Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies: The Struggle for Power in the Italian Renaissance [1 ed.] 1138624101, 9781138624108

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Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies

The theme of conspiracies plays a key role in Machiavelli’s writings, in which can be found considerations and analyses on the use of conspiracy as an instrument of conquest of power and as a technique for political fighting. This volume denies an interpretation in which Machiavelli limited himself to warning against conspiracies, judging them as a dangerous and useless tool. In reality, he elaborated a real phenomenology or anatomy of the conspiracy. His thoughts on this theme represent a practical manual for the ‘coup d’état’ and the violent seizure of power. But, as always, they also contain brilliant intuitions on political psychology, the sociology of power, and social anthropology. Alessandro Campi is Full Professor of Political Science at the University of Perugia, Italy.

Routledge Studies in Renaissance and Early Modern Worlds of Knowledge Series Editor: Harald E. Braun

This series explores Renaissance and Early Modern worlds of knowledge (c.1400–c.1700) in Europe, the Americas, Asia and Africa. The volumes published in this series study the individuals, communities and networks involved in making and communicating knowledge during the first age of globalization. Authors investigate the perceptions, practices and modes of behaviour which shaped Renaissance and Early Modern intellectual endeavour and examine the ways in which they reverberated in the political, cultural, social and economic sphere. The series is interdisciplinary, comparative and global in its outlook. We welcome submissions from new as well as existing fields of Renaissance Studies, including the history of literature (including neo-Latin, European and non-European languages), science and medicine, religion, architecture, environmental and economic history, the history of the book, art history, intellectual history and the history of music. We are particularly interested in proposals that straddle disciplines and are innovative in terms of approach and methodology. The series includes monographs, shorter works and edited collections of essays. The Society for Renaissance Studies (www.rensoc.org.uk) provides an expert editorial board, mentoring, extensive editing and support for contributors to the series, ensuring high standards of peer-reviewed scholarship. We welcome proposals from early career researchers as well as more established colleagues. SRS Board Members: Erik DeBom (KU Leuven, Belgium), Mordechai Feingold (California Institute of Technology, USA), Andrew Hadfield (Sussex), Peter Mack (University of Warwick, UK), Jennifer Richards (University of Newcastle, UK), Stefania Tutino (UCLA, USA), Richard Wistreich (Royal College of Music, UK) The Elizabethan Secretariat and the Signet Office The Production of State Papers, 1590–1596 Angela Andreani Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies The Struggle for Power in the Italian Renaissance Alessandro Campi

Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies The Struggle for Power in the Italian Renaissance Alessandro Campi With Three Texts by Niccolò Machiavelli Translated by Christian E. Detmold

First published 2019 by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 Taylor & Francis The right of Alessandro Campi to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this title has been requested ISBN: 978-1-138-62410-8 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-46101-9 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

Acknowledgments

viii

PART I

Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies

1



3

Introduction: Machiavelli, Theorist of Conspiracies ALESSANDRO CAMPI

1 Luctus Publicus/Salus Publica: Bloodbath in Florence

10

ALESSANDRO CAMPI

2 From Magione to Senigallia: False Conspiracy, Double Conspiracy

25

ALESSANDRO CAMPI

3 Machiavelli the Conspirator?

39

ALESSANDRO CAMPI

4 Phenomenology and Anatomy of Conspiracy

59

ALESSANDRO CAMPI

PART II

On Conspiracies

83



85

Note on the Texts ALESSANDRO CAMPI



On Conspiracies NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI

91

vi Contents

Description of the Methods Adopted by the Duke Valentino When Murdering Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, the Signor Pagolo and the Duke di Gravina Orsini

116

NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI



The Pazzi and the Conspiracy Against the Medici

125

NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI

Bibliography Index

143 149

Portrait of Machiavelli (1546–47) Atelier of Giorgio Vasari–Pedro Rubiales, or Roviale the Spanish (1511–82 ca.) Perugia, Campi-De Angelis Collection, oil on wood, 15.5 x 21.5 cm

Acknowledgments

This book is the end result of an intellectual journey which began five years ago, on the occasion of the 500th anniversary of the drafting of the Prince. In 2013—thanks to Giuliano Amato, at that time president of the Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana-Treccani—I organized in Rome, in the Vittoriano Museum, the exibition dedicated to Il Principe di Niccolò Machiavelli e il suo tempo. 1513–2013 (The Prince by Niccolò Machiavelli and his Time. 1513–2013). After Rome, the exhibit traveled first to Washington, then to New York, then to Seoul. Another significant step in this journey was the exhibition on Machiavelli e il mestiere delle armi. Guerra, arti e potere nell’Umbria del Rinascimento (Machiavelli and the Profession of Arms. War, the Arts and Power in Umbria during the Renaissance), which I organized, together with my colleagues Erminia Irace, Francesco Federico Mancini, and Maurizio Tarantino, in Perugia from October 2014 to January 2015. It was during the preparation of these events that I had the idea of a book dedicated to the subject of conspiracy in the thought of Machiavelli. I am grateful to Emanuele Cutinelli Rèndina and Giorgio Inglese for agreeing to discuss this project with me in its early stages: their friendly advice and comments were definitely valuable. I owe a profound debt of gratitude to a number of individuals and institutions that supported this work in a variety of ways. Reconstructing the complete list would be impossible, but I would particularly like to mention and thank—for their suggestions, encouragement and collaboration—Enzo M. Baldini, Sergio Bertelli, Filippo Ceccarelli, Paolo Crisostomi, Virman Cusenza, Giulio De Ligio, Stefano De Luca, Andreina Draghi, Stefano Lucchini, Francesca Mariani, Maria Giovanna Fediga Mercuri, Ambassador Sergio Mercuri, Gianfranco Pasquino, Sergio Rizzo, Florindo Rubbettino, Gennaro Sasso, Maurizio Serio, Valdo Spini, Maurizio Tarantino, Maria Cristina Valenti, Maurizio Viroli, and Mauro Zampini. I must also mention Massimo Bray, Loredana Lucchetti, Alessandro Nicosia, Marco Pizzo (director of the Museo Nazionale del Risorgimento in Rome), and Maria Letizia Sebastiani (former director of the Biblioteca Nazionale of Florence)

Acknowledgments  ix The Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Perugia was helpful in providing a grant to conduct my research: for this generous financial support, a special thanks to Carlo Colaiacovo and Giampiero Bianconi. Gregory Conti deserves special credit for his translation of my manuscript in English (and for his patience and kindness). Invaluable editorial assistance was provided by Max Novick, my editor at Routledge, who supported this project from the initial proposal to its completion. I am grateful to Dr. Harald E. Braun for his interest in the volume and for encouraging its publication in the Studies in Renaissance and Early Modern Worlds of Knowledge monograph series. Much gratitude goes also to Jennifer Morrow at Routledge for her help in moving the manuscript through various stages. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Maria Cristina De Angelis, for her words of encouragement and endless patience. To her—my princess—this book is dedicated. Alessandro Campi Perugia December 15, 2017

Part I

Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies

Introduction Machiavelli, Theorist of Conspiracies Alessandro Campi

Machiavelli’s writings, especially his diplomatic-administrative correspondence and the Florentine Histories, contain frequent accounts and descriptions of conspiracies, intrigues and secret machinations. But it is in the Discourses—in the famous chapter 6 of Book III1—that Machiavelli addresses the conspiracy theme in a systematic manner. The chapter offers all of the following: an ample number of case studies (taken from ancient history as well as Italian history, closer to his own time); a broad classification; a conceptual elaboration; and a detailed technical analysis. Machiavelli’s opinion on this particular and extreme form of political struggle can already be found, in a severe and apparently definitive form, at the opening of the text, where he says of conspiracies that there is no ‘more dangerous or more foolhardy enterprise [than] this one, because it is difficult and extremely dangerous at every one of its stages, which results in the fact that many conspiracies are attempted but very few reach their desired goal’ (III, 6, 4). Similar words of admonition appear in The Prince: ‘the difficulties on the side of the conspirators are infinite. And one sees from experience that there have been many conspiracies, but few have had a good end’ (XIX, 11), and, with slightly minimal (but meaningful) variations, in the Florentine Histories: ‘such undertakings [conspiracies], if there is some shadow of glory in thinking of them, have almost always very certain loss in their execution’ (VI, 29, 14). Based on these passages, many scholars and readers of the Florentine have tended to exaggerate Machiavelli’s distaste for conspiracy as an instrument of political struggle and a means of gaining access to power.2 Machiavelli was wary of conspiracies, advising against them on practical grounds and blaming the conspirators even when animated by noble ideals. There were many reasons for this negative view of conspiracies: a) their frequently baneful outcomes, ruinous for their promoters—as certified by a multitude of historic examples; b) their inability to achieve stable, and not merely new, political alignments; c) the risk of the new institutional order being overthrown in turn, in a similarly dramatic manner; d) the difficulty of building any sort of popular support or consensus around a violent practice, whose conception and realization were always an affair of socially restricted

4  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies groups and exclusionary oligarchies detached from the larger body politic and operating inside the closed circle of princely power (and it is well known that Machiavelli considered popular good will towards the prince to be crucial to maintaining a solid government in any political community); e) and, finally, his own personal experience, on at least one occasion, of the risks to which one can be exposed (starting from the supreme risk of losing one’s life) when one allows oneself to become directly or indirectly involved in such endeavors, as vile as they are reckless. One might reasonably assume that such a pronounced aversion to conspiracies, a tactic to be shunned personally and politically, should have pushed Machiavelli to dismiss them as a pathology alien to his way of conceiving the dynamics of power and politics, to ignore them or relegate them to a subordinate role. Quite to the contrary, however, his aversion to conspiracies did not prevent him from devoting to them a profound historical examination, distinguished by its analytical and conceptual rigor. Indeed, Machiavelli’s reflections on the theme cannot be reduced to a generalized warning to guard against conspiracies or to a well-argued condemnation of an inauspicious practice, for either of which a few lines would have been sufficient. Instead, they are an attempt, and an ambitious one at that, to construct a sort of general theory of conspiracy, that is, to conduct a systematic exposition of the topic—a practice or form of political struggle with its own intrinsic specificity—not only from a theoretical or historico-political point of view, but also from a practical-technical standpoint. This attempt was elicited, clearly, by the importance that conspiracies had assumed in Florence and in Italy during the period immediately prior to Machiavelli’s time (not surprisingly re-baptized in much of 20th-century historiography as ‘the age of conspiracies’).3 In his own time, moreover, conspiracies continued to enjoy an ongoing currency—albeit in a phase of transformation for the civil systems then governing the peninsula—when the institutional arrangements that would later characterize the modern state were just coming into their own. There are also several other factors that could have induced Machiavelli to undertake such an extensive and thoroughly articulated treatment of conspiracy. First of all, there is the ‘classical nature’ of the topic. In Greek and Roman historical literature, which Machiavelli so assiduously frequented (though not always through primary sources [cf. Ridley, 1983; Martelli, 1998]), conspiracy was, to say the least, recurrent and an explanatory key in many pages of ancient history (cf. Pagán, 2004; Roisman, 2006). Another consideration is that conspiracy constitutes, as it were, the dark and shadowy side of politics, its imponderable aspect, not easily reducible to a calculus of interests and advantages, something that an author so inclined to rationalism, but also aware of the role played in history by good fortune, contingency, and human passion, inevitably found intriguing. Furthermore, and especially if we take as valid the myth of Machiavelli the fervent republican (cf. Baron, 1961; Pocock, 1975; Skinner, 1981), he may have drawn

Introduction  5 inspiration from many ancient and modern conspiracies that were arguably motivated or inspired by a desire for freedom and an aversion to tyranny, occasionally carried to the point of self-immolation. This was certainly a theme to which Machiavelli, despite all the doubts he may have harbored concerning the positive outcomes of conspiratorial intrigues, could not remain indifferent (unless, of course, ‘the myth’ of Machiavelli the fervent republican is truly a myth). Finally, we must not forget that conspiracy, because of the dynamics set in motion from its ideation to its execution, remains an instrument of power (that is to say a means, albeit a violent one, of attaining it). Conspiracy is a course of action that must be planned, finetuned, and executed in a timely fashion and in accordance with a rigorously prepared logical procedure. Machiavelli was sensitive—if only by virtue of his long professional experience in the ranks of Florentine bureaucracy— to the practical-operational factors, the executive and pragmatic aspects of political struggle. There were, therefore, from Machiavelli’s point of view, many wellfounded reasons to put himself to work on a more than occasional consideration of the topic of conspiracy. His reflection turns out to be not only deep and articulated, despite being presented in a scattered and fragmentary fashion throughout his works, but also original and quite innovative compared to the historical-intellectual tradition in which he was trained.4 Two aspects in particular strike the attentive reader as especially original compared to what was at the time the usual way of reasoning about conspiracies, whether classical or ancient or contemporary. The first concerns his approach to the phenomenon, which departs from the canon, at once dramatizing, introspective, and moralistic, defined and established by Sallust (Osmond, 1995). For centuries, this approach was the rule in the narration of such events: the study of the personality and psychology of the conspirators. One paradigmatic example is the interpretation of the Pazzi conspiracy by Poliziano (2012), his almost exclusive focus on the criminal mind and moral abjection of the perpetrators, his moralistic slant and his complaints about the decay of social mores and his theatrical narration of the events. Machiavelli replaces all this with an interpretation that aims to insert each conspiracy within its historical context and to provide as far as possible a political interpretation of the conspiracy. He is not satisfied with using, as a measure of explanation, the spirit of revenge, mere self-interest, personal resentment or individual cruelty. To be sure, these are all elements associated with the carrying out of a conspiracy, but for Machiavelli, they do not explain its actual underlying causes. The second element of Machiavelli’s originality concerns his refusal to limit himself, as was the case with previous historical literature, to providing a chronicle—more or less cut and dry, more or less adorned with colorful and horrifying details, more or less biased by hagiographic objectives or defamatory intentions—of single criminal episodes. On the contrary, he elaborates a reflection on conspiracies with the idea of distilling the sum

6  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies total of all of them into a uniform vision or representation. He aims to develop a model, from which to deduce rules of conduct and criteria for action which are as far as possible uniform and universal, valid alike for past and present, and observable in the most diverse historical contexts. All of this—as has been rightly observed by Harvey C. Mansfield in his commentary on the Discourses5—amounts to an undeniable innovation with respect to the tradition of political thought before Machiavelli. Conspiracy in the general sense is not only distinct from tyrannicide or from the simple (and occasional) power-hungry assassination (Turchetti, 2013), but in Machiavelli becomes a political category or concept, of which it is possible to trace—on the basis of the various historical cases or examples—a sort of phenomenology. In the following pages, we will try to elucidate Machiavelli’s particular reading of the phenomenon—complex and not without contradictions but taken altogether original and innovative. We will start by recalling some events—the Pazzi conspiracy (1478), the so-called Magione conspiracy (1502), the Boscoli and Capponi conspiracy against Giuliano de’ Medici (1513), and the plot to assassinate Cardinal Giulio de’ Medici (1522). Machiavelli’s having been involved in them as an observer, a direct witness, perhaps even as a participant, must have had no little influence on his thinking. The teachings and reflections that he drew from them were probably different, more articulated, and less peremptory than the ones which have been attributed to him by a vast literature. It is true that Machiavelli was personally opposed to conspiracies. In his professional role as Secretary of the Chancery he was, it could be said, a man of order. He observed political things from the point of view of power that was growing more and more centralized in its institutional articulations and command structures and that before too long would become sovereign and exclusive, the single legitimate power of the modern state. Conspiracies, on the contrary, both products and producers of chaos, are the fruit of internecine civil struggles, which they tend to perpetuate rather than resolve. Even when they aim to create or restore a more law-abiding and harmonious system, they usually end up, whether they succeed or fail, producing a more unfair and absolutist system. As a man of government, could Machiavelli have been attracted by practices of this nature? As a writer of political texts, moreover, Machiavelli worked in the unhappy condition of exile; and exile, being sent away from the city and from public life was the destiny, as he well knew, that awaited those who had survived the failure of a conspiracy. His proscription in 1512 had different causes: the political defeat of the republican regime of which he was the ideologue and the most eminent functionary, and the return to power of the Medici with their princely ambitions. But this psychological condition alone, his condition as an exiled and banished citizen, comparable to that of a fugitive conspirator or an outlaw, would be enough to explain his aversion to conspiratorial actions.

Introduction  7 All of this notwithstanding, and despite all the distaste and hostility he might have felt toward them on an intellectual and practical level, Machiavelli applied to conspiracies his talents as a theorist and analyst in the conviction—matured through both study and experience6—that they constitute one of the principal ways through which, in all times, the struggle for power has been conducted. He believed, therefore, that they deserve, with all due respect for their diversity and singularity, to be given an overarching framework, to be granted consideration as a whole, an approach which highlights their common traits and similarities. It is not only that the psychology of the conspirator, as Sallust had already sketched it, would always be the same: that is to say, a mixture of blind ambition and fierce determination, of inclination to violence and a taste for secrecy, of passion for power and disposition to personal risk. There are also recurrences and similarities in the way of operating and acting of all conspirators. In all such machinations there exist rules to be observed and difficulties and dangers that present themselves in the same way on every occasion. There are recurring peculiarities and modalities to be observed. Finally, they have their own general historico-political significance that the analyst of power cannot disregard and that goes beyond the outcome, successful or not, of the individual plot. Conspiracy, in sum, is a dangerous practice,7 difficult to manage, perhaps better avoided. However, it is also—as Machiavelli would write in his most important historical work8—‘something that requires much consideration’ (Florentine Histories, VIII, 1, 2) and not a ‘matter that could be passed over with brevity’ (Florentine Histories, VIII, 1, 1). Conspiracy, in other words, is an entirely political phenomenon which must be addressed, must be known in its intrinsic dynamics, contextualized historically, and interpreted conceptually in all its various aspects. Just how Machiavelli did this is what should emerge from the pages that follow and from the careful reading of his main writings on the subject (On Conspiracies; Description of the Methods adopted by the Duke Valentino when murdering Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, the Signor Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini; and The Pazzi and the Conspiracy against the Medici), which we have brought together as though they formed an organic text, a text conceived by their author in a unitary way. Taken together, they constitute that book On Conspiracies, which Machiavelli never actually wrote, but which he probably thought about many times over the course of his life.

Notes On the editorial success and circulation of this chapter, cf. the Note on the Texts. 1 2 On this topic, critics are mostly unanimous: from Oreste Tommasini to Gennaro Sasso. As to the former, ‘Conspiracies as a matter of principle repel him; his experience had shown them as useless and detrimental’ (Tommasini, 1999: 68). As to the latter, equally blunt, conspiracy is ‘an endeavor that he explicitly abhorred’ (Sasso, 1993: 467).

8  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies 3 The mandatory reference is the classic work by J. Burckhardt (1860). Many useful considerations on 15th-century conspiracies, part of the deep institutional transformations of a political-jurisdictional and political-diplomatic nature, which swept through the regimes, monarchies, and principalities present in Italy during the 15th century, can be found in Fubini (1994). 4 Elena Fasano Guarini in her study (1996) tries to interpret Machiavelli’s reflections on conspiracies in a systematic manner, proposing evaluations and reaching conclusions that I share for the most part. As an example, where it is pointed out that in Machiavelli, the untimeliness of conspiracies does not exclude, in certain historical circumstances, their inevitability, especially when they are motivated, on an ideal level, by an indomitable desire for freedom, or the awareness that, in order to modify the reigning balance of power, there exists no other means than the physical elimination of the one who holds that power. Among the extremely rare contributions, in Italy and abroad, on this matter we also recommend Osmond (2005), Martel (2009), Bento (2013), and Geuna (2015a, 2015b). Merely informative and with scarce critical substance is the work by Russo (2005). Cf. for a summary Campi (2014). 5 ‘On Conspiracy is a new subject for political philosophy. The ancient writers had told of particular conspiracies, but these had never been placed in the foreground to illustrate a theme that could lead to a practical recommendation’ (Mansfield, 2001: 317). 6 The reference is to the famous passage of The Prince, where Machiavelli speaks about the ‘long experience with modern things and [the] continuous reading of ancient ones’ (Dedicatory letter). 7 It should be clear, in reference to Machiavelli and his era, that the ‘perilousness’ of conspiracies does not affect only plotters and their potential victims, but also, evidently, those who write and talk about them. Especially if one, like Machiavelli, discusses them not just in terms of technique, but also shows how they can be an instrument to destroy or consolidate power. A conspiracy has to deal with secrets, and any discourse or reasoning on a conspiracy is unavoidably based on the presence or lack of secrecy. 8 According to some scholars La Mandragola and La Clizia—two of Machiavelli’s best known plays—hide behind their frivolous surface an esoteric level that also expresses his political interpretation of conspiracies. Cf. Sumberg (1970), Palmer (2001), and Martel (2009).

References Baron, H. (1961). Machiavelli the Republican Citizen and Author of the ‘Prince’, English Historical Review, No. 76: 217–53. Bento, A. (2013). Das Coniuras. Anàlise de um Capítulo de ‘Discursos Sobre a Primeria Década de Tito Lívio’, Res Publica (Porto), No. 13: 63–78. Burckhardt, J. (1860). Die Kulture der Renaissance in Italien: ein Versuch. Basel: Schweighauser. Campi, A. (2014). Congiure, ad vocem, in G. Sasso (ed.), Enciclopedia Machiavelli. Rome: Istituto per l’Enciclopedia Italiana, 337–42. Fasano Guarini, E. (1996). Congiure ‘contro alla patria’ e congiure ‘contro ad uno principe’ nell’opera di Niccolò Machiavelli, in Y.-M. Bercé and E. Fasano Guarini (eds), Complots et conjurations dans l’Europe moderne. Rome: École française de Rome, 9–53. Fubini, R. (1994). Italia quattrocentesca: Politica e diplomazia nell’età di Lorenzo il Magnifico. Milan: Franco Angeli.

Introduction  9 Geuna, M. (2015a). Machiavelli e le congiure. La prospettiva dei ‘Discorsi’, in G. M. Anselmi, R. Caporali, and C. Galli (eds), Machiavelli cinquecento: Mezzo millennio del ‘Principe’. Milan—Udine: Mimesis, 181–202. Geuna, M. (2015b). Machiavelli e il problema delle congiure, Rivista storica italiana, Vol. 127, No. 2: 355–410. Mansfield, H. C. Jr. (2001, originally 1979). Machiavelli’s New Modes and Orders: A Study on the ‘Discourses on Livy’. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Martel, J. (2009). Machiavelli Public’s Conspiracies, Media Tropes, Vol. 2, No. 1: 60–83. Martelli, M. (1998). Machiavelli e gli storici antichi: Osservazioni su alcuni luoghi dei ‘Discorsi’. Rome: Salerno Editrice. Osmond, P. J. (1995). ‘Princeps Historiae Romanae’: Sallust in Renaissance Political Thought, Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome, No. 40: 101–43. Osmond, P. J. (2005). The Conspiracy of 1522 Against Cardinal Giulio: Machiavelli and ‘gli esempli de li antiqui’, in K. Gouwens and S. E. Reiss (eds), The Pontificate of Clement VII: History, Politics, Culture. London: Routledge, 55–72. Pagán, V. E. (2004). Conspiracy Narratives in Roman History. Austin: University of Texas Press. Palmer, M. (2001). The Master Fool: The Conspiracy of Machiavelli’s ‘Mandragola’, in Masters and Slaves: Revisioned Essays in Political Philosophy. Lanham: Lexington Books, 99–115. Pocock, J. G. A. (1975). The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought on the Atlantic Republican Tradition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Poliziano, A. (2012, originally 1478). ‘Coniurationis Commentarium’: Cronaca della congiura dei Pazzi, in A. Poliziano and G. Becchi, La congiura della verità, edited by M. Simonetta. Naples: La Scuola di Pitagora Editrice. Ridley, T. R. (1983). Machiavelli and the Roman History in the ‘Discourses’, Quaderni di Storia, No. 18: 197–219. Roisman, J. (2006). The Rhetoric of Conspiracy in Ancient Athens. Berkeley—Los Angeles: University of California Press. Russo, F. (2005). Machiavelli e le congiure, in G. Dessì and M. P. Paternò (eds), Il realismo politico e la modernità. Rome: Istituto Luigi Sturzo, 9–32. Sasso, G. (1993). Niccolò Machiavelli, II: La storiografia. Bologna: Il Mulino. Skinner, Q. (1981). Machiavelli. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sumberg, T. A. (1970). ‘La Mandragola’. An Interpretation, Journal of Politics, No. 23: 320–40. Tommasini, O. (1999, originally 1911). La vita e gli scritti di Niccolò Machiavelli nella loro relazione col machiavellismo, II, part 1. Bologna: Il Mulino. Turchetti, M. (2013). Tyrannie et tyrannicide de l’Antiquité à nos jours. Paris: Classiques Garnier.

1 Luctus Publicus/Salus Publica Bloodbath in Florence Alessandro Campi

At the time of the Pazzi conspiracy and the bloody events that followed it—we are in April–May, 1478—Machiavelli was just a boy. Born in March, 1469, he was not yet ten years old. But in those days he was surely, as were all Florentines, an eyewitness to the harsh reaction of the Medici partisans against the Pazzi clan and to outbursts of more or less spontaneous popular fury which, as always during such events, was directed against the losers and their property. Some ferocious scenes, among them murders and mutilated or abused corpses, must have deeply impressed themselves on the mind of the young boy. Traces of them seem to have lingered in his historical texts, where he wrote—drawing more probably from his personal memories or from oral accounts than from some diarist or chronicler—that ‘the limbs of the dead were seen fixed on the points of weapons or being dragged about the city’ (Florentine Histories, VIII, 9, 3) and that ‘the deaths inflicted in those days [were] so many that the streets were filled with the parts of men’ (Florentine Histories, VIII, 9, 10). But it is not to be excluded, considering how precociously people of that period became accustomed to violence and blood, that the young Niccolò di Bernardo himself was present among the Florentine boys (known as putti) who, according to the chronicles of the time, all in agreement, and the various subsequent reconstructions, serially abused the dead body of Jacopo de’ Pazzi: Today is Sunday, May 17th, 1478, and walking in Florence I found many boys who had disinterred Messer Jacopo attaching him to the tail of a donkey and dragging him all around the streets stopping by the place where he used to live, then taking him onto the Trinity bridge and throwing him in the Arno.1 (Viviani [1478], quoted in Villard, 2008: 475) And on the day of May the 15th, 1478, Messer Iacopo de’ Pazzi was disinterred from Santa Croce and buried inside the walls of Florence, between Porta Santa Croce and Porta alla Giustizia, inside.

Luctus Publicus/Salus Publica  11 And on the day May the 17th, 1478, around eight in the evening, the boys disinterred him again, and with a piece of rope still around his neck, they dragged him around Florence; and, when in front of the door of his house, they put the rope around the door clapper, hanging him up on it, saying: knock on the door, and in this manner all around the city they made many slurs; and then tired, knowing no more what they could do with him, they went onto the Rubaconte Bridge and threw him into the Arno. [. . .] And another day [. . .] the boys pulled him back out of the water, and hung him from a willow tree, then they beat him with a club, and threw him back in the Arno.2 (Landucci [1467–1500?], 1883: 21–2) an enormous multitude of boys, as though mysteriously roused by the flames of the Furies, dig up the corpse once again; and they nearly stone to death a man who tries to stop them. Then they tie up the corpse with the rope that was used for the hanging and they drag him with scorn and insults all around the city streets. Some others, preceding them, scornfully order those they encountered to get out of the way, since they are escorting an esteemed cavalier; some others, reprimanded the corpse and exhorted it with clubs and goads to hurry up and not make the citizens wait who are expecting him in the square. Then, after taking him to his house, they knock on the door with his head while they scream: ‘Who’s at home?’ and ‘Who will welcome his lordship who has come back with such a lot of company?’. Since they are impeded from entering the square, they head toward the Arno and throw the corpse in the river.3 (Poliziano [1478], 2012: 80–2) his death [Jacopo’s] was ignominious. The plebians had so inveighed against him that he was considered unworthy for burial. He was entombed twice, the first time in church and the second inside the perimeter wall, and removed from both places because he had refused the Extreme Comforts of Christian piety and had committed the sacrilege of devoting himself to Satan. For this he was thrown into the Arno after he was dragged for a long time around the streets of the city by a few boys.4 (Giovio [1551], 2006: 657) Whatever his attitude at the time of the events, whether that of a fightened callow onlooker or that of a devilish young ruffian not at all fearful of the death being played out on the city streets, there is no doubt that the conspiracy against Lorenzo and Giuliano is the one that most stimulated Machiavelli’s mind and informed his commitment as a political writer. It dominates his discussion of the topic in the Discourses (in the chapter on

12  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies conspiracies in Book III it is recalled and cited no less than five times) and particularly in the Florentine Histories (where Chapters 2 to 10 of Book VIII are devoted to it). There were, certainly, a number of reasons for this. The conspiracy’s violent and brutal dynamic had rooted it firmly in the Florentine collective consciousness. The identity of its principal target inevitably bestowed on it great symbolic value in the years and decades to come. In our own time, too, it has become the conspiracy par excellence in Renaissance Italian history, consecrated by both fine art and a vast literature.5 But to these reasons must be added the political-diplomatic implications which it incorporated, both at the time and from a later historical perspective, and which, as we will see, did not escape Machiavelli’s careful consideration. It also became an exemplary conspiracy for the lessons, empirical and factual, that an attentive observer such as Machiavelli was able to draw from it: first and foremost, its paradoxical reversal—ascribable to the force of chance and the unpredictability of history—of the intentions and objectives of those who had promoted it. Carefully planned to destroy the power of the Medici, it ended up instead exalting it and rendering it absolute, making its survivor Lorenzo, as Guicciardini wrote in his famous reconstruction of the event, the ‘lord of the city’. His ‘potenzia’ or power, which until the moment of the assassination attempt ‘was in him great but suspect, became enormous and safe’ (History of Florence, IV), thanks to a rediscovered popular favour. Meanwhile his enemies, at one time part of the same established order, came out annihilated and destroyed forever. That’s why—we read at the end of the chapter—it ‘is the end of the civil divisions and discords: the extermination of a part, the leader of the other part now become the lord of the city’ (History of Florence, IV). But how is this event narrated and interpreted in Machiavelli’s pages? A passage from The Discourses (‘The chief motive that caused the Pazzi family to conspire against the Medici was the question of the inheritance of Giovanni Bonromei, which was taken from them at the Medici’s orders’: III, 6, 20) seems to endorse the idea, still supported by some scholars today (cf. Matucci, 1996), that Machiavelli in reality offered a non-political reading of this conspiracy, centered on the personal hatred and resentment then existing between the two families. Furthermore, this reading appears to be biased toward the conspirators’ point of view, intent only on securing revenge for the private offenses they had suffered from their rivals.6 This formulation, first sketched out in the Discourses, as seems to be demonstrated by the above mentioned text, would be more fully developed in the Florentine Histories, whose pages—the fruit of a commission conferred on Machiavelli directly by the Medici7—contain not a single mention of responsibility on the part of the Medici for the complex plot organized for the purpose of ousting them. The entire conspiratorial episode is presented—exactly as Poliziano had done—as the result of a conflict of personalities moved only by feelings of personal aversion and self-interest. Some of the personalities are characterized by innate wickedness, authentic

Luctus Publicus/Salus Publica  13 moral abjection, or an uncontrollable longing for riches.8 All of this would produce a narrative that was detailed and engaging, even commendable from a literary point of view, clearly modeled on classical texts (starting with, naturally, De Coniuratione Catilinae by Sallust [cf. Bolaffi, 1949; La Penna, 1968; Osmond, 1995; Osmond, 2014]). In some key passages, Machiavelli seems to put himself in the shoes of an eye witness (as when he describes the death of Giuliano and the wounding of Lorenzo, almost giving the impression of having been present during the episode), but at the price of offering no explanation of the causes of the conspiracy other than ‘personal’ or ‘temperamental’ ones. At least in part, the conspiracy was the result of the factional political disputes typical of Florence, but which, strangely, Machiavelli would relegate to a secondary role in his account, despite having used them as the interpretative axis of his work on the history of the city. Today, however, thanks to an ample historiography,9 we know that this episode is more correctly framed in a wider political-diplomatic constellation, composed of responsibilities and motivations that go far beyond Florence’s borders. The conspiracy certainly cannot be reduced to a family dispute caused by the theft of an inheritance, by a series of discourtesies, or by a mercantile rivalry.10 But does it seem plausible that a refined and profound political analyst such as Machiavelli would relegate to the background or completely overlook— either to appease Cardinal Giulio de’ Medici, who had commissioned his Florentine Histories, or for the sake of creating an audience-pleasing dramatic interpretation of the events—the historical-political implications of such a striking incident? Could Machiavelli have failed to see or even have deliberately concealed, for example, the logical-factual connection between the assassination attempt against the Medici and the assassination of Galeazzo Maria Sforza (cf. Ilardi, 1986; Lubkin, 1994), committed two years earlier in Milan? Both were certainly indicative of how the political geography of the peninsula and the internal power arrangements of the two regimes were changing. Could the author of an ambitious and innovative brief treatise On Conspiracies and a statesman who had always shown great attention for the balance of power among the Italian city-states and the accelerating centralization of power that was modifying their institutional frameworks have failed to take advantage of, or worse, intentionally hidden away a treasure trove of valuable lessons? In reality, a careful reading of the preface to Book VIII, which introduces the narrative of the conspiracy, clearly demonstrates that Machiavelli interprets it, with regard to its causes and deep motivations, within a political context characterized by the factional struggle for and against the consolidation of the de facto dominion of the Medici. The failure of the conspiracy would finally grant the Medici, in the person of the surviving Lorenzo, legitimacy in the eyes of the population and a previously lacking vast civil consensus. Similarly, the consequences (paradoxical in certain respects) produced by the conspiracy are also political-institutional, and Machiavelli

14  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies believes he can generalize them, far beyond the Florentine case, into a sort of historical regularity. According to this general interpretation, conspiracies are the only instrument by which overly concentrated power can be opposed and overthrown. Nevertheless, they frequently end up—in the case of failure—making that power even more absolute (and the surviving prince even more suspicious and vengeful): We shall tell about the state of the Medici after it had conquered all the enmities that had come against it openly. If that house wanted to take sole authority in the city and to stand out from the others by living civilly, it was necessary that it also overcome those that schemed secretly against it. For although the Medici fought with some other families as equals in authority and reputation, citizens who were envious of their power could openly oppose them without fear of being suppressed in the beginnings of their enmities; for since the magistrates had become free, none of the parties had cause to fear except after defeat. But after the victory of ’66 [the one of Piero de’ Medici on his inner opponents], the whole state had been required so restricted to the Medici, who took so much authority, that is was required for those who were malcontent at it either to endure that mode of living with patience or, if indeed they wanted to eliminate it, attempt to do so by way of conspiracy and secretly. Such ways, because they succeed only with difficulty, most often bring ruin to whoever moves them and greatness to the one against whom they are moved. Hence, almost always a prince of a city—which happens rarely—rises to greater power and many times from being a good man, becomes bad. For conspiracies by their example give him cause to fear; and in fearing, to secure himself; and securing himself, to injure; hence arise hatreds later, and often his ruin. And so these conspiracies immediately crush whoever moves them and in time offend in every mode the one against whom they are moved. (Florentine Histories, VIII, 1, 3–7) This passage does not refer to personal disputes or rivalries, which certainly existed between the members of the Pazzi and Medici clans and which surely acted as a lighted fuse or trigger for the conspirators’ plot, but rather to a political situation in Florence. The power of the Medici had grown to such a high degree (cf. Rubinstein, 1997), thanks to their more or less direct control of all the most important city magistracies, that their opponents were left with, as their only weapons of opposition, sedition and conspiracy— dangerous in itself, difficult to manage, its outcome always uncertain. The conspiracy matures, therefore, in an internal political situation of radicalism and exceptionality, of a mortal struggle—whose outcome seems, however, to be already predetermined, considering the social and political position now held by the Medici. The struggle is between the ambition of this dynasty to become a formal principate (an ambition that seems by now to

Luctus Publicus/Salus Publica  15 be almost impossible to oppose), and those sectors of the local oligarchy which, as in the case of the Pazzi’s family, believe they still have wealth, ambitions, and political relationships sufficient to oppose that hegemonic plan.11 But the conspiracy is also influenced by an external political situation that has become unstable since, upon the tragic death of Galeazzo Maria Sforza, the diplomatic-political friendship between Florence and Milan has been weakened and expansionist aims have grown, particularly those of the papacy. The opening of Book VIII—‘lies in the middle of two conspiracies, one already narrated and taking place in Milan, the other yet to be narrated and occurring in Florence’ (VIII, 1, 1)—shows how much Machiavelli was aware of the existing relationship between the two events and of their consequences for the balance of political power that had ruled Italy until that moment. Already at the beginning of the second chapter there is a clear allusion to the political context within which the conspiracy would ripen thanks to a vast concourse of forces and powers (from papal Rome to the Duchy of Urbino). Italy, Machiavelli writes, ‘was divided into two factions: pope and king [Ferdinand I of Aragon, king of Naples] on one side; Venetians, duke [of Milan] and Florentines on the other’ (VIII, 2, 1). But, soon afterwards, there is an even clearer reference to the aversion that Pope Sixtus IV—whose role in the organization of the conspiracy would be crucial—harbored against the Signoria, to the point that ‘in whatever his enterprise [he] strove to offend the state of Florence’ (VIII, 2, 1). His was not a personal aversion to the Medici, but a hostile attitude toward the state— Florence—within which the Medici exercised their growing dominance and where they wished to establish, in that part of the Italy over which Rome historically exercised its influence, a powerful principate. Nor, as Machiavelli presents it, does Lorenzo’s choice to obstruct the social ascent of the Pazzi derive from economic rivalry, or simply from questions of prestige and envy. Rather, it derives from Lorenzo’s precise political assessment, made together with his counselors and friends, who explained to him, ‘how very dangerous it was to him and contrary to his authority to join wealth and state in citizens’ (VIII, 2, 8). Economic power, in excess of a certain level, tends by necessity to transform itself into political power. Once this level of wealth is achieved, one’s aspiration flows toward a leading role in the public sphere. This is exactly what Lorenzo tried to prevent, maneuvering so that no offices or magistracies were given to members of the Pazzi clan ‘those ranks of honor that it appeared to the other citizens they merited. From this arose in the Pazzi their first indignation and in the Medici their first fear; and as one of these grew, it gave matter for the other to grow upon’ (VIII, 2, 9). In his relationships with members of the Pazzi family, Lorenzo certainly looked after his own economic interests. Above all else, however, he did not want the Pazzi to overshadow him politically or even challenge his role as dominus and de facto Lord of Florence: ‘hot with youth and power [Lorenzo] wanted to take thought for everything and wanted everyone to recognize everything as from him’ (VIII, 3, 1). In other words,

16  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies Lorenzo wanted his leadership and authority to be legally and universally recognized. The real issue at stake in the conspiracy, therefore, is power over the city, just as its effective cause—from the Pazzi’s point of view—is their frustration at not occupying, despite their wealth, any role in the public life of the city. Such motivations can hardly be considered to be of a private nature and indeed Machiavelli does not so consider them (cf. Fubini, 1998). In the same manner, it is worth repeating, Machiavelli clearly understood the nature of the Roman-Florentine diplomatic plot authored, on the one hand, by Girolamo Riario, Lord of Imola and nephew of Sixtus IV, and, on the other, by Francesco de’ Pazzi, the two main material organizers of the conspiracy. The first, counting on the help of the Pope, yearned for a principate in Romagna and he had every reason to want to weaken the Florentine presence in that area of Italy. The second, who was ‘more spirited and more sensitive than any of the others’ (VIII, 3, 4) and who had amassed great financial wealth on the Roman market, aspired instead to the public offices and honors which he believed were due him in his city, from which he had practically been banished by Lorenzo. Therefore ‘he decided either to acquire what he lacked or to lose what he had’ (VIII, 3, 4), resorting to the extreme measure of the assassination of those—the Medici brothers— who opposed his political ambitions. Girolamo Riario and Francesco de’ Pazzi concluded, Machiavelli writes, ‘that the pope and the king [of Naples] would easily approve [the conspiracy] if it could be shown to each of them how easy the thing was’ (VIII, 3, 7). And in fact they were right, at least with regard to Sixtus IV, who in the delicate preparatory phase of the conspiracy ‘made all the largest offers he could on behalf of the enterprise’ (VIII, 4, 4). In the eyes of Machiavelli, the decisive role of Sixtus IV, whether as inspiration or director, was demonstrated—apart from the involvement in the subversive plan of Giovanbattista da Montesecco, one of the pope’s most trustworthy condottiere (Simonetta, 2014)—by one specific fact: the reluctance to go forward with the plot on the part of Jacopo de’ Pazzi, the real leader of the family, without whose consent the conspiracy could never have gone ahead, was overcome only when Jacopo received assurances that Sixtus IV was favorable to the overthrow of the Medici regime. ‘The authority of the pope moved Jacopo somewhat’ (VIII, 4, 7), writes Machiavelli, to explain how, after so much discussion, even ‘Messer Jacopo [. . .] agreed to the enterprise’ (VIII, 4, 8). But it is the military attack on Florence following the failed assassination of Lorenzo that unveils the involvement of the two powers, Rome and Naples (and therefoere Sixtus IV and Ferdinand I of Aragon), who from the outside, together with the Pazzi and their acolytes, had organized the conspiracy: But since the change of state did not occur in Florence as the pope and the king desired, they decided that what they had not been able to do by conspiracy they would do by war. With the greatest speed, both put

Luctus Publicus/Salus Publica  17 their men together to attack the state of Florence, while proclaiming that they wanted nothing from the city other than that it should rid itself of Lorenzo de’ Medici, whom alone, of all the Florentines, they held for an enemy. (Florentine Histories, VIII, 10, 1) If this is the historical-political framework of the conspiracy as described in the Florentine Histories, then the plot was much more than a blood feud motivated by the envy that the Pazzi (‘all so avaricious’) nourished for the Medici (‘splendid and munificent’), as it was portrayed by Poliziano (2012: 56, 64), with whom Machiavelli does not agree, despite using him as a source. It is not the case, therefore, that Machiavelli’s account hides the political reasons which brought the Medici to attract so much hatred in their regard, or their responsibility, by dint of their abuse of power and mistreatment of their adversaries, in triggering the plot. Having clarified Machiavelli’s political analysis and explanation of the Pazzi conspiracy itself, it remains to be understood what he deduced from the episode in terms of a general reflection or lesson on the topic of conspiracy in the broader sense, drawn partially from the Florentine Histories, and partially from other writings. What immediately emerges is that the Florentine event provided Machiavelli with an extremely instructive example of the difficulties faced by conspirators, as he would theorize in the Discourses, ‘before, during, and after the fact’ (III, 6, 51)—that is, in the organization, execution, and post-execution phases of the plot. While some of his assumptions or practical precepts were confirmed by the events, on one fundamental point—regarding secrecy as a necessary condition to the success of a conspiracy—the Pazzi plot represented a sort of refutation or nonconformity. If the best way of protecting the secrecy of the conspiracy during the organization phase is to limit the number of people who know about it or participate in it, then in fact things had gone differently in the case of the conspiracy against the Medici, which, despite involving a large number of people all over Italy (almost 50), was not discovered until the moment of its implementation: when one [a conspiracy] has been kept secret for a long time among many men, it is considered a miraculous achievement, as was the conspiracy [. . .] of the de Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano de’ Medici, which was known to more than fifty men and discovered only at the moment it was to be carried out. (Florentine Histories, III, 6, 61) Evidently, every rule or axiom of behavior has its exceptions. Two other aspects of the conspiracy, however—its failed execution and its consequences—conformed to Machiavelli’s precepts. When passing from planning to action, Machiavelli advises, one must always consider

18  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies the imponderable, the unexpected, chance, everything, in other words, that might force a change in plans at the last moment, with consequences that can no longer be calculated in a rational way or planned with a cool head. Reading the Discourses, it becomes clear that a sudden change in plans is what thwarts the efforts of the plotters, leading them to failure: The established plan was that the Medici would serve the cardinal of San Giorgio the midday meal and that they were to be killed at that repast; it had been decided who would kill them, who would seize the palace, and who would race through the city and call the people to liberty. It happened that while the Pazzi, the Medici, and the cardinal were hearing a solemn rite in the cathedral of Florence, it became known that Giuliano would not eat with them that morning; this caused the conspirators to gather together, and what they were to have done in the Medicis’ home they now decided to do in the church. This upset the entire plan, because Giovambattista da Montesecco did not wish to take part in the murder, declaring that he did not want to do it in a church, so that they had to entrust every action to new agents, who did not have sufficient time to summon up their courage, and they committed such errors that they were beaten down while carrying out their plans. (Discourses, III, 6, 106–8, emphasis mine) The pope had been maintaining Raffaello de’ Riario, nephew of Count Girolamo, at the University of Pisa to learn canon law; and while he was in the place, the pope promoted him to the dignity of the cardinalate. It appeared therefore to the conspirators that they should bring this cardinal to Florence so that his coming would cover up the conspiracy, as it would enable them to hide the conspirators they needed among his retinue, and from this they could take the opportunity of executing it. So the cardinal came and was received by Messer Jacopo de’ Pazzi at Montughi, his villa near Florence. The conspirators desired to bring Lorenzo and Giuliano together by means of the cardinal and, as soon as this happened, to kill them. Therefore, they arranged for the Medici to hold a banquet for the cardinal at their villa in Fiesole, which either by chance or on purpose Giuliano did not attend. So, since this scheme turned out to be vain, they judged that if they invited him to a banquet in Florence the two would have to come of necessity. And so, the order having been given, they fixed this banquet for Sunday, the twenty-sixth of April, in the year 1478. Thus, as the conspirators were thinking how they could kill them in the middle of the banquet, they were together on Saturday night, when they planned all that they would have to execute the following morning. But when day came, Francesco was informed that Giuliano was not coming to the banquet. Therefore, the leaders of the conspiracy assembled again and concluded that carrying it into

Luctus Publicus/Salus Publica  19 effect was not to be delayed, because it was impossible, since it was known to many, that it not be discovered. And thus they decided to kill the Medici in the cathedral church of Santa Reparata; since the cardinal would be there, the two brothers would attend in accordance with custom. They wanted Giovan Battista to assume the task of killing Lorenzo, and Francesco de’ Pazzi and Bernardo Bandini to kill Giuliano. Giovan Battista refused [. . .]. This was the beginning of the ruin of their enterprise, because, since time was pressing, of necessity they had to give this task to [. . .] two men who by practice and by nature were very inept for so great an undertaking. For if ever any deed requires a great and firm spirit made resolute in both life and death through much experience, it is necessary to have it in this, where it has been seen very many times that men skilled in arms and soaked in blood have lacked spirit. (Florentine Histories, VIII, 5, 1–13, emphasis mine) The sudden change of the location of the ambush (first the Medici’s Villa located on the Fiesole Hill, then their city residence in Via Larga, finally the cathedral in Florence), followed by the unexpected refusal of Montesecco to commit a sacrilegious act and thus the need to hire at the last moment two new men inept in the use of arms and lacking determination, combine to demonstrate how contingency, casuality, and the exceptional can intervene in human affairs. The best laid plans and most astute calculations are made vain and precarious by chance, and, like this one, a conspiracy can end badly despite lengthy and careful planning. The hand of fate was made all the more powerful by the bad idea, pursued by the plotters from the beginning, of committing a simultaneous double murder, something that history shows to be nearly impossible and unavoidably risky insofar as one is exposed, in case of failure, to the inexorable vendetta of the surviving target. This is another rule that the Pazzi and their allies should not have violated: A conspiracy can fail to be executed perfectly when it is directed against one leader for the reasons already provided, but it can also easily fail to be executed perfectly when the conspiracy is directed against two leaders; in truth, this kind of conspiracy is so difficult that it is almost impossible for it to succeed. To undertake a similar enterprise at the same time in different places is almost impossible, because it cannot be carried out at different times if the first is not to spoil the second. Thus, if a conspiracy against one prince is an uncertain, dangerous, and imprudent affair, conspiring against two rulers is completely vain and foolhardy [. . .]. Hence, everyone should avoid conspiracies such as these aimed at more than one leader, because they do not benefit the conspirators, the city, or anyone else; on the contrary, survivors who remain become even more insufferable and harsher, as Florence [knows]. (Discourses, III, 6, 128–30, 135)

20  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies Still to be told is what happened in Florence once the failure of the conspiracy was clear. Not just the bloodbath and the violent repression of all those who took part in it, but the political effects produced by the plot: the strengthening of the power of Lorenzo the Magnificent, now without enemies, and his definitive legitimation in the eyes of the citizens and the people. All of this shines through in the speech that Machiavelli has Lorenzo pronounce in the Florentine Histories in the aftermath of the failed assassination attempt and while, after the papal excommunication of the city, the armies of Rome and Naples are marching against him. Florence and the Medici, Lorenzo explains, are a single thing, as the popular mobilization in his favor after the murder of Giuliano has demonstrated. The authority and the power which he enjoys are not the fruit of usurpation or violence, but have been earned ‘by liberality, humanity, and munificence’ (VIII, 10, 18). Moreover, they have always been supported—as had already been the case, during the times of Cosimo de’ Medici—‘with your consent and union’ (VIII, 10, 20). ‘[M]y house could not have ruled and would not be able to rule this republic if you together with it had not ruled and did not rule now’ (VIII, 10, 21). Lorenzo is, by his own words, a prince beloved by the community, and, as Machiavelli had already written in The Prince, ‘against whoever is reputed it is difficult to conspire, difficult to mount an attack, provided it is understood that he is excellent and revered by his own subjects’ (XIX, 5). A munificent and generous prince, influential and virtuous, will always have on his side the majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends and of the state which defend him, so that when popular good will is added to all these things, it is impossible that anyone should be so rash as to conspire. For whereas a conspirator ordinarily has to fear before the execution of the evil, in this case (having the people as enemies) he must fear afterwards too, when the excess has occurred, nor can he hope for any refuge. (Discourses, XIX, 13–14) This means that the failure of the Pazzi conspiracy was probably inscribed in this fateful union between the Medici and their city, a union which was finally made manifest through the sacrifice of Giuliano and the bloodbath that ensued.

Notes 1 ‘Oggi siamo ad 17 di maggio 1478 in domenicha Ɛ andando io apasso per la terra cioe per firençe io trovaji che molti fanciugli avevano dissotterrato Mess Jachopo e atacchatolo alla coda d’uno asino e tranearonlo per tutta la tera e massime a chasa dove habitava poi lo condussono al ponte a santa trinita e gittarolo in Arno’.

Luctus Publicus/Salus Publica  21 The one by the copyist Viviano Viviani is a chronicle written on the same day as the facts. The manuscript—still unpublished and titled Ricordo dell’uccisione di Giuliano de’ Medici nella congiura de’ Pazzi, e della morte subita da molti de congiurati—is now held in the National Library in Florence (Ms II, III, 138, ex Magl., cl. XXIV, 154). 2 ‘E a dì 15 di maggio 1478, fu dissotterrato messere Iacopo de’ Pazzi, di Santa Croce, e sotterrato lungo le mura di Firenze, tra la Porta alla Croce alla Porta alla Giustizia, dentro. E a dì 17 di maggio 1478, circa a ore venti, e fanciugli lo disotterròno un’altra volta, e con un pezzo di capresto, ch’ancora aveva al collo, lo straccinorono per tutto Firenze; e, quando furono a l’uscio della casa sua, missono el capresto nella canpanella dell’uscio, lo tirorono su dicendo: picchia l’uscio, e così per tutta la città feciono molte diligioni; e di poi stracchi, non sapevono più che se ne fare, andorono in sul Ponte a Rubaconte e gittorolo in Arno. [. . .] E un altro dì [. . .] e fanciugli lo ritrassono fuori dell’acqua, e impiccorollo a un salcio, di poi lo bastonorono, di poi pure rigittato in Arno’. These words are from the chronicle of Luca Landucci (1437–1516). Apothecary and diarist, he started to work on his chronicle in 1467 (1500, for other scholars, among them the editor of the first printed edition of the abovementioned work). After his death, the work was continued until the year 1542 by an anonymous source (one of his relatives?). The authentic diary—published for the first time in 1883—is now preserved in the Municipal Library in Siena. 3 ‘puerorum ingens multitudo, velut quibusdam furiarum arcanis facibus accensa, conditum rursus cadaver effodiunt; prohibentem nescio quem parum abfuit quin lapidibus necarent. Tum, quo fuerat suffocatus, laqueo apprehendunt multisque conviciis ac ludibriis per omnes urbis vicos passim raptant. Hic alii per ridiculum praeeuntes decedere via obvios iubere, quod se equitem insignem dicerent adducere; alii baculis stimulisque increpitantes monere hominem, ne praestolantibus se in foro civibus esset in mora. Mox ad suas adductum aedes ostium capite pulsare subigunt, simul exclamant, ecquis intus sit, ecquis redeuntem magno comitatu dominum excipiat. In forum venire prohibiti, ad Arni fluvium contendunt eoque cadaver abiciunt’. This is the testimony of Poliziano (1454–1494). His famous Coniurationis Commentarium, desired by Lorenzo de’ Medici himself, as we know, was rashly composed and published in the summer of 1478, therefore a few weeks after the attempted assassination of Giuliano. 4 ‘necis supplicium tulit, usque adeo in eum concitata plebe, ut sepulturae honore indignus putaretur; bisque tumulatus, semel in templo, iterum in pomerio, indeque erutus, quod supremas Christianae pietatis cohortationes, sese itidem Cacodaemoni impie deuouens, reiecisset; diu a pueris per urbem raptatus, in Arnum traheretur’. Paolo Giovio (1483–1552)—historian, biographer, and prelate—has told of Jacopo’s terrible death within the biographical profile dedicated to Giuliano de’ Medici in his famous book Elogia virorum bellica virtute illustrium etc. (1551). Cf. Zimmermann (1995). 5 The artistic-symbolic consecration of the conspiracy was very precocious. Already in 1478 the sculptor and medallist Bertoldo di Giovanni, pupil of Donatello and intimate friend of Lorenzo the Magnificent, coined a bronze medal—one of the most beautiful of the Italian Renaissance for its exquisite workmanship—to celebrate the sacrifice of Giuliano and the narrow escape of Lorenzo, whose faces appear on the two sides in profile, in a solemn pose. On the first side of the medal—today visible in the Museo del Bargello in Florence—we can read ‘LUCTUS PUBLICUS’, on the second ‘SALUS PUBLICA’, while on both of them are depicted, carved in miniature, the agitated moments of the ambush. The failure

22  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies of the conspiracy, in the interpretation of one Medici supporter, corresponds to the security of the Florentine State and with the ascent of the Magnificent as its undisputed lord. Apart from the numerous chronicles and historical reconstructions, the Pazzi conspiracy has also been memorialized in novels, theatrical dramas (Vittorio Alfieri, 1789 [Alfieri, 1985]), paintings, engravings, and popular prints. For a literarily enjoyable and historiographically rigorous reconstruction of the events, see Martines (2004). Cf. also Acton (1979), Unger (2008), Capponi (2014), and Cardini, Frale (2017). 6 Closer to our interpretation in its recognition of Machiavelli’s framing the Pazzi Conspiracy within the context of Italy’s political-territorial balance of power, is the essay by Cipriani (1990). According to this essay, the conspiracy ‘did not draw nourishment only from aristocratic hatreds, but also from the obvious desire to give rise to that ‘mutation of the state’ aimed at breaking, along with the Medici’s hold on power, the iron-clad alliance, which from the times of Cosimo il Vecchio, connected the Florentine Republic to the Duchy of Milan’ (Cipriani, 1990: 137). 7 On the central role that the Medici played in Machiavelli’s life and works, cf. Marietti (1974), Najemy (1982), and Butters (2010). 8 When presenting the plotters to his readers, Poliziano composes an authentic bestiary, far more vivid than Sallust’s depiction of the Catiline: Jacopo de’ Pazzi ‘swear the gods and the humans. [. . .] Pale and wan [. . .] never keeping his mouth still, neither his eyes, nor his hands. [He had] two major vices [. . .]: great greed and a great love of squandering. [. . .] For this he was hated by everyone’; Francesco Salviati ‘was ignorant and despiser of every human and divine law, full of every vice and vileness, uncontrolled in his licentiousness and infamous in his enticements’; Francesco de’ Pazzi, ‘man of a superb nature’, ‘[was] a bloodthirsty man who, in order to realize whatever he had in his mind, was not held in any respect for honesty, religion, good or bad reputation’; Jacopo Salviati, ‘very capable to wheedle men’s spirits’, ‘was devoted with diligence to harlots and to jags’; Jacopo Bracciolini had an ‘inborn vanity [. . .] inveighed against human habit with no discretion [. . .]. He squandered in few years the considerable patrimony that he inherited from his father and therefore [. . .] [he was] available for every buyer’; Bernardo Bandini was a ‘corrupted man, brazen, fearless, him too steeply pushed to every crime after having squandered the family patrimony’ (Cf. Poliziano, 2012: 56–62). For more details on the image of Catiline in Middle Age and Renaissance conspiracies, cf. Osmond (2000; 2014). Machiavelli, on the other hand, while not hiding the vices and weaknesses of the single participants in the conspiracy, is much more impartial in his judgments and never freely insulting. Of the Pazzi, who according to Poliziano (2012: 57) were ‘all extremely stingy’ and hated by the community, he says for example that they ‘were the most splendid in wealth and nobility of all Florentine families’ (Florentine Histories, VIII, 2, 5). Of Jacopo de’ Pazzi, moreover, he recalls some of the vices of which he was accused, ‘among them games and blasphemies’, but ‘he compensated for [these vices] by many charities, because he used to help generously many who were needy as well as holy places’ (Florentine Histories, VIII, 9, 13). In any case, he does not identify the wickedness of the individuals and their moral miseries as the key to the explanation of the conspiracy. 9 Cf., as an example of a wider historiographical perspective, the synthetic but precious work by Fubini (1994b). Cf. also, with a similarly broad interpretative line on the conspiracy that takes into account especially the ‘international’ variables, Simonetta (2008).

Luctus Publicus/Salus Publica  23 10 Which and how many forces—inside and especially outside Florence—took part in the conspiracy has already been told, as is well known, by Francesco Guicciardini in the pages of his History of Florence: ‘Contributed on this contract not only the Count [Girolamo Riario], but also His Holiness the Pope was aware and willing, although to maintain his honor he made Count Girolamo lead the contract. King Ferdinand, a confidant very close to the Pontiff, also took part in the contract. He was indignant about the State of Florence having established a connection with Venice and Milan, and he persuaded himself, that by starting a new State in Florence he would be able to have the city at his will [. . .]. Federico Duke of Urbino, long completey devoted to the King, also participated, in part because of the opportunity of absorbing Città di Castello, which under the Papal State had Lorenzo Iustini as its Lord, an avid supporter of conspiracy who preferred Federico to his rival Sir Nicolò Vitelli da Castello’ (History of Florence, IV). 11 Well written by Sasso (1993: 468) that ‘Pazzi conspiracy [. . .] is [. . .] almost the symbol of a desperation: the extreme gesture with which a political group that with clarity of mind and without illusions foresee the death destiny from whom was awaited, it searched, in vain, to prevent or delay its accomplishment’.

References Acton, H. (1979). The Pazzi Conspiracy: The Plot Against the Medici. London: Thames and Hudson. Alfieri, V. (1985, originally 1789). La congiura dei Pazzi, in L. Toschi (ed.), Tragedie, Vol. II. Florence: Sansoni. Bolaffi, E. (1949). Sallustio e la sua fortuna nei secoli. Rome: Perrella. Butters, H. (2010). Machiavelli and the Medici, in J. M. Najemy (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 64–79. Capponi, N. (2014). Al traditor s’uccida: La congiura dei Pazzi: un dramma italiano. Milan: Il Saggiatore. Cardini, F., and Frale, B. (2017). La Congiura: Potere e vendetta nella Firenze dei Medici. Bari: Laterza. Cipriani, G. (1990). La congiura dei Pazzi: considerazioni storiografiche, in S. Rota Ghibaudi and F. Barcia (eds), Studi politici in onore di Luigi Firpo, Vol. I. Milan: Franco Angeli. Fubini, R. (1994b). La congiura dei Pazzi: radici politico-sociali e ragioni di un fallimento, in Italia quattrocentesca: Politica e diplomazia nell’età di Lorenzo il Magnifico. Milan: Franco Angeli, 87–106. Fubini, R. (1998). Machiavelli, i Medici e la storia fiorentina del Quattrocento, Pariser Historische Studien, No. 47: 327–38. Giovio, P. (2006, originally 1551). Elogi degli uomini illustri, edited by F. Minonzio, translation by A. Guasparri e Franco Minonzio. Turin: Einaudi. Ilardi, V. (1986, originally 1972). The Assassination of Galeazzo Maria Sforza and the Reaction of Italian Diplomacy, in Studies in Italian Renaissance Diplomatic History. London: Ashgate, 72–103. Landucci, L. (1883, originally 1467–1542). Diario fiorentino dal 1450 al 1516, continuato da un anonimo fino al 1542, edited by I. Del Badia. Florence: Sansoni.

24  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies La Penna, A. (1968). Brevi note sul tema della congiura nella storiografia moderna, in Sallustio e la ‘rivoluzione romana’. Milan: Feltrinelli, 432–52. Lubkin, G. (1994). A Renaissance Court: Milan Under Galeazzo Maria Sforza. Berkeley: University of California Press. Marietti, M. (1974). Machiavelli historiographe des Médicis, in A. Rochon (ed.), Les Écrivains et le pouvoir en Italie à l’époque de la Renaissance. Paris: Sorbonne, 81–148. Martines, L. (2004). April Blood: Florence and the Plot Against the Medici. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Matucci, A. (1996). Narrare o interpretare: Machiavelli e la congiura dei Pazzi, in J.-J. Marchand (ed.), Niccolò Machiavelli: Politico storico letterato. Rome: Salerno Editrice, 315–35. Najemy, J. M. (1982). Machiavelli and the Medici: The Lessons of ‘Florentine Histories’, Renaissance Quarterly, No. 35: 551–76. Osmond, P. J. (1995). ‘Princeps Historiae Romanae’: Sallust in Renaissance Political Thought, Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome, No. 40: 101–43. Osmond, P. J. (2000). Catiline in Fiesole and Florence: The After-Life of a Roman Conspirator, International Journal of the Classical Tradition, Vol. 7, No. 1: 3–38. Osmond, P. J. (2014). Catiline in Renaissance Conspiracy Histories: Hero or Villain? The Case of Stefano Porcari, in M. Chiabò, M. Gargano, A. Modigliani, and P. J. Osmond (eds), Congiure e conflitti: L’affermazione della signoria pontificia su Roma nel Rinascimento: politica, economia e cultura. Rome: Roma nel Rinascimento, 203–15. Poliziano, A. (2012, originally 1478). ‘Coniurationis Commentarium’. Cronaca della congiura dei Pazzi, in A. Poliziano and G. Becchi, La congiura della verità, edited by M. Simonetta. Naples: La scuola di Pitagora Editrice. Rubinstein, N. (1997, originally 1966). The Government of Florence Under the Medici (1434 to 1494). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Sasso, G. (1993). Niccolò Machiavelli. II: La storiografia. Bologna: Il Mulino. Simonetta, M. (2008). The Montefeltro Conspiracy: A Renaissance Mystery Decoded. New York—London: Doubleday. Simonetta, M. (2014). L’enigma Montesecco: una nuova scoperta sulla congiura dei Pazzi, Sisto IV e i ‘novi tyranni’. Rome: Roma nel Rinascimento, 279–98. Unger, M. J. (2008). Magnifico: The Brilliant Life and Violent Times of Lorenzo de’ Medici. London—New York: Simon & Schuster. Villard, R. (2008). Du bien commun au mal nécessaire: Tyrannies, assassinats politiques et souveraineté en Italie, vers 1470-vers 1600. Rome: École française de Rome. Zimmermann Price, T. C. (1995). Paolo Giovio: The Historian and the Crisis of Sixteenth—Century Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

2 From Magione to Senigallia False Conspiracy, Double Conspiracy Alessandro Campi

In the famous Description of the Methods adopted by the Duke Valentino when murdering Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, the Signor Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini, Machiavelli narrates the plot against Cesare Borgia (also called Duke Valentino) by members of a group who met in Magione (a small town in Umbria overlooking Lake Trasimeno) between the 24th of September and the 8th of October, 1502. We are talking about Paolo, Francesco, and Giambattista from the Roman Orsini family; Vitellozzo Vitelli, Lord of Città di Castello; Oliverotto Euffreducci, Lord of Fermo; Giampaolo Baglioni, who with his family dominated Perugia; as well as the representatives of Giovanni Bentivoglio, Guidobaldo di Montefeltro, and Pandolfo Petrucci, respectively tyrant of Bologna, Duke of Urbino, and Lord of Siena.1 Most of them had supported with men and arms the expansionist plan hatched in November, 1499 by Valentino (with the direct support of his father, Pope Alexander VI, and the approval of France). This plan was aimed at setting up a unified dominion in central Italy starting from the historic territorial possessions of the Church. In June 1502, Cesare Borgia was beginning to organize the ‘new state’ administratively, after having unified it by way of swift and effective military campaigns. But when it became clear that this new state would lead to the political dissolution of the local Seigniories of Umbria, the Marche, Tuscany, and Romagna, the lords of some of these lands—‘in order not to be devoured by the dragon one by one’,2 formed a coalition (at the meeting in Magione) to stop the planned conquest and, at the earliest opportunity, physically eliminate Borgia from the scene. Although often presented as a conspiracy, whose requirements would include secrecy and rapid implementation, what came out of the meetings in Magione was more an alliance or a coalition. It was correctly described at the time as an anti-Borgia diet, whose subscribers (and objectives) were soon known to the various Italian courts.3 Naturally, Valentino was also quickly informed. Thus began a complex politico-diplomatic maneuver by both sides, to obtain support from the other parties interested in the clash that was about to take place between Borgia and his erstwhile allies or comrades in arms.

26  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies The first to be called into play was Florence. The rebels asked Florence to side with them against Valentino (Florence itself having much to fear from the consolidation and growth of a new principate in Central Italy that would territorially encircle it). Borgia too invited the Tuscan Republic to form a political-military league which would have had the blessing of France and the Pope. Florence preferred not to side openly with either of the contenders, waiting to see who would gain the upper hand and reasoning—as did Venice, the other power which chose to remain neutral—that it had everything to gain from the prospect of the mutual undermining of the two adversaries. In line with its traditional policy of prudence, the Florentine Republic, which through Pandolfo Petrucci also had an open channel to the rebels, sent as its envoy to hear out Borgia’s claims and requests someone who—as happily phrased by Roberto Ridolfi in his famous biography of Machiavelli— ‘would commit little and understand a lot’ (Ridolfi, 1978: 88). For Florence it was a matter of buying time; of promising without committing itself too much (especially on the economic-military side); of understanding the real intensions of Valentino without laying its cards on the table; of asserting its own point of view without irritating an interlocutor inclined to carrying out his threats. The man suited for this diplomatic mission (legation) was Machiavelli.4 He enjoyed the trust of Piero Soderini,5 political chief of Florence (cf. Butters, 1985; Pesman Cooper, 2002), and, with an inferior rank to that of ambassador (of orator as his office was then called in Florence), he could not make any commitments in response to Borgia’s pressing offers of friendship and alliance, or his even more pressing requests for a well-paid military contract (condotta). Over the span of three months, on his trips between Imola and Senigallia (via Cesena), Machiavelli was able to observe, and to document in writing for future memory, that the real conspiracy—the conspiracy in a technical sense—the fruit of deft dissembling and bold and unscrupulous maneuvering, was the one secretly plotted by Valentino against the rebellious mercenaries (condottieri). First, he wheedled them with promises of new alliances, money, and munificent military contracts; then, after they had been snared in the trap of an illusory definitive reconciliation, he physically eliminated them in the most brutal fashion. The Prince adopted Valentino as a model of the ‘new prince’ and as proof of how even men of power have to come to terms with fortune and the unexpected, sometimes stronger than their own personal virtues (cf. Sasso, 1966; Anglo, 1969). It is worth noting, therefore, that the book describes this famous and complex event with brutal concision, which nonetheless clearly indicates which conspiracy Machiavelli considered to be the true conspiracy. The gathering of the squires in the Umbrian castle in Magione was far too public and inspired not by farsighted calculation but by fear and desperation once they realized ‘that the greatness of the duke and of the Church was ruin for them’ (The Prince, VII, 20). The plot constructed by Valentino, on the other hand, was a cunning response to the

From Magione to Senigallia  27 insubordination of his former military leaders. Being able to rely on ‘neither France nor other external forces’ Valentino ‘turned to deceit’ (si volse alli inganni), that is to say, the planning of revenge by subterfuge and artifice. ‘He knew so well how to dissimulate his intent’, Machiavelli adds, to be able to reconcile in a few weeks first with the most eminent among his old leaders, Paolo Orsini (even ‘giving him money, garments, and horses’: The Prince, VII, 21), and then with most of the other captains of adventure. His goal was to pretend to have become friends and allies again and then— taking advantage of their ‘ingenuiousness’, in other words their foolishness and their improvidence—to bring them disarmed to Senigallia where he would kill or imprison them. The conclusion of the brief account of the episode in The Prince has been judged by many observers as perhaps the finest example of Machiavelli’s storied cynicism: ‘These heads were then eliminated’ (VII, 22). A brief and blunt sentence, without even a single word to recall the brutal violence inflicted on them by the Duke’s hatchet men once the trap was sprung. Without even recording their names for future memory. What stands out is the absolute cynicism of Valentino, while his victims—nameless—are a mere detail. Curiously, the account of the events contained in the almost daily diplomatic missives that Machiavelli sent back to Florence during the three months (October 5, 1502 to late January 1503), when he accompanied Valentino through Romagna, the Marche and Umbria, are far more precise and analytic. But the substance does not change. The authentic conspiracy is the one that came to fruition, surprising everybody except perhaps Machiavelli, in Senigallia. Instead, the one in Magione—in the words of its promoter, Giampaolo Baglioni—was a political-military ‘confederation’ or ‘alliance’ (collegazione) born so that ‘nobody among us would suffer attacks or offenses from others that would not be shared by all’ and with the aim ‘of helping one another as true and good brothers’.6 The reason Cesare Borgia, after the betrayal by his lieutenants, ‘turned to deceit’ is easily identified. Rather than the mere expression of his own distrustful and vengeful nature, it derived from the failure of his initial military response. Indeed, in the first battles with the rebels on the border between Umbria and the Marche, around mid-October, Valentino’s most reliable military commanders (Ramiro de Lorqua, Miguel de Corella, and Hugo Moncada) took a beating (‘[they] were quite clobbered’,7 in Machiavelli’s words). Against ‘this diet of failed men’,8 as the Duke disdainfully called those who had dared to threaten him after having vowed friendship and loyalty, it was necessary to resort to other instruments: diplomatic persuasion; material corruption; the seduction that a lord always exercises over his vassals even in times of decline and weakness;9 his own cunning repaid by the others’ foolishness or hubris; his silent machinations while awaiting the propitious moment to strike and take revenge. A counter strategy that is oblique and indirect, and that Machiavelli sees slowly ripen right before his eyes, without, however, being able to grasp it fully. It was obviously not revealed to

28  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies him by Valentino. As it appears from Machiavelli’s missives to the Signoria, for Valentino secrecy and the art of dissembling, subterfuge to the point of exasperation, even with his most trusted men, amounted to an inalterable rule of conduct. Secrecy was a lifestyle, a necessity of the art of command, a precaution to safeguard his own life, a way to confuse his adversaries and keep them in a constant state of tension: In this Court the things to be kept tacit are never spoken and we rule with admirable secrecy (20th of October, 1502);10 We have to do here with a prince who governs on his own [who does not trust even his collaborators, who keeps his thoughts secret from everybody] (13th of November, 1502);11 Nobody knows what path he [the Duke] will take because it is difficult for them to know and understand him (28th of November, 1502);12 All the spirits of those who have something to say [who have the capacity of analysis and discernment] are suspended over what this Lord should do (14th of December, 1502);13 What this Lord wants and wishes to do now is not known (23rd of December, 1502);14 This Lord is greatly secretive, nor do I think anyone knows what he will do except him [. . .] he never communicates anything, if not when he does it; and he does it only when it is strictly necessary and in his own way and never otherwise (26th of December, 1502).15 If something is suggested to Machiavelli by his princely interlocutor during their frequent conversations, it is always by way of allusions, veiled hints, which often alternate with concrete threats and explicit complaints about Florence and the elusive and dilatory attitude of its leaders. The revelation of what is brewing comes instead to the Florentine ambassador through his observation of the conduct of Valentino’s new enemies and through the knowledge that he has accumulated of his character and his way of acting.16 Machiavelli’s conclusions are conjectures, but they are based on his analysis of the situation and the existing power relationships, which, notwithstanding the temporary difficulties of the Borgia faction, make him think (with a prophetic spirit, of which he will boast directly to Valentino)17 that the rebels have no chance of victory. With the diet of Magione and the rebels’ subsequent moves in the field, they had committed the mistake of letting everybody know their hostile intentions, the network of their diplomatic connections and their military plans, instead of keeping them secret: ‘these Orsini, Vitelli and their associates have completely exposed themselves, and have stopped dissembling’.18 Not only this, but, by following their moves, it becomes evident that, despite their declared unity of intent, they are internally divided, slow, and, above all, undecided. According to Machiavelli, ‘his enemies’ delay in attacking him’19 cannot help but play into the hands of Valentino. Moreover, they had not taken into account the support enjoyed

From Magione to Senigallia  29 by the Duke for the pursuit of his political project, aimed at creating a unified realm at the expense of the many, and, from his point of view, anachronistic tyrannies present in Central Italy.20 Hence Machiavelli’s conviction, transmitted to his superiors as early as the 17th of October and reiterated many times with different nuances, that ‘this Lord, as long as the pontiff lives and his friendship with the King [of France] persists, will continue to benefit from the good fortune that he has had in abundance until now’ and that ‘those who have cast the shadow of wanting to be his enemies are no longer in time to hurt him today, nor will they be tomorrow’.21 Having overcome the initial confusion and fear, it thus seems clear to Machiavelli that Valentino has little to fear from the insubordination of his old mercenary captains. He need only decide the best way to rid himself of them and take his revenge. As early as mid-October, by playing on their divisions and ambitions, he had brought back a few of them—Giovanni Bentivoglio, Paolo Orsini—into his orbit. By promising collaboration and clemency, military contracts and land grants, prebendaries and even arranged marriages, he had already started negotiations which, in just a few days, would translate into veritable friendship pacts, duly signed by both parties. The agreement with the Orsini family, whose first draft is dated October the 28th, after having blamed the ‘controversies and hostilities, mistrust, suspicions’ that arose over time between the two families, commits them to a ‘real and eternal peace, harmony and union, with the full remission of all damages and injuries, which might have occurred until this day’.22 The one between the Duke and the Lord of Bologna, Giovanni Bentivoglio, officially signed on November the 23rd, provides that, in addition to monetary and military obligations, there will be formed a good alliance, confederation and league to last in perpetuity for them, their heirs and successors, for the conservation of their common interests, with the obligation of sharing the same fortune and of having the same friends and enemies. To these agreements must be added—as demonstrated by Machiavelli’s dispatch of November the 28th—the ‘very submissive and grateful letters’ that Vitellozzo Vitelli—he too in the meantime regretful for his insubordinate gesture—addresses to Borgia, ‘apologizing and offering his friendship, and writing that, having the occasion to personally talk with him, he will surely and perfectly justify himself, convincing him that the things that happened were absolutely not intended to offend him’.23 But behind the solemn conciliatory words, behind certain sudden repentances, which in less than a month marked the end of the Magione accords and the break up of the anti-Borgia front, there lay other very different hidden agreements, at least from Valentino’s point of view. Machiavelli senses this and finds confirmation of it—though veiled and prudent—in the words of Valentino’s secretary, the trusted Agapito Geraldini, with whom he

30  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies established an intimate and complicitous relationship. In the dispatch dated 29th of October, Machiavelli reports to the Ten (Dieci di Balìa) Agapito’s reaction to the rumors of an agreement between the Duke and some of the rebels: ‘he [Geraldini] laughed about them and said that the agreement was a way of keeping them at bay’.24 It was, therefore, an expedient to buy time, while waiting to strike those who in Valentino’s eyes were only traitors and enemies. (But, could the Orsinis possibly not be aware in turn of Borgia’s and his father pontiff Alexander VI’s real intentions towards them? Everybody is pretending to trust each other, waiting to be the first to strike, in a continuous game of dissembling and deceit in the face of which—Machiavelli candidly admits—‘I get confused’).25 The diplomatic report sent to Florence on November the first is even clearer: ‘I’ve been all the day long with Messer Agapito’,26 Machiavelli writes. His objective is to procure for himself the text of the pacts (capitoli) that have been signed, according to the rumors he has heard, between Paolo Orsini and the Duke. But it is the Duke’s secretary, once again, who lets him glimpse the hidden truth of things in a flash and allows him to imagine a different scenario from the one that was unfolding publicly. Not only has no definitive pact yet been signed, there are only drafts to be completed and corrected, and then submitted for papal approval, ‘but even a child would laugh at these agreements, their having been accepted by the Duke only under coercion for fear of the risk he was in’.27 It is true—Machiavelli explains to the Signoria—that Geraldini is tied to the Colonna family and is thus a fierce defamer of the Orsini, for which reason his words should be taken with prudence. But the message, confirmed by another source inside the Borgia Court, who in all his letters is kept incognito, remains equally clear. With those who have betrayed him, Valentino has no intention of renewing friendships and, therefore, the agreements that are being discussed will be born as dead letters, full as they are, furthermore, Machiavelli writes on November the 10th, confirming his skepticism, ‘of distrust and suspicion’.28 What is actually unfolding, behind the veneer of a conciliation, is thus a bloody showdown: ‘we are talking peace but preparing for war’ (letter to the Ten, 13th of November).29 But it remains to be seen what form this showdown will take. Will it be an open military conflict, as the troop movements on the ground seem to indicate, or, rather, will it take the form of some cunning stratagem, which Valentino is surely conjuring, but which may also be in the minds of his enemies? What Machiavelli records during the last three weeks of December, after his departure on the 11th of the same month from Imola, where he had resided for two months, is indeed a plot. Difficult to unravel even for him, it is an interweaving of moves and countermoves, rumors and whisperings, of apparently nonsensical maneuvers and decisions as unexpected as they are inexplicable. It is a game of reciprocal cunning, marked by constant suspicion and continual deceptions and turnabouts. The Florentine ambassador does not doubt the final outcome (he is in fact convinced that Valentino

From Magione to Senigallia  31 ‘does not want anything but to capture those who had orchestrated this villainy and who were just one step away from taking over his state’).30 The solution that is being prepared, however, eludes him, and he cannot imagine the precise contours, bound to be dramatic, of the contest. How to explain, for example, the Duke’s decision, militarily nonsensical, to allow the ‘French infantrymen’ who had been sent to assist him, to leave (22nd of December)? A decision so sudden and unexpected as to have ‘turned upside down the brain of the entire Court’,31 writes Machiavelli who had heard the news just two days before. Has Borgia become tired of their presence, also annoying to the population who suffer their vexations? Does he think he has sufficient forces under his own command, or does he want to look weak and unprepared in order to force his enemies to show their hand and better convince them not to fear him? And how to explain the cruel murder of Ramiro de Lorqua, his trusted supporter, ordered by Borgia himself (December the 26th)? Is it a conciliatory signal sent to his subjects in Romagna, who could no longer tolerate the brutal methods of the governor?32 Or is it a threatening message sent to his enemies with whom maybe ‘Messer Rimirro’ was in cahoots and with whom, a traitor in turn, he was probably orchestrating something? The result of these agitated days was, as is well known, the Senigallia deception. But it was a double and specular deceit, if it is true that, behind the veil of a feigned reconciliation, both contenders were thinking of an ambush. Valentino’s merit, so to speak, was his acting first, with more determination and more guile. By feigning to be weaker than his rivals, giving the impression of being at their mercy, simulating a fear that he did not have, leaving them freedom of action (in the conquest and occupation of Senigallia), the Duke was able to spring the conspiracy—likely revealed to its executors only at the last moment—according to his secret plans. Toward the middle of January, in the (well-founded) fear that his Florentine chiefs had not read the letters in which he had recounted, as it was unfolding, what happened in Senigallia on the night of New Year’s Eve, Machiavelli furnishes them with a summary of the entire episode from which it clearly emerges—down to his meticulous choice of the most expressive terms—how the betrayed was able to betray his betrayers who were about to newly betray him. How, in other words, faced with a badly organized attempted conspiracy, Valentino responded with a conspiracy that was perfectly executed. After the departure of the French from Cesena, this Lord [Valentino] sensed that these reconciled enemies were trying, while pretending to conquer Senigallia in his name, to capture and neutralize him, judging themselves able, under color [with the pretext] of this enterprise, to gather their forces together, thinking that there remained available to his Excellency fewer men than he actually had, and because of this their plans were easier. Hence this Lord thought to prevent them and

32  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies permitted them the venture of Senigallia and lay in wait, hiding his forces to make them come more willingly and with more determination. And so, when they moved to Senigallia, he left Cesena, and when he arrived in Pesaro, news arrived that Senigallia was again occupied by the Orsini on behalf of the Duke, from the citadel to the outside; they then solicited him to advance with his troops and his artillery to expunge the fortress. The Duke, in order to let them continue to think they could deceive him, had, during the journey from Cesena to Fano, made his troops move forward in small groups so that no-one could count them or have a precise idea of their real number; and among the other tricks used to conceal their number, he had not assigned a commander to more than 100 footsoldiers or 100 crossbowmen on horseback—whom he had divided into small groups and sent to lodgings in various places inside his lands, and when he was departing from Cesena he communicated in which part of Fano they should meet and whose orders they should follow. On arriving in Fano on the 30th [December] with all his army, deciding to ride on to Senigallia the next morning at dawn, he ordered all his commanders to have all their men deployed at 8 in the morning, along a river about 6 miles away from Fano [. . .]. And in order to make his enemies even more confident, and to display poor organization in his approach, he made no use of wagons, with which his army was abundantly supplied, but had them advance on foot a few. As your Seigniories will know, the distance from Fano to Senigallia is about 15 miles. [. . .] Finding themselves in Senigallia—when the Duke was in Fano— Vitellozzo, Signor Paolo Orsini, the Duke di Gravina and Oliverotto da Fermo were in Senigallia with 2000 infantrymen and 300 fusiliers on horseback (and the rest 6 miles away from them). And since the others were planning to launch a surprise attack on the Duke, it was necessary for the Duke to surprise them, and knowing full well what their plans were, and the lay of the land [of the city], and how he could be attacked and how he could attack the others he wrote a letter to the Orsini in the evening from Fano (and then set off the next morning) in which he stated he would be there the next day with his army. And for this reason he wanted them to take all of their soldiers out of Senigallia and have them lodge outside in those houses that [. . .] are close to the main gate of the town. He further wrote that he wanted all the gates of the town closed, starting from the one overlooking those houses, so that no one could enter the town except those he wanted. And after telling his soldiers how to march and the Orsini how they should receive them, he left early in the morning from Fano and moved slowly on Senigallia, in the way that footsoldiers advance in formation; and truly, for the quantity and the quality of the soldiers and the people of the place who turned out in force without breaking their ranks, it seemed to me a spectacle rarely to be seen.

From Magione to Senigallia  33 The front lines of this army were still about three miles away from Senigallia when the troops of Orsini and Vitelli started to appear to meet the Duke. They did not come all at once, but one after another: for this it can be deduced they were not moving based on a common decision, but at random, forced by necessity and shame, that is, by the good fortune of the others and their own misfortune. (Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 555–8, emphasis mine) Unfortunately, this account is brusquely interrupted. The final part of the letter—presumed to have been written by Machiavelli in mid-January, while he was in Castiglione del Lago (a town on the border between Umbria and Tuscany) and was about to conclude, after more then three months, his strenuous mission—has in fact gone lost. We no longer have the description of the final moments of the enemies of the Duke and, above all, of how the trap was sprung. Nor was the description contained in the previous particularly detailed letters, confirming, probably, that the effective execution of a conspiracy—which in the end is a question of mere instants—depends instead on its long and careful preparation, which, therefore, deserves to be examined with greater attention. The bloody epilogue of the entire event, as will later be reported in The Prince, is contained, not coincidentally, in just a few essential sentences: ‘he took them all [. . .]; and in my opinion, they will not be alive tomorrow morning’ (31st of December, 1502);33 ‘His Seigniory had held them prisoner [. . .] had Vitellozzo and Messer Oliverotto da Fermo killed; and the other two are still alive’ (1st of January, 1503);34 ‘this Seigniory had Vitellozzo and Liverotto killed [. . .] while he had Messer Paolo and the Duke di Gravina brought to Rome’ (2nd of January, 1503).35 What really counts in Machiavelli’s narrative are the motives behind the conspiracy and the operational and political capabilities of those who execute it. Valentino’s motives, which amount to a justification of his actions in the eyes of his contemporaries and of history, are the spirit of revenge and the desire to punish those who, as traitors, cannot be neutralized but by recourse to their own weapons: ‘and it is a good thing to deceive them who have themselves been masters of deceit’.36 (The reference, contained in the dispatch of the 10th of January, is to Petrucci, the tyrant of Siena, whom Valentino wishes to oust, but it regards all the other tyrants already eliminated from the scene). The virtues that allow Cesare Borgia to get the better of the rebellious captains and to organize a perfect conspiracy are those that Machiavelli condenses in his letter to the Ten of the 8th of October: one hand, he seems to enjoy inconceivable luck, an extraordinary character and superhuman hope that he will be able to achieve all his desires; on the other hand, he appears to a very prudent man governing a state with great repute and without having, inside or outside, enemies of any importance, his having killed them or reconciled with them.37

34  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies Good fortune and cunning, indomitable will and political savvy, the ability to use force and pragmatism, animosity and farsightedness, circumspection and determination, pitiless realism and visionary capability. Of all these character traits and behaviors ascribed to Valentino, which in The Prince would become part of the basis for his model political leader (cf. Marchand, 1969), Machiavelli will give special emphasis in his description of the events of Senigallia, edited and completed about ten years later, to his being ‘a most perfect dissembler’ (Description of the Methods adopted by the Duke Valentino when murdering Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, the Signor Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini, 18). Instead of fighting his enemies directly, Borgia believed ‘that it would be safer and more advantageous to outwit them’ (ibid.: 22), resorting for this purpose to ‘the utmost cunning and cleverness’ (ibid.: 32): from personal seduction to veritable corruption, from diversionary maneuvers to veiled threats, from perjury to false promises. Perhaps it is to Valentino’s organization of the Senigallia conspiracy, in response to a conspiracy that was supposed to kill him in that same city, that Machiavelli refers to in the fragment of the Discourses where he advises a prince who discovers or is suspicious of a plot against him not to abandon himself to blind repression, but to deceive the eyes of the conspirators, to carefully calculate their forces, to make them reveal themselves through overconfidence: Yet, I do not wish to fail to warn that prince or republic against whom a conspiracy has been planned to be cautious, so that when a conspiracy is revealed to them, before they make an effort to avenge themselves, they will seek to understand very well its characteristics, and they will take careful measure of the conditions of the conspirators as well as their own, and when they find that the conspiracy is widespread and powerful, they will never reveal it until they have prepared themselves with forces sufficient to suppress it; acting otherwise, they would discover only their own ruin. For this reason, they must make every effort to pretend to dissimulate, since once the conspirators find themselves exposed, driven by necessity they will act without scruples. (III, 6, 187–8) To a conspiracy, one is well advised to respond with another conspiracy, as long as one acts first. But an intrigue involving a plurality of plotters, undecided about what to do, unsupportive of one another, must be opposed, if one indeed wants to take recourse to the same means of attack, by a plan thought out in secrecy together with a few trusted allies, to be carried out with speed and determination. Machiavelli would make use of these lessons in his future writings on conspiracy.

Notes 1 Cf., for a synthetic reconstruction of this famous episode, Finzi (2003) and Calitti (2014). Cf. also Sasso (1966).

From Magione to Senigallia  35 2 As Giampaolo Baglioni wrote to Messer Vincenzo da Perugia, Podestà of Florence, on the 11th of October, 1502. This letter can be read in Machiavelli (1964: 538). 3 Machiavelli left for his second mission to Valentino on the 5th of October, when the diet of Magione—on whose outcome he was expressly asked to report, including the reaction to it on the part of the son of the Pope—was still in progress, and everybody, starting with the Florentine authorities, was already aware of it. Strange conspiracy, deprived of every air of secrecy! On the connection between the two ‘conspiracies’—Magione and Senigallia—cf. the brief but insightful reflections by Valle (2012). 4 The Seigniory will decide to send an orator to Valentino, in the person of Jacopo Salviati, only after the Senigallia massacre, in part because of Machiavelli’s insistence, partly for reasons of health and fatigue, that he be replaced. Cf. the letter sent to Florence dated the 14th of December, 1502, where protecting himself and with a little irony, Machiavelli suggests a turnover for the task ‘because I was not well and still am not, and there is needed a man of greater discourse [of greater perspicacity], greater reputation and who knows the world better than I do’ (Machiavelli, 2003: 499). We will refer to this volume, indicating its editors (Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina) and the page numbers, for the quotes in this chapter taken from Machiavelli’s diplomatic correspondence, particulary with regard to the diet of Magione and the subsequent massacre in Senigallia. 5 Soderini was elected in the new magistracy on the 22nd of September, a few days before the departure of Machiavelli for Imola. Cf. Bertelli (1975), Pesman Cooper (2010) and Cutinelli Rèndina (2014). 6 Those are the words with which Giampaolo Baglioni presents the results of the Magione diet to the Podestà of Florence, Vincenzo da Perugia Count di Montevibiano, in a letter dated the 11th of October, 1502. The entire text can be found in Machiavelli (1964: 539–40, 541–44). 7 Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 379. 8 Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 338. 9 Concerning the conflict between Borgia and the rebel squires, Sergio Bertelli had well written that ‘it had not a different connotation than the fights of the Roman barons—Orsini, Savelli, Colonna—against the Pope’; which barons ‘were never able to propose to overturn the existing situation, but only to obtain, within that framework, stronger positions. The rebellion of Magione, therefore, is not a rebellion of submissive States to an unexpected enemy, but a ground swell of opposition by the feudatories against their own lord: it has no other result than a compromise where the vassals obtain, along with the indispensable forgiveness, a greater autonomy’. Entirely unobjectionable apart from the comment that the rebellion went too far for Borgia to be able to settle for a compromise or grant his forgiveness. Cf. the Nota introduttiva to the texts of Machiavelli second legation to Valentino in Machiavelli (1964: 326). 10 Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 379. 11 Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 435. 12 Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 469. 13 Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 497. 14 Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 516. 15 Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 520. 16 Machiavelli had come to know and appreciate Valentino’s method of operation— a mixture of courage, luck, will and virtue, of shrewdness and determination, of prudence and rapidity in execution—since the time of Valentino’s first legation in Urbino during June 1502, together with Francesco Soderini. In the letter to the Ten written on the 22nd of June in Ponticelli, he explained, regarding the

36  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies quick conquest of Urbino: ‘This victory is all founded on the prudence of this Seignior who, having arrived within 7 miles of Camerino, without eating and drinking, he moved on to Cagli about 35 miles away, besieging at the same time Camerino, raiding it; a stratagem to be noticed, Your Seigniories, along with the rapidity and its great result’ (Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 232). In the letter of the 26th of June he wrote instead, after having personally met him for the first time (the day before): ‘This Seignior is really splendid and magnificent; and he is so brave in arms that even the big things appear to him little; and to gain glory and possession of a state he does never rest or know strain or danger. He arrives in a place before it is possible to understand from where he is leaving; he is beloved among his soldiers; he chooses the best men in Italy to fight with him. These things—along with a perpetual good fortune—make him victorious and formidable’ (Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 247). 17 So he is supposed to have said to Valentino, according to what he reported on their conversation in his letter to Florence of the 20th of November: ‘and I said to him that I was convinced about his victory, and if I had written it the day before as I understood it, on reading it today it would have appeared to have been a prophecy’. Cf. Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 455. 18 Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 379. 19 Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 392. 20 Once the massacre was completed, in his famous report to the Reggimento of the town of Perugia, dated the 2nd of January, 1503, Valentino, after having denounced ‘the sly rebellion and the atrocious betrayal’ against him, justifies the elimination of the rebels—moved only by ‘immense ambition and outrageous cupidity’—with the need to get rid of these tyrants, defined as ‘a real public pest of all the Italian communities’. Within his political project, we can find a motivation that is both unifying and patriotic, historically and politically progressive, if we compare it with the endemic wars perpetrated by the tyrant-mercenary captains, who dominated the various towns during that time. The letter, in its entirety, can be read in Machiavelli (1964: 547–48). But the concept was already mentioned, immediately after the massacre, in a conversation with Machiavelli, so he would transmit the message to his Florentine principals. In the letter to the Ten of the 1st of January, 1503, it is reported that Valentino had ‘wiped out all the scandal seeds and that discord that was ruining Italy’ (Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 526). The theme comes back in the letter of the 2nd of January, but with a significant improvement: Valentino had not intended only to get rid of the ‘tyrants and assassins and traitors’, he also wanted to ‘free all the Church lands from other factions’, that is to say, from the factions and the cliques keeping the town under a permanent condition of civil disorder (Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 531). As reported in the letter to the Ten, dated the 8th of January, when Valentino was about to settle with Città di Castello, Perugia, and Siena: he does not want these lands free of their tyrants for his sake, but he wants to give them back to the legitimate dominion of the Church, aiming at the most to relieve them of the armed factions raging in them (‘his intention is not to expel a tyrant to replace him with another ten’) (Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 539). 21 Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 373–74. 22 For the original text of the two agreements, with Orsini and Bentivoglio, cf. Machiavelli (1964: 544–47). 23 Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 468–69. 24 Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 404. 25 Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 404. 26 Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 411.

From Magione to Senigallia  37 7 Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 411–12. 2 28 Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 432. 29 Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 436. 30 Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 498. 31 Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 511. 32 This is the interpretation of the episode that would be consecrated in The Prince, VII, 27–28: ‘And because he knew that past rigors had generated some hatred for Remirro, to purge the spirits of that people and to gain them entirely to himself, he wished to show that if any cruelty had been committed, this had not come from him but from the harsh nature of his minister. And having seized this opportunity, he had him placed one morning in the piazza at Cesena in two pieces, with a piece of wood and a bloody knife beside him’. Giorgio Inglese concludes opportunely, however, in his comment to the text: ‘Other sources speak—on the contrary—of an agreement between Ramiro and the conspirators, in order to kill Borgia’ (Inglese, 2013: 49, note n. 90). In this case, plausibly, the assassination of his lieutenant was the prelude to the Senigallia massacre. 33 Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 524. 34 Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 527. 35 Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 530–31. 36 Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 546. 37 Fachard-Cutinelli Rèndina: 540.

References Anglo, S. (1969). Machiavelli: A Dissection. London: Victor Gollancz. Bertelli, S. (1975). Machiavelli and Soderini, Renaissance Quarterly, XXVIII, No. 1: 1–16. Butters, H. (1985). Governors and Government in Early Sixteenth-Century Florence: 1503–1519. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Calitti, F. (2014). La congiura di Magione, in A. Campi. E. Irace, F. F. Mancini, and M. Tarantino (eds), Niccolò Machiavelli e il mestiere delle armi: Guerra, arti e potere nell’Umbria del Rinascimento. Perugia: Aguaplano, 79–89. Cutinelli Rèndina, E. (2014). Soderini, Francesco, ad vocem, in G. Sasso (ed.), Enciclopedia Machiavelli. Rome: Istituto per l’Enciclopedia Italiana, 539–43. Finzi, C. (2003). Niccolò Machiavelli e la ‘congiura’ di Magione, Peregrinationes: Acta et Documenta, IV, No. 4: 19–33. Inglese, G. (2013). Introduzione, in N. Machiavelli, Il Principe, New edition by G. Inglese. Turin: Einaudi. Machiavelli, N. (1964). Legazione e commissarie, edited by di S. Bertelli, Vol. I. Feltrinelli. Milan: Feltrinelli. Machiavelli, N. (2003). Legazioni: Commissarie. Scritti di governo, tome II (1501– 1503), Introduction and texts edited by D. Fachard, Comment edited by E. CutinelliRèndina. Rome: Salerno Editrice. Marchand, J.-J. (1969). L’évolution de la figure de César Borgia dans la pensée de Niccolò Machiavelli, Revue Suisse d’histoire, XIX, No. 2: 327–55. Pesman Cooper, R. (2002). Pier Soderini and the Ruling Class in Renaissance Florence. Goldbach: Keip Verlag. Pesman Cooper, R. (2010). Machiavelli, Pier Soderini, and the Republic of 1494– 1512, in J. M. Najemy (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 48–63.

38  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies Ridolfi, R. (1978, originally 1954). Vita di Niccolò Machiavelli: Settima edizione italiana accresciuta e riveduta. Florence: Sansoni. Sasso, G. (1966). Machiavelli e Cesare Borgia: Storia di un giudizio. Rome: Bonacci. Valle, R. (2012). Dall’arte della congiura alla riproducibilità tecnica del complotto. Le derive del machiavellismo immaginario e la cospirazione transpolitica, Rivista di Politica, Vol. III, No. 1: 73–87.

3 Machiavelli the Conspirator? Alessandro Campi

According to the celebrated and polemical characterization by Leo Strauss, Machiavelli was a ‘teacher of conspirators’ a ‘master of conspiracy’: that is to say, a refined and shifty corrupter of the customs and social order inherited from tradition. But he was not ‘himself a conspirator’ (Strauss, 1958: 169). Intellectually committed to building new ‘modes and orders’, to elaborating a model of power without—contrary to the past—any transcendent legitimation, based on the one hand on the strength, shrewdness, and persuasive capacity of the prince, and, on the other, on popular consensus, he surely could not waste time on ephemeral intrigues or secret meetings aimed at overthrowing this or that ruler and establishing a dominion that was by definition ephemeral.1 Having deeply studied them in the classics of ancient historiography and having written about them in his own time, Machiavelli knew well both the political vacuousness of conspiracies and the threat they posed to personal safety. Furthermore, he stigmatized their motivations, which often did not go much beyond personal resentment or private revenge, and that is why he always personally kept his distance from them. But to what extent does this reading or interpretation correspond to reality? Did Machiavelli ever have anything to do with conspiracies and plots, or did he limit himself to writing about them, what’s more, in disapproving and negative terms? The canonical biographies (cf. Prezzolini, 1967; Ridolfi, 1978; Viroli, 2000; Unger, 2011), in fact, present Machiavelli, if not as the protagonist, then as a co-author or participant in at least two conspiratorial episodes. Both were failures and both were destined to produce negative consequences in his public life and to influence his political reflections on the theme. It was indeed these bad personal experiences (particularly the first one, dated 1513), which contributed in no small way to the frustration of his hopes for a return to political-administrative office in the service of Florence. They also gave rise to his aversion to conspiracies and his often dismissive judgments expressed (especially in the Discourses) of those to those who meddle in them, almost always displaying their ineptitude and superficiality.2 The episodes in question, as well known and as often recounted as they are, still appear today to be wrapped in mystery, their contours vague and

40  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies ambiguous, presenting aspects that are controversial, to say the least, particularly with regard to Machiavelli’s effective involvement in them. At the same time, it would be odd if this were not the case, given that we are talking about events which by definition are imbued with secrecy, and whose reconstruction can hardly be entrusted to documents and papers, assuming they ever in fact existed and that they have survived. With regard to memoirs, judicial accounts, chronicles, and reports, official or unofficial, on these events, in some cases numerous and even circumstantial, it is precisely Machiavelli’s experience as a supposed conspirator that shows us that these sources are to be considered with circumspection and caution, if not with outright suspicion. *** The first of these episodes is certainly the most cited in the biographies, not least because of the peculiar context—political and personal—in which it took place. The 7th of November, 1512, just over two months after Piero Soderini’s flight from Florence and the return of the Medici, Machiavelli was removed from office along with the trustworthy Biagio Buonaccorsi. His idea, cultivated for several weeks, that the new Medici government could reach an accord with the popular orders and the republican magistracies (which would have also allowed him the possibility of maintaining his offices or in any case to remain inside the orbit of power), had turned out to be mistaken. He had sketched out the idea in the short discourse To the Palleschi (Ai Palleschi), composed very likely at the beginning of November, and thus a few days before his dismissal. Addressed to the new de facto rulers of Florence—who had come to power after the constitutional restoration of mid-September that led to the abolition the Nine of the militia, the dissolution of the Ordinance and the annulment of the Grand Council—the discourse suggested that they avoid focusing on the memory of Soderini. Instead, they should concentrate on the hidden threats that could be posed by the Optimates party, who had been neutralized by the Gonfaloniere for life (Gonfaloniere perpetuo) Piero Soderini thanks to his alliance with the popular faction. Machiavelli was now suggesting the same anti-oligarchical strategy to the Medici.3 But, as we know, his suggestion was ill-fated. The response to this proposal was his immediate removal from the second Chancellery and from the office of secretary to the Ten, followed by two decrees—on the 10th and the 17th of November—sending him into exile within the Florentine dominion for one year. The decrees also imposed a heavy bail of 1,000 florins and prohibited him from setting foot in Palazzo Vecchio, also for one year. We know almost nothing about what Machiavelli did in the next two or three months, immediately after his fall from grace. Surely it was a period of turmoil, remorse, worries, and bad thoughts, culminating in an incident that—in the climate of suspicion, recrimination, and revenge following the Medici restoration—could have cost him his life. On the 18th

Machiavelli the Conspirator?  41 of February, 1513, in rather strange circumstances, there came to light a conspiracy attempt, failed at birth, aimed at Giuliano di Lorenzo de’ Medici (and maybe also his brother, Cardinal Giovanni). According to this report by Jacopo Nardi (1476–1563), included in his Histories of the City of Florence4 (Istorie della città di Firenze) and subscribed to by all other historical accounts down to our own time, the events were said to have gone like this: Some citizens were captured in Florence thanks to some evidence brought to the attention of the magistrate of the Eight by Messer Bernardino Coccio from Siena, who as a remuneration for this action received in concession a hostel in San Gimignano. Coccio, a frequent guest in the home of the Lenzi family, relatives of Piero Soderini, found a paper describing some eighteen to twenty young people. This paper inadvertently fell from the pocket of Pietro Pagolo Boscoli and, found by Bernardino, led the magistrate to arrest the people on the list as said above. Among those arrested, the principals were the above-mentioned Pietro Pagolo and Agostino di Luca Capponi. Interrogated and tortured, they did not confess to having plotted against the state, but they did not deny the guilt of being animated by a great desire for freedom for their homeland, and a few words carelessly pronounced among themselves betrayed their intentions. Wherefore, the aforesaid Agostino Capponi and Pietro Pagolo Boscoli were condemned to death, and on the day of Cardinal de’ Medici’s departure from Florence for the election of the new Pope, they were executed.5 (Nardi, 1858: 20–1) In a slightly different form, but analogous in substance, the same event had been reconstructed almost 30 years before by Francesco Vettori (1474– 1539) in his city chronicles, written between 1527 and 1530,6 during the years of his voluntary exile after the restoration of the Florentine Republic: Agostino Capponi and Pietropaolo Boscoli conspired to murder Giuliano de’ Medici. And they were discovered thanks to a script in which they wrote the names of those they believed would help them after the assassination, even though they had not conferred with them before. They were so careless that they allowed the script to fall on the floor, and being found, it was brought to the Cardinal [Giovanni]; and finding in it the names of men all of whom he knew were suspect, he ordered the arrest not only of Pietropaolo and Agostino, but of all those mentioned in the letter, believing they were all guilty of the same error. And all of them were examined but only Agostino and Pietropaolo were found guilty, and they were condemned to death by the Eight. Among the others, some were exiled, because during their examinations they showed deep ill will toward the Medici, and some were absolved. In any case, all those who were convicted and exiled for this, upon Cardinal

42  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies de’ Medici’s election as Pope, which then followed within just a few days, were absolved and released.7 (Vettori, 1972 147) The names mentioned in the document (paper or script) inadvertently let fall by Boscoli or lost by the two conspirators included—at the seventh place on the list, according to the version of it that can be read in the Diaries by Marin Sanudo (1466–1536)8—the name ‘Niccolò di messer Bernardo Machiavelli’, who at that time, being almost 45, was not properly a young man, much less, given the experience he had behind him, could he have been defined a dreamer or a hot-head inflamed with ideals badly assimilated from classical literature. On the 19th of February, solely for this rather odd and suspect circumstance, an arrest warrant was issued against him.9 Having surrendered promptly to the authorities, he was imprisoned in the Bargello and subjected to cruel mistreatment (the Strappado torture), without, however, admitting any involvement, direct or indirect, in the enterprise. His salvation—while the two recognized leaders, or more simply the two confessed instigators of the conspiracy, were handed over to the executioner at dawn on the 23rd of February—was that, on the one hand, people close to the Medici and friends of his (first of all Paolo Vettori and probably Giuliano de’ Medici himself)10 immediately did all they could in favour of his innocence, and, on the other hand, that Cardinal Giovanni was elected Pope with the name of Leo X on the 11th of March. This news, as can be read in the chronicles of that time, was followed by days of rejoicing and celebration throughout Florence and, what really counts, an amnesty that allowed Machiavelli to leave prison and retire to his lands in San Casciano. From where, he shortly—partly to keep himself spiritually active, partly in his never abandoned hope to be recalled to duty in some office by the new lords of the town—he started his famous correspondence with Francesco Vettori (cf. Najemy, 1993). In the meantime, Vettori had become the Medici’s ambassador to Rome and was, therefore, in the right position to be Machiavelli’s channel to the new pontiff, as well as the true political leader of Florence and the dominus in the Medici family. His first letter to Vettori, dated March the 13th, was clearly affected by the fearful threat that he had suffered and by the sense of liberation that, once the danger passed, replaced it, so much so that it allowed him to augur well for his imminent future. ‘[F]ate has done everything to make me undergo this insult’, he wrote, ‘yet, thanks to God, it is passed. I hope to not incur anymore, yes, because I will be more careful, yes, because the times will be more liberal, and not so suspicious’ (Machiavelli, 2002: 99).11 It can be understood from these words, with their reference to prudence, that his only fault was that of having gossiped about or spoken ill, with levity, about the new lords of Florence. It was solely for this reason that he appeared to be an opponent or enemy of the Medici, which he was not, and, above all, which he did not mean to be, at least in those circumstances.

Machiavelli the Conspirator?  43 But was it truly carelessness, ill fate, or, even worse, the simple naiveté of two young members of the town oligarchy, with vague republican feelings and above all with no political experience, that brought about Machiavelli’s involvement in a venture that—vague and mysterious though it was—ended tragically for many of those who were implicated in it?12 The idea that is generally espoused is that Machiavelli’s name was included among those potentially interested in the plot due to a political misunderstanding or a miscalculation that was both erroneous and naïve. He had been, as the closest collaborator of Piero Soderini, an authoritative supporter of republican precepts, and as such was to be considered an adversary of whatever form of principate or dynastic dominion. Therefore, he could be considered a potential conspirator for freedom, to be placed (even without his knowledge) on the list of potential participants in the conspiracy. But to reason in such terms is to fail to realize that, after the Medici’s return to the city, Machiavelli’s position had indeed changed. Certainly, his change of position was based on his political pragmatism and on his personal needs (bordering on opportunism), but also on his belief that, at that moment, the risk of a princely tyrant was less than that of an aristocratic restoration. Republican and popular freedom, in his opinion, had more to fear from the second than the first. But this explanation, which sees Machiavelli’s inclusion on the list as a mere political blunder, does not resolve all the episode’s incongruities and oddities. Its having gone down in history for reasons that are more ethico-literary than political13 in the proper sense, has led to the neglect of everything that is improbable (or, better said, everything that is potentially instrumental or factitious) in the reconstructions of Machiavelli’s role in the conspiracy. What if his involvement in the conspiratorial plot was the result, not of a political miscalculation accompanied moreover by grave carelessness in the planning phase, but of a machination against the ex-Secretary, taking advantage of the good faith (bordering on stupidity) of the two aspiring tyrannicides? Did that slip of paper bearing the names of the potential conspirators (perhaps even without their knowledge) really exist? If so, who materially drew it up and prepared it? Was it one of the conspirators, or someone on the outside who was aware of what was developing and had an interest in getting Machiavelli involved to put him in a bad light and damage him? Was it really clumsily lost by those who had written and prepared it, and promptly picked up, to be delivered to the authorities, by ‘Bernardino Coccio from Siena’? For his solicitude, as recalled by Nardi, Bernardino was even too generously remunerated, giving rise to the doubt that the services he had truly rendered were probably quite different. The only one, until now, who has gone so far to hypothesize a scenario inspired by these questions and to raise doubts concerning the canonical version of the conspiracy—shared by all the historiography—is the philologist Mario Martelli, in his critical comment to The Prince published in

44  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies 2006. The work of an eminent scholar—proposed with prudence and with irony, but with a personal conviction that clearly stands out in his writing— its thesis is that there was ‘an oligarchic attempt to frame Machiavelli’ (Martelli, 2006: 18, footnote No. 14)14 aimed at definitively neutralizing a rival who, although momentarily in difficulty, was nonetheless troubling the waters around the Medici and their circle with the idea of his return to political activity. Assuming the validity of Martelli’s suggestion, we can speak of a (real) conspiracy within the (if not imaginary then clumsily imagined) conspiracy: the first being the one plotted against the ex-Chancellor and based on the discovery, a little bit too casual to avoid arousing suspicions about possible instigators or creators, of the letter that incriminated him; while the second is the one roughly sketched out or merely fantasized by Boscoli and Capponi and all too quickly repressed by the authorities. That Machiavelli could have been the victim of a machination set in motion by someone who did not forgive him either his long political and administrative activity at the side of Soderini or his more recent opening to the Medici, was after all an idea already hinted at by his grandson Giuliano de’ Ricci (1543–1606). This can be deduced by an eloquent passage in his famous apograph concerning these events: ‘it is no wonder that his enemies, of which he was certainly not lacking, found an occasion to put him in prison’ (quoted in Tommasini, 1994: 634).15 (An interpretative notion injudiciously cast aside by later historical accounts.) Machiavelli’s enemies were notoriously the oligarchs of Florence, those who opposed both the popular republic and the Medici principate. The occasion that they were looking for—to avenge themselves on him and to definitively purge him—was furnished, probably accidentally, by the two impetuous imitators of Brutus. But perhaps we can take this hypothesis even further. Conspiracies, after all, must not be analyzed and understood only from the side of the alleged conspirators, but also from the side of the potential victim, who in some circumstances is less of a victim than might appear. Besides organized (and discovered) conspiracies, there are also those that are invented and (too emphatically) denounced. Not only, but even a true conspiracy can, perhaps owing to the ineptitude of the conspirators themselves, be skillfully exploited by its intended target, who can then, after having ascertained its failure or its organizational shortcomings, overturn it to work in his favor. In the game of politics, often made up of dissembling and deceit and rapid turnabouts, a prince might even choose to invent a threat to himself— to spread rumors of a conspiracy, actually non-existent, against his own person—just to create the formal pretext for crushing his opponents and political adversaries and consolidating his own power. Or, he might exaggerate and give substance to a rumor or voice some suspicion—as could have happened in the case we are now examining—for the same purpose of eliminating from the scene his most dangerous competitors, or perhaps of making a show of strength for the eyes of potential dissenters.

Machiavelli the Conspirator?  45 There is a document—a missive by Giuliano de’ Medici to Piero da Bibbiena written soon after the conspiracy was discovered and its two creators arrested (the exact date is the 19th of February, 1513)—that is extremely revealing from this point of view. Written by the very person who should have been its main victim, the letter describes the conspiracy as ‘a bad intention with little order, having no beginning or end, and without risk for the State [of Florence], [. . .] things have proceeded without alteration, public or private, and so quick as to draw benefit rather than damage’ (emphasis mine).16 What does this final observation denote? Mere cynicism in the face of a threat revealed to be inconsistent, or the purely political capability to transform, to one’s own benefit, poison into medicine, to exploit a disturbance for the sake of reinforcing one’s own power by spilling some blood, to gather fruit (namely political advantage) from a potentially damaging event? In his Discourses, Machiavelli will also talk about this aspect of conspiracies— that they can paradoxically succeed even when they fail, producing a political outcome favorable to their intended target. Machiavelli knew only too well that politics always has to deal with the irony of fate and reversals of fortune (cf. Zuckert, 2017). Who can say that those lessons did not mature in his mind by virtue of the sad event in which he was involuntarily caught up? Not the mere rejection of conspiracies, but the awareness of their duplicity or structural ambiguity, of their being an instrument in the struggle against power to which, however, power might also resort in order to protect itself from those who aspire to it or from those who do not recognize its legitimacy. But Machiavelli may also have deduced another lesson from his unfortunate personal experiences. Often, one conspiracy (someone else’s) is denounced in order to cover up or make others forget about another one (one’s own). The maneuvers, more naïve than imaginary, ascribed to Capponi and Boscoli, who now appear to us more as scapegoats or sacrificial victims than dangerous assassins, were probably meant—once they were made public—to distract attention from other intrigues, far more audacious and real. After the sack of the town of Prato (29th of August, 1512), and exploiting the worries that they had seized Florence for another sacking now thought to be imminent, these intrigues had brought about the overthrow of Piero Soderini and the return of the Medici by virtue of a real conspiracy. The end of the republic, although it had come about under the threat of the Spanish army, was indeed, as can be deduced by a famous page by Francesco Guicciardini, in The History of Italy (XI, 4), the result of a sudden inside coup, the result of intrigues and conspiratorial maneuvers led by the Medici’s partisans, ‘young noblemen, seditious and eager of innovations’, who had taken advantage of the glimmerings of an external war in order to settle their internal accounts with the republic and the popular regime. But as soon as the Florentines heard about the defeat of Prato [. . .], there was great perturbation in the minds of men. The Gonfaloniere,

46  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies regretting his vain counsels, terrified and having almost completely lost his reputation and prestige, ruled rather than ruling, and irresolute, allowed himself to be led by the will of others, and did not attend to anything, neither protecting himself nor the safety of the citizenry. Others who were looking forward to a change in government waxed bold and publicly laid blame on the present state of affairs: but most of the citizens, unaccustomed to arms and having the miserable example of Prato before their eyes, although they warmly preferred a popular form of government, were exposed because of their fear, as easy prey of anyone who wished to oppress them. Because of this, Paolo Vettori and Antonio Francesco degli Albizzi, young noblemen, seditious and eager of innovations, became more audacious. Many months earlier, these two had already secretly conspired with several others in favour of the Medici, and had secretly met and spoken with Giulio de’ Medici in a villa within Florentine territory near Siena, for the purpose of working out a means to restore this family to power. These young men now resolved to get the Gonfaloniere out of the municipal palace by force. Having apprised Bartolomeo Valori of their plans, a young man of the same rank and, like Paolo, deeply in debt because of his excessive expenditures, on the morning of the second day after the loss of Prato, which was the last day of August, they went with a small company to the palace, where they found no guard or resistance whatever, since the Gonfaloniere had surrendered everything to the will of chance and fortune; and entered his chamber, threatening to take his life if he should not leave the palace; in which case they promised to give him their pledge that he would go unharmed. The Gonfaloniere yielded to this, and now there was a tumultuous uprising all over the city, many persons revealing themselves opposed to him and no one in his favour. Having at their orders caused the magistrates immediately to convene, who according to the law had the widest authority over the gonfalonieri, the conspirators demanded that Soderini be legally removed from the magistracy, under the threat that otherwise they would take his life. Fearing he would be killed, he was removed from office against his will, and taken for safety to the house of Paolo Vettori whence, on the following night, carefully guarded, he was led to Sienese territory, and from there, pretending to go to Rome with the safe-conduct obtained from the Pope, he secretly took the road to Ancona and went by sea to Ragusa [today Dubrovnik], because his brother the Cardinal [Francesco Soderini] had advised him that the Pope would break his promise to him, either out of hatred or greed to plunder his money since he was reputed to be very rich. (Guicciardini, 1984: 263–4, emphasis mine) The ouster of Soderini—a necessary step in allowing the Medici back into the halls of power—was, therefore, a conspiracy. But another episode

Machiavelli the Conspirator?  47 instigated by the Medici and their supporters—it too organized to distract the citizens, make them forget or as a coverup—was a mixture of popular uprising, armed insurrection and palace conspiracy. Set in motion on the 16th of September, 1512, two weeks after the events reported by Guicciardini and with the precise intent of putting a stop to the restorative ambitions of the aristocratic party, this scheme led to the assault—weapons in hand and to the cry of palle! palle!17—on the Palazzo della Signoria, the convocation of the Parliament in the square (a democratic instrument that in reality, in Florentine history, had always opened the doors to despotic and absolutist solutions), to the establishment of a new ruling committee (Balìa) ‘chosen among the most fanatical supporters [of the Medici]’ (Ridolfi, 1978: 209) and, shortly afterwards, to the renunciation of his office by the newly nominated Gonfaloniere, Giovanbattista Ridolfi (formerly a supporter of Savonarola, but more recently one of the leaders of the Optimates faction). In order to divert the attention of the Florentines from these ambiguous events, not without their bloody consequences, nothing was better than the shadow of a conspiracy against the new civil order that was trying to establish itself on the ashes of the republican regime. A conspiracy that, as can be deduced from the various sources, was repressed on the basis of mere rumor and suspicion, extorting from the guilty the confession of nothing more than malevolent intentions against the Medici, enemies of Florentine freedom. The established order, legitimate by definition, defends itself in this way too, by conspiring itself against its potential enemies, imputing to them fictional proposals and conspiratorial plans, or by making use of real conspiracies as a pretext, purposely exaggerating them and presenting them as dangerous even when completely evanescent, in order to justify its repressive action, to consolidate or attract popular approval, which otherwise it would not have. The episode in which Machiavelli was indirectly involved, therefore, could easily correspond to a conspiracy typology or variant, whose importance Machiavelli was among the first to appreciate and which, in the decades to come, would attract the attention of theorists of the Reason of State and writers of treatises on the era of the Counter-Reformation (cf. Borrelli, 1996). This was not the traditional and expected concept of conspiracies against power, but the typology of conspiracies of power, plotted by the holders of power for defensive and conservative aims, to more easily strike their opponents (real and potential), with the excuse of safeguarding the established (and as such the only legitimate) order against the threat of internal subversion. *** The contours of the second conspiratorial episode that may have personally involved Machiavelli are still less certain. To start with, even assuming he was actually involved in it, this episode certainly did not play an important role in Machiavelli’s reflections on the theme. The episode dates to June 1522, when the writing of the chapter of his Discourses dedicated to

48  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies conspiracies was already completed and he had just started to write the one for the Florentine Histories (though, as we will see, this latter does include some biographical traces and literary echoes of this second adventure). But the real problem concerns the supposed role of the quondam Secretary in the conspiratorial plot. The objective of the plot was to murder Cardinal Giulio de’ Medici, who, in just a few months, in November 1523, would be elected Pope with the name of Clement VII and who, at that moment— following the premature death on the 4th of May 1519 of Lorenzo di Piero de’ Medici—was the real dominus (Lord) of Florence. Once again, upon comparing documents and memoirs, Machiavelli’s role in the conspiracy appears to have been totally adventitious and speculative, when not based on bad or overly predictable reasoning.18 The instigators and organizers of this second conspiracy were, as reported in all the sources, Zanobi Buondelmonti and Luigi di Piero Alamanni, with the help of the habitués of the Orti Oricellari (Rucellai Gardens): Iacopo da Diacceto (known as Diaccetino), Filippo de’ Nerli, Antonio Brucioli, Luigi di Tommaso Alamanni, Battista della Palla, and Niccolò Martelli (cf. Gilbert, 1964). They were all personalities with whom Machiavelli had had, and still maintained, not only close relationships and common intellectual interests, but also a certain political consonance, in a phase in which he had put himself under the protective umbrella of the Medici, and particularly of Cardinal Giulio. And we know how much these interlocutors were, in various ways, themselves supporters and relatives of the Medici, albeit on the verge of breaking or loosening—for personal, political and ideological reasons—their time-honored solidarity with the family. The triggering cause of the conspiracy—as one can read in the Commentari by Filippo de’ Nerli and in the Istorie by Nardi—was the hope of constitutional reform nourished, not least among supporters of the Medici family, by Cardinal Giulio. Nevertheless, Giulio would soon disappoint and frustrate this hope, to the point of confirming the suspicion that his proclaimed plans for change and his openness to a republic—accentuated after the death of Leo X, the 1st of December, 1521—were merely a stratagem. Leo’s death brought to the forefront the question of what kind of regime Florence should give itself with the approaching death or extinction of the Medici, by this time nearly bereft of legitimate male heirs. Giulio’s failure to act on his promises was taken as proof that they were more than anything else a simulation and a form of deception, or simply a way to buy time, to delay his opponents, the most prominent of whom were the Soderini clan and particularly Cardinal Francesco. Once again at this political juncture, Machiavelli did not fail to push his project for a return to the institutions of the popular state, proposing again to Giulio de’ Medici more or less the same theories he had suggested ten years before to Giovanni de’ Medici. But neither his memoranda,19 nor those written by Alessandro de’ Pazzi (favoring the aristocracy) and by Buondelmonti himself (which have unfortunately been lost), were well received even

Machiavelli the Conspirator?  49 by those who had solicited them as contributions to the future constitution of Florence. Hence, the growth of political discontent and demands for change were no longer to be entrusted to the benevolence of the Cardinal, but to the eloquence of arms. Cardinal Soderini (in accord with his brother Piero, exiled in Ragusa) proposed to bring about violent change in the Florentine government by way of a military expedition led by the mercenary captain Lorenzo Orsini (known as Renzo di Ceri) and supported diplomatically by France. Buondelmonti, Alamanni, and their companions had instead imagined a more direct but equally resolutive action: the physical elimination of Giulio de’ Medici, to take place on the 19th of June 1522, the day of Corpus Christi. But the two plans, probably born separately, had ended up intertwined and superimposed, combining the internal rivalries of Florence with a more general anti-Medici hostility which, at that moment, involved not only the French monarchy, but also Genoa and the Duchy of Ferrara. As in the conspiracy of 1513, in this case, too, the intrigue was brought to a premature end by the accidental and fortunate discovery of some compromising papers (in line with a recurring script that inevitably recalls the Catilinarian conspiracy of Roman times. Cicero, by way of a stratagem and with the complicity of the delegates of the Allobrogi, was able to intercept the written proof incriminating Catiline and his supporters [cf. Sallust, 2010: XLIV-XLV]. This stratagem is probably the basis of one of the practical suggestions to aspirant conspirators that can be read in the Discourses, III, 6, 84: ‘every man should guard himself against writing as if avoiding a reef, for nothing can more easily convict you than the writing of your own hand’). So, on the 22nd of May, a French courier was casually intercepted as he was carrying some letters addressed to Diaccettino from Battista della Palla,20 the liaison between the Florentine conspirators and the Court of Francis I. Warned in time of the discovery, Buondelmonti and Alamanni fled Florence, taking refuge in France. Diacettino and Alamanni’s poet cousins, with the same name, were instead captured, immediately put on trial and, after having confessed their intentions and naming the names of their allies, beheaded on the 7th of June (‘The Orti Oricellari were decimated at the end by the executioner, who broke up forever the genial band’ [Tommasini, 1999: 259]). Della Palla and Brucioli were declared rebels and forced into exile. This time around, Machiavelli, despite his ‘reputation as an anti-Medici conspirator’ (Ridolfi, 1978: 317) and his friendships with many of the plotters, had no judicial problems and was not subject to any form of persecution. We know, in reality, from the trial testimony of one of the protagonists of the plot, Niccolò Martelli, that Buondelmonti had actually thought about involving his friend Machiavelli but was dissuaded from doing so because he was too poor and too much a friend of the Medici not to arouse suspicion, no matter what he might have been asked to do. This delayed evidence—in

50  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies 1526, two years after the capture of Martelli, when the Florentine Histories had long been finished and the Florentine political scene had dramatically changed from four years before—clearly shows that Machiavelli had practically nothing to do with this conspiracy. Moreover, even though it was promoted by his friends and acquaintances, he had not even been informed of it. As things stand, any question of his involvement would concern its intellectual aspect, namely the possibility that he was, through his verbal and written teachings, the accidental but direct instigator, as already asserted by Nardi: the above mentioned Niccolò was greatly loved by them [the friends of Cosimo Rucellai and the habitués of the Orti Oricellari], [. . .] and they had great pleasure in discussing with him, having vast consideration for all his works, meaning that Niccolò was somehow responsible for the thoughts and actions of these young men. (Nardi, 1858: 72, emphasis mine) This thesis is dear to all the historiography that has portrayed Machiavelli almost solely as a republican patriot and trainer of kindred spirits in the fight for freedom against tyranny (Baron, 1961; Pocock, 1975; Skinner, 1981). Some of the conspirators, ‘educated in the classics, animated by a great desire to do something extraordinary, something that would make their names illustrious, were exalted listening to the teachings of Machiavelli’ (Villari, 1913: 130). They had been led astray by the enthusiasm with which, in the meetings in the Orti Oricellari, Machiavelli had spoken to them ‘about the Roman and Italian republics; a people in arms; about great men placed in heaven next to the gods for having sacrificed to the homeland their substance, their lives’ (ibid.: 131). Is not this too—the master who incites the minds of his disciples—a form of responsibility or participation? If this were the case, Machiavelli himself, in those moments, might have felt weighing on his shoulders a certain moral burden following the discovery of the plot and the ruin of those who were involved in it. A nagging thought, of which there might have remained a trace, especially in the Florentine Histories, when he found himself narrating a conspiracy such as the one against Galeazzo Maria Sforza in 1476. How different was Machiavelli’s role in the failed assassination of Giulio de’ Medici from that ascribed to the humanist Cola Montano, who had enflamed the minds of three young Milanese scions and armed their hand to have ‘in all his reasonings execrated life under a prince who was not good, calling those glorious and happy whom nature and fortune had allowed to be born and live in a republic’ and for having declared ‘that all famous men had been nourished in republics and not under princes: for republics nourish virtuous men, princes eliminate them; the one profits from the virtue of others, the other fears it’ (Florentine Histories, VII, 33, 3)? Might Machiavelli have said or thought of himself, as he had said of Montano, that he was in turn ‘a lettered and ambitious man’

Machiavelli the Conspirator?  51 (Florentine Histories, VII, 33, 2), capable himself of conquering, with the words he addressed to them, ‘the spirit and will of those youths’ (Florentine Histories, VII, 33, 5)? Actually, more than a few commentators on this conspiracy have taken the opposite view. Not the spiritual symbiosis and the community of ideals between Machiavelli and his disciples, both enemies of tyranny and lovers of ancient history, but the curious circumstance that this conspiracy had been inexpertly carried out by a group of men who, in the meetings in the Orti Oricellari, had had the occasion to learn directly from Machiavelli’s own voice the practical risks associated with conspiracies, so often destined to failure. Youths, therefore, who should be considered as having been vaccinated against such a temptation. Such is the view of Filippo de’ Nerli in his Commentari, where, with regard to these reckless youths, he writes: in the conspiracy against this [Giulio de’ Medici], [they] did not well consider what Machiavelli in his book Discourses had written on conspiracies, which if they had well considered it, they would not have done it, or, though nevertheless doing it, they would have proceeded more cautiously. (De’ Nerli, 1728: 138)21 But something analogous was also written by Cesare Guasti, the philologist and erudite Tuscan to whom we owe the collection, in the middle of 19th Century, of the documents, including the trial record, related to the conspiracy and its various protagonists. He too observes with surprise: ‘it is remarkable that there should be a plot planned by those who met in the garden of the Ruccellai, where Machiavelli himself, instructed by his own experience, had discredited conspiracies with his authoritative words’ (Guasti, 1859: 121). Hence, Machiavelli was not a bad mentor. Rather, he had bad disciples, more inattentive than fanatical. It could therefore be the case, assuming these observations to be valid, that his erstwhile friends had misunderstood or merely forgot along the way Machiavelli’s teachings on conspiracy. To be sure, those same teachings had been understood and well-fixed in the mind—to the point of scrupulously applying them—by a reader and well-known admirer of Machiavelli: Clement VII, even before becoming Pope. If, as seems plausible, Machiavelli did not limit himself to stigmatizing conspiracies as useless and dangerous or to subtly promoting them as the only weapon against tyrants available to the (often fanatical and naïve) defenders of freedom, but he also subjected them to a detached historical, political, and technical analysis, then it does not seem strange that his indications resonated and attracted attention beyond the circle of his most intimate republican admirers. We thus return to the point that we have been trying to make: perhaps Machiavelli distrusted, more than conspiracies themselves, their conspirators who were technically inexperienced or blinded by the spirit of revenge, rendered naïve and unwise

52  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies by idealistic passion, which is to say unfamiliar with politics and its dynamics. The success of a conspiracy, in fact, is not measured solely by the nobility of the ideals that inspire it, but also (perhaps especially) by the practical presence of mind and skill (including the cold blood) of those carrying it out. At the same time, he knew well, having put it in writing, that while organizing a conspiracy requires a special expertise, an equal measure of political and technical skill is required of the prince or the republic that wishes to discover and repress it and perhaps even turn it to its own advantage once it is known or after having ascertained its failure. There are eloquent passages on these matters in the Discourses, which confirm the use for the purposes of conservation and repression that those in power can make of an instrument as peculiar as the conspiracy. They must guard against conspiracies by using both prudence and cunning, constraint and determination, rather than limiting themselves to denouncing or condemning them: Yet, I do not wish to fail to warn that prince or republic against whom a conspiracy has been planned to be cautious, so that when a conspiracy is revealed to them, before they make an effort to avenge themselves, they will seek to understand very well its characteristics, and they will take careful measure of the conditions of the conspirators as well as their own, and when they find that the conspiracy is widespread and powerful, they will never reveal it until they have prepared themselves with forces sufficient to suppress it; acting otherwise, they would discover only their own ruin. For this reason, they must make every effort to pretend to dissimulate, since once the conspirators find themselves exposed, driven by necessity they will act without scruples. (III, 6, 187–8, we have already quoted this passage) Nor can a prince or a republic that wishes in an advantageous way to delay exposing a conspiracy adopt a better expedient than cleverly offering the conspirators an opportunity in the near future, so that while they wait for that opportunity or think they have ample time, that prince or republic has time to punish them. Anyone who has acted differently has hastened his own ruin. (III, 6, 192–3) But when conspiracies are weak, they should and must be suppressed without fail. (III, 6, 196) Actually, Machiavelli—to pick up again on Strauss’s suggestion from which we started—had never been seditious. He had never taken part in political conspiracies, not only because he considered them often unproductive and always highly dangerous, but also because they did not match his temperament, which was never inclined to the spirit of adventure. On

Machiavelli the Conspirator?  53 the contrary, he was always guided by great prudence and sometimes by a certain opportunism. Nor did they match his political vision, which did indeed call for subterfuge, deceit, duplicity, dissembling, but as dialectical instruments. For Machiavelli, these tactics were rhetorical and argumentative expedients, techniques through which to unveil the spirit of the interlocutor, ways to bend him to one’s own will and one’s own interests, not corollaries to violence which, as political action, remained in his mind the extreme option, a necessity imposed by contingencies and which in certain circumstances cannot be avoided, but which if not oriented by a vision or a design remains an end in itself. Immorality is not inherent to the use of violence, but to its use without a purpose. Violence is immoral when it is gratuitous or blind. Machiavelli was not a conspirator, but he was a historian and above all an analyst of conspiracies—of those he came to know about through literature, those he experienced as a witness, and those in which he found himself involuntarily involved. Having personally avoided them had not prevented him from understanding their significance, their dynamics, and their historical function.

Notes 1 An overview of the interpretation offered by Strauss (and by his followers) of Machiavelli as ‘conspirator’ and theorist of conspiracies is provided in Campi (2014). Cf. also Germino (1991), Sorensen (2006), and Suppa (2009). 2 There were bad experiences that influenced his reflections. This is the opinion, still today vastly shared, that was clearly professed by Oreste Tommasini, one of Machiavelli’s greatest late 19th-century biographers: ‘Of the sad process of the prison and of the trial [calling to mind the 1513 conspiracy] the only long-lasting effect was the one of being sculpted in his spirit producing the considerations of the famous chapter on conspiracies in the third book of his Discourses’ (Tommasini, 1999: 72–3). 3 Machiavelli, ‘in looking for the defects of Piero [Soderini], not mentioning this state [the new regime or power of the Medici, after their return to the city], mentions only those citizens who hated them and those in Florence who were openly against them [. . .]. In the same way, the current regime, discovering Piero Soderini, would lower his reputation, not to its own advantage but to the advantage of those citizens that were its enemies and who spoke ill of it [. . .] this regime has not as its enemy Piero Soderini, but the old system’. Cf. Machiavelli (2001: 582–3). For an analysis of this text, cf. Sasso (1993: 319–22). 4 Nardi started the work around 1553 and he worked on it for many years without being able to finish it. The first printed edition, posthumous, was published in Lyons in 1582 by the typographer Thibaud Ancelin. 5 ‘Furon presi in Fiorenza alcuni cittadini per un indizio rapportato al magistrato degli otto da un messer Bernardino Coccio sanese, che per remunerazione di tal beneficio conseguì poi il padronaggio d’uno spedale nella terra di San Gimignano. Costui usando in casa de’ Lenzi, parenti di Piero Soderini, trovò notati e descritti in una carta circa a diciotto o venti giovani; la quale, caduta disavvedutamente a Pietro Pagolo Boscoli, e da questo messer Bernardino ritrovata, fu cagione che fussero ritenuti da quel magistrato, come di sopra è detto. De’ quali giovani furono, come principali, ritenuti il detto Pietro Pagolo e Agostino di Luca Capponi; e, esaminati a parola e con tortura, non confessarono d’avere

54  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies macchinato contra allo stato cosa alcuna, ma non negarono già la colpa del desiderio loro buono della libertà della patria, e alcune parole poco prudentemente usate tra loro, che la intenzione d’essi potevano manifestare. Onde i detti Agostino Capponi e Pietro Pagolo Boscoli furono condannati alla morte, sì che nel seguente dì dalla partita del reverendissimo cardinale de’ Medici da Fiorenza, per andare alla creazione del nuovo papa, ne fu fatta la esecuzione’. 6 The Sommario dell’istoria d’Italia dal 1511 al 1527 by Vettori was published for the first time in 1848. 7 ‘E congiurarono Agostino Capponi e Pietropaulo Boscoli di ammazzare Giuliano de’ Medici. E furono scoperti, perciò feciono una scritta, dove scrissono i nomi di quelli che credevono, seguita la occisione, si avessino a scoprire in loro favore, ancora che prima non la volessino loro conferire. Et hebbono sì poca avvertenzia, che se la lasciarono cadere; et essendo ritrovata, fu portata al Cardinale; e, conoscendo lui in essa essere nomi di uomini tutti sospetti, ordinò fussino presi non solo Pietropaulo et Agostino, ma tutti li altri che erano in su detta scritta, pensando che tutti fussino nel medesimo errore. E tutti furono essaminati; ma solo furono trovati in colpa notabile Agostino e Pietropaulo, i quali dalli Otto furono condannati a morte. Delli altri qualcuno ne fu confinato, perché per le loro essamine si conobbe malissimo animo verso i Medici, alcuni furono absoluti, benché tutti quelli che per questo caso furono condannati e confinati, alla creazione del cardinale de’ Medici in Papa, che seguì poi intra non molti giorni, furono liberi ed assoluti’. 8 Cf. Tommasini (1999: 68). We are referring to the Cronaca dei fatti avvenuti o che interessano la Repubblica di Venezia tra la fine del ’400 ed i primi tre decenni del ’500. The work was composed by Sanudo between 1496 and 1533, but unpublished until the end of the 19th century. It was published, from the autograph held in the Biblioteca Marciana, between 1879 and 1903. 9 This warrant—the Bando degli Otto contro Niccolò Machiavelli—can be read in Villari (1913: 556–57). 10 By admission of Machiavelli himself, in his letter to Francesco Vettori of the 18th of March, 1513, ‘I can say that I owe all that I still have to live to Giuliano the Magnificent and to your beloved Paolo’ (Paolo Vettori, among the protagonists of the Soderini expulsion, supporter of the Medici, was Francesco’s brother). Cf. Machiavelli (2002: 104). 11 Machiavelli touches upon the tortures suffered and valiantly born in the following letter to Vettori, dated 18th of March and just now recalled: ‘I want you to have this pleasure from my pains that I withstood them so bravely, that I love myself for them, and believe I am more than I thought’. Cf. Machiavelli (2002: 104). 12 Only Boscoli and Capponi were executed. Among the other arrested potential participants in the plot were Niccolò Valori and Giovanni Folchi, who were imprisoned for two years in the Volterra fortress and banished forever from the city. Others (Francesco Serragli, Pandolfo Biliotti, Duccio Adimari, Ubertino Bonciani) were condemned to banishment; others underwent bail. Machiavelli was among the few to be considered without guilt (even if not unharmed in body and above all in spirit) in this episode. A reliable balance sheet of the repression that followed the discovery of the conspiracy, which opens an interesting passage on the role held in it by Machiavelli, is contained in the letter by Giuliano de’ Medici to Piero da Bibbiena, residing at the time in Venice. The letter is dated the 7th of March 1513, when Machiavelli was still imprisoned and formally indicted, but Machiavelli’s name does not appear among the conspirators, no less than eight, that Giuliano explicitly mentions. To his correspondent, Giuliano announces with satisfaction that ‘the wound has been opened and cleansed, and

Machiavelli the Conspirator?  55 thank God no sign of guilt was found’. Justice had rapidly run its course: ‘the chiefs Agostino Capponi and Pietro Paolo Boscoli, youths, from good families, without bad reputation [. . .] supplicium capitis sumptum est’ (‘they were beheaded’); Niccolò Valori and Giovanni Folchi ‘are confined for two years in the fortress of Volterra [. . .] and then banished forever from the domain of Florence’; ‘some others implicated in some way, like Francesco Seragli, Pandolpho Biliotti, Dutio Adimari, Ubertino Bonciani, have been banished for a few years in various places in the countryside of Florence’; ‘those who proved to be innocent were released’. Machiavelli was not mentioned, and he probably was among those ‘who proved to be innocent’ and that would in any case have been released, even if the amnesty—which hastened his way out of jail—declared upon the election of Giovanni de’ Medici as Pope, had not been granted. This important letter can be read in Villari (1913: 555–6). 13 The reference here is obviously to the words of Boscoli, on the verge of being executed, immortalized by Luca della Robbia in his Recitazione: ‘Eh, Luca, get this Brutus out of my head, so that what I am about to do I will do as a real Christian’. In his last hours, Boscoli had received the last rites in the presence of his friend Luca di Simone di Marco Della Robbia, humanist and publisher, who left a dense written account with religious echoes (the Della Robbia family was tied to the spiritual legacy and teachings of Savonarola of his conversations with the dying Boscoli). The Recitazione del caso di Pietro Pagolo Boscoli e di Agostino Capponi, written on the spur of the moment, was published for the first time by F. L. Polidori in the Archivio storico italiano (1842, No. 1: 283–309). With the title La morte di Pietro Paolo Boscoli and few revisions had appeared in Della Robbia (1943), with an introduction by the writer Riccardo Bacchelli. It can now be read—with few excisions—in Marchi (2005: 29–30). It is Boscoli’s generous (albeit ingenuous) libertarian and anti-tyrannical afflatus, combined with his Christian torment that invokes the deliverance of the soul in the face of premature death, that has given historical and literary notoriety to this conspiracy, which in and of itself has few differences from many others—successful and not—that characterized the 14th and 15th centuries. 14 Martelli (2006: 18, footnote No. 14): ‘that list of pretended and presumed sympathizers of the two conspirators really existed? And he was one of them—what a thoughtless man!—to drop the letter from his chest? Oh, great naiveté of the ancient conspirators!’ In support of his hypothesis, Martelli considers it not by chance that the conspiracy attempted to involve also Giovanni di Simone Folchi, who collaborated with Machiavelli during the time (we are in FebruaryApril 1506) of the constitution of that civic militia, the so-called Ordinanza, seen as annoying and opposed in every way by the oligarchical faction. If the two, accused of plotting against the Medici, had ended up being decapitated, even if on the basis of a vicious rumor or of a suspicion, it surely would have been a political coup for their aristocratic enemies. 15 The so-called Apograph Ricci is the collection-transcription of manuscripts by Machiavelli edited between 1573 and 1594 by his nephews Giuliano de’ Ricci and Niccolò il Giovane, as part of a definitive edition of the works by the Secretary which, however, was never completed. The Apograph Ricci was pubblished for the first time by Tommasini in his biography of Machiavelli. 16 The full text of the letter can be found in Villari (1913: 553–54). But it is also mentioned in Tommasini (1999: 68), who in his turn sees in this venture (citing almost verbatim Giuliano’s letter) ‘bad intention with little to show for it’ (ibid.). According to Ridolfi (1978: 15), ‘It was one of those usual conspiracies, as happen from time to time, tasting more of books than of daggers, but in this one the classical aspiration was made more innocent by a certain candid simplicity’.

56  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies 17 Six red balls (palle) on a yellow background appeared on the Medici emblem at the time of Lorenzo the Magnificent. ‘Palle! palle!’ was therefore the battle cry supporting the family. 18 Was Machiavelli Machiavellian? Did he apply in his own political life the precepts and teachings that his works advised men of power to follow? If one believes that Machiavelli himself was a shrewd man, inclined to subterfuge, morally ambiguous, able to dissimulate his true thoughts and intentions, then one might also think that it was he who denounced the conspiracy organized by his followers of the Orti Oricellari against Giulio de’ Medici. Why rule it out? Such a betrayal would have brought him a number of advantages. It would have ingratiated Machiavelli with the Cardinal, Lord of Florence, from whom he could have obtained a prestigious political appointment. What’s more, he would have avoided repeating the terrible experience of spring, 1513, when for the mere suspicion of having been a member of the conspiracy against Giuliano and Giovanni de’ Medici, he was arrested, tortured, and threatened with death. Machiavelli an informant out of interest and fear? This is a grave suspicion, but it is also historically plausible. Is it possible that Machiavelli did not know the subversive intentions of the young men to whom he had imparted his lessons on the very subject of conspiracies and with whom he had direct and confidential relationships? Why not, then, consider the hypothesis that it was in fact Machiavelli who unveiled—perhaps involuntarily—the plot that was being organized? He could even have participated in the organization of the plot only to then withdraw from it for fear of its negative consequences for his person in case of failure or worried by the dilettantism of the young conspirators who had gotten him involved, if not in an active and operational role, in consideration of his intellectual prestige and their common republican sentiments. Not to mention that they considered him their spiritual guide and mentor. The problem is that when speaking of Machiavelli, the imagination runs wild. And history runs the risk of being transformed into a novel or a feuilleton. The truth is that there exists no evidence or document or testimony (written or oral) that attests to Machiavelli’s involvement in the conspiracy of 1522. He was not, based on what we know, among the conspirators and in all likelihood he never knew anything about the attempt on the life of Giulio de’ Medici that was then being planned. 19 Machiavelli participated in the political-constitutional debate during 1520– 1522, with at least three speeches. The most important and articulated is the one written, in all probability, between November 1520 and January 1521, known by the title Discursus florentinarum rerum post mortem Iunioris Laurentii Medices: the historical-institutional weakness of Florence, he argues, is to never have been a real principate nor an effective republic. The solution proposed, from an institutional point of view, is the reopening of the Grand Council, as an instrument of popular government, balanced by the creation of a limited council composed of 65 citizens, from whom would be chosen the Gonfaloniere: a synthesis, in his idea, of freedom and authority. A second speech has come down to us in fragmentary form (and with a 19th-century title: Ricordo al Cardinale Giulio sulla riforma dello stato di Firenze), surely written after the death of Leo X. The third, dating to April 1522, is Minuta di provvisione per la riforma dello stato di Firenze l’anno 1522, of which the autograph is still conserved. The three texts can be read, adequately commented and annotated, in Machiavelli (2001: 621–54). On the significance of these texts in the more general context of Machiavelli’s political thought, cf. Inglese (1985) and Anselmi (1996). 20 ‘A certain courier was captured on his horse bringing some letters from Battista della Palla to the conspirators, through which the Cardinal was able to discover their plan. After the interrogation of the courier, Jacopo da Ghiacceto, a young

Machiavelli the Conspirator?  57 noble man of letters was captured. After the interrogation of this last, the Cardinal discovered the conspiracy’. Cf. De’ Nerli (1728: 139). 21 The chronicle was written by Filippo de’ Nerli (1485–1556) between 1537 and the date of his death. We dispose finally a critical version of the Commentari. Cf. Russo (2005–2006).

References Anselmi, G. M. (1996). Il ‘Discursus florentinarum rerum’ tra progetto politico e prospettiva storiografica, in J.-J. Marchand (ed.), Niccolò Machiavelli: Politico storico letterato. Rome: Salerno Editrice, 189–207. Baron, H. (1961). Machiavelli the Republican Citizen and Author of the ‘Prince’, English Historical Review, No. 76: 217–53. Borrelli, G. (1996). La necessità della congiura nelle scritture italiane della Ragion di Stato, in Y.-M. Bercé, and E. Fasano Guarini (eds), Complots et conjurations dans l’Europe moderne. Rome: École française de Rome, 81–91. Campi, A. (2014). Leo Strauss, ad vocem, in G. Sasso (ed.), Enciclopedia Machiavelli. Rome: Istituto per l’Enciclopedia Italiana, 577–9. De’ Nerli, F. (1728). Commentari de’ fatti occorsi dentro la città di Firenze dall’anno 1215 al 1537. Augusta: Mertz e Majer. Della Robbia, L. (1943). La morte di Pietro Paolo Boscoli, edited by R. Bacchelli. Florence: Le Monnier. Germino, D. (1991). Blasphemy and Leo Strauss’s Machiavelli, Review of Politics, Vol. 53, No. 1: 146–56. Gilbert, F. (1964). Bernardo Rucellai and the Orti Oricellari: A Study on the Origin of Modern Political Thought, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, Vol. XX: 161–91. Guasti, C. (1859). Documenti della congiura fatta contro il cardinale Giulio de’ Medici nel 1522, Giornale storico degli archivi toscani, Vol. III: 121–50, 185– 232, 239–67. Guicciardini, F. (1984, originally 1969). The History of Italy, translated, edited, with notes and an Introduction by S. Alxander. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Inglese, G. (1985). Il ‘Discursus florentinarum rerum’ di Niccolò Machiavelli, La Cultura, Vol. XXIII: 203–28. Machiavelli, N. (2001). Ai Palleschi, in L’arte della guerra: Scritti politici minori, edited by J.-J. Marchand, D. Fachard, and G. M. Anselmi. Rome: Salerno Editrice. Machiavelli, N. (2002). Lettere a Francesco Vettori e a Francesco Guicciardini, edited by G. Inglese. Milan: Rizzoli. Marchi, G. P. (2005). Testi cinquecenteschi sulla ribellione politica. Verona: Edizioni Fiorini. Martelli, M. (2006). Breve storia del ‘Principe’, in N. Machiavelli, Il Principe, edited by M. Martelli. Rome: Salerno Editrice. Najemy, J. M. (1993). Between Friends: Discourses of Power and Desire in Machiavelli—Vettori Letters of 1513–1515. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Nardi, J. (1858). Istorie di Firenze, edited by A. Gelli, Vol. II. Florence: Le Monnier. Pocock, J. G. A. (1975). The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought on the Atlantic Republican Tradition. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

58  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies Prezzolini, G. (1967, first Italian edition 1928). Machiavelli. New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux. Ridolfi, R. (1978, originally 1954). Vita di Niccolò Machiavelli: Settima edizione italiana accresciuta e riveduta. Florence: Sansoni. Russo, S. (2005–2006). Filippo de’ Nerli, Commentari de’ fatti civili occorsi nella città di Firenze dal 1215 al 1537: Edizione critica, Tesi di dottorato, Università degli Studi di Napoli ‘Federico II’, Anno Accademico 2005–2006. Sallust (2010). Catiline’s Conspiracy, the Jugurthine War, Histories, translated with an Introduction and Notes by W. W. Batstone. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sasso, G. (1993). Niccolò Machiavelli, II: La storiografia. Bologna: Il Mulino. Skinner, Q. (1981). Machiavelli. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sorensen, K. A. (2006). Discourses on Strauss: Revelation and Reason in Leo Strauss and His Critical Study of Machiavelli. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Strauss, L. (1958). Thoughts on Machiavelli. Glencoe: The Free Press. Suppa, S. (2009). Machiavelli nel modello conservatore di Leo Strauss, in A. Arienzo, G. Borrelli (eds.), Anglo-American Faces of Machiavelli: Machiavelli e machiavellismi nella cultura anglo-americana (secoli XVI–XX). Monza: Polimetrica. Tommasini, O. (1994, originally 1883). La vita e gli scritti di Niccolò Machiavelli nella loro relazione col machiavellismo, Vol. I. Bologna: Il Mulino. Tommasini, O. (1999, originally 1911). La vita e gli scritti di Niccolò Machiavelli nella loro relazione col machiavellismo, Vol. II, part 1. Bologna: Il Mulino. Unger, M. J. (2011). Machiavelli: A Biography. New York: Simon & Schuster. Vettori, F. (1972, originally 1848). Scritti storici e politici, edited by E. Nicolini. Bari: Laterza. Villari, P. (1913). Niccolò Machiavelli e i suoi tempi. Terza edizione ricevuta e corretta dall’Autore, Vol. II. Milan: Hoepli. Viroli, M. (2000, first Italian edition 1998). Niccolo’s Smile: A Biography of Machiavelli. New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux. Zuckert, C. (2017). Machiavelli’s Politics. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

4 Phenomenology and Anatomy of Conspiracy Alessandro Campi

Having examined some aspects of a biographical nature, useful in evaluating how certain experiences, certain directly lived events, may have informed Machiavelli’s complex reflections on the theme,1 we must now investigate more organically how he confronted the question on an analytical-descriptive level. We must now focus, in other words, on how he tried to offer, in his various works, what we would define as an empirical-phenomenological interpretation of conspiracies. The mandatory starting point of this reconstruction is the already frequently mentioned chapter On Conspiracies in the Discourses (the 6th of Book III). Its most striking feature is that it opens with a glaring contradiction, left unresolved by Machiavelli and indicative of his style of argument, often marked by logical incongruities and by forced or manipulative reconstructions of events at the service of his political analysis. In this case, it is a contradiction that has not always been noted or adequately assessed by the critical literature. While he submits, on the one hand, ‘that many more princes have lost their lives and their states through conspiracies than through open warfare’ (III, 6, 3), which would seem to vouch for their efficacy in light of both ancient and contemporary historical experience, he also argues, on the other hand, that a conspiracy is an enterprise that is ‘difficult and extremely dangerous at every one of its stages, which results in the fact that many conspiracies are attempted but very few reach their desired goal’ (III, 6, 4). This skepticism about the practical-political utility of such an instrument is expressed in similar terms in The Prince (‘the difficulties on the side of the conspirators are infinite. And one sees from experience that there have been many conspiracies, but few have had a good end’, XIX, 11) and can be explained—considering the date of composition of both texts, notoriously begun after his removal from the office of Chancellor in November 1512 and completed by the end of 1517—by recalling his traumatic experience of February,1513, when he was involved in the ephemeral intrigue planned by Pietro Paolo Boscoli and Agostino Capponi against Giuliano (and Giovanni) de’ Medici. Machiavelli’s memories of these grim personal experiences lie behind his invitations to prudence and the nearly fatalistic

60  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies attitude with which the chapter seems to open. While princes are advised, in order to escape the ever-present threat of conspiracies, to adopt every available means to cultivate and maintain the favour of the people—‘being hated by the people’ (Discourses, III, 6, 10) for offenses ‘against property, lifeblood, or honor’ (III, 6, 14) of his subjects and for threats directed at them is, as a matter of fact, the main motive for conspiracies2—private citizens are advised, on the other hand, ‘to live content under whatever dominion has been imposed on them by fate’ (III, 6, 5).3 But his disapproval, if not a downright aversion, for this type of enterprise did not prevent Machiavelli from proposing an analytical treatment, a collection of case histories and even an indicative typology of the phenomenon. From making them, that is, an object of technical and scientific investigation, without any moralism whatsoever. Historical experience, in fact, seems also to suggest to him another truth: the violence and secrecy that characterize conspiracies are also the characteristics from which, very often, power and its political order originate. Although they tend to hide and repress these founding traits of theirs, the traits persist and represent the structurally opaque and dark side of power and its established order. Violence and secrecy, in other words, though unspeakable and threatening, tend to show themselves again, unaltered, every time the established order faces a crisis or becomes the object of protest and contention. If the ruling order originates from a conspiratorial matrix, it is destined to maintain and perpetuate that matrix. From the point of view of historical-political analysis, this makes it impossible to repress or underestimate the phenomenon of conspiracy. First of all, Machiavelli proposes a distinction among conspiracies ‘against the prince’, implying a mere change in the leadership of the established order (to which he devotes most of his reflections), those ‘against one’s fatherland’ (which pursue instead constitutional change, the desire to move from a republic or a corrupt monarchy to a principate, as in the historically paradigmatic example, despite its failure, of Catiline, treated briefly only at the end of the chapter) and ‘those that are formed to give a city over to the enemies who are besieging it’ (III, 6, 8). These last, already analyzed in the Discourses, II, 32, 16–24, concern instead a form of betrayal or an understanding with an external enemy, to whom support is offered, or by whom the conspirator is corrupted, or with whom the conspirator collaborates in the illusion of being able to win power from the city’s dominant faction of the moment. In this last case, however, power obviously comes at the price of losing autonomy and owing vassalage to the allied foreign power.4 Machiavelli then goes on to explain the proper understanding of what we mean by a conspiracy. Lending faith to its Latin etymology (cum-iurare): a collective act based on a binding vow, a secretly subscribed (or solely verbal) agreement between at least two parties (cf. Campi, 2012), he distinguishes a conspiracy from an individual action such as a classic tyrannicide. (‘A single individual cannot be said to form a conspiracy but, rather, this represents

Anatomy of Conspiracy  61 the firm determination aroused in a single man to kill the prince’: III, 6, 27). This last—political homicide or tyrannicide (cf. Turchetti, 2013)—can be a gesture born of rage or desperation, of the desire to avenge a personal offense or to commit—even for noble reasons, as for example the punishment of a usurper—a sensational act. But Machiavelli, precisely because it is a gesture conceived in the mind of a single individual, does not seem to see in it a political intention or purpose aimed at a change of leadership, which is what instead characterizes and distinguishes a conspiracy from the mere assassination of a king or a prince. Lastly, Machiavelli underlines that conspiracies—those of the first type, ‘against a prince’—are based on one presupposition that is, so to speak, sociological, and another that is instead psychological. The first is represented by the physical proximity of the conspirators to the prince, by their belonging to his circle or by the possibility of their having ‘easy access to the prince’ (III, 6, 38): I must say that all conspiracies are found in the histories to have been organized by great men or by those closest to the prince. (III, 6, 36) It is evident, therefore, that those who have organized conspiracies have all been great men or close to the prince. (III 6, 41) The psychological motive instead is to be found mainly—Machiavelli submits—in ingratitude and the ‘lust for power’ (III, 6, 46). Very often those who have obtained all kinds of privileges and advantages from the prince are not content with what they have obtained, and end up aspiring to his position at the cost of his physical elimination. This is the case of ancient Rome, of those who conspired against their emperors and protectors after having obtained from them every possible benefit and advantage. Indeed, there is no material or pecuniary benefit that can satisfy the desire for power and the will to command. As Machiavelli writes in his Discourses, these conspirators ‘were accustomed to so much wealth, honor, and rank by their emperors that they felt nothing was lacking in the perfection of their power except the empire itself’ (III, 6, 42). With these annotations, we enter into what we could define as the psychosociology of conspiracies. From a geometrical point of view, power, even the most absolute power, is not a dot, but a circle, on the inside of which are, besides him who is the formal holder, all those who share it with him in various ways (family and relatives, counsellors and collaborators, courtiers and adulators, clientes [clients]). The relationship between the power holder and his circle is always an inextricable tangle of contradictory feelings that go from loyalty to envy, from gratitude to resentment, from respect to fear. The more they are in the good graces and vicinity of the chief, by being

62  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies one of his confidants or one of his trusted advisors, the more—Machiavelli seems to assert—the belief takes root in his subordinates that they themselves can aspire to the supreme command. They aspire to have no fewer titles or virtues than the one who holds power in that moment. The glory of power, what makes it sacred and intangible, works only by way of physical distance from it; distance accentuated by symbolism and rituals that adorn it in the eyes of those who are subject to it or observe it from afar. Seen from up close—touched by hand or in a certain measure shared—power loses its aura. It becomes something that anybody in its vicinity can aspire to in an absolute and exclusive way, assuming he has the nerve to grasp it, if necessary through violence, which for the one committing it—having seen the real face of power—is never profane or unmotivated. Cupidity and ingratitude, feelings rooted in human nature, nourish the will for dominion, which is, in turn—among those who are inside the power circle—the spring that sets the conspiracy in motion. Obviously, only someone who is close to the prince or has access to his person can materially attack the prince. But Machiavelli appears to mean more than mere physical vicinity to the one who is to be eliminated. He also has in mind their spiritual or symbolic vicinity, meaning that the conspirators share with the victim the same codes of conduct, the same desires, and perhaps also the same vices. Above all, however, both operate and act inside the same space, namely the space of power, which has its own anatomy and separateness with respect to rest of the social world. If it is true—as Machiavelli seems to have intuited based on his own experience—‘that power is an independent greatness, even with respect to the consensus that created it’ (Schmitt, 1990: 21),5 it is also sustained by its own peculiar internal dialectic. Having stated these premises, Machiavelli goes on to treat the technicaloperative aspects of conspiracies. He thus confirms the often pragmatic and instrumental orientation of his thinking (cf. Gilbert, 1965; Chabod, 1993; Cutinelli Rèndina, 1999; Zuckert, 2017) and the fact that conspiracies, though potentially dangerous, may also, if successful, be a necessary and useful if not legitimate means of effecting political change and a re-balancing of power. This observation gives rise to practical suggestions, rules and recipes, on how to avoid the risks and the unforeseen difficulties inherent in conspiracies and on the precautions to be taken to neutralize them or to make them turn out well. Machiavelli’s advice seems to be addressed indifferently to princes as well as to ‘private citizens’, and, over the centuries, this apparent neutrality has led these celebrated pages to be considered as a sort of manual for use by men of power and aspiring conspirators. He writes with an almost didactic intent (considered perverse or edifying depending on the reader’s point of view). It hardly needs pointing out that these very pages, viewed as an incitement to revolt against the established order, inspired much of the anti-Machiavellianism of the 17th century (cf. Panella, 1943; Kahn, 1994; Anglo, 2005; Kahn, 2010; Moyer, 2017; Campi, 2018). But appeals were made to these same pages—for example, in the 19th

Anatomy of Conspiracy  63 century—by more than a few aspiring revolutionaries. We know, especially from the historical-political experience of the 20th century, that revolution, once deprived of its mythic-palingenetic character, is nothing more than a violent form of access to power pursued by minorities of ideologically motivated professionals of armed struggle.6 Revolutions, we could say, are successful conspiracies, which achieve their double objective: to eliminate the old holders of power and win popular consensus. Machiavelli concentrates particularly on the difficulties that conspiracies encounter in the various technical phases of their execution, which are, in his judgment, essentially three: the conceptual-planning phase, the execution phase, and the post-execution phase. As he writes, the dangers of conspiratorial plots ‘incurred [. . .] in planning them, in executing them, and even after they have been executed’ (III, 6, 25), the subversive plots present complications ‘before, during, and after the fact’ (III, 6, 51). In the initial conception and planning phase the main problem is maintaining secrecy, a danger that becomes even greater if the secret is shared by a large number of people: ‘It is possible to find one or two trusted friends, but when you try to extend this number to many, it is impossible to find them’ (III, 6, 57). The risk, the more the network of participants in the conspiracy is extended, is that of the tip off or betrayal: ‘the conspiracy is discovered before the plot is carried out [. . .] because of the infidelity of the people with whom you are conspiring’ (II, 32, 18); or because of imprudence: ‘when a conspirator speaks carelessly’ (III, 6, 62). Hence the necessity, for the architect or creator, to reveal his subversive plan only to really trusted people or even better to no one, and in any case only when it is time to act. Proper timing also reduces the chances of being discovered and denounced and of leaving evidence of one’s intentions that could turn out to be compromising.7 Concerning the execution phase, the difficulties arise instead either from changing the plan; or from a lack of courage on the part of the man who carries it out; or from an error that the executor commits out of a lack of prudence; or from failing to execute the conspiracy perfectly, with part of those who were supposed to be killed remaining alive. (III, 6, 100) The implementation of a conspiracy, assuming it is not discovered in advance, must, therefore, take the following into account: chance and the unforeseeable; the inexpertness or lack of determination of the attackers; the insufficient prudence with which targets are sometimes chosen (as when one aspires to eliminate two targets at the same time); and, finally, the furious reaction of those who are fortunate enough to survive the ambush. Coherently with his vision of politics as being subject to the arbitrariness of fortune and the irrationality of history, Machiavelli insists strongly on

64  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies the irruption of chance or the accidental into the conspiratorial plot. As he wrote in a previous section of the Discourses: But if the conspiracy is not discovered during the planning, a thousand problems then arise in putting it into action, because either you arrive before the appointed time or you arrive afterwards, which spoils everything, or if an accidental noise is raised, as with the geese on the Capitol, or if normal routine is broken, the slightest error and the smallest mistake ruin the whole enterprise. (Discourses, II, 32, 19–20) The most perfect and careful plan can misfire and go haywire owing to an event—even minimal—which could not be foreseen. In order to be successful, a conspiracy requires rational planning, but the rationality of every human construction must always deal with fatality, with sudden changes of scenario. Similarly, one must take into account the possibility of human error or momentary weakness, an attacker who lacks intestinal fortitude or familiarity with weapons or whose cockiness translates into fear and cowardice when it’s time to strike. As for the risks inherent in the third phase, namely once the conspiracy has been brought to an end, they are reduced substantially to one, but it is politically decisive: ‘when someone remains alive to avenge the dead prince’ (III, 6, 153). This danger is even more serious ‘when the people are the friend of the prince that you have murdered’ (III, 6, 160). Here Machiavelli comes to what is perhaps the central point of his argument, the point that provides theoretical coherence to his entire reflection and that justifies on a general political level his personal reservations for this form of struggle. It is popular hatred of the prince that creates the collective mood (therefore the conditions and the justification) that leads ‘great men’ to conspire. Conversely, it is popular favour that is the best antidote to subversive plots since—as is also written in The Prince—against a prince who is ‘reputed’, ‘excellent’ and ‘revered by his own subjects’ ‘it is difficult to conspire’ (XIX, 5). Conspiracies are by definition, from the operative point of view, an elitist and socially restricted phenomenon, consumed for the most part within the sphere of power, among the few that hold it and the few that aspire to it, and from which, therefore, the people are substantially excluded. The people are, however, the arbiter that decrees, beyond the achievement of the immediate objective of every single conspiracy, its effective success or its concrete failure from the political point of view. The plotters who, after killing the prince, are unable to bring the people over to their side, despite instrumentally brandishing the flag of freedom from the tyrant, are destined to failure and are exposed to a brutal revenge: But of all the dangers that can be incurred after the execution of such a plan, there is none more certain or more to be feared than when the people are the friend of the prince that you have murdered, because

Anatomy of Conspiracy  65 conspirators have no remedy against this danger and can never secure themselves against it. (Discourses, III, 6, 160) In other words, the people’s falling out of love with the prince is what favors a conspiracy; popular approval in his regard is what can decree its failure. The fact remains, concludes Machiavelli, that conspiracies are dangerous for the prince in any case, even in the case that the intention to kill him should fail. Just as they always cast a shadow of infamy on those who organize them, conspiracies also leave a shadow of suspicion on the intended victim. The shadow of suspicion grows even darker should the prince, after escaping his assassins or having discovered and neutralized their criminal plan, succeeds in killing them and prosecuting them along with their accomplices. The people, in fact, will end up believing ‘that the conspiracy was an invention of the prince to give vent to his avarice and cruelty against the lives and property of those whom he has killed’ (III, 6, 186). But perhaps—Machiavelli seems to sense—rather than a mere shadow of suspicion there may be the real possibility that the conspiracy against the prince was actually solicited or artfully constructed by the prince himself. With the idea of casting himself in the role of the victim and attracting the favor of the people, a crafty prince under siege may resort to a repressive action against his enemies. Such are the conspiracies, in other words, on the part of the power holder, aimed at consolidating his hold on it. *** Our examination of Machiavelli’s analysis of conspiracies cannot stop at his Discourses, no matter how central this work is to the theme we are discussing. Some of the arguments developed in it are expounded synthetically (anticipated or recalled? It obviously depends on which hypothesis on the dating of his works is accepted) in the initial section of chapter XIX of The Prince (De contemptu et odio fugiendo/Of Avoiding Contempt and Hatred). Among the most discussed by the critics, owing to its disharmonious and barely coherent structure, this chapter is the fruit of evident reworkings and conspicuous integrations (cf. Martelli, 2006). The resonances and consonances between the two works concern various aspects. For example, the vacuity or inadequacy of conspiracies as a means for overthrowing the established order so as to create a more stable and durable one (but we have already said many times that this critical reservation should not be interpreted as an absolute disapproval of the phenomenon). The two works also resonate with regard to the difficulty for the conspirators of finding allies who are loyal, motivated and not disposed to betray for their convenience: For whoever conspires cannot alone, but he cannot find company except from those he believes to be malcontents; and as soon as you disclose your intent to a malcontent, you give him the matter with which to

66  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies become content, because manifestly he can hope for every advantage from it. So, seeing sure again on this side, and on the other, dubious gain full of danger, he must indeed either be a rare friend, or an altogether obstinate enemy of the prince, to observe his faith with you. (The Prince, XIX, 12) Likewise, the theme of ‘popular good will’ (benivolenzia populare: XIX, 14), of the favor, that is, which the people reserve for the prince when in his actions he lets himself be guided by ‘greatness, spiritedness, gravity, and strength’ (XIX, 4), which allows him to be sheltered from the hostile intentions of the ambitious few who aim to overthrow him. In this case, the conspirator, ‘having the people as enemies’ (XIX 14), is doomed to almost certain failure, even where his criminal plan should succeed. This theme is connected to the utilitarian recommendation to the prince to neutralize the wicked feelings in his regard from the community in order to limit the ambitions of the ‘great men’ and to discourage them from conspiring against him. ‘[T]he prince may secure himself sufficiently if he avoids being hated or despised and keeps the people satisfied with him’ (XIX, 9). Machiavelli submits this last point to historical verification through recourse to numerous case studies, drawn in large part from the work of the Greek historian Herodianus and by referring to the lives of the Roman emperors in the age of the Severi. From Commodus to Maximinus Thrax, passing through Caracalla and Severus Alexander, each was architect and victim of conspiracies caused by the impossibility of satisfying the greed of the soldiers who supported them and the thirst for power of the aristocrats, generals, and courtiers who surrounded them. The conspiring emperors were doomed to fail because they had never cultivated the support of the people. This famous chapter of The Prince also contains, however, original ideas and arguments beyond the specifications of themes already contained in the Discourses. It is argued, for example, not only that the support of the citizens works in favor of the prince and against the intentions of the conspirators— ‘whoever conspires always believes he will satisfy the people with the death of the prince, but when he believes he will offend them, he does not get the spirit to adopt such a course’ (XIX 10)—but that other factors do so as well, ‘the majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends and the state which defend him’ (XIX, 13). Power, even when it has had arbitrary and violent origins, tends to present itself—once it has achieved a minimum of consolidation—as legitimate and endowed with formal recognition, which ends up rendering unacceptable any form of contestation. This is true of a brutal seigniory and even more true of a civil principate which adds to its authority to command the support of the people. Against the constituted power, protected by the laws and by the ‘majesty’ which envelops any political institution by the mere fact of its existence, the choice of a violent conspiracy—even when motivated by noble ideals—always runs the risk of appearing to be an abuse dictated by the most biased self-interest. This

Anatomy of Conspiracy  67 explains why—according to Machiavelli—on the side of the conspirator, who moves in the shadows using devious arms and deceits, ‘there is nothing but fear, jealousy, and the anticipation of terrifying punishment’ (XIX, 13). The conspirator moves in a material and psychological condition that dooms him to damnation, renders all of his choices and motivations ambiguous and suspect, and inevitably casts an air of preventive condemnation on the political aim he had planned to reach through such means. This does not deny the reality of the political sphere but rather reduces it to a dimension that is at the same time opaque and barbaric. *** This is the synthesis of Machiavelli’s position on conspiracies from the theoretical-analytical point of view, as expounded mainly in the Discourses and The Prince. The Florentine Histories, on the other hand, provide the exampla which support his vision, and which, involving historical events more closely related to his direct political experience and his knowledge of 15thcentury Italian princely courts, in some measure enrich his interpretation. In this work, for example, not least because of the conflictual dynamic that marked the history of Florence from its origins, the accent is on the tendentially divisive and corrosive character of conspiracies. Given their sectarian matrix, such practices do not in fact give rise to a new political order but rather to perennial instability, the fruit in turn of a feeling of hate and revenge between the factions or parties destined to endure over time and to undermine civil life perpetually. Thus they are typical of those historical contexts, like 14th- and 15th-century Italy, in which there is still no defined and stable power, but in which sectarianism and internal group divisions are at the basis of political struggle (cf. Villard, 2008). This is the significance, for example, assigned by Machiavelli to the 1340 aristocratic conspiracy in Florence headed by Piero de’ Bardi and Bardo Frescobaldi and aimed at getting rid of the tyrannical magistracy of Iacopo Gabrielli da Gubbio (Florentine Histories, II, 32). It resulted in a defeat for its promoters that cost them the loss of all their goods and banishment from the realm. This is an interesting and instructive event, not least because it was discovered and neutralized by the city authorities thanks to a tip-off from Andrea de’ Bardi, one of the conspirators. At the moment of acting, ‘in thinking the thing over’—Machiavelli writes—‘the fear of punishment became more powerful in him than the hope of revenge’: II, 32, 9). This incident seems to confirm not only that the participants in a conspiratorial action must be chosen with care, but also that, if one indeed wants to strike the target, he must act in the shortest possible time. Swift action is needed to avoid a change of minds, to allow no one the chance to discover the conspiracy or to reveal it, to exploit the surprise factor to the damage of the enemy. Finally, speed is crucial for the simple reason that political action is effective when it is both quick and resolute. On the contrary, delay entails the risk of certain failure: ‘But because the more that dangerous courses are

68  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies considered, the less willingly they are undertaken, it always happens that conspiracies that allow an interval of time before their execution are discovered’ (II, 32, 8). The condemnation of ‘the benefit of time’ (The Prince, III, 30), of waiting to see what happens, of a lack of decision, is a constant of Machiavelli’s position in his critique of the Florentine governors of that time, in his vision of politics, and in his analysis of subversive plots. The Florentine Histories, however, devote greater attention than the Discourses to the motivations behind conspiracies. Glory, honor, the defense of republican freedom, the fight against tyranny or religious obscurantism all have a role in his accounts of the 1453 conspiracy of Stefano Porcari (VI, 29), the Prato sedition against Florence in 1470 promoted by Bernardo Nardi (VII, 25–7), and the plot in 1476 that took the life of Galeazzo Maria Sforza (VII, 33–4). These motivations are different from the interweaving of economic interests, ambition to power, diplomatic intrigues, factional feuds or private resentments that were the main causes in other events recounted in the Florentine Histories, such as the conspiracy against Annibale Bentivoglio in 1445 (VI, 9–10), the sedition against Piero de’ Medici in 1466 (VII, 10–20), and the Pazzi conspiracy in 1478 (VIII, 1–10). As we have seen before, there is no trace in Machiavelli’s description of the conspirators of that indulgence, typical of 19th-century Italian and European romanticliberal culture, which sees in the conspirator for freedom and against tyranny a sort of hero liberated from social conventions and prepared to sacrifice himself in the name of a supreme public good. While Machiavelli’s writings show no exaltation or idealized transfiguration of those who seek help from the dagger to pursue their plans, they do contain an attentive assessment, not without some personal sympathy, of the noble reasons that can sometimes lead a group of men to conspire against authority and power. The attempted assassination of Nicholas V, one of the most famous anti-papal conspiracies among the many of the (broadly speaking) modern era (cf. Gardi, 2003), falls exactly within this typology. Stefano Porcari—presented by Machiavelli as ‘noble by blood and by learning, but much more so by the excellence of his spirit’ (VI, 29, 2)—wanted to restore the autonomy of Rome and to end the papal regime that had suppressed and mortified it. A humanist by education, the son of a family that had always fought for the republican State against theocratic absolutism (and that would continue to conspire against the popes even after Stefano‘s failure),8 his greatest desire—as Machiavelli writes in the Florentine Histories—‘according to the custom of men who relish glory, was to do or at least to try something worthy of memory; and he judged he could do nothing else than try to see if he could take his fatherland from the hands of prelates and restore it to its ancient way of life, hoping by this, should he succeed, to be called the new founder and second father of that city’ (VI, 29, 3). To be sure, this was a difficult and ambitious enterprise. Nevertheless, what made him hope for a prosperous end to his undertaking were the evil customs of the prelates and the discontent of the barons and the

Anatomy of Conspiracy  69 Roman people, but above all, what gave him hope were those lines of Petrarch in the canzone that begins ‘Gentle spirit that rules those limbs’, where he says: ‘Atop Mount Tarpeio, Oh! canzone, you will see/a knight whom all Italy honors/more thoughtful of others than of himself’. (Florentine Histories, VI, 29, 4) These two passages are important not only for what they say about Porcari, but for what they say about Machiavelli himself. In just a few lines he reveals a lot about his most authentic political and intellectual position: the evocation of classical antiquity as a model of behavior for the virtuous man or the man who aspires to glory; the historically exemplary character of political action; the patriotic element of defending one’s own city; the republican and anti-tyrannical afflatus (which, however, does not deny power its dimension or its absoluteness); the evocation of the figure of the princefounder of a new political order; the critique of the Church, of its secular customs and its pretensions to political hegemony; the condemnation of civil corruption; the literary allusion to the figure of the politician-redeemer (and it is significant that here we find, as in chapter XXVI of The Prince, a citation of a prophetic tone drawn from Petrarch’s Canzoniere).9 The conspiracy probably failed, Machiavelli writes, ‘because of infidelity among the conspirators’ (VI, 29, 11). But there remains, beyond his usual perplexities on the recourse to such an instrument of struggle, his ill-concealed appreciation of the intentions that moved Porcari, to whom, despite the blame that accompanies every failure, should not be denied ‘some shadow of glory’ (VI, 29, 14). A similar interweaving of idealism, classical allusions, humanistic rhetoric and political-civil passion is also present to some degree in the failed conspiracy of Bernardo Nardi, whose ambition was, in the words addressed to his soldiers, ‘to free them and his fatherland from slavery’ (VII, 26, 9), and to convince them to be part of the enterprise where they will gain ‘perpetual peace and eternal fame’ (ibid.), ‘he reminded them of their ancient liberty’ (VII, 26, 10). But these ingredients are found especially in the conspiracy that in 1476 took the life of the Duke of Milan Galeazzo Maria Sforza. In this case, the enemy of tyranny and supporter of the republican spirit is the eccentric man of letters Cola Montano. In his preaching, Machiavelli writes, Cola Montano had shown how republics ‘nourish virtuous men’, while principates ‘eliminate them’ (VII, 33, 3). His words, whose intended target was the Duke, had enflamed the spirits of some Milanese youths, among whom were Giovanni Andrea Lampugnani, Girolamo Olgiati and Carlo Visconti: Many times he reasoned with them about the most wicked nature of the prince, about the unhappiness of anyone governed by him; and he came to have such confidence in the spirit and will of those youths that he had them swear that, as soon as they were of an age when they could, they would free their fatherland from the tyranny of that prince. Thus,

70  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies since the youths were overflowing with this desire, which kept growing with their years, the customs and modes of the duke, and still more the particular injuries done to themselves, hastened them toward putting their desire into effect. (Florentine Histories, VII, 33, 5–6) In his account, Machiavelli does not hide the importance of ‘private injuries’ (VII, 33, 10) as a motive for conspiracy, especially with regard to the figure of Lampugnani, but the theme of winning freedom from the tyrant is no less predominant and decisive. This applies in particular to Girolamo Olgiati, of whom—as all the subsequent historiography would do—Machiavelli emphasizes the nobility with which, being a person of letters embued with noble ideals, he faced a cruel death. But this conspiracy—‘planned secretly and executed spiritedly’ (VII, 34, 25), and thus carried out in a technically irreproachable manner—is also important for the reasons that nonetheless ensured its failure on the political level. Once again, Machiavelli highlights the theme of the role of the people as arbiter in the balance of power and in struggles for its conquest. After the Duke was killed, the Milanese conspirators were not able to mobilize all of those, nobles and common citizens, who were opposed to his cruelty, his sexual excesses, his profligacy and, finally, his rapacious tax policy. ‘[T]hey were ruined when those they had hoped would have to follow and defend them neither defended nor followed them’ (VII, 34, 25). This conclusion implies a great skepticism about the behaviour of the subjects or the governed, highlighting their tendency to conservatism and passivity. If princes must learn to live in a way that makes them beloved and respected, ‘so that no one can hope, by killing [them], to save himself’ (VII, 34, 26), those who oppose them or aspire to oust them, must know ‘how vain is the thought that makes one trust too much that a multitude, even thought malcontent, will either follow you or accompany you in your dangers’ (VII, 34, 26). The support offered by the people to those who govern often has nothing to do with devotion and gratitude, but has a lot to do with conformism, passive acceptance of authority, and the desire to be left in peace. It is exactly this collective attitude of submission towards the dominant authority that tends to make conspiracies fail and favor those who hold power. *** But there are other elements that stand out in the conspiratorial histories narrated by Machiavelli (in particular in the Florentine Histories) which, on the one hand, help to enrich his interpretation of the phenomenon, and on the other, offer to the reader—especially contemporary readers—cues for reflection and analysis. These cues could be considered of a symbolicanthropological nature, which go, therefore, beyond the properly political dimension, within which we have analyzed Machiavelli’s writings up to now.

Anatomy of Conspiracy  71 One greatly suggestive aspect encountered in many conspiratorial episodes concerns the relationship between the sacred and violence, attested to by the places and dates that are often chosen for implementation of the criminal plan: churches, cathedrals or places of worship, feast days, anniversaries, or religious processions or ceremonies. The conspiracy of Piero de’ Bardi and Bardo Frescobardi is planned for All Souls’ Day, on the 2nd of November, 1340: The plan made among them was that each would gather many armed men at home, and the morning after the solemn day of All Saints, when everyone was in the churches praying for their dead, they would take up arms to kill the Captain and the first among those who were ruling, and afterwards reform the state with new Signori and a new order. (Florentine Histories, II, 32, 7) Although Machiavelli does not report the details, Annibale Bentivoglio was killed by Baldassarre Canetoli during the baptism of a scion of the Canetoli family, to which Bentivoglio had been invited as godfather to signal the pacification between the two families! Stefano Porcari was supposed to strike down Pope Nicholas V during the night of the Epiphany. Galeazzo Maria Sforza was killed on St. Stephen’s Day in the church dedicated to this same saint. Before striking, the Milanese conspirators prayed and invoked divine protection for the success of their enterprise. Giovannandrea, with the others, was at the church early; they heard Mass together, and, having heard it, Giovannandrea turned to a statue of saint Ambrose and said: ‘O, patron of our city, you know our intention and the end for which we are willing to put ourselves in so many dangers. Be favorable to our enterprise and show by favoring justice that injustice displeases you’. (Florentine Histories, VII, 34, 6) Finally, the ambush against the Medici brothers took place, as we have already seen, in the town cathedral (and even included some clergymen among the conspirators). But is it sufficient to explain this religious connection to note, as Machiavelli also does, that these solemn and public occasions were the most favourable times to strike, since during such events the victim was more exposed or felt, surrounded by the crowd, less vulnerable? This may be true as a technical or practical consideration, but equally true is the sacrilegious and/or redemptive character of an assassination perpetrated against a power holder in a sacred place or during a religious feast day. From one perspective, it is a profanation, which casts a shadow of damnation on those responsible for it. From another perspective, it is an act—publicly executed, and thus reinforcing its significance and importance—that invokes the blessing of heaven or

72  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies is carried out in the name of a higher justice.10 To act inside a consecrated space, or inside a public-civil space (also endowed, in its own way, with symbolic value), to act coincidentally with a temporal deadline defined on the religious calendar, means, from the attacker’s point of view, committing not a mere assassination but a ritual sacrifice, replete with its own ceremonial and solemn character. To act in this way is to express hope for absolution and to invoke forgiveness at the moment of committing one’s greatest sin: the killing of a man. It serves to conceal behind the authority of religion an act of political insubordination. It is no coincidence, in other words, that the participants in a conspiracy, its most direct artificers, bind themselves to one another by way of formulas, oaths or secret agreements and that they precede the execution of the plot with prayers, symbolic gestures or even veritable rituals. One such example is the sumptuous ceremony organized by Stefano Porcari with his allies on the night before the attack on the pontiff (but as we know the conspirators were discovered and neutralized before they could strike): But then, when it appeared to him that he had attracted enough men to his will, he decided not to postpone attempting the thing. He commissioned his friends who were in Rome to order a splendid dinner at a fixed time, to which all the conspirators should be called with orders that each should have with him his most trusted friends; and he promised to be with them before the dinner was finished. All was ordered according to his plan, and Messer Stefano had already arrived at the house where they were dining, so that as soon as the dinner was over, he, dressed in cloth of gold, with necklaces and other ornaments that gave him majesty and reputation, appeared among the guests; and, having embraced them, he urged them with a long speech to steady their spirits and be ready for so glorious an undertaking. (Florentine Histories, VI, 29, 8–9, emphasis mine) ‘Majesty’ and ‘reputation’. Those who attack power, and aspire to win it, must demonstrate that they are up to it by adopting its exterior forms and its expressive modalities, its codes of behavior and its symbols. To demolish it through violence is not a destructive act, but the premise of its refoundationperpetuation. The blood that is spilled by an act in itself vulgarly profane is actually functional to the act’s re-legitimation. Striking in a sacred spacetime, in which the rhythm of ordinary history is by definition suspended or bracketed, is the way to carry out this process of transfiguration, giving birth to a new (stable) political order out of (momentary) chaos, a fair and durable power out of a necessarily violent instant, a new form of civil harmony out of a tragically lacerating act. To justify the affront to power, in other words, to instill it with meaning and elevate it above the level of an arbitrary act, it must be compensated for on the symbolic level. It demands a proper contextual re-consecration, without which the conspiracy would

Anatomy of Conspiracy  73 be merely another display of barbarity, or a primitive act of revenge, with no political significance. Hence, the non-causality, the necessity we might say, of performing such secular actions in consecrated contexts and setting the stage for them with promises, prayers, oaths, and pleas to heaven. Another recurring element in conspiracies, which also has to do somehow with their broader religio-symbolic dimension, is presaging. The killer and the victim (particularly the latter) are often the object of premonitions and visions. There is an advance perception, through signs from above or meaningful coincidences, of the sad destiny that is about to be encountered. Violence does not erupt casually into the order of history but seems to be part of an inscrutable plan which later becomes clear only when it is executed, quite apart we might say, from the will of those who are called upon to execute it. This is what happens to Galeazzo Maria Sforza on the morning of the day of his assassination. He is overcome with baleful thoughts, receives obscure but threatening signals, which almost push him to take his leave from earthly life: To the duke, on the other hand, who was to come to church, came many signs of his future death: for when day came, he dressed, as he was often accustomed to do, in a cuirass, which he immediately took off as if it offended him either in comfort or in appearance. He wanted to hear Mass in the castle but found that his chaplain had gone to San Stefano with all his chapel accoutrements; he wanted the bishop of Como to celebrate the Mass in place of the chaplain, and the bishop brought up some reasonable objections. So almost by necessity, he decided to go to the church; but first he had his sons Gian Galeazzo and Ermes come to him, and he embraced and kissed them many times—it appeared he could not separate himself from them. (Florentine Histories, VII, 34, 7–9) Machiavelli describes an analogous premonition in the case of Vitellozzo Vitelli. This leader of the failed plot against Cesare Borgia foresees his dark fate as he is about to enter Senigallia, where he will be killed by Valentino’s hired killers, a victim of the trap prepared by Borgia against his betrayers who had perhaps deceitfully planned to kill him. In the famous Description of the Methods adopted by the Duke Valentino when murdering Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, the Signor Pagolo and the Duke di Gravina Orsini, the mercenary captain, once notorious and violent, is described as a by now humbled figure, who appears to meet his tragic destiny with a mixture of fatalism and resignation, without even trying to escape, having perceived his fate as ineluctable: Vitellozzo, unarmed and wearing a cape lined with green, appeared very dejected, as if conscious of his approaching death—a circumstance which, in view of the ability of the man and his former fortune, caused

74  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies some amazement. And it is said that when he parted from his men before setting out for Sinigalia to meet the duke he acted as if it were his last parting from them. He recommended his house and its fortunes to his captains, and advised his nephews that it was not the fortune of their house, but the virtues of their fathers that should be kept in mind. (Description, 46–7) Machiavelli uses similar words—which seem to veil a cruel sort of caricature directed at him who became, after the assassination of his brother Paolo Vitelli, one of the most rabid enemies of Florence—in his message to the Ten of Freedom sent toward the middle of January 1503 to report what happened in Senigallia: Vitellozzo came on a mule, disarmed, with a tight garment, black and worn, and a black cloak lined in green; and anyone who saw him, would never have judged him to be the one who twice this year, under his own auspices, had tried to expel the King of France from Italy. His face was pale and stunned, easily indicating to everybody his imminent death. (Machiavelli, 2003: 558) Signs, forebodings, harbingers, visions; a conspiracy is not only a form of struggle for power, distinguished by violence and homicidal intentions, it is also the fulfilment of a plan or a design. It presents itself to all its protagonists as something necessary and inevitable, as an act of justice (for those who plan it and those who execute it) or as a form of punishment from which it is impossible to escape (for those who fear it or feel they are its targets). There is, finally, a third element that emerges from between the lines of Machiavelli’s writings. It is what we might define as the physical-corporal dimension of conspiracies, their symbolic-material character. It concerns both the way the attackers savage their designated victim and the way the conspirators are relentlessly harried when, having failed or been discovered, the manhunt is unleashed and their pursuers abandon themselves to revenge. With respect to the conspiracy’s intended victims, the homicidal fury hurled against them goes far beyond the plotters hate for them, becoming the expression of a simultaneous desire for symbolic annihilation and vilification, sustained by an anxiety for justice that is nothing less than absolute. As with other conspiracy chroniclers of his time and immediately thereafter, the details that Machiavelli reports in his histories are particularly meaningful from this point of view. A striking example is the murderous vehemence with which Lampugnani, Olgiati and Visconti throw themselves upon Galeazzo Maria Sforza when he enters the temple: The first to move were Lampognano and Girolamo. Pretending to open a way for the prince, they got close to him and grasped their weapons,

Anatomy of Conspiracy  75 short and sharp, which they had hidden in their sleeves, and attacked him. Lampognano gave him two wounds, one in the belly, one in the throat; Girolamo also struck him in the throat and the breast. Because Carlo Visconti was positioned nearer to the door and the duke had already passed by him, he could not wound the duke in front when he was attacked by his companions, but with two blows pierced his back and his shoulder. These six wounds were so quick and so sudden that the duke was on the ground almost before anyone was aware of the deed; nor could he do or say anything except, as he fell, to call once only the name of Our Lady to his aid. (Florentine Histories, VII, 34, 14–16) A similar scene takes place in the cathedral of Florence on the 26th of April, 1478. Once again, there is a mixture of blind rage and homicidal fury, almost beastly, inhuman: Bernardo Bandini, with a short weapon prepared to this effect, pierced the breast of Giuliano, who after a few steps fell to the ground; Francesco de’ Pazzi threw himself on him, filled him with wounds, and struck him with such zeal that, blinded by the fury that transported him, he wounded himself gravely in the leg. [. . .] Bernardo Bandini, upon seeing Giuliano dead, also killed Francesco Nori, a very good friend of the Medici, either because he hated him of old or because Francesco had striven to help Giuliano. (Florentine Histories, VIII, 6, 6 and 10) With regard to the conspirators, on the other hand, the least that can happen to them when their conspiratorial plan is shown to be flawed is to see their homes destroyed and burnt, their goods confiscated and themselves banished from the city along with their relatives—as happened in 1340 to Piero de’ Bardi and Bardo Frescobaldi. But the destiny of failed conspirators is not only death, generally violent and atrocious, but the vilification of their bodies. Slaughtered, exposed to popular shaming, exhibited as trophies or as an admonishment, they are the objects of a profanation that takes on a sort of tragic and paradoxically cathartic meaning. By way of the enactment of a collective expiatory rite, which takes the form of outright symbolic cannibalism, the weakened institutional order is integrally recomposed. The violence it has suffered is nullified and compensated for by an incomparably greater outburst of violence. It is not just a political reckoning, an opportunity to eliminate opponents and safeguard power from danger, but an explosion of collective energies, a barbaric act through which power relegitimates itself and re-generates itself in the eyes of the people—who are usually the main perpetrators of these acts of violence. Discovered in his hideout, after having participated in the assassination of Annibale Bentivoglio, Battista Canetoli ‘was first killed and then dragged

76  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies through the town and burned’ (VI, 9, 7). A barbaric public outrage was reserved, after their killing, to the three attackers of Galeazzo Maria Sforza. Although Machiavelli does not report on this incident, it is the same tragic destiny that befell the participants of the failed attack against Lorenzo de’ Medici, which, as we have previously mentioned, the Florentine Histories recall in graphic, and dreadful, detail. The conspirators are thrown into the void from Palazzo della Signoria or hanged from its windows, others are lynched by the crowd, the corpse of Jacopo de’ Pazzi is cut to pieces and dragged around the town for days. We have iconographic testimony of the Medici’s revenge: the sketch by Leonardo da Vinci, from 1479, that shows the hanging—after his capture in Constantinople—of the assassin of Giuliano: Bernardo Bandini. But while the massacre was still fresh in everybody’s minds, a life-size cycle of frescoes portraying the killed conspirators (starting with the members of the Pazzi family) was commissioned to no less than Sandro Botticelli, who painted it above the Porta della Dogana of Palazzo Vecchio. For almost 20 years, until their removal in 1494, when the Medici were banished, those frescoes constituted both a tragic admonition to all possible opponents and a symbolic representation of how power, when attacked and threatened, is not afraid to reveal its original animus and its true face, both marked by violence that is never gratuitous nor blind, but politically generative, and therefore legitimate and foundational in the eyes of history. The three symbolic-religious elements of conspiracies rapidly reviewed here—ritual assassination in a sacred or public place or time, premonitions or signs from above, the cathartic and purifying violence that savages the bodies of holders of power or those of their enemies—play a part in Machiavelli’s reflections for the simple reason that they can all be found in classical scholars whom he knew very well and who may have inspired him in no small way. One noteworthy example, in this context, is probably the most famous conspiracy described by Herodotus in his Histories, where the above-mentioned elements are all found in a single episode (which Machiavelli knew well and expressly mentioned in his Discourses: III, 6, 74–5). This immensely famous conspiracy was plotted by seven noble Persians (among them the future emperor Darius) against the so-called False Smerdis, the usurper Magus (actually named Gaumāta) who took the place of the authentic Smerdis after the latter was killed by order of his older brother Cambyses (cf. Campi, 2016). This was a very intricate conspiracy that cannot be recounted here (cf. Gershevitch, 1979; Dognini, 1999). What’s most interesting for us, however, is the way the story of this conspiracy is developed, in its fundamental passages, in the account of the Greek historian. The participants make a sacred pact based on oaths and promises. They request divine help in ensuring the success of their endeavor. Signs from above (‘there appeared seven pairs of sparrow hawks that were chasing two pairs of vultures, plucking and scratching them’: III, 76) convince them of the goodness of their action. The two Magi usurpers (the False Smerdi and

Anatomy of Conspiracy  77 his brother Patizeide) are beheaded inside the palace, and their cut-off heads are exhibited to the people. A bloodbath ensues (‘The Persians, informed about what the seven conspirators had done [. . .], wherever they found a Magi alive put him to death’: III, 79) and becomes the base on which the Achaemenid dynasty would re-establish its sovereignty in Persia. There is also a conspiracy inside the conspiracy, the cunning deceit through which Darius would be able to grab for himself the royal emblems to the detriment of the other participants in the intrigue. Machiavelli does not treat these aspects of conspiracies explicitly or deeply. He only alludes to them or suggests them. They are only sketched and outlined. But they are nevertheless a part, unless we want to settle for an all too literal interpretation of his writings, of the way he represents the universe of Renaissance-era conspiracies. Furthermore, on closer inspection, those conspiracies are based in turn on a very old and one might say historically recurrent scenario. The political intertwines with the religious, the sacred sphere and secular power are specular and not alternative dimensions, violence is clearly both the origin of chaos and the foundation of order, and political opposition and private revenge are often inextricably interwoven. All of this at least until, with the advent of political modernity, political struggle—according to a conventional view—would be structured in progressively more civil and orderly forms. These new forms of struggle, however, have never impeded those opposing the established order or the established order itself from resorting, even in our own time, to forms of action become once again violent and aggressive, to deception and intrigue, to back room maneuvers and cruel traps. Once again, in other words, to plots and conspiracies. But there has indeed been a change, neither foreseen nor even imagined by Machiavelli. Conspiracy—politically founded on the desire for power by those who don’t have it and the fear of losing it by those who do, having, therefore, a precise and defined target, and carried out by real people in flesh and blood—has now been joined, with the progression of modernity, by a new dimension in political struggle. This new struggle is based on the unconscious fears and excogitations that Power—an increasingly abstract and unintelligible entity, unattached to the physical person of those who exercise it—instills in those that are subjected to it or distanced from it. The internal conflicts inside the circle of power have always been—and always will be—the origin of conspiracies, even of those that are consumed in contemporary politics, perhaps not anymore by dint of dagger blows, but through the divulgation of secret dossiers or by resort to the deceitful and always effective arm of public denigration or private extortion. The morbid fantasies that society, having become a politically autonomous entity, has developed with respect to Power have instead become the matrix of conspiratorial paranoia, which is one of the characteristic traits of contemporary culture (cf. Pipes, 1997; Goldberg, 2001; Taguieff, 2005; Fenster,

78  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies 2008). Conspiracy, as Machiavelli described and analyzed it, belongs to the microphysics of power and regards the sphere of political struggle. Plots, instead, belong to the metaphysics of power and can be explained in the framework of a philosophy of history in which the actions of individuals tend to disappear and lose their meaning, replaced by the decisions and the will of abstract collective subjects and elusive entities. A conspiracy and real enemies can be defended against, not so a plot or an absolute Enemy, without a name and without a face. In his accounts of conspiracies, Machiavelli spoke to us about men, with their passions and their ambitious plans, who act within the dimension of history and politics. Our pretension of explaining all of reality and of finding the secret of History, by resorting to elemental mechanisms of action, to secret intrigues having as their objective even the conquest of the planet and control over all of humanity in universal plots would simply have made Machiavelli smile. Or maybe he would not even have understood it, as naïvely stupid and childish as it would have appeared to him.

Notes 1 We have said many times that in Machiavelli the conspiratorial phenomenon is not presented as univocal in its political meaning and its operative modalities. This is also demonstrated by the fact that in order to describe it he does not use only the term ‘conspiracy’ (congiura), but also many other terms and definitions, used as synonyms: confirming not only his (well-known after all) writing energy or inventive capability, but also the, so to say, historical importance of the phenomenon, made clear precisely thanks to the vast range of terms and expressions through which it was indicated at that time, and that Machiavelli seems to record in a complete way in his writings. At the same time, we have to bear in mind that the word conspiracy in his texts is sometimes used—as, after all, occurs still today—also in a metaphorical and figurative meaning, or rather to indicate situations or different contexts than political homicide organized by a small group of men united by a vow or by a reciprocal loyalty pact. The semantic constellation that indicates ‘conspiracies/congiure’ in a strict sense includes terms to be considered synonymous, such as ‘conspiracies/cospirazioni’ (‘he was never conspired by his citizens’, The Prince, VIII, 22); ‘treatises/trattati’ (‘the Florentine by treaty took away from him Pisa’, Florentine Histories, II, 30, 10; ‘ordered [. . .] certain treaties’, letter to the Ten of Freedom of the 7th of October, 1502); ‘practices/pratiche’ (‘he held practices in Cortona in order to take it away from the Florentines, and, since everything was discovered, his plan became vain’, Florentine Histories, V, 31, 21); ‘machinations/macchinazioni’ (‘all of them machinated and plotted against His Worship’, letter to the Ten of Freedom of the 20th of October, 1502); and ‘intelligences/intelligenze’ (‘they both told me that this is for sure an intelligence with Pandolfo’, letter to the Ten of Authority of the 11th of April, 1505). But there can be found also, especially in the chancellor’s writings, ‘reasonings/ragionamenti’, ‘leagues/leghe’, and ‘sects/sette’. Machiavelli in his original writings does not use the term ‘plot/complotto’ since it is a definition of French derivation that entered into the political language starting from the 17th century. As for the figurative meaning, in the Discourses II, 2, 40 ‘a republic conspiracy’ is a synonym for a league or a political—military alliance, as is a ‘completed

Anatomy of Conspiracy  79 conspiracy’, in The Prince XIII, 8, indicates an agreement or an understanding to the detriment of someone. But conspire is also used by Machiavelli, as in the current linguistic use, to indicate the participation of more strengths or events in the same objective (‘to destroy such dominion [. . .] not only a single community but many were the ones that [. . .] conspired’: Florentine Histories, I, 1, 4). On the differences, first of all of a lexical-semantical nature but also of their own nature, that is to say, operative and political, between ‘conspiracy’ and ‘plot’ (that refers to different linguistic constellations and, above all, pinpoint phenomenon or action forms different among them), can be read Campi (2012). If a conspiracy has to do with secrecy and confidentiality, a plot has to do with mystery and the unknown: it concerns, beyond the apparent pun, deeply distinguished cognitive domains. If the conspiracy refers to a group of flesh and blood men, kept together by a bond or agreement (that can even assume a sacred and religious characterization), the plot is accomplished by collective entities, vague for their own definition, without a face (the Jews, the Freemasonry, the Jesuits, the Illuminati, the Templars, the ‘Gnomes of Zürich’, the Trilateral Commission, etc.: that which in the paranoid vision that sustains a great part of contemporary political-publicist debate tends to be defined, without any other specification, ‘strong powers’), which bond is represented by the will, not to take power or to influence it in some specific historical context, but to dominate the world in its entirety, on the basis of a conquest plan of the same supported by a metaphysical vision which aims to extinguish the historical dialectic and of every form of conflictual pluralism in favour of a universal and unique power. Cf. on the differences between ‘conspiracy’ and ‘plot’ also the considerations by Caffiero, Visceglia (2003). 2 This tripartition is one of the most famous parts of the chapter: ‘Injuries must either be against property, lifeblood, or honor. To threaten someone’s lifeblood is more dangerous than to execute him; or rather, making threats is extremely dangerous, while ordering executions involves no danger whatsoever, because a dead man cannot think about a vendetta, while those who remain alive most often leave the thinking to the dead. But anyone who is threatened and forced by necessity either to act or to suffer will become a very dangerous man to the prince [. . .]. Besides this kind of necessity, injuries to property and honor are the two things that offend men more than any other kind of attack, and the prince must protect himself against them, because he can never strip a man of so much that he will not have a knife left which to take his revenge; nor can he ever dishonor a man so much that he does not retain a heart and mind stubbornly intent to revenge. Of the honors that may be taken away from men, those relating to women are most important; after that comes an outrage committed against one’s person’ (Discourses, III, 6, 14–18). Sergio Bertelli (1985) used this tripartite division as the starting point to offer an overview, dense with insightful opinions and historical comments, of some of the most well-known conspiratorial episodes of the Italian Renaissance. 3 This admonition recalls another contained in The Prince, III, 1: ‘men willingly change their lord in the belief that they will fare better: this belief makes them take up arms against him, in which they are deceived because they see later by experience that they have done worse’. In politics, therefore, desiring the best and trying to obtain it through violence invites the risk of finding oneself worse off after than before: with less freedom and faced with a new power even more robust and oppressive. 4 The example adduced by Machiavelli in this part of the Discourses is referred to the manner in which the Romans, thanks to internal complicities, were able to conquer in 327–326 B.C. the town of Paleopolis. As he writes ‘Romans occupied [Paleopolis] by agreement with those inside the city’ (II, 32, 16).

80  Machiavelli and Political Conspiracies 5 Gespräch über die Macht und den Zugang zum Machtaber is a famous essay of Carl Schmitt (in form of dialogue) originally published in 1954. It contains interesting pages on the theme of access to power, such as, for example: those who hold power undergo indirect and determinate influences from those around him; the antechamber is more important than the chamber in which the power is nominally exercised; real power consists in controlling the hallways that lead to the powerful person. 6 On revolution, not as mass sedition or popular violence, but as conspiracy against constituted power, as a ‘coupe d’état’ plotted in accordance with precise techniques of political struggle by ‘professional revolutionaries’; on the ‘Catalinarians’ of the extreme right and the extreme left operating against the 19th- and 20th-century liberal State, cf. the classic and still unequalled text by Malaparte (2011). Cf. also Boutin, Rouvillois (2007). 7 Also worthy of note in this regard is the ‘technical’ annotation contained in The Life of Castruccio Castracani: ‘As, however, in a conspiracy paucity of numbers is essential to secrecy, so for its execution a few are not sufficient’ (103); which seems to suggest the existence of an optimal number of conspirators, a number sufficient to guarantee both the secrecy of the plan and its success, but this number is never specified by the Florentine. 8 On Porcari and his family, cf. Modigliani (2013). This volume, beyond news of the family and the details of the conspiracy, also includes a vast collection of the archival, historical, and literary sources on the conspiracy. 9 In his works on the Florentine, Maurizio Viroli had paid great attention to the rhetorical-moral dimension of Machiavelli’s writings, to the theme of the politicalredeemer as central in his works, starting with The Prince. This is particularly true of Viroli (2013). 10 The public execution of the conspiracy also serves—exactly because it is a representation or a stage performance which everybody potentially and actually must attend—to render collective and communitarian an act which might otherwise be considered, if performed in a closed or secluded space, as a merely private vendetta, deprived as such of political meaning. But it is also a way, if you will, of sharing, again collectively, the responsibility for the eventual assassination, committed, from the conspirators’ point of view, in the general interest, and thus in the name and on behalf of the people.

References Anglo, S. (2005). Machiavelli: The First Century: Studies in Enthusiasm, Hostility, and Irrilevance. Oxford—New York: Oxford University Press. Bertelli, S. (1985). Le congiure, in S. Bertelli, F. Cardini, and E. Garbero Zorzi (eds), Le corti italiane del Rinascimento. Milan: Mondadori, 243–56. Boutin, Ch., and Rouvillois, F. (eds) (2007). Le coup d’État: Recours à la force ou dernier mot du politique? Paris: François-Xavier de Guibert. Caffiero, M., and Visceglia, M. A. (2003). Congiure romane e cultura politica europea: riflessioni introduttive, Roma moderna e contemporanea, Vol. XI, No. 1–2: 7–27. Campi, A. (2012). Congiura o complotto. Qualche necessaria (o forse soltanto inutile e superflua) distinzione, Rivista di Politica, No. 1: 101–12. Campi, A. (2016). Una fonte machiavelliana in materia di cospirazioni e trame segrete: Erodoto e la congiura dei sette contro il falso Smerdi, in A. Campi and L. Varasano (eds), Congiure e complotti. Da Machiavelli a Beppe Grillo. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 101–28.

Anatomy of Conspiracy  81 Campi, A. (2018). La fortuna di Machiavelli nella cultura letteraria e politica occidentale, in E. Cutinelli Rèndina and R. Ruggiero (eds), Machiavelli. Rome: Carocci, 285–310. Chabod, F. (1993, originally 1964). Scritti su Machiavelli. Turin: Einaudi. Cutinelli Rèndina, E. (1999). Introduzione a Machiavelli. Bari: Laterza. Dognini, C. (1999). L’ascesa al trono di Dario: Congiura o successione dinastica?, in M. Sordi (ed.), Fazioni e congiure nel mondo antico. Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 101–14. Fenster, M. (2008). Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture. Minneapolis—London: University of Minnesota Press. Gardi, A. (2003). Congiure contro i papi in età moderna. Per un’interpretazione generale, Roma moderna e contemporanea, Vol. XI, No. 1–2: 29–51. Gershevitch, I. (1979). The False Smerdis, Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungariae, No. 27: 338–51. Gilbert, F. (1965). Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in SixteenthCentury Florence. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Goldberg, R. A. (2001). Enemis Within: The Culture of Conspiracy in Modern America. New Haven—London: Yale University Press. Kahn, V. (1994). Machiavellian Rhetoric: From the Counter-Reformations to Milton. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kahn, V. (2010). Machiavelli’s Afterlife and Reputation to the Eighteenth Century, in J. M. Najemy (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 239–55. Machiavelli, N. (2003). Legazioni: Commissarie: Scritti di governo, tome II (1501– 1503), Introduction and texts edited by D. Fachard, Comment edited by E. CutinelliRèndina. Rome: Salerno Editrice. Malaparte, C. (2011, originally 1931). Tecnica del colpo di stato. Milan: Adelphi. Martelli, M. (2006). Breve storia del ‘Principe’, in N. Machiavelli, Il Principe, edited by M. Martelli. Rome: Salerno Editrice. Modigliani, A. (2013). Congiurare all’antica: Stefano Porcari, Niccolò V, Roma 1453. Rome: Roma nel Rinascimento. Moyer, A. E. (2017). Reading Machiavelli in Sixteenth-Century Florence, in W. Caferro (ed.), The Routledge History of the Renaissance. London: Routledge, 192–209. Panella, A. (1943). Gli Antimachiavellici. Florence: Sansoni. Pipes, D. (1997). Conspiracy: How the Paranoid Style Flourishes and Where It Comes From. New York: The Free Press. Schmitt, C. (1990, originally 1954). Dialogo sul potere. Genoa: Il Melangolo. Taguieff, P.-A. (2005). La Foire aux ‘Illuminés’: Ésoterisme, théorie du complot, extrémisme. Paris: Mille et une nuits-Fayard. Turchetti, M. (2013). Tyrannie et tyrannicide de l’Antiquité à nos jours. Paris: Classiques Garnier. Villard, R. (2008). Du bien commun au mal necessaire: Tyrannie, assassinats politiques et souveraineté en Italie, vers 1470-vers 1600. Rome: École française de Rome. Viroli, M. (2013). La redenzione dell’Italia: Saggio sul ‘Principe’ di Machiavelli, Rome—Bari: Laterza. Zuckert, C. (2017). Machiavelli’s Politics. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Part II

On Conspiracies

Note on the Texts Alessandro Campi

On Conspiracies Right from its title—On Conspiracies—this famous chapter of the Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius (the 6th of Book III) presents itself, not least because of its unusual length compared to the other chapters composing the work, as an independent treatise (evidently rather forcibly inserted into the body of the Discourses). This chapter is in essence a treatise on a theme that held for its author—as we have tried to explain in our introductory essay—a significance that was at once political-practical, theoretical and finally (just finally) biographical. Machiavelli’s treatise on conspiracies, it should come as no surprise, has always had independent circulation and diffusion, already certified in the manuscript tradition. Of the twelve codices on which are based the modern critical editions of the Discourses—the most important, and the only one that contains the complete text of the work, is manuscript Harley 3533 of the British Library in London, dating back to the first half of the 16th century (conventionally called L by scholars). Two others, however, also dating back to the first half of the 16th century, are autonomous transcriptions, probably deriving from a common ancestor, of the chapter on conspiracies. They are the Palatine Codice 1104, cc. 45r-56v, of the Biblioteca Nazionale of Florence (acronym P) and Manuscript X of Balía, Correspondence, Responsive 119, cc. 290r-319v, of the Archivio di Stato of Florence (acronym A).1 These two transcriptions allow us to imagine that the treatise on conspiracies was read as a work on its own starting from the very first years following its writing. But it was in France, just a few decades after Machiavelli’s death, that a tradition was launched that tends to consider his reflections on conspiracies as an independent text. In 1575, in Paris, printed by the typographer Abel l’Angelier, there appeared a version of the Bellum Catilinae by Sallust, edited by Jérôme de Chomedey, which has in its appendix also a French translation of the Traicté des coniurations, extraict du troisiesme livre des discours de Machiavelli, an extrapolation of the conspiracies chapter of the Discourses.

86  On Conspiracies Jumping ahead to two and half centuries later, there appeared in 1818— from the Parisian publisher Chasseriau—an anonymous translation of Le Prince, marked with this date in the bibliographic note accompanying the edition of the booklet published in 1884 by the Parisian bookstore De Garnier Fréres da L. Derome, which represents, as stated on p. 226, a ‘nouvelle traduction, augmentée de note historiques et politiques et suivie d’un traité sur le conspiration du même auteur’.2 In 1842, the Traité des conspirations et du régicide (which includes, along with chapter 6, also the French translation of chapters 7 and 8 of Book III of the Discourses) appeared as the last section (after the Traité de la République and the Traité du Prince, ou de la Monarchie) of the Oeuvres politiques de Machiavelli printed in Paris by Lavigne Libraire-Éditeur and edited by P. Christian (pseudonym of Christian Pitois), which includes, as a guide to the reading, an Essai sur l’esprit révolutionnaire. The translation used is the classic one done by Charles-Philippe-Toussaint Guiraudet in 1799 for his edition of the Oeuvres de Machiavelli (Libraire Potey, Paris), which would be used again during the middle of the 20th century, in France in 1935 and in Belgium in 1944, in two (profusely illustrated) editions of Le Prince, which in their appendix propose again the Traité des conspirations et du régicide in the same version already published in 1842: the first one printed with the editorial signature A l’Enseigne du Pot Cassé, the second one published by the Éditions Terres Latines. This choice to consider the chapter on conspiracies of the Discourses as independent has also been adopted, more occasionally, in other linguistic contexts. In Risorgimento Italy, an excerpt of the chapter appeared in a small volume titled Elettuario contro le sette segrete apprestato massimamente per la gioventù, published in Modena in 1853 by the Tipografia Vincenti, with an introduction by Fortunato Cavazzoni Pederzini. The book contains a denunciation of the conspiratorial practices of the Freemasons and the Carbonari written in a catholic counter-revolutionary tone. The editor used Machiavelli to demonstrate the dangers and risk of failure awaiting those who conspire against the established order. The chapter was published in its integral version in a Portuguese edition of the famous Machiavellian booklet, appearing in 1945 in Lisbon from the publisher Cosmos, translated by Berta Mendes, and with a preface and notes by Manuel Mendes. The title given to this appendix to O Principe— Tratado des Conspirações e do Regicídio—and a quick reading of the text clearly indicate the dependence of this Portuguese version on the abovementioned French version by Guiraudet. A separate edition of Machiavelli’s text, in the classic translation done by Leslie J. Walker in 1950, has recently been published in English with the title On Conspiracies, but without any critical-documentary annotations (Penguin Books, London 2010). This same version has been published in a Spanish translation with the title De las conjuras (Taurus, Madrid 2012).

Note on the Texts  87 All things considered, it seems clear that the idea of presenting Machiavelli’s reflections on conspiracies in an autonomous format—first realized in France in 1575—can hardly be classified as an arbitrary extrapolation or a forced interpretation from the historical-philological point of view. On the contrary, this bibliographical history reflects Machiavelli’s own conviction that the phenomenon of conspiracy had its own peculiarity from the historical and theoretical point of view, and as such, it deserved an autonomous and specific treatise. In this volume, for the anthological section of the Machiavellian texts, I have used (with slight correction of the text, above all with respect to the names of the cited historical characters) the classic and famous English translation by Christian E. Detmold included in the four volumes of the Historical, Political, and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolò Machiavelli, James R. Osgood and Company, Boston, 1882. The text On Conspiracies from the Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius is found in volume II, pp. 329–49. For the division of the texts into paragraphs, as for the preparation of the historical notes, I have consulted the edition of the Discourses by the philologist Giorgio Inglese (N. Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio, Rizzoli, Milan, 1984, with an Introduction by Gennaro Sasso and a Note on the Text also by Inglese) and the critical edition realized by Francesco Bausi (cf. footnote No. 1). ***

Description of the Methods Adopted by the Duke Valentino When Murdering Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, the Signor Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini The autograph codex of this celebrated text—which tells us about the vendetta of Cesare Borgia against some of his allies and lieutenants who, fearing his sudden political-military ascent, formed a coalition against him during the diet which took place in the castle of Magione, near Lake Trasimeno—is now held in the Archivio di Stato of Florence (Carte Strozziane, Serie I 137, cc. 201r-204r). The title by which this work is known and which has also been used in this essay, the original manuscript being without a title (the one that appears inside the codex—Il tradimento del duca Valentino al Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo et altri—was written by a different hand than Machiavelli’s), is the one given to it in 1532 by the Roman publisher Antonio Blado, who included it (along with The Life of Castruccio Castracani) in the appendix of the first edition of the Principe. The text—as with the majority of Machiavelli’s works, left unpublished and printed only after his death—has been the subject of debate concerning the exact, or better, plausible, date of its composition (cf. Richardson, 1979; Matucci, 2014). According to some critics, the narrative should be considered almost immediately successive to the events, of which Machiavelli

88  On Conspiracies was, as is well known, a direct witness. The year of writing can therefore be considered to be 1503, in the period between June and August, as we can deduce from the reference to the elevation to Cardinal by Alexander VI of his nephew Francisco de Loris (‘Monseigneur d’Euna, who afterwards became Cardinal’) on the 31st of May, 1503. But the graphic characteristics of the manuscript, the detached tone with which the story seems to develop, some chronological clarifications which are obviously redundant in a work written immediately following the events, have led many scholars to change the date—depending on the various hypotheses—to between 1511–12 and 1517. This work, too, therefore, in the version that has come down to us, could be included among those written by Machiavelli in the months or years following the traumatic end of his professional career in the Florentine Chancellor’s office. It is likely, even accepting this second hypothesis, that the manuscript come down to us was based on a composition (or even on notes, on a rough book or on a first unrefined and concise version of the text) written, so to speak, on the spot, when Machiavelli’s memories of the Senigallia massacre and of the frenetic political-diplomatic and military events which proceeded it, were still fresh in his mind. As years passed, and he went ahead with revisions, Machiavelli, on the one hand, would give the report a more literary and dramatic tone, with the proper pedagogical intent of better highlighting the resoluteness of Valentino in dealing with the revolt of his lieutenants, while on the other, he would modify, in making the transition from a chronicle to a narrative history, some points and aspects. These adaptations can be easily deduced by a textual comparison between the work at issue and the letters (or what is left of them in the Florentine archives) written to the Seigniory during his diplomatic legation at Valentino between the 7th of October, 1502 (the date of his arrival in Imola) and the middle of January 1503 (letters and missives, as they have come down to us, that do not allow us to date precisely the official end of the mission or to pinpoint the time of his departure for Florence). There are, in fact, some—albeit minimal—incongruences and deformities, chronological and substantive, between the diplomatic letters written at the time and the description of the events (and of the characters) reworked in the following months and (according to some) years. Some critics—already starting with Pasquale Villari (1912: 422–3)—have done well to highlight these differences, but in order to avoid interfering too much with the reading of Machiavelli’s palpitating composition, we have preferred not to annotate.3 A definitive critical version of this text has been prepared by Jean-Jacques Marchand for the ‘National Edition of the Works by Niccolò Machiavelli’, published in the volume L’arte della guerra. Scritti politici minori, edited by Jean-Jacques Marchand, Denis Fachard, and Giorgio Masi, Salerno Editrice, Rome, 2001, pp. 597–606. This is the edition that I have consulted for the paragraph division of the text and for the historical comment notes. But I have also consulted the version of Machiavelli’s report by Giorgio Inglese, published in N. Machiavelli, La vita di Castruccio Castracani e altri scritti, Rizzoli, Milan, 1991, pp. 95–106.

Note on the Texts  89 Also in this case, for the anthological section, I have used the English translation by Christian E. Detmold in the IV volume, pp. 377–83, of his edition on Machiavelli’s writings. ***

The Pazzi and the Conspiracy Against the Medici The Florentine Histories are Machiavelli’s last great composition, his most relevant one from the historiographic point of view, and for a long time the most critically neglected (cf. Sasso, 1993). Divided into eight books, it reports the history of Florence from its origins to the death, in 1492, of Lorenzo de’ Medici. The work was commissioned by Cardinal Giulio de’ Medici (the future Pope Clement VII), formalized by the Ufficiali allo Studio Fiorentino (Administrators of the Florentine University [cf. Davies, 1998]), presided over by the Cardinal, on the 8th of November, 1520. Its writing lasted about four years (rather than the initially expected two). Once completed, in May 1525, the manuscript was presented directly by the author to the client in Rome, the Cardinal in the meantime having been elected Pope (19th of November, 1523). The first printed version was published in 1532, in two editions appearing in a short time one after another: the Roman one by Antonio Blado, dated 25th of March, and the Florentine one by Bernardo di Giunta, impressed with the date of the 27th of March. The Pazzi conspiracy can be found in Book VIII of the Florentine Histories (§§1–10). For the narration of this famous conspiracy, Machiavelli drew inspiration mainly from three sources: the Laurentii Medicei Vita by Niccolò Valori (1464–1530 ca.), humanist and politician, who in 1512 was involved in the conspiracy against the Medici by A. Capponi and P. P. Boscoli (the same that demanded the arrest of Machiavelli and his torture after his defenestration from the Chancellor’s office); the Coniurationis Commentarium by the humanist Angelo Poliziano (1454–94); and the socalled Confessione by Giovanni Battista da Montesecco. The first critical edition of the Istorie fiorentine by Plinio Carli, based on the four manuscript testimonies held in Florentine libraries, dates back to 1927. The definitive one was edited by Alessandro Montevecchi and Carlo Varotti, and published in the national Edition: N. Machiavelli, Opere storiche, edited by A. Montevecchi and C. Varotti, coordination by G. M. Anselmi, two volumes, Salerno Editrice, Rome, 2010. For this anthology, I have used the translation of the History of Florence published by Christian E. Detmold in the first volume of Historical, Political, and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolò Machiavelli, pp. 368–83. *** For the quotes from the writings by Machiavelli contained in our introductory essay, I have used the following versions: N. M., The Prince, translated and with an Introduction by Harvey C. Mansfield, University of Chicago Press, Chicago-London, 1985; N. M., Florentine Histories, translation by

90  On Conspiracies Laura F. Banfield and Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ), 1988 (quotes republished with permission of Princeton University Press conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc); N. M., Discourses on Livy, translated with an Introduction and Notes by Julia Conaway Bondanella and Peter Bondanella, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008 (first published 1997) (quotes republished with permission of Oxford University Press conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc). But I also consulted other versions of Machiavelli’s works: The Prince and The Discourses, with an Introduction by Max Lerner, The Modern Library, New York, 1940; The Prince, translated by W. K. Marriott, Alfred Knopf, New York, 1992 (this edition includes the translation of the writing on the conspiracy of Cesare Borgia in Senigallia); and The Discourses of Niccolò Machiavelli, translated by Leslie J. Walker, 2 voll., Routledge, London-New York, 1975 (first published 1950).

Notes 1 Both manuscripts also include transcriptions of chapters 1, 4, and 6 of Book I of the Discourses. For an analytic description of these precious documents, which certifies the autonomy of the chapter on conspiracies compared to the rest of the work and its independent diffusion already starting from the first half of the 16th century, cf. Bausi (2001, Vol. 2: 806–9), the Nota al testo written for his critical edition to the Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio. 2 Sergio Bertelli and Piero Innocenti, in their fundamental Bibliografia machiavelliana (1979: 218, entry No. 73), indicate this edition as published four years later, in 1822. 3 But there are also commentators—for example Ridolfi (1978: 456–457)—who consider the deformities to be more than minimal, irrelevant, or referring to aspects and events that were controversial even for historians contemporary to Machiavelli. And from them he has deduced the thesis that the manuscript come down to us, assuming it is datable to a period between 1514 and 1517, should be considered the fair-copy transcription, without too many posthumous additions, of a report written just after the events occurred.

References Bausi, F. (2001). Nota al testo, in N. Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio. Rome: Salerno Editrice. Bertelli, S., and Innocenti, P. (1979). Bibliografia machiavelliana. Verona: Edizioni Valdonega. Davies, J. (1998). Florence and Its University during the Early Renaissance. Leiden— Boston—Köln: Brill. Matucci, A. (2014). Modo che tenne il duca Valentino, ad vocem, in Enciclopedia Machiavelliana. Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 190–3. Richardson, B. (1979). Per la datazione del ‘Tradimento del duca Valentino’ del Machiavelli, La Bibliofilia, No. 81: 75–85. Ridolfi, R. (1978, originally 1954). Vita di Niccolò Machiavelli: Settima edizione italiana accresciuta e riveduta. Florence: Sansoni. Sasso, G. (1993). Niccolò Machiavelli. II: La storiografia. Bologna: Il Mulino. Villari, P. (1912). Niccolò Machiavelli e i suoi tempi, 3rd edition revised and corrected by the Author, Vol. I. Milan: Hoepli.

[1] On Conspiracies1 Niccolò Machiavelli

[2] It seems to me proper now to treat of conspiracies, being a matter of so much danger both to princes and subjects;2 [3] for history teaches us that many more princes have lost their lives and their states by conspiracies than by open war. But few can venture to make open war upon their sovereign, whilst every one may engage in conspiracies against him. [4] On the other hand, subjects cannot undertake more perilous and foolhardy enterprises than conspiracies, which are in every respect most difficult and dangerous;3 and thence it is that, though so often attempted, yet they so rarely attain the desired object.4 [5] And therefore, so that princes may learn to guard against such dangers, and that subjects may less rashly engage in them, and learn rather to live contentedly under such a government as Fate may have assigned to them,5 I shall treat the subject at length, and endeavor not to omit any point that may be useful to the one or the other. [6] And certainly that is a golden sentence of Cornelius Tacitus, where he says ‘that men should honor the past and obey the present; and whilst they should desire good princes, they should bear with those they have, such as they are’;6 [7]—and surely whoever acts otherwise will generally involve himself and his country in ruin. [8] In entering upon the subject, then, we must consider first against whom conspiracies are formed; and it will be found generally that they are made either against the country7 or against the prince. It is of these two kinds that I shall speak at present; for conspiracies that have for their object the surrender of any town to an enemy that besieges it, or that have some similar purpose, have already been sufficiently discussed above.8 [9] In the first instance we will treat of those that are aimed against the sovereign, and examine the causes that provoke them; these are many, [10] though one is more important than all the rest, namely, his being hated by the mass of the people.9 For when a prince has drawn upon himself universal hatred, it is reasonable to suppose that there are some particular individuals whom he has injured more than others, and who therefore desire to revenge themselves. [11] This desire is increased by seeing the prince held in general aversion. [12] A prince, then, should avoid incurring such universal hatred; and, as I have spoken elsewhere of the way to do this,10 I will say no more about

92  On Conspiracies it here. If the prince will avoid this general hatred, the particular wrongs to individuals will prove less dangerous to him; [13] partly because men rarely attach sufficient importance to any wrong done them to expose themselves to great danger for the sake of avenging it, and partly because, even if they were so disposed and had the power to attempt it, they would be restrained by the general affection for the prince. [14] The different wrongs which a prince can inflict upon a subject consist either in an attempt upon his possessions, his person,11 or his honor. [15] In matters of personal injury, threats are worse than the execution; in fact, menaces involve the only danger, there being none in the execution, for the dead cannot avenge themselves, and in most cases the survivors allow the thought of revenge to be interred with the dead. [16] But he who is threatened, and sees himself constrained by necessity either to dare and do or to suffer, becomes a most dangerous man to the prince, as we shall show in its proper place.12 [17] Besides this kind of injury, a man’s property and honor are the points upon which he will be most keenly sensitive.13 A prince, then, should be most careful to avoid touching these; for he can never despoil a man so completely but what he will cherish a determined desire for revenge. [18] As to attacking men’s honor, that of their wives is what they feel most, and after that their being themselves treated with indignity. [19] It was an outrage of this nature that armed Pausanias against Philip of Macedon,14 and such indignities have caused many others to rise against their princes. In our day, Julius Belanti would not have conspired against Pandolfo, tyrant of Sienna,15 had it not been that the latter, having accorded him one of his daughters in marriage, afterwards took her away from him, as we shall relate in its place.16 [20] The principal cause of the conspiracy of the Pazzi against the Medici was the inheritance of Giovanni Borromeo,17 of which they had been deprived by an order of the Medici. [21] There is another and still more powerful motive that makes men conspire against their princes, and that is the desire to liberate their country from the tyranny to which it has been subjected by the prince. [22] It was this that stirred up Brutus and Cassius against Caesar; it was this that excited others against the Falari,18 the Dionysii,19 and other usurpers. [23] And no tyrant can secure himself against such attacks, except by voluntarily giving up his usurpation. [24] But as none of them ever take this course, there are but few that do not come to a bad end; and thence this verse of Juvenal’s: Ad generum Cereris sine caede et vulnere pauci descendunt reges et sicca morte tiranni.20 [25] The perils incurred by conspirators are great, as I have said above, because they present themselves at every moment. There is danger in plotting and in the execution of the plot, and even after it has been carried into effect. [26] A plot may be formed by a single individual or by many; [27] the one cannot be called a conspiracy, but rather a determined purpose on

On Conspiracies  93 the part of one man to assassinate the prince. [28] In such case the first of the three dangers to which conspiracies are exposed is avoided; for the individual runs no risk before the execution of his plot, for as no one possesses his secret, there is no danger of his purpose coming to the ears of the prince. [29] Any individual, of whatever condition, may form such a plot, be he great or small, noble or plebeian, familiar or not familiar with the prince; for everyone is permitted on occasions to speak to the prince, and has thus the opportunity of satisfying his vengeance. [30] Pausanias, of whom I have spoken elsewhere, killed Philip of Macedon as he was proceeding to the temple, surrounded by a thousand armed men, and having his son and his son-in-law on either side. [31] But Pausanias was a noble, and well known to the prince. [32] A poor and abject Spaniard stabbed King Ferdinand of Spain21 in the neck; the wound was not mortal, but it showed nevertheless that this man had the audacity as well as the opportunity of striking the prince. [33] A Turkish Dervish drew a scimitar upon Bajazet, the father of the present Grand Turk;22 he did not wound him, but it shows that this man too had the audacity and the opportunity to have done it, had he so chosen. [34] I believe it is not uncommon to find men who form such projects (the mere purpose involving neither danger nor punishment), but few carry them into effect; and of those who do, very few or none escape being killed in the execution of their designs, and therefore but few are willing to incur such certain death. [35] But let us leave the plots formed by single individuals, and come to conspiracies formed by a number of persons. [36] These, I say, have generally for their originators the great men of the state, or those on terms of familiar intercourse with the prince. None other, unless they are madmen, can engage in conspiracies; for men of low condition, who are not intimate with the prince, have no chance of success, not having the necessary conveniences for the execution of their plots. [37] In the first place, men of no position23 have not the means of assuring themselves of the good faith of their accomplices, as no one will engage in their plot without the hope of those advantages that prompt men to expose themselves to great dangers. And thus, so soon as they have drawn two or three others into their scheme, some one of them denounces and ruins them. [38] But supposing even that they have the good fortune not to be betrayed, they are nevertheless exposed to so many difficulties in the execution of the plot, from being debarred free access to the prince, that it seems almost impossible for them to escape ruin in the execution. For if the great men of a state, who are in familiar intercourse with the prince, succumb under the many difficulties of which we have spoken, it is natural that these difficulties should be infinitely increased for the others. [39] And therefore those who know themselves to be weak avoid them, for where men’s lives and fortunes are at stake they are not all insane; and when they have cause for hating a prince, they content themselves with cursing and vilifying him, and wait until someone more powerful and of higher position than themselves shall avenge them. [40] Still, if one of this class of persons should be daring

94  On Conspiracies enough to attempt such an undertaking, he would merit praise rather for his intention than for his prudence. [41] We see, then, that conspiracies have generally been set on foot by the great, or the friends of the prince; and of these, as many have been prompted to it by an excess of benefits as by an excess of wrongs. Such was the cause of the conspiracy of Perennius against Commodus, of Plautianus against Severus, and of Sejanus against Tiberius.24 [42] All these men had been so loaded with riches, honors, and dignities by their Emperors that nothing seemed wanting to complete their power and to satisfy their ambition but the Empire itself; and to obtain that they set conspiracies on foot against their masters, [43] which all resulted, however, as their ingratitude deserved. More recently, however, we have seen the conspiracy of Jacopo Appiano succeed against Piero Gambacorte, prince of Pisa; this Jacopo owed his support, education, and reputation to Piero, and yet he deprived him of his state.25 [44] The conspiracy of Coppola26 against Ferdinand of Aragon, in our own day, was of the same character; Coppola had attained such greatness that he seemed to lack nothing but the throne, and to obtain this he risked his life, and lost it. [45] And certainly if any conspiracy of the great against a prince is likely to succeed, it should be one that is headed by one, so to say, almost himself a king, who can afford the conspirators every opportunity to accomplish his design; [46] but, blinded by the ambition of dominion, they are equally blind in the conduct of the conspiracy, for if their villainy were directed by prudence, they could not possibly fail of success. [47] A prince, then, who wishes to guard against conspiracies should fear those on whom he has heaped benefits quite as much, and even more, than those whom he has wronged; for the latter lack the convenient opportunities which the former have in abundance. The intention of both is the same, for the thirst of dominion is as great as that of revenge, and even greater. [48] A prince, therefore, should never bestow so much authority upon his friends but that there should always be a certain distance between them and himself, and that there should always be something left for them to desire; otherwise they will almost invariably become victims of their own imprudence, as happened to those whom we have mentioned above. [49] But to return to our subject. [50] Having said that conspiracies are generally made by the great, who have free access to the prince, let us see now what their results have been, and what the causes were that influenced their success or their failure. [51] As we have said above, there are in all conspiracies three distinct periods of danger. [52] The first is in the organization of the plot, and as but few have a successful issue, it is impossible that all should pass happily through this first stage, which presents the greatest dangers; [53] and therefore I say that it requires the extremest prudence, or great good fortune, that a conspiracy shall not be discovered in the process of formation. [54] Their discovery is either by denunciation27 or by surmises. [55] Denunciation is the consequence of treachery or of want of prudence on the part of those to whom you confide your designs; [56] and treachery is so common that you cannot

On Conspiracies  95 safely impart your project to any but such of your most trusted friends as are willing to risk their lives for your sake, or to such other malcontents as are equally desirous of the prince’s ruin. [57] Of such reliable friends you may find one or two; but as you are necessarily obliged to extend your confidence, it becomes impossible to find many such, for their devotion to you must be greater than their sense of danger and fear of punishment. [58] Moreover, men are very apt to deceive themselves as to the degree of attachment and devotion which others have for them, and there are no means of ascertaining this except by actual experience; [59] but experience in such matters is of the utmost danger. And even if you should have tested the fidelity of your friends on other occasions of danger, yet you cannot conclude from that that they will be equally true to you on an occasion that presents infinitely greater dangers than any other. [60] If you attempt to measure a man’s good faith by the discontent which he manifests towards the prince, you will be easily deceived, for by the very fact of communicating to him your designs, you give him the means of putting an end to his discontent;28 and to insure his fidelity, his hatred of the prince or your influence over him must be very great.29 [61] It is thus that so many conspiracies have been revealed and crushed in their incipient stage; so that it may be regarded almost as a miracle when so important a secret is preserved by a number of conspirators for any length of time. Such however was the case in the conspiracy of Piso against Nero,30 and in our times that of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano de’ Medici, of which more than fifty persons were cognizant, and which yet remained undiscovered till the moment of its execution. [62] Discovery from lack of prudence occurs when any one of the conspirators speaks incautiously, so that a servant or third person overhears it, as happened to the sons of Brutus, who in the arranging of their plot with the messengers of Tarquin were overheard by a slave, who denounced them.31 Or it may occur from thoughtlessness, when someone communicates the secret to his wife or child, or to some other indiscreet person, as was done by Dinnus, one of the conspirators with Philotas32 against Alexander, who confided the plot to Nicomachus, a lad of whom he was enamored, who told it to his brother Ciballinus, who at once communicated it to the king.33 [63] As to discovery by conjecture, we have an instance of it in the Pisonian conspiracy against Nero. The day before he was to have killed Nero, Scevinus, one of the conspirators, made his testament; he ordered his freedman Melichius to sharpen an old, rusty poniard, enfranchised all his slaves and distributed money amongst them, and had bandages made for tying up wounds. Melichius surmised from these various acts what was going on, and denounced it to Nero. [64] Scevinus was arrested, and with him Natales, another conspirator, with whom he had been seen to converse secretly for a length of time. As their depositions respecting that conversation did not agree, they were forced to confess the truth, and thus the conspiracy was discovered to the ruin of all that were implicated.34

96  On Conspiracies [65] When the number of accomplices in a conspiracy exceeds three or four, it is almost impossible for it not to be discovered, either through treason, imprudence, or carelessness. [66] The moment more than one of the conspirators is arrested, the whole plot is discovered; for it will be impossible for any two to agree perfectly as to all their statements. [67] If only one be arrested, and he be a man of courage and firmness, he may be able to conceal the names of his accomplices; but then the others, to remain safe, must be equally firm, and not lay themselves open to discovery by flight, for if any one of them proves wanting in courage, whether it be the one that is arrested or one of those that are at liberty, the conspiracy is sure to be discovered. [68] Titus Livius cites a very remarkable instance that occurred in connection with the conspiracy against Hieronymus, king of Syracuse.35 Theodorus,36 one of the conspirators, having been arrested, concealed with the utmost firmness the names of the other conspirators, and charged the matter upon the friends of the king; and, on the other hand, all the other conspirators had such confidence in the courage of Theodorus, that not one of them left Syracuse, or betrayed the least sign of fear. [69] The conduct of a conspiracy then is exposed to all such dangers before it can be carried into execution; and to avoid these perils the following remedies present themselves. [70] The first and most certain, I should rather say the only one, is not to afford your associates in the plot any time to betray you; and therefore you should confide your project to them at the moment of its execution, and not sooner. [71] Those who act thus are most likely to escape the first of the three dangers, and frequently also the others; and therefore have their enterprises almost always succeeded. And any man of prudence will always be able to govern himself in this wise. I will cite two examples of this. [72] Nelematus, unable to bear the tyranny of Aristotimus, tyrant of Epirus, assembled in his house a number of friends and relatives, and urged them to liberate their country from the yoke of the tyrant. Some of them asked for time to consider the matter, whereupon Nelematus made his slaves close the door of his house, and then said to those he had called together, ‘You must either go now and carry this plot into execution, or I shall hand you all over as prisoners to Aristotimus.’ [73] Moved by these words, they took the oath demanded of them, and immediately went and carried the plot of Nelematus successfully into execution.37 [74] A Magian having by craft usurped the throne of Persia, and the fraud having been discovered by Ortanus, one of the grandees of the realm, he conferred with six other princes of the state as to the means of ridding themselves of this usurper. When one of them inquired as to the time when they should act, Darius,38 one of the six assembled by Ortanus, arose and said, ‘We must either go now at this very moment and carry it into execution, or I shall go and denounce you all,’ [75] whereupon they all arose, and, without affording any one time to repent, they carried their design into execution without difficulty.39 [76] The Ætolians acted much in the same way in ridding themselves of Nabis,40 tyrant of Sparta. They sent Alexamenes, one of their citizens, with thirty horse and

On Conspiracies  97 two hundred infantry, to Nabis, on pretence of rendering him assistance; but they gave secret instructions to Alexamenes to slay Nabis, and enjoined the others, on pain of exile, strictly and most implicitly to obey the orders of Alexamenes, [77] who accordingly went to Sparta, and kept the secret until the moment when he succeeded in killing Nabis.41 [78] In this manner then did Nelematus, Ortanus, and Alexamenes avoid the dangers that attend the conduct of conspiracies before their execution, and whoever follows their example will be equally fortunate in escaping them. [79] And to prove that it is in the power of every one to act in the same way, I will cite the case of Piso, to which I have already referred above.42 [80] Piso was a man of the highest consideration and distinction43 in Rome, and the familiar companion of Nero, [81] who reposed entire confidence in him, and often went to dine with him at his villa.44 Piso then might have attached to himself a few men of intelligence and courage, well qualified for such an attempt as he contemplated. This would have been an easy thing to do for a man of such high position; and then, when Nero was in his gardens, he might have communicated his project to them and have stirred them by a few words to do what they would not have had time to refuse, and which could not have failed of success. [82] And thus, if we examine all the other instances, but few will be found where the conspirators might not have acted in the same way; but men not accustomed to the affairs of this world often commit the greatest mistakes, and especially in matters that are so much out of the ordinary course as conspiracies. [83] One should therefore never open himself on the subject of a conspiracy except under the most pressing necessity, and only at the moment of its execution; and then only to one man, whose fidelity he has thoroughly tested for a long time, and who is animated by the same desire as himself. [84] One such is much more easily found than many, and therefore there is much less danger in confiding your secret to him; and then, even if he were to attempt to betray you, there is some chance of your being able to defend yourself, which you cannot when there are many conspirators. I have heard many wise men say that you may talk freely with one man about everything, for unless you have committed yourself in writing the ‘yes’ of one man is worth as much as the ‘no’ of another; and therefore one should guard most carefully against writing, as against a dangerous rock, for nothing will convict you quicker than your own handwriting. [85] Plautianus, wishing to have the Emperor Severus and his son Antoninus killed, committed the matter to the Tribune Saturninus; he however, instead of obeying Plautianus, resolved to betray him, and, fearing that in accusing him he would be less believed than Plautianus, he exacted from him an order in his own handwriting to attest his authority. Plautianus, blinded by his ambition, gave him such a written order, which the Tribune used to accuse and convict him. Plautianus denied his guilt with such audacity, that without this written order and other indications he never would have been convicted.45 [86] You may escape, then, from the accusation of a

98  On Conspiracies single individual, unless you are convicted by some writing or other pledge, which you should be careful never to give. [87] In the Pisonian conspiracy there was a woman named Epicaris, who had formerly been a mistress of Nero’s. She deemed it advisable to have amongst the conspirators the commander of a trireme,46 who was one of Nero’s body-guards. [88] She communicated the plot to him, but without naming the conspirators. The commander, however, betrayed her confidence, and denounced Epicaris to Nero; but she denied it with such audacity as to confuse Nero, who did not condemn her.47 [89] There are two risks, then, in communicating a plot to any one individual: the first, lest he should denounce you voluntarily; the second, lest he should denounce you, being himself arrested on suspicion, or from some indications, and being convicted and forced to it by the torture. [90] But there are means of escaping both these dangers: the first, by denial and by alleging personal hatred to have prompted the accusation; and the other, by denying the charge, and alleging that your accuser was constrained by the force of torture to tell lies. [91] But the most prudent course is not to communicate the plot to any one, and to act in accordance with the above-cited examples; and if you cannot avoid drawing someone into your confidence, then to let it be not more than one, for in that case the danger is much less than if you confide in many. [92] Another necessity may force you to do unto the prince that which you see the prince about to do to you; the danger of which may be so pressing as not to afford you the time to provide for your own safety. [93] Such a necessity ordinarily insures success, as the following two instances will suffice to prove. [94] The Emperor Commodus48 had amongst his nearest friends and intimates Letus49 and Electus,50 two captains of the Praetorian soldiers; he also had Marcia as his favorite concubine. As these three had on several occasions reproved him for the excesses with which he had stained his own dignity and that of the Empire, he resolved to have them killed, and wrote a list of the names of Marcia, Letus, and Electus, and of some other persons, whom he wanted killed the following night. Having placed this list under his pillow, he went to the bath; [95] a favorite child of his, who was playing in the chamber and on the bed, found this list, and on going out with it in his hand was met by Marcia, who took the list from the child. Having read it, she immediately sent for Letus and Electus, and when these three had thus become aware of the danger that threatened them, they resolved to forestall the Emperor, and without losing any time they killed Commodus the following night.51 [96] The Emperor Antoninus Caracalla52 was with his armies in Mesopotamia,53 and had for his prefect Macrinus, a man more fit for civil than military matters.54 As is always the case with bad rulers, they are in constant fear lest others are conspiring to inflict upon them the punishment which they are conscious of deserving; thus Antoninus wrote to his friend Maternianus55 in Rome to consult the astrologers as to whether any one was aspiring to the Empire, and to advise him of it. [97] Maternianus wrote back

On Conspiracies  99 that Macrinus was thus aspiring; and this letter fell into the hands of Macrinus before it reached the Emperor. He at once directed his trusted friend, the Centurion Martialis, whose brother had been slain by Caracalla a few days before, to assassinate him, which he succeeded in doing.56 [98] From this we see that the necessity which admits of no delay produces the same effect as the means employed by Nelematus in Epirus,57 of which I have spoken above. [99] It also proves the truth of what I said in the beginning of this discourse,58 that to threaten is more dangerous for princes, and more frequently causes conspiracies, than the actual injury itself; and therefore princes should guard against indulging in menaces. For you must bind men to you by benefits, or you must make sure of them in some other way,59 but never reduce them to the alternative of having either to destroy you or perish themselves. [100] As to the dangers that occur in the execution of a conspiracy, these result either from an unexpected change in the order of proceeding, or from the lack of courage in those who are charged with the execution of the plot, or from some error on their part, owing to want of foresight in leaving some of those alive whom it was intended to have killed. [101] There is nothing that disturbs or impedes the actions of men more than when suddenly, and without time to reflect, the order of things agreed upon has to be entirely changed. [102] And if such a change causes embarrassment in ordinary affairs, it does so to an in finitely greater degree in war or in conspiracies; for in such matters nothing is more essential than that men should firmly set their minds on performing the part that has been assigned to them. [103] And if men have their minds fixed for some days upon a certain order and arrangement, and this be suddenly changed, it is impossible that this should not disturb them so as to defeat the whole plot. So that it is much better to carry out any such project according to the original plan, even if it should present some inconveniences, rather than to change the order agreed upon and incur a thousand embarrassments. [104] And this will occur, if there be not time to reorganize the project entirely; for when there is time for that, men can suit themselves to the new order of things. [105] The conspiracy of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano de’ Medici is well known.60 [106] These were to dine on the appointed day with the Cardinal of San Giorgio,61 and it was agreed amongst the conspirators to kill the Medici at this dinner. They had distributed amongst themselves the several roles, as to who was to kill them, who was to seize the palace, and who was to scour the city to rouse the people to liberty. [107] It happened that whilst the Medici, the Pazzi, and the Cardinal were at some great solemnity in the cathedral church of Florence, it became known that Giuliano would not dine with the Cardinal on that day. Hereupon the conspirators hastily met, and resolved to do in the church what they had intended to do in the house of the Medici. [108] This disarranged all their plans, for Giambattista Montesecco62 refused to consent to the murder in the church, which obliged them to make an entire change and distribute the roles to different persons,

100  On Conspiracies who, not having time fully to prepare themselves, committed such mistakes as to cause themselves to be crushed in the execution.63 [109] Want of firmness in the execution arises either from respect, or from the innate cowardice of him who is to commit the act. [110] Such is the majesty and reverence that ordinarily surrounds the person of a prince, that it may easily mitigate the fury of a murderer, or fill him with fear.64 [111] Marius having been taken prisoner by the Minturnians, they sent a slave to kill him, who was so overcome by the presence of this great man, and by the memory of his glory, that his courage and strength failed him at the thought of killing Marius.65 [112] Now if a man in chains, in prison, and overwhelmed by misfortune can still exert such an influence, how much more is to be feared from a prince who is free, and clothed in all the pomp and ornaments of royalty, and surrounded by his court? [113] And whilst all this pomp is calculated to inspire fear, an affable and courteous reception may equally disarm you. [114] Some of the subjects of Sitalces,66 king of Thrace, conspired against him. The day for the execution of their plot being fixed, they went to the place agreed upon where the king was, but not one of them made a movement to strike him; so that they returned without having made the attempt, and without knowing what had prevented them, and reproached each other. [115] They committed the same fault several times, so that the conspiracy was discovered, and they suffered punishment for the crime which they might have committed, but did not.67 [116] Two brothers of Alfonso, Duke of Ferrara,68 plotted against his life, and employed for the execution of their plot one Giannes,69 the Duke’s almoner and musician, who several times at their request brought the Duke to them; so that they might on each occasion have killed him, [117] but neither of them had the courage to do it. The conspiracy was discovered, and they bore the penalty of their wickedness and their imprudence. [118] Their neglect to profit by the opportunities afforded them for the execution of their design could have arisen only from two causes; either the presence of the prince imposed upon them and filled them with fear, or they were disarmed by some act of kindness on his part. [119] Failure in the execution of such designs results from lack of prudence or courage; men are seized by one or the other of these feelings, which confuse their brains and make them say and do things that they ought not. [120] And nothing can better prove the fact that men’s minds are thus seized and confounded than the fact stated by Titus Livius of Alexamenes the Ætolian, who wanted to kill Nabis of Sparta, of whom I have already spoken. When the time for the execution of his design had come, and he was about to make known to his soldiers what they would have to do, as Titus Livius says, ‘Collegit et ipse animum, confusum tantae cogitatione rei’.70 [121] For it is impossible that one should not be confused at such a moment, even though possessed of firmness and courage, and accustomed to the use of the sword and to seeing men killed. [122] Therefore only men experienced in such affairs should be chosen as the instruments of execution, and none

On Conspiracies  101 other should be trusted, though they be reputed to be most courageous; [123] for you cannot be sure of any man’s courage in great affairs, unless it has been tested by actual experience. [124] For the confusion of the mind at the important moment may cause the sword to drop from a man’s hand, or may make him say things that will be equally ruinous. [125] Lucilla,71 the sister of the Emperor Commodus, ordered Quintianus to kill him. [126] He lay in wait for Commodus at the entrance of the amphitheatre; and on stepping up to him with drawn dagger, he cried, ‘The Senate sends you this!’ which caused Quintianus to be arrested before he had time to strike Commodus.72 [127] Messer Antonio da Volterra, having been appointed to kill Lorenzo de’ Medici, as we have related above,73 called out, on approaching him, ‘Ah, traitor!’. This mere word saved Lorenzo and defeated the attempt. [128] Conspiracies against single individuals are generally apt to fail, for the reasons I have adduced; but when undertaken against two or more persons, they fail much easier. Such conspiracies present so many difficulties that it is almost impossible they should succeed. [129] In fact, to strike two blows of this kind at the same instant and in different places is impracticable, and to attempt to do so at different moments of time would certainly result in the one’s preventing the other. [130] So that, if it is imprudent, rash, and doubtful to conspire against a single prince, it amounts to folly to do so against two at the same time. [131] And were it not for the respect which I have for the historian, I should not be able to believe possible what Herodianus relates of Plautianus, when he charged the centurion Saturninus by himself to kill Severus and Caracalla, who lived separately in different places; for it is so far from being reasonable, that nothing less than the authority of Herodianus could make me believe it.74 [132] Some young men of Athens conspired against Dioeles and Hippias, tyrants of Athens; they succeeded in killing Dioeles, but missed Hippias, who avenged him.75 [133] Chion and Leonidas, of Heraclea, disciples of Plato, conspired against the tyrants Clearchus and Satirus;76 they slew Clearchus, but Satirus, who remained, avenged him.77 [134] The Pazzi, whom I have mentioned several times, succeeded only in killing Giuliano. [135] Thus conspiracies against several persons at the same time should be avoided; they do no good to the conspirators, nor to the country, nor to anyone, but rather cause the tyrants that survive to become more cruel and insupportable than before, as was the case with those of Florence, Athens, and Heraclea, already mentioned above. [136] It is true that the conspiracy of Pelopidas to deliver his country,78 Thebes, from her tyrants, succeeded most happily, despite of all those obstacles; [137] and he conspired not only against two, but against ten tyrants,79 and, so far from having ready access to them, he had been declared a rebel and had been banished. With all this, he was enabled to come to Thebes to slay the tyrants and free his country. [138] But he succeeded thus mainly through the assistance of a certain Charon, privy counselor of the tyrants, who facilitated his access to them and the consequent execution of his plot.80

102  On Conspiracies [139] Let no one, however, be seduced by this example; for it was an almost impossible enterprise, and its success was a marvel, and was so regarded by the historians, who speak of it as a most extraordinary and unprecedented event.81 [140] The execution of such a plot may be interrupted by the least false alarm, or by some unforeseen accident at the moment of its execution. [141] The morning of the day when Brutus and his fellow-conspirators intended to kill Caesar, it happened that the latter had a long conversation with Cn. Popilius Lena, one of the conspirators. This was observed by the other conspirators, who at once imagined that Popilius had denounced the conspiracy to Caesar, and were tempted to assassinate Caesar on the spot, and not to wait until he should reach the Senate; and they would have done so, had they not observed that after the conversation Caesar made no extraordinary movement, which reassured them.82 [142] These false apprehensions are not to be disregarded and should be carefully considered, the more so as it is very easy to be surprised by them; [143] for a man who has a guilty conscience readily thinks that everybody is speaking of him. You may overhear a word spoken to someone else that will greatly disturb you, because you think it has reference to you, and may cause you either to discover the conspiracy by flight, or embarrass its execution by hastening it before the appointed time. [144] And this will happen the more easily the more accomplices there are in the conspiracy. [145] As to the unforeseen accidents, of course no idea can be given of them; they can only be illustrated by examples that should serve as a caution. [146] Julio Belanti of Siena (of whom I have already made mention)83 hated Pandolfo for having taken his daughter84 away from him after having first given her to him as his wife. He resolved to kill him, and thus chose his time. [147] Pandolfo went almost daily to visit a sick relative, and in going there he passed before Julio’s house, who, [148] having observed it, arranged to have the conspirators there to assassinate Pandolfo when he passed. He concealed them, well armed, behind the house door, whilst one of them was stationed at the window to watch for the coming of Pandolfo, and to give a signal when he should be near the door. Pandolfo came, and the signal was given by the conspirator at the window; [149] but at that moment a friend met and stopped Pandolfo, whilst some who were with him moved on, and, upon hearing the noise of arms within the door of Julio, they discovered the ambush, so that Pandolfo was enabled to save himself, and Julio, with his accomplices, was obliged to fly from Sienna. [150] This accidental meeting with a friend prevented the execution of the plot, and thwarted the designs of Julio.85 [151] Such accidents, being rare, cannot be foreseen nor prevented; [152] though one should endeavor to foresee all that can happen, so as to guard against it. [153] It only remains for us now to speak of the dangers’ that follow the execution of a plot; of which there is really but one, namely, when someone is left who will avenge the prince that is killed. [154] He may have brothers or sons, or other relatives, who inherit the principality, and who have been

On Conspiracies  103 spared by your negligence or for some of the reasons we have mentioned above, and who will avenge the prince. This happened to Giovan Andrea da Lampognano, who, together with other conspirators, had killed the Duke of Milan,86 who left a son and two brothers,87 who in time avenged the murdered Duke. [155] But truly in such cases the conspirators are not to be blamed, because there is no help for it. There is no excuse for them, however, when from want of foresight or negligence they permit any one to escape. [156] Some conspirators of Forlì killed the Count Girolamo,88 their lord, and took his wife and children, who were of tender age, prisoners. Believing, however, that they could not be secure if they did not obtain possession of the castle, which the castellan refused to surrender, the Lady Catharine, as the Countess was called,89 promised to the conspirators to procure its surrender if they would allow her to enter it, leaving them her children as hostages. [157] Upon this pledge the conspirators consented to let her enter the castle; but no sooner was she within than she reproached them for the murder of the Count, and threatened them with every kind of vengeance. [158] And to prove to them that she cared not for her children, she pointed to her sexual parts, calling out to them that she had wherewith to have more children. [159] Thus the conspirators discovered their error too late, and suffered the penalty of their imprudence in perpetual exile. [160] But of all the perils that follow the execution of a conspiracy, none is more certain and none more to be feared than the attachment of the people to the prince that has been killed. There is no remedy against this, for the conspirators can never secure themselves against a whole people. [161] As an instance of this, I will cite the case of Julius Caesar, who, being beloved by the people, was avenged by them; for having driven the conspirators from Rome, they were the cause of their being all killed at various times and places. [162] Conspiracies against the state are less dangerous for those engaged in them than plots against the life of the sovereign. In their conduct there is not so much danger, in their execution there is the same, and after execution there is none. [163] In the conduct of the plot the danger is very slight, for a citizen may aspire to supreme power without manifesting his intentions to any one; and if nothing interferes with his plans, he may carry them through successfully, or if they are thwarted by some law, he may await a more favorable moment, and attempt it by another way. [164] This is understood to apply to a republic that is already partially corrupted; for in one not yet tainted by corruption such thoughts could never enter the mind of any citizen. [165] Citizens of a republic, then, may by a variety of ways and means aspire to sovereign authority without incurring great risks. If republics are slower than princes, they are also less suspicious, and therefore less cautious; and if they show more respect to their great citizens, these in turn are thereby made more daring and audacious in conspiring against them. [166] Everybody has read the account written by Sallust of the conspiracy of Catiline, and knows that, after it was discovered, Catiline not only stayed

104  On Conspiracies in Rome, but actually went to the Senate, and said insulting things to the Senate and the Consul;90 so great was the respect in which Rome held the citizens. [167] And even after his departure from Rome, and when he was already with the army, Lentulus91 and the others would not ‘have been seized if letters in their own handwriting had not been found, which manifestly convicted them.92 [168] Hanno, one of the most powerful citizens of Carthage, aspired to the tyranny of the state, and arranged to poison the whole Senate on the occasion of his daughter’s marriage, and then to make himself sovereign. [169] When this plot was discovered, the Senate did nothing more than to pass a decree limiting the expense of feasts and weddings; such was the respect which the Carthaginians had for so great a citizen as Hanno.93 [170] It is true that in the execution of a conspiracy against one’s country there are greater difficulties and dangers to surmount. For it is very rare that the forces of a conspirator suffice against so many; and it is not every one that controls an army, like Caesar, or Agathocles,94 or Cleomenes,95 and the like, who by a single blow made themselves masters of their country. [171] For such men the execution is sure and easy, but others who have not the support of such forces must employ deceit and cunning, or foreign aid. [172] As to the employment of deceit and cunning, I give the following instances. Pisistratus, after the victory which he had gained over the people of Megara,96 was greatly beloved by the people of Athens. One morning he went forth from his house wounded, and charged the nobility with having attacked him from jealousy, and demanded permission to keep a guard of armed followers for his protection, which was accorded him. [173] This first step enabled him easily to attain such power that he soon after made himself tyrant of Athens.97 [174] Pandolfo Petrucci returned with other exiles to Siena, where he was appointed to the command of the guard of the government palace, a subordinate employ which others had refused. Nevertheless, this command gave him in time such influence and authority that in a little while he became prince of the state.98 [175] Many others have employed similar means, and have in a short time, and without danger, acquired sovereign power. [176] Those who have conspired against their country with their own forces, or by the aid of foreign troops, have had various success, according to their fortune. [177] Catiline, whose conspiracy we have already spoken of, succumbed.99 [178] Hanno, whom we have also mentioned, having failed in his attempt with poison, armed his partisans to the number of many thousands, and perished with them.100 [179] Some of the first citizens of Thebes, wishing to obtain absolute control of the state, called to their aid a Spartan army, and seized the government.101 [180] Thus, if we examine all the conspiracies attempted by men against their country, we find none, or but very few, that have failed in their conduct; but in their execution they have either met with success or failure. [181] Once, however, carried into effect, they involve no other dangers but such as are inherent to absolute power; for he who has become a tyrant is exposed only to the natural and

On Conspiracies  105 ordinary dangers which tyranny carries with it, and against which there are no other remedies than those indicated above. [182] Those are the considerations that have presented themselves to me in treating the subject of conspiracies; and if I have noted only those where the sword is the instrument employed, and not poison, it is because the course of both is absolutely the same. [183] It is true that the latter are in proportion more dangerous, as their success is more uncertain, for it is not every one that has the means of employing poison; it must, therefore, be entrusted to such as have, and that very necessity causes the dangers. [184] Furthermore, many reasons may prevent a poison from proving mortal, as in the case of Commodus. Those who had conspired against him, seeing that he would not take the poisoned draught they had offered to him, and yet being resolved upon his death, were obliged to strangle him.102 [185] There is, then, no greater misfortune for a prince than that a conspiracy should be formed against him; for it either causes his death, or it dishonors him. [186] If the conspiracy succeeds, he dies; if it be discovered, and he punishes the conspirators with death, it will always be believed that it was an invention of the prince to satisfy his cruelty and avarice with the blood and possessions of those whom he had put to death.103 [187] I will, therefore, not omit offering an advice to princes or republics against whom conspiracies may have been formed. If they discover that a conspiracy exists against them, they must, before punishing its authors, endeavor carefully to know its nature and extent,—to weigh and measure well the means of the conspirators, and their own strength. And if they find it powerful and alarming, they must not expose it until they have provided themselves with sufficient force to crush it, as otherwise they will only hasten their own destruction. [188] They should therefore try to simulate ignorance of it, for if the conspirators should find themselves discovered, they will be forced by necessity to act without consideration. [189] As an instance of this, we have the case of the Romans, who had left two legions at Capua to protect its inhabitants against the Samnites. The commanders of these legions (as we have related elsewhere)104 conspired to make themselves masters of the city. When this became known at Rome, the new Consul Rutilius105 was directed to see to its being prevented; and by way of lulling the conspirators into security, he published that the Senate had resolved to continue the legions in garrison at Capua. [190] The captains and soldiers, believing this, and thinking, therefore, that they had ample time for the execution of their design, made no attempt to hasten it, and thus waited until they perceived that the Consul was separating them from each other. This excited their suspicions, and caused them to expose their intentions, and to proceed to the execution of their plot.106 [191] There could not be a more forcible example than this for both parties; for it shows how dilatory men are when they think that they have time enough, and, on the other hand, how prompt they are in action when impelled by necessity. [192] A prince or a republic who, for their own advantage, wish to defer

106  On Conspiracies the disclosure of a conspiracy, cannot use a more effectual means for that purpose than artfully to hold out to the conspirators the prospect of an early and favorable opportunity for action; so that, whilst waiting for that, or persuaded that they have ample time, the prince or republic will themselves gain time to overwhelm the conspirators. [193] Those who act differently will accelerate their own ruin, as was the case with the Duke of Athens107 and Guglielmo de’ Pazzi.108 [194] The Duke, having become tyrant of Florence, and being apprised that there was a conspiracy on foot against him,109 had one of the conspirators110 seized without further inquiry into the matter. This caused the others at once to take to arms, and to wrest the government from him.111 [195] Guglielmo de’ Pazzi was commissary112 in the Val di Chiana in the year 1501.113 Having heard114 that a conspiracy had been organized in Arezzo in favor of the Vitelli, for the purpose of taking that place from the Florentines, he immediately went there, and without considering the strength of the conspirators or measuring his own, and wholly without any preparation, he had one of the conspirators115 seized by the advice of his son, the Bishop of Arezzo.116 Hereupon the others immediately took to arms, declared the independence of Arezzo, and made Guglielmo prisoner. [196] But when conspiracies are feeble, they can and ought to be crushed as promptly as possible; [197] in such case, however, the two instances we shall quote, and which are almost the direct opposites of each other, should not in any way be imitated. The one is that of the above-named Duke of Athens, who, to prove his confidence in the attachment of the Florentines to him, had the man who denounced the conspiracy to him put to death.117 The other is that of Dion of Syracuse,118 who by way of testing the fidelity of someone whom he suspected ordered Callippus,119 in whom he had entire confidence, to pretend to be conspiring against him. [198] Both, however, ended badly; the first discouraged the accusers, and encouraged those who were disposed to conspire; and the other paved the way for his own destruction, and was, as it were, the chief of the conspiracy against himself, as was proved by experience, for Callippus, being able to conspire with impunity against Dion, plotted so well that he deprived him of his state and his life.120

Notes 1 Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius, III, 6. 2 Subjects: the private persons or citizens. 3 As clarified later in the text (cf. above, in the text, §25), the phases of conspiracy that Machiavelli analyzes, each of them presenting specific risks, are three: organization (or ideation), execution, and post-execution (whether failed or successful). 4 This is a recurrent theme. It can also be found in The Prince, XIX, 11 with similar words (‘And one sees from experience that there have been many conspiracies, but few have had a good end’) and, even more accentuated, in the Florentine Histories (‘if there is some shadow of glory in thinking of them [the conspiracies], have almost always very certain loss in their execution’, VI, 29, 14; ‘because they [the conspiracies] succeed only with difficulty, most often bring

On Conspiracies  107 ruin to whoever moves them and greatness to the one against whom they are moved’, VIII, 1, 5). 5 It may be well to recall, with regard to the false hopes that are often placed in a change at the top of the power structure to be accomplished perhaps through the physical elimination of those who occupy it, what is written in The Prince, III, 1: ‘This is that men willingly change their lords in the belief that they will fare better: this belief makes them take up arms against him, in which they are deceived because they see later by experience that they have done worse’. 6 This is a quote from Tacitus, cited from memory or drawn from some collection of maxims or classical sayings, which in the original—Tacitus, Historiae, IV, 8—sounds like: ‘ulteriora mirari, praesentia sequi; bonos imperatores voto expetere, qualescumque tolerare’. In the text of the Roman historian, the words were pronounced by Marcellus Epirus, in a speech to the Senate the day after the election of Vespasianus, in order to justify himself from the accusation of being a friend and comrade of Nero and of having shared his corruption, cruelty, and bad behavior. 7 Those against the homeland are conspiracies finalized to destroy, perhaps with the help of an outside power, the institutions of one’s own city and to establish a new constitutional system. 8 In Discourses, II, 32, 16–24, where it is said, in reference to the wars fought by the Romans, that during a siege they tried to conquer the city ‘by clandestine violence / violenza furtiva’, therefore with deceit and through conspiracies or stratagems carried out ‘by agreement with those inside the city’, that is to say, with the help of people under siege willing to betray their homeland. This part of the Discourses introduces some of the critical reflections that will be developed in the conspiracy chapter (III, 6). As an example, Machiavelli writes: ‘This kind of attack [the reference is to the siege and the conquest of Paleopolis in 327–26 B.C.] has been attempted many times, by the Romans and by others, and it has met with success on few occasions; the reason is that every small obstacle breaks up the plan, and obstacles arise easily, because the conspiracy is discovered before the plot is carried out, and it may be discovered without much difficulty, both because of the infidelity of the people with whom you are conspiring and because of the difficulty of putting the plan into action, since you have to come to an agreement with your enemies and with people with whom it is not permissible to speak except under some pretext. But if the conspiracy is not discovered during the planning, a thousand problems then arise in putting it into action, because either you arrive before the appointed time or you arrive afterwards, which spoils everything, or if an accidental noise is raised, as with the geese on the Capitol, or if normal routine is broken, the slightest error and the smallest mistake ruin the whole enterprise’ (II, 32, 17–20). The conclusion of Machiavelli is similar to the one mentioned above in footnote No. 4: ‘Of these methods, therefore, many are tried, few are actually tested, and very few succeed’ (II, 32, 24). 9 Popular resentment as the spring (and justification) of conspiracies, which the prince has to avoid kindling through threats, offenses and insults addressed to others (whether his subjects or the members of his circle), can be found also in The Prince, XIX, 10: ‘And one of the most powerful remedies that a prince has against conspiracies is not to be hated by the people generally’. 10 This reference is to chapter XIX of The Prince, entitled De contemptu et odio fugiendo (On Avoiding Contempt and Hatred) and dedicated, in its first part, to the analyses of the phenomenon of conspiracies. 11 Machiavelli is referring to threats by the prince against the goods and property of his subjects, but also against their lives. As written in The Prince, XVII,

108  On Conspiracies 12–13: ‘The prince should nonetheless make himself feared in such a mode that if he does not acquire love, he escapes hatred [. . .]. This he will always do if he abstains from the property of his citizens and his subjects, and from their women’. Cf. also The Prince, XIX, 2–3: ‘What makes him [the prince] hated above all, as I said, is to be rapacious and a usurper of the property and the women of his subjects. From these he must abstain, and whenever one does not take away either property or honor from the generality of men, they live content’. 12 Cf. above, in the text, §§92–95. 13 The sentence recalls the very famous one in The Prince, XVII, 14, according to which the prince ‘above all [. . .] must abstain from the property of others, because men forget the death of a father more quickly than the loss of a patrimony’. 14 This episode is reported in the Discourses, II, 28, 10–15. From the killing of Philip of Macedon at the hand of Pausanias, who did not forgive the Macedonian king for not having avenged him for the sexual abuses that he was subjected to by the noble Attalus and his friends, Machiavelli culls the following principle: ‘he must never esteem a man so lightly that, piling injury upon injury, he believes that the injured man does not think about taking revenge despite all the danger and harm that might befall him’. The vilification of one’s own person as the cause of or motive behind a revenge plot, with explicit reference to the story of Pausanias, can also be found in Aristotle, from whom Machiavelli may have drawn the example: ‘the conspiracy against Philip by Pausanias was owing to the fact that he did not impede the friends of Attalus from insulting Pausanias’ (Aristotle, Politics, V, 1311b). 15 Pandolfo Petrucci was Lord of Siena from 1498 to 1512. 16 For this episode, cf. above, in the text, §§145–150. 17 In 1478, the conspiracy against Lorenzo and Giuliano de’ Medici. We are referring to a law that the Medici had had approved on the 18th of March, 1477— De testamentis (‘Qualiter mulier ab intestato succedat’)—which stated that in the absence of a written will, the estate shall be inherited by the male descendants of the deceased (the sons or the grandchildren) rather than the daughters or female descendants. For this episode, cf. Florentine Histories, VIII, 2, 11–13. 18 Phalaris was the tyrant of Agrigento from 570 to 555 B.C., the year of his death. He was deposed and killed after a conspiracy led by Telemachus. 19 The plural refers to the two tyrants of Syracuse: Dionysius I, known as Dionysius the Elder (430–367 B.C.), and Dionysius II, known as Dionysius the Younger (397–after 343 B.C). 20 Juvenal, Satirae, X, 112–113: ‘Few are the kings who descend without wounds or murder to Cérès [Pluto, the god of the underworld, to indicate the other world]. Few tyrants die a dry death’. 21 We are referring to Ferdinand II of Aragon known as the Catholic (1452–1516). The episode of the failed attack dates to the 7th of December, 1492. During a public speech, a mentally ill peasant tried to strike the king with a dagger, but the downward stroke, diverted by the gold chain on the king’s neck, did not produce a lethal wound. 22 This refers to Bajazet II (1447–1512): he was sultan of the Muslim empire from 1418 to his death. ‘The present Grand Turk’ to whom Machiavelli refers in the text is his son Selim I (1465–1520). The episode of the attack against ‘the father of the present Grand Turk’ took place in June, 1492. 23 ‘Weak men’ (uomini deboli), men of no position, are contraposed by Machiavelli to ‘great men’ (uomini grandi), but not only with respect to opposing social conditions, but especially because the latter are characterized by being close to power and to the prince.

On Conspiracies  109 24 Sestius Tigidius Perennis (or Perennius) was praetorian prefect under the emperor Commodus (161–192 A.D.), against whom he organized a conspiracy during 185. He was discovered and killed. Gaius Fulvius Plautianus (?–205 A.D.), also a praetorian prefect, was the designated heir of the emperor Septimius Severus (146–211 A.D.). Accused of having plotted against Septimius, he was killed in 205 by the future emperor Antoninus Caracalla (186–217 A.D.), his father-inlaw, having given him as spouse his daughter Plautilla. Lucius Aelius Sejanus (ca. 20 B.C.–31 A.D.), finally, was minister of the emperor Tiberius (42 B.C.–37 A.D.), from whom—after having poisoned his son Drusus and exiled his wife Agrippina—he tried to steal the reign through a conspiracy. He was executed in 31. For the report of the first episode, Machiavelli drew from the Greek historian Herodianus, published in 1493 in the Latinization by Poliziano, a source much used in this chapter of the Discourses as in XIX of The Prince: Herodianus, Historiae de imperio post Marcum, I, 9 (cf. Marchand, 2015). As for the second episode—cited in a wider manner above, §85 and mentioned again in §31—still from Herodianus, Historiae de imperio post Marcum, III, 12. For the third episode, Suetonius, Tiberius, 65 and Tacitus, Annales, IV, 70–71, 74 and V, 6–8. 25 Jacopo I d’Appiano (1322 ca.–1398) in 1369 was named Chancellor of the Elders by Pietro or Piero Gambacorta (not Gambacorte) (1319–1392), at the time Lord of Pisa and ally of the Florentines. In accord (according to some sources) with Gian Galeazzo Visconti, Duke of Milan, Jacopo organized, on the 21st of October, 1392, the murder of Gambacorta and of his two children. He took the seigniory of the city and held it until his death. 26 Francesco Coppola, Count of Sarno (1420–1487) had collected a vast economic fortune thanks to the support granted by the King of Naples, Ferdinand I of Aragon (also known as Ferrante of Aragon). Having entered into disagreement with Ferdinand and his son, Alfonso, Duke of Calabria, he was among the organizers in 1485 of the so-called ‘barons’ conspiracy’. Arrested on the 13th of August of the following year, he was tortured and executed together with his son. 27 Very often, the secret informer acted for a monetary reward or for revenge against the presumed conspirators. 28 By denouncing the conspirators, it is in fact possible to hope to enter into the good graces of the prince. 29 Similar concepts to those expressed in this paragraph can be found in The Prince, XIX, 12: ‘For whoever conspires cannot be alone, but he cannot find company except from those he believes to be malcontents; and as soon as you disclose your intent to a malcontent, you give him the matter with which to become content, because manifestly he can hope for every advantage from it’. 30 We also refer above to the conspiracy against Nero organized by Gaius Calpurnius Piso in 65 A.D. with the participation of Annaeus Seneca and Marcus Annaeus Lucanus—the source is Tacitus, Annales, XV, 48–74. Cf. above, in the text, §§63–64, 79–81, and 87–88. In this statement on the difficulty of keeping a conspiracy secret, Machiavelli takes directly to heart an observation by Tacitus, Annales, XV, 54: ‘sed mirum quam, inter diversi generis, ordinis, aetatis, sexus, dites, pauperes taciturnitate omnia cohibita sint’ (‘It was however wonderful how among conspirators of different class, rank, age, sex, among rich and poor, everything was kept in secrecy’). 31 In the report by Titus Livius, Ab urbe condita, II, 4, the sons of Brutus, Titus, and Tiberius are indicated as participants in the conspiracy plotted by a group of young Romans, who wanted to bring back the monarchy after the ouster of Lucius Tarquinius Superbus, but it is not certain—as Machiavelli submits—that they let slip the compromising words that, overheard by a servant during dinner

110  On Conspiracies and immediately reported to the consular authorities, brought about the failure of the plot. 32 Philotas was a captain in the Macedonian army. 33 The episode dates back to 330 B.C. and is mentioned—with changes and imprecisions (it was not Ciballinus to tell to the king about the conspiracy, the participation of Philotas is questionable, etc.)—by Curtius Rufus, Historia Alexandri Magni Macedonis, VI, 7. 34 Cf. Tacitus, Annales, XV, 54–56. The correct name of the freed slave mentioned in the text is Milicius. 35 Hieronymus (231–214 B.C.), grandchild and successor of Hiero II, was tyrant of Syracuse from 216 to 215 B.C., for just 13 months. The source of Machiavelli is Titus Livius, Ab urbe condita, XXIV, 4–5. 36 The correct name is Theodotus, not Theodorus. 37 This is the conspiracy promoted in 272 B.C. by Ellanicus (deformed by Machiavelli in Nelematus) in the city of Elaea in Epirus, after the death of Pirrus, reported in Justin, Pompei Trogi Historiarum Philippicarum Epitome, XXVI, 1. 38 Darius I (550–486 B.C. ca.), son of Hystaspes and therefore belonging to the cadet branch of the royal Persian family of the Achaemenid, took the throne in 522 B.C., holding it until his death. 39 The conspiracy plotted by the future emperor Darius and by some noble Persians against the false Smerdis—that is to say, against the Zoroastrian Magus Gaumāta who deceitfully posing as the Smerdis-Bardiya, son of Cyrus the Great and younger brother of the king Cambyses, who the king had secretly killed before dying in turn due to a war wound, briefly succeeded in usurping the throne of the Achaemenid—is amply reported in Herodotus, Historiae, III, 61–87. 40 Nabis was King of Sparta from 206 B.C. to 192 B.C. 41 The episode is drawn from Titus Livius, Ab urbe condita, XXXV, 34–36, where he talks about one thousand infantrymen and not—as Machiavelli writes— about two hundred. 42 Cf. above, in the text, §61. 43 The positive consideration of Piso is drawn from Tacitus, Annales, XV, 48, 2–3. 44 Tacitus, Annales, XV, 52, 1: ‘the conspirators [. . .] resolved to hurry the assassination at Baiæ, in Piso’s villa, whither Nero, charmed by its loveliness, often went, and where he enjoyed bathing and banquets’. 45 The source of this report is Herodianus, Historiae de imperio post Marcum, III, 12: cf. above footnote No. 24. 46 An ancient type of galley with three rows of oars. The mentioned captain’s name was Volusius Proculus. 47 This episode is drawn from Tacitus, Annales, XV, 51. 48 Commodus (161–192 A.D.), son of Marcus Aurelius, reigned from 180 A.D. until the year of his tragic death. 49 Quintus Emilius Lectus was praetorian prefect. 50 Lucius Aurelius Eclectus was the chamberlain of the emperor. 51 The report of the conspiracy, with some changes, is drawn from Herodianus, Historiae de imperio post Marcum, I, 16–17. In reality, Commodus was killed by the gladiator Narcissus, who strangled him. 52 Antoninus Caracalla (186–217 A.D.), son of Septimius Severus and Julia Domna, was made co-emperor in 198 A.D. He succeeded his father in 211 A.D. along with his brother Geta (whom he had killed the following year) and he reigned until he was in turn killed by his bodyguards, incited by the prefect of the guards Marcus Opellius Macrinus. 53 He was in Carre (actually Harran, in Turkey), occupied in a military expedition against the Parti.

On Conspiracies  111 54 Marcus Opellius Macrinus (164–218 A.D.) was a man of law and a soldier, and according to Machiavelli he had a better aptitude for the former than the latter. 55 Flavius Maternianus had the military command of Rome during the absence of Antoninus Caracalla. 56 Also in this case, the source is Herodianus, Historiae de imperio post Marcum, IV, 12–13. 57 Cf. above, in the text, §72. 58 Cf. above, in the text, §15. 59 A very brutal principal often recurring in Machiavelli’s work. Discourses, II, 23, 8: ‘In substance, a government is nothing more than the control of subjects in such a way that they cannot and must not harm you; this is achieved either by making yourself completely safe from them, by taking away from them every means of doing you harm, or by bringing them benefits in such a way that it would not be reasonable for them to desire some change in fortune’. The Prince, III, 18, in even a more brutal manner: ‘For this has to be noted: that men should either be caressed or eliminated, because they avenge themselves for slight offenses but cannot do so for grave ones; so the offense one does to a man should be such that one does not fear revenge for it’. 60 Machiavelli talks about it amply in his Florentine Histories, VIII, 1–10. 61 This is Cardinal Raffaele Sansoni Riario (1460–1521), grandchild of Girolamo Riario and great grandchild of Pope Sixtus IV. He was named Cardinal of S. Giorgio al Velabro the 10th of December, 1477. 62 Mercenary captain in the service of the Church. He had an important part in the organization of the conspiracy. 63 As is well known, only Giuliano de’ Medici was killed. Machiavelli indicates fate or contingency (that is to say, a change of plan imposed by factors not taken into account or external to the will of the conspirators) and the incompetence of the attackers (substituted at the last moment and revealed to be of weak temper and technically incapable) as the main causes of the failure of the conspiracy taken as an example. 64 When facing the designated victim, the attacker may be moved to pity (if weak in spirit) or more probably, as Machiavelli believes, he may be awed by the ‘majesty’ of the prince. 65 In 88 B.C., Gaius Marius was fleeing Rome to escape from Sulla’s troops. Near Minturno, a knight of barbarian origin (a Cimbrian or a Gaul) sent by the local magistrates attempted to kill him. After he escaped the ambush, he was able to board a ship for Sicily. The source of this episode is Plutarch, Gaius Marius, XXXIX, 8. 66 Sitalces was king of the Thracian Odrysian state from 440 to 424 B.C. 67 Sitalces is abundantly reported in Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, II, 95–101, which Machiavelli read in the Latin translation by Lorenzo Valla printed in 1493 (?), but the events of the conspiracy can be found neither there nor in other known sources. Probably Machiavelli adapted to Siltaces the episode narrated by Herodotus, Historiae, in V, 92: ten men sent to kill the infant Cypselus (who an oracle indicated would be the future tyrant of Corinth) did not have the courage to accomplish the order; then, reproaching one another for the weakness demonstrated (particularly since this is also present in Machiavelli’s tale), they go back, but Cypselus has already been put in a safe place. 68 Alfonso I d’Este (1476–1534), son of Ercole I, was Duke of Ferrara from 1505 to his death. The two brothers were Ferrante (or Ferdinando) and the illegitimate Giulio. The conspiracy dates to May–June 1506. 69 The Gascon Giovanni (Jean) d’Artiganova, also known as Gian Cantore, musician and singer in the Ferrara Court.

112  On Conspiracies 70 Titus Livius, Ab Urbe condita, XXXV, 35: ‘He collected his own spirits, which were confused by the greatness of the undertaking’. 71 Annia Aurelia Galeria Lucilla (148 ca.–184 ca. A.D.), daughter of Marcus Aurelius, wife of Lucius Verus (died in 169) and sister of Commodus. In 182 A.D. she plotted a conspiracy against her brother, who had excluded her from the power. The executor was Claudius Pompeianus Quintianus, fiancé of Lucilla’s daughter and also her lover. Once the attack failed, Quintianus was executed, while Lucilla was exiled to Capri and killed there. 72 The source of this episode is Herodianus, Historiae de imperio post Marcum, I, 8–9 and I, 20–23. 73 The only possible cross reference to the text is at §108, where however the name of Antonio da Volterra is never explicitly mentioned, as Machiavelli means to suggest, writing, ‘as we have related above / come di sopra si disse’. 74 The example of the attempted conspiracy by Gaius Fulvius Plautianus against Septimius Severus and Caracalla returns for the third time. The source, explicitly indicated by Machiavelli, is Herodianus, Historiae de imperio post Marcum, III, 12, where however—in Poliziano’s Latin version of the Greek historian’s text, the one used by Machiavelli—it is said that the two sovereigns were not in two different countries or places, but in two different rooms of the same building. 75 This refers to the conspiracy against Hippias (?–after 490 B.C.) and Hipparchus (?–514 B.C.), the sons of the Athenian tyrant Pisistratus (600 ca.–528/527 B.C.), plotted by Harmodius and Aristogeiton, widely reported by Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, VI, 54–59. However, Machiavelli’s source, as we can understand when he names the tyrant Hipparchus Dioeles, is Justin, Pompei Trogi Historiarum Philippicarum Epitome, II, 9. The episode dates to 514 B.C. 76 The two were brothers. Satyrus succeeded the murdered Clearchus. The conspiracy dates to 352 B.C. 77 The source for this event is Justin, Pompei Trogi Historiarum Philippicarum Epitome, XVI, 5. 78 Pelopidas (420 ca.–364 B.C.), noble Theban and supporter of democracy, exiled by Athens, in 379 organized a conspiracy aimed to overturn the oligarchic government established in Thebes in 382 with the support of the Spartans—stopped by the three polemarchs Archia, Leontide, and Philip. 79 The expression ‘ten tyrants’ generally indicates a group of men, in this case the three polemarchs mentioned in the previous footnote. 80 Machiavelli’s source is Plutarch, Pelopidas, 5–12, but with some inaccuracy: the ‘counsellor of the tyrants’ snuck in among the polemarchs as a secretary, according to the report of Plutarch, was Fillida and not Charon, who was instead the one who called the shots of the Theban conspiracy. Machiavelli had confused the two figures. 81 Such a unique example, in the political-historiographic perspective of Machiavelli, based on the imitation of the past, that it is clear that it cannot contain any type of useful teaching. It does not, therefore, establish any rule or regularity. 82 The source is Plutarch, Brutus, XVI. The conspiracy against Julius Caesar has already been mentioned in §22. Gnæus Popilius Lena learnt about the conspiracy, but he was not among the conspirators. 83 Cf. above, in the text, §19. 84 Petrucci’s daughter’s name was Sulpizia. 85 The conspiracy attempt by Giulio Bellanti (not Belanti) against Pandolfo Petrucci, moved at the same time by political and personal reasons, dated to May, 1508. The rivalry between the Bellanti and Petrucci families, former allies, is also touched upon in Francesco Guicciardini, The History of Italy, IV, 3.

On Conspiracies  113 86 Galeazzo Maria Sforza, son of Francesco Sforza (1401–1466) and Bianca Maria Visconti (1425–1468), Duke of Milan, was born in Fermo in 1444 and was killed on the 26th of December 1476 inside the Milanese Church of Santo Stefano. The conspiracy was organized by three young republican sympathizers: Girolamo Olgiati, Carlo Visconti, and Giovanni Andrea Lampugnani (this last was the material executor of the murder). This famous episode is amply narrated by Machiavelli in Florentine Histories, VII, 33–34. 87 Respectively, Gian Galeazzo (the son), Ludovico il Moro and Ascanio (the two brothers). 88 Girolamo Riario (1443–1488), nephew of Sixtus IV, was Lord of Imola and Forlì. 89 Caterina Sforza (1463 ca.–1509) was the natural daughter (later recognized) of Galeazzo Maria Sforza and Lucrezia Landriani. In 1477, she married Girolamo Riario. After her husband’s murder in 1488, the (well-known) event reported by Machiavelli took place. Caterina tricked the conspirators and shut herself in the Ravaldino stronghold in Forlì, while the town was surrendering to the pontiff, waiting for the armies of the Sforza and of the Bolognese Bentivoglio, who helped her take back the seigniory of Forlì, a seigniory that she owned together with the one of Imola as the regent for her son Ottaviano. In 1498, the future Giovanni dalle Bande Nere was born from her—secret—marriage to Giovanni de’ Medici (in 1496 or 1497). In December 1499, her dominion was devastated by the advance of Cesare Borgia’s army. 90 Lucius Sergius Catiline, after being accused of plotting against the res publica [republic] by the consul Lucius Paolus, on the 8th of November, 63, appeared in the Senate to defend himself, but in that moment the accusation was reiterated by the other consul, Marcus Tullius Cicero. The ‘insulting things’ said to the ‘Consul’ (Cicero) during the assembly concerned his origins. Being born not in Rome but in the municipality of Arpinium (Southern Lazio), Catiline defined him with disgust ‘inquilinis civis urbis Romae’ [lodger of the city of Rome] (Sallust, Catilinae conjuratio, XXXI, 7). 91 Publius Cornelius Lentulus Sura was among the most influential members of the conspiracy. 92 In accord with Cicero, who was in need of a proof of the conspiracy to be shown to the Senate to nail Catiline and especially his men who remained in Rome, the ambassadors of the Allobroges pretended to join with the conspirators and to commit to their idea, but to do that they asked—writes Sallust, Catilinae conjuratio, XLIV, 1—for ‘a written and signed agreement to be carried to their fellow citizens: otherwise it would not be so easy to convince them of such a dangerous venture’. Thanks to this document, consigned to the Roman authorities, it was possible to capture and to prosecute the conspirators. 93 The attempted coup d’état by Hanno—politician and Carthaginian general living during the 4th century B.C.—took place in 340 B.C. (but the date is approximate), and it is narrated in Justin, Pompei Trogi Historiarum Philippicarum Epitome, XXI, 4. 94 Agathocles (360 ca.–289 B.C.) was tyrant of Syracuse from 316 to 289 B.C. 95 Cleomenes III (260 ca.–219 B.C.), son and successor of Leonidas, reigned over Sparta from 235 to 222 B.C., when he was defeated by Antigonus III Doson King of Macedonia. After escaping to Egypt he committed suicide. 96 On the war between Athens and Megara for the control of the Salamis Island, which Machiavelli calls to mind, cf. Herodotus, Histories, I, 59 e Plutarch, Solon, XXX. 97 Pisistratus’ ascent (600 ca.–528/527 B.C.) to the tyranny took place around 560 B.C.

114  On Conspiracies 98 Pandolfo Petrucci came back from Siena after his long exile in 1478, but the offices mentioned in the text were conferred on him only in January 1496. This is an example, not so rare in Machiavelli, of drastic contraction of historical timing for reasons tied not only to his narrative rhythm, but to his tendency to bend historical facts and events to a superior political-pedagogical purpose. 99 Catiline attempted to break the political system of Rome, but he was ruined due to the failure of his ambitious and wicked conspiratorial plot. He left Rome after his dispute with Cicero in the Senate, with the idea of organizing by himself an army which would march on the city. He died in 62 B.C. fighting near Pistoia (Tuscany) against Petreius. 100 On Hanno cf. above, in the text, §§168–169. He was killed, after tremendous torture, with all his family members. Cf. Justin, Pompei Trogi Historiarum Philippicarum Epitome, XXI, 4. 101 We are talking about the three polemarchs mentioned above in footnote No. 78. 102 Cf. above, in the text, §§ 94–95. The ineffectiveness of the poison used to kill Commodus is described in Herodianus, Historiae de imperio post Marcum, I, 17. 103 The prince who, after having discovered it thanks to a tip off, violently represses a conspiracy, cannot escape the suspicion—dangerous for his reputation in the eyes of the people—that he had invented the threat with the aim of suppressing and eliminating his opponents. 104 Cf. Discourses, II, 26, 8: ‘After the Roman legions who where left in Capua conspired against the Capuans, as will be recounted in the appropriate place, this conspiracy gave birth to a mutiny, and when this was put down by Valerius Corvinus, among the other articles contained in the agreement, very severe penalties were stipulated for anyone who might ever reproach the soldiers for that mutiny’. 105 Gaius Marcius Rutilus (or Rutulus). 106 The source of this example, which dates to 342 B.C., is Titus Livius, Ab Urbe condita, VII, 38–41. 107 Walter VI of Brienne, Duke of Athens (1304/1305 ca.–1356), was governor of Florence from 1342 to 1343. 108 Guglielmo de’ Pazzi (1437–1516), son of Antonio (1410–1458), in 1459 (1460, according to some sources) married Bianca de’ Medici (1455–1488), Piero di Cosimo de’ Medici and Lucrezia Tornabuoni’s daughter, elder sister of Lorenzo and Giuliano. This marriage could have established a political-financial alliance between the two families. But the rivalries—political, personal, and economic—were so deep that in the end an open fight was unavoidable. 109 During Walter’s short governance of Florence, violent and oppressive, three conspiracies were organized against him. His political adventure is reported by Machiavelli in his Florentine Histories, II, 33–37. 110 Antonio Adimari. 111 A popular revolt obliged him to leave the city in July 1343. 112 Commissary for the Florentine Seigniory. 113 In his text, Machiavelli writes 1501. But the revolt took place during June of the following year. 114 Thanks to the informant Amelio da Castello. 115 The captured were actually two, Antonio da Pantaneto and Marcantonio del Pasqua, who told the Commissar about the impending revolt. 116 Cosimo de’ Pazzi (1466–1513) was the son of Guglielmo and Bianca de’ Medici. He was Bishop of Arezzo from 1497 to 1508.

On Conspiracies  115 117 This is Matteo di Morozzo, as Machiavelli writes in the Florentine Histories, II, 36, 13: ‘Thus it happened that when Matteo di Morozzo, either to ingratiate himself with him or to free himself from danger, revealed to him that the Medici family with some others had conspired against him, the duke not only did not investigate the thing but had the discloser put to death miserably’. 118 Dion of Syracuse (410–354 B.C.) was collaborator of Dionysus I and, after the death of this last, counselor of the son Dionysus II (called Dionysus the Younger) who ended up removing him and taking advantage of the absence of the King of Syracuse. But his rule was ephemeral: it lasted only three years, from 347 to the year in which, in his turn, he was the victim of the conspiracy narrated by Machiavelli. 119 Callippus was navarch, that is to say, commander of the Syracuse fleet. He was Dionysus the Younger’s son-in-law. 120 Born as a simulated conspiracy, to expose and eliminate the tyrant’s opponents, it resulted—Machiavelli noted with poorly concealed irony—in an effective conspiracy, which cost the life of him who had clumsily promoted it (Dion was ‘the chief of the conspiracy against himself’). Callippus as a matter of fact ordered the murder of Dion and took his place. The episode dates to 353 B.C. and the source is Plutarch, Dion, 54–57.

Description of the Methods Adopted by the Duke Valentino When Murdering Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, the Signor Pagolo and the Duke di Gravina Orsini Niccolò Machiavelli [1] The Duke Valentino1 had returned from Lombardy, where he had gone to exculpate himself to King Louis XII2 of France from the many calumnies that had been told of him on account of the revolt of Arezzo and other places in the Val di Chiana.3 He had stopped at Imola4 with the intention of uniting all his troops there for the purpose of attacking Giovanni Bentivogli.5 the tyrant of Bologna; as he wanted to bring that city under his dominion and make it the capital of his duchy of Romagna. [2] When this project became known to the Vitelli6 and the Orsini7 and their adherents, they became apprehensive that the Duke would become too powerful; and that it was to be feared that after taking Bologna he would turn to destroy them, so as to remain alone under arms in Italy.8 [3] They therefore appointed a meeting at Magione, in the Perugian territory, which was attended by the Cardinal, Pagolo, and the Duke Gravina Orsini,9 Vitellozzo Vitelli,10 Oliverotto da Fermo,11 Giampagolo Baglioni,12 tyrant of Perugia, and Messer Antonio da Venafro,13 envoy of Pandolfo Petrucci,14 chief of the government of Siena. They discussed the aggrandizement of the Duke, and his intentions, and the necessity of checking his eager ambition, as otherwise there would be danger of their being destroyed with the rest of them. [4] They resolved not to abandon the Bentivogli, and to endeavor to win the Florentines over to their side. Accordingly they sent agents to those places, promising help to the one, and urging the other to unite with them against the common enemy. [5] This meeting became quickly known throughout Italy, and those peoples who were not satisfied to be under the rule of the Duke, amongst whom were the people of Urbino,15 took hope of a change for the better. [6] Thus it came that, whilst minds were thus undecided, certain men of Urbino formed the plan to seize the castle of San Leo,16 which still held for the Duke, [7] and availed themselves of the following opportunity. The governor was strengthening the castle, and, as he was getting some timbers brought in, the conspirators placed themselves in ambush; [8] and whilst the drawbridge was encumbered by some beams that were being brought to the castle, so

Description of the Methods Adopted by the Duke Valentino  117 that the guard on the inside could not prevent them, the conspirators seized the opportunity and leaped upon the bridge, and thus obtained entrance into the castle. [9] So soon as this capture became known, the whole country rose in rebellion, and recalled the old Duke;17 although the capture of the castle did not inspire the people with as much hope as the meeting at Magione, by means of which they hoped to obtain assistance. [10] So soon as the members of the assembly at Magione heard of this revolt in Urbino, they felt that they must not lose this opportunity. They at once called their troops together, for the purpose of seizing any other place that might still remain in the hands of the Duke, [11] and sent again to Florence to solicit that republic to join them in extinguishing the conflagration that threatened her equally with themselves. They showed the Florentines how easy victory would be, and that they could never expect a more favorable opportunity. [12] But actuated by their hatred against the Vitelli and the Orsini,18 from various causes, the Florentines not only declined to unite with them, but sent their secretary, Niccolò Machiavelli,19 to offer to the Duke Valentino shelter and assistance against his new enemies. [13] He found the Duke at Imola, full of apprehensions because his own troops had suddenly and quite unexpectedly turned against him; so that he found himself disarmed at the very moment when war was almost upon him. [14] But having taken courage again in consequence of the offers of the Florentines, he decided to protract the war with the few troops that he had, and to endeavor by peace negotiations to obtain assistance. [15] This he managed in two ways: he sent to the king of France for troops, and at the same time engaged every man-at-arms, and others who followed the calling of mounted soldiers, [16] and was careful to pay them all most exactly. [17] Notwithstanding all this, his enemies advanced and moved upon Fossombrone, where some of his troops had made a stand, but were routed by the Vitelli and the Orsini. [18] This induced the Duke to try and stop these hostile attempts against him by peace negotiations; and being thoroughly skilled in the art of dissembling,20 he lost no chance of making his enemies understand that they were making war upon a man who was willing that they should have possession of all he had acquired, and that he merely wanted the title of prince, leaving them to have the principality. [19] And so thoroughly did he persuade them of this that they sent the Signor Pagolo to him to negotiate a peace, and meantime they put up their arms. [20] But the Duke did not for a moment stop his preparations, and made every effort to increase both his infantry and his mounted force; [21] and to prevent these preparations from being noticed, he distributed his troops separately through all the places of the Romagna. [22] Meantime some five hundred French lances had come to him, and although he felt strong enough to revenge himself upon his enemies by open war, yet he thought it would be safer and more advantageous for him to keep up his deception, and not to stop his peace negotiations. [23] And so well did he manage this matter, that he concluded a peace with them,21

118  On Conspiracies according to which he confirmed to each of them their old engagements; he paid them four thousand ducats at once, and promised them not to disturb the Bentivogli. He also concluded a matrimonial alliance with Giovanni, and consented that none of them should ever be constrained to appear in person before him, except so far as it might suit themselves to do so. [24] On the other hand, they promised to restore the duchy of Urbino to him, as well as all the other places which they had taken up to that day, to serve him in all his expeditions, and not to make war upon any one without his permission, nor to engage themselves in the service of anyone else. [25] After the conclusion of this treaty, Guido Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, fled again to Venice, having first caused all the fortresses in his state to be dismantled; for having full confidence in the population, he did not want these fortresses, which he believed he could not defend, to fall into the enemy’s hands, who might use them to restrain and oppress his friends. [26] But the Duke Valentino, after having concluded this convention, and having distributed all his troops and the French lances throughout the Romagna, suddenly left Imola, about the end of November, and went to Cesena, where he remained many days, negotiating with the agents of the Vitelli and of the Orsini, who happened to be with their troops in the duchy of Urbino, as to what new enterprises were to be undertaken. [27] But as nothing was concluded, Oliverotto da Fermo was sent to make him the offer, that, if he were disposed to undertake the conquest of Tuscany, they were ready to cooperate with him; but if not, then they would go and endeavor to capture Sinigaglia.22 [28] To which the Duke replied, that he had no intention of carrying the war into Tuscany, as the Florentines were his friends; but that he should be well pleased that they should take Sinigaglia. [29] Very soon after that, news came that the place had capitulated, but that the citadel had refused to surrender to them, the governor being unwilling to give it up to anyone except to the Duke in person; and therefore they urged him to come there at once. [30] The opportunity seemed favorable to the Duke, and his going not likely to give umbrage, as he had been called by them, and did not go of his own accord. [31] And to make things the more sure, he dismissed all the French troops, who returned to Lombardy, except the one hundred lances under the command of Monseigneur de Caudales,23 his brother-in-law; [32] and having left Cesena about the middle of December, he went on to Fano. There he employed all the cunning and sagacity that he was capable of; he persuaded Vitelli and the Orsini to await him at Sinigaglia, assuring them that mistrust could not make the agreement between them more sincere nor more durable, and that, so far as he was concerned, he only wanted to be able to avail himself of the arms and advice of his friends. [33] And although Vitellozzo remained very reluctant to accept the invitation, his brother’s death having taught him that a prince whom you have once offended is not to be trusted,24 yet he yielded to the persuasion of Pagolo Orsini, who had been corrupted by presents and promises25 of the Duke to wait for him at Sinigaglia.

Description of the Methods Adopted by the Duke Valentino  119 [34] The Duke thereupon, before leaving for Fano, on the 30th of December [1502], communicated his plan to eight of his most trusty followers, amongst whom were Don Michele26 and Monseigneur d’Euna,27 who afterwards became Cardinal. He directed them that so soon as Vitellozzo, Pagolo Orsini, the Duke Gravina, and Oliverotto came to meet him, each two of them should take one of these four between them, mentioning specially by name each one of the four which each two of them were to take between them; they were to entertain them until their arrival at Sinigaglia, and were not to permit them to leave until they had reached the Duke’s lodgings, where they were to make them prisoners. [35] After that he ordered that all his armed force, consisting of more than two thousand horse and ten thousand infantry, should be at the break of day on the Metauro, a river, five miles from Fano, and there to wait for him. [36] Having met them there on the morning of the last day of December, he sent about two hundred of his mounted men ahead towards Sinigaglia, and then he started his infantry, after which he came himself with the remainder of his mounted force. [37] Fano and Sinigaglia are two cities of the Marches, situated on the shore of the Adriatic, and some fifteen miles distant from each other. Any one going to Sinigaglia has the mountains on his right hand; their base in some places stretches close down to the sea, so as to leave but a narrow space between, and at the widest place the distance between the mountains and the sea is barely two miles. [38] The city of Sinigaglia is but little more than a bowshot’s distance from the foot of the mountains, and less than a mile from the shore. [39] By the side of the city runs a little stream, which bathes that part of the walls of the city that looks up the road towards Fano. [40] On approaching Sinigaglia the road runs for a considerable distance by the mountains; [41] but on arriving at the stream that bathes the walls of Sinigaglia, the road turns to the left, and follows the banks of the stream for about a bowshot’s distance, until it comes to a bridge that spans the stream almost in face of the gate by which you enter Sinigaglia, not in a straight line, but obliquely. [42] Before the gate there is a suburb composed of some houses and a square, one side of which is formed by the bank of the little stream. [43] The Vitelli and the Orsini, having given orders to await the coming of the Duke, had, by way of personally showing him honor, and for the purpose of lodging his troops, sent their own away to some castles about six miles distant from Sinigaglia, and had only left Oliverotto with his men in Sinigaglia; these consisted of one thousand infantry and one hundred and fifty mounted men, who were quartered in the above-mentioned suburb. [44] Matters being thus arranged, the Duke Valentino went towards Sinigaglia; [45] and when the head of his cavalry had reached the bridge, they did not pass it, but halted, and one half faced the river, and the other half fronted towards the country, leaving a space between them for the infantry to pass through, who entered the place without halting. [46] Vitellozzo, Pagolo and the Duke Gravina, mounted on mules, and accompanied by a

120  On Conspiracies few horsemen, came to meet the Duke. Vitellozzo was without arms, and wore a cloak lined with green; he seemed very sad, as though he had a presentiment of the death that awaited him, which caused some astonishment, as his valor and former fortune were well known.28 [47] It was said that, when he parted from his troops to come to Sinigaglia for the purpose of meeting the Duke, it seemed as though he bade them good by forever. He recommended his house and fortune to his captains, and admonished his nephews not to remember the fortune of their house, but only the valor of their fathers.29 [48] When the three arrived before the Duke, they saluted him courteously, and were graciously received by him; and those to whom the Duke had committed their charge took them at once between them. [49] But when the Duke noticed that Oliverotto was not with them, (he having remained with his troops at Sinigaglia, whom he kept arrayed in line in the square opposite his lodgings by the river, where he made them go through their exercises), he gave a wink to Don Michele, to whose charge Oliverotto had been confided, to see that Oliverotto should not escape. [50] Don Michele therefore rode ahead, and having found Oliverotto he told him that this was not the time to keep the troops out of their quarters, which might otherwise be taken from them by the troops of the Duke; and therefore he advised him to let the troops go into their quarters, and come himself with him to meet the Duke. [51] Oliverotto followed this advice, and went to join the Duke, who so soon as he saw him called him; and after having duly saluted the Duke, he joined the others. [52] When they had entered Sinigaglia they all dismounted at the Duke’s lodgings, and, having entered with him into an inner chamber, they were all made prisoners. [53] The Duke immediately mounted his horse and ordered the troops of Oliverotto and the Orsini to be disarmed and stripped. [54] Oliverotto’s troops, being nearby, were completely stripped, [55] but those of the Vitelli and the Orsini, being at a distance and having apprehended the destruction of their masters, had time to unite, and, recalling the valor and discipline of the Orsini and the Vitelli, drew together, and succeeded in saving themselves despite of the efforts of the people of the country and the hostile troops. [56] The Duke’s soldiers, not satisfied with plundering the troops of Oliverotto, began to sack Sinigaglia, and they would have completely pillaged the town, if the Duke had not repressed their rapacity by having a number of them put to death. [57] But when night came and the disturbances were stopped, the Duke thought it time to make way with Vitellozzo and Oliverotto; and having them both brought into the same chamber, he had them strangled. [58] Neither of them before death said a single word worthy of their past lives. Vitellozzo conjured those who put him to death to implore the Pope to grant him a plenary indulgence for all his crimes. Oliverotto, weeping, cast all the blame for the injuries done the Duke upon Vitellozzo. [59] Pagolo and the Duke Gravina Orsini were left alive until Duke Valentino heard that the Pope had seized the Cardinal Orsini, the Archbishop of Florence,30 and

Description of the Methods Adopted by the Duke Valentino  121 Messer Jacopo da Santa Croce. [60] After having received this intelligence, the Signor Pagolo and the Duke Gravina were strangled in the same way as the others, at Castel della Pieve,31 on the 18th of January, 1503.

Notes 1 Cesare Borgia (1475–1507), son of the Cardinal Rodrigo (elected Pope in 1492 with the name Alexander VI) and Vannozza Catanei (1442–1518), after the death of his brother Giovanni Duke of Gandia (1476–1497), of whose assassination he was considered responsible and the instigator, left his ecclesiastic career (he obtained the cardinal purple in 1493) to devote himself to a military life and to the project—financed by his father and supported by the King of France, Louis XII—of building a dynastic dominion, of which the starting territorial base was to behave been founded on the ancient properties of the Church in Central Italy. The epithet of Duke of Valentinois (or Valentino) derives from his obtaining from Louis XII—after a secret agreement between Louis and Alexander VI, for the concession of the necessary dispensation to the French King in order to contract a new marriage—the countships of Valence and Diois, the Issoudun Castel, and a substantial monetary annuity. The elevation of the Valence fiefdom to a duchy permitted Borgia to be the proud holder of the title, which, in Machiavelli’s writings, would often be used. 2 Louis XII (1462–1515), successor of Charles VIII, reigned in France from 1498 until his death. 3 In June, 1502, first Arezzo then the entire Valdichiana opposed the dominion of Florence, at that moment occupied in the organization of a new military expedition against Pisa. Militarily supported by Giampaolo Baglioni and Vitellozzo Vitelli, the Republic blamed Cesare Borgia directly for the subversion. His ambitions on Florence and its properties were openly declared and he, it was feared, would have favored the return to power of the Medici. It was the intervention of the French that stopped the plot and brought a halt to any chance of a regime change in the Seigniory. Seizing Arezzo in August 1502, where in the meantime Piero de’ Medici had been installed, the French gave it back to the Florentines, commanding Valentino to abandon his intention of conquest to the detriment of a historically ally of France. 4 Borgia annexed Imola in December, 1499, taking it from Caterina Sforza, making it the seat of the governorate and of the Supreme Court of the ‘State’ of Romagna, which started to administratively organizing the territories into three districts, each entrusted to a special commissioner but under the control of a sole governor. Imola, as can be deduced from the report, was also the military base chosen by Valentino (where he arrived in September, 1502) to march from for the conquest of Bologna, which in his intentions would have been the effective political capital of the new principate. 5 Giovanni Bentivoglio (1443–1508) established his hegemony over Bologna (which formally would always be a fiefdom of the Holy See) in November, 1463, when he was elected Gonfaloniere of Justice by the oligarchs who supported his faction. But in a few years, through the reform of the town’s constitutional systems, Bentivoglio’s seigniory transformed into a perpetual tyranny. His political friendship with France (more than one of familiar reasons with Milan: Giovanni in fact had married Ginevra Sforza) protected him from Cesare Borgia’s objectives. Surviving this, he was expelled from Bologna in 1506, after the excommunication ordered by Pope Julius II. 6 The Vitelli, a mercenary captain dynasty, were the undisputed Lords of Città di Castello in Umbria during the 15th and the 16th centuries.

122  On Conspiracies 7 The Orsini, mercenary captains and Churchmen, was among the most powerful families of the Roman nobility. Their aversion to the Borgia was born when the Orsini supported the French expedition of Charles VIII (1494) in Italy and had grown since the ascent to the papacy of Cardinal Rodrigo Borgia. 8 Valentino’s political-military escalation was astonishing, enough to vindicate the concerns of his soldiers and allies, who were afraid to see their own seigniories swallowed into the Borgia’s rising principate. In a little more than two years, he took possession of Imola and Forlì (Count Riario’s properties), of Cesena (taken from the Malatesta), of Pesaro (where a Sforza’s cadet branch reigned), of Rimini (also once belonging to the Malatesta), of Faenza (Manfredi’s dominion), of Piombino (governed by the Appiani), of Urbino (capital of the Duchy of Montefeltro), and, finally, of Camerino (Seigniory of the Varano). 9 Three members of the Orsini family, to whom the Magione Castle belonged as a commenda, were present at the meeting. The first, ‘the Cardinal’, is Giambattista (or Giovan Battista) Orsini (before 1450–1503). After having supported the election to the papacy of Rodrigo Borgia he came into conflict with the son of this last, Cesare, and opposed his ambitious plans of conquest. Once back in Rome the day after the Senigallia events, after the agreement with the Borgia, he was captured under their order and poisoned in Castel Sant’Angelo on the 22nd of January, 1503. The second, ‘Pagolo’, is Paolo Orsini (?–1503), natural son of the Cardinal Latino Orsini, soldier and mercenary captain, first in the service of Florence, afterwards to Cesare Borgia. Captured in Senigallia, he was strangled in Castel della Pieve (cf. below footnote No. 31) on the 18th of January, 1503. The third, ‘the Duke di Gravina’, is Francesco Orsini (?–1503), a man of arms in his own right, cousin of Paolo, with whom he shared a violent end. 10 Vitellozzo Vitelli (1458 ca.–1503), mercenary captain, become the most wellknown exponent of the Umbrian dynasty after his tragic death at the hand of Valentino. Before serving Borgia, he was on the payroll of Charles VIII at the time of his military expedition to Italy. The hate of Vitellozzo against Florence— which explains, for example, his prominent role in the Arezzo revolt (cf. above footnote No. 3)—started after his brother Paolo (?—1499), accused of agreement with the enemy during the siege of Pisa by the Florentines, who had given him command of their troops, was arrested, tortured and finally beheaded (on the 1st of October, 1499), although there was no proof of his betrayal against the Seigniory. 11 Oliverotto Eufreducci, also known as Oliverotto or Liverotto da Fermo (1475 ca.–1503), mercenary captain, first in the service of Florence (he was among the lieutenants of Paolo Vitelli), afterwards to Valentino. He took possession of Fermo in 1502, after having killed by surprise his uncle Giovanni Fogliani and various other noteworthy citizens during ‘a very solemn banquet’ organized by the same Oliverotto. The episode of this massacre is reported by Machiavelli in chapter VIII, 17–19 of The Prince. Oliverotto is taken as a contemporary example (the classic one is the tyrant of Syracuse, Agathocles) of how a principate can be conquered ‘by some criminal and nefarious path’, resorting to betrayal and assassination—Machiavelli concludes peremptorily—‘can enable one to acquire empire, but not glory’ (VIII, 2 and 10). 12 Giampaolo Baglioni (1470 ca. –1520), mercenary captain and Lord of Perugia, over which he exercised an intermittent dominion due to the violent inner tensions which the town and his own dynasty experienced: in 1500, as an example, Giampaolo was luckily able to survive the massacre of his brothers and cousins organized by Carlo and Grifonetto Baglioni; and for the following years he had to fight several times against dissidents and exiles from Perugia who threatened the Seigniory with arms. Giampaolo was the organizer, with Cardinal

Description of the Methods Adopted by the Duke Valentino  123 Giambattista Orsini, of the meeting of Magione. He escaped the revenge of Valentino, having sensed in advance his plan and having not accepted—conversely than the Orsini, Petrucci and Bentivoglio—a new agreement with him after having betrayed, offended and threatened him. He abided scrupulously by the rule, disregarded by the other mercenary captains who became hostile to Valentino after having served him and who ingenuously accepted his urging to go to Senigallia, according to which ‘a prince whom you have once offended is not to be trusted’, as can be read in §33 of this text. After having served the Florentines, Pope Alexander VI, the Borgia, and the French, Baglioni concluded his military career on the payroll of the Most Serene Republic of Venice (Serenissima). Accused of betrayal by Pope Leo X, who suspected a secret agreement with Francesco Maria della Rovere, he was forcedly convened in Rome, imprisoned in Castel Sant’Angelo and beheaded in 1520. 13 Antonio Giordani da Venafro (1459–1530) was minister and counsellor of Pandolfo Petrucci (cf. the following footnote). Also Giovanni Bentivoglio and Guidobaldo da Montefeltro were represented during the meeting: the first by his son, Ermes Bentivoglio, and the second by an appointee still unknown. 14 Pandolfo Petrucci (1450 ca.–1512), merchant and politician, Lord of Siena, which he had to leave after adhering to the anti-Borgia league and which he succeeded in reconquering the following year only thanks to French help. It was Petrucci, on behalf of the other conspirators, who led the negotiations with Florence to have the Republic—together with the other seigniories threatened by Valentino—adhere to the agreements signed in Magione. But his diplomatic pessuring did not have a positive outcome. 15 Urbino, ruled by Guidobaldo da Montefeltro (1472–1508), youngest son of Federico (1422–1482), was conquered by Borgia’s troops in June, 1502. 16 This is a mistake on the date by Machiavelli. Specifically, the Duchy of Urbino rebelled against Valentino on the 5th of October, 1502, before the Magione diet concluded. Other territories belonging to the Montefeltro dominion also rebelled: from Cagli to Gubbio. A report of this episode, chronologically more accurate and better rendered in its political-military aspects, is found in the letters addressed to the Ten of Liberty of the 7th of October, 1502, dating back to the period of his legation to Cesare Borgia. It can be read, in a carefully annotated critical edition, in Machiavelli (2003: 335–41). 17 ‘The old Duke’ is Guidobaldo da Montefeltro. He was expelled twice from his city by Valentino: in June 1502 and in December of the same year. On both occasions, he took refuge in Venice. Married, without children, to Elisabetta Gonzaga (1471–1526), in 1504 Guidobaldo adopted his nephew Francesco Maria della Rovere, who succeeded him as Duke of Urbino in 1508. 18 The Florentines feared revenge on the part of Vitellozzo Vitelli (cf. above footnote No. 10). Having killed his brother Paolo as a traitor, an ignominious accusation for a soldier (even though a mercenary captain). The betrayal, as such, was never effectively proven. After that episode, the Lord of Città di Castello became a merciless enemy of the Republic. As for the Orsini, we must keep in mind their dual kinship relation with the Medici: Lorenzo the Magnificent (1449–1496) married in 1469 Clarice Orsini of the Dukes of Gravina (1453 ca.– 1488); the elder son Piero (1472–1503) married Alfonsina Orsini of the Dukes of Bracciano (1472–1520) in 1488. The Roman family strove many times—as during the time of the revolt of Arezzo and Valdichiana—to overturn the Florentine Republic and to favor the return to power of the Medici dynasty. 19 Machiavelli refers to himself in the third person. He does not want his testimony to be direct or personal, but rather an impartial historical report. On the dating of this report cf. in this book the Note on the Texts.

124  On Conspiracies 20 With respect to the subject of simulations and deceits, we must recall what Machiavelli writes in The Prince (‘A prudent lord, therefore, cannot observe faith, nor should he, when such observance turns against him’ and it is necessary for him ‘to be a great pretender and dissembler’, XVIII, 8 e 11) and in the Discourses (‘a leader who wishes to undertake great enterprises must learn how to deceive’, II, 13, 5). 21 The agreement between Borgia and the Orsini (and their allies) was signed in Imola on the 28th of October, 1502. The complete text of the treaty can be found in Machiavelli (1964: 544–45). 22 At that time the government of Senigallia was in the hands of Giovanna da Montefeltro (1463–1514), sister of Guidobaldo, reigning on behalf of her young son Francesco Maria (1490–1538). Francesco Maria’s father, Giovanni della Rovere, died in November, 1501. 23 Jean de Foix, Count of Candale (?–1528/1532). 24 As already mentioned, among the rebels of the Magione, Giampaolo Baglioni was the only one to obey this rule and the only military chief, among the participants of the diet, to escape Valentino’s revenge. 25 Vitellozzo Vitelli sensed the danger and feared that Valentino was about to set a trap for them. Paolo Orsini convinced Vitelli there was no risk, and not because of the peace agreement signed, but because he ‘had been corrupted with presents and promises’ by Cesare Borgia: who confirms himself to be not only a liar and a man with no scruples, but also a corruptor of souls and bodies. In The Prince it is written, to intensify the unscrupulously effective image of Valentino, that he reconquered the faith of Orsini ‘giving him money, garments, and horses’ (VII, 21). 26 Don Miguel de Corella (?–1508), known as Don Micheletto, man at arms, native of Valence, devoted friend of Valentino, for whom he operated as a military commander and hired assassin. 27 Francisco de Loris (?–1506), Bishop of Elne (Perpignan). A nephew of Alexander VI, he served him in the capacity of secretary and general treasurer. He was elevated to the rank of Cardinal by his uncle on the 31st of May 1503. 28 Although Vitellozzo Vitelli was an old enemy of Florence, Machiavelli seems not to hesitate to spend some appreciative words on him as he headed for his tragic and fatal destiny. 29 Presages and premonitions are never lacking in conspiracy stories, both on the side of the attackers (who read in them the result more or less fortunate of their plots) and on the side of the victims (who often sense in advance the threat and the danger, even if not able to escape their destiny). 30 Rinaldo Orsini (?–1510) was Archbishop of Florence from 1474, then of Cesarea from 1508. He was arrested in Rome and imprisoned on the 3rd of January, 1503, along with other enemies of Borgia, but unlike Cardinal Giambattista, he was able to save his life, just as Jacopo Santacroce, the other prisoner mentioned in the text, avoided death. 31 This is the town of Città della Pieve, on the border between Umbria and Tuscany.

The Pazzi and the Conspiracy Against the Medici1 Niccolò Machiavelli

1.  Government of the Family of the Medici in Florence [1] The beginning of this Eighth Book being between two conspiracies, the one already related and having occurred at Milan,2 and the other to be narrated and occurring at Florence, it would seem to be proper and in accordance with our usual habit to discuss the nature and importance of conspiracies. This we should gladly have done if the matter could be briefly disposed of, [2] and we had not already treated the subject at length in another place.3 [3] But having done so, we will now leave it and pass to another, and will relate how, the government of the Medici having overcome all its openly declared enemies, and aiming to obtain undivided authority in the city and to hold a position entirely apart from all the others in the republic, it became necessary that it should also subdue its secret enemies. [4] For whilst the Medici contended with some other families of equal authority and influence, those citizens who were jealous of their power could openly oppose them without fear of being crushed at the very outset of their opposition; for the magistrates having become free, neither of the parties had cause for apprehension. [5] But after the victory of 14664 the whole government became as it were concentrated in the hands of the Medici, who acquired so much authority that those who were dissatisfied with it concluded that they must either submit patiently, or resort to a conspiracy if they wished to put an end to that state of things. But conspiracies rarely succeed, and very often cause the ruin of those who set them on foot, whilst those against whom they were aimed are only the more aggrandized thereby. [6] So that a sovereign who is assailed by such means, if he is not killed, as was Galeazzo, Duke of Milan, (which rarely happens, however) rises to greater power, and very often becomes bad after having originally been good. For such attempts inspire a prince with fear, and fear brings with it the necessity of securing himself, and this causes violence and wrong to others, whence hatreds are engendered, which in turn often lead to the ruin of the prince. [7] And thus these conspiracies quickly cause the ruin of those who originate them, and in the course of time prove most injurious to those against whom they were directed.5

126  On Conspiracies

2. Differences Between the Family of the Pazzi and That of the Medici [1] Italy was divided at this time by two leagues, as we have shown above;6 the Pope and the king of Naples7 on the one side, and the Venetians, the Duke of Milan, and the Florentines on the other; and although they had not yet come to actual war, yet every day fresh causes occurred for its breaking out. Above all, the Supreme Pontiff sought on all occasions to injure the Florentines. [2] Thus, upon the death of Messer Filippo de’ Medici,8 Archbishop of Pisa, the Pope, in opposition to the wishes of the Signoria of Florence, invested Francesco Salviati,9 a declared enemy of the Medici, with the archbishopric. [3] And as the Signoria were not willing to give him possession of it, further difficulties resulted. [4] Moreover, the Pope did everything in Rome to favor the family of the Pazzi,10 and took every occasion to show disfavor to the Medici.11 [5] The family of the Pazzi were at that time one of the most distinguished in Florence, both by their wealth and nobility. The head of the family was Messer Jacopo,12 whom the people had created a noble on account of his birth and wealth. [6] He had no children except one illegitimate son;13 but he had a number of nephews, the sons of his brothers, Messers Piero and Antonio; the sons of the first were Guglielmo, Francesco, Rinato, and Giovanni, and those of the other were Andrea, Niccolo, and Galeotto. [7] Cosimo de’ Medici, in view of the opulence and rank of the Pazzi, had given his niece Bianca14 in marriage to Guglielmo, hoping by this alliance to unite the two families more closely, and to put an end to the hatreds and enmities that were constantly arising from their mutual suspicions. [8] But so uncertain and fallacious are all human calculations, that it turned out just the reverse; for some of Lorenzo’s counsellors pointed out to him that it would be most hazardous and adverse to his authority to unite so much wealth and power in the hands of any one citizen; [9] and for this reason Messer Jacopo and his nephews did not obtain those places and dignities, which in the estimation of other citizens they seemed to merit. This was the first thing to excite the anger of the Pazzi and the apprehensions of the Medici—and as the one increased, the other grew likewise; whence the Pazzi, on every occasion when they came in competition with other citizens, were not favorably regarded by the magistrates. [10] Francesco dei Pazzi being at Rome,15 the Council of the Eight, forgetful of that respect which it was customary to observe towards distinguished citizens, compelled him for some slight reason to return to Florence; so that the Pazzi complained of it everywhere in offensive and disdainful language, which only increased the suspicions of the others, and served to bring more injuries upon themselves. [11] Giovanni dei Pazzi16 had married the daughter of Giovanni Borromei,17 an exceedingly rich man, and whose entire wealth had descended on his death to his daughter, who was his only child. [12] But his nephew Carlo held possession of some of his property, and, the matter having come to litigation, a law was passed, by virtue of which the wife of Giovanni dei Pazzi

The Conspiracy Against the Medici  127 was despoiled of her paternal inheritance, which was conceded to Carlo;18 this wrong the Pazzi ascribed altogether to the influence of the Medici. [13] Giuliano de’ Medici often remonstrated on this subject with his brother Lorenzo, saying that he feared that by attempting to grasp too much they would lose all.

3. Conspiracy of the Pazzi, in Which Pope Sixtus IV and the King of Naples Are Implicated [1] But Lorenzo in the heat of youth and power wanted to direct everything himself, and wanted to have everyone recognize his authority. [2] The Pazzi, on the other hand, proud of their rank and wealth, could not bear to submit to all these wrongs, and began to think of revenge. [3] The first to propose anything definite against the Medici was Francesco, [4] who was more sensitive and high-spirited than the others; so that he resolved either to recover what he had lost, or to lose what he possessed. [5] And as the government of Florence was odious to him, he lived almost entirely at Rome, where, according to the custom of Florentine merchants, he carried on large financial operations. [6] And being intimately allied with the Count Girolamo,19 they often complained to each other of the Medici, and came to the conclusion that, if they wished to live secure, the one in the enjoyment of his estates, and the other in his city, it would be necessary to change the government of Florence; which they thought however could not be done without the death of Giuliano and Lorenzo. [7] They judged that the Pope and the king would readily agree to this, provided they could convince them of the facility with which this could be effected. [8] Having once taken up this idea, they communicated the whole matter to Francesco Salviati, Archbishop of Pisa, who being an ambitious man, and still smarting under a recent injury received at the hands of the Medici, readily concurred with them. [9] And after examining as to the best course to be adopted, they resolved, as the best means of insuring success, to draw Messer Jacopo dei Pazzi into their plans, believing that without his co-operation they could affect nothing. [10] For this purpose it was deemed best that Francesco dei Pazzi should go to Florence, and that the Archbishop and the Count Girolamo should remain in Rome near the Pope, so as to be able to communicate the matter to him at the proper time. [11] Francesco found Messer Jacopo more cautious and difficult than he had anticipated; and having so informed his friends at Rome, it was thought necessary to influence him through higher authority. Thereupon the Archbishop and the Count Girolamo communicated the whole matter to Giovan Battista da Montesecco,20 the Pope’s Condottiere, [12] who had a high reputation as a soldier, and was under obligations both to the Pope and the Count. But he pointed out to them the difficulties and dangers of the undertaking, [13] which the Archbishop endeavored to explain away, pointing out in turn the important aid which the Pope and the king of Naples would lend to the enterprise; and, above all, the hatred which the citizens

128  On Conspiracies of Florence bore to the Medici, the numerous relatives that would follow the Salviati and the Pazzi, and the facility with which Giuliano and Lorenzo could be killed, they being in the habit of walking through the city unaccompanied and unsuspecting; as also the ease with which the government could be changed after their death. [14] Battista did not entirely believe all this, having heard many of the Florentines speak very differently.

4.  Continuation of the Same [1] Whilst the conspirators were occupied with these projects and discussions, Carlo, lord of Faenza,21 fell sick, so that his speedy death was apprehended. [2] The Archbishop and the Count Girolamo thought this a suitable occasion for sending Giovan Battista to Florence, and thence into the Romagna, on pretence of recovering certain lands of his of which the lord of Faenza had held possession. [3] The Count therefore commissioned Giovan Battista to seek an interview with Lorenzo, and in his name to solicit his advice as to how best to proceed in this affair of the Romagna; and to confer with Francesco dei Pazzi and then unitedly to endeavor to persuade Messer Jacopo to come into their views. [4] And to enable Giovan Battista to bring to bear upon Messer Jacopo the authority of the Pope, they caused him, before his departure, to have an interview with the pontiff, who promised to give them all the assistance in his power for their undertaking. [5] Giovan Battista, having arrived at Florence, called upon Lorenzo, who received him most graciously, and advised him most kindly and judiciously in relation to the points he had submitted to him. Giovan Battista was filled with admiration for Lorenzo, having found him to all appearances quite a different man from what had been represented to him; and he judged him to be gentle and wise, and most amicably disposed towards the Count. [6] Nevertheless he wanted to confer with Francesco; but not finding him, as he was absent at Lucca, he had an interview with Messer Jacopo, who was at first quite indisposed to entertain the affair; [7] but before he left him he was somewhat moved by the authority of the Pope, in consequence of which he requested Giovan Battista to go on his trip to the Romagna and return, and said that meantime Francesco would be back in Florence, and they could then discuss the matter more fully. [8] Giovan Battista accordingly went and returned, and after the pretended consultation with Lorenzo about the affairs of the Count, he met Messer Jacopo and Francesco dei Pazzi and succeeded in inducing Messer Jacopo to consent to the enterprise. [9] Thereupon they discussed the mode of proceeding. [10] Messer Jacopo did not think it practicable whilst the two brothers Medici were in Florence, and therefore suggested that they should wait until Lorenzo should go to Rome, as it was generally reported he intended doing; and that then the plot might be carried out. [11] Francesco was pleased at the idea of Lorenzo’s going to Rome, but maintained that, even if he did not go there, both brothers might be killed either at some wedding or play, or in church. [12] And

The Conspiracy Against the Medici  129 as to foreign aid, he thought that the Pope might get troops enough together under pretence of an attempt upon the castle of Montone, there being good reason for taking it from the Count Carlo,22 on account of the disturbances which he had created in the territory of Sienna and Perugia, which we have related above.23 [13] They came, however, to no further conclusion than that Francesco dei Pazzi and Giovan Battista should go to Rome and there arrange everything with the Count and the Pope. [14] The subject was discussed anew in Rome, and finally it was concluded that, the attempt upon Montone being determined upon, Giovan Francesco da Tolentino,24 one of the Pope’s captains, should go into the Romagna, and Messer Lorenzo da Castello25 into his own country, and that both should hold themselves in readiness, with their own companies and the troops of their respective countries, to act according to the orders of the Archbishop Salviati and Francesco dei Pazzi; that these should come to Florence together with Giovan Battista da Montesecco, and there provide everything necessary for the execution of the plot, for which King Ferdinand, through his ambassador, had promised all needed assistance. [15] When the Archbishop and Francesco dei Pazzi had come to Florence they drew Jacopo, son of Messer Poggio,26 into their plot, a learned but ambitious youth, and ever eager for novelty. They also drew in the two Jacopo Salviatis, the one a brother27 and the other a relative28 of the Archbishop. They furthermore brought in Bernardo Bandini29 and Napoleone Franzesi,30 ardent youths, and greatly attached to the family of the Pazzi. [16] Amongst the foreigners who joined besides the above named were Messer Antonio da Volterra,31 and one Stefano,32 a priest, who taught Latin to the daughter of Messer Jacopo dei Pazzi. [17] Rinato dei Pazzi,33 a grave and prudent man, and who well knew all the ills that flow from similar enterprises, did not join in the conspiracy, but rather expressed his detestation of it, and did all that he honestly could do to break it up.

5.  Organization of the Conspiracy [1] The Pope had sent Raffaello di Riario,34 a nephew of the Count Girolamo, to the University of Pisa for the purpose of studying the ecclesiastical laws, and whilst still there the Pope promoted him to the dignity of Cardinal. [2] The conspirators deemed it advisable to bring this Cardinal to Florence, so that they might avail of his presence to conceal amongst his retinue such associates as they might need, and who might thus take part in the execution of the plot. [3] The Cardinal came, and was received by Messer Jacopo dei Pazzi at his villa of Montughi, near Florence. [4] The conspirators intended also, by his means, to bring Lorenzo and Giuliano to the same place at the same time, so that they might on that occasion put them both to death. [5] They managed therefore to have the Cardinal invited by them to a banquet at their villa at Fiesole. Giuliano, however, either from chance or purposely, did not attend this banquet. Having been disappointed in this plan, the

130  On Conspiracies conspirators thought that, if they were to invite the Medici to a banquet in Florence, both brothers would surely come. [6] This being agreed upon, Lorenzo and Giuliano were invited for Sunday, April 26, 1478; [7] and the conspirators, confident of being able to kill them in the midst of this feast, convened on Saturday night, and made all necessary dispositions for the execution of their design on the following day. [8] But when Sunday came, Francesco was notified that Giuliano would not appear at the banquet. [9] The chiefs of the conspiracy therefore met again, and concluded that it would not do to postpone the execution any longer; as it would be impossible to avoid discovery, the plot being known to so many. [10] They therefore resolved to kill them in the cathedral church of Santa Reparata, where the two brothers would come according to their custom, especially as the Cardinal was to be there. [11] They wanted Giovan Battista to undertake the killing of Lorenzo, and Francesco dei Pazzi and Bernardo Bandini were to despatch Giuliano. [12] But Giovan Battista refused, either because his feelings towards Lorenzo had become mollified by the intercourse he had had with him, or for some other reason. He said that he would never have audacity enough to commit so great an outrage in church, and thus add sacrilege to treason. [13] This was the beginning of the ruin of their plot. For time pressing, they were obliged to entrust the killing of Lorenzo to Messer Antonio da Volterra and the priest Stefano, who were both by nature and habit entirely unfit for so great an undertaking; for if any act requires boldness and intrepidity, and that resoluteness in life and disregard of death which only great experience can give, it is such an occasion, where it has often been seen that even men experienced in arms and accustomed to blood have had their courage fail them. [14] But having finally decided upon this course, they agreed that the signal for action should be when the priest, who celebrated the principal mass, should take the communion; and in the meantime the Archbishop Salviati with Jacopo di Messer Poggio and their followers should seize the public palace, so that the Signoria either voluntarily or by force would have to act with them after the death of the two young Medici.

6. Execution of the Plot. Giuliano de’ Medici Is Killed; Lorenzo Saves Himself [1] This arrangement having been determined upon, they went into the church, where the Cardinal had already arrived with Lorenzo de’ Medici. [2] The church was crowded with people, and divine service had already commenced, but Giuliano had not yet come. Francesco dei Pazzi, therefore, together with Bernardo, who had been designated to kill Giuliano, went to his house, and by artful persuasion induced him to go to the church. [3] It is really a noteworthy fact that so much hatred and the thoughts of so great an outrage could be concealed under so much resoluteness of heart, as was the case with Francesco and Bernardo; for on the way to church, and even after

The Conspiracy Against the Medici  131 having entered it, they entertained him with jests and youthful pleasantries. And Francesco even, under pretence of caressing him, felt him with his hands and pressed him in his arms for the purpose of ascertaining whether he wore a cuirass or any other means of protection under his garments. [4] Both Giuliano and Lorenzo de’ Medici knew the bitter feelings of the Pazzi towards them, and their anxiety to deprive them of the government of the state; but they had no apprehensions for their lives, believing that, if the Pazzi were to attempt anything, it would be by civil proceedings and not by violence; and therefore, not being apprehensive of their personal safety, they simulated a friendly feeling for them. [5] The murderers thus prepared placed themselves, some close by the side of Lorenzo, which the great crowd in the church enabled them to do easily without exciting suspicion, and the others near to Giuliano. [6] At the appointed moment Bernardo Bandini struck Giuliano in the breast with a short dagger which he had prepared for the purpose. After a few steps Giuliano fell to the ground, and Francesco dei Pazzi threw himself upon him covering him with wounds, and was so maddened by the fury with which he assailed Giuliano that he inflicted a severe wound upon himself in one of his legs. [7] Messer Antonio and Stefano, on the other hand, attacked Lorenzo, but after many blows succeeded only in wounding him slightly in the throat; for either their irresolution, or the courage of Lorenzo, who on finding himself assailed defended himself with his weapon, or the interference of bystanders, defeated all their efforts to kill him, so that becoming alarmed they fled and concealed themselves, [8] but being found were ignominiously put to death, and their bodies dragged through the whole city.35 [9] Lorenzo, on the other hand, together with the friends he had around him, shut himself up in the sacristy of the church. [10] Bernardo Bandini, seeing Giuliano dead, also killed Francesco Nori,36 a devoted friend of the Medici, either because of some old hatred, or because Francesco attempted to assist Giuliano. And not content with these two murders, he rushed to seek Lorenzo, so as to make good by his courage and swiftness what the others by their cowardice and tardiness had failed to do; but Lorenzo being shut up in the sacristy, Bernardo could not carry out his intention. In the midst of these violent and tumultuous scenes, which were so terrible that it seemed as though the church itself were falling, the Cardinal took refuge by the altar, where he was with difficulty saved by two priests, until the alarm had somewhat abated, when the Signoria were enabled to conduct him to his palace, where he remained in greatest apprehension until his liberation.

7. The Archbishop Salviati, Whilst Attempting to Make Himself Master of the Palace, Is Taken and Hung [1] There happened at this time in Florence certain citizens of Perugia, whom the violence of faction had driven from their homes; these the Pazzi

132  On Conspiracies had drawn into their plot by promises of restoring them to their country. The Archbishop Salviati, who went to seize the palace together with Jacopo di Messer Poggio and his relatives and friends, took these Perugians with him; [2] and having arrived at the palace he left a portion of his followers below, with orders that, upon the first noise they heard, they were at once to occupy the entrance of the palace, whilst he himself with the larger number of the Perugians rushed upstairs, where he found the Signoria at dinner, for it was already late; but after a short time he was admitted by the Gonfaloniere of Justice, Cesare Petrucci.37 [3] He entered with a few of his followers, leaving the rest outside; the greater portion of these shut themselves up in the chancellery, the door of which was so arranged that, once closed, it could neither be opened from the inside nor the outside without the key. [4] The Archbishop meantime, having entered the hall together with the Gonfaloniere on pretence of having something to communicate to him on behalf of the Pope, addressed him in an incoherent and suspicious manner, so that his language and change of countenance excited such suspicion in the Gonfaloniere that he rushed out shouting, and, meeting Jacopo di Messer Poggio, he seized him by the hair and gave him in charge of two sergeants. [5] The Signoria, having taken the alarm, quickly seized such arms as chance supplied them, and all those who had come upstairs with the Archbishop, most of whom were shut up in the chancellery and the rest terror-stricken, were either slain or thrown alive out of the palace windows, between which the Archbishop, the two Jacopo Salviatis, and Jacopo di Messer Poggio were hanged. [6] Those who remained below had forced the guard and the gate, and occupied the entire lower floor of the palace; so that the citizens, who upon hearing the alarm had rushed to the palace, could neither give aid nor counsel to the Signoria.

8.  Fate of the Other Conspirators [1] Meantime Francesco dei Pazzi and Bernardo Bandini, seeing that Lorenzo had escaped and that the one of them on whom the success of the conspiracy mainly depended was seriously wounded, became alarmed. Bernardo, with the same promptness and courage in behalf of his own safety that he had displayed against his enemies, the Medici, saved himself by flight. [2] Francesco, having returned to his own house, tried to mount on horseback, for it was arranged that they should ride through the city and call the people to arms and liberty; but the wound in his leg and the consequent great loss of blood prevented him. He therefore undressed, and throwing himself naked upon his bed, he begged Messer Jacopo to do what he himself could not. [3] Messer Jacopo, though old and unaccustomed to scenes of violence, yet, by way of a last effort to save their fortunes, mounted a horse, and, followed by about one hundred armed men gathered for this purpose, went to the Piazza, calling for help on behalf of the people and of liberty. [4] But the one having been made deaf by the wealth and liberality of the Medici, and

The Conspiracy Against the Medici  133 the other being unknown in Florence, his calls remained unheeded by any one. [5] The Signori, on the other hand, who were masters of the upper part of the palace, greeted him with stones and menaces. [6] Whilst hesitating, Messer Jacopo was met by his brother-in-law, Giovanni Serristori,38 who reproved him for the riot they had occasioned and advised him to return home, as the other citizens had the people’s welfare and liberty as much at heart as he. [7] Messer Jacopo, bereft of all hope therefore, and seeing the palace in the hands of the enemy, Lorenzo safe, and the people not disposed to follow him, and being at a loss what else to do, resolved if possible to save his life by flight, and with such followers as were with him in the Piazza he left Florence to go into the Romagna.

9. The Dangers to Which Lorenzo Has Been Exposed Increase the Love of the Florentines for Him and His Power. Punishment of the Conspirators [1] Meantime the whole city was in arms, and Lorenzo de’ Medici accompanied by many armed men had returned to his house. [2] The palace was recovered by the people, and those who had seized it were all captured and put to death, [3] and the name of the Medici was shouted throughout the whole city; whilst the heads and limbs of the conspirators were paraded on pikes or dragged through the streets, and the Pazzi were pursued by everybody with violent abuse and acts of cruelty. [4] Their houses were already in the possession of the populace, and Francesco was dragged naked from his bed and led to the palace, and there hung by the side of the Archbishop and the others. [5] But it was impossible either on the way there or afterwards to induce Francesco by any degree of maltreatment to say one word of what had been said or done by the conspirators; and fixedly looking in another direction he sighed in silence without one word of complaint. [6] Guglielmo dei Pazzi, brother-in-law of Lorenzo, was saved in Lorenzo’s house, both on account of his innocence and through the influence of his wife Bianca. [7] Every citizen, armed or not, called at Lorenzo’s house on this occasion to offer him his personal service or his substance; such was the power and public favor which the house of Medici had acquired by their prudence and liberality. [8] Rinato dei Pazzi was living in retirement at his villa when these disturbances occurred. When he heard of the affair, he attempted to fly in disguise, but was recognized on the road and captured and carried to Florence; [9] and although he repeatedly entreated his captors to kill him on the road, yet he could not prevail upon them to do it. [10] Messers Jacopo and Rinato were condemned to death, and executed four days after the attempt upon the Medici. Amongst the many persons that were killed during those days, and whose limbs encumbered the highways, Messer Rinato was the only one that excited commiseration; for he had ever been regarded as a wise and good man, and was known to be free from that pride of which the other members of the Pazzi family were accused. [11] And so that these

134  On Conspiracies events might not fail to serve as an extraordinary example, Messer Jacopo, who at first was buried in the tomb of his ancestors, was removed thence, like an excommunicated person, and interred outside of the city walls.39 And even from there his body was taken and dragged naked through the entire city with the very rope with which he had been hanged; and then, as though unfit to be buried in the earth, the same persons who had dragged the body through the streets of Florence, cast it into the waters of the river Arno, which were at that moment unusually high. [12] A truly memorable instance of the instability of fortune, for a man to fall from such a position of wealth and prosperity, to such a depth of misfortune, ruin, and disgrace. [13] Messer Jacopo dei Pazzi was said to have had some vices, amongst others gaming and swearing, which were compensated for, however, by his many charities, for he gave most liberally to the churches and the poor. [14] It may also be said in his favor, that, on the Saturday preceding the Sunday that was devoted to so many murders, he discharged all his debts, so as to save others from being involved in his misfortunes; and returned with the most scrupulous care to the real owners all the goods which he had in his own and in the public warehouse belonging to others. [15] Giovan Battista da Montesecco was beheaded after a lengthy examination; Napoleone Franzesi escaped by flight from the punishment of death; Guglielmo dei Pazzi was exiled; and such of his cousins as remained alive were imprisoned in the lowest dungeons of the castle of Volterra. [16] All these disturbances being thus ended and the conspirators punished, the obsequies of Giuliano de’ Medici were celebrated with general lamentations; for he had possessed as much liberality and humanity as could be desired in any one born to such high fortune. [17] He left a natural son, born a few months after his death, who was named Giulio,40 and who had all the virtues and good fortune now known to the whole world, and of whom we shall speak more fully when we come to the affairs of the present day if God spares our life. [18] The troops that had been collected under Giovan Francesco da Tolentino in the Romagna, and under Messer Lorenzo da Castello in the Val di Tevere, and who were already on the march to Florence to support the conspirators, returned home when they heard of the disastrous failure of the enterprise.

10. The Pope Excommunicates Florence, and Together With the King of Naples Makes War Upon the Republic. Lorenzo Speaks to the Citizens Assembled in the Palace [1] As the hoped for changes in the government of Florence did not take place, the Pope and the king of Naples resolved to bring about by war what the conspiracy had failed to effect. Both gathered their armies with all possible speed for the purpose of attacking the government of Florence, publishing to the world at the same time that all they wanted of the city of Florence was that they should remove Lorenzo de’ Medici from it, he being

The Conspiracy Against the Medici  135 the only one of all their citizens whom they regarded as an enemy. [2] The king’s troops had already passed the Tronto, and those of the Pope were at Perugia, when the latter, by way of making the Florentines feel his spiritual as well as his temporal power, excommunicated and anathematized them.41 [3] The Florentines, seeing such large forces moving against them, made the utmost exertions to prepare for their defense. [4] As it was generally reported that this war was particularly aimed at Lorenzo, he resolved before anything else to assemble the Signori in the palace, and with them all the most distinguished citizens, to the number of three hundred, [5] whom he addressed in the following words: ‘I know not, most excellent Signori, and you, illustrious citizens, whether to lament with you at the events that have taken place, or whether to rejoice at them. [6] Certainly, when I think of the deep deception and bitter hatred with which I was assailed and my brother murdered, I cannot but feel overwhelmed with sadness, and lament them with all my heart and soul. [7] But on the other hand, when I consider with what promptitude, zeal, and love, and with what universal accord, my brother was avenged and myself defended, then I not only feel that I have cause for rejoicing, but actually have an inward feeling of exaltation and glory. [8] For truly, if experience has shown that I have more enemies in the city than I had supposed, it has also proved to me that I have more ardent and devoted friends than I had ever believed. [9] I am forced, then, to lament with you on account of the wrongs done to others; but at the same time I must rejoice because of your kindness to me. But in proportion as these wrongs were unusual and unprecedented, and the less they were deserved by us, the more am I constrained to grieve at them. [10] For consider, O illustrious citizens, to what a degree of ill fortune our house has been brought, that we could not be secure in the midst of friends and relatives, and not even in the church itself. [11] Those who have occasion to fear for their lives generally look to their friends and relatives for aid; but we found ours armed for our destruction. The churches usually are a place of refuge for those who are persecuted for private purposes or for reasons of state; [12] but where others look for friendly aid, there we found assassins; and where parricides and murderers find an asylum, there the Medici found their death! [13] But God, who had never before abandoned our house, has even now saved us, and has taken the defense of our just cause into his own hands. [14] What injury have we done to anyone to provoke such a desire for revenge? Truly those who have shown themselves such violent enemies of ours had never received any private wrongs at our hands; for had we been disposed to injure them, they would never have had the opportunity of injuring us. [15] If they attribute to us any public wrongs they may have suffered, and of which I know nothing, they insult you more than us, and this palace and the majesty of this government more than our house. For it would go to show that you have undeservedly wronged your own citizens on our account, which is very far from the truth; for you would no more have done it than we would have asked it. [16] And whoever will honestly seek for the truth of the matter will

136  On Conspiracies find that the advancement of our family has ever been by general consent, and for no other reason than because we have striven to oblige every one with kindness and liberality and with benefits. [17] If, then, we have treated strangers thus, how can it be supposed that we would outrage our own relatives? If they were influenced by the desire for dominion, as would seem to have been the case from their seizing the palace and coming armed into the Piazza, then that of itself shows their detestable ambition and damnable designs, and condemns them. If they did it from jealousy and hatred of our authority, then the offense was greater to you than to us; for it was you who gave us that authority. [18] Certainly the authority which men usurp merits hatred, but not that which is gained by kindness, liberality, and munificence. [19] And you know that our house never attained any rank to which they were not raised by this Signoria and your unanimous consent. [20] It was not force of arms and violence that brought my grandfather Cosimo back from exile, but it was your unanimous desire and approval; and it was not my aged and infirm father who defended the state against its many enemies, but you defended him with your benevolence and authority. Nor could I (being at that time, as it were, but a boy) have maintained the rank and dignity of my house had it not been for your counsels and your favor. [21] Our house never did and never could have directed the affairs of this republic, if you, jointly with them, had not sustained and directed them. [22] I know not, therefore, what reason they could have had for hating us, nor what just grounds for jealousy. Let them show hatred to their own ancestors, who, by their pride and avarice, lost that influence which ours knew how to acquire by the very opposite means and efforts. [23] But admit even that the injuries done them by us were very great, and that they were justified in seeking our destruction, yet this would not justify their attempt to seize this palace. Why league themselves with the king of Naples and the Pope against the liberties of this republic? Why break the long peace of Italy? [24] They have no excuse for all this. Let them assail those who have wronged them, but let them not confound private enmities with public wrongs. [25] It is this that increases our troubles and misfortunes even after their defeat; for in their stead come the Pope and the king of Naples to make war upon us, which they assert is aimed at me and at my house. [26] Would to God that this were true, for then the remedy would be prompt and sure; for I should not be so base a citizen as to prefer my safety to your dangers, but I would infinitely rather avert the danger from you at the risk of my own destruction. [27] But as the powerful always cover their unjust acts with some less dishonest pretext, so have our enemies taken this mode of cloaking their ambitious designs. [28] Should you, however, think differently, then I can only say that I am in your hands; it is for you to direct me or not, as you please. You are my fathers and my defenders, and I shall submit at all times with pleasure to your instructions, and shall never refuse, whenever it may seem good to you, to terminate with my own blood this war, which was begun with that of my brother.’

The Conspiracy Against the Medici  137 [29] The citizens could not refrain from tears whilst Lorenzo spoke; and with the same feelings with which they had listened to him one of their number responded, saying that ‘the city of Florence recognized the great merits of himself and his family, and that Lorenzo might remain of good cheer; for with the same promptitude with which they had avenged his brother’s death and saved his own life they would assure him his authority and influence, which he should never lose so long as they possessed their country.’ [30] And to make their acts correspond with their words, they provided at once a certain number of armed men to serve as a bodyguard to Lorenzo, to protect him against insidious attacks of domestic enemies.

Notes 1 Florentine Histories, VIII, 1–10. The section titles are by Christian E. Detmold, the English translator, and not by Machiavelli. 2 Machiavelli is referring to the conspiracy organized in January, 1476 against the Duke of Milan, Galeazzo Maria Sforza. Galeazzo was killed during an ambush organized by three young Milanese noblemen with republican sentiments— Machiavelli reports this event in the Florentine Histories, VII, 33–34. 3 Machiavelli is referring to what is written in the Discourses, III, 6 and The Prince, XIX. 4 The reference here is to a failed insurrection attempt in 1466 by some sections of the Florentine oligarchy led against Piero de’ Medici (1416–1469). These events are reported by Machiavelli in the Florentine Histories, VII, 10–20. 5 In this passage, Machiavelli seems to introduce a nuanced on judgment of the counterproductive character of conspiracies. If, on one hand, they lead often to the ruin of those who organize and realize them, on the other, they end up producing a negative consequence even on the one who is the subject and victim. Perhaps the intended victim succeeds in saving his life, in making the conspiratorial plan fail and in repressing with blood the dissidents, but the prince’s prestige (that is to say his popular consensus), in perspective, becomes fatally damaged by his having been the target of a secret conspiracy. Not taking into account the suspicion, difficult to eliminate, that the conspiracy seemingly thwarted or failed could have been in reality invented, designed or manipulated by the prince himself with the aim of repressing his opponents or to curry the favor of the people by presenting himself as a victim. 6 Reference to Florentine Histories, VII, 31. 7 Sixtus IV (reigning from 1471 to 1484) and Ferdinand I of Aragon (reigning from 1458 to 1494). 8 Filippo de’ Medici (1426–1474), son of Vieri and Auretta Nerli, belonged to a secondary branch of the family. After the failure of the family banking enterprise, Cosimo de’ Medici (1389–1464) took him under his protection. Probably influenced by a paternal uncle, Donato (1402–1474), who was Bishop of Pistoia from 1436, Filippo started an ecclesiastic career. In 1457, he obtained the episcopal seat in Arezzo and in 1458 he was nominated Referendary of the Curia, to finally end up as Archbishop in Pisa starting from January, 1461. His ambition to the cardinal purple was thwarted by the choice of Lorenzo, on coming to power in 1469, of entrusting to his brother Giuliano the ecclesiastical politics of the Medici family. 9 Francesco di Bernardo Salviati (?–1478) belonged to a historical Florentine family, whose members filled at various times the most important city offices (62 of

138  On Conspiracies them were Priors and 20 Gonfalonieri of Justice). On the 14th of October, 1474, after the death of Filippo de’ Medici, Francesco was named Archbishop of Pisa by the Pope, without any attempt to secure the consent of Florence, contrary to the normal procedure. As Machiavelli recalls immediately afterwards in the text, a dispute arose between the Curia and the Seigniory, with this last succeeding in delaying for about three years the assignment of the prelate, to whom in the meantime were uselessly proposed other seats. But the hostility of Salviati against Lorenzo dated back to when Lorenzo, a few years earlier, had opposed his appointment as Archbishop of Florence after the sudden death of the Cardinal Pietro Riario: the office then given to the brother-in-law of the Magnificent, Rinaldo Orsini, who held it from 1474 to 1508. 10 The Pazzi family—accredited by some chroniclers as a genealogy dating its origins back to the Roman Era (the Paccia gens) or to the Early Middle Ages (Pazzo di Ranieri could have been the mercenary captain who, during the first Crusade, was the first to plant the Christian emblem on the wall of Jerusalem)—had a primary role in Florence, according to what is reported by the most reliable historiographic sources, starting from the first half of the 14th century when some of its representatives stood out as militants of the Guelphs faction. During that period, the Pazzi already fell under the wool merchant corporation and started to be involved in finance. The origin of their great economic fortune, which extended well beyond Florence’s borders, can be ascribed to Andrea di Guglielmino de’ Pazzi (1371–1445), father of Antonio, Piero, and Jacopo. 11 Their conflict with the papal authority cost the Medici their withdrawl—to the benefit of the Pazzi—from the offices and concessions they had in Rome. They had to renounce management of the Vatican finances (being until that moment the depositary of the Apostolic Camera) and the profitable monopoly on alum extraction within the papal territories. 12 Jacopo Pazzi (1422–1478), besides incrementing the family businesses by carrying on the actions of his father Andrea, held various public offices. He was ambassador to the Emperor and King of Naples in 1467, in 1469 and 1474; Prior in 1453 and 1463; one of the Eight in 1457, in 1460 and 1468; and Gonfaloniere of Justice in 1469. Due to his age, prestige, and wealth during the time of the conspiracy, he was considered the lord of his family. 13 Even if the translator uses the word son, she was a daughter. Her name was Caterina (1463–1490), and after the massacre and the diaspora of her family she embraced the monastic life, retiring to the Benedictine cloister of Monticelli. 14 Bianca de’ Medici (1455–1488) was the daughter of Lucrezia Tornabuoni and elder sister of Lorenzo and Giuliano. In 1459 (1460, according to some sources) she married—by her grandfather’s will, who in this way was aiming to tighten a political-economic alliance among the two families—Guglielmo de’ Pazzi (1437– 1516), son of Antonio, and together they had 16 children. After the conspiracy, she was exiled along with her husband. Guglielmo also held prestigious public offices: Prior in 1467, member of the Eight in 1469, member of the Council of Two Hundred in 1470, and Consul of the Mint in 1475. 15 Francesco (1444–1478) took care of the family business in Rome. 16 Giovanni (1439–1481) was the brother of Francesco, Guglielmo, and Andrea. In 1472, he was a member of the Priors of Liberty. 17 Beatrice Borromei. 18 The law, De testamentis (‘Qualiter mulier ab intestato succedat’), approved with retroactive effect on the 18th of March, 1477, stated that in the absence of a written will, the estate must be inherited by the male descendants of the deceased (the sons or, as in this case, the grandchildren) instead of the daughters or female descendants.

The Conspiracy Against the Medici  139 19 Girolamo Riario (1443–1488), nephew of Pope Sixtus IV, was Lord of Imola and Forlì. In 1477 he married Caterina, daughter of Galeazzo Maria Sforza. He was among the most important architects of the conspiracy against the Medici brothers. His implacable hatred for them was born when Lorenzo, in 1473, tried to impede the acquisition of Imola by Count Girolamo, whose ambition was to build a principate in Romagna thanks to the political-financial support of his uncle, the pontiff. Girolamo, escaped the revenge of the Medici after the failure of the conspiracy, but was in turn victim of a conspiracy. Having lost the protection of the Church after the election to the papacy of Innocent VIII in 1484, he was slaughtered in his palace in Forlì on the 14th of April, 1488 by a group of nobles lead by Ludovico and Checco Orsi, displeased by his exorbitant financial policies. In reality, according to many sources, the assassination was the inspiration of Cardinal Giuliano della Rovere (the future Pope Julius II), whose fear was that the Duchy of Milan—due to the weakness of Girolamo (who moreover was his cousin) and the actions of Caterina Sforza—could take possession of Imola and Forlì, taking them away from the control of Rome. Cf. Pellegrini (1999). 20 Giovanni Battista da Montesecco (first half of the 15th century–1478), native of the Marche, was a man of arms and captain always at the service of the Church. In 1469 he distinguished himself in Rimini during the fight between the papal troops and those of Roberto Malatesta. For his merit, he was named by Sixtus IV captain of the guard of the Apostolic Palace and chief official of the papal fortress of Castel Sant’Angelo. He had a decisive role in the organization of the conspiracy, in its negative outcome and in the historical reconstruction which was reported to posterity. He decided to organize on behalf of the Pope and his nephew Girolamo Riario, to whom he was bound by ties of devotion and loyalty the complex political-diplomatic plot which would have as its objective the elimination of the Medici brothers and a regime change in Florence. But on the initial opportunity and its effective realization Montesecco always nourished doubts: accentuated by his meetings with Lorenzo (who soon appeared to him in a perspective far from negative compared to how he was represented by his enemies) and became insuperable when he refused to let the Magnificent’s blood flow inside a sacred place. And this decision, which entailed the replacement at the last minute of an expert military man with two clergymen completely unfamiliar with arms, was what permitted Lorenzo to survive. Completely involved in the intrigue, notwithstanding this extreme change of mind, Montesecco was arrested and tortured. But before being beheaded on the 4th of May (his head was placed on the front door of the Palazzo del Podestà), he rendered a substantial written confession in which made explicit reference to the involvement of Sixtus IV and of the Count of Riario. The text of the confession was printed on the 4th of August and widely circulated in the following months by order of Lorenzo (who in this manner intended to counteract the Church’s propaganda against Florence), and it still represents today one of the privileged sources for a detailed reconstruction of the events, the intentions, and the maneuvers of those involved in the plot. The Confessione of Montesecco can be read in Capponi (1875: 509–20). Cf. also Simonetta (2014). 21 Carlo II Manfredi (1439–1484), firstborn son of Astorre II and Giovanna Vestri, was Lord of Faenza and Count of Val di Lamone. He owned the Seigniory of Faenza from 1468 to November 1477, when—gravely ill and believed close to death—he was removed from power by his brother Galeotto. 22 Carlo Fortebracci da Montone (1421–1479), son of Andrea or Braccio da Montone (1368–1424), mercenary captain and man of arms. The assault of Montone’s castle, on the way from Assisi to Città di Castello, would allow the pontiff’s troops to stop near the Tuscan border, waiting to assist the conspirators.

140  On Conspiracies 23 After fifteen years of fighting on the payroll of Venice, Carlo went back to Montone on the 27th of March, 1477, with the intention of establishing a dominion similar to the one instituted by his father Andrea. But left without a military engagement and in difficulties he devoted himself—counting on the support and complicity of Lorenzo—to raids and armed forays in the adjacent territories, from Perugia to Città di Castello, eventually threateing Siena for an ancient credit claimed by his father, who had died more than fifty years earlier. Those are ‘the disturbances’ which Machiavelli reports (partially narrated in the Florentine Histories, VII, 32) which were taken as a pretext by the Pope in order to seize the Montone’s castle—his delegates took it on the 23rd of October—with the idea of bringing peace back to the area. 24 Gian Francesco Mauruzzi da Tolentino (?–1487), mercenary captain and man of arms, was commander of the papal army in Romagna. 25 Lorenzo Giustini da Città di Castello (1430?–1487), jurist and mercenary captain, was ambassador of the Pope to the King of Naples Ferdinand I of Aragon. 26 Jacopo Bracciolini (1442–1478) was the son of the great humanist Poggio Bracciolini (1380–1459). He was friends with Marsilio Ficino and a member of the Platonic Academy. His literary fame was tied to some vernacular translations: the Historia Florentina written by his father (which was printed in 1476), the Scriptores Historiae Augustae, his father’s Latin version of the Ciropedia by Xenophon. Close to the Medici family (he dedicated to Lorenzo a Commento sopra il Trionfo della fama by Petrarch), he later bonded to the Pazzi and the Salviati (at the time of the conspiracy he was the secretary of the young Cardinal Raffaele Sansoni Riario). His change of mind was probably due to his characteristic restlessness (‘a learned but ambitious youth, and ever eager for novelty’, Machiavelli writes) and to his economic difficulties. His involvement in the conspiracy ended with his hanging. 27 Jacopo di Bernardo Salviati was the brother of the Archbishop of Pisa Francesco. 28 Jacopo di Iacopo Salviati was the cousin of the Archbishop Francesco and sonin-law of Filippo Tornabuoni. 29 Bernardo di Giovanni Bandini de’ Baroncelli (1420–1479), merchant and banker, belonged to a family tied to the Pazzi by business relationships. After the conspiracy—in which he had a materially decisive role (he was the first to mortally stab Giuliano) and to which he adhered hoping to straighten out his disastrous financial situation—he was able to escape towards Constantinople. He was captured by Mehmed II (‘the Grand Turk put into his [Lorenzo] hands Bernardo Bandini, the killer of his bother’: Florentine Histories, VIII, 36, 16) and consigned to the Florentine ambassador Antonio de’ Medici. Brought back to Florence in December, 1479, he was executed and hanged from the window of the Bargello. His tragic end was immortalized thanks to a very famous drawing by Leonardo da Vinci. 30 Napoleone di Antonio di Niccolò Franzesi da Staggia (?–1479) was tied by friendship and clientele relationships to the family of Guglielmo de’ Pazzi. Among the conspirators he was the only one who was able to escape Florentine justice and the Medici’s vendetta. 31 Antonio di Gherardo Maffei from Volterra (?–1478), a religious man, was a writer of the Apostolic Camera. In the months preceding the conspiracy, he was sent by the Roman Curia to Pisa with the assignment of bringing the galero to the young Riario Sansoni, who, on the 10th December, 1477, entered the Sacred College of Cardinals. He entered into a very close relationship with Salviati and the Pazzi. He joined the conspirators late, perhaps in part to take revenge for the sack of Volterra in 1472 after its rebellion against Florence, the sack for which responsibility was ascribed to Lorenzo. He was hanged.

The Conspiracy Against the Medici  141 32 Stefano di Niccolò from Bagnone in Val di Magra (?–1478), parish priest of Montemurlo, was secretary of Jacopo de’ Pazzi and protector of his natural daughter Caterina. He was hanged. 33 Renato de’ Pazzi (1442–1478) was the elder son of Piero. He was member of the Eight in 1474 and Official of the Mint in 1476, but he was more devoted to study than to politics and business. Even though unrelated to the conspiracy (in order to not be involved he left Florence in the days preceding the attack) he was executed anyway on the 28th of April. Once he understood that the revenge of the Medici would not spare anyone in his family, he tried to escape disguised as a farmer, but he was recognized, captured, and consigned to the authorities. 34 Raffaele Sansoni Riario (1460–1521), nephew of Girolamo and grandnephew of Sixtus IV, was named Cardinal of San Giorgio al Velabro on the 10th of December, 1477 (cf. above footnote No. 31). For his presence at the ambush of the Medici brothers—he was a guest of the Pazzi in those days, as can be read in Machiavelli’s report—he was considered an accomplice in the conspiracy and kept under arrest for a short time. In 1483 he was nominated Camerlengo and he moved to Rome. In 1517 he was again accused of taking part in a plot against another Medici, Leo X, planned by a group of cardinals led by Cardinal Alfonso Petrucci. Imprisoned in Castel Sant’Angelo, he was for a short time deprived of the cardinal purple. The passage of the young Cardinal in Florence—who was traveling towards Perugia where he had recently been named Papal legate—was the pretext (we can even say the lure) used by the conspirators to try to ‘drive out’ the two brothers, who were unlikely—concerning a papal relative—to refuse the invitation to participate in a public ceremony, a reception or a banquet offered in honor of the guest. And when they both would be exposed in one of these occasions, they would be. But the events, because of a sequence of accidents, delays and casualties, went in a different way. So it became necessary to prepare the ambush inside the Santa Reparata Cathedral (today Santa Maria del Fiore Cathedral), Sunday the 26th of April. Accidents and unexpected changes of plan (as well as unpredictable ones) can decide the fate of a conspiracy, as is the case of every other political action. Nothing surprising, obviously, for one who—like Machiavelli—had assigned an important place in human events to fate, contingency and the downsides of fortune. 35 In reading these lines, we can understand how the failure of the conspiracy was largely caused by the ‘irresolution’ of Antonio Maffei and Stefano Bagnoni. Having escaped from the temple, taking advantage of the confusion, the two clergymen took refuge in the Benedictine monastery of Badia, where they were captured on the 3rd of May to be immediately executed. The report by Machiavelli offers a version of the events that risks seeming temporally contracted to the reader and largely dramatized for narrative purposes. 36 Francesco di Antonio Nori, besides being a personal friend of Lorenzo, was a functionary of the Medici Bank. 37 Cesare di Domenico di Tano Petrucci was Podestà of Prato, a town under Florence’s dominion, during the time of the conspiracy organized by Bernardo Nardi and repressed in blood by the same Petrucci. We are talking about an episode reported by Machiavelli in the Florentine Histories, VII, 25–27. During the Pazzi conspiracy, Petrucci filled the office of Gonfaloniere of Justice and he would show the same determination against the conspirators already demonstrated at the time of his governance in Prato. 38 Giovanni di Antonio Serristori (1419–1494), devoted friend of the Medici, belonged to a rich merchant family. He filled important public offices: he was member of the Priors, of the Ten of Balia and Gonfaloniere of Justice. In 1442 Jacopo married Maddalena di Antonio Serristori, sister of the above-mentioned Giovanni.

142  On Conspiracies 39 Exhumed from the family’s grave in Santa Croce, where he was initially deposed, the corpse of Jacopo de’ Pazzi was newly buried in deconsecrated land. Rumors spread among the people that his blasphemous act was to be considered the origin of the floods that were striking Florence in those days. Everything took place on the 15th of May. But this was not enough to appease the rage of the Florentines. Two days later—as can be read in the report—the corpse was newly exhumed and dragged around the streets, before being reduced to pieces and thrown in the Arno River. 40 The reference here is to Cardinal Giulio de’ Medici (1478–1524), the future Clement VII, commissioner and dedicatee of the Florentine Histories. 41 Two Papal Bulls were issued against the Seigniory, whose printed versions were widely circulated among the different Italian and European Courts. The first, dated 1st of June (Iniquitatis filius et perditionis alumnus), besides providing for the excommunication of the city, ordered the immediate liberation of Cardinal Raffaele Sansoni Riario (which took place on the 13th of the same month). The second, dated 22nd of June, ordered the city’s interdiction. The conflict between Florence and Rome was also a propaganda war. The papal pronouncements were followed by libels and writings against the Medici family. Lorenzo, from his point of view, rallied no small intellectual energies in order to present his version of the conspiracy, to denounce the complex political plot that generated it (even if avoiding a direct accusation of the Pope) and to break the politicaldiplomatic encirclement which was generated to the detriment of Florence. It is in this climate of accusations and countercharges that the famous Coniurationis Commentarium by Angelo Poliziano was inserted. More than a historical reconstruction, the mentioned text represents the report of a live witness (Poliziano was present during the attack), written with clear polemic-propagandistic and apologetic intentions. The main objective of the libel—written in the summer of 1478 at Lorenzo’s request and immediately printed by the typographer Nicolò di Lorenzo della Magna—was indeed one of offering a reconstruction of the events finalized to cast a disreputable shadow on the main participants of the conspiracy and to glorify, also in the eyes of his enemies, the figure of the surviving Medici. Cf. Poliziano (2012).

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Index

Acton, Harold 22 – 3, 143 Adimari, Antonio 114 Adimari, Duccio 54 – 5 Agathocles, tyrant of Syracuse 104, 113, 122 Agrippina Vispania 109 Alamanni, Luigi (di Piero) 48 – 9 Alamanni, Luigi (di Tommaso) 48 – 9 Albizzi, Antonio Francesco degli 46 Alexamenes the Ætolian 100 Alexander VI 25, 30, 66, 88, 121, 123 – 4; see also Borgia, Rodrigo Alexander the Great, King of Macedonia 95 Alfieri, Vittorio 22 – 3, 144 Alfonso I d’Este, Duke of Ferrara 100, 111 Alfonso II 109 Alfonso of Aragon, Duke of Calabria see Alfonso II alliance/confederation/league 26, 29, 40, 114, 126, 130; Magione 25; matrimonial 118; political-military (collegazione) 27, 78 ambition 6 – 7, 14 – 16, 36, 47, 66, 68 – 9, 94, 97, 116, 136 Amelio da Castello 114 Ancelin, Thibaud 53 Angelier, Abel 85 Anglo, Sydney 26, 37, 62, 80, 143 Anselmi, Gian Mario 9, 56 – 7, 89, 143, 145 – 6 Antigonus III Doson, King of Macedonia 113 Antonio da Pantaneto 114 Antonio da Venafro see Giordani, Antonio Appiani, family (Piombino) 122 Archia, polemarch of Sparta 112

Arienzo, Alessandro 58, 148 Aristogeiton 112 Aristotimus, tyrant of Epirus 96 Aristotle 108 army 32 – 3, 104, 113, 114; Macedonian 110; papal 140; Spanish 45; Spartan 104 Astorre II Manfredi, Lord of Imola and Faenza 139 Attalus 108 authority 14 – 16, 20, 56, 66, 70, 72, 94, 97, 101, 104, 126 – 8, 136 – 8; to conspire against 68; sovereign 103 Bacchelli, Riccardo 55 Baglioni, Carlo 122 Baglioni, Giampaolo, Lord of Perugia 25, 27, 35, 122 – 4 Baglioni, Grifonetto 122 Bagnoni, Stefano 141 Bajazet II, Sultan of the Muslim empire 108 balance of power 8, 13, 22, 70 Bandini, Bernardo 19, 22, 75 – 6, 129 – 32, 140 Bandini de’ Baroncelli, Giovanni 140 Banfield, Laura F. 90 Barcia, Franco 23, 144 Bardi, Andrea de’ 67 Bardi, Piero de’ 67, 71, 75 Baron, Hans 4, 8, 50, 57, 143 Barons conspiracy 94, 109 Batstone William W. 58, 147 Bausi, Francesco 87, 90, 143 Becchi, Gentile 9, 24, 147 Belanti, Julius or Julio see Bellanti, Giulio Bellanti, family (Siena) 112 Bellanti, Giulio 92, 102, 112

150 Index Bentivoglio, Annibale I 68, 71, 75 Bentivoglio, Ermes 123 Bentivoglio, family (Bologna) 36, 113, 121, 123 Bentivoglio, Giovanni II, Lord of Bologna 25, 29, 32, 36, 121, 123 Bento, António 8, 143 Bercé, Yves-Marie 8, 57, 143 – 4 Bernardo di Giunta see Giunti, Bernardo di Bertelli Sergio 35, 37, 79, 80, 90, 143, 146 Bertoldo di Giovanni 21 Bibbiena, Piero da 45, 54 Biliotti, Pandolfo 54 – 5 Blado, Antonio 87, 89 Bolaffi, Ezio 13, 23, 143 Bonciani, Ubertino 54 – 5 Bondanella, Conaway Julia 90 Bondanella, Peter 90 Bonromei, Giovanni see Borromei, Giovanni Borgia, Cesare (Valentino), Duke of Valentionis 25 – 31, 33 – 7, 73, 87 – 8, 113, 116 – 24 Borgia, family (Rome) 28, 122, 124 Borgia, Giovanni, Duke of Gandia 121 Borgia, Rodrigo 88, 121 – 5, 130; see also Alexander VI Borrelli, Gianfranco 47, 57 – 8, 144, 148 Borromei, Beatrice 138 Borromei, Carlo 126 Borromei, Giovanni 12, 126 Boscoli, Pietro Paolo 6, 41 – 2, 44 – 5, 53 – 5, 59, 89 Botticelli, Sandro (Alessandro di Mariano di Vanni Filipepi) 76 Boutin, Christophe 80, 143 Braccio da Montone see Fortebracci, Andrea Bracciolini, Jacopo 22, 129 – 30, 132, 140 Bracciolini, Poggio 140 Brucioli, Antonio 48 – 9 Brutus 95, 109 Brutus (Marcus Junius Brutus the Younger) 44, 55, 92, 102 Buonaccorsi, Biagio 40 Buondelmonti, Zanobi 48 – 9 Burckhardt, Jakob 8, 143 Butters, Humphrey 22 – 3, 26, 37, 143 Caferro, William 81, 146 Caffiero, Marina 79 – 80, 144 Calitti, Floriana 34, 37, 144 Callippus 106, 115

Cambyses, King of Persia 76, 110 Campi, Alessandro 8, 37, 53, 57, 60, 62, 76, 79 – 81, 144 Canetoli, Baldassarre 71 Canetoli, Battista 75 Canetoli, family (Bologna) 71 Caporali, Roberto 9, 145 – 6 Capponi, Agostino 6, 89, 41, 44 – 5, 53 – 5, 59, 89 Capponi, Gino 139, 144 Capponi, Luca 41, 53 Capponi, Niccolò 22 – 3 Capponi, Nicola 50, 69 Caracalla Antoninus, Roman emperor 66, 97 – 9, 101, 109 – 12 Caracalla Geta, Roman emperor 110 Cardini, Franco 22 – 3, 80, 143 – 4 Carli, Plinio 89 Carlo II Manfredi, Lord of Faenza 128 – 9, 139 Cassius 92 Catanei, Vannozza 121 Catilinarian conspiracy 49, 103 – 4, 113 Catiline Lucius Sergius 22, 49, 60, 103 – 4, 113 – 14 Cavazzoni Pederzini, Fortunato 86 Cérès see Pluto Chabod, Federico 62, 81, 144 Charles VIII, King of France 121 – 2 Charon 101, 112 Chiabò, Myriam 24, 147 Chomedey, Jérôme de 85 Christian, P. see Pitois, Christian Ciballinus 95, 110 Cicero Marcus Tullius 49, 113 – 14 Cipriani, Giovanni 22 – 3, 144 Clearchus 101, 112 Clement VII (Giulio di Giuliano de’ Medici) 46, 48, 51, 89, 142 Cleomenes III, King of Sparta 104, 113 coalition 25, 87 Coccio, Bernardino 41, 43, 53 Cola Montano see Capponi, Nicola Colonna, family (Rome) 30, 35 Commodus Lucius Aurelius, Roman emperor 66, 94, 98, 101, 105, 109 – 10, 112, 114 condottiero 16, 26, 127 conspiracy (concept of) 7, 26, 27, 77 – 9, 92, 96, 114, 124, 137; against Alfonso, Duke of Ferrara 100; against Annibale Bentivoglio 68; against Commodus 94, 105, 109, 112; against False-Smerdi 76 – 7, 110; against Galeazzo Maria Sforza

Index  151 50, 68 – 70, 103, 113, 137; against Giuliano di Lorenzo de’ Medici 6, 41 – 7, 53 – 5; against Giulio de’ Medici (Clement VII) 6, 48 – 52, 56 – 7; against Hieronymus 96; against Julius Caesar 102, 112; against Nero 95, 98, 109; against Piero de’ Medici 68; against Pietro Gambacorta 94, 109; against Septimius Severus 94, 109, 112; against Sitalces 100; against Tiberius 94, 109; by Bernardo Nardi 68, 69; by Pausanias 92 – 3, 108; by Piero de’ Bardi and Bardo Frescoladi 67, 71; causes of 13; general theory of 4, 6, 59 – 65; organization 15 – 16, 72, 106 – 7; of Pelopidas 101, 112; of Stefano Porcari 68 Coppola, Francesco 94, 109 Corella, Miguel de (Don Michele or Micheletto) 27, 119, 124 corruption 27, 34, 103, 107; condemnation of 69 Curtius Rufus 100 Cutinelli-Rèndina, Emanuele 33, 35 – 7, 62, 81, 144, 146 Cypselus 111 Cyrus the Great, King of Persia 110 Darius I, King of Persia 76 – 7, 96, 110 Davies, Jonathan 89, 90, 144 De Coniuratione Catilinae 13 Degli Albizzi, Antonio Francesco 46 Del Badia, Iodoco 23, 145 Della Palla, Battista 48 – 9, 56 Della Robbia, family (Florence) 55 Della Robbia, Luca 55, 57, 144 Della Rovere, Francesco Maria, Duke of Urbino 123 – 4 Della Rovere, Giovanni 124 Della Rovere, Giuliano see Julius II Dessì, Giovanni 9, 147 Detmold, Christian E. 87, 89 Diaccetto, Iacopo (Diaccettino) 49, 56 Dioles see Hipparchus, tyrant of Athens Dion of Syracuse 106, 115 Dionysus I o Dionysus the Elder, tyrant of Syracuse 108, 115 Dionysus II o Dionysus the Younger, tyrant of Syracuse 108, 115 Dognini, Cristiano 76, 81, 144 Domna Julia 110 Donatello (Donato di Niccolò di Betto Bardi) 21

Drusus Iulius Caesar (Drusus minor) 109 dynastic dominion 43, 121 Eclectus Lucius Aurelius 98, 110 Electus see Ecletus Lucius Aurelius Ellanicus 96 – 7, 99, 110 enemy 17, 35, 42, 53, 66 – 7, 69, 91, 118, 122 – 4, 126, 133, 135; absolute 78; common 116; external 60 envy 15, 17, 61 Epicaris 98 Epirus (region) 96, 99, 110 Epirus Marcellus 107 Ercole I d’Este, Duke of Ferrara 111 Euffreducci, Oliverotto, Lord of Fermo 25, 32 – 3, 117 – 20, 122 execution 20; of conspiracy 3, 5, 17, 33, 35, 63, 64, 68, 72, 92 – 3, 95 – 7, 99, 100 – 6, 129 – 30; public 80 Fachard, Denis 33, 35 – 7, 57, 81, 88, 146 faction(s)/factional 13, 15, 26, 60, 67, 121, 131; Borgia 28; Guelphs 138; optimates or oligarchical 47, 55; popular 40 Falari see Phalaris, tyrant of Agrigento Fasano Guarini, Elena 8, 57, 143 – 4 fear 14, 26, 29 – 31, 46, 56, 67, 74, 95 – 6, 100, 111, 126, 135, 139 Federico da Montefeltro, Duke of Urbino 123 Fenster, Mark 77, 81, 144 Ferdinand I (Ferrante) of Aragon, King of Naples 15 – 16, 23, 94, 109, 129, 137, 140 Ferdinand II of Aragon, King of Naples 93, 108 Ferrante or Ferdinando d’Este 111 Ficino, Marsilio 140 Fillida 112 Finzi, Claudio 34, 37, 144 Fogliani, Giovanni 122 Foix, Jean de, Count of Candale 124 Folchi, Giovanni 54 – 5 Fortebracci, Andrea (Braccio da Montone) 139 Fortebracci, Carlo (Carlo da Montone) 139 fortune/fortuna 4, 26, 29, 33 – 4, 36, 45 – 6, 50, 73, 93 – 4, 104, 120, 134 – 5, 141; arbitrariness of 63; change in 111; economic 109 Frale, Barbara 22 – 3, 144

152 Index Franzesi da Staggia, Napoleone 129, 134, 140 freedom 5, 8, 41, 43, 50, 56, 64, 79; republican 68 Frescobaldi, Bardo 67, 75 Fubini, Riccardo 8, 16, 22 – 3, 145 Gabrielli, Iacopo (da Gubbio) 67 Gaius Marius 111 Galli, Carlo 9, 145 – 6 Gambacorta, Pietro or Piero 94, 109 Gambacorte, Piero see Gambacorta, Pietro Garbero Zorzi, Elvira 80, 143 Gardi, Andrea 68, 81, 145 Gargano, Maurizio 24, 147 Gaumāta 76, 110 Gelli, Agenore 57, 146 Geraldini, Agapito 29, 30 Germino, Dante 53, 57, 145 Gershevitch, Ilya 76, 81, 145 Geuna, Marco 8 – 9, 145 Gian Cantore (Giannes or Giovanni or Jean d’Artiganova) 100, 111 Gilbert, Felix 48, 57, 62, 81, 145 Giordani, Antonio (da Venafro) 117, 123 Giovan Francesco da Tolentino see Mauruzzi, Gian Francesco Giovanna da Montefeltro, Duchess of Urbino 124 Giovanni Andrea da Lampognano see Lampugnani, Giovanni Andrea Giovanni Battista (Giovanbattista) da Montesecco 16, 18 – 19, 89, 99, 127, 129, 134, 139 Giovanni dalle Bande Nere (Ludovico de’ Medici) 113 Giovio, Paolo 11, 21, 23, 145 Giulio d’Este, Duke of Ferrara 111 Giunti, Bernardo di 89 Giustini, Lorenzo (da Città di Castello) 23, 25, 134, 140 glory 3, 36, 68 – 9, 100, 106, 122, 135; of power 62 Goldberg, R. A. 77, 81, 145 Gonzaga, Elisabetta 123 good fortune 4, 29, 33 – 4, 36, 93 – 4, 134 Gouwens, Kenneth 9, 147 government 4, 49, 91, 104, 106, 111, 117, 124, 128, 131; change in 46, 127, 134; Medici 40; men of 6; oligarchic 112; popular 46, 56

great men/uomini grandi 50, 61, 64, 66, 93 Guasti, Cesare 51, 57, 145 Guicciardini, Francesco 12, 23, 45 – 7, 57, 112, 145 Guidobaldo da Montefeltro, Duke of Urbino 25, 123 – 4 Guiraudet, Charles-Philippe-Toussaint 86 Hanno 104, 113 – 14 Harmodius 112 hate 22, 53, 60, 66 – 7, 74 – 5, 91, 102, 108, 122 Herodianus 66, 101, 109 – 12, 114 Herodotus 76, 110 – 11, 113 Hiero II, tyrant of Syracuse 110 Hieronymus, tyrant of Syracuse 96, 110 Hipparchus, tyrant of Athens 101, 112 Hippias, tyrant of Athens 101, 112 human nature 62 human passion 4 Hystaspes 110 Ilardi, Vincent 13, 23, 145 imitation of the past 112 Inglese, Giorgio 37, 56, 57, 87 – 8, 145 – 6 Innocent VIII (Giovanni Battista Cybo) 139 Innocenti, Piero 90, 143 Irace, Erminia 37, 144 Iustini, Lorenzo see Giustini, Lorenzo Jacopo I d’Appiano 94, 109 Jacopo da Santa Croce 121 Jacopo di Messer Poggio see Bracciolini, Jacopo Julius II (Giuliano Della Rovere) 121, 139 Julius Caesar 103, 112 Justin 110, 112 – 14 Juvenal 92, 108 Kahn, Victoria 62, 81, 145 Lampugnani, Giovanni Andrea 69, 70, 74 – 5, 103, 113 Landriani, Lucrezia 113 Landucci, Luca 11, 21, 23, 145 leader/leadership 12, 16, 19, 34, 42, 60 – 1, 73, 124 Lena Gnæus Popilius 102, 112

Index  153 Lentulus Publius Cornelius Sura 104, 113 Leo X (Giovanni de’ Medici) 41 – 2, 48, 55 – 6 Leonardo da Vinci 76, 140 Leonidas, King of Sparta 113 Leonidas of Heraclea 101 Leontide, polemarch of Sparta 112 La Penna, Antonio 13, 24, 146 Lerner, Max 90 Letus Quintus Emilius 98, 110 liberality 20, 132 – 4, 136 liberty 18, 69, 96, 99, 132 – 3 Lorenzo da Castello see Giustini, Lorenzo Loris, Francisco de (Monseigneur d’Euna) 88, 124 loyalty 27, 61, 78, 139 Lubkin, Gregory 13, 24, 146 Lucanus Marcus Annaeus 109 Lucilla Annia Aurelia Galeria 101, 112 Lucius Paolus 113 Lucius Verus, Roman emperor 112 Ludovico il Moro (Ludovico di Savoia) 113 Luigi XII, King of France 116, 121 Machiavelli, Niccolò (nephew of Niccolò Machiavelli) 55 Macrinus Marcus Opellius 98 – 9, 110 – 11 Maffei, Antonio 140 Magione 25 – 8, 35, 87, 122; conspiracy 6; diet of/meeting at 25, 28, 35, 116 – 17, 123 majesty 20, 66, 72, 100, 111, 135 Malaparte, Curzio 80 – 1, 146 Malatesta, family (Cesena and Rimini) 122 Malatesta, Roberto 139 Mancini, Francesco Federico 37, 144 Manfredi, family (Faenza) 122 Manfredi, Galeotto19 Mansfield, Harvey C. 6, 89 – 90 Marcantonio del Pasqua 114 Marchand, Jean-Jacques 24, 34, 37, 57, 88, 109, 143, 146 Marchi, Gian Paolo 55, 57, 146 Marcus Aurelius, Roman emperor 110, 112 Marietti, Marina 22, 24, 146 Marriott, W. K. 90 Martel, James 8 – 9, 146

Martelli, Mario 4, 9, 43 – 4, 55, 57, 65, 81, 146 Martelli, Niccolò 48 – 50 Martialis 99 Martines, Lauro 22, 24, 146 Masi, Giorgio 88 Maternianus Flavius 98, 111 Matteo di Morozzo 115 Matucci, Andrea 12, 24, 87, 90, 146 Mauruzzi, Gian Francesco (da Tolentino) 129, 140 Maximinus Thrax 66 Medici, Antonio de’ 140 Medici Bianca de’ 114, 138 Medici, Cosimo de’ 20, 126, 137 Medici, Donato de’ 137 Medici, family (Florence) 6, 10, 12 – 20, 22, 40 – 9, 53 – 6, 71, 75 – 6, 89, 92, 99, 108, 115, 121, 126 – 8, 130 – 3, 135, 138 – 42 Medici, Filippo de’ 126, 137 – 8 Medici, Giovanni di Lorenzo de’ 41 – 2, 48, 55 – 6, 59, 141; see also Leo X Medici, Giovanni di Pierfrancesco de’ 113 Medici Giuliano di Lorenzo de’ 6, 41 – 2, 45, 54, 56, 59 Medici, Giuliano di Piero de’ 6, 8, 11, 13, 17 – 21, 75 – 6, 95, 99, 101, 108, 111, 114, 127 – 31, 134, 137 – 8, 140 Medici, Giulio di Giuliano de’ 6, 46, 48 – 51, 56, 89, 142; see also Clement VII Medici, Lorenzo di Piero de’ (Lorenzo the Magnificent) 11 – 13, 15 – 21, 23, 41, 48, 56, 76, 89, 95, 99, 101, 108, 114, 123, 126 – 35, 137 – 8, 140 Medici, Ludovico de’ (Giovanni dalla Bande Nere) 113 Medici, Piero di Cosimo de’ (Piero the Gouty) 14, 68, 114, 121, 137 Medici, Vieri de’ 137 Mehmed II, Sultan of Ottoman Empire 140 Melichius 95 Mendes, Berta 86 Modigliani, Anna 24, 80 – 1, 146 – 7 Moncada, Hugo 27 Montefeltro, family (Urbino) 122 – 3 Montevecchi, Alessandro 89 Moyer, Ann E. 62, 81, 146 multitude 3, 11, 70

154 Index Nabis, tyrant of Sparta 96 – 7, 100, 110 Najemy, John M. 22 – 4, 37, 42, 57, 81, 143, 145 – 7 Narcissus 110 Nardi, Bernardo 68 – 9, 141 Nardi, Jacopo 41, 43, 48, 50, 53, 57, 146 Natales 95 Nelematus see Ellanicus Nerli, Auretta 137 Nerli, Filippo de’ 48, 51, 57, 144 Nero Claudius Caesar Augustus Germanicus, Roman emperor 95, 97 – 8, 107, 109 – 10 new order 71, 99 Niccolò il Giovane see Machiavelli, Niccolò Nicholas V (Tomaso Parentucelli) 68, 71 Nicolini, Enrico 58, 148 Nicolò di Lorenzo della Magna 142 Nicomachus 95 Nori, Francesco di Antonio 75, 131, 141 Olgiati, Girolamo 69, 70, 74, 113 Oliverotto o Liverotto da Fermo (vedi Euffreducci, Oliverotto) Orsi, Checco 139 Orsi, Ludovico 139 Orsini, Alfonsina 123 Orsini, Clarice 123 Orsini, family (Rome) 25, 28 – 30, 32 – 3, 35 – 6, 116 – 20, 122 – 4 Orsini, Francesco, Duke of Gravina 25, 32, 116, 120, 122 Orsini, Giambattista (Giovan Battista) 25, 116, 120, 122 – 4 Orsini, Latino 122 Orsini, Lorenzo (Renzo di Ceri) 49 Orsini, Paolo (or Pagolo) 25, 27, 29 – 30, 32, 116, 118 – 20, 122, 124 Orsini, Rinaldo, Archbishop of Florence 124, 138 Ortanus 96 – 7 Orti Oricellari see Rucellai Gardens Osmond, Patricia J. 5, 8 – 9, 13, 22, 24, 146 – 7 Pagán, Victoria E. 4, 9, 147 Palmer, Michael 8 – 9, 147 Panella, Antonio 62, 81, 147 Paolus Lucius 113 passion(s) 7, 52, 78; political-civil 69

Paternò, Maria Pia 9, 147 Patizeide 77 Pausanias 92 – 3, 108 Pazzi, Alessandro de’ 48 Pazzi, Andrea de’ 126 Pazzi, Andrea di Guglielmino de’ 138 Pazzi, Antonio de’ 114, 126, 138 Pazzi, Caterina de’ 138, 141 Pazzi, Cosimo de’, Bishop of Arezzo 114 Pazzi, family (Florence) 10, 12, 14 – 20, 22, 76, 92, 95, 99, 101, 126 – 8, 131, 133, 138, 140 – 1 Pazzi, Francesco de’ 16, 18, 22, 75, 126 – 32 Pazzi, Galeotto de’ 126 Pazzi, Giovanni de’ 126 Pazzi, Guglielmo de’ 106, 114, 126, 133 – 4, 138, 140 Pazzi, Jacopo (Iacopo) de’ 10, 16, 18, 21 – 2, 76, 127 – 9, 134, 138, 141 – 2 Pazzi, Niccolò de’ 126 Pazzi, Piero de’ 126, 138, 141 Pazzi, Renato (Rinato) de’ 126, 129, 133, 141 Pazzi conspiracy 5 – 6, 10, 17, 22 – 3, 68, 89, 99, 125 – 37, 141 Pazzo di Ranieri 138 Pellegrini, Marco 139, 147 Pelopidas 101, 112 people 10, 18, 20, 32, 60, 63 – 6, 70, 75, 91, 99, 103, 114, 117, 120, 126, 130, 132; in arms 50; infedelty of 107 Perennis (Perennius) Sestius Tigidius 94, 109 Pesman Cooper, Roslyn 26, 35, 37, 147 Petrarch (Francesco Petrarca) 69, 140 Petreius 114 Petrucci, Alfonso 141 Petrucci, Cesare, podestà of Prato 132, 141 Petrucci, family (Siena) 112 Petrucci, Pandolfo, Lord of Siena 25 – 6, 33, 104, 108, 112, 114, 117, 123 Petrucci, Sulpizia 112 Phalaris, tyrant of Agrigento 92, 108 Philip, polemarch of Sparta 112 Philip of Macedon 92 – 3, 108 Philotas 95, 110 Pipes, Daniel 77, 81, 147 Pirrus 110 Pisistratus, tyrant of Athen 104, 112 – 13 Piso Gaius Calpurnius 95, 97, 109 – 10 Pisonian conspiracy 95, 98

Index  155 Pitois, Christian 86 Plautianus Gaius Fulvius 94, 97, 101, 109 Plautilla 109 Plutarch 113, 115 Pluto 108 Pocock, John G. A. 4, 9, 50, 57, 147 Polidori, Filippo Luigi 55 political order 60, 67, 69, 72 Poliziano, Angelo 5, 9, 11 – 12, 17, 21 – 2, 24, 89, 109, 112, 142, 147 popular 4, 47, 75; consensus 3, 12, 40, 63, 65, 137; faction 40; freedom 43; fury 10, 107; good will/benivolenzia populare 4, 20, 66; mobilization 20; orders 40; regime 45, 46; republic 44; state 48, 56; violence 80 Porcari, Stefano 24, 68 – 9, 71 – 2, 80 power 10 – 15, 26, 40, 45 – 7, 60 – 6, 68 – 72, 77 – 8, 112, 126; absolute 104; access to 3, 63, 80; circle of 4, 40, 108; constituted 66, 80; economic 15; internal 13; secular 77; space 62; sovereign 104; supreme 103; temporal 135 Prezzolini, Giuseppe 39, 58, 147 principate 14 – 16, 43, 56, 60, 69, 122, 139; civil 66; Medici 44; new 26, 121 prudence 30, 35, 36, 42, 44, 52 – 3, 59, 94, 133; lack of 63, 95, 100; man of 96; policy of 26 Quintianus Claudius Pompeianus 101, 112 Ramiro de Lorqua (Rimirro) 27, 31 rationalism 4 realism 34 Reason of State 47, 135 Reiss, Sheryl E. 9, 147 religion 22; authority of 72 Renzo di Ceri see Orsini, Lorenzo revolt 62, 88, 114; of Arezzo 116, 122 – 3; popular 114; in Urbino 117 revolution 63, 80 Riario, family (Imola and Forlì) 122 Riario, Girolamo, Lord of Imola and Forlì 16, 23, 111, 113, 129, 139 – 41 Riario, Ottaviano 113 Riario, Pietro, Cardinal of Florence 138 Riario Sansoni, Raffaele, Cardinal of S. Giorgio al Velabro 18, 111, 129, 140 – 2

Ricci, Giuliano de’ 44, 55 Richardson, Brian 87, 90, 147 Ridley, T. R. 4, 9, 147 Ridolfi, Giovambattista 47 Ridolfi, Roberto 26, 38 – 9, 47, 49, 55, 58, 90, 147 Rochon, André 24, 146 Roisman, Joseph 4, 9, 147 Rota Ghibaudi, Silvia 23, 144 Rouvillois, Frédéric 80, 143 Rubinstein, Nicolai 14, 24, 147 Rucellai, Cosimo 50 Rucellai Gardens (Orti Oricellari) 48 – 51, 56 Ruggiero, Raffaele 81, 144 Russo, Francesca 8 – 9, 147 Russo, Sergio 57 – 8 Rutilius see Rutilus Gaius Marcius Rutilus Gaius Marcius (or Rutulus) 105, 114 Sallust 5, 7, 13, 22, 49, 58, 85, 103, 113, 147 Salviati, family (Florence) 128, 140 Salviati, Francesco di Bernardo, Archbishop of Pisa 22, 126 – 7, 129 – 30, 132, 137 – 8, 140 Salviati, Jacopo (brother of the Archbishop of Pisa Francesco) 22, 35, 129 Salviati, Jacopo (cousin of the Archbishop of Pisa Francesco) 129, 132, 140 Sanudo, Marin 42, 54 Sasso, Gennaro 7 – 9, 23 – 4, 26, 34, 37 – 8, 53, 57 – 8, 87, 89 – 90, 144, 148 Satirus see Satyrus Saturninus 97, 101 Satyrus 101, 112 Savelli, family (Rome) 35 Scevinus 95 secrecy 7, 8, 17, 25, 28, 34, 40, 60, 63, 79 – 80, 109 sedition 14, 80; Prato 68 Schmitt, Carl 62, 80 – 1, 148 Sejanus Lucius Aelius 94, 109 Selim I, Sultan of the Muslim empire 108 Seneca Annaeus 109 Senigallia 26 – 7, 31 – 5, 73 – 4, 123 – 4; conspiracy 34, 74, 90; massacre 37, 88, 122; occupation of 31 Serragli, Francesco 54

156 Index Serristori, Giovanni 133, 141 Serristori, Maddalena 141 Severi, dinasty 66 Severus Alexander, Roman emperor 66 Severus Septimius, Roman emperor 94, 97, 101, 109 – 10, 112 Sforza, Ascanio 113, 122 Sforza, Caterina 113, 121, 139 Sforza, family (Milan) 113 Sforza, Francesco I, Duke of Milan 113 Sforza, Galeazzo Maria, Duke of Milan 13, 15, 50, 68 – 9, 71, 73 – 4, 76, 86, 113, 137, 139 Sforza, Ginevra 121 Sforza, Ludovico Maria see Ludovico il Moro Sidney, Alexander 145 Simonetta, Marcello 9, 16, 22, 24, 139, 147 – 8 Sitalces, King of the Thracian Odrysian state 100, 111 Sixtus IV (Francesco della Rovere) 15 – 16, 111, 113, 137, 139, 141 Skinner, Quentin 4, 9, 50, 58, 148 Smerdis 76, 110 Soderini, family (Florence) 48 Soderini, Francesco 35, 46, 48 – 9 Soderini, Piero 26, 35, 40 – 1, 43 – 6, 48, 53 – 4 Sordi, Marta 81, 144 Sorensen, Kim A. 53, 58, 148 sovereign authority 103 sovereign power 104 sovereignty 77 spiritual legacy 55 state 14 – 15, 33, 131, 136; modern 4, 6; mutation of 22, 71; new 23, 25; to plot against the 41, 103; popular 48; republican 68 statesman 13, 93, 96 Stefano di Niccolò da Bagnone in val di Magra 141 Strauss, Leo 39, 52 – 3, 58, 148 struggle for power 7, 74 Suetonius 109 Sulla Lucius Cornelius 111 Sumberg, Theodore A. 8 – 9, 148 Suppa, Silvio 53, 58, 148 suspicion(s) 29 – 30, 40, 44, 47 – 9, 55 – 6, 65, 98, 105, 114, 126, 131 – 2, 137

Tacitus Cornelius Publius 92, 107, 109 – 10 Taguieff, Pierre-André 77, 81, 148 Tarantino, Maurizio 37, 144 Tarquin see Tarquinius Lucius Superbus Tarquinius Lucius Superbus 109 Telemachus 108 Theodorus see Theodotus Theodotus 96, 110 Thucydides 111 – 12 Tiberius 109 Tiberius Claudius Nero, Roman emperor 94, 109 Titus 109 Titus Livius 96, 100, 109 – 10, 112, 114 Tommasini, Oreste 7, 9, 44, 49, 53 – 5, 58, 148 Tornabuoni, Filippo 140 Tornabuoni, Lucrezia 114, 138 Turchetti, Mario 6, 9, 61, 81, 148 tyrannicide 6, 43, 60 – 1 tyranny 5, 50 – 1, 68 – 9, 92, 96, 104 – 5, 113; perpetual 121; of the state 104 Unger, Miles J. 22, 24, 39, 58, 148 Valentino see Borgia, Cesare Valerius Corvinus 114 Valla, Lorenzo 111 Valle, Roberto 35, 38, 148 Valori, Bartolomeo 46 Valori, Niccolò 54 – 5, 89 Varano, family (Camerino) 122 Varasano, Leonardo 80, 144 Varotti, Carlo 89 Vespasianus Titus Flavius, Roman emperor 107 Vestri, Giovanna 19 Vettori, Francesco 41 – 2, 54, 58, 148 Vettori Paolo 42, 46, 54 Villard, Renaud 11, 24, 67, 81, 148 Villari, Pasquale 50, 54 – 5, 58, 88, 90, 148 Vincenzo da Perugia (Count of Montevibiano), Podestà of Florence 35 violence 7, 10, 20, 27, 53, 60, 71 – 7, 79, 125, 131, 136; clandestine 107 Viroli, Maurizio viii, 39, 58, 80 – 1, 148 virtue/virtù 5, 20, 26, 33, 35, 45, 62, 74, 126, 134; virtuous man 50, 69 Visceglia, Maria Antonietta 79 – 80, 144

Index  157 Visconti, Bianca Maria 113 Visconti, Carlo 69, 74 – 5, 113 Visconti, Gian Galeazzo, Duke of Milan 109 Vitelli, family (Città di Castello) 28, 33, 121 Vitelli, Niccolò 23, 106, 117 – 20 Vitelli, Paolo 74, 122 Vitelli, Vitellozzo, Lord of Città di Castello 26, 29, 73 – 4, 117 – 24 Volusius Proculus 110

Walker, Leslie J. 86, 90 Walter (Gualtieri) VI of Brienne, Duke of Athens 106, 114 weak men/uomini deboli 108 Xenophon 140 Zimmermann, T. C. Price 21, 24, 148 Zuckert, Catherine 45, 58, 62, 81, 148