Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest of Cyprus 9781788318631, 9781786734808

Citation preview

Demetris Assos holds a Bachelor of Arts Joint Honours in History and Politics and a Master of Arts in Modern History from the University of Durham. In 2009 he was awarded a PhD from the Institute of Commonwealth Studies of the University of London for his dissertation on the political history of Cyprus in the 1950s. Since 2009 he has been a member of the diplomatic service of the Republic of Cyprus. He served for four years (2010 – 14) in Tehran as Deputy Head of Mission and since September 2017 has served as Consul General of the Republic of Cyprus in St Petersburg, Russia.

‘Makarios: The Revolutionary Priest of Cyprus is well written, balanced, and accessible – it is a joy to read. Assos makes wonderful use of primary and secondary sources – both in Greek and English. Highly recommended for undergraduate and graduate students as well as scholars interested in Cyprus, Great Britain, Greece, Turkey, and NATO. A substantial contribution to the field’. George Kaloudis, Professor of Political Science and History at Rivier University, Nashua, New Hampshire, USA

MAKARIOS

The Revolutionary Priest of Cyprus

DEMETRIS ASSOS

I.B. TAURIS Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA BLOOMSBURY, I.B. TAURIS and the I.B. Tauris logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2018 Paperback edition first published 2020 Copyright © Demetris Assos, 2018 Marilyn Dunn has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. For legal purposes the Acknowledgements on p. ix constitute an extension of this copyright page. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: 978-1-7883-1203-5 PB: 978-0-7556-0678-8 ePDF: 978-1-7867-3480-8 eBook: 978-1-7867-2480-9 Series: International Library of Twentieth Century History, volume 120 Typeset in Garamond Three by OKS Prepress Services, Chennai, India To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters.

In memoriam of my dearest brother Pambos, my first companion in the journey of life.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

ix

1. Church, Nationalism and Politics before 1950 Church, Religion and Nationalism in Cyprus before 1948

1

2. The Making of Archbishop Makarios III The Rise of AKEL and the Struggle for Political Mastery in Greek Cypriot Politics 3. The Road to the UN, November 1950–October 1954 Resistance on the Domestic Front Attempts to Secure Greek Sponsorship for a UN Appeal The Papagos Government and the Cyprus Problem 4. The Pursuit of Enosis by Other Means, December 1954–October 1955 Makarios, the Foundation of EOKA and the Rationale for the use of Violence 5. The Negotiations With Harding, November 1955– February 1956 Makarios Faces Internal Opposition The Greek Government Fails to Support Makarios The Role of the Vicious Circle of Violence and Counter-Violence

5 17 22 42 43 54 68 75 79 100 110 113 116

viii

† Makarios Makarios Attempts to Secure Support for the Proposals The Dynamics of the Collapse

122 125

6. Arrest, Deportation and Exile: The Seychelles Interlude Arrest and Deportation Reaction and Consequences of the Exile Life in Exile

132 134 137 142

7. The Unravelling of the Enosis Campaign Makarios and Grivas Disagree Over Strategy International Pressure and Deadlock The Turkish Campaign for Partition

159 164 179 182

8. Makarios and the ‘Solution’ of Independence The Impact of the Macmillan Plan Makarios Reacts to the Macmillan Plan The Zurich Settlement

192 193 201 212

Conclusion

229

Notes Bibliography Index

237 275 283

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book is based on the doctoral dissertation which was completed back in 2009 at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London. Therefore, I feel the need to acknowledge and thank my then sponsors, the A.G. Leventis Foundation and the Arts and Humanities Research Council, UK. Special mention must go to my supervisor Prof Robert Holland who guided me skilfully, patiently and rather wisely during the three and a half years of my academic adventure. My intellectual debt to my supervisor is undeniable. I also would like to thank my two examiners, Dr Sarah Stockwell and Dr Klearchos Kyriakides for their useful feedback which has improved the text. As usual any errors or omissions are entirely my own. I cannot find enough words to thank my parents Antonis and Eleni for all their help, financial and emotional. For all the advice and the unconditional support they have dispensed and for encouraging my academic endeavours throughout the years. I would like to thank my Uncle Panicos, Aunt Helen and my three cousins, Bam, Mario and Andreas not only for offering me a place to stay during the first three months of my PhD studies but for all the unstinting love and affection they have given me during my stay in London. Beyond that there are many more people who at different stages of my journey have helped me in different ways and in varying degrees. Diana Weston Markides was particularly helpful during

x

† Makarios

my initial stages of my research and on quite a few times she pointed me toward the right direction. I also want to thank the late Stavros Panteli, the person who initiated me to the ways of the British National Archives. I want to thank Chrysostomos Pericleous, a close family friend but also a keen and perpetual researcher of the history of Cyprus, for his sheer enthusiasm and willingness to debate and argue but also to share his resources and insights with me. Similarly I want to express my appreciation to Takis Hatzidemetriou, especially for one particularly intense session we had over the summer of 2007. It helped me a lot to figure out in my mind a lot of background issues relating to Makarios. To the persons who have kindly agreed to speak to me and give me their own accounts of Archbishop Makarios, I would like to thank them one more time, even though most of them are no longer alive. In no particular order I want to thank, Vasos Lyssarides, Petros Stylianou, and the late Patroclos Stavrou, Paschalis Paschalides and Andreas Azinas. My research has benefited tremendously from their input and I am grateful for all their help. I want to thank a whole host of friends who have been there for me during my long journey. There are too many to name here, they know who they are. Thank you all for the support and the friendship over the years. Special thanks to Michael Papadopoulos for providing a second pair of eyes over the different drafts which converted the original dissertation to its present format. I also feel the need to thank I.B.Tauris and all the members of its staff who were involved in this project. I am honoured for the trust you have placed in my work and for accepting to publish this book. Last but not least I would like to express my heartfelt appreciation to my wife Anna and my daughter Sofia for all the love, the psychological support and the pleasant distractions they have provided over the years from the constant onslaught of ‘words, words, words’.

Disclaimer: All views expressed in this book are entirely and exclusively my own, based on independent research I have undertaken prior to my professional career and do not in any way reflect the official position of any institution, governmental or private, with which I am professionally associated and/or employed presently. All errors, factual or in judgement are entirely my own.

1

Church, Nationalism and Politics before 1950 An incident recorded in the diplomatic memoirs of Angelos Vlachos, Greek Consul General in Jerusalem in the early years of the State of Israel, and later still a significant player in Cypriot affairs, conjures up the totemic personality of Archbishop Makarios III which lies at the heart of this book. During March 1956, only a few days after the controversial decision by the British Government to deport the Archbishop to the Seychelles, Vlachos, accompanied by a clerk of the Greek Consulate, went hunting close to a Palestinian refugee camp. At some point they were surrounded by a mob of furious Palestinians who started to throw stones and verbally abuse them. Despite their protestations that they were Greeks, and even though Vlachos’ companion spoke Arabic fluently, the mob did not take any notice. The ring started to close around the two men, when the companion of Vlachos, in an act of desperation, threw his rifle on the ground, put his hands up and shouted with all his might: ‘Makarios!’ It was a genuine deux ex machina as the mere utterance of the name of the Cypriot Archbishop instantly changed the mood of the mob and averted a nasty outcome. Instead the mob started to repeat the name Makarios rhythmically and warmly greeted the two men. Makarios’ recent deportation had had a tremendous impact on world opinion and had penetrated even into Palestinian refugee camps. In this telling incident, by implication, by invoking the name of Makarios, Greeks were able to claim

2

† Makarios

co-victimhood with Palestinians Arabs at the hands of Western aggression.1 This anecdote demonstrates that Makarios had a stature which transcended the narrow confines of his small home island. The office he held can explain his popularity and prominence in Cyprus, but his ability to attract the international news’ limelight was unusual. Certainly the size of Cyprus, a small British colony in the Eastern Mediterranean, belies the diplomatic prestige he enjoyed and the news coverage he received. Even so his career as an internationally respected and recognised politician is only one facet of Makarios. He was more than just an eloquent spokesman of the Greek Cypriots. A quick glance on the curriculum vitae of ‘Archbishop Makarios III of Nova Justiniana and all Cyprus’, to use his formal title, reveals the extent of his stature which dominated the political skyline of his home island. His political career between 1950 and 1959, itself fraught with the controversies inherent in an anti-colonial struggle, left an indelible stamp on the history of the Cyprus problem. Yet he remains an enigmatic and ambiguous personality who requires careful historical examination. A crucial factor contributing to his ambiguous nature is the conflation of Makarios with the Cyprus struggle by friends and enemies. The fusion of these two different narratives has subsumed Makarios the person within the greater narrative of the Cyprus problem, which has created a perfect paradox; although Makarios is ubiquitous in the Cypriot saga, at the same time comparatively little is known about the man himself. He was a man held in awe by the great majority of the Greek Cypriots, which conferred on him an almost messianic authority. When he finally returned to Cyprus in March 1959, after three years of absence, almost half of the Greek Cypriot population turned out to give him a triumphant welcome.2 No Cypriot leader has ever enjoyed such immense popularity. Yet despite his charisma, he was bitterly opposed from several sides. Makarios’ popularity was of a nature which caused controversy, but also provoked deeply divisive responses on three different fronts; in Britain as the colonial overlord of Cyprus, in Greece as the

Church, Nationalism and Politics before 1950 † 3 imagined ‘Motherland’ of the Greek Cypriots and indeed within the Greek Cypriot community itself. It was Makarios’ drive and determination which launched the ‘internationalisation’ of the Cyprus question by using the United Nations forum as a means of applying moral pressure on an intransigent Britain, and by travelling widely to promote the Cyprus issue in Athens, London, Washington and New York. Makarios was the one who sought to explore the possibilities of an anti-colonial dimension to the Cypriot struggle, thus keeping abreast with international developments beyond the close confines of Cyprus. Up to that point the Cyprus issue was cast as a nationalist struggle of an irredentist character, a feature which did not make it particularly salient in the international arena. Thus he was not shy to court the friendship of increasingly anti-Western Arab countries and to exploit their hostility toward Britain for his own means. It was this anti-colonial logic that brought Makarios into the Bandung Conference rubbing shoulders with the leaders of what subsequently became the Non-Aligned Movement, courting the UN vote of African and Asian countries. On the domestic front Makarios also broke new ground and was prepared to take grave risks. He breathed new life into the ancient institution of the Ethnarchy, galvanised the enosis movement and succeeded in reaching an uneasy but workable understanding with the left-wing party AKEL (Progressive Party of the Working People, Anoruvtikό Kόmma Ergazomέnoy Laoύ). Beyond doubt he was the greatest critic of the British regime in Cyprus and as he stepped up his international campaign he became a major challenge to the British administrators. When violence broke out and the British failed to reach an agreement with him they deported him to the Seychelles in 1956. Ironically this action attracted more attention to the Cypriot prelate and made the solution to the problem yet more elusive. His return from exile to Athens in March 1957 was one of the greatest public events in the Greek capital since the end of World War II.3 The end of the first ten years of his archiepiscopal reign was marked by the ZurichLondon agreements, which established the Cyprus Republic. Makarios, instead of achieving his life-long ambition of union

4

† Makarios

with Greece, ended up signing the independence of Cyprus and being elected the first president of the Republic of Cyprus. The deviation from the ‘sacred’ ideal of union with Greece is an important aspect of ambiguity which runs throughout his entire career. There is a constant tension between ideal and realpolitik, while his guarded vagueness shrouded in mystery both his intentions and the outcomes of his policies. This book will isolate the ‘Makarios factor’ and will examine it in detail. It will shed new light on the more general history of the Cyprus problem by illuminating the political career of the most prominent Cypriot of modern time. It will examine the political career of Archbishop Makarios during the period when the enosis (union with Greece) struggle unfolded within Cyprus, that is, between the years 1950 and 1959. After independence, enosis assumed a more covert guise. Therefore, 18 October 1950, the date when he was consecrated Archbishop of Cyprus and assumed the mantle of political leader of the Greek Cypriot community, will be our starting point. However, the tumultuous events of 1948– 9 and the plebiscite of 1950 which marked the beginning of a new phase of the Cyprus struggle necessarily form part of the background of this study. Its terminus will be March 1959 when Archbishop Makarios returned to Cyprus after a three-year exile and the conclusion of the Zurich-London agreements that laid the foundations of the Republic of Cyprus. The significance of Makarios in recent Cypriot history clearly extends beyond 1959. However, three very concrete reasons dictate the rationale to concentrate only on the years 1950– 9. The first one has to do with time constraint. A complete biography of Makarios would exceed the scope of the present study and require an even longer and complicated research. The second reason is that these ten years have a ‘natural’ beginning and end point – the enthronement through to the signing of the agreements that led to independence. Finally, in terms of research the decade of the 1950s is the most accessible to the scholar of Cyprus history. This is because there is a wide availability of primary material and because of an increased understanding we have of this period thanks to studies by other scholars in recent years. Therefore this

Church, Nationalism and Politics before 1950 † 5 book will build on the available literature in the field and enrich the existing bibliography by examining this neglected aspect of the Cyprus problem. Church, Religion and Nationalism in Cyprus before 1948 Before proceeding further, it is pertinent to examine the history of nationalism and the history of the Church of Cyprus up to the point when Makarios returned to Cyprus from his studies in the USA on 9 June 1948. It is imperative to understand the nature and the impact of nationalism in Cyprus, in order to explain how this movement became associated with the ancient institution of the Orthodox Church. Only then one can appreciate how Archbishop Makarios’ ecclesiastical post was invested with such political power. Even though Makarios in some respects was breaking new ground, at the same time he was riding on the crest of a nationalist movement that was both older and bigger than himself. Ultimately his office and the nationalist movement constituted the context within which he had to operate and formulate policy. It is no exaggeration to claim that his political cognisance was shaped and influenced by this tradition and in order to understand Makarios the decision maker, we have to bear in mind that as Archbishop he incorporated forces and interests which were profoundly shaped by institutional and historical tradition. The origins of the Church of Cyprus stretch back to late antiquity. Christianity was introduced to the island by a Cypriot Jew, Barnabas, who founded the Church of Cyprus in the mid-first century AD, with the help of St Paul.4 In honour of its founder, the archiepiscopal seat is also known as the throne of St Barnabas. In 478 AD, the Byzantine Emperor Zeno conferred to the Church of Cyprus its autocephalous status, that is, autonomy in ecclesiastical affairs from the Patriarchate of Antioch, which had contended that it had the right to appoint the bishops of Cyprus. The politics and ecclesiastical disputes behind this move are beyond the scope of this study, but what matters is that the Church of Cyprus as early as the fifth century AD had formal independence in its domestic

6

† Makarios

affairs. In addition, Zeno, in recognition of the fact that the Cyprus Church was equal in rank with the Patriarchates, granted to the Archbishop of Cyprus three privileges of symbolic nature: to sign in red ink, an imperial prerogative, to wear purple during ceremonies and to carry an imperial sceptre instead of a pastoral staff.5 These privileges have been jealously guarded throughout the centuries to the present day. As a result Makarios’ trademark signature on official documents was always in red, a subtle indication of the longevity and the status of the institution he represented. Theoretically it is possible to argue that, in the Orthodox world, the Church of Cyprus ranks fifth in seniority after the four Patriarchates of Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria and Constantinople, even though this point may well be disputed by many people. The Churches of other Orthodox countries like Georgia, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Rumania, even Russia, are in chronological terms at least junior to the Church of Cyprus since they had acquired their independent status at a later date.6 The Church of Cyprus acquired a distinct political role during the Ottoman period,7 which begun in 1571, when the Ottomans conquered Cyprus from the Venetians, and ended in 1878 when the Sultan conceded administrative control of Cyprus to the British Empire. The administrative machine of the Ottoman Empire was unique in the handling of its multi-racial population. It established the millet system, which structured its population along religious, as opposed to linguistic or racial lines. Millet in Arabic means nation and within the Ottoman context it came to mean the degree of autonomy, especially in cultural affairs, the non-Muslim religious groups enjoyed with the forbearance of the Sultan.8 As a result, the Orthodox population of the Ottoman Empire was considered to belong to the Greek Orthodox community, which was known as Millet-I-Rum or Rum Milleti.9 Under the millet system the Orthodox Church was granted civil jurisdiction over the Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire. It was responsible for the collection of taxes prescribed by Islamic law and guaranteed the allegiance of Christian subjects to the Sultan. The Oecumenical Patriarch acted as a sort of national chief, millet-bashi, and could appeal to the Sultan himself when

Church, Nationalism and Politics before 1950 † 7 local Ottoman authorities were acting arbitrarily at the expense of the welfare of Christian subjects.10 The Church of Cyprus naturally complied with the Ottoman model and co-operated with Ottoman authorities along the lines of the formal relation established between the Oecumenical Patriarch and the Porte.11 By the middle of the eighteenth century the Church of Cyprus had succeeded in obtaining official recognition of the privileges it enjoyed. As Sir George Hill notes, in 1754 the bishops of Cyprus secured from the Sultan a firman (imperial decree) which recognised ‘the four prelates as Kojabashis or guardians and representatives of the rayahs, with direct access to the Porte’.12 Between 1754 and 1821, the Cypriot clergy enjoyed increasing power and prestige.13 On the issue of the authority of the Cypriot clergy in 1815, it was remarked that: ‘Cyprus although nominally under the authority of a Bey appointed by the Qapudan Pasha, is in fact governed by the Greek Archbishop and his subordinate clergy’.14 This comment is supported by the expert opinion of Englezakis, a historian of the Church of Cyprus, who argued that the bishops not only ‘behaved as prelates and pastors, but also as chief magistrates of the rayahs appointed by the Caliph of Islam’.15 According to Vanezis, it was during this time that the term Ethnarch (leader of the nation) came to be associated with the Archbishop of Cyprus, reflecting the leading position of the latter in the Christian community and his possession of actual temporal powers.16 This modus vivendi was disrupted in 1821, when the shock of the Greek war of independence reached Cyprus. The Greek rebellion in mainland Greece provided exactly the excuse required by the local Governor to cut the Greek elite down to size. He secured a firman from the Sultan that allowed him to turn against them. The senior clergy, including the Archbishop, along with 400 lay notables were executed.17 Despite this bloody setback the Church retained a great deal of its influence and prestige, even after Ottoman reforms of 1839 and 1856 eroded its tax collecting functions.18 The Church was not to enjoy again the extent of influence it did in the second part of the eighteenth century. However, in the second part of the nineteenth century right until

8

† Makarios

the end of Ottoman rule, the relations between the Church and the Ottoman state were formalised. The Archbishop gained membership to an appointed eight-member council, which had executive and administrative powers, while in 1863 an imperial degree guaranteed the property of the Church.19 The advent of British colonial rule turned out to be a formidable challenge to the Church of Cyprus. The reconfiguration of power relations, which the regime-change brought about, inaugurated tensions that eventually produced the paradox of 1955 – the ancient Church of Cyprus leading an anti-colonial struggle. British rule was not the only factor which transformed the Church of Cyprus from a defender of the status quo to a revisionist player but its advent was to have significant effects. Indeed, Robert Holland and Diana Markides have underlined the cultural gulf between the Eastern Orthodox mentality of the Church and the attitude of the British colonial government, which intensified political differences over a long period. The British efforts to separate the State from the Church alienated the Church of Cyprus.20 However, complete isolation between Church and colonial government was the result of a protracted process and did not come about until after 1945. It is true that Sir Garnet Wolseley, the first High Commissioner of Cyprus, treated the Church in a cavalier manner: he introduced property tax on church lands, withheld the support of state officials in assisting the clergy to collect its clerical dues from the Christian population, resulting in a dramatic reduction of the Church’s income, and in 1879, contrary to canon law, arrested four priests and treated them like private citizens.21 One priest was condemned to forced labour, while the other two suffered the indignity of being shaven.22 After Wolseley’s departure a pattern of rough and ready coexistence emerged which was based on the common interest of maintaining social stability. 23 Archbishop Sophronios attempted to secure legal recognition of the rights the Church had enjoyed during Ottoman rule, but divisions within the clergy and the Greek Cypriot community foiled his efforts which were terminated by his death in 1900.24 Thus a golden opportunity for a formal understanding between Church and

Church, Nationalism and Politics before 1950 † 9 British civil authorities was missed, which had significant consequences for the future. Rolandos Katsiaounis argues that the partial erosion of the Church’s former privileges under British rule rendered it more susceptible to popular pressure. Since it no longer enjoyed the support of the state in collecting clerical dues it had to rely on voluntary contributions and to take into account the mood of the general population.25 As nationalism made inroads in Greek Cypriot politics, the Church was forced to follow this trend or else it would lose its prestige, which was no longer underpinned by legal mechanisms. This pressure from below was one factor pushing the Church toward a more radical stance vis-a`-vis the Cyprus Government that culminated in the 1950s under the leadership of Makarios. The second factor behind the gradual radicalisation of the Church was the failure to reach understanding with the British. This reversed the position of the Church under the Ottomans, which had a stake in the status quo and tended to uphold the Ottoman regime as long as its rights were respected. With the erosion of its privileges the Church had no reason to preach consent to British rule. On the contrary, if it wanted to maintain its leading position within Greek Cypriot society, especially in the wake of mass politics, radicalisation of the enosis movement and breakdown of traditional society, it had to play the nationalist card and pit itself against British rule. The question which needs to be addressed, then, is how did the Church manage to maintain its leading position under hostile British rule? According to historical tradition, Wolseley was welcomed to Cyprus in 1878 by a delegate of the Greek Orthodox Church with the peroration that: ‘We accept the change of Government inasmuch as we trust that Great Britain will help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian Islands, to be united with Mother Greece, with which it is naturally connected’.26 If this incident did take place, then it amounts to the first enosis demand, what is known in Greek historiographical discourse as the Megali Idea. When the Greek Kingdom was established in 1830, it contained only a relatively small segment of the entire Greek population; the rest remained under Ottoman rule in different lands in the

10

† Makarios

Balkans and the Near East such as Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace, Constantinople, Asia Minor, Syria and Egypt. The existence of substantial Greek populations outside the Greek Kingdom gave birth to the idea of national regeneration in the form of aggrandisement of the newfound Greek state at the expense of the Ottoman Empire with the specific aim to unite all Greekspeaking people in the Near East in a single Hellenic kingdom. This irredentist project, inspired by Byzantine splendour rather than by Classical Greece of the fourth century BC, which Western intellectuals had glorified since the Renaissance, came to be known as Megali Idea (literally Great Idea).27 The ideology of Megali Idea was gradually disseminated to the periphery of the Hellenic world through the political elite and the intelligentsia as a prerequisite for the political expansion of the Greek state. Cyprus became a fertile ground for the growth of Greek nationalism because the majority of the population spoke Greek and preserved an archaic Greek culture.28 The growth of the enosis sentiment was not a straightforward and linear affair. Certainly Cyprus lacked the volatility of Crete, where the desire for enosis repeatedly plunged it into bouts of violence. Yet Hill maintained that ‘the “Hellenic idea”’ succeeded in expressing itself throughout British rule in different forms and guises.29 Holland and Markides have argued that the demand for enosis during the first years of British occupation necessarily had to operate within certain restraints and that in Greek Cypriot politics it was the continuity of the tribute30 which occupied the foreground. The enosis movement started to assert itself more confidently after the turn of the twentieth century as the fear of reverting to Ottoman rule receded from the horizon of possibility.31 Ironically the liberal approach of the British toward the enosis movement tolerated the growth of Greek nationalism, which ultimately shaped the political discourse of the Greek Cypriots and challenged British rule. Ideologically, Paschalis Kitromilides has argued that Megali Idea was essentially a conservative ideological construct of an entrenched political elite. In elaborating that modern Greece was the successor of Ancient Greece and the Byzantine Empire it

Church, Nationalism and Politics before 1950 † 11 succeeded in excluding social criticism and erecting in its place ‘an intolerant sense of self-sufficiency and self-confidence based on the argument of continuity between the classical past and Neohellenic present’.32 By turning political attention toward foreign policy and the objective of expanding the Greek state, it locked in the status quo at the expense of critical social dialogue. Political frustrations were given an emotional outlet, through a romantic irredentist political project.33 This kind of sentiment migrated to Cyprus as well, where the ideal of enosis eventually evolved to being the panacea of Greek Cypriot politics, the promised land of a community which had been educated to think that union with Greece was a historical inevitability, while at the same time maintaining a socially conservative outlook. The growth of nationalism in Cyprus increased the prestige of the Church of Cyprus and was an important factor in preserving its leading role in Greek Cypriot socio-political life. There is a debate about the actual relation of nationalism and the Church of Greece and how the two interacted with each other.34 But in the case of the Church of Cyprus the Kitromilides thesis – that the Orthodox Church was extremely hesitant to nationalist ideas and was enlisted in nationalist projects only after the emergence of nation states and the ‘nationalisation’ of local churches – rings particularly true.35 Therefore the Church of Cyprus did not spearhead the nationalist movement but was pulled along as nationalism became the dominant discourse of Greek Cypriot politics. As we shall see in the second chapter, clerical leadership in order to recover lost political ground had to radicalise its own position in order to halt a slide toward the margins of Greek Cypriot political culture. It is important to note that only after the fusion of orthodoxy and nationalism the Orthodox Church became an integral part of Hellenism and its history was interpreted in that light. The preservation of Greek linguistic continuity under the aegis of the Church during the Ottoman years, portrayed as the ‘dark ages’ of Hellenism, was stressed. Therefore the Church was seen as a matrix of nationalism and a means of spreading the ideals of Hellenism, as the qualities of Orthodoxy and Greekness became

12

† Makarios

intimately linked. This populist view, which came to dominate Greek Cypriot politics, does not stand up to historical scrutiny, but for all practical purposes the Church of Cyprus during the latter part of British rule had become an important contributing factor to Greek nationalism and its central role in the nationalist project enabled it to pose as the champion of Greek Cypriot nationalism, even though it had in fact been rather docile under Ottoman rule.36 In sketching the background of Makarios some attention must also be given to the British colonial dimension. British rule in Cyprus commenced in 1878. In 1882 the British established the Legislative Assembly which to some degree contributed to the development of secular politics and, implicitly, undermined the influence of the Church. Nevertheless, the composition and the powers of the assembly meant that the autocratic powers of the colonial government remained undiluted. Out of 18 members, six were appointed by the High Commissioner, nine were Greek Cypriots and the last three were Turkish Cypriots. Greek and Turkish members were elected by their respective communities from separate electoral rolls. Even though the assembly had no decision-making power it could review financial issues and acted as the legislative body of the colonial government. However the combined votes of the minorityTurkish Cypriot delegates with the votes of the appointed members gave the casting vote to the Governor, thus making a mockery out of a Greek Cypriot majority in the chamber. In the event of Greco-Turkish cooperation the High Commissioner could fall back on his reserve powers which enabled him to veto any legislation he did not like and to legislate with decrees.37 This ‘toy parliament’, instead of channelling the political frustrations of the island in a healthy manner, contributed to the deterioration of relations between the colonial government and Greek Cypriots, especially in the 1920s with what had become a mature enosis movement. The outbreak of World War I, in 1914, led Britain to annex Cyprus unilaterally as the Ottoman Empire sided with the Central powers. The annexation was formally recognised by the newly

Church, Nationalism and Politics before 1950 † 13 established Turkish Republic in the Treaty of Lausanne which was signed in 1923. With this treaty, Turkey, the successor state of the Ottoman Empire, gave up any claims on the island. In 1925 Cyprus was declared a Crown Colony. Nevertheless, becoming formal subjects of the British Empire did nothing to check the growing grievances the Greek Cypriots felt toward the British administration of the affairs of the island nor did it curtail their desire for enosis. Frustration with British rule built steadily throughout the 1920s and combined with adverse economic conditions, eventually resulted in open revolt in 1931, which was promptly suppressed. In the aftermath of this uprising, among other repressive measures imposed, such as the suspension of the Legislative Assembly, press censorship, fines on the Greek Cypriot community and the introduction of direct rule by decrees, the British authorities targeted the Church as an important source of national agitation. There were several deportations, including important clergymen such as the Bishop of Kitium, Nicodemos Mylonas, who had played an instrumental role in the uprising, and the Bishop of Kyrenia, who later became Archbishop Makarios II. Even the ringing of church bells was forbidden unless it was for the purpose of regular service.38 Thereafter the fortunes of the church suffered as the British attempted to bring it under their control. The death of Archbishop Cyril III in 1933 left the throne of St Barnabas empty and the entire island with only a single senior prelate, the Bishop of Paphos, who now had to act as locum tenens. Under the existing ecclesiastical regulations three senior prelates were required for a legitimate archiepiscopal election, a condition that could not be met on account of the British deportations. The plight of the Church was exacerbated further in 1937, when the Governor introduced a series of laws, which sought to make future elections subject to British control. Specifically law No. 33 banned from election any person who had been deported, or had been involved in seditious activities. Law No. 34 made the election of a new Archbishop subject to the Governor’s approval. Finally law No. 25 made the finances of the Church subject to governmental control and investigation.39

14

† Makarios

During the years of World War II the deep distrust and even alienation between British authorities and the Church continued. Arnold Percy, editor of ‘Cyprus Post’ during the years 1942 –5, in his memoirs gives a telling example of this alienation. Leontios the locum tenens asked Percy to pass to the Governor the Church’s support for the Allies’ war effort. However, he also reiterated his resistance to the Church laws of 1937. This attempt for a wartime modus vivendi was shot down by the Governor, who merely commented cynically, ‘He said that, did he?’40 Yet the Church’s capacity to generate popular support was retained despite the adverse conditions. This was so because the Cyprus colonial government treated only the symptoms of Greek nationalism but failed to engage with its causes. Such a cure could only be found if the British authorities were ready to accept enosis as a logical and acceptable future for the island – something they always remained deeply unwilling to do. Before the 1950s showdown between the Church and Cyprus government could unfold, there was one more challenge the Church of Cyprus needed to overcome. This was the challenge of retaining the monopoly of representing the legitimate interests of the Greek Cypriot community. During the World War years the British courted Cypriot goodwill by relaxing the draconian measures they had taken in the aftermath of 1931. Press censorship was lifted, the formation of political parties was allowed and municipal elections took place again in 1943;41 it was even hinted that Cyprus could be awarded to Greece after the end of hostilities.42 The elections of 1943 saw the emergence of AKEL – the communist party – as an important political force in Cyprus. Prior to the founding of AKEL in 1941, there had been a Cyprus Communist Party (KKK, Kommoynistikό Kόmma Kύproy), which was founded in the 1920s and existed in underground conditions. AKEL drew its strength from the trade and labour union movement. In the early 1940s it emerged as a party with a mass following which enabled it to mount a challenge for supremacy in the Greek Cypriot community and to act as the most important critic of the British government.43 The progress of AKEL in the 1940s, perhaps reflecting in part the

Church, Nationalism and Politics before 1950 † 15 ascendancy of the Soviet Union in world affairs but also the rise of KKE the Communist Party of Greece (KKE, Kommoynistikό Kόmma Ellάdo6), and communism in Greece, was impressive. In the municipal elections of 1943 its candidates were successful in Limassol and Famagusta. In 1946 an AKEL-led alliance carried all principal towns of Cyprus including Nicosia the capital, which was considered to be conservative, save the towns of Paphos and Kyrenia.44 Moreover, AKEL had the capacity to stage mass rallies and demonstrations, part and parcel of a more dynamic approach to political activism and participation. When on 23 October 1946, Arthur Creech Jones, the Colonial Secretary, announced the intention of the British government to ‘establish a more liberal and progressive regime in the internal affairs of the island’ a struggle for supremacy in Greek Cypriot politics was about to unfold at a number of levels.45 The Church of Cyprus having survived so many centuries of foreign rule had retained its character and its prestige. Yet now its prime and most mortal enemy of all was within the Greek Cypriot community. Here was an internal challenge to its leadership, with mass appeal, a dynamic approach and with an alternative vision of nationalism, which sought to reshape the entire spectrum of public affairs. Parallel to the communists in Greece, who envisioned a socially reformed Greece, the AKEL bid represented the challenge of a new secular order. It sought to remould society according to Marxist ideals, seeking to become the leading political force in Greek Cypriot society marginalising the Church, which had survived the legal onslaught of the British Government. The stakes of this struggle were high indeed. In order to survive and recapture lost ground it had to change its old paternalistic ways to match the new challenges of mass politics. The resulting counterstrike of the Church against this fresh challenge, the entry of Makarios into the midst of this fierce struggle, and the eventual recovery of the Church with the election of Makarios as Archbishop of Cyprus will be discussed in the following chapter. The decision within the Church to call the young Makarios back from America to take up episcopal duties and then to elect him Archbishop, must be seen as a response to the AKEList challenge.

16

† Makarios

The obituary of Makarios for the London Times concluded that ‘he was above all, a Greek Cypriot’, which can explain his failure to create a Cypriot nation.46 Ultimately it was not possible for Archbishop Makarios III to transcend the ideals and assumptions of the Greek Cypriot community to which he belonged. His Greek Cypriot identity derived from his ecclesiastical office and position as Ethnarch is crucial when examining his political actions. Did his source of authority, the archiepiscopal office, restrict his political vision and options in a fateful manner? This is an important question, especially in light of the observation of Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, the Greek foreign minister during the years 1956–63, that Makarios was wary only of Greek Cypriot criticism: ‘His one weakness was his inability to stand up to criticism from his fellow-countrymen’. Indeed throughout the career of the Archbishop there is a constant tension, between the romantic idealism of Greek nationalism and the hard implacable restraints of realpolitik.47 A paradoxical position underpinned the political career of Makarios. He was an ecclesiastical leader who assumed an active role in political affairs, not as a defender of the status quo, but as a conservative revisionist. He sought to end British rule while striving to maintain a socio-economic balance that favoured a strong Church in Greek Cypriot society. It is within the context of this strategy, along with its ramifications and antinomies, that the political career of the Archbishop will be evaluated. More importantly, this book will address the question of who was Archbishop Makarios and will account for his political actions which had such an impact on the history of Cyprus. This will dispel the mystique identified with his persona and politics and give us a better understanding of this remarkable individual.

2

The Making of Archbishop Makarios III Although this is a study of the politics of Makarios some early biographical information is required, in order to appreciate fully the complexity of his personality and how the imprint of his earlier life affected his subsequent political career. Michael Mouskos, his original lay name, was of very humble origins. He was born on 13 August 1913 in Ano Panayia (Άnv Panagiά), a village in the Paphos district, the western province of Cyprus. His parents Eleni Mouskos and Charalambos Mouskos earned their living mainly by keeping goats. Makarios is an ecclesiastical name and Michael adopted it as Orthodox tradition dictates years later when he was ordained a deacon in 1938. Under normal circumstances Michael would have grown to become a goat-herder like his father. Indeed until the age of 11 he had a very traditional upbringing. Five years after his birth, Eleni bore her second son, Yiacovos, and five years later, Maria became the fifth member of the Mouskos family. On 20 April 1924 Michael’s mother passed away. Two years later, in 1926, he graduated from elementary school with an average mark 9.5 out of 10.1 Although Michael was gifted and intelligent his father’s meagre finances meant that he could not afford to attend high school. A solution to this problem was proposed by the elementary school teacher, who suggested that Michael should join the Kykko Monastery since the prestigious monastery could provide secondary education to its novices. After a successful interview, Michael was accepted as novice in the monastery, at the age of 13. In this manner he continued his

18

† Makarios

education despite the financial restraints of his family and took the first step on the path of priesthood. Michael, who now adopted the surname Kykkotis to denote his affiliation to the monastery of Kykko, spent seven years in the monastery. During these seven years he carried out the tasks that all novices must perform, attended regularly the church and prayer services, studied as much as he could and developed an inclination for long walks. Although he displayed a sense of humour and a tendency to play pranks, at the same time he had a gentle nature and was a dedicated student as he finished his studies at Kykko with an excellent mark. When the shockwaves of the 1931 insurrection filtered through to the isolated monastery, Michael excited by the events scribbled on the kitchen wall Zito h Enosis (long live enosis).2 At the age of 20, Michael was awarded a bursary to attend the Pancyprian Gymnasium in Nicosia in order to finish his secondary education, since the education offered at the monastery was insufficient. This was his first trip to Nicosia, the capital of the island, and it must have made an impression on someone who had grown up in Ano Panayia and in the confines of a monastery. The Pancyprian Gymnasium was the oldest secondary education institution on the island, founded in 1812 by Archbishop Kyprianos. Located near the building of the Archbishopric Palace the Pancyprian Gymnasium was instrumental in producing pupils with a heightened Greek consciousness throughout British rule in Cyprus, as it was staffed by graduates of Greek universities and followed the curriculum implemented in all high schools in mainland Greece. Michael belonged to a Greek Cypriot generation which grew up in the backdrop of the post-1914 annexation and the post-1931 crackdown against enosis activities. The ‘repressive’ British regime, which was known as ‘Palmerocracy’, inevitably drove enosis emotion and activities underground but did not dissipate them. By becoming clandestine the enosis movement became even more appealing to its initiates and more inflexible in its political aims. In the summer of 1936 he graduated from high school and returned to Kykko where he was given the stewardship of the monastery school. He served in his new position for only one year

The Making of Archbishop Makarios III † 19 because he was subsequently appointed secretary to the monastery council which convened in the monastery’s depedency in Nicosia, the Metokhi of Kykkos. Mayes suggests that during this period Michael desired to study in Athens and his relocation to Nicosia enabled him to convey his wishes to his superiors successfully.3 Before leaving for Athens to pursue higher education, he was accepted in the ecclesiastical ranks by being ordained deacon by the locum tenens, Bishop Leontios, in Phaneromeni Church on 7 August 1938.4 To mark this rite of passage the name Michael Kykkotis was dropped and the ecclesiastical name Makarios (meaning blessed in Greek) was adopted. Promptly after this important event he travelled to Athens to study theology in the University of Athens. The student years of Makarios were years of political chaos and material depredation in the history of Greece. From September 1938 until September 1946, when he left for the USA, Greece experienced military rule, embroilment in World War II, a brief interlude of military triumph after successfully repulsing an Italian offensive on its northern borders, defeat at the hands of the German armed forces, followed by occupation, which in its turn was succeeded by a civil war between communists and right-wing nationalists in the wake of national liberation. Makarios’ personal life was greatly influenced by the tumultuous political developments. Events and experiences during this period helped to mould his political outlook and set in motion his clerical career. With the outbreak of war in October 1940 Makarios attempted to escape from Greece because, as a British citizen, he could have been interned by the occupying authorities. On the scheduled day of his departure the port was bombed by German planes, sending people to scuttle for cover. After emerging from shelter he discovered that his ship had been sunk during the bombing. His failure to escape from Greece meant that he had to share the wartime deprivations of the people of Athens – during which tens of thousands of Greeks died from starvation.5 Luckily the personal intervention of the Archbishop of Athens saved him from the fate of internment.6 Since Makarios was trapped in

20

† Makarios

Athens while World War II raged on he continued his studies and succeeded in graduating from university with high honours in 1942. After his graduation he decided to enrol in the law school of the University of Athens, the natural choice for any normally ambitious individual in the circumstances. Parallel to his studies he officiated as a deacon at the church of St Irene in Aiolou street. A severe attack of bronchial pneumonia had undermined his constitution to such an extent that he could not become involved in the resistance.7 However, between the months April and June 1944 he was administering the resistance oath to teams of students.8 On 13 January 1946 he was ordained priest and archimandrite at the church he had been officiating. This was a crucial step for his future ecclesiastical career because he could now be a candidate for a bishopric. As a deacon, Makarios had the choice to marry, but had he chosen this course, the upper echelons of clergy would have been barred to him. Since he was still unmarried when he was ordained he had to remain celibate but he could now follow a path which could lead to the throne of St Barnabas.9 The contacts he had developed at St Irene church eventually brought him in touch with Lieutenant-Colonel Georghios Grivas, the person who would assume the military leadership of EOKA.10 Their first meeting took place in 1946, after Makarios had written a few articles for Grivas’ newspaper, in which he attacked communism from a Christian point of view.11 Since the relations of the two men were so intertwined, it is important to sketch briefly the biography of Grivas. He was born in Nicosia on 6 June 1897. After finishing high school, he was accepted in the Cadet Officers School in Athens, from where he graduated with the rank of lieutenant. He saw active service in Asia Minor during the Greco-Turkish war in 1919 –22 and on the Albanian front in 1940. After the defeat of the Greek army in 1940 Grivas returned to Athens and founded the secret organisation ‘X’ (pronounced khi) which was pro-royalist and violently anti-communist.12 Claims that ‘X’ participated in the resistance against the Germans seem to be exaggerated. Instead, it became notorious for its vindictive actions against the Communists in 1945 – 6.

The Making of Archbishop Makarios III † 21 Christopher Woodhouse, the British liaison officer in occupied Greece, noted that ‘its name [organisation ‘X’] was unknown until shortly before the Germans left; and even then the name signified nothing connected with resistance: the sinister significance of a Ku Klux Klan’.13 Makarios’ brief interaction with Grivas at the height of the right-wing-communist confrontation in Greece in combination with his expression of anti-communist feelings is significant but should not be exaggerated. Makarios can in no way be implicated with Grivas’ brutal anti-communist activities as some left-wing critics have suggested. Archival research by Hatzivassiliou corroborates the view that Makarios had not been a member of ‘X’ during occupation, even though his church was in proximity to Grivas’ headquarters.14 Save for their meeting in 1946, it appears that they had no other contact, despite their common acquaintances. Regarding Makarios’ criticism of communism, this should not surprise us. Makarios could hardly be unaffected by deeply anti-communist sentiments in a strongly middle-class congregation like St Irene in the circumstances of late 1944. After the end of German occupation the communist guerrilla forces had under their control most of Greece. In December they attempted to seize Athens as well, but were denied only by direct British military intervention. Moreover, by the beginning of 1946, civil war in earnest had begun. Furthermore, the Soviet treatment of the church of seizing its lands and following a policy of harsh secularisation added to the suspicion Makarios felt toward communism, as he presumed that the Greek communists aspired to imitate their comrades in Moscow. In the polarised political climate of Athens a cleric taking an ideological stance against communism which had declared its atheism and was willing to seize power with the force of arms was entirely understandable. However his early anticommunist stance is worth remembering as it will become relevant with his induction in Greek Cypriot politics. Conversely we must be careful from interpreting this event as the precursor of EOKA. This is hardly the case as their meeting was coincidental. There was little to signal that in less than a decade’s time the two

22

† Makarios

men would join forces against the British colonial authorities in Cyprus. It is possible to postulate that the acquaintance of the two men and their common social circle contributed to the selection of Grivas as the leader of EOKA.15 On September 1946, against the backdrop of the Greek Civil War, Makarios gained a scholarship from the World Council of Churches to pursue his studies to a postgraduate level at the theological school of Boston University in the USA. It is interesting to note that Makarios was probably the only anti-colonial leader from a British colony, who did not have a British connection and did not study there. Right until 1955, when the colonial authorities started to monitor his activities more closely, he had had virtually no contact with the British mentality. Moreover, his religious identity made him even more alien to British policy makers, who were used to a clear demarcation between politics and religion. This cultural gap is worth bearing in mind when considering his subsequent interactions with the British authorities. Makarios was to remain in the USA studying until the spring of 1948, when events in his distant home island would summon him back to Cyprus. It is to the domestic affairs of Cyprus that we have to turn, in order to appreciate the confluence of events which required the return of Archimandrite Makarios from Boston to become the next bishop of Kition. The Rise of AKEL and the Struggle for Political Mastery in Greek Cypriot Politics In the first chapter we saw that AKEL benefited from the wartime partial relaxation of the repressive colonial regime that was established post-1931, to make important inroads in the Cypriot political scene. The rise of an organised and well-disciplined leftwing party with mass following caused an inevitable reaction from the right-wing camp, which eyed warily the growth of the Left. In 1943, the year which saw the breakthrough of AKEL in the municipal elections, KEK (Cyprus National Party, Κυπριακό Εθνικό Κόμμα) was founded to act as a counterweight to AKEL. In 1942, PEK (Agrarian Union of Cyprus, Παναγρωτική Ένωση

The Making of Archbishop Makarios III † 23 Κύπρου) was founded, which represented the right-wing conservative elements of the rural economic sector. The domination of the leftist-affiliated PSE (Pancyprian Trade Union Committee, Παγκύπρια Συντεχνιακή Επιτροπή)16 in the trade union movement was broken in 1944 when seven right-wing trade unions were founded and subsequently united under the umbrella organisation of SEK (Confederation of Cyprus Labour, Συνομοσπονδία Εργατών Κύπρου). The trade unions adhering to SEK were dubbed new trade unions, in contrast to their left-wing counterparts or the ‘old’ trade unions.17 It must be noted that SEK compared to PSE was not as vigorous and at times its very existence was in doubt.18 However, the weakness of SEK could not disguise the division of Greek Cypriot society into ideologically rival camps that contributed to a rigid social stratification and a political rivalry between Right and Left. This rivalry was further fuelled by the Greek Civil War, which had a galvanising effect on this incipient conflict, and by the proceedings of the Consultative Assembly. The Consultative Assembly was the British-led initiative to introduce a constitution and a degree of self-government on the island by calling different elements of both Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities to co-operate in drawing up a new constitution.19 The issue of participating in the Consultative Assembly became the apple of discord between Right and Left. This confrontation which essentially was a struggle for the mastery of Greek Cypriot politics, inevitably embroiled the Church of Cyprus. This was so because the British authorities had decided to revoke the repressive Church laws of 1937 and allow the conduct of archbishopric elections. Control of the archiepiscopal throne and the Ethnarchy granted critical influence over the majority of the Greek Cypriot community. The archbishop was indirectly elected through universal male suffrage and traditionally bore the title of Ethnarch, which meant the leader of the nation. The archbishop had at his disposal two political bodies, the Ethnarchic Bureau and the Ethnarchic Council. The former was a small committee of advisers who were appointed by the archbishop and formed a quasi-cabinet, while the latter was an assembly of prominent citizens who represented

24

† Makarios

different sections of Greek Cypriot society. These two bodies were not church bodies and were made up mostly of laymen. The Church leadership, that is, the Holy Synod, also participated in the Ethnarchic Council. Collectively they were known as the Ethnarchy, even though it was the Bureau which was the main advisory body to Makarios.20 As a result the Church of Cyprus exercised both religious and political power but it must be noted that the Ethnarchy had little actual bureaucratic power save the prestige it commanded among the Greek Cypriot community. The fact that both the archbishop and the bishops were elected indirectly by the people added to the prestige and popularity of the Ethnarchy, especially in the absence of an elective parliament or a degree of participation in the administration of the island. The archiepiscopal elections of 1947 were heavily influenced by the wider political struggle for supremacy as AKEL decided to take an active role in the proceedings by supporting the candidacy of the locum tenens, Bishop Leontios of Paphos, who had been moderate and appeared willing to co-operate with AKEL. The initiative of AKEL to become involved in the affairs of the church, which had hitherto been the privilege of the Right, was an indication of the confidence of the communist party that was unsettling its opponents. Katsiaounis argues that the tension of the electoral campaign exceeded the levels of the 1946 municipal elections reflecting both the increased stakes of the election and the escalating ideological confrontation.21 On 4 May 1947 the candidature of Leontios secured 900 special representatives out of 1000. This overwhelming majority rendered the second stage of voting null, as it was clear that Leontios would secure an unassailable lead in the second stage of voting over his opponent.22 On 20 June the ecclesiastical elective council declared Leontios the new archbishop of Cyprus.23 The initial caution of the Right over participation in the Consultative Assembly, essentially dreading the prospect of a communist-dominated chamber coming into force,24 was reinforced by Leontios’ election. Successive electoral victories of the Left conveyed the impression that communism was on its way to becoming the dominant political force of Cyprus.25 Thus

The Making of Archbishop Makarios III † 25 AKEL and its political allies decided to co-operate with the British, while the Right held back declaring that the best solution would be immediate enosis. Although the emotional appeal of enosis cannot be discounted easily, especially against the backdrop of Greek nationalist agitation of the late 1940s, it is important to note that political expediency was probably the driving force behind this slogan. Yet the seeming invincibility of AKEL was dealt two telling blows which helped to swing the political pendulum back to the Right again. Against all predictions Archbishop Leontios not only resisted the overtures of AKEL for a reformed Ethnarchy Council which would contain a stronger communist element, but he also condemned AKEL’s participation in the Consultative Assembly, making it clear that he was not AKEL’s stooge.26 In late July, Leontios died suddenly and the Bishop of Kyrenia, Makarios Myriantheus,27 who had been banished after the 1931 insurrection and returned to Cyprus only in 1946, became locum tenens. Makarios Myriantheus, a devout supporter of enosis and fanatically anti-communist, was the candidate of the Right in the new archbishopric elections which were held in October 1947. The elections returned a comprehensive victory for the camp of Makarios Myriantheus but the campaign was acrimonious and charged with political tension. Only police intervention prevented the outbreak of serious riots as the confrontation of Right and Left coloured all political activities in Cyprus.28 Makarios Myriantheus was consecrated Archbishop Makarios II on 30 November signaling the fightback of the Right under the banner of the Ethnarchy. A more confident Right soon stepped up its criticism of AKEL’s participation in the Consultative Assembly by accusing the communists of betraying enosis. The theme of national betrayal was developed further by Archbishop Makarios II, who declared ‘a bitter “holy war” against the communist “apostates” and “disclaimers of national, religious and family values”’,29 while in an interview to Reuters he stated that his prime concern was the eradication of Communism.30 It was amidst this polemical atmosphere that the young Makarios was elected Bishop of Kition. His election was part of

26

† Makarios

the wider counter-offensive of the Church and the Right to regain the political initiative. In fact political tensions in 1948 escalated further with a mutual economic boycott for business and shops belonging to the opposite camp.31 In addition each side tried to exploit its strengths in order to overawe its opponent and gain political capital. AKEL and PEO staged massive strikes in 1948 which were inevitably opposed by the Right and SEK and led to widespread strife as the labour force was split into strikers and blacklegs.32 On the other hand, the Ethnarchy under the guidance of Makarios II continued its campaign against communism by filling the empty bishoprics with candidates who were sympathetic to his own combination of anti-communist and pro-enosis views. All three Episcopal seats of Kyrenia, Larnaca (also known as Kition or Kitium) and Paphos were now empty. Nicodemos Mylonas, the bishop of Kition, had died in exile in 1937.33 During the brief reign of Leontios, the first round of elections for the Episcopal seats of Paphos and Kition took place with AKEL offering Makarios its support to his candidacy for the bishopric of Paphos. Makarios refused this invitation because his priority was his studies but also because he knew that the Ethnarchy was backing Cleopas, the former abbot of Kykko, for the same position.34 The newspaper Έuno6 (Nation) published a telegram sent by Makarios which declined the proposed candidacy.35 The fact that the telegram was sent to the nationalist faction rather than to AKEL itself was interpreted by the right-wing press as a refusal of Makarios to co-operate with the communists.36 This sounds plausible in light of his anti-communist feelings, subsequently demonstrated when he returned to Cyprus. In any case, after the death of Leontios, Makarios II held new elections for all three episcopal seats. They were inevitably influenced by the unfolding political struggle. The Right sensing the need for a more dynamic clerical leadership to support the elderly Makarios II invited Makarios to be the candidate for the seat of Kition.37 The electoral campaign, although fairly brief, lasting between the months of February and April, was also close because AKEL

The Making of Archbishop Makarios III † 27 had decided to oppose Makarios’ candidacy.38 Makarios headed into the final stage of the elections having secured only 17 special representatives, as opposed to the 19 of his opponent, but the ex officio members, under the instructions of Makarios II, voted for him en block, giving him a final majority of 28 to 19.39 On the same day of his election, 8 April, he was sent a telegraph which informed him of his success and asked him to return to Cyprus as soon as possible.40 Conventionally the reception of this telegram has been portrayed as a shock to the newly elected bishop, who was keener on his studies rather than on an Episcopal career with political connotations.41 This version of events is contradicted by Makarios’ reply the following day which indicated clearly that he accepted his election.42 Moreover according to Nέo6 Kypriakό6 Fύlaj (New Cypriot Guardian), Makarios in one of his homebound letters, dated 26 March, revealed that he was planning to leave the USA sometime in April.43 Therefore it appears that he must have been aware of his candidacy and any misgivings he had about his election as a bishop had been resolved earlier than 8 April, probably when his name was floated by the Right and not when he was informed of his election, even though he did reject the first offer of AKEL. Before returning to Cyprus, Makarios stayed in Greece for about two months in order to grow the conventional beard of Orthodox clergy. While in Greece he visited the infamous island of Makronisos, where communists and dissidents were interned and ideologically ‘rehabilitated’ through intense nationalist propaganda.44 In the guest book Makarios wrote: ‘It was a psychic rejuvenation for us the visit at Makronisos. We leave with unshakeable belief that our Hellas will never die’.45 He also traveled to northern Greece where he praised the efforts of the Greek Army still chasing communist guerillas.46 Both these visits resonated deeply with nationalist fervour and were a clear indication of Makarios’ ideological stance. Even if such actions could be partly symptomatic of the greater struggle of life and death between anti-communist and communist forces in the Greek world, and by extension in Cyprus as well, it was clear that the new Bishop of Kitium was entering the political scene of

28

† Makarios

Cyprus with clear-cut feelings about communism. In this respect he was ideally suited for the anti-communist crusade which the Ethnarchy was carrying out and in which he was expected to participate. With his enthronement to the seat of Kitium on 13 June 1948, Makarios gained a place in the Ethnarchy, the heart of Greek Cypriot politics, launching his political as well as his ecclesiastical career. He was the last of the three newly elected bishops to assume his office – as Kyprianos and Cleopas, both favoured by Makarios II, had already been invested to the thrones of Kyrenia and Paphos respectively – which completed the defeat of communist infiltration in the senior ranks of the Church. With its senior ranks replenished and invigorated the Church of Cyprus was well poised to continue its political offensive against the communists. The earlier collapse of the Consultative Assembly had been a reverse for AKEL which left it vulnerable to the accusation of betraying the cause of enosis. British colonial authorities had turned down the demand for full self-government on the Maltese pattern and proposed instead a form of limited self-government which was rejected by both Right and Left. Thus the attempt of AKEL to outflank the Church and the Right in the political battleground, through the establishment of selfgovernment, ground to a halt. In a military analogy, AKEL was the general who had committed too many of his forces without securing sufficient gains for his losses and his flanks were now ominously exposed. Moreover, there was the unforeseen outcome that the Church, through its confrontation with AKEL, had clawed its way back into the foreground of Greek Cypriot politics. It was not long before the Church realised that, in order to maintain a permanent advantage over AKEL it had to reorganise itself and to imitate it in one vital respect. It had to create its own sophisticated organisational framework capable of mobilising a larger base if required. Thus in July the Holy Synod convened to discuss the ‘national question’ and decided to set up a National Council which would act as an advisory body to the Ethnarchy. Invariably all its members were drawn from the Right including, apart from the Church leadership,

The Making of Archbishop Makarios III † 29 representatives from organisations like PEK and OHEN (Orthodox Christian Union of Youth, Ορθόδοξη Χριστιανική Ένωση Νέων), KEK and notable right-wing personalities.47 In addition an Athens mission was established, signalling which way the weight of the enosis campaign would fall once the supremacy of the Right and the Church was consolidated on the Cypriot front. The official press release of the Holy Synod stated that the aim of the National Council would be to promote the ‘national struggle for enosis’ according to the political line of the Ethnarchy, whereas British authorities in Cyprus judged that the principal aim of the council would be to fight communism.48 The truth of the matter was that enosis and containment of communism were different yet complementary aspects of the Church’s ideological desideratum. Anthropologist Ioannis Papadakis has commented that the response of the Church to the challenge of the Left was ‘to define “Greekness” as proChurch, pro-Greek monarchy and anti-communism’. This particular interpretation of Greek nationalism borrowed ‘from the notion of the Hellenic-Christian ideals’ of the Great Idea which conferred on the communists a ‘heretical’ status since ‘being Greek meant being Christian Orthodox’.49 This ideological struggle between competing interpretations of Greek identity led to what Hatzivassiliou has called the radicalisation of the enosis movement which was both maximalist in its final aim, intolerant of communists and oblivious to Turkish Cypriot sensitivities and eventually became willing to use violence to achieve its ends.50 The British were correct in their assessment that communism was the prime target of the Church. Even though its anti-communism was organically linked with enosis, the demand for enosis was held in check during the course of the Greek Civil War. With the defeat of communism in Greece, the Church was more confident to campaign for enosis and capable of attracting popular support in Greece. This substantial shift of attitude after April 1949 was completely lost on the British who continued to believe that the demand for enosis was merely the work of a few intellectuals and some middle-class elements.

30

† Makarios

Makarios in full agreement with the rest of the Church’s leadership took an active role in the anti-communist drive by questioning the putative willingness of the communists to cooperate in the implementation of the constitution which the British had announced. In a speech on 20 June, only one week after his enthronement, he said inter alia: I do not think and I do not believe that the slogan ‘selfgovernment’ is the bridge towards Enosis. On the contrary it is the final grave of Enosis. Enosis and only Enosis is not a slogan without meaning and empty words. It is of course faith. And the road towards Enosis could be shortened, if all united under the Enosist flag will fight with true faith for Enosis.51

Self-government was the slogan of AKEL during its participation at the Consultative Assembly, so that criticism of self-government was a measured attack on AKEL. Support for the line ‘enosis and only enosis’ was a defence and a repetition of the rallying cry of the Ethnarchy against the proposed constitution and the AKEList manoeuvring for self-government. In a press release he took a clear stance against communism stating that communism and Hellenism were a contradiction in terms: ‘I am a Hellene and as a Hellene I resent Communism. I am a Christian and as a Christian I abhor communism. Hellenism and Communism are incompatible terms [. . .] Christianity and Communism are opposite and mutually exclusive’.52 The energy and the efficiency of Makarios in his new duties were recognised, because the National Council decided to award him the presidency of a politburo, which would act as the executive committee of the more unwieldy Council. This was part of the greater modernisation of the Church institutions necessary for the pursuit of enosis. The progress of the young bishop was also noticed by the Governor of Cyprus who had written in his report to the Colonial Office: ‘There is no doubt that the moving spirit in this politburo will be the Bishop of Kitium and there is some evidence that in other respects also he is gradually emerging as a

The Making of Archbishop Makarios III † 31 man of energy and strength of character overtopping his contemporaries in the Church’.53 The struggle for political supremacy continued unabated in 1949 and although it peaked on account of the municipal elections certain factors pointed toward eventual defeat for the Left and resurgence for the Church of Cyprus. After the collapse of the Consultative Assembly, AKEL suffered from internal dissension because a sizeable minority wanted to continue the path of co-operation with the British, while the more hardcore elements wanted a return to the ‘safe’ line of enosis. Early in 1949 references to self-government and self-rule disappeared almost overnight from the rhetoric of AKEL.54 In March the split became more serious when the entire central committee resigned en bloc and was replaced by a provisional committee of seven members who were regarded as more ‘sound’.55 The new provisional committee immediately reverted back to enosis by declaring that ‘nothing can save Cyprus and its people but the immediate deliverance of the Island from the English imperialist yoke and our enosis with Greece’.56 Switching back to enosis did not help AKEL to hold onto the gains of the municipal elections of 1946. Denounced earlier in April by the Ethnarchy as a national and religious enemy and an obstacle to enosis, it had to wage a bitterly contested electoral campaign.57 This time the Church was determined to engage AKEL in the game of mass politics by matching communist rallies with its own processions and rallies and throwing its full weight behind right-wing candidates.58 Heightened passions led to localised violent incidents, especially in Nicosia, where two people were killed and 50 more were injured.59 Although AKEL succeeded in retaining control of the councils of Famagusta, Limassol and Larnaca, it lost Nicosia to the Right. Paphos and Kyrenia were retained by the latter, and 11 out of the 15 lesser local councils were won by right-wing candidates. In total the right-wing combination received 60 per cent of the votes. This was hardly a rout for AKEL but it was definitely a check compared to the election of 1946, especially as it was thought that AKEL commanded the majority of the electorate.60 The vulnerability the

32

† Makarios

Church felt vis-a`-vis AKEL explains why it reacted with such panic to the way this threat seemed to be about to reach an early climax with the help of British ‘constitutionalism’. In this context Makarios III, as a young, charismatic and youthful archbishop, arrived as a much-needed saviour. Nevertheless the enosis line in AKEL was consolidated further during the 6th Conference of the Party which took place in August. The conference validated the return to the enosis line, denounced its previous policy of self-government as ‘opportunistic’ and ‘compromising’ inspired by petty bourgeois influences and elected a new leadership which was entirely ‘proletarian’.61 The net effect was the replacement of moderate elements willing to pursue an evolutionary line on enosis with hardcore Marxists who preferred a rigid stance hoping to outbid the nationalists. In the meantime Makarios’ personal stock rose even further after mending the fences between Polycarpos Ioannidis62 and Themistocles Dervis,63 who had been attacking each other through their respective newspapers. Makarios’ personal intervention patched things up and averted the danger of dissension in the Right after the success of the municipal elections.64 It also signified the weakness of the lay Right and its reliance on the Ethnarchy to provide a firm political lead as the former was unable to compete alone against AKEL. In September Makarios visited Athens for personal and ecclesiastical reasons; to obtain medical attention for his sister and to arrange via the Greek Foreign Ministry the removal of the remains of his predecessor, Nicodemos Mylonas, from Jerusalem. While in Athens he had what would subsequently become the usual flurry of political meetings with a string of personalities, including King Paul of the Hellenes. Later he travelled to Constantinople to meet Athenagoras, the Ecumenical Patriarch.65 What was discussed in the meetings is not clear, yet one particular issue arose which was destined to dominate the political scene of Cyprus in the following months and mark a significant shift of the Cyprus problem. The possibility of holding a plebiscite as a means to buttress the case of enosis on the basis of the principle of selfdetermination, according to Savvas Loizides,66 was first mentioned

The Making of Archbishop Makarios III † 33 in a three-way discussion between him, Prof Demetrios Vezanis67 and Makarios during the latter’s visit to Athens.68 Yet it was AKEL which moved first to implement the idea of a plebiscite as part of its enosis strategy. The switch back to enosis was an ambivalent move because it could easily play into the hands of the Ethnarchy, especially since the demand for enosis was part of a greater nationalist discourse in which the Church was an integral part. Thus the only way for AKEL to compete with the Ethnarchy in the race for enosis was to be more nationalist than the nationalists by stepping up the demand for enosis. AKEL sent a memorandum to the UN which accused Britain that it was denying the right of self-determination to the people of Cyprus and then declared that it would collect signatures in support of the memorandum.69 This attempt to internationalise the Cyprus problem was set to outflank the Right and expose Greece, which had been advocating that the issue would be solved within the framework of traditional Greco-British friendship. If GrecoBritish relations were shaken due to the Cyprus problem it was of no concern to AKEL. In fact it was an extra incentive to press with this demand, because its ultimate aim was to be united with a communist Greece. For the Ethnarchy the renewed challenge from AKEL presented a dilemma. After that bitter struggle to assert enosis over selfgovernment was it to allow AKEL to snatch the banner of enosis right from its hands? If it was to maintain its leading position in Greek Cypriot society it had to maintain its momentum by moving forward and to translate words into actions. Therefore it responded to the challenge by announcing its own plebiscite. The decision of the Ethnarchy to hold a plebiscite lest it would be overshadowed by AKEL was an important turning point for the subsequent policies of the Ethnarchy. This was the beginning of a new phase of the Cyprus problem that would eventually lead to the internationalisation of the Cyprus problem. Internationalisation was the political campaign of the Greek Cypriots to muster adequate international support from other UN member countries in order to pressure Britain into conceding enosis. This new phase of the Cyprus question also meant that an evolutionary approach

34

† Makarios

to the problem, through the development of self-rule and the promise of self-determination in the unspecified future, was irrevocably ruled out by the crushing majority of the Greek Cypriots. It was also the beginning of the transformation of the Church into a revisionist political player. Complete transformation would only be achieved under the leadership of Makarios III but the seeds of this policy were sown in late 1949. The Church in its effort to keep its advantage was forced to adopt a revolutionary mantle resulting in the paradox of a conservative institution clamouring for change. However, it must be stressed that the essential goal was conservative – seeking to change the status quo by achieving enosis while ignoring other socio-economical changes. Yet this limited but specific revision set the Church of Cyprus on collision course with the British colonial authorities. Whereas British authorities were concerned with the growth of AKEL, it was the Church that eventually became the greatest source of agitation against British rule and as we shall see the point of origin of the anti-colonial struggle in the 1950s. * * * The declaration of AKEL that it would inaugurate its petition campaign on 4 December 1949 provoked a rapid response from the Ethnarchy. It convened on 1 December in an emergency meeting presided by Bishop Makarios, as the old archbishop was infirm.70 It acknowledged an earlier decision of the Holy Synod, taken on 18 November, to hold a plebiscite as a means of demonstrating the will of the Greek Cypriots for uniting with Greece, and scheduled a full session of the National Council for 5 December to discuss the issue in detail.71 Mentioning a decision for a plebiscite predating the publication of AKEL may have been a face-saving stratagem, but there is no doubt that the driving force behind the decision was Makarios.72 The National Council resolved to invite the Cyprus Government to conduct the plebiscite itself but, in case the proposal was rejected, to hold its own plebiscite on 15 January 1950.73 Sir Andrew Wright, the Governor of Cyprus, rejected the possibility of a plebiscite under

The Making of Archbishop Makarios III † 35 the aegis of British colonial authority, stressing that the issue for the British government was closed, but AKEL unilaterally decided to support the plebiscite and called its followers to vote in favour of enosis.74 In the run-up to the plebiscite nationalistic emotion flared up as both the Church and the Left urged the people to vote in favour of enosis. An Ethnarchy encyclical called the people to fulfill its duty: ‘For enosis and only enosis you have struggled for so many years. Enosis and only enosis you are called to seal with your vote’.75 AKEL matched the rhetoric of the Ethnarchy in its own declaration, which called all the ‘Hellenes’ of Cyprus ‘to demand what for centuries has been demanded by the previous Cypriot generations, the national liberation, the enosis of Cyprus with the mother country, Greece’.76 Given the strong endorsement of the two poles of the Greek Cypriot society it was not surprising that between 15 and 22 January almost 96 per cent of the Greek Cypriot population visited their local church, where the lists of names were held, to sign in favour of enosis.77 At this point it is imperative to say a few words about the Turkish Cypriots. Although this book is mainly about Makarios with an obvious emphasis on the Greek Cypriot dimension some general comments about the Turkish Cypriots are needed as they will become important later. The Turkish Cypriots had always been outnumbered by the Greek Cypriots. In fact, throughout British rule their relative size decreased from representing 24.4 per cent of the general population in 1881 to 17.9 per cent by 1946.78 As a result there was a strong tradition in resisting the possibility of Greek rule as a prelude to subjugation to the Greek majority. Niyazi Kizilyurek argues that the experience of Muslim populations in the Balkans after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, including atrocities and deportations, served as an example for the Turkish Cypriot leadership, which was determined to avoid a similar fate at the hands of the Greek Cypriots.79 When the British set up the Legislative Assembly in 1882, the Muslims80 petitioned against Greek Orthodox majority and demanded equal representation.81 Fear of Greek Cypriot domination was reinforced further by the fate of the Cretan

36

† Makarios

Muslims, who were caught in the rising tide of anti-Muslim emotion that swept former Ottoman lands and were harassed by the Greek Orthodox majority into leaving Crete. Eventually the last Cretan Muslims were forced to leave by 1924 under the Lausanne arrangement for ‘general population exchange’ between Greece and Turkey. The so called ‘Cretan syndrome’, the anxiety to prevent Greek rule lest it would bring the end of Turkish Cypriot presence on the island, dominated the minority’s political outlook and naturally braced them to resist the enosis campaign. Responding to the plebiscite, the Turkish Cypriots cabled the Foreign Office to protest against the possibility of enosis and issued their own appeal to the United Nations denouncing the Greek Cypriot demand.82 Because Turkish Cypriot reaction until 1955 was mainly peaceful the Greek Cypriots found it convenient to turn a blind eye to this reaction and generally underestimated the gravity of the situation. Ironically just as the British failed to take heed of Greek nationalism until it resorted to violence, the Greek Cypriots were eventually forced to rethink their attitude toward Turkish Cypriots when they initiated their own armed struggle. The interaction of Makarios with the Turkish Cypriots was very limited because he spent most of his life isolated from them. His village was fully Greek, even though there were some surrounding mixed villages, and by the age of 13 he had become an initiate of an Orthodox monastery. As mentioned earlier his secondary school was a bastion of Greek nationalism entirely devoid of the Turkish element. There was also no visible Turkish or Turkish Cypriot community in Athens, and certainly no such representatives in the School of Theology in Boston. It was only when he returned to Cyprus, as bishop, that he was likely to come into serious contact with Turkish Cypriots, having spent his formative years with virtually no substantial contact with them. * * * The Governor’s report from Cyprus poured scorn on the outcome of the ‘plebiscite’ by noting discrepancies during the process mainly in the form of different forms of pressure which boosted the final result in favour of enosis.83 Even if there was some truth in

The Making of Archbishop Makarios III † 37 this, refusal to appreciate the plebiscite as an honest manifestation of the Greek Cypriot will for enosis, no matter how romantic and naı¨ve the motives behind it were, smacked of wishful thinking. Such thinking was employed every time British colonial authorities were presented with a demand for enosis backed with popular support and was paramount in triggering an eventual armed reaction from the Greek Cypriots. The British attitude was best captured by George Kelling, who remarked that British officials ‘invented a Cypriot everyman, pro-British, anti-enosis and inarticulate. Once such collaborators had been conceived it was impossible to disprove their existence, since this eternal Cypriot ally never expressed himself’.84 If anything the plebiscite made the British Government dig in its usual position of no change in Cyprus hoping that this new initiative for enosis would run out of steam. The successful outcome of the ‘plebiscite’ became the springboard for an ambitious enlightenment campaign abroad which aimed to attract support and sympathy for the cause of enosis. This campaign was to be undertaken by a delegation whose composition became a bone of contention with far-reaching implications for Makarios and his future career. The first casualty of this fresh political animosity was AKEL, whose advances for a joint delegation were spurned by an alarmed Ethnarchy. Apart from the bad blood which separated the two sides it was feared that cooperation with the communists could attract Soviet attention and compromise any chances for an amicable settlement between Greece and Britain, leading to AKEL’s decision to form its own delegation.85 Getting rid of the unwarranted help of AKEL did not help to build a consensus over the membership of the delegation. Makarios as the architect of the plebiscite and the leading personality of the Ethnarchy Bureau was probably right in expecting to be also awarded leadership of the delegation in order to complete the task he had initiated. However, the political nuances of such a prestigious mission made it attractive to anyone who nursed the ambition to succeed the 80-year-old archbishop. Thus Kyprianos, the Bishop of Kyrenia, put himself forward to be the leader of the delegation. Despite repeated

38

† Makarios

meetings none of the two prelates would back down but eventually it was agreed to ‘abide by the decision of the Holy Synod’. The Holy Synod failed to resolve the impasse and eventually resorted to drawing lots which declared Kyprianos the winner.86 According to Fantis the lots were rigged by the so-called ‘Kyrenia Circle’, who were the power behind the archiepiscopal throne and wished Kyprianos to succeed Makarios II.87 This scenario sounds plausible in light of a British political report which informed the Colonial Office in London that ‘in the summer of 1948 a chorepiscopos (bishop without a See) was appointed to assist him [Makarios II] in the management of archiepiscopal affairs which were getting beyond his powers’. Such was the feebleness of the incumbent that he appeared ‘incapable of comprehending anything’ thus leaving ‘the affairs of the Archbishopric largely to his advisers, chief of whom [were] Koumbarides of Kyrenia and Polycarpos Ioannidis’.88 Both Ioannidis and Koumbarides belonged to the ‘Kyrenia Circle’, but especially the former who was a close associate of Kyprianos and a harsh critic of Makarios. Another fleeting reference to this incident is found in the memoirs of Azinas who during his first meeting with Makarios asked: ‘Is it true that a draw was carried out and that you would have lost anyway, since the lots all carried the same name?’ Makarios in characteristically Byzantine style avoided the question but conspicuously avoided denying the implication.89 The above evidence suggests that Makarios was denied the opportunity to lead the plebiscite delegation. This incident is important in the narrative of Makarios especially if we accept the possibility that Makarios was aware of the plot. It was the beginning of a rivalry between Makarios and Kyprianos. After Makarios became Archbishop, Kyprianos, as the leading persona of the ‘Kyrenia Circle’, distinguished himself as a critic of Makarios’ pragmatic policy deploring any whiff of deviation from the sacred ideal of enosis, which lasted right until the Bishops plot in 1972 –3.90 This group mutatis mutandis was the Cypriot version of the ‘Suez rebels’ group, the group of MPs during Eden’s premiership who called for a strong British stance in the Middle

The Making of Archbishop Makarios III † 39 East, and as a result exerted disproportional influence in Greek Cypriot affairs with its call for a more ‘Hellenistic’ stance. This was due to Kyprianos’ line of attack which sought to portray Makarios’ tactical changes in policy as wavering on the sacred ideal of enosis. Exploiting the emotional attraction of enosis was a ploy used repeatedly both in Greece and Cyprus for ulterior motives but in the case of Makarios it was his Achilles’ heel. As Archbishop and Ethnarch he was particularly vulnerable to calls from extreme nationalists to conform to some unrealistic yet highly desirable purist standard. The explanation of this siren call, enticing yet dangerously attractive, lies in the nationalist discourse which dominated Greek Cypriot politics. Makarios was both a symbol and an incarnation of Greek nationalism in Cyprus which gave him political authority superior to the conventional authority enjoyed by lay politicians so long as he moved within certain perceived boundaries, but if he moved outside these boundaries even an Archbishop could become highly vulnerable. Thus the very source of his authority constrained his political outlook because he could not be seen acting against enosis, which was the Holy Grail in the religious myth of Greek Cypriot nationalist sentiment. This was a prime contradiction in Makarios’ political outlook which bedevilled his entire career and prevented him from asserting full mastery over his policies. The rivalry of Makarios and Kyprianos took a further twist with the death of Archbishop Makarios II on 28 June 1950 that signalled the race of succession. Plainly Makarios was more popular than Kyprianos on account of the energy he had demonstrated during his tenure as Bishop of Kition. The following day SEKA (Co-ordinating Committee of Cypriot Struggle, Συντονιστική Επιτροπή Κυπριακού Αγώνος), which included notable personalities such as the mayors of Nicosia and Paphos, the general secretaries of PEK and SEK, declared in favour of Makarios.91 PEK’s endorsement concluded with a memorable ‘Makarios is dead. Long live Makarios’ which encapsulated the positive mood of Makarios’ supporters.92 A Kyrenia front did emerge and attempted to fight a battle which was already lost but, when SEKA asked Kyprianos to make his intentions clear he decided that retreat was the better part of valour.

40

† Makarios

In his telegram to locum tenens Cleopas Kyprianos made it clear that he was officially pulling out of the contest: ‘I wish to continue unperturbed with my colleagues the sacred mission of the Delegation and I request that my name not to be involved in the Archbishopric election, preserving thus the desirable national unity’.93 On 20 October 1950, at 10:00am, 78 electors, 22 clerics, 44 laymen and 12 ex officio convened in the archbishopric palace for the final round of election which would determine the new Archbishop of Cyprus. Bishop Makarios of Kition received 77 votes out of the 78, and was promptly declared Archbishop Makarios III. On this occasion, AKEL had been completely excluded from the political process within the Church – a legacy of the strategy began under Archbishop Makarios II. Its offer to the Right for a common candidate who would be representative of both factions was bitterly rejected, and since the electoral polls were purged of left-wing voters it was unable to contest in the election.94 Therefore it boycotted the proceedings and disputed the legitimacy of the new Archbishop. Characteristically, its mouthpiece (New Democrat) called the whole process an electoral coup and drew attention to the fact that there was a low turnout to the elections.95 There was nothing surprising about AKEL’s attitude given the political struggle of the late 1940s, but it is worth stressing that it was an avowed enemy of the newly elected Archbishop in 1950. However, Makarios III, by adopting the risky strategy of ‘internationalisation’, had to part with the policy of excluding AKEL that was so relentlessly pursued by his predecessor, since otherwise there could be no sustainable Greek Cypriot ‘front’ against the British. Thus the relations of Makarios-AKEL gradually shifted toward a modus operandi which after independence transformed into an actual cooperation. The evolution of this complex relationship which contributed to the political ambiguity of the archbishop – especially in the backdrop of the Cold War and the legacy of the Greek Civil War – will be central to our discussions in the following chapters. In his enthronement speech Makarios promised that he would not rest until the light of national liberation would dawn in Cyprus.96 It was clear that his energy and industry was to be

The Making of Archbishop Makarios III † 41 directed in the cause of enosis in a manner that none of his predecessor could have done or hoped to do so. This was partly due to structural factors, like the rise of nationalism and the nationalisation of the Church of Cyprus, the unwillingness of the British to accept enosis as a legitimate demand, the communist challenge which galvanised the Church into becoming a revolutionary institution of conservative convictions and the growing movement of anti-colonialism, but it was also down to Makarios’ personal qualities of charismatic leadership and extraordinary single-mindedness in the pursuit of what he thought was the historical destiny of his people. His quest for enosis was not a straightforward issue as it cut across the boundaries of anti-colonialism and high diplomacy on the one hand and irredentist nationalism on the other. Internal Greek Cypriot dissension further compounded the situation. Enosis was the only common point between Right and Left, but on anything else there was deep division including the means of pursuing this elusive objective. The unity of the Right which had elected Makarios was a fragile one, with a seething ‘Kyrenia Circle’ ready to pounce on any faltering of enosis. In his enthronement speech Makarios also claimed that labour, vigilance, struggle and sacrifice were the inheritance of the Archbishopric office. Given the difficulties and dilemmas which surrounded the position he held, this was a prophetic assessment.

3

The Road to the UN, November 1950 – October 1954 There was no question that the overriding concern of the new Archbishop was how to further promote the cause of enosis. Having played an instrumental role in the political resurgence of the Ethnarchy in the previous three years, which culminated in the plebiscite of 1950, he now had a clear mandate to take the enosis campaign to the next level. Pursuit of this aim required careful and elaborate campaigning on different levels ranging from the domestic front in Cyprus to UN diplomacy. For the latter Makarios had to rely exclusively on Greece’s support but even so there was no guarantee of success because of the complexity associated with the proceedings of the UN. Primarily he had to consolidate the domestic front against British initiatives which could erode support for enosis, contain AKEL and rally behind him the majority of the Greek Cypriot public in order to safeguard his prestige. Securing the domestic front was part of the preparation for an appeal to the UN by Greece over the future of Cyprus. Recourse to the UN was of course only a means to the end of enosis, but such were the passions and the expectations that its prospect caused in Cyprus (and in Greece) that it dominated this period. It was certainly the most visible and dramatic aspect of Makarios’ policies during the pre-EOKA years, as it brought him into disagreement with successive Greek governments but also disconcerted the British. Nevertheless the UN recourse was not a monolithic pursuit but an objective integrated in a greater and multi-faceted strategy. Yet as will be discussed it was an important watershed in the progress of the enosis movement.

The Road to the UN, November 1950 – October 1954 † 43 Resistance on the Domestic Front The domestic agenda of the Archbishop was dominated by two objectives which were ultimately intertwined. The first was to consolidate the gains made by the Ethnarchy during 1948– 50 by strengthening its position in the political developments through its further reorganisation, by appointing reliable persons at key positions of strategic organisations and by cultivation of a consensus among the right-wing leadership. The second objective was resistance to British initiatives which sought to undermine the enosis movement, either through constitutional proposals or through other schemes which could inhibit the growth of Greek Cypriot nationalism. To resist British efforts of diluting the enosis movement required strong leadership, a level of organisation and industry previously unknown to earlier advocates of enosis. Such innovations were crucial because Makarios knew that British failure to counter Greek sentiment would strengthen the proenosis faction and his personal position in Cypriot politics. The first measure taken to bolster the ranks of the enosist faction was the establishment of a new youth organisation, PEON (Pancyprian National Youth Organisation, Pagkύprio6 Eunikή Orgάnvsi6 N1olaίa6), which was founded in January 1951.1 The main aim of PEON was to enlist the help of young Greek Cypriots on the ‘domestic front’.2 It was a novel move as it harnessed the fighting spirit of the youth for the cause of enosis which soon made its presence felt, especially in secondary schools. On the second anniversary of the plebiscite, January 1952, there were spontaneous student demonstrations in the towns of Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta and Paphos. In the latter emotions ran high when a procession of students, led by a standard-bearer with the Greek flag, was intercepted by the police force.3 In May 1952 the Governor’s report to the Colonial Office noted that walls and streets in Cyprus were daubed with slogans by PEON members. Slogans such as ‘Greeks’ liberty is won with blood – Enosis. A.A.A,’ or the ubiquitous ‘A’, which stood for ‘antistasis’, that is, resistance in Greek.4 The greatest agitation caused by PEON was during the celebrations for the crowning of Queen Elizabeth II, when students in Nicosia and Paphos staged protests. Again the most serious

44

† Makarios

incidents took place in Paphos where 800 students demanded the removal of the Union Flag from the Paphos stadium and stoned the outnumbered Police force. Order had to be restored with the help of the Royal Engineers, who were there to take part in the parade the following day.5 The British response to the rising militancy of the student population was to refuse the renewal of PEON’s registration which led to its dispersion soon after the demonstrations.6 This did not end the involvement of youths in seditious activities, as Greek Cypriot students continued to protest against British rule and to demonstrate their support for Makarios’ policies. Despite its short-term existence PEON succeeded in spreading a nationalist consciousness amongst the students and to give an active mass following to the enosis movement, paving the way for the intimate association of EOKA and the Greek Cypriot youth. The radicalised youth served as a recruiting pool for EOKA with many former PEON members joining its ranks.7 Makarios proceeded methodically to establish a network of alliances and secure unwavering support for his policies in the organisation which was associated with the archiepiscopal seat. For the vacant seat of Kition, Makarios threw his full weight behind the candidacy of archimandrite Anthimos Machairotis, who was elected unanimously on 4 February 1951.8 The following month the ailing bishop of Paphos died vacating another episcopal seat. This time Kyprianos objected to Makarios’ candidate of choice, archimandrite Fotios Koumidis, on the grounds of the latter’s competence for the post.9 This caused a rift between Makarios and Kyprianos but eventually Koumidis’ election was ratified by a majority decision of the Holy Synod, with Kyprianos as the sole objector.10 Despite opposition from Kyprianos, the act itself a warning shot that the Kyrenia bishop would not accept passively instructions, Makarios secured an important flank. He now had the majority in the Holy Synod and two of the three bishops firmly allied to him. This majority was essential because it allowed Makarios to claim that he represented the vast majority of clergy and laity. On 28 February 1951, Makarios, following the precedent of previous archbishops, decided to revive the institution of the

The Road to the UN, November 1950 –October 1954 † 45 Ethnarchy Council,11 the appointed advisory body constituted by lay prominent personalities. The recent innovation of the Ethnarchy Bureau was also revived with Makarios himself being the president of this body.12 Unlike his predecessor, who due to his old age delegated a lot of his powers, Makarios had both the energy and determination to maintain firm control of the Ethnarchy administration. The Ethnarchy Council, despite its limitations, was a forum for church and lay leadership, which strengthened their alliance and maintained the support of the urban secular leaders to Makarios and the Church in general. The consensus-building effort around Makarios’ political platform was extended further with the inauguration of the Pancyprian National Assembly. This Assembly was summoned twice on 25 April 1952 and 23 July 1954. Both assemblies had a 600-strong membership, ‘including the rightwing Mayors of towns and rural municipalities, officials of rightwing clubs and other organizations, and nationally minded representatives of the professions in all parts of the island’.13 Despite the evident lack of the Left from the Pancyprian Assemblies, Makarios used them to reach out to the masses, to promote and rally support for his policies and generally to keep abreast of the new phase of mass politics which had blossomed since the early postwar years, despite the limitations of British rule. A criticism of the Ethnarchy Council and the Pancyprian Assembly was that they were designed to act as a rubber stamp to the archbishop’s personal decisions and agendas.14 This was true as Makarios concentrated power in his hands and that despite his efforts to cultivate a semblance of wide participation and of democratic elements and process, in reality he behaved more like an enlightened despot. However in the Cypriot context authentic representational processes were always elusive. Apart from the impracticability of creating from scratch democratic institutions parallel to the British administration, there were the deep divisions within the Greek Cypriot society and the tendency of the personal element to take precedence over issues of substance. Makarios himself argued that elections could polarise the people while what was needed most was unity.15 Moreover, the traditional leadership of the archiepiscopal office, and the life

46

† Makarios

term of the archbishop, meant that a gifted incumbent could really make a mark simply because he could not be voted out of office. In the case of Makarios his personal charisma combined with the inability of the secular right-wing nationalist camp to produce capable leadership, meant that it was natural that he could command so much influence without having access to any real bureaucratic power. In fact, because of the elusive nature of his leadership and prestige he had to court public approval because if he was to lose his wide appeal he could also lose his talismanic power. That he was careful to create an impression of wide support was a tactical prerequisite of his overall strategy of promoting enosis. Resistance to British efforts to secure Greek Cypriot cooperation was the second major objective of Makarios on the domestic front. When, in June 1950, the Cyprus Government passed the Villages Administration and Improvement Law which aimed to erect local councils in certain larger villages, they were opposed by Makarios on the grounds that they were a form of cooperation between the British authorities and Greek Cypriot population: Independently of the limited or extensive rights of these Councils, their creation constitutes a skilful subversion of our national struggle, a) because the people will be presented as participants with the Government and b) because with this measure the Government paves the way for a new constitutional proposal or other forms of local liberties, which will present [Cyprus] detached from its sole demand, its union with mother Greece.16

Such intransigence vis-a`-vis the British was detrimental to the welfare of the Greek Cypriots and appeared to be a gut reaction. However, in the case of Makarios appearances were deceptive. After the climax of the plebiscite there was really no other option but escalation of the enosis demand. Having irrevocably rejected the constitution, an evolutionary approach to the Cyprus problem, he had to press ahead with the enosis campaign. Like the exercise of

The Road to the UN, November 1950 –October 1954 † 47 riding a bicycle, he had to keep pedalling to maintain the momentum otherwise it was possible that the political gains the Ethnarchy had made in 1948 –50 would be squandered. There was fear that the British would impose a constitution which would eventually snuff out the enosis movement by offering an alternative vision for the future of Cyprus. Andreas Azinas, in an interview with the author, claimed that the prospect of a constitution in the early 1950s troubled Makarios because it could have split the population, absorbed the energy of the enosis movement, as people would turn their attention to the daily affairs of the island and ultimately even subdue the movement.17 Rumours of imminent constitutional change spiked at different times causing wild speculation but also a lot of wariness on the part of the Ethnarchy as in March –April 1952, when Governor Wright travelled to London for discussions with his superiors at the Colonial Office.18 Similar rumours broke out on the occasion of Wright’s replacement by Sir Robert Armitage.19 This is why Makarios came out against constitutional reform so strongly in his speeches and sermons. His address to the first Pancyprian National Assembly tackled specifically the issue of the constitution and defended his hardline policy against the criticism that it was leading to a political cul-de-sac: We do not overlook the economic and other problems of the land and we demand from the responsible Government their solution. But through this slogan [enosis and only enosis] we express our determination to fight for Enosis and we will accept no spurious solution for our demand, except the one and only, Enosis. We shall reject any constitutional proposal, through which the Government will strive [. . .] the settlement of our question and we will not accept any capitulation for a compromise solution.20

In January 1954, in a speech commemorating the fourth plebiscite anniversary, against the backdrop of fresh constitutional rumours and the imminent arrival of a new Governor, Makarios rejected again unequivocally the prospect of compromise: ‘Let the new

48

† Makarios

Governor arrive bearing a constitution or other schemes invented by the colonial machine. What we desire and shall pursue is the new Governor to depart, soon and without a successor’.21 Makarios was not simply a short-sighted nationalist fixated with enosis who militated against a compromise solution. He was astute enough to grasp that the battle for the constitution was a struggle which he could not afford to lose because his entire political future was imperilled. He was responding to what he felt to be a direct challenge to the primacy of the Ethnarchy and a threat to the sacred ideal he had sworn to fulfill when he was invested archbishop. It was natural that Makarios was anxious of the prospect of a British constitution laced with enough incentives to draw Cypriots into participation. In 1948 the British had refrained from unilateral implementation of the constitution but there was no guarantee that at some point they would not proceed with such a scheme. Despite the putative wealth of the Church, there was a serious question mark over its ability to compete directly with the new offices and positions that would be made available to the Greek Cypriots with a new constitution. Political maximalism marched hand-in-hand with a selfconscious Greek identity which had to be preserved at all costs in the face of British efforts to derail the enosis movement. Thus the Church was extremely sensitive to any educational reforms because the long-standing British laissez faire approach to Greek Cypriot education had enabled the inculcation of Greek sentiment and contributed to the growth of Greek nationalism. This sensitivity intensified in the aftermath of the 1931 insurrection when the Cyprus Government brought primary education under its control, because it gave validity to the suspicion that the Greek identity was under siege.22 There was already an ongoing grievance against the Cyprus Government when it decided to pass the Secondary Education Law of 1952. Under the new law any secondary school facing financial problems could apply for state assistance provided ‘that teachers would be appointed by Government after consultation with the governing body of the school concerned, that tuition fees will be limited, that a certain proportion of pupils would be admitted free and that the

The Road to the UN, November 1950 – October 1954 † 49 curriculum would not be varied without the permission of the Director of Education’.23 The law itself was not as subversive to the independence of secondary Greek education as Makarios asserted, especially since the scheme was optional. What was really at stake was the fear that the British would surreptitiously take over all education and that passive acceptance of such interference in what was considered to be a bastion of Greek sentiment would reflect badly on the enosis camp. He condemned the new law strongly and decided to establish educational funds to assist the insolvency of the Greek secondary schools and appealed to the people to contribute to this cause. The Church led the way through example by donating £10,000 for the repayment of the Pancyprian Gymnasium’s debt and contributed £5,000 to the general fund. As a result the government bill was mostly rejected by the responsible Greek Town School Committees.24 Following up his defiant policy, Makarios raised the stakes in the educational battle higher by issuing a new encyclical in which he admonished his flock to avoid the ‘xenomania’ of enrolling their children in primary schools where Greek was not the main teaching language.25 The controversy surrounding education was renewed the next year when the Government attempted to assert control in the two Greek secondary schools of Paphos. Pupils from Paphos’ two schools were actively involved in protests resulting in the suspension of their respective headmasters. In response the government amended the law relating to the appointment of Town School Committees allowing the Governor to appoint up to nine members who no longer had to be Greek Orthodox. Although the press communique´ of the Government stressed the fact that ‘these steps are being taken solely on grounds of public security and social order and not for the purpose of making any changes in the curricula followed in the secondary schools’ it nevertheless rankled with Makarios because potentially British officials could interfere with the Greek Town School Committees.26 The spectre of British intervention in this sensitive issue, which was also organically linked to the chronic doubt whether the enosis appeal could persist in the absence of any tangible progress, provoked an exaggerated

50

† Makarios

response. Although the new committee was in fact composed of Greek Cypriots, Makarios denounced the amendment in the most polemical terms: We shall not allow the foreign Government to subjugate our schools through its organs. We rather prefer to close them down and re-establish the clandestine schools which operated during the dark ages of Turkish rule than allow the Government to become master of our holy and sacred possessions. We shall react with all our power against the foreign Government’s plans regardless of the consequences for which the oppressing Government will be solely responsible.27

Opposition to British schemes extended even to affairs which appeared to be non-political as Makarios progressively escalated his resistance to all possible spheres of interaction between Government and Greek Cypriots. The objective was to erode British claims that moderate Greek Cypriots supported British rule as progressive and economically sound. In May 1953 Makarios instructed Azinas, who was a leading member of SEK and a close associate, to reject the Agricultural Marketing Bills despite the fact that from an economic point of view they were beneficial. There was a temporary split in SEK but reconciliation followed soon. Makarios had emerged stronger from this minicrisis. The bills were defeated despite the desire of some members who wanted to cooperate with the British, unaware of Makarios’ decision to politicise and contest all Government schemes as a prerequisite for the intensification of the political struggle. Eventually SEK rallied behind him after a successful reconciliation of the two factions a few months after the initial crisis and Azinas’ position in SEK was strengthened with his election as General Secretary.28 If Makarios’ inflexible attitude vis-a`-vis the British was conditioned by the enosis imperative the same should have held true for AKEL. After all, AKEL was dubbed enemy of the nation and religion, an insidious force bent on the destruction of the Hellenic ideals. Yet the relations of AKEL and Makarios in the

The Road to the UN, November 1950 – October 1954 † 51 years 1950 –4 turned out to be far more complex than anticipated to the point that they demand some analysis to appreciate the full complexity of the Cypriot political landscape which the archbishop had to navigate. As we have seen in the previous chapter, AKEL after the failure of the Consultative Assembly reverted to the enosis line hoping that it could beat the Ethnarchy at its nationalist game. However, after the conclusion of the Greek Civil War this line was paradoxical to say the least because AKEL was effectively demanding union under a Greek Government that had crushed its Greek communist brothers. Its outlook became even more confused with the pursuit of a contradictory policy: on one hand it fiercely denounced both the Greek Government and the Ethnarchy for their failure to achieve enosis and on the other it issued fiery declarations in favour of enosis and professed its readiness to close ranks with the Ethnarchy. For example, the Greek Government was attacked as a ‘monarchofascist’ regime, enslaved to the USA, which wanted to settle the Cyprus problem by any means.29 Makarios was accused of being a manipulative demagogue who had no real interest in pursuing the ‘liberation struggle’.30 Although from the perspective of AKEL such wild accusations were consistent with the ideological outlook of the party and its conviction that the Cyprus struggle would only succeed if AKEL was allowed to participate alongside the Ethnarchy, it is not hard to understand why such rhetoric made little progress beyond left-wing circles. However, the decision of AKEL to follow an enosis line, with the crude strategy of simply trying to outbid the Ethnarchy in its intransigence, played into the hands of Makarios. As he stepped up his enosis campaign increasingly the criticisms and condemnations emanating from AKEL had the ring of petty politics rather than a substantive alternative vision. Makarios unlike his predecessor was willing to translate his words into actions, using his authority to forge ahead in the struggle for enosis. This contrasted sharply with the articulate inactivity of AKEL which appeared to be out of ideas and overshadowed by an energetic archbishop. Moreover, the contrast of personalities between

52

† Makarios

Makarios and Ezekias Papaioannou, the Secretary General of AKEL, tilted the balance in favour of the former. Makarios, vested in the office of the archbishop, with his appearance that echoed to a glorious Byzantine past and his fiery sermons, cut an impressive figure compared to the almost pedestrian Papaioannou, who lacked any comparable charisma. The weakness of AKEL was exacerbated further with the purge of 1952 when the dissidents of 1948, the personalities who had opposed the majority decision to withdraw from the Consultative Assembly, were removed from the Party.31 This reflected negatively on the image of the party because it conveyed the impression of disunity and disarray. It was a serious setback for a party that was renowned for its iron discipline and unity in purpose. In addition the purge denied it the service of some very able men like Ploutis Servas, former Secretary General of AKEL, who was instrumental in catapulting AKEL into political prominence during the 1940s. Moreover, it eliminated the dissident voices which called for co-operation with the British and a gradualist approach to the ‘national question’.32 Thus the enosis ideal was thoroughly consolidated in the Greek Cypriot community which, despite the published revocations of AKEL on the self-government line, unwittingly handed the initiative to Makarios. This was because the imagined tradition of the Church championing the national cause, reinforced with the recent experience of the Consultative Assembly, established in popular perception the Ethnarchy as the leading institution in favour of enosis. In addition the charismatic leadership of Makarios, which was visibly striving to change the political status quo, meant that AKEL could only play second fiddle to the Ethnarchy. The decline of AKEL could not have passed unnoticed by the Cyprus Government, which in early spring of 1952 reported to London that ‘communist influence in the island is at present at low ebb’ having ‘lost the initiative in the face of the Church’s pursuit of enosis’.33 But perhaps the best indication of AKEL’s weakness lay in the conduct of the municipal elections of 1953. Sensing its weakness, AKEL attempted to strike a bargain with the Right, with the purpose of electing candidates of wider

The Road to the UN, November 1950 – October 1954 † 53 appeal, but this advance was blocked by an Ethnarchy intervention which warned the people to stay clear from any ‘collaboration with the reds’.34 Despite the rebuff the elections were conducted normally in ‘an atmosphere of calm and good order’ in sharp contrast with the excesses and violence of 1949.35 AKEL did retain Limassol, Famagusta and Larnaca, and tried to give a triumphant spin on the results,36 but its newfound moderation was an implicit acceptance that its political star was outshone by the brilliance of the Archbishop. Makarios, unlike his predecessor, was not so greatly preoccupied with the threat AKEL could pose to the primacy of the Ethnarchy. He remained vigilant in his dealings with AKEL, rejecting its offers of collaboration and refusing to invite them either to the Ethnarchy Council or the Pancyprian Assembly, but the mastery he enjoyed over the enosis movement meant that his leadership could not effectively be challenged by the communists. If anything, as his internationalisation campaign intensified, he tended to underplay the strength of AKEL. In a press conference he gave in Athens in April 1951, Makarios somewhat boldly claimed that the influence of the communist party had fallen to 15 per cent of the electorate.37 When interviewed by the BBC he went as far as to claim that the Greek Cypriot brand of communism was ‘a kind of Trades Union Movement for the improvement of the workers lot’.38 These statements had some validity. AKEL had lost the political initiative and appeared ‘to have abandoned its former truculent militancy’ but the main reason behind this unthreatening depiction of AKEL was down to wider political considerations.39 It was a tactical move to stress that the enosis movement was free from communist elements which might seek to exploit any change in the status quo and cause trouble in a strategically sensitive island. But it was also an indication that his main concern lay elsewhere, namely in the anti-colonial struggle. However, under the impact of the internationalisation campaign the relations of AKEL-Ethnarchy were affected and to some extent had to be reconfigured to reflect the vicissitudes of the enosis campaign abroad. This twist has to be evaluated in connection with the events relating to the long path to the first

54

† Makarios

UN appeal and will be discussed in the following section along with the other aspects of the internationalisation campaign. Attempts to Secure Greek Sponsorship for a UN Appeal Makarios knew that his domestic opposition to British rule was not enough to achieve his avowed purpose and that it was imperative to exert international pressure on Britain to force a reappraisal on its Cyprus strategy. This could be achieved by persuading Greece, an ally and traditional friend of Britain, to take up the Cypriot issue more vigorously. Despite the emotional attraction of Cyprus, Greece was reluctant to make such a demand and curtailed itself to mere expressions of hope that the issue would be settled amicably between the two countries. When the Cypriot delegation bearing the signed volumes of the plebiscite visited Athens in 1950, it tried to convert the Greek Government to the cause of enosis. The Greek Prime Minister at the time, General Plastiras, made it clear that the issue was to be settled amicably within the framework of Greco-British relations at an opportune time.40 It was this wary attitude of the Greek Government that Makarios sought to change when he visited Athens for the first time as archbishop in the spring of 1951. His main allies in this effort were the student body, the Ethnarchy Bureau in Athens and the Archbishop of Athens, Spyridon. The latter was also the leader of the umbrella organisation PEEK41 (Panhellenic Committee for the Union of Cyprus, Panellήnio6 Epitropή Enώsev6 Kύproy) which united all pro-Cyprus forces in Greece and contributed significantly to the making of the Cyprus issue as a popular cause in Greece. Support from these organisations meant that Makarios, as the representative of an unredeemed Greek island, enjoyed considerable influence in Athens as well. However, despite the popularity he could muster in the Greek capital he failed to elicit a tangible change from the government. Responding to the Cypriot demands, the Greek premier, Sophocles Venizelos, summoned a meeting of all parliamentary parties to discuss the problem, where there was a consensus that

The Road to the UN, November 1950 – October 1954 † 55 the issue had to be advanced within ‘the framework of traditional Anglo-Greek friendship’.42 This was at considerable variance with Makarios who had publicly stated that he expected an immediate de´marche to the British Government and, failing that, the issue should be raised at the following General Assembly of the United Nations.43 Venizelos was also loath to raise the issue in the forceful manner envisioned by Makarios. When the former visited the British ambassador in Athens he was rather apologetic, claiming that the Greek Government, although under public pressure to be more firm over the issue, ‘did not wish to create friction with its old friends’ and went as far as to wonder if future similar delegations could be blocked from leaving the island.44 Regarding this first visit to Athens, Stefanidis has noted a contradiction in the behaviour of the archbishop in his dealings on one hand with the American and the British embassies and his public declarations on the other. During these two visits Makarios indicated that he was open to the possibility of some compromise. He suggested to the American ambassador that agitation in Cyprus could be contained ‘if a statement were made holding out hope to Cyprus for the future’.45 A few days later he impressed the British ambassador by pointing out ‘that there was a difference between refusing to discuss the matter in present circumstances and saying that the question was closed’ implying that some indication of change would be enough to alter his militant attitude on enosis.46 Stephanides argues this nascent conciliation was stopped in its tracks when Makarios in the press conference on 6 April stated that a vague promise of change would not be enough and only a pledge of cession ‘within a reasonably short time’ could be considered.47 This confusion regarding the apparent contradiction between the private Makarios and the public orator was in fact typical behaviour. In private he was usually a lot more pragmatic than what his rhetoric suggested.48 In fact he was willing to discuss the possibility of a compromise that would offer him a face-saving pretext to climb down from his public statements. However in public he was too self-conscious of appearances and the need to convey the idea that he was an indomitable leader in

56

† Makarios

the face of extreme odds. Without anything tangible in hand he could not appear in public renouncing enosis in order to secure future gains that depended entirely on British good will. Moreover there is no archival evidence to suggest that the British Government was contemplating a compromise agreement with Makarios. To judge him solely by his public statements is a mistake because it ignores this important dichotomy in his personality. Although in private he was a lot more pragmatic, at the same time he felt the need to strike a militant pose in order to maintain his aura of a defiant leader that was crucial in galvanising the enosis movement. The next step in the internationalisation campaign was to apply more pressure on the Greek Government and push it down the UN path. In an unprecedented move Makarios decided to follow an oblique approach. If Greece was unwilling to sponsor the Greek Cypriot appeal then one of the friendly Middle Eastern Arab states could be persuaded to lend such support or at least the prospect itself could overcome Greek hesitation. The idea to generate sympathy and support for the Cyprus cause outside the Hellenic world, in states that were likely to view the decolonisation of Cyprus sympathetically, was the brain child of Makarios which reflected his adaptive political thought in an age of rising anticolonialism feeling. Makarios launched his Middle Eastern initiative by writing to the foreign ministers of Egypt and Lebanon in May 1952 to thank them for expressing their support over the Cyprus issue in a recent UN debate. His message to the Egyptian foreign minister hinted at the possible parallels that could be drawn from the anti-colonial struggle of Egypt with Cyprus: ‘with interest we observe the struggles of the Egyptian people for the completion of its national liberty and we wish for its successful outcome’.49 Egypt was not a colony but its struggle to assert its independence vis-a`-vis Britain’s lingering influence and presence on its soil was to become a point of reference for the Greek Cypriots. Makarios, who was to develop good personal relations with Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, felt that there were lessons to be learned from the Egyptian experience that could be applicable to Cyprus as well.

The Road to the UN, November 1950– October 1954 † 57 This gambit was soon followed up a few days later with Makarios’ visit to Egypt, Lebanon and Syria. With his usual guardedness Makarios claimed that the purpose of his visit was to secure the ‘moral support of the Greek communities in his campaign for the enosis of Cyprus with Greece’.50 There was a significant Greek community in Alexandria. In addition there were Orthodox communities in Syria and Lebanon. Makarios hoped that if he could enlist them to his cause they could influence their respective governments in supporting the Greek Cypriot demand for enosis at the UN. Once in Egypt Makarios mobilised the support of the Greek community in Alexandria by setting up a Cyprus Brotherhood. In addition he met with both the prime minister and foreign minister of Egypt and gave several press conferences.51 In Damascus he was offered hospitality by the Patriarch of Antioch and in one of the two receptions that were given in his honour, he stated that ‘the object of his visit was to confer with the Patriarch and to enlighten the Syrian people about enosis’.52 The most disappointing part of his trip was his visit to Beirut, where he failed to actually see the Lebanese prime minister and was warned by the Greek charge´ d’affaires to refrain from raising the issue of enosis.53 The Lebanese Government in 1952 had enough internal problems and dissensions to deal with and needed Western support to maintain an uneasy peace. To become involved in the Cyprus problem was seen as an unnecessary and unrewarding risk. In any case this first contact with the Middle East, a region seething with anti-Western feeling, opened new possibilities for Makarios and influenced his political outlook. Most Arab states held the USA and Britain responsible for the plight of the Palestinians and regarded British efforts to maintain its influence in the region with suspicion. It was in this trip that the seeds of his anti-colonial career were sowed. The Greek Cypriots were under the impression that other countries were acquiring the right of selfdetermination while they were being made an exception. This added to the sense of injustice they felt and strengthened the demand for enosis as the only acceptable political solution. A case in point, demonstrating how decolonisation abroad fanned the flame

58

† Makarios

of enosis, was the occasion of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1953 which granted self-government to Sudan with the prospect of selfdetermination by 1956. The newspaper Έθνος (Nation) headline read ‘While we remain slaves, one more country celebrates the achievement of its freedom’.54 In reality, after the decolonisation of India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon in the late 1940s, there were was no blanket application of self-determination. During the mid1950s Britain was only tentatively discussing self-government for the majority of its colonies and only by the early 1960s was independence granted on a wider scale. Nevertheless the Greek Cypriots were adept at interpreting a very complex British decolonisation through an enosis lens. The fact that there were countries which had already gained their independence was more than enough to fuel their grievance, especially since they thought themselves to be ‘white’ and therefore ‘deserving’ better treatment than the populations of the other colonies. Straight after his Middle East tour Makarios flew to Athens determined not to depart from Greece until he received a final answer from the Greek Government to his demand for the latter to appeal to the UN over Cyprus.55 By this time Makarios was convinced that no bilateral talks between Britain and Greece could ever hope to settle the issue because the British side had no inclination to do so.56 In addition to a series of meetings with Venizelos who was now Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, since General Nicolaos Plastiras the Prime Minister was infirm, Makarios also had discussions with the leader of the opposition, Field Marshal Alexandros Papagos, and was received in audience by King Paul.57 However this flurry of meetings and consultations could not disguise the growing tension between Makarios and Venizelos over the UN appeal. According to a subsequent revelation of Venizelos in the Greek Parliament, there was a particularly heated exchange of words over the appropriate direction of Greek foreign policy: When in 1952 he [Makarios] came to my office at the Foreign Ministry and told me: ‘I shall expose you before the Greek people for refusing to bring the issue before the United

The Road to the UN, November 1950 – October 1954 † 59 Nations’. I told him: ‘You can expose me before anybody you want and with whatever accusations you find appropriate, but I will not allow you to direct the foreign policy of Greece.’58

Makarios, exasperated with the reluctance of the Greek government to appeal to the UN over Cyprus, decided to publicly denounce it hoping to gain a favourable response from the Greek public. In a radio address to the Greek nation Makarios, after thanking the Greek people for its support to the Cypriot cause, accused both the Greek Government and the Opposition that they had lacked ‘boldness’ and ‘courage’ to promote the cause of enosis. He denounced the Greco-British friendship as an ‘insult’ to the Greek nation because in its name Cyprus was held captive in the most cynical manner. British policy did not escape the Archbishop’s ire either, as he reproached the justification of its Cyprus policy – it was claimed that British retention was a strategic necessity in the struggle for international freedom – as a hypocritical practice of double standards. His address concluded with a dramatic appeal to the Greek people: You have the power to make your political leaders comply with your demand and mandate, to bring the Cyprus question before the Assembly of the international organisation. To you then I entrust the handling of the sacred cause of Cyprus on the Greek side. I direct to you heartfelt greetings with the certainty that I entrust the case in strong hands.59

What impact this appeal had had is imponderable but it was becoming evident that in his quest for enosis Makarios was becoming a recognisable public figure in Greek politics as well. The reasons behind this event could be many and diverse, the disillusionment of Greek electorate with uninspiring politicians in a weak and fundamentally unstable political system. The popularity of the Cyprus issue was another factor – the last flash of the moribund Megali Idea which had become a palliative distraction of the masses from the traumas of the recent civil war. However without his personality and oratory skill Makarios

60

† Makarios

would not have been able to make the transition from a Greek Cypriot leader to a public persona of the entire Greek world. Indeed a few years later he would be even asked to consider the possibility of becoming Prime Minister of Greece. His brittle relations with the Greek Government attracted criticism from contemporaries, who questioned the political wisdom of Makarios causing rifts between Greece and Cyprus, essentially seeking to encroach on the sovereignty of Athens by propagating a Cypriot-centric approach to the Cyprus problem. A common criticism was that Makarios, despite his appeals to Hellenism and his desire to unite Cyprus with Greece, acted primarily as a Cypriot without taking into account the wider interests of Greece.60 Similarly Averoff criticised the internationalisation campaign which began with the plebiscite mission of 1950 as an ill-conceived strategy which had not taken into account the wishes of the Greek Government that was bound to influence adversely the interests of Greece.61 By implication this criticism applies to Makarios as well as the inheritor and propagator of the internationalisation line that was launched back in the spring of 1950.62 This negative view of Makarios’ political agenda is compounded further by the critique of Stefanidis and Mayes. According to the former Makarios ‘had little grasp of contemporary international politics’ while Mayes argues that the radio address to the Greek people ‘was a demonstration of [his] single-mindedness, but also a proof of his complete inability to appreciate Greece’s problems or the international situation in which she was enmeshed’.63 Such assessments raise two important questions that need to be addressed: firstly, what caused this disparity of opinion between Makarios and the Greek Government? Secondly, was Makarios a naı¨ve dabbler in high diplomacy? The disparity of political perception between Athens and Nicosia because of the Cyprus problem, itself a phenomenon likely to perpetuate itself and resurface so long it remains unsolved, was rooted in structural factors which made Greek reliance on American and British support mandatory. Since the debilitating civil war had been won with American and British aid, it meant that Greece was most reluctant to antagonise Washington and London. Britain clearly

The Road to the UN, November 1950 – October 1954 † 61 wanted to retain Cyprus and the USA did not want the political future of the island to become a bone of contention between its NATO allies. Greek reliance on its British and American allies did not end with the conclusion of the Greek Civil War but continued unabated because of the ‘menace from the north’. According to Hatzivassiliou, this was a fusion of the old regional rivalries with other Balkan states and the Cold War polarisation. Yugoslavia had aided the communist guerrillas during the Greek Civil War but even more dangerous was the Bulgarian threat. Bulgaria traditionally coveted an outlet to the Mediterranean in the shape of Salonica, the second-biggest Greek city, and for this reason invaded Greece on three different occasions in 1913, 1916 and 1941. The fact that Bulgaria was now a Soviet satellite turned Greece’s northern border into a long vulnerable defence line. The need to defend this border dominated early Greek Cold War strategy, which was bent on the preservation of the status quo, and made imperative the need to join NATO in order to counterbalance the pressure on its northern border. The strategic situation was compounded by the extensive Greek coastline which made axiomatic the cultivation of good relations with the dominant sea power in the Eastern Mediterranean. This reinforced the Western strategic orientation of Greece further, since Britain was this power until 1947 and subsequently the USA.64 There were also domestic considerations in Greece that militated against an adventurous foreign policy. After the civil war there was urgent need to restore the economy and rebuild the country’s damaged infrastructure. Economic weakness was coupled with chronic political weakness. Since the end of the civil war the country was ruled by a string of weak coalition governments which did not have the political capital or will to embark on such an ambitious project, especially given the fragile international position of Greece. Finally, Greece had to nurse the burgeoning but delicate GrecoTurkish friendship that was partly stimulated by the common Soviet threat and their simultaneous accession into NATO. In the early 1950s, officially at least, Turkey showed little interest in the Cypriot issue, even though Turkish emotion was brewing both on

62

† Makarios

the island and in Turkey itself.65 In this sense it was wiser for the Greek Government to avoid agitation over Cyprus, lest it would provoke the interest and latent rivalry of Turkey. One factor that was subsumed within the Turkish relations and later cast a long dark shadow over Greek policy in Cyprus was the issue of the Ecumenical Orthodox Patriarchate and the Greek community in Istanbul, or Constantinople as it is called in Greek. The Patriarchate, the Holy See of the Patriarch of Constantinople, the most senior institution of the Orthodox Church, was not only the central focus of the Orthodox religion but also the last direct remnant of the Byzantine Empire, a reminder of the Greek past of Istanbul. Preservation of the Patriarchate and the Greek community of Istanbul was a duty no Greek Government could afford to shirk, but at the same time depended heavily on cordial relations with Turkey. This was so because the Patriarchate and the Greek minority were exempted from the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, which provided for the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey and there was fear that if Greco-Turkish relations deteriorated, the Patriarchate would suffer. Indeed as we shall see the outbreak of violence in Cyprus had a most dramatic impact on the Greek community of Istanbul and eventually signalled the end of a Greek presence in the historical city.66 Greek hesitancy over the issue of Cyprus was a rational decision grounded in the realities of the Cold War and the weak international standing of the country in the 1950s. Why did Makarios lack empathy with the dilemmas of metropolitan Greece? Especially in retrospect it is not easy to defend the policy of internationalisation but at the same time one needs to bear in mind that the danger of this policy becomes evident in the light of revision. Makarios, although not a head of a government, had his own domestic affairs to manage and advancement of enosis was fatefully linked with his prominent position in the Greek Cypriot community. His primacy in Greek Cypriot affairs was dependent on whether he could deliver success on the enosis front. Makarios felt the need to set things in motion, otherwise enosis would lose its appeal. George Seferis,67 when he visited Cyprus in November 1953, wrote in his diary after a meeting with Makarios that the

The Road to the UN, November 1950 – October 1954 † 63 latter was worried about the ability of the Ethnarchy to retain popular support for enosis and that the status quo was demoralising the masses, which underlined the urgency for some sort of breakthrough that could galvanise the people.68 The fear of losing popular support in conjunction with the British refusal to even acknowledge the possibility of self-determination hardened the logic of internationalisation as a natural reaction to the impasse. An important weakness of Makarios was that he lacked access to a sophisticated state apparatus which left the fundamental romanticism of enosis entirely unmitigated by the harsh environment of the realpolitik.69 The undeniable romanticism of the Greek Cypriot community, a by-product of the enosis discourse, was enhanced further by the island mentality of Cyprus, which produced a parochial worldview. The tendency was to ignore regional power relations such as the strategic interests and the influence of Turkey, to view the Turkish Cypriots within the strict confines of Cyprus, which meant that they should passively accept the fate of a minority, and to indulge in selective reading of the currents of international relations. Therefore, because decolonisation was happening elsewhere it was thought that Cyprus had to follow suit. Perhaps the greatest folly of the internationalisation campaign was the belief that the UN was a world court where complaints could be taken and a legally binding decision could be reached reflecting the ‘just’ cause of enosis. Finally, it must be noted that after the categorical rejection of the constitutional path combined with British refusal to eventually yield Cyprus, there was little choice about the direction of the Cyprus problem to the point that one can discern a degree of inevitability. It was almost implausible for an archbishop with the experiences and outlook of Makarios to dare and swim against the current of enosis without a serious concession from the British. In fact after having put himself so unambiguously at the head of the Greek Cypriot aspiration for enosis, he now had no alternative but to follow the logic of the ‘demand’ he had propagated. That this demand had behind it decades of yearning and hopefulness meant that Makarios had no other option but to ‘ride the tiger’ especially since he had done so

64

† Makarios

much to set events in motion. Insistence for enosis was an irreducible element of the political outlook of Makarios but this type of stubbornness was not fundamentally different from British determination to retain Cyprus at all costs as means of staving off the virtually inevitable decline of the British Empire. In other words his inflexibility over enosis was in some ways provoked by British policy in Cyprus and it is important to bear this in mind before criticising Makarios’ ‘naive stubbornness’. * * * After his failure to secure a Greek recourse to the UN, Makarios decided to travel to the USA to canvass political support and attend the UN debates in New York. Before his departure he was asked by a reporter how he would react if the Soviet Union supported enosis. Makarios replied that ‘we shall not be displeased’.70 This was an indication of his pragmatism and his willingness to practice the art of the possible rather than maintain a myopic political vision based on an inflexible ideology. It was also the influence of the anti-colonial feeling to which he was exposed when he visited the Middle East and the beginning of a maverick policy of forging alliances of convenience with unlikely partners. His audacity to break with the strict anti-communist tradition of the Ethnarchy, even if this was out of necessity rather than conviction, increased the tension with the ‘Kyrenia Circle’. His visit to the USA, which lasted from the end of October 1952 until the end of February 1953, despite the wild rumours it generated especially in the Athenian press about a ‘Pan-American Union for Justice to Cyprus’ to be spearheaded by American personalities, did not have the impact British authorities had feared and Greek press had hoped for.71 The highlight of his visit was his appearance before the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee on 10 February 1953.72 Despite his presence at the UN proceedings, the Cyprus issue was not discussed. Nevertheless Makarios was impressed by the General Assembly’s resolution of 16 December 1952, which recommended to its members to ‘recognise and promote the realisation of the right of self-determination of the peoples of Non-Self-Governing and

The Road to the UN, November 1950 –October 1954 † 65 Trust Territories’ and to ‘facilitate the exercise of this right by the peoples of such Territories according to the principles’ of the UN charter.73 While this resolution increased his determination to persist with the UN path in private he did not reject entirely the possibility of some compromise. In a conversation with a member of the State Department he professed his willingness to accept a self-governing constitution for the island on the condition the British would shift from their ‘no change’ line and agree to an eventual plebiscite on enosis after an interval.74 In his first public announcement in Cyprus after his tour in the USA, Makarios made it clear that he would ask the Governor of Cyprus to hold a new plebiscite to establish the true will of the Cypriot people, on the basis of the new UN resolution of 16 December 1952. In case of British refusal he stated his intention to appeal to the UN and in this effort he would not hesitate to ask the support of all the member-states. More specifically he claimed that ‘we shall accept offered support from any hands’, hinting that he was willing to court the vote of the Soviet bloc.75 This was his second allusion to the Soviet Union as a possible counterweight to Britain and NATO in a future UN debate over the status of Cyprus, underlining his determination to overcome British resistance by all means and with any alliance he could forge. However his pledge, which was part of his escalation strategy, to officially ask the British authorities to realise ‘the right of the people of Cyprus to self-determination’ preceded any plans for a UN battle. The pledge was translated into action on 27 April 1953 in an official letter to the Governor Sir Andrew Wright.76 The response of the Governor did not surprise anyone; it reiterated that ‘Her Majesty’s Government [did] not contemplate any change in the sovereignty of Cyprus’ regarding the issue raised by Makarios as closed.77 After the anticipated British rejection the rationale of the internationalisation campaign was validated one more time and Makarios prepared for a showdown. Responding to the British refusal to examine the demand of self-determination the Ethnarchy applied for a permit to organise a mass rally in the Nicosia stadium to protest against British rule and as a show of

66

† Makarios

force in the bloodless contest between Church and Government. The Cyprus authorities promptly refused to grant such a permit but Makarios refused to back down.78 Instead he risked incurring the wrath of the Cyprus authorities by issuing an encyclical calling the faithful to attend Phaneromeni Church in Nicosia on 28 June 1953.79 The decision to use the pulpit to deliver a political message was one of the characteristic ploys of Makarios. It also incensed most British authorities because it belied the British beau ideal of clear demarcation between religion and politics. Moreover the use of a place of worship as a political platform complicated things further. The British took pride in their tolerant attitude toward the religion of their colonial subjects and were extremely wary to take any action that could be interpreted as intervention in religious affairs unless it was deemed to be absolutely necessary. In planning this political event, Makarios made an important departure from his usual conduct. For the first time he invited the communist party to his sermon.80 With the internationalisation campaign acquiring greater impetus and significance it was wise for Makarios to bury the hatchet with AKEL, especially since the latter appeared to be weak, rather subdued and ever eager for some form of collaboration with the Ethnarchy. If the gesture of inviting AKEL was enough to secure its cleaving to the enosis line and an implicit acceptance of the primacy of the Ethnarchy in the political affairs, then it was a risk worth taking and Makarios was bold enough to go against the ideologically fixed norms of Greek Cypriot society. It was an unprecedented move as the Ethnarchy had repeatedly refused AKEL’s calls for cooperation and took great pains to isolate left-wing supporters from organisations like the Ethnarchy Council. The invitation of the Archbishop was welcomed with enthusiasm by the left-wing press, which called its readers to attend the congregation of 28 June.81 In his speech Makarios spoke with his usual fervour, criticising the British stance on the Cyprus issue, and lamenting the fact that the ‘civilised people’ of Cyprus was still subjugated but drew courage from the birth of the spirit of freedom which was delivering people in foreign lands. Once more he declared the

The Road to the UN, November 1950 –October 1954 † 67 determination of the Greek Cypriots to remain steadfast to their Greek ideals and called the Greek Government to lodge an appeal to the UN. The earlier indications of reaching out to the Soviet bloc acquired a more ‘official’ status when he told the congregation, which contained the leadership of AKEL and a substantial group of AKEL supporters who flooded the church, that ‘in our effort to achieve our desirable freedom we shall extend both the right and the left hand, to accept offered help both from the East and the West’.82 Yet despite this opening toward AKEL this was neither an alliance nor an entente cordiale between the Church and the communist party. AKEL wanted participation in the Ethnarchy Council and a genuine effort for the creation of a united front, even though it was unclear how such a front would work. Makarios was uncomfortable with the idea of full-blown collaboration with AKEL and was also wary of internal dissension from the ‘Kyrenia Circle’.83 Only an alliance on the terms of Makarios would be acceptable, anything else was too dangerous, but this required the submission of AKEL to Ethnarchy which was unacceptable to the communist party. As a result AKEL maintained its critical stance vis-a`-vis the Ethnarchy and especially vis-a`-vis the Greek Government, which continued to receive the usual flogging in the left-wing press for its perceived refusal to recourse to the UN.84 However, the gap between Church and AKEL lessened somewhat; indirectly the Ethnarchy recognised the importance of AKEL, whilst both sides declared their common support for enosis and more importantly the rivalry of 1948–9 was not revived. Thus the presence of AKEL at the Phaneromeni Church marked the beginning of a long modus vivendi that eventually would mature into a functioning alliance after Cypriot independence. The next step in the escalation of the internationalisation campaign was to appeal directly to the UN and a new tour to the USA, in order to secure support of the appeal by a member-state.85 Invariably Makarios sent a letter to the Greek Prime Minister asking him to adopt the Greek Cypriot appeal, otherwise he would have no option but to turn to other countries.86 To what extent he was capable of implementing his threat is not clear:

68

† Makarios

there were all sorts of rumours flying in Cyprus that countries like Thailand, Poland or Czechoslovakia were willing to adopt the Greek Cypriot appeal.87 Soon the high hopes of the Cypriot primate were frustrated; the Secretary General of the UN informed him that since the Greek Cypriot appeal lacked backing from a member state it could not be placed before the UN.88 Even more worryingly the Greek ambassador Alexis Kyrou in the UN General Assembly on 21 September indicated that his country preferred to settle the issue within a bilateral framework with Britain.89 Greek refusal to sponsor the UN appeal made the long trip to the USA redundant. Furthermore, the earthquake on 10 September, which affected especially the southern part of the Paphos region, required his full attention.90 It appeared that Makarios despite his hard campaigning had nothing to show for his efforts and that the Cyprus problem was condemned to remain bound in a political limbo. Yet the political situation in Greece was changing and the initiative for the internationalisation campaign was soon to change hands. Although Kyrou officially declared that Greece would not support the appeal of Makarios, at the same time he warned that the door ‘before this international tribune’ would remain open in case the bilateral discussions failed to reach a settlement.91 This was the first indication that at last there was some convergence between Makarios and an Athens government and this was acknowledged by Makarios himself in his address to the Ethnarchy Council in October. Even though he expressed his reservation about the wisdom of the Greek Government in pursuing the issue through bilateral talks with Britain, he also voiced his satisfaction with the admission that a UN recourse was at least a potential option and conceded that it was better for the issue to be discussed later with Greek support rather than with the support of any other country.92 The Papagos Government and the Cyprus Problem Indeed the government of Field Marshal Alexandros Papagos, which was voted into office on 16 November 1952, was different from its predecessors. It was the first post-Civil War government

The Road to the UN, November 1950 – October 1954 † 69 to achieve a strong majority in the Greek parliament, securing 240 out of 300 seats, and was led by Papagos, a decorated war hero who enjoyed considerable prestige in Greek society.93 Papagos, unlike his predecessors, thought that the time was ripe to promote the issue of Cyprus, although he preferred to do this through bilateral talks with the British. However, as his advances were rebuffed by the British Government, he reluctantly started to re-evaluate his position, to eventually decide to raise the issue at the UN, by the summer of 1954. The main reason why Papagos refused to give support to the Greek Cypriot appeal submitted in the summer of 1953 was because he was due to have a meeting with the British Foreign Minister Sir Anthony Eden in Athens and intended to raise the Cyprus issue during this meeting. The outcome of the Eden –Papagos meeting was not at all the result hoped for by the Greek Premier.94 Instead the harsh rebuff of Eden spurred Papagos to pursue the issue more energetically and ultimately set Britain and Greece on a collision course. The actual history of the diplomatic events that let to the Greek appeal has been discussed elsewhere and needs not to be repeated here,95 as the initiative shifted away from Makarios to the Athens Government. However it is important to make a few comments about the overall contribution of Makarios to the decision of Greece to appeal to the UN. This feeds into the controversy of what motivated the Greek Government to follow the UN path. Averoff claims that the British attitude combined with increasing public pressure led to the Greco-British split.96 If this argument is correct, it means that Makarios acted as a catalyst with his frequent visits to Greece which excited the crowds and put pressure on the current Greek Government. On the other hand, Terlexis and Stefanidis argue that Papagos had a clear intention to internationalise the issue before his meeting with Eden. Terlexis contends whether the public pressure was as important as Papagos himself intimated. Instead, he argues that the Papagos Government was in a position to control and formulate public opinion.97 Stefanidis notes that Papagos was the first Greek prime minister who not only did not resist public opinion but instead he

70

† Makarios

made efforts to mould it to fit his agenda.98 Moreover, Hatzivassiliou in evaluating the outlook and attitude of the Papagos government, concludes that it was not the initiative of Makarios that led to the UN, but the willingness of the Prime Minister and his close associate Kyrou to actively pursue the issue.99 Although, Makarios was responsible for raising the public profile of the Cyprus problem and despite his capability of arousing the crowds, his plea for a UN recourse was successful because it eventually fell on receptive ears. The first half of 1954 saw a steady increase of the political temperature both in Athens and Nicosia, with anti-British feeling growing in the Greek world. When Makarios visited Greece for his usual annual trip in early 1954, the demonstrations that were part and parcel of the Archbishop’s visits gave vent to an antiBritish feeling which had not manifested itself before. The British Consulate at Rhodes was attacked by crowds which had gathered to welcome Makarios who was visiting the island after being invited by the Rhodes Municipal Council.100 Naturally the rising tensions militated against the possibility of bilateral talks that would solve the problem and instead made a UN showdown increasingly inevitable. In March the Greek Government warned that unless bilateral talks would take place it was determined to bring the issue ‘before the 9th General Assembly on September 1, 1954’.101 On the other hand the British Government remained adamant that no bilateral talks with Greece could be held and instead started to prepare for the eventual UN battle.102 The brewing storm finally broke out on 28 of July 1954, when the British Government announced its intention to introduce a new constitution for Cyprus in order to pre-empt criticism about the lack of constitutional progress on the island from the pending UN debate.103 During the debate in the House of Commons, Hopkinson, the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, when asked about the ultimate future of Cyprus, delivered his ‘never’ answer which sent an electrical shock to the Greek world.104 It must be noted that Hopkinson’s statement came immediately after the announcement of an agreement with the Egyptian Government, according to which Britain was to evacuate all its troops from the

The Road to the UN, November 1950 –October 1954 † 71 Suez Canal base within 20 months.105 This decision was bitterly opposed by the ‘Suez rebels’ but also increased the determination of the Eden administration to make a stand in Cyprus for two reasons. Firstly, to appease the dissidents and, secondly, because after the evacuation of Suez, Cyprus was to become the last bastion of British presence in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the impromptu ‘never’ caused a predictable backlash in Cyprus which overshadowed the constitutional offer. The recent out-of-hand rejection of any constitutional proposal by the second Pancyprian Assembly, which had convened on 23 July, made it clear that there was virtually no chance to attract serious support from the Greek Cypriots. Furthermore, the proposed constitution was even more restrictive than the one offered back in 1948, as the official and appointed members of the legislative assembly would constitute a majority. Therefore, even people who were willing to consider a constitution were dismayed by the proposal, like the prominent businessman Manglis, who dismissed the offer as ‘something for Zulus’.106 Five days later the British dropped a new bombshell, when the Attorney General of Cyprus, Criton Tornaritis, announced that ‘the present law relating to sedition will henceforth be strictly enforced and that seditious conspiracies, publications and visible representations made with a seditious intention will be prosecuted’.107 The Attorney General referred to the amendments that were passed back in January 1951, that were designed to curb ‘sedition’ and had already been condemned by Makarios as ‘illiberal’ in a letter to the Secretary General of the UN and the Foreign Ministers of the member-states.108 However the Cyprus Government refrained from enforcing it and apart from the occasional mention by Makarios, it was all but forgotten until the warning of the Attorney General which plunged the island into a fresh political crisis. The heavy handed action of the British brought a spirited reaction by the Greek Cypriots which reflected badly on the British administration. Greek Cypriot newspapers in unison decided to voluntarily suspend their activities and by 3 August it was formally agreed to stop publication for one whole week. Under the existing law even republishing extracts from the

72

† Makarios

debates in the House of Commons on enosis constituted a seditious act and potentially could lead to prosecution.109 This action was publicised by the London press which saw eye to eye with the Greek Cypriot press and criticised the initiative of the British authorities.110 Moreover the fear of a general crackdown succeeded to bring together the Ethnarchy with AKEL. It was not the first time that necessity brought together the two factions but this time the British were chiefly responsible for the strengthening of the anti-British front. After the statement of Tornaritis, the communist mayors of Limassol, Famagusta and Larnaca visited Makarios to discuss the political situation and two days later Dervis met with the communist mayors and agreed that a meeting of all mayors was required to consider how to protest.111 The mayors met on 10 August and on 12 August the communist and nationalist trade unions staged a 24-hour protest strike. The British authorities speculated that the only thing that prevented Makarios from forging an alliance with AKEL was concern over the impact it would have on American public opinion, but as we have seen the relations of AKEL-Ethnarchy had a rich history of confrontation and bitter rivalry.112 Now all eyes were turned on Makarios, as the leader of ‘the forces of sedition’, to see his reaction. Under the existing law, Makarios potentially could be prosecuted, since most of his sermons on enosis were of seditious intention. For the first time the Cyprus Government contemplated the possibility of arresting and deporting Makarios for his political activities but the Colonial Secretary advised that it was best to avoid taking such action ‘until grounds for such action have been reported [. . .] with fullest possible details of circumstances’.113 The temptation to take it out on Makarios the chief agitator was great but there was still a long way to go before such a momentous decision could be implemented. Obviously this information was not known to Makarios nor was the tolerance level of the Cyprus Government easy to surmise, especially now that Armitage felt he had the initiative in this ‘bloodless struggle’ for the island. Makarios, who was known for his single-mindedness and stubbornness, met the challenge head on without hesitation. For two running Sundays he defied the law

The Road to the UN, November 1950 –October 1954 † 73 with his seditious sermons. On 8 August he preached in a small village outside Nicosia, telling the small congregation that, ‘no imprisonment, no exile, no fire will prevent us from carrying on this struggle. Long live the union with Greece. Down with the constitution’.114 The following Sunday he preached at the Monastery of Trooditisa, itself a few miles away from the summer resort of the Governor, declaring: ‘We shall never submit to intimidation. We do not fear deportation or imprisonment’.115 But these were only a warm-up for the elaborate pro-enosis demonstration that was held on 22 August, again at the Phaneromeni church in Nicosia. The official purpose of the gathering was to pray for the successful outcome of the Greek appeal which was submitted to the UN on 20 August, but to also demonstrate defiance against British rule.116 In front of a 15,000strong crowd, Makarios made one of his most memorable speeches. His audience included all the Greek Cypriot leadership, all the Bishops, the leaders of parties, trade union leaders and a strong communist presence; like in 1953 AKEL was invited to participate, as well as British Labur MP Tom Driberg who was visiting Cyprus at the time and was sympathetic to the Greek Cypriot cause.117 His speech, punctuated by cries of ‘down with the constitution’, ‘long live Greece’, ‘an hour of freedom is better than 40 years of slavery and imprisonment’, dealt with the recent events and the situation in Cyprus, expressed hope for the UN appeal and finally concluded with the famous Phaneromeni oath that would subsequently haunt the steps of the Archbishop: Under these holy domes let us give today a holy oath: We shall remain faithful until death to our national demand. Without retreat. Without concessions. Without collaboration. We shall defy violence and tyranny. With courage we shall raise our morale stature above the petty and ephemeral obstacles, seeking only one thing, striving towards only one goal, Enosis and only Enosis.118

About a month later, news that the UN Steering Committee had decided to include the Greek appeal on Cyprus in the agenda of the General Assembly reached Cyprus. There was a moment of

74

† Makarios

hesitation, but when the Archbishop was asked whether he had heard the news and, if so, why the bells had not started ringing, the whole of Nicosia was drowned by the ringing of bells.119 Makarios had finally won his first diplomatic victory but only subsequent events would reveal its limitations. Makarios was successful in managing the enosis movement into an authentic popular mass movement that offered a genuine challenge to British legitimacy in Cyprus. Through careful planning he fortified the position of the Ethnarchy in the Greek Cypriot community and by extension his political position. By employing the help of different organisations that subscribed to his enosis line he was able to inculcate nationalist feeling in the wider public and deflect British lukewarm efforts of diluting the enosis movement. Such was the success of Makarios in rallying the Greek Cypriots behind the cause of enosis that even AKEL, which had contested bitterly the political lead of the Ethnarchy, accepted its primacy. This cemented the popularity of enosis in Greek Cypriot society as the supporters of an evolutionary approach were marginalised. As a result the pressure on Makarios to set things in motion became more acute, which led him to goad Greece into submitting a UN appeal over Cyprus against the explicit wishes of Britain. Without external pressure Britain could almost ignore the enosis movement with impunity. Although the persistence of Makarios in pursuing the UN option was successful insofar as the Papagos government decided in favour of this action it was, however, a Pyrrhic victory. Makarios was to discover that the UN was not an international court of justice and that no viable solution to the Cyprus problem could ever come out of it. Instead it earned them the displeasure of Britain, whose capacity to withstand the Greek Cypriot demand was underestimated. In addition after the massive build-up and the inflated expectations the UN failure left Makarios in a precarious position. No solution was forthcoming and yet he had vowed to do everything in his powers to promote the issue. The course of events was inevitably pushing him toward more extreme solutions.

4

The Pursuit of Enosis by Other Means, December 1954 – October 1955 This chapter will examine how the failure of the UN appeal prompted Makarios to entertain the possibility of using other means in order to promote the issue of Cypriot self-determination. More crucially it will examine his complex relationship with violence. Was Makarios a man of blood as the British subsequently accused him or was he dragged into this adventure against his better judgment? What were the reasons that led him to enlist an armed struggle and what did he hope to achieve by embarking on such a risky strategy? It will also discuss his complicated relationship with Grivas, the leader of the military movement, especially the disagreements the two men had during the preparation of the struggle. It will argue that their different outlooks foreshadowed future problems in the course of the struggle. In the second part it will examine how the outbreak of violence drew attention to the Cyprus problem but also how it caused problems for Makarios. From the early stages the direction of events was unfavourable; in the international sphere the British refused to acknowledge the demand for enosis and on the domestic front violence followed its own logic against the wishes of Makarios. This left the Archbishop poised to explore the possibility of a compromise settlement with the British. There was a degree of nonchalant inevitability in the disappointment and frustration that came to replace the euphoria created in Nicosia and Athens by the prospect of a full UN debate

76

† Makarios

over the Cyprus issue. After the excitement and the anticipation that political developments were finally on the verge of a turning point, the fickleness of international politics served as a nasty wake-up call to all the enthusiastic supporters of enosis who had clamoured for an appeal to UN as a lever against British intransigence. Following long and hard debates which do not need to concern us here1 the Assembly resolved on 17 December 1954 that it was not ‘appropriate to adopt a resolution on the question of Cyprus’.2 Given the support Britain could muster in the UN chamber and US opposition to airing this intra-NATO problem in the world at large, the failure of the Greek delegation was almost predictable. Makarios, however, while admitting his disappointment, attempted to put a positive spin on the result by claiming that the decision was ‘another moral weapon in the hands of the Cypriots’ in the continuation of the struggle and that nothing was really lost.3 Similarly Greek leadership argued that the very discussion of the issue at the UN had qualified it as an international issue that would set the pattern for the future.4 Ironically this nascent internationalisation, upon which so much hope and expectation was hinged, was already setting in motion unintended and undesirable consequences. The UN debate disturbed the fragile Greco-Turkish friendship as Turkey made it clear that it would not acquiesce to a change of the status quo.5 It has been noted that in these early stages of the controversy British officials had to cajole the Turkish government into taking a firm stance over Cyprus.6 Nevertheless Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots did have a genuine interest in the future of the island. This is important because Makarios and the Greek Cypriot leadership underestimated Turkey’s role and turned a blind eye to Turkish Cypriot sensitivities. Makarios’ typical response to Turkish Cypriot objections reflected the inability of the Greek nationalist discourse to accommodate the existence of a non-Greek group on the island. The Turkish Cypriots were regarded as just a minority and should therefore accept the fate of minorities, but they had nothing to fear as they would enjoy the same rights as the Muslim minority of Western Thrace in Greece. Moreover, the interest of the Turkish Government was dismissed as a British

The Pursuit of Enosis by Other Means † 77 ploy that would go away as soon as Britain conceded selfdetermination.7 In this respect the criticism of Vlachos, that Greek diplomacy was so carried away by its legalistic case for the self-determination of Cyprus that it ignored the existing regional power relations which lent special gravity to Turkey, is correct. British and American strategic planning considered Turkey as the cornerstone of Western policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Both the Athens government and Makarios refused to believe that Turkey had a genuine interest in Cyprus and although Athens soon realised its blunder and tried to be more realistic, Makarios persisted in believing that the Turkish case was entirely motivated by British diplomacy.8 The Turkish Cypriot attitude to enosis has already been discussed but we must also address the strategic concerns of Turkey since in the Eastern Mediterranean balance of power it was Turkey’s strategic objection to enosis that counted most, rather than the appeal to the human rights of the Turkish Cypriots. Plainly without the support of Turkey the Turkish Cypriots could not stand alone against Greek designs. Turkey was anxious to avoid Greek encirclement of its coastline. After the transfer of the Dodecanese to Greece in 1947, the western coast of Turkey was transformed into a Greek lake dotted with a multitude of Greek islands. Only the southern coastline was free from potential hostile action, provided Cyprus, located 40 miles southward, remained independent of the country dominating the western coastline. In the post-World War II era, Turkey had identified communism as its main threat. The narrow escape of Greece from the clutches of communism in the late 1940s proved the unreliability of Greece as an ally and made the prospect of enosis unacceptable, because in case of Greek reversion to communism, Turkey would find itself surrounded by communist states.9 In addition to this security anxiety, the historical context of Greco-Turkish relations was not readily conducive to unilateral Greek expansion reminiscent of the Great Idea. No Turkish government could easily forget the invasion of the Greek army that resulted in the Greco-Turkish war of 1919–22.

78

† Makarios

Failure of the Greek Government to prepare the ground on this sensitive issue made Turkey view the enosis campaign as a throwback to earlier Greco-Turkish conflicts. The presence of the Turkish Cypriot community gave an additional reason for concern. Most important of all, when nationalist feelings were roused, both in Turkey and among Turkish Cypriots, there was a hardening of resolve to prevent Greek rule on the island. A contemporary observer has also argued that the economic situation in Turkey was a contributing factor to the Turkish decision to take a stance in Cyprus. It was the perfect diversion from the dire economic situation that the Turkish Government used skilfully to deflect attention from its domestic track record.10 In any case despite common membership in NATO there was enough suspicion and bad blood between Greece and Turkey to make any unilateral move on Cyprus subject to bitter contention. The first UN debate exposed the folly that Turkey would tacitly accept a change in the status quo. It was not clear to what lengths Turkey would go to oppose such a move, but it should have been enough warning for the Athens government and Makarios to reassess their approach. Whereas the UN debate provided ample verbal warning, the Turkish Cypriots had already launched their anti-enosis campaign in opposition to Greek Cypriot claims. In the build-up to the UN battle the Turkish Cypriot leadership protested against any change in the island’s status quo, submitting a memorandum to the British authorities that ‘vehemently’ protested ‘against the union of Cyprus with Greece’.11 It was clear that the main preoccupation of the Turkish Cypriots was to avoid Greek rule which was synonymous with unmitigated domination that would turn Cyprus into a second Crete. This was not the end of Turkish Cypriot activities; on October 1954 the Cyprus Turkish Association in Britain staged a protest march in London to raise the public profile of the Turkish Cypriot cause in Britain.12 Escalating tensions on the island finally gave way to violence after the decision of the General Assembly. On 18 December Greek Cypriots staged an island-wide strike to protest the UN decision. As usual secondary education students carried out

The Pursuit of Enosis by Other Means † 79 processions in favour of enosis in all the principal towns, but in Nicosia and Limassol the processions turned violent and the police force had to be used to disperse the crowds. In Limassol the army intervened and shot upon the crowds, wounding three persons. More ominous was the first serious intercommunal incident that took place in Nicosia in the evening of 18 December, when a Turkish Cypriot mob entered the commercial street of the capital, vandalising Greek Cypriot property and shouting against enosis.13 Here was a foretaste of the intercommunal violence that was to come and yet Makarios contemplated the idea of violence as a means to the elusive political objective of enosis. On 2 January 1955, upon arriving in Athens from New York, where he had travelled to observe the UN debate, he stated to the press that the struggle would continue and intensify.14 Similar sentiments were echoed when he returned to Cyprus on 10 January, when he called the Greek Cypriot people to a constant, intense struggle until the end.15 Such bold statements against the backdrop of the enosis activities of Makarios and the flaring of Greek Cypriot resentment against British rule made the Archbishop the ideal scapegoat for British woes in Cyprus. By this time the British authorities started to entertain the thought of taking action against Makarios on the basis that his activities constituted an incitement to violence.16 In fact Makarios was already heavily involved in the organisation of EOKA and as his political options were exhausted the idea that some form of violence could nudge the British down the path of self-determination started to gain ground. Makarios, the Foundation of EOKA and the Rationale for the use of Violence Before proceeding with this topic one further disclaimer is necessary. The sources dealing with this murky aspect of Makarios’ political career are mainly drawn from memoirs, interviews of some of the participants and personal accounts. Some degree of conjecture is required to produce a meaningful analysis, without excluding the possibility of new documentation coming to light that could revise what is suggested here.

80

† Makarios

According to Grivas, he was the first person to conceive the idea of an armed struggle in Cyprus back in 1948, but initially he found it hard to secure support for his scheme in the political circles of Athens.17 This was understandable not only because of the weak position of Greece but also because the retired Colonel lacked the necessary prestige and connections to initiate such an ambitious project alone.18 Indeed this venture required the tacit acquiescence of the political elite of Athens and certainly the collaboration of the Archbishop of Cyprus. Therefore the idea started to gain ground only when Makarios himself and the Loizides brothers started to contemplate such action. Grivas was recruited to fulfill the role of the military leader of the organisation, after the suggestion of Georgios Stratos, a former minister of military affairs, and the approval of Makarios in May 1951.19 In July 1951 Grivas visited Cyprus incognito to survey the military possibilities of the island and to have discussions with Makarios. What needs to be stressed is the tension between the outlook of the two men that emerged from the very first meetings over the nature and direction of the struggle. Grivas noted that Makarios was ‘conservative’ and sceptical towards the plans of the former, which envisioned guerrilla warfare.20 Although there is no doubt that EOKA was the Archbishop’s brainchild, he doubted the wisdom of guerrilla tactics, preferring a sabotage campaign backed with popular protests. This difference became clearer the following summer during the first two sessions of the struggle committee. Despite the consensus that Makarios would be the political leader of the movement and Grivas the military leader, there was disagreement over the substance of the struggle. In the discussions Makarios argued for limited operations of harassment, sabotage and as little bloodshed as possible while Grivas was in favour of more dynamic action with groups of fighters that would strike military installations and personnel. The Archbishop once more voiced his scepticism regarding the fighting spirit of the Greek Cypriots claiming that ‘not even 50 men will be found to follow us’.21 However, the majority of the committee tended to agree

The Pursuit of Enosis by Other Means † 81 with Grivas, desiring a bold demonstration of the fighting spirit of the Greek Cypriots. In the end Grivas was authorised to go ahead with the preparations but on the thorny issue of the actual nature of the struggle it was decided that it would depend on the political developments, thus fudging over the disparity of views.22 This fundamental disagreement on the role of violence continued to loom, with the issue becoming a cause of latent friction. Makarios, reluctant to commit to a fixed date of commencing operations, thought that the whole affair could be over within three to six months anticipating a swift political settlement with London, while Grivas disagreed and pressed for an acceleration of the timetable.23 Corroborating evidence, regarding Makarios’ optimism on a swift political solution triggered by a show of force rather than hardcore military action, can be found in Kranidiotis’ account, where the Archbishop in advocating the rationale of action is quoted as saying: ‘We shall not need to go to extremes’. Yet in the same narrative an anecdotal incident that captures the crux of resorting to violence can be found. One day while Makarios was divulging to Kranidiotis details of the coming campaign the Abbot of Kykko almost prophetically warned them: ‘I know what you two have been talking about for so many hours. It is easy to start. The hard part is how to finish’.24 Although this crucial issue was not resolved, Makarios proceeded with organising the struggle. On 7 March 1953 in a ceremony that possibly was self-consciously styled on the model of the Philiki Etairia (Filikή Etairίa), the nineteenth-century underground nationalist organisation which was responsible for the Greek revolution of 1821 that eventually led to the establishment of an independent Greece, Makarios and his collaborators took a solemn oath for enosis, formalising their determination to translate their designs into action.25 The symbolism of this ceremony reveals a lot about the rigid and somewhat outdated nationalist outlook of the participants and lends credence to the view that Greek Cypriot irredentism in some respects was a throwback to the romantic nationalism of the nineteenth century. Despite the oath Makarios was still

82

† Makarios

uncomfortable with the military vision of Grivas and on two occasions he reiterated his position of ‘sabotage only’, the first time in person in March 1953 and through Azinas on 7 June 1953, which infuriated an impatient Grivas who had no sympathy for the reluctance of Makarios.26 This disagreement persisted even after the outbreak of violence. In the summer of 1955 Grivas pressed for the formation of assassination squads but Makarios maintained his objections.27 The fear that violence would open Pandora’s Box must account for the ambivalence of Makarios and his efforts to rein in Grivas’ military outlook from the beginning. According to Azinas, the Archbishop also sought advice from other military men, some endorsing a struggle of mass demonstrations and others suggesting a secret committee managing the struggle from Athens or even an Arab country rendering the defeat of the organisation impossible.28 There was one more factor contributing to the evasiveness of Makarios, and this was none other than the opposition of Papagos to any form of physical action in Cyprus. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Papagos thought that his personal handling could settle the issue and even after the failure of this policy he preferred an appeal to the UN. The Field Marshal’s opinion from the beginning was that a liberation struggle was premature since only diplomacy could solve the problem, a view compatible with the fragile strategic position of Greece. In fact there was a mutual resentment and distrust between Grivas and Papagos. Papagos distrusted Grivas’ extreme political views and disliked the fact that Grivas had now an independent connection to the palace that bypassed him. When Papagos as Prime Minister found out that Grivas’ men were collecting materiel for operations in Cyprus he had the secret police following them, fearing that they would procure supplies from the Greek army and implicate official Greece into an operation of which he did not approve. On 28 September Grivas was warned that he would be arrested if he was to continue with this project.29 Grivas on his own part was worried that in the future Papagos would attempt to take over EOKA from within by sending Greek army officers to ‘help’ him.30

The Pursuit of Enosis by Other Means † 83 Makarios was aware of the friction between the two men. Papagos had even warned him that Grivas would sooner or later become troublesome, and the Archbishop had warned Grivas to refrain from provoking Papagos.31 Makarios’ reluctance to endorse the initiation of the campaign was politically prudent. The tacit approval of Papagos was necessary since Greek diplomatic support was vital as the campaign aimed for a political outcome, rather than relying on military defeat of the British forces.32 Before committing to violence Makarios had to give diplomacy a chance, if the Papagos initiative and subsequently the UN appeal could secure an acceptable compromise then violence could be avoided. As other commentators have noted, only when the diplomatic options were thoroughly exhausted and Papagos finally acquiesced to violence did Makarios resolve to proceed with violence.33 Specifically the Rubicon of violence was only crossed on 10 November 1954, when Grivas arrived secretly in Cyprus. Timing in this affair was most important; this critical event took place when the opposition of Papagos was being eroded by British intransigence and anti-British feeling was high in Athens and Cyprus. More importantly Makarios had decided that some form of action during the debate could have helped to highlight the gravity of the situation in a dramatic manner. Only bad communications frustrated this plan, resulting in postponing the struggle for a later date.34 The decision for violence was part of the enosis politics, a calculated but risky decision to push the British toward conceding self-determination, taken only after political dialogue had failed. There are two variables regarding Makarios and his relationship to violence that need to be addressed. The first is the British accusation that Makarios was a man of violence. The second is the assertion that Makarios was naı¨ve in thinking that a few months of sabotage and demonstrations would be enough to settle the Cyprus problem. By taking into account his reservations regarding bloodshed and his subsequent alleged regret, it is hard to accept the accusation that Makarios was the sinister man of violence portrayed by some British media.35 This is not to say that the EOKA struggle went smoothly and that

84

† Makarios

there were no innocent or unnecessary casualties in a liberation movement that at certain stages took some sinister turns. But in this respect EOKA was not fundamentally different from other nationalist movements, nor could it escape from the vicious circle of violence and counter-violence and all its unintended consequences. The second criticism regarding Makarios’ inability to appreciate the forces that he unleashed requires a more sophisticated understanding of the thinking of the Archbishop. Grivas, Azinas and Vlachos have all argued that Makarios’ insistence that bloodshed was to be avoided lacked military understanding and was paradoxical because it tried to impose unrealistic constraints on a liberation campaign which by nature was charged with violence.36 In light of the tumultuous EOKA years this particular criticism rings true, yet Hatzivassiliou in his measured analysis sheds new light on the rationale for violence. The objective of EOKA was not to deal the deathblow to Greco-British relations, but rather to instigate a British strategic reassessment that would lead to negotiations and a settlement. Therefore to avoid bloodshed and the ill will that comes in its wake was politically desirable. Despite his shortcomings Makarios was a political animal and his blessing of EOKA was simply the continuation of the politics of enosis by other means. Indeed the original plan of the Archbishop of securing a speedy settlement via negotiations with London, as we shall see in the next chapter, came close to reality with the talks of Makarios and Harding.37 Had those talks been successful Makarios would have been viewed in an entirely different light, perhaps even as a master of the art of the possible. However, Makarios in this strategy committed three crucial mistakes. The first one, as rightly indicated by Hatzivassiliou, was his tendency to go for broke, which cost him the opportunity of a compromise and set in motion all sorts of hazardous ramifications. The second was to ignore entirely the Turkish Cypriots and the importance of Turkey in British strategic designs in the immediate region. Finally, where the envisioned strategy of EOKA required surgical precision for optimum results, in the person of Grivas he chose a blunt instrument, resulting in all sorts

The Pursuit of Enosis by Other Means † 85 of strategic and tactical headaches which will be discussed in the following chapters. * * * With the return of Makarios to Cyprus the EOKA preparations entered their final stage. On the meeting of 11 January 1955 at the Bishopric of Kition, Makarios informed Grivas that Savvas Loizides would be the liaison with Papagos, something which Grivas did not like because he distrusted the political ambitions of Loizides. In designating their emergency replacements – Makarios chose Bishop of Kition Anthimos and Grivas named Azinas – they underlined the gravity of the venture that they were about to embark upon.38 In the meantime the Cyprus government, already wary of the direction of events, was given a timely warning of the things to come by the clumsiness of EOKA. There were rumours that arms were smuggled into Cyprus from Greece circulating on the island from back in October 1954, but the incident of 25 January, when a naval patrol intercepted the caique Agios Georgios off the western coast of the island, provided hard evidence.39 The crew of the vessel and its associates, including Socrates Loizides, were apprehended along with the cargo of dynamite. An effort was made by British authorities to connect this incident with Makarios but there was not enough evidence to do so.40 Despite the setback Grivas and Makarios met for a second time for further consultations on 31 January at the Metokhi of Kykkos Monastery in Nicosia. In this meeting, Makarios gave his final consent to the commencement of operations but the old disagreement over the nature of the struggle surfaced again, impressing to Grivas that there should be no strike squads and no casualties.41 The actual date was fixed at the third meeting, on 7 March, when it was decided that the operations should commence on 1 April rather than on 25 March when the British authorities would anticipate troubles because of the celebrations of Greek Independence Day.42 In fact the Cyprus Government, on the verge of panic, decided to make one last effort to establish a bridge of communication with Makarios.43 This botched last-ditch effort

86

† Makarios

reflected the British predicament. For years the British had maintained that Cyprus was a non-issue, insisting that enosis agitation was the work of the Church and a few petty politicians. However, the resort to tough legislation to curb seditious activities drove home the point that some cooperation with Makarios was necessary to maintain order. As the leading political figure of the Greek Cypriot community the Archbishop was an irreducible element in governing the island peacefully. Nevertheless, the initiative failed because the position of Prime Minister Anthony Eden was too weak in the Tory party to make such a conciliatory move. As a result the British Government wanted Makarios to cooperate with them without offering him even the slightest sop, rejecting both the venue of Metokhi of Kykkos as a form of symbolic capitulation and the press communique´ drawn by the Archbishop with an eye to pre-empt his own domestic detractors.44 The impending EOKA campaign gave Makarios an additional reason to be extra careful in his dealings with the British. Despite his initial guardedness when the original proposal was made back in January 1955, he was willing to meet with the Governor. He even approached the Cyprus Government in February signalling his willingness for such a meeting provided the evasive issue of self-determination would be discussed.45 It was imperative for this topic to be finally broached because now developments had reached a certain critical junction which pushed Makarios to raise his price. He could not unilaterally retract his position of ‘enosis and only enosis’, after the furore of UN, but more importantly now that EOKA was waiting for his order to start operations. The British had to concede on this topic or at least demonstrate willingness to concede to secure Makarios’ cooperation – he had merely demanded a press communique´ referring to self-determination. Unfortunately, British authorities failed to realise that this was a last chance to stop the slide to violence. As a result the Archbishop notified Armitage that he had no interest in a meeting that would reiterate the present impasse but professed his readiness for a meeting in case the Cyprus Government was willing to reassess its present attitude.46 The

The Pursuit of Enosis by Other Means † 87 initiative was finally laid to rest by Makarios at the press conference of 15 March, when he announced that the meeting did not take place because ‘the Governor was not authorised by the Central British Government to discuss’ with him ‘a concrete proposal guaranteeing the exercise of the Cyprus people’s right to self-determination’.47 As usual the public Makarios was more categorical than his private and more astute persona would suggest. On 1 April the EOKA struggle began in earnest. The first strike caught British authorities totally by surprise as several government buildings were targeted, including Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation, which was severely damaged and rendered incapable of transmitting.48 The strikes could have been more devastating if the saboteurs had more experience in such covert operations, as the failure to explode an ordnance depot in Famagusta testified.49 Because the embryonic EOKA still lacked the resources for a sustained effort a tactical pause that lasted until June followed.50 Makarios, satisfied that the action of 1 April had finally added substance to the Greek Cypriot demand for enosis, took advantage of the lull in action and turned his attention to diplomacy. Anticipating a second Greek appeal to the UN, he travelled to Bandung of Indonesia to attend the Asian-African Conference (Bandung Conference) to highlight the anti-colonial aspect of the Cyprus problem and to court the vote of this emerging bloc of post-colonial states. As we saw in the previous chapter, Makarios had already been influenced by anti-colonial thought and attitudes during his Middle East visit in 1952, but the visit to Bandung even as a mere observer was a significant hallmark in his anti-colonial career. Introducing innovative ways of pursuing the traditional end of enosis was an important aspect of the political career of Makarios and his presence at the Bandung Conference underlined this quality in an emphatic manner. The decision to tap the potential of the anti-colonial movement for enosis added a slick layer of modernity to a Makarios, who was self-conscious of the weight of inherited tradition on his shoulders. The paradox was that although his undeniable commitment to enosis was derived from

88

† Makarios

an almost outdated irredentist nationalist discourse, at the same time he left no stone unturned in his quest to promote his objective. If the demand for enosis had to be recast in terms of selfdetermination, and increasingly after the first UN appeal that was the case, Makarios was willing to do so. If anti-colonialism, itself a recent phenomenon entirely alien to the concept of enosis, could help his home island then the Greek Cypriot demand could be propagated in an anti-colonial language. Compared to the other leaders of the enosis movement – the purist Bishop of Kyrenia and the inflexible Grivas – Makarios’ pragmatic approach and ability to adapt according to the circumstances made him a flexible and effective leader. On his way to Bandung he visited Egypt and the Lebanon. In Egypt, which had already expressed sympathy for the cause of enosis and had supported the Greek UN appeal, Makarios made efforts to cultivate further Cypriot –Egyptian relations. His address to the Egyptian people resonated with anti-colonial solidarity expressing the Greek Cypriot hope to emulate the Egyptian experience: ‘The Cypriot people watched with deep sympathy and honest satisfaction the struggle of the friendly Egyptian people and finally saw the achievement its full national freedom’.51 At the conference itself the Cyprus question was not discussed because Makarios missed the opening of the proceedings due to flight delays, but more importantly because it was agreed that adoption of final resolutions would require consensus, an impossibility considering the presence of a Turkish delegation.52 This setback was reported by the British embassy in Jakarta somewhat spitefully, but Makarios was undeterred.53 A memorandum on the Cypriot issue was circulated to the 29 delegations but Makarios’ most constructive effort was the cultivation of interpersonal relations with country leaders who potentially could help a second Greek UN appeal.54 On 22 April, he strengthened the Egyptian connection by having lunch with the president of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser. This meeting was followed up with a further visit to Egypt in May at the personal invitation of Nasser. On 25 April he met with the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and on 28 April with the President of

The Pursuit of Enosis by Other Means † 89 Indonesia, Sukarno. Both leaders expressed their sympathy for the Cypriot right for self-determination.55 After Bandung, Makarios travelled to Athens to consult with the Papagos government and to plan a new UN recourse. Apart from his discussions with the Greek Government, he also toured Salonica, where he addressed a 40,000-strong crowd.56 This new visit to Greece cemented popular support for the cause of Cyprus and inevitably increased the personal stock of the tireless Archbishop, who at the end of his Greece trip flew back to Egypt, on 19 May, to meet Nasser one more time.57 During this visit there was a failed attempt on the life of Armitage which prompted Makarios to declare against violence.58 Reuters reported that the Cypriot primate condemned all forms of violence, advocating for a renewed appeal to UN as the only way of solving the issue.59 This incident compounded further the Makarios enigma which puzzled British authorities so much. On one hand there was restrained relief that finally he had denounced violence – denunciation of violence would become an important issue in the exchanges between the Archbishop and British authorities – and on the other hand it was speculated whether he was losing control of the situation to the so-called extremist elements.60 However, the relation of Makarios with violence was too complicated to be reduced into such simplistic inference. Makarios’ reservations about violence against the person have already been discussed, but even if the attempt against Armitage had taken place against his better judgment or, even worse, without his knowledge, it was still too early to speak about losing control of the situation. Even if military affairs already tended to follow a course independent of the wishes of Makarios, he was the political leader of the movement with Grivas ultimately taking orders from him. Certainly it was an unpleasant reminder that once the genie of violence was out of the bottle it was not easy to direct exactly as planned. At the same time it was also a sign of the things to come: that violence could run out control and that Grivas’ strong personality was not easy to be kept in line with the ‘soft’ Makarios. When he was queried about this particular statement, after his return to Cyprus, he evaded the issue by

90

† Makarios

replying that all the events on the island must be viewed through the lens of the repressive measures of the British authorities.61 On 30 June 1955, the British Government invited Greece and Turkey to attend a Tripartite Conference in London to discuss the strategic issues of the Eastern Mediterranean in an effort to preempt the Greek UN appeal. The invitation of Turkey and the exclusion of Cypriots – both Greek and Turkish Cypriots – from the conference did not bode well for Makarios, who wanted direct negotiations between himself and the Cyprus Government to secure a date for the implementation of self-determination. This has always been his objective – the help of Greece was enlisted to add credibility to the Greek Cypriot cause – not to turn the issue into an international dispute between Britain, Greece and Turkey. However, the decision for internationalisation was a double-edged weapon because it also exposed it to the vicissitudes of international power relations. Makarios, who was always wary of British initiatives, immediately voiced his concern about Turkey’s invitation and the proposed discussions over the heads of the Cypriots themselves.62 Before turning his full attention to the Conference, an issue which sparked a fresh round of intra-Greek dissension between him and the Greek Government, Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd visited the island to see the situation for himself. Makarios, anxious to see if the outbreak of violence had changed British attitudes, was willing to meet with Lennox-Boyd. The announcement of the Conference, and now the visit of the Colonial Secretary, were all indications that something was afoot in London. Prior to the meeting Makarios, through conversations with an authorised go-between of the Colonial Secretary, had gained the impression that Lennox-Boyd was coming to Cyprus with a formula that promised self-determination after an interval of 20 years.63 It is not clear if this false assumption was corrected before the meeting, but the prospect of this idea, however imperfectly entertained by the British Government, was enough incentive for Makarios. In addition the new round of violence brought bloodshed – a Greek Cypriot bystander was killed by the explosion outside the Central Police Station of

The Pursuit of Enosis by Other Means † 91 Nicosia – but even more seriously for the inter-communal relations of the island it wounded 13 Turkish Cypriots and one Armenian.64 This incident caused an outrage in the Turkish community of Cyprus and was taken up by the press of mainland Turkey, with some opinions calling for the protection of the Turkish Cypriot community and the ‘formation of a “Cyprus Volunteer Army” of young Turks’.65 The agitation of Turkish Cypriots and the propensity of violence to escape the narrow confines which Makarios had wished EOKA to keep within must have worried him. His actual control over events with the evidence available will remain imponderable but it was natural for him to worry that things might not finish within a few months as he had predicted back in 1954. Whereas in public he had no hesitation to appear firm, in private he was more diffident and doubts gnawed at him as he wrestled with the burden of responsibility and his divided loyalties. In private conversation with the Greek Cypriot Assistant Commissioner of Nicosia he expressed misgivings about the direction of violence and revealed that ‘he would be prepared to discuss any offer provided that it conceded the principle of self-determination’.66 However when the Archbishop of Canterbury Geoffrey Francis Fisher asked him to take ‘a public stand against all acts of violence and all incitements to violence of spirit’ Makarios replied that such a condemnation ‘would not find at present stage the necessary response’ but would expose him ‘unprofitably’.67 Similar feelings were echoed in his conversation with the Archdeacon of Cyprus, Goldie.68 Essentially Makarios wanted a straightforward quid pro quo with the British Government; he would not condemn violence, after all he was the brain behind this campaign, but he was willing to cooperate with the Cyprus Government and use his influence to stop all violence, if self-determination, even at some future but fixed point was conceded. The outbreak of violence added a dimension of urgency to strike a deal with the British before violence could supplant political restraint or wider political concerns could transform the issue into an intractable international dispute. But at the same time concession of self-

92

† Makarios

determination became a sine qua non because without it Makarios could not back down from his well-established line of ‘enosis and only enosis’. Such thoughts were on the mind of the Archbishop when he met Lennox-Boyd at Ledra Palace Hotel in Nicosia on 9 July. Since the Colonial Secretary was not authorised to engage in substantive talks with the Archbishop, the principal function of the meeting was a sober exchange of ideas stripped of public rhetoric. Makarios made his opposition to the Tripartite Conference clear and reiterated his position on his inability to condemn violence, to which Lennox-Boyd retorted that the burden of leadership sometimes requires unpopular decisions.69 The British political mindset, accustomed to the stable framework of elected representative democracy, had little sympathy for the pastoral leadership of Makarios, which was a product of the peculiar socio-political milieu of Cyprus and was effective so long as it enjoyed popular support. The sense of frustration for the political impasse was telling in the way Makarios ruefully pointed out that even the Gold Coast was given self-government while Cyprus was ruled by decrees with no input from its own people. But when he was told that Cypriots could learn from this African example, Makarios fell back to a charming but enigmatic smile. On the thorny issue of constitution and self-determination, after some considerable fencing, Makarios conceded that an offer for a constitution that promised self-determination ‘would provide ground for discussions’.70 The impact of this admission, that perhaps some understanding could be reached with Makarios, would become clearer in the following months. Three days later Makarios travelled to Athens to discuss with the Greek Government the response to the British invitation for a Tripartite Conference. The Greek Government, despite some serious reservations, had already indicated that it would attend.71 Makarios opposed the British plan from the beginning and insisted that the Greek Government had to submit a new UN appeal before the Tripartite Conference and avoid acceptance of any proposals contrary to the principle of self-determination. Subsequently, because of the negative outcome of the conference,

The Pursuit of Enosis by Other Means † 93 the Greek Government was criticised for attending the conference as it recognised Turkey as an interested party in the Cyprus dispute.72 However, a Greek refusal would jeopardise subsequent appeals to the UN as it would demonstrate that Greece was uncooperative while seeking international support and goodwill.73 Although the Tripartite Conference was used as the springboard for launching the Turkish case on Cyprus, it did not mean that the absence of Greece from the Conference would somehow negate Turkish involvement in Cyprus. The meeting with Stephanos Stephanopoulos, the Greek foreign minister, was a tense affair which failed to resolve the divergence of opinion between the Archbishop and the Athens government. Stephanopoulos refused to agree that a UN appeal had to be submitted prior the conference, prompting Makarios to interrupt the meeting and issue a short and stiff press release.74 Makarios did not give up and sought to sway Papagos, who was now a shadow of his former self due to declining health, two days later. After an hour-long stormy session, during which a doctor had to be called to attend a frail Papagos, Makarios succeeded in wringing from the Prime Minister the promise that the Greek appeal would be submitted before 20 August so long as the result of the Tripartite Conference was negative.75 Despite his limited success there was little to disguise a new rift in Helladic-Cypriot relations. The capacity of the Cyprus problem to cause divisions in the Greek world in all possible combinations, intra-Greek, intraGreek Cypriot and between a Helladic and a Cypriot point of view, was inexhaustible and had the unnerving tendency to recur during the most crucial turning points. Makarios with his strong personality certainly compounded this complex further but to what extent he was its prisoner or one of its prime causes will remain a matter of opinion. * * * In the meantime the political temperature in Cyprus was rising as the British Government sought to assert some form of control over the unfolding breakdown of law and order. On 2 August leftwing and right-wing organisations and unions once more joined

94

† Makarios

forces to stage a general strike across the island, protesting against the new law that allowed the governor to detain persons without trial. Later in the evening protesters attempted to set the British Institute on fire, smashed the windows of certain shops and raised makeshift barricades to keep at bay the police force which was sent in to disperse the crowd.76 But it was the pending Tripartite Conference that dominated Greek Cypriot politics with speculation about the future and condemnation of ‘British machinations’ mounting. The Ethnarchy, sensing the importance of the Conference, convened the third Pancyprian National Assembly on 26 August 1955, inviting its members to exchange views on the political situation and to submit proposals on how to handle the problem. Makarios opened the proceedings with a signature speech which dealt with recent developments, by criticising the Cyprus Government on issues such as educational and economic policies, as well as the recent illiberal laws. After lengthy speeches from many delegates the Assembly passed a resolution which, among others, declared its opposition to any decision of the Tripartite Conference that would not be compatible with ‘the expressed will of the Cypriot people’.77 While drafting the resolution, the division between the moderates and the hardcore ‘Kyrenia Circle’ surfaced once more. While there was agreement on the end of selfdetermination, which was in fact a new bottle for the old wine of enosis, the means and the time frame for this end were bitterly disputed. The Bishop of Kyrenia wanted to include the word ‘unconditional’ before immediate self-determination but Makarios, wary of appearing too inflexible to the British and the international community in general, as foreign journalists were present at the proceedings, vetoed the proposal.78 The proceedings of the Tripartite Conference, which took place between 29 August and 7 September 1955, did not prove wrong the majority of Greek Cypriot opinion which had already criticised the venture as a British ploy. The event itself does not need to concern us here79 but a few words must be said about the aftermath of this sad affair. Overall, the British aim to defend its position on Cyprus by presenting it as an international dispute

The Pursuit of Enosis by Other Means † 95 between Greece and Turkey, rather than a colonial one, was achieved. The Turkish delegation unequivocally opposed any change to the status of the island, essentially supporting the British position and dispelling the Greek illusion that Turkey would acquiesce to enosis. Moreover, the door to self-determination was again pronounced closed as Macmillan explained to Fatin Zorlu, the Turkish representative, that the principle of selfdetermination is not a universal one.80 But this British success was rather short-lived as it was overshadowed by the events that unfolded in Istanbul. Istanbul was the home of a sizeable Greek minority, whose presence was secured by the treaty of Lausanne, and the Holy Seat of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. One of the most tragic unintended consequences of the Cypriot saga was the predicament of the Greek minority of Istanbul. So long as Greco-Turkish relations were friendly the Greeks of Istanbul enjoyed relative security and prosperity, but the emergence of the Cyprus issue adversely affected the fortunes of the said minority. Turkish authorities started to pressurise the Greek minority and the Patriarchate to toe the official Turkish line, which was in direct conflict with their ethnic outlook. The plight of the Greeks of Istanbul was briefly reported in Greek Cypriot press – a statement by Athenagoras that the Patriarchate is a religious institution and therefore cannot comment on political affairs and different negative comments on the Patriarchate by Turkish press – but whether such reports had any impact on Makarios is not clear.81 Averoff asserts that in the early days of the Cyprus problem, before the outbreak of violence, Makarios had suggested that the Greek community of Istanbul was ‘doomed to annihilation for a variety of reasons’ and it was not a sufficient reason to put the Cyprus problem on hold.82 This statement might sound harsh, especially in light of the riots that took place on 6 and 7 September that marked the beginning of the end of Greek presence in Istanbul, but for an accurate evaluation of this private exchange of views, the context is most important and Averoff does not convey that properly. It is possible that Makarios made an unpleasant but realistic prediction, which barring its

96

† Makarios

humanitarian aspect, could be praised for its accuracy. More than 40 years since the death of Makarios, the Patriarchate is still regarded suspiciously by Turkish nationalists and calls for its removal can still be heard. However, we do not know his thoughts after the events, or how the private pleas of Patriarch Athenagoras to reconsider the direction of the Cyprus problem affected him. According to a second-hand account published in the Greek Cypriot press in the early 1990s, Athenagoras sent two emissaries to Cyprus incognito to warn Makarios to stop the struggle because the Greek minority would be endangered, Greco-Turkish relations would be affected and the Greek Cypriot objective would not be achieved.83 Although Makarios indicated that he would act accordingly, this did not happen, but it added to the burden of responsibility that invariably plagues nationalist leaders, as it gave him one more acute dilemma to wrestle with. Quite possibly the fate of the Patriarchate became an additional concern for Makarios, which compelled him toward an early compromise, the negotiations with Harding being the eminent example, rather than a long-term struggle which Grivas accepted uncritically. Of the actual events, the pogrom of Constantinople as it was called in Greek, only a brief outline will be given here as there are studies which deal with this topic in great detail.84 It is now accepted that the Adnan Menderes’ government wanted to organise some demonstrations in order to underscore the extent of Turkish feeling over Cyprus but in the course of events these ‘spontaneous’ demonstrations degenerated into terrible riots that targeted systematically Greek, Armenian, Jewish and other foreign properties in Istanbul, but Greek property suffered the most extensive damages. Prior to the riots there were rumours that an attack on the Turkish Cypriots was imminent, but the immediate trigger was the bomb explosion, the act itself a Turkish provocation, at Atatu¨rk’s birthplace, which was also the Turkish Consulate General in Salonica. On the afternoon of 6 September Turkish mobs in Istanbul descended on Greek property, wreaking havoc and destruction. Simultaneously mobs in Izmir, where the NATO regional headquarters were stationed and hosted a Greek

The Pursuit of Enosis by Other Means † 97 contingent, attacked the Greek Consulate there, the Greek pavilion in the trade fair of Izmir and even houses of Greek officers. The list of damages makes a grim reading: 1,004 houses, 4,348 shops, 27 pharmacies and laboratories, 21 factories and 110 restaurants, cafes and hotels were all destroyed.85 Churches, schools, Greek-language newspaper premises and even cemeteries were not spared, while at least one priest perished in the flames that consumed his church.86 The riots dealt a serious blow to Greco-Turkish friendship and the relations between the two countries became frosty and tense, threatening the unity of the southeastern flank of NATO. Greece took offence at the handling of the situation especially by the USA, which refused to distinguish between offender and victim and the general public started to turn against NATO while supporters of a more neutralist stance became for vocal.87 Whereas before the riots the Turkish position on Cyprus was not taken seriously in Greece, now the Greek Government was forced to be even more cautious because the possibility of a repetition of similar attacks or the expulsion of the Patriarchate from Istanbul were unbearable sacrifices for Greece. The net result was to reinforce the divided impulses of the Greek Government, which had its own dilemma to deal with; on one hand the emotional pull of Cyprus and on the other the preservation of the Patriarchate and the Greek minority in Istanbul. Moreover, the deterioration of Greco-Turkish relations exacerbated the fragile international position of Greece and sharpened further the difference already identified in outlook between a Helladic-centric and a Cypriotcentric approach to the Cyprus problem. The inclination of the Greek Government for a more realistic approach, desiring a quick compromise settlement that would leave the door open for final self-determination, as opposed to the more romantic maximalist approach that prevailed in Cypriot circles, became acuter. The reversal of the Tripartite Conference was followed by the rejection of the second Greek recourse to the UN on 23 September, after intense British lobbying convinced the chamber that further discussions on this volatile issue would be detrimental. This left Makarios in a very difficult position; the

98

† Makarios

EOKA campaign instead of acting as a catalyst for British withdrawal had complicated the issue further and exposed the weakness of Greek diplomacy. The decision to use violence to achieve the political aim of enosis was a natural consequence of the hard line Makarios had followed in the previous years. In light of the British determination to hold onto Cyprus violence remained the only option that could break the deadlock. Yet the Archbishop knew that this was a high-risk strategy, which explains his reluctance with this option and his strenuous efforts to keep Grivas on a short leash. The outbreak of violence did draw attention to Cyprus but the British Government was able to manipulate the situation to its advantage by presenting it as a Greco-Turkish conflict. This outflanked the demand for enosis and complicated the political situation, a clear indication that the British would refuse to be cowed out of Cyprus in the manner Makarios had planned. In addition on the domestic front violence was already beginning to spiral out of control. Despite the request of Makarios of no bloodshed soon after the start of the struggle deaths followed and even worse the Turkish Cypriots indicated their early opposition to EOKA. All of a sudden Makarios’ position appeared more fragile than ever. His plan was not to embark on a protracted struggle that would cost lives and encumber bi-communal relations on the island. The possibility of Grivas of undermining his authority through a prolonged struggle and the loss of control on the direction of events were particularly distressing to him and reinforced his impulse for a compromise settlement. This was in accord with the original plan which envisioned a brief period of guerilla activities that would pave the way to discussions with the British to settle the future of Cyprus. His impulse for a speedy settlement was matched by a British change of heart. The significance of this chapter in our understanding of Makarios as a political leader cannot be underestimated. His convoluted relation with violence as a weapon in his struggle to achieve enosis is an issue which has confounded his critics. As we saw the Archbishop was neither the man of blood which the British have tried to present nor was he simply the political counterpart of

The Pursuit of Enosis by Other Means † 99 Grivas the freedom fighter. Although he was the political leader of EOKA and inevitably he must bear responsibility for the actions of the organisation, it is clear that he endorsed the use of violence only reluctantly, almost against his better judgment. Clearly he did not like the idea of bloodshed as a man of cloth but also because he knew that the use of violence would cross a point of no return, out of which there was no guaranteed and safe way out. Makarios was aware of this momentous decision but at the same time he felt the need to take the risk. As a practical man he was even prepared to tolerate bloodshed, even if as a matter of principle he was against it, as an inevitable side-effect of a liberation struggle so long as it would bear direct results. In this regard his philosophical outlook was fundamentally different from that of Grivas’, who accepted violence and bloodshed as part and parcel of life. Indeed for Grivas life was a physical struggle in which violence and bloodshed were the essential ingredients. Inevitably the two men were set for collision on what was the best course of action for the struggle. Makarios the national leader was to find out that to unleash the genie of violence, with the hope of achieving a political aim, was fairly easy but to actually control it, was a different matter altogether.

5

The Negotiations With Harding, November 1955–February 1956 In the previous chapter we saw that Makarios planned an armed struggle in order to force a British strategic reorientation over the future of Cyprus. According to the plan the violence would pave the way to a political settlement through negotiations with the Cyprus Government, since it was incapable of an outright military victory over the British. When Harding arrived in Cyprus authorised to explore the possibility of reaching an agreement in order to pacify the island, the Archbishop seized the opportunity to initiate a dialogue with the British. This chapter will examine the negotiations Makarios held with Harding intermittently from October 1955 to February 1956. Arguably this was the most critical period in Makarios’ political career before 1960, because the collapse of the talks had far-reaching consequences both for the personal fortunes of Makarios but also for the future of Cyprus itself. It will be argued that, contrary to subsequent British allegations, Makarios was committed to a political solution and was in fact wary of the continuation of the struggle. It will explain how Makarios’ efforts to secure an agreement with Harding were confounded by a series of factors which prevented him from accepting the British proposal which led to the collapse of the talks. Factors such as British reluctance to offer an unambiguous promise of self-determination, the opposition he met from within Greek Cypriot society, the inability of the Greek Government to offer him the necessary support he required, the psychological divide between Makarios and Harding as violence and counterviolence escalated and the distrust of Grivas toward the British all

The Negotiations With Harding † 101 contributed to the Archbishop’s reluctance to commit to the proposal despite his desire to do so. Finally it will examine whether the talks were a genuine lost opportunity for Makarios to guide the Cyprus problem on a course that potentially could lead to enosis. The talks began under the best possible auspices. Wider British strategic interests in the Middle East required the pacification of Cyprus, making Eden willing to give enough enticement to the Greek Cypriots to win them over. It was feared that Israel was contemplating renewing the Israeli – Arab conflict by means of a pre-emptive strike against its Arab neighbours. A flaring up of violence in the unstable Middle East could drag Britain into the fray by virtue of its treaty obligations to Jordan. For this reason the British Government wanted to keep Cyprus as quiet as possible in anticipation of the events in the Middle East.1 Furthermore by now the British Forces Middle Eastern headquarters had been relocated to Cyprus and the two bases at Episkopi and Akrotiri, which to present day are still British sovereign territory, were under construction. Moreover, after the fiasco of the London Conference and the deterioration of the security situation on the island, there was increasing international criticism of how Britain ran Cyprus, especially the direct rule of the Governor with decrees without Cypriot participation. Therefore the British Government was eager to promote Cypriot self-government in order to deflect such criticism. Makarios for his part was not happy with the Istanbul events, the weakness of Greek diplomacy to promote the cause of Cypriot self-determination and the escalation of violence which was proving to be harder to contain than previously thought.2 An additional factor calling for prudence and compromise rather than confrontation was the stirring of the Turkish Cypriots, who had started voicing their opposition to the EOKA struggle. Already there had been a publicised spat between EOKA and Dr Ku¨cu¨k, the Turkish Cypriot leader. Ku¨cu¨k received an anonymous threatening letter asking him to counsel his fellow Turkish Cypriots to keep their noses out of EOKA’s affairs. He responded by publicly stating that EOKA would not dare to attack him.3 By the middle of

102

† Makarios

October a Turkish organisation with the name VOLKAN started to circulate leaflets that demanded equal rights for the Turkish Cypriots and protested against the alleged favouritism of the Cyprus Government in favour of the Greek Cypriots.4 When Harding announced his readiness to meet Makarios, the Archbishop had valid reasons to seize the opportunity. The first meeting of the two men took place on 4 October, just one day after the arrival of Harding in Cyprus, at Ledra Palace in Nicosia. The conclusion of the first meeting for both sides was that there was potential for agreement. Harding in his report wrote that the ‘atmosphere throughout was frank and cordial’. He was impressed when Makarios used the words ‘“in principle” and “theoretical” when referring to the right to self-determination’ and his concession that the actual self-determination was an issue to be decided between ‘the British Government and elected representatives of the people of Cyprus’.5 On the Greek Cypriot side, Kranidiotis, who was present at the discussions, also noted the cordial atmosphere that prevailed during the first round of talks that took place in October.6 Even later in the other two October meetings when the discussions reached an impasse the feeling among the Greek Cypriot delegation was that the British were willing to make the extra effort to seal the negotiations.7 This positive atmosphere was also captured by the local press, when it reported after the failure of the third meeting to produce an agreement, that the two men were seen smiling on their way out of Ledra Palace.8 Indeed Holland has argued that ‘if both men had been left to themselves they would have stood a good chance of coming to an understanding’.9 However Makarios and Harding were ultimately advocates of virtually exclusive viewpoints which mere personal rapport could not easily bridge. The British were entering into discussions in order to pacify the island without military repression and perpetuate their presence in Cyprus. Whereas in principle selfgovernment was a concession the British were willing to make, self-determination was still unthinkable because they wanted to retain Cyprus for the foreseeable future. On the other hand Makarios sought through the discussions to terminate British rule

The Negotiations With Harding † 103 and facilitate enosis. For this reason the Archbishop insisted on securing a clear promise of self-determination by the British. In contrast the British were on purpose evasive on this promise precisely because they did not trust Makarios and because they wanted to remain in Cyprus. This divergence of opinion between the two sides was the most important obstacle in reaching an agreement as each side pressed for a formula that was essentially unacceptable to the other side. From the first meeting this fundamental difference cast a long shadow over the negotiations and was pivotal in the eventual breakdown of the talks as it virtually left no common ground for agreement. At the end of the first meeting Harding asked Makarios to submit in writing on what basis he would ‘be prepared to cooperate towards the development of constitutional selfgovernment’.10 Prior to this meeting Makarios had convened the Ethnarchy Bureau for advice on how to handle the discussions with the Governor and the consensus was that ‘the principle of selfdetermination must be recognised first and foremost’.11 The threepoint proposal submitted to Harding was according to this spirit, suggesting firstly that ‘recognition by the British Government of the right of the Cyprus people to self determination constitutes the indispensable basis for the solution of the Cyprus question’. The second point was that once this principle was recognised the Archbishop would be willing to co-operate in the establishment of self-government. Finally the actual timing of self-determination would be settled between the British Government and the elected representatives of the Cyprus people.12 Naturally Makarios’ proposal, which was passed on to London for scrutiny, went further than what British authorities had hoped for. For this reason in their second meeting Harding drew attention to Macmillan’s statement of 6 September 1955 that was made at the concluding stage of the Tripartite Conference as the formula favoured by the British Government.13 Makarios replied that he could not accept a plan which had already been rejected by the Greek Government and the Cyprus people and emphasised that he could not ‘recognise the competence of the Tripartite Conference, the consequences of which have been so sad’. The gap between the two sides was

104

† Makarios

obvious – whereas Harding insisted that the Macmillan statement was an open door of opportunity, Makarios claimed that he could not ‘see such an open door’.14 In the end Makarios asked permission to consult with his advisors before giving a final answer to the British counter-proposal. In the third meeting, which took place on 11 October 1955, Makarios’ principal aim was to isolate the Turkish factor which was introduced during the Tripartite Conference by securing from Harding the concession that Turkey would have no say over the final self-determination of Cyprus. For this reason the Archbishop asked Harding whether the future of the island would be decided after the reassembly of the Tripartite Conference or whether it would be a matter between the elected Cypriot representatives and the British Government as Harding’s radio address on 9 October had indicated.15 It was an anticipated ploy; the Field Marshal replied that the British Government was ‘honourably bound by the spirit of the British proposals at the tripartite conference in August’ which meant that it would ‘consult both the Greek and the Turkish Governments as well as Cypriot representatives before taking any final decision’.16 With Harding unable to meet the sine qua non of Makarios the discussion reached an impasse and the two men turned to the drafting of their common communique´ that would declare the failure of the meeting to achieve a breakthrough. At this critical junction Makarios with an impeccable sense of timing told Harding in English that he was ‘very unhappy’. The tone and timing of this remark impressed Harding who thought that perhaps Makarios left by himself could cooperate with the British and could prove to be ‘a useful contact’.17 Even though this first round of talks was unsuccessful the friendly atmosphere that had prevailed, coupled with Makarios’ last remark of regret for this failure, meant this was a mere lull in the negotiations and not the end. Harding, under the impression that he could carry the Archbishop with him, travelled to London to seek an improved formula while Makarios himself soon departed for consultations with the new Greek Government; Papagos had died on 3 October 1955 and was replaced as Prime Minister by Constantinos Karamanlis, a fairly junior minister.

The Negotiations With Harding † 105 The fourth meeting took place on 21 November, after Harding had flown to London to ask from his superiors an enticing formula that would win over Makarios. The Field Marshal, confident that the new proposal was sufficient, offered Makarios solemnly an envelope that contained the new formula of the British Government with the words: ‘Your Beatitude, I have very good news for you’.18 Yet the new British proposal did not quite offer self-determination, as Makarios had demanded, but through the use of a double negative left the possibility of self-determination open, albeit with certain qualifications: H.M.G. adhere to the principles embodied in the Charter of the UN, the Potomac Charter and the Pacific Charter, to which they have subscribed. It is not therefore their position that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now a practical proposition both on account of the present strategic situation and on account of the consequences on relations between NATO powers in the Eastern Mediterranean. They will therefore have to satisfy themselves that any final solution safeguards the strategic interests of the United Kingdom and her Allies.19

The initial reaction of Makarios was that the new proposal was a step in the right direction but did not go far enough to meet his position. Harding replied that it was a huge step forwards which was meant to launch an evolutionary process. After the initial exchanges there was considerable discussion over the implications of the text. Makarios consistently criticised the formula ‘as vague and the negation of self-determination’. His gravest concerns were that the British Government still retained the final say over the timing of self-determination and that the formula granted a virtual veto to Turkey. Despite Harding’s best efforts to convince the Archbishop of British sincerity the latter maintained that the proposal was unacceptable and the meeting ended unresolved. To underline his position Makarios returned the documents with a wry smile, claiming that he did not want to be accused of leaking sensitive information to the press.20 Harding’s report has

106

† Makarios

considerable differences from the account of Kranidiotis, even though the latter was not trying to produce a blow-by-blow account. But on the substance of the meeting the two accounts agree that although Makarios thought the new formula was an improvement, he refused to endorse it, disappointing Harding.21 The rejection of the proposal shocked the Greek Foreign Minister, who had previously endorsed it ‘off the record’.22 The British Government, despite its disappointment, launched a new diplomatic effort, approaching both the Greek and the US governments, asking for their help in resuming the negotiations. Eden and Karamanlis exchanged private notes on the topic of discussions soon after the rejection of Makarios.23 Although there was disagreement as to whether the Greek Government ought to pressurize Makarios into accepting the British proposal – the Greek Government insisted that such a move before the pending elections would be akin to political suicide – by the end of December the Karamanlis administration admitted, despite its reservations, that it would recommend to the Archbishop the resumption of the talks.24 The US Government also responded positively to the request of its British counterpart, even though it tried to maintain strict equality between Britain and Greece, and instructed its consul in Cyprus to meet with Makarios and draw his attention to the US support for the British proposals.25 Alexios Liatis, the Director of the Diplomatic Office of the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited Cyprus on 25 December, to inform Makarios about the diplomatic exchanges between the British and the Greek Government and ultimately to advise him to accept a fresh invitation from Harding to continue the negotiations.26 With the advent of 1956, a fresh round of negotiations began. The two meetings that took place on 9 and 13 January restored communication between the two parties but failed to make any important progress. This was despite the new improved formula by the British, since the changes were purely cosmetic and the substance of the proposal was retained intact.27 As a result these two sessions were dominated by what Markides has called as ‘semantic somersaults’, with Makarios striving to remove the phrases he

The Negotiations With Harding † 107 thought amounted to a Turkish veto and Harding proposing changes of tone but not of substance.28 By this point, as Harding noted, the negotiations were moving in circles. During the meeting of 9 January Makarios restated his opinion that the formula ‘would make the exercise of selfdetermination unattainable in the foreseeable future’ because he was certain that somewhere in the proposal there was a built-in Turkish veto. The repeated assurances of Harding that despite treaty obligations ‘the final decision regarding Cyprus rested with Her Majesty’s Government alone’ made no impression on the Archbishop, reflecting the crisis of trust that existed between the two parties.29 This impasse was repeated on 13 January when Makarios after another argument with Harding stated that the British formula was ‘absolutely unacceptable’ as long as it contained the words ‘the political situation’ and ‘treaty obligations’. Even when directly asked what exact changes in the wording would earn his co-operation Makarios refused to be pinned down, stating that the removal of the two phrases would only constitute ground for cooperation but he would still require the consent of his advisors.30 Despite the misgivings of the two sides the talks continued with renewed effort. Prior to the meeting on 27 January 1956, Harding had visited London for further consultations with his superiors. The end result of these consultations was the finalisation of the formula, which despite a few changes retained its essence and more importantly the double negative, and a draft statement denouncing violence that Makarios was expected to sign.31 Makarios now presented with the final formula wanted to shift the issue to the nature of self-government because for him the two issues were vitally intertwined.32 Makarios also disagreed with the statement against violence that Harding was now asking him to make, fearing that such a statement could backfire and have the opposite effect. It was not the first time that Makarios was professing weakness in coming out against violence. He was conscious of protecting his prestige which had come under attack by the ‘Kyrenia Circle’, but it is possible that there was a genuine concern that his switch from enosis to self-government and cooperation with the British would be lost on the more hot-headed

108

† Makarios

Grivas. However, when Harding insisted that this declaration was vital in building a ‘real basis for co-operation’, Makarios agreed in principle provided he was allowed to discuss the British proposal with his advisors.33 On 2 February 1956 Makarios sent his written reply to Harding. Once more he expressed reservations about the vague phrasing of the proposal and went as far as to say that he would not sign such a document if it was produced during bilateral talks. However, since it was merely ‘a statement of British policy on Cyprus’ – a point Harding had repeatedly drummed during the talks – and since he desired the pacification of the island he was accepting the invitation to co-operate with the Cyprus Government in framing ‘a constitution for the transitory regime’.34 At the same time Makarios asked Harding to define in advance the principles that would guide the promised self-government, to end the Emergency and give a general amnesty to all political offences.35 Subsequently the Archbishop clarified to the US Consul, who was intermittently mediating between the Cyprus Government and the Archbishopric, that without prior agreement on the fundamentals he would not cooperate with the British authorities.36 Nevertheless Makarios persisted with the negotiations and despite of all the obstacles in Cyprus and abroad, the two sides came very close to an agreement. On 14 February Harding replied to Makarios’ request for elucidations on the specifics of the constitution. Although Makarios found Harding’s response to be a ‘long and legalistic letter’, efforts to bridge the gap continued.37 The following day Makarios sent a message to Grivas asking him to suspend his operations in anticipation of how the negotiations would pan out. The latter complied and by 18 February the relevant order had reached all the EOKA squads.38 Kranidiotis and Reddaway under instructions from their respective leaders had two meetings on 17 and 19 February addressing many substantial details paving the way for a final solution.39 A few days later Makarios and Harding had an informal meeting with the Philhellene Labour MP Francis Noel-Baker who had flown to Cyprus at the request of Makarios acting as a mediator and

The Negotiations With Harding † 109 translator. The two outstanding issues were the provisions of the constitution and amnesty. Makarios insisted that the British ought to clarify the guiding principles of the constitution because he felt the assurance of ‘a wide measure of democratic self-government’ was not sufficient.40 Harding’s response was that the constitution would be drawn after all the interesting parties would be consulted but he could not prejudge the outcome of this process. This was suspicious to Makarios as it did not clearly indicate that the Greek Cypriots would be the elected majority in the legislative chamber. The past experience of the original Legislative Assembly, where Greek Cypriot majority was made a mockery by the combined votes of Turkish Cypriot and appointed members, was now haunting the efforts for a compromise. The Turkish Cypriot demand for equal representation was well known and Makarios feared that the British would yield on this demand or find a way to block Greek Cypriot majority.41 Psychologically this point was vital for Makarios because it would greatly dispel the mistrust he had for the British offer which prevented him from assenting to it. Amnesty was the second thorny issue over which there was significant difference. In past correspondence Makarios had asked for a full amnesty for all political prisoners and a freezing of death sentences, arguing that such a move would earn the gratitude of the Greek Cypriots and create a climate of good will. A Greek Cypriot campaign of ‘no cooperation without amnesty’ was turning the whole issue into a real deal-breaker and Makarios felt the need to address this popular demand.42 Moreover, amnesty was a demand of Grivas as well which meant that the Archbishop could hardly afford to risk the resentment of his lieutenant and the convicted EOKA fighters at this critical junction. Harding on the other hand, whose chief concern was the restoration of law and order, felt that any mentioning of amnesty would prejudice the pacification of the island and affect adversely the morale of the Security Forces.43 As a result he stood firm on this issue, offering only to gradually relax the Emergency Laws as public order would improve. Yet Harding reported that it was still possible to settle this issue even though it ‘would involve lengthy discussions on points of detail’.44

110

† Makarios

Clearly the absence of a promise of self-determination was pivotal in Makarios’ reluctance to accept the formula. This stemmed from the divergent viewpoints held by the Archbishop and the British Government and the crisis of trust brought about by the outbreak of violence. Both sides were more eager to hedge their position rather than reassure the other party of their good intentions. As John Reddaway45 rather tellingly suggested, the talks eventually degenerated into ‘a dialogue of the deaf’. This inevitably became one of the major factors leading to the collapse of the talks.46 Makarios Faces Internal Opposition The second factor that reinforced Makarios’ doubts vis-a`-vis the British proposal was the opposition he had to face from within the Greek Cypriot community, especially from the extreme right wing and from AKEL. At the Ethnarchy Council meeting of 10 October Makarios was criticised by the ‘Kyrenia Circle’ for making too many concessions to the British. The opposition of the Kyrenia purists to any deviation from the line of enosis was to a certain degree predictable and has been well established in the existing literature.47 The constant danger to any nationalist political leader to be outflanked. Negotiations therefore were by nature very dangerous because they presented the irrevocable dilemma: to accept the compromise and risk the wrath of the extremists and a split of the national front, or appease the purists but mortgage the political future through intransigence? In any case the wrath of extremists was not a trifle issue, Gandhi had paid with his life, while in the case of Makarios his reasonable calls for compromise were likely to be greeted with the accusation of betraying the oath of enosis. For this reason it is worthwhile to copy here extracts from the minutes of that particular session of the Ethnarchy Council: Konstantinides: I consider that should this proposal [Makarios’ three-point plan] be made by the Governor it could constitute a subject for discussion. I think it was a mistake it was put forward by us. [. . .] The National Assembly decided on the immediate application of self-determination. I do not consider

The Negotiations With Harding † 111 we can withdraw from that decision. As regards the third paragraph, I think it is very dangerous to allow the discussion of the period for the application of self-determination to be undertaken by the majority of the representatives of the people. This plan must therefore be withdrawn and should not be repeated in the future. It should be resolved that, as it has not been accepted, it must be withdrawn. Archbishop: I disagree with your views. To talk about immediate self-determination without doing something about it is unremunerative policy, though a safe one and without consequences. However, let us examine what can be done. We achieve nothing if we do not find a way to supplement the threats of intransigence with acts. [. . .] Konstantinides: I consider the struggle which has been conducted during the past years has not been fruitless. The struggle under your leadership, especially during the past few years, was intransigent but not unremunerative. I think the struggle should be continued along intransigent lines. I would add that we must also be prepared to suffer certain hardships as well, resulting in the advancement of our cause.48

This disagreement at the Ethnarchy Council acquires greater significance when corroborated with a British intelligence report. According to the report the Archbishop was attacked by the Kyrenia faction ‘so vehemently even to the extent of calling him a “traitor”’.49 A new dimension to the conflict is added which is not conveyed by the minutes referred to above as they do not capture the emotional charge of the incident. The use of the word ‘traitor’ was not something trivial especially since Makarios was extremely sensitive to accusations of unacceptable compromise. To be called a ‘traitor’ for attempting to reach a workable compromise with Harding was a smarting insult that affected his approach to the negotiations. The Bishop of Kyrenia himself, in a parallel of 1948, when AKEL had come under heavy criticism for daring to break away from the line of enosis, attempted to undermine Makarios by adopting an inflexible line on the matter. On 5 February 1956, he stated during a sermon that: ‘We in Cyprus shall continue on

112

† Makarios

a more intense level our campaign around our sole slogan – Enosis.’ More worryingly he denounced self-government when he told the cheering crowd that the constitution was ‘the graveyard of Enosis’.50 The use of the church as an opposition forum rankled because this was a stratagem Makarios himself used against British rule. The emergence of the Kyrenia opposition made Makarios even more cautious and more inflexible in his dealings with Harding. He was especially sensitive to any criticism which questioned his nationalist credentials because such criticism was particularly scathing due to the charm the word enosis held over the general Greek Cypriot public. Therefore he was careful not to concede too much to the British. In addition Makarios was also criticised by AKEL, which was against the talks primarily because he refused to form a common front with it. The negotiations gave it a chance to attack the Ethnarchy hoping to expand its base by following the well-established line of trying to outbid the nationalists in defiant rhetoric. As a result AKEL dismissed the talks as a series ‘of unacceptable bargains’ and accused Makarios of carrying ‘secret negotiations behind people’s back’.51 Ironically the roles of AKEL and Makarios were now reversed; back in 1948, it was the Archbishop who had claimed that the constitution was the burial of enosis and now it was AKEL taking this extreme line.52 In a Paphos village the words ‘The Archbishop has betrayed us. Down with EOKA! Up with AKEL!’ were found painted on a wall while a slogan written on a church in Larnaca called on the people to ‘unite against agreement between Makarios and Harding’.53 The opposition of AKEL was easier to weather because of the bad relations between Makarios and the communist party. However, the fact that a possible failure would play into the hands of AKEL, after all that was the fate of the communist party in the aftermath of the Consultative Assembly, was not lost to him. As a result Makarios was less inclined to accept a formula which required him to show good will in exchange of vague promises for future gains.

The Negotiations With Harding † 113 The Greek Government Fails to Support Makarios The Archbishop in his effort to reach an agreement with Harding was hoping to secure the support of the Greek Government. He knew that his initiative would attract untoward criticism and for this reason he wanted the Greek Government to offer him succour which would fortify his position vis-a`-vis all dissenting voices in Cyprus. Such unequivocal support from the Greek Government was not forthcoming. Already the Cyprus issue was turning into a serious headache for the Greek Government. The weakness of the international position of Greece has already been discussed, but after the Istanbul pogrom it was exacerbated further because it had to balance its support to the Greek Cypriots with the preservation of the Greek minority and the Patriarchate in Istanbul by seeking a Cypriot settlement. The two issues were fused into an irrevocable dilemma that plagued Greek foreign policy. Understandably the preservation of the Patriarchate added to the cautious impulse of Greece to follow a more prudent foreign policy which came in sharp contrast with the revolutionary impetus of the Greek Cypriots. More importantly the new Prime Minister Karamanlis from the outset of his premiership was bitterly attacked from all sides: both from his more senior colleagues, who had not anticipated his appointment by the King, but also from the opposition because he was called to form a government without holding any elections. This was a time when Greek political life was highly susceptible to rumours and conspiracy theories. It was widely circulated that Papagos had died some weeks before, but its announcement was delayed, in order to give enough time to the Palace, which was thought to be a hotbed of American and British interests, to appoint Karamanlis, as the person to frustrate the national issue of Cyprus by following a policy of appeasement.54 It must be noted that no matter how extraordinary this might sound to the modern reader, past events seemed to justify such wild speculation. The fraught relations of the Crown with the political parties created an atmosphere of distrust, while British and American involvement in the Civil War created the impression that Greece was being run by NATO.

114

† Makarios

As a result Karamanlis started his premiership on the back foot, treading carefully especially on the Cyprus issue, which had become a stick which the Opposition used repeatedly to beat a beleaguered government. According to Kranidiotis, Makarios wanted the Greek Government to publicly endorse his new line of compromise and co-operation with the British, something which would strengthen his hand vis-a`-vis the ‘Kyrenia Circle’.55 But the weakness of the Greek Government made this impossible – Karamanlis both in Greece and in Cyprus was already accused of being a compromiser. Karamanlis himself was conscious that he had not secured a public mandate so he merely assured Makarios that he would support him, but shirked from publicly stating that the negotiations were a good chance for an honourable settlement, especially since he had proclaimed general elections for the beginning of 1956 in a bid to shore up his position.56 Makarios, always sensitive to his own position – while in Athens he had received a warning from the Bishop of Kyrenia to ‘make no concession of any kind’ – tried to secure concessions from Spyros Theotokis, the new Greek foreign minister, in an effort to guard his own flanks. He asked for an assurance that the Greek Government would make a fresh UN appeal by January, if the negotiations made no progress. More worryingly for the Greek Government, he appealed for the formation of a government of national unity that would handle the Cyprus problem.57 In light of the polarisation that existed in Athens and the populism that had become associated with the Cypriot issue, he was warned that this was an impractical proposition. Makarios’ efforts to strengthen his position were understandable but troubled the Greek Government, which preferred the resumption of the Makarios –Harding talks. Throughout the whole negotiations the previously identified tension between Helladic-centric and Cypriot –centric outlook – the division of opinion between the Greek Government and Makarios as the Greek Cypriot leader – intensified and a mutual distrust plagued their relations. Makarios, on one hand, expected a more firm line and succour from the Karamanlis government. On the other hand the Greek Government was wary of Makarios for two reasons: firstly, his

The Negotiations With Harding † 115 maximalist position in combination with his public appeals could act as the catalyst of its downfall at a critical junction, when the political infighting in Athenian politics had reached its zenith.58 Secondly, as Karamanlis himself noted, Makarios’ handling of the Cyprus issue often overlooked the impact of his efforts on the wider interest of Greece.59 Makarios and the Karamanlis government found themselves bound to each other in an uncomfortable alliance. Although the two parties needed the help of each other, they failed to find a working formula and instead their relations were marked by malaise and resentment. The first wanted the Greek Government to give him unconditional public support in order to press on with the talks and secure an agreement. However, the Karamanlis administration was reluctant to do so because it was paralysed by its own internal critics. Makarios’ letter to Harding on 2 February 1956 informing him that he was willing to consult with the Cyprus Government for the drawing up of a constitution, provided certain conditions were met, was reported positively by the media. This gave the impression of a pending agreement. In Athens, which was in the grip of an election fever, the news media was used by the Opposition parties to attack the Karamanlis government. The Cyprus issue was once more providing ample opportunity for outbursts of populist nationalist rhetoric to undermine a beleaguered administration. The Popular Social Party expressed its surprise that the agreement contained nothing on self-determination, the Progressive Party declared that anything but the date of Cypriot self-determination was ‘mere idle talk’, while the Democratic Party accused the Greek Government of abandoning Makarios, which accounted for the latter’s difficult position of relinquishing self-determination.60 On the other hand the Karamanlis government attempted to present a positive picture but it also stated that although it supported Makarios he alone was responsible for the negotiations.61 The failure of the Greek Government to come out and give its full support openly to the negotiations was one of the complaints of Makarios, who felt that the unwavering support of the metropole could strengthen his position. Of course the Greek

116

† Makarios

Government was simply seeking to guard its own flank. Karamanlis resented the manner in which the Cyprus problem and by extension Makarios intruded in Greek politics and compounded further his fragile position. Lack of communication and empathy between Makarios and the Karamanlis government caused unnecessary resentment and ill-will. As it has been noted earlier, the capacity of the Cyprus issue to generate endemic infighting in the Greek political world was almost infinite. Their failure to appreciate each other’s worries came at a great cost. The Archbishop balked from concluding the talks which could have solved the Cyprus problem and Karamanlis had to continue the thankless task of handling an issue that was causing so much trouble. In any case the lack of public support from Greece was critical for Makarios, who felt that a display of support from Athens would have strengthened his hand. The Role of the Vicious Circle of Violence and Counter-Violence The fourth reason that contributed to the collapse of the talks was how violence impacted on the psychological climate which was so crucial in bridging the differences between Makarios and Harding. Violence undermined much-needed trust and triggered the inevitable vicious circle of violence and counter-violence, which widened the psychological gap between the Cyprus Government and the Greek Cypriots. Harding took very seriously all EOKA activities as his priority was to restore law and order. When Makarios and Harding met for the fourth time on 21 November, the latter noticed the increase of violence which coincided with the return of Archbishop from Athens. Subsequently Harding remarked that Makarios ‘turns Terrorism on and off like a tap’62 – a perception that slowly poisoned the initial goodwill and paved the way to distrust and resentment, which ultimately led to the deportation of the Archbishop. This determination of Harding caused friction with Makarios because the latter worried that the Field Marshal would insist on the prosecution of EOKA fighters after an agreement was signed. In the end the issue of amnesty became one of the

The Negotiations With Harding † 117 outstanding issues that led to the collapse of the talks. Equally important, the strong-handed measures Harding adopted during the course of the negotiations alienated Makarios. In Chapter 2 we discussed how Makarios used different youth movements and the Greek secondary schools to mobilise mass support for enosis. Under the impact of the EOKA struggle, Grivas himself was a great believer in the revolutionary potential of the youth and the Greek Cypriot student movement was radicalised further: protests, demonstrations, absenteeism, EOKA leaflet circulation, painting of enosis slogans on school buildings and the persistence of flying the Greek flag in defiance of the order that no foreign flag could be flown became frequent in many Greek secondary schools. On 15 November Samuels School in Nicosia was struck off the register and declared closed until further notice by Harding, on account of its ‘bad record for indiscipline’.63 This did not prevent the deterioration of the situation which continued unabated. In fact student agitation reached new levels of extremism and disregard for any form of authority, save EOKA and the national cause, when on 20 November students assaulted the houses of the Headmaster and Assistant Headmaster of the Pancyprian Gymnasium, for appealing to students to remain calm and attend their classes, and left threatening notes signed ‘EOKA’.64 Even a direct appeal from the Ethnarchy Bureau for return to normality and a voluntary suspension of school activities by its own governing body did not improve the situation.65 By December Harding had closed down two more schools affecting 2048 students, while in January 1956 he turned against the Pancyprian Gymnasium, the largest school in the island.66 On the other side Harding, exasperated with the spike of violence and eager to get to grips with the suppression of the insurgency, declared a state of emergency on 26 November.67 The declaration of emergency sharpened the psychological divide between Makarios and Harding, widening the gulf between Greek Cypriots and the British administration, at a time when both sides were striving for a compromise. Makarios, responding to Harding’s move, denounced the new British move as an assault ‘on fundamental and internationally recognized human rights’.68 Harding for his part

118

† Makarios

wanted to use the state of emergency to take action against the Bishop of Kyrenia who was promptly identified as a leading troublemaker.69 Makarios’ behaviour, by virtue of his status as a negotiator, was still to be tolerated. However the British Government had wisely decided that any action against any member of the Church at a time when a political solution was actively pursued in connection with the head of the Ethnarchy would be inadvisable.70 By this process of elimination AKEL became the only viable target and suitable whipping boy for an administration eager to stamp its authority on its recalcitrant subjects. On the evening of 13 December 1955, AKEL and its associated organisations like AON (Reconstructive Organisation of Youth, Ανορθωτική Οργάνωση Νέων), the youth organisation, and EAK (Agrarian Union of Cyprus, Ένωση Αγροτών Κύπρου), the communist agrarian union, were proscribed. The following day the mayors of Larnaca and Limassol and the vice-mayor of Famagusta were arrested along with leading members of PEO. In addition the newspapers Νέος Δημοκράτης (New Democrat) and Ανεξάρτητος (Independent) were suspended.71 Theoretically the stance of AKEL justified this heavy-handed approach by Harding, as it had opposed bitterly the negotiations of Makarios and Harding. Nevertheless Harding’s quarrel was with Makarios and the Ethnarchy, not with AKEL, whose influence was waning due to its disassociation from the EOKA struggle. If the move against AKEL aimed to serve as an example to Makarios and the Church in general, which were perceived as the primary cause of agitation, it did not serve its purpose. Makarios, already unhappy with the emergency, sought to score a political point over the Cyprus Government by condemning the action against AKEL on a matter of principle, casting himself as a defender of liberal values.72 This incident demonstrated most aptly that the impact of the counter-insurgency of Harding, which from his point of view was perfectly justifiable, was driving the Greek Cypriot community into closing its ranks against the foreign Cyprus Government which was perceived as becoming increasingly oppressive. The resulting hardening of attitude affected the outlook of Makarios for the remainder of negotiations and added to the mutual mistrust that was steadily building up.

The Negotiations With Harding † 119 Another incident that underlined the sharp psychological gap between Greek Cypriots and British authorities, due to the vicious circle of violence and counter-insurgency measures, was the funeral of Charalambos Mouskos. Mouskos, a cousin of the Archbishop and an EOKA fighter, had died after ambushing a British car patrol. His funeral turned into an emotional affair. In fact it became the starting point of the cult of worshipping fallen EOKA fighters as heroes, with thousands of people paying their respects to his corpse which laid in repose. Previously the passage of the coffin from the Pentaya hospital near village Lefka to Nicosia was solemnly greeted at every single village. Boys and girls laid flowers on the coffin, while the pupils of the Morphou Gymnasium knelt as the coffin passed by shouting ‘Long live enosis’ and ‘Well done’. At the end of the funeral most of the large crowd which had gathered wanted to follow the coffin to its resting place. The authorities, fearing that the flaring of emotions could turn into a riot (and possibly resenting this public endorsement of EOKA activity) warned the crowd that only relatives could follow the coffin to the graveyard. The crowd was not in a receptive mood and instead formed a procession behind the pallbearers. Subsequently the police tried to intercept the procession with tear gas, causing confusion. According to Greek Cypriot sources the security forces also attempted to physically disperse the crowd.73 After the funeral Makarios sent an angry telegram to Harding, calling the efforts of the security forces a ‘sacrilege’ and ‘a black stigma in the history of the British occupation of Cyprus’.74 Naturally the response of Harding was to shift blame to those who had chosen to defy his orders. The categorical disagreement of the two men over this issue reflected the polarisation of emotions between the two sides and their contrasting perceptions on key issues like law, order, patriotism and terrorism. The context of escalating confrontation between Greek Cypriots and the Cyprus Government did not help the progress of the negotiations. The delicate nature of the talks require great amount of good will, which under the impact of violence dissipated and eventually gave way to distrust and ill-will, especially from

120

† Makarios

Harding’ part. Makarios on his part found it harder to take British assurances at face value fearing that without cast-iron guarantees on the issue of self-determination he would find himself in a position of impotence at the mercy of the Cyprus Government. Ironically while violence was instrumental in forcing the British to enter into discussions with him at the same time it was a major stumbling block because it poisoned the atmosphere and led to a critical lack of trust that sealed the fate of the talks. * * * The brinksmanship of Makarios was another factor contributing to the collapse of the talks. This was partly down to his religious identity and the self-conscious burden of an enosis tradition that he carried with his archiepiscopal office. By definition the Archbishop was supposed to be inflexible in the demand for enosis because it was simply an article of faith. Had there been a secular leader in his stead, possibly he would have found it easier to accept a compromise agreement with the British. Such a leader would not have been as conscious of the long nationalist tradition and would have been more pragmatically inclined. Makarios had a self-conscious nationalist dignity in his bearing which prevented him from appearing to be too flexible. When he was presented with the improved formula during the fourth meeting he rejected it out of hand. His desire to guard his flank from the ‘Kyrenia Circle’ was important in this decision. Since he had already come under fire for putting forward an unacceptable compromise, an accusation which would be repeated as the negotiations continued, it made sense for him to take action and pre-empt more opposition of this kind. As it has been argued earlier, the opposition of the purists was his Achilles’ heel. The simplest way to cover this particular weakness was to adopt an intransigent position. Thus if the talks failed his own position within the Greek Cypriot community would not come under criticism. Even if he was contemplating to accept the British proposal he still had to play the intransigent card in order to maintain the nationalist aura he had cultivated over the years and protect his authority which drew greatly from the popularity he

The Negotiations With Harding † 121 enjoyed. Given the circumstances prevailing in Cyprus at the time, it is no exaggeration to argue that the role Makarios had cast for himself required of him to show some degree of inflexibility, even if he was contemplating compromise. In addition the Archbishop had a penchant for brinksmanship and was eager to cultivate a reputation as a tough negotiator. In fact he took pride in his ability as a hard negotiator. When Kranidiotis asked Makarios why he had not asked for time to ponder on the proposal, the Archbishop replied somewhat boastfully: I have rejected it in order to retaliate for the negative answer of the Governor to my own plan which I had proposed in our first meeting. I still believe that the plan as a basis is good. Of course we cannot accept it as it is, but we could negotiate. Of course – and he said ‘of course’ with an expression of self-complacency – I take for granted all the positive elements contained in this document, and if the other members of the Ethnarchy agree we shall come back.75

Makarios had confidence in his abilities as a negotiator and always believed that he could extract the optimum from his opponent. Although his purpose of mind and ability to grasp subtleties not immediately recognisable cannot be denied, in this particular instance his tendency to go for broke was a serious mistake for which subsequently he had to pay dearly. By adopting a hard stance he appeared insincere and lacking good faith at a time when good will was the most important element in these negotiations. The issue of trust and good will was reciprocal – Makarios thought he was perfectly justified in being wary of the British proposal – but his brinksmanship was another factor contributing to the collapse of the talks. Makarios himself, in an interview given to Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci years after the EOKA struggle, admitted that his refusal as a novice to obey the abbot’s command to grow his beard, which was eventually resolved without him giving in, was the beginning of his inclination for brinksmanship: ‘It’s my strategy. It always has been. I mean, I’ve always enjoyed the game of pushing myself to the edge of the abyss

122

† Makarios

and then stopping so as not to fall. You see what I mean? It’s not that I stop at the last moment because I realize the abyss is there; I calculate to the millimeter that I can go that far and no further.’76 Unfortunately he was under the impression that his ‘hard’ negotiating tactics were actually enabling him to make slow but steady improvement: Harding wanted genuinely to reach to a solution. The negotiations with him were hard. I insisted adamantly on the points which I considered them crucial. He refused and resisted and often our sessions ended in disagreement. But in the following session, Harding would accept whatever he had refused previously. Thus I would secure small gains. The negotiations were progressing slowly but steadily.77

This was a serious error of judgement because, contrary to his impression, his tactics were actually mortgaging his good faith as a negotiator. When pressed by Harding if he would be ready to denounce violence, Makarios replied that it would have to be done on his own terms lest it would backfire. Given his delicately poised position, his reply was understandable, but in the context of his guardedness and seemingly ever-shifting position, it is not surprising that Harding started to doubt the assurances of his interlocutor.78 Mistrust was reciprocal and just as like Makarios refused to trust British assurances, so Harding was now questioning the credibility of the Archbishop as he clearly indicated in his conclusions telegrammed to London.79 The Archbishop’s tendency to go for broke eventually alienated Harding, who initially had thought that he could reach an agreement with Makarios. Makarios Attempts to Secure Support for the Proposals Despite all the difficulties surrounding the progress of the negotiations Makarios genuinely wanted a solution. For this reason at the end of January 1956 he asked time from Harding in order to embark on the delicate task of securing support among the different Greek Cypriot factions for the British formula which would enable him to reach an agreement with Harding.

The Negotiations With Harding † 123 The first obstacle was to gain the consent of Grivas. In a secret meeting that took place at the familiar monastery of Kykko, Makarios and Grivas discussed the prospects of a settlement. According to the only surviving record of that meeting, the former despite his reservations appeared willing to strike a deal with Harding. Grivas, ever suspicious of the British, accepted reluctantly this decision. Evidently tension was building up between the two men due to their different outlook and political cognisance. The cautious Makarios indirectly indicated to Grivas that it would be wise to end the armed resistance and concentrate entirely on the political aspect of the issue. On the other hand, Grivas was surprised when he was informed by his more politically sensitive interlocutor that the people were getting tired of the struggle.80 Later in his memoirs, which he kept religiously during the EOKA campaign, he wrote that during the negotiations he had sent a message to Makarios informing him that he would only lay down his arms on four conditions: a) strict guarantees by the British for the enforcement of the agreements; b) the withdrawal of all troops and policemen who had been posted in Cyprus since the Emergency; c) a general political amnesty should be offered; d) internal security not to be left in British hands.81 Ultimately two of the three outstanding points that prevented the completion of agreement would be the issue of amnesty and the control of internal security. Undoubtedly Makarios insisted on these two points in order to retain the vital support of Grivas. As we have seen Grivas was hardly the sole cause for the collapse of the talks. It has already been discussed how the circle of violence and counter-violence affected the relations of Makarios and Harding but now Grivas himself was emerging as an additional obstacle to a successful conclusion. This illuminates the argument of Hatzivassiliou that the actions of Grivas were proving to be a doubleedged sword. His campaign was instrumental in shaking the British position of ‘never’ but at the same time it was undermining good

124

† Makarios

will, which was so important in reaching an accord.82 Moreover, Grivas’ intractable personality and his rigid worldview encroached on the political sphere of competence of Makarios, who had to negotiate bearing in mind the objections and concerns of the EOKA leader. Had Grivas extended his unqualified support to Makarios, it is possible that the latter could have been more flexible in his dealings with Harding and conclude the negotiations successfully. Yet some portion of responsibility for the failure of EOKA to comply unconditionally with its political leadership must lie with Makarios as well for choosing Grivas as his commander-in-chief. As it has been argued earlier, the subtle strategy of changing the British position of ‘never‘ was incongruous with the choice of Grivas, who was proving to be a blunt instrument. The second part of Makarios’ consensus-building effort was a session at the Ethnarchy Council and a meeting with different representatives of the Greek Cypriot community to discuss the British proposal.83 In the Ethnarchy Council Makarios distinguished between the desirability of enosis and what course of action was possible. He openly admitted that he had significant reservations and that the gap between his position and the government’s proposal was ‘great’ but nevertheless invited the Ethnarchy members ‘to see what we can best achieve’. He even argued against a predetermined date for the application of self-determination, asserting that in the absence of such a clause the elected members of the legislative chamber would be free to ask for self-determination immediately. It is not clear if this argument was made to bend the resistance of the Bishop of Kyrenia, who insisted on ‘the historical slogan of “enosis and only enosis”’, or if Makarios was contemplating renewing the struggle for self-determination as soon as self-government was implemented. In the ensuing discussion, with the sole exception of Bishop Kyprianos,84 the Ethnarchy members indicated their agreement with Makarios’ draft reply to Harding.85 In his meetings with the other Greek Cypriot organisations, according to the Times of Cyprus, Makarios asserted his authority securing approval for his handling of the negotiations. When the representatives of the Old Trade Unions made a broadside of demands to be met before consenting to the suggested course of

The Negotiations With Harding † 125 action, Makarios asked them if they had anything positive to contribute to his plan, to which they were unable to respond. The objections of the left-wing mayors and the tentative disagreement of the Greek newspaper editors were addressed in a similar fashion.86 As a result Makarios emerged from his frantic consultations with a clear mandate to proceed with his plan of action. Only Kyprianos and Grivas did not endorse him and expressed reservations against the possibility of reaching an agreement with the British administration. The predictable resistance of the first was merely a nuisance but the opposition of the latter was more critical because an inopportune incident of EOKA violence could exhaust Harding’s fraying patience. Nevertheless these disagreements paled into insignificance in front of the reservations Makarios himself felt regarding the proposed formula. If he had felt that the formula was satisfactory he would have been inclined to cooperate with the Cyprus Government irrespective of any opposition, since he knew that the solid majority would support him. However, his reservations were not resolved and continued to plague the discussions until the actual collapse. The Dynamics of the Collapse The scene was now set for one final meeting that would decide whenever Cyprus would become a self-governing territory under the British Crown or whether the Emergency would continue indefinitely. The last meeting was set for 29 February. The Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd after a request from Harding flew to Cyprus to participate in the final round of these complex negotiations. Clearly Harding wanted Lennox-Boyd to be personally involved in the likely breakdown.87 This appears to justify the Greek Cypriot criticism that the last round was a cynically staged affair that was designed to frame Makarios as the guilty party and open the way for action against him. However the sole outside chance for success was blocked before the meeting even took place. When he arrived in Cyprus Lennox-Boyd realised how grim the situation would be in case of failure and asked authorisation from Eden for some ‘sugar-coating’ that could

126

† Makarios

possibly wean Makarios from his position. Prior to the last meeting it was established that Makarios would co-operate if the British were to concede Greek Cypriot majority in the assembly, offer a general amnesty and agree to a transfer of public security to a Greek Cypriot minister as soon as law and order were restored. LennoxBoyd considered these demands unacceptable but was willing to concede the demand of Greek Cypriot majority.88 Whether this ruse would have sealed the deal remains imponderable because the Cabinet did not approve this new concession on the grounds that it would be objectionable to the Turkish community.89 Yet there was an important twist to this decision that partly confounds the Greek Cypriot criticism that Eden’s fear of alienating the Turks undermined the talks. Already some advisers were thinking that it was wise to ‘tell the Turks that 18 per cent of the [Cypriot] population cannot have an unqualified veto on the remaining 82 per cent’.90 This is important because even Harding himself would later come to the conclusion that self-determination was the only permanent solution of the Cyprus problem.91 Eden admitted that the rejection of Greek Cypriot majority was not entirely down to Turkish objections, but mostly due to domestic concessions. The truth of the matter was quite ironic, especially if we bear in mind that British officials repeatedly told Makarios that the duty of a leader is to lead and refuse to be led by his supporters. Instead there were some parallels between a public opinionconscious Makarios and Eden in the sense that the British Prime Minister felt to be under pressure from his own purists, the ‘Suez Rebels’ who were closely scrutinising his foreign and colonial policies. Therefore he felt that he could not afford to appear ‘weak’ over Cyprus during a period when his administration was coming under increasing pressure.92 In light of this detail it is tempting to indulge in a counter-factual hypothesis that if Makarios was willing to risk a co-operation with the British he would eventually secure enosis through the back door, especially if we consider the British pattern of decolonisation. Most countries embarked on the path of self-government with independence being a taboo word in British circles and yet slowly and surely independence became a reality. So one has to wonder, why not Cyprus as well? Of course no

The Negotiations With Harding † 127 satisfactory answer can be given but it certainly revisits the debate of a lost opportunity, even if this was a bit of a far-fetched opportunity. Before the actual meeting of 29 February 1956, Nicosia was shaken by several bomb explosions. To this day is not clear who was responsible for this incident, which has received disproportional attention in many accounts because its various portrayals have tapped into the deep divide between the supporters of Grivas and Makarios. Generally speaking pro-Makarios accounts hold Grivas responsible for the explosions, contending that the latter was not happy with the negotiations and wished to make his mark at a critical junction.93 On the other hand pro-Grivas accounts deny this responsibility implying that some other organisation could have been responsible.94 But in the absence of any evidence, such assertions that AKEL or the British Intelligence Service were the real culprits must be dismissed as conspiracy theories until solid evidence is produced by their exponents. AKEL at no point in the 1950s had the capability of armed violence and the British Intelligence Service had no reason to sabotage talks which were bound to collapse. More importantly Grivas himself in the English version of his memoirs writes that because he distrusted the British he had ordered the bombs as a warning and a demonstration of force.95 This passage for unknown reasons was omitted from his Greek version. It is possible that Grivas, who was incapable of grasping political subtleties, had ordered the bombings in order to make a point and possibly thinking that he was actually reinforcing the hand of Makarios. In any case the explosion of the bombs was not responsible for the collapse of the talks as some Makarios supporters have claimed or implied, nor was it a clear-cut sign that Grivas rejected the talks. It certainly reflected an important difference in the outlook between Makarios and Grivas, and by extension why the latter was a poor strategic choice as leader of a guerrilla movement that ought to have been completely subordinate to the Archbishop. The bearing of the bombing incident on the final meeting is not clear. It hardly helped Makarios, who was already being suspected of having close links with ‘terrorism’. Instead it exacerbated an already terse atmosphere but the actual reasons for collapse were elsewhere to be found.

128

† Makarios

Since the two parties had respectively resolved they could not make any more concessions to the other side the final meeting of Makarios and Harding was tinged with the inevitability of failure. The Archbishop raised objections to three points: the amnesty, public security and the definition of an ‘elected majority’, which triggered a lively discussion between him, Harding and LennoxBoyd. By this time it was clear that the greatest stumbling stone was the lack of trust between the two sides. For example, Makarios was wary of the retention of public security by the Governor for as long as he saw fit, fearing that it could lead to an abuse of power. Harding insisted on this particular point because he had grown so distrustful of Cypriot politics that he ‘could envisage a situation in which law and order had outwardly been restored but under the surface extremely dangerous activities were going on’.96 In other words public security had to be maintained under the Governor in order to safeguard against a renewed underground enosis campaign. Makarios’ distrust was particularly paralysing because despite his sincere desire for a settlement he did not dare to proceed further until clear assurances to his objections were given. When it became clear that Makarios could not be persuaded to accept the proposal, the Colonial Secretary asked him to choose between ‘continuation of disorders’ and the ‘inevitable introduction of more severe counter-measures’ and ‘the opportunity for cooperation’ with the Cyprus Government. It was an irrevocable dilemma because none of the options presented to him were satisfactory and both choices were burdened with unpleasant consequences. As he explained to Lennox-Boyd he thought that the proposal did not go far enough to enable him to muster wide support among his people. He was acutely aware that by accepting he was at risk of appearing to ‘become an object of severe attack and criticism’ and ultimately lose a great deal of this authority.97 Despite his desire for an agreement his sensitivity to domestic criticism by his own people, itself not a trifle concern, coupled with his distrust toward British motives determined the outcome of his inner struggle. It was fitting that the Ethnarch chose to stay close to his flock even though that entailed a yet unspecified danger. Unfortunately the

The Negotiations With Harding † 129 rejection of the British proposal triggered a series of events that were to have far-reaching effects on the collective future of his people, but above all on the all-important issue of enosis. It is ironic how the nationalist nature of his power which invested him with so much authority at the most critical junction became the greatest stumbling block in his efforts to achieve what he thought was the best for his people. Like a hero plucked from an Ancient Greek tragedy his gift of charismatic leadership had become a tragic flaw that led to his fall. Makarios’ plea for a last-gasp reconsideration of the three points fell on deaf ears. Both Lennox-Boyd and Harding were at the end of their tether. The Colonial Secretary gave a short and terse reply, expressing his regret for the failure of the talks and the meeting was ended. According to Kranidiotis the last words of LennoxBoyd were rather ominous: ‘May God save your people’.98 It is therefore surprising that Makarios himself left from the meeting under the impression that there would be one more.99 This means that there was one more factor influencing his decision to reject the proposal and that is his brinkmanship, which has been discussed earlier. Makarios was right that the British would be unable to find someone to replace him as the negotiator of the Greek Cypriot community after his exile but he fatally misjudged the patience of the British side. The presence of the Colonial Secretary should have been ample warning that a make-or-break point had been reached. Yet Makarios persisted with his hard line under the impression that the British would relent in a future meeting. Indeed the fate of the Archbishop was decided shortly after the return of the two British officials at the Governor’s house. Harding, eager to get to grips with his plan of stamping out terrorism, announced to Lennox-Boyd that, ‘I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that there is no longer enough room in this island for His Beatitude and myself’. The Colonial Secretary concurred, but prophetically said: ‘If you get rid of the Archbishop, he will come back as Head of State’.100 The failure of the negotiations was a great personal reverse for Makarios. He had come so tantalisingly close to an agreement that could end the Cyprus struggle before it could develop into a full-

130

† Makarios

blown international crisis. Instead the collapse of the talks would act at the harbinger of dire consequences both for himself and the political future of Cyprus. In the aftermath of the talks, Makarios was deported, Harding unleashed a draconian anti-terrorist campaign and inter-communal relations in Cyprus deteriorated. Moreover, the final agreement that established an independent republic turned out to be merely the beginning of new troubles rather than a settlement. In light of this it is possible to argue that the negotiations were potentially a lost opportunity. In retrospect it was the only British plan that could, albeit in an indirect manner and at some unspecified point in the future, facilitate enosis. This point is crucial because as Markides has argued after the collapse of the talks ‘the prospect of Cypriot self-determination had faded into the realms of political make-believe’.101 Makarios sensed that he was presented with an opportunity and wanted a successful conclusion to the talks. Yet despite his desire to reach an agreement with Harding his efforts were ultimately in vain. The most important reason for the failure of the talks was the mutually exclusive viewpoints of the two sides, which doomed the talks. The bare minimum of what Makarios was willing to accept was simply too much for the British to concede. However, other factors exacerbated the situation and effectively eliminated any remaining hope for agreement. Opposition from AKEL, the Bishop of Kyrenia and the failure of the Greek Government to publicly endorse Makarios meant that the Archbishop felt keenly the risk of the possibility that the British might not honour their word and leave him exposed. This naturally reinforced his impulse to press for guarantees the British were not willing to give in advance. In addition the political climate was adversely affected by violence in a reciprocal manner. It poisoned the good will and rapport Makarios had managed to build with Harding and stifled the desire to reach out to the other side. Instead both men in the face of increasing violence and counter-violence doubted each other’s sincerity, feeling the need to fall back on their respective sides. To compound the situation further Grivas refused to give his blessing to the negotiations and instead put pressure on Makarios to be more firm in his dealings with Harding. Finally,

The Negotiations With Harding † 131 the Archbishop’s brinksmanship style during the negotiations reinforced further Harding’s suspicions that Makarios was not a reliable negotiator, which in its turn encouraged the British to be more conservative in their dealings. The combination of all these reasons produced a mutual crisis of trust that made an agreement impossible. The opportunity presented, however elusive, was lost forever and now Makarios had to contend with the wrath of a frustrated British administration.

6

Arrest, Deportation and Exile: The Seychelles Interlude This chapter will discuss the British rationale behind the decision to arrest and deport Makarios after the collapse of the Harding talks and narrate in some detail the actual deportation. It will analyse the consequences of the deportation in the Cypriot political scene and how it alienated Greek Cypriot opinion. It will also examine how international opinion received the news of the deportation and argue that on balance the negative response to the British action, both in Cyprus and internationally, essentially released countervailing forces that eventually made the release of Makarios inevitable. The second part will concentrate on the life of Makarios while in exile and examine his state of mind. His major preoccupation while detained in the Seychelles, apart from his personal responsibility for the development of the struggle, was his inner conflict regarding the use of violence. His ambivalence toward the use of violence will be examined in order to shed more light on his psychological make-up. This will offer further insights to his nuanced relationship with violence, which was already discussed in Chapter 4. It will be argued that an appreciation of Makarios’ conviction on the limits of violence in the pursuit of enosis is crucial in order to understand his political thought and his future handling of the Cyprus problem. Finally, it will examine the reasons why the British Government decided to release him. Despite the failure of 29 February 1956, Makarios was under the impression that the British had not said their final word. On 3 March, Ελευθερία (Liberty) reported that the Ethnarch was

Arrest, Deportation and Exile: The Seychelles Interlude † 133 receptive to the resumption of the talks and on 8 March he stated to the Times of Cyprus that he was willing to meet the British official that would design the new Cyprus constitution to resubmit the views of the Ethnarchy.1 Privately, he was even more optimistic that with little bit of more effort and understanding from the British authorities, an agreement could be reached. It is striking that this thought persisted even after his deportation, as his letter to the British MP Francis Noel-Baker, while in exile in the Seychelles, testifies.2 At heart Makarios, was an optimist but unwittingly he was committing a serious error of judgment regarding British policy on Cyprus. The optimism of the Archbishop was certainly not matched by the British. Harding was adamant that Makarios’ time on the island was up and, on 5 March 1956, he sent a long telegram to London requesting his deportation.3 Soon rumours started to circulate both in London and in Nicosia that the Archbishop was to be deported, forcing Lennox-Boyd to deny such rumours.4 Makarios himself, although he was warned by a contact close to the Government House that the British authorities were planning to deport him, decided to carry on with his schedule. He was to fly to Athens on 9 March for further consultations with the Greek Government and this posed the question, which he discussed with the Abbot of Kykko, as to whether it would be best to simply lie low and see what happened. In the end Makarios decided to go to Athens, gambling that the British would not dare to risk the backlash of his deportation, but for good measure he packed some extra clothing and an Anglo-Greek dictionary.5 Recent developments in the Middle East did not help the case of the Cypriot primate. As we have discussed earlier, British policy in Cyprus was effectively an appendix of the wider Middle Eastern strategy and events in this sensitive region had a tendency to impact on Cypriot politics. The declining British prestige in the Middle East received a fresh blow on 1 March when King Hussein of Jordan dismissed the Commander of the Arab Legion, Lt General Sir John Glubb. Glubb Pasha, as he was more commonly known, was considered to be a symbol of British prestige and influence. His dismissal provided the ‘Suez Rebels’ with a new

134

† Makarios

opportunity to attack the Eden administration for being weak and failing to stand firm in the Middle East.6 The bearing of this event on the decision to deport Makarios was mostly psychological, in the sense that Eden was more susceptible to approving an action that would stop the so-called retreat from the Middle East. There were echoes of the summer of 1954, when Hopkinson’s impromptu ‘never’ was offered to mollify the cries of ‘no scuttling’ which criticised the settlement for the Suez base. It was amidst such conditions that the British Cabinet decided to authorise Harding to deport Makarios. The decision was part of the wider tendency which permeated British policy in the wider Middle East of personalising complex problems and conflating entire issues with the actions of individuals. In the Cypriot context, a cult of Makarios was developed, which was all about how to deflate the Archbishop.7 Characteristical of this mentality was Harding’s proposal in the spring of 1957 for a political counter-offensive against the Archbishop. At the beginning of his proposal it was stated that ‘Makarios personally constitutes the main remaining obstacle to an agreed settlement of the Cyprus problem’.8 In Egypt, British policy makers fumed against Nasser, who stoked the fire of PanArabism that was incompatible with British designs, and in Jordan, King Hussein was cast as a villain for inflicting such a humiliation on the injured British prestige by dismissing Glubb Pasha. However, there was not much Britain could do about the two Arab leaders, but Makarios being a British subject could serve as the whipping boy of an embattled administration. As Robert Stephens noted, ‘Eden could not send Nasser or Hussein into exile, but he could make an example of Makarios’.9 Arrest and Deportation10 On 9 March 1956, at 1.45 pm, Makarios, after an enthusiastic send-off by a crowd of some hundreds which had gathered at the Archbishopric Palace, embarked in his limousine that was to drive him to the airport. There was also a second car carrying some Ethnarchy members that were to see Makarios off. As soon as the

Arrest, Deportation and Exile: The Seychelles Interlude † 135 two cars left the Archbishopric, armed paratroopers poured into the area and began a hunt to find incriminating evidence that would establish an unequivocal connection between EOKA and Makarios. Machine guns were emplaced on the walls of outbuildings and every person was stopped, put against the wall and searched. Initially only the gardens of the palace were searched. Later the paratroopers evacuated the building and the whole building was searched thoroughly. No one was allowed to spend the night in the building, forcing its many clerics to seek shelter at the Metokhi of Kykko in Nicosia, while the building itself was sealed off with barbed wire.11 Despite the rigorous search the British troops failed to find the ‘smoking gun’ that could justify the deportation of the Archbishop and had to content themselves with carrying off reams of paperwork that after careful examination turned out to be rather innocent.12 In the meantime Makarios’ car was shadowed by a military car full of soldiers and police officers. At the entrance of the airport a British army officer requested politely from everybody,13 save Makarios, to step out of the car. The officer assumed the driver’s position. The second car was allowed to go through normally to the civilian airport. Makarios was not entirely sure what was going on and initially thought that he was receiving a special treatment that would allow him to circumvent the usual boarding procedure because of his office. Soon he became aware that he was being driven to the military airport of Nicosia. Eventually the car stopped in front of a Hastings Mark II aeroplane and the British officer very politely asked the Archbishop to board the aeroplane. On the aeroplane there was another officer who after apologising read to Makarios the deportation order. Makarios wanted to notify his sister, who was to travel with him to Athens for medical reasons, but he was refused as British authorities did not want news of the deportation to leak out before its planned official press release. He was allowed to scribble a few notes explaining briefly that he was about to be exiled and asked the British officer to forward them to the Archbishopric.14 After some time Reverend Papastavros, the firebrand priest of the Phaneromeni church, also boarded the plane. Initially

136

† Makarios

Makarios thought that the priest had somehow acquired permission to come and say goodbye but a disgruntled Papastavros revealed that he was also arrested. At this point Makarios, who maintained his cool – he was rarely unsettled and could take adversity in his stride – playfully remarked that they would travel together. Humour was one of the most endearing attributes of the Archbishop, a quality that was very rarely seen in public; indeed his speeches very rarely employed humour, wit or irony.15 Nevertheless many accounts of the private Makarios concur that he had a keen sense of humour that he often used to put at ease his interlocutors, as in this case. Sometime later the Bishop of Kyrenia, Kyprianos, and his secretary Polycarpos Ioannides, were escorted to the aeroplane, thereby completing the deportation quartet. Superficially the four men were ‘guilty’ of the same crime – their activities in favour of enosis and subversion of British rule on the island – but beyond that there were several important differences in outlook between Makarios and his three co-exiles. The choice of such companions might have been in British eyes a small act of charity as the Archbishop would not be entirely isolated, but as we shall see later, during the long months of exile the ideological differences of the deportees would eventually surface, which made his exile even more unpleasant. The details of the multi-staged trip that eventually terminated at Mahe´ island of the Seychelles are not that important for our purposes. It is interesting to note that there was a very congenial atmosphere between the British captors and the Cypriot deportees. According to British reports, the demeanour of the deportees was excellent, primarily due to the attitude of Makarios, who had tried to cheer up his companions. At some point when the deportees were asked to board on a bus to carry them to port from where they would continue their journey via ship, the Archbishop ‘remarked in good humour – “There is no finer way of learning geography than as the guest of Her Majesty The Queen”’.16 Makarios noted the respectful treatment he and his companions received and courtesy showed by all British officers and staff. The captain of H.M.S. Loch Fada, the ship that carried

Arrest, Deportation and Exile: The Seychelles Interlude † 137 them to Mahe´, had surrendered his personal cabin to Makarios, something which the Archbishop appreciated deeply. The journey was only completed by the afternoon of 14 March 1956, because of the secrecy surrounding the whole operation. British authorities knew that the legal ground for deporting Makarios was not beyond reproach but also wanted to avoid the scrutiny of the press: indeed Loch Fada on its way to Mahe´ was shadowed by a private light aircraft that was hired by reporters eager to capture an image of the exiled Archbishop. It was at the small island of Mahe´ that Makarios was to spend the next 13 months isolated from the rest of the world but most importantly away from his beloved island, unable to have any influence on the course of events. This was the greatest burden that he was to carry silently while political events in Cyprus were racing ahead. Reaction and Consequences of the Exile Greek Cypriot reaction to the news of the deportation was rather subdued. There were no widespread spontaneous demonstrations, as might have been expected, but dismay for the loss of their leader. The week after the deportation there were some efforts to organise strikes across different sectors of the economy but the effort petered out by 20 March 1956, when life had returned to normality.17 Despite the numb Greek Cypriot reaction there was one very important consequence which the British had not anticipated. The rationale for the deportation was that by removing the ‘extreme’ Makarios it was hoped that some moderate elements would come forward to negotiate selfgovernment with Harding. The elusive moderate Greek Cypriot by now had become a creature of British make-belief. In fact the overwhelming Greek Cypriot majority was alienated by the deportation and naturally closed ranks in response to this new adversity. The last remaining Greek Cypriot member of the Governor’s Executive Council, Ioannis Clerides QC, resigned in protest, severing one of the last links between the Cyprus Government and the Greek Cypriot community.18

138

† Makarios

The bishop of Kition, Anthimos, being the most senior prelate on the island, became locum tenens and vowed to uphold the ‘national line’ propagated by Makarios.19 Grivas, who was now entirely free to pursue the struggle as he saw fit, since the more conservative impulse of the Archbishop was removed, decided to ‘fight to the end’.20 By the end of March EOKA intensified its campaign, killing 17 persons: eight of them were members of the security forces, 39 persons were wounded, out of which 28 were members of the security forces. There were 101 bomb incidents and two serious ambushes against the security forces.21 In addition there was an unsuccessful attempt on the life of Harding himself, in retaliation for the deportation.22 Such was the shock of the deportation that even the deep Greek Cypriot ideological divisions were temporarily reconciled over the issue of Makarios. On 1 June all Greek mayors and deputy mayors convened at the Nicosia Town Hall to examine the situation on the island. The decision which was publicised two weeks later was that the mayors ‘will never participate in any negotiations concerning the Island’s political future and to re-affirm that there can be no possibility for the solution of the problem so long as His Beatitude is held down in forced confinement’.23 The emphatic manner in which the Greek Cypriots reaffirmed their loyalty to their national leader was a form of moral victory for the Archbishop. The position that no solution could be viable without the release of Makarios was eventually but grudgingly accepted by the British and it was one of the reasons contributing to the termination of the Archbishop’s exile. At the same time the deportation was also an important turning point for the EOKA struggle and a political defeat for Makarios. His original vision of the struggle, as opposed to that of Grivas, was a short campaign with as few casualties possible, that would alter the British position of ‘no change’. By negotiating with Harding he had come tantalisingly close to this but with his deportation his dream of a speedy settlement was in tatters. He removal from the political arena rendered him unable to exert any control on EOKA, which in any case had the tendency to get out of control despite the assurances of Grivas. Now the course of

Arrest, Deportation and Exile: The Seychelles Interlude † 139 events would be shaped primarily by the campaign of EOKA and the countervailing determination of Harding to stamp it out, spurring further the vicious circle of violence and counterviolence. Moreover, the strategy of internationalisation had backfired, Greece was diplomatically too weak and the introduction of Turkey as an irreducible element in the solution of the problem weakened further the Greek Cypriot position. Clearly the question of enosis was not as straightforward as Makarios had thought it was back in the early 1950s when he was contemplating violence as a means to further his political aim. His gamble to use violence to secure a quick settlement did not pay off but instead it produced unexpected and unintended consequences that complicated the issue. It was these thoughts that troubled the conscience of Makarios while in exile in the Seychelles feeding his internal struggle of whether he had made the right choices and what were the full implications of his deportation for the future of his home island. His enforced inactivity was particularly unpleasant, not only because by nature he was industrious and gregarious, but also because it forced him to ponder with little respite his personal responsibility for the Greek Cypriot predicament. The reaction in mainland Greece was equally hostile. GrecoBritish relations, already strained because of the ongoing Cyprus dispute, reached a new all-time low as news of the deportation of Makarios filtered through. Charles Peake, the British ambassador in Athens, reported that had it not been for the cold and wet weather there would have been spontaneous demonstrations at the airport as crowds had gathered to welcome the Cypriot Archbishop.24 Karamanlis immediately held an emergency cabinet meeting which after a hectic session decided to recall its Greek ambassador in London, to submit a protest to the Secretary-General of the UN, and to make an appeal to the Security Council. It also released an official communique´ denouncing the action of the British Government.25 Such was the atmosphere in Greece that a popular backlash became inevitable as once more protesters in all major Greek cities took to the streets to vent their frustration against British diplomacy. In Heraklion, the principal town of Crete, the British Consulate was

140

† Makarios

broken into and sacked by a mob, with the consul seeking refuge in a Greek military installation. In Salonica a demonstrating crowd attempted to break into the British Consulate General and was repelled after a ‘large number of police and soldiers’ intervened at a cost of 120 injuries. In Corfu the consular flag was removed, only to be returned later by the local authorities.26 Unpleasant as it was, this Greek backlash was also predictable but not serious enough to worry the British Government. What could really unsettle the British was the wider international public opinion. The Cyprus problem had become a propaganda battle and public opinion mattered in this contest of impressions. Even more important to Britain was the reaction of the USA. Its attitude on the Cyprus issue was particularly important to London because of the extensive influence the USA could wield both in NATO and in UN proceedings. In addition the desire to nurture the ‘special relationship’ between London and Washington made the British government eager to secure the accord of its US counterpart, especially on strategic issues. For this reason US opinion on the Cyprus matter was always something to be borne in mind when formulating British policy, even though there was a streak of resentment, when the USA raised concerns or expressed opinions that were not entirely agreeable with British views. The USA’s main preoccupation with this affair was to avoid a fracturing of the NATO front and its administration repeatedly urged all sides to settle the issue amicably. For this reason the US administration did not respond favourably to the deportation of Makarios because it knew that such a move would aggravate the situation. Moreover, the British Government had failed to give the State Department advance warning. John Foster Dulles, the American foreign secretary, found out about the deportation from news agency reports.27 The British practice of taking unilateral actions without consulting or forewarning its US ally, exasperated US officials because they often found themselves managing crises that were not of their own making. In this case the US Government was aware of the growing anti-Western feeling in Greece because of the Cyprus problem, and especially now that the Archbishop had been deported,

Arrest, Deportation and Exile: The Seychelles Interlude † 141 attempted to mollify Greek feeling. The US Ambassador in Athens visited the Greek Foreign Minister and ‘expressed the sympathetic concern of the United States Government and people for recent developments in Cyprus’.28 There was also British concern over the message of the US Government to its Greek counterpart and over American press reports about the situation in Cyprus.29 The feeling in London was that American press distorted the position of the British Government and that the sympathy of the US Government to Greece would be counterproductive because it would encourage ‘Greek intransigence’. Officially the US Government never condemned the deportation publicly, but according to Claude Nicolet many officials in the State Department privately thought that the release of Makarios was instrumental in finding a settlement and worked toward this direction.30 This covert attitude helped Karamanlis’ effort to secure the release of Makarios, as the former capitalised on the US sympathy on this issue. Beyond the muted displeasure of the USA, Britain had also to take into account the response of different countries, which on balance was generally negative. This is not to say that there was a uniform world opinion on the deportation – the intensity of opinions and the general interest in the case varied considerably from country to country – but on the whole there was a backlash against Britain. For example, the reaction of Sudan, a country which had acquired its independence from Britain only a few months ago, was more polemical than the reaction of European countries like Italy. The Sudanese House of Representatives eventually passed a unanimous resolution condemning British action as a violation ‘against human justice’, whereas the Italian press proclaimed its support for the Cypriots and questioned the wisdom of the deportation.31 Examples of other countries where the deportation of Makarios received negative press coverage were West Germany, Spain, Denmark, Yugoslavia, Egypt and Syria. This backlash by itself was not substantial enough to reverse Britain’s decision but in an age of increased media scrutiny in international political affairs, the image-conscious British Government found negative comments in the international press irksome. Additionally there were negative

142

† Makarios

comments by leftist elements in the British press. It was also frustrating on two accounts: firstly, because it was a reflection of the declining prestige of the British Empire as countries became more critical of colonialism. But also, because of an unforeseen paradox, the deportation had unwittingly increased the exposure of Makarios, as it generated even more interest in his person, and even won him some international sympathy. As a result the very act of deportation generated countervailing forces that eventually made the detention of Makarios a political liability for Britain, a process that paved his triumphant return from exile. If anything the absence of the Archbishop left a political vacuum in Cyprus that proved impossible to fill, which led to the conclusion that that without him no permanent settlement was possible. The real challenge for Makarios was to realise that even though he was indispensable to a solution, he still had to accommodate the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. More importantly he had the onerous task of going against the grain of his nationalist credentials and convincing his people, who were in the grip of the EOKA fever, that such a compromise was necessary. It was a task fraught with all sorts of problems and contradictions which was only achieved imperfectly in 1959. Life in Exile At the end of his exile Makarios remarked that ‘under different circumstances [he] could have been happy’ living in Mahe´.32 The pristine beauty of the island, its isolation from mundane affairs, made it ideal for someone who wanted to meditate and pray. Certainly there was something agreeable – a pleasant throwback to his earlier worry-free monastic life as an initiate at the Kykko monastery – about the new routine that the Archbishop adopted during his stay in the Seychelles. According to the account of Captain P. S. Le Geyt, one of the two existing records about Makarios’ life in Seychelles,33 an ordinary day would begin at 6 am. Until 11 o’clock in the evening, which was his usual bed time, Makarios would divide his time between walking and exercising, reading the newspapers or some book, improving his

Arrest, Deportation and Exile: The Seychelles Interlude † 143 language skills by taking English lessons, having discussions with his co-exiles and listening to the BBC, which relayed news from Athens on the wireless in the evening.34 Therefore it is easy to understand why such a life in that particular setting, which was conducive to deep reflections, could have been agreeable to the monastery-reared Makarios. Idyllic as life may have been on Mahe´ island, it was also at times burdensome and dreary, mainly because the Archbishop was no longer an initiate but a political leader at a time of crisis when his presence in Cyprus was most important. Not only was he plucked out of Cypriot politics at a critical junction, he was also virtually isolated from the rest of the world. News from his beloved island reached him sporadically via ship, as there was no airstrip on the island. It was frustrating for the man who had dominated Greek Cypriot affairs and was always in the thick of political developments to be stranded in a distant island receiving only trickles of information, while he knew that events in Cyprus were racing ahead of him. In a letter to the Bishop of Kition Anthimos, compiled at the beginning of the exile, he complained about the lack of news and contact with the outside world.35 The fact that all correspondence had to be censored by the Cyprus Government added to the already long delivery time, exasperating further Makarios who normally kept himself updated with current affairs. This sense of helplessness overwhelmed the relief and serene tranquillity he had found in Seychelles and progressively as the situation in Cyprus became more critical, the burden of responsibility started to weigh heavier on the archiepiscopal shoulders. The monotony of life was not always agreeable, especially for someone who was industrious and painfully aware of his task back at home. Despite the co-operation of the exiles with Captain Le Geyt, British authorities feared the possibility of escape or even a rescue operation, which would have the covert blessings of the Greek Government. Indeed, occasional rumours of possible rescue expeditions approaching the Seychelles reached British authorities and no matter how far-fetched such scenarios were they were never dismissed out of hand.36 For this reason the

144

† Makarios

Governor of the Seychelles, Sir William Addis, decided to reinforce security measures around Sans Souci, the house where the detainees were being accommodated. When the four Cypriots found out that a new fence would be built around the house and that dog patrols would be conducted on a regular basis they expressed their displeasure. Already unhappy with what they considered to be unacceptable delays in receiving their correspondence and unnecessary restrictions to their movement around the island, they resorted to a hunger strike that started on the morning of 6 May 1956.37 Makarios also wrote a long letter addressed to Addis explaining in detail the reasons over which they had decided to go on a hunger strike.38 The issue was quickly resolved after a visit by the Secretary to the Government of Seychelles on the morning of 8 May. In exchange of a parole, that the deportees would not try to escape their detention, the Seychelles Government decided to drop the additional security measures.39 This was the only substantial complaint of Makarios regarding the living conditions in Sans Souci, which was resolved fairly amicably given the power relations between the detainees and the Seychelles Government. On the whole the four Cypriots were treated in a humane and dignified manner – something which Makarios readily acknowledged. What really troubled him was his conscience: the inexorable questions about the political situation in Cyprus, the uncertain future that lay ahead but most importantly his personal responsibility. Beneath his cool exterior that professed a restrained optimism regarding the political future of Cyprus and his playful sense of humour, there was a shadow of doubt that progressively grew deeper as the long months of his exile wore on. Le Geyt noted that during July Makarios started to take long walks by himself and was often in deep thought.40 An indication of what was on the Archbishop’s mind can be found in Papagathangelou’s memoirs, where the latter asserts that toward the end of July, Makarios posed the question of whether the EOKA struggle was morally justified.41 Unfortunately not enough details are provided; we are only told that after a long discussion between Ioannides,

Arrest, Deportation and Exile: The Seychelles Interlude † 145 Papagathangelou and Makarios, the latter was satisfied that the struggle was indeed just. Nevertheless this detail reveals a lot about the convoluted psychological profile of Makarios. It certainly refutes the British portrayal of the Archbishop as a grim man of violence and bloodshed. Instead we catch a glimpse of a man torn in two by the personal struggle of divided loyalties: the religious person who abhors violence as a matter of Christian principle and the political leader who reluctantly admits that in the imperfect political world, sometimes the end justifies the means. This almost existential anxiety of Makarios reinforces the argument that his relation to violence was not straightforward. As we saw in Chapter 4, he was reluctant to resort to general violence; instead he preferred very limited action against non-human targets, instructing Grivas to avoid bloodshed altogether during the first few months. This could have been slightly disingenuous, because Makarios was calculating and certainly hoping, that with the first whiff of violence the British would agree to open negotiations over the future of Cyprus, thus bypassing altogether the thorny issue of violence against human targets. Makarios’ misgivings about violence and his hope for a speedy settlement are important nuances in the complex narrative of the EOKA struggle, which are often overlooked by accounts that emphasise the heroic exertions and sacrifices of the Greek Cypriots. On the contrary it could be argued that the length of the struggle was a personal failure of Makarios, an unintended outcome in spite of his initial plans. In this personal failure there is also an inevitable degree of tragedy because, despite the Archbishop’s charisma and gifts, he proved unable to lead his people to the promised land of enosis. Instead after four years of bloodshed and sacrifices he had to settle for an independent republic with clear guarantees against the possibility of enosis. Clearly at the time of his exile, he was unaware of this sense of tragedy that would eventually define his entire political legacy. Nevertheless he was certainly apt to question the choices that had rendered him a political exile and by extension his own political morality. Therefore, his questioning of the morality of

146

† Makarios

the struggle reflected also a painful introspection that added to his already considerable personal burden of responsibility. Makarios’ morale was to receive a heavy blow, compounding further his already stressed psychological constitution, in the following month when news of the Grivas’ diaries finally reached Mahe´ through an official bulletin. Back in Cyprus the Security Forces had launched a fairly successful offensive against EOKA. In addition to the crippling blows dealt to EOKA, the Security Forces managed, through different means, to capture a lot of EOKA documents, including several volumes of Grivas’ personal diary. Grivas was a compulsive diarist and kept a meticulous record of day-to-day affairs throughout the EOKA struggle. However his habit eventually backfired, as the safekeeping of these documents proved harder than he had originally anticipated. These vital documents were secured on four different occasions: The first one was on 10 June 1956 when a British patrol forced Grivas to abandon hastily his position, leaving behind some of his personal belongings including a part of his diary. During Operation Foxhunter, Security Forces discovered in a jar just two miles southwest of Kykko monastery another volume. Subsequently another volume was unearthed in August in the fields of the village of Lysi. Finally according to British reports another volume was discovered ‘through sources which cannot be revealed’.42 The discovery of Grivas’ diary was most unfortunate because it occurred at a time when the Greek Government attempted to strike a more conciliatory stance by asking Grivas, through its new Consul General in Cyprus, Angelos Vlachos, to offer a ceasefire.43 On 16 August Grivas offered a ceasefire but the Eden administration was in no mood for conciliation as it was chiefly preoccupied with the unfolding Suez crisis. Instead Harding responded by offering to the ‘terrorists of EOKA’ to surrender and choose between full amnesty and emigration to Greece or to stay in Cyprus and be tried for their ‘crimes’.44 Behind this blunt rejection of EOKA’s offer was the uncovering of Grivas’ diary which gave the British Government an opportunity to justify its hard stance in Cyprus and score a propaganda point against the Greeks. Before the expiry of the offered amnesty, Lennox-Boyd

Arrest, Deportation and Exile: The Seychelles Interlude † 147 gave a press conference on 26 August 1956 in London, publicising certain extracts from the diary that sought to cast Makarios as an extreme fanatic and the main culprit for the bloodshed in Cyprus.45 Given the cult of personality that permeated British thinking – that is the tendency to think that all the troubles in Cyprus were down to the activities of its Archbishop – the main preoccupation was how to prove the sinister link of Makarios with EOKA and to demonstrate to the world’s public opinion how Machiavellian the Cypriot primate truly was. As a result it was Makarios who suffered most from this discovery because the efforts of British propaganda that drew evidence from Grivas’ diary targeted the Archbishop and not Grivas. For example, a booklet published by the British Government in 1958, ‘The Church and Terrorism in Cyprus’, which contained extracts from the diaries, concluded ‘beyond doubt that Archbishop Makarios was the instigator of that movement [EOKA] and, up to the time of his deportation, the overall controller of its operations’.46 There were even thoughts to bring Makarios to trial based on the evidence provided in the diary but it was dropped after the unequivocal advice of the British Attorney-General that material in the Grivas diary was not admissible evidence.47 News of the diary eventually reached Seychelles when its official bulletin on 27 August 1956 published an article with the title ‘Makarios played leading part in EOKA terrorism’, discussing the revelations of the diary, especially the personal involvement of the Archbishop with EOKA.48 The immediate reaction of the usually cool Makarios was to ask for a cigarette from Papagathangelou in order to calm his nerves.49 Makarios was a chain smoker, even though he was careful not to smoke in public, but during his exile he was persuaded by Papagathangelou to quit smoking. However such was the impact of the news of Grivas’ diary that he felt the need to fall back on this comfort habit. It was a serious blow to Makarios because he was unable to rebut the British accusations and limit the damage caused by these disclosures.50 Soon the increased stress and the gloom which had taken over all four detainees took its physical toll on the Archbishop, who felt keenly his predicament. On 13 September he was hospitalised for observation with the suspicion

148

† Makarios

that he was suffering from a duodenal ulcer.51 In the past few weeks he had complained of stomach ache, a condition exacerbated by anxiety and poor spirits. After a few days and several medical tests he was dismissed, without being diagnosed with any particular condition, which suggests that his discomfort may have been down to psychological stress rather than to something physical.52 Although he was assured of his good health Makarios continued to be ‘in a very contemplative mood’ and kept his own company.53 At about this time Makarios had ‘two animated discussions’ with the Bishop of Kyrenia.54 Unfortunately Le Geyt spoke no Greek to record these conversations, which would provide a second and more detached version from Papagathangelou’s account. These conversations are crucial because they convey vividly the ideological difference between Makarios, as the pragmatic political leader who also had ultimate political responsibility since he was the undisputed Greek Cypriot leader, and his three fellow co-exiles who were the embodiment of a purist stance on the national question. The opposition of the ‘Kyrenia Circle’ to any suspicion of possible deviation from the so-called ‘national line’ has already been discussed, as well as how such criticism unsettled Makarios, because essentially it was undermining his nationalist credentials. This ideological difference between the co-exiles added a further twist to the increasing isolation the Archbishop was feeling because simply he had no one he could confide to. On the two known occasions when he attempted to put across his own ideas the discussion became too heated and tense, so instead of unloading his mind it had the opposite effect. Unsurprisingly he chose to retreat into himself and spent a lot of time lost in deep thought. In fact in September he asked for a tent to use as a retreat – an indication that he wanted to be left alone – and his request was granted when a tent on the hill-side above the Lodge was erected for his private use. The understanding was that no one was to disturb him while he was studying there.55 These two conversations also indicate that Makarios had serious doubts about the EOKA struggle and that he was not happy with the turn of events, preferring to stop the military

Arrest, Deportation and Exile: The Seychelles Interlude † 149 campaign and concentrate on the political struggle. He was beginning to appreciate how violence and military affairs tended to run out of his control and he felt more comfortable to concentrate exclusively on the political aspect of the problem where he enjoyed clear supremacy. This was not inconsistent with his earlier stance when during his negotiations with Harding he had argued at the Ethnarchy Council for acceptance of self-government in order to carry on the struggle for enosis by political means at the putative legislative chamber.56 It also reinforces further the argument made earlier that despite Makarios’ nationalist rhetoric and his classification as an archetypal nationalist leader of an anti-colonial struggle he had a very complicated relationship with violence. Certainly it was not as straightforward as the British thought it was nor as problemfree as it is often assumed in Greek Cypriot narratives of the EOKA struggle. He had many misgivings about the use of violence, but more importantly he was probably the only leader in the Greek Cypriot Right who was pragmatic enough to appreciate the limitations of violence and the need for compromise, or at least to pursue enosis through indirect means rather than the direct approach of ‘enosis or death’. Therefore these discussions also foreshadowed the botched attempt of Makarios to call off the EOKA campaign after his return to Athens in April 1957.57 What exactly was stated during those conversations?58 In the first incident the Archbishop drafted a telegram addressed to Harding that requested a ceasefire from EOKA. Papagathangelou and Ioannides, when asked to approve and sign, refused, forcing Makarios to redraft his telegram which was now accepted unconditionally. However, the Bishop of Kyrenia refused to entertain any thought of ceasefire and spent four hours saying no to every single argument in favour of Makarios’ proposal. In the end the telegram was never sent because Makarios wanted all exiles to sign and approve his initiative. One of his main weaknesses as a political leader was that he relied too much on consensus and when he could not attain it he was inclined to hesitate. Of course this was partly due to the fragile nature of his

150

† Makarios

authority but also down to what Paul Sant Cassia has called ‘village ethic’ that is the ‘deep desire to keep all alternatives open, by a wish not to alienate others irrevocably, even political opponents.’59 The second conversation took place several months later, toward the end of the exile, on 6 March 1957.60 Over breakfast the detainees were discussing the news of the previous night as reported by the Athens Radio.61 The main topic was the demise of Grigoris Afxentiou,62 which prompted Makarios to wonder aloud if he was mistaken not to have insisted on a cessation of EOKA activities during the last September. Given the recent UN resolution which was adopted on February 1957, which called for ‘an atmosphere of peace, and freedom of expression’, he thought that EOKA should have had declared a truce, which potentially could have saved Afxentiou.63 These comments provoked the sharp reaction of Ioannides, who questioned the need for a ceasefire. The Archbishop insisted that shedding more blood was futile and that the people were getting tired of the struggle. Soon the other two exiles weighed in on the discussion, siding with Ioannides, sparking a debate on the merits of realism and sacrifice in a national struggle. Makarios stressed the need for measure and realism arguing that sacrifice by itself, although admirable, was not necessarily going to lead to the desired outcome. The other exiles, with Ioannides as the principal proponent, counter-argued that realism and sacrifice were mutually exclusive terms. It is pertinent to point out that the accounts of Papagathangelou and Ioannides were clearly written to expose Makarios as a ‘compromiser’. In the discourse of enosis the word compromise invariably bore negative connotations and was often used as an accusation. Therefore a supporter of Makarios could argue that such a biased account cannot be accepted prima facie, as it strives to besmirch the reputation of the Archbishop. However, Makarios, being a political animal, was never oblivious to the benefits of compromise and indeed his original aim was an agreement with the British that would eventually bring enosis and not a heroic but ultimately self-defeating struggle, as the EOKA campaign turned out to be. Moreover, the blood sacrifices of the Greek Cypriots

Arrest, Deportation and Exile: The Seychelles Interlude † 151 pained the humanist Archbishop and troubled his conscience as he felt a degree of personal responsibility for the outcome of events. His co-exiles had a more inflexible attitude toward the death tally, an inevitable consequence of a national struggle. For them blood and heroic sacrifice were fundamental aspects of the nationalist ideals they held. Thus we can infer from the accounts cited above that Makarios wanted to suspend the EOKA struggle because he felt violence was getting out of control, even though the actual details will probably forever elude us. This argument can be partially corroborated through British documentation. For example a report of Addis to Lennox-Boyd in July 1956, at about the time when Makarios raised the question whether the resistance of EOKA was morally justified, suggested that there was some disagreement between the Archbishop and his co-exiles over the political situation in Cyprus.64 More solid evidence can be found in the documentation of the visit to the Seychelles of Criton Tornaritis, the former Attorney-General of Cyprus. In the closing months of 1956 Lord Radcliffe, a Law Lord, was commissioned to design a new constitution for Cyprus.65 After its completion Tornaritis along with Radcliffe’s secretary, D. L. Pearson were sent to Mahe´ to submit a copy of the proposed constitution to Makarios, to provide any necessary factual clarifications, and to examine the possibility of the Archbishop endorsing it.66 In the reports of the two men there is ample evidence of the attitude of Makarios that confirms that he was at odds with the other exiles and that he was indeed deeply concerned about the situation in Cyprus, desiring to end violence and bloodshed. Nevertheless despite his private misgivings when presented with the British delegation his first concern was to guard his flank. He could sense that the British were beginning to realise that his endorsement did bear special weight but he was not prepared to squander this advantage by cooperating with the British while he was still detained. It was also important to avoid possible future accusations that he had endorsed a constitution in exchange for his personal freedom. As a result he informed his interlocutors in the presence of his fellow detainees on

152

† Makarios

21 December 1956 that he could not make any comment about the constitution while he was exiled. On Christmas day during a private meeting with Tornaritis the Archbishop ‘volunteered that the Cyprus situation troubled him and grieved him above any other person and if opportunity were given he would use all his influence to end it’.67 This clearly echoed the sentiments he had expressed in his discussions with the other Cypriots. Yet he would not make such a move while in Seychelles because he was afraid his people would ‘think it the result of undue influence whilst under detention’. As usual his chief preoccupation was with Greek Cypriot opinion, but such an initiative was bound to cause some opposition. Therefore it was to his interest to appear to be making such an appeal from a position of strength rather than from the weak position of exile; otherwise he risked his fragile authority. There was also a degree of personal pride; he could not make such a conciliatory move before his dignity and freedom was restored. Ironically the views of Makarios, which were genuine, were greeted with disbelief by British authorities, and especially Harding, who wanted the Archbishop to elaborate on his plan of containing violence. The Field Marshal was suspicious that Makarios was merely trying to secure concessions in return for vague assurances. The experience of their negotiations had left Harding bitter and in the grip of perennial suspicion of any proposal by Makarios.68 Nevertheless, one more meeting was arranged, after instructions from Lennox-Boyd and Harding authorising Tornaritis and Pearson to examine the possibility of Makarios supporting the constitution and to ask him to expand on his plan to stop violence in Cyprus. It is important to note that this meeting took place in the absence of the other detainees on British initiative because it was felt that the presence of the other detainees could adversely influence Makarios. This last meeting produced no substantial agreement because the Archbishop refused to ‘make a pacifying move while detained’ and he adamantly declined to comment on the constitution. But in his final statement he clearly indicated his desire to stop hostilities:

Arrest, Deportation and Exile: The Seychelles Interlude † 153 In any event I genuinely desire, irrespective of any settlement of the political question, to see Cyprus return to peace, and I sincerely believe that my return to, and presence in, Cyprus would constitute the main factor for the success of the restitution of peace in Cyprus. The way in which peace should be restored, as stated in another conversation of ours, I would like to be left to me.69

Evidently there was a definite ideological split between Makarios and the other detainees over the issue of violence and the general direction of the struggle. He was concerned that the situation was getting out of control and that violence was not longer beneficial in the pursuit of the political objective of enosis. Tornaritis in his conclusions commented on this division and informed LennoxBoyd that the Archbishop ‘genuinely desire[d] to make some pacifying move at an early date’.70 These conclusions were in accord with the accounts of Papagathangelou and Ioannides discussed above and more importantly foreshadowed the attempt of Makarios to terminate the EOKA struggle when he returned to Athens in April 1957. It is also important to note that his conciliatory attitude on violence made it easier for the British Government to decide to release him, even though it was hoped that a clear condemnation of violence would be elucidated. By March 1957 the confluence of international developments were particularly conducive for a relaxation of the emergency state in Cyprus. The Karamanlis government after the shock of deportation had embarked on a diplomatic offensive to secure the release of Makarios, because he was the only person with enough authority to negotiate and accept a settlement. This Greek initiative by spring 1957 was slowly bearing fruit. The focus of Greek diplomacy was the UN forum where the Cyprus issue was discussed one more time. The opportunity of the compromise resolution 1013(XI) which had called for the resumption of negotiations was seized by the Athens government to apply more pressure on Britain. Through its Consulate General in Nicosia, which served as an intelligence link between Grivas and the Greek Government, it instructed the leader of EOKA to offer a new truce

154

† Makarios

in order to facilitate the termination of the deportation.71 On 14 March 1957 Grivas declared that he was ‘ready to order the suspension’ of his operations ‘if the Ethnarch Makarios was to be released’.72 Britain had already come under criticism for rejecting so bluntly the first EOKA ceasefire and this second offer could not be dismissed as readily. Moreover the Karamanlis government was successful in bringing to bear US influence on Britain on this particular issue. One day after the EOKA truce Karamanlis sent a private message to President Eisenhower stressing the fact that the release of Makarios would be instrumental in finding a solution to the vexing problem of Cyprus.73 A few days later Eisenhower discussed the issue with the new British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan at the summit Bermuda Conference.74 The Suez crisis which had unfolded in the closing months of 1956 had claimed the premiership of Anthony Eden. The decision of Britain to regain the Suez Canal with the help of France and Israel, which had been nationalised by Nasser during the summer of 1956, was met with stiff US resistance. The Eisenhower administration was not informed of this decision and did not approve British plans. For this reason the USA applied pressure on Britain to withdraw from Suez in order to avoid an escalation of the conflict which potentially could embroil the Soviet Union as well. As a result of this humiliating climb-down Anthony Eden was forced to resign as prime minister of Britain and was replaced by his foreign secretary Harold Macmillan. It is important to note that Eden, who was obsessed with appearing firm in Middle East, was the one who ordered the deportation of Makarios. Macmillan was not necessarily more conciliatory over Cyprus, but had no qualms to do what he thought was necessary and for this reason decided to release Makarios in the hope that it would earn him some political credit. Thus the British Government was already contemplating such a move for a variety of reasons but Eisenhower’s input provided an extra incentive. Continuation of the exile was an embarrassment and attracted untoward criticism. Tellingly, Macmillan’s explanation was that ‘we let the Archbishop out not because we like him but because we are sick of him’.75 Moreover it was clear

Arrest, Deportation and Exile: The Seychelles Interlude † 155 that the Cyprus problem had reached such an impasse that a gesture of good will was needed in order to break the deadlock or at least convey the impression of some progress. Finally the new British Government was on the cusp of a strategic reorientation vis-a`-vis its attitude to Cyprus, pondering a shift from the traditional argument that British presence had to carry on indefinitely. 1957 was the year when the doctrine ‘Cyprus as a base’, which automatically excluded Cypriot self-determination, changed to ‘bases in Cyprus’ which allowed Britain greater freedom of action regarding the ultimate future of the island.76 Lennox-Boyd announced in the House of Commons on 20 March that if Makarios was to denounce violence and terrorism, he would be released.77 The next day Addis in a private interview with the Archbishop handed him an official letter from the British Government that asked him to condemn violence in Cyprus. Makarios professed that he was ready to ‘to make a categoric appeal to the people of Cyprus to renounce violence’ but he also stressed the fact that his statement was a voluntary gesture and not an attempt to buy his freedom.78 The next 24 hours were particularly stressful for the Cypriot primate, as he agonised over the exact wording of his reply. He was clearly uncomfortable about the fact that he had to make such an important decision without any input from the different Greek Cypriot factions.79 The reply handed on 22 March did not go as far as the British had hoped for, because its appeal to EOKA to ‘declare a cessation of all operations’ was made conditional on the abolition of the emergency by the Cyprus Government. There was one last-ditch effort by Addis to convince him to make a more unequivocal statement on the termination of violence but Makarios refused to budge.80 Since the decision to release the four detainees did not hinge entirely on the wording of the message – British authorities were already seriously contemplating such a move – in the end the message was deemed to be adequate enough to justify his release. On the morning of 28 March, Philip Harris, Acting Secretary to the Government of the Seychelles, and Trevor Williams, Deputy District Secretary, announced to the four detainees that they were free to leave the Seychelles and go anywhere they

156

† Makarios

pleased, save Cyprus. All restrictions of communication and censorship were lifted. They only left the island on 6 April because there was no immediately available ship; the State of Bombay which was originally scheduled to carry them had no available space. In the end Aristotle Onassis, the Greek tycoon, diverted one of his tankers, the Olympic Thunder, to collect the four Cypriots and carry them to Madagascar, from where they could continue their journey by air. From the activities of Makarios in the last days of his exile, which were also his happiest, his graciousness really stands out. Despite the exile and the personal grief he felt no resentment and bore no grudges. His comment to Stanley Jones, his English instructor who had stopped giving him lessons after the disclosures of Grivas diaries, was striking: ‘My dear Mr Jones, you should never mix politics with persons’.81 The contrast with the British authorities which were striving to ‘personalise’ the Cyprus problem could not have been starker. As a parting gift to his place of exile he offered to donate £1000 toward a Permanent Scholarship Fund to assist local students to acquire secondary education. This particular move was detested by both Harding and Lennox-Boyd; the Field Marshal thought it was a ‘nauseating’ and ‘patronising attempt’ to divert attention from his involvement with EOKA.82 However it was evident that this move could not really be resisted and in the end the wiser council of letting things take their course prevailed.83 Of the receptions the four deportees held to say their goodbyes the party for the servants conveyed clearly that they harboured no hard feelings. All servants past and present including their families were impeccably hosted by the four Cypriots in a final act of thanksgiving. By the end of the party 3000 rupees were given as gratuities to the serving staff. Makarios also donated 300 rupees to the Seychelles Hospital Samaritan Fund where he had been treated. Finally he gave gifts to the Le Geyt couple to express his gratitude for ‘the courteous way’ in which they had taken care of him.84 It was such personal gestures that enabled Makarios to win the hearts of men and accounted for his charm. There was warmth and kindness about the private Makarios which few people could

Arrest, Deportation and Exile: The Seychelles Interlude † 157 resist that was always in the shadow either of his heroic portrayal by his supporters or the rabid accusations of his detractors. The exile was the price Makarios had to pay for his involvement in the EOKA struggle and his failure to reach an agreement with Harding. Paradoxically his removal from Cypriot politics had the opposite effect the British Government had hoped for. The collective refusal of Greek Cypriots to cooperate with the Cyprus Government while the Archbishop was detained, in conjunction with negative international opinion on the heavy-handedness of deportation, proved in practical terms that Makarios could not be wished away. Nevertheless during his exile he was forced into reflection on the unfolding of the struggle, its rising stakes and the dangers it now faced. His personal responsibility for the unfavourable development of the struggle, his removal from Cypriot politics at a time when his presence was needed most and the most vexing question of all: had violence served its purpose and was a compromise the only viable exit strategy? Despite the abrasive debates with his co-exiles, who insisted that both sacrifice and violence were necessary ingredients in any national struggle, Makarios was adamant that they had to be rationally appraised. In this respect he had a rather cool and rational understanding of the limits of armed violence in the pursuit of political means, which was at odds with the millenarian aspect of the enosis movement he was leading. Although he was a firm believer in enosis, he followed a realistic strategy which brought him into conflict with the purists, who believed that any form of compromise was dangerous and unacceptable. Makarios, who was already unhappy with the course of events and wary of the fact that violence had proved to be a double-edged sword, resolved that once he was given the opportunity he would have to stop the military aspect of the struggle. He arrived at this conclusion after painful introspection and plenty of soul searching which preoccupied his long hours of solitude in Mahe´. His conversations with his co-exiles and his discussions with Tornaritis conveyed his frame of mind on this issue unambiguously. However, there was a great disparity between a decision that

158

† Makarios

was reached during cool contemplation while stranded in the middle of the Indian Ocean and the reality of implementing it once his freedom was restored. Instead he was to discover that events were running out of control and emotions continued to run high. Despite his desire for a compromise the British were no longer interested in speaking to him and Grivas was anything but the model Clausewitzian soldier, who obeyed his political superiors without any objections. How he would deal with the problem of ending the struggle and his renewed efforts of securing a solution will be discussed in the next chapter.

7

The Unravelling of the Enosis Campaign In the previous chapter we saw that Makarios resolved to persist with his strategy of reaching a compromise agreement with the British Government and to bring under control the violence of EOKA. The latter would serve a double purpose: to help facilitate fresh negotiations with the British Government, which he assumed would eventually lead to self-determination, and in order to stop what he thought was excessive bloodshed that no longer served its original political purpose. His underlying assumption was that the British, having seen the folly of trying to alienate him, would be now willing to make the necessary concessions to secure an agreement. However, this could not be further from the truth. In fact the political parameters of the Cyprus problem had changed so much during his exile and continued to change that a solution of enosis was no longer feasible. The period after his release until the summer crisis of 1958, triggered by the Macmillan plan, was dominated by a litany of reverses, complications and pitfalls which slowly drove the point home: Makarios was relegated to a position of secondary importance but more critically, the demand for enosis was becoming untenable. This chapter will argue that Makarios, faced with four basic factors which eroded his position, was eventually forced to accept the new strategic realities and by extension acknowledge that enosis was no longer feasible. Firstly, the British had no desire to talk to him and were in fact determined to deny him any special status. Instead Britain was more preoccupied with securing Turkish support for its Cyprus

160

† Makarios

policy. Secondly, his plan to stop hostilities faltered in the absence of any actual progress, while his grip on Greek Cypriot affairs was weakened on account of Grivas’ tendency to assume initiatives that Makarios did not endorse. Thirdly, the prolonged political deadlock made it clear that international opinion was no longer receptive to an enosis solution and that Greece was too weak to promote it anyway. Fourthly, the Turkish Cypriots during this period under the auspices of the Turkish Government launched their own campaign for partitioning Cyprus, destabilising further the situation on the island but also undermining further the demand for enosis. The transition from the point of unfounded optimism, that the negotiations with the British would continue from where they were interrupted, to the point of accepting that enosis was not feasible, was crucial in paving the way to his eventual agreement to the solution of independence. * * * On 17 April 1957, after a brief detour in Madagascar and Kenya, Makarios arrived finally in Athens by plane. The formalities of his welcome in Athens roughly coincided with the Easter celebrations, as 21 April was the Orthodox Easter. News of the impending arrival of the Archbishop was one of the few occasions, since the Cyprus issue had attracted the headlines of the Athenian press back in 1954, that had a positive impact on the general public. One more time the charismatic Cypriot acted as a catalyst for a general wave of euphoria and optimism in the Helladic public. As a result Athenians came out in droves to welcome the man who had become the personification of enosis and the person who had defied the British Empire. According to The Times the fanfare put up by the Athenian public was ‘one of the most impressive welcomes ever accorded’ to any person, churchman, sovereign or statesman.1 The Archbishop was received with military honours by the Archbishop of Athens, Greek officials and the Ethnarchy, while more than 200 foreign correspondents shadowed his every move. Premier Karamanlis was conspicuously absent from the welcoming ceremonies even though he did send an official representative of

The Unravelling of the Enosis Campaign † 161 the Greek Government.2 The motorised procession that transported him to the city centre, which had been festooned with Greek flags, posters and portraits of the Archbishop in full regalia since the early morning, had to stop en route several times as all the suburban mayors wanted to greet and address him. At Hadrian’s Arch, which marks the entry to ancient Athens, the mayor of Athens officially welcomed him to the city. Finally the procession stopped at Constitution Square where he addressed the crowds from the balcony of the hotel ‘Grand Bretagne’. The adoring crowd desperate to catch a glimpse of Makarios climbed on trees and lamp-posts and eventually broke the security cordon of the police when he appeared on the balcony to give an emotional speech.3 The word enosis was conspicuously absent from his speech, a small hint suggesting that Makarios viewed the current woes of Cyprus more pragmatically than his fiery rhetoric suggested.4 Yet in that particular moment this subtle signal of the difficulties that lay ahead was lost on the majority of the cheering crowds. Despite this small doubt, both the universal adoration he received in Athens and the enthusiastic celebrations in Cyprus that marked the announcement of his release from exile were certainly a high point in the political career of Makarios. The young boy from Panayia, who had joined the monastic order because his father could not afford his secondary education, had come a long way to become a pan-Hellenic symbol of national pride and a leader of men. Makarios theoretically could still preside over enosis that would end successfully the Cyprus saga and enshrine his name in the pantheon of Greek heroes. However appearances were deceptive, because both Makarios and the Greek Government knew privately that the Cyprus issue was on a dead end and some serious strategic reorientation was needed to rescue the possibility of enosis in the unspecified future. Although Makarios was ready to resume talks with the British Government, the latter had resolved to isolate him. This was down to two reasons. Turkish support to British plans in Cyprus had become so important that Britain felt it could not afford to isolate Turkey. By re-entering into talks with the Archbishop it would provoke Turkey’s reaction, which had already expressed its

162

† Makarios

reservations regarding the release of Makarios.5 For this reason resuming discussions with the Archbishop was ruled out in order to avoid alienating Turkey. The second factor contributing to this decision was the strong dislike for Makarios which continued to run through the British Government. The idea of holding the Archbishop responsible for the troubles in Cyprus was too seductive to be relinquished even after his release. In fact Macmillan’s reasoning, ‘we let the Archbishop out not because we like him but because we are sick of him’,6 set the blueprint of how he was to be handled after his release. If exile had failed to break him, it was hoped that a long sojourn in Athens would succeed. British refusal to recognise him as ‘the sole participant’ in any talks and the intention to deny him ‘any status on the international aspect’ were consequent of the decision to sideline the Archbishop.7 For the same reason his return to Cyprus – where he could contribute to the pacification of the island – was explicitly forbidden. His natural position was in Cyprus and the British in preventing him from accessing his base of power were effectively trying to cut him down to size. Harding went as far as to suggest a complete political counter-offensive against Makarios but it was resolved that such a move could have the opposite effect.8 Nevertheless there was agreement in the upper echelons of the Foreign Office that the Archbishop in principle had to be deflated.9 The British attitude was a serious setback because it firmly slammed the door on the solution of enosis. Makarios was now more than ever eager to talk but he had no one to talk to. Instead the British Government was determined to let his actions and speeches fade ‘unanswered into space’.10 This subtle campaign of discrediting was more insidious than his deportation because Makarios was now brought into contact with the consequences of the prolonged struggle but with little leverage on the actual events. He was in the unenviable position of bearing responsibility for the turn of events in Cyprus but wielding very little power to influence the course of events. In this sense the British Government was more successful in ‘breaking’ Makarios but by alienating him they were also alienating the Greek Cypriots. The price for this obsession was the stubborn

The Unravelling of the Enosis Campaign † 163 refusal of the Greek Cypriots to cooperate with any British plan and the continuation of the impasse. By the end of May 1957 Makarios indicated privately to the British Government that he was ready to travel to London for discussions, provided self-determination was granted without a fixed date. This was in sharp contrast with his earlier public announcements. Prior to his arrival in Athens he accused the British Government of intransigence. He insisted that the Turkish Cypriots ought to be satisfied with minority rights, avoided commenting on the Radcliffe plan and expressed caution regarding the possibility of a NATO initiative to find a solution to the problem. Finally he reiterated that the ‘Cypriot people’ was determined to achieve its ‘freedom’.11 The dichotomy between his public rhetoric and his private thoughts has been discussed before and there was nothing new in Makarios striking a defiant note in public. Up to a point this was expected of him. Nevertheless he was aware that he had to be more conciliatory to grab British attention. If there was agreement on the issue of self-determination he was willing ‘to negotiate interim period on basis of Radcliffe proposals’ without excluding NATO involvement for defence purposes.12 Makarios felt he was making serious concessions, especially compared to the hard line he had maintained in public but the British Government was determined to ignore him. Lennox-Boyd’s response was that he had no ‘wish to encourage [Makarios] to believe that he can come here expecting to negotiate on his own, and put us on the defensive by inventing new sets of conditions’. Moreover acceptance of such proposal ‘would be fatal to an attempt to get Turkish’ agreement for the Radcliffe constitution.13 A few days later on 28 May Makarios followed up his initiative by submitting a message for Macmillan at the British embassy in Athens. The tone and language of the letter were somewhat awkward. It drew attention to UN resolution 1013 and requested the termination of the state of emergency in Cyprus and the resumption of bilateral discussions ‘on the basis of the application of self-determination’.14 There was not a word about Turkey or the Turkish Cypriots or any indication that Makarios actually appreciated how the issue was no longer merely

164

† Makarios

a straightforward colonial issue. Predictably the British response was entirely negative. It shifted the blame back to the Archbishop for the continuation of the emergency and rejected the prospect of exclusive bilateral talks between Makarios and the British Government because ‘other and wider interests have a right to be consulted’. As for the application of self-determination LennoxBoyd’s declaration of 19 December 1956 remained in force.15 The rejection of Makarios’ advances for renewed negotiations was consistent with the British policy of sidelining him and not to accord him ‘any status on the international aspect’. The British reply intentionally was not addressed to Makarios but to Zenon Rossides, the Ethnarchy member who had previously submitted the letter, a clear indication that the Archbishop no longer merited any special attention. Instead he had to be deflated by refusing to acknowledge him as an important factor, especially since Turkey had become the chief British preoccupation in the Cyprus problem. British refusal to confer with Makarios weakened his position substantially and dispelled the aura of invisibility his triumphant return had bestowed upon him. It meant that he had no other option but to antagonise the British Government by bringing to bear international pressure on it. This was a tough proposition because it meant he would have to rely on Greek support. The Greek Government was reluctant to go to the lengths Makarios wished but was also too weak to exert effective pressure on Britain as past experience had demonstrated. In addition it complicated his task of bringing EOKA violence under control. In the absence of solid concessions from the British, Makarios was not in a position to assert the end of the military struggle. On the contrary he had to endure the continuation of hostilities which gave Grivas ample scope to undermine Makarios’ authority on issues that went beyond the military sphere. Makarios and Grivas Disagree Over Strategy The second factor undermining the position of Makarios was his inability to impress on Grivas the fact that violence had served its purpose. On the contrary the disagreement of the two men over

The Unravelling of the Enosis Campaign † 165 matters of strategy compounded the situation further. Makarios’ political position was weakened and he was forced to accept the continuation of hostilities with all their negative consequences which he was so desperate to avoid. As soon as the excitement of the arrival of Makarios subsided, he attended a series of confidential meetings with Karamanlis, his chief advisers and the Ethnarchy members who had flown from Cyprus. The chief objective was to review the progress of the Cyprus issue and take stock of the latest developments. The view of the Greek Government was that the situation required the termination of the EOKA struggle. Given its weakness to secure Cypriot self-determination, the Greek Government wanted to change its Cyprus policy and seek a compromise agreement, either of self-government or even independence which would leave the door open for enosis in the future. Already the Greek Government had taken measures reflecting a more realistic approach toward the Cyprus problem. Back in July of 1956, Angelos Vlachos was posted to the Consulate General in Nicosia. His quality of straight-talking and ability to impress on the Greek Cypriots the need for a more pragmatic approach to the Cyprus problem was deemed crucial.16 Karamanlis strongly felt that the populism associated with the Cyprus issue had to be reined in because it was divisive and complicated further the search for a solution as unrealistic demands were put forward. For this reason he wanted someone who could handle the issue in a sober manner. Soon after the release of Makarios, Georgios Seferiadis (the real name of Georgios Seferis, the famous poet-diplomat), a well-known anglophile, was appointed ambassador in London to fill the post that had been vacated after the deportations in March 1956, in order to mend Greco-British relations. A month later Georgios Pesmazoglou, an old friend of Kemal Atatu¨rk, was appointed to the Greek embassy in Ankara, with the task of nursing GrecoTurkish friendship and explore the possibility of reaching an understanding with Turkey over independence.17 Makarios, who had always been ambivalent about the use of violence and was certainly unhappy with the protracted struggle, viewed sympathetically this reorientation of the Greek foreign policy.

166

† Makarios

The political realities during the absence of Makarios had changed considerably and there were serious factors that called for a change of tactics in order to preserve the possibility of enosis. Greek foreign policy was unable to promote Cypriot selfdetermination effectively. The UN chamber at best yielded limited success. UN General Assembly Resolution 1013(XI), although it was important in securing the release of Makarios, made for ambiguous reading, allowing the interested parties to interpret it according to their own agendas. Nor could any UN GA resolution be a substitute for an actual settlement which itself required an understanding with Britain and Turkey. The continued Cypriot crisis brought Greece in conflict with its NATO allies, a situation that was in contrast with its fundamental Cold War strategy. The foremost priority of Greece was to safeguard its territorial integrity against the Communist regimes north of its border and NATO membership was an irreducible element of this strategy. Additionally deteriorating relations with Turkey were a cause of concern because of fears that the attacks on the Greek community in Istanbul would be renewed.18 On balance the handling of the Cyprus issue was a burden for Greece, which jeopardised its wider national interests, and there was a need for a climb-down to arrest further negative developments. Continuation of the EOKA struggle affected adversely intercommunal relations in Cyprus. The actual outbreak of violence had polarised the two communities into rival groups locked in a struggle for supremacy. Although the Turkish Cypriot counter-campaign to enosis was yet to culminate, there were signs of growing tension and simmering resentment. Despite the assurances of EOKA that it was not targeting the Turkish Cypriots, the aim itself of enosis was heartily opposed by the overwhelming majority of Turkish Cypriots because of fear of assimilation or even extinction.19 The Cretan syndrome, that is, the fear that Greek rule would lead to their subjugation, forced migration and extinction cast a long shadow in Turkish Cypriot politics and deeply influenced their perception of the EOKA struggle. Therefore it was only natural for them to side with the Cyprus Government, because they perceived the continuation of

The Unravelling of the Enosis Campaign † 167 British rule as a guarantee for their continued prosperity. Moreover they felt aggrieved about the cavalier Greek Cypriot attitude regarding their reservations on the question of enosis, resulting in rising intercommunal tensions which became conducive to spontaneous outbreaks of violence. For example, at the end of March 1956, 15 Turkish Cypriots and two Greek Cypriots were injured, after an intercommunal incident at the village of Vasilia, which was triggered when a Turkish Cypriot boy reported a Greek Cypriot youth for stoning British army vehicles. This incident sparked off disturbances in Nicosia where both Greek and Turkish properties were damaged.20 As the campaign of EOKA intensified, the Turkish Cypriots increasingly were being embroiled in the struggle between Security Forces and the Greek Cypriot population. Primarily this was down to the employment pattern in the Police Force in response to the growing needs of the Emergency. One of the first aims of EOKA was to neutralise the presence of Greek Cypriots in the Police Force and this was achieved through intimidation and assassination by the summer of 1955. This forced the Cyprus Government to turn to Turkish Cypriots to make up for the massive exodus of Greek Cypriots from the Police Force.21 As a result Turkish Cypriot police men found themselves at the receiving end of EOKA’s violence, which in turn provoked Turkish Cypriot reaction since the latter were psychologically disposed to view EOKA as a threat to their welfare. The brewing confrontation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots – up to this point all intercommunal incidents were spontaneous, incidental ramifications of the EOKA campaign – was an important factor in the Cyprus imbroglio that could not be ignored. By the end of 1957 the Turkish Cypriots with help from Turkey organised themselves to carry out their own countercampaign for partition. Protracted fighting between Greek and Turkish Cypriots could make British position in Cyprus unpalatable eventually facilitating the decision to abandon the island and partition it. In light of the statement of Lennox-Boyd acknowledging that partition could be a possible outcome for Cyprus all intercommunal incidents acquired a more sinister

168

† Makarios

aspect because they had the potential to act as the harbinger of partition. In addition such intercommunal incidents sent a clear message to the Greek Cypriots that the Turkish Cypriots could no longer be ignored. Ironically just as the Greek Cypriots had resorted to violence to back up their claim for enosis and gain the attention of their British overlords, the Turkish Cypriots were finding themselves in a similar case of having to resort to violence themselves in order to force their Greek Cypriots compatriots to heed their own cri de coeur. It is not clear what Makarios made of the Turkish Cypriot factor, because publicly at least he was always down playing their anxieties as well as their importance, but certainly the Greek Government drew Makarios’ attention to the growing resentment of the Turkish Cypriots. Irrespective of Makarios’ feelings the growing assertiveness of the Turkish Cypriots was a reason for concern because it added to the complexity of the problem. The most important cause for concern was the statement Lennox-Boyd made in the House of Commons on 19 December 1956 when he unveiled the Radcliffe Constitution. The Radcliffe Constitution was the main British initiative in the second half of 1956, for which the British Government had even attempted to secure the approval of Makarios while he was in exile. The proposed constitution was rejected both by the Greek Cypriots and the Greek Government. Primarily because Makarios was still in exile and as a matter of principle they refused to collaborate with the British while the Archbishop was exiled, even though the Greek Government cited the illiberal form of the constitution as the official reason for its rejection.22 The accusation that the plan was illiberal might have been a bit too harsh, especially since the Radcliffe constitution provided for a clear Greek Cypriot majority in the Legislative Assembly and rejected the Turkish Cypriot demands for equal representation in administration. In fact there was provision for only one minister for Turkish affairs. Nonetheless, the Governor retained extensive reserve powers which were viewed with suspicion by the Greek Government, hence its argument that the constitution was in fact undemocratic and illiberal.

The Unravelling of the Enosis Campaign † 169 The actual merits and defects of the plan became rather moot with the accompanying statement of Lennox-Boyd, who after presenting the constitution announced that a review of the status of Cyprus will be possible ‘when the international and strategic situation permits, and provided that self-government is working satisfactorily’. He then proceeded to introduce the concept of double self-determination as a final settlement for Cyprus: When the time comes for this review, that is, when these conditions have been fulfilled, it will be the purpose of Her Majesty’s Government to ensure that any exercise of selfdetermination should be effected in such a manner that the Turkish Cypriot community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community, shall, in the special circumstances of Cyprus, be given freedom to decide for themselves their future status. In other words, Her Majesty’s Government recognise that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options.23

This statement was the result of British policymakers’ plan to carry with them both Greece and Turkey and earn their approval for this new initiative. This balancing act could only be achieved by promising self-determination to the Greeks and partition to the Turks, who insisted that self-determination of Cyprus was unacceptable.24 It was the first time that partition was publicly mentioned as a possible outcome for the Cyprus problem and, ever since, the spectre of partition has been haunting all attempts of solving the problem to the present day. More importantly it marked an important milestone toward the unravelling of the enosis campaign. From this point onwards the pursuit of enosis using paramilitary violence was outflanked by far more explicit and pressing dangers. If the British found their position untenable they could simply partition the island and leave. This called for a change of tactics and a change to a more conciliatory attitude that would circumvent the danger of partition. When Makarios was informed of the British intention to grant self-determination to the Turkish Cypriots as well he responded:

170

† Makarios

‘I will write to Grivas. I believe that the struggle has contributed its maximum. From now on it does not add anything. Probably it deducts. If he agrees, we will have to stop, and start negotiations from the point they were interrupted before my exile’.25 Makarios was too optimistic to think that the negotiations could continue from where they were interrupted; the British had no such intention, as he was soon to find out. Nevertheless the fear of partition, however distant it appeared in the spring of 1957, forced Makarios to accept the advice of the Greek Government that a change of policy was needed lest the pursuit of enosis would prove self-consuming. According to the existing accounts – unfortunately no available official records have been traced relating to this crucial event and its reconstruction must draw from memoirs – Makarios indicated that he agreed with the analysis of Seferiades, Vlachos and Averoff, the key participants in the consultations. Averoff noted that the ‘Archbishop accepted Vlachos’ view without reservation and agreed that EOKA operations must stop’.26 Vlachos in his own version of events claims that Makarios after being advised on the merits of ending the struggle responded that he agreed entirely but Grivas had to take the share of his responsibilities.27 Such an interpretation, that the Archbishop was contemplating an end to the struggle, is likely to prove controversial and become the subject of criticism both from the supporters and the detractors of Makarios. For the former because it can be perceived as an attack to ‘diminish’ his nationalist credentials which goes against the discourse of the indomitable leader in the face of implacable odds. For example, the editor of the ‘Collected texts of archbishop of Cyprus Makarios III’ (Άpanta Arxi1piskόpoy Makarίoy G’) argues that the Archbishop was pressured by the Greek Government into this initiative.28 The complex love-hate relationship between Greek Cypriots and mainland Greeks merits a separate study on its own. For our purposes it suffices to say that traditionally in Greek Cypriot accounts the Karamanlis administration has been portrayed as ‘weak’ with a tendency for ‘compromise’. As a result Karamanlis is commonly cast by Greek Cypriots as the scapegoat for their ill fortunes. Whereas, for the critics of the Archbishop, the mere thought that he was

The Unravelling of the Enosis Campaign † 171 contemplating the termination of the struggle is another ‘proof’ that Makarios had sold out the vision of enosis, an event that foreshadows the ‘betrayal of Zurich’ and his consent to the establishment of an independent Cyprus. Nevertheless the interpretation that Makarios was seriously contemplating an end to the EOKA struggle is backed by substantial evidence and is consistent with his political astuteness and alertness to the dangers of violence. Therefore it is not unreasonable to infer that the Archbishop either was convinced or had even independently arrived at the conclusion, that a termination of the campaign was becoming a pressing necessity. The crux of the matter was how Makarios would handle this delicate decision and more importantly how Grivas would respond to a command to stop his operations. Already the latter had reacted angrily to a message by Averoff sent on 5 April 1957, which informed him that the Greek Government would have no objection to a declaration of ‘cessation of operations on the day of Makarios’ arrival’.29 This message was a response to an earlier message of Grivas in which he had indicated his willingness to ‘comply with any recommendations made to [him] by Isaakios [pseudonym of Averoff] concerning the cessation of the struggle’.30 Evidently the Greek Government desired the end of violence but was too timid to ask Grivas directly and instead preferred to tip-toe around the topic which had the potential to topple it from power. Makarios was also inclined toward this course of action but was also hesitating. At this junction everybody was too concerned with making sure that the responsibility for terminating the struggle could be shuffled onto somebody else. The Greek Government wanted Makarios to take this responsibility, whereas he was too afraid to ask such a thing of Grivas. In his vague and guarded letter to Grivas, Makarios after praising the exertions of EOKA raised cautiously the possibility of a final ceasefire.31 In other words he wanted to pass some of the responsibility to Grivas as well, but the latter was not impressed. His rambling response, ranging from the fear of AKEL and the possibility of communism prevailing in Cyprus to the ‘submissive’ attitude of Greece, essentially rejected the

172

† Makarios

termination of the struggle.32 Makarios, when faced with the opposition of Grivas, lost his nerve and changed his mind, opting for a fudged compromise. On 14 May 1957, Makarios wrote to Grivas informing him that they were in agreement. The struggle had to go on but the suspension of hostilities had to continue.33 This raises the question whether, if both the Greek Government and Makarios were in agreement and asked Grivas to terminate the struggle, would he have obeyed? One can only speculate what the response of Grivas would have been, but it is evident that both the Greek Government and Makarios were preoccupied with guarding their respective flanks. As a result they hedged their bets and balked from taking such an ambitious initiative. Although Makarios preferred the end of the armed struggle, was unable to argue his case with conviction for two reasons. Firstly, he knew that he could not end the struggle empty-handed, even though he was hoping that ending the hostilities could pave the way to a solution. His position was too weak to allow such a dramatic move. More importantly he found himself in an awkward position on account of his dual role as a religious and political leader. First and foremost he was the Ethnarch, which meant that, despite his pragmatic streak, he could not view the enosis question with an entirely rational lens. Had he been a secular leader, by definition wedded to the idea that politics is the art of the possible, it would have been easier for him to admit that the armed struggle was a mistake which had to be ended. But he was Archbishop Makarios, the political leader of Greek Cypriots by virtue of his spiritual authority. He was too self-conscious of the enosis tradition associated with his religious office – that it was Cyprus’ manifest destiny to be united with Greece – to begin handling the Cyprus problem as just another political question to be solved with a rational approach. There were certain expectations that derived from his office but also from the irredentist, with spiritual undertones, enosis ideology to which he subscribed fully which he could not simply ignore despite his worldly astuteness. If that was the case he could have accepted the Harding proposals and he would not have agonised on how to broach this delicate subject with Grivas.

The Unravelling of the Enosis Campaign † 173 In retrospect one has to wonder whether the failure to end the struggle during the spring of 1957 was a mistake of Makarios. The deadlock in Cyprus continued and the crisis was to deepen even further before light could start flickering at the end of the tunnel. Certainly the political climate in Cyprus and Greece was not conducive for such a bold move without any tangible returns, which explains the reluctance of Makarios to persist with this course of action. In addition Grivas had become a national hero himself and he could cause all sorts of problems since he was not likely to consent to the end of the struggle. This raises the question of what if Grivas had been more docile? Could this have made it easier for Makarios to end the struggle? In theory, the final say rested with Makarios, the political leader of the struggle. But the headstrong personality of Grivas and his tendency to take initiatives which were not necessarily in agreement with the Archbishop undermined the latter’s authority and added an unnecessary level of complexity to the handling of the struggle. As a result the relations of the two men were never as harmonious as the British had suggested when they discovered Grivas’ diaries. At no point was Grivas simply a yesman and the Archbishop had virtually no control over the military campaign – something which added to his uneasiness about the continuation of the hostilities. Examples of how Grivas’ initiatives went against the wishes of Makarios and undermined his authority as the political leader were the campaign against AKEL and the passive resistance plan. The communist party from the beginning denounced the paramilitary action of EOKA as ‘irresponsible’ but later in March 1957 revised its position vis-a`-vis EOKA conceding that it had underestimated the strength of the movement but maintained its opposition to the use of violence.34 Despite this qualification relations between the two factions remained brittle at best. One reason for EOKA targeting AKEL members was the fear that since the communist party remained a disciplined and organised body there was the possibility to usurp the peace that the EOKA exertions had won. On 12 June 1957, Grivas warned Makarios that ‘we will win the armed struggle and lose in the political

174

† Makarios

sphere’ to AKEL.35 On the other hand the Right still lacked an organised political party that could match AKEL. For this reason Grivas was toying with the idea of setting up a party to rival the ‘impeccably’ organised Left.36 A British report noted that since the release of communist leaders from detention ‘there have been signs of increasing strength of the organisation in the Left Wing [sic] in Cyprus, and political thinking independent of the Nationalists’.37 In addition in August 1957 the communist mayor of Famagusta visited Makarios in Athens for discussions, a sign that AKEL was reclaiming its position in Cypriot politics.38 This nascent confidence of AKEL troubled Grivas, whose experience during the Greek Civil War taught him to hate and fear communism in equal measures. It was his fear that AKEL would dominate Cypriot politics that drove his anti-communist campaign. From August 1957 onwards EOKA orchestrated a series of beatings of various AKEL members in different villages. This campaign climaxed in January 1958 when two members of PEO were murdered and two more injured, while clashes between Right and Left took place at Akhna and Pighi villages. PEO telegraphed Makarios to warn him about the possibility of a civil war and called for a 48-hour strike.39 Makarios tried to curb Grivas initially through a public appeal calling for ‘complete harmony’ to prevail among the ‘Greek Cypriot People’.40 A few days later, on 30 January 1958, he wrote to Grivas and tried to impress upon him the danger of civil strife if the attacks on AKEL continued.41 Nevertheless Grivas was unrepentant, claiming that AKEL was arming itself and preparing to strike EOKA.42 There was a renewed spate of particularly callous murders against AKEL members in May and June 1958 which once more brought the Greek Cypriots to the verge of civil war but to the credit of the AKEL leadership it showed commendable self-restraint and did not respond in kind.43 The action of EOKA against AKEL, although it was justified with the unverified assertions that the organisation was only striking ‘traitors’ and not any particular faction, left a bitter legacy between Right and Left in Cyprus that lasts to the present day.44

The Unravelling of the Enosis Campaign † 175 Makarios was not impressed with Grivas’ explanations for two important reasons. Firstly, although ideologically he was diametrically opposed to AKEL, over the years he had developed a more nuanced relationship with its leadership. The Archbishop had come to understand that AKEL was not the implacable foe Grivas made it out to be. In fact under the leadership of Makarios the Ethnarchy had come to an understanding with AKEL avoiding the grave friction of the late 1940s when violence was part and parcel of the political rivalry of Right versus Left. EOKA violence against AKEL threatened this modus vivendi and inflicted long-term damage between the two camps. This was not to the liking of Makarios, who resented the idea of victimising the Left purely on ideological grounds, as he believed that only politically AKEL could be contained and not with violence which carried the risk of reprisals. Secondly, Makarios objected also to the timing of the attacks because they were taking place at a time when the Turkish Cypriots were stepping up their own campaign for partition, as we shall see later. Therefore, from a strategic point of view it did not make sense for Grivas to turn against the Left while the Turkish Cypriots were on the war path. Makarios–Grivas relations received a further blow due to a disagreement over the issue of passive resistance. Grivas wanted to raise the stakes further by enforcing a plan of passive resistance that aimed to cut off as much as possible the Greek Cypriot community from the British administration through boycotting British imports, refusal to co-operate with the authorities and acts of defiance like the replacement of all shops signs in Greek.45 On 8 March 1958 Grivas declared the commencement of passive resistance calling the public to conform to his orders of boycott in order to demonstrate the unity of the Greek Cypriot people.46 The Archbishop did not like this new initiative, fearing that the economic dislocation of the boycott would ultimately erode the prestige of EOKA and the Ethnarchy. Being more pragmatic, he did not like the attitude of ‘all or nothing’ and was more concerned about the welfare of his people. When Makarios informed Grivas of his reservations the latter responded angrily replying that he would

176

† Makarios

not tolerate the undermining of his campaign.47 As a result their relations cooled considerably and for some time they even stopped communicating with each other.48 Makarios was concerned with Grivas’ tendency to assume initiatives that blurred their respective spheres of competence. Makarios as the political leader was responsible for the strategy, whereas Grivas as the military leader was responsible for implementing the strategic decisions of Makarios through military means. However, the initiatives against the communists and the passive resistance campaign were essentially matters that pertained to strategy. The Archbishop’s efforts to restrain Grivas fell on deaf ears. Grivas argued that he was the judge of such matters even though his initiatives implicitly undermined the political authority of Makarios and effectively were arrogating decisions of issues of strategy to his person. This tacit power struggle made the vulnerable position of Makarios even more awkward; if he could not rely on Grivas, his military subordinate, how could he deal with the British? Even more worryingly deteriorating relations with Grivas carried the risk of turning the Archbishop into some paper tiger, removed from his people, ignored by the British and unable to exert control over his lieutenants. In this sense the British decision to refuse Makarios entry to Cyprus inadvertently contributed to the straining of relations between the two men. The frequency and means of communication were not conducive to ironing out misunderstandings and of course there could be no direct consultations. This is not to say that had Makarios been in Cyprus there would have been no problems with Grivas but the absence of the Archbishop left a vacuum that the former was only too happy to fill. The British Government had predicted that a long sojourn in Athens would tempt Makarios to ‘get involved more deeply than he would wish in Greek internal politics’.49 Political infighting between opposition and government, with the national issue of Cyprus being the perennial bone of contention, had reached new lows. Before the arrival of Makarios in Athens the Greek foreign minister, Evangelos Averoff,50 had come under fire in parliament by

The Unravelling of the Enosis Campaign † 177 the parties of opposition because UNGA Resolution 1013(XI) did not explicitly mention the word enosis. Thus he was accused that he had abandoned the cause. As a result the Greek Government was subjected to a vote of no confidence, which it survived, but not before provoking Averoff into a serious blunder.51 During a heated exchange with the members of the opposition the Foreign Minister blurted out that ‘anyone who, in order to reach enosis, will not accept independence as a transitional stage is worthy of criticism’.52 This was a serious slip-up at a time when the Karamanlis administration was slowly readjusting its policy on the Cyprus issue, and beginning to cultivate the ground for the possibility of a compromise solution of independence. This statement gave the perfect counter-argument both to Britain and Turkey to resist the idea of independence and hindered the prospects of independence in the following two years. It was inevitable that the parties of the opposition would attempt to draw the Archbishop into the Athenian political intrigues that were proliferating at the time. The great popularity he enjoyed with the Helladic public was now reinforced further with the aura of a national hero that his exile had conferred upon him. Potentially Makarios could wield enough popularity to topple the Karamanlis administration, a possibility that the opposition parties entertained in the spring of 1957. The build up to the return of the Archbishop saw the climax of a whispering campaign which purported that Makarios disapproved of the Karamanlis administration and as a second Eleftherios Venizelos53 was ready to become the prime minister of Greece. The newspapers controlled by the opposition parties were rife with such rumours and speculated openly on a possible rift between Makarios and Karamanlis to the point that even King Paul of the Hellenes expressed his concern for the stability of his government.54 The situation was exacerbated by the silence of Makarios on this topic; in none of his published interviews did he thank Karamanlis personally or his administration for their efforts in securing his release while in at least one interview he stated that he would be willing to meet with opposition leaders.55 Moreover,

178

† Makarios

Karamanlis and Averoff behind the scenes had a serious argument about the manner in which they would receive Makarios. Averoff wanted Karamanlis to welcome personally the Archbishop at the airport. The Prime Minister, probably resentful of the attention lavished on the Cypriot primate, but also weary that Makarios could be his political undoing, wanted to avoid this gesture.56 The two men reconciled before the story leaked to the press, but Karamanlis did not welcome Makarios at the airport even though he did send an official representative of the Greek Government. Once in Athens Makarios refused to become involved in this game and kept ‘all his public pronouncements’ that could be open to such interpretation ‘carefully neutral’.57 Nevertheless this did not stop members of the opposition parties from approaching the Archbishop. During the summer of 1957 Sophocles Venizelos, the leader of the Liberal Party, approached Makarios through Kranidiotis with the proposal to head a new political party to replace the Karamanlis administration. On three different occasions the Archbishop was tempted with the vision of becoming prime minister of Greece but to his credit and despite the tension between himself and Karamanlis, he rejected this proposal.58 He was too astute to fall for such a proposal that could be his political undoing. There was the precedent of Eleftherios Venizelos, but the case of Makarios was more complicated. Cyprus unlike Crete at the beginning of the twentieth century was part of the British Empire and was in the grip of a serious crisis. More importantly Venizelos was a secular politician and nothing prevented him from relocating to Athens to enter Greek politics. Makarios was first an Archbishop and his principal loyalty was with the Church of Cyprus. To become prime minister of Greece would eventually demand of him to renounce his archiepiscopal position and he was not prepared for such a sacrifice. Despite the popularity he enjoyed in Greece there was no guarantee that it could be converted into political capital. The world of Greek politics could be too big even for the Archbishop of Cyprus and there was the danger of losing the appeal he had precisely because he cast himself as an above politics national figure. Once he would descend into the mundane plains of the fractious Greek politics

The Unravelling of the Enosis Campaign † 179 his prestige would rapidly vanish. Makarios doubted the sincerity of the offer, thinking that it could be a ploy to damage his prestige and adamantly refused the proposal.59 Whether he could make a successful prime minister will remain hypothetical but his decision to remain aloof of Greek politics was correct. The idea of Makarios as prime minister of Greece would have caused all sort of anxieties to Britain, yet such a development would not necessarily have helped Cyprus. The proposal itself was made with an ulterior motive as Sophocles Venizelos essentially was looking for a way to claw himself back to power. Venizelos made a similar proposal to Grivas when he returned to Greece as a decorated war hero in March 1959, thinking that the General could emulate the example of Papagos. Grivas did not have Makarios’ qualms but his attempt to reinvent himself as a politician failed to get off the ground.60 International Pressure and Deadlock The third factor undermining the position of Makarios was the persistent political deadlock over the future of Cyprus. Despite his release no significant progress had been made as Britain and Greece held onto their mutually exclusive views. The Archbishop had to do something to attempt to break the deadlock or risk becoming an irrelevancy, just as the British had predicted and hoped for.61 The rejection of his proposal for renewed bilateral negotiations meant that he had to change his tactics and direct international pressure on Britain in the hope that it will change its position. For this reason he decided to play the torture ‘card’. On 19 June 1957 Makarios gave a press conference accusing the British Security Forces of torturing political prisoners and chief suspects in their quest to extract vital information on the whereabouts of EOKA.62 His desire to air what he felt to be the legitimate grievances of his compatriots cannot be doubted. As he explained to Greek officials he felt a moral responsibility to denounce the ill treatment of Greek Cypriot political prisoners on account of the strong public feelings on the issue and the possibility of a backlash if the matter was not raised.63 In addition

180

† Makarios

it was hoped that in this way moral pressure could be brought to bear on Britain. However, this brought him at odds with the Greek Government, whose priority was not the public feeling in Cyprus – this was Makarios’ chief concern – but the fear that raising the issue would deepen further the gulf between Greece and Britain. This was a time when the Greek Government was trying to drive a wedge between Britain and Turkey and an effort to discredit the British Army would not be conducive to this effort. There were also concerns that such a move would alienate the Labour party which was considered an important ally on the British domestic front.64 Moreover the ‘atrocity card’ was an important bargaining chip in the UN debates to be used to stop any British allegations that Greece was covertly supplying EOKA and fomenting terrorism.65 The allegations hardly added anything substantial to the case of the Greek Cypriots. It did cause friction with the Greek Government because the latter felt that this initiative could do more harm than good to its policy on Cyprus. Just as Makarios was wary of Grivas’ initiatives, the Greek Government was now equally wary of Makarios, because despite his good intentions he was in fact encumbering the efforts of Greek diplomacy. The British plan of relegating Makarios to a mere nuisance appeared to work. Macmillan gleefully announced to his cabinet that the Archbishop was ‘proving an increasing embarrassment for the Greek Government’.66 Realistically the only place where Makarios could turn his attention hoping for some progress was the upcoming UN debate on Cyprus. During the summer of 1957 he decided to travel to the USA with the dual purpose ‘to enlighten the American public opinion on the Cyprus question’ and to follow the new UN debate.67 The importance of his visit was downplayed by the US Government from the beginning, partly because of its strict official neutrality on the Cyprus problem but also because of a Makarios blunder. Prior to his departure from Athens on 30 August he had given a press conference during which he questioned the fact whether the US Government was as liberal and democratic as its people.68 This provoked a sharp reaction from

The Unravelling of the Enosis Campaign † 181 the US Government. The State Department indicated that it was best for Makarios to abort his visit to the USA while news agencies were reporting that Eisenhower and Dulles would not receive Makarios. The Archbishop thought the response of the Greek Government was lukewarm, as he wanted a stiff rejection of the said American message, but he did not cancel his trip.69 In any case, it was unlikely that either Eisenhower or Dulles would have the time or the interest to meet Makarios and even if that was to happen the impact would have been negligible anyway. The US position on the matter was quite clear; to keep equal distance between all interested parties, since it was of secondary importance for Washington. The second full debate on Cyprus in the UN did not yield any substantially positive results. Despite the commendable performance of the Greek delegation, which on purpose argued its case in moderate terms, in the end the hope of a supportive resolution was frustrated. After long and hard debates at the UN the Greek delegation succeeded in passing a favourable resolution from its Political Committee on 12 December 1957, which expressed ‘its earnest hope that further negotiations and discussions will be undertaken in a spirit of cooperation with a view to have the right of self-determination applied in the case of the people of Cyprus’.70 It was a moral victory of some sort, although it still needed a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly to be adopted as a full UN resolution, a majority which was not forthcoming. In the end the vote of the General Assembly went against adopting the resolution, as only 31 countries voted in favour, 23 against and 24 chose to abstain.71 Makarios, who had impressed the need of putting the resolution to the test, irrespective of the chances of success, hailed the latest UN debate on Cyprus as a moral victory and a ‘tremendous step’ toward a solution to the problem.72 However, as Averoff noted no UN resolution could be of practical use because it would be unenforceable. On the contrary there was even the risk of pushing Britain and Turkey to an agreement over partition in order to solve the problem once and for all.73 Realistically although the

182

† Makarios

UN was one of the few means through which Greece could apply a modicum of pressure on Britain, it was an uphill struggle to achieve even limited gains. Makarios was aware of the limitations of the UN but he continued to cling onto it because the cause of Cypriot self-determination was supported by certain memberstates and this provided him with much-needed comfort. The failure of Makarios to apply any meaningful pressure on Britain and shake it from its position that unitary selfdetermination was unacceptable was a direct result of his weak position. At the same time this failure was a reason for concern. Essentially Makarios could only rely on a weak Greek diplomacy to apply some pressure on Britain through the UN. Nonetheless, at the UN Britain was capable of blocking any unfavourable resolution. As a permanent member of the Security Council, Britain could veto any resolution that was not to its liking. Despite Makarios’ efforts to put a positive spin on the UN proceedings, it was becoming plain to see that international sympathy alone was not enough and that the international climate was not conducive to enosis. The Archbishop was running out of options and his position was becoming increasingly weaker. The Turkish Campaign for Partition The manifestation of a Turkish campaign for the partition of Cyprus dealt a hammer blow to the demand of enosis from which it never recovered and the emergence of this threat was instrumental in Makarios’ strategic reorientation. Turkey regarded the release of Makarios as the thin edge of the wedge, as it feared that it was the beginning of a British volte-face in Cyprus, which would eventually lead to enosis.74 The announcement of NATO General Secretary Henry Spaak initiative in May 1957, which essentially sponsored independence as the ideal solution to the Cyprus imbroglio, added to Turkish suspicions that Britain would use the NATO pretext to climb down from its promise of partition. British assurances that no future concrete plans over Cyprus were drawn in the absence of Turkey did not assuage its anxieties.75 On the contrary the Turkish Government drew the impression that its

The Unravelling of the Enosis Campaign † 183 British counterpart was unreliable and therefore became more intransigent, aiming to wring partition out of British hands. Soon the Turkish position changed from reluctant endorsement of British policies to partition as a final solution which would provide minimum satisfaction to Turkey.76 From the outset of the release of Makarios, Turkey hardened its position toward both Britain and Greece. The Turkish press criticised Britain that it ‘rewarded’ terrorism and that the decision was a result of its ‘weak’ foreign policy.77 With Greece it adopted an even harder stance, when the Turkish Foreign Minister summoning the Greek Charge d’Affaires to read him a note that effectively accused both Makarios and the Greek Government of being hostile to Turkey.78 On 18 April 1957, Prime Minister of Turkey Adnan Menderes issued a statement condemning the Greek welcoming of Makarios, which provoked an equally sharp counter-statement by the Greek Government.79 This was only the preamble to the Turkish counter-campaign for partition. As Hatzivassiliou has argued, in the spring of 1957 Turkey and by extension the Turkish Cypriots went through the same process Greece had experienced in 1954– 5 when the Cyprus problem was raised in public consciousness in a monolithic manner.80 For example, Dr Facil Ku¨
cu¨k, Chairman of the ‘Cyprus is Turkish’ Party, took a leaf out of Makarios’ book of internationalisation, with his travels to Turkey and his fiery rhetoric on the necessity of partition. In April 1957, during a visit to Ankara, he declared that ‘the only means of solving the Cyprus problem is to partition the island’.81 In addition assertions of British discrimination at the expense of Turkish Cypriots, and exaggerated allegations about Greek Cypriot but more specifically about Makarios’ intentions became the mainstay of Turkish Cypriot rhetoric.82 On 3 June all the Turkish Cypriot councillors who participated in the five principal town councils resigned en masse, a move dictated by the wider campaign of partition that originated from Ankara. This action was described as ‘the first step in the separation of Turkish affairs’ and was justified on the grounds that the Turkish Cypriots did not want ‘to become the political tools of the Greek Cypriots’.83 Meanwhile the Turkish press in mainland

184

† Makarios

Turkey ran a publicity campaign in favour of partition, which was particularly critical of the British administration. Especially the partial relaxation of the Emergency, which was introduced as means of easing off the tension and in response to the continued truce of EOKA, came under severe criticism as an abandonment of ‘the Turks in Cyprus to Greek hands’.84 Even more ominously on the evening of 31 August an explosion at a house in the predominantly Turkish suburb of Nicosia, Omorphita, seriously injured four Turkish Cypriot youths, one of whom later died. When the house was searched ‘5 pipe type bombs and 108 feet of fuse, 20 lbs of gunpowder, a pipe wrench and spanner were found together with 11 more primed pipe type bombs’.85 Whereas previously Turkish Cypriots had curtailed themselves to propaganda efforts, distributing leaflets and writing slogans, now they were arming themselves, determined to achieve their own political objective through violence. In November 1957, the Turkish Prime Minister told the British Ambassador in Ankara that the Cyprus issue had become the acid test for Anglo-Turkish relations as ‘any solution other than partition would be regarded as a preparation for the island going to Greece’. The Turkish Government was anxious to capitalise on the December 1956 declaration, fearing that the British Government wanted to wriggle out of it.86 One factor which was on the mind of Turkish officials was the prospect of a change of leadership in Britain. After all the Lennox-Boyd declaration was a unilateral statement of policy, which had no binding effect on any future Labour government. It was important to capitalise on it while it was still on offer. Statements by Labour politicians, who had adopted a more pro-Greek stance, were hardly reassuring to the Turkish Government. On 5 October the Labour MP Barbara Castle was quoted in the Daily Herald reaffirming that Labour’s policy on Cyprus was democratic selfdetermination, specifying that ‘we do not include partition within our definition of democratic self-determination’.87 Makarios’ reaction to the growing Turkish threat was to announce his willingness to travel to Turkey for discussions on 14 January. In this way he acknowledged the need to placate

The Unravelling of the Enosis Campaign † 185 Turkish opinion; a few days earlier he had stated to Reuters that the relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots had always been friendly, but Turkey was in an uncooperative mood.88 The Turkish Embassy in Athens informed the Archbishop that ‘for the time being such a visit would be undesirable, in view of the complications it might engender’.89 Paradoxically the Greek Government, which was surprised by the announcement of Makarios as it was not given advanced warning, was in agreement with its Turkish counterpart.90 Despite his good intentions it is not clear how his visit could have helped the situation given the intensity of Turkish emotion on the Cyprus issue. On the one hand it was positive that Makarios had realised the need to take Turkey more seriously, even if that could expose him to the criticism that he was legitimising Turkish claims, but on the other hand his initiative was flawed. The interest of Turkey in Cyprus was too deep and complex to be neutralised with a simple visit to Ankara, even if the Turkish Government was willing to meet with him. In this respect the Archbishop still underestimated the extent of the Turkish problem. After the failure of this initiative he did not concern himself substantially with the Turkish factor and returned to his well-worn rhetoric of ‘AngloTurkish cooperation’ against the ‘legitimate’ Greek Cypriot demand for self-determination. The appointment of Sir Hugh Foot on 3 November 1957 as the replacement of Harding was further ‘proof’ for the Turkish government of British back-pedalling on Cyprus. Foot’s reputation as a liberal was particularly alarming because in Turkey liberalism and philhellenism were perceived to go handin-hand. His connection with the Labour Party was equally worrying because the Labour Party had been critical of Tory policy in Cyprus and opposed partition. In fact this particular quality made him an attractive candidate because it could facilitate a sort of bipartisan understanding between the British Government and the Labour party on what had become a thorny issue.91 Furthermore, Foot began his tenure with a flurry of good-will gestures, including the release of 100 Greek Cypriot detainees just before Christmas.92 This marked departure from

186

† Makarios

the stilted style of Harding, who as a soldier his chief preoccupation was to restore the security environment, was not agreeable with the Turkish Cypriots who by now opposed any plans of self-government or co-operation with the Greek Cypriots.93 When Foot drew a plan to break the deadlock, he encountered stiff Turkish resistance. His plan envisioned a seven-year period of self-government. At the end of this period self-determination was offered to both communities; this was to placate the Turks. Foot hoped that his proposal of a seven-year hiatus of liberal selfgovernment would be enough for cooler judgments to prevail, which would lead to the rejection both of partition and enosis. Britain was to retain military bases on the island. In addition the Cyprus Government would progressively end the emergency state by releasing detainees and abolishing the relevant regulations within three months of announcing the plan. The most maverick aspect of the plan was the integration of Makarios in the pacification process of Cyprus. The Archbishop would be allowed to return to the island on the provision that he would give clear guarantees that he would use his authority ‘for the maintenance of peaceful conditions’.94 The British Government was sceptical about this plan, especially since Makarios was ‘acknowledged’ as an important factor in pacifying the island. The proposed rehabilitation for the Archbishop flew in the face of prevailing attitude in cabinet but it was resolved to give Foot a chance. The plan was put to the test when Foot visited Ankara along with the Foreign Secretary to discuss the plan with the Turkish Government. From the outset the Turkish representatives were extremely negative and critical of the plan. By now the Turkish Government had lost all patience with British plans and instead wanted to cash in the partition cheque it was promised. For this reason it shot down the plan by counter-proposing its own terms which essentially undermined the British plan. Zorlu demanded a federal solution which would grant ‘complete selfgovernment [to] each community separately’. As a guarantee he requested a Turkish military enclave, to be granted immediately.95 To seal the deal, Zorlu insisted on a ‘definite and

The Unravelling of the Enosis Campaign † 187 binding agreement embodying the Colonial Secretary’s statement of December 19, 1956’.96 The discussions, which were doomed to failure, were overshadowed by the events in Cyprus. On 27 January 1958 a Turkish Cypriot crowd clashed with the security forces. It was the first time the Cyprus Government had to use violence to suppress a Turkish Cypriot demonstration and even open fire in order to disperse the crowds. There were also riots the following day resulting in deaths and injuries on all sides involved. Clearly the demonstration was a premeditated incident designed to draw attention to the Turkish case for Cyprus, not unlike the Istanbul anti-Greek riots in September 1955.97 Subsequently Foot informed Lennox-Boyd that according to the security authorities ‘the Turkish Cypriots were determined to provoke a clash and would have done so whatever our line’.98 Apart from stopping the Foot plan dead in its tracks, which had little chance of success anyway given the prevailing attitudes of all involved parties, the Turkish Cypriot riots marked an important shift on the Cypriot political landscape. Relations between Turkish Cypriots and the Cyprus administration reached a nadir. This had serious implications about the viability of British presence on the island since the Cyprus Government had come to rely heavily on the assistance of Turkish Cypriots in its effort to suppress the EOKA campaign. The disproportional employment of Turkish Cypriots in the police force meant that that loss of Turkish Cypriot support would make the British position on the island ‘well-nigh untenable’, and conflict against both communities was to be avoided at all costs.99 As a result, the need to placate Turkey became an imperative of British strategy in the closing stages of the emergency. The fragile security situation was compounded further with the emergence of a new Turkish Cypriot organisation, TMT (Turkish Resistance Organisation), which played an important role in promoting the cause of partition and the ethnic segregation of Turkish Cypriots. A few days after the disturbances TMT leaflets circulated in Nicosia declaring the impossibility of Turkish Cypriots living under British administration or coexisting with

188

† Makarios

Greek Cypriots. TMT prohibited Turkish Cypriots from cooperating with the Cyprus Government, asked all the mukhtars (heads of villages) to resign from their posts and called for an economic campaign ‘from Turk to Turk’ that supposedly would boost the economic vibrancy of the community. Chillingly the rallying cry of TMT was ‘partition or death’, the perfect foil to EOKA’s ‘enosis or death’.100 Continuation of the EOKA struggle alongside the new-found militancy of the Turkish Cypriots carried the grave risk of provoking an intercommunal showdown. Such an event could engender a more general Greco-Turkish war as relations between the two countries reached new lows. But even if such a possibility could be neutralised by NATO the possibility of civil war could break the British will to stay in Cyprus. In that case Britain could partition the island and withdraw. Inadvertently, continuation of the EOKA campaign could lead to partition. At this point a few words need to be said about how further violence in Cyprus could trigger the British decision for the division of the island. When the Cyprus Cabinet Committee was established in April 1957, its mission was ‘to review the implications of a Partition of Cyprus’.101 Since the Turkish Cypriots were not the majority in any substantial geographical part of the island, partition along ethnic lines would require considerable forced population displacement across superficial borders.102 Therefore such a ‘solution’ could create even more trouble for the British administration. As a result serious misgivings were expressed in the cabinet, with some ministers expressing the view that partition would be ‘unacceptable to public opinion in this country [Britain] and damaging to our international reputation’.103 There were also the unhappy precedents of Ireland, Palestine and India which had caused a lot of resentment and damaged British prestige. Partitioning Cyprus would illuminate an aspect of decolonisation that the British preferred to avoid. For this reason in the second part of 1957 there was a shift away from partition and instead there was emphasis in finding a solution that would satisfy all the involved parties. It was Britain’s refusal to implement early partition that

The Unravelling of the Enosis Campaign † 189 caused the rift in Turkish –British relations but at the same Britain was a prisoner of its past policies, refusing to withdraw the partition statement lest it would alienate Turkey. All British plans after the Radcliffe constitution included the promise of partition in order to gain Turkish endorsement. The cabinet concluded that outright partition remained a last-resort option in the face of protracted terrorism, reasoning that the British Government ‘could not afford indefinitely to devote military resources to its repression’.104 This warning was also conveyed to the Greek Government in February 1958 when a British delegation travelled to Athens for consultations and was later repeated in May 1958.105 In light of this conclusion the EOKA campaign by the end of 1957 had become counter-productive because it could not impose a military defeat on the Cyprus Government and could only provoke a violent Turkish Cypriot reaction. This in its turn could critically destabilise the island and lead to a British evacuation and partition. Foot, fully aware of the danger, insisted on meeting with Makarios and giving him a candid warning about the situation in Cyprus during the visit of the British delegation to Athens in February 1958. The discussions between the Greek and British governments were inconclusive but Foot seized the opportunity to inform both the Greek Government and Makarios of the dangerous situation in Cyprus. On 13 February when he met Makarios the Governor ‘emphasized the risks of further violence which could only lead towards a divided island’ and explained ‘the new situation’ that arose from the ‘changed attitude of the Turkish minority’.106 Previously Selwyn Lloyd and Foot had impressed on the Greek representatives the dangers of intercommunal violence and the inherent risk of partition.107 Makarios accepted Foot’s warning, but insisted that the problem was not an ‘international’ one but an issue between Britain and Cyprus. A few days later Makarios wrote to Grivas to inform him about the Greco-British discussions. Although he admitted that the parameters of the issue had changed entirely, the crux of the matter now was to find a solution that would satisfy Turkey, he did not say anything about the danger of intercommunal violence and the prospect of

190

† Makarios

partition. Instead he expressed reserved optimism that with ‘skilful handling’ this new crisis could be averted.108 On the contrary the situation was about to get dramatically worse. On 27 February 1958, two ministers of the Karamanlis cabinet resigned from their post sparking a crisis as the ruling party no longer commanded the majority in the parliament. Two days later Karamanlis resigned and a caretaker government was appointed, while general elections were proclaimed for 11 May 1958.109 The Greek Government’s crisis meant that Britain had to delay its new comprehensive plan on Cyprus until the Greek elections were resolved. There was some relative calm, at least compared to the more widespread conflicts of June–August, in Cyprus during this interlude, punctuated by isolated incidents of violence. These incidents involved mainly the murdering of Greek Cypriot leftists allegedly by EOKA but also a mirror campaign against Turkish Cypriot leftist by TMT. By intimidating the leftist element in their respective communities the two paramilitary organisations were steeling themselves and closing ranks in anticipation of a major intercommunal face-off. Pressure on the island which had been steadily building up had now reached a critical point where any provocation could trigger widespread violence. This provocation was provided by the pending Macmillan plan. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots convinced that the plan was unfavourable decided to go on the offesnive. The only difference was EOKA’s determination to respond in kind, plunging Cyprus into its great intercommunal crisis. Makarios’ initial optimism that his release and the partial relaxation of the Emergency would herald a new phase of the Cyprus problem and lead to a satisfactory settlement proved unfounded. Ironically he had failed to realise that the moment he was deported, the possibility for a solution subject to negotiations between the Greek Cypriots and the British was lost forever. From the spring of 1957 until June 1958 the Archbishop came up against the hard realities of the problem which effectively made enosis impossible. The unwillingness of the British to give him any special status in combination with their priority to secure Turkish consent over any future plan in Cyprus outflanked Makarios’

The Unravelling of the Enosis Campaign † 191 strategy. The British were to enter into discussions so long as the Turkish would also participate and were given equal voice. His plan to terminate the EOKA struggle, partly to appease the British, partly because he had realised it had outlived its usefulness, was frustrated. On one hand British refusal to resume talks meant that ending the struggle would be a leap of faith and on the other hand Grivas questioned the rationale of this decision. This was a blow to Makarios because his political authority was challenged by Grivas and because he had to endure the continuation of the struggle which no longer added to the cause of enosis but instead caused additional complications, like the EOKA campaign against the Left. Diplomatically the internationalisation campaign had ground to a halt as neither the Greek Government nor Makarios could exert meaningful pressure on Britain and change its position. Even the UN could no longer offer succour as the futile debates on Cyprus suggested. Finally the emergence of the Turkish Cypriot campaign for partition exacerbated further the Greek Cypriot position, impregnating the EOKA struggle with the possibility of partition. What Makarios had tried to avoid in the spring of 1957 was now a tangible possibility as continuation of violence carried the risk of intercommunal conflict and the danger of pushing the British to the decision of dividing the island and evacuating. The combination of these factors was instrumental in prompting Makarios to realise that enosis was no longer viable and modify his strategy to reflect this reality. The actual renunciation of enosis could only happen in response to the Macmillan plan, which acted as a catalyst and demonstrated dramatically the full extent of the Greek Cypriot weakness. How Makarios dealt with this crisis and his actual conversion to the solution of independence will be discussed in the final chapter.

8

Makarios and the ‘Solution’ of Independence In the previous chapter we saw how the hard political realities forced Makarios to accept that independence would be a more realistic settlement to the Cypriot question. In this final chapter the actual transition to independence and the conclusion of the EOKA struggle on the basis of an independent Cypriot republic will be examined. The chapter is divided in two parts. The first part will discuss the impact of the announcement of the Macmillan plan and how it aggravated the already weakened Greek Cypriot position. It will explain Makarios’ response to this fresh crisis and why he chose at this junction to throw his weight behind the solution of independence and how this proposal was met. The second part will discuss Makarios’ reaction to the Zurich settlement that was agreed between Greece and Turkey. Although he had given his blessing to the idea of independence, accepting the Greco-Turkish agreement was not easy for him. This resulted in changing his mind on several occasions, jeopardising the agreements until the very last minute. The reservations of the Archbishop, ranging from his basic ideological and moral distaste for a solution other than enosis, through to the practical shortcomings of the agreements, will be discussed in detail. It will argue that Makarios’ behaviour prior to his signing of the agreements was not entirely whimsical, as has been traditionally portrayed especially by Greek and British accounts. It will also explain why in the end he accepted the agreements despite his reservations and will conclude with Makarios’ arrival in Cyprus which marks the end of his anti-colonial career.

Makarios and the ‘Solution’ of Independence † 193 The Impact of the Macmillan Plan In anticipation of the new British plan – a policy statement was scheduled for 17 June 1958 – Turkey decided to pre-empt the British initiative by ordering a fresh show of Turkish Cypriot force. The latter were, by now, in the grip of TMT which had imposed a harsh monolithic line of partition through a campaign of intimidation.1 TMT in its turn was controlled by the Turkish military which meant that the Ankara government could unleash Turkish Cypriot violence at will. The Turkish Government convinced that the new plan would be counter to its interests decided to resist it through Turkish Cypriot violence that would demonstrate the impossibility of any co-habitation between the two Cypriot communities. The premeditated riots were precipitated by a staged bomb incident at the Turkish Government Information Bureau in Nicosia on the evening of 7 June 1958.2 Many years after the event, the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash3 confessed that the bomb was planted by Turkish agents known to him.4 Soon after the explosion Turkish Cypriot mobs descended to the streets of Nicosia setting fire on Greek property and clashing with Greek Cypriot crowds that had gathered in response to the Turkish Cypriot agitation. Various intercommunal clashes ensued resulting in the death of two Greek Cypriots and a number of serious injuries on both sides. Order was restored by British troops only by the early hours of 8 June, when a curfew on the city was successfully enforced. The newly established ‘Green Line’, which demarcated Nicosia in two parts, had to be manned with troops in order to seal off the two communities from each other. Ethnic tension on the island was running high in the aftermath of the intercommunal clashes of 7/8 June 1958 leading to a series of intercommunal incidents in other parts of the island as well. The unwillingness of the British Security Forces to deal with Turkish Cypriot violence in the same heavyhanded way used against Greek Cypriots convinced the latter that there was a Turko-British conspiracy afoot that aimed to strangle the cause of enosis once and for all. This accusation was a mainstay in Greek Cypriot propaganda but the recent turn of events fuelled further their grievance. Yet, the reality was more

194

† Makarios

complicated than the simplistic explanation of a conspiracy. In fact British authorities were distressed about the fresh wave of Turkish violence because it jeopardised their new plan. Foot summoned the Turkish Cypriot leaders and asked for a condemnation of the riots to no avail.5 Furthermore, the Turkish Government was striking a very belligerent tone against Britain. The Turkish Foreign Minister when he met the British Ambassador to discuss the pending plan warned that if Britain was ‘to go ahead with their intended statement, the Turkish Government would make things difficult’.6 In light of the events of 7 and 8 June 1958, this warning was particularly chilling, as it showed that Turkey was willing to antagonise Britain in order to achieve its objectives in Cyprus. It is obvious that in the context of the deterioration of Turko-British relations there was no scope for conspiracy against the Greek Cypriots. Makarios, following the events from Athens, felt that EOKA had to protect both Greek Cypriot life and property but also to retaliate against Turkish Cypriot provocation. In an earlier message Makarios advised Grivas not to provoke the Turkish Cypriots but at the same time asked for a show of force in case of future Turkish riots ‘to teach them a good lesson’.7 Grivas who never took to advice kindly, especially in matters pertaining to the military field, replied that he was ‘in the position to know how to counter the Turks’. In the wake of the Turkish Cypriot attacks, Makarios wrote to Grivas again to complain about the failure of EOKA to defend the Greek Cypriot community. The latter replied that he was in control and only due to ‘substantial’ and ‘psychological’ reasons he held his hand but should new attacks happened again ‘harsh reprisals’ would ensue.8 The Archbishop was unhappy with this response. Influenced by the climate of distress and the incoming bleak reports, he found it inappropriate that at this crucial junction when Greek Cypriot lives were threatened EOKA watched passively. On 18 June he wrote again to Grivas criticising the lack of action in the face of Turkish aggression. Grivas, offended by the criticism, insisted that the Turkish Cypriots were colluding with the British authorities, which complicated his task.9 No such ploy existed but Grivas was correct in pointing out the difficulties

Makarios and the ‘Solution’ of Independence † 195 EOKA had in staging substantive retaliations. The majority of EOKA fighters were actually hiding in rural areas and the strict curfew imposed by the authorities made the movement of fighters in urban areas difficult. The predilection of the Security Forces against Greek Cypriots and its more lax attitude toward Turkish Cypriots hindered further EOKA’s ability to take action and in juxtaposition fostered Turkish aggression. There was also disagreement over the method of reprisals Makarios insisted that EOKA should respond immediately and on-the-spot to aggression. Grivas disagreed with this view, arguing that the Turkish threat had to be viewed in an island-wide context. It was easier for EOKA to carry out reprisals in the rural areas where it had superiority of numbers and most of its men were hiding than in the urban areas where the majority of Turkish Cypriot aggression was taking place.10 Grivas promised that in the future the Greek Cypriot defence would cope better and reviewed the issue of reprisals. Yet the tension between the two men did not ease; a symptom of the malaise that dominated Makarios–Grivas relations. Rumours that Turkish troops were being mustered on the southern coast of Turkey with the intention of invading the island did not reassure the Greek Cypriot community.11 The situation on the ground took a turn for the worse as the Turkish Cypriots in the aftermath of the riots moved to establish their own de facto municipal areas. The municipal market areas of Nicosia and Limassol which were used jointly by the two communities were forcibly taken over by the Turkish Cypriots in a bid to establish homogeneous Turkish quarters and promote further their partitionist plans. This had an adverse effect on the economy of the towns involved as access to the market was denied to the Greek Cypriots. Administration also suffered as municipal employees who had to cross the communal division line to perform their duties were subject to intimidation and murder, resulting in a self-imposed restriction of intercommunal movement.12 Even worse was the embryonic ethnic cleansing initiated by the Turkish Cypriots. Despite being the minority, the Turkish Cypriots were by far the most militant community at this stage,

196

† Makarios

underlined by the forced eviction of Greek Cypriots from the predominantly Turkish suburbs of Omorphita in Nicosia and Ayios Antonios in Limassol. This was followed up with the Turkish Cypriot demand for legitimisation of the recently established Turkish municipalities.13 By the end of July 1958, the first trickle of organised Turkish Cypriot movements across the island began. It was partly down to fears of Greek retaliation but also because of pressure from TMT which aimed to create a solid Turkish nucleus in the northern part of the island as part of its overall partition policy.14 The reluctance of the Cyprus Government to deal effectively with these Turkish provocations, out of fear that complete breakdown of relations with the Turkish community would place an unbearable stress on the British position on the island, added further to Greek Cypriot suspicions of Turko-British collusion. The volatile situation on the island was contained temporarily with the imposition of a curfew and the reinforcement of the Security Forces with paratroopers that were flown in Cyprus to aid in the hard task of keeping the two communities apart. This gave breathing space to Britain to seek diplomatic support for its new plan through the medium of NATO. After a few days of intense diplomatic exchanges between all concerned parties, Britain officially unveiled the Macmillan Plan on 19 June despite failing to secure support from either Greece or Turkey. Turkey, hostile to the plan from the outset, rejected it although it satisfied a lot of its demands. According to a memorandum prepared by the Cyprus Government the plan was ‘based on the idea of partition’. Although it excluded geographical separation it provided for administrative partition, ‘the separation of the two communities and the right of the Turkish community to run its own affairs no less than the Greek’.15 Although Turkey could recognise the advantages of the new plan it could not climb down from its original demand without some face-saving excuse.16 On the other hand the plan was a disaster for the Greek side. Averoff wrote in his memoirs that the Macmillan Plan was the worst possible solution as ‘to all intents and purposes it meant a temporary, de facto, triple condominium over Cyprus’.17 The

Makarios and the ‘Solution’ of Independence † 197 telling consternation of the Greek Cypriots was reflected by the comment of an Ethnarchy member who, upon visiting the Greek Consul General, simply commented ‘it is finished’.18 The population of the island was formally separated into two nominal communities – Greek and Turkish Cypriot – which were given equal rights. Both communities were accorded ‘self-government and communal autonomy’ which translated into a separate House of Representatives for each community. Members of either community would have the right to double nationality, Greek or Turkish, while retaining the British one. The most problematic provision was the legal standing which was conceded to Turkey in Cypriot internal affairs. Both Greek and Turkish governments were given the right to appoint special representatives to help in the administration of the island. This meant that Turkey would have acquired a legal stake in Cyprus. Matters pertaining to foreign policy, internal security and defence were reserved to the Governor, who would seek the advice of the Greek and the Turkish representatives on such matters.19 At the end of a seven-year period, Britain would ask Greece and Turkey to share sovereignty of the island, except for the military enclaves reserved for strategic reasons, thus leading to a tridominium.20 The Karamanlis government, which was returned to power in the elections of May 1958, securing more than 40 per cent of the votes, knew that to accept such a plan would spell its end. The growing disillusionment of Greek public with NATO over its stance on the Cyprus issue and its drift toward neutrality was reflected in the electoral results. The United Democratic Left, the facade of the abolished Greek Communist party, received 24 per cent of the popular vote, beating the Liberal party, which secured only 21 per cent. This rendered the Communist party the second-most popular party in Greece and the principal opposition party in Parliament but also served as a stiff warning that a sizeable section of the Greek public was not accepting that NATO membership was more important than Cyprus.21 The Karamanlis government was now under even more pressure to appear firm, especially since it had maintained that the problem could be solved only through the framework of the alliance. Karamanlis

198

† Makarios

and Averoff during a meeting with the British ambassador insisted that even if they had wanted to accept the Macmillan Plan, it was impossible for them to do so.22 Although the Greek Government was determined to resist the Macmillan Plan at the same time the impulse for a compromise solution that would heal this suppurating wound was reinforced further. This tension at the heart of Greek foreign policy is vital in understanding the handling of the Cypriot issue in the months leading to the London agreements. Britain was concerned with securing Turkish consent because without it the plan was impractical given the strong Greek opposition. Once details of the plan were revealed the Turkish Government realised its advantages prompting a mood change. Zorlu stated that ‘it should not be impossible to reconcile the British plan with the Turkish thesis of partition’.23 This signalled a shift in Turkish position but its earlier militant stance made it hard for the Turkish Government to simply revert to cooperation with Britain without a serious loss of face. It was a fresh Middle Eastern crisis which provided Turkey with a golden opportunity to revise its policy over Cyprus and mend its relations with Britain. In fact the instability prevalent in the Middle East throughout the late 1950s threatened Turkey’s position. During 1957 there had been border skirmishes between Turkey and Syria. This rivalry was compounded further when the United Arab Republic (UAR) was proclaimed on 1 February 1958. The fusion of Egypt and Syria into UAR under the leadership of Nasser increased further the pressure on the southern Turkish border but also destabilised the region further. Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, which were aligned to the West, attempted to form the Arab Federation as a counterweight to Nasser’s UAR. However, this effort proved to be moribund with Lebanon declining to join the Federation, sparking an internal crisis among its mixed population. The situation deteriorated further on 14 July when a coup d’ etat overthrew the pro-British Iraqi monarchy. The new Iraqi Government declared its withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact, the cornerstone of British policy in Middle East. Britain and the

Makarios and the ‘Solution’ of Independence † 199 USA responded to the crisis by sending troops to Jordan and Lebanon respectively in an effort to shore them up against the tide of Arab nationalism.24 The collapse of the Baghdad Pact acted as a wake-up call and an opportunity for Turkey. On the one hand it reminded Turkey of its precarious position in the Middle East and the need for good relations with Britain as the principal Western power in the region. On the other hand this crisis provided the perfect pretext to reverse its hard stance on Cyprus. The Turkish Government could now ‘argue that this was no time for rocking the boat of Western solidarity in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean’.25 By the end of July when Menderes went to London for discussions on the future of the Baghdad Pact he indicated willingness to talk about Cyprus. This change of Turkish attitude prompted Macmillan to embark on a personal mission in August to Athens and Ankara to secure support for his plan. Securing Greek support was impossible because of the fundamental objections of the Greek Government. Nevertheless Macmillan was able to secure Turkish support which was all he needed in order to forge ahead with the plan.26 In the meantime Cyprus continued to teeter on the brink of civil war. July saw the second wave of intercommunal violence, when Grivas finally decided to take the battle to the Turkish Cypriots as well. On 9 July he declared that the Turkish Cypriots were legitimate targets of EOKA in retaliation for their recent aggression.27 As a result the Turkish Cypriots in July suffered almost twice as many casualties as the Greek Cypriots.28 The Security Forces responded by cracking down on violence with even more curfews, collective punishments and mass arrests, mainly of Greek Cypriots. Moreover the economy of the island was heavily dislocated as the two communities retreated into themselves, refusing to trade and work with each other. The protracted violence was detrimental to all sides. The British Government was desperate to stop the violence in order to implement its plan, Turkey’s attention after the Iraqi revolution was fixed on the Middle East and the Karamanlis government was painfully aware that continuation of violence was actually exacerbating further the

200

† Makarios

Greek Cypriot position. Makarios in Athens was petitioned by a steady stream of Greek Cypriots, who were asking him to intercede to stop EOKA’s violence and secure some settlement that would avert the pending catastrophe. The Archbishop privately had resolved that the struggle had to end or at least another long suspension was required in order for diplomacy to resume.29 When Macmillan issued a call for the end of violence in Cyprus and asked his Greek and Turkish counterpart to endorse his appeal, his plea fell on receptive ears.30 Two days after the circulation of Macmillan’s plea, on 4 August, Grivas responded by issuing his own truce for five days against both the British and the Turkish Cypriots but declared his intention to renew operations if provoked anew. TMT reciprocated issuing its own ceasefire terminating the intercommunal fighting. After this August truce no further intercommunal incidents took place.31 With the Turkish acceptance of the Macmillan Plan the original pattern of EOKA violence against the British was restored in a frantic effort to stop the implementation of the plan. On 15 August the British Government presented the Greek Cypriots with a fait accompli announcing that it would ‘proceed to give effect to the policy’ which was unveiled in June. More specifically this included the compilation of separate electoral rolls in order to facilitate elections for the separate Houses of Representatives as provided by the plan, and the establishment of separate ‘Greek and Turkish Cypriot Municipal Councils’. It was also announced that by 1 October the Greek and Turkish governments had to appoint their special representatives who would advise the Governor in his task of running the island.32 The impending arrival of the Turkish Government representative to Cyprus was of particular significance to Makarios because essentially it was a personal defeat. Despite the tribulations and exertions of the last four years enosis remained elusive. Instead, Turkey, which back in 1954 was not even considered an interested party, was about to acquire official footing in the affairs of the island. It was both a humiliating and frustrating development for Makarios especially since for centuries the Ethnarch had been the

Makarios and the ‘Solution’ of Independence † 201 sole powerful pivot within Cyprus. The Mufti, the rough ‘Ethnarch’ counterpart in the Turkish Cypriot affairs, had never enjoyed similar or even proportional authority. Previous archbishops had survived regime changes, efforts to be cowed and controlled by external Powers, but they maintained their prominent political position despite all adversities. This monopoly was now threatened by the arrival of the Turkish representative who could rival the primacy of the Archbishop and bolster the position of the up to now overlooked Turkish Cypriots. The stakes for Makarios could not be higher. As the political leader of the Greek Cypriots but also as Ethnarch he could not countenance such dramatic change in Cypriot balance of power without a fight. All his attention was now turned to the sole task of blocking the Macmillan Plan at all costs. Makarios Reacts to the Macmillan Plan The Greek side found itself in dire straits even though there was a disagreement between the Archbishop and the Greek Government on the extent of the crisis. In a discussion held at the Greek Foreign Ministry on 6 August 1958, Averoff expressed to Makarios the fear that the Macmillan Plan would finally break the will of the Greek Cypriots. The proposed condominium status was particularly worrying because the future of the island could not be settled without the consent of Turkey. For this reason Averoff advocated the need for ‘maximum concessions without, however, creating rights for Turkey’.33 On the other hand Makarios remained optimistic that the Macmillan Plan would falter in the face of stiff Greek Cypriot opposition but even if the plan was implemented he was prepared ‘to react with all means’ at his disposal. He was also adamant that on the ‘issue of condominium we must not concede anything’ and even rued the ceasefire of 4 August because it prevented EOKA from asserting its military superiority vis-a`-vis the Turkish Cypriots. As a result of the shock of the Turkish Cypriot attacks in June, Makarios was now determined to stand firm in front of Turkish aggression in Cyprus. He could not stomach how the Turkish Cypriots had transformed

202

† Makarios

from a sheepish minority to an aggressive group that held the future of Cyprus hostage to their will. However this view overlooked the ever-weakening diplomatic position of the Greek Cypriots. In contrast the position of Turkey was growing stronger, now casting a long shadow over Cyprus. Averoff stressed that in the greater picture Turkey was stronger as it was ‘the axis of western policy and in the Middle East it dominates British and American policy’.34 Makarios responded that Turkey’s strength was not enough because the Greek Cypriots could ‘destroy everything on the island’ meaning that if the Greek Cypriots were pushed in an all-or-nothing struggle, they could prevail given their numerical superiority. Averoff, wanting to restrain the newfound belligerence of Makarios, disagreed with this assessment countering that Greece was already isolated in NATO and that Cyprus was only a small concern to Britain, which if pushed would choose Turkey over Greece and the Greek Cypriots.35 Makarios’ reluctance to admit that the political developments had effectively outflanked any resistance that EOKA could offer was due to his disbelief about how low the Greek Cypriot fortunes had sunk. In conjunction with the aggression of the Turkish Cypriots he was momentarily overwhelmed by a desire to stand firm and even escalate the struggle further if the British persisted with a plan he considered entirely unacceptable. Disappointment with the meek stance of Greece added to the instinct of lashing out against the enemy. Nevertheless when the British Government announced that the plan would go ahead and declared 1 October as the beginning of this partnership plan, Makarios was forced to reassess the situation more pragmatically. The arrival of the Turkish representative acquired an almost iconic importance because it marked the legitimisation of the new Turkish presence and interest in the island 80 years after the end of Ottoman rule. For this reason both Makarios and the Greek Government launched a desperate campaign to arrest this development. On 13 September 1958, Makarios appealed to the British and American ambassadors in Athens by asking them to intercede in order to stop the arrival of the Turkish representative to Cyprus.36 The Greek Government with more options and power at its

Makarios and the ‘Solution’ of Independence † 203 disposal did its best to voice its displeasure especially to its NATO allies. On 6 September Karamanlis in an official statement warned ‘that the Greek Government is determined to use all political and diplomatic means at its disposal’ to counter the ‘unjust’ British plan.37 On 9 September Greece forwarded a memorandum to all NATO members, including its General Secretary, explaining its position on the British plan. Even King Paul, who had an amicable relationship with President Eisenhower, was enlisted in this effort. The Greek monarch sent a personal letter to the US president asking for his intervention for a solution that would be more agreeable to the Greek Government.38 Karamanlis himself summoned the US ambassador and requested a substantial intervention of the US Government in the Cyprus problem, stressing that the passive role of the USA was perceived as an abandonment of Greece by its allies.39 Yet short of an EOKA victory over the security forces, which was impossible given its limited resources, there was little else that could be done to arrest the implementation of the Macmillan Plan. Continuation and escalation of the EOKA struggle could eventually entangle Greece and Turkey in war. This was not acceptable for the Karamanlis administration because it would jeopardise its NATO membership and the potential losses of such a war outweighed the benefits of success. In other words the sacrifices that Greece had to make to regain Cyprus were too great to be borne and, even then, there was no guarantee of success. There was only one thing to be done and that was to climb down from the demand for enosis. The only person that could publicly renounce enosis, albeit with qualifications to soften the blow and call for a new direction, was Makarios. The embattled Karamanlis administration could not renounce enosis publicly because it would trigger a political crisis which it could barely afford. Only Makarios had enough authority and popularity to impress to the Greek public the need for a compromise settlement. The Archbishop who was kept au courant with the diplomatic activities of the Greek Government had realised that the situation called for a substantial concession to Turkey in order to block the Macmillan Plan. Desperate times,

204

† Makarios

called for desperate measures and it was in this frame of mind that Makarios decided to play his last trump card. By conceding that independence was acceptable, he gave to the Greek Government more freedom of movement in its pursuit for a solution. Yet there was mutual distrust between the Archbishop and the Greek Government. Makarios thought that the Greek Government was not doing enough for Cyprus, that it was too ‘soft’ and too subservient to its NATO allies. Karamanlis resented the hijacking of the Greek foreign policy by the Cyprus problem and by extension Makarios because of his strong opinions and his insistence on imposing his Cypriot-centric views on the Greek Government at the expense of its wider interests. Nevertheless, at the same time their respective efforts for a solution to the Cyprus problem were intertwined, with one party unable to operate without the help of the other. Karamanlis without the blessing of Makarios could not pursue a solution that went contrary to enosis, nor could he reach an understanding with Turkey if independence was not an option. Greco-Turkish rapprochement was crucial in settling the Cyprus issue and the proposal of an independent Cyprus was an integral element in restoring Greco-Turkish relations. On the other hand, Makarios had to rely on Greek diplomatic support because, as we saw, neither Britain nor Turkey were willing to talk to him. Britain ignored him completely while Turkey declared him a persona non grata. Only the Greek Government had the standing and capacity to negotiate an independence solution with Britain and Turkey, a reality that Makarios understood reluctantly. On 22 September 1958, Makarios gave an interview to the Labour MP Barbara Castle who was visiting Athens. During this interview the Archbishop told Castle that he ‘would be prepared to accept the status of independence for Cyprus on the condition that this status shall not be changed’.40 The idea of independence was not new. After all Makarios had spoken about the possibility of Cyprus becoming an independent state back in July 1957 provided enosis was not ruled out in the future.41 Spaak had also campaigned behind closed doors for an independent Cyprus as a means of healing this NATO rift. The most prominent advocate of Cypriot independence was the Indian UN representative and India’s

Makarios and the ‘Solution’ of Independence † 205 Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, who had stressed to the Greek UN delegation Indian willingness to support a pro-independence resolution. Unfortunately his proposal was rejected by Makarios during the proceedings of the Assembly in December 1957, because the Archbishop wanted to press on the draft resolution that called for the application of self-determination in Cyprus.42 What was special about this new proposal on independence was that it came directly from Makarios with the explicit condition that the future of the island would be subject to a UN guarantee. Up to this point the idea of independence was a half-baked plan, a stop-gap measure to overcome the obstacles to self-determination, but not a final solution. It was the first time that the Archbishop spoke favourably of independence in such an unequivocal manner, signalling a fundamental change in the Greek Cypriot attitude. This shift essentially paved the way for the Zurich agreement and momentarily at least closed the door on enosis. The second point that needs to be borne in mind is that Makarios, for the first time for such an important decision, did not seek consensus or the opinions of other Greek Cypriot personalities. Whereas in the past, notably during his discussions with Harding, he had tried to cultivate consensus among his community, now in stark contrast with all previous prevarication the Archbishop was simply announcing to the world at large, including the Greek Cypriots, this crucial change of policy. Grivas was sent a letter explaining this change of policy after the interview with Castle took place. The explanation offered by the Archbishop was telling in conveying the sense of desperation that had led him to the point of renouncing enosis for independence. ‘An imposition of the British plan – no matter how brave and determined the resistance of the Greek Cypriot people might be – would lead inevitably to partition’ or, as a best-case scenario, concede extensive rights to the Turkish Cypriots. For this reason the solution of independence was a tactical necessity as the international situation was no longer conducive to a pro-enosis solution.43 Makarios felt that that the implementation of the Macmillan Plan was so detrimental that it had to be stopped by any means, leading him to take this bold step knowing in advance that there would be a backlash against his announcement.

206

† Makarios

Grivas was upset with the independence suggestion and responded with his usual rambling manner criticising the Greek government that it ‘handled the Cyprus problem in a deplorable manner’ failing to make the most out of the struggle sacrifices for the sake of its allies. He rued the fact that ‘no coordination between the diplomatic and military struggle’ existed and wondered whether his exertions were considered hindrance to Greek diplomacy. On this point Grivas was correct. His unwillingness to accept the political limits dictated by diplomacy was instrumental in his problematic relations with the Greek Government and Makarios. This crucial dimension was entirely lost on the hot-headed Colonel. He disagreed with the political handling of the issue but promised to remain ‘a soldier’.44 Concluding, he warned he would address the ‘Greek and Cypriot people’ with ‘frankness’ if the struggle was lost. Grivas’ response was hardly reassuring; despite his promise not to express his discontent publicly, he did not give his support to the new initiative of Makarios. Moreover, he remained capable of complicating the situation by resisting the wishes of the Archbishop or even voicing his opposition to the new direction of events. Grivas’ refusal to support independence was keenly felt by Makarios, who enlisted the help of the Bishop of Kition to message Grivas to refrain from criticism at such a crucial stage lest it would split the Greek Cypriots. Again Grivas was not happy but for the moment held his peace.45 The person who felt no qualms in publicly denouncing Makarios’ new political line was the Bishop of Kyrenia. It was hardly surprising that the purist Bishop Kyprianos leapt at the chance to criticise Makarios publicly given their personal rivalry but also their sharp political differences. The danger was that the Bishop of Kyrenia, along with the other two exiles, could act as a rival pole to Makarios and challenge his leadership at a time when unity was required above everything else. On 24 September a statement by Kyprianos criticising the proposal of independence was published in the Greek press.46 The Bishop expressed his grief for the statement of the Archbishop and maintained that ‘only the Cypriot people’ had the ‘right to determine the political future of

Makarios and the ‘Solution’ of Independence † 207 the island’, accusing Makarios of usurping its will. Makarios’ response was minimal, stating that the Bishop of Kyrenia was entitled to his own opinion on the Cyprus question, but refused to enter into a public debate.47 The Bishop was unsuccessful in rallying popular support to his cause as on 25 September 1958, all the Cypriot mayors, including the mayor of Kyrenia, sent telegrams to the Archbishop expressing their full support for his leadership.48 Nevertheless, Kyprianos was undeterred by the lack of support for his insistence on enosis by all means until the bitter end. Makarios had a clear command of Greek Cypriot loyalties but there was one authority even higher, which Kyprianos hoped to sway to his cause. On 9 October 1958, Kyprianos along with the other two former exiles, Ioannidis and Papagathangelou, wrote directly to King Paul himself in a desperate effort to undermine both Makarios and the Greek Government. How impressed King Paul was with this plea is not clear but judging by the lack of response it is safe to conclude that the King was unmoved. The letter was an impassioned plea for firm action lest greater disasters would befall Greece. It warned that the ‘Nation’ would suffer even greater woes if the ‘cloud of defeatism and cowardice’ was allowed to spread over the country. Concluding, the three men beseeched the King, as ‘Father of the Nation’ to issue a royal proclamation that Greece would continue the struggle for the unfettered self-determination of ‘Hellenic Cyprus’.49 The lynchpin of their argument of why enosis was the only acceptable policy reveals a lot about the political make-up of the ‘Kyrenia Circle’, that was in constant opposition to the more pragmatic Makarios. While Cyprus was threatened with partition, they were worried that an independent Cyprus would lose its Hellenic character and be dominated by the Communists. Moreover, the solution of independence would vindicate AKEL, which from 1947 had chosen to support self-government but was rejected by the Ethnarchy as a betrayal of enosis, and allow it to make further inroads in the Cypriot public.50 This fanatical anticommunism of the Kyrenia Circle was in stark contrast with Makarios. For the former enosis had always been a safeguard against

208

† Makarios

communism; after all the Right rallied behind the cause of enosis in any meaningful manner only after the emergence of AKEL as a credible alternative to the dominance of the Ethnarchy. The Archbishop ideologically was not sympathetic to communism. Although he was wary of AKEL he viewed it with a degree of pragmatism that allowed them to co-exist peacefully. He had no wish to cooperate with AKEL but over the years, even more so after independence, he had come to appreciate that the communist party was not entirely intractable. Moreover, he felt confident that despite the strengths of his left-wing rivals, he could still command enough support to his person and the Ethnarchy in order to preserve its position in Cypriot politics. He was astute enough to realise that the danger of partition was far greater than his ideological differences with AKEL. Unfortunately his rivalry with the enosis purists and their criticism from the Right continued throughout his entire political career. In 1974 this internecine rivalry reached its climax, when he was removed from power on the pretext that he was faltering on the issue of enosis, while giving the excuse to Turkey to invade Cyprus. The opposition of the Kyrenia Circle failed to gather momentum as the majority of the Greek Cypriots rallied behind Makarios but the situation remained critical. Neither Britain nor Turkey showed much enthusiasm for this new initiative. For the British Government the idea of independence was ‘superficially the most attractive but in practice the worst solution’, because it would hand Cyprus to Makarios.51 Anything that would increase his importance was at this stage considered anathema. Instead it tried to play down the importance of this declaration as nothing particularly new.52 When Makarios submitted his proposal in a memorandum on 27 September 1958 to the British Government, he was completely ignored.53 Nevertheless the manner in which Makarios approached the British Government was clumsy. There were more efficient and discreet ways of sounding the British than submitting a short and dry memorandum with little more explanation. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership were equally unimpressed. On 24 September Fazıl Ku¨cu¨k54 declared that he did not trust the guarantees of Makarios, stating: ‘We believe

Makarios and the ‘Solution’ of Independence † 209 that an independent Cyprus means Enosis, because an independent government formed on the basis of the majority would be able to decide for union with Greece whenever it wishes’.55 Zorlu echoed similar sentiments by stating that independence can be granted only to communities and not to land. Since there were two communities in Cyprus, Turkey would happily accept Turkish Cypriot independence – that is, partition under another name.56 In light of the cool reception of his proposal by Britain and Turkey, Makarios’ brittle relations with the Greek Government were put to the test. On the surface there was agreement that independence was the only viable escape strategy from the quagmire of the Macmillan Plan but the strain of the failure of the enosis campaign was taking its toll. The latent tension between Makarios and Karamanlis on which was the best way to handle the Cyprus problem surfaced again. Makarios, unhappy with Karamanlis reluctance to go for broke, opined that ‘NATO should be warned that Greece will consider its position within it if the plan is imposed’. Karamanlis retorted that it was the first time the Archbishop was expressing such views and defended his government by reporting all the actions it had taken to stop the plan. ‘Beyond these actions’ he added sternly ‘there is nothing but an actual exit from NATO’. This was the crux of the matter: Makarios perceived NATO membership as a bargaining chip, leverage to be used to frighten Britain and the USA into acquiescing to the demand for enosis. In contrast Karamanlis, who had to take into account the fragile position of Greece in the Cold War Balkans, considered NATO membership a non-negotiable aspect of his policy. In the end Makarios toned down his criticism claiming that he had no complaints, just a ‘different evaluation regarding the limits of our actions’ which according to him ‘were not exhausted’. Karamanlis replied that the limits were defined by him and that he considered an exit from NATO as a ‘national danger’ and the conversation ended with both sides maintaining their respective views on this issue.57 Karamanlis resented how Makarios, an unelected leader of an island that did not belong to Greece, tried to dictate his foreign policy. The idea that the Cyprus problem should become the

210

† Makarios

monolithic pursuit of Greece was abhorrent to him both from a practical point of view as Greece had other vital national interests but also as a matter of principle. He could not and did not desire to surrender his foreign policy to the Archbishop of Cyprus. The personal message he conveyed to Vlachos before the latter was posted to the Consulate in Nicosia captures the attitude of Karamanlis on the Cyprus issue: ‘I will not blow up Greece for their sake! The Cypriots must cease to think that they can dictate to me the policy of Greece. I determine Greek policy and the limits within which it operates’.58 The fact that Makarios was so popular in Greece and was touted as his replacement for the premiership added a personal element in the fraught relations of the two men. It is interesting to note that whereas Makarios in his dealings with Grivas tended to urge restraint and had a greater appreciation of the political difficulties that beset the struggle, in his dealings with Karamanlis he tended to be more radical, urging for greater risks. This was due to the changing position of power Makarios experienced in his dealings with Grivas and Karamanlis respectively. With Grivas, Makarios felt that ultimately the responsibility was his, so he loathed the Colonel’s hot-headed excesses or his attempts to arrogate to himself political power. Whereas with when he dealth with Karamanlis, Makarios urged for riskier strategies. The impulse to demand more from Greece was reinforced by the general feeling that prevailed in Cyprus at the time, that Greece for the sake of its alliances had abandoned the Greek Cypriots. From his position of impotence in Athens, Makarios was particularly susceptible to this feeling of despair and naturally felt the need to express his concern about what was perceived to be a lukewarm response from the Greek Government. As he told Karamanlis, if he was to be asked whether the Greek Government had done ‘everything possible’ in blocking the British plan he ‘would not be able to respond positively’.59 The disagreement between the Archbishop and the Greek Government did not become public but Makarios’ anxiety about the vulnerability he felt regarding the new position he had taken expressed itself in a different manner. Despite the brave face he put on in public, privately the idea of independence was the result

Makarios and the ‘Solution’ of Independence † 211 of a very painful compromise. This contradiction between his identity as Ethnarch and the need for a more realistic line manifested itself on 20 November when he gave an interview to New York Times. Makarios had travelled to the USA in midNovember to follow the new UN debate on Cyprus. It is not clear if Makarios was misquoted or if things stated confidentially were actually used to compile the article but what was published did not help his cause. The Archbishop was quoted stating that he had received ‘encouragement from the State Department to make the claim for independence’ but out of fear of ‘Turkish reaction’ the US Government avoided making any announcements. He was also cited asserting that independence was a ‘concession’ but this did not mean ‘that the islanders did not still want eventual union with Greece’.60 Inevitably his statements attracted negative reaction. The State Department officially distanced itself from the comments of Makarios.61 Both British and Turkish officials armed with these statements argued that the Archbishop was now showing his true colours while unofficially the State Department informed the Greek Government that Makarios had attempted to expose them to the British and the Turkish governments. Averoff felt that the interview was a blow to the Greek effort in the UN, as it squandered a lot of hard-earned good will with the State Department.62 Even the Greek press criticised the interview, with one newspaper calling the whole incident a ‘great blunder’ which could only cause ‘great damage’.63 The sharp reaction to his interview forced Makarios to issue a new statement on 22 November to clarify his position, claiming he had been encouraged by ‘American circles’ and not by the American Government as it was reported by the New York Times.64 Whether this was enough to contain the damage caused will remain imponderable but this incident had a deeper significance in the psychological study of the Archbishop. It conveyed vividly the mixed feelings he had on the issue of independence, his reluctance to accept that enosis was forever lost but also his vulnerability now that he had made this important concession. On one hand, he wanted to present his proposal as an initiative that had the blessing of the USA and send the signal that

212

† Makarios

it was a concession made from a position of power rather than weakness and desperation. On the other hand, he wanted to address the anxiety of his people by paying a tribute to the strength of the spirit of enosis and even hinting that sometime in the future it could still be attainable. This divided impulse is important in understanding his wavering attitude on the Zurich constitution and his vacillation at the London Conference where the independence of Cyprus was officially signed. The Zurich Settlement The story of how the Zurich settlement was agreed between the Greek and Turkish governments needs not to detain us as it has been told elsewhere in great detail and skill.65 It suffices to say that after the end of the final UN battle on the Cyprus issue on 4 December Zorlu approached Averoff in a friendly mood which triggered the rapid rapprochement that ensued. On 6 December 1958, Averoff and Zorlu had a private meeting and discussed their respective position on the Cyprus problem. It was agreed to meet again a few days later in Paris where a NATO conference would be held.66 In their second meeting held on 16–18 December 1958, the two ministers compiled a memorandum that contained the points of agreement and disagreement.67 After this second meeting Pesmazoglou in Ankara was authorised to continue the diplomatic exchanges working hard to narrow the gap between the two sides. Makarios was not involved in any of these talks. Nevertheless Averoff prior to his third meeting with Zorlu in January 1959 met with the Archbishop and briefed him on the new state of affairs and the possibility of a breakthrough. In response to this new development Makarios cancelled a planned trip to Japan and the Far East, a move that underlined the gravity of the situation.68 According to the available documentation the two men determined the limits of the talks and only after the approval of the Archbishop, Averoff had his third meeting with Zorlu, which had a more substantive character.69 Between 17 and 21 January the third meeting of the two foreign ministers took place in Paris where more detailed negotiations took place.

Makarios and the ‘Solution’ of Independence † 213 Due to Turkish insistence for a conference to settle the issue Karamanlis decided to confer with Makarios before embarking on this bold move. At a meeting which took place on 29 January 1959, Makarios was given a detailed account of the progress of the Greek –Turkish talks.70 The Archbishop expressed his agreement with the handling of the Greek Government. He expressed his belief that ‘the Greek position would be the dominant one’ even if ‘the Turks were given privileges to guarantee their complete security’. He also demonstrated commendable realism regarding the proposed regime by stating that without those privileges ‘free political life in Cyprus would not be feasible’.71 It is interesting to note that in this meeting both Makarios and Anthimos casually brushed aside the issue of separate municipal councils, which subsequently caused so much trouble in the new-found republic as the study of Diana Markides so aptly demonstrates. Whereas Averoff had objected to the Turkish request for separate councils, the two prelates argued that since the danger of partition was shelved there was no need for the Greek Cypriots to subsidise the squalid Turkish quarters. The rationale was that no matter how much money would be spent, the Turkish Cypriots would always be unhappy, so if they were left to their own devices they would have no one to blame but themselves.72 Mistakenly Makarios underestimated the divisive nature of the separate municipalities, assuming that the Turkish Cypriot would be entrapped in selfimposed ghettoes. At the end of exhausting negotiations which took place in Zurich on 5–11 February 1959, Menderes and Karamanlis announced that a ‘compromise solution’ was achieved and were now ready to consult with Britain for trilateral negotiations to finalise the settlement.73 Karamanlis as soon as he returned to Athens on the evening of 11 February met with Makarios to brief him about the talks. The following day in a gruelling session that began early in the morning Makarios was given a detailed report and the Zurich texts, the proposed constitution, the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance. The Archbishop replied that he was satisfied with the agreements. He was also informed that Britain was about to call a five-party round-table conference

214

† Makarios

composed of British, Greek, Turkish, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot delegations to ratify the agreements and work out the final details. His response was that ‘he would bring up no point at all of the Zurich agreements for discussion’.74 Nevertheless somewhat ominously he also stated that ‘for reasons of order, the impression should not be created that the Cypriot representatives were being invited to the conference merely to be notified of what already had been agreed upon’. As it turned out this was an early indication that he would not simply accept the fait accompli of Zurich without attempting to improve the treaties. He requested to raise a few issues with the Turkish Cypriot leadership hoping that after agreement they could be modified. At this point Karamanlis eager to cement the approval of Makarios stated that it ‘could not be maintained that the Zurich agreements had been reached in absentia of the Cypriots’ since they strictly adhered to lines previously agreed by the Archbishop.75 According to Soulioti, this argument was disingenuous and unfair. A comparison of the records of Makarios’ briefing on 29 January and the actual Zurich agreement reveals at least four important issues of which Makarios was not aware before he saw the actual agreements.76 Briefly the four issues were: the provision of separate majorities in the House of Representatives for the enactment of certain legislative issues, which was in fact added after the suggestion of the Turkish delegation and the Greeks representatives failed to spot its wider significance.77 Nothing was stated previously by the Greek Government on the provision of ‘unilateral intervention’ which was given to Turkey under the Treaty of Guarantee. The setting up of a Tripartite Headquarters was previously broached but the Greek position had been ‘reserved’. Yet Cyprus was now encumbered with the Treaty of Alliance which specified the stationing of a Turkish and a Greek army contingent on its soil. Finally the extension of the Turkish vice-president’s veto power on internal security issues was against Makarios, wishes, who had previously expressed that the vicepresident’s veto should be reduced to specific issues. In light of these important differences, which ultimately caused friction and complicated the functioning of the Cyprus Republic the

Makarios and the ‘Solution’ of Independence † 215 hesitation of Makarios to sign the agreements becomes more understandable. Despite the framework of agreement between the Archbishop and the Greek Government, in the course of negotiations the Greek delegation deviated from the agreement and accepted clauses not previously discussed. Essentially Makarios was presented with a fait accompli. This does not mean that the Greek Government had misled Makarios on purpose but his lack of input during the negotiations turned out to be crucial, even if at the time was deemed instrumental for the successful fruition of the Greco-Turkish rapprochement. Nevertheless Makarios, overwhelmed by the information he was given, failed to appreciate the importance of these overlooked differences and reiterated that he would cause no problems in London. He merely wished to invite the five mayors and the acting Ethnarch Anthimos to join him.78 When the meeting ended Makarios withdrew to compile a statement to the press which he read first to Karamanlis. The statement expressed the satisfaction of the Archbishop and congratulated the Greek Premier for the ‘results of the Greek-Turkish discussions in Zurich’ which laid the foundations for ‘an immediate and final solution of the Cyprus problem’.79 This was subsequently released to the scores of journalists that had gathered outside waiting impatiently to report on this crucial meeting. It has been suggested that Makarios accepted the Zurich agreement out of fear that the continuation of the emergency in Cyprus would finally erode his prestige. Especially since he was no longer in the thick of action, unlike Grivas who by now had acquired a legendary status, there was the danger that his prolonged stay in Athens would eventually render him an irrelevancy.80 There is truth in this assessment but it does not tell the whole picture. His personal ambitions were always important but his concern for his people cannot be overlooked. There was genuine concern about the direction of events in Cyprus, which can be traced as far as his negotiations with Harding when he thought that he had the opportunity to stop the violence before it could get out of control. With the imposition of the Macmillan Plan he was presented with a force majeure which only the painful

216

† Makarios

compromise of independence could block. As he explained to Kranidiotis who had rushed to Athens from a trip abroad, the Zurich agreement ‘was the only way to avoid the implementation of the Macmillan Plan’.81 When Kranidiotis suggested that the Harding proposals were in fact better than the present agreement, the Archbishop replied: Maybe you are right [. . .] Faced with the danger of implementing the Macmillan Plan, which made Turkey a partner in Cyprus, Zurich is better. We must be realists. Today more than twenty EOKA fighters are condemned to death and are going to be executed. The people in Cyprus are being harassed by the British and the Turks. Even the passive resistance of EOKA with its boycott of British products had caused great discomfort to the people. A solution had to be given.82

Yet Makarios had second thoughts after a second and more careful reading of the documents. Specifically he was unhappy with the representative Greek and Turkish military forces that were to be stationed on the island, the Treaty of Guarantee and the clause of separate majorities in the House of Representatives, which we have already discussed. On the morning of 13 February 1959, Makarios summoned Vlachos to Grand Bretagne hotel to inform him that he could not accept the documents he had previously consented to. According to Vlachos it was evident that the Archbishop had not slept at all the previous evening, the strain of responsibility taking an obvious toll.83 When Karamanlis was informed of this he instructed Vlachos and Bitsios to visit Makarios and go over the agreements one more time and clarify the situation. Makarios now expressed ‘various reservations of secondary nature’ but also added that he found it hard to sign the agreements ‘without prior consultation with representatives of the Cypriot people’.84 Mayes argued this was a weak excuse for a leader of the Archbishop’s stature who enjoyed so much popularity to seek public approval.85 Bitsios reasoned that such a move would be an admission of his part that any party had the authority to

Makarios and the ‘Solution’ of Independence † 217 judge him on such a crucial policy issue to which he had been privy to, but to no avail.86 As we have seen previously this was the modus operandi of Makarios when he sensed that he was on the threshold of a momentous event. When he was presented with Harding’s proposals, he had asked from the Field Marshal extra time to consult with his people before a definite answer. It was his instinct as pastor, Ethnarch and Archbishop, but most of all part and parcel of his village politics of trying to please everybody and not to burn one’s bridges, to seek consensus and gain popular support. After all he was fully aware that his authority stood and fell with the endorsement of his flock, and as a good shepherd it was in character to ask for the opportunity to explain to them the need for the new direction rather than simply tell them. It is pertinent to bear in mind that the announcement of the Zurich agreement was sudden for the general public as the Greek – Turkish talks had been kept secret for fear of failure. Even Kranidiotis was not aware of the agreements until he had read in the press Makarios’ ringing endorsement. The Cypriot mayors were hostile to the sudden news as they felt that the Archbishop should have had consulted with them before praising the Greek Government. Despite the request of the Bishop of Kition and the Greek Consul General no congratulating telegrams were sent to Athens and the press was generally rather lukewarm as people were genuinely taken by surprise by this sudden announcement.87 Then there was the problem of Grivas and the cryptic silence he maintained over the issue of independence. Despite his isolation, he was not kept entirely in the dark as it has been maintained subsequently. Given the circumstances Grivas received adequate information about the progress of the Greek –Turkish talks and the prospect of an independent Cyprus. In early February he received three different letters from Makarios, Averoff and Azinas informing him about the ongoing Greek – Turkish dialogue and the possibility of a positive outcome. Especially Azinas’ letter gave a rough outline of the agreement that was being prepared, mentioning the creation of an independent Cyprus state, withdrawal of the British, participation of the Turkish Cypriots

218

† Makarios

in the administration and certain guarantees on specific issues.88 On 13 February Makarios sent another letter to Grivas informing him about the most basic points of the Zurich agreement and requesting EOKA’s endorsement.89 Yet such support was not forthcoming at a time when the Archbishop felt most vulnerable. According to Azinas the response of Grivas was eagerly anticipated because it was feared that he would respond with one of his fiery pamphlets, calling for a fight to the bitter end, which would hardly help the delicate situation.90 For all these reasons Makarios was wavering, wrestling with the burden of responsibility, unable to commit clearly to one course of action. He needed at least the tacit approval of Grivas to guard his flanks and secure the post-settlement peace. But he also needed to carry with him as much of the public opinion as possible and was reluctant to simply go against the grain. Later in the afternoon he held a long discussion with Kranidiotis, Anthimos the Bishop of Kition, Chrysostomos the Abbot of Kykko and Zenon Rossides who had flown to Athens to offer their support and counsel, and indicated his unwillingness to sign the agreements. The doubts we have mentioned above had swayed his judgment but he could not bring himself to reach a conclusion. His advisers were also split, with Anthimos and Chrysostomos advising an acceptance of the agreements, whereas Kranidiotis and Rossides were against it. In the end it was decided that Makarios would travel to London but if no improvement was possible he would refuse to sign the agreements.91 Before the Archbishop left his advisors for a fresh meeting with Karamanlis, he informed them that he was inviting the mayors and other representatives, including representatives of PEO, to canvass their opinions as well but his inclination remained negative.92 In this way he addressed the issue of the lukewarm reception of the Zurich news and fortified his own position irrespective of what his final decision would be. It was striking that he omitted to invite any EOKA members to Athens, even though there were two EOKA members in the list who attended in private capacity but not as the official representatives of the organisation.93 Grivas expressed his displeasure for not being asked to comment on the choice of representatives but

Makarios and the ‘Solution’ of Independence † 219 Makarios dismissed it claiming that, ‘Grivas does not know the Cypriots better than me’.94 In the evening of 13 February 1959, Makarios explained his reservations to Premier Karamanlis; this time the Treaty of Guarantee was cited as a major obstacle to accepting the agreements. Karamanlis replied in what was meant to be a reassuring argument but instead turned out to be somewhat prophetic; only due to Greek Cypriot fault the Treaty of Guarantee would ever have any effect on the political life of Cyprus. After more explanations and clarifications Karamanlis asked his intelocutor to state clearly whether he was prepared to travel to London and sign the agreements without seeking to reopen the negotiations. The Cypriot primate promised to give an answer the following morning.95 The next day Makarios had a stormy meeting with the advisers who had come from Cyprus. In the end following many altercations, disagreements and passionate pleas, it was decided that the Archbishop along with his advisers would travel to London.96 Then he sent a message to Karamanlis that he was now prepared to sign the agreements on the condition that the Greek Government would reveal nothing about the matter of British bases in Cyprus because he wanted to negotiate this issue in detail himself with the British.97 The arrival of Makarios in London after what had transpired since 1955 was bound to be eventful. The possibility, however remote, that he could be assassinated while on British soil meant that he became ‘the best-guarded’ man in Britain, as a Greek Cypriot newspaper reported.98 It was ironic how the man who three years ago was deported for fomenting terrorism was now accorded protection normally reserved for state dignitaries. Nevertheless Makarios failed to escape the wrath of the right-wing League of Empire Loyalists. Upon entering his hotel two members of the League began broadcasting anti-Makarios slogans.99 Even more bizarre was the action of another loyalist in Newcastle who filed for a warrant for the arrest of the Archbishop for conspiring ‘with Col. Grivas and other Greeks to seize the British isle of Cyprus for Greece’ but it was rejected as the British Government had long resolved that a prosecution of Makarios would be unprofitable.100

220

† Makarios

In the meantime the Archbishop in the company of his 35strong delegation was having fresh doubts. The majority of the Greek Cypriot delegates received details about the agreements for the first time and inevitably spotted different unfavourable clauses, fuelling Makarios’ feelings of doubt. On the morning of 16 February 1959, when the Greek Cypriot delegation convened for the first time, the majority was against the agreements.101 At the same time, the majority also indicated their willingness to follow the lead of the Archbishop, no matter what his decision might be. Makarios was now on the cusp of signing the agreements that would lay to rest his dream of enosis. Naturally his mind darted back to August of 1954 when he gave a solemn oath under the ‘holy domes’ of Phaneromeni church for ‘enosis and only enosis’ and his inaugural speech when he promised not to rest his eyes until the light of enosis would dawn in Cyprus. Naturally he found this a daunting prospect. He informed his advisors that if he could not achieve some changes he would refuse to sign the agreements. The following day during the first plenary session all interested parties, save the Archbishop, expressed their satisfaction and accord with the proposed agreements. Makarios expressed ‘some reservations on certain points over the draft resolution’ which appeared ‘to be workable’. He also indicated his willingness to meet with the Turkish Cypriot representatives, Denktash and Ku¨cu¨k, in the hope that he could persuade them to accept his reservations. It was decided to adjourn the meeting for 18 February.102 The Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers had still not arrived and their presence and signatures were needed in order to successfully complete the conference but the Archbishop’s last-minute reservations were threatening to upset the whole conference. As soon as Karamanlis arrived in London, on the evening of the same day, he arranged a meeting with Makarios to confront him about his new change of heart. In their discussion Karamanlis reiterated the positive aspects of the agreements and reminded the Archbishop of his earlier promise that he would cause no trouble in London.103 Makarios did not contradict Karamanlis, loath to

Makarios and the ‘Solution’ of Independence † 221 make the situation worse by drawing attention to the fact that the Zurich agreements contained points of substance he was not informed of previously.104 He declared that he had to act according to his conscience.105 When the other Greek Cypriots who were present106 pointed out the inconsistency of the Archbishop’s behaviour, Makarios replied: ‘Gentlemen, you may be right. But I abdicate from the leadership of the Cypriot struggle, which one of you may take over’.107 Karamanlis, fed up with Makarios’ prevarication, angrily declared before storming off from the meeting: Irrespective of what you will do, Your Beatitude, in order to prevent Greece from becoming the laughing stock, I will participate in the conference. But from this point onwards I terminate the Cypriot policy of the Greek government. If you would like to continue the struggle you will have to find support elsewhere.108

What actually happened during these two days, until the morning of 19 February when Makarios decided to sign the agreements, is not easy to establish because all the sources that give details of how the events unfolded are drawn from memoirs and personal accounts. A degree of caution must be exercised especially in light of the accusation by certain Greek Cypriots that Greek officials tried through flattery to sway the Greek Cypriot representatives in order to undermine Makarios or that the Archbishop was subject to psychological pressure to change his mind and sign the agreements.109 Beyond any doubt those were stressful times and Makarios was already under a lot of pressure by virtue of the momentous decision he was called upon to make: to sign the agreements that would create an independent republic of Cyprus or refuse to do so and allow the uncertainty and bloodshed of the Emergency to carry on without substantial hope in sight. The responsibility was crushing, which explains his indecision as he was torn between what he thought was politically necessary and the ideal of enosis he represented as Ethnarch.

222

† Makarios

Averoff on the morning of 18 February met with the Greek Cypriot delegation with Makarios present to explain one more time the advantages of the agreements.110 He also declared unequivocally that the Zurich agreements were the final effort of the Greek Government. If the agreements were to be rejected, Karamanlis was determined to hold elections on this issue and if successful he would cease supporting the Cypriot cause.111 This was a grave statement and given the stressful conditions prevailing in Dorchester Hotel it is understandable how this could have been construed as a form of blackmail. In the absence of more details from the available documents it is hard to reach a conclusion. It is pertinent to bear in mind that the Karamanlis administration felt that the stakes were high and could no longer afford to have its foreign policy held hostage to the Cyprus problem nor could tolerate further Makarios’ indecision. In fact it is unclear what more the Greek Government could do apart from continuing to support a futile struggle that was almost bound to slide to partition. The Greek Cypriot delegation had another meeting and discussed the issue further; this time the majority gave to the Archbishop a carte blanch to take whichever decision he thought appropriate. Only eight representatives, including the five left-wing mayors, insisted that Makarios had to reject the agreements.112 Nevertheless Makarios was unshaken from his position, although most of his advisers adopted a more sober outlook. In the secondary plenary session as expected the Archbishop refused to sign the agreements. As Ku¨cu¨k revealed to the other members of the conference the reservations Makarios had mentioned in the previous session were all raised and discussed with the Turkish Cypriot delegation but were unacceptable because the Archbishop was essentially asking them to ‘compromise on the compromise’. Makarios found himself in an awkward position, uncomfortable and paradoxical in equal measures. On one hand he was thrust into the limelight as the outcome of the conference hinged upon his pending agreement, but on the other he did not have the power to make the changes he wished in order to make the whole arrangement more palatable to himself and his people. Despite his

Makarios and the ‘Solution’ of Independence † 223 pleading that he should not be ‘faced with a take it or leave it’ situation and that even a few small changes would mean the world to him he was met with stiff resistance. Reopening the negotiations was unacceptable. Eventually Selwyn Lloyd who was acting as a Chairman asked for a straight answer, whether the Archbishop was ready to accept the agreements ‘in essence as the foundation of the final settlement’. Makarios was clearly wrestling with his conscience weighing up the possibilities but being too stubborn to give up on his principles evaded the question by insisting that he needed more time to ponder the question. In the end the timely intervention of Averoff in combination with Zorlu’s sympathetic concern regarding Makarios’ position of responsibility earned the Archbishop a few more hours. It was agreed that he would give a definite answer the following day.113 The additional time that was requested for one last examination of his conscience and a final painful introspection before making his decision. According to Mayes he spent most of his time in contemplation and prayer seeking divine guidance in the task providence had allotted to him.114 Before he was left all by himself for the long hours of the early morning his restless peace was disturbed on three occasions. Queen of the Hellenes Fredericka herself called from Athens asking him to sign the agreements for the sake of Greece. Then Hugh Gaitskell, the leader of the Labour Party, also phoned appealing for a positive response lest the conference would fail. Finally Foot paid him one last visit to make one final plea for the sake of Cyprus, and then the Ethnarch was left all by himself.115 Whatever advice, admonition or warning he could possibly receive had been dispensed. All he had to do now was to weigh the matter one more time and give one simple answer, to accept the agreements and secure peace in Cyprus despite all the shortcomings of the settlement or reject and face the consequences of the continuation of the Emergency. By the crack of dawn he had finally reached the decision to sign the agreements. In the end, as he subsequently reasoned, the fear of partition outweighed his reservations about the agreements and he chose what he thought to be the lesser evil.116 Before signing the agreements he informed his advisors

224

† Makarios

that he took all the responsibility upon himself and did not consider them accountable for his decision to accept the agreements.117 He called the Foreign Office and declared his willingness to sign the agreements. There was a further twist to the signing of the agreements that is worth recounting here. After the treaties were ratified Makarios approached Karamanlis who was conversing with Averoff and said:118 ‘Did you really believe, Mr President, that I would not sign the agreements?’ ‘Why then all the turmoil you caused for two days with your last-minute refusal?’ ‘I had my reasons’, replied Makarios evasively and according to another source he added that he would explain at some point but such an explanation was never offered.119Averoff suggested that Makarios had always intended to sign the agreements and his refusal to sign was not because of the reservations he cited but was down to another preoccupation. Makarios had to protect his reputation as a tough negotiator and was anxious to avoid the accusation that he had surrendered too much, too willingly. After all he took pride in his brinksmanship. Even more importantly he was desperate to avoid the impression that the treaties were something that the Greek Cypriots would simply have to accept without any input. Such anxiety was expressed both at the conference but also before departing from Athens. In addition Makarios had hoped to make certain changes to the agreements, hence his efforts to approach the Turkish Cypriots and his insistence that some tweaking of the treaties could render the whole thing more acceptable. When he realised that despite his negotiating skills he could not achieve any improvements he finally agreed to sign.120 There is substance to this theory but as Soulioti argued to ‘attempt to describe Makarios’ state of mind during the two days of the London Conference by reducing it to a simple question of whether he did or did not at all stages intend to sign the agreements is unrealistic’. More realistically he underwent a lot of agonising changes and one must bear in mind that he was essentially asked to accept a fait accompli to which he

Makarios and the ‘Solution’ of Independence † 225 had no input whatsoever. He alone bore responsibility vis-a`-vis the Greek Cypriots for abandoning enosis. The hard task of implementing the agreements would fall upon him along with blame in case of a breakdown. In other words the consequences of the agreements would follow him for the rest of his political career and the defects he perceived made it hard for him to sign. As a result he felt keenly the shortcomings of the agreements which troubled his conscience but the decision of the Greek Government to honour its signature no matter what left him in a difficult situation. In the end he voiced his objections in order to record them for the future and in anticipation of the accusations that he was a traitor, attempted to revise what he could, but once he realised that it was impossible, he was reduced to the unhappy position of accepting the agreements over the continuation of the Emergency.121 With the signing of the agreements Makarios was finally free to return to Cyprus and begin the long process of state-building and to heal the wounds of the struggle both within the Greek Cypriot community and also with the Turkish Cypriots, with whom he was expected to share the administration of the island. On 1 March 1959, after almost three years of exile, Archbishop Makarios arrived in Cyprus. In the past the return of the Archbishop from his frequent travels abroad had always been an occasion for celebration but this time the preparations and the scale of enthusiasm dwarfed any previous occasions. Despite the uncertainty felt about the agreements, no Greek Cypriot had ever imagined that Cyprus would end up as an independent republic, the very arrival of their Ethnarch after three years of bitter exile and after so much suffering and woes was an occasion for celebration. There were questions about the new state of affairs but there was no doubt about the affection and devotion the average Greek Cypriot felt for Makarios, especially after his forceful separation from them. This affection translated into a most impressive welcome that the Greek Cypriots had ever put for any personality in modern history. According to a Greek reporter about 150,000 people turned out in the small square in front of the Archbishopric to welcome Makarios back, under the

226

† Makarios

watchful eye of 400 representatives of the foreign press who were strategically placed on the roof of Severios library.122 The numbers and logistics of this welcome tell their own story. One village 150 km away from Nicosia, in an age when private ownership of an automobile was a privilege of the few, out of a total population of 600, was able to send 312 people to Nicosia to catch a glimpse of their beloved Archbishop. According to the Times of Cyprus, villages with strong nationalist credentials such as Palechori were left entirely empty, with only watchdogs guarding the derelict properties of the villagers who had taken the pilgrimage to the Archbishopric palace.123 On Sunday morning 20,000 cars from all corners of the island converged on Nicosia carrying with them a crowd of flag-waving Greek Cypriots. The journey from the airport, on account of numerous interruptions by the adoring crowds who wanted to come as close as possible to their Ethnarch, lasted for one hour and 17 minutes. Makarios stood erect in an open car decorated in the Greek colours, greeting and blessing the crowds. At the entrance of Nicosia a make-shift arch of triumph was erected to declare to all and sundry that this was indeed a day of triumph and joy.124 When he finally reached the Archbishopric Palace under the cheers of the crowds, he went to the Cathedral of St Ioannis, the starting and ending point of all his travels. Once inside the cathedral he ceremoniously kissed the bible before the altar and then in an apotheosis of cheers he sat on the Archiepiscopal Throne which had remained vacant during his exile. After a brief thanksgiving liturgy he was ushered into the back entrance of the Palace, pursued by weeping women who were only deterred by a human cordon of Ethnarchy minders. Finally Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus in full regalia appeared at the balcony of the Archbishopric Palace and after a welcoming by Bishop of Kition, he addressed the crowds who were patiently waiting for his words. Even the collapse of a nearby building, overloaded by people anxious to catch a glimpse, did not spoil the mood as luckily no one was hurt seriously. After the anticipated praise to God for his safe arrival to his home island following so many trials and a brief introduction he declared majestically to the crowds: ‘We have

Makarios and the ‘Solution’ of Independence † 227 won! Cyprus today is free. Celebrate brothers. Raise your head up high’.125 This impressive welcome went a long way to dispel the worry in the Archbishop’s mind regarding his own popularity. Even if the agreements were unpopular, there was no doubt that his popularity was undiminished which granted him all the necessary political credit for the hard task ahead. The most pressing concern, Grivas, was soon to be resolved with the latter’s declaration on 9 March 1959, calling the Greek Cypriots to unite behind Makarios and support him ‘in his difficult task’. On 17 March 1959, in accord to the amnesty agreed between the Archbishop and Foot, Grivas left Cyprus and returned to Greece as a war hero.126 There were still many loose ends in the aftermath of the struggle until the actual declaration of independence on 16 August 1960 but the departure of Grivas was crucial in paving the way to the normalisation of the island and the inevitable political ascendancy of Makarios. For the time being the Grivas factor was neutralised and Makarios had the freedom to stamp his authority in the new state of affairs. Yet the paradoxes associated with the leadership of Makarios persisted and were reinforced further. Despite the failure of the struggle to achieve enosis there was little doubt who was going to be the first President of the Republic of Cyprus as he received twice as many votes as his opponent in the elections held on 14 December 1959. His election as president underpinned his political leadership of the Greek Cypriot community with a legal framework cementing it further but it also made him the official Head of State of Cyprus. Considering how close to ruin Cyprus was during the summer of 1958 and the alienation of Makarios from Cypriot affairs, the new era appeared to be promising. Makarios with a reinforced aura of authority and the experience of the anti-colonial struggle under his belt was to preside over a united independent Cyprus and dedicate himself to the task of state-building. Nevertheless appearances in the case of the Archbishop were usually misleading. Enosis was dead but not its ghost. Its supporters with Grivas acting as its focal point from Athens were still bitter about the renunciation of enosis and were willing to

228

† Makarios

antagonise Makarios and the new-found republic. In addition most of the ardent enosis supporters were now decorated heroes by virtue of their participation in the EOKA struggle, which gave their voice special gravity. Thus the opposition from the extreme Right was to continue with new vigour and determination. Relations with AKEL, the most numerous and disciplined party, remained awkward, partly a legacy of the past but partly because a close association with the communist party could damage the nationalist credential of the Ethnarch at a time when the US was to take an increasing interest in Cypriot affairs. Finally Makarios had to nurse his brittle relations with the Turkish Cypriots who were now partners in the bi-communal republic and could not be ignored without attracting untoward attention from Turkey, which now had a legal standing in Cyprus alongside Greece and Britain. His task of steering between the desire for enosis from the extreme Right and the Turkish Cypriots’ demands for equality was compounded by a complex and unwieldy constitution. On a personal level the tension between his religious and political nature was now even more pronounced because the presidential office complicated further his task. As President of Cyprus he was bound to follow policies that were not always in accordance with his role as Ethnarch the custodian of the tradition of enosis. How successful he would manage the pitfalls that lay ahead in this new beginning remained to be seen.

Conclusion The departure point of this book was to pose the question of Archbishop Makarios III’s dilemmas, preoccupations and ultimate goals. As has been noted, despite being one of the prime agents in the history of Cyprus in the years 1950– 9, his motives, aims, hopes and political aspirations remained surprisingly underexplored. Moreover, because of the manner he dominated Greek Cypriot affairs, his role has been subsumed within the larger narrative of Cypriot history, creating the paradox of a presence that is ubiquitous yet inscrutable. It did not set out a conventional overarching question to drive its overall structure. As a general rule, personalities are hard to pin down, as people change and evolve over time, often expressing contradictory emotions and convictions at different points, confounding even the most persistent researcher. Makarios was not an exception to this rule. In fact, he was, if anything, elusive by nature, and self-contradictory on account of the conflicting positions he came to occupy over the course of his political career. The objective, instead, was to contextualise Makarios’ actions and agenda on the one hand, and on the other to extract the impact of his role from the broader narrative, thereby to present a measured understanding of his politics and to dispel the mysticism surrounding him. Perhaps the most striking contradiction is that, although we know his actions and their impact quite well, we hardly know anything about the motives that drove him to those actions. This is the main question addressed here. It may appear to be a somewhat straightforward question, but, in order to be answered adequately, it requires a careful and nuanced understanding of a personality which appears to defy simplistic explanations. Although the method adopted has been essentially chronological, and, due to this, has inevitably recapped the main

230

† Makarios

phases and themes of the Cyprus struggle between 1950 and 1959, it has done so by focusing sharply on the distinctive role of Makarios himself. What this book aimed to achieve was striking a balance between the heroic portrayals of Makarios’ supporters and the demonisation he was often subjected to by both his Cypriot and non-Cypriot detractors. Extreme interpretations of the Archbishop, whether negative or positive, have contributed to a mystification which obscures the actual historical record. To cast Makarios as an extraordinary individual, who can only be interpreted in absolute Manichaean terms is, to recall E.H. Carr’s famous lectures on the nature of history, ‘altogether inadequate – so inadequate as to be altogether misleading’.1 Indeed a historian should not deal in such absolutes. For beyond the said mystification there was a highly gifted tactician with certain flawed characteristics, who was surrounded by intense pressures which might have defeated even more experienced politicians. The pressures associated with political responsibility are an important theme in assessing his career, especially because any mistake was likely to be multiplied due to the inherent weakness of the position Makarios held. Consider, for example, British attitude on the future of Cyprus. Despite initially insisting that they would stay in Cyprus forever, they revised this position by resolving that they could acquiesce to a change of status as long as military bases were retained, then tried to retain sovereignty by inviting Greece and Turkey to help in administrating the two communities, only to finally accept independence. The British position was thus constantly being revised in light of imagined and real threats, and often according to political expediency. Such radical policy revisions were a luxury Makarios could not afford, which to some extent explains his intransigence. The validity of all praises and criticisms of the Archbishop must therefore be evaluated within the specific historical context he operated, bearing in mind how weak his position throughout this period was. Ultimately, any judgment must be made in the light of empirical evidence and not according to partisan viewpoints and above all avoid ex post facto criticism.

Conclusion † 231 Chapter 1 discussed the historical background of the Church of Cyprus, its relation to Greek nationalism, and how it came to be the custodian of Greek consciousness in Cyprus. This was done to account for the political role of the Church of Cyprus and by extension why Makarios, as Archbishop, was the de facto political leader of the Greek Cypriot community. In addition it conveyed the sense of historical tradition associated with the mantle of the Archbishop. He carried this burden self-consciously throughout his political career, with his desire for enosis being a fundamental aspect of his political outlook. In Chapter 2, after a brief discussion of his formative years, we saw the immediate background to his election as Archbishop. The struggle between Left and Right in the Greek Cypriot community and the reinvigoration of the Ethnarchy as the prominent nationalist institution marked the early political career of Makarios. More importantly, it left him with a deep distrust for communism and the mandate to promote enosis by all means, lest AKEL was to rise again to challenge the dominance of the Church. In Chapter 3 we saw the efforts of Makarios to promote enosis against the wishes of both the British and of the Greek government. Against the British he rallied Greek Cypriot resentment of British rule and harnessed it into a popular mass movement of resistance with enosis as its goal. This was accomplished through hard work, but also by using his charisma to capture the imagination of his audience. His fraught relations with the Greek government, a theme that runs throughout the whole book, were discussed. He was often in conflict with the Greek government on account of their divergent opinions on the significance of the Cyprus problem in the overall foreign policy of Greece. Nevertheless, in the end the Greek government did appeal to the UN on behalf of Cyprus, which marked the beginning of the internationalisation of the Cyprus problem. The effort to internationalise the issue, however, did not bear fruit, and for this reason Makarios started to contemplate a different approach to secure enosis. This was discussed in detail in Chapter 4, where his complex relationship with violence, his ambivalence towards it, and his reluctant endorsement of it as a

232

† Makarios

means to exert extra pressure on the British was explored. His nuanced relationship with violence was developed further in Chapters 5 and 6 to reach the conclusion that despite appearances Makarios was not the man of blood which the hostile British media presented him as during the Emergency. Chapter 4 also introduced the problematic dynamics of the relationship of Makarios with Grivas. A vital argument developed in this book is that from the beginning there were crucial differences in the outlook of the two men, which inevitably brought them in disagreement over the aims and especially the means of the struggle. The traditional portrayal in the official Greek Cypriot historiography that the two men cooperated harmoniously is challenged. This theme was pursued further in Chapter 5, 7, and 8, when on different occasions Makarios and Grivas disagreed on points of substance. Chapter 5 engaged with what is arguably the most critical stage in the Archbishop’s political career in the period under scrutiny. It argued that the negotiations with Harding were the only chance Makarios had to secure a settlement that could potentially lead to enosis. Equally importantly, it was an opportunity to end the struggle before violence escalated further and complicated the issue more. This was crucial to Makarios because he only accepted the option of violence as a last resort, and continued to find it abhorrent. His effort to reach an agreement was thwarted by obstacles which ultimately proved insurmountable. Mutual lack of trust, the inadequate British proposal and internal opposition, were crucial factors militating against his impulse to cooperate with the British. Therefore the collapse of the talks was a personal defeat and a reversal for the moderate approach he represented. In Chapter 6 the consequences of the deportation of Makarios were discussed along with its impact on the EOKA struggle and the political future of Cyprus. It also examined how the exile affected the psychological disposition and political outlook of the Archbishop and more specifically how the lesson of the deportation convinced him that the struggle had to end. This was because he was wary of how violence tended to get out of his

Conclusion † 233 control, and did not subscribe to the logic that a liberation struggle automatically required unconditional sacrifices. Chapter 7 discussed how Makarios attempted to terminate the EOKA struggle, but, due to a combination of reasons, he found it impossible to take such a leap of faith. The refusal of Grivas to accept that violence had served its purpose, combined with the reluctance both of Makarios and the Greek government to take full responsibility for the decision to end the struggle, posed grave difficulties. Moreover, Makarios had no concrete gain in hand to help him sell this ‘unorthodox’ idea, and an entirely rational approach to this burning question was not conducive to his archiepiscopal credentials. As a result, the idea was dismissed, and instead Makarios settled for a half-hearted compromise of a mere suspension of hostilities in an effort to apply a modicum of control over Grivas. This arrangement gave him a breathing space in which to negotiate an agreement, but he failed to do so because the British chose to ignore him, being more preoccupied with securing Turkish support for their Cypriot policy. British admission that partition could be a final solution (effectively outflanking the tactical value of EOKA), the emergence of the Turkish Cypriot campaign for partition, Grivas’ vindictive campaign against AKEL jeopardising Greek Cypriot unity, and the inability of Greece to promote enosis through international pressure, all affected Makarios’ outlook. It was becoming evident that the pursuit of enosis had become counterproductive and there was a need for a strategic reorientation. His dramatic shift to the solution of independence was analysed in the final chapter. In response to the danger of the Macmillan Plan, the Archbishop proposed an independent Cyprus, something which eventually Turkey accepted in order to negotiate an agreement with Greece. It also dealt with Makarios’ reluctance to sign the Zurich – London agreements and argued that the Archbishop had valid reasons to object to the agreements, contrary to previews analyses. In the end, however, he was left with no other choice but to sign the agreements, establishing an independent republic of Cyprus.

234

† Makarios

By carefully evaluating Makarios’ motives and actions, this book has unpacked all the contradictions that made up his complex personality. The question we posed at the outset, of what his dilemmas, preoccupations, and ultimate goals were, and, most importantly, why he did what he did, is thereby answered. Aspects of his political career that were previously unknown or understudied, like his relationship with EOKA and especially with Grivas, his attitude to violence, his ambitions for the direction of the struggle, his fraught relations with successive Greek governments, and his attitude toward AKEL and communism, have been subjected to a detailed analysis. Makarios thus emerges as something more than an ambiguous character with unfathomable motives. He certainly cultivated a purposeful ambiguity and appeared contradictory on many occasions, especially when considering the dichotomy between his public and private personas. Whatever his shortcomings may have been from a British, Greek or Turkish perspective, his actions and choices had an internal logic of their own, a reflection of his very distinctive position as Ethnarch and ‘national’ leader, and the need to accommodate a rapidly shifting political and tactical environment. Through careful contextualization of the man, his actions and mistakes become explicable and subject to dispassionate historical scrutiny. Archbishop Makarios remains controversial to the present day, and still casts a shadow over the Cypriot political landscape. His name crops up frequently as all major towns have an avenue dedicated to his name, as well as schools, hospitals, and even football stadiums. Makarios is inevitably a permanent point of reference in any historical overview of the Cyprus problem, which remains a staple issue in the political discourse of the island. The elusive search for a lasting and comprehensive solution to the Cyprus dispute inexorably leads Greek Cypriot thoughts to the man whose political career has been so intimately intertwined with the fortunes of their entire community. The prolonged deadlock has been unkind to his legacy. There is the temptation to ascribe past Greek Cypriot mistakes uncritically on him without any qualification. The almost religious reverence that was

Conclusion † 235 accorded to him by mainstream media and by the government’s official line until the end of the 1980s, during that time any hint of criticism was silenced, has now provoked a natural backlash. In recent decades, the critics of Makarios have multiplied. In addition to the criticism from the extreme Right, which still holds him responsible for ‘selling out’ enosis, there is also a section of the Greek Cypriot public that, due to its desire for a solution, is inclined to view the career of the Archbishop through a revisionist lens, and sometimes even to cast him as a scapegoat for the current predicament of Cyprus. Moreover, his style of political leadership was of a different era of mass politics, which no longer corresponds to the current political reality. Hartley’s literary insight that ‘the past is a foreign country; they do everything different there’ is particularly true in this case.2 Contemporary Cypriots invariably inhabit an entirely different world from the one, in which the charismatic Makarios became an almost messianic political figure of international recognition. As the memory of this bygone era fades, the new generations of Cypriots, who have no firsthand experience of the foreign country that Makarios dominated, are more likely to hold negative or at best apathetic views of his legacy. The religious aspect of his identity is especially problematic to some people as the secularisation of Cypriot politics glosses over the particular historical context which gave birth to the phenomenon of the Archbishop as a political leader. The decline of Makarios’ personal stock could not have been captured better than by the removal of his gigantic statue, in 2008, from the courtyard of the Archbishopric Palace. For years, the ten-metre statue stood as an apt tribute to the disproportionate influence Makarios exerted on Cypriot affairs. After a decision by the current Archbishop, the statue was relocated to the resting place of Makarios, close to Kykkos monastery. Although the removal was heavily publicised, it barely provoked a negative reaction. Instead the move was applauded since the statue was deemed to be an ‘eyesore’. In its place a life-size marble statue has been erected but, as a British holidaymaker tellingly remarked, the replacement went from ‘one extreme to the other’.3 Indeed, it

236

† Makarios

is possible that, in the grips of an understandable revisionism, Makarios will be relegated from the adored leader of the 1950s to an embarrassing, anachronistic, meddlesome priest. Such a verdict would be cruel and unfair for the most prominent Cypriot leader. A detached appreciation of his politics along with his shortcomings is certainly pivotal in furthering our understanding of Cypriot history, but it is vital to bear in mind the adage: ‘Those who write history have the gift of revision, while those who make it get only one chance.’

Notes 1

Church, Nationalism and Politics before 1950

1. A. Vlachos, Mia worά ki έna kairό έna6 diplvmάth6 [Once upon a time a diplomat, vol. 4] (Athens, 1986), pp. 210 – 11. 2. The Times, 2 March, 1959. It estimates that a crowd of 150,000 converged to Nicosia to welcome the archbishop. According to the census of 1956 the Greek Cypriot population was 416,986; Cyprus Population Estimates, October 1956, Cyprus Government (Nicosia, 1957). 3. The Times, 18 April 1957. 4. G. Theodoulou, The Origins and Evolution of Church-State Relations in Cyprus (Nicosia, 2005), pp. 2 – 4. 5. Ibid., pp. 9–14; P. N. Venezis, Makarios: Faith and Power (London, 1971), p. 38. 6. Venezis, Makarios: Faith and Power, p. 39. 7. For a brief and good discussion on the relations of the Orthodox Church with Ottoman administration see Theodore Papadopoullos, ‘Orthodox Church and civil authority’, Journal of Contemporary History, 2 (1967), pp. 201 – 9. 8. T. S. Bahcheli, ‘Communal discord and the stake of interested governments in Cyprus, 1955– 1970’ (PhD thesis, LSE, 1972), p. 23n.1. 9. A. Alexandris, The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918– 1974 (Athens, 1983), p. 21. 10. Papadopoullos, ‘Orthodox Church and civil authority’, p. 202. 11. G. S. Georghallides, A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus 1918 – 1926 (Nicosia, 1979), p. 56. 12. G. Hill, A History of Cyprus (Cambridge, 1952), p. 316. 13. Theodolou, Origins and Evolution of Church-State Relations in Cyprus, p. 39. 14. Quoted in P. Persianis, Church and State in Cyprus Education (Nicosia, 1978), p. 9. 15. B. Englezakis, ‘The Church of Cyprus in the Eighteen and Nineteenth Centuries’, Studies on the History of the Church of Cyprus, trans. By Norman Russell (Aldershot, 1995), p. 249. 16. P. N. Venezis, Makarios, Pragmatism Vs Idealism (Abelard-Schuman, 1974), p. 42. 17. R. Katsiaounis, Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus During the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century (Nicosia, 1996), p. 13.

238

† Notes to Pages 7 – 10

18. However the Church continued to collect its customary dues with the support of the Ottoman regime and retained its wealth. This practice changed only under British rule; see below. 19. Georghallides, A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus, pp. 56 – 7; Theodolou, Origins and Evolution of Church-State Relations in Cyprus, pp. 45 – 6. 20. R. Holland and D. Markides, The British and the Hellenes (Oxford, 2006), p. 167. 21. Georghallides, A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus, pp. 59 – 61; Theodolou, Origins and Evolution of Church-State Relations in Cyprus, pp. 49 – 53. 22. According to Englezakis this incident sparked off protests in all the towns in Cyprus and eventually captured even the attention of Queen Victoria; B. Egglezakis, Studies on the History of the Church of Cyprus (Aldershot, 1995), pp. 427– 8. 23. Holland & Markides, The British and the Hellenes, p. 167. 24. Georghallides, Political and Administrative History of Cyprus, p. 61; Egglezakis, Studies on the History of the Church of Cyprus, p. 428. 25. Katsiaounis, Labour, Society and Politics, p. 76. 26. Quoted in G. Hill, A History of Cyprus (Cambridge, 1952), p. 297. Hill contended that it was the Bishop of Kition who made the declaration, but he also mentions that there is controversy regarding the identity of this bishop as according to some other sources which he cites the quote is attributed to the Archbishop Sophronios. See footnote 8 on p. 297. This ambiguity was investigated by Katsiaounis who arrived at the conclusion that the address did not actually occur in the romantic way it has been presented in Greek historiography and uncritically reproduced in English literature as well. More likely it was an ex posto facto invention of Greek Cypriot historians. See Katsiaounis, Labour, Society and Politics, pp. 25 –8 and Andrekos Varnava, ‘Sophronios III, 1865– 1900, The last of the “old” and the first of the “new” Archbishop-Ethnarch’, in The Archbishops of Cyprus in the Modern Age: The Changing Role of the Archbishop-Ethnarch, their Identities and Politics (Newcastle, 2013), eds A. Varnava and M. N. Michael, pp. 118– 24. 27. R. S. Peckham, National Histories, Natural States (London, 2001), p. 38. 28. P. M. Kitromilides, ‘Greek irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus’, Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy (London, 1990), XII, p. 4; P. M. Kitromilides, ‘The dialectic of intolerance: ideological dimensions of ethnic conflict’, Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy, XII, p. 20. 29. Hill, op. cit., p. 496. See also pp. 488–568, for a history of the enosis movement. 30. When Cyprus was assigned to Britain in 1878 it was agreed that Britain would pay the surplus revenue of the island to the Porte. The agreed fixed sum was a serious financial drain of an already economically impoverished economy. What added insult to the injury was that the tribute was deposited in the Bank of England to pay off an earlier Ottoman war loan which the Ottoman authorities could not afford to pay, and had been guaranteed by the British and the French governments. Thus the Cypriots ended up paying a loan which had no connection with their own affairs. The tribute was opposed both by Greek and

Notes to Pages 10 – 14 † 239

31. 32. 33. 34.

35. 36.

37.

38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

Turkish Cypriots even though their motives were different. The latter wanted the tribute to be paid to the Porte as a sign of continued Ottoman sovereignty over the island, whereas Greek Cypriots came to associate the tribute with British oppression. Holland & Markides, The British and the Hellenes, pp. 169– 71. Kitromilides, ‘The dialectic of intolerance’, XII, pp. 13– 14. Ibid., pp. 15 – 17. For an overview of different historiographical responses on the issue of the relations of Church and state nationalism in Greece, see A. Anastassiadis, ‘Religion and politics in Greece: The Greek Church’s “conservative modernization” in the 1990s’, Research in Question, No. 11 – January 2004, pp. 11 – 13. P. M. Kitromilides, ‘“Imagined communities” and the origins of the national question in the Balkans’, M. Blinkhorn and T. Veremis (eds), Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality (Athens, 1990), pp. 53 – 9. For example, Archbishop Kyprianos who eventually was executed by the Turkish governor had in fact warned, in 22 April 1821, his flock to surrender their arms to Ottoman authorities and declared his loyalty to the Sultan; see Katsiaounis, Labour, Society and Politics, p. 12. E. Hatzivassiliou, The Cyprus Question, 1878– 1960: The Constitutional Aspect (Minneapolis, 2002), p. 26. In 1925 when Cyprus became a Crown Colony, the High Commissioner was elevated to the status of Governor and the Council was reform without any actual change taking place. Greek members increased to 12, official members to nine and the Turks retained their seats. This ensured the continuation of the neutralisation of Greek majority, p. 34. D. Markides and G. S. Georghallides, ‘British attitudes to constitution-making in post-1931 Cyprus’, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 13 (1995), p. 69. Hill, History of Cyprus, p. 605. P. Arnold, Cyprus Challenge (London, 1956), pp. 38 and 43. Post-1931 members in municipal councils were appointed by the Governor. Grivas claimed that outside the British recruiting office in Cyprus there was a sign which read: ‘Cypriots by joining in the British army you fight for Greece and freedom’. G. Grivas, Apomnhmon1ύmata Agώno6 EOKA 1955– 1959 [Memoirs of the EOKA struggle, 1955 – 1959] (Athens, 1961), p. 6. Grivas’ memoirs were also translated into English; see C. Foley, The memoirs of General Grivas (London, 1964). Textual differences between the two works will be discussed later. Memoirs (Greek version), p. 6. Sir Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister on the eve of the Italian attack on Greece sent a message to his Greek counterpart: ‘Their [Greek people’s] martyrdom will be avenged by the Pan-Hellenic Army of liberation. The unity of all her sons and daughters behind their King and Government in the cause of their Fatherland will bring its own reward’. In Cyprus this was interpreted as a promise for enosis: Hill, op. cit., p. 560. Hill commented that there was a widespread conviction in Cyprus that victory for the Allies would bring enosis, ibid.

240

† Notes to Pages 14 – 20

43. See T. W. Adams, AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus (Stanford, 1971), pp. 1 – 22, for a brief overview of the history of communism of Cyprus and how AKEL was founded. 44. Political Situation Report for May 1946, CO 67/323/7. The six major towns in Cyprus were Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca, Paphos and Kyrenia. 45. House of Commons Debates 427, cc 396. 46. The Times, 4 August 1977. 47. This remark captures also the crux of the relations between the Athens government and Makarios as Greek Cypriot leader and highlights a crucial theme in this study – the split in the Greek political world between a Helladiccentric and a Cypriot-centric approach to the Cyprus problem. E. Averoff, Lost Opportunities (New York, 1986), pp. 62 – 3.

2 The Making of Archbishop Makarios III 1. 2. 3. 4.

5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

S. Mayes, Makarios, A Biography (London, 1981), p. 13. Mayes, Makarios, p. 18. Ibid., pp. 19 – 21. There is a clash between the accounts of Mayes and Vanezis. According to Mayes the ceremony was held in Phaneromeni Church whereas Vanezis asserts that it was held in the Cathedral of St Theodoros in Paphos. Although locum tenens Leontios was also bishop of Paphos it is more likely that he spent most of his time in Nicosia in the Archbishopric palace rather than in Paphos. Moreover since Michael was based in Nicosia it seems more likely that the consecration took place in Nicosia. The Red Cross estimated that about 250,000 people had died in Greece between 1941 and 1943 because of the famine caused by German occupation; see M. Mazower, Inside Hitler’s Greece (London, 1993), p. 41 and chapter 3 for more background information on the famine. See A. Markaki, O Asymbίbasto6 Makάrio6: Misό6 Aiώna6 Agώn16 [The uncompromisable Makarios: Half-a-century of struggles] (Athens, 1980), p. 32 for a personal account of Makarios for this event. Mayes, Makarios, p. 23; P. N. Vanezis, Faith and Power (London, 1971), p. 82. E. Hatzivassiliou, Strathgikέ6 toy Kypriakoύ, H d1ka1tίa toy 1950 [Strategies of the Cyprus problem, the decade of 1950], (Athens, 2005), p. 56. Vanezis, Faith and Power, pp. 82 – 3. With the new rank he acquired new responsibilities – he was given his own parish at St Paraskevi in Piraeus. EOKA stands for Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters). It was the Greek Cypriot guerrilla force which fought against British rule in Cyprus from 1955 – 9. For more information regarding its conception and formation see Chapter 4. Makarios became an acquaintance of Zaferios Valvis, a lawyer by profession, who was

Notes to Pages 20 – 24 † 241 11. 12.

13.

14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21. 22.

23.

second in command in Grivas’ organisation ‘X’. Patroclos Stavrou, interview given to the author on 18/7/2006 in Nicosia. C. F. Foley and W. I. Scobie, The Struggle for Cyprus (Stanford, 1973). The person who brought them together was Zaferios Valvis, pp. 7– 8. Mayes, Makarios, p. 24. See L. F. Leonidou, G1ώrgio6 Grίba6 Dig1nή6 – Biograwίa, 1o6 tόmo6 [Georghios Grivas Dighenis – A Biography, vol. 1] (Nicosia, 1995) and volume 2 (Nicosia, 1997), for more details. Arguably it is the most complete biography of Grivas. C. M. Woodhouse, Apple of Discord (London, 1985), p. 31. Leonidou, an enthusiastic admirer of Grivas, asserts that ‘X’ was a resistance organisation but admits that throughout occupation it was unable to secure any serious amount of equipment and that only in August 1944 it was able to arm itself. Leonidou, Grivas, pp. 204– 5. E. Hatzivassiliou, Strategies of the Cyprus problem, p. 54. Hatzivassiliou has examined the list of members which Grivas himself had compiled and the list of recommended members for honorary award for their resistance activities which was submitted to the government in 1950. There is no entry with the name Makarios, Michael Mouskos or Kykkotis. Patroclos Stavrou interview; Leonidou, Grivas vol. 1, p. 336. PSE (Παγκύπρια Εργατική Ομοσπονδία) was founded in 1941 and was later replaced by PEO (Pancyprian Federation of Labour) after it was declared illegal by the Cyprus Government in 1945 after a trial of its leading members. For more details about political changes in the war years including the rise of AKEL and the response of the Right see R. Katsiaounis, H Diask1ptikή [The Consultative Assembly] (Nicosia, 2000), pp. 64 – 100. Adams, AKEL, p. 29. Two books which deal with this period of the Cyprus problem, the proceedings of the Consultative Assembly and the political struggle between Right and Left are, Y. Leventis, Cyprus: The Struggle for Self-Determination in the 1940s (Frankfurt am Main and New York, 2002) and Katsiaounis, The Consultative Assembly. E. Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 1955 – 59 (Minnesota, 1997), p. 3. Katsiaounis, Consultative Assembly, p. 252. The voting system for senior prelates (bishops and the archbishop) is an indirect one. For archbishopric elections the entire male population votes 1000 special representatives, who subsequently vote 66 general representatives, 44 from laity and 22 from priesthood. These general representatives convene along with certain ex officio members constituting an elective assembly which decides the archbishop. For more details on the background of the election, see Katsiaounis, Consultative Assembly, pp. 247 – 55 and M. F. Cleanthous, Arxi1piskopikέ6

242

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

42.

† Notes to Pages 24 – 27 Eklogέ6 Sthn Kύpro [Archbishopric elections in Cyprus] (Nicosia, 2005), pp. 60 – 7. Political situation report for March 1947, CO 67/341/7. Katsiaounis, Consultative Assembly, p. 264. Political situation report for June and July 1947, CO/67/341/7. Not be confused with Makarios, the subject matter of this book. Political situation report for October 1947, ibid. According to the report members of ‘X’ were sighted. Quoted in Leventis, Cyprus: The struggle for self-determination, p. 250. Political situation report for December 1947, CO/67/341/7. D. Alastos, Cyprus Guerrilla (London, 1960), p. 33. N. Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt (London, 1978). According to Crawshaw a total quarter-of-a-million working days were lost in the three major strikes of 1948, p. 40. See also Political Situation Reports for 1948, CO 537/4041 for references to the strikes and the use of violence in the labour disputes. See Chapter 1, p. 14. Mayes, Makarios, p. 27; P. Papademetris, Istorikή Egkyklopaίd1ia th6 Kύproy , 1878– 1978, [Historical encyclopedia of Cyprus, 1878 – 1978, volume 8, 1946 –1954] (Nicosia, 1979– 80), pp. 115– 16. Έuno6, 11 July 1947. The short telegram read ‘I wish to continue my studies I decline the candidacy Makarios Kykkotis’. Ibid; Nέo6 Ky priakό6 Fύlaj, 16 June 1948. Nέo6 Ky priakό6 Fύlaj, 16 June 1948, for more details on the organisations and personalities of the Right, which had decided to choose Makarios and to support his campaign. Cyprus political situation report for January, CO 537/4041. Ibid., political situation report for March; Nέo6 Ky priakό6 Fύlaj, 9 April 1948. El1y u1rίa, 9 April 1948. See also Makarios, vol. 1, 1948 – 1954 (Nicosia, 1991), p. 21 for the photocopy of the original telegram and Makarios’ reply. Mayes, Makarios, p. 31; Vanezis, Makarios: Faith and Power, p. 84; See also an interview of Makarios to Carnegie Samuel Calian, claiming that he had cabled back turning down the offer: http://theologytoday.ptsem.edu/jan1975/v31-4criticscorner5.htm. Calian is a Professor of Theology at the Theological Seminary of the University of Dubuque, Iowa. He has written extensively about Eastern Orthodoxy. Άpanta Arxi1piskόpoy Kύproy Makarίoy G΄ (Collected texts of archbishop of Cyprus Makarios III). Vol. 1 – 3 (Nicosia, 1991 – 3) (referred to as Makarios). For the purpose of this book only the first three volumes were consulted, vol. 1, p. 21. The reply was dated 9 April 1948, that is the following date of the incoming telegram from Cyprus. The telegram read: ‘Submitting to the calling of Lord, as expressed through the voting of the clergy and the people, I accept my election as Bishop of Kition. I thank you for the warm congratulations. Elected Bishop of Kition, Makarios’.

Notes to Pages 27 – 32 † 243 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55.

56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

63. 64. 65. 66.

The text of his acceptance was originally published in El1y u1rίa, 10 April 1948. Nέo6 Ky priakό6 Fύlaj, 2 April 1948. For more details on Makronisos see Y. Hamilakis, ‘The Other “Parthenon”: Antiquity and National Memory at Makronisos’, Journal of Modern Greek Studies (2002), pp. 307 –38. Quoted in A. Fantis, O Entawiasmό6 th6 Έnvsh6 [The burial of Enosis] (Nicosia, 1995), p. 12. Crawshaw, Cyprus Revolt, p. 46. See also S. Papageorghiou, AKEL to άllo KKE [AKEL another KKE] (Athens, 1984), pp. 153 – 4 for a quoted firsthand account witness of Makarios’ visit. Political situation report for month September 1948, CO 537/4041. El1y u1rίa, 14 July 1948; political situation report in Cyprus for the month of July, CO 537/4041. I. Papadakis, ‘Perceptions of history and collective identity: a study of contemporary Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalism’ (PhD thesis, Cambridge University), 1993, p. 28 Hatzivassiliou, The Cyprus Question, p. 14. Makarios, p. 36. Έuno6, 13 August 1948. Political report in Cyprus for month of December 1948, CO 537/4041. Political situation in Cyprus for January 1949, CO 537/4973. Ibid., political situation for March 1949. According to the Governor’s report the provisional committee was made up of ‘extreme communists’. Similarly, Crawshaw argues that AKEL’s leadership had now passed into the hands of extremists, op. cit., p. 41. See Leventis, op. cit., p. 248 for a discussion of the self-criticism of the party on its conduct. Quoted in Leventis, op. cit., p. 249. Mayes, op. cit., p. 35. Alastos, op. cit., p. 34; political situation for April 1948, CO 537/4973. Ibid., political situation for May 1948. Mayes, op. cit., p. 35; The Times, 24 May 1949. A. Fantis, op. cit., pp. 21 – 3. Ioannides was the editor of the newspaper ‘Ewhm1rί6’, a close adviser of Makarios II and secretary of the Kyrenia See. He was known for his strong anti-communist and nationalist feelings and was interned after the events of 1931 on account of his subversive activities. Dervis an OBE had been mayor of Nicosia prior his defeat in 1946 and was reelected in 1949. He was also the leader of KEK, the nationalist party and owner of the newspaper ‘Έuno6’. Political situation in Cyprus during the month of August, 1949, CO 537/4973. Ibid., September political situation. Savvas Loizides was Greek Cypriot by birth, but had lived and worked in Athens since 1931. Because of his involvement in the events of 1931 he was

244

67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77.

78. 79.

80.

81. 82.

† Notes to Pages 32 – 36 banished from Cyprus by the British authorities. He was a doctor of laws and practised law in Athens. Savvas’ younger brother Socrates had served as General Secretary of PEK but his residence permit was revoked by the Cyprus Government on account of his enosist views and activities. Moreover, both brothers were members of the Ethnarchy branch in Athens and were well connected with the political world of Athens. Savvas was later elected MP with the Karamanlis party, as he had acquired Greek citizenship. The Loizides brothers played an important role in the founding of EOKA. Prof Vezanis was another doctor of laws, a colleague and a friend of Loizides. S. Loizides, Άtyxh Kύpro6, Pv6 έzhsa toy 6 pόuoy6 kai toy 6 kahmoύ6 th6, 1910 –1980 [Unfortunate Cyprus, how I lived its passions and sorrows, 1910– 1980], (Athens, 1980), p. 54. Cyprus to Colonial Office, no. 586, 2 December 1949, CO 67/352/2; Nέo6 Dhmokrάth6, 29 November 1949. Cyprus to Colonial Office, no. 586, 2 December 1949, CO 67/352/2; Nέo6 Dhmokrάth6, 30 November 1949. El1y u1rίa, 2 December 1949. Mayes, op. cit., p. 37; Vanezis, Life and Leadership, p. 34. This also follows from Loizides’ narrative that Makarios had discussed the possibility of a plebiscite with him. El1y u1rίa, 6 December 1949. See Makarios, pp. 418 –23 for the exchange of Governor with Makarios II; Neos Democratis, 3 December 1949; Political situation for December, CO 537/4973. El1y u1rίa, 10 December 1949. An1jάrthto6, 12 January 1950. Any Greek Cypriot aged 18 years old and above was entitled to vote. The total number of potential voters was 224,747 out of which 215,108 voted for enosis which equaled almost to 96 per cent of the Greek Cypriot population, which represented approximately 75 per cent of the entire Cypriot population. Archbishop Makarios II to Governor A. Wright, 4 February 1950, Makarios, p. 427. Statistics taken from L. W. St. John-Jones, The Population of Cyprus (London, 1983), p. 60, Table 3. In 1946 Greek Orthodox were 361,199 and the Muslims 80,548, p. 51, Table 2. N. Kizilyurek, ‘The Turkish Cypriots from an Ottoman-Muslim community to a national community’, H. Faustmann and N. Peristianis (eds), Britain in Cyprus, Colonialism and Post-Colonialism 1878 –2006 (Bibliopolis, 2006), pp. 315– 25, p. 319. The Cypriot Muslims adopted a Turkish identity and started calling themselves Turkish Cypriots only after the prevalence of Kemalism in Turkey itself. For this point see Kizilyurek, and J. A. McHenry, The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus, 1919– 1939 (London, 1987). Hill, op. cit., pp. 419 – 20. Turks of Cyprus Protest: Against the Desire for Union With Greece, CO 537/6235; Dr Fazil Kouchouk’s (Cyprus Turkish National Party president)

Notes to Pages 37 – 44 † 245 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90.

91. 92. 93. 94.

95. 96.

3

telegram to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 13 December 1949, CO 67/352/2. Political situation in Cyprus January 1950, CO 537/6235. Kelling, Countdown to Rebellion, p. 162. Political situation January and February 1950, CO 537/6235; Press conference of Bishop Makarios, 17 February 1950, Makarios, p. 279. Political situation for March 1950, CO 537/6235. Fantis, op. cit., footnote of p. 42. Political report for May 1949, CO 537/4973. A. Azinas, 50 Xrόnia Sivpή6 [50 Years of Silence] (Nicosia, 2001) vol. 1, pp. 133– 4. Azinas’ memoirs were subsequently translated in English. In 1972 Kyprianos along with the Bishops of Paphos and Kition called Makarios to step down from the presidency of the Cyprus republic because his dual roles as president and archbishop were allegedly violating canon law. This led to a major ecclesiastical crisis which was eventually resolved with the defrocking of the three bishops. For more details see Mayes, op. cit., pp. 215 – 27 and Y. Lamprou, Istorίa toy Kypriakoύ [History of the Cyprus problem] (Nicosia, 2004), pp. 277 – 89. Έuno6, 30 June 1950. Ibid., 2 July 1950. Έuno6, 11 August 1950. See also Political reports for July and August 1950, CO 537/6235. For the rejection of AKEL’s offer see Έuno6, 13 July 1950: ‘The election of the new Archbishop and Ethnarch is an exclusive affair of the Greek people of our Island and not of the communists, who have nothing in common with our Church and our Country’. For the purging of electoral rolls from the Left see Political report for July 1950, op. cit. Nέo6 Dhmokrάth6, 26 August 1950, ‘Away from tomorrow’s electoral farce’; 21 October 1950, ‘Yesterday the electoral coup was completed’. Makarios, p. 63.

The Road to the UN, November 1950– October 1954

El1y u1rίa, 19 January 1951. Ibid. 16 January 1952, Nέo6 Dhmokrάth6; 16 January 1952, Έuno6. Political situation reports, May 1952, CO 926/19. Political situation reports, June 1953, CO 926/20; Nέo6 Dhmokrάth6, 2 June 1953. 6. Mayes, Makarios, op. cit., p. 44. 7. For example Stavros Poskotis the secretary of PEON was the intelligence officer of EOKA. Grivas himself praised the involvement of students in the Cyprus struggle, Grivas, op. cit. (Greek version), p. 29. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

246 8. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

25. 26. 27. 28.

29. 30.

† Notes to Pages 44 – 51 Έuno6, 21 January 1951. Έuno6, 4 August 1951. El1y u1rίa, 23 September 1951. The reigning archbishop had the prerogative to summon an Ethnarchy Council which could advise and assist the archbishop in his duties. Both Leontios and Makarios II had similar councils to advise them, although under Makarios II it was known as National Council, but the existence of this body was based on the traditional overlap of religious and political affairs in Greek Cypriot community rather than cannon law. El1y u1rίa, 1 March 1951. Political situation report for April 1952, CO 926/19; Makarios, pp. 149 – 51 and pp. 231 – 41. I. Stephanides, Isle of Discord (New York, 1999), p. 240. Makarios, p. 104. Ibid., pp. 73 – 5. Andreas Azinas, interview with the author on 9 June 2006 in Nicosia. Petros Stylianou, an ex-EOKA fighter, former MP and general-secretary of SEK asserted that Makarios was anxious to isolate elements which were in favour of a constitution; interview with the author on 11 January 2006 in Nicosia. Political report for March and April, CO 926/19. Έuno6, 3 September 1953; Political situation report December 1953, FO 371/112830. Makarios, p. 151. Ibid., p. 221. P. K. Persianis, Church and State in Cyprus Education (Nicosia, 1978), pp. 102–4. Political report for July 1952, CO 926/19. Ibid., political report for August. Interesting enough the defiant stance of Makarios inspired the Turkish Cypriot press to also attack the new law as the Turkish Cypriots strove to assert their own ethnic identity in opposition to the rise of Greek nationalism. For the text of the encyclical see Makarios, pp. 163– 5. Makarios, pp. 166– 7. Press communique´ published in the local press, 4 July 1953, FO 371/107502; Political situation for July 1953, WG 10110/5, FO 371/107485. Ibid., political situation for July 1953. Political report for October 1953, CO 926/ 20; Political report for January 1954, FO 371/112830; A. Azinas, 50 Xrόnia Sivpή6 [50 years of silence] (Nicosia, 2001), pp. 213 – 18. Regarding the split in SEK, Azinas mentions that Makarios chose to keep his counsel over the bill because he was afraid of leaks and preferred to press ahead risking a split but confident that eventually the majority of SEK, even the disgruntled, would rally behind him. Nέo6 Dhmokrάth6, 15 November 1951. Ibid., 30 March 1952.

Notes to Pages 52 – 55 † 247 31. Nέo6 Dhmokrάth6, 28 August 1952. 32. See Nέo6 Dhmokrάth6 between 31 August and 4 September 1952; Political situation report for August 1952, CO 926/19. Other purged members worth mentioning were Adam Adamantos, the able mayor of Famagusta who was in favour of a constitution, and Fifis Ioannou, who was the secretary-general during the Consultative era. 33. Political situation report, March 1953, WG 10110/4, FO 371/107485. 34. El1y u1rίa, 21 April 1953. 35. Political situation report, May 1953, CO 926/20. 36. Nέo6 Dhmokrάth6, 19 May 1953, ‘the triumphant victories of Limassol, Famagusta, Laranca and Paphos splintered the Jericho walls of disunity’. The mention of Jericho walls was an allusion to the refusal of the Ethnarchy for collaboration and the intended message of the article was that the results validated AKEL’s line for collaboration since it received so many votes. However in Paphos AKEL had actually supported right-wing candidates because it lacked its own capable candidates in that district. 37. Makarios, p. 281. Makarios proceeded to claim that upon the completion of enosis it would be up to the Greek Government to deal with the communists since the Ethnarchy did not have the authority to take measures against them. 38. Makarios, interview with BBC on 15 October 1954, PREM 11/595. 39. Political situation July 1953, CO 926/20. 40. Stephanides, op. cit., p. 13. The attitude of the Greek Government after the end of the civil war on the Cyprus issue was aptly summed up by George Papandreou, Vice-Premier, in his conversation with mayor of Nicosia Dervis: ‘Today Greece breathes with two lungs; one British, the other American. Therefore she cannot afford to be suffocated because of the Cypriot issue’, quoted in P. Terlexis, ‘Greece’s policy and attitude towards the problem of Cyprus’, PhD dissertation (New York University, 1968), pp. 90–1. 41. PEEK was also known as PEAEK (Pan1llήnio6 Epitropή Agώno6 Enώs1v6 Kύproy – Panhellenic Committee of Struggle for the Union of Cyprus). 42. Athens to Foreign Office, no. 25, 26 March 1951, FO 371/95133. 43. Confidential report of Sir C. Norton to Mr Morrison on the visit of Makarios to Athens, 18 April 1951, RG 1081/47, FO 371/95133. 44. Athens to Foreign Office, no. 102, 11 May 1951, RG 1081/62, FO 371/95133. 45. British embassy Athens Norton to Morrison, 28 March 1951, RG 1081/40, FO 371/95133. 46. Confidential report of the British ambassador in Athens over his meeting with Makarios, 28 March 1951, RG 1081/39, FO 371/95133. 47. Stephanides, op. cit., pp. 20 – 1. For the full text of the press conference see Makarios, pp. 281– 6. 48. For an excellent analysis of Makarios’ public rhetoric see P. S. Cassia, ‘The Archbishop in the beleaguered city: an analysis of the conflicting roles and

248

49. 50. 51. 52.

53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65.

66. 67. 68.

† Notes to Pages 55 – 63 political oratory of Makarios’, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 8 (1983), pp. 204– 11. El1y u1rίa, 8 May 1952. El1y u1rίa, 16 May 1952. Political report for May 1952, CO 926/19. Ibid., political report for June 1952. Interestingly enough Makarios was faced with an embarrassing Syrian claim on Cyprus. Although this claim was hardly serious it was a subtle sign that the internationalisation campaign was opening all sorts of possibilities with unintended consequences which Makarios failed to grasp. British Legation Beirut to Foreign Office, 11 June 1952, VG 1081/32, FO 371/101811. Έuno6, 14 February 1953. El1y u1rίa, 20 June 1953. Makarios, p. 303. Political report for June and July 1952, CO 926/19. Quoted in P. Terlexis, op. cit., p. 92. Makarios, pp. 158– 60. Vlachos, op. cit., pp. 205 – 6. Averoff, op. cit., p. 12. Let us not forget that the ‘luck’ of the draw prevented Makarios from leading the plebiscite mission. Stephanides, op. cit., p. 237; Mayes, op. cit., p. 49. E. Hatzivassiliou, Greece and the Cold War, Frontline State (London, New York, 2006), pp. 5 – 11. Greece was accepted into NATO in September 1951 and its accession was ratified in early 1952. For example, British authorities in Cyprus in September 1953 noted that ‘there are signs that Turkey is beginning to take almost as much interest in enosis as Greece itself’. In a local Turkish Cypriot paper a statement by the Turkish Government was printed which ended: ‘For the time being there is no Cyprus issue. Moreover, it is not possible for Great Britain to take any decision on Cyprus without first having the official opinion and the consent of the Turkish Government’; Political situation report September 1953, CO 926/20. For this issue see A. Alexandris, The Greek Minority of Istanbul and GreekTurkish relations 1918– 1974 (Athens, 1983). Official of the Greek Foreign Ministry, he served as ambassador in London between 1957 and 1961. He was also awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1963 and was known for his great love for Cyprus. G. Seferis, Mέr16 [Days, volume 6, 20 April 1951 –4 August 1956] (Athens, 1986), p. 100. See also L. Durrell, Bitter Lemons (London, 1957), which narrates the impressions Cyprus made to the author in the years 1953– 6. A Greek Cypriot is quoted saying on the issue of constitution: ‘We fear that any delay would spell the death of Union. We could easily be led away by political differences. Our unity would be impaired by a long period of waiting.

Notes to Pages 63 – 68 † 249 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75.

76. 77. 78.

79. 80. 81. 82. 83.

84. 85. 86. 87.

If we accepted any interim, state of things we would founder in apathy and self-division’, pp. 124– 5. E. Hatzivassiliou, Strategies of the Cyprus problem, p. 334. Political report for October 1952, CO 926/19. British embassy in Athens to United Kingdom delegation to the United Nations, 6 December 1952, FO 371/101812. Stephanides, op. cit., p. 31. Mayes, op. cit., p. 51. Quoted text retrieved from the UN website at: http:// daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/079/79/IMG/NR007979. pdf?OpenElement, last viewed on 16 March 2009. British embassy in Athens to Foreign Office, 9 March 1953, WG 1081/16, FO 371/107501. Makarios, pp. 184– 7; Political situation for March 1953, WG 10110/4, FO 371/107485. There is a discrepancy between the Greek text and the British report. In the British report it states that Makarios claimed ‘we shall seek the support from every hand, even from dirty hands’. In the Greek text as printed in Makarios there is no mention of dirty hands, but rather he speaks of accepting help from any hands. Nevertheless the hint of seeking Soviet support is there but in the British version is more pronounced. Letter of Makarios to Wright, 27 April 1953, CO 926/10. Ibid., Wright to Makarios, 11 May 1953. Acting Governor to Secretary of State Oliver Lyttelton, no. 920, 11 July 1953, CO 926/10; See also for the initial press release of the Ethnarchy calling the people to attend the mass rally, 9 June 1953, El1y u1rίa & Nέo6 Dhmokrάth6. 21 June 1953, El1y u1rίa. In fact Makarios invited AKEL to the initial mass rally that was cancelled because of failure to secure a permit but the invite was extended to the event of 28 June as well. See 9 June 1953, Nέo6 Dhmokrάth6. 24 June 1953, Nέo6 Dhmokrάth6. Makarios, pp. 198– 202; Acting Governor to Secretary of State Oliver Lyttelton, no. 920, 11 July 1953 and Speech delivered by H. B. the Archbishop on 28 June 1953, CO 926/10. 1 July 1953, Nέo6 Dhmokrάth6 contains some glimmers of the impromptu meeting of Makarios with the representatives of AKEL after the congregation of 28 June. Apparently Makarios had told the representatives of AKEL that he was concerned that AKEL wanted to exploit the enosis campaign for its own purposes. For example, on 9 December 1953, Nέo6 Dhmokrάth6 slammed the Greek foreign policy on Cyprus as ‘deceitful’ after the failure of the Greek Foreign Minister to mention Cyprus during his annual review in the Parliament. Political situation report for August 1953, CO 926/20. Makarios, pp. 371– 2. Mayes, op. cit., p. 53.

250

† Notes to Pages 68 – 71

88. Political report for September 1953, CO 926/20. 89. S. G. Xydis, ‘Toward “toil and moil” in Cyprus’, The Middle East Journal, vol. 20 (1966), p. 7. 90. The earthquake claimed 40 lives, 100 people were injured, in five villages up to 90 per cent of housing had collapsed or was severely damaged. About 1500 houses were destroyed completely, 4000 more sustained serious damages rendering 32,000 people homeless; see Political report for September 1953, CO 926/20. 91. Quoted in S. G. Xydis, op. cit, p. 7. 92. Makarios, pp. 212– 14. 93. Stephanides, op. cit., p. 41. Papagos was army commander during the GrecoItalian war of 1940 – 1 and the civil war. After the conclusion of the civil war he was awarded the rank of the Field Marshal, the only Greek Army officer to ever receive this title. 94. Conversation between the Secretary of State and Papagos, WG 1052/3, FO 371/107499; see also Stephanides, op. cit., pp. 47 – 8. 95. Stephanides, op. cit., pp. 47 – 66. 96. Averoff, Lost Opportunities, p. 26. 97. Terlexis, ‘Greece’s policy and attitude . . .’, p. 113. 98. Stephanides, op. cit., p. 276. 99. Hatzivassiliou, Strategies of the Cyprus problem, p. 339. 100. From Athens to Foreign Office, no. 109, 19 March 1954, WG 1081/48, FO 371/112844. 101. British embassy in Athens to Foreign Office, 2 March 1954, WG 1081/34, FO 371/112844. 102. Minute of a Meeting held in the Colonial Office on 14 April 1954, Med 30/1/01, CO 926/180. 103. For more details on the background of this political decision and the prevailing mentality in Whitehall at the time see R. Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954– 1959 (Oxford,1998) pp. 34 – 8. 104. ‘It has always been understood and agreed that there are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent,’ House of Commons Debates, vol. 531, cc 495–8, 28 July 1954. Such was the impact of this ‘never’ that later the Greek Government released that particular extract from Hansard as postage stamps with a large blot of ink across the quotation, see The Times, ‘Hansard Quotation on Greek stamps’, 30 September 1954, WG 1081/949, FO 371/112873. 105. House of Commons Debates, vol. 531, cc 495– 7, 28 July 1954. 106. Durrell, Bitter Lemons, pp. 147 –8. The constitution provided for an assembly of 33 members where six would be officials, 12 nominated unofficial members and 15 elected members, 12 Greek Cypriot and three Turkish Cypriots; see Cyprus: joint memorandum by Lyttelton and Selwyn Lloyd on future policy, 21 July 1954, CAB 129/69, C(54)245. 107. Armitage to Lennox-Boyd no. 239, 3 August 1954, WG 1081/230, FO 371/112850.

Notes to Pages 71 – 77 † 251 108. C.f. Stephanides, op. cit. p. 16, Crawshaw, p. 51, Makarios, pp. 85 – 7. 109. The Times, 9 August 1954. 110. Even The Times criticised the move arguing that ‘the British tradition is that the liberties of the subject should depend directly on the law, and not on the forbearance of the executive’, editorial on 10 August 1954. 111. Report on the political situation in Cyprus for the period 1 July to 10 August 1954, FO 371/112830. 112. Ibid. 113. Lennox-Boyd to Armitage, no. 294, 6 August 1954, WG 1081/256, FO 371/112850. 114. Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, no. 258, 8 August 1954, FO 371/112850. 115. El1y u1rίa, 17 August 1954. 116. Ibid., 14 August 1954; Xydis, op. cit., p. 14. 117. Pro-enosis demonstration, 22 August, a report prepared by the office of the commissioner of police, CO 926/171. 118. Makarios, p. 257, pp. 253– 7 for the whole speech. 119. Political report for September 1954, FO 371/112830.

4 The Pursuit of Enosis by Other Means, December 1954– October 1955 1. Stephanides, op. cit. Chapter 3 is devoted to the proceedings of this affair. 2. Quoted in S. G. Xydis, ‘The UN General Assembly as an instrument of Greek policy: Cyprus, 1954– 58’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 12, 1968, p. 143, footnote 3. 3. Makarios, p. 395. 4. Xydis, The UN General Assembly, p. 143. 5. Crawshaw, op. cit., p. 87. 6. Holland, op. cit., p. 43. 7. See Makarios, p. 279: ‘The anti-enosist movement of the Turks is not spontaneous but expedient [. . .]. In any case it is the opinion of the overwhelming majority that is taken into account and not of the minority’s. It is certain that the Turks have nothing to lose from enosis. As a minority they will preserve all their rights, as they were preserved by the Turks of Thrace’. Similar comments were made in his interview of 6 April 1951, p. 282. In the same interview responding to the question of who is responsible for the Turkish agitation over Cyprus, he replied: ‘I will not hesitate to say that this agitation is expedient and fostered by the English’, p. 283. On 10 June 1952, commenting on the reactions of the Turkish Cypriots to the enosis movement he dismissed them as ‘simple expedient noise which is also fostered by the English’, p. 301. In his interview of 25 July 1952 he reiterated his opinion that Turkey’s interest in Cyprus was the result of British diplomacy, p. 310. 8. Vlachos, Once upon a diplomat, p. 206.

252

† Notes to Pages 77 – 82

9. For an elaboration of this Turkish argument see Turkey and Cyprus (Turkey Embassy in Great Britain, London, 1956), pp. 12 – 16; see also T. Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955 (London, 1995), pp. 31 – 5. 10. C. Foley, Legacy of Strife: Cyprus From Rebellion to Civil War (Harmondsworth, 1964), p. 35. 11. The Cypriot– Turkish point of view on the Cyprus Question, 7 October 1954, WG 1081/859, FO 371/112870. 12. Manchester Guardian, 23 October 1954, ‘Cyprus Turks March Through London’, WG 1081/901, FO 371/112871. 13. El1y u1rίa and Nέo6 Dhmokrάth6, 21 December 1954; R. Armitage to W. A. Morris, 21 December 1954, CO 926/172. 14. Daily News Bulletin, Prime Minister’s Office, Information Department, 4 January 1955, FO 371/117620. 15. Makarios, pp. 269– 71. 16. Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, no. 18, 11 January 1955, RG 1081/34, FO 371/117621. A minute on this report read: ‘There can I think be no doubt at all that this constitutes incitement to violence. If this goes on, the arrest of Archbishop will become inevitable’. 17. Grivas, Memoirs (Greek version), pp. 14 – 15. 18. Hatzivassiliou, Strategies of the Cyprus Problem, p. 82. 19. Azinas, op. cit. (Greek version), pp. 188 –9; Loizides, op. cit., p. 97. Stratos served as minister of military affairs in 1947– 8. 20. Grivas, Memoirs (Greek version), pp. 16 – 17. 21. Quoted in ibid., p. 19. 22. Loizides, op. cit., pp. 99 – 100. 23. Ibid., p. 20. 24. Kranidiotis, Dύskola Xrόnia [Hard Years] (Athens, 1981), pp. 79 – 80. 25. M1gάlh Kypriakή Egkyklopaίd1ia [Great Cypriot Encyclopaedia], ed. A. Pavlides (Nicosia, 1986), p. 158; Papagathangelou, op. cit., p. 261. ‘I swear in the name of the Holy and Consubstantial and Indivisible Trinity to preserve, sacrificing my own life, suffering the most gruesome torments, secret everything I know and I want to hear for the question of the Enosis of Cyprus. I shall obey blindly each relevant command issued to me’. The participants save Makarios were Nikolaos Papadopoulos, Georghios Stratos, Yerasimos Konnidaris, Antonios Augikos, Savvas Loizides, Socrates Loizides, Elias Tsatsomiros, Demetrios Stauropoulos, Demetrios Vezanis, Elias Alexopoulos. Grivas was not present at the ceremony and signed the oath later. 26. Grivas, op. cit., pp. 21 – 2. 27. S. Papageorgiou, Ky priakή Qύ1lla 1955–1959 [Cypriot storm 1955– 1959] (Nicosia, 1977), pp. 352 – 5. The problem with this work is that no citation is given; instead certain documents are reproduced but its format does not conform to a scholarly standard and its claims cannot be verified. However on this particular issue Papageorgiou has a special bearing because of his intimate association with EOKA and its leaders. According to the author,

Notes to Pages 82 – 85 † 253

28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33. 34.

35.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43.

Grivas despite the objections of Makarios began preparations for guerilla warfare as early as April 1955 and in his diary had noted that he was determined to proceed with this plan. This is partly verifiable from Grivas’ memoirs, op. cit., pp. 54 – 5. Azinas, op. cit., p. 200. Grivas, op. cit., p. 18; Azinas, op. cit., pp. 275– 6; Andreas Azinas interview with the author on 9 June 2006 in Nicosia. Grivas diary entry of 11 January 1955 in Lennox-Boyd to Harding, no. 1577, 25 August 1956, RG 1081/1894, FO 371/123921; Azinas, 50 years of silence, p. 330. Ibid., p. 226, pp. 275– 6. In the general plan of EOKA Grivas acknowledged that a military victory was impossible, instead it was hoped that through military action the British would be forced to reassess their position on Cyprus and concede the moral point of self-determination; see Grivas, op. cit., appendix, p. 3. Crawshaw, op. cit., p. 99; S. Xydis, Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation (Columbus, 1967), p. 72. Grivas diary entry of 11 January 1955 found in Lennox-Boyd to Harding, no. 1577, 25 August 1956, RG 1081/1894, FO 371/123921; Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 81; Azinas, op. cit., pp. 298 – 9. Makarios had instructed Grivas to be ready to launch his first sabotage strikes in case the debate was unfavourable, but after discussions with the Greek UN representative Alexis Kyrou it was agreed to postpone any action hoping to secure American support. Unknown to Makarios, Kyrou sent a telegram to the Greek Consulate with the new directive of no action. But when the USA failed to support the Greek motion there was not enough time to send a new message to Cyprus and so no action was taken. Azinas contends that Savvas Loizides was behind Kyrou’s telegram, as the former was concerned about his brother who was in Cyprus helping Grivas with the preparation of the struggle. Kranidiotis, op. cit., pp. 58 – 9. ‘It was a mistake the murders of women and children and English soldiers, and even greater mistake the executions of communists. We should, after the refusal of the British government, have internationalised our issue and won the public opinion with other means and not with violence’. Grivas, op. cit., pp. 21– 2; Vlachos, Once upon a diplomat, pp. 259– 60; Azinas, op. cit., pp. 209 – 10. Hatzivassiliou, Strategies of the Cyprus problem, pp. 267– 71. Papageorgiou, op. cit., pp. 102 – 5. Political situation for October 1954, FO 371/112830. Holland, op. cit., pp. 49 – 50; Crawshaw, op. cit., p. 107. Papageorghiou, op. cit., p. 111. Leonidou, op. cit., p. 139; Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 81. British embassy Athens to Foreign Office, no. 8, 5 January 1955, RG 1081/7, FO 371/117620.

254

† Notes to Pages 86 – 91

44. Lennox-Boyd to Armitage, no. 95, 25 February 1955, RG 1081/135, FO 371/117625; Minute by Anthony Nutting, 28 February 1955, RG 1081/137, FO 371/117626; Lennox Boyd to Armitage, no. 101, 28 February 1955, RG 1081/145, FO 371/117626. 45. Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, no. 120, 24 February 1955, RG 1081/134, FO 371/117625; Ibid., Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, no. 121, 25 February 1955, RG 1081/134A. 46. Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, no. 125, 27 February 1955, RG 1081/138A, FO 371/117626. 47. Translated extract from ‘Eleftheria’ dated 16 March 1955, Armitage to LennoxBoyd, 17 March 1955, FO 371/117627. 48. Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, no. 182, 1 April 1955, RG 1081/210, FO 371/117628. 49. Ibid. 50. Crawshaw, op. cit., p. 115. 51. Makarios, vol. B, pp. 30 – 1. 52. Ibid., Makarios to Kranditios, 27 April 1955, p. 214. 53. British embassy Djakarta to Foreign Office, 5 May 1955, CO 926/447. 54. Makarios, Activities at Bandung, 21 April 1955, p. 33. 55. Ibid., p. 35. 56. Ibid., Address to the people of North Greece, 17 May 1955, p. 51. 57. El1y u1rίa, 20 May 1955. 58. Grivas, op. cit., p. 43. The attempt was made on 25 May 1955. 59. El1y u1rίa, 27 May 1955. 60. Cyprus intelligence committee report for May 1955, RG 1091/520B, FO 371/117639. 61. Makarios, p. 236. 62. Ibid., Statement by Makarios, 30 June 1955, p. 237. 63. Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, no. 379, 22 June 1955, RG 1081/527, FO 371/117639; ibid., Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, no. 383, 23 June 1955, RG 1081/527(A); Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, unnumbered, 23 June 1955, RG 1081/530, FO 371/117640; ibid., Lennox-Boyd to Armitage, no. 354, 24 June 1955, RG 1081/531. 64. Crawshaw, op. cit., p. 122. 65. British embassy in Ankara to Foreign Office, no. 30, 29 June 1955, FO 371/117640. 66. Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, unnumbered, 23 June 1955, RG 1081/530, FO 371/117640; Discussion of Makarios with Archdeacon Goldie on 27 June 1955, RG 1091/595A, FO 371/117641. 67. Letter of Makarios to Geoffrey Cantuar, 24 June 1955, PREM 11/2268. 68. Conversation of Archdeacon Goldie with Makarios 27 June 1955, FO 371/117641 and CO 926/447. The first document contains a summary of the conversation which gives the impression that Makarios feared that if he was to condemn violence his life could be threatened. However in CO 926/447,

Notes to Pages 91 – 97 † 255

69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75.

76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85.

where the full conversation is given, Makarios merely states that condemnation of violence will not be constructive. Later he reveals that he received death threats which he took very seriously but this information does not uphold the thesis that he was hostage to extremists, at least not at this stage. Then what was Makarios afraid of? Grivas had noted in his diary, the one which was later captured by the British, on 23 June 1955, that he had warned Makarios to be careful as the Turkish Cypriots were planning to assassinate him; see Lennox-Boyd to Harding, no. 1577, 25 August 1956, RG 1081/1894, FO 371/123921 and for more information Papageorgiou op. cit., pp. 315 – 17. What merit there was in such warning is unclear, ironically it was Greek hands that eventually tried to assassinate Makarios, not Turkish or British, but in a climate of uncertainty all rumours acquired a degree of credibility. Minutes of the meeting at Ledra Palace Nicosia, 9 July 1955, RG 1081/595A, FO 371/117641. Ibid. E. Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 1955 – 59 (Oxford, 1997), pp. 31 – 2. This criticism was mainly from a Greek Cypriot point view. The editor of Makarios makes this point p. 75n.4. Ibid., p. 32. Makarios, p. 65. Ibid., Meeting with Papagos, 14 July 1955, p. 66; British Embassy in Athens to Foreign Office, no. 340, 15 July 1955, RG 1081/661, FO 371/117643. In the end the Greek Government filed its second appeal to the UN on 26 July before the Tripartite Conference which was scheduled to begin on 29 August, after the UN deadline. El1y u1rίa and Έuno6, 3 August, 1955. The fire at the British Institute was put out quickly but the Institute did not escape its fate; about a month later in a similar incident it was completely destroyed by fire. Makarios, p. 588; Ibid., pp. 67 – 78. Times of Cyprus, 27 August 1955. For more details on the conference itself see, The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean, August 29– September 7, 1955, Cmnd. 9594 (London, HMSO, 1955). Ibid., p. 36. In November 1957 Zorlu became Foreign Minister of Turkey. Έuno6, 8 and 9 July 1955. Averoff, op. cit., p. 19. Fil1l1ύu1ro6, Daily column of Christakis Katsambas, 22 April 1992. See A. Alexandris, The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish relations, 1918– 1974 (Athens, 1983), pp. 253– 70; S. Vryonis, The Mechanism of Catastrophe (New York, 2005). Alexandris, op. cit., p. 259.

256

† Notes to Pages 97 – 106

86. British Consulate General Istanbul to Southern Department, Foreign Office, 22 September 1955, RG 10344/48; British Embassy Residence Istanbul to Southern Department Foreign Office, 22 September 1955, RG 10344/52; for a report on how the events developed see British Embassy Residence to Macmillan, no. 193, 22 September 1955, FO 371/117711. 87. British Embassy in Athens to Foreign Office, no. 493, 20 September 1955, RG 10344/41, FO 371/117711.

5 The Negotiations With Harding, November 1955 –February 1956 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

Holland, op. cit., pp. 92 – 3. Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, no. 1475, 23 September 1955, CO 926/448. Times of Cyprus, 5 July 1955. Interim Intelligence Report, 18 October 1955, RG 1081/1361, FO 371/117667. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, no. 775, 5 October 1955, CO 926/545. Three meetings took place in October on 4, 7 and 11. Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 114. El1y u1rίa, 12 October 1955. Holland, Britain and the revolt in Cyprus, p. 87. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, no. 775, 5 October 1955. Translation of the minutes of Ethnarchy Bureau Meeting, 3 October 1955, PREM 11/1243. N.B. Minutes of the Ethnarchy Bureau and Council and other documents were seized by British security forces and transported to London for translation after the deportation of Makarios when the Archiepiscopal Palace was stormed in the hope that incriminating material against Makarios would be found. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, no. 780, 5 October 1955, CO 926/545. Ibid., Harding to Lennox-Boyd, no. 795, 7 October 1955. Ethnarchy Council minutes, 10 October 1955, opening comments of Makarios on pp. 2 –3 (Folio 23, 24), PREM 11/1243. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, no. 817, 11 October 1955, CO 926/545. Lennox-Boyd to Harding, no. 792, 8 October 1955. CO 926/545. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, no. 817, 11 October 1955. CO 926/545. Kranidiotis, Hard Years, p. 133. Cyprus formula as agreed by the Colonial Policy Committee at meeting held on 6 November 1955, CO 926/545. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, no. 1080, 22 November 1955, CO 926/545. Kranidiotis, op. cit., pp. 134 – 5. According to the author, Harding was shaken by the refusal of Makarios and before leaving the meeting had told Makarios: ‘I am sorry, I am really sorry for what you are doing’. Athens embassy to Foreign Office, no. 650, 21 November 1955, CO 926/545; Ibid., Athens embassy to Foreign Office, 22 November 1955.

Notes to Pages 106 – 109 † 257 23. Foreign Office to Athens embassy, no. 861, 23 November 1955, CO 926/545; Athens embassy to Foreign Office, no. 677, 28 November 1955, CO 926/546. 24. For Greek refusal to pressurise Makarios, see Athens embassy to Foreign Office, no. 715, 8 December 1955 and Athens embassy to Foreign Office, no. 721, 10 December 1955, CO 926/546. For Greek willingness to advise Makarios to resume negotiations, see Athens embassy to Foreign Office, no. 698, 5 December 1955 and Athens embassy to Foreign Office, no. 735, 14 December 1955, CO 926/546. See also Theotokis memo of 21 December 1955 in Kvnstantίno6 Karamanlh6, Arx1io, G1gonόta & K1ίm1na (Constantine Karamanlis, archive, events and documents) (referred to as Karamanlis Archive) Gen. Editor Constantine Svolopoulos (Athens, 1992–1994), vol. 1–3, p. 318. 25. Harding to Lennox Boyd, no. 1109, 25 November 1955; Harding to Lennox Boyd, no. 1136, 29 November 1955, CO 926/546. 26. Makarios, pp. 133– 5; Harding to Lennox-Boyd, no. 1331, 27 December 1955, RG 1081/1735A, FO 371/117678. 27. See Foreign Office to Athens embassy, no. 954, 8 December 1955, CO 926/546 for the text of the revised formula. 28. D. W. Markides, ‘Britain’s “new look” policy for Cyprus and the MakariosHarding talks’, January 1955 – March 1956, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 23 (1995), p. 491. 29. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, no. 50, 10 January 1956, CO 926/547. 30. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, no. 79, 14 January 1956, CO 926/547. 31. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, no. 184, 27 January 1956, RG 1081/136, FO 371/123867. 32. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, no. 191, 28 January 1956, CO 926/548. 33. Ibid. 34. Correspondence exchanged between the Governor and Archbishop Makarios (1956), Cmd 9708. 35. Ibid. 36. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, no. 256, 3 February 1956, RG 1081/182, FO 371/123868. 37. Minute by J. G. Ward, 16 February 1956, RG 1081/273B, FO 371/123870. 38. Papageorghiou, Cypriot Storm, p. 446. 39. Ibid., Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 17 February, RG 1081/274; Harding to Lennox Boyd, 19 February 1956, RG 1081/289. 40. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 24 February 1956, RG 1081/310, FO 371/123871. 41. Times of Cyprus, 11 October 1955: ‘The Turks of Cyprus would insist upon being equally represented with the Greeks in the administration of the Island if they were asked to co-operate in self-government or any constitution, the Mufti, Mehmet Dana Effendi, told me’. 42. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 19 February 1956, RG 1081/289, FO 371/123870. 43. Ibid., Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 17 February 1956, specifically paragraph 15. 44. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 24 February 1956.

258

† Notes to Pages 110 – 117

45. Reddaway was the British Administrative Secretary in Cyprus, chief adviser to John Harding and participated in the talks. 46. MMS. Medit. S. 25, A.F. J. Reddaway, ‘Reflections on an unnecessary conflict: Cyprus, 1955– 58: account as Administrative Secretary, Cyprus, 1946-60’, Rhodes House, Bodleian Library, Oxford, p. 26. 47. For example, see the editorial comment in Makarios, p. 93. 48. Ethnarchy Council minutes, 10 October 1955 (pp. 4 – 5, Folio 26, 27), PREM 11/1243. Konstantinos Konstantinides was a lawyer from Kyrenia who was ideologically aligned to the ‘Kyrenia Circle’. 49. Interim intelligence report, 18 October 1955, RG 1081/1361, FO 371/117667. 50. The Times of Cyprus, 6 February 1956. 51. Appeal of AKEL to all Cyprus people in order to avert the national sell-out, RG 1081/1624, FO 371/11767; Statement by Politburo of Central Committee AKEL, RG 1081/1607, FO 371/117675. 52. See Chapter 2, p. 11. 53. Ibid. 54. Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, p. 77, footnote 85; Markides, ‘Britain’s “new look”, p. 492; Kranidiotis, Oi diapragmat1ύs1i6 Makarίoy – Xάrntigk [The negotiations of Makarios – Harding] (Athens, 1987), pp. 26 – 7. 55. Kranidiotis, The negotiations of Makarios - Harding, pp. 26 – 8; Hard Years, pp. 144. 56. Karamanlis Archive, vol. 1, p. 272. 57. Athens to Foreign Office, no. 624, 12 November 1955, RG 1081/1424, FO 371/117669. 58. From Athens to Foreign Office, no. 638, 16 November 1955, CO 926/545. Theotokis was bitter about the fact that Makarios spent considerable time with members of the Opposition and appeared to entertain the idea that if the Karamanlis government proved intractable he could join forces with the Opposition to overturn it. This fear of Makarios playing a part in ousting the Karamanlis government was revived later in the spring of 1957 after the return of the Archbishop from his exile, when the rumours of such a move became rife, and as we saw had some truth in them. 59. Karamanlis Archive, vol. 1, p. 293. 60. Athens embassy to Foreign Office, no. 77, 3 February 1956, RG 1081/173, FO 371/123868. 61. Ibid., Athens embassy to Foreign Office, no. 84, 7 February 1956, RG 1081/192. 62. F. Noel-Baker, My Cyprus File (Nicosia, 1985), p. 23. 63. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, no. 1036, 15 November 1955, CO 926/166. 64. Έuno6, 22 November 1955; Chronological record of the part played by students of Cypriot schools in acts of violence and disorder between 1 August

Notes to Pages 117 – 126 † 259 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83.

84. 85. 86. 87. 88.

1954 and 31 January, 1956, p. 9, Fol. 66, CO 926/166. Refer to this report for more details on the general situation in schools. Έuno6, 23 and 24 November 1955. Ibid., Harding to Lennox-Boyd, no. 1217, 10 December 1955, Harding to Lennox-Boyd, no. 204, 28 January 1956. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, no. 1113, 26 November 1955, RG 1081/1518B, FO 371/117672. Makarios, p. 125; Harding to Lennox Boyd, no. 1152, 2 December, PREM 11/1248. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, no. 1185, 5 December 1955, PREM 11/1248. Lennox-Boyd to Harding, no. 1133, 6 December, ibid. El1y u1rίa, 15 December 1955; Makarios, p. 128n.1. Makarios, pp. 128 –9. ‘We are of the opinion that one ideology can be combated only with another better ideology and not with violence’. Times of Cyprus, 18 December 1955; Editorial comment in Makarios, p. 130. Times of Cyprus, 19 December 1955. Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 135. O. Fallaci, Synάnthsh m1 thn Istorίa [Interview with history] (Athens, 1976), p. 538. Quoted in Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 151. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, no. 79, 14 January, CO 926/547. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, no. 80, 14 January 1956, CO 926/547. S. Papageorgiou, Cypriot Storm, pp. 438. Grivas, Memoirs (Greek version), p. 92. Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, p. 59. The organisations which Makarios consulted were the mayors and their councils, the former members of the old Legislative Assembly, the Medical Association, the Bar Association, the Secondary Schoolteachers’ Association, the Pharmaceutical Association, the editors of the main Greek newspapers, and the central committees of PEK and the New Trade Unions; see Harding to Lennox-Boyd, no. 205, 28 January, CO 926/548. In the end Makarios also consulted the Old Trade Unions as well, see below. Even his close associates, Charilaos Demetriadis, the mayor of Kyrenia and Savvas Christis, who had previously opposed the Archbishop’s switch to selfgovernment, grudgingly consented to Makarios’ plan. Ethnarchy Council minutes of 30 January 1956, Fol. 45– 50, PREM 11/1243. The Times of Cyprus, 2 February 1956. Holland, op. cit., p. 112; Markides, op. cit., p. 496; P. Murphy, Alan LennoxBoyd, A Biography (London, 1999), p. 119. Lennox-Boyd to Eden, 28 February 1956, RG 1081/327 A, FO 371/123871. ‘Naturally however while the constitution must adequately safeguard all sections of the community, these safeguards could not be such as to enable any one section to obstruct measures supported by the majority in matters which did not prejudice that community’s particular interests.’

260

† Notes to Pages 126 – 134

89. Ibid., Eden to Lennox-Boyd, 28 February 1956, RG 1081/327D. 90. Ibid., Ward, minute, 28 February 1956, RG 1081/327. 91. Appreciation by the Governor of the situation on 4 April 1956, PREM 11/1251. ‘Against this background I conclude that the basic principle for any real attempt to reconcile the conflict of interests must be the application of self-determination to Cyprus in our own time and on our own terms. The time should be dictated mainly by our own military requirements.’ 92. Holland, op. cit., p. 113. 93. Kranidiotis, Oi Diapragmat1ύs1i6 Makarίoy – Xάrntigk [The negotiations of Makarios – Harding] (Athens, 1987), p. 86. The author asserts that the bombs were a demonstration of EOKA’s discord with the agreements. Francis Noel-Baker, My Cyprus File, p. 28. 94. Leonidou, Grivas, p. 294; Papagathangelou, My witness, p. 301. 95. G. Grivas, Memoirs. Edited by Charles Foley (London, 1964), p. 64. Interestingly Leonidou records that Grivas indeed ordered his squads to bomb as many targets as possible on the evening of 29 February when the meeting would take place. This order was cancelled in the last minute, possibly after a request of Makarios. According to Noel-Baker, Makarios had spent the whole day trying to avert the bombings which implies that the Archbishop was aware of the order. Because of time constraints Leonidou does not exclude the possibility that some bombs were actually exploded in compliance to the original order; see Leonidou, op. cit., p. 294; Noel-Baker, op. cit., p. 28. 96. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 1 March 1956, RG 1081/379A, FO 371/123873. 97. Ibid. 98. Kranidiotis, Hard Years, p. 171. 99. Papageorgiou, Cypriot Storm, p. 450. 100. Quoted in Murphy, Alan Lennox-Boyd, p. 120. 101. Markides, ‘Britain’s “new look” policy for Cyprus’, p. 501.

6 Arrest, Deportation and Exile: The Seychelles Interlude El1y u1rίa, 3 March 1956; Makarios, p. 317. Makarios, pp. 347– 50, especially p. 348; Kranidiotis, Hard Years, p. 172. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, no. 489, 5 March 1956, PREM 11/1248. El1y u1rίa, 7 March 1956. P. S. Le Geyt, Makarios in exile, (Nicosia, 1961), p. 106; Mayes, Makarios, p. 84. Markides, Britain’s “New Look” Policy for Cyprus, p. 498; Holland, Britain and the Cyprus Revolt, p. 115 and p. 117. 7. For more details on this strand of British policy see R. Holland, ‘The Cult of Makarios: Archbishop Makarios III and the British, 1950– 1959’, Acts of the Third International Congress of Cypriot Studies, Nicosia 2001.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Notes to Pages 134 – 141 † 261 8. Political counter-offensive against Archbishop Makarios, May 1957, FO 371/130165. 9. R. Stephens, Cyprus, A Place of Arms (London, 1966), p. 146. 10. Details of the deportation, unless otherwise stated are drawn from Makarios’ written account of events which can be found in Makarios, pp. 323– 38 and LeGeyt, Makarios in exile, pp. 106– 8 (Margaret LeGeyt’s impression of Makarios’ oral testimony). 11. El1y u1rίa, 10 March 1956; Times of Cyprus, 10 March 1956. 12. After the raid an Archbishopric insider made an interesting point: ‘Do you really think that if we wanted to keep an arsenal in Cyprus we would keep it inside the Archbishopric, when we had known for the previous nine months that a raid was coming?’ Quoted by Francis Noel-Baker in Parliamentary Debates (Commons), vol. 363, 19 July 1956, cc 1438. 13. There were three more persons in the car, Yiacoumis, Makarios’s brother and designated driver, Chrysostomos the Abbot of Kykko, who was also the spiritual father of Makarios and the Chorepiscopos (Bishop without See) of Salamina Yennadios. 14. Both notes were very brief but also reflected a serene acceptance of this unpleasant event. One note was for Kranidiotis and one for Choroepiscopos Yennadios, Makarios, p. 165, p. 167. 15. P. Sant Cassia, ‘The archbishop in the beleaguered city: an analysis of the conflicting roles and political oratory of Makarios’, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, vol. 8 (1983), p. 211. 16. Report on Operation Apollo, 14 March 1956, ADM 1/26590. 17. From the political office with the Middle East Forces (Nicosia) to Foreign Office, no. 236, 28 March 1956, RG 1081/638, FO 371/123880. 18. Minutes of 13 March 1956, CO 69/70. 19. Grivas, Memoirs (Greek), p. 93. 20. Ibid., p. 94. 21. From the political office with the Middle East Forces (Nicosia) to Foreign Office, no. 236, 28 March 1956, RG 1081/638. 22. Grivas, Memoirs (Greek), pp. 96 – 7. 23. Circular letter by the Mayor of Nicosia Dervis, 15 June 1956, RG 1081/1656, FO 371/123911. 24. Charles Peake to Selwyn Lloyd, no. 57, 22 March 1956, RG 1081/636, FO 371/123880. 25. Athens embassy to Foreign Office, no. 171, 10 March 1956, RG 1081/410, FO 371/123874. 26. Charles Peake to Selwyn Lloyd, no. 57, 22 March 1956, RG 1081/636. 27. Information to the United States Government about the deportation of Archbishop Makarios, RG 1081/532, FO 371/123877. 28. Foreign Office to Athens embassy, no. 407, 13 March 1956, FO 371/123876. 29. Washington embassy to Foreign Office, no. 642, 12 March 1956, RG 1081/445, FO 371/123875; Foreign Office to Washington, no. 1680, 22 March

262

30. 31.

32. 33.

34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

† Notes to Pages 141 – 147 1956, RG 1081/643, FO 371/123880; Foreign Office to Washington, no. 1653, 21 March 1956, RG 1081/590, FO 371/123879. Claude Nicolet, United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954– 1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention (Mannheim, 2001), p. 97. Khartoum to Foreign Office, no. 377, 7 June 1956, RG 1081/1107, FO 371/123894. Impressive as it was it has to be said that the Sudanese resolution was passed when only 19 members out of a total of 96 were present, suggesting that it was not a high Sudanese priority. For Italian reaction see Rome embassy to Foreign Office, no. 148, 12 March 1956, RG 1081/428, FO 371/123875. Makarios, p. 177. The second account is Papagathagelou’s testimony, see: P. Papagathagelou, H Marty rίa Moy , Pv6 έzhsa thn proparask1y ή kai ton agώna th6 EOKA (My witness, How I lived the preparation and the struggle of EOKA) (Nicosia, 1995). Le Geyt, Makarios in exile, pp. 20 – 1. Makarios, p. 341. R.N.O. East Africa to Admiralty D.N.I., 22 May 1956, RG 1081/1011, FO 371/123891. Addis to Lennox-Boyd, no. 102, 7 May 1956, PREM 11/1248. Makarios, pp. 343– 6. Addis to Lennox-Boyd, no. 104, 8 May 1956; Addis to Lennox-Boyd, no. 126, 6 June 1956, PREM 11/1248. Le Geyt, op. cit., p. 24. Papagathangelou, op. cit., p. 359. Terrorism in Cyprus, CO 926/451. For more details on the diary of Grivas see also material in CO 926/452 and FO 371/123924. See also, Grivas, Memoirs (Greek), op. cit., p. 127. According to Grivas the location of his diary became known to the British through betrayal which could explain the enigmatic ‘through sources which cannot be named’. However Grivas does not say anything regarding the volume recovered on 10 June 1956 and the one found near Kykkos Monastery. Regarding his narrow escape he merely says that he had abandoned some items but does not mention anything about his diary, p. 106. Karamanlis Archive, vol. 2, pp. 148– 9. The Times, 17 August and 23 August 1956. The Times, 27 August 1956. Lennox-Boyd argued that Makarios was ‘the personal director of the whole tragic business and in no sense a moderate’. The Church and Terrorism in Cyprus, CO 926/930. On the British attitude regarding Makarios in light of Grivas’ diary see also Holland, op. cit., p. 151. See PREM 11/2249. Article reproduced in Geyt, op. cit., pp. 180 – 3. Papagathangelou, op. cit., p. 378. On a more personal note, Stanley Jones a retired District Commissioner from Tanganika who was appointed to teach English to Makarios refused to continue

Notes to Pages 147 – 154 † 263 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73.

74.

doing so in light of the revelations in Grivas’ diary. He was replaced by Le Geyt’s wife, Margaret, Le Geyt, op. cit., p. 53. Addis (Seychelles) to Lennox-Boyd, no. 207, 14 September 1956, CO 926/448. Makarios, p. 371. Geyt, op. cit., p. 35. Ibid. Le Geyt, op. 36. See Chapter 5. This will be discussed in Chapter 7. See Papagathangelou, op. cit., pp. 381 – 3. Sant Cassia, op. cit., p. 203. The actual record of this conversation was written by Ioannides himself and published in the newspaper Gnώmh, 7 March 1971. This was subsequently incorporated in Papaganthagelou’s account, op. cit., pp. 425– 8. Using the wireless set of Sans Souci the Cypriot inmates were able to receive news from Athens radio even though reception was not always reliable or clear. Afxentiou was a senior member in the EOKA hierarchy and a wanted man by British authorities. After a tip-off his hideout was surrounded by British soldiers on 2 March and because he refused to surrender he was burned alive after a confrontation of ten hours. H. Faustmann, ‘Divide and quit? The history of British colonial rule in Cyprus 1878– 1960’ (doctoral dissertation, University of Mannheim, 1999), pp. 188– 9. Addis to Lennox-Boyd, no. 154, 20 July 1956, PREM 11/1248. The importance of this constitution, its reception by the Greek Cypriots and its wider significance on account of the manner it was presented publicly will be discussed in the following chapter. Report on a visit to Archbishop Makarios in Seychelles by C. G. Tornaritis and Mr D. L. Pearson, RG 1015/31, FO 371/130070. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Karamanlis Archive, p. 309. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, no. 476, 14 March 1957, RGC 1057/12, FO 371/130112. Karamanlis Archive, p. 309. This was not the first time Karamanlis raised the issue of the Archbishop with the US administration. It was previously raised on 15 November 1956 during the visit of Karamanlis to Washington, ibid., p. 200. King Paul also wrote to Eisenhower asking him to mediate for the release of Makarios see: Letter of King Paul of the Hellenes to President Eisenhower, 10 March 1957, 25 A / 000291, Karamanlis’ Personal Archive. RGG 1051/23 Bermuda Conference Item 3 at Plenary Meeting on 21 March 1957, 15.45, FO 371/130112.

264

† Notes to Pages 154 – 164

75. From United Kingdom Delegation, Bermuda to FO, no. 88, March 24, 1957, RGG 1051/17, FO 371/130112. 76. The beginning of this important transformation can be traced back to the Bermuda Conference when Macmillan told Eisenhower that Britain ‘had no reason to prevent the island from achieving its independence’ or even its union with another sovereign state. See RGG 1051/23 Bermuda Conference Item 3 at Plenary Meeting on 21 March 1957, FO 371/130112. However Macmillan rather ominously added that Britain was staying on the island to prevent a Greco-Turkish conflict. Even if this was a remark that aimed to deflect attention from Britain it also had a ring of truth as subsequent events would clearly demonstrate. 77. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), vol. 567, 20 March 1957, cc 395. 78. Addis to Lennox-Boyd, no. 50, 21 March 1957, CO 926/949. 79. Le Geyt, op. cit., p. 52. 80. Addis to Lennox-Boyd, no. 53, 23 March 1957, CO 926/949. 81. Le Geyt, op. cit., p. 54. 82. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, no. 611, 2 April 1957, CO 926/924. 83. Ibid., Lennox-Boyd to Harding, no. 562, 5 April 1957. 84. Le Geyt, op. cit., pp. 57 – 8.

7 The Unravelling of the Enosis Campaign 1. The Times, 18 April 1957. 2. For more details on the cool personal relations between Karamanlis and Makarios see pp. 176– 7. 3. Crawshaw, op. cit., 237 – 8. 4. Athens embassy to Foreign Office, no. 301, 18 April 1957, RGC 1782/31 (A), FO 371/130163. 5. Ankara embassy to Foreign Office, no. 288, 24 March 1957, CO 926/949. 6. From United Kingdom Delegation, Bermuda to FO, no. 88, March 24, 1957, RGG 1051/17, FO 371/130112. 7. Lennox-Boyd to Macmillan, 23 March 1957, CO 926/949. 8. Harding, Political counter-offensive against Archbishop Makarios, May 1957, FO 371/130165. 9. RGC 1782/71G minute by J. A. Thomson, 6 June 1957, FO 371/130165. 10. The Times of Cyprus, 25 May 1957. 11. See interviews and statements given on 29 March, 11 April, 12 April 1957, in Makarios, pp. 377– 93. 12. Robert Boothby to Lennox-Boyd, 25 May 1957, CO 926/924. 13. Ibid., Lennox-Boyd to Robert Boothby, 30 May 1957. 14. Ibid., Athens to Foreign Office, no. 385, RGC 1782/56A. 15. Ibid., Foreign Office to Athens embassy, no. 647, 30 May 1957. See further below for an elaboration on Lennox-Boyd’s statement of 19 December 1956.

Notes to Pages 165 – 172 † 265 16. When Karamanlis received Vlachos to fill him in about his mission in Nicosia he told him: ‘You shall go to Nicosia! I don’t care about any embassy! Neither London, neither New York, neither Washington! I am interested in Nicosia. I want to have a person who will tell me the truth about Cyprus and tell the truth to the Cypriots! I will not blow up Greece for their sake! The Cypriots must cease to think that they can dictate to me the policy of Greece. I determine Greek policy and the limits within which it operates’, quoted in Vlachos, op. cit., p. 233. 17. Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, p. 97. 18. Averoff private archive: 100/1 Foreign Ministry to Greek UN delegation in New York, no. 4698 and no. 4699, 2 February 1957. 19. EOKA had circulated leaflets in the Turkish sector of Nicosia in June 1955 reassuring the Turkish Cypriots of its friendly intentions toward them. Grivas, op. cit., p. 52. 20. Faustmann, op. cit., p. 167. 21. For more details see, D. M. Anderson, ‘Policing and communal conflict: the Cyprus emergency, 1954– 1960’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol. 21 (1993), pp. 177 – 207. 22. Ibid., pp. 87 – 8. 23. House of Commons Debates vol. 562, cc 1268. 24. Lennox-Boyd to Harding, 25 September 1956, RG 1081/2175, FO 371/123929; Minute 1, 11 December 1956, C.M. 98 (56) CAB 128/30. 25. Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 265. 26. Averoff, Lost Opportunities, p. 132. 27. Vlachos, op. cit., p. 349. 28. See Makarios, vol. B, p. 188 and vol. C, p. 22. Similar views were expressed by Patroclos Stavrou and Andreas Azinas in interviews given to the author. The interviews took place on 18 July 2006 and 9 June 2006 respectively. Stavrou insisted that the issue of ending the struggle was never raised and dismissed the claims of Vlachos as the writings of a persona non grata. According to Azinas there were different thoughts about a suspension of hostilities but not termination, which were primarily the initiative of the Greek Government. The rationale was to improve the bargaining position of Greece and not the end of the struggle itself. 29. Averoff, op. cit., p. 125; Grivas, op. cit., p. 169. 30. Averoff, op. cit., pp. 124– 5. There is a contradiction in Averoff’s account. On one hand he says that his message was neutral and it was not his intention to prejudge the decision of Makarios. He even claims that he thought the threat of violence was an important negotiating chip and yet on the other hand he draws attention to the fact that subsequently Makarios had agreed to the end of the struggle. 31. Makarios, pp. 188– 9. 32. Grivas, op. cit., pp. 170 – 3. 33. Makarios, p. 22.

266 34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

51. 52. 53.

† Notes to Pages 173 – 177 Grivas, op. cit., p. 35; Faustmann, op. cit., p. 128 and p. 201. Papageorghiou, op. cit., p. 607. Ibid., p. 198. Appreciation of the Communist attitude and strength in Cyprus as in September 1957, CO 926/1056. By August 1957 all the left-wing leaders and members who had been rounded up back in December 1955 were released in response to the improved conditions of security resulting from the EOKA ceasefire; see El1yu1rίa, 10 August 1957. RGC 1782/88, Harding to Lennox-Boyd, no. 1528, 8 August 1957, FO 371/130611. Crawshaw, op. cit., p. 280. Makarios, p. 344. Papageorghiou, op. cit., p. 598. Ibid., p. 599. Faustmann, op. cit., p. 249. A good discussion, including the contested views of both sides, about the 23 left-wing victims of EOKA whose memory AKEL requests to be rehabilitated can be found in Simerini, 7 April 2008. For more details see Grivas, op. cit., pp. 358 –64. Papageorghiou, op. cit., 601. Grivas, op. cit., pp. 365 – 7. Averoff Archive, 103/1, minutes of a conversation between Makarios and Averoff on 6 August 1958; Grivas, op. cit., p. 369. RGC 1782/48, 10 May 1957, FO 371/130164. Averoff had replaced Theotokis in May 1956, when the latter was deemed by the Ethnarchy as too ‘soft’ in handling the Cypriot affair. Effectively Theotokis, even though he had worked quietly behind the scenes to prolong the negotiations of Makarios with Harding, had become the scapegoat of the frustrated and leaderless Ethnarchy for the ill fortunes of the enosis campaign. In true internecine fashion the Cyprus problem added gist to the mill of Greek endemic politics making and breaking political careers in an almost whimsical manner. See Karamanlis Archive, vol. 2, pp. 60 and 88 – 9. For more details on the debate see Xydis, Conflict and Conciliation, pp. 50 – 64. Athens embassy to London, 13 August 1957, RGC 1051/123, FO 371/130116. There were some similarities between Venizelos and Makarios. Venizelos distinguished himself in Cretan politics while Crete was autonomous and notionally still under Ottoman suzerainty. After achieving the virtual independence of Crete, Venizelos relocated to Athens to become a Greek MP and subsequently prime minister in 1910. Then he proceeded to dominate Greek politics until 1920, having masterminded the doubling of Greece’s territory and the attainment of a foothold in Asia Minor after the Treaty of Sevres. Of course his vision of a Greater Greece was subsequently crushed during the Greco-Turkish war of 1920–2 but nevertheless Venizelos remains

Notes to Pages 177 – 182 † 267

54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68.

69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75.

arguably the most successful Greek politician of the twentieth century. From a psychological point of view there were also parallels between the Cretan and Cyprus affairs. The question of Cretan enosis with Greece was also a contentious issue in Greek politics for more than 40 years but its successful solution encouraged the Greek Cypriots to think that history was on their side. In this sense Makarios could be seen as a second Venizelos, a prominent politician from the periphery of the Greek world that could lead Greece itself to new glories. How realistic this expectation was will remain an imponderable of history but Makarios was not likely to abandon Cyprus while its future was uncertain for the even more fractious prime ministerial office of Greece, even though he was flattered by the idea. Vlachos, Once upon a time a diplomat, pp. 339 –40 and 342–3. Makarios, p. 393. In interview given on 12 April 1957 while in Nairobi he was asked: ‘After your arrival in Athens will you meet with the leaders of the opposition parties?’ He replied: ‘Of course, I will have such meetings’. Vlachos, op. cit., p. The Times of Cyprus, 25 May 1957. Kranidiotis, op. cit., pp. 278 – 80. Ibid., p. 280. Karamanlis Archive, vol. 5, pp. 176– 7. RGC 1782/48, A. E. Lambert to W. E. Young. 10 May 1957, FO 371/130164. ‘Unless he can keep himself in the limelight, people will lose interest in him altogether’. Makarios, pp. 271– 83; See English text at Athens embassy to Foreign Office, 19 June 1957, RGC 1782/67A, FO 371/130165. Averoff Archive, 102/2 Palamas to Foreign Ministry, no. 4762, 20 November 1957. Ibid. Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the international status, pp. 105– 106. CAB 128/31, CC (57), 51st Conclusions, 11 July 1957. Makarios, p. 301. Ibid., p. 297. ‘I will be happy to be among the American people who I have known during my stay there as a student, but also during my subsequent visits, and I appreciate its liberal and democratic spirit. Now if the same spirit characterizes its government as well is a different question’. See the relevant telegrams in, Makarios, pp. 302– 3. Xydis, Conflict and Conciliation, p. 468. For more details about the debate see Ibid., pp. 427 – 95. Makarios, p. 322. Averoff, op. cit., p. 207. Ankara embassy to Foreign Office, no. 288, 24 March 1957, CO 926/949. RGC 10344/38E Foreign Office to Ankara, no. 799, 9 April 1957, FO 371/130095.

268

† Notes to Pages 183 – 187

76. RGC 1072/38G Ankara to Foreign Office, no. 362, 9 April 1957, FO 371/130138. 77. RGC 10344/35B From Ankara to Foreign Office, no. 313, 29 March 1957, FO 371/130095. 78. Averoff, op. cit., p. 128. 79. Karamanlis Archive, vol. 2, p. 323. 80. Hatzivassiliou, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, p. 106. 81. RGC 1782/44, Turkish News Bulletin, 3 May 1957, FO 371/130164. 82. In his speech, which included the partition statement mentioned above, Ku¨cu¨k also claimed that: ‘Two years ago this priest [Archbishop Makarios] had declared in a sermon preached in Cyprus: “What has been written in our book about the Greek nation is coming true. The day is drawing near when the entire Mediterranean will belong to the Greek Empire. Our bells will soon ring in Cyprus; then in Saint Sophia in Istanbul; and finally we shall have all Anatolia under our jurisdiction. This is not what I say, but what Jesus says”. This assertion attracted the attention of British officials but after a careful examination they were not able to confirm that such a statement was ever made, see RGC 1782/44 J. A. Thomson (Foreign Office) to K. J. Neale (Colonial Office), 10 May 1957, FO 371/130164. 83. Quoted in D. W. Markides, Cyprus, 1957– 1963: From Colonial Conflict Constitutional Crisis. The Key Role of the Municipal Issue (Minneapolis, 2001), p. 16. 84. Lennox-Boyd to Harding, no. 1308, 14 August 1957, CO 926/615. The severity of the campaign was such that the Turkish Prime Minister was approached to intervene discreetly, see, ibid., Istanbul General-Consulate to Foreign Office, no. 159, 16 August 1957. 85. Harding to Lennox-Boyd, no. 1370, 3 September 1957, CO 926/615. 86. Ankara embassy to Foreign Office, telegram no. 1098, 27 November 1957, CO 926/616. 87. Foreign Office to Ankara, no. 2009, 9 October 1957, CO 926/616. 88. Makarios, pp. 338– 40. 89. The Times, 16 January 1958. 90. RGC 1782/3D Athens to Foreign Office, 24 January 1958, CO 926/926. 91. Crawshaw, op. cit., p. 263. 92. Holland, op. cit., p. 223. 93. Unanimous resolution of the ‘Cyprus is Turkish’ Party taken at an extraordinary meeting in Nicosia on 15 December 1957, CO 926/643. 94. RGC 1051/2, Revised Plan, FO 371/136361. 95. Record of discussion in the evening of 27 January 1958, RGC 10319/91/G, FO 371/136307. 96. Ibid. Record of discussion on the evening of 29 January 1958. 97. Governor’s deputy to Lennox-Boyd, January 27, 1958, PREM 11/2260. ‘In an answer to a question of mine, the Turkish leaders said that the object of the demonstration was to show the solidarity and vigour of the Turkish-Cypriot

Notes to Pages 187 – 194 † 269 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107.

108. 109.

community in support of their desire for partition at a time when, as they judged, their fate was being discussed in Ankara’. Foot to Lennox-Boyd, telegram no. 202, 5 February 1958, PREM 11/2260. Memorandum prepared by the Deputy Governor, the Administrative Secretary and the Chief of Staff, 20 April 1958, PREM 11/2261. Foot to Lennox-Boyd, no. 180, 1 February, 1958, PREM 11/2260; Crawshaw, op. cit., p. 277. Cabinet Cyprus Committee, ‘A note by the Secretary’, C. Y. (0) (57) 1, 4 April, CAB 21/4267. Unfortunately the series CAB 134/1589 which includes the minutes of the Cyprus Committee is detained for national security reasons. A Memorandum on Possible Schemes for the Partition of Cyprus, Secretariat, Nicosia, 10 November 1956, CO 926/277. Minute 6, 11 July 1957, C.C. 51 (57) CAB 128/31. Minute 5, 22 January 1958, CC 8 (58) CAB 128/32. See below and Foreign Office to Athens embassy, telegram no. 622, 7 June 1958, PREM 11/2262. Record of conversation between the Governor of Cyprus and Archbishop Makarios, in Athens, 13 February 1958, RGC 1782/9, FO 371/130132. Record of meeting with Greek Prime Minister, 12 February 1958, RGC 10319/66, FO 371/136306; Karamanlis Archive, vol. 3, pp. 57 –60. It is interesting to note that according to the Greek transcript Lloyd cited the partition of Palestine as a possible outcome for Cyprus if the situation continued to deteriorate, ibid., p. 66. Makarios, p. 354. S. G. Xydis, Cyprus Reluctant Republic (The Hague, 1973), p. 107.

8

Makarios and the ‘Solution’ of Independence

1. Leftist Turkish Cypriots were murdered because of their ties with the Greek Cypriot community. Turkish Cypriot members of PEO were ordered to resign and a boycott campaign of all Greek products was imposed on the Turkish Cypriot community which was too small to achieve genuine economic independence. See Ankara embassy to Foreign Office, no. 800, 1 June 1958, CO 926/619; Crawshaw, op. cit., p. 287. See also Chapter 7, p. 18. 2. Account of incidents of 7 – 13 June, CO 926/906. 3. Rauf Denktash, a rising Turkish Cypriot politician who had only recently resigned as Crown Prosecutor in order to take a more active role in Turkish Cypriot politics. In the 1960s he replaced Ku¨cu¨k as the most prominent Turkish Cypriot leader and his involvement in Turkish Cypriot affairs continued well into the twenty-first century. 4. Markides, op. cit., p. 21. 5. Note of meeting at Government House, 8 June 1958, CO 926/643. 6. Ankara embassy to Foreign Office, no. 62, 20 June 1958, CO 926/620.

270 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

† Notes to Pages 194 – 206 Grivas, op. cit., p. 258. Papageorgiou, op. cit., p. 606. Ibid., pp. 610 – 11. Ibid., p. 611. Athens embassy to Foreign Office, no. 370, 9 June 1958, CO 926/598. Markides, op. cit., p. 22. Foot to Lennox-Boyd, 3 July 1958, CO 926/804. Crawshaw, op. cit., p. 304. Foot to Lennox-Boyd, no. 1193, 12 June 1958, CO 926/714. Ankara embassy to Selwyn Lloyd, no. 62, 20 June 1958, CO 926/620. Averoff, op. cit., p. 237. Quoted in Vlachos, Ten Years of Cyprus Problem (Athens, 1980), p. 219. Draft White Paper on Cyprus, 9 May 1958, CAB 129/93 C 102 (58). Minute 2, 13 May 1958, CC 42 (58) CAB 128/32. Xydis, Reluctant Republic, p. 119; Karamanlis Archive, vol. 3, p. 124. Athens embassy to Foreign Office, no. 382, 11 June 1958, PREM 11/2262. Quoted in Holland, op. cit., p. 259. S. Xydis, Cyprus Reluctant Republic (The Hague, 1973), p. 122, footnote 11. Michael Stewart (Charge d’Affaires) to Selwyn Lloyd, 5 September 1958, CO 926/621. Karamanlis Archive, pp. 187– 203; RGC 10344/229, From Ankara to Foreign Office, no. 1272, 11 August 1958, FO 371/136340. Grivas, op. cit., p. 268. Twenty-eight casualties for the Greek Cypriots and 44 for the Turkish Cypriots, Crawshaw, op. cit., p. 408. Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 352. The Times, 31 July 1958. Grivas, op. cit., pp. 272 – 3; Crawshaw, op. cit., pp. 304 – 305. Statement issued from 10 Downing Street at 5 p.m. on 15 August 1958, CO 926/1069. Averoff archive, File 103/1, Discussion at the Foreign Office, 6 August 1958. Averoff archive, File 103/1, Discussion at the Foreign Office, 6 August 1958. This conversation is reconstructed in Xydis, Cyprus Reluctant Republic, pp. 177–81. Ibid. Xydis, Cyprus Reluctant Republic, p. 235. RGC 10319/228 Athens embassy to Foreign Office, no. 698, September 7 1958, FO 371/136312. Karamanlis personal archive: 27 A / 000911. Karamanlis Archive, pp. 223– 6. The Times, 23 September 1958. El1y u1rίa, 21 July 1958. Xydis, op. cit., p. 243. Makarios, pp. 418– 21. Grivas, op. cit., p. 306.

Notes to Pages 206 – 215 † 271 45. Ibid., pp. 306 – 307. 46. RGC 1782/112, Athens embassy to Foreign Office, text of the statement made by Bishop of Kyrenia, FO 371/136441. 47. Xydis, Reluctant Republic, p. 245, footnote 60. 48. Makarios, p. 422; Times of Cyprus, 26 September 1958. 49. Karamanlis private archive, 27A / 001015. 50. Ibid. 51. Quoted in Holland, op. cit., p. 284. 52. RGC 982/81, Memorandum by A. D. S. Goodall, 24 September 1958, FO 371/136441. 53. Makarios, p. 178. 54. Prominent Turkish Cypriot politician who eventually became the first VicePresident of the Republic of Cyprus after independence. 55. Times of Cyprus, 24 September 1958. 56. Makarios, p. 421, footnote 5. 57. Karamanlis Archive, pp. 227– 8. 58. Quoted in Vlachos, op. cit., p. 233. 59. Karamanlis Archive, p. 228. 60. RGC 1782/125, Washington Embassy to Foreign Office, no. 3169, 21 November 1958, FO 371/136441. 61. Ibid., RGC 1782/125A Washington Embassy to Foreign Office, no. 3171, 21 November. 62. Karamanlis Archive, p. 294. 63. RGC 1782/125D, Athens embassy to Foreign Office, no. 854, 24 November 1958, FO 371/136441. 64. Makarios, p. 448, footnote 1. 65. Xydis, Reluctant Republic, pp. 359– 86, pp. 406 –19. 66. Averoff, op. cit., pp. 294 – 303. 67. Karamanlis Archive, vol. 3, pp. 320– 2. 68. Xydis, Reluctant Republic, p. 401. 69. Karamanlis Archive, vol. 3, p. 365. 70. Averoff, Angelos Vlachos and the Bishop of Kition were also present. The meeting took place at Karamanlis’ residence. 71. Ibid., p. 368. 72. Ibid., p. 367. 73. Ibid., p. 392. 74. Ibid., p. 397. 75. Ibid. 76. S. Soulioti, Fettered Independence, Cyprus, 1878– 1964) (Minneapolis, 2006), vol. 1, pp. 94 –5. 77. Ibid., pp. 79 – 80. 78. Ibid. 79. Makarios, p. 478. 80. Holland, op. cit., p. 308.

272 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93.

94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109.

110. 111. 112.

† Notes to Pages 216 – 222 Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 360. Ibid., p. 362. Makarios, p. 204n.6. Karamanlis Archive, vol. 3, p. 403. Mayes, op. cit., p. 130. Karamanlis Archive, vol. 3, p. 403. Xydis, Reluctant Republic, p. 426. Grivas, op. cit., pp. 352 – 5. Ibid., p. 377. Azinas, op. cit. (Greek version), p. 779. Kranidiotis, op. cit., pp. 365 – 6. Ibid., p. 366. These were Vassos Lyssarides, a doctor who offered his services to EOKA members and eventually became the private physician of Makarios and Tassos Papadopoulos, a young ambitious lawyer. Papadopoulos proceeded to become the youngest minister in the history of the Cyprus Republic and served also as president of the republic between 2003 and 2008. Grivas, op. cit., p. 377; Azinas, op. cit., p. 782. Karamanlis Archive, vol. 3, p. 403. Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 367. Karamanlis Archive, vol. 3, p. 404. El1y u1rίa, 17 February 1959. Times of Cyprus, 16 February 1959. Alan Robertson to Theobald Mathew, 20 February 1959, DDP 2/2661; Harding to Alan Robertson, CO 926/927. Kranidiotis, op. cit., pp. 368–9; A. Fantis, The burial of enosis (Nicosia, 1995), p. 390. RGC 1073/35, Verbatim report of the first plenary session held at Lancaster House, London, 17 February 1959, FO 371/144641. Karamanlis Archive, vol. 3, p. 404. Soulioti, Fettered independence, pp. 510– 11n.51. Averoff, op. cit., p. 348. Bishop Anthimos, Dervis, Rossides and Chrysafinis were present at this meeting. Xydis, op. cit., p. 439. Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 370. See the report of Papadopoulos to Grivas, published in Grivas, op. cit. pp. 381– 2; Lyssarides in an account published in the newspaper ‘Nέa’ [News] argued that essentially Averoff blackmailed the Archbishop into signing, see Makarios, p. 212n.2. Karamanlis Archive, vol. 3, p. 404. Ibid., p. 406; RGC 1073/54 Record of a meeting held in the Foreign Office, 18 February 1959. Makarios, pp. 210– 12.

Notes to Pages 223 – 235 † 273 113. RGC 1073/35B Verbatim report of the second plenary session held at Lancaster House, London, 18 February 1959, FO 371/144641. 114. Mayes, op. cit., p. 135. 115. Kranidiotis, op. cit., p. 372. 116. Makarios, pp. 216– 17. 117. Euno6, 21 May 1959. 118. Xydis, Reluctant Republic, p. 456. 119. C. M. Woodhouse, Karamanlis, The Restorer of Greek Democracy (Oxford, 1982), p. 86. 120. Averoff, op. cit., pp. 350 – 1. 121. Soulioti, Fettered Independence, pp. 96 – 8. 122. The estimated Greek Cypriot population for 1956 was 416,986, Cyprus, Population Estimates, Government of Cyprus (Nicosia, 1956). 123. Times of Cyprus, 2 March 1959. 124. Kauhm1rinή (Auhnώn) [Kathimerini] 3 March 1959. 125. Makarios, pp. 233– 6. It is interesting to note that Makarios, who often included classical allusions in his speeches when he declared ‘we have won’, used the same word – N1nikήkam1n” (Nenike´kamen) – that the legendary marathon runner Pheidippides had used when he raced all the way from Marathon to Athens to inform his compatriots that the Athenian forces had routed the Persian army. It was a deliberate choice of word in order to cultivate an atmosphere of success and joy because Makarios was concerned that the Greek Cypriots would be disappointed with the agreements. 126. Grivas, op. cit., p. 403, p. 409.

Conclusion 1. E. H. Carr, What is History, (Basingstoke, 2001), p. 114. 2. L. P. Hartley, The Go-Between, (New York, 2002), p. 1. 3. London Times, 23 October 2008.

Bibliography

Archives and Manuscripts United Kingdom (National Archives, London). ADM 1: Admiralty, and Ministry of Defence, Navy Department: Correspondence and Papers. CAB 21: Cabinet Office and predecessors: Registered Files (1916 –65). CO 67: Colonial Office: Cyprus, Original Correspondence. CO 69: Colonial Office: Cyprus, Sessional Papers. CO 537: Colonial Office and predecessors: Confidential General and Confidential Original Correspondence. CO 926: Colonial Office: Mediterranean Department, predecessor and successors: Registered Files, Mediterranean Colonies (MED Series). DPP 2: Director of Public Prosecutions: Case Papers, New Series. FO 371: Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence (1906–66). PREM 11: Prime Minister’s Office: Correspondence and Papers (1951– 64). Foot papers held at Rhodes House, Bodleian Library, University of Oxford. Legum Papers held at Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London. Karamanlis Foundation in Athens. Private papers of Constantine Karamanlis. Private papers of Evangelos Averoff.

Oral Testimonies to the Author Andreas Azinas, Nicosia, 9 June 2006. Paschalis Paschalides, Nicosia, 23 July 2006. Patroclos Stavrou, Nicosia, 18 July 2006. Petros Stylianou, Nicosia, 11 January 2006. Vasos Lyssarides, Nicosia, 5 June 2006.

Published Documents in English Cmnd. 9594, The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus (1955). Cmnd. 9708, Correspondence Exchanged Between The Governor and Archbishop Makarios (1956).

276

† Makarios

Cmnd. 42, Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus: Report Submitted to the Secretary of State for the Colonies by the Right Hon. Lord Radcliffe (1956). Cmnd. 455, Cyprus: Statement of Policy (1958). Cyprus Population Estimates October 1956 (published by the Statistics Section, Financial Secretary’s Office, Nicosia, 1957). Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, Documents signed and initialled at Lancaster House on February 19, 1959 (London, 1959). Terrorism in Cyprus (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1956). US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957 Vol. XXIV: The Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean (Washington, DC, 1989). US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958 – 1960 Vol. X: Part 1, Eastern Mediterranean; The Soviet Union; Cyprus (Washington, DC, 1993).

Published Documents in Greek Άpanta Arxi1piskόpoy Kύproy Makarίoy G΄ [Collected texts of Archbishop of Cyprus Makarios III], vol. 1, 1948–54 (Nicosia, 1991) (referred to as Makarios). Άpanta Arxi1piskόpoy Kύproy Makarίoy G΄ [Collected texts of Archbishop of Cyprus Makarios III], vol. 2, 1955– April 1957 (Nicosia, 1992). Άpanta Arxi1piskόpoy Kύproy Makarίoy G΄ [Collected texts of Archbishop of Cyprus Makarios III], vol. 3, May 1957 – March 1959 (Nicosia, 1993). Kvnstantίno6 Karamanlh6, Arx1ίo, G1gonόta & K1ίm1na [Constantinos Karamanlis, archive, events, documents], (general editor) Constantinos Svolopoulos (Athens, 1992, vol. 1). Kvnstantίno6 Karamanlh6, Arx1ίo, G1gonόta & K1ίm1na [Constantinos Karamanlis, archive, events, documents], (general editor) Constantinos Svolopoulos (Athens, 1993, vol. 2). Kvnstantίno6 Karamanlh6, Arx1ίo, G1gonόta & K1ίm1na [Constantinos Karamanlis, archive, events, documents], (general editor) Constantinos Svolopoulos (Athens, 1994, vol. 3).

Secondary Literature in English Adams, T. W., AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus (Stanford, 1971). Alastos, Doros, Cyprus Guerrilla (London, 1960). Alexandrou, Alexis, The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918 – 1974 (Athens, 1983). Bahcheli, Tozun, Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955 (London, 1995). Bryant, Rebecca, Imagining the Modern (New York, 2004). Crawshaw, Nancy, The Cyprus Revolt (London, 1978). Englezakis, Benedict, ‘The Church of Cyprus in the Eighteen and Nineteenth Centuries’, Studies on the History of the Church of Cyprus, trans. By Norman Russell (Aldershot, 1995). Foley, Charles, Legacy of Strife: Cyprus From Rebellion to Civil War (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964). Foley, Charles and Scobie, W. I., The Struggle for Cyprus (Stanford, 1973). Georghallides, G. S., A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus (Nicosia, 1979). ———, Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs (Nicosia, 1985).

Bibliography † 277 Hatzivassiliou, Evanthis, Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 1955– 59 (Minneapolis, 1997). ———, The Cyprus Question, 1878–1960: The Constitutional Aspect (Minneapolis, 2002). ———, Greece and the Cold War, Frontline state, 1952–1967 (London, New York, 2006). Hill, George, A History of Cyprus, vol. 4 (Cambridge, 1952). Holland, Robert, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus 1954– 1959 (Oxford, 1998). Holland, Robert and Markides, Diana, The British and the Hellenes (Oxford, 2006). John-Jones, L. W. St., The Population of Cyprus (Southampton, 1983). Kalotychos, Vangelis (ed.), Cyprus and its People (Oxford, 1998). Katsianounis, Rolandos, Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus During the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century (Nicosia, 1996). Kelling, George Horton, Countdown to Rebellion: British Policy toward Cyprus 1939 – 1955 (New York, 1990). Koliopoulos, John, S. Brigands With A Cause, Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece, 1821– 1912 (Oxford, 1987). Koliopoulos, John and Veremis, Thanos, Greece: The Modern Sequel (London, 2002). Leventis, Yiorgos, Cyprus: The Struggle for Self-Determination in the 1940s (Frankfurt am Main, New York, 2002). Markides, C. Kyriakos, The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic (New Haven, 1997). Markides, Diana Weston, Cyprus 1957– 1963: from colonial conflict to constitutional crisis; the key role of the municipal issue (Minneapolis, 2001). Mayes, Stanley, Cyprus and Makarios (London, 1960). ———, Makarios, A Biography (London, 1981). Mazower, Mark, Inside Hitler’s Germany: The Experience of Occupation, 1941 – 44 (London, 1993). McHenry, James, The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus, 1919– 1939 (New York, London, 1987). Murphy, Philip, Alan Lennox-Boyd, A Biography (London, 1999). Nicolet, Claude, United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954– 1974: Removing the GreekTurkish Bone of Contention (Mannheim, 2001). Panteli, Stavros, A New History of Cyprus (London, 1984). Peckham, Robert Shannan, National Histories, Natural States (London, 2001). Persianis, Panayiotis, Church and State in Cyprus Education (Nicosia, 1978). Salih, Halih Ibrahim, Cyprus: An analysis of Cypriot Political Discord (New York, 1968). Soulioti, Stella, Fettered Independence, Cyprus, 1878– 1964, vols 1 and 2 (Minnesota, 2006). Stephanides, Ioannis, Isle of Discord (New York, 1999). Stephens, Robert, Cyprus, a Place of Arms: Power Politics and Ethnic Conflict in Eastern Mediterranean (London, 1966). Theodoulou, Georghios, The Origins and Evolution of Church-State Relations in Cyprus (Nicosia, 2005). Vanezis, P. N., Makarios: Faith and Power (London, 1971). ———, Makarios, Pragmatism Vs Idealism (London, 1974). Volkan, Vamik, Blood Lines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism (Boulder, 1998). Vryonis, Speros Jr., The Mechanism of catastrophe: the Turkish pogrom of September 6 – 7, and the destruction of the Greek community of Istanbul (New York, 2005). Ware, Timothy (Bishop Kallistos of Diokleia), The Orthodox Church (London, 1983). White, Hayden, Metahistory (London, 1975).

278

† Makarios

Woodhouse, C. M., Karamanlis, The Restorer of Greek Democracy (Oxford, 1982). ———, Apple of Discord (London, 1985). Xydis, Stephen, Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation (Columbus, 1967). ———, Cyprus: Reluctant Republic (The Hague, 1973).

Secondary Literature in Greek Christodoulou, Miltiades, H Por1ίa Mia6 Epoxή6, H Ellάda, h Ky priakή Hg1sίa kai to Kypriakό Prόblhma [The progress of an age, Greece, Cypriot leadership and the Cyprus problem] (Athens, 1987). Cleanthous, Marinos F., Arxi1piskopikέ6 Eklogέ6 Sthn Kύpro [Archbishopric elections in Cyprus] (Nicosia, 2005). Droushiotis, Makarios, EOKA, H Skot1inή Όch [EOKA, The Dark Side] (Athens, 1998). Economides, Christofi, Apomy uopoihmέnh Istorίa toy Ky priakoύ Sta T1l1y taίa 50 Xrόnia [Demystified history of the Cyprus problem in the last 50 years] (Athens, 1993). Egglezakis, Benedict, Eίkosi M1lέtai Dia thn Ekklhsίan Kύproy [Twenty Studies for the Church of Cyprus] (Athens, 1996). Hatzivassiliou, Evanthis, Strathgikέ6 toy Ky priakoύ, H d1ka1tίa toy 1950 [Strategies of the Cyprus problem, the decade of 1950] (Athens, 2005). Katsiaounis, Rolandos, H Diask1ptikή 1946-1948 [The Consultative Assembly] (Nicosia, 2000). Lamprou, K. Yiannis, Istorίa Toy Ky priakoύ, Ta Xrόnia M1tά Thn An1jarthsίa, 1960– 2004 [History of the Cyprus problem, the years after the independence, 1960– 2004] (Nicosia, 2004). Leonidou, Leonidas F., G1ώrgio6 Grίba6 Dig1nή6 – Biograwίa, 1o6 tόmo6 [Georghios Grivas Dighenis – A Biography, vol. 1] (Nicosia, 1995). ———, G1ώrgio6 Grίba6 Dig1nή6 – Biograwίa, 2o6 tόmo6 [Georghios Grivas Dighenis – A Biography, vol. 2] (Nicosia, 1997). Markaki, Andronikou, O Asymbίbasto6 Makάrio6: Misό6 Aiώna6 Agώn16 [The uncompromisable Makarios: Half-a-century of struggles] (Athens, 1980). M1gάlh Kypriakή Egkyklopaίd1ia [Great Cypriot Encyclopaedia], (Gen. Ed.) Antros Pavlides (Nicosia, 1986). Papageorgiou, Spyros, Ky priakή Qύ1lla 1955– 1959 [Cypriot storm] (Nicosia, no publishing date). ———, AKEL to άllo KKE [Akel the other KKE] (Athens, 1984). ———, O Grίba6 kai h «X», To xamέno arx1ίo [Grivas and ‘X’, the secret archive] (Athens 2004). Skopetea, Elli, To «Prόtypo Basίl1io» kai h M1gάlh Idέa [The ‘model kingdom’ and the Great Idea] (Athens, 1988). Svolopoulos, Constantinos, H Ellhnikή Ejvt1rikή Politikή, 1945– 1981 [Greek foreign policy, 1945– 1981] (Athens, 2003). Terlexis, Pantazis, Diplvmatίa kai Politikή toy Ky priakoύ, Anatomίa Enό6 Lάuoy6 [Diplomacy and policy of the Cyprus problem, the anatomy of an error] (Athens, 1971). Tsalakos, Yiorghos and Kranidiotis, Yiannos (eds), Makάrio6, Όpv6 ton 1ίdan [Makarios, as they saw him] (Athens, 1980).

Bibliography † 279 Varnava, Andrea, Istorίa toy Ap1l1y u1rvtikoύ Agώna th6 EOKA, 1955– 1959 [History of the liberating struggle of EOKA, 1955– 1959] (Nicosia, 2002). Xydis, A.G., Linardatou S. & Hatziargyri K. (eds), O Makάrio6 kai oi sy mmaxoί toy [Makarios and his allies] (Athens, 1974, 3rd edition).

Articles Anastassiadis, Anastasios, ‘Religion and politics in Greece: The Greek Church’s “conservative modernization” in the 1990s’, Research in Question, 2004, pp. 1–35. Anderson, M. David, ‘Policing and communal conflict: the Cyprus emergency, 1954– 1960’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 1993, pp. 177 – 207. Cassia, Paul Sant, ‘The Archbishop in the beleaguered city: an analysis of the conflicting roles and political oratory of Makarios’, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 1983, pp. 191 – 212. Cohn, Bernard S., ‘History and anthropology: the state of play’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 1980, pp. 198 – 221. Eller, Jack David and Coughlan, Reed, M., ‘The poverty of primordialism: the demystification of ethnic attachments’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 1993, pp. 183–202. Evriviades, Marios L., ‘Greek policy and Cyprus: an interpretation’, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, 1987, pp. 25 – 48. Faustmann, Hubert, ‘The UN and the internationalisation of the Cyprus conflict, 1949– 58’, Oliver P. Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay (eds), The Work of the UN in Cyprus (Basington, 2001). Holland, Robert, ‘Never, never land: British colonial policy and the roots of violence in Cyprus, 1950– 54’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 21 (1993), pp. 148– 76. Kitromilides, Paschalis, ‘From coexistence to confrontation: the dynamics of ethnic conflict in Cyprus’, Michael Attalides (ed.), Cyprus Reviewed (Nicosia, 1977), pp. 35 – 70. ———, ‘Greek irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus’, Middle Eastern Studies, 26 (1990), pp. 3 – 17. ———, ‘“Imagined communities” and the origins of the national question in the Balkans’, M. Blinkhorn and T. Veremis (eds), Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality, (Athens, 1990) pp. 23 – 66. ———, ‘The dialectic of intolerance: ideological dimension of ethnic conflict’, P. Kitromilides (ed.), Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy (London, 1994), pp. 5 – 30. Loizos, Peter, ‘The progress of Greek nationalism in Cyprus, 1878 –1970’, J. Davis (ed.), Choice and Change (New York, 1974). Markides, Diana Weston, ‘Britain’s “new look” policy for Cyprus and the MakariosHarding talks, January 1955 – March 1956’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 1995, pp. 479 – 502. Markides, Diana and Georghallides, G. S., ‘British attitudes to constitution-making in post-1931 Cyprus’, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 1995, pp. 63 – 81. Mavratsas, Caesar, ‘Approaches to nationalism: basic theoretical considerations in the study of the Greek-Cypriot case and a historical overview’, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, 1996, pp. 77 –102.

280

† Makarios

Papadopoullos, Theodore, ‘Orthodox Church and civil authority’, Journal of Contemporary History, 1967, pp. 201 – 209. Stamatakis, Nikos A., ‘History and nationalism: the cultural reconstruction of the modern Greek Cypriot identity’, Cyprus Review, 1991, pp. 59 – 86. Stockwell, Sarah, ‘“Splendidly Leading the Way”? Archbishop Fisher and Decolonisation in British Colonial Africa’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 2008, pp. 545 – 64. Varnava, Andrekos ‘Sophronios III, 1865–1900, The last of the “old” and the first of the “new” Archbishop-Ethnarch’ in The Archbishops of Cyprus in the Modern Age: The Changing Role of the Archbishop-Ethnarch, their Identities and Politics (Newcastle, 2013), eds A. Varnava and M.N. Michael, pp. 118–24. Xydis, G. Stephen, ‘The UN General Assembly as an instrument of Greek policy: Cyprus, 1954– 58’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 12 (1968), pp. 141– 58. ———, ‘Toward “toil and moil” in Cyprus’, The Middle East Journal, 20 (1996), pp. 1 – 19. Yavuz, M. Hakan, ‘The evolution of ethno-nationalism in Cyprus under the Ottoman and British systems’, Cyprus Review, 1991, pp. 57 –79.

Memoirs in English Arnold, Percy, Cyprus Challenge (London, 1956). Averoff-Tossizza, Evangelos, Lost Opportunities (New York, 1986). Azinas, Andreas, 50 Yeats of Silence, Cyprus’s Struggle for Freedom (Nicosia, 2002). Bitsios, Demitris S., Cyprus: The Vulnerable Republic (Thessaloniki, 1975). Castle, Barbara, Fighting All the Way (London, 1993). Eden, Anthony, The Eden Memoirs [Vol. 3], Full Circle,1951– 1957 (London, 1962). Foot, Hugh, A Start in Freedom (London, 1964). Grivas, Georghios, trans. by Foley, Charles, The Memoirs of General Grivas (London, 1964). Macmillan, Harold, Riding the Storm, 1956– 1959 (London, 1971). Noel-Baker, Francis, My Cyprus File (Nicosia, 1985). Reddaway, John, Burdened with Cyprus (London, 1986).

Memoirs in Greek Azinas, Antreas, 50 Xronia Sivph6 [50 years of silence], vol. 1 (Nicosia, 2001). ———, 50 Xronia Sivph6 [50 years of silence], vol. 2 (Nicosia, 2001). Grivas, Georghios – Dighenis, Apomnhmon1ύmata Agώno6 EOKA, 1955– 1959 [Memoirs of the EOKA struggle, 1955– 1959] (Athens, 1961). Evdokas, H. Takis, ‘Egώ 1ίmai h Kύpro6’ [I am Cyprus] (Nicosia, 1990). Fantis, Antreas, O Entawiasmό6 (1nό6 glykύtatoy on1ίroy ) th6 Έnvsh6 [The burial (of the sweetest dream) of enosis ] (Athens, 1995). Kranidiotis, Nicos, Dύskola Xrόnia [Hard years] (Athens, 1981). ———, Oi diapragmat1ύs1i6 Makarίoy – Xάrtingk, 1955– 1956 [The Makarios – Harding Negotiations] (Athens, 1987). Loizides, Savvas, Άtyxh Kύpro6, Pv6 έzhsa toy 6 pόuoy 6 kai toy6 kahmoύ6 th6, 1910– 1980 [Unfortunate Cyprus, how I lived its passions and sorrows, 1910– 1980] (Athens, 1980).

Bibliography † 281 Papagathagelou, Papastavros, H Martyrίa Moy , Pv6 έzhsa thn propar ask1y ή kai ton agώna th6 EOKA [My witness, How I lived the preparation and the struggle of EOKA] (Nicosia, 1995). Servas, Ploutis, Ky priakό: Eyuύn16 [Cyprus Problem: Responsibilities] (Athens, 1980). Vlachos, Angelos, Dέka Xrόnia Kypriakoύ [Ten Years of the Cyprus Problem] (Athens, 1980). ———, Mia worά ki έna kairό έna6 diplvmάth6 [Once upon a time a diplomat] (Athens, 1986).

PhD Theses Bahcheli, Tozun S., ‘Communal discord and the stake of interested governments in Cyprus, 1955– 1970’ (PhD thesis, LSE, 1972). Faustmann, Hubert, ‘Divide and quit? The history of British colonial rule in Cyprus, 1878– 1960’ (PhD thesis, Mannheim, 1999). Kyriakides, Klearchos Adonis, ‘British Cold War strategy and the struggle to maintain military bases in Cyprus, 1951–60’ (PhD thesis, Cambridge University, 1997). Michail, Michalis, ‘H diadikasίa sygkrόthsh6 1nό6 u1smoύ 1joysίa6. Ekklhsίa th6 Kύproy 1754–1910’ [The process of establishing an institution of power. Church of Cyprus 1754–1910] (PhD thesis, University of Cyprus, 2004). Papadakis, Ioannis, ‘Perceptions of history and collective identity: a study of contemporary Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalism’ (PhD thesis, Cambridge University, 1993). Terlexis, Pantazis, ‘Greece’s policy and attitude towards the problem of Cyprus’ (PhD thesis, New York University, 1968).

Newspapers and Publications in English The Economist. The Times.

Newspapers and Publications in Greek Έuno6. El1yu1rίa. Kήryka6. Nέo6 Dhmokrάth6. Nέo6 Kypriakό6 Fύlaj. Fil1l1ύu1ro6.

Electronic Sources www.greekworks.com/content/index.php/weblog/extended/eoka_strikes_again Kitroeff, Alexander, ‘EOKA Strikes Again’, 1 June 2002. www.politis-news.com/cgibin/hweb?-A¼1399&-V¼fakeloihead. http://theologytoday.ptsem.edu/jan1975/v31-4-criticscorner5.htm#Calian.

Index

Addis, William, 144 AKEL (Progressive Party of the Working People), 3, 14, 15, 22, 24– 8, 30 – 5, 37, 40, 42, 50, 51, 53, 66, 67, 72 – 4, 110, 111, 112, 118, 127, 130, 171, 173, 174, 175, 207, 208, 228, 231, 233, 234 Anthimos, 44, 85, 138, 143, 213, 215, 218 Armitage, Robert, 47 Athenagoras, Ecumenical Patriarch, 96 Averoff-Tossizza, Evangelos, 16, 60, 69, 95, 170, 171, 176– 8, 181, 196, 198, 201, 202, 211–13, 217, 222– 4 Azinas, Andreas, 38, 47, 50, 82, 84, 85, 217– 18, 246, 252, 265 Bandung Conference, 3, 87 Britain appointment of Foot as Cyprus governor, 185 attitude to enosis, 36 – 7 decolonisation policy, 58 deportation of Makarios, 133 introduction of new constitution, 70–1 Macmillan Plan, 196 –7, 200 partition as contingency plan for Cyprus emergency, 188– 9 Radcliffe constitution, 168 – 9 reaction to deportation of Makarios, 140– 2 refusal to consult with Makarios, 162– 4, 209

release of Makarios, 153– 5 rule in Cyprus, 12 – 13 support of self-determination of Cyprus, 106 Tripartite Conference, 90 and Turkish consent for Cyprus policy, 84, 198, 202 wider situation in Middle East and Cyprus policy, 101 Byzantine Empire, 10, 62 Castle, Barbara, 184, 204 –5 Church of Cyprus, 23, 24, 28, 31, 34, 41, 178, 231 Constantinople, 6, 10, 32, 62, 96 Consultative Assembly, 23 – 25, 28, 30, 31, 51, 52, 112 Cyprus Communist Party, 14 Cyril III, Archbishop, 13 Denktash, Rauf, 193, 220 Dulles, John Foster, 140 Eden, Anthony, 38, 69, 71, 81, 86, 101, 106, 125, 126, 134, 146, 154 Eisenhower, President of the USA, 154, 203 enosis, 3, 4, 9 – 14, 18, 25, 26, 28 –37, 39, 41 –4, 46 – 53, 56 – 9, 62, 63, 65– 7, 72 – 9, 81, 83 – 9, 91 – 5, 97– 9, 101, 103, 107, 110, 112, 117, 119, 120, 124, 126, 128 – 30, 132, 136, 139, 145, 149, 150, 153, 157, 159– 63, 165 –73, 175,

284

† Makarios

177, 179, 181– 3, 185– 93, 200, 203– 5, 207– 9, 211, 212, 220, 225, 227, 228 EOKA, 20 – 2, 42, 44, 79, 80, 82 – 7, 91, 98, 99, 101, 108, 109, 114, 116 – 19, 121, 123 – 5, 135, 138, 139, 142, 144 – 51, 153 – 7, 159, 164 – 6, 167, 170, 171, 173 – 5, 173, 180, 184, 187 – 92, 194, 195, 199 – 203, 216, 218, 228 Ethnarch, 7, 16, 23, 39, 138, 142, 154, 172, 200, 201, 211, 215, 217, 223, 225, 226, 228, 234 Ethnarchic Bureau, 23, 37, 45, 54, 103, 117 Ethnarchic Council, 23 – 5, 45, 53, 66 – 8, 110, 11, 124, 149 Ethnarchy, 3, 23 – 6, 28– 35, 37, 42, 43, 47, 48, 51 – 3, 63 –7, 72, 94, 112, 118, 121, 124, 143, 160, 172, 207, 208, 231 Fallaci, Oriana (interview with Makarios), 121 firman, 7 Glubb, John, 133 Geoffrey, Archbishop of Canterbury, 91 Goldie, Archdeacon, 91 Grivas, Georghios, 20 – 2, 75, 80 – 5, 88, 89, 96, 98 – 100, 108, 109, 117, 123– 5, 127, 130, 138, 145– 7, 154, 156, 158, 160, 164, 170– 6, 179, 180, 191, 194, 195, 199, 200, 206, 210, 215, 217– 19, 227 Greece, concern regarding Greek minority of Constantinople, 95, 97 and Cyprus, 54– 5, 58 –62, 68 –70, 73, 76, 166 decision to attend tripartite conference, 92 – 3 disagreement with Makarios over Zurich, 219, 221– 2, 224

informs Makarios about Zurich Agreement, 212– 13 involvement in Makarios-Harding negotiations, 106, 113– 16 reaction to Macmillan Plan, 203 reaction to Makarios’ deportation, 139– 40 relations with Greek Cypriot leadership, 170–1, 204, 209– 10, 215 termination of EOKA struggle, 171– 2 welcome of Makarios from exile, 159– 60 Greek political system and Makarios, 177– 80 Greco-Turkish friendship, 61, 76, 97, 165 Harding, John, 84, 96, 100– 12, 114–34, 137 – 46, 149, 152, 156, 162, 172, 185– 205, 216, 217 Holy Synod, 24, 28, 29, 34, 38, 44 Hopkinson, Henry, 70, 124 Hussein, King of Jordan, 133, 134 KEK (Cyprus Nationalist Party), 22, 29, 243 Kyprianos, Archbishop, 18, 38 Kranidiotis, Nicos, 81, 102, 106, 108, 114, 121, 129, 187, 216– 18 Ku¨
cu¨k, Fazil, 101, 183, 208 Kykkos Monastery, 19, 85, 86, 235 Metokhi of Kykkos, 19, 85, 86, 145 Kyrenia Circle, 38, 41, 64, 67, 94, 107, 110, 114, 120, 148, 207, 208 Kyrou, Alexis, 68, 70, 253 Labour Party and Cyprus problem, 180, 185, 223 Legislative Assembly, 12, 13, 35, 71, 109, 168 Lennox-Boyd, Alan, 90, 92, 125, 126, 128, 129, 133, 146, 151– 3, 155, 156, 163, 164, 167– 9, 184, 187

Index † 285 Leontios, Archbishop of Cyprus, 14, 19, 24 – 6 Le Geyt, P.S., 142– 4, 148, 156 Liatis, Alexios, 106 Lloyd, Selwyn, 189, 223 Locum tenens, 13, 14, 19, 24, 25, 40, 138 Loizides, Savvas, 32, 85 Loizides, Socrates, 85 Macmillan, Harold, 95, 103, 104, 154, 159, 162, 163, 180, 190– 3, 196, 198, 199– 201, 203, 205, 209, 215, 216, 233 Makarios II (Myriantheus), 13, 25 –8, 38 – 40 Megali Idea, 9, 10, 59 Menderes, Adnan, 96, 183, 199, 213 Menon, Krishnan, 205 Metokhi of Kykkos, 19, 85, 86, 135 Millet-system, 6 Mouskos, Charalambos, 17, 119 Mylonas, Nicodemos, 13, 26, 32 nationalism, 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 – 16, 29, 36, 39, 41, 43, 48, 81, 199, 231 NATO, 61, 65, 76, 78, 96, 97, 105, 113, 140, 163, 166, 182, 188, 196, 197, 202– 4, 209, 212 Non-Aligned Movement, 3 OHEN (Orthodox Christian Union of Youth), 29 organisation ‘X’, 20 – 1 Ottoman Empire, 6, 10, 12, 13, 35 Pancyprian Gymnasium, 18, 40, 117 Pancyprian National Assembly, 45, 47, 94 Papagos, Alexandros, 58, 68 – 70, 74, 82, 83, 85, 89, 93, 104, 113, 179 Partition, 197 – 70, 175, 181 – 91, 193, 195, 196, 198, 205, 207– 9, 213, 222, 223, 233 Papaioannou, Ezekias, 52

Patriarchate, of Constantinople, 5, 6, 62, 95 –97, 113 Paul, King of the Hellenes, 32, 58, 177, 207 Pearson, D.L., 151, 152 PEEK (Panhellenic Committee for the Union of Cyprus), 54 PEK (Agrarian Union of Cyprus), 22, 29, 39 PEON (Pancyprian National Youth Organisation), 43, 44 Plastiras, Nicholaos, General, 54, 58 Ploutis Servas, 52 PSE (Pancyprian Trade Union Committee), 23 Radcliffe, Cyril John, 151, 163, 168, 189 Rossides, Zenon, 164, 218 SEK (Confederation of Cyprus Labour), 23, 26, 39, 50 SEKA (Co-ordinating Committee of Cypriot Struggle), 39 self-determination, 33, 34, 63 – 5, 75, 77, 79, 83, 86, 87, 89, 90 – 2, 94, 95, 97, 100 – 5, 110, 111, 115, 120, 124, 126, 130, 155, 159, 163–5, 169, 181, 182, 184– 6, 205, 207 double self-determination, 169 Seferis, George, 62, 65 Spaak, Henry initiative on Cyprus, 182 Sophronios, Archbishop, 8 Soviet Union, 15, 64, 65, 154 St Barnabas, 5, 13, 20 Stephanopoulos, Stephanos, 93 Stratos, Georgios, 80 Suez rebels, 38, 71, 126, 133 Theotokis, Spyros, 114 TMT, 187, 188, 190, 193, 196, 200 Tornaritis, Criton, 71 Tripartite Conference (London Conference), 90, 92 – 4, 97, 103, 104, 214

286

† Makarios

Turkey campaign for partition, 182 –8, 193– 6 fear of Greek encirclement, 77 –8 gives up Cyprus, 13 initial disinterest in Cyprus, 61 –2, 76 importance in British consideration, 84, 104, 139, 198 opposes change of status in Cyprus, 95, 169 opposes proposal of independence, 208– 9 Turkish Cypriots, 12, 35 – 6, 63, 76 –8, 84, 213 agitation against EOKA campaign, 91, 166– 8, 175

campaign against EOKA, 183 – 8, 190, 193– 6, 199– 200 resistance to enosis, 36 UN appeal for self-determination, 33– 4, 76, 78, 181 Greece refuses to appeal to UN, 58–9 Greece decides to appeal to UN, 68 – 9 United Arab Republic, 198 Vlachos, Angelos, 1, 77, 84, 146, 165, 170, 210, 216 Venizelos, Sophocles, 54, 55, 58, 177–9 Zorlu, Fatin, 95, 186, 198, 209, 212, 223 Zurich-London Agreements, 3, 4, 171, 192, 205, 212, 218, 221– 2, 233