Mainstreaming versus Alienation : A Complexity Approach to the Governance of Migration and Diversity [1st ed.] 9783030422370, 9783030422387

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GLOBAL DIVERSITIES

Mainstreaming versus Alienation A Complexity Approach to the Governance of Migration and Diversity Peter Scholten

mpimmg

Global Diversities

Series Editors Steven Vertovec Department of Socio-Cultural Diversity Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity Göttingen, Germany Peter van der Veer Department of Religious Diversity Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity Göttingen, Germany Ayelet Shachar Department of Ethics, Law, and Politics Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity Göttingen, Germany

Over the past decade, the concept of ‘diversity’ has gained a leading place in academic thought, business practice, politics and public policy across the world. However, local conditions and meanings of ‘diversity’ are highly dissimilar and changing. For these reasons, deeper and more comparative understandings of pertinent concepts, processes and phenomena are in great demand. This series will examine multiple forms and configurations of diversity, how these have been conceived, imagined, and represented, how they have been or could be regulated or governed, how different processes of inter-ethnic or inter-religious encounter unfold, how conflicts arise and how political solutions are negotiated and practiced, and what truly convivial societies might actually look like. By comparatively examining a range of conditions, processes and cases revealing the contemporary meanings and dynamics of ‘diversity’, this series will be a key resource for students and professional social scientists. It will represent a landmark within a field that has become, and will continue to be, one of the foremost topics of global concern throughout the twenty-­first century. Reflecting this multi-disciplinary field, the series will include works from Anthropology, Political Science, Sociology, Law, Geography and Religious Studies. While drawing on an international field of scholarship, the series will include works by current and former staff members, by visiting fellows and from events of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity. Relevant manuscripts submitted from outside the Max Planck Institute network will also be considered. More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/15009

Peter Scholten

Mainstreaming versus Alienation A Complexity Approach to the Governance of Migration and Diversity

Peter Scholten Erasmus University Rotterdam Rotterdam, Zuid-Holland, The Netherlands

ISSN 2662-2580     ISSN 2662-2599 (electronic) Global Diversities ISBN 978-3-030-42237-0    ISBN 978-3-030-42238-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42238-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Joe Raedle / Staff/ Getty Images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

At the source of this book is a profound curiosity and amazement as to how societies ‘govern’ migration and migration-related diversity. This book brings together pretty much everything I have learned on what drives migration and diversity policymaking. At an early stage of my career I came to understand that rationality only goes part of the way towards explaining policymaking in these areas. I was increasingly drawn towards the study of these policy areas, intrigued by why much of the (rationalist) toolkit that I had learned as policy scientist did not help me to understand policymaking in these areas. For some reason I didn’t come across many other policy scientists in these areas, although many were focusing on comparable ‘wicked’ policy problems such as climate change, welfare state reform and (to a lesser degree) gender. Since then it has become my mission to develop a better theoretical understanding of the dynamics of migration and diversity policymaking that will contribute to the policy sciences. The road towards this mission was paved with many ‘complexities’. My efforts to develop a firm grasp of migration studies literature has given me a thorough understanding of migration and diversity (such as social, historical, economic) phenomena. Based on this understanding I thought I was able to see when policies were right or wrong, or even ‘good’ or ‘bad’. For instance, whether promoting ‘immigrant integration’ was good or bad, whether integration v

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measures worked or did not work, or whether recognizing environmentinduced migration or ‘climate refugees’ was right or wrong. However, this approach did not really help me to understand the logic of policymaking. It was informed by a rationalist view of policymaking as being driven by a serious conversation with the problem situation. My work on reflexive research-policy dialogues (PhD thesis, DIAMINT project) provided initial insights into what was later to become the core framework for this book. Developing the notion of reflexivity as part of research-policy relations made it clear that reflexivity was hardly ever achieved. It seemed to me that there was something amiss with the quality of the policy process in the areas of migration and diversity. Reflexivity appeared as a ‘counterfactual’ condition revealing what was missing. In subsequent research projects I explored what could be driving policymaking, if it was not rationality or reflexivity. In one of my main contributions to policy science so far, I showed that the concept of ‘multi-level governance’ assumed a far too well-structured and organized governance approach when compared to the chaotic and disorganized governance relations that I encountered. What I found was disjoined rather than multi-level governance, but once again I did not really understand why this was so. In the IMAGINATION project, my colleagues and I showed that the governance of intra-EU mobility was driven by decoupling between various policy actors and levels on a profound level of defining intra-EU mobility. My colleagues and I arrived at similar observations in another project on Cities of Migration. This project showed that, in spite of all the theorizing and philosophizing on models of integration and migration governance, there was no ‘one-size-fits-all’. Migration and diversity took as many configurations as there were cities in our project, and policy responses differed even more significantly. Importantly, when theorizing that there was a systematic connection between ‘types of diversity’ and ‘modes of local governance’, we observed only a slight correlation. Once more, I was struck by the complex nature of migration and diversity governance, while lacking the conceptual and theoretical tools to make sense of this complexity.

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Inspiration came from yet another project (UPSTREAM), where we applied the notion of mainstreaming from other policy areas such as gender, disability and climate change to the areas of migration and diversity. The literatures from those areas shed much light on how policymaking in these complex, broad and often contested areas differs from the more organized and structured nature of policymaking in other areas. Yet here too, mainstreaming as a concept, especially when compared with gender mainstreaming, represented a counterfactual rather than the actual reality of policymaking. Sometimes it is strange how the answer is actually staring you straight in the face if only you know how to phrase the question precisely. This realization dawned on me when I became aware that the quality of the policy process, or the ‘logic’ of policy dynamics, echoed something that I had come across years ago as a PhD student in the work of the American policy scientists Anna Schneider and Helen Ingram. Although I was coming from a totally different perspective than the once they had taken more than 25 years earlier, I was also becoming aware of how and why policies sometimes tend to follow a degenerative logic. Since then, I have been working to reconstruct everything I have learned so far in terms of what I have come to define as mainstreaming versus alienation as a dual nature of policymaking on complex policy issues. By that time, I had worked on very different aspects of migration and diversity policymaking and could reconstruct various dimensions of mainstreaming versus alienation in line with the four major traditions in the policy sciences: rationalism, institutionalism, constructivism and the political perspective. The circle was complete and I knew that I could start writing the book that now lies before you. I had gone from being astounded as to why much of the policy theory I had learnt didn’t apply to migration and diversity, to an in-depth engagement with migration studies and finally, to a better understanding of policymaking in complex policy areas. This should hopefully lead to a book of value to migration scholars and policy scientists alike. The result of my quest is a very critical understanding of policymaking that seeks to contribute to a better grasp of policymaking on migration and diversity. A while ago, I might have written a book on everything

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that is ‘wrong’ with migration and diversity governance without having a thorough understanding of why things appeared to go ‘wrong’ or how actors could be empowered to act differently. This book is not meant as a relativist account (‘everything is just so complex’) nor as a deconstructive account (‘actors do everything wrong’). Rather it is meant as a constructive account that will enable scholars to understand how and why migration and diversity policies are shaped in response to complexity and empower actors involved in policymaking to better grasp and deal with complexity. I am deeply indebted to a very long list of names and institutions for making this book possible, or more generally, for assisting me on the long road that has led to this book. Without aspiring to be complete, I wish to start by thanking my direct colleagues at Erasmus University Rotterdam with whom I’ve worked on the projects that set me on the journey towards this book in the first place: Han Entzinger (DIAMINT and many other projects), Godfried Engbersen and Mark van Ostaijen (IMAGINATION), Asya Pisareveskaya and Zeynep Kasli (Cities of Migration) and Ilona van Breugel with whom we started to explore the concept of mainstreaming for the first time in the context of the UPSTREAM project. I would also like to thank my colleagues from the IMISCOE Research Network for their inspiration and support. In the very early days of my career, IMISCOE was where I took my first steps in migration research as a policy science PhD. Since then I have experienced IMISCOE as a rare example of a reflexive research community, with scholars coming together from very different backgrounds under precisely the conditions that are developed in this book for ‘reflexivity’. Their trust, openness, feedback and sometimes also straightforward criticism has been a (perhaps even ‘the’) key driver behind this book. Being inspired and knowing what to write is not the same thing as actually getting a book written. Therefore, a special word of thanks to the Migration Policy Center at the European University Institute, which has been kind enough to host me during several writing retreats. A word of thanks to those who have been kind enough to donate their precious time and go through earlier drafts of this book: Lars Tummers and Bram Steijn (for helping me into the world of ‘policy alienation’), Victor Bekkers and Menno Fenger (with whom I’ve worked on the four

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dimensions of policy literature), Andrew Geddes, Steven Vertovec (for helping me to understand the governance of ‘superdiversity’), Maria Schiller, Han Entzinger, Godfried Engbersen, Geert Teisman (for helping me navigate the world of complexity governance) and the entire PRIMUS team at Erasmus University Rotterdam (Asya, Nathan, Ilona, Zeynep, Ronald, Warda, Sevgi and Karin). Also a special word of thanks to Liz Butijn-Cross from Crossover Translations for proofreading this manuscript. Rotterdam, Zuid-Holland The Netherlands 22 April 2019

Peter Scholten

Contents

1 Introduction  1 2 A Governance Perspective on the Complexification of Migration and Diversity 27 3 Between Governance Mainstreaming and Alienation 47 4 Knowledge 69 5 Institutions101 6 Power123 7 Discourses147 8 Research, Reflexivity and the Practice of Migration and Diversity Governance169

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9 Conclusions189 References201 Index219

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Schematic overview of the multidimensional governance perspective41 Fig. 4.1 Overview of models of research-policy relations (based on Hoppe 2005; P Scholten 2011) 85 Fig. 8.1 Number of journals focused on migration and migrationrelated diversity (1960–2018) (Pisarevskaya et al. 2019) 178 Fig. 8.2 Number of journal articles and book chapters on migration and migration-­related diversity (1961–2017) (Pisarevskaya et al. 2019) 178

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List of Tables

Table 3.1 Summary of main characteristics of mainstreaming 55 Table 3.2 Summary of the four manifestations of alienation 66 Table 4.1 Examples of organizations specialized in migration research, in-­between research and policy, and at various levels of governance89 Table 9.1 Summary of the conceptualization of mainstreaming versus alienation in migration and diversity governance 192

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List of Boxes

Text Box 2.1  Social Complexity and ‘Minority Groups’ Text Box 3.1 Why a Mainstreamed Approach to Migration Requires More Than Just Having a Migration Policy Text Box 3.2  Why Gender Mainstreaming Did Not Always Work….. Text Box 4.1  Symbolic Knowledge Utilization and Alienation Text Box 5.1 An Illustration of the Mobility-Proofing of an Institution; the ‘Mobility’ of Child Benefits Text Box 6.1  Mainstreaming and the Role of Migrant Organisations Text Box 7.1  How the French Do Target Groups by Means of Proxies Text Box 8.1 Academic Mainstreaming; why Migration Scholars Should Mix More with Scholars from Other Fields and Disciplines

33 51 55 92 108 131 160 184

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1 Introduction

Why does the governance of migration and migration-related diversity so often derail? Why are migration and diversity policies so often declared a failure? Why are the issues of migration and diversity so contested, not only in terms of political contestation but also in terms of disagreements about very basic and fundamental questions such as who is a migrant, what is integration, and so on? Why do our policies and our institutions such as welfare states have so much difficulty with coming to terms with the emerging realities of migration and diversity? And how can we rethink migration and diversity governance in a way that does justice to the complex nature of these issues? That migration and diversity governance often derail is manifested, amongst others, in the frequent crisis sensation in this governance area. There are few areas that are so often in ‘crisis-mode’ as the areas of migration and diversity governance. For instance, Europe was quick to frame the refugee inflow in 2015 and later years as a ‘refugee crisis’, although it was never entirely clear what this crisis precisely meant, and importantly also, what triggered this crisis. The same applies to discourses on a ‘crisis of integration’, a ‘crisis of multiculturalism’, or the ‘crisis’ related to intra­EU mobility that played such an important role in Brexit. © The Author(s) 2020 P. Scholten, Mainstreaming versus Alienation, Global Diversities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42238-7_1

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This book searches for an answer to why the governance of migration and diversity so often derails, and what can be done to prevent this. It does so by examining the governance process rather than the policy output and outcomes per se. In particular, it explores the impact of the complexification of migration and diversity on governance. In a broader perspective, the governance of migration and diversity are key examples of how contemporary societies are dealing with the increase of social complexity. Migration has become a structural reality in an increasing number of places, but often in very different and variable ways. This includes, but is not limited to, differences in types of migration, such as refugee migration, labour migration, family migration and many other forms of migration. It also includes differences in patterns of mobility of these migrants: some migrants stay, some return, some move on and some engage, for instance, in circular mobility patterns. Furthermore, as a consequence of migration, migration-related diversity has increased in many places across the world. However, diversity does not follow a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model. Whereas some countries or cities have only recently started to face migration or only serve as gateways for migrants, others have long-established migration histories with distinct migrant minorities or with so many minorities that one can even speak of superdiversity (Vertovec 2007b). In some cities, the population with a first or second generation migration background comprises more than half the total urban population. A city like London illustrates how complex migration and diversity have become as governance challenges. More than half of the London population has a first or second generation migration background. But this ‘migration background’ reflects a broad diversity of different ethnic, cultural, social and economic backgrounds. Also, the city’s population has become increasingly ‘floating’, with a constant inflow of newcomers and an outflow of people moving on, moving back or settling elsewhere temporarily. Consequently, the city must play on many chessboards at the same time. On the one hand, it has to make sure that newcomers find jobs and have access to services and that discrimination is addressed, even though it is not even sure whether people will stay and there is an ongoing inflow of new migrants in need of assistance. On the other hand, it has to address sentiments amongst the broader population regarding

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the arrival of newcomers in order to prevent a popular backlash and to reproduce some form of social cohesion in the face of ‘superdiversity’ and an increasingly floating population. All this takes place within the broader social context of ongoing new arrivals, a political context marked by contestation and mediatisation and a broader international context in which treaties such as the Geneva Convention as well as various EU treaties (at least until Brexit) structure the inflow of specific migrants into the city. Another illustration of how social complexity challenges governance is the issue of environmental refugees. Although various migration scholars consider that environmentally driven migration has already become the largest migration type on a global scale, the concept of ‘environmental refugee’ is not recognized in any international treaty (Laczko 2010). As slow-onset as well as rapid-onset developments such as natural disasters continue to increase the number of environmental refugees, governments in destination areas are faced with the challenge of how to respond to this migration flow and the question of whether or not these migrants will stay. Is there a need for a policy aimed at incorporation, or should policy focus on temporary residence while maintaining a perspective on the area of origin? And what are the broader political implications of accepting environmental migrants? In fact, scholars argue that even the recent Syrian crisis that spurred large-scale migration to various neighbouring countries and to Europe, was fundamentally driven by factors of environmental degradation. Yet another illustration of how social complexity tends to challenge conventional ways of thinking about governance and policymaking involves the contestation of discourses on migration and diversity. A much-used discourse in relation to migrant incorporation evolves around the concept of ‘integration’. Not only has this concept been fiercely politically contested but it has also been criticized by scholars for being extremely difficult to define and measure. Some scholars argue that the term integration emerged primarily as a source of legitimation for government intervention with migrants (Favell 2003; Schinkel 2013, 2017). Similar issues have evolved around the discursive construction of who is a migrant and who is not, and also for how long someone should continue to be labelled as a migrant. For instance, can the children of migrants also be described as actual (second generation) migrants?

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The central thesis of this book is that coming to terms with social complexity requires a governance approach that acknowledges and is better equipped to cope with complexity. This is based on a key observation in governance literature is that complex issues require complex responses (Jessop 1997; Klijn and Koppenjan 2014; Marco Verweij and Thompson 2006). There are no ‘quick fixes’ for complex problems such as climate change and gender mainstreaming. In fact, as will be argued in this book, it is the denial or failure to recognize complexity that contributes to the frequent ‘crisis mode’ in migration and diversity governance. Coping with complexity requires reflexivity and structural accommodation to complexity within the mainstream, rather than a one-size-fits-all solution that can be designed, implemented and considered to have ‘solved’ the problem. Dealing with complex issues such as migration and diversity means that such issues should become part of almost everything we do, of how we think and of the structures and institutions we reproduce. This means making migration and diversity integral parts of today’s complex governance systems, very similar to how gender and environmental concerns are integrated (‘mainstreamed’) into governance systems. There can be many factors at play in governance processes that may defy complexity, and contribute to simplifications, reductions or denials of complexity rather than efforts to grasp and respond to it. In policy science literature this has been described as ‘degenerative policy designs’ (Schneider and Ingram 1997) or ‘policy pathologies’ (Dunlop 2017), likely to lead to policy fiascos (Hart 2017). Indeed, many studies of migration and diversity policymaking reveal this urge to come up with quick, clear and simple solutions; for instance, the strong belief that migration-related diversity can be ‘managed’ by state-led integration policies, or that migration can be ‘managed’ through restrictive migration policies or border control. This book focuses on this dual nature of governance processes in complex policy areas, which involves a constant discrepancy between recognizing, understanding and responding to complexity on the one hand, and denying and simplifying complexity on the other. It takes migration and migration-related diversity—two highly complex issues—as its central (revelatory) case studies. Rather than focusing on migration and diversity per se, or on the outcomes or effects of policies, it focuses

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specifically on the governance processes in these areas that underlie these policies. It will do so by systematically reviewing how complexity is dealt with in different dimensions of governance processes, distinguishing between the role of knowledge (rational perspective), institutions (institutional perspective), power (political perspective) and discourses (constructivist perspective). Focusing on these four dimensions of governance, a systematic connection will be made between migration literature on the one hand, and the literatures on policymaking and governance on the other. This also involves making connections with literature on the governance in other highly complex policy areas, such as gender and environment. The dual nature of governance in the face of social complexity will be conceptualized as a tension between ‘mainstreaming’ and ‘alienation’. Coping with social complexity requires an ongoing process of recalibration of mainstream policies and institutions (‘mainstreaming’) in the face of often unforeseeable and uncontrollable dynamics of migration and diversity. It requires a constant rethinking of, for instance, how we organize welfare states, ideas about citizenship, access to public services, ideas about national identity, the organization of international trade: or, to put it briefly, of almost every imaginable fact of today’s complex societies. A complex solution to complex issues thus means that key aspects of contemporary society will have to be constantly recalibrated or ‘updated’ in the face of new developments in migration and diversity. However, there are many factors at play in the dynamics of migration and diversity governance that defy complexification and contribute to what I will conceptualize as ‘alienation’. Examples of this include US President Trump’s construction of a wall at the US-Mexican border and the EU-Turkey deal, intended to function as a ‘quick-fix’ to the European refugee crisis. However, as ongoing migration to both the US and the EU show, migration is driven not only by government policies, but also by economic interests, global developments, and so on. Another example includes multicultural policies aimed at migrant incorporation that were implemented by various countries in the late twentieth century, based on a firm belief that government policies would be able manage relations between supposedly clearly identifiable migrant minorities (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010).

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This book critically examines how and why the four dimensions of governance dynamics may incline towards either mainstreaming or alienation. How and why can the production and application of knowledge in governance processes contribute to either mainstreaming or alienation? How can institutions respond to complexity in a way that averts alienation and promotes mainstreaming? How do power relations in governance processes relate to complexity? And what role do discourses play in mainstreaming or alienation? This book offers a governance perspective that promises to grasp rather than reduce the complexities of migration and diversity governance. It allows for a deeper understanding of how and why governance approaches emerge in specific settings, rather than offering a perspective on how they ‘should’ evolve according to specific (political, sociological, legal, economic) premises. It does so by developing a multidimensional governance perspective on migration and diversity policymaking, rooted in the broader field of policy sciences and governance studies (Bekkers et  al. 2017; Deleon 1994). This multidimensional governance perspective is systematically connected throughout various chapters in the book to migration studies literature. It brings together various factors that can shape governance responses in specific settings, such as knowledge and information, power and conflict, institutional structures and discourses and images. Thus incorporating insights from various broader social scientific paradigms (critical theory, positivism, social constructivism and institutionalism) (see Guba 1990), the book provides heuristic tools for understanding the actual dynamics of governance. The aim of this multidimensional approach is to allow migration scholars to grasp and reflect on the complexity of migration and diversity governance, which will also contribute to reflexivity on the part of actors involved in migration and diversity governance in practice. The perspective thus taken in the book builds on but also differs from several earlier works that focused on what is often described as the ‘failure’ of migration or diversity governance. Stephen Castles (2004) focuses on ‘why migration policies fail’, point in particular at the social dynamics of migration flows themselves, the importance of globalization in this area and the complications that arise in political systems. Whereas Castles looks in particular at the failure of policies per se given their own

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objectives, I focus more on how policies fail to grasp the complexity of migration and diversity, even within the formal objectives of policies. Also, the complexity perspective developed in this book looks more at the governance process itself for explanations for ‘alienation’, rather than for factors in the context of this process. Gallya Lahav and Virginie Guiraudon (2006) argue that there is a ‘gap’ between political demands and policy outputs, pointing amongst others as the disjuncture between public opinion and policy elites and, like Castles, the dynamics between national and international policy arenas. Here again I’m not so much trying to explain why there is a gap between demands and outputs, but rather how and why migration governance tries to cope with social complexity, and for what happens within the governance process itself.

1.1 Migration, Diversity and Social Complexity To understand why migration and diversity governance have evolved to present such complex governance challenges, it is important to first sketch what distinguishes these areas from other governance areas. A key premise on which this book builds is that there has been an increase of social complexity, which I will describe as a ‘complexification’ of migration and diversity. I will argue that migration and diversity governance are key illustrations of how contemporary societies are struggling to come to terms with the increase of social complexity. Yet, there have only been very few connections between complexity literature and migration studies. Whereas areas as climate governance, economic governance and the governance of technological developments have often been studied from a complexity perspective, this is much less the case for the governance of social complexity as in the case of migration and diversity (with notable exceptions as Page 2010, Vertovec 2007a, b). The complexification of migration and diversity refers not so much (or not only) to developments in the scale of migration and diversity, but primarily to transformations in key issue characteristics of migration and diversity. First, it has become increasingly obvious that migration has

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become a structural phenomenon, inherently connected to broader processes of globalization, individualization and the evolution of new communication and transportation technologies. Some scholars say that we are living in an ‘age of migration’ (Castles et al. 2013). Studies have showed that there is indeed a global increase in migration in terms of absolute figures, although global migration has not increased as a percentage of the total population. However, it is clear that more and more areas have become immigration areas (beyond the traditional immigration regions of North America, North-West Europe and Australia), and that in specific areas (such as various European countries) relative levels of immigration have increased significantly (IOM 2017). However, to say that migration has become a structural phenomenon does not mean that it always takes a similar shape or scale. The fact that the percentage of the global population that is on the move has remained relatively stable already reveals significant disparities in regional migration levels (IOM 2017). Also, patterns of migration have grown increasingly complex and diversified. In other words, social complexity has increased. This involves various different ‘types’ of migrant flows (labour migration, humanitarian migration, family migration, student migration, etc.), increasingly diffuse ‘boundaries’ between such types (such as ‘environmental refugees’) and increasing insecurity on the temporalities of migration (permanent, temporary and everything in-between). Regarding these temporalities, some scholars speak of the rise of ‘liquid migration’ (Bygnes and Erdal 2017; Engbersen 2016). Furthermore, immigration levels may be relatively easy to capture in statistics, but they are often very difficult to predict. This became very clear during the so-­called European refugee crisis, when many European countries felt ‘overrun’ by a sudden influx of refugees, in particular from Syria. Similarly, migration flows as a consequence of sudden-onset climate change effects are evidently very hard to predict. A second key societal transformation that is increasingly posing governance challenges is the growing significance of migration-related diversity as a consequence of structural migration. There has been a ‘broadening’ of diversity, in terms of an increasingly broad range of regions (and especially cities) characterized by migration-related diversity, as well as in terms of the relative scale of this diversity. In fact, a growing number

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of cities has been defined as ‘majority-minority cities’, or cities where more than half of the population has a migratory background (Maurice Crul 2016). As a consequence, migration has become a key part of social life in many places, especially cities. Besides a broadening, there has also been a ‘deepening’ of diversity, referring to an increase of social complexity. Some have described this as a trend towards ‘superdiversity’ (Vertovec 2007a, b, 2015). This means that diversity involves so many different groups and dimensions (cultural, religious, social, economic, political, legal), that it is difficult to define migration-related diversity in terms of specific migrant groups or ‘minorities’. Or, as others have described it, diversity has in itself become so diverse that there is a need to move beyond the ‘ethnic lens’ (Glick-­ Schiller et  al. 2006; Hollinger 2006). This poses evident governance challenges. Perhaps one of the oldest dilemmas in diversity governance is how and especially whom to target migrant incorporation policies. When a society has become superdiverse, perhaps the target of diversity governance should be the entire diverse population. Finally, a key element of complexity is that the broadening and deepening of migration and diversity do not manifest themselves everywhere in the same way. There is no one-size-fits-all. Levels of migration, and also histories of migration, vary significantly between different parts of the world (countries, cities, regions). Patterns of diversity also vary significantly; some places (especially cities) seem to have become superdiverse, but many places are witnessing different sorts of diversity, for instance with a clear dominant minority group, with only a few small groups. Here the perspective of this book also parts ways with emerging frameworks in migration studies on superdiversity and liquid mobility; rather than stating that superdiversity and liquid mobility represent ‘the’ state or trend in migration and diversity, I will argue that they only constitute one of the many states and trends in migration and diversity. Therefore, I refer to complexification of migration and diversity as a process that can have many outcomes, rather than as one specific state of migration and diversity. These key characteristics (uncertainty and contestation, the changing nature of migration patterns and migration-related diversity, and the absence of a one-size-fits-all approach), show that migration and diversity

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have evolved not only into very significant and pertinent issues but also into extremely complex governance issues. The complex nature of these ‘wicked policy problems’ brings about many governance dilemmas. For instance, the uncertainty surrounding migration flows complicates the management of migration and can give voice to anti-immigration movements that make use of this uncertainty to spread ‘fear’ concerning migration levels (creating the feeling of being ‘overrun’), as well as to more pro-migration groups that could underestimate migration levels or overestimate the degree to which policies actually manage to exert control over migration. Similarly, migration-related diversity often sparks contestation as well as uncertainty, such as whether ‘integration problems’ are caused by deficiencies on the part of migrants or by processes of exclusion in the host society.

1.2 B  etween Mainstreaming and Alienation in Migration and Diversity Governance The complexification of migration and diversity challenges conventional ways of thinking on migration and diversity governance. The rise of social complexity also complicates governance processes, which is the central focus of this book. It makes migration and diversity into key examples of what is often defined in the literature as ‘wicked policy problems’ (Hisschemöller and Hoppe 1995; Peters 2017; Rittel and Webber 1973; M Verweij 2014). These are issues that cannot be resolved simply by studying ‘the facts’, as these facts are often contested and involve a high degree of uncertainty. For instance, ‘facts’ about migration are often characterized by high levels of uncertainty as well as by contestation about who should or should not be considered a regular migrant. Others have described this type of issues as ‘unstructured policy problems’ (Hisschemöller and Hoppe 1995) or ‘intractable policy controversies’ (Schön and Rein 1995). They should be distinguished from well-­ structured or ‘tamed’ problems, which are marked by a lack of disagreement and an abundance of knowledge on how to solve them.

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The increase of social complexity demands a different way of thinking on migration and diversity governance. First of all, it is not only governments (local, regional, state, European, UN) that ‘govern’ migration and diversity. Governments often cooperate with non-governmental actors to develop and implement specific governance strategies; examples of this include the role of private enterprises such as airlines in border control at airports, or the role of civil society organizations in providing relief to refugees and assisting the integration of immigrants. Guiraudon and Lahav (2000) argue that migration policies, traditionally anchored in state-specific models, have consistently ‘shifted upwards, downwards and outwards’. A complex governance network has been created not only by the growing involvement of international bodies such as the UN or bodies created for intergovernmental cooperation such as the EU, but also by the growing involvement of local actors (cities facing migration challenges, agencies working to manage borders, etc.) and non-governmental actors (including civil society organizations as well as private enterprises). Secondly, the governance of migration and diversity can no longer be confined to specific institutionalized policy fields, such as ‘integration policies’, ‘migration policies’, or ‘diversity policies’. Migration governance covers a broad range of more traditional policy areas, including but not limited to ‘migration policies’ per se. The governance of migration includes much more than just the legal regulation of which categories can and cannot enter or leave a specific territory, subject to which conditions. Migration governance also relates to economic governance, specifying in what sectors there may (or may not) be a demand for surplus labour, or welfare state governance specifying when and why someone really gains access to a country’s community bound by social solidarity. A very specific example of this is the externalization of migration governance by the European Union (EU) (such as Andrew Geddes 2018), whereby the EU systematically integrates its migration policy interests in the design of its external policies. Similar processes can be found in how various immigration countries have systematically connected their ‘immigration policies’ and ‘development policies’ in an effort to establish a more comprehensive migration governance approach towards the root causes of migration. In the field of integration or ‘diversity’ governance, this development seems to have gone even further, leading in many places to the

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abandonment of institutional ‘integration policies’. Integration governance has become part of more generic ‘policies’, such as educational policies, welfare state arrangements, economic policies and housing policies. This trend towards the generalization of migration and diversity governance into complex actor networks, can be described as ‘mainstreaming’ (Scholten and Van Breugel 2017). Similar to areas such as gender mainstreaming, disability mainstreaming or environmental mainstreaming, this involves a trend towards a more generic and cross-sectoral approach towards topics that are hard to demarcate from others (Dalal-Clayton and Bass 2018; Daly 2005). It marks a trend towards treating migration and diversity as issues that are relevant to the mainstream, and no longer as issues that are pertinent only to specific groups or specific areas. Key drivers behind the trend towards mainstreaming include the growing recognition of the more structural character of migration and the ‘broadening’ and ‘deepening’ of diversity that were discussed in the preceding section. The question of mainstreaming governance logically emerges when migration is not incidental but structural, and when migration-­related diversity is no longer something that is only visible in the margins but something that is starting to change mainstreaming (‘superdiversity’). The concept of mainstreaming speaks to a broader concern within governance studies on governance in ‘wicked’ policy areas. Faced with complexity and contestation, it becomes more difficult to institutionalize specific policy approaches and to identify clear target groups of policies. In complex social settings, characterized by mobility and superdiversity, it becomes hard to define specific groups as targets of policies, not only as there can be many groups involved (such as the over 180 nationalities that nowadays live in cities such as London and New  York but also Antwerp), but also as the ‘boundaries’ between groups fade as part of processes of cultural hybridization. Furthermore, group-specific approaches have not only been seen as just a means to solve specific problems but have also had their legitimacy questioned from a political perspective (as undemocratic privileging of specific groups) as well as from a sociological perspective (as inadvertently reifying group identities). However, as I will argue in various chapters, there are many factors at play in governance processes regarding migration and diversity that do not sustain this trend towards mainstreaming. Rather, I will hypothesize

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that in governance processes addressing complex issues such as migration and diversity, there is a strong inclination towards ‘alienation’. Rather than developing a generic governance response that reflects the broader governance challenges of structural migration and emerging superdiversity, alienation means that discrepancies emerge between the challenges that governance is facing and the governance strategies that are put forward. The concept of alienation can be positioned in a broader literature in sociology as well as in governance studies on various forms of separation or ‘estrangement’, between a person and the structure of which he or she is part, or between the structure and its environment (Blauner 1964; Marx 1844; Seeman 1959; Tummers et al. 2009). Within the context of governance, alienation may involve a sense of meaninglessness if policies miss purpose, a sense of powerlessness if actors feel they have no influence or control over a policy, or a sense of isolation if a policy leads to the selective inclusion and exclusion of specific groups or individuals. The concept is applicable to migration and diversity governance at both levels, as alienation can lead to estrangement among migrants, actors involved in governance and the broader public concerning the challenges of migration and diversity, as well as estrangement on the system level if a discrepancy emerges between the system and problems. In itself, this inclination towards alienation should not be seen as specific to the issues of migration and diversity. It has been argued that policy processes for wicked policy problems are generally marked by greater complexity and contestation (Hisschemöller and Hoppe 1995). However, it would appear that there is a ‘perfect storm’ for these issues that creates complexity and contestation, turning them into revelatory cases for the study of wicked policy problems and what I will call alienation. Migration and diversity have emerged as perhaps the most politicized topics of our times. This has become clearly apparent, not only in Europe with what was described as ‘the refugee crisis’ of 2015 and 2016, but also in the US with Trump’s ‘wall’ at the Mexican border, in Bangladesh with the refugees from Myanmar and in the contestation in Australia on the off-shore reception of asylum seekers. It has also manifested itself as one of the key social questions of our times, with many countries and cities facing the challenge of preventing interethnic tensions and emancipating the ethnic underclass that has already become a reality in some places. Furthermore, it is an institutionally complex issue, not only

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because many governments adopt very different positions, but also because it involves complex interrelations between different levels of government, such as between local, regional, national, intergovernmental and international organizations and networks. That is why, hypothetically, migration and diversity are revelatory cases where one can expect, as I will argue, a clear tendency toward governance alienation rather than governance mainstreaming. Alienation can take many forms. There can be ‘problem alienation’, involving meaninglessness in governance processes due to a misfit that emerges between the societal problems that migration and diversity governance face, and the policy approaches that are actually developed. This may be the case, for instance, when new problems emerge for which policies have no solution or, conversely, when there are policy solutions in place that lack purpose in terms of having a clear problem to solve. Another form of alienation, ‘institutional alienation’, involves estrangement or loss of purpose of established institutions (such as citizenship, nationality, welfare states), or misfit and ‘decoupling’ between different institutions (such as levels of government) that face the complexification of migration and diversity. ‘Political alienation’ involves the estrangement of policymaking from complexification due to the reproduction of specific power structures and inequalities. Sometimes this is also the explicit purpose of symbolic politics, to create a shared definition of migration and integration problems that may not represent actual social facts but does serve specific political functions. Finally, ‘social alienation’ is another form whereby migration and diversity governance may alienate specific social groups, for instance by social exclusion or discrimination, but potentially also by inadvertently ‘labelling’ groups in a way that reinforces social boundaries in society and a feeling of ‘otherness’ amongst specific groups.

1.3 A Multidimensional Governance Perspective To develop a better understanding of how and why actors (both governmental and non-governmental) deal with the complexification of migration and diversity, and to what extent we can speak of either mainstreaming

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or alienation, this book develops a multidimensional governance perspective. This perspective focuses on governance as a process, and on understanding and explaining how and why actors involved in governance processes deal with migration and diversity. Governance is understood as efforts to address specific issues within complex actor networks (Colebatch 2009, 2014; Anne Mette Kjaer 2004; Kooiman 2000, 2003). Such efforts may involve or lead to formal policies but also to more informal approaches to managing or solving a problem. Any type of issue can be involved in governance, including issues that are perceived by actors as a ‘problem’ as well as issues that present actors with opportunities. Furthermore, governance may involve various types of actors, including but not limited to governmental actors. A governance perspective is seen as particularly fit for the study of issues that can be classified as ‘wicked policy problems’, as in these cases strategies of problem solving are expected to be complex and to involve strong interdependencies between a variety of actors (Hoppe 2011). This is precisely what is needed for developing a better understanding of how actors deal with migration and diversity. This focus on governance means that this book will not so much discuss developments in migration and diversity or the actual policy output and outcomes of governance processes per se. A governance perspective helps to unravel that policymaking on migration and migration-related diversity is driven by much more than ‘just’ objective developments in the underlying migration and diversity issues. ‘Facts’ on how migration and diversity develop may or may not ‘filter’ into governance processes; the question of how and to what extent they influence governance is an empirical question that will very much depend upon a variety of other factors. Precisely because of the uncertainties and complexities involved in migration and diversity, it is important to look beyond objective explanations such as what causes integration problems and what are the economic benefits of specific forms of immigration. Other factors include the institutional and political setting that may influence how governance approaches to migration and diversity shape up, as well as more symbolic factors regarding how migration and diversity are portrayed and socially constructed. For instance, routines in how migration was dealt with in the past, political developments such as the

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rise of populism, and events with great symbolic importance such as moral incidents or value conflicts can spark broader developments in terms of governance. It is this variety of factors that promises a better understanding of developments in migration and diversity governance, such as whether there is a trend toward mainstreaming or alienation. For instance, factors such as political contestation may (but do not necessarily) contribute to political alienation; strongly path-dependent routines at the street-­ bureaucracy level may contribute to problem alienation, or conversely, the ‘street-wise’ knowledge of street-level bureaucrats may prevent problem alienation. Therefore, to be able to understand the variety of factors that shape mainstreaming or alienation in migration and diversity governance, this book will offer a comprehensive discussion of factors from different ‘dimensions’ of governance. Each of these dimensions is rooted in one of the four central paradigms in social science research: positivism, institutionalism, critical theory or social constructionism (see also Guba 1990). They are called dimensions, as for a good understanding of governance, they should not be considered as mutually exclusive (‘either/or’) dimensions. For instance, power and institutions will often both be at play in governance processes at any given time, although in different ways, whereby one may be more pertinent than the other at a specific moment. The four ‘dimensions’ of governance each highlight specific sets of factors that account for governance processes. Positivism focuses particularly on factors such as knowledge, information and expertise, which rationalize governance and often define a clear involvement of experts in policymaking. Critical theory emphasizes the role of conflict, power and interests. In contrast to positivism, critical theory sees no ‘objective’ problem resolution strategies, but rather sees governance as an inherently contested and interest-driven activity that will inevitably reflect power imbalances in society. Institutionalism is another, more generic social-­ scientific perspective that highlights the importance of institutions, routines and established ‘rules of the game’ in structuring governance processes. Finally, social constructionism adds a fourth dimension to governance, emphasizing the role of discourses, ideas and perceptions in governance.

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Whereas the factors from these four dimensions may help us to understand governance processes in any kind of policy area, I will argue throughout this book that in the case of migration and diversity governance, these factors are inclined to come together in combinations that promote alienation rather than mainstreaming. However, in order for scholars to understand this alienation, and for policymakers to develop a more reflective position that may enable them to prevent alienation, it is important to have this multidimensional perspective and be aware of what precisely drives alienation.

1.4 Towards Reflexive Research-Policy Dialogues Observing that there is a complexification of migration and diversity governance and aiming to develop a better understanding of how and why this seems to lead to an inclination towards alienation rather than mainstreaming does not mean that one should simply accept that nothing can be done about complexification and alienation. There is nothing deterministic about the relation between complexity and alienation, nor is there any fatalism or relativism in the approach in this book. Rather, a key objective is to promote reflexivity not only among actors directly involved in the governance of migration and diversity, but also among scholars involved in the study of these areas. Awareness and understanding of what drives governance towards either mainstreaming or alienation can empower actors involved in migration and diversity governance (including both governmental and non-governmental actors) to get a better ‘grip’ on the complexity of these phenomena and to prevent the feeling of loss-of-control that often comes with the crisis mode of governance in these areas. Recognizing complexity and understanding mainstreaming as a ‘complex solution to a complex problem’, can help actors to avert alienation. Importantly, this book seeks to achieve such reflexivity, but not by advocating a specific ‘policy paradigm’ or ‘truth claim’ regarding how migration and diversity should be managed. Rather, it seeks to promote reflexivity on the factors that shape

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how and why actors in specific settings may develop specific paradigms or truth claims; in other words, the focus is on reflexivity as part of the governance process rather than on specific policy output or outcomes. Achieving such reflexivity also requires a critical discussion of the role of migration scholarship in the governance of migration and diversity. Evidently, the key aim of migration scholarship lies in developing a better understanding of migration and diversity per se, for instance as a social, cultural, legal, historic or economic phenomenon. As such, in principle, the role of scholars is distinct from that of policy actors. However, the goal of promoting reflexivity does apply to how relations are configured between researchers and policy actors actually involved in the practice of migration and diversity governance. For instance, how policymakers use knowledge claims, how funds for research may influence knowledge production or how researchers and policymakers socially interact in practice. In fact, as Schon and Rein argue, wicked policy problems or ‘intractable policy controversies’ cannot be resolved by simply looking at ‘the facts’ (Schön and Rein 1995); often these facts are themselves ‘contested’, or they can be interpreted differently, or different actors can simply select different facts. Reflexivity means a better understanding and awareness of how research-policy relations can play a role in either mainstreaming or alienation. This calls for migration studies to pay more attention to not only which policies are developed in specific settings and to what effect, but also how and why policies are developed, and the role that researchers play in policymaking. Various studies have shown that there was a particularly strong policy-orientation among migration scholars in the 1980s and 1990s. Policy relevancy provided a boost to the development of migration research, but it also led to criticisms on the ‘co-optation’ or instrumentalization of migration research as part of broader governance regimes and in particular of ‘national models of integration’ (Favell 2003; Schinkel 2013; Scholten and Timmermans 2010; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002), as well as criticism of the alleged normative bias among migration scholars (including empathy for the research subjects, leading to pro-multicultural attitudes among scholars (Ratcliffe 2001; Jan Rath 2001)).

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This involves a call for ‘reflexive knowledge production’ in migration studies. This means that given the complex nature of migration and diversity, migration scholars must be aware of the often essentially contested nature of the concepts that are used. Reflexive knowledge production means awareness of and critical reflection on the concepts and theories used by migration scholars (Scholten 2011). Reflexivity should contribute to a better comprehension of complexity, and prevent scholars from using concepts and theories that help reproduce simplifications of complexity. For instance, to what extent does the use of concepts such as ‘integration’ and even ‘migration’ reproduce a nation-state perspective and limit opportunities for reflection on more complex forms of diversity and more complex mobilities (Thränhardt and Bommes 2010)? Another example includes the call by Janine Dahinden for a ‘demigranticization’ of migration studies (Dahinden 2016), arguing that migration scholars should be more reflexive on whether and when issues of study are really specific to migration, and to prevent cases where studies of migration and migrants create the impression that such issues would be ‘exceptional’ to migrants. Reflexivity does not mean that there can be no relationship between research and policy, but rather that their relationship should be seen as a critical dialogue. On the one hand, this means that in order to understand and avert alienation, there must be intellectual independence and distance. To understand governance alienation, migration scholars should not have a stake in governance processes. On the other hand, the metaphor of ‘dialogue’ is used to make clear that reflection should not only be ‘about’ a topic and the subjects involved the topic, but also ‘with’ the subjects involved in the topic (Scholten a.o. 2015). So, no Ivory Tower scholarship, but rather a dialogue with involved actors. This is also a key epistemological premise; the only way to understand governance alienation is to understand what drives the subjects involved in this alienation. This book challenges migration research to adopt such a reflexive position and engage in critical dialogues with stakeholders in migration and diversity governance. It is to this purpose that the fields of governance studies and migration studies will be connected. Although migration scholarship has come a long way in understanding developments in migration and diversity, our understanding of why governance processes

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seem to be so alienated from these objective developments is very limited. Rather than merely denouncing policies as ‘wrong’, ‘biased’ or ‘ill-­ informed’, this approach seeks to understand how and why policies evolve as they do, and how and why research is sometimes used and sometimes ignored. Rather than becoming a stakeholder in these actual governance processes, this approach calls upon migration scholarship to develop a better understanding of how and why actors (governments, NGOs, migrants, and many other types of actors) deal with migration and diversity. This also demands a more interdisciplinary approach, where besides the more traditional sociological (and anthropological) migration research, the field can engage more directly with insights emerging from other fields such as political sciences, policy sciences, public administration and governance studies. This book will help migration scholars as well as stakeholders involved in the governance of migration and diversity, including politicians, policymakers but also, for instance, non-governmental organizations and the broader public, to understand rather than reduce, to grasp rather than simplify, the complexities of migration and diversity governance. It is this understanding, supported by the multidimensional perspective, which will offer a compass to stakeholders interested in understanding the dynamics of governance. This can support a reflexive position and help actors to adopt strategic positions within the broader dynamics of governance.

1.5 Outline of the Book After introducing the key ambition and thematic of the book, Chap. 2 will provide the basic analytical framework on which the book is based. This involves a discussion of what makes migration and diversity such complex or ‘wicked’ governance challenges and what constitutes the ‘complexification’ of migration and diversity that is so central to this book. This chapter also lays the foundation of the multidimensional perspective on governance that will guide the following chapters as it introduces the four ‘dimensions’ of governance: knowledge, power, institutions and discourse.

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Chapter 3 is positioned within the broader literature on the governance of complex problems and develops the book’s central conceptual and theoretical lenses: mainstreaming versus alienation in migration and diversity governance. Speaking to the mainstreaming literature, the core theoretical argument is that complex problems require complex solutions that are embedded insofar as possible in an integral (cross-sectoral) approach. Such a mainstreamed approach provides the type of ‘messy solutions’ that complex problems require and allows for flexibility in dealing with local problem circumstances and policy preferences: there is no ‘one-size fits all’. However, as hypothesized throughout this book, precisely because of the complexities of migration and diversity governance, there are many factors that may prevent such governance mainstreaming. In this context, I will refer to various forms of alienation in relation to how complex policy problems may be affected by various structural factors (problem alienation, social alienation, political alienation and institutional alienation) that prevent mainstreaming from taking place. In Chaps. 4, 5, 6 and 7, each dimension of governance (knowledge, power, institutions, discourse) is discussed in depth, and applied to migration and diversity governance in particular. This involves a systematic effort to bring together knowledge on these dimensions. Rather than a comprehensive overview of all literature on migration diversity, this focuses specifically on literature on migration and diversity governance and the central themes that have emerged in this literature. This literature will be structured around the four dimensions defined in Chap. 2. Furthermore, each of the chapters reviews evidence on how and why the various ‘dimensions’ of governance may contribute to mainstreaming or alienation in migration and diversity governance. Chapter 8 discusses the implications of the governance trends of mainstreaming versus alienation in migration and diversity governance for migration studies. It calls for reflexivity not only amongst policymakers but also in migration scholarship. This also has implications for the relationship between researchers on the one hand, and politicians, policymakers and the broader public on the other. Finally, the concluding chapter reflects on the broader implications of this study, not only for migration studies but also for governance studies in general. What can be learnt from migration and diversity as revelatory

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case studies on governance under circumstances of great complexity? What broader research agenda for both migration studies and governance studies emerges from this book?

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2 A Governance Perspective on the Complexification of Migration and Diversity

A governance perspective allows for a deeper understanding of how actors in various settings respond to migration and diversity. Rather than reducing complexity, it enables a better comprehension of it. Complexity not only characterizes migration and diversity as social phenomena (social complexity), but also governance in these areas (complexity governance). In fact, as we will see in this chapter, the complexity of migration as a social phenomenon feeds into the complexity of governance, but conversely, the complex dynamics of governance also seem to affect migration and diversity as social phenomena (see also Jessop 1997). This chapter starts by conceptualizing migration and migration-related diversity and elaborating on what I will describe as the ‘complexification’ of migration and diversity. Referring to recent developments in the field of migration studies, I will argue that something has changed in the character of migration and diversity, which seems to defy conventional ways of thinking about migration and diversity governance. This involves, as we will see, more than just an increase in the scale of migration and diversity towards and within specific regions. It also involves a change in patterns of migration and forms of diversity. I will argue that these

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changes can best be described in terms of a complexification of diversity, defying, for instance, traditional notions of an ethnic lens and distinct categories of migrants. It is this complexification that marks migration and diversity as key examples of what is defined in the governance literature as ‘wicked policy problems’. Such problems are marked by contestation and uncertainty, precisely because of their complex nature. Governance in these areas tends to involve disagreement, not only about what the best way would be to solve the policy problem, but also at a more basic level on what the policy problem actually is, how it should be defined, and what could be to blame. To understand how actors deal with this complexity, an analytical framework has been developed in this chapter that provides the conceptual and theoretical foundations for subsequent chapters. This framework involves a governance perspective that emphasizes various dimensions of governance processes: the role of knowledge and information; power and conflict; institutions and rules and discourses and perceptions. Although these dimensions play a role in any type of policy field, I will show in this and subsequent chapters, that in the case of wicked problems such as migration and diversity, the dimensions seem to come together in ways that promote forms of alienation.

2.1 Conceptualizing Migration and Migration-Related Diversity To understand the governance of migration and diversity, we need at least a basic conceptualization of what is meant by migration and diversity. This conceptualization will take account of the fact that the way in which migration and diversity are conceptualized is often an intrinsic stake in the governance practices being examined. Therefore, migration will be defined broadly as movement across specific political and administrative boundaries for more than only a very short term. Which boundaries have to be crossed in order for actors to speak of ‘migration’ is an empirical question. In most cases migration is synonymous with international migration, which signals the dominance

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of a nation-state perspective on migration. But in various countries domestic forms of movements between, for instance, regions or provinces are also considered as ‘domestic’ migration (such as within China or Viet Nam). When no political or administrative boundaries are crossed, one usually does not speak of migration, but simply of movement, mobility or ‘commuting’. The importance of crossing political and administrative boundaries signals the importance of the political constitution of what we define as ‘migration’. When movement is only for very short-term purposes, such as tourism and business travel, one usually does not speak of migration. However, movement for study purposes or labour is usually described as migration. The reason for movement is less distinctive for the conceptualization of migration (although it can be essential for the legal perception of and response to migration). In practice, this tends to include a broad variety of migratory motives, such as humanitarian motives, labour, family reasons and often a combination of these factors. Diversity in this book refers to ‘migration-related diversity’. Although this may be related to other forms of diversity (such as gender and cultural diversity in general), the focus will be on any form of diversity that is related to migration. What shapes this migration-related diversity is an empirical question; it may involve ethnic diversity, social and cultural forms of diversity, but also, for instance, political or economic forms of diversity. A contested issue is for how long some form of diversity is considered as being related to migration, in particular whether this applies for a specific period after migration (new arrivals), to the entire first generation or perhaps even also to second or subsequent generations with some sort of ‘migratory background’. This too will be considered as an empirical question. Some countries are known for their institutional approaches to both first-generation migrants and their children, including the collection of social statistics on the position of second-generation ‘migrants’ (M Crul et  al. 2012; M Crul and Vermeulen 2003). Others have a much more limited definition, focusing only on the first generation that is directly ‘foreign born’ or even focusing only on the first years after the arrival of new migrants. Importantly, this book will focus on how and why actors that interact in complex networks make sense of migration and diversity, rather than

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on issues of migration and diversity per se. This also reveals deeper ontological and epistemological premises. Ontologically, it is very hard to define what migration and migration-related diversity really are. What constitutes a migrant for one person may be perceived differently by another, as with the example of environmental refugees. Therefore, for a study of governance, it is crucial to study how migration and migration diversity are given meaning as part of real-world social processes, rather than trying to establish what they ‘objectively’ mean. Epistemologically, migration and diversity are difficult to study, precisely because of this lack of clear definition and the impossibility of ‘measuring’ them in any objective way. Therefore, this book is based on empirical studies of how actors deal with migration and diversity, rather than trying to grasp and define migration and diversity in itself. For instance, nowadays a person moving from Poland to the UK is defined as a migrant. Under national and international law, this person is legally and politically constituted as someone who has transgressed borders between nation-states. However, before Brexit—the departure of the UK out of the European Union—this person would not have been considered a migrant, but rather as a mobile EU citizen exercising his or her right to free movement. This is all regardless of whether this person defines him or herself as a migrant, or whether he or she is perceived as a migrant by the host society. In fact, concerns amongst the British population on how to regulate intra-EU ‘mobility’ and incorporate CEE ‘migrants’ into British society were key motives behind Brexit. This clearly shows that the definition of who is a migrant and what constitutes migration is in itself a key issue in the governance of migration and diversity.

2.2 T  he Complexification of Migration and Diversity To understand the governance of migration and diversity, one should first understand the challenges that governance in these areas is facing. The central development that is addressed is the complexification of migration and diversity. Complexification means that there is no ‘one-size-fits-­all’ to the patterns and configurations that migration and diversity take across

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various settings. This discards, for instance, notions of universal ‘multicultural’ or ‘assimilationist’ models of diversity, as well as claims of a universal trend towards superdiversity. Complexification means uncertainty and contestation. Trends and developments in migration and diversity are often driven by highly complex sets of factors, making it almost impossible to foresee or predict migration flows. This uncertainty also complexifies governance solutions. There is a clear relationship between uncertainty and contestation; knowledge uncertainty tends to be increased by contestation of knowledge claims. When taking stock of the literature on trends in migration and diversity, two issue dimensions emerge that appear to be of particular relevance to this complexification: the ‘diversification of diversities’ and the ‘diversification of migratory patterns’. First, the ‘diversification of diversities’ (Hollinger 2006) involves a growing variation and dynamics in the configuration that migration-related diversity takes in different settings. In some settings, this configuration of diversity is evolving towards what is described by some as ‘hyperdiversity’ or ‘superdiversity’ (Maurice Crul 2016; Escafré-Dublet and Lelévrier 2018; Geldof 2018; Meissner and Vertovec 2015; Tasan 2014; S Vertovec 2007). Although definitions of superdiversity vary to some extent, they capture both a ‘broadening’ of diversity, meaning that the scale of diversity is increasing, as well as a ‘deepening’ of diversity, meaning that diversity cannot be captured in terms of singular groups or categories. For instance, Crul and Mollenkopf show that in a growing number of cities, a majority of the population consists of migrants and their direct descendants, so-called majority-­ minority cities (Crul 2016; Crul and Mollenkopf 2012). This applies to a global city like London but also to smaller cities, such as Antwerp and Rotterdam. The deepening of diversity means that there is increasing diversity within migration-related diversity, not only along diverse ethnic lines, but also along cultural, economic, political and social lines (Vertovec 2007). It is therefore no longer possible to capture diversity in terms of specific ethnic or minority groups, as these groups are also internally diversified (especially over various generations). In order to capture diversity, both research and policy need to reach beyond an ‘ethnic lens’ that tends to reduce the complexification of diversity in contemporary societies (Glick-Schiller et al. 2006; Glick-Schiller and Çağlar 2013).

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This ‘diversification of diversities’, however, does not involve superdiversity always and everywhere. In fact, the trend towards superdiversity seems to apply in particular to global cities such as London and cities with a very specific migration situation (such as harbour cities like Antwerp and Rotterdam). In other settings, there may be very different configurations of diversity. For instance, some countries have very specific migrant groups because of their migration histories, such as the presence of Brazilians in Portugal, or Mexicans in Californian cities. In some places, migration may be a very recent phenomenon. Also, there may be places that act more as a half-way station for migrants on their way to other places. In fact, this is how Italy perceived its position for a long time in response to the European refugee crisis of 2015 and onwards, before becoming aware that many people were not just passing through Italian cities, but actually settling there. This shows that one should not rush to see superdiversity as a universal condition or trend, but rather as a phenomenon that is specific to situational settings. Secondly, the complexification of migration and diversity involves a diversification of migratory patterns. This involves a growing variation in different sorts of ‘mobilities’ (Glorius and Grabowska 2014; Meissner 2015; Okólski 2001; Glick-Schiller and Salazar 2013). The traditional perspective on migration is that a person leaves a place to settle permanently in another place. However, factors such as developments in transportation and communication technologies are leading to more variation in migratory patterns: migration seems to be less often permanent. This has been described in the literature as ‘liquid mobility’ or ‘liquid migration’ (Bygnes and Erdal 2017; Engbersen 2012). For instance, within the EU, labour migrants from Central and Eastern European countries often move between various countries depending on economic opportunities. Also, migrants sometimes move back and forth between different places, forming ‘transnational spaces’ (Faist 2000). Besides different kind of mobilities, the diversification of migration also means variation in migration motives. Although people have, of course, always moved for various reasons (migration motives such as labour, humanitarian reasons, family, colonial), countries are increasingly faced with varied motives rather than flows driven by a very specific migration motive. Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly difficult to

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differentiate between different motives. For instance, there is often an inherent relation between labour/economic migration and family migration, as well as between humanitarian and labour migration. In fact, the notion of migration motives can be seen as a reduction of the complexity that is often behind migration flows. Here again, complexification does not mean that all migrants are suddenly ‘footloose’ and have no specified migration motive; it merely means that diversity within migratory patterns has increased. In different places and in different cases, different patterns are likely to emerge. And as we will see later, this complexifies governance, as policies cannot reduce complexity to one specific migrant category. For instance, civic integration programmes will have to be designed in very different ways depending on whether a government assumes that migrants come from one specific group with one specific motive (such as family migration), or if programmes have to be designed to cater to a broad variation of categories. This complexification of diversity, captured in terms of a diversification of diversities and migratory patterns, will be discussed throughout this book in terms of a ‘governance challenge’. It is important to note that this challenge does not manifest itself in similar ways across different settings. It defies universal notions of ‘superdiversity’, ‘the ethnic lens’, permanent migration and ‘liquid mobility’. These notions may apply to specific settings but are unlikely to be generic. The complexification of migration and diversity requires a perspective that can capture rather than reduce the diversification of diversities and mobilities. Text Box 2.1  Social Complexity and ‘Minority Groups’ Various scholars have observed an increase in the social complexity of migration-related diversity, described as a ‘diversification of diversity’ or ‘superdiversity’. One of the implications is that it becomes increasingly difficult to speak of distinct migrant groups, such as ‘the Filipinos’, ‘the Turks’, ‘the Polish’, etc. Social complexity often means high complexity within these groups as well. Such as between different generations, such as the huge differences in economic status but also for instance cultural preferences of first, second and third generation migrants from Turkey in Germany. But also differences in socio-economic status, such as between students and domestic workers from the Philippines. (continued)

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Text Box 2.1  (continued) This challenges conventional language that is used to describe migration-­ related diversity, which often refers to distinct migrant groups or even minority groups. Think for instance of countries that have followed group specific policies to certain migrant groups. This does not mean that groups cannot exist, but rather one cannot assume that migration-related diversity will always and everywhere be structured along identifiable groups. To what extent there are groups then becomes an empirical question rather than a policy assumption. Policies that do assume the existence of too ‘monolithic’ groups in settings of high social complexity, do risk ‘alienation’ and policy failure. Think of how many EU policies failed to capture the complexity within intra-EU migrants by targeting policy at low-skilled workers whereas a growing number of migrants were students.

2.3 The Value of a Governance Perspective This book offers a governance perspective to develop a deeper understanding of the challenges of the complexification of migration and diversity for actors (both state and non-state) in various settings (local, regional, national and international). Such a governance perspective emphasizes how approaches towards migration and diversity are formulated and implemented in complex settings and are characterized by multiple actor networks, uncertainty of knowledge claims, multiple discourses and often by competing interests (Colebatch 2009; Kjaer 2004; Rhodes 1997). The governance perspective on migration and diversity builds on, but also reaches beyond, alternative (e.g. sociological, legal, political, economic) perspectives for several reasons. First, a sound sociological understanding of underlying problem developments in migration and migration-related diversity does not necessarily provide an explanation for how actors such as governments address these issues. Indeed, knowledge of problem developments and the factors that cause such problems can contribute to the shaping of governance strategies. For instance, a good understanding of the extent to which the educational achievements of migrant minors mirrors that of the rest of society and the effects of this on labour market participation in later stages, can of course contribute to governance

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strategies in the educational domain. However, such sociological understanding is often not the only trigger behind governance strategies. In fact, there are many cases where such knowledge is absent, uncertain or contested. And even when such knowledge is available, there are many other factors that account for governance strategies. Alternatively, migration scholars have increasingly paid attention to the economic perspective on migration and diversity. From this perspective, it is not the underlying issues themselves, but rather what migration and diversity imply in economic terms for those involved and for the receiving society, that determines what governance strategies are adopted. Indeed, as Hampshire (2018) has shown, such an economic perspective does (at least to some extent) account for why countries are often relatively open to specific migrants who bring economic benefits and closed to others. However, here too, what constitutes economic benefits or liabilities, and for whom, can be both uncertain (not easy to determine) and contested. A clear illustration of such difficulties in determining economic costs or benefits concerns the long-raging controversy over whether immigration brings benefits or liabilities to the receiving society, involving key migration scholars such as Borjas (1989). Similarly, a debate as old as migration scholarship itself is whether migration-related diversity within organizations brings burdens, such as increasing transaction costs and decreasing group cohesion, or benefits in the form of creativity and internationalization. A political perspective stresses the importance of political representation and political structures in defining collective courses of action regarding migration and diversity. This highlights a very different aspect of governance, not necessarily related to the objective characteristics of these issues, but rather to political representations of them. It shows that a good understanding of underlying problem development is often not the only factor determining governance strategies. Rather, governance strategies are politically determined and driven by conflicts, interests and inequalities. They are also aimed at resolving (or reproducing) such conflicts, interests and inequalities. This has become visible in the dramatic politicization of migration and diversity in many countries all over the world, driven amongst others by the rise of populism, and leaving an

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important imprint on policies (Hampshire 2018; Mudde 2018). Politicization has been an important driver behind more restrictive immigration and more stringent integration policies, but similarly, as Guiraudon (1997) has shown, depoliticization has in the past allowed for the development of more generous policies for migration and incorporation in various European countries ‘behind gilded doors’. However, the logic of migration and diversity governance cannot be confined or simplified to that of politics. There are various aspects of migration and diversity that seem to defy the logic of politics. One key factor is, evidently, that migrants are not always included in political processes on migration and diversity; in fact, their inclusion is a stake in the political process, distinguishing this policy area from many other contested areas where at least the target populations have a formal voice. Finally, a legal perspective emphasizes institutionalized ‘rules of the game’ as drivers of migration and diversity governance. This can take the form of national and international laws and treaties regulating immigration and specifying when and how action can be taken against discrimination. For instance, the 1953 Geneva Convention continues to have a direct effect on the countries that signed up to it (almost every country in the world) to offer protection to ‘refugees’, regardless of the occasional ‘whims’ of domestic politics. Once more, a purely legal perspective would fail to grasp the full complexity of governance strategies on migration and diversity. First of all, laws and treaties do not only ‘structure’ social actions; they can also be produced, reproduced and altered by social and political action. This means that legal structures are not ‘objective’ nor ‘cast in stone’, but should rather be considered as social products, driven by social constructions of problems, economic interests and political beliefs. For instance, what constitutes a ‘refugee’ under the Geneva Convention is a legacy of how statesmen after the Second World War defined refugees at a time when they were driven by very specific political (and economic) beliefs to pacify the post-war refugee issue. Such legal structures do not always effectively structure what happens in concrete governance practices. In fact, there is a broad literature on how migration and diversity law is often reinterpreted in very specific settings, for example, by front-line workers or ‘street-level bureaucrats.’

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2.4 C  omplexity Governance; Complex Issues Require Complex Approaches A key premise in this book is that the complexification of migration and diversity requires a complex governance approach. This speaks to what in the literature is described as complexity governance (Chandler 2014; Duit and Galaz 2008; Jessop 1997; Kickert 1993; Klijn and Koppenjan 2014; Teisman and Klijn 2008). Complexity governance refers to a rather broad field of study that shares a focus on how policies are made in settings that often include but are not limited to government, that involve complex forms of relations between actors and multidimensional approaches and that often run across different institutional levels. The term ‘governance’ is used here in the broader sense than the use of the concept ‘policy’ in more traditional political science and policy science work. Rather than referring only to formal government policies, the term governance will be applied (in its traditional epistemological meaning) to any deliberate and collaborative form of action (or the choice not to act) to address a specific societal issue. Complexity governance then refers to forms of policymaking that deviate from a government (often state-centric) perspective, in which governments may play a role but only as one of many actors, working together, for instance, with NGOs and private organizations. Hence, complexity governance often comes with complex governance networks (Klijn and Koppenjan 2014; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Van Bueren et al. 2003). Central to the complexity governance literature is not only an empirical observation that governance processes tend to become more complex, but also a normative statement that in order to cope with today’s complex problems a more complex governance approach is required. Verweij and Thompson frame this as ‘messy problems requiring messy solutions’ (Marco Verweij and Thompson 2006). Complex, contested and multifaceted problems, such as migration and diversity but also issues like climate change, as in Thompson and Verweij’s research, can rarely be resolved by one specific measure or policy instrument. In the scope of this book, Thompson and Verweij’s adagio will be translated as ‘complex problems require complex solutions’. Solutions to

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complex problems can only be achieved if they try to grasp and cope with the full complexity of these problems. If policies fail to capture this complexity, this will, as will be argued in Chap. 3, lead to policy pathologies. This idea that complex problems require complexity governance relates to the work of various scholars on how different types of policy problems tend to lead to different forms of policy dynamics (Hoppe 2011; Stacey 2007). However, Stacey argues that problems that are characterized by disagreement and uncertainty (wicked policy problems) tend to lead to disintegration, anarchy and avoidance. The notion of complexity governance poses an alternative to such ‘anarchy’. Rather than having one big masterplan, complexity governance involves an emerging or evolving approach comprising a complex set of measures and instruments (plural policy responses) that is often developed ‘on the go’ (incremental) (see also G.  Teisman et  al. 2009; G. R. Teisman and Klijn 2008). Geyer and Rihani (2012) pose complexity governance as an alternative to both orderly and disorderly public policy. Orderly public policy is based on a positivist (or ‘Modernist’) belief that problems can be fully resolved when approached in an orderly and rational manner. Disorderly public policy would take a relativist approach, involving policy processes where everything is relational. Complexity governance would be based on a belief that everything is probabilistic, that knowledge helps policymaking but will never lead to full control, and that governance is a process rather than a concrete policy outcome or output. Complexity governance involves the development of solutions or ‘policies’ that do not necessarily fit within pre-existing institutional categories or levels. Precisely because problems tend to be complex, they are often found at various institutional government levels and various institutionalized policy domains or subsystems. Within this context, concepts such as poly-centric and multi-level governance have emerged to emphasize how policy solutions are developed in ways that reach beyond institutional governance categories. The messiness of complexity governance is related to the uncertainty and contestation that are inherent to complex policy problems (Roe 2012). Uncertainty means that knowledge (e.g. on the causes of a policy problem, or the effects of a policy measure) is never complete; available

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knowledge is seen as probabilistic knowledge and as incomplete in terms of accounting for new and emerging problem developments. For instance, one can never be sure whether an integration policy approach that worked in one country or city, would work as well in another country or city. Contestation means that knowledge, however relevant, will always also be subject to interpretation. Varying interpretations of knowledge may lead to contestation. For instance, what one actor may believe to be a successful policy approach, may be seen as a failure by other actors working with different standards or who have different beliefs. The idea of complexity governance will be developed further in relation to the concepts of mainstreaming and alienation in Chap. 3. As we will see, the notion of mainstreaming speaks closely to the literature on complexity governance, arguing that complex problems require complex solutions in the form of plural policy responses that run across areas and levels and engage multiple actors. In contrast, governance alienation emerges when governance responses fail to accommodate complexity or problem situations, and reduce rather than grasp complexity.

2.5 A  Multidimensional Approach to Governance To be able to understand how actors respond to the complexification of migration and diversity, we need a governance perspective that allows us to grasp rather than reduce the complexity of governance in this area. Such a governance perspective should allow for a broad understanding of the factors that can shape governance responses in specific settings, without involving a ‘one size fits all’. It should also allow us to better understand the drivers behind trends such as mainstreaming and alienation. To this aim, a comprehensive and multidimensional perspective on governance will be developed throughout this book and applied to the fields of migration and diversity governance. At its most basic level, this multidimensional perspective is grounded in the paradigm dialogue that has marked the development of the social sciences in general (Guba 1990). This dialogue involves meta-perspectives such as positivism, critical theory, institutionalism and social constructionism. Rather than

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choosing sides in this dialogue and adopting one of these perspectives, the aim of understanding (rather than critiquing) governance complexity is better served by a comprehensive approach that takes all of these perspectives on board. Within the scope of this book, these meta-perspectives are seen as ‘dimensions’ that are not mutually exclusive but that will often play interconnected roles within complex governance settings. Each dimension represents groups of factors that may account for governance processes in specific settings (Fig. 2.1). The first dimension of this multidimensional perspective on governance (Bekkers et al. 2017) is based on positivism, also framed as ‘rationalism’ or ‘objectivism’. Key factors here include knowledge, information and expertise. Positivism is grounded in Comte’s sociology emphasizing the importance of objectivism in the social sciences and the potential impact of rationalism on not only our understanding of but also the resolution of real-world social problems. This is also exhibited in contemporary forms of positivism, emphasizing a belief in ‘rational societal steering’ and in ‘evidence based policymaking’ (Young et  al. 2002). In policy studies this positivist approach has laid the foundation of the so-called policy analytical movement, where rational policy analysis is seen as the way to enhance the quality and problem-solving capacity of policies. When applied to migration governance, studies have covered a broad range of positivist or rationalist factors. This includes, for instance, the collection of the so-called ‘ethnic statistics’ or data on the (social, economic, cultural, or other) position of ethnic minorities, the role of experts or expert institutes in policy processes, the ‘measurement’ of integration processes and the setting of objective indicators that would allow for the development of migration scenarios. Critical theory, also framed as the ‘political’ perspective, emphasizes the role of factors such as conflicts, interests and power. In this perspective, governance, as any other form of human and social activity, is essentially an interest-driven activity that inevitably leads to conflicts and whose outcomes will depend on differences in power positions. This approach emphasizes that such conflicts can be open, as in political competition or in social movements, as well as tacit. In policy sciences and governance studies in general, critical theory has developed various strands,

2  A Governance Perspective on the Complexification…  •Knowledge •Information •Expertise

•Power •Interests •Conflicts

Positivism

Institutionalism •Institutions •Routines •Rules of the

game

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Critical theory

Social constructionism •Discourses •Ideas •Perceptions

Fig. 2.1 Schematic overview of the multidimensional governance perspective

including a political perspective on policymaking that shows how the creation of powerful advocacy coalitions can influence policy processes (Sabatier 1988). Critical theory also has a well-developed tradition in the field of migration studies. Political economic approaches have revealed how global economic disparities are a root driver of migration streams, involving various forms of migration between ‘periphery’ and ‘centre’ as a reflection of broader patterns of exploitation of the periphery by the centre. Similarly, in diversity governance, various scholars have argued that interventions such as ‘integration policies’ are often not only driven by economic motives but also by a ‘problematization’ of cultural differences. When cultural and economic inequalities collide, an ethnic underclass may develop, legitimating various forms of state intervention. Various critical theorists in migration studies have criticized migration scholarship based on a more positivist tradition. For instance, Favell has argued that the preoccupation of scholars with ‘migrant integration’ has inadvertently instrumentalized research as part of the broader

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‘integration project’ of nation-states (Adrian Favell 2001). Dahinden equally argues that the concepts of migration and integration both reproduce state views on mobility, and advocates the ‘de-migranticization’ of migration studies (Dahinden 2016). Another dimension of governance processes involves the role that institutions play. Institutionalism emphasizes that governance processes do not take place within an institutional void, but are driven by various sorts of formal and informal, manifest and tacit patterns of social interaction. Institutions in the sociological sense can involve codes, ideas and routines that structure social relations, and are constantly reproduced in these social relations (Hall and Taylor 1996). This may involve institutions such as the nation-state or the welfare-state as well as more general ideas about ‘citizenship’, ‘nationhood’ or ‘integration’ as an institutionalized idea. In migration studies, a significant body of literature has emerged around a more institutionalist perspective on migration and diversity. This includes studies on how integration is promoted in various ‘welfare state regimes’, but also on how ideas on migrant integration tend to be bound to specific ‘national models of integration’ (C.  Bertossi 2011; Christophe Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012; P. J. Bowen 2007). Studies like Brubaker’s key reading on France and Germany (R.  Brubaker 1992; W. R. Brubaker 1990) show, from a historical institutionalist perspective, how traditions of nationhood can continue to shape approaches to migration and integration for very long periods. Finally, social constructionism emphasizes the key role of discourses, ideas and perceptions in governance and policymaking. What drives governance is not so much the knowledge or power that actors bring to bear or the institutional setting in which they interact, but rather how they attribute social meaning to problems and social relations. This approach shifts attention to discourses that socially construct problem situations with the use of specific language, ideas and images. Influential studies in the social constructionist tradition in policy sciences have addressed how ‘framing’ in media and politics affects policymaking, how policies themselves ‘frame’ problems (Schön and Rein 1995), and how policies attribute social meaning to their target groups (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 1997; Yanow 2002).

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2.6 Conclusion This chapter provides the analytical framework on which the subsequent chapters are based. It makes the case for a governance perspective on migration and diversity in order to make sense of the challenges that actors working on migration and diversity are facing. These challenges stem from what I have described as the ‘complexification’ of migration and diversity. A multidimensional governance perspective can help us to understand how actors cope with this complexity, and how multiple factors, including knowledge, institutions, discourses and power shape their responses. In subsequent chapters the governance perspective developed here will be applied to the field of migration and diversity governance. In the next chapter, a theoretical argument will be built on how and why complexification can lead to either mainstreaming or alienation in migration and diversity governance. Subsequent chapters then substantiate this theoretization by bringing together knowledge on migration and diversity governance around the four dimensions that have been defined in this chapter: positivism, institutionalism, critical theory and social constructionism. Throughout these chapters, we will discover from these dimensions that complexification brings on board a variety of factors that lead to an inclination toward alienation rather than to the mainstreaming of migration and diversity governance.

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3 Between Governance Mainstreaming and Alienation

The key focus of this book is not so much the complexification of migration and diversity as the ways in which societies perceive and respond to it. The emphasis is on how societies engage with the issues of migration and diversity, which often involve networks of both governmental and non-governmental actors. This may occur at various levels, such as cities developing a governance response to specific local patterns of mobility and diversity; regions or countries developing policies to regulate migration or to promote integration, or international governance responses as within the context of the European Union and the United Nations. However, we can assume that the relationship between migration and diversity and governance responses (at different levels) is also complex. Firstly, due to complexification, there will not be a clear-cut relationship between a singular trend in migration and diversity and a singular trend in governance that applies across different societal settings. There is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ in migration and diversity governance. Rather, we can expect very different governance responses in different societal settings, characterized by different patterns of migration and diversity. For instance, governance responses in a city that has become a majority-­ minority city or a superdiverse city will be very different than responses in a city where migration is a recent phenomenon. In fact, if one thing © The Author(s) 2020 P. Scholten, Mainstreaming versus Alienation, Global Diversities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42238-7_3

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stands out from comparative research on migration and diversity policies, it is the way in which cities and countries tend to approach migration and diversity issues in very different ways. Secondly, one cannot simply assume that there is any relationship between the social facts on migration and diversity and governance responses to them. Governance responses are driven by many factors, many of which are not necessarily related to developments in the problem situation. This brings us back to the various perspectives that were sketched in the previous chapter, highlighting the role of political factors, public perceptions, and the logic of institutions. This complexity approach to migration and diversity and governance has important implications for how to theorize this relationship. What has often been done in the literature on migration and diversity governance has been to design specific migration or ‘integration’ models that fit in particular societal settings. See, for instance, the literature on migration regimes or national integration policy models (C.  Bertossi 2011; C. Bertossi and Duyvendak 2009). As will be argued in this chapter, such models are reductions or even denials of complexity rather than helpful tools for understanding it. Rather than referring to specific policy models, I will conceptualize two ways in which societies may respond to migration and diversity. This refers to specific logics in the formulation of governance responses, rather than to specific governance outcomes or ‘models’ per se. Firstly, mainstreaming has been developed as one of the potential governance logics. Referring to related literatures, such as on gender and environmental mainstreaming, the concept of mainstreaming describes how governance topics are informed by the constant accommodation of generic structures (‘the mainstream’) to new and changing problem dynamics. Rather than isolating an issue as something temporary or unique to a specific group, mainstreaming involves an integral approach whereby structural adjustments are made to generic institutions. In this sense it reflects Thompson and Verweij’s statement of ‘messy problems requiring messy solutions’. In parallel to gender mainstreaming, migration and diversity mainstreaming means adjusting existing institutions and policies to reflect emerging realities on migration and diversity. Examples of this include accommodating a welfare state to the realities of mobility, or adjusting educational

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services to take into account the diversification of the population. Such mainstreaming does not define a specific governance model that is relevant across settings; rather it specifies a governance approach that can lead to the adoption of very different governance ‘models’ in response to very different societal settings. Secondly, I will define alienation as a logic behind governance responses that ignores or fails to capture the complexification of migration and diversity. Alienation here means a growing discrepancy between the challenges (and opportunities) offered by developments in migration and diversity, and the logic behind governance. This could, for instance, involve a denial of social developments, symbolic politics, institutional factors that are resistant to social developments, and so on. The concept of alienation not only speaks to a long research tradition in the critical sociological tradition (Marx 1844; Seeman 1959) and public administration (Tummers et al. 2009), but also to what policy scientists have defined as ‘degenerative policy designs’ (Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram 1993; A.  L. Schneider and H.  M. Ingram 1997). Some policy designs are defined as ‘degenerative’ within the logic of policymaking, as when the construction or framing of underlying problems or the social groups involved triggers policies that deny or even reify a problem situation. It is in this tradition that I will further develop the notion of governance alienation and distinguish various forms of governance alienation: policy alienation, social alienation, political alienation and institutional alienation.

3.1 Mainstreaming Mainstreaming involves a governance approach that tries to come to terms with complexity by addressing policy issues via mainstream policies, institutions and structures. It offers a complex governance response to complex policy issues such as migration and diversity. Rather than setting policy issues apart with an issue-specific approach, it puts policy issues into the mainstream. This means that established policies, institutions and structures are constantly reviewed and recalibrated to achieve optimal policy outcomes for specific problems. Rather than a

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problem-­ specific policy, mainstreaming involves a cross-sectoral and often also multi-level approach that cuts across policy sectors (such as housing, education and labour) and levels of government (local, national and regional). Rather than being an approach with clear political and administrative structures, mainstreaming will often involve complex governance networks (including both governmental and non-governmental actors). Instead of taking a group-specific approach aimed at a clearly defined target population, mainstreaming involves targeting the mainstream (a whole society approach). And finally, rather than adhering to a specific preferred policy outcome, mainstreaming refers to an ongoing process of recalibrating generic policies, institutions and structures that may take very different shapes in different situational settings (no onesize-fits-all, no single ‘policy model’). The concept of mainstreaming has often been applied to issues such as gender, disability and environmental concerns (Dalal-Clayton and Bass 2009; Daly 2005; Jones and Webster 2006; Lombardo and Meier 2006; Nunan et al. 2012). These can be also considered as complex policy issues that are pertinent to mainstream policies, institutions and structures, rather than specific to a particular group or category, one specific sector, or one specific actor. The process of mainstreaming has been particularly manifest in the area of gender (Lombardo and Meier 2006). Issues of gender are no longer confined to the emancipation of women, but are perceived as involving changes within generic societal institutions such as the functioning of the labour market (e.g. discrimination against women in specific functions, wage gaps between men and women) and the educational system (e.g. civic education, prevention of gender stereotypes). This also shows that the governance of gender issues should not be treated as a separate issue within its own policy silo, but rather as an issue that cuts across various policy areas and domains. It shows that although there may be someone responsible for developing a vision on gender mainstreaming, such as a special government minister, responsibility for gender mainstreaming lies with a large group of actors, including governmental organizations (various ministries and levels of government), non-­ governmental organizations and private organizations. Similarly, a process of environmental mainstreaming (Dalal-Clayton and Bass 2009) has been taking place in a growing number of countries.

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Environmental concerns are being integrated into a generic approach to increase focus on the environment in existing policies and institutions, such as including environmental issues in education, incorporating environmental concerns in economic policies, making the environment part of external and development policies, and also to some extent, of migration policies. This example also illustrates that a state-centric view on mainstreaming will not suffice: at the end of the day, the success of environmental mainstreaming will depend on a broad range of societal actors, including but certainly not limited to, governments. Text Box 3.1  Why a Mainstreamed Approach to Migration Requires More Than Just Having a Migration Policy Migration policies in a narrow sense regulate the entry and exit of person on and from a specific territory, mostly a nation-state. This narrow approach to migration is also what the term ‘migration policy’ in both formal and public language mostly refers to. However, it would be naïve to see understand such policies as a comprehensive approach to a complex social phenomenon as migration. Therefore, a mainstreamed governance approach to migration should involve much more than a migration policy in a narrow sense. For instance, as most migration scholars see environmental change as one of the main drivers of migration, a mainstreamed approach to migration should make migration an integral concern within environmental policies as well. Furthermore, a mainstreamed approach also requires some sort of coordination between different policy areas. For instance, it would be incredibly ineffective to boast a very restrictive migration policy while at the same time not addressing the environmental triggers of migration. A similar argument can be made for various other policy areas in which migration governance could be mainstreamed, including international relations, defence policies (addressing political instability in the region), economic policies, cultural policies, and so on.

From the literatures on governance mainstreaming in other complex policy areas, several key characteristics of mainstreaming can be distinguished (P.  Scholten and Van Breugel 2017). First, mainstreaming involves embedding a policy issue into mainstreaming policies, institutions and structures. This means that rather than establishing a specific institutional framework or a specific policy for a specific problem, existing policies, institutions and structures are accommodated to problem

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developments. This involves a shift from a situation whereby there is a clear institutionalized policy domain or ‘policy subsystem’ (Baumgartner Frank and Jones Bryan 1993) to a more complex and fluid situation in which a governance approach cuts across both policy sectors and policy levels. Rhodes (1997) describes this as ‘polycentric governance’. This poly-centricism has a vertical dimension that cuts across sectors and a horizontal dimension that cuts across policy levels. For instance, in the area of gender mainstreaming, the cross-sectoral nature of policies is clearly reflected in how gender is embedded in policies on education, labour, health and almost any other imaginable policy sector. The vertical dimension speaks more directly to the literature on multi-level governance (Bache and Flinders 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Piattoni 2010), which involves various modes of interaction and coordination of governance between levels. For instance, the existence of venues for the coordination of policies at different levels is an example of multi-level governance. Many examples of this can be found in the areas of migration and diversity governance (the European Migration Network, Eurocities, etc.). At the same time, poly-centricism does not mean that multi-level governance will inevitably evolve. In fact, there are also many instances whereby policies live ‘parallel lives’ at different levels, without meaningful interaction and potentially even contradicting each other. This has been described by some as forms of decoupling or ‘disjointed governance’ (Curry 2018). A second characteristic of mainstreaming involves a shift from a state-­ centric ‘government’ approach to an approach that involves complex actor networks. Bringing a policy issue into the mainstream means involving mainstream actors in the governance of these issues. This includes, but is not limited to, governmental actors. For instance, complex actor networks in migration management are not limited to states exerting control over cross-border traffic; they also include private companies such as airlines and airports that implement border control, and NGOs operational in border areas (as in the Mediterranean during the European refugee situation in 2015/2016). Another characteristic of mainstreaming that can be deduced from the broader mainstreaming literature, refers not so much to the coordination but rather to the orientation of governance. On this dimension,

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mainstreaming involves abandoning a focus on specific parts or groups in society for a more universalistic approach. It becomes difficult to target policies at specific groups when complex issues are involved. This is clearly manifest in the issue of environmental mainstreaming where the complexity of the issue defies any clear targeting of measures. Rather, a ‘whole society approach’ is required, as issues like the environment and gender are relevant to everyone in society, regardless of their background or status. Importantly, the whole society approach entails an active approach to promote awareness of the topics being mainstreamed; in the mainstreaming literature, it is not a euphemism for government retrenchment, with specific policies being abandoned without any replacement being put in place. Concerning migration and diversity, various scholars have argued that the complexification of migration and diversity (see also Sect. 2.2) has made group-specific targeting of policies impossible (Hollinger 2006; van Breugel and Scholten 2017; S. Vertovec 2007). Not only have ‘boundaries’ between migrant groups become more fluid (especially over generations), but the impact of migration-related diversity at society at large has become so significant that coping with diversity has increasingly become a matter that is relevant to society as a whole rather than specific parts of it. Finally, mainstreaming refers to a situational process rather than a specific or one-size-fits-all policy outcome or policy model. In the face of the ongoing dynamics of the complexification of issues as gender, migration and diversity, an ongoing review and accommodation of mainstream policies, institutions and structures is required. It is precisely because complexity tends to be accompanied by uncertainty and contestation that an ongoing recalibration of the mainstream is required to cope with it. Whereas in the traditional view, policies are seen as the outcomes of a policy process, from the perspective of mainstreaming there is no end to the policy process of dealing with complexity. Furthermore, it can be anticipated that mainstreaming will produce very different outcomes in different settings, depending upon the specific local circumstances. For instance, the types and scale of migration that a country is faced with will determine how generic institutions or policies will accommodate it. The types of institutions that are in place, such as whether a country has a more social-democrat or a more liberal or residual welfare state, will also

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affect how migration can be ‘mainstreamed’ into these institutions. Sometimes even the geographical positioning of a city, for instance whether it is near a border or a harbour, or more isolated from main migration streams, will influence how migration and diversity can be mainstreamed into generic institutions. In line with the critical discussion of ‘modelling’ in migration studies earlier in this chapter, there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to mainstreaming. This characteristic of mainstreaming also means that it does not necessarily involve or preclude a specific governance strategy or approach to migration and diversity. Neither does it involve embracing or rejecting migration or diversity. Rather, it means that if a government wishes to cope with migration in a specific way, whether this is restrictive or more open, the best way to do so is through generic mainstreamed policies. Similarly, coping with migration-related diversity within the context of the complexification of contemporary societies, can be best achieved through a mainstreamed approach rather than a specific approach. For instance, referring to ‘traditional’ models of integration policies, mainstreaming may lead to either assimilationist or multiculturalist policies, depending on what is appropriate in the specific problem situation and institutional setting (Table 3.1). The mainstreaming lens used in this book to discuss how mainstreaming can offer a way to come to terms with the growing social complexity of migration and diversity, should not be adopted uncritically. In fact, gender scholars (such as Lombardo and Meier 2006) have been rather critical of mainstreaming in policy practices. They observe that under the framing of mainstreaming, a lack of resources or the lack of a clearly coordinated policy vision can pose serious limits to mainstreaming. Similarly, one of my earlier studies on mainstreaming in integration governance shows that what policymakers phrase as mainstreaming does not always accord to actual policy practices (van Breugel and Scholten 2017). For instance, in various states the banner of ‘mainstreaming’ veiled an actual policy of austerity and retrenchment, rather than an investment in an actual mainstreaming of migration and diversity priorities across governance fields and actors. In France, the mainstreaming lens has been confused with colour blindness and Republicanism, which can be considered a form of denying social complexity rather than an effort to come

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Table 3.1  Summary of main characteristics of mainstreaming

Mainstreaming

Poly-centrism

A shift from a problem-specific approach to a cross-sectoral and multi-level approach that embeds a policy issue into mainstream (generic) policies, institutions and structures.

Complex actor networks

A shift from a state-centric approach to a mainstream approach that involves complex actor networks (including but not limited to governmental actors)

Whole society approach

A shift from a targeted or group-specific approach to a whole society approach

A process rather than a one-size fits all model

Mainstreaming as a process rather than a specific policy outcome or model, which can take different shapes in different situational settings (no one-size-fits-all).

to terms with it. Mainstreaming does not mean (at least not per se) government retrenchment or colour blindness, but rather that migration and diversity become priority issues within ‘mainstream’ structures, institutions and policies. It means a different mode of governance, at least different from simple state-led integrationism or migration control, rather than that it means having no policy or no prioritization of migration and diversity issues at all. Text Box 3.2  Why Gender Mainstreaming Did Not Always Work….. Whereas the concept of governance mainstreaming may be new to the field of migration and diversity, it has been used and applied extensively in the field of gender. However, as Petra Meier (2015) argues, the practice of gender mainstreaming has been far more complicated than the theory of mainstreaming. In practice, as Meier shows, gender mainstreaming often came with too little resources to actually embed gender as a policy priority across policy sectors. This imposes an important risk to gender mainstreaming; rather than transforming a specific into a generic approach, mainstreaming may lead to dilution of gender as a policy priority altogether. Therefore, as an important lesson for studies of migration and integration governance, the use of the concept of ‘mainstreaming’ should always be approached critically.

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3.2 Alienation Whereas mainstreaming involves a logic of policymaking aimed at accommodating structural and institutional settings to the complexification of migration and diversity, alienation involves a logic of policymaking whereby structural and institutional settings lead to estrangement from this complexification. Whereas mainstreaming tries to capture complexity as a structural part of migration governance, alienation involves a failure to capture complexity that leads to policy pathologies. The concept of alienation has been used in various disciplines, but in general, it has its roots in the critical sociological tradition (such as Hegel, Marx and Marcuse). In critical Marxist literature, alienation (or ‘Entfremdung’) is seen as being driven by social stratification and leading to powerlessness and the exploitation of specific individuals and groups (Marx 1844). Although there are important variations in how alienation is defined, it generally refers to a separation between human or social behaviour on the one hand and aspects of human nature or broader society on the other hand (Blauner 1964). Marx describes the alienation of the worker within capitalist structures as a relation of the worker to his own activity as an alien activity not belonging to him; it is activity as suffering, strength as weakness, begetting as emasculating, the worker’s own physical and mental energy, his personal life, or what life other than activity – as an activity which is turned against him, neither depends nor belongs to him. (Marx 1844, quoted in Tummers 2012)

Various dimensions of alienation have been distinguished in the literature: powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, social isolation and self-estrangement (Blauner 1964; Seeman 1959; Tummers 2012; Tummers et al. 2009). Applications of these dimensions show that it is not necessary for all dimensions to be present simultaneously; rather that the dimensions address different manifestations in practice (and at different levels). For instance, studies on the psychological consequences of societal structures have focused more on self-estrangement, social isolation and normlessness, whereas studies of government and governance have focused more on powerlessness and normlessness (Tummers 2012).

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Alienation is driven by structural or systematic factors and affects the parts of such structures or systems, for example, the impact of societal structures (such as capitalism) on individuals in such structures (such as the worker). This is considered as a consequence of how such structures work, rather than a consequence of individual choice. For instance, in sociological literature alienation has been linked to various broader societal processes, such as capitalism and stratification, bureaucratization or professionalization (see also Blauner 1964; Seeman 1959). There are various concrete manifestations of alienation. For instance, Blauner (1964) speaks of work alienation, as a sense of meaninglessness and self-estrangement experienced by workers. Tummers et  al. (2009) speaks of policy alienation, referring to how professionalization in bureaucratic settings can lead to alienation when civil servants have to implement policies that they do not support or understand (engaging with the dimensions of powerlessness and meaninglessness). Within the scope of this study, the concept of alienation will be applied to governance as one specific form of social structure; in other words, the core focus will be on how the structure of governance and policymaking in the case of complex policy problems influences the relations between and behaviour of the actors involved. Within governance studies and in the policy sciences in general, there have been various studies that engage either directly or indirectly with the topic of alienation as part of governance and policy processes. Although engaging with the concept of alienation only indirectly, Schneider and Ingram (1993, 1997) refer to policy designs that can be ‘degenerative’. By degenerative they mean that policy designs often have an inherent tendency to privilege some groups and burden others, thereby weakening the position of some groups and strengthening that of others. They see this as ‘degenerative’, especially from the perspective of democratic theory; some groups will end up not only being perceived more positively but also by being more powerful in terms of having their voice heard and their needs taken into consideration. From the perspective of alienation, the notion of degenerative policy designs refers to how the structures of policymaking (such as in the form of target group constructs) lead to alienation (powerlessness, social isolation) among specific groups.

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Schneider and Ingram explain how degenerative policy designs work, with reference to various types of target group constructions. They define these group constructs based on two variables; whether they are perceived positively or negatively, and whether or not they are powerful in terms of resources and political influence. Advantaged groups are those groups that are powerful and perceived positively, such as the hard-working citizen, home-owners, civil servants or academics. Dependents are groups that are also seen positively, but have a weak position, such as single mothers. Contenders are perceived negatively but are powerful, such as bank mangers. Finally, deviants, such as criminals or prostitutes, are perceived negatively and are relatively powerless. What happens, according to Schneider and Ingram, is that there are incentives for politicians and policymakers to provide benefits to some and burdens to others. There are political gains for openly supporting dependents and the advantaged, whereas there are political gains for openly ‘punishing’ deviants (e.g. by calling for heavier sentences). Contenders will usually also be benefited, but more tacitly, in a ‘behind the scenes’ manner, such as complex tax regimes. As a consequence, such policy designs strengthen some groups, and weaken others, the deviants in particular. This only increases the incentives to treat some groups positively and others negatively, introducing a self-reinforcing logic to strengthen some groups while weakening others. As a consequence, the democratic idea of ‘one man one vote’ no longer holds, as the position of some will weigh more heavily in policy designs than that of others. Whereas Schneider and Ingram and Hoppe speak of ‘degenerative policy designs’, especially from the perspective of democratic theory (focusing on power and powerlessness), I will not take democratic theory as my point of departure for studying the governance of wicked policy problems. The effects of structural factors in the policy process on how policies are designed can be broader than degeneration in a democratic sense. For instance, as we will see in later chapters, it can lead to policies that worsen rather than alleviate a problem situation, or that legitimate a broader institutional framework rather than solving specific social problems. As the various forms of alienation show, there can be diverse forms of ‘degeneration’.

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What I do take from Schneider and Ingram’s ground-breaking work are the broader structural factors that drive what they call degeneration and what I will call alienation. This alienation is not so much seen as a consequence of individual choices made by specific actors but can only be understood within the context of the broader societal processes that lead such actors to make specific choices. For instance, as Schneider and Ingram argue, it is not so much an individual choice of politicians to define social groups; rather it is inherent to the broader logic of politics and policymaking that social groups will be defined and given a specific social meaning (positive/negative, powerful/powerless). Policymakers have to construct target groups for their policies, and politicians have to respond to political incentives regarding social constructions of specific groups. Although leaning primarily on the more social constructivist tradition in their reference to broader structural factors in the policy process, Schneider and Ingram clearly engage with the other traditions in the policy sciences. In particular, the political logic concerning target group constructions clearly relates to the political perspective, whereas the institutional perspective is involved when it comes to institutional logics that are produced and reproduced around target group constructions, and that in themselves also make these constructions difficult to change. They also argue that target group constructions seem rather immune to rational information on these groups; conversely, they argue that target group constructions are often constitutive of what information is produced, gathered and selected for policy purposes. In this study I will elaborate on the notion of alienation to gain a better understanding of the logic of governance processes as applied to the fields of migration and diversity. Alienation is conceptualized here as the alternative to mainstreaming. Whereas mainstreaming means that policies and institutions adapt to the changing situation (complexification) of migration and diversity, alienation means that developments in policies and institutions are not driven by the problem situation. Instead, alienation means that such developments (or the lack thereof ) are estranged from actual developments in the problem situation. This estrangement from the problem situation will be theorized in this book and substantiated based on the current state of migration literature.

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This will be done with reference to the four ‘traditions’ within policy sciences: positivism (the role of knowledge); institutionalism (role of institutions); the political perspective (the role of power) and constructivism (the role of discourses, ideas and language). This will enable a better and more comprehensive understanding of the factors that contribute to either governance mainstreaming or alienation. Furthermore, referring to these four traditions, four different forms of alienation will be defined: problem alienation; institutional alienation; political alienation and social alienation.

Problem Alienation The first form of alienation involves ‘problem alienation’. This means that there is a discrepancy between, on the one hand, the problem situation and efforts to properly understand and to ‘manage’ or control the situation, and on the other hand factors that actually shape governance responses that may not be oriented at the problem situation at all. For instance, there may be a lack of will to develop a proper understanding of what explains a problem situation, or policies may not be oriented towards solving the underlying problem. From a distinctly positivist perspective, problem alienation emphasizes the ‘meaninglessness’ dimension of alienation; policymaking as meaningless because policymakers are driven by concerns other than objective problem resolution. The issue of problem alienation can be expected to be more pertinent when complex or ‘wicked’ policy problems such as migration and diversity are involved. For this type of policy problems, the factors that underlie a problem situation are more difficult to grasp, and the policy problem may be harder to control and manage. However, even in these situations mainstreaming could result from a sincere effort in governance responses to grasp the complexities of a problem situation and to develop flexible and innovative responses in policies (see our discussion of complexity governance). However, we may expect that precisely because the problem is so complex, it may be more difficult to grasp in policy processes, and may provide a foundation that is more conducive to problem alienation than in other areas involving more well-structured policy problems.

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Policies are more likely to be ‘meaningless’ if they deny or fail to capture the complexity of issues like migration and diversity. As a consequence of problem alienation, ‘decoupling’ may occur between a governance process and a problem situation. This could lead to policies that are more or less immune to problem evidence, or even to policies that exacerbate a problem situation instead of alleviating it. In this sense, the meaninglessness that problem alienation tends to involve is not always without consequences.

Institutional Alienation Another form of alienation, grounded in institutionalist approaches to policy processes, concerns institutional alienation. This refers to estrangement from the complexities of problem situations (e.g. migration and diversity) because of the institutional logic of various institutions relevant to migration governance (e.g. welfare states, citizenship regimes). Mainstreaming, in contrast, refers to the embedding of migration and diversity within the logics of these institutions. An example of mainstreaming in this context would be adjusting welfare states to reflect the complex realities of increasing immigration and deepening diversity. Alienation means that institutions fail to include the realities of migration and diversity (which apply regardless of the actual direction of policy goals, such as limiting or promoting migration). This refers to the ‘normlessness’ dimension of alienation, meaning in particular the absence of clear norms that provide guidance on how to cope with complexity. Within the context of the broader institutional perspective on public policy, institutional alienation can be interpreted as a decoupling between the logics of appropriateness and the logic of consequence within specific institutions. What is considered appropriate within an institution, such as the path-dependency of ideas and routines in an institution such as the welfare state, may no longer be in line with the consequences of such an institution, such as fulfilling certain functions within increasingly floating and diverse populations. This discrepancy between appropriateness and consequence may apply both within and between institutions. Complex policy problems often also involve complex institutional

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settings, with different institutions being involved in different and sometimes even conflicting ways. This may apply to relations between various types of institutions as well as to relations between institutions. For instance, institutional alienation may emerge when a country’s citizenship regime accommodates migration and diversity in a different way than its welfare state regime. Or, institutional alienation may emerge when a city’s inclusive approach to migration and diversity (such as ‘welcoming cities’ or ‘refugee cities’) is in conflict with a more restrictive approach at the national level. Key consequences of institutional alienation may include friction between institutions and an erosion of the legitimacy of specific institutions. As we will see in later chapters, institutional alienation has led to contradictory governance responses in various settings (such as between urban and national, or between national and international governance), leading to institutional stress and contradictory outcomes. In fact, such institutional friction can be equally seen as a cause and result of the complexity of problems such as migration and diversity. Within institutions, alienation can lead to the erosion of legitimacy. From the institutional perspective, institutions are reproduced precisely because and for as long as they are considered legitimate. When an institutional misfit emerges and an institution starts to produce outcomes that are not considered legitimate, this can lead to the institution itself being questioned. In fact, the relation between debates on immigration and national identity in many countries can be seen as illustrations of how increased levels of migration put pressure on institutions, such as that of national identity.

Political Alienation Political alienation refers to how governance processes can fail to capture complexity due to broader power structures that define, constrain and enable them. Such power structures become manifest in inequalities, conflicts and struggles in policy processes. This includes, but is by no

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means necessarily limited to, the political arena. Alienation from a political perspective can also mean that governance is driven by privileged interests, such as economic interests or groups in privileged positions, potentially leading to biased policies and policy outcomes. Political alienation can also be driven by political incentives, as theorized by Schneider and Ingram. In fact, the politicization of migration in many countries is evidence of the strength of political incentives concerning the governance of migration and diversity. This form of alienation mainly pertains to the powerlessness dimension that has been discussed in the broader alienation literature. Complex policy problems such as migration and diversity can be hypothesized as being prone to open as well as to more implicit forms of political contestation. Precisely because of their complexity, it may be harder to identify the interests of actors as clearly as in more structured policy areas. In fact, this is one of the drivers behind Freeman’s client politics thesis, which argues that migration policymaking is often strongly influenced by specific, well-organized interest groups or ‘clients’, such as business interests or migrant groups (Freeman 1995). At the same time, the complexity of the problem also makes it more prone to political framing. As Rein and Schon have argued, it is precisely when there is a multiplicity of frames in complex situations that it becomes very difficult to resolve controversies by examining ‘the facts’, as these facts are often contested. Political alienation may have a range of consequences. One is that policies and policy outcomes may be biased towards specific interests, as in the client politics thesis. Another is that political alienation leads to a gap between political debates and actual policies on the ground, in the form of what can be described as ‘symbolic politics’. Or, in contrast to symbolic politics, political alienation can also lead to a form of ‘democratic impatience’ or unrealistic calls for policy intervention and belief in what state-led government can do in terms of achieving migrant incorporation or migration management. For instance, the building of walls to control migration could be seen as a form of political alienation expressing an overly strong belief in what walls can do in terms of stopping migrants.

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Social Alienation Finally, a fourth form of alienation speaks to the social-constructivist work of Schneider and Ingram: social alienation. Social alienation refers to the estrangement of a governance process from groups and categories involved in the governance process, which can also change the composition and positions of these groups. This means that a governance process may inadvertently (or at least implicitly) change the position of groups involved in the process in ways that are not in line with the formal goals. This may include the forms of ‘degeneration’ discussed by Schneider and Ingram, involving the inadvertent weakening or strengthening of the position of some groups. This compares to what others have described as the ‘social isolation’ dimension of alienation. It may also be that policies shape groups in a way that does not necessarily have a basis in the actual problem situation, or on the contrary, that policies ignore groups that nonetheless occupy an important position in the actual problem situation. This social alienation applies in particular to policy problems such as migration and integration, which involve clear social groups or categories. At the same time, there is often tension between social categorization and the complex social reality of groups and categories, which are often very fluid, highly changeable and very difficult to demarcate. However, the governance of migration and diversity is often very much about the delineation of groups and categories, who is in and who is out, in an attempt to reduce the complex social reality of migrant groups and categories. This is reflected in the many debates and controversies on categorization in migration and diversity policies: who is a migrant in the first place, who is to be integrated and who is not. Mainstreaming, as we have seen above, is an effort to avert such targeting of policies at specific groups or categories, targeting the whole society instead. Social alienation may have very obvious consequences for the groups and categories involved, including social isolation, but also self-­ estrangement and normlessness. As Schneider and Ingram already argue, this can be to the benefit or detriment of the social position of some groups. For instance, the politicization of migration has contributed to a

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negative labelling and problematization of specific migrant groups in many countries, such as the efforts of the Trump administration to selectively limit immigration from Muslim countries.

3.3 C  onclusions: Between Mainstreaming and Alienation This chapter has developed mainstreaming and alienation as the two central conceptual and theoretical lenses on the governance of migration and diversity. Referring more broadly to the literature on complex policy problems, the key theoretical argument is that complex problems require complex solutions that are embedded as much as possible in an integral (cross-sectoral) approach. This is reflected in the concept of mainstreaming, which refers to the embedding of governance into generic policy areas and the targeting of the whole population. Such a mainstreamed approach, as argued in this chapter, allows not only for the type of ‘messy solutions’ that complex problems require, but also allows for flexibility regarding local problem circumstances and policy preferences: there is no ‘one-size- fits-all’ policy model associated with mainstreaming. Instead, it involves a governance strategy that embeds migration and diversity governance into mainstream governance and politics, rather than singling it out as a stand-alone topic, thereby reducing its complexities. However, as hypothesized throughout this book, precisely because of the complexities of migration and diversity governance, there are many factors that may prevent such governance mainstreaming. Elaborating on Schneider and Ingram’s approach to ‘degenerative policy designs’, I will refer to various forms of alienation in reference to how complex policy problems may involve various structural factors (knowledge, power, ideas, institutions) that prevent mainstreaming from occurring. In this regard, I distinguish between problem alienation, social alienation, political alienation and institutional alienation. In subsequent chapters, this tension between mainstreaming on the one hand, and various forms of alienation on the other, is discussed in greater depth (Table 3.2).

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Table 3.2  Summary of the four manifestations of alienation

Problem alienation

Estrangement of policies and governance actors from complex problem developments, involving meaninglessness and simplifications or denials of complexity

Institutional alienation

Estrangement from complexification driven by the internal logic of institutions (pathdependency) or lack of institutional connections (decoupling), leading to failures to keep up with complexification (normlessness).

Political alienation

Estrangement from complexification driven by structural inequalities and conflict, leading to interest-driven and selective reductions of complexity, which further reproduces inequalities (powerlessness for some and powerfulness for others)

Social alienation

Estrangement from complexification driven by discourses about specific groups or actors, bringing about the social exclusion of some and inclusion of others.

Alienation

References Bache, I., & Flinders, M.  V. (2004). Multi-level governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Baumgartner Frank, R., & Jones Bryan, D. (1993). Agendas and instability in American politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bertossi, C. (2011). National models of integration in Europe: A comparative and critical analysis. American Behavioral Scientist, 55(12), 1561–1580. Bertossi, C., & Duyvendak, J. W. (2009). Beyond models of integration: France, the Netherlands and the crisis of national models. Special issue, Migrations Société, 122, 39–76. Blauner, R. (1964). Alienation and freedom: The factory worker and his industry. Oxford: Chicago University Press.

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Curry, D. (2018). Intra-European movement: Multi-level or mismatched governance? In Between mobility and migration (pp.  141–160). Berlin: Springer. Dalal-Clayton, D. B., & Bass, S. (2009). The challenges of environmental mainstreaming. Experience of integrating environment into development institutions and decisions. London: IIED. Daly, M. (2005). Gender mainstreaming in theory and practice. Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society, 12(3), 433–450. Freeman, G. (1995). Modes of immigration politics in liberal democratic states. International Migration Review, 29(4), 881–902. Hollinger, D. A. (2006). Postethnic America: Beyond multiculturalism. New York: Basic Books. Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2001). Multi-level governance and European integration. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc. Jones, D., & Webster, L. (2006). A handbook on mainstreaming disability. London: VSO. Lombardo, E., & Meier, P. (2006). Gender mainstreaming in the EU: Incorporating a feminist reading? European Journal of Women’s Studies, 13(2), 151–166. Marx, K. (1844). Economic and philosophical manuscripts. Early writings, 333. Moscow: Progress Publishers. Nunan, F., Campbell, A., & Foster, E. (2012). Environmental mainstreaming: The organisational challenges of policy integration. Public Administration and Development, 32(3), 262–277. Piattoni, S. (2010). The theory of multi-level governance: Conceptual, empirical, and normative challenges. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rhodes, R. A. W. (1997). Understanding governance: Policy networks, governance, reflexivity, and accountability (Vol. 37). Buckingham: Open University Press. Schneider, A., & Ingram, H. (1993). Social construction of target populations: Implications for politics and policy. American Political Science Review, 87(2), 334–347. Schneider, A. L., & Ingram, H. M. (1997). Policy design for democracy. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Scholten, P., & Van Breugel, I. (2017). Mainstreaming integration governance: New trends in migrant integration policies in Europe. Springer. Seeman, M. (1959). On the meaning of alienation. American Sociological Review, 24, 783–791.

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Tummers, L. (2012). Policy alienation: Analyzing the experiences of public professionals with new policies. Rotterdam: Erasmus University Rotterdam. Tummers, L., Bekkers, V., & Steijn, B. (2009). Policy alienation of public professionals. Public Management Review, 11(5), 685–706. van Breugel, I., & Scholten, P. (2017). Mainstreaming in response to superdiversity? The governance of migration-related diversity in France, the UK and the Netherlands. Policy & Politics, 45(4), 511–526. Vertovec, S. (2007). Super-diversity and its implications. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 30(6), 1024–1054.

4 Knowledge

The first dimension that will be explored further, is that of the role of rational factors in migration and diversity governance. This includes, for instance, knowledge, information and expertise. Speaking to the broader positivist tradition in the social sciences, this dimension expresses a ‘positive’ belief that problems, however wicked, can be resolved when approached rationally and objectively. This requires not only knowledge on policymaking, but also the promotion of the role of knowledge ‘in’ as well as ‘for’ policymaking (Lasswell 1970). Although the positivist perspective has been challenged by alternative perspectives, it would be a mistake to discard it as a key aspect to understanding broader governance dynamics. Rationalism continues to be an important explanatory framework in governance and policy dynamics. This is illustrated by the importance attributed to policy evaluation and to ‘evidence-based policymaking’ (M Baldwin 2018; Sanderson 2002; Young et al. 2002). The continued relevance of positivism certainly applies to the area of migration and diversity governance. Various scholars have shown that the development of migration studies even has its origins in a rationalist belief in the contribution this research field could make to the resolution of migration and integration as social problems (Bommes and Morawska © The Author(s) 2020 P. Scholten, Mainstreaming versus Alienation, Global Diversities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42238-7_4

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2005; R.  Penninx et  al. 2008). This has been associated with a strong belief in the problem-solving capacity of states, which should be able to develop rational policy interventions based on the available knowledge and expertise. In migration studies, this is reflected in the strong belief in opportunities for migration control and for ‘state-led integrationism’ (Favell 2001). It also manifested in the role that migration studies have played in the development of migration and diversity policies in various places across the world. A concrete manifestation of such ‘research-policy relations’ is the production of data on migratory and integration processes (Bijl and Verweij 2012; Simon et al. 2015). However, the role of knowledge and expertise also seems to have become increasingly contested. In the context of growing public and political contestation, a discourse on ‘alternative facts’ emerged in various settings. Also, the credibility of research was put at stake in various countries in the context of the broader politicization of these issues. The complexification of migration and diversity clearly has consequences for the role of knowledge in migration and diversity governance. On the one hand, we can observe a mainstreaming of knowledge on how to govern migration and diversity into various policy areas, partly because of the evolution of migration and diversity research. This includes increased attention to the strongly cross-sectoral character of migration and diversity, for instance along the lines of social-economic status, education, gender and housing rather than only migration background. Also, the availability of good data allows for a constant check on whether generic policy measures (such as in education) produce equal outcomes for various groups (such as migrants versus natives). As such, as we will see in this chapter, the availability of data may contribute to the mainstreaming of integration governance. On the other hand, problem complexity and contestation also put pressure on the role that knowledge and expertise can play in the areas of migration and diversity. This has become apparent in a growing recognition of uncertainty, not only regarding knowledge about migration and diversity but also about policy interventions and the problem-­solving capacity of states. For instance, the extent to which states can actually ‘manage’ integration and migration is being called into question increasingly often. This has also manifested itself in the context of the

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politicization of migration and diversity in many countries, which has also led to a politicization of research in these areas. For instance, various studies have shown that research is being utilized ‘symbolically’ rather than ‘instrumentally’ to an increasing extent, and even that the credibility of research and experts is being put increasingly on the line in the politicized settings of migration and diversity governance (Baldwin 2018; Boswell 2009a; H Entzinger and Scholten 2015). As we will see in this chapter, this means that although there is potential for mainstreaming by using knowledge in migration governance, there are also clear tendencies towards what I have described as ‘problem alienation’. Obviously, knowledge can be an important factor to mainstream integration and diversity into governance. However, it is precisely because of complexity and contestation, as we will see in this chapter, that knowledge can also contribute to problem alienation because of limitations in the impact of policies (problem uncertainty) and policy design (policy uncertainty embedded into the selection, production, interpretation and utilization of specific knowledge claims). Problem alienation may be made manifest in ‘meaningless’ governance responses to migration and diversity.

4.1 The Positivist Approach The positivist approach has been at the foundation of the development of the social sciences. Building on the legacy of the Enlightenment, positivism is based on an epistemological belief in the scientific method as a tool to unravel the mystery of social problems and processes. Social issues should be approached ‘rationally’, void of any form of politicization or specific value orientation. This puts researchers and experts who follow this scientific method, in the position of ‘speaking truth to power’ (Hoppe 1999; Wildavsky 1979). In terms of governance and policymaking, this is often associated with depoliticization and even technocracy (ibid). Furthermore, positivism is based on an ontological belief that problems and processes can be measured and that actors involved in social processes act rationally. Problems can be solved, if approached rationally. This is visible in the belief of the early social sciences in various forms of

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social steering or social engineering. The development of modern welfare states has been a key illustration of such a belief in social steering on a rational basis in order to resolve deeper social problems such as unemployment and even poverty. In more contemporary literature on policymaking, this positivism is visible in the notion of ‘evidence based policymaking’ (M Baldwin 2018; Sanderson 2002; Young et al. 2002). Several key elements of positivism can be highlighted further and applied to the area of migration and diversity governance in subsequent sections. First is the assumption that problems can be objectified and that therefore the effects of policies on these problems should also be ‘measurable’. Policies are considered rational means to achieve public goals. An important condition is that means-ends relations in policies are designed rationally and based on an objective understanding of the actual problem. Here positivism exhibits what Ted Porter (1995) describes as a great ‘trust in numbers’, or the urge to quantify and thereby objectify problems and the impact of policies on them. This, as we will see later in this chapter, has been a key aspect of migration and diversity governance, for instance in relation to the production and use of various forms of statistics to capture the socio-economic position of migrants (also described as ‘ethnic statistics’), or more generally in the belief in state-led integration paradigms (Favell 2003). Secondly, positivism exhibits a strong belief in intervention, or in other words, a strong belief in the problem-solving capacity of policies. Goal rationality is considered a defining element, not only for social behaviour and interaction but also for governance itself. This goal rationality can be illustrated by the metaphor of the homo economicus, or the effort to achieve goals in the best way and at the lowest cost. For instance, for migration governance this would mean the development of migration policies as rational solutions to specific goals, such as restricting access to a country, acquiring additional labour, regulating access to a welfare state, etc. Thirdly, a key element of positivism concerns the role of researchers and experts in policymaking. Positivism puts researchers in a central role in policymaking processes. This can take direct forms such as in technocratic modes of governance where experts have a far-reaching involvement in policymaking, as well as more indirect forms where the knowledge

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and information that experts produce is taken as the foundation for policymaking (including forms of evidence-based policymaking). In the following sections of this chapter, these elements of positivism will be explored further in relation to the literature on migration and diversity governance. Reaching beyond a caricature of positivism in its most extreme forms, we will see that positivism continues to have significant explanatory leverage for various governance patterns in the areas of migration and diversity. However, we will also see that the role of knowledge and information is perhaps more contested in wicked policy areas such as migration and diversity than in other policy areas. In fact, as we will see, the contestation of knowledge and information in governance processes in these areas is a key driver of alienation of migration and diversity governance.

4.2 R  ational Belief in ‘Integrationism’ and Migration Control A key element of positivism that has been particularly manifest in the field of migration studies is the focus on migration control and the (state-­ led) integration of migrants. On an instrumental level, this also involved a strong policy-orientation, especially in the early development of the field of migration studies (Favell 2003). Many studies concentrated on issues related to the regulation of migration or integration policies. The dependency on funding schemes from governments (including national and European governments in particular) clearly influenced this dependence (Bommes and Morawska 2005; A. Geddes 2005). But also on a theoretical level, this focus on interventions in migration and integration has led to systematic knowledge on the conditions under which governments can or cannot control migration or promote integration.

State-Led Integrationism The focus on and belief in state-led integrationism is demonstrated by what Favell describes as ‘the integration paradigm’ in migration research

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(2001). This involves a paradigm that is shared and coproduced by scholars and policymakers and provides the basis for a state-led project of migrant integration. This paradigm is, according to Favell, organized and reproduced around the concept of ‘integration’. The term integration first of all involves ‘a descriptive and normative umbrella term, that can give coherence and polish to a patchy list of policy measures aiming at something which, on paper, looks extremely difficult and improbable: the (counterfactual) construction of a successful, well-functioning multi-­ cultural or multi-racial society’ (ibid: 14). Furthermore, integration is ‘not only an ideal goal for society; it is also something a government sets out to achieve (…), this assumption is crucial to the nation-state centred conceptualization of social processes that will be found at the core of practical ordinary language usages of the term, (..) (and) precludes the idea that a society might achieve an integrated state of affairs without the state’s intervention’ (ibid: 15). The term integration is thus, as Favell argues, directly connected to a belief in interventionism, in that integration is something that can and should be promoted through rational societal steering. Thus, in many countries across the world, ‘integration policies’ have been designed as instruments to achieve such integration. This involves coordinated policy programmes, in some cases even involving Ministries and Ministers of ‘Integration’, with a broad range of policy measures to achieve the goal of integration: measures to promote participation in the labour market, to provide additional educational services, to organize ‘civic integration programmes’ for newcomers leading to their passing an ‘integration’ test, etc. This interventionism has been mostly connected to ideas of the nation-­ state in the form of ‘national models of integration’ (Bertossi 2011; Thränhardt and Bommes 2010). Within such national models, integration is developed as a state-led project to achieve integration within and by a nation-state. In the context of current debates on globalization but also on glocalization, the integration of migrants somehow has been defined as something to be achieved at the level of the nation-­state. This also means that there may be important differences between different state-led models of integration. Various national models are mentioned in the literature, such as the French Republicanist model, the Dutch multicultural model or the British race relations model. Such models involve

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clear rational elements, such as the belief that a state can actually promote integration. However, it also involves elements that we will discuss later in other governance perspectives, such as how national models reproduce specific institutionalist ideas on the nation-state and how models tend to be reified in political and public discourses. Whereas Favell frames this positivist belief in the problem-solving capacity of states in terms of ‘integrationism’, this is somewhat confusing when it comes to the different approaches that states may adopt towards ‘integration’. Whereas the French national approach to integration reflects what in the literature is defined as ‘assimilationism’ (involving an approach to promote social-economic participation as well as socio-­ cultural adaptation to the host society), other countries have adopted very different approaches that have often exhibited an equal belief in state-led integrationism. For instance, both the UK and the Netherlands have for a long time followed a more or less multiculturalist approach (framed as a race relations approach in the UK and an ethnic minorities approach in the Netherlands) which exhibit an equal belief in the state’s problem-solving capacity. As Grillo argues (2010), the UK state-led approach to multiculturalism was driven by the wish to manage intercultural relations and establish what he describes as ‘multiculturalism on one island’. Equally, in the Netherlands as in various other European countries, a multicultural approach emerged to ‘manage’ ethnic relations by giving migrant minorities a voice whereby measures were developed to promote the ‘integration’ of specific minority groups, thus pacifying potential ethnic tensions in society. In other words, various models of integration, including both classical ideal types of ‘assimilation’ and ‘multiculturalism’ can involve strong beliefs in state-led integration, even though they follow different paths.

The Focus on Migration Control Similar ideas regarding positivism and (state-led) interventionism in particular can be found in studies of migration. Just as with ‘integration’, various theories depict migration as a rational process. This applies in particular to neo-classical approaches to migration, which inherently see

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migration as a consequence of rational decision making on behalf of individual migrants, with economic reasons playing a key role (King 2012). Neo-classicism in its most classic form assumes that migrants have sufficient information and capacity to take rational decisions on when to migrate, how and to which places. This takes a rather economic deterministic view of migration that fits very well within the positivist approach. In fact, founding fathers of the neo-classical view on migration such as Ravenstein (1885) even speak of laws of migration, which depend mainly on economic conditions. The very popular push-pull approaches, which are mostly derived from neo-classicism, also take many of these rationalist assumptions on board, assuming that a migratory decision is a sort of ‘cost-benefit’ analysis between various conditions, which include but are not limited to economic conditions in both the origin and destination location. This positivist approach to migration has coincided with a positivist perspective on how to manage or control migration. In fact, migration scholars have argued that migration often tends to be problematized only when the crossing of state-borders is involved (international migration), because this challenges nation-states’ control over entry to and exit from their territories. On a theoretical level, the drivers of internal or domestic migration and those of international migration are not that different (King and Skeldon 2010). Perhaps it is the concept of migration regimes that captures the belief in the rational steering of migration most profoundly. A migration regime is a system of laws and policies that regulate migration to and from a specific country or region (Horvath et al. 2017) and usually includes a specific approach to border management. It exhibits a belief, often reproduced not only by scholars but also by policymakers and politicians advocating specific regimes, that migration flows, drivers and infrastructures can be steered effectively through migration regimes. Similar to national integration models, such regimes may take many different forms. Some migration regimes may restrict some types of migration while being relatively open to others. For example, many migration regimes only permit highly selective labour immigration (e.g. only high-skilled migration, or only selected low-skilled labour market segments for which there is high demand). The EU common approach to immigration is an example of a

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migration regime, but so is the Geneva Convention, the ‘sanctuary cities’ in the US, or even the plans by US President Donald Trump to build a wall along the US-Mexican border. An example of how migration regimes can exhibit a profound belief in migration management for rational purposes, is the way in which states (both in the global south and the global north) have defined migration management as an instrument for achieving policy goals in relation to demographic transition. On the one hand, immigration has been coined in various countries as a potential solution to demographic ageing. This has been an important argument in the broader public and political debate within Germany on its relatively open migration regime for refugees, which already dates back to the early 1990s. On the other hand, various countries, such as many African countries, have adopted migration regimes that promote emigration as a potential solution to demographic transition and a source of economic, social and cultural remittances. Another concrete illustration of the rationalism behind migration regimes is the issue of return migration. From a rationalist perspective, a migration regime can only be comprehensive if it also includes an approach to deal with the return of immigrants who have not been admitted or have otherwise lost their legal residency status. However, there seems to be a difference between integration and migration when it comes to the role of the nation-state. Especially in the literature on migration regimes, much has been said on the evolution of intergovernmental, supra-governmental and even global migration regimes. The Geneva Convention on refugee migration is an example of a global migration regime that provides one consistent legal framework for the regulation of refugee migration that has been adopted by the vast majority of countries across the world. On a regional scale, the evolution of an EU migration regime is a very clear example of how migration regimes can evolve beyond the national level. The EU’s migration regime is perhaps one of the clearest examples of a regional migration regime that has evolved beyond the national level. In contrast to immigrant integration, immigration policies have been Europeanized to a significant extent. This includes the direct impact had by many EU regulations and directives, such as the European family

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reunification directive. However, it is debatable whether this migration regime ‘undermines’ the capacity of member states to ‘steer’ migration flows. In fact, various scholars have argued that the reason why so many EU countries have consented to the development of a common European approach to immigration is that it actually strengthens the grasp that member states have on migration to their countries. Rather than ‘losing control’, EU member states appear to have been regaining control over immigration by collaborating within a European setting. Europeanization as such has been a rational strategy to enhance control over immigration in a way that would have been impossible for a national migration regime on its own.

Boundaries of Positivism: Problem Uncertainty Over the past decades, migration literature has revealed many of the limitations of the positivist approach to migration control and ‘integrationism’.This includes studies that take a more critical approach to the role of states, studies that show how integration policies and migration regimes often work out very differently in practice, and studies that have revealed various inadvertent effects of ‘rational’ policies. Limitations in terms of policy design (policy uncertainty) will be discussed in the following sections, but this section will discuss a limitation more directly related to the rational belief in societal steering that characterized positivism: problem uncertainty. As many studies have shown, the complexities of migration and diversity also have consequences for the opportunities for rational societal steering. In contrast to well-structured problems where the basic policy problem is clearly defined and there is clear knowledge on how to target the problem, the issues of migration and diversity are ‘essentially contested’ and characterized by uncertainty regarding how to target them. In his work entitled ‘Why do migration policies fail?’, Stephen Castles argues that migratory processes often have their own ‘social dynamics’ that are very difficult to target with policies (2004). For instance, migrants as ‘agents’ can respond to policies reflectively by trying to find alternative routes or alternative ways to make it across a border. Furthermore,

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migration policies are often embedded in complex global settings. For instance, if one country alters its migration policy, this may lead to rerouting of migration flows to other countries. Hence, migration policies should always be studied in a broader context, beyond the scope of what is ‘rational’ within a specific (national, regional) setting. Such uncertainty-producing factors are equally present in the area of migration-related diversity and ‘integration processes’. In spite of the strongly held belief in ‘integrationism’, there are very few studies that actually confirm the impact of integration policies on integratory processes. Many other factors play a role in integratory processes, such as the economic opportunities (or limitations) in a country which depend on the broader economic climate, and other actors (beyond governments) that may provide (or inhibit) opportunities for integration, such as the involvement of civil society actors or private volunteers. In fact, various studies show that the impact of policies on integration has been rather limited, while the impact of broader economic and societal factors has been very significant. Yet, in spite of these limitations, it is fair to say that beliefs regarding the capacity to steer migration and integration have proven very resilient. Somewhat paradoxically, the perceived limitations of the problem-­solving capacity of (primarily) states seems to have contributed to even more calls for rational steering by states. In the early 2000s, many countries declared the ‘failure’ of multiculturalism or of integration policies in general. Fed by various developments, including the rise of populism, the leaders of Germany, France and the UK (Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron) declared in 2010 and 2011 that multiculturalism had failed in their countries. Merkel literally stated that ‘efforts to achieve a multicultural society in Germany had utterly failed’ (quoted in A Geddes and Scholten 2016). Although at one level this statement can be challenged due to the fact that Germany is one of the European countries that never really adopted a multicultural approach (ibid), what is important in the context of this chapter is that this statement by Merkel and other EU state leaders reflects a belief that it was possible for the state to achieve a multicultural society in the first place. Moreover, their responses were to design different and allegedly more ‘effective’ ways to promote migrant ‘integration’,

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rather than nuancing the idea that integration could be achieved by means of state-led policies. In fact, all three state leaders denounced ‘multiculturalism’ in an effort to substantiate their ‘tougher’ integrationist approach. Sarkozy went on to re-install a state integration policy in the years after this statement, Merkel developed Germany’s first coordinated national integration policy and Cameron strengthened the community cohesion approach that had already emerged in the UK in the 2000s. In general it can be said that public and political contestation surrounding integration, exemplified by the rise of populism and anti-­ immigrant movements around the world, seems to be reinforcing rather than weakening the idea that states should manage migration and diversity.

4.3 Measuring Migration and Integration An issue that is central to the positivist approach in general and which has manifested itself in the areas of migration and diversity in particular, is that of measurement and monitoring. A strong belief in problem-­ solving usually coincides with a strong belief in objectifiable ways of measuring the problem, monitoring problem developments and evaluating the impact of policies on these problems. As Kraler et al. argue (2015), there is more than merely an epistemological relation between the concepts ‘states’ and ‘statistics’. However, measuring ‘migration’ and ‘diversity’ has evolved into one of the key controversies in migration studies, involving, in particular, a lively dialogue with the rationalist perspective. Countries have often adopted very different ways of data collection on migration, involving both the flows of migrants as well as stocks of migrants and different aspects of their position in society (Bijl and Verweij 2012; Fassmann et al. 2009; Simon et al. 2015; Singleton 1999). Fitting within broader national traditions of population statistics, and also depending on the policy contexts in different countries, migrants have been categorized according to their legal status (type of permit, residency status), citizenship (nationality), origin (country of birth, or parents’ country of birth), residence (length of residence) or ethnicity (language, cultural community, religion, skin colour).

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Most countries only produce statistics on ‘first generation migrants’, that is, people who have actually migrated. Some countries go a step further to include the direct descendants of these migrants: the second generation. For instance, in Germany, the term ‘people with a migration background’ is used not only for people who have migrated into Germany, but also for ‘foreigners’ born in Germany and people born in Germany with at least one parent born outside of Germany. Countries that have a regular census, such as the US, Canada, the UK and Australia, can also collect data on ethnic or racial background that reaches beyond the distinction between first and second generation. A census works through self-identification, as people can indicate whether they consider themselves as belonging to a specific ethnic or racial category. So this also applies to third generations or beyond, as well as to native ethnic or racial communities. Differences in methods of data collection, however, have broader implications. First of all, different methods say different things about what ethnicity or race means for governance. When working with registry data, countries can inadvertently reify ethnic groups by putting people into specific categories based on registry data on nationality or country of origin. Often such data on nationality and origin is reinterpreted as ‘ethnic data’, or data on who belongs to which ethnic category. This involves clear epistemological issues, as governments (or data producers) then define what ethnicity is, and to whom it applies. Given the complexities of ethnic identification, this carries evident risks of problem alienation whereby governments may define categories that do not correspond with the categories that people actually consider they belong to themselves. One example is how various European governments have defined just one Moroccan ethnic community, whereas Moroccan migrants come from a range of different ethnic backgrounds, with different languages, different organizations and significant cultural differences. Furthermore, such ethnic reification based on registry data could in some cases lead to awkward situations whereby people who have tried to flee from a specific community are subsequently identified as a member of that community based on registry data. Census data allows for a better approximation of the complexity of ethnic categories experienced in a society, as it relies on self-identification.

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However, here too, there are obvious risks of reification in the definition of ethnic categories to be included in a census. Some governments working with census data have included a category ‘other’ in the census, allowing them to capture (to some extent) the growing hybridization and complexification of identities. Secondly, another implication of different methods of (ethnic) data collection, are the difficulties with comparability of data on migrants. There are very significant differences in methods of collection between countries, and also in the categories for which data are collected (Michel et al. 2006; Salt et al. 1994). France is an example of a country that is highly resistant to the collection of any type of data on ‘ethnicity’; it only has data on nationality and whether someone is foreign born but does not collect more specific data on migrant groups within France. The collection of such data would be in conflict with the colour blindness of the French republican model. Although the absence of such data may prevent the French government from reifying ethnic categories amongst the French population, it has been fiercely criticized by scholars for another implication it has for problem alienation. For instance, Amiraux and Simon (2006) argue that the absence of ethnic statistics has led to the neglect of migrant-specific issues, such as socio-economic deprivation of migrant groups and discrimination. In other countries where ethnic data is collected, definitions and methods often differ. For instance, registry data on people with a Moroccan background is very different than census data on people who consider themselves to be Moroccan. Often, definitions and methods used for ethnic statistics are strongly embedded in what is defined as ‘national models of integration’ (Bertossi 2011). This means that they are strongly situated in specific national political and social settings, which are often specific to countries. This has, as will be argued in more depth later, been an important impediment to the theoretical development of migration research. There is, however, an important paradox regarding the role of ethnic data in migration and diversity governance. This paradox makes it very difficult to say whether ethnic data promote mainstreaming or (problem) alienation. However, it may allow us to better understand the conditions under which the use of ethnic data may lead to either mainstreaming or alienation.

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On the one hand, ethnic data can be used to monitor policy outcomes for ethnic categories. They make it possible to check whether generic (and specific) policies result in equal outcomes for different categories. As such, they can prevent mainstreaming from being entirely blind. By averting problem alienation, ethnic data makes it possible to check whether generic policies, such as education, housing and labour, effectively manage to address issues or problems experienced by migrants. In fact, the production of ethnic data can in itself be an important policy instrument to monitor and influence policies in various policy areas in terms of their outcomes for migrants. For instance, when ethnic data show that Turkish migrants are more likely to drop out of primary education, the availability of such data can convince policymakers in the educational domain to adjust generic policies in such a way that they cater better to the needs of Turkish migrants (without necessarily designing a specific approach aimed only at Turkish migrants). Indeed, one of the criticisms of French scholars on the French colour-blind approach is that the absence of ethnic data produces a sort of integration blindness in French policies. Furthermore, ethnic data allow for responsive governance adjustments when changes become evident in the position of different groups. By providing a ‘thermometer’ into current developments in the position of migrants, it allows for the swift identification of areas where actions may be required. Subsequently, it helps to raise consciousness on emergent problem issues amongst responsible actors. This responsiveness may lead to better ways to grasp and respond to the often complex and fluid developments in migration and diversity. On the other hand, the methodological and epistemological issues associated with ethnic data entail various intrinsic risks. One is that rather than grasping the complexity of ethnic groups and their positions, data reduces this complexity in ways that are not considered legitimate by those involved or that misrepresent specific problem situations. This could lead to problem alienation if a government then fails to grasp a problem situation adequately, and acts on representations of a problem situation that are not considered valid. Another risk is that ethnic data not only distort the understanding of a problem situation, but also influence the problem situation in specific

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ways. As mentioned earlier, the definition of ethnic groups can lead to the reification of those groups. This, as we will see later in Chap. 7, can contribute to what is defined as ‘social alienation’. This means that an inadvertent effect of categorization is the reification of groups.

4.4 Research-Policy Relations Knowledge encompasses various sorts of knowledge, including expert and academic knowledge as well as lay knowledge. However, the positivist perspective attaches significant value to the role of expert or academic knowledge. Positivism not only a strongly held belief in the problem-­ solving capacity of states and the measurement of problems, but also in the contribution that research can make to governance and to the measurement of problems. This belief has been very important, not only to the input of migration and diversity research to policymaking, but also to the development of migration studies as a research field (P Scholten et al. 2015). In this section, we will discuss how the complexification of migration and diversity has increased dependency on knowledge on migration and diversity, while also leading to contestation on researchpolicy relations. Obviously, in complex problems as migration and diversity, there may be an inherent tension between ‘evidence-based policymaking’ and ‘fact-free politics’. This belief in the role of research in policymaking rests upon the broader literature on research-policy dialogues. There can be very different types of research-policy relations. In some modes, research claims a primary role in policymaking, either through direct involvement in policymaking, as in the technocratic model, or through a more indirect role, as in the enlightenment model. In these models, research will play a key role in defining policy problems and formulating policy solutions, and politicians and policymakers will operationalize the outcomes from research into policies. Alternatively, in some research-policy relations, politics has primacy over research. This may take the form of engineering modes where politicians selectively shop from and build relationships with parts of the research community to develop policies, or it can take a more bureaucratic form whereby researchers produce only facts and politicians take all the decisions based on these facts (Fig. 4.1).

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Role division Sharp

Diffuse

Science

Enlightenment

Technocracy

Politics

Bureaucracy

Engineering

Relative primacy

Fig. 4.1  Overview of models of research-policy relations (based on Hoppe 2005; P Scholten 2011)

The model that is clearly preferred by the positivist approach to governance is that of technocracy, whereby research has an important and direct role in governance processes. During the development of migration studies as a research field, from approximately the 1970s to the 1990s, such technocratic modes played an important role. As various scholars have argued (Ratcliffe 2001; J. Rath et al. 1999), early migration studies evolved with a clear policy-orientation. Whereas enlightenment certainly also took place from the more generic disciplines, early migration studies often had a strong policy-orientation. Governance questions, such as how to manage migration, race relations and the incorporation of minorities, were central to the development of this field. This had important structural and substantive implications for the early development of migration studies. First, policy-orientation had important consequences for the conceptual and theoretical development of migration studies. As argued earlier (in 4.1), migration research played an important role in the coproduction of specifically national models of integration. This involved a coproduction of specific conceptualizations of migration and diversity within national settings, such as race relations management in the UK and the US, multicultural relations in Canada and Australia, and ‘ethnic minorities’ in the Netherlands. This dominance of national models stimulated the development of migration research but also formed an impediment for theory-building, as knowledge production was fragmented and there was a clear national container view in different conceptualizations. As Favell (2003) has argued, these

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conceptualizations involved a strong orientation towards policy intervention. Whether ‘diversity’ was framed in terms of race relations, multicultural relations or ‘integration’ depended significantly on the policy framing in different national settings. Secondly, the policy-orientation of early migration research also had structural implications for the research field. National models involved close proximity between migration scholars and policymakers. In many countries, early migration studies started in organizations that operated on the boundaries of research and policy, or at least had a strong orientation towards current policy questions (e.g. CRER in the UK or the Scientific Council for Government Policy in the Netherlands). Also for the production of data on migration and migrants, relations were developed with government-oriented or government-associated institutes. Some scholars even speak of a ‘symbiotic’ relationship between research and policymaking (Jan Rath 2001). However, this close relationship between migration research and policymaking seems to have changed significantly since the late 1990s and early 2000s. In that period, migration studies evolved rapidly, not only in terms of size but also in terms of interdisciplinarity and international orientation. In terms of conceptual and theoretical developments, this field has developed a stronger comparative orientation, contributing significantly to theory-building and conceptualization beyond a national container view. This is also manifest in the growth of academic networks in migration research, such as the IMISCOE Research network on International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe, and the Network on Migration Research in Africa (NOMRA). Furthermore, in many ways migration research is not only benefitting from developments in broader disciplines, such as sociology, political sciences, geography, demography, economics, law and history, but is also contributing to key theoretical developments in these broader disciplines (Brettell and Hollifield 2014). In this sense, one can speak of the ‘academic mainstreaming’ of migration studies. For instance, in sociology the issue of mainstreaming has been at the centre of theoretical thinking on welfare state reform and inequality in general, whereas in political sciences it has been at the heart of theoretical developments around the concept of citizenship.

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Importantly, the positivist perspective puts great value on the contribution of knowledge and research to policymaking. As observed in Chap. 2, knowledge can be expected to play a crucial role in the governance of complex problems like migration and diversity. In order to mainstream migration and diversity into governance strategies, research must be able to understand and capture complexity, thereby preventing problem alienation. In this sense, early migration studies responded to a clear need to get a better grasp of the rapid developments in migration and diversity. Although the proximity of researchers and policymakers has been criticized from the perspective of theory-building (Bommes and Morawska 2005; Favell 2001), from the perspective of complexity governance this proximity should not necessarily be valued negatively. In fact, in a way that is very similar to the focus on innovation in the engineering sciences, policy-orientation among migration scholars has undeniably been a factor of key importance in the development of today’s migration and diversity policies. The coming of age of migration studies as a research field has been marked by growth, but also by differentiation. The field has expanded immensely, both in terms of the number of publications and the number of scholars and institutes specialized in migration studies (Levy, Pisarevskaya, & Scholten, Unpublished manuscript). Furthermore, in structural terms, the field has diversified significantly since the 1990s to include very different types of institutional settings for migration scholars. This involves both a stronger academic base for migration studies, with specialized institutes at a growing number of universities, as well as a proliferation of organizations operating in-between research and policy. From a positivist perspective, the growth of organizations in-between research and policy in particular can be interpreted as a sign of the positive contribution that research can make to policymaking. This involves various types of what is described in the literature as ‘idea brokers’ or ‘boundary organizations’ (Guston 2001; Miller 2001), including think tanks (sometimes party-political think tanks), advisory bodies and advisory committees. Most countries have specialized idea brokers on migration and diversity at the national level, although there are sharp differences in national cultures when it comes to shaping organizations in-­between research and policy. For instance, Canada and the UK have a strong

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tradition in ad-hoc high-level committees (such as the Taylor-­Bouchard Committee and the Cantle Committee respectively), whereas countries like France and Germany have a stronger tendency to institutionalize ‘in-between’ organizations. There has also been a strong growth in the number and presence of idea brokers at other governance levels, such as at the EU level (MPG, CEPS, MPI-Europe), the global level (the Migration Policy Institute) and increasingly also at the local level. Such ‘idea brokers’ may also involve NGOs. Finally, there is also a growing number of policy organizations (or departments of broader government organizations) specializing in migration research. This does not involve organizations that make policies per se, but organizations that are embedded in the broader government apparatus and provide in-house research or data production capacity. A key example is the International Organization for Migration, now a UN agency, which has a very strong track record in producing data on migration (such as GMDAC) and researching migration on a global level. The EU has recently launched the Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography (KCMD, part of the JRCs), which aims to make research and data more accessible to various parts of the European Commission. Such organizations can also be found at the national and local level, for example, BAMF (German Federal Office on Migration and Asylum), which provides research, data and support in the field of migration and integration in Germany (Table 4.1). However, this growth and differentiation in the field of migration studies also has effects that, from a positivist perspective, could impede the influence of research on policymaking. One is that the structural differentiation in the research field has also led to knowledge fragmentation, impeding more systematic knowledge accumulation. It is not difficult to find different knowledge claims on any topic within migration research; for instance, on whether economic growth tempers or promotes migration. Some data signal the positive integration of migrants while other data signal that migrants are still lagging behind. Such differences are particularly likely to emerge in policy areas that are marked by complexity and contestation. There is a growing number of initiatives to promote more systematic knowledge accumulation. In the field of migration and diversity, there is

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Table 4.1 Examples of organizations specialized in migration research, in-­ between research and policy, and at various levels of governance

Global level

Academic institutes or networks Metropolis

Regional level

IMISCOE Research Network (Europe), NOMRA (AFR), APMRN (Asianpacific)

National level

Integration and Migration Research Council (GER), Interuniversity committee on Integration Migration (US) London Migration Research Network

Local level

Idea Brokers

Policy organizations

Migration Policy Group, Global Forum on Migration & Development Migration Policy Group (EU), Migration-Policy Institute Europe (EU), Center for European Policy Studies (EU), Migration Policy Center (EU), Knowledge Institute for Integration and Society (NL), DIIS (DK),

International Organization for Migration

Idem (Rotterdam)

Barcelona Municipal Immigration Council

Knowledge Center on Migration and Demography (EU), European Migration Network (EU), AEMI

BAMF (GER), Social and Cultural Planning Office (NL), Policy Science Institute (UK)

no structure or platform such as the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that systematically brings together research and policymaking. However, initiatives such as the recently launched KCMD (EU) and the IMISCOE-led CrossMigration project are taking steps in a similar direction.

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4.5 Utilization and Coproduction of Migration Knowledge What matters from a positivist perspective is not only how research-­ policy relations are shaped, but also the way in which they contribute to knowledge utilization. From the positivist perspective, knowledge utilization is a key means for achieving mainstreaming and preventing alienation. However, knowledge can, as will be discussed below, be utilized in very different ways. There are forms of knowledge utilization that help mainstreaming, but knowledge can also be used in a way that promotes alienation. Furthermore, the utilization of knowledge cannot be seen as being entirely separate from the production of knowledge. To understand forms of knowledge utilization, we must also be able to understand forms of coproduction of knowledge (H Entzinger and Scholten 2015). In fact, as we touched upon earlier, migration research has witnessed clear examples of knowledge coproduction in the form of national models. Three different types of knowledge utilization are distinguished in Christina Boswell’s key study on the political uses of knowledge (Boswell 2009a). First, instrumental knowledge utilization involves the direct use of knowledge for policymaking (which can involve policy formulation, as well as decision-making, implementation or evaluation). Boswell defines this as using ‘knowledge as a means of improving the quality of output, or adjusting the social impacts of (..) actions’ (ibid: 61). For instance, instrumental knowledge utilization may involve the use of research on the relationship between economic development and migration to shape international policies aimed at economic development, or the use of data on the socio-economic or socio-cultural needs of migrants in order to target policies at such needs. When viewed from the positivist perspective, instrumental knowledge utilization can be an important way to prevent (problem) alienation. It helps to ground policy in an evidence-based understanding of the policy problem. As mentioned earlier, this is one of the reasons why policy-­ orientation in migration research and the evolution of organizations in-­ between research and policy is valued positively from the positivist perspective. Also, from this perspective, having good data on the position

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of migrants is of key importance to evidence-based policymaking. In spite of the aforementioned reservations regarding how to measure or ‘capture’ migration and diversity in data, the production and utilization of such data is greatly valued in the positivist perspective. Having data on the position of migrants makes it possible to set an agenda for integration issues and to check the extent to which generic or specific policies effectively address issues experienced by migrants. Here the paradoxical situation may emerge that although a mainstreamed policy approach involves abandoning specifically targeted policies, having good data on specific groups makes it possible to check whether such generic policies work out equally for different groups. A clear illustration of how this works is the case of anti-discrimination policies: although aimed at eradicating any unjustified distinctions between (ethnic, racial, religious and sexual) groups, having good data on the position of these groups is an important condition for being able to identify and target discrimination. For instance, countries with good data on the position of different groups (such as the UK’s registry data) have been able to identify what is described as ‘statistical discrimination’, whereas in countries where such data is not available (such as France) it has been impossible to prove statistical discrimination, forcing anti-discrimination policies to rely on prevention and act only upon concrete cases of discriminatory incidents (Simon 2008). Two other types of knowledge utilization that Boswell distinguishes both involve symbolic forms of knowledge utilization: substantiating knowledge utilization and legitimating knowledge utilization. Substantiating knowledge utilization means that knowledge is used to substantiate policy positions that have already been taken, in terms of the aforementioned models of research-policy relations, thus putting policy before research. In Boswell’s words (2009a, b: 87); ‘both political and action organizations may draw on expert knowledge as a means of justifying their policy preferences’. For instance, policymakers and politicians can selectively pick and choose from the available stock of knowledge and expertise, searching for knowledge claims and data that substantiate their policy positions. Evidently, this also means ignoring knowledge claims that contradict policy positions. For instance, driven by the political sense of urgency during the recent refugee crisis, there was a clear quest amongst EU member states for knowledge on how to restrict migration

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and better control the EU’s borders, while ignoring knowledge claims that said that the capacity of migration control is limited and that a more structural approach was required to address the refugee crisis. Legitimating knowledge utilization does not so much address the substance of knowledge claims, but rather the symbolic importance of using and referring to research in policy processes. According to Boswell (2009a, b: 87) this involves ‘knowledge as a source of legitimation (..), commissioning, carrying out, collecting and affirming the importance of research in decision-making (..) (to) demonstrate the rationality of an organization’s decision-making style’. For instance, having knowledge and data on the position of migrants already legitimizes having a policy aimed at migrant integration. In fact, the utilization of knowledge has played a key role in diversity governance in contexts where there was not yet a clear policy on migrant integration. For instance, the German BAMF was essential to the development of a German integration policy long before a coordinated national policy strategy was announced; although there was no special Minister for integration, the data produced by BAMF enabled the special envoy for foreigners (Auslanderbeauftragte) to put the issue of migrant integration on the agenda and confront ministers in areas such as education, housing and labour on the impact of their policies on integration. Similar processes have taken place in other countries and at EU level, whereby knowledge has played a key role in legitimating a common European integration agenda.

Text Box 4.1  Symbolic Knowledge Utilization and Alienation Many governments have (since the 1990s in particular) established extensive data services to generate all sorts of data on the ‘integration’ of immigrant minorities. These data capture for instance not only how many immigrants are there, but also how they perform in schools, how many are unemployed, what the trends are in language acquisition, where migrants live, and so on. For instance, in Germany the production of this data is one of key functions of the BAMF. The function of this data, as Adrian Favell (2003) has shown, is not only to provide input to policies or to monitor the impacts of policies; it is also to legitimize that there is a policy on migrant integration at all! The machineries of data production are also machineries of legitimation. They help legitimate that there is something in the position (continued)

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Text Box 4.1  (continued) of immigrants that requires an integration policies. However, this is also where the risk of problem alienation comes in. Having data on the integration of minorities will also reproduce the idea that there is something specific to, or something wrong with, the integration of minorities. It may lose touch with what the actual social complexities of migrant integration; for instance, that rather than a problem of integration, there is a general problem of socio-economic participation, a general problem of discrimination, are any other situation that explains the situation of migrants but is not specific to it. This is what could be described as problem alienation, or the loss of contact with the complexity of the problem situation by simplification with significant consequences. It could lead to what I will later describe as social alienation; the reproduction of discourses that say that there is something specific to or ‘different’ to immigrants.

Another illustration of legitimating knowledge utilization is how many countries have at some point established ad-hoc expert committees to examine specific aspects of migration or diversity governance and to come with policy suggestions. Take for instance the famous Parekh committee in the UK, formally called the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, or the equally famous Süssmuth committee in Germany, formally called the Independent Committee on Migration (both established in 2000). Although these committees beyond any doubt have also come with instrumental building blocks, an important function has been to reinforce policy developments already under way and legitimize government actors who want to show that they have a key role in the development of new policies (Hunter and Boswell 2015; Schneider and Scholten 2015). It would be too easy, for various reasons, to say that instrumental knowledge utilization contributes to mainstreaming, while other types of more symbolic knowledge utilization contribute to alienation. First of all, it is quite well possible that the utilization of knowledge to build a policy agenda and legitimate policy actors also helps to develop a more mainstreamed approach, just as BAMF has helped to legitimate the development of an integration policy priority in Germany. Another reason why the distinction between instrumental and more symbolic forms of knowledge utilization cannot be reduced to

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mainstreaming or alienation respectively, is the relationship between knowledge utilization and production. What knowledge is used and what is ignored often has both a direct and indirect effect on knowledge production. This may take the shape of structural relations that provide differentiated opportunity structures to knowledge producers. For instance, when symbolic knowledge utilization involves the selective use of specific knowledge claims, this may lead to privileged relations with specific knowledge producers and potentially also to material and immaterial forms of support. This can then lead to what is described in the literature (STS Studies) as ‘coproduction’ of knowledge (Gibbons et  al. 1994; Jasanoff 2013; Nowotny et al. 2003). In the field of migration studies there are various examples of such coproduction of knowledge. Perhaps the most notorious are the national models of integration that were coproduced by scholars and policymakers (and broader sets of actors involved in discourse coalitions around specific national models, including NGOs). Examples include the coproduction of the French Republican model by public intellectuals and politicians/policymakers (Favell 1998; Feldblum 1998) and the coproduction of the UK Race Relations model in the 1970s by a discourse coalition that has been described as a ‘race relations industry’ (C. Joppke 1999; Ratcliffe 2001). Such cases of coproduction, often involving close relations between specific scholars and policymakers in national contexts, have been criticized by some as forms of ‘methodological nationalism’ (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). They define methodological nationalism as the ‘naturalization of the global regime of nation-states by the social sciences’ (ibid: 2). They distinguish three variants of methodological nationalism: ‘1) ignoring or disregarding the fundamental importance of nationalism for modern societies; this is often combined with 2) naturalization, i.e., taking for granted that the boundaries of the nation-state delimit and define the unit of analysis; 3) territorial limitation which confines the study of social processes to the political and geographic boundaries of a particular nation-state’ (ibid: 2). What the concept of methodological nationalism makes clear is that this coproduction did not only involve the selective use of knowledge and expertise, but also had an impact on knowledge production and the development of migration studies as a research field.

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4.6 C  onclusions: Between Mainstreaming and Problem Alienation This chapter highlights the importance of ‘knowledge’ as a factor in the governance of migration and diversity. It shows that from a positivist perspective, knowledge is seen as a positive condition for governance mainstreaming. Having good data on migration and migrants, and knowledge on migratory and integration processes and on how to manage these processes, is seen as a prerequisite for having policies that help to solve problems and prevent problem alienation. Indeed, the knowledge factor has been of central importance in the development of migration and diversity governance over the past decades. This is demonstrated by the proliferation of research institutes (in academia as well as idea brokers and policy organizations specializing in in-­ house data and research production) and the emphasis on ‘evidence-based policymaking’. In spite of the challenges of diversification and fragmentation, it is fair to say that the knowledge base for migration and diversity governance has increased significantly. Also, there has been a clear policy-­ orientation towards the development of migration studies as a research field. Although criticized from the academic perspective with regard to its impact on systematic theory-building (Bommes and Morawska 2005), policy-orientation can be valued positively from a positivist perspective as the development of knowledge in order to make better policies. Furthermore, in spite of important differences between countries and across periods in time, research has made a highly significant contribution to policymaking. In fact, this has also led to criticism (from non-­ positivist perspectives) of the technocratic nature of migration and diversity governance. However, the discussion of the role of knowledge in migration and diversity governance has also highlighted various complexities that challenge the positivist thesis that knowledge promotes governance mainstreaming. One of these complexities—uncertainty—directly challenges the belief in rational societal steering. Even when migration and diversity policies are designed rationally, there are many factors that may limit societal steering in practice. For instance, migratory processes and diversity are often driven by other factors, such as broader societal developments

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and opportunities or limitations offered by the economic climate. Such developments are far less foreseeable and manageable and introduce a high degree of problem uncertainty to migration and diversity policies. Paradoxically, criticism regarding the effectiveness of migration and diversity policies has often coincided with calls for more government intervention in the form of better integration or migration policies. This is perhaps most clearly illustrated by the rejection of the multicultural paradigm in various European countries in the early 2000s, which was not accompanied by a more modest approach to the problem-solving capacity of governments but rather by calls for new and better (and in some regards tougher) policies. There seems to be a paradox between the acknowledgement of uncertainty regarding past policies and the resilient belief that future policies will be less impeded by such uncertainties. As well as exploring problem uncertainty as a contributing factor to problem alienation, causing ‘rational’ policies to fail in targeting specific problems, this chapter also discussed uncertainty within policy design (policy uncertainty) as a cause of problem alienation. As both ‘migration’ and (migration-related) ‘diversity’ (or ‘integration’) are essentially contested concepts, it is often impossible to define or ‘measure’ these concepts in practice. In fact, one of the forms of problem alienation that was identified in this chapter (and will be examined in more depth in Chap. 7) is the definition of policy categories (such as using terms like ‘migrants’ or ‘minorities’ in policy designs) that defy the social complexities of such categories. In addition, the involvement of research in policymaking may also introduce various elements of problem uncertainty. For instance, the proliferation of migration research has also led to fragmentation and problems concerning systematic knowledge accumulation. When designing policies, policymakers often have to cope with competing and dissenting knowledge claims on specific issues, such as the relationship between economic development and migration, or between integration and crime. Furthermore, knowledge claims can be utilized in very different ways. Although the positivist perspective propagates the instrumental use of knowledge, in practice knowledge is often utilized in more symbolic ways. This challenges the perception of ‘evidence-based policymaking’. Furthermore, even when knowledge is used either instrumentally or

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symbolically, it is important to be aware of processes of coproduction of knowledge. As the importance of national models of integration illustrates, the knowledge and discourses that are produced by scholars are often also part of broader (in this case national) social and political contexts. What appears as ‘evidence based policymaking’, might very well be ‘policy-based evidence making’.

References Amiraux, V., & Simon, P. (2006). There are no minorities here: Cultures of scholarship and public debate on immigrants and integration in France. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 47(3–4), 191–215. Baldwin, M. (2018). The politics of evidence-based policy in Europe’s ‘migration crisis’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration studies, 45(12), 2139–2155. Bertossi, C. (2011). National models of integration in Europe: A comparative and critical analysis. American Behavioral Scientist, 55(12), 1561–1580. Bijl, R., & Verweij, A. (2012). Measuring and monitoring immigrant integration in Europe. Integration. The Hague: SCP. Bommes, M., & Morawska, E.  T. (2005). International migration research: Constructions, omissions, and the promises of interdisciplinarity. Hants: Ashgate Pub Ltd. Boswell, C. (2009a). The political uses of expert knowledge: Immigration policy and social research. Recherche, 67, 02. Boswell, C. (2009b). The political uses of expert knowledge: Immigration policy and social research. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brettell, C. B., & Hollifield, J. F. (2014). Migration theory: Talking across disciplines. Routledge. Castles, S. (2004). Why migration policies fail. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 27(2), 205–227. Entzinger, H., & Scholten, P. (2015). The interplay of knowledge production and policymaking: A comparative analysis of research and policymaking on migrant integration in Germany and the Netherlands. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 17(1), 60–74. Fassmann, H., Reeger, U., & Sievers, W. (2009). Statistics and reality: Concepts and measurements of migration in Europe. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

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Favell, A. (1998). Philosophies of integration: Immigration and the idea of citizenship in France and Britain. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Favell, A. (2001). Integration policy and integration research in Europe: A review and critique. Citizenship today: Global perspectives and practices, Washington, DC: Brooking Institution, 349–399. Favell, A. (2003). Integration nations: The nation-state and research on immigrants in Western Europe. Comparative Social Research, 22, 13–42. Feldblum, M. (1998). Reconfiguring citizenship in Europe. In C. Joppke, (Ed.), Challenge to the nation-state. Immigration in Western Europe and the United States (p. 234). New York: University of Chicago Press. Geddes, A. (2005). Migration research and European integration: The construction and institutionalization of problems of Europe. In International migration research: Constructions, omissions and interdisciplinarity (pp.  265–280). Chicago: Chicago University Press. Geddes, A., & Scholten, P. (2016). The politics of migration and immigration in Europe. London: Sage. Gibbons, M., Limoges, C., Nowotny, H., Schwartzman, S., Scott, P., & Trow, M. (1994). The new production of knowledge: The dynamics of science and research in contemporary societies. London: SAGE Publications Limited. Grillo, R. (2010). 3 British and others. In The multiculturalism backlash: European discourses, policies and practices (Vol. 50). London: Routledge. Guston, D.  H. (2001). Boundary organizations in environmental policy and science: An introduction. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 26(4), 399–408. Hoppe, R. (1999). Policy analysis, science, and politics: From ‘speaking truth to power’ to ‘making sense together’. Science and Public Policy, 26(1), 201–210. Hoppe, R. (2005). Rethinking the science-policy nexus: From knowledge utilization and science technology studies to types of boundary arrangements. Poiesis & Praxis: International Journal of Technology Assessment and Ethics of Science, 3(3), 199–215. Horvath, K., Amelina, A., & Peters, K. (2017). Migration regimes in the spotlight: The politics of migration in an age of uncertainty. Special Issue of Migration Studies, 5(3). https://doi.org/10.1093/migration/mnx055. Hunter, A., & Boswell, C. (2015). Comparing the political functions of independent commissions: The case of UK migrant integration policy. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 17(1), 10–25. Jasanoff, S. (2013). States of knowledge: The co-production of science and the social order. London/New York: Routledge.

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Joppke, C. (1999). Immigration and the nation-state: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press. King, R. (2012). Theories and typologies of migration: An overview and a primer. King, R., & Skeldon, R. (2010). ‘Mind the gap!‘integrating approaches to internal and international migration. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 36(10), 1619–1646. Kraler, A., Reichel, D., & Entzinger, H. (2015). Migration statistics in Europe: A core component of governance and population research. In P.  Scholten, H.  Entzinger, R.  Penninx, & S.  Verbeek (Eds.), Integrating immigrants in Europe: Research-policy dialogues (pp. 39–58). Cham: Springer International Publishing. Lasswell, H. D. (1970). The emerging conception of the policy sciences. Policy Sciences, 1(1), 3–14. Michel, P., Perrin, N., & Singleton, A. (2006). Towards Harmonised European Statistics on International Migration. Louvain: UCL. Miller, C. (2001). Hybrid management: Boundary organizations, science policy, and environmental governance in the climate regime. Science, Technology & Human Values, 26(4), 478–500. Nowotny, H., Scott, P., & Gibbons, M. (2003). Introduction: ‘Mode 2’ Revisited: The new production of knowledge. Minerva, 41(3), 179–194. Penninx, R., Spencer, D., & Van Hear, N. (2008). Migration and integration in Europe: The state of research. Swindon: Economic and Social Research Council. Porter, T. M. (1995). Trust in numbers: The pursuit of objectivity in science and public life. Princeton University Press. Ratcliffe, P. (2001). The politics of social science research: Race, ethnicity and social change. Springer. Rath, J. (2001). Research on immigrant ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. In The politics of social science research (pp. 137–159). Springer. Rath, J., Penninx, R., Groenendijk, K., & Meyer, A. (1999). The politics of recognizing religious diversity in Europe. Social reactions to the institutionalization of Islam in the Netherlands, Belgium and Great Britain. Netherlands Journal of Social Sciences, 35, 53–68. Ravenstein, E. G. (1885). The laws of migration. Journal of the Statistical Society of London, 48(2), 167–235. Salt, J., Singleton, A., & Hogarth, J. (1994). Europe’s international migrants: Data sources patterns and trends. London: HMSO. Sanderson, I. (2002). Evaluation, policy learning and evidence-based policy making. Public Administration, 80(1), 1–22.

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Schneider, J., & Scholten, P. (2015). Consultative commissions and the rethinking of integration policies in the Netherlands and Germany: The Blok Commission and the Süssmuth Commission. In P. W. A. Scholten, H. Entzinger, M. J. A. Penninx, & S. Verbeek (Eds.), Research-policy dialogues on migrant integration in Europe (IMISCOE book series) (pp. 77–98). Dordrecht: Springer. Scholten, P. (2011). Framing immigrant integration: Dutch research-policy dialogues in comparative perspective. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Scholten, P., Entzinger, H., Penninx, R., & Verbeek, S. (2015). Integrating immigrants in Europe. Research-policy dialogues. Springer. Simon, P. (2008). The choice of ignorance: The debate on ethnic and racial statistics in France. French Politics, Culture & Society, 26(1), 7–31. Simon, P., Piché, V., & Gagnon, A. A. (2015). Social statistics and ethnic diversity. Springer. Singleton, A. (1999). Combining quantitative and qualitative research methods in the study of international migration. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 2(2), 151–157. https://doi.org/10.1080/136455799295113. Thränhardt, D., & Bommes, M. (2010). National paradigms of migration research (Vol. 13). Göttingen: V&R Unipress. Wildavsky, A. (1979). Speaking truth to power. Little Brown: Boston. Wimmer, A., & Glick Schiller, N. (2002). Methodological nationalism and beyond: Nation–state building, migration and the social sciences. Global Networks, 2(4), 301–334. Young, K., Ashby, D., Boaz, A., & Grayson, L. (2002). Social science and the evidence-based policy movement. Social Policy and Society, 1(3), 215–224.

5 Institutions

Migration and diversity governance do not exist in an institutional void. Besides the interplay of knowledge, power and discourses, there is always an institutional context that may have either a constraining or an enabling effect on governance approaches. Institutions are structural elements that have an impact on governance beyond the level of individuals. Various examples can be mentioned that have been and are still very relevant in the area of migration and diversity governance, including welfare states, labour market regimes, citizenship regimes, and on a more abstract level even the institutions of ‘nationality’ and ‘national identity’. The first key issue regarding institutions that will be discussed in more detail in this chapter, is the relation between institutions and the complexification of migration and diversity. To what extent do institutions reflect this complexification, and to what extent are they able to accommodate complexification? For instance, to what extent do the welfare states that we designed decades ago reflect the current realities of migration and diversity? And to what extent are these welfare states still able to achieve their objectives given these new realities? This issue of institutional ‘goodness of fit’ with the complexification of migration and diversity, raises questions regarding institutional reproduction and change. Governance mainstreaming means that institutions © The Author(s) 2020 P. Scholten, Mainstreaming versus Alienation, Global Diversities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42238-7_5

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must constantly adapt in response to changing institutional circumstances, such as the complexification of migration and diversity. For instance, it means that regardless of what type of welfare state regime is selected by a country or city, an institution like a welfare state must constantly adjust to changing circumstances, for instance by adapting welfare state services and eligibilities to cope with increased mobility and diversity. A second issue concerns the relation between various institutions involved in the governance of migration and diversity. Here institutional ‘goodness of fit’ refers to the extent to which there is a complementary relationship between the governance of migration and diversity in various overlapping or cross-cutting institutional settings. This can refer to the relation between local and national governance, or for instance, between governance in the area of labour and that in the area of education. This issue of the goodness of fit between institutional settings raises questions about institutional relations in complex governance settings. Governance mainstreaming in this context means that the activities of various institutions are complementary and usually require some form of coordination. Here the issue of multi-level governance emerges, referring to how various types of institutional actors operating at various levels of governance engage in mutually coordinated action. Institutional alienation refers to situations where there is a mismatch or ‘decoupling’ between institutions and their problem environment or in the relations between different institutions. For instance, alienation may emerge if there is friction between the assumptions on which an institution is based (such as national solidarity being the basis for the welfare state) and the realities of international migration, or if there is friction between the governance approaches adopted at various levels (such as national policies aimed at selective exclusion and local policies aimed at the inclusion of irregular migrants). In this chapter I will further examine the role of institutions in migration and diversity governance. In particular, I will explore governance mainstreaming and alienation both within and between different institutions that are relevant in these policy areas. This includes institutions such as welfare states and citizenship regimes, as well as relations between local, national, regional and global institutions.

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5.1 The Institutionalist Approach Although in many ways leaning on and incorporating elements of positivist, critical and constructivist theory, institutionalism has evolved into one of the main schools of thought within the social sciences (Hall and Taylor 1996; March and Olsen 1983; Steinmo et al. 1992).This has, however, also coincided with fragmentation within the institutionalist perspective. In their famous article on ‘three institutionalisms’ in political science, Hall and Taylor distinguish between rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism (1996). Rational choice institutionalism speaks clearly to other perspectives, especially to positivism and also to critical theory to a certain extent. It assumes that institutions will act rationally based on the knowledge and information available to them and given their institutional interests. However, it is not a positivist belief in knowledge and societal steering, but an institutional context that drives institutions to act rationally in order to ensure institutional survival. Knowledge and information are tools for institutions to respond strategically to changes in the institutional context. This may mean that what is rational from a rational choice perspective (to ensure institutional survival) is not rational from a positivist perspective (to solve a problem rationally). For instance, it may be rational for an institution such as a government to produce ethnic statistics to legitimize its integration policies, whereas this may not be rational from the perspective of the reifying effect that ethnic statistics may have on social groups. Historical institutionalism has a different take on institutionalism, referring in particular to the endogenous logic that institutions develop over time. This logic tends to create what is described as ‘institutional path-dependency’ (Mahoney and Thelen 2015; Pierson 2000). This does not mean that institutions do not change at all, but that they usually change incrementally and in the direction set out by previous developments in the institution (also referred to as layering, drift, conversion). Just like rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism stresses that institutions will generally tend to ensure their own survival, but unlike rational choice institutionalism this perspective argues that

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survival is more dependent upon and constrained by historic choices than strategic choices. However, occasionally, such path-dependent processes tend to be disrupted by what is described as ‘critical junctures’: times when the survival of some institutions is threatened, and new institutions are created. In fact, in the field of migration governance, there has been reference to many crises and incidents that have supposedly formed such critical junctures, such as the 9/11 attacks in New York and the migration flows triggered by the Syrian war in the 2010s. Finally, sociological institutionalism focuses on how institutions tend to develop their own ‘logic’ in different institutional forms, routines, procedures and symbols. Rather than being rational as in the positivist perspective or strategic as in rational choice institutionalism, institutions are expected to act in accordance with what is ‘appropriate’ within specific institutional settings. An institution is seen here as an organizational form in the sociological sense with specific codes of behaviour and interaction that can be specified in rules as well as in more informal codes and ‘symbols’. For instance, an institution such as the welfare state may be driven to a large extent by an internal logic of provision and helping people that could create dependency; or the institution of border management may be driven by an internal logic of keeping people out. This chapter does not choose one of these three institutionalisms, but rather seeks elements from all three institutionalisms that help account for the dynamics of migration and diversity governance. As we will see, institutionalism has been a very important perspective within migration studies that has been applied to many different institutions and institutional settings.

5.2 Institutions and Migration First, I will discuss the relation between institutions and the complexification of migration and diversity. Speaking to all three different forms of institutionalism (rational choice, historical and sociological institutionalism), it is possible to identify elements of governance mainstreaming as well as tendencies towards institutional alienation. It is, however, impossible to discuss all of the institutions that are relevant in migration studies.

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Therefore, I will limit this discussion to two institutions that have emerged as being particularly prominent in migration studies: welfare states and citizenship regimes.

Welfare States Welfare states constitute perhaps the most often-covered type of institution in the literature on migration and especially on diversity governance. There is a very rich literature on the impact of migration on welfare states and vice versa, as well as on the relation between diversity and welfare states (Banting et  al. 2006; Bommes and Geddes 2000; Borang 2018; Johnston et al. 2010; Schierup et al. 2006). It is important to observe that there is also much contestation in the relationship between welfare states, migration and diversity. It is not a key objective here to conclude these ongoing academic conversations, but rather to explore elements in this conversation that suggest a trend towards either mainstreaming or alienation. What speaks clearly from the literature on welfare states is the historical-­ institutionalist element of path-dependency in welfare states. There are very different types of welfare states, and the choice for specific types has often been made decades ago (if not longer). For instance, many European welfare states were developed in the second half of the twentieth century, often in response to specific national economic and social conditions. This led Nordic European countries to develop more social-democratic welfare states, the UK towards a more liberal welfare state in line with its overall economic structure, continental European countries such as Germany towards a more conservative welfare state based on historic ideas of the family, and Southern European countries towards often more traditional or residual welfare states. Following the institutionalist perspective, the type of welfare states that developed in the past, has had important implications for migration and diversity in later periods. First, welfare states are often considered to have an impact on migration flows. For instance, migrants in search of social or economic security may deliberately choose states with relatively generous and easily accessible welfare state facilities (GJ Borjas 1994). In

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contrast, liberal welfare states may be more attractive to migrants who are able to bring their own social, economic or cultural capital. Secondly, welfare states constitute important opportunity structures for coping with migration-related diversity, in various ways. The social rights and services that come with welfare states—such as access to social benefits, training and educational services, health services and, for instance, social housing—can have an enabling or constraining effect on integration. There is, however, much debate on the impact of different types of welfare structures, ranging from studies that argue that generous welfare states can generate forms of welfare state dependency (Bommes and Geddes 2000), to others that argue that access to social benefits provides migrants with a safety net and eventually promotes their integration (Oliver 2018; Schierup et al. 2006). For instance, in the case of family migrants, research shows that restricting access to various social services and benefits limits prospects for integration and increases dependency amongst family migrants on their sponsors. In addition, welfare states create opportunity structures in terms of the actor constellations they generate, including the role of labour unions, NGOs and churches. It is very well known that in countries like Germany and France, the presence of labour unions played an important role in the labour market integration of migrants (Bommes and Geddes 2000). Thirdly, welfare state structures can have an effect on attitudes towards migrants (Borang 2018). Welfare states are based on ‘internal solidarity’, the national solidarity required to uphold a welfare state system. This usually comes together with a form of ‘external exclusion’, a clear separation between who is in and who is out (Bommes and Geddes 2000). Especially in strong welfare states (social democrat or conservative types), ‘welfare chauvinism’ can emerge, feeding a perception of welfare tourism (Will Kymlicka 2015). A key question from the institutionalist perspective is to what extent welfare states are able to adapt to the realities of the complexification of migration and diversity. Studies show that with the growing scale of mobility and the growth of diversity within welfare states, tension can

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emerge between internal solidarity and external exclusion (Bommes and Geddes 2000). How complex this tension can be is exemplified by the debate on what Kymlicka has described as ‘the progressive’s’ dilemma‘(Will Kymlicka 2015). This means that progressive parties often experience a dilemma between internal and external solidarity, between maintaining the national solidarity that is required to uphold a welfare state and at the same time being relatively open to migration and inclusive for newcomers. What is evident in many countries is that specific provisions are created for providing or constraining migrants’ access to welfare state services. In most cases a migration-integration nexus is created whereby migrants gradually receive access to specific entitlements and services. How this is done varies greatly between countries, and also between migrant categories. As mentioned, in many countries family migrants are held in a position of dependency on their sponsors for a period of around five years. In some countries, asylum seekers are allowed to enter the labour market after one year, or three years, while in other countries they are not allowed to perform any kind of paid or unpaid labour. Also, in many countries civic-integration programmes have been designed to ‘equip’ migrants with the skills necessary to access the labour market (such as basic language proficiency and knowledge of society). Such schemes often echo a combination of rights and duties, of the fact that in order to get access to welfare state services, migrants also have obligations to participate (H. Entzinger 2006). What is needed from the perspective of governance mainstreaming is for general welfare state structures to adapt to the realities of migration and diversity. Rather than creating specific provisions for migrants, this means adjusting general provisions to promote optimal outcomes for integration and mobility. This has been done in various countries by connecting welfare state benefits to specific contributions, for instance years in school or years of work. This provides a universal approach to welfare state access while allowing for some form of exclusion in order to uphold internal inclusion.

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Text Box 5.1  An Illustration of the Mobility-Proofing of an Institution; the ‘Mobility’ of Child Benefits Mobility patterns have become increasingly complex and unpredictable. Some people will migrate once, other several times, back and forth, or on to different locations. This invokes many questions on various entitlements that persons have, or may have for some time, under specific welfare state arrangements. One example is child benefits that families may develop based on citizenship. However, what does mobility mean for these benefits? In some cases, citizens may be allowed to ‘export’ their child benefit when they migrate to another country, whereas in others this is systematically denied. What does this mean for expats, or for people who live just across the border, or for families that (perhaps even without having this planned) decide to stay abroad for much longer or even permanent, or for families where children receive a second citizenship after some time? There are many different ways of doing this, but important from a complexity governance perspective is to consider the consequences that the complexification of migration has for welfare state policies, as well as the other way around, what implications welfare state policies may have on migration? For instance, if the mobility of welfare state entitlements is restricted, will this also restrict the willingness of the recipients of these entitlements to be mobile? Or to the contrary, if child benefits can be exported, does that promote ‘return migration’?

Institutional alienation occurs when welfare states fail to adapt. This can lead to the erosion of welfare states or declining support for them. In fact, as stated by Kymlicka, this is precisely where the progressives’ dilemma lies. Migration can put pressure on the provision of various welfare state services, such as access to social housing or specific social benefits. The perceived overrepresentation of migrants in welfare state facilities may also lead to declining solidarity. Furthermore, in terms of actual migration flows, institutional alienation can also mean that welfare states become a pull (or in some cases a push) factor in migration.

Citizenship Another institution that has been at the centre of debates on migration and diversity, is that of ‘citizenship’. Especially for national citizenship, countries have often evolved very specific regimes over long periods of time and

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embedded these regimes deeply into societal structures (such as welfare state access, political participation, etc.). For instance, Brubaker’s (1990, 1992) key reference study on citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany, working from a clear historical-institutionalist perspective, shows how deeply historically embedded these two countries’ citizenship regimes are. The French ‘ius soli’ regime is firmly grounded in its state-centric history in which the central state had a clear interest in making new citizens based on birth right, whereas Germany’s ‘ius sanguinis’ system is grounded in its specific history of a people without a clear state who held on firmly to the ‘blood connections’ of the German people. Also, the ‘ius soli’ regimes that can be found in countries like Australia and the US are firmly rooted in the foundational legacies of these countries as immigrant countries. Such citizenship regimes can have important implications for the governance of migration and diversity in these countries. Ius soli regimes where migrants gain access to full citizenship via birthright have an inherently open and inclusive position towards newcomers. This can facilitate the integration of migrants in various ways, protecting them from discrimination, providing access to the welfare state and opportunities for political participation. Because of their more essentialist perception of ‘ethnic’ citizenship, ius sanguinis systems may have a more exclusive effect. Although various countries with ius sanguinis (e.g. Germany, India, Japan, Greece and many Arab and African states, such as Morocco) have been relatively generous in terms of immigration, they have been less open in terms of access to full citizenship. It is fair to say that in many countries tensions have emerged regarding the institution of citizenship due to increasing migration and diversity (Bloemraad et al. 2008; Favell 1997; Joppke 1999, 2003; Kymlicka and Norman 2000). For a long time (up until the early 2000s) Germany’s ius sanguinis system experienced institutional alienation due to the exclusion of migrants (especially from political rights) on the one hand, and their inclusion in the German welfare state (relatively generous granting of social rights) on the other hand. This created a sort of intermediary type of citizenship, which has been described by some as ‘denizenship‘(Hammar 1985). The evolution of such forms of denizenship can be seen as a form of institutional alienation, as it creates a second class citizenship regime and reveals the limitations of the original citizenship regime.

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As a sign of governance mainstreaming, the citizenship regime in various countries has been adapting to migration and diversity. One such adaptation is an evolution towards what has been described as ‘ius domicili’ (Faist 2000; Favell 1997). This means that rather than being based on blood-ties or birth-right, citizenship is granted to people who have lived in a country for a certain period of time. This is a more universal system than ius sanguinis while still providing a restriction to access to citizenship that responds to the reality of increasing migration. At the same time, the contestation of migration and diversity has also led to pressure in many countries for institutional adaptation to strengthen the exclusive function of citizenship regimes. A key argument of populist and some conservative parties has been that citizenship is something that one should ‘merit’ rather than something that should be granted too easily. This has, for instance, been a key issue of debate in France, one of the most traditional ‘ius soli’ countries. Here, the Front National in particular claim that ‘être français cela se mérite’ (being French is something you have to deserve), and that it must be made more difficult to access French citizenship. In many countries with ius soli traditions, civic integration programmes have emerged for newcomers, often making citizenship dependent on the successful completion of a civic integration programme or even a civic integration test (Bonjour 2010; Joppke 2007; Michalowski and van Oers 2012). Furthermore, contestation has also focused on the issue of dual citizenship. Although very much a reality and a consequence and sign of complexification, dual citizenship is also interpreted as an erosion of the idea of national citizenship. In response to such contestation, many countries have made access to citizenship dependent on rejection of one’s original citizenship. However, once more signalling problem complexity, many exemptions are made for people from countries that do not allow their nationals to renounce citizenship (e.g. Greece and Morocco). Such institutional adaptations cannot straightforwardly be interpreted either as mainstreaming or alienation. In fact, when civic integration schemes are designed to promote the integration of newcomers, they can be interpreted as a mainstreaming effort, one that adapts the current citizenship regime to the reality of migration. However, civic integration

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schemes have also been interpreted as efforts to limit migration, which can be seen as a form of alienation (institutional drift). Also, the efforts to curtail opportunities for dual citizenship can be interpreted as a form of alienation, as they ignore the complexification of citizenship in an area of increased mobility and diversity. Migration and diversity have also played an important role in adaptation of the institution of citizenship at other levels. On the one hand, forms of citizenship have emerged beyond the level of the nation-state. Transnational citizenship involves a more sociological approach that emphasizes how citizenship can be embedded in more than one place simultaneously (Bauböck 1994; Faist 2000; Morawska 2003). European citizenship is a form of transnational citizenship, which still links people to nations but also reaches beyond this. Post-national citizenship refers to forms of citizenship that are no longer anchored in nation-states, but, for instance, in universal human rights or in universal personhood (Soysal 1994). On the other hand, migration and diversity seem to have contributed to the rise of urban citizenship (Baubock 2003). Urban citizenship can provide a powerful alternative for inclusion, not only because of the proximity of cities in particular to the realities of migration and diversity, but also as a result of the failure of national citizenship regimes to adapt to migration and diversity.

5.3 Institutional Dynamics in Migration and Diversity Governance Another key issue from an institutionalist perspective concerns the relations and interactions between institutions: institutional dynamics. The complexity of migration and diversity is often also reflected in institutional complexity, with various institutions playing complementary roles. This concerns relations between various levels and types of institutions as well as the institutional feedback that institutions generate for governance processes.

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Multi-Level Governance Both migration and diversity governance are characterized by the involvement of different types of actors across different levels. Guiraudon and Lahav (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000) describe this as a moving ‘upwards, outwards and downwards’ of governance tasks and responsibilities. This has, as we will discuss in this section, provided various opportunities for institutional mainstreaming as well as challenges in terms of institutional alienation. However, the multi-level configuration in both areas has taken rather different shapes. Migration governance is marked by a relatively high degree of internationalization. This takes the form of various international treaties, such as the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention, which has been ratified by 155 countries, as well as various international organizations that play a role in migration management at various levels, such as the UN organizations UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and IOM (International Organization for Migration). A specific form of internationalization (or even to some extent supranationalization), has been regional cooperation in migration management such as within NAFTA but in particular within the European Union. EU member states have, via various treaties, handed a significant part of their sovereignty in managing migration to the EU. With FRONTEX, the EU has even created a communitarian agency for border control (although with limited competences). On a broader European scale, the European Charter of Human Rights has had a particularly significant effect on migration management, for instance by codifying the right to family life, something which has had great impact on family migration to Europe. Although embedded in this international institutional environment, the direct management of migration remains largely in the hands of nation-states. However, in migration management, states are increasingly relying on other types of organizations, including NGOs and private organizations. For instance, when it comes to air traffic, a significant part of border control has been delegated to private airline companies. Many countries rely on the input of NGOs in various parts of migration management, such as providing assistance to migrants (Ambrosini and Leun 2015), or even search and rescue operations in areas such as the Mediterranean that are undertaken by NGOs.

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The local level mostly plays less of a role in migration governance. In spite of sometimes clear differences in local preferences regarding migration, the direct involvement of local governments in migration has remained marginal. There are some examples, such as in the UK, where the UK government has made special arrangements with the Scottish government regarding the dispersion of asylum seekers, especially families, to Scottish cities such as Glasgow (Scholten 2016). There are also examples in Europe and the US of cities that more openly take a welcoming position regarding migrants, including asylum seekers but sometimes also labour migrants. Sanctuary cities or welcoming cities have emerged in the US and Europe that sometimes defy national policies by taking an open and accommodative approach to such migrants (Bauder 2017; Huang and Liu 2018; Oomen and Berg 2014). At the same time, there are also cities that lobby national and international governments and organizations for more restrictive migration management in order to limit the impact of migration on them (Scholten et al. 2018). Diversity governance is characterized by a somewhat different institutional configuration. Whereas the shifts ‘downwards’ and ‘outwards’ are clearly recognizable, the shift ‘upwards’ has been less significant when it comes to diversity or, more specifically, migrant incorporation. International organizations (including NGOs such as Amnesty International) and treaties (such as the ECHR) have indeed had an impact on national diversity governance, but at a level that cannot be compared with migration governance. For instance, the European regime for ‘migrant integration’ has remained very weak, based on a set of ‘European common basic principles of integration’ and a common European Integration agenda, which are not very substantive yet. There are, however, some significant spin offs from the Europeanization of migration policy that affect diversity management, such as the EU Directive on Third Country Nationals, which specifies clear conditions for the treatment of third country nationals in EU member states. This does not mean that how to ‘govern’ migration-related diversity has remained an exclusively national policy prerogative (as was the case in the past, under distinct ‘national models of integration’, which were discussed earlier). The shift ‘outwards’ has been very significant, especially for NGOs but also for private enterprises. For instance, for the

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management of refugee integration in Denmark, very successful ‘Branchepakker’ (sectoral pacts) were introduced, whereby companies and government organizations concluded a pact to help refugees in their ‘on the job’ education and labour market integration. The role of NGOs in integration policies is even more widespread. Organizations such as Caritas not only support but also implement a range of integration measures in diverse countries. In several countries this also involves cooperation with organizations or representative bodies specifically for migrants. What has been very significant in diversity governance, is what has been described as a ‘local turn’ in diversity governance (Zapata-Barrero et  al. 2017). Local governments, in particular cities, have assumed an increasingly prominent role in migration governance. Far from merely implementing national policies, cities are increasingly taking an active role in shaping local policies in response to specific local circumstances. Some scholars argue that this usually involves a more accommodative approach to diversity, as cities are much closer to the actual diversity in their societies and have a greater stake in making sure that diversity works out and that conflicts are prevented (Mahnig 2004; M.  Schiller 2015; Vermeulen and Stotijn 2010). Others argue that localization also means differentiation, with cities adopting approaches that match specific local circumstances that can vary significantly (Caponio and Borkert 2010; Glick Schiller and Caglar 2010; Scholten 2016). The term multi-level governance has emerged with reference to this complexification of institutional settings for both migration and diversity governance. This term has emerged in particular from EU studies to describe the division of labour and interactions between various levels of government and various types of organizations involved in various European policy areas (Bache and Flinders 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Piattoni 2010). Multi-level governance is described as an alternative to Europeanization or internationalization, where policy roles are not so much transferred to higher levels as distributed and coordinated across different levels and different actors (often positioned as an alternative to a top-down approach to Europeanization). Furthermore (as mentioned in Chap. 2), multi-level governance is often positioned as a response to the complexification of policy settings, whereby state-centric policies (or

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policies with one ‘steering’ policy actor) are replaced by poly-centric settings and often involve wider policy networks. Given the complexification of migration and diversity governance, multi-level governance can be seen as a strategy for achieving institutional mainstreaming. A clear advantage of multi-level governance in these areas is that it allows for a more flexible approach that can respond to specific local circumstances and demands, rather than imposing a one-­ size-­fits-all approach across various levels and actors. For instance, in the area of diversity governance, a shift from the traditional ‘national models of integration’ towards multi-level governance, gives cities more discretion to approach migrant incorporation in a way that is seen as fitting (and politically desirable) in their city’s context. As such, multi-level governance may allow some cities to be more ‘welcoming’ than others, albeit within the confines of national and international regulations. At the same time, the institutional complexification of migration and diversity governance also carries the risk of institutional alienation. In fact, various studies point out the institutional friction that emerges between actors and levels involved in migration and diversity governance, and the difficulties of establishing an effective mode of multi-level governance. For instance, the EU’s regime on ‘internal’ (labour) mobility has on various occasions led to friction between the perspective of EU member states and that of European cities regarding ‘intra-EU mobility’; whereas the EU sees a migrant who moves from Poland to Germany as a mobile EU citizen, the German government and German cities often perceive such a person as a ‘migrant’ and is therefore at odds with the EU regime that does not allow for integration measures for mobile citizens. There are many examples that illustrate how the practices of various levels and actors are not optimally coordinated, or coordinated at all for that matter. Various studies show that this applies to many types of integration policy, whereby national and local policies lack mutual coordination, resulting not only in diverging policies but sometimes even in contradictory policies. This form of institutional alienation has also been described as ‘decoupling’ or ‘disjointed governance’, which means that governance takes place at various levels without any meaningful coordination (Scholten 2016).

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Institutional Feedback in Migration and Diversity Governance Besides relations and interactions between various institutions, another form of institutional dynamics concerns how institutions from the past influence governance making in the present and future. A specifically institutionalist term—feedback—is used a lot in this setting. This term refers to how institutions that have been created in response to migration and diversity issues in the past also influence the governance of issues in the future (Bakewell et al. 2016). Such feedback can contribute to shaping migration flows and diversity patterns. One form of institutional feedback comes from the institutions that have been established in the past to manage migration and diversity. Various scholars have argued that institutional developments from the past explain why, as they put it, ‘liberal states accepted unwanted migration’ (Freeman 1994, 1998; Guiraudon 1997; C Joppke 1998a, b). Liberal states have developed institutions to protect fundamental liberal principles, now codified in international treaties and maintained by organizations such as the UN and law courts. For instance, liberal principles regarding human rights and non-discrimination also constrain opportunities for states and other actors to restrict migration. This is why, as various scholars argue, liberal states have remained relatively open to migration in spite of rising politicization and claims that they are limiting ‘unwanted’ migration. For instance, there is only limited scope to restrict family migration for a liberal state that protects the fundamental human right to family life. In this context, some speak of ‘judicial activism’ in the form of courts adopting very active roles in protecting and maintaining liberal principles. For instance, Guiraudon argues that courts played a key role in the extension of various rights to migrants (including social rights) in European countries, forcing governments to adopt liberal approaches to diversity governance (Guiraudon 2000). Judicial activism has recently also become more manifest in the US, where under the Trump administration there have been various cases where US courts forced president Trump to revoke or change policies. Also in India, courts have played an

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important role in protecting the liberal rights of Rohingya refugees from nearby Myanmar, constraining government plans for the large-scale repatriation of Rohingya. Another form of institutional feedback is more endogenous to migration streams. Migration flows tend to develop their own institutional dynamics (Bakewell 2013; Bakewell et al. 2016). This includes, for instance, the institutionalization of knowledge on how to migrate from one place to another, the institutionalization of networks that facilitate further migration, and even the emergence of institutional actors such as organizations involved in specific migration flows. Carling et al. speak in this context of the emergence of institutionalized ‘migration corridors’ that provide durable connections (and migration streams) between specific destinations and origin places (Carling 2016). Such corridors can have broader implications, beyond that of feedback on future migration flows as they can also generate and transfer various forms of remittances, such economic, social and cultural remittances.

5.4 C  onclusions: Between Mainstreaming and Institutional Alienation The institutional perspective helps us understand the challenges of institutional dynamics in response to the complexification of migration and diversity. It shows that besides knowledge, politics and discourses, institutions play a key role in explaining migration and diversity governance outcomes. Rather than an institutional void, migration and diversity governance is characterized by the constant production and reproduction of institutions that range across levels and different types of actors. Several institutions, including welfare states and citizenship regimes, have been discussed in more depth in this chapter. There has also been a more detailed discussion of how institutions at various levels interrelate (multi-­level governance) and how migration flows tend to generate their own institutional dynamics (feedback). Importantly, the complexification of migration and diversity appears to be mirrored in a complexification of the institutional environment of migration and

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diversity governance. Rather than migration and diversity management being a clear national prerogative (as under the national models from the past), various institutional actors are now operating across various institutional levels. Institutional mainstreaming means that institutions that have been created in the past adjust to the changing circumstances of migration and diversity today and in the future. We have seen that the way in which institutions adjust is often marked by ‘path-dependency’. For instance, we saw that for the institution of citizenship, developments long in the past (such as the founding of a state) often put a clear stamp on how countries respond to new challenges much later. Whereas path dependency can mean that institutions only adjust in line with previous developments, it can also mean that institutions find it difficult to adjust at all. As we have seen in the case of welfare states, a failure to adjust may lead to institutional alienation. This is reflected in the erosion of support for current welfare state regimes, or in dysfunctionalities in established regimes. Another form of institutional accommodation refers to the complexification of the institutional context itself, or the change from state-centric governance modes to more poly-centric modes. Here we have seen the emergence of multi-level governance as an approach to coordinate practices across levels and various types of actors, offering a flexible rather than a one-size-fits-all approach in response to complexity. When functional, multi-level governance can be seen as a form of governance mainstreaming, as it accommodates mainstream institutions to new governance challenges. However, as we have seen in this chapter, there are many instances in which coordination between actors and across levels falls short, resulting in institutional alienation. The often referred to contradictions (‘decoupling’) between national and local approaches to migrant integration, but also the increasing friction between national migration policies and international migration regimes, are clear examples of this.

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6 Power

Power, according to the more critical tradition in the social sciences, is everywhere. It is part of the language that we use to define problems, it is enshrined in the institutional rules, procedures and structures that we have developed, and it is even embedded in the knowledge claims that we see as either valid or invalid. Without intending to resolve ancient paradigm dialogues on the relationship between power and the other factors discussed in this book, it is important to distinguish power analytically as one of the factors that shapes migration and diversity governance. And as migration and diversity governance deals with clear power questions, such as who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’, it is not surprising that the critical tradition within migration studies has been relatively well developed. One key element of the critical approach that has been relevant in migration studies is how different interests are mobilized and represented in migration and diversity governance. For instance, to what extent have migrant organizations (group-specific organizations, organized on the basis of nationality, ethnicity or other migrant-specific demarcations) played a role in migration and diversity governance, and to what extent have mainstream organizations (such as trade unions) played a role in representing the interests of migrants? It is clear, however, that not only migrants, but other interests also play a key role in governance in these areas. © The Author(s) 2020 P. Scholten, Mainstreaming versus Alienation, Global Diversities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42238-7_6

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Broader economic factors behind migration and diversity in particular weigh in, as many studies have suggested. Some scholars even refer to the imbalanced influence of various economic interests as ‘client politics’. Another element refers to the role of power in politics. A key issue in this regard is how politicization has affected migration and diversity governance. One of the issues that will be discussed is how politicization and de-politicization are themselves stakes in governance processes, which both determine and are determined by power relations. Hence, we will speak of the politics of politicization. Another issue related to politics is the rise of both immigrant and anti-immigrant parties. Anti-immigrant parties include, but are not limited to, populist parties that often adopt critical attitudes towards migration and diversity as elements of a broader populist and anti-elitist agenda. Examples include the Trump administration in the US, Front National in France, AfD in Germany and Lega Nord in Italy. Within this book’s broader theoretical argument on mainstreaming versus alienation, the power dimension introduces a range of factors that may drive both. It signals that the mainstreaming of migration and diversity also requires a redefinition of power relations. It may also work against or favour the interests of specific groups or institutions. For instance, what will mainstreaming mean for single ethnicity organizations, or for policy departments specialized in ‘integration policy’, and even for scholars working specifically on ‘integration’? In fact, mainstreaming can be seen as a rebalancing of power relations in society as it requires generic institutions to treat migrants on an equal footing with other citizens. The critical perspective also signals various factors that may contribute to alienation. One is that power, and especially differentiation in power positions between actors, always introduces a ‘selective mobilization of bias’ in policy processes (Baumgartner and Jones 1991; Schattschneider 1960). This means that driven by the interests of specific groups, policymaking may be driven in a direction that serves these interests. This may introduce what I will describe as ‘political alienation’, or a logic of policymaking driven by the interests of groups or actors in broader power structures, introducing selective (or biased) problem perceptions as well as strategically mobilizing specific institutional interests. In such cases, governance is driven not by learning or by institutional fit, but rather by the strategic mobilization of specific interests.

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6.1 The Critical Approach The critical approach is rooted in a broad tradition within the broader discipline of the social sciences and economics, inspired by key thinkers such as Marx, Engels and Bourdieu. It highlights the role of factors such as power, conflicts and interests in policymaking (simplified here under the category of power). This involves both explicit and implicit power structures. Explicit power structures may involve differences in decision-­ making power or in material and immaterial resources. Many critical theorists have studied the centralization of decision-making power by states, the influence of elites on politics or the exploitation of workers by capital owners within capitalist systems. Implicit power structures refer to how interests and power relations may be embedded within other societal structures or institutions, such as within welfare states, ideas on citizenship, and discourses (Marlou Schrover and Schinkel 2015), but also within knowledge. Taking odds with the positivist perspective, critical theorists argue that the way in which knowledge is produced and utilized is determined by broader power structures and interests that influence whether we see knowledge claims as being valid or invalid and who we consider as authoritative and credible sources and who is not considered as such. The critical perspective views social dynamics, including policy dynamics, as being driven by the dialectics of different interests within broader power structures. Therefore, policymaking will be influenced by power-­driven conflict and struggles. This perspective does not consider how to make policies ‘better’, either through learning or institutional fit. Rather, the notion of degeneration or ‘alienation’ has its roots in the critical perspective. Power structures will drive actors to pursue their interests in strategic ways, mostly at the expense of other people (or other things, for example, the environment). The role of the critical scholar in this perspective is to create awareness of broader (explicit and implicit) power structures. Consciousness regarding power relations may enable actors to develop or demand mitigating actions to constrain the alienating effect of power structures. An important aspect of the critical perspective, which is also sometimes framed as ‘the political perspective’, is that power and conflict are not confined to the political arena. In this perspective, politics is

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everywhere, and everything is political. The dialectics of power structures thus takes place in the political arena, but also in the broader public arena, in economic systems, schools and the most basic elements of everyday life. In the field of policy sciences, the critical perspective has been developed further in various theoretical frameworks that account for the role of power in policymaking. As discussed by various policy scholars, policy processes tend to generate a ‘selective mobilization of bias’ within specific ‘policy subsystems’ (Baumgartner and Jones 1991; Schattschneider 1960). This means that rather than policies being discussed and formulated in the broader ‘macropolitical’ arena, they tend to be discussed, formulated and often also implemented within smaller institutionalized networks generated by specific organized interests. This offers a way for these actors to privilege their interests and to protect their policy subsystem from interference from dissenting actors. One of the most widely used critical policy approaches, is the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) (Sabatier 1988, 1991).This framework highlights how actors strategically mobilize and pool resources in advocacy coalitions, which are also defined as ‘policy monopolies’ by several other scholars (Baumgartner and Jones 1991). The strength of such advocacy coalitions determines the impact they can have on policymaking. An often-referred to example of this is the advocacy coalition between tobacco industries, advertising industries and legal agencies, which for a long time managed to prevent smoking bans in many countries. Policy dynamics in this framework is driven by competition between strategically operating advocacy coalitions. Major policy changes are triggered only when the power-balance between advocacy coalitions is disturbed (often due to external triggers or crises, such as focus events or economic depressions). Such policy changes will, according to this perspective, not be triggered by policy learning: the policy beliefs that advocacy coalitions share and that hold them together (their ‘selective mobilization of bias’) are resistant to rival knowledge claims. Learning is only likely to help advocacy coalitions to (incrementally) develop their policy beliefs further, not to change them fundamentally.

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Following this critical perspective on policymaking, as elaborated in the ACF, two key issues will be addressed in this chapter. The first issue concerns the ways in which actors or groups mobilize their interests and potentially shape ‘advocacy’ coalitions in migration and diversity governance. Secondly, I will focus on the broader ‘power structures’, discussing in particular the politicization of migration and diversity governance. As discussed in this chapter, this politicization should not so much be seen as an exogenous development that impacts migration and diversity governance, but rather as an endogenous development driven by the ‘politics of politicization’ among actors involved in these areas.

6.2 T  he Selective Mobilization of Bias in Migration and Diversity Governance The first aspect of the critical perspective that will be discussed in more depth with reference to migration and diversity governance, is the mobilization of interests. Speaking to the broader literature on policy sciences, policy processes tend to generate a ‘selective mobilization of bias’. In this context, various actors or groups will be discussed, including the mobilization of migrants. In addition to migrants, I will also look at studies on the mobilization of broader economic interests as well as the mobilization of broader political voices on migration and diversity governance.

Mobilization of Migrants A key issue in the critical perspective is the mobilization of migrants. Raising awareness of power structures, mobilizing their interests, and trying to obtain a better position within power structures, is considered essential for obtaining a better position within society. At the same time, critical theorists emphasize how power structures tend to alienate migrants in various ways that can be economic (exploitation), social (stigmatization) and political (exclusion).

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Critical studies often start from the observation that there is a lack or gap in the mobilization of migrant interests when compared to other groups, which applies to both political and other, broader forms of social mobilization (Martiniello 2005). Studies variably blame this mobilization gap on either a lack of awareness or organization within migrant groups, or on a lack of openness and ‘opportunity structures’ in the broader social and political system. When it comes to the mobilization capacity of groups, studies often refer not only to differences between migrants and dominant societal groups (natives) in terms of social and political capital, but also to differences between migrant groups (Morales and Giugni 2016). For instance, in European literature, various studies refer to differences in social capital between Turks and Moroccans, with Turks using their relatively high degree of social capital for various forms of social and political mobilization, whereas Moroccans are more fragmented and often lack the social capital for mobilization (Jacobs and Tillie 2004). The size of groups also matters, as Schrover and Vermeulen indicate in their study (M Schrover and Vermeulen 2005): it is difficult for smaller groups to gain the momentum required to mobilize, whereas if groups are too large, they may face challenges of internal fragmentation that impede their opportunities for joint mobilization (this has happened to many Muslim organizations in European countries). Other studies refer to variation in opportunity structures as a trigger for mobilization. For instance, Koopmans has shown that national variations are very important in accounting for different degrees (and forms) of mobilization (R Koopmans 2004); Dutch migrants tend to organize more along ethnic lines as this seemingly fits within the national tradition of pillarization along various minorities, whereas in Germany, participation is along generic lines such as trade unions, welfare organizations and churches. More generally, it seems that countries that have some form of ‘politics of recognition’ regarding migrant minorities, tend to provide opportunity structures for mobilization along ethnic or cultural lines. This explains why countries that have, or at least have had in the past, more multiculturalist policies, tend to have a stronger mobilization of migrant organizations.

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This applies to countries like Canada, the UK, Australia and the Netherlands, where migrant organizations play an important role: in some countries they are even institutionalized within consultation structures on national or local policies (D’Angelo 2015; Eggert and Pilati 2014; Lucassen and Penninx 2009). In contrast, more universalistic countries (such as France) tend to promote mobilization along non-ethnic or non-cultural lines. Such countries often present fewer opportunities for migrant organizations, at least not along ethnic, cultural or religious lines (Schnyder 2016; M Schrover and Vermeulen 2005). In these countries, other organizations may represent the interests of migrants under other umbrellas. This can involve NGOs stepping in to represent migrant interests, or more specifically the interests of female migrants, migrant children or migrants in need of specific protection (M Schrover and Vermeulen 2005). Another example includes the role that trade unions have played in the inclusion of migrants (and in some cases also their exclusion) (Kahmann 2002; R Penninx and Roosblad 2002). This applied in particular to guest workers in countries like Germany, where the representation of migrant interests has been amongst others part of the role of trade unions. At the same time, trade unions in other countries, such as France, considered guest labour migration as a threat to the position of native workers, and therefore were sometimes opposed to assisting migrants (Ireland 1994). Political mobilization has been an area of specific interest in the critical perspective (Heelsum 2002; Jacobs and Tillie 2004; Kemp et al. 2000; Martiniello 2005; Morales and Giugni 2016; Pilati and Morales 2016). Empirically, studies consistently show that migrants often participate less in politics; they vote less often and are also less often elected. At the same time, especially with the growing ‘scale’ of migration and migrationrelated diversity, there is a growing reference to the importance of migrants in electoral politics. This is sometimes described as the ‘ethnic vote’ or the ‘black vote’. Especially at the local level, the migrant vote is known to have a key impact on elections (such as the elections for Mayor of London). However, in terms of representative politics, government and bureaucracy, studies suggest that there is a persistent lag in the

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involvement of migrants, even in countries with more longstanding migrant communities such as Canada and the UK. This is also reflected in the weak presence of migrant parties, even in countries and cities with a very strong migrant presence. Only very few countries have immigrant parties in parliament (such as DENK in the Netherlands), whereas they are slightly more frequent on an urban level. Transnational mobilization is another form of mobilization that has received increased interest from migration scholars. This refers to the mobilization of communities beyond the boundaries of nation-states; sometimes this involves communities that keep their feet in two states (such as the strong connection between Turkish organizations in Germany and Turkey), but it can also involve broader diasporas (such as the Turkish diaspora in Europe). Within such communities, various activities can be developed, such as economic (exchange of resources, economic remittances), social (transnational networks, exchange of skills), cultural and political activities. The complexification of migration and diversity raises questions regarding the mobilization of migrants. A key issue concerns the complexification of migration-related diversity, or as it has been described earlier, the deepening of diversity or the rise of ‘superdiversity’. This complexification makes it more difficult to employ an ‘ethnic lens’ or to think in terms of clear and distinct migrant groups, as boundaries between groups are increasingly diffuse. For instance, Vertovec argues that in superdiverse settings it is no longer self-evident to work with single-­ ethnicity organizations. It challenges the idea that migrants will always mobilize as migrants or as migrant groups, as their identification may be shaped along very different lines; for instance as members of an underclass, as more religiously conservative parts of society, or in many other ways. In fact, from critical theory it could be argued that ethnic or racial consciousness can also be seen as a false form of class consciousness, drawing attention away from more economic determinants of the position of migrants. This also applies to ideas on the political participation of migrants ‘as’ migrants, such as in the form of an ethnic vote or via immigrant parties.

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Text Box 6.1  Mainstreaming and the Role of Migrant Organisations What role do migrant organisations play in a mainstreamed governance approach? Whereas such organisations still would play an important role, this role would be different from more conventional approaches that assume the presence of coherent and identifiable migrant groups. In fact, studies following a more interculturalist perspective, have shown how working with are described as ‘single-ethnicity’ organisations would not only deny the social complexity of ethnic diversity, but could also inadvertently strengthen ethnic boundaries. However, beyond such single-ethnicity organisations, a mainstreamed approach could involve other ways of engaging with organisations that somehow represent migrants. For instance, organisations that focus more in general on issues of migrants and health, or on interculturality in education, or on religious diversity in general.

 lient Politics, Constitutional Politics C and the Liberal Paradox There is more to the mobilization of interests in migration and diversity governance than the mobilization of migrant interests. Other interests play a key role in shaping migration and diversity governance as well. As a clear illustration of the critical perspective on governance, various migration scholars have argued that migration and diversity policies are driven by specific privileged interests. It is precisely because these areas are characterized by complex multi-actor settings that they involve a wide range of specific interests that may entail strong contradictions and contestation. The migration scholar Freeman speaks of client politics as a driving force behind migration and diversity policies (Freeman 1995). Originally coined as a term by J.Q. Wilson (1980), client politics refers to how specific and organized interests influence policymaking and can produce outcomes that do not necessarily have majority support. Freeman, and with him various other migration scholars (C.  Joppke, 1998a, b; C Joppke and Guiraudon 2003; Lahav and Guiraudon 2006), argue that client politics explains why relatively open or expansionist migration policies and inclusive incorporation policies have been adopted in many liberal democrat states, in spite of restrictionist and exclusive political and public discourses.

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Client politics is driven by the circumstance that in areas such as migration and diversity, the benefits tend to be concentrated within specific groups and categories in society, whereas the costs (in an economic and social sense) tend to be dispersed. This generates a policy logic in which specific organized interests will try to put their stamp on policies. This includes, for instance businesses and employers, but may also include NGOs and mobilized migrant groups. According to Freeman The typical mode of immigration politics… is client politics, a form of bilateral influence in which small and well-organized groups intensely interested in a policy develop close working relationships with officials responsible for it. Their interactions take place largely out of public view and with little outside interference. Client politics is strongly oriented toward expansive immigration policies. (Freeman 1995, p. 886)

Hollifield argues that although client politics is an important factor, it is not the only the driving force behind what he describes as the ‘liberal paradox’ (Hollifield 1998; Hollifield et  al. 2008). This paradox means that although relatively open migration policies involve serious risks, the economic interests of liberal economies are benefited by open migration policies. Besides client politics, another force is what Joppke has described as constitutional politics (C Joppke 1998a, b). One form of constitutional politics (Shapiro and Stone 1994), involves what Joppke describes as the ‘self-limited sovereignty’ of states participating in various national and international legal frameworks that have a binding effect on national immigration policies. For instance, Germany is an example of a country that has enshrined various legal obligations into national laws, thus driving migration and diversity policies from the legal dimension (C Joppke 1998a, b). On an international level, there are many examples of how countries participate in the establishment of international legal frameworks that have a long-term impact on national immigration politics. Examples include the participation of most countries in the UN Geneva Convention, or the significant degree of Europeanization of immigration policies. This has been interpreted as a form of ‘uploading’ policy preferences to an inter-governmental or supra-governmental level, which makes it harder for successive governments to change such policies (A Geddes and Scholten 2016).

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Another form of constitutional politics involves the active role that courts have played in shaping migration and diversity policies. Guiraudon (1997, 2000) and Guiraudon and Lahav (2006) is one of the scholars who have shown how organized interests, such as NGOs, migrant organizations and sometimes businesses, have resorted to legal venues to pursue their policy interests. Her study on rights extensions for migrants in France, Germany and the Netherlands very convincingly shows what is described as strategic ‘venue shopping’, with migrants resorting to courts rather than politics to see their interests served. This fits the broader view in the policy sciences that policy entrepreneurs generally search strategically for venues where they believe their interests would be best served or that would be most susceptible to their policy ideas (Baumgartner and Jones 1991). Some scholars also show that courts have shown a degree of judicial activism concerning migrant rights (Guiraudon 2000). For instance, the European Court of Justice has upon various occasions interpreted EU law and directives in a way that extends the social rights of migrants in EU member states (A Geddes and Scholten 2016). When policies are driven by specific privileged interests, or by the ‘power’ of specific groups, this can be taken as a sign of political alienation. This political alienation takes the form of a specific ‘mobilization of bias’ in the policy process, and consequently, in policy output also. Importantly, this political alienation should be taken as a characteristic of the governance process, rather than as a characteristic of the implications of policy outcomes per se. Indeed, as we will see later, the mobilization of bias in favour of migrant rights can obviously also prevent what we will describe as ‘social alienation’ in the next chapter. However, it can also be equally true that the shaping of immigration policies in accordance with specific economic interests introduces a bias that harms the position of migrants or citizens in general, such as by selectively allowing forms of labour migration that may compete with other labour interests. The mainstreaming of migration and diversity governance can offer a strategy for averting such political alienation. From the policy science literature, it is very well known that the impact of privileged or at least organized interests on policymaking is most significant when there is a clearly institutionalized policy subsystem (Baumgartner and Jones 1991; Kingdon 1984; Sabatier 1988). When there is a clear policy subsystem,

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organized interests can institutionalize their policy preferences, exclude other groups and maintain a policy status quo as long as the policy subsystem is not deconstructed (through agenda setting or otherwise). Mainstreaming means that rather than constructing a specific policy subsystem, the complexity of wicked problems such as migration and diversity requires a generalization of these topics across various policy sectors and domains. This diminishes the opportunities for organized interests to effectively control participation in a subsystem and preserve their interests, and ensures a broader embedding of migration and diversity governance into generic concerns on, amongst others, education, welfare states, labour, housing, and so on. However, mainstreaming also involves risks when it comes to the selective mobilization of bias it can generate. Almost inherent to migration and diversity governance is that interests concern groups that do not always have the resources or degree of organization for mobilization. The question then arises as to what extent mainstreaming can result in a fair ‘mobilization of bias’ that also reflects the interests of migrants. In fact, as part of a broader critique of modern democracies, to what extent do democracies involve ‘client politics’ on behalf of established groups at the cost of newcomers?

The Politics of Gendered Migration One specific power structure that plays an important role in migration and diversity governance is that of gender relations. There are obvious gender aspects not only to migration and diversity as social phenomena, but also to the governance of migration and diversity. This involves, for instance, the gendered implications of migration laws, such as the dependent resident status of family migrants. In many countries, spouses risk losing their residency status if, for some reason, they get divorced within a certain time frame. Also, policy discourses on migration and diversity are often gendered, as in the fear of Muslim asylum migrants during the 2015/2016 refugee situation in Europe. When referring to the role of remittances in the relation between migration and diversity, gender is also often an important factor, as the often male guest labourers send economic, social and cultural remittances home to their families.

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A lack of awareness of the gendered aspects of migration governance may lead to the reproduction of gendered inequalities, and thus to political alienation. According to Kofman et al. Despite (the) increasing presence of migrant women in Europe, and a recognition of the femininization of migration (..), mainstream literature on migration has continued to ignore their presence. Most studies appear to be gender-neutral while utilizing models of migration based on the experiences of men. Women, where their presence is acknowledged, are often treated as dependants, migrating under family reunion and their contribution to economies and societies of destination countries ignored. Over the past 15 years, feminists have highlighted the heterogeneity of women’s positions within the migration stream, their presence in the labour market, their contribution to welfare and their increasing political activities. Yet the migration of women continues to receive little attention in mainstream literature and migration theorists have not adequately taken on board the significance of gender in understanding migration today. (Kofman et al. 2000)

One aspect of the need for gender awareness is the still often relatively weak representation and mobilization of women in migration and diversity governance (Kofman et al. 2000; M Schrover and Moloney 2014). This leads to policies that acknowledge and possibly reproduce gender issues in migration, such as migration policies that fail to recognize the risk of sexual abuse in migratory trajectories, or the regulation of family migration without taking consideration of gendered family relations. Another example is how integration policies have often been targeted at promoting work, which ignores other gendered routes of integration that do not necessarily include paid work. A very specific form involves the trafficking of women for the sex industry, which is a form of forced migration that seems to defy traditional categories of migration; various countries have responded by adopting specific measures for women who can prove that they have been the victim of trafficking. Another aspect of this awareness does not so much concern its involvement in governance as the gendered consequences of migration and diversity governance. As migration governance is, as Kofman et al. state, presented as being gender neutral, potential gender-specific consequences often tend to be ignored. A clear example is how restrictions on family migration (family formation, family reunification) may reproduce gender

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inequalities, and how welfare conditionalities attached to family migration may even increase gendered dependencies and inequalities within families.

6.3 T  he Politicization of Migration and Diversity Studies on the selective mobilization of bias have paid significant attention to how specific interests are represented in migration and diversity governance (see 6.2). However, one of the basic assumptions behind ideas such as client politics and constitutional politics is that migration and diversity governance are driven by a relatively high degree of de-­ politicization. Although this assumption may have applied to a large part of the second half of the twentieth century, in many parts of the world migration and diversity have become increasingly politicized since the 2000s. This has had an important effect on the logic of policymaking in these areas. This does not mean that concepts such as client politics and constitutional politics have lost their relevance, but rather that they should be positioned in a broader contemporary understanding of what politicization means for migration and diversity governance. Whereas client politics and constitutional politics have been important in the creation of institutionalized policy domains for migration and diversity, the politicization that has increased since the 2000s has been a clear signal of the growing complexification and contestation of these areas. Furthermore, by challenging subsystem politics, politicization inevitably has consequences for mainstreaming and political alienation.

The Politics of Depoliticization Politicization means increasing political attention and open political contestation of migration and diversity governance. As mentioned, policy science literature argues that both politicization and depoliticization are inherent stakes in the policy process. Some actors will try to prevent politicization, or protect a prevailing policy subsystem or policy monopoly by generating negative feedback towards contenders and preventing the

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agenda setting of a topic in the broader public and political arena. For instance, if organized business actors have an interest in preserving an open immigration regime, they will be likely to prevent politicization and provide negative feedback to contenders calling for more restrictive policies. At the same time, actors that feel excluded from a policy subsystem, will have an interest in challenging it and trying to put an issue on the broader agenda in an effort to get their voice heard. For instance, workers who feel threatened by relatively open policies on low-skilled or cheap labour migration, have an interest in politicizing the issue in order to get their concerns on the agenda. Elites have supposedly had a strong impact on migration and diversity governance, preventing politicization, and alienating the topics of migration and diversity as political issues from a broader public. This argument has already been made by Freeman (Freeman 2002), who argued that consensus of the political elites was a condition under which client politics could emerge. This observation has been supported by other researchers, such as Statham and Geddes, who show that political elite consensus rather than organized interests have driven migration and diversity policies (Statham and Geddes 2006). Studies highlight various motives behind this politics of depoliticization. Once again, client politics is often portrayed as a key motive for depoliticization (Freeman 1995). Open politicization could increase the pressure on governments to adopt policies that may harm specific organized interests, such as the interests of business elites in open migration and the interests of organized migrant organizations and NGOs. Another supposed motive is the fear that politicization leads to incentives to ‘play the race card’ (Guiraudon 1997; P Scholten 2011). More generally, there has been a strong belief in various countries, such as Canada, Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany, and to some extent the UK, that the nature of migration-related diversity, involving vulnerable ethnic or racial minorities, requires the topic to remain a non-partisan issue. It is precisely because of the vulnerable position of migrants that politicization would directly contribute to the political and social alienation of the groups involved. Finally, depoliticization, especially in the sense of an absence of party-­ political politicization, is related to internal contradictions and

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uncertainties in party political positions. On the one hand, in line with Freeman’s client politics thesis, there are often evident internal contradictions in the positions of liberal-conservative parties (including parties such as the Republicans in the US, the Christian Democrat CDU in Germany and the Conservatives in the UK). These parties often adopt relatively conservative positions regarding the impacts of migration on society while also representing the business interests that benefit from migration. On the other hand, social democrat parties often face what is described as the progressives’ dilemma (Will Kymlicka 2015). This involves a dilemma between advocating forms of international solidarity with migrants while protecting the social rights that are endowed upon citizens under welfare states that require some form of national solidarity. Key here is not to analyse these internal party contradictions in depth, but to argue that these contradictions introduce a degree of complexity for parties that speak out on migration and migration-related diversity, and may thus provide a ground for depoliticization. The politics of depoliticization can also take very different forms. Depoliticization should not always be interpreted as the (relative) absence of political attention. Another strategy can be to delegate migration and diversity to ‘non-political’ arenas, such as to scientists or to courts. This also can be seen as a form of ‘venue shopping’, whereby migration and diversity are delegated to those ‘venues’ that have lowest risks of open politicization. Getting scientists or authoritative advisory bodies involved in policy can be a strategy for diverting attention away from political contestation. This strategy has been commonly used in many countries, including Canada (Lefebvre and Brodeur 2017), Australia (Freeman and Birrell 2001; scholar.google), the UK (Hunter and Boswell 2015), Germany (Schneider 2009; Schneider and Scholten 2015) and the Netherlands (P.  Scholten 2009). As mentioned earlier, the courts have also been a primary arena, not only for controlling policies but also for refining and fine-tuning key policy details. Finally, other levels of government can also provide ‘venues’ to which attention for migration and diversity can be diverted. In countries like Canada and the UK, issues of migration-related diversity have been widely decentralized to local and regional governments; for instance in the UK, itself a pluralistic ‘nation’, this has helped to prevent national debates on migration and national identity (Hansen 2000).

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In terms of mainstreaming versus alienation, it should be clear that depoliticization cannot be seen as a strategy towards mainstreaming and embracing the complexity of migration and diversity in contemporary governance. It is fair to argue that politicization also brings risks of alienation, especially for the migrant groups involved, but this does not mean that depoliticization is a sustainable response. In fact, depoliticization can quite literally be seen as a form of estrangement of the challenges associated with migration and diversity from the broader public. Delegating migration and diversity to (political, economic) elites and keeping the issue from broader debate is a form of complexity reduction that can lead to governance approaches that are not viable in the long term. Mainstreaming in that case would involve a ‘normalization’ of migration and diversity as issues of political debate, embracing the (political) contestation that is inherent to this type of complex policy problems. However, as we will see later, arguing that depoliticization can lead to political alienation, does not mean that politicization cannot lead to political alienation.

Politicization and the Rise of Populism In various countries across the world, both migration and diversity governance have become increasingly politicized since the early 2000s (Brug et al. 2015; A Geddes and Scholten 2016). It seems as if the consensus among the party-political elite not to politicize migration and diversity, as far as this has existed according to various scholars, has lost a significant degree of its explanatory leverage for contemporary cases of politicization. Speaking to generic policy sciences, it is evident that a series of focus events (Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Birkland 1998) around the turn of the millennium, many of which had an international impact, played a key role in breaking the status quo that was generated by elite consensus. These events include the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US in 2001, as well as other terrorist activities in various European countries, the Arab Spring and the refugee crises of 2015/16, which clearly had global implications. A key factor in politicization, not unrelated to such focus events, has been the rise of populist and anti-immigrant parties. Cas Mudde speaks more specifically of the rise of ‘populist radical-right parties’ (2007, 2013). This involves a clear distinction between populist parties as a more general

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category, which includes both left-wing (such as the former Chavez’ socialist party in Venezuela and the Five Star Movement in Italy) and right-wing parties. Populist radical right parties tend to have an anti-­immigrant and/ or anti-immigration agenda, which is not always the case with left-wing populist parties. Populist radical right parties, according to Mudde, combine elements of nativism, authoritarianism and populism. They generate electoral support by appealing to charismatic leadership, the ‘ordinary man in the street’ and distinctly native sentiments and ideas. This means that populist radical right parties often invoke a clear sense of ‘nationalism’ and essentialist and culturalist understandings of citizenship and nationhood. There are plenty of examples of the emergence of such populist radical right parties across the world. Their growth in both numbers and power has been particularly significant in Europe (Mudde 2007), with the rise of parties such as the Front National in France, Alternative Fur Deutschland in Germany, the Freedom Party in the Netherlands, the Lega Nord Movement in Italy, Golden Dawn in Greece, the Swedish Democrats and the UK Independence Party (UKIP) in the UK. In terms of political positions, these parties all advocate restrictive immigration policies (targeted in particular at restricting Muslim immigration). In terms of migration-related diversity, there are differences between parties advocating assimilationism (such as AfD, UKIP, Lega Nord, SD) and parties that take a more segregationist line (FN, Golden Dawn, Freedom Party). Furthermore, these parties often make a strong issue connection between being anti-immigrant and being anti-EU.  At the core of this issue connection is a belief that it is because of Europeanization that countries have ‘lost control’ over their national immigration policies. However, the role of migration and diversity in contemporary politicization goes much further than populist radical right parties. First of all, the politicization of migration and diversity in general and the rise of populist radical right parties in particular have also affected the positions of mainstream political parties. In many countries, mainstream parties have become more outspoken in terms of their positions on migration and diversity (Brug et al. 2015). Research shows that many parties have taken over some elements from populist parties (Mudde 2013, 2018). This became clearly manifest in the early 2000s, when the state leaders of three main European countries (Germany, the UK and France), quickly followed each other in denouncing multiculturalism as a failure.

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Furthermore, this broader impact of populism (and politicization) goes beyond the sphere of political parties or ideologies. Gidron and Bonikowski argue that, besides being a political ideology, populism is also a discursive style and a broader political strategy (Gidron and Bonikowski 2013). It is a discursive style that emphasizes opposition between the people and the elites in a binary way, and that tends to appeal directly to the ‘ordinary man in the street’ in texts and speeches. Furthermore, it is a political strategy with a clear emphasis on authoritative leadership and mass mobilization. These two other ‘varieties of populism’ have been very visible in the positioning of mainstream parties in the fields of migration and diversity. These broader implications of politicization and the rise of populism carry evident risks of political alienation. Whereas depoliticization alienates the broader public from the debate on one of the most essential transformations in contemporary society, politicization in general and populism in particular can generate a political dynamic whereby migration and diversity become symbolic topics for a broader mobilization against the elites. Rather than being focused on issues experienced by ‘the populus’, migration and diversity have become key issues to generate mobilization and substantiate a binary opposition against (supposed) elites. Precisely because of the contested and complex nature of migration and diversity, and perhaps also because of the significance of developments therein, these issues are very suited to such symbolic mobilizations. This may have alienating effects, as it estranges political debate from actual issues related to migration and diversity.

6.4 C  onclusions: Between Mainstreaming and Political Alienation The concept of alienation has its roots in the critical tradition. In this perspective, alienation is all about inequalities. Translated to inequalities in terms of policy processes, this means the introduction of the selective mobilization of biases in policy processes. Several of such selective mobilization of biases were discussed in this chapter, including a bias concerning migrant groups and organizations, organized interests (client politics), and gender. Furthermore, it was discussed how patterns of politicization

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and depoliticization can promote or mitigate such mobilization of biases. Depoliticization can reinforce selective mobilization around organized interests, whereas politicization (such as driven by the rise of populism) can generate a policy dynamic whereby migration and diversity become issues of symbolic politics. In terms of the critical perspective, mainstreaming would mean that policymaking on migration and diversity would be driven by a fair consideration of inequalities and power structures. Such inequalities can thwart policy processes, especially in an area that almost by definition involves not only contestation but also groups that often occupy less powerful positions in society. Mainstreaming would involve the inclusion of such groups in policy processes as well as a fair mobilization of all others affected by developments in migration and diversity. However, as this chapter has discussed, various factors almost endemic to these policy areas generate alienation rather than mainstreaming. The selective mobilization of bias around organized interests (client politics) and the politics of depoliticization that was often generated by such interests, as well as politicization and the rise of populism, have tended to generate alienation. This has led to the emergence of a policy logic that is not only characterized by a strong symbolic dimension rather than by an orientation towards problem solving (symbolic politics), but also by inequalities and even unfairness in the involvement of relevant groups in the policy process. Importantly, such inequalities have involved the exclusion of both migrant groups and other groups affected by migration and diversity. Furthermore, although complexification requires mainstreaming, the critical perspective shows that complexification can also complicate mainstreaming. Efforts have been made, and are still being made in some settings, to come to a fair inclusion of migrant groups in policymaking. However, with the complexification of diversity, it is very hard to define which groups to include but also to what extent there are still groups to include. For instance, efforts to collaborate with migrant organizations have also led to negative inadvertent side effects, such as reifying group structures, and have given rise to contestation regarding the extent to which such organizations are representative.

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7 Discourses

Social constructionism represents a fourth perspective on the dynamics of migration and diversity policy, which does not so much emphasize the role of knowledge, power or institutions as that of language, ideas and narratives or ‘discourses’. The social constructionist perspective has highlighted the importance of the ideational and communicative realm when it comes to how actors understand and act upon societal issues. Rather than knowledge, institutions or power, discourses shape how we define societal issues, including whether or not we perceive something as a ‘problem’. Furthermore, by defining ‘problems’ as real, discourses can also make ‘problems’ real in their consequences. Especially with complex and contested policy problems such as migration and diversity, the social constructionist approach has contributed significantly to our understanding of how discourses matter to policymaking. Social constructionism has become an important part of the policy sciences (Fischer 2003; Forester 1993; Hajer 1995; Ingram et al. 2007; Rein and Schön 1994; Roe 1994; Stone 1989; Yanow 1996) as well as of contemporary migration research (Bleich 2002; Boswell et al. 2011; J. R. Bowen 2006; Yanow 2015). A key aspect of the constructionist approach that will be discussed in more depth in this chapter, is that of the role of discourses in © The Author(s) 2020 P. Scholten, Mainstreaming versus Alienation, Global Diversities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42238-7_7

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policymaking. In the face of complexity, discourses will often create coherent and convincing narratives on how and why policymakers should respond to issues of migration and diversity (Hajer 1995; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Roe 1994). Often, as many scholars argue, such discourses help actors to reduce or simplify complexity to provide feasible and convincing courses of action (Boswell 2011). A second aspect to be discussed in more depth concerns not so much the role of discourses in policymaking, but rather the discursive impact of policies. This can be the impact on societal issues in general as well as the consequences for specific social groups in particular. Social constructionists speak of a ‘performative effect’ of policy discourses (Yanow 1996). This reflects the broader Thomas’ theorem that has been widely shared in the social constructionist paradigm, that ‘if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences’. A particular consequence of migration and diversity policies is that they can have a strong impact on migrants and migrant groups, as well as on the interaction between migrants and others. The social constructionist perspective can help us to understand processes of both mainstreaming and alienation in migration and diversity governance. Discourses can help include as well as exclude migrants in the mainstream, and can help to shape policies in a way that either grasps or simplifies the complexities of migration and diversity. It is crucial to understand the conditions under which such discourses contribute to either mainstreaming or alienation.

7.1 The Social Constructionist Approach Social constructionism, also described as social constructivism or the culturalist perspective (Bekkers et al. 2017), focuses attention on social processes of sense making. Discourses in this perspective are not just representations of specific social realities: they constitute social realities. There is quite some variation in how discourses are defined. For the purposes of this book, and following largely the work of Hajer (Hajer 1995) and Fischer (Fischer 2003), discourses are defined as more or less coherent stories, consisting of specific concepts, beliefs and ideas that attribute

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meaning to a social situation and suggest specific courses for action in the context of this situation. This definition comes very close to closely associated concepts such as narratives (Roe 1994) and frames (Rein and Schön 1994). Policy discourses give meaning and direction to the interaction between the actors involved in a policy process. Discourses ‘frame’ problem situations in the face of complexity and include a ‘normative leap from what is to ought’ (Rein and Schön 1994). Discourses contain a ‘diagnosis’ of a situation as a ‘prognosis’ for action (Benford and Snow 2000). This means that such discourses are never ‘neutral’ in a mere objectivist sense; rather they include interpretations of problem situations that are often based on specific knowledge claims as well as values. This can help policymakers to come to terms with complex problem situations and to define feasible policies. Discourses can thus have an important effect on social interactions in policymaking. Within the policy sciences, there has been much attention to how discourses shape policy processes, for instance by the discursive construction of policy subsystems and policy monopolies (Baumgartner and Jones 1991) or by providing the conceptual foundations for policy networks (Klijn and Koppenjan 2014). Hajer (1995) describes a process of ‘discourse institutionalization’ when a discourse emerges, acquires support from actors sharing the same discourse (a ‘discourse coalition’), and becomes embedded in institutional policy arrangements. Once institutionalized, a process of ‘discourse structuration’ emerges, whereby a discourse starts to structure how people think and act upon a problem situation. For example, in the realm of environmental policies, a discourse on ‘sustainable development’ emerged, became institutionalized and started to structure the interaction between and meaning-giving of actors operating in this policy realm. Furthermore, discourses can also have an impact on social dynamics beyond the policy process. Indeed, within policy sciences there has been growing attention for the role of discourses in government communication, and even the role of discourses as policy instruments. This involves increasing attention being paid to how policies are communicated and ‘framed’, as well as to influencing behaviour by means of selective and strategic ‘nudging’ (Selinger and Whyte 2012). Take, for instance,

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how urban planning has involved sophisticated ways of planning neighbourhoods that ‘nudge’ people from different backgrounds to meet and interact. Discourse can, in particular, have an effect on social groups that are directly or indirectly targeted by policies. Social policies in particular tend to carve out specific social target groups. Besides reducing the social complexity around groups, as addressed earlier (see section 2.2), which makes it difficult to define groups, such social constructions can have various social implications for such groups. As Schneider and Ingram (1993) argue, the social construction of target groups communicates a message about who is deserving of help and who is not, and who is powerful and thus able to stand on their own feet, and who is not. They distinguish between four types of target group constructions: advantaged (strong and positive), dependents (weak and positive), contenders (strong and negative) and deviants (weak and negative). The social construction of target groups creates incentives for politicians and policymakers to provide benefits or burdens to these groups, and determines whether they do so overtly or tacitly. For instance, political support can be generated for openly burdening deviants, or for openly benefiting dependents and the advantaged. Contenders will often also receive political support, but often in a more tacit way. This incentive structure, and the allocation of benefits and burdens in accordance with these incentives, will also affect the position of the groups involved, as Schneider and Ingram argue. It creates disparities in both the social and political position of groups that undermines the ‘one-man-one-vote’ idea that underlies democracies. Deviants in particular will be put at greater distances from the socio-political system, whereas dependents, advantaged and in some cases also contenders will have a stronger position. Such implications for the position of groups are understood by Schneider and Ingram as key aspects of what they define as a degenerative logic of policymaking. Taking a social constructionist perspective on migration and diversity policies, it is clear that discourses can promote mainstreaming as well as alienation. On the one hand, discourses are an inherent aspect of how complex social realities are understood and acted upon. Even when, or perhaps particularly when, complex social problems are involved, it is

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through discourses that actors make sense of and navigate their ways through this complexity. In terms of mainstreaming it is important that actors have discourses that help them to grasp and understand complexity and respond to new problem developments. Rein and Schön (1994) have developed a framework for what they describe as ‘critical frame reflection’, which helps actors to produce, reproduce or change discourses or ‘frames’ in the face of complex or ‘intractable’ social problems. In the face of complexity, Rein and Schön argue that actors should be aware of their (cognitive/social) frames, they must be able to make frames explicit, identify alternative frames, reflect on the coherency, consistency and consequences of these frames and be willing to change frames when this seems appropriate. When such conditions are satisfied, frame reflection can help adjust ‘mainstream’ policy discourses in a way that reflects emerging developments and interpretations of problem situations such as migration and diversity. Also, critical frame reflection involves a recognition of the essential role that discourses and frames play in policy dynamics, making them an inherent stake within policy dynamics rather than assuming that discourses are ‘given’ and cannot be changed. On the other hand, as some of the studies that have been mentioned above have suggested, discourses can also have alienating effects. What Schneider and Ingram define as degenerative policy designs, whereby policies estrange some social groups while empowering others, will be seen as ‘social alienation’ in this book. This means alienation in terms of the social consequences for specific groups or actors. For instance, social groups, such as migrant groups or native groups may be alienated by paternalistic policies or minorities policies respectively. This may also involve policy actors that are alienated by discourses that simplify or reduce complexity rather than helping them to grasp complexity. Especially as the conditions for reflection are very ideal-typical, reflecting Habermas’ ideal speech situation to some extent, it is quite likely that in practice discourses will emerge and structure actor behaviour in a way that is not critically reflected upon. This is also social alienation as it disempowers actors to understand problem complexity. The following sections will zoom in respectively on the role of discourses in migration and diversity policy dynamics and on the construction of

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social groups within these discourses. For both dimensions of a social constructionist approach, a discussion will be provided of the conditions that promote either mainstreaming or alienation.

7.2 Discourses in Migration and Diversity Governance The social constructionist approach sees policymaking as a sense-making activity. Through the construction of discourses, social problems are defined and interpreted, and appropriate courses of action are suggested. This section examines studies on (policy) discourses in the field of migration and diversity policies and discusses how such discourses may have contributed to either mainstreaming or alienation.

 igration and Diversity As Essentially M Contested Concepts A first element of discourses concerns the definition or conceptualization of policy problems (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988; Rochefort and Cobb 1994). As already argued in section 2.1, the complexification of migration and diversity poses serious challenges to the definition of migration and diversity as social or policy problems. Migration and diversity are clear examples of, as constructionists describe it, ‘intractable policy controversies’ (Hisschemöller and Hoppe 1995; P. Scholten 2011; Schön and Rein 1995). This concerns problems that involve uncertainty and contestation at the most basic level of problem definition, including the wording of the problem, the interpretation (‘causal stories’) of the problem as well as the courses of action to be suggested. A central reason for why migration and diversity have become such intractable policy controversies, is that migration and diversity are in itself ‘essentially contested concepts’ (Collier and Hidalgo 2006). As social constructionists argue, the wording of migration and diversity is in itself contested. Or in other words, the discursive construction of what is seen as migration and what as (migration-related) diversity is in itself a

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stake within the policy process. Essentially contested concepts involve more than just ‘disagreements’ that could in theory be solved by examining the facts; conceptual contestation at the fundamental level of problem definition also means that the selection of which ‘facts’ matter is also contested, as will be the interpretation of these facts. The concept of migration is in itself already an example of an essentially contested concept. Partially, this contestation is related to varying interpretations of when someone is a migrant. For instance, from a political or legal perspective, migrants are often defined as people who move across an international border in order to settle somewhere else. A sociological definition of migrants can be much broader and include various forms of domestic migration. An example of where this definition has become particularly contested is that of migration within the EU. The EU consistently speaks of mobile EU citizens when referring to people who move between EU member states, whereas many EU member states and European cities tend to perceive these mobile EU citizens as migrants. The complexity surrounding the concept of ‘migration-related diversity’ is perhaps even more significant. At the level of defining what counts as migration-related diversity, a key issue is when someone can be defined as a migrant, and for how long. For instance, is a migrant someone who has actually migrated, or does it also include a second or even third generation (Alba 2005; M. Crul and Heering 2008)? And for how long after migration does someone continue to be conceptualized as a migrant, and who decides this? Another issue is on what basis migrants are defined: is this based on place of birth, legal status, race, ethnicity, nationality, or something else? A final and much contested issue is how to define courses of action regarding migration-related diversity. As discussed earlier in Chap. 4, the concept of ‘integration’ is widely used but also contested in terms of what it means (participation, assimilation) and who is responsible (integration as individual responsibility versus integration as a perspective for state intervention) (Schinkel 2013). The contested nature of concepts in the field of migration and diversity shows the challenges as well as the need for critical reflection. Reflection at the level of discourses can promote governance mainstreaming when it helps policy actors to grasp and respond to complexity. At the same time, absence of reflection can lead to discourses that promote social alienation

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by simplifying complexity with implications for the social position of actors and groups. The rise of the term superdiversity provides an example of how challenging this reflection can be. On the one hand, the rise of the term superdiversity in the 2000s (S Vertovec 2006, 2007a, b) has helped migration scholars and policy actors to capture the emerging complexity of migration-related diversity. It provided a way of reaching beyond the ‘ethnic lens’ that had been a dominant discourse up until that point, and no longer fully captured the dynamics of migration-related diversity. Subsequently, the concept of superdiversity has played an important role in revising policy discourses. On the other hand, the popularity of the superdiversity discourse (or in social constructionist terms, its discursive institutionalization and subsequent structuration of migration discourses), has also given it somewhat of the status of a paradigm beyond reflection. Rather than being a concept that helps us to understand complexities, it has started to define reality, even in situations where superdiversity is contested or simply does not apply. This involves a degree of complexity simplification by assuming that superdiversity applies, or should apply, everywhere. It is important to note that essentially contested concepts do not only involve uncertainty, but also contestation at the level of values and norms. Social constructionists see problem definition as an essentially subjective and value-driven activity. This means that the definition that emerges for migration and for migration-related diversity will have consequences for policy dynamics, society and the groups involved. This will be discussed in more depth in the next section and in 7.3 respectively.

Discourses in Migration and Diversity Governance In migration research, a considerable amount of attention has been paid to the role of discourses in migration and diversity policies (Boswell et al. 2011). Two important lines of study can be distinguished: one that focuses generally on how discourses develop in the field of migration and diversity policies, and one that focuses more specifically on the situational embedding of such discourses in specific contexts (such as in national contexts).

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A key example of the first line of study is Christina Boswell’s work on narratives of societal steering (Boswell et al. 2011). She shows how, in the face of the complexity of migration, policymakers for various reasons tend to reproduce narratives of migration control. Such narratives tend not only to overestimate possibilities for migration control, but also a variety of what she calls ‘problems of distortion and counterproductive effects’. Driven by control narratives, policymakers make choices that can have unanticipated and inadvertent effects. For instance, efforts made in various European countries to limit labour migration in the late 1970s did not stop further immigration, but instead discouraged labour migrants from returning to their home countries (for fear of not being let back in later) and inadvertently encouraged family migration (first family reunification, followed by family formation). Central to Boswell’s account of migration control narratives is her explanation of why narratives that tend to promote alienation are produced. She points not only to the role of political pressure on policymakers to control migration, but also to the impact of the broader media and bureaucratic organizations. The media tends to promote simplifying and dramatized narratives, while bureaucratic organizations also tend to prefer narratives that are workable, feasible and easy to communicate within and beyond the organization. Party politics and the mass media call for simple and dramatised narratives of migration control; and bureaucratic organizations require the development of narratives that are easily communicated and justifiable to officials, practitioners and interest groups. The implication is that policy interventions have a structural tendency to ‘short circuit’ the complexity of the migratory processes they are attempting to steer. (Boswell 2011: 1)

Such ‘short-circuiting’ of complexity results in social alienation, in this case of those directly involved in the production of the narratives. It leads to an over-belief in interventionism and control and a lack of understanding and appreciation of the limitations and inadvertent effects of such control. One could describe this social alienation as the development of a social bubble based on unrealistic beliefs in control. Interestingly, Boswell shows that this social alienation, the ‘social bubble’, tends to be

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reproduced by a selective and symbolic (see also Chap. 4) utilization of research. For instance, policymakers will seek out knowledge claims that help them to substantiate their control narratives and legitimate their interventions, instead of searching for knowledge claims that grasp complexity and might undermine simpler control narratives. The second line of study on discourses in migration and diversity governance focuses more on the contextual embeddedness of such narratives. Earlier in this book we discussed the prominent role of national models of integration both in policymaking and research (see paragraph 4.5). Whereas institutionalists argue that such models are institutionally reproduced and thus path-dependent, constructionists would say that the reproduction of these models is more embedded in national discourses. Indeed, various scholars have pointed out the role of what I would describe as ‘discourse coalitions’ in the reproduction of national models of integration (Bleich 2002, 2003; J.  Duyvendak and Scholten 2012; Favell 2003). For instance, John Bowen in his account of the French Republican Model, explains very thoroughly why, as he puts it, ‘the French don’t like headscarves’ (J.  R. Bowen 2006; P.  J. Bowen 2007). Bowen clearly shows the role of discourses in shaping policies and, in this case, public perceptions of migration and diversity. In France, this involves a discourse on public values, framing headscarves primarily as an issue that is in conflict with secularism (‘Laïcité’). Also, he shows how a strongly varied coalition of actors shared and reproduced this discourse, including politicians, policymakers, researchers and public intellectuals. Scholars like Favell and Bleich show that similar processes took place in the UK, where a discourse around ‘race relations’ was reproduced by a discourse coalition of politicians, policymakers and scholars (Bleich 2002; Favell 1998). In Canada, and especially in Quebec, a discourse coalition reproduces a more interculturalist approach (Lefebvre 2017). In the Netherlands, as a clear example of discursive construction rather than institutional path-dependency, a powerful discourse was created that policies from the past had been (too) multiculturalist. However, as scholars have argued, this has only been the case to a very limited extent: such multiculturalism discourses in the Netherlands functioned primarily as a counter-discourse to legitimate the turn away from multiculturalism towards a more assimilationist approach in the 2000s (J. Duyvendak and Scholten 2012; J. W. Duyvendak and Scholten 2009).

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Just like the more bureaucratic narratives of migration control that Boswell analyzed, such national ‘discourses’ on migration and diversity carry a significant risk of social alienation. Rather than creating a ‘bureaucratic’ bubble, they create a ‘national’ bubble that can distort a full appreciation of the complexities of migration and diversity. The reproduction of simplifying national narratives can generate pathologies in terms of understanding the challenges posed by migration and diversity (which may not be so nationally specific) and responding adequately to these challenges (in a way that may require thinking outside of the black box of national discourses).

7.3 T  he Discursive Construction of Social Groups A second key topic of research in social constructionist approaches to migration and diversity governance involves the social construction of target groups. This reflects a broader literature in the policy sciences (Ingram and Schneider 1993; Ingram et al. 2007; Pierce et al. 2014). However, in the case of migration and diversity policies, it involves a very specific group: migrants. As we will see, this has important consequences for the logic of policymaking, introducing a risk of social alienation of migrants.

Social Construction of Migrant Groups Categorization is an issue that has been addressed earlier in the book as part of the rational approach to policy. Indeed, as policy scholars argue, there is often a rational-instrumental need for the categorization of groups that are directly (or indirectly) involved in policies. This is the definition of policy target groups. However, as scholars like Schneider and Ingram but also Yanow have shown, such target groups are often not self-evident (Ingram and Schneider 1993; Yanow 2002; Yanow and Haar 2013). What is seen as the social construction of target groups is often an inherently context-driven and normative process. It can represent, reproduce or even produce broader constructions of relevant groups, of who belongs to such groups, and what it means to be a member of a group.

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As Yanow shows, the construction of migrant target groups is often very much connected to bureaucratic and instrumental needs in specific policy settings. For instance, for the provision of specific public services, some governments wish to collect data on race or ethnicity; not only at an aggregate level, but also at an individual level to determine whether differentiated services are required. In the US, this often meant capturing race in terms of ‘five’ standard racial or ethnic categories: White, Black, Asian, Native American, and Hispanic. As Yanow clearly shows, when someone fills in one of these categories on a form (or when a government agency does it for a person), this can have a range of consequences for education, health, criminal justice and many other areas. Sometimes these implications are codified, as when governments provide more funding to schools that accept children from first or second generation migration backgrounds in order to address the (statistical) disadvantages that such groups may face. Sometimes they are less tangible, as in the form of subjective but institutionalized assumptions held by health services providers regarding the type of health problems (and underlying social behaviour) that specific migrant groups may face. Various studies show that the forms that such social constructions may take vary greatly between countries (Favell 2003). For instance, the UK and the US are countries where migrants are often constructed in terms of specific racial categories. Furthermore, this is done based on a population census, where people can indicate the category to which they feel they belong. Many European countries construct migrants based on ethnicity, often defined on a national basis; for instance, Turkish migrants in Germany. There are also countries that defy having explicit target group constructions for migrants. France is perhaps the most notable example of this, with no official categorizations on the basis of either ethnicity or race (Amiraux and Simon 2006; Simon 2008a, b). Available data only states the country of origin and nationality of people residing in France. Target group constructions, especially when formalized and institutionalized, can have significant consequences for the groups involved. It is such consequences that will be described as ‘social alienation’. As Schneider and Ingram argue, target group constructions are not merely descriptive, but also normative; they convey messages about deservingness and need that are projected, in this case, on migrant groups. For instance,

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in the Netherlands the construction of migrant groups has changed dramatically in a couple of decades: migrants have gone from being perceived as relatively weak ethnic minorities in need and deserving of state help and protection, to being seen as primarily Muslim communities that challenge national norms and values, constitute a security risk and are not deserving of help but rather of a policy that places an individual obligation on migrants to integrate or even assimilate. Such changes in target group constructions often have important policy implications. In the Netherlands, policy has changed from being a minorities policy focused on social and cultural emancipation to being an integration policy that makes individual migrants fully responsible for all of their integration requirements, including the financing of their civic integration courses (P. Scholten 2011; Yanow and Haar 2013). Moreover, as Schneider and Ingram argue, there is a deeper, self-­ reinforcing effect that aggravates the alienating effects of target group constructs. The normative messages that are conveyed by target group constructs also provide incentives to politicians and policymakers to treat these groups in specific ways. They refer to this as self-reinforcing political opportunity structures that lead to ‘degenerativeness’. For instance, portraying migrants as negative and weak (deviants), provides political incentives to publicly burden migrants, and a strong disincentive to provide any benefits to them. For instance, the Dutch case provides an example in which the increasingly negative portrayal of migrants in the early 2000s provided further incentives to develop a negative discourse on migrants, which further reinforced their social alienation (Scholten 2011). In terms of complexification of diversity, the social construction of target groups can be seen as denials of the complex nature of group formation and identification. One of the key traits of the notion of ‘superdiversity’ is that it has become increasingly difficult to place migrants in distinct categories. This applies to government target group constructs as well as to the self-definition of migrant groups via a census. It also applies to situations where explicit target groups are made that defy the complexity of migrant groups (such as ethnic minorities, racial categories, etc.), as well as to situations where a colour-blind approach prevents any form of categorization (thereby denying that groups and group identities may matter). Simon even describes the latter situation as a ‘choice for ignorance’ (Simon 2008b).

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Mainstreaming would then not involve a colour-blind strategy, but rather a differentiated strategy towards capturing (or at least approximating) the complexity of migrant groups. Rather than institutionalizing a target construction on one specific basis, it means having data on many grounds that may be relevant for capturing the diversity of diversities in specific situations. This means that rather than a migrant or a group being placed in one single category for instrumental policy purposes, data on migrants are compiled for as many different aspects as needed. This can include, but should never be limited to just race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, and so on. Data on social groups can then assist the mainstreaming of generic policies and institutions. Rather than institutionalizing a specific policy around one or several socially constructed target groups (such as in multicultural policies), such data can help recalibrate and adjust generic policies and institutions in order to cater to and achieve equal outcomes across a variety of groups. For instance, the educational system can be adjusted in response to data on the differential impact of specific educational services across different groups based on ethnicity, race or nationality (somewhat similar to the gender mainstreaming in response to data on gendered impacts of educational services).

Text Box 7.1  How the French Do Target Groups by Means of Proxies Although France is widely known for its Republicanist approach, research has shown that it does target within its color-blind policy approach. For a long time its ‘Politique de la Ville’ evolved around setting specific priority urban zones (zones urbaines prioritaires) or priority education zones (zones education prioritaires). In this context it did target the neighborhoods where groups were overrepresented with specific problems or needs, rather than targeting the groups themselves. This is a policy approach that is used more widely in complex settings, where setting ‘proxies’ may be more effective than direct targeting. Whereas the French have chosen for an area-based approach as a proxy to targeting, there are many examples from other countries that follow a more needs-based approach. For instance, in Denmark language support is not dedicated to specific groups, but based on universal language skill test early in school career of children.

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Identification and ‘Othering’ It is worth elaborating further on how social constructions of migrant groups can generate social alienation. A key element of social alienation, as mentioned above, is that target group constructs convey normative messages on groups. This affects not only how they are treated, but can also affect their self-identification (see also Schneider and Ingram 1993) as well as how groups organize, mobilize and make (public or collective) claims (R Koopmans 2004; Ruud Koopmans and Statham 2003). The social construction of target groups is essentially also a form of identity politics. Target group constructs ascribe a certain identity. Importantly, the construction of these identities is often a collective process. This often involves agency of migrants, for instance in the form of migrant organizations representing specific group identifications (e.g. Somali organizations, Muslim organizations, black-Muslim organizations, migrant organizations, etc.). However, this agency is no guarantee that migrants themselves will have the final say in how their group identities are constructed. This ascription of identity can result in ‘othering’ (Van Houtum and Van Naerssen 2002) as a very specific form of social alienation. This means that target group constructs tend to reify and institutionalize identities that define migrants as being ‘the other’. Evidently, this can have important consequences for these groups, not just in terms of how they are treated but also in terms of self-identification. In this context, an important criticism emerged from interculturalist thinkers versus multiculturalist thinkers, saying that organizing policies based on specific cultural minorities carries the risk of strengthening minority identity over other identities (Meer 2016; Zapata-Barrero 2015). Interculturalists thus claim that multiculturalism has inadvertently contributed to the reification and ‘othering’ of groups, instead of contact and good relations between groups. Schinkel (2013, 2017) accounts for this ‘othering’ by referring to the function of constructing ‘the other’ in contrast to ‘us’ (or ‘the native’) in the context of broader societal debates on migrant integration. Rather than having a primary orientation on the integration of migrants per se, a function of migrant integration policies is to integrate ‘us’ by contrasting

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‘us’ versus ‘them’. Othering in this respect is defined by Schinkel as a form of ‘social hypochondria’; it projects feelings of insecurity in society upon ‘the other’, in this case, ‘the newcomer’. Empirical studies also show how target group constructions influence the organization and claims-making of migrants. Koopmans and Statham (2003) show how the claims that migrants make in the political arena, and the grounds on which they mobilize, are very much determined by the national political and policy contexts. For instance, the UK race relations discourse and the social construction of migrants in the UK on a racial basis, is very much reflected in the type of claims that migrants make in the media and in the political arena. In the Netherlands, where migrants are defined primarily on an ethnic and cultural basis, this is also very much reflected in the type of claims made by migrants. This illustrates the self-reinforcing logic that target group constructions can generate.

7.4 C  onclusions; Between Mainstreaming and Social Alienation The social constructionist perspective highlights the role that discourses play in migration and diversity policies. Discourses are more than definitions or descriptions of problem situations and appropriate policy actions; they attribute meaning to and interpret problem situations as a foundation for policy action. Especially when complex policy issues such as migration and diversity are involved, there is likely to be significant variation in and contestation on policy discourses. When examining migration studies literature, there is much research on the role of discourses in policies as well as on the social impact of these discourses. The essentially contested nature of many concepts related to migration and diversity, seems to contribute significantly to complexity in policymaking. The concepts that are used, including basic terms like ‘migration’ and ‘integration’, are often part of very specific ‘discourse coalitions’. Within such coalitions a specific discourse is shared, but between discourse coalitions there tends to be significant misunderstanding

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and contestation. Often, as we have seen in this chapter, such discourses follow a specific rational-instrumental logic, providing actors working on migration and diversity with a shared understanding that allows them to implement a specific policy. Or it follows a specific national discourse. A key aspect of such discourses is how migrants are socially constructed. Target group construction is often an inherent aspect of the policymaking process but tends to follow a specific logic when migrants are involved. Although there is agency on behalf of migrants, they often do not have the final say on the identities that are ascribed to them in target group constructs. Furthermore, once institutionalized, target group constructs can have important implications for migrants in terms of what policies are developed, how they are treated, and also in terms of their self-identification. Discourses are an inherent aspect of policymaking and can thus potentially contribute to either mainstreaming or alienation. What matters is how discourses are constructed and in particular to what extent there is critical reflection about the discourses that are being used. Following Rein and Schön’s notion of critical frame reflection, a key role of migration scholarship is to promote critical reflection on the discourses that are used. This could lead to a mainstreaming of migration and diversity discourses that could help to define migrants as part of the mainstream and minimize the risk of social alienation. However, as we have seen in this chapter, the social constructionist perspective helps to elucidate how policy discourses often tend to generate ‘social alienation’ under conditions of complexity. This can involve the social alienation of migrants in the form of ‘othering’. Target group constructions not only capture identities, they also ascribe identities, and institutionalize and reify identities in a way that can contribute to alienation. This is what is described by scholars as ‘degeneration’ or as ‘othering’. Social alienation may also involve policy actors. As studies (Boswell 2011; Boswell et al. 2011) show, policy discourses or ‘narratives’ often tend to simplify or ‘short-circuit’ complexity for bureaucratic or instrumental reasons. This may result in policymakers working within the ‘social bubble’ of a specific discourse, alienated from broader developments in the complex settings of migration and diversity.

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Pierce, J. J., Siddiki, S., Jones, M. D., Schumacher, K., Pattison, A., & Peterson, H. (2014). Social construction and policy design: A review of past applications. Policy Studies Journal, 42(1), 1–29. Rein, M., & Schön, D. (1994). Frame reflection. Toward the resolution on intractable policy controversies. New York: Basic Books. Rochefort, D.  A., & Cobb, R.  W. (1994). The politics of problem definition: Shaping the policy agenda. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Roe, E. (1994). Narrative policy analysis: Theory and practice. Durham: Duke University Press. Schinkel, W. (2013). The imagination of ‘society’ in measurements of immigrant integration. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 36(7), 1142–1161. Schinkel, W. (2017). Imagined societies: A critique of immigrant integration in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schneider, A., & Ingram, H. (1993). Social construction of target populations: Implications for politics and policy. American Political Science Review, 87(2), 334–347. Scholten, P. (2011). Framing immigrant integration: Dutch research-policy dialogues in comparative perspective. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Schön, D.  A., & Rein, M. (1995). Frame reflection: Toward the resolution of intractable policy controversies. Basic Books. Selinger, E., & Whyte, K. (2012). Nudging cannot solve complex policy problems. European Journal of Risk Regulation, 3(1), 26–31. Simon, P. (2008a). Les statistiques, les sciences sociales françaises et les rapports sociaux ethniques et de «race». Revue Française de Sociologie, 49(1), 153–162. Simon, P. (2008b). The choice of ignorance: The debate on ethnic and racial statistics in France. French Politics, Culture & Society, 26(1), 7–31. Stone, D. A. (1989). Causal stories and the formation of policy agendas. Political Science Quarterly, 104(2), 281–300. Van Houtum, H., & Van Naerssen, T. (2002). Bordering, ordering and othering. Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, 93(2), 125–136. Vertovec, S. (2006). The emergence of super-diversity in Britain. ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Society Working Paper (COMPAS), 25, University of Oxford. Vertovec, S. (2007a). New complexities of cohesion in Britain: Super-diversity, transnationalism and civil-integration. West Yorkshire: Commission on Integration and Cohesion. Vertovec, S. (2007b). Super-diversity and its implications. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 30(6), 1024–1054.

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8 Research, Reflexivity and the Practice of Migration and Diversity Governance

The conceptual and theoretical framework developed in preceding chapters seeks to contribute to a better understanding of mainstreaming and alienation in the governance of migration and diversity. Although this framework is primarily focused on the study of migration and diversity governance, it can also play a role in migration and diversity governance. The framework and conceptual tools developed in this book can make actors aware of the factors that may promote either mainstreaming or alienation. The ambition of this chapter is to discuss how the insights from this book could enrich the practice of migration and diversity governance. In reflecting on how the perspective offered in this book may enrich the practice of governance I will also consider the role that migration scholars play in governance. This role of migration scholars has, at times, been contested (Boswell 2009; Scholten et  al. 2015). Various scholars have argued that research-policy relations in the past have not only had a perverse effect on policymaking (Ratcliffe 2001), but also on the development of migration studies itself (Bommes and Morawska 2005; Favell 2003; Schinkel 2013). For instance, earlier chapters revealed how research and policymakers coproduced paradigmatic closure around specific national models of integration or ideas about migration control (Chap. 4), © The Author(s) 2020 P. Scholten, Mainstreaming versus Alienation, Global Diversities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42238-7_8

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and how institutional connections between research and policy can lead to selective knowledge utilization but also to the production of migration research and data (Chap. 5). Therefore, a discussion of how awareness of mainstreaming and alienation can enrich migration and diversity governance should also include a discussion of what this means for migration scholarship and the relation between migration research and policy. With regard to the actual practice of migration and diversity governance, the key question is whether actors can come to terms and cope with the complexification of migration and diversity. Does the central thesis of this book—that complexification leads to an inclination towards alienation—involve a deterministic relationship from which no escape is possible, or can actors respond to complexification in a way that promotes mainstreaming? Is alienation inevitable and fatalistic, or can actors recognize and avert it? Navigating a way between relativism and positivism, the notion of reflexivity will be explored throughout this chapter to address this key issue. By helping actors to become aware of the factors that promote alienation or mainstreaming, this book seeks to contribute to reflexivity on the part of actors involved in migration and diversity governance.

8.1 What Policy Actors Can Do: Reflexivity In the policy literature, there are different takes on the extent to which actors can actually be aware of and tame the factors that drive policymaking while being involved in and part of these policymaking processes. This applies in particular to wicked or complex policy problems. On the one hand, there is the ‘optimistic’ or ‘positivist’ view, which sees coping with complexity as an issue of problem structuring. According to this view, it is possible to tame the uncertainties and contestation that accompany complexity. Objectivity is essential to this taming of wicked problems, as was discussed in Chap. 4. In other words, actors could cope with complex problems by resolving their complex nature. This involves an ‘objective’ disposition of policy actors (able to identify and utilize knowledge) as well as a strong belief in knowledge and information (as being sound, complete and intelligible). For instance, faced with new migration flows, governments should acquire relevant knowledge and information

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and adjust their policies accordingly, thereby solving the problem and removing the issue from the agenda. However, as has been argued in preceding chapters, this view involves many fundamental issues that cast doubt on whether such problem structuring is possible in the case of wicked policy problems. On the other hand, there is what could be called the more ‘pessimistic’ view, which sees alienation or ‘degeneration’ as an inescapable part of the governance of wicked policy problems. There is a sense of determinism but also relativism to this view. It is deterministic as it sees alienation (and the uncertainties and contestation that come with complexity) as inherent to the actions of and relations between policy actors. It is precisely because actors are part of and ‘caught’ in the logic of policymaking that characterizes wicked or complex problems, from which they are unable to escape. For instance, faced with the dynamics of migration flows, business actors are supposedly doomed to engage in ‘client politics’ in order to serve their interests, or politicians are ‘doomed’ to engage in symbolic rhetoric for electoral gain. This pessimistic view has a sense of relativism to it, as it does not express any belief in the role that knowledge and information could play in problem structuring or in the capabilities of actors to reflect on and respond to such knowledge and information.

Reflexivity Navigating between these optimistic and pessimistic views, the notion of reflexivity takes an alternative view. Reflexivity does not involve a belief that social phenomena can be fully controlled by human reasoning, but it does believe that by constantly trying to develop a better understanding of new and changing social phenomena, these phenomena will change as a consequence of reflexive social action. The notion of reflexivity has been developed by social theorists that include Beck (1992, 1998, 2000), Beck et al. (1994), Giddens (1984) and Bourdieu (2004). It refers to a higher form of reflection whereby actors are aware of the deeper causes and effects of social phenomena and change and direct their actions accordingly. Thomas and Thomas have expressed this aptly in their famous statement that ‘if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences’ (Thomas and Thomas 1928).

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Especially for the governance of wicked problems, the notion of reflexivity adequately captures how governance can rarely be seen as a linear process leading to a single policy outcome and the full resolution of a policy problem. Rather, when faced with complexity, governance can be seen as an ongoing process of constantly responding to new or changing social circumstances. Reflexivity contains the word ‘reflex’, expressing a constant circular relationship between our social understanding of phenomena and the social actions that shape them. When a social phenomenon emerges, societies will try to understand what is causing it, and use this understanding to reshape the phenomenon. This, in turn, will have all sorts of effects that will have to be understood better, and so forth. Whereas the optimist view believes that actors can control social phenomena by rational societal steering and the pessimist view holds that actors will always be captured in the dynamics of these social phenomena without being aware of this, the notion of reflexivity highlights that actors will constantly have to respond to new and changing social circumstances by making sense of them and in order to change them. In other words, the best thing that policy actors can do when coping with complex policy problems, is to ‘run behind the facts’ as best they can. The issue of migration control illustrates how reflexive governance can work in practice. The flows, drivers and infrastructures of migration are often highly variable and unpredictable. This means that migration policies often need to be revised repeatedly in the light of new migration developments. Moreover, the very drivers and infrastructures that are targeted by migration policies will also respond to and change due to migration policies. For instance, migrants will learn which migration drivers (work, humanitarian reasons or family reasons) provide the best opportunities for immigration, which countries are most or least open, which infrastructures provide access to these countries, and so on. Such reflexivity on the part of migrants will trigger changes in policies, which will need to respond to the reflexivity of migrants. This means that rather than being based on a stable policy paradigm, the governance of migration will mostly involve constant changes in the response to new developments and new insights. Naturally, this will only be the case if governance is driven by reflexivity.

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 ritical Reflection and the Situated Resolution C of Controversy Reflexivity can be considered a theoretical ideal in the context of wicked policy problems, but can it actually be achieved in the context of the often complex and intractable realities of governance? Rein and Schön’s framework of critical frame reflection applies the notion of reflexivity specifically to policymaking (see also Chap. 7). They argue that what they describe as ‘reflection’ can contribute to the ‘situated resolution of controversies’ (Schön and Rein 1995, p. 176). They also believe that coping with complex or ‘intractable’ policy problems requires actors to be reflexive ‘within the game’: Starting with the analysis of controversy as frame conflict, we propose that human beings can reflect on and learn about the game of policymaking even as they play it, and, more specifically, that they are capable of reflecting in action on the frame conflicts that underlie controversies and account for their intractability. In our view, human beings are capable of exploring how their own actions may exacerbate contention, contribute to stalemate, and trigger extreme pendulum swings, or, on the contrary, how their actions might help to resolve the frame conflicts that underlie stubborn policy disputes. We believe that hope for human reason in the chaotic, conflictual world of policy-making lies in a view of policy rationality that gives a central place to this human capability for reflection ‘within the game.’ (ibid: 37–38)

Importantly, Rein and Schön see this ‘reflection’ as a ‘social’ rather than as a ‘cognitive’ activity; that is why reflexivity would always need to be ‘situated.’ This means that reflexivity would depend on how social relations between actors are organized. These relations should be characterized by what they describe as ‘design rationality’. Design rationality does not mean rationality at a cognitive level on how to objectively understand and control a policy problem, but rather design rationality at a social level on how to shape relations between actors involved in a policy process. According to Rein and Schön, these relations would need to be characterized by several criteria in order to achieve ‘critical reflection’:

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–– Communicative imperative; actors must be willing and capable of engaging in conversation with each other regarding a problem situation. –– Awareness; actors must be aware of their own problem understandings (‘frames’) and be able to ‘put themselves in the shoes of other actors’, and thus identify alternative understandings of a problem situation. –– Conversation with the problem situation; actors must have a clear understanding of the problem setting in order to examine the consistency of both their own and alternative problem views. –– Willingness to change; actors must be open to change if the critical examination of the actor’s views and consideration of alternative views give cause to do so. This also requires a degree of mutual trust. Echoing the earlier observation in this book that complex problems require complex solutions, reflexivity seems to offer such a complex approach rather than a simple solution. It provides a way for constantly and structurally responding to the challenges that complex problems like migration and diversity bring. Mainstreaming requires constant reflexivity on how established policies and institutions should be adjusted to deal with the emerging realities of migration and diversity, as well as on how such structural adjustments affect the social phenomena of migration and diversity. This reflexivity does not have an end-point, but requires a constant re-examining of governance responses in the light of the dynamics of complex problems. Examples include reflexivity on the functioning of welfare states in the light of migration dynamics, reflexivity on migration policies in the light of new and emerging migration flows, as well as on the impact of policies on these flows, etc. A key empirical question is, evidently, whether actors can achieve the ambition of reflexivity. How realistic are the conditions that Rein and Schön have outlined for achieving ‘reflexivity’ under concrete and actual policy circumstances? Especially in the field of environmental research, studies have provided evidence of ‘reflexive modernization’, in particular involving a growing awareness of the circular relationship between environmental change and social behaviour (Beck et al. 1994). This awareness among various policy actors and across policy sectors has been a key driver of environmental mainstreaming, or the ongoing adjustment of many policies and institutions to the emerging understandings of

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environmental change. However, other studies in this area have revealed how difficult it is to achieve reflexivity, and how many ‘incentives’ there are in economic and social structures to promote environmental degradation (Hisschemöller et al. 2001). The framework developed in this book hopes to make actors aware of the factors that lead to either mainstreaming or alienation. Promoting reflexivity can contribute to averting alienation and promoting mainstreaming. However, the discussion on alienation in earlier chapters casts doubt regarding the extent to which reflexivity has been achieved in the governance of migration and diversity. For instance, the analysis of problem alienation casts doubt on the extent to which policy actors have been able to engage in a serious conversation with the problem situation. Similarly, institutional alienation shows that both the communicative imperative and the willingness to change may be difficult to achieve in settings characterized by institutional decoupling and path-dependency. Political alienation may also impede awareness of alternative problem understanding because of political objectives, or a conversation with the problem situation because of symbolic politics. Finally, social alienation may impede communication as it excludes some actors from the conversation. More empirical research is required in the field of migration and diversity governance to examine the extent to which reflexivity is achieved. And in achieving reflexivity, researchers play a very particular role, to which I will turn in the next section.

8.2 W  hat Research Can Do; Reflexive Research-Policy Dialogues What role can migration research play in promoting reflexive governance? As already observed in various parts of this book, migration researchers have at times played an important role in the governance of migration and diversity. This has also had an important effect on the development of the field of migration studies, in terms of both size and substance. How can migration research contribute to reflexivity in a way that helps actors to avert alienation and promote mainstreaming?

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Research-Policy Relations as a Reflexive Dialogue Whereas helping people to understand social phenomena such as migration and diversity is in itself a core ambition of the social sciences (knowledge production), changing these social phenomena is not a direct ambition of the social sciences. However, there is an evident relationship between the two: by helping people to understand phenomena, scholars can contribute to reflexivity. For instance, research revealing that in addition to direct discrimination there may also be more indirect, implicit or ‘institutional’ forms of discrimination, has significantly reshaped thinking on discrimination. However, whether research actually leads actors to change social behaviour depends on a much broader range of factors. In particular, whether migration research actually contributes to reflexive governance also depends on how the relation between research and policy is shaped. In Chap. 4, we already explored from a rationalist perspective how research-­policy relations can be configured according to different models, including technocracy, enlightenment, (social) engineering and bureaucracy. These models differ in terms of scientific or political primacy, and whether or not they define sharp boundaries between science and politics. However, reflexivity in the context of complex problems requires a different way of thinking about researchpolicy relations. Neither research nor politics can have primacy, as politics needs research to be reflexive, but research cannot determine politics because of the knowledge uncertainty that characterizes complex problems. Also, the idea of ‘boundaries’ between research and politics vanishes to the background in a setting where complexity often involves a mutual ‘scientification of politics’ as well as ‘politicization of science.’ With regard to Rein and Schön’s ideas on critical reflection, research-­ policy dialogues in the context of complexity need to satisfy their conditions of communication, awareness, conversation with the problem situation and willingness to change. This alternative mode of research-­ policy relations has been described in terms of a ‘dialogue’ (P Scholten et al. 2015). Research-policy relations as a ‘dialogue’ means that neither research nor politics has primacy and that there are no impermeable boundaries between researchers and policymakers engaging in mutual relations from distinct roles. Academics do not retreat into an ivory tower, nor do research-policy relations take the shape of a firmly

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institutionalized relationship: rather researchers and policy actors engage in mutual interaction on an equal playing field but playing different roles. Redefining research-policy relations as a dialogue also reflects how the governance of complex problems is an iterative rather than a linear process. Reflexive governance does not mean that research can provide ‘once and for all’ solutions to complex problems; instead, it requires a constantly recurring search for new answers to new questions. This also means that researchers are not expected to provide ‘the answer’ to governance challenges. Rather, they are expected to assist actors in finding answers to new questions, whereby these actors are expected to be aware of uncertainty and able to work with competing knowledge claims. As such, critical research-policy dialogues can play a key role in the mainstreaming of migration and diversity governance. They can help actors to constantly re-examine policies and institutions in the light of new developments. They fulfil a central role in reflexivity by helping actors to understand developments in the context of migration and diversity and to respond accordingly. However, having critical research-policy dialogues is not enough in itself to bring about mainstreaming. The following sections outline a number of ways in which critical research-policy dialogues can help avert alienation.

Knowledge Accumulation against Problem Alienation Problem alienation impedes reflexive governance and mainstreaming. In what way can research-policy dialogues contribute to averting problem alienation? A first contribution of migration scholarship can be to help actors to engage in a serious conversation with the problem situation. This is, evidently, very close to the heart of what migration research is about: producing knowledge about migration and diversity. However, there are several challenges involved when it comes to contributing to a conversation with the problem situation. The field of migration studies has grown rapidly over the past few decades. This involves an expansion along various dimensions: –– Size: the field of migration has expanded rapidly in terms of number of publication outlets (for the number of journals, see Fig. 8.1, and for the number of journal and book publications, see Fig. 8.2), as well as

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Fig. 8.1  Number of journals focused on migration and migration-related diversity (1960–2018) (Pisarevskaya et al. 2019)

Fig. 8.2  Number of journal articles and book chapters on migration and migration-­related diversity (1961–2017) (Pisarevskaya et al. 2019)

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in terms of scholars specialized in migration and institutes established specifically for the study of migration. For instance, between 2010 and 2018, IMISCOE, Europe’s largest migration research network, expanded from 300 to more than 800 individual members, and from 29 to 45 member institutes. –– Globalization: there has been a rapid expansion of migration studies beyond Europe and North America, such as the foundation of an African Migration Network and the organization of migration conferences in Asia. –– Interdisciplinarity: the range of disciplines and research fields engaged in migration studies has also expanded (Brettell and Hollifield 2014). Whereas originally migration studies was primarily an area for sociological and anthropological research, it is now being studied in other disciplines, such as economics, political science, public administration, geography, demography, history and law, and emerging disciplines such as health sciences and psychology. This growth of the field of migration research has, however, also led to knowledge fragmentation. Knowledge fragmentation without knowledge accumulation has, according to various scholars, impeded theory=building in migration studies (see also Bommes and Morawska 2005). Although much research is being produced, migration research lacks an infrastructure to bring together research from the growing field and the growing range of countries and disciplines (P Scholten et al. 2015). Here the field also suffers from the legacies of its development in the past. The early development of migration studies was shaped primarily in specific national contexts, leading to what some have described as ‘methodological nationalism’, which is still manifest in some of the concepts and data produced in migration studies today (Christophe Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012; Kraler et al. 2015; Simon et al. 2015). Theory-building is an important force against problem alienation as it enables actors to develop a clear understanding of a specific aspect of migration and diversity. For instance, a clear theoretization of the relationship between population mobility and social cohesion at the neighbourhood level will assist policy actors to engage in a serious conversation with the problem situation, as it provides them with the conceptual and

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theoretical tools for doing so. On the contrary, knowledge fragmentation without knowledge accumulation can contribute to relativism amongst policy actors. The lack of a clear conceptual apparatus or the presence of incompatible knowledge claims can contribute to a sentiment of ‘anything goes’ that promotes problem alienation. There has, however, been significant progress in the development of better infrastructures for systematic knowledge accumulation. The field of migration studies has become increasingly institutionalized at an international level, as demonstrated not only by the international publication outlets specialized in migration studies, but also by the growing number and size of international migration networks (Metropolis, IMISCOE, the Migration Conference, the African Migration Network, etc.). In the positivist view, as we saw in Chap. 4, knowledge accumulation and theory-building are expected to solve policy controversies. From the point of view of reflexivity and mainstreaming, this is not the case. It is precisely because complex problems such as migration and diversity are characterized by relatively high degrees of uncertainty, that knowledge accumulation should be seen as an ongoing process rather than something with a clear end-point leading to problem resolution. Knowledge disagreements are often a driver of theory-building, and actors involved in reflexive governance should be able to cope with dissenting knowledge claims. In fact, this is why research-policy dialogues and critical conversations with the problem situation will contribute to reflexive governance as much as they can contribute to knowledge production and accumulation in migration studies.

 eflexive Knowledge Production Against R Political Alienation Political alienation can impede reflexive governance in various ways. Structural inequalities between the positions of various actors can be an obstacle to the communicative imperative, as it provides some actors with more say than others. For instance, we saw in Chap. 6 that client politics tends to privilege some actors over others. In addition, symbolic politics can be an obstacle both to a conversation with the problem situation (as

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the problem is considered for symbolic purposes only), and to awareness (as no reflection on alternative problem views is likely to take place). Reflexive knowledge production calls upon migration scholars to be more aware of the ‘political’ connotation that some of their concepts and theories may have. It appeals to them to produce knowledge in a way that helps to grasp complexity rather than helping to reproduce specific complexity simplifications. This can prevent scholars from inadvertently promoting political alienation and reproducing (tacit) power structures in the policy field. It does not so much require scholars to refrain from engaging in research-policy dialogues, but rather calls upon them to engage in research-policy dialogues from an intellectually and structurally independent position. In the development of migration studies over the past decades, there have been structural relationships that may have impeded this academic independence. For instance (as discussed in Chaps. 4 and 5), various studies have discussed how structural dependencies emerged between migration scholars and policymakers around specific national models of integration (Bommes and Morawska 2005; Favell 2003; Ratcliffe 2001). Simon et al. show that this reproduction of national models is still manifest in data collection and conceptualization of migrants in countries across the world (2015). Geddes (2005) shows how the growing involvement of EU institutes in funding migration research (such as via EIF, later renamed to AMIF, as well as the European framework programmes) also involved an attempt to ‘coproduce’ migration as a European problem (see also Andrew Geddes and Scholten 2015). Favell (2001) even argues that migration research, both in the study of migration and ‘integration’, has been instrumentalised in the context of state concerns to control migration and enforce integration. Reflexive knowledge production does not, of course, mean that there can be no relations between researchers and policymakers. Rather, it means that in order to promote reflexivity, these relations should be void of structural and institutional interests. Earlier studies have revealed what is described as the ‘institutionalization problem’: once relations between specific researchers and policy actors become institutionalized, this tends to contribute to ‘paradigmatic closure’ and limit the opportunities for reflexive governance (H Entzinger and Scholten 2015; P Scholten

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et  al. 2015). With respect to Rein and Schön’s conditions for critical reflection, this means that institutionalization limits the opportunities for open communication and for raising awareness on alternative problem views. With regard to political alienation, anchoring academic independence would also be in the interest of policy actors. It would give them access to unbiased knowledge and expertise that they could use in a way that would allow for reflexive governance. In practice, this means that policy actors would be better off if they could have access to a broad range of academics and institutes, as this would prevent the privileging of specific knowledge claims. This would increase the likelihood of policy actors being able to access knowledge and information that would help them to understand new and emerging phenomena, rather than having to account for new developments on the basis of older theories and concepts. In order to be reflexive, policy actors need to remain open to varying knowledge claims. Academic independence also requires reflexivity on behalf of migration scholars concerning the theoretical and conceptual tools they use. This involves awareness of the values that may be embedded in migration research, and how these values may relate to broader structural inequalities in society. For instance, the term ‘integration’ has been the subject of much reflection in migration studies over the past decade (Adrian Favell 2001; Schinkel 2017). This has led to a sharp decrease in the use of this concept in research, as it was seen as overly reflecting state priorities. Also with regard to how migration scholars collect data, there is growing reflexivity on the methods and grounds for data collection (Simon et al. 2015).

Academic Mainstreaming Against Social Alienation Social alienation refers to how discourses can have an effect on social groups involved in migration and diversity governance. This may include various social groups, such as migrants, as well as others who feel affected by migration and diversity. What can research-policy dialogues do to

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prevent social alienation? An important driver of social alienation is, according to Schneider and Ingram, the construction of policy target groups. Target group constructions supposedly contribute to a degenerative policy logic by providing (negative/positive) incentives for the treatment of specific groups. In the case of migration and diversity this often involves specific migrant groups. Reflexivity on the social construction of migrant groups can thus be an important condition for addressing social alienation. Migration research can inadvertently contribute to the degenerative effects of target groups by focusing attention primarily on what is specific to migrant groups. Various studies argue that this is what occurred when migration research focused primarily on specific (ethnic or racial) minorities (Jan Rath 2001). According to this view, minorities research inadvertently contributed to the idea that migrant groups are very different from other groups because of their ethnic or racial background, and require a group-specific approach in order to address group-specific issues. Mainstreaming involves looking not so much at what is specific to migrant groups, for instance, their racial or ethnic background, but rather at how the issues that migrants face are connected to broader (social, economic, political, etc.) structures. For instance, racial discrimination may still emerge as an important topic of research, but then as a societal problem rooted in specific societal structures with particular consequences for various groups. One way for migration studies to be more reflexive on group constructions and contribute to governance mainstreaming, is what can be described as ‘academic mainstreaming.’ This means that migration studies should be seen primarily as a transdisciplinary field of study, similar, for instance, to gender studies. Migration studies is not a discipline and much of what it studies is closely related to general studies on social inequality, post-colonialism, economic globalization, and citizenship, etc. In fact, given the significance of migration and diversity today, migration studies has significant potential to contribute to ‘mainstream’ theory development in a variety of disciplines, including sociology, political science, economics and law.

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Text Box 8.1  Academic Mainstreaming; why Migration Scholars Should Mix More with Scholars from Other Fields and Disciplines It is clear that migration studies has evolved as a distinct and increasingly institutionalized field of study, with its own journals, conferences, institutes, training programs and networks. It is a field defined by its focus on migration, migrants and migration-related diversities. However, this does not mean that what is studied by migration scholars is always specific to migration, migrants and migration-related diversities. The institutionalization of migration studies carries in it the risks of ‘exceptionalism’, or in other words, inadvertently reinforcing the idea that what migration scholars find is very particular to migration, migrants and migration-related diversities (and thus contributing to ‘social alienation’). Here again a comparison with gender studies is very helpful in understanding how the social complexity of issues as gender and migration bring along very strong intersectional characteristics that are often not so particular at all to either men or women or to migrants or non-migrants. To understand how for instance generic economic factors or generic political and cultural developments account for migration, migrants and migration-related diversities, it is of utmost important that migration scholars remain embedded in broader fields of study and disciplines that address such more generic developments. And the other way around, by mainstreaming the findings of migration scholars into generic fields and disciplines such as economics, political science and sociology, a lot can be learnt in these disciplines from how migration is often a revelatory case on how general economic, cultural or political developments play out in the context of globalization and rising social complexity. That is why migration scholars should not set themselves too much apart from other communities of scholars!

 nowledge Coproduction Against K Institutional Alienation Finally, institutional alienation refers to a failure of institutions and institutional relations to accommodate the constantly changing complexities of migration and diversity. For instance, path dependency can limit reflexivity by diminishing the willingness to change, or institutional decoupling can limit reflexivity and awareness of policy alternatives and obstruct communication between actors. One way for migration research to help prevent institutional alienation is to develop what has been described as ‘socially robust knowledge’ (Nowotny 2003; Nowotny et  al. 2001; Nowotny et  al. 2003). This

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involves the coproduction of knowledge with a broad range of actors involved in a specific problem situation. Rather than coproduction with specific actors (as mentioned above), socially robust knowledge does justice to the poly-centric nature of complex policy problems, and often involves a broad range of actors (complex governance networks) rather than specific dominant actors. Such coproduction does not see actors just as end-users of knowledge production, but rather involves them directly in research. When actors feel ‘on board’ in knowledge production, they are also much more likely to accept challenging (and perhaps unwelcome) messages and will therefore be more willing to change and less susceptible to un-reflexive path-­ dependency. This could boost reflexivity in a similar way to ‘research & innovation’ efforts in other areas and help actors and institutions to adapt much more swiftly to new and changing problem dynamics. Furthermore, the coproduction of socially robust knowledge has connective potential as it brings together a variety of actors. A central problem of institutional alienation was that in complex settings, actors often fail to connect with others in meaningful ways, leading institutions to live ‘parallel lives.’ For instance, we observed earlier that such ‘decoupling’ often takes place in multi-level settings, where different levels of governance (such as EU, national and local policies) fail to connect and sometimes even adopt contradictory and conflicting approaches. Coproducing knowledge in poly-centric settings can unearth meaningful connections between actors and institutions, and as such be a driver of, for instance, multi-level governance. At the same time, making sure that coproduction is ‘socially robust’ across a sufficiently broad range of actors, is also a way to prevent knowledge coproduction from reproducing structural inequalities that benefit only some actors at the expense of others (see political alienation above).

8.3 C  onclusions; Towards Reflexive Research-Policy Dialogues Reflexive research-policy dialogues can provide a way to help actors to identify, understand and grasp the complexities of migration and diversity governance. Rather than reducing or simplifying complexity in a way

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that may lead to alienation, reflexivity provides the type of complex approach that complex problems such as migration and diversity usually require. Reflexivity is a more challenging, but also more realistic, alternative to seeing migration and diversity governance as a linear process in search of a rational problem resolution. Rather it sees migration and diversity governance as an ongoing process of critical examination of problem developments and constant policy changes (‘reflex’). It is also a more promising alternative to a more pessimistic or relativist view that sees alienation as an inescapable process, to which policy actors involved in complex problems as migration and diversity are supposedly doomed. As we have seen in this chapter, reflexivity makes significant demands of the quality of the governance process. Following Rein and Schön’s approach to critical reflection, reflexivity demands of actors that they are capable and willing to engage in a critical conversation with others, with the problem situation and with their own beliefs, in addition to a willingness to change their views if necessary. When configured as ‘critical dialogues’, research-policy relations can contribute to reflexive governance. This make demands, not only of policy actors, but also of researchers. As observed in earlier chapters, knowledge fragmentation, selective coproduction of knowledge and a narrow preoccupation with specific groups, have often prevented migration research from contributing to mainstreaming and averting alienation. However, theory-building and systematic knowledge accumulation could provide a counter strategy to problem alienation, as academic independence can prevent political alienation, academic mainstreaming can prevent social alienation, and knowledge coproduction in poly-centric settings can prevent institutional alienation.

References Beck, U. (1992). Risk society: Towards a new modernity (Vol. 17). Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications Limited. Beck, U. (1998). Politics of risk society. In J. Franklin (Ed.), The politics of risk society (pp. 9–22). Cambridge: Polity.

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Beck, U. (2000). Risk society revisited: Theory, politics and research programmes. In The risk society and beyond: Critical issues for social theory (pp. 211–229). London: Sage. Beck, U., Giddens, A., & Lash, S. (1994). Reflexive modernization: Politics, tradition and aesthetics in the modern social order. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Bertossi, C., & Duyvendak, J. W. (2012). National models of immigrant integration: The costs for comparative research. Comparative European Politics, 10(3), 237–247. Bommes, M., & Morawska, E.  T. (2005). International migration research: Constructions, omissions, and the promises of interdisciplinarity. Hants: Ashgate Pub Ltd. Boswell, C. (2009). The political uses of expert knowledge: Immigration policy and social research. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bourdieu, P. (2004). Science of science and reflexivity. Cambridge: Polity Press. Brettell, C. B., & Hollifield, J. F. (2014). INTRODUCTION migration theory: Talking across disciplines. Routledge. Entzinger, H., & Scholten, P. (2015). The interplay of knowledge production and policymaking: A comparative analysis of research and policymaking on migrant integration in Germany and the Netherlands. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 17(1), 60–74. Favell, A. (2001). Integration policy and integration research in Europe: A review and critique. Citizenship today: Global perspectives and practices, Washington, DC: Brooking Institution, 349–399. Favell, A. (2003). Integration nations: The nation-state and research on immigrants in Western Europe. Comparative Social Research, 22, 13–42. Geddes, A. (2005). Migration research and European integration: The construction and institutionalization of problems of Europe. In International migration research: Constructions, omissions and interdisciplinarity (pp.  265–280). Chicago: Chicago University Press. Geddes, A., & Scholten, P. (2015). Policy analysis and Europeanization: An analysis of EU migrant integration policymaking. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 17(1), 41–59. Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society. Cambridge: Polity Press. Hisschemöller, M., Hoppe, R., Dunn, W. N., & Ravetz, J. R. (2001). Knowledge, power and participation in environmental policy analysis. London: Routledge. Kraler, A., Reichel, D., & Entzinger, H. (2015). Migration statistics in Europe: A core component of governance and population research. In P.  Scholten, H.  Entzinger, R.  Penninx, & S.  Verbeek (Eds.), Integrating immigrants in

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Europe: Research-policy dialogues (pp. 39–58). Cham: Springer International Publishing. Nowotny, H. (2003). Democratising expertise and socially robust knowledge. Science and Public Policy, 30(3), 151–156. Nowotny, H., Scott, P., & Gibbons, M. (2001). Re-thinking science: Knowledge and the public in an age of uncertainty. Cambridge: Polity. Nowotny, H., Scott, P., & Gibbons, M. (2003). Introduction: ‘Mode 2’ Revisited: The new production of knowledge. Minerva, 41(3), 179–194. Pisarevskaya, A., Levy, N., Scholten, P., & Jansen, J. (2019). Mapping migration studies: An empirical analysis of the coming of age of a research field. Migration Studies, mnz031. https://doi.org/10.1093/migration/mnz031. Ratcliffe, P. (2001). The politics of social science research: Race, ethnicity and social change. Springer. Rath, J. (2001). Research on immigrant ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. In The politics of social science research (pp. 137–159). Springer. Schinkel, W. (2013). The imagination of ‘society’ in measurements of immigrant integration. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 36(7), 1142–1161. Schinkel, W. (2017). Imagined societies: A critique of immigrant integration in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Scholten, P., Entzinger, H., Penninx, R., & Verbeek, S. (2015). Integrating immigrants in Europe. Research-policy dialogues. Springer. Schön, D.  A., & Rein, M. (1995). Frame reflection: Toward the resolution of intractable policy controversies. Basic Books. Simon, P., Piché, V., & Gagnon, A. A. (2015). Social statistics and ethnic diversity. Springer. Thomas, W. I., & Thomas, D. S. (1928). The child in America: Behavior problems and programs. New York: Knopf.

9 Conclusions

The starting point of this book was the question: why does the governance of migration and migration-related diversity derail so often? Rather than focusing on policies or specific policy outcomes, this book has searched for an answer to this question by examining the dynamics behind policy making and the factors that shape governance in these areas. It seeks to understand what drives actors to shape migration and diversity policies in specific ways. To do so, this book builds bridges between the literatures of policy sciences and governance studies on the one hand, and of migration studies on the other. This aims to contribute to a better theoretical understanding, not only of migration and diversity governance, but also of the governance of complex or wicked policy problems in general. Migration and diversity are revelatory cases of so-called complex or wicked policy problems. In migration studies, there has been a complexification of migration and diversity. Rather than simply referring to a linear increase in the scale of migration or diversity (such as towards superdiversity), complexification means that migration and diversity have become increasingly complex, involving different configurations

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in different settings. They also involve different patterns of mobility and different configurations of diversity that are variable over time as well as between different situational settings (cities, regions, countries) and categories. Moreover, this complexification is also inherently related to the uncertainty and contestation surrounding migration and diversity. There are very few issue areas where key concepts, such as ‘migration’, ‘integration’ or ‘diversity’, are contested at such a fundamental level. This complexification poses a challenge to the governance of migration and diversity: there are no quick fixes for complex issues like these and there is no one-size-fits-all model of integration or migration governance. This is illustrated by the many governance dilemmas that were discussed in various chapters: institutional friction between various levels of government (national versus local integration policies); the labelling effects of official government statistics (reification of ethnicity); symbolic politics (not only related to the rise of populism); reproduction of gendered power structures in the management of migration; overestimation of the potential of government intervention (‘integration’, migration control), and many more. The governance of migration and diversity tends to derail when it fails to respond to this complexification. This is defined in this book as ‘alienation’, or estrangement of the governance process from the complexification in the problem situation. This concept of alienation addresses a broader literature in policy sciences on degenerative policy designs or policy pathologies, but with a specific emphasis on coping with complexity. However, mainstreaming is developed throughout the book as a perspective on how governance can respond to complexity in a way that could prevent alienation. Leaning on work on gender mainstreaming, this perspective provides a complex approach to a complex problem. Navigating between objectivism and relativism, mainstreaming offers a perspective that is realistic about the limitations of governance in coping with complexity (responding reflexively rather than controlling rationally) while avoiding the relativist premise that actors and structures are always unable or unwilling to become aware of and respond to complexity. In other words, mainstreaming neither reduces nor fatalizes complexity.

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9.1 U  nderstanding Governance Dynamics: Mainstreaming Versus Alienation Following the literature on policy sciences and governance studies, the making of policies is determined by the interplay of various factors, which are often defined in terms of four dimensions or types of factors: knowledge, institutions, power and discourses (Bekkers et  al. 2017; Guba 1990). In coping with complexification, these factors can come together in specific ways. Building on the literature of migration studies, this book shows that in dealing with the complexification of migration and diversity, there is an inclination towards alienation. This can involve meaninglessness in policy processes, manifested in a lack of serious engagement with the problem situation, or in an overestimation of the potential for (state-centric) interventions in integration or migration (problem alienation). It can also involve normlessness in policy processes, manifest in uncertainties and contradictions in policy solutions at different levels or in different settings. It can involve a logic of policymaking driven by and reproducing broader power structures in society, such as gendered migration structures (political alienation). Finally, alienation can also contribute to the powerlessness of some groups, such as in the social construction, reification and sanctioning of group identities that defy the complex reality of migration and diversity (social alienation). Mainstreaming provides a perspective on how governance can respond to complexity. Mainstreaming is a complex approach to a complex problem. It is not a specific substantive policy model that should apply anywhere, nor is it a one-size-fits-all, a quick fix or a catch-all solution. Rather, mainstreaming involves a constant process of adjusting the mainstream in response to complexification; it does not have one policy output, but involves constant readjustments in response to emerging developments. This involves mainstreaming policies, institutions and structures, such as welfare states, policies across various sectors and government structures. This involves a cross-sectional approach (very similar to gender mainstreaming), which defines migration and diversity as topics that should not be set apart (as relevant only to migrants or the immediate neighbourhoods where they live), but treated as topics of

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generic importance that cut across various policy sectors. This also involves an approach oriented towards the whole diverse population, rather than an approach that targets specific migrants or minorities (Table 9.1). Table 9.1   Summary of the conceptualization of mainstreaming versus alienation in migration and diversity governance

Knowledge

Institutions

Power

Discourses

Mainstreaming Knowledge as instrument for adaptation of generic policies to the complex and rapidly changing problem dynamics of migration and diversity. Institutional adaptation to ensure a fit between institutions and the constantly changing complexities of migration and diversity, as well as a fit between the responses from various institutions (multilevel governance) Efforts to counterbalance structural inequalities between actors in policymaking, and to include relevant actors in the mainstream of policymaking Mainstreaming as the constant reflection on and reproduction or change of policy discourses in the face of developments in the problem situation

Alienation Problem alienation driven by knowledge uncertainty, symbolic knowledge utilization and overestimation of interventionism in migration control and integration promotion. Institutional alienation when there is a misfit between institutional developments (path dependency) and the complexities of migration and diversity, or a misfit between different institutions (decoupling) Political alienation as a logic of policymaking driven by structural inequalities (such as client politics) or symbolic politics. Social alienation as the selective empowerment or disempowerment of specific groups and actors as a consequence of discourses

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Importantly, both mainstreaming and alienation are defined in this book at the level of the policy process. It is the interaction between actors involved in the governance of migration and diversity that is characterized either by mainstreaming or alienation, not the actors themselves. This means that it can be very difficult for specific actors to escape alienation, such as a minister who seeks to develop a new approach to migration management while facing a broader institutional and political environment that will ‘push’ him in a certain direction; a street-level bureaucrat who seeks a quick fix to an individual ‘integration problem’ rather than a more evolving approach that may apply across various settings, or a migrant NGO that inadvertently reproduces a target group construction that denies complexity. In fact, the frequent use of terms like crisis and incidents with reference to the many dilemmas facing migration and diversity governance already signals how existing policies, structures and institutions often fail to capture complexity. For instance, the European ‘Refugee Crisis’ in 2015/2016 can be seen as a failure of European institutions to accommodate the complexification of migration. As a consequence, mainstreaming is not something that can be achieved by one actor, or by announcing a new policy plan. Mainstreaming is not a new policy model for migration management or integration promotion. It is an approach that requires a rethinking of generic policies, institutions and structures. For instance, mainstreaming can be achieved by a crosssectoral recalibration of policies, examining case by case to what extent a policy accommodates the complexification of migration and diversity. Mainstreaming also requires flexibility, a willingness to constantly reexamine and re-adjust policies and structures. This requires an awareness that migration and diversity are structural policy issues at a systematic level that will be here to stay, rather than temporary problems that can be ‘solved’ by one specific policy solution. Once again, there are clear parallels between gender mainstreaming and the mainstreaming of migration and diversity governance.

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9.2 What Does this Mean for Research? The discussion of mainstreaming versus alienation in migration and diversity governance has broader implications for both the fields of policy sciences and governance studies and that of migration studies. In fact, this book calls for more cross-fertilization between these fields of research. In migration studies, policy literature can contribute to a better understanding of the factors that drive policies; in policy studies, the literature from migration studies can contribute to theory-building on the governance of complex problems.

Policy Sciences and Governance Studies Migration and diversity governance provide revelatory cases for the governance of wicked or complex policy problems. There are few contemporary policy areas that are as complex and contested as migration and diversity. Studies in these areas can reveal much on how the factors of knowledge, power, institutions and discourses come together under conditions of complexity. There is good reason to believe that problem, political, institutional and social alienation can be found in other complex policy areas as well. The concept of alienation engages with other studies of pathologies in policy processes, most notably the work of Schneider and Ingram on ‘degenerative policy designs’ (1997). However, whereas Schneider and Ingram argue that the degenerativeness of policies stems from target group constructions, my argument is that it stems from failures to be aware of and respond to complexity. Target group constructs indeed contribute to (social) alienation. Captured in the terms of this book, Schneider and Ingram have focused primarily on social alienation (and to a lesser extent on political alienation) whereas the literature on wicked policy problems and complexity governance has focused primarily on problem alienation and institutional alienation. The contribution of this book is that the case of migration and diversity reveals the interplay between all four forms of alienation: problem, institutional, political and social. In order to understand the full complexity of the governance of wicked policy problems, all four manifestations of alienation must be addressed.

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Furthermore, Schneider and Ingram take democratic theory as the foundation for their conceptualization of degenerativeness. Degenerativeness means introducing a selective bias in policymaking. However, in addition to degenerativeness, alienation may also involve meaninglessness (problem alienation), normlessness (institutional alienation) and powerlessness (political alienation). Rather than taking a normative political perspective on policymaking, this book takes societal complexification as a starting point for analysis. This seeks to contribute to a broader agenda in policy sciences on how policy processes cope with the complexification that can be found in many other policy areas as well. Finally, it is surprising that the involvement of policy scientists in the field of migration and diversity has been rather limited. There is a rapidly evolving literature on wicked policy problems (Hisschemöller et al. 2001; Peters 2017; Van Bueren et al. 2003; M Verweij 2014) that has been shedding new light on environmental and climate governance in particular, but which has thus far left the area of migration and diversity largely untouched. The same applies to the literature on complexity governance which has largely focused on issues that are complex in terms of the technical knowledge involved and system adaptation (institutional friction) rather than on issues that are complex in terms of knowledge and social contestation.

Migration Studies Policy theory can make an important contribution to migration studies. As argued in section 2.3, there is much more to understanding the dynamics of migration and diversity governance than trying to understand the dynamics of migration and diversity as objective social phenomena. Evidently, it is a key raison-d-être of migration studies to understand what drives migration and what the consequences are of migration-related diversity. However, this does not suffice for a full understanding of what drives migration and diversity governance. Nonetheless, the discussion and review of migration studies literature throughout various chapters shows that there is already quite a body of literature on migration and diversity policies. This book contributes a theoretical and conceptual framework that is grounded in policy literature.

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First and foremost, this bridging of policy literature and migration studies leads to a better understanding of mainstreaming versus alienation in migration and diversity governance. This sheds light on what the complexification of migration and diversity means for policy. The drawing of a parallel with gender issues, among others, reveals that in contrast to gender mainstreaming, the mainstreaming of migration and diversity has been far more limited. Building on policy literature, the concept of alienation provides an explanation for this discrepancy and the failure to capture complexity in migration and diversity governance. It accounts for why developments in the migration literature, such as the rise of ‘superdiversity’ and ‘liquid migration’, have not been precisely reflected in governance responses. This sets a research agenda for migration studies to further examine the conditions under which either mainstreaming or alienation are promoted in migration and diversity governance. The failure to respond to complexification and the complexity reductions that are evident in policies also have an effect on migration and diversity as social phenomena. Social alienation can have an obvious effect on the groups affected, in particular migrants, but also on natives who feel deprived because of migration. But the meaninglessness of migration and diversity policies can also have consequences for migration and diversity; even when lacking a serious conversation with the problem situation, policies can influence the behaviour of actors in the field of migration and diversity governance, and the way in which the public perceives migration and diversity. Linking complexity to migration and diversity governance also calls for more reflexivity within the field of migration studies. In the field of migration studies there has been significant work on theoretical models of diversity governance (‘models of integration’) and migration management (‘migration regimes’). The theoretization of the relationship between complexification and governance alienation or mainstreaming encourages migration scholars to move away from this theoretical modelling, or at least from the belief that one specific model (such as multiculturalism, interculturalism or assimilationism) would provide the best approach. It is precisely because of complexification that there will not be a one-size-­ fits-all solution. Rather than one catch-all model, complexity requires different approaches in specific settings. Moreover, it requires such

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approaches to be very flexible to order to respond to new situational developments over time. This reflexivity also calls for a rethinking of some of the most basic concepts in migration studies. A key concept such as ‘integration’ has not only been coproduced in close relationship with states seeking to control interethnic relations, it also reproduces state-centric ideas on societal integration that defy the complexification of migration and diversity. The same applies to concepts such as ethnic or racial minorities, which also deny complexification and often reproduce a state interest in managing relations with such minorities. Even basic concepts, such as migration and ‘migrants’ (especially when referring to ‘second generation migrants’), risk reproducing state rather than theoretical conceptualizations, and reducing rather than grasping the complexity of mobilities and identification. As such, this book joins the argument for a ‘de-migranticization’ of migration studies, not only to increase reflexivity on the field’s relationship with (nation) states (Dahinden 2016), but also to enable the field to better understand and research complexification and mainstreaming.

9.3 What Does this Mean for Governance? Finally, this book is not only a study of migration and diversity governance, but also seeks to contribute to awareness of mainstreaming and alienation in migration and diversity governance. This involves a call for reflexivity in governance, and for reflexive research-policy dialogues on migration and diversity.

Reflexivity The term reflexivity contains the word ‘reflex’, which refers precisely to the best course of action for actors facing the complexification of migration and diversity: to respond flexibly and intelligently to the ongoing dynamics of migration and diversity. Every new trend and every new crisis or incident can be a key learning moment for how to recalibrate generic policies, institutions and structures. Mainstreaming requires reflexivity from policy actors, or ‘reflexive governance’. Rather than arguing

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that policy actors will always drown in complexity or arguing that they will be able to master complexity fully when acting rationally, reflexivity means that policy actors should at least be able to critically rethink mainstream policies, institutions and structures in the light of emerging complex developments. Reflexivity can thus contribute to mainstreaming and awareness of the factors that could lead to alienation. This does, however, impose several conditions on the policy process: actors should be able and willing to engage in dialogue on their problem views (communicative imperative); they must also be aware of their own problem views or ‘frames’; there should be a serious conversation with the problem situation and there must be a willingness to change if circumstances give cause to reconsider problem views. A key question for further empirical research is whether the ‘quality’ of migration and diversity governance satisfies these criteria. The discussion of alienation in this book and the review of studies on migration and diversity policymaking, give rise to serious doubts regarding the reflexive qualities of migration and diversity governance.

Reflexive Research-Policy Dialogues Rather than either research or policy being ‘on top’ and the other one ‘on tap’, constituting the relation between research and policy as a ‘dialogue’ can contribute to the conditions of ‘reflexivity’ outlined above. This means that the research-policy dialogue should involve open communication between scholars and policy actors, promoting awareness of different problem views and beliefs (as opposed to objectivism, or having one single truth), as well as promoting a serious conversation with the problem situation (as opposed to relativism), and adopting flexibility in cases where reflection reveals a reason to change. In Hoppe’s words, this involves a shift from either ‘science speaking truth to power’ or ‘mandated science’, to ‘making sense together’ (Hoppe 1999). It is by ‘making sense together’ that research-policy dialogues can help grasp complexity and contribute to mainstreaming rather than alienation. However, the analysis in this book shows that configuring research-­ policy relations as a reflexive dialogue has often proven difficult to achieve

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in practice. Various scholars have revealed how research-policy relations often tended to lead to paradigmatic closure, for instance concerning specific national models of integration. Also, rather than engaging in an open dialogue, institutionalization of research-policy relations often privileged specific knowledge claims (according to some scholars this was even instrumental to the genesis of migration studies). This often tends to further reinforce paradigmatic closure, and obviously paradigmatic closure can be a clear impediment to reflexivity and responding to complexity. At the same time, knowledge fragmentation (as opposed to paradigmatic closure) also tends to promote alienation rather than mainstreaming. Knowledge fragmentation can lead to knowledge conflicts, selective knowledge and relativism. Although reflexivity means being aware of multiple truth claims, it also involves a serious conversation with the problem situation. Relativism and pick-and-choose strategies can impede such a conversation with the problem situation and lead to problem alienation and ‘policy-based evidence making’. There are several ways to configure research-policy dialogues in a way that would support reflexivity. First, by taking a middle ground between paradigmatic closure and knowledge fragmentation, the systematic accumulation of knowledge can promote a serious conversation with the problem situation. Systematic knowledge accumulation means bringing together and synthesizing available knowledge, which will reveal both the strengths and limitations of knowledge claims (what is known as well as what is not known). Secondly, reflexivity will be promoted by what can be defined as a ‘mainstreaming of migration studies’. This means that rather than migration and diversity being systematically treated as distinct phenomena, they are instead systematically connected to the work being done in mainstream academic disciplines, such as sociology, economics, political sciences, law, etc. This relates to the argument concerning the ‘de-­ migranticization’ of migration studies (Dahinden 2016). Such academic mainstreaming can help prevent social alienation. Thirdly, institutional alienation can be averted by coproducing migration knowledge within broader governance networks. Rather than coproduction with single dominant actors (such as states), this involves the coproduction of socially robust knowledge within complex

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governance networks. This can prevent institutional alienation by coupling actors from various sectors and levels, and making them involved in and aware of the knowledge being coproduced. Finally, political alienation can be an important impediment to reflexive research-policy dialogues. The simultaneous politicization of science and scientification of politics has impeded reflexivity in mutual research-­ policy relations, leading to diffuse boundaries. Reconfirming academic independence can be an important strategy for reconfirming boundaries and contributing to research-policy dialogues from clearly different positions. Independence does not mean retreating into an ivory tower. Rather, it means reasserting independence whilst engaging in a dialogue with policy, politics and broader society.

References Bekkers, V., Fenger, M., & Scholten, P. (2017). Public policy in action: Perspectives on the policy process. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. Dahinden, J. (2016). A plea for the ‘de-migranticization’ of research on migration and integration. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 39(13), 2207–2225. Guba, E. G. (1990). The paradigm dialog. London: Sage. Hisschemöller, M., Hoppe, R., Dunn, W. N., & Ravetz, J. R. (2001). Knowledge, power and participation in environmental policy analysis. London: Routledge. Hoppe, R. (1999). Policy analysis, science, and politics: From ‘speaking truth to power’ to ‘making sense together’. Science and Public Policy, 26(1), 201–210. Peters, B. G. (2017). What is so wicked about wicked problems? A conceptual analysis and a research program. Policy and Society, 36(3), 385–396. Schneider, A. L., & Ingram, H. M. (1997). Policy design for democracy. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. Van Bueren, E. M., Klijn, E. H., & Koppenjan, J. F. M. (2003). Dealing with wicked problems in networks: Analyzing an environmental debate from a network perspective. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 13(2), 193–212. Verweij, M. (2014). Wicked problems, clumsy solutions, and messy institutions in transnational governance. The problem-solving capacity of the modern state: Governance challenges and administrative capacities, 183–197.

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Index

A

Academic mainstreaming, 86, 182–184, 186, 199 Alienation, vii, 5, 10–14, 39, 47–66, 73, 102, 124, 148, 190 B

BAMF, 88, 92, 93 Bauböck, R., 111 Boswell, C., 71, 90–93, 138, 147, 148, 154, 155, 157, 163, 169 Boundary organizations, 87 C

Çağlar, A., 31, 114 Castles, S., 6–8, 78 Categories, 11, 28, 31, 33, 38, 50, 64, 81–83, 96, 107, 125, 132, 135, 140, 158–160

Citizenship, 5, 14, 42, 61, 62, 80, 86, 101, 102, 108–111, 117, 118, 125, 140, 183 Client politics, 63, 124, 131–134, 136–138, 141, 142, 171, 180 Colebatch, H.K., 15, 34 Complexification, 2, 5, 7, 9, 10, 14, 17, 20, 27–43, 47, 49, 53, 54, 56, 59, 70, 82, 84, 101, 102, 104, 106, 108, 110, 111, 114, 115, 117, 118, 130, 136, 142, 152, 159, 170, 190, 196, 197 Complexity, v, vi, viii, ix, 2–13, 15, 17, 19–22, 27, 28, 33, 34, 36–40, 43, 48, 49, 53, 54, 56, 60–63, 65, 70, 71, 78, 81, 83, 87, 88, 93, 95, 96, 108, 110, 111, 118, 131, 134, 138, 139, 148–151, 153–157, 159, 160, 162, 163, 170–172, 176, 181, 184, 185, 190, 196–199

© The Author(s) 2020 P. Scholten, Mainstreaming versus Alienation, Global Diversities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42238-7

219

220 Index

Constitutional politics, 131–134, 136 Constructivism, vii, 6, 60, 148 Coproduction, 85, 90–94, 97, 184–186, 199 Critical theory, 6, 16, 39–41, 43, 103, 130

European Union (EU), 3, 5, 11, 30, 32, 34, 47, 76–79, 88, 89, 91, 92, 112–115, 133, 153, 181, 185 Evidence based policymaking, 40, 69, 72, 73, 84, 91, 95–97 F

D

Dahinden, J., 19, 42, 197, 199 Decoupling, vi, 14, 52, 61, 102, 115, 118, 175, 184, 185 Degenerative policy designs, 4, 49, 57, 58, 65, 151, 190 Demigranticization, 19, 42 Depoliticization, 36, 71, 136–139, 141, 142 Disability, vii, 12, 50 Discourse coalitions, 94, 149, 156, 162 Discourses, 1, 3, 5, 6, 16, 20, 21, 28, 34, 42, 43, 60, 70, 75, 93, 97, 101, 117, 125, 131, 134, 147–163, 182 Domestic migration, 29, 76, 153 E

Environment, vi, 5, 51, 53, 102, 112, 117, 125 Essentially contested concepts, 96, 152–154 Ethnic categories, 81–83, 158 Ethnicity, 80–82, 123, 153, 158, 160 Ethnic lens, 9, 28, 31, 33, 130, 154 Ethnic statistics/ethnic data, 40, 72, 81–83, 103

Favell, A., 3, 18, 41, 42, 70, 72–75, 85, 87, 92, 94, 109, 110, 156, 158, 169, 181, 182 France/French, 42, 54, 75, 79, 82, 83, 88, 91, 94, 106, 109, 110, 124, 129, 133, 140, 156, 158 Freeman, G., 63, 116, 131, 132, 137, 138 G

Geddes, A., ix, 11, 73, 79, 105–107, 132, 133, 137, 139, 181 Gender, v, vii, 4, 5, 12, 29, 48, 50, 52–55, 70, 134, 135, 141, 160, 183, 184, 190, 196 Gendered migration, 134–136 Germany, 33, 42, 77, 79–81, 88, 92, 93, 105, 106, 109, 115, 124, 128–130, 132, 133, 137, 138, 140, 158 Glick-Schiller, N., 9, 18, 31, 32, 94, 114 Globalization, 6, 8, 74, 183, 184 Governance studies, 6, 12, 13, 19–22, 40, 57 Guba, E.G., 6, 16, 39 Guiraudon, V., 7, 11, 36, 112, 116, 131, 133, 137

 Index 

221

H

J

Hollinger, D.A., 9, 31, 53 Hoppe, R., 10, 13, 15, 38, 58, 71, 85, 152, 198

Joppke, C., 94, 109, 110, 116, 131, 132 Judicial activism, 116, 133

I

K

Individualization, 8 Ingram, H., 4, 42, 49, 57–59, 63–65, 147, 150, 151, 157–159, 161, 183 Institutional alienation, 14, 21, 49, 60–62, 65, 102, 104, 108, 109, 112, 115, 117–118, 175, 184–186, 199, 200 Institutional feedback, 111, 116–117 Institutionalism, vii, 6, 16, 39, 42, 43, 60, 103, 104 Institutions, 1, 28, 101–118, 124, 174 Integration, v, vi, 1, 3, 10–12, 14, 15, 18, 19, 33, 40, 42, 47, 48, 54, 55, 64, 69–77, 79–86, 88, 91–97, 106, 107, 109, 110, 113–115, 118, 124, 135, 153, 156, 159, 161, 162, 169, 181, 182, 196, 197, 199 Integrationism, 55, 70, 73–79 Integrationism, 55, 70, 73–79 Integration policy, 4, 11, 12, 36, 39, 41, 48, 54, 73, 74, 78–80, 92, 93, 103, 115, 124, 135 Intractable policy controversies, 10, 18, 152 Intra-EU Mobility, vi, 1, 115

Knowledge accumulation, 88, 96, 186 Knowledge production, 18, 85, 94, 176, 185 Knowledge utilization, 90–94, 170 Kymlicka, W., 106–109, 138 L

Lahav, G., 7, 11, 112 Liberal paradox, 131–134 Liquid migration, 8, 32, 196 Local turn, 114 London, 2, 12, 31, 32, 129 M

Mainstreaming, vii, viii, 4–6, 10–14, 16–18, 21, 39, 43, 47–66, 70, 71, 82, 83, 86, 90, 93–97, 101, 102, 104, 105, 107, 110, 112, 115, 117–118, 124, 131, 133, 134, 136, 139, 141–142, 148, 150–153, 160, 162–163, 169, 170, 174, 175, 177, 184–186, 190, 196–199 Methodological nationalism, 94 Migration policy, 4, 6, 11, 51, 72, 79, 96, 113, 118, 131, 132, 135, 172, 174

222 Index

Migration regimes, 48, 76–78, 118, 196 Migration studies, v, vii, 6, 7, 9, 18, 19, 21, 22, 27, 41, 42, 54, 69, 70, 73, 80, 84–88, 94, 95, 104, 105, 123, 162, 169, 175, 181–184, 189, 195–197, 199 Minorities, 2, 5, 9, 33, 34, 40, 75, 85, 92, 93, 96, 128, 137, 151, 159, 161, 183, 197 Mobilization, 124, 126–136, 141, 142 Mudde, C., 36, 139, 140 Multiculturalism, 75, 79, 80, 140, 156, 161, 196 Multi-level governance, vi, 38, 52, 102, 112–115, 117, 118, 185 N

National models, 74, 75, 85, 86, 90, 94, 97, 118, 181, 199 Nation-state, 19, 29, 30, 42, 51, 74–77, 94, 111, 112, 130, 197

Policy subsystem, 52, 126, 133, 134, 136, 137, 149 Political alienation, 14, 16, 21, 49, 60, 62–63, 65, 124, 133, 135, 136, 139, 141–142, 175, 180–182, 185, 186, 200 Political sciences, 20, 37, 86, 103, 183, 184, 199 Politicization, 35, 36, 63, 64, 70, 71, 116, 124, 127, 136–142, 176, 200 Polycentric governance, 52 Populism, 16, 35, 79, 80, 139–142 Populist radical right parties, 139, 140 Positivism, 6, 16, 39, 40, 43, 60, 69, 71–73, 75, 78–80, 84, 103, 170 Power, 5, 6, 14, 16, 20, 21, 28, 40, 42, 43, 58, 60, 62, 65, 71, 101, 123–142, 147, 198 Problem alienation, 14, 16, 21, 60–61, 65, 71, 81–83, 87, 90, 93, 95–97, 175, 186, 199 Progressive’s dilemma, 107, 108, 138 Proxies, 160

O

Othering, 161–163 P

Paradigmatic closure, 169, 181, 199 Path-dependency, 61, 103, 105, 118, 156, 175, 184, 185 Policy sciences, v–viii, 4, 6, 20, 37, 40, 42, 57, 59, 60, 126, 127, 133, 136, 139, 147, 149, 157, 190

R

Race relations, 74, 75, 85, 86, 156, 162 Rationalism, vii, 40, 69, 77 Reflexive knowledge production, 19, 180–182 Reflexivity, vi, viii, 4, 6, 17–19, 21, 169–186, 196–200 Refugee crisis, 1, 5, 8, 13, 32, 91, 92 Research-policy dialogues, vi, 17–20, 84, 175–186, 197, 198, 200

 Index 

Return migration, 77, 108 Rotterdam, viii, ix, 31, 32 S

Schinkel, W., 3, 18, 125, 153, 161, 169, 182 Schneider, A., vii, 4, 42, 49, 57–59, 63–65, 150, 151, 157–159, 161, 183 Schneider, J., 93, 138 Second generation migrants, 3, 197 Social alienation, 14, 21, 49, 60, 64–65, 84, 93, 133, 137, 151, 153, 155, 157–159, 161–163, 175, 182–184, 186, 196, 199 Sociology, 13, 40, 86, 183, 184, 199 Superdiversity, ix, 2, 3, 9, 12, 13, 31–33, 130, 154, 159, 196 T

Target groups, 12, 42, 57–59, 150, 157–163, 183 Thompson, M., 4, 37, 48 Tummers, L., viii, 13, 49, 56

223

U

Uncertainty, 9, 10, 15, 28, 31, 34, 38, 53, 70, 71, 78–80, 95, 96, 138, 152, 154, 170, 171, 176, 177 V

Vertovec, S., ix, 2, 5, 7, 9, 31, 53, 154 Verweij, A., 70, 80 Verweij, M., 4, 10, 37, 48 W

Welfare states, v, 1, 5, 11, 12, 14, 42, 48, 53, 61, 62, 72, 86, 101, 102, 104–109, 117, 118, 125, 134, 138, 174 Wicked policy problems, v, 10, 13, 15, 18, 28, 38, 58, 60, 171, 173 Y

Yanow, D., 42, 147, 148, 157–159