Lucretius and His Intellectual Background 0444858180, 9780444858184

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Lucretius and his Intellectual Background

Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences P.O. Box 19121, 1000 GC Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Proceedings of the colloquium, Amsterdam, 26 - 28 June 1996

ISBN 0-444-85818-0

Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen Verhandelingen, Afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, deel 172

Lucretius and his Intellectual Background

Edited by K.A. Algra, M.H. Koenen and P.H. Schrijvers

North-Holland, Amsterdam/ Oxford/ New York/ Tokyo, 1997

Contents

David Sedley How Lucretius Composed the De rerum natura

1

Graziano Arrighetti Lucrece dans l 'histoire de l 'Epicurisme. Quelques reflexions Tiziano Dorandi Lucrece et les Epicuriens de Campanie Knut Kleve Lucretius and Philodemus

35

49

Martin Ferguson Smith The Chisel and the Muse Diogenes of Oenoanda and Lucretius

67

Michael Erler Physics and Therapy Meditative Elements in Lucretius' De rerum natura David T. Runia Lucretius and Doxography

L. Deschamps Lucrece et Varron

21

79

93

105

Carlos Levy Lucrece avait-il lu Enesideme?

115

A.A. Long Lucretius on Nature and the Epicurean Self

125

Keimpe Algra Lucretius and the Epicurean Other On the Philosophical Background of DRN V.1011-1027

141

Piet Schrijvers L 'homme et l' animal dans le De rerum natura Lucrece et la science de la vie 151

V

Mieke Koenen Lucretius' Olfactory Theory in De rerum natura IV

163

Jose Kany-Turpin Cosmos ouvert et epidemies mortelles dans le De rerum natura Diskin Clay Lucretius' Gigantomachy

179

187

Woldemar Gorier Storing up Past Pleasures The Soul-Vessel-Metaphor in Lucretius and in his Greek Models

193

Alain Gigandet L'interpretation des mythes comme lieu et enjeu de la polemique philosophique dans le De rerum natura 209 Kimberly R. Gladman and Phillip Mitsis Lucretius and the Unconscious 215 Bibliography

225

List of Contributors Index Locorum

VI

245

243

Preface

This volume contains the acta of the colloquium on 'Lucretius and His Intellectual Background' which took place under the supervision of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences in Amsterdam from 26 to 28 June 1996. This colloquium brought together a number of specialists in Hellenistic philosophy and literature to study the context and sources of Lucretius' De rerum natura. Several reasons may be given for this specific choice of focus. One reason concerns the direction Lucretian scholarship itself has taken over the last decades. Now that the 'psychological' approach appears to have lost its appeal and the phantoms of the 'mad poet' and the 'antilucrece chez Lucrece' are no longer with us, Lucretian scholars are more and more trying to explain particular features of the De rerum natura by reference to the affiliations of doctrine and method between Lucretius and others (Epicurus, the Epicurean tradition, or other Greek and Roman philosophers and poets). However, there is still no consensus nor on the degree to which Lucretius faithfully represents Epicurus' philosophy, nor on the extent to which he incorporates elements from other sources. Further explorations therefore appear to be called for. Another reason is that the study of Hellenistic thought has made considerable progress over the last decades. Thus the research on the papyri from Ercolano and on the fragments of Diogenes of Oenoanda has allowed us to draw in some finer shades in our picture of the Epicurean tradition. But also in other areas, such as the history of Stoic philosophy, or ancient doxography, scholarship has advanced. It seems legitimate to ask where all this leaves Lucretius, and whether we are now better placed to determine his position within the larger contexts of Epicureanism and Hellenistic philosophy. The present volume approaches this question of Lucretius' position along two different lines. The first nine papers systematically explore the relation between Lucretius and specific other authors or schools. The remaining nine papers rather offer what might be called 'case studies' sketching the background of particular motifs or passages in Lucretius. Within the group of general studies the first five deal with the relation between Lucretius' poem and the Epicurean tradition. David Sedley discusses Lucretius' use of Epicurus' On Nature and attempts to reconstruct Lucretius' Arbeitsweise in writing the DRN. Graziano Arrighetti then focuses on how the DRN as a didactic poem fits into the Epicurean tradition, despite this tradition's alleged hostility towards poetry. Tiziano Dorandi discusses the evidence on the Epicurean circles in the area around the Bay of Naples in the first century BC. The possibility that Lucretius was

K.A. Algra, M.H. Koenen and P.H. Schrijvers

VII

acquainted with these Epicurean circles, in particular with Philodemus, is explored by Knut Kleve. Finally, Martin Ferguson Smith deals with the question whether there was any connection between Lucretius and Diogenes of Oenoanda - a question which until a few years ago hardly anyone would have thought of putting in this form, but which now deserves our consideration in view of recent attempts to redate Diogenes' inscription. The next four general contributions explore how Lucretius should be positioned vis-a-vis other elements of Hellenistic intellectual life. Michael Erler studies the elements of meditation and therapy in Lucretius' poem against the background of other Hellenistic and Roman examples of protreptic literature concerned with the ars vitae. David Runia takes DRN V.1204-1240 as an example of how Lucretius used the Hellenistic doxographical tradition. The question whether any connection can be established between Lucretius and Varro is the subject of Lucienne Deschamps' paper. Carlos Levy concludes this part of our volume by an investigation of how Lucretius reacted to sceptical arguments and whether he can be shown to have known Aenesidemus' work. Of the remaining nine contributions the first five are case studies dealing with more or less specific or technical philosophical issues. Anthony Long focuses on the way in which Lucretius integrates the subjective and objective aspects of the Epicurean self, i.e. the way we are supposed to experience the world on the one hand, and the description and explanation of that world in the 'objective' terms of Epicurean physics on the other. Keimpe Algra highlights the Epicurean background of some aspects of the Kulturentstehungslehre of DRN V, and questions the view that Lucretius here introduces heterodox elements. Piet Schrijvers' contribution explores the background of various biological passages in DRN and tries to answer the question whether we can find traces of direct acquaintance on Lucretius' part with Aristotle's biological works. Mieke Koenen comments on Lucretius' account of smell in DRN IV.673-715 and studies those elements of ancient olfactory theories that may help to put Lucretius' account in perspective. Josy Kany-Turpin studies Lucretius' account of the origin of epidemic diseases in the sixth book of DRN, partly against the background of what is known of Democritus' theory of an extra-cosmic provenance of such diseases. Four further case studies remain. Diskin Clay discusses what he regards as Lucretius' polemical adaptation of a motif we know from the remains of Aristotle's On Philosophy. The sources of and the literary models for Lucretius' application of the metaphor of the human soul as a vessel are the subject of Woldemar Gorler's contribution. Alain Gigandet contrasts some instances of Lucretius' treatment of myth with the Stoic practice of allegorical interpretation. Finally, Kimberly Gladman and Phillip Mitsis take issue with some interpretations of Lucretius which involve the notion of the unconscious. They argue that the relevant passages should be explained in different terms and that a conception of the unconscious in anything like the Freudian sense was not part of Lucretius' intellectual background. Inevitably there is quite a lot in these contributions which is tentative or hypothetical, and concerning many of the questions that are raised a non liquet is as far as we can get. Also the main question whether Lucretius was an orthodox, or even 'funda-

VIII

Preface

mentalist', Epicurean or whether he from time to time allowed himself to include heterodox views, does not receive a definitive or even unanimous answer in this book. Some papers may be regarded as contributing to the 'fundamentalist' picture (Sedley), others rather favour the picture of a more heterodox Lucretius (Schrijvers), or take some kind of middle position (Long) by arguing that Lucretius sometimes paraded Epicurean ideas in a Stoicizing dress, taking advantage of the fact that there was in some respects a considerable common ground between the various Hellenistic schools. Maybe this scholarly diaphonia should be taken as a warning that the question of orthodoxy versus heterodoxy should not be put in too general terms and that it allows of different answers for different elements in Lucretius' work. Anyway, the editors, inspired by Aristotle's dictum that wi~ EU1topfjcmt ~ouAoµi:vot~ 1tpoupyou "CO8ta1topfjcrm KaA&~ (Metaph. A 995a27-28), like to believe that a collection of studies like the present one should not only be judged by the answers it provides, but also by the questions it raises and by the way it maps the limits of what can be known at present. Editorial interventions have been limited to purely technical matters. This means that the contributors have been free to present unorthodox views if so they wished. It also means that one will sometimes find that different contributors have taken different or even opposing stances on a particular subject. Any attempt to impose uniformity would have been otiose, and the editors believe that the readers should be allowed to assess the various positions and arguments for themselves. The editors wish to thank the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Leiden-Utrecht Research Institute for Philosophy, the Faculteit der Wijsbegeerte, the Faculteit der Letteren and the Vakgroep Griekse en Latijnse Talen en Culturen of the University of Leiden for their financial support. Thanks are due also to the members of the Advisory Committee: Anthony Long, Jaap Mansfeld, David Runia and David Sedley. Keimpe A. Algra Mieke H. Koenen Piet H. Schrijvers

K.A. Algra, M.H. Koenen and P.H. Schrijvers

IX

David Sedley

How Lucretius Composed the De rerum natura

1. The thesis My aim is to argue for the following account of Lucretius' procedure when composing the De rerum natura. His sole Epicurean source was Epicurus' On Nature, and, of that, mainly the first fifteen of its thirty-seven books. Initially he followed its sequence of topics very closely, indeed almost mechanically. But to some extent as he proceeded, and to a greater extent during a phase of rewriting, he developed a radically revised structure for the whole. At his death, the reorganisation of books I-III was (so far as I can judge) complete. For books IV-VI, however, he had plans which can still to some extent be discerned from his proems, but which he did not live to put into operation. The Lucretian material of which I am speaking is the physical exposition in the main body of all six books. Naturally I am assuming the remainder to be his own original compositions, in some cases drawing on his independent knowledge of Epicurean ethics - I mean in particular the proems, the poetic manifesto at I.921950 (and IV.1-25), at least the bulk of the Magna Mater passage (11.600-660), and the ethical diatribes which close books III and IV. Of the concluding account of the Athenian plague I shall have something to say at the end. Recovering this process of composition requires a good deal of effort and patience. But Lucretius' creative achievement in structuring his poem as we know it can only be appreciated when we see what material he started with, how he set about the task of reshaping it, and what further plans may have remained unfulfilled at his death.

2. Lucretius' source It used to be widely debated whether Lucretius' source text was Epicurus' 37-book magnum opus On Nature, his Letter to Herodotus, his Great Epitome, or some combination of these, or, alternatively, whether he relied on more recent Epicurean writings. 1 1

For surveys of these views, see Schmidt (1990) 12-23, and, more selective, Erler (1994) 414-416. Schmidt in particular defends the view that more recent Epicurean writings play a large part - a thesis originating in particular from Liick (1932). Cf. also Runia in this volume (98). My own view is that Lucretius makes no use of Epicurean or other philosophical or scientific work postdating Epicurus, but I must reserve my defence of that for my forthcoming book on Lucretius (although see n. 33 below).

D. Sedley

Lately these questions about sources have fallen into the background, no doubt to the relief of many. There are even those, like Diskin Clay, who maintain that Lucretius worked directly from no source at all.2 This last option is, in my view, effectively ruled out by the comparison, on which this paper will be focused, between the structure of Lucretius' poem and that of On Nature. The data which I shall present seem to me only intelligible if Lucretius is taken to be working directly from a text of Epicurus, one which is either On Nature itself or a close derivative of it. But which text? While it is quite understandable that Lucretian scholars should have got bored with Quellenforschung, it is surprising that no Lucretian scholar has set out to reopen the question of Lucretius' source materials in the light of our constantly improving range of evidence on Epicurus' On Nature. In the chart which follows, I give on the left the fullest reconstruction that I can manage of On Nature I-XV, based on the papyrus fragments and all the secondary evidence, including the Letter to Herodotus, which is avowedly an epitome of On Nature. 3 Each item is marked with a lower-case roman numeral. To its right I show the sequence of contents in the DRN. Where Lucretius includes a topic not otherwise attested for On Nature, it appears with the prefix 'L' (LI, L2 etc.). There are ten such additions. 4 Where Lucretius has a topic in a different position from Epicurus, I mark the transposition with an arrow. Despite the disparities, it leaps to the eye that there is an extensive and non-accidental correspondence between the sequence of topics in On Nature and that in the DRN. Lucretius includes some topics not found in the Letter to Herodotus, and the Letter includes some topics not found in Lucretius, but that need reflect no more than two partly different policies used in excerpting material from On Nature. Moreover - and this is of the utmost importance - one of the disparities of sequence can be shown to depend on a transposition which Lucretius himself made during the writing of the poem, after having initially followed the exact order found in On Nature. The proem to book IV preserves, side by side, two alternative programmatic passages. The later of the two (26-43) was written when the book was expected to follow what we now call book III, on the soul and its mortality. The earlier version (45-53), accidentally left in during the process of editing, preserves an earlier plan in which the book followed directly after book 11.5 Thus originally 2

Clay (1983b) 31. For Clay's arguments against On Nature as source, see ib. 18-19. I have permitted myself a little help also from the Letter to Pythocles for the reconstruction of Nat. XI. The full reasoning behind the reconstruction will be found in Chapter 4 of my book (see n. 1). For an earlier version, see Sedley (1984), reproduced in Erler (1994) 95 (who also offers a helpful conspectus on the evidence for On Nature). 4 I have excluded non-expository passages, such as the proems and the poetic manifesto at 1.921-950. 5 This was long ago shown by Mewaldt (1908), and has been widely accepted. Of later discussions critical of Mewaldt, see esp. Pizzani (1959) 157-167, and Gale (1993-1994) 4-5. But their strongest objection, that book IV assumes some knowledge of book III, is not decisive. It may simply show that Lucretius became aware during the course of writing book IV that he would eventually need to transpose it - see 9-10 below. In Sedley (1998) I argue that the first version contains a translation of technical terminology alien to Lucretius' eventual method, lending new confirmation to Mewaldt' s conclusion that this represents an early draft of the poem. In defence of Mewaldt against the alternative proposal of Drexler ( 1935) that Lucretius' change of mind was the other way round - to move book IV to a position after book II - see Ferrari (1937). 3

2

How Lucretius Composed the De rerum natura

Chart 1

Nat.

II

DRN

(i) methodological preliminaries ............................................. . (ii) nothing comes into being out of nothing .......................... . (iii) nothing perishes into nothing ........................................... . (iv) the all never changes ........................................................ . (LI) the existence of the invisible ........................................ . (L2) the existence of void .................................................... . (v) the all consists of bodies and void .................................... . (vi) some bodies are compounds, others constituents ............ . (vii) nothing exists independently except bodies and void .... . (viii) bodies' constituents (distinguished in (vi)) are atomic .. .

(ix) the all is infinite ................................................................ . (L3) critique of geocentric cosmology ................................ . (x) unimaginably, not infinitely, many atomic shapes ............ . (xi) atoms are in perpetual motion .......................................... . (L4) the swerve of atoms ..................................................... . (L5) more on motion ............................................................ . (L6) compounds ................................................................... .

(xii) there are infinitely many worlds ..................................... . (xiii) existence and mobility of images ................................... . III-IV (xiv) vision, truth and falsity ................................................... . (L7) refutation of scepticism ............................................... . (xv) the other senses ................................................................ . (xvi) thought ............................................................................ . (L8) critique of biological teleology ................................... . (L9) nutrition, motion, sleep, dreams, sex .......................... . V (xvii) atoms lack secondary qualities ...................................... . (xviii) atomic dimensions ........................................................ . (xix) up and down ................................................................... . (xx) equal speed of atoms ....................................................... . VI(xxi) nature of the soul ............................................................ . VIII (xxii) mortality of the soul ...................................................... . (xxiii) soul is not incorporeal .................................................. . IX

I.149-214 I.215-264 I.265-328 I.329-417 I.418-429 I.430-482 I.483-634 I.635-920 I.951-1051 1.1052-1113 (II.333-580) II.62-215 II.216-293 II.294-332 ll.333-580 II.581-729 l/.730-990 II.1023-1174 (IV.26-238) (IV.239-468 (IV.469-521) (IV.522-721) (IV.722-822) (IV.823-857) (IV.858-1287) (II.730-990)

J -----1----1

ID.94-416 ID.417-1094

IV.26-1287 X

XI

XII XIII XIV

xv

(xxiv) metaphysics of properties and time .............................. . (LI 0) mortality of our world ............................................... . (xxv) origin of our world ........................................................ . (xxvi) origin of heavenly bodies ............................................. . (xxvii) size of heavenly bodies ................................................ . (xxviii) motions of heavenly bodies ........................................ . (xxix) attack on astronomical devices ..................................... . (xxx) stability of the earth ....................................................... .

(xxxi) further astronomical phenomena .................................. . (xxxii) other worlds ................................................................. . (xxxiii) origins of civilisation .................................................. . (xxxiv) the correct attitude to divinity ..................................... . [(xxxv) atmospheric and terrestrial phenomena] ..................... . (xxxvi) critique of monism ...................................................... . (xxxvii) critique of finite pluralism ......................................... . (xxxviii) critique of Anaxagoras ............................................. .

D. Sedley

V.55-415 V.416-508 (V.564-613) V.509-533 V.534-563 V.564-613 V.614-770

J

V.771-1457 VI.50-91 VI.96-1286 (1.635-711) } (1.712-829) ___ (1.830-920)

_.

3

Lucretius took items (xii) and (xiii) in their original sequence from On Nature II, so that DRN IV's topic - images, perception and other soul and body functions - followed directly after that of the multiplicity (and impermanence) of worlds at the end of book II. It was only after he had begun drafting that sequence that Lucretius decided to postpone perception and related topics until after what is now called book III, on the soul and its mortality. Given, then, that one of the arrowed transpositions is demonstrably Lucretius' own, there is a serious possibility that the others were also made by him during the process of writing. In the case we have just examined, Lucretius' original sequence - (xii), (xiii) was identical to that in On Nature II, and also, consequently, to that in Letter to Herodotus 45-46. In principle, then, he could be following either of these texts,6 or indeed some third, unknown text which took over the same sequence. The favourite candidate for this unknown text has long been the Great Epitome (Mqa.ATJ 'Enrroµ11), 7 a work of which we know only because it is cited three times in the scholia on the Letter to Herodotus. Before proceeding further, it will be best for me to explain why I believe that On Nature is itself the unmediated source. The hypothesis that the Letter to Herodotus may have been Lucretius' primary source offers few attractions. It is certainly not enough to pick out the occasional phrase from it which Lucretius can be said to have directly translated, since there need be little doubt that any such phrase occurred in On Nature too.8 The hypothesis must of course assume that Lucretius supplemented the Letter with a great deal of other Epicurean material. But it is not easy for its proponents to explain why Lucretius should have so closely matched the sequence of On Nature even at points where the Letter offered no guidance. For example, a look at the chart will show that he largely preserves the order of topics in On Nature XI-XII, despite the fact that neither the Letter to Herodotus nor, for that matter, the Letter to Pythocles could have offered sufficient reason to do so. Neither letter includes item (xxx), yet Lucretius has preserved its original place in the sequence, as the final columns of On Nature XI confirm. Stronger evidence against the Letter to Herodotus as source is forthcoming from the end of On Nature II. Epicurus' sequence there is: existence of images, their fineness, 9 6

Those who have supported On Nature as primary source include Mewaldt (1908), von der Muehll (1922) III-IV, Boyance (1963) 53-56, and Arrighetti (1973 2). The case for the Letter to Herodotus as primary source, whose groundwork was laid by Woltjer (1877) and Brieger (1882), has most recently been urged by Fowler (1996). 7 That the Great Epitome is Lucretius' main source was the proposal ofGiussani (1896-1898), I 1-11. 8 E.g. Bailey ( 1947) I 25: 'as will be seen from time to time in the commentary, his relation to it [sc. the Letter to Herodotus] is so close that it is almost impossible to resist the conclusion that he was translating it' (although Bailey does not make it Lucretius' primary source). For an effective reply to this inference, see Boyance (1963) 55 n. 1. 9 The images' lightness and fineness are invoked at fr. 24,36-37 Arr., where Epicurus is evidently relying on an earlier proof. This presumably came during or (more likely) directly after his proof of their existence. It is unsurprising that it is not listed in the book's closing summary along with the proofs of the images' existence and their speed of generation and travel: fineness has been established not as an end in itself but as a premise for the proofs of rapid generation and travel.

4

How Lucretius Composed the De rerum natura

their speed of generation, their velocity. This is identical to the sequence which we find in Lucretius IV.54-216. 10 But the Letter to Herodotus (46-48), in condensing this material, has produced a slightly changed order the existence of images, their velocity - including their fineness merely as a premise, their speed of generation. Here then there can surely be no possible doubt that Lucretius' debt to On Nature has not been mediated by use of the Letter to Herodotus. Since the Letter to Herodotus seems to be ruled out as Lucretius' main source, we are left with a choice between On Nature itself and the Great Epitome. If the mysterious Great Epitome is assumed to have been sufficiently great, in principle almost anything found in On Nature could have recurred in it. But it seems an awfully implausible candidate for Lucretius' source text. This title does not feature among those which Diogenes Laertius catalogues as Epicurus' leading works (X.27-28), or as the main texts on physics (ib. 30, where he does cite not only On Nature but also the physics summaries in the 'letters', i.e. those to Herodotus and Pythocles). Nor is it cited by any ancient source apart from the scholiast on the Letter to Herodotus. By contrast, On Nature (a) was the most prominent of all Epicurus' works, (b) is by far his most widely cited work on physics, and (c) can be seen from the multiple copies in the Herculaneum library to have been collected and valued by Epicureans in Lucretius' own day. In view of all this, the common impression that it was virtually unreadable, generated by the woeful state of the papyri, cannot be correct. Even allowing - as I prefer to insist - that Lucretius is unlikely to have been a member or active associate of Philodemus' school, we at least have incontrovertible evidence from his library that copies of On Nature were obtainable in Italy. Lucretius had to get his own texts of Epicurus from somewhere, and the papyri of On Nature which survived at Herculaneum may well include some of the exemplars from which his own copy was made. There was surely no better archetype of Epicurus available in Italy than Philodemus' ancient copies of On Nature, undoubtedly imported from the Garden in Athens. 11 Of course Lucretius is selective. He has omitted many topics and arguments altogether, and has cut down considerably on the large amount of polemical content that shows through in the fragments of On Nature. His doing so is fully accounted for by (a) the need to fit the main argument of fifteen books of On Nature into six books of Latin hexameters, and (b) the lower levels of philosophical expertise, and perhaps 10 Cf. Barigazzi (1958) 254. The denial of this fact by Lackenbacher (1910) 232 is based on a simple mistake. He thinks that Lucretius' first argument for (c) is founded on the images' 'lightness', while Epicurus' first argument for (c) is founded on their 'fineness' (AE1ttOtTJ Kai cpi,-,ov(EN l 155a21). 12 Thus the Stoic theory of olKeiromc; had explicit recourse to the concept of cosmic nature and was highly systematic. Its Aristotelean counterpart stayed closer to common sense notions, was less systematic and invoked the concept of nature only indirectly and only in the relatively weak sense that 'man is by nature a gregarious animal'. 13 Cf. Mitsis (1988) 101 for an example of such an 'Hobbesian' interpretation. It is worth pointing out, incidentally, that Hobbes' own position on psychological egoism was less straightforward than is usually assumed; on which see now Gert (1996) 167 with n. 4.

144

Lucretius and the Epicurean Other

(such as were launched by Chrysippus). Cicero paraphrases their arguments:

14

In the first book of the De Finibus (1.69)

Sunt autem quidam Epicurei timidiores paulo contra vestra convicia sed tamen satis acuti, qui verentur ne, si amicitiam propter nostram voluptatem expetendam putemus, tota amicitia quasi claudicare videatur. Itaque primos congressus copulationesque et consuetudinum instituendarum voluntates fieri propter voluptatem, cum autem usus progrediens familiaritatem effecerit, tum amorem efflorescere tantum ut, etiamsi nulla sit utilitas ex amicitia, tamen ipsi amici propter se ipsos amentur. Etenim si loca, si fana, si urbes, si gymnasia, si campum, si canes, si equos, si ludicra excercendi aut venandi consuetudine adamare solemus, quanto id in hominum consuetudine facilius fieri poterit et iustius?

These later Epicureans, then, explicitly played down the importance of the hedonistic basis of Epicurean friendships (which, according to their opponents, would only make for 'crippled' friendships (claudicare)), by arguing that hedonistic motives only play a role at the first stage (primos congressus fieri propter voluptatem), but that once friendships are well under way, utilitarian motives are superseded (etiamsi nulla sit utilitas ex amicitia) by a gradual process of appropriation (usus progrediens familiaritatem effecerit), based on consuetudo (consuetudine adamare). It is precisely in virtue of the independent, non-utilitarian status of this process that this passage in Cicero resembles what we find in Lucretius. It is worth noting that the mechanism of familiarization by consuetudo which is here described appears in Lucretius as well. At the end of the famous finale of book IV on love and sex, Lucretius adds a few low-key remarks on non-passionate love. There is nothing miraculous in the fact that men sometimes love physically unattractive women. No need to have recourse to an explanation in terms of divine intervention (divinitus, Venerisque sagittis) which is of course anathema to Lucretius the Epicurean. Instead the principle that consuetudo concinnat amorem is here explicitly invoked as a perfectly viable alternative explanation (IV.12781287): Nee divinitus interdum Venerisque sagittis deteriore fit ut forma muliercula ametur; 1180 nam facit ipsa suis interdum femina factis morigerisque modis et munde corpore culto, ut facile insuescat secum degere vitam. quod superest, consuetudo concinnat amorem; nam leviter quamvis quod crebro tunditur ictu, 1185 vincitur in longo spatio tamen atque labascit. nonne vides etiam guttas in saxa cadentis umoris longo in spatio pertundere saxa?

A similar role for consuetudo in the Kulturentstehungslehre of book V would be perfectly apposite insofar as it would fit in with the overall explanatory strategy of this account. After all Lucretius envisages the emergence of civilisation as something which can be explained without reference to divine intervention, 15 or to any kind of teleology; instead it is presented as a process of trial and error, of gradual evolution 14

On Chrysippus' attacks against Epicurean hedonism and their aftermath see Algra (1997). Cf. also Diogenes of Oenoanda fr. 12, col. II-III Smith: neither the technai (which are said to have developed µ1m1toux.p6vou) nor language are to be regarded as divine gifts. 15

K. Algra

145

driven by a number of spontaneous reactions to particular circumstances, usus and experientia mentis. 16 Now it might be thought that these views on gradual appropriation represent an heterodox strand within the Epicurean school. After all, they are explicitly ascribed by Cicero to later Epicureans. On closer view, however, matters are more complicated. What was heterodox about this later theory described by Cicero was presumably not the introduction of appropriation as an independent explanatory factor, but rather the playing down of the importance of hedonism as the second explanatory factor next to it. Indeed in Fin. 1.67-68 Cicero himself suggests that the element of a community transcending the limits of individualism was present in the orthodox Epicurean account of friendship as well. For he has the Epicurean spokesman Torquatus speak of friends sharing each other's pleasure and pain (laetemur amicorum laetitia aeque atque nostra etc.) and as taking on some laborious tasks propter amici voluptatem as well as propter suam voluptatem, and claim that according to Epicurus people love their friends as they love themselves. 17 This suggests that - like Aristotle and the Stoics, on which see above, 143 - Epicurus was willing to envisage the possibility of a situation where the boundaries between self-interest and other-interest get blurred. What is particularly interesting is that Cicero' s Epicurean spokesman suggests that this growing tendency to love our friends as we love ourselves, is a second factor which, next to pleasure as a motive (i.e. as a factor independent of hedonistic or utilitarian considerations), explains how friendships work according to Epicurus (et hoe ipsum efficitur in amicitia et amicitia cum voluptate connectitur). Again, such an independent process of familiarization also appears to be what we find in Lucretius. But there is also evidence - and in part direct evidence 18 - of Epicurus' own use of the conceptions of Kotvrovia and olKet6tT]i; and of the idea of a gradual appropriation which leads to such forms of community as we are here talking about. The relevant texts present a number of difficulties that will have to be passed over here, but the main points stand out clear enough. First, there is the brief characterization of Epicurean friendship provided by Diogenes Laertius. It features the notion of an emerging koinonia. We are told, at D.L. X.120 that Epicurean friendship, in spite of the fact that it takes its start in what is useful (ou'l i-ai; xpeiai;), grows into a kind of community (crnvicnacr0m oi:aui-11vKata Kotvroviav wii; wii; 11oovaii; lK1te1tATJproµ(tvo1i;)).19 Secondly, and more importantly, in one of Epicurus' own sententiae, 16 Cf. V.1452-1453: usus et impigrae simul experientia mentis / paulatim docuit pedetemptim progredientis. A case in point is of course the account of the origin and development of language; cf. V.10281090 and Ep. Hdt. 15-16. 17 Fin. 1.67-68: [ ... ] neque vero ipsam amicitiam tueri nisi aeque amicos et nosmet ipsos diligamus, idcirco et hoe ipsum efficitur in amicitia et amicitia cum voluptate connectitur. [ ... ] Nam et laetemur amicorum laetitia aeque atque nostra et pariter dolemus angoribus. Quocirca eodem modo sapiens erit affectus erga amicum quo in se ipsum, quosque labores propter suam voluptatem susciperet, eosdem suscipiet propter amici voluptatem. 18 Even if both the KD and the RS appear to contain material coined not by Epicurus himself, but by later Epicureans, they must have reflected the Epicurean orthodoxy - note that the KD were memorized by faithful Epicureans as a kind of catechism (cf. Cicero Fin. 1.20). On the composition of the two collections see now the convenient survey in Erler (1994) 81-82. 19 The most important MSS have Kata Kotvmviav toii; taii; fJoovaii; €K1tE1t1.:1wroµ.Bignone's restoration €K1tE1t1.:r1proµ(ev01i;) is now commonly accepted. Usener's emendation Kuta Kotvmviav

146

Lucretius and the Epicurean Other

KD 40, we find the concept of oikeiotes: people living together in safe and close communities are said to have reached the strongest possible degree of familiarization (1tATJpccr1:a1:riv olKEtO'tTJ'tU).I here give the text as printed by Arrighetti: "Ocrot 1:T]Vouvaµtv l:crxov 'COU'CO0appdv µa.1i.tO"'CU SK 'CCOV oµoppouv,:rov 1tapa&ATJµEvov. This is indeed a similar line of thought to that in Lucretius; but it should be noted that in Plato the contagion goes the other way round: we have to be careful when 'buying' thoughts and advice: we cannot carry them home in neutral containers as we can carry other things bought in the market - we have to pour 'bought' thoughts directly in our mind; so if the merchandise is putrid, it is bound to infect our soul, it being the 'vessel'. There is no need to follow Usener (1887) 263 commenting on Lucretius Vl.10: similitudinem vasis statuo ab ipso Epicuro usurpatam.fortasse ex Bione sublatam ... 5 Notoriously, the Garden's philosophical opponents denied that this was possible, the Epicurean 'goods' or 'pleasure' being basically physical ones which would not last beyond their actual experience. Carneades mocked at the doctrine of f)6ovai memorized (Plut. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum 1089c = fr. 436 Us.= Carneades fr. 20 Mette): this was like noting down in a diary how often one had made love, enjoyed delicious food etc., and then reviving the experience by studying the lists; similarly Cic. Tusc. V.74: ...ut si quis aestuans ... recordari velit sese aliquando in Arpinati nostro gelidisfluminibus circumfusumfuisse; non enim video, quo modo sedare possint ma/a praesentia praeteritae voluptates. And it was easy enough to argue that if past goods stored up in memory guaranteed happiness for ever then past evils, stored up likewise in everyone's memory, should result in perpetual misery, see e.g. Cic. Fin. II.104: illud quale tandem est: bona praeterita non eff/.ueresapienti, ma/a meminisse non oportere? For a more subtle form of criticism, based on a vessel-metaphor, see Appendix a.

,o

196

ev

Storing up Past Pleasures

the other you have been unable to do so, i.e. you did not "keep" what you have enjoyed (940: quae fructus cumque es) and you "hate" your life (941: vita in offensa est), you are dissatisfied with your life - if so it does not make sense either to go on living, as whatever benefits of pleasures I might further bestow on you will be equally lost.' The latter statement is not only harsh, it is discouraging. And that is surprising in a poem otherwise bursting with missionary zeal. Could not Nature have said: 'If you have not succeeded so far, try better henceforth?' Later on (959) it is at least hinted at that a conversion for the better is possible; but on the whole Lucretius, in our third book passage, follows one single and simple line: 'Whether you are satisfied with your vita anteacta or utterly dissatisfied, there is no reason whatsoever to cling to life.' What Nature states as her reasons for saying so sounds a bit small-minded and down-to-earth, as if she has taken offence at the rejection of her gifts: 'You have tried everything I had to offer, and you did not like it. Do not wait for further pleasures to come - there are none, everything will be the same as before, everything will be repeated for ever' (944-947, compare 1080 f.: praeterea versamur ibidem atque insumus usque I nee nova vivendo procuditur ulla voluptas). A second rhetorical division follows (947-951 ; 952-965): of those who are dissatisfied first young persons are addressed, and it is repeated to them that there are no new commoda to come; then the elderly dissatisfied are told they had to go anyhow and make way for new generations, Nature needed the atomic material they were made of. There is general agreement that the last third of De rerum natura III, from 830 onwards, is something like a consolatio: Lucretius is anxious to prove that there is no reason to be afraid of Death, and there is also agreement that most of the consolatory topics of this section are in close analogy to the ones found in Epicurus' Letter to Menoeceus. 6 This is not true of our vessel-passage III.931-958. This section is not easily read as part of a consolatio: our passage is an outright invective against those who are unduly reluctant to die. Typically, Nature's speech is introduced and commented upon by such verbs as increpare (932), intendere /item (950), inclamare, increpare voce acri (954), increpare plus the rare verb incilare (963). If a Greek source for this diatribic insertion is required, it is Bion of Borysthenes rather than Epicurus. Here we have a telling instance of the 'grim' side of Lucretius' work ; it is sections like this Lucretius will have had in mind when he admitted his doctrine might seem to some a ratio ... tristior (1.943 f.= IV.18 f.). But be it Bion or some other writer of diatribes: he did not invent the vesselmetaphor. In Plato's Gorgias (493a-494b) we read a strikingly similar and more elaborate version. Both Lucretian passages are clearly influenced by it, not directly but through the intermediary of a diatribe, possibly more than one, as I am inclined to assume (which is not to say that Lucretius never read Platonic books). Socrates tells Callicles an ingenious man had likened the part of our soul in which the desires are located and which is 'easily persuaded' (dvansi0im-0m) to ajar (1ti0oc;).With undis-

6

A sensitive and detailed interpretation of III.931-971 may be found in Stork (1970) 86-102; 195-202.

W. Gorier

197

ciplined people (dK6Aacrt01)the jar is perforated (tetp11µsvoi;), so they can never become satisfied, neither in life nor after death in the Underworld, their soul being a KocrKivcp dmJKacrevtllV tow avoiJ-rrovchi;tetpi,µsVllv, sieve (493c): -r11v... 'lfUXllV cite oo 8uvaµsv11v crtsye1v 81' dmcrtiav (Schleiermacher: d1tA,icrtiav) te Kai 'and the soul of the thoughtless he likened to a sieve, as being perforated, ATJ011v, since it is unable to hold anything by reason of its unbelief (if Schleiermacher's conjecture is accepted: insatiability) and forgetfulness' (W.R.M.Lamb's translation). Callicles is not yet ready to concede that the moderate way of life is to be preferred; so Socrates goes on with a closely related simile (493d-494a): The reasonable and the undisciplined one (dK6Aacrtoi;),both have a number of jars man (m:oq>prov) (1ti001).The reasonable man's jars are 'sound' (fryteii;),so they could have been filled with wine, honey, and milk etc. The licentious one's are perforated (tetpi,µsva Kai cra0pa), and therefore their owner has to fill them up, incessantly, all in vain ... Would not Callicles agree that it is much better to have one's vessel sound? Callicles does not agree (494a): 'You are wrong, Socrates. For that man who has taken his fill can have no pleasure any more; in fact it is what I just now called living like a stone,7 when one is filled up and no longer feels any joy or pain. But a pleasant life consists rather in the largest possible amount of inflow.' That sounds reasonable enough and indeed convincing: it is not precisely a thrilling experience to possess well-filled jars - it is much more exciting to get them filled. Or, to go back to Socrates' first simile: could it really be called 'pleasurable' to have one's desires fulfilled, once and for all; is it not rather the act of fulfillment that may rightly be called 'pleasure', is it not simply normal and natural to long for ever new and renewed joyful acts and experiences? This dispute between Socrates and Callicles is, of course, a precise anticipation of the later dispute between Epicureans and Cyrenaics: Epicurus upheld that the true and only pleasure worth its name was 1Catacrti,µat1K1lft8oviJ, 'static' pleasure, brought about by the total absence of pain and desire; whereas Aristippus and his followers, most notably Anniceris, thought that a 'static' condition was no pleasure at all - they preferred, just as Callicles had done, what Epicurus called ft8ov11£v pleasure 'in movement'. 8 Lucretius, in his two vessel passages, of course, 1C1viJcre1, sides with Epicurus: happy are those whose souls are watertight vessels, and who have been able to store up a good number of past commoda. Their vessel is full. It is a clear implication of the vessel-metaphor that there is a limit to our hoarding up: when a jar is full, there is no point in trying to pour in ever more. This is in line with 7 Grg. 492e: ol 1-.iSotyap civ oii,:ro yE Kai ol VEKpoiEul>mµovecr,:a,:01Ekv (viz. if happiness is defined as absence of all desires). 8 Clemens Alex. Strom. 11.21, 130.7-8 (= fr. 168 Mannebach, SSR IV G 4): ol oi; 'AvvtKepEtot ~iou 1:EAO(; ouoi;v cbptO'JJ,EVOV 61:Cl~ClV, ElCCl0'1:T]