Making an American Festival [Reprint 2020 ed.] 9780520942431

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Making an American Festival

Making an American Festival CHINESE NEW

I N SAN F R A N C I S C O ' S

YEAR

CHINATOWN

Chiou-Ling Yeh

m U N I V E R S I T Y BERKELEY

OF LOS

CALIFORNIA ANGELES

PRESS LONDON

University of California Press, one of the most distinguished university presses in the United States, enriches lives around the world by advancing scholarship in the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences. Its activities are supported by the U C Press Foundation and by philanthropic contributions from individuals and institutions. For more information, visit www.ucpress.edu. University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University of California Press, Ltd. London, England © 2008 by The Regents of the University of California Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Yeh, Chiou-ling, 1967Making an American festival: Chinese New Year in San Francisco's Chinatown / Chiou-ling Yeh. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN: 9 7 8 - 0 - 5 2 0 - 2 5 3 5 0 - 6 ( c l o t h : a l k . p a p e r ) ISBN: 9 7 8 - 0 - 5 2 0 - 2 5 3 5 1 - 3 ( p b k . : a l k . p a p e r )

1. Chinese New Year—California—San Francisco— History. 2. Chinese Americans—California—San Francisco—Social life and customs. 3. Chinatown (San Francisco, Calif.)—Social life and customs. I. Title. GT4905.Y44

2008

394.261—dc22

2008007774

Manufactured in the United States of America z7 10

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This book is printed on Natures Book, which contains 50% post-consumer waste and meets the minimum r e q u i r e m e n t s o f ANSI/NISO Z 3 9 . 4 8 - 1 9 9 2 (R 1 9 9 7 )

(Permanence of Paper).

To my parents, A-Chun Chen and Jung-Chang Yeh, and my late grandmother, Tui Wu Chen

CONTENTS

LIST

OF

ILLUSTRATIONS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Introduction

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ix xi

Making Multicultural America: Cold War Politics,

Ethnic Celebrations, and Chinese America

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i

i. Transnational Celebrations in Changing Political Climates

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12

2. "In the Traditions of China and in the Freedom of America": The Making of the Chinese New Year Festival

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29

3. Constructing a "Model Minority" Identity: The Miss Chinatown U.S.A. Beauty Pageant

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56

4. Yellow Power: Race, Class, Gender, and Activism 5. Heated Debate on the Ethnic Beauty Pageant 6. Hybridity in Culture, Memory, and Politics

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75 102

122

7- Selling Chineseness and Marketing Chinese New Year: Corporate Sponsorship, Television Broadcasts, and Counter Memory

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150

8. "We Are One Family": Queerness, Transnationalism, and Identity Politics Epilogue

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174

Post—Cold War Celebrations

NOTES

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207

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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INDEX

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ILLUSTRATIONS

1. Cover of Wave magazine

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14

2. Korean War veterans in the Chinese New Year parade 3. The S.F. All-Stars

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4. St. Mary's Chinese Girls' Drum Corps in the 1954 Chinese New Year parade / 41 5. San Francisco mayor George Christopher with Miss Chinatown contestants, 1956 / 49 6. Miss Chinatown float, 1954 7. Carnival

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8. Mr. Chinatown Contest

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9. Community fair, Chinese New Year Festival, 2005 10. The Eight Immortals

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11. Asian Pacific Sisters in the 1994 Chinese New Year parade 12. Gay Asian Pacific Alliance's Chinese New Year parade float, 1996 / 193

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Making an American Festival is attributable to the great assistance and generosity of many people. This book started as a second-year research paper at the University of California, Irvine. It was my friend and colleague, Sherri Bayouth, who suggested to me that I work on the Chinese New Year. Without the guidance and faith of my seminar instructor, Cornelia Hughes Dayton, Making an American Festival would have died a long time ago. I thank my dissertation committee members, Yong Chen, Alice Fahs, Laura Kyun Yi Kang, and Jon Wiener, whose guidance and encouragement shaped an earlier version of this project. My advisor, Yong Chen, introduced me to Asian American history and gave me the benefit of his enormous critical guidance. He has pushed me to think more thoroughly and to explain complicated historical events in clear writing. Alice Fahs's expertise in cultural history and gender studies has helped to shape this project from the beginning. I am grateful to Jon Wiener for his guidance and advice in developing my graduate and professional careers. Laura Kang's constructive critique has pushed me to deepen my historical analysis with interdisciplinary work. Thanks are also due to the faculty at the Asian American Studies Department, especially Dorothy Fujita-Rony, Glen Mimura, and Linda Vo for providing enormous support and advice. THE PUBLICATION OF

xi

In assisting me in my research, I am grateful for the archival and field trip guidance provided by Him Mark Lai and Linda Crowder. I am indebted to the librarians and staff at the San Francisco Public Library (both the Main Library and Chinatown Branch), the Bancroft Library at the University of California, Berkeley, the California Historical Society, St. Mary's Catholic Church, and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. My deepest gratitude goes to Wei-Chi Poon from the Ethnic Studies Library at the University of California, Berkeley, Daniel Tsang and Angela Yang from the Main Library at the University of California, Irvine, KekTim Lee at the Gay Asian Pacific Alliance, Rita Lopez at the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and Beverley Lee at the Parade Office. I also wish to thank Marisa Louie from the Chinese Historical Society of America for providing me with valuable visual images. This book could not have been completed without those who were willing to share their memories and experiences with me. In particular, I want to thank Annie Soo for opening her home to me and David Lei for sources and delicious meals. I received generous financial support for research and writing from the History Department, Humanities Center, and Regents Dissertation Fellowship at the University of California, Irvine; the Western Association of Women Historians' Founders Graduate Student Fellowship Award; the University of California's Kevin Starr Postdoctoral Fellowship Program; the American Historical Association's Albert Beveridge Award; the Popular Culture Associations Marshall FishwickTravel to Popular Culture Collections Grant; the Rockefeller Postdoctoral Fellowship at Bryn Mawr College; the Research, Scholarship, and Creative Activity Summer Fellowship, Minigrant, CAL Microgrants, and the University Grants Program at San Diego State University. Portions of chapters i, 2, 3, and 4 appeared in different forms in the following articles: "Contesting Identities: Youth Rebellion in San Francisco's Chinese New Year Festivals, 1953-1969," in The Chinese in America: A History from Gold Mountain to the New Millennium (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2002); and '"In the Traditions of China and in the Freedom of America': The Making of San Francisco's Chinese New Year Festivals," American Quarterly (Spring 2004): 395-420. Writing is a solitary and lonely endeavor. Fortunately, many friends and colleagues have supported me with their encouragement and suggestions at different stages of the writing project. My thanks to Crystal Anderson, Susie. Lan Cassel, Anne Choi, Marc Dollinger, Augusto Espíritu, Bill Ong Hing, Madeline Hsu, Shiho Imai, Victor Jew, Mathew Jacobson, Russell Kazal, Lon Kurashige, Anthony Lee, Robert Lee, ImoX1 1

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

gene Lim, Gina Masequesmay, Vu Pham, Marc Ross, George Sanchez, Nayan Shan, Amy Stillman, Martin Summers, John Kuo Wei Tchen, L. Ling-Chi Wang, David Yoo, and Henry Yu. I am grateful to George Lipsitz and Judy Yung for providing valuable suggestions to transform my dissertation into this book. Thanks as well to fellow post-docs at the Humanities Research Institute: Peter Cahn, Jerry Miller, Mimi Saunders, and Mark Wild, for generous commentary and good company. My gratitude also goes to the members of the Asian and Asian American Perspectives on Transnationalism and Performance group: Dorinne Kondo, Rachel Lee, Shen Lin, Mitsuya Mori, Karen Shimakawa, Deborah Wong, and Cheng-Chieh Yu. In addition, Rockefeller Fellow Alison Kibler challenged me to rethink some of the key issues in the book. I additionally benefited from the advice of fellow graduate students, Mariam Beevi Lam, Wilson Chen, Cindy Cheng, Vivien Deno, Lan Dong, Jane Hsu, Robert Johnson, Tim Kelly, Michael Masatsugu, Jon Mochizuki, Fiona Ngo, Jocelyn Pacleb, Jane Park, Duane Phan, John Rosa, and Fred Schoemehl who either read a potion of the project or encouraged me to continue with humor and care. In particular, I want to thank Jose Alamillo for reading different versions of the draft and Charlene Tung for reading the entire manuscript. Moreover, I am grateful to Monica McCormick, Niels Hooper, Rachel Lockman, and Mary Severance at University of California Press for their confidence in the project and shepherding it to publication. Finally, my appreciation goes to Christopher Pitts for painstakingly copyediting the manuscript. I have benefited in many different ways from my colleagues at San Diego State University, especially Andrew Abalahin, Laurie Baron, Edward Beasley, Edward Blum, Sandra Campbell, David Christian, Lisa Cobbs Hoffman, Steve Colston, Paula de Vos, Kate Edgerton-Tarpley, Sarah Elkind, Joanne Ferraro, Eve Kornfeld, Matt Kuefler, Vu Le, Tom Passananti, Beth Pollard, John Putman, and Andrew Wiese. Thanks also to Jefferson Jay, Kyra Lavender, and Kevin Peth for painstakingly transcribing oral history tapes, and Jesse York for getting sources for me. Throughout the years, my family has given me tremendous support for this project. My warmest appreciation goes to my parents, A-Chun Chen and Jung-Chang Yeh, for their love and absolute faith in me. I am grateful to my beloved grandmother who, unfortunately, passed away in the early stages of research. This book is dedicated to them. I also thank my siblings, Yih-Tong Yeh, Chen-Chi Yeh, and Tse-Chi Yeh, for taking care of our father, who fell ill in the midst of the project. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

XU1

Above all, Kuo-Tung Li helped me to finish the book. He graciously worked many hours as my research assistant and read and lived with various incarnations of the manuscript from the beginning to the end. I have been nurtured and sustained not only by his love, but also by his delicious cooking. Irene arrived in the final stage of the project and has constantly reminded me that a book is just a book—there are more important things in life.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

INTRODUCTION

Making Multicultural America Cold War Politics, Ethnic Celebrations, and Chinese America

IN FEBRUARY 1953, the first Chinese New Year Festival Committee placed an announcement in the major San Francisco Chinese American newspapers. It provided four reasons for hosting the Chinese New Year Festival. First, the celebration was a way to register opposition to communist China, which the committee accused of eliminating the Chinese New Year holiday even though the People's Republic of China (PRC) never banned its observation. Second, the festival would celebrate American democratic practices and defuse anti-Chinese American sentiments aroused by the outbreak of the Korean War (1950-1953). Third, the celebration would revitalize Chinatown businesses that had been afflicted by the U.S. embargo against communist China. Finally, the committee planned to use the occasion to unify non-communist Chinese Americans.1 This announcement explicitly situated the ethnic festival in a Cold War context; it was clearly a response to the direct impact of American foreign policy on the ethnic community. The "fall" of China in 1949 and the entry of the PRC into the Korean War in 1950 put Chinese Americans in a vulnerable political and economic position. Ethnic leaders therefore created a modern Chinese New Year celebration that showcased their patriotism and anticommunist conviction. These leaders argued that preserving an ethnic cultural celebration not only fended off communism, but also safeguarded the strain of American democracy that championed ethnic diversity. The i

term multiculturalism had not yet gained currency, but these leaders understood that what they called ethnic cultural retention could help fight the Cold War; by showcasing cultural diversity, the festival could help refute accounts of racial inequality in the United States.2 Ethnic festivals were also an important medium for the leaders to exercise control over the community, marginalize dissidents, project a "model minority" image, and draw tourists into Chinatown. Chinese immigrants had honored the Chinese New Year in the United States since the mid-nineteenth century, but their celebrations for the most part were private and family- or community-oriented. For the Chinese New Year dinner, bachelors congregated at the homes of those who could afford to bring families to the United States. Family associations sponsored banquets and lion dances (in which performers wearing a lion costume mimic the animal's movements) to forge bonds among members. Occasional "outside barbarians" were invited to join the celebration.3 Over the past half century the Chinese New Year Festival has grown into a major event. It has morphed from a one-day celebration into a three-week festivity and the parade route has expanded well beyond Chinatown. Originally, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce was the celebration's sole sponsor; the San Francisco Convention and Visitors' Bureau signed on as a cosponsor in 1963, and various mainstream corporations joined in 1987. Over the years, the festival moved well beyond the local level, as the Chinese New Year parade was broadcast to a national television audience and then to Hong Kong and Taiwan. This transnational cultural production and reception extended the significance of the celebration far beyond promoting local Chinatown businesses; it became vital to San Francisco's tourist industry and, more importantly, to its multicultural reputation. Mainstream corporations came to view the festival as an advertising bulletin board through which they could sell their brands and, eventually, products, because Chinese Americans were considered "model minorities" with enormous buying power, as well as "cultural brokers" who could bridge U.S. and Pacific Rim markets. Beginning in the twenty-first century, Chinese New Year celebrations even spread to the areas with few Chinese American setdements. Many of them were cosponsored by mainstream corporations. As we have already seen, San Francisco's contemporary Chinese New Year celebration was created in a time when the nation was eager to demonstrate its multicultural image. Following World War II, the federal government felt the need to symbolically incorporate Chinese Americans into the national family. Because China was an ally during the war, Chinese Amer2

INTRODUCTION

icans were rewarded with the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882—1943), which had suspended immigration for sixty years. Although they were also granted naturalization rights the same year, the annual immigration quota was set at a mere 105 individuals. The "fall" of China and the subsequent outbreak of the Korean War turned Asia into a strategically important area in the fight against communism. Meanwhile, the PRC strongly criticized the United States with regard to civil rights.4 Similar critiques from other newly decolonized Third World countries and the Soviet Union, coupled with the rise of the civil rights movement, forced the federal government to address the issue of racial inequality. It thus became imperative for the federal government to showcase the integration of Chinese Americans into the nation so that it could refute criticism and maintain its position as a democratic leader. The media's portrayal of Chinese Americans as model minorities likewise served the purpose of demonstrating that the United States had accommodated Chinese Americans and allowed them to ethnically assimilate into the nation.5 The creation of the so-called ethnic paradigm in the early twentieth century was designed to provide a framework for the assimilation of Eastern and Southern European immigrants. Horace Kallen introduced the concept of culturalpluralism to advocate the retention of distinct group culture in 1924, which became one of the two major theories of the ethnic paradigm. Another theory was led by Chicago sociologists such as Robert E. Park, who called for assimilationism, an argument that immigrants would eventually shed old-world identities and become fully incorporated into American society. The ethnic paradigm provided a theoretical framework for Eastern and Southern European immigrants to be integrated into Anglo-Saxon society and to become "Caucasian" in the mid-twentieth century, according to the historian Matthew Frye Jacobson, as ethnicity "erased race as a category of historical experience for European . . . immigrants."6 Postwar liberalism and Cold War politics extended this ethnic paradigm to other nonwhites. The underlying assumption was that the racial barrier was no longer an issue and the United States had become a "color blind" society. Proponents of this framework overlooked structural racism and insisted that nonwhites could assimilate into the Untied States through "individual efíbrt, cultural assimilation, and political accommodation."7 At the same time, the notions of cultural pluralism and assimilationism merged to become multiculturalism, as the United States strove to create an image of a multicultural nation. Racial and ethnic minorities thus were encouraged to celebrate their dual identity.8 Given the importance of the public display

INTRODUCTION

3

of nonwhite cultures as a manifestation of U.S. multiculturalism, the Chinese New Year Festival immediately became a foreign policy weapon. 9 Indeed, the State Department sent a broadcast team to record the first festival and aired it in the PRC through the Voice of America. Although it was illegal at the time, people could access it via short-wave radios. 10 Ethnic leaders also seized this opportunity to transform Chinese Americans from a racialized location into an assimilable ethnic position. The political situation in the 1950s blocked any possibility of immigrants returning to China. Instead, the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act and the addition of new naturalization rights, coupled with the Cold War political climate, inspired many to seek ethnic integration. Because nonwhites and their cultures were promoted to enhance the image of a democratic America, ethnicity became capital for Chinese Americans to counter prejudice and create business opportunities. Ethnic celebrations became a stage for them to manifest and commodify their ethnicity, as well as to display their own Americanness and patriotism. The rise of the modern Chinese New Year Festival thus suggests that Chinese Americans contributed to the onset of multiculturalism as early as the 1950s, as opposed to the common assumption that it emerged in the aftermath of the civil rights movement. 11 Since U.S. Cold War politics encouraged the public display of ethnic celebrations to endorse its multicultural image, Chinese Americans were compelled to perform certain aspects of the ethnic culture, specifically, aspects that were seen as exotic and different from the mainstream and thus fulfilled Orientalist expectations. The cultural critic Edward Said defines Orientalism as "a body of theory and practice" based on Western preconceptions that exoticize and diminish Eastern people and culture. 12 The historian John Kuo Wei Tchen has demonstrated the ways in which Americans have been fascinated with Chinese culture since the colonial period. 13 Europeans and white Americans seldom had a monopoly on Orientalism, though. 14 Chinese Americans themselves appropriated strategic Orientalism and turned Chinatown into an exotic and distinct space by incorporating pagodas, Chinese-style window patterns, and plaques featuring the eight trigrams and dragons, the most prominent Chinese architectural motifs recognized by most Americans. 15 This strategy effectively drew tourists into Chinatown and promoted tourism as the mainstay of Chinatown's economy in the early twentieth century, a time when few Chinese Americans were able to participate in the mainstream job market. 16 In 1953 Chinese American leaders again exoticized the ethnic celebration to attract tourists into Chinatown and to defuse a difficult political cli-

4

INTRODUCTION

mate. Traditional Chinese clothing, paper lanterns, pagodas, and images of renowned Chinese sights were included to cater to the fetishism of the general public who conflated the local community with the mystic Orient. Chinese Americans also fulfilled the image of a multicultural country, made possible through American ideals of freedom that encouraged ethnic cultural expression. By rooting ethnic celebration in the Cold War rhetoric of "freedom" and "democracy," ethnic leaders thereby emphasized their efforts to preserve the U.S. democratic system. Through claims that ethnic celebration was in defiance of communist China, these leaders portrayed themselves as Cold War warriors; they were now at the forefront of fighting communism. By strategically Orientalizing ethnic celebration and situating it in mainstream racial and political ideologies, community leaders strove to incorporate their own culture into the national identity. The public display of ethnic celebration likewise created a space for Chinese Americans to connect with their cultural heritage. The constant refashioning of mainstream racial ideologies into different forms compelled ethnic leaders to consistently reformulate the image of the community. In the second half of the twentieth century, the "model minority" myth was one of the most prominent racial projects imposed upon Chinese Americans—and Asian Americans in general—to combat communism, civil rights movements, and homosexuality. Most existing literature has focused on the critique of the model minority myth and its detrimental effect on Asian Americans.17 While I concur with this assessment, I want to contend that the critique negated the agency of Chinese Americans and other Asian Americans. The historian Lon Kurashige has argued that "anti-model-minority literature" fails to provide "the more enlightening challenge of understanding the past with all its contradictions and complexity."18 Building upon his argument, Making an American Festival y^^i. discuss the "contradictions and complexity" of the model minority image constructed by ethnic leaders as well as the criticism that it generated. Chinese American leaders strategically appropriated the idea of model minority and articulated it through the Miss Chinatown U.S.A. beauty pageant. By defining ideal Chinese American womanhood, ethnic leaders established the standards for Chinese American women and men—each was equipped with Confucian ideas such as obedience, self-control, and loyalty to the family, as well as higher education. This definition emphasized the work ethics that enabled Chinese Americans to achieve upward mobility and exercise middle-class consumer values. Whereas the introduction of INTRODUCTION

5

the Confucian gender norm to the community enabled men to restore their patriarchal power, the construction of a model minority man was an attempt to incorporate Chinese American males into the American family. This came at a time when the mass media marginalized them while simultaneously elevating their female counterparts as "a symbol of domesticity."19 Through accentuating cultural attributes, rather than racial distinctions, ethnic leaders strove to transform Chinese Americans into ethnic, a cultural group whose mere difference from white America was culture, so that they could assimilate into the dominant society. Such a strategy, though permitting middle-class Chinese Americans to move into white suburbs, failed to transform the Chinese American racialized status; they remained foreigners, or, to use the term coined by the historian Mae Ngai, "alien citizens."20 This strategy also generated tensions and conflicts within the community itself. Whereas most literature on the model minority myth and the general history of Chinese Americans tends to concentrate on the class dimension—influenced by the sociologist Peter Kwong's class analysis—my discussion of ethnic beauty pageants and parades not only addresses class differences within the community, but also contends that gender and sexuality are inseparable from ethnic identity formation.21 Chinese cultural traditions and labor recruiting practices discouraged female immigration. The 1875 Page Law that barred the entry of Chinese prostitutes further reduced the number of Chinese women in the community.22 The subsequent Chinese Exclusion laws again significantly deterred the arrival of women because it prohibited the entry of Chinese laborers and their family members and only allowed the admission of individuals who were merchants, students, teachers, and diplomats and their families. As a result, Chinese immigrants were forced to form a "bachelor society." The few women who managed to enter the country were portrayed as prostitutes or concubines. Chinese male immigrants were thus stereotyped as engaging in "deviant heterosexuality," a practice that lay beyond the norms of the conjugal relationship.23 Discrimination further drove male immigrants to concentrate on "'feminized' forms of work—such as laundry, restaurants, and other service-sector jobs."24 To correct this image, ethnic leaders created the Miss Chinatown U.S.A. beauty pageant to disassociate Chinese Americans from the original bachelor society stereotype. The ethnic beauty pageant also endorsed the model minority narrative, which advocated a middle-class heterosexual nuclear family, where the women were homemakers and the men breadwinners. Once middle-class heterosexual 6

INTRODUCTION

identity became a requisite of ethnic citizenship, those who dissented from mainstream American values were excluded from the ethnic family. While ethnic leaders used cultural productions to create a group identity and to manifest control over group members, the latter likewise used them to resist control and to rearticulate group identity. Influenced by the civil rights and black power movements, Chinese American youth adopted a militant masculine identity to oppose the docile and feminized model minority image. They argued that the model minority narrative failed to tackle structural class and racial issues. Instead, they called for "yellow power" and attacked racial and class inequality. Male activists, however, insisted on conflating ethnic nationalism with militant masculinity, which unfortunately reproduced gender inequality and discriminated against homosexuals. The failure to challenge heterosexuality as a prerequisite of ethnic citizenship delayed the entry of queer Chinese Americans to the ethnic celebration until 1994. The history of the Chinese New Year Festival thus reveals the complex process of Chinese American identity formation and how ethnic members negotiated different categories of identities such as ethnicity, gender, sexuality, class, and national origin. Transnational politics and economies similarly affected Chinese American identity formation and the Chinese New Year celebration.25 The marginalization of Chinese immigrants in mainstream politics compelled them to watch China's political development closely, because they believed that a stronger China could transform their racialized status. This obsession with transnational politics was closely tied to American foreign policy and obliged the ethnic community to publicly display political allegiances. For example, the anticommunist hysteria at the height of the Cold War motivated festival organizers to denounce communist China and display their loyalty to Taiwan, while the normalization of relations between the United Sates and the PRC in 1979 demanded that Chinese Americans retract their support for Taiwan and instead recognize mainland China. The impact of these two competing foreign governments and their relations with the United States not only affected the ethnic celebration, but also Chinatowns inner politics. Ethnic festivals became sites where local, national, and transnational politics contested and competed with each other for dominance. At the same time, the impact of globalization manifested itself in the ethnic celebration. In the late 1980s, widespread media coverage of Chinese Americans' high purchasing power inspired multinational corporations to begin sponsoring the Chinese New Year Festival in order to improve product marketing. The festival telecasts shown in Hong Kong

INTRODUCTION

7

similarly permitted these sponsors to reach potential consumers across the Pacific. The influence was not unidirectional, but reciprocal. Following the 1970s, Asia's unstable political climate and rapid economic growth prompted Hong Kong investors to purchase Chinatown properties, which then generated debates over the preservation and development of Chinatown. These examples demonstrate that the complexity of ethnic identity formation cannot be understood without going beyond the national boundary. Analyzing the history of the Chinese New Year Festival reveals the dynamics of both contemporary U.S. racial politics and Chinese American communities. Public celebrations are a place where governments and group leaders exercise their control over their citizens and group members. The inclusion and exclusion of certain people, activities, or objects from the public space mirror the power structure and hierarchy of a society. Nevertheless, authorities and leaders could hardly implement a total control over public behavior and space, nor could they control the audience's reactions. Following the process that legitimized the ethnic celebration in multicultural America, this study interrogates assumptions about ethnicity, race, class, and the transnational politics and economies that shaped— and were in turn reshaped by—San Francisco's Chinese Americans in the second half of the twentieth century. The legitimizing process also provoked tensions and conflicts within the ethnic community and raised questions about the definition of femininity, masculinity, and sexuality. Therefore, the history of the Chinese New Year Festival, as this book will reveal, entails the experiences of urban Chinese Americans and their attempts to reconfigure U.S. national culture and identity. Making an American Festival examines festival publications, brochures, pamphlets, television broadcasts, newspapers, oral histories, autobiographies, archival sources, and government records. Festival publications, brochures, and pamphlets from San Francisco's Chinese Chamber of Commerce demonstrate how certain Chinese American community leaders created, manipulated, and marketed group identity. Mainstream and ethnic newspapers prove to be another valuable source of information on the festivals and Chinatown. Both Chinese- and English-language materials have helped to uncover the struggles and creativity involved in crafting an ethnic identity. I have also collected oral histories from festival organizers and participants in the San Francisco Bay Area and included oral histories conducted by other scholars. In addition, I have drawn information from 8

INTRODUCTION

autobiographies to capture different voices. Archival sources and government publications have further allowed me to piece the picture together. A brief note on the terminology used in this study. I have retained original terms when possible as they reveal how Chinese Americans identified themselves. For example, in the 1950s and 1960s Chinese-language community newspapers often used the terms "Westerners" and "Chinese," while the English-language media generally employed "Chinese-Americans" or "American-Chinese." In this book, I use the term "Chinese Americans" to refer to both immigrants and their descendants. I have chosen this term because of its political implications, even though it is problematic. As the cultural critic Laura Kyun Yi Kang has pointed out, it does not allow for fluid identity.26 Although I have retained the term, I have by no means tried to argue for a fixed definition of Chinese Americans. O n the contrary, this study demonstrates that the definition is shifting and unstable. I have also tried to be careful to distinguish Chinese Americans from those who did not identify themselves as such, but rather as Taiwanese Americans, Vietnamese Chinese Americans, or Hong Kong Chinese Americans. Others even choose to identify more with their transnational identity. Unfortunately, oftentimes they have been lumped together because the mainstream and ethnic press, as well as government agencies, have categorized them as Chinese Americans. This book is organized chronologically. Certain issues are examined in different chapters, since the problems resulting from ethnic identity formation cannot be neatly categorized into a single theme or period. Chapter 1 briefly recounts the pre-i950s Chinese New Year celebration and the ever-changing political conditions facing Chinese Americans in the 1950s. Here I argue that the ethnic festival is not a direct transplant of the traditional celebration, because the Republic of China (ROC) had eliminated Chinese New Year festivities as part of the post-dynastic modernizing effort. Instead, the ethnic celebration was a way for Chinese Americans to bond among themselves, to connect with their family members and relatives in China, and to attract tourists into Chinatown. The chapter also examines the political conditions that motivated ethnic leaders to stage a public Chinese New Year celebration in 1953. Chapter 2 recounts how ethnic leaders exoticized the Chinese New Year to generate political and economic resources for their own profit. Rooted in Cold War rhetoric, the modern celebration strove to be compatible with American containment policy, manifesting ethnic cultural expression and anticommunist convictions. Accordingly, festival organizers showcased war veterans and a beauty

INTRODUCTION

9

queen alongside the ethnic culture's exotic elements on the parade route. Such a strategy was intended to demonstrate Chinese American patriotism and to lure tourists into Chinatown. However, an emphasis on the exotic elements of the festival reinforced the notion that Chinese Americans were ethnic others. A 1956 grand jury subpoena that accused many Chinese Americans of illegal immigration compelled the ethnic community to adopt a model minority image. Chapter 3 demonstrates how ethnic leaders articulated Chinese American identity through the Miss Chinatown U.S.A. beauty pageant. By redefining womanhood to celebrate Chinese beauty and modern American education, these leaders employed the model minority narrative to integrate themselves into mainstream society and reconstitute patriarchal power and middle-class manhood in the ethnic community. Community radicals and student activists later criticized this model minority image. Chapter 4 investigates the conflicts between the image promoted by festival organizers and the militant yellow power deployed by a number of youth groups. It examines various "sideshows" in the festival such as critiques, violence, an alternative celebration, and a demand to recognize Chinese New Year as a public holiday.27 This chapter focuses on the militant masculinity manifested by male and female gang members, radicals, and student activists who chose to use violence and political demonstrations to protest racial, gender, and class oppression. Their actions changed the dominant racial discourse, which now categorized Chinese Americans as a "New Yellow Peril" in addition to model minorities.28 The following two chapters continue to discuss the conflict over ethnic identity. Chapter 5 discusses how different groups used the ethnic beauty pageant to achieve their own ends, ranging from ethnic solidarity and pride to business profits and career motives. While beauty pageant contestants had become increasingly outspoken and assertive since the 1970s, their entry to the competition continued to be manipulated by community leaders and family members. Chinese American radicals and feminists also used the beauty pageant to attack class inequality and gender exploitation. Chapter 6 explores several competing cultural productions that strove for authority in ethnic identity formation. While the parade committee emphasized a transnational identity, festival program writers claimed their Americanness. Meanwhile, although the overt conflict surrounding the Chinese New Year Festival decreased in the late 1970s and 1980s, the process of negotiating ethnic identity continued both domestically and internationally. The rise of ethnic consciousness loosened the Chinese Chamber of Commerce's singu10

INTRODUCTION

lar hold on the celebration. Beginning in 1975, the Chinese Culture Center began to host an alternative Chinese New Year celebration, the Spring Festival. Moreover, the changes in U.S. foreign policy not only compelled parade organizers to alter their transnational politics, but also transformed Chinatowns internal political dynamics. The last two chapters examine how globalization and transnational queer activism affected the ethnic celebration. Chapter 7 focuses on how commercialism and the mass media entered the terrain of ethnic identity formation. By evoking exoticism and the model minority image in the English-language parade broadcasts, parade organizers successfully attracted corporate sponsorship and incorporated the Chinese New Year Festival into contemporary multicultural America. However, the counter memory presented in the Chinese-language parade broadcasts rebuffed the idea of a unified Chinese American ethnicity, instead revealing a heterogeneous community divided by geographic and linguistic barriers. Chapter 8 argues that ethnic leaders excluded queer Chinese Americans from public celebrations until 1994, in an attempt to counter the. conception of Chinese Americans as engaging in "deviant heterosexuality." Inspired by their queer counterparts in Asia, Chinese American gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgenders adopted a "coming home" strategy, rather than "coming out," to perform queerness in the ethnic celebration and upset the gendered heteronormative representation of ethnic citizenship. In order to negotiate the conservative post—Cold War political climate, ethnic leaders used the Chinese New Year Festival as a platform on which to display their patriotism and to Orientalize Chinese American identity. Ultimately, this strategy failed to challenge U.S. racial ideology, instead reinforcing Chinese American otherness—an outcome that, ironically, has provided them with a place in multicultural America. Above all, however, is the fact that the celebration has become a space in which many Chinese Americans have been able to empower themselves and identify with their ethnicity.

INTRODUCTION

ONE

Transnational Celebrations in Changing Political Climates

IN 1951 SAN FRANCISCO'S Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA) staged a Chinese New Year celebration to "support the anticommunism policy of the U.S. government." The parade departed from the C C B A headquarters on Stockton Street, taking Sutter Street to Grant Avenue, the main tourist thoroughfare, and then returned to the C C B A . With the police leading the procession, six hundred Chinese American school children and several hundred adults marched with placards stating "Down With Communism" and "Preserve Your Heritage of Freedom." The march ended with a meeting hosted by the Anti-Communist League pledging a Chinese American anticommunist stance and unfailing patriotism to the United States.1 The parade's celebratory spirit was dampened not only by a firecracker ban, but also by a holiday goods shortage, the result of an embargo against the People's Republic of China (PRC) that went into effect after it entered the Korean War in 1950. The embargo had affected Chinatown's tourist business, which depended on the ability of various curio shops to sell Chinese goods.2 Political oppression and economic recession were major concerns in many Chinese American communities in the early 1950s. As a result, ethnic leaders transformed the Chinese New Year from a private celebration into a public demonstration of their U.S. patriotism and anticommunist 12

conviction in the early 1950s. Why did community leaders choose to showcase their patriotism through the Chinese New Year and not other ethnic holidays? How did the mid-twentieth-century celebration differ from the previous decades? What can the history of Chinese New Year celebrations tell us about Chinese American history in general? Although the mainstream society had been attracted to the Chinese New Year since the mid-nineteenth century, the ethnic community failed to have a consensus over the celebration. White writers and photographers shared their observations about ethnic holidays in popular publications. The San Francisco Chronicle, a major San Francisco newspaper, covered the festivities annually. After the Republic of China (ROC) overthrew the Qing government in 1911, the Chinese American community had been obsessed with the question of whether to celebrate the Chinese New Year. Political upheaval in China was one factor that affected Chinese American attitudes toward ethnic celebration, but there were also other factors as well, including the acculturation of Chinese Americans and the relationship between China and the United States.

PRE-COLD

WAR C H I N E S E

NEW YEAR

CELEBRATION

In 1880, Catherine Baldwin shared her experience of San Francisco Chinatown's Chinese New Year celebration with readers in Harper's New Monthly Magazine. Invited by a friend to join the festivity, she was delighted to see the neighborhood decorated with red strips of paper featuring Chinese calligraphy. She wrote: "Gorgeous lanterns were suspended in front of doors or hung in rows from the numerous balconies. The flags of the Consulate, of the Six Companies, of the several temples, etc., fluttered in the breeze." She reported that firecrackers were set off to drive away evil spirits while "Celestials" dressed in new silk or satin clothes crowded the streets to pay off debts or prepare for the holiday since all stores would be closed for three days. On Chinese New Year's Eve, Chinatown residents first worshipped ancestors or family gods and then feasted. The following day, she saw that Chinatown was filled with well-dressed men who were on their way to visit friends or relatives. During this celebratory period, she observed, gambling was the most popular form of entertainment, while the Cantonese opera in the Grand Theatre on Clay Street came in second.3 The vital community described by Baldwin was the oldest Chinese American enclave in the United States. Chinese first settled on a single block of Sacramento Street and then spread north to Dupont Street (later TRANSNATIONAL CELEBRATIONS

13

T HE WAVE M

Mk

¥

Figure i. Mainstream publications were fascinated by Chinese New Year celebrations. The cover of Wave magazine, for example, printed Arnold Genthe's photos of Chinese New Year visitors in Chinatown. Courtesy of Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

renamed Grant) in the mid-iSjos. The community quickly expanded from six or eight blocks in 1876 to more than twelve blocks in 1885. New Chinese arrivals flocked to the area to open shops and establish residence. They added signs and placards to local buildings, giving the area a distinct character. The numerous Chinese arrivals or transits to or through the area increased its economic vitality. Accordingly, Chinatown emerged as a commercial and service center for many Chinese immigrants. The services provided by these immigrants, such as houseboys and laundry shops, extended to the entire city. They also successfully entered many light manufacturing industries, such as textiles, shoes, and cigars.4 During this time, district (huiguan) and family (surname) associations were established in the Chinese American community to provide social welfare services to members as well as to defend their rights. The C C B A , also known as the Chinese Six Companies, was the most prominent of these organizations. Established loosely in the 1860s and then formalized in 1882, the C C B A became the governing body of Chinatown, as all district and family associations followed its regulations. Similar institutions sprang up in other Chinese American communities, all of which submitted to the leadership of the C C B A in San Francisco. Dominated by immigrant merchants and elites, the C C B A fought against anti-Chinese legislation through the judicial system, with mostly negative results. The political disenfranchisement of Chinese immigrants propelled the C C B A into the position of broker between the ethnic community and the dominant society.5 Chinese immigrants brought old world traditions and rituals—including Chinese New Year celebrations—to the host country. These old world rituals served as a link between immigrants and their home countries and created a sense of community in their adopted country. Those who worked as houseboys or in the surrounding areas came back to Chinatown to celebrate the festivities, and district and family associations sponsored banquets and lion dances to forge bonds among members.6 The observation of ethnic traditions generated and revealed interracial tensions, which had a dampening effect. More than a dozen Chinese immigrants were arrested for violating the city's ban on fireworks in the 1876 Chinese New Year celebration.7 Firecrackers had significant cultural meanings to many Chinese Americans, as they believed that firecrackers could scare away devils and evil spirits. The practice of setting off firecrackers in the ethnic celebration started right after Chinese immigration to the United States. The ban on firecrackers, mostly for noise control, TRANSNATIONAL

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sometimes was attributed to a discriminatory policy. After all, fireworks and firecrackers had been part of Independence Day celebrations throughout U.S. history, and even though the use of fireworks was technically illegal, authorities were very lenient toward offenders on the Fourth of July.8 In part, the crackdown on the Chinese use of fireworks stemmed from sensational reportage of tong wars in the media; the police did not want fireworks to be mistaken for bullets.9 The firecracker ban was not the only factor that diminished the celebratory spirit; the elimination of the Chinese New Year celebration under the R O C turned out to have a greater effect on the ethnic celebration. After the Qing government was overthrown, the new Republican government set about modernizing China. It abolished the lunar calendar, thereby eliminating the Chinese New Year. The C C B A of San Francisco announced the new policy and urged everyone to follow it, allowing a one-year grace period to accommodate local practices. Many ethnic leaders in other parts of the country also endorsed the new policy to keep apace of Chinas modernizing effort. John Tim Loy, an ethnic spokesperson in Nevada County, California, claimed that 1912 was to be the last Chinese New Year celebration. He stated, "The revolutionary movement has brought many things to pass, and now we have president. Next Year we celebrate New Year alle [sic] same American on first day of the year." 10 As a result, fewer people honored the ethnic holiday. 11 The acculturation of the Chinese American community also played an important role in the decline of ethnic celebration. During the 1920s and 1930s Chinese New Year celebrations, visitors noticed that Chinese American flappers and their male companions dressed in Western-style suits. Mainstream newspapers also reported and printed children clad in storebought Western-style attire during the festivities. Meanwhile, community newspapers lamented the waning of ethnic celebration in the community. 12 Numerous working-class Chinese immigrants, however, continued to honor the Chinese New Year. In the days leading up to the new year, Grant Avenue was filled with booths selling holiday goods such as lilies, fruits, candies, and other delicacies. Many people decorated their houses and hung festoons, flags, and lanterns on the streets. Chinatown residents set off firecrackers if they were allowed. 13 Many Chinese Americans in other parts of the country also retained the tradition. The Los Angeles Chinatown, for example, welcomed the holiday with a dragon dance. 14 The fight over whether to maintain the ethnic tradition continued until the

l6

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post-World War II years. Defenders, many of them from the business class, argued that it enabled Chinese Americans to retain their ethnic ties and to generate profits. Moreover, they argued, the Chinese government should not intervene in a long-kept tradition. But others contended that the ethnic community should follow the modern practice. Supporters of the Nationalist government (the dominant political force in the ROC) also refused to participate in new year celebrations. This debate continued until the Cold War, when ethnic leaders came to see the celebration as a valuable tool to help conform to U.S. political ideologies. But the persistence of some Chinese Americans compelled the C C B A and other organizations to continue hosting Chinese New Year banquets and other celebratory events throughout the first half of the twentieth century. 15 This was a victory for the business community, which understood the power of Orientalist fantasy in the American imagination. The holiday decorations, the lion dances, and the booths on Grant Avenue were significant attractions for tourists. 16 In 1907 a group of merchants in San Francisco formed the Chinese Chamber of Commerce to protect and promote their business interests. Chinese Americans in other cities, such as Honolulu, New York, and Vancouver, soon followed. 17 In 1931 the Chinese Chamber of Commerce organized a Chinese New Year parade to attract visitors. The event included lion dances, concerts, and dramas. Female sexuality was another attraction: several Chinese American women dressed up as "Chinese maids" and served biscuits and tea to guests.18 Community organizations relied on traditional celebrations for fundraising. In 1927 St. Mary's Chinese School organized the "Feast of Lanterns" to raise money for the school. The Lantern Festival took place two weeks after the Chinese New Year and marked the end of the new year celebration. The event included a beauty contest, a parade, stage performances, and a cabaret. Beauty pageant candidates were judged by the number of raffle tickets they sold. The 1927 parade was larger than it had been in previous years, including mainstream and community groups for the first time. Veterans, military and ethnic school bands and drill corps, Catholic and community marching teams, and community organization cars and floats jammed the parade route. Organizers also invited the San Francisco mayor to the event and asked him to assist in selling raffle tickets. Moreover, the parade was not confined to Chinatown: it started on Market Street, proceeded to Grant Avenue, through Pacific Avenue, then Stockton Street, and ended at St. Mary's auditorium, on Stockton and Clay streets. Although rain forced

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the organizers to change the parade time and caused some groups to withdraw, the event successfully attracted numerous spectators.19 The "Feast of Lanterns" may have provided a blueprint for post—World War II Chinese New Year celebrations. While exotic traditions lured tourists into Chinatown, they did not prevent racial discrimination. During the 1935 Chinese New Year celebration, the police urged white Americans to stay away from Chinatown in light of a potential tong war that never materialized. Normally the coverage of the new year celebration did not appear on the first few pages, but the police warning was printed on the first page of the San Francisco Chronicle with a headline "S. F. Police Blockade Chinatown, Fearing Tong War Outbreak." The two-day blockade resulted in huge financial losses for Chinatown businesses. The CCBA protested "a slander on our race." It questioned the police's decision to use a "petty squabble between two families as an excuse to punish a whole population," even though the police never blocked "streets in the American section where murders [were] committed in broad daylight." In that year, the police prohibited Chinese Americans from setting off firecrackers, until Chinese American protests compelled city hall to rescind the ban.20 The Sino-Japanese war created a tremendous impact on the ethnic community and, especially, its celebration. Although most families continued their private observance, public events and celebrations such as the one staged by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce were cancelled in order to raise money for the war effort in China. Ethnic leaders also urged people not to shoot fireworks as powder was needed for the war.21 But they soon realized that public celebrations could help the ethnic community generate funds. In 1938 more than two thousand cities staged "Bowl of Rice Parties" to raise money for war relief in China. San Francisco Chinatown recreated an "Old Chinatown" which was not only decorated with colorful couplet banners and illuminated lanterns, but also was filled with Chinese American men and women clad in traditional Chinese attire. According to Chinese Digest reporter William Hoy, the event was "the most magnificent, heartwarming and spontaneous spectacle ever given in this 90-year community."22 Categorized as "almost a family affair" by the San Francisco Chronicle, it effectively enhanced Chinatown's business and collected money for the war in China. 23 The 1940 "Bowl of Rice Party" in San Francisco took place during the Chinese New Year celebratory period. In an attempt to use Chinese culture to lure more attendees, organizers staged activities such as Chinese fashion shows, Chinese con18

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certs, acrobatics, Chinese operas, and Chinese art exhibitions. T h e event was so successful that organizers hosted another "Bowl of Rice Party" in the following year.24 The amicable relations between China and the United States during World War II, coupled with the contribution of Chinese Americans both at home and in battle, significantly affected the ethnic community in the postwar years.

CHANGING

FATE

During the 1946 Chinese New Year celebration, San Francisco's Chinatown stores were brightly decorated, with holiday goods overflowing onto the sidewalks. Lions danced through the streets in a fundraising event for the Chinese Hospital. Even though no other public events were scheduled, visitors continued to pour into Chinatown during the one-week festivity.25 Chinese Americans certainly had a lot to celebrate. During World War II, they had gone from being the "yellow peril" to "heroic fighters," especially in comparison with the "bad Japanese."26 Changed perceptions also ended the anti-Chinese immigration laws. In 1943, Chinese immigrants finally gained the right of naturalization, although the immigration quota was limited to 105 persons annually.27 However, the most important phenomenon in postwar immigration was the large influx of women. By the 1960s, their children had become an important force for reform. T h e arrival of women also transformed the population from a bachelor society into a family community. World War II opened up opportunities for Chinese Americans to integrate into the mainstream job market. Many of them entered into professional and technical fields, with some even reaching managerial level (see table 1). Yet this did not mean that Chinese Americans no longer encountered job discrimination. In 1950, 21 percent of San Francisco job openings still specified the undesirability of "Orientals." 28 Meanwhile, housing desegregation enabled middle-class Chinese Americans to move from Chinatown to other parts of the city and the larger San Francisco Bay Area. Cold War politics had compelled the federal government to advocate more civil rights measures in order to gain legitimacy as the world's leading democracy. 29 In 1948 the Supreme Court declared that restrictive covenants, which had prevented Chinese from moving into white neighborhoods, were unconstitutional. 30 San Francisco's Chinatown slowly began to extend beyond its old borders. T h e southern boundary

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19

TABLE

I

Major Occupation Groups of the Chinese by Gender, 1940 and 1950 1940

1950

Male

Female

Male

Female

33,625

2,829

40,111

8,278

3,422

750

4,512

3,210

Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers

448

9

1,348

42

Farm and farm managers

458

5

574

18

20

11

65

29

Occupation Total employed 3 Clerical, sales, and kindred workers

Farm laborers (unpaid family workers) Farm laborers (wage workers and farm foremen)

917

6

547

19

Laborers (except farm and mine)

259

19

782

47

Operatives and kindred workers

7,502

750

6,574

1,711

Private household workers

1,954

287

746

514

812

216

2,511

914

7,250

253

8,920

658

10,515

562

13,000

940

68

24

532

176

Professional, technical, and kindred workers Proprietors, managers, and officials (except farm) Service workers (except private household workers) Not reported

SOURCES: Seventeenth Census of the United States, "Non-White Population by Race: 1950": 3B-42 and Sixteenth Census of the United States, "Characteristics of the Non-White Population by Race: 1940": 44; Rose Hum Lee, The Chinese in the United States of America (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, I960), 48. a Excludes those on emergency work.

inched toward Bush Street, while the northern one merged into the North Beach Italian American community. The eastern border moved toward Sansome Street and the western one spread into the small valley located between Nob Hill and Russian Hill, reaching Van Ness Street. The largest outlying settled areas were in the middle-class residential districts of Sunset and Richmond. 31 However, even though Chinese Americans had begun to move beyond old boundaries, discrimination continued to exist in certain neighborhoods, which remained closed to outsiders. 32 Overall, Chinese Americans were optimistic in the post-World War II years. Nevertheless, they would soon find that they were facing an important political hurdle: the Cold War. TRANSNATIONAL

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COLD WAR

YEARS

The whole atmosphere here then

wasjear.

— f r a n k l i n w o o , quoted in Longtime Californ', 216

The political climate of the early Cold War period often placed Chinese Americans under intense scrutiny. In 1949, when communists wrested control of mainland China and established the PRC, Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist government (the ROC) retreated to Taiwan. Americans felt betrayed by the loss of the mainland and made distinctions between Mao Zedong's communist China and Chiang Kai-shek's capitalist China. As one official of the State Department put it, "Because of what we did while others were treating them badly, we think the Chinese ought to be grateful to us. I run into this idea often, in our way of writing about China policy, our acts in China, back to Boxer days and John Hay. The Chinese should be grateful. That's why we're so riled up about Red China. That they should go and join up with the Russians makes us doubly mad." 33 The PRC's involvement in the Korean War (1950—53) intensified resentment toward the Chinese. Mainstream media portrayed them as "inhuman," "treacherous," and "deceitful, fighting hordes" who were killing "our boys," a drastic departure from the World War II-era image of Chinese as "heroic" allies.34 This resentment was projected onto Chinese Americans. It was not unusual for immigrant communities to become suspect when their ancestral countries were at war with the United States. German Americans had had to demonstrate that they were n o percent American in World War I. And although Japanese Americans wasted no time in pledging their loyalty to the United States, they were still subjected to interment during World War II. Likewise, Chinese Americans faced hostilities after the outbreak of the Korean War. Shopkeepers and restaurateurs along Grant Avenue noticed that visitors were hostile, and angry Americans even ransacked a restaurant.35 "It was pretty bad," American-born Chinatown resident Him Mark Lai recalled, "After China entered the war, [Chinese Americans] were treated like Japanese." 36 Chemist and Chinatown resident Franklin Woo noted: "The McCarthy terror didn't affect Chinatown as much as it could have. . . . But still I was very careful about circumventing things when I talked. You had to make sure you didn't sound anti-American. Actually, I think the Korean War had a greater impact on Chinatown than McCarthyism. The whole atmosphere here then was fear. If you weren't careful, you could be thrown into a concentration camp." 37 This fear was TRANSNATIONAL

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heightened when Congress passed Tide II of the McCarran Internal Security Act (Emergency Detention Act) in 1950, which legalized the internment of communists during a national emergency.38 Many community newspapers thus warned Chinese Americans of their vulnerable positions. Dai-Ming Lee editorialized in Chinese World, a bilingual ethnic newspaper: "We must remember that the present position of the Chinese people is a difficult one, particularly now when the Chinese Communists have invaded Korea. Any careless act could easily become grounds for misunderstanding."39 The Chinese Press, an English-language community newspaper, also published the following message in bold print: "Truce may be pending in Korea, but all over the world the ruthless march of Communis [m] still is advancing. As long as the Communists are in power, the mother country of our origin, it is possible for eruptive public feelings against us. We must continue our good-will public relations and be on constant alert. . . . For the year ahead, we face the challenge of being still better American citizens . . . [and] to further understand our fellow Americans of other racial extractions and endeavor for their understanding of us."40 Chinese Americans understood that since they were perceived to be foreigners, their lives were contingent upon U.S. foreign policy. To counter the hostility, ethnic leaders proposed to reduce racial tensions by being "better" citizens. Although the U.S. government never did intern Chinese Americans during the Cold War, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) harassed many of them. For example, beginning in 1951, the INS required blood tests for both Chinese immigrant applicants and their parents (generally fathers) to determine if they had legal relatives in the United States. Other medical tests such as Xrays and dental examinations were used to determine the age of the applicants. The INS and the FBI subjected the ethnic community to intrusive investigations and yet never found any suspected communists.41 This absence of communists did not prevent federal agents from investigating Chinese Americans. On the contrary, the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 armed them with new power to deport anyone who had connections with communist regimes, even if they were naturalized citizens. Because the FBI had a hard time finding evidence to prosecute Chinese American leftist organizations, it began to seek the assistance of the INS. The FBI's quest to find communists thus legitimized the INS to "link immigration fraud with subversive activities." The INS saw the communist pretext as a perfect opportunity to crack down on illegal immigration. As a result, the 22

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federal government began to use the connection between illegal immigrants and "Red" Chinese to investigate potential suspects.42 Agents would randomly stop Chinese Americans in various Chinatowns to see if they had proper documents. As Maurice Chuck of San Francisco recalled, "They would stop you on the street. Harassed you and asked you all sorts of questions, push you around. It became a daily part of our lives in Chinatown during that time."43 The FBI even questioned children in playgrounds or schools, thereby motivating some parents to instruct their children on how to answer questions. As one resident recalled, "One day, my mother told me to use a different name in school."44 This harassment was a constant source of anxiety for many, especially those who entered the country as "paper sons." Paper sons claimed to be the children of either merchants or U.S. citizens, two groups that were allowed entry to the United States during the Exclusion Era (1882—1943). While some paper sons were in fact legitimate, many Chinese used this practice to circumvent the Chinese Exclusion Acts.45 If the real identity of a paper son were to be discovered, he would be deported to China. This anxiety was not specific to the Bay Area. Helen Zia recalled that her father, who lived in suburban New Jersey, was suspected of communist leanings because he expressed his political opinions in Chinese newspapers. FBI agents likewise questioned Tung Pok Chin, a laundry operator in New Jersey, even though Chin had served in the U.S. Navy during World War II.46 The INS did deport or jail some Chinese Americans, especially those who were PRC sympathizers or members of leftist organizations, such as Min Qing (the Chinese-American Democratic Youth League) and the China Daily News. Established in San Francisco in 1946, Min Qing—a social, educational, and cultural group—had a large Chinese-language collection in its library, including works written by communist Chinese. Because of members' sympathy to the political developments in the PRC, government agents questioned their American patriotism. For example, when American-born Rolland Lowe enlisted for the Korean War, an intelligence agent visited his military compound in Korea to investigate his loyalty background. Moreover, when the INS found that other members or their ancestors had entered the country illegally, it stripped them of their citizenship or sent them to jail. Maurice Chuck was one such victim. He had immigrated to the United States in 1947 with his father, who had entered as a paper son. His membership in Min Qing triggered the INS to investigate his father's immigration fraud. Similar investigations compelled members to finally disband Min Qing in 1959.47 TRANSNATIONAL CELEBRATIONS

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The FBI also scrutinized leftist newspapers. The China Daily News—a Chinese-language newspaper supported by New York's Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance (CHLA), with a focus on the latest developments in the PRC—became the target of an FBI investigation in 1951. The newspaper had received $150 for publishing an advertisement for a PRC bank that helped Chinese Americans wire money to their families in China. Authorities accused the paper of violating the Trading with the Enemy Act, which forbade any monetary exchange with enemies of the United States. As a result, Eugene Moy, editor of the China Daily News, went to jail along with three laundry workers who had sent money home. Several newspaper workers committed suicide or were deported; altogether, sixty-five hundred were investigated by the FBI. The China Daily News was not alone. The China Weekly and the Chung Sai Yat Po, both published in San Francisco, were shut down when frightened readers cancelled subscriptions and businesses rescinded advertisements.48 Surviving community newspapers—except Chinese World, the Chinese Pacific Weekly, and the China Daily News, which still maintained dissenting voices—shifted to proNationalist and old-establishment stances. Anticommunist hysteria and the ideological war between the PRC and the United States forced the ethnic community to grow closer to the Nationalists in Taiwan. This was not the first time that the interests of Chinese America were interwoven with Chinese politics. The competition between Sun Yat-sen's republican Xingzhonghui (later reorganized as the Tongmenghui and then the Kuomintang, i.e., the KMT or Nationalist Party) and the imperial Baohuanghui was entangled with the question of Chinese exclusion.49 Political disenfranchisement encouraged Chinese immigrants to identify with China during the Exclusion Era. They thus actively participated in homeland politics, hoping that a strong China could defend their rights. When Japan invaded China in 1937, the KMT seized the opportunity to exploit Chinese American ethnic and nationalist sentiments and successfully recruited the leaders of the old establishment to gain political influence in Chinatown.50 In the early Cold War era, the KMT profited from anticommunist hysteria and the PRC embargo to advance its political, cultural, and economic influence in Chinatown. With the help of the FBI and the INS, it successfully purged PRC supporters. Any anti-Nationalists or leftists were accused of being communists and suffered harassment from the FBI and the INS. New York's Kang Jai Association, which was sympathetic to the PRC, was the subject of an INS raid just before the 1951 Chinese New Year. Agents 24

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"claimed to have seized 'tremendous amounts' of alleged Communist literature." As a result, eighty-three people were detained. 51 Meanwhile, the Nationalist government of Taiwan rewarded supporters, such as those in the C C B A , with governmental positions. Additionally, the Taiwan government sponsored newspapers and activities in Chinatown to discourage possible pro-PRC cultural events.52 The embargo against the P R C provided Taiwan with an opportunity to export mushrooms, Chinese artwork, and other light industry goods to the United States. It thus became a dominant political, cultural, and economic force in Chinatown for more than twenty years.53 Only after Nixon's visit to the PRC in 1972 and the normalization of relations in 1979 did the Nationalist government gradually lose control in Chinatown. Yet the controversy between two competing foreign governments continued to be a focal point in the Chinese American community in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Conservative groups such as the C C B A also manipulated the anticommunist hysteria to enhance their power in the community. The C C B A of San Francisco enjoyed full political control until the 1930s, when the growing popularity of Marxist ideology in China and the United States and the increase of class and ethnic consciousness among workers and students precipitated the emergence of pro-labor, pro-left groups, and student organizations in Chinatown. For example, the C H L A was established in 1933 in New York for the welfare of laundry workers. 54 Workers in San Francisco also formed the Chinese Workers Mutual Aid Association ( C W M A A ) in 1937 to address working conditions and to study Marxist theory. Students in New York formed the Chinese Youth Club (Niuyue huaqiao qingnian jiuguo tuan) in 1937, while their counterparts in San Francisco established the Chinese Youth League, the predecessor of the Min Qing organization. 55 These student groups welcomed both men and women from all class backgrounds, in contrast to the male merchant dominance of the old establishment. Some women even assumed leadership roles in Min Qing. 5 6 Widespread anticommunist hysteria during the Cold War encouraged the C C B A to take a loyalty pledge to the Nationalist government. The Nationalists also granted political and economic interests to C C B A leaders, which further motivated the group to identify with Taiwan. The C C B A thus manipulated the anticommunist hysteria to eliminate its rivals, branding those who criticized either the Nationalists or the old establishment as communists. 57 Even those who urged Chinese Americans to shy away from transnational political conflicts and focus instead on domestic issues were black listed. Gilbert Woo, for instance, was under

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constant attack for not supporting the Nationalist government in his Chinese-language newspaper, the Chinese Pacific Weekly. In order to consolidate its power, the old establishment and proNationalist groups invited federal agents to scrutinize leftist and antiNationalist organizations. Agents recruited Chinese Americans as government informants in order to penetrate community organizations, thus creating an opportunity for the federal government to intervene in community affairs previously closed to the outside world. The presence of Chinese informants unsurprisingly created anxiety among community members. 58 Consequently, pro-Nationalist groups began to gain control in Chinatown; by the early 1960s, Chinese American leftist groups had virtually disappeared.59 The U.S. embargo against the PRC further exacerbated the effects of political repression.60 T h e embargo forced the closure of Chinese dry goods stores, grocery stores, and pharmacies. Many curio and souvenir stores had to stock Japanese toys and gift articles.61 Not only did tourism decline, but many Chinese Americans also stopped coming to Chinatown for fear of being questioned by the FBI or INS. Even though Chinese Americans faced political persecution from both the U.S. federal government and the Nationalist government of Taiwan, the Cold War political climate compelled politicians and the press to denounce racism. San Francisco Mayor General Richard Mittels perhaps sensed the antagonism when he issued a statement that praised Chinese Americans as patriots who had "served with distinction" in the last war. He further stated that they did not need to fear anti-Chinese sentiments. A San Francisco Chronicle editorial, printed on December 2,1950, noted that the "Chinese in Chinatown are predominantly anti-Communist. . . . To show resentment of them merely plays the Communist game of setting races against each other." The editor concluded: "Most Chinese are Americans, too, and anyone who display[s] a prejudice toward them on [sic] discriminate, mass basis is displaying a lack of respect for American citizenship itself." 62 The rhetoric of "good Chinese" and "bad Chinese" was used to remind the general public that because Chinese Americans were wartime patriots, they should be regarded as good Americans. Ethnic leaders certainly understood that they had to exploit the image of the anticommunist "good Chinese." Even though Chinese immigrants were able to obtain citizenship starting in 1943, this did not guarantee protection, especially considering the precedent of Japanese American internment. As such, they needed to demonstrate their patriotism to gain acceptance. These 26

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circumstances motivated ethnic leaders on both coasts to pledge "100 percent loyalty to Uncle Sam." Albert K. Chow, Democratic Party leader and the unofficial mayor of San Francisco's Chinatown, claimed that many "young Chinese-Americans are enlisting to fight the Communists right now. We plan all-out support for America's war effort. [We] will automatically back American policy in the Far East or anywhere else."63 The leaders not only pledged their loyalty, but also adamantly emphasized that the majority of Chinese were not communists. Shavey Lee, the unofficial mayor of New York's Chinatown, emphasized that "Chinese people on the whole—and that means 99 percent of them—whether in China, America, or any other place in the world, are N O T Communists." 64 At the same time, other leaders underscored the fact that the majority of Chinese Americans were born in the United States. George Moy, executive secretary of the O n Leong Merchants' Association of Washington, D.C., remarked, "Why should there be any sympathy for the Communists? The people here are second, third, fourth, and even fifth generation Americans. This is our home." 65 Indeed, about half of the Chinese Americans were native born in the mid-1950s.66 Unfortunately, the aforementioned loyalty pledge and the efforts made by Chinese Americans during the 19 51 Chinese New Year celebration, as described in the beginning of this chapter, failed to protect them from discrimination. Not only did they continue to suffer from political, social, and economic oppression, but they also found themselves in a catch-22 position involving monetary extortion by the PRC. While the Treasury Department allowed other Americans to send money to rescue relatives who were under arrest in China, Chinese Americans were prohibited from doing so, and were accused of violating the Trading with the Enemy Act. 67 The problems Chinese Americans faced in the 1950s compelled them to assimilate into mainstream society. For example, Tung Pok Chin of New Jersey began to celebrate American holidays and redecorated his laundry shop and living quarters to "look as American as possible." He even discarded Chinese newspapers, only displaying Life Magazine and the New York Times in his store.68 Lai recalled similar occurrences in San Francisco. "A lot of Chinese tended not to stress Chineseness at all. . . . People from that generation did not know much Chinese. People moved to suburbs [and] did not go to Chinese school any more. They didn't talk much about China." 69 Many of them therefore chose to shy away from ethnic cultures, as they believed that minimizing their Chineseness would demonstrate their American patriotism. However, they soon found out that assimilation was not a good strategy; the Cold War motivated the United States

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to reformulate its national identity as "a pluralistic nation of immigrants," which encouraged ethnic minorities to celebrate their dual identity.70

CONCLUSION

The Chinese New Year celebration in the United States meant more than an indication of ethnic retention. While Chinese immigrants brought this old world tradition with them to maintain their transnational ties, they also used the occasion to forge bonds among themselves. But even old world traditions proved to be unstable, as shown by the Republican government's decision to eliminate the Chinese New Year celebration. Accordingly, the ethnic community was pressured to do the same. Nevertheless, ethnic bonds and economic profits eventually outweighed political concerns and motivated Chinese Americans to continue to honor the ethnic holiday. The celebration, in fact, became a tool for the community to attract tourists into Chinatown and to raise money for the Sino-Japanese War during World War II. While the victory of World War II temporarily brought Chinatown back to a celebratory mode, the fall of China to the communists and the treacherous political climate in Cold War America again subjected Chinese Americans to vulnerable political and economic positions. Ethnic leaders thus considered the Chinese New Year celebration as an important occasion to voice Chinese American patriotism and to rescue troubled Chinatown businesses. Yet this time, these leaders did not simply sell the exotic characteristics of the ethnic celebration, but also situated it in Cold War rhetoric and policy.

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TRANSNATIONAL CELEBRATIONS

TWO

"In the Traditions of China and in the Freedom of America" The Making of the Chinese New Year Festival

ON THE EVENING OF FEBRUARY 15, 1953, the parade's Grand Marshal,

Corporal Joe Wong, a veteran who had been blinded in Korea, and two enlisted female Air Force officers, Jessie Lee and Anna Tome, led the first modern Chinese New Year parade in San Francisco's Chinatown. In Wong's wake came bagpipers, the Sixth Army band, and a unit of Chinese American war veterans, followed by cars from the San Francisco mayor's office, the Anti-Communist League, the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA), and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. St. Mary's Chinese Drum and Bugle Corps and other Chinese school marching bands added to the parade's atmosphere. Half an hour later, celebrities, including the radiant Miss Chinatown festival queen, and a dragon dance jammed the parade route.1 Why did parade organizers include veterans alongside dragon dances? Why did they juxtapose the Anti-Communist League car with the beauty queen float? The inclusion of these elements in the parade suggests that festival organizers wanted not only to demonstrate their patriotism and anticommunist convictions, but also to sell Chinese American gendered and sexualized ethnicity. The loss of mainland China to the communists in 1949 and the entry of the People's Republic of China (PRC) into the Korean War in 1950 threatened to make Chinese Americans virtual "enemies" of the United States. Cold War politics and rhetoric, however, provided ethnic 29

leaders with an opportunity to stage an ethnic celebration and reposition themselves in mid-twentieth-century American race relations. Although Chinese Americans were granted the right of naturalization in 1943, legal citizenship did not free them from being viewed as perpetual foreigners or "alien citizens." 2 In fact, they became even more vulnerable under Cold War politics. This was not a new threat to Chinese Americans. They had used litigation, strikes, and boycotts to negotiate treacherous political, economic, and social conditions since the mid-nineteenth century. But this situation was more precarious, especially with the precedent of Japanese American internment during World War II.3 To counter the political difficulties, a group of Chinese American male leaders in San Francisco combined both Cold War rhetoric and Orientalist imagination to reclaim their status as Americans. They not only emphasized the compatibility between ethnic culture and mainstream American tradition, but also contended that the expression of ethnic culture could be seen as a manifestation of American domestic freedom, which thereby supported U.S. Cold War politics. This chapter discusses how certain Chinese American male leaders in San Francisco responded to the political and economic difficulties of the Cold War through the creation of the contemporary Chinese New Year Festival. These men belonged to the middle-class and were highly influential in Chinatown politics and business, thus facilitating their roles as cultural brokers between the ethnic community and mainstream society. By this time, Chinese Americans had long been Orientalized by their fellow Americans—in other words, they were portrayed as exotic and distinctly different from white Americans. These leaders understood that only by appealing to the American Orientalist imagination could they distinguish themselves from the Red Chinese and, in addition, draw more tourists into Chinatown. Nevertheless, they did not simply emphasize exotic traditions; they instead rooted ethnic cultural preservation in the Cold War rhetoric of "freedom" and "democracy." As such, the leaders actively chose certain "Chinese" and "American" cultural attributes to construct an ethnicity that presented no threats to the United States. The construction of a nonthreatening ethnic identity was not enough, however. Since the mid-nineteenth century, the perception of a "bachelor society," coupled with the imagery of Chinese immigrant women as prostitutes, resulted in an idea that Chinese Americans were imbued with an excessive and dangerous sexuality.4 To represent Chinese America via an ethnic beauty queen allowed male leaders to appeal to the Orientalist

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imagination. It also produced a non-threatening gendered (feminized) and sexualized ethnicity at the height of the Cold War. As the embodiments of exoticism and Confucian gender norms, Miss Chinatown beauty queens became a means for these leaders to reassert patriarchal control and attract mainstream tourists.

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In 1953 a Chinatown businessman, Henry Kwock (better known as H. K.) Wong, initiated the idea of the modern Chinese New Year Festival. Born into a family of twelve in San Francisco's Chinatown in 1907, Wong had had to quit school in the seventh grade to help support his family. A subsequent job at the local Bank of Canton allowed him to meet many businesspeople; eventually, his ambition propelled him into the neighborhood s elite. He was executive secretary of the CCBA in 1943 and later became president of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. Moreover, Wong wrote for several community newspapers, such as Chinese World, a bilingual publication, and the Chinese Digest, an English-language news source. Later in his life he helped found the Chinese Historical Society and became a director of the San Francisco Convention and Visitors' Bureau. His public relations acumen led to his involvement in almost every major ethnic event, permitting him to become a broker between the community and city hall.5 Wong viewed the Chinese New Year Festival as a way to change the public image of Chinese Americans. "I always saw the newspaper headlines 'Chinatown Gambling Raid' . . . in the pre-Chinese New Year Festival days. I always grumbled, 'What's the matter with them? There are so many good things about Chinese and our Chinatown. Why do they play up this gambling?" Wong wanted the festival to showcase Chinese "art, music, dance" and fashion and to "invite our American friends to share in this happiness and to appreciate and learn things about [the] Chinese."6 The printed announcements of the festival in the first few years echoed these concerns. Given the difficult political situation facing the ethnic community at the time, the committee urged each Chinese American to gain support from mainstream society in order to safeguard their ethnic culture. More importantly, they were encouraged to defend American cultural diversity. With the world separated into "democracy" and "communism," these leaders felt compelled to promote the free expression of the ethnic culture as a form of democracy.7 " I N THE T R A D I T I O N S OF C H I N A "

31

Wong then enlisted male professionals and businesspeople to form a Chinese New Year Festival committee.8 John Kan was one of the members. John was born in 1907 in Portland, Oregon. Before his family moved to San Francisco, he and his sister peddled strawberries after school and sold cha shew bau (steamed Chinese meat buns) to other Chinese Americans from the nearby gold mines in Grass Valley, California on Sundays.9 Poverty forced Kan to discontinue his education after grammar school and become an apprentice in a Chinatown grocery store. During the Depression, he did various odd jobs, working as a janitor, cook, and dishwasher. In 1935 Kan and his partners opened the Fong-Fong Bakery Fountain, with a modern storefront and uniformed staff, which became a popular hangout for American-born Chinese. Following a failed attempt to restore "Old Chinatown," a project that intended to bring back the pre-1906 Chinatown, his business finally took off after he started a luxury Chinese restaurant. With an Orientalized decoration that emphasized Chinese motifs and a glass enclosed kitchen, the restaurant effectively attracted affluent white customers. 10 Whereas Wong and Kan came from humble families, Paul Louie, the first Chinese New Year Parade chairperson, was from the merchant class. He was born in China in 1924 and immigrated to San Francisco at the age of four. His well-to-do background enabled him to attain a college degree from the University of California, Berkeley as well as study at Hastings Law School. However, he quit law school to join his family's import and export business. Louie was successful in all of his business ventures, ranging from banking and real estate to restaurants. As a result, he was an active member in the Chinatown business circle: he became involved in the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and was the principal force behind the construction of the Portsmouth Square Garage, which helped to alleviate Chinatown's parking problems at the time. These committee members attested to the importance of the business class in shaping the future of Chinatown and the rise of 1.5- and secondgeneration Chinese in the ethnic community. 11 The Chinese Chamber of Commerce was the main power behind the public celebration, although in the first few festivals it chose to forgo the idea of sponsoring the festival, fearing liability.12 Immigrant merchants were the dominant force in the ethnic community as they possessed both economic and linguistic advantages. But in the 1950s, the American-born generation began to replace their predecessors. The entry of American-born Chinese to mainstream jobs in post—World War II years significantly decreased the power of the 32

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old establishment in the ethnic community.13 Nevertheless, this failed to apply to Chinese American women: while their male counterparts assumed more leadership in the ethnic community, they continued to be excluded from the inner circle of power. For example, even though women bore the responsibility of fundraising (via a fashion show and beauty pageant) and also took on important functions such as announcers, performers, and the master of ceremonies, they were denied a role in virtually all decision making processes. For male leaders, the observance of the Chinese New Year resonated with U.S. Cold War ideology. In 1962 James H. Loo, president of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, wrote: "In the turmoil of the world situation, we citizens of Chinese ancestry want to take this opportunity to demonstrate to the peoples of the world, particularly those who are living behind the iron and bamboo curtains, how American democracy really works. . . . We, like many Europeans, who came to settle in this free land, are also proud of our ancient culture and endeavor to retain the best of our heritage. The New Year celebration exemplifies the expression of such a love of freedom and liberty."14 Like other European Americans, Chinese Americans embraced the concepts of freedom and liberty, which set them apart from communist Chinese. Moreover, Loo maintained that the Chinese in America had the same rights to retain their cultural heritage as their European counterparts. Such retention of the ethnic culture, therefore, not only articulated Chinese American patriotic sentimentality, but also depicted a certain kind of American democracy, one that trumpeted ethnic diversity. The mainstream media also considered the ethnic celebration an important manifestation of American freedom. The San Francisco Chronicle claimed that the festival asserted a dual faith "in the traditions of China and in the freedom of America." Because China had fallen into communist hands, it was American freedom that preserved Chinese traditions. Indeed, the burden of preserving ethnic traditions became even greater for Chinese Americans after communists took over China. As Wong stated, "We have rich traditions, colorful legends, and authentic pageantry. . . . I would like to see our wonderful traditions maintained, upkept, and used," especially when the assumption was that communist China was destroying the traditional culture.15 The organizers accused the PRC of suppressing the Chinese New Year celebration, even though it never forbade the observation of the holiday. Ironically, it was republican China that had eliminated the tradition after overthrowing the imperial government in 1911. "IN

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Nonetheless, the first parade chairperson, Paul Louie, claimed, "In communist China, the traditional holiday is not observed officially any more," which compelled the committee to stage "an ancient Chinese celebration for all the free world to see." 16 Rooting ethnic identity in cultural practices such as observing ethnic holidays, the leaders therefore highlighted those people who maintained these traditions as the only "real" Chinese. Such a strategy promoted the Chinese New Year observance in the United States as it served as an affront to communist China and asserted American democracy and multiculturalism.17 Moreover, it enabled Chinese Americans to become ethnic, because it was culture, not race, that defined them, thereby allowing them to ethnically assimilate into white America. Once Chinese Americans became real Chinese, exotic Oriental characteristics were mapped onto Chinatown. In order to attract the general public and promote commercial purposes, ethnic leaders accentuated Chinatown as an exotic and foreign place. T. Kong Lee, a festival organizer, wrote: "If you have been to the Orient, a visit to San Francisco Chinatown will vividly refresh your memory of your trip. If you have not been to the Orient, your trip to Chinatown will be as if you were visiting Formosa [Taiwan] or Hong Kong—both entertaining and educational."18 Lee cast San Francisco's Chinatown in the image of Taiwan or Hong Kong, not communist China, to attract tourists. Moreover, the president of the C C B A specifically urged women and children in Chinatown to dress in "traditional-style" clothing to increase "the Oriental color" during the festival period. Since most Chinese immigrants in the 1950s already had adopted Western clothing, dressing traditionally did not represent ethnic retention, but rather fed the anticipation of mainstream spectators and their Orientalist fantasy. Significantly, leaders only urged women and children to wear ethnic clothing since they signified a non-threatening exoticism, while men, in contrast, risked evoking the old image of the "yellow peril." With this effort, the leaders successfully transformed Chinatown into a safe place for mainstream consumers. During the 1953 festival, for example, newspapers reported that on Chinese New Years day, restaurants, pubs, and souvenir stores in Chinatown did three to five times the usual business.19 Reviving Chinatown's businesses was also important to preserving ethnic traditions. After the embargo, the need to revitalize Chinatown's economy surfaced in almost every major announcement and meeting. At the end of 1953, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce held an essay competition on how to bolster the Chinatown economy.20 Many businessmen volunteered and donated money for the festival with the hope that a public 34

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celebration would draw more tourists to Chinatown. The CCBA and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, whose members included almost all local businesses, asked all stores to hang decorations during the festival in order to attract tourists. The festival committee likewise waged a media campaign. In order to prepare the public for the celebration, the festival committee appeared on television shows and radio programs to explain the meaning of the ethnic holiday.21 It also invited members of the mainstream and ethnic media to parties where it provided information on festival and holiday customs and traditions. Moreover, the committee set up a press area with special lighting on a street corner to facilitate coverage of the event.22 In order to attract tourists, the leaders invented the myth that the modern festival had a long tradition. In 1956, for example, newspapers described the three-year-old parade as a "traditional grand parade." The San Francisco Chronicle also reimagined the parade's origin by linking it with the mythical Chinese patriarch, Huang Di (the Yellow Emperor), who is said to have established his imperial title circa 2698 B.C.E. Each year, newspaper coverage reasserted the parades continuity with the past by connecting the ethnic holiday with the Chinese calendar and zodiac. 23 By stressing the festival's ancient origin, the Chronicle reduced potential dangerous associations with Red China and posited Chinatown's version of Chinese culture as authentic. Chinatown leaders also had some success in getting mainstream politicians to parrot their patriotic goals. The Chinese New Year's greetings sent by officials and celebrities emphasized the patriotism and contributions of Chinese Americans. Politicians' compliments on their patriotism and contributions were not new. But this time, the rhetoric categorized them as citizens. For example, a message from the Secretary of the Interior stated in 1954: "The Chinese in San Francisco have established a brilliant record for patriotism and good citizenship and have demonstrated in their contact with the rest of the community that they are a force for constructive community betterment."24 California Governor Goodwin Knight likewise sent a similar greeting the same year: Behind "the annual observance of Chinese New Year [is] 4,000 years of colorful history. It is a splendid thing that such groups as our Chinese-American neighbors can in this country keep alive their ancestral traditions and at the same time contribute so much to the preservation of the American heritage of freedom and individual dignity through responsible citizenship."25 In typical form, this passage emphasized "responsible citizenship." The reason that Chinese Americans were included in this way in "IN

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mainstream society was a result of their patriotism and their record of being good citizens. Moreover, it affirmed their efforts to preserve American freedom through retaining ethnic cultural celebrations. The State Department also regarded the ethnic celebration as an effective way of demonstrating U.S. democracy. Using nonwhite cultures as propaganda was a common tactic deployed by the State Department to fend off foreign critics and showcase racial equality.26 It sent a broadcast team to Chinatown to record the event and publicized it to the P R C listeners through the Voice of America broadcast.27 Still, festival organizers were unable to avoid the Cold War crossfire. For example, in 1954, in order to add to the color of the festival, organizers purchased costumes and artifacts from Hong Kong. The San Francisco Customs Office detained the shipment because of suspicion that it had originated in China, which would have violated the embargo. After several appeals to no avail, festival organizers were compelled to stage a celebration without the detained goods.28

BICULTURAL

CELEBRATIONS

Thefestival will be a showcase of [the] integration of4,000years of traditions and rituals with modern American customs. — P A U L LOUIE, quoted in Chinese World, February 9, ¿953

In 1953 the Chinese New Year Festival included Chinese art shows, street dances, martial arts, music, sports, a fashion show, and the headline evening parade. One year later, the committee not only extended the festivities from one to three days, but also added the coronation of a beauty queen and Chinese movies to the program. Beginning in 1956, the festival introduced a smaller daytime parade designed to lure more people to the larger evening parade. Four years later, the festival committee and city hall invited Chinese and mainstream organizations to participate in the parade, but it required each float's theme to display ethnic contributions to the growth of California. In 1958 organizers expanded the ethnic beauty pageant, a primary attraction, into a nationwide event, "Miss Chinatown U.S.A." Overall, the committee designed the activities in the festivals to be "a showcase of [the] integration of 4,000 years of traditions and rituals with modern American customs." 29 The parade was the most prominent display of such integration with an

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Figure 2. The V F W Chinatown Post participated in a marching unit with returned Korean War veterans. Courtesy of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce.

emphasis on ethnic patriotism. It included American customs such as marching bands to manifest Chinese American loyalty to the United States. Instead of showcasing an immigrant pioneer spirit as exemplified in the ethnic celebrations of the 1920s, ethnic and racial minorities often militarized their celebrations in the Cold War period: veterans usually replaced pioneers on the parade route.30 As noted earlier, in 1953 Chinese American veterans of three wars (World War I, World War II, and the Korean War) marched in the parade. In 1954 Marine Lieutenant Thomas Lee, an officer recovering from wounds suffered on the Korean front, was selected to lead the parade.31 These veterans' presence showcased Chinese American participation in the major battles, thereby demonstrating their patriotism. The female veterans also embodied a representation different from the hyperfemininity and exoticism of the beauty queens, one of the main attractions in the parade. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine bands followed the ethnic veterans. Community newspapers such as Chinese World interpreted the mainstream military bands' participation as "a sign of cooperation between

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Chinese and Americans."32 This statement implied that Chinese Americans were equal partners with other Americans in mid-twentieth-century U.S. patriotism. Behind the bands came cars bearing local, military, and international government dignitaries. Nationalist China sent representatives to the parade and the coronation party. Chinese school marching teams prominently displayed the Nationalist flag alongside the American flag. In addition, the festival attracted politicians interested in soliciting votes. Now that Chinese Americans were eligible for citizenship, mainstream politicians had begun paying more attention to them.33 As an indication of the parade's growing importance, former Vice President Richard Nixon and California Governor Edmund Brown, who were then competing in the 1962 California gubernatorial race, were featured in the parade. The San Francisco Chronicle thus claimed that the parade had become a space for "an Occidental political rally."34 The parade also included a car sponsored by the Anti-Communist League. In order to avoid political persecution and deportation, the CCBA formed the Anti-Communist League on November 14, 1950, to show its loyalty to the United States. According to Pei Chi Liu, a KMT leader, the goals of the league's formation were "to let the American people know that the Chinese are not communists," and "to rally all overseas Chinese people against communism and to support the Republic of China." 35 In order to show their patriotism, the league raised funds to help American soldiers in Bay Area hospitals.36 According to Albert Wong, press representative for the league, these actions were to "assure our American friends of our loyalty and feeling—first, for the American Government; second, for the United Nations, and third, for the Chinese Nationalist government."37 The anticommunist conviction was not specific to San Francisco. In 1954 the All-American Overseas Chinese Anti-Communist League was established in New York to assure that Chinese Americans were not communists.38 The Chinese Press pointed out that the league represented "the feeling of most Chinese-Americans [who] stand against communist aggression."39 The loyalty pledge to the Nationalist government revealed a contradictory message: because of the Cold War containment policy, the ethnic community needed to showcase its loyalty to a foreign government in order to demonstrate its devotion to the United States. The allegiance to a foreign government, paradoxically, further strengthened Chinese American foreignness.

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Sports were another important instrument for the expansion of citizen participation through public ritual. Yet, for Chinese Americans, the meaning behind sports indicates more than acculturation. As the historian Joel Franks points out, Chinese Americans have participated in baseball, football, basketball, boxing, tennis, and golf since the nineteenth century. Their involvement in sporting activities effectively countered the stereotype that depicted men as unmanly and women as meek China dolls, dragon ladies, or prostitutes.40 Because Chinese Americans were often denied acceptance on mainstream sporting teams, they formed their own organizations. As early as 1912, Sacramento had a uniformed baseball team. H. K. Wong, the festival initiator, founded the Chinese Tennis Club of San Francisco in 193 5.41 Sports teams became a space for achieving ethnic pride. Meanwhile, participating in sports demonstrated signs of acculturation, as American-born Chinese identified with mainstream sports activities.42 Nevertheless, sports also created conflicts between generations. In his autobiography, Ben Fong-Torres, a Chinese American growing up in 1950s Oakland Chinatown, recalled that he and his sister were enthusiastic about baseball and basketball despite their parents' disapproval.43 Festival organizers included sports to expand festival participation. The events included tennis, volleyball, and basketball.44 It is difficult to measure precisely how ordinary people made the connection between their participation in such events and the symbolic messages of unity, patriotism, and ethnic pride that were so important to festival planners. Marginalized voices were generally not included in newspaper accounts. One Chinese American woman who grew up in Chinatown in the 1950s and 1960s, however, told me in a 1998 interview that Chinatown residents were very enthusiastic about volleyball, and that her brother never missed a contest.45 This kind of enthusiasm undoubtedly encouraged organizers to attach sports activities to the festival annually. Organizers invited community members and out-of-town visitors, and sometimes an overseas team, to the competition. Community newspapers reported substantially on these events. Such news spread widely into other ethnic settlements in the United States, thereby fostering the formation of an imagined Chinese America. 46 Additionally, organizers designed activities that catered to tourists' Orientalist expectations—in other words, their ideas of Chinese American culture as exotic and different. In 1957 several girls in a cable car tossed 5,000 Chinese fortune cookies to the crowd, each containing a "Happy New Year" greeting. The fortune cookie was invented in San Francisco by

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Figure 3. Sports championships were one of the popular components of the festival. This photo features the S.F. All-Stars, who won the Ti Sun Company Gold Trophy. Courtesy of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce.

the Kay Heong Noodle Factory in the 1930s to attract tourists. 47 Featuring fortune cookies—one of the most recognizable symbols of ethnic cuisine—in the parade suggests how willing the organizers were to pander to the expectations of white Americans. But organizers did not forget to emphasize the compatibility between "Chinese" and "American" customs. One of the popular attractions that demonstrated such compatibility was the St. Mary's Chinese Girls' Drum Corps, which combined the characteristics of "East" and "West." Wearing elaborate ancient Chinese-style uniforms with unique headdresses and red slippers "to make the appearance of the group as unique as possible," the girls' drum corps played songs such as "Chinatown, M y Chinatown." Written by William Jerome and Jean Schwartz in the 1900s and played later by Louie Armstrong in 1932, the song was a hit. The drum corps became so famous that its members were invited to play at John F. Kennedy's presidential inauguration as well as in Mexico and Taiwan. 48 Its attraction to mainstream society and transnational audiences rested

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Figure 4. St. Mary's Chinese Girls' Drum Corps in the Chinese New Year parade, Feb. 6, 1954. Courtesy of San Francisco Public Library.

upon a dual heritage—a modern American drum corps coupled with exotic traditional-style dress. Moreover, since the majority of drummers were typically male, a girls' drum corps was not only novel, but also reinforced an exotic and feminized ethnicity. 49 The exotic and feminized ethnicity became highly sexualized in other performances. The use of ethnic women to toss out fortune cookies indicates a desire to cater to the sexualized Orientalist fantasy among white America. Such a fantasy had been produced since the first year of the celebration, especially with the inclusion of Miss Firecracker. Chosen by non-Chinese reporters, Pat Kan, exposing her shoulders and upper chest, wore nothing but a string of firecrackers.50 Such a presentation was meant to create an exotic and highly sexualized image, which, like the firecracker, was quite explosive. Meanwhile, sexualizing firecrackers, the most controversial element of the ethnic culture, was an attempt to Orientalize firecrackers so that they could become safe and consumable, like female sexuality. Nevertheless, excessive female sexuality did not help allay the

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firecracker issue (to be discussed shortly). The committee toned down the excessive female sexuality the following year, repackaging it as the Miss Chinatown beauty pageant in the hopes that it could be acceptable to both mainstream and ethnic audiences, as they hoped to use the winners to represent the community. The United States has a tradition of using women in the service of nation building. 51 Scholars have written extensively on women as the embodiment of the nation, and, recently, they have begun to pay attention to beauty pageants as sites where national culture and nationalism could be articulated.52 The title of "Miss Chinatown" likewise suggests the intent of Chinese American male leaders to use the beauty queen to represent the ethnic community. But the decision to deploy the title of "Miss Chinatown" rather than that of "Miss Chinese America" reveals another desire: to emphasize the geographic location of space and to use femininity to signify the community. Because "Chinatown" itself embodies multiple meanings—from exoticism and Orientalism to familiarity and backwardness—the "Miss Chinatown" beauty pageant thus unavoidably inherits these meanings. The pageant committee therefore carefully selected particular contest attire, judging criteria, and specific definitions of womanhood to produce an image of exotic and obedient ethnic woman aimed at luring business to Chinatown, changing the perception of Chinese Americans, and reasserting patriarchal power. From 1953 to 1957, the festival committee included a local Miss Chinatown beauty pageant in the celebration.53 This was not the first time that Chinese Americans had held beauty pageants. As early as 1915, Chinatown's Chinese Hospital and other organizations had sporadically sponsored beauty pageants to raise money. From 1948 to 1952, the Chinese American Citizens Alliance and the San Francisco Lodge hosted an annual beauty contest for the Fourth of July to indicate their acculturation and patriotism.54 Unlike the preceding years, however, a cheongsam (a long Chinese gown, usually made of silk with a slit up the side) was presented as the official dress at the height of the Cold War.55 But why did the pageant committee adopt cheongsams in the 1950s, especially when contestants had previously worn western-style gowns to signal their acculturation?56 Cheongsams had been introduced to Chinatown in the 1930s, when the Chinese image began to shift from the yellow peril stereotype to heroic defenders fighting the Japanese invasion.57 The gown conjured up the image of Madame Chiang Kai-shek (Soong Mayling), a popular figure in American society and in the ethnic community during 42

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World War II.58 The adoption of such gowns also signifies that certain leaders wanted to claim Nationalist China as their "ancestral country," since the cheongsam was "the national female dress of Kuomintang China."59 In addition, this choice indicated an intention to cater to the mainstream China doll stereotype. Women became ethnic capital that lured tourists into Chinatown. Beauty pageants had long been linked to commercial interests—Atlantic City businessmen were motivated to create the Miss America beauty pageant to boost tourism.60 Chinatown business people successfully adopted the same strategy. In fact, this was not the first time that ethnic merchants profited from their female counterparts' sexuality. Working-class white men were regular clients of Chinese prostitutes in the Chinatowns of Los Angeles, New York, and San Francisco during the final three decades of the nineteenth century. However, in order to transform Chinatown from a red-light district to a tourist center, ethnic entrepreneurs needed to confine and repackage ethnic women's sexuality. During the 1930s these entrepreneurs decided to Orientalize Chinatown as a tourist center to provide economic opportunities for educated ethnic members, who were unable to find jobs outside the community. As a result, affluent white patrons filled San Francisco nightclubs like the Forbidden City to ogle exotic and modern Chinese American female performers.61 The pageant committee also exploited the China doll fantasy to lure tourists into Chinatown. As the Chinese Pacific Weekly put it, many male "Westerners" happily spent one dollar to purchase raffle tickets for their favorite candidates.62 The cheongsam was, in fact, redesigned by the committee to enhance a contestant's sexuality. An emphasis on the side slit created "the poured-in' look so highly desired." The slit on the side of the dress was increased to "endow the basically simple cheongsam with a touch of intrigue . . . a tantalizing suggestion about the beauty of its wearer."63 The wearer's sexuality was commodified through Orientalization. This representation was later repeated in the Hollywood film The World of Susie Wong. A prostitute with a heart of gold, Susie Wong became the symbolic figure for all Chinese American women, alongside the hypermasculine dragon lady. The pageant committee, however, was careful to "domesticate" the sexuality of ethnic women. Chinatowns had been dubbed bachelor societies as a result of the 1875 Page Law and the subsequent Chinese Exclusion Acts. The Page Law prohibited the entry of women for the purpose of prostitution, which significantly reduced the number of Chinese female immigrants, as many were suspected to be prostitutes.64 The subsequent Chinese Exclusion Acts further barred the wives of Chinese laborers from "IN

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entering the country and only allowed the admission of those women who were family members of the exempt classes, such as merchants, students, and diplomats. The few women who managed to enter the country were often perceived as prostitutes. Antimiscegenation laws that prevented nonwhites from marrying white women further deterred Chinese male immigrants from forming conjugal marriages and engaging in reproductive sexuality. As a result, they were portrayed as participating in "deviant heterosexuality," outside of respectable conjugal marriages.65 The War Bride Act of December 28,1945 and the Fiancées and Fiancés of the War Veterans Act of August 1946 enabled GIs to bring in 5,132 Chinese "war brides" between 1945 and 1950. From 1945 to 1965, seventy percent of admitted immigrants were Chinese women, some 37,228 out of 53,044. Sixty-five percent of these women entered as the wives of American citizens. 66 Many of them had married their husbands long before the passage of the new laws but were previously unable to enter the country. The influx of Chinese women thus permitted many to (re)build families. The arrival of women prompted male leaders to emphasize gender hierarchy and reposition bachelor men and newly arrived women within the heterosexual nuclear family structure familiar to mainstream America, rather than allow them to be perceived as potentially threatening sexualized figures. Meanwhile, the Cold War containment policy solidified social control on the homefront and encouraged the increase of masculine power and the stability of heterosexual families.67 The leaders therefore underscored the obedience of beauty queens and their roles in patriarchal families to position Chinese immigrant women in "respectable domesticity."68 H.K. Wong thus "rediscovered" the virtues of Chinese womanhood: Sam Chung Sze Duck (The Three Degrees of Obedience and the Four Virtues). According to Wong, "I only knew vaguely what it was about when I started. But I talked to a lot of old men, scholars; I looked through some Chinese books. Then I finally wrote . . . what Chinese woman should respect: first your father, then your brother, then your husband."69 Wong then publicized this idea in the media. For example, in 1956 the San Francisco Chronicle and Chinese World stressed in reports that the beauty queen had been reared in the three degrees of obedience and that she possessed the four virtues: good behavior, discreet speech, a serene spirit, and industriousness. The San Francisco Chronicle, describing one year's winner, wrote, "Miss Dong fills a modern role in an ancient tradition."70 This statement conjured up a notion of Confucian gender norms resonating with an ideal gender hierarchy. Although the majority of popular culture 44

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at this time encouraged American women to choose home over career, the reality was that more and more women entered the work force in the 1950s. In fact, the female employment rate rose 35.8 percent between 1950s and 1960s. Meanwhile, one-third of married women worked outside the home.71 To counter this trend, Hollywood films like Love Is a Many Splendored Thing (1955) advised "both white women and women of color to take the Western imagination's creation of the passive Asian beauty as the feminine ideal."72 The three degrees of obedience suggested by the Chinese American male leaders helped maintain the ideal gender order. Meanwhile, reestablishing Confucian gender norms had become a means for Chinese American men to revive their patriarchal manhood. Although they occupied a subaltern position in the dominant society, their gender privilege in the ethnic community enabled them to engage in what the sociologist Anthony Chen has called a "hegemonic bargain," which "occurs when a Chinese American man's gender strategy involves achieving manhood' by consciously trading on, or unconsciously benefiting from, the privileges afforded by his race, gender, class, generation, and/or sexuality."73 With the arrival of Chinese women in the postwar years, men were finally able to build or reunite with their families. The chance to elevate themselves as patriarchs enabled men to decouple themselves from the historical emasculated image and change the stereotypical perception of the ethnic community as a "queer" embodiment. At the same time, the arrival of women normalized a heterosexual identity and rendered those who practiced non-normative sexualities invisible. Community members also supported the "traditional" gender norm. Not only did parents often instill in their daughters the notion of the Confucian three degrees of obedience, but Chinese schools also bombarded them with the same ideology. Born and raised in San Francisco's Chinatown in the late 1940s and 1950s, Susan Yee revealed in a 2002 interview that her China-born older sister embraced the idea. Later when her sister married, her brother-in-law's family reinforced the Confucian gender ideology. "She indeed was very obedient to her husband and served her inlaws, and to this day, has pretty much devoted her life to the sons."74 Nevertheless, not all China-born women were content with such traditional gender roles. Immigrating to the United States in the late 1940s, Jin Xian, who was exposed to feminist ideas in her schooling in China, was dismayed by the strict gender norm in the ethnic community.75 Meanwhile, American-born Chinese women only observed certain aspects of the Confucian gender ideals. Susan Yee and her other sisters, for "IN

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example, revered their father, but not their husbands or sons.76 Other women like Lauren Chew did not follow the protocol at all. Born in San Francisco's Chinatown in 1948, Chew's immigrant mother attempted to inculcate her with traditional gender ideology, to no avail. As Chew put it, "I was very opinionated," which she partly attributed to her mother who was "a very powerful woman in the family." Since her American-born Chinese father worked in a nightclub, Chew's mother was her primary caretaker. Chew "had very little respect for [her] father" as he was never around, but she was terrified of her mother. As Chew said, "I think in most Chinese families the mother had a lot of power whether it is passive aggressive, or totally aggressive. My mom was not even passive aggressive. In terms of decision about money and stuff, she made the decision."77 In Yee's family, her mother also controlled family finances because her father's gambling habit made him a poor choice to manage their income. Such stories suggest that not all U.S.-born and immigrant Chinese women bought into traditional gender roles. These women also gained support from liberals in the ethnic community. Women's columns began to emerge in the Chinese Pacific Weekly and the Chinese American Weekly in the late 1940s. These columns, written by female authors, "openly challenged male superiority in the community" and urged men to consider their wives as equal companions.78 Nevertheless, the discrepancy between gender role expectations and practices often generated conflicts in some families. Indeed, marital discord ensued when some couples (re)established their families. Community newspapers reported extensively on family feuds, domestic abuse, suicide, and even homicide.79 Men often attributed the problems to cultural differences; they considered their wives being too "Chinese" and too "backward" to live an "American" life. One man beat his immigrant wife because she did not know how to cook American food. Husbands also criticized their wives for being too opinionated and refusing to adapt to their new life. A U.S.-born man, for example, complained about the appearance of his China-born wife. He was even more furious when she preferred to see a Chinese opera with his mother than attend an American movie with him. He was also frustrated with her refusal to follow his suggestions for Americanizing herself by changing her speaking manner and style of dress. To immigrant women, their problems were in part derived from the double burden of maintaining a household and working outside the home or in a family business. For example, Yuen Ock Chu, who immigrated to Los Angles in 1947, had to work in the family laundry while taking care of her children and attending other household 46

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chores, but her husband refused to lend a hand. In addition, immigrant women faced other problems such as terrible living and working conditions, isolation, and loneliness. Many were astounded by the primitive living conditions they found in Chinatown. Those who came from wealthy families or were lured by visions of the good life in the United States were surprised that they had to work outside the home to make ends meet. Moreover, these women faced threats from their husbands as their immigration status rested upon their marriages. Some men indeed requested the INS to deport their estranged or divorced wives.80 These women, however, were far from submissive, in spite of their language deficiency and receiving little community support. One woman, for example, threatened to go back to China alone if her husband refused to accompany her.81 Gender conflicts therefore motivated some male leaders to reassert Confucian gender norms to subordinate their female counterparts. Embodying the gender ideal was not restricted to Chinese or Chinese Americans. In 19 51 the Chinese Pacific Weekly selected Mariana, a German woman who married a Chinese American GI, as "a Model War Bride." Mariana was praised for her ability to quickly adapt into a new lifestyle: learning English and cooking Chinese food. She even understood the three degrees of obedience and four virtues and was content with being a dutiful wife.82 Using a woman as a symbol of Chinese America and Chinatown reinforced the stereotype of a feminized Chinese and created a nonthreatening image of the ethnic community and Chinatown. Having the mayor crown the beauty queen further demonstrates that Chinese Americans were subordinated to a masculine state, thereby signifying their ethnicity as politically, commercially, and culturally safe.83 In addition, the figure of the obedient ethnic woman not only refuted the impression of a homosexual bachelor society and fears of miscegenation between Chinese men and white women, but also created a safe heterosexual, family-centered space into which mainstream Americans could comfortably venture. This strategy successfully attracted tourists into Chinatown, fueling the local economy.84 Furthermore, the festival committee considered ethnic women to be cultural ambassadors because they were more acceptable to masculine elites within the dominant society. Although the festival included a "Mr. Chinatown" contest in 1954, its winners received no coverage from mainstream media and only scant reports from community newspapers.85 In contrast, San Francisco's mayor publicly kissing Miss Chinatown was hailed as a gesture that reduced conflicts between the ethnic community and city hall. As the Chinese Pacific Weekly reported in 1956, when the "IN

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mayor "kissed Miss Chinatown several times, it made everyone laugh. The tension resulting from the firecracker issue seemed to disappear."86 The restriction on firecrackers had strained the relationship between Chinese Americans and mainstream society. The comment on the kiss suggests that beauty queens were entrusted as cultural ambassadors to improve the relationships between the ethnic community and the larger society. Many women indeed took on the responsibility of educating the dominant society about their community and ethnic cultures when they were recruited into mainstream jobs. 87 Ethnic beauty queens similarly became liaisons to mainstream America and other Chinese American communities in California. Representing San Francisco's Chinatown, Miss Chinatown and her court invited the mayor and all Americans to join the ethnic celebration. Contestants and their sponsors went to more than ten cities in Northern California and the Los Angeles area to sell raffle tickets and to invite Chinese Americans to participate in the festival.88 Since the winner was the contestant who sold the largest number of raffle tickets, rich sponsors could easily control the outcome.89 Powerful sponsors could not only sell more tickets for their candidates, but also promote them through advertisements in community newspapers, thereby giving them the power to determine ethnic femininity.90 For example, in 1954 Ruby Kwong lost the crown to Bernice Wong because Wong's sponsor collected more money for her, even though Kwong individually sold more tickets than Wong. The emphasis on an entrepreneurial spirit reflected ethnic economic patterns: most Chinatown residents were either entrepreneurs or laborers, despite the fact that postwar liberalism opened doors for well-educated Chinese Americans to take up white-collar positions. Using fundraising ability as the primary judging criteria also demonstrated the organizers' goal to develop Chinatowns economy and community organizations. Beginning in the early twentieth century, community organizations such as the Chinese Hospital often staged a beauty contest whenever they needed to seek funding. During World War II, Chinese American women formed separate organizations to raise money for w a r efforts. 91 Provoked by the economic decline during the early Cold War period, Chinatown male leaders used female figures to lure tourists. Nevertheless, few women were willing to participate in the beauty pageant. The committee thus encouraged their entry by characterizing the contest as community service. As a result, some contestants viewed their participation as a way to contribute to the ethnic community. For example, the 1954 Miss Chinatown Bernice Wong stated in an interview: 48

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¡ H

Figure 4. St. Mary's Chinese Girls' Drum Corps in the Chinese New Year parade : Feb. 6, 1954. Courtesy of San Francisco Public Library.

upon a dual heritage—a modern American drum corps coupled with exotic traditional-style dress. Moreover, since the majority of drummers were typically male, a girls' drum corps was not only novel, but also reinforced an exotic and feminized ethnicity. 49 The exotic and feminized ethnicity became highly sexualized in other performances. The use of ethnic women to toss out fortune cookies indicates a desire to cater to the sexualized Orientalist fantasy among white America. Such a fantasy had been produced since the first year of the celebration, especially with the inclusion of Miss Firecracker. Chosen by non-Chinese reporters, Pat Kan, exposing her shoulders and upper chest, wore nothing but a string of firecrackers.50 Such a presentation was meant to create an exotic and highly sexualized image, which, like the firecracker, was quite explosive. Meanwhile, sexualizing firecrackers, the most controversial element of the ethnic culture, was an attempt to Orientalize firecrackers so that they could become safe and consumable, like female sexuality. Nevertheless, excessive female sexuality did not help allay the

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work for the nation and society."93 Her statement clearly evinces her desire to contribute to a diasporic nation. These contestants understood their position in a diasporic community and saw the pageant as a site that articulated transnational identity. Through such statements, these contestants showed that they were not the passive sexual objects that the organizers portrayed, but active members who helped build the community. Even so, the committee and the rhetoric surrounding the pageant objectified and sexualized its participants. The committee used candidates to raise funds but only rewarded one beauty queen and two princesses, even while acknowledging that all the girls deserved "the festival committees admiration." 94 It harnessed the women's ability to an economic end but failed to fully recognize their contributions. Although winners were judged on the outcome of their fundraising abilities, the coverage in newspapers mainly focused on candidates' measurements, cooking abilities, and hobbies. Few reports detailed how contestants collected money and the various kinds of difficulties they faced. 95 Indeed, Chinese American women's contributions failed to result in leadership positions in community organizations. Even though they made substantial contributions in war efforts and community activities during World War II, none of them were able to enter the power centers of the old establishment, such as the C C B A and Chinese American Citizens Alliance.96 In fact, the public role of women was seen as an extension of their domestic duty; their responsibility was to assist patriarchs in community building, not to assume a leadership role. Many women at this time indeed subscribed to this ideal. A man was still the spokesperson for the family, although most Chinatown male residents could not make a living wage because of discrimination and language barriers. They needed to rely on their wives, who worked as seamstresses, to make ends meet.97 Even some middle-class families were pressured to be dual-income households in order to maintain certain lifestyles. With both spouses working outside the home, some couples engaged in what the historian Judy Yung coined "interdependent partnership."98 As Yee recalled in a 2002 interview, because her father had regular working hours as a unionized janitor while her mother worked around the clock as a seamstress, her father did part of the cooking and all the ironing and washing. Although working outside the home increased power for women, female and male immigrants were still expected to conform to the traditional gender hierarchies of the three degrees of obedience and the four virtues. This ideology positioned men and women in separate, imagined spheres: men in the public market and 50

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women in the private domestic sphere. According to Yee, although her mother "controlled certain things and made decisions," her father "was always the head of the household in public, the spokesperson for the family in clan matters." 99 Likewise, despite the fact that Chew's mother made all the decisions about schooling, church, and friends, she viewed herself as being only a supporting role. Chew remembered that her mother "always said she knew what her role was. Her role was to support my father [and] his decision. . . . She saw him as a guy who had to go out every day and make money. It was our job at home to keep together for him. Didn't embarrass him." 100 Similarly, contestants' public roles were seen as an extension of women's domestic sphere, playing a supporting role for community building, thereby rendering these women's public contributions largely unmentioned. With this in mind, the committee's strategy of using a woman to represent Chinese Americans in the public sphere should not be interpreted as a subversion of traditional gender roles, especially when its emphasis was on the three degrees of obedience. This practice of downplaying women's contributions also resembled the dominant gender ideology in American popular culture that viewed women in terms of middle-class domesticity. 101 The final element of the festival was devoted to ethnic activities. These could be divided into three groups. For mainstream audiences, the first contained exotic and popular spectacles; the second was too ethnic to generate any interest; while the third was simply too foreign to be accepted. Lion and dragon dances belonged to the first group. During the Chinese New Year period, Chinese Americans used lion dances to raise money for community organizations such as the Chinese Hospital in Chinatown. 102 Meanwhile, the festival committee and mainstream newspapers strongly promoted the dragon dance: the festival ended each parade with a dragon dance to attract crowds, and the San Francisco Chronicle highlighted it by printing a picture of the dragon in almost every festival report. The Golden Dragon, forty feet long in 1958 and 125 feet long in 1961, was made of silk and papier-mache and created in Hong Kong. The Golden Dragon attracted many viewers, especially the general public. As Wong put it, "Wherever the Golden Dragon appears, it creates excitement, dispels gloom, drives off evil spirits, spreads good fortune, and radiates the happy spirit of the New Year."103 Ironically, this exotic animal was often portrayed as a symbol of "evil and threat" by the mainstream media. 104 Nevertheless, dragons and lions were important artifacts in the festival because they not only enticed ethnic sentiments, but also showcased multiculturalism: on

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the one hand, they were symbols that Chinese immigrants could relate to, as they embodied good fortune; on the other hand, they manifested a kind of American democratic practice that encouraged ethnic expression. Community newspapers often had substantial coverage and illustrations of Chinese opera, folk dances, and martial arts. However, mainstream newspapers publicized these activities but never discussed them at length, possibly because they only catered to Chinese immigrants. Because the major agenda of the festival was to generate political and economic resources, organizers and the media tended to emphasize the bicultural character (the combination of East and West) or exotic Chinese traditions, rather than pure Chineseness. The lack of interest in these other cultural elements might explain why they never fit into the stereotypical image of Chinese culture. At the time, they were simply not exotic and spectacular enough for a mainstream audience that often looked at ethnic cultures with a tourist mentality. Nevertheless, such a perception gradually evaporated in the 1980s, when the United States normalized its relationship with China and the economy in the Pacific Rim began to take off. Certain Chinese cultural practices, such as martial arts, suddenly became extremely popular in the dominant society. The most controversial aspect of the ethnic celebration was the firecracker. The practice of setting off firecrackers in the Chinese New Year celebration started right after Chinese immigration to the United States. In San Francisco, complaints about noise and fire hazards were as old as the ethnic celebration itself. In general, the police placed restrictions on the firework permits granted to the ethnic community. Cold War politics, however, compelled some local officials to support ethnic cultural practices. As one municipal judge, Lenore Underwood, stated: "I dislike to see the elimination of firecrackers from Chinatown during their festival. That's the way they chase away evil spirits."105 Assemblyman Philip Burton also suggested eliminating the firecracker ban. Meanwhile, commercial interests encouraged the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce to persuade the city to ease the ban.106 Even so,firecrackerswere completely oudawed in 1956, although they had been allowed at fixed times within prescribed areas in previous years. Leaders resorted to Cold War international politics to argue for ethnic cultural retention. The petitioners contended that communist China might use the firecracker ban as propaganda, because firecrackers had a great religious meaning for the Chinese.107 Chinese World editorialized that even communist China had decided not to "tamper with the traditional observance of the 52

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lunar new year" and the British colony of Hong Kong permitted the setting off of firecrackers for a limited period of time during the celebration period.108 This statement was different from the earlier ones that accused communist China of forbidding the holiday observance. The contradiction here signifies that Chinese Americans actively selected the rhetoric that would benefit them. In an article entided "Sorry, No Firecrackers," H.K. Wong wrote, "To Chinese it is . . . unthinkable that in this free land, one's religious method of expression of hope and happiness could be throttled." He emphasized the indispensable contribution of the ethnic celebration to San Francisco's tourist industry and concluded that Chinatown leaders might be "discouraged from staging another festival, a festival that adds to the glory and achievement of San Francisco."109 In order to safeguard ethnic tradition, Wong used the Cold War rhetoric to argue for the use of firecrackers. He even threatened not to stage another public celebration should the city disrespect the ethnic culture. This image was in opposition to the earlier one that accentuated Chinese Americans' peaceful characteristics and their conformity to the existing social order. These efforts finally allowed Chinese Americans to set off firecrackers, but only in Portsmouth Square. Because of the restrictions placed on firecrackers, the fire department only approved two firecracker displays in 1956. (In order to get a permit, the C C B A paid $10,000 in public liability insurance.)110 The editorial in Chinese World lamented that Chinese Americans "want to be law-abiding citizens but they cannot help regretting the disappearance of old customs." 111 Additionally, parade spectators greeted San Francisco Police Chief Frank Ahern with boos. Some Chinese Americans were upset with the rule that they could only set off firecrackers in Portsmouth Square instead of in and around their own homes, because they believed that lighting firecrackers indoors would scare evil spirits out of the house. The fact was, many disobeyed the rule. Police were under orders to arrest anyone violating the regulation, but they could not enter private homes without a warrant. 112 Perhaps because of the protest against the firecracker ban, the policy was changed to allow firecrackers in fixed hours and areas in the following years. Nevertheless, not all Chinese Americans were adamant about maintaining the firecracker practice. Some, by contrast, called for a ban or increased regulations.113 The issue died down for a while, only to heat up again in 1969. But at that time, it was white youths who randomly set off firecrackers at Chinese New Year celebrants.114 Overall the festival enjoyed great popularity. One hundred thousand people thronged the parade route in 1953. The one-day public celebration "IN

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was extended to three days in 1954 and a week in 1963. It also attracted attention from mainstream media. In 1956 the National Broadcasting Company did a nationwide telecast of the parade on its Wide, Wide World program while Captain Fortune presented a four-hour television show for the ethnic holiday.115 By 1957 the audience had increased twofold with the general public outnumbering Chinese. By 1961, according to a reader of the Chinese Pacific Weekly, almost 80 percent of spectators were non-Chinese.116 Community newspapers also reported that the festival had successfully won them the friendship of the American public. Chinese World, for example, editorialized in 1957 that the success of the festival rested not "so much in the beauty contests and parades which are commonplace events in connection with most celebrations, but in its successful presentation of Chinese customs and traditions to the general American public." 117 No wonder H.K. Wong proclaimed, "Whenever and wherever people read about the Chinese New Year Festival they always think of San Francisco Chinatown."118 Even though Wongs remark might be overstated, the importance of the ethnic celebration could not be ignored. Indeed, the annual Chinese New Year Festival became an important tradition of San Francisco Chinatown and attracted a wide range of spectators. The festival's success also generated great interest from the city government. Mayor George Christopher appointed the Chinatown Improvement Committee in 1956 to ensure that future construction in Chinatown be built in "Chinese styles." In 1957 he organized the San Franciscan Assisting Committee, composed of mainstream businesspersons, to support the festival and requested that Chinese and English language New Year greetings be made out offlowersat Golden Gate Park. Moreover, the mayor planned to expand the festival to make it a citywide event to bring San Francisco national publicity that would rival New Orleans's Mardi Gras or Pasadena's Rose Parade.119 Leaders in Chinatown responded to the mayor's idea enthusiastically with a five-year plan to give the festival nationwide appeal and a proposal to build a Chinese-style archway at the entrance to Chinatown.120 In 1963 the San Francisco Convention and Visitors' Bureau became a cosponsor for the festival. This affirmed the importance of the ethnic celebration not only for the city's tourist industry, but also for its multicultural image.

CONCLUSION

The intensified and often hysterical nativism prevalent in Cold War America provoked San Francisco Chinatown leaders to play upon the political 54

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climate to create a contemporary Chinese New Year celebration in 1953. The festival expressed their support for American multiculturalism as well as anticommunist sentiment. Selling the Orientalist imagination via the ethnic festival allowed them to appeal to mainstream tourists, which, at the same time, promoted ethnic cultural expression. Staging an ethnic beauty pageant not only brought tourists into Chinatown, but also normalized Chinese American women and men into a heterosexual nuclear family. Moreover, both parades and beauty pageants consolidated the power of the leaders in the community. For example, although residents such as Him Mark Lai thought the festival was only "good for the commercial community," they were not against it since tourism was China> . • • • 1 towns main economic activity. Ultimately, however, the festival did not mitigate political difficulties for Chinese Americans. Federal agents continued to persecute them. While San Francisco's city hall increased tourism by selling the "exoticness" of Chinese culture, the federal government used the pretext of fighting communism to investigate immigrants in Chinatowns throughout the United States. Chinese American leaders were thus motivated to invoke a "model minority" image by means of a national ethnic beauty pageant.

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THREE

Constructing A "Model Minority"Identity The Miss Chinatown U.S.A. Beauty Pageant

IN 1958 SEVENTEEN CONTESTANTS FROM California, Illinois, N e w York,

Massachusetts, Florida, and Connecticut came to San Francisco to compete for the first national "Miss Chinatown U.S.A." beauty pageant held at the Great China Theatre in Chinatown. Event tickets sold out in four days; those who were unable to see the show in person listened to live broadcasts on Chinese language radio programs. A panel of Chinese American and white judges used new judging criteria—based on beauty, personality, and talent (similar to the Miss America beauty pageant)—to choose a winner. June Gong, a contestant from Miami, was crowned by the mayor as the first "Miss Chinatown U.S.A." In the next few days, more than three hundred community and mainstream newspapers, including ones in Hong Kong and Taiwan, printed Gongs photo. As the national Miss Chinatown, Gong received huge welcome parties in New York and Hawaii Chinatowns. 1 Ethnic beauty pageants were the highlight of the contemporary Chinese New Year Festival. Contestants had to participate in various festival events—in addition to competition night, they had to attend a coronation party, a fashion show, and ride on a parade float. Another requirement was to appear in the events sponsored by their family associations. These activities turned contestants into ethnic celebrities. Many Chinatown stores posted their photos months before the competition and announced the 56

Figure 6. Miss Chinatown Bernice Wong waving to spectators during the Chinese New Year parade, February 6, 1954. Courtesy of San Francisco Public Library.

result afterward. 2 Ethnic beauty pageants also attracted a lot of coverage in community newspapers. They printed contestants' photos and short biographies one or two months prior to the contest and devoted extensive coverage to the competition night. Because of the tremendous popularity of the first national ethnic beauty pageant, organizers moved the contest from the 800-seat Great China Theatre to a 3,000-seat Masonic hall the following year.

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Miss Chinatown U.S.A. successfully attracted attention from mainstream society as well. Each year, the San Francisco Chronicle and the San Francisco Examiner covered the pageant and printed the winners' photos. Headshots of contestants posted on storefront windows in Chinatown similarly drew interest from non-Chinese tourists.3 In 1961 the Sahara Hotel in Las Vegas even attempted to steal the "Miss Chinatown" pageant title, but later changed it to "Miss East Bay," after receiving protests from San Francisco's Chinese Chamber of Commerce. 4 In the 1958 national pageant, ethnic leaders redefined ethnic womanhood. The intent to create an image of an exotic and obedient Chinese American (partly through Confucian gender norms, as discussed in chapter 2) successfully attracted tourists into Chinatown, but failed to upset the perception that perpetuated Chinese Americans as "enemies within." A political setback in 1956 motivated community leaders to turn the local pageant into a national contest and invoke the "model minority" image to gain "cultural citizenship," thereby continuing to exercise their patriarchal control in the community. 5 By redefining womanhood, these leaders rearticulated their ideal Chinese American: women and men who were equipped with certain cultural traits such as middle-class gender ideals, higher education, and work ethics that promoted economic success. Moreover, they observed Confucian ideas such as filial piety and gender hierarchy. Through this model minority identity, ethnic leaders attempted to transform Chinese Americans into ethnic minorities and integrate them into mainstream America. T h e new definition not only conformed to mainstream gender norms and economic values, but also fulfilled the Orientalist expectations of the mainstream society, which perceived Chinese Americans as exotic and different.

CRISES

O n January 10, 1956, Chinese World, a bilingual community newspaper, reported the death of an elderly Chinese man, Yip Kai-fu, who had committed suicide. In the article, the author attempted to explain the factors that led to Yip's death. "There seems to be a tendency in the implementation of these [immigration] laws to drive as many Chinese out of America as possible." 6 Another community newspaper voiced a similar thought. The editor of the Chinese-language newspaper Chinese Pacific Weekly pronounced him to be "a victim of ideological conflict" and "a tragedy in the Cold War era." 7 During the Exclusion period, many working-class Chi58

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nese immigrants used false papers to circumvent the discriminatory immigration policy. Of the 71,040 Chinese entering the country as derivative citizens between 1920 and 1940, it is impossible to estimate the number of persons who immigrated into the United States using fictive identities.8 In the mid-1950s, the State and Justice departments began to crack down on the practice of "paper sons and paper daughters." Claiming they were interested in investigating communist infiltration, federal agencies hired Chinese informants to gain access to Chinatown organizations so that they could stymie illegal immigration rackets. A feeling of hopelessness seized many Chinatown residents, especially male elders. They not only felt anxious about the federal investigation, but also were disheartened by the impossibility of returning to a communist-controlled China. Many felt that they would be stuck in the United States indefinitely and would never be able to reunite with their families who faced persecution in China because of overseas connections. These factors contributed to a high suicide rate among Chinese in San Francisco: from 1952 to 1959 it was 39 per 100,000 in comparison with the city average of 24.5 per 100,ooo. 9 The dreaded persecution finally came on February 18, 1956, right around the time of the Chinese New Year celebration. Chinese Americans awoke to find that a federal grand jury had subpoenaed eight Chinese family (surname) associations from San Francisco Chinatown for immigration fraud; the number later increased to twenty-six. The associations were asked to produce membership records, personal files, photographs, and account books for the inspection. 10 Four days prior, New York's Chinatown had encountered a similar investigation. Other Chinatowns such as those in Baltimore, Washington, D.C., and Boston were likewise on the recommended investigation list. 11 To subpoena the majority of family associations in Chinatown angered Chinese Americans, because it created the impression that these associations assisted in the illegal entry of Chinese immigrants. In other words, it "criminalized" the entire ethnic community. Dr. Carsun Chang, an ethnic leader, contended that the investigation appeared "to be a confusion of separate issues resulting in a mistaken public impression that all Chinese family associations, societies, and organizations were engaged in illegal entry racketeering in the U.S. and that all Chinese in the U.S. are suspected of involvement in illegal activities." 12 Community members argued that the investigation should focus on illegal immigrants rather than the whole community. The Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA) called the subpoena a discriminatory practice. Yet their protests failed. Federal officers continued CONSTRUCTING

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their investigation: they questioned children on playgrounds, randomly entered shops, and stopped passers-by on the street to ask for immigration documents. 13 The pervasive investigation urged one Chinese American to comment that this was the worst thing that had happened to the community since the Chinese Exclusion Act. 14 Political persecution further exacerbated Chinatown's economy. Many family associations cancelled their Chinese New Year banquets, and many restaurants and stores did little to no business. The C C B A of San Francisco stated that tourism revenue had dropped 30 percent in Chinatown since the investigation began, while New York business leaders reported that they were losing $100,000 per week. 15 Lim P. Lee, the head of the Cathay Post of the American Legion, who later became the postmaster of San Francisco in the late 1960s and 1970s, summed up the atmosphere in San Francisco's Chinatown: "Chinatown was hit like an A-bomb fell. Streets were deserted. Restaurants lost income. Shoppers avoided Chinatown, and for three weeks it was a ghost town." 16 To combat the investigation, the C C B A of San Francisco used numerous strategies. It promptly hired lawyers to defend twenty-six family associations and wasted no time in claiming that communists could easily use the anti—Chinese American racism to attack American democracy. 17 Moreover, it sought help from the Nationalist government, a strategy used by many immigrant communities to emphasize a transnational identity when necessary.18 Chinese Americans had a long history of turning to their ancestral country to deal with U.S. discriminatory policy. For example, in 1905 Chinese boycotted American goods to protest the renewal of the Chinese Exclusion Act. 19 In 1956 the Nationalist government and other Chinese diasporas voiced their concerns about the "blanket investigation of all Chinese in the United States."20 Representing sixty Chinese American civic, cultural, and family associations, the C C B A of New York protested to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Department of Justice, and other top government officials over the "blanket summoning" of Chinese organizations in San Francisco.21 Finally, on March 21,1956, Federal Judge Carter Blocks ruled that "the gross effect of the subpoenas" was that they were "unreasonable," because they were broad and constituted illegal search and seizure.22 The legal success, however, failed to translate into a total triumph for Chinese Americans. In fact, the day before the court victory, the State Department released a confidential document, attempting to influence the decision of the federal judge. In that report, Everett F. Drumwright, 60

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Consul General in Hong Kong, had written, "If ignorant [Chinese] applicants can be brought into the U.S. under this highly organized fraud system, it is obvious that Chinese Red agents can be so brought in." 23 The State Department then added an additional 102 staff members in Hong Kong to screen immigrants.24 The investigation led Chinese Americans "to believe that this was a backlash of emotions from the Korean War and a portent of greater persecution against the Chinese."25 Their fears of persecution were not without proof. A union activist in San Francisco, Dan Mar, was investigated by the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) in 1953. HUAC also questioned Lawrence Lowe, a Chinatown theater manager in 1956.26 Political setbacks in 1956 made many Chinese Americans realize that they needed to put aside their internal political differences and unite, even if only temporarily. In March 1957 the CCBA of New York called for a national meeting, the National Conference of Chinese Communities in America, in Washington, D.C. Ethnic leaders formed a National Chinese Welfare Council to craft strategies so that they could prevent further mass prosecutions and deportations. In addition to lobbying Congress for immigration reform, they agreed to endorse the INS s Chinese Confession Program. If confessions were accepted, authorities then adjusted confessors' immigration status. However, because the program had not been mandated by legislation, there was no guarantee that all persons who confessed could keep their legal status.27 Moreover, the confession program was known to persecute leftists and union activists, such as the subscribers of the left-wing China Daily News, the members of the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance, the Chinese Workers Mutual Aid Association, the Chinese American Youth Club, and the Chinese American Democratic Youth League.28 As such, accused persons often ended up losing their citizenship or deported. For example, Lee Ying, a co-owner of the World Theater in San Francisco, became an FBI suspect because he sponsored communist organizations. Ying was deported after his paper father, Hu Suey (Fong Suey) was pressured to confess that Ying was not his real son, but his sonin-law.29 The confession program also brought more INS agents into Chinatown. As a Chinese American woman recalled, "People were being stopped in the streets and asked for their papers. We heard about a man who hung himself after he got arrested."30 The confession program gave tremendous power to the INS and initially compelled 13,895 Chinese Americans to participate. The program later investigated an additional 22,084 persons and closed 11,294 immigration slots.31 CONSTRUCTING

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The confession program also created intense family strife as relatives had conflicting opinions as to whether they should participate in the program or not, and sometimes were even compelled to testify against one another. Nonetheless, it allowed the majority of the people involved in the program to become legal resident aliens or naturalized citizens.32 As a result, these people no longer lived in fear of their real identities being exposed. Moreover, their newly legalized status allowed them to bring their families into the United States once immigration laws changed in 1965. The subpoena incident compelled Chinese Americans to actively engage in political coalition-building with other minorities and to participate in electoral politics. Before this incident, many community members were concerned about the conflicts between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan, despite the efforts of some liberals, such as Gilbert Woo, editor of the Chinese Pacific Weekly, to urge Chinese Americans to focus on community issues and American politics.33 After the incident, many felt the need to shift to domestic issues. Dai-Ming Lee wrote in Chinese World, "The prosperity of Chinatown depends on cooperation with other communities and districts."34 Woo also urged that Chinatown needed to dispel the ideology of isolation and cooperate with other organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). 35 Harold Faulkner, the attorney who represented the family associations in the subpoena case, encouraged Chinese Americans to exercise their voting power.36 San Francisco's Chinatown began to support the Democratic Party because it had assisted them in the crisis. In 1958 the Chinese American Democratic Club was established to recruit more members.37 Meanwhile, the Chinese American Citizens Alliance, the CCBA, and other ethnic organizations worked together and lobbied for the amendment of the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, which still maintained the national origin quota system of 1924. These crises similarly propelled Chinese Americans in other areas of the country to raise their political consciousness. As one Los Angeles reader who wrote to the Chinese Pacific Weekly put it, young Chinese Americans should follow Jewish and African American examples by participating in electoral politics.38 Not only did the ethnic community feel the urgency to be incorporated into the mainstream political system, but it also sensed the need to be included in America in other areas, because the "American citizen had been defined over against the immigrant, legally, economically, and culturally."39 Even though Chinese immigrants gained naturalization rights in 1943, historical exclusion, racial ideologies, and Cold War politics still positioned 62

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them as enemies within. 40 To recast the image of Chinese Americans as menacing foreigners, some male ethnic leaders were motivated to assimilate into white American national culture. These leaders had long understood the significance of cultural prerequisites for American membership and deployed multiple strategies to "claim America." 41 In 1958 certain male ethnic leaders in San Francisco modeled the ethnic beauty pageant after the Miss America pageant in order to articulate their Americanness.

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H . K . Wong, who devised the idea of a nationwide Miss Chinatown U.S.A. beauty pageant after observing Atlantic City's Miss America, proclaimed that the beauty pageant reaffirmed "the position of San Francisco Chinatown as the capital of the Chinese in the U.S." 4 2 While this statement accentuated the importance of the San Francisco community, it was indicative of an ambition to create a national ethnic identity. But how did Chinese America benefit from the new institution? Wong explained, "The status of San Francisco Chinatown as a cultural, social, and business center would be enhanced by the 'Miss Chinatown, U.S.A.'" 4 3 Why did Wong only emphasize cultural, social, and economic advantages, but not political ones? In the 1950s, African Americans had launched the civil rights movement to challenge the racial hierarchy in the United States. Instead of following in their footsteps, however, male ethnic leaders chose to incorporate themselves culturally, socially, and economically into white America. Because, by the mid-twentieth century, they believed that "both the progressive and the regressive coalitions that formed around questions of segregation and desegregation solidified whiteness as a monolith of privilege."44 In order to explore the possibility of accessing the power of white America, these leaders invoked the model minority image in the national ethnic beauty pageant to perform whiteness. This new ethnic identity was articulated through the Miss Chinatown U.S.A. beauty pageant. The attempt to partake in the white American national community motivated the leaders to model the ethnic beauty pageant after Miss America. 45 The inclusion of "U.S.A." in the Miss Chinatown title enabled the male leaders to situate Chinatown within the U.S. nation-state and present Chinese American culture as compatible with the dominant conceptions of national culture. The new judging criteria— beauty, personality, and talent—allowed the organizers to create a model minority image through which they claimed their cultural citizenship in CONSTRUCTING

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the dominant society. Additionally, these criteria served as a new ideal for ethnic women, a continual effort to subject them to patriarchal power. This newly defined womanhood also enabled the leaders to reconstruct ethnic manhood to negotiate their racialized and gendered position. The national competition elected one beauty queen and four princesses (the runner-ups). In 1961 the committee added a Miss San Francisco Chinatown title, which required the winner to reside in San Francisco and participate in year-long activities if the winner of Miss Chinatown U.S.A. happened to be from outside the area and was thus unable to attend various functions. 46 Each year, contestants came to San Francisco's Chinatown for two weeks: to rehearse for the competition during the first week and to attend events hosted by family and district associations the following week. For H. K. Wong, the ethnic beauty queen symbolized both an "ideal" Chinese American woman and Chinatown itself, namely, a combination of "Eastern" beauty and "Western" modernity. As Wong put it, the contenders for the crown needed to have both the "looks that made Chinas beauties so fascinating" and represent "the typical Chinese girl in America." The event, he suggested, would trigger the elusive memory of ancient China's greatest beauties [that] might lurk in the judges' minds as they ponder their decision. Their thoughts might linger on the centuries-old Chinese concept of beauty such as melon-seed face, new moon eyebrows, phoenix eyes, peachlike cheek[s], shapely nose, cherry lips, medium height, willowy figure, radiant smile, and jet black hair. In addition to this Chinese standard of beauty, contestants also needed "modern" American qualities, such as "adequate education, training, and the versatility to meet the modern world." 47 Because beauty pageants are sites for the construction of "femininity and ethnicity" and entail the meaning of membership in the national community, this combination of an exotic Eastern appearance with modern Western characteristics became prerequisites for the Chinese American claim to American cultural citizenship.48 Here, Chinese features were no longer a threat to the American nation since the Chinese standard of beauty emphasized by Wong was exotic features that met the Orientalist fantasy of the dominant society. The Chinese features also fit into the multicultural image that the United States strove to maintain in vying for world power in the Cold War era. Nonetheless, to articulate ethnic identity through exoticized beauty indicates more than "assenting to and using a stereotype." 49 White Americas

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construction of self through the other and of an imagined democratic ideal encouraged Chinese Americans to occupy the position of otherness, a key to belonging to the American nation. The emphasis on modern American qualities was another effort to claim America. A contestant had to have "adequate education" to "meet the modern world" and qualities that enabled her to attend college. As one publication put it, "No girl is accepted as a candidate unless she can boast matching brainpower, preferably substantiated by one or more college degrees."50 Indeed, most participants were college students; some even entered graduate school. This practice was modeled after Miss America in order to boost the respectability of the beauty contest. But more importantly, an educated Miss Chinatown beauty queen signaled that Chinese Americans possessed modern qualities that allowed them to participate in mainstream society. This rhetoric was repeated in the 1950s community newspapers. For example, Xiao Min, a female writer, encouraged ethnic women to use scientific methods to raise children, while another female author considered an American education a necessary means to improve women's lives.51 But possessing modern qualities was not enough for male leaders; they also wanted to embrace an American middle-class identity and mode of consumption. Even though the term "model minority" had not been coined at this time, the model minority rhetoric that described Chinese Americans as obedient and hard-working high achievers had already emerged in the early Cold War period. 52 The adoption of the Miss America judging standards allowed the pageant committee to transform the image of the Chinese coolie to that of the model minority. The new criteria required contestants to wear one western-style gown and one cheongsam. Contestants often appropriated mainstream fashion and consumer values. In 1958 more than half of the candidates donned a white western gown, interpreted by a community newspaper as symbolizing purity and gentleness, characteristics that demonstrated American middleand upper-class femininity. 53 High heels, cosmetics, and expensive gowns were also reflections of middle-class consumer power. Moreover, the national contest continued the local pageant s tradition of raffle prizes that included automobiles and household appliances.54 Souvenir programs likewise featured beauty queens with cars and household appliances, which meant that they, like other middle-class American women, enjoyed modern conveniences.55 This also projected the idea that they had the skills to operate these modern appliances. CONSTRUCTING

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In addition, the model minority image propelled Chinese American men and women into the mainstream middle-class heterosexual nuclear family. During the question section, contestants' responses revealed that they adopted aspects of mainstream middle-class gender norms such as cooking and the importance of marriage, which also coincided with Confucian gender ideal. The first winner, June Gong, for example, majored in home economics. 56 Delegating women to the private sphere left men as the breadwinners. Moreover, in order to supply their wives with modern household appliances, they needed to move up the economic ladder. The model minority ideal thus defined men to be heterosexual and economically-driven. 57 Their economic success was connotative of their Americanness, as they, like other middle-class American men, were part of corporate America. Yet it was the appropriation of the Orientalist idea that completed the model minority man. A1961 publication compiled by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce to promote Chinatown included many examples of how Confucian ideologies shaped Chinese American men. In one article, entitled "A Chinese Gentleman," the author wrote that "a Chinese gentleman is a thorough disciple of Confucianism," who "is governed by a code of rites or ethics; he is civil and polite—even to his enemies." He then concluded that the Chinese gentleman "is never in trouble. He is never in a 'situation.'" 58 In other words, Chinese American men were law abiders who would not rebel against the existing system. Lim P. Lee further elaborated this concept in another article that argued that the Confucian doctrines produced docile characteristics in men. According to Lee, Chinese Americans exhibited three cultural traits: "respect for their elders, obedience to parents, and compliance with authority." The emphasis of hierarchy again created the image of self-governance and conformity. Furthermore, Lee accentuated the significance of education. "To strive for excellence in scholarship, the traditional leadership of the educated man, or a place of honor for the man of letters, are still virtues in Chinese circles."59 Whereas education enabled women to tackle domestic tasks, it allowed men to climb up the economic ladder. Education, along with other Confucian ideas, permitted both women and men to be model minorities. Modern American education likewise provided ammunition for American-born Chinese men to exercise control over their immigrant wives. Many of them attributed marital conflicts to their newly (re) united immigrant wives' unwillingness to give up "traditional Chinese culture and customs" and their "culturally, socially, and linguistically" ineptness in the United States.60 66

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They also accused these immigrant women of creating a negative image of the community. To deal with the problem, a community newspaper urged Chinatown residents to "Americanize" the newly arrived immigrant women through education. "The central concern with beautifying/Americanizing war brides is the matter of their education" so that these women could "get rid of the rural lifestyle and customs that they brought with them from faraway China, and change their typically slow-witted Chinese behavior."61 American education thus was seen as a panacea to redress this problem. Acculturated winners clearly displayed such an emphasis. June Gong was from Miami, Florida. As the first Chinese American family in that area, Gong had little contact with other ethnic members. In contrast, she was very familiar with mainstream cultural practices. Before she won the title of Miss New York Chinatown, she had already won several beauty contests while attending the University of New Hampshire. In addition to being a football queen and a freshman queen, Gong also won the first runner-up in the 1957 Miss New Hampshire contest, a preliminary for the Miss America pageant.62 The talent section further reveals the degree to which the committee embraced mainstream middle-class gender ideology. One judge commented that candidates who chose an ethnic cultural performance would receive more credit because it was an ethnic beauty contest, but the talent section betrayed the intention of indoctrinating the white middle-class gender norm. The purpose of the talent competition was to educate women in culture and refinement, part of the conventional ideal of white middle- and upper-class womanhood. The introduction of each contestant gives us an idea of the construction of womanhood emphasized in the contest. For instance, the i960 Miss Chinatown U.S.A. was introduced as such: Carole Ng, 19, a physical education major at San Francisco State College, is 5' 6", 1191b. 34—24—35. A soph at State, she was born in this city, graduated from George Washington High School and attended St. Mary's Chinese School. She participated in volleyball, basketball, ping-pong, and badminton tournaments and plays tennis. Carole has attended summer sessions at the U. of Hawaii the past two years and added surfing and water skiing to her athletic feats. She reads and writes Chinese, plays piano, dances, knits, and collects records as her hobby.63 Her ability to play sports indicates that she could participate in middleclass leisure activities. To juxtapose Chinese proficiency with other hobbies suggests that Chinese language was an acquired skill rather than an ethnic CONSTRUCTING

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language. This description also reveals that a winner needed to possess middle-class femininity, or at least pageant organizers intended to show that she had that capacity. The emphasis on intelligence, education, and other middle-class cultural capital demonstrates that Chinese Americans had the ability to participate in modern American society. In some cases, the committee deliberately and falsely advertised the versatility of contenders. For example, although Flora Chan, a 1962 participant, left the talent section of the application form blank, the pageant publication claimed that she loved literature, music, dance, drama, and movies. 64 One Chinese American pointed out that a family friend who entered the competition was characterized by the committee as "talented and very capable," even though she was "a truly unintelligent person." 65 The repackaging of contestants' abilities indicates that only intelligence and versatility permitted these candidates with an opportunity to win, implying that only the model minority image allowed Chinese Americans to partake in mainstream society. In addition, the peculiar ethnic identity represented in the pageant accentuated its dual heritage to counter against "the model minority stereotype . . . [which] positions Asia and America as antipodes, never meeting, as 'East is East and West is West.'" 66 One titleholder, for example, delivered the following monologue in the 1962 contest: Someone said West is West, East is East, East never meets West. However, I am the daughter of the East, the daughter of the West. 67 This speech claimed a distinct ethnicity. Prior to this contestant, no one who performed a monologue had ever won a title. This demonstrates that the committee valued the claim for Chinese American subjectivity. T h e particular subjectivity was femininity, which not only constituted as a broker between East and West, but also bridged the gap between the two because women were expected to learn American knowledge while perpetuating the Chinese nation. As one of the entry requirements to the contest was to have a father of Chinese descent, the female body thus embodied a patrilineal lineage. In addition, the Chinese standard of beauty valued in the contest signifies 68

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nostalgia for the "lost homeland." Some Chinese immigrants at that time felt that "there was neither country nor home . . . to talk about." Many could not go back to China after its transition to communism; nor did it make sense to return to Taiwan, because they had never lived there.68 Accordingly, Chinese immigrants could only identify with the China that existed in their memory. The female body therefore became a site from which a "lost" China was recovered. The burden of retaining fluency in Chinese likewise fell on the woman's shoulders. T h e personality part of the judging criteria was based on contestants' ability to answer five questions in their native Chinese dialects and two questions in English. Because China has numerous dialects, organizers chose not to favor one vernacular over another. Prior to 1965, the majority of Chinese immigrants spoke one of three Cantonese subdialects: Sam Yup (Sanyi), Sze Yup (Siyi), and Chungsan (Zhongshan). O f them, Sam Yup was considered more genteel, since the district was closer to the provincial capital of Canton (Guangzhou) and had more merchantclass residents. Sam Yup was often referred to as proper Cantonese and was taught in the Chinese language schools in Chinatown. Most Chinatown residents, however, spoke Sze Yup, which was considered to be a more rural and uneducated patois. 69 The pageant committee chose to ask contestants questions in Sam Yup, but the latter often replied in Sze Yup. For example, the 1958 host asked questions in Sam Yup with a heavy Chungsan accent while all contestants except for one responded in Sze Yup. These shifts in different dialects generated laughter from the audience. 70 Born and raised in Laramie, Wyoming, Kati Wang, a titleholder, recalled a similar experience in a 2002 interview. "They asked the question in proper Cantonese and I answered it in Toishanhua [Sze Yup]. It got a chuckle from the audience who were mostly from San Francisco and mostly did speak Toishanhua." 71 In general, candidates who could speak a Chinese dialect held an advantage over those who could not, since the personality section constituted 60 percent of the entire contest. Many Chinatown residents, like Lauren Chew's mother, an immigrant, sent their children to Chinese language schools and insisted that they speak Chinese at home. As Chew remembered, My father's family is totally American-born. . . . They would try to teach [my mother] things about being American. . . . They would say to her, "you really shouldn't speak to your children in Chinese because it is going to ruin and affect their English, the accent." And my mother would say,

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"I don't care, I don't believe that in America they are not going to learn English. What I am afraid of is that they are not going to be able to talk to me." So she was very firm about us speaking Chinese at home.72 However, most of the U.S.-born contestants who grew up outside Chinatowns could rarely speak any Chinese before beginning to prepare for the contest.73 As early as 1964, newspapers had already reported that that year's beauty queen, Josie Leong, could barely speak Chinese.74 Wang's observation of the pageant concurred with that report. Her fellow contestant, Fiona Yep, who grew up in Stockton, California, needed to "phonetically phrase out the response," and most of the contestants "had to memorize our Chinese answers."75 Suburban Chinese Americans were not the only ones who had difficulty learning Chinese; those who lived in Chinatowns also resisted the idea of learning another language besides English. As Chew put it, "as a very young child even in Chinatown, I got a very clear message by third grade that English was the prestigious language and that Chinese was an inferior [one]."76 As a result, by 1965 the ethnic beauty pageant committee had ceased factoring the Chinese language portion into the contest results, and by 1980, contestants were no longer required to answer questions in Chinese at all.77 Nevertheless, women were still expected to be respectful of their ethnic culture. Annie Shew Soo, the first Chinese American woman who worked in the San Francisco Chronicle, was recruited by H. K. Wong to work on the beauty pageant's publicity campaign, as well as to draft questions for the competition. She attributed June Gong's 1958 victory to the following reply: She was not glamorous. She was not beautiful. But the question was, "What American woman do you admire most?" A lot of them said, "Eleanor Roosevelt and Madame Curie," but she said, "My mother." A couple minutes of applause went on. . . . I knew that as soon as she answered that she was going to be a Miss Chinatown U.S.A.78 This evinces the committee s intention to carry on the ethnic culture by choosing a candidate who demonstrated her filial piety and identified with her mother, rather than mainstream celebrities.79 Meanwhile, some people in the ethnic community emphasized the cultural values and traditions that retained patriarchal power. The Chinese Pacific Weekly, for example, argued that the contestants should be tested on their knowledge of Chinese history and traditions rather than their lan70

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guage proficiency.80 Additionally, an article entitled "Thanks to Confucius" in a special festival publication explained that although Chinese Americans were no longer loyal followers of Confucian doctrines, they still maintained a patriarchal system. "The rapid Americanization of the Chinese woman doesn't mean she considers herself completely equal to her man. It's still the husband who rules the home."81 Women could only possess the American qualities that did not subvert the gender hierarchy. The insistence of men to the heads of households speaks to the persistent effort of reclaiming manhood from historical emasculation and queerness. But who could be part of Chinese America? Only those contestants whose father was of Chinese descent could enter the competition. Although the committee did not disclose its racial politics, it often favored European features. An interracial contender won the title as early as 1962. That years beauty queen, Darrah Lau, had French, German, and Chinese ancestry. The 1972 Miss San Francisco Chinatown, whose mother was French-Irish, was another interracial winner. 82 In contrast, the committee turned away contestants of African descent. Arlene Scott Sum, who represented Los Angeles in i960, was born in Trinidad. Like the other participants, a short biography was printed in the souvenir program, but in the entire history of the ethnic beauty pageant, her photo is the only one to have never been printed. She never appeared at the competition; the committee gave no explanation.83 The unspoken racial politics shored up the intent to define Chinese Americans as "whites" and explained why the committee favored a standard of white beauty. However, some ethnic members disapproved of these racial politics; conflicts over differing standards of beauty arose from the beginning.84 The standard suggested by Wong emphasized a merger of Chinese beauty and modern American qualities. Nevertheless, since the onset of the pageant judges had been criticized by ethnic defenders for placing too much emphasis on Western ideals of beauty. In 1958, for example, almost half of the judges were white "Westerners."85 The beauty standard was again a point of contention in the 1959 contest when the winner was taller than the average ethnic women (she was 5'6").86 These conflicts reveal the anxiety over the definition of ethnic identity.87 Although the Cold War political climate propelled Chinese Americans to pledge their Americanness, it also encouraged them to pay tribute to their adopted ancestral countries, Hong Kong and Taiwan, as opposed to China. While community newspapers such as the Chinese Pacific Weekly urged Chinese Americans to pay more attention to mainstream politics, CONSTRUCTING

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rather than political developments in Asia, economic and political marginalization prompted male leaders to foster ties to "surrogate homelands." 88 Pageant winners were sent to Taiwan and Hong Kong after the coronation. They sometimes even participated in the Double Ten (the celebration of the collapse of imperial China) festivities in Taipei and were photographed with top government officials there.89 Using beauty queens to establish their linkages to the "surrogate homelands" fulfilled the Orientalist expectation of the dominant society that Chinese Americans were foreigners. The homage to Hong Kong and Taiwan, rather than China, coincided with U.S. containment policy. In addition, the pageant allowed male leaders to build an imagined ethnic community across the United States through the widespread coverage of the contest in the ethnic press.90 Thanks to press coverage, many contenders in the 1950s local beauty contests received votes from places such as Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, Honolulu, Phoenix, Cincinnati, and even Mexico. 91 The national contest also fostered ethnic cohesion: many Chinese Americans continuously participated in the event. Jew Law Ying, a seamstress, was one example. Despite her frugality, Jew dutifully purchased a ticket each year. O n the night of the event, she would dress up in nice clothing, buy a souvenir program, and take notes on each contestant. Jew kept all the souvenir programs and never missed a single contest. Even when she was too fragile to go out alone at night, she insisted that her children drive her to the pageant. She even persuaded them to join her. Susan Yee and her elder sister escorted their mother to the event a couple of times, but mostly it was Jew's former sewing factory employer who accompanied her. Rather than be a one-day spectator, Jew followed the event from beginning to end. According to Yee, "She talked about it the whole week. I am sure that she talked about it with the sewing factory ladies that she worked with. And then she tried to guess who was going to win. She really became a judge." If her prediction was accurate, she would brag about it. "As far as she was concerned, it was a social event, an exciting event that she didn't want to miss. There were many other sewing factory women like her who went to the pageant for the same reason."92 To these garment workers, the pageant provided them with an opportunity to break up their daily routines, and more importantly, to discuss and determine ethnic femininity through choosing a winner, despite having no real power over the result. The interest in the pageant extended beyond working-class immigrant women. Some families had a tradition of choosing their own winners. As

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contestant Judy Jue explained, "My mother and I used to gather all the pictures of the contestants, and we would pick our own Miss Chinatown." 93 Gathering pictures of the candidates and commenting on them was a way for some families to identify with the ethnic community and decide their own ideal version of ethnic femininity. The national ethnic beauty contest similarly bolstered the imagined ethnic community by encouraging cooperation among ethnic organizations. In order to attract contestants from different places, organizers needed the assistance of Chinese Chambers of Commerce, merchant organizations, and family associations in other cities.94 The pageant committee also traveled to many parts of the country to solicit eligible candidates.95 Some Chinatowns, such as those in New York, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Hawaii, held local contests and then sent the winners to San Francisco. Thus, as the historian Judy Wu argues, the "solidification of these networks helped foster a sense of a national Chinese American identity."96 As mentioned in the beginning, the first national contest attracted contestants from Los Angeles, Chicago, New York, Massachusetts, Florida, and Connecticut. In the subsequent years, it drew young women from the East Coast, the South and the Midwest. 97 Sending a local contestant to the national contest thus helped to sustain the imagined national ethnic culture.

CONCLUSION

The political persecution in 1956 encouraged male ethnic leaders to unify the ethnic community by means of a national ethnic beauty pageant. The decision to model it after the mainstream Miss America pageant attests to a desire to incorporate Chinese America into the dominant society. The judging criteria—beauty, personality, and talent—provided the leaders with a chance to claim America by constructing a model minority image that emphasized middle-class gender ideals and consumption values as well as Confucian gender hierarchy and obedience. The insistence of the model minority image transformed the racialized and gendered positions of Chinese Americans in the dominant society. They were now more closely associated with whites than African Americans. As a model, they were used by the federal government to discipline other minorities. In exchange, Chinese Americans were rewarded with "permission" to participate in white America through the economy and consumption. Moreover, the model minority discourse shifted men from bachelors to heads of heterosexual households, thereby decoupling them CONSTRUCTING

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from the earlier portrayals of emasculation and queerness. Similarly, it domesticated women in middle-class households and allowed male leaders to assert hegemonic patriarchal control. Nevertheless, being a model minority failed to transform the racialized status of Chinese Americans. This docile position increasingly infuriated male and female activists who, inspired by the civil rights and black power movements, were dissatisfied with the law-abiding, middle-class feminized identity constructed through ethnic beauty queens. They adopted militant masculinity to attack racism and the universalism of white middle-class manhood. This strategy to equate ethnic nationalism with manhood, however, encouraged feminists to challenge sexism within youth movements and gender inequality in the ethnic community.

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FOUR

Yellow Power Race, Class, Gender, and Activism

ON MARCH i, 1969, a riot broke out following the Chinese New Year parade. Most Chinese American families had already gone home; Grant Avenue consisted mainly of white tourists and various Chinatown gangs. Although there was a confrontation earlier in the day at the festival street fair 1 , the first real fights started around 10:30 P.M. and took place between Chinese American male youths and their white counterparts. These were stopped immediately by street workers, a youth organization formed by Chinese Americans to prevent interracial fighting. Unfortunately, other fights soon broke out throughout the crowd. After one Chinese American youth was injured, street workers helped him to the sidewalk, where several white youths threw strings of firecrackers at him. Not far away, two whites threw firecrackers at a group of Chinese American youths. A policeman came to the scene, was hit with a cherry bomb, and subsequently called in nearby plainclothes officers for backup. At the same time, street workers rushed in to break up the fight that had developed. In the ensuing scuffle, two plainclothes officers mistakenly grabbed Cary Quan, one of the street workers who had come to help. Not knowing they were police, he resisted and was knocked down. At that moment, another fight broke out across the street. Taking advantage of the commotion, the two policemen dragged Quan to a squad car. The situation spun out of control and the crowd started chanting, "Pigs! Pigs!" At this point, 75

the riot police were called in. By the end of the night, eighty-nine people had been injured, including nine police officers, and more than seventy people had been arrested, mostly whites. One year prior, a smaller-scale riot had occurred at the same parade. A similarly tense exchange between the police and youths had inadvertently defused the underlying racial tensions. As George Chu, a Chinese American who witnessed the 1969 incident, commented, "What had threatened to be a race riot. . . turned into an old-fashioned confrontation with the cops."2 Nevertheless, the riots reveal the confrontational strategy certain Chinese American youths deployed in order to deal with interracial conflicts and police brutality. Gang violence stole the show at the 1969 parade. Headlines like the San Francisco Chronicles "Chinatown Riot after the Parade" disrupted the ethnic community's "model minority" image that Chinatown leaders had sought to build. The sociologist Stanford Lyman referred to Chinese American youth delinquency as "quasi-politics."31, however, consider it to be part of the youth resistance. Although these youths might not have been informed by political ideologies and resorted to street fights and delinquency to either defy authorities or vent their frustrations, their militant behaviors nevertheless left an undeniable impact on the ethnic community in the destruction of its public image. As the historian George Lipsitz has argued in the realm of popular culture, "This ain't no sideshow."4 Indeed, the "sideshows" sometimes even outshone the official show. The violence that followed the Chinese New Year parade, for example, destroyed the happy and festive image that the festival organizers wanted to maintain in order to attract tourists. Influenced by the newly rising black power movement, college students and radicals likewise rebelled against the model minority image. They openly criticized the political docility of the Chinatown establishment and the marginalization of the working-class. Additionally, they questioned the racial and economic structures of the United States and challenged the idea that economic mobility and consumption could "whiten" the Chinese American racialized status and enable them to assimilate into white America.5 Rather than seek to be like whites, these activists insisted on "yellow" identity and power. This chapter focuses on how female and male Chinese American activists, radicals, and gang members racialized and masculinized the ethnic celebration and transformed it into a working-class space in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It examines the "sideshows" that surrounded the ethnic cel76

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ebration, such as critiques of the Chinese New Year Festival, an alternative celebration, a demand to recognize the ethnic holiday, and the militant and violent behavior of radicals, students, and youth gangs. While some were well-planned and others were spontaneous, these "sideshows" dominated headlines in mainstream and ethnic newspapers and changed the perception of Chinese Americans as docile model minorities. Through an examination of the "sideshows" in the ethnic festival and an analysis of the defiance of authority among Chinese American youth, this chapter illuminates not only grassroots activism within the ethnic community, but also minority youth resistance within the larger American society.

BEHIND THE GILDED

CHINATOWN

In order to draw tourists into Chinatown, Chinese American leaders insisted upon the model minority image and disguised the racial and economic problems facing Chinese Americans. Such a strategy successfully attracted tourists into Chinatown and presented visitors with the picture of a happy, boisterous, and affluent Chinese America, especially during the Chinese New Year Festival. In an interview, Mason Wong, president of the Intercollegiate Chinese for Social Action (ICSA), a San Francisco State College (SFSC) student organization, summed up the problem in Chinatown: The Chinese community has the same basic problems as all other nonwhite communities. The only thing different is that it has neon lights and a few tourist restaurants, which is all that white people want to know about our community. Yet these restaurants are staffed by illiterate Chinese who work fourteen hours per day, six days per week, for starvation wages. The only way to survive in our community is to exploit each other, hence the myth of the successful Chinese businessman. This exploitation is perpetuated at the expense of the Chinese immigrants who can only find work in the sweatshops, laundries, and restaurants in Chinatown.6 Moreover, Chinatown residents suffered the effects of dense living quarters. In 1970, 68,058 Chinese Americans lived in Chinatown, about 9.5 percent of the city's total population. That year, 60 percent of Chinatown housing was substandard and the density figure was 228 persons per acre in Chinatown—nine times the city average.7 Coupled with population density, the poor conditions no doubt contributed to the highest tuberculosis rate in San Francisco and the nation in the 1960s.8 YELLOW

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In addition, Chinatown residents were frustrated by limited employment opportunities and poor earnings resulting from insufficient English skills and racial discrimination. Far from being a model minority, Chinatowns unemployment rate was 12.8 percent, compared to 6.7 percent for the city in i960.9 Those who did have jobs were fortunate to make a substandard living. In 1969 one-third of Chinese American families had an annual income under $4,000. New York Chinatown's median family income was between $4,000 and $4,999 in 1969, while the national median family income was $9,585.10 Although many immigrants came to this country with higher education and job skills, such experience rarely guaranteed success. On the contrary, their credentials failed to be recognized by most San Francisco employers and professional associations. Their insufficient command of English also prevented them from finding jobs commensurate with their abilities. Men often acquired jobs in restaurants while women worked in sweatshops.11 For example, in New York's Chinatown, 35.5 percent of the men worked in restaurants while 75 percent of women worked in garment factories.12 Their economic marginalization not only prevented them from moving out of Chinatown, but also hindered them from achieving hegemonic gender norms. The mainstream gender ideal and the model minority narrative both defined womanhood and manhood through separate gender spheres and high consumption power—a male breadwinner, a female homemaker, and a house full of consumer goods.13 Changes in U.S. immigration laws in 1965, which abolished "national origin" as the basis for allocating immigration quotas to various countries, brought in large numbers of new immigrants, further exacerbating the existing conditions.14 In the next five years, around twenty-five thousand new arrivals swamped Chinatown, looking for jobs, schools, and housing. Despite the population increase in Chinatown, housing availability had actually decreased from 35,643 to 34,870 in the 1960s. 15 The new arrivals thus severely crippled the already inadequate community resources. The Chinese Times, a Chinese-language Chinese American Citizens Alliance newspaper, gave a fair assessment of the problem. "Looking from the point of view of new immigrants, what they faced today was not ideal. On the contrary, the problems they encountered were quite complicated. The federal government relaxed the immigration laws, but did not have any plan for the settlement of the new immigrants. Moreover, Chinatown organizations also were incompetent in handling the problem."16 This assessment also applied to Chinatown youth. Although the mainstream media depicted Chinese American youth as hardworking, achieve78

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ment-oriented, and well-disciplined in the model minority rhetoric of the 1950s, Chinatown juvenile delinquency was increasing.17 Numerous youths at this time were either unemployed or underemployed, and many who were immigrants had dropped out of school because of the language barrier. Crowded living spaces further drove them to loiter on the streets. Moreover, the extension of Chinatown into neighboring areas created tensions and conflicts with non-Chinese youths. These factors, coupled with the lack of opportunities, encouraged many to resort to crime and juvenile delinquency. These youth gangs usually included both boys and girls. The core members of the X Gang, studied by the sociologist Rose Hum Lee, included ten boys and seven girls.18 The crimes and delinquency bespoke the "everyday forms of resistance" used by the youth to deal with the racial and economic problems they encountered in their daily lives. As the anthropologist James C. Scott explained with regard to peasant rebellions, the majority used ordinary tactics, such as stalling, slander, arson, and sabotage, to resist the powerful. Most of the resistance was not in a form of "collective outright defiance" and required "little or no coordination or planning." Similarly, working-class youths had "little prospect of improving their status." Engaging in petty crimes and street fights became their "only option" to fend for themselves.19 Between 1943 and 1949, only 184 Chinese American youths were sent to San Francisco juvenile court. Between 1964 and 1967, that number jumped to 538.20 In 1965 a Chinese American gang known as the Bugs committed forty-eight burglaries.21 Similar to the zoot suiters of War World II, these Chinese American men used a particular style of dress (black clothing, boots, and bouffant hairdos) to negotiate their multiple identities and resist the dominant culture.22 Unsurprisingly, the youth crimes alarmed ethnic leaders. As early as 1950, the Chinese Press, an English-language ethnic newspaper, described the ethnic community's concern. An "outbreak of gang fights, streetcorner hoodlumism, and robberies within the Chinese community has jarred the respectable citizens of Chinatown from their heretofore complacent attitude." 23 The gang problem prompted Chinese American social workers and other liberal and progressive leaders to create recreational and educational facilities, but their efforts fell short of meeting the needs of the youth. 24 Nor did government agencies provide adequate solutions to the problem. The antipoverty programs offered some English classes and welfare programs to immigrant youths, but were unsuccessful in securing jobs for them and their American-born counterparts.25 Youth crimes continued to rise.26 The situation forced otherwise quiet storeowners to express YELLOW

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their urgent concerns about burglaries, attacks, and interracial gang fights at the 1965 Human Rights Commission. 27 Nonetheless, not only did gangs continue to exist, but they also became vocal political groups. Meanwhile, college students began to challenge the authority of the Chinatown establishment.

CHINESE AMERICAN

YOUTH

GROUPS

Far from being a unified group, Chinese American youth were divided by national origin, educational, and class backgrounds. Youth organizations could be roughly divided into three groups: gangs, radicals, and student organizations. Most gang members were from Chinatown, while the majority of college student activists came from suburbs—though more and more Chinatown youths went to colleges in the later years of youth activism, including former gang members. Due to cultural and language differences, the foreign-born and U.S.-born youth did not get along, nor did they share the same racial politics or political agendas. While some were influenced by the Black Panthers, others experienced tense racial relations with African Americans. Moreover, whereas students began their movement on college campuses, Chinatown youth formed "delinquent" and radical groups in Chinatown. While gang members mostly focused on bettering immigrant youth conditions, radicals and student organizations concentrated on improving the ethnic ghetto and attacking racial and economic structures within the larger society. Often blamed for delinquency, Wah Ching (Chinese Youth) was the first group that openly challenged the docile model minority image through a public denouncement of the incompetent Chinatown establishment and an insistence on government assistance. Begun in 1963,Wah Ching consisted of immigrant youth from Hong Kong who banded together to defend themselves, as many of them seldom got along with their U.S.-born peers or other ethnic counterparts. By 1968 there were two to three hundred Wah Ching members in San Francisco, mostly males from seventeen to twenty years old. Some of them had come to the United States after 1962 under family reunion provisions, but the majority came after 1965 when immigration laws were relaxed. Very few Wah Ching members had steady jobs, and those who did lamented wages that were often less than $1 an hour, below the federal minimum wage. Their deficiency in English prevented them from continuing schooling and seeking work outside Chinatown. Many turned to petty crime to survive.28 80

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Facing a bleak future, Wah Ching members demanded education, job training, and a recreational clubhouse at the San Francisco Human Rights Commission meeting on February 26, 1968. Seeking help from a mainstream agency, these youths tarnished the self-sufficient model minority image and questioned Chinatown leaders' manhood, which was based upon providing for the community and patriarchal authority.29 Wah Ching's attempt failed, however.30 Disappointment motivated George Woo, its spokesperson, to threaten the old establishment: "Some of these kids are talking about getting guns and rioting. And I am not threatening, the situation already exists."31 Talk of violence prompted the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA), the most influential organization in Chinatown, to verbally attack Wah Ching: "They have not shown that they are sorry or that they will change their ways. They have threatened the community. If you give in to this group, you are only going to have another hundred immigrants come in and have a whole new series of threats and demands."32 Rather than see the youth issue as part of a deficiency in the racial and economic structures, the establishment saw it as a challenge to its authority and requested police assistance in disciplining the recalcitrant youths.33 In March, Wah Ching's president, Stan Wong, changed the strategy and pleaded to the CCBA for assistance. Wong stated, "We need to help ourselves. We want to build a clubhouse to keep off the streets. We look to the future and are mindful of the immigrant youths who will be coming here later. We hope they do not have to go through what we've been through."34 Again, the CCBA refused to help. Frustrated at the negative response, one foreign-born youth therefore charged, "Behind the Six Companies [a community name for the CCBA] is a bunch of gambling men, playing poker and mah-johng [sic], who promise much more than they ever perform."35 This accusation portrayed Chinatown leaders as economically irresponsible men, who, far from being good providers, squandered the family fortune foolishly. Clearly, it broke the myth of the model father the leaders strove to maintain, thereby invalidating the model minority narrative. The indifference of the Chinatown elite to community problems eventually drove some youths to either form grassroots organizations to tackle the issues or resort to violence to vent frustrations. Leway (an abbreviation for "legitimate ways") was the group that attempted to solve youth delinquency on its own terms. Composed mainly of U.S.-born high school dropouts, it was originally formed by seventeen members in 1967 and had grown to four hundred by early 1968. Leway tried YELLOW

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to stem juvenile delinquency in Chinatown by running a pool hall and a soda fountain to generate funding for a job-training program. According to Denny Lai, president of Leway, the pool hall was to be "a hangout for hoods. Most of us cats are misfits, outcasts with a rap sheet. What we're trying to do is keep the hoods off the streets, giving them something to do instead of raising hell." 36 The pool hall successfully became a gathering place for the youth with more than two hundred people often congregating there. In addition, Leway tried to assist its members by helping them attend college or by offering draft counseling services.37 Moreover, it set up a job finding program with the Economic Opportunity Council, a product of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, which was part of President Lyndon Baines Johnsons "war on poverty."38 Forty-seven members joined the program, but none of them received job interviews. Eventually, Leway fell short of accomplishing its goal of establishing a job-training program because it spent its earnings on rent and legal assistance. Nor did it receive any support from the Chinatown establishment. In contrast, its members suffered police brutality and harassment, especially when its treasurer, Leland Woo, became a major figure in a conflict between Chinatown celebrants and the police during the 1968 Chinese New Year parade. Because of continual police harassment and failure to secure employment for youths, Leway eventually had to close its doors in June 1969. 39 Whereas Wah Ching and Leway "blackened" the image of the model minority, the Red Guard Party openly followed an African American militant group, the Black Panther Party, founded in nearby Oakland in 1966. 40 Established in 1969, the Red Guard Party had a militant political agenda, a stark contrast to the old establishment's conformist image. As a Red Guard Party spokesman stated: "The Black Panthers is the most revolutionary group in the country and we are patterned after them." 41 The Red Guard Party members not only went to Oakland to study Marxism and Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) ideology with the Panthers, but they also invited the Panthers to come to Chinatown. 42 The strategy to model themselves after an African American militant group clashed with the efforts of the ethnic leaders who wanted to disassociate the community from blacks and be part of white America. Their conflicting racial politics triggered Red Guard Party members to accuse the C C B A of being "bananas"—yellow on the outside but white within. 43 In addition, the Red Guard Party exposed the failure of the model minority narrative and attacked the economic exploitation of the Chinatown establishment. It organized a "Serve the People" program in China82

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town: a free breakfast program for children and free lunches for elders.44 It also engaged in other antidevelopment activities, such as preventing the Chinese Playground from being torn down to build a garage, protesting when the Kwong Chow Temple was razed, and fighting against the demolition of the International Hotel, a residential hotel whose inhabitants were mostly seniors.45 Like other community activists, the Red Guard Party was at odds with the interests of business owners and challenged the authority of the old establishment. The Red Guard Party similarly stood in defiance of the old establishment's political stance. The Cold War containment policy had pressured Chinatown elites to denounce communist China. In contrast, Red Guard Party members not only gathered to study Mao Zedong's The Little Red Book, but also hung his picture in their headquarters in Chinatown. They brought their pro-China ideology into the community and the public space in various ways: they showed PRC films to Chinatown residents, they distributed The Little Red Book during the 1969 Chinese New Year Festival, and on May 7,1969, they displayed the PRC's flag in Portsmouth Square, the most visible public place in Chinatown. Moreover, the Red Guard Party urged the United States to normalize its relationship with the PRC, again enraging the old establishment who denounced communism.46 Through supporting a communist regime, the Red Guard Party not only undermined the conformist position of the old elites, but also challenged U.S. foreign policy. Finally, the Red Guard Party took up the antiracism and antiimperialism battles. It published newspapers declaring their fight against white supremacy and police brutality.47 It demanded low-cost housing, job assistance, free health clinics, and a school curriculum that included ethnic history. In addition, the Red Guard Party adopted an anti—Vietnam War position and requested exemption for all Asian American men from military service.48 Meanwhile, members went to SFSC to support their college-educated counterparts during the Third World Strike.49 College students likewise played an important role in raising ethnic consciousness. Inspired first by the civil rights movement and the subsequent black power movement, these students realized that their racial position was more similar to that of African Americans, rather than to white Americans as leaders believed. In 1968 Asian American students at SFSC and the University of California, Berkeley formed the Third World Liberation Front (TWLF), which linked racism to imperialism, and the oppression of racial and ethnic minorities to that of the Third World people. They YELLOW

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embarked on the Third World Strike at SFSC and U C Berkeley and demanded the establishment of ethnic studies programs. They also denounced the Vietnam War for its racist and imperialist dimension. 50 Moreover, these college students attempted to solve social and economic problems in Chinatown. One organization that was part of the T W L F at SFSC was the Intercollegiate Chinese for Social Action (ICSA). Formed in October 1967, the ICSA worked to tackle community problems, especially issues concerning the youth and the poor. Some members volunteered at the War on Poverty office. The organization also established a youth center in Chinatown and provided English and ethnic history classes to Wah Ching and other Chinatown youths. In addition, it questioned the CCBA's use of Economic Opportunity Council funding. 51 The Asian Community Center (ACC), founded by Berkeley students in 1970, offered tutoring in English, math, and science, an immigrant youth counseling program, and a free food service. In addition, it ran the Chinatown Cooperative Garment Factory as a new alternative to garment shops and unions that either exploited the workers or provided inadequate assistance.52 The A C C also introduced films about China, Vietnam, and the Black Panthers to Chinatown residents in an attempt to raise their political and ethnic consciousness.53 They likewise supported the causes of Chinatown youth groups such as Wah Ching and Leway and encouraged wider support through publicizing these groups in student and community newspapers.54 Like Chinatown youth, these college students were dissatisfied with the old establishment's tourist orientation and the San Francisco city government's indifference to Chinatown problems. On August 17, 1968, the ICSA formed a picket line along Grant Avenue during peak tourist hours to make sure that tourists were fully aware of the socioeconomic problems in Chinatown. 55 As L. Ling-chi Wang recalled: It was quite a political event in Chinatown. Those of us who were involved in it were very nervous [about] possible violence. Although our intentions were peaceful, we did not know whether the Chinatown establishment considered us a threat or not. But it turned out to be very peaceful, although we were denounced by the Chinese Six Companies [the CCBA]. For the first time problems were articulated beyond the Chinatown youth problems which were publicly aired before.56 The ICSA openly criticized the C C B A for failing to solve the deplorable living and working conditions in Chinatown. Meanwhile, the Concerned Chinese for Action and Change (CCAC), an organization comprised of 84

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students from SFSC and U C Berkeley as well as a few lawyers and clergy, requested that the CCBA stop construction of the Chinatown gateway, which was designed to attract more tourists. The demonstration, however, was unsuccessful.57 On the day of the gateway's inauguration in 1970, the Asian People's Coalition carried signs in both English and Chinese stating: "Housing for the People—Not Moon Gates for Tourists!"58 These political demonstrations openly challenged the docile model minority image and repeatedly asked the city government for public funding in order to improve the living and working conditions in Chinatown. Student activists also linked the problems facing Chinese Americans to those facing people in the Third World. On May 18, 1970, Bay Area college students organized a march from Portsmouth Square, past the CCBA and the Bank of America, and ending at the San Francisco Civic Center. In Portsmouth Square, Moon Eng, a leader from SFSC, called for Asian American students to return to their communities while Bing Tom, a U C Berkeley student, urged people to pay closer attention to the touristoriented development in Chinatown. Choosing the Bank of America as a protest site accentuated the economic exploitation facing Chinatown residents and the people in Vietnam.59 San Francisco Chinatown was not the only place that encountered youth protests. I Wor Kuen (Righteous and Harmonious Fists), an organization established by college and high school students and workers in 1969 New York, published a periodical, Getting Together, to attack racism, demand social services, and criticize the inability of the Chinatown establishment. In addition, it provided working-class mothers with childcare services and a bilingual language program, and pressured the New York City government to establish a Chinatown Health Clinic for tuberculosis treatment. To counter the political dominance of the Kuomintang (Taiwan's Nationalist Party) and to raise political awareness, it introduced films about the PRC. 60 Moreover, I Wor Kuen attacked the touristoriented approach of the old establishment and staged the Tourist Bus Demonstration in New York's Chinatown on April 17,1970. 61 To respond to the protest, a large sign saying "Chinatown Welcomes All Tourists" was hung in front of the CCBA building.62 Meanwhile, Chinese American youth in Philadelphia established a similar organization, Yellow Seeds, in 1971 to provide educational, recreational, and referral services to the community.63 This youth activism indicated heightened ethnic consciousness among the younger generation and the divergent racial and class politics that separated them from their elders. YELLOW

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Additionally, given that all youth organizations criticized the model minority image, they obviously challenged the patriarchal manhood of the old establishment. As the historian Steve Estes has argued, many African American civil rights activists and black power advocates embedded their struggle of racial equality with that of restoring manhood. While civil rights leaders such as Martin Luther King Jr. wanted to restore black manhood through maintaining patriarchy, black power supporters such as Malcolm X and the Black Panthers instead resorted to militant masculinity.64 Similarly, Chinese American youth correlated nationalism with manhood. A message on the wall of a Leway House recreation center wrote, "If you're not involved in the struggle for your people then you're of no use to yourself, your family, or your woman. You are dead!" 65 Many Chinatown radicals questioned the conformist attitude of their elders through performing militant masculinity. To them, manhood could solely be claimed by self determination—they demanded racial justice and economic rights. Their masculinity was manifested via demonstrations and public protests. Some, such as the Red Guard members, even performed their masculinity by carrying concealed weapons and wearing field jackets, dark clothes, and sunglasses, a stark contrast to the dark suits worn by Chinatown leaders. 66 Although Chinese American youths' militant approach effectively questioned the docile model minority image, their challenge stalled due to its fervent reproduction and maintenance of heteronormativity and patriarchy. The strategy to follow the Black Panther Party meant that the youth activists equated nationalism with militant masculinity. Accordingly, females and homosexuals could not fit into the ideal manhood. 6 7 They therefore reinforced a hierarchal gender relation and championed heteronormativity. Some felt that they "had to have [their] own 'nigger'—the Oriental female," who was portrayed as being super feminine and submissive, to elevate their masculinity. Others assumed a macho role and looked down upon their female counterparts. They thought women were inferior and categorized them in sexist and derogatory terms. 68 Meanwhile, I Wor Kuen promoted sexual liberation between women and men and insisted on abandoning monogamy, considered by many to be "a cover for degeneracy and the most blatant forms of male supremacy and the oppression of women." 6 9 The Red Guard Party, in contrast, took a more traditional approach in its early years and anchored a woman's place to the home and her value to reproduction. 70 Other male activists similarly subordinated sexism to racism. 71 Nevertheless, there were exceptions. For instance, Dolly Veale, who helped establish a health clinic in San Francisco's China86

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town in 1971, thought it was important to liberate women from feudal traditions.72 Most of the male activists, on the contrary, held up a patriarchal conception of gender and sexual relations, increasingly clashing with their female counterparts.73 Inspired by Chinese female revolutionaries in China and women's liberation in the United States, college activists began to promote the image of revolutionary women in communist China as a role model.74 Getting Together, an I Wor Kuen publication, and Gidra, an underground UCLA student newspaper, printed a number of articles on PRC women and the heroic stories of revolutionary women. These articles emphasized that women in China dressed like men and did men's jobs. "Chinese women do everything men do. They dig ditches, they drive trucks, they do farm labor, they are surgeons. There is a total lack of femininity. They wear the same baggy pants as men wear. There is no sign of curves, and no makeup." Moreover, these women could pursue education, work outside the home, and even be promoted into the ranks of leadership.75 While the mainstream society and the ethnic community emphasized female sexuality and femininity, these articles, in contrast, celebrated the masculine qualities of Chinese women.76 A number of female college students participated in the Asian American movement.77 As Juanita Tamayo Lott recalled, "I watched and oftentimes joined young Asian American women, particularly on campus, walk picket lines, march in demonstrations . . ."78 Another female activist was Laureen Chew, a participant in the 1968 SFSC strike. Chew was born and raised in Chinatown by an American-born father and an immigrant mother. Her father worked for a nightclub while her mother was a seamstress. She joined the student movement, even going to jail for twenty days because of the strike.79 Her militancy was in stark contrast to the submissive and conforming womanhood constructed through the ethnic beauty pageant. The strike led her to recognize the oppression in Chinatown. "I had lived in Chinatown all my life and I never thought of it as a community before. Those of us involved in the strike began to look at how Chinatown was overlooked; that services were lacking; and how we were stereotyped as a successful story. Not even one agency existed."80 Chew then returned to the community for various voluntary jobs: being a house parent for runaway girls, launching a tutorial program for immigrants, and going on weekly hikes with Chinatown youths.81 In addition to engaging in community activism, female students also formed study groups and read the works of Friedrich Engels and Mao.82 This phenomenon was not specific to the Bay Area. YELLOW

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Helen Zia, who grew up in suburban New Jersey, detailed in Asian American Dreams how her involvement in the Asian American movement at Princeton University transformed her from a quiet Chinese American woman to an outspoken antiwar activist.83 Female activists engaged in militant activities equivalent to that of their male counterparts, such as public demonstrations, strikes, and speeches, an inverse of Confucian gender ideals. They did not, however, experience gender equality within the Asian American movement. On the contrary, these female activists were delegated to clerical work and had "very little decision-making power."84 Nonetheless, some female activists had an ambivalent view toward gender discrimination within the Asian American movement. Activists like Chew prioritized racism to sexism. "We did not equate our struggle with the white women's movement because we felt, in many ways, Asian men were [more] oppressed than white women. . . . We did all the shit work, but that was not an issue at the time."85 Similar attitudes were shared by other minority women who felt that they had to suppress their criticism of gender discrimination in order to win the battle of racial equality.86 Not all women agreed. Although most Chinese American women, like other minority women, rarely identified with the women's liberation movement, their marginal experiences within the Asian American movement motivated some to form separate groups and to attack the gender inequality within the movement. In San Francisco, five women from the International Hotel Collective, a group fighting for the rights of the International Hotel's tenants, formed a separate Women's Collective. They championed the notion of sisterhood and insisted that women should not take a subordinate role. On the contrary, women should build a positive self-image and develop leadership skills.87 Moreover, they urged the brothers to "reevaluate their role as men."88 In Los Angeles, Asian American female activists equated gender exploitation with racial discrimination. "We should also teach the brothers that their chauvinistic act is a manifestation of the values of an exploitative system and that these are the same values held by the 'ruling class' which exploits and oppresses them."89 Meanwhile, some Asian American women at Princeton University began to chart the history of Asian American female immigration and to record the difficulties and oppression immigrant women faced in the workplace and at home. These students similarly questioned the Confucian notion of womanhood and sought equality with their male counterparts. Although Zia, like Chew, thought the women's liberation movement was irrelevant to minority women, she and her peers believed that they should fight 88

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racism and sexism simultaneously.90 Female activists also went back to the ethnic community to tackle issues concerning Asian American women. Some of them organized Asian Sisters in 1971 Los Angeles to combat the drug-use problem among young Asian American women. Another group of women established the Asian Women's Center to provide assistance such as child care, health care, counseling, and education in the following year.91 Overall, these female activists emphasized the notion of a "triple oppression." They saw their gender oppression as intimately connected to that of race and class.92 Female activists likewise made efforts to change the power structure within radical and student groups. The Red Guard Party was later compelled to include female activists in its leadership. Carmen Chow (later Carmen Chang) and her sister, Wilma, managed to penetrate I Wor Kuan's inner circle of power. That organization eventually included the clause, "an end to male chauvinism and sexual exploitation," in its twelve-point platform. In the East Wind, a student organization in Ann Arbor, Michigan, women constituted one-third of the leadership.93 While these female activists significantly changed gender dynamics within grassroots organizations, their battle on racism and ethnic exploitation was far from over. These efforts did not result in any fundamental changes within Chinatown; on the contrary, the C C B A accused such endeavors as being the result of "a few Caucasian agitators" and "Chinese undesirables."94 As Alan Wong, a SFSC student, recalled, "The conservative groups in Chinatown reacted" to student activism "by making up stories that we were Hong Kong students trained by the Red Guards to upset Chinatown's relationship with the white community." Some leaders even "threatened to have immigration authorities investigate" the families of the activist students.95 L. Ling-Chi Wang, who immigrated from Hong Kong and became a political activist in Chinatown under the influence of the civil rights movement, even received a death threat.96 At this time, family associations and tongs (fraternal organizations) still possessed the informal political power in Chinatown. The C C B A always claimed to be the spokesperson for the entire ethnic community and an organization devoted to the rights and welfare of Chinatown. Yet the C C B A and other traditional groups were mainly concerned with the interests of factory owners, merchants, and landlords, instead of the welfare of the working class. Other alternative organizations, such as the Newcomer's Service Center and Chinese for Affirmative Action, had little power to change conditions in Chinatown. 97 As such, community activists considered the YELLOW

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Chinatown establishment "as the biggest obstacle to improving Chinatown." Gordon Lau, president of the C C A C , concluded, "If the leadership here isn't concerned about the neglected working man, the forgotten juvenile, and overlooked senior citizen, how can we criticize the non-Chinese for not responding to our needs?"98 Nevertheless, to those Chinese immigrants who had been disenfranchised politically, they considered the best strategy to be a conformist position, not a confrontational one. As Lisa Mah remembered, her parents taught her that "you had to watch your step and you had to be very clever, you had to placate, you had to maneuver, and no matter what happened you did not get openly angry."99 The complacent attitude in part rested upon a belief that Chinese Americans had little political power. According to H . K . Wong, the festival initiator, "If you're politically strong, like the blacks or the Mexicans, you can go up and demand this and that. Chinatown has never really demanded anything because, up to now, there just aren't enough of us with political muscles." 100 Moreover, many Chinatown residents still had faith in the American Dream. A. A. Horn was one of them. Horn wrote to East/West, a bilingual community newspaper, accusing radicals of being ungrateful. "A two-room apartment for seven people may not be ideal according to our standards, but these people may have been living in shacks with no heat, sanitary facilities or even running water. Would not a two-room apartment in Chinatown be an improvement? . . . And how many of these ladies who used to work in sweatshops are now owners of valuable properties and parents of college-educated, ungrateful, empty-headed 'revolutionaries'?"101 Likewise, ethnic leaders often downplayed racialized economic issues.102 In the 1960s, African Americans had articulated racial problems clearly, while Chinese American leaders usually considered that the relation with whites was based on "class distinctions." 103 In other words, they thought people needed to "earn" their position through individual economic acquisition rather than question an unjust racial system. Furthermore, they believed that economic mobility could change their racial status. However, ethnic radicals resisted this conformist mentality and openly challenged it in the ethnic celebration.

CRITIQUES

OF T H E C H I N E S E

NEW YEAR

FESTIVALS

The commercialized and tourist-oriented Chinese New Year festival had become the center of criticism since 1965. The criticism could be traced back to the onset of the festival, when it was designed to attract tourists 90

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whose patronizing attitude and racist behavior often angered inhabitants. One twenty-seven-year-old acculturated Chinese American pointed out that white tourists "come into the Chinese meat store with their cameras, and they touch things. . . . Sure, you feel you're in a zoo." 104 The rowdy behavior of tourists further triggered resentment. Recalling the night of the 1969 parade, George Chu wrote: I . . . watched well-dressed couples stroll through Waverly Place, tearing posters and paper lanterns from the booths for souvenirs. . . . When asked politely to put things back, they handed over the decorations without a word of apology or any sign of shame; they acted as if Chinatown was theirs for the picking. I was beginning to understand the bitterness which lies just below the surface of this supposedly well-assimilated community.105 Moreover, some whites liked to throw firecrackers carelessly into the crowd during the ethnic parade. Coupled with gang problems, the parade route became a dangerous zone that many Chinese Americans dared not enter. 106 Beverley Lee, a U.S.-born Chinese woman, recalled, "In the 1960s and 1970s . . . a lot of American-born Chinese did not come down to Chinatown for the parade because we heard that people were getting hurt and injured because of firecrackers."107 This exotic space created through the ethnic celebration, paradoxically, was not a space in which most Chinese Americans felt comfortable. The ineffectiveness of the police force further exacerbated the rowdy behavior of tourists. Indeed, the racist attitudes of police officers triggered tremendous resentment among the youth. There were only three Chinese Americans employed in the San Francisco police force in the 1960s, and very few law enforcement officials knew anything about the Chinese language or culture. Moreover, they received false or racist information regarding the ethnic community. For example, State Attorney General Evelle J. Younger's office issued a confidential report that was full of false and racist statements about Chinese Americans. 108 Accordingly, the police often used excessive force against youths. The simmering animosity between the police and the youth finally erupted into a large-scale conflict the night of the 1969 parade. Other minority groups also experienced police brutality. As a result, many radical groups such as the Black Panther Party prioritized police brutality in their struggle for racial equality.109 In addition, the festival was blamed for using community resources to promote tourism that failed to benefit the entire community. Even a YELLOW

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conservative press such as the Chinese Times editorialized that the profits generated from the ethnic celebration should be donated to the Chinese Hospital, Chinese language schools, or other social welfare organizations.110 Some critics even accused certain festival activities of extracting money from the ethnic community. Of all the events, the carnival received the most negative attention. In order to fund the festival, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce allowed carnival operators to operate in Waverly Place, a Chinatown street, even though the rides and games had no cultural attachment to the Chinese New Year observance. Moreover, activists lambasted that children wasted lay see, money received during the ethnic holiday, on games offering shoddy, cheap, and unattainable prizes. 111 The carnival also disturbed regular businesses and created parking and crime problems, in addition to being a preferred site for gang fights. Wah Ching attempted to burn down the carnival in 1968, but was dissuaded by George Woo. 112 Because the carnival received so much criticism from youth groups and the media, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce decided to eliminate game booths but retain the rides for the 1969 festival. Because of the underlying profit-seeking mentality, the festival became a space working-class Chinatown residents could rarely afford to enter. A reader of the Chinese Pacific Weekly, a Chinese-language community newspaper, pointed out that Miss Chinatown U.S.A. beauty pageants, coronation dances, and fashion shows were held in upscale locales and that their tickets were so costly that ordinary Chinese Americans were discouraged from attending.113 Costs were not the only factor that deterred Chinese Americans from participating in festival activities. Starting in 1959, the Miss Chinatown U.S.A. pageant was held in the 3,000-seat Masonic Auditorium located outside Chinatown. The limited seating often prohibited more people from observing the contest. East/West, a community newspaper, thus editorialized that the pageant should move to the 12,000-seat Civic Auditorium because "the pageant belongs to the people, the man on the street."114 The parade seemed to be the only event that ordinary Chinatown residents could attend, even if it was so crowded with tourists that not everyone was able to see clearly. As Frank Eng recalled, "I don't believe it is really catering to the Chinese people. . . . They can't even get close enough to watch. You have to fight people off even to get near the parade, and then you have to pay for the seats." 115 Other festival activities staged by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce further exposed its intention to cater to the general public and exclude Chi92

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Figure 7. Carnival. Courtesy of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce,

natown residents. For instance, the 1961 parade included fewer ethnic components: no martial arts or lion dances. Even sports tournaments, which many Chinatown residents favored, were cancelled." 6 In addition, parade grand marshals were often entirely unrelated to the ethnic community— the 1966 grand marshal was James Drury, an actor in the T V series Virginian.117 These examples triggered one restaurant worker to conclude that YELLOW

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"because the Chamber's sole interest is in the tourist trade, and [the] majority of tourists being White, it has reshaped the New Year celebration event to cater to the White people." 118 Community liberals not only shared such sentiments, they even proposed to close the festivals to outsiders. 119 Once many festival activities were moved outside Chinatown, the resentment toward businesses shifted to the city government. Because of fire hazards, the 1965 parade route was changed to start near the Civic Center. Since then, few floats have even entered Grand Avenue, the main Chinatown thoroughfare. 120 Restaurant and gift shop owners on Grant Avenue were afraid that the change would drive away business. H . K . Wong, the festival initiator and a luxury Chinatown restaurant owner, complained in an interview: "I feel in this particular case, we have been prejudiced against. The Columbus Day parade goes right down Columbus Avenue in Italian town. That's no different from the New Year's parade going down our Grant Avenue. But they give you a lot of reasons why it shouldn't. . . . They say the street is narrow and congested and they're afraid of fire and all that . . . but what about New Orleans? That Mardi Gras? They got more people, their streets are just as narrow, yet they have it." 1 2 1 While Chinatown business owners feared the loss of tourists, Chinese American activists accused the change as catering to downtown businesses. These claims became more substantial with the Chinese New Year kickoff show, which was held in Union Square, outside Chinatown. 122 David Lei, a parade organizer, recalled in a 1998 interview, "The kickoff was to try to get downtown interests in the parade to bring tourism downtown." 1 2 3 Symbolically, the Chinese New Year parade became less of a celebration for the ethnic community and more of a city event, even though it was Chinatown's most visible spectacle. Nevertheless, the inclusion of Union Square in the celebration represented an attempt to integrate Chinatown into the broader San Francisco economy. 124 Meanwhile, Chinatown leaders' fears of losing tourist business to their downtown counterparts proved to be unwarranted.

AN ALTERNATIVE

CELEBRATION

In 1969 thirty San Francisco Bay Area student organizations staged a community-based street fair. The Youth and Recreation Committee of the Chinatown-North Beach Youth Council, established by twelve youth groups, initiated the idea of the street fair and pressured the Chinese Chamber of Commerce to use the street fair to replace the carnival. Eventually, the 94

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Youth Council, along with the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the San Francisco Art Commissions Neighborhood Arts Program, and the YWCA and YMCA cosponsored the event. The activities included Chinese and Western music performances, art exhibits, folk art demonstrations, food, sports, a fashion show, and educational booths, reflecting the influence of a newly ascendant ethnic movement and a desire to educate Chinese Americans about their "culture, history, and tradition." The effort successful attracted many Chinatown residents who crowded into Waverly Place.125 Another goal of the street fair was to improve Chinese American relations with African Americans. The fair organizers invited African Americans to run four booths. Initially, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce refused. Similar exclusion occurred in the ethnic beauty pageant as discussed in chapter 3, where a Chinese contestant of African descent was turned away in i960. This time, however, the leaders relented and allowed African American participation in the fair.126 Furthermore, the fair questioned the political stance of community leaders. The Red Guard Party distributed Mao Zedong's The Little Red Book in defiance of Chinatown leaders who used the ethnic celebration to demonstrate their loyalty to Taiwan's Nationalist government. The presence of The Little Red Book also questioned U.S. Cold War containment policy. Overall, the fair demonstrated the rising significance of youth activists who wanted to politicize the ethnic celebration and transform the ethnic community.

A CHINESE

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HOLIDAY

The rise of ethnic consciousness motivated some Chinese American high school students to demand that the city government honor the Chinese New Year observance. In 1969 twelve hundred students at Galileo High School signed a petition in which they asked for Chinese New Year's day off, provided that a note of excuse from home was submitted. In 1970, 1,050 students at Galileo were absent on Chinese New Year's day; they again requested that the ethnic holiday be recognized as a legitimate holiday. In addition, 250 students went to the San Francisco Unified School District headquarters to protest that the ethnic holiday received litde respect in comparison with Jewish holidays.127 The failure to honor the ethnic holiday revealed the hypocrisy of city hall, which only considered the ethnic celebration as part of the tourist industry. It wasn't until 1989 that the San Francisco School Board passed a resolution that honored the Chinese New Year observance.128 While YELLOW

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these youths sought governmental acknowledgement for the ethnic holiday, others resorted to violence to vent their frustrations over the economic and racial injustice during the celebration period.

VIOLENCE

"James, who is four years older, brutalized me for years. Perhaps he felt compelled to take on the role of man of the house and didn't know how to maintain control, resorting to constantly beating the 'shit' out of my sister." Bill Lee, born in an immigrant family in 1954 Chinatown, remembered violence as part of his childhood experience. Not only did his brother beat him and his sister, but his alcoholic father also physically abused his sister.129 Years later, Bill and his friends used violence to guard their territories on the streets, in pool halls, movie theaters, and on playgrounds. Older kids beat up the younger ones while American-born youths fought with immigrants. Violence became an everyday reality through which the youth performed their manhood and formulated their identity.130 As the writer Gus Lee explained in his autobiographical novel, China Boy, "Fighting was a metaphor. My struggle on the street was really an effort to fix identity, to survive as a member of a group and even succeed as a human being."131 Street fights became a way for Chinese American boys to resolve racial conflicts. While Chinatown business establishments wanted to lure tourists into Chinatown, some male youths considered these outsiders as intruders. As Joe Louie, a gang leader, recalled, We fight with people that come in, foreigners that come from elsewhere. . . . And actually some of them are just visitors that come around, not adult tourists but kids about fourteen or fifteen, close to our age. . . . At that time we were the one that, you know, went out and cause all this trouble. But sometimes they would come down and try to start trouble, too. Like they would come around in a car and say, "Fucking Chinks!" or "Goddamn Chinaman." . . . They just go rrrrrrrm, rrrrrrrm with the motor and take off. So you know, it sort of gets to your mind . . . and then you start to hate white people.132 Street fights became a means for youths to resist racism. As Clifford Fong, a former Galileo High School student and street kid, explained, "Cause the street kid has in his mind, 'Fucking white man going to try and take advantage of me, white man thinks he can take advantage of Chinese.' So even the smallest remark, the smallest thing is an excuse for the Chinese to kick the

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white mans ass." 133 Street fights were a daily occurrence between Chinese American boys and their rivals. Louie remembered the conflicts between Chinese and white kids while Warren Mar was arrested for fighting with his Mexican peers.134 Other youths had a feud with their African American counterparts from Telegraph Hill. 135 As early as i960, several Chinese American boys were arrested for shooting whites. 136 In early 1963 an interracial gang fight broke out which led to the arrest of four Chinese American youths. 137 While the Chinatown leaders used the model minority narrative to negotiate racial issues and to restore their manhood, Chinatown male youths resorted to violence to attack racism and to remasculinize themselves. To combat racism, youths were motivated to identify with virile and primitive masculinities. Fong explained, "Because a lot of tourists think they can come down and take advantage of our humbleness and stupidity in being docile, never defending ourselves, and especially like the guys being unmasculine.... and they think they can get away with pushing the Chinese around and they'll never fight back." 138 Many thus regarded fighting back as a way of resisting stereotypes. As Joe Louie put it, "These kids respect a guy [who] can fight."139 Meanwhile, kung fu movies became very popular in the ethnic community in the wake of Bruce Lee's success. Like many youths, Bill Lee went to see kung fu movies every week. The storylines in these films often celebrated brotherhood and social justice, and the heroes were like Robin Hood who robbed the rich and helped the poor. The popularity of kung fu movies among youths indicates that they identified with the figures that defied the middle-class authority. Some wanted to emulate the heroes in kung fu movies to give "power to the people." 140 Louie explained the mentality of the youth: '"Wow, what kind of establishment do we have?' They're rich, they got their money, they're keeping it to themselves. . . . And it kind of get to [the youth's] mind and that's why they're always fighting the rich people. Like the rich people, they come around like they own the goddamn street, you know." 141 Joe Fong, a notorious gang leader, similarly accused the old establishment for causing Chinatown's problems and called them "gentlemen crooks." 142 Others concurred. As the Wah Ching spokesperson, George Woo, stated, "I certainly don't identify with the petty American middle-class values of my aunts and uncles." 143 Militancy became a means for these youths to challenge the elite and to alleviate class inequality. Many youth groups began to engage in various confrontational strategies to demand economic and racial justice. Some used violence to vent YELLOW

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their frustrations. For example, Wall Ching committed crimes and disrupted the 1968 and 1969 Chinese New Year parades when it received no help from either the ethnic elite or the city. Others even considered violence and riots the only means to change structural racism. As Fong stated, "We should stand up and fight back like the blacks.... If there's no threats or riots or anything the federal government isn't going to help you at all." 144 College-educated Chinese American male and female activists likewise confronted the authority for structured deficiency. On February 27, 1969, two days before the Chinese New Year parade, the Concerned Chinese for Action and Change had a violent confrontation with a school superintendent over insufficient educational programs for Chinese Americans.145 The cultural critic Viet Thanh Nguyen has argued, "As part of their radicalization process, these young Asian American activists during and after 1968 began to see violence as a tool they could use as agents, rather than only as a weapon that targeted them as objects."146 Violence reached its high point during the Chinese New Year festivities. A reader of the Chinese Pacific Weekly reported that he saw fighting among Chinese American, African American, and white youths during the 1963 celebration.147 In 1968 fourteen assault cases were reported in the one-week Chinese New Year period and a small-scale riot broke out during the parade.148 The interracial fighting became so aggravated that a column in East/West urged the ethnic community to pay attention to this issue.149 The history of violence in Chinatown prompted the formation of the Chinatown Task Force of Youth for Service to prevent a full-scale riot in the 1969 festival. Nevertheless, interracial fighting still broke out after the parade. Yet the incident failed to compel Chinatown leaders or city hall to pay attention to the racial and economic issues facing ethnic youths. After the incident, the police department only remarked that "the disorders may have started simply because there were 'too many people in one place.'" 150 Community leaders were fearful that the lucrative festival would be prohibited. Eight days after the riot, Mayor Joseph Alioto told a press conference that the city would take steps to control "rowdyism, fireworks, and characters who cause trouble." He said that he had no intention of discontinuing the parade because it was "an event that rivals the Mardi Gras for national and international attention."151 Nonetheless, violence, demonstrations, and protests did encourage the mainstream society and the press to pay more attention to Chinatown's problems. The San Francisco Chronicle and the San Francisco Examiner published a series of articles about the "real" Chinatown—a place where hous98

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ing shortages, low pay, juvenile delinquency, and other immigrant problems predominated.152 By the late 1960s, the media significantly decreased the reports that depicted Chinatown as a model neighborhood. The descriptions of Chinatown as a poverty- and crime-driven ghetto contributed to the formation of the Chinatown fact finding committee in 1969. The CCBA, meanwhile, was still busy covering up, claiming that there were "very few problems in Chinatown, if any." 153 Even when the CCBA was forced to face the poverty issue, it excluded the poor people in an antipoverty meeting on the grounds that they were "too uneducated."154 The failure to solve structural deficiencies in the late 1960s resulted in more violence in the 1970s. The inability to solve youth issues led Wah Ching to divide into three groups in mid-1969: one group, which remained under the name Wah Ching, became more violent on the street, while the other two were incorporated into the Suey Sing and Hop Sing tongs. This generated more gang warfare in the 1970s, and Chinatown alleys became battlefields for gang members. Juvenile arrests soared to 430 in 1972 compared with eighty-five in 1964. 155 Gang members were eating for free in restaurants, paying nothing for movies, extorting "protection fees" from shopkeepers, and killing each other. The gang warfare significantly disturbed the Chinatown economy. As early as September 1969, the Chinese Pacific Weekly reported that due to the increasing crime rate, business had declined 15 to 20 percent.156 Yet business people preferred to tolerate such behavior rather than report it to the police, because "all this talk about violence is bad for business."157 By the mid-1970s, Chinatown had become one of the major contributors to San Francisco's business taxes, behind only the financial district.158 The flourishing tourist industry led both the business people and city hall to continually cover up the race and class issues.159 Even though several newspapers and magazines had run sensational articles on gang shootings in broad daylight, city authorities and Chinatown leaders still were maintaining the "safe and healthy" image of Chinatown, because tourists were never hurt and the killing only affected ethnic youth gangs.160 This indifference eventually resulted in the 1977 Golden Dragon Massacre, in which five people were killed and eleven wounded in Chinatown's Golden Dragon restaurant.161 None of the victims were gang members. This incident caused a huge scare, because it underlined the fact that anyone could become a victim of a random shooting. Accordingly, the shooting gained the attention of the mayor, the police, and ethnic business leaders.162 Even though the San Francisco Gang Task Force was formed in YELLOW

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September 1977 to deal specifically with Chinese American gangs, people no longer felt safe in Chinatown. Before the incident, shops had stayed open until midnight and people often went out for snacks until one or two o'clock in the morning. After the shooting, most shops, except restaurants, closed at six or seven o'clock in the evening. Few people lingered on the street after dark. The atmosphere in the community completely changed, and business never fully recovered.163 Moreover, the number of spectators in the Chinese New Year parade dropped by 25 percent. 164 Fighting and violence, the form of "everyday resistance" adopted by youth delinquents, successfully disrupted the acculturated, law-biding, submissive, and middleclass model minority image, deliberately constructed by the festival organizers, and challenged the hegemonic masculinity, based upon economic mobility and consumption. The violent behavior of the youths similarly changed the dominant racial discourse, which mapped the ethnic community into two starkly contrasting racial and class positions. Whereas the model minority image "whitened" Chinese Americans, thereby permitting them to assimilate into mainstream America through economic means and consumption, the portrayal of the masculinized activists and gang members, on the contrary, "blackened" Chinese Americans, and they came to be perceived as the "New Yellow Peril" who challenged racial and economic structures in the dominant society.165

CONCLUSION

The Chinese New Year Festival was a stage for the Chinatown establishment to showcase Chinese Americans as loyal, acculturated, and law-abiding model minorities who conformed to middle-class gender ideals and consumption values. This definition, however, silenced class division within and racial division outside the ethnic community, and encountered resistance once the younger generation came of age in the 1960s. College students, radicals, and youth gangs used demonstrations, grassroots movements, and violence to protest the control of Chinatown leaders, question the model minority image, and challenge the racial and economic injustice of the larger society. To claim "yellow power," they also engaged in various "sideshows" in the ethnic celebration, including critiquing the festival, staging an alternative celebration, and demanding to recognize the ethnic holiday. In addition, fighting and riots destroyed the image of the "happy" Chinese New Year celebration and brought the real Chinatown behind the celebratory scene into the light for all to see. The rise of political awareness precipitated

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the growth of community organizations and the urge to retain ethnic heritage. As a result, many social service organizations, such as the Chinese Newcomers Service Center, On Lok Senior Health Services, English Language Center, and Self Help for the Elderly, were formed to take advantage of LBJ's war on poverty programs and strive for civil rights and community welfare.166 Finally, Chinese American feminists demonstrated a different kind of Chinese American womanhood—one that was militant and masculine, an opposition to traditional gender norms. They also took on the ethnic beauty pageant and questioned the model minority womanhood.

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I OI

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Heated Debate on the Ethnic Beauty Pageant

undergraduate student at UCLA, she entered the Miss Los Angeles Chinatown beauty pageant in order to report on the event for Pacific Ties, the university's Asian American student newspaper. Her goal was to find out "what kind of woman the Asian community would choose as their representative," and, at the same time, "get close to the Chinese community in Los Angeles."1 Gouw did more than simply write an article about the event—she went on to win both Miss Chinatown Los Angles in 1983 and Miss Chinatown U.S.A. in 1984. After her success, Gouw insisted that she was a different kind of beauty queen who could "be articulate and assertive as opposed to a stereotypical beauty pageant winner." For Miss Chinatown U.S.A.'s talent competition, she chose to present a monologue. The pageant committee had discouraged her because it "might be 'political.'" Nevertheless, she insisted on performing the monologue in lieu of a modern jazz dance. Entitled "On Glorious Wing," it narrated the history of three generations of Chinese American women who overcame difficulties to become successful businesswomen, nurses, and teachers.2 While attending UCLA, Gouw herself had already begun pursuing her own career. In addition to modeling, she worked as an intern at Assembly Speaker Willie Brown's office and the United Way corporation. After the pageant, she won the Spokesmodel competition for Star Search. She has since become a news reporter and an actress.3

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Gouw found the beauty pageant experience to be positive. "Winning the Miss Chinatown U.S.A. has been extremely rewarding [because of] the people I've met and all the exciting c a r e e r . . . opportunities." 4 Her participation in the pageant provided her with networking opportunities with San Francisco's Chinese American community. As she stated, "I love meeting the movers and the shakers, the representatives of the community." 5 In subsequent years, she was often invited to host the national ethnic beauty pageant and the English-language television broadcast of the Chinese New Year parade. After the late 1960s, numerous contestants, like Gouw, became more outspoken and assertive. Their motivations for participating in the Miss Chinatown U.S.A. beauty pageant ranged from scholarships, simple enjoyment, and a free trip to San Francisco to building career opportunities. This chapter discusses to what extent participants have transformed the Miss Chinatown U.S.A. beauty pageant since the late 1960s. It also examines how different powers played into the beauty contest. While many contestants achieved their personal agendas through the competition, their entries were also manipulated and exploited by ethnic leaders and community and family members in order to fulfill various purposes. As discussed in chapter 3, in 1958 community leaders created an ideal Chinese American femininity through the national ethnic beauty pageant. The pageant produced the "model minority" image, which conformed to mainstream gender norms, consumption values, and work ethics, as well as Confucian hierarchy and obedience. This served to negotiate the Chinese American racialized and gendered position, to maintain male patriarchal control, and to attract tourists to Chinatown. While ethnic leaders continued to insist upon these agendas, contestants' families and sponsors saw the event as a community and business networking opportunity. Moreover, ethnic and feminist movements in the late 1960s and early 1970s motivated liberals, radicals, and feminists to see the pageant as a battleground for ethnic pride and gender equality. The event thus became a contested site for numerous individuals and groups trying to achieve various purposes.

FULFILLING

PERSONAL

AND SEEKING

FANTASY

OPPORTUNITIES

W h y were some Chinese Americans and, women in particular, enthusiastic about the ethnic beauty pageant? Certainly, many were enraptured with the pageant's glamour. The 1982 Miss Chinatown U.S.A., Stefanie

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Shiu, claimed that she had started fantasizing about being an ethnic beauty queen while still a young girl. The Shius settled in Lemoore, California, a small town thirty-seven miles east of Fresno, after emigrating from Hong Kong when Stefanie was six years old.6 For Stefanie, the event provided an opportunity for her to get away from a small town. She also believed that winning a title might free her from the daily struggles facing an immigrant daughter. The beautiful evening gowns and spotlights turned her into a celebrity, even if only temporarily. Other young women had their own reasons to participate in the pageant. Fiona Yep entered the competition due to parental pressure, while Kati Wang competed on behalf of her family association.7 For contestants like Cynthia D. Chin-Lee, who had never been to San Francisco, the contest was perceived as "a good way to get a free trip to the West Coast." 8 Other contestants such as Irene Tsu took part in the pageant to build a career in modeling or other aspects of the entertainment business. Entry to the competition allowed participants to build networks and meet significant people in ethnic organizations who might hold influence in their later careers. Some contestants were motivated to become involved in community issues. Wang, for example, worked briefly at an ethnic civil rights organization. Yep became an artist and produced several works that recorded ethnic experiences. Both of them credited the event for opening doors to the San Francisco ethnic community. Yep, in particular, attributed her success to the contacts she made during the contest.9 Winning a title in the pageant likewise opened doors to business circles. While their roles as cultural ambassadors between the ethnic community and the dominant society became less important as overt discrimination lessened, titleholders took on more responsibilities in promoting trade among ethnic communities as well as with Asian countries. As a result, they made fewer trips to the city hall and governor's office, and more trips to businesses in the United States and Asia. Indeed, the event was originally designed to boost the Chinatown economy. Since the pageant's inception, the judges had always been major donors or successful business women and men. To generate business, the committee even created a new title—"Miss Chinese Chamber of Commerce"—in 1968. Organizer Esther Li admitted that the purpose of the pageant was to "promote trade." 10 In 2002 Francis So, then president of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, unabashedly announced business acquisitions in Macao on the night of the pageant competition. 11 In order

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to strengthen ties among ethnic entrepreneurs, winners were required to attend various business ceremonies. Glenda Tang, the 1979 Miss Chinatown U.S.A., recalled that she went to six states to cut ribbons for new businesses. Another winner, Rose Chung, echoed her words: "Ribbon cuttings at new banks and restaurants are among the most common events that Miss Chinatown is expected to attend." 12 Trips to Asia also were vital in building business opportunities and networks. Nevertheless, the presence of winners on Asian trips was symbolic, as few of them could communicate effectively in Chinese. For example, Shirley Tom, a 1974 Miss San Francisco Chinatown, found that her Toishan dialect (one of the Cantonese subdialects) was of no use on her winning trip to Taiwan and Hong Kong. Although she met a few highranking officials in Taiwan, she could not identify any of them because she did not understand Mandarin. Even in Cantonese-speaking Hong Kong, Tom learned that her Toishan dialect was of no help, both because of her own lack of fluency and because Hong Kongers speak a different dialect of Cantonese. 13 The practice of using winners to promote trade generated mixed feelings among beauty queens. For example, one titleholder accused the Chinese Chamber of Commerce of failing to reward her for promoting business. "They use us for business. We bring so much business to San Francisco and they don't compensate the trouble and hard work of the girls." 14 In contrast, other beauty queens such as Linda Shen (Linda Lei), the 1971 Miss Chinatown U.S.A., took advantage of the networking opportunities and became successful businesswomen. 15 Supporters thus argued that the pageant provided upward mobility for working-class women. The historian Judy W u contends that working-class Chinese American women tended to take seriously the idea that the pageant would give them an opportunity to advance their personal interests. For example, the 1981 Miss Chinatown, Rose Chung, who came from a single-parent family and whose mother was a seamstress, claimed that the beauty contest not only gave her celebrity status, but also won her positions in Chinatown's community associations. These included president of the women's auxiliary group of her family association, president of the San Francisco General Hospital Chinese Employee Association, and membership on the Republican County Central Committee. 1 6 While the pageant furnished winners with exciting opportunities, it gave their family members a chance to network with other Chinese Americans.

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" I T WAS MY PARENTS W H O

ASKED"

Many later contestants credited their entry to the competition to their parents. This stands in direct contrast to the 1950s, when parents discouraged their daughters from entering. Joan Lowe, from North Beach, San Francisco, explained that her parents dissuaded her elder sister in competing in the local Miss Chinatown beauty pageant in the 1950s. "I have an older sister who worked for NY Metro Insurance Co., and they offered to sponsor her as a contestant. My parents said it wasn't a good idea. They said it doesn't matter how pretty you are. It is how many tickets you sell, and my sister was disappointed because she thought she could win with her looks." 17 Prior to 1958, the judging criteria indeed rested upon the fundraising ability of contestants and their sponsors. In those years, the committee had a difficult time finding contenders. But things soon changed: in the next decade, parents realized that the event could introduce them to ethnic and business leaders in San Francisco. When Chin-Lee was a freshman at Harvard University, her parents enrolled her in the Washington, D.C. Miss Chinatown beauty pageant.18 Wang entered the competition because of a phone call from her family association. In a 2002 interview, Wang explained her background. She was born and raised in Laramie, Wyoming. After her father passed away, her mother, who could not speak English, decided to move to San Francisco so that she could find a job in a Chinese-speaking community. Before the family moved to San Francisco, Wang had won a national speech competition, thereby gaining recognition from her family association in San Francisco. However, the family association contacted her mother, not her, to recruit Wang for the beauty contest. As she recalled, "It was through my mother. They told her they'd like me to compete.... You know, of course, being the immigrant Chinese who thinks that whatever your family association asks you to do, you do it. [I] was 15 years old. . . . I'm going to do what my mother and my family association said would be good." 19 For Wang, her participation fulfilled her obligation of being a Chinese American daughter. Yep also entered the competition for the same reason: "It was my parents who asked if I would like to do that." She explained that competing in the pageant was more important for her parents than for her; they were proud to showcase their beautiful daughter to other Chinese Americans.20 For these parents, the event provided them with a chance to network with other co-ethnics. The Chinese Times publicized the names of the contestants' fathers when introducing contenders. To be listed in the Chinese 106

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Times, the most widely circulated newspaper in the area, increased one's visibility in the ethnic community.21 Similar occurrences could be seen in other racial and ethnic communities, where parents pressured their daughters to participate in beauty pageants to gain political and economic resources.22 Moreover, through procuring suitable contestants, community organizations strengthened their ties to the rank and file in the local area and those in other parts of the country. Some winners even passed on their experiences to their daughters. One Miss Los Angeles Chinatown runner-up attributed her interest in the beauty contest to her mother, a former ethnic pageant winner. She grew up trying on her mothers pageant dresses and looking at her mothers contest photos. Her mother was deeply involved in her competition, helping her to pick out gowns and chaperoning her around during the contest.23 However, not all parents applauded the idea of sending their daughters to the pageant, especially those who had no ties to San Francisco's old Chinatown establishment. Helen Lee of Silicon Valley, California, was one example. "No one in our family had ever been involved in a beauty pageant before and, coming from a traditional Chinese family myself, the idea of being a part of something like this did not quite sit well with me." Nevertheless, she supported her daughter's decision to enter the competition, equating it with other college activities such as the Chinese Olympics and piano recitals. Having no connection to the old community motivated Lee to dissociate the beauty contest from the ethnic culture. She instead likened it to other extracurricular activities, which presented her daughter with "a good learning experience" and an opportunity to "meet different people."24 Unexpectedly, the pageant provided the Lees a chance to connect to the old establishment. Helen and her husband, Lester, gained an opportunity to meet other Lees in San Francisco. "We had never met anyone from the Lee Association in The City, and we found that all of them are very warm and friendly. Because we speak Mandarin, Lester and I thought that we would have a difficult time communicating with those who spoke Cantonese, and it would be hard for us to make connections, but we found that everyone accepted us with open arms."25 Newly immigrated contestants similarly considered the contest an outlet for them to meet native-born Chinese Americans. Yeelina Mingkit Chiu, a 1981 titleholder, immigrated to the United States four years prior to her beauty contest and credited the event with furnishing her an opportunity to become acquainted with American-born Chinese girls.26 The event thus provided an occasion for the post-1965 immigrants to get to HEATED

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know the old timers or American-born Chinese. This was important for an ethnic community divided by regional, generational, linguistic, immigration status, and national origin differences.

"SHOW YOUR OWN PEOPLE O F F " VS. "WHAT'S CHINESE ABOUT WOMEN

PARADING IN

SO

SWIMSUITS?"

Supporters contended that the pageant provided a chance to solidify the ethnic community through introducing ethnic heritage and the community to contestants. As Janet Lowe, a 1980 Miss San Francisco Chinatown, wrote in her farewell address: "One of my goals for wanting to become Miss Chinatown was for the opportunity to learn more about the Chinese people and their culture. I fulfilled this goal through my stay in Hong Kong and with the numerous social events with members of the Chinese community." 27 Although such a statement disclosed an intention to please the committee, her participation in the contest nevertheless introduced Lowe to the Chinese New Year celebration, something she had never observed prior to her entry.28 Going to San Francisco Chinatown likewise provided Stephanie L. Shiu, a 1982 Miss Chinatown U.S.A., with a chance to meet other Chinese Americans. As she explained, "I grew up in a small town where there are few Chinese families. I just felt something was missing in my life. I needed to fill an empty part of me that only direct interaction with the Chinese community could fulfill." The pageant enabled her to reconnect with her Chinese heritage, and she concluded her oneyear duty with the following statement: "I think my Chinese is a little better. Now I can speak in whole sentences without stumbling. I've learned a lot about my whole Chinese heritage."29 The committee also emphasized its effort to reinforce the participants' ethnic identity. Similar emphasis also occurred at other ethnic beauty pageants. For example, "the Nisei Week contest encouraged its participants to appreciate themselves as Japanese Americans." 30 Moreover, attending various activities hosted by family associations allowed contestants to grasp the power structure within the ethnic community. As Wang put it, the ethnic beauty pageant "gave me an introduction to a lot of the things going on in Chinatown; like I said, being a newcomer, I wasn't aware of all of the influence that the Chinese Chamber of Commerce played, that the family associations played." Yep concurred, "I think the way the pageant was set up was really to expose us how the community was run by whoever the power brokers were." Although she

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admitted that she failed to understand this at the time and simply followed orders, she credited the beauty contest for planting "the seed of being more conscious and aware of the community impact as a whole. . . . What was the reason to have the event at all? It was all economic, to solidify and make Chinatown a tourist destination."31 Other contestants likewise echoed Yep on the function of the event. As Chin-Lee put it, the pageant "is a money-making business, a public relations invention, and a community project. It benefits both the individuals involved and the community." She further commented that it was a "symbol of cohesiveness and a vehicle for contact and communication." 32 The event thus became a window for contestants to understand community affairs. In addition, supporters argued that the event provided a space for minority women excluded from mainstream beauty contests to gain recognition. For example, Sandra Wong, the 1973 Miss Chinatown U.S.A., competed twice in the Miss San Leandro contest. She won both the talent and swimsuit competitions in the first year, but was only the first runnerup in the overall competition in both 1971 and 1972. As a result, supporter John Lum argued that "discrimination doesn't only extend to housing, education, and jobs; it extends to beauty contests,' too." 33 The mainstream beauty pageant was slow to be receptive to racial and ethnic minorities: the first African American woman to win the Miss America pageant was in 1984, while the first Asian American winner was in 2001. 34 Supporters thus considered the pageant an alternative space to demonstrate ethnic pride. As H . K . Wong, the Miss Chinatown U.S.A. beauty pageant initiator, put it, the event was intended to "show your own people off." 3 5 Moreover, it provided a means to articulate an ethnic standard of beauty, a norm that was accessible to ethnic women. 36 However, critics disapproved of the pageant as the best way to exhibit ethnic pride. One, for example, asked, "What's so Chinese about women parading in swimsuits to the sounds of an upbeat version of the Lawrence Welk orchestra, anyway?" 37 Some, including certain organizers, perceived it as a misrepresentation, especially when the ethnic community became even more diverse after the arrival of post-1965 immigrants. At this time, the Chinese American population included both pre- and post-1965 immigrants and U.S.-born Chinese. The old immigrants, who hailed mostly from the Guangzhou (Canton) area, were quite different from the post1965 immigrants, who were from various regions across China. Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia also supplied immigrants to San Francisco. In the wake of the Vietnam War, many ethnic Chinese from Vietnam HEATED

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settled in Chinatown and the Tenderloin area. The normalization of relations between China and the United States and the 1997 handover of Hong Kong to China triggered many Taiwanese and Hong Kongers to emigrate.38 Esther Li, who was born and raised in San Francisco's Chinatown and had been involved in the pageant since the 1980s, disagreed that a foreign-born titleholder could represent American-born Chinese. "If you take a look, more and more of our contestants are now immigrants. They probably came when they were young. They were born in Hong Kong or China or Thailand, and they moved here. They grew up here with different viewpoint; I was born here and . . . grew up in San Francisco, period. So there is a different viewpoint of what a Chinese American woman is." 39 Different opinions on the definition of Chinese American women were reflected in the discussion of beauty standards and ethnicity. From the very beginning, the inclusion of non-Chinese judges has created a controversy, as discussed in chapter 3. The conflicts over the "Chinese" and "American" standards of beauty intensified in the 1960s and 1970s, especially with the influence of Asian American movement.40 Pageant contestant Alice Kong accused the committee of adopting white beauty standards. "It was obvious those girls with height" had an advantage.41 One Chinatown resident further pointed out that the ethnic beauty contest "shows that the closer you look like the whites, the prettier you are. For example, the longer the nose, the prettier."42 In addition, Wu points out that judges preferred contestants who had "Caucasian" eyes. "Larger eyes with double eyelids and longer eye lashes have traditionally been associated with a 'Western look,' as opposed to smaller eyes with single eyelids." The 1970 pageant program promoted this "Western look" by including a cosmetic surgery advertisement for converting '"oriental eyes' with single eyelids into 'Caucasian eyes' [with double-eyelids]."43 In addition to an emphasis on Western features, immigrant contestants who had little to no English proficiency felt at a disadvantage as early as the late 1960s, when the majority of judges spoke only English.44 This led some to provide suggested alternatives. For instance, in 1970 one Chinese American proposed in a community newspaper that a "Mr. Chinatown Contest," a bodybuilding competition, should be reintroduced to alter the perception of Chinese American men. Rather than remain satisfied with the portrayal of a submissive and obedient Chinese represented by the beauty queen, or the violent image projected by youth gangs, the proposal emphasized that the Mr. Chinatown contest should focus on masculine characteristics—strength, health, and power.45 The I I o

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Figure 8. Mr. Chinatown Contest. Left to right: Alvin Lee, Richard Hoey, Monroe Kwock, Albert Lee, Richard Yee, Ringo Wong (winner), Everett Lee, and Allen Joe. Courtesy of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce.

festival committee, however, never took the suggestion seriously. Although a Mr. Chinatown contest was included in the 1954 festival and enjoyed popularity, it was never held again. This may be because Chinese American men had greater difficulty being accepted into mainstream society, a view shared by some liberal Chinese. As Gilbert Woo, the editor of the Chinese Pacific Weekly, a Chinese-language ethnic newspaper, explained, women "have always found it easier to gain acceptance when making inroads into white society. For example, Anna May Wong's kissing scene with a white actor in a Hollywood film was perfectly accepted. However, if Anna May Wong had been a man there would never have been a kissing scene with a white actress."46 Women thus were seen as cultural ambassadors to the mainstream society. Accordingly, the committee continued to defend the practice of adopting Western beauty standards. Although organizer Esther Li thought that a Chinese American beauty criteria should differ from the white norm, she supported the practice of including non-Chinese judges. "We have a combination of Chinese and non-Chinese or Asian judges. I think it helps balance HEATED

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out some of the judging because this is the United States. What we try to do is get a little Western touch and Asian touch. And the East and West meet." 47 Li's statement indicates pressure to showcase Chinese American acculturation, but at the same time emphasizes an Orientalist characteristic. Meanwhile, the African American cultural movement of the 1960s, especially the notion of "black is beautiful," inspired many to criticize the racist beauty criteria. One of them was Gilbert Woo. He wrote that the committee should establish an "Eastern" standard of beauty to enhance ethnic confidence rather than undermine it. He frowned upon the "American" beauty standard, because it caused psychological and physical pain to women who attempted to emulate them. To end the practice, he thus called for an expulsion of non-Chinese judges. 48 Woo had other sympathizers who even demanded the Chinese Chamber of Commerce abolish the contest because China never had such a tradition. 49

" N O T W O M E N OF

LEISURE"

Although the committee claimed that the pageant provided upward mobility for working-class women, contestants and their families had to invest a significant amount of time and money into the event. In addition to the entry fee, they had to pay for expensive gowns. Family members also had to pay for the cost of travel and tickets to events such as the beauty pageant, coronation balls, and fashion shows. The expense could be as high as $5,000, some of which might be defrayed by sponsors—generally family associations or ethnic entrepreneurs.50 Nevertheless, most participants still had to pay for talent lessons, and certain skills, like learning to play a musical instrument, had to be cultivated from childhood. Accordingly, many contestants came from middle-class backgrounds. Chinese American radicals thus charged the ethnic beauty queens of failing to represent working-class immigrant women. An Americancollege-educated Miss Chinatown U.S.A. who spoke fluent English was quite different from her non-English-speaking immigrant counterpart. Donning a beautiful evening gown with heavy makeup, the ethnic beauty queen symbolized affluent middle-class purchasing power at a time when most Chinatown women were toiling in sweatshops and hardly making ends meet. One Chinatown resident blasted this misrepresentation: This Pageant is an insult to Chinese women. Here we have the most "beautiful" Chinese women in their fine clothes and just perfect makeup 112

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prance around the stage and impress the people who have bought tickets to see this parade of "Oriental Beauties." Not one of these women in the Pageant represents the Chinese women in America. The majority of Chinese women are hard-working. . . . They are not women of leisure.51 To this critic, Chinese American women should be represented by the working-class. In terms of demographics, many Chinatown residents did, in fact, hold blue-collar jobs. According to the 1970 census, 49.5 percent of Chinese American females over sixteen were employed. The number of working women was probably even higher—the 1969 Chinatown Study Report revealed that 75 percent of New York Chinatown women worked in garment shops.52 Contrary to the middle-class lifestyle and consumption emphasized in the pageant, very few working-class women had upward opportunities. Because contestants did not represent ordinary Chinatown women, one Chinese American thus argued that the money spent on the beauty contest should be appropriated for improving Chinatown infrastructure.53

"1 FELT LIKE A C O W B E I N G THROUGH

THE

STATE

MARCHED FAIR"

To win a pageant title, contestants had to perform certain types of femininity. Often, that meant they had to force their bodies to conform to Western ideals. Ethnic newspapers often published candidates' chest, waist, and hip measurements. Moreover, contenders were expected to expose themselves in certain ways and were aware that they had to project themselves as sex objects. An article in the Chinese Pacific Weekly, for instance, commented that the side-slit of the dress wore by the 1958 Miss Talent was so high that photographers might feel too embarrassed to shoot pictures. However, it defended the contestant stating that she needed enough room to move her legs for a Chinese dance performance.54 The same year, another candidate wore Chinese pants for the talent show for the same reason. This indicates that participants could choose a more "conservative" style of Chinese clothing. We do not know if wearing a high side-slit cheongsam was an advantage for that candidate or not. However, we can speculate that some contenders did expose themselves to get higher marks. The 1967 beauty queen, for example, created the illusion of performing a strip show, even though she only took off a scarf.55 Other candidates used padded bras, false eyelashes, and girdles for the competition.56 The rhetoric in newspapers further promoted a high level of interest in the contestants among male

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spectators. Ironically, while excessive sexuality was a taboo for the ethnic femininity constructed through Confucian gender norms (female sexuality as the possession of patriarchal father and husband), it was encouraged on stage so that the event could lure more spectators and sell more tickets. Meanwhile, even those contestants who intended to show their support for women's liberation unavoidably objectified themselves. For example, the 1972 candidate Patricia Moy delivered a free love speech in the talent show contest. She stated: (a)

No one objects to free love, love meaning everything excluding the physical act of sex, which can be considered love.

(b)

Virginity shouldn't be a prerequisite for marriage.

(c)

Homosexuality is not necessarily "bad" as society has always labeled it.57

Moy's speech advocated the freedom of female sexuality and argued against the prevailing condemnation of homosexuality in the ethnic community. Moy's view reflected the changes in sexual ideas and practices among young women. 58 However, many women like Moy who attempted to negotiate the sexual boundary were walking a fine line, as their attainment of sexual freedom would leave them open to sexual predators or objectification. 59 As W u suggests, the way Moy presented the speech in fact reinforced sexual exploitation. Moy began her act "by stripping off the top half of her pantsuit to reveal a bikini top, and then proceeded to deliver her original speech on free love, virginity, and homosexuality." According to Wu, "Moy's decision to expose her body expressed her sexual freedom but also encouraged audience 'gawkers' to view her as a sexual object." 60 The emphasis on women as sex objects placed contestants in a vulnerable position and made them prey to sexual harassment and even assault. Yep recalled the instructions she received at the 1965 pageant: the committee would "do their best to try to protect us" from sexual harassment, but it was normal for the press to "ask for more leg or something." Although Yep never experienced sexual harassment herself, she pointed out the potential dangers in encountering "all these old guys" from family associations.61 Indeed, one contestant almost became a victim of sexual assault.62 In order to ensure the safety of contestants, the committee arranged a chaperone system consisting of housemothers and male escorts. The arrangement restricted the freedom of the contestants, who could not go shopping or sightseeing alone, and generated complaints. 63 This practice clearly sent out a contradictory message to the wider public: on the one hand, the contest114

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ants' bodies were available and consumable on stage; on the other hand, their bodies were to be protected to maintain respectability and purity off stage. The chaperone system, however, wasn't really enough to shield contestants from sexual harassment. According to an article written by a volunteer escort, Bradford Woo, "the only actual 'protecting' the escorts really had to do was to protect the girls from 'wolves' and dirty old men." During the twelve-day escort period in 1978, contestants experienced several unpleasant events. At a Chinese restaurant south of San Francisco, contenders were greeted by "bawdy yelling and howling" from event-goers. The night before the Coronation Ball, contestants were again subjected to harassment at a Chinatown nightclub, where male patrons were allowed to "pat" them. Some contestants threatened not to participate in the parade if the committee failed to ensure their safety for a visit to a particularly disreputable organization that was "too drunk" and intimate the previous year. Even at the parade, the contestants were not safe from harassment. One spectator, for example, managed to kiss one while she was on a float.64 In her discussion of the pageant, Judy Wu concludes that harassers "translated the accessibility of [a contestant's] body image for commercial and cultural purposes as an accessibility of her body for their sexual purposes." 65 Although contestants were vulnerable to sexual harassment, it is incorrect to think of them as victims. In contrast, the preceding example indicates that titleholders vigorously protested sexual violation and demanded that the committee make changes. Fending off harassment further unified participants. The committee championed the contest as a space for bonding among Chinese American women. 66 Some contestants likewise confirmed such an emphasis. For example, Kati Wang and Fiona Yep became lifelong friends after the competition.67 Sometimes, though, the sisterhood rhetoric was overstated. Jennifer Cheung, a 1967 contestant, commented that her busy schedule during the contest prevented her from forming any friendships with other participants.68 Moreover, the intense competition easily gave way to hostility. One 1997 participant complained that someone stole her makeup botdes on competition night.69 These complaints and the aforementioned protest indicate that contestants became increasingly outspoken and critical of the event. From the onset, the pageant encountered criticism for sexism. Supporters initially claimed that Miss Chinatown U.S.A. was not a sex object because she did not wear a bathing suit. However, this argument was soon HEATED

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dropped after a swimsuit contest was adopted in 1967. Kenneth Joe, chairman of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce's supervisory board, defended the practice. "Compared to other pageants [our contestants] are much less bare; they wear stockings."70 Prior to the adoption of the bathing suit, the committee included a playsuit contest in 1962, which required contestants to wear fitted, short-skirt outfits. The new criteria generated debates within the ethnic community, and the Chinese Pacific Weekly encouraged readers from both sides to share their opinions in the paper.71 The rise of women's liberation movement further inspired ethnic feminists to criticize the sexist aspect of the pageant.72 Feminists chastised it for perpetuating patriarchy and objectifying the female body. Shirley Sun, director of the Chinese Culture Foundation, considered the contest to be presenting "flesh" while Lillian Kwock Sing referred to it as "outdated and sexist."73 One Chinese American feminist even sarcastically suggested that men should be judged on the same standard of wearing underwear and parading around on stage with their hairy legs.74 In 1975 the editor of East/West, a bilingual community newspaper, called for the elimination of the swimsuit competition.75 Some pageant participants likewise considered the swimsuit contest to be a humiliating experience. Chin-Lee was one of them. "I felt like a cow being marched through the state fair when I strutted out on stage in my sleek Catalina swimsuit."76 This criticism reveals a heightened consciousness among the ethnic community regarding sexual exploitation. Critics also charged the committee of masking its antifeminist ideas by awarding scholarships and including a question section in the competition. Linsay Tan, a physician at Kaiser-Permanente in Oakland, thought that event organizers asked questions "to get around the feminists, telling them, 'see, we're not just going for beauty, we're asking them their opinions. This is intellectual as well.'"77 Others pointed out the intellectual vapidity of the question section, which did not require any specific knowledge or preparation. For example, an education-major candidate might be asked why she wanted to be a teacher.78 Gordon Chin, a Chinese American community activist, was among those who considered the questions to be of no substance. "The questions they ask the girls are stupid and the answers even more ridiculous. The girls are supposed to be judged on beauty and brains, but. . . looks matter and not brains."79 One set of questions backs up this point: "Do you think there is too much violence on television?" Jenny Hsu of San Antonio, Texas: "Yes, I think there is too much violence on television.

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I enjoy watching fashion shows, music shows, and beauty pageants." "If you were God, what would you create?" Sally Kao of Daly City, California: "I would create man and woman and heaven. There would be no tree of knowledge. There would be heaven with no hell."80 Meanwhile, the committee used various strategies to cope with the criticism. It not only disavowed any class and gender bias, but also claimed that the event was a form of community service that advocated women's achievements.81 A t that time, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce felt compelled to make changes to keep the event popular. The first female master of ceremonies was introduced in 1972.82 In 1974 journalist Carolyn Gan was selected as the first female editor-in-chief for the annual souvenir program. In 1979 a woman became a member of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce board of directors. Moreover, in response to feminist critics, the 1976 Fashion Show Committee included male models and men's fashion in the female fashion show. Even though these changes indicate that the Chinese Chamber of Commerce was willing to accommodate criticism, they also show that the organization was reluctant to make any significant changes.83 Up through 1984, fashion show committee members—the only festival committee comprised of female members—were listed under their husbands' names in the souvenir programs.84 Moreover, the committee appropriated ideas from the women's liberation movement to enhance its goal of objectifying women. W h e n it decided to permit revealing dresses in the show, the committee proclaimed its support of female sexual liberation. The 1974 fashion show thus showcased a selection of revealing clothing including miniskirts. The committee's interpretation of female's sexual liberation shockingly coincided with "the objectification of female bodies that feminists criticized." In fact, it was possible that the committee never really intended to make any substantial changes. After all, the femininity constructed by the committee had objectified female bodies from the onset by adopting cheongsams with revealing side-slits, a "traditional" Chinese dress. It was possible, as W u suggests, that "arguments for sexual liberation may have been used to justify sexual exploitation." 85 It is a fair assessment to conclude that the committee's foremost purpose was to capitalize on fashionable ideas to boost the popularity of the beauty contest. Whereas the committee was quick to manipulate ideas from women's liberation, contestants responded to feminist ideas much more slowly.

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THE IMPACT

OF W O M E N ' S

LIBERATION

Most contestants in the early 1970s shared their reservation for the women's liberation movement and continued to perpetuate the traditional gender ideal. When the 1971 Miss Chinatown, Linda Shen, was asked about her perception of the feminist movement, she answered, "Oh, I guess it's all right. But I'm not involved in that. I just like kind of being the way I am." 86 Other contenders' statements revealed their ambivalence about feminism. Karen Lee expressed that, on the one hand, she advocated women's liberation; on the other hand, she enjoyed "having her cigarette lit and having somebody hold the door for her." 87 Arleen Chow made a similar remark: "A girl can do a man's job, mentally and physically, if trained properly. But a woman's place is in raising her family." 88 The 1976 Miss San Francisco Chinatown also insisted on two separate spheres. "I believe in equal employment opportunity and equal pay, but I don't think women should take over men's work—just for the sake of taking over."89 These comments indicate that most of these contestants perceived the women's liberation movement as liberal feminism, which advocated gender equality while they themselves supported gender differences.90 However, some contestants exhibited significant changes toward feminist ideas as time progressed. When interviewed in 2002, Wang and Yep kept emphasizing to me that their entry to the competition was at a time prior to the women's liberation movement. 91 Feminist ideas indeed reshaped certain contestants' views towards traditional gender roles. Some were more outspoken and less obedient than their counterparts in previous decades. For example, one contender unabashedly remarked in the question section that she would invite her boyfriend home despite the disapproval of her parents. The audience responded to her answer with applauses and laughter. It was impossible to find out whether "the audience accepted this remark or simply felt it refreshing." Gilbert Woo, reporting on the event, commented, "This answer is better than saying . . . 'I want to be a good wife and a good mother.' " 9 2 That comment certainly could not represent the opinion of the entire ethnic community, yet it showed that some Chinese Americans gradually altered their perception of ethnic femininity. Woo, in fact, exemplified such a shift. In the 1950s he had advocated the pageant even though he disagreed with its beauty standards. However, in a 1964 article entitled, "Women's Rights," he reminded readers of the women's rights movement in early twentieth-century China and criticized those who resisted the effort of seeking gender equality.93 By Il8

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1975' he even questioned the staging of the event, in an article entitled, " D o we need to have a beauty pageant?"94 Although most contestants continued to endorse the contest, some began to question the idea that a woman's place was in the private sphere. In contrast to the candidates in previous decades who wanted to give up their careers, many now regarded both work and family as equal responsibilities. Karen Lee was one example. Another candidate, Rosann Song, even asserted that she preferred a career to marriage.95 The increasing interest in pursuing careers could be attributed to feminist and civil rights movements, which produced new opportunities for minority women. Connie Chung, for example, became the first Chinese American female news anchor in the 1980s. Overall, Chinese American women working as professionals increased from 17 percent in i960 to 25 percent in 1980.96 Certain participants openly expressed their views on community or political issues. In the 1970s some participants candidly revealed political opinions that differed from those of the old establishment. The 1971 Miss San Francisco Chinatown praised the visit of President Richard Nixon to China even though the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the main sponsor of the event, was closely affiliated with the Nationalists of Taiwan and condemned anyone who advocated the communist government. 97 Another titleholder leveled against the economic problems faced by low-income Chinatown residents, which was seen as a challenge to the old establishment. 98 Some even criticized the pageant itself. For example, Ronda Ching, the 1981 Miss Chinatown U.S.A., denied that the competition was good for all Chinese American women because some developed a poor self-image after failing in the contest. 99 These winners' critiques indicate a change in the ideal ethnic womanhood, as now the committee began to favor outspoken women.

CONCLUSION

Many contestants entered the Miss Chinatown U.S.A. beauty pageant to pursue personal interests, which either overlapped or conflicted with the interests of other Chinese Americans who held a stake in the event. T h e pageant thus became a contested ground for various individuals and groups trying to achieve goals ranging from business opportunities and ethnic solidarity and pride to class interests and gender equality. T h e emergence of the outspoken beauty queens and the criticism surrounding the contest demonstrate the limited power of Chinatown leaders to maintain

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a singular definition of ethnic womanhood. However, Chinese Americans did not abandon this sexist institution. The Japanese American community, in contrast, railed against the Cherry Blossom beauty pageant and the Japanese American Citizens' League eventually voted to reject any involvement in it. 100 In her study of the ethnic beauty pageant, the historian Judy W u concluded that the continual popularity of the pageant and decreasing vocal opposition is indicative of "the decline of alternative strategies that advocate structural change and group-based solutions to achieve gender and racial equality." 101 Nevertheless, I argue that the lack of fundamental challenge to this gendered ethnic representation did not mean that Chinese American women gave in to racial and gender hierarchies. The civil rights movement, the ethnic movement, and the Asian American women's movement opened up diverse channels for them to counter racial hierarchy and gender inequality. According to Shirley Wong, chair of the Pacific and Asian American Women Bay Area Coalition, "Ten years ago there was a lot of opposition to beauty contests. Today, women are working on abortion and other issues." Wong, for instance, concentrated on racial violence. 102 Furthermore, for working-class immigrant women, the fight for better living and working conditions was more important than a battle against the beauty pageant. Like their predecessors, many of them publicly protested for their rights. Female garment workers, for example, successfully pressured the International Lady Garment Workers Union for the opening of a daycare center in New York's Chinatown in the late 1970s and early 1980s.103 In addition, more women began to assume leadership positions in community organizations. Anni Chung, a Hong Kong immigrant, became executive director of the Self-Help for the Elderly in San Francisco's Chinatown. Many women could challenge gender inequality within the system. The sociologist Linda Trinh V o has argued that "the politics of incorporation" used in the post—civil rights era was as important as, if not more significant than, the confrontational strategy.104 Meanwhile, Chinese Americans in the San Francisco Bay Area gradually lost interest in the beauty contest, as attendance to the competition dwindled significantly. The change had started as early as 1975. Although spectators still filled up the 3,000-seat Masonic auditorium, the response from the audience was lukewarm. According to a reporter, in "previous years, audiences rooted and cheered like Raider [sic\ fans—this year, a few deflated clusters of applause rang here and there." 105 From 1975 to 1994, the attendance dropped by 20 to 25 percent. 106 That number continued to 120

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drop sharply, forcing the committee to move the contest to the 1,000-seat Palace of Fine Arts in 1998.107 Moving the event to a smaller venue, however, could not disguise its declining popularity. In 2002 few community members came to see the competition, and most cheering and shouting sounds were from family members or friends of contestants from outside Chinatown. 108 The pageant similarly lost its national appeal, as the significance of San Francisco's Chinatown had decreased in relation to the growth of the Chinese American population in New York and Los Angeles. Although out-of-state candidates still appeared in the competition, most of the participants were from California, and, in particular, the San Francisco Bay Area. The pageant had lost its luster and no longer attracted focal attention from the ethnic community, although it continued to be part of the Chinese New Year Festival.109 In contrast, other parts of the celebration drew more interest. The Chinese New Year parade in particular consistently attracted political, cultural, and commercial attention. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce could no longer dominate the public celebration, however; beginning in 1975, the Chinese Culture Center had begun to host a different form of the ethnic celebration.

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SIX

Hjbriditj in Culture, Memory; and Politics

THE 1977 CHINESE NEW YEAR parade featured a Qing dynasty wedding procession. This eighty-person ceremony included a bridal palanquin, servants, jugglers, palace lanterns, Daoist priests, longevity ribbons, exotic masks, headdresses, and a dowry.1 The wedding procession was the idea of David Lei, a parade organizer, who went to Taiwan to search for "authentic" Chinese culture in order to attract parade spectators. This new addition generated both interest and criticism within the ethnic community. The debate behind this cultural representation was centered on the definition of Chinese American culture, as well as on who could determine what constituted that culture. This chapter focuses on the constellation of complex meanings behind various memories and narratives selected by Chinese Americans to express their identities. The diversity within the ethnic community resulted in various groups fighting for cultural authority in order to gain ethnic leadership. No consensus was reached, even within the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the main festival sponsor. While the aforementioned David Lei insisted on a transnational identity, his colleagues on the festival souvenir program committee wanted to claim Americanness. In addition, the rise of ethnic consciousness and political awareness resulted in the growth of social service and political organizations which, eventually, undermined the power of the old establishment. Indeed, the Chinese Chamber of 122

Commerce could no longer monopolize the ethnic celebration. Beginning in 1975, the Chinese Culture Center hosted an annual Spring Festival, an alternative to the ethnic parade and the beauty pageant. Moreover, the ethnic celebration intersected with U.S. immigration laws and foreign policies, for they not only determined the composition of the ethnic community, but also pressured the public display of ethnic identity to fit the national image. The response to this political pressure again attests to the multiplicity of the ethnic community. It also reveals how an ethnic community used a public celebration to negotiate multidimensional issues such as internal differences, national politics, and transnational conflicts.

IS T H I S M Y

CULTURE?

Although the Chinese New Year Festival successfully attracted numerous spectators, many avoided the public celebration. For example, Ruby Tom, the chairman of the Zone Three Council of the San Francisco School District, considered the public celebration irrelevant and thought of the ethnic holiday as a private occasion.2 Susan Yee, who was born and raised in Chinatown, felt the same way. To her, the most memorable thing about the Chinese New Year was "not the parade, not the operas, and what was going on in the community, but the bai nian [visiting friends and relatives], and what was going on in our family in celebration of the New Year."3 Fred Lau, the first Chinese American police chief in San Francisco, shared the same memory. "What I remember most when I was a kid about the Chinese New Year is the family gathering when relatives from throughout the Bay Area would come together during this celebration and come to share stories, gifts, and food. And such a tradition we want to continue."4 The Chinese New Year thus became an occasion to connect to other Chinese Americans. This phenomenon was not specific to the Bay Area. Brooklyn resident Tung Pok Chin took annual trips to the New York Chinatown to visit friends and relatives during the ethnic holiday.5 While Chinese Americans observed the ethnic holiday in a variety of ways, most considered it an occasion for family reunion, worshipping ancestors at home or in temples, and visiting friends and relatives. Before the holiday, each family cleaned and decorated their home, paid off their debts, and purchased special goodies and foods for the holiday dinner. On Chinese New Year's day, everyone was supposed to wear new clothing to signify a new beginning. Another custom was to give out lay see, red envelopes containing money, to children. The degree of observance differed HYBRIDITY

IN

CULTURE,

MEMORY,

AND

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in the ethnic community. Immigrants usually followed old world traditions more religiously than American-born Chinese. Ethnic holiday observance became Americanized when Chinese Americans were acculturated. In his autobiography, Yellow Journalist, William Wong described how he carried on his immigrant parents' tradition, but with some modifications. Because he was the only son in the family, he bore the responsibility of hosting the Chinese New Year's Eve dinner, but decided to turn it into a potluck. The duty of worshipping ancestors also extended to his sisters, rather than being the sole privilege of the male offspring.6 The changes in the ethnic holiday observance were even greater in Susan Yee's family. Yee recalled the way her family celebrated the holiday in a 2002 interview. "We ate together as a family for two meals: one to close the year and one to open the year. We used to do right on the day, no matter what day [of] the week it was. As we got older and our schedules were more difficult, then we waited for the weekend. But we always had New Year's Eve together, no matter what day [of] the week it was. I think that was very important because it was a big family event. We cleaned the house and got ready for the New Year according to the custom. My mother would give each of us lay see." After her parents passed away, she and her sisters no longer celebrated the ethnic holiday at home but went to a restaurant instead. As she lamented, "We are not following much of the way that we used to do it." Indeed, in 2002 she and her siblings postponed that year's holiday dinner and combined it with one of her sibling's birthday celebration. She regretted that the tradition was gradually being lost, particularly among the next generation. "I don't think they [her nieces and nephews] follow any of these customs in their own households. They go through some simplified form of it. I'm sure they still give lay see and they say the right things. Most of them don't even go to the parade and do the community things." In fact, because the Chinese New Year depends on the lunar calendar, her sisters are usually unaware of the exact date. "My sisters who don't read Chinese have to phone me to ask me when Chinese New Year is going to be. This year is the first year that I don't have a calendar at my house, on my wall, with the Chinese dates."7 East/West, a bilingual ethnic newspaper, also wrote about the decline in observing the ethnic holiday. "Little do the outsiders know that many second- and third-generation Chinese Americans are no longer participating in the New Year traditions. Many of them consider the customs oldfashioned and superstitious. Some find them difficult to fit into their Western values and lifestyle."8 124

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Even those who had participated in the public celebration rarely assented to the cultural significance of the holiday. Kenneth Nipp participated in the parade not for ethnic preservation, but for his Cornerstone Evangelical Baptist Church, which sent a contingent to the parade annually. Although he had marched in it for five years, he thought the ethnic holiday had little meaning to him. "I'm a Christian, and many of these customs are Buddhist traditions . . . from the old country. I'm not from the old country, I'm from America." He further pointed out that his peers shared the same thought. "And I'm sure that most Chinese Americans my age don't know the meaning of the traditions either. I don't think they care."9 In contrast, business people welcomed the profits generated by the ethnic celebration. Some Chinese Americans also considered commercialization a means to increase the importance of Chinatown. As Henry Der, then executive director of Chinese for Affirmative Action, pointed out, "There is no doubt that it's a strictly commercial venture to showcase Chinatown"; however, "the city wouldn't subsidize it if it didn't attract tourists."10 Some even commented that "in spite of the commercialization of Chinese New Year, it does help remind us that we belong to a unique culture."11 Indeed, for some Chinese Americans the ethnic festival was an occasion in which they could forge their identity. According to Lei, it was "the time that I celebrated my Chineseness with close friends who did not come to Chinatown until Chinese New Year."12 The numerous meanings attached to the festival indicate different definitions of ethnicity, a reflection of multiplicities within the community. The influx of post-1965 immigrants further diversified the heterogeneous nature of Chinatown because many of them had different linguistic, cultural, and political backgrounds than the older immigrants. As Gordon Lau, a former San Francisco supervisor, recalled, "In the old days, you'd walk down the street and you were always bumping into people you knew or who knew your parents or were married to a cousin."13 Before President Richard Nixon went to China, non-Cantonese speaking immigrants were seldom welcomed into the close-knit community.14 As the writer Gus Lee described in China Boy, "In Chinatown, the alienating difficulty of the Cantonese dialects scared me. They made me foreign, different, stupid. I was occasionally treated as if I were retarded. I was insulted by the presumption and hateful of the discrimination that was dealt to people who were mentally slow, or perceived to be so, and to those who appeared to be Chinese but didn't speak it. I did my best to avoid conversation, or nonconversation." He further described how his mother, an immigrant from HYBRIDITY

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Shanghai, felt isolated in a Cantonese-speaking community. 15 New immigrants like Vivian Chiang, who was born in Tianjin (near Beijing) and came to the San Francisco Chinatown in 1972, had to learn how to speak Cantonese in order to fit in with the ethnic community. 16 Nevertheless, the arrival of many non-Cantonese speaking immigrants increased Chinatowns linguistic diversity. A physician explained the shift: "In the 1980s, if you spoke either Mandarin or Shanghai dialect at the store, they just stared at you and made you feel an outsider. They didn't understand what you spoke. Only when I changed my tongue to Cantonese, or maybe a village dialect, then they felt very comfortable. But right now, in Chinatown, every word you can hear is either Mandarin, Shanghai, or dialects other than Cantonese. This is a big difference." 17 Toishan Cantonese became less dominant, and other dialects and languages such as Mandarin, Shanghainese, Fujianese, Vietnamese, and Burmese began to emerge in Chinatown. 18 While Chinatown gradually became more tolerant of non-Cantonese dialects, linguistic differences became a point of contestation in the ethnic festival. The speeches in the festival programs were either in Cantonese, Mandarin, or English, reflecting the desire to attract both old and new immigrants and American-born Chinese. While immigrants complained that the festival seldom included enough Chinese-language programs, the American-born generations could rarely understand anything but English. Mathew Fong, the director of the Chinatown Y M C A , stated, "Nowadays children are so active in other activities. And the speeches are in Chinese, so that's where they find themselves a bit lost." 19 It would be less complicated if language were the only issue. The difficulty, in fact, rested on the definition of ethnic culture. Some immigrants often considered the ethnic festival not "Chinese" enough since parades and beauty pageants were never part of Chinese traditions. At the same time, as Clarence Poon, then president of the Chinese Chamber of C o m merce, explained, "The queen contest is western, but if we don't have something western, then the younger generation isn't interested. T h e third and fourth generation isn't interested in Chinese opera." 20 Indeed, the younger generation was often quite alienated from the more sophisticated aspects of Chinese culture. Chin Yang Lee, author of Flower Drum Song, complained that his teenage daughter had no intention of learning about the cultural meaning of the ethnic holiday when they attended festival activities. O n the contrary, she enjoyed eating fried noodles and chop suey, watching the parade, and playing games at the carnival, like the other 126

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tourists.21 Another Chinese American remarked: "The only time I went to Chinatown was to eat like a tourist. I still have the same attitude today. I don't like to associate with the Chinese immigrants, I don't speak Cantonese and I never gave a helping hand to aid my people or the Chinatown community. In other words, I'm a banana." 22 The diversity of the ethnic community further contributed to the changes in political structure. With the rise of ethnic awareness, many thought the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA) could no longer be "the spokesperson" for Chinatown. 23 With its shrinking members and limited economic base in Chinatown, as well as its increasingly insignificant influence in mainstream society, the Chinatown establishment's leadership was challenged, although it continued to claim authority over large numbers of new non-Cantonese-speaking immigrants in Chinatown. The post-1965 immigrants were denied membership to district associations, family associations, and tongs. Worse yet, they usually were treated as outsiders. For example, the Chiu Chou, ethnic Chinese from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, were excluded from the old establishment as they were considered to be Vietnamese; this motivated them to establish the Chiu Chou Mutual Aid Association of San Francisco in Chinatown, later becoming the Chiu Chou Community Center, which had twelve thousand members in 1987. The significant number of Chiu C h o u in Chinatown compelled the old establishment to accept and invite them to the 1986 Chinese New Year parade.24 Other Chinese Americans such as professionals and businesspersons who did not live or participate in Chinatown activities started their own social, cultural, and political gatherings. The Organization of Chinese Americans (OCA) was one such example. 25 These new associations undermined the pivotal role played by old Chinatown organizations in the previous era. In addition, the social and ethnic movements of the 1960s created a new social class, mostly professionals, who were dissatisfied with the status quo. These community activists and professionals worked hard to stimulate the rise of ethnic, class, and political consciousness in Chinatown and create new infrastructures such as the Chinese for Affirmative Action, Concerned Chinese for Action and Change, and Chinese-Americans for Citizens Participation. The number of social service and political organizations increased to thirty-eight in the 1980s.26 These groups challenged the dominance of the Chinatown establishment and fought for a leadership role. This competition also entered the political arena, as the old establishment had a long history of pro-Taiwan politics. Even though many U.S.-born, middle-class Chinese HYBRIDITY

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shied away from transnational politics, they often favored the normalization of U.S. foreign relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC). The change of U.S. foreign policy toward the PRC in the 1970s realigned the power structure in Chinatown, which will be discussed shordy. Meanwhile, in the 1980s, wealthy Hong Kong immigrants not only brought strong financial power but also tremendous political clout. They made a significant financial contribution to mainstream politicians in exchange for access to political influence. T h e most prominent examples were Pius Lee, a businessman, and Rose Pak, a journalist. Both nurtured their ties to the mayor s office, in addition to holding significant positions in Chinatown. Lee was elected president of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in 1984. His company, California Realty and Land Co., had regularly sponsored the Chinese New Year Festival since the 1970s. Meanwhile, Pak's political influence compelled Mayor Art Agnos to appoint twenty Chinese Americans to various city positions. She also became "honorary chairwoman" of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. 27 Although Pak was influential in city politics and a "spokesperson" for the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, she was at war with many Americanborn Chinese and other Chinatown establishments. Pak criticized the C C B A , stating, "To build positively, they are inadequate. But to do you in, they are more than ample." In return, Harvey Wong, then president of the C C B A , gave the Hong Kong investors "no respect."28 Community organizations were also skeptical of how the political influence of Hong Kong immigrants in city hall would benefit the ethnic community. O n e activist complained that Hong Kong campaign contributors only attempted to gain "political alliances to enhance business opportunities," but did not consider the interests of small businesses in Chinatown. They usually left "grassroots work to the older Asian American groups." 29 This statement nevertheless erased the contributions made by these more recent immigrants. For example, the Self-Help for the Elderly, providing assistance to seniors in San Francisco, was headed by Hong Kong immigrant Annie Chung. The power struggle between wealthy Hong Kong immigrants and American-born Chinese revealed an entrenched division between Americanborn and foreign-born Chinese. T h e changes in the Chinese American population likewise contributed to the transformation of the power structure of community organizations. As mentioned earlier, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce included new immigrants such as Lee and Pak into its leadership. In addition, a new group of festival organizers, including David Lei, Calvin Lee, and Wayne

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Hu, emerged in the 1970s. These new organizers were in their twenties in the 1970s; most were either U.S.-born Chinese or had immigrated to the United States as young children. They had different ideas about what should be represented in the parade, that better reflected the new sense of ethnic consciousness. As opposed to previous years when mainstream celebrities had been invited as grand marshals, the parade committee in the 1970s made efforts to invite people who had made real contributions to the ethnic community. In 1971 California Supreme Court Justice Stanley Mosk was invited to be grand marshal. According to Lansing Kwok, then president of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Mosk ruled in the 1950s that under the Fourteenth Amendment, housing discrimination was unconstitutional. In addition, Mosk actively contributed to the ethnic community such as serving as chairman of the Chinese Newcomers Committee of the Bay Area Social Planning Council. 30

SOUVENIR

PROGRAMS

Festival souvenir programs further reflected the transformation in the community and leadership. These programs were originally published by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce beginning in 1958. Written mostly in English, they attempted to introduce general readers to Chinese food, art, customs, people, and Chinatown. The following passages indicate the targeted readers in the first few years: "The behavior and customs of the thousands of Chinese you meet in Chinatown might seem so strange and peculiar that you sometimes wonder who they really are. . . . To the stranger, Chinatown may be a strange city, intricate in its pattern of alleys and signs in Chinese calligraphy."31 Other editors and authors likewise emphasized the linkage between Chinese immigrants and the ancient traditions of China. For example, the aforementioned program claimed that "with more than four thousand years of recorded history behind them and molded, more or less, by a most unique civilization and the wisdom of such sages as Confucius and Lao-Tze, the pioneering Chinese came to this New World to seek their fortune as early as 1848."32 Another program followed a similar line of thought, stating that the residents of Chinatown were "the custodians of a four thousand year old Chinese culture."33 "By reinforcing ties to a Chinese past rather than focusing on an American present or future," festival programs "do not burden the consciousness of their Euro-American readers."34 Tracing history to the "great tradition" of China again reveals an attempt to use cultural superiority HYBRIDITY

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to enhance Chinese American racial status. The emphasis on culture (ethnicity) likewise fit into an imagined multicultural America. To demonstrate cultural differences, authors reinforced the mainstream Orientalist portrayal of Chinese Americans. A1965 article explained why the entertainment industry often portrayed Chinese Americans as speaking pidgin English: "It isn't just sheer malicious sarcasm on the part of the script writers to put pidgin English into the mouth of every Chinese character. A walk [through] Chinatown invariably brings every tourist within the earshot of some pidgin accent." It then pointed out, "The pidgin flavor of Chinatown English is but a reflection of the basic syntactical characteristics of the Chinese language."35 The author, Kai-Yu Hsu, a Chinese scholar, attributed pidgin English to the structure of the Chinese language rather than the historical and social factors that prevented immigrants from learning English. This article accentuated the otherness of Chinatown and defended a racist practice of mainstream society that emphasized Chinese American foreignness through pidgin English. The decision to publish this article and others like it was indicative of how the Chinese Chamber of Commerce catered to the idea of an exotic Chinatown in order to attract tourists. However, an article on the 1906 Chinatown earthquake in the 1968 program showed not only a change in content but also one of identity politics. The new focus emphasized Chinese American experiences in the United States. In the subsequent years, souvenir programs not only featured the history of San Francisco Chinatown, but also ethnic experiences in other parts of the country. For example, the 1974 program introduced the major urban areas where Chinese Americans had settled: San Francisco, Oakland, Los Angeles, Honolulu, and New York. 36 Programs also acknowledged the heterogeneous component of the ethnic community. A 1986 article entitled "Introduction to Chinatown" pointed out that 75 percent of the Chinatown population were immigrants, compared to only 28 percent within the entire city. It then demonstrated the demographic changes through descriptions of different types of Chinatown restaurants. "Ten years ago, a westernized form of Cantonese village cooking was the dominant cuisine in Chinatown. But the immigration and resettlement of people from China, Taiwan, [and] Southeast Asia have diversified Chinatown's population and its restaurant cuisine. One can now find Cantonese, Cantonese seafood, Szechuanese, Hunanese, Pekingese, Shanghainese, Vietnamese, vegetarian Cantonese, Cantonese clay-pot, Hakka, Chao Chow and the popular dim sum cooking." 37 Moreover, it dismissed a notion that Chinese Americans were culturally homog130

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enous. "The older generation sticks to Chinese attitudes and upholds Confucianism. [But the young] are frightened by their own race and heritage." The article further pointed out the degree of acculturation in the native-born generation. "To the young, China is a strange, exotic place, even when they are drawn to it. Their skins are Chinese but their minds are of the Occident." 38 Another article in 1987 similarly departed from the programs in previous decades that stressed a Chinese identity. The author instead emphasized an ethnic identity. "We assumed the identity not of Chinese; nor of Americans. We created a culture distinct from both worlds. We were Chinese-Americans." 39 This depiction reveals an intention to claim Americanness and reflects the rise of ethnic consciousness.40 In addition, new editorship focused on how Chinese Americans maintained ethnic cultures. An article entitled "Retaining Chinese Culture" featured the history of Chinese language schools. The first Chinese language school was founded in the beginning of the twentieth century; by the 1970s, the number of ethnic schools had increased to six. The ethnic language retention was not specific to Chinatown, as several smaller Chinese language schools could be found in other parts of the city. These schools, as the article put it, fulfilled "an important role—that of forging stronger links in the preservation and furtherance of Chinese culture in the United States."41 Another focus was to incorporate Chinese Americans into American history and to redefine American national identity. An author in the 1972 program began to use the term "pioneers" to refer to Chinese business owners on Dupont Gai (later named Grant Avenue) in 1850s and 1860s.42 In 1982 an article even commemorated the one-hundredth anniversary of the Chinese Exclusion Act. Written by the journalist Sam Chu Lin, it explained how the law not only prohibited Chinese, but also other Asian immigrants, from immigrating to America. Rather than depict Chinese immigrants as victims, Lin categorized them as "pioneers" and "settlers" who "helped to build a B E T T E R America." 43 In doing so, the author rewrote the American national memory and showed that Chinese immigrants were part of the frontier history. Moreover, by claiming them as settlers, Lin dismissed the sojourner narrative and instead claimed American identity. He then went on to point out the contributions of contemporary Chinese Americans in many areas.44 Another article entitled "Chinatown for all" in the 1981 souvenir program had a similar approach. In addition to introducing the difficulties and the discrimination faced by early Chinese immigrants, the author emphasized how these immigrants created their own community organizations and infrastructure to enlarge their resources.45 HYBRIDITY

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The programs even aimed a critical eye at the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and accused it of failing to meet the needs of the ethnic community. Despite listing the organization's many contributions from the time of its founding in 1908 to the 1950s, the article lambasted its recent incompetence, with a sole focus on the Chinese New Year Festival. "Today the Chamber finds itself under constant attack and criticism for its lack of leadership and activity in coping with the everyday problems of merchants—crime, labor disputes, competition and disunity, appearance of the community, etc. leading many to ask, 'Outside of managing in New Year festivities, what else is the Chamber doing?'" 46 Such daring criticism attests to the ascending openness of the new leadership in the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. Some articles moved away from the image of model minority that emphasized good work ethics, economic success, and political docility. Instead, they focus on grassroots activism. One article not only pointed out the deteriorating living conditions facing San Francisco's Chinatown residents, but also insisted that "people need the subsidy."47 Another article introducing the Oakland Chinatown took a critical view on the inadequacy of government agencies in providing assistance to new immigrants. It then celebrated community activism and the grassroots creation of the Oakland Consolidated Chinese Association to serve the needs of Chinatown residents.48 This narrative indicates a departure from the conformist stance. Nevertheless, most articles continued to emphasize the model minority image. When introducing community organizations, writers continued to stress self-reliance. For example, the 1972 program introduced numerous organizations ranging from family and district associations to trade and cultural organizations. A walking tour listed in the 1986 program showcased seventeen sites including family associations, community newspaper offices, Chinese schools, churches, and historical buildings. The article framed these community organizations in the model minority narrative, concluding, "these organizations may help to explain why the average Chinese is a lawabiding, industrious, family- and neighbor-conscious individual."49 Many articles also described the ethnic community in a similar fashion.

CHINESE

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While authors of the souvenir program attempted to use the model minority narrative to claim America, the Chinese New Year parade committee, under new leadership in the 1970s, wanted to claim transnational 132

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identity. T h e committee had a different idea of ethnic culture than that of the festival program editors. One of the parade organizers was the aforementioned David Lei. In 1956, at the age of seven, Lei immigrated to the United States from Taiwan. His father, a community leader, had already been involved in the parade for several years. Lei attended the University of California, Berkeley in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. He did not participate in the ethnic movement, but he might have been influenced by it. Lei criticized the previous parades for promoting "the old 'chop suey image.'" 50 In addition, he thought the Chinese New Year committee had a cultural responsibility to parade spectators. "I believe people who put out these events should take the time to explain them to people." 51 As a cultural coordinator, Lei thus placed this responsibility upon himself. In order to correct the "chop suey" image of the ethnic culture, Lei introduced a Qing dynasty wedding procession into the parade. As he said, "It is not a Chinese tradition to have [a] parade [during the] Chinese New Year. We do have traditions of processions in China, funeral processions . . . religious processions . . . political processions.... I thought it would be fun to have a procession within a procession, a parade within a parade. I imported the set of artifacts from Taiwan." 52 The wedding procession included a "real" bride and groom, which seemed to imply that the wedding procession was "authentic." The usage of "we" indicates that Lei identified himself with China, a different perspective than that of the festival program authors who emphasized their American identity. Yet Lei did not simply transplant Chinese culture into the United States. He knew that China had no parade tradition in the ethnic holiday observance. By including "a parade within a parade," Lei became an authority who invented a tradition. Moreover, his usage of "we" signifies an attempt to claim a collective history. In doing so, he nevertheless repudiated the rights of others to interpret culture, especially the rights of immigrants. Chinese American kids, Lei remarked, "were often called 'Ching Chong Chinamen.' When they relayed such incidents to their parents, their parents would simply remind them that you have the oldest culture.' Yet their parents could not, or would not, explain what that actually meant. If anything, their parents passed on folktales and myths." By identifying with children of immigrants, he considered that the culture passed on by immigrant parents "did not make any sense."53 His comments confirmed the differences in class, generation, and national origin within the ethnic community. In order to correct the history of "the folktale and perspective myth," Lei thus went to Taiwan to import an "authentic" aspect of Chinese culture.

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D i d Lei's cultural production make sense to people in the ethnic community? T h e wedding procession was both popular and the target of criticism. O n e Chinese American lambasted the wedding procession as a misrepresentation of ethnic culture, adding sarcastically, "Shouldn't they try to find a bride with bound feet for the wedding?" 5 4 For some Chinese Americans, like Diana H o n g , a Chinatown community worker, the festival activities not only failed to reflect working-class Chinese American culture, they actually "downgraded either working people or women," especially the imperial court dances. She charged, " T h e Chinese stuff in the parade is very old and out of date. Also, the celebration is very commercialized—it's done primarily to draw tourists. I don't think they bring out the best of Chinese culture or the newest." 5 5 An East/West editorial similarly criticized the absence of ethnic culture in the parade. T h e editor, Gordon Lew, was an immigrant from H o n g K o n g who came to the United States for university. Lew later established East/West and taught Chinese at City College. In one article, Lew questioned the transnational emphasis of the parade. " M o s t of the favorite units, such as the Eight Immortals, the classical wedding procession, the lantern-bearers and the effigies of the deities have their origins in China's past history and tradition." C o u l d this "authentic" Chinese culture really represent Chinese American culture? Lew then asked, "Are the events helping people to erase their stereotyped images of the Chinese, [or] are they only helping them to reinforce their own prejudices and distortions?" H e pointed out that the festival activities might give the larger society an impression that Chinese Americans were "a colony of foreigners holding on to some curious customs." 5 6 To him, the traditional Chinese aspects o f the parade not only reinforced the "exotic" image of Chinese Americans, but also "fetishized" the difference. To correct these Chinese stereotypes, Lew subsequently pointed out the importance of presenting a positive and real image of Chinatown to the general public: We must guard against giving others a false and distorted picture of our community. For instance, Chinese Americans do not eat banquet food such as shark's fin and bird nest soup everyday. We do not dress in theatrical garbs. We are not all kung fu experts. We are not all gamblers. Neither could we be classified as communist or nationalist. Chinese Americans are not "foreigners." Many of us have been here four or five generations. . . . We should not tell people how "we take care of our own" when we rarely do. We should not tell others how wise are our elders, how family cen134

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tered are our residents and how obedient are our youths when more and more families are breaking up and the number of problem youths is increasing.57 Lew questioned the cultural signifiers that failed to reveal quotidian ethnic experiences and denounced the things that perpetuated Chinese Americans as foreigners. To him, the parade should debunk exotic stereotypes, address community issues, and introduce the history of Chinese Americans. He nevertheless assumed a cultural authority who decided what should be included in the representation of the ethnic culture. His usage of "we," similar to Lei, claimed a collective history. He situated Chinese Americans in the context of the United States and overlooked transnational ties. T h e editorial articulated the power relations between Chinese Americans and mainstream society, clearly revealing that Lew was quite aware of the "gaze" of the dominant society. As a result, he insisted on showcasing an authentic ethnic experience. David Lei was also aware of the "majority gaze." It was for this reason that he introduced a different version of authentic culture. In 1977 it was the San Francisco Convention and Visitor's Bureau, not the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, who hired Lei as the parade coordinator. T h e bureau had been a cosponsor of the festival since 1963. Because it deemed the festival as one of the big events that drew tourists to the city, it encouraged festival organizers to include exotic Chinese characteristics in the parade. From this perspective, the wedding procession was more for attracting tourists, rather than introducing authentic culture as Lei claimed. This viewpoint was in line with the intentions of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce; its president, Stephen Fong, admitted that the festival was "to promote citywide business and to draw tourists to San Francisco." 58 T h e question remains, however: why did Chinatown residents continue to enjoy traditional and "exotic" aspects of the parade even if they bore no relation to their own experiences? O n e explanation lies in the concept of "ethnic spectators," put forward by the cultural critic Rey Chow. Chinese American cultural producers and spectators—in this case festival organizers and audiences—were quite aware of the "invisible gaze" that directed Chinese Americans' "path of identification and nonidentification." This process needed to be studied as "part of the process of cross-cultural interpellation that is at work in the larger ream of modern history." Western cultural imperialism started long before Chinese immigrants stepped onto American soil and continued to

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operate after their arrival. In the process of enacting subjectivity, Chinese Americans were quite aware of the "others' gaze." The sense of dislocation and loss made them long for something authentic. T h e "desires, fantasies, and sentimentalism" of certain cultural artifacts were codifications of "the process of a belated consciousness, a consciousness that comes into itself through memory substitution, and representation." C h o w further points out that "We might say a response such as 'Yes, that's me, that's Chinese' is a fetishizing imagining of a 'China that never is, but in that response also lies the wish that is the last residue of a protest against that inevitable 'dismemberment' brought about by the imperialistic violence of Westernization." 59 The response was a moment that constituted subjectivity, enabling the viewers to empower themselves. This interpretation "allows us to understand how audience members [and cultural producers] identify with characters quite different from them in gender, class, age, and experience." 60 Kek Tee Lim, a Malaysian Chinese immigrant, indeed felt empowered by the ethnic parade. As he explained, "I especially like the high school girls with their c o s t u m e s . . . . I think it's very Chinese in a way and it's very g r a n d . . . . And for me, to see Chinese people carry on the tradition in such a grand scale is very empowering to be a Chinese person." Although one might find his comment to fall toward essentialism and self-Orientalizing, the Chinese New Year parades nevertheless evoked his childhood memory of the holiday observance. According to Lim, My family celebrates Chinese New Year. When I was a kid, I always remember, that was the biggest thing, biggest event we had of all the years. I remember my mother, my auntie, my grandmother were all preparing rice cakes and everything, like two months before the New Year. And then we had five days' holiday. That was a big, big thing for us. And ever since I came to America, I don't have those things anymore. . . . At least when I go [to the Chinese New Year parade], I see the celebration; it makes me feel the New Year's spirit coming back. To see Chinese people carry on the tradition in such a grand scale is very empowering.61 Going to the Chinese New Year parade became a way for Lim to connect to his Chinese identity. Chinese New Year festivals likewise produced various memories among many participants. For example, Judy Yung, a Chinatown resident and a journalist for East/West, recalled in 1978:

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In our Chinese school days, we used to practice marching every night for two weeks in preparation for the parade. You could always hear shrill whistles blowing and drums beating in Chinatown schoolyards around parade time. On the day of the parade, sparks would ignite from the sheer excitement of anticipation—at home, at school, and on the streets of Chinatown. Families would line up along Grant Avenue with stools and blankets way ahead of starting time. There would be confusion and embarrassing moments when you heard your name called by someone sitting at the sidelines. Firecrackers would pop, but not all over, certainly not carelessly. The parade may not have been as extravagant and long, but the majority of the units would be local ones, including many school children such as ourselves. It was a hometown parade, festive and safe. Everyone had a good time.62 The Chinese school marching bands created bonds not only between Chinatown children and their parents, but also among residents. T h e marching band drills in Chinatown schoolyards presented Chinatown as a community rather than as a gilded ghetto. The participation of children in the parade indicates the growth of the ethnic community. To these school children, the parade was not an exotic or a commercial space. O n the contrary, it was a space that generated happy memories. T h e whistles and drums created a collective memory among many Chinatown residents. Yet collective memories often entail multiple and sometimes contradictory meanings. For example, the carnival in Waverly Place received tremendous criticism from ethnic radicals, as described in chapter 4. Nevertheless, to many children who grew up in Chinatown, the carnival produced happy memories. Leland Yee, a former member of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, explained how he liked the carnival atmosphere of the Chinese New Year festival: "We had Ferris wheels, bumper cars, miracle runs. As a boy growing up in Chinatown, you just don't see this every day of the year."63 Moreover, the festival's carnival was the only time that most parents could afford to spend with their children. Other Chinese Americans who grew up in Chinatown remembered the prizes they won in the carnival. David Lei believed that the mere mention of "the brown horse" to someone who grew up in Chinatown between the 1950s and 1970s would guarantee an instant bond from the shared experience.64 Memories such as these compelled some earlier anti-carnival protestors to change their minds and request that city hall not discontinue the carnival because of fire hazards.65 Although the inclusion of the carnival was to generate money for the Chinese Chamber of

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Commerce, it evoked positive memories for many. This example again attests to the complexity and multiplicity of Chinese Americans whose politics shifted according to circumstance. Differing politics also compelled some to seek a separate Chinese New Year celebration.66

COUNTERNARRATIVE:

THE SPRING

FESTIVAL

In 1975 the Chinese Culture Center designed a different kind of Chinese New Year celebration—the Spring Festival. It emphasized traditional peasant celebrations of the ethnic holiday, in line with the rhetoric of communist China. The introduction of the Spring Festival signifies the Chinese Culture Center's open support of the PRC, in contrast to the Chinatown establishment's continued support of Taiwan. It also showed how some people in the ethnic community recognized the needs of Chinatown residents, especially the majority of older immigrants who came from rural China. The Chinese Culture Center itself was the byproduct of the social and ethnic movements of the 1960s. The creation of the Chinese Culture Center represented the maturity of a counterforce that resisted the invented tradition and selective memory of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, indicating that the old establishment could no longer monopolize ethnic cultural production. The creation of the center could be seen as an example that reveals competing forces in Chinatown, especially between developers and community activists. To the radical community, the outcome was more of a compromise than a success. The center, operated by the Chinese Culture Foundation (CCF) of San Francisco, is located on Kearney Street, on the third floor of the Holiday Inn. J.K. Choy, manager of the Chinatown branch of the San Francisco Savings and Loan Association, established the C C F in 1965.67 Choy wanted to turn the site into "a museum, cultural center, or other public facility for use by the community," while radical activists demanded "low-cost housing" built for Chinatown's elderly.68 Eventually, city hall sold the site to Holiday Inn, which agreed to set aside one floor for the Chinese Culture Center. Such a decision inevitably enraged ethnic radicals. The Asian People's Coalition accused the hotel of being a scam because it gave "the Chinese people the impression we're getting a cultural center. . . . But only one floor and only a 40-year lease."69 Nevertheless, spearheaded by the CCF, Chinatown residents eventually gained a cultural center, even though it had taken more than a decade.

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To determine the center's direction was not easy—the process reveals the various tensions that pulled at the definition of ethnic culture. Chinese immigrants wanted to preserve the culture that linked them to the homeland. (In this case, they meant mainland China, because immigrants from other diasporas still were quite marginal in Chinatown.) They also wanted to use the center to educate a younger generation unfamiliar with ancestral cultures. The American-born generation, influenced by the ethnic studies movement, was eager to create a distinct culture that neither belonged to the mainstream nor to what had been imported from the ancestral land. And for mainstream society, the Chinese Culture Center was simply a place to learn about Chinese cultural aesthetics, which had nothing to do with Chinese American identity or experiences. Eventually, William Wu, Executive Director of the Chinese Culture Center, decided the direction of the center was "to reaffirm the identities of Americans of Chinese ancestry and to develop those areas of Chinese culture that remain meaningful to contemporary and future lifestyles."70 The Spring Festival was an example that demonstrated Wu's intention to design a space that catered to the ethnic community. The C C F disagreed with both the Chinese Chamber of Commerce's politics and its economic motives. It similarly disapproved of the ethnic festival for its lack of cultural significance. Dr. Shirley Sun, director of the C C F called the parade stereotypical and "fossilized."71 Vivian Chiang, who had been involved in the Chinese Culture Foundation since 1972, made similar comments: During the Chinese New Year, the parade is very colorful, but the other activities, like selecting the queen, I mean, what does that relate to the Chinese Festival?. . . Most Americans, they would connect the beauty pageant to the Spring Festival [Chinese New Year]. And yet Chinese American families have no activities unless you have a daughter who is participating in the competition. You have no role.72 In order to provide a space for Chinese Americans to celebrate this important holiday, the center designed community- and family-oriented programs. The activities, funded by the city's hotel tax, were either free or had a small admission fee. The Spring Festival successfully attracted crowds from the beginning. Narrated alternately in Cantonese and English, the programs drew both immigrants and U.S.-born Chinese. Parents brought their children to participate in various activities including martial arts,

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lion dances, Chinese music, folk dances, paper cutting, batik, pottery, dough sculpture, fortune telling, films, slide shows, and food demonstrations. The young children, who rarely understood Chinese, relied on their parents or grandparents to explain things to them. 73 In addition, the celebration included information on the numerous aspects of contemporary China. Most films and photography exhibits showcased the success of the communist liberation or scenic photography from the countryside around Sam Yup and Zhongshan. These photos fulfilled a need for those who did not have a chance to visit their homeland. 74 The 1975 exhibition included a "modern China" slide show. Some of the photos, classified under the series of "women hold up half the sky," exhibited how Chinese women performed strenuous tasks. "They were not only working with and dressing like men, but also doing 'mens jobs.'" 75 The blurred gender role was in opposition to the emphasis on the middle-class gender values presented by the ethnic beauty queens. By supporting the gender policy of the PRC, the Chinese Culture Center clearly manifested its political affiliation, thereby infuriating the old establishment. Starting the late 1980s, the celebration included an exhibition from the "In Search of Roots Program." The program was cosponsored by the P R C and the Chinese Culture Center, although each had its own goal: while the P R C wanted to cultivate the Chinese identity of American-born Chinese, the Chinese Culture Center intended to use it to reconnect suburban Chinese Americans to their ethnic roots. Each year, around ten Chinese American youths went to their ancestral villages to learn about their family histories. These trips made many youths realize that they were not only Americans, but also "Americans with Chinese ancestry." Urging participants to find their own family histories further encouraged them to identify with their ethnicity and ancestral land. Participants displayed their family trees at the exhibit, possibly motivating others to discover their own family histories. In addition, the program included a slide show that taught viewers about Chinese American history.76 Although the center provided an alternative space for community members to express their identity, it did not gain recognition from the old establishment because of its political affiliations. The center turned down a sponsorship from the Taiwanese government and advocated normalization between China and the United States. Thus, the pro-Taiwan Chinatown establishment boycotted all events sponsored by the foundation. The foundation was further accused of being associated with communism, due to director Shirley Sun's preferences for art from mainland China. She was, 1 4 0

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in fact, among the first Chinese Americans invited to visit the P R C in the 1970s. Soon after Sun became the director in 1974, she invited the Wushu Troupe, a martial arts group from China, to perform at the center. In the first five or six years, the center primarily invited artists from China. 7 7 Later, with the opening of the PRC, Chinese artists began charging enormous amounts of money for performances. As a result, the foundation could no longer afford to invite artists from China, and instead sponsored local ethnic artists.78 Changes in international politics and global economies again influenced the direction of the Chinese Culture Center. In the end, it was business that changed the political stance of the old establishment. Moreover, in the late 1980s, Taiwan lifted martial law and lessened its trade restrictions with China. The changing relationship between the two Chinas likewise altered internal Chinatown politics. The Chinatown establishment stopped boycotting the Chinese Culture Center. In the 1990s the Chinese Culture Center began to cooperate with the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in the planning of Chinese New Year activities. Similar to the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Chinese Culture Center also sought corporate sponsorship. 79 While political differences in the ethnic organizations gradually lessened due to economic interests, international politics continued to affect the ethnic community and its celebration.

POLITICAL

INFLUENCE

The competition for ethnic cultural leadership entered the political arena when the United States normalized its relationship with China. As illustrated in chapter 1, the changes in U.S. diplomatic policy and the international political climate often had a direct impact on Chinese Americans. T h e heterogeneity of Chinese Americans certainly reflects U.S. foreign policies and international conflicts. Chinese Americans were divided by their national origin and political affiliations. T h e conflicts between two competing foreign governments (China and Taiwan) accentuated Chinatown's inner political factions. Such tensions were notably manifested in the Chinese New Year Festival. Parade organizers used the occasion to denounce the P R C and showcase their loyalty to the Nationalist government of Taiwan, which the United States saw as a ally in containing communism. Each year, the Nationalist flag was prominently displayed on the parade route, either carried by a parade float or by one of the Chinese school teams. Since 1954, the Taiwanese Consul General had been invited

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14I

as a parade float judge or honored guest, while his wife was a beauty pageant judge.80 Similar political affiliations appeared in festival publications. For example, the 1968 festival program equated Taiwan's national day, Double Ten Day (October 10), with other important ethnic holidays such as the Chinese New Year.81 Meanwhile, parade organizers went to Taiwan to procure "authentic" Chinese goods and supported the idea of the Nationalist government as a retainer of traditional Chinese cultures. Many liberals, radicals, and China supporters, however, were discontent with this political manifestation. Shirley Sun blasted the celebration for being "politically tied to Taiwan."82 Several community liberals, such as Gilbert Woo, castigated the political oppression of the Nationalist government, and were thereby branded as communists by the old establishment. Many student activists and young radicals even openly supported the PRC. Even so, political differences seldom manifested in the ethnic celebration in the 1950s and 1960s. While an affinity with the Nationalist government was clearly showcased in the ethnic festival right from the beginning, any association with communist China was deliberately minimized to comply with U.S. containment policy. The Red Guard Party, a group of Chinese American radicals who distributed Mao Zedong's The Little Red Book at the 1969 Chinese New Year Festival, were a rare exemption. Nevertheless, the easing of tensions between China and the United States would soon end the Nationalist government's presence in the ethnic celebration. President Richard Nixon's trip to China in 1972 signified a new era for certain Chinese Americans. They were proud of this new relationship because they no longer feared being associated with "enemy agents." As one Chinese American woman explained, "Nixon's visit elevated the status of Chinatown. In a way, now it was okay to be Chinese. We could be proud to be Chinese. And China, instead of being an enemy, became a friend."83 Other Chinese Americans also felt empowered by the change. Philip Choy, an architect and a historian, stated: "I felt a feeling of pride watching Nixon and Zhou [the Chinese premier] meet. For the first time, a representative of China meets a representative of the Western world as equals. Before, foreign visitors came to China arrogantly and dictated terms before cutting her up."84 Once China was seen as an equal to the United States, Chinese Americans could proudly refer to China as their "homeland" and reaffirm their ethnic ties. The lessening hostility indeed permitted Chinese Americans to renew transpacific ties in both personal and economic terms. Visits to China had been cut off after the outbreak of the Korean War. The new Sino-American I42

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relations allowed Chinese Americans to revisit their families or relatives. It also generated economic interests in the ethnic community and mainstream society. Because of the post-Korean War embargo against China, Chinatown merchants were unable to purchase goods from the PRC and were forced to buy souvenirs and trinkets from Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. 85 The completion in the 1960s of a newly developed Nihonmachi (Japantown), posed a great threat to Chinatown businesses as the Japanese were selling similar goods. The lifting of the embargo in 1971 allowed Chinatown business people to import "authentic" Chinese goods to attract tourists and to cater to the needs of the local ethnic population. Chinese medicinal herbs were the first goods to be shipped into the United States.86 Most businesspeople, however, were hesitant to trade with China because the United States had imposed a stiff tariff ranging from 70 to 80 percent of import duty tax. It was only in 1979, when the two countries signed a mutual agreement granting a most-favored-nation tariff, that trade took off. New organizations began to emerge so as to create trading opportunities with China. In 1977 many professionals formed the National Association of Chinese Americans to "promote U.S.-China friendship." 87 In San Francisco, a group of Chinese American business people formed the Chinese American Association of Commerce ( C A A C ) in 1980 to meet new demands, because the Chinese Chamber of Commerce mainly worked with Taiwan and refused to trade with China. The founding members of the C A A C numbered n o , but after one year, membership increased to more than 200 people. San Francisco's city hall made similar efforts to increase business opportunities with China. The city not only hosted a merchandise exhibition from China in 1980, but Mayor Dianne Feinstein also proclaimed September of that year as "China Month." 8 8 Nixon's visit and the subsequent normalization of relations with China, coupled with the rise of the new left, fueled great interest in Chinese cultures within and outside the ethnic community. Chinatown institutions began to introduce mainland Chinese artists and sports teams. In 1972 the Chinese Cultural Foundation in San Francisco sponsored a lecture on contemporary Chinese revolutionary art. A touring Beijing Opera troupe and Chinese table tennis team met with great enthusiasm among Chinese Americans. 89 Chinese cuisine also became fashionable, and the Chinese dishes from Nixon's trip became particularly trendy. Instead of being satisfied with chop suey, Americans now requested more authentic Chinese food. The Mao (Zhongshan) suit, Mao's book of quotations, canned Chinese food, table tennis, and Chinese antiques likewise enjoyed popularity in mainstream society.90

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Pro-Taiwan groups and anticommunist supporters, however, were unhappy with the easing hostilities between China and the United States. Although the San Francisco Journal, a bilingual weekly newspaper, welcomed the normalization, the World Journal and Young China, both Chineselanguage daily newspapers, considered it to be a betrayal.91 Refugees from mainland China were still bitterly against the communist regime. Peter Eng's father, who fled to Hong Kong to escape communist rule, vowed that he would never return to a communist controlled China.92 Most of the Chinatown establishment, including the CCBA and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, still clung to the Taiwan government.93 Not all institutions, however, maintained the same political position. Four of the seven largest family associations broke with tradition on the first day of normalization and stopped raising the Nationalist flag.94 The rest of the old establishment, nevertheless, insisted on loyalty to the Nationalists. Although the rise of professionals and the increasing number of Chinatown residents who were not part of old establishment membership began to destabilize its spokesperson status, it still controlled significant material and personal resources in the ethnic community. The eighty-four family and district associations owned 50 to 75 percent of Chinatown real estate.95 Because the majority of the old establishment had a close political and economic relationship with Taiwan, it perceived China's growing support as a threat to its leadership. The conflict spread beyond the power center. One community leader commented that the antagonism was "most evident with recent immigrants—you can always hear them fighting about politics."96 This was not a new phenomenon, though; political differences had divided the ethnic community since the turn of the twentieth century. Public space became a contesting ground for various political struggles.97 The competition for political authority sometimes resulted in public confrontations. On May 20, 1978, more than one hundred persons rallied at Portsmouth Square, the most visible place in Chinatown, to denounce the inauguration of President Chiang Ching-kuo, eldest son of Chiang Kai-shek. They then marched to the Nationalist Party's headquarters and encountered the proChiang group, who was gathering inside to celebrate. Violence soon broke out between the two groups, resulting in several injuries.98 In order to ease tensions between the two factions, several community leaders began urging Chinese Americans to disassociate themselves from transnational conflicts. One requested, "We're Chinese-Americans. We can't fight these foreign wars; we've got our own life to live."99 An editorial I44

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in East/West voiced the same opinion: "Political influence from the other side of the Pacific has been a most unhealthy element in our communities. It alienates our leaders. It confuses priorities. It misuses our community organizations. Its presence has frightened many from participation in genuine community services." 100 Critics therefore called for political assimilation, which discouraged Chinese Americans from getting involved in transnational politics. This suggestion did not go over well, however, and political confrontations continued to manifest in Chinatown. On January i, 1979, the year that the United States recognized the PRC, hostility between the two factions boiled over. That morning, the proTaiwan group rallied at St. Mary's Square in Chinatown, after which about one thousand supporters marched through Chinatown, chanting "Free China, go, go, go; Communist, no, no, no." The march ended at 1:00 P.M., but about three hundred pro-Taiwan supporters proceeded to Portsmouth Square, where eight hundred people had gathered to celebrate the normalization. The pro-Taiwan supporters stopped on Clay Street across from Portsmouth Square chanting "Long Live Free China!" Despite there being more than 140 police officers positioned between two groups, violence still broke out, resulting in four injuries. 101 The rallies on both sides were clearly indicative of the severe political division within the ethnic community. Consequently, Chinatown residents anticipated that both sides would use the festival for their respective political agendas, as it was the most publicized community event, attracting not only ethnic, but also mainstream and transnational spectators. That year, the parade was to be broadcast live on KQED-TV, so greater exposure was guranteed. 102 Fortunately, both sides showed restraint and created no disturbances. In the long run, the recognition of the P R C generated less tension in everyday life than everyone had expected. 103 The absence of a violent confrontation, however, did not mean that politics were absent in the 1979 Chinese New Year Festival. When relations between China and the United States became normalized, Taiwan lost its status as an internationally recognized political entity. As a result, San Francisco Mayor Dianne Feinstein pressured the Chinese Chamber of Commerce not to display the Nationalist flag or any pro-Taiwan slogans. Nevertheless, China Airlines (Taiwan's flag carrier), the Chinese Central High School, and the Kin Kuo Chinese School all openly displayed the Nationalist flag during the parade route. 104 Politics remained an issue in the 1980 Chinese New Year Festival. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce had invited Taiwanese representatives to HYBRIDITY

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the parade since the second year of the festival. It had no intention of extending the invitation to the Chinese Consul General, Hu Dingyi. Knowing this, the mayor pressured the chamber to invite representatives of both governments. It complied, but then withdrew both invitations at the last minute. Moreover, the parade committee continued to allow Chinese schools to display Taiwanese flags, which infuriated the mayor and even prompted her to declare, "This is the last time city funds will be used for this event." 105 The flag issue not only angered the mayor, but also infuriated some Chinese Americans. Victor Seeto, vice president of the Chinese American Democratic Club ( C A D C ) , insisted that the public was "outraged that the Taiwan flag was prominently displayed within the parade by some of the marching units." The C A D C immediately asked Chief Administrative Officer Roger Boas to undertake a "thorough investigation" of the "possible misuse of public funds for improper and legal political purposes by the sponsor of the Chinese New Year parade." 106 Seeto even asked that the parade be put under "new sponsorship" if "improper and illegal political purposes" were found. 107 An editorial in East/West concurred: "A parade of this nature, supported by public funds, should not be used for partisan politics, not to mention foreign politics." 108 Not only did China sympathizers disagree with Taiwanese political affiliations, but other Chinese Americans also believed that the parade, the most significant and publicized event in the community, should have no associations with a foreign government. Others, however, questioned the politics of the city government. One reader of East/West pointed out that people should not overreact and argued that even though the federal government had ended normal relations with Taiwan, state and city governments had made no clear break with it. San Francisco remained a sister city with Taipei. 109 Moreover, just a month earlier city hall had accepted a pavilion from Taipei to be installed in Golden Gate Park. In addition, the mayor had arranged trips to Taipei as well as Shanghai and Beijing. These policies caused some Chinese Americans to wonder why the mayor had made such a big fuss over the parade incident. 110 City politics, nevertheless, had a lasting impact on the ethnic celebration. In 1981 Mayor Feinstein again notified the Chinese Chamber of Commerce that only American flags were to be displayed. As a result, several Chinese language schools withdrew their participation. 111 Since then, no foreign flags have appeared in the festival. In 1982 fourteen British Parliament members appeared on the parade reviewing stand, but no official representatives from either China or Taiwan were present. The Chinese Chamber of

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Commerce began to maintain a neutral position regarding transpacific politics. As Rose Pak, the main force within the organization, claimed, "This is a community event. We want to keep international politics out of it." 1 1 2 This incident demonstrates that Chinese Americans were discouraged from displaying their political differences in the public space. While early Cold War politics pressured them to showcase the Nationalist flag in the ethnic celebration, shifting foreign policies later made this unacceptable. Nevertheless, some spectators still held the Nationalist flag along the parade route. 113 Interestingly, not every city in the United States followed the federal governments foreign policy. For example, in Washington, D.C., during the 1980s, a small-scale Chinese New Year parade given by the local C C B A still hung Taiwanese flags along the parade route and distributed them to spectators.114 This incident reveals how a local celebration was affected by U.S. foreign policy and transnational conflicts. It also reflects the complex characteristics of the ethnic community, divided by differences in national origin and political affiliations. With the Cold War ending in 1989 and the allure of the Chinese market growing increasingly larger, the United States has continued to maintain relatively friendly relations with the PRC. (This has been intermittently disrupted by incidents such as the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989 and the collision between a U.S. spy plane and a Chinese fighter jet in 2001.) Meanwhile, Taiwan eased its China policy during the 1980s, which again influenced internal Chinatown politics. The old establishment stopped boycotting pro-China organizations, such as the Chinese Culture Center. Business opportunities also motivated Chinese Americans to be amenable to both sides. Accordingly, Chinese Americans attended important holidays for both: October 1 (the PRC's national day) and Double Ten Day (Taiwan's national day). Chinese and Taiwanese flags alike continued to be raised throughout San Francisco's Chinatown. But while increasingly more American-born Chinese felt that the transnational issue was irrelevant, the tensions between the two countries continued to plague the ethnic community, as many immigrants maintained close ties with their country of origin. In the last decade, the rise of the Taiwanese Independence Movement triggered an increasingly militant Chinese nationalism, thereby heightening tensions between Chinese and Taiwanese immigrants. The internal political division within China and Taiwan likewise surfaced in Chinatown and the ethnic celebration. In 2005, for instance, a protester used the festivity to convey his discontent for the 2004 Taiwanese presidential election, while Falun Gong, a spiritual movement banned in HYBRIDITY

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Figure 9. The national flags of China, Taiwan, and the United States flying side by side in Chinatown. The photo was taken in the community fair during the Chinese New Year Festival. February 5, 2005. Photograph by Kuo-Tung Li.

the P R C , was initially denied entry before being included at the last minute. 1 1 5 The political manifestation in the ethnic celebration will continue in the foreseeable future, for the replenishment of new immigrants from the conflicted areas will continue to involve the ethnic community in transnational politics. Meanwhile, because the dominant society has persisted in perpetuating Chinese Americans as foreigners and the relation-

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ship between the United States and the PRC continues to remain tenuous, it is unlikely that Chinese Americans will cease to showcase patriotism in the ethnic celebration.

CONCLUSION

The issues surrounding the Chinese New Year celebrations were full of contradictory characteristics, affected not only by conflicts between China and Taiwan, but also U.S. foreign policy. The diverse constituencies within the community also added to the conflicts over the definition of ethnic identity and culture: while Chinese immigrants wanted to transplant their homeland culture, American-born Chinese were committed to "claiming America" and discouraged "critical attention on things Asian." 116 Moreover, the rise of ethnic consciousness prompted the Chinese Culture Center to stage an alternative ethnic celebration. The cultural and political issues illustrated here indicate that we should pay attention to the multiplicity and heterogeneity of the Chinese American community. The cultural critic Lisa Lowe has aptly remarked in Immigrant Acts that "we need to think through the ways in which culture may be rearticulated not in terms of identity, equivalence, or pluralism, but out of contradiction, as a site for alternative histories and memories that provide the grounds to imagine subject, community, and practice in new ways." 117 The struggle over identity politics has indeed persisted. In the 1980s, transnational commercialism began to influence Chinese American identity formation.

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SEVEN

Selling Chineseness and Marketing Chinese New Year Corporate Sponsorship, Television Broadcasts, and Counter Memory

"TONIGHT,

OVER ONE H U N D R E D THOUSAND f i r e c r a c k e r s ,

twenty-one

floats, sixteen bands, dragons' glow, hundreds of kung fu and lion dances, and over three hundred thousand spectators." "They are all here to celebrate the Year of the Rooster." 1 Thus began two television hosts introducing the 1993 Chinese New Year parade broadcast. The marching unit for the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the parade's sponsor since the 1950s, sounded a gong. It was followed by kung fu teams and a dragon dance performed by U C Berkeley students. The Hip Wo Drum and Bell Corps, comprised of children wearing traditional Chinese outfits, played a march. Following in the wake of Grand Marshal Senator Dianne Feinstein's car were floats displaying corporate logos with "Chinese" themes. Halfway through the same parade broadcast, a white female reporter interviewed James Hong, a Chinese American actor. Before the conversation, two film clips of Hong's acting were shown. In both films, Hong portrayed unusual characters wearing exotic costumes. In one clip Hong's costume was stripped off by a white male, while in another he portrayed a pervert with long fingernails intending to molest a sleeping Asian beauty. The screen then flashed back to the parade route.

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Reporter: Hong: Reporter: Hong:

You promoted Asian Americans in your movie-making fields. How has it gone so far? It hasn't been progressed as much as we would like it to. I'm still playing villains. But you are very successful! I can do other good parts, good guys.2

The conversation between Hong and the reporter reveals a slippage in the model minority narrative that emphasized Chinese American political docility and economic assimilation and ruptures the Orientalized Chinese American culture that dominated the parade route and the English-language parade broadcasts. The negotiation between Hong and the exotic ethnic culture presented on the parade route was not specific to Chinese America, but a widespread phenomenon in many racial and ethnic communities that strove to create a public identity in contemporary multicultural America. With the rise of the Pacific Rim economy, the restructuring of global economies, the image of wealthy immigrants, and the prevailing model minority narrative, Chinese Americans became "dream customers" for multinational corporations. They were also perceived as cultural brokers to expedite trade across the Pacific. The parade committee seized upon such interest to incorporate the Chinese New Year Festival into mainstream corporate culture and contemporary multicultural America. Major corporations began to sponsor the festival in 1987, while television stations started annual broadcasts of the parade in 1988. The parade had become a converging space between globalism and localism. This chapter focuses on how the Chinese New Year festival committee has marketed the ethnic celebration in the last two decades by continuing to Orientalize Chinese American culture and embrace the model minority narrative in order to create a public identity. It also analyzes the adoption of parade television broadcasts and examines how Chinese- and English-language broadcasts entail the different processes of ethnicization and racialization. While mainstream parade telecasts situated the ethnic celebration in the narrative of multiculturalism, ethnic parade broadcasts presented a version of what the historian George Lipsitz has referred to as "counter memory." In Time Passages, Lipsitz explains, "Counter-memory is a way of remembering and forgetting that starts with the local, the immediate, and the personal."3 This case study thus provides

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insight into the complex yet contradictory identity politics in the age of commercialism.

"DREAM CUSTOMERS":

INTERESTS

THE CHINESE AMERICAN

IN

MARKET

Beginning in the late 1970s, Chinese Americans became increasingly visible in the media, and many corporations noticed their high purchasing power. But even before the Pacific Rim's economic boom and President Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1972, some mainstream corporations were already paying attention to ethnic consumers. The surge in the number of mainstream and international corporation advertisements in the Chinese New Year festival programs mirrored a growing interest in the ethnic market. Approximately eight mainstream corporations advertised in the i960 program; the number increased to sixteen in 1969. Most of these advertisements were for banking institutions. Advertisements for real estate agencies started to appear in 1965, reflecting the rise in purchasing property within various Chinese American communities, in part due to the arrival of middle-class immigrants from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and other Chinese diasporas.4 Later, the surge of the Pacific Rim economies and wide news coverage of Chinese Americans' high earning power further encouraged corporations to target ethnic clientele. Beginning in the 1980s, the mainstream and ethnic media ran reports on Chinese Americans who possessed more purchasing power than the average American. Deloitte & Touches 1990 marketing study, widely recounted in mainstream and community newspapers, depicted Asian Americans as having more disposable income and being more likely than the general public to patronize upscale stores and goods. The study investigated five hundred Asian Americans in the San Francisco Bay Area. Although it did not focus on Chinese Americans specifically, the results still affected the ethnic community, as mainstream society tended to lump all Asian Americans together. Compared with other ethnic groups, Asian Americans in the sampling group had a higher-level of education and income and were willing to spend more money for high-quality products. They were also younger than the general public and many of them still lived with their parents, which translated into more disposable income.5 The report further emphasized that Asian Americans participated in the mainstream consumer market: they were more likely to own electronic goods, credit cards, and to spend

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their free time shopping than the general population. 6 Asian Americans were thus perceived to be as affluent patrons and an excellent target market for corporations. Media that catered to Asian Americans likewise promoted the market worthiness of the group in order to attract advertisements. EastfWest, a Chinese American community newspaper, conducted a survey in 1983 that showed that 83.3 percent of its readers were homeowners and 59.9 percent owned more than one property. Moreover, 79.2 percent invested in stocks, bonds, funds, and gold. 7 Beginning in 1986, KTSF, a full-time Asianlanguage television station in the San Francisco Bay Area, repeatedly commissioned a research group to investigate Asian American consumer habits and concluded that Asian Americans were loyal to high-end brands.8 These reports again portrayed Chinese Americans as rich consumers. The arrival of Hong Kong investors further galvanized the image of affluent Chinese Americans. The return of Hong Kong to China motivated many wealthy families to invest in San Francisco Bay Area real estate before immigrating to California. It is impossible to track the inflow of capital to California, because Hong Kong has no foreign exchange control. Nevertheless, by the early 1980s, Hong Kong money controlled approximately 10 percent of the San Francisco downtown area. Hong Kongers had also purchased many upscale restaurants, hotels, and T-shirt and camera shops in Chinatown. 9 In 1990 the San Francisco Chronicle reported that Hong Kong and Taiwan investors owned 20 percent of property in the downtown area.10 The coverage on wealthy immigrants in the media, coupled with the model minority image, further promoted attention from mainstream corporations. The prevailing news coverage of Asian Americans as a model minority generated interest from large corporations. T h e anthropologist Arlene Dávila has argued that African Americans have long been recognized as a special market and Latina/os as the potentially largest minority market. Asian Americans, however, had to demonstrate their market values through the model minority rhetoric. 11 Though this rhetoric was deceiving, as many Asian Americans still lived under the poverty line, it nevertheless conferred upon them the status of "dream customers." 12 As Matt Davis, marketing director of the Asian Yellow Pages in San Francisco, commented, "Every time you guys [the media] do something on Asian buying power, our phones light up." 13 A managerial staff member in ethnic marketing further explained,

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Two years after we started, we realized that selling to Chinese merchants would not be enough. . . . We began to target American businesses, increasing their awareness of the buying power of the Chinese community and educating them on marketing techniques that would work on Chinese consumers; due to this, the ads they placed in our book brought in a lot of Chinese buyers to their establishments, and so they liked it. As a result, the number of American ads began to increase, and it was easier to target other American businesses. Consequently, 60 percent of the Chinese yellow pages clientele were mainstream companies.14 The desire to attract ethnic customers motivated companies to sponsor ethnic cultural events to gain exposure. According to Angela Chen, a senior product manager at Bank of America, "I think more and more people are realizing this is not just goodwill, this is good business sense."15 According to Eleanor Yu, president of Adland, one of the strategies "to get Asian American businesses" was to be "part of their ethnic communities."16 In 1996 Coca-Cola was the first major corporation to launch a nationwide television commercial designed especially for the ethnic holiday. A Chinese dragon made from six thousand Coke cans appeared during commercial breaks for programs like The Tonight Show and the Late Show with David LettermanP Some companies even donated substantial goods to ethnic events. In 1991 Remy Martin contributed $20,000 worth of merchandise to the Chinese-American Planning Council's Chinese New Year banquets.18 Others tried to profit directly from the ethnic holiday. As early as 1962, the Flamingo Hotel in Las Vegas featured its first Chinese New Year week with a twenty-two-course banquet, for which San Francisco Chinatown residents could easily purchase event tickets from local travel agencies.19 The high interest in the ethnic market thus motivated festival organizers to seek corporate sponsorship for the ethnic celebration.

CORPORATE

SPONSORSHIP

Taking advantage of the interest in the ethnic and transnational markets, ethnic leaders seized the opportunity to commodify ethnicity to attract corporations.20 In 1987, Wayne Hu, a successful fourth-generation Chinese American businessman and parade organizer from the 1980s to the present, initiated the idea of corporate sponsorship. Hu's involvement of the parade dated back to the 1960s; his father, Jackson Hu, had been one of the major 154

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parade organizers since the 1950s.21 Though commercialism had been the focus of the festival since the beginning, Hu took it into a different form by incorporating marketing techniques such as selling T-shirts and posters, and successfully sought sponsors from big corporations such as Coors Beer, Harrahs Hotel & Casino in Reno, and A T & T . Prior to corporate sponsorship many corporations purchased advertisements in festival programs, although they contributed much less than they did in the late 1980s. The largest donation, for instance, was $1,000 for the beauty pageant scholarship fund in the 1970s. Yet corporate sponsorship policy produced bigger and bigger revenues for the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. In 1989, three corporations gave $26,000 while fourteen companies supplied $141,000 in 1990. Hu projected that $100,000 in profit could be made within five years.22 As parade marketing director Peggy Kennedy pointed out, the number of sponsors quadrupled between 1990 and 1996.23 The committee solicited even more money in the late 1990s. The 1999 Chinese New Year festival and parade sponsorship booklet confirmed that a title sponsorship required $120,000, and the minimum contribution to the parade was $20,000.24 Enthusiastic corporate sponsorship was a response to the image of affluent Chinese America and a schema of attracting ethnic customers to their products. For example, the Anheuser-Busch Companies and the Bracco Distributing Company, the parent companies of Budweiser, indicated that sponsorship was part of the continuous effort to court the ethnic market. John Bracco, president of Bracco Distributing Company, said, "I, along with everyone at Bracco Distributing Company, would like to thank the Chinese community for their patronage." 25 Budweiser had a long history of targeting the Chinese American market—they had already advertised in the festival programs for years. Other businesses such as wine companies, banking institutions, investment firms, real estate agencies, hotels, airlines, automobile makers, car rental companies, telecommunications, and insurance companies all followed similar strategies to solicit a Chinese American clientele. The list of advertising companies reflects the image of the affluent Chinese: most of these companies sold luxury products or services, a significant contrast to the basic goods that were advertised to African Americans and Latina/os.26 The increase in corporate sponsorship was because the festival created a new space for companies to showcase their brands and to advertise their products. Global economic restructuring encouraged private corporations to partake in ethnic cultural tourism. To counter the economic rise of Germany, Japan, and certain Third World countries, American corporations SELLING

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began to expand what the anthropologist Roger Rouse has called "the realms of profit-making activity."27 The public space became an advertising bulletin board while immigrant communities became new frontiers. The funding from corporations enabled the festival to extend to two weeks and to add a flower market and community fair, both of which took place in Chinatown. Held right before the actual lunar New Year, the flower market sold festival goods, while the community fair, coinciding with the parade date, staged various cultural and entertainment booths. Both provided a chance for corporations and community organizations to cater to local Chinatown residents. The parade gave big corporations an even greater opportunity to appeal to a wider range of spectators, to showcase their brands, and to shape viewers' consumption habits. Corporations had their names displayed on the sponsored floats and embedded in the subtitles of the television broadcast. The number and duration of the displays reflected the amount of money contributed by the companies: the more they paid, the more exposure they attained during the event. In 1996, for example, a San Francisco Chronicle procession comprised three floats, several lion dance groups and marching bands, as well as the host cars for the parade grand marshal and San Francisco mayor.28 For the purpose of selling the ethnic celebration to corporations, the festival committee modified its volunteering practice and hired the aforementioned professional marketing consultant, Peggy Kennedy, to solicit sponsors. She started looking for sponsors for the next year's event as early as July. 29 As Wayne Hu noted, "The goal is to have a professional staff working year-round to make the parade a national event that will draw many more visitors to San Francisco, benefiting the entire city, not just Chinatown's restaurants and gift shops." 30 In other words, the privatization of the ethnic celebration, Hu thought, would transform it into a mainstream event. To attract mainstream sponsors, parade organizers underscored the exoticism of the ethnic culture and the transnational connections of the community. A booklet that promoted the festival to sponsors sealed the celebration in Chinese tradition. "Chinese New Year is a two-week spring festival which has been celebrated each year in China for over 5,000 years." The statement, like other festival rhetoric, froze and essentialized the celebration in a timeless vacuum. Reading only this one-page description, it was easy to mistakenly assume that the celebration took place in Asia. In fact, only one sentence in the entire fourteen-page booklet revealed that the 156

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celebration was in San Francisco: "[The festival] started in San Francisco in the 1860s, now the largest celebration of Chinese New Year outside Asia." The committee not only downplayed the historical and social factors that precipitated the ethnic celebration in this country, but also conflated Chinese American culture with Chinese culture by proclaiming, "One of the goals of the Chinese New Year committee is to educate the public about the richness of Chinese culture." 31 To substantiate the authenticity and attest to the transnational ties of the festival, the committee traveled to China each year to purchase new artifacts to add novelty to the parade and festival. T h e emphasis on "Chineseness" catered to a corporate conception of ideal ethnics whose culture was "unique, bounded, and separate from U.S. culture, which is simultaneously constructed as homogeneous, white, and 'mainstream.'" 32 Moreover, since most of the prospective sponsors were transnational corporations, the emphasis on "Chineseness" provided them with an opportunity to target multinational consumers. Corporations believed that the consumption behaviors of the ethnic audience would influence their relatives or friends "back home" since more than half of the Chinese American population was comprised of immigrants. These corporations similarly wanted to cater to other American consumers. Therefore, the "Chinese" elements included in the parade were quite familiar to the general public: the animals of the zodiac, renowned Chinese architecture, and elements of Chinese mythology. Consequently, Chinese America was embedded in an ancient China, a country from a different time zone that never evolved. The Chinese themes also fulfilled the mainstream audience's craving for exoticism and encouraged Chinese Americans to be proud of their ethnic culture. The conflation of Chinese and Chinese Americans celebrated a borderless global community that contradicted the otherwise increasingly impervious U.S. borders. During these years, private corporations sponsored most of the units on the parade route, including marching teams and bands, martial arts groups, lion dances, and floats. Bands came not only from nearby communities and local schools, but also from schools in Southern California, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington. T h e majority of the floats combined both Chinese and corporate themes. For example, in 1996 the Blue Shield of California float featured the G o d of Longevity surrounded by giant peaches, a symbol of immortality in Chinese culture. Chung Ngai dancers, a performing group from Chinatown, presented the classical Chinese dance, "Dance of the Peach Platter," to complete the theme of health and long life. 33

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Likewise, most floats skillfully displayed a variety of stereotypical Chinese themes, including traditional wedding processions, Chinese architecture, deities, and animals from the zodiac. Numerous participants wore traditional dress, some even donning elaborate imperial court robes. Most of these themes or performances were carefully staged in a traditional or ahistorical setting. Many featured groups either performed martial arts or traditional dances and songs, suppressing the fact that Chinese Americans also participated in mainstream pop culture, and Chinese diasporas likewise produced hybridized cultures, which could not be neatly categorized as Chinese. In order to create a unified and fixed Chineseness, parade organizers highlighted traditional Chinese culture and downplayed any connections with contemporary Chinese societies or diasporas, especially communist China (with the exception of pandas). A similar focus was echoed in the souvenir programs, which devoted many pages to floats that featured traditional Chinese culture and artifacts. Such an emphasis erased the multiplicity of Chineseness and the presence of nonprofit community organizations such as the Asian American donor program, which encouraged bone marrow donation. By highlighting exotic Chineseness, Chinese Americans became unassimilable foreigners who were too backward and exotic to be part of modern America. Moreover, to lodge Chinese America in a different time and space from modern America was in line with the cultural critic Caroline Chung Simpsons remark: "They could not share in the cultural memories and nationalist sentiments so critical to assimilation."34 The ethnic cultural artifacts presented on the parade route indeed bore particular cultural characteristics that perpetuated foreignness. In fact, it was foreignness that was deemed important in the modern American multicultural project. Parades included many Chinese folk and religious figures, such as the Monkey King puppets, the Eight Immortals, the Fook, Luk, and Shao puppets, and the goddess MaTsu (Ma Zu). Except for the two giant gods in the Ma Tsu procession that were carefully choreographed by evenly swinging their arms and walking in unison in big marching strides, demonstrating their divine and solemn status, the other deities, in contrast, were presented as caricatures, simply waving and bowing to the audience while advancing at an ordinary walking pace. Although the immigrant community favored these folk and religious icons, the rendering of the deities in an Orientalist fashion inevitably obscured their ethnic and religious significance. Under the auspices of the multicultural project, dragon and lion dances, martial arts, giant deities, and firecrackers became emblems of the ethnic 158

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Figure io. The Eight Immortals have been included in the Chinese New Year parade since the 1970s. Courtesy of San Francisco Convention & Visitors Bureau. Photograph by Jack and Betty Cheetham.

culture. In other words, what was represented here were the artifacts that were considered "exotic" and "different," thus reinforcing the belief that Chinese Americans were foreigners. Meanwhile, firecrackers, the most controversial element in the festival's history, became one of the most popular cultural signifiers. This multicultural narrative "asserts that American culture is a democratic terrain to which every variety of constituency has equal access and in which all are represented, while simultaneously masking the existence of exclusions by recuperating dissent, conflict, and otherness through the promise of inclusion." 35 The parades became part of what the anthropologist Richard Schechner has referred to as "official culture," which "likes its street displays to be orderly, arranged in longitudinal rectangles moving in one direction, and proceeding from a known beginning to a known end in time as well as space." 36 Every participating unit and every firecracker was regulated and licensed by the city. All marching bands, floats, cars, and audience members were managed by the producers and monitored by the police. Moreover, most of the interviewees only gave a brief celebratory response. The parades presented a happy, neat, conforming

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image, in line with "official displays," which "consist of neat rectangles, countable cohorts, marching past and under the fixed gaze of the reviewing stand" and "are so often associated with the military."37 Although multiculturalism secured the staging of the ethnic parade, organizers featured those Chinese Americans who were recognized as having achieved success in mainstream society to assure the group's market worthiness. The writer Maxine Hong Kingston rode atop the Woman Warriorfloatin 1994, waving to parade spectators. The same year, cast members from the film The Joy Luck Club also participated in the parade.38 In 2002 a float featuring a Chinatown pagoda gate with five Chinese-style drums carried actress Nancy Kwan, who not only starred in the 1961 Hollywood film Flower Drum Song, but also in The World of Susie Wong. The popularity of these cultural figures, nevertheless, rested on Orientalizing either ethnic cultures or bodies.39 With an emphasis on promoting the economy, the parade committee downplayed race and instead emphasized the assimilation of Chinese America. In 1996 the presence of the first Chinese American police chief, Fred Lau, demonstrated that the ethnic community was well represented in the city, while the inclusion of Congressman Michael M. Honda was an indication that Asian Americans were incorporated in mainstream politics.40 Their presence reinforced the model minority image: the assimilation of the ethnic community through hard work and self discipline. Under this pretense, Chinese Americans were docile and rarely caused political unrest; they now participated in the project of what Lipsitz has called "the possessive investment in whiteness," by patronizing the notion of liberal individualism rather than challenging structural racism.41 Coupled with the depiction of exotic foreigners, this image convinced marketers that the group was a worthy target, while masking the material struggles facing Chinese America. The successful model minority image concealed the fact that many ethnic professionals and managers encountered a glass ceiling in the workplace, and that most Chinatown household incomes were 40 percent below the city's average.42 Nevertheless, the image of affluent Chinese Americans was further promoted by television broadcasts of the ethnic parade.

TELEVISION

BROADCASTS

Chinese New Year parades were further transformed by television broadcasts. Starting in 1988, the Chinese New Year parades were telecast live on KTVU-TV (channel 2) in English and KTSF-TV (channel 26) in Man1 6 0

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darin and Cantonese. Beginning in 1990, KSCI-TV (channel 18) in Los Angles also broadcast the parade to Southern California's Chinese American community. KTVU, affiliated with the Fox Broadcasting Network, was able to attract generous funding and controlled most of the cameras on the parade route. KTSF and KSCI, established in 1976 and 1977 respectively, catered to the ethnic linguistic communities and had to purchase broadcasting rights from KTVU. 4 3 In addition to linguistic differences, KTVU also diverged from KTSF and KSCI in its style: the hosts in the former station followed a script, while the latter allowed for more spontaneous and casual conversation. Moreover, the former cast the parade in the context of American multiculturalism, while the later emphasized a transnational identity. Overall, the content of English- and Chinese-language broadcasts rendered a different interpretation of the ethnic culture, fittingly conveying the different process of racialization and ethnicization. Television broadcasts of the parade quickly spread throughout the United States. By 1989 there were six national markets: Chicago, Honolulu, Los Angeles, Seattle, Pittsburgh, and New York.44 The parade was also advertised in TV Guide beginning in 1990 and went live on the Travel Channel in 1994.45 Suddenly, anyone who had cable television could watch the ethnic parade from anywhere in the country. The increasingly wide coverage of the parade seemed to transform a local ethnic celebration into a national multicultural event. With a gesture toward greeting viewers in various locations, television hosts underscored the national interest of the ethnic celebration to boost its popularity, which in turn generated more advertising revenue for the television stations. The parade underwent significant changes in order to become more television friendly. In 1989 the parade office hired Argonne Parades of Atlanta, the producers of the Rose Parade. Meanwhile, KTVU was given the responsibility of finding corporate sponsors for each float and band, while KTSF and KSCI needed to find sponsors for their own productions. The parade length was shortened to fit into a two-hour broadcast time. Street spectators became secondary to television cameras, which occupied the prime viewing positions. KTVU's cameras were installed on Stockton Street at Union Square, on the left side of the performers. The bright television lights signaled to performers that they were in a television zone, where all participating units were carefully instructed to perform to the camera side rather than the people sitting in the bleachers. The instruction guidelines told the performers to "pretend that each television camera is an entire audience and you will look fantastic!" The performance was carefully SELLING

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orchestrated for perfection on the television screens. On the streets, several people held signboards instructing, "Stop," "Leave," "Wait," "Perform Now," and "Play Now." Sometimes television viewers could even hear people shouting, "Perform now!" Walking marshals also trekked alongside each unit to ensure top performances.46 The television zone eliminated the chance for street onlookers to interact with performers. David Lei, a parade organizer, recalled that he and his friends used to trick tourists into taking over the arduous work of carrying the heavy sections of dragons.47 In contrast to the earlier parades, audiences sat neatly in bleachers, closely monitored by the police. Audiences became part of the spectacle. Even though street spectators were no longer the principal audience, cameras occasionally focused on them to show their presence and diverse composition. Indeed, they were mentioned repeatedly by commentators to demonstrate the popularity of the parade and the diversity of spectators.

" L I V E FROM UNION THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE

SQUARE":

PARADE

BROADCAST

English-language parade broadcasts shifted the focal point of the parade. Ironically, Chinatown lost its position as the center of the event. The opening shot instead focused on the city skyline and the Golden Gate Bridge, symbols of San Francisco. The broadcast then displayed the title of the parade. It supplemented "San Francisco Chinatown" with the title of the major corporate sponsor. For example, in 1996 the parade was sponsored by the San Francisco Chronicle and became the "San Francisco Chronicle Chinese New Year Festival and Parade." The title was repeated before and after each commercial break. The settings and the way that parades were presented indicate that the parades belonged to the city of San Francisco and to multinational corporate sponsors. Instead of showing a confined Chinatown with its narrow streets, television cameras focused on the wide downtown streets. The background of the parade was made up of the high-rises and upscale boutiques around Union Square. The presentation indicates that Chinese Americans were now part of American capitalist culture and that the Chinese New Year festivals were part of its multicultural mosaic. The omission of Chinatown, however, disguised the major transformations undergone since the 1970s. When the Chinese New Year became privatized in the late 1980s, Chinatown was invaded by private corporations. A 1988 article in East/West cap162

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tured the changes. "Gone are the Fong Café, famous for its ginger ice cream; the Sang Wo Chinese-style grocery store; the Italian market that sold the best cooked ducks and chickens; the Sun Sing Theater; China Pharmacy; the herb shop that displayed historic Chinatown photos; the list goes on and on." 48 Similar reports could be found in other mainstream and ethnic newspapers.49 Since the 1970s, property ownership had been shifted from Chinese American district associations to private enterprises. The shifting ownership rate was elevated by the approach of Hong Kong's return to China in 1997. A 1987 report in the San Francisco Examiner estimated that $10 million a year was invested in Chinatown. 50 This jacked up the value of Chinatown's real estate and forced storeowners out of the community. Numerous old ethnic stores were replaced by malls, banks, and stores selling trinkets, cameras, and jewelry.51 The influx of outside capital and the transformation of Chinatown's landscape triggered a debate within the ethnic community over preservation and development. In addition, Chinatown's economy had been devastated by the 1989 earthquake, which eventually caused the closure of the Embarcadero Freeway, Chinatown's main access point. The demolition of the freeway deterred many suburban residents from coming into Chinatown to do their grocery shopping, which resulted in a corresponding increase of suburban Asian supermarkets, further endangering the Chinatown economy. T h e focus on downtown high-rises also masked the housing woes of Chinatown residents, who were crowded into substandard buildings. In 1985, 60 percent of the estimated 6,500 housing units were residential hotel rooms, built in the early twentieth century for Chinese "bachelors." The rooms were ten-foot-by-ten-foot cubicles, sometimes even smaller, and had no kitchens or bathrooms. 52 The tenants crammed into these buildings were still considered to be fortunate, as many others had lost their homes. During the decade of the 1970s, Chinatown lost an estimated one thousand to fifteen hundred housing units. 53 The situation continued to worsen in the 1980s. Television commentators skipped over other problems facing Chinese Americans. The main difference between the live performance and the television broadcasts was that the latter included commentary, which, in itself, was what also distinguished the English- and Chinese-language broadcasts. While the street spectators formed their own interpretations of every performance, mainstream commentators introduced each unit with prewritten scripts. The commentator teams were generally either composed of one white male anchor from K T V U and one Chinese American

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female—usually a previous Miss Chinatown queen or princess—or Ben Fong-Torres, a Chinese American writer from Oakland, accompanied by one white female anchor. (In 1999, Fong-Torres cohosted the program with a Vietnamese American female anchor, Thuy Vu.) In some years, a reporter appeared on the parade route to interview mainstream and ethnic celebrities. Overall, Chinese American hosts exhibited cultural sensibility and sometimes inserted their own memories into the program. Rebecca Wu, a former Miss San Francisco Chinatown and journalist, pointed out her alma maters among the marching units while Fong-Torres, a former writer for Rolling Stone, recounted his own experiences making papiermache lion heads while a child.54 These personal memories interrupted the exotic images neatly projected in the parade. On the contrary, white cohosts sometimes caricatured Chinese deities and artifacts to attract the attention of viewers. For example, Steve McPartlin's humorous dismissal of the ethnic culture completely betrayed the underlying theme that celebrated multiculturalism. In general, the English-language commentaries underscored the exotic characteristics of the ethnic culture and highlighted mainstream popular cultural signifiers. In the beginning of the show, the commentators emphasized firecrackers, dragon and lion dances, kung fu clubs, and characters from popular television shows or Disneyland. This emphasis highlighted Orientalist and popular components and were constantly reiterated to build up excitement and maintain interest. These highlights reveal the intention to appeal to the desire of consuming particular cultural traits while glossing over mundane activities, such as school marching bands, in order to complement multiculturalism. Given that the target audience was mainstream America, commentators briefly introduced the meaning or history of each participating unit on the parade route. For instance, the monkey king, one of the frequent entries, was introduced in the following way: "This is a folktale, an ethnic story. The emperor of Chini sent a Tang dynasty priest on a mission to India to bring back the scripture of Buddha. The priest was accompanied by three disciples: the pig, the friar, and the resourceful monkey king. The trips took nearly four thousand miles and lasted fourteen years or eighty-one chapters."55 This description introduced the story to Chinese American and mainstream audiences, yet it situated these giant figures in an ancient era and never explained the relevance to Chinese America. Often, Chinese objects were taken out of historical context. Viewers were informed that a gong was used as a form of communication in SELLING

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China, but were not told when the instrument was used. 56 White hosts sometimes even ridiculed ancient practices. For example, in response to Wu's report that kites "were invented over 2,200 years ago and used by the military to scare away enemies. . . . ," her cohost McPartlin cried, "It's the kites! They are dreadful kites! I am so scared! It's kites!" 57 Some viewers might have laughed with McPartlin and walked away with an impression that China was indeed backward or traditional, profoundly different from modern America. But some viewers found the remarks offensive. Ted Wong, a Chinese American who grew up in the Mission District of San Francisco, expressed his discontent in a 1999 interview: "Occasionally some of the white commentators or people who appear in the show may exhibit their ignorance,... their insensitivity about the Chinese New Year Parade. . . . Certainly, I'm aware of those things." 58 Under this official multicultural narrative, the "authenticity" of the artifacts became a central focus. Commentators emphasized that the "traditional" Chinese uniforms worn by some of the marching bands were designed and made in Taiwan or Hong Kong, while the Golden Dragon was handmade in Hong Kong. San Francisco streets thus were transformed into a living museum where many artifacts from Hong Kong and Taiwan were displayed. Street spectators and television viewers did not need to venture outside of the United States—or even beyond their living rooms—to view the exotic. In addition, most of the "imported" figures or uniforms were sponsored by transnational corporations, blurring the distinction between the local and global. This practice not only allowed the sponsored corporations to attract ethnic and mainstream consumers, but also provided them with a chance to showcase their support of multiculturalism. Indeed, Chinese American cultural particularities were orchestrated to perform and complete multiculturalism. Commentators constantly reiterated how various performances transformed the streets of San Francisco. City officials underscored the diverse participation of the city and the world in the ethnic celebration. The term "diversity" was stated repeatedly throughout the broadcast; the commentators and the city officials, however, never bothered to elaborate on its meaning. It seemed that they considered the term to be so familiar to audiences that it required no interpretation. Moreover, diverse images of numerous ethnic groups marching on the parade route reinforced this idea. For example, Native American participants, dressed in tribal clothing, performed traditional songs and dances. The popularity of certain aspects of Chinese American culture in mainstream society, such as martial arts, was emphasized by the different racial

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and ethnic groups marching with the numerous martial arts teams. Even though the emphasis on diversity celebrated group tolerance and harmony, it nevertheless elided racial tensions and conflicts. Since the 1980s, the increase in anti-Asian American sentiments has resulted in more violence against Asian Americans. The most notorious case was the murder of Vincent Chin in 1982. Chin, a Chinese American, was bludgeoned to death with a baseball bat by two unemployed autoworkers who blamed Japanese for the decline in auto industry in Detroit and thought Chin was Japanese. A report from the National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium (NAPALC) indicated that hate crimes soared in the 1990s.59 The narrative of cultural inclusion thus negated the history of economic, social, racial, and political exclusion for Chinese Americans. Nevertheless, there were moments that revealed historical exclusion. When introducing Gordon L. Lau Elementary School, Fong-Torres reported that it was once "the only school that Chinese could attend." 60 This brief statement informed the audience of a racist past, when Chinese children could only attend the "Oriental School." With efforts from community members, the school now was named after a Chinese American civil rights activist and former member of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors. In addition, while the mainstream broadcasts attempted to uphold the model minority image, their intention was occasionally disrupted by parade participants, who strove to present different versions of Chinese America. As noted earlier, James Hong's conversation with a reporter indicates how he was a token representation of the movie industry. When the reporter asked Hong about the progress of Asian Americans in Hollywood, she was surprised to hear him complain. She then quickly took the microphone away and used the model minority rhetoric to dismiss Hong's protest, while another white commentator immediately cast Hong in the "yellow peril" image by stating that there were "scary movies [and] scary characters."61 Not only did this example suggest that the image of diversity presented in the parade failed to reflect real experiences, but it also demonstrated that mainstream society had no intention of dealing with the problem. Hong himself instead recognized that he was a mere token and strove to improve the existing conditions. Overall, the English-language parade broadcasts situated Chinese American identity in the narrative of multiculturalism and discouraged the formation of minority solidarity. Each year, the parade included groups from numerous Asian American communities. The renowned Taiko Dojo drum166

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mers were followed by Korean American drummers from the Korean Youth Cultural Center. In their wake, the Malaysia Professional Business Association staged a wedding procession with marchers dressed in traditional attire, accompanied by a man hoisting a tall green palm tree. San Jose's Miss Tet beauty queen represented the Vietnamese American community. Hawaii also sent two groups: a Miss Chinatown and a group of Tahitian dancers in coconut bras and ti leaf hula skirts. The presence of numerous Asian and Pacific Islander American communities motivated commentators to emphasize that the celebration was not just for Chinese Americans, but for "all people of the Pacific Rim nations."62 The emphasis on transnationality, nevertheless, undermined the possibility of forming a group identity. In addition, although parade organizers intended to create an Asian American identity, this intention did not appear in the commentary.63 Each Asian American unit was introduced singularly with a focus on its unique cultural traits. Except a casual remark that indicated Vietnamese Americans also observed the lunar New Year, no effort was made to draw together common experiences or history among Asian Americans. In contrast, the emphasis on cultural diversity yielded a focus that stressed the exotic and foreign aspects of ethnic cultures in order to highlight the stark contrast to white American culture; this perpetuated the notion of Chinese Americans as foreigners and downplayed their American experiences and history. The intention to use ethnicity (in this case, Chineseness) to elide race nevertheless accentuated Chinese Americans' racial difference. The Englishlanguage parade broadcasts, however, could not monopolize the definition of ethnic identity. Their Chinese-language counterparts effectively presented a version of "counter-memory."

"SAN FRANCISCO

CHINESE NEW YEAR

CHINESE-LANGUAGE

PARADE

PARADE":

BROADCASTS

The Chinese-language parade broadcast began its program by displaying the title, "San Francisco Chinese New Year parade," in Chinese characters. Commentators then greeted each other and the audience in the wake of a commercial break that introduced the corporate sponsors. The commentators were one male and one female speaking Cantonese and Mandarin respectively, reflecting the diverse and diasporic identity of the ethnic community. Since KTSF and KSCI coproduced the program, each station contributed one host. These hosts were usually immigrants themselves. Rather than claim a fixed identity, these hosts demonstrated and contributed to the SELLING

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intention of constructing a more dynamic, fluid, and contested transnational identity. Hosts Regina Yuan and Yalek Huynh were on the commentating stand for more than ten years. Yuan emigrated from Shanghai to Los Angeles via Hong Kong. Achieving fame as a successful martial arts actress in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and then as a KSCI television host in Los Angeles, Yuan not only enjoyed celebrity status within the ethnic community in Southern California, but also maintained close ties with Hong Kong and Taiwan. Because KTSF and KSCI had no control over the actual shooting of the parade, they had to project their messages through the hosts' commentaries or short film clips. As such, the hosts' transnational backgrounds and diasporic identity became a central focus of the broadcasts. Using personal memories to showcase their knowledge of Chinese culture, these hosts accentuated their Chinese diasporic identity. In general, they tended to ignore prewritten scripts and instead engaged in spontaneous conversation. Speaking Cantonese and Mandarin alternately, the hosts often challenged each other's knowledge of Chinese New Year traditions. The good-natured teasing revealed that they were from different Chinese diasporas, thus contributing to the difference in observing the ethnic holiday. They focused more on Chinese idioms or cuisine, and only selectively introduced units on the parade route. In general, their commentary was less informative. This could be because they had less time to comment on each unit since they had to speak Cantonese and Mandarin alternately. It was perhaps also be a strategy for both stations to assert control, since neither had the power to determine what could be included in the parade. The loose structure in the ethnic broadcast nevertheless provided an alternative rendering of the parade. Unlike KTVU, the ethnic broadcast retained Chinese American ownership of the parade. It did not emphasize corporate sponsorship as much, and instead only stated each sponsor's name during commercial breaks. Moreover, the program referred to the festival according to either its location or the Chinese zodiac: it was the "San Francisco Chinese New Year Parade" or the "San Francisco Year of the Rabbit Parade." These names linked the ethnic celebration to the locality and the ethnic community. Although the commentators knew the diverse composition of their viewers, they assumed that their audiences shared similar cultural traditions. They thus did not have to introduce basic elements of Chinese culture as their KTVU counterparts did. For example, when they presented a lion dance, they only announced the name of the performing group. Nor did they explain mainstream cultural symbols, as Chinese immigrants 168

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were already acquainted with these symbols through American cultural imperialism. Instead, hosts focused on their meaning to the ethnic community. For instance, they suggested that the participation of Disneyland in the ethnic parade was an indication of its popularity among the ethnic community. With a focus on local and personal experiences, the commentators tended to openly express their feelings. For instance, when introducing The Joy Luck Club float, Yuan felt for second-generation Chinese Americans because many of them could identify with the generational conflict articulated in the movie. She then attributed the conflict to cultural differences. On another occasion, Yuan expressed delight in finally hearing Chinese music emanating from one of the floats.65 This expression of nostalgia might evoke the memories of some viewers and affirm their Chinese diasporic identity, but risk alienating others who could not identify with the cultural references. Even those who shared the same cultural references might not share the same memories. Commentators sometimes discredited the historical memories presented by the mainstream broadcast. For example, when a cast member from The Joy Luck Club answered a question on the comparison between the Chinese New Year celebration in Shanghai and that of San Francisco, she indicated that the degree of popularity was the same, but the style was different. Yuan then retorted that Shanghai s celebration was smaller than the one in San Francisco. In doing so, Yuan privileged her personal memories and demonstrated a competing narrative of Chinese diasporic identity.66 Although ethnic broadcasts emphasized competing personal memories, they made deliberate efforts to create a sense of ethnic community. While the term Chinatown was dropped from the title, the programs emphatically showcased the material space of San Francisco's Chinatown and the scene of local festivities. Cameras focused on crowded but festive streets filled with ethnic shoppers purchasing festival goods. In addition to food preparation, the program also featured a Chinese American family performing ancestral worship.67 Instead of homogenizing the ethnic community, these programs paid attention to regional and political differences. Commentators began the program by greeting viewers throughout the United States, as well as Hong Kong and Taiwan. In some years, telecasts inserted special segments that featured various Chinese American communities. The 1989 program, for instance, introduced viewers to the different immigration patterns of SELLING

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various groups. The Toishanese, coming from southern China, were the first to settle in the United States and had the longest history in San Francisco's Chinatown. Accompanying this narrative were Arnold Genthe's photographs of old Chinatown. Yuan then interposed her own immigration trajectory, from Shanghai to Los Angeles via Hong Kong, without overlooking other Shanghai immigrants who settled in San Francisco. Since K S C I of Los Angeles was the coproducer, communities in Southern California were also included. Not only did the program feature Little Taipei in Monterey Park (a Los Angeles suburb), it also introduced Orange County's Vietnamese Chinese. Though programs emphasized subgroup differences, they seldom addressed the political conflict between Taiwanese and mainlanders or the power struggle between Hong Kong immigrants and American-born Chinese in San Francisco. They likewise rarely addressed gender, class, and sexual hierarchies within the ethnic community. Instead, the term "we" was used repeatedly to evoke commonality and a sense of community. Occasionally it was used to refer to a subgroup. For example, commentators' statements, "we Taiwanese" or "we Shanghainese," detailed the diverse composition within the ethnic community. In addition, viewers learned how various groups celebrated the ethnic holiday in the United States. Most of the focus was on private celebrations, such as how to prepare festival dishes and observe traditional customs. Yet public celebrations were among featured programs as well. In 1989 it introduced the history of the Tet Festival, Vietnam's lunar New Year celebration. The Chinese New Year public celebrations in Hawaii and Los Angeles were also included in 1991.68 These presentations again focused on regional differences, thereby showcasing competing ideas of ethnic cultures. Moreover, through linking the present ethnic celebration to the past, the ethnic parade broadcast attempted to construct a collective American memory. In 1994 community historian Thomas Chinn explained how Chinese pioneers celebrated the ethnic celebration in mid-nineteenth-century San Francisco. Subsequently, contemporary parade organizer Wayne Hu recounted how he became involved in the modern celebration. Images of nineteenth-century parade scenes were juxtaposed with those of current festivities. By emphasizing that the ethnic celebration had one hundred and fifty years of history in the country, the presentation effectively grounded it in the United States and reconfigured American national identity. Furthermore, while authenticity was a major focus in English-language parade broadcasts, their Chinese-language counterparts emphasized the 170

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notion of transplant. For example, the former explained how the goddess Ma Tsu was imported from Taiwan; the latter revealed that the goddess had eight hundred worshippers in the Bay Area. Viewers learned that the popularity of the Ma Tsu temple was indicative of a surge in Taiwanese immigrants, as the goddess was venerated mainly in Taiwan and other coastal regions in southeastern China. 69 The program also focused on the changing aspects of the ethnic community. Although most of the emphasis was on the immigrant community, one year it quizzed American-born Chinese children shopping in a Chinese supermarket on their knowledge of the ethnic holiday. One answered that the Chinese New Year was once a year, while another responded that the holiday was an occasion for fun—eating dinner and receiving money. The others, however, did not know what Chinese New Year was. The reporter then lamented that many children rarely understood the meaning of the holiday, a stark contrast to the narrative of the mainstream broadcast which emphasized that Chinese Americans carried on their ancient tradition and were proud of their ethnic culture. 70 The interviews of American-born Chinese presented a more nuanced and complex version of Chinese America, whose definition is far more dynamic and fluid. Indeed, the narrative in the ethnic-language parade broadcasts often shifted between a Chinese diasporic identity and a Chinese American identity. The program seldom touched upon the tensions between the two, however. With a focus that emphasized fluid, dynamic, and competing identities, the differences between a transnational identity and an ethnic identity were seen as comparable to the differences in Chinese New Year traditions as expressed by the commentators. In addition to the celebration, there were also descriptions of the daily lives of Chinese Americans. To honor the Year of the Dog, the program demonstrated how a blind Chinese American coped with daily tasks with the assistance of a guide dog. 71 The broadcast even presented more controversial issues, such as bilingual education. 72 In general, ethnic broadcasts created a common identity among immigrant Chinese to help affirm their ethnic identity. But this space was far from ideal, because the narrative often elided the history of Americanborn Chinese. In addition, similar to the mainstream broadcast, Chinese commentaries also ignored the material struggles faced by the ethnic community, especially those in the laboring class who sustained the cultural production but never appeared in either narrative. SELLING

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I71

Through an emphasis on personalized and localized memory and an effort to create a collective identity, the ethnic parade broadcasts created multiple and competing versions of counter memory that were often conflicting, dynamic, plural, and nonlinear. Their version of the Chinese diasporic identity was similarly far from fixed and stable, but fluid, contested, and heterogeneous. The loose-structured programs thus effectively disrupted the neat and conforming image presented in the mainstream telecast. This counter memory, as Lipsitz has put it, "forces revision of existing histories by supplying new perspectives about the past." 73

CONCLUSION

The commercialization of the Chinese New Year Festival reveals the interwoven character of the relationship between globalism and localism. While the festival organizers wanted to expand a local celebration into a mainstream event by seeking corporate sponsorship, multinational corporations wanted to penetrate a local cultural celebration to reach local and multinational consumers. The parade became a converging space for these two forces. As a result, the ethnic cultural celebration was constituted as and subsumed under national capitalist cultural representations and a multicultural project. The parade organizers intended to create a public cultural space for Chinese Americans; however, they excluded the material realities and daily struggles undertaken in Chinatown and in Chinese American history, as well as the intra-ethnic conflicts and interracial tensions. The particular ethnic subjects emphasized in the parade and the English-language broadcast were foreign and exotic—a necessity for the multicultural project. In order to be successful, Chinese Americans needed to follow specific paths to fulfill the Orientalist imagination of the dominant society and elide their political, racial, social, and material struggles to the national audience. Surprisingly, the corporate sponsorship of the Chinese New Year Festival has generated little debate within the community. Beverley Lee, a parade organizer, summarized the prevailing mood: "It is a good thing. Without corporate sponsorship, we cannot do what we are doing now."74 While another parade organizer, David Lei, felt ambivalent about the commercialization of the parade, he also welcomed the change because the money from corporations allowed a lion dance team to go to Bay Area public schools to teach children about the ethnic holiday.75 Besides, commercialism had been a focus of the festival since the beginning. Even those who disagreed 172

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considered it a necessary evil. Therefore, unlike the debate surrounding Japanese Americans' Nisei Week in Los Angeles, Chinese Americans seemed to be quite indifferent to the privatization of the festival.76 However, this does not mean that Chinese Americans had surrendered to the hegemony of commercialism and multiculturalism or that of their middle-class leaders. Chinese-language parade broadcasts not only seldom follow the official narrative, but also created their own version of Chinese America. Moreover, few ethnic viewers absorbed everything they saw on the street or watched on television. Instead, they might watch all or part of the parade, and they might agree with or criticize what they viewed. "Images and icons compete for dominance within a multiplicity of discourses; consumers of popular culture move in and out of subject positions in a way that allows the same message to have widely varying meanings at the point of reception."77 Indeed, while certain Taiwanese immigrants found the Ma Tsu procession familiar, U.S.-born Chinese considered it odd or novel. The varied meanings espoused by different audiences thus challenged the hegemony of the "official culture." More importantly, the television broadcasts created a space that rendered a Chinese American collective memory. As Lipsitz has pointed out, "consumers of electronic mass media can experience a common heritage with people they have no geographic or biological connection." 78 The broadcasts allowed viewers from various locations to watch the celebration. 79 They might see it or watch it with friends, family members, or simply by themselves. The parades further created an ethnic subject in the public space, thereby empowering the ethnic community. Viewing the parade allowed Chinese Americans to ascertain their ethnicity and produce a common memory among them. Television broadcasts enabled audiences from elsewhere to connect to their ethnic culture. By appropriating commercialism and technology, Hu successfully transformed a local event into a national and transnational one and created a public space for the ethnic community. This public space also produced an opportunity for queer Chinese Americans to contest the heteronormative identity and gender ideals maintained through the ethnic beauty queen.

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EIGHT

"We Are One Family" Queerness, Transnationalism, and Identity Politics

(GAPA), clad in sweatshirts stating "We are one family" in Chinese, carried a twenty-five-foot lavender Godzilla along the 1994 Chinese New Year parade route. A pagoda-like carriage, decorated with lights, tropical plants, and bearing a plaque upon which was written the Chinese character for family, carried Mr. GAPA (in a dark suit) and Miss GAPA (a drag queen with a formfitting gown and bouffant hairdo). Members of the Asian Pacific Sisters (APS), a lesbian and bisexual group, donned either red phoenix costumes upon which was written "For the Love of Women" in Chinese, or colorful dog costumes in honor of the Year of the Dog. They also carried a banner stating "Asian Pacific Lesbians and Bisexual Women" in English and "Asian Women Same-Sex Love" in Chinese. Over one hundred gay, lesbian, and bisexual marchers shouted, "We're queer; we're Asian; we're all across the nation." APS provided masks for those women who feared identification. Many later took off their masks when parade spectators showed enthusiastic support. Numerous participants wore lavender ribbons with the names of absent friends in the United States or Asia who were afraid that their presence might generate repercussions from family members. This was the first time that the ethnic celebration included queer ethnic groups, even though white gays and lesbians had marched on the parade route for many years. To these participants and their sympathizers, this M E M B E R S OF T H E GAY ASIAN PACIFIC A L L I A N C E

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was a historic moment—they could finally be part of the family. As an APS member, Kim Compoc noted, "When we walked past the judges' stands, and we were bathed in that flood of light, that's when it all came together for me—this is a national event and it's going to have an impact around the world."1 Why were queer participants so thrilled to be marching on the Chinese New Year parade route? Why did GAPA use the "We Are One Family" slogan in the march? To which family was GAPA referring to here? Although the word family evokes numerous meanings, from blood relationships to group membership, ethnic leaders chose to define it as a nuclear, heterosexual composition to normalize Chinese America in the second half of the twentieth century. This definition was not only policed by ethnic members, but also by outsiders who had political or economic stakes in the term. Control was hardly total, though. This chapter examines how queer Chinese Americans used performativity to "queer" the ethnic celebration in order to challenge heterosexuality and rigid gender norms in the ethnic nation. Borrowing from the scholar Judith Butler's idea of performativity, which can be defined as "a stylized repetition of acts" produced in "bodily gestures, movements, and styles of various kinds," I argue that queer ethnics used numerous performative acts on the parade route to "express" their queerness.2 My definition of queer is based upon the historian Nayan Shah's argument that the term queer questions "the formation of exclusionary norms of respectable middle-class" heterosexuality.3 Throughout the chapter, I use queer to refer to those who did not identify with middle-class heteronormativity and gender ideals. I only use the terms gay and lesbian when an individual or group chose to affiliate with those specific sexual identities. While influenced by American sexual ideology, queer ethnics also were inspired by sexual ideas in Asia and diaspora communities, thereby creating "hybrid amalgamations of practices and beliefs."4 These hybrid practices and beliefs encouraged them to invoke a "coming home" strategy, rather than "coming out," to challenge the heteronormative identity.5 The coming out strategy rarely solved the impediment facing queers, for the ethnic culture often subsumed sexuality under social relations.6 Instead of singling out non-normative sexual identity, queer ethnics attempted to incorporate their sexuality into other categories of identity such as ethnicity. Crises nevertheless arose from this attempt to receive acceptance from the ethnic community. This unfortunately created yet another form of exclusion within the queer community. As scholars Biddy Martin and "WE

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1 7 5

Chandra Talpade Mohanty argue, "home" invokes multiple and contradictory meanings. In particular, "Illusions of home are always undercut by the discovery of the hidden demographics of particular places, as demography also carries the weight of histories of struggle."7 In the effort to be accepted in their ethnic "home," queer ethnics chose to legitimize themselves by excluding transgenders and cross-dressers. This chapter thus demonstrates the multiplicity and heterogeneity of the queer Chinese American community that was divided by class, gender, national origin, immigration status, cross-dressing, and transgenderism, among other things. The difficulty, then, rested not only upon how to (re)define. family but also how to recognize and reconcile its heterogeneous component.

NORMALIZING

HETEROSEXUALITY

AND NATURALIZING

GENDER

As discussed in chapter 2, a number of Chinese American leaders in San Francisco used the 1953 Miss Chinatown beauty pageant to normalize heterosexuality and enforce "proper" gender norms, in order to counter mainstream perceptions of Chinese immigrants as practicing "deviant heterosexuality" and abnormal gender roles. The Page Law and the subsequent Chinese Exclusion Act resulted in the formation of a Chinese "bachelor society." The dual conceptions of male bachelors and female prostitutes stereotyped the ethnic community as engaging in sexual practices that were outside the norms of the conjugal relationship.8 As a result, Chinese immigrants were perceived as "contrary to respectable domesticity and an ominous threat to ideal visions of American morality and family life."9 Moreover, discrimination drove male immigrants away from major industries and compelled them to concentrate on "'feminized' forms of work." 10 This image of non-normative sexuality and abnormal gender roles rendered Chinese immigrants as unassimilable foreigners. In order to be included in the American national imagination and gain full equality, Chinese Americans had to reverse their image as threatening sexualized and gendered figures. Ethnic beauty pageant organizers used Confucian gender ideology—the obedience of a woman to her father, husband, and son—to reposition Chinese women and men within nuclear families. They further invoked the model minority image in the national ethnic beauty pageant to place the ethnic community in a respectable middle-class heterosexual domesticity and gender ideals. This feminized, middle-class, heterosexual identity became a prerequisite of ethnic citizenship. 1 7 6

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To ensure its ethnic citizens embraced this notion, Chinese language schools, community newspapers, and gossip networks became disciplinary mechanisms that anchored social relations and power structures in heteronomativity and naturalized gender norms. As Ming-Yuen Ma, the director of There Is No Name for This, a documentary film depicting the difficulties encountered by queer ethnics, explained, "In an Asian family, an individual is not just a person, but an integral part of the family. Every step he or she takes reflects on the family. This makes it very difficult for Asian gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgenders to come out of the closet, because they do not want to hurt family members."11 Racial discrimination further tied Asian Americans closer to their families.12 Once heteronormativity and its fixed gender norms were firmly lodged in intricate social relations, it became a dominant force that structured social life. Family units, the most intimate establishments, thus became the most oppressive institution. As Jack Chan, a sixty-year-old immigrant, reasoned, "Shame, that's a big factor. Shame brought upon the family. You have to remember the Chinese, the name [and] the face of the family is everything."13 This mechanism of control accumulated in female ethnic beauty queens, constructed as emblems of Chinese America, who normalized heterosexuality and affirmed two separate spheres in the ethnic community, and in doing so gained an opportunity to be integrated within the larger society. Heteronormativity and proper gender roles thus prefigured social relations within the ethnic nation and racial relations between Chinese and white America. With the rendering of the ethnic family in heteronormativity and rigid gender roles, Chinese Americans who practiced non-normative sexuality and gender ideals not only became invisible, but were also virtually excluded from the ethnic nation as they endangered its existence. The presence of queer men threatened to evoke the emasculating and queer images in the larger society, thereby upsetting patriarchal manhood and jeopardizing an opportunity to access hegemonic masculinity. Queer women presented an even bigger threat to the ethnic nation, because females served as the face of the ethnic community through the Miss Chinatown beauty pageant. Being an emblem of the ethnic nation thus compelled women to be heterosexually desirable yet sexually pure. They likewise bore a responsibility to reproduce the ethnic nation, thereby leaving no room for female ethnic queers.14 Meanwhile, both male and female queer ethnics were disenfranchised. With mainstream politics operating upon group identity politics, the denial of ethnic citizenship deprived queer Chinese Americans' resources allotted "WE

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by the dominant society.15 The power to control resources became a means for ethnic leaders to control sexuality and gender in the ethnic community. Coupled with the fear that queerness might jeopardize their American cultural citizenship, leaders openly denied the existence of queer ethnics. As late as 1990, for example, a Chinatown minister insisted, "There is no such thing as a gay Chinese," at a meeting where the San Francisco Board of Education assessed the necessity of providing counseling services to gay and lesbian youths in public schools.16 Accordingly, queers not only were erased from the ethnic nation, but also from the larger society. For forty years, Chinese American leaders successfully upheld this normative heterosexual ethnic citizenship: although the Miss Chinatown U.S.A. beauty pageant encountered criticism for its sexist and middle-class practices, it never confronted any opposition for its embedded heteronormativity. Moreover, the new ethnic nation proposed by young Asian American activists and feminists further excluded queer Chinese Americans. 17 Similar to other racial and ethnic movements at that time, the Asian American movement not only endorsed heteronormativity-—calling queerness the white man's "decadent disease"—but also equated ethnic pride with militant masculinity, which eliminated the possibility of exploring other kinds of masculinity and femininity. 18 As Hung Nung wrote, I am Asian, a male, and gay. For the past year since I've gotten involved with the Asian Movement, or at least tried, I've been scored, ridiculed, and rejected by many so-called sincere Asian Movement people, especially the males . . . the males somehow feel that I'm undermining their male egos. I strongly believe in honesty. I won't pretend that I'm not gay. I'm proud to be Asian. And the two are not mutually exclusive.19 Asian American male activists rooted their fears in the fluidity of gender identity because they thought it undermined their ultramasculine stance, a strategy to counter historical emasculation produced by the dominant society. Moreover, because male activists couched their masculinity in heterosexuality, they ostracized those who had a different sexual identity. Mao's homophobic approach likewise motivated leftists to denounce nonnormative sexuality. As Don Kao explained his experience with I Wor Kuen, a Chinese American youth organization, "Once they knew I was gay, they dropped me like a hot potato. . . . I was Chinese, and the Chinese Left would not accept m e . . . . I was a socialist, Marxist, and committed activist, but they would just not have me." 20 Queer Asian American women also faced the same problem and were condemned by their straight 178

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counterparts in the Third World Women's Alliance (TWWA). As Syl Savellano, a Filipina American from Oakland, explained, We thought we could express our sexual identity. Wrong. . . . We were isolated. We felt bad. We all picked up that we were not welcome, at least to not talk about our lesbianism. So we pulled out. We got the cold shaft . . . In the Asian and Third World movement, we could have been treated better. It felt like our own people [were] stabbing us. [She] said, "We are not going to have any of "that" here; we have too many bigger issues." So we boycotted [the TWWA]. We did not want to go. It was only for straight women. It was not the place to go.21 Kitty Tsui encountered a similar experience. Born in Hong Kong, Tsui immigrated to England at the age of five and later moved to the United States as a young adult. She attended San Francisco State College in 1970, when the Asian American movement was in full swing. Being an active writer, Tsui became involved in Asian American Theater. In 1975, she discovered and announced her lesbian identity. However, except for her grandmother who embraced her sexuality, Tsui encountered hostilities from other family members and comrades in the movement. 22 Because Asian American feminists prioritized their critique on gender inequality and heterosexual exploitation, they trivialized the discrimination facing lesbians. Moreover, with a goal to achieve equality with men (both Asian and non-Asian), these feminists upheld a belief in the universal experience of ethnic women, which unfortunately, normalized heterosexuality as a common sexual identity.23 As these various ethnic nations all grounded themselves in heteronormativity, queer ethnics thus internalized the idea that their sexual orientation was irreconcilable with other categories of identity, especially ethnicity in this context. As George Choy, an ethnic queer activist, revealed, "I lived in fear from my friends and family, because Chinese men are not supposed to be gay."24 The fear of being expelled from the ethnic nation drove many to disguise their sexuality. Some even committed suicide, such as Choy's friend. 25 Although not every queer encountered similar tragedies, most met with either disbelief or outright denouncement when disclosing their sexuality to family members. Lee, a Taiwanese American who wished to conceal his first name, recalled, "When I finally told them, they insisted that I was going through a phase," because homosexuality was not deemed to be legitimate. Rafael Chang, a former Living Well director for an HIV project, faced an "WE

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even more devastating situation: he was disowned by his family after divulging his sexuality.26 Richard Fung, a Hong Kong immigrant, encountered the same predicament. Speaking of his mother, he said, "I wish we were still talking, even if she was mean, it would be better than not talking to her at all." 27 To add insult to injury, some parents used guilt to manipulate their children. As Paul Yee, whose son is gay, reasoned, "The parents are expert at playing on the guilt of their children. You know, filial piety, this obligation to make the parent happy and not to shame the family." 28 Dan Chin's mother, for example, threatened suicide after he disclosed his sexual orientation. 29 Such behavior intensified the guilt of many queers, including gay activist Daniel Tsang, who continued to suffer enormously even after his parents had died. 30 The difficulty of challenging heteronormativity also spoke to the predicament of questioning a naturalized gender ideology, because heteronormativity was based on a belief in rigid gender roles mapped onto the body. Only the opposite body and gender could engage in any sexual practices. Those who transgressed from such a belief and practice were considered abnormal. One drag queen contest winner explained, "In society as a whole, there is unfortunately still a lot of discrimination going on out there. People don't take me seriously as a female illusionist/transgender person. They only think of us in a negative light, assuming we are all sex industry workers!"31 Because the subversion embodied by cross-dressing and transgender identity is so explosive, most people would rather dismiss it than treat it seriously.32 Since the majority of ethnic embodiments were heteronormative, many were compelled to choose between their sexuality and ethnicity. According to Alex, a Chinese American college student, "Even though I'm Asian and gay, I just never associated the two. It was always one or the other."33 Others, like Dino Duazo, a GAPA member, attempted to reconcile the differences. "One of the biggest obstacles is. . . . trying to find an identity as Asian or gay or both. . . . Being Asian, there [are] expectations you're supposed to live up to. Being gay contradicts those expectations."34 Some finally realized that heteronormativity was a social construct. As Alex pointed out, "I thought my culture would never accept my homosexuality. Maybe that's why I just sort of disregarded and rejected [my culture]. . . . Now I see I can integrate the two and I'm trying." 35 This realization motivated some to create their own space so that they could explore their ethnicity and sexuality at the same time. David Chan pointed out that participating in queer ethnic organizations helped him overcome 1 8 0

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his identity crisis. "I am proud of my Chinese Malaysian heritage. I've learned to accept its grandeur and shortcomings. In the beginning, it was overwhelmingly scary and fearful for me to deal with the incongruities and to try to conform myself to my subcultures—Chinese, Asian, gay. Over time, I made a conscious decision to choose to lovingly lead my own life and not live in irrational fears." 36 The desire to control one's life inspired many to challenge the heteronormative definition of ethnic citizenship.

CHALLENGING

A

HETERONORMATIVE

AND GENDERED

IDENTITY

Similar to their nonwhite peers, who made "sense of their existence through a complex deployment of experiences in and symbolic practices" from multiple areas, queer Chinese Americans also rooted their efforts in challenging heteronormativity in the hybrid traditions of the United States and Asia. 37 The emergence of queer identity in the United States can be traced back to the second half of the nineteenth century, when urbanization and industrialization enabled women and men to lead anonymous lives, thereby creating an opportunity for them to forge homoerotic bonds. Women were encouraged to form friendships while men were engaged in a fluid sexuality, a contrast to the recent polarized conception of homosexuality and heterosexuality. Meanwhile, gay subculture emerged in urban areas such as New York City, which the historian George Chauncey has referred to as the "Gay World." 38 World War II further provided an opportunity for queer Americans. In the 1940s, the burgeoning of gay bars in major metropolitan areas, coupled with the emergence of queer literature, offered new conditions for "reshaping the consciousness of homosexuals and lesbians."39 The oppression during the 1950s ironically solidified queer identity and propelled the emergence of the homophile movement, the creation of the Mattachine Society in 1951, and the Daughters of Bilitis in 1955, which provided social support for gays and lesbians. Moreover, the fight against police harassment and the battle for the legitimacy of gay bars provided a safer environment for queers. The increasing prevalence of nightlife culture supplied yet another form of resistance. Inspired by the civil rights movement, gay bar and homophile activists launched a queer liberation movement and championed coming out of the closet as a political strategy.40 San Francisco became significant in queer activism in the 1960s, with the convergence of queer subculture and the Beat generation. The history of "WE

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queer culture in San Francisco can be traced back to the late-nineteenthcentury sex entertainment industry. The scarcity of women in the area encouraged the flourishing of female impersonators and queer culture. The temperance movement and Prohibition shifted queer culture from vaudeville theaters to nightclubs and the streets. Queer performers and racialized (including Chinese American) entertainers became one of San Francisco's tourist attractions. North Beach, home of a handful of gay and lesbian bars, became a popular tourist destination, along with the bordering Chinatown district. The Forbidden City, a Chinese American nightclub famous for Western performances with an "Orientalist" touch, attracted both white tourists and queer consumers. Another Chinese American-owned nightclub, Shangri-La, featured Chinese American female impersonators.41 In the 1950s the Beat movement revitalized gay and lesbian nightlife in North Beach.42 Nightlife culture, along with the homophile movement, became the major force in mainstream gay liberation. While bar culture and the "coming out" strategy were known to contemporary queer Chinese, premodern queer Chinese history remains unclear.43 According to the historian Bret Hinsch, premodern Chinese society was quite tolerant of non-normative sexuality. Male homosexuality was prevalent, especially among the upper class, as long as sexual practices did not upset class hierarchy and social relations. It was only in the Qing dynasty (1644—1912) that society began to normalize heterosexuality due to the influence of Neo-Confucian "rhetoric regarding the family, imported Manchu concepts of sexuality, and a reaction against individualistic Ming permissiveness." Western science and religion was the final blow that severed the ties between modern China and queer traditions.44 Frank Dikotter, however, contends that the "strong conceptual link between sex and reproduction" contributed to homophobia in Chinese society.45 The repugnance of male homosexuality led to strict regulation through legal codes and Confucian values. In contrast, female homosexuality was not subjected to the same scrutiny, since, according to the public discourse, it did not threaten patriarchy. This was the case until the May Fourth Movement (1919), which "liberalized opposite-sex socialization, courtship, and marriage in the 1920s," and transposed "the center of many Chinese youths' affection from a same-sex to a cross-sex axis." Public discourse on homosexuality only disappeared once the communists established power.46 Hinsch suggests that contemporary Chinese gays turned "to New York and San Francisco for examples to emulate."47 However, Western queer 1 8 2

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ideas failed to solve the problems facing queer Chinese, as the factors that led to the intolerance of non-normative sexuality in Chinese societies were markedly different. Homophobia in China was the result of a threatened family structure, while homophobia in the West was attributed to religious and ethical reasons. The rise of Christian fundamentalists, Western psychiatry—which criminalized and medicalized non-normative sexuality—and a political structure embedded in identity politics compelled queer white America to adopt a coming out strategy to seek political rights.48 In contrast, queer Chinese in Asia did not experience religious and government oppression, with the exception of those living in the British colony of Hong Kong. The absence of public discourse on homophobia and dual conceptions of sexuality allowed for non-normative sexual behavior, but unfortunately resulted in the absence of queer subjectivity in the public sphere. But this absence did not lead to the absence of queer activism in contemporary China, Hong Kong, or Taiwan. On the contrary, the blooming of the indigenous queer movement was the by-product of resisting colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism, and capitalism, as well as being due to the influence of Western queer activism.49 Accordingly, queer activists developed different strategies to deal with specific circumstances. Homophobic legal and religious discourses motivated queer Hong Kongers to create a queer identity in the 1970s, and the impending handover to China in the 1990s further compelled them to develop an indigenous queer subject, tongzhi. Meaning "comrades," tongzhi stood for the fight against homophobia and the integration of sexual politics with cultural identity. This term was later adopted by queers in China and Taiwan.50 Although communist China suppressed and prosecuted homosexuality, the suppression and prosecution was seldom based upon legal sexual discourse, but hooliganism (liumang) and medical discourse, which contributed to the absence of queer subjectivity. The shortage of consumer culture likewise delayed the emergence of gay and lesbian culture until the implementation of open market policy in the 1990s.51 The nonexistence of a queer discourse in the public sphere, however, did not mean a suppression of non-normative sexuality in private life. On the contrary, same-sex relations were under less scrutiny than premarital heterosexual relationships. Nevertheless, it was globalization and cosmopolitanism that propelled the emergence of China's queer public space in the late 1990s.52 Meanwhile, following the lifting of martial law in 1987, queer Taiwanese embraced a variety of strategies, ranging from political confrontation to "WE

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cultural and commercial subversion. The flourishing and diverse forms of resistance were an effect of strong indigenous political subjects, insurgents of neocolonial rule of Nationalist government, resistance of American imperialism, and the impact of feminism. Queer activists in Taiwan not only challenged institutional heteronormativity, but also invited individuals to explore their own homoeroticism.53 Although queer subjectivity was quite prominent in the public space, most queers had difficulty coming out to their families and coworkers. "Coming out is . . . usually an anonymous, collective process, one utilizing pseudonyms and masks—a pure public gesture—rather than an individual process."54 The strategy of collective coming out was used by APS in the 1994 Chinese New Year celebration. Indeed, queer Asian Americans maintained a close relationship with their counterparts in Asia. Queer Asians had already participated in queer ethnic groups in the 1970s. In a letter dated September 29, 1977, Tamara Ching proudly wrote that the Gay Asian Support Group (a San Franciscobased gay and lesbian organization) included members from Hong Kong, Japan, Thailand, and Malaysia. 55 Javid Syed, an Indian immigrant, explained the close connection. "There is a constant flow of ideas and people between the diaspora and the motherland. The support has taken the form of letter-writing campaigns, multi-city demonstrations, individual and grassroots fundraising, educational trainings, awards ceremonies, as well as cultural projects—all with an eye to strengthening queer A & P I networks in the U.S. and abroad." 56 Gay and lesbian ethnic publications publicized queer activities in Asia, in which many actively participated. In 1994, for example, numerous Asian American lesbians attended the Asian Lesbian Network conference in Taiwan. 57 In 1998 five hundred Asians and Asian Americans marched in San Francisco's Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Pride parade. In the same month, the first U.S. Chinese Tongzhi Conference took place in San Francisco, drawing participants from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and other diasporas to discuss issues specifically encountered by queer Chinese. 58 In a 2003 interview, M . J . Talbot, a GAPA founder, also credited the increasing acceptance of queer Asian Americans to activism in Asia: It's not just our work, it's the work of gay Asians and our straight friends from elsewhere, friends from Taiwan. That was pretty close to the time when that movie came out, The Wedding Banquet. . . . Things like that really help, because I understand from my friends in Taiwan . . . there were long lines in Taiwan to see the film. I certainly have seen it and enjoy 184

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it. . . . Films like that are very helpful because that also brings the whole issue out to the community, and when people see it and hear about it and think about it, they become less fearful and they can understand different issues better.59 The frequent contacts between queer Asian Americans and their Asian counterparts confirmed a flourishing queer Asian American activism. Queer Asian Americans entered mainstream gay and lesbian movements in 1979. A group of them participated in the First National Third World Lesbian and Gay Conference at Howard University in Washington, D.C., and decided to form the "Lesbian and Gay Asian Collective," inaugurating the queer Asian American movement. Their main goal was to battle heteronormativity within various ethnic communities and mainstream society, as well as racism in mainstream gay organizations, which stereotyped men either as "subservient houseboys" or "karate masters" and their female counterparts as "China dolls" or "dragon ladies."60 At that conference, queer Asian Americans marched from Howard University, through Chinatown, and on to a mall where Michiyo Cornell addressed a dilemma particular to queer immigrants: a fear of deportation that compelled many to hide their sexuality.61 Anticommunist hysteria converged with homophobia at the height of the Cold War. As a result, the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 began to deny entry to gay and lesbian immigrants. This was not the first time that immigration laws used sexuality as a criterion to control the national border. Following the passage of the Page Law in 1875, which barred the entry of Asian prostitutes to the United States, sexuality and sexual acts had been one of the grounds used to determine exclusion or inclusion to the country:62 Accordingly, Chinese Americans fought hard to defend the reputation of their women so that they could win admission.63 Nevertheless, they never attempted to stand up for their queer counterparts, nor did mainstream queer groups pay attention to this issue. Racism and sexism motivated queer Asian Americans to form separate groups. Mainstream queer organizations equated queerness with middleclass whiteness, thus silencing nonwhite and working-class queers. Female queers likewise encountered discrimination from their male counterparts. According to Daniel Bao of the API Wellness Center, queer organizations in the 1970s usually consisted of women and men from diverse racial and ethnic groups. However, these groups, plagued by racism and sexism, "went defunct. They were sexist and all the women left, then the non-Asians took "WE

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over."64 Nor did nonwhite lesbians find support from their white counterparts. Doreena Wong, a second-generation Chinese American who grew up in Millbrae, California, went to several consciousness-raising groups in San Francisco, yet she felt isolated as the only nonwhite lesbian in these groups. Canyon Sam, a second-generation Chinese American from San Francisco, encountered the same problem.65 As such, queer Asian American organizations began to arise in the late 1970s and 1980s. Many were based in the San Francisco Bay Area, including the Gay Asian Support Group, the Gay Asian Information Network (GAIN), the Asian American Feminists, the Gay Asian Association at Berkeley, the Asian American Alliance Active, the Association of Lesbian/Gay Asians, Pacific Friends, and Trikone (queer South Asian Americans). These organizations provided social spaces for queers to interact with each other. With the spread of the AIDS epidemic, the Living Well Project—which later became the GAPA Community HIV Project—was established in 1987 to raise awareness of the disease.66 Similar organizations followed to provide support for Asian American AIDS patients and their family members. The AIDS epidemic also accelerated the surge in queer ethnic organizations, since many felt the need to seek outside support. Moreover, because of immigration and migration, the queer population swelled significantly in San Francisco during this period, contributing to the urgency of forming new organizations, such as GAPA and APS, to accommodate recent arrivals. Founded in July of 1987, GAPA created a community for Asian and Pacific Islander American gays and bisexuals. Twelve members from the Berkeley Asian Men's Rap Group at the Pacific Center decided to create a support group for "going beyond rap and actually doing something about it, doing things in the community, because there was no community."67 To ensure that Asian Americans had ultimate control of the space, GAPA closed membership to non-Asians.68 This decision encountered criticism from white gays and generated debate in the Bay Area Reporter.® As it was, power was distributed unequally within GAPA; the group was often controlled by American-born or I.J generation Asians.70 More than just a social group, GAPA provided cultural and political support for its members. In addition to building a chorus and theater division for performers, its newsletter, the Lavender Godzilla, allowed members to discuss issues such as sexuality, racism, identity politics, and interracial dating. GAPA also promoted interethnic cultural understanding and honored ethnic heritage by hosting activities such as Lunar New Year banquets. Though GAPA insisted on maintaining an autonomous space for its mem186

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bers, it did not advocate a total withdrawal from mainstream queer movements. Instead, it actively participated in mainstream activities including the San Francisco Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Pride Parade.71 GAPA's challenge of heteronormativity culminated in the sponsorship of the annual Runway pageant. The pageant elected a Mr. GAPA and Miss GAPA (a drag queen), based on three judging criteria: eveningwear, an interview, and fantasy. Contestants freely explored their gender and sexuality through performance. The title winners became the representatives of the organization, and were required to support and advocate its purpose. The staging of Mr. and Miss GAPA pageants countered the emasculated portrayals of ethnic men in the larger society and the heteronormativity endorsed by the ethnic community. As M.J. Talbot, a founding member, explained, "There's Mr. GAPA from one end, and there's Miss GAPA [on the other, because] people are not one way. People identify with being very masculine, or people identify with being more feminine. That's the diversity in our community and we celebrate both of them."72 The Runway, a special program for the pageant, further explained the meaning of the contest: Mr. GAPA was to "highlight the special qualities of the Asian Pacific male," while Miss GAPA was to "challenge gender conformity."73 This space allowed contestants to explore and perform different types of masculinity or femininity. Miss GAPA contestants completely subverted heteronormativity by performing femininity through cross-dressing; this challenged the fundamental idea that anchored gender and sexuality in the body. Formed around the same time as GAPA, the Asian Pacific Sisters (APS; it later changed its name to the Asian Pacifica Sisters) strove to provide a safe space for queer Asian American women. Responding to an advertisement in Phoenix Rising, a publication produced by the Asian Lesbian and Gay Alliance (ALGA) and later continued by APS after the folding of ALGA, ten women decided to establish APS to engage in cultural, social, educational, and political activities in 1988. In addition to organizing sports and social events for members, APS also sought visibility in mainstream queer activities, such as the Gay Pride Parade.74 From the beginning, however, APS was plagued by organizational problems due to the differing opinions of its members regarding its structure and direction, which eventually contributed to its demise.75 APS adopted a different approach to queer activism than GAPA, reflecting the different methods Used by Asian American gay and lesbian organizations. Gay groups tended to focus more on combating racism in "WE

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mainstream gay communities, while lesbian groups made efforts to seek acceptance from the ethnic community. M . J . Talbot explained GAPA's strategy, "We've done pretty well in confronting racism in the gay community. We are now accepted in the gay community. We're in the Gay Pride Parade. We're involved with working with other gay organizations, so we're doing very well there. But, we really haven't dealt with the other one [the ethnic community], which is probably harder."76 Instead of following GAPA's lead and accentuating sexuality, APS attempted to reconcile sexuality with ethnicity. According to Pauline Guillermo, an interim board member: We approach things differendy than the boys . . . We're more culturally focused. The Asian women in general are very close to our parents, very tight into our culture, so when we try to be visible within our culture we do it more on a personal one-to-one basis, starting with our parents and our grandparents; we don't need to be visible in the larger gay community per se. Our importance and focus is that it is always within the Asian American general population that we want to make sure that we have visibility there. Only with ties to the culture can we move forward into the mainstream.77 The emphasis of queer Asian American women on intertwined connections of sexuality and ethnicity also compelled them to question the mainstream idea of coming out. 78 Focusing more on a personal and informal level, APS followed fewer mainstream confrontational strategies to combat the heteronormative system. It attempted to incorporate queer sexuality into ethnic social relations, an alternate strategy used by their Asian counterparts. In 1994 GAPA also adopted this strategy to queer the ethnic nation, by participating in its most significant celebration, the Chinese New Year Festival.

"COMING

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Gay activist M . J . Talbot decided to challenge heteronormative ethnic citizenship in 1993. As a post-1965 immigrant, Talbot maintained his transnational identity. He was born in Hong Kong to a Euro-Chinese father and a Chinese mother. He immigrated to the United States in 1966 at the age of sixteen. He first settled in Phoenix, Arizona, for a year and a half, and then moved to San Francisco. Talbot was very active in Bay Area gay circles. He

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helped to establish Pacific Friends to provide a social space for Asian American gays, and later was involved in the Asian Pacific AIDS Coalition. In 1988 Talbot assisted in founding GAPA. Meanwhile, he continued to foster his transnational ties to Asia by working for Taiwan's China Airlines.79 Talbot proposed to the GAPA board to participate in the Chinese New Year parade. With their approval, he then wrote to the parade committee and argued that since the parade had never had a gay Asian American group, the presence of GAPA would be monumental for the ethnic community. Talbot expected to encounter difficulties in the application process. But, to his surprise, the parade committee presented no problems. Parade director Kenny Lee commented, "I was glad to see more diversity. People tend to look at Chinatown as being less open to change, but this is a community parade and they are part of the community."80 Because GAPA's intention was to challenge the notion of heteronormative ethnic citizenship and to queer the ethnic celebration, participants worried about the response of parade spectators. How would they view the presence of queer Chinese Americans? Would they see it as a challenge to heteronormativity or simply another aspect of the ethnic community? Would the viewers greet them with violence? Some people, like Z Wong, founder of Older Asian Sisters in Solidarity, were concerned about violence. "The last time I was at the parade was 1969," Wong recalled. "When they had to call in the tactical squad for riot control. I was anxious about cherry bombs and barrel bombs being thrown." 81 Eric Herbas echoed similar concerns, wondering, "Were we going to be lynched, were they going to throw bottles or eggs?"82 To provide a safe space for queer marchers, GAPA hired four groups of security guards to walk alongside them. Some Asian Law Caucus students from U C Berkeley volunteered to mingle with the spectators to serve as witnesses in the event of harassment or violence. In general, the marchers experienced no major problems and were only subjected to one homophobic remark during the three-hour parade.83 During the Chinese New Year parade, GAPA shouted the slogan, "We are one family!" to challenge the conception of ethnic citizens as heterosexual.84 According to Dennis Lee, who designed the white sweatshirts with the "We are one family" slogan for parade marchers, "Coming out to your family is traumatic in a lot of ways and the family is important to a lot of Chinese American men . . . our participation means that we can be gay and be of your family."85 The slogan enabled queers to claim their citizenship in the ethnic community and demanded their recognition. As Talbot reasoned,

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We were always in the community, but we [never] have had a face. . . . The [parade] board could say, "It's no problem inviting the gay marching band because they're foreigners, because it doesn't happen here." But the fact that we were there, our faces were there . . . no longer could the Asian community say, "Oh, they don't exist. We don't have it." We do. We're your sons. We're your daughters. We're your uncles and your aunts.86 The "family" float also sent out an explosive message—it challenged the fundamental idea of the heterosexual nuclear family. On the float, Mr. GAPA wore a suit while Miss GAPA wore a dress. Both stood under a pagoda that displayed the word family on a plaque, which seemed to reaffirm the notion of heterosexual family. But the performance was more of a parody, as the presence of Miss GAPA, a drag queen, was not considered to be a "real" woman under the naturalized gender norm, and thereby achieved the effect of mocking the heterosexual union. Kek Tee Lim, a GAPA member and float designer, stated that the float and slogan questioned the heteronormative assumption of family. "My thinking is that we are one family . . . a gay family, another kind of family." To Lim, to participate in the Chinese New Year parade was to show that "we have a community."87 Lim's remark not only challenged the heteronormative definition of family in both mainstream society and the ethnic community, but also celebrated the queer community. Additionally, Lee thought the march affirmed their queerness and ethnicity. "It felt very empowering to look at Chinese families and Chinese faces, and have them see me marching behind the gay banner. That was a coming home and coming out all together at once [emphasis mine]."88 As the sociologist Chou Wah-Shan put it, "Huijia [coming home] means not only going back home, but, more fundamentally, searching the ultimate place to which one belongs."89 Through inserting queerness into social relations, queer Asian Americans aptly incorporated queerness into the ethnic nation and simultaneously crafted a space of their own.90 Indeed, for many queer participants, the march signified being part of the ethnic community. To Ann Mei Chang, an APS organizer, the event signaled that she could go back to her ethnic culture: "I never realized how much I missed the traditional Chinese activities I grew up with. As a lesbian, I thought I had to give that up—until now. It's a total high."91 Accordingly, marching on the parade route empowered many participants. As GAPA member Dennis Lee remembered, "What made the night so meaningful for me was not necessarily the warm acceptance of the audience 190

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Figure ii. Asian Pacific Sisters in the 1994 Chinese New Year parade. Courtesy of Gay Asian Pacific Alliance.

(although it did make a big difference); it was the claiming of personal power, of being open, of being free, of being who I am. The experience was more intense because those Chinese families lining the parade could have been my family. How often can we be totally open and honest with our families?" 92 To Lee, this meant more than personal empowerment. He also wanted to use the event to empower other queer ethnics and to educate the younger generation about different forms of sexuality. "What's really motivating for me is that for the younger people in the audience who might be questioning, it allows them to see alternatives, to feel better about themselves. It's important to communicate these things." 93 Indeed, the event enabled the GAPA to recruit new members from U C Berkeley.94 While G A P A emphasized queering the kinship network, APS adopted the strategy of a "collective coming out" to the ethnic community. Some members had been very active in mainstream queer activism, but feared that if they revealed their sexual identity to their loved ones they might be ostracized. Brian Chew, a G A P A member, explained, "We had no idea of how people would respond . . . even though [queer Chinese Americans] were 'out' in other areas, they were not going to be out' in Chinatown." 95 Those who decided to attend the parade also feared negative consequences. As Lisa

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Chun, an APS member, put it, "I was anxious about [the parade] all day. I've been out before, but always to sympathetic audiences. At work, some of my Chinese clients assume I'm straight, and I have heard incredibly homophobic, hostile remarks."96 Even so, more than one hundred queer Asian Americans bravely came out to march on the parade route. The strategy of allowing members to wear masks and walking under the banner "Asian Pacific Lesbians and Bisexual Women" in English and "Asian Women SameSex Love" in Chinese openly subverted the heteronormative ethnic citizenship without jeopardizing personal relations with family members. In other words, this strategy allowed people like Wu Kuang to affirm her queerness without upsetting her other identities, such as being a Chinese American daughter.97 To some queer Asian Americans, their participation in the parade refuted the perception that Chinese Americans were more homophobic than other communities. The same year, after Massachusetts^ highest court ruled that a queer group should be included in Boston's St. Patrick's Day parade, organizers "chose to cancel the event" rather than include the group. As Trinity Ordana, a leader in San Francisco's queer community, explained, "It's challenging the myth that Asian people are more homophobic than anybody else. The fact that we could participate in this without protest is a sign that Asian American young people are prepared to say who they are."98 One parade spectator indeed expressed his acceptance to queer ethnics on a television camera.99 But Herbas was less optimistic. He felt that the ethnic parade's spectators were not as enthusiastic as those at the Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Pride Parade. "This is still always a challenge for us because at certain points while you're marching up the street, people are completely silent, you get absolutely nothing," he said. "They respect us, but they don't fully support us." 100 Nevertheless, the strategy to queer the ethnic nation won queer Chinese Americans visibility and recognition in the 1996 Chinese New Year parade. APS was rewarded with a special cultural unit recognition award, while GAPA received a trophy for the second best community float built by a professional. 101 Winning a prize in the above categories indicates that APS and GAPA successfully incorporated queerness into the ethnic nation. Carrying a fifteen-foot golden phoenix—which symbolizes women in Chinese culture—in the parade, APS legitimized its footing in the ethnic nation. Using the phoenix to represent queer women not only subverted the rigid gender norms embodied by ethnic beauty queens, but also queered "Chinese" culture.

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Figure 12. The Gay Asian Pacific Alliance's float, entitled "Ten Chinese scholars in the orchid pavilion," which won the second best community float built by professionals in the 1996 Chinese New Year parade. Courtesy of the Gay Asian Pacific Alliance.

That same year, GAPA chose to challenge the most sacred form of Chinese culture: education. Education was an important component in the model minority narrative. GAPA's float, entitled "Ten Chinese scholars in the Orchid Pavilion," featured fourth-century Chinese scholars wearing makeup and long gowns. 102 With the stereotypical assumption that ethnic culture prioritized education, queering its emblematic form allowed GAPA to rewrite the definition of ethnicity. These scholars, carrying either a decorated paper parasol or fan, not only blurred the gender line but also evoked homointimacy or even homoeroticism. Their attire, gestures, and makeup effectively subverted the rigid middle-class heterosexual gender norm. Performing manhood and sexuality through femininity and homoeroticism destabilized the Chineseness that leaders subscribed to by invoking an era that disassociated Chinese manhood from masculinity and heterosexuality. During the Six Dynasties (266—589), upper-class Chinese men competed with each other for good looks and often applied cosmetics to enhance their

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appearances. They equated feminine characteristics with manliness and openly endorsed homosexuality.103 Moreover, male actors painted their faces for Chinese opera, a popular form of entertainment among immigrants. By referring to Chinese traditions that valued queerness, GAPA effectively challenged the heteronormative model minority image. Although the presentation won an award for GAPA, it created tensions within the queer community. After receiving a trophy from Mayor Willie Brown at a banquet hosted by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce on May 17, 1996, the GAPA parade cochair, Jeff Sead, expressed his excitement. "People really liked our presentation. The announcer said very glowing things. He said we are proud to have GAPA with us. His script was like we were just part of the family." 104 In order to be part of the ethnic family, however, GAPA would eventually have to sacrifice the presence of a drag queen in the parade (to be discussed shortly). Meanwhile, GAPA continued to queer other aspects of the ethnic culture. For example, in 1998 eight members of GAPA dressed up as the Eight Immortals, mythical figures who have been represented in the ethnic parade since the 1970s. By performing figures that were particularly popular with immigrant Chinese, GAPA thus questioned the heteronormative assumption. Using Mr. and Miss GAPA to perform the Jade Emperor and Jade Empress, the highest deities in popular Daoism, severed the universalized assumption of biological woman with femininity, as the Jade Empress was played by a drag queen. 105 Referring to a tradition that men portrayed women on the stage in the past not only normalized queer performances, but also subverted rigid gender norms. The major theme of the float paid tribute to the Jade Emperor's birthday, symbolizing the celebration of GAPA's tenth anniversary. In assuming the roles of the Jade Emperor and Jade Empress, the vernacular royalty as opposed to the imperial royalty, Mr. and Miss GAPA thus created an alternative space that celebrated queerness. This float won a prize for GAPA, representing the success of queering the ethnic culture. Queering mundane activities and normalizing non-normative sexuality and gender ideals were also part of GAPA's efforts. In 2000 GAPA float staged Mr. and Miss GAPA playing mah-jongg with two runner-ups, allowing GAPA to integrate queerness into everyday activities. 106 Because playing mah-jongg is an activity that cements social relationships, it allowed drag queens to anchor queerness into the ethnic kinship network. By queering quotidian activities, queerness became a norm, not an abnormality, in everyday lives. 194

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QUEER

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GAPA's march in the Chinese New Year parade not only contested heteronormativity, but also subverted the middle-class gender norm embodied by the female Miss Chinatown U.S.A. beauty queen. The presence of Miss GAPA contested the notion of a respectable heterosexual nuclear family that ethnic leaders strongly upheld. By performing femininity in a gay body, Miss GAPA posed a threat to the naturalized gender represented by the ethnic beauty queen. Clitoria Fabrica, the Miss GAPA Girl Next Door, recalled the moment when she took a photo with Miss Chinatown U.S.A.: "Initially, she didn't hesitate, and then she asked, 'What group are you with?' We started saying 'Gay Asian Pacific'—and she interrupted, okay, okay so she could get it over with. I don't know if she knew I was in drag or thought I was a lesbian!"107 The beauty queen's uneasiness could be attributed to the impossibility of situating drag queens into a singular subjectivity. The presence of the drag queen also undermined the authority of the beauty queen, an emblem of heteronormativity. As Butler put it, "In imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself—as well as its contingency."108 The fluidity of gender and sexual identities performed by drag queens thus subverted heterosexual ethnic citizenship. Yet drag queens subverted more than naturalized gender norms. Wearing cheongsams enabled drag queens to embody "the baggage of history and culture" that was intended to be represented by Miss Chinatown U.S.A. 109 While the beauty pageant committee used cheongsams to Orientalize and domesticate ethnic women, a drag performer in the same dress questioned the racialization and hegemonic idea of "respectable domesticity" in the dominant society, as well as the authority of ethnic leaders to selfpolice the ethnic community in order to maintain a model minority image. Problems, however, emerged within GAPA, as certain members attempted to regulate and control its image. Because GAPA was a nonprofit organization, it depended upon donors' contributions for most óf its activities. As a result, it bestowed upon donors the power to determine who could belong to the queer space. In 1996 a major donor for the Chinese New Year parade stipulated that no drag queens were to be allowed on the sponsored float.110 As Talbot explained, "The sponsor who was putting up the money for the float felt that it was not positive to show one of our members in drag. The sponsor is a gay Asian man, a GAPA member who is still 'in the closet.' He is a business owner and . . . very private.... He did not want to be acknowledged as the sponsor.... It was his wish that we highlight the cultural aspect and that's "WE

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why the float was at a Chinese setting [emphasis mine]."111 Apparently, this donor and certain queer Asian Americans excluded non-normative gender and sexual identity from the definition of the ethnic nation.112 In other words, in order to "come home" to the ethnic community, some members thought the organization should discipline themselves and present a positive image. GAPA's exclusion of drag queens thus rendered them invisible and reproduced the dominant discourse of othering.113 No wonder the 1995 Miss GAPA Max Lau accused the GAPA parade committee of becoming "conservative" in exchange for being accepted into the "mainstream."114 Lau was not alone. Many members also questioned this othering practice. Lavender Godzilla, GAPA's main publication, devoted one issue to discussing the controversy. Given that Mr. and Miss GAPA were representatives of the organization, the exclusion prompted member Ramon M. Kadi to ask, "When are [Mr. and Miss GAPA] supposed to be our ambassadors? If the rumor is true, that such a discriminating provision was attached to a donation, should we even receive such funding in the future? Where does GAPA stand with regards to drag queens?"115 In contrast, Alex Louie, a member of the GAPA Chinese New Year parade committee, argued that everyone could march in the parade, but only those who fit into the theme were allowed to ride on the float. He then asked members to disregard "markedly different, sometimes even contradictory, values and ideology." In other words, members should mute any differences within the organization. However, Alan S. Quismorio disagreed. Instead of suppressing dissidents, he contended that members should recognize the differences among them.116 This controversy indicates a conflict within the queer space that unfortunately replicated inequality in the dominant society. Fortunately, GAPA eventually resolved the tension within the group and allowed Mr. and Miss GAPA to go back to the parade route the following year. Miss GAPA, however, would soon encounter another sanction. This time, it was the Chinese New Year parade committee who set the terms. According to a letter dated January 5, 1998, the Chinese New Year parade office stipulated that Mr. and Miss GAPA "may not enter a convertible and that the title holders may not wear sashes. In this parade, we only acknowledge the winners of the Miss Chinatown U.S.A. pageant. I suggest that Mr. and Miss GAPA ride on your float, and if you think that their crowns are necessary, they may be dressed in costume as the emperor and empress."117 To avoid people mistaking Miss GAPA for Miss Chinatown U.S.A., an emblem of essentialized Chinese America, Miss GAPA was only allowed to appear if wearing a theatrical disguise. With the intention to 196

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normalize Chinese Americans through the maintenance of rigid gender norms and heterosexuality, an ethnic beauty queen's gender and sexuality became indisputable. A male body that performed femininity and nonnormative sexuality was seen as a threat that endangered not only the continuity of the ethnic nation, but also its image, for she might invoke the historical queer and emasculating portrayals. To dress the drag queen in a costume clearly reveals a desire to mock and caricature the non-normative gender and sexuality and to undermine her authority and legitimacy. Although the drag queen was seen as illegitimate, her presence clearly challenged the heterosexual representative of the ethnic nation. Even without a sash and tiara, Miss GAPA's donning of a cheongsam, the official dress of the Miss Chinatown U.S.A. beauty pageant, enabled her to legitimize her femininity and achieve "parodie performances of conventional gender constructions."118 In 2000 the Sing Tao Daily, a popular Chineselanguage newspaper, juxtaposed the photos of the Miss Chinatown U.S.A. float with GAPA's float. The Miss Chinatown beauty queen and princesses wore cheongsams and smiled at the audience, while Miss GAPA and a runner-up, both wearing similar dresses, sat at a mah-jongg table and waved to spectators.119 In the photograph, Miss Chinatown—the pivotal emblem of the ethnic nation—stood detached and alienated on top of a float decorated with lotus flowers, the symbol of sacredness. In contrast, Miss GAPA appeared as if in a domestic scene, cementing intimacy with the ethnic community by playing mah-jongg with her fellow float members. Here, Miss GAPA, a drag queen, no longer represented deviance or posted threats to the ethnic nation. Instead, her embodiment of queer domesticity became an intricate part of the ethnic nation. It is tempting to end the story here and celebrate the success of subversion. Nevertheless, because the subversion deployed by queer Asian Americans in part relied upon visibility on the parade route and television broadcasts, this visibility rested on the consumer market. It was up to the consumer market to determine the scope of subversion.

THE CONSUMER

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Indeed, it was the consumer market that limited the scope of subversion in the 1994 parade. Since the celebration not only attracted thousands of street spectators, but also hundreds of thousands of television viewers nationwide, the strategy of queering the ethnic nation was to gain visibility for queer Chinese Americans. APS and GAPA were confident that the significance of "WE

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the event would certainly win them exposure in the media. As it happened, the mainstream and ethnic media—including KRON (channel 4), KPIX (channel 5), KGO-TV (channel 7), CNN, the San Francisco Examiner, the Oakland Tribute, Asian Week, and the Sing Tao Daily—not only reported the event, but also claimed it to be a major breakthrough for the ethnic community. Channel 5 even interrupted its regular program to insert special coverage. Other television stations also interviewed GAPA and APS and showcased their preparation for the parade.120 Many queer marchers were exhilarated. Yet, in spite of all this, many television audiences never witnessed their participation that year. KTVU and KTSF, which held exclusive rights to the Chinese New Year parade broadcast, cut out GAPA's presence with a commercial break. "We cant help where the commercials fall," said Kevin O'Brien, vice president and general manager of KTVU. "Newsworthiness is a matter of opinion. We don't highlight any political stands."121 Although KTVU expressed no desire to "highlight any political stands," the omission nevertheless reflected a cultural stance—it clearly upheld the heterosexual image of the ethnic community. Moreover, both stations featured the San Francisco Lesbian and Gay Marching Band. This omission angered many marchers. Z Wong described some of the emotions regarding the telecast: "I was very annoyed with Channel 2 for cutting us out. They knew about it, they showed the SF L & G Marching Band, which is mostly white, and they cut us o u t . . . . They really dropped the ball on that." 122 The omission dampened the high expectations of many queer Asian Americans. Talbot recalled the incident: When that happened, when a lot of people were looking forward to seeing us on TV, those members who could not go to the parade because they were afraid to show their face, or for whatever reason, or people who did not live in the Bay Area, they had heard about it, that we were invited, they were all turning on to the TV just to see us. And what happened was if you saw the film, you saw us coming up next and it cut away to the commercial. Yeah, a lot of people were very upset... I know there were members who wrote to the TV station and complained and said, "Why did you do that, it's the first time this group was gonna be in the parade, and you should have highlighted it and you know, why are you censoring, are you homophobic, all that stuff. Talbot went on to attribute the omission to the consumer market, noting that "The whole show is geared towards a T V audience. They have sponsors, [so] they cut away to sponsors at every thirteen or fifteen minutes." 123 198

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Many queer ethnics, however, understood the importance of turning the consumer market to their own benefits. Keng H. Ho, for example, wrote in a letter to Sentinel, 1 recognized the value and the importance of corporate sponsorship. I am writing in because I would like the respective television stations Channel 2 and Channel 26, and the corporate sponsors, to know that we who are Asians/Gays/lesbians are watching, we notice what is happening and what is not. We are here to make sure this "coincidence" does not repeat itself. We are your audience and your consumers as well. We demand to be acknowledged and we will not be ignored any more. He further pointed out that queer Asian Americans penetrated every social class. "We are your sales associates, your hair stylists, your mail delivery people, your accountants, your architects, your dentists . . . and we are your family."124 By showing how populous queer ethnics were, Ho used the consumption power of the group to demand attention from corporations and television stations. The demand to be part of the consumer market secured reportage of the queer group the following year. KTVU's Chinese New Year parade host, Steve McPartlin, enthusiastically proclaimed, "I am proud to have them there!"125 Another year, KTVU host Ben Fong-Torres similarly pronounced, "They are active members of the community helping so many people in so many ways. [They] join us in the Chinese New Year parade to bring our awareness of their roles in San Francisco and the Bay Area."126 Although these comments failed to specify queer Chinese Americans' contributions or even mention their sexuality, the announcement of their presence, nevertheless, destabilized the heteronormativity upheld by ethnic leaders. The rising awareness of queerness could also be heard in the ethniclanguage Chinese New Year broadcast. In 1994 a host commented the first time on the increase in homosexual films and concluded that the surge indicated a rise in homosexuality.127 Although her assessment was wrong, as queer sexuality was probably just as prevalent as before, her comments on non-normative sexuality indicated the vitality of queer activism: queerness became increasing visible in the public discourse.

CONCLUSION

The participation of queer Chinese Americans in the Chinese New Year parade complicated ethnic identity politics and, in particular, questioned "WE

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heteronormative and gendered ethnic citizenship. To many queer ethnics, their queerness was not only inextricable from "the multiplicity of differences," such as gender, class, ethnicity, and national origin, but also embedded in social and race relations.128 Queer ethnics thus had to develop a strategy that enabled them to negotiate multiple issues, from racism in the dominant society and homophobia in the ethnic community and global consumer market to the emerging queer activism in Chinese societies and other diasporas. Nevertheless, an effort to be incorporated into the ethnic community unfortunately created tensions and conflicts within the queer space, which was articulated in the exclusion of Miss GAPA. However, the decision to queer the ethnic nation, without confronting gender and sexual politics, provided an opportunity for queer ethnics to "come home." T h e coming home strategy, rather than coming out, permitted them to incorporate queerness into the ethnic nation, and, in particular, to upset the definition of the heterosexual family and of the heteronormative gendered Chinese American citizenship. The inclusion of queer ethnics in the Chinese New Year parade speaks to a growing acceptance of non-normative sexuality. Several ethnic organizations began to pay more attention to queer issues. In 1996 the Organization of Chinese Americans even included a session on homosexuality at its national convention. In 1997 the National Asian Pacific American Bar Association equated legal discrimination of interracial marriages with that of same-sex marriages. 129 Other groups followed suit, including the Japanese American Citizen's League, and validated same-sex domestic partnership. 130 Moreover, when Danny Wan, a council member in Oakland, revealed his sexuality in 2000, many Chinese Americans indicated that they cared little about his sexual orientation. 131 In addition, numerous ethnic politicians such as San Francisco Supervisors Leland Yee and Mabel Teng openly supported GAPA. 1 3 2 A popular Chinese-language community newspaper also ran several special columns on queer Chinese Americans in 2002. 133 Although queer Chinese Americans could no longer be rendered invisible in the public space, their battle was far from over. As Talbot commented, "I'm a little disappointed that G A P A hasn't continued to do more work. . . . Yes, being in the Chinese New Year parade is good, but how about being in other things. There are other venues that you could get involved with. . . . You [cannot just say] 'Oh well, we've done the Chinese New Year parade and that's enough.' You cannot rest on your laurels. You

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have to continue to do good work." 134 Indeed, participating in the Chinese New Year Festival enabled queer Chinese Americans to queer the ethnic culture, but that strategy has yet to translate into political power or transform power structures in the ethnic community. In order to fully incorporate queerness into the ethnic nation, as Talbot put it, queer Chinese Americans have to continue combating heteronormativiy in other areas.

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EPILOGUE

Post—Cold War Celebrations

i A R R I V E D I N S A N F R A N C I S C O ' S C H I N A T O W N on February 23, 2002. This was the first Chinese New Year Festival after September 11, just six months after the terrorist attack. In Chinatown, however, one could hardly feel the political tension; festivities seemed to replace the fears and uncertainties. The police had closed off four blocks along Grant Avenue and two blocks on Jackson and Pacific streets for the Chinatown Community Fair. The outdoor stage at Jackson Street and Grant Avenue featured kung fu, Chinese acrobatics, ethnic dances, and, in some years, Chinese opera, attracting many viewers. Another popular booth belonged to the Sing Tao Daily, where singers sang Cantonese pop songs. The Sing Tao Daily was one of many overseas newspapers that set up offices in major U.S. cities to gain readership among the immigrant community. Other popular booths featured games and prizes. Booths that sold tapes, videos, and CDs—mostly from Hong Kong and Taiwan, and, to a lesser extent, China—encouraged fair-goers to purchase the latest soap operas, movies, and pop music. In contrast, community organizations such as the On Lok Senior Health Services, North East Medical Services, and Asian Liver Center received scant attention. A U.S. Postal Service van was selling the Chinese New Year stamp at the fair. Featuring the Chinese zodiac, the New Year's stamp was initially issued in 1993 and was the first commemorative stamp celebrating Chinese 203

America. 1 In 1989 the Organization of Chinese Americans (OCA), established in 1973 to advocate for Chinese American civil rights, had begun lobbying for a commemorative stamp. Two years later, the U.S. Citizens Stamp Advisory Committee decided to back the proposal. The O C A suggested several ideas, including "The fiftieth anniversary of the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the 125th anniversary of the Transcontinental Railroad." 2 The committee instead decided to issue the "Happy New Year" stamp to celebrate ethnic culture.3 Although the stamp indicates that the ethnic holiday was part of multicultural America, the use of aesthetic signifiers to represent the ethnic community continued to Orientalize Chinese America and to accentuate its otherness. As evening fell, the audience saw traditional Chinese clothing, Chinese lanterns, pagoda-style architecture, and renowned Chinese sights incorporated into the parade. Chinese music was played through loudspeakers. Numerous presentations accentuated authenticity, as many featured objects were either directly imported from China, Hong Kong, or Taiwan, or embodied different aspects of ancient Chinese culture. The emphasis on Chinese American transnational connections continued to conflate Chinese Americans with China, and indicated a persistent effort to champion U.S. multiculturalism and to emphasize the role of Chinese Americans in a global market. But this year, veterans had been brought back to the parade to showcase Chinese American loyalty and their contribution to the defense of the country. At the ethnic beauty pageant contest held one week prior, a huge American flag was displayed in the background when introducing contestants in swimsuits, and a model Statue of Liberty was used as a backdrop in a dance performance. That evening on the parade route, tribute was paid to the Chinese American police officers and firefighters involved in September 11. David Lim, a New York Port Authority police officer who was trapped in the World Trade Center's North Tower for five hours, received tremendous attention. New York firefighter Zach Vause, who was filmed carrying a chaplain from the North Tower, likewise received a heroic greeting. San Francisco was not the only ethnic community that accentuated ethnic contributions during the national crisis. Firefighters also rode in the 103rd Golden Dragon parade in the Los Angeles Chinatown. Michelle Ou, director of community relations for KSCI-TV, summed up the intention, by stating that the parade was an opportunity to present Chinese Americans "in a positive light in the general public . . . but more has to be done to demonstrate we have helped this country."4 204

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Ou's remark was shockingly similar to the predominant rhetoric voiced in the ethnic community at the height of the Cold War. Close to fifty years after the initiation of the 1953 Chinese New Year Festival in San Francisco, Chinese Americans still felt compelled to accentuate their loyalty. They had a reason to worry. The historical exclusion of Chinese Americans from citizenship prior to 1943 left a harmful legacy, and, additionally, they were persistently conflated with Chinese. Although the Cold War ended in 1989, China, one of the few remaining communist regimes, continues to be perceived as a threat to the United States. Several high profile cases, such as the 1996 Campaign Finance Scandal and the Wen Ho Lee case (1998-2000), confirmed that the dominant society insists on Orientalizing the ethnic community. John Huang and Charlie Yah-lin Trie were accused of soliciting foreign monies for Bill Clintons presidential reelection campaign. The media quickly jumped to connect the accusation of a "new yellow peril" with the "red peril." Huang and Trie were seen as Red China spies who attempted to influence the Clinton administration through illegal campaign contributions. The scandal, as the scholar L. Ling-chi Wang has argued, was an attempt to "'Orientalize' the political corruption and to lay the problem of corruption squarely on several Asian Americans and their so-called foreign connections in several Asian countries, not the least of which was communist' China." 5 The persistent perception of communist China as a threat to U.S. national security subjected Wen Ho Lee, a physicist working at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, to the Chinese American spy witch hunt. Lee, a Taiwanese immigrant, was first accused of espionage, and then of unlawfully downloading national defense information. The Federal Bureau of Investigation never secured any credible evidence to substantiate the first accusation. Its pursuit of the Lee case, however, confirmed that the federal government saw Chinese American scientists as potential suspects. Moreover, the Lee case indicates that mainstream society continued to lump China and Taiwan together—even though conflicts between the two had intensified in the 1990s—thereby ignoring the heterogeneous components within the ethnic community.6 The conflation of Chinese Americans with Chinese had a damaging effect on every ethnic member. One example was the media rhetoric resulting from the collision between a U.S. spy plane and a Chinese fighter jet off the coast of southeast China in early April 2001. After the spy plane incident, talk-show hosts and radio programs called for interning Chinese Americans and boycotting Chinese restaurants. They also used racial slurs, EPILOGUE

205

which were shockingly similar to the language used following the outbreak of the Korean War. 7 A study conducted by the Committee of ioo, comprised of ethnic elites, affirmed that Chinese Americans were still subjected to racial discrimination. They found that 25 percent of hiring managers had "very negative attitudes toward Chinese Americans," and 43 percent were "somewhat negative." 8 Although September n shifted the immediate threat from China to Muslim countries, ethnic leaders hardly felt relief. Instead, they sensed an urgency to demonstrate their loyalty in public displays. They understood that as long as they were not considered to be "Americans," they would be subject to political persecution if relations between the United States and China were to alter. Chinese New Year celebrations thus continued to be used as a platform to showcase patriotism. The above instances, however, seem to suggest that the Chinese New Year Festival failed to help change the perceptions of Chinese Americans in mainstream society. Even though festival organizers attempted to reconfigure American national memory and culture by emphasizing Chinese American contributions on the parade route, most spectators were left with exotic impressions. The strategy to re-Orientalize the ethnic celebration and place it in the context of multiculturalism seems to have added ammunition to Chinese American racial otherness. Rather than challenge the fundamental racial hierarchy, the festivals instead conformed to a multicultural project that restrained resistance, discouraged transformation, and downplayed racism. Chinese American identity became a fixed and essentialized commodity to attract tourists and corporate sponsorship. The persistence to accentuate exotic authenticity, unfortunately, continued to reinforce Chinese American foreignness. Nevertheless, the Chinese New Year Festival provided a space for many Chinese Americans to reconnect with their ethnic identity and to teach the next generation about ethnic heritage. Moreover, although the ethnic parade only occupied San Francisco streets for three hours each year, it has become a permanent fixture in the cultural landscape of the city. T h e question for the ethnic community in the new century, then, is how to transform the ethnic celebration from a commercial success into a political powerhouse that can successfully incorporate Chinese Americans into American national identity and culture.

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INTRODUCTION

1. Chinese World, February 12,1953. 2. Edward F. Haskell coined the word multicultural in Lance: A Novel about Multicultural Men (1941). Werner Sollors, "Ethnic Modernism, 1910-1950," American Literary History 15, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 74. The influence of Cold War politics on ethnic cultures has received scant scholarly notice even as attention is being increasingly directed toward its impact on domestic conditions, especially gender, sexuality, labor movements, the civil rights movement, and popular culture. See, for example, Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, 1988); Mary L. Dudziak, ColdWar Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Lary May, ed., Recasting America: Culture and Politics in the Age of Cold War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); Peter J. Kuznick and James Gilbert, eds., Rethinking Cold War Culture (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001). My study is indebted to the following scholarship that has focused on Cold War Chinese America. Judy Tzu-Chun Wu, " 'Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!': Representations of Ethnic and Gender Identity in the Miss Chinatown U.S.A. Beauty Pageant," Journal of Social History 31, no. 1 (September 1997): 5-31; Robert G. Lee, Orientals: Asian Americans in Popular Culture

207

(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999), chapters 5-8; Gloria Heyung Chun, Of Orphans & Warriors: Inventing Chinese American Culture & Identity (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2000), chapters 3-5; Xiaojian Zhao, Remaking Chinese America: Immigration, Family, and Community, 1940—1965 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), chapter 7; Shirley Jennifer Lim, "Contested Beauty: Asian American Women's Cultural Citizenship during the Early Cold War Era," in Asian/Pacific Islander American Women: A Historical Anthology, ed. Shirley Hune and Gail M. Nomura (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 188-204; Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), chapter 6. Christina Kleins Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945—1961 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003) is another revealing study of Orientalism in Cold War America. 3. Gary Scharnhorst, ed., Bret Harte's California: Letters to the Springfield Republican and Christian Register, 1866—67 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1990), 27; Yong Chen, Chinese San Francisco, 1850—1943: A TransPacific Community (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 119, 137-138; Annie (Shew) Soo, interview with the author, Berkeley, January 9, 2002 and February 15, 2002. 4. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 39. 5. Lee, Orientals, 145-179. 6. Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 95. no. 7. Lee, Orientals, 145-146,156-160. 8. Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 240. 9. Nonwhite artists and jazz musicians became Cold War ambassadors to validate racial progress and pronounce American democracy. Mary L. Dudziak, "Josephine Baker, Racial Protest, and the Cold War," The Journal of American History, 81, no. 2 (September 1994): 567; Penny M. Von Eschen, "Who's the Real Ambassador? Exploding the Cold War Racial Ideology," in Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945—1966, ed. Christian G. Appy (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), 110-131. Penny M. Von Eschen, Satchmo Blows Up The World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). 10. Chinese Pacific Weekly, Februarys, 1953. 11. According to the historian John Higham, it was the civil rights movement that led to the emergence of "multiethnic education" or "multicultural education." Higham, "Multiculturalism and Universalism: A History and Critique," American Quarterly 45, no. 2 (June 1993): 201. Although many racial and ethnic groups have used ethnic celebrations as a strategy to showcase their patriotism, claim their Americanness, and negotiate inter- or intra-group conflicts, com208

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munity celebrations became a widespread phenomena only in the last two decades of twentieth century. To name just a few exemplary works of ethnic celebrations: Robert Anthony Orsi, The Madonna on n$th Street: Faith and Community in Italian Harlem, 1880—1950 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985); John Bodnar, Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); April Schultz, Ethnicity on Parade: Inventing the Norwegian American Through Celebration (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994); Geneviève Fabre, Jürgen Heideking, and Kai Dreisbach, eds., Celebrating Ethnicity and Nation: American Festive Culture from the Revolution to the Early Twentieth Century (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001); Lon Kurashige, Japanese American Celebration and Conflict: A History of Ethnic Identity and Festival, 1934—1990 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). 12. Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 6. 13. John Kuo Wei Tchen, New York Before Chinatown: Orientalism and the Shaping of American Culture, 1776—1882 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); see also Henry Yu, Thinking Orientals: Migration, Contact, and Exoticism in Modern America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Klein, Cold War Orientalism. 14. Anthony Lee, Picturing Chinatown: Art and Orientalism in San Francisco (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 252—253. 15. Rose Hum Lee, The Chinese in the United States of America (London: Oxford University Press, i960), 60-62; Judy Yung, Unbound Feet: A Social History of Chinese Women in San Francisco (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 68. Christopher L. Yip, "The Impact of the Social-Historical Context on Chinese American Settlement," in The Chinese American Experience: Papers from the Second National Conference on Chinese American Studies, ed. Genny Lim (San Francisco: Chinese Historical Society of America and the Chinese Culture Foundation, 1980), 141-142. 16. Ivan Light, "From Vice District to Tourist Attraction: The Moral Career of American Chinatowns, 1880—1940," Pacific Historical Review 43 (August 1974): 367-394; Yung, Unbound Feet, 204. 17. See, for example, Lee, Orientals, chapter 5; Ronald Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 474-484; Sucheng Chan, Asian Americans: An Interpretive History (New York: Twayne Publishers, I99i):i67-i7i; Gary Y. Okihiro, Margins and Mainstreams: Asians in American History and Culture (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994), 140-147. 18. Kurashige, Japanese American Celebration, 1. 19. Lee, Orientals, 162. 20. Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 2. 21. See Peter Kwong, The New Chinatown (New York: Noonday Press, 1987). NOTES

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22. George Anthony Peffer, "Forbidden Families: Emigration Experiences of Chinese Women under the Page Law, 1875—1882," Journal of American Ethnic History 6 (1986): 28—46. Sucheta Mazumdar argues that the reason few Asian women migrated to the U.S. was because of their vital roles in home countries, not because of harsh immigration laws. Mazumdar, "What Happened to the Women? Chinese and Indian Male Migration to the United States in Global Perspective," in Asian/Pacific Islander American Women: A Historical Anthology, ed. Shirley Hune and Gail M. Nomura (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 58-74. 23. Jennifer Ting, "Bachelor Society: Deviant Heterosexuality and Asian American Historiography," in Privileging Positions: The Sites of Asian American Studies, ed. Gary Y. Okihiro et al. (Pullman: Washington State University Press, 1995), 271-279. 24. Lisa Lowe, Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 11. 25. For the transnational aspect of the Chinese American community, see Aihwa Ong Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999); Madeline Hsu, Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home: Transnationalism and Migration between the United States and South China, 1882—1943 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000); Yong Chen, Chinese San Francisco, 1850—1943: A Trans-Pacific Community (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). 26. According to Emma Woo Louie, Chinese immigrants in the nineteenth century referred to themselves as "Chinese." (However, I found immigrants today who still use the term "Chinese" to refer to themselves.) The terms "AmericanChinese" and "Chinese-American" were coined during World War II. Later, the subtle change to "Chinese Americans" was applied in the late 1960s to claim a stake in America. However, the Chinese American community was not united on the usage of this term because of differences in "political status, ethnic affiliation, residence and citizenship, and cultural and racial identification." Louie, Chinese American Names: Tradition and Transition (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 1998), 63; Laura Kyun Yi Kang argues for a new term, "Asian/ American," to signify shifting identities that "disrupt arbitrarily fixed spatial distinctions." Kang, "Compositional Subjects: EnfiguringAsian/American Women" (PhD diss., University of California, Santa Cruz, 1995), 9. 27. George Lipsitz, Time Passages: Collective Memory and American Popular Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), chapter 1. 28. Tom Wolfe, "New Yellow Peril," Esquire 72 (December 1969): 190—199. I. T R A N S N A T I O N A L

CELEBRATIONS

i. Judy Yung, Unbound Feet: A Social History of Chinese Women in San Francisco (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 239-241; "Chinatown IIO

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Parade Stresses Anti-Communism," San Francisco Chronicle, February 13, 1951; "Chinese Parade," Chinese World, February 12,1951. 2. After the communists took control of China, the United States implemented a restrictive trade policy. Chinese Pacific Weekly, December 17,1949; Hsu Kai-Yu, "Flower Stands on Sidewalks of Grant Avenue," Chinese World, February 6,1951; Shu Guang Zhang, Economic Cold War: America's Embargo Against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949-1963 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 30-31. 3. Catherine Baldwin, "Chinese in San Francisco—The Sixth Year of Qwong See," Harper's New Monthly Magazine 62, no. 367 (December 1880): 70-78. 4. Anthony W. Lee, Picturing Chinatown: Art and Orientalism in San Francisco (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 9; Yong Chen, Chinese San Francisco, 1850—1943: A Trans-Pacific Community (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 58, 61, 66. 5. See Thomas Chinn, Bridging the Pacific: San Francisco Chinatown and Its People (San Francisco: Chinese Historical Society of America, 1989), 3-7. 6. Baldwin, "Chinese in San Francisco," 73. 7. Chen, Chinese San Francisco, 138. 8. Len Travers, Celebrating the Fourth: Independence Day and the Rites of Nationalism in the Early Republic (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1997). 539. Chung Sai YatPo [hereafter CSYP], February 2,1916. 10. Patrick Tinlogy, "Nevada County's Chinese," Nevada County Historical Society 25, no. 1 (January 1971): 9. 11. CSYP, February 14,1911; CSYP, February 5,1913; "Chinese New Year Passes Quietly by Police Ban," San Francisco Chronicle, February 1,1919. 12. "Chinese Blend East, West in New Year Fete," San Francisco Chronicle, January 1,1931; "Chinese New Year Is Today," San Francisco Chronicle, February 13,1926; CSYP, January 19,1925. 13. "Chinese Celebrate Rainy New Year," San Francisco Chronicle, January 30, 1911; "Chinatown Aglow on Eve of Year 2466," San Francisco Examiner, February 12, 1915; "You Hear Big Noise?" San Francisco Chronicle, February 15,1920; "New Year Din Rings Through San Francisco Chinatown," San Francisco Chronicle, February 7,1921; "Chinese Pay Debts," San Francisco Chronicle, February 16,1923. 14. CSYP, February 9,1915. 15. CSYP, February 14,1912; CSYP, January 31,1919; CSYP, February 17,1931; "Chinese New Year Is Today," San Francisco Chronicle, February 13,1926. 16. Chinese immigrants already had capitalized on Orientalism to enlarge their economic resources. As early as the 1880s organizers in Bok Kai festivals of Marysville, California, deemphasized religious meanings but highlighted exotic cultural characteristics to attract tourists. Paul Gail Chace, "Returning Thanks: NOTES

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Chinese Rites in an American Community," (PhD diss., University of California, Riverside, 1992), 205. 17. L. Eve Armentrout Ma, "Chinatown Organizations and the AntiChinese Movement, 1882—1914," in Entry Denied: Exclusion and the Chinese Community in America, 1882—1943, ed. Sucheng Chan (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 151; L. Eve Armentrout Ma, Revolutionaries, Monarchists, and Chinatowns: Chinese Politics in the Americas and the ipu Revolution (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), 19. 18. "S.E Chinese Make Whoopee on New Year's," San Francisco Chronicle, February 17,1931; "Chinese New Year Begins Tuesday," San Francisco Chronicle, February 13,1931. 19. CSYP, January 25, February 1, 2, 16, 18, 19, 1927; "Queen Race for the Feast of the Lanterns," San Francisco Examiner, February 3, 1927; "Chinese Open Lantern Feast," San Francisco Examiner, February 18,1927. 20. "S.F. Police Blockade Chinatown," San Francisco Chronicle, February 4, 1935; "Chinese Flag Police Over Continued Curb on New Year's Tourist," San Francisco Chronicle, February 7, 1935; "Quinn Facing Suit on Tong Police Guard," San Francisco Chronicle, February 9,1935. 21. "Chinese Open New Year Fete," San Francisco Chronicle, February 6, 1932; "War in Orient Dims Chinese Fete in S.F. "San Francisco Chronicle, January 26,1933; "Chinese New Year," San Francisco Chronicle, February 5,1943. 22. "1,000,000 to Attend Chinese Aid Fetes," New York Times, June 14,1938; quoted in Yung, Unbound Feet, 239—240. 23. Quoted in Chen, Chinese San Francisco, 243, 245. 24. For more information on "Bowl of Rice Parties," see Yung, Unbound Feet, 239—240; Chen, Chinese San Francisco, 241—248. 25. "Chinatown's New Year Is In Full Swing," San Francisco Chronicle, February 4,1946. 26. With the influence from Pearl Buck's novel The Good Earth and Japan's attack on China, the image of Chinese in America became favorable. Harold R. Isaacs, Scratches on Our Minds: American Views of China and India (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 155-158. 27. This quota was based on race, rather than on national origin as in other European countries. For example, the law stipulated that even an individual of Chinese descent born in England was to be included in the quota. Between 1946 and 1952, the Chinese quota was not been fully used because the United States had closed its consulate in communist China and the latter forbade any emigration. As a consequence, a number of applicants were unable to apply for visas. Shien Woo Kung, Chinese in American Life: Some Aspects of Their History, Status, Problems and Contributions (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1962), no. 28. Chinese Press, January 13,1950.

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29. Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935—1960 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 99, 202. 30. Mary L. Dudziak, "Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative," Stanford Law Review 41 (November 1988): 105. 31. San Francisco Department of City Planning, "Chinatown/North Beach Study Area Map," Chinatown 701 Study Staff Report (San Francisco: San Francisco Department of City Planning, 1972); Victor Nee and Brett De Bary Nee, Longtime Californ: A Documentary Study of an American Chinatown (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), xxii. 32. One prominent housing discrimination example was the Sing Sheng case. Sheng was denied the right to move into a purchased house in South San Francisco. For more information, see Rose Hum Lee, The Chinese in the United States of America, (London: Oxford University Press, i960), 315-319; At the time, discrimination toward Chinese Americans was quite prevalent. According to the result of the 1948 Roper National 21-and-over survey: 14.2 % prefer not to have Chinese as fellow workers; 28.0% prefer not to have Chinese as neighbors; 23.5% prefer not to have Chinese as guests in their homes; and 64.6% prefer not to have Chinese as kin by marriage. Quoted in Isaacs, Scratches on Our Mind, 121. 33. Quoted in Isaacs, Scratches on Our Minds, 193—194. 34. Roger Daniels, Asian America: Chinese and Japanese in the United States since i8$o (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988), 215—229, 301. For mainstream society's perception of Chinese, see also Isaacs, Scratches on Our Minds, 63-238. 35. Lee, The Chinese in the United States, 367. 36. Him Mark Lai, interview with the author, San Francisco, July 14,1998. 37. Woo interview, quoted in Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ, 216. 38. Gloria Heyung Chun, Of Orphans and Warriors: Inventing Chinese American Culture and Identity (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2000), 75. 39. Dai-Ming Lee, "Chinese New Year Firecracker Regulations," Chinese World, February 5,19 51. 40. "Editorial Page," Chinese Press, December 28,1951. 41. Him Mark Lai, Gong huaqiao dao huaren-ershi shiji: Meiguo huaren shehuifazhan shi [From overseas Chinese to Chinese American: The history of the development of Chinese American society in the twentieth century] (Hong Kong: Sanlian Shudian, 1992), 355; Chinese World, February 22, 1956 [Chinese Section]; According to Kung, prior to 1955 the blood test was used only on the Chinese. Kung, Chinese in American Life, 160, 310.

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213

42. Xiaojian Zhao, Remaking Chinese America: Immigration, Family, and Community, 1940—1965 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 160—162; Lee, The Chinese in the United States of America, 368. 43. Maurice Chuck interview, quoted in Amy Chen, The Chinatown Files, VHS (New York: Filmmakers Library, 2001). Thanks to Daniel Tseng for bringing this source to my attention. 44. Chinese World, March 17, 1956; Joan Lowe [pseud.], interview with the author, San Francisco, July 1 4 , 1 9 9 8 . 45. Some foreign-born Chinese claimed their native-born status through derivative citizenship. 46. A merchant or U.S. citizen reported the birth of a son or daughter after a visit to China, which then created a slot to bring in a child. In the 1950s, the United States could not deport all illegal immigrants because it did not have diplomatic relations with China, and Taiwan and Hong Kong were unwilling to accept deportees. Though some were spared deportation, they were given suspended deportation status, meaning that they had no rights in the United States, nor could they reenter the country if they left it. L. Ling-Chi Wang interview, quoted in Chen, The Chinatown Files; Helen Zia, Asian American Dreams: The Emergence of an American People (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000), 11; Tung Pok Chin, Paper Son: One Man's Story (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000), 68-71, 83-88,126-129. 47. Tsai spelled the organization's name "Min Qing," Nee wrote "Min Ching" and Chen "Mun Ching." This is because of different Chinese dialects and romanization systems. For the history of Min Qing, see Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ', 2 0 7 - 2 1 7 ; Chen, The Chinatown Files, and Shih-Shan Henry Tsai, The Chinese Experience in America (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1 9 8 6 ) , 1 3 3 - 1 3 4 . 48. Congress passed the Trading with the Enemy Act in 1917, but never persecuted anyone. For details on the case, see Tsai, The Chinese Experience in America, 131—132; Him Mark Lai, "To Bring Forth a New China, to Build a Better America: The Chinese Marxist Left in America to the 1960s," Chinese America: History and Perspectives (1992): 51. 49. Ma, "Chinatown Organizations and the Anti-Chinese Movement," 157-158. 50. For the history of the Kuomintang influence among Chinese Americans, see Him Mark Lai, "The Kuomintang in Chinese American Communities before World War II," in Entry Denied: Exclusion and the Chinese Community in America, 1882—1943, ed. Sucheng Chan (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 170-212. 51. Him Mark Lai, "Chinese Organizations in America Based on Locality of Origin and/or Dialect-Group Affiliation, 1 9 4 0 S - 1 9 9 0 S , " in Chinese America: History and Perspectives ( 1 9 9 6 ) : 25. 214

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52. I am indebted to Daniel Tsang who pointed out the difference between the Taiwanese (indigenous) government and the Taiwan government. It wasn't until 1996 that Taiwan held its first presidential election, and it was only in 2000 that Taiwan was ruled by an indigenous party. Many Taiwanese regard the Kuomintang as outsiders. 53. Jack Chen, The Chinese of America (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 214—215; Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ,' 209. 54. For the history of the Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance of New York, see Renqiu Yu, To Save China, To Save Ourselves: The Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance ofNew York (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992). 55. Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ, 206-207; Yu, To Save China, to Save Ourselves, 124. 56. Zhao, Remaking Chinese America, 102. 57. Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ,' 208-213. 58. Nee & Nee, Longtime Californ, 216; Zhao, Remaking Chinese America, 165-168,170. 59. For the history of Chinese American Leftists, see Lai, "To Bring Forth A New China," 3-52; Him Mark Lai, "A Historical Survey of the Chinese Left in America," in Counterpoint: Perspectives on Asian America, ed., Emma Gee (Los Angeles: UCLA Asian American Studies Center, 1976), 63—80. 60. The restriction on Chinese goods was very rigid and included goods manufactured in Hong Kong, Macao, or other countries using raw materials from China. Chinese World, August 29,1951. 61. Because of the shortage of herbs from China, many turned to Western medicine. Lai, Gong huaqiao dao huaren-ershi shiji, 352; Philip P. Choy, "San Francisco Chinatown Historic Development," in The Chinese American Experience: Papers from the Second National Conference on Chinese American Studies, ed. Genny Lim (San Francisco: Chinese Historical Society of America and the Chinese Culture Foundation, 1980), 130; Chinese World, February 6,1951. 62. "Editorial," San Francisco Chronicle, December 5,1950. 63. "Chinese Here Pledge Their Loyalty," San Francisco Chronicle, December 2,1950. Chinese Americans in other parts of the country made similar pledges. 64. "Chinese Nor Reds," Chinese Press, October 27,1950. 65. "Cathay, U.S.A.," Chinese Press, June 22,1951. 66. Rose Hum Lee, "The Integration of the Chinese in the United States," unpublished paper cited in Isaacs, Scratches on Our Minds, 124. 67. For the detail of the extortion, see San Francisco Chronicle, November 10, 11,12,13,14,15, 20, 21, 22, 26, December 1, 3,10,17,1951. 68. Chin, Paper Son, 96,108. 69. Lai, interview. 70. Christina Klein, Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945—1961 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 240—41. NOTES

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2. "IN THE TRADITIONS

OF

CHINA"

The chapter title is taken from the San Francisco Chronicle, February i, 1953. 1. Chinese World, February 16,1953 [Chinese Section]. 2. Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 2. 3. Executive Order 9066 ordered many Americans of Japanese descent into internment. 4. Jennifer Ting, "Bachelor Society: Deviant Heterosexuality and Asian American Historiography," in Privileging Positions: The Sites of Asian American Studies, ed. Gary Y. Okihiro et al. (Pullman: Washington State University Press, 1995), 271-279. 5. Chinese World, February n, 1953; Thomas Chinn, Bridging the Pacific: San Francisco Chinatown and Its People (San Francisco: Chinese Historical Society of America, 1989), 244; Hilary Wong [pseud.], interview with the author, San Francisco, June 11,1999. 6. W. K. Wong interview, quoted in Victor G. Nee and Brett De Bary Nee, Longtime Californ': A Documentary Study of an American Chinatown (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 244. W.K. Wong is a pseudonym for H.K. Wong in Nee's book. 7. Chinese Times, February 10,1953; January 4,1954; January 25,1956. 8. That committee included Paul H. Louie (the first chairman of the Chinese New Year Festival committee), John Kan and S. K. Wong (parade); Jack Chow, Dolly Gee, and Fred Lee (entertainment); Sarah Lum and Elsie Yuen (fashion show); and Henry Lem (publicity). "Biggest Chinese New Year Fete Set," Chinese World, January 31, 1953; Chinn, Bridging the Pacific, 264; H.K. Wong, "H.K.'s Corner: Girls Wanted," Chinese World, January 11,1956; Chinese Times, March 21,1969, January 18,1975. 9. Thomas Chinn recorded that John Kan's family moved to San Francisco when John was four years old. Chinn, Bridging the Pacific, 243. 10. John Kan interview, Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ, 110-116. 11. The 1.5 generation refers to those who were born outside the United States but came to the country at a young age; the second generation refers to those who were born in the United States to immigrant parents. 12. Chinese Pacific Weekly, January 31,1953. 13. Xiaojian Zhao, Remaking Chinese America: Immigration, Family, and Community, 1940—1965 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 103. 14. Chinese New Year Festival Program [hereafter CNYFP], 1962, Chinese Chamber of Commerce [hereafter CCC]; quoted in Judy Tzu-Chun Wu, '"Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!': Representations of Ethnic and Gender Identity in the Miss Chinatown U.S.A. Beauty Pageant," Journal of Social History 31, no. 1 (September 1997): 10. Later, Chow Shu Kai, Taiwanese 216

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Ambassador to the United States, also used the same rhetoric. Chow contended that the Nationalist government supported the pageant and the festival while "our compatriots on the mainland of China . . . do not have the means to celebrate nor the freedom to commemorate occasions significant and meaningful according to the traditions of the old country." CNYFP, 1968, CCC, quoted in Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 10. 15. Wong interview, Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ, 244, 246. 16. San Francisco Chronicle, February 1,1953. Though the festival committee used the mainstream press to claim that the Chinese New Year was banned by communist China, ethnic newspapers revealed the opposite. The Chinese World, for example, contended that though communist China eliminated many Chinese traditions, it never forbade people to observe the Chinese New Year. "Editorial," Chinese World, February 8,1954. 17. Similar rhetoric can also be found in "Editorial," Chinese World, February 12,13,1953. 18. T. Kong Lee, "Welcome to Chinatown," in San Francisco Chinatown on Parade in Picture and Story, ed. H. K. Wong (San Francisco: Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 1961), quoted in Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 10. 19. Chinese World, February 26, 1953, January 31, 1957 [Chinese Section]. In 1953, the stores in Chinatown could be divided into three types. Grocery stores (170 total, with 90 percent Chinese American clientele); Chinese antique stores (67 total, with 40 percent Chinese American clientele); and Chinese restaurants (236 total, with 40 percent Chinese American clientele). Chinese Pacific Weekly, December 5,1953. 20. Chinese Pacific Weekly, December 5,1953. 21. Chinese Times, March 21,1969. 22. Chinese World, February 13,16,1953 [Chinese Section]; Young China, January 6,1954; Chinese World, February 2,1954, [Chinese Section]. 23. According to the historian Eric Hobsbawm, invented tradition implies continuity with the past. Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," in The Invention of Tradition, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1. San Francisco Chronicle, February 1,1953, February 18,1956. The first official lunar New Year celebration was in the Han dynasty (206 B.c.-A.D. 220). See D. Bodde, Festivals in Classical China (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 145-151. 24. "Gung Hay Fat Choy," Chinese World, February 8,1954. 25. "A Message for Chinese New Year from Governor Goodwin J. Knight," Chinese World, February 8,1954. Eleanor Roosevelt also sent a New Year's greeting, but regarded Chinese Americans as sojourners. She wrote, "I would like to send them my best wishes and my hopes that some day their country will be free and they will be happy again in their own homes [emphasis added]." "Gung Hay Fat Choy from Eleanor Roosevelt," Chinese World, January 24,1955. NOTES

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217

26. Mary L. Dudziak, "Josephine Baker, Racial Protest, and the Cold War," The Journal of American History 81, no. 2 (September 1994): 543—570. 27. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 14,1953. 28. Young China, February 9,1954. 29. Chinese Times, February 14, 1953; February 2,1954; Chinese World, January 18,1954; February 16,1956; January 15,1957. Unfortunately, I have found no articles to date detailing how Chinese Americans were represented in these floats. Chinese World, February 9,1953. 30. April R. Schultz, Ethnicity On Parade: Inventing the Norwegian American through Celebration (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994); John Bodnar, Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 138-166. 31. San Francisco Chronicle, February 6,1954. 32. See, for example, Chinese World, February 7, 1953 [Chinese Section], translated by the author. 33. Zhao, Remaking Chinese America, 25. 34. San Francisco Chronicle, February 25,1962. 35. Pei Chi Liu interview, Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ', 220. "Contributors received window stickers designed to reassure our American friends of our loyalty and feeling." Michael Dougan, "Parades: An American Invention," San Francisco Examiner, February 6, 2000. 36. Dai-Ming Lee of the Chinese World accused the Anti-Communist League of being "a propaganda organ for the Kuomintang government of Chiang Kaishek." He also charged that the money raised by the League was for Chiang Kaishek. Dai-Ming Lee, "The Sincerity of the Anti-Communist League," Chinese World, February 2, 1951. For more information on this controversy, see Pierre Salinger, "Chinatown Dispute Issues," San Francisco Chronicle, March 5,1951. 37. "Chinatown Parade," Chinese World, February 12, 1951; "Chinatown Parade Stresses Anti-Communism," San Francisco Chronicle, February 13,1951. 38. Ronald Takaki, Strangersfroma Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 415. 39. Chinese Press, January 1,1952. 40. Joel S. Franks, "Chinese Americans and American Sports, 1880—1940," in Chinese America: History and Perspectives (1996): 133-147. 41. Chinese Historical Society of America, A Celebration of Roots: Two Steps Forward—Chinese Americans in Sports (San Francisco: Chinese Historical Society of America, 1996), 17, 23. 42. K. Scott Wong, "War Comes to Chinatown: Social Transformation and the Chinese of California," in The Way We Really Were: The Golden State in the Second Great War, ed. Roger W. Lotehin (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 169. 43. Ben Fong-Torres, The Rice Room: Growing Up Chinese-American—From Number Two Son to Rock'nRoll (New York: Hyperion, 1994), 60, 63. 218

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44- "S. F. and Chinese Chambers Give $1000 for Festival," Chinese World, February 12, 1953; "Sports Tourneys for New Year Festival Set," Chinese World, February 7,1956. 45. Joan Lowe [pseud.], interview with the author, San Francisco, July 14, 1998. 46. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). 47. San Francisco Chronicle, February 1, 1957; Franklin Ng, ed., The Asian American Encyclopedia (New York: Marshall Cavendish, 1995), 481. 48. St. Mary's Chinese School was established in 1921. It was the second school in San Francisco to accept Chinese American students. It has a regular day school and a Chinese Language School. St. Mary's Calendar, St. Mary's Catholic Church Archives; Donald Forrester, "St Mary's Chinese Girls Drum Corps: Tenth Anniversary," St. Mary's Catholic Church Archives; For the information on "Chinatown, My Chinatown," see www.geocities.com/dferg5493/ chinatown.htm (March 25, 2002). I thank Benito M. Vergara and Kevin Lam for the information; "Short Historical Sketch of St. Mary's Chinese Girls Drum Corps," St Mary's Catholic Church Archives. 49.1 thank CharleneTung for this idea. 50. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 14,1953; Chinese Times, February 17,1953; Charles L. Leong, "The Quiet Chinese American," Asian Week, July 15,1982. 51. Lois Banner, American Beauty, (New York: Knopf, 1983), 250. 52. For more information on mainstream beauty pageants, see Banner, American Beauty, chapter 12; Armando R. Riverol, LivefromAtlantic City: The History of the Miss American Pageant Before, After, and in Spite of Television (Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1992); Frank Deford, There She Is: The Life and Times of Miss America (New York: Viking, 1971); Sarah Banet-Weiser, The Most Beautiful Girl in the World: Beauty Pageants and National Identity. For other beauty pageants, see Colleen Ballerino Cohen, Richard Wilk, and Beverly Stoeltje, eds., Beauty Queens on the Global Stage: Gender, Contests, and Power (New York: Routledge, 1996). Many studies have suggested that women are positioned as signifiers of the nation. To name only a few: Caren Kaplan, Norma Alarcon, and Minoo Moallem, eds., Between Woman and Nation: Nationalism, Transnational Feminisms, and the State (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999); Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan, eds., Scattered Hegemonies: Post-Modernity and Transnational Feminist Practices (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995). 53. Because there was little time to select a Miss Chinatown in 1953, the committee invited the 1952 Miss Chinatown. The contest was sponsored by the Chinese American Citizens Alliance. NOTES

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219

54- Judy Yung, Unbound Feet: A Social History of Chinese Women in San Francisco (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 148; Asian Week, February 12, 1981; East/West, February 18, 1970 [Chinese Section]. Scholars have only begun to pay attention to Chinese American beauty pageants recently. Yung, Unbound Feet, 148—149; Chen, Chinese San Francisco, 1850—1943: A Trans-Pacific Community (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 189, 192—194; Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!"; Shirley Jennifer Lim, "Contested Beauty: Asian American Women's Cultural Citizenship during the Early Cold War Era," in Asian/Pacific Islander American Women: A Historical Anthology, ed. Shirley Hune and Gail M. Nomura (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 188-204. 55. On the history of cheongsams, see Antonia Finnane, "What Should Chinese Women Wear?: A National Problem," Modern China 22, no. 2 (April 1996): 99-131. 56. For more information on the beauty pageant hosted by the Chinese American Citizens Alliance, see, Lim, "Contested Beauty." 57. Jingnan Hu [Gilbert Woo], Hu Jingnan wenji [Gilbert Woo Anthology] (Hong Kong: Xiangjiang chuban youxian gongsi, 1991), 530. I thank Görden Lew for this source. 58. Wong, "War Comes to Chinatown," 181. 59. Finnane, "What Should Chinese Women Wear?" 119. 60. Banet-Weiser, The Most Beautifiil Girl in the World, 34-35. 61. Anthony Lee, Picturing Chinatown: Art and Orientalism in San Francisco (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 253, 273; Yung, Unbound Feet, 201-204. 62. Chinese Pacific Weekly, January 12, 1954. At this time, Chinese-language newspapers often used "Westerners" to refer to the general public. 63. Alice Lowe, "Concealing—Yet Revealing," in San Francisco Chinatown on Paraele in Picture and Story, ed. H.K. Wong (San Francisco: Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 1961), 27; quoted in Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 7. 64. George Anthony Peffer, "Forbidden Families: Emigration Experiences of Chinese Women under the Page Law, 1875—1882," Journal of American Ethnic History 6 (1986): 28-46. 65. Ting, "Bachelor Society," 271-279; Nayan Shah, Contagious Divides: Epidemics and Race in San Francisco's Chinatown (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 77-104. 66. US. Statutes at Large: Containing the Laws and Current Resolutions (Washington, DC, 1946), 975; Paul K. T. Sih, and Leonard B. Allen, The Chinese in America (New York: St. John's University, 1976), 10; Mely Giok-lan Tan, The Chinese in the United States: Social Mobility & Assimilation (Jakarta, Indonesia: National Economic & Social Research Institute, 1971), 40. 220

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6j. Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, 1988). 68. Shah, Contagious Divides, 105. 69. Wong interview, Nee & Nee, Longtime Californ, 245. Sam Chung originally stated that a Chinese woman should respect her father, husband, and son; it did not mention brothers. 70. San Francisco Chronicle, February 12, 1956; Chinese World, February 16, 1956. 71. Mary P. Ryan, Womanhood in America: from Colonial Times to the Present (New York: Franklin Watts, 1983), 253-254; The majority of historians, such as Elaine Tyler May, contend that the notion of domesticity dominated postwar gender ideology and popular culture. However, Joanne Meyerowitz demonstrates that postwar mass culture exhibited an ambivalent view toward domesticity and career. May, Homeward Bound; Joanne Meyerowitz, "Beyond the Feminine Mystique: A Reassessment of Postwar Mass Culture, 1946-1958," Journal of American History, 79, no. 4 (March 1993): 1455—1482. For women's work in the postwar era, see William Henry Chafe, The American Woman: Her Changing Social, Economic, and Political Roles, 1920—1970 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), 217-218. 72. Gina Marchetti, Romance and the "Yellow Peril": Race, Sex, and Discursive Strategies in Hollywood Fiction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 116. 73. Anthony S. Chen, "Lives at the Center of the Periphery, Lives at the Periphery of the Center: Chinese American Masculinities and Bargaining with Hegemony," Gender and Society, 13, no. 5 (October 1999): 585. 74. Susan Yee [pseud.], interview with the author, Torrance, California, April 14, 2002. 75. Chinese Pacific Weekly, January 17,1953. 76. Yee, interview with the author. 77. Lauren Chew, interview with the author, San Francisco, January 9, 2002. 78. Zhao, Remaking Chinese America, 144-148. 79. Chung Sai YatPo, April 12,15, 22, May 18,19, 30, June 5,14,16, Oct. 25, 1950; China Daily News, May 24, June 10,12,1950; Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 11, i960. 80. Zhao, Remaking Chinese America, 127—133,137—139. 81. Chinese Pacific Weekly, June 22,1956. 82. Chinese Pacific Weekly, August 23, 1951, cited in Zhao, Remaking Chinese America, 149. Thanks to Xiaojian Zhao for this source. 83. Chinese World, February 8,1954 [Chinese Section]. 84. See, for example, Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 8,1957. 85. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 20, 1954; Chinese Times, February 12, 1954-

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221

86. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 24,1956, translated by the author. 87. Zhao, Remaking Chinese America, 69-70. 88. Chinese World, January 22,1954. 89. The 1956 beauty queen, however, was elected by the vote of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the festival committee, not according to her fundraising ability. 90. Lim, "Contested Beauty," 196. 91. Yung, Unbound Feet, 229—241. 92. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 6,1954, translated by the author. 93. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 6,1954. 94. Chinese World, January 27,1954. 95. Chinese World, January 27,1954; January 22,1957 [Chinese Section]; Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 1,1957. 96. Yung, Unbound Feet, 286. 97. This factor, combined with the influx of Chinese female immigrants in the postwar period, contributed to the growth of the garment industry in Chinatowns such as those in Los Angeles, New York, and San Francisco. Dean Lan, "Chinatown Sweatshops," in Counterpoint: Perspectives on Asian America, ed. Emma Gee (Los Angeles: UCLA Asian American Studies Center, 1976), 347-358; Xiaolan Bao, Holding Up More than Half the Sky: Chinese Women Garment Workers in New York City, 1948—92 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2001), 58, 67. 98. Yung, Unbound Feet, 285. 99. Yee, interview; Yung, Unbound Feet, 285. 100. Chew, interview. 101. May, Homeward Bound. 102. This practice started long before the contemporary Chinese New Year Festival. A lion danced through the narrow streets of Chinatown to gather "lettuce" (cash was tied to the lettuce). Cash contributions to the hospital were hung on strings from the doorways of shops and apartment houses. Beneath, a large red envelope containing money called lay see was tied to lettuce or other vegetables to attract the lion. The police usually escorted the lion, drummers, and musicians. 103. H.K. Wong, "The Divine Creature," San Francisco Chinatown on Parade in Picture and Story, ed. H. K. Wong (San Francisco: Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 1961), 50. 104. The most symbolic figure is the "Dragon Lady," who is perceived as exercising ruthless and corrupt power. In 1988, thirty persons from the First Testament Church went to Los Angeles' Chinese New Year parade to protest dragon dances because they considered the dragon a satanic symbol. Claudia Puig, "Year of the Dragon," Los Angeles Times, February 14,1988. 105. "Chinatown Rebellion," San Francisco Chronicle, February 18,1956. 222

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106. Chinese World, January 30, 1957 [Chinese Section]; "Firecracker Ban Holds," San Francisco Chronicle, February 17,1956. 107. Chinese World, February n, 1956 [Chinese Section]. 108. Dai-Ming Lee, "Fireworks on the Chinese New Year," Chinese World, February 7,1956. 109. H.K. Wong, "H.K.'s Corner: Sorry, No Firecrackers," Chinese World, February 15,1956. no. "Firecracker Ban Holds;" Chinese World, February 13,1956 [Chinese Section]; "Chinatown New Year's Fireworks," Chinese World, February 13, 1956. The festival almost could not take place for a few times because of the high insurance premium. hi. Dai-Ming Lee, "Editorial, Fireworks on the Chinese New Year," Chinese World, February 7,1956. 112. "Chinatowns Dragon Shuns Rainy Parade," San Francisco Chronick, February 20, 1956; "Chinatown Rebellion," San Francisco Chronicle, February 18,1956. 113. Chinese Pacific Weekly, January 24,1953. 114. Steve Zousmer, "The Tenacious Celebrants," San Francisco Chronicle, February 3,1970. 115. "Firecracker Ban Holds;" "Teevee Shows to Feature Chinese New Year," Chinese World, February 8,1956. 116. Chinese Pacific Weekly, March 9,1961. 117. "Editorial," Chinese World, February 5,1957. 118. Wong interview, quoted in Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ', 245. 119. Board of Supervisors Resolution No. 13092, City Clerk Office, San Francisco. 120. This was the first time that a district advisory committee was named for Chinatown. Chinese World, February 17,1956; San Francisco Chronicle, February 10, 16, 1956; Chinese World, January 15, 21, 26, 30, 1957, February 8, 1957; DaiMing Lee proposed the idea of the Chinatown archway; "Editorial," Chinese World, January 27,1956; "Editorial," Chinese World, January 9,1956. 121. Him Mark Lai, interview with the author, San Francisco, July 14,1998. 3. CONSTRUCTING A "MODEL M I N O R I T Y "

IDENTITY

1. Chinese World, February 12, March 8,1958; Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 21, 27,1958. 2. Susan Yee [pseud.], interview with the author, Torrance, California, April 14, 2002. 3. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 9,1961. 4. San Francisco Chronicle, October 13,1961. 5. My idea is indebted to William V. Flores and Rina Benmayor's argument on Latino cultural citizenship and Lisa Lowe's idea of using culture to gain NOTES

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223

access to American national identity. Flores and Benmayor, Latino Cultural Citizenship: Claiming Identity, Space, and Rights (Boston: Beacon Press, 1997); Lowe, Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 2-3. 6. "Editorial," Chinese World, January 10,1956. 7. Chinese Pacific Weekly, January 13,1956, translated by the author. 8. Mae M. Ngai, "Legacies of Exclusion: Illegal Chinese Immigration during the Cold War YearsJournal of American Ethnic History 18, no. 1 (Fall 1998): 4. 9. L. Ling-Chi Wang, "Politics of Assimilation and Repression: History of the Chinese in the United States, 1940—1970," Manuscript, Ethnic Studies Library, University of California, Berkeley, 510. At that time, no Chinese-language mental facility was available for Chinese Americans. Chinese Pacific Weekly, April 9,1959. 10. San Francisco Chronicle, February 15, 1956; Shien Woo Kung, Chinese in American Life: Some Aspects of Their History, Status, Problems and Contributions (Westport, CT: Greenwood Printing, 1962), 155-156; Chinese World, March 2,1956; San Francisco Chronicle, March 1,1956; "Editorial," Chinese World, March 3, 5,1956. Ninety percent of Chinese Americans in San Francisco's Chinatown belonged to one of these twenty-six family associations. Chinese Pacific Weekly, March 9,16,1956. 11. Xiaojian Zhao, Remaking Chinese America: Immigration, Family, and Community, 1940-196$ (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 162-164. 12. "Editorial," Chinese World, March 14,1956. 13. Chinese World, March 19,1956 [Chinese Section]. 14. "Editorial," Chinese World, March 3,1956. 15. Chinese Pacific Weekly, March 9, 16, 1956; "Six Companies Protests Calumny Heaped on Entire Chinese Community," Chinese World, March 17, 1956; Roger Daniels, Asian America: Chinese and Japanese in the United States since 1850 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988), 309. 16. Serena Chen, "A Look Back at the Chinese Confession Program," East/West, April 23,1987. 17. Kung points out that the Chinese Six Companies represented twentyfour family associations to challenge the subpoenas, but the Chinese World indicated that it was twenty-six. Chinese World, March 5, 6,1956 [Chinese Section]; Kung, Chinese in American Life, 156; Chinese Pacific Weekly, March 9,1956. 18. Zhao, Remaking Chinese America, 174. 19. Yong Chen, Chinese San Francisco, 1850—1943: A Trans-Pacific Community (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 148-161. 20. Zhao, Remaking Chinese America, 174. 21. Chinese World, March 13, 1956 [Chinese Section], No sources indicated that Chinese Americans had sought help from the NAACP or other civil rights 224

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associations. However, the Chinese World quoted the editorial on the subpoena from the Sun Reporter, an African American newspaper. The Sun Reporter urged "the NAACP, the ACLU, the JACL, and other organizations interested in the preservation of civil rights and civil liberties to protest this flagrant threat to the security of our fellow Chinese citizens." "Protest Against Mass Subpoenas Gets New Support," Chinese World, March 20,1956. 22. "Court Quashes Chinatown Subpoenas," Chinese World, March 21,1956; Chinese Pacific Weekly, March 23,1956; Kung, Chinese in American Life, 156. 23. "House Committee Hears Report on Citizenship Fraud," Chinese World, March 24,1956; Chinese Pacific Weekly, March 23,1956; Shih-Shan Henry Tsai, The Chinese Experience in America (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 135. 24. Kung, Chinese in American Life, 156. 25. Betty Lee Sung, Mountain of Gold: The Story of the Chinese in America (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1967), 105. 26. Him Mark Lai, Gong huaqiao dao huaren-ershi shiji: Meiguo huaren shehuifazhan shi [From overseas Chinese to Chinese American: The history of the development of Chinese American society in the twentieth century] (Hong Kong: Sanlian Shudian, 1992), 347. 27. Lai, Gong huaqiao dao huaren, 359; Chen, The Chinese of America, 215. See also, Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 218—224. 28. Benson Tong, The Chinese Americans (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000), 90; Judy Yung, Chinese Women ofAmerica: A Pictorial History (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1986), 83. 29. Zhao, Remaking Chinese America, 179. 30. Chen, "A Look Back at the Chinese Confession Program," 7. 31. Zhao, Remaking Chinese America, 183; According to Ngai, between 1957 and 1965,11,336 persons confessed, and an additional 19,124 were implicated by confessors. The program closed 5,800 slots. Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 221. 32. Ngai, "Legacies of Exclusion," 4. 33. Zhao, Remaking Chinese America, 123. 34. "Editorial," Chinese World, March 23,1956. 35. Chinese Pacific Weekly, April 6,1956. 36. "Editorial," Chinese World, March 31,1956. 37. Lai, Gong huaqiao dao huaren, 370. 38. Chinese Pacific Weekly, November 24, i960. 39. Lowe, Immigrant Acts, 4. 40. Even as late as 1969, J. Edgar Hoover still suspected members of the Chinese American community to be possible communist agents. One example was his testimony at a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations. He stated: NOTES

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Red China has been flooding the country with its propaganda and there are over 300,000 Chinese in the United States, some of whom could be susceptible to recruitment either through ethnic ties or hostage situations because of relatives in communist China. In addition, up to 20,000 Chinese immigrants can come into the United States each year and this provides a means to send illegal agents into our Nation. This outrageous accusation certainly put the ethnic community in a dangerous position and drove ethnic organizations to protest the unjust allegation. The Chinese American Citizens Alliance and the Chinese-American Democratic Club sent out protest letters that accentuated Chinese Americans' vulnerable position. For example, one letter wrote, "As a community we were subjected to suspicion, intimidation, and contempt... as a people we felt a constant threat of mass incarceration." Alan Wong, "An Answer to Hoover," East/West, July 23, 1969; "CACA, JACL Protest Slur Against Chinese," East/West, August 27,1969; "Chinese Demos Seek FBI Hoover's Ouster," East/West, July 28, 1971. The Japanese American Citizen League warned that Hoover's remark might raise a potential danger to Chinese Americans. "An Open Letter to J. Edgar Hoover," East/West, August 27,1969. 41. K. Scott Wong and Sucheng Chan, Claiming America: Constructing Chinese American Identities (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998). 42. Chinese World, March 5,1958. 43. H. K. Wong, "Chinatown USA Pageant," Chinese New Year Festival Program [hereafter CNYFP], i960, Chinese Chamber of Commerce [hereafter CCC]. 44. Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of A Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). 9545. Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994), 86. 46. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 16,1961; Chinese World, February 27,1961. 47. Wong, "Chinatown USA Pageant;" H.K. Wong, "Concept of Beauty," San Francisco Chinatown on Parade in Picture and Story (San Francisco: Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 1961), 79, quoted in Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 7,11. 48. Sarah Banet-Weiser, The Most Beautiful Girl in the World: Beauty Pageants and National Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 7. 49. Anne Cheng, The Melancholy of Race (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 36. 50. "Beauty Everywhere," Special Chinese New Year Section, S.F. News-Call Bulletin, February 2, i960, Chinese Historical Society [hereafter CHS], Box 4, Folder 2, Ethnic Studies Library, University of California, Berkeley (UCB). 51. Zhao, Remaking Chinese America, 150. 52. The term model minority was not explicitly coined until the late 1960s, yet the media had reported often on the good behavior of Chinese American youths 2ZÖ

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since the 1950s. Gloria Heyung Chun, Of Orphans and Warriors: Inventing Chinese American Culture and Identity (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2000), 89; For the media report of "model" Chinese American youth see, "No Chinese American Juvenile Delinquency," America 93 (July 6, 1955): 402; "Our Amazing Chinese Kids," Coronet 39 (December 1955): 31-36; "Why No Chinese American Delinquents? Maybe It's Traditional Respect for Parents," Saturday Evening Post 227 (April 30,1955): 12; "Americans Without a Delinquency Problem," Look 22 (April 29,1958): 75-81; "Chinatown Offers Us a Lesson," New York Times Magazine (October 6, 1957): 49ff, cited in Chun, Of Orphans and Warriors, chap. 3, n. 65. Robert Lee has argued that the model minority myth had its origins in the Cold War. Robert Lee, Orientals: Asian Americans in Popular Culture (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999), 145—179. 53. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 21,1958. 54. Young China, February 9,1954. 55. See, for example, CNYFP, i960. This could also be seen in other pageant publications. One advertisement, for instance, featured an ethnic beauty queen with a modern stove oven. The image not only situated Chinese American women in domestic roles but also showcased their eligibility in participating in mainstream society. Advertisement, H. K. Wong, ed., San Francisco Chinatown on Parade in Picture and Story (San Francisco: Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 1961), 51. 56. Chinese World, February 5,1958; Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 5. 57. Peter Chua and Diane C. Fujino, "Negotiating New Asian-American Masculinities: Attitudes and Gender Expectations," Journal of Men's Studies 7, no. 3 (1999): 39I-4I358. T. H. Yu, "A Chinese Gentleman," in San Francisco Chinatown on Parade in Picture and Story, ed. H. K. Wong (San Francisco: Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 1961), 76. 59. Lim P. Lee, "Spirit of the Festival," in San Francisco Chinatown on Parade in Picture and Story, ed. H. K. Wong (San Francisco: Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 1961), 66. 60. Zhao, Remaking Chinese America, 126-138. 61. ChungSai YatPo, September 22,1950, quoted in Zhao, Remaking Chinese America, 135. 62. Chinese World, February 5,1958; Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 5. 63. CNYFP, i960. 64. Application Form, Charles Leong Collection, Box 4, Folder 14, Ethnic Studies Library, University of California, Berkeley (UCB). 65. L. Luin, "Reflections on Chinese New Year—2 Views," Getting Together, February 3-16, 1973, quoted in Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 17. NOTES

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66. Gary Y. Okihiro, Margins and Mainstreams: Asians in American History and Culture (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994), 140. 67. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 22,1962, translated by the author. 68. Quoted in Kian Moon Kwan, "Assimilation of the Chinese in the United States: An Exploratory Study in California" (PhD diss., University of California, 1958), 129,131-13369. Sam Yap (Sanyi) district includes Namhoi (Nanhai), Punyu (Panyu), and Shuntak (Shunde) while Szep Yup (Siyi) comprises Sunwui (Xinhui), Sunning [Toishan] (Xinning), Hoping (Kaiping), and Yanping (Enping). 70. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 21,1958. 71. Kati Wang [pseud.] and Fiona Yep [pseud.], phone interview with the author, July 24, 2002. 72. Laureen Chew, interview with the author, San Francisco, January 9, 2002. 73. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 14,1963. 74. S.F. News-Call Bulletin, February 18,1964. 75. Wang, interview with the author. 76. Chew, interview with the author. 77. As the Chinese Pacific Weekly pointed out, it was futile to ask candidates to answer questions in Chinese since non-Chinese judges would not understand. It is unclear when the committee stopped requiring answers in Chinese in the overall competition, but it is certain that starting in 1965, the Chinese answer had no effect on the outcome, while the English-language portion scored 20 percent. This might be because at the time most contestants could barely speak Chinese at all, and often only memorized one or two phrases in order to answer questions. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 25, 1965; Evelyn Hsu, "A New Year for Miss Chinatown," San Francisco Chronicle, February 23, 1980. After 1965, more and more contestants were either immigrants themselves or the children of immigrants. Therefore, many of them were able to speak Cantonese or Mandarin. 78. Annie (Shew) Soo, interview with the author, February 15, 2002, Berkeley. 79. The 1959 beauty pageant queen also answered, "My mother," to the same question. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 12,1959. 80. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 21,1962. 81. "Thanks to Confucius," Special Chinese New Year Section, S.F. NewsCall Bulletin, February 2, i960, CHS, Box 4, Folder 2, Ethnic Studies Library, UCB. 82. H.K. Wong, "A Quintet of Fair Women," Chinese World, February 5, 1958; Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 12,1959, February 4, i960; Chinese Times, February 19, 1962; "Meanwhile: Miss SF Chinatown 1972 Brings in the New Year in HK," East/West, February 14,1973. 83. CNYFP, i960.

228

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84. The anxiety also manifested in the controversy over whether or not the general public should be invited to the celebration. Some felt that outsiders should not be considered a priority. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 25,1965. • 85. Seven judges were at the 1958 beauty pageant. Three out of six were from mainstream society while the seventh name was not disclosed. Chinese Times, February 6, 1958. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce usually invited celebrities from mainstream society and the ethnic community to be judges. Chinese Pacific Weekly, March 2,1967. 86. Chinese World, February 5,1958 [Chinese Section]; Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 12,1959. 87. Although ethnic defenders criticized the white standard of beauty, the Chinese American community had no strong rejection of interracial candidates as did the Japanese American community. For more information on mixed-race controversies in Japanese American beauty pageants, see Rebecca Chiyoko King "Multiraciality Reigns Supreme? Mixed-Race Japanese Americans and the Cherry Blossom Queen Pageant," Amerasia Journal 23 (1997): 113-128. 88. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 5,1948, September 3,1949. According to Joseph Roach, "the process of surrogation does not begin or end but continues as actual or perceived vacancies occur in the network of relations that constitutes the social fabric," Cities of the Dead: Circum-Atlantic Performance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 2. 89. The trip later included China when the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and other members of the old establishment recognized the potential commercial interests in China and, at the same time, Taiwan revoked its travel restriction and allowed citizens to visit China. 90. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). 91. Each raffle ticket was regarded as one vote. Chinese World, January 16,1957. 92. Yee, interview with the author. 93. Eliza Chan, "Interviews With Two Bay Area Beauty Pageant Contestants," East/West, February 4,1976. 94. Wong, "Miss Chinatown USA Pageant;" Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 8. 95. Lim P. Lee, "H.K. Wong, Sportsman, Community Leader, Par Excellence," Asian Week, April 29,1982. 96. Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay," 8. 97. Chinese Pacific Weekly, January 21, i960, February 16,1961, February 8,1962. 4. YELLOW

POWER

i. Joe Louie interview, Victor Nee and Brett De Bary Nee, Longtime Californ': A Documentary Study of An American Chinatown (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 343. NOTES

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2. George Chu, "A Wild Night in Old Chinatown," San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, March 9, 1969; "Chinatown Cherry Bombs Hit Police," San Francisco Chronicle, March 2, 1969; "Chinatown Riot After the Parade," San Francisco Chronicle, March 3,1969; Chinese World, March 4, 1969 [Chinese Section]; Chinese Pacific Weekly, March 6,1969. Two weeks before the Chinese New Year Festival, the police arrested two Chinese Americans, one Filipino American, and one African American for possession of a large amount of ammunition. The police never determined what the ammunition was for. Chinese Pacific Weekly, March 6,1969. An article in the San Francisco Examiner that explained the history of the Chinese New Year Festival called the incident "a race riot between young Chinese American gangs and bands of white thugs." The author suggested that it was "political radicals from SF State" who transformed the race riot into a clash with the police. Meanwhile, the Red Guard Party publication attributed the 1969 Chinese New Year Riot to the discriminatory behavior of the plainclothes policemen. Michael Dougan, "Parades: An American Invention," San Francisco Examiner, February 6, 2000; Chinese Pacific Weekly, March 20,1969. 3. Stanford Lyman refers to youth gangs' crimes and delinquency as "social banditry." See Lyman, Chinese Americans (New York: Random House, 1974), 162—163. For the studies on the Asian American movement and radicals, see Yen Le Espiritu, Asian American Panethnicity: Bridging Institutions and Identities (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992); William Wei, The Asian American Movement (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993); Stanford Lyman, The Asian in the West (Las Vegas: Desert Research Institute, 1970), 99—118; Daryl J. Maeda, "Black Panthers, Red Guards, and Chinamen: Constructing Asian American Identity through Performing Blackness, 1969—1972," American Quarterly 57, no. 4 (December 2005): 1079-1103; Steve Louie and Gleen K. Omatsu, eds., Asian Americans: The Movement and the Moment (Los Angeles: UCLA Asian American Studies Center Press, 2001); Fred Ho et al. eds., Legacy to Liberation: Politics and Culture of Revolutionary Asian Pacific America (San Francisco: AK Press, 2000); Laura Pulido, Black, Brown, Yellow, and Left: Radical Activism in Los Angeles (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006). As for studies on Chinese American gangs, see Lyman, The Asian in the West, 103-109; Christopher K. Loo, "The Emergence of San Francisco Chinese Juvenile Gangs from the 1950s to the Present" (master's thesis, San Jose State University, 1976); Ken Huang and Marc Pilisuk, "At the Threshold of the Golden Gate: Special Problems of a Neglected Minority," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 47, no. 4 (October 1977): 701-713; Paul Takagi and Tony Piatt, "Behind the Gilded Ghetto: An Analysis of Race, Class and Crime in Chinatown," Crime and Social Justice 9 (Spring-Summer 1978): 2—25. 4. George Lipsitz, Time Passages: Collective Memory and American Popular Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), chap. x. 230

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5- "Chinatown establishment," a term used by Victor and Brett de Bary Nee, refers to Chinatown entrepreneurs who often played important roles in family associations and community affairs. Nee & Nee, Longtime Californ', 228, 404-406. 6. William Orrick, Shut It Down! A College in Crisis: San Francisco State College, October, 1968-April, 1969: A Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention ofViolence (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 104. 7. San Francisco Department of City Planning, Chinatown JOI Study Staff Report (San Francisco: San Francisco Department of City Planning, 1972), 2; U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Table 20. Population of the 100 Largest Urban Places: 1970" (http://www.census.gov/population/documentation/twpsoo27/ tab20.txt). 8. San Francisco Department of City Planning, Chinatown 701 Study Staff Report, 2; in 1962 the tuberculosis rate was 104 per 100,000 inhabitants. It climbed to 164.2 in 1963, and then leveled off at 153.3 in 1964 and 146.8 in 1967. In comparison, the national tuberculosis rate in 1964 was 4.4, and the citywide rate in 1967 was 51.5. According to the Merck Manual ofDiagnosis and Therapy "high rates persist in congested areas of low living standards." L. Ling-Chi Wang, "Politics of Assimilation and Repression: History of the Chinese in the United States, 1940-1970." Manuscript, Ethnic Studies Library, University of California, Berkeley, 509; Robert Berbow, ed., The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy (Rahway, NJ: Merck Sharpe and Dohme Research Laboratories, nth edition, 1966), 1335. 9. Ronald Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 424. 10. Chinatown Study Group, Chinatown Report 1969 (New York: Chinatown Study Group, 1970), 56. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. State and Metropolitan Area Data Book (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1979), 39. Chinatown's poverty might have been even more severe than the census revealed. According to a study conducted by the San Francisco Department of Social Services, the average monthly income per family was $311. Dean Lan, "Chinatown Sweatshops," in Emma Gee, ed. Counterpoint: Perspectives on Asian America (Los Angeles: UCLA Asian American Studies Center Press, 1976), 252-253. 11. Chinese Pacific Weekly, January 25,1968; Yee, "Cracks in the Great Wall of Chinatown," 36; Gary Sala, "Immigrants Face Numerous Problems When Beginning Life Anew in U.S.," Chinese World, January 24,1969. Chinatown had 156 garment shops, most of which employed twenty-five people or fewer. Lyman, Chinese Americans, 154. 12. Chinatown Study Group, Chinatown Report 1969, 51. 13. Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 162-182. NOTES

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14- Sucheng Chan, Asian Americans: an Interpretive History (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1991), 198. 15. San Francisco Chinese Community Citizens' Survey and Fact-Finding Committee, San Francisco Chinese Community Citizens'Survey and Fact-Finding Committee Report (San Francisco: H.J. Carle & Sons, 1969), 6; San Francisco Department of City Planning, Chinatown 701 Study Staff Report (San Francisco: San Francisco Department of City Planning, 1972), 2. 16. Chinese Times, February 3,1969, translated by the author. 17. The term model minority was not explicitly coined until the late 1960s, yet the media had reported often on the good behavior of Chinese American youths since the 1950s. Chun, Of Orphans and Warriors, 89. For the media report of model Chinese American youths, see chap. 3, n. 65. 18. Rose Hum Lee, The Chinese in the United States of America (Hong Kong University Press, i960), 336, 338. 19. James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985), 29, 33. For the concept of resistance, see also Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990). 20. Kurt Robert Durig, "Social Change in San Francisco Chinatown" (master's thesis, San Francisco State College, 1961), 97; San Francisco Chinese Community Citizens' Survey and Fact-Finding Committee, San Francisco Chinese Community Citizens' Survey and Fact-Finding Committee Report, 135. 21. Ben Fong-Torres, "Chinatown Youth," San Francisco 11, no. 6 (June 1969): 26; Lyman, The Asian in the West, 104; Loo, "The Emergence of San Francisco Chinese Juvenile Gangs from the 1950s to the Present," 52. 22. Robin D. G Kelley, Race Rebels: Culture, Politics, and the Black Working Class (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 165-168. 23. "Punk War Hunting Business," Chinese Press, January 27,1950. 24. Lee, The Chinese in the United States of America, 337. 25. Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ', 357-358; Mike Mills, "Leway," San Francisco Chronicle, March 19, 1968; Ben Fong-Torres, "Self-Help for Chinatown Youth," East/West, March 20,1968. 26. Chinese Pacific Weekly, December 21,1961. 27. "Chinatown Frightened by Rising Crime," Chinese World, January 27, 1965. 28. Wah Ching is also spelled Hwa Ching. Rose Pak, "Chinatown Gangs," San Francisco Chronicle, July 6, 1972. The minimum wage was $1.25 in 1966, $1.40 in 1967, and $1.60 from 1968 to 1973. U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 2004-2005: The National Data Book (Washington, DC: U.S. G.P.O, 2004), 413. 29. Ken Wong, "Hong Kong Born Youth Group Plea for Chance," East/West, January 24, 1968; Ken Wong, "Youth Demand for Help Shakes Up Establish232

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ment," East/West, February 28,1968; Ken Wong, "Youths Make Formal Plea to Six Companies for Aid," East/West, March 13,1968; Leonard Nefit, "Chinatown: New Immigrants, New Woes," Chinese World, May 17,1968; Mike Mills, "Hong Kong Immigrants Chinatown's Jobless Young Men," San Francisco Chronicle, March 18,1968. 30. At the Human Rights meeting, the Chinatown Democratic Club and the San Francisco Greater Chinatown Community Service offered assistance. Others also donated money, but these donations were limited: the money raised was intended to build a clubhouse; the youth still needed financial support for education and job training. East/West editorialized that the community should seek help from city hall and government agencies. "Editorial: Something Done," EastiWest, February 28,1968. 31. Quoted in Lyman, The Asian in the West, 107. 32. Quoted in "Most Plea for Hwa Ching," East/West, March 13,1968. 33. "Six Co. Nixes Hwa Ching," East/West, March 20, 1968; "Generation Gap in Chinatown," Phoenix, reprinted in Chinese World, May 18,1968; Chinese Pacific Weekly, May 8,1968. 34. "Youths Make Formal Plea," East/West, March 13,1968, quoted in Lyman, The Asian in the West, 107. 35. "Youth's View," Chinese World, May 25,1968. 36. Quoted in Ko-Lin Chin, "Chinese Triad Societies, Tongs, Organized Crime, and Street Gangs in Asia and the United States" (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1986), 203. 37. Wei, The Asian American Movement, 14. 38. Edward D. Berkowitz, America's Welfare State: From Roosevelt to Reagan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 111. 39. Mike Mills, "Leway—The 'Self Helpers' of Chinatown," San Francisco Chronicle, March 19,1968; Ben Fong-Torres, "Self-Help for Chinatown Youth," East/West, March 20,1968. Chin, "Chinese Triad Societies," 203; Karen Umemoto, "'On Strike!' San Francisco State College Strike, 1968—1969: The Role of Asian American Students," in Contemporary Asian America: A Multidisciplinary Reader, ed. Min Zhou and James Gatewood (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 57. 40. Alex Hing, a former member of the Red Guard Party attributed the naming of the organization to Bobby Seale of the Black Panthers. Alex Hing, interviewed by Fred Ho and Steve Yip, in Legacy to Liberation: Politics and Culture of Revolutionary Asian Pacific America, ed. Fred Ho et al. (San Francisco: AK Press, 2000), 296. 41. Quoted in Lyman, The Asian in the West, 99. 42. Alex Hing, Legacy to Liberation, 286-287. 43. Chinese Pacific Weekly, June 26,1969. 44. Alex Hing, Legacy to Liberation, 288. NOTES

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45- Chinese Pacific Weekly, August 21, 1969; "Activities of the Red Guard Party," Getting Together 2 (March 15,1973): 4. 46. Maeda, "Black Panthers, Red Guards, and Chinamen," 1091—1092; Chinese Pacific Weekly, March 6,1969; Chinese Pacific Weekly, May 8,1969; Stanford Lyman, "Red Guard on Grant Avenue: The Rise of Youthful Rebellion in Chinatown," in Asian-Americans: Psychological Perspectives, ed. Stanley Sue and Nathaniel N. Wagner (Palo Alto: Science and Behavior Books, Inc, 1973), 20; "Red Guard, Appendix I: Red Guard Program and Rules, 1969," in Legacy to Liberation: Politics and Culture of Revolutionary Asian Pacific America, ed. Fred Ho et al. (San Francisco: AK Press, 2000), 402. 47. Chinese Pacific Weekly, March 27,1969. 48. Laura Ho, "Red Guard Party," Gidra (May 1969): 4, 7. 49. Alex Hing, Legacy to Liberation, 286. 50. Wei, The Asian American Movement, 15. 51. Umemoto, "On Strike!," 55; William Wei, however, wrote that the ICSA was formed in November 1967. Wei, The Asian American Movement, 17. Dennis Flanders and Eddie Chin, "Poor Youths Hope," Chinese World, May 20, 1968; Dennis Flanders, "Social Action—SFSC Chinese Students Break Passive Mold," East/West, June 5,1968. Wei, The Asian American Movement, 17. 52. Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ', 360-371. The Asian Community Center changed to Wei Min She in 1971. Him Mark Lai, "China and the Chinese American Community: The Political Dimension," Chinese America: History and Perspectives (1999): 13. 53. Steve Yip, "Serve the People-Yesterday and Today," in Legacy to Liberation: Politics and Culture of Revolutionary Asian Pacific America, ed. Fred Ho et al. (San Francisco: AK Press, 2000), 15—30. 54. See, for example, articles in Phoenix, a weekly San Francisco State University student newspaper, and in Gidra, a UCLA student newspaper. 55. Chinese Pacific Weekly, March 27,1969. 56. Quoted in Wei, The Asian American Movement, 13-14. 57. Chinese Pacific Weekly, August 22, 29,1968; "Demonstration Ends Chinatown Passivity," EastiWest, August 28, 1968; Wang, "Politics of Assimilation and Repression," 576. The San Francisco Board of Supervisors allocated $70,000 for the construction of the Chinatown gateway. San Francisco Chronicle, March 26,1967. The editorial in the EastiWest also called to divert the Chinatown gateway funding to build a recreational or educational center for immigrant youths, or more housing to relieve the shortage in Chinatown. "Editorial: Our Less-ThanTriumphant Chinatown Gateway," East/West, April 1,1967. 58. Drew McKillips, "Opening a Gate to Chinatown," San Francisco Chronicle, October 19,1970.

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59- "Asian Youth Rally Against War and Chinatown Poverty," East/West, May 20,1970. 60. Carmen Chow, Gidra (June 1971): 13; Fred Ho, "Fists For Revolution: The Revolutionary History of I Wor Kuen/League of Revolutionary Struggle," in Legacy to Liberation: Politics and Culture of Revolutionary Asian Pacific America, ed. Fred Ho et al. (San Francisco: AK Press, 2000), 6. 61. Founded in New York's Chinatown in 1969, "IWK was named after a peasant organization that tried to expel foreigners from China in the Boxer Uprising (1900). Its members identified with the 'revolutionary spirit' of the boxers and rejected the stereotype of Chinese as passive victims of exploitation." I Wei, The Asian American Movement, 212-214. 97°» I Wor Kuen came to organize Leway and the Red Guard Party in San Francisco, building a national I Wor Kuen. It sought to raise class consciousness in Chinatown by introducing Marxism and Maoism. Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ', 371. 62. Rocky Chin, "New York Chinatown Today: Community in Crisis," in Roots: An Asian American Reader, ed. Amy Tachiki et al. (Los Angeles: Continental Graphics, 1971), 287. 63. Shih-Shan Henry Tsai, The Chinese Experience in America (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 166—167. 64. Steve Estes, I Am A Man!: Race, Manhood, and the Civil Rights Movement (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005). 65. Bill Moore, "Street Gangs of Chinatown," San Francisco Chronicle, August 13,1969. 66. Alex Hing, Legacy to Liberation, 284; Ho, "Red Guard Party," Gidra (May 1969): 4, 7. 67. Frances M. Beal, "Women in the Black Liberation Movement: Three Views," in Sisterhood Is Powerful: An Anthology ofWritings from the Women's Liberation Movement, ed. Robin Morgan (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), 385; Estes, I Am A Man!, chapter 7. 68. Dinora Gil, "Yellow Prostitution," Gidra (April 1969): 2; Wilma Chen, "Movement Contradiction," Gidra (January 1971): 8. 69. Quoted in Espiritu, Asian American Panethnicity, 47-48. 70. Espiritu, Asian American Panethnicity, 47. 71. Helen Zia, Asian American Dreams: The Emergence of American People (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2000), 18—19. 72. Dolly Veale, "Mao More Than Ever!" in Legacy to Liberation: Politics and Culture of Revolutionary Asian Pacific America, ed. Fred Ho et al. (San Francisco: AK Press, 2000), 192. The Black Panther leader Huey Newton later began to support feminist organizations and gay rights groups. Estes, I Am a Man!, 174—175. 73. Similar conflicts also arose in the black liberation movement. Beal, "Women in the Black Liberation Movement," 382—387.

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74- According to William Wei, the Asian American women's movement was not part of the mainstream women's liberation movement. Wei, The Asian American Movement, 73. For the history of women's liberation movement, see Sara Evans, Personal Politics: The Roots of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left (New York: Knopf, 1979); Winifred D. Wandersee, On the Move: American Women in the 1970s (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988); Alice Echols, Daring to Be Bad: Radical Feminism in America, 1967—1975 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989); Barbara Ryan, Feminism and the Women's Movement: Dynamics of Change in Social Movement, Ideology and Activism (New York: Routledge, 1992). 75. "Women in China," Gidra (September 1972): 12-13. 76. In recent years, however, many scholars have concluded that the PRC failed to liberate Chinese women. See Kay Ann Johnson, Women, the Family, and Peasant Revolution in China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Margery Wolf, Revolution Postponed: Women in Contemporary China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985); Philis Andors, The Unfinished Liberation of Chinese Women, 1949-1980 (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1983); and Judith Stacey, Patriarchy and Socialist Revolution in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). 77. Chinese Pacific Weekly, May 8,1969. 78. Juanita Tamayo Lott, "Growing Up, 1968-1985," in Making Waves: An Anthology of Writings By and About Asian American Women, ed. Asian Women United of California (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), 354. 79. "Laureen Chew," Asian Week, August 31—September 6, 2001. 80. Mark J. Jue, "Former SF State Students Discuss 1968 Strike and Its Meaning Now," East/West, November 2,1983. 81. "Laureen Chew," Asian Week. 82. Wei, The Asian American Movement, 78. 83. Zia, Asian American Dreams, 18, 20. 84. Lauren Chew interview, quoted in Chun, Of Orphans and Warriors, 178-179. 85. Jue, "Former SF State Students Discuss 1968 Strike." 86. Estes, I Am a Man!, 169. 87. "Asian Women's Center," Gidra (January 1973): 14-15. 88. International Hotel Women's Collective, "Sisterhood is Powerful," in Asian Women (Berkeley: University of California, 1971), 122-124. 89. Gidra (January I97i):i2. 90. Zia, Asian American Dreams, 19. 91. Espiritu, Asian American Panethnicity, 47—48; Sisters of Asian Women Center, "Asian Women's Center," Gidra (December 1973): 15. 92. Espiritu, Asian American Panethnicity, 48. 93. Alex Hing, Legacy to Liberation, 290-292; Moritsugu "Mo" Nishida, interviewed by Fred Ho, in Legacy to Liberation: Politics and Culture ofRevolu236

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tionary Asian Pacific America, ed. Fred Ho et al. (San Francisco: AK Press, 2000), 305; "I Wor Kuen: 12 Point Platform and Program," in Legacy to Liberation: Politics and Culture of Revolutionary Asian Pacific America, ed. Fred Ho et al. (San Francisco: AK Press, 2000), 406. 94. "A Manifesto by the CCBA Regarding Chinese Youth Problems," September 1, 1968, Asian American Studies Library, University of California, Berkeley; Ken Wong, "Six Co. Gets the Word," East/West, September 18,1968. 95. Quoted in Jue, "Former SF State Students Discuss 1968 Strike and Its Meaning Now," East/West. 96. Ling-Chi Wang, interview with the author, Berkeley, March 13, 2002. 97. Jade Fong, "The Chi-Am Corner," East/West, July 19, 1972; C.M. Lee, "Six Companies No Help At All," Chinese World, June 5,1968. 98. "Candidate Lau Urges Chinatown Multi-Center," East/West, July 30,1969. 99. Lisa Mah interview, Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ', 166. 100. W.K. Wong interview, Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ, 247. W.K. Wong is the pseudonym of H. K. Wong. 101. "Letter to the Editor: Disappointed," East/West, March 10,1971. 102. The exception was the Chinese Pacific Weekly, which regarded the problem as a social issue. Chinese Pacific Weekly, April 3,1969. 103. James Chin, "Chinese American Race Relations," East/West, March 11, 1967. 104. Quoted in Chin, "Problems of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism Among Chinese-Americans in San Francisco," 94. 105. Chu, "A Wild Night in Old Chinatown." 106. Joan Lowe [pseud.], interview with the author, San Francisco, July 14, 1998; Beverley Lee, interview with the author, San Francisco, June 4, 1999; Hillary Wong [pseud.], interview with the author, San Francisco, June 11,1999; East/West, February 18,1970. 107. Lee, interview with the author. 108. Warren Mar, "From Pool Halls to Building Workers' Organizations: Lessons for Today's Activists," in Asian Americans: The Movement and the Moment, eds. Steve Louie and Glenn K. Omatsu (California, UCLA Asian American Studies Center Press, 2001), 36. The city government began to actively recruit bilingual police officers after the Chinese for Affirmative Action filed a lawsuit in 1973. Peter Chan, "Community Groups Speak Out on Police Relations, Social Issues," East/West, February 16,1983; Gloria Choi, and Katie Choy, "SF State Reacts to 'Racist' Report," EastfWest, October 10,1973. 109. Estes, LAm a Man!, 156-157. no. Chinese Times, March 1,1969. hi. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce received $3,000 from the carnival. Chinese Pacific Weekly, August 22,1968; "Editorial: A Million Dollar Idea Free to NOTES

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the Chamber," EastfWest, January 10, 1968; "Editorial: Chamber's Carnival, East/West, August 7, 1968; Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 20, 1969, February 26, 1976. Susan Yee [pseud.], interview with the author, Torrance, California, April 14, 2002. 112. Chinese American gangs were found fighting among themselves, assaulting visitors, and throwing cherry bombs during the carnival. Ken Wong, "New Year Festivities Marred by Violence in the Streets," East/West, February 14,1968. 113. Chinese Pacific Weekly, March 2,1967. 114. East/West, March 1,1967. The first Miss Chinatown U.S.A. pageant was held at the Great China Theatre in Chinatown. 115. Frank Eng interview, Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ', 161. 116. Chinese Pacific Weekly, March 9,1961. 117. " 'Virginian to Grand Marshal New Year Parade," Chinese World, January 24,1966. 118. Quoted in "Reflections on Chinese New Year—2 Views." 119. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 25,1965. 120. San Francisco News-Call Bulletin, February 9,1965; Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ, 161; "Editorial: Chinese Chamber of Commerce Chinese New Year Banquet," Chinese World, March 12, 1966; "Chinese Parade Protest," San Francisco Examiner, January 26, 1966. Starting in 1981, "the parade route was changed to include Union Square, bypassing Grant Avenue." Miss Chinatown U.S.A. Pageant Souvenir Program, 1995, Chinese Chamber of Commerce. 121. Wong interview, Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ, 247. 122. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 25,1965; San Francisco Chronicle, February 27,1966. 123. David Lei, interview with the author, San Francisco, May 24,1998. 124. Chinese New Year Festival Program, 1965, Chinese Chamber of Commerce. 125. Quoted in Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 21; "Editorial: Dialogue with the Young," EastfWest, August 14, 1968; "New Year Fete, Youth Groups Do Own Things," East/West, February 19,1969 ; "Editorial: Only a 'Fair' Fair," East/West, March 19,1969. The Youth Street Fair was not the first alternative celebration. In 1967 the East/West News Magazine and Gum Sahn Tours featured a celebration including Chinese art, Beijing opera, and folk dances. East/West, February 11,1967. 126. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 27,1969; "Fair for the Real Chinatown," San Francisco Chronicle, February 27,1969. 127. Chinese American city hall employees made the same demand. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 27, 1969; Chinese World, February 6, 1969; "Many Absent at Galileo High For the Chinese New Year," San Francisco Examiner, February 6,1970; "New Year Protest," San Francisco Chronicle, February 7,1970; Ben Fong-Torres, "Galileo Protest," East/West, February 11, 1970; "Editorial: New Year off!" East/West, February 11,1970. 238

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128. Grande Lum, "SF School District Instructs Staff to Be Sensitive to Lunar New Year," East/West, February 18,1988. 129. Bill Lee, Chinese Playground: A Memoir (San Francisco: Rhapsody Press, 1999), 22-23. His father never beat him or his brother because they were "the boys." 130. Although using violence to deal with racial tensions was not a male privilege, the sources I read seldom include information on women who resorted to the same strategy. 131. Gus Lee, China Boy: A Novel (New York: Dutton Books, 1991), 3-4. 132. Louie interview, Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ', 339-340. 133. Fong interview, Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ, 347. 134. Louie interview, Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ, 339-340; Mar, "From Pool Halls to Building Workers' Organizations," 35. 135. Lee, Chinese Playground, 62; Lyman, The Asian in the West, 105. 136. Chinese Pacific Weekly, June 23, i960. 137. Buck Wong, "Need for Awareness: An Essay on Chinatown, San Francisco," in Roots: An Asian American Reader, ed. Amy Tachiki et al. (Los Angeles: Continental Graphics, 1971), 270. 138. Fong interview, Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ, '346-347. 139. Joe Louie interview, Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ, 341. 140. Lee, Chinese Playground, 6j, 344. 141. Louie interview, Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ,' 342. 142. Linda Yee, "Gentlemen Crooks," East/West, November 28,1973. 143. Quoted in Lyman, The Asian in the West, 109. 144. Fong interview, Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ,'345. 145. East/West, May 8,1968 [Chinese Section]; Chinese Pacific Weekly, March 20,1969. 146. Viet Thanh Nguyen, Race and Resistance: Literature and Politics in Asian America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 88. 147. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 14,1963. 148. East/West, March 20,1968 [Chinese Section]. 149. East/West, May 8,1968 [Chinese Section], 150. "City to Protect Chinese Parade," San Francisco Chronicle, March 3,1969. Chinese American community newspapers offered no in-depth discussion concerning the 1969 Chinese New Year riot. For example, the Chinese Pacific Weekly only translated George Chu's article "A Wild Night in Old Chinatown," from the Sunday Examiner and Chronicle. Chinese Pacific Weekly, March 20,1969. 151. "City to Protect Chinese Parades," San Francisco Chronicle, March 3, 1969. 152. "City to Protect Chinese Parades," San Francisco Chronicle; James Chin, "Chinese-American Race Relations," EastfWest, March 11, 1967; San Francisco Chronicle, August n, 12,13, 20,1969; San Francisco Examiner, August 14,15,16, 17,18,1969. NOTES

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239

153- Bill Moore, "One Chinatown View," San Francisco Chronicle, August 15, 1969. 154. Ken Wong, "Help the Poor," East/West, April 16,1969. 155. Tong [tang] means hall in Chinese. According to Sucheng Chan, in the United States the term refers to the "fraternal organizations" that bind "members together through secret initiation rites and sworn brotherhood." Chan, Asian Americans, 67. While some of the Wah Ching members were adopted by Tongs, others refused to be associated with Tongs and formed Chung Yee, which the media often referred to as the Joe Fong Gang or Joe Boys. Even members who were part of Tongs rarely obeyed their orders religiously. Sometimes, warfare broke out between them and Tongs. Calvin Toy, "A Short History of Asian Gangs in San Francisco "Justice Quarterly 9, no. 4 (December 4, 1992): 655-659; "The Gangs of Chinatown," Newsweek (July 2,1973): 22. The number of crimes increased significantly to 2,549 i n I 97° and 2,652 in 1971. Even though the dramatic increase reflected the different methods of defining larceny (including both petty theft and burglary), the number of crimes was indeed quite significant. R. W. Davis, "Major Crimes Rate Up in Chinatown," East/West, March 1,1972; San Francisco Chinese Community Citizens' Survey and Fact-Finding Committee, San Francisco Chinese Community Citizens'Survey and Fact-Finding Committee Report, 135. 156. Chinese Pacific Weekly, September 11,1969. 157. Charles Howe and Rose Pak, "How Gangs Are Terrorizing SF Chinatown," San Francisco Chronicle, July 4,1972. 158. Chalsa Loo, Chinatown: Most Time, Hard Time (New York: Praeger, I99i). 53-54159. Mayor Alioto denied the request from Chinese American representatives for federal funding to build housing and other community infrastructure because he believed that Chinatown was "not a ghetto" and the housing density was "by choice." "Chinatown Is Not a Ghetto," EastfWest, July 2,1975. 160. Similar problems also prevailed in other Chinatowns such as those in New York and Los Angeles. 161. Between the late 1960s and the 1977 Golden Dragon Massacre, at least fifty Chinese American gang members were killed. Max Millard, "The Golden Dragon Massacre: Ten Years Later, Chinatown Is Safer," AsiAm 7, no. 9 (September 1989): 54. 162. The turning point for New York's Chinatown was the 1982 shooting at a Chinatown bar. As the result of high profile gang violence, Hollywood began to portray Chinatown as a lawless place, with films such as The Year of the Dragon and China Girl. For New York's Chinatown gang, see Ko-Lin Chin, Chinatown Gangs: Extortion, Enterprise, and Ethnicity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

240

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99

Because the sensationalized coverage of Chinatown gang violence hurt business significantly, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in San Francisco expanded the Moon Festival to attract tourists. Peter Kuehl, "A Parade to Drum Up Business in Chinatown," San Francisco Chronicle, September 28,1977. 163. Wong [pseud.], interview with the author; Calvin Lee, interview with the author, San Francisco, June 12,1999. 164. Susan Rosegrant, "What Does It Take to Finance a Parade?" East/West, March 8,1978. 165. Tom Wolfe, "New Yellow Peril," Esquire 72 (December 1969): 190-199. 166. The Chinatown-North Beach Economic Opportunity Council was established in 1965. It then formed the English Language Center, Planned Parenthood, Self Help for the Elderly, Neighborhood Legal Assistance, and the Summer Youth Program. The Northeast Medical Services was launched in 1968, while the Youth Services and Coordinating Center in 1970. In 1971, On Lok Senior Health Services was established. As for the Chinatown Neighborhood Improvement Center, it was built in 1977. The growth of these organizations was the result of the ethnic and civil rights movements. Him Mark Lai, Gonghuaqiao dao huaren-ershi shiji: Meiguo huaren shehuifazhan shi. [From Overseas Chinese to Chinese American; The history of the development of Chinese American society in the twentieth century] (Hong Kong: Sanlian Shudian, 1992), 472. 5. H E A T E D D E B A T E ON T H E E T H N I C

BEAUTY

PAGEANT

1. Lorena Tong, "Miss Chinatown Cynthia Gouw Insists She Is Not the 'Beauty Pageant' Type," East/West, December 5,1984. 2. Wally Lee, "Los Angeles Entrant Wins 1984 Miss Chinatown USA Title," East/West, February 15, 1984; Quoted in Judy Tzu-Chun Wu, '"Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!': Representations of Ethnic and Gender Identity in the Miss Chinatown U.S.A. Beauty Pageant," Journal of Social History 31, no. 1 (September 1997): 25; Tong, "Miss Chinatown Cynthia Gouw." 3. Frances Leventhal, "Former Miss Chinatown Lands 'Star Trek' Role," Asian Week, October 14, 1988; English-language Chinese New Year Parade recording, 1993, K T V U . 4. Tong, "Miss Chinatown Cynthia Gouw." 5. Beverly R. Picache, "Cynthia Gouw," Asian Week, February 14,1992. 6. "Queen Stefanie," Asian Week, January 28,1982. 7. Kati Wang [pseud.] and Fiona Yep [pseud.], telephone interview with the author, July 24, 2002. 8. Cynthia D. Chin-Lee, "An Inside Look at the Miss Chinatown Pageant," East/West, January 20,1982. 9. Wang and Yep, interview with the author. 10. Esther Li, interview with the author, San Francisco, June 3,1999.

NOTES

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241

11. Field notes, February 16, 2002. 12. "Rose Chungs Message," Asian Week, January 21,1982. 13. Folk Kuhn, "Shirley Tom," East West, January 29,1975. 14. Evelyn Hsu, "A New Year for Miss Chinatown," San Francisco Chronicle, February 23,1980. 15. Miss Chinatown U.S.A. Pageant Souvenir Program [hereafter MCPSP], 1990, Chinese Chamber of Commerce [hereafter CCC]. 16. Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 19. 17. Joan Lowe [pseud.] interviewed with the author, July 14, 1998, San Francisco. 18. Chin-Lee, "An Inside Look at the Miss Chinatown Pageant." 19. Kati Wang [pseud.], Asian Employees Association Scholarship Awards Dinner Speech, June 4, 1999 [author's possession]; Wang and Yep, interview with the author. The Chinese New Year Festival Program listed Wang's age at the time of the competition as eighteen. 20. Wang and Yep, interview with the author. 21. See, for example, Chinese Times, January 13,1968. 22. Shirley Jennifer Lim, "Contested Beauty: Asian American Women's Cultural Citizenship during the Early Cold War Era," in Asian/Pacific Islander American Women: A Historical Anthology, ed. Shirley Hune and Gail M. Nomura (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 192. 23. Leslie Ong [pseud.], phone interview with the author, August 4, 2002. 24. Bobble Lee, "Lees, Up To $5,000 for a Daughter in Pageant," Asian Week, April 4,1986. 25. Lee, "Lees, Up To $5,000 for a Daughter in Pageant." 26. Edilberto G. Lim, "Yeelina Chiu," Asian Week, April 23,1981. 27. Janet Lowe, "Miss Chinatown, San Francisco," Chinese New Year Festival Program [hereafter CNYFP], 1981, CCC, 23. 28. Hsu, "A New Year for Miss Chinatown." 29. Stefanie Shiu, "Stefanie Shiu," Asian Week, February 17,1983. 30. Lon Kurashige, Japanese American Celebration and Conflict: A History of Ethnic Identity and Festival in Los Angeles, 1934—1990 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 174. 31. Wang and Yep, interview with the author. 32. Chin-Lee, "An Inside Look at the Miss Chinatown Pageant." 33. John Lum, "The Miss San Leandro Contest," East/West, May 1972, quoted in Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 19. 34. Sarah Banet-Weiser, The Most Beautiful Girl in the World: Beauty Pageants and National Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Lim, "Contested Beauty," 193. 35. Hsu, "A New Year for Miss Chinatown." 36. Lim, "Contested Beauty," 193. 2 4 2

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37- Asian American Center, "Miss Chinatown—A Cultural Event?" 38. "In Search of Empowerment," San Francisco Business, July 1985, 6—11. 39. Li, interview with the author. 40. The anxiety over ethnic identity also manifested in the controversy over if the general public should be invited to the celebration; some felt that outsiders should not be considered a priority and insisted on changing the festival sponsor from the Chinese Chamber of Commerce to the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 25,1965. 41. Paul Hui, "Alice Kong Also Ran," East/West, February 20,1974, quoted in Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 16. Up to 1987, "the average height of Miss Chinatown U.S.A." was "5 feet 5.3 inches." MCPSP, 1987, CCC. 42. She also commented, "The contest just shows that the Chinese aren't good enough for the white's beauty contest, so they have to have their own." "What do you think about the Miss Chinatown U.S.A. Beauty Contest," East/West, January 27,1971, quoted in Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 15. 43. Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 16. 44. Chinese Times, February 6,1968. 45. Chinese Pacific Weekly, January 22,1970. 46. Gilbert Woo, "The Role of Chinese American Women," Chinese Pacific Weekly, May 27, 1976, translated by Donald Golden, reprinted in East/West, June 9,1976. 47. Li, interview with the author. 48. Abiola Sinclair, "Black Hair and the Cultural/Political Movement of the 1960s," in The Harlem Cultural/Political Movements, 1960—1970, ed. Abiola Sinclair (New York: Gumbs & Thomas Publishers, 1995), 69-72; Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 13,1969. 49. Yen Huang, "Chinese New Year and Tradition, " Getting Together, January 26,1974 [Chinese Section]. 50. Lee, "Lees, Up to $5,000 for a Daughter in Pageant." 51. Luin, "Reflections on Chinese New Year—2 Views." 52. Chinatown Study Group, Chinatown Report 1969 (New York: Chinatown Study Group 1970), 51. 53. Chinese Pacific Weekly, September 6,1962. 54. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 21,1958. 55. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 21,1958; Maitland Zane, "She's Miss Chinatown U.S.A.," San Francisco Chronicle, February 20,1967. 56. Chin-Lee, "An Inside Look at the Miss Chinatown Pageant." 57. Quoted in Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 23. 58. Beth Bailey, Sex in the Heartland (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). 59. Kathy Peiss, Cheap Amusements: Working Women and Leisure in Turn-ofthe-Century New York (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 112-114. NOTES

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243

60. Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 23. Moy's strategy proved to be too daring for the beauty pageant committee. She lost the competition in San Francisco, although she was crowned "Miss New York Chinatown." Jade Fong, "The Chi-Am Corner," East/West, March 1,1972. 61. Wang and Yep, interview with the author. 62. Luin, "Reflections on Chinese New Year—2 Views." 63. Lester Chang, "The Hectic Pace of the Beauty Pageant Housemother," East/West, January 31,1979. 64. Bradford Woo, "An Escorts Look at the Miss Chinatown Pageantry," East/West, March 8,1978. 65. Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 16. 66. Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 20-21. 67. Wang and Yep, interview with the author. 68. Shirley Sun, "Tall and Lissome Jennifer Chung Fulfills Her Childhood Dream," East/West, February 21,1967, cited in Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 21. 69. Asian Week, February 10, 2000. 70. Laird Harrison, "Quiet Debate on Beauty Pageants," Asian Week, March 14,1986. 71. Chinese Pacific Weekly, April 16,1962. 72. For the history of second-wave feminism, see Sara Evans, Personal Politics: The Roots of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left (New York: Knopf, 1979); Alice Echols, Daring To be Bad: Radical Feminism in America, 1967-1975 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989). In 1968, New York Radical Feminists staged a protest at the Miss America beauty pageant and crowned a live sheep "Miss America." Echols, Daring To be Bad, 92-95. 73. "The 'Costs' of Chinese Celebration," San Francisco Examiner, February 15.197774. San Francisco Journal, January 29,1975 [Chinese Section]. 75. "Editorial: An Alternative to the Pageant," East/West, February 19,1975. 76. Chin-Lee, "An Inside Look at the Miss Chinatown Pageant." 77. Sheri Tan, "Different Strokes for Different Folks," Asian Week, March 22, 1985. 78. Chinese World, February 8,1968 [Chinese Section], 79. Gordin Chin, interview, "What do you think about the Miss Chinatown U.S.A. Beauty Contest," East/West, January 27,1971. 80. Genny Lim, "The Selling of Miss Chinatown U.S.A.," East/West, February 19,1975. 81. Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 18. 82. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 17,1972.

244

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83. CNYFP, 1974, CCC, cited in Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 23. 84. CNYFP, 1984, CCC, 40. 85. Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 22-23. 86. Dreic McKillips, "Minnesota Girl Wins Title," San Francisco Chronicle, February 11, 1971, cited in Wu, '"Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 22. 87. Eliza Chan, "Interviews With Two Bay Area Beauty Pageant Contestants," East/West, February 4,1976, quoted in Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 20. 88. Judy Quan, "Three Queen Contestants," East/West, February 16,1972. 89. Chan, "Interviews With Two Bay Area Beauty Pageant Contestants." 90. Thanks to Charlene Tung for this idea. 91. Wang and Yep, interview with the author. 92. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 15,1973, translated by the author. 93. Chinese Pacific Weekly, September 24, 1964, reprinted in "Women's Rights," Hu Jingnan Wenji [Gilbert Woo Anthology], (Hong Kong: Xiangjiang chuban youxian gongsi, 1991), 254-256. 94. Chinese Pacific Weekly, January 16,1975. 95. Chan, "Interviews With Two Bay Area Beauty Pageant Contestants." 96. Judy Yung, Chinese Women of America: A Pictorial History (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1986), 106. 97. Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 24,1972. 98. Lim, "Yeelina Chiu: A Proud Princess." 99. "A Parting Queens Reflections," Asian Week, February 26,1981. 100. Harrison, "Quiet Debate on Beauty Pageants." The critique on the Miss Chinatown U.S.A. beauty pageant resurfaced in 2000, but the focus was on the fierce competition, rather than the middle-class-oriented approach and sexist dimension. Asian Week, February 10, 2000. 101. Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 25. 102. Harrison, "Quiet Debate on Beauty Pageants." 103. The Day Care Center was opened in 1984. Xiaolan Bao, "Politicizing Motherhood: Chinese Garment Workers' Campaign for Daycare Centers in New York City, 1977-1982," in Asian/Pacific Islander American Women: A Historical Anthology, ed. Shirley Hune and Gail M. Nomura (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 286-300. 104. Linda Trinh Vo, Mobilizing An Asian American Community (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004), 8. 105. Genny Lim, "The Selling of Miss Chinatown," East/West, February 19,1975. 106. Carolyn C. Gan, "Ivy Hsu Captures 1994 Miss Chinatown U.S.A. Crown," Chinatown News, March 3,1994.

NOTES

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2

45

I07- Edward Park, "A Crown of Dignity," Asian Week, February 10, 2000. 108. Field notes, February 16, 2002. 109. The decline of the ethnic beauty pageant is also reflected in its decreasing revenues. In the past, its profits subsidized other festival activities. However, in the last few years, it has been funded by profits generated from the parade. 6. HYBRIDITY

IN C U L T U R E ,

MEMORY, AND

POLITICS

1. "Spring Festival," East/West, March 2, 1977 [Chinese Section]; Lester W. Chang, "400,000 Jam Parade Route to See Dragon Usher in the New Year," East/West, March 9,1977. 2. Rose Pak, "Busy Preparations for the Chinese New Year," San Francisco Chronicle, February 2,1973. 3. Susan Yee [pseud.], interview with the author, April 14, 2002, Torrance, California. 4. Quoted in English-language Chinese New Year Parade recording [hereafter ELCNYPR], 1996, KTVU. 5. Tung Pok Chin, Paper Son: One Mans Story (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001), 139. 6. William Wong, Yellow Journalist: Dispatches from Asian America (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001), 45—48. 7. Yee, interview with the author. 8. "Editorial: Old Traditions With New Meaning," East/West, February 11,1981. 9. Evelyn Hsu, "Foot-Dragging Over Chinese Parade," San Francisco Chronicle, January 30,1982. 10. "The 'Costs' of Chinese Celebration," San Francisco Examiner, February 15.197711. "Carole's Barrel," EastfWest, February 18,1970; quoted in Judy Tzu-Chun Wu, " 'Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!' Representations of Ethnic and Gender Identity in the Miss Chinatown U.S.A. Beauty Pageant," Journal of Social History 31, no. 1 (September 1997): 18. 12. David Lei, interview with the author, San Francisco, May 29,1999. 13. L.A. Chung, "Neighborhood's Future in Question," San Francisco Chronicle, April 25,1985. 14. Although the Chinatown establishment had political ties with Taiwan, where Mandarin was the dominant language, the dialect was not welcomed in Chinatown. 15. Gus Lee, China Boy: A Novel (New York: Dutton Books, 1991), 241. Most older immigrants spoke one of the Cantonese subdialects, like Sam Yup and Sze Yup. Newer immigrants generally spoke Mandarin or other dialects. 16. Vivian Chiang, interview with the author, June 16,1999, San Francisco. 17. Quoted in Michel S. Laguerre, The Global Ethnopolis: Chinatown, Japantown andManilatown in American Society (New York: St. Martins Press, 2000), 41. 246

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18. "The Legacy of Chinatown," Asian Week, May 31,1996. 19. Julie Smith, "A Little Tiff at the Chinese New Year," San Francisco Chronicle, February 18,1977. 20. Smith, "A Little Tiff at the Chinese New Year." 21. EastfWest, March 26,1976 [Chinese Section]. 22. Quoted in Ben R. Tong, "The Ghetto of the Mind: Notes on the Historical Psychology of Chinese America," Amerasia Journal 1, no. 3 (November 1971): 22. 23. "Six Companies No Help at All," Chinese World, June 5, 1968. 24. Raul Ramirez, "Chiu Chou Immigrants Bring Mercantile Spirit," San Francisco Examiner, August 3, 1987; "Snaking Dragon Climaxes Chinese New Year Parade," San Jose Mercury-News, March 7,1986. 25. "Editorial: Who Speaks for the Chinese-Americans?" East/West, August 1, 1973. The goal of the Organization of Chinese Americans (OCA), established in the District of Columbia in 1973, was to urge Chinese Americans and Asian Americans to participate in mainstream politics and to increase their political, economic, and cultural power. OCA Newsletter. Community Organizations Folder, San Francisco Public Library, Chinatown Branch. 26. Chung, "Neighborhoods Future in Question." 27. "Orangeland Voted Down," Asian Week, August 16,1985; Edward Iwata, "Beneath Serene and Thriving Surface, Old Battles Live On," Los Angeles Times, January 15,1990. 28. Iwata, "Beneath Serene and Thriving Surface." 29. Quoted in Aihwa Ong, "Limits to Cultural Accumulation: Chinese Capitalists on the American Pacific Rim," in Toward a Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Nationalism Reconsidered, ed. Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Bäsch, and Christina Blanc-Szanton (New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1992), 137; Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics ofTransnationality (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 176. 30. "Role for Mosk in Chinatown Parade," San Francisco Chronicle, February 1,1971. 31. "This Is the City of 46 Centuries," Chinese New Year Festival Program [hereafter CNYFP], 1965, Chinese Chamber of Commerce [hereafter CCC]. 32. "This Is the City of 46 Centuries," CNYFP, 1965, CCC. 33. "Gum San Wah Fow," CNYFP, 1967, CCC. 34. Mary Young, Mules and Dragons: Popular Culture Images in the Selected Writings of African-American and Chinese-American Women Writers (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 145. 35. Kai-Yu Hsu, "The Sing-Song and the Bird-Scratches," CNYFP, 1965, CCC. 36. Charles L. Leong, "San Francisco Chinatown"; Young G. Lee, "Oakland Chinatown and Its O.C.C.A."; Carolyn Gan, "Los Angeles Chinatowns"; NOTES

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2 4 7

Florence J. Chinn, "Honolulu Chinatown"; "New York Chinatown," CNYFP, 1974, CCC. 37. "Introduction to Chinatown," CNYFP, 1986, CCC, 46-47. 38. "Chinatown for All," CNYFP, 1981, CCC, 25. 39. Rick Jen Wong, "Chinatown," Miss Chinatown U.S.A. Pageant Souvenir Program (hereafter MCPSP), 1987, CCC, 44. 40. Although the way in which the Chinese American identity was presented in the souvenir program was simplistic, it nevertheless showed a shift from the previous years. 41. "Retaining Chinese Culture," CNYFP, 1972, CCC, 33. 42. "Pioneers," CNYFP, 1972, CCC, 17. 43. Sam Chu Lin, "A Centinnial [sic]," CNYFP, 1982, CCC, 24, 37. 44. Lin, "A Centinnial," 24, 37. 45. "Chinatown for All," CNYFP, 1981, CCC, 25. 46. "A History of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce," MCPSP, 1988, CCC, 16. 47. "Chinatown for All," CNYFP, 1981, 25. 48. Lee, "Oakland Chinatown and Its O.C.C.A." 49. "Community Organizations," CNYFP, 1972, CCC, 32. 50. "The 'Costs' of Chinese Celebration," San Francisco Examiner. 51. Chang, "400,000 Jam Parade Route to See Dragon Usher in the New Year." 52. Lei, interview with the author. 53. David Lei, interview with the author, San Francisco, May 14,1999. 54. San Francisco Journal, February 16,1977 [Chinese Section]. 55. Smith, "A Little Tiff at the Chinese New Year." 56. "Editorial: Consider the Alternatives," East/West, January 30,1974. 57. "Editorial: Let People Know About the Real Chinatown," East/West, February 9,1977. 58. Smith, "A Little Tiff at the Chinese New Year." 59. Rey Chow, Woman and Chinese Modernity: The Politics of Reading Between West and East (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 18, 26-27. 60. Josephine Lee, Performing Asian America: Race and Ethnicity on the Contemporary Stage (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997), 59. 61. Kek Tee Lim, interview with the author, May 12, 2002, San Francisco. 62. Judy Yung, "Chi-Am Corner: New Year Reflections," EastiWest, February 22, 1978. Judy Yung was a journalist for EastiWest before becoming a librarian and historian. A Chinatown native, Yung wrote many articles about San Francisco's Chinatown in EastiWest, sometimes using a pen name, Jade Fung. 63. Leland Yee, ELCNYPR, 1996, KTVU. 64. David Lei, interview with the author, May 25,1999, Berkeley. 248

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65. Lei, interview with the author. 66. Other community organizations also hosted numerous Chinese New Year celebrations. For example, several cultural groups had staged a Chinese Spring Festival since 1975, which included traditional dances, films from the PRC, flower displays, food, music, martial arts, photography, and art displays. These alternative forms of celebration tended to distinguish themselves from the commercial celebration sponsored by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. Smith, "A Little Tiff at the Chinese New Year." 67. J. K. Choy was an important figure in the community who operated outside of the Chinatown establishment. In 1949, he created an English edition of Chinese World. In 1963, Choy established the San Francisco Greater Chinatown Community Service Association, an organization that was independent of the old Chinatown institutions, "to keep pace with the times by providing the maximum amount of social and other community services to help the underprivileged in communities throughout the country." In 1965, he formed the Chinese Culture Foundation of San Francisco. Him Mark Lai, "China and the Chinese American Community: The Political Dimension," Chinese America: History and Perspectives (1999): 11-12. 68. Him Mark Lai, "Thirty Years of the Chinese Culture Foundation and Twenty-Two Years of the Chinese Culture Center of San Francisco," unpublished manuscript, 10. I am grateful to the author for allowing me to see his work in progress. Judy Tzu-Chun Wu, " 'Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!': Representations of Ethnic and Gender Identity in the Miss Chinatown U.S.A. Beauty Pageant," Journal of Social History 31, no. 1 (September 1997): 14. 69. "Holiday Inn Opening," EastfWest, January 20,1971. 70. Lai, "Thirty Years of the Chinese Culture Foundation and Twenty-Two Years of the Chinese Culture Center of San Francisco," 24-25. U.S.-born Chinese increasingly dominated the membership of the Chinese Culture Foundation's board. These English-speaking Chinese Americans often had no proficiency in Chinese, thereby alienating the large population of Chinese-speaking immigrants. Lai, "Thirty Years of the Chinese Culture Foundation," 37. 71. "The 'Costs' of Chinese Celebration," San Francisco Examiner. 72. Chiang, interview with the author. 73. Him Mark Lai, "10,000 Attend Spring Festival," East/West, March 5, 1975; Chinese Pacific Weekly, February 12,1981. 74. San Francisco Journal, February 23,1977 [Chinese Section]. 75. San Francisco Journal, February 19,1975 [Chinese Section]. 76. Chiang, interview with the author; for more information on the "In Search of Roots Program," see Andrea Louie, Chineseness Across Borders: Renegotiating Chinese Identities in China and the United States (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).

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77- Lai, "Thirty Years of the Chinese Culture Foundation and Twenty-Two Years of the Chinese Culture Center of San Francisco," 26-37, 4778. The funding for the Spring Festival was from San Francisco's hotel tax, later changed to the San Francisco Art Fund. Chiang, interview with the author. Susan Rosegrant, "What Does it Take to Finance a Parade?" East/West, March 8,1978. 79. Chiang, interview with the author. 80. Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 11. There was an annual tournament for best floats. 81. CNYFP, 1968, CCC. 82. "The 'Costs' of Chinese Celebration," San Francisco Examiner. 83. Quoted in Michel S. Laguerre, The Global Ethnopolis: Chinatown, Japantown and Manilatown in American Society (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 39. 84. Ken Wong, "Chinatown Is Proud and Booming," San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, February 27,1972. 85. Him Mark Lai, Gong huaqiao dao huaren-ershi shiji: Meiguo huaren shehui fazhan shi. [From Overseas Chinese to Chinese American: The history of the development of Chinese American society in the twentieth century] (Hong Kong: Sanlian Shudian, 1992), 398. 86. Keith Power, "China Trade Policy," San Francisco Chronicle, June 12,1971. 87. Lai, "China and the Chinese American Community," 14. 88. "Mayor Feinstein Proclaims September 'China Month,'" East/West, March 26,1980; Chinese Pacific Weekly, March 12,1981. 89. Ling-Chi Wang, San Francisco Journal, March 22,1972. 90. San Francisco Journal, March 22,1972 [Chinese Section]; Beth Ann Krier, "China Exports: L.A. s Cup of Tea," Los Angeles Times, Feb. 25,1972. 91. George Draper, "Chinese Dailies in S.F. Are Angry," San Francisco Chronicle, January 5,1979. 92. Peter Eng, "The Worlds Between My Father and Me," San Francisco Chronicle, June 6,1982. 93. After normalization, the PRC started a similar campaign to gain support from Chinatown organizations, as did Taiwan. The competition resulted in the formation of political factions within organizations. Lai, "China and the Chinese American Community," 14. 94. Stephen Hall, "Bring Problems to Chinatown," San Francisco Chronicle, March 31,1979. 95. Iwata, "Beneath Serene and Thriving Surface." According to Victor Nee and Brett De Bary Nee, 65 percent of the land and property in the core area of Chinatown belonged to family and district associations. Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ', 232. 96. "The 'Costs' of Chinese Celebration," San Francisco Examiner. 97. Nee and Nee, Longtime Californ, 201-213. 250

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98. "Editorial," East/West, May 31,1978. 99. "The 'Costs' of Chinese Celebration," San Francisco Examiner. 100. "Editorial: Get Rid of Foreign Influence," East/West, July 25,1973. 101. "Thousands Turn Out to See Parade," East/West, February 14, 1979; "Normalization Celebration," San Francisco Journal, January 3, 1979; "S.F. Police Prevent a Clash in Chinatown," San Francisco Chronicle, January 2,1979. The Chinese Times reported that the pro-Taiwan supporters numbered about 2,000. Chinese Times, January 2,1979. 102. "Thousands Turn Out to See Parade," East/West; "Normalization Celebration" San Francisco Journal. 103. Chinese Pacific Weekly, January 4,1979. 104. China Airlines, a Taiwanese airline, has been actively involved in the Chinese New Year Festival. Each year, it sponsors a float and the Miss Chinatown beauty pageant. Certain years, its flight attendants also provided evening entertainment at the pageant contest. "KMT Flags in City-Funded Chinese New Year's Parade," San Francisco Journal, February 14,1979. 105. "China Rep Problem Mars New Year Parade," East/West, March 5,1980; Wu, "Loveliest Daughter of Our Ancient Cathay!" 24. 106. "Demo Club Asks City Hall to Investigate New Year Parade," East/West, March 26,1980. 107. Doug Chan, "City Investigates Charges of Parade Funds Misuse," San Francisco Journal, April 9,1980. 108. "Editorial: The New Year Parade," EastfWest, March 26,1980. 109. San Francisco signed its sister city agreement with Taipei in 1969. Elizabeth Lu, "SF Mayor's Trip to Far East Brought Business, Social Ties with Shanghai," East/West, December 5,1984. no. East/West, March 26,1980 [Chinese Section]. San Francisco later became a sister city with both Taipei and Shanghai. At the time, Mayor Feinstein remarked that "we tried not to get into politics. We're a friendship and trade group." Lu, "SF Mayor's Trip to Far East Brought Business, Social Ties with Shanghai." hi. "Editorial: New Year Parade," East/West, February 18,1981. 112. Don Lattin, "165,000 at Chinatown Parade," San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, January 31,1982. 113. Young China, February 2,1982. 114. Evelyn Hsu, "A Bang-up Celebration in Chinatown," Washington Post, February 2,1987. 115. Chinese Americans throughout the country confronted similar political tensions. See Clenda Kay Joe, "We Should Put Aside the PRC/Taiwan Debate and Look to Community Problems," originally published in the Southwest Chinese Journal, quoted in East/West, February 18,1981; Rona Marech, "Politics on Parade for Chinese New Year Fest," San Francisco Chronicle, February 19, 2005; NOTES

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251

Brad Carson, "A Parade of Supporters for Justice in San Francisco," Epoch Times, March 3-9, 2005. The Falun Gong first appeared in China in 1992. Following a peaceful protest in Beijing in 1999, the Chinese government began persecuting practitioners. Although the Falun Gong spread to other Chinese diasporas throughout the world, the PRC used its political clout to keep international members from joining ethnic festivals. For example, in Australia, they were denied permission to participate in the Sydney Chinese New Year parade. "Falungong Row Overshadows Australia's Chinese New Year Preparations," Agence France Presse, February 8, 2005. Falun Gong was denied permission to participate in San Francisco's 2006 Chinese New Year celebration. 116. Sau-ling Wong, "Denationalization Reconsidered: Asian American Cultural Criticism at a Theoretical Crossroads," Amerasia Journal 21 (1995): 227-228. The most prominent person to adopt this culture nationalist position was Frank Chin, who wanted to make a clear break with the ancestral land, people, and cultural heritage. 117. Lisa Lowe, Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 96. 7. SELLING

CHINESENESS

1. English-language Chinese New Year Parade recording [hereafter ELCNYPR], 1993, KTVU. 2. ELCNYPR, 1993, KTVU. 3. George Lipsitz, Time Passages: Collective Memory and American Popular Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), 213. 4. Chinese New Year Festival Program [hereafter CNYFP], 1965, Chinese Chamber of Commerce [hereafter CCC]. 5. "Bay Area Asian Consumers' $$$," Asian Week, March 16,1990. 6. "Bay Area Asian Consumers' $$$," Asian Week. 7. "East/West Readers' Survey Shows Well-Educated Group," East/West, August 3,1983. 8. www.ktsf.com/en/research/market_research.html (June 11, 2003). 9. Aihwa Ong, "Limits to Cultural Accumulation: Chinese Capitalists on the American Pacific Rim," in Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Nationalism Reconsidered, ed. Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Bäsch, and Cristina Blanc-Szanton (New York: The New York Academy of Sciences, 1992), 134. 10. Matier and Calandra, "Beyond Chinatown," San Francisco Chronicle, April 15,1990. 11. Arlene Dávila, Latinos, Inc.: The Marketing and Making of A People (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 228.

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12. "Survey Says Asians Are Dream Customers," San Francisco Chronicle, March 5,1990. 13. Matier and Calandra, "Beyond Chinatown." 14. Quoted in Michel S. Laguerre, The Global Ethnopolis: Chinatown, Japantown, andManilatown in American Society (New York: St. Martins Press, 2000), 133-134. 139. 15. Julia Angwin, "Beating the Drum for Asian Buyers," San Francisco Chronicle, March i, 1996. 16. James Leung, "Companies Court Asian Americans," San Francisco Chronicle, November 15,1990. 17. Angwin, "Beating the Drum for Asian Buyers." 18. Joel Millman, "Cognac Wars," Forbes 147 (March 18,1991): 104. 19. Chinese World, January 30,1962. 20. Private donations supported the festival in the first three years; the Chinese Chamber of Commerce became the main sponsor in the years following. City hall began to subsidize the Chinese New Year Festival in 1956 and the Convention and Visitors' Bureau became a cosponsor in 1963. San Francisco institutionized cultural tourism and established the Grant for the Arts funding from the hotel tax. Culture and ethnicity became a selling point for the city. The 1995 Miss Chinatown U.S.A. Pageant Souvenir Program indicated that the Hotel Tax Fund began to subsidize the festival in 1964. That year, the city contributed $3,500. Steve Zousiner, "The Tenacious Celebrants," San Francisco Chronicle, February 3, 1970. Miss Chinatown U.S.A. Pageant Souvenir Program [hereafter MCPSP], 1995, CCC. 21. Patrick Andersen, "Chinese Parade A Family Tradition For Wayne Hu," Asian Week, February 6,1987. 22. KTVU agreed to pay up to $50,000 per year for Argonne Parades' costs. It retained profits by selling syndication rights to stations in New York, Chicago, Los Angles, Seattle, Honolulu, and Pittsburgh. "S.F. Chinese New Year's Parade Going National," San Francisco Chronicle, February 17,1989. 23. Angwin, "Beating the Drum for Asian Buyers." 24. Chinese New Year Festival and Parade Sponsorship booklet, 1999, CCC, 9, 12. In the last few years, corporate sponsorship has contributed more than $750,000 annually. Half of the money was spent on parade production and marketing. It also subsidized other festival activities, such as the ethnic beauty pageant. 25. "Anheuser-Busch and Bracco Sponsor Chinese New Year Celebration," Asian Week, February 9,1990. 26. Dávila, Latinos, Inc., 228. 27. Roger Rouse, "Thinking Through Transnationalism: Notes on the Cultural Politics of Class Relations in the Contemporary United States," Public Culture 7, no. 2 (1995): 366-367.

NOTES TO PAGES I 5 3 — I 5 6

253

28. CNYFP, 1996, CCC, 85, 29. Beverly Lee, interview with the author, San Francisco, June 4,1999. 30. "S.F. Chinese New Year's Parade Going National," San Francisco Chronicle. 31. San Francisco Chinese New Year Festival and Parade, sponsorship booklet, 1999, parade office collection. 32. Dävila, Latinos, Inc., 235. 33. CNYFP, 1996, CCC. 86. 34. Caroline Chung Simpson, An Absent Presence: Japanese Americans in Postwar American (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 65. 35. Lisa Lowe, Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 86. 36. Richard Schechner, The Future of Ritual: Writings on Culture and Performance (London: Routledge, 1993), 82. 37. Schechner, The Future of Ritual, 46. 38. ELCNYPR, 1994, KTVU. 39. Sau-Ling Cynthia Wong, "Ethnic Subject, Ethnic Sign, and the Difficulty of Rehabilitative Representation: Chinatown in Some Works of Chinese American Fiction," Yearbook of English Studies 24 (1994): 255-257. 40. ELCNYPR, 1994, KTVU. 41. George Lipsitz, "The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: Racialized Social Democracy and the 'White' Problem in American Studies," American Quarterly, 47, no. 3 (September, 1995): 369-387. 42. "The Legacy of Chinatown," Asian Week, May 31,1996. 43. http://traffic.bayinsider.com/station/1853331/detail.html (June 10, 2003); http://traffic.bayinsider.com/station/1853353/detail.html (June 10, 2003); www .lai8.tv/aboutus_corporatehistory.aspx (June 10, 2003); www.ktsf.com/en/about/ company.html (June 10, 2003); www.asianmediaguide.com/asian/tv/ktsf.html (June 10, 2003). 44. "S.F. Chinese New Year's Parade Going National," San Francisco Chronicle. 45. Patrick Andersen, "TV Coverage of Chinese New Year Parade Goes National," Asian Week, February 12,1990. 46. Phil Arnone, KTVU/Fox's Letter to Chinese New Year Parade participants, December 21,1998, Parade Office Archives. 47. "Chinatown Crowds," San Francisco Chronicle, January 31,1993. 48. Richard Springer, "A Minority View," East/West, July 28,1988. 49. Edward Iwata, "Embattled Restaurant Digs in," San Francisco Chronicle, October 24,1981; L. A. Chung, "Neighborhood's Future in Question," San Francisco Chronicle, April 25, 1985; "Are the Chinese Leaving Chinatown," Asian Week, February 7,1986; Patrick Andersen, "T-Shirts, Jewelry Shops Gaining on Grant Ave.," Asian Week, July 10,1987; Patrick Andersen, "Commentary: Where 254

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1 5 6 - 1 6 3

Did Chinatown Go?" Asian Week, January 16,1987; Patrick Andersen, "Camera Shops Invade," Asian Week, May 29, 1988; Dexter Waugh, "Glitzy Electronics, Camera Shops Make Chinatown Shudder," San Francisco Examiner, June 5,1988. 50. K. Connie Kang, "Two Countries, One Neighborhood," San Francisco Examiner, August 17,1987. 51. Johnny Ng, "High Chinatown Rents," Asian Week, January 19, 1990; Andersen, "T-Shirts, Jewelry Shops Gaining on Grant Ave"; Springer, "A Minority View." 52. Chung, "Neighborhood's Future in Question." 53. Russell Jeung, "City Planning Approves Rezoning of Chinatown into Three Subdistricts," East/West, February 26,1987. 54. ELCNYPR, 1994,1995,1996,1997, KTVU. 55. ELCNYPR, 1995, KTVU. 56. ELCNYPR, 2002, KTVU. 57. ELCNYPR, 1995, KTVU. 58. Ted Wong, interview with the author, June 7,1999, San Francisco. 59. According to NAPALC, the number of hate crime cases are as follows: 335 in 1993, 452 in 1994, 458 in 1995, 534 in 1996, 481 in 1997, 429 in 1998, 486 in 1999, 411 in 2000, 507 in 2001, and 275 in 2002. The organization attributed the decline of hate crime cases in 2002 to underreporting, poor quality of data collection, and the decreasing resources in local law enforcement. National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium, ipp4 Audit of Violence Against Asian Pacific Americans, annual report, (Washington, DC: National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium, 1994), 8; National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium, 2002 Audit of Violence Against Asian Pacific Americans, annual report, (Washington, DC: National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium, 2004), 8,11. 60. ELCNYPR, 2002, KTVU. 61. ELCNYPR, 1997, KTVU. 62. ELCNYPR,1996, KTVU. 63. David Lai, interview with the author, Berkeley, May 14,1999. 64. Chinese-language Chinese New Year Parade recording (hereafter CLCNYPR), 1994, KTSF. 65. CLCNYPR, 1994, KTSF. 66. CLCNYPR, 1994, KTSF. 67. CLCNYPR, 1988,1989, KTSF. 68. CLCNYPR, 1989,1991,1995, KTSF. 69. CLCNYPR, 1989,1994,1997, KTSF. 70. CLCNYPR, 1991, KTSF. 71. CLCNYPR, 1994, KTSF. 72. CLCNYPR, 1993, KTSF. 73. Lipsitz, Time Passages, 213. 74. Lee, interview with the author. NOTES

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75- David Lei, interview with the author, Berkeley, May 29,1999. 76. For the controversy on Nisei Week, see Lon Kurashige, Japanese American Celebration and Conflict: A History of Ethnic Identity and Festival in Los Angeles, 1934—1990 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 186—212. 77. Lipsitz, Time Passages, 13. 78. Lipsitz, Time Passages, 5. 79. "S.F. Chinese New Year's Parade Going National," San Francisco Chronicle. KSCI discontinued the San Francisco Chinese New Year parade broadcasts in 2003, because Los Angeles had begun staging its own Golden Dragon parade. 8.

" w e

a r e

o n e

f a m i l y "

1. Caroline Jean Lee, "An Historic First," San Francisco Bay Times, March 10, 1994; Asian Week, February 18,1994, Third Force, June 30,1994. 2. According to Butler, gender is not an essence, but constituted by performative expressions. Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990), 24-25,140-141. 3. Nayan Shah, Contagious Divides: Epidemics and Race in San Francisco's Chinatown (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 13. 4. Martin F. Manalansan IV, Global Divas (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 17. 5. Gay and lesbian studies have been dominated by a "coming out" approach that assumes most gays and lesbians lived in closets prior to World War II. See, for example, John D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United States, 1940—1970 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983); Allan Berubé, Coming Out Under Fire: The History of Gay Men and Women in World War II (New York: Free Press, 1990). Queer studies scholars have recently began to challenge the "coming out" narrative. See, for example, George Chauncey, Gay New York: Geniler, Urban Culture, and the Making of the Gay Male World, 1890—1940 (New York: Basic Books, 1994). Martin Manalansan IV contends that not all Filipino gays shared the idea of "coming out." Manalansan, Global Divas, 21-44. 6. Chou Wah-Shan, Tongzhi: Politics of Same-Sex Eroticism in Chinese Societies (New York: The Haworth Press, 2000), 19. 7. Biddy Martin and Chandra Talpade Mohanty, "Feminist Politics: What's Home Got to Do with it?" in Feminist Studies!Critical Studies, ed. Teresa de Lauretis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 196. 8. Jennifer Ting, "Bachelor Society: Deviant Heterosexuality and Asian American Historiography," in Privileging Positions: The Sites of Asian American Studies, ed. Gary Y. Okihiro et al. (Pullman: Washington State University Press, 1995), 217-279. 9. Shah, Contagious Divides, 12.

256

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1 7 1 - 1 7 6

10. Lisa Lowe, Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 1 9 9 6 ) , 1 1 . 11. Billie Lee, "No Name for This," Asian Week, July 11,1996. 12. Manalansan, Global Divas, 103. 13. Alice Y. Horn, "Stories from the Homefront: Perspectives of Asian American Parents with Lesbian Daughters and Gay Sons," in Asian American Sexualities: Dimensions of the Gay and Lesbian Experience, ed. Russell Leong (New York: Routledge, 1 9 9 6 ) , 4 5 . 14. Thanks to Charlene Tung for this idea. In late imperial China, however, men faced more severe punishment for engaging in non-normative sexuality than women. This might be because men were the bearers of the family lineage. Vivien W. Ng, "Homosexuality and the State in Late Imperial China," in Hidden From History: Reclaiming the Gay & Lesbian Past, ed. Martin Bauml Duberman et al. (New York: NAL Books, 1 9 8 9 ) , 7 6 - 8 9 . 15. Cathy Cohen, "Contested Membership: Black Gay Identities and the Politics of AIDS," in Queer Studies: An Interdisciplinary Reader, ed. Robert Corber and Stephen Valocchi (Maiden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2 0 0 3 ) , 4 6 - 6 0 . 16. Doug Seto, "Gay Activist George Choy is Dead at 33," Asian Week, October

8,1993.

17. Similarly, the women's liberation and the black power movements often discriminated against gays and lesbians. The only exception was Huey Newton, the Black Panther Party chair, who supported gay liberation. Martha Shelly, "Notes of a Radical Lesbian," in Sisterhood Is Powerfiil: An Anthology of Writings from the Women's Liberation Movement, ed. Robin Morgan (New York: Vintage Books, 1 9 7 0 ) , 3 4 3 - 3 4 8 ; Steve Estes, I am a Man!: Race, Manhood, and the Civil Rights Movement (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2 0 0 5 ) , 162-163,174-176.

18. Karyn Janowski, "Gay Asians Gain Visibility," San Francisco Sentinel, March 16, 1989. KDP (Katipunan ng mga Demokratikong Pilipino, Union of Democratic Filipinos), was the only group among Asian American organizations that accepted gays and lesbians. Trinity A. Ordona, "Asian Lesbians in San Francisco: Struggles to Create a Safe Space, 1 9 7 0 S - 1 9 8 0 S , " in Asian/Pacific Islander American Women: A Historical Anthology, ed. Shirley Hune and Gail M. Nomura (New York: New York University Press, 2 0 0 3 ) , 3 2 2 . Estes, I am a Man!, 162-163.

19. Quoted in Daniel C. Tsang, "Losing Its Soul?: Reflections on Gay and Asian Activism," in Legacy to Liberation: Politics and Culture of Revolutionary Asian Pacific America, ed. Fred Ho et al. (San Francisco: AK Press, 2 0 0 0 ) , 5 9 . 20. Quoted in Ordona, "Coming Out Together: An Ethnohistory of the Asian and Pacific Islander Queer Women's and Transgendered People's Movement of San Francisco," (PhD diss. University of California, Santa Cruz, 2 0 0 0 ) , 9 5 .

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21. Syl Savellano, interviewed in Ordona, "Coming Out Together," 91. 22. Ordona, "Asian Lesbians in San Francisco," 323-324. 23. Other queer nonwhites experienced similar discrimination from coethnic feminist groups. 24. Seto, "Gay Activist George Choy is Dead at 33." 25. Seto, "Gay Activist George Choy." 26. Tim Kingston, "A New Year," S.F Frontiers, February 13,1997. 27. Young Lee, "Asian Gays and Lesbians Tackle Difficulties in both Asian and Gay Communities," Northwest Asian Weekly, March 19,1994. 28. Emily Lew, quoted in Ordona, "Coming Out Together," 356. 29. Vanessa Hua, "Storming the Stage," San Francisco Chronicle, October 2, 2001. 30. Daniel Tsang, interview with the author, Irvine, California, May 30, 2002. 31. "Inquiring Minds Want to Know!!" Lavender Godzilla: The Official Newsletter of the Gay Asian Pacific Alliance [hereafter LG] (April 2001): 4, 8,10. 32. Some scholars have different interpretations of drag queens. Marjorie Garber, for example, argues that drag performances do not subvert gender and class hierarchies. Marjorie Garber, Vested Interests: Cross-Dressing & Cultural Anxiety (New York: Routledge, 1992). 33. Tom Lee, "The Gay Asian American Male," Asian Week, June 28, 2000. 34. Lee, "The Gay Asian." 35. Lee, "The Gay Asian." 36. Lee, "The Gay Asian." 37. Manalansan, Global Divas, 35. 38. Lillian Faderman, Odd Girls and Twilight Lovers: A History of Lesbian Life in Twentieth-Century America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). For the debate on the definition of lesbian relationships, see George Chauncey Jr., Martin Bauml Duberman, and Martha Vicinus, "Introduction," in Hidden From History: Reclaiming the Gay and Lesbian Past, ed. Martin Bauml Duberman et al. (New York: New Books, 1989), 6—7. Chauncey, Gay New York. 39. D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities, 14, 32. 40. D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities, 57-239. Nan Alamilla Boyd, Wide Open Town: A History of Queer San Francisco to 196$ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 10—13. Boyd argues that many demands in the 1969 Stonewall Rebellion had been made in San Francisco by 1965. 41. Anthony W. Lee, Picturing Chinatown: Art and Orientalism in San Francisco (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2001), 284. 42. D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities, 176—195; Boyd, Wide Open Town, 25-79, 12.3-124. Boyd argues that the Beats remained a separate entity from the queer community. 43. Most literature on queer Chinese history focuses on gays, not lesbians. Tze-Lan D. Sang's The Emerging Lesbian was the first book-length study on 258

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Chinese lesbians. Sang, The Emerging Lesbian: Female Same-Sex Desire in Modern China (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003). For the studies on Chinese gays, see, for example, Bret Hinsch, Passions of the Cut Sleeve: The Male Homosexual Tradition in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), I thank Kathryn Edgerton-Tarpley for this reference; Matthew H. Sommer, "The Penetrated Male in Late Imperial China: Judicial Constructions and Social Stigma," Modern China 23, no. 2 (April 1997): 140-180; Chou, Tongzhi. 44. Hinsch, Passions of the Cut Sleeve, 7,163,167-168. 45. Frank Dikotter, Sex, Culture, and Modernity in China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995), 142. 46. Sang, The Emerging Lesbian, 21, 26. 47. Hinsch, Passions of the Cut Sleeve, 171. 48. D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities, 16. 49. For the history of gay activism in contemporary Chinese societies, see Chou, Tongzhi. 50. According to Tze-Lan D. Sang, tong "retains the specificity of the clinical term tongxinglian [homosexual]." Wah-Shan Chou, however, argues that the term does not connote sexuality. Sang, The Emerging Lesbian, 236; Chou, Tongzhi, 3. 51. Chou, Tongzhi, chapters 2, 3. 52. Sang, The Emerging Lesbian, 163-173. 53. Chou, Tongzhi, chapter 4; Sang, The Emerging Lesbian, chapters 9,10. 54. Sang, The Emerging Lesbian, 226. For more information on using masks as a "collective coming out" strategy, see Fran Martin, Situating Sexualities: Queer Representation in Taiwanese Fiction, Film and Public Culture (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003), chapter 7. 55. Tamara Ching to Coalition for Human Rights, September 29, 1977, GLBT Historical Society Archives. 56. Ankita Sadaf Kelly, "Queer Asian and Pacific Islanders," San Francisco Frontiers, March 22, 2001. 57. Kathy L. Teo, "APL & Bs Tackle International Issues ALN Update," Phoenix Rising: The Asian Pacific Sisters Newsletter [hereafter PR] (Winter 1993/4): 10. 58. Stacy Lavilla, "A Growing Show of Pride," Asian Week, July 9,1998. 59. M.J. Talbot, phone interview with the author, March 3, 2003. 60. Lee, "Asian Gays and Lesbians Tackle Difficulties in both Asian and Gay Communities." Queer Chinese Austrians encountered the same problem as their American counterparts. See Tony Ayres, "China Doll—The Experience of Being a Gay Chinese AustrianJournal of Homosexuality, 3, no. 4 (1999): 87-97. 61. Michiyo Cornell, "Living in Asian America: An Asian American Lesbian's Address before the Washington Monument," in Asian American Sexualities: Gay and Lesbian Experience, ed. Russell Leong (New York: Routledge, 1996), 83-84. NOTES

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62. Eithne Luibheid, Entry Denied: Controlling Sexuality at the Border (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 20—21, 31—53. 63. Xiaojian Zhao, Remaking Chinese America: Immigration, Family, and Community, 1940—196$ (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 17-27. 64. Kingston, "A New Year." 65. Ordona, "Asian Lesbians in San Francisco," 325. 66. "Bay Area Queer Asian and Pacific Islander Timeline," San Francisco Frontiers, March 22, 2001. 67. Karyn Janowski, "Gay Asians Gain Visibility," San Francisco Sentinel, March 16,1989. 68. Mike Hippler, "Lavender Godzillas," Bay Area Reporter, September 14, 1989. 69. Bay Area Reporter, March 15, 22, April 26, May 17,1990. 70. K. Tee Lim, interview with the author, San Francisco, May 12, 2003. 71. "A Proud, Growing Community," Asian Week, July 9,1998; GAPA flyer, GAPA archive; Talbot, interview with the author. 72. Talbot, interview with the author. 73. "The House of Extrava GAPA," Runway 1992. 74. Asian Pacifica Sisters Pamphlet, GAPA Archives; Patti Chang, "Talking History," PR (October 1990): 5. Trinity Ordona contributes the origin of APS to the 1987 Asian Pacific Islander lesbian retreat and the march on Washington. Ordona, "Coming Out Together," 246. 75. Chang, "Talking History," 5. 76. Talbot, interview with the author. 77. Lavilla, "A Growing Show of Pride." 78. Cristy Chung et al. "In Our Own Way: A Roundtable Discussion," in Asian American Sexualities: Dimensions of the Gay and Lesbian Experience, ed. Russell Leong (New York: Routledge, 1996), 95. 79. Talbot, interview with the author. 80. Helen Zia, "The Great Wall," Out, June 1994, 30. 81. Lee, "An Historic First." 82. Lavilla, "A Growing Show of Pride." 83. Talbot, interview with the author. 84. Talbot first proposed to have a theme on "Out of the Dog House," which would emphasize the "coming out" of queer Asian Americans. But the idea was later abandoned since it was too dangerous to bring real dogs out on the parade route. Talbot, interview with the author. 85. Elisa Lee, "Gay And Lesbian Contingents to March in Chinatown New Year Parade," Asian Week, February 18,1994. 86. Talbot, interview with the author.

2 6 0

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87- Lim, interview with the author. 88. Lee, "An Historic First." 89. Chou, Tongzhi, 259. 90. Their participation in the Chinese New Year parade granted GAPA and APS a chance to join in the Cherry Blossom parade. But the audience at that parade was less enthusiastic and the parade announcer did not even mention the name of APS. 91. Zia, "The Great Wall." 92. Dennis Lee, "Parade Reflections," LG (April 1994): 2. 93. Lee, "Gay And Lesbian Contingents to March in Chinatown New Year Parade." 94. Talbot, interview with the author. 95. Kingston, "A New Year." 96. Lee, "An Historic First." 97. Wu Kuang, "Parading Our preferences," PR (Spring/Summer 1994): 1,10. 98. Elisa Lee, "Lavender Godzilla," Third Force, June 30,1994. 99. Channel 7 News, February 26,1994, GAPA archives. 100. Lavilla, "A Growing Show of Pride." 101. Cynthia Laird, "GAPA Gets Award for Chinese New Year Parade Float," Bay Area Reporter, May 30,1996. 102. Ramon M. Kadi, "Editorial: Should've, Could've, Would've Ain't Good Enuv," LG (April 1996): 2. 103. Hinsch, Passions of the Cut Sleeve, 65—76. 104. Kingston, "A New Year." 105. "A Proud, Growing Community," Asian Week. 106. Sing Tao Daily, February 20, 2000; Chou, Tongzhi, 263. 107. Lee, "An Historic First." 108. Butler, Gender Trouble, 137. 109. Manalansan, Global Divas, 138-140. no. "GAPA Sets Yet Another Record," LG (May 1996): 4. hi. Talbot, interview with the author. 112. Lim, interview with the author. 113. Gayatri Gopinath, "Funny Boys and Girls: Notes on a Queer South Asian Planet," in Privileging Positions: The Sites of Asian American Studies, ed. Gary Y. Okihiro et. al. (Pullman: Washington State University Press, 1995), 121. 114. Max Alu, "Just Simply Bad Politics," LG, (April 1996): 5. 115. Laird, "GAPA Gets Award for Chinese New Year Parade Float;" Kadi, "Editorial: Should've, Could've, Would've Ain't Good Enuv," 2. 116. Alex Louie, "Of Drag and Dragon," LG (April 1996): 5, 8; Alan S. Quismorio, "About Identity," LG (April 1996): 5, 6.

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2ÖI

ii7- "Letter to GAPA from the Parade Office," January 5, 1998, GAPA Archives. 118. Gopinath, "Funny Boys and Girls." 119. Sing Tao Daily, February 20, 2000. 120. Channel 4, channel 5, and channel 7 coverage of the Chinese New Year parade, GAPA archives. 121. Robert T. Bernardo, "Gay Asians Make History at Parade," San Francisco, March 2,1994; "Hey!!" LG (April 1994): 2. 122. Lee, "An Historic First." 123. Talbot, interview with the author. 124. "Letters: Coincidence? He Thinks Not," San Francisco Sentinel, March 23,1994. 125. English-language Chinese New Year parade recording (hereafter ELCNYPR), 1996, KTVU. 126. ELCNYPR, 1997, KTVU. 127. Chinese-language Chinese New Year parade recording, 1994, KTSF. 128. Eric Estuar Reyes, "Strategies for Queer Asian and Pacific Islander Spaces," in Asian American Sexualities: Dimensions of the Gay and Lesbian Experience, ed. Russell Leong (New York: Routledge, 1996), 86. 129. Myron Dean Quon, "The Freedom to Marry," Asian Week, November 20,1997. 130. Kingston, "A New Year." 131. Yvonne Kennedy and Haili Cao, "Asian Constituents Supportive of Council's Wan," Oakland Tribune, Oct. 29, 2000. 132. "A Proud, Growing Community." Mabel Teng was highly visible during the granting of same-sex marriage licenses at San Francisco City Hall in February 2004. 133. China Daily News, March 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 2002. I thank Daniel Tseng for this source. 134. Talbot, interview with the author. EPILOGUE

1. The first Chinese New Year stamp was available for purchase on December 30,1992. "Year of the Rooster," San Francisco Chronicle, December 31,1992. 2. L. A. Chung, "New Stamp Will Honor Chinese Americans," San Francisco Chronicle, July 30,1992. 3. Lisa Lowe, Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 9. 4. Sam Chu Lin, "A Testimony to APA contribution," Asian Week, February 14, 2002. 5. L. Ling-chi Wang, "Race, Class, Citizenship, and Extraterritoriality: Asian Americans and the 1996 Campaign Finance Scandal," in Contemporary Asian 262

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America: A Multidìsciplinary Reader, ed. Min Zhou and James V. Gatewood (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 518-534. 6. Wen Ho Lee and Helen Zia, My Country Versus Me (New York: Hyperion, 2001). 7. Lisa Richardson and Hilary E. Macgregor, "To Be Chinese in America," Los Angeles Times, Aprii 30, 2001. 8. Connie Kang, "Study Finds Persistent Negative Perceptions of Chinese Americans," Los Angeles Times, April 25, 2001.

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Miss Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 104 Miss East Bay, 58 Miss Firecracker (Pat Kan), 41 Miss GAPA, 174,187,190,194-197, 199 Miss Los Angeles Chinatown beauty pageant, 102, 107 Miss New Hampshire beauty pageant, 67 Miss New York Chinatown, 244n6o Miss San Francisco Chinatown, 64, 71, 105,118-119,164 Miss San Leandro beauty pageant, 109 Miss Talent, 113 Miss Tet beauty pageant, 167 Mittels, Richard, 26 model minorities, 2—3, 5 - 6 , 1 1 , 55; and beauty pageants, 58, 63, 65-68, 73, 103, 226-2271152; and identity politics, 131; and marketing, 151, 153, 160; and queerness, 176, 193—194,195; and television broadcasts, 151,166; and youth resistance, 7 , 1 0 , 76-82, 85-86, 97.100 Mohanty, Chandra Talpade, 176 Monkey King puppets, 158,164 Monterey Park, 170 Moon Festival, 240-24ini62 Mosk, Stanley, 129 mothers, Chinese American: and beauty pageants, 69-73,105—107, 228n79; and identity politics, 125—126; and patriarchal power, 46, 50—51; and political persecutions, 23; and queerness, 180,188; and youth resistance, 85, 87 Moy, Eugene, 24 Moy, George, 27 Moy, Patricia, 114, 244n6o Mr. Chinatown contest, 47,110-111, h i Mr. GAPA, 1 7 4 , 1 8 7 , 1 9 0 , 1 9 4 , 1 9 6 multiculturalism, 2 - 5 , 1 1 , 34, 51, 54-55, 204, 206, 207-208n2, 208-209nn; and beauty pageants, 64; and marketing, 151,159-160,172; and television broadcasts, 161-162,164—167, 172-173

National Asian Pacific American Bar Association, 200 National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium (NAPALC), 166, 255^9 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 62, 224-225n2I National Association of Chinese Americans, 143 National Broadcasting Company, 54 National Chinese Welfare Council, 61 National Conference of Chinese Communities in America, 61 national identity, 5, 28, 63,131,133, 223-22405 nationalism, 7, 24, 42, 74, 86,147, 252nn6 Nationalist government, Chinese. See Taiwan's Nationalist government national origin, 7, 62, 78,133,147,176, 2I2n26 Native Americans, 165 nativism, 54 naturalization, 3-4,19, 22, 30, 62 Neighborhood Arts Program, 95 Neighborhood Legal Assistance, 241M66 neocolonialism, 183—184 Newcomer's Service Center, 89 newspapers, ethnic, 8-9,16, 22-27, 39> 46-47, 52-54; and beauty pageants, 56-57, 65, 70-71,113; and model minorities, 67; and political persecutions, 58; and youth resistance, 77, 83—84, 87. See also names ofnewspapers newspapers, mainstream, 8 - 9 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 16, 51-52; and beauty pageants, 56, 58; and youth resistance, 77. See also names of newspapers Newton, Huey, 2 3 5 ^ 2 , 257ni7 New Yellow Peril, 1 0 , 1 0 0 New York Chinatown, 43, 56, 59—60, 73, 78, 85,120,123,130, 222n97, 24oni6o New York Times, 27 Ng, Carole, 67-68 Ngai, Mae, 6 Nguyen, Viet Thanh, 98 INDEX

309

Nihonmachi (Japantown), 143 Nipp, Kenneth, 125 Nisei Week, 173 Nixon, Richard, 25, 38,119,125, 142-143,152 normalization policy, 7, 25, 52, 83, no, 128,140,143-145, 25on93 Northeast Medical Services, 24ini66 nuclear family, 6, 44, 55, 66,176,190, 195 Nung, Hung, 178 Oakland Chinatown, 39,130,132 Oakland Tribune, 198 obedience, 5, 42, 44-47, 50-51, 22in69; and beauty pageants, 58, 65-66,103; and queerness, 176 O'Brien, David, 198 October 1 Day, 147 old world: and identities, 3; and traditions, 15, 28,124 Older Asian Sisters in Solidarity, 189 1.5 generation, 32, 2i6nn "On Glorious Wing" (monologue), 102 On Leong Merchants' Association (Washington, D. C.), 27 On Lok Senior Health Services, xoi, 203, 24ini66 operas, Chinese, 13,19, 46, 52,123,126, 143,194, 203, 238ni25 oppression, 10,12, 27, 83, 86-89, :42> 181,183 Ordana, Trinity, 192, z6ony4 Organization of Chinese Americans (OCA), 127,199, 204, 247n25 Oriental School, 166 Orientalism, 4-5,11,17, 30, 32, 34, 39, 41, 55, 204-6, 207~8n2, 2ii-2i2ni6; and beauty pageants, 43, 58, 64, 66, 72,112; and identity politics, 130, 136; and marketing, 151,160,164, 172; and queerness, 182,195 Orientals, 19 otherness, Chinese, 10-11, 65,130,136, 159, 204 Ou, Michelle, 204-5 outside barbarians, 2 INDEX

Pacific and Asian American Women Bay Area Coalition, 120 Pacific Center, 186 Pacific Friends, 186,189 Pacific Rim markets, 2, 52,151-152,167 Pacific Ties, 102 Page Law (1875), 6, 43,176,185 Pak, Rose, 128,147 Palace of Fine Arts, 121 pandas, 158 paper sons/daughters, 23, 59, 61 parades, 2,10, 29, 35, 36-41,37, 41, 55, 57, 204, 206; and beauty pageants, 115,121, 246M09; critiques of, 91—94; and identity politics, 122-127, I2 9> 132-138,139,141-142,145-147, 25ini04; and marketing, 150-151,154, 156-160,159, 172; pre-Cold War, 12, 17-18; and queerness, 174-175,184, 187-201, ip2,194, 26in90; and television broadcasts, 2,11,145, 150-151,160-173, 256n79; and youth resistance, 75-76, 82, 91, 98, 100, 23on2 Park, Robert E., 3. See also assimilation patriarchal power, 6,10, 31, 42, 44-46, 50, 22in69; and beauty pageants, 64, 70-71, 74,103,114,116; and queerness, 177,182; and youth resistance, 81, 86-87 patriotism, 1, 4,10-13, 23> 26-29, 33, 35-38, 42,149, 206, 208-209nn People's Republic of China (PRC). See communist China performativity, 175, 156m personality competition, 56, 63, 69, 73 phoenix, 192 Phoenix Rising, 187 picket lines, 84, 87 pidgin English, 130 ping-pong, 67 pioneers, 131,170 police, 12,16,18, 53, 203, 222nio2; and identity politics, 145; and marketing, 159-160; and queerness, 181; and television broadcasts, 162; and youth resistance, 75-76, 81—83, 91» 98-99, 23on2, 237nio8, 239ni50

political consciousness, 62, 71-72, 84-85,100,122,127, 247n25 political influence, 7 , 1 7 , 1 9 , 21-31, 33, 47, 52, 54-55, 206, 2i6-2i7ni4; and beauty pageants, 58, 63, 71-72,102, 107,119-120; and identity politics, 11,122-123, 125,127-128,138-149, 148, 25on93; and queerness, 181, 183-184,198, 201; and youth resistance, 76, 80, 82-85, 89-90, 95. See also political persecutions political persecutions, 22-26, 38, 55, 58-62, 73, 205-206, 224-225nni7,2i, 225-226n40 politicians, mainstream, 17, 26, 35, 38, 47-48, 49, 52, 54, 2i7n25; and identity politics, 128,143,145-146, 251M10; and marketing, 156,160; and queerness, 193; and violence, 98-99, 240m59 politics of incorporation, 120 pool halls, 82, 96 Poon, Clarence, 126 Portsmouth Square, 32, 53, 83, 85, 144-145 possessive investment in whiteness, 160 postwar liberalism, 3, 48 poverty, 32, 78-79, 99,153,160, 23inio. See also War on Poverty prejudices, 4, 26,134 princesses (runner-ups), 50, 64,164, 197 Princeton University, 88 privatization of festival, 156,162,173 Prohibition, 182 prostitutes, Chinese, 6, 30, 39, 43-44, 176,185 protection fees, 99 public holidays, 10, 95-96,100, 238ni27 qiaoling, 49 Qing dynasty, 13,16,122,133,182 Quan, Cary, 75 queer culture, 181—182 queer liberation movement, 181—182, 185

queerness, 7 , 1 1 , 45, 71, 74,173, 174—201; challenging heteronormativity, 181—188; and collective "coming out" strategy, 184,191-192, 259n54; and "coming home" strategy, 11,175-176,188-197,192,194, 26on84; and "coming out" strategy, 11,175,177,181-184,188-192, 200, 256n5, 259n54, 26on84; and normalizing heterosexuality, 176-182, 257nni4,i7,i8; and television broadcasts, 197—199 queer studies, 2 5 6 ^ Quismorio, Alan S., 196 racial politics, 2-8, 10-11, 34, 2i2n26; and beauty pageants, 62-63, 71, 74, 103,112, 120; and queerness, 177, 182; and souvenir programs, 130; and television broadcasts, 166-167, 172; and violence, 96-100, 239ni30; and youth resistance, 82—86, 88—91 racism, 3, 26, 205—206; and beauty pageants, 112; and firecrackers, 15-16; and identity politics, 130; and marketing, 160,166; and political persecutions, 60; and queerness, 185—187, 199; and youth resistance, 74, 83—86, 88, 91, 96-98 radicals: and beauty pageants, 103,112; and identity politics, 137-138,142; and youth resistance, 10, 76-77, 80, 86, 90—91, 98, 23on2. See also names of radical organizations radio programs, 35, 56 raffle tickets, 17, 43, 48, 65,106 recreational facilities, 79, 81, 86, 2 33n3°> 2 34 n 57 Red Guard Party, 82-83, 86, 89, 95,142, 23on2, 233n40, 235n6i refugees, 144 Remy Martin, 154 reproduction, 86; and heteronormativity, 182 Republic of China (ROC), 9 , 1 3 , 1 6 - 1 7 , 21, 28, 38 restrictive covenants, 19 Richmond district, 20

INDEX

311

riots, 75-76, 91, 98,100,144-145,189, 230112, 23911150, 25111101 Rolling Stone, 164 Roosevelt, Eleanor, 2171125 Rose Parade (Pasadena), 54 Rouse, Roger, 156 Runway pageant, 187 Sahara Hotel (Las Vegas), 58 Said, Edward, 4 Sam, Canyon, 186 Sam ChungSzeDuck (Wong), 44, 221069 same-sex marriages, 200, 262M32 San Franciscan Assisting Committee, 54 San Francisco Art Commission, 95 San Francisco Art Fund, 25(^78, 253n20 San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, 52 San Francisco Chronicle, 13,18, 26, 33, 35; 38, 51; and beauty pageants, 44, 58, 70; and marketing, 153,156; and queerness, 198; and television broadcasts, 162-163; and youth resistance, 76, 98, 230n2 San Francisco Convention and Visitors' Bureau, 2, 31, 54,135, 253n20 San Francisco Customs Office, 36 San Francisco Examiner, 58, 98,163 San Francisco Gang Task Force, 99—100 San Francisco Greater Chinatown Community Service, 233^0, 249067 San Francisco Human Rights Commission, 80-81, 233n30 San Francisco Journal, 144 San Francisco Lesbian and Gay Marching Band, 198 San Francisco Lodge, 42 San Francisco Savings and Loan Association, 138 San Francisco School Board, 95 San Francisco State College (SFSC), 77, 83-85, 87, 89,179, 23on2 Sang, Tze-Lan D., 259^0 Savellano, Syl, 179 Schechner, Richard, 159 school dropouts, 79, 82 312

INDEX

Schwartz, Jean, 40 Scott, James C., 79 Sead, Jeff, 194 Seale, Bobby, 233^0 seamstresses, 50, 72, 87,105, 222n97, 231ml second generation, 32,124,169,186, 2i6nn Seeto, Victor, 146 Self Help for the Elderly, 101,120,128, 24ini66 Sentinel, 199 separate spheres, 50-51, 78,118,177. See also gender September 11 terrorist attacks, 203—204, 206 "Serve the People" program, 82-83 sexism, 74, 86, 88-89,115—116,120, 178,185 sexual harassment, 114—115 sexuality, 8,17, 29-30, 41-45, 50; and beauty pageants, 6,113—115; and queerness, 7,175-176,178-183, 185-188,191,193-197,199, 259n50 Shah, Nayan, 175 Shanghai as sister city, 146, 25inno Shangri-La nightclub, 182 Shen, Linda, 105,118 Sheng, Sing, 213^2 Shiu, Stephanie L., 103-104,108 Simpson, Caroline Chung, 158 Sing, Lillian Kwock, 116 Sing Tao Daily, 197-198, 203 Sino-Japanese war, 18, 24, 28, 42 sister cities, 146, 25inniO9,ii0 Six Dynasties (266-589), 193 So, Francis, 104 Song, Rosann, 119 Soo, Annie Shew, 70 Soong Mayling, 42—43 souvenir programs, 72,122,129—132, 142, 248n40; and marketing, 152,155, 158, 253n20 Soviet Union, 3 spokesmodel competition, 102 sports, 36, 39, 40, 67, 93, 95 Spring Festival, 11,123,138-141, 249n66, 25on78

spy plane, U.S., 147, 205 stamps, 203-204 St. Mary's Chinese Girls' Drum Corps, 29, 40—41, 41, 2i9n48 St. Mary's Chinese School, 17-18, 29 Stonewall Rebellion (1969), 2 5 8 ^ 0 street fairs, 75, 94-95, 2380125 strikes, 30, and female activists, 88 student activists, 10, 25, 76—77, 80, 83-89, 94-95,142, 23on2 students as exempt class, 6, 44 subjectivity, Chinese American, 68,136; and queerness, 183—184,195 subpoenas (1956), 10, 59-62, 224—225nni7,2i Suey Sing tong, 99 suicides, 24, 46, 58-59, 61,179-180 Sum, Arlene Scott, 71 Sunset district, 20 Sun, Shirley, 116,139—142 Sun Reporter, 224—225n2i Sun Yat-sen, 24 Sunset district, 20 surrogate homelands, 72, 229n88 sweatshops, 50, 72, 77-78, 84, 90, 112-113, 222n97, 23innio,n swimsuit competitions, 109,115—116 Syed, Javid, 184 table tennis teams, 143 Taiko Dojo drummers, 166-167 Taipei as sister city, 146, 25inni09,ii0 Taiwanese Consul General, 141-142 Taiwanese Independence Movement, 147 Taiwan's Nationalist government, 7 , 1 7 , 21, 24-26, 34, 205, 2i4n46, 2i5n52, 2i8n36; and beauty pageants, 43, 56, 71-72,105,109-110,119, 229n89; and identity politics, 62,127,133,138, 140-149,148, 246ni4, 250n93, 25inioi; and marketing, 152—153; and parades, 38,133; and political persecutions, 60; and queerness, 183-184, 189; and sports, 40; and television broadcasts, 2,165,168—171,173; and youth resistance, 85, 95 Talbot, M. J., 184-185,187-189,195, 198, 200-201, 26on84

talent competitions, 56, 63, 67—68, 73, 102,109,112-114 Tan, Linsay, 116 Tang, Glenda, 105 tariffs, 143 television broadcasts, 2, 7—8,11,145, 150-151,160-172, 256n79; and beauty pageants, 103; Chinese-language broadcasts, 167—172, 204-205; and corporate sponsorship, 156,160, 253n22; English-language broadcasts, 54,161-167; a n d queerness, 192, 197-199; and Voice of America, 4, 36 temperance movement, 182 Teng, Mabel, 200, 262ni32 tennis, 39, 67 Tet Festival, 170. See also Vietnamese lunar New Year There Is No Name for This (documentary film), 177 Third World countries 3; and economy 155-156; and youth resistance, 83, 85 Third World Lesbian and Gay Conference, 185 Third World Liberation Front (TWLF), 83-84 Third World Strike, 83-85, 87 Third World Women's Alliance (TWWA), 179 Thuy Vu, 164 Tiananmen Square Massacre (1989), 147 Time Passages (Lipsitz), 151 Tom, Bing, 85 Tom, Ruby, 123 Tom, Shirley, 105 Tome, Anna, 29 Tongmenghui, 24 tongs (fraternal organizations), 89, 99, 127, 24oni55 tong wars, 16,18 tongzhi, 183-184, 259n50 Tonight Show (TV program), 154 tourism, 2, 4, 9-10,17-18, 26, 28, 30-31, 34-35, 39, 52-55, 211—2i2ni6; and beauty pageants, 43, 47-48, 58, 103,109; critiques of, 90-94; and identity politics, 125-127,130, INDEX

313

tourism (continued) 134-135,143; and marketing, 155-156, 253n20; and political persecutions, 60; and queerness, 182; and television broadcasts, 162; and youth resistance, 76-77, 84-85, 95-97, 99, 240—24ini62 Tourist Bus Demonstration (New York), 85 trade policy, U.S., 12, 24-26,104-105, 143, 2iin2. See also embargo Trading with the Enemy Act (1917), 24, 27, 2i4n48 transgenders, 11, 176—177,180 transnational identity, 7-13, 24-25, 28, 40, 204; and beauty pageants, 50, 60; and corporate sponsorship, 154, 157; and cultural productions, 2; and identity politics, 122-123,128, 132-135,144-145,147-149; and marketing, 156,161,168,171; and queerness, 188-189; and television broadcasts, 2, 161,165,167-168, 171, 173 Trie, Charlie Yah-lin, 205 Trikone, 186 Tsang, Daniel, 180 Tsu, Irene, 104 Tsui, Kitty, 179 tuberculosis, 77, 85, 23in8 Tung Pok Chin, 123 TV Guide, 161 Underwood, Lenore, 52 Union of Democratic Filipinos (KDP), 257ni8 United Nations, 38 United Way, 102 University of California, Berkeley, 83-85.133.186,189,191 upward mobility, 5, 76,105,112-113 urbanization, 181 U.S. Chinese Tongzhi Conference, 184 U.S. Citizens Stamp Advisory Committee, 204 U.S. Justice Department, 59-60 U.S. State Department, 4, 21, 36, 59-61

314

INDEX

U.S. Supreme Court, 19 U.S. Treasury Department, 27 Vancouver, 17 Vause, Zach, 204 Veale, Dolly, 86-87 Veterans, 9,17, 29, 37, 44, 204 Vietnamese Chinese Americans, 9, 109-110,126-127, 1 3°> 164,167,170 Vietnamese lunar New Year, 167,170 Vietnam War, 83-85, 88,109-110 violence: and identity politics, 144-145; and queerness, 189; and television broadcasts, 166; and youth resistance, 10, 76, 81, 84, 96-100, 239nni29,i30, 240-24inni55,i6i,i62. See also riots virtues, 44-45, 47, 50 Vo, Linda Trinh, 120 Voice of America, 4, 36 volleyball, 39, 40, 67 Vu, Thuy, 164 Wah Ching (Chinese Youth), 80-82, 84, 92, 97-99, 233n30, 24oni55 Wah-Shan, Chou, 190 Wan, Danny, 200 Wang, Kati, 69-70,104,106,108,115, 118, 242ni9 Wang, L. Ling-chi, 84, 89, 205 War Bride Act (1945), 44 war brides, 44, 47, 67 War on Poverty, 82, 84,101 war veterans, 9,17,19, 23, 26, 29, 37, 37> 44. 204 Washington, D.C., Chinatown, 59, 106,147 Wave magazine, 14 Wedding Banquet, The (film), 184-185 wedding processions, 122,133—135,158, 167 "Westerners," 43, 71, 22on62 Wide, Wide World (TV program), 54 womanhood, Chinese American, 5—6, 10, 42, 44,119-120; and beauty pageants, 58, 64, 67, 22in69; and youth resistance, 78, 87-88,101

Woman Warrior (Kingston), 160 Women's Collective, 88 women's liberation: and beauty pageants, 114,116—119; and queerness, 178-179, 257ni7; and youth resistance, 86-89, IIO> 235n72> 236nn74,76 Wong, Alan, 89 Wong, Albert, 38 Wong, Anna May, 111 Wong, Bernice, 48-49, 57 Wong, Doreena, 186 Wong, Eva, 4Ç Wong, Harvey, 128 Wong, Henry Kwock ("H. K."): and beauty pageants, 63-64, 70-71, 109, 22in69; and dragon dances, 51; as festival initiator, 31-33, 54, 90; and firecracker ban, 53; and parade routes, 94; and patriarchal power, 44; and sports, 39 Wong, Joe, 29 Wong, Mason, 77 Wong, Sandra, 109 Wong, Shirley, 120 Wong, S. K „ 2i6n8 Wong, Stan, 81 Wong, Ted, 165 Wong, William, 124 Wong, Z „ 189,198 Woo, Bradford, 115 Woo, Franklin, 21 Woo, George, 81, 92, 97 Woo, Gilbert, 25-26, 62,111-112, 118-119,142 Woo, Leland, 82 work ethics, 5, 58, 65,103, 131,160 working class, 16, 25; and beauty pageants, 72,105,112-113,120; and critiques of festivals, 92; and identity politics, 134; and political persecutions, 58—59; and queerness, 185; and television broadcasts, 171; and youth resistance, 76, 79, 85, 89-90 WorldJournal, 144

World of Susie Wong, The (film), 43, 160 World Theater, 61 World War II era, 19-21, 20, 28, 30 Wu, Judy, 73,105, no, 114-115,117,120 Wu, Rebecca, 164-165 Wu, William, 139 Wushu Troupe, 141 X Gang, 79 Xiao Min, 65 Xingzhonghui, 24 X-rays, 22 Year of the Dragon, The (film), 240-241M62 Yee, Leland, 137, 200 Yee, Paul, 180 Yee, Susan, 45-46, 50—51, 72,123—124 Yellow Journalist (Wong), 124 yellow peril, 19, 34, 42,166 yellow power, 7,10, 76,100 Yellow Seeds, 85 Yep, Fiona, 70,104,106,108-109, 114-115,118 Ying, Lee, 61 Yip Kai-fU, 58 Young China, 144 Younger, Evelle J., 91 Youth and Recreation Committee, 94 youth resistance, 75-77, 79-91, 23on2; and public holidays, 10, 95-96, 238ni27; and queerness, 178; and violence, 96—100, 239nni29,i30,i50, 240-24inni55,i6i,i62 Yu, Eleanor, 154 Yuan, Regina, 168-170 Yuen, Elsie, 2i6n8 Yuen Ock Chu, 46-47 Yung, Judy, 50,136-137, 248n62 YWCA/YMCA, 95,126 Zia, Helen, 23, 88 zodiac, Chinese, 35,157—158,168, 203 zoot suiters, 79

INDEX

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