Making Sense of Natural Disasters: The Learning Vacuum of Bushfire Public Inquiries 3030947777, 9783030947774

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Making Sense of Natural Disasters: The Learning Vacuum of Bushfire Public Inquiries

Graham Dwyer

Making Sense of Natural Disasters

Graham Dwyer

Making Sense of Natural Disasters The Learning Vacuum of Bushfire Public Inquiries

Graham Dwyer Centre for Social Impact Swinburne University of Technology Melbourne, VIC, Australia

ISBN 978-3-030-94777-4    ISBN 978-3-030-94778-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94778-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the ­publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and ­institutional affiliations. Cover pattern © John Rawsterne/patternhead.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

Disasters affecting humans are not new but they are occurring more often. This may be to do with the size of the population of homo sapiens upon the planet but it may be something to do with the planet itself. In a world of climate change and a wide acceptance that human actions and reactions contribute to the Anthropocene, disasters in the twenty-first century threaten more human life and living standards in more and more places. Given this, what might we learn about how to organize against them? Graham Dwyer offers in this book a way forward to enrich our understanding. Dwyer has concentrated upon emergency management practitioners and those communities facing extreme events, especially bush fires. His approach is based upon research in the state of Victoria in Australia but is germane to our understanding of disaster management in many nations, in both hemispheres. He shows that the organization of humanity, both in the face of such disasters and the planning that goes into preparation for them, relies upon a process of ‘sense-making’ whereby extraordinary conditions are fitted into everyday, ordinary frameworks that are meant to be formal, robust, and pre-planned to deal with such extreme conditions. Dwyer points out, however, that emotions are heightened in such extraordinary circumstances and formal, linear systems rarely conceptualise this element as a matter of great consequence. Indeed, the deliberations of Public Inquiries seek to remove emotion from their thinking almost altogether and to concentrate upon rationality and the allocation of blame within a legal framework of cause and effect. By ignoring the role of human emotions in extreme circumstances, says Dwyer, Public Inquiries offer little that is new to human understanding. Dwyer’s v

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provocative research suggests that Public Inquiries must consider the role of ‘emotion’ within their very ‘rational’ frameworks. Without this new dimension, humanity faces a ‘learning vacuum’ with mortal consequences for many. Graham Dwyer’s book, for this reader, relates back to a tension deep within human history, yet is in order to understand our future upon a changing planet. In ancient Greece, the Apollonian strand of thinking emphasised rationality and the power of thought. Apollo was the sun God and appealed to logic, prudence and illumination. On the other hand, Dionysus was the God of wine and dance and is associated with chaos and irrationality. His worship appealed to those who wished to celebrate the emotions and instincts. Some have seen this quarrel acting at the level of the human brain where the Apollonian resides in the higher cortex, whereas the Dionysian is to be found in the ‘reptilian’ and ‘limbic’ brains still possessed by the human anatomy. This tension in worldviews seems very relevant to this reader in understanding Making Sense of Natural Disasters. Dwyer wishes for immediately experienced ‘emotions’ to be admitted into Public Inquiries despite their legal focus being upon long, drawn out cerebration, seeking allocation and apportionment of responsibility. It is this other, fully embodied worldview of those facing extreme danger on the front line that he offers. He leads the reader to see the value in our understanding of a world in which, one might argue, the pre-­ eminence of legal-rational bureaucracy has created a runaway monster of climate change ready to devour the world as we humans know it. And in such threats to life and limb is it any surprise that sense-making might well include the spontaneous reaction of our own viscera? Making Sense of Natural Disasters is thus a book for today, not only for the women and men who face the consequences of a hotter, drier world almost every day but for us all. Emergency workers protect us, of course, but in order to do so they must protect themselves, using not only planning in the seminar room but ‘out there’ with a mind that is fully embodied in the face of terrifying conditions. Graham Dwyer has done these emergency workers a great service in rendering the world more complex yet more understandable, as well as those who plan for disasters, those who seek to control events afterwards, and all of us who are beholden to them. His readers will appreciate his subtlety and erudition in so doing. University of Manchester Manchester, UK

Gibson Burrell,

Preface

Victoria, Australia, is arguably the most fire-prone area in the world. Scientists and climatologists claim that with climate change we will increasingly experience longer drought periods, higher wind speeds and warmer temperatures, giving rise to a greater bushfire threat in an already extremely bushfire-prone environment. Given such circumstances, it is likely that Victoria’s emergency management organizations will increasingly find themselves responding to bushfires characterized as complex, harmful and rare. This book examines the public inquiries conducted after some worst-­ ever bushfires witnessed in Australia, in order to understand how emergency management organizations make sense of and learn from bushfires in Victoria so that they can be better prepared for bushfires in the future. Despite its long history of bushfires post-European settlement, Victoria has struggled to make sense and learn from its experience. While the in-­ depth findings of public inquiries into major bushfires have resulted in various recommendations being developed and implemented in emergency management organizations, there continues to be a perception that learning from such events rarely occurs. This book examines some of Victoria’s most significant bushfire inquiries and the ways in which emergency management organizations made sense of their findings and recommendations. I show that while public inquiry findings do shape bushfire planning and preparedness, they have also created a learning vacuum because their recommendations tend to have a retrospective focus. This keeps government, emergency management organizations and the community looking back at tragic bushfires without focusing on learning lessons when they need to look forward to vii

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future bushfire and other natural hazard events, as well as human-­ made crises. Given the impact of these fires, I also reflect on the emotions that surrounded these inquiries. I find that negative emotions have surrounded the implementation of these inquiry recommendations because they have increased accountability demands on emergency management practitioners at a time when their efforts need to be focused on developing a shared responsibility for managing risk in partnership with government and communities. Accordingly, I suggest that future research should seek to develop new ways to conduct public inquiries in a more inclusive and meaningful manner, which will result in recommendations that facilitate more effective planning for future bushfires. This means moving beyond the existing quasi-judicial approach towards a public review process shared across government, emergency management organizations and the community. As Victoria faces a future of unknowns surrounding bushfires, it is important that we move beyond the learning vacuum with its retrospective learning, towards a more prospective approach where we prepare as a community and society  – not only for bushfires, but for all the natural hazards and challenges we are likely to face in the future. Such an approach may yield better ways of learning and, consequently, more meaningful organizational change in our emergency management organizations. Although history may dim the memory of just how devastating bushfires can be (Griffiths, 2010), it is important that political leaders, emergency management practitioners and private citizens continue to be mindful of bushfire risk so that they can help each other to prepare for the inevitable fire events of the future. The experiences of those who have lived through the bushfire events at the core of this book remind us of the need to continue to heed the lessons from them: The scene that confronted me when I first saw Strathewen was—it was indescribable. There literally wasn’t anything that wasn’t burnt, that wasn’t destroyed … We came over the hill and the young chap that was driving for me, he saw his parents’ house fully enveloped in flames … it was very difficult. I got further up Chads Creek Road … and I met a resident on the road and he said, ‘There’s a body up there’. I went up and there was a chap I had known for 40 years dead in the middle of the oval. (Mr. David McGahy, captain of the Arthurs Creek CFA brigade, describing his observation when

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he arrived at Strathewen in the aftermath of the Black Saturday bushfires, quoted in Parliament of Victoria, 2010: 83)

Melbourne, VIC, Australia

Graham Dwyer

References Griffiths, T. (2010). An unnatural disaster: Remembering and forgetting bushfire. History Australia, 6(2), 35.1–35.2. Parliament of Victoria. (1939). Report of the royal commission to inquire into the causes of and measures taken to prevent the bush fires of January, 1939, and to protect life and property, and the measures taken to prevent bush fires in Victoria and protect life and property in the event of future bush fires 1939, Parliamentary paper (Victoria. Parliament); T. Rider, Acting Government Printer, Melbourne.

Acknowledgements

I acknowledge the Traditional Owners of the lands where I respectively live and work. I pay my respects to their Elders past, present and future. I recognize that these lands have always been places of teaching, research and learning. I would like to acknowledge the following people for their support over the course of my journey so far into academia. First and foremost, I would like to thank Cynthia Hardy, Laureate Professor Emerita, University of Melbourne (and collaborator on several publications) for your guidance, support and mentorship in all matters academic relating to research, writing, publication, teaching and learning. Your generosity (and patience) knows no bounds, for which I am ever so grateful. Such generosity (and patience) was always present as my lead PhD supervisor during my time at University of Melbourne. I would also like to thank Professor Susan Ainsworth and Professor Graham Sewell (both University of Melbourne) for your support as co-PhD supervisors and your considerable investment in my topic, which has given me so much content to work with as a basis for writing this book. More broadly, I would like to thank all of the staff at the Department of Management & Marketing, University of Melbourne, for their support during my PhD and Teaching Fellowship journey, as well as the team at the Bushfire and Natural Hazards Cooperative Research Centre (now Natural Hazards Research Australia). At Swinburne University of Technology (SUT), I would like to thank all the team at the Centre for Social Impact (CSI) and more broadly colleagues at the School of Business Law and Entrepreneurship. A very special xi

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

thanks to Dr Michael Moran, National Education Director, CSI, Associate Professor Emma Lee, tebrakunna country, Indigenous Leadership, CSI, SUT, and Professor Timothy Marjoribanks, SUT for their guidance and support which has contributed enormously to helping me develop over the course of my early career as an academic. I also extend this thanks to Dr Warren Staples, University of Melbourne and Professor Michael Dowling, Dublin City University. A special thanks to my collaborators who have helped, are helping and will (continue to) help explore the knowledge frontier related to many of the issues at the core of this book. Specifically, I would like to acknowledge: • Professor Cynthia Hardy, Laureate Professor Emerita, University of Melbourne, Australia • Professor Steve Maguire, University of Sydney, Australia • Professor Haridimos Tsoukas, University of Cyprus, Cyprus & University of Warwick, UK • Professor Leanne Cutcher, University of Sydney, Australia • Professor Gibson Burrell, University of Manchester, UK • Professor Markus Höllerer, University of New South Wales, Australia & WU Vienna, Austria A very special thanks to all of the police and community of emergency management practitioners who continue to help us understand so many of the nuances surrounding the work that you do and the challenges which you face as you plan for and respond to fire in our landscape. Finally, for everything, míle buíochas to my family and community of friends in Melbourne and Dublin.

Contents

1 Introduction  1 1.1 What Happens After Disasters?  5 1.2 Structure of the Book  8 References 10 2 Learning as Sensemaking 15 2.1 What Is Sensemaking? 18 2.2 Equivocality and Sensemaking 23 2.3 What Happens After Disaster and Public Inquiry Sensemaking? 28 2.4 Sensemaking and Emotion 30 2.5 Conclusion 33 References 34 3 Bushfires and Public Inquiries: A Case Study of Victoria 43 3.1 Making Sense and Learning from Public Inquiries 44 3.2 Victoria: Case Study of a Bushfire Society 45 3.3 Conclusion 62 References 62 4 Sensemaking and Learning from Public Inquiries 65 4.1 Findings 66 4.2 Conclusion 81 References 81 xiii

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5 Discussion and Conclusions 83 5.1 Models of Post-Inquiry Sensemaking 87 5.2 Reflections 88 5.3 Areas for Future Consideration 98 5.4 Practical Contributions100 5.5 Personal Reflection107 References110 References117 Index133

List of Figures

Fig. 4.1 Fig. 5.1

Sensemaking and learning from public inquiries. (Adapted from Dwyer and Hardy (2016)) Sensemaking and learning in emergency management organizations

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List of Tables

Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 4.4 Table 4.5 Table 5.1

Sources of textual data Illustration of codes and quotes for key themes Summary of findings from Black Friday 1939 Summary of findings from Ash Wednesday 1983 Summary of findings from Black Saturday 2009 Summary of findings from Black Summer Inquiry Part 1 Emotions surrounding public inquiry sensemaking and learning Recurring focus of Victorian bushfire inquiries

47 56 71 72 74 75 78 87

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Abstract  This chapter presents an overview of the key concepts related to the ways in which sensemaking and learning unfold following significant natural hazard events. While scholarly and practitioner work has highlighted the damage and losses that occur as a result of natural hazard events, there has been less focus on what happens afterward. Accordingly, the focus of this book is to bring attention to the ways that government, emergency management and community stakeholders seek to make sense of and learn from natural hazard events through public inquiries. I do so by focusing on the case study of bushfire in Victoria, Australia, specifically on the ways in which emergency management practitioners use the findings and recommendations from public inquiries to plan for the risks associated with future bushfires. Keywords  Natural hazard events • Bushfires • Public inquiries • Sensemaking • Learning Recent history has provoked a high level of concern over the earth’s natural environment and the extreme events, grand challenges and wicked problems surrounding natural hazards (Dwyer, 2021b; Gephart, 2021). Higher temperatures, intensifying wind speeds and rain deficits are being attributed to climate change, and are subsequently prompting floods, droughts and bushfires which are increasingly endangering the lives of © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 G. Dwyer, Making Sense of Natural Disasters, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94778-1_1

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those practitioners who must respond to them (Dwyer, 2021c). These have become increasingly regular, complex and devastating, giving rise to novel societal risk (Nohrstedt & Bynander, 2019; Glade et  al., 2010; Birkman, 2006) and placing communities in the path of considerable dangers (Zuccaro et al., 2020). The increased incidence and severity of disasters has also been challenging for the broader community of emergency management practitioners, including government ministers, policymakers, police officers, firefighters, weather forecasters and geospatial analysts, creating three forms of uncertainty described as “known, unknown and unknowable” (Chow & Sarin, 2002: 127). In many instances there have been long-term effects on communities, landscapes and ecosystems (Waldmüller, 2021). Globally, disasters such as hurricanes (e.g. Katrina, USA, 2005: 1464 lives lost), earthquakes (e.g. Haiti, 2012: 223,000 lives lost) and tsunamis (e.g. Southeast Asia, 2004: 250,000 lives lost) have revealed insights into the difficulties facing community, government and industry organizations as they cope with, manage and respond to adversity in challenging environments (Birkman, 2006; Dwyer, 2015; Kates et  al., 2006; March & Olsen, 1983; Pauchant & Douville, 1993). Such events have highlighted the importance of implementing science- and evidence-based approaches to Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation as identified in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (SFDRR) (Zuccaro et al., 2020). While SFDRR requires “the adoption of policies, strategies and plans and the further review and development of normative instruments at local, national, regional and global levels as well as quality standards and practical guidelines” (UNISDR, 2015: 3), there remains little by way of insight to guide practitioners as they seek to develop such instruments. Experience has shown that even well-prepared emergency management organizations struggle to respond effectively to natural hazard events and the disasters they bring into existence (see Dwyer et al., 2021; Mileti, 1999), because their learning from previous events is undermined when new or unfamiliar conditions unfold. While SFDRR begins to train attention on the need to move towards a multi-­ hazard and multi-sector approach to mitigating natural disaster risk, the case study of bushfires in Victoria shows that, even with increased scientific knowledge and robust policies in place, bushfire events still give rise to significant damage and losses. Ultimately, no two events are the same, so it becomes problematic to apply yesterday’s learning to present-day disasters (Dwyer, 2021a). Disasters are also typically events with a high impact

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but a low probability of occurring, meaning that they interact with actors, systems, processes, procedures and routines in the organizational environment in a manner that is often rapid and unpredictable (Landgraf & Officer, 2016; Thatcher et al., 2015; Kruke & Olsen, 2005; Weick, 1988, 1999). Such scenarios create a high cognitive load (Sweller, 1994), as individuals’ ability to understand and manage what is occurring begins to diminish in the face of escalating danger. Individuals move between emotional states such as anxiety, panic, fear and stress as they seek to take meaningful action to ameliorate the emerging danger and avoid significant losses and damage to communities. Such disasters also have an emotional impact on individuals who work in emergency management organizations, who may experience feelings of regret, shame and sadness after these events because of a perception created by media commentaries and public inquiries that their actions were unable to ameliorate the harmful effects of disaster (Dwyer, 2021a; Dwyer et  al., 2021). Risk management and capacity-building focused on integrating climate change into hazard mitigation planning offer the potential to ameliorate the harmful effects of natural disasters (Stults, 2017; Buergelt & Paton, 2014). However, this book shows that there are challenges with achieving an integrated approach to hazard mitigation through deliberative forums such as public inquiries. I show that, despite the fact that they span 80 years of learning and significant innovation in Victoria, public inquiries as a sensemaking device have given rise to a learning vacuum, insofar as there is little new that emerges from their deliberation. The focus of this book is the way in which emergency management organizations and the organizational actors that comprise them make sense of and learn from the paradoxes, predicaments and problems which arise from disasters. I do so by examining four case studies of bushfires and the public inquiries that were held after them in the state of Victoria, Australia. Its unique combination of landscape, climate and vegetation makes Victoria one of the most fire-prone areas in the world. Consequently, and not surprisingly, Victoria has had a long history of bushfires (Griffiths, 2010). Four such bushfires continue to live in the collective memory of Victorians and are the focus of my study: the Black Friday fires of 1939; the Ash Wednesday fires of 1983; the Black Saturday fires of 2009; and the Black Summer fires of 2019. In each case, the organizations responsible for managing these fires faced surprising, overwhelming and novel situations that, despite their experience with bushfires, were difficult to manage

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and gave rise to widespread damages and losses – leading to close examination by subsequent public inquiries. This book reflects on the ways that emergency management organizations understood and acted following these bushfire disasters. We know from the existing literature that such sensemaking occurs as individuals seek to understand a situation that is rapidly and unpredictably unfolding (Dwyer, 2021b). Often, because of the nature of a disaster, this initial attempt at understanding fails, as Weick (1993) famously showed in the rapid onset of wildfire at Mann Gulch in 1939. This had fateful consequences as firefighters failed to make sense of what was happening. A long list of other studies has shown how problems with sensemaking and the failure to generate plausible meanings about what may be unfolding can lead to or exacerbate disasters (Brown, 2000, 2004; Gephart, 1984, 1993, 2007; Turner, 1976; Vaughan, 2006; Weick, 1990, 1993, 2010). We also know that, in order to make sense of what happened during a disaster, and how and why it occurred, governments will usually commission a public inquiry (e.g. see Gephart, 1984, 1993; Gephart et al., 1990; Elliot & McGuiness, 2002; Lalonde, 2007). Studies of such inquiries have shown that they often identify how people’s behaviour in emergency situations is frequently a contributing factor to the disaster  – because they failed to make sense of it at the time (Leveson et al., 2009; Perrow, 1981, 1983; Vaughan, 1990, 2006). They also show that the inquiry itself involves a retrospective form of sensemaking around what happened during the disaster (Boudes & Laroche, 2009; Colville et al., 2013; Brown & Jones, 2000; Brown, 2000, 2004, 2005; Gephart, 1984, 1993, 1997). This has been no different in a Victorian context, where public inquiries have been used to make sense of bushfires since 1939 (Dwyer & Hardy, 2016; Dwyer et al., 2021). There is, then, a rich body of literature about sensemaking, both during a disaster and afterward when an inquiry takes place. However, there is less work on learning and how it occurs. We know little in terms of how the individuals, groups and organizations charged with responding to the public inquiries make sense of their recommendations after commissioners have concluded their deliberations (Dwyer, 2021a). Moreover, recent work has even called for new ways of conducting public review processes which seek to foster new cultures of learning within emergency management organizations (Dwyer, 2021a; Dwyer et al., 2021). This, then, is a key focus of this book: How should public review processes be conducted after major bushfires? By exploring this question, I provide an evidence

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base for exploring how a broader range of stakeholders can become involved in planning for, responding to and recovering from bushfires in the future.

1.1   What Happens After Disasters? It is important to understand what happens after disasters that usually arise from bushfires (as well as other natural disasters) and how organizations respond to them for both practical and theoretical reasons, and studying public inquiries helps us to do this. Practically speaking, inquiries are ostensibly intended to either reduce the likelihood that disasters will re-­ occur or, if that is not possible, to improve the way organizations respond to them through learning for the future. Inquiries into bushfire disasters have significantly informed the practice of emergency management in Victoria, but we know very little about how this takes effect and whether and how inquiries engender change and learning in organizations (Dwyer & Hardy, 2016). Bushfire management in Victoria involves a complex arrangement of plans, structures and hierarchies that have been established and refined over many years as a result of lessons from a range of bushfires and other natural disasters. Anecdotal evidence thus suggests that public inquiries and their recommendations do play an important role in shaping the ways in which Victorian emergency management organizations respond to and prepare for bushfires, although how they do so is not clear. Some researchers suggest that public inquiry recommendations can make a “staunch commitment to a particular set of meanings” that may, in fact, create “substantial blindspots that impede action” such as organizational change and learning (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010: 562). In other words, public inquiries may inhibit the future attempts of organizations to deal with disasters as much as they help them, and this has proved to be the case over time (Dwyer, 2021a). Theoretically speaking, it seems likely that individuals who work in emergency management organizations will have to make sense of inquiry recommendations before they can implement them (Botterill, 2014). They therefore engage in sensemaking and sensegiving (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991) as they seek to interpret the recommendations, influence each other’s perceptions and implement change in their organization. However, to date there has been limited involvement of broader emergency management stakeholders in society (see Williamson et  al., 2020). The bulk of evidence from public inquiries has been generated by

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cross-examining individuals from the upper hierarchical echelons of emergency management organizations; lessons learned have accordingly been developed from such perspectives. This follows a range of studies that imply that sensemaking, sensegiving and learning are the domain of managers in the upper echelons of an organization’s hierarchy; those who operate at the lower levels of a hierarchy appear more likely to be passive recipients of sensegiving, with their responses often cast as resistance (Dwyer et  al., 2021; Bartunek et  al., 2006; Bean & Hamilton, 2006). However, emergency management organizations are characterized by their inclusion of a broad range of functional experts, that is, those with various forms of highly technical expertise who do not necessarily have managerial responsibility. It therefore seems likely that those at the lower echelons of emergency management organizations would play an important and, indeed, prominent role in the sensemaking and sensegiving processes following from public inquiry recommendations, with their actions inevitably contributing to whether or not learning unfolds. Accordingly, I ask the question: How can emergency management organizations facilitate collective learning after public inquiries have been published, and in particular, does it give rise to lessons for the future? This is important as we seek to reflect on new, more inclusive ways of conducting public review processes. The second focus of this book is the role of emotion in these sensemaking processes; this is increasingly becoming an important focus of scholarship around natural hazard events (Lifang et  al., 2020). We know that bushfires and natural disasters generate intense emotions, but there has been little focus on the emotions that arise as a result of public inquiry sensemaking (Dwyer, 2018). Indeed, scholars have argued for more research to clarify the role of emotion in sensemaking generally (e.g. Liu & Maitlis, 2014; Maitlis & Christianson, 2014) and in relation to learning. Some scholars portray emotion as a potential impediment to meaningful action in the context of learning organizational change initiatives (Maitlis et al., 2013). However, other studies suggest that emotional states such as fear, panic and stress play an important role in directing individuals’ attention to the very anomalies or discrepancies in their environment that fuel sensemaking before, during and after both human-made crises and natural disasters (Cornelissen et  al., 2014; Weick, 1993). Without such emotions, individuals may not notice the emergence of ‘learning cues’ in real time and take the actions required to avert disasters (Dwyer & Hardy, 2016: 2). That said, where emotions have brought attention to

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discrepant environmental cues and they have been misinterpreted, individuals have been found to bring harmful circumstances into existence (Colville et  al., 2013). Thus, the effect of emotions during a disaster is unclear. We know even less about the emotions that arise after disasters in relation to subsequent public inquiries (Dwyer et al., 2021). The individuals who responded to a disaster will often be required to give evidence at the inquiry, which frequently emphasizes blame and culpability (Dwyer, 2021; Dwyer & Hardy, 2016). After the inquiry has completed its deliberations and published its findings, individuals found to be at fault by the inquiry may then be responsible for making sense of the recommendations and implementing changes in their organizations. However, there is little understanding of the impact of such emotional ‘contagion’ (Cornelissen et  al., 2014) on the organization and its response to the inquiry. Accordingly, the second focus of this book is: What are the emotions that shape sensemaking in emergency management organizations after the findings from public inquiries have been published and do they influence learning? I explored these areas of interest by examining bushfires in Victoria. I chose this context because such disasters occur regularly, leading to subsequent inquiries, many of which have been controversial (Tolhurst, 2019, 2020). Further, emergency management organizations are charged with preparing for and responding to subsequent bushfires based on what they have learned from previous events. I felt that I could discern evidence of how sensemaking and learning occurs from public inquiry recommendations, as well as the emotions surrounding such events, by examining the state’s most significant fire events. I examined a range of documents, such as newspaper articles, public inquiry transcripts and commentaries from online platforms related to the bushfires and the public inquiries. I chose this approach because sensemaking and learning are social processes that emerge as a result of dynamic interactions between different groups of individuals who seek to interpret equivocality such as confusion or ambiguity in their environment (Weick et  al., 2005; Maitlis & Christianson, 2014; Brown et al., 2015; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015).

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1.2   Structure of the Book1 In this chapter I identify the characteristics of sensemaking as a concept and explain how it arises from equivocality, where situations allow for the possibility of multiple meanings and interpretations (e.g. Wagner & Gooding, 1997; Weick, 2001). In particular, the focus of my review is on sensemaking studies that relate to human-made and natural disasters. I find that crises and disasters have provided potent conditions for observing how sensemaking – or a lack thereof – unfolds. Next, I examine the work of scholars who have sought to show how public inquiries make sense of such disasters. Such scholars have shown that public inquiries usually result in authoritative accounts of findings and recommendations. From my review of the literature, I find that disasters have provided a basis for developing theory in relation to how sensemaking gives rise to learning and vice versa. Scholars have extended sensemaking theory by examining how public inquiries make sense of highly equivocal events such as disasters; however, the literature is largely silent about the ways in which public inquiry findings then influence learning within emergency management organizations. In Chap. 3, I present an overview of the four bushfire events that gave rise to significant damages and losses in Victoria. Each bushfire was followed by a public inquiry that acted as a catalyst for change in emergency management organizations in Victoria. While the recommendations of public inquiries have certainly given rise to organizational change, they have also created forms of learning inertia insofar as similar recommendations re-occur and the same issues remain unresolved. This can contribute to a perception that emergency management organizations are unable to learn from previous experiences. In Chap. 4, I draw on publicly available content to explore how public inquiries and the sensemaking processes surrounding them might give rise to what Argyris (1976) refers to as single- and double-loop learning. I find evidence suggesting that emergency management organizations used single-­loop learning (learning that occurs as a result of detecting errors) from the recommendations of inquiries to make sense of, and learn from, four of Australia’s worst bushfires in order to be better prepared for similar events in future. I also find that public inquiries were a basis for double-­ loop learning (learning that prompts a change in the governing values of an organization), insofar as publicly available commentaries suggested that sensemaking and learning cues from recommendations gave rise to new

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practices that enabled emergency management organizations to prepare better for the future effects of fire. I find that emotions seem to play a role in shaping the sensemaking and learning process before, during and after public inquiries have concluded their business. I conclude this chapter by reflecting on the three key focus areas of this book. In the final Chap. 5, I present two models showing how sensemaking and learning emerge after significant bushfires. Figure 4.1 shows how sensemaking plays an important role in organizations after a public inquiry report is published. Importantly, it highlights an over-emphasis on learning retrospectively, which limits the ability of government, emergency management practitioners and the community to focus on planning and preparedness for future bushfires. Figure 5.1 shows how emergency management organizations seem to move between negative and positive emotional experiences as they make sense of and learn from public inquiries. Figures 4.1 and 5.1 challenge the idea that public inquiry recommendations are authoritative, and provide insights into the ways in which they are re-interpreted within organizations through sensemaking and learning. I hope that these models will provide a basis for organizational practitioners to develop processes for identifying sensemaking and learning cues that will enable them to implement public inquiry recommendations in the most meaningful and efficient manner for their organization and the broad range of stakeholders who have a role in planning for and responding to bushfires. My study suggests that emotion must be a part of this process. This study therefore provides a basis for re-evaluating and reconsidering the ways in which future Royal Commissions after disaster events are conducted, placing an emphasis on procedural sensemaking and learning in a prospective manner, rather than developing recommendations based on past bushfire events that have little relevance for the future. I conclude with a discussion which offers some personal reflections and pathways forward in terms of how practitioners might be able to move beyond the learning vacuum which seems to have been created by public inquiries after bushfires in Victoria.

Note 1. The methods, findings and analysis pertaining to Chaps. 3 and 4 have been updated from  the  author’s previously published work, which has been appropriately referenced.

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References Argyris, C. (1976). Single loop and double loop models in research on decision-­ making. Administrative Science Quarterly, 21(3), 363–375. Bartunek, J. M., Rousseau, D. M., Rudolph, J. W., & DePalma, J. A. (2006). On the receiving end: Sensemaking, emotion, and assessments of an organizational change initiated by others. The Journal of Applied Behavioural Science, 42(2), 182–206. Bean, C. J., & Hamilton, F. E. (2006). Leader framing and follower sensemaking: Response to downsizing in the brave new workplace. Human Relations, 59(3), 321–349. Birkman, J. (Ed.). (2006). Measuring vulnerability to natural hazards: Towards disaster resilient societies. United Nations University Press. Botterill, L. (2014). Making drought policy through public inquiries: Managing risk or coping with disaster? In S. Prasser & H. Tracey (Eds.), Royal commissions & public inquiries: Practice & potential (pp.  189–203). Connor Court Publishing. Boudes, T., & Laroche, H. (2009). Taking off the heat: Narrative sensemaking in post-crisis inquiry reports. Organization Studies, 30(4), 377–396. Brown, A.  D. (2000). Making sense of inquiry sensemaking. Journal of Management Studies, 37(1), 45–75. Brown, A.  D. (2004). Authoritative sensemaking in a public inquiry report. Organization Studies, 25(1), 95–112. Brown, A.  D. (2005). Making sense of the collapse of Barings bank. Human Relations, 58(12), 1579–1604. Brown, A.  D., & Jones, M. (2000). Honourable members and dishonourable deeds: Sensemaking, impression management and legitimation in the ‘Arms to Iraq Affair’. Human Relations, 53(5), 655–689. Brown, A.  D., Colville, I., & Pye, A. (2015). Making sense of sensemaking in organization studies. Organization Studies, 36(2), 265–277. Buergelt, P. T., & Paton, D. (2014). An ecological risk management and capacity building model. Human Ecology, 42(4), 591–603. Chow, C. C., & Sarin, R. K. (2002). Known, unknown, and unknowable uncertainties. Theory and Decision, 52(2), 127–138. Colville, I., Pye, A., & Carter, M. (2013). Organizing to Counter Terrorism: Sensemaking amidst dynamic complexity. Human Relations, 66(9), 1201–1223. Cornelissen, J. P., Mantere, S., & Vaara, E. (2014). The contraction of meaning: The combined effect of communication, emotions, and materiality on sensemaking in the Stockwell shooting. Journal of Management Studies, 51(5), 699–736.

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Dwyer, G. (2015, November 24). [Media article]: Victorians should face facts: Bushfires are inevitable. Retrieved from http://www.theage.com.au/comment/victorians-­should-­face-­facts-­bushfires-­are-­inevitable-­20151124 Dwyer, G. (2018). Learning for the future: The emotional cycle of bush fire. Australian Journal of Emergency Management, 33(2), 8. Dwyer, G. (2021a). Learning to learn from bushfire: Perspectives from Victorian emergency management practitioners. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 80(3), 602–612. Dwyer, G. (2021b). Hiding in plain sight: Vulnerability, public administration, and the case of Covid-19 hotel quarantine. Australian Journal of Public Administration. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-­8500.12505 Dwyer, G. (2021c). Enacting safety: Firefighter sensemaking of entrapment in an Australian bushfire context. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2021.102697 Dwyer, G., & Hardy, C. (2016). We have not lived long enough: Sensemaking and learning from bushfire in Australia. Management Learning, 47(1), 45–64. Dwyer, G., Hardy, C., & Maguire, S. (2021). Post-inquiry sensemaking: The case of the ‘Black Saturday’ bushfires. Organization Studies, 42(4), 637–661. Elliot, D., & McGuiness, M. (2002). Public inquiry: Panacea or placebo? Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 10(1), 14–25. Gephart, R.  P. (1984). Making sense of organizationally based environmental disasters. Journal of Management, 10(2), 205–225. Gephart, R. P. (1993). The textual approach: Risk and blame in disaster sensemaking. Academy of Management Journal, 36(6), 1465–1514. Gephart, R.  P. (1997). Hazardous measures: An interpretive textual analysis of quantitative sensemaking during crises. Journal of Organizational Behaviour, 18(1), 583–622. Gephart, R. P. (2007). Crisis sensemaking and the public inquiry. In C. M. Pearson, C. Roux-Dufort, & J. A. Clair (Eds.), International handbook of organizational crisis management (pp. 123–160). Sage Publications. Gephart, R. (2021). Tracking disasters: Researching at the edge of chaos. In Research in times of crisis. Emerald Publishing Limited. Gephart, R. P., Steier, L., & Lawrence, T. (1990). Cultural rationalities in crisis sensemaking: A study of a public inquiry into a major industrial accident. Industrial Crisis Quarterly, 4(1), 27–48. Gioia, D. A., & Chittipeddi, K. (1991). Sensemaking and sensegiving in strategic change initiation. Strategic Management Journal, 12(6), 433–448. Glade, T., Felgentreff, C., & Birkmann, J. (2010). Editorial for the special issue: Extreme events and vulnerability in environment and society. Natural Hazards, 55(3), 571–576. Griffiths, T. (2010). An unnatural disaster: Remembering and forgetting bushfire. History Australia, 6(2), 35.1–35.2.

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Kates, R. W., Colten, C. E., Laska, S., & Leatherman, S. P. (2006). Reconstruction of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina: A research perspective. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 103(40), 14653–14660. Kruke, B.  I., & Olsen, O.  E. (2005). Reliability-seeking networks in complex emergencies. International Journal of Emergency Management, 2(4), 275–291. Lalonde, C. (2007). The potential contribution of the field of organizational development to crisis management. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 15(2), 95–104. Landgraf, M., & Officer, C. P. (2016). Natural disasters since 1900: Over 8 million deaths and 7 trillion US dollars damage. Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. Leveson, N., Dulac, N., Marais, K., & Carroll, J. (2009). Moving beyond normal accidents and high reliability organizations: A systems approach to safety in complex systems. Organization Studies, 30(2–3), 227–249. Lifang, L. I., Zhiqiang, W. A. N. G., Zhang, Q., & Hong, W. E. N. (2020). Effect of anger, anxiety, and sadness on the propagation scale of social media posts after natural disasters. Information Processing & Management, 57(6), 102313. Liu, F., & Maitlis, S. (2014). Emotional dynamics and strategizing processes: A study of strategic conversations in top team meetings. Journal of Management Studies, 51(2), 202–234. Maitlis, S., & Christianson, M. (2014). Sensemaking in organizations: Taking stock and moving forward. The Academy of Management Annals, 8(1), 57–125. Maitlis, S., & Sonenshein, S. (2010). Sensemaking in crisis and change: Inspiration and insights from Weick (1988). Journal of Management Studies, 47(3), 551–580. Maitlis, S., Vogus, T. J., & Lawrence, T. B. (2013). Sensemaking and emotion in organizations. Organizational Psychology Review, 3(3), 222–247. March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1983). Organizing political life: What administrative reorganization tells us about government. The American Political Science Review, 77(2), 281–296. Mileti, D. (1999). Disasters by design: A reassessment of natural hazards in the United States. National Academies Press. Nohrstedt, D., & Bynander, F. (2019). Lessons and avenues for future research in collaborative crisis management. In Collaborative crisis management (pp. 148–160). Routledge. Pauchant, T. C., & Douville, R. (1993). Recent research in crisis management: A study of 24 authors’ publications from 1986 to 1991. Organization & Environment, 7(1), 43–66. Perrow, C. (1981). Normal accident at Three Mile Island. Society, 18(5), 17–26. Perrow, C. (1983). The organizational context of human factors engineering. Administrative Science Quarterly, 28(4), 521–541.

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Sandberg, J., & Tsoukas, H. (2015). Making sense of the sensemaking perspective: Its constituents, limitations, and opportunities for further development. Journal of Organizational Behaviour, 36(S1), S6–S32. Stults, M. (2017). Integrating climate change into hazard mitigation planning: Opportunities and examples in practice. Climate Risk Management, 17, 21–34. Sweller, J. (1994). Cognitive load theory, learning difficulty, and instructional design. Learning and Instruction, 4(4), 295–312. Thatcher, A., Vasconcelos, A.  C., & Ellis, D. (2015). An investigation into the impact of information behaviour on information failure: The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power disaster. International Journal of Information Management, 35(1), 57–63. Tolhurst, K. (2019). Black Saturday: Have we fixed a flawed system?https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/black-­saturday-­have-­we-­fixed-­a-­flawed-­system Tolhurst, K. (2020). We have already had countless bushfire inquiries. What good will it do to have another? https://theconversation.com/we-­have-­already-­had-­ countless-­bushfire-­inquiries-­what-­good-­will-­it-­do-­to-­have-­another-­129896 Turner, B. A. (1976). The organizational and interorganizational development of disasters. Administrative Science Quarterly, 21(3), 378–397. UNISDR. (2015). Reading the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030. Available at https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/ 46694 Vaughan, D. (1990). Autonomy, interdependence, and social control: NASA and the space shuttle challenger. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(2), 225–257. Vaughan, D. (2006). NASA revisited: Theory, analogy, and public sociology. American Journal of Sociology, 112(2), 353–393. Wagner, J. A., III, & Gooding, R. Z. (1997). Equivocal information and attribution: An investigation of patterns of managerial sensemaking. Strategic Management Journal, 18(4), 275–286. Waldmüller, J. M. (2021). Expanding the transdisciplinary conversation towards pluriversal distributive disaster recovery: Development ethics and interculturality. Disaster Prevention and Management. https://doi.org/10.1108/ DPM-­03-­2021-­0069 Weick, K.  E. (1988). Enacted sensemaking in crisis situations. Journal of Management Studies, 25(4), 305–317. Weick, K. E. (1990). The vulnerable system: An analysis of the Tenerife air disaster. Journal of Management, 16(3), 571–593. Weick, K.  E. (1993). The collapse of sensemaking in organizations: The Mann Gulch disaster. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38(4), 628–652. Weick, K.  E. (1999). Sensemaking as an organizational dimension of global change. In D. L. Cooperrider & J. E. Dutton (Eds.), Organizational dimensions of global change (pp. 39–56). Sage. Weick, K. E. (2001). Making sense of the organization. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Weick, K. E. (2010). Reflections on enacted sensemaking in the Bhopal disaster. Journal of Management Studies, 47(3), 537–550. Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. M., & Obstfeld, D. (2005). Organizing and the process of sensemaking. Organization Science, 16(4), 409–421. Williamson, B., Markham, F., & Weir, J. (2020). Aboriginal peoples and the response to the 2019–2020 bushfires (Working paper no.: 134/2020). Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Australian National University. https:// doi.org/10.25911/5e7882623186c Zuccaro, G., Leone, M. F., & Martucci, C. (2020). Future research and innovation priorities in the field of natural hazards, disaster risk reduction, disaster risk management and climate change adaptation: A shared vision from the ESPREssO project. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 51, 101783.

CHAPTER 2

Learning as Sensemaking

Abstract  This chapter presents a review of the sensemaking literature. I show that sensemaking is prompted by equivocal circumstances and comprises seven characteristics. I then show how sensemaking has been used within public inquiries as a way of learning from crises and disasters. I conclude by bringing attention to the lack of focus in research studies that seek to examine what happens in relation to sensemaking and learning within emergency management organizations after a crisis and/or disaster. This is important because to date research studies have focused on what happens during a crisis and/or disaster event, but not afterward. Accordingly, lessons learned have been developed without due regard for future bushfires. Keywords  Sensemaking perspective • Equivocality • Emotion • Antilearning In this chapter, I review the sensemaking literature and show how it plays an important role in learning. Scholars agree that sensemaking is a well-­ established theory or perspective that has had a significant influence on organizations and the way in which they make meaning within their environment (Colville et al., 2016; Holt & Cornelissen, 2014; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015). In general, sensemaking has mainly been associated with research that is “interpretive, social-constructionist, processual and © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 G. Dwyer, Making Sense of Natural Disasters, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94778-1_2

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phenomenological” (Brown et al., 2015: 266). The variety of subject areas that influence sensemaking has meant that the concept is usually defined from a range of different perspectives (Colville et al., 2016; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015). Sensemaking is ultimately a social process whereby individuals create plausible meaning and understandings when they encounter novelty, anomalies, equivocality and/or discrepant cues in their environment (e.g. Maitlis, 2005; Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015). Novelty and equivocality sit at the core of emergencies, crises and disasters. However, they also persist during public inquiries following such events and as emergency management practitioners and organizations seek to make their own sense of bushfire events and to implement the recommendations emerging from public review processes (Dwyer et al., 2021a). Equivocality arises as individuals and groups experience novelty, ambiguity and uncertainty. It is associated with the complexity and unpredictability of organizational life in general, but is exacerbated when circumstances such as bushfires (and other emergency events) arise (Brown et al., 2008; Dwyer et al., 2021b). Equivocality, and the circumstances that surround it, has been defined in different ways by different scholars. Allard-Poesi (2005) associates it with confusion and ambivalence, while Balogun and Johnson (2005) associate it with uncertainty. Sometimes it is associated with ambiguity (e.g. Sonenshein, 2007); sometimes, it is differentiated from it (e.g., Colville et al., 2013; Brown et al., 2015). For the purposes of this book, I define equivocality in general terms, where some form of confusion and ambiguity leads to discrepant cues which, in turn, give rise to multiple interpretations that are reconciled through a social process of sensemaking (e.g. Weick, 2001; Weick et al., 2005). Such equivocality can arise gradually or rapidly, with sensemaking being a delineating “process by which organizational situations are framed, narrated or categorized through the words or bodily gestures of agents in contexts, and how these structure subsequent perceptions” (Holt & Cornelissen, 2014: 525). Accordingly, Weick et al. (2005: 410) have suggested that “sensemaking and organization constitute one another” because the organization will emerge “from an ongoing process in which people organize to make sense of equivocal inputs and enact that sense back into the world to make it more orderly”. While the literature suggests that sensemaking can be prompted by mundane, everyday moments in ‘sensible’ organizational environments (Patriotta & Brown, 2011), there seems to be agreement among scholars

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that sensemaking (or its absence) is much more potent and visible in non-­ sensible environments such as crises and disasters, where inconsistent or conflicting cues give rise to novelty and equivocality for individuals (Weick, 1993). In particular, studies show that disasters are often characterized by “dynamic complexity” (Colville et al., 2013: 1201). In disaster situations, scholars have observed that “the sense of what is occurring and the means to rebuild that sense collapse together” (Weick, 1993: 634). Given that disasters often result in significant damage and losses, governments will usually establish public inquiries to make sense of them (Stark, 2019a, 2019b). Public inquiries make sense of disasters through ceremonies and rituals, including evidence hearings, from which independent appointees of government construct an authoritative account of findings and recommendations (Dwyer & Hardy, 2016; Gephart, 1984). Such accounts are often expected to prompt changes within organizations (Dwyer et al., 2021a). Hence, an important point of interest of this book is what happens after such inquiries, and whether (as well as how) they prompt learning. We know little of the ways in which emergency management organizations make sense of public inquiry recommendations and findings. The spur to sensemaking is the extent to which bushfires cause significant damages and losses to communities, and how they create complex and dangerous work environments for individuals who work in emergency management organizations. After enduring such harrowing experiences, emergency management practitioners are often required to recount their traumas at public inquiry hearings, meaning that emotions may play an important role (Dwyer, 2021a). We therefore need to know more about the emotions that arise from such experiences (Dwyer et al., 2021b) and their effects (Maitlis et al., 2013). The remainder of this chapter elaborates on sensemaking as a concept – a cluster of characteristics – and shows how it arises from equivocality, with a particular focus on disasters. I then focus on the ways in which public inquiries have made sense of such disasters. This is important as a way of bringing attention to the way public review processes could be conducted in a more meaningful way in the future and give rise to learning in emergency management organizations. By examining the sensemaking literature with an emphasis on crises and disaster studies, I provide an insight into the way that meaning is made by emergency management actors and the organizations they work in. I then develop my areas of interest that pertain to what happens afterward: How does sensemaking occur in

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emergency management organizations after the findings from public inquiries have been published, and how do emotions influence meaning-­ making within these organizations? With this in mind, the next section explains sensemaking as a cluster of related characteristics, providing the conceptual foundation for identifying the way this notion shapes, influences and gives rise to learning.

2.1   What Is Sensemaking? Sensemaking “…emerges from efforts to create order and make retrospective sense of what occurs” (Weick, 1993: 635). As such, sensemaking comprises “at least seven distinguishing characteristics” in two broad, self-­ explanatory components (Weick, 1995: 17). The first component is sensing, comprising two general characteristics: • it is retrospective, and • it is shaped by identity construction, founded on the premise that people construct cognitive schemes that are built up over time from lived experience (Gioia  & Thomas, 1996; Helms-Mills, 2002; Weick, 1995). These guide people in their response to stimuli such as events, prompts, triggers and surprises (Brown & Humphreys, 2003; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Schwandt, 2005; Weick et al., 2005; Weick, 1993). The second component, making, has five general characteristics: • the process is enactive of sensible environments • it is social • it is ongoing • it focuses on extracted cues, and • it is driven by plausibility rather than accuracy. In the ‘making’ component of sensemaking, people attempt to enact sensible environments through “conversational and social practices” (Gephart, 1993: 1469) about specific events in order to arrive at an understanding about what is plausible, rather than objectively accurate. Questioning, framing, bracketing and storytelling enliven the social process at the heart of sensemaking (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Brown & Jones, 2000; Maitlis, 2005; Nigam & Ocasio, 2010). Generally, the

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making properties are informed by how people ontologically and epistemologically understand their environment (Fiss & Hirsch, 2005). Collectively, these properties enable sensemaking to materialize and unfold through “language, talk and communication”, which bring “situations, organizations and environments” into existence (Weick et al., 2005: 409). However, sensemaking has proved difficult to define. In fact, one of sensemaking’s foremost scholars, Karl Weick, cautions against using these properties in a definitive manner, arguing that they are better thought of as a general guide for conceptualizing the sensemaking perspective (1995). These properties have given sensemaking scholars a model by which they can understand how “people develop some sort of sense regarding what they are up against, what their own position is relative to what they sense, and what they need to do” (Weick, 1999: 42). The remainder of this section examines these characteristics in more detail. Drawing on Schutz (1967), Weick (1995) highlights retrospective thinking as an important property of sensemaking. Sensemaking involves the ongoing retrospective development of plausible images that rationalize what people are doing (Weick et  al., 2005: 409). The literature has observed that past experience is a meaningful part of behavioural actions (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Humphreys et  al., 2012; Maitlis, 2005; Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010) and all sensemaking involves reflection on past experiences (Gioia & Thomas, 1996). This implies that there can be no sensemaking without reference to the past (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Weick, 1993, 2010). Studies show that people use histories in the form of stories (Humphreys & Brown, 2002) to justify action for change or project desired future states (Brown & Humphreys, 2003). These are closely related to personal experiences stored in cognitive schemes built up over time to make sense of complex reality and influence how people behave (Balogun, 2003; Louis, 1980; Louis & Sutton, 1991; Weick, 1995). Change management initiatives often adopt a revisionist history focus, with an emphasis on reconstructing, remembering and/or re-interpreting images, identities and reputations (Orton & Weick, 1990; Porac et  al., 1989) as a foundation for meaning and understanding towards a desired future (Gioia et  al., 2002). In turn, this implies that meaning is made according to the identity adopted by the sensemaker or the sensegiver at a particular time (see Bartunek et al., 2006; Brown & Jones, 2000; Brown et al., 2008). Scholars have observed that an individual’s identity construction plays a key role in how they ‘make sense’. The literature suggests that identity is

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constructed from an individual’s existing cognitive schemes or mental modes, which are shaped by their lived experience and their environment. Accordingly, the sensemaking literature suggests that, cognitively, people’s identities are inseparable from how they think about their experiences in life and from the values, attitudes and norms they live by (see Louis, 1980). The literature posits that people will even enact different identities from mental modes to fit with their environment (Brown et al., 2008). Over time, people build ways of thinking within cognitive schemes, which have been shown to be malleable as people will often alter their identity to fit with that of their organization at any given time (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991). Cognitive schemes have been shown to influence the way that people make sense of their environment as individuals (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Maitlis, 2005). While sensemaking and identity have a cognitive dimension, the literature shows that they are also socially constructed, in that individuals seek to influence each other’s reality about what may be occurring in organizational situations and environments (see Balogun & Johnson, 2004, 2005; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Mills & Weatherbee, 2006; Myers, 2007; Mullen et al., 2006). Studies have also shown that individuals in groups socially construct their identity (e.g. engineers during the space shuttle Challenger explosion or the firefighters at Mann Gulch) by collectively interpreting data to construct a shared meaning about what is unfolding in changing environments (see Vaughan, 1990, 2006). Disaster situations have been shown to challenge individuals’ identities and hence their ability to make sense (Shrivastava et al., 1988; Vaughan, 1990, 2006; Weick, 1988, 1993) as they find their cognitive schemes have no previous cues that can enable them to interpret the equivocality arising in their environment. During disasters or times when equivocal cues are high, individuals (as well as groups) will often become so overwhelmed that they lose the ability to enact and interpret equivocal cues which, under normal circumstances, would enable them to make and give sense (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Maitlis, 2005; Weick et al., 2005). Enactment is the mechanism by which people in organizations construct their environment as they experience it (see Cornelissen et al., 2014; Pondy & Mitroff, 1979). This feature of sensemaking as a social process enables people to “bring events and structures into existence and set them in motion”, resulting in new constraints and opportunities that did not exist before they engaged in enactment (Maitlis, 2005; Weick, 1988: 306).

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The literature suggests that, through enactment, people and organizations construct and act on new expectations of the future and/or interpretations of the past (Mullen et al., 2006; Weick, 1988, 1995) – before, during and after an emergency, crisis or disaster event (Dwyer, 2021a). Such studies also demonstrate how environments can be socially constructed, as individuals bracket specific moments to subjectively interpret cues within organizational routines, hierarchy and interactions (Cunliffe & Coupland, 2012; Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007; Weick, 1988, 1995, 2010) at the micro level of the organization (Catino & Patriotta, 2013; Rouleau, 2005). The literature illustrates sensemaking as a dynamically fluid, social and ongoing process with no defined beginning or end (Weick, 1995), where people interact within their environment through stories while moving across and between existing cognitive schemes of experience to understand novel situations (Cornelissen, 2012). “Talk, discourse and conversation” (Weick, 1995: 41) are the key mediators of these social sensemaking processes (Geppert, 2003; Louis, 1980). Maitlis (2005) shows that sensemaking is omnipresent in organizations as a means for people to understand and attribute meaning to their work lives through narrative exchanges. It provides “clear questions and clear answers” (Weick, 1993: 636), and precedes and follows decisions at all levels within the hierarchy (e.g. see Balogun & Johnson, 2004, 2005), while stimulating cognitive triggers that drive sensemaking (Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007) and often define the emotional response people have to situations (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010). As active participants in sensemaking processes, people interpret sensemaking cues, which “…are simple, familiar structures that are seeds from which people develop a larger sense of what may be occurring” (Weick, 1995: 50). These cues provide people with the basis for scanning, noticing, surveilling and framing intangible organizational phenomena. In turn, this process enables these phenomena to be interpreted at all levels in the organization to make and give sense about salient events that have occurred, are occurring or may occur in the future (Weick et al., 2005; Vaughan, 1990, 2006; Weick et al., 2008). Without cues there would be no basis for people to intuitively engage in sensemaking and take action in the organizational context (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Labianca et  al., 2000; Weick, 1993, 1995). Bracketing, connecting and interpreting cues based on salient frames are central to the process of developing plausible accounts of what is happening in organizational situations (Colville et al., 2013). As a subjective

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process, sensemaking can never be concerned with ‘accuracy’ or ‘truth’; instead it is concerned with “plausibility, pragmatics, coherence, reasonableness, creation, invention and instrumentality” (Weick, 1995: 57; see also Myers, 2007). Although accounts may not always be accurate, they must be socially acceptable and credible if they are going to result in meaning, understanding and action (Brown & Jones, 2000; Brown et  al., 2008). Scholars have found that stories as social constructions of individuals’ lived experience (Louis, 1980) play an important part in building plausibility into sensemaking processes (see Colville et  al., 2012; Humphreys et al., 2012) because they show the “patterns that may already exist in the puzzles an actor now faces, or patterns that could be created anew in the interest of more order and sense in the future” (Weick, 1995: 61). Scholars have suggested that sensemaking properties are best illustrated when people are compelled to ask themselves who they are within the context of their organizations, and forced to understand what is going on around them in their environment (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010). These seven sensemaking properties have been used by scholars to show how people ascribe meaning and understanding to what is going on in their organization (e.g. see Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Maitlis, 2005; Thomas et al., 1993; Weick, 1993). These characteristics as part of a sensemaking process have also been shown to provide the basis for action such as organizational learning and change (Colville et al., 2016). I define sensemaking as a social process of face-to-face interaction among individuals, which is ongoing until plausible meaning is made of a stimulus prompted by noticing, framing and bracketing cues emerging from within the organization and its environment (Weick et  al., 2005; Weick, 1995). Sensemaking cues play a complex and nuanced role in the meaning-making process and have received considerable attention in research studies. Studies suggest that cues are signifiers that enhance understanding. They can include ‘fragments’ that exist in organizations, such as numerical readings from processes and systems, text from written documents or talk from conversations among individuals, all of which may prompt action insofar as they provide a basis for interpretation and the creation of new meaning (Colville et al., 2014; Dwyer & Hardy, 2016; Maitlis, 2005). The literature suggests that as individuals interpret cues they begin to negotiate, produce and collectively bring a new organizational reality into existence, prompting a process of learning and sometimes even change

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(Currie & Brown, 2003; Schwandt, 2005). Sensemaking and its key characteristics are often used in organizations to provide plausible explanations about why certain cues are framed and used to justify learning (Colville et al., 2014; Crossan et al., 1999; Weick, 1995). In this way, sensemaking has been used to show how people seek to learn and implement change (Bean & Hamilton, 2006; Brown & Humphreys, 2003; Turner, 1976), while also showing how strategy creation, collective cognition, decision-­ making and knowledge creation unfold in different contexts. These properties give people a basis “to accept the diversity and mutation of the world…so that this changing world shall not become meaningless” (Fuentes, 1990: 49–50). This is particularly relevant for scholars seeking to build more prospective sensemaking theory in the kinds of turbulent environments in which emergency management organizations operate. Scholars have suggested that sensemaking gives rise to sensegiving, which is the process of attempting to influence the sensemaking and meaning construction of others towards a preferred redefinition of a “new organizational reality” (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991: 443). Sensegiving is also an interpretive process (Bartunek et al., 1999; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991) in which individuals  – possibly from different hierarchical levels of the organization – influence each other through persuasive or evocative language choices (Dunford & Jones, 2000). Scholars have shown that sensegiving is used by organizational leaders (Bartunek et al., 1999; Corley & Gioia, 2004; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991), middle managers (Balogun, 2003) and other specialists and/or employees in organizations (Maitlis, 2005). Moreover, sensegiving has been shown to influence the way in which sensemaking (Maitlis, 2005) occurs, as individuals, usually managers, disseminate new understanding to individuals at lower levels of the organizational hierarchy  – information that ultimately shapes how they understand themselves, their own work and that of others, as well as their perceptions of emergency phenomena in their environment (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991).

2.2   Equivocality and Sensemaking Equivocality is a feature of everyday societal and organizational life. As explained earlier, equivocality refers to organizational information that gives rise to a range of different meanings or multiple interpretations, which prompt individuals to begin sensemaking (Putnam & Sorenson, 1982). Equivocality can arise in many different ways: it may emanate from

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events in an organization that are very different to what has previously occurred (e.g. Weick, 1993), or it may occur because of disagreements about the interpretation of symbols and artefacts (e.g. Dutton & Dukerich, 1991). It can also result from factors that serve to violate expectations (e.g. Bowman & Kunreuther, 1988; Christianson et al., 2009). Circumstances that give rise to equivocality can then prompt sensemaking, whereby individuals begin to inquire, probe and challenge themselves and each other about what they are interpreting and observing in their environment, in order to create a shared understanding of what is occurring (Catino & Patriotta, 2013; Maitlis, 2005). Individuals may be able to recreate “an intersubjective sense of shared meanings through conversation and non–verbal behavior in face-to-face settings where actors seek to produce, negotiate, and maintain a shared sense of meaning” (Gephart et al., 2010: 284–285), as long as they remain able to interpret the cues from their environment. In this section, I examine two important contexts of equivocality where sensemaking has been studied: during disasters and in post-disaster inquiries. 2.2.1  Sensemaking During Disaster A large amount of research on sensemaking has been carried out in relatively stable environments, such as companies, orchestras, universities, utilities, hospitals and religious orders (e.g. Porac et  al., 1989; Maitlis, 2005; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Labianca et al., 2000; Bartunek et al., 2006; Nigam & Ocasio, 2010; Bean & Hamilton, 2006). However, sensemaking in the context of disasters has attracted particular attention from scholars because equivocality is particularly high in such settings (Dwyer et  al., 2021; van Hulst & Tsoukas, 2021; Billings et  al., 1980; Weick, 2010). By their very nature, disasters create what Colville et  al. (2013: 1201) refer to as “circumstances that are suffused with dynamic complexity”. This poses challenges for sensemaking at all levels in the organization, as individuals have to make sense from ongoing, complex surprises emerging from the regular and rapid onset of “continuous discontinuous change” (Colville et al., 2012: 8) that can threaten both the existence of the organization and the lives of those managing the situation (Weick, 1993). Studies by various scholars shave shown that people often enact behaviours that cause, contribute to and/or exacerbate disasters (Christianson et  al., 2009; Vaughan, 1990, 2006; Weick, 1988, 1990, 1995, 2010).

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Disasters often have their origins in human error and entrenched habits, routines and patterns; these may give rise to the disaster in the first place and/or conspire to constrain people’s ability to engage in meaningful sensemaking during the disaster (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010; Weick, 1988, 1990), as individuals fail to observe cues and generate plausible meanings about what may be unfolding (Brown, 2000, 2004; Gephart, 1984, 1993; Turner, 1976; Weick, 1993, 2010). For example, Perrow (1967, 1981: 18), using the example of an accident at a nuclear power plant, shows how centralized authority stifles people’s ability to pick up on cues and enact sensemaking behaviours that may avert a crisis. Weick’s (1990) case study of a collision between two aircraft at Tenerife Airport in 1977 shows how interruptions to routine generate false hypotheses about situations, which may create a disaster as people fail to make sense of what is happening (Termeer, 2009; Termeer & van den Brink, 2013; Weick, 1990). In the case of the NASA space shuttle Columbia, Vaughan (2006) shows that an absence of sensemaking can result in errors and misconduct, with disastrous consequences. The disaster sensemaking literature has shown that the unpredictable and rapidly changing conditions that occur during disasters affect people’s ability to frame events, bracket cues and develop plausible accounts as events unfold (Dwyer, 2021b; Howitt & Leonard, 2009; Weick, 2010). Sensemaking is critical during disasters, but can be difficult to enact. This is a particularly acute challenge for emergency management organizations responsible for managing disasters (de Rond, 2017; Quarantelli, 1988), when the result can be large numbers of fatalities and high levels of destruction, often resulting in a review process conducted by either the organization itself or the government through a public inquiry (Dwyer et al., 2021). 2.2.2  Sensemaking During Public Inquiries Public inquiries are temporary organizations that bring together relevant individuals and/or groups in a facilitated manner to discuss and deliberate on matters of public interest such as crises and disasters (Stark, 2019a, 2019b; Prasser, 2021; Gephart, 1984). Individuals may continue to experience equivocality following a disaster if there is no definitive account of what happened and why losses or damages were so significant (Dwyer & Hardy, 2016; Gephart, 1984, 1993). Public inquiries are often perceived as an important way of making sense of such equivocality in a plausible, if

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not always accurate, manner (Dwyer, 2021a; Turner, 1976, 1978; Vaughan, 1990, 2006). By bringing together different parties associated with a disaster, public inquiries involve individuals and/or groups in a deliberative process (Pascoe, 2009; Prasser, 2006), which allows for protracted debate and discussion about different aspects of disasters – reconstructing and re-interpreting what happened (Gephart, 2007). This, in turn, enables governments to create perceptions of transparency and accountability in an authoritative manner (McKay, 2009; Prasser, 2006). Inquiries are therefore mechanisms for rebuilding public confidence and protecting organization legitimacy where failure is evident (see Boudes & Laroche, 2009; Brown, 2000, 2004, 2005; ’t Hart, 1993; Turner, 1976), as well as forms of coping and future policy development (Botterill, 2014). Public inquiries range from informal ‘town hall’-style meetings in communities with few rules as to how their deliberations are conducted, to more formal arrangements provided for under statute and modelled on quasi-judicial proceedings (Prasser, 2006). In the case of formal inquiries, governments will usually appoint independent commissioners who can use statutory powers to solicit testimony under oath from witnesses, who may be subpoenaed (Pascoe, 2009). Where disasters are particularly complex, commissioners and witnesses will usually be represented by legal counsel (Pascoe, 2009). Governments often commission formal public inquiries to provide an explanation of what happened and why in relation to high-­ profile disasters. These face-to-face ceremonial occasions adhere to various rituals as they assemble representatives from organizations with varying levels of involvement in the disaster (Brown, 2004). In the course of an inquiry, commissioners ask a series of questions to which witnesses respond, giving rise to a social process of sensemaking in which rich descriptions of the disaster are built from different perspectives in an authoritative forum (Brown, 2000, 2004). The process of sensemaking is often extended through a series of public consultations, formal submissions and exhibits from the community. These may support or refute witness claims, shaping the final form of the commissioners’ report (Boudes & Laroche, 2009; Bowman & Kunreuther, 1988; Gephart, 2007; Pascoe, 2009). The outcome of the inquiry is usually an authoritative report, often supported by a collection of transcripts that record evidence, hearings and cross-examinations. The report articulates the most significant issues in the disaster under examination (Gephart et al., 1990), as well as recommendations for future improvements to reduce the chances of the disaster occurring again (Boin et al., 2009; Stern, 1997).

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Many researchers argue that, despite being perceived as authoritative, public inquiry reports comprise a series of normative judgements (i.e. subjective decisions informed by pre-existing values rather than objective logic), coupled with authorial strategies of omission and selection, as commissioners seek to reconstruct what happened and why (Brown, 2000, 2004; Brown & Jones, 2000; Dwyer, 2021a). These accounts may be more plausible than accurate in relation to accountability and responsibility (Gephart, 1984, 1988, 1993; Gephart et  al., 1990, 2010; Brown, 2000, 2004, 2005; Brown & Jones, 2000). Scholars have suggested that they are only one construction of events (Boudes & Laroche, 2009; Gephart, 1984), and are the result of sensemaking by the authors concerned and the decisions and selections made when constructing their report (Gephart, 1984, 1988, 1993). They may emphasize blame rather than transparency (Resodihardjo, 2020), and may be more concerned with protecting the system rather than with the fate of individuals (’t Hart, 1993; Brown, 2004; Gephart, 1993). Nonetheless, the authoritative nature of such reports means that they are expected to provide a basis for action such as new policy, learning and change in organizations (Stark, 2020; Dwyer & Hardy, 2016; Pascoe, 2009). 2.2.3  Sensemaking and Learning Public review and inquiry process have proved to be an important basis for learning insofar as organizational actors can leverage knowledge from systems at the individual and group levels of the organization (Catino & Patriotta, 2013; Buchanan, 2011; Argyris & Schön, 1978, 1996) so that errors can be corrected and change can be made in an objective, fact-­ driven manner through intuiting, interpreting, integrating and institutionalizing (Crossan et al., 1999). Learning occurs in two ways (Argyris, 1976). Single-loop learning occurs through error correction, but without altering the underlying governing values of the system and/or organization. Double-loop learning occurs when errors are corrected by changing governing values and subsequent actions. Thus single-loop learning produces change within the existing organizational culture, while double-loop learning leads organizations to re-evaluate governing values and potentially change their culture and practices at a more fundamental level. Moving from single-loop to double-loop learning allows organizations to adjust their culture so that they can escape the ‘cultures of entrapment’ that produce antilearning

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(Weick and Sutcliffe, 2003: 73). This arises when organizational actors (and/or processes) remain blind to incompetencies and inefficiencies, giving rise to inadequate performance that can harm the organization and its stakeholders (Argyris, 1993; Argyris & Schön, 1996).

2.3   What Happens After Disaster and Public Inquiry Sensemaking? Scholarly work has recently examined sensemaking (or a lack thereof) surrounding and following specific disasters, but there has been little attention focused on what happens after an inquiry into a disaster has finished its deliberations, including the responses it sparks within emergency management organizations (Dwyer et  al., 2021). Given the role that these organizations play in preparing for and responding to disasters and providing evidence to public inquiries, their responses would seem to be important, especially as public inquiries are established, at least ostensibly, to stimulate and implement learning from the event. Research has recently found evidence that this occurs when public administration organizations undergo a process of conceptual mapping in relation to lessons learned following the release of public inquiry findings and recommendations (Stark, 2019a, b, 2020). Turner (1976, 1978) systematically analyzed significant disasters in the UK between 1966 and 1974 to show that readjusting culture was necessary in state organizations to manage and alter the institutional behaviours that preceded disasters, in order to try to prevent them from happening in the first place. Disaster inquiries may therefore provide valuable opportunities for single- and double-loop learning and organizational change; this may prevent behaviours contributing to non-­ conformance, deviance and errors that have played a role in the disaster (Ashford, 1990; Elliott, 2009; Elliot & McGuiness, 2002; Lalonde, 2007). However, this continues to be contested, as scholars have reported evidence suggesting that public inquiry recommendations are not implemented in an efficient and effective manner (Tolhurst, 2019, 2020). From existing theory, we know that stable hierarchies enable individuals at different levels to make sense of equivocal cues through the social processes of sensemaking and sensegiving so that over time they can construct plausible meaning as they reflect on their experiences (see Thackaberry, 2004; Balogun, 2003; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Weick, 1995). A study by Thackaberry (2004) found

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that, although self-reflection comprising sensemaking and sensegiving activities within the US Forest Service may engender new ways of thinking and diagnoses about firefighter safety issues, bureaucratic management may obstruct cultural change. Furthermore, while studies suggest that hierarchy plays an important enabling role for senior management to ‘give sense’ to people at lower levels of an organization (e.g. Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991), it has also been shown to contribute to disasters by prompting action that exacerbates or escalates an emergency situation (Cornelissen et al., 2014). For example, Vaughan (1990, 2006) has highlighted several ways in which hierarchical structures contributed to the disintegration of space shuttle Columbia: Cultural traits and organizational practices detrimental to safety were allowed to develop, including: reliance on past success as a substitute for sound engineering practices (such as testing to understand why systems were not performing in accordance with requirements); organizational barriers that prevented effective communication of critical safety information and stifled professional differences of opinion; lack of integrated management across program elements; and the evolution of an informal chain of command and decision-making processes that operated outside the organization’s rules. (CAIB, vol. 1, 2003: 9)

This research suggests that hierarchy may have played a role in contributing to the Columbia disaster. But what part did it play afterward, as organizations sought to respond to the lessons learned from the disaster? What emotions surfaced as different actors were called before the inquiry to explain what happened and why? Did the findings give rise to organizational change that addressed the issues raised by the inquiry? We still know relatively little about what happens within organizations after public inquiries have concluded their work and made their findings known. Do emergency management organizations ever actually make sense of and interpret the recommendations from public inquiries and does this enable them to ameliorate the future effects of disasters? We know that public inquiries can prompt managers to implement change in emergency management organizations (Dwyer et al., 2021a; Stark, 2020), though others have claimed that the ritualized and political aspects of public inquiries inhibit learning (Buchanan, 2011) and have led to a politicization of public review processes. This is problematic because emergency management organizations have become preoccupied with accountability,

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which has diminished their ability to reduce the impact of bushfires (Tolhurst, 2019). Such claims suggest that sensemaking and learning in disaster and crisis contexts are in tension with each other (Schwandt, 2005). Indeed, studies have shown that public inquiry recommendations can give rise to learning in present moments that has limited meaning in any prospective sense (Dwyer et  al., 2021a). This suggests that public inquiries must become more prospective in their approach to improving organizational function in order to improve future emergency planning, response and recovery.

2.4   Sensemaking and Emotion When sensemaking takes place during disasters and also during inquiries, where individuals often experience considerable equivocality, it is likely that these individuals will also experience different emotions. The emergence of equivocality in organizations can trigger a condition referred to as cognitive loading (Sweller, 1994), as individuals seek to interpret ambiguous cues through sensemaking and sensegiving (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Thomas et al., 1993) when learning from past crises and recognizing future ones (Lerbinger, 2012). This section discusses the influence of cognitive loading on people’s response to changes in organizational conditions, suggesting that it gives rise to different emotions when individuals make sense of equivocality before, during and after disasters (Thatcher et al., 2015). Cognitive loading is the use of the brain’s working memory to absorb information from outside world inputs (based on Sweller, 1994). The brain’s ability to attribute meaning and understanding to these inputs is determined by its amount of available working memory (Paas et al., 2003), which is often hindered as disasters unfold (Thatcher et al., 2015). The more working memory available, the more likely it is that people will be able to attribute meaning and understanding from outside world inputs to their experience and relate it to knowledge residing within their cognitive schemes (Sweller, 1994). Sweller (1994), Paas et  al. (2003) and Van Merrienboer and Sweller (2005) identify three types of cognitive loading that, when combined, equal the sum of total cognitive loading that people experience. Intrinsic loading is the level of difficulty associated with the new experience, which will be higher if a person’s brain has multiple factors to consider at once. Intrinsic loading is minimized where people can process factors progressively, from simple to complex. Extraneous loading

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is the effect generated by the manner in which information is presented, and will reach higher levels when there are distracting factors such as noise. Germane loading is the way in which people structure outside world inputs as knowledge by drawing on previous experience already registered within their cognitive schemes. Thatcher et al. (2015) have applied affective load theory to a disaster context. Affective load theory posits that people develop norms based on group membership when they seek to understand information about disasters. Affective norms are learned through social processes of sensemaking. This can ameliorate or exacerbate disasters, depending on the way that people take action based on how they interpret information. More specifically, the bushfires which I examine in this book show that cognitive load levels are also likely to increase for practitioners as they anticipate and expect disaster events (Camerer & Kunreuther, 1989; Christianson et  al., 2009). Over recent decades atmospheric scientists have continued to predict that climate change will give rise to heatwaves, droughts and bushfires, and that these will be increasingly frequent, complex and threatening to communities (Flannery, 2013). Such threats create novel and unprecedented challenges for practitioners within emergency management organizations (Birkman, 2006; Quarantelli, 1988). While such individuals already respond to challenging circumstances on a daily basis, they are likely to find themselves in the midst of potentially catastrophic disasters more frequently in the future. It is likely that the cognitive loading levels of individuals working for emergency management organizations will continue to increase over time as severe natural disasters become high-impact, high-probability events (Dwyer, 2021c). Moreover, the public scrutiny under which such individuals perform their duty and the likely examination they will face from government and society through public inquiries are likely to exacerbate cognitive loads. This will likely engender increasing levels of emotional reactions such as stress, anxiety and shock among those working for emergency management organizations (Dwyer et al., 2021b). Scholars have provided us with numerous examples of how change triggers an emotional response in both crisis and non-crisis situations (see Weick, 1988, 1990, 1993; Weick et al., 2008). Fear, anxiety, panic, helplessness and vulnerability are often manifested in turbulent environments within disasters. Where change is rapid, so too are emotions like dread, betrayal, deception and anger (Balogun, 2003; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Louis, 1980). Even in more stable environments, such emotions have

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been cast as an impediment to change in the organizational context (Balogun & Johnson, 2004, 2005; Catino & Patriotta, 2013; Maitlis et  al., 2013). Many researchers suggest  – implicitly or explicitly  – that sensemaking is more effective when emotions are held in check (Elfenbein, 2007; Fineman, 2004, 2006; Huy, 1999; Maitlis et al., 2013; Mumby & Putnam, 1992; Weick, 1993). Unexpected events or surprises trigger the arousal of the autonomic nervous system, which prompts people to react to an event that may impact on their wellbeing. This can result in them ignoring important sensemaking cues of which they would otherwise be aware, in turn inhibiting their ability to make sense of changed circumstances (see Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010; Maitlis et al., 2013). We know that when change events such as crises and disasters occur, people frequently find their identities, routines, values, attitudes and norms challenged by what is unfolding (e.g. see Cornelissen, 2012; Thomas et al., 1993; Weick, 1988, 1990, 1993). The ability to frame events, bracket cues and conclude plausible accounts can be lost (Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007; Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010; Weick, 2010), resulting in a breakdown of sensemaking. Despite the literature highlighting emotion as an inhibitor of sensemaking, (Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007; Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010), it is also clear that emotion can result in the “simplicity of action” triggered by events during times of continuous discontinuous change, even if it is not underpinned by “complexity of thought” (Colville et al., 2012: 5). Such simplicity of action may help individuals to act in complex, overwhelming situations when equivocality is high and consequences may give rise to harm and even tragedy. Emotion has been shown to direct attention to certain cues, which creates a shared sense of what is occurring, thereby enabling action in difficult situations. However, this action may not necessarily be effective or appropriate. For example, Colville et al. (2013) and Cornelissen et al. (2014) have found that communication, negative emotion and material cues gave rise to police officers framing a civilian as a suicide bomber, resulting in the accidental shooting of an innocent victim. There is, then, a question as to whether emotions enhance or impede sensemaking, and considerable scope to explore the way in which emotions – positive and negative  – influence how equivocal events are interpreted, both at the time and when individuals return to their organizations following disasters and inquiries. The sources of emotion also need to be examined. While disasters trigger emotions in immediate and visible ways, the ongoing emotional

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context is more complex. For example, disasters often result in significant material losses and damages for communities, meaning that the emotional effects may last long after the disaster ends. In the case of members of emergency management organizations, disasters create challenging and dangerous work environments on a regular basis, meaning that individuals anticipate forthcoming disasters as well as dealing with previous events and their long-term effects on the community (Dwyer et al., 2021b). In addition, these individuals may be required to respond to public inquiry questions about their actions on the day of the disaster, when their competence and judgement are likely to be called into question. Insofar as such inquiries are often associated with assigning blame (Eburn & Dovers, 2015; Gephart, 1993, 2007), it seems likely that such experiences would give rise to further negative emotions, as individuals relive the disaster and defend themselves from charges of negligence or incompetence. When public inquiries make their authoritative accounts available, they often recommend changes to the emergency management organizations held responsible. We know from existing studies that organizational artefacts stimulate individuals to make sense prospectively (Stigliani & Ravasi, 2012). However, we know little about whether this gives rise to negative, positive or mixed emotional states, as individuals begin the process of unlearning old routines in order to prepare better for the future. The emotional states associated with the original disaster and the public inquiry may shape the implementation process and learning outcomes. Accordingly, my second area of interest is: What types of emotion arise from public inquiry sensemaking and what are the implications for learning?

2.5   Conclusion This chapter has explored sensemaking as a concept, how it arises from equivocality with a particular focus on disasters, and the ways in which public inquiries make sense of these disasters afterward. Disasters have provided an important basis for developing theory in relation to how sensemaking arises and occurs. Scholars examining the ways in which public inquiries make sense of highly equivocal events such as disasters have further extended sensemaking theory. Despite such advances, we still know relatively little about the ways in which public inquiry findings influence emergency management organizations. There is also scope to extend our understanding of the role of emotion in sensemaking processes surrounding public inquiry recommendations. In Chap. 4, I use the case study of

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Victoria to explore the various ways in which sensemaking gives rise to learning and how this is shaped by emotion among emergency management practitioners as they respond to bushfire, are cross-examined during public inquiries, and must return to their organization to implement the recommendations from public review processes.

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CHAPTER 3

Bushfires and Public Inquiries: A Case Study of Victoria

Abstract  This chapter presents a case study of bushfires and public inquiries in Victoria, which shows the ways in which sensemaking and learning unfold after significant disasters. I examine these bushfires and public inquiries by using a qualitative and interpretive methodology. By examining publicly available documents and commentaries in relation to four of Victoria’s most significant bushfire inquiries, I show that public review processes have resulted in significant learning, which has enabled emergency management organizations to plan for and respond to significant bushfires more effectively. However, my analysis shows there has been very little variation in terms of the findings that emerge from public inquiries. Accordingly, I suggest that learning from bushfires has become stifled as a result of public inquiry recommendations that are rolled over from previous bushfire events and have little relevance for ameliorating the effects of present-day and future disaster events. Keywords  Public inquiries • Case study • Textual analysis • Single-­ loop learning • Double-loop learning In this chapter, I examine a variety of documents and a series of publicly available commentaries to understand how learning occurred in Victorian emergency management organizations as a result of bushfire public inquiries. I chose this approach because sensemaking and learning are usually © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 G. Dwyer, Making Sense of Natural Disasters, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94778-1_3

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underpinned by social processes that emerge through interaction between different groups of individuals who seek to interpret equivocality in their environment. I use public inquiries to understand the different ways that sensemaking and learning emerge after significant bushfire events. I examined reports from public inquiries and a range of publicly available commentaries for evidence of sensemaking and learning after Victoria’s worst bushfires. I found that there was evidence suggesting that individuals in emergency management organizations used the recommendations from such inquiries to make sense of and learn from major bushfire events so that they can better prepare for future events. However, there was also a collective sense that there are issues relating to the way emergency management organizations work together and the way they prepare for bushfire seasons, and a failure in the community to accept that bushfires are inevitable, which see a range of recommendations continuously re-emerge. It seems that public inquiries have created a vacuum insofar as emergency management organizations find themselves continuing to work with the same types of issues; this has created a perception that learning from bushfires is rare.

3.1   Making Sense and Learning from Public Inquiries I use a qualitative and interpretative approach to consider the ways in which public inquiries are used to make sense of and learn from bushfire experiences (see Gephart, 1997 for a similar approach). I chose this approach because sensemaking and learning are social and interpretive processes that emerge as a result of dynamic interaction between different groups (Brown et  al., 2012, 2015) whose subjective interpretations of everyday life cohere into a meaningful ‘reality’ (Crotty, 1998; Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Hussey & Hussey, 1997). An interpretive approach emphasizes qualitative research methods that are flexible, sensitive to the social context and concerned with understanding complex issues (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gephart 2004a & b; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). This approach enabled me to develop a case study of bushfire public inquiries in a Victorian context. A case study is an empirical investigation that looks at phenomena within a particular setting (Yin, 1994), and this allowed me to collect the rich data that I needed to explore sensemaking processes and the ways in which these gave rise to learning (or otherwise). I undertook a textual analysis of the reports of four public inquiries to explore how they might give rise to subsequent sensemaking and learning.

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3.2   Victoria: Case Study of a Bushfire Society The state of Victoria, Australia, is the research setting for this study. Victoria’s combination of landscape, climate and vegetation makes it one of the most fire-prone areas in the world. These characteristics essentially mean that it is a ‘bushfire society’ with a long history of bushfires (for an overview of Victorian bushfire events see Dwyer, 2021). Victoria’s high bushfire risk is the consequence of a combination of factors, including large areas of highly flammable dry eucalypt forest, expanses of highly flammable grassland, a climatic pattern of mild moist winters followed by hot dry summers, protracted droughts and agricultural practices where fire is routinely used. These factors give rise to great concern for community safety among practitioners in Victoria’s emergency management organizations. Victoria has also seen an increasing population density in bushfire-prone areas, such as the rural-urban fringe. Consequently, a major bushfire can result in significant impacts, including loss of life, loss of infrastructure, financial losses, environmental degradation and reduced services to the community. Bushfire management in Victoria involves a complex arrangement of plans, structures and hierarchies that have been established and refined over many years, often as a result of learning from a range of emergencies. Government, voluntary and private organizations and communities all play a vital role in the prevention of, response to and recovery from bushfire. Managing bushfire is ultimately a shared responsibility involving many people and organizations in the community, though some organizations do have particular specialist roles. Given the dedicated role of several organizations in preparing for and responding to bushfires, coupled with the frequency of bushfires in Victoria, I felt that I would be able to discern evidence of sensemaking and learning by examining the state’s most significant fire events: the way in which emergency management organizations responded to them; what emerged from the subsequent independent inquiries commissioned by the Government of Victoria to understand why such fires were so severe; and how emergency management organizations can learn from them in the future. In detail, I examined the four public inquiries – into the Black Friday fires of 1939, the Ash Wednesday fires of 1983, the Black Saturday fires of 2009 and the Black Summer fires of 2019/20 – to explore whether and how they led to sensemaking and learning. I selected these fires as case studies because they were perceived to be four of the most significant and damaging natural disasters in Victoria (and in Australia), resulting in the

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loss of a considerable number of lives and properties (Tolhurst, 2020). It appeared likely that sensemaking would occur through the public inquiries that followed them, as in the case of other public inquiries dealing with crises (e.g. Gephart, 1984; Gephart et al., 1990; Brown, 2000; Brown & Jones, 2000). I also felt that there would be evidence of learning (or its absence) from inquiry reports and related texts insofar as public inquiries in Australia are expected to be an important vehicle for learning (Prasser, 1985). Dwyer and Hardy (2016) have shown that the findings and recommendations from several of these reports have had a significant influence on the practice of emergency management in Victoria. To explore how sensemaking and learning occur in organizations after a significant fire event, I examined the text and talk of publicly available commentaries of emergency management practitioners who have been responsible for planning for and responding to a range of different bushfire events. I first explored whether sensemaking and learning are triggered as a result of public inquiries into major bushfires. I found that the inquiries constructed these fires as novel and equivocal, justifying the need for retrospective sensemaking and learning through deliberative public inquiry processes. My findings confirm that sensemaking and learning occurred during the inquiries, as well as suggesting how “learning cues” (Dwyer & Hardy, 2016: 56) provided a basis for the “single-loop learning” (insofar as we learned about the causes of the fires and the damage they caused) and “double-loop learning” (Argyris, 1976: 363) that occurred during the inquiry to extend beyond it and lead to changes in organizational practices. 3.2.1  Data Collection I collected the reports of the public inquiries in a Victorian context: the Report of the Royal Commission to Inquire into the Bush Fires of January 1939 (Black Fridaybushfires); the Report of the Bushfire Review Committee, 16 February 1982–83 (Ash Wednesdaybushfires); the Report of the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission 2009–10 (Black Saturday Bushfires) and the Report of the Black Summer Inquiry 2019–20. I augmented these reports with other texts that were related to the four public inquiries but produced afterward. Using Factiva, which is a search engine for newspaper articles, TV and radio transcripts, journals and so on, I identified 20 publicly available interviews with senior firefighters,

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commissioners and politicians, 30 newspaper articles and 10 weblogs (Table 3.1). These texts were collected because they provided views, however subjective, on whether and how sensemaking and learning occurred both during and after the inquiries. These four events are generally regarded as the most significant bushfires in Victoria. However, the following list shows that Victoria has a long history of bushfire events and incidents surrounding them which have been followed by public inquiries. Table 3.1  Sources of textual data Text source

Relevance

Number of sources

1. Bushfire public inquiry reports

Public inquiry reports provide detailed accounts of sensemaking and meaning over a period of time with input from government, emergency management and community stakeholders, and provide evidence of learning Observers’ comments on whether they believe the public inquiry made sense of and learned lessons from the previous bushfire, as well as whether sensemaking, learning and change have subsequently occurred Observers’ comments on whether they believe that the mode of public inquiry was appropriate for making sense of the bushfire Media articles provide commentaries on whether the public inquiry made sense of and learned lessons from the previous bushfire, as well as whether sensemaking, learning and change have occurred subsequently Media articles evaluate whether recommendations from previous inquiries have been successfully implemented Weblogs from social media platforms and emergency management organizations’ websites provide commentaries on whether the public inquiry made sense of and learned lessons from the previous bushfire, as well as whether sensemaking, learning and change have subsequently occurred. Weblogs provide individual commentaries about the influence of the process of sensemaking and learning on their organization

Four reports

2. Publicly available interviews

3. Media articles

4. Weblogs

Twenty interviews with politicians, firefighters, Royal Commissioners

Thirty newspaper articles

Ten weblogs by emergency management practitioners

(continued)

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Table 3.1  (continued) Bushfire event

Review focus

Key findings

Inquiry

Key recommendations

1939: Black Friday

Origins and causes of the fires and an assessment of the measures taken to prevent damages prior to and during the fires

Careless burning and land clearing resulted in the third most deadly bushfires in Australia

Stretton Royal Commission Type: Royal Commission

1944: Yallourn Fires

Origins and causes of the fires and an assessment of the measures to prevent damages

Many of those who would have been available to fight the fires were on duty in WWII

Stretton Royal Commission Type: Royal Commission

1977: Black Saturday

Report on the occurrence of the bush and grass fires

This fire confirmed significant bushfires were being driven by atmospheric changes and that significant fires do not necessarily occur at ‘11 year intervals’ Acknowledgement that bad fire days could be predicted

Esler Barber Board of Inquiry Type: Board of Inquiry/Review Committee

Inquiry recommended fundamental changes of planning and response emergency management arrangements for bushfire in Victoria Inquiry recommended that the Country Fire Authority be established to provide for firefighting on private land in regional areas Inquiry recommended that there is modernization and maintenance of power lines and electrical infrastructure; closer partnerships between CFA regions to enable better fire prevention; FCV (now DELWP) continue to undertake ‘fuel prevention burning’ every couple of seasons (continued)

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Table 3.1  (continued) Bushfire event

Review focus

Key findings

Inquiry

1983: Ash Wednesday

Report investigated the causes and effects of the significant fires

These fires confirmed that the interval between significant and damaging fires had shortened, which meant there was a need for a much more comprehensive and strategic approach to planning for and responding to bushfires

Inquiry of the Co-ordinator of the State’s DisPlan Type: Review Committee (Evaluation review and investigation report)

2002: Linton Inquiry

Investigation into the deaths of firefighters while conducting prescribed burning operations

Key recommendations

Inquiry recommended much greater use of science in the prediction of fire. Recommended that planned burning adopted as an integral approach to bushfire season preparedness Victoria move towards year round focus on planning, preparedness, response and recovery Despite being a Investigation & Inquiry benign fire Inquests into a recommended weather day, an Wildfire & the transformation of unexpected switch Deaths of 5 the safety in the wind Firefighters at requirements direction ignited Linton 2 surrounding PPE smoldering December 1998* and procedures embers, quickly *Fire was a followed by giving rise to a prescribed burn firefighters during fire, which claimed that became a prescribed burning the lives of bushfire and bushfire firefighters Type: Coronial suppression Inquest (these types of inquiries explicitly seek to not apportion blame, only seeking to determine cause of death) (continued)

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Table 3.1  (continued) Bushfire event

Review focus

Key findings

2003: Alpine Fires

Inquiry into the causes of major bushfires of 2002/03

Bushfires burned the largest amount of land and (at that time) and burned for the longest amount of time

2005: Wilson’s Promontory Bushfire

Inquiry into the reasons why a prescribed burn became a bushfire which could have claimed hundreds of lives

Inquiry

Inquiry into the major fires of 2002/2003 Type: Inquiry by government officer with statutory powers (Evaluation review and investigation report) There were severe Inquiry into the weather conditions Wilson’s for several days Promontory leading up to and Bushfire Inquiry including the days at Tidal River* of the prescribed * Fire was a burn ‘burn-off’ that became a bushfire Type: Inquiry by government officer with statutory powers (Evaluation review and investigation report)

Key recommendations Inquiry recommended an emphasis on planned burn targets as well as the reporting and monitoring of planned burning

Inquiry recommended greater proceduralization of planned burning with an emphasis on auditing, monitoring and planning surrounding all aspects of prescribed burning. Recommended a shift towards more engagement and partnership with the community in relation to planning prescribed burning (continued)

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Table 3.1  (continued) Bushfire event 2005/2006: South West Victoria Bushfires

Review focus

Ministerial Taskforce to examine the ways in which fire can be used as part of an integrated land management strategy (There was also a significant joint agency review of the season) 2006–2007: Joint Agency Great review of Divide bushfires, North & which South produced a Bushfires report, which reemphasized the findings from 2005–06

Key findings

Inquiry

Key recommendations

Weather conditions were not necessarily abnormal but these fires show that bushfire can materialize at any given time. While weather conditions were not necessarily abnormal there were more deaths recorded despite the small size of the fires One of the most extensive fires in Australian history but they were largely unfolded on public land

Inquiry into the Impact of Public Land Management Practices on Bushfires in Victoria Type: Parliamentary Inquiry (Report of recommendations to Victorian Parliament)

Inquiry recommended joint agency training in relation to incident control and command around bushfire suppression and planned burning; as well as further expansion of funding for IT and e-mapping/fire modelling

Inquiry into the Impact of Public Land Management Practices on Bushfires in Victoria Type: Parliamentary Inquiry (Report of recommendations to Victorian Parliament)

As above

(continued)

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Table 3.1  (continued) Bushfire event

Review focus

Key findings

Inquiry

2009: Black Saturday

A report of four volumes reviewed what happened and why the bushfires of 7 February caused so much damages and losses

Most significant and damaging bushfires ever in Australia caused by weather conditions and fire behavior that was unique

2009: Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission Type: Royal Commission

2013: Harrietville Bushfires

Key recommendations

Inquiry recommended significant and transformative recommendations surrounding all year round planned burning in a collaborative manner with the Victorian community. The Royal Commission proposed a very significant target of 5 per cent of planned burning of public land A significant Harrietville 2013: Inquiry Inquiry bushfire bushfire burned into the Major recommended that season insofar for 55 days out of Bushfires of agencies were as one fire at an 86-day bushfire 2012–13 required to revisit Harrietville season. Systems Type: Inquiry by fire ground safety burned for an were found to government officer training to prevent abnormal have ‘failed’ and with statutory future deaths in length of human errors of powers relation to time. There judgment put & tree-falls was a coronial firefighters in Coronial Inquest inquest into harm’s way into deaths of 2 the deaths of Risk to firefighters firefighters two recurs despite best firefighters efforts to normalize and manage it (continued)

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Table 3.1  (continued) Bushfire event

Review focus

Key findings

Inquiry

2015: Lancefield-­ Cobaw Fire

Planned burn escape, which gave rise to a significant bushfire that, caused significant damages and losses in the community

A planned burn that had been scheduled for a number of years was authorized. Weather was unseasonably warm and moisture deficits were high. There were also insufficient personnel resources to undertake the burn

Independent Investigation of the Lancefield Cobaw Fire October 2015 Type: Independent Inquiry appointed by the Victorian Government (Report of Recommendations to the Minister for Police & emergency Services)

2015–16: Wye River – Jamieson Track fire

Key recommendations

Inquiry recommended a shift from a target based approach to planned burning to a strategic focus whereby burning is planned in such a way that plans are made up to 5 years in advance, made available for community consultation and focus on areas that maximize the protection of life, property and assets Several days Flame coupled Inspector-­ Inquiry of severe fire with severe fire General for recommendations weather weather and the Emergency placed an emphasis meant that topography of the Management’s on fire agencies when a flame area became review of the reviewing their was ignited by enmeshed and 2015 Wye systems for lightning destroyed River-Jamieson recording the strikes a fire numerous homes Track fire allocation and that was and properties. Type: Inquiry by sharing of relatively Fire prediction government officer resources small in modeling with statutory Recommendations hectare terms (adopted after powers also required threatened Black Saturday) agencies to better holidaymakers meant that classify the severity during the agencies were able of different fire peak to evacuate entire incidents using Christmas areas, which meant maps season no lives were lost (continued)

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Table 3.1  (continued) Bushfire event

Review focus

Key findings

Inquiry

Key recommendations

2019–20: Victorian Fire Season (Black Summer)

A two phase inquiry by the Inspector General for Emergency Management (Victoria) which examines community and sector preparedness for the bushfire season (phase 1) as well as an examination of the recovery and relief arrangements (phase 2)

These bushfires were some of the most novel observed in Australia insofar as they started from lightning strikes at night time. The Victorian government adopted a new approach to reviewing these fires insofar as they began the review as the fires were still burning. The beginning of the bushfire season saw the issue of the first ‘Code Red Day’ in over 10 years

Inquiry into the 2019–20 Victorian Fire Season Type: Inquiry by government officer with statutory powers (Evaluation review and investigation report)

Improvements to be made in the following areas: Effectiveness of emergency management command and control and Victoria’s operational response Effectiveness of the declaration of a state of disaster Timeliness and effectiveness of activation of Commonwealth assistance and resource availability State evacuation planning and preparedness process and practices Preparedness ahead of the 2019–20 fire season Effectiveness of immediate relief and recovery work and arrangements, and the creation of Bushfire Recovery Victoria, the National Bushfire Recovery Agency and how they work together

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I have reviewed inquiries in this list and many of the findings and recommendation recur (see Table 5.1). While this does not suggest that there has been a lack of progress in the practice of emergency management, it does prompt questions around the shape and form of learning which occurs after significant fire events. By focusing on four significant bushfire events I have been able to offer some insights into learning and how it can be refined in the future. These revolve around moving towards more participatory forms of collective learning (see Chap. 5 for further details). 3.2.2  Data Analysis An interpretive approach was used to analyze whether the texts contained evidence of sensemaking and learning, and to explore the nature of these processes. Rereading the texts, and relating them to my understanding of sensemaking and learning from the literature, I was able to identify “themes, meanings and patterns in textual data” (cf. Gephart, 1997: 585; see also Shepherd & Williams, 2014), from which I then developed perspectives about sensemaking and learning in Victorian emergency management organizations. In the first instance, I examined the public inquiry reports for evidence that the bushfires were perceived to be novel, given my interest in how sensemaking and learning occur in response to novel conditions of dynamic complexity, where meanings are equivocal. Table 3.2 shows how perceptions of novelty were inferred from references in the inquiry reports to the bushfires as ‘unprecedented’, ‘previously unseen’, ‘catastrophic’, ‘new’, unforeseen’, ‘unchartered’ and ‘unknown’. By exploring the excerpts containing these terms, I was able to identify accounts that constructed the fires as novel, with their novelty rendering the meaning of technical and expert data, the relevance of warning ‘signs’, and the usefulness of existing plans and predictions equivocal  – uncertain, ambiguous and open to interpretation. The inquiry reports were then examined for evidence of sensemaking. Excerpts containing references to ‘understanding’, ‘listening’, ‘review’ and ‘deliberations’ were identified. I then explored these excerpts in more detail to see whether there was evidence that the process of receiving submissions, holding hearings, conducting deliberations and writing a report had served to make sense of the fires for those involved. The next stage of analysis was to look for evidence of learning. Building on the work of Argyris (1976), I differentiated between single-loop and

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Table 3.2  Illustration of codes and quotes for key themes Indicative codes

Quotes

Novelty References to a bushfire that was ‘unprecedented’, ‘previously unseen’, ‘catastrophic’, ‘new’, unforeseen’, ‘uncharted’, ‘unknown’ Analysis of excerpts from inquiry reports undertaken to discern whether and how the bushfire was constructed in relation to novelty

Report of Inquiry: 1939 Black Friday “There had been no fires to equal these in destructiveness or intensity in the history of settlement in this State, except perhaps the fires of 1851, which, too, came at summer culmination of a long drought” (Parliament of Victoria, 1939: 6) Report of Inquiry: 1983 Ash Wednesday “[T]heir extent and severity, especially in terms of the truly disastrous proportions reached on 16 February 1983, constituted an unmistakable peak in the disaster record of the State” (Parliament of Victoria, 1984: 12) Report of Inquiry: 2009 Black Saturday “Although the fires of January–February 2009 were catastrophic, they were not the first fires to gravely affect the State of Victoria. The outcome of these fires, however–especially the loss of life–surpassed that of past fires” (Parliament of Victoria, 2010: xvi) Report of the Inquiry: 2019 Black Summer bushfires “During the 2019–20 fire season Victoria faced its most challenging bushfire emergency since the devastating 2009 bushfires, with a geographic scale not seen since 1939. The significant human and property losses, and a range of consequential impacts, are still being experienced” (Parliament of Victoria, 2020: 5) (continued)

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Table 3.2 (continued) Indicative codes

Quotes

Sensemaking References to the bushfire that referred to ‘understanding’, ‘listening’, ‘review’, ‘deliberations’ Analysis of excerpts from inquiry reports undertaken to discern evidence of sensemaking

Report of Inquiry: 1939 Black Friday “To enable a report of full effect to be made, it would be necessary to inquire into and resolve the preliminary problem of the co-ordination of control of forest lands by, and recognition and preservation of the rights of, the various persons and departments whose interests are rooted in the soil of the forests; to inquire into the constitution and administration of some of these departments” (Parliament of Victoria, 1939: 7) Report of Inquiry: 1983 Ash Wednesday “The aim of this report therefore is to consider factors relevant to the bushfires which occurred in Victoria during the 1982/83 season, particularly those of 16 February 1983, and to make any necessary recommendation for countering disaster situations in the future” (Parliament of Victoria, 1984: 4) Report of Inquiry: 2009 Black Saturday “As commissioners, we concentrated on gaining an understanding of precisely what took place and how the risks of such a tragedy recurring might be reduced” (Parliament of Victoria, 2010: vii) Report of the Inquiry: 2019 Black Summer bushfires “There are two critical elements to bushfire risk in Victoria. The first is to understand it. Bushfire remains the principal risk to life, property and community infrastructure. This is well understood by the State and significant resources are devoted on an ongoing basis to mitigating against, preparing for, responding to and recovering from bushfires” (Parliament of Victoria, 2020: 24) (continued)

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Table 3.2 (continued) Indicative codes

Quotes

Single-loop learning References to ‘learning/lessons’, ‘mistake’, ‘experience’ Analysis of excerpts from inquiry reports undertaken to discern evidence of single-loop learning in the form of explanations of what happened and why

Report of Inquiry: 1939 Black Friday “Except that the summer of 1938–39 was unusually dry and that it followed what already had been a period of drought, the causes of the 1939 bushfires were no different from those of any other summer. There were, as there always have been, immediate and remote causes. The major, over-riding cause, which comprises all others, is the indifference with which fires, as a menace to the interests of us all, have been regarded …” (Parliament of Victoria, 1939: 11) Report of Inquiry: 1983 Ash Wednesday “It was clear, therefore, that in spite of experience of past bushfires and the lessons learned from them, the events of the 1982/83 season needed careful analysis and evaluation” (Parliament of Victoria, 1984: 2) Report of Inquiry: 2009 Black Saturday “The resultant evidence is the most comprehensive ever assembled about the circumstances of deaths in an Australian bushfire. It thus offers an unprecedented opportunity for analysis. Looking back on the experience of 7 February, it is plain that on such days, when bushfires are likely to be ferocious, leaving well before the fire arrives is the only way of ensuring one’s safety” (Parliament of Victoria, 2009: 334) Report of the Inquiry: 2019 Black Summer bushfires “I (Inspector General for Emergency Management) am satisfied that the evidence available to the Inquiry was sufficient to enable the identification of those areas of preparedness and response in greatest need of improvement” (Parliament of Victoria, 2020: 5) (continued)

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Table 3.2 (continued) Indicative codes

Quotes

Double-loop learning References to ‘learning’, ‘continuous learning’, lessons learned’, ‘re-evaluate’, ‘review’, ‘fundamental’, ‘change’, ‘system’ Analysis of excerpts from inquiry reports undertaken to discern evidence of double-loop learning in the form of recommendations for fundamental change in bushfire management systems Analysis of excerpts from subsequent texts undertaken to discern accounts of change and views that learning occurred

Publicly available interview: 1939 Black Friday “Fire-fighters are now trained to know when to retreat or leave, and they have the right back–up and support. None of those systems were in place then” (Steve Bracks, past Premier of Victoria) Publicly available interview: 1983 Ash Wednesday “As a nation, did we learn from the experience? Of course we did. But that was never going to be enough. [I]t is the work of our bushfire scientists over the last two decades … that has made the greatest contribution to saving lives and property” Gary Morgan, past Chief Executive of the Bushfire Co-operative Research Centre (Bushfire CRC) Publicly available interview: 2009 Black Saturday “The 2009 bushfires were subject to an exhaustive Royal Commission of Inquiry. That led to a series of fundamental changes, many of which are largely invisible to the public eye. But they are fundamental” (Craig Lapsley, past Emergency Management Commissioner) Report of the Inquiry: 2019 Black Summer bushfires “Recently, there has been a shift to an ‘all communities, all emergencies’ approach but there remains a strong focus on fire throughout many of the operational procedures and governance arrangements which reflects the primacy of bushfire risk to the Victorian community” (Parliament of Victoria, 2020: 65) (continued)

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Table 3.2 (continued) Indicative codes

Quotes

Learning cues Analysis of accounts from subsequent texts referring back to recommendations in inquiry reports to explain, justify or initiate changes in organizational practices

Publicly available interview: 1939 Black Friday “[I]t was a turning point in terms of structure and arrangement for fire prevention and fire suppression because when you look at the model [which included a state fire authority, planned burning and clearer responsibilities] which was proposed as a result of the 1939 Royal Commission …” (Russell Rees, past Country Fire Authority (CFA) Chief Officer) Weblog: 1983 Ash Wednesday “The 1983 Ash Wednesday bushfires also provided a range of experiences to build upon. The suddenness, the velocity and the deadliness of those fires added considerable urgency as far as our need to know more about a range of variables such as fire behaviour and fire weather [referring to the need to model fire behaviour]. We needed better guidelines on how to manage the land for both bushfire protection and for its conservation value [referring to formalizing the management of major emergencies]” (Gary Morgan, past Chief Executive of the Bushfire CRC) Publicly available interview: 2009 Black Saturday “The primacy of human life is more obviously at the forefront of all of our activities. That is why the advice to leave a high bushfire area well in advance of a bushfire threat is so prominent in our communications. It is the safest option. Likewise, information and advice to the public is delivered in an integrated and varied way. The advice is as timely and relevant as it can be. The means of delivering this are improving all the time [referring to the need for a review of the ‘Stay or Go’ policy]” (Craig Lapsley, past Emergency Management Commissioner) Report of the Inquiry: 2019 Black Summer bushfires “Many submissions from individuals and groups made suggestions or recommendations for improvements in the sector and specific emergency management organizations. These recommendations were considered in line with the Terms of Reference and helped provide important insights into what communities want to see done differently in the future” (Parliament of Victoria, 2020: 49)

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double-loop learning. Argyris argues that single-loop learning occurs through error correction, without altering the underlying governing values of the system and/or organization. Double-loop learning occurs when errors are corrected through more fundamental organizational changes. Single-loop learning produces change within the existing organizational culture, while double-loop learning leads organizations to re-evaluate governing values and, potentially, make more fundamental changes to culture and practices. I therefore conceptualized ‘single-loop’ learning in the bushfire inquiries in terms of explanations of what had happened and why. In other words, single-loop learning captured the key events and narrative of the fires. I identified and explored excerpts in the inquiry reports containing terms like ‘learning’, ‘lessons’, ‘mistake’ and ‘experience’ for evidence of such explanations. I conceptualized ‘double-loop’ learning in terms of recommendations for more fundamental change. I therefore examined excerpts in inquiry reports containing references to ‘learning’, ‘continuous learning’, ‘lessons learned’, ‘re-evaluate’, ‘review’, ‘fundamental’, ‘change’ and ‘system’ to identify and explore recommendations for fundamental change. I also identified double-loop learning that extended beyond the inquiries in the form of subsequent changes within emergency management organizations. In other words, double-loop learning occurs when practices, processes and organizations are transformed as a result of the public inquiries’ findings and recommendations. To identify double-loop learning, I examined texts produced after the inquiries to see if they provided accounts of fundamental changes made after the inquiry, and to identify independent views from experts, firefighters, journalists and politicians as to whether such learning had taken place. Finally, I explored the link between inquiry recommendations and subsequent changes to organizational practices. I analyzed excerpts from inquiry reports detailing recommendations for fundamental change, and compared them to accounts in subsequent texts detailing how these recommendations were implemented through changes to organizational practices. In this way, I identified what I refer to as ‘learning cues’ in the inquiry reports, as texts produced after the inquiry referred back to particular recommendations in order to explain, justify or introduce changes in organizational practices.

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3.3   Conclusion This chapter has presented the methods and methodology used to understand the way that public inquiries embark on sensemaking in relation to bushfires. Chapter 4 presents the findings from my study, which suggests that sensemaking from public inquiries can give rise to learning in emergency management organizations after disastrous bushfires. My findings show how the novelty and equivocality associated with bushfires extends into the organizational environment as organizational actors seek to interpret public inquiry recommendations through ongoing sensemaking and sensegiving activities. As the level of novelty and equivocality diminished, sensemaking was replaced by learning as the recommendations were implemented within emergency management organizations. Chapter 4 provides the basis for reflection about how sensemaking and learning occur in organizations after experiencing a period of protracted equivocality following events such as bushfire. I show that while some learning does occur, there is a sense that it still falls short of being appropriate to ameliorate the likely effects of future fires. Accordingly, I suggest that public inquiries have created a learning vacuum insofar as they have created a situation that keeps government and society fixated on a series of issues that are in essence beyond resolution given Victoria’s landscape and risk profile.

References Argyris, C. (1976). Single loop and double loop models in research on decision-­ making. Administrative Science Quarterly, 21(3), 363–375. Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (1966). The social construction of knowledge: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge. Doubleday. Brown, A.  D. (2000). Making sense of inquiry sensemaking. Journal of Management Studies, 37(1), 45–75. Brown, A.  D., & Jones, M. (2000). Honourable members and dishonourable deeds: Sensemaking, impression management and legitimation in the ‘Arms to Iraq Affair’. Human Relations, 53(5), 655–689. Brown, A. D., Ainsworth, S., & Grant, D. (2012). The rhetoric of institutional change. Organization Studies, 33(3), 297–321. Brown, A.  D., Colville, I., & Pye, A. (2015). Making sense of sensemaking in organization studies. Organization Studies, 36(2), 265–277. Crotty, M. (1998). The foundations of social research: Meaning and perspective in the research process. Sage.

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Dwyer, G. (2021). Learning to learn from bushfire: Perspectives from Victorian emergency management practitioners. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 80(3), 602–612. Dwyer, G., & Hardy, C. (2016). We have not lived long enough: Sensemaking and learning from bushfire in Australia. Management Learning, 47(1), 45–64. Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building theories from case study research. Academy of Management Review, 14(4), 532–550. Eisenhardt, K.  M., & Graebner, M.  E. (2007). Theory building from cases: Opportunities and challenges. Academy of Management Journal, 50(1), 25–32. Gephart, R.  P. (1984). Making sense of organizationally based environmental disasters. Journal of Management, 10(2), 205–225. Gephart, R.  P. (1997). Hazardous measures: An interpretive textual analysis of quantitative sensemaking during crises. Journal of Organizational Behaviour, 18(1), 583–622. Gephart, R. P. (2004a). Normal Risk: Technology, Sensemaking, and Environmental Disasters. Industrial Crisis Quarterly, 17(1), 20–26. Gephart, R. P. (2004b). Qualitative research and the Academy of Management Journal. Academy of Management Journal, 47(4), 454–462. Gephart, R. P., Steier, L., & Lawrence, T. (1990). Cultural rationalities in crisis sensemaking: A study of a public inquiry into a major industrial accident. Industrial Crisis Quarterly, 4(1), 27–48. Hussey, J., & Hussey, R. (1997). Business research: A practical guide for undergraduate and postgraduate research. Palgrave. Parliament of Victoria. (1939). Report of the royal commission to inquire into the causes of and measures taken to prevent the bush fires of January, 1939, and to protect life and property, and the measures taken to prevent bush fires in Victoria and protect life and property in the event of future bush fires 1939, Parliamentary paper (Victoria. Parliament); T. Rider, Acting Government Printer, Melbourne. Parliament of Victoria. (1984). Report of the bushfire review committee: On bush fire disaster preparedness and response in Victoria, Australia, following the Ash Wednesday fires 16 February 1983. Melbourne Government Printer. Parliament of Victoria. (2009). Opening remarks, Chair of the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission. Retrieved from http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/96781/ 20100923-­0 223/www.royalcommission.vic.gov.au/getdoc/ee8eec7c-­ da6c-­4c97-­9ec8-­3553d705f102/Opening-­Remarks%2D%2D-­Chairman.pdf Parliament of Victoria. (2010). Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (2009). Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission final report. Summary report; Volume I— The fires and the fire-related deaths; Volume II—Fire preparation, response and recovery; Volume III—Establishment and operation of the commission; and Volume IV—The statements of lay witnesses). Ordered to be printed July 2010 by authority Government Printer for the State of Victoria. PP No. 332– Session 2006–10.

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Parliament of Victoria. (2020). Inquiry into the 2019–20 Victorian Fire Season Phase 1 report. The report into community and sector preparedness for and response to the 2019–20 fire season. IGEM, Authorised and published by the Victorian Government. Prasser, S. (1985). Public inquiries in Australia: An overview. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 44(1), 1–15. Shepherd, D. A., & Williams, T. A. (2014). Local venturing as compassion organizing in the aftermath of a natural disaster: The role of localness and community in reducing suffering. Journal of Management Studies, 51(6), 952–994. Tolhurst, K. (2020). We have already had countless bushfire inquiries. What good will it do to have another? https://theconversation.com/we-­have-­already-­ h a d -­c o u n t l e s s -­b u s h f i r e -­i n q u i r i e s -­w h a t -­g o o d -­w i l l -­i t -­d o -­t o -­h a v e -­ another-­129896 Yin, R. K. (1994). Case study research: Design and methods (2nd ed.). Sage.

CHAPTER 4

Sensemaking and Learning from Public Inquiries

Abstract  This chapter presents the findings of my analysis. I show how novelty gave rise to important sensemaking and learning cues which demonstrate the ways in which sensemaking and learning arose from public inquiries. This analysis provides the basis for a model that captures the way that sensemaking cues and learning cues give rise to change after significant disaster events generally and bushfires specifically. I conclude with an overview of the emotions that arise from the processes of sensemaking and learning and reflect on the ways in which they shape change initiatives. Keywords  Novelty • Sensemaking cues • Learning cues • Change This chapter shows how the inquiries that followed four of Australia’s worst bushfires – the Black Friday fires of 1939, the Ash Wednesday fires of 1983, the Black Saturday fires of 2009 and the Black Summer bushfires of 2019–20 – gave rise to sensemaking and learning. My findings suggest that the inquiries that followed each of these bushfire events constructed them as novel insofar as they were unique and/or unprecedented, justifying the need for sensemaking and learning through deliberative public inquiry processes. While my findings suggest that sensemaking and learning occurred during each of the four inquiries, I also find that different types of cues – which are signifiers of what has occurred, is occurring or will occur  – provided the basis for double-loop learning that extended © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 G. Dwyer, Making Sense of Natural Disasters, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94778-1_4

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beyond the inquiries and led to changes in organizational practices. These findings are important insofar as they suggest that both sensemaking and learning can be enhanced by holding a range of different types of public inquiries. While there has been considerable focus on public inquiries in public administration and political science literature, this has largely been in relation to the processes that underpin their sensemaking processes as part of deliberate democracy initiatives (Carson & Hartz-Karp, 2005; Hartz-Karp, 2005); we know far less about whether and how inquiries engender learning (Dwyer, 2021; Stark, 2019a, 2019b). I observe that across each of the four inquiries at the empirical core of this book, a range of recommendations continue to reoccur. I conclude this chapter with a general model of inquiries as they relate to the case study of Victoria, which has implications for the wider Australian context. While public inquiries do result in learning, they do so only in a retrospective way, based on present-day understandings. Accordingly, I suggest that the process and methods that underpin public reviews are of limited value to government, community and emergency management organizations in terms of learning for the future. This invites the question: How should we conduct reviews that enable emergency management practitioners to effectively plan for and respond to the bushfires of the future?

4.1   Findings 4.1.1  Equivocality and Sensemaking The analysis of the inquiry reports suggests that all four bushfires were interpreted as representing novel conditions, in turn giving rise to equivocality. The reports conveyed this novelty by drawing attention to unprecedented conditions before and during the major fires. In all four cases, inquiry reports constructed the fire as so overwhelming that individuals could not make sense of it at the time. Such was the unprecedented nature of all four fires that actors struggled to frame what was going on, recognize cues and bring their existing knowledge to bear on the situation. The speed of the fires was appalling. Balls of crackling fire sped at a great pace in advance of the fires, consuming with a roaring, explosive noise, all that they touched. Houses of brick were seen and heard to leap into a roar of flame before the fires had reached them. Some men of science hold the

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view that the fires generated and were preceded by inflammable gases, which became alight. (Parliament of Victoria, Report of Black Friday Inquiry, 1939: 5)

Inquiry reports argued that these fires were extreme and unprecedented, which meant that existing procedures and systems failed to contain the fires, allowing them to escalate significantly and detrimentally. Black Saturday wrote itself into Victoria’s history with record-breaking weather conditions and bushfires of a scale and ferocity that tested human endurance. (Parliament of Victoria, Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission Final Report Volume 1, 2010: v)

If equivocality had made it difficult for emergency services to respond adequately to the fires at the time, then sense needed to be made retrospectively, through the submissions, hearings and, ultimately, the inquiry report. [T]he 16 February, 1983, constituted an unmistakable peak in the disaster record of the State. It was clear, therefore, that in spite of experience of past bushfires and the lessons learned from them, the events of the 1982/83 season needed careful analysis and evaluation. To this end, in conjunction with other initiatives, the government decided to establish a Bushfire Review Committee. (Parliament of Victoria, Report of the Ash Wednesday Inquiry, 1984: 2)

The inquiries helped to make sense of the past – the apparent novelty of the bushfire meant that it could only be fully understood through a posthoc inquiry. However, this attempt at comprehension of past events was clearly made with a view to safeguarding the future. We have seen the pain people have endured and continue to bear and we know it will be a long road to full recovery for many. Bushfire is an intrinsic part of Victoria’s landscape, and if time dims our memory we risk repeating the mistakes of the past. We need to learn from the experiences of Black Saturday and improve the way we prepare for and respond to bushfires. (Parliament of Victoria, Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission Final Report Volume 1, 2010: v)

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In this way, the inquiry reports at least ostenstibly adopt a prospective outlook in relation to future learning. I am determined that this Royal Commission report is never allowed to gather dust. It is crucial that we grasp the opportunity now to make our State safer. I am equally determined that the path forward unites all Victorians in one commitment to do all we can to preserve human life in the face of the threat of bushfires. (Premier of Victoria, quoted in Department of Premier and Cabinet, 2010: para. 10)

In recent times, inquiry reports have recognized that bushfire is one learning focus among a range of different crisis, emergency and disaster events. Victoria also finds itself in a situation where the effects of a global pandemic are concurrently impacting fire-affected communities. The situation is further complicated by the longer-term and still-present consequences of drought. [T]he impacts of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic will be a key factor throughout Phase 2 of the Inquiry, which focuses on community recovery. Clearly, these compounding events will significantly affect community recovery and it will sometimes be difficult to discern between the relative impacts of each. Since Victoria’s emergency management reform process began after the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission and the subsequent Review of the 2010–11 Flood Warnings and Response, the State has endured several emergencies resulting in review or inquiry. These include but are not limited to the2014 Hazelwood Mine Fire, the 2015 Wye River/Jamieson Track Fire, and the 2016 Thunderstorm Asthma emergency. (Parliament of Victoria, 2020: 5)

4.1.2  Single-Loop and Double-Loop Learning In making sense of the bushfires, the inquiry reports provided accounts that indicated single-loop learning. These took the form of explanations of what had happened during each of the bushfires, and why it had happened. Except that the summer of 1938–39 was unusually dry and that it followed what had already been a period of drought, the causes of the 1939 bushfires have been immediate and remote causes. [I]t will appear that no one cause may properly be said to have been the sole cause. The major, over-riding cause, which comprises all others, is the indifference with which forest fires,

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as a menace to the interests of us all, have been regarded. (Parliament of Victoria, Report of the Black Friday Inquiry, 1939: 11)

There was also evidence of double-loop learning, as some inquiry recommendations identified a need to re-evaluate systems that had been considered adequate until the unprecedented nature of fires exposed their limitations. The inquiry reports suggested that preparing for and responding to future bushfires on the scale of those recently experienced would require new practices, new routines and, in some instances, new systems. [W]e need to learn the lessons so that problems can be avoided in the future. The Commission therefore examined the policies, systems and structures needed to ensure that government, fire and emergency services agencies and individuals make informed, effective decisions about their response to bushfires in a way that protects life and minimises loss. (Parliament of Victoria, Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission Summary Report, 2010: 4)

The inquiries were a first step, insofar as recommendations argued for fundamental changes in the system of bushfire management that would, in turn, require changes in the practices of specific organizations. A legacy for governments or a legacy for a fire leader I think will be to introduce these recommendations over time to avoid, as best we can, these sort of events that occurred on the seventh of February. (Jack Rush, Queens Counsel assisting the Black Saturday Inquiry, interviewed by Fyfe, 2010)

Double-loop learning extended beyond the inquiries, as changes were implemented in organizations responsible for bushfire management. For example, a Park Ranger who had witnessed the Ash Wednesday fires commented on changes that followed the public inquiry: Ash Wednesday had jolted firefighting services to re-examine how they tackled bushfire. From communications, to the way we transport people, to the way we use aircraft, dozers, the way we configure people across the landscape. It made us look hard at that. It made us look at how we configure our incident management teams, how we train people. (McAloon, 2008: para. 15–16)

Similarly, changes were announced following the Black Saturday Royal Commission, including: “reducing fuel load on public land while

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monitoring and carefully managing the ecological consequences of such action; maintaining strategic fire breaks to protect communities and their critical assets, such as water; limiting known fire-starting activities on days with a dangerous fire risk; and encouraging individuals living in unacceptably high bushfire risk areas to relocate to safer environments” (Victoria’s Emergency Services Minister quoted in Department of Premier and Cabinet, 2011: para. 10). More recently, the Black Summer Inquiry has noted the importance of changes developed over time that have made an important contribution to community safety. That said, the Black Summer fires showed that double-­ loop learning is an ongoing process. One of the most profound developments since the 2009 Victorian bushfires has been the extent to which Victorians now have access to critical information before and during emergencies. This is in large part the result of a deliberate program at state and national levels to improve the advice and warnings to communities under threat from bushfires and other emergencies. Innovations, such as the Vic Emergency App and the national Emergency Alert telephony system are examples of this. Other information sources have grown organically and been adopted and adapted by government and agencies, such as various social media. The use of informal sources of information, such as trusted local networks, adds another layer. (Parliament of Victoria, 2020: 26)

In tracing links between inquiry recommendations for fundamental changes and accounts of changes being implemented in organizations, I identified the importance of learning cues (Dwyer & Hardy, 2016). Learning cues are key fragments of information that serve as ‘stimuli that gain attention and engender action’ (cf. Colville et al., 2014: 217). They are not pre-determined or even pre-existing, but instead emerge, as actors draw on particular fragments of text, insights and experiences from inquiry recommendations to explain, justify and initiate subsequent changes in organizational practices. In this way, learning cues appear to help extend to the wider setting the double-loop learning that occurs during the inquiry, providing a basis for subsequent changes in organizational practices.

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4.1.3  Sensemaking and Learning from Bushfire Sensemaking and learning were a central feature of the four bushfire inquiries. In the case of Black Friday (1939), sensemaking constructed the bushfire as Australia’s worst natural disaster – a novel event, compounded by a chronic drought and a lack of accountability (Table 4.1). I interpreted the inquiry as engaging in single-loop learning by offering explanations as to why the fire occurred and escalated to such an unprecedented extent. These explanations included the lack of fire-related organizations with responsibility for managing risk in regional areas, an absence of forest management, and conflict among various organizations. Recommendations included the need for a state fire authority, new guidelines for planned burning, and clearer responsibilities for land and forest management. Proposals from the inquiry served as learning cues in that they were referred to in subsequent texts discussing changes in organizational Table 4.1  Summary of findings from Black Friday 1939 Novelty and equivocality

Sensemaking and single-loop learning

Learning cues

Double-loop learning and new organizational practices

Australia’s worst natural disaster

The fire occurred and escalated because no fire-related organizations had responsibility for managing risk in regional areas The fire occurred and escalated because there was an absence of forest management The fire occurred and escalated because of intra-­ organizational conflict

Recommendation for a State fire authority to educate citizens about the risk of fire in regional areas and to co-ordinate training of volunteer firefighters

The CFA comes into existence in 1945 to manage fire in regional areas on private land

Recommendation for new guidelines for planned burning off of growth to reduce fuel hazards

Planned burning is instituted as a fire management strategy

Recommendation for clearer responsibilities among land and forest managers

The 1939 Forests Act gives the Forest Commission complete control of fire management on public land in Victoria

Chronic drought

Absence of organizational accountability

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practices. These changes included the establishment of the Country Fire Authority (CFA), whose jurisdiction included fires on private land in regional areas, the institutionalization of planned burning and the introduction of the 1939 Forest Act, giving the existing Forest Commission complete control of fire management on public land. I interpreted these changes as double-loop learning insofar as they changed the assumptions around emergency management in Victoria in ways that continue to the present day. In the case of Ash Wednesday (1983), I again observed that sensemaking constructed the bushfires as novel – the worst natural disaster to date, owing to the early onset of summer and irregular fire behaviour (Table 4.2). Single-loop learning occurred as inquiry reports explained the damage caused by the fire in terms of conservative planning on the part of the community, the need for more effective responses from emergency management organizations, and the need for a better understanding of fire Table 4.2  Summary of findings from Ash Wednesday 1983 Novelty and equivocality

Australia’s worst natural disaster

Sensemaking and single-loop learning

The fire caused losses because the community had become conservative about planning for the risk of bushfire Early onset Fire losses and damages of summer may have been less if fire management organizations had been able to respond more effectively to the rapid onset of bushfires Irregular fire The fires highlighted a behaviour need for a better understanding of fire behaviour

Learning cues

Double-loop learning and new organizational practices

Recommendation for a new education programme to educate people about fire risk and bushfire preparedness

The ‘Stay and Defend or Go Early’ policy is adopted

Recommendation for new partnership arrangements between fire management organizations

The 1986 Emergency Management Act implements a formal partnership approach to managing major fires Fire modelling is instituted as a fire management strategy

Recommendation for formal modelling of fire typologies in different terrains to improve planning and preventative action against bushfire

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behaviour. Recommendations regarding new education programmes, new partnership arrangements and formal modelling of fire typologies served as learning cues in that they were referred to in subsequent texts discussing changes in organizational practices. These changes included a new ‘Stay or Go’ policy, which was an education programme to assist communities living in areas of high bushfire risk in their preparation for the fire season. Other changes involved new partnership arrangements and the institutionalization of fire modelling. I interpreted these changes as double-loop learning, as the ‘Stay or Go’ policy was developed collaboratively as a result of new partnership arrangements introduced through legislation. It remained the cornerstone of Victoria’s bushfire safety programme for more than 25 years, while the new fire management strategy became established practice. Inquiry sensemaking in the case of Black Saturday (2009) constructed these fires as the country’s worst natural disaster, resulting from a severe heatwave and an absence of leadership in the line of command-and-­control authority (Table 4.3). Single-loop learning explained the severity of the fire in terms of individuals lacking bushfire safety plans, the build-up of fuel, and a lack of clarity regarding the line of command-and-control authority. Recommendations regarding fire warnings, planned burn-offs and a review of the co-ordination of fire management organizations served as learning cues in that they were referred to in subsequent texts discussing changes in organizational practices. These changes included new forms of warning, defined burn-off targets, and legislation to establish a new position of Fire Services Commissioner (now the Emergency Management Commissioner). Again, I interpreted these changes as double-loop learning as they involved radical and/or transformative changes to existing policies and the organization of the overall fire management system, requiring a significant shift in culture, values and work practices. Inquiry sensemaking in the case of Black Summer 2019 showed that the fires were constructed as unprecedented and novel. They were generally attributable to climate change, and the fire behaviour was particularly erratic due to warmer-than-average temperatures and high moisture deficits. There was also general agreement that the fire season had occurred earlier than usual, with flame ignition first occurring in June 2019. In terms of single-loop learning, recommendations to date have focused on how land is managed and the way that communities prepare for fires. In terms of double-loop learning, it was recommended that the state shift away from a targeted number of hectares for planned burning, in favour of

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Table 4.3  Summary of findings from Black Saturday 2009 Novelty and equivocality Australia’s worst natural disaster

Sensemaking and single-loop learning

The actions of many people living in high fire danger areas on the day of 7 February 2009 showed that they did not have a robust bushfire safety plan Severe The fires were heatwave exacerbated by a build-up of fuel such as desiccated flora communities and vegetation growth There was an The severity of the absence of fires showed that authority, emergency leadership and management command and command-and-­ control control structures needed role clarification

Learning cues

Double-loop learning and new organizational practices

Recommendation for a review of the ‘Stay or Go’ policy and implementation of new technology to provide timely and relevant information to communities potentially at risk Recommendation for fire management organizations to burn a rolling target of 5 per cent minimum of public land

Warnings are now issued to correspond with potentially harmful fires on severe fire days

Recommendation for a review of how fire management organizations’ activities are coordinated and controlled

There is now a defined target of land that must be burned each year, with an appraisal of how this activity is contributing to mitigating bushfire risk The 2010 Fire Services Commissioner Act established a new Fire Services Commissioner whose role is to coordinate and oversee the activities of fire management organizations

a more strategic approach that would ameliorate the effects of severe bushfires in the future (Table 4.4). Sensemaking and learning were thus embodied in the deliberative processes of the four public inquiries. Single-loop learning in inquiry reports resulted in explanations of what happened and why, while evidence of double-loop learning was found in the form of recommendations for more fundamental changes. Learning cues in the recommendations appeared to gain attention and engender action insofar as they were referred to in relation to subsequent changes in the practices of organizations responsible for bushfire management.

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Table 4.4  Summary of findings from Black Summer Inquiry Part 1 Novelty and equivocality

Sensemaking and Learning cues single -loop learning

Double-loop learning and new organizational practices

Australia’s worst natural disaster

Based on prior evidence fire in the landscape should not be considered as surprising, yet many in the community were not prepared for the fire season

Recommendations to review existing operational and government arrangements to plan for and respond to bushfire events, which are becoming more unpredictable because of climate change Fires were Recommendation to problematic because undertake planned there were so many burning in a strategic that were ongoing manner rather than simultaneously emphasizing hectare across the state targets

Continue to build greater community awareness of the importance of working in active partnership with emergency management organizations

The severity of the fires shows that the community and emergency management organizations needed to find new ways to work together

A systematic review of land and fuel management in Victoria to plan more effectively for fires that will be more volatile in the future

Record high temperatures, coupled with lightning strikes across Victoria, started fires in November 2019 which lasted until the end of January 2020 Operational governance, community consultation and accountability

Recommendation to examine the ways in which the community and emergency management organizations work together

Planned burning continues to develop in a manner that incorporates local knowledge to ensure that risk is managed appropriately

The study thus suggested that sensemaking and learning occur during and after public inquiries, as events move from a natural disaster, through the public inquiry deliberations and report, to the aftermath of the inquiry. This resulted in a preliminary model (Fig. 4.1) which suggests that when a natural disaster such as a bushfire is seen as a novel and/or unprecedented event it will prompt equivocality for emergency management organizations  as they begin to understand and learn from their experiences.

G. DWYER

SENSEMAKING IS PROMTED BY PUBLIC INQUIRY

HIGH

HIGH NEGATIVE EMOTION IS REPLACED BY POSITIVE EMOTION

LOW

LOW

EQUIVOCALITY DECREASES AS SENSEMAKING INCREASES

RETROSPECTIVE SENSEMAKING

INDIVIDUALS BEGIN TO FOCUS ON THE FUTURE FIRES

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HIGH

HIGH SENSEMAKING INCREASES WITH CONCERN ABOUT FUTURE FIRES

LOW LOW

LOW

POSITIVE EMOTION IS REPLACED BY NEGATIVE EMOTION

PROSPECTIVE SENSMAKING

Fig. 4.1  Sensemaking and learning from public inquiries. (Adapted from Dwyer and Hardy (2016))

When significant damages and losses arise from such events, governments will usually commission a public inquiry, which is effectively charged with resolving this equivocality. Such inquiries give rise to single-­loop sensemaking and learning insofar as they produce a reconstructed (and arguably re-imagined) account of what occurred. These accounts provide learning cues that signify the basis for meaningful action. In making recommendations for organizational changes to ameliorate the effects of future disasters, they play an important role in assisting members of emergency management organizations to engage in sensemaking and double-loop learning. While the inquiries have resulted in learning, they have not been without controversy. In reviewing the transcripts of the inquiry reports it is clear that the inquiry process took an emotional toll on many of the emergency management practitioners involved. This perspective was reinforced by a review of publicly available commentaries, which seemed to portray emergency management practitioners as being at fault for what occurred. From the perspective of emergency management practitioners, negative emotion was present in the lead-up to the bushfire events, during the bushfires and in the immediate aftermath of the bushfires. Negative emotions were a recurring theme as emergency management practitioners

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sought to make sense of the bushfires as they burned out of control on the Victorian landscape, and then prepared to face a public inquiry into the bushfire events. However, this began to change as the focus of these emergency management practitioners transitioned to making sense of recommendations in their organizational context. Within the more mundane, normalized and settled environment of their everyday organizational life, emergency management practitioners were able to work under less challenging circumstances – albeit while coping with the occupational stressors of having lived through some of the most traumatic bushfire events in Victorian history. My analysis of blogs and reports from emergency management organizations surrounding the inquiries found that there was a change in mood and feeling over time. Positive emotions began to emerge as organizational actors began to reflect on the lessons learned from their experiences, which became a basis for implementing changes that they felt could ameliorate the effects of future bushfires. However, it was clear from reviewing the transcripts of cross-examinations from the public inquiries, as well as publicly available commentaries, that emergency management practitioners were deeply concerned about the prospect of future fires. In essence there is a complex and dynamic relationship between equivocality, emotions, sensemaking and learning over different time periods before, during and after the fires (see Table 4.5). It seems that sensemaking and learning surrounding bushfire is driven by ongoing emotionality and equivocality. There are several important insights generated from an analysis of the public inquiries that followed some of Victoria’s most novel and unprecedented bushfires. First, in each public inquiry, novelty was attributed to particular circumstances in the natural environment that accounted for these ‘novel’ and ‘unprecedented’ natural disasters, although all four inquiries clearly indicated that similar conditions could be expected to occur again in the future. According to inquiry reports, these novel conditions had taken emergency management practitioners by surprise. The resulting equivocality meant that individuals could not make sense of the environmental conditions at the time, leading to the need for a public inquiry to provide retrospective sensemaking in order to resolve the equivocality and manage future conditions more effectively. Second, sensemaking during the inquiry appears to have reduced the equivocality associated with novel bushfires by creating shared understandings and making it possible to construct plausible explanations of what happened and why. This sensemaking provided the basis for single-loop learning to

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Table 4.5  Emotions surrounding public inquiry sensemaking and learning Overview of emotions reported in publicly available interviews, media articles and weblogs by emergency management practitioners Leading up to the bushfires Anxiety and worry because Anxiety and worry because of the fire weather of the fire weather predictions prior to the predictions prior to the bushfire events; and bushfire events, and potential harm if fires are potential harm if ignited ignited During the bushfires Stress because the weather Stress when fires burned out conditions were generally of control and caused worse and more volatile significant losses and than predicted on each fire damages to property and life day Anxiety knowing that fires were occurring in highly populated communities

Anxiety because of the systems overload that was occurring

Stress as the fires on Black Saturday burned out of control

Stress as the fires burned out of control and the damages and losses became known

Anxiety and worry because of concerns surrounding the levels of community preparedness

Stress about the lack of available knowledge as fires burned out of control and when communication systems became overloaded and failed Stress when they realized they had no information to develop response strategies to manage the fires Stress about decisions they needed to make that might put fire crews at risk from the fires

The immediate aftermath Stress as government, the Stress as community outcry Sadness and guilt that more community and media and anger surfaced in the could not be done to prevent demanded facts and days after the fires the fires, loss of life and loss/ explanations about damage to homes occurrences during the most severe fires Sadness about the loss of Sadness as each day revealed Shock that bushfire could their colleagues’ lives to the further loss of life from the have such a devastating effect fires fires In anticipation of the Royal Commission/Public Inquiry Anxiety because they knew Stress in relation to the Worry that they might be they might be called before information demands of the called before the Royal a Royal Commission/Public Royal Commission/Public Commission/Public Inquiry Inquiry Inquiry to give evidence and be cross-examined (continued)

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Table 4.5 (continued) Overview of emotions reported in publicly available interviews, media articles and weblogs by emergency management practitioners During the Royal Commission/Public Inquiry Guilt that their colleagues Shock due to the unfairness were called before the Royal of the questions asked by Commission/Public lawyers representing the Inquiry and cross-examined Royal Commissioners/ in an unfair manner Officers in Charge of the Public Inquiry

Sadness that the Royal Commission/Public Inquiry was conducted in such an adversarial manner Anger about the ways lawyers vilified and blamed their colleagues for occurrences on Black Saturday

The Aftermath of the Royal Commission Anger in relation to the Anger that the Royal content and focus of some Commission’s/Public of the recommendations Inquiry’s report blamed senior managers for failures on the day of Black Saturday

Anger that the Royal Commissioners/Officers in Charge of the Public Inquiry made recommendations in their report of findings that showed that they did not understand bushfire suppression and response Anger as they continued to Sadness because the Royal Anger because they felt that reflect on the way that they Commission/Public Inquiry some of the findings of the and their colleagues were chose such an adversarial Royal Commission/Public treated during the Royal approach to cross-examining Inquiry did not represent Commission/Public witnesses during the Royal their recollection of Inquiry Commission/Public Inquiry occurrences on the day of the bushfire event Emergence of positive emotion Confidence because senior Confidence because of Trust because of changes to manager responsibilities changes made as a result of hierarchical structures that during high fire danger the recommendations, fostered closer working were made clear by which made reporting lines relationships between legislation enacted from the during bushfires clearer individuals Royal Commission’s and/or Public Inquiry’s recommendations (continued)

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Table 4.5 (continued) Overview of emotions reported in publicly available interviews, media articles and weblogs by emergency management practitioners Happiness knowing that an Emergency Management Commissioner assumes responsibility for coordinating response and suppression on days of high fire danger

Happiness knowing there is greater trust among colleagues as a result of the improved working relationships that arose from implementing the Royal Commission recommendations Trust because the Royal Happiness because the Commission/Public Royal Commission/Public Inquiry recommendations Inquiry recommendations enabled individuals to work prompted individuals to in a more transparent re-evaluate and improve the manner nature of their working relationships Return of negative emotions Reluctance to believe that Anger that the Royal the changes implemented Commission/Public Inquiry would actually make a missed the opportunity to difference if Victoria make ‘once in a generation’ experienced severe change to make bushfire firestorms education part of school curricula Anxiety as spaces and Anxiety as extreme weather situations continue to patterns during bushfire remind individuals of the season evoke memories of stressful events that extreme fire events and occurred on the day of the prompt a heightened sense bushfire event of urgency among individuals

Confidence because individuals experienced the benefits of positive change in their working lives

Happiness because the Royal Commission/Public Inquiry recommendations provided a basis for resolving known problems in an expedited manner

Worry that the community has become more passive as a result of the changes that arose from recommendations

Stress that some roles have more responsibility for making decisions that could impact on the community on high fire danger days

occur during the inquiry, as well as potential double-loop learning in the form of subsequent organizational changes. Third, as practitioners return to their organization after public inquiries conclude their business, a further iteration of sensemaking commences at the organizational level. However, from the analysis in this chapter, I observe that practitioners at the organizational level become concerned that the implementation of public inquiry recommendations may not be relevant in terms of ameliorating the effects of future fire events. Every bushfire event is ultimately different, and the recommendations from past inquiries may not give rise

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to practices that can enable emergency management practitioners to prepare for unknowns surrounding future events. Finally, the analysis in this chapter shows that, despite the span of decades between some public inquiries, the focus of the recommendations remained relatively stable, even though there is a consensus that bushfires are becoming much more complex. This raises questions about whether public inquiries have created a learning vacuum, limiting the degree to which emergency management organizations effectively prepare for future bushfires.

4.2   Conclusion This chapter has presented the findings of a study against the backdrop of Victoria’s bushfire history, which suggest that sensemaking from public inquiries can give rise to learning in emergency management organizations after disastrous bushfires. The study suggests that, for inquiries to lead to changes in organizational practices, double-loop learning must extend beyond the inquiry into everyday organizational life. It would appear that this process is facilitated by learning cues – stimuli that gain attention and engender action, signifying to others a need for a specific change, and allowing actors to move from a state of disorder about past events to a new order about future events (cf. Colville et  al., 2014)  – which, in turn, aid the introduction of changes in organizational practices, processes and procedures following the inquiry. However, my analysis indicates that many recommendations consistently recur, which may be hindering learning in emergency management organizations. This is important because it raises an important question: Have the modes and methods surrounding public inquiries created a learning vacuum, and if so, does this mean that a way of conducting public review processes is needed in relation to natural disasters in Victoria and beyond? I will explore the issues that sit at the core of this question in Chap. 5.

References Carson, L., & Hartz-Karp, J. (2005). Adapting and combining deliberative designs: Juries, polls and forums. In J. Gastil & P. Levine (Eds.), The deliberative democracy handbook: Strategies for effective civic engagement in the twenty first century. Jossey-Bass. Colville, I., Hennestad, B., & Thoner, K. (2014). Organizing, changing and learning: A sensemaking perspective on an ongoing ‘soap story’. Management Learning, 45(2), 216–234.

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Department of Premier and Cabinet. (2010, August 27). [Media release]: Government takes action on major bushfire reforms. Retrieved from http:// archive.premier.vic.gov.au/response-­to-­bushfire-­royal-­commission/11686-­ government-­takes-­action-­on-­major-­bushfire-­reforms-­.html Department of Premier and Cabinet. (2011, May 31). [Media release]: Bushfires implementation plan. Retrieved from http://www.premier.vic.gov.au/media-­ centre/media-­r eleases/1080-­b ushfires-­i mplementation-­p lan-­t abled-­i n-­ parliament.html Dwyer, G. (2021). Learning to learn from bushfire: Perspectives from Victorian emergency management practitioners. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 80(3), 602–612. Dwyer, G., & Hardy, C. (2016). We have not lived long enough: Sensemaking and learning from bushfire in Australia. Management Learning, 47(1), 45–64. Hartz-Karp, J. (2005). A case study in deliberative democracy: Dialogue with the city. Journal of Public Deliberation, 1(1), 1–15. McAloon, C. (2008, February 15). [Media article]: Ash Wednesday 25 years on – The lessons learnt. Retrieved from http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2008/02/14/2163089.htm Parliament of Victoria. (1939). Report of the royal commission to inquire into the causes of and measures taken to prevent the bush fires of January, 1939, and to protect life and property, and the measures taken to prevent bush fires in Victoria and protect life and property in the event of future bush fires 1939, Parliamentary paper (Victoria. Parliament); T. Rider, Acting Government Printer, Melbourne. Parliament of Victoria. (1984). Report of the bushfire review committee: On bush fire disaster preparedness and response in Victoria, Australia, following the Ash Wednesday fires 16 February 1983. Melbourne Government Printer. Parliament of Victoria. (2010). Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (2009). Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission final report. Summary report; Volume I— The fires and the fire-related deaths; Volume II—Fire preparation, response and recovery; Volume III—Establishment and operation of the commission; and Volume IV—The statements of lay witnesses). Ordered to be printed July 2010 by authority Government Printer for the State of Victoria. PP No. 332– Session 2006–10. Parliament of Victoria (2020). Inquiry into the 2019–20 Victorian Fire Season Phase 1 report. The report into community and sector preparedness for and response to the 2019–20 fire season. IGEM. Authorised and published by the Victorian Government. Stark, A. (2019a). Public inquiries, policy learning, and the threat of future crises. Oxford University Press. Stark, A. (2019b). Policy learning and the public inquiry. Policy Sciences, 52(3), 397–417.

CHAPTER 5

Discussion and Conclusions

Abstract  This chapter presents a discussion and draws conclusions from Chap. 4. I reflect on the demands and burdens that public inquiries place on emergency management practitioners before I bring attention to the fact that recommendations from public inquiries are recurring. Accordingly, I suggest that learning occurs within a vacuum created by public inquiries after significant bushfire events. Given that significant and damaging bushfire events are occurring more regularly, and public inquiries have been shown to place emotional burdens on emergency management practitioners, I reflect on whether it is timely to change the way that we make sense of and learn from significant bushfire events. Keywords  Bushfire history • Recurring recommendations • Post-­ inquiry sensemaking Significant and damaging fire events occur regularly in Victoria. In this book I have examined four inquiries into Australia’s worst bushfire disasters, and it seems inevitable that we will see more events of similar severity. Indeed, climatologists continue to claim that these significant mega-fires or fire storms can no longer be considered once-in-a-generation events (Leonard & Howitt, 2010). Today’s climate conditions increase the likelihood that we will experience major bushfires and other natural disasters more frequently. This suggests that emergency management organizations © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 G. Dwyer, Making Sense of Natural Disasters, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94778-1_5

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will continue to find themselves seeking to make sense of and learn from unprecedented events that will likely have only a partial resemblance to what has happened before (Flannery, 2013). It seems that emergency management organizations will therefore need to become more adept at prospective sensemaking as they seek to ameliorate the harmful effects of natural hazards and disasters in the future. This book has examined how emergency management organizations make sense of and learn from public inquiries that occur after major bushfires. Whether public inquiries have meaningful benefits for these organizations and society more generally has been a subject of debate. Accordingly, I have sought to understand how emergency management organizations make sense of public inquiries and whether they give rise to learning and organizational change. Two areas of interest guided the focus of this book. My first area of interest is: How does sensemaking occur in emergency management organizations that deal with disasters after the findings from public inquiries have been published and, in particular, does it give rise to learning? In answering this question, I show how equivocality arising from the Royal Commission’s recommendations prompted sensemaking and sensegiving between individuals in the affected emergency organizations. The recommendations also gave rise to sensemaking and learning cues, which were important mechanisms in helping these individuals to collectively make meaning of the recommendations before using them as the basis for organizational learning. Public inquiry sensemaking creates a shared meaning of sorts, from which learning cues enable groups to notice and frame different organizational processes for change. This shows that public inquiries are as much a socially constructed phenomenon as they are an objective, authoritative vehicle for public review processes. Accordingly, we must be mindful that public inquiry reports can only present one version of what happened during an event such as a bushfire, and they are very much a product of authorial strategies of omission (Brown, 2004). The second focus of this book is: What are the emotions that shape sensemaking in emergency management organizations after the findings from public inquiries have been published and do they influence learning? Answering this question is complex. Publicly available commentaries and evidential transcripts from public inquiry hearings show that emergency management practitioners can experience stress and anxiety long before any flame ignites on the landscape. This stress becomes more

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intense as fires begin to take hold. Emergency management practitioners also seem to carry stress and anxiety into public review processes as their decision-making and actions are closely scrutinized. Such emotions continue, and even turn to anger as the practitioners and their organizations are blamed for events surrounding the fires and the associated damages and losses. Public inquiries that occur after significant bushfires are surrounded by sensemaking, learning and the emotions generated from these social processes. What is the outcome from these social processes? In this chapter, I bring such processes together in two complementary models (see Figs. 4.1 and 5.1). I use these models as the basis for showing how sensemaking gives rise to learning and learning gives rise to sensemaking. I then reflect on the practical implications of this work, where I aim to provide a basis for governments to closely consider their reasoning before appointing a Royal Commission after a significant natural disaster. My hope is that this study can contribute to the development of a review process that is better aligned to and focused on learning for future bushfires, rather than anchoring our focus on blaming, vilifying or scapegoating the individuals whose skills are so critical to preparing for the equivocal challenges that will likely arise with the bushfires of the future. In Victoria as well as Australia in general, bushfire history with its reminders of loss and tragedy has a tendency to repeat itself, often in novel and unprecedented ways. The need to continue to make sense of and learn from bushfires is as relevant now as it has ever been. Indeed, it may be of even greater importance in a globally warmed future. With such challenges come promising avenues for future research and practice change. The final part of this chapter reflects on some proposed areas for future research and practice change. It is my hope that this study will provide the basis for research that will challenge some of the assumptions at the core of sensemaking and learning and help emergency management practitioners move beyond the inertia surrounding public inquiry recommendations. Such inertia creates a learning vacuum that stifles the possibility of double-loop learning. Finally, I conclude with my personal reflections on how my work experience, coupled with my research, has shaped my notion of engaged scholarship. This raises questions about how to create a meaningful praxis of knowledge transfer between theory and practice (Bansal et al., 2012). While my engaged scholarship journey so far has sought to extend organizational theory based on practitioner experience, the next stage in the journey is to

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extend practice, based on newly developed theory and practice around the ways in which public review processes are conducted. Scholars have suggested that building theory from practice and practice from theory is a somewhat fraught exercise (McKelvey, 2006). However, the benefits of seeking to create change based on practice informing theory may prompt the development of a more dynamic model for conducting the public inquiries of the future. This is important when we know from almost 82 years of learning from bushfires in Victoria that public inquiry recommendations will revolve around the five key areas outlined in Table 5.1. Despite advances in technology and innovation that have enabled emergency management organizations to plan for and respond to bushfires more effectively, the deliberations of Victoria’s public inquiries have broadly centred on the same issues despite the mode and method of the review process. Their focus has primarily been on perceived failures surrounding the policies, processes, procedures and initiatives relating to these five recurring themes. This seems to keep practitioners frozen in a paralysis where they continue to make retrospective sense when they need to focus on the future. For all the money, time, energy and political attention that has been devoted to public inquiries, there has been little progress in supporting emergency management practitioners to achieve a more prospective focus. This is captured in my model of post-inquiry sensemaking. Table 5.1  Recurring focus of Victorian bushfire inquiries Victoria’s bushfire safety policy

Each of the public inquiries claimed that Victoria’s bushfire safety policy either failed or was less than effective as a mechanism for preventing and/or ameliorating the severity of the bushfires Leadership Each of the public inquiries claimed leadership either failed or was less than effective as a mechanism for preventing and/or ameliorating the severity of the bushfires Interagency Each of the public inquiries claimed that interagency collaboration/ collaboration/partnerships failed or were less than effective as a partnerships mechanism for preventing and/or ameliorating the severity of the bushfires Community warnings Each of the public inquiries claimed that community warnings and and information information failed or were less than effective as a mechanism for preventing and/or ameliorating the severity of the bushfires Land and fuel Each of the public inquiries claimed that land and fuel management management failed or was less than effective as a mechanism for preventing and/or ameliorating the severity of the bushfires

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5.1   Models of Post-Inquiry Sensemaking My findings allow me to propose two models which capture the essence of sensemaking, learning and emotion in organizations after public inquiries have concluded their work. Figure 4.1 shows that the release of an inquiry’s findings, in this case the Royal Commission’s recommendations, gives rise to equivocality, which is a basis for sensemaking and learning. This equivocality prompts processes of sensemaking among these groups across and between emergency management organizations. My model suggests that sensemaking activities are initially high, as individuals draw on sensemaking cues to interpret the equivocality surrounding the recommendations. Figure  5.1 shows how the emotions shape the sensemaking and learning process. Negative emotions appear to be high as individuals struggle with equivocality, while organizational learning is low because insufficient sense has been made of the recommendations to allow individuals to conceptualize and implement the necessary organizational changes. Single loop learning and sensemaking

NATURAL DISASTER

PUBLIC INQUIRY DELIBERATIONS

SENSEMAKING

Double loop learning and sensemaking

RECOMMENDATIONS

NEW PRACTICES

SENSEMAKING

SENSEMAKING

SENSEMAKING

SENSEMAKING

Public inquiry: evidence is heard; deliberaons are made; report is wrien; recommendaons are made SENSEMAKING

SENSEMAKING

Organizaon: recommendaons reviewed by praconers and applied in their organizaons SENSEMAKING

NOVELTY

SENSEMAKING LEARNING

SINGLE LOOP LEARNING

SENSEMAKING

LEARNING CUES

SENSEMAKING

LEARNING FOR THE FUTURE

EVENT IS TRIGGERED

SENSEMAKING

Transions to

DOUBLE LOOP LEARNING

Fig. 5.1  Sensemaking and learning in emergency management organizations

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Over time, as sensemaking reduces equivocality, individuals draw on learning cues that provide the basis for double-loop learning, which results in successful organizational changes. However, with further reflective learning, and as individuals begin to consider the likelihood of future disasters, equivocality begins to re-emerge – previous learning is seen as inadequate and further sensemaking is deemed necessary – and organizations become concerned about whether the changes they have made will ameliorate the harmful effects of the bushfires likely to occur in the future. Figures 4.1 and 5.1 stress the importance of understanding how individuals within emergency management organizations make sense of public inquiry recommendations, and show the way in which sensemaking provides the basis for learning. They also propose that individuals experience different emotional states as they make sense and learn. Accordingly, I propose that emotions play an important role in sensemaking and learning retrospectively and prospectively, as individuals in emergency management organizations start to reflect on what the future might hold. Recent studies are beginning to show that emotions, while not always positive, can prompt sensemaking (Dwyer et al., 2021b), which enables emergency management practitioners to reinterpret public inquiry recommendations in such a way that they can be used as a basis for learning and preparation for future fires.

5.2   Reflections In the following sections, I reflect on the ways in which sensemaking and equivocality from major events such as a bushfire give rise to sensemaking and learning during and after public inquiries, and the ways in which these processes are shaped by emotions. 5.2.1  Sensemaking and Equivocality Sensemaking is known to play an important role in the way that individuals and organizations interpret equivocality (Gephart, 1984; Weick, 1993; Maitlis, 2005; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015). Indeed, scholars generally agree that sensemaking “emerges from efforts to create order” because of the ongoing equivocality that seems to suffuse organizational life, in both

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sensible and more noticeably in non-sensible environments, such as disasters (Weick, 1993: 16; Colville et al., 2013a, b). Such scenarios have been the subject of considerable research, where scholars have shown that individuals find it difficult to make sense and act upon equivocality during (and sometimes leading up to) disasters, for example the 1949 Mann Gulch Fire (Weick, 1993), the 1966 Aberfan Mine Collapse (Turner, 1976), the 1984 Bhopal Gas Explosion (Weick, 1988), the 2003 Shuttle Colombia Explosion (Vaughan, 2006) and the 2009 Black Saturday Bushfires (Dwyer, 2021c). In each of these studies, discrepant cues inhibited individuals’ ability to make meaningful sense of what was happening around them. There is a well-developed body of knowledge on how sensemaking occurs during disasters where equivocality is particularly high (e.g. Colville et al., 2012; Cornelissen, 2012). Similarly, numerous studies have examined the way in which public inquiries make retrospective sense of disasters by constructing a report of findings and recommendations that are generally perceived as authoritative, even though they have been shown to be artefacts of selection and authorial strategies to present one version of the truth (Dwyer, 2021a; Brown, 2000, 2004; Boudes & Laroche, 2009; Gephart et al., 1990). Given that sensemaking has been shown to arise both during disasters and during subsequent public inquiries, it seemed likely that sensemaking would play an important role in organizations afterward, as individuals seek to interpret what public inquiry recommendations mean for their future preparation for disasters. There are, however, fewer studies of how individuals make sense of inquiry findings and recommendations, despite some evidence suggesting that the authoritative nature of such reports means that they do prompt action, learning and change (Dwyer & Hardy, 2016). It is important to understand this latter part of the process insofar as scholars have repeatedly spoken of the future as being one where unprecedented events will arise on a recurring basis (Colville et al., 2013b) and that such events will owe little to what has occurred before (Farjoun, 2010). Studies to date characterize public inquiry reports as authoritative, insofar as they are artefacts from public inquiries with prescriptive intent and a statutory basis (e.g. Brown, 2000, 2004; Prasser, 2006). While my study shows that recommendations were authoritative insofar as emergency management organizations were required to make changes to the safety policy, the full meaning of the recommendations in terms of organizational change only became clear over time, through multiple iterations

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of sensemaking and sensegiving. Recommendations were a considerable source of equivocality. Senior managers and functional experts were concerned that they oversimplified complex issues around issuing warnings to the community on days of high fire danger. For emergency management practitioners at different levels in the organization, equivocality arose as they sought to mediate different interpretations of recommendations across hierarchical boundaries. None of the groups had a clear understanding of the specific implications of recommendations for work arrangements. Accordingly, my model challenges the taken-for-granted assumption that public inquiry recommendations are authoritative, and provides insights into the way in which they are re-interpreted within organizations through sensemaking and learning. While existing studies of sensemaking suggest that change arises as a result of actions and reactions in response to equivocality in present-day circumstances, my study suggests a deeper level of complexity. Organizations, individuals and groups are dealing with multiple sources of equivocality – not just from the report of an inquiry, but also from past events  – which collectively shape the sense that is made. For example, when each of the groups was making sense of recommendations, individuals often made references to difficult experiences from past bushfire events such as Ash Wednesday and Black Saturday, procedural injustices during the Black Saturday Royal Commission and other emergency management public inquiries, and the impact of climate change on the Black Summer bushfires. Accordingly, my study broadens the notion of equivocality as a multifaceted prompter of sensemaking, as multiple disasters and inquiries that occurred at different times and in different spaces shape, inform and influence the way in which emergency management organizations make and give sense to each other. 5.2.2  Sensemaking and Learning The relationship between sensemaking and learning has recently received considerable attention, with scholars suggesting that there is significant scope for achieving a greater understanding of the relationship between the concepts (Colville et al., 2013a). Given the heavily ritualized and often political nature of public inquiries, some researchers have suggested that they inhibit learning (e.g. Tolhurst, 2019, 2020; Buchanan, 2011). Nonetheless, the authoritative nature of public inquiries means that they are expected to somehow result in organizational learning, and some

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scholars have demonstrated that public inquiries into disasters do prompt change (e.g. Bowman & Kunreuther, 1988). For emergency management organizations to act on a public inquiry’s recommendations, both sensemaking and learning must occur. My study finds that public inquiries reduce equivocality through single-loop learning by constructing an authoritative narrative around a novel event; this provides a basis to create shared understandings, making it possible to construct a plausible basis for action. For inquiries to lead to changes in organizational practices, double-loop learning must extend beyond the inquiry. Double-loop learning is facilitated by learning cues – stimuli that gain attention after equivocality has been interpreted from past events – which facilitate movement to a new order about future events which, in turn, aids the introduction of changes in organizational practices following an inquiry. Therefore, public inquiry sensemaking provides a basis for single-loop learning to occur during the inquiry, as well as double-loop learning in the form of more fundamental organizational changes. However, for the latter to occur, sensemaking and learning must continue beyond the inquiry, and take place in the organizations concerned. This analysis facilitates a deeper understanding in relation to sensemaking and learning in two ways. First, it extends our insight into the interplay between sensemaking and learning in organizations after public inquiries have concluded their work. Sensemaking gives rise to learning and learning gives rise to sensemaking, as individuals seek to create meaning in relation to public inquiry recommendations. In essence, there is a circular logic which on one hand provides the basis for change as sensemaking gives rise to learning but on the other hand prevents it as learning gives rise to more sensemaking. Accordingly, my study challenges the proposals of scholars who suggest that sensemaking and learning are in tension with each other, such as Schwandt (2005), who suggests that sensemaking may preclude more fundamental learning because individuals interpret equivocal cues to align with current knowledge, whereas my study suggests that more fundamental double-loop learning can occur. However, the relationship is complex, and the double-loop learning that does occur seems to continue to be in the areas identified in Table  5.1. This appears a little simplistic in times where bushfires are becoming more complex and prolonged. Second, while studies to date have acknowledged the prominent role that sensemaking and learning cues play in meaning-making processes (e.g. Maitlis, 2005; Weick et  al., 2005; Colville et  al., 2014; Dwyer &

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Hardy, 2016), there is scope for extending our knowledge in terms of what constitutes these cues and how they facilitate learning. Sensemaking cues come from multiple sources: not just the inquiry’s report, but also individual and shared experiences of participating in the inquiry, and the shared process of sensemaking in the organization following the inquiry. Learning cues are also broader than textual fragments from inquiry reports. They constitute the experiences, text and talk that get noticed, bracketed and framed after the equivocality from recommendations has been interpreted from sensemaking cues, and they provide a basis for collective action. For example, my study observed that learning cues were used to identify how different organizational processes could be improved in relation to the practice of emergency management. It seems that once emergency management practitioners had interpreted the equivocality surrounding public inquiry recommendations, they were able to reflect on their experience in a manner that enabled them to use their tacit knowledge of organizational processes to implement change in a much more meaningful way. Accordingly, my study further enhances our understanding of the relationship between sensemaking and learning. While it has been suggested that learning cues help extend double-loop learning from public inquiries to the wider organizational context (Dwyer & Hardy, 2016), we know little about how this occurs. Figure 5.1 suggests that learning cues engender double-loop learning by enabling groups to assimilate lessons from disasters and related public inquiries as a result of sensemaking. Learning cues enable groups of organizational actors to identify and implement new practices that they hope will ameliorate the effects of future disasters. Individuals and groups will often have concerns about the focus and intent of public inquiry recommendations, and learning cues enable them to transcend such concerns and use such recommendations to prepare for the disasters of the future. Learning cues are also important because my analysis suggests that public inquiries in Victoria have entrapped emergency management organizations in a change vacuum, centred on practice areas (see Table 5.1) that are not serving them to plan for and respond to future fires. My analysis shows that learning cues may have a dimension that helps to expedite change after disasters, as individuals seek to ensure that valuable lessons to improve their organization are not lost to harmful cultures of entrapment which can give rise to learning vacuums. A culture of entrapment is a series of processes which hinders learning whereby “people get locked into lines of action, subsequently justify those lines of action, and

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search for confirmation that they are doing what they should be doing. When people are caught up in this sequence, they overlook important cues that things are not as they think they are” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2003: 73). Cultures of entrapment perpetuate practices that are known to be problematic for the organization (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2003). Ultimately, it seems that learning cues (like sensemaking cues) provide an important basis for action in organizations after periods of protracted equivocality that inevitably arise after disasters. For example, Fig.  5.1 shows that learning cues are likely to become more meaningful as groups collectively make sense of public inquiry recommendations and frame the processes they seek to change. However, to date these have been largely limited to developing new lessons surrounding core competencies in emergency management organizations. Accordingly, I propose that while learning cues are an important mechanism for enabling individuals and groups to share perspectives across emergency management organizational boundaries, they must also be considered more broadly by the stakeholders and organizations that comprise civil society. Recent experiences surrounding the Black Summer bushfires of 2019–20 and Black Saturday bushfires of 2009 bring attention to the need to identify lessons learned around the ways that land is used and developed, as well as the recovery efforts that must occur in fire-affected communities after fires have been suppressed. In the case of the Black Saturday bushfires, the loss of critical infrastructure, homes, businesses and community assets, coupled with personal grief and post-traumatic stress in communities ten years on, provides compelling evidence for developing recommendations that seek to facilitate ongoing support to affected communities after significant bushfire events (Gibbs et al., 2021). Therefore, it is important that learning cues are expanded as part of any future public inquiry processes to ensure that there is collective action among relevant stakeholders in terms of planning, preparedness, response and recovery to ameliorate the effects of future disasters (Drennan et al., 2014; Stark, 2018). My analysis shows that when we consider sensemaking in a disaster setting we must take into account the roles of different actors across a range of organizations and avoid circumstances where “the upper echelon members can dominate the definition of the negotiated reality because of the influence they hold over possible visions of change” (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991: 446). My findings suggest that the scope of changes identified through sensemaking and sensegiving after public inquiries must be expanded and delivered through a range of civil society and public

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administration organizations beyond just those in the emergency management sector (Miller, 2013). This is important because the implementation of recommendations after public inquiries has historically been seen as the responsibility of emergency management organizations. Studies to date have also assumed or implied that sensegiving occurs as a trait of leadership among senior managers (Maitlis, 2005; Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). My study suggests that the implementation of meaningful strategic change from public inquiry recommendations relies on the sensemaking and sensegiving activities of individuals at each hierarchical level, and that sensegiving is a mechanism for individuals outside of the upper echelons of hierarchy to provide organizational leadership. It therefore does not support existing sensemaking studies, which seem to assume that sensemaking is overwhelmingly or even primarily the domain of the senior leadership actors. My model suggests that the occurrence of sensemaking and sensegiving is likely to occur among different hierarchical groups, which is important to ensure that the interests of all parties are reflected in the new practices that emerge from public inquiry recommendations. From my observations, managing change in a post-disaster context is “less about directing and controlling and more about facilitating recipient sensemaking processes to achieve an alignment of interpretation” (Balogun & Johnson, 2005: 24). This creates dynamic interactions and perspectives that have, surprisingly, attracted less attention in scholarly studies. Accordingly, the preceding chapters bring attention to the important leadership roles played by an array of different actors in the processes of sensemaking and sensegiving that arise from efforts to interpret the equivocality surrounding public inquiry recommendations and, more broadly, during strategic change initiatives. Sensemaking and learning allow individuals to understand what is occurring and act collectively (Maitlis, 2005; Mills & Weatherbee, 2006). These processes enable groups across multiple levels of the hierarchy to stimulate organization-wide conversations and share accounts of their different interpretations of equivocality. Meaning emerges from the different interpretations of cues across hierarchical boundaries over time. It seems that once a shared meaning is established in relation to public inquiry recommendations, learning cues provide a basis for noticing, bracketing and framing of different processes that individuals agree to re-evaluate and change through collective action. Accordingly, I show how sensemaking and learning cues enable individuals to transcend hierarchical boundaries to accomplish double-loop learning in the form of organizational change.

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5.2.3  Sensemaking, Learning and Emotion In recent times scholars have called for more studies on the role of emotion, to ascertain its role in and impact on sensemaking and learning among organizational actors (e.g. Kroon & Reif, 2021; Vuori et al., 2018; Maitlis et  al., 2013). The role of emotion in sensemaking and learning among organizational actors has been neglected in disaster sensemaking studies (Dwyer et  al., 2021b; Morrice, 2013). To date, scholars have implied that sensemaking can elicit a variety of emotions, and that emotional responses may have an influence on whether and how people engage in sensemaking  – or may even result in the collapse of sensemaking (Vaughan, 1996; Weick, 1993). Recent studies (Rushton et  al., 2021; Colville et  al., 2013a, 2013b; Cornelissen et  al., 2014; Whittle et al., 2012) have shown that the negative emotions that surround disasters, such as anxiety, fear and stress, often result in behaviours that give rise to tragic and unintended consequences among groups and organizations that plan for and respond to disasters (Colville et al., 2013; Cornelissen et al., 2014). A range of important social science studies have shown that in equivocal and challenging circumstances, negative emotion seems to prompt sensemaking, with consequences such as change (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991), surprise (Louis, 1980) or tragedy (Colville et al., 2013). Interestingly, the literature has cast emotions as an impediment to change and as best held in check (e.g. see Maitlis et al., 2013; Mumby & Putnam, 1992). Emotions are an important part of post-inquiry sensemaking as different organizational actors come together (and others are excluded) in the aftermath of a disaster; while disasters trigger emotions in immediate and visible ways, the emotional context of post-inquiry sensemaking is more complex. In the first instance, my study shows  – as other studies have done – that disasters often result in significant losses and damages for communities while giving rise to challenging and dangerous work environments for emergency management practitioners (see Birkman, 2006). However, unlike previous research (see Weick, 1993), I found little evidence suggesting that the actions of organizational actors who were anxious and stressed exacerbated what unfolded during the bushfires (Dwyer, 2021a). For example, there were no losses of operational firefighter lives on the day of Black Saturday. While my analysis suggests that a range of different organizational actors experienced stress and anxiety during four of Australia’s most significant bushfires, there was little to suggest that their actions exacerbated events, indicating that emotions do not always

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necessarily contribute directly to disaster situations, even when such situations are novel. In fact, my findings suggest that despite equivocal situations during a disaster, individuals can still operate effectively to manage situations. While studies to date (Cornelissen et al., 2014; Maitlis et al., 2013; Weick, 1993; Vaughan, 1990) suggest that the heightened negative emotions among groups can cause or exacerbate disasters, my findings highlighted how the actions of firefighters under very difficult circumstances prevented the fires damaging some of Victoria state’s significant infrastructure, suggesting that even during novel and equivocal times, individuals can make sense of, take action on and ameliorate disasters (e.g. see de Rond, 2017). This is often overlooked in studies of crises and disasters (Dwyer, 2021b). Future studies must begin to focus on the traumatic, stressful and shocking experiences of many emergency management officers in the lead-up to the bushfires, during public inquiries and afterward as they begin to plan for future events. As indicated in Fig. 5.1, the equivocality and sensemaking that follow a public inquiry into a disaster are likely to be accompanied, at least initially, by negative emotions on the part of organizational actors. While studies to date have contributed to knowledge about how public inquiries make sense (e.g. Gephart, 1997), we know relatively little of their emotional impact on the individuals who participate in them. This book begins to bring attention to both the negative emotions associated with the original disaster and how inquiries can themselves generate negative emotions. Scholars have characterized public inquiries as comprising ceremonies and rituals (’t Hart & Boin, 1993; Brown, 2004; Elliot & McGuiness, 2002) to the extent that they are perceived as objective, clinical and forensic. This overlooks many of the social dynamics of which they are comprised, and particularly the way in which they generate largely negative emotions. In addition to producing an interpretation of what occurred (e.g. Brown & Jones, 2000), public inquiries also generate emotions, especially for individuals who feel that their evidence and submissions to an inquiry are misinterpreted in hearings and recommendations. My model (Fig. 5.1) proposes that emotions are likely to be carried forward into organizational sensemaking and any subsequent learning that occurs, as individuals struggle to interpret the equivocality associated with the various public inquiry reports. Different interpretations of evidence, selective omissions and commissions, and authorial strategies shape a particular version of an inquiry’s report (e.g. Brown, 2000, 2004). For those individuals required to appear before the inquiry

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and/or charged with implementing its recommendations, equivocality and emotion are bound together. My study shows how public inquiries give rise to negative emotions, and have a far greater impact on individuals than research to date has suggested. I identify specific types of emotions that arise when making sense of public inquiry recommendations. Scholars have suggested that examining for and conceptualizing emotion is challenging and that it often becomes obscured during times of organizational change (Fineman, 2004). We know that change triggers an emotional response in both crisis and non-­ crisis situations, as levels of cognitive loading increase (see Weick, 1988, 1990, 1993; Weick et al., 2008). Emotions such as anxiety, stress, sadness, shock, guilt and anger surfaced as individuals relived their experiences during the implementation of public inquiry recommendations. My findings also show that positive emotions such as trust, confidence and happiness arose as sensemaking and learning progressed  – although when deeper, more reflective learning occurred, negative emotions were reported once again. My model (Fig. 5.1) suggests that the emotions (both positive and negative) that arise during a disaster are only the beginning of a cycle of emotionality that influences and shapes the way in which public inquiry recommendations are implemented. Figure 5.1 proposes that the negative emotions prompted by equivocality play an important role in sparking a process of sensemaking and learning. This is important, particularly because existing research (see Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010) suggests that sensemaking around disaster events is more effective when emotions are held in check, lending support to the notion that emotions impede organizational change following public inquiries (Maitlis et  al., 2013). However, my study suggests that emotion prompts sensemaking and sensegiving in such a way that it re-interprets public inquiry recommendations to become meaningful for groups within organizations and enable them to bring about change through double-loop learning  – at which point positive emotions began to surface. In providing insights into this process, my study shows how both negative and positive emotions play a role in influencing and indeed shaping cultural readjustment in organizations; this would not occur if emotions were, as studies have suggested (see Mumby & Putnam, 1992; Weick, 1993; Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010), an inhibitor of sensemaking. This book lends support to studies that have suggested that negative emotion is likely to provide the basis for sensemaking (Maitlis et al., 2013), and further highlights the role of positive emotion. The role of positive

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emotion has attracted little attention in sensemaking studies, which appear to assume that individuals will be more inclined to associate negative feelings or experiences with problems in their environment, whereas positive feelings signify safety (Maitlis, 2005). My analysis of the public inquiries featured in this book suggests that individuals experienced positive emotions as they made sense and noticed learning cues that enabled them to bracket the organizational processes related to continuous improvement. Individuals began to experience feelings of trust, confidence and happiness as double-loop learning began to take effect and their organization returned to a sensible state after a period of protracted equivocality. However, negative emotions, such as anxiety, returned when organizational actors considered the likelihood of future fires. My model challenges existing research that suggests that individuals only notice and make sense of equivocality when experiencing negative emotion. The model shows that positive emotions provide a basis for individuals to make sense in a prospective manner as they move between different episodes of emotionality and equivocality. Finally, the temporal component of emotion in my study is interesting. My model (Fig. 5.1) shows that negative emotion is high during times of sensemaking as individuals struggle to make sense of equivocality. Positive emotions surface as they grapple with equivocality and create plausible meaning, beginning to learn from their experiences and implement double-­loop learning. While negative emotion fuels sensemaking, positive emotion as individuals make sense of equivocality fuels learning (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). My study shows how equivocality from public inquiry recommendations prompts sensemaking in emergency management organizations and how this provides a basis for learning. It shows that sensemaking occurs across different hierarchical levels. I also find that emotion plays an important role in the sensemaking processes, not only retrospectively but also prospectively as individuals begin to consider the likelihood of future bushfires.

5.3   Areas for Future Consideration While this book reflects on the way that organizations make sense of and learn from bushfires, I recognize that there are a number of limitations associated with my perspectives. Like scholars before me, I acknowledge that my perspectives are a subjective and idiosyncratic reflection of the way

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that I conducted the research for this book. However, peer reviewed research has supported such approaches (e.g. Dwyer et al., 2021a; Dwyer & Hardy, 2016; Brown, 2000, 2004; Gephart, 1993). It must also be noted that I was not a direct part of the public inquiries and the implementation of their recommendations. I therefore relied heavily on publicly available commentaries, which are secondary accounts from which I infer perspectives on the ways that we learn from public inquiries. While the organizational actors (who I cast as senior managers, middle managers and functional experts) at the core of the commentaries lived through the experience of the fires and the subsequent public inquiries and shared their accounts, they invariably have private views about some of their experiences that they may not have shared. The views of these organizational actors are also subjective and idiosyncratic, insofar as they make choices and selections about different events as they recall them, and choose to emphasize different parts of their experiences publicly. Organizational actors may also consciously or unconsciously omit certain facts about the events, the subsequent public inquiries and the ways in which the recommendations were implemented in their organization. I am also aware that organizational actors might have emphasized different aspects of their experience if I had conducted interviews with them sooner after the bushfire events and/or the public inquiries, or indeed at a later date. This book provides no measurement or evaluation of the effectiveness of the changes that occurred in various organizations and whether they actually improved organizational performance in preventing and managing bushfires. My investigation of single-loop and double-loop learning is grounded in terms of whether sense was made, narratives were established and organizational changes were made. It does not involve a formal evaluation of those changes over time. Similarly, in identifying and analyzing emotions, I am relying on retrospective accounts by individuals. Despite these limitations, my study makes several contributions to existing understandings of sensemaking, learning and emotions that surround public inquiry processes, and suggests some promising avenues for further research. Significant bushfires will inevitably occur in the future, yet there are very few studies that observe how equivocality emerges and how it influences the sensemaking, learning and emotions of emergency management professionals in real time. Consequently, I suggest that future ethnographic studies would have a lot to offer. In the first instance, ethnographies of sensemaking during disasters have great potential to broaden our

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knowledge of the equivocality that emergency management practitioners encounter under emergency conditions. Such studies may enable us to understand the situations that give rise to equivocality and offer an opportunity to understand how sense is and can be made. Similarly, real-time ethnographies of public inquiries, where the emotional impact on and displays of individuals can be more closely examined, would offer considerable insight. They may also provide a basis for Royal Commissioners to be less judgemental when pointing to failures of emergency management organizations on days like Black Saturday. Finally, ethnographies that examine how organizations make sense of and learn from inquiries – as they do so – would help us understand how to support such organizational change efforts, and provide a way to more critically examine whether inquiry recommendations do indeed form an effective basis for improving how emergency management organizations respond to disasters. I encourage further research that actively involves those who work in emergency management.

5.4   Practical Contributions This book makes several practical contributions from both a policy perspective and a practice perspective. From a policy perspective, this book provides policymakers with a basis for improving the ways in which we make sense of and learn from natural disasters. There are multiple options available to governments that allow for a more procedural, less judicial way of conducting inquiries; this may enable individuals in incident control or operational firefighting leadership roles to recount their experiences while sparing them the emotional trauma of cross-examination about a disaster that has likely left them with residual stress, anxiety and worry. As disasters and crises continue on a seemingly unprecedented scale, it is important that public review processes do not add to the burdens experienced by emergency management practitioners. Second, while my analysis shows the importance of sensemaking and learning after disasters, it also suggests that the negative emotions associated with these processes can affect the wellbeing of senior managers, middle managers and functional experts. With commentators suggesting that natural disasters are likely to increase in the future, it is likely that public inquiries will continue. To alleviate the impacts of stress, anxiety and even anger on individuals at different hierarchical levels, I suggest that

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there is a need to focus less on retrospective sensemaking around emergency service decision-making, and more on prospective sensemaking that seeks to improve the way that the community prepares for the inevitable natural disasters of the future. This requires a shift whereby the community perceives itself as an active partner of emergency management organizations in planning and preparedness, rather than a passive recipient of their decisions. While the government may influence policy and practice change in emergency management organizations, work remains to be done to ensure that those living in bushfire-prone areas are aware of how they can prepare for days like Black Saturday, and have a plan in place to ensure that they do not find themselves in the path of the fires and natural disasters of the future. 5.4.1  Public Inquiry Models, Sensemaking and Learning While emergency management organizations have grappled with the recommendations that have emerged from bushfire public inquiries since 1939, there is little doubt that 76 years of sensemaking and learning have led to significant innovation. We have seen improvements in community bushfire education programmes, advances in modelling fire behaviour, more sophisticated approaches to delivering bushfire warnings, an increased emphasis on planned burning to prepare for fire seasons, and greater integration across emergency management agencies. However, the sensemaking and learning surrounding such innovation have been challenging for individuals at all hierarchical levels, not least because of the quasi-judicial approach taken to collecting evidence as part of the public inquiry processes. This was particularly the case with the 2009 Black Saturday Royal Commission, where it seemed that the Victorian government struggled to know what to do in the aftermath of fires; it appears that the decision was made in haste to conduct a Royal Commission when other non-judicial options were available (see Eburn & Dovers, 2015). Research by Dwyer and Hardy (2016) suggested that the review committee approach used after the Ash Wednesday fires of 1983 would have satisfied the requirement to establish key facts about the Black Saturday bushfires, and could have been used as the basis for making recommendations for future change to emergency management organizations. The non-judicial approach taken by the review committee in relation to the Ash Wednesday fires played a key role in capturing important sensemaking

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and learning cues; this provided the basis for new practices while also facilitating a broader debate about the role of the community in emergency management. It seems that this particular review committee inquiry was successful because it was chaired by emergency management experts who intricately understood the nuances and challenges associated with managing bushfire in Victoria – not by lawyers whose primary task is to establish accountability. Accordingly, the committee’s recommendations focused on changes that needed to be made to organizational systems to prepare for the fires of the future, while also prompting a broader societal discussion about living in one of the most bushfire-prone areas in the world. This was in direct contrast to the Black Saturday Royal Commission, which had a retrospective focus, resulting in many individuals being blamed, scapegoated and even vilified. While it was important to examine what happened and why after Black Saturday, it seems that the Royal Commissioners overlooked the fact that to live in Victoria is to live with bushfire. There is very real concern among the participants in my study that the retrospective nature of the Royal Commission has created an ingrained belief that we can prevent all bushfires, or predict when and where they will happen. A more prospective approach to sensemaking during the Royal Commission might have challenged the Victorian community’s sense of entitlement to own and develop land in fire-prone areas. While the Royal Commission forensically cross-examined the Victorian emergency services, there was a compassionate sensitivity shown to members of the community. Much of this sensitivity has continued since, with governments reluctant to raise the matter of community members’ accountability for their behaviour before, during and after a bushfire.. It seems that there is a need for greater discussion about community accountability during public inquiry processes, particularly when the community can do so much to protect themselves and each other. This is particularly important as research suggests that the people who live in some of the highest fire risk communities in Victoria are choosing to take a passive approach to bushfire preparedness and planning, waiting to see what happens on high fire danger days rather than having a plan and knowing what they will do before a fire is ignited (Reynolds & Tyler, 2018; Dwyer, 2015; McLennan et al., 2014). There is, then, considerable scope for my study to contribute to the development of future public inquiry processes that

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place an emphasis on the extraction of meaningful sensemaking and learning cues, and which consider the specifics of individual fire events against the fire-prone context of Victoria. My hope is to contribute to the implementation of Recommendation 67 of the Royal Commission’s report: The State consider the development of legislation for the conduct of inquiries in Victoria—in particular, the conduct of royal commissions. (Parliament of Victoria, Victorian Bushfire Royal Commission Summary Report, 2010: 34)

To address some of the challenges associated with Royal Commissions after bushfires, I propose a more consultative and less judicial approach, so that deliberations focus on circumstances, events and organizational systems, rather than individuals. Figures 4.1 and 5.1 suggest that an increased procedural emphasis on sensemaking and learning during inquiries, rather than on allocating blame, may result in more meaningful sensemaking and learning cues and help emergency management practitioners to change organizational practices. The decision by the Victorian government not to pursue a Royal Commission after the Black Summer bushfires indicates that advances are beginning to emerge in terms of how we learn from significant fire events. To support this change, I encourage further research that centres on the study of individuals who have lived through disasters and the resulting public inquiries. Such studies may not only increase meaningful learning and build momentum for change, but may also have a cathartic effect, whereby individuals can reflect on their experiences of a major event and broker them into learning and change, hence returning the organization to a sensible environment after a period of protracted equivocality. 5.4.2  Towards a Learning Culture Although scholars have noted that ‘knowledge’ means different things for academics and practitioners (Cornelissen et al., 2021; McKelvey, 2006), I believe that engaged scholarship needs to extend beyond achieving theoretical gains and place an increased emphasis on building collaborative relationships. I hope that this particular work can further extend the

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existing learning culture within emergency management organizations beyond emergency operations. While a learning culture is well developed at the operational level within Victorian emergency management organizations (and indeed more generally in Australia), insofar as debriefing occurs and corrective actions are developed after every response to an emergency, there remains considerable scope to develop a reflective learning culture at the organizational level (Dwyer & Hardy, 2016). Figures 4.1 and 5.1 offer emergency management practitioners a framework for progressing the implementation of complex public inquiry recommendations through workforce training initiatives at both operational and organizational level. While implementing organizational change is challenging within ‘normal’ work environments (Stensaker et al., 2008), I suggest that emergency management organizations operate in an environment where equivocality is omnipresent. Moreover, managing equivocality is much more challenging for emergency management professionals because of the likelihood that trauma will accompany many of the events they deal with as part of their core business. Figures 4.1 and 5.1 provide a basis for discussing the next steps in relation to how emergency management practitioners make sense and learn from public inquiry recommendations – moving beyond the learning vacuum of bushfire inquiries, where we have seen the same sorts of inquiry recommendations emerge and re-emerge since Victoria’s first Bushfire Royal Commission in 1939. By focusing on Victoria’s worst bushfire events and subsequent public inquiries, this book provides a foundation for emergency management organizations to ensure appropriate peer support mechanisms are in place before, during and after significant bushfires, as individuals work through equivocality while seeking to facilitate sensemaking and learning. In doing so, I hope that negative emotions can be acknowledged, shared and normalized within organizational culture, as opposed to individuals carrying them as a personal burden. Recent studies related to remembrance and commemoration in Victorian emergency management organizations suggest that, while firefighters find ways of coping with their difficult experiences through collective debriefing, they struggle with being characterized as heroes because they know that they will be unable to prevent losses from bushfires in the future (Cutcher & Dwyer, 2020). By bringing attention to the role of emotion in sensemaking and learning, I hope that this study will provide pathways towards managing

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negative emotions more strategically, and enable individuals to experience more positive emotions as part of a sensemaking and learning culture that helps them to prepare for the bushfires of the future. It may be worthwhile for emergency management organizations to develop training for senior managers, middle managers and functional experts that encourages more awareness about the role of emotions in many different aspects of their work. It is my hope that this will support them to make sense of their work experiences before, during and after major emergency events, while becoming more comfortable with the prospect of working in an environment where catastrophic events are likely to occur in the future. Having reflected on the ways in which public inquiries have shaped the recommendations and policy changes after these fires, the following sections focus on the implications of this book for (i) bushfire planning and preparedness; (ii) the role of citizen participation in the design of bushfire and community safety initiatives; and (iii) creating safe spaces for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people to participate and lead changes related to caring for Country. 5.4.3  Bushfire Planning and Preparedness The bushfire events at the core of this book are a stark reminder that Victoria is one of the most bushfire-prone areas in the world (e.g. see Stults, 2017). The findings from my analysis clearly show that an interdisciplinary risk management model (Buergelt & Paton, 2014) is needed to move beyond the learning vacuum that has been created by public inquiries. In Victoria, ‘rare’ and ‘unique’ bushfires have been frequent events over the last twenty years. With this in mind, planning and preparedness for future bushfires must embrace what Buergelt and Paton (2014: 591) refer to as “a multitude of variables operating across a wide range of dimensions (i.e. individual, historical, physical/natural, social, spiritual/ religious, economic, political) and different scales (i.e. individual, household, community organizations, business, local government, state government)”. In essence, preparing for future bushfires must seek “to decrease risk and increase people’s ability to cope, adapt and recover when disaster strikes” (Paton, 2019: 327). This needs to be the collective focus, not only of emergency management organizations but also more broadly within civil society organizations (Lerbinger, 2012). Australian citizens must be involved in planning for bushfires based less on the lessons of the past and

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more on the effects of future fires shaped and ‘altered’ by climate change (Stults, 2017: 29). 5.4.4  Citizen Participation in the Design of Bushfire and Community Safety Initiatives While acknowledging that a more holistic approach to bushfire planning and preparedness is important, the literature is less prescriptive about how this can be achieved. My findings, like Marton and Phillips (2005), suggest that inclusive and integrated policy-making needs to be at the core of local, regional and state levels of planning for and responding to bushfires. However, this continues to be more easily noted than achieved, with the Black Summer bushfires of 2019–20 clearly showing (like Marton and Phillips’ 2005 reflection on the Victorian bushfires of 2002–03) that planning, response and recovery surrounding this event were disjointed as a result of “differences amongst the key stakeholders in terms of their understanding of local values and hence priorities for action, and of the need for local innovation and leadership” (Marton & Phillips, 2005: 75). One approach that offers considerable scope for addressing these challenges is deliberative democracy, where local stakeholders can come together in forums and committees to reflect on the challenges that natural hazard events can pose for their communities (cf. Millen, 2011). By doing so they can deliberate in an ongoing manner that enables them to plan for, respond to and recover from natural hazard events that are likely to affect their community. That said, some commentators have recently concluded that deliberative democracy has been less than successful in bringing diverse stakeholders together as the basis for programme-­building related to planning, preparedness, response and recovery (PPRR) within communities (Curato, 2018; Waldmüller, 2021). Curato and Böker (2016: 187) offer insights into the ways that deliberative democracy may enable communities and the stakeholders within them to engage in PPRR in relation to bushfire: The development of a deliberative system cannot rely on the mechanism behind one particular component part, but its relevance also extends to its own evolution: It must itself evolve in a systemic fashion, combining the positive impacts of different component parts together to bring forth overall impacts that go beyond the sum of the different component parts.

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Sensemaking and sensegiving as described in this book offer promising social processes that can be leveraged by communities to develop more meaningful deliberative democracy forums in relation to planning for, responding to and recovering from bushfires in Victoria. 5.4.5   Aboriginal Leadership and Care for Country Recent scholarly work has noted that the 2019–20 bushfires had a disproportionate impact on Aboriginal peoples (Freeman et al., 2021). My study brings further attention to an absence of Aboriginal peoples’ voices in the public inquiries, their findings and recommendations, where “Aboriginal peoples are primarily relegated to an historical footnote, rather than featuring as contemporary residents, as First Peoples, as land and rights holders, or as part of contemporary fire management” (Williamson et al., 2020: 14). With this in mind, much remains to be progressed in terms of “learning to learn from bushfire” (Dwyer, 2021a: 1). Cultural burning practices led by Aboriginal people, with their emphasis on smaller, less damaging and cooler burning, adapted to the specifics of local landscapes, have been shown to be one way of reducing the threat of future fire while promoting care for Country (Freeman et al., 2021). While I do not purport to have cultural knowledge or any authority to recommend cultural burning in Victoria or Australia in general, I do empathize with submissions to the Black Summer Inquiry 2019–20 that seek “a review of all opportunities and approaches … including Aboriginal land management and fire approaches to protect life, Country and cultural values” (Fletcher, 2020, p. 1) as a basis for preparedness and planning for future bushfires in Victoria. I propose that sensemaking and other modes of meaning making such as sensegiving can offer one way of undertaking review processes that ensures that cultural burning is guided and conducted by Aboriginal peoples’ knowledge and leadership.

5.5   Personal Reflection I began this work in the aftermath of Black Saturday and the subsequent Royal Commission. My purpose was to examine whether public inquiries make a difference in emergency management organizations. It was a question I had been curious about for many years, sparked by my previous career in the Victorian public service. In 2003, I had started working with a Victorian government department shortly after the Alpine fires of

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2002–03, which led to 13,000 kilometres of land being burned. While no lives were lost in those fires, the scale of the damage caused to the landscape prompted the government to undertake a review of Victorian emergency management, which resulted in 47 recommendations. In 2005, I commenced a management role with responsibilities for performance improvement in a government department responsible for responding to and planning for bushfire on public land. It was difficult to know what actions constituted a recommendation being implemented and even more difficult to evaluate whether organizational learning had occurred. Moreover, I recalled that many of the recommendations in this inquiry were similar to those that had appeared in prior reports of public inquiry recommendations. I was also an operational firefighter, where I became aware that public inquiry recommendations could be a source of great frustration for practitioners, who do not think they necessarily result in meaningful learning or change. While I shared many of the frustrations of my colleagues, I wondered if continuous learning would occur within the organization without a requirement prescribed by public inquiry recommendations. I continued to be intrigued by the fact that organizational learning was almost always retrospective. I was also interested in the difficulties of making organizational change. These are insights I have sought to carry forward into this book. Although the emergency management organizations for which I worked did much valuable work, I was often struck by how difficult it was to make sense and learn in a prospective manner, particularly when the challenges were well known. That said, there are many unknowns associated with bushfire, not to mention the extraordinary workload that arises as a result of meeting planned burning requirements and targets associated with preparing for bushfire seasons. Change is complicated, and even when there is a perception that emergency management organizations have learned from the past, we witness occurrences such as Black Saturday where no policy or system could have prepared the state for anything less than significant damages and losses. Over the six years I worked in emergency management in Victoria, I observed many of the challenges encountered by emergency management practitioners, from protracted fire seasons exacerbated by climatic conditions, to trying to work in an integrated manner with multiple organizations responsible for different aspects of bushfire planning and response. A key part of my role was testing new technology in bushfire-prone areas and evaluating its effectiveness based on feedback from emergency

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management organizations and the community, and I came to know many of the emergency services and community leaders around Victoria, including those affected by Black Saturday. I learned a great deal from many of these professionals and volunteers. As an operational firefighter on the fireground and a community information officer in the incident control centre, I personally became aware of the many perils facing emergency management professionals. The volatile nature of Victoria’s climate means the conditions faced by firefighters can rapidly change from benign to deadly. Similarly, in incident control roles as a communications officer I occasionally found myself in the challenging circumstance where it was difficult to know where the fire was and what it was doing. This made it very difficult to issue timely and effective warnings  – particularly when I knew that wrong or inaccurate warning information could trigger decisions by the community to leave their property, only to be met by the dangers of flame on the road. On the day of Black Saturday, I reflected a lot on my time in emergency management and thought about many of my former colleagues. I had left emergency management four months before Black Saturday, and often wondered how I would have coped on such a day. I also became concerned that I could be called before the Royal Commission to provide evidence about the performance review standards for which I had some responsibility over the course of my career. I had been advised that I should expect to be called. However, this did not happen, and it soon became clear that the Royal Commission was more concerned with cross-­ examining senior managers and key incident control staff who were operational on the day. Like many interested observers, I watched as the Royal Commission unfolded, often with great sympathy for my former colleagues – as well as for the victims of the fires – as they were blamed for the events of Black Saturday, and it became apparent to me that the Royal Commissioners had little regard for the broader context of emergency management. At times, I became angry that the Royal Commissioners permitted such unfair cross-examinations of individuals who were living through the trauma of what had happened on Black Saturday, as well as being in the midst of a fire season that carried a real threat of further disaster. I also perceived much of the media commentary to be rather sensationalist at a time when more measured analysis was required. The public inquiry reports at the core of this book evoked many emotions for organizational actors. On many occasions, I found myself feeling

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somewhat guilty that I had left my career in emergency management and was spared the stress of Black Saturday. I felt quite sorry at different times during the Royal Commission as I listened to my former colleagues recount some very sad and distressing stories. I was both angered and saddened when I met former colleagues who had carried blame and guilt from their Black Saturday and Royal Commission experiences to such an extent that they resigned. This meant that Victoria lost some of its most experienced and knowledgeable bushfire experts. As I conclude this book, I believe that my next challenge is to shape and prompt change in emergency management by carrying theory into practice and practice into theory through effective engagement processes (Howard-Grenville, 2021; Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006). This is a difficult process given that knowledge in research and knowledge in an organization carry very different meanings, with scholars suggesting there are tensions between the two (Bartunek & Rynes, 2014; Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006). As I begin the next stage of my engaged scholarship journey I will seek to enable, facilitate, convene and support the knowledge transfer of my empirical work into practice (Bansal et al., 2012). In my future work, I will seek to support the move to prospective public inquiry sensemaking, so that future emergency management professionals might be spared the unnecessarily difficult experiences of a judicial Royal Commission, and be helped to engage positively with change initiatives taking place within their organizations  – initiatives designed to address the ongoing and intensifying challenges of bushfires.

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Index

A Aboriginal land management approaches, 107 Ash Wednesday bushfires, 3, 45, 46, 59, 60, 65, 67, 69, 72, 90, 101 Ash Wednesday Review Committee, 46, 56–58, 67, 101 Ash Wednesday Review Committee findings evidence of double-loop learning, 72 evidence of novelty and equivocality, 72 evidence of sensemaking, 72 evidence of single-loop learning, 72 B Black Friday bushfires, 3, 45, 46, 59, 60, 65, 67, 69, 71 Black Friday Royal Commission, 46, 56–58, 60 Black Friday Royal Commission findings

double-loop learning, 71 evidence of novelty and equivocality, 71 evidence of sensemaking, 71 evidence of single-loop learning, 71 Black Saturday bushfires, ix, 3, 31, 45, 46, 59, 60, 65, 67, 69, 73, 78–80, 90, 93, 95, 100–102, 107–110 Black Saturday Royal Commission, 46, 56–59, 67–69, 78–80, 84, 87, 102, 103, 107, 109, 110 Black Saturday Royal Commission findings evidence of double-loop learning, 74 evidence of novelty and equivocality, 74 evidence of sensemaking, 74 evidence of single-loop learning, 74 Black Summer bushfires, 3, 45, 46, 56–60, 65, 70, 73, 90, 93, 103, 106, 107 Black Summer Inquiry, 46, 70

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 G. Dwyer, Making Sense of Natural Disasters, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94778-1

133

134 

INDEX

Black Summer Inquiry findings evidence of double-loop learning, 75 evidence of novelty and equivocality, 75 evidence of sensemaking, 75 evidence of single-loop learning, 75

emergence through learning and change, 77 emergence through sensemaking, 97, 98, 105 Enactment, 20 Equivocality, see Novelty and equivocality

C Care for Country, 107 Citizen participation, 105 Climate change, vii, 1, 3, 31, 73, 75, 90, 106 Cognitive loading, 3, 30, 31, 97 Cognitive schemes, 20 Cultural burning practices, 107 Cultural change, see Double-loop learning Culture of entrapment, 92

H Hazard reduction, see Planning, preparedness, response and recovery

D Deliberative democracy, 106, 107 Double-loop learning, 68–70, 74, 76, 80, 81, 91, 94, 97, 98 in Ash Wednesday findings, 72 in Black Saturday findings, 74 in Black Summer findings, 75 Black Friday findings, 71 E Emotion, negative as a spur to sensemaking, 97, 98 as impediment to sensemaking, 32, 97 surrounding bushfires, 3, 17, 77, 96, 100, 104 surrounding public inquiry processes, viii, 33 Emotion, positive

L Learning cues, 6, 8, 9, 22, 46, 61, 70, 71, 73, 76, 81, 84, 88, 91–94, 98, 102, 103 in Ash Wednesday findings, 72 in Black Saturday findings, 74 in Black Summer findings, 75 Black Friday findings, 71 Learning vacuum, vii, viii, 3, 44, 62, 81, 85, 92, 104, 105 N Novelty and equivocality, 16, 17, 62 in Ash Wednesday findings, 72 in Black Saturday findings, 74 in Black Summer findings, 75 Black Friday findings, 71 O Organizational change, see Double-­ loop learning Organizational hierarchy as contributor to disaster, 29 and sensegiving, 29, 87, 94 Organizational learning, see Double-­ loop learning

 INDEX 

P Planning, preparedness, response and recovery, 93, 105–107 community participation, 106 Public inquiries conduct of, 26, 103 emotional toll on emergency management practitioners, 7, 76, 79, 85, 96, 97, 102, 109, 110 future inquiry processes, 17, 66, 86, 93, 100, 102 future planning and preparedness, 26 prospective sensemaking, 26 rationale for, 4, 25 recurring recommendations, 81, 86 retrospective focus, vii, xvii, 4, 9, 26, 46, 66, 67, 77, 86, 89, 101 R Risk management, see Planning, preparedness, response and recover S Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2

135

Sensegiving, 23 and organizational hierarchy, 23, 29, 87, 94 Sensemaking, 18 as a social process, 7, 16, 18, 21, 22, 26 Black Friday findings, 71 characteristics, 18 during disasters, 4 failure, 24 focus on learning cues, 18 in Ash Wednesday findings, 72 in Black Summer findings, 75 in in Black Saturday findings, 74 influence of identity, 18, 19 plausibility, 18, 21 retrospective focus, 18, 19 through the implementation of inquiry recommendations, 4, 27–29, 33, 62 Single-loop learning, 58, 68, 71, 77, 91 in Ash Wednesday findings, 72 in Black Saturday findings, 74 in Black Summer findings, 75 Black Friday findings, 71 T Trauma, see Emotion, negative