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Aggelos Kapellos Lysias 21
Trends in Classics – Supplementary Volumes
Edited by Franco Montanari and Antonios Rengakos Scientific Committee Alberto Bernabé · Margarethe Billerbeck Claude Calame · Philip R. Hardie · Stephen J. Harrison Stephen Hinds · Richard Hunter · Christina Kraus Giuseppe Mastromarco · Gregory Nagy Theodore D. Papanghelis · Giusto Picone Kurt Raaflaub · Bernhard Zimmermann
Volume 28
Aggelos Kapellos
Lysias 21
A Commentary
DE GRUYTER
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Preface The speech of Lysias numbered 21 and having the title ‘On a charge of taking bribes’ has not been the subject of thorough research by modern scholarship. Although citations from the speech which focus on Attic oratory are not lacking in papers and books, there is no exclusive study of or commentary on this speech. However, the speech, which was delivered after the restoration of democracy in 402 B.C., provides us with important information about the military engagement of the Athenians at Aegospotami, the role of Alcibiades in the political life of Athens, the relationship between the demos and the aristocrats, Athenian institutions (e. g. taxation, liturgies and conscription), religious beliefs, moral values and the political behaviour of the Athenians as an ideal and reality in public and private life. Moreover, this text helps us in our understanding of the development of Attic oratory. Last, Lysias’ speech is very important for our understanding of the legal and rhetorical treatment of the accusations of embezzlement of public money and bribery. The present commentary is an attempt to address these problems.¹ In my analysis I put much emphasis on the structure, strategy and argumentation of the speech. Moreover, I am especially interested in tensions between the actual practices of the anonymous client of the logographer and civic ideals invoked in the present case. For this reason I draw not only on prose but also on poetry in some cases and eschew artificial distinctions between ‘literature’ and ‘history’. Instead, I use every piece of information in the Introduction and the Commentary that contributes to an understanding of the speech. Last, I often attempt to interpret the text as ‘a devil’s advocate’,² i. e. I try to define the weak points of the speech in order to achieve a better understanding of the facts of the case. My initiation into this way of reading of rhetorical texts started in London, when I was a postgraduate student of Professor Christopher Carey. At this point I wish to thank my tutor, because he allowed me to use his edition of the text of Lysias, which he accomplished with a great deal of effort, love and wisdom. This commentary has been slightly revised and modified from the thesis that I submitted for the degree of Ph.D. at the University of Ioannina in 2009. In the preface of my thesis I acknowledged debts to a variety of people. Here I repeat these debts. First and foremost to my supervisor, who takes pride of place in
For the necessity but also the difficulty of writing a commentary which puts emphasis on these subjects cf. Todd, Use and Abuse, 170,172– 75. Carey, Lysias, ix.
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this preface, Professor I. N. Perysinakis, not only for his encouragement and his academic support but also because he remains a force in my life. I am most grateful to him; this is the least I can say. More words about him turn the praise into flattery. During the examination of my thesis, several scholars read and commented on the draft, thereby causing me to rethink but also to defend my arguments. Their remarks can only have improved the final version and many of them have found their way into the present study. I am indebted to the following: Prof. T. Stephanopoulos, who suggested the subject of the thesis, the associate Professor S. Constantinidou, Prof. A. Gartziou, the assistant Professor A. Efstathiou, the assistant Professor E. Alexiou and Dr. A.Kostopoulou. Moreover, I am indebted to Dr. K. Apostolakis for reading several drafts of the thesis before its submission. His help was valuable. Last, I thank Professors C. Bearzot and E. Medda for their help with the Italian bibliography and their suggestions. For the publication of this commentary in the excellent series Trends in Classics I am most grateful to its coeditor Professor A. Rengakos. Moreover, I am most grateful to my reviewers, Professor P. J. Rhodes and Professor M. J. Edwards. Their scholarship and industry was a blessing for me and this was proved for my benefit during their review of the present commentary. During this procedure both scholars read and reread successive drafts with a keen eye for problems and an equally keen desire to be helpful. Their persistence in detail and penchant for asking hard questions saved me from serious errors. However, in all fairness to them I must point out that I have not always followed their advice, so I hope my obstinacy will not be to the detriment of myself or Lysias. I defend myself by saying that I have given here of my best and express my gratitude to the examiners. In any case, possible omissions or mistakes are my sole responsibility. Last, I ought to thank my parents for their love and affection. Moreover, I must say that my mother has been a witness and a consistent supporter not only of the writing of the thesis but also of its transformation into a published book. Her patience and optimism saved me many times. This book is dedicated to the memory of my grandfather Vasilios and my grandmother Christina. For their personal sacrifices from the first moment I was born I was trying to prove them I was worthy of their love and attention. Now that they live in heaven I can only offer them this book as a tribute to their memory. Aggelos Kapellos
Contents Abbreviations Bibliography
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. Introduction 1 A. The historical background (The defeat at Aegospotami) B. The identity of the speaker 11 C. The charge of bribery 26 31 D. The legal problems of the speech E. The defensive strategy 39 55 F. Τhe dating of the speech 56 G. Structure and Style 56 . The structure of the speech . The style 57 . Commentary
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Index of Sources
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General Index
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1
Abbreviations For this speech I have followed C.Carey’s new edition Lysiae: Orationes Cum Fragmentis, Oxford 2007. In my work the abbreviations for ancient writers follow the LSJ pattern, except for some cases where more extended abbreviations are used like Aesch. = Aeschines, Isocr. = Isocrates, Dem. = Demosthenes, Thuc. = Thucydides. The extracts from the texts of ancient writers cited follow the Oxford edition unless stated otherwise. The extracts included in collections of fragments are followed by the name of the editor. More precisely, for Longinus I use the new edition by M.Patillon and L.Brisson, Longin, Fragments. Art Rhétorique, Rufus Art Rhétorique, Paris 2001. For Hyperides I use the edition by C.Jensen, Hyperidis Orationes Sex Cum Ceterarum Fragmentis, Teubner 1963 (or.publ.1917). The abbreviations of periodicals follow L’ Année Philologique. The reference e. g. ‘see Dem.18.296 with Yunis, Demosthenes, 274’ means see Dem. 18.296 and relevant comment of Yunis on page 274 of his study. My reference ‘see comm. § 1’ means ‘see my commentary on § 1’.
Bibliography In the Bibliography I include those published works which I cite by abbreviation in the introduction and the commentary. However, the total bibliography used is much more extensive, and other items are cited in full at the relevant points. Adkins, MR Adkins, Moral Values Alexiou, Euagoras Amit, Athens Αποστολάκης, Πολύστρατος Balogh, Political Refugees Bicknell, Genealogy Bloedow, Alcibiades Blundell, Helping Friends Bommelaer, Lysandre Bonner and Smith, Justice Burkert, Religion Cairns, Aidos Cairns, “Thinking Big” Carey, Lysias Carey, “Rhetorical Means” Carey, “Τα όρια του δημοσίου λόγου” Carter, Quiet Athenian Cartledge and Harvey, Crux Cartledge, “Greek religious festivals” Cartledge-Millett-Todd, Nomos Cartledge-Millett-v.Reden, Kosmos
A.W.H.Adkins, Merit and Responsibility: A Study of Greek Values, Oxford , repr. Chicago . A.W.H.Adkins, Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece: From Homer to the end of the Fifth Century, London . E.Alexiou, Das Euagoras des Isokrates: Ein Kommentar, Berlin . M.Amit, Athens and the Sea, Brussels . Κ.Αποστολάκης, [Λυσίου] Υπέρ Πολυστράτου, Athens . E.Balogh, Political Refugees in Ancient Greece: From the Period of the Tyrants to Alexander the Great, Roma . P.J.Bicknell, Studies in Athenian Politics and Genealogy, Historia Einzelschriften , Wiesbaden . E.F.Bloedow, Alcibiades Reexamined, Historia Einzelschriften , Wiesbaden . M.W.Blundell, Helping Friends and Harming Enemies, Cambridge . J.F.Bommelaer, Lysandre de Sparte, Paris . R.J.Bonner and G.Smith, The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle, Vol. II, Chicago. W.Burkert, Greek Religion, transl. J.Raffan, Cambridge . D.L.Cairns, Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature, Oxford . D.L.Cairns, ‘Hybris, Dishonour and Thinking Big’ JHS (), – . C.Carey, Lysias: Selected Speeches, Cambridge . C.Carey “Rhetorical means of persuasion” in Worthington, Persuasion. C.Carey, ‘Τα όρια του δημοσίου λόγου στην κλασική Αθήνα’ Δωδώνη: Φιλολογία (), – . L.B.Carter, The Quiet Athenian, Oxford . P.Cartledge and D.Harvey (eds.), Crux: Essays in Greek History Presented to G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, London . P.Cartledge, “The Greek Religious Festivals” in Easterling-Muir, Greek Religion and Society, – . P.Cartledge, P.Millett and S.Todd (eds.), Nomos: Essays in Athenian Law, Politics and Society, Cambridge . P.Cartledge, P.Millett and S.v.Reden (eds.), Kosmos: Essays in order, conflict and community in classical Athens, Cambridge .
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Worthington, Dinarchus-Hyperides Wylie, “Aegospotami” Wyse, Isaeus
I.Worthington, Greek Orators II: Dinarchus Hyperides, Warminster . G.Wylie, ‘What really happened at Aegospotami?’ AC (), – . W.Wyse, The Speeches of Isaeus, with Critical and Explanatory Notes, Cambridge
1. Introduction A. The historical background (The defeat at Aegospotami) The battle that decided the outcome of the Peloponnesian War took place in the region of the Hellespont.¹ The Athenian fleet suffered an unexpected defeat there by the Spartans. The identification of the responsibility of the Athenians who took part in the battle explains the reasons which caused this particular outcome; and simultaneously creates a background for the understanding of our speech. In the autumn of 404 B.C.² Lysander went to the Hellespont in order to cut off the supply of grain from the Black Sea to Athens. The Athenians, wanting to fight with him at all costs in order to win the war,³ followed him to the same area and were stationed at Aegospotami. It was there that Alcibiades appeared, advising his compatriots to move to Sestus where there was a port for protection and from where it was easier to get supplies (Xen. Hell.2.1.25, Plut. Lys.9.10).⁴ His advice to move the fleet there was correct from a strategic standpoint, since the Athenians had faced the same difficulty of getting supplies during the expedition to Sicily, when Alcibiades was among the appointed generals (Thuc. 6.48,50.1). Nepos mentions that Alcibiades talked to Philocles in the presence of the soldiers. Such a move was normal for Alcibiades, who put his plans into effect by exploiting the influence he had over his fellow-citizens.⁵ In the recent past he had convinced almost the entire city to vote in favour of the Sicilian expedition (Thuc. 6.19).⁶ During the stay of the Athenian fleet at Samos he initially convinced the soldiers that it was necessary to overthrow the democratic regime Cf. comm. § 9 ὅτε γὰρ ἐν τῇ τελευταίᾳ ναυμαχίᾳ αἱ νῆες διεφθάρησαν. Cf. Xen. Hell.2.1.25 with Krentz, Xenophon, Hellenica I, 174. For the reasons that such a conflict was necessary see Strauss, “Aegospotami”, 28. See Gomme, HCT, v. 1, 19 – 20, Morrison and Coates, Athenian Trireme, 93 – 103. Cf. the opinion of the Old Oligarch about the advantage the navy had compared to the infantry concerning the ease of moving: Καὶ τὸν μὲν πεζῇ ἰόντα δεῖ διὰ φιλίας ἰέναι ἢ νικᾶν μαχόμενον, τὸν δὲ πλέοντα, οὗ μὲν ἂν ἧ κρείττων, ἔξεστιν ἀποβῆναι, ταύτῃ τῆς γῆς, ἀλλὰ παραπλεῦσαι, ἕως ἂν ἐπὶ φιλίαν χώραν άφίκηται ἢ ἐπὶ ἣττους αὑτοῦ ([Xen.] Ath.Pol.2.5 – 6). Last, cf. Hyp. fr. 156 (Jensen), where he talks about τῶν τόπων τὴν ἀλιμενίαν. Wylie, “Aegospotami”, 130, questions the credibility of this testimony. Macleod’s analysis, “Rhetoric and History”, 68 – 87, leaves no doubt about the weakness of Alcibiades’ argumentation. What matters most though, is the fact that the Athenians adopted his proposals. Cf. E.F.Bloedow, “Not the Son of Achilles, but Achilles himself”: Alcibiades’ Entry on the Political Stage at Athens II’ Historia 39 (1990), 1– 19.
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(Thuc. 8.47.2), while a little later, he obtained his recall to Athens with the consent of the soldiers; they immediately elected him as a general along with the other generals, and trusted him with the management of all issues (Thuc. 8.82). Finally, when he returned to Athens, he successfully addressed his fellow citizens, convincing them that he was not responsible for the misfortunes of the city.⁷ Diodorus seems to reinforce the testimony of Nepos, who states that Alcibiades spoke to the Athenians and that the generals finally rejected his proposal.⁸ His choice to address the Athenians was a most ingenious tactic aimed to put psychological pressure on the generals. Alcibiades was particularly skillful in choosing the most appropriate and effective arguments.⁹ What he should have done in this case was to ensure that the soldiers listened to the actionplan he proposed to the generals.¹⁰ It was, therefore, in his interest to expound his views without using offensive language towards the generals. This is confirmed by Xenophon and Plutarch. Xenophon reports that Alcibiades αὐτοὺς παρῄνει, while the latter mentions ἐδίδασκε τοὺς στρατηγοὺς (Plut. Alc.36.6, Lys.10.5). More precisely, the verb διδάσκω is part of the vocabulary of deliberative oratory of the 5th century B.C. and is used by Thucydides for Pericles, to demonstrate his political responsibility towards the Athenian citizens.¹¹ Thucydides often uses this verb with regard to Alcibiades but always with the intention of informing his readers about the advice the latter gave to the Persians or Tissaphernes.¹² The use of the same verb by Plutarch suggests that Alcibiades presented his fellow citizens with an action-plan, which was designed to actually
Xen. Hell.1.4.20. Notice that Xenophon says that nobody objected to what Alcibiades said (οὐδενὸς ἀντειπόντος), a fact that proves that his speech was successful (cf. Aesch. 2.13) and explains why they all (ἁπάντων) elected him commander-in-chief. Xenophon immediately afterwards records the Athenians’ thoughts, i. e. that it was only Alcibiades who could save the city. This actually means that Alcibiades had once more succeeded in managing his fellow citizens’ sentiments and directing them where he wanted, a fact which is proved from his election. See also Hatzfeld, Alcibiade, 296 – 97. See Nepos Alc.8.2: praesente vulgo agree coepit and Diod. 13.105.2– 4: οἱ μὲν Άθηναῖοι διηπόρουν ὅ,τι χρήσωνται τοῖς πράγμασιν … ᾿Aλκιβιάδου δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐλθόντος καὶ λέγοντος … οἱ δὲ τῶν ᾿Aθηναίων στρατηγοί .. αὐτὸν ἐκἐλευσαν ἀπιέναι καὶ μηκέτι προσεγγίζειν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ. See Forde, Alcibiades, 92– 93, Carey, Lysias, 173,119 – 121, Romilly, Alcibiade, 90,9, cf. Ostwald, Sovereignty, 317. About the efficiency of such an initiative see C.G.Starr, Political Intelligence in Classical Greece, Leiden 1974, 13 – 14. About the genuine democratic deliberative rhetoric of Pericles as opposed to other politicians of the 5th century B.C. see the enlightening analysis of Yunis, Taming Democracy, 72– 76 and also Kallet-Marx, “Money Talks”, 234 n.30. See Gribble, Alcibiades, 198.
A. The historical background (The defeat at Aegospotami)
3
benefit rather than harm them.¹³ The view, therefore, that he spoke rudely to the generals cannot be inferred from Plutarch’s text.¹⁴ However, the generals, and especially Tydeus and Menander,¹⁵ were not convinced about the sincerity of his intentions and believed that if Alcibiades remained longer among them, he would create more problems. More specifically, they probably feared that, although Alcibiades was there as a private individual and not as an officially elected general, he could overthrow them and influence the soldiers more than they could.¹⁶ Therefore, they demanded that he immediately leave and never return (Xen. Hell.2.1.26, Plut. Lys.10.5, Diod. 13.105.4).¹⁷ Each one of them separately had his own reasons for not wanting Alcibiades as a partner.¹⁸ Menander was not a model general. During the Sicilian expedition his excessive ambition to outdo his colleagues, Nicias and Demosthenes, led him into constant failures (Plut. Nic.20). It was, therefore, impossible for an envious man, like him, to miss the opportunity to be glorified for a significant victory over Lysander. In the Hellespont, Menander was concerned that the more experienced Conon may be able to do better than him, and he could not, therefore, tolerate co-operation with Alcibiades, who was not even elected by the ecclesia. Tydeus had a personal dispute with Alcibiades, because he held him responsible for the death of his father Lamachus,¹⁹ so he would not accept any discussion with him. Thus, both men’s common grievance against Alcibiades arose because of the events in Sicily and his desertion to the Spartans (Plut. Nic.20); these were sufficient grounds to attack him verbally, more than the other generals did. It is also possible, according to what I said earlier about the rhetorical skills of Alcibiades, that some soldiers started saying in
Plutarch based his reference on the fact that the readers were familiar with Thucydides (see Stadter, Plutarch, 17– 19), so it is certain that he deliberately chose the same verb as Thucydides to show readers the real intentions of Alcibiades. The same verb is also used by Plutarch to praise statesmen like Pericles (see Stadter, Pericles, 154), whereas he used the same verb previously to unreservedly praise Alcibiades on his effectiveness to control the impulse of the democratic fleet in Samos in 411 B.C. (see Alc.26.5 – 7). As Wylie argues, “Aegospotami”, 132. See Kapellos, ‘Adeimantos’, 262. This actually happened to general Chabrias. See Nep. Chabrias 4.1. W.E.Higgins, Xenophon the Athenian, New York 1977, 113, explains the role human passions played in the decisions of individuals in Xenophon’s work and assumes that excessive selfishness was the cause for the behaviour of the generals. For the generals’ feelings see Romilly, Alcibiade, 224. About the generals see J.Kirchner, Prosopographia Attica, Berlin 1901– 3: Menander (9857), Tydeus (13884), Philocles (14517), Cephisodotus (8312), Conon (8707), Adeimantus (202). Wylie, “Aegospotami”, 131.
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a low voice that Alcibiades’ opinion was right, and, because the troops were always a threat to their commanders,²⁰ the Athenian generals reacted abruptly, fearing that the decline in the soldiers’ morale,²¹ could also result in their inadequacy to control the situation.²² We do not have adequate information to judge Cephisodotus as a general. Adeimantus, although he was an old friend of Alcibiades, refused to accept the notorious man into the army, apparently fearing the reactions of the other generals.²³ Philocles had proposed in the Athenian assembly cutting off the hands of the enemies who would be taken hostage, a fact which shows his immorality.²⁴ It is worth mentioning that Xenophon in this particular passage does not generally refer to naval battles between the two sides which would occur in the future, but he expressly writes εἰ κρατήσειαν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ. The use of the definite article implies that he has in mind that particular sea fight. Philocles as a skilled demagogue (Plut. Comp.Lys.-Syl., 4) had convinced the Athenians that he would defeat and then humiliate the Lacedaemonians. He would not, therefore, accept Alcibiades’ accusations to the soldiers, made a little time before the final encounter (Nepos Alc.7.8.2), that his decision not to move the army to Sestus would jeopardise their lives; since in this way he would undermine his own credibility as a commander.²⁵ Conon also wanted Alcibiades to leave. The opinion that he, as an experienced general, was not willing to receive advice from the less experienced Alciades,²⁶ is not convincing. In the period between the recall of Alcibiades on Samos and his second exile Alcibiades handled the issues of war with great success.²⁷ In Mantineia he had forced the Lacedaemonians to fight with the Athe-
See Hamel, Athenian Generals, 119 – 121. Cf. Hamel, Athenian Generals, 71. Ostwald, Sovereignty, 448, overemphasizes, in my opinion, the military expertise of the two generals. Judging however, on the basis of the outcome in the Hellespont, he comments on the final selection of the demos as such: ‘Politics outweighed considerations of effective military leadership and precipitated defeat: the Athenian generals proved no match for Lysander.’ See A.H.Sommerstein, Frogs, Warminster 1996, 297, Kapellos ‘Adeimantos’, 262. On this issue see Xen. Hell.2.1.31 with P.Ducrey, ‘Aspects Juridiques de la victoire et du traitement des vaincus’ in Vernant, Problèmes de la guerre, 235. See also Kapellos, ‘Adeimantos’, 259 – 60. Ostwald, Sovereignty, 435 n.98, argues that Philocles adopted Cleophon’s policy in favour of a war against Sparta to the limits and his stark opposition to Alcibiades. As Wylie, “Aegospotami”, 130, says. See A.W.Gomme, ‘Four Passages in Thucydides’ JHS 70 (1951), 72– 74, Gribble, Alcibiades, 198 n.107. With reference to the decision of the fleet in Samos in 411 B.C. to sail to Peiraeus and overthrow the rule of the Four Hundred Sealey, Greek Politics, 128, expressly says: ‘The troops at
A. The historical background (The defeat at Aegospotami)
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nians in one day (Thuc. 6.16.6). In Abydus the conflict between Athens and Sparta was inconclusive, until he appeared, winning an important victory in favour of his co-patriots (Xen. Hell.1.1.5).²⁸ In Cyzicus Alcibiades played an important part in the defeat of Mindarus’ fleet and the flight of the Spartans from the city.²⁹ So, if Thucydides with his phrase κράτιστα διαθέντι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου refers to the period between the return of Alcibiades and his second exile,³⁰ this means that Alcibiades could possibly be considered inferior to Conon in terms of reliability but not in terms of competence.³¹ Moreover, his election as a general with supreme power in 407 B.C. came about because the citizens thought that he was the only one able to restore the city’s former power (Xen. Hell.1.4.20). Even those who disliked him, accused him not of being an incompetent military leader but a politician who could lead the city to new disasters (Xen. Hell.1.4.17). The reason for Conon’s refusal was that he had replaced Alcibiades, and would not want to betray the trust of his fellow citizens by accepting cooperation with the person the city had rejected³² and later be charged with a possible defeat because of him. But even if the generals had ever decided to accept the help of Alcibiades, there would always have been a risk of the latter breaching the agreement. This can be understood if we consider Alcibiades’ behaviour in the Athenian fleet at Samos. He had promised that he would make Tissaphernes and the Great King their friends if they overthrew the democratic regime in Athens, and he had even prided himself on his influence on Tissaphernes (Thuc 8.48.1, 81.2– 3).³³ Alcibiades’ ultimate objective was his own recall.³⁴ Now, in
Samos in 411 regarded the rule of the Four Hundred as an intolerable evil. Alcibiades was a good enough general to dissuade his troops from sailing to the Peiraeus’ (my emphasis). For Alcibiades’ role in this sea-fight Morrison and Coates, Athenian Trireme, 83, say: ‘Alcibiades, arriving from Samos with 18 ships, played a decisive role’ (my emphasis). Even Bloedow, Alcibiades, 43 – 44, who debases Alcibiades’ role as a general, cannot deny that his appearance decided the outcome in favour of the Athenians. With reference to Alcibiades’ action, see Kagan, Empire, 245 – 46, Romilly, Alcibiade, 193 – 94: ‘Il y joint, dans l’action, les qualités … sa participation et sa résolution demeurent indéniables’. For Alcibiades’ intervention in Cyzicus cf. R.J.Littman, ‘The battle of Cyzicus’ TAPA 99 (1967), 269 – 71. See e. g. Adcock, Thucydides and his Ηistory, Cambridge 1963, 134. Such an argument is used against him in court. See § 7 of our speech οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἀνέβη ἐπ’ ἄλλην ναῦν εἰ μὴ τὴν ἄριστα πλέουσαν, μέλλων αὐτὸς κινδυνεύσειν and the relevant comm. in the commentary. Strauss, “Aegospotami”, 29 – 30. Kagan, Empire, 389, first remarked that the Athenians showed distrust towards Alcibiades because of his false promises regarding the assistance that was to be provided by Tissaphernes. I base my analysis on his opinion strengthening it, I hope, with more evidence. See Sealey, Greek Politics, 115.
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1. Introduction
the Hellespont, Alcibiades promised the Athenians the help of the Thracian kings, citing intimate friendship with them (Diod. 13.105.3). Some of them, however, thought that Alcibiades was only boasting with his promise about defeating the Spartans in a few days (Plut. Alc.37.3). What both cases have in common is the emphasis Alcibiades places on his friends and allies as well as his own pride. The Athenians in Samos trusted him but help from Persia never came, despite his promises about intimate friendship with the latter (Thuc. 8.49.1).³⁵ Why should the Athenians not believe now that Alcibiades was still exaggerating and lying, when he talked about his friendship with the Thracians? Although both sources at first glance seem contradictory about to whom Alcibiades spoke first, in fact they reveal his unreliable character, even if his actual promises could be effective and feasible.³⁶ Thus, because of Alcibiades’ instability, the Athenians in the Hellespont could not discern easily when he was telling the truth and when he was lying; that is why they did not trust him. On the other hand, Alcibiades’ sudden presence in the Athenian camp was because the Athenians themselves had considered a year earlier renegotiating with him, believing that he was the only politician who could save the city from the difficulties of the war.³⁷ Since Alcibiades was really interested in returning to Athens, it is certain that his friends would have informed him about the attitude of the citizens towards him,³⁸ so that all he had to do was to wait for the right moment to intervene, appearing as the saviour of the fleet. The testimony of Diodorus that Alcibiades did not approach the Athenians because of patriotic feelings, but because he hoped that if his compatriots won the war, the way for his return to Athens would be free (Diod. 13.105.4, Nep. Alc.8.1), is correct. The same conclusion about Alcibiades’ motives can be drawn from Xenophon’s
See Bloedow, Alcibiades, 33 – 41, and his severe criticism of the inability of Alcibiades to bring Tissaphernes on the side of Athens. For all the reasons why the Athenians as a whole do not trust Alcibiades see Romilly, Alcibiade, 215. Alcibiades had been in the same difficult position against the Spartans, when he had tried to persuade his fellow citizens that the cities of Ionia would defect from Athens (see Bloedow, Alcibiades, 22– 32). See Aristoph. Frogs 1422– 32 with Lévy, Athénes, 20, R.F.Moorton, Jr, ‘Aristophanes on Alcibiades’ GRBS 29 (1988), 345 – 59, Romilly, Alcibiade, 217– 20, E.F.Bloedow, ‘On ‘nurturing’ lions in the State: Alcibiades’ Entry on the Political Stage in Athens’ Klio 73 (1991), 62– 63, Gribble, Alcibiades, 88. Alcibiades had friends, even at the time he was away from the city (cf. Xen Hell.1.4.18 – 20, Plat. Alc.A.104b1– 2), since the distance did not prevent him from maintaining a friendship (cf. Arist. Nic.Eth.1157b10 – 11).
A. The historical background (The defeat at Aegospotami)
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narrative.³⁹ Alcibiades was most concerned for his personal interest,⁴⁰ but this does not mean that he could not help his country after helping himself first.⁴¹ Alcibiades’ departure was finally justified because of the conduct of the generals. When they had refused any cooperation with him and rejected him, saying that they were the generals and not him (Xen. Hell.2.1.26), no scholar has argued that this act constituted ὕβρις,⁴² since in the moral code of the Athenians it was unacceptable for one to insult a fellow citizen.⁴³ Plutarch does not fail to describe Tydeus’ behaviour as hybristic.⁴⁴ Xenophon, however, taking for granted that his readers would not need more clarification on the departure of Alcibiades, chose not to comment further on Alcibiades’ response, because he was interested most in what the generals were going to decide from that moment on.⁴⁵ Since the generals rejected Alcibiades’ proposal, the question that arises is what measures they took in order to force Lysander to fight. One might expect they would have moved to Sestus so not to have the problem of protecting the fleet and securing its supplies, since that city was the best naval base for the
See Wolpert, Remembering Defeat, 5 – 6. About the role of Alcibiades’ self-interest during his political activity see Macleod, “Rhetoric and History”, 72, W.R.Connor, Thucydides, Princeton 1984, 59,69,163 – 165, C.B.R.Pelling, ‘Plutarch and Thucydides’ in Stadter, Plutarch, 23, M.F.Williams, Ethics in Thucydides: The Athenian Simplicity, Lanham 1998, 227– 37. The political attitude of Alcibiades from the time of his return to Athens after the first exile to the time of his appearance at Aegospotami can be better understood if we compare it to the attitude of Andocides, about whom see Balogh, Political Refugees, 32– 35. Aristotle is classified among the ancient critics, who do not take the incident into consideration, but only the accusations against Alcibiades regarding the scandals of Hermocopidai and the Eleusinian Mysteries; this is why he reports that because Alcibiades did not tolerate being offended, he fought against his own country (Post. Anal.97b15). Among modern scholars, it is worth mentioning the opinion of N.Hammond, A History of Greece to 322 BC, Oxford 1986, 3rd ed., 417, who mentions: ‘Alcibiades … advised the Athenian generals to move the fleet to Sestos; but they paid no heed, and he rode away.’ Only J.B.Bury-R.Meiggs, A History of Greece, London 1975, 4th ed., 316, comment on the attitude of the generals towards Alcibiades: ‘his sound advice was received with coldness, perhaps with insult’ (my emphasis), without, however, interpreting the meaning of the insult suffered by Alcibiades. See D.MacDowell, ‘Hybris in Athens’ G & R 23 (1976), 20, Fisher, Hybris, 91– 93. Plut. Alc.37.2: Ταῦτα δὲ λέγοντος τοῦ ᾿Aλκιβιάδου καὶ παραινοῦντος εἰς Σηστὸν μεθορμίσαι τὸν στόλον, οὐ προσεῖχον οἱ στρατηγοί, Τυδεὺς δὲ καὶ πρὸς ὕβριν ἐκέλευσεν ἀποχωρεῖν οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνον, ἀλλ’ ἑτέρους στρατηγεῖν, Lys. 11.1: ταῦτα δὲ αὐτοῦ διδάσκοντος οὐκ ἐπείθοντο, Τυδεὺς δὲ καὶ πρὸς ὕβριν ἀπεκρίνατο, φήσας οὐκ ἐκεῖνον, ἀλλ’ ἑτέρους στρατηγεῖν (my emphasis). Xenophon was interested most in what the generals were going to decide from that moment on, because his purpose was to show the skills of the military leaders (see Krentz, Xenophon, Hellenica I, 4).
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Athenians in the region.⁴⁶ The view that the generals were wrong in denying that the fleet was exposed in the area, despite Alcibiades’ warnings,⁴⁷ or even better, that they feared that the inhabitants of Sestus⁴⁸ would betray them, is not sound. By studying the attitude of the people of Sestus, we realise that they were constant supporters of the Athenians. In the sea fight of Cynossema in 411 B.C., the Athenians defeated the Spartans using Sestus as their naval base.⁴⁹ After their victory at Abydus the Athenians went there without having any problems with the population (Xen. Hell.1.1.7– 8). Alcibiades arrived at the same place (Xen. Hell.1.1.11), probably estimating that the Athenians would have the assistance of the residents of Sestus now as in the past and advised the generals to use not only the harbour but the city as well to face the Spartans (Xen. Hell.2.1.25). After that nothing seems to have changed, because following the unexpected attack of the Spartans at Aegospotami, the Athenian soldiers, who escaped, took refuge behind the fortified walls of Sestus and survived.⁵⁰ The residents seem to have provided assistance to the Athenians because Lysander was forced to conquer the city (Diod. 13.106.6,8), a fact which shows more than anything else that the people of Sestus chose to defend the Athenians by fighting against the Spartan commander,⁵¹ instead of delivering them to him.⁵² Moreover, three of the ships which returned to Athens had escaped from Sestus.⁵³ Consequently, it is reasonable to believe that the fear of punishment by the demos prevented the
About this point of view see Ste. Croix, Origins, 48, Morrison and Coates, Athenian Trireme, 80 n.1. See also French, Growth, 109, about the strategic location of Sestus since the time of the Persian wars. See H.D.Westlake, Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History, Manchester 1969, 218. Wylie, “Aegospotami”, 129. About this issue see the analysis of Morrison and Coates, Athenian Trireme, 80 – 83, which stresses the importance of the area for the Athenians. See Wylie, “Aegospotami”, 136. To be able to realise the importance of the assistance offered by the people of Sestus to the Athenians it is worth comparing their attitude to that of the oligarchic Corinthians in 394 B.C., who refused permission to the Athenians to enter their city. Cf. Dem. 20.52– 53 with Sandys, Demosthenes, 50 – 51. Bommelaer, Lysander, 111, believes that the word τειχύδρια used by Xenophon (Hell.2.1.19), refers not to the walls of Sestus but to the small walls that the Athenians built behind which they had camped. However, because of the laxity that prevailed in the army, the Athenians finally failed to react to the unexpected attack of the Spartans. This view is attractive, but what is clear from all the sources is the complete lack of planning of the Athenians. If one adopts Bommelaer’s view, the question arising is how could the Athenians build these small walls, even by working late at night, in four days (see Xen. Hell.2.1.23, Plut. Lys.10.3). See comm. § 11.
A. The historical background (The defeat at Aegospotami)
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generals from moving there.⁵⁴ This, of course, does not serve as an excuse for their lack of a specific plan of action. Since Alcibiades did not find receptive ears, the only thing he could do was to question the intentions of the generals and to consider them traitors in turn (Plut. Alc.37.2). When departing from the camp he said, according to Plutarch (Alc.37.3) and Nepos (Alc.8.2), to the γνωρίμους,⁵⁵ who had been ordered to lead him away from the camp,⁵⁶ that if the generals had not offended him, he would have forced the Spartans to fight or leave their vessels within a few days. At this point we should comment on the attitude that the γνώριμοι had towards the words of Alcibiades, since they identified with the trierarchs of the Athenian fleet.⁵⁷ Some of them believed that Alcibiades was simply lying (Plut. Alc.37.2– 3),⁵⁸ while others felt that he could really help them if the Thracian javelin men and cavalrymen attacked the Spartan camp. The fact that some trierarchs believed him is partly justified, because of his prior decisive contribution to the battle of Cyzicus. At this time Alcibiades was already in the region of the Hellespont and, with the assistance of the Thracian kings, he could directly act in favour of the Athenians. Moreover, all the members of the Athenian fleet knew from the outset that owing to the lack of food they could not remain at Aegosopotami for several days without fighting. On the other hand, those who did
See Strauss, “Aegospotami”, 28, cf. Carter, Quiet Athenian, 30 – 31, Harvey, “Dona ferentes”, 99 – 100, Sinclair, Participation, 146 – 52 and particularly 169 – 70. These identify with the rich aristocrats of Athens (see Ste. Croix, Class Struggle, 372– 73, Ober, Mass and Elite, 11– 12) one of whom is the anonymous client of Lysias of this speech. Would it be unreasonable to believe that the speaker was among those who accompanied Alcibiades out of camp? Plutarch mentions what Alcibiades said but he does not specify why his hero decided to speak to them. One of the main reasons for doing so might have been that Alcibiades knew some of them. The speaker of this speech could have been one of them, since Alcibiades had chosen to campaign as ἡγεμὼν αὐτοκράτωρ in his own ship (see comm. §§ 6 – 7). The way the generals chose to expel Alcibiades from camp brings to mind the expulsion of the Spartan ambassador Melesippus from Athens, following Pericles’ decision, and his escort by guards to the border, so not to speak to any Athenian citizen (see Thuc. 2.12.1– 2). The generals chose that Alcibiades was accompanied by people of his class so that he could not come into any contact with the soldiers, since what they apparently feared was the reaction of the latter. About the identification of the aristocrats and the trierarchs see Gabrielsen, Athenian Fleet, 41– 53. Plutarch uses the infinitive ἀλαζονεύεσθαι in this passage. Translating this as “telling lies” in my analysis is based on texts related to persuasion and has this meaning (see D.MacDowell, ‘The Meaning of the ἀλαζών” in ‘Owls to Athens’: Essays on Classical Subjects for Sir Kenneth Dover, E.Craik (ed.), Oxford 1990, 291). It should, however, be noted that MacDowell bases his analysis on sources that chronologically belong to the 4th century B.C. and that Plutarch is not included in this study.
10
1. Introduction
not believe Alcibiades were also right, since he did not present a concrete plan on how to compel Lysander to fight.⁵⁹ It was consequently inevitable that the opinions of the Athenians about Alcibiades would be divided (Alc.37.3). This, however, does not mean that the trierarchs had no responsibility for the safety of the fleet and the final defeat.⁶⁰ After the departure of Alcibiades the situation remained uncertain, since the Athenians did not have a plan of action on how to force the Spartans to fight. Thus, as Lysander refused to respond to the challenge of the Athenians to fight for four days, the insubordination of the crew members grew and only a few trierarchs took some measures to keep their men in readiness for fight.⁶¹ Lysander, of course, all this time applied a specific action-plan, i. e. he was sending his fastest ships to spy on the movements of the Athenians, and only when these ships returned, did he allow the rest of the fleet to disembark (Xen. Hell.2.1.23 – 24).⁶² The postponement of this conflict made all the Athenians despise Lysander more and more.⁶³ The former behaved as if they had forgotten that Lysander was there to fight.⁶⁴ Their excessive confidence was one of the main reasons for the defeat of their fleet.⁶⁵ Finally, Lysander succeeded in defeating his enemies. When, on the fifth day after the signal of the spy ships, his men attacked the Athenian fleet, rowing up and shouting to embark (Plut. Lys.11.5), while the Athenians were far away from their ships (Xen. Hell.2.1.28) without any guards as some form of protection.⁶⁶ Conon was the first to realize that the Spartan fleet had begun their attack and tried to make his men board their ships by a call to arms⁶⁷ or by entreating or forcing them (Plut. Lys.11.3 – 4). The Athenians were surprised by the coordi Cf. Aesch. 3.99: Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἂλλοι ἀλαζόνες, ὅταν τι ψεύδωνται, ἀόριστα καὶ ἀσαφῆ πειρῶνται λέγειν. Cf. comm. § 9 ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοῖς τριηράρχοις ὠργίσθητε. Cf. comm. § 10 παρεσκευασάμην … ὑπηρεσίαν ἀκόλουθον. My analysis at this point follows the narration of Xenophon and not that of Diodorus as it seems rather unreliable. About this issue see e. g. V.J.Gray, ‘The value of Diodorus Siculus for the years 411– 386 B.C.’ Hermes 115 (1987), 78 – 79, B.S.Strauss, ‘Aegospotami Reexamined’ AJP 104 (1983), 24– 35, B.Bleckmann, Athens Weg in die Niederlage. Die letzen Jahre des Peloponesischen Kriegs, Stuttgart-Leipzig, 1998, 572– 80, K-W.Welwei, Das Klassische Athen, Darmstadt 1999, 241. See Xen. Hell.2.1.27, Plut. Alc.36.6, cf. comm. § 9 ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοῖς τριηράρχοις ὠργίσθητε. This is proved by the fact that Conon stole the Spartan fleet sails from Avarnis after the defeat. Cf. Taillardat, “La trière athénienne”, 195, Casson, Ships and Seamanship, 236, Morrison and Coates, Athenian Trireme, 97– 99. Cf. Morrison and Coates, Athenian Trireme, 58. About the protection of the fleet see Morrison and Coates, Athenian Trireme, 99. Lysias’ client could potentially be one of them; otherwise, it is difficult to explain how his own ship was one of the few which escaped from the Spartans with Conon on board.
B. The identity of the speaker
11
nated attack of the Lacedaemonians,⁶⁸ which was a determining factor on the outcome of the conflict.⁶⁹ At the same time, the sight of the attacking Spartan fleet created fear.⁷⁰ The prevailing unrest contributed to an even faster defeat of the fleet.⁷¹ The end of the Athenian hegemony had just started.
B. The identity of the speaker In this trial, we do not know the identity of the speaker. Konstan⁷² reports that the speaker is the son of someone named Eucrates, but this seems to result from confusion with speech 18 of Lysias (cf. 18.4). If we knew the name of the speaker, we could better assess his personality and interpret the speech and the trial more fully. To get to know the speaker I shall use the information he gives about himself in the text, combining it with our knowledge of the political, social and financial situation in Athens towards the end of the 5th century B.C. Financial Status/Profession. The speaker starts his speech by enumerating the liturgies he undertook.⁷³ Davies⁷⁴ estimates that during the 5th century B.C. in Athens there were probably 400 men who belonged to the liturgical class and recognizes seventy men who were obliged to undertake liturgies in the last third of the 5th century. One of them was the speaker. Given that the wealth of the ruling social classes in ancient Greece mainly derived from the land, where cereals, oil and wine were produced and sheep,
Cf. Hdt. 6.77– 78 Cleomenes’ victorious unexpected attack against the Argeians in 494 B.C. thanks to the participation of all the soldiers with Lewis, News and Society, 59 – 60. Cf. Xen. Cyrop.1.6.37, who talks about possible deception of the opponent, by creating overconfidence at first. About the importance of deception as a tactic at war see P.Krentz, ‘Deception in archaic and classical Greek warfare’ in v.Wees, War and Violence, 167– 200. Cf. Xen. Oec.8.8, Thuc. 4.10.5. About the psychological reaction of the Athenians at the time of the attack see Diod 13.106.4– 6. Cf. also Hyp. fr. 157 (ed. Jensen) and Segal, “Gorgias”, 107: ‘if the opsis discerns a fearful sight like the approaching or armoured troops, it is itself disturbed and disturbs the psyche, so that though the danger is in the future, they flee struck out of their wits as if it were already present. The tarache which the physical stimulus creates in the opsis is transmitted in the psyche, sets that too into a state of tarache, and thus causes a total ekplexis, a sudden yielding to an emotional and non-rational response’. About the tarache and its impact on the fleet see also the analyses of J.de Romilly, Histoire et Raison chez Thucydide, Paris 1956, 169 – 72 and V.Hunter, Thucydides: The artful reporter, Toronto 1973, 89 – 90,112,114– 17,180. Pity, 38. See comm. §§ 1– 5. See Wealth, 32– 33.
12
1. Introduction
oxen and horses grazed,⁷⁵ it is right to assume that the main occupation of the speaker was farming. It remains unknown, however, how much land he owned,⁷⁶ and if the land was partitioned into plots located throughout Attica.⁷⁷ During the Decelean War the impact on the economy of Athens was significant, because it took some years to bring agricultural production back to former levels of activity.⁷⁸ Disaster, however, was not permanent.⁷⁹ The effort required to destroy the olive trees was great,⁸⁰ and even if a tree was cut or burnt, it was still able to produce new fruit quite easily.⁸¹ Generally speaking, the Peloponnesian War never created a long-term crisis in agriculture,⁸² so we can safely say that while the speaker may have momentarily sustained an economic blow, this would not have been so serious for him to be found in a dire financial position. Strauss believes that the speaker probably dealt with importing products, mainly wheat because of the blockade of Deceleia.⁸³ Although Athens produced a percentage of the quantities of grain needed,⁸⁴ it still did not cease to import quantities of it from other places,⁸⁵ so the speaker might have been involved with imports at that time.
Cf. Xen. Oec.20.22, see Dover, GPM, 114, Ste. Croix, Origins, 267,396, Ste. Croix, Class Struggle, 120 – 21. From the surviving sources we know that the greatest amount of land was owned by Phaenippus, which reached approximately two hundred hectares. See G.E.M de Ste Croix, ‘The estate of Phaenippus’ (ps.-Dem. Xlii) in Ancient Society and Institutions. Studies Presented to Victor Ehrenberg, E.Badian, (ed.), Oxford 1966, 109 – 114 and A.Burford-Cooper, ‘The family farm in Greece’ CJ 73 (1977– 78), 162– 75. From the surviving sources we know that most landowners in Athens did not possess one piece of land in one area, but plots of land in different areas. See Davies, Wealth, 52– 54. See Ober, Fortress Attica, 13 – 14. See V.N.Andreyev, ‘Some Aspects of Agrarian Conditions in Attica in the Fifth to the Third Centuries B.C.’ Eirene 12 (1974), 18 – 19, E.Will, ‘Le territoire, la ville et la poliorcetique grecque’ RH 253 (1975), 301– 04, Hanson, Warfare and Agriculture, 137– 43. See Hanson, Warfare and Agriculture, 47– 56, 142– 43. See Carey, Lysias, 114– 15. See J.Ober, ‘Thucydides, Pericles, and the Strategy of Defense’ in The Craft of the Ancient Historian: Studies in Honor of Chester G. Starr, Lanham 1985, 171– 188, I.G.Spence, ‘Perikles and the Defence of Attika during the Peloponnesian War’ JHS 110 (1990), 91– 109. See Athens, 50. For different views of the extent to which Athens relied on imported grain see P.Garnsey, ‘Grain for Athens’ in Crux, 62– 75 and Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World, Cambridge 1988, 123,132– 49; M.Whitby, ‘The grain trade of Athens in the fourth century B.C.’ in Trade, Traders and the Ancient City, H.Parkins and C.Smith (eds.), London and New York 1998, 102– 28. See S.Isager and M.H.Hansen, Aspects of Athenian Society in the Fourth Century B.C., Odense 1975, 19 – 29.
B. The identity of the speaker
13
Towards the end of the 5th century B.C., the purchase of uncultivated land, land reclamation and sale were very profitable and a means of enrichment.⁸⁶ In addition, the collection of rents for houses and land was an important source of income for every wealthy Athenian.⁸⁷ It is possible then that the speaker used these two means to enjoy financial benefits. Whatever his profession, the fact that the speaker was away from Athens for seven years⁸⁸ because of his involvement in the campaigns of the city, probably means that he had assigned a supervisor⁸⁹ as a replacement or he assigned the care of his property to a friend.⁹⁰ The constant availability of cash was necessary for the speaker to finance the expensive liturgies he assumed, since no wealthy Athenian could count on the sale of property for this purpose, but only on current sources of income.⁹¹ Liturgies. The reason why the speaker assumed so many liturgies is not known. It has been suggested that the zeal to spend so much money in favour of the city was due to the desire of the speaker to eliminate any suspicion about the oligarchic beliefs of his family.⁹² This is one possible reason, since his father was probably one of the supporters of overthrowing the democracy in 411 B.C., as we shall see below.⁹³ Moreover, the opinion that the speaker was seeking to enjoy political reliability in the eyes of his fellow citizens via expensive liturgies, in order to claim an honoured position in Athens in the future,⁹⁴ is partly correct; since from the age of twenty he enjoyed important political privileges and positions,⁹⁵
Cf. Xen. Oec.20.22– 26 with Pomeroy, Oeconomicus, 339 – 40. See also her introduction in the same work and mainly Oeconomicus, 49. See Finley, Land and Credit, 12– 13, L.Casson, ‘The Athenian Upper Class and New Comedy’ TAPA 106 (1976), 33 – 35, Davies, Wealth, 49, R.Osborne, ‘Social and economic implications of leasing land and property in classical and Hellenistic Greece’ Chiron 18 (1988), 304– 319. See comm. § 3 τὸν δὲ μεταξὺ … ἀνήλωσα. This was the common practice for the Athenians who could not permanently supervise their property. Pečírka, ‘Homestead Farms in Classical and Hellenistic Hellas’ in Vernant, Problèmes de la guerre, 115 – 18,134. Cf. Dem. 49.37, 53.4, see Millett, Lending and Borrowing, 209. See Millett, Lending and Borrowing, 69,79 – 80. This is the opinion of Millett. See Lending and Borrowing, 86. See Introduction,The defensive strategy of the speech, 70. See Kyle, Athletics, 163 n.42, who compares the speaker with the orator Andocides but also other politicians of the city of Athens based on Davies, APF. See comm. § 18 ὡς πολλὰς ἀρχὰς ἄρξας ἐκ τῶν ὑμετέρων ὠφέλημαι.
14
1. Introduction
which indicate that he was considered to be a very prominent Athenian.⁹⁶ It would be better to say that by assuming so many successful liturgies the speaker reinforced the positive impression he had already made on the Athenian society, in order to claim more privileges in the future. Setting goals for a more glorious political career, via the use of liturgies, was already a regular practice shared by other men of the same young age in Athens.⁹⁷ Military operations. The activities of the speaker, however, do not end here; they are closely related to the military life of Athens. His career started with Alcibiades as a general,⁹⁸ when in 407 B.C. the latter boarded his ship and headed with it in the direction of Samos; having first stopped at Andros to conquer it after its rebellion from Athens.⁹⁹ There the speaker was nearly killed, since Alcibiades decided to besiege the island (Xen. Hell.1.4.21– 23, Diod. 13.69.4– 5). Then he sailed to Ephesus, where Alcibiades learned that Lysander was repairing his fleet (Xen. Hell.1.5.10, Diod. 13.71.1). The speaker would have to face Lysander and his fleet in a naval battle for the first time, but the refusal of the latter to fight with the Athenians led Alcibiades to decide to set up camp at Notium. When the latter learned that Thrasybulus was building walls around Phocaea, he decided to visit him leaving Antiochus as commander in his place and ordering him not to enter into conflict with Lysander.¹⁰⁰ The question that arises here is whether the speaker remained with the rest of the fleet, under the authority of Antiochus, or if he sailed along with Alcibiades to Phocaea. If we combine the testimony of Diodorus that Alcibiades took with him τὰς στρατιώτιδας ναῦς and ἀρίστους στρατιώτας (Diod.13.71.1– 2) with the claims of the speaker that his own trireme ἄριστα ἔπλει παντὸς τοῦ στρατοπέδου (§ 6), and that Alcibiades οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἀνέβη ἐπ’ ἄλλην ναῦν εἰ μὴ τὴν ἄριστα πλέουσαν, μέλλων αὐτὸς κινδυνεύσειν (§ 7), it is difficult to believe that the speaker did not travel with him. Moreover, since Alcibiades returned as soon as he learned about the battle
Another known case similar to the speaker’s, proving political experience, is that of Alcibiades, who, at the age of twenty-five, was appointed to be one of the reviewers of the contributions of the allies (see Ostwald, Sovereignty, 293). See P.J.Rhodes, ‘Political Activity in Classical Athens’ JHS 106 (1986), 142, comm. § 1 μὲν ἐπὶ Θεοπόμπου ἄρχοντος … μνᾶς. cf. Davies, Wealth, 26. In the present analysis I shall not comment on the reasons of Alcibiades’ departure to Ionia (on this issue see the discussion of Bloedow, Alcibiades, 72– 79, who mentions the older approaches of previous scholars). What is of interest here is to identify in which areas and under what conditions the speaker fought as a trierarch. See comm. § 6 πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ᾿Aλκιβιάδης … ἔπλει ἐπὶ τῆς ἐμῆς νεώς. This is the most probable destination of Alcibiades (see Kagan, Empire, 312– 13). About this important mistake of Alcibiades see Bloedow, Alcibiades, 75 – 79.
B. The identity of the speaker
15
at Notium and challenged Lysander to fight in a sea fight,¹⁰¹ it is reasonable to believe that he sailed on the ship on which he left Athens. From there the Athenian fleet, under the command of Alcibiades, sailed to Samos, but the people back in Athens resented him,¹⁰² so he abandonded the speaker’s ship, boarded another and left for Cherronesus.¹⁰³ After Alcibiades’ departure Conon arrived in Samos with twenty ships, and became head of the fleet. The speaker remained with the Athenian fleet on this specific island with the rest of the Athenians, obeying the orders Conon gave them; that is to say, carrying out raids and looting against the enemies of the city (Xen. Hell.1.5.20, Diod. 13.74.1– 2). On this island the general Archestratus boarded his trireme and sailed with the entire fleet to Mytilene. It was there, however, that Archestratus was killed after the blockade of Callicratidas.¹⁰⁴ Erasinides then boarded the speaker’s ship.¹⁰⁵ Meanwhile, Conon, who had no other alternative solution, decided to send two of his finest vessels of the fleet to Athens to inform them about the siege (Xen. Hell.1.6.19). Given that the general Erasinides was in charge of one of the ships, the speaker was definitely the trierarch.¹⁰⁶ The fact that Conon chose the speaker’s ship among the best triremes proves that his vessel was really one of the foremost triremes of the Athenian fleet and that he was a good trierarch, who had the money to spend on it. The recruitment and boarding of young rowers and soldiers under the command of Conon (Xen. Hell.1.6.19) shows that the latter was sure of the speaker’s ability to impose discipline on his men and achieve the difficult task set.¹⁰⁷ Eventually, the two ships of the Athenians attempted to escape from the Spartans and while the latter initially seemed to be surprised and unable to arrest them, they managed to capture one of the two ships. Only the speaker’s ship was able to escape and sail to Athens, announcing the sad news (Xen.
See 13.71.4. The key phrase here is: διὰ σπουδῆς. See also Plut. Alc.35.8. See comm. § 7 ἐπειδὴ … τῆς ἀρχῆς. See comm. § 7 οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἀνέβη … κινδυνεύσειν. See comm. § 8 οὗτοι πάντες … ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ. See comm. § 8 Ἐρασινίδης μετ’ ἐμοῦ συνέπλει. The first to note that Erasinides was sailing on the speaker’s ship to Mytilene was MacCoy (“Leon”, 192). This scholar also observes that the speaker fought as a trierarch in the Ionian war, since the latter boasts that his ship was among the fastest of the Athenian fleet, and that after the death of Archestratus Erasinides was sailing with him. Lysias chooses not to mention this issue in the speech. Nevertheless, he will reveal the ability of his client as trierarch, when refers to Aegospotami. See comm. § 10 παρεσκευασάμην … ἀκόλουθον.
16
1. Introduction
Hell.1.6.20 – 22). Thus, the speaker’s trireme proved to be the best, not only in theory but in practice.¹⁰⁸ After Erasinides and the speaker had arrived in the city of Athens, the Athenians were stirred; they prepared one hundred and thirty ships within thirty days and sailed to Samos (Xen. Hell.1.6.24). Since the Athenians recruited every man who could meet the requirements of the mission, it is certain that the speaker also took part in the mission and that he probably took part in the battle of Arginousae that followed, once more under the command of the general Erasinides.¹⁰⁹ Then Erasinides and the other generals were asked to return to Athens and accused of not having recovered the bodies of the dead, while the fleet was in Samos (Xen. Hell.1.7.2, 2.1.16). Since the speaker, only a short while later, took part in the sea fight at the Hellespont, we must conclude that Erasinides did not return to Athens on board the speaker’s ship. If this had happened, it would make more sense to believe that the speaker joined the Athenian fleet sailing with one of the new generals; otherwise it is difficult to explain how such a competent trierarch as he sailed alone to Aegospotami.¹¹⁰ The speaker, as a member of the fleet, took part in the plundering of the territories of Asia Minor, which belonged to the King of Persia, and in the attacks on Chios and Ephesus. Then the Athenians, following the movements of Lysander, were found in the Hellespont in order to fight with him, but when the time came, as I showed before, they were unprepared.¹¹¹ The speaker was among the few who were able to escape from the Spartans at Aegospotami thanks to the proper organization of his ship and the discipline imposed on the crew.¹¹² Political activity. On the return of the few trierarchs who escaped from Lysander to Athens, some citizens raised the accusation that even the trierarchs should be held responsible for the defeat.¹¹³ This embittered the trierarchs who, while talking to one another, declared their disappointment,¹¹⁴ because, instead of being
Consequently, the claim of the speaker that he had the ἄριστα πλέουσαν ναῦν (§ 6) is real. See comm. § 8 Ἐρασινίδης μετ’ ἐμοῦ συνέπλει. See comm. § 9 οὐδενός μοι συμπλέοντος στρατηγοῦ. See Introduction, The defeat at Aegospotami, 10 – 11. See comm. § 10. See comm. § 9 ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοῖς τριηράρχοις ὠργίσθητε. Cf. Isocr. 18.60: πρὸς τὰ παρόντ’ άθύμως διακειμένων. These meetings must be real; otherwise it would not be possible for the speaker to know the reactions of his former colleagues. In addition, it is difficult to explain how the speaker knew why the trierarchs stopped assuming trierarchies if this piece of information is not true. Finally, and most importantly, this
B. The identity of the speaker
17
congratulated, they were were held responsible.¹¹⁵ Moreover, the speaker among them,¹¹⁶ taking advantage of the general panic, decided to leave his position as a trierarch illegally.¹¹⁷ He took the decision in fear, believing that there was no reason to fight against the Spartans any more¹¹⁸ and also because he felt that he had to look after himself and his family.¹¹⁹ When Lysander besieged Athens and instructed everyone not to import wheat to the city, otherwise the penalty would be death, the speaker believed that the destruction of the city was certain. For this reason he did not dare to bring food into the city, either for himself or for his family.¹²⁰ The blockade of Athens led many poor Athenians to gather within the walls, a fact which led to greater food shortage. The lack of food and the influx of the poor into the city caused the resentment of the aristocrats.¹²¹ Since there is no argument that indicates that some of them had different feelings, we cannot exempt the speaker. It is reasonable to believe that the speaker agreed with Theramenes’ proposal to dismantle the walls and surrender the city to the Spartans, as did the majority of the Athenians, since he does not report any disagreement with this.¹²² Moreover, taking into consideration that the war was close to its end, it is also
speech was literally delivered some time before our speech, i. e. before the fall of Eleusis in the hands of the democrats (see Loening, Reconciliation, 124). About class tensions in post-war Athens see especially Strauss, Athens, 55 – 59. Among them is definitely the speaker, Nausimachus, whom he rescued, Isocrates’ client (Isocr. 18) and Eryximarchus (Roberts, P.Ryl. 489, col. 100 – 103). This is what all the trierarchs who returned to Peiraeus did. See D.S.Robertson, ‘The duration of a trierarchy’ CR 51 (1927), 115 – 16. The only trierarch who continued to fight against the Spartans was Isocrates’ client (see 18.60). For his personal activity he was later honoured by the demos, whereas his motive was, as he confesses, φιλοτιμία πρὸς τὴν πόλιν (18. 61). The φιλοτιμία of Lysias’ speaker for his fellow citizens seems to have been lost for the moment (cf. § 22). Cf. Isocr. 18.60: τὰ δ’ ἴδια σκοπουμένων. Here we have the earliest proof of the decision of the aristocrats to be interested primarily in their own personal interests rather than the city. Therefore, Sinclair’s view, Participation, 192, that this change of attitude of prominent Athenians started the year following the restoration of democracy in 403 B.C. is not correct. Cf. Isocr. 18.60 – 61: τῶν ἄλλων … νομιζόντων τὰ μὲν κοινὰ διεφθάρθαι … προειπόντος Λυσάνδρου, εἴ τις εἰσάγει σῖτον ὡς ὑμᾶς θάνατον τὴν ζημίαν … τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲ τὸν σφέτερον αὐτῶν εἰσάγειν τολμώντων. By using the pronoun τῶν ἄλλων the speaker means both times the trierarchs and not any other citizens. See Ober, Fortress Attica, 53 – 54. Cf. Xen. Hell.2.2.22.
18
1. Introduction
reasonable to believe that the speaker was happy, because he would no longer have to put his life in danger.¹²³ During the period between the conclusion of peace in March and the appointment of the Thirty, the Athenian aristocracy was divided into two groups. One comprised those who had been sent into exile by the democratic regime, who were organized into clubs and supported oligarchy; and the other, those well-known citizens who were not members of clubs, who wanted to restore the πάτριος πολιτεία and who had Theramenes as their leader. The latter group, though dissatisfied with the way the demos exercised its power, did not wish the overthrow of democracy in favour of oligarchy.¹²⁴ As the speaker was never exiled from the city, but remained in Athens for all those years and fought against the Spartans,¹²⁵ we must consider it as certain that he belonged to Theramenes’ group. For the latter, πάτριος πολιτεία meant the abolition of salaries for all those taking office and the restriction of political rights to those who could serve personally and with their own money, i. e. the hoplites and the aristocrats.¹²⁶ It is not easy to decide if the adoption of this view was a matter of principle or a matter of practical evaluation of the current political situation for the speaker. If, however, we bear in mind that the speaker offered his money lavishly for the fleet of Athens all these years, contributed two eisphorai,¹²⁷ and finally received the anger of his fellow citizens, it is preferable to believe that he was in favour of Theramenes’ programme mainly because of personal interest. However, the actions of the oligarchs with Lysander’s assistance led to the overthrow of the democratic regime and the rise of the Thirty to power.¹²⁸ Theramenes was the one who convinced the moderate Athenians of the good intentions of the Thirty.¹²⁹ Besides, the future tyrants of the city had been elected as a
See § 3 καθ’ ἡμέραν ὐπὲρ ὑμῶν κινδυνεύων καὶ ἀποδημῶν. His decision not to risk anymore was taken, as we saw before, the moment he returned to the city from the Hellespont. About the credibility of this point of view see Ostwald, Sovereignty, 469 – 71. See comm. §§ 3, 6 – 10. See C.Bearzot, ‘Teramene tra storia e propaganda’ RIL 113 (1979), 195 – 219, especially 213 – 19, Ostwald, Sovereignty, 471– 72. See comm. § 3 ὅμως είσφορὰς … εἰσενήνοχα. In our speech, the speaker will never admit something like this, but in order to obtain his acquittal, he will emphasize to the jurors that the treasuries of Athens are empty and that the city could rely on people, like him, who are eager to spend their money in the future for any financial need which may arise (see comm. §§ 13, 14, 16, 19, 25). About what actually happened see Ostwald’s analysis, Sovereignty, 475 – 777. About the reasons why the moderate Athenians were convinced by Theramenes see T.M.Murphy, ‘Lysias 25 and the intractable Democratic abuses’ AJP 113 (1996), 549.
B. The identity of the speaker
19
legitimate government and not because of cooperation among the oligarchs.¹³⁰ This is why (if they were already in power by then) they allowed their fellow citizens to hold the annual Panathenaea¹³¹ of 404/03 B.C, i. e. a few days after they were established in power.¹³² The speaker apparently believed that a new era was beginning for the city so he decided not to hide his property any longer¹³³ but to make it φανεράν ¹³⁴ in order to be elected a choregus by his tribe again.¹³⁵ Moreover, the speaker’s positive attitude towards the new government was probably because he believed its propaganda about the deliverance of the city from the sycophants and the need for moral reformation.¹³⁶ For this reason, it is possible that he might have approved of the execution of some of the sycophants,¹³⁷ who with their methods and practice¹³⁸ made the lives of the most eminent citizens difficult.¹³⁹
See Ostwald, Sovereignty, 477– 78. See comm. § 4 καὶ ὕστερον … πεντεκαίδεκα μνᾶς. This action of the Thirty confirms what Wilson, Khoregia, 91, suggests: ‘Festivals under the oligarchic regime may have continued to be held in the name of the demos as a whole, even when the demos had had its powers restricted’. The Panathenea were held in the last days of the month Hecatombaeon (see comm. § 1 ἐπὶ δὲ Γλαυκίππου … ὀκτακοσίας). The Thirty, consequently, might have come to power a few days earlier. Krentz, Thirty, 149 – 50, believes that the Thirty were elected between the middle and the end of summer, although he does not reject the possibility that they were selected earlier by Lysander. P.Green, ‘Rebooking the flute-girls: a fresh look at the chronological evidence for the fall of Athens and the ὀκτάμηνος ἀρχή of the Thirty’ AHB 5 (1991), 1– 16, argues that the Thirty were elected in late September or early October. See also Rhodes, CAP, 436 – 37. Consequently, the claim of Isocrates’ client that the trierarchs of the Hellespont hid their property (τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ ἀποκρυπτομένων 18.60) is not entirely correct with regard to our speaker. The latter, however, did not do something that could be considered later on as assistance for democracy, while the import of wheat in the city certainly was (see Isocr. 18.61). Cf. § 12 οὐδὲ παραστῆναι τοῖς διαδυομένοις … τῶν σφετέρων αὐτῶν. About the mode of selection of the trierarchs for the Panathenaea see comm. § 2 καὶ ἐπὶ Διοκλέους … τριακοσίας. Cf. Lys. 12.5, 25.30 – 31, Xen. Hell.2.3.12, Arist. Pol.1305b22 – 27, see L.Gianfrancesco, ‘Aspetti propagandistici della politica dei Trenti Tiranni’ CISA 2 (1974), 20 – 35, Krentz, Thirty, 46, Wolpert, Remembering Defeat, 16, 18, Ostwald, Sovereignty, 480. The sycophants mainly attaccked wealthy citizens (see Carter, Quiet Athenian, 111– 13). About the general approval of the execution of the sycophants see Krentz, Thirty, 60. See Underhill, Xenophon Hellenica, 54, Harvey, “Sycophant”, 112– 114. See Diod. 14.4.2: καὶ μέχρι τούτου τοῖς ἐπιεικεστάτοις τῶν πολιτῶν εὐαρέστει τὰ γινόμενα. If the support for the policy of the Thirty to purge the city from the sycophants was not immediate and apparent from every citizen, as Krentz, Xenophon Hellenica, II, 125, believes, this does not mean that the common sentiment was not satisfied. Moreover, it does not mean either that the aristocrats had any objections to approve in public of the measures taken, since it was they who suffered by the activities of the sycophants. This was the right moment for them to manifest their
20
1. Introduction
Nevertheless, this feeling of security was soon lost after their execution, since the Thirty killed even the wealthy citizens who had initially supported them.¹⁴⁰ Among those executed were those citizens who did not support their policy and were openly opposed to them (Lys. 12.25, 30.13). The speaker chose to remain silent and never publicly expressed his objection about the deeds of the Thirty. His attitude is not surprising, since everybody else was doing the same. The only politician who openly and publicly expressed his disapproval of the unjustified assassinations was Theramenes.¹⁴¹ Then the Thirty proceeded to compile a list of three thousand citizens, in which they would include men whom they would favour, but without being quite certain whom to include ([Arist.] Ath.Pol.36.2). The fact that the speaker was not driven from the city, as happened with other Athenians,¹⁴² means that the Thirty decided that he should remain in Athens. It would be interesting to know the reasons that made the Thirty believe that the speaker would be trustworthy. For him the main reason to stay in the city would be, of course, to safeguard his property. To this thought I am led by the admission of another of Lysias’ litigants who says that he stayed in the city for this same reason.¹⁴³ Those from whom this litigant wanted to protect his wealth can be no other than the Thirty, which means that he no longer trusted them. In my opinion, this fact is also valid for our speaker, whom Lysias certainly would never allow him to confess such a thing in public, since this would ruin the defence of the speech. It is certain, on the other hand, that he managed to keep his possessions, when the Thirty decided that only three thousand would be allowed to do so (Xen. Hell.2.4.1). The protection of the fields of the Three Thousand, however, was uncertain. This is demonstrated by the decision of the oligarchs themselves to send part of the Spartan garrison and their cavalrymen to guard the fields for fear that the democrats might engage in looting (Xen.Hell.2.4.4). It seems that the democrats were successful; that is why Aristarchus complained to Socrates that he could not take part in the production of the fields, because of the men of Thrasybulus,
indignation. If the Thirty were elected as a legal government, as Krentz maintains (see Thirty, 50), the decision to punish the sycophants was the decision of the legal government, and this enabled the eminent citizens to express their feelings freely. But even if the Thirty had been elected as a temporary legislative body (see Rhodes, CAP, 434– 35), this was not a problem for the nobility to rejoice on the execution of the well-known sycophants who could no longer harm them. See Ostwald, Sovereignty, 484. See Lys 12.25, 34.4, Ostwald, Sovereignty, 485. On this issue see Ostwald, Sovereignty, 488. Cf. Lys. 25.18: οὐκ ἂν δικαίως ὑμᾶς μισεῖν … τοὺς προθυμουμένους τὰ ἑαυτῶν σῶσαι.
B. The identity of the speaker
21
who controlled most of the rural area of Athens.¹⁴⁴ For this reason, most probably, the speaker’s fields may have suffered damage because of the raids in the countryside.¹⁴⁵ Meanwhile, the increasing reaction of Theramenes against the measures of his extreme colleagues resulted in his being taken before the Boule and being convicted. The removal of the name of Theramenes from the list of citizens was based on the argument that anyone who had taken part in the demolition of the walls of Eetionea and had been an enemy of the Four Hundred should be removed from the list. As Pseudo-Aristotle reports, referring to the trial, the only man who fell in both categories was Theramenes (Ath.Pol.37.1). The argument that those who participated in the government of the Thirty were not the opponents of the Four Hundred is important, because it implies that the tyrants were sure about the political attitude of the three thousand citizens towards the previous oligarchic regime. If we take into consideration that during the Four Hundred the speaker was still a minor, we must believe that there had been some evidence for his political beliefs, and this was because his father had at least been positive towards the new regime and the overthrow of democracy.¹⁴⁶ When the decisive battle took place in Peiraeus, the oligarchs were defeated,¹⁴⁷ a fact which led the Thirty to harden their attitude and seek to kill the inhabitants of Eleusis. In the illegal trial against them Critias demanded that the Three Thousand condemn the Eleusinians using the threat of the armed Spartan garrison.¹⁴⁸ Up to that time, the Three Thousand agreed on how to deal with the rebels at Phyle. Nevertheless, after the punishment of the Eleusinians discord arose among them.¹⁴⁹ Since the speaker was politically moderate, it is reasonable to assume that he did not agree with the measures taken by the extreme oligarchs.¹⁵⁰
Xen. Mem.2.7.1– 2: λαμβάνομεν δὲ οὔτε ἐκ τῆς γῆς οὐδέν· οἱ γὰρ ἐναντίοι κρατοῦσιν αὐτῆς· οὔτ’ ἀπὸ τῶν οίκιῶν. In this phrase οἱ ἐναντίοι are identified with Thrasybulus’ men (see Krentz, Thirty, 94). On this issue cf. also Isocr. 16.13: Οὐ καταλαβόντες τὸν Πειραιᾶ καὶ τὸν σῖτον τὸν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ διεφθείρετε καὶ τὴν γῆν ἐτέμνετε. We could also consider as relevant to the topic Lys. 31.9, 17– 19. Todd believes that Lys. 7.6 is also relevant (see Lysias, Speeches 1 – 11, 518). See my previous analysis about the financial status of the speaker. See further, Introduction, The defensive strategy of the speech, 53 – 54. About these events see Ostwald, Sovereignty, 488 – 90. About this issue see A.P.Dorjahn, ‘Intimidation in Athenian Courts’ CQ 32 (1937), 347– 48, cf. also Lys. 12.93: εἰς τοσοῦτον ὑπεροψίας ἐλθόντες ὥστε οὐ τῶν ἀγαθῶν κοινούμενοι πιστοὺς ὑμᾶς ἐκτῶντο, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὀνειδῶν μεταδιδόντες εὔνους ᾤοντο εἶναι. See Cloché, “Trois- mille”, 14– 28. Cf. Lys. 12.92: ὅσοι ἐξ ἄστεώς ἐστε, σκέψασθε ὅτι ὑπὸ τούτων οὕτω σφόδρα ἤρχεσθε.
22
1. Introduction
In the decisive conflict what is particularly important is the fact that the herald Cleocritus, in his speech to the supporters of the Thirty on the battlefield, urged them to cease hostilities, taking into consideration the religious and social bonds that united them, such as the religious festivals of the city¹⁵¹ and their common fights against their enemies (Xen. Hell.2.4.20 – 22).¹⁵² In the meeting, the Thirty convoked to decide about what they should do.¹⁵³ Those who believed they had not been unfair to any co-citizen tried to persuade the others that they should not remain loyal to the Thirty and thus allow for the loss of the city. It is most probable that the speaker realized after Cleocritus’ speech his role within Athenian society. He had never harmed anyone,¹⁵⁴ and considering that throughout their office the Thirty benefited largely more than those who supported them,¹⁵⁵ took the floor and urged the rest of the citizens to help the city out of this difficult situation.¹⁵⁶ Such intervention would have been important, because it made his opinion of the Thirty known to the rest of the Three Thousand. Although, until now, he did not officially protest about their practices, the defeat of the latter in the battle, entitled him to express his views freely. The speaker chose in the end to be reconciled with the democrats rather than betray his city to Sparta.¹⁵⁷ Given that dances played a decisive role in the organisation of social cohesion in ancient Greece (see Α.Γκάρτζιου-Τάττη, ‘Ο χορός στην αρχαία Ελλάδα’ in Χορός και Κοινωνία, Β.Νιτσιάκος, (ed.), Κόνιτσα 1994, 17– 32), it is worth wondering to what extent the speaker’s contribution to the organisation and realisation of so many dances in the religious festivals of Athens defined his attitude (cf. comm. §§ 1– 4). The influence of this particular herald is also held by Lewis, News and Society, 52– 56, in her analysis about the role of heralds in the life of the Greek cities. About the convocation of this council see Ostwald, Sovereignty, 491. See comm. § 18 ἢ ὡς αἰσχροῦ τινος αἴτιός εἰμι. Cf. Lys. 12.93, 25.6, Xen. Hell.2.3.48, [Arist.] Ath.Pol.36.2. The use of the verb ἐδίδασκον, which is part of the vocabulary of the political oratory of the time (see Introduction, The defeat at Aegospotami, 2) implies a mastery of the art of rhetoric. Apparently, the speaker, as a wealthy aristocrat, had been taught the art of rhetoric by a sophist. It is worth remembering that Critias had enforced a law prohibiting the teaching of rhetoric during the regime (Xen. Mem.1.2.31: ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἔγραψε λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν). Perhaps the leader of the violent oligarchs wanted to limit the influence of the sophists in Athens in this way, as Ostwald supposes (Sovereignty, 487 n.108). What is certain is that he had not estimated that the latter had reached their goals many years before, as it is demonstrated by the initiative of the moderates, among them the client of Lysias, to speak before all the Three Thousand. Cf. Lys. 26.19: οὗτοι γὰρ εἵλοντο μετὰ τῶν κατελθόντων πολιτεύεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ τῶν τριάκοντα Λακεδαιμονίοις δουλεύειν. Here it is worth asking whether this time the moderate supporters of the Thirty, like the speaker, saw through the plans of the Thirty an effort to adjust Athens in the Spartan political model (Krentz, Thirty, 64– 68, Whitehead, “Thirty Tyrants”, 119 – 30), or whether this happened at the time when the Thirty selected them among the Three
B. The identity of the speaker
23
A new board of ten men was elected, replacing the Thirty and empowered to put an end to the hostilities between the two parties. The oligarchs, however, did not stop the hostilities, but instead they requested the assistance of the Spartans to defeat the democrats.¹⁵⁸ Moderate citizens, like the speaker, reacted to the new situation, since they realized that the Ten did not seek reconciliation. The latter, however, killed a prominent man, Demaretus, in order to scare them, and further strengthened their power with the help of the weapons of the Spartan Callibius and some horsemen ([Arist.] Ath.Pol.38.2). Again, however, the people of the city reacted and replaced the Ten with another board of ten men.¹⁵⁹ The election of these new people took place when the people of Peiraeus won the war, but before Pausanias arrived ([Arist.] Ath.Pol.38.3). This means that the moderates chose to react as they had done in the past, whilst at the same time the extreme oligarchs seemed to be losing control. The election of these ten new officials, which took place before the arrival and intervention of the military support by the oligarchic Spartans in the city demonstrates the fear of these citizens, like the speaker, that eventually the extreme oligarchs might win and definitely prevail. The moderate Athenians also could not know what the intentions of the Lacedaemonians were.¹⁶⁰ This did not mean, however, that they trusted the democrats either. When the Spartan general Pausanias eventually sought peace and reconciliation between the two parties, the people of the city sent ambassadors to Sparta, offering to surrender unconditionally to the Spartans, while the democrats were obliged to surrender the Peiraeus and Munychia. Consequently, reconciliation was not yet in their minds and clearly also not in the speaker’s mind.¹⁶¹ Finally, in 403 B.C. the people of Peiraeus and the people of the city reached an agreement, which included the important condition that the Athenians should not be resentful about the mistakes made by both of them in the past.¹⁶² Five of the terms of the agreement regarded the creation of a semi-independent community at Eleusis, where the oligarchs who did not wish to stay in Athens could take up residence.¹⁶³ Although those who had fought with the ThirThousand (see R.Brock, ‘Athenian Oligarchs: The Numbers Game’ JHS 109 (1989), 163). The question remains unanswered. About these events see Ostwald’s analysis, Sovereignty, 491– 92. About this issue see A.P.Dorjahn, ‘On Aristotle, Ath.Pol. XXXVIII, 3’ PhQ 32 (1944), 289 – 96, Krentz, Thirty, 96 – 97, Walbank, “Thirty Tyrants”, 93 – 94 n.47, Loening, Reconciliation, 45 – 46. But against the second Ten see Rhodes, CAP, 459 – 60. About the motives of the Spartans see Ostwald, Sovereingty, 493 – 94. See Ostwald, Sovereignty, 496. Krentz, Thirty, 104, proves this view. About the terms of staying in Eleusis see Ostwald, Sovereignty, 498.
24
1. Introduction
ty feared retaliation from the democrats, and were concerned about whether they should move to Eleusis, the less compromised members of the Thirty had already taken the decision to remain in the city.¹⁶⁴ The speaker, who he was sure that from the time of the military defeat of the Thirty that he had done nothing reprehensible against his fellow citizens during the regime, remained in Athens. If the leaders of the oligarchs at Eleusis were those of the Thirty who had survived,¹⁶⁵ we have another reason to understand why the speaker did not leave the city. The assumption of two luxurious choregies in the same year by the speaker, at the time of the restoration of democracy, is the practical proof of his desire to restore social and religious life to its former good condition. At the same time this was an effective way to indicate his political beliefs and persuade the democrats that he was not a wicked oligarch.¹⁶⁶ The adequate financial resources of the speaker to assume liturgies are probably due to his favourable treatment by the democrats.¹⁶⁷ It was agreed in the terms of the amnesty that every Athenian citizen should return to his property (Xen. Hell.2.4.38), which enabled citizens like him to remain among the wealthiest of the Athenian population.¹⁶⁸ The aristocracy of the city, after the office of the archon Eucleides, remained unpunished and wealthy¹⁶⁹ by contrast with the Athenians as a whole.¹⁷⁰ This fact explains why the speaker, at the time he delivered this speech, can state in court that he remains rich.¹⁷¹ Nevertheless, tension between the democrats and former supporters of the Thirty did not stop after the reconciliation. Phormisius suggested that civil rights
As Loening, Reconciliation, 68, rightly remarks. This is what Walbank believes “Thirty Tyrants”, 95. See comm. § 4 ἐπὶ δὲ Εὐκλείδου … ἑκκαίδεκα μνᾶς, καὶ Παναθηναίοις τοῖς μικροῖς … ἑπτά μνᾶς. Wilson, Khoregia, 91, rightly remarks that the assumption of a choregy by a citizen during a particular political regime does not necessarily mean that this citizen ideologically identifies with the regime. About the way the Three Thousand enjoyed favourable treatment after the peace restoration see Cloché, “Les Trois-mille”, 21– 25. See P.Cloché, ‘Les conflits politiques et sociaux à Athenes pendant la guerre corinthienne’ (395 – 387 avant J.-C.) REA 21 (1919), 158, Loening, Reconciliation, 67, Ostwald, Sovereignty, 501. This is Cloché’s conclusion, “Les Trois-mille”, 27. Having been one of the Three Thousand, the speaker will not have had his property confiscated under the Thirty; but if he had not bought confiscated property under the Thirty he will not now have been in danger of losing any property. Cf. Lys. 13.47. Cf. §§ 14, 15, 19.
B. The identity of the speaker
25
should be granted only to the Athenians who possessed land.¹⁷² This proposal was probably supported by many of those who stayed in the city during the regime,¹⁷³ but we do not know how many Athenians or which Athenians supported Phormisius. We cannot also be certain whether or not the speaker supported Phormisius. Some time after the reconciliation¹⁷⁴ the oligarchs at Eleusis hired mercenaries and attempted to retake power by force, but all the residents of the city now resisted them and also implemented the terms of reconciliation for the people of Eleusis.¹⁷⁵ The speaker’s reaction to the aggressiveness of the oligarchs suggests that he wished political stability for the city. Conclusion. This analysis makes clear that the speaker is neither an oligarch nor a democrat.¹⁷⁶ His generous economic attitude towards the city in the early stages of his life and his constant involvement in the wars of Athens place him in the ranks of those aristocrats that the Old Oligarch criticized. This was because although they were not democrats by nature, they truly supported the demos, having chosen to work for it either as officials or as liturgists.¹⁷⁷ Until the time of the defeat in the Hellespont, the speaker seemed to belong to those members of the nobility who were unable to realise that democracy was the power of a particular social group who cared for their own interests, so they cooperated with the demos.¹⁷⁸ However, the compatibility between their real interests and those of the demos disappeared when people like him were considered traitors to the city. Frustration because of the current political circumstances initially led him to welcome the new regime of the Thirty; but when it proved detrimental to him and the city, he decided to work with the demos again. This was probably the main reason why the speaker assumed a financial office. Unfortunately, accusations of misappropriation of public funds and bribery were raised against him.
This proposal by Phormisius was put forward before the hostilities with the oligarchs of Eleusis stopped (see Ostwald, Sovereignty, 504 n.24), therefore, before the present trial. Cf. Lys. 34.1– 3, see Cloché, “Les Trois-mille”, 26 and the bibliography that A.Fuks cites in his analysis, The Ancestral Constitution, London 1953, 42 n.24. The surviving sources do not help us to assess when exactly the people of Eleusis put their plan in practice. For this matter see Loening, Reconciliation, 59 – 60. For this issue see Ostwald, Sovereignty, 501. Cf. Lys. 25.8, Isocr. 16.37, Dover, LCL, 49, Furley, Andokides, 61 n.47. See [Xen.] Ath.Pol.2.19. Cf. Wilson, Khoregia, 173: ‘many had doubtless internalized the democratic ideology of the system.’ See Ober, Political Dissent, 22– 23.
26
1. Introduction
C. The charge of bribery¹⁷⁹ Τhe speaker has to face two very serious accusations, the embezzlement of public funds and bribery. Regarding the charges of bribery, the key questions in this case are as follows: 1) who the speaker received the ‘gift’ from, 2) who gave it to him 3) where he received it.¹⁸⁰ In this part of the speech the speaker does not deal with the legal aspects of the case because he dealt with them, as he says, just previously,¹⁸¹ so I shall attempt to shed light on the case only from the surviving part of the defence. Unfortunately for us, the text of Lysias is not helpful regarding the second and third questions, whereas for the first question the only information is the word οἱ ἂλλοι. ¹⁸² This word is adequate evidence to begin my analysis. According to Demosthenes, there are three things that a bribed citizen betrays: εἰ δ’ ὁ μὲν καιρούς, ὁ δὲ πράγματα, ὁ δὲ στρατιώτας προδίδωσιν, ὧν ἂν ἕκαστος, οἶμαι, κύριος γένηται, ταῦτα διαφθείρει (19.268). Since the speaker denies that he intended to harm the city by receiving this gift¹⁸³ and the word πράγματα refers to the existing regime,¹⁸⁴ we can take it for granted that the speaker is accused of bribery which aimed to undermine the democratic regime that had just been restored in Athens. The key question that arises, therefore, is who might be those people who wished to bribe an Athenian citizen to help them harm the democracy. At the time the speech was delivered, the Persians were not
Although the speech was delivered in late 5th century B.C., in this section I shall attempt to illuminate aspects of the case using rhetorical texts from the 4th century B.C. This synchronic method is appropriate in an analysis like this, but it is also imperative because of the lack of other rhetorical texts of the same period as our speech (cf. Ober, Mass and Elite, 35 – 36). The question, which is likely to arise here, is, whether the perceptions of the Athenian society on bribery had changed over the two centuries (cf. Ober, Mass and Elite, 37). I may remark that: 1) from the time the speech was delivered until 386 B.C., there was no different political or social attitude towards accusations such as this (see B.Strauss, ‘The Cultural Significance of Bribery and Embezzlement in Athenian Politics: the Evidence of the Period 403 – 386 B.C.’ AncW 11 (1985), 67– 74); 2) Demosthenes attempts to show that Aeschines is guilty of bribery in 343/2 B.C., comparing him with Epicrates, who, although he was one of those who restored democracy in 403 B.C., was found guilty of the same offence as Aeschines (Dem. 19.277– 79). These two arguments suggest that similar trials of the 4th century B.C. allow us to shed light safely on our case too. Cf. Hyp. 5.2: πόθεν ἔλαβες τὸ χρυσίον, καὶ τίς] ἦν σοι ὁ δούς, καὶ ποῦ. See comm. § 1 Περὶ μὲν τῶν κατηγορημένων … ἀποδέδεικται. The correct formulation is: ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ τῆς πόλεως κακῷ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων δωροδοκοίην (§ 21). § 22: τοσαῦτα χρήματα εἶναι, ἃ ἐγὼ βουληθείην ἄν τι κακόν τῇ πόλει γενέσθαι. See LSJ s.v. πρᾶγμα ΙΙΙ 2, cf. Lys. 16.3, Dem. 20.17 with Sandys, Demosthenes, 19, Dem. Lett.1.6 – 7 with Goldstein, Letters, 254.
C. The charge of bribery
27
a threat for Athens any more, while during the 4th century B.C. the Athenians accused each other of having been bribed by Philip.¹⁸⁵ Consequently such a possibility must be excluded. The greatest external enemy for Athens, over the last decades, were the Spartans and especially Lysander, who through his actions succeeded in overthrowing the regime. Lysander was not alone in carrying out this plan, but there were some Athenians who wanted to overthrow democracy after the failure of the Sicilian expedition.¹⁸⁶ We must, therefore, decide whether it was the main enemy of the city or the oligarchs who allegedly bribed the speaker or both. To find out the truth we must investigate whether in other texts the people accused of bribery use phrases identical or similar to those of our speaker and generally if they avoid referring to the name of the person considered to have bribed them. The answer is given by Demosthenes who, in one of the letters he sent to his fellowmen when he was in exile because he was accused of bribery, uses the same word as of the speaker, τῶν ἄλλων (§ 22): Θαυμάζω τοίνουν καὶ τοῦτο’ εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἀγνοεῖ, ὡς οὐδὲ τοῦτο συμφέρει τῇ πολιτείᾳ φανερὸν γιγνόμενον, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν ἄλλην τινὰ κτησαμένοις φιλίαν καὶ κατορθοῦσιν ἐν πᾶσιν πλεονεκτεῖν ὑπάρχει, κἂν ἀτυχήσωσίν τι, ρᾳδίους εἶναι τὰς λύσεις (Lett.3.23). In this passage the great orator refers to the relations of Athens with Alexander but he chooses not to name the latter and to use the phrase ἄλλην φιλίαν, because this serves his strategy.¹⁸⁷ The use of this word in our text and the text of Demosthenes in the same way gives me the impression that this was a way through which the Greeks avoided naming someone. Therefore, in our speech the speaker refers to the Spartans, although he chooses not to name them, since this also does not serve his strategy.¹⁸⁸ The possibility that the speaker refers to Athenian oligarchs who attempted to bribe him should be excluded because of the political developments of the time. It is true that a little while before the speech was delivered, the oligarchs who did not want to remain in Athens moved to Eleusis, and some time later, with the help of mercenaries, they went into conflict with the residents of Athens to retake power. One could suggest here, as Cloché does, that the oligarchs in Eleusis were looking for partners in the city to overturn the political system
See C.Cooper, ‘Rhetoric of Philippizing’ in Alexander’s Empire: Formulation and Decay, W.Heckel, L.Tritle, P.Wheatley (eds), California 2007, 1– 12. On this topic see Calhoun’s study in comm. § 9 ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοῖς τριηράρχοις ὠργίσθητε. About this passage and the rhetorical tactic of Demosthenes see Goldstein’s excellent analysis, Letters, 147– 48. See comm. § 22 μαινοίμην γὰρ … τῶν ἄλλων δωροδοκοίην.
28
1. Introduction
again. According to him, some of the Three Thousand who had chosen to remain in Athens after the return of the exiled, were pressed by public opinion or by the fear of retaliation to campaign against Eleusis, while others approved of the return of the oligarchs of Eleusis in order to strengthen the oligarchic groups in Athens.¹⁸⁹ This theory is attractive, if we correlate it with our case, because we would have a good reason to believe that the speaker was bribed by the oligarchs in Eleusis. However, Loening¹⁹⁰ is right to reject this argument, taking into consideration that the Three Thousand themselves, one of whom was the speaker, had voted for the removal of the Thirty, so it is unlikely that they had been in favour of the oligarchs. Besides, all the residents of Athens and not just the people from the Peiraeus marched out against the oligarchs in Eleusis.¹⁹¹ At this point, however, a problem arises since our first explanation that the speaker refers to the Spartans does not square with the fact that they did not support the oligarchs of Eleusis, since such support no longer served the Lacedaimonian interests.¹⁹² Besides, one year previously, the Spartan kings were those who feared that Lysander finally might rule in Athens; that is why they sent Pausanias to stop him.¹⁹³ One might think that the one who attempted to bribe the speaker could only be Lysander, since according to Pausanias: Πελοποννησίων δὲ καὶ ᾿Aθηναίων πολεμησάντων … οἵ τε Λυσάνδρου καλούμενοι ξένοι χρόνον οὐδένα ἀνίεσαν πατρίδας ἐγχειρίζοντες Λυσάνδρῳ τὰς ἑαυτῶν (7.10.2– 3). It is a fact that Lysander had created relationships of this kind with the Greeks during the war¹⁹⁴ and that in 403 B.C., which is one year before the trial, he had overtly persuaded the Lacedaemonians to give one hundred talents to the Thirty who were in Eleusis in order to fight the democrats.¹⁹⁵ Reconciliation, however, between the Athenian democrats and the oligarchs resulted in the termination of Lysander’s career, which explains why over the next seven years we do not have
See La Restauration démocratique à Αthènes en 403 avant J.C., Paris 1915, 285 – 86. Reconciliation, 62. About the speaker’s attitude towards the Thirty see Introduction, The identity of the speaker, 49 – 52. About the activity of the oligarchs in relation to Sparta see Loening’s important remarks Reconciliation, 61– 64. Plut. Lys.21.3: ὡς μὴ πάλιν ὁ Λύσανδρος διὰ τῶν φίλων κύριος γένοιτο τῶν ᾿Aθηνῶν. As regards Pausanias’ motives Loening (Reconciliation, 16) remarks: ‘He must have suspected that Lysander desired to restore the oligarchs in the Eleusis to their former position in Athens’. See L.G.Mitchell, Greeks Bearing Gifts: The public use of private relationships in the Greek World, 435 – 323 B.C., Cambridge 1997, 57,87. Xen. Hell.2.4.28. The Spartans will do exactly the same and in 381 B.C. in Phleious to influence the outcome of the conflict there. See Xen. Hell.5.3.16 – 17.
C. The charge of bribery
29
any evidence of his activity.¹⁹⁶ Consequently, the testimony of Pausanias cannot be applied to the chronological period in which we are interested in. My analysis so far demonstrates that those who, according to the prosecutors, bribed the speaker were the Spartans. This is an accusation however, which is not convincing in reality. The answer as to what exactly happened and how the accusation is justified, in my opinion, can only be given by the institution of ξενία, which, as we have seen, is mentioned by Pausanias. The speaker originates from an old aristocratic family of Athens of great wealth,¹⁹⁷ i. e. he belongs to that social class which created networks of ξενία with other Greek aristocrats and foreigners.¹⁹⁸ The institution of ξενία was created between two aristocrats through the exchange of mutual promises of loyalty, greeting and the delivery of a gift, which could be money from the man who asked to be ξένος to the other.¹⁹⁹ We should not therefore exclude the possibility that the speaker at that time might have concluded a ξενία with a Spartan or have renewed an earlier ξενία concluded by his relatives. This is the answer to our initial question about who gave the money. The existence of such relationships at the time the speech was delivered was active as it is evidenced by the ξενία which the Thirty and the family of the general Nicias offered to the Spartan general Pausanias.²⁰⁰ The relatives of the latter argued that the ξενία with Pausanias was beneficial, because it led all the Peloponnesians to be convinced that the Thirty were vicious and that they murdered citizens who were distinguished for their wealth, birth and general excellence (Lys. 18.11). Nevertheless, ξενία as an institution could be easily misinterpreted as a relationship of servitude and not of friendship because of the exchange of material goods by the Athenian litigants, who accused their opponents of being subject to foreigners and acting as their authorized agents.²⁰¹ In our case it appears that the speaker’s opponents saw something really unusual,
This remark belongs to G.Wylie, ‘Lysander and the Devil’ AC 66 (1997), 82– 83. Cf. comm. § 17 ἡγούμενος τούτων … καταλιπεῖν. See Herman, Ritualised Friendship, 96 – 97,128 – 29. See Herman, Ritualised Friendship, 34– 35,45 – 46,50. About ξενίαι more precisely, especially between the Spartans and the rest of the Greeks, see S.Hodkinson, Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta, London 2000, 341– 43. See Harvey, “Dona ferentes”, 107, who rightly cites Lys. 18.2. See Herman, Ritualised Friendship, 37– 39. Ξενία relationships turn into, according to this scholar, patron-client bonds. As an example he mentions the relationship between the Persians, the Macedonians and the governors of the Hellenistic times with the citizens of city-states. Nevertheless, he does not include among them the relationships that might be created between the Spartans and the Athenians.
30
1. Introduction
which is the financial transaction between the speaker and his ξένος, ²⁰² and accused him of bribery or someone else witnessed the event and agreed to testify in court against the speaker.²⁰³ From his side the speaker cannot easily admit the existence of ξενία with a Spartan, because the relationship of the aristocrats normally ceased when the cities were at war with each other.²⁰⁴ Athens of course was not currently at war with Sparta but it had not yet gained independence from the Lacedaemonians, therefore the relationship between the two cities cannot be considered peaceful.²⁰⁵ If my reasoning is correct, then we have a possible explanation of what is happening in this trial.
Bribery as an illegal action was done in secret (see Harvey, “Dona ferentes”, 93), we cannot exclude the possibility, however, that someone saw the speaker’s contact with the man who gave him the money. The eventuality of something like that having happened should not surprise us, since there were witnesses even to the scandals of Hermocopidae and the Eleusinian Mysteries. Thus, Diocleides claimed that, during the night, he saw some people breaking the Hermocopidai in the theatre of Dionysus (Andoc. 1.37– 38), whereas in Eupolis’ comedy Δῆμοι, a servant appears to have seen a rich foreigner who had taken part in the parody of the Mysteries walking through the Athenian agora (see Furley, Andokides, 133 – 36). Unfortunately, there is no reference in the text to the existence of witnesses nor the testimony of a witness, because this was obviously done in the legal part of the speech. At the same time, none of the forensic speeches related to the bribery of officials includes testimonies of witnesses, to allow us to shed light on our case. But even if there was a single reference in favour or against the speaker, it would not be sufficient to illuminate our case, since, as Harvey, “Dona ferentes”, 93 and Sinclair, Participation, 180 – 81 rightly remark, we do not have interrogation of the witnesses from both sides. See Herman, Ritualised Friendship, 1– 2. It is not accidental that the speaker of Lys. 18 feels some kind of insecurity about Pausanias’ ξενία. For this reason, he repeatedly stresses that the Lacedaemonians are enemies of the city (Lys. 18.2,3,5,12). P.J.Rahn, ‘The date of Xenophon’s exile’ in Shrimpton and MacCargar, Classical Contributions, 112, argues, citing Lys. 18.11, that the speaker underlines Pausanias’ and the Spartans’ good will. Moreover, he points out that there are not any anti-Spartan feelings in this speech. As regards the first claim, we should take into account that the speaker stresses that Pausanias’ favourable treatment by the Athenians served as an example for the Lacedaemonians, but not that both of of them were initially positive towards the Athenians. Therefore, we talk about a procedure that developed gradually. As per his second claim, the passages characterising the Spartans as enemies weaken Rahn’s position. The fact that, at the time of the delivery of the speech, the Spartans were not a threat to Athens does not mean that the Athenians did not regard them any more as enemies. In 400/399 B.C. Thibron will ask for three hundred horsemen from the Athenians, who, in order to appease the Spartans and not only out of hatred for the cavalrymen, carried out this order. About this matter see Loening’s analysis, Reconciliation, 118.
D. The legal problems of the speech
31
D. The legal problems of the speech In the text there is no explicit mention of the official accusation against the speaker. In two passages, however, the speaker refers to the accusation he faces: a) ἡγοῦμαι δ’, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί (καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν ἀχθεσθῇ) πολὺ δικαιότερον ὑμᾶς ὑπὸ τῶν ζητητῶν ἀπογραφῆναι τὰ ἐμὰ ἔχειν, ἢ ἐμὲ νυνὶ κινδυνεύειν ὡς τοῦ δημοσίου χρήματα ἔχοντα (§ 16); b) ἐγὼ δ’ ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ ἱκετεύω καὶ ἀντιβολῶ μὴ καταγνῶναι δωροδοκίαν ἐμοῦ, μηδ’ ἡγήσασθαι τοσαῦτα χρήματα εἶναι, ἃ ἐγὼ βουληθείην ἄν τι κακόν τῇ πόλει γενέσθαι. μαινοίμην γὰρ , ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εἰ τὴν μὲν πατρῴαν οὐσίαν φιλοτιμούμενος εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀναλίσκοιμι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ τῆς πόλεως κακῷ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων δωροδοκοίην (§§ 21– 22). From these passages we can certainly draw the conclusion that the speaker has some public office and that at the end of his term some indictment was brought against him for the wrong performance of duties. § 16 seems to imply a charge of embezzlement (κλοπή), but §§ 21– 2 write of bribe-taking (δωροδοκία). The Athenian officials after their term in office was completed, had to go through the procedure of εὔθυνα. ²⁰⁶ This examination consisted of two parts, the financial and the more general one. The first part was called λόγος and the second εὔθυναι. Thirty λογισταί in the 5th century B.C.,²⁰⁷ who were elected by lot, and ten συνήγοροι, who were also elected by lot, checked the accounts of public money that each official had spent during his office. They, in turn, referred the case to a court and presided over a body of 501 jurors. The συνήγοροι assumed the role of the prosecutors, but any citizen could become prosecutor if he wished. In the second case, the citizen who acted as a prosecutor made a complaint officially but he could also be assisted by other fellow-citizens, who spoke against the defendant.²⁰⁸ The trials judged by the accountants were γραφή κλοπῆς, δώρων and ἀδικίου. ²⁰⁹ In case of conviction the fine levied by the court was ten times higher than the amount stated by the prosecutors. The hearing of these cases lasted for one day ([Arist.] Ath.Pol.67.5). In our case the γραφή ἀδικίου is not related to the text and, therefore, it is no concern of ours. The other two γραφαί are related to what the speaker reports but the main problem is that the two types of γραφαί are separate legal
In this analysis I follow Harrison, Law, 28 – 31, MacDowell, Law, 262– 65, Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 222– 23, Todd, Shape, 112– 13. Ath.Efstathiou, ‘Euthyna procedure in 4th c. Athens and the case On the False Embassy’ Dike 10 (2007), 115 demonstrates that there were thirty accountants in the 5th century B.C., whereas in the 4th B.C. their number was reduced to ten. See Bonner and Smith, Justice, 36,38. About the legal procedure see [Arist]. Ath.Pol.48.3, 54.2 with Rhodes, CAP, 560 – 61,597– 99.
32
1. Introduction
procedures,²¹⁰ and, therefore, it is difficult to understand on the basis of which γραφή the speaker is in the dock. Thus, no scholar can be certain of the type of this trial. Jebb²¹¹ believes that, because the first part of the speech, in which the speaker gave answers to the accusations against him has not survived, the real nature of the case is dubious. Nevertheless, judging from the reference in § 21, he believes that the prosecutor had assumed some kind of office and that when he gave his account about it, he was accused of financial corruption. Gernet-Bizos²¹² argue that the speaker is accused of a double offence in the surviving part of the speech, i. e. that of corruption and a second offence vaguely stated in § 16, the offence of theft of public money. According to them, the offence of corruption was penalised in different ways according to the seriousness of the events and the procedure followed. Todd²¹³ in his work on Athenian law believes that the trial is γραφή δώρων, that is one of the many types of γραφαί available for use against the state officials. Nonetheless, in his commentary on Lysias, Todd has a rather different opinion:²¹⁴ the title of the speech suggests that the speaker has been accused of bribery, but this might be the copyist’s device, who had to read a speech which had not survived complete. On the basis of § 16, this scholar believes that the speaker is accused of appropriation of state property and that probably this state property has been denounced with ἀπογραφή before a special committee of ζητηταί. Goldstein²¹⁵ proves that the Athenian law regarded bribery and embezzlement as crimes of equal importance. Concerning our speaker he believes that he defends himself against the accusation of bribery but in § 16 he mentions money embezzlement. Harvey²¹⁶ classifies our speech among the trials in which the accusations of bribery and embezzlement could be pronounced against the same person. Sinclair²¹⁷ argues that a defendant accused of bribery could simply return the gift he received to be confiscated with an ἀπογραφή, whereas if he was taken to court after εὔθυνα, he could be punished with a tenfold fine. As proof he cites §§ 16, 21 and 25 of our speech and [Arist.] Ath.Pol.54.2, without explicitly specifying his opinion of our speech. Wilson²¹⁸ believes that the speaker delivered this speech as a response to the accusation of Modern research has demonstrated that γραφή for embezzling public money was different from that of bribery (see D.Cohen, Theft in Athenian Law, Munich 1983, 49 – 51). Jebb, Athenian Orators, 219. L.Gernet-M.Bizos, Lysias Discours ΙΙ. Texte établit et traduit, Paris 1962, 71– 72. See Shape, 302. Lysias, 228. Letters, 67. “Dona ferentes”, 80, 91 n.57. Participation, 174– 75. Khoregia, 181.
D. The legal problems of the speech
33
bribery against him. Taylor²¹⁹ believes that the trial is about the revelation of an illegal transaction, where the defendant accepted money to do something dishonest to the detriment of the city. This researcher points out that such trials were combined with bringing in additional indictments against people to create a more plausible accusation of treason. This is why, she adds, it is difficult to discern today to what extent the accusation of bribery was added to the rest of the accusations or whether it was the main issue in the trial. It is difficult to take a clear standpoint on this perplexing issue. In § 15 the speaker uses the phrase τῶν ὑμετέρων, which is frequent in Attic oratory and refers to the misappropriation of public funds.²²⁰ The phrase alone is not sufficient to lead us to say with certainty that the main accusation is embezzlement but that this accusation is also pronounced against the speaker, as is expressly stated in § 16. Nevertheless, Todd’s view that the speaker is accused of stealing public money and that his property has been denounced by an ἀπογραφή before a committee of commissioners is not correct, because the speaker refers exclusively to the jurors and not to himself.²²¹ A careful reading of the text leads us to conclude that the speaker in this passage takes for granted that the judges know what the tasks of the commissioners are and on the basis of this fact, he creates a specific argument to dissuade them from condemning him.²²² It is probable that the strategy of the speaker to convince the jurors that he was so rich and so simple in his life style that he does not need money,²²³ is sufficient to invalidate both accusations. In my opinion, the emphasis put by the speaker on the accusation of bribery and the supplication addressed to the jurors not to condemn him for this offence,²²⁴ gives the impression that this must be the main accusation. It is also unknown what the speaker’s office was but the accusation of embezzlement makes it clear that he was accused in connection with the ἀρχή he held or, if he did not hold any ἀρχή, with some other position through which he could have had access to public money, e. g. trierarchy or a festival liturgy.²²⁵ The fact that the speaker was during the regime of the Thirty among the Three Thousand was not a legal problem for the Athenians of the time, since the
See C.Taylor, ‘Bribery in Athenian Politics Part I: Accusations, Allegations and Slander’ G & R 48.1 (2001), 54– 55. See Harvey, “Dona ferentes”, 80. The speaker says ὑμᾶς ἀπογραφῆναι and not ἐμέ. About the interpretation of the passage see the relevant comm. in § 16. See comm. §§ 16 – 17. See comm. § 21 ἐγὼ δ’ ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ ἱκετεύω καὶ ἀντιβολῶ … γενέσθαι. See comm. § 18 ὡς πολλὰς ἀρχὰς ἄρξας ἐκ τῶν ὑμετέρων ὠφέλημαι.
34
1. Introduction
new democratic regime did not restrict the civil rights of that group of citizens.²²⁶ Therefore, this issue does not play a legal role in the case. The prosecutors are equally unknown. The speaker refers to more than one prosecutor. If in the present trial one citizen was the prosecutor, then it is also he who brought the charge before the court against the speaker, while the others supported the accusations with their speeches. In the Athenian legal system the speeches of the prosecutors were delivered within a time period given to the prosecutor and the defendant,²²⁷ so a litigant was justified in considering the accusation as collective and not to make any distinction among his prosecutors. The speaker does the same for his defence tactic.²²⁸ He depicts his opponents as litigious sycophants²²⁹ who refrain from assuming the liturgies required²³⁰ and whose attitude shows μνησικακία towards him.²³¹ The accusation of sycophancy is common in forensic speeches and we cannot say with certainty that the speaker tells the truth, because even the prosecutors who were motivated by the public interest were identified under this condition.²³² The real reasons will therefore remain unknown to us.²³³ The likelihood that prosecutors belong to the aristocracy of the city is also not a problem, as this was the rule.²³⁴ The implicit argument, however, of μνησικακία expressed by the speaker is more problematic, since the democrats were the ones who acted as prosecutors against former supporters of the oligarchic regime. The trial, however, that Poliochus, a member of the Three Thousand, instigated against the sons of Eucrates, who also remained in the city at that time, is a strong indication that some of the people who remained in the city decided to show their faith in democracy by prosecuting former comrades.²³⁵ Taking this fact into consideration, one can reasonably argue that the plaintiffs were supporters of the regime of the Thirty, who
See Loening, Reconciliation, 101– 02. Krentz, Thirty, 118 – 19, proves that Evander (Lys. 26), Rhinon from Paeania and Cephisophon are definitely some of the old supporters of the Thirty who certainly assumed important ranks after the restoration of democracy. Our speaker should be included among these men. See Rhodes, CAP, 721. See comm. § 20 Οὔκουν ἄξιον … καταψηφίσασθαι. See comm. § 17 διὰ ταύτην … σῴζεσθαι, comm. § 20 οἳ … κατηγορεῖν τολμῶσι. Cf. Christ, Litigious Athenian, 32– 34. See comm. § 12 οὐδὲ παραστῆναι … σφετέρων αὐτῶν. See comm. § 20 καὶ ἐξ ὧν … ὀργισθήσεσθε. See A.W.H.Adkins, ‘Polypragmosyne and “Minding One’s Own Business”: A Study in Greek Social and Political Values’ CP 71 (1976), 307– 11. Cf. Rubinstein, Litigation, 134. See e. g. Ober, Mass and Elite, 112– 13. See Loening, Reconciliation, 131– 32.
D. The legal problems of the speech
35
decided to prosecute the speaker. The last thing that I must underline concerning the prosecutors is that the person who took the initiative to prosecute the speaker could be certain about his future, since in an εὔθυνα the prosecutor who failed to convince the jurors of the guilt of his opponent did not suffer any legal consequences.²³⁶ The next major problem is that of the penalties which were imposed on the speaker if he was to be convicted. He says: ἄτιμοι γενέσθαι, ἢ στερηθέντες τῶν ὑπαρχόντων πένητες εἶναι καὶ πολλῶν ἐνδεεῖς ὄντες περιιέναι (§ 25). Both penalties were very strict. The person who was sentenced to άτιμία could not appear in certain public places, take part in public life or appear in court. He was entitled, however, to keep his individual rights as a citizen, since he was not officially exiled, and also to maintain his property. However, from the moment that these people could not defend their rights in court, their lives became unbearable and as a result there were many of them who voluntarily chose to follow the path of exile.²³⁷ The second punishment, namely the deprivation of property, amounted to economic disaster, since the speaker would have to pay the heavy fine imposed by the court. This disaster would not only occur as a result of the confiscation of his property by the court, but because he probably would have had to sell it to secure the required amount to pay the fine.²³⁸ The text itself thus leads us to conclude that the court imposed one punishment of the two on the speaker. My view follows that of Hansen,²³⁹ who maintains that if someone was charged with offences which are of our concern in the present case, he could be punished with άτιμία or a financial penalty. MacDowell²⁴⁰ does not accept this view and argues that the officials who were convicted of bribery were punished with άτιμία in addition to the amount of money they had to pay and not instead of it. I have just stated that a clear identification of the type of the trial is difficult,²⁴¹ so it is not
See MacDowell, Law, 64– 65. About the consequences of άτιμία see Goldstein, Letters, 68, Todd, Shape, 365. Goldstein, Letters, 66 n.16, argues that άτιμία imposed on those punished for bribery or embezzlement did not include the confiscation of their property. Thus, about the speaker Goldstein says that he is afraid of losing his property due to the high penalty which is going to be imposed on him and not because the jurors will confiscate his property. On the basis of Goldstein’s research, we can say that the only way for the speaker to have so much liquid money would be to sell his movable property. See Apagoge, 86 – 89. See “Bribery”, 72– 74. The first researcher, as far as I know, to explicitly formulate the difficulty of using our speech to draw general conclusions about this legal case is Harrison (Law, 208, n.2): ‘two other speeches of Lysias were probably delivered in εὔθυναι: 27 Epikr. and 21 ἀπολ.δωρ. … These
36
1. Introduction
easy to say which of the two researchers is generally right about the trials of bribery.²⁴² With regard to this trial, however, I must note that the speaker mentions these two forms of punishment alternatively rather than additionally (that’s why he is using the alternative conjunction ἤ). On the other hand, we must take into consideration that during his defence the speaker emphasizes the eventuality of losing his property because of the penalty which will be imposed on him and the consequences this will have for the citizens²⁴³ and not the άτιμία. The choice of Lysias to illustrate the effects of only one sentence is probably done because it relates directly to the financial status of the jurors, so he thinks this argument will affect them more than if he reported only the penalty of άτιμία, which would only affect him personally. On the other hand, the explicit reference to both penalties in the epilogue does not allow us to reject with certainty that both punishments are possible.²⁴⁴ Whatever the final sentence imposed on the speaker, it is certain that his children would also inherit it directly as the use of the first person in the plural shows.²⁴⁵ The last and perhaps most interesting matter is the outcome of the trial which we do not know. If the speaker was convicted, since there was not a specified penalty in trials of this type, (ἀγῶνες τιμητοί), it is certain that he and the plaintiff would have suggested different penalties in additional speeches,²⁴⁶ while the jurors chose between the two alternative penalties by voting
speeches are of limited value as evidence, since they date from a time when purely political considerations were likely to dictate even the forms of procedure’ (my emphasis). It is noteworthy that no one of the two researchers includes our speech in their analysis. See §§ 12– 14. The failure to identify exactly which of the two types of penalty was inflicted in a trial, which was certainly a trial for the accusation of bribery, can also become apparent in the studies of distinguished scholars. Harvey, “Dona ferentes”, 96, commenting on the issue of conviction or not of the citizens who were accused of bribery, identifies two distinct types of penalty, that is a money fine, which will lead to the ruin of a defendant, and his explusion from the city. The adoption of this view obviously means the acceptance of Hansen’s views. In his bibliography, however, about the legal issues of bribery, he does not refer to the study of the latter and he does not explain why he adopts this particular view. On the contrary, he refers to the paper of MacDowell about the laws on bribery, without actually accepting his views (see 77 n.4). This is the only weakness of his exquisite study. § 25: ἀναγκασθησόμεθα. See also Goldstein, Letters, 27. Hansen, Apagoge, 71 and MacDowell, “Bribery”, 74– 76, prove that this was the sentence for any trial of bribery but, as I mentioned before, they do not include our passage in their studies. About the offers of alternative penalties see Harrison, Law, 166, Todd, Shape, 133 – 34. About the length of additional speeches see D.MacDowell, ‘The length of the speeches on the assessment of the penalty in Athenian courts’ CQ 35 (1985), 525 – 26.
D. The legal problems of the speech
37
again.²⁴⁷ In my opinion, however, the outcome of the trial could be positive for the speaker, although it is not certain that it was.²⁴⁸ The first factor indicating that the speaker was acquitted is his social contribution. Sinclair²⁴⁹ points out that if someone was acquitted for the accusation of bribery or embezzlement, this simply meant that the jurors accepted his argument that his services for the benefit of the city in the past were considered more important than the accusations against him. The view that jurors should choose between the speaker’s acquittal and his conviction on the basis of the evaluation of each litigant’s social contribution is not wrong.²⁵⁰ In fact, the generosity of the speaker and the choice of Lysias to exploit it suggest that indeed such a defensive strategy could be effective. At this point, in order to understand the dilemma which the jurors had to face about what decision to take, we should also seriously take into consideration the age of the speaker. If we compare what he says in his speech to what the speaker of Lysias 19 says, we will find that the arguments are almost identical, that is the latter’s father had also assumed all the liturgies entrusted to him, seven trierarchies and many eisphorai (19.57). The significant but crucial difference as regards this man is that, while he had assumed these liturgies over a period of fifty years (19.58), the speaker has fulfilled the same duties in exactly half the years at the young age of 26.²⁵¹ This undoubtedly proves that he was more active and more effective in relation not only to any of his peers but also to many citizens who were two or three times older than him.²⁵² Moreover, we must take into consideration that in our case it is the speaker who evokes these arguments and not a son who is trying to strengthen the public image of his father. This fact²⁵³ could be, in my opinion, a key justification for the jurors to acquit him.
MacDowell, “Bribery”, 58 – 59. Todd, Lysias 1 – 11, 4 n.13 argues that the result can plausibly be inferred in only three speeches of the surviving speeches of Lysias. Participation, 182: ‘an acquittal might simply mean that the dikasts had accepted the argument that a defendant’s past services to Athens should induce them not to entertain charges of bribery (or embezzlement)’ (my emphasis). Among the speeches he cites he includes §§ 16 and 21 of our speech. For the reasons confirming this view see Adkins, MR, 201– 3, Moral Values, 119 – 26. For further evidence for the correctness of this view see comm. §§ 1– 10, 13 – 14, 23 – 24. See comm. § 1 ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐδοκιμάσθην … τριάκοντα μνᾶς. The importance of the age in Athenian courts is stressed by Demosthenes, who claims that although his opponent Meidias is 20 years older than him, Meidias has not assumed more liturgies than Demosthenes (21.154). The comparison between the contributions of the young speaker with the father of the litigant of Lysias 19 is my argument. Such comparisons, however, between young and elderly
38
1. Introduction
On the other hand, Sinclair’s argument that the jurors chose between acquittal and conviction on the basis of someone’s services for Athens is simplistic, because through it one could argue that it had a universal validity for each trial like this one. However, we cannot say that this is true, since no other similar cases survive, where a defendant was acquitted only because his contribution was great. Moreover, the speaker does not list his benefactions merely in order to suggest that they are more important than the accusations against him but in order to suggest that a man who spends his money for public purposes and does not live a luxurious life is not the kind of man who would embezzle or take bribes.²⁵⁴ Last, if we approve of this opinion, this amounts to forgetting that the Athenians put a lot of emphasis on their laws in order to decide on the outcome of a trial.²⁵⁵ Therefore, if there were not strong legal arguments against the speaker, the social contribution of Lysias’ client may have helped him to be acquitted. Also, the poor financial situation of the city and the promise of the speaker to be generous in the future as before, must have been a key factor for his acquittal.²⁵⁶ Ergocles’ plaintiff reinforces my view, which rejects the possibility that the jurors might acquit those guilty of theft and bribery, because the state treasuries were empty.²⁵⁷ The speaker is inevitably one of those accused of bribery and theft and it must be noted that he does not forget to point out that the state treasuries are empty.²⁵⁸ Besides, at that time, the loan that the Thirty had taken from the Spartans in order to continue the civil war was outstanding, while the men from the Peiraeus had decided to pay jointly with the men from the city after the integration of the people of Eleusis. Given that Sparta demanded immediately after the fall of Eleusis (i. e. in the period during which this citizens were not unknown in the Athenian courtrooms. About this issue as regards Lysias’ clients see M.Menu, Jeunes et vieux chez Lysias, L’akolasia de la jeunesse au IVe siècle av. J.-C., Rennes 2000, 16 – 31. A rhetorical exploitation of age is manifest in Dem. 21.154. See above n. 252. See comm. § 21. See E.Harris, ‘Law and Oratory’ in Worthington, Persuasion, 130 – 37. See comm. § 14. His argumentation is perfectly in accordance with the jurors’ conception about law. Cf Dover, GPM, 292– 93: “Since the Athenian people was the source of law, the people, as sovereign, could forgive its breach. Thus, the question before a jury, as representing the people, was not exactly, ‘Has this man, or has he not, committed the act with which he is charged?” but rather, ‘What should be done about this man, who has been charged with this offence?’ (my emphasis). Lys. 28.3: καὶ γὰρ δὴ δεινὸν ἂν εἴη, εἰ νῦν μὲν οὔτως αὐτοὶ πιεζόμενοι ταῖς εἰσφοραῖς συγγνώμην τοῖς κλέπτουσι καὶ τοῖς δωροδοκοῦσιν ἔχοιτε, ἐν δὲ τῷ τέως χρόνῳ, καὶ τῶν οἴκων τῶν ὑμετέρων μεγάλων ὄντων καὶ τῶν δημοσίων προσόδων μεγάλων οὐσῶν, θανάτῳ ἐκολάζετε τοὺς τῶν ὑμετέρων ἐπιθυμοῦντας. See comm. § 13 ὁρᾶτε γάρ … ὀλίγα ἐστί.
E. The defensive strategy
39
speech was delivered) the payment of the loan before 399 B.C.²⁵⁹ and that the revenues of the city were slender, it is reasonable to believe that the jurors considered it beneficial to the city²⁶⁰ to acquit the speaker so that he could cover part of the loan.²⁶¹ Such a possibility is not unreasonable if we take into consideration his arguments.²⁶² Finally, the political atmosphere of the era worked in favour of the speaker’s acquittal.²⁶³ At a time when the democrats and the oligarchs had just given oaths of reconciliation it is more reasonable to believe that the jurors acquitted the speaker and did not believe the accusations that this particular fellow citizen was bribed in order to harm the community as a whole.
E. The defensive strategy What actually determined the outcome of a trial of classical Athens were the events themselves but also the rhetorical quality of the speeches delivered by the litigants. Thus, a defendant, even if there was no incriminating evidence against him, should argue in such a way as to convince the jurors that the accusation was unfounded. Lysias, taking advantage of the peculiarities of the Athenian legal system, where the defendants gave an account of their earlier life to rebut the accusations against them²⁶⁴ also follows this strategy for the speaker, i. e. he tries to enhance his ethos in order to persuade the jurors that the accusations of bribery and embezzlement against his client are unfounded.²⁶⁵ This was
Cf. comm. § 12 ἐὰν οὖν ἐμοὶ πεισθῆτε … αἰρήσεσθε. About the issue of the loan see Loening, Reconciliation, 85 – 87. Loening, Reconciliation, 87, argues that the city itself would pay the money for the loan and not those who, up to that time, constituted the Three Thousand. Although in another part of his study he recognises that the financial situation in the city was lamentable and that those who would move to Eleusis would not be refunded for the movable fortune they had acquired during the regime of the Thirty via illegal confiscations (Reconciliation, 66 – 67), he does not explain if that money was enough to cover the debt of one hundred talents owed to Sparta. This is not possible, since those moving to Eleusis were a few compared to those who preferred to remain in Athens. This financial flaw, consequently, could only be covered by wealthy citizens like the speaker. See comm. §§ 13 – 14. Cf. §§ 3, 5, 19, 25. We should not overlook the connection between the current political situation and the verdict of the law courts. Cf. Dem. 19.3: μοι δοκοῦσιν ἅπαντες οἱ παρ’ ὑμῖν ἀγῶνες οὐχ ἦττον, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Aθηναῖοι, τῶν καιρῶν ἢ τῶν πραγμάτων εἶναι (my emphasis). See comm. § 1 Περὶ μὲν τῶν κατηγορημένων … ἀποδέδεικται. See comm. § 12 ἐὰν οὖν ἐμοὶ πεισθῆτε, comm. § 20 πειθομένους κατηγόροις τοιούτοις ἐμοῦ καταψηφίσασθαι and Todd’s remark: ‘on the point of law, we should always remember that an
40
1. Introduction
necessary because in cases such as this, the emphasis on ethos was a key element of proof of someone’s innocence or guilt. Thus, Aeschines, replying to the accusations of Demosthenes that he had been bribed by Philip, also puts emphasis on his ethos, while, on the other hand, Demosthenes, as the prosecutor of Aeschines, and Deinarchus, as the prosecutor of Demosthenes and Philocles, not having concrete proof of the guilt of their opponents, insist on the ethos of the latter featuring prominently on their πονηρίαν (Dem. 19.33,101,109,119,339,340, Din. 1.106 – 7, 3.1,6,12,18). So the speaker, in order to strengthen his position, focused on issues that would distract the jurors and would win their favour. Thus, he mainly highlighted his role as a choregus and trierarch, emphasizing the number of liturgies he undertook. The speaker dedicates the first part of his defence, in the part of the speech that survives, to a comprehensive account of the liturgies undertaken, stressing each time the amounts of money he spent (§§ 1– 5). Lysias’ decision that his client should refer to this issue in detail seems to have been particularly successful in cases such as the present if we take into consideration that another client of the logographer, the son of Aristophanes, a few years after the delivery of our speech, enumerated the liturgies assumed by his father, attempting to convince the jurors that the latter was wrongly accused of embezzlement of public funds (19.56 – 57). The difference between the two speeches is certainly that this litigant outlined his father’s liturgies in a single paragraph. The fact, however, that these liturgies are read one by one to the jurors immediately after reminds us of our speaker, who enumerates them in the main part of his speech. We do not know how long this litigant devoted to listing these liturgies.²⁶⁶ The fact that he restarts his speech with the words: ᾿Aκούετε, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τὸ πλῆθος (19.58), means that the detailed description of liturgies could serve as a strong counterbalance to the accusation of unlawful possession of money/funds.²⁶⁷ The success of such a tactic is also evidenced by Demosthenes, who, in an effort to obtain his return to the city after having been convicted of corruption by Harpalus, reports to his fellow citizens: παραλείπω πολλά, ἐφ’ οἷς ἕτερος καὶ μηδὲν
Athenian trial is an adversarial and not an inquisitional procedure: the jury are not there to find out the truth, but to decide which of two theses they find preferable’ (“Use and Abuse”, 172) (my emphasis). In the Athenian legal system a clepsydra was used to measure the time allotted to each speaker. The clepsydra stopped during the testimony of the witnesses or when documents were read out in court. See S.Young, ‘An Athenian clepsydra’ Hesperia 8 (1939), 174– 84, Harrison, Law, 161– 162, MacDowell, Law, 249 – 50, Rhodes, CAP, 722. Cf. Din. 3.18.
E. The defensive strategy
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ἄλλο χρήσιμος γεγονὼς δικαίως ἂν ἠξίου τυγχάνειν σωτηρίας, χορηγίας καὶ τριηραρχίας καὶ χρημάτων ἐπιδόσεις ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς καιροῖς· ἐν οἷς ἐγὼ φανήσομαι οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ἐξητασμένος πρῶτος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους παρακεκληκώς (Lett.2.12). It is certain that Demosthenes is not called to account before the court, but he certainly refers to someone’s acquittal.²⁶⁸ Along with the list of liturgies, the speaker stresses his financial generosity during the assumption of these specific tasks. The amounts spent by the speaker only for liturgies relating to dances reached two and a half talents,²⁶⁹ while the total amount allocated to the Athenian demos exceeds ten talents.²⁷⁰ This amount is very large²⁷¹ and the speaker’s generosity is unique, since not only does it exceed the amounts spent by any other litigant in the surviving speeches, but there is not even a single Athenian to be compared with him if we take into consideration that the money spent by the wealthy clients of Isaeus ranged between two and five talents.²⁷² His offer is particularly important, as the money the liturgists spent was not only intended to cover the cost of the festivals but also for the welfare of the Athenians who participated in them.²⁷³ We should note here the number of people paid by the speaker: a chorus for tragedy, a male chorus in the Thargelia, a pyrrhic dance in the Great Panathaenea, a male chorus in the Great Dionysia, a dithyrambic chorus of fifty individuals in the Little Panathaenea, a comic dance of twenty-four people, the group of torch runners in the Promethea, a children’s dance (dithyrambic dance), a pyrrhic dance in the Little Panathaenea, a trireme
By the word σωτηρίας the speaker means his acquittal by the court and not his return to Athens. He referred to this issue earlier in the speech (see Lett.2.5). As per our speech cf. § 17: ὑφ’ ὑμῶν δικαίως σῴζεσθαι. I must point out that Demosthenes’ παράλειψις is similar to our speaker’s (see comm. § 18 ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων … ἀπολογήσασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν). It would not be wrong, however, to believe that this specific omission is not simply a rhetorical tactic of Demosthenes to conceal the truth regarding his activity, but a conscious choice, which is created by the right evaluation of the situation: the orator is in exile; consequently, the account of the liturgies he once assumed does not strengthen his pledge for the revocation of his punishment. This passage of the speech denotes that Demosthenes followed this tactic in his defensive speech, without actually convincing the jurors of his innocence due to the ill feeling prevailing against him. If this speech had survived, we could reach useful conclusions, after comparing it with our speech. The calculation belongs to Podlecki, “Choral Victories”, 95. Todd, Lysias, 230, provides a particularly informative table with the speaker’s liturgies and the amounts spent. See comm. § 5 καὶ τούτων ὧν κατέλεξα. See R.Wevers, Isaeus. Chronology, Prosopography, and Social History, The Hague 1969, 96 – 97. See Wilson, Khoregia, 123 – 28, who analyses the issue of ‘choregic patronage’ and the wish of the demos for this to exist.
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crew in the Sounion boat races, the crews of seven triremes (of two hundred people each) and two eisphorae to benefit the city as a whole, since the funds of the city were insufficient.²⁷⁴ It is possible that the speaker in some cases used the same people in these liturgies. If we take into consideration, however, that not all the members of warships survived after the sea-fights²⁷⁵ and that the liturgists who won renewed the members of the choruses,²⁷⁶ it is certain the number of people paid by the speaker must be really large. This financial support for his fellow citizens justifies the speaker’s argument that his money was their own money, so it was in their interest to acquit him.²⁷⁷ The next strong point of the speaker’s defence was his military ethos. Lysias’ decision that his client devoted adequate time on this issue to defend himself was, if not imperative, at least useful because of the accusations, as demonstrated by another of Lysias’ clients, the prosecutor of Ergocles, who says: ὅστις ἐν τοσαύτῃ ἀπορίᾳ τῶν ὑμετέρων πραγμάτων ἢ πόλεις προδίδωσιν ἢ χρήματα κλέπτειν ἢ δωροδοκεῖν ἀξιοῖ, οὗτος καὶ τὰ τείχη καὶ τὰς ναῦς τοῖς πολεμίοις παραδίδωσι καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν ἐκ δημοκρατίας καθίστησιν (Lys. 28.11). In this trial, which takes place several years after our own,²⁷⁸ the main accusation against Ergocles was that he, as a treasurer and his superior general Thrasybulus, who was not alive any more, embezzled money which they had to deliver to the Athenian demos. Not everything that the speaker says seems to be directly related to this case,²⁷⁹ since at the time of delivery of the speech the city walls were unthreatened and neither the fleet nor the democratic regime were in danger. We must, therefore, assume that the view of Ergocles’ prosecutor aims this argument at every Athenian who embezzled money or received bribes at any time.²⁸⁰ In fact, the consequences inflicted by those who betrayed their city or embezzled its money or received bribes from its enemies are directly related to what hap-
See French, Growth, 167. See comm. § 10 παρεσκευασάμην … ὑπηρεσίαν. See comm. § 2 νικήσας. See comm. §§ 12– 14. See Lamb, Lysias, 587. The accusation of betraying the ships is probably related to Lys. 28.2, where Thrasybulus is accused of destruction of the ships because the people in charge did not pay any money for their maintenance. It might also be related to 28.4, where the speaker accuses Thrasybulus of delivering the warships worn out instead of new. The other accusations do not seem to be related directly to the case. It is certain that the speaker wishes to connect, at least up to a certain point, the current case to the events of 404 B.C., since he connects the activity of Ergocles and Thrasybulus to that of the Thirty (Lys. 28.12– 14). I am not going to insist on this issue any more, since this is not closely linked to our speech.
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43
pened immediately after the defeat of the Athenians in the Hellespont in 404 B.C.,²⁸¹ i. e. a little while before our trial. It is consequently justified to believe that Lysias felt sure that the correct presentation of the military activity of his client would acquit him. Thus, the speaker, from the very beginning of the speech, reminds the jurors that he had served as a trierarch for seven years (§ 3). However, what actually emphasizes his military ethos is the phrase κινδυνεύων καὶ ἀποδημῶν. The use of this phrase is very important because, for the first time in the surviving texts, an Athenian citizen attributes to himself one of the key features which the Corinthians attributed to the Athenians at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, i. e. their willingness to run military risks for the benefit of their city, whenever and wherever they were asked to do so.²⁸² This argument demonstrates that the stance of the Corinthians towards the Athenians actually reflects the ideology of the latter.²⁸³ The speaker exploits this argument to influence the jurors emotionally and show that he belongs, like them,²⁸⁴ to that generation of warriors who made Athens a great city. At the moment of delivery of the speech this ideological argument did not apply, of course, because the Athenian empire was no longer εὐδαίμων;²⁸⁵ that is why the speaker does not insist more on this. But what he can do is to imply that he still embraces the military and the political ideology of the city: τοιούτοις ἡμῖν χρῆσθε πολίταις οἵοισπερ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ (§ 25).²⁸⁶ The speaker documents his military value as trierarch further, first by indicating the decision of Alcibiades as a general to travel with him²⁸⁷ and by high-
Cf. Xen. Hell.2.2.20, 3.24– 26. Thuc. 1.70.3 – 4: κινδυνευταί καὶ … ἀποδημηταὶ. See comm. § 3 καὶ καθ’ ἡμέραν ὐπὲρ ὑμῶν κινδυνεύων καὶ ἀποδημῶν. See Crane’s article in comm. § 25 ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις ἐμοῦ τοιαύτην περὶ ὑμῶν γνώμην ἔχοντος. See comm. § 10. I have to point out here that the Corinthians, while praising the Athenians, do not divide them in social classes but refer to them as a whole. See comm. § 20 καὶ ἐξ ὧν μὲν ἡ πόλις εὐδαίμων ἔσται … ὀργισθήσεσθε. P.Harding (‘In search of a Polypragmatist’, 43 – 44 in Shrimpton and MacCargar, Classical Contributions) supports the view that even the wealthy Athenians were in favour of the existence of the Athenian empire. His point of view is correct. At that time, however, the idea of the revival of the empire could exist only in the form of an ideological argument in the courtrooms. On the other hand, it is excessive to argue, like C.D.Hamilton (Sparta’s Bitter Victories, London 1979, 171), that the wealthy land owners had no motives for any new conflict towards the end of the 5th century B.C., by using the sources of the 4th century B.C. If there had been any military engagement between Athens and Sparta at the end of the 5th century, we could be sure that the claim of the speaker was real or just an argument to win the jurors’ favour. See comm. §§ 6 – 7.
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lighting then the desire of all the other generals who succeeded the notorious man to be on his ship.²⁸⁸ Nevertheless, the greatest proof of his value becomes manifest when he refers to the naval battle of Aegospotami. The conflict in the Hellespont is the only specific reference to a sea fight in the speech and the most detailed compared to the rest of his military activity. Initially, the speaker comments very carefully on the reaction of his fellow citizens towards the trierarchs who returned from Aegospotami²⁸⁹ and then he explains how, with his own παρασκευή the commander, the officers and the crew obeyed his orders.²⁹⁰ This short but very comprehensive report of his relationship with his subordinates during the campaign in the Hellespont reveals one of the ways in which democracy identified the relationship between the demos and the aristocrats. This was done by no other means than by the enforcement of discipline on the crews by the trierarchs on the battlefield and the crews’ obedience.²⁹¹ According to the Old Oligarch: ἐν ταῖς … τριηραρχίαις γιγνώσκουσιν ὅτι … οἱ πλούσιοι τριηραρχοῦσιν, ὁ δὲ δῆμος τριηραρχεῖται ([Xen.] Ath.Pol.1.13). The demos knows that the rich are those who become trierarchs, while it takes part in trireme service, i. e. it does not only receive money but it also has the obligation to follow their orders. The relationship between these two becomes clearer with the use of the same verb in both the active and passive voice.²⁹² This means that the demos consciously executes the orders of the wealthy citizens selected to this office but also that every single trierarch is responsible for all the activities of his ship during a campaign and mainly for his active service during the operations in course. Therefore, concerning our speaker we may say that since he exercised his duties adequately at Aegospotami he can use his ability to have control over the sailors as a means in the courtroom to win the favour of the jurors. This attitude is certainly acceptable to the latter, since in the Athenian courts the litigants expressed values and concepts that were acceptable to
See comm. § 8 οὗτοι πάντες ἐβούλοντο … ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ. See comm. § 9 ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοῖς τριηράρχοις ὠργίσθητε. See comm. § 10. It goes without saying that this relationship collapses, when either part does not fulfil their duties. This was the case for the rest of the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami with the exception of the remaining eight trierarchs who escaped from the Spartans. See further comm. § 10 παρεσκευασάμην … ἀκόλουθον and § 11 αἱ μὲν τοίνυν σωθεῖσαι τῶν δώδεκα ἦσαν. In LSJ s.v. τριηραρχῶ the phrase is translated as ‘has trierarchs found it’. In my opinion, this interpretation does not convey the real meaning of the text. Wilson’s translation, “Tragic Prestige”, 94, ‘the demos is presided over in the triremes’, clarifies the relationship between the demos and the aristocrats.
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the majority of the citizens.²⁹³ Besides, we must not forget that some of the jurors identified with the speaker’s old co-warriors.²⁹⁴ After completing the reference to his military activity, the speaker repeats for the second time the risks he ran and links this fact with the trial in which he is the defendant, asking the jurors indirectly to acquit him.²⁹⁵ From this point of the speech to the epilogue, the speaker does not refer to his military ethos. But when he reaches the end of his speech, the speaker refers to this issue again by giving new important information, which shows convincingly his conscious choice to put the city before his family.²⁹⁶ The efficiency of his speech is also increased by not distinguishing himself from his former cowarriors, though he was a trierarch and not a sailor, but instead by exposing their common fate during the campaigns, thus demonstrating that the trireme was a ‘school of democracy’.²⁹⁷ To strengthen his ethos even more, the speaker has recourse to a particular tactic, that is he uses concepts and vocabulary from the funeral orations, in which particularly the soldiers of Athens and not the sailors were praised.²⁹⁸ In this way, the speaker obviously seeks to flatter his audience, since he equates the contribution of all those serving on ships with that of the hoplites. If more speeches than the actual ones had survived, we might be able to assess the degree and manner in which the oarsmen of Athens were praised, so we would be able to assess the tactic of Lysias better.²⁹⁹ Irrespective of that, however, if we
See Dover, GPM, 5 – 8, Ober, Mass and Elite, 43 – 49. See comm. § 10 καὶ ταῦθ’ ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω … στρατιωτῶν. See comm. § 11 Καὶ οὕτω … εἰργασμένος τὴν πόλιν. See comm. § 24. See Strauss’ study in the comm. § 10 ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ παρασκευῆς τῆς ἐμῆς. See the introductory comm. §§ 24– 25. Cf. Parker, Religion, 131– 32: ‘In the early years of the century a patriotic death was a privilege reserved for cavalry and hoplites, but later the oarsmen of the fleet too must have been included, although, revealingly, we cannot distinguish them’. Loraux, Invention, 212– 13, argues that in the surviving funeral orations only Lysias praises the navy of the city in a few paragraphs. There are, however, passages, related to the Persian wars, where although there is no detailed reference to the navy, praise is aimed at it too. Cf. Lys. 2.47: καὶ πεζομαχοῦντες καὶ ναυμαχοῦντες, Dem. 60.9: ἐκεῖνοι τὸν ἐξ ἁπάσης τῆς ᾿Aσίας στόλον ἐλθόντα μόνοι δὶς ἠμύναντο καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν. In both passages, we notice the double use of the particle καὶ, which in no way allows degrading the importance of the contribution of the sailors. Aristotle (Rhet.1396a12– 13) also mentions as a topic for praise τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίαν ἢ τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχην, whereas Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Rom.Arch.5.17.4) believes centuries after the abolition of the institution that the Athenians added the funeral orations in honour of those who died at Artemision, Salamis, Platea and Marathon. In none of these texts is there a reference to the contemporary contribution of the Athenian fleet. In Aristophanes’ comedies, ho-
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take into consideration that the majority of the jurors – co-warriors of the speaker are πένητες ³⁰⁰ and we combine this with the scathing comment of Platonic Socrates that πολλαχῇ κινδυνεύει καλὸν εἶναι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἀποθνήσκειν … καὶ ἐὰν πένης τις ὢν τελευτήσῃ, καὶ ἐπαίνου αὖ ἔτυχεν, καὶ ἐὰν φαῦλος ᾖ (Men.234c1– 4), we can say with certainty that especially the poor jurors were flattered by his words. The speaker, however, was aware that his intense activity as a liturgist was not enough to obtain his acquittal but he also needed a concrete framework within which he would demonstrate his value as a citizen to an even higher degree. This framework more precisely is no other than the growing religious insecurity of his fellow citizens at that time,³⁰¹ and so the speaker as a result of this, emphasizes his piety.³⁰² The promotion of his piety becomes gradually perceived, first through his actions and secondly by his words. Thus, in the first five paragraphs of the speech the speaker explains to the jurors the many liturgies he had assumed until the time of the delivery of the speech (§§ 1– 5). The main purpose of this form of argumentation is to impress the jurors,³⁰³ but we must not forget that the office of a choregus also had a religious function in the Athenian perception.³⁰⁴ Moreover, it is not coincidental either that the speaker finishes his reference to the liturgies by pointing out his generosity, which the very religious life of the city reinforced.³⁰⁵ It is certain that his choice functioned in a very
wever, who writes some years before our speech, there is no distinction between the soldiers and the ‘sailing mob’ (see Thomas, Oral Tradition, 224– 25), which indicates that in, at least some of the funeral orations, the sailors of the city were praised. Such speeches were delivered throughout the war (see J.E.Ziolkowski, Thucydides and the Tradition of Funeral Speeches at Athens, Salem, New Hampshire 1981, 22), and although there is not any information about those speeches, it is worth thinking to whom the funeral oration in favour of the dead of the Hellespont referred to, the sailors or the hoplites? (cf. Strauss, “Aegospotami”, 32). The same question also applies to the naval successes of the year 411/410 B.C. See comm. § 15 καὶ πένητα … φθονῆσαι. Socrates increased this insecurity with his provocative life style (see W.R.Connor, ‘The other 399: Religion and the Trial of Socrates’ in Georgica: Greek Studies in Honour of G.Cackwell, BICS Suppl. 58, 1991, 49 – 56) and the Thirty with their impiety (see P.Krentz, ‘SEG XXI, 80 and the rule of the Thirty’ Hesperia 48 (1979), 61– 63, Thirty, 88). At this point I must specify what I mean by piety: ‘to maintain a pious standing in the community one had essentially to acknowledge and perform the requisite ritual acts, which include oaths and prayers, and display in general an overt concern for the gods’ (Yunis, Religious Beliefs, 39). The real religious feelings were matters that simple people could not understand. See Yunis, Religious Beliefs, 54– 55. See comm. §§ 1– 5. See Yunis, Religious Beliefs, 21, Wilson, “Tragic Prestige”, 86 – 90, Khoregia, 207 and 222– 25. See Parker, Religion, 127– 28.
E. The defensive strategy
47
favourable way to his defence if we take into consideration that Andocides, two years after the trial, exploited the concern of the Athenians to maintain their religious beliefs by highlighting his assumption of religious offices, like the office of architheorus, and thus gained his acquittal.³⁰⁶ The reference to the trierarchies (§§ 6 – 11) cannot be considered a direct evidence of the piety of the speaker,³⁰⁷ but fits within the frame of the relationship ‘Athenian prosperity equals the favour of the gods’. More precisely, the Athenians believed that 1) the gods favoured their city, and as a result, the city enjoyed good luck and 2) they gave it supremacy in the sea fights.³⁰⁸ During the Peloponnesian War, religion in Athens went through a major crisis.³⁰⁹ Shortly before the Sicilian expedition, the mutilation of the Hermai was considered by the Athenians to be an offence to all the Olympian gods and therefore a bad omen for the campaign,³¹⁰ whereas during the campaign the conviction of the Athenians that the gods were on their side collapsed because of their defeat and they felt that a god had turned against them.³¹¹ This uncertainty declined temporarily with the naval victories of 411/10 B.C, but returned and reached its peak after the defeat at Aegospotami. According to Plutarch, some Spartans reported that the Dioscuri appeared on the left and right side of Lysander’s trireme, like stars shining on the rudders, when the ship came out of port sailing against the Athenians. This view was expressed with certainty by men from the fleet of Lysander, since they were able to see them.³¹² At the same time, the Athenians believed that the gods were not favourable to them, particularly since a meteorite fell at Aegospotami, and they interpreted this as an omen of their misfortune (Plut. Lys.12.1– 3). Probably because See Missiou, Andokides, 53. R.Garner, Law and Society in Classical Athens, London and Sydney 1987, 49, gives this explanation as per the reference to the trierarchies in court: ‘the fact that this liturgy was mentioned in court as often as any other is indirectly explained by religion, since Greek beliefs made the city’s welfare a matter of especially deep anxiety … reverence was fully due those who financed the fleet’. Gabrielsen, Athenian Fleet, 231 n.23, states he has second thoughts about this view, but in my analysis I shall argue that Garner’s interpretation is partly well founded. See Mikalson, Religion, 18 – 19. About the reasons of this phenomenon see Furley, Andokides, 71– 92. See Furley, Andokides, 20 – 22. See C.A.Powell, ‘Religion and the Sicilian Expedition’ Historia 28 (1979), 15 – 31. This rumour was probably generated by the belief of the Spartans that the Dioscuri were initially deities of Sparta who interfered so that their protégées win the fights. About the role of the Dioscuri see e. g. Burkert, Religion, 212– 13, R.Parker, ‘Spartan Religion’ in Classical Sparta: Techinques Behind Her Success, A.Powell (ed.), London 1989, 147, H.A.Shapiro, ‘Cult Warfare. The Dioscuri between Sparta and Athens’ in Ancient Greek Hero Cult, R.Hagg (ed.), Stocholm 1999, 99 – 107 and particularly 104,107.
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of this omen, Lysias said in his funeral oration that the defeat was the result of a gods’ plan.³¹³ However, in contrast with the belief of the Athenians on the outcome of the defeat, there were some trierarchs, like the speaker, who escaped from the Spartans. In my opinion, the speaker’s statement that he was able to impose discipline on his crew³¹⁴ aims to indicate that he had the favour of the gods. Ischomachus, who mentions in Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, referring to the crews of the ships, that the gods punish the lazy people,³¹⁵ reinforces my view. The last and strongest argument with a religious character is created on the basis of the accusation of bribery itself. In other words, the speaker reports that he would be crazy to spend the parental property for the benefit of the city showing φιλοτιμίαν on the one hand, and on the other be bribed by the enemies of the city in order to harm it (§ 22). The emphasis here should be placed on the verb μαίνομαι, since the Greeks believed that the gods were those who sent the μανίαν to people.³¹⁶ With the negation of this attitude, therefore, the speaker indirectly but clearly means that if he indeed had displayed such contradictory behaviour, this would be punishment sent by the gods.³¹⁷ However, none of the jurors could
The relevant passage reads: ἀπολομένων γὰρ τῶν νεῶν ἐν Ἐλλησπόντῳ εἴτε κακίᾳ ἡγεμόνος κακίᾳ εἴτε θεῶν διανοίᾳ (Lys. 2.58). We may notice that Lysias does not supply any further explanation on what this plan of the the gods’ was. Bearing in mind the general reluctance of the Athenians to define the outcome as a defeat and the option of the term ‘misfortune’ instead of defeat (see comm. § 9 διὰ τὴν γενομένην συμφοράν), it would be justified to believe that the time had not come, if it ever came, for an orator to explain in a funeral oration, whose role was to improve the image of the city, this particular plan of the gods. See comm. § 10 παρεσκευασάμην … ἀκόλουθον. See Xen. Oec.8.16 with Pomeroy, Oeconomicus, 287. This passage provides a logical explanation why the Athenians were defeated at the Hellespont. In a period when religious diagnoses are rare (see Parker, Miasma, 277- the term ‘religious diagnoses’ is his), Xenophon gives an explanation which has a religious background and simultaneously he gives the οnly logical explanation about the defeat, that is the Athenians did not take any precaution against Lysander. Since the members of the Paralus managed to flee from the Hellespont and inform the Athenians about the defeat (see Xen. Hell.2.2.3), it is possible to believe that the trierarchs who escaped were in a state of alertness. In our case, this means that Xenphon attempts to incorporate this sea defeat within a religious frame (cf. F.Pownall, ‘Condemnation of the impious in Xenophon’s ‘Hellenica’’ HTR 91 (1998), 251– 77), something which all the Athenians accepted and, consequently, the jurors. Besides, Lysias does the same (see n.313). The favour of the gods towards the speaker proves that he was not contemptuous of the Spartans. See B.Simon, Mind and Madness in Ancient Greece: The Classical Roots of Modern Psychiatry, Ithaca and London 1978, 65 – 67,100 – 2,221, Burkert, Religion, 80, Parker, Miasma, 242– 48. The religious conception of the speaker, i. e. that there are two levels, the divine and the human level, and that the first influences the second, resemble those of the prosecutor of
E. The defensive strategy
49
believe that there was such a possibility, since the speaker has proved himself to have the favour of the gods.³¹⁸ Following all this, the attack of the speaker against his opponents as vicious citizens who were found to be defendants in a trial ἀσεβείας and who through their way of life prove themselves worse than Cinesias,³¹⁹ sounds natural and justified. This accusation blemishes their ethos in the worst possible way, since they become the centre of attention and concern of all the Athenians,³²⁰ whereas it is in contrast with his own religious ethos. In conclusion, I may say that the rhetorical projection of Lysias of a personality which has piety as one of its key features is highly successful and is directly related to the case, since the Athenians considered this kind of man as honest,³²¹ i. e. as the last group of citizens who should be charged with such serious crimes. My analysis so far gives the impression that the speaker has several important arguments to persuade the jurors that the charges against him are unfounded. Nonetheless, all the litigants do not always tell the truth, and when there are issues that make their speech problematic, they try to avoid them. Our speaker is not, of course, excluded. In our text there are two points that deserve special attention, so I shall analyze them in full detail. First, I must note that, while in the other surviving forensic speeches there are clear references to recent political developments, this speech, at the first reading, appears not to have a distinct political background.³²² The latest political events at the time the speech was delivered were the fall of the Thirty, the migration of the extreme oligarchs to Eleusis and their new conflict with the peo-
Andocides, who maintains that his opponent went through many hardships and he now is in court because of the actions of the gods. On this matter see Furley, Andokides, 106 – 7. In our speech none of these, of course, is expressly mentioned. It is also noteworthy that in the text the question that the speaker should explain why the gods could have this attitude against him is not raised. This probably does not happen, because it is about a hypothetical eventuality and not a real fact. With my analysis I have demonstrated, I hope, that the gods showed concern about offences of this kind too, thus nullifying the opinion of Mikalson, Religion, 30 – 31, that the gods were not interested in bribery or embezzlement. See comm. § 20. Cf. Yunis, Religious Beliefs, 40: ‘the religious beliefs held by an individual were not primarily a matter of public record nor a matter of public concern, although the individual’s religious behaviour was certainly both visible to the public and of public concern. Beliefs influence behaviour’. See Dover, GPM, 253. Ober, Mass and Elite, 348, classifies our speech in this category of forensic speeches.
50
1. Introduction
ple of the city. Nowhere, however, in the text can we find an explicit reference to them, which leads us to wonder why there is this omission. Wilson³²³ believes that if the speaker showed some sympathy for the Thirty and he remained in the city, his role was not so important in the course of the events for there to be reprisals against him. This seems to imply that the speaker had no plausible reason to want to refer to the turbulent political events that took place at the end of the 5th century B.C. However, as I showed earlier, he remained in the city and supported the tyrannical regime with reservations.³²⁴ The reason, therefore, must be different and it can be no other than the fact that in 403/02 B.C., immediately after the restoration of democracy and the elimination of the leaders of the oligarchs at Eleusis, the antipathy towards the Three Thousand was great.³²⁵ It is noteworthy that all the defendants who refer to the political events of the time follow two paths: they either profess faith in democracy³²⁶ or acknowledge their involvement in the oligarchic regime and directly invoke the amnesty.³²⁷ In our speech, Lysias, knowing that his client cannot explicitly deny his oligarchic beliefs,³²⁸ follows a different tactic, i. e. he avoids any clear statement that links the regime of the Thirty with his political and social action. Some particular points in the text substantiate my view. In § 1 the speaker reports that he assumed his first choregy in the archonship of Theopompus. Wilson³²⁹ rightly points out that although the speaker links the assumption of the choregy with the office of Theopompus, in the first two months of the year 411/10 B.C. Mnesilochus was the eponymous archon, who later became one of the Thirty. The festivals mentioned in § 1 will have been held after Theopompus had succeeded Mnasilochus, but if his δοκιμασία was early in 411/0,³³⁰ that will have been under Mnasilochus. This fact allows us to suspect that the speaker does not wish to link his name with a man who was a member of the oligarchic
Khoregia, 92. See Introduction, The identity of the speaker, 17– 21. See Loening, Reconciliation, 117. Cf. Lys. 18.2,5,7,11,23,24. For Lysias’ clients see Lateiner, Lysias and Athenian Politics, 157, Lateiner, “Lysias”, 150 – 51. For Andocides see Sealey, Greek Politics, 137. Even if we did not have the opportunity to spot the speaker’s political activity accurately, the opinion of Lateiner (Lysias and Athenian Politics, 156) that if one of Lysias’ clients does not deny in court that he has oligarchic beliefs, then he was probably sympathetic to the political machinations of the oligarchs, must be right. Khoregia, 89. See Rhodes, CAP, 497.
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regime of the Four Hundred,³³¹ but even more with one of the pioneers of the newly abolished tyranny.³³² Instead, the reference to the archon Theopompus is not a problem for the speaker because the former, although he had been elected eponymous archon like other officials by the intermediary regime, continued his office after the restoration of democracy in accordance with the wish of the Athenian demos.³³³ In § 4 we have the greatest proof of the speaker’s concern that his action might be associated with the Thirty, because instead of mentioning the name of the eponymous archon Pythodorus, he uses ὕστερον and avoids the risk.³³⁴ The speaker, however, chooses to use some phrases during the speech, which indirectly situate his speech in the political context of that time. In § 18 he uses the phrases οὐκ … αἰσχροῦ τινος αἴτιός εἰμι and τὰς τῆς πόλεως συμφορὰς εἶδον in which again, indirectly and not clearly, he denies that he may be associated with the Thirty.³³⁵ In § 20 the speaker accuses his opponents of not helping the city so as to become εὐδαίμων again, an idea which leads to the conclusion that the speaker blames his rivals for μνησικακίαν,³³⁶ but again indirectly. This is strange, since the μνησικακία as an issue is unrelated to the accusations against him;³³⁷ he could therefore directly refer to it. His attitude towards his prosecutors and their motives is very careful and shows that the speaker does not want to give the impression to the jurors that this trial is due to the hatred generated by the rule of the Thirty. Last, the degree of attention given by Lysias to avoid any explicit reference to the present is incontestably demonstrated by some points of his argumentation where we would expect him to associate himself directly with the restored democracy. Thus, while in § 22 he classifies himself among the εὖ πεποιηκότας, i. e. to those whom the demos considered to have benefited them,³³⁸ he does not classify himself among the democrats. Finally, while in § 25 he refers to the impending punishment, which is similar to the fate of the exiled democrats before their return to the Peiraeus, the speaker does not parallel his fate to their own but he hopes the jurors will make the necessary connections by themselves.
See Ostwald, Sovereignty, 461. See Ostwald, Sovereignty, 420. See comm. § 4 καὶ ὕστερον … πεντεκαίδεκα μνᾶς. About the interpretation of these phrases see the relevant comm. in the commentary. See comm. § 20 καὶ ἐξ ὧν μὲν ἡ πόλις … ὀργισθήσεσθε. About the terms of the μνησικακία see Loening, Reconciliation, 30 – 50. See comm. § 22 ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν … τὴν ψῆφον φέρειν. See comm. § 25 ἡγουμένους … περιιέναι.
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The only reference which is directly related to the current political situation is the phrase ὑμᾶς νυνὶ ἐν τῷ θαρραλέῳ ὄντας in the epilogue,³³⁹ but even here he does not involve himself but seeks to justify his request to be acquitted.³⁴⁰ If we take into consideration the negative atmosphere that prevailed at the time against those who remained in the city, combined with the weight of the double accusation against him, we can say that Lysias intelligently but also necessarily invented the most effective strategy to protect his client from the intense political passions of the end of the 5th century B.C.³⁴¹ A second critical point in the defensive tactic of the speaker is the reference to the presence of Alcibiades on his ship. The speaker claims that he could do nothing to prevent the general and he states emphatically that there was no relationship between them (§ 6). This claim is problematic, since the speaker demonstrates that his ability as trierarch was based on the character of Alcibiades and at the same time he presents this as a coincidence. The matter is not as simple as that. Lysias’ client enumerates the liturgies he assumed up to the archonship of Diocles (§ 2) and immediately adds the information that he had served as trierarch for seven years (§ 3). After that he reports that he returned to the city during the archonship of Alexias and continues enumerating the liturgies until § 5 without giving any further information on his trierarchies. He goes back on this issue in § 6 and analyzes it up to § 10. In this way, one gets the impression that the speaker has chosen to divide the report of the liturgies into two distinct parts, one referring to the choregies and the other referring to the trierarchies. Since, however, he declares that he returned to Athens during the archonship of Diocles, namely 405/04 B.C, and that his office as a trierarch lasted seven years, this means that he also undertook these tasks in 411 B.C. the same year his career as a choregus started (§ 1). However, there is not such a clear statement in the text, but the speaker restricts himself to talking about τὸν δὲ μεταξὺ χρόνον (§ 3). A second chronological problem is also created by the speaker’s words. If he seems to stop choregies in 409/08 B.C in the archonship of Diocles and assume the same duties again in the archonship of Alexias 405/04 B.C., this means that the interval of four years could be the one during which he became a trierarch.
This phrase refers to the feeling of security generated in the city after the restoration of democracy. See further Introduction,The dating of the speech, 55 – 56. See comm. § 25 ὑμᾶς νυνὶ ἐν τῷ θαρραλέῳ ὄντας. In our case, the distinction of the jurors into men of the city and men of the Peiraeus (Lys. 12.92– 93, 26.16 – 20) or the recognition among the jurors of men who took part in the oligarchic regime (Lys. 16.8) is of no value for the defence of the speaker at this period; that is why Lysias does not use it.
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53
However, as I mentioned above, he refers to seven years and not four. It is therefore reasonable to believe that the speaker does not want the jurors to calculate exactly the interval when he served as a trierarch and especially when he actually started his service³⁴² but he wants them to be impressed by the length of time he remained a trierarch.³⁴³ The answer to our problem might lie in the fact that Alcibiades returned to Athens in 407 B.C.,³⁴⁴ that is one year after the choregy of the speaker in the archonship of Diocles, and chose him as his trierarch,³⁴⁵ but the speaker does not want this to be perceived by anyone. This fear is justified. Wilson suspects that the speaker’s father was probably one of those very powerful men in Samos in 412 B.C. who had attempted to overthrow democracy.³⁴⁶ If this view is correct, it means that his father was among the wealthy citizens who accepted the proposal of Alcibiades to overthrow democracy in Athens in order to secure friendship with Tissaphernes and accept Alcibiades back into Athens, hoping that in this way they could have control of the city and defeat the enemies.³⁴⁷ Alcibiades, therefore, chose to travel with the speaker because of his friendship with the speaker’s father,³⁴⁸ believing
Wilson, Khoregia, 90, commenting first on the liturgies enumerated by the speaker stops in § 3, where the speaker starts talking about the trierarchies and says: ‘If, as seems likely, the speaker’s list is complete and chronologically organized, there follows a gap of some four years in his performance of agonistic leitourgiai, but he is careful to explain it by reference to his continuous and apparenty active service as a trierarkh for seven years’. Wilson actually explains what the speaker was doing during those four years, but he does not notice that there is a reference to seven years’ trierarchies and that there is some kind of inconsistency in the speech. On the occasion of this slight mistake in the excellent study of this scholar, modern philologists should confess that if Lysias could see their efforts to interpret his speeches and that after so many readings of his speeches they still remain perplexed, he would be laughing, rejoicing over his success. Perhaps Lysias might be laughing even more than he laughed with his client, who at some time contested his ability as a logographer (cf. Plut. Mor.504C). Gabrielsen, Athenian Fleet, 243 n.18, remarks that the litigants who promote the trierarchies they undertook in the courtrooms (Lys. 19.57, 21, Isaeus 6.60) claim that the service of the trierarchy lasted for seven years. According to him, this coincidence is strange, but it is probably used because it created a positive impression on the jurors. The effort of our speaker to disorientate the jurors by using number seven confirms the view of this classicist that with such an argument the litigants could win the favour of the jurors. About the dating of this fact see also Underhill, Hellenica, xlii, Ferguson, Treasurers, 45 n.1. See § 7 καίτοι ὑμᾶς … ἐβούλετο. About the dating of this event see also Underhill, Hellenica, xlii, Ferguson, Treasurers, 45 n.1. See Wilson, Khoregia, 343 n.181. See Ostwald, Sovereignty, 352. Cf. Aesch. 3.52, where it is said that the general Cephisodotus chose Demothenes as a trierarch, because he was an old friend of his father.
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that his son could be as reliable as his father was.³⁴⁹ It is also possible that the two men were already friends, since the Athenians ‘inherited’ friends and enemies from their fathers.³⁵⁰ If my reasoning is correct, then it seems likely that Alcibiades appointed the speaker as a trierarch and decided to sail with him, something the generals always did.³⁵¹ This is partly understandable for Alcibiades, since during the Sicilian campaign he had travelled with his own ship,³⁵² while now he had to travel on another’s ship. Nonetheless, the selection of the speaker as a trierarch reveals that Alcibiades was certain that he could rely on the speaker. What could someone infer from the fact that Alcibiades selected the ship of a relative of his to travel on? Last, the friends of Alcibiades achieved the election of Adeimantus, who originated from the same phyle as Alcibiades.³⁵³ Could it be possible, even now, that some people remembered these facts and assumed that the speaker, since he belonged to the same phyle as Alcibiades, was also to blame for the future defeat in the Hellespont? All these are reasonable assumptions that give a possible explanation why the speaker, although he refers to Alcibiades, denies any relationship with him. The attitude of the speaker demonstrates the rhetorical ingenuity of Lysias, since he portrays the relationship between the speaker and Alcibiades in the light of the defeat of 404 B.C.³⁵⁴ The speaker actually wants to convince the jurors that he belonged to those who thought of Alcibiades as the sole person responsible for past misfortunes but also to those who thought of him as the sole cause for future disasters.³⁵⁵ The association between the evil recent political past and the uncertain present, through the controversial role of Alcibiades,³⁵⁶ makes the speaker’s subsequent claim that he did not welcome the misfortunes of the city³⁵⁷ credible and the charge of bribery by the enemies of the city questionable.
Cf. comm. § 6. See Cox, Household Interests, 80. See Jordan, Athenian Navy, 68 – 70. See Jordan, Athenian Navy, 91. See Bicknell, Genealogy, 104– 05. Cf also Lys. 14.31 with Carey, Lysias, 168. Cf. Xen. Hell.1.4.17– 18. The same connection but in a direct way and in full detail will be exposed by the prosecutor of the son of Alcibiades, linking the father of the young defendant with all the subsequent misfortunes of the city: καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ὑπερβολὴν ποιησάμενος τῆς προτέρας πονηρίας ἐτόλμησε τὰς ναῦς Λυσάνδρῳ μετὰ ᾿Aδειμάντου προδοῦναι. ὥστε εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἢ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας ἐν ναυμαχίᾳ ἐλεεῖ, ἢ ὑπὲρ τῶν δουλευσάντων τοῖς πολεμίοις αἰσχύνεται, ἢ τῶν τειχῶν καθῃρημένων ἀγανακτεῖ, ἢ Λακεδαιμονίους μισεῖ, ἢ τοῖς τριάκοντα ὀργίζεται, τούτων ἁπάντων χρὴ τὸν τούτου πατέρα αἴτιον ἡγεῖσθαι (Lys. 14.38 – 39). See comm. § 18 ἢ ὡς τὰς τῆς πόλεως συμφορὰς ἀσμένως εἶδον.
F. Τhe dating of the speech
55
F. Τhe dating of the speech The speech refers to the archonship of Eucleides (§ 4), so must have been written in or soon after 403/02 B.C. Gernet-Bizos³⁵⁸ believe that the trial took place shortly after the archonship of Eucleides, i. e. shortly after 403/02 B.C., because the speaker stops the expounding of his liturgies in 404/03 B.C. Similarly, Lamb believes that, because the speaker makes a detailed presentation of the liturgies until the year 404/3,³⁵⁹ the speech was delivered in 403/02 B.C., that is one year later. Todd³⁶⁰ also argues that the trial took place soon after the restoration of democracy in 403/02 B.C., since this is the last date the speaker submits in his report of the liturgies in § 4. Todd’s opinion is the more precise, since he states that democracy in the city had been restored. We can confirm that the speech was delivered soon after 403/02 B.C. with another argument. The restoration of democracy and the treaty of reconciliation took place in the archonship of Eucleides in 403/02 B.C.³⁶¹ At the same time, the speaker refers indirectly to the agreement of the Athenians not to harbour grudges between themselves, agreed at that time.³⁶² The combination of the realisation of this historical event and the simultaneous allusion by the speaker to it creates a secure post quem. Moreover, there is another way to attempt to date the speech in 403/02 B.C. The speaker at the end of the speech addresses the judges saying: ὑμᾶς νυνὶ ἐν τῷ θαρραλέῳ ὄντας (§ 25). It is noteworthy that Lysias himself uses the same phrase in his denunciation speech against Eratosthenes: ὑμεῖς νῦν ἐν τῷ θαρραλέῳ ὄντες (12.94). Loening argues that Lysias here refers to the sense of security generated in Athens after the expulsion of the Thirty from Eleusis,³⁶³ i. e. an event which occurred towards the end of the year 402/01 B.C. or early in the following year, after the fatal ambush set up by the democrats against the leaders of the oligarchs.³⁶⁴ However, in my opinion, this phrase may still point to 403/02 B.C., i. e. before the elimination of the oligarchs from Eleusis.³⁶⁵ In 12.90 – 93 Lysias makes a contrast between the lives of the Thirty and the Three Thousand Lysias, 73. Lysias, 475. Lysias, 228. See Loening, Reconciliation, 21– 22. See comm. § 20. See T.Loening, ‘The autobiographical speeches of Lysias and the biographical tradition’ Hermes 109 (1981), 285. About this date see Loening, Reconciliation, 59 – 60. For the dating of Lys. 12 in 403/2 B.C. see also the analysis of C.Bearzot, Lisia e la tradizione su Teramene, Milano 1997, 42–44,47–50,227.
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during the regime and emphasizes the feelings of loneliness, insecurity and humiliation the Three Thousand felt because of the tyrants. Then the speaker emphasizes the benefits of the victory of the demos over the Thirty and claims that the Three Thousand feel secure now (12.94). Moreover, the argument of Loening,³⁶⁶ that the period immediately after the return of the exiles from the Peiraeus would have been the least appropriate moment to underscore Athens’ division is not right, in my opinion, for two reasons: a) immediately after the restoration of democracy Thrasybulus gave a speech to the men who had remained in the city and made several contrasts between them and the demos (Xen. Hell.2.4.40 – 42). Thus, the first division between the citizens of Athens, i. e. ‘the men from the Peiraeus’ and the ‘men from the city’ had already been created and b), Lysias would not attempt to destroy any feelings of reunion, if he was not sure that emotions still ran high in Athens.
G. Structure and Style 1. The structure of the speech The text has a distinct structure without creating ambiguity about the issues the speaker wants to analyze. After a short προοίμιον (§ 1), the speaker displays in §§ 1– 11 the economic and military tasks he had assumed in the past (πίστεις ἐκ τοῦ βίου). In §§ 1– 5 the speaker refers to the choregies he assumed with only a brief reference to his military activity (§ 3), while in §§ 6 – 11 he highlights his activity as a trierarch. This becomes clear with two τεκμήρια. The first is that he had the best trireme of the Athenian fleet, which is evidenced by the decision of Alcibiades and the desire of the generals who succeeded him to sail with his ship. The second relates exclusively to his action at Aegospotami (§§ 9 – 10). At this point there is the only testimony, that of Nausimachus (§ 10). The report on the trierarchies ends with a repetitive reference to them (§ 11). On the basis of the liturgies undertaken so far, the speaker argues that the city will benefit if he is allowed to maintain his property and to spend it for the benefit of the public interest (§§ 11– 19). Then the speaker denounces his prosecutors in two paragraphs, presenting them as litigious, cowards and men who are incapable of benefiting the city (§§ 20 – 21). The speaker in §§ 22– 25 reintroduces the issue of his public contribution.
See Loening, 1981, 285.
G. Structure and Style
57
§§ 23 – 25 constitute the ἐπίλογος of the speech. In § 22 he presents the accusation against him as absurd and his relationship with the jurors as a relationship between a benefactor and a beneficiary. In §§ 23 – 24 the speaker returns to the issue of the liturgies, demonstrating to the jurors that for him the city was a higher priority than even his own family. In § 25 the client of Lysias, relying on his public contribution, demands the χάρις of the jurors and presents the consequences of a conviction.
2. The style A fundamental study to prove the authenticity of a speech of the Lysianic corpus was that of Dover,³⁶⁷ who analyzes the style of Lysias’ speeches in comparison to the 12th speech, which was delivered with certainty by him and proves that our speech is genuine. The latest study of Usher-Najock³⁶⁸ applies the same method as that of Dover, also comparing Lysias’ speeches with each other, and reaches the same conclusion. This allows us to study the style of the text separately to identify the individual virtues of Lysias and therefore engage with the author.³⁶⁹ Vocabulary. The words we encounter in the text are the everyday language of the Athenians. As, of course, in the other speeches of Lysias, in the text there are six words, according to Dover, which do not belong to the vocabulary of forensic oratory: ἀναθέσει (§ 2), ἁμιλλώμενος (§ 5), ἐπιπονωτάτην (§ 19), δωροδοκία (§ 21), περιάψω (§ 24).³⁷⁰ In the text, the use of the conjunctions καί, δέ is quite frequent, more particularly in §§ 1– 6 and §§ 6 – 8, where the speaker displays the choregies he assumed and mentions the generals who boarded his ship. This is noteworthy, because, to my knowledge, there is no other text of the surviving Greek oratory and in Lysias in particular that a speaker uses these conjunctions so often. The use of the conjunction οὖν is also frequent (§§ 12, 13, 19, 20). Finally, the use of the verb ἡγοῦμαι is used so that either the speaker expresses his opinion as regards him LCL, 115 – 147. S.Usher-D.Najock, ‘A statistical study of the authorship in the Corpus Lysiacum’ Chum 16 (1982), 85 – 106. Our speech, according to their analysis, has as its parallel in a stylistic level the 7th speech of Lysias. Cf Dover, LCL, 96: ‘to read a text thoroughly is to form a partial acquaintance with its author’. Although this remark of Dover belongs to the chapter ‘Crude Stylometry’, in my opinion, it is valid for an exclusive stylistic study of a speech. See LCL, 122. These words belong to those which Dover, LCL, 115, classifies as ‘technical terms in so far as they refer to administrative, ceremonial, legal, commercial and military functions or family relationships’.
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self (§§ 11, 16, 17, 18, 23, 24, 25) or about what the jurors should think of him (§§ 13, 19, 21). Figures of Speech. Antithesis is a main organisational element in the speech, which is used to contrast more concepts rather than words. Antitheses μέν-δέ: Περὶ μὲν τῶν κατηγορημένων, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἱκανῶς ὑμῖν ἀποδέδεικται. ἀκοῦσαι δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὑμᾶς ἀξιῶ (§ 1). Αἱ μὲν τοίνυν σωθεῖσαι τῶν δώδεκα ἦσαν ἐγὼ δ’ ὑμῖν δύο ἐκόμισα (§ 11). ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀχάριστα εἶναι τὰ εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀνηλωμένα, ἐκείνους δὲ ὀρθῶς βεβουλεῦσθαι (§ 12). ὥστε ἰδίᾳ μὲν τῶν φείδομαι, δημοσίᾳ δὲ λῃτουργῶν ἥδομαι (§ 16). τούτων μὲν αὐτὸς αἴτιος εἶναι, τὴν δ’ οὐσίαν ἑτέρους μοι καταλιπεῖν διὰ ταύτην μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἀδίκως συκοφαντεῖσθαι, δι’ ἐκεῖνα δὲ ὑφ’ ὑμῶν δικαίως σῴζεσθαι (§ 17). οἳ περὶ ἀσεβείας μὲν ἀγωνιζόμενοι τηλικοῦτοι γεγόνασιν, οὐκ ἂν δυνάμενοι δ’ ὑπὲρ τῶν σφετέρων ἁμαρτημάτων ἀπολογήσαθαι ἑτέρων κατηγορεῖν τολμῶσι … ἐξ ὧν μὲν ἡ πόλις εὐδαίμων ἔσται, οὐ συμβάλλονται, πάντα δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὅπως ὑμεῖς τοῖς πεποιηκόσιν ὀργισθήσεσθε (§ 20). οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐν τῷ δήμῳ κατείποιεν ὑμῖν τὰ σφἐτερ’ αὐτῶν ἐπιτηδεύματα … ἐγὼ δ’ ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ ἱκετεύω καὶ ἀντιβολῶ μὴ καταγνῶναι δωροδοκίαν ἐμοῦ (§ 21). ἡμῖν μὲν δεινὸν ὑμῖν δὲ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι … ἀνάξια μὲν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πεπονθότες, ἀνάξια δὲ τῶν εἰς ὑμᾶς ὑπηργμένων (§ 25). The most characteristic use of antithesis is encountered in the sole argument ex contrariis, which is there in the speech and which aims at demonstrating the contradiction of the accusation against him: μαινοίμην γὰρ , ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εἰ τὴν μὲν πατρῴαν οὐσίαν φιλοτιμούμενος εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀναλίσκοιμι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ τῆς πόλεως κακῷ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων δωροδοκοίην (§ 22).³⁷¹ Homoioteleuton: ἐπίστησθε … ψηφιεῖσθε (§ 1), ἐκόμισα … ἔσωσα (§ 9), ὑβρισθῆναι … παραστῆναι, ψηφιεῖσθε … αἰρήσεσθε (§ 12), βουλεύσησθε … ἐπιμελήσεσθε (§ 13), ποιήσητε … ἀδικήσετε (§ 14), ἀμφισβητῆσαι … ἐλεῆσαι … φθονῆσαι, ἐπιθυμήσωσι … ἀναλίσκωσιν (§ 15), ἔχειν … κινδυνεύειν, φείδομαι … ἥδομαι (§ 16), συκοφαντεῖσθαι … σῴζεσθαι (§ 17), καὶ ἰδίων καὶ τῶν δημοσίων (§ 18), μεμνῆσθαι … ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, ἡττηθῆναι … ἐπαρθῆναι, μέμψασθαι … προσκαλέσασθαι (§ 19), καταψηφίσασθαι … ἀπολογήσασθαι (§ 20), ἠλέησα … ἐδάκρυσα (§ 24), καταλείψω … περιάψω (§§ 24– 25). Parisosis: τῶν μὲν ὑμετέρων ἐπιθυμήσωσι, τὰ δὲ σφέτερα αὐτῶν εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀναλίσκωσιν (§ 15 with homoioteleuton), ἰδίᾳ φείδομαι … δημοσίᾳ ἥδομαι (§ 16 with homoioteleuton). Figure chiaston: § 17 ἡγούμενος τούτων μὲν αὐτὸς αἴτιος εἶναι, τὴν δ’ οὐσίαν ἑτέρους μοι καταλιπεῖν διὰ ταύτην μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἀδίκως συκοφαντεῖσθαι, δι’ ἐκεῖνα δὲ ὑφ’ ὑμῶν δικαίως σῴζεσθαι. The structure of the sentence is: ἡγούμενος
For an analysis of this specific argument see the relevant comm.
G. Structure and Style
59
τούτων μὲν αὐτὸς αἴτιος εἶναι=a, τὴν δ’ οὐσίαν ἑτέρους μοι καταλιπεῖν=b, διὰ ταύτην μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἀδίκως συκοφαντεῖσθαι=b, δι’ ἐκεῖνα δὲ ὑφ’ ὑμῶν δικαίως σῴζεσθαι=a. Hyperbaton: The speaker uses slight hyperbaton three times in the speech, that is he interjects two words between two other words which are syntactically linked together, to give emphasis to his arguments: κινδύνους–ὑπὲρ ὑμῶνκεκινδυνευκὼς (§ 12), ἕξετε-πᾶσι-χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἡμετέροις (§ 14), τοιαύτην-περὶ ὑμῶν-γνώμην (§ 25).³⁷² Repetition: The speaker repeats the same word three times in the speech. These three repetitions are necessary, since they help in the creation of persuasive arguments.³⁷³ In the first two cases the speaker uses the same pronoun three and twice respectively: πόσα … πόσα … πόσα (§ 9-for a full stylistic analysis of the passage see below), τῶν ἡμετέρων-τῶν ὑμετέρων (§ 13). The difference in the second case is that the pronoun is used in the first and second person respectively, thus creating assonance.³⁷⁴ Also the speaker uses the same adjective in a climax twice: ἀνάξια μὲν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πεπονθότες, ἀνάξια δὲ τῶν εἰς ὑμᾶς ὑπηργμένων (§ 25). As per the way of connecting thought and style, I may note that the speaker intersperses his speech with direct addresses to the jurors (§§ 1, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25) and only at one point of his speech does he use three successive questions in order to express his feelings for them:³⁷⁵ καίτοι οὕτω παρεσκευασμένην τριήρη πόσα οἴεσθε ἀνηλωκέναι χρήματα; ἢ πόσα τοὺς πολεμίους εἰργάσθαι κακά; ἢ πόσα τὴν πόλιν εὖ πεποιηκέναι; (§ 9). Finally, the speaker creates an impression of spontaneity and immediacy with the use of parentheses (ἵνα καὶ τούτου
About the reasons for using hyperbaton in the particular passages see the relevant comm. in the commentary. I show the importance of these repetitions in the relevant comm. of the commentary. On assonance see J.D.Denniston, Greek Prose Style, Oxford 1952, 124– 39. I.Worthington, A Historical Commentary on Dinarchus: Rhetoric and Conspiracy in Later Fourth-Century Athens, Michigan 1992, 17, points out that in Dinarchus’ speech Against Demosthenes there are many examples of assonance. At the same time, in n.13 of the same page, he mentions that K.Dover indicated to him in a letter that, although assonance is frequent in epideictic speeches, Herodotus and Thucydides consciously avoid it. Dover seems to confuse the forensic speeches, which were destined mainly to be heard and secondly to be read, with the two historical texts addressing readers (see E.Greenwood, Thucydides and the Shaping of History, London 2006, 16 – 17). The differentiation is, therefore, inevitable and it cannot reduce the use of assonance in forensics speeches, like ours or like Deinarchus’ speech. On the contrary, the appearance of the same phenomenon throughout the peak of forensic oratory demonstrates that the orators were certain that they would attract the attention of their audiences. See relevant comm. in the commentary.
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μνησθῶ … συμφοράν § 9) and the rhetorical paraleipsis (ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων δὲ καὶ ἰδίων καὶ τῶν δημοσίων οὕτως ἡγοῦμαὶ μοι πεπολιτεῦσθαι, καὶ ὑμᾶς εἰδέναι, ὥστε οὐδὲν δεῖν με ἀπολογήσασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν § 18).
2. Commentary ᾿Aπολογία δωροδοκίας ἀπαράσημος: The title of the text relates directly to the main charges against the speaker. See further Introduction, The legal problems of the speech, 31– 34. The adjective ἀπαράσημος here means “anonymous” (cf. Antiph. Tetr.1α). It is consequently an invention of the copyist and not Lysias’ title, since the speaker’s name is not mentioned in the text and apparently there was no adequate information to verify it. §§ 1– 5. Introductory comments. List of choregies: The citation of choregies was a safe method of the litigants to demonstrate the quality of their characters, so it was taken for granted that they would make use of it (cf. Dem. 21.151). Their aim was to gain popularity through excessive expenditure (see Jones, AD, 56), but also to face any prejudice of the audience against the wealthy citizens (see Harding, “Rhetoric and Politics”, 32– 33). Since it was probably not the case that a litigant would recite his speech by heart (see S.Usher, ‘Lysias and his clients’ GRBS 17 (1976), 36), but rather he was allowed to have a note of his speech in court and consult it in order to provide correct evidence, it is likely that the speaker read the following paragraphs to the jurors from his manuscript (see Lavency, “Lecture”, 233 – 34). Nevertheless, since a well-written speech was not sufficient to impress the court and the ability of a litigant to speak from memory supported his successful presentation (see Hall, “Lawcourt Dramas”, 47, cf. W.V.Harris, Ancient Literacy, Harvard 1989, 32), it would be better to believe that at this point the speaker did not need to have the manuscript before him. Besides, the speaker refers to liturgies he assumed in the recent past. Cf., on the contrary, Lys. 19.57: ὁ τοίνυν ἐμός πατὴρ ἄρχειν μὲν οὐδεπώποτε ἐπεθύμησε, τὰς δὲ χορηγίας ἁπάσας κεχορήγηκε, τρετριηράρχηκε δὲ ἑπτάκις, εἰσφοράς δὲ πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας εἰσενήνοχεν. ἵνα δὲ εἰδῆτε καὶ ὑμεῖς καὶ καθ’ ἑκάστην ἀναγνώσεται. § 1. Περὶ μὲν τῶν κατηγορημένων, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἱκανῶς ὑμῖν ἀποδέδεικται: Dover, LCL, 160, claims that the person who published the speech chose this particular part of it which is preserved, in order to highlight its rhetorical quality, but he did not consider it necessary to publish the legal part of it. Fisher, SVCA, 58, believes that this part of the speech was the only one which was published, because it was the most interesting. The section preserved is, in his opinion, a recapitulation and focuses on the speaker’s services to the city and on the favour which he thinks he can claim in return. Gribble, Alcibiades, 103, believes that as long as there is no narration of the facts of
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the case but only an attempt to defend the public and private life of the accused, this speech (like the speeches Lys. 14, 18, and Isocr. 16, 20) owes its present form to the review it underwent in order to be published. In my opinion, the first two views are correct. The assumption that this part of the speech was the most interesting (Fisher) is correct, because if the speaker won the case, then the readers would really like to know how a man accused of bribery (see § 21), succeeded in convincing the jurors that he should be acquitted. This consequently means that the rhetorical value of the speech was such that there was no need to publish the legal part of it (Dover). We also have omission of the legal part of a speech in other published rhetorical speeches. Isocr. 18.19: Ὡς μὲν οὖν οὐκ αἴτιός εἰμι Καλλιμάχῳ τῆς τῶν χρημάτων δημεύσεως, ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδεῖχθαί μοι νομίζω. Cf. also Lys. 27.1, 28.1. With regard to the last view (Gribble), it is true that the published version of a speech could be significantly different from the speech delivered on the day of the trial due to the interaction with the audience (see Lavency, Aspects, 183 – 194, Dover, LCL, 168 – 170, Todd, “Use and Abuse”, 159 – 178, I.Worthington, ‘Greek Oratory, Revision of Speeches and the Problem of Historical Reliability’ C & M 42 (1991), 55 – 74), but Gribble does not present any arguments to substantiate his position. On the contrary, this analysis will attempt to show that a strategic organization of the arguments and the rhetorical techniques combined with a masterly display of ethos might be sufficient for someone to win even a difficult case. Addressing the jurors at this point is justified, since the recapitulation of the speaker is starting and by addressing them he wants to signal the transition to the next stage of the procedure. Besides, the use of direct forms of address, although it might interrupt the natural flow of the text, makes it more typical of practical rhetoric, according to Hermogenes (On Types of Style 1.6). The address to the jurors as ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί is also encountered in §§ 13, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25. In my opinion, on all these occasions Lysias also interrupts the natural flow of the text and highlights some specific points in the speech which are more important than others for the speakers’ acquittal (see the relevant comm.). ἀκοῦσαι δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὑμᾶς ἀξιῶ, ἵν’ ἐπίστησθε περὶ οἴου τινός ὄντος ἐμοῦ ψηφιεῖσθε: The speaker tells the jurors that he will refer to issues irrelevant to the legal part of the case. With the phrase περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, as will become clear later, he means the liturgies (§§ 1– 5) and trierarchies (§§ 6 – 10) he assumed. The claim of the speaker that the jurors should reach a verdict after taking into consideration his ethos was a necessary rhetorical tactic, since the ἦθος τοῦ λέγοντος, one of the three types of ἐντέχνων πίστεων, according to Aristotle, created some credibility by presenting a character and personality acceptable to
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the jurors (cf. Arist. Rhet.1356a4– 6, 1366a9 – 11: ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον αἱ πίστεις γίγνονται δι’ ἀποδεικτικοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι’ ἠθικοῦ (τῷ γὰρ ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα πιστεύομεν, τοῦτο δ’ εστὶν ἀν ἀγαθὸς), see Seager, “Alcibiades”, 9, Dover, GPM, 294, Hunter, Policing Athens, 101, A.Scafuro, The Forensic Stage: Settling Disputes in Graeco-Roman New Comedy, Cambridge 1997, 57– 66). At the same time, the projection of the ethos of a litigant was permitted by the legal system of Athens so that he could refute the accusations against him (see P.J.Rhodes ‘Keeping to the Point’ in The Law and the Courts in Ancient Greece, E.M.Harris and L.Rubinstein (eds.), London 2004, 137– 58 and particularly 138 – 42 about Lysias’ speeches). Therefore, references to the ethos are common in forensic texts (cf. e. g. Andoc.1.124, Lys. 14.23, Isaeus 2.27, Isocr. 17.35, Dem. 18.6, 22.8, 24.155, 35.32, 58.30, Aesch. 3.79). The emphasis put on the moral qualities of the speaker becomes clear with the use of the pronoun οἴου, which is also used by other litigants (cf. eg. Lys. 18.1, Dem. 20.23, Isocr. 16.15, 20.22). During the delivery of his speech the speaker will repeatedly draw the attention of the jurors to his reliability as a citizen. See comm. § 16 τοιοῦτον … παρέχω. For the idea that the jurors should give a verdict after having formed an adequate opinion of the case, cf. Dem. 25.3. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐδοκιμάσθην μὲν ἐπὶ Θεοπόμπου ἄρχοντος, καταστὰς δὲ χορηγὸς τραγῳδοῖς ἀνήλωσα τριάκοντα μνᾶς: At the age of 18 an Athenian male could obtain full rights and obligations, if he managed to pass the δοκιμασία. The speaker, after completing his eighteenth year, became a member of his demos with the consent of his fellow citizens (cf. M.Golden, ‘Demosthenes and the Age of Majority at Athens’ Phoenix 33 (1979), 25 – 38, Rhodes, CAP, 497– 98) and then he passed the last δοκιμασία in the Council of the Five Hundred to become officially a citizen (cf. Harrison, The Law of Athens, vol. 1, Oxford 1968, 79 n.1, Rhodes, CAP, 493 – 502, Whitehead, Demes, 97– 104). In the 4th and probably the 5th century B.C. (see P.Siewert, ‘The Ephebic Oath in Fifth-Century Athens’ JHS 97 (1977), 102– 11, but cf. Α.Γκάρτζιου-Τάττη, ‘Αρχαία Ελλάδα, Ο τόπος και οι άνθρωποι’ in Γλώσσα και Λογοτεχνία στη Δευτεροβάθμια Εκπαίδευση (Ι.Ν.Περυσινάκης-Α.Τσαγγαλίδης (eds.), Ιωάννινα 2004, 489), immediately after a successful examination in the δοκιμασία, every young Athenian male, armed with a shield and a spear, swore the ephebic oath at the temple of the goddess Athena Agraulos. The oath included the young man’s commitment that he would fight for the benefit of the city, show obedience to the officials, faith in the laws and respect for the ancestral gods (see Plescia, Oath and Perjury, 16 – 17). On the basis of the military, political and religious significance of the oath he had given for the city, the speaker will mention the liturgies he assumed for many religious celebrations (see comm. §§ 1– 5), he will emphasise his military bravery (see
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comm. §§ 3, 6 – 11), and he will attempt to weaken the accusations (see comm. § 21) by blaming his adversaries of impiety (see comm. § 20). All the aforementioned facts took place during the archonship of Theopompus, that is 411/10 B.C. From this reference, we can calculate that the speaker was born in 429 – 28 B.C. and therefore he was aged 26 (Lamb, Lysias, 474– 75). Whereas the normal age of marriage for an Athenian man was about twentyfive to thirty (cf. Xen. Oec.1.1 with Pomeroy, Oeconomicus, 216 – 17, Davies, APF, 336, n. 8802 and 8823, J. Roy, ‘Polis and Oikos in Classical Athens’ G & R 46 (1999), 6), if we take § 24 literally, the speaker must have been married by the age of twenty-two, but if Wilson’s view that the speaker’s arrhephoria in § 5 was for his own daughter as arrhephoros (see Khoregia, 42– 43 with 327 n.173, cf. comm. § 24 οὐδ’ ἐμνήσθην … ἐμαυτοῦ), he must have been married by the age of eighteen or nineteen. This had probably happened out of respect for his father (cf. Dem. 40.12). Moreover, the assumption of a choregy at this early age might mean that the speaker’s father had died and that he inherited his fortune or that his father kept a part of his property and bequeathed the rest to the speaker (cf. Strauss, Fathers and Sons, 67– 70). καταστὰς δὲ χορηγὸς τραγῳδοῖς ἀνήλωσα τριάκοντα μνᾶς: The first liturgy undertaken by the speaker was to produce a tragic trilogy. It would be interesting to know with certainty how the speaker assumed a choregy in his early adulthood, i. e. if he voluntarily presented himself, if his peers recommended him or if he was appointed by the eponymous archon among the three hundred men who became choregi (cf. Wilson, Khoregia, 53 – 54). Taking into consideration his love of victories (cf. comm. for νικήσας below), his generosity (cf. comm. § 5 εἰ ἐβουλόμην … ἀνήλωσα), and his will to serve his city (cf. §§ 11– 12 ἑκόντος ἐμοῦ … λαμβάνειν, § 13 τῶν ἐθελόντων λῃτουργεῖν, § 16 λῃτουργῶν ἥδομαι), it would be justified in believing that the assumption of this choregy was a matter of choice (cf. Dem. 21.23). Assuming a choregy at the age of eighteen was known in Athens. A similar case is that of Pericles, who at the age of twenty became a choregus for the Persians of Aeschylus (see Davies, APF, no. 457). The early commitment of the two men to produce tragic drama is a strong indication that the young aristocrats through this initiative were immediately gaining prestige and status in the eyes of the Athenians and foreign visitors attending the festival (see Wilson, Khoregia, 174– 75). The undertaking, however, from then on of mainly dithyrambic dances makes me suspect that the speaker was not particularly thrilled at the idea of producing a tragic trilogy once more because of its high cost. Whatever the truth is, with this specific reference the speaker aims to inform the jurors of his eagerness to contribute to the community as a whole. But in-
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stead of differentiating himself from his opponents from the very beginning, as e. g. Demosthenes (18.257, 21.155), the speaker reserves such comparison for purely tactical reasons for a later stage of the defence, when he is going to refer to his opponents, who deliberately refrain from undertaking liturgies (see comm. § 12). This amount of thirty minai is excessive, since even the cheapest liturgy of Lysias 21 cost nearly as much as a contemporary skilled workman was paid in a year, i. e. 3 minai a year (Davies, APF, xxii). Although the concept of the annual salary was not quite known, considering the circumstances of that period (as Wilson remarks, “Tragic Prestige”, 91 n. 36, commenting on Davies’ previous view), the Athenians were aware of how much money they earned as jurors or soldiers each time they were paid (see comm. § 13 ὁρᾶτε … ὡς ὁλίγα ἐστί). Therefore, one is justified in believing that the jurors did some calculations comparing the amount indicated by the speaker to their own income. This would make some of them feel impressed and some others feel envy (see comm. § 15 καὶ πένητα … φθονῆσαι). καὶ τρίτῳ μηνὶ Θαργηλίοις νικήσας ἀνδρικῷ χορῷ δισχιλίας δραχμάς: On the seventh day of the month Thargelion (mid May-mid June) the Athenians honoured Apollo mainly by performing five cyclic dances of five teams of men and five teams of children respectively elected by the phylae but with the difference that every dance and every choregus represented two phylae. Circular dances were the only competitive event of the celebration with the participation of the choregi. About the celebration see further Parke, Festivals, 148, Simon, Festivals, 76 – 79, Wilson, Khoregia, 32 – 33,77, P.Wilson, ‘Performance in the Pythion: The Athenian Thargelia’ in The Greek Theatre and Festivals, P.Wilson (ed.), Oxford 2007, 150 – 82. The choregi had to select the appropriate people from distant areas and convince them to join the chorus (see Pickard-Cambridge, Festivals, 76, Wilson, Khoregia, 75 – 76). Since the speaker won, it is reasonable to believe that his victory was due to the successful selection of the dancers (cf. Antiph. 6.11). The dances of the men consisted of people aged between eighteen or twenty to forty-five (see Wilson, Khoregia, 75), which means that the speaker was able to convince people much older than himself to compete in his chorus. His eagerness to be a choregus is evidenced by the fact that just two months after the successful choregy of a tragic drama he once again assumed a liturgy in this specific celebration. His action psychologically prepares the jurors to accept his claim that he belongs to that group of citizens who really wish to assume liturgies (see § 13). At this point, it is the first time the speaker notifies the jurors that he achieved his first victory. This information is particularly important, because the
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speaker will state that he won five times as a choregus. The registration of these victories, combined with the information given by Plutarch that the general Nicias had also won many of the liturgies he had undertaken (Nic.3.3 – 4), is the best evidence of the competition existing among the wealthy citizens over who the winner was going to be and refutes the argument that there was no competition because of the ἀντίδοσις (see E.Cohen, Athenian Economy and Society: A Banking Perspective, Princeton 1992, 198 – 99). All festivals in Athens were of a competitive nature and were encouraged by the state (see Osborne, “Competitive festivals”, 28 – 37,21– 25). Moreover, the gods were delighted to see the competition among the phylae (see Burkert, Religion, 103), while competitive supremacy was considered the most appropriate way to show respect to them (Cartledge, “Greek religious festivals”, 101). On the other hand, the speaker had every reason to be proud of the result. Winning a victory was a laborious process, since money was not the only factor for success, but it also required time and effort. The evidence for this is that the public liturgists selected the members of their teams not only among those who had previously competed in such events but they also chose talented young people whom they identified by asking acquaintances, friends and fellow-citizens (see N.Fisher, ‘Gymnasia and democratic values of leisure’ in Cartledge-Millettv.Reden, Kosmos, 93, Wilson, Khoregia, 133). Moreover, φιλοτιμία was not only something natural in the eyes of everyone (see Arist. Rhet.1370b32– 71a10, cf. Nic.Eth.1124b9 – 15), but it was absolutely justified because of the speaker’s young age (cf. Arist. Rhet.1389a12 – 13). The jurors might have appreciated his φιλοτιμία (cf. Xen. Mem.3.4.3), comparing him with other people who came last in competitions (cf. Isaeus 5.36), after having taken into account that a characteristic of democracy was the spirit of competition (cf. Dem. 20.108 with Sandys, Demosthenes, 86) and the receiving of honours (see Cohen, Violence, 75). This passage strengthens Lateiner’s view, “Lysias”, 154, that the Athenian courts were composed of ordinary people who were impressed by the simple construction of a speech and the pride displayed by a litigant. ἐπὶ δὲ Γλαυκίππου ἄρχοντος εἰς πυρριχιστὰς Παναθηναίοις τοῖς μεγάλοις ὀκτακοσίας: Here the speaker refers to the Great Panathenaea, a glorious celebration which took place every four years and was attended by visitors from every part of Greece. The Great Panathenaea were held over several days towards the end of the month Hecatombaeon (mid July-mid August), while the whole festival was taking place in the northwest district of Athens. The speaker here refers to one of the two main events, the pyrrhic dances, where naked dancers were jumping and moving in a circle, holding shields and spears (see Parke, Festivals,
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36, Simon, Festivals, 55 – 72, Robertson, “Athena’s Shrines”, 56 – 57,63, Wilson, Khoregia, 37– 38, Parker, Polytheism, 256 – 58). Pyrrhic dances were military dances accompanied by the music of the aulus (see Wilson, Khoregia, 37). At the Great Panathenaea, dancing with arms, ἀνθιππασία, the torch races, triremeraces and competing at εὐάνδρια were all events of the phylae (see Osborne, “Competitive festivals”, 30 – 31). The Great Panathenaea of the year 410 B.C. cost more than six talents (see Parker, Religion, 129 n.25); thus the amount of eight hundred drachmas spent by the speaker for the festival was quite big. § 2. ἔτι δ’ ἀνδράσι χορηγῶν εἰς Διονύσια ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄρχοντος ἐνίκησα, καὶ άνήλωσα σὺν τῇ τοῦ τρίποδος ἀναθέσει πεντακισχιλίας δραχμάς: Part of the celebration of the City Dionysia, which was celebrated in Athens from the ninth to the thirteenth day of the month Elaphebolion (mid-March to midApril), was the dithyrambic poetry contest of men and young boys. The city appointed three choregi for the dithyrambic dances of the young boys and an equal number of choregi for the men’s dithyrambic dances (see Parke, Festivals, 129, 132, Wilson, Khoregia, 22, 77). The speaker became a choregus for the dance in the archonship of Glaucippus once again (410/09 B.C.), nine months after his last choregy. It is noteworthy that the speaker had been a choregus twice in one year, which means that he repeated what he had done in the archonship of Theopompus (410/09 B.C.), and even won a second victory. The fact that his dance won in the Dionysia means that the speaker took care to select the best dancers (cf. Xen. Mem.3.4.5: Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐάν … τοὺς κρατίστους … ἐν τοῖς χορικοῖς, ἐξευρίσκῃ τε καὶ προαιρῆται, εἰκότως ἂν καὶ τούτου νικηφόρος εἴη). For his victory, Lysias’ client dedicated a tripod, which was the prize for the winner of a dithyrambic dance and was awarded to the choregus. The choregi, in turn, dedicated their tripods as conspicuous monuments in the city (see PickardCambridge, Festivals, 77– 78, Osborne, “Competitive festivals”, 32, Wilson, Khoregia, 219 – 26). The speaker was not obliged to dedicate the tripod, but because competitions such as the Dionysia and the Thargelia were held among the phylae, it was to the benefit of the latter to promote their victories as much as possible (see Podlecki, “Choral Victories”, 96 – 97), and the speaker consequently dedicated the tripod to project the victory of his phyle. From a personal point of view, the speaker projected his success (cf. Dem.52.22), since this success functioned as a μνημεῖον of his ἀρετή (cf. Isaeus 5.41 with Wyse, Isaeus, 466 – 67) and φιλοτιμία (cf. Isaeus 7.40, Plat. Gorg.472a with E.R.Dodds, Plato: Gorgias, Oxford 1959, 244– 45). In order to demonstrate to the jurors the extent to which this collective victory was identified in his own mind with individual success, the speaker chooses
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to mention the final amount of five thousand drachmas he spent for the choregy and the tripod. καὶ ἐπὶ Διοκλέους Παναθηναίοις τοῖς μικροῖς κυκλίῳ χορῷ τριακοσίας: Diocles was archon in 409/8 B.C. Unlike the Great Panathenaea celebrated every four years, the Little Panathenaea was celebrated every year. The main features of the Great Panathenaea celebration, the procession and the games, were held in the Little Panathenaea too (see Davies, “Liturgies”, 37, Burkert, Religion, 232, Parker, Polytheism, 268). The competition of cyclic dithyrambic dances for men and young boys, consisting of fifty people each dancing around a circular altar was part of the games. Each phyle, assisted by the eponymous archon and the supervisors, appointed the choregi (see Pickard-Cambridge, Festivals, 75, T.B.L.Webster, The Greek Chorus, London 1970, 68,91) The speaker was among those elected and decided to spend three hundred drachmas to produce this beautiful spectacle (cf. Xen. Oec.8.20). If we compare this sum to the eight hundred drachmas he had spent on the pyrrhic dances of the Great Panathenaea, (§ 2), and the seven hundred drachmas spent on the pyrrhic dances of the Little Panathenaea, (§ 4), it is reasonable to assume that the dance competition of the celebration was considered less important than the military and athletic pyrrhic dances (Wilson, Khoregia, 37). What is certain, however, is that the jurors would be impressed by this reference, because once again the speaker spent more money than he actually had to (cf. § 5). § 3. τὸν δὲ μεταξὺ χρόνον ἐτριηράρχουν ἑπτὰ ἔτη, καὶ ἕξ τάλαντα ἀνήλωσα: Assuming choregies together with trierarchies for seven consecutive years (411/10 – 405/4 B.C.) was the speaker’s personal choice, because those serving as choregi were exempted from the obligation to become trierarchs (see Wilson, Khoregia, 59). It is the first time the speaker implies his voluntary offer (cf. comm. §§ 5, 13). A trierarchy included command of a trireme and bearing the expenses of maintenance and equipment of the ship (see Amit, Athens and the Sea, 103 – 15, Jordan, Athenian Navy, 61– 93). The claim of the speaker that he had been a trierarch for seven years is very likely to have impressed the jurors. See Introduction, The defensive srategy of the speech, 52– 53. Although in §§ 1– 5 Lysias’ client tells the jurors in every detail which choregies he assumed, at this point he does not mention anything specific about the missions in which he participated. The one and only reference is that to Aegospotami (see §§ 9 – 10). Moreover, he does not mention anything about the cost of each trierarchy. Instead, he chooses to refer to the total amount of six talents, which was undoubtedly excessive (see Gabrielsen, Athenian Fleet, 125) to make an even greater impression on them. He will make use of the same tactic a little
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later on, while referring to the cost of liturgies undertaken, without specifying what was the actual amount required for each one separately: καὶ τούτων ὧν κατέλεξα, εἰ ἐβουλόμην κατὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα ἐν τῷ λῃτουργεῖν, οὐδ’ ἂν τὸ τέταρτον μέρος ἀνήλωσα (§ 5). From this passage it becomes clear that the speaker assumed trierarchies, as well as other liturgies (see § 1), from the moment he reached the age of adulthood. One might expect here the speaker to state clearly, as he did with the choregies, that immediately after his δοκιμασία he assumed the duties of a trierarch (cf. Dem. 21.154– 55). However, this is a matter of the structure of the speech, since the speaker will separately refer to his military ethos later (see §§ 6 – 10). καὶ τοσαύτας δαπάνας δαπανώμενος: The speaker encompasses in one sentence all the liturgies mentioned before in §§ 1– 2. The use of the pronoun τοσαύτας and the cognate object of the participle δαπανώμενος with which the alliteration of the letter δ is created, is probably intended to emphasize the size of the amounts allocated (cf. comm. § 11 Καὶ οὕτω πολλοὺς κινδύνους … τὴν πόλιν). καὶ καθ’ ἡμέραν ὐπὲρ ὑμῶν κινδυνεύων καὶ ἀποδημῶν: Other litigants use almost the same argument (cf. Lys. 3.47, 10.27, 11.9, Dem. 37.54, 50.59, 58.67). Despite Pericles’ claim that it was the way of life in Athens that made people want to put their lives at risk for the benefit of their city (Thuc. 2.39.4), the Athenian litigants did not hesitate, because of the constant military conflicts, to remind the jurors of their choice to fight. This tactic was very effective, because their participation in the hazards of the city was not obvious, as is evidenced by the frequent accusations against citizens who proved reluctant to defend their city (cf. Lys. 3.45, 6.40,46 – 47,59, 31.31, Lyc. 1.14,17,18 – 19,21,25,45 with Balogh’s analysis, Political Refugees, 37). For this reason, the speaker hastens, from the very beginning of his speech, to make his military ethos known to the jurors. He attempts this by using the same argument as Hyperides in his funeral oration for the dead of the Lamian war, i. e. he highlights the daily risks he ran: ὑπὲρ ὧν ἁπάντων οὖτοι … τοῖς καθ’ ἡμέραν κινδύνοις τοὺ εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον φόβους τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων παραιρούμενοι τὸ ζῆν ἀνήλωσαν εἰς τὸ τοὺς ἄλλους καλῶς ζῆν (6.26). The use of phrases from the funeral orations will be repeated on a larger scale towards the end of the speech (cf. comm. § 24). This argument can also be seen as evidence of faith in the supremacy of the democratic regime in Athens when compared to the assertion of Demosthenes that the Athenians could defeat king Philip of Macedon because his subjects did not wish to fight
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for him every day: οἱ δ’ ουδὲν δέονται, καταλείποντες …. φθείρεσθαι καὶ καθ’ἑκάστην ἡμέραν κινδυνεύειν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ (11.9-cf. also Seager, “Elitism”, 23). By using the participle ἀποδημῶν the speaker reminds the jurors of one of the characteristics the Corinthians attributed to the Athenians at the beginning of the war, which was in fact their readiness to leave home to serve the interests of their city (cf. Thuc. 1.70.4: ἀποδημηταί with Gomme, HCT, v. 1, 233). On the importance of this argument, see Introduction, The defensive strategy of the speech, 43. Although the speaker emphasizes the lengthy duration of these dangers, he will not give any substantial information regarding the places he fought in (cf. Lys. 18.7: πολλαχοῦ μὲν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν κεκινδυνευκόσι) except for Aegospotami. This is obviously because in his mind what he did in the Hellespont is μέγιστον τεκμήριον of his military ethos (see further comm. §§ 9 – 10). ὅμως είσφορὰς τὴν μὲν τριάκοντα μνᾶς τὴν δὲ τετρακισχιλίας δραχμὰς εἰσενήνοχα: In the classical period, Athens had to resort to levying an extraordinary direct tax, called εἰσφορά, in cases of emergency-especially during wars when unavoidable expenses could not be met by the ordinary resources of the state (on eisphora in the fifth and fourth centuries see P.Brun, Eisphora – Syntaxis – Stratiotika, Paris 1983). Dover, “Antiphon”, 59, on the basis of this testimony claims that in the period 411– 404 B.C. there were only two eisphorai in Athens, because the speaker is particularly careful to specify his financial obligations to the state. This view is probably correct; otherwise it is hard to believe that a rich citizen, like him, who spent money lavishly on his obligations to the city, would not give money for other unexpected financial contributions once the city needed them (cf. Dem. 20.18). We should also take into consideration that one of Isaeus’ clients implies that the precise calculation of the contributions and money paid is a proof that someone is telling the truth (fr. 2.2– 3, (Forster)). The testimony is particularly important in our case, since it confirms that there were only two contributions levied during that period. Consequently, Ostwald’s argument, Sovereignty, 344, that the levies of eisphorai were frequent, though correct, cannot rely on this passage, which is cited as a proof. Besides, this reference serves the rhetorical strategy of the speaker (see comm. § 5 καὶ τούτων ὦν κατέλεξα), therefore it is hard to believe that he would not mention any other eisphorai, if there had been any. The payment of eisphorai, however, was not an easy thing to do even for the very wealthy Athenians (cf. Xen. Oec.2.6) whereas the expectation that they would pay the large sums levied was not always met (see Jones, AD, 56 – 57). If we assume that the speaker paid his eisphorai at the same time he assumed the liturgies, while taking over the liturgy before leaving, as other litigants did
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(cf. Dem. 50.5 with Millett, Lending and Borrowing, 69), we realise that settling this debt was not a typical procedure. For this reason, the speaker uses ὅμως to show the jurors his ability to draw on liquid finances. This reference is part of his plan so that the jurors realise his generosity a while later (see comm. § 5). By doing so, he also paves the way for his later argument ταύτην ἡγεῖσθαι πρόσοδον βεβαιοτάτην τῇ πόλει, τὰς οὐσίας τῶν ἐθελόντων (§ 13), given that the amounts of eisphorai paid were calculated according to the property of which he had declared himself to be in possession (cf. Ste. Croix, “Demosthenes’ τίμημα”, 33 – 35). At this point it is clear that the speaker attempts to win the favour of the jurors, since they knew that his declaration of his property was a voluntary action (see Gabrielsen, “ΟΥΣΙΑ”, 99 – 100). ἐπειδὴ δὲ κατέπλευσα ἐπὶ ᾿Aλεξίου ἄρχοντος: Although the speaker previously referred to his seven year service as a trierarch (§ 3), he gave no information about when he left. At this point, however, he chooses to refer to his return to Athens. In this passage, the speaker gives the impression that throughout those years he did not return to Athens at all. It is noteworthy that Lysias’ client states that he had returned to Athens in the archonship of Alexias (405/4 B.C.), i. e. under the democracy (cf. Rhodes, CAP, 436 – 37), while Eryximachus, one of the trierarchs that survived the battle of the Hellespont, also points out that he returned but without mentioning when (see Roberts, P.Ryl. 489, ll. 101– 04). Obviously, the different conditions in each of these trials led Lysias to choose different tactics regarding the reference to the name of the eponymous archon. The speaker, however, avoids any reference to the political situation in Athens at the time of his return to the city, so that the jurors do not associate his presence with current political developments. See further Introduction, The personality of the speaker, 17– 19. The same tactic is used by Lysias for another litigant, Mantitheus, who, instead of the name of the Thirty, uses the general term ἐκεῖνοι: οὔτε ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς ἦν εἰς τοιοῦτον καιρὸν ἀφιγμένους ἐπιθυμεῖν μετέχειν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων κινδύνων, οὔτ’ ἐκεῖνοι φαίνονται τοιαύτην γνώμην ἔχοντες (16.4– 5). On the other hand, the prosecutors are seeking to connect the return of the defendants with adverse political developments in Athens. Cf. Lys. 6.27, who states about Andocides: κατέπλευσεν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πόλιν ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων. εὐθὺς ἐγυμνασιάρχουν εἰς Προμήθεια καὶ ἐνίκων ἀναλώσας δώδεκα μνᾶς: The speaker refers to assuming one more liturgy, that of the Promethea, where torch races were held among groups of runners (see Parke, Festivals, 171, Simon, Festivals, 53, Kyle, Athletics, 191– 93). The torch races were probably part of the annual Panathenaea and were the responsibility of the phylae. The gymnasiarchs paid for the selection and training of their team, for the trainer,
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the torches and other expenses (see Davies, “Liturgies”, 36, Wilson, Khoregia, 35 – 36). The speaker emphasizes the fact that he assumed the liturgy in question as soon as he returned to Athens (εὐθύς), but he does not specify, as he previously did, how much time had elapsed (cf. § 1 τρίτῳ μηνὶ Θαργηλίοις νικήσας ἀνδρικῷ χορῷ). Nevertheless, if we take into account that in a previous point through the more general phrase ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄρχοντος the speaker meant that the period between one liturgy and the other was exactly nine months (see comm. § 2 ἔτι δ’ἀνδράσι … δραχμὰς), the time he refers to by the adverb ‘immediatety’ must be shorter than nine months, that is it was held in 405/4 B.C. under the democracy (cf. previous comm.). With this indication of immediate alternation in tasks, the victory and the amount spent, the speaker attempts to demonstrate to the jurors his readiness and willingness to serve the city (cf. § 13 ταύτην ἡγεῖσθαι βεβαιοτάτην τῇ πόλει, τὰς οὐσίας τῶν ἐθελόντων λῃτουργεῖν, § 16 ἰδίᾳ μὲν ζῶν φείδομαι, δημοσίᾳ δὲ λῃτουργῶν ἥδομαι). If we bear in mind that the city entrusted to the choregi the participation of youth in this festival, which was part of their military training (see Wilson, Khoregia, 36) and that the former were responsible for the protection of the morals of the latter, whom they had under their supervision (cf. [Plat.] Eryx.399a), we can be certain that the Athenians considered the speaker a very reliable person. The jurors would have taken notice of this fact, if we also take into consideration that when he undertook the liturgy he was young too, just twenty-four years old. § 4. καὶ ὕστερον κατέστην χορηγὸς παιδικῷ χορῷ καὶ ἀνήλωσα πλέον ἢ πεντεκαίδεκα μνᾶς: The fact that the speaker does not mention the name of the eponymous archon raises questions about when he assumed the choregy and who the archon was. Aristotle leads us to say with certainty that the speaker assumed the choregy in the year 404/3 B.C. in the archonship of Pythodorus, since he uses the same expression as the speaker, wanting to record the year the Athenians were defeated at Aegospotami. To be more precise he then uses the name of archon Alexias: τῷ γὰρ ὕστερον ἔτει, ἐπ’ ᾿Aλεξίου ἄρχοντος, ἠτύχησαν τὴν ἐν Αιγὸς ποταμοῖς ναυμαχίαν ([Arist.] Ath.Pol.34.2). Given that the previous year is that of the archon Callias ([Arist.] Ath.Pol.34.1, see Rhodes, CAP, 422), it is likely that by ὕστερον the speaker refers to exactly the following year and not to a longer or shorter period of time. In this passage the speaker chooses to refer to the fact that he had only undertaken a chorus of children, but he omits to link this liturgy to the regime of the Thirty. Having in mind that children’s choruses were held during the Panathenaea, we could presume that the speaker refers to the annual Panathenaea
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held in the month Hecatombaeon in 404/03 B.C., perhaps just before the time the Thirty came into power (see Hignett, HAC, 378 – 83). Wilson, Khoregia, 344 n.189, believes that possible festivals for this choregy are the Dionysia and the Thargelia of 404 B.C. or the Panathenea, the Dionysia and the Thargelia of 403 B.C. He also considers as possible festivals the Hephestia and the Promethea of those years. However, we have no reason to associate Athens’ festivals very specifically with the democracy (see P.J.Rhodes, ‘Nothing to Do with Democracy: Athenian Drama and the Polis’ JHS 123 (2003), 104 – 19) and since no text alleges otherwise it is likely that the Thirty continued to celebrate Athens’ festivals. On the other hand, it was probably the Thirty who had appointed Pythodorus as the eponymous archon (see Rhodes, CAP, 437), and, because of the violent way they governed, that particular year was named by the Athenians ἀναρχία (see Xen. Hell.2.3.1, Diod. 14.3.1). For this reason, the speaker having in mind how sensitive his fellow citizens were about the regime, does not mention the name of the eponymous archon at all and, taking advantage of the fact that the Athenians did not retain a clear memory of the latter’s name but it was only recorded in the official archives (see Gomme, HCT, v. 1, 3 n.1), he avoids specifying exactly when he performed this choregy. Andocides uses the same tactic: Ὑμεῖς οὖν καὶ αὐτοί ὕστερον … ἠξιώσατε γὰρ τους φεύγοντας καταδέξασθαι καὶ τοὺς ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους ποιῆσαι (1.109). In this way the speaker manages to remove from the minds of the jurors the suspicion that he had been a supporter of the Thirty (see also Todd, Lysias, 231 n.10 and Todd, Lysias 1 – 11, 520 n.15). If some jurors ever had such a thought, then all the elements of the speech which prove the generosity of the speaker would lose their force, since the Athenians believed that the supporters of the regime would have to endure the contempt of their fellow citizens and not their gratitude, despite any generous offer of theirs to the city (cf. Lys. 26.4, see Wolpert, Remembering Defeat, 131). This attitude confirms the view that, at that particular period, all the Athenians really wanted to forget what had happened when the Thirty were in power (see Wolpert, Remembering Defeat, 120, J.Dillery, Xenophon and the History of his Times, London and New York 1995, 140 – 41). Nevertheless, if the trial had taken place a few years later, the speaker would not have had a problem with naming Pythodorus, since one of Lysias’ clients did not hesitate to do so: ἐπειδὴ δ’ ἐγὼ παρέλαβον τὸ χωρίον, πρὶν ἡμέρας πέντε γενέσθαι, ἀπεμίσθωσα Καλλιστράτῳ, ἐπὶ Πυθοδώρου ἄρχοντος (7.9-cf. Todd, Lysias 1 – 11, 520). By this tactic the speaker finally succeeds in creating an even stronger argument for his defence, as the jurors retain the memory of the simple fact that the speaker had assumed one more liturgy, while exempting him from any association with the Thirty.
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ἐπὶ δὲ Εὐκλείδου ἄρχοντος κωμῳδοῖς χορηγῶν Κηφισοδώρῳ ἐνίκων, καὶ ἀνήλωσα σὺν τῇ τῆς σκευῆς ἀναθέσει ἑκκαίδεκα μνᾶς: At this point the speaker reverts to his previous tactic of mentioning the name of the eponymous archon and then the festival in which he was a choregus. The reference to the name of Eucleides does not pose any problem to the speaker, since either the restoration of democracy occurred during his term of office, that is in 403 B.C. (see further Loening, Reconciliation, 21– 22) or he was not appointed until the democracy was restored (see Rhodes, CAP, 462– 63). By referring to his assuming a liturgy, the speaker obviously wants to indicate to the jurors his practical desire to restore the city to its former situation, since the celebrations confirmed the existence of the democracy (see Introduction, The identity of the speaker, 24). He does not state, however, why he suddenly refrained from assuming liturgies in this particular period, as Jebb observes (Attic Orators, 219 – 20). This might have happened because of his commitment to the office undertaken for which he was on trial. The choregy of comic drama is the first and only one undertaken by the speaker. It is noteworthy that the speaker was doing something rather unusual at the festival, that is he dedicated the equipment of the performance in order to commemorate his victory (Podlecki, “Choral Victories”, 97). It is equally likely, however, that the speaker does not refer to the costumes and masks used in the comic drama in particular but to some marble, bronze or wooden masks devoted, so that the drama victory remains indelible in the memory of the people (see Wilson, Khoregia, 238 – 40). He does not distinguish between the amounts spent on the comic drama and the commissioning of the equipment but he returns to the same tactic applied earlier in the speech, which is to indicate the total amount spent on the Dionysia and the tripod (§ 2). The objective is again to generate positive impressions. καὶ Παναθηναίοις τοῖς μικροῖς ἐχορήγουν πυρριχισταῖς ἀγενείοις, καὶ άνήλωσα ἑπτά μνᾶς: For the second time in his career, the speaker assumes a choregy in the Little Panathenaea (see § 2), but this time he produced a chorus of beardless pyrrhic dancers. He had also assumed a choregy for adult pyrrhic dancers for the third time in the series during his career in the archonship of Glaucippus in the Great Panathenaea (see § 1). The amount of seven mnai is inferior to that spent on the pyrrhic dancers of the Great Panathenaea, but the jurors might not have paid so much attention to the fact. On the contrary, some might have noticed that this is the second liturgy in the same year, i. e. the speaker repeated what he had done in the beginning of his career (see § 1). The most important thing, however, is that the seven minai
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amounted to the wages of two skilled workers for a full year (cf. comm. § 1 καταστὰς δὲ χορηγὸς … τριάκοντα μνᾶς). The jurors must have been impressed again. § 5. νενίκηκα δὲ τριήρει μὲν ἁμιλλώμενος ἐπὶ Σουνίῳ, άναλώσας πεντεκαίδεκα μνᾶς: The ἅμιλλα νεῶν was a competition among phylae (see Davies, “Liturgies”, 36) and took place during the Panathenaea (see J.Neils et al., Goddess and Polis: The Panathenaic festival in Ancient Athens, Princeton 1992, 97,207). Such competitions were frequent in Athens and were a means of training crews (see Morrison-Williams, GOS, 308). The liturgists who took part in this competition were probably regular trierarchs aiming to gain fame and recognition, which were obtained by choregies at the time (see Wilson, Khoregia, 48 – 49). The speaker, thanks to the many victories already achieved in the celebrations of the city, certainly did not need to gain more recognition but he still spent fifteen hundred drachmas, which was more money than he had spent for the Panathenaea pyrrhic dances (see §§ 1, 4). His action demonstrates once again his love for distinction (cf. comm. § 11 νικήσας). χωρὶς δὲ ἀρχιθεωρίας καὶ ἐρρηφορίας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, εἰς ἃ ἐμοί δεδαπάνηται πλέον ἢ τριάκοντα μναῖ: At this point the speaker completes his reference to the liturgies he assumed and includes through this phrase some other liturgies which he does not consider appropriate to elaborate on. The son of Alcibiades follows almost the same tactic when, after giving details of his father’s activities and distinction in the Olympic Games (Isocr. 16.32– 33), he records with a similar phrase some of his father’s other activities without further analysis: Χωρὶς δὲ τούτων ἐν ταῖς θυσίαις καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ταῖς περὶ τὴν ἑορτὴν δαπάναις οὕτως ἀφειδῶς διέκειτο καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τὰ κοινὰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐλάττω τῶν ἰδίων τῶν ἐκείνου (Isocr. 16.34). The same tactic is also used in political contexts (cf. Dem. 18.24). Therefore, the view that the comprehensive statement of the speaker indicates the importance of these two liturgies for the city (see Wilson, Khoregia, 42) should be accepted with some reservations, otherwise the accusation of deceit of the ἀρχιθεωροί and offence of the ritual by Alcibiades would not make any sense (cf. [Andoc]. 4.29). Obviously, the amounts of money the speaker spent separately for each of these liturgies were not as large as all the previous ones, so he considered it useful to report the total amount for all three liturgies in order to impress the jurors once again. The use of the plural number for these liturgies means that the speaker had undertaken some of them at least twice. Perhaps this happened in the period between 409 B.C. and 405 B.C., when the speaker had not assumed the well known liturgies. On the other hand, we cannot exclude the possibility that what he says
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is a rhetorical exaggeration and that he refers to several of the liturgies of this type to impress the jurors even more. ἀρχιθεωρίας: The ἀρχιθεωρία was a liturgy requiring the ἀρχιθεωρός to lead a small delegation of citizens who would carry offerings to a festival outside of Attica, acting as the ambassadors of the city. In general, the most important destination for the Athenians was Delos (see Davies, “Liturgies”, 38, Parker, Religion, 150, Wilson, Khoregia, 44– 46), but equally important destinations at the time were the Olympia, the Isthmia, the Nemean and the Pythian Games (See Davies, “Liturgies”, 37, Jordan, Athenian Navy, 162 – 63, Parker, Polytheism, 79). From 411 until 402 B.C., i. e. in the time span of those nine years, the speaker could have been an ἀρχιθεωρός twice in the Olympia and four times in the Isthmia. He does not state, however, how many times he was ἀρχιθεωρός or to which of the places mentioned he was actually sent by the city. This is probably because he believed that the glory awarded to the city and every ἀρχιθεωρός by the assumption of this particular task was so large (cf. [Andoc]. 4.29), that there was no need to say anything more to win the favour of the jurors. Because ἀρχιθεωρία was a liturgy requiring special luxury (cf. Arist. Nic.Eth.1122a5) the speaker probably spent more money on ἀρχιθεωρία than arrhephoriae. However, it is certain that assuming ἀρχιθεωρίαι was considered a strong piece of evidence of someone’s piety (cf. Plut. Nic.3.5). The creation of such an impression at this point will allow the speaker to urge the jurors to pray, asking that other Athenians should spend their money to the benefit of the city like him (see comm. § 15 καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς εὔχεσθαι … ἀναλίσκωσιν). ἐρρηφορίας: This is was secret ceremony held on the night before the great procession of the Panathenaea and was performed by two or four girls of noble birth, named arrhephoroi, in honour of Athena Polias and Aphrodite. The girls carried on their heads some items, the nature of which they ignored, placing them at a specific spot after descending to an underground passage in the Acropolis and, on their way back, they carried something the content of which was unknown to them. The young Athenian maids completed their participation in the Arrhephoria by weaving the new peplos for the Panathenaea procession through a secret ritual. The Arrhephoria was one of the liturgies undertaken by wealthy citizens who paid for the white dresses of the girls, their gold jewellery and the sweets especially prepared for them. The Arrhephoria were held every year in the month Scirophorion (see further Parke, Festivals, 141– 43, Simon, Festivals, 39 – 46, Burkert, Religion, 143,228 – 29, J.N.Bremmer, Greek Religion, Greece & Rome, New Surveys in the Classics , No. 24, Oxford 1994, 16,69 – 71, Robertson, “Athena’s Shrines”, 60 – 62, E.Kadletz, ‘Pausanias 1.27.3 and the Route of the Arrhephoroi’’ AJA 86 (1982), 445 – 46, N.Robertson, ‘The Riddle of Arrhephoria at Athens’ HSCP 87 (1983), 241– 88, L.V.Sichelen, ‘Nouvelles orientations dans l’étude
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de l’Arrhéphorie Attique’ AC 56 (1987), 88 – 102, Garland, New Gods, 167– 68, Parker, Polytheism, 219 – 22). Judging from the frequent references to this ritual in forensic speeches, we realise the importance of the Arrhephoria for the Athenians (see Robertson, ‘The Riddle of Arrhephoria’, 242– 43). The assumption of this liturgy indicates the piety and the φιλοτιμία of the speaker (cf. V.Wohl, ‘εὐσεβείας ἕνεκα καὶ φιλοτιμίας: Hegemony and Democracy at the Panathenaia’ C & M 47 (1996), 66 – 70), a key issue for the speaker’s tactic of defence (cf. § 21). καὶ τούτων ὧν κατέλεξα: By using the pronoun τούτων the speaker refers to the amounts spent on liturgies. The total amount reaches 10.5 talents and it is very large, if one takes into consideration that the property Demosthenes had to inherit from his father through his commissioners was 14 talents (cf. Dem. 27.4). At this point, where the account is complete, we would expect the speaker to calculate the total amount spent on liturgies and eisphorai and report it to the jurors, a tactic widely used by other litigants (cf. Lys. 19.59, Dem. 27.9 – 11 with L.Pearson, Demosthenes: Six Private Speeches, Oklahoma 1972, 117). However, this is a conscious choice based on the fact that, as Lysias knew that the jurors were aware of the liturgies and financial requirements that accompanied them, he emphasizes the amounts and the circumstances under which they were spent in order to gradually win their attention, and finally their admiration (see introductory comm. §§ 1– 5). Given that the report on the offers is completed in five distinct paragraphs, namely the speaker dedicated 1/5 of this part of the speech to them, and that so much money spent on religious purposes has been recorded, it is difficult to believe that the jurors would remain unimpressed by his detailed enumeration (see Mikalson, Religion, 100 – 1, cf. Ober, Mass and Elite, 226), but would consider it of prime importance after all to accurately calculate the total amount spent. To understand how confident Lysias was about his choice and to show that he was not afraid that the jurors might believe that his client was rather loquacious, it would be sufficient to compare this passage with the words of another litigant, who says: καὶ πρὸς θεῶν, ἄνδρες δικασταί, δέομαι ὑμῶν, μή με ἡγήσησθε ἀδολεσχεῖν, ἐὰν διὰ μακροτέρων διηγοῦμαι τά τε ἀναλώματα καὶ τὰς πράξεις (Dem 50.2). The method of recording expenditure seems simple and prima facie justifies the view of Dionysius of Halicarnassus about Lysias: τάξει δὲ ἁπλῇ τινι κέχρηται τῶν πραγμάτων (Lys.15). However, while the invocation of liturgies by other defendants always operated as a supportive means (see Johnstone, Disputes, 94), here Lysias consciously begins this part of his speech with them (cf. Dem. 18.2 with Usher, Demosthenes, 170, 18.56, Aesch. 3.205) and clearly records the litur-
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gies and expenditure incurred by his client, taking advantage of what Aristotle recognizes as a weakness of the jurors, i. e. they are ordinary people and they are in general unable to follow a complex argument (see Rhet.1357a10 – 12 with J.C.Trevett, ‘Aristotle’s knowledge of Athenian Oratory’ CQ 46 (1996), 378). More precisely, the τάξις of the λόγος follows the τάξις of the βίος of the speaker (cf. Dem. 60.15 – 16). εἰ ἐβουλόμην κατὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα ἐν τῷ νόμῳ λῃτουργεῖν, οὐδ’ ἂν τὸ τέταρτον μέρος ἀνήλωσα: The specific claim of the speaker has divided modern research. Baldry (The Greek tragic theatre, London 1971, 32– 33) considers that the speaker is likely to exaggerate the amounts allegedly spent, but he believes that in times of financial stress it was possible for the state to ask for the payment of larger sums. Instead, Dover, “Antiphon”, 58 – 59, does not believe that the speaker is exaggerating, but that this is a case of emergency with the levying taxes on rich people. Todd, “Use and Abuse”, 169, believes that Lysias’ client spent much more money by his own choice than needed, but he also believes that this was an exceptional case and certainly not the rule concerning the expenditure imposed. Podlecki, “Choral Victories”, 95, remarks that from the 10.5 of the talents spent by the speaker in total approximately 2.5 talents were spent on choregies and believes that, although the speaker was not the only Athenian who assumed liturgies, he was certainly one of the very few people who spent so much money at a time of financial hardship for the city. In my opinion, Baldry is wrong. Other litigants also claimed to have spent more money than required (cf. Lys. 7.31, 25.13, Dem. 21.156) without detailing the amounts. In such cases, where no accurate evidence is given, it is then more reasonable to believe that the litigants might have lied rather than a man like the speaker who spent so much time in order to enumerate the amounts spent in full detail. Besides, the speaker will use his generous offer to defend himself and persuade the jurors that his conviction will be ὕβρις (see comm. § 12), that he will be better than the treasurers of the city (see comm. § 14), and mainly that the accusations against him are not justified (see comm. § 22). Having first of all the intention to refute the main accusations against him, the speaker found it necessary to emphasize the abundance of money spent to the benefit of the city, although he knew that the jurors would not approve and would feel quite irritated by such an initiative (cf. Lys. 19.56, Dem 21.153). This unusual expenditure is a τεκμήριον that the charge is unfounded. The same opinion but without adequate documentation is also expressed by Cartledge, “Greek religious festivals”, 125, who argues that the speaker explained that he had spent so much money in order to show that the accusation is incompatible with his previous offerings to the city.
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At this point the speaker projects μεγαλοπρέπειαν as his main characteristic: αἱ δὴ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαι καὶ πρέπουσαι …[ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς] πῶς κάλλιστον καὶ πρεπωδέστατον, σκέψαιτ’ ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσου καὶ πῶς ἐλαχίστου … ὅσα πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτίμητὰ ἐστιν, οἷον εἴ που χορηγεῖν οἴονται δεῖν λαμπρῶς ἢ τριηραρχεῖν … ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δαπανήμασιν ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια (Arist. Nic.Eth.1122b3 – 4,8 – 10,20 – 23,34). This is a key element in the strategy of the speech, since the speaker will further analyse his arguments on this basis (cf. comm. §§ 12– 14). This great financial offer would not leave the jurors unimpressed, on the grounds that the festivals of Athens functioned not only as symbols of the ‘national’ unity of the city (see A.Giovannini, ‘Symbols and rituals in classical Athens’ in City States in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy, A.Molho, J.Emlen and K.A.Raaflaub (eds.), Stuttgart 1991, 459 – 78) but also as agents of social cohesion (see S.Goldhill, ‘The Great Dionysia and civic ideology’ in Nothing to do with Dionysos, Athenian Drama in its Social Context, J.J.Winkler and F.Zeitlin (eds.), Princeton 1990, 97– 121). §§ 6 – 11. Trierarchies. Admittedly physical hazard was considered to be of higher importance than the financial sacrifices in favour of the city (see Dover, GPM, 162). Because of this the speaker, from this point onwards, will refer to his military activities during the Peloponnesian War so that the jurors have a more complete opinion of his ethos (cf. comm. § 1). Through his financial sacrifices and dedication on the battlefield, the speaker intends to convince the jurors of his patriotism (cf. Pritchett, War I, 27). § 6. τὸν δὲ χρόνον ὃν ἐτριηράρχουν, ἡ ναῦς ἄριστά μοι ἔπλει παντὸς τοῦ στρατοπέδου: At this point the speaker brings up an issue which he raised at the beginning of the part of the speech that is preserved, that is his military service. The argument that the ship was the best of the Athenian fleet is probably true (see Introduction, The identity of the speaker, 14– 15). The word στρατόπεδον is used for the army (cf. Lys. 31.26), but it can also be used for the navy (see LSJ s.v., Thuc. 8.48.2,72.1 with Amit, Athens and the sea, 44– 45, Hdt. 7.12.2 with W.W.How and J.Wells, A Commentary on Herodotus, V. 2 (Books V-IX), Oxford 2002, 239. Cf. also Dem. 50.53 – 54. τεκμήριον δὲ τούτου ὑμῖν μέγιστον ἐρῶ: On the importance and use of evidence in the speech see the relevant comm. in § 9. The speaker wants to convince the jurors that this claim is true. One might expect the speaker to present the generals Alcibiades, Archestratus and Erasinides as eyewitnesses who would confirm that he actually had the best trireme, since they had travelled on his
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ship. This was in fact impossible, because none of them were alive (see comm. §§ 6, 8). However, even if Alcibiades was alive and was living in Athens, it would be rather risky to rely on the testimony of such a controversial person (see comm. § 7). πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ᾿Aλκιβιάδης, ὃν ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ἂν ἐποιησάμην μὴ συμπλεῖν μοι, οὔτε φίλος ὢν οὔτε συγγενὴς οὔτε φυλέτης ἔπλει ἐπὶ τῆς ἐμῆς νεώς: The speaker supports his argument by first and foremost naming Alcibiades, without specifying who he is by giving his father’s name or his demos (see Bicknell, Genealogy, 43 – 44, Whitehead, Demes, 69 – 72). This is not necessary, because Alcibiades was known to everyone (cf. Hyp. 3.19 with Whitehead, Hyperides, about Hypereides’ practice, when referring to Alexander the Great). The key question here is how Alcibiades decided to travel aboard the speaker’s vessel. The speaker does not explain the reason for this choice. In ancient Athens the generals appointed wealthy Athenians as trierarchs by selecting them from lists. Sometimes, however, the candidate trierarchs voluntarily presented themselves before the generals (see Amit, Athens and the Sea, 110, Jordan, Athenian Navy, 61– 63, P.J.Rhodes, ‘Problems in Athenian Eisphora and Liturgies’ AJAH 7 (1982), 3). The speaker’s clarifying statement that he would not have wanted the notorious man to have travelled with him implies that in no case did he appear voluntarily before his superiors offering to assume duties. His claim also implies that he presents this relationship in the light of the defeat of 404 B.C. (see Introduction, The defensive strategy of the speech, 53 – 54), but it certainly does not guarantee that this is how the speaker thought of Alcibiades in 407 B.C. (see Introduction, The defeat at Aegospotami, 9 and The identity of the speaker, 14– 15). A plausible explanation for his reluctance might be the religious preconceptions of the time, because the Athenians believed that it was dangerous for one to travel on the same vessel with someone who had insulted the gods and we must not forget that Alcibiades had been accused of having profaned the Eleusinian Mysteries (see Strauss, Fathers and Sons, 150 – 153). If this view is valid, then the effort of Alcibiades to prove that he had not been disrespectful towards the gods when holding the Eleusinian Mysteries on land rather than at sea (see Parke, Festivals, 68 – 69), had been forgotten after his death and with it the remission of sin granted by the Athenians. Given that the trierarchs were taking up their duties in mid-summer (see Jordan, Athenian Navy, 65 – 66) and Alcibiades sailed against Andros in September of the year 407 B.C. (see Xen. Hell.1.4.21), we can conclude that Alcibiades chose the speaker as a trierarch about three months before the beginning of the campaign. Since Alcibiades travelled aboard the speaker’s trireme as commander-in-
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chief, then this was the τριήρης στρατηγίς (see definition in Morrison and Williams, GOS, 249). For the emphatic formulation of a denial about having any relationship with an unwanted person, such as Alcibiades in this case, cf. Lys. 6.46: οὐδεπώποτ’ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐστρατεύσατο, οὔτε ἱππεὺς οὔτε ὁπλίτης, οὔτε τριήραρχος οὔτ’ ἐπιβάτης. οὔτε φίλος ὢν: While other litigants are quick to note the integrity and primacy of their famous friends (see Lavency, Aspects, 82), the speaker, however, denies that he had been a friend of Alcibiades. There were some important reasons for the denial of the existence of such a relationship. The idea of helping friends was genuinely aristocratic (see M.T.W.Arnheim, Aristocracy in Greek Society, London 1977, 168), so if the speaker confessed that he had been Alcibiades’ friend, the jurors would consider it almost certain that the speaker would have helped him, because friendship was a bond of obligations and responsibilities between both parties and always a bond for efficient actions (see Arnheim, Aristocracy, 142– 44, S.Goldhill, Reading Greek Tragedy, Cambridge 1986, 82, M.Heath, The Poetics of Greek Tragedy, Stanford 1987, 73 – 74, Blundell, Helping Friends, 47,56 – 57, D.Konstan, Friendship in the Classical World, Cambridge 1997, 56 – 57). One should also remember that from the moment of his return to Athens Alcibiades was supported above all by his friends (see Xen. Hell.1.4.16, Cf. Plat. Epist.7.325c5-d5), who were rich and eminent and they would definitely help him if needed (see Plat. Alc.A.104b1– 2), something which actually happened later (see Polyaen. Strat.Alc.1, Nepos Alc.10.5 – 6, cf. Blundell, Helping Friends, 34,38). Moreover, since at the moment of the delivery of the speech the Athenians no longer shared the same enthusiasm about Alcibiades as at the time he was commander-in-chief (see Romilly, Alcibiade, 197– 98), the admission of such a friendship might have caused the risk of the speaker being accused by his opponents of considering friendship more important than the interests of the city and democracy (cf. Ober, Mass and Elite, 258, Roisman, Manhood, 59). If, however, at that time Alcibiades was popular, the speaker would hurry to stress that he was a trierarch because of the friendship bonding them. Note how easily another client of Lysias defines his relationship with Conon: στρατηγῶν γὰρ Κόνων περὶ Πελοπόννησον, τριηραρχήσαντι τῷ ἐμῷ πατρὶ πάλαι φίλος γεγενημένος (Lys. 19.12). οὔτε συγγενὴς: The denial of kinship with Alcibiades is due to the fact that it was his relatives who had achieved his safe return to the city (see Xen. Hell.1.4.18, Plut. Alc.32.3, cf. Connor, New Politicians, 11– 14, Dover, GPM, 275 – 76). Thus, at the moment of his return to Athens from exile, Alcibiades did not
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disembark from the ship before he met his cousin Euryptolemus (on this matter see Ostwald, Sovereignty, 429). We can better realize the importance of such a relationship, if we consider that Alcibiades from Phegus, a cousin of Alcibiades, had been found guilty of the scandal of the Hermocopidai and the parody of the Eleusinian Mysteries, but he mainly remained an associate of the Spartans and a traitor to Athens even when the latter had returned from the first exile to the city (see Bicknell, Genealogy, 96 – 98). For this reason, Thrasyllus, as the commanding general of the Athenian fleet, sentenced him to death by stoning when he arrested him (see V.J.Rovisach, ‘Execution by Stoning in Athens’ CA 6 (1987), 246). Perhaps the reference to Thrasyllus might not have been accidental (cf. comm. § 7 τοὺς δὲ μετὰ Θρασύλλου). So, while other litigants did not fail to mention that they were relatives with respectable citizens of Athens (see R.Osborne, Demos: The Discovery of Classical Attica, Cambridge 1985, 148), the speaker hastens to mention that he was not a relative of Alcibiades so as not to predispose the jurors negatively against him. § 7. οὔτε φυλέτης: Denying that the speaker originated from the same phyle as Alcibiades is due to the fact that the phylae constituted the basis of the army (see Rhodes, CAP, 253). The most important thing here is that the generals chose their trierarchs based on phylae (see Athenian Navy, 63 – 65), so one could easily suspect that Alcibiades had known the speaker for a long time and this was why he had selected him. A possible acquaintance between the two men would not be out of the question, as the phylae held competitions in various festivals in the city, involving teams from each phyle (see Osborne, “Competitive Festivals”, 30 – 31,33). Also, the rich citizens who belonged to the same phyle assumed choregies in festivals, such as the Dionysia and knew one another (see S.Todd, ‘The rhetoric of enmity in the Attic Orators’ in Cartledge-Millet-v.Reden, Kosmos, 165 – 66). These social contacts demonstrate that people who belonged to the same phyle had many opportunities, through the activities of their phyle, to get to know one another quite well (see Fisher, SVCA, 18); so the speaker is quick to deny such a relationship. If we consider, on the one hand, Aristotle’s view that two people who fought together and belonged to the same phyle were interested in winning (see Nic.Ethic.1160a14– 18) and, on the other hand, the reluctance of the speaker to campaign with Alcibiades, we realise how negative the opinion of the Athenians for the latter was at that particular period of time.
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καίτοι ὑμᾶς οἶμαι εἰδέναι ὅτι στρατηγὸς ᾧ ἐξῆν ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἐβούλετο: The particle καίτοι used has a connective sense here and means “moreover” (cf. Denniston, GP, 555 – 56). At this point the speaker refers to the responsibilities of Alcibiades as a commander and the opportunities provided by the office granted to him. It is a fact that the notorious man was elected general in 407 B.C., shortly before his return to Athens, and that some time after his arrival and the delivery of his speech before the ecclesia he became ἁπάντων ἡγεμὼν αὐτοκράτωρ. This seems to be the only occasion when an Athenian general was made superior to his colleagues (see Rhodes, CAP, 265 – 66); the Athenians may not have spelled out precisely how extensive his powers were. The speaker certainly knew this fact, but in order to reinforce his previous argument on the absence of a relationship between him and Alcibiades, he stresses that Alcibiades could do whatever he wanted and that this was common knowledge among the jurors. This last claim was intended to mislead the jurors, since it created remorse and guilt in those jurors who seemed to be ignorant of what everyone else had known for sure (cf. Ober, Mass and Elite, 149). With this sentence Lysias’ client makes an indirect comment about Alcibiades’ character, commenting once again on his arbitrariness and egotism (cf. Romilly, Alcibiade, 91). Above all, however, he aims at the reaction of the jurors, since if one did what he wanted, it was considered a sign of disobedience towards the laws and the democratic regime (see Seager, “Elitism”, 18, Cohen, Violence, 54). To be able to understand this we should compare this sentence with that of Aelius Aristides concerning Themistocles: [οἱ ᾿Aθηναῖοι] εἰς Σαλαμῖνα ἔφυγον, ἑλόμενοι Θεμιστοκλέα στρατηγόν, καὶ ἐπέτρεψαν ὅ τι βούλοιτο τοῖς ἑαυτῶν πράγμασι χρήσασθαι (Ag.Plat.222). This phrase means that the right of Themistocles to do whatever he wanted was a decision of the people, with the sole purpose of serving the interests of the city and not to satisfy his individual interests. Thus, in the courtrooms of Athens another negative opinion against Alcibiades is added after his death. At the end, the speaker is identified in the minds of the jurors with the rest of the citizens who reacted against the excessive behaviour of Alcibiades (cf. Thuc. 6.15.4) and this enhances his ethos (see Introduction, The defensive tactic of the speaker, 54). His criticism will be more believable later, when he claims that he was always κόσμιος and σώφρων as a citizen (§ 19), since the Athenians believed that the κόσμιοι men did not approve of the behaviour of those who did whatever they wanted (see Seager, “Elitism”, 19). οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἀνέβη ἐπ’ ἄλλην ναῦν εἰ μὴ τὴν ἄριστα πλέουσαν, μέλλων αὐτὸς κινδυνεύσειν: There was nothing unusual or reprehensible about Alci-
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biades’ desire to board the trireme of the speaker, since it was the fastest of all (§ 6 ἡ ναῦς ἄριστα ἔπλει). Cf. Dem. 50.12: διὰ τὸ ἄριστὰ μοι πλεῖν τὴν ναῦν … προσταχθέν μοι … Μένωνα τὸν στρατηγὸν ἄγειν εἰς Ἑλλήσποντον with Morrison and Coates, The Athenian Trireme, 124, Dem. 50.52: ὁ Τιμόμαχος βουλόμενος αὐτὸς χρῆσθαι τῇ νηὶ ὡς ἄριστα πλεούσῃ with R.Richardson, Against Ctesiphon, New York 1979, 77. Cf. also Hdt. 8.22,42, Thuc. 2.83.5, Xen. Hell.1.6.19, 5.1.27. See also Jordan, Athenian Navy, 118. The emphasis the speaker put on the wish of Alcibiades to travel on his trireme, so as not to be at risk, reminds the jurors of the notorious man’s specific reactions in the past. When Alcibiades was arrested to face trial in Athens on the scandals of the Hermocopidai and the Eleusinian Mysteries, he followed the Salaminia on his own ship, which then allowed him to save time and escape safely (see Thuc. 6.61.6 – 7). Similarly, when the Athenians considered him responsible for the defeat at Notium and dismissed him for a second time from his office, he cunningly moved within the army, took a trireme and escaped to Cheronessus (see Xen. Hell.1.5.15 – 18 with Hatzfeld, Alcibiade, 318). Thus, the similarity in the way Alcibiades chose to escape in both cases could make some jurors think that either Alcibiades had chosen the speaker’s vessel to escape from the city or to deceive the speaker in order to help him escape in case he was in danger (cf. Romilly, Alcibiade, 114). To prevent this from happening, the speaker presents it as common knowledge of almost all the citizens (ὑμᾶς οἶμαι εἰδέναι) that this was the behaviour one could have expected of Alcibiades. Taking also into consideration that the speaker had already strengthened his position by making his military ethos known earlier in his speech (see comm. § 3 καθ’ ἡμέραν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν κινδυνεύων καὶ ἀποδημῶν), the role of Alcibiades as a commander is reduced, since he is presented as counting on his subordinate for his safety. The reality, of course, regarding Alcibiades’ military competence is different but this is something which it is not in the speaker’s interest to admit (see Introduction, The defeat at Aegospotami, 4– 5). § 8. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνους μὲν ὑμεῖς ἐπαύσατε τῆς ἀρχῆς: One might expect the speaker to refer extensively to the reasons for Alcibiades’ removal from the generalship in order to stress further that there was not any kind of relationship with him, but he suddenly proceeds to a sharp transition from him to the other generals who served with him. There were two main reasons for Alcibiades’ dismissal. The first was the grievances of the people of Syme about Alcibiades’ unreasonable decision to capture their city, although they were allies of Athens. The second reason was an accusation by the Athenian soldiers who came from Samos to the ecclesia and reported that he was cooperating with the Spartans and the Persian Pharna-
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bazus with the result that Athens would lose the war and that he would be able to oppress the people. These accusations had led the Athenians to suspect him and to elect ten new generals in his place (see Xen. Hell.1.5.16, Diod. 13.73.3 – 74.2 with Ostwald, Sovereignty, 430 and Kagan, Empire, 320 – 22). The other two generals were Thrasybulus and Conon (see Xen. Hell.1.4.10 – 11). In this passage the speaker does not mean that the Athenians removed the generals from office by formal vote but that the generals of Alcibiades’ year, 407/06 B.C., had their term of office ended when they were not elected for the next year. Moreover, the Athenians had no reason to depose all the generals after Notium, and probably did not depose them all, but more likely is that the elections for 406/5 B.C. were held soon after Notium, and then Thrasybulus like Alcibiades was not elected but Conon was (see Kagan, Empire, 326). It is noteworthy that at the time of the speech Thrasybulus was highly regarded because of his military action against the Thirty (cf. Xen. Hell.2.4.2,5,10 – 17) and the restoration of democracy (cf. Xen. Hell.2.4.42– 43). On the other hand, Conon, who was in Cyprus then, may have been suspected by the Athenians because of the defeat at Aegospotami (see Introduction, The defeat at Aegospotami, 10 – 11), so this makes me suspect that the speaker makes an implicit reference to both of them deliberately, although Thrasybulus had nothing to do with Aegospotami, and uses the pronoun ἐκείνους in order to avoid any reference to the sea-fight (notice that later on he will claim that no general travelled on his ship before the military encounter in the Hellespontsee comm. § 9 οὐδενός μοι συμπλέοντος στρατηγοῦ). To flatter the jurors, the speaker identifies them with the Athenian demos who took the decision by using the personal pronoun ὑμεῖς (for the use of the personal pronoun in the strategy of the speech see comm. § 12 ἐγὼ δ’ ὑμῖν … τριήρη). This identification is justified, because the court was a representative subgroup of the demos of Athens (see M.H.Hansen, The sovereignty of the people’s court in Athens in the Fourth Century B.C. and the Public Action against Unconstitutional Proposals, Odense, 1974, 20 – 21). The use of this tactic was successful, as its use by other litigants testifies (cf. Dem. 20.2 with Sandys, Demosthenes, 8). τοὺς δὲ μετὰ Θρασύλλου: For 407/06 B.C. Thrasybulus was not elected commander along with Alcibiades but Thrasyllus and Conon were (see Kagan, Empire, 325 – 26). At this time, however, when opinions about Alcibiades were negative, the speaker, according to Dover, seized the opportunity and distinguished Thrasyllus among the ten other generals in order to underline his democratic convictions. This does not necessarily mean that the general in question had more powers than his colleagues (see Dover, “ΔΕΚΑΤΟΣ ΑΥΤΟΣ”, 68 – 69).
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Evaluating the general as a democrat is right. Although Thrasyllus was a simple soldier in the beginning, he had a leading part with Thrasybulus in the restoration of democracy in the army of Samos (see Thuc. 8.73.4,75.3) and together they defeated the Spartans at Cynossema (see Thuc. 8.104– 106.5). Later, along with Alcibiades he defeated the Lacedaemonians in the battle of Abydus (see Xen. Hell. 1.2.15 – 17 with Krentz, Xenophon Hellenica I, 116, Diod. 13.64.4, Plut. Alc.29.2– 3, Bloedow, Alcibiades, 59) and managed to re-conquer Calchedon (see Xen. Hell.1.3.1– 2, Diod. 13.66.1, Plut. Alc.29.3, Bloedow, Alcibiades, 60). Finally, in the naval battle of Arginousae Thrasyllus, commanding the right part of the right wing of the Athenians, defeated the left wing of the Spartans forcing them to flee (see Xen. Hell.1.6.33). Immediately afterwards he was held responsible, jointly with the other generals, for not recovering the living men as well as dead bodies from the naval battle (see following comm.), and was put to death after a hasty decision taken by the Athenians, which they later regretted (see Xen. Hell.1.7.35, Diod. 13.103.1). For Thrasyllus see further W.J.MacCoy, ‘Thrasyllus’ AJP 98 (1977), 264 – 89. By putting more emphasis on Thrasyllus, the speaker infers that the Athenians evaluated him positively and in retrospect the effect of Thrasyllus’ activity and his reputation was soon restored, allowing the speaker to refer to him and thus strengthen his defence. Although we could not, of course, exclude the possibility that all jurors did not remember the joint action of the two men in two of the aforementioned battles, the way Lysias refers to Thrasyllus and Alcibiades gives the impression that the opinion of the Athenians of each one was consolidated, or at least this is what he wanted them to believe. δέκα εἵλεσθε: The speaker omits to mention the names of the generals. These are: Conon, Diomedon, Pericles, Erasinides, Aristocrates, Archestratus, Protomachus, Thrasyllus, Aristogenes and Lysias or Leon (see Develin, Athenian Officials, 178 – 79). After winning the battle of Arginousae the eight generals who fought in the sea-battle sent their trierarchs, Theramenes and Thrasybulus, with fortyseven vessels to rescue the survivors and recover the dead but because of bad weather, they were not able to execute the orders they were given. The generals were removed from the command even before they returned to Athens. Two of the eight generals who had fought in the battle (Diomedon, Lysias, Pericles, Erasinides, Aristocrates, Thrasyllus, Aristogenes and Protomachus) Aristogenes and Protomachus did not return to Athens, but fled for their lives. The remaining six were sentenced to death (see Xen. Hell.1.7.1– 35). It is noteworthy that the speaker believes that the jurors in the court had elected the generals, which is rather improbable, since in this trial the body of jurors comprised five hundred and one people (see Introduction, The legal prob-
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lems of speech, 31), a lot fewer than those who took part in the ecclesia (see Hansen, Ecclesia, 7– 10). However, with this argument, the speaker seeks to flatter the jurors, thus acknowledging their political presence in previous significant political events regardless of space and time (cf. A.Wolpert, ‘Addresses to the Jury in the Attic Orators’ AJP 124 (2003), 537– 55). Other litigants also use the verb εἵλεσθε in order to emphasize the power of the demos and, therefore, win the favour of the jurors (cf. Lys. 13.10, Andoc. 1.81, Aesch. 2.20,149, 3.115, Din. 4.58). οὗτοι πάντες ἐβούλοντο ἐπὶ τῆς ἐμῆς νεὼς πλεῖν, ἀνέβη μέντοι πολλῶν λοιδοριῶν αὐτοῖς γενομένων ᾿Aρχέστρατος ὁ Φρεάρριος· ἀποθανόντος δὲ τούτου ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ: The speaker chooses here to convey to the jurors a rather rare detail of the military life of the city, that is the generals wrangling amongst themselves in order to travel on his vessel. Since everyone in the city knew that Alcibiades always acted for his best personal interests, the generals apparently believed that the notorious man would not choose to travel under the responsibility of a trierarch unless he felt really safe aboard the warship of the latter (cf. § 7). Thus, seeking to protect their lives, the generals chose to sail with the speaker and selected him as their trierarch without knowing, however, that the rest of their colleagues had made the same choice. It is not specified in the text if the speaker was aware of the incident because he was an eyewitness or if the information was spread by those present, as it is not also stated who was aboard. The client of Lysias simply states that eventually Archestratus, amidst this wrangling, sailed with him. The absence of further comments denotes that the speaker remained uninvolved waiting to accept the decision of his superiors, whatever that decision was. At the same time the incident highlights in an undeniable way that his ship was the most reliable (cf. comm. § 6 τὸν δὲ χρόνον … τοῦ στρατοπέδου). Concerning the general Archestratus the only information we have is that he was a friend of one of the sons of Pericles and that he died in 406 B.C. in Mytilene, on the basis of the speaker’s testimony (see Ostwald, Sovereignty, 430 n.75). Xenophon informs us (see Hell.1.6.16 – 18) that Conon had sought refuge in the port of Mytilene with the other generals but he does not mention Archestratus’ name at all. Callicratidas, pursuing Conon, also entered the port challenging Conon to a battle and causing him to lose thirty ships, while he remained in the port with the forty warships he had under his command. The men of the thirty ships which were destroyed saved their lives by swimming ashore. Given that the speaker does not refer to some damage to his ship, it is impossible that his ship was one of those, and it is therefore unlikely that Archestratus was killed there. Consequently, Archestratus and the speaker must have remained trapped in the harbour with the other forty of Conon’s ships.
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Diodorus (13.78.2– 79.3), who deals with the same facts, does not mention Archestratus’ name or the names of the generals except for Conon, but gives some information which could help us speculate on how and where Archestratus was killed. According to his narrative, Conon, after the thirty ships had been sunk, headed with all the strength he had to the city of Mytilene. The Lacedaemonians rushed to prevent the Athenians from reaching the shore and seeking refuge within the city walls, quite unsuccessfully. Conon, expecting that Callicratidas would try to besiege the city, blocked with the help of the Mytileneans both ends of the city harbour and sank a number of small and large vessels by using rocks. Moreover, he put forward the prows of his fleet to prevent his opponents from using a διέκπλους (cf. comm. § 9 ὅτε … διεφθάρησαν). In the Spartan attack the men of both camps showed extraordinary courage, to the point that some men were not even aware of having been wounded. Many of those aboard were killed by enemy arrows, while other wounded men fell into the sea. It is likely that Archestratus was killed during this conflict (see MacCoy, “Leon”, 191– 92). Finally, although Archestratus managed to board the speaker’s ship amid wrangling, he was unable to save his life. The speaker refers to the death of his superior in Mytilene in a single word, because obviously what happened on the island was well known to his fellow citizens. What is most striking is the fact that while the demes of Alcibiades, Thrasyllus and Erasinides immediately afterwards are not mentioned, the opposite occurs with Archestratus. The reference to the name of a general and his deme is formal and it is encountered in official texts (cf. Aristoph. Birds 134 with Dover, Clouds, 111), so perhaps in this way the speaker wanted to show that the relationship between them was quite formal. In the same way he will refer to the trierarch whom he saved, namely Nausimachus (see § 9). About the speaker himself, we can say with certainty that in the conflict of Mytilene, where so many people died, he might have risked his life. These facts confirm his previous claim that he was endangering his life on a daily basis (cf. § 3). Ἐρασινίδης μετ’ ἐμοῦ συνέπλει: Erasinides is the general who recommended discarding the bones of Phrynichus outside the borders of Attica. After midJune of 406 B.C. he was found blockaded with Conon at the port of Mytilene after the attack of Callicratidas. He managed to escape, however, and take over the difficult task of informing his fellow citizens about the difficult position of his colleague. In late July to early August, Erasinides and all the other generals who had been elected after the defeat at Notium sailed to Samos, obeying the demos’ orders. The general Eteonicus sailed to Lesbos to help Conon, while Erasinides and the other Athenian generals sailed to Arginousae to face the Lace-
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daemonians and achieved a glorious victory. After the failure of the Athenian generals to recover the dead and rescue the survivors from the waterfield Erasinides was accused of embezzlement and misconduct by Archedemus. Finally, in a trial that showed in a bad light the democratic regime of Athens, he was executed. About these events see further the analysis of Ostwald, Sovereignty, 420 – 21,432 – 45. From all the above it is inferred that Erasinides had not chosen the speaker as his trierarch in Athens but in Mytilene. It seems that the general did not hesitate to board the speaker’s ship, despite the fact that Archestratus, who was previously aboard the ship, had been killed, and that he was confident that the speaker had the best trireme and that he was the best trierarch. Then it was Erasinides who had fled from the island and returned to Athens with the speaker as his trierarch (see Introduction, The identity of the speaker, 15 – 16). The fact that Erasinides undertook this risky duty and only his own ship escaped, of the two ships that had undertaken this duty, demonstrates that the speaker was actually a competent trierarch. This piece of information about Erasisindes aims at convincing the jurors that he had the best trireme of the Athenian fleet (cf. § 6 ἡ ναῦς ἄριστα μοι ἔπλει παντὸς τοῦ στρατοπέδου). Since in the short period of a month an expeditionary force was prepared to be sent to face the Spartans and Erasinides was one of the generals, as I said above, it is reasonable to believe that the speaker was chosen for the second time as a trierarch by Erasinides but this time according to the normal procedures and that he then fought with him at Arginoussae on the right side of the left wing behind Diomedon (cf. Xen. Hell.1.6.29). Due to the democratic beliefs of Erasinides and the repentance of the demos for the execution of the generals (Xen. Hell.1.7.35), the speaker attempts for a second time, as he did with Thrasyllus (see comm. § 6 τοὺς μετὰ Θρασύλλου), to give the impression that he is imbued with democratic ideas. καίτοι οὕτω παρεσκευασμένην τριήρη πόσα οἴεσθε ἀνηλωκέναι χρήματα; ἢ πόσα τοὺς πολεμίους εἰργάσθαι κακά; ἢ πόσα τὴν πόλιν εὖ πεποιηκέναι;: καίτοι often marks the transition from a rhetorical syllogism to another, from minor to major, which is formulated in the form of a rhetorical question and its conclusion is left to the imagination of the reader (see Denniston, GP, 561– 62). Here the speaker’s intention is to demonstrate to the jurors that he had the best trireme of the Athenian fleet (ἡ ναῦς ἄριστα μοι ἔπλει παντὸς τοῦ στρατοπέδου). Thus, the first reasoning the jurors were asked to make in order to judge the speaker’s position was to take into consideration what he says regarding the generals and the wrangling amongst themselves in order to travel on his ship (ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνους … Ἐρασινίδης μετ’ ἐμοῦ συνέπλει §§ 7– 8).The second rea-
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soning is introduced with καίτοι and raises three distinct questions. In all three, the quantitative pronoun πόσα is repeated, thus creating the rhetorical figure of ἀναφορά in order to emphasize the importance and magnitude of his offer. Lysias uses the same rhetorical figure in other speeches but by using the pronoun ποῖος: ποῖον φίλον, ποῖον συγγενῆ, ποῖον δημότην χρὴ τούτῳ χαρισάμενον κρύβδην φανερῶς τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπέχεσθαι; (6.53). With the first question the speaker brings back an issue raised at the beginning of the speech, i. e. that he had spent a lot of money on his trireme (ἐτριηράρχουν … τάλαντα ἀνήλωσα § 3). He turns the attention of the jurors to the παρασκευή of the trireme, an issue he will further analyze in detail (see comm. § 10). Immediately after he mentions for the first time that with his military activity he caused a lot of harm to the enemies of the city, which the jurors can easily conclude if they thought of the battles in which he had taken part (cf. comm. §§ 7– 8). Finally, for the first time he also refers to the benefaction of the city, an issue through which he will attack his opponents later on (see comm. § 21), and on which he will base one of the major arguments of his defence (see comm. § 22). Before the jurors had the time to think of the answers to the questions raised, the speaker immediately proceeds to answer them, thus preparing his next move, which was to provide the proof of his claims: τεκμήριον δὲ τούτου μέγιστον. Judged on the basis of the content of the questions, the speaker wants to indicate indirectly his bitterness towards those who had underestimated his offer to the city because of the outcome of the sea-fight at Aegospotami (see Introduction, The identity of the speaker, 16 – 17), something which seems likely because of the valuable information he provides later in the speech in regard to Aegospotami (see comm. §§ 9 – 10). Bitterness and fear was also expressed by Lysias in his speech Against Hippotherses (see ll. 163 – 81, in particular ll. 171– 73, and also 216 – 17, fr. CLXX (Carey) with E.Medda, In Hippothersem, in Theomnestum et fragmenta ex incertis orationibus, Firenze 2003, 139 – 43) for a clear supporter of the Thirty (see P.Cloché, ‘Le discours de Lysias contre Hippothersès’ REA 23 (1921), 28 – 36). This chapter of the speech demonstrates the ability of the orator to apply the same technique under different circumstances depending on the side he supports in the court. τεκμήριον δὲ τούτου μέγιστον: Τhe speaker uses the same phrase in § 6. τεκμήριον in rhetoric is the ἀναγκαῖον σημεῖον for the formulation of a syllogism (cf. Arist. Rhet.1357b3 – 10, Isocr. 9.8 with Alexiou, Euagoras, 80 – 81) and it precedes or follows the events narrated by a speaker (cf. Lys. 13.73, Dem. 30.4– 5, 36.12, 47.77). In this speech the speaker chooses to place τεκμήριον twice in the beginning of his syllogism. The word in this case, according to Bateman, is based on a historical event and it means “argument”. According to the
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same scholar, Lysias probably believes that τεκμήριον belongs to the ἔντεχνοι πίστεις in § 10, and it is also confirmed by the testimony of the witnesses (see J.J.Bateman, A study of the arguments in the speeches of Lysias, Ithaca-New York 1958, 13 – 14). This may be true for the second τεκμήριον but not for the first, since the speaker did not invite the witnesses to substantiate his words about Alcibiades (§ 6). The importance of the two τεκμήρια for the speaker is demonstrated by the fact that the adjective μέγα is in the superlative degree. Adversely in the speeches of other litigants, we encounter the use of the same adjective but in the positive degree. Cf. Lys. 7.33, 19.45, Dem. 30.6, 59.57,82, Isocr. 9.8 with Alexiou, Euagoras, 80 – 81. §§ 9 – 10. The sea-fight in the Hellespont: In his report of the events that took place in the Hellespont the speaker will not give a complete picture of what happened but will concentrate on his own activities. At this point of the speech Lysias adopts in practice Gorgias’ opinion that when using speech what is most important is not the representation of reality but the swing of public opinion (for this point see Α-Φ.Μουρελάτος, ‘Ο Γοργίας για τη λειτουργία της γλώσσας’ in Η αρχαία Σοφιστική, Ελληνική Φιλοσοφική Εταιρεία, Πρακτικά του Ά Διεθνούς Συμποσίου Φιλοσοφίας, Αθήνα 1982, 229 – 30). For the speaker what matters most is not the account of what happened on the battlefield but the reference to his action and the city as a kind of consolation (φάρμακον) in the hearts of the jurors (cf. Gorg. Hel.14 with Segal, “Gorgias”, 105, Isocr. 8.39) because of the painful result. Therefore, his aim is to make the jurors favourable towards him. At the same time, I suspect that the speaker through his selective reporting of the events hoped that when his readers realized what he had omitted, they would become favourable witnesses, believing that by his choice he considered them intelligent and not foolish (cf. ([Demetrius] On Words 222). The report of what happened during the conflicts with the Spartans aims to highlight, in a straightforward way, the military ethos of the speaker. Lysias applies the same technique to other speeches. Cf. 16.13 – 16 and mainly § 15: εἰς Κόρινθον ἐξόδου γενομένης καὶ πάντων προειδότων ὅτι δεήσει κινδυνεύειν, ἑτέρων ἀναδυομένων ἐγὼ διεπραξάμην ὥστε τῆς πρώτης τεταγμένος μάχεσθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις· καὶ μάλιστα τῆς ἡμετέρας φυλῆς δυστυχησάσης, καὶ πλείστων ἐναποθανόντων ὕστερος ἀνεχώρησα τοῦ σεμνοῦ Στειριῶς τοῦ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις δειλίαν ὠνειδικότος. See in detail A.Kapellos, ‘In defence of Mantitheus: Strtucture, Strategy and Argumentation in Lysias 16’ BICS (forthcoming).
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§ 9. ὅτε γὰρ ἐν τῇ τελευταίᾳ ναυμαχίᾳ αἱ νῆες διεφθάρησαν: In the surviving rhetorical corpus this is one of the two references to the defeat in the Hellespont as the τελευταία ναυμαχία (see also Lys. 18.4). The fact that no other clarification is given about which battle this was indicates that everyone knew that the speaker referred to the naval battle of Aegospotami. This reference should be considered mild, since the speaker does not mention a ‘defeat’. As opposed to this cf. Dem 51.8: ὅτε γὰρ τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ τῇ πρὸς ᾿Aλέξανδρον ἐνικήθητε and my comm. on § 9 ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοῖς τριηράρχοις ὠργίσθητε. Roberts, P. Ryl. 489, 109 n.101, supports the view that there was no real battle in the Hellespont (but without sufficient evidence). This opinion is right, meaning that there were not many enemy ships rammed and there was no approaching of triremes or crew fighting; since the entire fleet had no time to react (see Xen. Hell.2.1.28, Diod. 13.106.3 – 6 with Kapellos, “Philocles”, 98, Plut. Lys.11.5, Alc.37.4; cf. L.Rawlings, ‘Alternative Agonies’ in v.Wees, War and Violence, 236 – 37). It is most likely that the few Athenian ships made a διέκπλους or at least part of this specific tactic in order to escape. The thalamites and the zygites sat on the rowing bench of the thranites and from this position, the three groups together rowed to develop the maximum speed of 7.2 knots, while the shields placed at their side gave them some kind of protection from the spears of their opponents. As the Athenians were the best-trained Greek rowers, they managed, owing to their specific skills, to achieve greater speed than their enemies by half a knot. This gave them the opportunity to row through the enemy line, break the oars of the attacking enemy ships and fire shots (About the way of realising this tactic see W.L.Rodgers, Greek and Roman Naval Warfare, Annapolis Maryland 1964, 42 – 43,45,121,10, Taillardat, “La triere athénienne”, 203 – 4, A.J.Holladay, ‘Further thoughts on trireme tactics’ G & R 35 (1988), 149 – 50). Διέκπλους was done by a leading trireme (see Morrison and Williams, GOS, 316, I.Whitehead, ‘The periplous’ G & R 34 (1987), 178) and, since the sources refer to Conon as the architect of the escape (see Xen. Hell.2.1.28, Plut. Lys.11.3 – 6, Alc.37.4), it is reasonable to believe that his own ship was the one that first sailed through the Spartans. At Aegospotami this was the only tactic available for the Athenian ships to use in order to escape and they surely knew it well because of their previous victorious battle in Arginousae. There, the Athenian ships, because they were quite slow, created a formation of two lines in order to prevent the διέκπλους of the Spartan ships, which were faster (see Xen.Hell.1.6.31). In the Hellespont, however, the Spartan fleet attacked the Athenian fleet without knowing whether and how many Athenian ships would be ready to fight at that moment (see Xen. Hell.2.1.28), so it was taken by surprise by the διέκπλους of the nine Athenian ships and thus failed to destroy them (For the successful implementation of
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διέκπλους in other battles under similar conditions with the ones in the Hellespont see Morrison and Coates, Athenian Trireme, 71 and Morrison and Williams, GOS, 314– 16). The successful of this tactic by Conon and the eight other trierarchs was the reason that Lysander did not capture them. The likelihood that this tactic was used is reinforced by the verbs used by Diodorus: τῶν μὲν οὖν τριήρων δέκα μόνον διεξέπεσον, ὧν μίαν ἔχων Κόνων (13.106.6) and Plutarch: ὁ μὲν Κόνων ὀκτὼ ναυσὶν ὑπεξέπλευσε καὶ διαφυγών (Lys.11.5), ὀκτὼ μόναι τριήρεις ὑπεξέφυγον μετὰ Κόνωνος (Alc.37.4). Besides, the speaker mentions in the beginning of this paragraph the blows he inflicted on the enemies (τοὺς πολεμίους εἰργάσθαι κακά) and invokes the memory of the jurors who took part in the events (§ 10), while Eryximachus, another client of Lysias, uses the same argument, a fact that indeed indicates there had been some kind of conflict (see Ehrhardt, “Aegospotami”, 226, Wylie, “Aegospotami”, 134). In my opinion, it is difficult to accept that those few warriors who had managed to escape from Lysander would argue in court that there had been some kind of naval conflict with the enemy without this having ever happened and believe that the jurors would approve of such a lie. The implementation of this tactic was a difficult venture (cf. Morrison and Coates, Athenian Trireme, 59), which is why, although only few ships successfully made it, it was sufficient for the Athenians to believe that a normal battle took place there (cf. Lys. 12.43, 18.4, 19.17). In this way the defeat appeared less insulting (see Wolpert, Remembering Defeat, 7, Kapellos, “Philocles”, 99 – 100). οὐδενός μοι συμπλέοντος στρατηγοῦ: This clarification is necessary, because the arguments concerning his military skills were based on Alcibiades’ and the other generals’ desire to board his ship (§§ 7– 8), so inevitably the speaker might expect some jurors to believe that the generals in the Hellespont would also have sought to have the speaker under their command. It is surprising that the generals in the Hellespont did not choose someone as experienced and capable in the art of war, as the speaker was, to be their trierarch. Besides, the latter could also attribute to the former the same motives he attributed to Alcibiades (cf. comm. § 8). The disappointment of the Athenians about the irresponsibility of the generals in the Hellespont (see Introduction, The defeat at Aegospotami, 10 – 11) seems to have been so strong that it was necessary for Lysias to stress the absence of any of them from being on board the ship of the speaker, even though his client was obliged to do so. The speechwriter uses this tactic so that the speaker avoid the accusation that he was responsible for the defeat. Eventually, as the speaker himself will confess later, not even the trierarchs were exempted from the anger of their fellow citizens (see comm. ἐπειδὴ και τοῖς τριηράρχοις ὠργίσθητε). In this case, not even the proof of his pa-
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triotism was enough to free him from any of the rumours spread (see Introduction, The identity of the speaker, 16). This passage denotes that the Athenians held all the generals responsible for the defeat without exception. We would expect the speaker to indicate Conon as the only competent general who was able to escape, but the speaker chooses to omit his name for the second time in his speech (cf. comm. § 7 ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνους μὲν ὑμεῖς ἐπαύσατε τῆς ἀρχῆς). It is also interesting to realise that the speaker does not incriminate Alcibiades for the outcome at the Hellespont, which actually suggests that the notorious man bears no responsibility for the defeat (cf. Introduction, The defeat at Aegospotami, 10 – 11). (ἵνα καὶ τούτου μνησθῶ … συμφοράν): The proper use of parentheses is very important, because it interrupts the natural flow of the text and gives it the immediacy of the spoken word (cf. Hermog. On Types of Style 1.6: αἱ ὑποστροφαὶ λόγου … διαφθείρουσι τὸ σεμνὸν αὖται καὶ πάλιν αὗ τὸ καθαρὸν ὡσαύτως, διακόπτουσαί τε κατὰ τὰς ἐπεμβολὰς καὶ ἀναχαιτίζουσαι τὸ ἄφετον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐλεύθερον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινότερον καὶ πολιτικώτερον ἄγουσαι). Unlike other orators, who used parentheses in a hasty and erroneous way which interrupted a syllogism, thus depriving the speech of its brevity and adding minor details to the most important and significant events (cf Hermog. On Types of Style 2.1, G.Kennedy, ‘The oratory of Andocides’ AJP 79 (1958), 38, R.Clavaud, Le Ménexène de Platon et la rhétorique de son temps, Paris 1980, 252), Lysias adds important information, such as pointing out that the Athenians were angered about the defeat, characterizes the defeat as a disaster and mainly provides the information that the blame for the outcome was also put on the trierarchs. It is noteworthy that the speaker includes in the parenthesis information which the Athenians knew already, while outside the parenthesis he records the events which were heard for the first time (cf. introductory comm. § 10). By using the parenthesis Lysias derives specific benefits for his speaker, namely halting the natural flow of the speech and enhancing the ethos of the latter, because of his hesitation in judging the reaction of his fellow citizens. Cf. Hermog.: αἱ δὲ μετ’ ἐνδοιάσεως ἐπικρίσεις ἠθικαί … πᾶσα ἐνδοίασις ἠθικώτερον ποιεῖ τὸν λόγον (On Types of Style 1.6) and Dover, LCL, 78. Moreover, with the use of the parenthesis the speaker seems to improvise, which is a highly effective tactic, since it gave the impression that the text we are reading was actually spoken word rather than a memorized text written in advance and learnt by heart (cf. E.Dickey, Greek Forms of Address: From Herodotus to Lucian, Oxford 1996, 31). Given that at this point of the speech what is important is the positive reaction of the jurors to the speech (cf. introductory comm. §§ 9 – 10), we must believe that this improvisation, with the use of the parenthesis, is an artificial creation of Ly-
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sias and not really a reaction of the speaker due to his rhetorical education (as it appears likely according to A.P.Dorjahn-W.B.Fairchild, ‘Extemporaneous Elements in the Orations of Lysias’ CB 43 (1966), 17). The speaker uses parentheses three times in the text, but for different reasons. See comm. § 16 and § 23. (ἵνα καὶ τούτου μνησθῶ: The litigants always declare they have difficulty reminding the jurors of tragic events of the past. Cf. Lys. 13.43 – 44: ἀνιῶμαι μὲν οὖν ὑπομιμνῄσκων τὰς γεγενημένας συμφορὰς τῇ πόλει, 31.8: ἐγώ, καθ’ ὅσον ἀναγκάζομαι, κατὰ τοσοῦτον μέμνημαι, Andoc. 1.80: ἐγὼ οὐδὲν δέομαι μεμνῆσθαι οὐδ’ ἀναμιμνῄσκειν ὑμᾶς τῶν γεγενημένων κακῶν. The reference to the final military defeat of the city was painful to the Athenians (see Nouhaud, Utilisation, 280, Loraux, Invention, 139, Roisman, Manhood, 68 – 69), so the speaker with this verbal formulation shows that the reference to the battle causes him some discontent and that he makes it only in order to defend himself. With this reminder, the speaker implicates the jurors themselves as being fully aware of what he states: τούτου μνησθῶ … πάντες ἐπίστασθε. Lysias applies the same tactic when referring to what happened in those years and to a client of his in the role of the prosecutor. Cf. 13.44: ἀνιῶμαι μὲν οὖν ὑπομιμνῄσκων ταὰς γεγενημένας συμφορὰς τῇ πόλει … ἴστε μὲν γὰρ τοὺς ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος τῶν πολιτῶν κομισθέντας, οἷοι καὶ ὅσοι, καὶ οἵῳ ὀλέθρῳ, ὑπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα ἀπώλοντο· ἴστε δὲ τοὺς ἐξ Ἐλευσῖνος, ὡς πολλοί ταὐτῇ συμφορᾷ ἐχρήσαντο. In this way, the speaker confirms in practice the democratic belief that the citizens identify with the jurors. However, because the opinion of the court might change unexpectedly in one direction or another depending on the atmosphere that prevailed at that time (see Hall, “Lawcourt Dramas”, 44), the speaker is reserved in his reference to the defeat of the fleet so as not to infuriate the jurors. Besides, the Athenians had punished the poet Phrynichus years ago because he had written a tragic drama on the fall of Miletus, while it was still occupied by the Persians (see Hdt. 6.21 with L.Pearson, ‘Historical Allusions in the Attic Orators’ CQ 36 (1941), 229). The possibility of such a reaction is also manifested by a comparison of this reference with a similar report by Andocides, who asks the audience not to get angry, because he will speak directly and report the facts: καὶ γὰρ εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἀχθεσθήσεται παραιτοῦμαι· γὰρ ὄντα λέξω (3.21). Therefore, I do not agree with Carey (“Τα όρια του δημοσίου λόγου”, 45), who believes that it was acceptable to the jurors for someone to speak about the disasters that occurred at the end of the war.
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ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοῖς τριηράρχοις ὠργίσθητε: The speaker refers to one of the emotions his fellow citizens showed towards the officials during the 5th and 4th centuries B.C. (see Plut. Lys.5.2, Cim.17.2, Diod. 13.101.4– 5, Dem. 49.14, 51.8 – 9, Huart, Thucydide, 160, V.Hunter, ‘Thucydides and the Sociology of the Crowd’ CJ 84 (1988 – 89), 21– 22, Romilly, Alcibiade, 215). By admitting the existence of this emotion the speaker means that the Athenians believed that the trierarchs slighted them by not taking any measures against Lysander, so they took revenge by accusing them of the defeat (cf. Konstan, Emotions, 45,47). This specific information is of particular interest because, although the responsibility for the defeat lies primarily with the generals (see Introduction, The defeat at Aegospotami, 9 – 11), the Athenians also showed their anger at the trierarchs at the moment they returned to the city, as one of them who also returned alive from the Hellespont testifies: [τῶν τριηράρχων] πρὸς τὰ παρόντ’ ἀθύμως διακειμένων (Isocr. 18.60). With this sentence Isocrates’ client means that the trierarchs felt this way because of the anger of the Athenians, since everything he says is not related to either the defeat in the Hellespont or the current political situation in the city but to the psychological condition of the trierarchs (cf. Xen. Hell.2.2.9 – 10). The reasons for this anger are serious and quite numerous. First of all, the Athenians at this time had to blame some men for what they feared they would suffer from the other Greeks (see Xen. Hell.2.2.3). Having forgotten that it was they who had approved of the campaign to Aegospotami and had ratified the demagogic policy of the generals (cf. Thuc. 8.1.1: χαλεποὶ μὲν ἦσαν … ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ ψηφισάμενοι, see Introduction, The defeat at Aegospotami, 4), they now realised the evils that would affect them and they were outraged by the new situation (cf. Dem. 6.33: ὅταν οὖν μηκέθ’ ὑμῖν ἀμελεῖν ἐξουσία γίγνηται τῶν συμβαινόντων, μηδ’ ἀκούηθ’ ὅτι ταῦτ’ ἐφ’ ὑμᾶς ἐστιν ἐμοῦ μηδὲ τοῦ δεῖνος, ἀλλ’ αὐτοὶ πάντες ὁρᾶτε καὶ εὖ εἰδῆτε, ὀργίλους καὶ τραχεῖς ὑμᾶς ἔσεσθαι νομίζω). Since none of the generals returned to the city and took the blame, the Athenians found it easy to blame the trierarchs (cf. Dem. 6.34: ὁρῶ γὰρ ὡς τὰ πόλλ’ ἐνίους οὐκ εἰς τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλ’ εἰς τοὺς ὑπὸ χεῖρα μάλιστα τὴν ὀργὴν ἀφιέντας). This was added to by the fact that the office of the trierarchs was the second greatest in Athens after that of their superior generals (see Roberts, “Aristocratic Democracy”, 362– 64). Moreover, many trierarchs in 411 B.C. were keen to overthrow the democratic regime, a fact that had later led the democratic fleet to dismiss those suspected as oligarchs (see Thuc. 8.47.2,76.1– 2). It is then quite reasonable for the Athenian demos to believe that some trierarchs had oligarchic leanings and that they acted secretly in the Hellespont so that the fleet be defeated in order to succeed in overthrowing the democratic regime (cf. Lys. 12.36, G.M.Calhoun, Athenian clubs in politics and litigation, Rome 1964, 140 – 47). In conclu-
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sion, their anger is justified given that Athens was still at war (cf. Thuc. 3.82.2). At the same time, however, Plutarch’s criticism that the Athenian demos gets easily angry is confirmed: εὐκίνητός ἐστι πρὸς ὀργὴν (Mor.799C). On the other hand, the trierarchs were partly responsible for the outcome, because they were responsible for the readiness of the ships, as Xenophon indicates, who does not distinguish his compatriots according to their military rank, but equally refers to the contempt all members of the fleet showed to Lysander: [οἱ ᾿Aθηναῖοι] καταφρονοῦντες δὴ τοῦ Λυσάνδρου, ὅτι οὐκ ἀντανῆγεν (Ηell.2.1.27-cf. Introduction, The defeat at Aegospotami, 10). Lévy, Athènes, 35 n.5, believes that the anger of the Athenians was directed only against those trierarchs who returned with their ships to Peiraeus from Aegospotami and resigned without continuing to fight against the Spartans but not against everyone, since one of Isocrates’ clients remained a trierarch (18.59). This conclusion is not certain, since there is nothing to rule out the possibility that Isocrates’ client was considered responsible for the outcome too but he ultimately chose not to resign. If Diodorus’ record of the events is more reliable than Xenophon’s (see 13.106.1– 3), and Philocles had indeed a precise course of action in mind to face Lysander (see D.Lotze, Lysander und Peloponnesische Krieg, Berlin 1964, 32, Ehrhardt, “Aegospotami’, 227), then the responsibility of the trierarchs is even greater, as they did not carry out his orders for the immediate boarding of the crews on their ships. Taking also into consideration that the trierarchs were those who influenced the behaviour of sailors in a campaign (cf. Thuc. 8.45.3,73.5) and that the Spartan trierarchs had managed to impose discipline on the crews and achieve a surprise attack (see Plut. Lys.11.2), it is certain that the Athenian trierarchs bore great responsibility for the lack of discipline within the fleet. Their attitude immediately justifies the accusations of treason against the generals (see Bommelaer, Lysandre, 110), and that is why the speaker appears defensive towards the jurors, unlike in earlier parts of the speech, where he emphasized his activity as a trierarch (see §§ 3, 6 – 8). The speaker’s surprise about the anger of his fellow citizens is justified, because he obviously expected that the citizens at least would not turn their anger on those able to perform their duties thoroughly (see Introduction, The identity of the speaker, 16 and comm. § 10 εἶχον γὰρ … τὴν ἄλλην ὑπηρεσίαν ἀκόλουθον). At the present moment Lysias feared that the jurors had not forgotten their anger against the trierarchs, so they might let their emotions distort their deliberation in court (cf. Konstan, Emotions, 69) and then condemn the speaker because of the defeat at Aegospotami (cf. D.Konstan, ‘Rhetoric and Emotion’ in A Companion to Greek Rhetoric, I.Worthington (ed.), London 2007, 420). The interpretation of the events from the perspective of the group of the trierarchs who survived Aegospotami justifies the correction of δέ into by
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Markland, which is not in the manuscripts. The conjunction καί in our text is responsive (cf. Denniston, GP, 293). The speaker, of course, does not attempt to interpret the reasons for his fellow citizens’ anger or refer to the subject with ease. Only two men did so. The first was Pericles, who told the Athenians at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, that he knew that their anger against him was due to the moral decline resulting from the ravaging of the land in Attica by the Spartans (see Thuc 2.60.1,64.1 with H.Yunis, ‘How do the People Decide? Thucydides on Periclean Rhetoric and Civic Instruction’ AJP 112 (1991), 193). The second was Socrates, who declared to his jurors that he did not fear the anger of the Athenians at the Arginousae trial and that, precisely because he never felt fear, like his fellow citizens, he refused to condemn the generals (see Plat. Apol.32b-c, cf. Xen. Mem.1.1.18). Direct reference to the anger of the jurors-citizens could safely be made by a litigant, if he was not the recipient of this emotion, in order to flatter his audience: ὅτε γὰρ τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ τῇ πρὸς ᾿Aλέξανδρον ἐνικήθητε, τότε τῶν τριηράρχων τοὺς μεμισθωκότας τὰς τριηραρχίας αἰτιωτάτους τοῦ γεγενημένου νομίζοντες παρεδώκατ’ εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον, καταχειροτονήσαντες προδεδωκέναι τὰς ναῦς καὶ λελοιπέναι τὴν τάξιν. Καὶ κατηγόρει μὲν ᾿Aριστοφῶν, ἐδικάζετε δ’ ὑμεῖς· εἰ δὲ μὴ μετριωτέραν ἔσχετε τὴν ὀργὴν τῆς ἐκείνων πονηρίας, ουδὲν αὐτοὺς έκώλυε τεθνάναι (Dem. 51.8 – 9). The importance of the trierarchs for the city, however, was so great that only a few years later, when the wounds of defeat were somewhat healed, even the prosecutors admitted that the tenure of the trierarchs before and after the defeat in the Hellespont was equally praiseworthy. Cf. Lys. 6.46: πότερον ὡς στρατιώτης ἀγαθός; ἀλλ’οὐδεπώποτ’ἐκ ταῆς πόλεως ἐστρατεύσατο … τριήραρχος … οὔτε πρὸ τῆς συμφορᾶς οὔτε μετὰ τὴν συμφοράν … γεγονώς. διὰ τὴν γενομένην συμφοράν): The choice of the word συμφορά here is conscious and reveals the rhetorical expertise of Lysias. As the orators spoke with εὐφημία before the ecclesia, i. e. they avoided referring to the recent misfortunes of the city by using words that reflected the reality of things but used a more general term (see Montiglio, Silence, 134), likewise the speaker and those who referred to the events of the Hellespont and defined them as a disaster (e. g. cf. Lys. 16.4: ἡμᾶς γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ πρὸ τῆς ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ συμφορᾶς … ἐξέπεμψε), use the same tactic in court, i. e. they replace the word ἦττα, which shows what happened as a final result, with this particular word. This means that although there was no explicit mandate to enforce this attitude, since the court identified with the demos of Athens (see comm. § 7 ἐπειδὴ δὲ … ἀρχῆς), the litigants held the same attitude like the public speakers. The degree of attention the Athenians paid to the issue of the defeat at Aegospotami is also manifested
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by the description of Xenophon: Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ᾿Aθήναις τῆς Παράλου ἀφικομένης νυκτὸς ἐλέγετο ἠ συμφορά (Hell.2.2.3). Although we would expect the use of the word ἦττα, because this was the information that the sacred ship transferred to Athens (see A.Kapellos, ‘Xenophon and the execution of the Athenian captives at Aegospotami’ Mnemosyne 66 (2013), 468 – 69), Xenophon uses the word συμφορά, because with this the Athenians tried to exorcise evil (ἐλέγετο). Obviously, the Athenian orators and the litigants tried to do the same (Lévy, Athènes, 40, first observed that the term ‘disaster’ is vague, but without explaining the reasons that impose the use of the word). Thus, with this word the speaker protects himself from any negative reaction by the audience. This is attested to by the fact that the word is in the parenthesis (cf. comm. § 9 ἵνα καὶ τούτου μνησθῶ … συμφοράν). At the same time, he relieves the citizens from any responsibility by presenting them as blameless for the result (Lévy, Athènes, 43) in order for them to be favourably disposed towards him and listen carefully to what he is going to say about his personal action at Aegospotami. His cautious attitude towards this particular disaster paves the way for his next argument about all the other calamities of the city. See comm. § 18 τὰς τῆς πόλεως συμφορὰς ἀσμένως εἶδον. ἐγὼ την τε ἐμαυτοῦ ναῦν ἐκόμισα καὶ τὴν Ναυσιμάχου τοῦ Φαληρέως ἔσωσα: There is an emphatic use of the pronoun ἐγώ so that the speaker can highlight the importance of his action (cf. Cooper, Syntax, 485). He is going to use almost the same words in a later section, starting his speech again with the personal pronoun: ἐγὼ δ’ ὑμῖν δύο ἐκόμισα, τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ καὶ τὴν Ναυσιμάχουν τριήρη (§ 11). Moreover, the speaker emphasizes that he also saved his ship and Nausimachus’ ship linking the two sentences with the particles τε-καί (see Denniston, GP, 497). The reference to Nausimachus’ deme indicates that the relationship between the speaker and him was quite formal (cf. comm. § 8 οὗτοι πάντες … ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ). It is likely that at the time of the διέκπλους some Spartan vessel tried to ram Nausimachus’ ship but the speaker managed to protect his colleague’s ship with the right manoeuvre. Assistance offered to a companion during the war was an act of bravery but at the same time it was dangerous and could cause injury or death to those who hurried to help their comrades (cf. Plat. Alc.A.115b1– 3,5 – 8). The jurors, reflecting that very few ships had escaped from Aegospotami (cf. Ιsocr. 18.59: μετ’ ὀλίγων ἔσωσα τὴν ναῦν) and that there had been trierarchs who had not been able to save their own ship (see Roberts, P.Ryl. 489, ll.105 – 7), might have appreciated the speaker’s readiness to save not only his own ship but also that of Nausimachus. The testimony is of particular importance at a time when there was no lon-
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ger an Athenian fleet (see Xen. Hell.2.2.20, Lys. 13.15,34, cf. comm. § 11 Αἱ μὲν τοίνυν σωθεῖσαι τῶν νεῶν δώδεκα ἦσαν). Simultaneously we should consider that since the fleet was equivalent to the demos of Athens (see Amit, Athens and the sea, 43 – 46), the rescue of the two hundred crew members of Nausimachus was equivalent to the rescue of part of the population of the Athenian demos, part of which included the jurors of this court (cf. § 10 καὶ ταῦθ’ ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω, πάντες ἐπίστασθε, ὅσοι ἐτυγχάνετε ὄντες ἐκεῖ τῶν στρατιωτῶν). It is certain that the jurors might have appreciated the initiative the speaker took to save the crews. § 10. Introductory Comment: On the grounds of what the speaker reports outside the parenthesis in § 9 (cf. comm. § ἵνα καὶ τούτου μνησθῶ), but mainly on the grounds of what he says in this paragraph, he attracts the interest of the jurors, since the information he provides about the way he managed to keep the crew battle worthy is totally new for his fellow citizens who did not fight at Aegospotami and, most importantly, it comes from one of the trierarchs who, though rescued, was never allowed to explain how and why (see Introduction, The identity of the speaker, 17). Moreover, there had never been in Athens complete official information on the defeat or even an interpretation of the events, as happened with the failure to recover the shipwrecked at Arginousae (Xen. Hell.1.7.5), but all citizens were perplexed with regard to the culpability of the generals and their own survival (see Xen. Hell.2.1.32, 2.3 – 4 and Introduction, The defeat at Aegospotami, 7– 11). The successful flight of the speaker and other litigants (cf. Isocr. 18.60), allows the logographer to bring new information to light in the courtroom, which was related to the defeat and finally to make his client more likeable rather than a litigant who provoked anger (Lewis, News and Society, 25, although she shows the way information was supplied to the Athenian society by individuals, she does not interpret the function of information provided by the logographers concerning events, such as those reported by the speaker). Now, whether or not what the speaker reports on Aegospotami is going to be remembered by the jurors after the end of the trial is something Lysias is not interested in (cf. Thomas, Oral Tradition, 217). § 10. καὶ ταῦτα ούκ ἀπὸ τύχης ἐγίγνετο: The καί is responsive, adding a new element to the content of that which was previously reported (see Denniston, GP, 293). This new element is the luck factor. The common conception in the 5th and 4th centuries B.C. was that luck played an important role in military matters. Cf. Diod. 13.22.6: τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις πλεονεκτήματα τύχῃ καὶ καιρῷ κρίνεται πολλάκις, Isocr. 18.32: πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὸν πόλεμον πολλαὶ πόλεις ἂν εὑρεθεῖεν
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καλῶς ἠγωνισμέναι … τῶν μὲν τοιούτων ἔργων, ὅσα μετὰ κινδύνων πέπρακται, τὸ πλεῖστον ἄν τις μέρος τῇ τύχῃ μεταδοίη, Thuc. 1.140.1: ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὰς ξυμφορὰς τῶν πραγμάτων οὐχ ἧσσον ἀμαθῶς χωρῆσαι ἢ καὶ τὰς διανοίας τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· δι’ ὅπερ καὶ τὴν τύχην, ὅσα ἄν παρὰ λόγον ξυμβῇ, εἰώθαμεν αἰτιᾶσθαι. On this matter see also M.Palmer, Love of Glory and the Common Good: Aspects of Political Thought of Thucydides, Lanham 1992, 16,69, P.Debnar, Speaking the Same Language: Speech and Audience in Thucydides’ Spartan Debates, Michigan 2001, 84– 85,157,229 – 30. The Athenians, however, never admitted that they should blame themselves for their defeats but they believed that luck favoured their opponents. Cf. Thuc. 7.77.3 (Nikias’ claim): ἱκανὰ γὰρ τοῖς τε πολεμίοις ηὐτύχηται, [Arist.] Αth.Pol.34.2: ἠτύχησαν τὴν ἐν Αἰγὸς ποταμοῖς ναυμαχίαν, Diod. 13.102.2 (Diomedon’s claim): τὰς δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς νίκης εὐχὰς ἐπειδήπερ ἡ τύχη κεκώλυκεν ἡμᾶς ἀποδοῦναι, Isocr. 12.99: τῆς ἀτυχίας τῆς ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ γενομένης, 15.128: Καίτοι χρὴ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄριστον νομίζειν, οὐκ εἴ τις μιᾷ τύχῃ τηλικοῦτόν τι κατώρθωσεν ὥσπερ Λύσανδρος, ὃ μηδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων διαπράξασθαι συμβέβηκεν, Lyc. 1.18: οὐκ ᾐσχύνθη τὴν τῆς πατρίδος ἀτυχίαν. Cf. also Isocr. 5.62 (about Conon as regards his activity in the Hellespont): ᾿Aτυχήσας γὰρ ἐν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ τῇ περὶ Ἑλλήσποντον, 5.67: Κόνων δεδυστυχηκὼς. On facing defeat as a misfortune rather than a result of a bad state of affairs see G.Mathieu, Isocrate Discours. Texte établi et traduit, III, Paris 1950, 135 n.1, Nouhaud, Utilisation, 280 – 82). This reference to luck is related only to the speaker himself and not the city. In the 5th century B.C. good luck was the proof of the favour of the gods (see K.J.Dover, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, Oxford 1981, vol. 4, 247– 49), while the Athenians did not accept the view that the gods did not favour their city (see Carey, ‘Τα όρια του δημοσίου λόγου’, 32). If the speaker referred to the entire city, he would have risked leaving himself exposed at the wrath of the jurors, which, as Ι have already pointed out, he was trying to avoid (see comm. §§ 9 – 10 the sea-fight in the Hellespont). Nevertheless, saving one’s life in battle, without relying on luck, was acceptable. Cf. Lys. 2.79: τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησαν, οὐκ ἐπιτρέψαντες περί αὑτῶν τῇ τύχῃ, ἀλλ’ ἐκλεξάμενοι τὸν κάλλιστον (θάνατον), Eur. Herc.201– 3: τοῦτο δ’ ἐν μάχῃ σοφὸν μάλιστα, δρῶντα πολεμίους κακῶς σῴζειν τὸ σῶμα, μὴ ᾿κ τύχης ὡρμισμένον, Thuc. 6.23.3: ἐλάχιστα τῇ τύχῃ παραδοὺς ἐμαυτὸν βούλομαι ἐκπλεῖν, παρασκευῇ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰκότων ἀσφαλὴς ἐκπλεῦσαι, Dem. 50.20: οἶμαι δ’ ἂν, εἴ τις αὐτοὺς τοὺς παραταξαμένους ἐρωτήσειεν πότερ’ ἡγοῦνται ταῖς αὑτῶν ἀρεταῖς ἢ τῇ παραδόξῳ καὶ χαλεπῇ τύχῃ κατωρθωκέναι καὶ τῇ τοῦ προεστηκότος αὑτῶν ἐμπειρίᾳ καὶ τόλμῃ, οὐδέν’ οὔτ’ ἀναίσχυντον οὔτε τολμηρὸν οὕτως εἶναι, ὅντιν’ ἀντιποιήσεσθαι τῶν πεπραγμένων. On the contrary, leaving the outcome of a conflict to luck could have devastating consequences. Cf. Thuc. 7.61.3 (Nicias before
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the battle with the Syracusans): τὸ τῆς τύχης κἂν μεθ’ ἡμῶν ἐλπίσαντες στῆναι, 7.67.4: ὑπερβαλλόντων γὰρ αὐτοῖς τῶν κακῶν καὶ βιαζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῆς παρούσης ἀπορίας ἐς ἀπόνοιαν καθεστήκασιν οὐ παρακευῆς πίστει μᾶλλον ἢ τύχης ἀποκινδυνεῦσαι οὕτως ὅπως δύνανται, 7.68.1: πρὸς οὖν ἀταξίαν τε τοιαύτην καὶ τύχην ἀνδρῶν ἑαυτὴν παραδεδωκυῖαν πολεμιωτάτων, Antiph. 6.15: οὐ δῆτα ἔγωγε, πλήν γε τῆς τύχης, ἥπερ οἶμαι καὶ ἂλλοις πολλοῖς ἀνθρώπων αἰτία ἐστὶν ἀποθανεῖν. It is therefore reasonable to believe that the jurors might have admired his attitude. Towards the end of the 5th century B.C., however, all the Greeks began to take the luck factor more into consideration, as is illustrated by the representations of luck occurring for the first time during this period (see L.Villard, LIMC VIII.1 1997, 124). On the contrary, the speaker seems to demonstrate by his flight the main view of Thucydides that history is made by the actions of people rather than pure chance (see Gribble, Alcibiades, 166). ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ παρασκευῆς τῆς ἐμῆς: παρασκευή means the existence of the necessary equipment for the ship and the training of the crew under the supervision of the trierarch (see Morrison and Coates, GOS, 308). The training of one hundred and seventy Athenians in order to be able to row as a team created a spirit of joint activity, turning the trireme into a school of democracy for the citizens (see B.S.Strauss, ‘The Athenian trireme, school of democracy’ in Demokratia: A conversation on democracies, ancient and modern, J.Ober and C.Hedrick (eds.), Princeton 1996, 313 – 26); however, this training was difficult to take place as a project (see Morrison and Williams, GOS, 309 – 310). The jurors, hearing from the beginning of the speech the speaker indicate that he had served as a trierarch for seven consecutive years (§ 2), would fully accept his claim here that he had evaluated the importance of the campaign long before. Moreover, such a claim is entirely justified, since the Athenian fleet was sailing to Chios and Ephesus and was preparing for battle (see Xen. Hell.2.1.16). Thus, the speaker by his action and through his own trireme, which is a microcosm of democracy, appears as a protector of democracy and of the citizens that support it. This is a key reason for the jurors to owe him favour (see § 25). The projection of the ethos of Lysias’ client attempts here to reverse the negative feelings that prevailed in Athens against the trierarchs as a whole (see Introduction, The identity of the speaker, 16 – 17). εἶχον γὰρ χρήμασι πείσας: The pilots received high wages but also economic benefits (see Amit, Athens and the Sea, 42). The speaker here does not refer to the normal salary but to an additional financial allowance he provided to his pilot (see Harvey, “Dona ferentes”, 83-cf. on the contrary Aesch. 2.148, where the same phrase is used for bribery) so that his trireme is the most battle worthy
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(see Morrison and Williams, GOS, 258, Morrison and Coates, Athenian Trireme, 119). It was also necessary for a speaker to pay his pilot so that the rowers did not desert the ship (cf. B.Strauss, ‘Perspectives on the death of fifth-century Athenian seamen’ in v.Wees, War and Violence, 269). Towards the end of the 5th century B.C. the view that money was needed to achieve a military success was still new, thus the orators of the city focused on this matter in order to make the Athenians realize this (see Kallet-Marx, “Money talks”, 242– 43). Thus, on the basis of the effort of the public speakers to persuade the ecclesia that war requires money, the speaker, although he had supported the city in the past by his personal wealth to continue the war (see § 3), takes advantage of the situation and urges the jurors to evaluate in earnest the value of wealth to the benefit of the city. Relying on this, the client of Lysias can then make an extensive reference to his property (see §§ 13 – 14). The action of the speaker to secure Phantias as his pilot by giving him money supports Pericles’ view that wars are won mainly by having an ample money supply (cf. Thuc. 2.13.2, see L.Kallet-Marx, Money, Expense and Naval Power in Thucydides’ History, 1– 5.24, Oxford 1993, 205). κυβερνήτην Φαντίαν ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον: The κυβερνήτης was the first officer of a vessel (Amit, Athens and the sea, 29) and he was the main figure of it (Ste. Croix, Origins, 395 n.7). He was responsible for the safety of the ship and during a battle he was under the command of the trierarch (see Gomme, HCT, v. 1, 23). Concerning the pilot, no other text mentions this Phantias and he is the only Phantias mentioned in Athens. On the basis of the existing schlarly knowledge on how a trireme departed (see Morrison and Williams, GOS, 200 – 01), we can assume that at the time of the διέκπλους (cf. comm. § 9 ὅτε γὰρ ἐν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ αἱ νῆες διεφθάρησαν) the speaker gave direct instructions to Phantias and the rowers through the boatswain for the ship to leave. Phantias, moving the rudder to the left or right or keeping it in the vertical, directed the trireme through the attacking Spartan fleet. ὃς ἐδόκει τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἄριστος εἶναι: To become a pilot one had to start his career first as a simple sailor, then as a πρῳρεύς (πρῳράτης) and finally as a pilot (see Casson, Ships, 302 n.9), therefore we can assume that Phantias had thus obtained that specific qualification. Additionally, as many Athenians were good pilots thanks to the experience gained in the seas and to their training on board commercial ships (cf. [Xen.] Ath.Pol.1.20), it is likely that in the same way Phantias had acquired the valuable experience necessary for the naval engagement of the Hellespont.
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By using ἐδόκει the speaker makes it clear that he does not express his own opinion, but Phantias’ reputation had taken panhellenic proportions. Thus, his own reputation as a trierarch indirectly becomes nationwide. The designation of Phantias as a top pilot means that he had the appropriate technical knowledge and ability to govern a ship better than anyone else (cf. Plat. Resp.341cd, Xen. Hell.1.5.11, Mem.1.2.9, 3.9.11). The speaker stresses the value of his pilot, because the contribution of the pilots in a naval battle was decisive for the outcome (cf. Thuc. 7.70.3,6, Diod. 13.39 – 40). He also wants to flatter his audience, since the recognition of the role of the pilot was equal to the recognition of the naval force of the city, which was created by the Athenian demos (cf. Plut. Them.19.5 – 6, B.Strauss, ‘Democracy, Kimon, and the Evolution of Athenian Naval Tactics in the Fifth Century BC.’ in Polis and Politics: Studies in Ancient Greek History presented to Mogens Herman Hansen on his sixtieth birthday, August 20, 2000, P.F.Jensen-T.H.Nielsen-L.Rubinstein (eds.), Copenhagen 2000, 316 – 17). παρεσκευασάμην δὲ καὶ τὸ πλήρωμα πρὸς ἐκεῖνον καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ὑπηρεσίαν ἀκόλουθον: The crew of a ship numbered two hundred sailors in total. The ὑπηρεσία was a special category of thirty men. It included the ἐπιβάται, ten hoplites, the non-commissioned officers (κελευστής, πεντηκόνταρχος, πρῳράτης ναυπηγός, αὐλητής) and the four archers (see Amit, Athens and the Sea, 29, Morrison and Coates, Athenian Trireme, 109 – 111, J.S.Morrison, ‘Hyperesia in naval contexts in the fifth and fourth centuries BC’ JHS 104 (1984), 48 – 59). The Athenian state distributed the sailors on the ships from public lists but they did not always all end up on them. Even if they ended up on a ship, they were not accepted as sufficient for the task (see Morrison and Williams, GOS, 274 n.40), because the trierarch bore full responsibility for the recruitment of rowers (see Gabrielsen, Athenian Fleet, 105 – 110). Therefore, the speaker implies here that he chose the men of his crew, saw to their training (see Amit, Athens and the Sea, 114) and he consequently did not thoughtlessly accept the men that the city chose for him. Lysias’ client emphasizes Phantias and the ὑπηρεσία, because on every ship these specific members of the crew were the assistants of the trierarch (see Morrison and Williams, GOS, 255 – 56, 266 – 68). ἀκόλουθον: Morrison and Williams, GOS, 258, argue that, at this point, the speaker implies that he gave extra money to ensure the specific officers as his crew, citing also Dem. 51.6, where the litigant refers to the κρατίστην ὑπηρεσίαν, which he obtained by giving them extra money. But what the speaker implies here is that it was hard to make his staff obey the orders of the pilot and not that he found necessary to increase the wages of these men (for the correct interpretation of the adjective see LSJ s.v. ἀκόλουθος). Here the speaker demon-
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strates to the jurors more than ever his ability as a trierarch since, although on all previous occasions he certainly secured the most suitable crews for his ship (cf. comm. §§ 7– 8), his difficulty at Aegospotami was to restrain his men when they saw almost all the others despise Lysander and disembark. This testimony reinforces the credibility of the historical sources when they refer to laxity in the Athenian camp (see Introduction, The defeat at Aegospotami, 10). The recruitment of appropriate rowers was a difficult matter because of the fear of desertion and the need to make up for losses (see Gabrielsen, Athenian Fleet, 122– 24), so the speaker stresses his strong personal commitment to ensure the effectiveness of the crew in times of crisis as in the Hellespont. Considering the duties of ὑπηρεσία (see Morrison and Coates, Athenian Trireme, 112,120, Pritchett, War I, 38 – 39,45 – 46), we can speculate on how the crew performed their duties: Before the Spartans attacked, the πεντηκόνταρχος, who was the treasurer of the pilot and responsible for buying and expenses, was going to Sestus to buy food, accompanied by some members of the crew. At the time of their escape the archers, sitting next to the trierarch and the pilot, gave them protection, in particular to the pilot, as he was too busy to defend himself. The πρῳράτης directed the rowers making them give their best, carrying out the orders of the pilot. The κελευστής, as the main assistant of the pilot, was obeying the latter’s command, while the αὐλητής was giving the rhythm of rowing to the sailors. καὶ ταῦθ’ ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω, πάντες ἐπίστασθε, ὃσοι ἐτυγχάνετε ὄντες ἐκεῖ τῶν στρατιωτῶν: The speaker uses the additive καί for the second time in the same paragraph to reveal another piece of information about Aegospotami (see Denniston, GP, 293), namely that all those who were in the Hellespont know that he was telling the truth. The invocation of the testimony of the jurors as former co-fighters and thus eyewitnesses was the usual practice. The generals of the battle of Arginousai invoked as witnesses the testimony of the pilots of the vessels and the members of their crews (see Xen. Hell.1.7.6), and so did Euryptolemus, in turn, in the speech he made to support them (see Xen. Hell.1.7.32). The defender of Polystratus documents the bravery of his brother in the same way: Τὸν δὲ πρεσβύτατον ἀδελφὸν αὐτοί οἱ συστρατευόμενοι ἴσασιν, οἵτινες μετὰ Λέοντος ἦτε ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ, ὥστε νομίζειν μηδενὸς ἥττον’ εἶναι ἀνθρώπων τὴν ψυχήν ([Lys]. 20.29), whereas Apollodorus invokes the memory of the jurors in order to reinforce his ethos: ὅσοι μὲν τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἐστε καὶ παρῆτε ἐκεῖ, αὐτοί τε ἀναμνήσθητε καὶ τοῖς παρακαθημένοις φράζετε την τ’ ἐμὴν προθυμίαν καὶ τὰ συμβάντα ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τῇ πόλει πράγματα καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας, ἵνα ἐκ τούτων εἰδῆτε ὁποῖος εἰμι περὶ ἄν προστάξητε ὑμεῖς (Dem. 50.3). In the same way as the speaker, Demosthenes attempts to prove his point of view on the events in Perinthus and
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Alopeconnesus saying: ὅτι τοίνυν ταῦτ’ ἀληθῆ λέγω, τῶν μὲν τῷ στρατηγῷ συμβάντων δήπου μάρτυρες ὑμεῖς ἐστέ μοι (23.168). Finally Isocrates, referring to the Persian wars, invokes those who took part in the events to criticise what he reports: Καίτοι τίνας ἄν τις κριτὰς ἱκανωτέρους ποιήσαιτο καὶ πιστοτέρους τῶν τότε πραχθέντων ἢ τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀγῶσι παραγενομένους; (12.52). Nevertheless, the litigants of the 4th century B.C. who had served in the infantry could not use the same tactic, since it was the mercenaries and not the Athenian citizens who served on the battlefield (cf. Dem. 4.47). We must consider it as certain that Lysias believed in the efficiency of this tactic in this particular trial, since he uses it in his speech against Eratosthenes: ταῦτα δὲ ἐπίστασθε μὲν καὶ αὐτοί, καὶ οἶδ’ ὅ τι δεῖ μάρτυρας παρέχεσθαι· ὅμως δέ (12.61). By using ταῦτα the speaker means that the jurors know that no general sailed on his ship, that he saved his ship and that of Nausimachus and that he had convinced Phantias to be his pilot and all his crew to follow the latter’s orders. His certainty, however, should not become easily accepted, because the people who took part in the battle could not remember because of fear certain details, as those the speaker mentions, but could still remember some of them (cf. A.J.Woodman, Rhetoric in Classical Historiography, London 1988, 17– 23). Obviously, by mentioning all these details, the logographer believed that even if the jurors remembered one piece of information, this would be enough for his client to win their favour. What is quite difficult to understand is how the speaker appears to be so sure that among the jurors there were people who had fought with him then. Twelve vessels returned in Athens (see comm. § 11), which means that two thousand four hundred men were rescued, and thus they could serve as jurors. Taking into consideration that six thousand jurors served in Athens every year and that they were divided into a small number of large court groups rather than numerous smaller court groups (see Christ, Litigious Athenian, 44), Lysias estimated that up to 1/3 of the old ex-colleagues might be among the current critics of his client. But even if that year fewer fighters than those who took part in the Hellespont were registered as jurors because of the previous lethal famine during the Spartan blockade (cf. Xen. Hell.2.2.10 – 18,21), some would have survived and definitely been registered. Besides, he divides the audience into those who served as soldiers (ὅσοι) and those who heard what had happened then for the first time. Wolpert (Remembering Defeat, 7) argues that the speaker referred to the jurors present at the Hellespont in order to create a personal relationship with them, to predispose them to be positive about his arguments, so that they would eventually hear his case as supporters and allies rather than as an impartial body. What was therefore important in this case was not the presence of all the jurors in the Hellespont but the reference of the litigants to them as sharing
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joint experiences. I may say that I agree with Wolpert and remark that the tactic he describes is used by Aeschines against Timarchus, who treated the jurors as one body (cf. 1.65). Moroever, I may say that although the speaker has divided the jurors into two parts, I suspect that Lysias does not seem preoccupied about the jurors who had not fought at Aegospotami, because he believed that after recounting the facts so far they would not be annoyed (cf. Thuc. 2.35.2 and Pericles’ division of his audience into those who know and do not know the deeds of the war dead), but, on the contrary, his client would have won their favour (see Introductory comm. §§ 9 – 10). κάλεσον δὲ καὶ Ναυσίμαχον: The best possible choice for the client of Lysias could not be any other than the testimony of the beneficiary himself. Another equally important reason is that Nausimachus served in the Hellespont having the same duties as the speaker. This testimony is the only one that survives within the whole of forensic speeches related to the naval battle at Aegospotami (cf. Lys. 6.46, 12.43, 14.38, 16.4, 18.4, 19.16, Isocr. 18.60), and one might expect that more witnesses were called and especially the sailors from the ship of the speaker to testify in his favour. This probably did not happen, because the charges against the trierarchs (§ 9) were made by the soldiers themselves who took part at Aegospotami (cf. Thuc. 8.72.2 the characterization of the sailors as ναυτικός ὄχλος, Kapellos, 2009, 257 and Introduction, The defeat at Aegospotami, 1– 2 about the troops as a threat to their superiors), so hardly anyone would like to testify in favour of the speaker. But even if some of the soldiers had nothing negative to say against the client of Lysias, it is most likely that they were afraid to testify in his favour, fearing the general reaction of their fellow citizens who believed that the trierarchs should be held responsible for the defeat (see comm. § 9 καὶ τοῖς τριηράρχοις ὠργίσθητε διὰ τὴν γενομένην συμφοράν and Thuc. 6.24.4 about the attitude of the minority against the impetuous will of the many). For a soldier to call witnesses on his behalf was very easy, especially when his participation in a military conflict was victorious, as the co-speaker of Polystratus makes evident, who refers to the bravery of his brother in a few words and invokes as witnesses more than one of his former fellow soldiers (cf. [Lys.] 20.29 with Αποστολάκης, Πολύστρατος, 227– 28). The inability to call more witnesses to testify forces the speaker to refer to the testimony of a single but nevertheless very important witness, the man whose life he saved. An important reason for the testimony of Nausimachus was his wish for the return of the benefaction (see Arist. Rhet.1361a30 – 31, Blundell, Helping Friends, 32 – 33). Since the return of gratitude was not mandatory, it is also likely that the testimony in favour of the speaker was due to a joint tactic
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of the trierarchs who returned from the Hellespont (cf Isocr. 18.60) and a testimony to the solidarity that they developed as a means of resistance against the aggression of the demos. Taking into consideration that the Athenians who agreed to testify shared the risks that threatened the main opponents of a trial (see S.Todd, ‘The purpose of evidence in Athenian courts’ in Cartlege-Millett-Todd, Nomos, 23 – 31), we can be certain that this is a form of solidarity among ὅμοιοι which is enhanced by the presence of Nausimachus in the courtroom throughout the delivery of the speech by the speaker (see S.Amigues, ‘Le temps de l’impératif dans les ordres de l’orateur au greffier’ REG 90 (1977), 227– 29). At the very moment the speaker refers to the events in the Hellespont, followed by the testimony of Nausimachus, the atmosphere in court must have been highly charged. ΜΑΡΤΥΡΙΑ: The speaker, like all the litigants, gives his own version of the events and calls the particular witness for two reasons: 1) to confirm what he has already reported and 2) to give the impression to the jurors that he enjoys the full support of the man who knows what happened better than anyone else (for these issues see R.J.Bonner, Evidence in Athenian courts, Chicago 1905, 54, S.Humphreys, ‘Social relations on stage: witnesses in classical Athens’ in Oxford Readings in the Attic Orators, E.Carawan (ed.), Oxford 2007, 176). More precisely, the speaker expects Nausimachus here to testify that he did not only save his life but to say exactly how he was saved, τά γενόμενα (cf. Rubinstein, Litigation, 73), a particularly important issue for his strategy here (cf. C.Carey, ‘Legal Space in Classical Athens’ G & R 41 (1994), 183 – 84). In this way, the witness assists the attempt of the speaker to guide the minds of the jurors to what actually happened in the Hellespont (cf. Introductory comm. §§ 9 – 10) and simultaneously he gives extra information (cf. Introductory comm. § 10). Finally, Nausimachus indirectly praises the speaker for his fighting spirit, without the latter having to boast on this issue, a tactic which he will use in a next part of his speech in order to help his defensive strategy (cf. comm. § 11 Καὶ οὕτω πολλοὺς κινδύνους … τὴν πόλιν). § 11. Αἱ μὲν τοίνυν σωθεῖσαι τῶν δώδεκα ἦσαν: Other texts give conflicting information on the number of escaped ships (see Krentz, Hellenica I, 177). Ηere the speaker provides the important information that only twelve ships survived the sea-battle in the Hellespont. Bommelaer (Lysandre, 108) dοubts this testimony, holding that the logographer used number twelve in confusion because of the terms of the capitulation, which provided for the surrender of all the Athenian ships except twelve (Xen. Hell.2.2.20). Accepting such a view, however, would mean that Lysias, just one year after the return of the rescued ships,
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ignored such an important piece of information, although his intention was to strengthen the defence of his client by referring to his activity in the Hellespont. Isocrates, writing many years after the naval battle in the Hellespont, might have been mistaken about the number of ships lost when he referred to two hundred triremes (8.86) instead of one hundred and eighty (Xen. Hell.2.1.20, Diod. 13.105), because his speech was not delivered before a real court audience and therefore there were no repercussions in the event of any historical inaccuracies (cf. Isocr. 9.68 with Alexiou, Euagoras, 163 – 64). Similar historical discrepancies and inaccuracies we can also find in one of Andocides’ speeches, when he refers to events that took place fifty years before the delivery of his speech (see K.J.Maidment, Minor Attic Orators I: Antiphon Andokides, London and Cambridge, 494 – 95, Thomas, Oral Tradition, 119 – 223). Lysias, however, is addressing people who learned after the battle that some ships escaped (cf. comm. § 10 καὶ ταῦθ’ ὅτι … τῶν στρατιωτῶν). The view of Ehrhardt, “Aegospotami”, 229 and Roberts, P.Ryl. 489, 105, that some Athenians, except those who survived Aegospotami with nine ships (Xen. Hell.2.1.29), managed to reach Sestus and escape with three ships confirms the number given by Lysias. It is likely that Lysander, being responsible for the number of ships that Athens should keep (see J.A.R.Munro, ‘The end of the Peloponnesian War’ CQ 31 (1937), 36 – 38), decided that Athens would maintain only those vessels that had managed to escape from the Hellespont. This could have been done for the Athenians to remember that only a small number of triremes had managed to escape from the Hellespont and thus blemish their military prestige even more, despite their desire to forget those sad events (see comm. § 9). The reference to the number of the ships which escaped does not seem to worry Lysias but, on the contrary, he expects that the jurors will quite positively evaluate the fact that his client was one of the few survivors. ἐγὼ δ’ ὑμῖν δύο ἐκόμισα, τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ καὶ τὴν Ναυσιμάχου τριήρη: The speaker places at the beginning of this sentence the personal pronoun ὑμῖν, which in this case functions as a personal dative of benefit (see Cooper, Syntax, 278 – 81) in order to emphasise the fact that the recipient of his action, i. e. the rescue of his ship and Nausimachus’ ship, is no other than the demos. The same emphasis on the Athenian demos is also made by Demosthenes when, opposing Leptines’ proposal, he says: σκεψώμεθα δὴ τίνας ἡμῖν εἰσποιεῖ χορηγοὺς εἰς ἐκείνας τὰς λῃτουργίας (Dem. 20.19). Demosthenes uses the first person of the pronoun to show that his interest is identical with the public interest but he is not the one on trial. On the other hand, the speaker, since he was the defendant in this trial and his honesty towards his fellow citizens was strongly disputed (see § 21), is bound to convince the jurors that he cares for the common
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good, that is why he uses the the second person of the personal pronoun. See §§ 12, 14, 17, 23, 25. By using the same pronoun, he will also seek to demonstrate to the jurors that they bear some kind of responsibility towards him. See §§ 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 25. Καὶ οὕτω πολλοὺς κινδύνους ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν κεκινδυνευκώς καὶ τοσαῦτα ἀγαθὰ εἰργασμένος τὴν πόλιν: The speaker begins his argument by referring to the dangers he faced, a tactic which Lysias uses in other speeches too. Cf. e. g. 10.2, 18.7. In this passage the speaker uses the hyperbaton figure by means of the prepositional phrase ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν so that he can emphasize that he faced these dangers to defend the Athenian demos. The prepositional phrase ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν was also used in § 3 by the speaker, when he referred to the same dangers. The speaker so far in the narrative has not fully explained how and why he had encountered many dangers. Nevertheless, the initial connection of the present statement with the projection of his military ethos (see comm. § 3 καθ’ ἡμέραν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν κινδυνεύων) and, in particular, his claim that he did a lot of harm to the enemies by his activity at Aegospotami (τοὺς πολεμίους εἰργάσθαι κακά, see comm. §§ 9 – 10) leaves no room for the jurors to contest his claim. On the importance of this argument cf. comm. § 25 ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις … ἔχοντος. The second claim ἀγαθὰ εἰργασμένος τὴν πόλιν is also a frequent rhetorical argument, which is used by the litigants either to praise the actions of people referred to (cf. Lys. 5.3, 13.95, 14.10, 19.19, Andoc. 1.141, Dem. 19.280, 20.112) or to tarnish the image of their opponent (cf. Lys. 6.40, 13.26,33,76, 18.2, fr. CLXX ll. 205 – 7 (Carey), Isocr. 5.61, Aesch. 3.226). The argument, as it is formulated by the speaker, will be also used about the democratic Athenians of this period who fought for the removal of the Thirty and the restoration of democracy. Cf. Lys. 25.28: τῶν ἐκ Πειραιῶς οἱ μεγίστην δόξαν ἔχοντες καὶ μάλιστα κεκινδυνευκότες καὶ πλεῖστα ὑμᾶς ἀγαθὰ εἰργασμένοι. Studying all these passages with reference to the speaker’s second claim, we can see that several litigants comment on the acts of someone else but not their own. However, the speaker refers to himself in the first person describing his own actions. This was done in order to show that he was solely responsible for his actions and thus convince the jurors that it would be to the benefit of the city if he were acquitted. Other ligitants also used this tactic but not with the same degree of persuasiveness (cf. Lys. 25.4). This was the beginning of a tactic which was going to be used by litigants in the 4th century B.C. (cf. Isocr. 16.35) and which will be developed fully by Demosthenes (cf. Rubinstein, Litigation, 195, Dem. 13.13, 18.10 with Usher, Demosthenes, 173). Cf. also his comment (Demosthenes, 20), which is also valid, in my opinion, concerning our speaker: ‘nei-
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ther orator allows the facts to speak for themselves, but Demosthenes has developed the mixture to the point, where his personality presides over both the events and their interpretation’-my emphasis). Besides, self-praise was not an insult to the audience, when someone was defending himself and referred to his public action (see Montiglio, Silence, 126, cf. I.Rutherford, ’The poetics of the parapthegmata: ‘Aelius Aristides and the decorum of self-praise’ in Ethics and Rhetoric, D.Innes-H.Hines-C.Pelling (eds.), Oxford 1995, 193 – 204). The speaker, on the basis of the idea that those who have offered ἀγαθά in favour of the city deserved the χάρις of their fellow citizens (cf. Lys. 6.36, 25.11), although he does not explicitly refer to it, prepares the jurors for the first time for his main demand (cf. § 17 and § 25). The second move towards achieving the goals of his strategy will be made later on (cf. comm. § 13 ὥστ’ ἄξιον … τῶν ἐθελόντων λῃτουργεῖν ). νυνὶ δέομαι οὐ δωρεὰν ὥσπερ ἕτεροι ἀντὶ τούτων παρ’ ὑμῶν λαβεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ στερηθῆναι τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ: The speaker, by using the emphatic adverb of time νυνὶ, stresses for the first time how important the immediate satisfaction of his claim was for him, since he was threatened by an imminent danger (cf. §§ 16, 25). Having in mind the current political circumstances in the city (cf. comm. § 25 ὑμᾶς νυνὶ ἐν τῷ θαρραλέῳ ὄντας), the speaker demands the gratitude of the jurors (cf. comm. § 25 ἀπαιτῶ νῦν τὴν χάριν). Another defendant of Lysias also puts an emphasis on the present period of time by using the same adverb but for different reasons. Cf. 19.61– 62. See also the sources Rubinstein cites, Litigation, 213 n.52, in which she includes sections of our speech, § 17 erroneously and § 25 without explaining the use of νῦν (the present passage is not mentioned at all). Δωρεά was the attribution of a honorary wreath to a fellow citizen by the Athenians for his political contribution to the city (see Usher, Demosthenes, 13), ἀτέλεια from the liturgies (cf. Dem. 20.29 with Sandys, Demosthenes, 33) and σίτησις ἐν πρυτανείῳ for those who had excelled in the panhellenic games (cf. Dem. 20.141 with Sandys, Demosthenes, 102). It was the mention of one’s name in an honorary inscription commemorating his victories in various festivals, the election in public office (see Fisher, SVCA, 28, Reden, Exchange, 98) and the recall from exile (cf. Isocr. 16.11, Dem. Lett.2.5). Δωρεά for the generals meant taking the leadership of the city army (cf. Dem. 23.196 – 97), especially after their military success (cf. Aesch. 3.243) and building Herm stones or statues in their honour (cf. Dem. 13.21– 23, Aesch. 3.182– 83). Taking into consideration that the good citizens were competing among themselves for donations offered by the demos (cf. Dem. 20.108) and that the
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donations were given to famous Athenians even for major issues, the speaker is fully justified in demanding that he should not be deprived of his property (this is the meaning of the phrase τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ- cf. Isocr. 18.64 and Xen. Oec.18). P.Millett (‘The Rhetoric of Reciprocity in Classical Athens’ in Reciprocity in Ancient Greece, Ch.Gill- N.Postlethwaite-R.Seaford (eds.), Oxford 1998, 232) argues that the speaker presents the favour he is asking for as something simple. However, the favour that the speaker requests is not primarily and directly related to the deprivation of his property, but to his acquittal of the charges against him (cf. § 21). The deprivation of property would be one of the consequences of his punishment (cf. § 25). Moreover, the granting of the donation by the city was easier than the return of a favour (cf. Dem. 51.17). His request is based on the belief that the man who had the right to manage his property could use it safely as he wished (cf. Arist. Rhet.1361a19). Now, if the property was going to be used for the benefit of the city, as the speaker proves, this would be a satisfactory reason for the wealthy citizens to keep their property (cf. Dem. 10.45). Thus the speaker here can be bluntly honest to the jurors about his wishes and later on support in a credible way that he can manage his property more effectively than anyone else (cf. § 14). Although the speaker presents his request as something simple to highlight its value he implies that he deserves the donation. The argument is apt, since in Athens one could request a donation from one’s fellow citizens if the city, after many hardships, could again believe in its own strength (cf. Aesch. 3.167) just as at the time the speech was delivered (cf. comm. § 25 ὑμᾶς νυνί ἐν τῷ θαρραλέῳ ὄντας). ἡγούμενος καὶ ὑμῖν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι παρά τε ἑκόντος καὶ παρ’ ἄκοντος ἑμοῦ λαμβάνειν: The adjective αἰσχρός is used by the orators to express an act that causes the frustration, the contempt or the hostility of someone (see Adkins, MR, 31– 33,156 – 58, Dover, GPM, 70). By using this adjective the speaker wishes to emotionally attract the jurors and state his concern over being convicted, since this would be equal to public acceptance by the jurors that their πενία is the main reason leading to his conviction (cf. Adkins, MR, 161, 204– 5). However, that would also confirm the view of the oligarchs: ἥ τε γὰρ πενία αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον ἄγει ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ ([Xen]. Ath.Pol.1.5). In this way, Lysias’ client forces the jurors to create a negative image of themselves in order to persuade them to acquit him (cf. Cairns, Aidos, 397). The speaker implies the issue of the negative consequences the πενία can have for the jurors without explicitly acknowledging the possible reason for his conviction, since this would alienate them and make them hostile towards him. Instead, at no point of his speech will he declare contempt
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or hatred for the jurors. On the contrary, he will demonstrate that his interests and the interests of the demos are identical (cf. §§ 12– 18). The emotional and political significance of the adjective αἰσχρόν is so great for the speaker’s rhetorical strategy that he will repeat it in the epilogue in order to comment on his possible conviction (see comm. § 25). Regarding his voluntary offer (ἑκόντος ἑμοῦ λαμβάνειν), we should mention that the speaker proved what his intention was at an earlier point of his speech (cf. comm. § 5 εἰ ἐβουλόμην … τὸ τέταρτον μέρος ἀνήλωσα) and he does the same later on: ταύτην ἡγεῖσθαι πρόσοδον βεβαιοτάτην τῇ πόλει, τὰς οὐσίας τῶν ἐθελόντων λῃτουργεῖν (§ 13), ἕξετε πᾶσι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἡμετέροις ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον (§ 14), δημοσίᾳ δὲ λῃτουργῶν ἥδομαι (§ 16). About the significance of the voluntary offers of the wealthy citizens cf. Anax. Rhet.Alex.2.16 – 17. The speaker will also make clear from now on what the consequences for the jurors are going to be if he has to give his money involuntarily (παρ’ ἄκοντος λαμβάνειν): οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην ὑβρισθῆναι, ἐκείνους δὲ δοκεῖν ὀρθῶς βεβουλεῦσθαι ὅτι ὑμῖν οὐδὲν προεῖνται τῶν σφετέρων αὐτῶν (§ 12), ἐὰν δ’ ἐμὲ πένητα ποιήσητε, καὶ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀδικήσετε (§ 14). § 12. καὶ οὐ τοσοῦτον μοι μέλει εἴ με δεῖ τὰ ὄντα ἀπολέσαι: This sentence is quite a revelation as regards the way the speaker deals with his property. The use of οὐ τοσοῦτον shows that the speaker is interested in it. Gabrielsen, not taking into consideration οὐ τοσοῦτον, believes that the speaker is actually lying by saying that he is not interested in his property, since in §§ 13 – 14 he attempts to convince the jurors that his own money is also their money (Athenian Fleet, 11). This, however, cannot be true because of the penalty that is threatening him and his family, something that the researcher does not take into consideration either: ἄτιμοι γενέσθαι, ἢ στερηθέντες τῶν ὑπαρχόντων πένητες εἶναι καὶ πολλῶν ἐνδεεῖς ὄντες περιιέναι (§ 25). ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην ὑβρισθῆναι: The speaker states to the jurors that he cannot accept being found guilty, since this would amount to ὕβρις. In no case does he mean he will suffer ὕβρις because of the jurors themselves, because this would be a direct attack against them, a tactic which the litigants avoided (see Carey, “Τα όρια του δημοσίου λόγου”, 46 – 48). In contrast, he refers to the probability of his conviction, which is equivalent to hybristic behaviour by his opponents and the recognition of their right to cause αἰσχύνην to his person. This would occur, since ὕβρις was the deprivation of someone’s property when it brought dishonour to the victim (cf. comm. § 25) and an attitude of contempt and excessive self-confidence by the perpetrator (see N.R.E.Fisher, ‘Hybris and Dishonour: I’ GRBS 23 (1976), 184, cf. Introduction, The defeat at Aegospotami, 7).
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Thus the speaker gives the understanding that if the jurors actually believe the accusations against him, they will automatically become jointly responsible. To prevent this eventuality the speaker presents the behaviour of his prosecutors as hybristic (cf. Fisher, Hybris, 94– 95, Dem. 21.6 with MacDowell, Meidias, 225, 30.2, 43.77, 45.1, 54.1, 56.12, 57.6, Isaeus 5.24, 12.12, Isocr. 16.48). The speaker’s warning, however, about his possible reaction is justified according to the Greek code of values, since a victim may become angry and feel the strong desire to get revenge and restore his honour by punishing his ὑβριστής (see Fisher, ‘Hybris and Dishonour: I’, 180). Fisher, SVCA, 29, on the basis of this passage, argues that the jurors took into consideration the fact that if they condemned the rich citizens in order to take their property, the latter would react against the democratic regime and against assuming liturgies. This observation does not apply in this particular case, because the speaker would no longer be able to assume liturgies if a penalty were to be imposed (see § 25). In my opinion, the speaker’s words are an indirect warning of potential social unrest in the future, which might be provoked by wealthy people who were or would be in a position similar to his. Such a reaction on the speaker’s side was quite unusual but it was not unknown in the Greek world (cf. Arist. Pol.1266a37– 39, see Ober, Mass and Elite, 241, Gabrielsen, Athenian Fleet, 11– 12). My point is reinforced by the fact that the speaker later on characterises his enemies as sycophants (§ 17), i. e. a group of people who were considered responsible for στάσεις in the Greek cities (see “Harvey, ‘Sykophant”, 118, cf. Loening, Reconciliation, 106). The speaker, by means of what he implies here, attempts to alert the jurors to the seriousness of the trial. The latter are sure to have considered his words, as the years following the amnesty were marked by particular tensions among the social classes in Athens (see Strauss, Athens, 89 – 92, Ober, Mass and Elite, 95 – 100). The attribution of the term ὑβρισταί to his prosecutors aims to differentiate their ethos from the speaker’s a little later on, when he will refer to his σωφροσύνη (§ 19), since the two terms have contrasting meanings (see Rademaker, Sophrosyne, 257– 58). οὐδὲ παραστῆναι τοῖς διαδυομένοις τὰς λῃτουργίας ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀχάριστα εἶναι τὰ εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀνηλωμένα, ἐκείνους δὲ ὀρθῶς βεβουλεῦσθαι ὅτι ὑμῖν προεῖνται τῶν σφετέρων αὐτῶν: This argument refers to two separate groups: on the one hand the speaker (ἐμοὶ μὲν) and on the other hand those who avoid assuming liturgies (ἐκείνους). The key question here is how they should keep their money. The speaker refers to the money in a single phrase, τὰ εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀνηλωμένα, taking for granted that the jurors do not need more clarification on a
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point made previously in the most exhaustive way (see §§ 1– 10). By the phrase τῶν σφετέρων αὐτῶν he also means his opponents’ money (cf. Lys. 29.9). Regarding his own person, the speaker argues that those who avoid assuming liturgies will form the opinion that the money he offered to the city was ἀχάριστα, while those who avoid giving their money to the demos will believe that they did right in not doing so (cf. Dem. 20.113). The choice of the adjective ἀχάριστα is particularly successful, since ingratitude meant that the demos did not recognise the value of a citizen and did not return him the favour for his offer (cf. Dem 20.113). The term “ungrateful’ was attributed to the Athenian demos by the oligarchs (cf. Theophr. Char.26.5), something that made the Athenians feel annoyed (cf. Aesch. 3.181– 82, Dem. 20.10,55,113,119, Hesk, Deception, 175 – 76). The speaker, however, is very careful and for this reason he does not directly characterise the jurors in this way, but he argues that the latter will give such an impression to those who hide their wealth. In this way he exercises some kind of psychological pressure on them in order to acquit him. At the same time, he expresses his indignation (οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην ὑβρισθῆναι οὐδὲ παραστῆναι), i. e. his pain at the undeserved good fortune of his opponents (cf. Konstan, Emotions, 112,122), who avoid assuming liturgies and remain unpunished, while he is accused in court, although he has spent so much for Athens (cf. comm. §§ 1– 5). The manifestation of such an emotion is justified at this moment, since indignation is declared, when one considers oneself worthy of honour rather than punishment (cf. § 11). Besides, indignation was acceptable even by moderate citizens like himself (cf. comm. § 18 ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων … περὶ αὐτῶν). Cf. Hermog. On Types of Style 2.8: Ἡ βαρύτης ἐννοίας μὲν ἔχει τὰς ὀνειδιστικὰς ἁπάσας, ὅταν εὐεργεσίας τις ἑαυτοῦ λέγων τὸ μηδενὸς ἢ ἐλαττόνων ἠξιῶσθαι ἢ καὶ τοὐναντίον, ὅτι καὶ τιμωρίας ἀντὶ τιμῆς ἠξίωται, ὀνειδίζῃ … Γίνονται μέντοι βαρύτητες κἀκ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν πως εἶναι δοκουσῶν ἐννοιῶν μεθοδευθεῖσαί πως, ὅταν τις … τῶν ἐναντίων ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου φαίνηται ἑαυτὸν … ἀξιῶν καὶ ὀνομάτων καὶ πραγμάτων. For the speaker the present trial was a matter of τιμή, a fact which allows him to be indignant (cf. Dover, GPM, 238 – 39). The speaker’s stance is related directly to that of many other Athenians who had chosen not to give their money for the benefit of the demos, so Lysias takes advantage of the opportunity to refer to such an important subject for Athenian society. This happened because the rich Athenians were bothered by the obligatory character of the liturgies, which they considered public intrusion on their property (see Christ, “Liturgy Avoidance”, 156 – 57). Moreover, since the burden of the financial backing fell increasingly on the rich citizens, they either avoided their financial obligations or they aimed at remaining inactive (see R.Thomsen, ‘War Taxes in Classical Athens’ in Armées et fiscalité dans le monde attique: Paris, 14 – 16 Octobre 1976, Colloques nationaux de Centre nationale de la recher-
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che scientifique, no. 936, Paris 1977, 135 – 47). The existence of ἀντίδοσις testifies that there were Athenians who were not willing to spend their fortune by assuming liturgies (cf. Dem. 20.22 with Sandys, Demosthenes, 24, see V.Gabrielsen, ‘The Antidosis Procedure in Classical Athens’ C & M 38 (1987), 37– 38, P.V.Stanley, ‘Release from Liturgical Service in Athens’ Laverna 4 (1993), 26 – 44), K.Apostolakis, ‘The Rhetoric of an Antidosis: [D.] 42 Against Phaenippus’ Αριάδνη 12 (2006), 106). Their stance, which was intensified mainly after the Sicilian expedition (see Missiou, Andokides, 84), led to the gradual weakening of democracy, since Athens could not collect the taxes she needed for her political decisions (see Ober, Mass and Elite, 203) and aim at a vigorous external policy (see Ste. Croix, “Demosthenes’ τίμημα”, 69 – 70). Thus Lysias exploits the suspicion of the Athenians that the rich citizens hide their property (see Christ, “Liturgy Avoidance”, 159 – 60) and points out to the jurors that the speaker’s opponents put their private interests above those of the city (cf. S.C.Humphreys, ‘Public and Private Interests in Classical Athens’ CJ 73 (1977), 102). What is important here is that the speaker claims that his punishment will have immediate consequences for the undemocratic behaviour of his opponents (ἐκείνους … τῶν σφετέρων αὐτῶν). Such an argument seems convincing, since it was almost impossible for someone to know the exact economic situation of the rich citizens because of the many ways they used to hide their property (see Finley, Land and Credit, 14,99 – 114, Gabrielsen, “ΟΥΣΙΑ”, Christ, “Liturgy Avoidance”, 158 – 59, Gabrielsen, Athenian Fleet, 9). However, making a closer reading of this passage we realize that the speaker makes an exaggerated statement: οὐδὲν προεῖνται τῶν σφετέρων αὐτῶν, because if his opponents wanted to hide all their money in order to avoid assuming liturgies, they should have sold all their property (cf. Finley, Land and Credit, 54– 55). Besides, hiding huge amounts of money was not something that was easy to do (see Gabrielsen, Athenian Fleet, 54– 57). Moreover, there is a contradiction in his claim. If someone wanted to belong to the class of those who assumed liturgies, he should have φανερὰν οὐσίαν (cf. L.Gernet, The Anthropology of Ancient Greece, transl. J.Hamilton and B.Nagy, Baltimore 1981, 345). Therefore, how is it possible that the plaintiffs have invisible property that includes them in this specific class and yet they do not have any money to fullfil their obligations at the same time? By this argument the logographer exploits the disfavour that the Athenians showed to those citizens who made their wealth invisible by turning it into cash (cf. Isaeus 5.43 with Wyse, Isaeus, 470), and attacks them by presenting them as ἀνελευθέρους (cf. Arist. Nic. Eth.1121b15 – 16,20 – 21).
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ἐὰν οὖν ἐμοὶ πεισθῆτε, τά τε δίκαια ψηφιεῖσθε καὶ τὰ λυσιτελοῦντα ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς αἰρήσεσθε: All litigants are aware that they have to persuade the jurors in order to win their case. But because they know that the jurors will have to choose between their version of events and that of their opponents, they choose first to confess explicitly that this is the prerequisite and then they formulate what the benefits for the former are going to be. This syllogism is most often expressed in the form of a conditional. For the sake of emphasis, some litigants, like the speaker, place the personal pronoun ἐμοί before the verb to emphasize their own words. Cf. Ιsocr. 20.21: Οὐκ, ἂν γέ μοι πεισθῆθ’, οὕτω διακείσεσθε πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς οὐδὲ διδάξετε τοὺς νεωτέρους καταφρονεῖν τοῦ πλήθους τῶν πολιτῶν, οὐδὲ ἀλλοτρίους ἡγήσεσθ’ εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους τῶν ἀγώνων, ἀλλ’ ὡς ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ δικάζων οὕτως ἕκαστος ὑμῶν οἴσει τὴν ψῆφον, Andoc. 1.149: Ὡς ἐμοὶ μὲν πειθόμενοι οὐκ ἀποστερεῖσθε εἴ τι ἐγώ δυνήσομαι ὑμᾶς εὖ ποιεῖν· ἐὰν δὲ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς τοῖς ἐμοῖς πεισθῆτε, οὐδ’ ἂν ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ ὑμῖν μεταμελήσῃ, οὐδὲν ἔτι πλέον ποιήσετε. It is also possible that the pronoun follows the verb. Cf. Dem. 18.176: ἂν μέντοι πεισθῆτ’ ἐμοὶ καὶ πρὸς τῷ σκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ φιλονικεῖν περὶ ὧν ἂν λέγω γένησθε. Last, cf. Aristoph. Wasps 747, Eccles.209. The speaker believes that in his case the jurors will reach a just verdict and that at the same time this verdict will be in their own interest (this is the reason why the speaker uses τε … καὶ, for which see Denniston, GP, 511– 21). This argument is particularly noteworthy because, according to Aristotle, deliberative oratory refers to the future and talks about interest, whereas forensic oratory refers to the present and is about justice (Rhet.1357a36-b29, see C.S.Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, New York 1924, 14– 15). The speaker combines the purpose of these two kinds of rhetoric with a view to obtaining his acquittal. Unlike the Old Oligarch who thought the courts in Athens were not aiming at justice, but only to serve their own interests ([Xen.] Ath.Pol.1.13: ἔν τε τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐ τοῦ δικαίου αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον μέλει ἢ τοῦ αὑτοῖς συμφόρου), the speaker adopts a more moderate attitude and argues that the jurors can combine justice and interest. It is interesting to notice that in the deliberative speeches of the same era the speakers attempt a synthesis of interest and justice (see G.A.Kennedy, ‘Focusing of Arguments in Greek Deliberative Oratory’ TAPA 90 (1959), 132– 33,136). This new argument is also applicable in the courtrooms, since the courts acted as sub-groups of the polis (see Ostwald, Sovereignty, 34– 5 with n.131; for another view see M.H.Hansen, ‘Demos, Ekklesia and Dikasterion: A Reply to Martin Ostwald and Josiah Ober’, The Athenian Ecclesia II, Copenhagen 1989, 213 – 8). We realise that the same argument is also used from now on by other litigants (cf. Lys. 19.64, Isocr. 18.68, Aesch. 2.118).
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In the present trial we may note that the speaker, like any other litigant, considers his acquittal as fair (see Christ, Litigious Athenian, 39) because of the large amounts of money he has offered to Athens (cf. §§ 5, 9, 12 with Dem. 20.119). What the speaker mainly seems to be aiming at is to persuade the jurors that by acquitting him they would first of all take care of their own interests, so he uses the pronoun ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς. When later on he will refer to the eventuality of being condemned, he is going to use the same words: ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀδικήσετε (§ 14). § 13. ὁρᾶτε γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τὰ προσιόντα τῇ πόλει ὡς ὀλίγα ἐστί: It was not possible for the average Athenian citizen to fully understand the financial matters of the city, such as revenues and expenses (see Kallet-Marx, “Money talks”, 228 – 232), so the speaker does not waste time, as before, stating in full detail the money he spent (see §§ 1– 5). Instead, he stresses that the revenues of the city are slender. Cf. also Dem. 3.20: ὁρᾶτ’ οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Aθηναῖοι, ταῦθ’ οὕτως, ὅπως καὶ τὰ πράγματ’ ἐνδέχεται καὶ δυνήσεσθ’ ἐξιέναι καὶ μισθὸν ἕξετε. The goal of the speaker is that the jurors realise the importance of his statement and that they consider the implications for themselves due to the lack of money in the public treasury. What the jurors might think of first would be the collapse of the Athenian hegemony. Many law cases of the subordinate cities were tried in Athens by the Athenians themselves, but the city’s defeat in the war had, as a result, that the trials concerning the allies stopped, and therefore the chances of more poor people becoming jurors and earning money were dramatically reduced (see French, Growth, 127, Ober, Mass and Elite, 84). More precisely, six thousand Athenians were entitled to collect three obols a day for 175 – 225 days a year (see Hansen, Athenian Democracy, 186). The salary paid to a juror, though of course it was only sufficient to cover the basic needs of an Athenian citizen (Jones, AD, 50), was more than necessary because of the economic slump brought about by the war; some people considered it to be a serious means for financial support (see Sinclair, Participation, 128, Σακελλαρίου, Αθηναϊκή Δημοκρατία, 410 – 11). At the time of the delivery of the speech the jurors did not know whether their salary was going to be paid to them (cf. [Arist.] Ath.Pol.27.4, Plut. Per.9.2– 3 with Rhodes, CAP, 342– 43). The jurors would also not expect to make money as soldiers, since not only could they not receive their salary, which had been reduced by fifty percent (cf. Thuc. 8.45.2, Xen. Hell.1.5.4– 7, Plut. Alc.35.5, see Pritchett, War I, 24– 28) but also they could not secure any salary at all as sailors or hoplites because of the loss of the hegemony (see Amit, Athens and the sea, 48 – 49). For the reduced sources of the Athenian hegemony see Σακελλαρίου, Αθηναϊκή Δημοκρατία, 258 – 63. For the reduced public revenues of Athens after the Peloponnesian War see French, Growth, 125 – 26, L.Gluskina, ‘Zur Specifik der klassischen griechischen Polis
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im Zusammenhang mit dem Problem ihrer Krise’ Klio 57 (1975), 425 – 29, Ober, Fortress Attica, 13 – 31, Strauss, Athens, 42– 70. The decision of the speaker to lead the jurors to make such reasoning is justified and not provocative at all, since it derives from the thoughts of a citizen who lavishly offered his money to the city in the past (see §§ 3, 5). καὶ ταῦτα ὡς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφεστηκότων ἁρπάζεται: By the use of the word ἐφεστηκότες the speaker refers generally to all the city officials (see LSJ s.v. ἐφίστημι), accusing them of embezzling the money of the city. The argument that the city officials perform their duties deficiently is frequently used (cf. Lys. 19.57, 25.19, 28.3 – 6,10,13, Dem. 51.10, Aesch. 3.2), but in order for it to be acceptable each scholar must enquire whether it is indeed true (see Lateiner, “Lysias”, 151– 52). The speaker emphasizes his argument by combining the lack of προσιόντα and their embezzlement by the public officials. The speaker uses the verb ἁρπάζω in order that the insensitive way in which the city officials deprived their fellow citizens of public money becomes more apparent. His aim is to make angry the jurors at the existing situation and persuade them that it is in their interest to acquit him (τὰ λυσιτελοῦντα ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς αἱρήσεσθε). Cf. Dem. 8.55: καίτοι ἔγωγ’ ἀγανακτῶ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτ’, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Aθηναῖοι, εἰ τὰ μὲν χρήματα λυπεῖ τινὰς ὑμῶν εἰ διαρπασθήσεται, ἃ καὶ φυλάττειν καὶ κολάζειν τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἐφ’ ὑμῖν ἐστι, Isocr. 12.141: ἑκείνους τοὺς τὰ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων κτήματα τῆς πόλεως εἶναι φάσκοντας, τὰ δὲ ταύτης ἴδια κλέπτειν καὶ διαρπάζειν τολμῶντας, καὶ φιλεῖν μὲν τὸν δῆμον προσποιουμένους, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων αὐτὸν μισεῖσθαι ποιοῦντας. Cf. also Lys. 22.15, Aesch. 3.222, Aristoph. Knights 802 – 04. ὥστ’ ἄξιον ταύτην ἠγεῖσθαι πρόσοδον βεβαιοτάτην τῇ πόλει, τὰς οὐσίας τῶν ἐθελόντων λῃτουργεῖν: From a syntactic point of view the phrase τὰς οὐσίας τῶν ἐθελόντων λῃτουργεῖν acts as apposition to the pronoun ταύτην, which is placed in the beginning of the sentence to give emphasis. However, judging the argument on the basis of its meaning the first sentence has the second as its premise, since it is necessary for the πρόσοδος to be βεβαιοτάτη, according to the speaker, that there are Athenian citizens willing to undertake liturgies voluntarily, meaning that they spend their money by their own free choice rather than because of the obligation imposed by the state (cf. Dem. 21.156 – 57 with §§ 1– 5). Therefore, in contrast with other reluctant choregi (see comm. § 12 οὐδὲ παραστῆναι … τῶν σφετέρων αὐτῶν) the speaker uses the familiar tactic of the litigants to emphasize their voluntary offer to the city in order to win the favour of the jurors (cf. Dem. 18.99 with Usher, Demosthenes, 204, Dem. 19.99, see Jor-
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dan, Athenian Navy, 92, Roberts, “Aristocratic Democracy”, 361,366, Christ, “Liturgy Avoidance”, 155 – 56, Wilson, Khoregia, 158). As someone’s wish to assume choregies justified the request for favour from the jurors in return (cf. Dem. 21.156), it is justifiable to say that here the speaker is preparing the jurors for a second time to accept his later argument that he demands their favour (cf. comm. § 11 Καὶ οὕτω πολλοὺς … εἰργασμένος τὴν πόλιν). ἐὰν οὖν εὖ βουλεύσησθε, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐπιμελήσεσθε τῶν ἡμετέρων χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἰδίων τῶν ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν: By using the verb εὖ βουλεύσησθε the speaker refers to εὐβουλία, which is related to the conduct of the internal politics of a city and the common interests of its people (see Rademaker, Sophrosyne, 207– 08). The choice of the verb is suitable for it matches the speaker’s argument. Since the speaker’s own money is their own, this means that as jurors they ensure at least the basics for their families through their salary. Moreover, as a representative sub-group of the demos in the ecclesia (see comm. § 8 ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνους μὲν ὑμεῖς ἐπαύσατε τῆς ἀρχῆς), the jurors ensure for the city the necessary amounts of money to perform the religious festivals (cf. §§ 1– 5). The argument that the speaker’s money is also their own is strengthened by the repetition of the same pronoun in a different person: τῶν ἡμετέρων -τῶν ὑμετέρων. Thus, the verbal coincidence reinforces the notional coincidence that Lysias attempts to achieve. This is the only point in the speech where the speaker’s χρήματα coincides with the money of the demos. In his following points he will refer to the χρήματα of the city and his own attitude to it by making a clear distinction. Cf. § 15 τῶν μὲν ὑμετέρων ἐπιθυμήσωσι, § 18 ἐκ τῶν ὑμετέρων ὠφέλημαι (in both cases after the ὑμετέρων the word χρημάτων is again implied – cf. Aesch. 3.19). The word χρήματα means the ready money, property or wealth that one holds (see Reden, Exchange, 174, cf. Xen. Oec.1.7– 8 with Pomeroy, Oeconomicus, 218 – 19). In the text the word χρήματα is not encountered again, but it is implied by the speaker in other passages in which he refers to his financial offer to the city. Thus, by the phrase ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀχάριστα εἶναι τὰ εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀνηλωμένα (§ 12) Lysias’client meant the ready money he has spent on the city as when he referred to the revenues of the city which were pilfered by the city guardians (cf. comm. § 13). At this point, but also in subsequent points, where the same topic is going to be mentioned, the speaker will mean ready money again (cf. § 14 τῶν ἐμῶν ἐγὼ πολὺ βελτίων ὑμῖν ἔσομαι ταμίας … ταῦτα διανεμοῦνται, § 15 τῶν ὑμετέρων ἐμοὶ διδόναι ἢ τῶν ἐμῶν ἐμοὶ ἀμφισβητῆσαι, § 16 τὰ ἐμὰ ἔχειν, § 17 τοῖς εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀνηλωμένοις … δι’ ἐκεῖνα δὲ ὑφ’ ὑμῶν δικαίως σῴζεσθαι).
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§ 14. εἰδότες ὅτι ἕξετε πᾶσι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἡμετέροις ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον: Although the speaker is the one who spent the money, he presents the jurors as having used this money, while at the same time he assures them that they can do the same in the future. The placement of πᾶσι before the infinitive creates a moderate hyperbaton figure of speech and the phrase ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον urges the jurors to remember his previous generosity (cf. comm. § 5 εἰ ἐβουλόμην … ἀνήλωσα), which is going to continue taking place. His generosity is so great that the speaker does not even need to promise, like other litigants, that in the future he will offer even more money than he has already given (cf. Ιsaeus 6.61: ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, see Gabrielsen, Athenian Fleet, 231 n.24). With his claim, the speaker suggests that he fully accepts the request of the demos for the wealthy citizens to assume public liturgies for its own benefit, as opposed to the wish of the oligarchs (cf. [Xen]. Ath.Pol.1.13, Oec.2.6 – 7 with Pomeroy, Oeconomicus, 228 – 29). At the same time, his attitude is in stark contrast with that of his opponents who, according to his allegations, refrain from assuming their obligations to the city (cf. § 12). οἶμαι δὲ πάντας ὑμᾶς ἐπίστασθαι ὅτι τῶν ἐμῶν ἐγὼ πολὺ βελτίων ὑμῖν ἔσομαι ταμίας τῶν τὰ τῆς πόλεως ὑμῖν ταμιευόντων: The bad management of the financies of the Panathenaea by the treasurers was something frequent, as proved in the annual inspection at the end of their tenure (see Ferguson, Treasurers, 16 n.1, 138 n.2). This is something that the jurors already knew. The importance of the speaker’s assertion is that it comes from someone who, through the large amounts he spent and the victories he won over many years (see §§ 1– 5), demonstrated in practice that he had the requisite knowledge for the successful financial accomplishment of all the liturgies he assumed. On the other hand, the treasurers, who were elected from a list of wealthy citizens and were not selected by lot (see Carter, Quiet Athenian, 17, Develin, 7– 10) because of the belief that the practical training they had acquired in the management of their assets was sufficient to manage the financial affairs of the city of Athens (see D.Harris, ‘Freedom of Information and Accountability’ in Osborne and Hornblower, Ritual, Finance, Politics, 220), were often unable to cope successfully with the tasks assigned by the state. The problem had even worsened due to the frequent reluctance of the citizens to undertake this particular office (see M.H. Hansen, ‘Perquisites for Magistrates’ C & M 32 (1980), 122) because it constituted a kind of liturgy that led to high costs and no profits (see Carter, Quiet Athenian, 35). Inevitably this situation directly concerned the jurors themselves, on the grounds that the treasurers were responsible by law for the payment of the salaries to the
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jurors (see Ferguson, Treasurers, 134, C.W.Fornara (ed. and transl.), Archaic Times to the end of the Peloponnesian War, v. 1, Cambridge 1977, no. 154, 181– 83). The speaker, knowing the view of the democrats that the rich were excellent money treasurers (cf. Thuc. 6.39.1, see Jones, AD, 54) and taking advantage of the current situation, can eventually claim that he will be better than the official treasurers of the city. His supremacy is based on the rules set by the city itself and to emphasize his argument he uses the personal pronoun ὑμῖν, which acts as a dative of advantage. The speaker had used the same pronoun to emphasize that the return of his own ship and Nausimachus’ ship was to the benefit of the city (see comm. § 11 ἐγὼ δ’ ὑμῖν … τριήρη). Here the pronoun is used twice: the first time the speaker refers to himself, the second time to the city and the jurors. In the latter case, the pronoun ὑμῖν should be considered dative of advantage rather than disadvantage, since according to my analysis it has become clear that the treasurers of the city did not really care for the interests of the city. The ironic predisposition of the speaker here will become afterwards a censure against the treasurers (see comm. § 14 ἕτεροι δὲ … καὶ τἆλλα). ἐὰν δ’ ἐμὲ πένητα ποιήσητε, καὶ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀδικήσετε: It is the first time the speaker determines the financial situation he is going to be in if the jurors condemn him. More precisely πένης is the person who will need to work to survive (see Ste. Croix, Class Struggle, 431, Markle, “Pay”, 267– 71). The speaker does not use the word accidentally, since in that case he would no longer have πολλά χρήματα (cf. Xen. Oec.11.4– 5), so he will not be able to continue to offer money to the benefit of the city. Consequently, if the jurors decide that he should be financially degraded to this economic class, they will have deprived the demos of money spent on liturgies and which essentially belongs to them (cf. §§ 1– 5 and § 13 ἐὰν οὖν εὖ βουλεύσησθε … τῶν ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν). His argument is quite convincing. The reduced revenues (cf. comm. § 13) and the poor performance of duties by the treasurers would jeopardise the remuneration of the jurors, especially those who expected to obtain part of their income from the judicial salary (see Markle, “Pay”, 274– 81). Besides, his conviction would be equal to the retraction of the view of the democrats themselves that the rich were excellent money treasurers (see comm. § 14 οἶμαι δὲ πάντας … ταμιευόντων). At this point Lysias demonstrates his skill in directing the jurors psychologically wherever he wants. While previously his client focused on the relationship litigant-jurors-city, warning the jurors that his conviction would be ὕβρις, having negative consequences on the society as a whole (see comm. § 12), here he exclusively sheds light on the relationship jurors-litigant; the unfair decision against him would amount to injustice for the jurors themselves and his problem be-
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comes theirs too. The jurors no longer have to worry about the accusations of the oligarchs that the people exploit the rich men for the benefit of the poor (see Jones, AD, 54– 55, Ober, Political Dissent, 19), but about their own financial future. The speaker reverses the terms and makes the jurors believe that indeed by acquitting him they opt for their own benefit, something which he claimed a little earlier: τὰ λυσιτελοῦντα ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς αἱρήσεσθε § 12. At the end of the speech the speaker will refer to the consequences his impoverishment will have for him and his children (see comm. § 25). ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα διανεμοῦνται, ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα: The speaker’s claim that even if the treasurers confiscate his property (cf. § 25) the money will never reach the hands of the citizens but they will divide it up among themselves, constitutes a direct reference to a real problem of Athens, since the state, owing to the economic slump during that period, significantly increased the recording of all financial matters managed by officials to minimize the risk of misappropriation of public funds. With the phrase καὶ τἆλλα the speaker refers to the collection of taxes and the property of temples. For this issue see R.Thomas, ‘Literacy in archaic and classical Greece’ in Literacy and Power in the ancient world, A.Bowman and G.Woolf (eds.), Cambridge 1994, 45 – 49. Lysias brings a real problem of Athenian society to court in order to cast doubt among the jurors over how beneficial it would be to condemn someone, the money of whom might not actually end up in the city if he were punished (cf. the complaint of Isocr. 8.13: νομίζετε δημοτικωτέρους εἶναι … τοὺς τὰ τῆς πόλεως διανεμομένους τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ὑμῖν λειτουργούντων). With this tactic he compels the jurors to consider his previous claim: ἐὰν οὖν ἐμοὶ πεισθῆτε … τὰ λυσιτελοῦντα ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς αἱρήσεσθε (§ 12). § 15. Ἄξιον δὲ ἐστίν ἐνθυμηθῆναι ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον ὑμῖν προσήκει τῶν ὑμετέρων ἐμοὶ διδόναι ἢ τῶν ἐμῶν ἐμοὶ ἀμφισβητῆσαι: About the formulation πολὺ μᾶλλον ὑμῖν προσήκει … ἢ in Lysias cf. 30.33: ἐνθυμεῖσθε δὲ ὅτι [οὔτε Νικόμαχος] οὐδὲ τῶν αἰτησομένων οὐδεὶς τοσαῦτα ἀγαθὰ πεποίηκε τὴν πόλιν, ὅσα οὖτος ἠδίκηκεν, ὥστε πολὺ μᾶλλον ὑμῖν προσήκει τιμωρεῖσθαι ἢ τούτοις βοηθεῖν. Cf. also 14.21: ὑμᾶς δὲ χρὴ ὑπολαμβάνειν … ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς προσήκει τῶν λιπόντων τὴν τάξιν κατηγορεῖν ἢ ὑπέρ τῶν τοιούτων ἀπολογεῖσθαι, 28.13: ὅσοι δὲ κατελθόντες ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ τὸ ὑμέτερον πλῆθος ἀδικοῦσι, τοὺς δὲ ἰδίους οἴκους ἐκ τῶν ὑμετέρων μεγάλους ποιοῦσι, πολὺ μᾶλλον αὐτοῖς προσήκει ὀργίζεσθαι ἢ τοῖς τριάκοντα. The speaker’s assertion that the jurors should give him their money rather than dispute his claims to his belongings is based on the generous use of his money during his assumption of choregies and eisphorai (see comm. §§ 1– 5)
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but also on his previous analysis, where he pointed out that he would make a better treasurer than the treasurers of the city: ἐμῶν ἐγὼ πολὺ βελτίων ὑμῖν ἔσομαι ταμίας (§ 14). To attract the attention of the jurors he once again uses the personal pronoun ὑμῖν, which functions here as dative of advanage in terms of syntax (see comm. § 14 οἶμαι δὲ πάντας ὑμᾶς … ὑμῖν ταμιευόντων). καὶ πένητα γενόμενον ἐλεῆσαι μᾶλλον ἢ πλουτοῦντι φθονῆσαι: The speaker here reverts to a point raised earlier, i. e. to the possibility of becoming a πένης (see comm. § 14 ἐὰν δ’ ἐμὲ … ἀδικήσετε) and argues that if he is impoverished, then the jurors will have to pity him instead of envying him because of his actual wealth. The reference to his possible πενία and his existing πλοῦτος is intentional. The Athenians of the lower income class were generally tolerant towards the property of the aristocrats (see Jones, AD, 35 – 37, Connor, New Politicians, 21 n.34, Dover, GPM, 40). Nevertheless, the war created an increase in the already existing tension between the haves and the have-nots (cf. Arist. Pol.1295b30, see V.Ehrenberg, The People of Aristophanes: A Sociology of Old Attic Comedy, Oxford 1951, 2nd ed., 251, A.Lintott, Violence, Civil Strife and Revolution in the Classical City 750 – 330 B.C., London 1982, 176 – 78). Thus, the impoverished people of the middle class were envious of the rich as the latter, although they lost much of their wealth, remained rich (see Strauss, Athens, 56). It is therefore reasonable for the speaker to fear the envy of the jurors when he remains rich and the public treasuries are empty (see comm. § 13). For this reason he refers to the ἔλεος and φθόνος, which are contrasting emotions (see Konstan, Pity, 45 – 46) and recommends that the jurors avoid the second emotion (cf. Arist. Rhet.1387b23 – 25, Dem. 20.140). Lysias is very careful with his wording, since he does not say directly that the jurors envy the speaker, because apparently no one could find out who envies one another for their wealth (cf. Isocr. 15.142– 43) but also in order not to offend them (cf. Dem. 20.56,139, where the speaker pays exactly the same attention to the reactions of the jurors). The speaker’s request is based on assuming so many liturgies (cf. §§ 1– 5 with N.Fisher, “Let Envy Be Absent’: Envy, Liturgies and Reciprocity in Athens’ in Konstan and Rutter, Envy, 199 – 200) and his promise that he will be spending his fortune in the same way in the future (cf. §§ 13 – 14 οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐπιμελήσεσθε τῶν ἡμετέρων χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἰδίων τῶν ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν, εἰδότες ὅτι ἕξετε πᾶσι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἡμετέροις ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον). For liturgies as a means of reducing envy and envy as an argument in Athenian courts see the analyses of Walcot, Envy and the Greeks: A study of human behaviour, Warminster 1978, 59,67– 70, Ober, Mass and Elite, 227, D.L.Cairns, ‘The Politics of Envy and Equality in An-
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cient Greece’, 244– 47 and Fisher, “Let Envy Be Absent” in Konstan and Rutter, Envy, 193 – 202. The reasons why the jurors should pity him if he becomes a πένης, will be exposed by the speaker in the epilogue. See comm. § 25. καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς εὔχεσθαι τοὺς ἄλλους εἶναι τοιούτους πολίτας, ἵνα τῶν μὲν ὑμετέρων ἐπιθυμήσωσι, τὰ δὲ σφέτερα αὐτῶν εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀναλίσκωσιν: The phrase τοῖς θεοῖς εὔχεσθαι means that someone prays to the gods (cf. Aristoph. Birds 127 with Dover, Clouds, 109 – 110). The speaker, therefore, urges the jurors to pray, a practice often used by litigants for various reasons from now on (cf. e. g. Lys. 13.1,3, 14.42, Aesch. 2.87,151, Dem. 3.18, 14.39, 20.25,49,67,161, 54.16, Hyper. 2 fr. 3 (Jensen) with Whitehead, Hyperides, 98). The speaker by using the phrase τοὺς ἄλλους εἶναι τοιούτους πολίτας and the pronoun τοιοῦτος indirectly identifies himself as a model citizen for whom the jurors should pray to the gods so that the other Athenians become like him. For the first time an issue related to religion is brought up, which Lysias is going to exploit effectively in his attack against the opponents of his client (see comm. § 20 καὶ ὧν Κινησίας … ἀγανακτοῦσι, § 21 οὗτοι μὲν οὖν … εὐξαίμην κακόν). The use of such an argument by the speaker is based on his piety, which he has demonstrated by assuming choregies in so many religious festivals (cf. §§ 1– 5 with Roberts, “Aristocratic Democracy”, 365, Dem. 20.125 with Sandys, Demosthenes, 94, Garland, New Gods, 4, 8). About the importance of using the pronoun see further comm. § 16 τοιοῦτον … παρέχω. The speaker’s self-definition will be continued and intensified when attacking his prosecutors (see comm. § 20 καὶ ἐξ ὧν μὲν ἡ πόλις … τοῖς εὖ πεποιηκόσιν ὀργισθήσεσθε). ἵνα τῶν μὲν ὑμετέρων ἐπιθυμήσωσι: Αs the speaker previously referred to the city officials who abused money which they had confiscated from wealthy citizens (§ 14), it is reasonable to believe that he directs the minds of the jurors to them. The tone of the speaker becomes more lenient now, since he uses the verb ἐπιθυμῶ and not ἁρπάζω, as he did before (see comm. § 13 καὶ ταῦτα … ἁρπάζεται). Βy using the phrase τὰ δὲ σφέτερα αὐτῶν εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀναλίσκωσιν the speaker refers to himself, as is implied by the use of the verb ἀναλίσκω (see §§ 1– 8, where the verb and the participle are used ten times by the speaker), and also the pronoun σφέτερα αὐτῶν (cf. §§ 13 – 14 τῶν ἡμετέρων χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἰδίων τῶν ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν, εἰδότες ὅτι ἕξετε πᾶσι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἡμετέροις). With the use of the same pronoun, he also reminds the jurors of the attitude of his opponents: ἐκείνους δὲ δοκεῖν ὀρθῶς βεβουλεῦσθαι ὅτι ὑμῖν οὐδὲν προεῖνται τῶν σφετέρων αὐτῶν (§ 12).
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§ 16. ἡγοῦμαι δ’, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί (καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν ἀχθεσθῇ) πολὺ δικαιότερον ὑμᾶς ὑπὸ τῶν ζητητῶν ἀπογραφῆναι τὰ ἐμὰ ἔχειν, ἢ ἐμὲ νυνὶ κινδυνεύειν ὡς τοῦ δημοσίου χρήματα ἔχοντα: The speaker uses the phrase μηδεὶς ὑμῶν ἀχθεσθῇ, even in a parenthesis, which we will also meet in other speeches, in order to address the feelings of the jurors (see Dem. 21.58 with MacDowell, Meidias, 278 – 79, for further examples). Lysias uses a bold argument for his client, i. e. he says that the jurors and not the speaker should be in the place of the defendant, as is suggested by the phrase ὑμᾶς ὑπὸ τῶν ζητητῶν ἀπογραφῆναι. The ζητηταί were officers who discovered the public debtors and those who possessed public money illegally. A familiar case of these officers is that of Peisander and Charicles, who in 415 B.C. argued that the scandals of the Hermocopidai and the Eleusinian Mysteries aimed at the overthrow of democracy (see Andoc. 1.36 with MacDowell, Andocides, 280, Ostwald, Sovereignty, 332 n.144). On the other hand, the use of the verb ἀπογράφω indicates that the speaker refers to the legal process whereby, after a court decision, a list of the assets of a public debtor was created so that his property be seized and the debt to the city paid in full (see Finley, Land and Credit, 92– 95, 111– 13, Harrison, Law, 211– 17, R.Osborne, ‘Law in Action in Classical Athens’ JHS 105 (1985), 44– 48, Todd, Shape, 118 – 19). Lysias’ client, therefore, imagines a hypothetical trial, where the ζητηταί will record the names of the jurors on the charge of illegally holding his property. The formulation of an argument by Lysias regarding the commissioners may not be irrelevant to current political reality but is due to the existence and action of such a committee at this particular moment, which may have been set up in early 403 B.C, to deal specifically with the estates of the Thirty (see Walbank, “Thirty Tyrants”, 96). Consequently, it would seem justifiable to believe that the speaker refers to the same committee. If this view is correct, then it explains why the speaker believes in advance that some jurors would resent what he is going to say. The jurors did not, of course, hold the speaker’s real estate but what he wants to clarify is that the way in which he has used his property is as if it really belongs to the city. In previous parts of his speech the speaker demonstrated that he repeatedly offered more money than he was required from the very beginning of his adulthood (§§ 5, 8); therefore some jurors would realize that they could reckon his money in the state revenues and felt that, thanks to his will, they could always rely on it. In this way, it appears as if the jurors own his money (cf. comm. § 13 ταύτην ἡγεῖσθαι πρόσοδον βεβαιοτάτην τῇ πόλει, τὰς οὐσίας τῶν ἐθελόντων λῃτουργεῖν). With this thought in mind the speaker makes the hypothetical case, where the ζητηταί control their expenses and find that the speaker does not own his property. The idea that these officials would control the ju-
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rors might make some of the jurors feel that this affected their role and reliability, so the speaker anticipates them reacting like this by saying that they might feel annoyed. On second thoughts, however, the ‘accusation’ that the jurors possess his property quashes the practice of the Athenian courts to convict rich defendants in order to secure money for the salaries of judges (see Jones, AD, 58 – 59), since in this case it is already theirs. Thus, although Lysias initially gives the impression that the speaker criticizes the jurors severely (as Lateiner, “Lysias”, 152– 53, believes) or that he talks to them freely because of his wealth (as Wilson, Khoregia, 180 – 81, believes), at the end his client strengthens their role. The speaker’s reference to the ἀπογραφή is deliberate, because the punishment that threatened whoever was not fulfilling his obligations after the ἀπογραφή was ἀτιμία, i. e. what he will undergo if he is convicted (see § 25). τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐμαυτὸν τῇ πόλει παρέχω: By using the pronoun τοιοῦτος the speaker reminds the jurors of his ethos, as it was witnessed during the exposition of his liturgies (cf. comm. §§ 1– 10). Other litigants (cf. Lys. 19.61, Andoc. 1.41, Isaeus 7.41, Dem. 8.70, 20.34, 60.25) use the same type of character description. Nevertheless, the difference is that, while they all praise other persons, Lysias’ client makes his own self-characterization. This is a tactic which he used in a previous part of his speech (cf. comm. § 11 Καὶ οὕτω πολλοὺς κινδύνους …. εἰργασμένος τὴν πόλιν) and which he will use again later referring to his relationship with his fellow citizens (cf. comm. § 19 τοιοῦτον παρασχεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὥστε μηδένα τῶν πολιτῶν μήτε μέμψασθαι μήτε δίκην τολμῆσαι προσκαλέσασθαι) and also to close his speech (cf. comm. § 25 μηδαμῶς … τοιούτοις ἡμῖν χρῆσθε πολίταις οἵοισπερ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ). The same pronoun, but for different reasons, will be used for his prosecutors (see comm. § 20 πειθομένους … καταψηφίσασθαι). ὥστε ἰδίᾳ μὲν τῶν φείδομαι, δημοσίᾳ δὲ λῃτουργῶν ἥδομαι: The speaker maintains that he is frugal in the private use of his means, while he delights to spend his money on liturgies. He often uses the argument that he is μέτριος in his expenses (see Roisman, Manhood, 178 – 79, Rademaker, Sophrosyne, 241) to win the favour of the jurors. This argument is created on the basis of the logical reasoning that if one spends a lot of money for himself, he undermines his ability to assume liturgies for the city in the future (see Rademaker, Sophrosyne, 241,259 – 60). The speaker indirectly but clearly states, for the second time in his speech, that he is μεγαλοπρεπής. Cf. Arist. Nic.Eth.1122b6 – 8: δαπανήσει … ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής … ἡδέως and comm. § 5 εἰ ἐβουλόμην … ἀνήλωσα. One’s ability to handle his property frugally and be able to live with little money comes from his contempt for the pleasures of life (cf. Gorg. Pal.Apol.15).
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Later on the speaker will further substantiate his argument, claiming that he can neither be overcome by pleasure nor be elated by gain (see comm. § 19). His aim in both cases is to moderate the envy of the jurors because of his great wealth (cf. comm. § 15) and persuade them that he is μεγαλοπρεπής, since a characteristic of those people was to be frugal about the private use of their money but generous for the city (cf. Arist. Nic.Eth.1123a4– 5). The speaker’s point of view on the subject of liturgies, as expressed here, is in contrast to the perception of many wealthy Athenians of that period that they were financially oppressed because of the liturgies and eisphorai (see Christ, “Liturgy Avoidance”, 153 n.29, Gabrielsen, Athenian Fleet, 7– 9). Generally speaking, it is quite difficult to formulate any opinion on the credibility of such views (see Davies, APF, xxviii, Dover, GPM, 176 – 177), because wealthy people were not in any case free to choose whether or not to pay the taxes levied by the city (see M.I.Finley, Economy and Society in Ancient Greece, New York 1983, 90 – 91). With his first claim the speaker provides the jurors with the necessary arguments to believe that he is φιλότιμος in relation to the city (cf. Dover, GPM, 230 – 31), an issue he will later use to refute the accusations against him (see § 22). On the other hand, his emphasis on his voluntary offer presses the jurors to accept his demand for favour. Cf. Dem. 21.156: ἐθελοντὴς … οὗ χάριν … δικαίως ἄν τις ἔχοι. § 17. καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς περιοῦσι μέγα φρονῶ, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀνηλωμένοις: The speaker specifies to the jurors the reason he is proud, i. e. about the money he has spent for the city and not for the ample money he possesses (for the right interpretation of the phrase see ἐπὶ τοῖς περιοῦσι LSJ s.v. περιουσία). He puts emphasis on his words by the use of the opposition οὐκ – ἀλλά. The speaker goes on with this argument, because at the beginning of the speech he had stated that the amount of money spent on liturgies was at least four times higher than was required (see §§ 1– 5, cf. Missiou, Andokides, 38). This could, therefore, cause the dissatisfaction of some jurors and strengthen their envy (cf. comm. § 15 καὶ πένητα … φθονῆσαι). Above all, however, there was the risk that the jurors might think that the speaker considers himself superior to the others because of his money, and therefore prone to commit ὕβρις to the detriment of his fellow-citizens (cf. Adkins, Moral Values, 86 – 87, Fisher, Hybris, 322– 23, E.Alexiou, Ruhm und Ehre. Studien zu Begriffen, Werten und Motivierungen bei Isokrates, Heidelberg 1995, 80 – 85, Cairns, “Thinking Big”, 10 – 17). However, with this explicit statement the speaker wards off such a risk and makes the following claim that he has always been κόσμιος and σώφρων more convincing (cf. comm. § 19 διὰ τέλους … σώφρονα).
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For these reasons, the speaker leaves unspecified the exact size of his property, while he stresses that he spends his money for the demos (εἰς ὑμᾶς). Priding oneself on the money spent for the benefit of the city seems to have been an accepted tactic in courtrooms, so the speaker does not hesitate to formulate such a claim in order to strengthen his position. To realize more clearly the speaker’s position towards his city, it would be sufficient to consider the attitude of the man he claimed he did not want on his ship, Alcibiades (see § 6), regarding the same question: καὶ ὅσα αὖ ἐν τῇ πόλει χορηγίαις ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ λαμπρύνομαι, τοῖς μὲν ἀστοῖς φθονεῖται φύσει καὶ οὐκ … ἄδικον ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ μέγα φρονοῦντα μὴ ἴσον εἶναι, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ κακῶς πράσσων πρὸς οὐδένα τῆς ξυμφορᾶς ἰσομοιρεῖ (Thuc. 6.16.3 – 4). With the phrase ἐπὶ τοῖς εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀνηλωμένοις for the second time in the speech the speaker briefly refers to the sums he has spent but here in a completely different context (see comm. § 12). ἡγούμενος τούτων μὲν αὐτὸς αἴτιος εἶναι, τὴν δ’ οὐσίαν ἑτέρους μοι καταλιπεῖν: At this point the speaker makes a distinction between the money that he spends for the city and the fortune that he inherited (τούτων μὲν-τὴν δ’ οὐσίαν). The truth with regard to the money that the speaker spent for the city was highlighted at the beginning of his speech (cf. comm. §§ 1– 5). In order to add emphasis, he uses the final pronoun αὐτός in the nominative (cf. Cooper, Syntax, 485). The second part of his argument is of particular interest because, while other litigants report expressly that they inherited their fortune from their father (cf. Isaeus 7.5, Aesch. 1.97, Dem. 21.157, 36.43), the speaker does not say anything of this kind, but he uses the pronoun ἕτερος, which, when used without an article, is quite vague and means ‘the other’ (cf. Cooper, Syntax, 401). Taking into consideration, however, that the pronoun is used in the plural, we should consider it as certain that the speaker here does not mean only his father but also his ancestors, stressing that they bequeathed the property to him. The speaker’s emphasis on the fact that his ancestors created this fortune, although it was not a frequent argument, was a reality, as Aristotle testifies, when he clarifies that those who spend a lot of money have inherited it from their ancestors (cf. Nic.Eth.1122b29 – 30: τῶν προγόνων, Rhet.1387a23: οἱ ἀρχαιόπλουτοι-cf. also Isaeus 5.41: οἱ ἡμέτεροι πρόγονοι οἱ ταῦτα … καταλιπόντες). The contribution of the speaker’s father in this economic chain was to increase the fortune which he had also inherited from his own father (cf. Plat. Resp.330a7-b7), a fact that entitles the speaker to refer to it later on as πατρῴαν οὐσίαν (§ 21). The emphasis, therefore, on the family fortune, which passes from generation to generation, certainly aims to show the continuous presence of his οἶκος in the political life of
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the city. The ultimate aim of the speaker is to impress the jurors (cf. Dover, GPM, 173). At the same moment, however, what is most striking is that the speaker does not name the family he comes from, not even the name of his father, something that we often meet in other defensive speeches (cf. e. g. Isocr. 16.25 – 26). Taking also into consideration the tactic followed by many litigants to report nominally the economic offer or the excellent political and military action of their ancestors in order to gain the gratitude of their courts (cf. Thomas, Oral Tradition, 111,115 – 131), we would expect the speaker to do something similar. Unless the speaker referred to his family in the lost earlier part of the speech, the absence of such arguments leads me to suspect that the speaker intentionally seeks to conceal any information regarding his father and his family. This is probably happening because in the past his father had expressed his oligarchic convictions (this is Davies’ opinion, APF, 593, which, however, he does not prove. See further Introduction, The defensive strategy of the speech, 53 – 54) and, since the Athenians believed that the son ‘inherited’ the political behaviour of the father (cf. Cox, Household Interests, 79 – 80), the speaker wants at all costs to avoid this kind of association (cf. comm. § 4 καὶ ὕστερον). διὰ ταύτην μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἀδίκως συκοφαντεῖσθαι, δι’ ἐκεῖνα δὲ ὑφ’ ὑμῶν δικαίως σῴζεσθαι: In this passage the speaker creates an argument which is based on his good financial condition. It consists of two parts: the first part concerns his fortune, the second concerns the money he spent for the city (διὰ ταύτην μὲν – δι’ ἐκεῖνα δὲ). The speaker, for the first time in the speech, characterizes his opponents as enemies and their judicial motion against him as a slanderous action. The definition of somebody as ἐχθρός meant that there existed some rivalry between the two people, which prompted either side to wish to take revenge (cf. Cohen, Violence, 65 – 67). Although we do not know his opponents’ speech, in order to know if they called him an enemy, it is certain that they also considered him as such, since one way to injure one’s enemy was to exile him from the city through a court decision (cf. Cohen, Violence, 71– 72); that is the punishment which threatens him now (cf. § 25). In order to disparage their action the speaker attributes to his accusers the deprecatory accusation of being unjust sycophants (cf. Harvey, “Sykophant”, 107) and claims that they accused him because of his fortune (διὰ ταύτην). In this way the speaker takes advantage of the suspicion of the jurors that every accuser had some economic benefit from the indictment (cf. Christ, Litigious Athenian, 145), in order to distract the jurors’ attention from the content of the accu-
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sation attributed to him (cf. § 21). For the motives of the accusers see Introduction, The legal problems of the speech, 34– 35. In the second part of his argument the speaker emphasises once more the money that he spends for the city (the δι’ ἐκεῖνα refers to τοῖς εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀνηλωμένοις-cf. §§ 5, 8, 12, 13 – 14, 19). Because of the money spent the speaker believes that he is entitled to be saved by the jurors. At this point, he partially repeats his previous argument that by acquitting him the jurors will reach a just decision and simultaneously they will choose what is to their advantage (see comm. § 12). However, the speaker expresses his own opinion now and does not face the trial from the perspective of the jurors (cf. § 12 ἐὰν οὖν ἐμοὶ πεισθῆτε), so he does not speak with uncertainty any more but with certainty, as the use of the infinitive σῴζεσθαι in the present tense shows and the participle ἡγούμενος (cf. comm. § 18). The characterization of the jurors as saviours is justified because of the sentence that threatens him (§ 25). With this argument he prepares the jurors psychologically, so that they may believe his claim that he is innocent: μηδ’ ἡγήσασθαι τοσαῦτα χρήματα εἶναι, ἃ ἐγὼ βουληθείην ἄν τι κακόν τῇ πόλει γενέσθαι (§ 21). ὥστ’ οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως ἕτεροὶ με ἐξαιτήσαιντο παρ’ ὑμῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἴ τις τῶν ἐμῶν φίλων τοιοῦτον ἀγῶνα ἠγωνίζετο, ὑμᾶς ἂν ἠξίουν ἐμοὶ δοῦναι τὴν χάριν, καὶ εἰ παρ’ ἄλλοις ἐκινδύνευον, ὑμᾶς εἶναι τοὺς δεομένους ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ: With the first sentence the speaker refers to the tactic of relatives and friends to plead in favour of the defendants so that they may arouse the pity of the jurors (see Rubinstein, Litigation, 48,155 – 56). The use of the pronoun ἕτεροι initially creates some ambiguity with regard to who he has in mind; however, the reference to the existence of his friend immediately afterwards implies that he refers to his friends and not to his relatives (as Rubinstein believes, Litigation, 156 n.93). The rejection of such a tactic by the speaker (οὐκ εἰκότως) is surprising, since it was effective and caused concern to the accusers, who hurried to warn the jurors not to take it into consideration (cf. Lyc. 1.139: τινὲς αὐτῶν οὐκέτι τοῖς λόγοις ὑμᾶς παρακρούσασθαι ζητοῦσιν, ἀλλ’ ἤδη ταῖς αὑτῶν λῃτουργίαις ἐξαιτεῖσθαι τοὺς κρινομένους ἀξιώσουσιν). Moreover, there were friends who could ask the jurors to return the favour to them by acquitting the defendant (cf. Dem. 21.208: Πέπυσμαι τοίνουν καὶ Φιλιππίδην καὶ Μνησαρχίδην καὶ Διότιμον τὸν Εὐωνυμέα καὶ τοιούτους τινὰς πλουσίους καὶ τριηράρχους ἐξαιτήσεσθαι καὶ λιπαρήσειν παρ’ ὑμῶν αὐτόν, αὑτοῖς ἀξιοῦντας δοθῆναι τὴν χάριν ταύτην (see further Rubinstein, Litigation, 219 – 20). The speaker refers to this last tactic and claims that if some friend of his were accused in a trial similar to his own (τοιοῦ-
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τον ἀγῶνα), he would himself ask, as a supporter of his friend in the position of the defendant, that the jurors grant the favour to him. He also claims that if he stood trial (ἐκινδύνευον) because of other plaintiffs (παρ’ ἄλλοις) and not because of the actual ones, he would require that the jurors become his supporters pleading for him in the court (for this interpretation of κινδυνεύω see I.Worthington, ‘κινδυνεύειν: To be on Trial’ PP 40 (1985), 38 – 39). Consequently, in both cases, the speaker suggests the existence of two different trials, where each of the parties involved have reversed roles. In the first case we have a reversal of roles between him and one of his friends, while in the second case the jurors stand on the rostrum, i. e. they have changed roles for the second time in the speech (see comm. § 16 ἡγοῦμαι … χρήματα ἔχοντα). In the first case, although the speaker emphasises the trial with the use of the cognate object of the verb (ἀγῶνα ἠγωνίζετο), the formulation becomes consciously softer with the use of the verb ἀγωνίζομαι, because it is in the third person. In the second case however, where he refers to himself, Lysias’ client uses the verb κινδυνεύω, because this is the objective reality of the trial (cf. § 16 ἐμὲ κινδυνεύειν). In order to determine with more clarity his relationship with the jurors he repeatedly uses the personal pronoun: με-παρ’ ὑμῶν-ὑμᾶς-ἐμοὶ-ὑμᾶς-ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ (cf. comm. § 11 ἐγὼ δ’ ὑμῖν … τριήρη). That the jurors should grant him the favour does not cause problems, since it was quite usual (cf. Isocr. 16.35, Lyc. 1.135). Moreover, the reversal of the roles of the jurors on the first reading appears offensive but it is justified by Athenian law, since the jurors were not professional lawyers but citizens, who at some time in their life, were found or would be found on the rostrum (cf. Isocr. 15.23). Also, we should infer that the speaker speaks in this way because he believes that the jurors know very well who he really is, so they can accept such an argument (cf. § 1 ἐπίστησθε περὶ οἵου τινὸς ὄντος ἐμοῦ ψηφιεῖσθε). Thus, we can justifiably argue that Lysias’ ultimate aim with this tactic is for the jurors to realize better the difficult situation in which the speaker finds himself and to support him. Andocides also applies the same strategy, that is the jurors hypothetically reverse roles in favour of the defendant: Ὑμεῖς τοίνυν καὶ ἀντὶ πατρὸς ἐμοὶ καὶ ἀντὶ ἀδελφῶν καὶ ἀντὶ παίδων γένεσθε· εἰς ὑμᾶς καταφεύγω καὶ ἀντιβολῶ καὶ ἱκετεύω· ὑμεῖς με παρ’ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν αἰτησάμενοι σῴσατε (1.149-cf. Rubinstein, Litigation, 156). This fact leads me to believe that the speaker here won the favour of the jurors. Christ, Litigious Athenian, 252 n.71, uses this particular passage in order to show that the speaker asks the favour of the jurors as tangible proof of their support to him, so that he can effectively face his slanderous opponents. This view is partly correct, because the speaker does not state that he refers to his own trial and the gratitude that the jurors owe him, but to a hypothetical trial similar to
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his, in which a friend of his would be involved and the jurors would acquit the latter on his behalf. There is no doubt, however, that with this complex argument the speaker aims at his own acquittal. The favour of the jurors for himself will be requested by the speaker at the end of his speech (cf. comm. § 25 ὑμᾶς ἀπαιτῶ νῦν τὴν χάριν). § 18. τοῦτό γε εἰπεῖν ἔχοι τις … ἀσμένως εἶδον: At this point the speaker uses the technique of προκατάληψις, i. e. he hurries to anticipate possible accusations on the part of the audience or his accusers with regard to his political behaviour (Cf. Anax. Rhet.Alex.18.1: Προκατάληψις μὲν οὖν ἐστι, δι’ ἧς τά τε τῶν ἀκουόντων ἐπιτιμήματα καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἀντιλέγειν μελλόντων λόγους προκαταλαμβάνοντες ὑπεξαιρήσομεν τὰς ἐπιφερομένας δυσχερείας). The speaker obviously does not have any specific fellow-citizen in mind; that is why he uses the pronoun τις, which in similar cases has the general meaning ‘somebody’ (cf. Cooper, Syntax, 551). A little later on the speaker will point out that his social behavior is also impeccable: μηδένα τῶν πολιτῶν μήτε μέμψασθαι μήτε δίκην τολμῆσαι προσκαλέσασθαι (§ 19). ὡς πολλὰς ἀρχὰς ἄρξας ἐκ τῶν ὑμετέρων ὠφέλημαι: At this point the speaker may be admitting that he has assumed political offices from the age of 20, a fact that might have happened because the city was at war but also because of the reluctance of many Athenians to assume offices during that period (see R.Develin, ‘Age Qualification for Athenian Magistrates’ ZPE 61 (1985), 156 – 58). On the other hand, he may mean that he cannot have profited from holding offices, because he has not yet held any offices. M.H.Hansen, ‘Seven Hundred Archai in Classical Athens’ GRBS 21 (1980), 167– 69, argues that in order to assume any kind of offices one was supposed to be over thirty years of age but he does not take this passage into consideration. Millett, Lending and Borrowing, 86 – 87, also erroneously says that the speaker refers to undertaking liturgies in the present passage. Such an interpretation is not supported by the text. If my first interpretation of the passage is right, what is important here is that the speaker does not deny that he has also undertaken offices in the past but that these are not so many to justify the idea that he had acquired financial profits from them. Here the speaker obviously refers to offices he assumed during the democratic regime (cf Lys. 18.10, where the speaker expressly reports the offices that Diognetus assumed during the regime of the Thirty). Such an argument is justified because, although Plato claimed that in democracy the poorer citizens were those striving for personal profits via their offices (Resp.521a), actually the citizens believed that the rich also, whether they
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were rich because of inheritance or nouveaux riches, acquired large profits from their offices (cf. Sinclair, Participation, 180). The general impression was that the longer one stayed in office the more money he gained. Cf. Lys. 19.48: Κλεοφῶντα δὲ πάντες ἴστε, ὅτι πολλὰ ἔτη διεχείρισε τὰ τῆς πόλεως πάντα καὶ προσεδοκᾶτο πάνυ πολλὰ ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἔχειν and 19.52: ᾿Aλκιβιάδης τέτταρα ἢ πέντε ἔτη ἐφεξῆς ἐστρατήγει ἐπικρατῶν καὶ νενικηκὼς Λακεδαιμονίους, καὶ διπλάσια ἐκείνῳ ἠξίουν αἱ πόλεις διδόναι ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν, ὥστ’ ᾤοντο εἶναί τινες αὐτῷ πλεῖν ἢ ἑκατὸν τάλαντα. Aristotle shared the same opinion (Pol.1308b13 – 14); this is why he stated that offices with great responsibility should have a short duration. For this reason the defendants hurried to declare, irrespective of the procedure, that they never sought to assume offices many times in the past and in particular offices related to the management of public money (cf. [Lys.] 20.17 with Αποστολάκης, Πολύστρατος, 186, 24.26). With the phrase ἐκ τῶν ὑμετέρων Lysias’ client shows how much respect he has for public property (cf. comm. § 13 oὐδὲν ἧττον … ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν). It is also worthy of attention that the speaker keeps for himself the verb ὠφέλημαι, which has a softer sentimental charge in contrast to the verb ἁρπάζεται, which he used at a previous point reproaching the rest of the appointed guardians of the city (cf. comm. § 13 καὶ ταῦτα ὡς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφεστηκότων ἁρπάζεται). ἢ ὡς αἰσχροῦ τινος αἴτιός εἰμι: Here we should not ascribe to the adjective αἰσχρόν the meaning it had in § 12 (see comm. ἡγούμενος καὶ ὑμῖν αἰσχρὸν … λαμβάνειν) but we must interpret it in relation to the entire phrase, which is mainly related to to the recent unpleasant political events that took place in Athens. More explicitly, Lysias characterizes as a disgraceful act the arrest of his brother by the Thirty and his execution during the regime. Cf. 12.22: Καὶ εἰς τοσοῦτόν εἰσι τόλμης ἀφιγμένοι ὥσθ’ ἥκουσιν ἀπολογησόμενοι, καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς οὐδὲν κακὸν ουδ’ αἰσχρὸν εἰργασμένοι εἰσίν. By the same word Lysias describes the political actions of Theramenes, namely his participation in the regime of the Four Hundred (cf. also Lys. 25.14), his false promises that the Athenians would not give any hostages, demolish the city walls, surrender the ships to the Spartans and, above all, that the democratic regime would not be overthrown against the demos’ will (see Lys. 12.68, cf. Xen. Hell.1.7.22, Dem. 20.79). Finally, the betrayal of the army to the enemies was characterised as αἰσχρόν (cf. Lys. 13.65). Consequently, among disgraceful acts, we could include: one’s delivery into the hands of the Thirty to be killed (as Socrates was requested to do with Leon of Salamis-see Plat. Apol.32c-d), the accusations against the democratic citizens in order to be condemned by the Thirty, (see Lys. 13.2,18,23,44), the enlisting of the names of fellow-Athenians in Lysander’s catalogue (see Krentz, Thirty, 78) and serving in
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the Council of Five Hundred controlled by the Thirty (see Andoc. 1.95, Lys. 25.14, 26.10, Roberts, P.Ryl. 489, ll. 110 – 12, P.J.Rhodes, The Athenian Boule, Oxford 1972, 164– 65,181). The ultimate goal of all these acts was the illegal gain of more profits (Xen. Hell.2.4.40: ὑμεῖς δὲ πλουσιώτεροι πάντων ὄντες πολλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ ἕνεκα κερδέων πεποιήκατε). Given that the speaker is accused of the illegal possession of money, this reference is certainly needed. I suspect that Lysias believed that by only one sentence the jurors would understand the meaning of the adjective, so he chose this comprehensive expression to renounce any action which could be associated with the Thirty. Lateiner (“Lysias”, 150), although he rightly points out that if a litigant could demonstrate that he is not associated with the tyrants, he effectively strengthens his defence, argues that the speaker makes no reference to the regime of the Thirty. This view is correct in the sense that the speaker does not make an explicit reference to the Thirty. However, this does not just happen here but also in other parts of the speech too, where we would expect something similar, because it does not serve his defensive strategy (see further Introduction, The defensive strategy of the speech, 49 – 52). This claim is made here by the speaker to make his next claim about a longstanding, self-respecting life credible (see comm. § 19), since the main characteristic of a prudent man was to avoid αἰσχρά (see North, Sophrosyne, 89). ἢ ὡς τὰς τῆς πόλεως συμφορὰς εἶδον: The democratic ideology required that the citizens stated and showed that they regretted the calamities of the city, whereas allegations of disrespectful conduct became frequent arguments against opponents (see Seager, “Elitism”, 15 – 16, cf. Eur. Supp.897– 98, Din. 1.36, Dem. 18.41 with Usher, Demosthenes, 186, 18.217 with Yunis, Demosthenes, 232, 19.130, 22.66, Lyc. 1.133). This happened because the betrayal of the city was actually what separated the democratic man from the oligarch in Athens during that period (see Wolpert, Remembering Defeat, 123 – 125), so the speaker is quick to declare that he has nothing to do with the defeat of the city. This claim is a commonplace for Lysias’ clients. See Lévy, Athènes, 227. The speaker certainly does not mention at all what he was doing during the regime of the Thirty but he merely hurries to confirm that he was displeased with the city’s misfortunes. This claim, combined with the previous one about parsimony in his finances (cf. § 16 ἰδίᾳ μὲν τῶν φείδομαι), nullifies the possible thought of some jurors that he lived in wealth at a time when the city was plagued by misfortunes (cf. Din. 1.36 with Worthington, Dinarchus-Hyperides, 153 – 54).
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ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων δὲ καὶ ἰδίων καὶ τῶν δημοσίων οὕτως ἡγοῦμαὶ μοι πεπολιτεῦσθαι, καὶ ὑμᾶς εἰδέναι, ὥστε οὐδὲν δεῖν με ἀπολογήσασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν: The speaker here uses the verb ἡγοῦμαι instead of the verb οἴομαι, which he used when comparing himself with the treasurers of the city (cf. § 14), in order to show his strong conviction about what he is saying (cf. [Lys.] 20.5 with Αποστολάκης, Πολύστρατος, 139). Lysias’ client had also used the verb ἡγοῦμαι in § 16, where he had claimed that the jurors hold his property. In that case the intense tone of his speech was justified, since the speaker had already proved the credibility of his statement (cf. §§ 1– 5, 10). In this passage, however, such a stong conviction is not justified. In my opinion, the speaker exploits the ignorance of the jurors concerning his personal and political behaviour but also because he cannot obviously provide proofs with regard to this (cf. Dem. 40.53 – 54 with Hesk, Deception, 228 – 29), claims that they all know who he is; he therefore, does not need to say more about it. His omission of information in court that would be in his favour takes place so that the speaker appears to be a moderate person and therefore can be considered reliable (Cf. Hermog. On Type of Styles 2.6: ἐπιεικὲς εἶναι τὸ ἑκόντα παραλείπειν, ὅσα τις εἰπεῖν ἔχει … ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ. Καὶ πολύ γε τὸ ἀξιόπιστον διὰ τὴν ἐμφαινομένην ἐπιείκειαν αἱ παραλείψεις ἔχουσι, Long. fr. 48, chapt. 194 (Patillon-Brisson), H.Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, D.E.Orton and R.D.Anderson (eds.), Leiden 1998, 393 – 94. The παράλειψις as a rhetorical argument is important, because it gives the impression that something is common knowledge to all. For this reason, it was often used by other litigants too. Cf. Dem. 18.69 with Usher, Demosthenes, 195, C.Carey-D.Reid, Demosthenes: Selected Private Speeches, Cambridge 1985, 169, Cohen, Law, Sexuality, 80 – 81, Ober, Mass and Elite, 147– 49, Montiglio, Silence, 130. Concerning the use of the infinitive of the verb πολιτεύομαι in the present perfect, cf. Dem. 18.4,10, Aesch. 3.61. The phrase ὑπὲρ τῶν δημοσίων and the verb πολιτεύομαι suggest that the speaker refers to his public activity as an orator (cf. Whitehead, Demes, 68, Ober, Mass and Elite, 106, Hyp. 3.27 with Whitehead, Hyperides, 229). Moreover, this verb is related to the accusation of bribery pending against him. Cf. § 21 and Harpocr. s.v. δώρων γραφή· ὁπότε τις αἰτίαν ἔχοι τῶν πολιτευομένων δῶρα λαβεῖν, τὸ ἔγκλημα τὸ κατ’ αὐτοῦ διχῶς ἐλέγετο, δωροδοκία τε καὶ δώρων γραφή. Cf. also Dem. Lett.2.1 who, while trying to convince his fellow-citizens to go back on his condemnation for bribery, says: ἐνόμιζον μὲν ἀφ’ὧν ἐπολιτευόμην, οὐχ ὅπως μηδὲν ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα πείσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέτρι’ ἐξαμαρτὼν συγγνώμης τεύξεσθαι.
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§ 19. δέομαι οὖν ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τὴν αὐτὴν νῦν περὶ ἐμοῦ γνώμην ἔχειν, ἥνπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ τέως χρόνῳ, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῶν δημοσίων λῃτουργιῶν μεμνῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐνθυμεῖσθαι: The same argument from the speaker, i. e. that the jurors should hold the same opinion of the defendant as they had hitherto is also the request of other litigants. Cf. Lys. 3.21, 7.12, 24.21, Andoc. 1.141. The prosecutors instead urge the jurors to have a negative impression of their opponents. Cf. Lys. 7.24, 15.1,12, 25.3, Isocr. 20.7. The use of the resumptive participle οὖν (see Denniston, GP, 463 – 64) shows that the speaker strengthens what he expressed in his previous arguments concerning the regime of the Thirty. The denial of having any relationship with them (cf. comm. § 4 καὶ ὕστερον) is a good reason to ask the jurors to have the same opinion of him as in the past. Any association with the Thirty would not allow him to make such a claim, as Evander’s prosecutor reveals, who, first accusing his opponent of being an accomplice of the tyrants, then says: οὐκ ἂν ἄτοπον ποιήσαιτε, εἰ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην ἔχοντες περὶ αὐτοῦ φανεῖσθε; (Lys. 26.10). The next two things that the speaker asks from his jurors is to remember the public liturgies he assumed in the past and his private ἐπιτηδεύματα. Regarding the first claim, we must consider it reasonable for the speaker to believe that the jurors remember his liturgies, because they were numerous and expensive (see comm. §§ 1– 5). Besides, the way in which he expounded the liturgies he assumed was such as to give him the certainty that the jurors would actually remember what he did (see comm. § 5 καὶ τούτων ὧν κατέλεξα). On the basis of these firm memories of the jurors regarding the lituriges he assumed, the speaker will also begin the epilogue of his speech. See § 23. In his second claim, which refers to his private qualities, he clearly emphasises more heavily, as the use of μὴ μόνον – ἀλλὰ shows (see Denniston, GP, 3). Private qualities are divided into καλά–χρηστά (cf. Lys. 31.25, Isocr. 2.38, Dem. 60.27) and φαῦλα (cf. Diod. 11.87.5). As positive qualities were considered the acquisition of the favour of the gods (cf. Xen. Oec.11.7), victory in the Olympic Games (cf. Isocr. 16.32– 33), distinction at war (cf Isocr. 16.29), the desire to die for one’s country (cf. Isocr. 2.36) and εὐπραξία, which someone could characterize as κράτιστον ἐπιτήδευμα (cf. Xen. Mem.3.9.14). The importance of good qualities was so great that one could honour a dead man by referring to the qualities of the latter when he was alive (cf. Isocr. 9.2). The Athenians put great emphasis on their fellow citizens’ qualities (cf. Thuc. 2.37.2, 6.15.4,28.2, Isocr. 2.2, see Seager, “Alcibiades”, 8 – 10,16) and especially the qualities of young people (cf. Lys. 14.1, 30.2, Aristoph. Nub.1015). References to qualities were quite frequent in courts, because, on the basis of these, the jurors could ascertain the moral character of the litigants. Vicious qualities were a main reason for a litigant to launch an attack against his opponent (cf.
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Lys. 9.18 [Andoc.] 4.33, Aesch. 1.123, see Seager, “Alcibiades”, 14– 15) and seek to convince the jurors that the latter was πονηρός, that is reluctant to offer his services to the city (cf. Lys. 14.43, Isocr. 20.4, see Adkins, MR, 214), while good qualities were a good reason to ask for his acquittal (cf. Gorg. Pal.Apol.32). Consequently, the reference of the speaker to his good qualities is apposite, since he demonstrated his military capacities above all with his activity in the Hellespont (see comm. §§ 8 – 10), while he will refer to his status as a benefactor of the city later (see comm. §§ 20, 22). Actually, to strengthen his position even more the speaker will not fail to refer to his opponents’ qualities (see comm. § 21). We would expect, however, the speaker to urge the jurors to take into consideration his qualities and not simply to ask them to do so. Isocrates gives a possible explanation as to why this is not happening: Οὕτω γὰρ … τινὲς ὑπὸ τοῦ φθόνου καὶ τῶν ἀποριῶν ἐξηγρίωνται καὶ δυσμενῶς ἔχουσιν ὥστε … μισοῦσιν … τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τὰ βέλτιστα (15.142). Taking into consideration the speaker’s previous request to the jurors not to envy him because of his wealth (see comm. § 15 πένητα γενόμενον ἐλεῆσαι μᾶλλον ἢ πλουτοῦντι φθονῆσαι), we may conclude that the speaker fears that this kind of emotion may dominate in the hearts of the jurors and that they will not value him for his qualities. ἡγουμένους ταύτην εἶναι {τὴν} λῃτουργίαν ἐπιπονωτάτην: By this sentence the speaker does not refer to assuming trierarchies and choregies (see N.Lewis, ‘Leiturgia and Related Terms’ GRBS 3 (1960), 181– 83), something which we meet in other texts too (see [Arist.] Ath.Pol.29.5, Lys. 18.7, Dem. 10.4), but to κοσμιότης and σωφροσύνη, as he is going to make clear immediately afterwards. It is also noteworthy that he recognizes, for the first time in the speech, that any liturgy the wealthy citizens assume is laborious regardless of the financial condition of each one separately (cf. § 5). To give more emphasis to his claim the speaker uses emphatically the pronoun ταύτην. The following infinitives function, syntactically speaking, as an explanation of the demonstrative pronoun ταύτην (see Cooper, Syntax, 520 – 21). διὰ τέλους τὸν πάντα χρόνον κόσμιον εἶναι καὶ σώφρονα: Here the speaker refers to two key features that an Athenian citizen should have, κοσμιότης and σωφροσύνη, which are often linked in our sources (though particularly associated with Sparta, they were also valued in Athens – see North, Sophrosyne, 94,98, Rademaker, Sophrosyne, 237 n.22, Rhodes, CAP 504– 5). Propriety and σωφροσύνη on a personal level meant the conformity of a citizen to the laws and the demonstration of proper behaviour towards other Athenians (see
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North, Sophrosyne, 121– 22, Rademaker, Sophrosyne, 229 – 30,234– 37,245 – 47, Roisman, Manhood, 192). The allegation about τὸν πάντα χρόνον propriety is important, because the speaker means the years from his coming of age until the time of delivering the speech, i. e. including the time that the Thirty were in power. It is noteworthy that other litigants pointed out that they maintained orderly behaviour during the oligarchic regime, that is they did not harm any fellow citizen (cf. Lys. 7.41, 26.5, Isocr. 18.17– 18). The speaker, however, once again avoids linking his name with the Thirty (cf. comm. § 4 καὶ ὕστερον). As for σωφροσύνη we must say that during the Peloponnesian War this virtue suffered many attacks, mainly by some of the aristocrats, because they regarded it as an obstacle to the achievement of their personal desires and passions (see Aristoph. Clouds 1060 – 62, Plat. Gorg.429a,c,d,e, 494c, Resp.560d with H.North, ‘A period of opposition to sophrosyne in Greek Thought’ TAPA 78 (1947), 10 – 14). The speaker, however, differentiates himself from these people and implicitly stresses that he remained σώφρων throughout his life, thus indicating that he disagrees with their views. At the same time he serves his strategy of defence, since the adjective σώφρων indicates moral values and belongs to the socio-political vocabulary with which the noble Athenians attempted to convince the community as a whole that they were the most remarkable members of the city (see W.Donlan, ‘Social Vocabulary and its relationship to Political Propaganda in Fifth-Century Athens’ QUCC 27 (1978), 104,107– 08). This is probably the reason why the invocation of σωφροσύνη is one of the recurrent arguments of Lysias’ clients (see Lateiner, “Lysias”, 152). This inevitably means recognition by the jurors of the speaeker’s merit and therefore leads to his acquittal. Because σωφροσύνη was believed to be the appropriate virtue for young people (see North, Sophrosyne, 5,20,91 n.20, Rademaker, Sophrsosyne, 244 n.37, Roisman, Manhood, 177) like him (see comm. § 1 ἐπὶ Θεοπόμπου … τραγῳδοῖς), the speaker obviously aims to impress the jurors with this specific argument. Furthermore, his jurors can accept the claim that he has lived σωφρόνως, since it was considered that this behaviour befited those who owned property (cf. Arist. Pol.1326b30 – 32). The speaker’s reference to σωφροσύνη shows that Lysias follows a specific strategy. While he could have directly asked the jurors’ gratitude as a σώφρων citizen, as other litigants did (see Johnstone, Disputes, 101), he prefers to prepare the jurors psychologically on this issue (see § 25) and attack his prosecutors by questioning their military and political activity (see comm. §§ 20 – 21). We must also notice that propriety and σωφροσύνη are closely related to his military ethos (see comm. §§ 3, 6 – 10), since these were virtues that the public
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speakers of the funeral orations attributed to the war dead (see Gorg. Fun.Or.fr.6 (Diels-Kranz), Dem. 60.4, cf. Roisman, Manhood, 177). καὶ μήθ’ ὑφ’ ἡδονῆς ἡττηθῆναι: Pleasure may indicate a desire for a) unlawful sex either as adultery (cf. Lys. 1.26 with Dover, GPM, 208, Plut. Alc.23.7, Fisher, Hybris, 13) or homosexual relationships (cf. Aesch. 1.76,96, Plat. Phaedr.237d238c with Cairns, “Thinking Big”, 25 – 27, Xen. Mem.2.1.21– 33 with Fisher, Hybris, 110 – 11, Xen Oec.2.7 with Pomeroy, Xenophon, Oeconomicus, 229). b) Material goods such as furniture and earthenware (cf. Lys. 19.31, Plut. Alc.16.1), works of art (Dem. 21 with Davies, APF, no. 600), fancy clothes (Dem. 36.45) and luxurious houses (Dem. 21.158). c) Horsebreeding (cf. Thuc. 6.12.2, Aristoph. Clouds 243 with Dover, Clouds, 129). d) Flutegirls, courtesans, men and women slaves, and dice (cf. Aesch. 1.42, Lys. 3, 4, Aristoph. Plut.179,242– 44,303, Dem. 36.45, Dem. 21.158 with MacDowell, Meidias, 378, Dem 59.33 with C.Carey, Apollodoros Against Neaira [Demosthenes] 59, Warminster 1992, 102– 3, Plut. Alc.4.8, Theophr. Char.4.7 with Ussher, Theophrastus, 58). It was not an easy thing for someone not to be overcome by pleasures (cf. Arist. Nic.Eth.1109a14– 16). This argument is important, since the speaker rejects the dissolute life, which was a characteristic of the young aristocrats of Athens (about the aristocratic lifestyle see H.I.Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity, transl. G. Lamb, New York, 1964, 65 – 67, Donlan, Aristocratic Ideal, 155 – 77, O.Murray, Early Greece, New Jersey 1993, 2nd ed., 201– 19, J.Davidson, ‘Fish, Sex and Revolution in Athens’ CQ 43 (1993), 53 – 58, cf. Carter, Quiet Athenian, 21– 23). This argument relates to the speaker’s military ethos, since overcoming the pleasures and material gain were characteristics of the Athenians who died fighting for the city. Cf. Thuc. 2.42.4: τῶνδε δὲ οὔτε τις τὴν ἔτι ἀπόλαυσιν προτιμήσας ἐμαλακίσθη. μήθ’ ὑπὸ τοῦ κέρδους ἐπαρθῆναι: The speaker differentiates himself from those who are proud of their income, because the democratic Athenians generally despised people who boasted (see Missiou, Andokides, 29) and grumbled at wealthy people seeking gain without any concern for the benefit of their fellow citizens (see Dover, GPM, 171– 74). The fierce desire for gain was even considered an indication of oligarchic predispositions (cf. Theophr. Char.26.1 with Ussher, Theophrastus, 217). On the other hand, the fact that the speaker was rich did not mean that he had to overlook profit-making, as this could lead to absolute poverty (cf. Xen. Oec.2.7). For the second time in the speech the speaker reveals to the jurors his relation with money (see § 16). With this argument he is trying to become agreeable to the jurors, since he rejects the notion that those who had more riches than
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others usually considered themselves superior (cf. Arist. Pol.1301a31– 33). This claim is also necessary, as it does not befit a pious citizen, like him (cf. Plat. Laws716a: ὁ δέ τις … χρήμασιν ἐπαιρόμενος καταλείπεται ἔρημος θεοῦ and the comm. § 15 καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς εὔχεσθαι … ἀναλίσκωσιν). Last, this claim is necessary for his next argument too, i. e. that he has never done any injustice, since those who boasted about their profits could do injustice to a fellow citizen in order to gain even more (cf. Dem. 21.159, Isocr. 21.6-Rademaker, Sophrosyne, 235, argues that the speaker asserts here that he resists injustice but without documenting his position). ἀλλά τοιοῦτον παρασχεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὥστε μηδένα τῶν πολιτῶν μήτε μέμψασθαι μήτε δίκην τολμῆσαι προσκαλέσασθαι: The speaker, as in § 16, is using the pronoun τοιοῦτος. There he commented on his lifestyle in relation to the city (see relevant comm.), while here he refers to his relationship with his fellow citizens. This relationship is perfect, since no one has ever criticized him or taken him to court (emphasis on the double use of μήτε – μήτε). Abstention from injustice towards other citizens was considered a characteristic of a σώφρων man (see Dover, GPM, 67, Rademaker, Sophrosyne, 243 – 45), so the speaker justifiably stresses the absence of any such complaints because of this behaviour (ὥστε). Other clients of Lysias use the second part of the argument: πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας οὕτως βεβίωκα ὥστε μηδεπώποτέ μοι μηδὲ πρὸς ἕνα μηδὲν ἔγκλημα γενέσθαι (16.10). See also 5.3, 12.4, 13.67. Such a claim is of great importance in that period, because amnesty did not protect one against the possibility of being accused in court of an incident that had occurred before the oligarchy (see Loening, Reconciliation, 137). As a result, his previous claim that his opponents are unjust sycophants (see § 17) sounds more justified. § 20. Οὔκουν ἄξιον, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, πειθομένου κατηγόροις τοιούτοις ἐμοῦ καταψηφίσασθαι: The speaker in order to weaken the position of his opponents, is negative about them using the pronoun τοιοῦτος, a strategy used in other speeches too (cf. Lys. 14.41, 26.18, Dem 13.19, Din. 1.40, see Wilson, Khoregia, 154). The phrase οὔκουν ἄξιον combined with the pronoun τοιοῦτος strengthens his purpose even further. Cf. Dem. 36.59: οὔκουν ἄξιον, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Aθηναῖοι, τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα προέσθαι. Cf. Lys. 19.61: οὔκουν ἄξιον τοῖς τῶν κατηγόρων λόγοις πιστεῦσαι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἔργοις, Isaeus 11.47: οὐκ ἄξιον τοῖς τούτου λόγοις πιστεύειν. The speaker’s contemptuous behaviour towards his opponents is justified because of their attitude towards him (cf. §§ 12, 17) but also because of their impiety, their reluctance to fight for the city, their hypocrisy and their indifference
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to the εὐδαιμονία of the city, as he will prove from now on. With the same pronoun, he will also speak again in a contemptuous way in the last paragraph of the speech referring to the accusations against him: τοιαύταις αἰτίαις (§ 25cf. also Lys. 5.2, Aesch. 3.221). This trial was public, which means that one man was probably the prosecutor who sued him on paper (ὁ γραψάμενος), while the others acted as supporting prosecutors (see Rubinstein, Litigation, 105 – 6). However, like many other litigants, the speaker does not make such a distinction (see Rubinstein, Litigation, 98), because he wants to prove that this was a coordinated attack against him (cf. § 17 ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν). In this passage, the speaker refers to a possible condemnation by the jurors for the first time by using the infinitive καταψηφίσασθαι. He started defending himself by saying that the jurors’ awareness of who he really is was important for them in reaching their verdict: ψηφιεῖσθε (§ 1). He will ask for his acquittal for the first and last time while concluding his speech: ἀποψηφισάμενοι (§ 25). The use of the same verb with a different preposition each time, which also changes its meaning, reveals the evolution of the thought of the speaker, which is actually based on the content of his words. Initially, he is neutral with regard to the verdict; afterwards, however, having said many things about himself, he dissuades the jurors from condemning him and at the end when he has concluded his arguments, he urges them to acquit him. οἳ περὶ ἀσεβείας μὲν ἀγωνιζόμενοι τηλικοῦτοι γεγόνασιν, οὐκ ἂν δυνάμενοι δ’ ὑπὲρ τῶν σφετέρων ἁμαρτημάτων ἀπολογήσαθαι ἑτέρων κατηγορεῖν τολμῶσι: The phrase περὶ ἀσεβείας ἀγωνιζόμενοι is also found in other speeches and it is used with regard to trials of impiety (cf. e. g. Antiph. 3.3.6, Dem. 22.2, 24.7, 35.48, 57.8). The use of the infinitive ἀπολογήσαθαι (cf. Lys. 9.17, 26.13, Dem. 18.9) also indicates a pending trial. It, therefore, means that the speaker’s opponents are possibly defendants for some religious offence, since at that time such trials were conducted (e. g. see Jebb, Attic Orators, 281– 92, Lys. 7 with Carey, Lysias, 115). If this is indeed the real reason for their prosecution or just an excuse, because they were supporters of the Thirty (cf. Todd, Lysias, 1 – 11, 479, see Introduction, The legal problems of the speech, 34– 35), we do not know. We cannot exclude the possibility that the speaker tells the truth about them, but his failure to provide any evidence leads us to believe that this is a false accusation aiming at blemishing their ethos. Cf. Αndoc. 1.100: ᾿Aλλ’ ὅμως οὗτος ἑτέρων τολμᾷ κατηγορεῖν, ᾧ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς ὑμετέρους οὐδ’ αὐτῷ ὐπὲρ αὑτοῦ ἔστιν ἀπολογεῖσθαι with Furley, Andokides, 57 about Andocides’ strategy as a whole in this paragraph. Cf. also Dem. 21.58, 22.69, 59.109.
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The accusation of impiety meant the violation of the ephebic oath given by the Athenians during their δοκιμασία (see Plescia, Oath and Perjury, 17 n.4) and because the speaker has shown so far throughout his life that he has honoured this oath (see comm. § 1 ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐδοκιμάσθην), he attempts to make the jurors compare his own political attitude with that of his rivals. This interpretation is justified by the fact that the speaker makes here his first direct reference to them. The speaker argues that because his opponents know that they will not be able to defend themselves effectively (οὐκ ἂν δυνάμενοι), they have the audacity to act as the accusers not only of him but also of other Athenians (this is indicated by the pronoun ἑτέρων). Accusations of contradiction between the real and apparent motives of the opponents are already known from Antiphon (cf. 6.7). With his attack the speaker implies that these people are in fact a public threat, since they turn against citizens who have no connection with their backdoor activities and create social unrest. The speaker emphasizes their blustering by using the verb τολμῶ, which other litigants use for the same purpose (cf. e. g. Andoc. 2.64, Isaeus 1.17, 3.61, Isocr. 18.16, Dem. 18.22, Aesch. 1.64, 3.53, Lyc. 1.135, Din. 4.49). He consciously repeats the verb τολμῶ, which he used in his previous argument in regard to his fellow citizens, (§ 19), to show the viciousness of his opponents; although nobody has dared to raise δίκην against him, they dare to raise γραφήν! The argument that the prosecutors are trying to distract the jurors from their own mistakes and blame the speaker for this reason is repeated in other speeches of Lysias too. Cf. 25.1: τῶν δὲ κατηγόρων θαυμάζω, οἵ ἀμελοῦντες τῶν οἰκείων τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἐπιμελοῦνται, εἰ σαφῶς εἰδότες τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας καὶ τοὺς πολλὰ ἐξημαρτηκότας ζητοῦσι [κερδαίνειν ἢ] ὑμᾶς πείθειν περὶ ἁπάντων ἡμῶν τὴν γνώμην ταύτην, Lys. 9.17. This is not accidental but a rhetorical strategy of the logographer (cf. Dion.Hal. Lys.17.15 – 17), which was created thanks to the code of the καλοί κἀγαθοί according to which the assumption of the role of the prosecutor in a γραφή by an aristocrat against a peer made him πονηρός and removed him from his social class (see Ste. Croix, Origins, 373 – 74). This of course applies only if the eventual accuser is lying and not if he defends the truth and the public interest. The speaker judges the initiative of his opponents in becoming prosecutors by how they exercised their office in order to prove their vices. Lysias uses this argument elsewhere too. Cf. 6.33: Εἰς τοσοῦτον δὲ ἀναισχυντίας ἀφῖκται, ὥστε καὶ … ἀποδοκιμάζει τῶν ἀρχόντων τισί. The same also applies to the accusation that the opponents, even though they are themselves guilty, appear as protectors of the city: οἳ τὰ μὲν προσταττόμενα ποιεῖν οὐκ ἐθέλουσι, τοιούτων δ’ ἔργων ἐπιθυμοῦσι, καὶ περὶ τῶν σφετέρων αὐτῶν κακῶς βουλευσάμενοι περὶ τῶν ὑμετέρων
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δημηγοροῦσιν (Lys. 14.45). Eventually the speaker manages to vilify his accusers (cf. Carey, “Rhetorical Means”, 35). καὶ ὧν Κινησίας οὕτω διακείμενος πλείους στρατείας ἐστράτευται, οὗτοι περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως ἀγανακτοῦσι: Having first demonstrated his military ethos (see §§ 3, 6 – 10), the speaker compares his prosecutors with Cinesias, saying that he had taken part in more campaigns than them and that they still resent what is happening in the city. With this accusation of avoiding military service, the speaker mainly accuses his opponents of cowardice (cf. Carey, Lysias, 143 n.10). The strength of the argument, however, does not lie in the accusation itself, as it is common in forensic speeches, (cf. Lys. 3.45 with Carey, Lysias, 112, Aesch. 3.152,174,181,187,253, see D.MacDowell, Aristophanes and Athens, Oxford 1995, 22– 25), but in the comparison with Cinesias. He was the head of an ἑταιρεία the members of which called themselves κακοδαιμονισταί and who gathered on the ill-fated days of each month to show disrespect to the gods. Cinesias was punished by the gods with chronic illness, while the other members of the group died. On this issue see Lysias fr. LXXXV and fr. LXXXVI (Carey), Aristoph. Birds 1372– 1409 with the analysis of J.D.Mikalson, ‘ἡμέρα ἀποφράς’ AJP 96 (1975), 22, Fisher, Hybris, 146, Furley, Andokides, 90. The speaker does not mention what exactly the behavior of Cinesias and his team was, but he obviously assumes that the jurors know what exactly happened, so he merely restricts himself to the phrase οὕτω διακείμενος. The reference to Cinesias is not accidental. The speaker is aware that his fellow citizens feared that the misfortunes and disappointments they had experienced towards the end of the 5th century B.C. were a kind of divine revenge (see J.V.Muir, ‘Religion and the new education’ in Easterling and Muir, Greek Religion and Society, 195, cf. O.Murray, ’The Affair of the Mysteries: Democracy and the Drinking Group’, in Sympotica: A Symposium on the Symposion, O.Murray (ed.), Oxford 1990, 158, Introduction, The defensive strategy of the speech, 47– 48), so he seeks to persuade them that approving of accusations deriving from groups of people like his opponents incites the wrath of the gods. Consequently, his prosecutors inevitably become unreliable and their accusations incredible, since no one believed the words of such people (cf. Arist. Rhet.1416a26 – 28 with G.P.Palmer, The Τόποι of Aristotle’s Rhetoric as exemplified in the Orators, Chicago/Illinois 1934, 26 – 29), while he enhances his piety by criticising them (cf. Carey, “Rhetorical Means”, 37). The comparison of the opponents with another person, who was considered notorious for his impiety to the gods, is also used by another speaker and probably indicates the effectiveness of this kind of argument. Cf. Lys. 6.17: τοσοῦτον δ’ οὗτος Διαγόρου τοῦ Μηλίου ἀσεβέστερος γεγένηται· ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ λόγῳ περὶ τὰ
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ἀλλότρια ἱερὰ καὶ ἑορτὰς ἠσέβει, οὗτος δὲ ἔργῳ περὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ πόλει with Furley’s analysis (Andokides, 109 – 10). V.Hunter (‘Gossip and the Politics of Reputation in Classical Athens’ Phoenix 44 (1990), 299 – 325 and Policing Athens, 96 – 110,116 – 118), considers that reports such as the speaker’s were gossip, since they involve moral judgments, and believes that the courts acted as the final transmitter in the procedure of imparting such information to the Athenian society. Nevertheless, as P.Harding points out (‘All pigs are animals, but are all animals pigs?’ AHB 5 (1991), 145 – 48), any moral judgement is not necessarily gossip and we cannot prove if the courts used information which was already known to the audience or if they made the information known to the general public. I may say that what the speaker does here is to exploit the prejudice of his fellow citizens towards people such as Cinesias in order to achieve the rhetorical technique of λοιδορία more effectively. The speaker uses the pronoun οὗτοι to refer to his opponents in a contemptuous way (cf. e. g. Dem. 17.7, 18.296 with Yunis, Demosthenes, 274, 19.157, 20.79, Din. 1.44, see Cooper, Syntax, 522). This is the second time he uses a pronoun to vilify his accusers (see comm. § 12). By using the verb ἀγανακτῶ the speaker wants to prove the hypocrisy of his opponents, since to be entitled to express their indignation at the behaviour of others they should themselves show the required behaviour (cf. Dem. 18.22, Aesch. 3.147, [Arist.] Ath.Pol.36.1).With the phrase τῶν τῆς πόλεως the speaker, like other litigants (cf. Dem. 28.2), refers to the overall problems of the city. The point, however, is the emphasis on the fact that the hypocrisy of his prosecutors is not related solely to his own case but to all the issues of Athens, since the plaintiffs refuse to perform the ultimate duty for the Athenians, i. e. to serve willingly as soldiers for the city, as he himself did (cf. Introductory. comm. § 6 – 11). καὶ ἐξ ὧν μὲν ἡ πόλις εὐδαίμων ἔσται, οὐ συμβάλλονται, πάντα δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὅπως ὑμεῖς τοῖς πεποιηκόσιν ὀργισθήσεσθε: The ultimate goal for each individual but also for each city was, according to the Greeks, εὐδαιμονία (cf. e. g. Plat. Resp.421b3-c6, Arist. Rhet.1360b5 – 13, Pol.1264b17– 19). In this respect, the interest of the Athenians was great, since they believed that the happiness of the city was inherited by their ancestors (cf. Dem. 11.16), while, according to Plutarch, it was a gift of Pericles to the Athenians (cf. Plut. Per.16.2). The Athenians believed that for the city to be εὐδαίμων there should exist good laws respected by the citizens and the jurors (cf. Dem. 3.27, 11.16, 20.111, Lyc. 1.3 – 4). Moreover, the rich citizens should give money for the benefit of the city assuming all kinds of choregies and trierarchies (cf. Roberts,
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P.Ryl. 489, ll.68 – 72, Isocr. 7.53). On a religious level people should sacrifice to the gods and be pious (cf. Lys. 30.18, Dem. 3.26 – 27). In military terms the Athenians acquired εὐδαιμονία when they were involved in the campaigns of the city (cf. Dem. 3.24), led the Greeks and protected them when they needed it (cf. Dem. 3.26 – 27, 10.46). For Athens to remain εὐδαίμων, the Athenians should really want to fight for it (cf. Lyc. 1.150, Dem. 10.46, 13.20 – 21, 62.50.2– 3). For this reason, εὐδαιμονία was considered to be a result of her victorious wars against her opponents (cf. Dem. 14.40), while the evidence of this was freedom (cf. Thuc. 2.43.4) or the autonomy of the city (cf. Hyp. 6.25). Since εὐδαιμονία, therefore, had political, religious and military aspects, the speaker uses the term ἐξ ὧν to show that his opponents do not help the city at any level (οὐ συμβάλλονται), an argument that sounds justified, since in his analysis so far he has proved their shortcomings at all these levels. Moreover, the reference to εὐδαιμονία is directly related to the current political situation in the city and aims to disparage the accusers. One of Isocrates’ clients argues that the Athenians became εὐδαιμονέστατοι when the civil war ended (cf. 18.46), i. e. the time when our speech was delivered. In one speech Lysias states: ἕω[ς] μ[ὲ]ν γὰρ ὑ[μεῖς ηὐδα]ιμονεῖτε, πλου[σιώτατος ἦ]ν τῶν μετοί[κων· ἐπειδ]ὴ δὲ συμφο[ρὰ ἐγένετο] (fr. LXX Πρὸς Ἱπποθέρσην (Carey)). This means that the Athenians believed that their city was εὐδαίμων before the defeat at Aegospotami but not any more (the speaker referred to the defeat in the Hellespont also describing it as a συμφορά (§ 9), while presenting the εὐδαιμονία of the city as a future event: ἡ πόλις εὐδαίμων ἔσται and not ἐστί, as it is not now). Last, Andocides refers to the εὐδαιμονία of the city, asserting that the Athenians could achieve it if they did not harbour grudges: ἠξιώσατε γὰρ τούς τε φεύγοντας καταδέξασθαι καὶ τοὺς ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους ποιῆσαι. Τί οὖν ὑμῖν ὑπόλοιπόν ἐστι τῆς ἐκείνων ἀρετῆς; μὴ μνησικακῆσαι, εἰδότας, ὦ ἄνδρες, ὅτι ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολὺ ἐλάττονος ἀφορμῆς ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ μεγάλη καὶ εὐδαίμων ἐγένετο (1.109). Combining these sources, we may safely argue that what Lysias’ client implies is that his prosecutors impeded the implementation of the amnesty with their behaviour and showed μνησικακίαν (cf. Loening, Reconciliation, 20 – 22). Their attitude entitles him to lauch a strong attack against them. First, the fact of not contributing to the happiness of the city marginalizes them, since the εὐδαιμονία of the citizens and the city coincided (cf. Arist. Pol.1324a5 – 10). Above all, what the speaker implies is that his accusers are essentially traitors, a particularly strong accusation within the context (cf. Dem. 18.296 with Yunis, Demosthenes, 274). The formulation of an argument which is based on the concept of happiness of the city suggests that this issue preoccupied the Athenians in that period and was an issue of public debate. For this reason, the speaker will not hesitate to
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mention this in order to direct the anger of the jurors against his prosecutors (C. De Heer, ΜΑΚΑΡ-ΕΥΔΑΙΜΩΝ-ΟΛΒΙΟΣ-ΕΥΤΥΧΗΣ: A Study of the Semantic Field Denoting Happiness in Ancient Greek to the End of the 5th Century BC, Amsterdam 1969, 80 – 81, is wrong to argue that the Athenians used the word εὐδαιμονία occasionally in their daily life and that only Antiphon uses it). The speaker uses the phrase πάντα ποιοῦσιν in order to show his opponents’ spite, but instead of referring to himself uses the general description εὖ πεποιηκότες so that the jurors draw the conclusion that the target of the prosecutors were not just citizens like him, who demonstrate through their behaviour that they are concerned about the happiness of the city (cf. §§ 1– 11, 19 with Isocr. 7.53), but all those who benefit her. For the second time, therefore, he places the activities of his opponents in a wider context by presenting them as a public threat, but here he becomes more specific with regard to people facing danger: the εὖ πεποιηκότες and no longer ἕτεροι (cf. comm. § 20 οἵ περὶ ἀσεβείας … τολμῶσι). With the alleged attempt of the prosecutors to arouse the anger of the jurors Lysias’ client probably refers to the application of the well-known tactic of prosecutors to obtain the conviction of their opponent (see Carey, “Rhetorical Means”, 29 – 30). The efficiency of the tactic was great (cf. Arist. Rhet.1356a15 – 16, see Αποστολάκης, Πολύστρατος, 122) and is common in cases of corruption (cf. Aesch. 3.3 with § 21), so the speaker feels it necessary to refer to it. That is not true, of course, as his opponents seek his own punishment and not the punishment of all those who act for the benefit of the city. In this way, however, he tarnishes their character and turns the anger of the jurors from his person against those who first sought to trigger that anger. § 21. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐν τῷ δήμῳ κατείποιεν ὑμῖν τὰ σφἐτερ’ αὐτῶν ἐπιτηδεύματα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔχοιμι ὅ τι τούτου μεῖζον αὐτοῖς εὐξαίμην κακόν: After a long period (καὶ ἐξ ὧν … ὀργισθήσεσθε) the speaker begins his sentence for the second time in the speech using the pronoun οὗτοι to show again his contempt for his opponents (cf. comm. § 20 οὗτοι … ἀγανακτοῦσι). Lysias reopens the issue of prayer for the second time but while the first time he had used it as a piece of advice to the jurors (cf. comm. § 15 καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς εὔχεσθαι … ἀναλίσκωσιν), this time it is a hypothetical situation where his client could pray to the gods. Finally, at a previous point the logographer had referred to the qualities of his speaker (cf. § 19 τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐνθυμεῖσθαι), whereas here the question of the qualities of the accusers is raised. Consequently, in this passage, Lysias uses words and ideas we have encountered in previous
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parts of the speech, but this time he uses them in order to malign the opponents of the speaker. The syllogism in the passage is this: The speaker thinks that his opponents could enumerate their qualities. However, after this enumeration the result would definitely be negative for them, so negative that there could not be μεῖζον αὐτοῖς κακόν. The client of Lysias is apparently mocking his prosecutors. The speaker does not explain why his opponents would like to join in such a process. The alleged choice of this specific tactic on their part seems to be an anticipation by the speaker of an argument of the other party (cf. A.P.Dorjahn, ‘Anticipation of Arguments in Athenian Courts’ TAPA 66 (1935), 282– 85), where the prosecutors would try to persuade the Athenian demos in the ecclesia and not only the jurors now for their political and military ethos (in Attic oratory the phrase ἐν τῷ δήμῳ is used as a synonym of the phrase ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ. See Hansen, Ecclesia, 130). This argument suggests that his opponents were famous political figures. In this trial, one person was the main prosecutor, while the others acted as supporting prosecutors (see Introduction, The legal problems of the speech, 31). However, because there were cases where one man acted as a public prosecutor, while his political associates supported his accusation with their actions (see Connor, New Politicians, 25 – 29,66 – 79, Ostwald, Sovereignty, 321– 22), what the speaker reports might actually happen. Moreover, the speaker does not specify what exactly would be the κακόν for his opponents. In the ecclesia, the citizens could intervene by shouting or interrupting the speakers when they heard things that they disagreed with (see J.Tacon, ‘Ecclesiastic Thorubos: Interventions, Interruptions, and Popular Involvement in the Athenian Assembly’ G & R 48 (2001), 173 – 92, Montiglio, Silence, 146). R.Thomas, ‘And you, the Demos, made an uproar’: Performance, Mass audiences and text in the Athenian democracy’ in Sacred Words: Orality, Literacy and Religion. Orality and Literacy in the Ancient World, vol. 8, A.P.M.H.Lardinois and J.H.Blok and M.G.M. van der Poel, Leiden 2011, 161– 87). It is, therefore, justifiable to believe that the speaker imagines a strong reaction by the audience. The real κακόν could eventually be their full political elimination and the disdain of their fellow citizens, as later happened with the unsuccessful attempt of Aeschines to convince the Athenians that Demosthenes should not be crowned (see Aesch. 3 and Dem. 18 with E.M.Harris, Aeschines and Athenian Politics, Oxford 1995, 138 – 48, I.Worthington, ‘Demosthenes’ (in)activity during the reign of Alexander the Great’ and J.Buckler, ‘Demosthenes and Aeschines’ in Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator, I.Worthington (ed.), London and New York 2000, 96 – 100 and 145 – 48, respectively. In his final attack against the opponents of his client, Lysias aims at convincingly presenting the prosecutors as a group of vicious people who have never
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done the city any good. This tactic is based on the interest and concern of the Athenians over which people decided to assume the role of public prosecutor (see Christ, Litigious Athenian, 143 – 47, L.Rubinstein, ‘The Athenian Political Perception of the Idiotes’ in Cartledge-Millet-v.Reden, Kosmos, 134– 35) and to achieve his goal better Lysias chose for his client from the very beginning not to distinguish between the main prosecutor and his fellow prosecutors (see comm. § 20 πειθομένους … καταψηφίσασθαι). ἐγὼ δ’ ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ ἱκετεύω καὶ ἀντιβολῶ μὴ καταγνῶναι δωροδοκίαν ἐμοῦ, μηδ’ ἡγήσασθαι τοσαῦτα χρήματα εἶναι, ἃ ἐγὼ βουληθείην ἄν τι κακόν τῇ πόλει γενέσθαι: At this point the speaker calls for the mercy of the jurors. This strategy was familiar in the courtrooms (see Johnstone, Disputes, 115 – 17), but what is noteworthy is the use of the verbs δέομαι, ἱκετεύω and ἀντιβολῶ, which in reality bear the same meaning. These three verbs are found seven times in total in the surviving corpus of the Attic orators and twice in the surviving Lysianic corpus (see Dem. 27.68, 45.1,85, 57.1, Isaeus 2.44, Lys. 18.27, 21.21). This indicates the seriousness of the accusation and the anxiety of the speaker that the jurors might not believe him. The argument that there is no amount of money for the acquisition of which he would wish any ill to befall the city could be believed by the jurors, since in previous parts of his speech he proved what his relationship with his own money is (see comm. § 16 ὥστε ἰδίᾳ … ἥδομαι). § 22. μαινοίμην γὰρ , ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εἰ τὴν μὲν πατρῴαν οὐσίαν φιλοτιμούμενος εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀναλίσκοιμι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ τῆς πόλεως κακῷ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων δωροδοκοίην: This argument belongs to the argumenta ex contrariis, i. e. it is based on the contradiction of the ideas it contains. These ideas are, on the one hand, the speaker’s zeal to spend the paternal property (cf. comm. § 17 ἡγούμενος τούτων … καταλιπεῖν) to the benefit not only of these jurors but also of the omnipresent demos, as is indicated by the address ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί (cf. comm. § 8 δέκα εἴλεσθε), while, on the other hand, it is the accusation of wishing to harm the city (ἐπὶ τῷ τῆς πόλεως κακῷ). These ideas are connected by the particles μὲν-δὲ, whereas the argument is introduced by the verb μαινοίμην through which the speaker describes the contradiction created. With the sentence introduced by μὲν the speaker refers to a fact, that is his desire for honours (about the interpretation of the word φιλοτιμία cf. Dover, GPM, 230,233 – 34), which he admits for the first time explicitly here (cf. comm. § 1 καὶ τρίτῳ μηνὶ … Θαργηλίοις δραχμάς), while with the sentence introduced by δὲ, he presents what μανία would be on the basis of the fact he suggested in the previous sentence, namely the accusation of δωροδοκία.
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With this argument Lysias is seeking to convince the jurors that there is no motive for the action, so there is no corruption. Politicians also used the same argument to refute the accusations of corruption on the basis of the feeling of the Athenians that one’s wealth made one incorruptible (see Ober, Mass and Elite, 238). In this particular case, where the φιλοτιμία of the speaker serves the μεγαλοπρέπειαν (cf. comm. § 5 εἰ ἐβουλόμην … ἀνήλωσα) such an argument is particularly strong. However, what is particularly important here is the use of the verb μαίνομαι, not a phrase like ἄτοπον, δεινόν ἐστι that is more frequent in these arguments (see Αποστολάκης, Πολύστρατος, 74). Gorgias explains the reason for choosing this verb, when in his defence of Palamedes he says: μανία γάρ ἐστιν ἔργοις ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀσυμφόροις, αἰσχροῖς, ἀφ’ ὧν τοὺς μὲν φίλους βλάψει, τοὺς δ’ ἐχθροὺς ὠφελήσει, τὸν δὲ αὑτοῦ βίον ἐπονείδιστον καὶ σφαλερὸν καταστήσει (Pal.Ap.25). Nevertheless, this definition of madness includes acts and behaviour such as those which the speaker denied and will deny further in his speech (cf. §§ 8, 18, 19, 24, 25); that is why Lysias’ client deviates from the rule. For this argument, see also Introduction, The defensive strategy of the speech, 48– 49. On the basis of the verb μαίνομαι, the orators of the 4th century B.C. will create identical arguments. Cf. Hyp. 3.9: ἐμαίνεσθε γὰρ ἄν, εἰ ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τὸν νόμον τοῦτον ἔθεσθε ἢ οὕτως, εἰ τὰς μὲν τιμὰς καὶ τὰς ὠφελίας ἐκ τοῦ λέγειν οἱ ρήτορες καρποῦνται, τοὺς δὲ κινδύνους ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν τοῖς ἰδιώταις ἀνεθήκατε. Cf. also Dem. 18.51, 34.16 about different arguments. The use of such an argument at this moment reveals Lysias’ rhetorical ingenuity. Just as in the later manuals of rhetoric speakers are advised to try to demonstrate that they have no interest in what they are accused of doing (see Anax. Rhet.Alex. 18.13 – 14), here the speaker attempts to prove that the accusation is unfounded, keeping to a distinct structure in the speech (see Introduction, The structure of the speech, 56 – 57), which naturally leads to the conclusion that the accusation is unfounded. In spite of the fact that the legal part of the speech is not preserved so as to examine the legal arguments of the speech too, and although someone could argue that the accusation against the speaker is true, because there were people who had money but they would do anything to acquire more (cf. Xen. Symp.4.35), it is difficult to believe that the jurors contested the fact that the speaker is innocent after the application of such a strategy (cf. § 1). Besides, to refuse him the possibility of gaining more distinctions is a decision with implications for themselves, since because of his φιλοτιμία the community as a whole benefits (cf. §§ 1– 6 with Dem. 21.159). ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὐκ οἶδ’ οὕστινας ἢ ὑμᾶς ἐβουλήθην περὶ ἐμοῦ δικαστὰς γενέσθαι, εἴπερ χρὴ τοὺς εὖ πεπονθότας περὶ τῶν εὖ πεποιηκότων εὔχεσθαι τὴν ψῆφον φέρειν: The speaker here formulates the
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hypothesis that if he could choose his jurors, he would not want anyone else but the jurors already in front of him, because he has been their benefactor. The argument has two parts. The first regards the jurors and him, while the second is a general statement. In the first part, the speaker refers to the jurors twice, the first time while addressing them officially (ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί) and the second with the pronoun ὑμᾶς. With this double repetition, the speaker makes the jurors face two situations: the first which is real and objective at the time of the delivery of the speech, i. e. that they are his jurors, and the second, where he chooses them as his jurors because he wants to. Since these two situations lead to the same result, the speaker seems to be flattering the jurors and admitting that he has confidence in their judgment. Lysias uses a similar argument for another client: καὶ τοιούτων ἡμῖν ὑπαρχόντων εἰς τίνας ἂν ἐβουλήθημεν δικαστὰς καταφυγεῖν; (18.22– 23). In the second part, the speaker reaches a conclusion with a general reference implicitly classifying himself among those who benefit the city. He used the same method and the same phrase earlier in the speech (see § 20), but here his aim is to point out to the jurors the seriousness of the situation, since their decision does not only affect him but all the citizens who have shown the same political behaviour as he has in the past (hence the use of the participle πεποιηκότων in the present perfect). The self-description as εὖ πεποιηκότος and the specific definition of the relationship between benefactor-citizen and beneficiary-demos is a perfectly justified argument in the legal and political system of Athens on the basis of the social and political views of the time. In § 13 he had referred to the ἐθέλοντας λῃτουργεῖν, again including himself in this particular group of people. This argument is directly linked to the εὖ πεποιηκότας, since any voluntary liturgy was considered by the Athenians benefaction (cf. Dem. 20.22). Moreover, in §§ 12– 13 he had said commenting on the outcome of the trial, depending on whether it would be positive or negative for him: ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην … ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀχάριστα εἶναι τὰ εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀνηλωμένα … τά τε δίκαια ψηφιεῖσθε. A possible negative verdict of the jurors is related to the perception that the beneficiaries who can return the favour but do not are ungrateful and unjust. Cf. Xen. Mem.2.2.1: τοὺς εὖ παθόντας, ὅταν δυνάμενοι χάριν ἀποδοῦναι μὴ ἀποδῶσι, ἀχαρίστου καλοῦσιν. Οὐκοῦν δοκοῦσί σοι ἐν τοῖς ἀδίκοι καταλογίζεσθαι τοὺς ἀχαρίστους; Ἔμοιγε, ἔφη. Cf. also [Xen.] Ath.Pol.1.4: ἐὰν δὲ εὖ πράττωσιν οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ οἱ χρηστοί, ἰσχυρὸν τὸ ἐναντίον σφίσιν αὐτοῖς καθιστᾶσιν οἱ δημοτικοί. Finally this argument relates to the current political situation, where the common belief was that those who benefit the city show their goodwill towards democracy (cf. Isocr. 16.41: Ὥστ’ … ἐξ ὧν ὑμᾶς εὖ πεποίηκεν … ρᾴδιον γνῶναι τὴν εὔνοιαν τὴν ἐκείνου), whereas the supporters of the Thirty
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aimed to κακῶς ποιεῖν τῇ πόλει (cf. Lys. 12.58: ὥστε σφόδρα χρὴ ὀργίζεσθαι, ὅτι Φείδων αἱρεθείς ὑμᾶς διαλλάξαι καὶ καταγαγεῖν τῶν αὐτῶν ἔργων Ἐρατοσθένει μετεῖχε καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ γνώμῃ τοὺς μὲν κρείττους αὑτῶν δι’ ὑμᾶς κακῶς ποιεῖν ἕτοιμος ἦν). The attempt of the speaker not to be connected in any way with the regime of the Thirty (see comm. § 18: τοῦτό … συμφορὰς ἀσμένως εἶδον) is certainly accomplished here. Because these issues relate to other citizens, the speaker is justified in believing that the decisions of jurors have general implications for the Athenian society. The questioning of the ability of the jurors to judge their benefactors, namely the ability of the demos to judge citizens like him, though quite daring, is not a censure against the democratic regime (cf. [Arist.] Ath.Pol.9.1 with Rhodes, CAP, 162), but stems from his conviction that he has to be acquitted, and by doing so he attempts to alert them even more regarding the seriousness of the situation (cf. Dem. 20.83, where the goal is the same, but the strategy is similar). At the same time, of course, he attempts to conceal his guilt about the accusation against him if we trust Demosthenes’ view that: αἱ εὐπραξίαι δειναὶ συγκρύψαι καὶ συσκιάσαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰσίν (11.13). The speaker’s indirect request that he should be acquitted is based on the belief that the beneficiaries would repay the appropriate reward to their benefactors, particularly when they are in need (cf. [Lys.] 20.31, Dem. 20.41, Aesch. 3.182) but also on the hope that the jurors would take into consideration that their own decision would serve as an example for those who, in the future, would like to benefit the city (cf. Lys. 18.23, Dem. 20.5). At this point too, the speaker is psychologically preparing the jurors to accept his demand for favour for the last time, since his fellow citizens believed that the benefactors of the city in critical times not only deserved the gratitude of the demos (cf. Isocr. 18.62, Dem. 20.39,46) but also were entitled to demand it from the jurors (cf. Lys. 18.23). Moreover, because the Athenians believed that the return of benefaction by the city to their benefactor should be realised when he is still alive, since the dead do not know what the city will do for them after death (cf. Aesch. 1.14), the speaker will demand favour at this particular moment (cf. § 25: ἀπαιτῶ νῦν τὴν χάριν). §§ 23 – 24. Introductory comment: A common feature of these two paragraphs is their structure. They both create a long sentence. Each one of them is divided into two parts. In the first part, by using the negative (οὐδεπώποτε § 24, οὐδ’ … οὐδεπώποτε § 25) the speaker announces what he denies and in the second by using ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον what he approves of. This specific structural pattern is not new to Attic Greek. Thucydides used the pattern quite extensively in order to make the content of the funeral speech of Pericles clearer (see J.S.Rusten,
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‘Stucture, Style, and Sense in Interpreting Thucydides: The Soldier’s Choice (Thuc. 2.42.4)’ HSCP 90 (1986), 53), and there is much likelihood that Lysias borrowed the pattern from Thucydides so that the jurors should understand better the importance of his argument. My view is strengthened by the fact that the arguments of § 24 are found in Thucydides’ funeral speech (see following comm.). If Thucydides influenced Lysias in the writing of his funeral oration (see Nouhaud, Utilisation, 113 – 14, Todd, Lysias 1 – 11, 242 n.49), perhaps he also influenced him during the writing of this specific speech. § 23. καὶ μὲν δή, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, (ἐπιθυμῶ γὰρ καὶ τούτων μνησθῆναι): With the particle καὶ μὲν δή the speaker introduces a new argument (cf. Denniston, GP, 395 – 97). In contrast with his hesitation to refer to the events in the Hellespont (cf. comm. § 9), now the speaker declares his wish to remember things related to him. He again uses a parenthesis to strengthen his ethos (cf. comm. § ἵνα καὶ τούτου μνησθῶ). By the use of the pronoun τούτων he prepares the jurors for the issues that he is going to analyze, i. e. the liturgies he undertook and the risks he ran. οὐδεπώποτε λῃτουργεῖν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν δέον εἰ τοσούτῳ πενεστέρους τοὺς παῖδας καταλείψω, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰ μὴ προθύμως ποιήσω τὰ προσταχθέντα: With the claim that he did not resent spending more money than he actually should the speaker repeats his original argument: εἰ ἐβουλόμην κατὰ τα γεγραμμένα ἐν τῷ νόμῳ λῃτουργεῖν, οὐδ’ ἂν τὸ τέταρτον μέρος ἀνήλωσα (§ 5). For the first time the speaker refers to his children but without mentioning their names, their number or their sex. If the rich liturgist who assumed the Arrhephoria was the father of one of the girls who took part in the ritual (see Wilson as cited on comm. § 1 ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐδοκιμάσθην … τριάκοντα μνᾶς), then one of his two children was a girl. This view is reinforced by the fact that the word παῖς is not synonymous with the word υἱός (cf. Dem. 20.1 with Sandys, Demosthenes, 6 – 7). In this passage the speaker points out that because of his excessive zeal in assuming more liturgies than necessary he could have left his παῖδας πενεστέρους. He immediately makes clear the reason for this choice: προθύμως ποιήσω τὰ προσταχθέντα. With this phrase the speaker means the liturgies and eisphorai, which he was obliged to undertake, renouncing, however, as indicated by the adverb προθύμως, his personal wishes (cf. Seager, “Elitism”, 18). This wish was no other than to bequeath his wealth to his children. We often meet this argument in forensic speeches (cf. Isaeus 5.27 with Wyse, Isaeus, 398), because the willingness of someone to execute the commands of the city was more important than the amounts he would spend. Cf. Dem. 20.45: σκοπεῖτε δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, εἰ μνᾶς
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ἑκατὸν καὶ πάλιν τάλαντον ἔδωκεν (οὐδὲ γὰρ τοὺς λαβόντας ἔγωγ’ ἡγοῦμαι τὸ πλῆθος τῶν χρημάτων θαυμάσαι), ἀλλὰ τὴν προθυμίαν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν ἐπαγγειλάμενον ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς καιροὺς ἐν οἷς. It is noteworthy that the speaker uses the comparative πενεστέρους rather than the positive degree πένητας. This is obviously happening because he earns a lot of money (cf. § 19) but also because he manages his money well (cf. § 14). The main reason, however, he chooses the comparative πενεστέρους is for strategic purposes, since in the epilogue he will talk about possible impoverishment of his children, which will occur if the jurors punish him (πένητας εἶναι-see further comm. § 25). His argument, however, is quite reminiscent of the complaint of the Old Oligarch: ἐν ταῖς χορηγίαις αὖ καὶ γυμνασιαρχίαις γιγνώσκουσιν ὅτι χορηγοῦσιν μὲν οἱ πλούσιοι, χορηγεῖται δὲ ὁ δῆμος, καὶ γυμνασιαρχοῦσιν οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ τριηραρχοῦσιν, ὁ δὲ δῆμος τριηραρχεῖται καὶ γυμνασιαρχεῖται. ἀξιοῖ γοῦν ἀργύριον λαμβάνειν ὁ δῆμος καὶ ᾄδων καὶ τρέχων καὶ ὀρχούμενος καὶ πλέων ἐν ταῖς ναυσίν, ἐν ταῖς ναυσίν, ἵνα αὐτός τε ἔχῃ καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι πενέστεροι γίγνωνται ([Xen.] Ath.Pol.1.13). §§ 24 – 25. Introductory comment: The main feature of these paragraphs is the speaker’s emphasis on his military ethos through the use of ideas and vocabulary that we meet in the funeral speeches (see Introduction, The defensive strategy of the speech, 45 – 46). This is done so that the speaker indirectly underlines his democratic principles, since the funeral orations identify with democracy (see Loraux, Invention, 242– 45). In terms of rhetoric, this specific tactic shows Lysias’ great literary talent. The logographer takes advantage of the fact that forensic and display speeches differ only during the time of the rhetorical action (cf. Arist. Rhet.1414a18 – 19, see Lavency, “Lecture”, 230), so he uses vocabulary from the epideictic style in order to strengthen the defence of his client. This literary connection contradicts Nouhaud’s view that Lysias was not familiar with this kind of rhetoric (see Utilisation, 113), but, on the contrary, it proves his great literary talent. Cf. Dion.Hal. Lys.16: τριχῇ δὲ νενεμημένου τοῦ ρητορικοῦ λόγου καὶ τρία περιειληφότος διάφορα τοῖς τέλεσι γένη, τό τε δικανικὸν καὶ τὸ συμβουλευτικὸν καὶ τὸ καλούμενον ἐπιδεικτικὸν ἢ πανηγυρικόν, ἐν ἅπασι μὲν τούτοις ἐστίν ὁ ἀνὴρ λόγου ἄξιος. § 24. οὐδ’ εἴ ποτε κινδυνεύσειν ἐν ταῖς ναυμαχίαις μέλλοιμι: In this point Lysias’ client comes back to an issue he had raised for the first time in the beginning of the speech, namely the endless risks he ran in favour of the city (see § 3). The jurors know that the speaker experienced these dangers at sea and not on land (cf. § 6); nowhere before had he used this word but only when he referred
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to the naval battle at Aegospotami naming it the τελευταία ναυμαχία (§ 9). This occurs once again towards the end of the speech. As in the beginning of the speech the speaker did not give any information about the naval battles in which he risked his life, he is doing the same thing now (cf. comm. § 3 καὶ καθ’ ἡμέραν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν κινδυνεύων καὶ ἀποδημῶν). Here, however, the motive is different. Taking into consideration that the war dead in the funeral speeches are completely identified with their city and its policy, without any information given on the battles in which they were killed (cf. Thomas, Oral Tradition, 213 – 15,217), it is justifiable to believe that the speaker wants to present himself as a simple member of the city who is in no way superior to his co-fighters (cf. also Lys 16.16, see Introductory comm. §§ 24– 25). οὐδεπώποτ’ ἠλέησα οὐδ’ ἐδάκρυσα οὐδ’ ἐμνήσθην γυναικὸς οὐδὲ παίδων τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ: The speaker at this point mentions his children for the second time in the speech and his wife for the first time. She is not named, since something like this constituted a violation of social conventions (cf. D.Schaps, ‘The woman least mentioned: Etiquette and Women’s Names’ CQ 27 (1977), 323 – 30). This reference is particularly important, since the speaker made clear how he viewed his family when he was fighting for the city. This attitude of his at first glance is quite perplexing. The fact that the speaker did not cry for his family appears curious, since another litigant stresses how much he missed his family each time he was away in order to serve the city: τίνα με οἴεσθε ψυχὴν ἔχειν ἢ πόσα δάκρυα ἀφιέναι, τὰ μὲν ἐκλογιζόμενον περὶ τῶν παρόντων, τὰ δὲ καὶ ποθοῦντα ἰδεῖν παιδία καὶ γυναῖκα; ὧν τί ἥδιον ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ, ἢ τοῦ ἕνεκ’ ἄν τις εὔξαιτο τούτων στερηθείς ζῆν; (Dem. 50.62). Moreover, his claim that he did not remember his family sounds excessive, since all the warriors from the Homeric era to the classical years included thoughts of their wives and children. Cf. Hom. Il.2.292– 94: καὶ γάρ τίς θ’ ἕνα μῆνα μένων ἀπὸ ἦς ἀλόχοιο ἀσχαλάᾳ σὺν νηΐ πολυζύγῳ, ὅν περ ἄελλαι / χειμέριαι εἰλέωσιν ὀρινομένη τε θάλασσα, Xen. Reven.2.2– 3: μέγα δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν τέκνων καὶ τῶν οἰκιῶν ἀπιέναι. This remembrance of the family was frequent and intense a while before the battle for all fighters in every era. Cf. Hom. Il.5.686 – 88: οὐκ ἄρ’ ἔμελλον ἔγωγε νοστήσας οἶκον δὲ φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν/ εὐφρανέειν ἄλοχόν τε φίλην καὶ νήπιον υἱόν, Il.15.494– 98: ὃς δέ κεν ὕμεων/ βλήμενος ἠὲ τυπεὶς θάνατον καὶ πότμον ἐπίσπῃ/ τεθνάτω· οὔ οἱ ἀεικὲς ἀμυνομένῳ περὶ πάτρης/ τεθνάμεν· ἀλλ’ ἄλοχός τε σόη καὶ παῖδες ὀπίσσω,/ καὶ οἶκος καὶ κλῆρος ἀκήρατος, Lys. 2.39: ἔλεός τε παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν πόθος, Xen. Anab.3.1.3: οὐ δυνάμενοι καθεύδειν ὑπὸ λύπης καὶ πόθου … γυναικῶν, παίδων, οὓς οὔποτ’ ἐνόμιζον ἔτι ὄψεσθαι. Cf. also Thuc. 7.69.2, Diod. 13.15.2.
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His attitude appears to be opposed to all the others who did not hide their feelings for their wives (see G.Raepsaet, ‘Sentiments conjugaux à Athènes aux Ve et IVe Siècles avant notre ère’ AC 50 (1981), 678 – 84) and viewed their children as their own image (cf. J.P.Vernant, Mortals and Immortals: Collected Essays, F.I.Zeitlin (ed.), Princeton 1991, 327– 29). This is not accidental but, on the contrary, it reveals that Lysias is trying to create for his client the image of a warrior who shares the archaic ideology, according to which the individual places his homeland above his own self and his family (cf. comm. § 25 ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον … περιάψω). With these extravagant statements of patriotism, the speaker stresses his absolute adhesion to the wartime battles of the city and its requirement that the citizens place their city above their families (cf. Dover, GPM, 301– 3). οὐδ’ ἡγούμην δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ τελευτήσας ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος τὸν βίον ὀρφανοὺς καὶ πατρὸς ἀπεστερημένους αὐτοὺς καταλείψω: By δεινόν here the speaker means the probability of being killed on the battlefield on behalf of his country and therefore leaving his children orphans. The concern about the fate of the orphans during their childhood is found in Homer for the first time (Hom. Il.6.431– 33) but the phrase comes from the funeral speeches and aims to strengthen once again his military ethos (§§ 3, 9 – 10). Cf. Dem. 60.28: δεινὸν οὖν ἡγοῦντο τὴν ἐκείνου προδοῦναι προαίρεσιν, καὶ τεθνάναι μᾶλλον ᾐροῦντο. For the argument to become more forceful, the speaker promotes the conflict between his family and military commitments with the use of a pun, which is created with the words πατρίς and πατήρ (Strauss was the first to observe the pun (Fathers and Sons, 49), but he makes a mistake however, in my opinion, when he asserts that in this way the close relationship between public and private life in the Athenian culture comes to the surface and not their confrontation). By outlining the two ways of life and combining the two words, the speaker stresses his patriotism more effectively (cf. Dem. 18.205 with Yunis, Demosthenes, 224, cf. Roisman, Manhood, 58). With this statement, the speaker demonstrates his bravery. Cf [Arist.] On Vices and Virtues 1250a45: ἀνδρείας δ’ ἐστὶ … τὸ εὐθαρσῆ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς, Nic.Eth.1250a44-b5: λέγοιτ’ ἂν ἀνδρεῖος ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεής, καὶ ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγυια ὄντα· τοιαῦτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον. Lysias’ rhetorical eloquence is proved here outright, since even if the speaker is not dead and his children are not orphans, he presents the situation as if it were true. In this way, however, he livens up his fear that he would not see his children again, a thought which he shared with all the other warriors (cf. Strauss, Fathers and Sons, 213 – 14). The Athenians believed that military bravery and fatherhood were very closely linked, since they believed that, as warriors, they fought for the freedom
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and the salvation of their children from the enemies of the city (cf. A.Aymard, ‘Paternité et valeur militaire’ LEL 33 (1955), 42– 43, M.-Th.Charlier et G.Raepsaet, ‘Etude d’un comportement social: les relations entre parents et enfants dans la société Athénienne à l’époque classique’ AC 40 (1971), 598, Y.Garlan, La Guerre dans l’antiquité, Paris 1972, 65). Combining this perception with the particular argument the speaker uses, it is reasonable to believe that he aims to arouse the pity of the jurors. Cf. Ιsocr. 16.28: Αὐτὸς δὲ κατελείφθη μὲν ὀρφανός· ὁ γὰρ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ μαχόμενος ἐν Κορωνείᾳ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀπέθανεν. Cf. also the interest of the orators who delivered funeral orations for the children of the dead warriors: ὀρφανοὺς δὲ τοὺς αὑτῶν παῖδας ἀπέλιπον (Lys. 2.71), πολλῶν δὲ καὶ δεινῶν ὑπαρχόντων τοὺς μὲν παῖδας αὐτῶν ζηλῶ, ὅτι νεώτεροί εἰσιν ἢ ὥστε εἰδέναι οἵων πατέρων ἐστέρηνται, ἐξ ὧν δ’ οὗτοι γεγόνασιν, οἰκτίρω, ὅτι πρεσβύτεροι ἢ ὥστε ἐπιλαθέσθαι τῆς δυστυχίας τῆς ἑαυτῶν (Lys. 2.72), λυπηρὸν παισίν ὀρφανοῖς γεγενῆσθαι πατρός (Dem. 60.37). ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰ σωθεὶς αἰσχρῶς ὀνείδη καὶ ἐμαυτῷ καὶ ἐκείνοις περιάψω: The idea of αἰσχύνη and the disgrace that follows if somebody is not willing to sacrifice himself for the benefit of the city but prefers to save his life, is frequently found in the funeral orations. Cf. Thuc. 2.42.4– 43.1: περὶ τοῦ ἤδη ὁρωμένου σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἀξιοῦντες πεποιθέναι, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ παθεῖν μᾶλλον ἡγησάμενοι ἢ [τὸ] ἐνδόντες σῴζεσθαι τὸ μὲν αἰσχρὸν τοῦ λόγου ἔφυγον … ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυνόμενοι ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτήσαντο, Lys. 2.33: οἱ δ’ ἡμέτεροι πρόγονοι … ἡγησάμενοι κρεῖττον εἶναι μετ’ ἀρετῆς καὶ πενίας καὶ φυγῆς ἐλευθερίαν ἢ μετ’ ὀνείδους καὶ πλούτου δουλείαν τῆς πατρίδος, Dem. 60.26: ἃ φοβούμενοι πάντες εἰκότως τῇ τῶν μετὰ ὀνειδῶν αἰσχύνῃ τόν τε προσίοντ’ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων κίνδυνον εὐρώστως ὑπέμειναν, καὶ θάνατον καλὸν εἵλοντο μᾶλλον ἢ βίον αἰσχρόν. Cf. also Plat. Men.246d1– 5: Ὦ παῖδες, ὅτι μέν ἐστε πατέρων ἀγαθῶν, αὐτὸ μηνύει τὸ νῦν παρόν· ἡμῖν δὲ ἐξὸν ζῆν μὴ καλῶς, καλῶς αἱρούμεθα μᾶλλον τελευτᾶν, πρὶν ὑμᾶς τε καὶ τοὺς ἔπειτα εἰς ὀνείδη καταστῆσαι. With these two notions the speakers of the funeral orations refer to the future accusations that the warriors might hear if finally they had shrunk from fighting the enemy so that they might save their own lives (see L.Pearson, Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece, Stanford 1962, 162– 64, Huart, Thucydide, 457– 58). The speaker by virtually repeating the same ideas creates a powerful argument, making clear that the real salvation for him lay in the maintenance of his own honour and that of his children. His choice sounds normal following his statement that he is a σώφρων citizen (cf. comm. § 19), since those of such quality avoided the αἰσχύνη that was created because of their cowardice at war (cf. Dem. 1.27). The present passage strengthens the opinion of Adkins and Cairns that the fear of the Homeric heroes that they might become the laugh-
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ing-stock of their fellowmen is also valid for the Athenians of the 5th century B.C. (see Adkins, MR, 33,156 – 57, Cairns, Aidos, 59 – 60,265 – 66). The argument that disgrace might be related to his children is right. Cf. Plut. fr. 39 (Sandbach): Τὰ γὰρ τῶν πατέρων ἀδικήματα χραίνει καὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους αὐτῶν καὶ ἐνόχους ἀποφαίνει ταῖς τιμωρίαις· καὶ γὰρ ὀνείδη καὶ ἀδοξίαι αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἀδικιῶν συμβαίνουσι, καὶ τίσεις ἐκ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἀπολαμβάνοντες, ὧν ἔσχον ἀδικήσαντες οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν, συναπολαύουσι τῶν ὀφειλομένων ἐκείνοις κολάσεων. This attitude, according to Aristotle, is a proof of bravery: ἀνδρείας δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ μᾶλλον αἱρεῖσθαι τεθνάναι καλῶς ἢ αἰσχρῶς σωθῆναι ([Arist.] On Vices and Virtues 1250a44-b5), τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ φεύγειν καὶ ὁ θάνατος τῆς τοιαύτης σωτηρίας αἱρετώτερος (Nic.Eth.1116b19 – 20). This does not mean, however, that the quality was self-evident because it was desirable. Cf. Andoc. 1.57: Φέρε δὴ (χρὴ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀνθρωπίνως περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐκλογίζεσθαι, ὥσπερ ἂν αὐτὸν ὄντα ἐν τῇ συμφορᾷ) τί ἂν ὑμῶν ἕκαστος ἐποίησεν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν δυοῖν τὸ ἕτερον ἑλέσθαι, ἢ καλῶς ἀπολέσθαι ἢ αἰσχρῶς σωθῆναι, ἔχοι ἄν τις εἰπεῖν κακίαν εἶναι τὰ γενόμενα· καίτοι πολλοὶ ἄν καὶ τοῦτο εἵλοντο, τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείονος ποιησάμενοι τοῦ καλῶς ἀποθανεῖν. Cf. also Isocr. 2.36: ἐὰν δ’ ἀναγκασθῇς κινδυνεύειν, αἱροῦ καλῶς τεθνάναι μᾶλλον ἢ ζῆν αἰσχρῶς. Consequently, it is certain that the jurors might have been emotionally affected by the argument of the speaker as soldiers of the city themselves. Moreover, this argument is particularly apposite, because it is related to the political context of the era, as the prosecutor of Alcibiades’ son proves, saying about the democrats who occupied Phyle in order to overthrow the Thirty: ταῦτα ποιήσαντας οὐκ ὄνειδος τοῖς παισί καταλιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ τιμὴν παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις κτήσασθαι (Lys. 14.33). The speaker, of course, cannot claim that he belongs to this group of Athenians (see Introduction, The real identity of the speaker, 18 – 22, cf. The defensive strategy of the speech, 49 – 52), but he creates a common point of identification with them in order to win their favour. § 25. ἀνθ’ ὧν: Having reminded the jurors in the two previous paragraphs of his distinguished political and military behaviour, the speaker uses this particular phrase, which has a causal meaning here (cf. Cooper, Syntax, 531– 32), in order to prepare them for what he wants to ask. However, he mainly wants to provide solemnity and validity in his words, since with this phrase, which we meet in inscriptions, the city began its reference to the privileges that it granted to its benefactors (cf. Dem. 20.30 with Sandys, Demosthenes, 34, see R.Meiggs and D.M.Lewis, Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C., Oxford 1969, no. 94 col. 11, 284. Cf. also Isocr. 18.61: ἀνθ’ ὧν ὑμεῖς
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ἐψηφίσασθ’ ἡμᾶς στεφανῶσαι καὶ πρόσθε τῶν ἐπωνύμων ἀνειπεῖν ὡς μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίους ὄντας. Other litigants use the same technique too, when they first refer to their military ethos. Cf. Dem. 50.64: ἀνθ’ ὧν ἁπάντων νῦν ὑμῶν δέομαι, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν εὔτακτον καὶ χρήσιμον ἐμαυτὸν παρέσχον, οὕτω καὶ ὑμᾶς νυνὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ πρόνοιαν ποιησαμένους, καὶ ἀναμνησθέντας ἁπάντων ὧν τε διηγησάμην πρὸς ὑμᾶς, τῶν τε μαρτυριῶν ὧν παρεσχόμην καὶ τῶν ψηφισμάτων, βοηθῆσαι μὲν ἐμοὶ ἀδικουμένῳ. Cf. also Isaeus 7.39 – 41 and Lys. 2.59: ἀνθ’ ὧν ἡ πόλις αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐπένθησε καὶ ἔθαψε δημοσίᾳ. ὑμᾶς ἀπαιτῶ νῦν τὴν χάριν: The litigants share a common wish: that the jurors show them their gratitude because of the liturgies they assumed and the dangers they faced in war (cf. Carey, “Rhetorical Means”, 33). Their demand, however, for the return of the favour by the state is something more serious and it derives from the transfer from an interpersonal level to a ‘national’ level of the concept that the beneficiary has the duty to return the favour (cf. Ober, Mass and Elite, 229) and particularly when the life of the benefactor, or his relatives, is in danger. Thus, Hecuba demands as a favour from Odysseus not to kill her daughter Polyxene, since she saved him in Troy, although Helen had recognized him. Now that her daughter’s life is in danger, she demands a favour (see Eur. Hec.272: ἃ δ’ ἀντιδοῦναι δεῖ σ’ ἀπαιτούσης ἐμοῦ, 276: ἐγὼ χάριν τ’ ἀπαιτῶ τὴν τόθ). Lysias’ client who had participated in many expeditions and endangered his life so many times (cf comm. §§ 7– 11), is therefore justified in asking for the jurors’ favour. This, however, would be of some value only when it was attributed to people who were alive (cf. B.MacLachlan, The Age of Poetry: Charis in Early Greek Poetry, Princeton 1993, 73 – 75, cf. Mikalson, Religion, 79); consequently, the return of the favour should take place now that he is still young and alive (this explains the use of the adverb νῦν). This is the main reason why he directly and plainly dares to demand favour (cf. Millett, Lending and Borrowing, 124). Moreover, this demand springs from his immoderate zeal to assume liturgies (cf. comm. § 5), and although more emphasis is put on his military offer, the liturgies are one of the two reasons for which a defendant like the speaker can demand a favour (Lysias writes ἀνθ’ ὧν and not ἀνθ’ οὗ). The present passage negates the opinion that the honorary character of the liturgies refused any rich citizen who had contributed to the prosperity and safety of the city or the state the right to require something in return under his own personal terms (see Missiou, Andokides, 40).
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καὶ ἀξιῶ: By the use of this verb one can claim a right (see LSJ s.v. III, cf. Dem. 18.6 with Usher, Demosthenes, 172). Arguments based on this verb by litigants we also find in other forensic speeches, cf. e. g. Isocr. 18.64. The speaker used the verb ἀξιῶ in the introduction (§ 1) and in § 17 (ὑμᾶς ἂν ἠξίουν ἐμοὶ δοῦναι τὴν χάριν). Concerning the moods of the verb used we must say that in the introduction but especially here in the epilogue, the use of the indicative rather than the potential indicative by Lysias is imperative (see Goodwin, MT, 8,81– 84), because what the speaker claims is directly related to his present difficult situation, i. e. his trial (see comm. § 16 ἐμὲ νυνὶ κινδυνεύειν), and not to a hypothetical situation where somebody else is in danger of being convicted (see comm. § 17 εἴ τις τῶν ἐμῶν φίλων τοιοῦτον ἀγῶνα ἠγωνίζετο). ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις ἐμοῦ τοιαύτην περὶ ὑμῶν γνώμην ἔχοντος: The speaker now exclusively focuses on his role as a soldier and not as a choregus and he refers for the last time to the risks run on behalf of the city to strengthen his position (cf. comm. § § 3, 11). All this is summarized by the phrase τοιαύτην γνώμην ἔχοντος in which the explanatory participle is in the present tense so that the speaker can state that his attitude towards risks is constant and real at the moment he is speaking (see Goodwin, MT, 8,334– 35). The fact that the phrase is recurrent in the funeral speeches is not accidental. Cf. Lys. 2.35: [οἱ δ’ ἡμέτεροι πρόγονοι] ποίαν δὲ γνώμην εἶχον ἢ οἱ θεώμενοι τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ναυσίν ἐκείναις, οὔσης καὶ τῆς αὑτῶν σωτηρίας ἀπίστου καὶ τοῦ προσιόντος κινδύνου, ἢ οἱ μέλλοντες ναυμαχήσειν ὑπὲρ τῆς φιλότητος, ὑπὲρ τῶν ἂθλων τῶν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι;, 2.40: πολὺ πλεῖστον ἐκεῖνοι κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἁπάντων διήνεγκαν καὶ ἐν τοῖς βουλεύμασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πολέμου κινδύνοις, εἰκότως δὲ τὴν εὐτυχίαν ὁμονοοῦσαν τοῖς κινδύνοις ἐκτήσαντο, 42– 43: καὶ γὰρ τίνες ἂν τούτοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἤρισαν γνώμῃ καὶ πλήθει καὶ ἀρετῇ;, Dem. 60.23: οὐδενὶ τούτων ὀρθῶς ἐχρήσαντο. Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλ’ ἔστιν τούτων ὡς ἕκαστος ἔχει γνώμης, οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνειν. It is certain that Lysias wants by this phrase to stress that his client keeps alive the spirit of one of the most important features of the Athenians, i. e. the unfailing desire to pursue risk (see Huart, Thucydides, 365 – 67, G.Crane, ‘The Fear and Pursuit of Risk: Corinth on Athens, Sparta and the Peloponnesians (Thucydides 1.68 – 71, 120 – 121)’ TAPA 122 (1992), 227– 56). The recipient of this γνώμη is the Athenian demos, which is once again identified with the jurors (cf. comm. § 7 ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνους μὲν ὑμεῖς), and in order to to make it even clearer the speaker uses the hyperbaton figure (τοιαύτην – περὶ ὑμῶν – γνώμην). The logographer’s aim here is not only to win the favour of the jurors but rather to justify his client’s claim to be acquitted, since the γνώμη of the Athenians was no longer obvious. Cf. Xen. Symp.4.35: ὁρῶ γὰρ πολλοὺς μὲν ἰδιώτας, οἵ πάνυ πολλὰ ἔχον-
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τες χρήματα οὕτω πένεσθαι ἡγοῦνται ὥστε πάντα μὲν πόνον, πάντα δὲ κίνδυνον ὑποδύονται, ἐφ’ ᾦ πλείω κτήσονται. We should not forget that the speaker has also classified his prosecutors among those people (cf. §§ 12, 20). The importance of the γνώμη of the citizen-warriors of Athens can be better understood if we consider Demosthenes’ appeal to his fellow citizens, a few decades later, to fulfil their military tasks: ἒστι τοίνυν πρῶτον μὲν τῆς παρασκευῆς, ὦ ἄνδρες ᾿Aθηναῖοι, καὶ μέγιστον, οὕτω διακεῖσθαι τὰς γνώμας ὑμᾶς ὡς ἕκαστον ἑκόντα προθύμως ὅ τι ἂν δέῃ ποιήσοντα (14.14) and to assess properly the stance of those who resisted Philip: τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ πολέμου γνώμην τοιαύτην ἔχοντας (2.1). Cf. also Lys. 18.2, Dem. 4.7. About γνώμη see also Huart, Thucydide, 304 – 13, Dover, GPM, 123 – 24. ὑμᾶς νυνὶ ἐν τῷ θαρραλέῳ ὄντας: The speaker’s demand for a return of the favour at this precise moment (νυνὶ – cf. ὑμᾶς ἀπαιτῶ νῦν τὴν χάριν) is based on the full restoration of democracy in the city, as this phrase demonstrates (see Introduction, The dating of the speech, 55 – 56). ἐμὲ καὶ τοὺς παῖδας τούτους περὶ πολλοῦ ποιήσασθαι: An example of rhetorical ὑπόκρισις. With the use of the pronoun τούτους the speaker probably shows his children, who are present in the courtroom, to the jurors, aiming at strengthening the visual impression (cf. Rubinstein, Litigation, 154– 55). The young Demosthenes, many years later, will also ask for protection of the state in a very similar way, while claiming the paternal property deprived by his guardians: δέομαι οὖν ὑμῶν … μὴ περὶ πλείονος τὰς τούτου δεήσεις ἢ τὰς ἡμετέρας ποιήσασθαι (27.68). Cf. also Aesch. 2.180: δέομαι σῶσαί με καὶ μὴ τῷ λογογράφῳ καὶ Σκύθῃ παραδοῦναι, ὅσοι μὲν ὑμῶν πατέρες είσὶ παίδων ἢ νεωτέρους ἀδελφοὺς περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθε, ἀναμνησθέντες ὅτι τὴν τῆς σωφροσύνης παράκλησιν διὰ τῆς περὶ Τίμαρχον κρίσεως ἀειμνήστως παρακέκληκα. Last, cf. Antiph. Tetr.2.2.11– 12. The importance of the phrase in this passage can become more obvious if we consider that it is also used in Lysias’ funeral oration: μόνην δ’ ἄν μοι δοκοῦμεν ταύτην τοῖς ἐνθάδε κειμένοις ἀποδοῦναι χάριν, εἰ … τοὺς δὲ παῖδας οὕτως ἀσπαζοίμεθα ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ πατέρες ὄντες … τίνας δ’ ἂν τῶν ζώντων δικαιότερον περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοίμεθα ἢ τοὺς τούτοις προσήκοντας; (2.75 – 76). The speaker, though alive, asks the jurors to show the same sense of moral responsibility and paternal interest shown by the city for the orphan children of the war (see French, Growth, 150, Loraux, Invention, 283 – 84) for his own children as well but taking care of their upbringing in a different way, namely by acquitting him. By this request he also seeks to arouse the pity of the jurors for their fate but also to indicate that it is in the interest of the state to preserve his rich οἶκος,
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since his children would continue to assume liturgies (cf. W.K.Lacey, The Family in Ancient Greece, London 1968, 99). This emotional appeal is justified, since the Athenian law functioned in some cases, as in the present case (cf. comm. § 25), in the form of collective punishment (see Hansen, Apagoge, 118 – 19). ἡγουμένους ἡμῖν μὲν δεινὸν ὑμῖν δὲ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι, εἰ ἀναγκασθησόμεθα ἐπὶ τοιαύταις αἰτίαις ἄτιμοι γενέσθαι, ἢ στερηθέντες τῶν ὑπαρχόντων πένητες εἶναι καὶ πολλῶν ἐνδεεῖς ὄντες περιιέναι: A while earlier the speaker clarified what was not δεινόν for him: λῃτουργεῖν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν δέον (§ 23) τελευτήσας ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος τὸν βίον ὀρφανοὺς καὶ πατρὸς ἀπεστερημένους αὐτοὺς καταλείψω (§ 24). Now, he uses the same adjective again to show finally what is δεινόν for him and his children, that is the two penalties he faces. For the second time the speaker also stresses that his conviction will be αἰσχρόν for the jurors (see comm. § 11 ἡγούμενος καὶ ὑμῖν … λαμβάνειν). What is novel now is that the speaker connects the two adjectives to show that his penalty concerns him and the jurors at the same time. However, before he states what the penalties are, he deems it necessary for the second and the last time to undervalue the accusations against him by using the phrase τοιαύταις αἰτίαις. With this phrase he actually disparages his opponents for the second time, since after having started his attack against them he expressed himself in a similar way: Οὔκουν ἄξιον, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταὶ, πειθομένους κατηγόροις τοιούτοις (§ 20). After calling into question the quality of his prosecutors (see comm. § 20), the contestation of the quality of the accusations sounds normal: τοιοῦτοι κατήγοροι > τοιαῦται αἰτίαι. The effectiveness of this phrase is also attested by its use by other defendants. Cf. Lys. 7.41: ἀθλιώτατος ἂν γενοίμην, εἰ φυγὰς ἀδίκως καταστήσομαι … πατρίδος δὲ τοιαύτης ἐπ’ αἰσχίστοις στερηθείς αἰτίαις, Aesch. 2.158: Οὐκοῦν εἰ ὑμεῖς αὐτῷ ἐπιστεύσατε, ἢ ᾿Aριστοφάνης μου συγκατεψεύσατο, ἐπ’ αἰσχραῖς αἰτίαις αἰτίαις ἀπωλόμην ἂν ἀδίκως. The first penalty for the speaker and his children was ἀτιμία. This brought the deprivation of voting rights, denial of access to the agora and the temples, deprivation of every kind of political and judicial service, as well as deprivation of his honour. In this case all the culprits became καθάπαξ ἄτιμοι and they were deprived of their civil rights for ever (see Hansen, Apagoge, 54– 98, MacDowell, Law, 74– 75, “Bribery”, 73, Todd, Shape, 142– 43). The second penalty will financially degrade the speaker and his children into the class of πένητες, who will have to work to survive (see comm. § 14 ἐὰν δ’ ἐμὲ πένητα ποιήσητε, καὶ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀδικήσετε). For more information on the penalties, see Introduction, The legal problems of the speech, 35 – 36. With the argument of ἀτιμία the speaker intends to cause the ἔλεος of the jurors, since the fate of the children who were deprived of their father and risked
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losing their political rights was something the Athenians were preoccupied with. Cf. Dem. 27.68: δίκαιοι δ’ ἔστ’ ἐλεεῖν … ἡμᾶς τοὺς πολὺν χρόνον ὦν ὁ πατὴρ ἡμῖν κατέλιπεν στερομένους καὶ πρὸς ὑπὸ τούτων ὑβριζομένους καὶ νῦν περὶ ἀτιμίας κινδυνεύοντας. As for πενία I must note that the speaker, though brave, does not belong to those who did not fear it (cf. Arist. Nic.Eth.1115a17). This should surprise neither the jurors nor modern readers, since the speaker also raised this issue in previous parts of his speech. Cf. comm. § 11 δέομαι … μὴ στερηθῆναι τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ, comm. § 12 οὐ τοσοῦτόν μοι μέλει εἴ με δεῖ τὰ ὄντα ἀπολέσαι. Nevertheless, his concern is justified, since the possession of wealth or the lack of it in the 5th century B.C. was a key factor of personal value and moral superiority (see Donlan, Aristocratic Ideal, 139 – 40). The reference to πενία is part of the arguments of forensic rhetoric and is used by both defendants and plaintiffs. Thus, the speaker stresses his potential poverty to escape exile, whereas the prosecutor of the son of Alcibiades claims the benefits for the Athenians from his opponent’s exile, relying just on the poverty of the son of the notorious man: ᾿Aλλὰ μὲν δὴ οὐδ’ ἂν ἐξελθὼν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως οὐδὲν δύναιτο κακὸν ὑμᾶς ἐργάσασθαι, δειλὸς ὢν καὶ πένης καὶ πράττειν ἀδύνατος καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις διάφορος καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων μισούμενος (Lys. 14.44). What is certain is that with this argument the speaker attempts to arouse the pity of the jurors. Cf. Isocr. 18.6: χρὴ … πένητας γενομένους ἐλεεῖν οὐ τοὺς ἀπολωλεκότας τὴν οὐσίαν ἀλλὰ τοὺς εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀνηλωκότας, Dem. 10.43: ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἄθλιος οὐδ’ ὠμὸς εἶναι δοκεῖ τὴν γνώμην, οὔκουν ᾿Aθηναίων γε, ὥστε λυπεῖσθαι ταῦτα λαμβάνοντας ὁρῶν τοὺς ἀπόρους καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδεεῖς ὄντας. See also Dover, GPM, 197. At the same time, the attempt to affect the jurors emotionally comes to moderate his demand for favour, showing that the jurors always have the final say in the outcome of the trial (cf. comm. § 25 ὑμᾶς νῦν ἀπαιτῶ τὴν χάριν). This tactic is probably Lysias’ rhetorical device, because another client of his uses the same argument. Cf. 18.23: νῦν τοίνυν ταύτην ἀνθ’ ἁπάντων ἀπαιτοῦμεν τὴν χάριν, μὴ περιιδεῖν ἡμᾶς ἀπόρως διατεθέντας μηδ’ ἐνδεεῖς τῶν ἐπιτηδείων γενομένους. About the objective of the speaker see also Konstan, Pity, 38. The argument of impoverishment is related to the current political reality, since the speaker equates the situation in which he and his family run the risk of being found in the same situation the exiled democrats were found in before they had reached Peiraeus. Cf. Lys. 12.97: ὅσοι δὲ τὸν θάνατον διέφυγον, πολλαχοῦ κινδυνεύσαντες καὶ εἰς πολλὰς πόλεις πλανηθέντες καὶ πανταχόθεν ἐκκηρυτόμενοι, ἐνδεεῖς ὄντες τῶν ἐπιτηδείων, οἱ μὲν ἐν πολεμίᾳ τῇ πατρίδι τοὺς παῖδας καταλιπόντες, οἱ δ’ ἐν ξένῃ γῇ, πολλῶν ἐναντιουμένων ἤλθετε εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ.
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The speaker rightly argues, however, that if these penalties are inflicted on him, it will be something terrible for him. As for ἀτιμία, we must stress that exclusion from public places, where citizens gathered, denied the opportunity to the ἄτιμος Athenian to maintain his position in public scrutiny (see Cohen, Law, Sexuality, 72– 74). For the speaker, who had won personal fame due to his victories in the games (see comm. § 1 καταστὰς δὲ χορηγὸς τραγῳδοῖς), this penalty would be particularly offensive to his honour. Moreover, ἀτιμία was equivalent to the deprivation of παρρησία and hence to the loss of his status as a free citizen (cf. Montiglio, Silence, 116 – 17). On the other hand, the financial degradation of the speaker to πένης means that he would no longer have any free time to take part in the ecclesia (see Markle, “Pay”, 269 – 74). Considering that free time was actually a privilege of the aristocrats (see J.L.Stocks, ‘ΣΧΟΛΗ’ CQ 30 (1936), 180 – 82) and that the speaker was among the richest citizens (cf. comm. § 5 εἰ ἐβουλόμην … ἀνήλωσα), his conviction would mean the loss of an active member of the city, who paid the extra eisphorai needed by the city despite the difficulties he had (see comm. § 3 ὅμως εἰσφορὰς … εἰσενήνοχα). Besides, the speaker has given the impression that he could manage public affairs with great success (cf. comm. § 18 τῶν δημοσίων οὕτως ἡγοῦμαι μοι πεπολιτεῦσθαι καὶ ὑμᾶς εἰδέναι). It is, therefore, justifiable to believe that the jurors would realise the force of the argument and his anxiety at this point. For the same reasons, however, the description of his conviction as αἰσχρά sounds normal here, since this was the way to describe the non-return of a favour, something which the speaker demonstrated that he deserved (see comm. §§ 23 – 25). Cf. Dem. 20.81: εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν, ἐφ’ οὓς μεθ’ ὅπλων ἦλθεν ἐν ἐχθροῦ τάξει, μηδὲν ὧν ἔδοσαν πρότερον νῦν ἀφῄρηνται, άλλὰ τὰς πάλαι χάριτας μείζους τῶν καινῶν ἐγκλημάτων πεποίηνται, ὑμεῖς δέ, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐπ’ ἐκείνους ἐλθὼν ἐτελεύτησεν, ἀντὶ τοῦ διὰ ταῦτ’ ἔτι μᾶλλον αὐτὸν τιμᾶν καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς πρότερον εὐεργεσίαις τι δοθέντων ἀφῃρημένοι φανήσεσθε, πῶς οὐκ εἰκότως αἰσχύνην ἕξετε; This description of his conviction is also related to the speaker’s previous argument not to be envied because of his wealth (§ 15), since the absence of envy on the side of the city was equivalent to abstention from anything αἰσχρόν. Cf. Dem. 20.140: οὐδ’ ἔστιν ὄνειδος ὅτου πορρώτερόν ἐσθ’ ἡμῶν ἡ πόλις ἢ τοῦ φθονερὰ δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἁπάντων ἀπέχουσα τῶν αἰσχρῶν. ἀνάξια μὲν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πεπονθότες, ἀνάξια δὲ τῶν εἰς ὑμᾶς ὑπηργμένων: The speaker uses the rhetorical figure of ἀναφορά, i. e. he successively repeats the adjective ἀνάξια to cause the pity of the jurors once more. ἐπανάληψις as a technique was particularly effective in creating emotions; that is why it will be used later by Demosthenes and it will be analyzed by the teachers of rhetoric
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(cf. Dem. 18.24 with Usher, Demosthenes, 180). In our speech the use of the adjective is due to the technique of pity, whereby a speaker qualifies as unbecoming the penalty which is going to be inflicted on him in order to invoke the pity of the jurors. Cf Arist. Rhet.1385b13 – 16: ἔστω δὴ ἒλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ ἢ λυπηρῷ τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν, ὃ κἄν αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειεν ἂν παθεῖν ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τινα, καὶ τοῦτο ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται. See Konstan, Pity, 34,38 – 39. This technique is particularly apposite in this passage. The speaker has previously referred to the need that favour be granted to him by the jurors in the present; this is why he can stress effortlessly that this situation is unworthy of him and his family. Cf. Anax. Rhet.Alex.36.47– 48: Εὖ διαθήσομεν ἡμᾶς καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους κακῶς … ἀποφαίνοντες κεφαλαιωδῶς … τοὺς κρίνοντας αὐτοὺς καὶ διεξιόντες αὐτοῖς, ὡς νῦν καιρὸς χάριτας ἡμῖν τῶν ὑπηργμένων ἀποδοῦναι, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἐλεεινοὺς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καθιστάντες, ἐὰν ἐνδέχηται. Τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσομεν ἐπιδεικνύντες, ὡς … ἀναξίως δυστυχοῦμεν κακῶς … νῦν πάσχοντες … ἐὰν μὴ βοηθῶσιν ἡμῖν οὗτοι· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ τοιαῦτα ὑπάρχῃ, μὴ βοηθῶσιν ἡμῖν οὗτοι … ἐκ γὰρ τούτων ἐλεεινοὺς καταστήσομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀκούοντας εὖ διαθήσομεν. We must also note that the speaker uses the participle ὑπηργμένων here to refer to how the jurors and the demos have profited thanks to him, while by the participle τῶν ὑπαρχόντων he referred to what his family will be deprived of. For this reason, the first participle is in the present tense, while the second is in the present perfect tense. What the speaker wants to demonstrate by this participle is, on the one hand, the situation in which he and his family will be found, and, on the other hand, the financial situation of the demos through his own actions from the past. This contrast is designed to affect the judges emotionally further. With the phrase ἀνάξια δὲ τῶν εἰς ὑμᾶς ὑπηργμένων the speaker refers to the liturgies and the trierarchies he assumed for the city, since the adjective ἄξιος, which is the opposite of the adjective ἀνάξιος, is used for the same purpose. Cf. Dem. 20.151: πρὸς τοίνυν Δεινίαν· οὗτος ἴσως ἐρεῖ τριηραρχίας αὑτοῦ καὶ λῃτουργίας. ἐγὼ δ’, εἰ πολλοῦ τῇ πόλει Δεινίας ἄξιον αὑτὸν παρέσχηκεν, ὡς ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ νὴ τοὺς θεούς, μᾶλλον ἂν παραινέσαιμ’ αὑτῷ τινὰ τιμὴν ὑμᾶς ἀξιοῦν δοῦναι. A similar argument in a similar military context, in order to cause the pity of the jurors, is used by other litigants too. Cf. Dem. 20.82: καὶ μὴν καὶ κατ’ ἐκεῖν’ ἀνάξι’ ἂν εἴη πεπονθὼς ὁ παῖς εἴ τῆς δωρειᾶς ἀφαιρεθείη, καθ’ ὃ πολλάκις ὑμῶν στρατηγήσαντος Χαβρίου οὐδενὸς πώποθ’ υἱὸς ὀρφανὸς δι’ ἐκεῖνον ἐγένετο, αὐτὸς δ’ ἐν ὀρφανίᾳ τέθραπται διὰ τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς φιλοτιμίαν τοῦ πατρός and 20.101: μήθ’ ὑμεῖς ποιήσητε μηδὲν ἀνάξιον ὑμῶν αὐτῶν. Cf. also Isocr. 18.26: οὔτ’ ἄξια’ ὑμῶν τοῖς πρότερον ἐγνωσμένοις ποιήσαιτε.
166
2. Commentary
μηδαμῶς, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί· ἀλλ’ ἀποψηφισάμενοι τοιούτοις ἡμῖν χρῆσθε πολίταις οἵοισπερ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ: About the use of the adverb μηδαμῶς cf. Lys. 24.23, Dem. 20.8,158. The speaker urges the judges to acquit him and use him just as before. The phrase τοιούτοις ἡμῖν χρῆσθε πολίταις is more general and simultaneously more important than the phrase ἕξετε πᾶσι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἡμετέροις ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον (§ 14), since it refers to the quality of his ethos as a whole, stresses his past services and justifies his request to be acquitted. To make the meaning of his argument even clearer, the speaker uses words where alliteration of the sounds σ, π and ρ is apparent. Moreover, the pleading of the speaker to the jurors gains more importance with the promotion and use of the pronoun τοιοῦτος, which he used previously in his speech to define his status as a citizen (see comm. § 16 τοιοῦτον … παρέχω, comm. §19 τοιοῦτον παρασχεῖν … προσκαλέσασθαι). This argument is of major importance. In the beginning of his speech the speaker had promised the jurors to demonstrate who he really was (cf. § 1 περὶ οἵου τινὸς ὄντος ἐμοῦ). During his speech he made clear that he had always been eager to offer more money than was actually actually required (cf. §§ 5, 16) and that he had fought with bravery and determination whenever his country had asked him to (cf. §§ 3, 6 – 10, 23 – 24), i. e. that his main characteristic was his willingness to offer himself χρήμασι καὶ σώματι in favour of his country. If the jurors realised his quality as a citizen, then the speaker stood a great chance of achieving his acquittal (cf. Dover, GPM, 292– 93).
Index of Sources Aelius Aristides: Ag.Plat. 222: Aeschines: 1.14: 1.123: 1.42: 1.64: 1.65: 1.76: 1.96: 1.97: 2.13: 2.20: 2.87:125 2.118: 2.148: 2.149: 2.151: 2.158: 2.180: 3: 3.2: 3.3: 3.19: 3.52: 3.53: 3.61: 3.79: 3.99: 3.115: 3.147: 3.152: 3.167: 3.174: 3.181: 3.182: 3.181 – 82: 3.182 – 83: 3.187: 3.205: 3.221: 3.222: 3.226:
83
152 138 140 143 107 140 140 129 2 n.7 87 117 102 87 125 162 161 148 119 147 120 53 n.348 143 136 63 10 n.59 87 145 144 112 144 144 152 115 111 144 77 142 119 110
3.243: 3.253:
111 144
Anaximenes: Rhetorica ad Alexandrum: 2.16 – 17: 113 18.1: 133 18.13 – 14: 113, 150 36.47 – 48: 165 Andocides: 1.36: 1.37 – 38: 1.41: 1.57: 1.80: 1.81: 1.95: 1.109: 1.124: 1.141: 1.149: 2.64:
126 30 n.202 127, 165, 178 158 95 87 135 146 63 110, 137 117 143
[Andocides]: 4.33:
138
Antiphon: 3.3.6: 6.7: 6.11: 6.15: Tetr.1a: Tetr.2.2.11 – 12:
142 143 65 102 61 161
Aristophanes: Birds: 127: 134: 1372 – 1409:
125 88 144
Clouds: 243: 1060 – 62:
140 139
168
Index of Sources
Ecclesiazousai: 209:
117
Frogs: 1422 – 32:
6 n.37
Knights: 802 – 4:
119
Nubes: 1015:
137
Plutus: 179: 242 – 44: 303:
140 140 140
Wasps: 747:
117
Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics: 1109a14 – 16: 1115a17: 1116b19 – 20: 1121b15 – 16: 1121b20 – 21: 1122a5: 1122b3 – 4: 1122b6 – 8: 1122b8 – 10: 1122b20 – 23: 1122b34: 1123a4 – 5: 1124b9 – 15: 1157b10 – 11: Rhetoric: 1356a4 – 6: 1356a15 – 16: 1357a10 – 12: 1357a36-b29:117 1357b3 – 10: 1360b5 – 13: 1361a19: 1361a30 – 31: 1366a9 – 11:
140 163 158 116 116 76 79 127 79 79 79 128 66 6 n.38
63 147 78 90 145 112 107 63
1370b32 – 71a10: 1385b13 – 16: 1387a23: 1387b23 – 25: 1389a12 – 13: 1396a12 – 13:45 n.299 1414a18 – 19: 1416a26 – 28:
66 165 129 124 66 154 144
Politics: 1264b17 – 19: 1266a37 – 39: 1295b30: 1301a31 – 33: 1305b22 – 27: 1308b13 – 14: 1324a5 – 10: 1326b30 – 32:
145 114 124 141 19 n.136 134 146 139
[Aristotle]: Athenaion Politeia: 9.1: 27.4: 29.5: 34.1: 34.2: 36.1: 36.2: 37.1: 38.2: 38.3: 48.3: 54.2: 67.5:
152 118 138 72 72, 101 145 20, 22 n.155 21 23 23 31 n.209 31 n.209, 32 31
On Vices and Virtues: 1250a45: 156 1250a44-b5: 158 [Demetrius]: On Words: 222:
91
Demosthenes: 1.27: 3.18: 3.20:
157 125 118
Index of Sources
3.24: 3.26 – 27: 3.27: 4.7: 4.47: 6.33: 6.34: 8.55: 8.70: 10.4: 10.43: 10.45: 10.46: 11.13: 11.16: 13.13: 13.19: 13.20 – 21: 13.21 – 23: 14.39: 14.40: 17.7: 18: 18.2: 18.4: 18.6: 18.9: 18.10: 18.22: 18.24: 18.41: 18.51: 18.56: 18.69: 18.99: 18.176: 18.205: 18.217: 18.257: 18.296: 19.3: 19.33: 19.99: 19.101: 19.109: 19.119: 19.130:
146 146 145 161 106 96 96 119 127 138 163 112 146 152 145 110 141 146 111 125 146 145 148 77 136 63, 159 142 110, 136 143, 145 75, 164 135 150 77 136 119 117 156 135 65 145, 146 39 n.263 40 119 40 40 40 135
19.157: 19.277 – 79: 19.280: 19.339: 19.340: 20.1: 20.2: 20.5: 20.8: 20.10: 20.17: 20.18: 20.19: 20.22: 20.23: 20.25: 20.29: 20.30: 20.34: 20.39: 20.41: 20.45: 20.46: 20.49: 20.52 – 53: 20.55: 20.56: 20.67: 20.79: 20.81: 20.82: 20.83: 20.108: 20.111: 20.112: 20.113: 20.119: 20.125: 20.139: 20.140: 20.141: 20.151: 20.158: 20.161: 21: 21.6: 21.23:
145 26 n.179 110 40 40 153 85 152 165 115 26 n.184 63, 70 109 116, 151 63 125 111 158 127 152 152 153 152 125 8 n.51 115 124 125 134, 145 164 165 152 66, 111 145 110 115 115, 118 125 124 124, 164 111 165 165 125 140 114 64
169
170
21.58: 21.151: 21.153: 21.154: 21.154 – 55: 21.155: 21.156: 21.156 – 57: 21.157: 21.158: 21.159: 21.208: 22.2: 22.8: 22.66: 22.69: 23.168: 23.196 – 97: 24.7: 24.155: 25.3: 27.4: 27.9 – 11: 27.68: 28.2: 30.2: 30.4 – 5: 30.6: 34.16: 35.32: 35.48: 36.12: 36.43: 36.45: 36.59: 37.54: 40.12: 40.53 – 54: 43.77: 45.1: 45.85: 47.77: 49.14: 49.37: 50.3: 50.5: 50.12:
Index of Sources
126, 142 61 78 37 n.252, 38 n.253 69 65 78, 120, 128 119 129 140, 163 141, 150 131 142 63 135 142 106 111 142 63 63 77 77 149, 162 145 114 90 91 150 63 142 90 129 140 141 69 64 136 114 114, 149 149 90 96 13 n.90 105 71 84
50.20: 50.52: 50.53 – 54: 50.59: 50.62: 50.64: 51.6: 51.8 – 9: 51.10: 51.17: 52.22: 53.4: 54.1: 54.16: 56.12: 57.1: 57.6: 57.8: 58.30: 58.67: 59.33: 59.57: 59.82: 59.109: 60.4: 60.9: 60.15 – 16: 60.23: 60.25: 60.26: 60.27: 60.28: 60.37: 62.50.2 – 3:
101 84 79 69 155 159 104 96, 98 119 112 67 13 n.90 114 125 114 149 114 142 63 69 140 91 91 142 140 45 n.299 78 160 127 157 137 156 157 146
Letters: 1.6 – 7: 2.1: 2.5: 2.12: 3.23:
26 n.184 136 41 n.268, 111 41 27
Dinarchus: 1.36: 1.40: 1.44: 1.106 – 7:
135 141 145 40
Index of Sources
3.1: 3.6: 3.12: 3.18: 4.49: 4.58:
40 40 40 40, 40 n.267 143 87
Dionysius of Halicarnassus Lysias: 16: 154 17.15 – 17: 143 Roman Archaeology: 5.17.4:
45 n.299
Diodorus Siculus: 11.87.5: 13.15.2: 13.22.6: 13.39 – 40: 13.64.4: 13.66.1: 13.69.4 – 5: 13.71.1: 13.71.1 – 2: 13.73.3 – 74.2: 13.74.1 – 2: 13.101.4 – 5: 13.102.2: 13.103.1: 13.105: 13.105.2 – 4: 13.105.3: 13.105.4: 13.106.3 – 6: 13.106.6: 13.106.8: 14.3.1: 14.4.2:
137 155 100 104 86 86 14 14 14 85 15 96 101 86 109 2 n.8 6 3, 6 92 8 8 73 19 n.139
Euripides: Hecuba: 272:
159
Hercules: 201 – 3:
101
Supplices: 897 – 98:
135
Gorgias: Funeral Oration: fr. 6 (Diels-Kranz):
140
Helen: 14:
91
Palamades’ Apology: 15: 25: 32:
127 150 138
Harpocration: Δώρων γραφή:
136
Hermogenes: On Types of Style: 1.6: 2.1: 2.6: 2.8:
94, 121 94 136 115
Herodotus: 6.21: 6.77 – 78: 7.12.2: 8.22: 8.42:
95 11 n.68 79 84 84
Homer: Iliad: 2.292 – 94: 5.686 – 88: 6.431 – 33: 15.494 – 98:
155 155 156 155
Hyperides: 2. fr. 3 (Jensen): 3.9: 3.19: 3.27: 5.2: 6.25: fr. 156 (Jensen):
125 150 80 136 26 n.180 146 1 n.4
171
172
Index of Sources
fr. 157 (Jensen):
11 n.71
Isaeus: 1.17: 2.27: 2.44: 3.61: 5.24: 5.27: 5.36: 5.41: 5.43: 6.60: 7.5: 7.39 – 41: 7.40: 7.41: 11.47: 12.12: fr. 2.2 – 3 (Forster):
143 63 149 143 114 153 66 67, 129 116 53 n.343 129 159 67 127 141 114 70
Isocrates: 2.2: 2.36: 2.38: 5.61: 5.62: 5.67: 7.53: 8.13: 8.39: 8.86: 9.2: 9.8: 9.68: 12.99: 12.141: 12.52: 15.23: 15.128: 15.142: 15.142 – 43: 16: 16.11: 16.13: 16.15: 16.25 – 26:
137 137, 158 137 110 101 101 145 123 91 109 137 90, 91 109 101 119 106 132 101 138 124 62 111 21 n.144 63 130
16.29: 16.32 – 33: 16.34: 16.35: 16.37: 16.41: 16.48: 17.35: 18: 18.7: 18.6: 18.16: 18.17 – 18: 18.19: 18.26: 18.32: 18.46: 18.60:
18.60 – 61: 18.61: 18.62: 18.64: 18.68: 20: 20.4: 20.7: 20.22: 21.6:
137 75, 137 75 110, 132 25 n.176 151 114 63 17 n.116 70 163 143 139 62 165 100 146 16 n.114, 17 n.119, 96, 100, 107, 108 17 n.120 19 n.133, 158 152 112, 159 117 162 138 137 63 141
Longinus: fr. 48 chapt. 194:
136
Lycurgus: 1.3 – 4: 1.14: 1.17: 1.18: 1.18 – 19: 1.21: 1.25: 1.45: 1.133: 1.135: 1.139: 1.150:
145 69 69 101 69 69 69 69 135 132, 143 131 146
Index of Sources
Lysias: 1.26: 2.33: 2.35: 2.39: 2.40: 2.42 – 42: 2.47: 2.58: 2.59: 2.71: 2.72: 2.79: 3: 3.21: 3.45: 3.47: 4: 5.2: 5.3: 6.17: 6.27: 6.33: 6.36: 6.40: 6.46: 6.46 – 47: 6.59: 7: 7.6: 7.9: 7.12: 7.24: 7.31: 7.33: 7.41: 9.17: 9.18: 10.2: 10.27: 11.9: 12: 12.5: 12.22: 12.25: 12.36: 12.43:
140 157 160 155 160 160 45 n.299 48 n.313 159 157 157 101 140 137 69, 144 69 140 142 110 144 71 143 111 69, 110 81, 98, 107 69 69 142 21 n.144 73 137 137 78 91 139, 162 142, 143 137 110 69 69 55 n.365 19 n.136 134 20 96 93, 107
12.58: 12.61: 12.68: 12.92: 12.93: 12.92 – 93: 12.97: 13.1: 13.2: 13.3: 13.10: 13.15: 13.18: 13.23: 13.26: 13.33: 13.34: 13.43 – 44: 13.44: 13.47: 13.65: 13.73: 13.76: 13.95: 14: 14.1: 14.10: 14.23: 14.31: 14.33: 14.38: 14.38 – 39: 14.41: 14.42: 14.43: 14.44: 14.45: 15.1: 15.12: 16.3: 16.4: 16.8: 18: 18.1: 18.2: 18.3:
173
151 106 134 21 n.150 21 n.148, 22 n.155 52 n.341 163 125 134 125 87 100 134 134 110 110 100 95 95, 134 24 n.170 134 90 110 110 62 137 110 63 54 n.354 158 107 54 n.356 141 125 138 163 144 137 137 26 n.184 98, 107 50 n.326, 52 n.341 30 n.204, 62 63 29 n.200, 30 n.204, 50 n.326, 110, 161 30 n.204
174
18.4: 18.5: 18.7: 18.10: 18.11: 18.12: 18.23: 18.24: 18.27: 19.12: 19.16: 19.17: 19.19: 19.31: 19.45: 19.48: 19.52: 19.56: 19.57: 19.59: 19.61: 19.64: 21.1: 21.2: 21.3: 21.4: 21.5: 21.6: 21.7: 21.8: 21.9: 21.10: 21.11: 21.12: 21.13: 21.14: 21.15: 21.16: 21.17: 21.18: 21.19: 21.20: 21.21: 21.22: 21.23: 21.24:
Index of Sources
11, 92, 93, 107 30 n.204, 50 n.326 50 n.326, 70, 110, 138 133 29, 30 n.204, 50 n.326 30 n.204 50 n.326, 152 50 n.326 149 81 107 93 110 140 91 134 134 78 37, 53 n.343, 61, 119 77 127, 141 117 61 – 67 67 – 68 69 – 72 72 – 75 75 – 79 79 – 82 82 – 84 84 – 91 91 – 100 100 – 8 108 – 13 113 – 18 118 – 20 121 – 23 123 – 125 126 – 28 128 – 33 133 – 36 137 – 41 141 – 47 147 – 49 149 – 52 152 – 54 154 – 58
21.25: 22.15: 24.21: 24.23: 25.1: 25.3: 25.4: 25.6: 25.8: 25.11: 25.13: 25.14: 25.18: 25.19: 25.28: 25.30 – 31: 26: 26.4: 26.5: 26.10: 26.13: 26.16 – 20: 26.18: 26.19: 27.1: 28.1: 28.2: 28.3: 28.3 – 6: 28.4: 28.10: 28.11: 28.12 – 14: 28.13: 29.9: 30.2: 30.13: 30.18: 31.8: 31.9: 31.17 – 19: 31.25: 31.26: 31.31: 34.1 – 3: 34.4:
158 – 66 119 137 165 143 137 110 22 n.155 25 n.176 110, 111 78 134, 135 20 n.143 119 110 19 n.136 34 n.226 73 139 135, 137 142 52 n.341 141 22 n.157 62 62 42 n.279 38 n.257 119 42 n.279 119 42 42 n.280 119 115 137 20 146 95 21 n.144 21 n.144 137 79 69 25 n.172 20 n.141
Index of Sources
Menexenus: 246d1 – 5:
157
fr. CLXX (Carey): fr. LXX (Carey): fr. LXXXV (Carey): fr. LXXXVI (Carey): fr. CLXX (Carey): [Lysias] 20.5: 20.17: 20.29: 20.31:
17 n.116, 71, 92, 99, 109, 135, 145 90 146 144 144 110 20 136 134 107 152
Phaedrus: 237d-238c:
140
Laws: 716a:
141
Nepos: Alcibiades: 7.8.2: 8.1: 8.2: 10.5 – 6:
Respublica: 330a7-b7: 341c-d: 421b3-c6: 560d:
129 104 145 139
4 6 2 n.8, 9 81
[Plato]: Eryximachus: 399a:
72
140 140 140 3 n.13 86 86 81 118 15 n.101 2, 10 n.63 7 n.44, 9 6, 9, 10 9 92, 93
P.Ryl. 489 (Roberts):
Chabrias: 4.1:
3 n.16
Pausanias: 7.10.2 – 3:
28
Plato: Apology: 32b-c: 32c-d:
98 134
Alcibiades A: 104b1 – 2: 115b1 – 3: 115b 5 – 8:
6 n.38, 81 99 99
Plutarchus: Alcibiades: 4.8: 16.1: 23.7: 26.5 – 7: 29.2 – 3: 29.3: 32.3: 35.5: 35.8: 36.6: 37.2: 37.3: 37.2 – 3: 37.4:
Epistle: 7.325c5-d5:
81
Cimon: 17.2:
96
Gorgias: 429a: 429c: 429d: 429e: 472a: 494c:
139 139 139 139 67 139
Lysander: 5.2: 9.10: 10.3: 10.5: 11.1: 11.2: 11.3 – 4:
96 1 8 n.52 2, 3 7 n.44 97 10
175
176
Index of Sources
11.3 – 6: 11.5: 12.1 – 3: 21.3:
92 10, 92 47 28 n.193
Nicias: 3.3 – 4: 3.5: 20:
66 76 3, 19
Pericles: 9.2 – 3: 16.2:
118 145
Themistocles: 19.5 – 6:
104
Comparatio Lysander-Sylla: 4: 4 Moralia: 504C: 799C: fr. 39 (Sandbach):
53 n.342 97 158
Polyaenus: Stratagems-Alcibiades 1: 81 Theophrastus: Characters: 4.7: 26.1: 26.5:
140 140 115
Thucydides: 1.70.3 – 4: 1.70.4: 1.140.1: 2.12.1 – 2: 2.13.2: 2.35.2: 2.37.2: 2.39.4: 2.42.4: 2.42.4 – 43.1: 2.43.4: 2.83.5:
43 n.282 70 101 9 n.56 103 107 137 69 140, 153 157 146 84
3.82.2: 4.10.5: 6.12.2: 6.15.4: 6.16.3 – 4: 6.16.6: 6.19: 6.23.3: 6.24.4: 6.28.2: 6.39.1: 6.48: 6.50.1: 6.61.6 – 7: 7.61.3: 7.67.4: 7.68.1: 7.69.2: 7.70.3: 7.70.6: 7.77.3: 8.1.1: 8.45.2: 8.45.3: 8.47.2: 8.48.1: 8.48.2: 8.49.1: 8.72.1: 8.72.2: 8.73.4: 8.73.5: 8.75.3: 8.76.1 – 2: 8.81.2 – 3: 8.82: 8.104 – 106.5:
97 11 n.70 140 83, 137 129 2 1 101 107 179 122 1 1 84 101 102 102 155 104 104 101 96 118 97 2, 96 5 79 6 79 107 86 97 86 96 5 2 86
Xenophon: Anabasis: 3.1.3:
155
Cyropaedia: 1.6.37:
11 n.69
Hellenica: 1.1.5:
5
Index of Sources
1.1.7 – 8: 1.1.11: 1.2.15 – 17: 1.3.1 – 2: 1.4.10 – 11: 1.4.16: 1.4.17: 1.4.17 – 18: 1.4.18: 1.4.18 – 20: 1.4.20: 1.4.21: 1.4.21 – 23: 1.5.4 – 7: 1.5.10: 1.5.11: 1.5.15 – 18: 1.5.16: 1.5.20: 1.6.19: 1.6.20 – 22: 1.6.24: 1.6.29: 1.6.31: 1.6.33: 1.7.2: 1.7.5: 1.7.6: 1.7.22: 1.7.32: 1.7.1 – 35: 1.7.35: 2.1.16: 2.1.19: 2.1.20: 2.1.23: 2.1.23 – 24: 2.1.25: 2.1.26: 2.1.27: 2.1.28: 2.1.29: 2.1.31: 2.1.32: 2.2.3: 2.2.3 – 4: 2.2.9 – 10:
8 8 86 86 85 81 5 54 n.355 81 6 n.38 2 n.7, 5 80 14 118 14 104 84 85 15 15, 84 16 16 89 92 86 16 100 105 134 105 86 86, 89, 114 16, 102 8 n.52 109 8 n.52 10 1, 8 3, 7 10 n.63, 97 10, 92 109 4 n.24 100 48 n.315, 96 100 96
177
2.2.10 – 18: 2.2.20: 2.2.21: 2.2.22: 2.3.1: 2.3.12: 2.3.48: 2.4.1: 2.4.2: 2.4.4: 2.4.10 – 17: 2.4.20 – 22: 2.4.28: 2.4.38: 2.4.40: 2.4.40 – 42: 2.4.42 – 43: 2.3.24 – 26: 5.1.27: 5.3.16 – 17:
106 43 n.281, 100, 108 106 17 n.122 73 19 n.136 22 n.155 20 85 20 85 22 28 n.195 24 135 56 85 43 n.281 84 28 n.195
Memorabilia: 1.1.18: 1.2.9: 1.2.31: 2.1.21 – 23: 2.2.1: 2.7.1 – 2: 3.4.3: 3.4.5: 3.9.11: 3.9.14:
98 104 2 n.156 140 151 21 n.144 66 67 104 137
Oeconomicus: 1.1.: 1.7 – 8: 2.6: 2.7: 8.8: 8.16: 8.20: 11.4 – 5: 11.7: 18: 20.22: 20.22 – 26:
64 120 70 140 11 n.70 48 n.315 68 122 137 112 12 n.75 13 n.86
178
Revenues: 2.2 – 3: Symposium: 4.35:
Index of Sources
155
150, 160
[Xenophon]: Athenaion Politeia: 1.4: 1.13: 1.20: 2.5 – 6: 2.19:
151 44, 117, 154 103 1 n.4 25 n.177
General Index Aegospotami: 1, 7 n.41, 8, 15 n.107, 16, 44, 47, 56, 68, 70, 72, 85, 90, 92, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 105, 107, 109, 110, 146, 154 Alcibiades: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 43, 52, 53, 54, 56, 75, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 91, 93, 94, 129, 158, 163 accusation(s): 4, 7 n.42, 16, 25, 26, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36 n.244, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 48, 49, 51, 52, 57, 58, 63, 64, 69, 75, 78, 84, 93, 97, 114, 123, 127, 128, 130, 133, 134, 136, 142, 143, 144, 146, 148, 149, 150, 152, 157, 162 amnesty: 24, 50, 114, 141, 146 anger: 18, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 100, 146, 147 Arginousai: 105 argument(s): 1 n.6, 2, 5 n.31, 17, 21, 26 n.179, 28, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, 43, 46, 48, 49, 51, 53 n.343, 55, 56, 58, 59, 62, 66, 69, 70, 71, 73, 78, 79, 80, 83, 87, 90, 93, 99, 106, 110, 112, 114, 116, 117, 119, 120, 122, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153, 154, 156, 157, 158, 159, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166 aristocrat(s): 9 n.55, 9 n.57, 17, 18, 19 n.139, 25, 29, 64, 139, 140, 164 Athens: 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 n.41, 8, 9 n.55, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 n.132, 20, 21, 22 n.151, 22 n.156, 22 n.157, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 37 n.249, 38, 39, 39 n.261, 41 n.268, 43, 43 n.286, 45, 47, 52, 53, 55, 56, 63, 64, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 89, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 102, 103, 106, 109, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 121, 123, 134, 135, 138, 140, 145, 146, 151, 161 Attica: 12, 76, 88, 98 benefaction(s): 38, 90, 107, 151, 152 Boule (see also Council of the Five Hundred): 21, 63, 135
bribery: 25, 26, 27, 30, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 48, 49 n.318, 54, 62, 102, 136 Callicratidas: 15, 87, 88 charge (s): 5, 15, 26, 31, 34, 35, 37 n.249, 42 n.279, 49, 54, 61, 78, 107, 108, 112, 126, 134 choregus(i): 19, 40, 46, 52, 64, 65, 66, 67, 74, 160 crew(s): 10, 16, 42, 44, 48, 75, 92, 97, 100, 102, 104, 105, 106 Critias: 21, 22 n.156 Cinesias: 49, 144, 145 citizen(s): 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 9 n.56, 13, 16, 17 n.118, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 29, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38 n.253, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 49, 53, 56, 61, 63, 65, 66, 69, 70, 73, 76, 82, 83, 84, 88, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 102, 106, 107, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 121, 123, 125, 27, 128, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 151, 152, 156, 157, 159, 161, 163, 164, 166 commander: 2 n.7, 4, 8, 14, 44, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85 competition: 66, 67, 68, 75, 82 Conon: 3, 4, 5, 10, 15, 81, 85, 86, 87, 88, 92, 93, 94, 101 contempt (contemptuous): 112, 113, 127, 141, 142, 145, 147, 48 n.315, 73, 97 dance(s): 22 n.151, 41, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 75 defeat: 1, 4, 5, 10, 11, 16, 22, 23, 24, 43, 47, 48, 54, 80, 84, 85, 88, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 100, 101, 107, 118, 135, 146 defendant(s): 31, 32, 33, 34, 36 n.244, 37 n.249, 38, 39, 45, 49, 50, 54 n.356, 71, 77, 109, 111, 126, 127, 131, 132, 134, 137, 142, 159, 162, 163 democracy: 13, 17 n.119, 18, 19 n.133, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 34, 44, 45, 50, 51, 52
180
General Index
n.339, 53, 55, 56, 66, 71, 72, 73, 74, 8, 85, 86, 110, 116, 126, 133, 151, 154, 161 envy: 164, 65, 124, 128, 138 Erasinides: 15, 16, 79, 86, 88, 89 evidence: 19 n.132, 21, 26, 29, 36 n.241, 37 n.250, 39, 47, 61, 66, 69, 76, 78, 79, 142, 146 favour (of the jurors): 39, 40, 43 n.286, 44, 53 n.343 (see also χάρις) fear: 3, 4, 8, 9 n.56, 11, 17, 20, 23, 24, 28, 53, 90, 97, 98, 106, 107, 124, 138, 144, 156, 157, 163 festivals: 19 n.132, 22, 41, 50, 64, 66, 67, 72, 73, 74, 76, 79, 82, 111, 120, 125 flattery (of the jurors): 45, 46, 85, 87, 98, 104, 151 fleet (Athenian): 1, 3 n.13, 4 n.27, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16,18, 42, 44 n.291, 45 n.299, 47 n.307, 56, 79, 82, 88, 89, 92, 95, 96, 97, 100, 102 friend(ship): 5, 6, 13, 29, 53, 66, 81, 87, 131, 132, 133 generosity: 37, 41, 46, 64, 71, 73, 121 (in)gratitude: 73, 107,111, 115, 130, 132, 139, 152, 159 jurors: 18 n.127, 31, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 51, 52 n.341, 53 n.343, 54, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 130, 131, 132, 133, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166 gods: 46 n.302, 47, 48, 49, 63, 66, 80, 101, 125, 137, 144, 146, 147 Hellespont: 1, 3, 4 n.22, 6, 9, 16, 18 n.123, 19 n.133, 25, 43, 44, 46 n.299, 48 n.315,
54, 70, 71, 85, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 98, 101, 103, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 138, 146, 153 indignation: 20 n.139, 115, 145 litigant(s): 20, 29, 34, 37, 39, 40, 41, 44, 49, 53 n.343, 61, 63, 66, 69, 70, 71, 77, 78, 81, 82, 85, 87, 91, 95, 98, 99, 100, 104, 106, 108, 110, 113, 117, 119, 121, 122, 125, 127, 129, 130, 135, 136, 137, 139, 142, 143, 145, 155, 159, 165 liturgy: 33, 47 n.307, 64, 65, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 121, 138, 151 Lysander: 1, 3, 4 n.22, 7, 8, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 n.132, 27, 28, 47, 48 n.315, 93, 96, 97, 105, 109, 134 Lysias: 9 n.55, 10 n.67, 11, 15 n.107, 17 n.118, 20, 22 n.156, 26, 32, 35 n.241, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53 n.342, 54, 55, 56, 57, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 71, 73, 77, 78, 81, 83, 86, 87, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 100, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 115, 116, 120, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 132, 134, 135, 136, 139, 141, 143, 144, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153, 154, 156, 159, 160, 161, 163 money: 13, 15, 18, 29, 30 n.202, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36 n.244, 38, 39 n.261, 40, 41, 42, 44, 65, 66, 68, 70, 75, 76, 77, 78, 90, 103, 104, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 134, 135, 140, 145, 149, 150, 153, 154, 166 Mysteries: 126, 7 n.42, 30 n.202, 80, 82, 84 Mytilene: 15, 87, 88, 89 Notium: 14, 15, 84, 85, 88 oligarch(s): 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 n.156, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 39, 49, 50, 55, 96, 112, 115, 121, 123, 135 oligarchy: 18, 141 Old Oligarch: 1 n.4, 25, 44, 117, 141, 154
General Index
181
parenthesis: 94, 99, 100, 126, 153 patriotism: 79, 156 Pausanias, the Spartan general: 23, 28, 29, 30 n.204 Pericles: 2, 3 n.13, 9 n.56, 64, 69, 87, 98, 103, 107, 145, 152 Phyle: 21, 158 phyle(ai): 54, 67, 68, 82 plaintiff(s): 34, 36, 38, 116, 132, 145, 163 (im)piety: 46, 47, 49, 64, 76, 77, 125, 141, 142, 143, 144 property: 13, 19, 20, 24, 32, 33, 35, 36, 48, 56, 64, 71, 77, 103, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 120, 123, 124, 16, 127, 129, 134, 136, 139, 149, 161 prosecutor(s): 29, 31, 32, 34, 35, 40, 42, 48 n.317, 51, 54 n.356, 56, 71, 95, 98, 114, 125, 127, 137, 139, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 158, 160, 162, 163
27, 29, 30 n.203, 32, 34, 35 n.241, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 44, 45, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51, 53 n.342, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 66, 69, 73, 74, 77, 79, 81, 83, 84, 85, 90, 91, 94, 97, 99, 102, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 117, 118, 120, 121, 123, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 133, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146, 147, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 159, 160, 163, 164, 166 – forensic: 30 n.203, 34, 49, 57, 59 n.374, 63, 77, 107, 117, 144, 153, 154, 159 – deliberative: 2, 117 – funeral: 45, 46 n.299, 48, 69, 140, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 160, 161 strategy of the speech: 27, 33, 37, 39, 52, 70, 79, 85, 108, 111, 113, 32, 135, 139, 141, 142, 143, 149, 150, 152
reconciliation: 23, 24, 25, 28, 39, 55 restoration of democracy: 17 n.119, 24, 34 n.226, 50, 51, 52 n.339, 55, 56, 74, 85, 86, 110, 161
(rhetorical) tactic: 2, 27 n.187, 34, 40, 41 n.268, 45, 50, 52, 62, 65, 68, 69, 71, 73, 74, 75, 77, 85, 92, 93, 94, 95, 98, 106, 107, 108, 110, 113, 119, 123, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132, 147, 148, 154, 163 (military tactic): 11 n.69, 26 n.72, 42 n.190, 118, 119 Theramenes: 17, 18, 20, 21, 86, 134 the Thirty: 18, 19 n.132, 19 n.139, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 33, 34, 38, 39 n.261, 42 n.280, 46 n.301, 49, 50, 51, 55, 56, 71, 72, 73, 85, 90, 110, 126, 133, 134, 135, 137, 139, 142, 151, 158 Thrasybulus: 14, 20, 21 n.144, 42, 56, 85, 86 Thrasyllus: 82, 85, 86, 88, 89 treasurer(s): 42, 78, 105, 121, 122, 123, 124, 136 trierarch: 9, 10, 14 n.98, 15, 16, 17 n.117, 19 n.133, 40, 43, 44, 45, 48, 52, 53, 54, 56, 68, 69, 71, 75, 80, 81, 82, 86, 87, 88, 89, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108 trierarchy: 33, 53 n.343, 68 trireme: 14, 15, 16, 41, 42, 44 n.292, 45, 47, 56, 67, 68, 79, 80, 84, 89, 90, 92, 102, 103, 109
sailor(s): 44, 45, 46 n.299, 97, 103, 104, 105, 107, 118 salary: 65, 102, 118, 120, 122 Samos: 1, 3 n.13, 4, 5, 6, 14, 15, 16, 53, 84, 86, 88 Sestus: 1, 4, 7, 8, 105, 109 ship(s): 5 n.28, 8, 9 n.55, 10, 14, 15, 16, 42 n.279, 44, 45, 47, 48, 52, 54, 56, 57, 68, 79, 80, 82, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 97, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 122, 129, 134 Sicilian expedition: 1, 3, 27, 47, 116 Socrates: 20, 46, 98, 134 soldier(s): 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9 n.56, 11 n.68, 15, 45, 46 n.299, 65, 84, 86, 106, 107, 118, 145, 158, 160 Spartan(s): 1, 134, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 38, 44 n.291, 47, 48, 82, 84, 86, 89, 91, 92, 97, 98, 105 speech(es): 1, 2 n.7, 5 n.31, 9 n.55, 11, 15 n.107, 17 n.114, 18 n.127, 20, 22, 24, 26,
182
Tydeus:
General Index
3, 7
ἀρχιθεωρός: 76 άντίδοσις: 66, 116 μανία (μαίνομαι): 48, 149, 150
ξενία: 29, 30 ὕβρις: 7, 78, 113, 122, 128 φιλοτιμία: 17 n.118, 48, 66, 67, 77, 149, 150 χάρις: 57, 111