the way Islamic groups have justified the attack by drawing attention to Israel’s control over Palestinian lands. For different views on the impact of the U.S. war on Afghanistan in Southeast Asia and Malaysia, see Djalal and McBeth (2001); Ranawana (2001); Farish Noor (2001). 2. For example, challenges to democracy in Indonesia and Philippines are from radical Islam, terrorism, and secessionism. The Abu Sayyaf group based in the southern Philippines is said to have received millions of U.S. dollars in ransom in the Sipadan abductions; see Davis (2000). For recent ethnic clashes between Malays and Indians in Malaysia, see Jayasankaran (2001a). 3. For a response to the verdict, see Ching (2000b); Spaeth (2000). 4. I use “radical” here because there are several positions within the Muslim community in Malaysia and within PAS. Also see endnote 8 in the Introduction (Chapter 1). 5. For problems within the Keadilan, see Wan Hamidi Hamid (2000b). 6. For PAS’s views on the economy and role in upholding democracy in the two states, see Vatikiotis (2000).

Glossary

abuyah adat al-Ma’unah aqidah azan bahasa Malaysia baju bangsa bumiputra ceramah dakwah Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka Dewan Negara Dewan Rakyat din wa dawla fatwa hadith hijab hokumat-e qanun hudud ijma ijtihad Jemaah Tabligh jihad jus soli

father of all customs, traditions Brotherhood of Inner Power beliefs a Muslim call to prayer Malay language dress, shirt race, tribe, nation sons of soil, Malays and all other indigenous groups and tribes lecture to call Literary and Language Agency senate house of representatives combining faith and state politics religious edicts collections of sayings and acts of Muhammad, the Prophet long, loose robe rule of law quranic criminal punishment consensus independent judgments/reasoning Lecture Group to struggle, to battle, a holy war for the religion law of the soil, by birth

217

218 kadhi kafir kharaj madrasah majlis agama Malaysia Boleh masjid Melayu Baru Melayu Raya mentri besar merdeka mufti muktamar nama negeri Operasi Lalang Orang Asli qisas Quran raja reformasi ridda ringgit rukunegara sadaqah Semangat 46 shari’a shurah sokong-dan setuju sumpah keramat tele-kung Tenaganita tudung ulama umat umma UMNO Baru waqf yang di-pertuan agong zakat

Glossary

priest infidel, disbeliever Islamic taxes school religious bureau Malaysia Can place for worship New Malay Greater Malaya chief minister independence religious official general assembly name, reputation, title state, country Operation Lalang, 1987, a government crackdown on dissidents indigenous groups living in Peninsular Malaysia retaliation, Islamic punishment for murder and the infliction of injury holy book prince, ruler reform apostasy Malaysian dollar articles of faith of the state/national pledge alms Spirit of ’46 Islamic law consultation support and agree sacred declaration a white praying veil Women’s Force (or Energy) cover, veil, head scarf religious scholars religious sect or community of believers community of Muslim believers New UMNO charitable endowments king wealth tax

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABIM

Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement) Aliran Aliran Kesedaran Negara (National Consciousness Movement) APU Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (Muslim Unity Front) ARF ASEAN Regional Forum ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations AWAM All Women’s Action Society Malaysia BA Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Front) Bhd Limited BMF Bumiputra Malaysia Finance BN Barisan Nasional (National Front) CCA class conflict approach CDA cultural diversity approach COAC Centre of Orang Asli Concern CPA consociational politics approach DAP Democratic Action Party DEVAW Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women DJZ DongJiaoZong (United Chinese Schools Committees’ Association Malaysia and United Chinese School Teachers’ Association Malaysia) DVA Domestic Violence Act FMS Federated Malay States Gerakan Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People’s Movement) HAKAM National Human Rights Society ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights IMF International Monetary Fund 219

220 ISA JHEOA JIM JUST Keadilan LAWASIA MATA MCA MCP MDU MIC MNP MNS NECC NEP NGOs NOC OIC PACOS PAP PAS Perkim Perwaja Petronas POASM PPA PRM Proton PULO SIS SUARAM Suqiu

UDHR UMNO

Abbreviations and Acronyms

Internal Security Act Jabatan Hal Ehwal Orang Asli (Department of Orang Asli Affairs) Jemaah Islah Malaysia (Malaysian Muslim Reform Movement) International Movement for a Just World Parti Keadilan Nasional (National Justice Party) Law Association for Asia and the Pacific Majlis Agama Tertinggi Malaya (Malayan Supreme Religious Council) Malaysian Chinese Association Malayan Communist Party Malayan Democratic Union Malaysian Indian Congress Malay Nationalist Party Malaysian Nature Society National Economic Consultative Council New Economic Policy nongovernmental organizations National Operations Council Charter of the Organization of Islamic Conference Partners of Community Organisations People’s Action Party, Singapore Parti Islam SeMalaysia (Islamic Party of Malaysia) Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (Islamic Welfare Association of Malaysia) Perwaja Terengganu Sdn Bhd (Perwaja Steel Ltd) Petroliam Nasional (National Petroleum Corporation) Peninsular Malaysia Orang Asli Association Printing Presses and Publications Act of 1948 Parti Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People’s Party) Perusahaan Otomobil Nasional Bhd (National Automobile Corporation) Pattani United Liberation Organization Sisters in Islam Suara Rakyat Malaysia (Voice of the Malaysian Peoples) Jawatankuasa Rayuan Pilihanraya Persatuan-persatuan Cina Malaysia (Malaysian Chinese Organizations Elections Appeals Committee) Universal Declaration of Human Rights United Malays National Organization

Abbreviations and Acronyms

UMS WAO WTO WWF

Unfederated Malay States Women’s Aid Organization World Trade Organization World Wide Fund for Nature–Malaysia

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Index

Abdul Razak Hussein, Tun: forges BN, 63–64, 106; heads NOC, 62, 144; as prime minister, 41, 65, 68, 144; quasi-authoritarian rule, 144 ABIM. See Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia Adat, 9, 27, 42, 94, 186 Afghanistan, 91, 116, 117, 212 Aliran (National Consciousness Movement), 195 Alliance: on achieving independence, 32, 142; constitutional contract, 32; inherited coercive machinery, 139 All Women’s Action Society (AWAM), 194 Alternative Front. See Barisan Alternatif Anderson, Benedict, 20 Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM), 117; Anwar’s role, 104–105; infiltrates PAS, 107; Middle East influence, 104. See also Anwar Ibrahim Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (APU), 107 Anwar Ibrahim: in ABIM, 104; in ASEAN, 171, 210; assaulted, 174; challenges Ghafar Baba, 110, 145; in civil society, 105; detained under ISA, 174; dismissal and arrest, 109–111, 141, 146, 153, 210; impact of trial, 93, 109, 113, 146; and Mahathir, 106, 110, 145; media allies

of, 145–154; reformasi, 110, 112, 113, 118 ASEAN. See Association of Southeast Asian Nations Asian economic crisis (1997–1998), 8, 13, 18, 109, 171, 197, 213 Asian Wall Street Journal, 156 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 168–172; and globalization, 18, 172; and minority rights, 198. See also Human rights Authoritarianism: challenges to, 4, 13, 118, 156–158; civil society, 151–152; consociationalism, 141; constitutional traditions supporting, 139–140; defeat of secular forces, 110; explanations for, 130, 132–138, 141; plural society, 133–137; political culture, 154–155, 158; political stability for, 138; state and economic growth, 149–150; in UMNO, 143–144. See also Mahathir bin Mohamad; Populist authoritarianism BA. See Barisan Alternatif Bahasa Malaysia (Malay language). See Culture Bangsa Malaysia (nation-state). See Mahathir bin Mohamad Barisan Alternatif (BA; Alternative Front): differences with PAS, 184; formation of, 111; future of, 211–212; general elections (1999),

245

246

Index

111, 147, 184; political parties in, 147, 211–212; as weak opposition, 211–212 . See also Barisan Alternatif; Democratic Action Party; General elections; Keadilan Barisan Nasional (BN; National Front): accommodation of groups, 41; dominated by UMNO, 138, 143; formation of, 62–63, 106; general elections, 111–112; grants political stability, 153. See also Citizenship; General Elections; Mahathir bin Mohamad; United Malays National Organization Bassam, Tibi, 99 BN. See Barisan Nasional British Malaya, 22, 27. See also Federation of Malaysia Bumiputra. See under Malays Bureaucracy, 39, 69–72, 137, 142, 149–150, 179 Chandra Muzaffar, 182, 195, 196, 211 Citizenship, 53–79; challenges to, 81–82; criticism of liberal theories, 56–57; development in Malaysia, 29, 53–54, 81; elite accommodation of, 59–60, 142; within European tradition, 55–57, 81; legal definition, 79; principles of, 58–61, 120; in Southeast Asia, 53 Civil society: limited citizen participation, 160, 175; in Malaysia, 192–196, 214; need for modification, 4, 198; NGOs in, 193–197; pluralism in, 213–214; reformasi, 110, 172; religious associations, 4, 214; research institutions, 193; rights of citizens, 214–215; Tocqueville on, 119–120; within Western political tradition, 1–5. See also Anwar Ibrahim; Democracy; Masyarakat madani Colonialism: Chinese and Indian immigrants, 25–26, 28, 30, 44, 54, 60; constitutional developments under, 26; formation of plural society, 24–26, 208; historical approaches to, 7; historical identities of ethnic groups, 44, 55, 58; immigration policy under, 26;

introduced differences, 208; Japanese occupation, 27–28; party formations in, 30–32; trade, 31. See also British Malaya; Malayan Union Communist insurgency, 28–30 Consociationalism: basis of Alliance rule, 96, 142–143; goal of Malay preeminence, 141; rules and restrictions of, 141; to satisfy UMNO’s role, 142–143. See also Authoritarianism; United Malays National Organization Constitution, 29; accommodation of group interests, 60–61; crisis in, 213; political liberties, 173, 176; principles of equality and freedom, 12; provisions for Islam, 95–98; rights, fundamental, 153; rights, religious, 97, 173–174; special position of Malays, 12. See also Citizenship; Human rights Corruption: in politics, 100, 144–145, 148, 156–157 Culture: Bahasa Malaysia, 36, 66–68, 101; Chinese Cultural Congress, 74; Chinese education, 66–67, 74–76; opposition to national culture, 75; Orang Asli, 77–78; rukunegara, 36, 73–74, 140. See also Education Daim Zainuddin, 145, 154, 156 Dakwah (to call), 44, 91, 93, 100–102, 106. See also Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia; Islam; Malays DAP. See Democratic Action Party Darul Arqam (House of Arqam), 102–104, 117; activists detained under ISA, 174; banned, 103; Rufaqa Corporation, 104 Democracy, 127–133; Asian, 127, 129; criticism of, 128, 167; economic development and, 130–132; Islamic concepts in promoting, 198–199; in Malaysia, 13, 118, 140, 146, 159–160; modernization, 131, 132; in Southeast Asia, 7, 129, 131, 133, 167, 207; structural definition of, 128. See also Plural society Democratic Action Party (DAP): differences with PAS, 184, 212; leaders arrested, 175; low standing

Index in 1999 elections, 145, 157–158, 211–212; as opposition party, 61, 111 Development: consumer culture, 82; criticism of Western values in, 43; First Malaysia Plan, 58–59, 62–63; indigenous groups, 77–78, 179; interracial disparities, 68–69; modernization of rural life, 69; and political democracy, 131, 132; Second Malaysia Plan, 58–59, 68–69. See also Culture; Dongjiaozong; Economy Domestic Violence Act (DVA), 189–190 Dongjiaozong, 66–74 DVA. See Domestic Violence Act Economy: changes in class formation, 70–72, 137, 149–150; Chinese capital, 26, 72, 148–150; in the colonial period, 24–26, 31; and the NEP, 54, 61–64, 68–71, 73, 80, 82, 95, 101, 149, 151–152; privatization of, 39, 151–152; state-sponsored changes to, 10, 69, 136–137, 149–151. See also Globalization Education: Bahasa Malaysia, 67–68; Barnes Report, 66; British policy, 66–67; challenges to, 73–74; Dongjiaozong, 66–74; Education Act (1996), 75; Fen-Wu Report, 66; language as identity, 101; Razak Committee on, 67; vision schools, 75–76. See also Culture; Malaysian Chinese Association; United Malays National Organization Elites, 33, 96, 135–136, 142, 154, 167, 183; traditional, 31; rural, 71 Emergency: coercion during, 139–140; communist insurgency, 28–30, 139; fundamental liberties during, 173; in Kelantan, 106; after race riots, 62 Ethnic groups: approaches toward, 134–137; in ethnonationalism, 25; flexible identities of, 23, 137; and authoritarianism, 133–135; and the state, 130 Executive, 146, 151, 213; control over civil society, 4; dominance in constitution, 140, 153; during emergency, 174. See also Mahathir

247 bin Mohamad; Parliament; United Malays National Organization

Fadzil Mohamed Noor (president, PAS), 107, 196; as leader of opposition, 111 Federation of Malaysia, 26–30, 58–59, 139; challenges from neighbors, 35 Freedom of the press: libel suits by government, 175; government control over media, 112, 148; restrictions on, 153, 159, 175 Gellner, E., 20 General elections: Alliance losses, 144; Anwar crisis, 110; Chinese voters, 76, 157–158; communal riots following, 61; control of dissent in, 175; new issues, 112, 129; of 1969, 61–62, 79; of 1990, 107, 145; opposition party gains, 61, 93; race and religion in, 136; PAS in, 197. See also Barisan Alternatif; Barisan Nasional Globalization: cultural rights, 11, 167; democratic reforms, 207; IMF and WTO role in, 18, 38–39; Islam, 11; Malaysian response to, 11, 210; nationalist discourse on, 19, 38–42; and the nation-state, 1–2, 11, 197; state sovereignty, 19, 167. See also Mahathir bin Mohamad; Nationalism; Nation-building; Nation-state Haji Abdul Hadi Awang, 107, 113–114, 196 Haji Fuad bin Hassan, 32, 106 Harakah (PAS newspaper), 112, 175 Hitam, Musa, 144, 175 Hudud (quranic criminal punishment), 96, 181, 189, 191–192; Mahathir on, 189. See also Islamic state Human rights: and ASEAN, 170–171; Asian values, 167, 170, 176, 178; communitarians on, 168, 181–184; critique of liberal democracy, 177; in Malaysia, 171–176; and Lee Kuan Yew, 170, 171; legislation on women’s rights and, 188–192; nationalist school on, 168, 176–179,

248

Index

183, 197; traditionalists on, 168, 176, 180–189; UN General Assembly debates, 169–170. See also Individualism; Islam; National Human Rights Commission of Malaysia; National Human Rights Society; Women’s rights Immigrants. See British Malaya; Colonialism Indigenous groups, 9. See also Orang Asli Individualism, 82, 177, 179, 183 Internal Security Act (ISA), 110, 172, 174, 212. See also Darul Arqam; Anwar Ibrahim Islam: in the constitution, 96–97; cult groups in, 116; cultural identity, 91–92, 94–95, 138; dakwah, 91, 93, 99–102, 106; democracy and human rights, 91–92, 198–199, 214; federalstate relations, 97; forms of, 11; Hindu influence, 94; impact on civil society, 95, 109, 118–120; Islamic resurgence, 12–13, 89–91, 101; Islamization of society, 99, 113–116; in the Middle East, 107–108; in the 1990s, 90–91, 209; in Southeast Asia, 91, 100, 104; reformasi, 92, 117–120; rejection of secularism, 89–90; state policy 108–109; voluntary associations in, 6. See also Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia; Anwar Ibrahim; Darul Arqam; Islamic state; Mahathir bin Mohamad; Parti Islam SeMalaysia; Sisters in Islam Islamic laws. See Hudud; Islam; Islamization Islamic state, 90; Din wa dawla, 99; PAS on, 107, 115, 180, 212 Islamization: Islamic laws, 191–192; problems with, 114–117; race between UMNO and PAS, 113–114, 213. See also Islam; Islamic state Judiciary: loss of power, 141, 145, 153; Mahathir’s use of, 172; need for reform, 213 Keadilan (National Justice Party), 111; differences with PAS, 184, 212;

general elections, 111, 147, 211; leadership of, 175, 211; multiracial, 212; NGO membership overlaps, 196; and reformasi, 111. See also Barisan Alternatif; Chandra Muzaffar; Wan Azizah Wan Ismail Keane, John, 2 Kelantan, 22, 27, 93, 96, 106–107, 114, 116, 157 Kerajaan (government), 23, 47, 155 Lee Kuan Yew: Anwar dismissal, 171; criticism of king’s address, 35; on democracy and rights 170, 178, 183. See also Singapore Liberal democratic theory, 158; critique of, 177; cultural alternative to, 104, 167; defense of, 183; Islamic alternative to, 181–182; neutral state, 98; opposition to Western values in, 43, 101, 118; NGOs that endorse, 194; private and public distinction in, 57, 98–99, 108, 186. See also Democracy; Human rights Lipset, Seymour Martin, 132 Locke, John, 128 Mahathir bin Mohamad: and Anwar, 110, 145–146; and Asian values, 42–43, 152, 168, 178, 179; authoritarian, 138, 150, 154, 155, 172; and Bangsa Malaysia, 37, 42; changes UMNO culture, 151; citizenship rights, 64–65; co-opts Islam, 95, 106, 108, 117; criticism of IMF, 38–40; electoral advantage, 153, 159; era of, 10, 210; erodes political institutions, 80, 139–140, 152, 159, 213; exponent of nationalist school, 168, 176–179, 183; globalization and nationbuilding, 10, 37–39, 179–180; on hudud, 189; human rights violations, 178; leadership of, 9–10, 41, 129–130, 145, 151–154, 156, 136, 158; Look East policy, 37–38, 43, 109, 152, 179; and Malay interests, 143, 147; and The Malay Dilemma, 9, 37, 58, 64–66; and NGOs, 153, 159; political patronage, 9–10; privatization, 152, 154; Vision 2020

Index policy, 43, 71–73, 152. See also Globalization; Human rights; Malays; Nation-building; Nationstate; Parti Islam SeMalaysia; United Malays National Organization; Women’s rights Malayan Communist Party (MCP), 29–30 Malayan Democratic Union (MDU), 30 Malayan Union, 29–30, 96, 139. See also British Malaya; Colonialism Malay National Party (MNP), 30 Malays, 17–18; as bumiputra, 9, 44, 62, 69–71, 76–77, 79, 82; business community, 72, 150; under colonialism, 24–29; cultural identities, 36, 40, 43, 91, 107–108, 149, 159; divisions among, 23–24, 33, 92; dominant ethnic group, 9, 41; economic backwardness of, 58, 62–63, 67, 69, 80, 82, 99; Malayan nationalism, 19–24, 30–31, 43, 58; Melayu Baru, 44; middle class of, 72, 95, 99, 100–101, 138, 159, 210; privileges to, 34, 54, 55, 58; society, 19, 42, 58, 92–95, 155, 209; UMNO as protector of, 9, 34, 71; women, 186. See also Bahasa Malaysia; Culture; Dakwah; Education; Islam; Mahathir bin Mohamad; New Economic Policy; Parti Islam SeMalaysia Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA): business interests of, 71; formation of, 30, 32, 34, 60; gains from economic policy, 71; general elections (1999), 158; losses in 1969, 62; as member of BN, 143; political voice of, 143; and UMNO on education, 60, 67–68. See also Barisan Alternatif; Barisan Nasional Malaysian Chinese Organizations Elections Appeals Committee (Suqiu), 76 Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC): formation of, 30, 32, 34, 60. See also Barisan Nasional; Malaysian Chinese Association Masyarakat madani, 5–7 MCA. See Malaysian Chinese Association

249

Media. See Freedom of the press Merdeka (independence), 29, 139; Merdeka Day, 61, 67 Merdeka University Berhad v. Government of Malaysia case, 74, 98. See also Culture; Education MIC. See Malaysian Indian Congress Modernization: community identities under, 176; and development, 131–133; disillusioned middle class, 95; empowered elites, 12, 100; ethnonationalism, 24; Islam, 12, 100; Marxist approach, 132; the NEP and, 100; in Southeast Asia, 197; traditional structures, 42; Western values in, 39–40, 100. See also Democracy; Women’s groups; Women’s rights Multiculturalism, 33, 35, 39–41, 54–55, 91, 96–97, 99; heterogenous public, 56 National Development Policy (NDP), 152 National Economic Consultative Council (NECC), 76 National Front. See Barisan Nasional National Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM), 172–173, 175, 195 Nationalism: anticolonialism, 29; classical model of, 17, 20; distinct ideology, 21; ethnic nationalism, 23–27, 30–32; fabrication, 20, 40; as response to immigrants, 26, 28, 32; slow evolution of Malay, 19, 21–23, 31–32. See also Globalization; Mahathir bin Mohamad National Operations Council (NOC), 62–63. See also Abdul Razak Hussein, Tun Nation-building: approaches to, 17–18, 21; in Malaysia, 19, 34–41, 45; and the monoethnic state, 18, 41, 208. See also Globalization; Mahathir bin Mohamad; Nation-state Nation-state, 1–3; cultural rights from, 11, 167; in Malaysia, 30, 33–35, 40–41, 59; secular, 177; in Southeast Asia, 7–9, 17; Soviet Union collapse

250

Index

of, 10. See also Globalization; Nationalism; Nation-building New Economic Policy (NEP), 54, 61–64, 68–71, 73, 80, 82, 95, 101, 149, 151–152; expands middle class, 72, 138; as goal of modernization, 208; ideology of rukunegara, 73; impact on backward areas/groups, 70–73, 101; Islamic resurgence, 72, 100, 138; problems of, in social justice, 82; role of Chinese business class, 72; and women’s rights, 186–188 NGOs. See Nongovernmental organizations Nik Aziz Nik Mat, 107, 114 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 2–4, 193–197, 214; amendment to the Societies Act, 194; definition of human rights, 172, 194; diverse nature of, political and nonpolitical, 194–195; and globalization, 172; party formations, 196; against police brutality, 174; and policymaking, 194; and the state, 194–196. See also Democracy; Mahathir bin Mohamad; Reformasi movement; Women’s groups; Women’s rights

reformulates shari’a, 114–115; rise in popularity, 94–95, 112, 116, 118, 147, 157. See also Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia; Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah; Anwar Ibrahim; Barisan Alternatif; Dakwah; Darul Arqam; General elections; Haji Abdul Hadi Awang; Hudud; Human rights; Islam; Islamization; Islamic state Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM), 111, 147, 211 PAS. See Parti Islam SeMalaysia Petroleum Development Act (1974), 150 Plural society: approaches to, 134–136; democracy in, 134; formation of, 24–26, 208. See also Colonialism Political Islam, 91. See also Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia; Parti Islam SeMalaysia; Sisters in Islam Political stability, BN as guarantor of: sustains authoritarianism, 138 Populist authoritarianism, 130, 138, 150, 159, 172; impact on citizenship, 155; Mahathir’s leadership style, 151 Printing Presses and Publication Act (PPA), 153, 175 PRM. See Parti Rakyat Malaysia Putnam, Robert, 2–3

Official Secrets Act, 153, 172 Orang Asli (indigenous groups living in Peninsular Malaysia), 77–79, 195 Operasi Lalang (Operation Lalang), 110; arrests, 144, 174; decline of judiciary, 145 Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), 169

Quran, 6, 120, 176, 180–181, 184, 187–188

Parliament, 63, 213 Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS): call for jihad, 107, 117; challenge to UMNO, 9, 95, 107, 211; defining roles for women, 114–115, 187–188, 199; development in the 1970s, 99–102; differences with allies, 212; formation and goals of, 32, 106–108; governing two states, 91, 107, 113, 168–169; and Islamic state, 107, 115; joins Alliance, 106; and multiculturalism, 211; and reformasi, 113;

Race riots, 61–62; explanations for, 136–137 Raja (prince/ruler): kerajaan, 23, 47, 155 Reformasi movement: on civil society, 117–120; criticism of Mahathir, 112; factors of, 92, 109, 112; Keadilan leads, 111 Rukunegara (articles of faith). See Culture Rushdie, Salman, 90 Sabah (North Borneo), 34–35, 44–45, 79 Sarawak, 34–35, 44–45, 79 Schumpeter, Joseph, 127, 132 Shari’a, 27, 45, 114–115, 168, 170, 181, 188–190, 198

Index Singapore, 21, 27, 35, 45, 61, 179. See also Lee Kuan Yew Sisters in Islam (SIS), 195; interpretation of Quran, 187–188; on hudud, 191 Southeast Asia, 1–8, 53, 91, 129, 131, 133, 167, 207, 209. See also ASEAN; Asian economic crisis; Democracy State. See Nation-building; Nation-state Suaram, 195–196 SUHAKAM. See National Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Sultans, 22, 26–27, 29, 57, 59, 96, 140, 142; monarchy, 30; Malay rulers, 63. See also Yang di-Pertuan Agong Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah: forms Semangat 46, 145; rejoins UMNO, 146; with the opposition, 107 Terengganu, 22, 27, 95–96, 107, 113, 157 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 119. See also Civil society; Democracy Tun Hussein Onn, 41, 65, 144 Tunku Abdul Rahman: and Mahathir, 61, 64; and PAP, 35; as prime minister, 36, 62, 64, 104, 143; proposal for Federation of Malaysia, 34–35 UN. See United Nations United Malays National Organization (UMNO): business interests of, 71, 148; decline of, 130, 156–157, 209, 211; electoral strategy of, 147; evolution from the Alliance, 142; factionalism, 136, 144–145; formation of, 29, 32; image of

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power sharing, 143, 147, 150; incorporates Islam, 95, 108, 109, 113–114, 212; lack of competition, 146; for Malay interests, 9, 142, 148; nation-building, 148–149; under Onn Bin Ja’afar, 29, 32, 144; PAS challenge to, 107, 114, 149; patronage, 146–147; politics of consociationalism, 141; power struggles, 143–146; splits in, 144–145. See also Alliance; Barisan Nasional; General elections; Mahathir bin Mohamad; Nation-state United Nations (UN): debate on women’s rights, 185; regional protection system, 170; and UDHR, 169 Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, 111, 211 Women’s rights, 184–189; and Domestic Violence Act, 189; legislation on, 188–192; and participation in the economy, 186; prevention of sexual harassment, 192; reproductive rights, 190–191; restrictions on, 115; UMNO and PAS on, 184 Women’s groups, 189, 194; agenda for change, 195; Islamization of society, 186–187, political participation of, 192. See also Human rights; Parti Islam SeMalaysia; Sisters in Islam Women’s Aid Organization (WAO), 189, 194 Yang di-Pertuan Agong (king), 35; emergency powers, 62, 140. See also Constitution; Mahathir bin Mohamad; Sultans

About the Book

Vidhu Verma tracks two simultaneous processes in Malaysia: the increasing aspirations for democratic governance, and the emergence of the Islamic party as a major force in Malaysian politics. Verma argues that rapid and often forced modernization and development have created severe tensions in contemporary Malaysia, providing Islamist parties with the space to create a political-cultural identity for the Malays. Tracing the historical and political dynamics underlying nearly twenty years of authoritarian rule, she addresses five central issues: secular nationalism, Islam, citizenship, democracy, and human rights. She demonstrates that the current Islamic resurgence has so far expanded the frontiers of civil society in the country, but she also cautions that neither democracy nor civil liberties will be sustainable if the forces of civil society allow repression of individual rights in the name of religious conformity and moral conduct. Vidhu Verma teaches political science at Gargi College at Delhi University, India. She is also a fellow with the Indian Council of Social Science Research. Her publications include Justice, Equality, and Community: An Essay in Marxist Political Theory.

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