Logical Investigations [2] 9780415241908, 0415241901

Table of contents :
Contents
Volume II, Part I of the German Editions (continued)
Investigation III: On the theory of wholes and parts
Introduction
1 The difference between independent and non-independent objects
§1 Complex and simple, articulated and unarticulated objects
§2 Introduction of the distinction between independent and non-independent objects (contents)
§3 The inseparability of non-independent contents
§4 Analyses of examples following Stumpf
§5 The objective determination of the concept of inseparability
§6 Continuation. Tie-up with a criticism of a much-favoured notional determination
§7 Further pointing up o f our notional determination by introducing the concepts of pure law and pure genus
§7a Independent and non-independent Ideas
§8 Demarcation of the distinction of independent and non-independent contents and the distinction between intuitively emphatic and intuitively blended contents
§9 Continuation. Reference to the wider sphere of the phenomena of fusion
§1O The multiplicity of laws governing the various sorts of non-independent contents
§11 The difference between these ‘material’ laws and ‘formal’ or ‘analytic’ laws
§12 Basic determinations in regard to analytic and synthetic propositions
§13 Relative independence and non-independence
2 Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes and parts
§14 The concept of foundation and some relevant theorems
§15 Transition to the treatment of the more important part-relations
§16 Reciprocal and one-sided, mediate and immediate foundation
§17 Exact determination of the concepts of piece (portion), moment, physical part, abstractum, concretum
§18 The difference between the mediate and immediate parts of a whole
§19 A novel sense of this distinction: nearer and more remote parts of the whole
§20 Nearer and remoter parts relatively to one another
§21 Exact pinning down of the pregnant notions of whole and part, and of their essential species, by means of the notion of foundation
§22 Forms of sensuous unity and wholes
§23 Forms of categorial unity and wholes
§24 The pure formal types of wholes and parts. The postulate of an a priori theory
§25 Additions regarding the ‘piecing’ (fragmentation) of wholes through the ‘piecing’ of their ‘moments’
Investigation IV: The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings and the idea of pure grammar
Introduction
§1 Simple and complex meanings
§2 Whether complexity of meanings merely reflects complexity of objects
§3 Complexity of meanings and complexity of the concrete act of meaning. Implied meanings
§4 The question o f the meaningfulness of ‘syncategorematic’ components of complex expressions
§5 Independent and non-independent meanings. The non-independence of the sensory and expressive parts of words
§6 Other opposed distinctions. Unclosed, abnormally abbreviated and defective expressions
§7 The conception of non-independent meanings as founded contents
§8 Difficulties of this conception. (a) Whether the non-independence of the meaning does not really only lie in the non-independence of the object meant
§9 (b) The understanding of isolated syncategorematica
§10 A priori laws governing combinations of meanings
§11 Objections. Modifications of meaning which are rooted in the essence of expressions or meanings
§12 Nonsense and absurdity
§13 The laws of the compounding of meanings and the pure logico-grammatical theory of forms
§14 Laws which discourage nonsense and laws which discourage absurdity. The Idea of a purely logical grammar
Notes
Investigation V: On intentional experiences and their ‘contents’
Introduction
1 Consciousness as the phenomenological subsistence of the ego and consciousness as inner perception
§1 Varied ambiguity of the term ‘consciousness’
§2 First sense: Consciousness as the real phenomenological unity of the ego’s experiences. The concept of an experience
§3 The phenomenological and the popular concept of experience
§4 The relation between experiencing consciousness and experienced content is no phenomenologically peculiar type of relation
§5 Second sense. ‘Inner’ consciousness as inner perception
§6 Origin of the first concept of consciousness out of the second
§7 Reciprocal demarcation of psychology and natural science (first edition)
§8 The pure ego and awareness (‘Bewusstheit’)
Additional Note to the Second Edition
2 Consciousness as intentional experience
§9 The meaning of Brentano’s demarcation of ‘psychic phenomena’
§10 Descriptive characterization of acts as ‘intentional’ experiences
§11 Avoidance of verbally tempting misunderstandings. (a) The ‘mental’ or ‘immanent’ object
§12 (b) The act and the relation of consciousness or the ego to the object
§13 The fixing of our terminology
§14 Difficulties which surround the assumption of acts as a descriptively founded class of experiences
§15 Whether experiences of one and the same phenomenological kind (of the genus feeling in particular) can consist partly of acts and partly of non-acts
§16 Distinction between descriptive and intentional content
§17 The intentional content in the sense of the intentional object
§18 Simple and complex, founding and founded acts
§19 The function of attention in complex acts. Instance of the phenomenological relation of verbal sound to sense
§20 The difference between the quality and the matter of an act
§21 The intentional and the semantic essence
Appendix to §11 and §20
3 The matter of the act and its under lying presentation
§22 The question of the relation between the matter and quality of an act
§23 The view of ‘matter’ as a founding act of ‘mere presentation’
§24 Difficulties. The problem of the differentiation of qualitative kinds
§25 Closer analysis of our two possible solutions
§26 Consideration and rejection of the proposed conception
§27 The testimony of direct intuition. Perceptual presentation and perception
§28 Special investigation of the matter in the case of judgement
§29 Continuation: ‘acceptance’ or ‘assent’ given to the mere presentation of the state of affairs
Additional note
§30 The conception of the identical understanding of a word or a sentence as a case of ‘mere presentation’
§31 A last objection to our view. Mere presentations and isolated ‘matters’
4 Study of founding presentations with special regard to the theory of judgement
§32 An ambiguity in the word ‘presentation’, and the supposed self-evidence of the principle that every act is founded on an act of presentation
§33 Re-establishment of our proposition by means of a new notion of presentation. Naming and asserting
§34 Difficulties. The concept of the name. Positing and non-positing names
§35 Nominal positing and judgement. Where judgements as such can be parts of nominal acts
§36 Continuation. Whether assertions can function as complete names
5 Further contributions to the theory of judgement. ‘Presentation’ as a qualitatively unitary genus of nominal and propositional acts
§37 The aim of the following investigation. The concept of an objectifying act
§38 Qualitative and material differentiation of objectifying acts
§39 Presentation in the sense of an objectifying act, and its qualitative modification
§40 Continuation. Qualitative and imaginative modification
§41 New interpretation of the principle that makes presentations the basis of all acts. The objectifying act as the primary bearer of ‘matter’
§42 Further developments. Basic principles of complex acts
§43 Backward glance to our previous interpretation of the principle under discussion
6 Summing-up of the most important ambiguities in the terms ‘presentation’ and ‘content’
§44 ‘Presentation’
§45 The ‘presentational content’
Note
Volume II, Part 2 of the Second German Edition
Foreword to the second edition
Investigation VI: Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge
Introduction
First Section: Objectifying intentions and their fulfilments: knowledge as a synthesis of fulfilment and its gradations
1 Meaning-intention and meaning-fuIfilment
§1 Whether every type of mental act, or only certain types, can function as carriers of meaning
§2 That all acts may be expressed does not decide the issue. There are two senses to talk about expressing an act
§3 A third sense of talk about the ‘expression’ of acts. Formulation of our theme
§4 The expression of a percept (‘judgement of perception’). Its meaning cannot lie in perception, but must lie in peculiar expressive acts
§5 Continuation. Perception as an act which determines meaning, without embodying it
Addendum
§6 The static unity of expressive thought and expressed intuition. Recognition (das Erkennen)
§7 Recognition as a character of acts, and the ‘generality of words’
§8 The dynamic unity of expression and expressed intuition. The consciousness of fulfilment and that of identity
§9 The differing character of an intention inside and outside the unity of fulfilment
§10 The wider class of experiences of fulfilment. Intuitions as intentions which require fulfilment
§11 Frustration and conflict. The synthesis o f distinction
§12 Total and partial identification and distinction as the common phenomenological foundations of predicative and determining forms of expression
2 Indirect characterization of objectifying intentions and their essential varieties through differences in the syntheses of fulfilment
§13 The synthesis of knowing (recognition) as the characteristic form of fulfilment for objectifying acts. Subsumption of acts of meaning under the class of objectifying acts
§14 Phenomenological characterization of the distinction between signitive and intuitive intentions through peculiarities of fulfilment
§15 Signitive intentions beyond the limits of the meaning-function
3 The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge
§16 Simple identification and fulfilment
§17 The question of the relation between fulfilment and intuitive illustration
§18 The gradations of mediate fulfilments. Mediate presentations
§19 Distinction between mediate presentations and presentations of presentations
§20 Genuine intuitive illustration in every fulfilment. Authentic and inauthentic intuitive illustration
§21 The ‘fulness’ of a presentation
§22 Fulness and ‘intuitive substance’ (Gehalt)
§23 Relations of weight between the intuitive and signitive ‘substance’ (Gehalt) of one and the same act. Pure intuition and pure signification. Perceptual and imaginal content, pure perception and pure imagination. Gradations of fulness
§24 Graded series of fulfilments
§25 Fulness and intentional matter
§26 Continuation. Representation or interpretation (Auffassung). Matter as the interpretative sense, the interpretative form and the interpreted content. Differentiating characterization of intuitive and signitive interpretation
§27 Representations as the necessary bases of presentation in all acts. Final clarification of talk about the different modes of the relation of consciousness to its object
§28 Intentional essence and fulfilling sense. Epistemic essence. Intuitions in specie
§29 Complete and defective intuitions. Adequate and objectively complete intuitive illustrations. Essentia (Essenz)
4 Consistency and inconsistency
§30 The ideal distinction of meanings into the possible or real (reale) and the impossible or imaginary
§31 Compatibility or consistency as an ideal relationship in the widest sphere of contents in general. Compatibility of ‘concepts’ as meanings
§32 Incompatibility (conflict) of contents in general
§33 How conflict can also be a foundation for unity. Relativity of the talk of compatibility and conflict
§34 Some axioms
§35 Incompatibility of concepts as meanings
5 The ideal of adequation. Self-evidence and truth
§36 Introduction
§37 The fulfilling function of perception. The ideal of ultimate fulfilment
§38 Positing acts in the function of fulfilment. Self-evidence in the loose and strict sense
§39 Self-evidence and truth
Second Section: Sense and understanding
6 Sensuous and categorial intuitions
§40 The problem of the fulfilment of categorial meaning-forms, with a thought leading towards its solution
§41 Continuation. Extension of our sphere of examples
§42 The distinction between sensuous stuff and categorial form throughout the whole realm of objectifying acts
§43 The objective correlates of categorial forms are not ‘real’ (realen) moments
§44 The origin of the concept of Being and of the remaining categories does not lie in the realm of inner-perception
§45 Widening of the concept of intuition, and in particular of the concepts perception and imagination. Sensible and categorial intuition
§46 Phenomenological analysis of the distinction between sensuous and categorial perception
§47 Continuation. Characterization of sense-perception as ‘straightforward’ perception
§48 Characterization of categorial acts as founded acts
§49 Added note on nominal formations
§50 Sensuous forms categorially grasped but not functioning nominally
§51 Collectiva and disjunctiva
§52 Universal objects constituting themselves in universal intuitions
7 A study in categorial representation
§53 Backward reference to the researches of our first section
§54 The question of the representing contents of categorial forms
§55 Arguments for the assumption of peculiar categorial representing contents
§56 Continuation. The mental linkage of combined acts and the categorial unity of corresponding objects
§57 The representing contents of the founding intuitions are not immediately connected by the representing content of the synthetic form
§58 The relation of our two distinctions: outer and inner sense, also sense for categories
8 The a priori laws of authentic and inauthentic thinking
§59 The complication into ever new forms. The pure theory of the forms of possible intuitions
§60 The relative or functional difference between matter and form. Pure acts of understanding and those mixed with sense. Sensuous concepts and categories
§61 Categorial forming involves no real reshaping of the object
§62 Our freedom in the categorial forming of given material and its limits. Purely categorial laws (laws of 'authentic' thinking)
§63 The new laws of the validity of signitive and admixedly signitive acts (laws of inauthentic thinking)
§64 The pure logico-grammatical laws are laws for any understanding whatever, and not merely for any human understanding. Their psychological meaning and normative function in relation to inadequate thought
§65 The senseless problem o f the real meaning of the logical
§66 Distinction between the most important differences mixed up in the current opposition of ‘intuiting’ and ‘thinking’
Additional note to the second edition
Third Section: Clarification of our introductory problem
9 Non-objectifying acts as apparent fulfilments of meaning
§67 That not every act of meaning includes an act of knowing
§68 The controversy regarding the interpretation of the peculiar grammatical forms which express non-objectifying acts
§69 Arguments for and against the Aristotelian conception
§70 Decision
Appendix: External and internal perception: physical and psychical phenomena
Notes