Local Government in the European Union: Completing the Integration Cycle 3030743810, 9783030743819

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Local Government in the European Union Completing the Integration Cycle Marius Guderjan · Tom Verhelst

Local Government in the European Union “Local government is a key topic for EU scholars. Yet, it has been somewhat under-explored, with the literature on the EU having largely neglected it. This book does much to fill this gap by providing an empirical and theoretical account of the role of local government in European integration. It provides a well informed and very thoughtful account of the different relations between the different elements of European local government.” —Prof. Neill Nugent, Professor emeritus, European Politics, Manchester Metropolitan University “This book examines whether the EU multi-level system consists of not just of three, but of four levels—i.e. not just the levels of the EU, the Member State governments and the regions, but also one of local governments. To this end, the authors work with the analytical framework of an integration cycle, according to which local government reacts to the impact of EU decisions by adapting its internal organisation and external interactions in order to shape European integration in general and EU policies in particular. Empirically it is shown how complex this cycle is and how its results emerge from an interplay of formal and informal, vertical and horizontal interactions.” —Prof. Dr. Hubert Heinelt, Retired Professor, Public Administration, Public Policy and Local Politics, TU Darmstadt—Institute for Political Science

Marius Guderjan • Tom Verhelst

Local Government in the European Union Completing the Integration Cycle

Marius Guderjan Centre for British Studies Humboldt University of Berlin Berlin, Berlin, Germany

Tom Verhelst Centre for Local Politics Ghent University Ghent, Belgium

ISBN 978-3-030-74381-9    ISBN 978-3-030-74382-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74382-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Alex Linch shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

In the past decade, the European Union faced major challenges ranging from financial and economic crisis, climate change, migration, a rise of Euroscepticism, Brexit and most recently a global pandemic. Border controls have been temporarily reintroduced, and some Member States seriously undermine the democratic principles of the EU.  This has put Member State governments into the spotlight of European integration. Yet, under the surface there has also been a growing recognition that many answers to these challenges need to be provided at the local level. Cities, towns and counties can be a vital locus of democracy and help building a link between citizens and European institutions. They provide expertise and capacities to tackle joint social, political and economic issues and have in the past taken a vital role in bringing the people of Europe together. Though not always recognised as an important layer of government in the ‘grand scheme’ of politics, local government adds input and output legitimacy to European governance, and some local authorities have become proactive international players driving innovative policy agendas in areas such as environmental change and the integration of refugees. Until today the Europeanisation and European integration of local government has remained a niche subject—arguably not as appealing as the international relations of national governments, major constitutional reforms or the economy of the Single Market. When the two of us met for the first time during a panel on local government in the EU about 10 years ago, both of us were working on related topics. As part of a rather small bunch of researchers, who firmly believe in the increasing relevance of v

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local and regional authorities for the social and political integration of Europe, we kept meeting each other at conferences in the following years. Eventually, in September 2016 at the Annual UACES conference at Queen Mary University in London, we first talked about pooling our wisdoms to produce a joint monograph that combined insights from the theory of European integration with the empirical realities of local authorities. Although there were studies on relevant issues, we felt the bigger perspective was still not sufficiently addressed and were enthusiastic to fill this gap. We started exchanging ideas and drafting some initial chapters, but it took two more years and another conference after which we got invited to submit a book proposal to Palgrave Macmillan until we got fully committed to this project. Everyone who worked on co-authored books knows about the challenges of such an endeavour, as much as about the intellectual stimulation of working closely with like-minded people. Sharing a common passion and remaining empathetic and understanding to each other’s concerns only enriched the final outcome. We worked hard to get this book over the finishing line, and our dedication has been worthwhile. We believe this monograph makes an important contribution to both European studies and local government studies. We also hope it provides an interesting, if not fascinating, reading not only for fellow academics but also for practitioners and politicians working in this field. We tried to produce a book that speaks to an audience, who are already familiar and specialised in local-European relations, as well as to interested minds, who are fairly new to the subject and are looking for an introduction or an overview. We want to thank a number of people for their support and input that went into this book. Among them are our PhD supervisors Janet Mather, Lee Miles, Neill Nugent, Herwig Reynaert and Kristof Steyvers. Special thanks also go to David Bell for his services which helped two non-native speakers to ensure that their English language makes sense. Finally, we have to thank our partners and families for their emotional support and the time they had to spare us throughout the last months of writing. This book has long been overdue and we hope you will enjoy reading it. Berlin, Germany Ghent, Belgium 

Marius Guderjan Tom Verhelst

Contents

1 Introduction: Studying European Integration of Local Government  1 2 The Integration Cycle: Theorising European Integration of Local Government 21 3 The Top-Down Perspective: Legislative and Policy Impact 45 4 The Internal Perspective: Awareness, Attitudes and Adaptation 67 5 The Horizontal Perspective: Twinning, Networks and Territorial Cooperation 91 6 The Formal Bottom-Up Perspective: Constitutional Status and Institutionalised Participation123 7 The Informal Bottom-Up Perspective: Mobilisation and Interest Representation151

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8 Closing the Cycle: The Impact of Formal and Informal Mobilisation175 9 Conclusion: Reflections on European Integration of Local Government199 Index217

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Fig. 2.2 Fig. 4.1 Fig. 5.1 Fig. 5.2 Fig. 5.3 Fig. 7.1 Fig. 8.1

The Europeanisation ladder The integration cycle European policy agenda in Flemish local government Typology of town twinning Typology of transnational municipal networks in Europe A map of European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation Local access routes to the EU A causal model of local government influence in the EU

31 38 81 96 99 111 166 190

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List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 3.3 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 5.1 Table 6.1 Table 7.1

Subnational authorities in the EU 8 The impact of EU law on local government functions 49 The impact of EU law on local government policies 52 The European structural and investment funds 55 Awareness of European affairs in Flemish local government 80 Attitudes towards the EU in Flemish local government 82 Institutional and organisational adaptation in Flemish local government83 Local policy networks in the EU 105 Membership in the Committee of the Regions 129 Strategic choices in the informal mobilisation of local actors 157

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List of Text Boxes



Textbox 3.1 Textbox 5.1 Textbox 5.2 Textbox 5.3 Textbox 6.1 Textbox 7.1 Textbox 7.2 Textbox 8.1

Interreg and Urbact The CEMR: The Association of Local and Regional Government in Europe EUROCITIES: The Network of European Cities Intra-regional Cooperation in North Rhine-Westphalia Subsidiarity Warnings of the CoR EU Litigation on Public Procurement Lobbying Strategies of Local Authorities in Belgium and the Netherlands Proactive Influence of Local Councillors in the CoR

56 100 103 112 131 159 167 180

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Studying European Integration of Local Government

A Europe of Four Levels? Throughout the last two decades, various initiatives have been launched to build a ‘Europe of four levels’, in which different government levels work together to realise joint policy objectives and strengthen the legitimacy of EU governance. Towards the end of his time in office, former Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker highlighted the priority of an effective and systematic involvement of cities, towns and counties as the fourth level: I want our Union to have a stronger focus on things that matter to our citizens. […] Our Union cannot be built without the active and equal participation of local authorities, EU institutions and every level of government in between. […] I hope the leaders of the other institutions and national authorities will join me in putting these reflections at the heart of the future work of our Union. (Juncker, 10 July 2018; see EC, 2018)

The first links between local government and the EU date back to the early years of European integration when the 1957 Treaty of Rome introduced regional policy to overcome socio-economic disparities across Europe’s regions. After the establishment of the Directorate-General for Regional Policy in 1968, which was renamed the DG Regional and Urban Policy in 2012, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was created in 1975 for the purpose of investing in jobs, competitiveness, economic growth, improved quality of life and sustainable development. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Guderjan, T. Verhelst, Local Government in the European Union, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74382-6_1

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Together with the EU cohesion policy of the 1986 Single European Act, regional policy was further strengthened through a framework for financing projects and investments with the objectives of developing disadvantaged regions and strengthening economic, social and territorial cohesion across Europe (Article 174 TEU). This offered a strong incentive for local authorities to turn their attention to Brussels  and acquire significant resources from the ERDF and the European Social Fund (ESF) (Bache, 2004, pp. 166 et seq.; Bache, 2008, p. 23; Goldsmith & Klausen, 1997, pp. 1 et seq.). Local and regional authorities’ engagement in the European polity experienced another boost at the end of the 1980s, when former Commission President Jacques Delors started to recognise subnational authorities as political actors in the EU (Le Galès, 2002, pp.  99–100). Consequently, the partnership principle was introduced to the Structural Funds in 1988 to decentralise the delivery of funding programmes. Even though national governments remained in control of the final decisions on the allocation of funds, they were expected to work in partnership with local and regional authorities (and other societal actors). As this provided local government with greater legitimacy and opportunities to engage in European affairs (Conzelmann, 1995, pp. 134–135; John, 2001, p. 69), local authorities started to participate within transnational organisations and networks (Marshall, 2005, p. 669). In particular, EUROCITIES and the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) provided local actors with effective platforms to promote their preferences and practices at national and European levels (Marshall, 2008, pp.  101, 109). Overall, regional and cohesion policy provided local authorities across Europe with strong links to, and a central role in building proactive relationships with, EU policies and institutions. The increasing importance of cohesion policy for local government coincided with the movement towards the ‘completion’ of the Single Market, which during the 1990s created a number of directives and regulations that affected the practice of municipalities and put them in a position between executing and subsequently shaping European policies and law (Münch, 2006, p. 127; Rechlin, 2004, pp. 16 et seq.). As local actors became increasingly aware of the strong impact of the EU on their own administration and policy, they engaged more proactively in European affairs. More and more local authorities adapted their politico-­ administrative structures, opened offices in Brussels, participated in networks and developed strategies to promote their preferences across

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different levels (Fleurke & Willemse, 2006, p. 85; Marshall, 2005, p. 669; Martin, 1997, p. 63; Schultze, 2003, p. 135; Sturm & Dieringer, 2005, p. 282). The creation of the European  Committee of  the Regions (CoR) in 1992 by the Treaty of Maastricht was a landmark, as it provided regional and local representatives for the first time with formal participation rights in EU policy-making (Rechlin, 2004, p.  31; Wollmann & Lund, 1997, p. 62). Through a series of other policy initiatives and programmes, such as Interreg, the  Environment Action Programme, Youth In Action, Europe for Citizens, Lifelong Learning, Intelligent Energy Europe (IEE), the  Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP) and the Framework Programmes for Research and Technological Development, the Commission continued to pull local government into a compound polity that is commonly referred to as multilevel governance (Bache et al., 2011, pp. 125–126). Such was the scale of the developments described that by the end of the 1990s Goldsmith and Klausen (1997, p. 251) proclaimed a new stage of local-supranational relations, leading to a shift in integration studies away from the focus on supranational and national levels towards local governance. Throughout the 2000s, several initiatives have demonstrated the intention of the Commission, and increasingly also of the EP, to intensify cooperation with cities, towns and counties. The 2001 White Paper on European Governance sought to enforce true partnership integrating different levels of government through systematic dialogues with regional and local representatives (Atkinson, 2002, pp.  782 et  seq.; Karvounis, 2011, pp. 215 et seq.; Reilly, 2001, p. 1). In 2009, the White Paper on Multilevel Governance, which was issued by the CoR to draw attention to local and regional government, stated: Multilevel governance is not simply a question of translating European or national objectives into local or regional action, but must also be understood as a process for integrating the objectives of local and regional authorities within the strategies of the European Union. Moreover, multilevel governance should reinforce and shape the responsibilities of local and regional authorities at national level and encourage their participation in the coordination of European policy, in this way helping to design and implement Community policies. (CoR, 2009, p. 7)

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With the Lisbon Agenda of 20001 and its successor Europe 2020,2 launched in 2010, the local level became more significant within the design and implementation of the EU’s strategic plans. When the cohesion policy for 2007–2013 was subordinated to competitiveness and growth, and subsequently to the Europe 2020 strategy, the ideas of partnership and dialogue also entered the EU’s economic policy: “All national, regional and local authorities should implement the partnership principle, closely associating parliaments, as well as social partners and representatives of civil society, contributing to the elaboration of national reform programmes as well as to its implementation” (EC, 2010, p. 27). With the Commission highlighting the role of local government, Europe 2020 has become an attractive framework to which local authorities would relate their own policies. This has led to the local level gradually taking a greater role for delivering strategic objectives (Van Bever et al., 2011b, pp. 236 et seq.). The Lisbon Treaty has further indicated the growing role of local government in EU affairs and manifests the constitutional recognition of a ‘Europe of four levels’ (Hoffschulte, 2006, p. 63). For the very first time, a European treaty referred to the right to local self-government (Art. 4.2 TEU) and extended the principle of subsidiarity explicitly to the regional and the local level (Art. 5.3 TEU). Due to profound challenges, such as the 2008 economic and financial crisis; the arrival of large numbers of refugees from Syria, Africa and other regions; climate change; demographic changes and terror attacks, the EU—as well as national governments—has increasingly turned to cities as valuable allies to tackle essential policy issues. Based on the Pact of Amsterdam, the EU Urban Agenda was introduced in 2016 to support the building of voluntary partnerships across cities, national governments, the Commission, and business and civil society organisations. In its report on the role of cities in the institutional framework of the Union, the 1  The European Council set out the strategic goal for the EU “to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (Lisbon European Council Presidency Conclusions 23–24 March 2000). 2  Europe 2020 seeks to deliver smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. By 2020, 75% of the population aged 20–64 should be employed; 3% of the EU’s GDP should be invested in research and development; CO2 emissions should be reduced by 20%; share of early school leavers should be under 10%, and at least 40% of the younger generation should have a tertiary degree; and 20 million less people should be at risk of poverty (EC, 2010).

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European Parliament (2018, p. 6) has reinstated the central role of cities for the EU’s policies and polity: [The European Parliament] [d]efends that cities should be recognised as centres with a positive role in the development of European Union strategies, contributing to reinforce the multi-level governance system of the Union and that this perspective has a practical consequence regarding the institutional framework of the bottom-up or top-down decision-making process of the EU.

This book examines whether the European system of governance has effectively become a Europe of four levels. There are practical as well as political reasons to believe that local government has not yet been truly integrated into the EU polity. In many Member States, national governments exert a strong control over local government’s ability to participate effectively in European affairs (Atkinson, 2002, pp.  785 et  seq.), and effective cooperation and the incorporation of local government into EU policy-making often lacks firm commitments and tangible outputs (Grimm, 2011, pp. 1528 et seq.; Guderjan, 2012). Nevertheless, we have witnessed an increasing formal acknowledgement of local government at the European level, while national governments have lost their monopoly over European policy and can no longer fully exclude subnational authorities from EU policy-making (Keating, 1999, pp. 8 et seq.; Jeffery, 2000, p. 5; Schultze, 2003, p. 135). As John (2001, p. 71) argued: […] European-level institutions and policies transfer ideas and working practices in a manner that moves local decision-making away from national and hierarchical forms of politics towards more negotiated and interdependent practices that blur the impact of tiers of government and involve a wide range of interest groups.

The European engagement of local government may be constrained by political and bureaucratic resistance from national executives, but socio-­ economic pressures and supra- and subnational trends foster stronger multilevel cooperation (Guderjan, 2012, p. 120). Continuously, the local level has taken a greater role in shaping and delivering joint policies ranging from economic growth, employment, social inclusion, poverty and housing to environmental protection, migration and asylum, digital transition and urban mobility. The new opportunities offered by the multilevel

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partnerships have increased the potential for local authorities to promote their interests and even to bypass the state level using autonomous channels of access to EU policy-making (Goldsmith, 2003, pp.  121 et  seq.; Schultze, 2003, p. 124). As the quote by Jean-Claude Juncker at the beginning of this chapter claims, “[o]ur Union cannot be built without the active and equal participation of local authorities”. Indeed, at least discursively, local actors have become interlocked in the European Politikverflechtung, a complicated system of shared jurisdiction and compound governance arrangements (Derenbach, 2006, pp. 77–78). In this book, we want to understand to what extent local government has actually become integrated into the EU, which dynamics drive this ongoing process and how local government contributes to the trajectories of European integration. The main question of such an endeavour is whether local authorities are primarily agents of decisions made elsewhere or whether they have truly become proactive actors influencing the very dynamics of European integration. By answering this question, we will also assess how both local government and the EU respond to this new reality by adjusting their values, structures, organisation and practices. Despite their increasing relevance, these are not issues that have been the focus of a great deal of attention from existing scholarship on European integration or local government. In order to provide answers, this book introduces the idea of an integration cycle as an analytical framework which covers the different elements and effects of the interactions between local government and the EU. As a comprehensive book addressing the bigger picture of European integration from a local government perspective, this work contributes to a holistic understanding of an often overlooked reality, and therefore, we believe, is long overdue.

Local not Regional Government Many accounts of multilevel relationships in the EU place local and regional government under the common banner of ‘subnational authorities’ (cf. Hooghe & Marks, 1996; Bomberg & Peterson, 1998; Jeffery, 2000; Marks et  al., 2002; Fleurke & Willemse, 2006; Callanan & Tatham, 2014; Herrschel & Newman, 2017) or ‘sub-state entities’ (Tatham, 2010, 2013). This is often due to the EU’s initial perception of subnational government as a ‘unitary’ third level comprising both regions and local authorities as one constitutive government layer (Panara & Varney, 2013, p. xix). On the one hand, the EU generally

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prefers dealing with partners that operate on a scale large enough to have significant economic impact (Goldsmith, 2011, p.  37). On the other, local authorities themselves often approach the EU in a collective way rather than individually, which then qualifies as a ‘regional activity’ in some definitions of ‘regionalism’ (Herrschel & Newman, 2017, pp.  37 et  seq.).3 Regions and local authorities are, however, not the same, and studying the European integration of local government requires us to draw clear distinctions between both levels (cf. Schultze, 2003, pp.  121–123; Marshall, 2005, pp.  669–670; Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008, p. 173; Panara & Varney, 2013, pp. xix–xx). Not only do they differ in terms of history, size and numbers, but municipalities also have a particular outlook as historically place-bound entities and are considered the grassroots level of political participation and the foundation of democracy (cf. Steyvers, 2010, p. 17). The European multilevel patchwork is made up of Member States comprising one-tier, two-tier and three-tier subnational government systems. Despite a strong variation of population and territory between the large metropoles, common cities and smaller towns, every EU Member State comprises a large number of local authorities (Table 1.1). Regions, as well as intermediate authorities, operate on a much larger scale, do not exist in every Member State and take very different forms (Goldsmith, 2011, p.  37). Some have long-standing roots (e.g. the German and Austrian Länder), while others have evolved in the wake of a decentralisation process (e.g. regions in Belgium, France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom). In regions with less powers and competences (e.g. Greece, Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands), local actors typically assume a more powerful role at the subnational level (Hooghe & Marks, 1996, p.  74). In some Member States (e.g. Belgium, Germany, the United Kingdom), it is also the regional level that holds the supervisory competences over local authorities and by directly engaging with the EU local authorities can challenge this hierarchy (De Rynck, 1997, p. 121; Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008, p.  173).4 Lastly and importantly, some regions 3  According to Callanan and Tatham (2014, p. 19), for instance, there are two large groups of subnational actors: highly active and effective regions and associations of local government and weaker regions, local government associations and single authorities hesitant and ineffective in their European engagement. 4  While some authors (cf. John, 1994, pp. 909–910) consider strong regions a useful asset for local mobilisation towards the EU, others (cf. De Rynck, 1997) perceive strong regional activism as a major constraint for it.

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Table 1.1  Subnational authorities in the EU (CEMR, 2016) Member State

Population (million)

Local authorities

LAI indexa

Intermediate Regional RAI authorities authorities indexb

Austria Belgium Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Rep. Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Poland Portugal Romania Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden UK Total/avg

8.51 11.20 7.25 4.25 0.86 10.51 5.63 1.32 5.45 65.86 80.78 10.99 9.88 4.60 60.78 2.00 2.94 0.55 0.43 16.83 38.50 10.43 19.94 5.42 2.06 46.51 9.65 64.31 N = 507.44

2100 589 265 555 380 6258 98 213 313 36,658 11,313 325 3.201 126 8006 119 60 105 68 390 2479 3400 3181 2930 212 8176 290 419 N = 92,229

64.84 61.33 66.23 56.74 42.29 64.92 74.65 63.66 79.36 66.78 73.93 47.88 50.78 34.92 68.18 54.29 65.10 55.90 39.18 59.56 74.11 61.57 58.14 60.85 48.92 54.98 75.09 45.65 X = 59.64

/ 10 / / / / / / / 99 295 / 19 / 110 / / / / / 380 / / / / / / / N = 913

9 3 / 21 / 14 5 / 18 16 16 13 / 3 20 5 / / / 12 16 2 41 8 / 19 20 4 N = 265

23.0 33.1 2.0 9.0 0.0 9.0 7.3 0.0 7.1 20.0 37.0 11.0 10.9 3.0 27.3 3.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 17.5 8.0 3.8 10.0 8.0 1.0 33.6 12.0 11.2 X = 11.1

Ladner et al., 2016

a

b

Hooghe et al., 2016

were established only to qualify for the European Structural Funding (the so-called paper regions) (Hooghe & Marks, 1996; Goldsmith, 2011; Greenwood, 2011). The strong variance of formal regional authority is demonstrated by the Regional Authority Index (Hooghe et  al., 2016) (Table 1.1). On a functional level, there are often clear differences between regions and local authorities. Compared to regions with a strong constitutional

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status and considerable legislative and fiscal powers, the competences of local authorities are often restricted to implementing administrative tasks (Panara & Varney, 2013, p. xx). Typically, local services include a mix of social services (e.g. education, child care, elderly care, health services, culture and sports) and economic services (e.g. water supply, electricity supply, transport and waste management) (Wollmann & Marcou, 2010). As the range and autonomy to deliver these tasks varies strongly across Member States (cf. Hesse & Sharpe, 1991; Sellers & Lidström, 2007; Goldsmith & Page, 2010; see Table 1.1 for the Local Autonomy Index), the interests of local and regional government in the European polity certainly do not always align (Greenwood, 2011). In practice and for analytical purposes, it may not always be possible to strictly separate the local and regional levels. Local government comprises over 90,000 European cities,5 towns and even counties across the EU but also a large number of inter-municipal arrangements established to provide local public services more efficiently (cf. Teles & Swianiewicz, 2018). Hence, throughout this book, the term ‘local government’ will refer to the vast variety of single and collective local authorities (including counties), as well as to the different types of municipal networks and municipal umbrella associations. Notwithstanding some overlap, analytically, it is necessary to differentiate between the European integration of local and regional government. While the regional level has attracted particular academic attention in European studies, the local perspective is still relatively understudied despite its significant contribution to European integration (Le Galès, 2002; Schultze, 2003; Goldsmith, 2011; Van Bever et al., 2011a; Panara & Varney, 2013). Studying European integration from a local government perspective allows us to introduce ‘new actors, institutions, relations and networks’ into an ever-expanding field of enquiry (Klausen & Goldsmith, 1997, p. 251). As Marks et al. argue: It is not the case that regions, and regions alone, are intent on pursuing political influence in the EU. Localities do the same if they can gain through strength of numbers what they lack in individual strength. (2002, p. 12) 5  Cities represent a further subset of local government (Schultze, 2003; Marshall, 2005) and are spaces where actors from different territorial levels interact politically and economically. Cities are typically more independent from both the regional and the national levels and develop their distinctly urban policy agendas, which often deviate from rural interests (Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008).

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[And yet, we] know less about the European concerns and activities of local authorities than we do of regional actors. Perhaps it is time ‘to bring the local back in’ to the study of multi-level governance. (ibid., pp. 15–16)

For practical reasons, shifting the focus of analysis from regional to local government is also important to understand the future developments in European multilevel governance. While the notion of a ‘Europe of the regions’ peaked two decades ago, it seems to have gone out of fashion having failed to live up to expectations that it would give regions full legal status in the EU (Greenwood, 2011). Regional activists have more recently advocated a ‘Europe for the regions’ as a new approach to realise more tangible results in a structural way (Moore, 2008, p. 532). This change of focus has been picked up by local actors as an opportunity to get involved and offer the EU institutions a safer, in some cases less controversial, alternative to involve subnational actors in EU policy-making. As we will show in this book, local government has stepped up to take a more prominent role at the European stage, and it is more than likely to continue to do so.

State of Knowledge and General Approach of the Book By the mid-1990s, Wessels (2000, pp. 271–273) argued that local authorities had not yet become substantially incorporated in the EU’s multilevel system. Since then, however, the status of local government was strengthened not only on a constitutional basis by the Lisbon Treaty but also within EU policy initiatives, and local government has had time to adapt and respond to the challenges of European integration. Although it has been widely recognised that European integration has prompted emerging patterns of interaction between local government and the EU (cf. Goldsmith & Klausen, 1997; Keating, 1999; Jeffery, 2000; De Rooij, 2002; Goldsmith, 2003; Schultze, 2003; Derenbach, 2006; Münch, 2006; Van Bever et al., 2011a), these patterns have not yet been addressed systematically in European integration research. Existing works that have theorised the nature of the EU have focused on the historical evolution of supranational institutions; the behaviour and transformation of national governments and the state as a black box; the integration of specific policy areas, particularly economic policies; and more recently on questions of public support and democratic legitimacy (see Chap. 2). Ten years since

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Kettunen and Kull (2009, p. 119) suggested that the complex inter-relationship between the evolution of European governance and local government was still relatively under-researched from a conceptual perspective, European integration studies have only made few attempts to fill this gap.6 Local government studies also treat local-EU relations as a niche subject. Only from the late 1990s onwards, research has started to incorporate European perspectives, mainly looking at the so-called Europeanisation of local government. Goldsmith in 1993 was one of the first to put this topic in the academic spotlight. About 10 years later John (2001) addressed the Europeanisation of local governance only among other major developments in Western Europe at that time, while Denters and Rose (2005) identified Europeanisation as one of the most significant macro-trends in contemporary local governance alongside globalisation and urbanisation dynamics. Goldsmith and Klausen’s (1997) edited volume European Integration and Local Government was the first comprehensive account of local-­ supranational relations. They addressed the need for a coherent theoretical approach linking local government to the evolution of European governance and provided important Europeanisation indicators, a classification of local authorities, as well as chapters on individual Member States and a discussion of networks and lobby offices. Further edited volumes by Hamedinger and Wolffhardt (2010) and Van Bever et al. (2011c) advanced integration theory in relation to local government by linking country-­ specific and thematic case studies to wider theoretical debates. A series of books and articles focused specifically on Europeanisation dynamics at the local level (cf. John, 2001; De Rooij, 2002, 2003; Schultze, 2003; Fleurke & Willemse, 2006; Van Bever et al., 2011b; Dossi, 2017), the role of cities as European and international actors (cf. Le Galès, 2002; Van der Heiden, 2010; Herrschel & Newman, 2017), the legal and constitutional status of local government within the EU (Panara & Varney, 2013) and the relationship between the local and European levels in the context of subsidiarity and multilevel governance (Pazos-Vidal, 2019). There is also a body of research dealing with particular aspects of local government in the EU, including litigation, legal compliance, policy implementation, financial

6  A significant attempt in this regard was the application of the Fusion approach for the study of European integration from a local government perspective (Guderjan, 2013, 2015; Guderjan & Miles, 2016) (see Chap. 2).

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mobilisation, networking, formal and informal regulatory mobilisation, influence and internal adaptation. This research provides empirical and conceptual insights and tools, which we introduce and deploy in the different thematic chapters of this book. Our book aims to complement the existing literature by explaining European integration through the perspective of local government. We will systematically link the macro-trajectories of the EU’s evolution to micro-developments at the local level drawing from the insights and analytical tools of various integration theories and operational approaches, including intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism, neo-institutionalism, fusion, multilevel governance and Europeanisation (see Chap. 2). For this purpose, we introduce the analytical framework of an integration cycle in which local government responds to the top-down impact of EU policies by adjusting its internal and external organisation and subsequently seeks to participate in and even feed into the future developments of the EU. Crucial for the empirical validity of this cycle is the actual impact of local government on European integration when initiating a new integration loop. According to this idea, an increasing involvement of local actors shapes the EU’s policies, politics or polity, which, in turn, leads to new top-down impact pushing local authorities to adapt and mobilise upwards again. This cyclic evolution is highly multifaceted and follows from the interplay of formal and informal, territorial and functional, vertical and horizontal, and direct and indirect dynamics, which we will explain step by step in the following chapters. Empirically, the book presents a rich variety of evidence from primary and secondary sources supporting and exemplifying the integration cycle. This includes qualitative and quantitative data from our own empirical studies of local government in Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom.7 Considering the multitude and strong variance of local authorities across the EU, we do not attempt to capture every Member State in 7  From 2010 to 2012, 36 qualitative interviews were conducted to inform a comparative study of a total of 14 local authorities in North Rhine-Westphalia and the North West of England. The research applied the Fusion approach to the integration of local government into the EU and focused on five indicators to examine the top-down impact of European law and policies, local attention and attitudes towards the EU, institutional adaptation and horizontal and vertical mobilisation of local actors (cf. Guderjan, 2013). Additionally, we present survey data on the Europeanisation of local government in the Flemish region of Belgium addressed to the municipal CEOs of all Flemish municipalities in 2018. The survey was conducted online and anonymously with a response rate of 40.9% (N  =  126) (cf. Verhelst,

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detail. Rather, we discuss thematic evidence that aims to offer a sufficiently differentiated view on the variations in local government’s constitutional status, powers, size, resources, practices, incentives and rationales (cf. De Rooij, 2002; Hamedinger & Wolffhardt, 2010; Goldsmith, 2011). There is a clear practical relevance to this book relating to common debates about the profound impact of the EU on local practices and the role of local authorities as the democratically legitimised units of government closest to the citizens. Advocates of a more systematic integration of local government in the EU often reference the fact that about 445 million people live in European cities and towns and that they are strongly affected by decisions coming unidirectionally from Brussels. The drive to incorporate a local perspective in EU policy-making is also underpinned by strong normative considerations and corresponding principles such as subsidiarity, decentralisation and democracy. At the same time, how local actors and EU institutions interact to cope with these challenges is often overlooked. Our book therefore aims at further elaborating the relationship between local government and the European Union as it unfolds in practice. The different dynamics of this interaction are presented in the following chapters and are organised according to the constitutive elements of the integration cycle. Chapter 2 provides a theoretical discussion and introduces the integration cycle. The synthesis of different approaches brings macro- and micro-­ dynamics together to build an analytical framework for the study of the integration of local government into the EU’s system of governance. While insights from different European integration theories allow us to link the transformative dynamics at the local level to the macro-trajectories of the EU, Europeanisation dynamics and multilevel governance account for the micro-developments. Given the macro-trajectories of European integration as they unfold, Chap. 3 focuses on the impact of European legislative and broader policy output on local government. Top-down ‘downloading’ comprises both legislation with which local authorities have to comply (the constraint side of downloading) and policies promoted by EU programmes and funding schemes for which local authorities can compete (the opportunity side of downloading).

2019). The questions cover different elements of the integration cycle and will be used to illustrate our arguments throughout the thematic chapters of the book.

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In response to the downloading dynamics, Chap. 4 demonstrates how local authorities have started to internally adapt their practices, potentially their orientation and preferences and eventually even their institutions, policy agendas and administrations. Chapter 5 shows that local government has not only internalised EU politics but also externalised their activities by cooperating across borders through transnational networks and partnerships. This form of ‘cross-­ loading’ ranges from traditional cultural exchanges and activities to functional policy and political networks. As local government has become increasingly important for the delivery of EU policies and has pushed to have a say over decisions that affect them, Chap. 6 examines the formal channels to participate in EU policy-­ making that have evolved over time and which allow for a bottom-up mobilisation of local actors. Because the formal access to EU policy-making is restricted to a small number of local actors and varies across Member States, Chap.  7 sheds light on the informal mobilisation of local actors operating as territorial interest groups in the EU.  It looks at how different access routes have become central to uploading local practices, interests and demands to the EU polity. Chapter 8 discusses the results of the interplay between formal and informal uploading, which allows local government to become a meaningful stakeholder and further integrate into the EU’s system of governance. It tests whether both types of bottom-up mobilisation provide local government with actual influence in the EU’s wider trajectories, thereby completing the integration cycle. The book concludes with an overall outline of how the integration cycle works in practice and by explaining the conditions under which local government is pulled into the EU’s multilevel polity and through which it is able to subsequently shape the dynamics of European integration.

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CHAPTER 2

The Integration Cycle: Theorising European Integration of Local Government

Introduction European integration has been marked by two major trajectories: first, the creation of supranational institutions through which Member States cooperate and take joint decisions, and second, a shift of Member States’ loyalties, expectations and activities towards this emerging polity (Diez & Wiener, 2009, pp. 3–4; also Haas, 1958, p. 16). National governments have decided to establish supranational institutions and gradually transferred powers, competences and resources from national to European institutions in order to deal with common challenges. Over time, they released more control over their own fate than they had anticipated due to ‘spillover’ effects from one policy area to another (Littoz-Monnet, 2010, pp.  3–4). As a result, EU institutions and Member States have become increasingly interdependent, and divisions of political authority and accountabilities have blurred. Different levels of government have become locked into joint governance arrangements and rules, which can be described as an ‘interlocking or “messy” federalism’ or a Politikverflechtung (Chryssochoou, 2001, p. 19). As we have outlined in the introductory chapter, local government is still an emerging actor in this ‘multilevel compound’ and is certainly a minor player in the wider trajectories of European integration. Yet, without neglecting that the power over major decisions  about the development of the EU is located elsewhere, there are certain functional logics at © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Guderjan, T. Verhelst, Local Government in the European Union, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74382-6_2

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play which reach deep into the local level. As joint institutions, mutual dependencies and loyalties evolve under a joint system of governance, Member States undergo a  fundamental transformation of their national and subnational structures and practices to adapt to the new political realities. A theory of  European integration has  therefore to link the  overall picture to its constituent parts (Chryssochoou, 2001, p. 11). This chapter draws from a range of integration theories to explain European integration from a local government perspective or the European integration of local government, respectively. It also relies on insights from the Multilevel Governance Approach (MLG) to account for the relations amongst supranational, national and subnational levels and discusses Europeanisation dynamics to analyse the impact and responses of European governance at the local level. However, while neither MLG nor Europeanisation studies explicitly aim to explain European integration, we set out for a theoretical framework that addresses and links both macroand micro-dynamics of local-supranational relations. For this purpose, we introduce the idea of an integration cycle according to which local government adjusts itself both internally and externally in response to the top-­ down impact of European integration in order to deal with EU affairs and participate in EU policy-making. Ultimately, this leads to local actors proactively affecting the trajectories of European integration.

The Macro-Trajectories of European Integration Scholars of European integration  are broadly split into two opposing schools: intergovernmentalists and supranationalists. While intergovernmental approaches assume that integration is largely controlled by national governments, supranationalists suggest that the European polity has escaped national control and has become the fairly autonomous driver of an integration dynamic that transforms the Member States (Schimmelfennig, 2010, pp. 37–38). Although both schools hold fundamental truths, neither of them is entirely convincing when it comes to explaining the actual realities of European integration. The evolution of the EU’s joint system of governance needs to be understood in the context of growing global economic interdependencies, due to which European nation states have lost some of their powers and ability to use traditional steering tools to deal with welfare and macro-economic policies. Two major strategies to regain political control over economic and public policies are competing: the intergovernmental and the federal solution.

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Intergovernmental cooperation without sanction and control mechanisms would not create the effective means to provide long-term economic stability. Even the most intensive intergovernmental cooperation would not be able to overcome the fear of being outsmarted and misled by partners. While the establishment of joint institutions and effective decision-making processes is thus a rational choice by governments made to justify their loss of sovereignty, national policy-makers would not go so far as to transfer all their autonomy and so replace their nation states with a European federation. Hence, they relocate state activities to an inter-­ state arena in which they seek to keep a high degree of sovereignty by continually participating in joint policy-making (Wessels, 1992, pp. 41–45; 1997, pp.  273, 285 et  seq.; 2000, p.  128; Schmitter, 2004, p.  50). Paradoxically, the desire to restore political sovereignty has led to a loss of sovereignty to a supranational arena and caused a de facto and a de jure erosion of nation sovereignty. As a result, the ‘virtuous circle’ of European integration—the mutual reinforcement of economic growth, the evolution of the welfare and service state and political stability—turned into a ‘vicious circle’ (Schneider, 2011, pp. 30–31; Wessels, 2000, pp. 124–126). The result is a third way of theorising European integration that combines strong collective institutions and modes of governance with the pursuit of both common and individual policy goals (Chryssochoou, 2001, p.  8; Wessels, 1997, p. 187). European integration has confronted Member States with unintended consequences that have escaped national control and cannot be reversed easily (Diez & Wiener, 2009, p. 10; Pollack, 2009, p. 136). According to a functionalist logic, policy responsibilities that are transferred to the EU, particularly economic policies, ‘spill over’ to other areas, including issues of ‘vital interests’, which subsequently also have to be dealt with at the European level. This functional spillover does not occur automatically; the joint polity ‘locks in’ national interest formation and conditions subsequent policies (Wessels et al., 2003, pp. 33 et seq.). National actors, who shifted their loyalties and orientations (political spillover), and supranational actors, who have an interest in expanding their fields of activities (cultivated spillover), push for further integration of policies (Diez & Wiener, 2009, p. 8; also Haas, 1958). Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (2014, p. 233) therefore highlighted: […] as transnational exchange rises in any specific domain […], so do the costs, for governments, of maintaining disparate national rules. As these

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costs rise, so do the incentives for governments to adjust their policy position in ways that favour the expansion of supranational governance. Once fixed in a given domain, European rules […] generate a self sustaining dynamic, that leads to the gradual deepening of integration in that sector and, not uncommonly, to spillovers into other sectors.

The spillover logic has created constant pressures to adapt and reform the EU’s polity to provide a ‘fair’ balance of different interests whilst still ensuring efficient common problem-solving (Wessels, 1992, pp. 47–48). As national actors seek to participate in EU decision-making, they drive the expansion of joint procedures. The evolution of EU committees and partnerships indicates how national governments and administrations are pooling public resources within a growing number of policy fields (Wessels, 1998, pp. 216 et seq.). Despite cyclical ups and downs, growth and differentiation of structures and procedures are obvious long-term outcomes of what Wessels (1997, p. 273) calls “a ‘fusion’ of public instruments from several state levels linked with the respective Europeanization of national actors and institutions”. The fusion of resources and policy instruments under a shared system of governance allows Member States to stay in control over political decisions for as long as it serves their objectives (Wessels, 1997, p. 274; 2000, p. 123; Schneider, 2011, pp. 24 et seq.). Although they are not willing to give up their independence, neither an evolution towards a federal union nor a backlash to mere intergovernmental cooperation seems likely (Rometsch & Wessels, 1996, pp. 364 et seq.). Accounting for both intergovernmental and supranational logics is not a revolutionary or particularly new idea, but a fusion perspective provides a third way to account for asymmetrical patterns of integration in particular (Schneider, 2011, pp. 24 et seq.). As Mittag (2011, p. 129) argues: the fusion perspective does not bring about a ‘closed’ theoretical construct, but rather an agglomeration of similar assumptions and approaches. Moreover, it does not exclude particular theory elements but shares co-­ existence of different assumptions and strategies in a constructive way.

Instead of narrowing down our approach by strictly following one school of European integration, we subscribe to the added value of combining intergovernmental, supranational and functional logics. It remains the interplay of intergovernmental and supranational dynamics that is

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shaping the nature of integration. Next to the daily business of European governance, major political decisions and reforms have not been transferred to the supranational level and will continue to be dominated by national governments, particularly in times of crisis (Beach, 2016, p. 51).1 Although Member States have become interlocked in a multilevel polity and have lost some control over supranational developments, they still exert a profound influence on the direction of European integration. Yet, as institutions from different levels continue to extend and intensify their cooperation and operate vertically and horizontally in a common policy cycle, they become more and more interdependent (Rometsch & Wessels, 1996, pp. 328 et seq.) with policy and polity spilling over and expanding the EU’s policy portfolio. The interplay of intergovernmental cooperation and functional integration is well demonstrated by the banking union and financial integration. In response to the Euro crisis, core financial competences were integrated inside the Eurozone as had not been the case before (Schimmelfennig, 2014, pp.  325 et  seq.).2 Both national and supranational actors have pushed for institutional growth differentiation and a fusion of public instruments, which provides Member States with significant control over decisions and blurs accountability and responsibilities for policy outcomes. Major decisions behind these developments were made by the heads of government and ministers of finance of the Eurozone during informal meetings. While the European Fiscal Compact and the ESM are subject to 1  Bickerton et al. (2015) argue that even though since Maastricht further economic, financial and diplomatic competences have been transferred to the European level, they remain under intergovernmental control by the European Council and the Council of Ministers. According to their idea of a ‘new intergovernmentalism’, Member States have become very reluctant to give up further political autonomy and therefore avoid the supranational community method as a decision-making mode. Instead, they use unbinding negotiations and consensus for cooperation in new policy areas (Puetter, 2016). 2  Since the 2008 financial crisis, the integration of economic policies has required stronger fiscal cooperation. The Commission and the European Central Bank initiated a set of legal measures to establish a banking union integrating the European banking system and taking over supervisory tasks from the Member States (Beach, 2016, pp. 46 et seq.). To save financially troubled states, particularly Greece, the EU established the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in 2010 and its successor the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in 2012, a permanent institution that can lend states in need up to €500m. As part of a joint governance arrangement, potential receivers of the ESM have to subscribe to ex ante controls of their national budgets and quasi-automatic sanctions by the EU if they breach the agreed deficit requirements (Schimmelfennig, 2014, pp. 325 et seq.).

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intergovernmental decision-making with only a marginal role for the Commission (Puetter, 2016), their outputs are binding, and the European Central Bank has acquired new competences (Schimmelfennig, 2015). Despite the continuation of spillovers and a deepening integration of policy areas, the macro-trajectories of European integration have faced a period of stagnation since the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty, and there seems to be little common appetite for major reforms and treaty changes. Euro-sceptic movements and nationalist governments have gained momentum across the EU, undermining joint commitments and the very core principles the Union is built upon. Because European integration no longer seems an ever-continuing process, we agree with Schmitter (2004, p. 47) that [a]ny comprehensive theory of integration should potentially be a theory of disintegration. It should not only explain why countries decide to coordinate their efforts across a wide range of tasks and delegate more authority to common institutions, but also why they do not do so or why, having done so, they decide to defect from such arrangements.

Member States can reassess their relationship with the EU, decide to withdraw competences and authority and eventually ‘spill-back’ their joint obligations and commitment to integration (Schmitter, 2004, p.  57). Brexit is undoubtedly the most drastic and significant case of a Member State’s disintegration from the EU. After the general referendum held on 23 June 2016, in which a slight majority of 51.9% voted to leave the EU, it took three-and-a-half years of uncertainty and negotiations before the United Kingdom actually left on 31 January 2020. Brexit seems to confirm the intergovernmentalist view that Member States remain in control of their own fate and can ultimately withdraw from the EU as they like. Yet, it also demonstrates that disentangling the functional interdependencies is an extremely complex, lengthy and resource-intensive endeavour. In its negotiations with the United Kingdom, the EU and its members have committed firmly to the core principles of the Union leaving little room for concessions to the United Kingdom. Access to the Single Market is dependent on alignment with its regulatory regime and jurisdiction, and legal divergences come with high costs to prevent the exit of other Member States and to avoid advantaging a neighbouring country that competes with the EU’s economy.

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Despite the ‘deterrent effect’ of Brexit and a related upsurge in pro-­ European sentiments, a major leap forward in the integration process that would require further treaty reforms is likely to meet fierce resistance among EU citizens. Even though collective decision-making facilitates the delivery of public goods, functional demands for supranationalism clash with preferences for national self-rule (Schakel et  al., 2015, p.  270). According to Miller (2017, pp. 421–422): The EU’s reason to exist, not to mention the avowed aim to further deepen integration, is far from self-evident among publics. The original, war-­ avoidance rationale for European integration in the 1950s is outmoded and will not suffice. […] If citizens across Europe are to see themselves as beneficiaries, and not as victims, of European integration, they will have to see and buy into a new, relevant, credible rationale for sharing sovereignty and burdens with their neighbors.

Considering the increasing relevance of European politics in public debates (cf. Kriesi, 2016), new approaches to EU integration have emerged in recent years. In light of these developments, major constitutional reforms are unlikely, as the post-functional analysis by Hooghe and Marks (2009, p. 22) explains: […] the mobilization of exclusive national identity among mass publics is likely to raise the heat of debate, narrow the substantive ground of possible agreement and make key actors, including particularly national governments, less willing to compromise. Several observers have noted an intensification of national stubbornness in European negotiations. As European multi-level governance has become more closely coupled, so leaders have less room to manoeuvre.

In the course of multiple crises, national governments have taken back some say over major decisions from EU institutions, including fiscal and refugee policies. Even though these vital challenges to the European project have pushed the focus back on to the national governments in the EU, underneath the ‘high politics’ outlined above, local government has continued to expand its role in European governance driven by three major forces. First, functional spillover continues to foster deeper integration of local authorities to meet major common economic and social challenges. Due to political spillover, local actors have to varying extents shifted their loyalties and orientations towards the EU. Lastly, in terms of cultivated

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spillover, supranational actors have increasingly acknowledged their reliance on local authorities to deliver EU policies, gain public support and increase democratic legitimacy. They have therefore initiated a series of policies and political decisions to reach out to the local level (see Chap. 1).

The Micro-Trajectories of Local-Level Europeanisation As European integration spills over to the domestic level (though not in a harmonised, unified fashion) (Olsen, 2002, p. 935), theories of European integration have traditionally focused on the national level of government and largely neglected what is happening inside the ‘black box’ of the Member States (Guderjan, 2015, p.  938). Littoz-Monnet (2010, p.  2) suggested a more dynamic model that captures “how interactions between subnational, state-level and supranational actors interplay in those processes” and that can “explain how developments in one institutional venue induce developments in other venues, or, in other words, how actions by one set of (institutional) actors can induce actions by another set of actors that were formerly passive”. To introduce a dynamic model that allows us to interpret European integration from the perspective of local government, we need to explain the systemic linkages between macro- and micro-­ trajectories and how the whole relates to its constituent parts (Chryssochoou, 2001, p. 11). For this purpose, we draw on the body of Europeanisation literature and apply it to the local level. Although Europeanisation and European integration condition each other, they are distinct phenomena. Whereas European integration is an ontological matter and encompasses the evolution of the EU’s political system and the reasons for pooling sovereignty, the Europeanisation of institutions, actors and policies represents a post-ontological phenomenon that follows from integration (Radaelli, 2003, p.  33). Far from being a clearly defined concept, Europeanisation is often used in academic research to denote a very broad variety of political phenomena (Olsen, 2002, pp. 921–924).3 Radaelli (2000, p. 4) provides a useful definition to specify 3  Olsen (2002, pp. 923–924) described five different contexts of Europeanisation referring to changes in external state boundaries, developing institutions at the European level, central penetration of national systems of governance, exporting forms of political organisation and the political unification project. We adopt a narrower definition to clearly distinguish it from integration dynamics.

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Europeanisation dynamics to the particular context of local government4 (cf. Hamedinger & Wolffhardt, 2010a) as: Processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.

According to Radaelli (2000), studies of Europeanisation then need to account for the domains of Europeanisation and the direction and extent of Europeanisation. Domains of Europeanisation In the context of this book, the domains of Europeanisation mainly refer to the changes and adaptations that take place within local government and within European institutions. As Hamedinger and Wolffhardt (2010a, p. 28) highlighted, Europeanisation in this context stands for “the interplay between actors and institutions on the European and the city level, which leads to changes in  local politics, policies, institutional arrangements, discourse, actors’ preferences, values, norms and belief systems on both levels”. This interplay broadly involves three dimensions (cf. Kern & Bulkeley, 2009, p. 312; Van Bever et al., 2011, pp. 16 et seq.): 1. Top-down (also hierarchical or download) Europeanisation is the most visible and tangible dimension. The EU operates as an additional layer of supranational authority, commanding local authorities to comply with the European legislative output and/or to meet the eligibility requirements set by the EU in order to receive funding. EU directives, regulations and other legal instruments have to be implemented at the local level, while local authorities also voluntarily download European policies to acquire the financial means of the European Structural Funds and other funding regimes as part of a softer form of ‘policy promotion’ (Schultze, 2003, pp. 123–124). 4  The interplay of local government and the EU has been captured by a number of labels, such as ‘local-level Europeanisation’ (Van Bever et al., 2011), ‘the Europeanisation of local government’ (Goldsmith, 1993), ‘the Europeanisation of cities’ or ‘urban Europeanisation’ (Hamedinger & Wolffhardt, 2010a; González Medina & Fedeli, 2015).

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2. Bottom-up (also cooperative or upload) Europeanisation is a response to the top-down pressure of European integration on local government. As EU regulations increasingly impact the local level, local authorities seek to use the opportunity structure of the EU’s governance system to proactively influence European policies in return whilst promoting local interests and uploading innovative practices and policies at the European level (De Rooij, 2002; Fleurke & Willemse, 2006; Kern, 2009). 3. Horizontal (also cross-load) Europeanisation is often linked to vertical dynamics, but distinct from top-down and bottom-up Europeanisation. This form of Europeanisation refers to the numerous forms of cooperation between local authorities in a European context. Such transnational networks and partnerships foster cooperation and mutual exchange of best practice and innovations between the participating authorities. Engaging in long-term and ad hoc partnerships offers opportunities to build internal and collective capacities, to qualify for European funding, to keep track of European legislation, to aggregate local interests and to subsequently upload them into the European arena.

Direction and Extent of Europeanisation The direction and extent to which these three dimensions alter the politico-­ administrative organisation, practices, orientation, norms and policies within local government varies greatly across local authorities. Goldsmith and Klausen (1997) distinguished between counteractive, passive, reactive and proactive local authorities.5 Counteractive authorities are sceptical about EU affairs and deliberatively choose not to engage with the EU (what Radaelli (2000) would call ‘negative’ Europeanisation). Passive authorities engage with Europe, but their activities tend to be coincidental rather than a deliberative policy choice. Reactive authorities have not only an interest in European dossiers, but they also want to learn about EU affairs. Lastly, a small group of proactive authorities have a clear idea of their relationship with Europe and take a leading role in European affairs,

5  These four categories largely coincide with the four general outcomes of Europeanisation discerned by Radaelli (2000): retrenchment, inertia, absorption and transformation.

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often as part of a more comprehensive strategic campaign to establish an international public profile (cf. Goldsmith, 1993, p. 694). John (2000, pp. 881 et seq.; 2001, p. 72) used the picture of a ladder with nine steps and four phases of Europeanisation to capture these variations (Fig.  2.1). Local authorities gradually climb the Europeanisation ladder as they develop different, more challenging EU-directed activities. In the minimal phase, local authorities merely seek to meet the EU’s legal requirements (i.e. complying with EU rules, directives and regulations), gather and manage European information and disseminate this information to the private sector and the public. The second phase is financially orientated as authorities aim to maximise their efforts in the competition for European funding and utilise European money to facilitate the economic regeneration of the territory. When local authorities enter the third phase, they engage in networking through links with other local organisations, transnational networks and cooperation in joint projects. Only in the final phase local authorities exceed the short-term effects of implementing EU legislation and acquiring European funding, and become fully Europeanised. They incorporate EU ideas and policies in their internal policy agenda and enter the process of EU decision-making by advising the EU on implementation issues. Even though John’s model has been criticised for its sequential and cumulative logic, it does give a clear indication of and empirical benchmark for the different ways in which local authorities deal with European affairs in practice (RoB, 2013).

I H G F E D C B A

Fully Europeanised Making the council’s policies more ‘European’ Advising the EU on implementation issues Networking Participating in EU international networks and co-operating in joint policies Linking with other local organisations participating in the EU Financially orientated Facilitating economic regeneration (through D) Maximising EU grants Minimal Communicating to the private sector and the public Managing European information Responding to EU directives and regulations

Fig. 2.1  The Europeanisation ladder (based on John, 2001, p. 72)

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Europeanisation concepts are certainly useful as an ‘attention-directing device’ to capture different dimensions and intensities of change in the relationship between local government and the EU.  However, even though some scholars consider Europeanisation as a middle-range theory that ‘provides a common set of terms and statements’ to address specific aspects of the phenomenon under study (Hamedinger & Wolffhardt, 2010b, pp.  234–235), it is not an explanatory theory in itself (Olsen, 2002, pp. 921 et seq.). Europeanisation is perhaps better understood as a multi-layered explanandum (something which needs to be explained) than a grand theory or explanans (something which provides explanation) (Featherstone, 2003; Radaelli, 2004, p.  2; Lodge, 2006, p.  60). Miles (2011, p. 189) has suggested that existing Europeanisation studies tend to suffer from ‘limited ambitions’ and a ‘lack of clarity’ in explaining the link between macro- and micro-dynamics in particular. To draw causal explanations of these processes, they need to be embedded within a wider theoretical context of integration (Radaelli, 2003, pp.  27 et  seq.; Bulmer, 2007, pp. 46 et seq.). While this book relies on Europeanisation concepts to examine the micro-­trajectories of integration, these trajectories still need to be connected to the macro-trajectories that we have discussed earlier in this chapter. Therefore, the following section focuses on the Multilevel Governance Approach (MLG) as a complementary perspective which we will use to explain the specific connections between local government and the EU.

The EU as a System of Multilevel Governance Amongst the established approaches that conceptualise the nature of European governance, MLG emphasises the blurring of domestic and international politics by focusing on changes in horizontal and vertical relations amongst actors at supranational, national and subnational levels (Bache, 2008, pp. 21, 28). More specifically, it accounts for the interaction of interdependent state and non-state actors pursuing common objectives and shaping policy within networks under a complex system of governance (Bache & Flinders, 2004a; Benz, 2010, p. 215; Zürn et al., 2010, p.  4). Relevant to our book is the idea that European multilevel governance has evolved as ‘a complex set of overlapping and nested governance systems’ (Loughlin, 2001, p. 20) in which actors from European, national, regional and local governments co-exist and interact (Panera &

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Varney, 2013). Therefore, Blom-Hansen (2005, p. 628) referred to MLG as “arguably one of the most descriptively accurate models of this policy process, and it correctly directs our attention to the full range of subnational, national, and supranational actors involved in the process”. Initially, MLG was based on empirical studies of the EU’s structural policies during the early 1990s, when Hooghe and Marks (2001, 2003, 2010; Hooghe, 1996; Marks, 1993; Marks & Hooghe, 2004; Marks, Hooghe and Blanks, 1996) described how in the course of European integration interconnected political arenas had evolved. Although national governments have remained the key players in European governance, political influence has partly shifted both to the supranational and the subnational levels of government. As EU institutions, particularly the Commission, have promoted the involvement of subnational authorities in different policy areas (see Chap. 1), the gate-keeping role of national governments has been challenged, and traditional state hierarchies have been bypassed (Bache & Flinders, 2004b, p. 37). To account for the role of the different constitutional levels of government more strongly, Hooghe and Marks (2003, 2010) advanced two different types of multilevel governance which co-exist in practice (Bache, 2008, p. 27). Put simply, MLG type I refers to interactions between a small number of clearly defined hierarchical levels of government in stable state polities, as is the case in federations. Under MLG type II, governance is distributed across numerous levels, task-specific, intersecting and subject to flexible arrangements. A large number of collaborating levels, groups and actors, including smaller territorial units, cross hierarchical borders and act outside larger jurisdictions within a polycentric mode of governance under which decisions are made collectively to deal with joint problems and policies. These heterogeneous and functional  arenas do not directly challenge state authority and are embedded within type I jurisdictions (Hooghe & Marks, 2004, pp. 17 et seq.; 2010, pp. 18 et seq.). The turn from formal decision-making to informal mechanisms of interaction through flexible networks (Goldsmith, 2003, p. 129; Littoz-­ Monnet, 2010, p. 6) and the distinction between territorial and functional patterns has been a ‘remarkable step forward’ towards a comparative framework for analysis (Benz, 2010, p.  215). Rather than focusing on resource dependencies, control mechanisms and power, multilevel governance is about cognitive, communicative and negotiation processes, as well as about coalition- and network-building. In particular, MLG type II

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has made an important contribution to understanding the flexible, less formalistic nature of European integration and patterns of ‘loose coupling’  beyond binding mandates or formal decision-making (Benz & Eberlin, 1999, p. 333). Despite its important contribution, there are also limitations to MLG’s ability to explain European integration from a local government perspective. First and foremost, MLG was never intended to develop into a full-­ fledged theory of European integration that clearly explained the underlying causes and dynamics behind the evolution of Europe’s multilevel polity and the mobilisation of subnational authorities therein (cf. Jordan, 2001, p. 201; Fairbrass & Jordan, 2004, p. 152; George, 2004, p. 113; Littoz-Monnet, 2010, p. 4; also Dyson & Sepos, 2010, pp. 18–19). Secondly, while, like other policy-centred and policy-network approaches, MLG analyses modes of policy-making and outputs (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 2014, p.  231), it focuses predominantly on the delivery of policies that are initiated outside of subnational jurisdictions rather than on initiatives that have their origins in local politics (Sturm & Bauer, 2010, pp. 20–21). Thirdly, a dynamic multilevel framework has to account for the power relations across different levels by explaining how the locus of governance shifts across government levels due to their interaction (Littoz-Monnet, 2010, p. 5). We agree with Stephenson (2013, p. 821) that “MLG was about opportunities for some and loss (of power and influence) for others, leading to potential conflict, blocking and, subsequently, strategies to circumvent the national level whereby lower levels sought to increase their institutional and negotiating capacity”. But, like him (2013, p. 825), we also think that MLG does not explain why and when certain levels are empowered or weakened. MLG does not address the actual influence that subnational governments exert in multilevel policy-making, the adaptation of local government in response to European integration and the motivation and attitudes behind subnational engagement with EU policies. Rather, it describes the ‘physical manifestation’ of subnational involvement in EU business, but an understanding of the rationales of subnational mobilisation also has to consider intrastate factors, such as the status and constitutional position of subnational government (Jeffery, 2000, p. 3). By implying that national governments have lost influence, MLG’s emphasis on power-sharing seems to have been overly optimistic and ignored the actual role of power. Institutional tensions between different political arenas still set structural limits to an interlocking of

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multilevel politics (cf. Benz & Eberlin, 1999, p.  332). Blom-Hansen (2005, p. 628) therefore argued: The multi-level governance model has the distinctive strength of drawing attention to the degree of multi-level involvement in EU decision-making. […] But the multi-level governance model tends to equate multi-level involvement with multi-level governance. It argues that the multi-level character of the EU empowers the supranational and the subnational levels at the cost of the nation state, which must accept ‘a significant loss of control’.

Despite these limitations, we still believe in the great value of MLG as a complementary perspective, particularly when it comes to the governance of policies. As Stephenson (2013, p.  818) suggests “[…] even if MLG could not provide a toolkit to help scholars explain the precise dynamics of how governance arrangements had come to be, what it could tell us was how governance was arranged today in a way that was easy to grasp”. This is particularly important as MLG is not only an academic concept but is widely used by EU policy-makers as a reference to promote the structural involvement of local government, not only in relation to cohesion policy but also in other policy domains. Policy initiatives, such as the 2001 White Paper on European Governance, the 2009 White Paper on Multilevel Governance, Europe 2020, the 2016 Urban Agenda, and the increasing enforcement of the partnership principle show that multilevel governance has paved the way for local government to become part of European governance. In the following, we therefore  propose an analytical framework that incorporates the MLG perspective into a wider macro-view on European integration (cf. Fairbrass & Jordan, 2004, p. 152), while considering the micro-level dimensions of local-level Europeanisation. We examine the extent to which local government has evolved from an implementer to a shaper of European policies and even integration. In doing so, we do not assume that the EU has become a fully fledged multilevel governance system, and we acknowledge the possibility of reversing trends or failures of integration dynamics. Under consideration of power relations, constitutional positioning and actors’ attitudes (Fairbrass & Jordan, 2004, p. 163), the following analytical framework  can identify systematic patterns of increasing procedural complexity and differentiation through which previously distinct jurisdictions are blurring. Through polycentric networks and functional governance arrangements local actors participate and feed

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into EU policies without necessarily challenging state authority. Hierarchies, resource dependencies, control mechanisms and power remain crucial determinants of local government’s engagement in EU affairs (see MLG type I). Yet, flexible patterns of ‘loose coupling’ (cf. Benz & Eberlin, 1999, p.  333) and the ‘living constitution’ are essential to European integration of local government (see MLG type II). We therefore think of multilevel governance as a wide variety of nested governance compounds with built-in top-down, horizontal and bottom-up logics fuelling European integration.

The Integration Cycle If we want to fully comprehend  the territorial and functional dynamics that contribute or constrain patterns of multilevel governance, we need to embed local-level Europeanisation in  the wider context of the merging arrangement between supranational, national and subnational levels of governance (cf. Miles, 2007, p. 9). For the purpose of studying local government in particular, we subsume the theoretical accounts of European integration, Europeanisation and multilevel governance within an overarching analytical framework that links the macro-trajectories of European governance to the transformative micro-processes at the local level and vice versa. Earlier in this chapter, we have outlined how the fusion approach offers useful insights by combining nation state transformation with studies of  European integration (Wessels, 1992, pp.  38–41; Diedrichs et  al., 2011, pp.  11–12; Schneider, 2011, pp.  28–29). According to Wessels et al. (2003, pp. 3 et seq.), in a ‘loop of adaptation’, Member States have ‘pushed’ for the creation of a supranational polity that subsequently ‘pulls’ them into a system of joint governance that gradually transforms their very nature: Through various loops of push-pull dynamics between the European and the national levels, the struggle for a voice has even increased the institutional and procedural differentiation in the national as in the European arenas. (ibid., p. 6)

This loop of adaptation features elements of top-down, bottom-up and horizontal Europeanisation at various levels, including the local one. European legislation and policies cause a reorientation towards Brussels,

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whereby domestic actors adapt their preferences and practices according to this new political system. To effectively influence the policies that affect their own rules and practices, these actors adapt their organisational structures (Rometsch & Wessels, 1996, p. 351; Wessels et al., 2003, p. 14). Ultimately, as a response to the supranational impact on domestic affairs, actors from Member States have themselves deepened the integration process (Littoz-Monnet, 2010, p. 7). As Hamedinger and Wolffhardt (2010b, pp. 229–230) pointed out, we should also interpret the relationship between local government and the EU as such a “circular, dynamic and interactive process”; even though the push and pull dynamics between top-down impact, adaptation and mobilisation are clearly more conditional and, therefore, less universal at the local level (Guderjan & Miles, 2016, p. 642). It is thus not only important to examine differences across policy areas but also to consider the variations and asymmetries of size, resources, competences, structures, traditions and constitutional and normative settings in local government across and within different Member States. The integration cycle will be explained and analysed in detail in the following chapters starting with the top-down impact of EU legislation and policy on local government (Chap.3). This triggers an internal adaptation of actors’ awareness and attitudes towards the EU and of the institutions and organisation of local government (Chap. 4), as well as a horizontal cooperation of local authorities in domestic and European networks and associations (Chap. 5). Building on these dynamics, the bottom-up engagement of local government includes a formal mobilisation via constitutional and institutional structures (Chap. 6) and also an informal mobilisation that relies on lobbying strategies to influence EU policy-making (Chap. 7). Empirical examples suggest that the interplay of formal and informal bottom-up mobilisation allows local actors under certain conditions to effectively impact EU policies, politics and polity and thereby to make a significant contribution to the trajectories of European integration (Chap. 8). As European integration is neither static, universal nor ever-­ deepening, the validity of the integration cycle depends on a series of conditions and dynamics. Therefore, our book will explore whether the cycle actually works as an integration loop that starts again at the top and triggers further top-down impact, horizontal adaptation and vertical mobilisation (Chap. 9) (Fig. 2.2).

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EUROPEAN INTEGRATION Functional & cultivated spillover

EUROPEAN UNION Governance

Output

Constitution, institutions, procedures

Policies, legislation, rules, decisions

Legislation

TOP DOWN Policy

MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT REGIONAL GOVERNMENT

Political spillover

Formal mobilisation

BOTTOM UP Informal mobilisation

LOCAL GOVERNMENT Internal Awareness, attitudes, adaptation

External Horizontal cooperation

EUROPEANISATION Fig. 2.2  The integration cycle

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Guderjan, M. (2015). Theorising European integration of local government  – Insights from the fusion approach. Local Government Studies, 41(6), 937–955. https://doi.org/10.1080/03003930.2015.1057277 Guderjan, M., & Miles, L. (2016). The fusion approach – Applications for understanding local government and European integration. Journal of European Integration, 38(6), 637–652. https://doi.org/10.1080/0703633 7.2016.1176028 Haas, E. (1958). The uniting of Europe: Political, social and economic forces 1950–1957. Stanford University Press. Hamedinger, A., & Wolffhardt, A. (2010a). Introduction. Understanding the interplay between Europe and the cities: Frameworks and perspectives. In A. Hamedinger & A. Wolffhardt (Eds.), The Europeanization of cities. Policies, urban change & urban networks (pp. 9–39). Techne Press. Hamedinger, A., & Wolffhardt, A. (2010b). Conclusions. The Europeanization of cities: Challenges of an evolving research agenda. In A.  Hamedinger & A.  Wolffhardt (Eds.), The Europeanization of cities. Policies, urban change & urban networks (pp. 227–237). Techne Press. Hooghe, L. (1996). Cohesion policy and European integration: Building multi-­ level governance. Oxford University Press. Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2001). Multi-level governance and European integration. Rowman & Littlefield. Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2003). Unravelling the central state, but how? Types of multi-level governance. The American Political Science Review, 97(2), 233–243. Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2009). A post-functionalist theory of European integration: From permissive consensus to constraining dissensus. British Journal of Political Science, 39(1), 1–23. Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2010). Types of multi-level governance. In H. Enderlein, S. Wälti, & M. Zürn (Eds.), Handbook on multi-level governance (pp. 17–31). Edward Elgar. Jeffery, C. (2000). Sub-national mobilization and European integration: Does it make any difference? Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(1), 1–23. John, P. (2000). The Europeanisation of sub-national governance. Urban Studies, 37(5–6), 877–894. John, P. (2001). Local governance in Western Europe. Sage. Jordan, A. (2001). The European Union: An evolving system of multi-level governance … or government? Policy & Politics, 29(2), 193–208. Kern, K. (2009). Cities in a European setting. Paper submitted for presentation at the Conference “Innovation for Good Local and Regional Governance: A European Challenge”, University of Twente (Enschede), April 2–3. Kern, K., & Bulkeley, H. (2009). Cities, Europeanization and multi-level governance: Governing climate change through transnational municipal networks. Journal of Common Market Studies, 47(2), 309–332.

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Kriesi, H.-P. (2016). The politicization of European integration. Journal of Common Market Studies, 54, Annual Review, 32–47. https://doi. org/10.1111/jcms.12406 Littoz-Monnet, A. (2010). Dynamic multi-level governance – Bringing the study of multi-level interactions into the theorising of European integration. European Integration Online Papers, 14(1) http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2010-­001a.htm Lodge, M. (2006). The Europeanization of governance – Top down, bottom up or both? In G.  F. Schuppert (Ed.), The Europeanisation of governance (pp. 59–76). Nomos. Loughlin, J. (2001). Subnational democracy in the European Union. Challenges and opportunities. Oxford University Press. Marks, G. (1993). Structural policy and multilevel governance in the EC.  In A. W. Cafruny & G. G. Rosenthal (Eds.), The state of the European community (pp. 391–409). Lynne Rienner. Marks, G., & Hooghe, L. (2004). Contrasting visions of multi-level governance. In I. Bache & M. Flinders (Eds.), Multi-level governance (pp. 15–30). Oxford University Press. Marks, G., Hooghe, L., & Blank, K. (1996). European integration from the 1980s: State-centric v. multi-level governance. Journal of Common Market Studies, 34(3), 341–378. Miles, L. (2007). The Nordic states and the European Union: The conceptual utility of fusion. Paper presented at Nordic International Studies Association (NISA) conference, May 23–25, Ødense, Denmark. Miles, L. (2011). Thinking bigger: Fusion concepts, strengths and scenarios. In U.  Diedrichs, A.  Faber, F.  Tekin, & G.  Umbach (Eds.), Europe reloaded  – Differentiation of fusion? (pp. 187–210). Nomos. Miller, B.  H. (2017). Tomorrow’s Europe: A never closer union. Journal of European Integration, 39(4), 421–433. https://doi.org/10.1080/0703633 7.2017.1309037 Mittag, J. (2011). Towards disciplinary transfers? Benefits and restraints of European integration and fusion theory for historical science. In U. Diedrichs, A. Faber, F. Tekin, & G. Umbach (Eds.), Europe reloaded – Differentiation of fusion? (pp. 111–140). Nomos. Olsen, J.  P. (2002). The many faces of Europeanisation. Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(5), 921–952. Panera, C., & Varney, M. (Eds.). (2013). Local government in Europe: The ‘fourth level’ in the EU multilayered system of governance. Routledge. Pollack, M. (2009). The new institutionalisms and European integration. In A.  Wiener & T.  Diez (Eds.), European integration theory (pp.  125–143). Oxford University Press. Puetter, U. (2016). The centrality of consensus and deliberation in contemporary EU politics and the new intergovernmentalism. Journal of European Integration, 38(5), 601–615.

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Radaelli, C. M. (2000). Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive change. European Integration Online Papers (EIoP), 4(8). http:// eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-­008a.htm Radaelli, C. M. (2003). The Europeanization of public policy. In K. Featherstone & C. M. Radaelli (Eds.), The politics of Europeanization (pp. 27–56). Oxford University Press. Radaelli, C.  M. (2004). Europeanisation: Solution or problem? European Integration Online Papers (EIoP), 8(16). http://eiop.or.at/eiop/ texte/2004-­016a.htm RoB (Raad voor het openbaar bestuur). (2013). Met Europa verbonden. Een verkenning van de betekenis van Europa voor gemeenten en provincies. Den Haag. Online Policy Paper. http://www.rob-­r fv.nl/documenten/boekje_ advies_met_europa_verbonden.pdf Rometsch, D., & Wessels, W. (1996). The European Union and its Member States – Towards institutional fusion? Manchester University Press. Schakel, A., Hooghe, L., & Marks, M. (2015). Multilevel governance and the state. In S. Leibfried, E. Huber, & J. Stephens (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of transformations of the state (pp. 269–285). Oxford University Press. Schimmelfennig, F. (2010). Integration theory. In M.  Egan, N.  Nugent, & W. E. Paterson (Eds.), Research agendas in EU studies – Stalking the elephant (pp. 37–59). Palgrave Macmillan. Schimmelfennig, F. (2014). European integration in the Euro crisis: The limits of postfunctionalism. Journal of European Integration, 36(3), 321–337. https:// doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2014.886399 Schimmelfennig, F. (2015). What’s the news in ‘New Intergovernmentalism’? A critique of Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter. Journal of Common Market Studies, 53(4), 723–730. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12234 Schmitter, P. (2004). Neo-functionalism. In A. Wiener & T. Diez (Eds.), European integration theory (pp. 46–741). Oxford University Press. Schneider, H. (2011). Die Fusionsthese: Voraussetzungen, Eigentümlichkeiten, Implikationen  – Ansätze zur Analyse des integrationstheoretischen Zentralbegriffs von Wolfgang Wessels. In U. Diedrichs, A. Faber, F. Tekin, & G.  Umbach (Eds.), Europe reloaded  – Differentiation of fusion? (pp. 23–77). Nomos. Schultze, C. J. (2003). Cities and EU governance: Policy-takers or policy-makers? Regional & Federal Studies, 13(1), 121–147. Stephenson, P. (2013). Twenty years of multi-level governance: ‘Where Does It Come From? What Is It? Where Is It Going?’. Journal of European Public Policy, 20(6), 817–837. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2013.781818 Stone Sweet, A., & Sandholtz, W. (2014). Integration, supranational governance, and the institutionalization of the European polity. In B. F. Nelsen & A. Stubb (Eds.), The European Union: Readings on the theory and practice of European integration (pp. 229–249). Palgrave Macmillan.

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CHAPTER 3

The Top-Down Perspective: Legislative and Policy Impact

Introduction The integration of local government in the EU started at the European level (Hamedinger & Wolffhardt, 2010, p. 30). Therefore, we start our discussion of the integration cycle with the most striking aspect of the relationship between the EU and local government: the top-down impact. It was only after the EU started to disseminate rules and policies that trickled down to the local level that local government turned its attention towards European affairs. Two developments are particularly relevant to understanding why this is a prerequisite for local government’s adaptation to and proactive engagement with European affairs. First, throughout the 1990s the movement towards the ‘completion’ of the Single Market created a number of directives and regulations that affected the practices of local authorities and prompted them to increase their engagement with EU policies (Münch, 2006, p. 127; Rechlin, 2004, p. 16 et seq.). Second, the EU’s regional and cohesion policy has provided local actors across Europe with a formal role in the EU’s economic strategies and allowed them to build proactive relationships with supranational institutions (Conzelmann, 1995, pp.  134–135; John, 2001, p.  69; Bache, 2004, p. 166 et seq.; 2008, p. 23; Goldsmith & Klausen, 1997, p. 1 et seq.). As the local level has gradually taken a greater role in the delivery of European policy goals (Van Bever et al., 2011b, p. 236 et seq.) and European policy increasingly intersects with local practices, functional necessity pulls local © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Guderjan, T. Verhelst, Local Government in the European Union, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74382-6_3

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authorities into the European policy cycle. In this way local government entered the EU’s system of governance under which the consequences of policy choices made on different levels become interlocked. ‘Downloading’ in this respect comprises EU legislation that local authorities have to comply with (legislative impact), and policies promoted by the EU through its funding schemes and programmes for which local authorities can compete (policy impact). While the legislative impact and the policy impact are both considered as part of the top-down domain of Europeanisation (in contrast to horizontal and bottom-up Europeanisation; see Chap. 2), the legislative impact is an inevitable pressure to which local authorities have to adapt in a reactive way. Policy impact, in turn, creates the opportunity for local actors to proactively engage with the EU by receiving funding in exchange for implementing policies (Van Bever et al., 2011a, pp. 16–26). Therefore, the interplay between both types of downloading is as a story of opportunities and constraints (cf. Fleurke & Willemse, 2006). This chapter will seek to refine this general picture by explaining how local authorities deal with the impact of the EU and how this dynamic is strongly mediated by central-local relations within Member States.

Legislative Impact Over time, the EU has added an extra legislative footprint onto local government by enacting a series of rules and regulations which local authorities are compelled to adhere to (Goldsmith, 2005, p. 240; Callanan, 2012, p. 755). EU law is supreme to national law and must be either directly or indirectly applied by the Member States.1 The EU’s regulatory regime develops common standards; fosters economic growth, technical innovation, employment and national security; and promotes regional cohesion (Orbie, 2009, pp. 168–169). However, the Commission initiates policies

1  While in states with monist legal systems, like Germany, international law is directly applicable, dualist systems, such as the UK, require national legislation for EU law to become effective. European treaties are primary sources of law that are directly applicable and have direct effect, which means individuals refer to them in their domestic courts. Secondary sources include directives, regulations and judicial decisions by the Court of Justice, which derive from the EU’s powers set out in its treaties. While regulations and decisions are also both directly applicable and effective, directives need to be transposed into national legislation and only in rare cases have direct effect.

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but lacks the necessary administrative capacities to realise its agenda. It relies then heavily upon its Member States and local authorities to implement EU policies (Goldsmith, 1997, p. 5 et seq.; 2003, p. 121). The legislative impact of the EU redefines the discretion of local government and adds a new layer onto the classic division between autonomous local tasks and delegated tasks from national government (Backes & van der Woude, 2013, pp. 250–251). Yet, it is the internal state structure which determines to what extent local authorities share the responsibility for the application and enforcement of European rules on matters that fall within their remit (Goldsmith, 1997, p. 5 et seq.; 2003, p. 121; Jeffery, 2000, p.  3; De Rooij, 2002, p.  449). The functions, competences and discretion of local government  depend on the relations between and among local and higher levels of government within the Member State (cf. Goldsmith, 2005). Depending on the particular state structure, the supervisory authority over the local level is exercised either solely or jointly by the central level, the regional level or another subnational authority (e.g. provinces, counties, Kreise etc.). As a rule of thumb, local authorities with comprehensive functions and competences are generally more exposed to legislative pressures from the EU than those with less responsibilities (cf. Persson, 2013, p. 325).2 The EU’s legislative impact stretches from the core principles and constitutional provisions within its treaties to broad framework directives, regulations and case law by the Court of Justice (Goldsmith, 2005, p. 240; Knowledge Centre Decentral Europe, 2008, pp. 15–17). First and foremost, EU treaties change election procedures at the local level to broaden democratic representation and accountability (Frenzel, 2013, p.  123). Article 22.1 and 22.2 TFEU provide that EU citizens have an active and passive suffrage for local and European elections within the Member State of their residency. Though often ignored when it comes to local government, also the basic freedoms of persons, services, goods and capital on which the internal market is built have a direct impact on local government (Hessel, 2003, p.  48). With very few exceptions, local authorities ought not to violate the four freedoms, for instance, by discriminating against or excluding foreign companies when they acquire goods or services. According to the freedom of persons, which includes labour and settlement, EU citizens can work in another Member State and enjoy 2  Comparative research revealed ample variance in autonomy, functions and discretion of local government throughout the EU (cf. Ladner et al., 2016).

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equal labour rights and equal treatment when accessing public services in the locality they reside in. The freedom of capital prevents local authorities from imposing restrictions on EU citizens when purchasing real estate. When local authorities violate these freedoms, European citizens can challenge them in court (Knowledge Centre Decentral Europe, 2008, pp. 23–32). Many of these general principles and provisions are put into practice through the enactment of regulations and directives, which are to varying degrees implemented by subnational authorities (Huysseune & Jans, 2008, p. 2). The implementation of European legislation is probably the strongest link between local and European institutions. EU legislation initially targeted a limited number of policy fields that mainly fell under the competence of national administrations. This situation changed drastically when the 1987 Single European Act expanded the EU’s policy portfolio with new initiatives on the environment, social policy, industry and research and development. Subsequently, the EU started to issue legislation to complete the creation of the internal market and to protect the environment (Guderjan, 2015, pp. 941–943; John, 2000, p. 879). The pace and impact of the new regulatory environment was such that only one decade later, it was hard to find a single policy field within the remit of local or regional government that was not in one way or another affected by EU legislation (John, 2000, p. 879). Different authors concur that today nearly all local competences are partly regulated at the European level, including environment, energy (gas, electricity), water and waste management, spatial planning and development, public transport, local economy, agriculture, trade standards, public contracting, state aid, technology, research and training, public services, e-government, consumer protection, health care and safety, free traffic, equality, social policy, housing, poverty, employment, culture, tourism, childcare and education (Callanan, 2012, p.  754; Goldsmith, 2005, p. 240; Greenwood, 2011, p. 182; Hessel, 2003 pp. 46–48; John, 2000, p. 879; Schultze, 2003, p. 123; Van de Cruys & Opsomer, 2013, p. 8; Guderjan, 2019, p. 395).3 3  In 1997, Hessel and Mortelmans published a lengthy volume of EU rules that applied to the local level in the Netherlands at that time. The overview contained provisions on telecom, tourism, suffrage, services, working conditions, public procurement, budgetary discipline, VAT, state aid, fraud, personal data, driver’s licence, IDs, visa, free traffic of persons, nationality requests, asylum procedures, human trafficking, waste management, CO2 emission, air quality, environment, gasoline emission, pollution, civil protection, antiterrorism, and so on.

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Table 3.1  The impact of EU law on local government functions Function

Policy domain

Service provider Public service delivery, competition law

Purchaser Employer Planner and monitoring/ licencing body Land and building-owner Data processor

Legislation Monti-Kroes Package (IP/05/937) on rules governing compensation for public service obligations; Directive 2006/123/EC (services in the internal market), Services of General Economic Interest Package (IP/11/1571); Directive 2011/83/EC (consumer rights); Directive 2008/98/EC (waste management) Directives 2014/23-24-25/EU

Public procurement law Human resources Working Time Directive 2003/88/EC, Equal management Treatment Directive 2006/54/EC Environmental law Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC; Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC; Air Quality Directive 2008/50/EC; Birds Directive 2009/147/EC; Environmental Noise Directive (2002/49/EC) Environmental law Directive 2010/31/EC (energy performance of buildings); Directive 2012/27/EU (energy efficiency) Data protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR)

Considering the scope of EU policies affecting local government, it seems that almost every basic function of local government has been impacted by EU law to a certain extent. Above all this involves local authorities’ role not only as public service providers but also as purchasers, employers, planning and licencing bodies, as owners of land and buildings and as data processors (cf. Callanan, 2012, p.  754; Greenwood, 2011, p. 182; Knowledge Centre Decentral Europe, 2008, p. 9) (Table 3.1). As the planning and licencing agencies, local authorities have to follow environmental standards and public consultation procedures issued at the European level (e.g. air quality, water quality, habitat of threatened or endemic animal and plant species, environmental noise, birds) (Frenzel, 2013, p.  114; Knowledge Centre Decentral Europe, 2008, pp.  70, 74; Guderjan, 2019, pp. 395–396). In agricultural, environmental and food policy, European rules impose strict standards and reporting duties on local authorities as monitoring agencies. As employers, local authorities are bound by rules on working conditions, working time and the European-wide recognition of professional qualifications (Persson, 2013, pp.  324–325). Public buildings have become subject to European

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prescriptions on energy performance, and essential services, including waste management, were brought under a European legal framework (Guderjan, 2019, p. 396). Since local authorities process large amounts of personal data, the European rules on data protection enacted by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) compelled local authorities to redesign their internal data management processes (e.g. hiring a Data Protection Officer, securing databases). EU legislation has a significant effect on local public budgets. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial and economic crisis, the EU imposed strict budgetary discipline on Member States, which was handed down to many cities and towns necessitating additional austerity measures onto strained local budgets (Leroy, 2013, pp. 8–12). European state aid rules set a level playing field for local government’s financial transactions with private enterprises and regulate subsidies for public-private cooperation, including urban development and public infrastructure, sport facilities, swimming pools, hospitals, museums and telecommunication (Knowledge Centre Decentral Europe, 2008, pp. 49–63). In the course of the liberalisation of the energy market from 1996 onwards, inter-municipal companies lost their monopolies over electricity and gas supplies, depriving municipalities of their large dividends (Van Bever et al., 2009, p. 12). Commentators have often tried to quantify the impact of EU rules to argue for a better consideration of local perspectives in European policy-­ making. The Committee of the Regions, for instance, claims that 70 to 75% of all EU legislation is implemented by subnational authorities (CoR, 2010, p. 8; Van Bever et al., 2011a, p. 16). Other estimations (e.g. Rechlin, 2004; Moore, 2008, p. 518; CEMR,4 the Flemish5 and English6 associations of local authorities) suggest that 50 to 80% of local activities are somehow affected by European provisions. While it is certainly true that the scope of legislation relevant for local government is comprehensive, these numbers are indeed very general and, therefore, questionable (RoB, 2013, pp. 29–30). Specific examples are therefore  an effective way to illustrate the top-­ down impact. In 2013, the Flemish umbrella association of local government (VVSG) published a volume (De Wachter, 2013, pp. 38–46; also De 4  https://www.uclg.org/en/media/news/check-out-cemr-infographic-european-­­ commission-and-its-impact-local-government (accessed on 16 December 2016). 5  De Wachter, 2008, p. 55. 6  http://www.local.gov.uk/eu-policy-and-lobbying (accessed on 22 January 2015).

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Wachter, 2009, pp. 52–54) with a series of specific examples, which help to understand the sheer variety of the legal impact of the EU on local practices (see also Table 3.1): • The Services Directive forced municipalities to evaluate whether their service regulations and licences conflicted with the free movement of services and the free settlement of service providers. This affected, for instance, local regulations on night shops, outdoor bars and public fairs. The directive further prescribed governments to cut red tape and simplify administrative procedures, as well as to establish online one-stop shops providing information about service procedures, rules and licences in support of European-wide service providers. • Environmental and energy legislation has considerable financial implications for municipalities. In order to comply with the EU Water Framework Directive, many towns and cities had to undertake major costly investments in their public sewage systems and sidewalks. • The Energy Performance of Buildings Directive required an expensive modernisation of public building insulation and lighting in order to reduce energy consumption. • The European public procurement acquis regulates public tendering, including e-procurement, which pushes local authorities to invest in training and technical expertise and ICT equipment. The procurement rules further prescribe the conditions for local authorities to purchase goods and services from other public authorities without having to tender publicly (e.g. via inter-municipal cooperation; see Chap. 8). • Leisure activities in local government are, for instance, subject to the Bathing Water Directive which defines the conditions of the water quality for safe bathing, affecting coastal cities or municipalities with public swimming ponds; and European safety and quality standards set strict rules for public playgrounds. A 2019 survey amongst Flemish municipalities found that in addition to wider environmental and economic development, more recent issues that affect the daily work of administrations were particularly relevant for local actors, such as data protection (the 2016 GDPR) and public procurement (the updated acquis of 2014). According to the survey, ‘softer’ tasks, such as youth policy, leisure, sport, culture and citizens’ wellbeing, are considered less exposed to European impact (Table 3.2).

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Table 3.2  The impact of EU law on local government policies (Verhelst, 2019, pp. 89–90)

Data management Public procurement Environment Agriculture Regional development Economic development Mobility Spatial planning Tourism Wellbeing/care Culture Youth Sport

% (very) large

% average

% (very) small

N

75.5 71.7 72.6 57.5 41.0 31.4 18.9 14.2 12.3 13.3 6.7 5.7 3.8

17.0 17.9 23.6 27.4 43.8 45.7 49.1 43.4 43.4 41.0 41.0 36.8 39.6

7.5 10.4 3.8 15.1 15.2 22.9 32.0 42.4 44.3 45.7 52.3 57.5 56.6

106 106 106 106 105 105 106 106 106 105 105 106 106

Not all local authorities perceive the impact of European legislation the same way, and they retain some freedom of manoeuvre to apply the given rules. According to Bondarouk and Liefferink (2017, p. 742), compliance with EU law is “essentially a matter of filling in the available room for policy discretion”. The implementation of the EU Ambient Air Quality Directive in the Netherlands provides an interesting example of this. While some authorities were ‘over-compliant’, introducing more ambitious policy measures than necessary, others only modestly adjusted their air quality planning merely to meet the legal requirements and took implementation less seriously (Bondarouk & Liefferink, 2017). More than the pressure of the environmental issues as such, it was the size and resources of the municipalities that determined their level of ambition. Nevertheless, the general measures to combat air pollution met the technical compliance criteria within each authority and in many municipalities even converged due to joint actions and information exchange between localities. The implementation of the Ambient Air Quality Directive in Frankfurt and Dortmund found that attitudes, aspirations and discourses of local actors play an important role (see Chap. 3). Frankfurt, an ambitious, fully Europeanised city, interpreted the directive as ‘an innovative problem solution’ and introduced radical measures to improve the air quality, for instance, by introducing a low emission zone. In Dortmund, seemingly  more sceptical of the EU, the directive was perceived as an

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unjustified intervention from a distant authority, and it therefore only adopted a minimal approach to comply with the directive (Barbehön, 2016). When local authorities fail to comply with European legislation, they may face severe consequences, such as being forced to revoke public tenders, reclaim illegal subsidies, shut down building sites or pay penalties to citizens or enterprises (Knowledge Centre Decentral Europe, 2008, pp. 5, 17–19).7 On several occasions where there was uncertainty over the implementation of EU rules by local administrations, the Court of Justice had to provide legal clarification (Fischer, 2006, p. 106). Notable examples are the judgements on compensation payments Case C-107/98, Teckal v Comune di Viano, [1999] and C-280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH, Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH [2003]. Some judgements were even codified in EU law later on, which was the case with the 2005 Monti-Kroes Package on rules governing compensation for public service obligations IP/05/937, the 2011 Service of General Economic Interest Package IP/111571 and the Public Procurement Directives (Directives 2014/23-24-25/EU). For the EU, the Member States bear the ultimate legal responsibility and are sanctioned for non-compliance with EU law, even if the breach is caused at the local level (Avdikos, 2013, pp.  147–148; Van den Bossche, 2010, pp. 11–14).8 In some Member States with a strong centralisation of power, national government anticipated this by enacting laws to restore central control over local-EU relations and shifted the responsibility for non-compliance to the local level.9 In the Netherlands, for instance, the Statute on the correct application of European law by public authorities empowers the national government to overrule local autonomy by giving direct orders to local authorities when they are at risk of infringing EU law. When the state is fined because of non-compliance by a local authority, the act further allows imposing a fine on local government as a form of restitution.10 The United Kingdom’s 2011 7  According to Mastenbroek (2005, pp. 1104–1116; cf. Marshall, 2005), a ‘compliance deficit’ of Member States or local authorities, which fail to transpose, implement or enforce EU rules in a timely or correct manner, is usually not caused by a mismatch between the costs and the appropriateness of compliance (the goodness-of-fit thesis), but due to domestic politics or administrative and legal issues. 8  In Belgium, the federal state received a fine of €10 million in 2013 due to non-­compliance with the criteria for urban waste water purification, although it was a regional competence and local authorities caused the breach. 9  In turn, local government can also operate as a ‘watchdog’ for the Commission by uploading information about the application of rules. To some extent this has provided local authorities with political leverage vis-à-vis their national governments (Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008, p. 176).

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Localism Act introduced a similar mechanism to pass European penalties on to local authorities, if they do not comply with EU law. In turn, the act codified a commitment from the UK government to involve local actors in their policy formulation towards the EU if local issues are at stake (Varney, 2013, p. 355).

Policy Impact While the previous section discussed the EU’s regulatory impact, this section turns to policy promotion (Schultze, 2003, pp.  123–124), which reflects the EU’s nature as a (re)distributive state-like body (cf. John, 2000, p. 879). Over time the EU has become aware of local government’s potential role in delivering its agenda with regard to social policy, poverty, employment, economic growth, energy, climate change, housing, health, transport initiatives, security and integration of migrants and refugees (Guderjan, 2019, p.  396). Since the EU has very limited legal competences and administrative capacities in these areas, it uses policy programmes as a strategy to realise its objectives.11 For local government, European programmes and funding are clearly amongst the most appealing reasons to engage with EU policies (John, 2001, p. 67; also Goldsmith, 1993, p. 692), offering extra financial means to carry out both existing and innovative projects (Verhelst, 2019, pp. 91–92). If rules and regulations are the EU’s sticks to enforce compliance, funding then represents the carrots that incentivise local authorities to voluntarily commit to joint strategic goals (cf. Marshall, 2005, p. 676). Callanan and Tatham (2014, p.  4) call this financial mobilisation (as opposed to the more proactive regulatory mobilisation which they use to try to influence policy-making; see Chaps. 7 and 8). In different policy areas, the EU sets strategic objectives for Member States to achieve through programmes that are co-funded by the European budget (the Multiannual Financial Framework, MFF). For 2014–2020, it allocated €1087 billion to fund programmes on five priorities: competitiveness for growth and jobs (including programmes on research,  The Act on the supervision of European subsidies also allows the Dutch national government to intervene in  local applications for EU funding (Backes & van der Woude, 2013, pp. 251–253). 11  Along the same lines, the EU has adopted an urban dimension in its policies, institutionalised an EU Urban Agenda and developed an urban policy through different programmes in the context of cohesion policy (González Medina & Fedeli, 2015; see also Chap. 6). 10

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education and infrastructure; 13% of the total budget); economic, social and territorial cohesion (regional policy and cooperation; 34%); sustainable growth and natural resources (CAP, fisheries, rural development and environment; 39%); security and citizenship (justice, border protection, migration and citizenship; 2%); and global Europe (external action, development and humanitarian aid; 6%).12 Structural Funds—renamed to the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF)—are the most important source of funding for local government and comprise the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the Cohesion Fund (CF), the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) (see Table  3.3). While ERDF and ESF are principally available for all regions in the EU, the CF targets less affluent Member States. The ERDF finances two of the most relevant European programmes for local government: Urbact for sustainable urban development and Interreg to promote territorial cooperation (Interreg; see Textbox 3.1) (see Chap. 4).

Table 3.3  The European structural and investment funds Funds

Main objective

Programmes

Size

ERDF

Strengthen economic and social cohesion in the EU by correcting imbalances between the regions Combat poverty and improve employment and education Reduce economic and social disparities and promote sustainable development

Interreg, URBACT

€187.4 billion

Thematic programmes

€86.4 billion

Trans-European transport networks, environment LEADER, Smart villages, national programmes Thematic programmes

€63.4 billion

ESF CF

EAFRD Support the vibrancy and economic viability of rural communities through rural development measures EMFF Foster a dynamic fishing industry and ensure a fair standard of living for fishing communities

€95.6 billion

€5.7 million

Data retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/funding/; https://www.europarl. europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/637925/EPRS_BRI(2019)637925_EN.pdf 12  https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/eu-budget/spending/topic/eu-funding-programmes-2014-2020_en. The remaining 6% of the budget is used for administering the programmes.

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Textbox 3.1  Interreg and Urbact

Since 1990, Interreg has been an essential instrument to promote European territorial interactions by funding cross-border (Interreg A), transnational (Interreg B) and interregional (Interreg C) cooperation through a range of different  programmes. Transport, followed by tourism and environmental protection, has been the most important subject of European territorial cooperation under INTERREG I (1990–1993) and II (1994–1999). During the third period (2000–2006), health and culture have emerged as areas of cooperation between municipalities (Wassenberg & Reitel, 2015, p. 33). But more importantly, INTERREG III was also part of the Lisbon Strategy’s competitiveness agenda and supported the 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds. Over time, the budget allocated to Interreg has massively increased (Reitel et  al., 2018, pp.  13–14), although it only accounted for a minor share of the EU’s total budget for Cohesion Policy (e.g., less than 3% for 2014–2020) (Medeiros, 2018, p. 72). For the 2014–2020 programme, 322 local authorities participated in Interreg projects financed with a designated €359m by the ERDF to promote either research and innovation (65 approved projects), competitiveness (66), low-carbon economy (60) or environment and resource efficiency (67). Interreg is a good example of a top-down policy initiative that subsequently encouraged bottom-up mobilisation feeding back into EU policies (Reitel et al., 2018, pp. 8–15). One decade after Interreg was launched, URBACT I (2000–2006) started as an additional territorial cooperation programme with a specific focus on urban development by bringing cities together to develop sustainable integrated solutions to common policy challenges. Following URBACT II (2007–2013), between 2014 and 2020, URBACT III was allocated a total budget of €96.3 million to fund transnational exchanges, capacity-building and capitalisation and dissemination. Through mutual learning processes and sharing of good practice, cities are supported to improve (1) capacities for policy delivery, (2) policy design and practices, (3) the implementation of strategies and actions and (4) knowledge building and sharing. Contributing to the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy, the different activities and networks were  clustered into five priority (continued)

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Textbox 3.1  (continued)

areas: physical urban development, economy, environment, governance and inclusion.13 Like Interreg, Urbact has been an example of European-wide policy promotion providing a strong incentive for further horizontal and bottom-up activities. Programmes financed by Structural Funds are administered by regions and Member States on behalf of the European Commission. Domestic actors prioritise objectives, launch calls for projects, manage applications and approve and finance projects based on the overall strategic plans that they submit to the Commission (Van Bever et  al., 2009, p.  20). For 2000–2006, Structural Funds were distributed according to three priorities: to promote the development and structural adjustment of regions whose development is lagging behind (Objective 1), to support the economic and social conversion of areas experiencing structural difficulties (Objective 2) and to support the adaptation and modernisation of education, training and employment policies and systems in regions not eligible under Objective 1 (Objective 3). During the 2007–2013 programming period, the priority objectives were matched with the Lisbon Strategy including Convergence (former Objective 1), Regional Competitiveness and Employment (former Objective 2) and European Territorial Cooperation (former Objective 3). The European Structural and Investment Funds for 2014–2020 amount to €450 billion and were made part of the Europe 2020 strategy to foster smart, sustainable and inclusive growth and promote Europe’s competitiveness and a social market economy. The 2014–2020 ESIF programming period was organised into five priority areas: research and innovation, digital technologies, supporting the low-carbon economy, sustainable management of natural resources and small businesses. In addition to the Structural Funds, EU funding for local government comprises a wide range of thematic community initiatives designed and run by the Commission or European Agencies (Van Bever et al., 2009, pp. 18–19). Some examples of these action programmes relate to environment and climate action (LIFE), sustainable urban development (UIA),  https://urbact.eu/.

13

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active European citizenship (Europe for Citizens), asylum and migration (AMIF), youth (Youth in Action), research and education (Horizon 2020, Erasmus+), technology (WiFi4EU), culture (Creative Europe), international aid and development (EU Aid) and employment and social innovation (EaSi). Structural Funds or community initiatives provide earmarked grants. To participate in EU programmes, project proposals have to meet the eligibility criteria that match the overarching operational objectives of the funds. Local authorities then need to comply with strict rules (e.g. procedures, partnerships); so there is a strong top-down dynamic to the financial mobilisation (cf. Van Bever et  al., 2011a). Most European funding does not cover the total project costs but requires co-funding from local, regional and national authorities or other stakeholders. Because applying for EU funding is a highly competitive, time- and resource-intensive and technical procedure, many local authorities refrain from developing proposals (De Rooij, 2002, pp.  453–455; De Wachter, 2013, pp. 11–13; Van Bever et al., 2009, pp. 19–21; Verhelst, 2019, pp. 91–92). Nevertheless, EU funding opportunities are extremely attractive financial prospects, and many local authorities consequently follow the various calls. Zerbinati (2012, pp.  582–585) explained in five steps how this works.14 After screening for relevant programmes, which often tackle economic issues, local authorities design projects that match the programme’s general policy objectives and eligibility criteria. The third step involves a thorough analysis of the resources and competences needed for  a project, including matched funds (e.g. from private investments, national funds and loans), technical expertise, competences and capacities, political support and local partners (e.g. companies, trade unions, social organisations, governments, voluntary organisations, schools and universities). To then secure resources and competences, local authorities train and appoint officers, establish a designated division, hire external consultants, liaise with partners and acquire co-financing. In particular Structural Funds require lobbying national and regional governments, which produce the overarching programmes and approve local project applications. During the fifth step, local authorities manage the process

14  This is similar to common subsidy guides of local government associations (cf. Verhelst et al., 2015, p. 137).

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by overseeing applications, implementing projects and sometimes even developing a corporate strategy between local government and civil society over the usage of funding. Whether local authorities adopt a strategic approach to obtain European funding depends strongly on their political and administrative leadership, traditional practices and the nature of local economies (e.g. tourism, urban and industrialised areas), existing policy arrangements and internal and external support structures (e.g. programme secretariats, national governments or partner authorities) (Dossi, 2012; Zerbinati, 2012; Verhelst et  al., 2015). Since  EU funding is an instrument to distribute wealth across the EU and provide social cohesion, big cities, which face many social and economic challenges, and deprived areas are amongst the greatest beneficiaries of EU funding (Verhelst et al., 2015, pp. 150–156). Some local authorities have used European programmes successfully to regenerate their locality (Hamedinger & Wolffhardt, 2010, p. 21; Dossi, 2012). Despite being top-down, particularly larger cities have been able to retain control and ownership over the implementation of programmes, for instance, by initiating their own local projects prior to the call for applications (Pflieger, 2014, p. 340). Empirical evidence has shown that having learned to steer their way through the maze of EU programmes, local authorities’ chances to acquire future funding are significantly higher (Zerbinati, 2004, p. 1016). However,  downloading EU policies is not just a source of economic benefits. Local authorities can showcase prestigious European projects (flagship projects) and benchmark their practices against project partners (Goldsmith, 1993, p. 695; De Wachter, 2013, pp. 30–31; Marshall, 2005, pp.  680–681). Even more importantly for the integration cycle, downloading triggers organisational adaptation and bottom-up mobilisation to subsequently  upload local interests (De Rooij, 2002, p.  464). Unsurprisingly lobbying for future funding opportunities is a high priority on local agendas (Mastenbroek et  al., 2013, pp.  17–18; Callanan & Tatham, 2014, p. 5),15 as small changes to the eligibility criteria can have large implications for the ability to obtain financial support (John, 2000, 15  This is a case of regulatory mobilisation. Callanan and Tatham (2014, p. 5) explain the relation between regulatory and financial mobilisation as follows: “[…] lobbying on the EU-wide rules governing cohesion policy would constitute regulatory mobilization […], even if an anticipated outcome of this activity might be the prospect of accessing new funding opportunities (financial mobilization)”.

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p. 879). As Chap. 6 will show, the Commission has gradually formalised the partnership principle to foster a strong involvement by local government in the Structural Funds programmes of the Member States to deliver economic, social and territorial cohesion.

Conclusion The implementation of EU rules and policies by local authorities makes a meaningful contribution to European integration at the grassroots level (Derenbach, 2006, pp.  86–88), because it allows local government to deliver and support wider policy objectives beyond purely national interests. As Frenzel (2013, p. 123) argued: This […] reveals the true value of local government in delivering political integration. Local government shall not provide a protective shield for any national reservation; it ought to be an independent protagonist in order to contribute to the process of European integration, safeguarding the cultural and political diversity of its people and foster tasks of their common agenda, e.g. protection of the environment, equivalent living conditions, and peace.

Through legislation (treaty provisions, directives and regulations and case law) and policy (Structural Funds and community initiatives), the EU exercises a considerable top-down impact on local government reaching deep into established local practices. Because European institutions neither possess the political nor the administrative means to implement EU policy directly, Member States and in particular  local authorities are responsible for implementing many provisions initiated in Brussels (Klausen & Goldsmith, 1997, pp.  252–253). The top-down domain of Europeanisation is the starting point of the integration cycle, to which local authorities respond either in a reactive way, by merely implementing EU rules, or more proactively, by seizing the available opportunities to initiate new policies and to tackle common economic, social and environmental challenges. The EU’s legal impact ranges from technical provisions that directly interfere with local practices to electoral rules and decisions with profound financial and political ramifications. By altering public service provision, the creation of the Single Market had significant effects on socio-­economic life in local communities (De Rynck, 1997, p. 121). Even though Member States and local authorities have some discretion on how to adopt EU

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rules, common working conditions, consumer standards and environmental norms have led to a harmonisation of local operations (cf. Klausen & Goldsmith, 1997, p.  252). EU law also impacts the relations between local, regional and national governments (cf. De Rynck, 1997, p.  121; John, 2000, p.  878): in some centralised Member States (e.g. the Netherlands and previously the United Kingdom), the national government enacted laws to restore central control over local-EU relations and to deal with the financial consequences in case of non-compliance at the local level. In contrast to the hard impact of legislations, Structural Funds and community initiatives are a softer tool to promote EU policies. EU funding schemes and programmes offer local authorities means to realise their policy objectives, to level out disparities across the EU and to regenerate the locality. Whether local authorities are willing and capable to master the challenges, conditions and competition  linked to the allocation of European funding depends on a mix of structural determinants, such as size, resources, powers, traditions and socio-economic character, as well as on individual actions, discourses, information exchange, networking and entrepreneurialism. Financial mobilisation is an effective way to encourage local commitment to the EU, as Carmichael (2005, p. 142) observed that “cities that are not likely to be recipients of EU funding will have less interest in EU activities”. Importantly, the impact of financial mobilisation extends beyond the realisation of tangible projects when local authorities adapt their internal capacities for further applications (see Chap.  4), engage in horizontal cooperation with other local actors (see Chap. 5) or seek to influence EU decision-making from the bottom up (see Chap. 6, 7, and 8). As this book will demonstrate, participating in EU-wide programmes and projects has not only enabled some local actors to shape policies but even the wider trajectories of European integration.

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Münch, C. (2006). Emanzipation der lokalen Ebene? Kommunen auf dem Weg nach Europa. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Orbie, J. (2009). Theorie van de Europese integratie. Ideeën, belangen en instellingen. Acco. Persson, V. (2013). Sweden. Local government in Sweden: Flexibility and independence in a unitary state. In C. Panara & M. Varney (Eds.), Local government in Europe. The ‘fourth level’ in the EU multilayered system of governance (pp. 305–329). Routledge. Pflieger, G. (2014). The local politics of Europeanization: A study of French cities’ approaches to participation in the CIVITAS programme. European Urban and Regional Studies, 21(3), 331–344. Rechlin, S. (2004). Die deutschen Kommunen im Mehrebenensystem der Europäischen Union: Betroffene Objekte oder aktive Subjekte? Discussion Paper SP IV 2004-101, Social Science Research Center Berlin. Reitel, B., Wassenberg, B., & Peyrony, J. (2018). The INTERREG experience in bridging European territories. A 30-year summary. In E.  Medeiros (Ed.), European territorial cooperation: Theoretical and empirical approaches to the process and impacts of cross-border and transnational cooperation in Europe (pp. 7–23). Springer. RoB (Raad voor het openbaar bestuur). (2013). Met Europa verbonden. Een verkenning van de betekenis van Europa voor gemeenten en provincies. Den Haag. Schultze, C. J. (2003). Cities and EU governance: Policy-takers or policy-makers? Regional & Federal Studies, 13(1), 121–147. Van Bever, E., Reynaert, H., & Steyvers, K. (2011a). The road to Europe – Main street or backward alley for local governments in Europe. In E.  Van Bever, H. Reynaert, & K. Steyvers (Eds.), The road to Europe – Main street or backward alley for local governments in Europe? (pp. 13–30). Vanden Broele. Van Bever, E., Reynaert, H., & Steyvers, K. (2011b). Together we are strong(er). Cross-border cooperation in a EU multi-level system. In E.  Van Bever, H. Reynaert, & K. Steyvers (Eds.), The road to Europe – Main street or backward alley for local governments in Europe? (pp. 233–253). Vanden Broele. Van Bever, E., Reynaert, H., Steyvers, K., & Vos, H. (2009). Lokale besturen: verleid of geleid door Europa? In H. Reynaert, K. Steyvers, & E. Van Bever (Eds.), Van dorpsstraat tot Straatsburg. Europeanisering van lokale besturen (pp. 5–34). Vanden Broele. Van de Cruys, R., & Opsomer, B. (2013). Europeanisering in een meerlagige bestuurscontext. BinnenBand, 18(82), 8–10. Van den Bossche, A. M. (2010). Over Europees recht, lokale besturen en (hun) diensten. In L. Hoornaert, G. Straetmans, & A. M. Van den Bossche (Eds.), Lokale besturen: dichtbij en EU-nabij (pp. 1–34). Intersentia. Varney, M. (2013). United Kingdom. Local government in England: Localism delivered? In C. Panara & M. Varney (Eds.), Local government in Europe. The

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‘fourth level’ in the EU multilayered system of governance (pp.  330–368). Routledge. Verhelst, T. (2019). Vlaamse steden en gemeenten in de EU: van onverschillig naar proactief? Een stand van zaken anno 2019. In H.  Reynaert (Ed.), Verrekijkers voor lokale besturen: Een lange(re) termijnvisie? (pp.  75–103). Vanden Broele. Verhelst, T., Van Bever, E., & Reynaert, H. (2015). Europese programma’s en subsidies voor Vlaamse gemeenten: een surveyanalyse van de activiteit en determinanten tijdens de programmaperiode 2007–2013. In H.  Reynaert (Ed.), Uitdagingen voor de lokale besturen 2015–2019 (pp. 131–158). Vanden Broele. Wassenberg, B., & Reitel, B. (2015). Territorial cooperation in Europe: A historical perspective. European Union. Zerbinati, S. (2004). Europeanization and EU funding in Italy and England. A comparative local perspective. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(6), 1000–1019. Zerbinati, S. (2012). Multi-level governance and EU structural funds: An entrepreneurial local government perspective. Local Government Studies, 38(5), 577–597.

CHAPTER 4

The Internal Perspective: Awareness, Attitudes and Adaptation

Introduction European integration presents a new political environment for local government that stimulates learning processes and internal changes to cope with this new reality. Chapters 2 and 3 discussed in detail how Europeanisation dynamics manifest the integration of competences and policies across multiple levels. While the term ‘Europeanisation’ is used to describe a range of different phenomena, this chapter focuses on the socialisation and adaption to the European system of governance within local authorities (cf. Kohler-Koch, 1999, p. 29; Bache, 2008, p. 1; Börzel & Risse, 2000, pp. 1–6; Vink & Graziano, 2007, pp. 3 et seq.). The interplay between European and local institutions and actors has affected the latter in their politics, structures, interests and norms (Hamedinger & Wolffhardt, 2010, p. 28). Developing new strategies and adapting organisational structures allows local government to fully participate in European governance (cf. Rometsch & Wessels, 1996, p. 351; Wessels et al., 2003, p. 14). As De Ceuninck et al. (2019, p. 387) observed: Internally, the organisation and behaviour of the local authorities have changed […] New policy, expectations, innovative forms of cooperation and negotiation, adjustments in the organisation (e.g. establishing a department for EU affairs) and task division (e.g. allocating personnel to EU affairs) are common third-order consequences of the Europeanisation process.

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This chapter focuses on the awareness, the attitudes and the institutional and organisational adaptation of local government to European integration as crucial links to understand the interplay between the different domains of Europeanisation: the top-down impact of EU policies (Chap.  3) and the subsequent horizontal (Chap.  5) and bottom-up (Chaps. 6 and 7) engagement in European affairs. The chapter demonstrates the variable geometry of this process with an in-depth discussion of the internalisation of EU affairs for the case of Flanders in Belgium.

Awareness of European Affairs As Miles (2007, p. 10) notes, Europeanisation refers to “the process in which the focus of attention of policy-makers may become greater and drawn more strongly to EU-related matters (in both a quantitative and qualitative sense)”. By 1993, Goldsmith (1993, p.  683) had already observed that the EU had become an important point of reference for local actors. As the integration process advanced in the early 1990s and the establishment of the CoR brought local councillors in direct contact with the EU, local actors became exposed to European policy initiatives and to the practices of local authorities within other Member States (Benington & Harvey, 1999, p. 200). Though dealing with EU issues was not a high priority within the large majority of local authorities back then, it did not go unnoticed that EU policies had caused an increase in workload for them  (Goldsmith & Sperling, 1997, p. 102). Throughout the 1990s local actors and institutions had increasingly recognised the impact of EU legislation and were becoming aware of financial opportunities provided by cohesion policy (Bache, 2008, p. 120; Martin, 1997, p. 54). When local authorities started to monitor the new political framework and disseminate information to their administrations and localities at large (cf. John, 2001), local government associations and networks operated as the ‘eyes and ears’ in Brussels on behalf of their members (see Chap. 5). Despite this growing awareness, at the beginning of the new millennium, Goldsmith (2003, p. 128) suggested that the rise of local attention to Brussels had still been incremental, slow and varied greatly across Europe. Kettunen and Kull (2009, p. 130) argued that due to the different status of local government, European awareness has been stronger in the north than in the south. For instance, local authorities in the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden have paid relatively

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high attention to the EU (Guderjan, 2015).1 Yet, a 2012 survey amongst local authorities across North Rhine-Westphalia showed that awareness varies just as much within these states. Here, Europe was an important item on the agenda for about half of the larger cities (Landua, 2012). In an in-depth case study of North Rhine-Westphalia (and the North West of England), Guderjan also found that Local administrations […] know about the EU’s legal impact and funding opportunities, but the majority of local authorities do not show an in-depth awareness of European policies. Major cities have been ahead in developing a European agenda, because they have the adequate resources and are generally more interested in developing international profiles to compete globally. Though the size of an organisation matters, there are larger authorities with limited interest in Europe and also small boroughs with relatively aware policy-makers and officers. (Guderjan, 2015, p. 944)

A study of 48 EUROCITIES members corroborated the relative effect of municipal size on the awareness of European affairs within local government. Surprisingly, some three out of four members indicated to be not very or only modestly interested in and enthusiastic about EU affairs, and barely one out of five EU liaison officers felt satisfactorily knowledgeable about EU policies and legislation. Interest and knowledge was mostly limited to task-specific areas, such as EU funding, European projects and best practice sharing with other cities. Political objectives and EU policy-­ making (e.g. lobbying, participation in EU consultation, impact of EU legislation), on the other hand, were of lesser concern even in many major cities (Verhelst, 2019, pp. 86–91). Verhelst (2019, p. 89) has therefore suggested that “the interest in and satisfaction with the knowledge of EU affairs in the city administration should (still) be called mediocre—even though boosting the interest is placed on either the political or the administrative agenda in many cities”. While many cities disseminate information about Europe internally and/or externally (see below), some of them have taken their engagement to another level by training their personnel in EU affairs. Other studies (Catalano & Graziano, 2011, p. 8; Eckert et  al., 2013; Guderjan, 2015; Bacon, 2016, p.  108) have also shown that local authorities are not equally drawn into EU business as their national governments. 1  Other authors (cf. John, 2000, pp.  883–885), however, argued that the north-south divide did not sufficiently account for the differences in local-level Europeanisation.

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Notwithstanding the knowledge of EU legislation and funding opportunities within local government, ‘Europe’ remains of second or third order and a minor concern on the agenda of many local politicians, and the domestic space continues to dominate local thinking. As EU directives are not directly applicable but require legislation within Member States to come into effect, in-depth expertise of specific European legislation is not always necessary for the daily work of local administrations. And yet, the promotion of partnership and dialogue and the participation in EU policy initiatives, ranging from the Lisbon Strategy to its successor Europe 2020 and the Urban Agenda (see Chap. 1), have stimulated local government to align its strategies with the European agenda (Catalano & Graziano, 2011; Van Bever et al., 2011, pp. 236 et seq.). Overall, Guderjan (2015, p. 945) found: There is an increasing convergence of policy agenda, as national and subnational strategies are aligned with European framework policies, like Europe 2020, but so far local governments remain largely at the implementing end. Only a few engaged officers and local politicians would act as policy entrepreneurs within EU affairs.

The next section sheds more light on these reasons and motives to engage or disengage with European affairs and wider questions of EU integration.

Attitudes towards the EU Alongside awareness, local attitudes towards EU affairs and integration are prerequisites for the internal adaptation and horizontal cooperation and mobilisation on budgetary and regulatory issues. As European integration triggers political spillover influencing norms, values, interests and preferences of Member States, local actors are also expected to shift their loyalties and orientations towards the EU. Considering the range of attitudes towards the EU, it is useful to distinguish between pragmatic day-to-day issues, such as legislation, funding and network opportunities and wider constitutional questions. Clearly one of the caveats in making claims about the attitudes of local authorities towards the EU is their vast diversity. It is, for obvious reasons, impossible to capture the views of all politicians and officials working for local government across Europe. Whereas the vast majority of local actors do not

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proactively engage with Europe, it is primarily the ambitions of local political leaders that drive European engagement and ensure political support for dedicated councillors and specialised officers to promote European issues effectively within local administrations (Bacon, 2016, p. 109). At the same time, administrative entrepreneurialism by officers with a professional interest in ‘Europe’ is often equally important for a proactive engagement. For local government, European integration is often depicted as a story of opportunities and constraints (Fleurke & Willemse, 2006b). To some extent, local attitudes can be explained by a pragmatic cost-benefit analysis in local authorities (cf. Huggins, 2018). Given the limited resources and capacities, local actors do not internalise EU norms and preferences unconditionally. Instead, they need to be goal-oriented, deliver tangible results and justify their expenses. Local policy-makers then support or resist integrating with Europe because of the corresponding advantages or constraints that they relate to European integration. The most direct and visible benefit of European integration comes from the EU’s funding opportunities, as John (2001, p. 67) argued: “Any public authority becomes alert if it can access pots of money, and for many this incentive is the main reason for engaging with European affairs”. Horizontal cooperation and the exchange of experience and knowledge with other local authorities across Europe have traditionally been another major engine for local authorities to engage with the EU (Guderjan, 2015, p. 949; Guderjan & Miles, 2016, p. 646; Bacon, 2016, p. 25). Although local actors are uneasy with the heavy workload and complex procedures that come with these opportunities, EU programmes are an extra lever to implement policy agendas for which they would otherwise lack the financial resources or to develop new policies (Van Bever et  al., 2011, pp. 274–275, 279; Verhelst, 2019, pp. 91–92). For a small group of pioneers, becoming a ‘European city’ is even an end in itself insofar as their political and administrative elites seek to step out of their ‘national comfort zone’ (cf. Goldsmith, 1993, pp.  694–695; Marshall,  2005, pp. 680–681; Kern, 2009, pp. 18–19). Establishing an international profile serves several purposes. It helps to attract funding for prestigious ‘flagship projects’ (competitive function); it enhances a city’s appeal as a partner for transnational cooperation (cooperative function); it presents a role model for peer cities (mimetic function); and it gives the city an authoritative voice in European policy-making (political function).

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Although local authorities have become very aware of the impact of EU policies and legislation, an additional layer of governance does not only provide opportunities but also poses constraints to local autonomy (Van Bever et  al., 2011, pp.  274–275). Local actors have regularly expressed their dissatisfaction with European legislation and the additional financial and bureaucratic burden it brings about (Guderjan, 2015, p. 949; Guderjan & Miles, 2016, p. 646). European regulations on services of general interest and public procurement, for instance, limit the ability of local authorities to provide state aid as they overrule local regulations. Particularly in Member States where local authorities enjoy a strong constitutional status (mostly in Western Europe), this interference in local competences challenges their idea of local self-government (Fleurke & Willemse, 2006a, p. 84 et seq.; Bacon, 2016, p. 75). And still, a 2013 survey among German cities (of over 100,000 inhabitants) found that over two thirds show a positive attitude towards European integration in general and believe that it offers new opportunities for them (Bacon, 2016, p.  145). In order to benefit from a European-wide economy and joint policies, and not at least peace and stability on the continent, local politicians are willing to accept the obligations of EU membership in return (Guderjan, 2015, p. 949; Guderjan & Miles, 2016, p. 646). While local actors have a fairly clear idea about the direct advantages and disadvantages of European integration for them, they pay less attention to the constitutional and institutional evolution of the EU as a whole. Nevertheless, Lindh et  al. (2009, p.  41) argue that subnational actors “have a stake in political terms in ensuring that the European Union succeeds in order to satisfy domestic policy outcomes even if this affects and complicates daily […] politics”. Certainly, a book about the European integration of local government needs to ask if, and to what extent, local actors perceive themselves as part of a wider system of governance and whether they “redefine their interests and behaviour to meet the imperatives, norms, and logic of EU membership” (Featherstone, 2003, p. 12). Since the mid-1990s, the Union’s approach of multilevel partnerships and multi-stakeholder governance has sensitised the Commission towards local practices and led to the consultation of local representatives at the policy-making stage (Münch, 2006b, p. 361). In Chap. 2, we explained that actors from different levels of governance have increasingly appreciated the inclusive nature of European governance and pushed for new

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institutional and procedural arrangements providing them with greater influence on policy outcomes. Unlike their national governments, however, local actors have only limited, if any, influence on the macro-­ directions of European integration. For local politicians and officers of smaller authorities, constitutional issues such as the Lisbon Treaty are simply too abstract to be on the political agenda of their council or administration.2 This does not imply that such macro-views are completely absent. Local actors who have experience in cooperating with the Commission—municipal umbrella organisations, transnational networks, a few local policy entrepreneurs and engaged officers—have learned to steer their way through the messy institutionalised processes of European governance and know how to use the flexible channels to participate and promote their interests in EU policy-making (Goldsmith, 2003, pp.  121 et  seq.; Schultze, 2003, p. 124; see Chaps. 7 and 8). Still, most local actors will not have this view of the EU as an inclusive system that can serve their immediate interests (see Kettunen & Kull, 2009 for Estonia and Finland; Guderjan, 2013, 2015 for Germany). From their perspective, the interests of national actors usually overrule local concerns, which are therefore often dropped within negotiations between Council of Ministers and European Parliament. Along the same lines, the Commission is not always perceived as a ‘good ally’, but rather as an opponent insensitive to municipal practices and against which local self-government consequently needs to be protected (Maennle, 2003; Witte, 2011, p. 294; Guderjan, 2015, p. 949; Guderjan & Miles, 2016, p. 647).3 Whether or not local actors show a preference for the EU’s inclusive system of governance depends, amongst other factors, on the position of local authorities within a Member State and the availability of financial and personnel resources (De Rooij, 2002, p.  449; Jeffery, 2000, pp.  2 et seq.). Especially, actors from local authorities which are strongly controlled by their national government seem to appreciate direct engagement with the Commission and other EU institutions to promote their 2  It is quite striking in this regard to note how in 2018, many local authorities in Belgium were not (yet) convinced of the strong impact that Brexit or the Urban Agenda would have on them (Verhelst, 2019, pp. 88–89). 3  As we will explain in Chaps. 6, 7 and 8, this view informs the strategies of local actors to lobby and upload their preferences into European policy-making.

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interests (see Dabrowski, 2014 for Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary; Guderjan & Miles, 2016 for England). Nevertheless, the case of Estonia shows that there are also municipalities with comparatively weak positions, which have not adapted their orientation and working processes to the EU simply because they do not believe in having a say over European politics in the first place (Kull & Tatar, 2015). Local authorities with a strong constitutional status, in turn, believe that their actions and demands are politically legitimised by their citizens and should therefore be prioritised over other interests by getting privileged access to consultation procedures. Regional and local bodies therefore strongly welcomed the recognition of subsidiarity, the right to local self-government and the right of action for the CoR within the Lisbon Treaty. A few actors would even hope to gain permanent access to the Commission’s working groups and committees and in the most extreme case to embed local governance as a cross-cutting issue in the Commission (Hoffschulte, 2006; Münch, 2006a, p. 115; Eckert et al., 2013, pp. 58 et seq.; Guderjan, 2015, p. 949; Guderjan & Miles, 2016, p. 464). Just as national governments adopt a preference for a third-way integration (see Chap. 2), local actors, although clearly operating on a smaller scale, show a similar intention to protect their local autonomy and competences from far-reaching EU interventions, while at the same time supporting supranational integration to deal with macro-­challenges, such as economic growth, environmental protection and security. Lastly, it is worth highlighting that local identities and the personal everyday experiences of citizens with their local authorities also shape actors’ perception of European integration. In the light of the recent stagnation, and even crisis, of European integration since the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty, we therefore want to briefly emphasise that public opinion and support for the EU also affect local attitudes (cf. Tausendpfund & Schäfer, 2018, p. 554). The increasing relevance of European politics in public debates and demands for local self-rule, as addressed by a post-­ functional perspective (Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Schakel et al., 2015, 270; see Chap. 2), in combination with a potential ‘spill back’ caused by the success of Euro-sceptic movements and authoritarian governments, have limited the appetite of many local actors to deepen European integration. For instance,  the rise of Euroscepticism in the years before the United Kingdom’s EU referendum had already negatively affected the European engagement of English local authorities, which used to be amongst the pioneers in Brussels (Guderjan, 2013, p.  165 et  seq.). When public

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attitudes are generally not in favour of the EU, local government’s integration with Europe is constrained and even more dependent on entrepreneurial local politicians with a strong preference for being involved in European governance.

Institutional and Organisational Adaptation According to the loop of adaptation (see Chap. 2), governments not only adjust their preferences but also their own organisational structures to European integration (Rometsch & Wessels, 1996, p. 351; Wessels et al., 2003, p. 14). There is a strong rationale for introducing designated capacities and procedures that enable local authorities to deal with EU legislation and policies effectively, to proactively participate in funding programmes and to promote their own preferences vis-à-vis the EU (Bacon, 2016, p. 125). Because European integration neither prescribes an organisational harmonisation nor fundamentally alters local politico-­ administrative structures, the extent to which local authorities adapt their institutions, policies and organisation varies. They may appoint designated officers and teams; organise training, visits and exchanges; introduce an executive councillor or a council committee for European affairs; develop European agendas, strategies and policies; and even establish a representation in Brussels. For many smaller local authorities which lack the financial and administrative means, inter-municipal cooperation and umbrella associations offer the capacities to provide these functions collectively. Within local administrations, European officers are responsible for raising awareness for European affairs, promoting and organising proactive engagement, obtaining and distributing information (e.g. via newsletters, meetings and events) and coordinating policy and funding activities across different departments, as well as engaging in national and international municipal networking activities. Because ‘Europe’ is a cross-cutting task affecting different administrative sectors, local authorities often designate it a central position within their administrations, commonly attached to the mayor’s office. This allows them to increase the authority of the designated officers and to give ‘Europe’ greater significance beyond the allocation of funding. In some larger cities equipped with the necessary resources, lobbying and participating in consultations at the EU level is an additional part of their tasks. Some administrations have developed comprehensive structures, strategies and procedures to master European dossiers effectively. Additional training programmes increase internal capacities to this

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end, and exchanges with officers and politicians from other municipalities enable best practice exchange (Verhelst, 2019, pp.  86–93). While European affairs are still mostly dealt with by administrations rather than by councils, there are cases where elected councils delegate European issues to the mayor, council leaders or to an executive councillor responsible for international affairs. Some councils even established a specific committee, usually as part of a wider portfolio on planning and economic development dealing with the acquisition of structural funds. Consequently, European policy objectives have  entered council debates and the policy strategies of local executives, making council policies more ‘European’ in the end (cf. John, 2001, p. 72; Verhelst, 2019). These procedural changes are particularly common in Member States in which local councillors participate in the CoR (Guderjan, 2013, pp. 155, 238). The internal adaptation of local government began to take off during the early 1990s with the appointment of European officers within some major cities. Often, they came under the departments for economic development to deal with a ‘flood of regulations’ affecting their work, to seize on the opportunities to allocate EU funding and to participate in transnational networks (Benington & Harvey, 1999, p.  203; Marshall, 2005, p. 101). England was among the pioneers in these developments. By 1995, 73% of English local authorities had hired one or more officers; 50% had at least one full-time position designated for European issues and 10% appointed a European unit; 35% of authorities had established working groups on European affairs to work across different administrative departments; and 27% had nominated a special contact for European questions within each department (Martin, 1997, pp. 58–59). In comparison, over half of Irish, around 40% of West German (15% in East Germany in 1991), 30% of Dutch and 8% of Danish municipalities had delegated European issues to dedicated members of their administrations (Bacon, 2016, p. 114). In Germany, a Member State in which local government enjoys a strong constitutional status, the majority of larger cities had adapted their administrations, but most authorities with fewer than 100,000 inhabitants had not introduced European competencies by the early 2000s (von Alemann & Münch, 2006, pp. 17–19; Münch, 2006a, pp. 178–191; Wessels, 2000, p. 270). Since then about a third of the 71 major German cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants surveyed in 2013 adopted a European mission statement for their administration, while only 2.8% maintained no European capacity. About 30% of the cities appointed more than one

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officer dedicated to European affairs, 24.2% had one and 43.9% had only a part-time EU officer (Bacon, 2016, pp.  147–152). In North RhineWestphalia, the largest German Land, in about 60% of local authorities European issues were dealt with in one or more administrative departments (Landua, 2012). A more recent study of EUROCITIES members affirms that a department or unit for European affairs has become a fairly common arrangement in the major cities (two thirds of the cities), and almost every one of them introduced procedures to disseminate EU-related information within their administration, mostly on EU funding opportunities (87.5%), European projects managed by the city (77.1%), participation in the EUROCITIES network (77.1%) and best practices in other European cities (56.3%). About 30% have even  set up an internal programme to train their staff on European matters (Verhelst, 2019, pp. 87–88). The establishment of a representation in Brussels is the most eye-­ catching as well as the most recourceful and therefore rarest form of adaptation. When the EU developed its regional policy in the late 1980s and adopted a responsive attitude towards subnational representation, this changed the opportunity structure at EU level (Ercole et al., 1997, p. 234; Heichlinger, 1999, pp.  5–6; Moore, 2008, p.  521). The complexity of funding programmes, new legislation and decision-making required local antenna in Brussels to collect and distribute information. In addition to monitoring and sharing information around legal initiatives, policy developments and funding opportunities, the main roles of the Brussels representations involve networking, liaising with sub-regional and European actors, influencing policy, promoting localities in the EU and supporting local politicians (Ercole et al., 1997, pp. 232–233; Benington & Harvey, 1999, p. 203; Heichlinger, 1999, pp. 15–17; Marks et al., 2002, pp. 4–6; Marshall, 2005, p. 108; Huysseune & Jans, 2008, p. 5).4 Birmingham was the first city to open an office in Brussels in 1984. Subsequently, a snowball effect created ‘a rush to be represented’ (Goldsmith, 2011, p. 42), as local authorities did not want to miss out on this new opportunity (Heichlinger, 1999, p. 1). By the end of the 1990s, 4  A study of Marks et al. (2002) into the policy activities of subnational offices in Brussels revealed that they consider information to be their primary function, before networking and liaising. Lobbying was deemed slightly less important and determined by the size and budget of the office and by the office type. Collective associations pay more importance to the lobby function than individual ones.

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the United Kingdom had the highest number of local (not regional) permanent representations which allowed them to bypass central government and get direct access to European funding. UK authorities were followed by their counterparts in Germany and Spain (John, 2001, p. 86; Huysseune & Jans, 2008, p. 2; Goldsmith, 2003, p. 124; Rowe, 2011, pp. 55, 65; Bacon, 2016, p. 97).5 In the course of the 2004 enlargement of the Union, many local authorities from the new Member States added to the landscape which nowadays comprises about 300 representations of local and regional authorities. Although they have no formal status, the EU does acknowledge those representations as consultative bodies.6 Rather than representing individual authorities (as it was the case for the United Kingdom), it is largely local government associations which maintain a representation in Brussels to act on behalf of their members (Callanan, 2012, pp. 771–772). To create further synergies and pool resources, it has moreover become common practice to establish office communities between different associations (Kettunen & Kull, 2009, p.  124). The Eurocommunalle office of the three German-wide associations for cities, counties and municipalities is a typically  cited example of this (Münch, 2006b, pp. 364–365; Rechlin, 2004, p. 40; Struve, 2006, pp. 339–340; Bacon, 2016, pp. 95–97).7 Regardless of whether they operate as an individual or a collective representation, Brussels offices have become central outposts of local government in the EU, epitomising the interplay between top-down, horizontal and bottom-up dynamics.

Awareness, Attitudes and Adaptation at Play: The Case of Flanders Although  relevant local actors do generally acknowledge that European integration has some effect on their work, the direction and extent (cf. Radaelli, 2000) to which the awareness and attitudes of local actors are Europeanised varies greatly across local authorities, as does their institutional and organisational adaptation. Goldsmith and Klausen (1997) 5  For an overview of the different types of Brussels offices, see Heichlinger, 1999, pp. 10–11. 6  http://www.commissioner.brussels/i-am-an-organisation/regional-representations. 7  The Eurocommunalle opened a common office in Brussels as early as 1991, which later in 2002 was divided into three individual offices on joint premises. In 2007, a number of collective representations from other Member States moved to the joint House of Cities, Municipalities and Regions in Brussels.

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suggested that counteractive and passive authorities are either sceptical or ignorant about EU affairs and, either deliberately or unintentionally, have little engagement with EU policies and politics. While reactive authorities already show a higher level of awareness, only proactive authorities pay great attention to the EU and develop their own agenda and activities (Goldsmith, 1993, p. 694). Until today “there is only a small minority of cities and municipalities that belong to the pioneering group of fully Europeanised governments”, as De Ceuninck et al. (2019, p. 388) argued. Many local authorities remain either passive or reactive to European integration and have not adjusted their agenda and practices to it. They have not fully internalised European policies and developed their own agenda in response; and in John’s (2000, pp. 881 et seq.; 2001, p. 74) sense, they are therefore not fully Europeanised. Many studies (cf. De Rooij, 2002; Hamedinger & Wolffhardt, 2010; Eckert et  al., 2013, pp.  158–159; Dabrowski, 2014, pp.  378 et  seq; Callanan & Tatham, 2014, p. 190; Kull & Tatar, 2015, p. 235 et seq.; Guderjan, 2015, p. 944; Guderjan & Miles, 2016, p. 645; De Ceuninck et  al., 2019, p.  388) have identified an interplay of various factors to account for the variation in which local authorities become aware of and supportive towards European affairs and re-organise accordingly. These factors pertain to the cultural and structural features of cities (e.g. political and administrative entrepreneurialism, size, resources, economic performance) but also to the characteristics of the wider political system in which they are embedded (e.g. competences, eligibility for privileged funding for prioritised target areas,8 geography, national culture and party politics). These elements are well illustrated by the case of Flanders, a region in the North of Belgium which comprises 300 comparatively small municipalities enjoying a moderate level of autonomy (cf. Steyvers, 2015). At the end of the twentieth century, De Rynck (1997) summed up the Europeanisation of Belgian local authorities under the title of ‘Belgian Local Government: Far Away from Brussels’. The article concluded that at that time, Belgian local authorities were hardly aware of the impact of EU policies at the local level. As a result, Europe was of no concern to most of them, and they were poorly informed, had hardly adapted and were only occasionally engaged. Their involvement was reactive rather 8  Bacon (2016, pp.  108–109), however, argues that privileged funding status does not necessarily result in more proactive European engagement.

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than proactive and did not follow from explicit strategies. Such ignorance within a Member State home to the EU’s main institutions was quite ‘astonishing’ (John, 2000, p. 884). De Rynck (1997) attributed this lacklustre behaviour to a number of causes, such as the small scale of Belgian municipalities, the lack of political leadership and the transversal nature of EU policy, which did not sit well with the fragmented and party-­politicised political structure of Belgian local government. Belgium’s municipal umbrella associations were also  rather passive, and the strong European aspirations of the Belgian regions pushed local authorities to the background. The most active authorities were found in the Walloon region, which had more economically deprived areas. De Rynck’s predictions for the future were hardly optimistic (1997, p. 142): “Since most municipalities are poorly informed and do not see EU policies as exerting much influence upon them, there is no external incentive which could trigger interest in EU affairs”. Two decades later the situation has noticeably improved amongst Flemish municipalities: a  majority of them  have become aware of the impact of EU rules and programmes (see Table  4.1). Cautiously, local politicians and administrations have developed a greater interest in and knowledge of European affairs and share relevant information, especially about projects and programmes in which they participate—although the number of proactive cities is still modest.

Table 4.1  Awareness of European affairs in Flemish local government Indicators Impact of rules/regulations Impact of subsidies/programmes Impact of relations with other local authorities Political interest Administrative interest Political knowledge Administrative knowledge Communication to citizens Communication to businesses Communication about EU projects Communication about EU programmes

% (very) great

% moderate

% (very) little

N

51.4 43.8 10.5

42.9 44.8 34.3

5.7 11.4 55.2

105 105 105

6.6 6.5 9.4 8.5 6.6 5.7 26.7 24.5

34.9 37.4 33.0 37.7 28.3 28.3 30.5 35.8

58.5 56.1 57.6 53.8 65.1 66.0 42.8 39.7

106 107 106 106 106 106 105 106

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Apart from raising their awareness, Flemish local authorities have developed more positive and active attitudes towards European affairs. Figure 4.1 illustrates that pragmatism prevails on the European agenda of the communes as they are mostly interested in funding for programmes (around 75%) and projects (around 70%), in networks (around 50%), in best practice exchange (around 45%) and in twinning (around 40%). Monitoring EU legislation is another high priority for communes (around 60%), which is likely to increase the awareness of EU policies. The figure shows that size matters, as bigger cities (with more than 25,000 inhabitants; yellow line) score generally higher for networking, project work and the development of a European identity. Communes with strong political leadership in European affairs (red line) are even more incentivised to promote a European agenda. Pro-European leadership in the administration (grey line) adds extra relevance for engaging with specific policy issues, such as best practice exchange, legislative monitoring, funding and project work.

Influence the EU Win European awards

Build a European identity

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Share best practices

Participate in networks

Participate in projects

Attract funding

Learn best practices

Monitor EU rules Active twinning

All communes

Strong mayoral leadership

Strong administrative leadership

Large cities

Fig. 4.1  European policy agenda in Flemish local government (% important)

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Table 4.2 indicates that in almost half of the communes, leading politicians and designated officers have adopted an entrepreneurial attitude. EU programmes enable not only the delivery of policies that were already in the pipeline but also the development of new policies. Showcasing policies on the international scene is a lesser priority. Participation in Europe-wide networks and partnerships is driven foremost by the possibility to access funding, followed by best practice and knowledge exchange. Although it appears to be a second-order issue, up to two thirds of communes engage in networks and partnerships because they believe that this helps to promote local interests at the EU level, build a European identity and train their staff. Overall, a pragmatic cost-benefit analysis seems to inform the attitudes of local actors in Flanders. Lastly, Table 4.3 demonstrates that there is still a majority of Flemish municipalities that have not fundamentally adapted their organisation and procedures and remain passive in this respect or reactive at best.9 In around 40%, European affairs have been made part of a wider policy portfolio. Still, in 50 to 75% of local authorities, European dossiers are on the agenda Table 4.2  Attitudes towards the EU in Flemish local government Indicators

% (very) great % moderate % (very) little N

Leadership in European affairs Mayor 18.1 Executive councillor 16.5 Municipal CEO 13.3 Administrative officer 16.5 Motives to participate in European programmes Delivering existing policies 88.4 Developing new policies 75.4 Strengthening municipal policy 69.6 Building a European identity 7.2 Motives to participate in European networks or partnerships Exchanging best practice and knowledge 52.9 Obtaining EU funding 72.3 Defending local interests at EU level 11.9 Building a European identity 28.9 Training officers 24.8

35.2 32.0 41.0 28.2

46.7 51.5 45.7 55.3

105 103 105 103

5.8 17.4 13.0 30.4

5.8 7.2 17.4 62.4

69 69 69 69

25.5 19.8 47.5 35.6 33.7

21.6 7.9 52.6 35.7 41.5

102 101 101 101 101

9  In addition to the variance within the data, we expect municipalities that did not participate in the study to be more passive.

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Table 4.3  Institutional and organisational adaptation in Flemish local government Indicators Institutions and organisation Mayor responsible for EU affairs Executive councillor responsible for EU affairs Department for EU affairs Policy officers for EU affairs (+ average FTE’s) Training and information on EU affairs Visit to EU institutions Policy Strategy for EU programmes and funding (+ under development) EU affairs in the policy agreement EU affairs in the strategic policy plan EU affairs on the agenda of the executive board EU affairs on the council agenda Cooperative arrangements with other organisations Provinces Flemish government The umbrella association of Flemish local government Inter-municipal companies Other Flemish municipalities

% yes

N

21.5 16.8 4.7 31.7 (0.3) 33.6 15.2

107 107 107 63 107 66

12.3 (+ 14.2)

106

14.0 18.7 75.7 52.3

107 107 107 107

34.0 29.2 14.3 18.1 14.3

106 106 105 105 105

of the council or the executive board, though only 14 to 19% have included them formally in their strategic planning. Importantly, institutional and organisational adaptation is largely about appointing and training designated officers (nearly one out of three). Developing a strategy to obtain European funding and organising visits to European institutions is less common (around 25% and 15%). For smaller municipalities facing structural barriers in terms of size and resources, cooperative arrangements with other local authorities, inter-municipal companies, the provinces, the Flemish government and the umbrella association enable a collective approach to engage in European affairs. As this case study shows, Flemish municipalities have significantly evolved in terms of awareness, attitudes and adaption to European affairs. The speed of such an internalisation, however, differs markedly. A large group of authorities is driven mostly by financial incentives and remains passive or reactive. Still, a  small number of pioneers have developed a strong European awareness and proactive attitude and adjusted their

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organisation and agenda. Whether or not local authorities turn from passive to proactive players in the European integration process depends not only on their size but is also contingent upon their geography (e.g. border towns), the entrepreneurialism of leading politicians and officers and the presence of particular policies and expertise that are compatible with a broader European framework (e.g. on energy efficiency, tourism).

Conclusion This chapter has presented an essential link between the top-down impact of EU policies (see Chap. 3) and the bottom-up engagement feeding into the integration cycle (see Chaps. 6, 7, and 8). Over the last three decades, local government has paid increasing attention towards European affairs and responded and adapted to the new system of governance. A high level of awareness, a clearly defined attitude and institutional responses to European integration are not present in every European local authority. The status of local authorities within the national politico-administrative system, as well as the entrepreneurialism of local politicians and officers, plays an important role for internalising EU affairs. Only a few proactive authorities, in particular bigger cities, have aligned their agenda with a wider European policy framework. Overall, it is the domestic space that remains the primary reference for most local authorities in Europe. Even though it is hardly possible to capture the variety of attitudes towards integration at the local level, we can still observe some general patterns. Local actors engaged in European affairs generally appreciate the tangible benefits of European integration, such as free trade and movement, funding and opportunities to cooperate horizontally with other local actors. In turn, they have little choice but to accept the legal constraints to their practice and extra burdens and costs that come with it. Notwithstanding that most local authorities show limited interest in the EU’s wider constitutional and institutional trajectories, local actors and agents have over time expressed their desire to protect local autonomy from European interventions and expand their access to EU policy-­making. Whether local actors appreciate the accessibility of European governance or whether they perceive the EU as insensitive to local practices and as a threat to local selfgovernment is partly related to their own constitutional status. This chapter has also shown that an adaptation of local administrations has become fairly common for many authorities in order to allocate EU funding, manage relevant information and coordinate EU-related

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activities. In some cases, EU affairs have become explicitly included in the political agenda and strategic planning. Depending on their size and resources, local authorities have  either appointed part-time or full-time officers or even established administrative departments dedicated to European affairs. Smaller authorities which are endowed with less resources can appeal to other municipalities, higher political levels, inter-municipal companies and umbrella associations to receive the information, cooperation and support they need to engage with Europe. Brussels offices are the most ambitious form of institutional adaptation, but they are only maintained by a small minority of cities (or city regions) or by municipal umbrella organisations. These hubs operate as the eyes and ears of local government at the European level and perform a wide range of functions that are part of the integration cycle, such as disseminating information, applying for funding, facilitating horizontal cooperation, lobbying policies and participating in consultations. Overall, we can conclude that though European integration has impacted on the thinking, practices and structures of local government, it has not fundamentally altered them. The extent to which local actors pay attention, support and adapt to EU affairs depends not only on a pragmatic cost-benefit analysis (cf. Huggins, 2018; Bacon, 2016) but also on engaged individuals, narratives, political visions, citizens’ attitudes and social norms. How such internal dynamics translate into external horizontal and vertical activities will be discussed in the following chapters.

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CHAPTER 5

The Horizontal Perspective: Twinning, Networks and Territorial Cooperation

Introduction Having discussed the internal adaptation of local authorities in the previous chapter, this chapter is devoted to their external adaptation to European integration through horizontal cooperation and networks. Networking marks one of the most fundamental developments for both local actors and European institutions (Goldsmith, 1993, p.  696) and, according to Le Galès (2002, p. 105), is “a key indicator of the institutionalization of Europe at levels beyond and below nation-states”. Promoted and funded since the 1990s by the Commission, the European Parliament and the Committee of the Regions, local authorities have developed numerous horizontal networks across Europe and beyond that vary in size, duration, scope and functionality (Martin, 1997, pp. 63–65; Smith, 1998, pp. 62; Martin & Pearce, 1999, pp. 32–37; Mather, 2000, p. 163 et seq.; Phelps et al., 2002, pp. 212–214; Zerbinati, 2004, p. 1001; Zerbinati & Massey, 2008, p. 84; Huggins, 2018a, pp. 1263–1264). Horizontal cooperation between local authorities in the EU is usually seen as a beneficial way to exchange experiences and best practices, to pool resources  and enhance individual capacity, as well as to find innovative solutions for joint problems. Participation in such networks is voluntary but conditional, exacting and contingent upon historic and cultural differences. In some cases, particularly when local authorities are faced with financial constraints, membership in networks provides an added © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Guderjan, T. Verhelst, Local Government in the European Union, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74382-6_5

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financial value and access to funding for projects that could not be realised otherwise or competed for against better-resourced authorities. Horizontal networking then follows pre-determined goals as part of a wider strategic agenda based on an economic cost-benefit analysis (cf. Huggins, 2018a, pp.  1268–1272). For many local authorities, however, the exchange of information, experience and culture, and even building an international identity precede and outweigh the competitive advantages of acquiring extra funding (cf. Bacon, 2016, p.  168; Landua, 2012, pp.  14–15; Marshall, 2005, p. 680). As for the internal adaptation of local government, the horizontal cooperation of local authorities in the EU is distinct from top-down and bottom-up Europeanisation, yet often interlinked. For one thing, without horizontal partnerships and networks, local authorities would not be able to seize the bulk of funding opportunities. For another, horizontal activities result from, and simultaneously lead to a shift in, local actors’ attention towards Brussels. Such coordination and cooperation allows local actors to keep track of European legislation, to aggregate common positions towards EU policies and subsequently to upload their interests to the European arena (Phelps et  al., 2002, pp.  213–214; Kern & Bulkeley, 2009; Lindh et  al., 2009, p.  39). By learning from other localities and formulating joint positions (cross-loading, Marshall, 2005, p. 673), local government can feed back innovative policies into the EU’s agenda (John, 2000, p.  882, 2001, p.  72) and even into the trajectories of European integration. This makes an important link in the integration cycle and to some extent connects the top-down impact of EU legislation and policies to the bottom-up engagement. Considering the wide diversity of horizontal cooperation between local authorities, this chapter will set out three broad types of networks, namely town twinning, transnational municipal networks and territorial cooperation (cf. Ercole et al., 1997, p. 219).1

Town Twinning Town twinning is likely to be the most common form of horizontal cooperation between local authorities in Europe. The CEMR (2007, pp. 3–4) counted over 17,000 twinnings with a majority set up by France, Germany,

1  For Ercole et  al. (o.c.), participation in the advisory councils of the EU represents a fourth collective activity of local authorities in the EU. We will discuss this activity in Chap. 6.

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Italy, Poland and the United Kingdom, but also by Scandinavian cities. Because this form of networking has no pre-set rules or requirements (Baycan-Levent et al., 2010), twinning arrangements are not as straightforward as one might think but rather complex and multidimensional (Janczak, 2017). As a rule of thumb, town twinning involves bilateral formalised and long-term relationships between two municipalities, cities or counties from different countries established for various, well-defined purposes (Clarke, 2010, p. 2; Falkenhain et al., 2012, p. 231). The CEMR (2007, p. 2) more specifically defines town twinning as “the coming together of two communities seeking, in this way, to take action with a European perspective in the aim of facing their problems and developing between themselves closer ties of friendship”. In a broader sense, this type of networking involves the “cooperative arrangements between cities, towns, and even non-adjacent countries promoting economic and cultural ties” (Joenniemi & Janczak, 2017, p. 424).2 General accounts of local-level Europeanisation often treat town twinning as little more than a curious relic from the past. Research indicates that the landscape of town twinning is slowly becoming saturated (Falkenhain et  al., 2012), whereby  the rise of Euroscepticism put town twinning further under pressure (Janczak, 2017). Yet, twinning is not only cities’ first step on the international stage in many cases (Vion, 2002, p. 623), until today it is an integral part of the integration of local government in the EU, and it has been in the focus of a growing body of literature (Joenniemi & Janczak, 2017). As Janczak (2017, p. 490) suggests: Theorizing about European town twinning seems to be a challenging task, due to the multidimensional and varied character of the phenomenon. […] European integration grand theories […] offer an interesting framework […], they are, however, too general to understand this process, and, additionally, twinning itself only partly results from continental integration processes. Finally, the link between them and microstructures is missing in the academic debate, despite literature considering town twins as laboratories of European integration […].

 There is a wide array of synonyms for twinning arrangements, including sister/connected/double/partner/twin cities, twin city partnerships, jumelages, etc. (see De Villiers et al., 2007, p. 1; Kern, 2009, p. 15; Joenniemi & Sergunin, 2011, pp. 121–122; Janczak, 2017, p. 479). Town twinning can also refer to partnerships between cities in the same country (cf. Joenniemi & Sergunin, 2011) or to the specific twinning of two cities lying across a national border (‘border twin towns’; cf. Janczak, 2017). 2

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For a number of reasons, town twinning represents ‘another face of integration’ (Joenniemi & Sergunin, 2011). The central motive behind many twinning arrangements has been to promote peace and reconciliation3 through mutual understanding, friendship and socio-cultural exchange4 (Le Galès, 2002; Kern, 2009; Falkenhain et al., 2012; Joenniemi & Sergunin, 2011). Historically and politically, it is remarkable how “[a]t every step in the process of European construction, twinning has had a fundamental role to play”, as the CEMR (2007, p. 2) claims. Town twinning is a Europe-wide phenomenon that dates back to the Middle Ages (Zelinsky, 1991; Vion, 2002; De Villiers et  al., 2007; Falkenhain et al., 2012).5 In the wake of the Second World War, twinning was an attempt to build a new international political order on the basis of municipal institutions (Vion, 2002, p. 640) and rapidly grew under the rivalry between two French institutions, the Council of European Municipalities (CEM) and the Bilingual World. The latter, inspired by a universal vision of twinning, reached out to the Soviet world but was gradually overshadowed by CEM, an organisation rooted in Medieval Christian Europe which perceived municipal bonds as ways to promote European brotherhood and create a municipal-based political union in Europe.6 A  second large twinning wave took place during the Cold War in the 1970s and was again highly politicised (Falkenhain et  al., 2012, pp.  231–232). Because  twinnings across the Iron Curtain were prohibited, city ties in the East and in the West were able to thrive apart from each other. Cooperative arrangements between cities only became 3  The importance of reconciliation and peacekeeping as drivers of town twinning is reflected in the prevalence of French-German twinnings in the first phase of town twinning after World War Two (Falkenhain et al., 2012). These efforts followed from the establishment of the Union Internationale des Maires in 1947, which led to the first official post-war jumelage in 1950 (Ludwigsburg and Montbéliard). In the same period, twinnings between British and German cities were also signed (e.g. Bristol-Hannover, Oxford-Bonn, ReadingDüsseldorf in 1947) (De Villiers et al., 2007). 4  These objectives were fostered by joint activities, including junkets for dignitaries; events related to sport, culture, religion, food, remembrance and music; language and student programmes; and the exchange of trade, information, advice and equipment (Zelinsky, 1991, p. 3). 5  For example, the bond between Paderborn and Le Mans established in 836. Next to the pioneering cities, other specific social and economic groups bonding with each other (e.g. youth movements, missionary efforts, world’s fairs, business conventions) were predecessors of modern town twinning. 6  This tradition is still reflected in the standard twinning oath and several twinning rituals.

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possible after the decline of the Soviet Union in 1989. Suddenly, political elites in Central and Eastern Europe sought to bond with their counterparts in the West as part of a newly achieved self-determination that paved the way for economic and political integration. In the late 1980s, the Commission also started to provide financial assistance for a wide array of twinning projects aimed at supporting exchange, solidarity, art, culture, youth, citizenship, social inclusion and sustainable development, the improvement of local service provision and local economic development (CEMR, 2007, pp. 6–30). In particular, the Europe for Citizens programme7 has encouraged democratic and civic participation of citizens in the EU and has also explicitly targeted cities within countries in preparation of their accession to the EU (Falkenhain et al., 2012, pp. 232–233; Joenniemi & Sergunin, 2011, p. 126). The social dimension of town twinning has made an important, yet often overlooked, contribution to European integration (Falkenhain et al., 2012, p. 230; also CEMR, 2007 pp. 1–3; Joenniemi & Sergunin, 2011, p. 121). Twinnings mobilise a large number of citizens, transgressing state borders and governments (Falkenhain et al., 2012, p. 230). Transnational exchanges and contacts between citizens stimulate a mutual sense of belonging, tolerance and understanding amongst European citizens, which potentially enhances public support for the European project.8 The choice for a partner city is based on existing bilateral relations across states, economic and political similarities and geographical proximity, as well as on migration experiences and humanitarian aspirations, ties in the cultural world and civil society (Zelinsky, 1991; Falkenhain et  al., 2012; Kaltenbrunner et al., 2014; Janczak, 2017). Cities then select their specific partners in other states according to the size of city, historical ties, shared socio-economic interests or political ideologies, similar city names or even personal histories (Zelinsky, 1991; Baycan-Levent et al., 2010; Joenniemi & Sergunin, 2011; Kaltenbrunner et al., 2014). A typical feature of town 7  Initiated in 1989 and following from an ad hoc Committee report and a resolution from Parliament, Europe for Citizens is managed by the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA) and currently funded with EUR 187 718 000 of which 60% is allocated to town twinning, networks of towns and civil society projects. 8  Especially for young people, twinning projects are often a first way to get acquainted with the EU. According to Falkenhain et al. (2012, p. 230), alongside ERASMUS, town twinning has been a mechanism of ‘social engineering’ through which the EU and Member States sought to foster networking and exchange from the bottom up. Twinnings between cities from Central, Eastern and Western Europe are outstanding examples thereof (Hoetjes, 2009).

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High

Technical/ Expertise

Active European citizenship

Low

High

LOCAL SOCIETY

Symbolic

Socio-Cultural

Low

LOCAL GOVERNMENT Fig. 5.1  Typology of town twinning (based on De Wachter, 2011, p. 2)

twinning is that it combines an institutional base (local government) with the involvement of local society (citizens and  NGOs) (Janczak, 2017, p. 488). The various combinations of both elements lead to a typology of four twinning clusters (De Wachter, 2011, p. 2; see Fig. 5.1). Often effective town twinning relies on the combination of high support from both civil society and local government. While symbolic twinnings are usually less active and merely confined to ceremonial meetings, cultural twinnings rest on a firm social base but lack solid political support.9 Technical jumelages have a clear institutionalised focus on exchanging knowledge and expertise but may lack the commitment of social actors if they become too professionalised (Hoetjes, 2009). The strongest twinnings thrive on an active European citizenship supported by a clear political will. Transnational exchange and cooperation in twinning partnerships has produced functional spillover by ‘introducing’ Europe into the city hall (cf. Van Bever et  al., 2011a, p.  284), offering opportunities for staff

9  Yet despite its explicit inclusive purpose (cf. Zelinsky, 1991, p. 3), in practice twinning also tends to attract a particular group of citizens with higher levels of education and socioeconomic status (Hoetjes, 2009).

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training and development and inspiring the development of more fully fledged transnational city networks and participation in EU-funded projects, which also have an important economic impact (cf. Zelinsky, 1991, pp.  24–26; CEMR, 2007; Kern, 2009; Joenniemi & Sergunin, 2011, p. 121; Janczak, 2017, p. 487). In order to ensure a lasting engagement, however, town twinnings should not only have a solid base and carefully selected partners. It is equally important that they are underpinned by active marketing, committed and sound management and the support of a good business plan (De Villiers et al., 2007). Throughout the years, many twinnings have transformed from cultural associations to platforms for personal and educational exchange and have also become agents for commercial exchange and economic development (O’Toole in de Villiers et  al., 2007, p.  2; also Le Galès, 2002, p.  108; Baycan-Levent et  al., 2010, pp.  1198–1200). Thematic targeting and intensification of existing partnerships have become essential for maintaining a proactive engagement of partner municipalities (Hoetjes, 2009; Baycan-Levent et al., 2010; Falkenhain et al., 2012). Modern twinnings jointly carry out projects of essential public service delivery, such as waste treatment and water management or social services, common public policies (e.g. youth activities, education and culture, economic and business development, transport infrastructure), and even set up joint working groups, committees and council sessions. As the initial purpose of the twinning has gradually given way to more permanent, structural and functional cooperation, the ‘partnership of reconciliation’ has turned into a ‘partnership of integration’ (Köhle, in Joenniemi & Janczak, 2017, p. 242; also Joenniemi & Sergunin, 2011, p. 124).

Transnational Municipal Networks Unlike bilateral town twinning, which is rooted in cultural exchanges, transnational municipal networks refer to multilateral associations of local actors pursuing specific policy agendas. Their membership is voluntary and based on a non-hierarchical and polycentric form of decentralised cooperation (Kern, 2009, p. 16). Compared to most town twinnings, transnational municipal networks are marked by their formalised structures, a high degree of consolidation, transparency, economic management and systematic monitoring and evaluation (Karvounis, 2011, pp.  218–220). They usually involve three basic groups of actors: member cities from different countries, collective institutions (a general assembly, board and

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presidency) and a general secretariat and national or sectoral coordinators (Kern, 2009, p. 16). Some also comprise national local government associations, NGOs, universities and research institutes (Karvounis, 2011, p. 218). Transnational city networks are set up to achieve common objectives (Karvounis, 2011, p. 218), even though the commitment of the network members is often highly differentiated and likely to change over time (Huggins, 2018a). In practice, the functions of these networks can be fairly wide (cf. Goldsmith, 1993, p.  696; Le Galès, 2002, p.  106; Phelps et al., 2002, p. 213; Atkinson & Rossignolo, 2010, pp. 203–207; Karvounis, 2011, p. 219): they distribute information (e.g. experiences, knowledge, best practices, ideas) and provide technical assistance to the members.  Through these  networks  cities cooperate economically and develop coordinated innovative solutions for common policy challenges. A small number of networks also pursue wider political coordination and cooperation and promote an international identity among their members. We can categorise the different types of transnational municipal networks on the basis of two different dimensions. First, network membership may range from synergy to complementarity. While synergy refers to networks comprising a specific selection of similar local authorities, complementarity networks are  more inclusive and represent a broad cross-­ section of local government (cf. Ercole et al., 1997, p. 221; Herrschel & Newman, 2017, p.  110). The second dimension describes the scope of networks, which can be distinguished on a continuum between thematic (often policy-oriented) and institutional (generally based or multi-­ purpose) networks, whereby the latter provide more complementary functions, such as internal organisation and interest representation across different policy themes (cf. Ercole et  al., 1997, p.  225; Atkinson & Rossignolo, 2010, p. 203; Van der Heiden, 2011, p. 191). When we cross both dimensions, four types of transnational city networks can broadly be discerned (Fig.  5.2):10 institutional associations, geographic/cluster networks, policy networks and sectoral networks. Networks with an institutional scope adopt a broad range of activities and cover different aspects of urban policy as their members see fit. These activities include internal organisation and political concertation, policy

10  We do not consider these ideal types to be mutually exclusive as many networks can be transformative or have overlapping or variable functions in practice.

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Complementarity

Policy Network

Institutional Association

Institutional

Thematic

SCOPE Sectoral Network

Geographic / Cluster Network Synergy

MEMBERSHIP Fig. 5.2  Typology of transnational municipal networks in Europe

input and lobbying alongside typical network functions such as project work and information exchange (cf. Kern, 2009, p. 17). Institutional associations are, strictly speaking, not networks (cf. Ercole et al., 1997, p. 223) but channels of formal representation (cf. John, 2000, p. 887). They represent local government systematically at the European level (cf. Goldsmith, 1993, p.  696; Hooghe & Marks, 1996, pp.  86–87; Greenwood, 2011, p. 192). As the umbrella association of local government within the EU, the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) is the most renowned transnational network of its kind deploying a wide range of activities in a systematic way (see Textbox 5.1). The European Confederation of Local Intermediate Authorities (CEPLI)11 is another example of an important institutional association that represents second-­ tier local authorities. Institutional associations can also cooperate on the basis of a particular function of local government, such as the European Centre of Employers and Enterprises (CEEP).12 11  CEPLI was founded in 2008 by the associations of local counties from Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland and Romania, which in total present 1167 intermediate authorities (CEPLI). 12  Founded in 1961 the CEEP includes 20 associations of local and regional authorities and public service providers and promotes municipal public service provision at the EU level.

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Textbox 5.1  The CEMR: The Association of Local and Regional Government in Europe

Since its foundation in 1951 by members from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Switzerland, the CEMR has aimed at providing a forum for debate between local and regional governments around issues related to governance, democracy, environmental protection, energy and economic, social and territorial cohesion.13 The CEMR brings together 60 national municipal umbrella associations and 130,000 individual local and regional authorities from 41 countries, organised in national sections making it the largest and most comprehensive European organisation of its kind. During the 1990s, the right of the CEMR to forward general local concerns and political preferences within official hearings, committees and expert groups of the Commission and the European Parliament was fully acknowledged by the Commission (Leitermann, 2006, p.  336; Münch, 2006b, p. 369; Struve, 2006, p. 343). Having evolved from French-­ German town twinning, the CEMR’s contribution to European integration relates in particular to  the promotion of peace, a unified Europe, democracy and the participation of citizens (CEMR14; Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008, p. 177). The CEMR maintains headquarters in Paris as well as an office in Brussels and is organised into national sections (CEMR15). The organisation of the national sections differs significantly and is dominated by the local government associations from different Member States. For instance, the French16 section rests on legal statutes and represents over 1800 local authorities, which pay membership fees. The UK section, in contrast, is represented by the Local Government Association for England and Wales (LGA), the Convention of (continued)

13  CEMR is also the European section of United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), a worldwide umbrella organisation. 14  https://ccre.org/en/article/introducing_cemr. 15  https://ccre.org/en/article/about_members. 16   The ‘Association Française pour le Conseil de Commune et Régions d’Europe’ (AFCCRE).

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Textbox 5.1  (continued)

Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA) and the Northern Ireland Local Government Association (NILGA) (Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008, pp. 177–178). In the German section, over 40 designated European officers from counties, county-exempted cities and a few county-­ constituent municipalities participate in nationwide working group meetings twice a year to share information and to discuss innovative practice and projects, funding programmes, European policies and constitutional issues. Some CEMR secretariats of national sections, such as those from Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Denmark maintain close contact and cooperate on specific issues (Guderjan, 2013; Münch, 2006a, pp. 225–226; Spengler, 2009). The national sections (together with the CEMR Secretary General) pool individual preferences of local authorities, draft joint position papers and elect representatives to the Assembly of Delegates. The Assembly sets the policy objectives and appoints the Policy Committee, the main governing body. Both are responsible for formulating the final policy positions which enjoy a high level of legitimacy but represent typically only a watered-down version that members can agree on. At the same time, CEMR committees support the Secretary General by facilitating the exchange of information and the formulation of policy objectives. The relative static structures and a highly diverse membership cause considerable difficulty for the articulation and promotion of common objectives. Though they may not always be fully committed to common positions, coordination and cooperation are essential to effectively pursue an aggregated interest (Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008, pp. 177–183).

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Geographic networks have a similarly broad institutional scope of action, yet they are based on more clearly defined membership covering local authorities from a particular territorial area (cf. Le Galès, 2002, p. 106). Examples of geographic networks are ‘Atlantic Cities’ (connecting local authorities from countries located at the Atlantic coast), ‘Balcinet’ (the Balkan Cities Network), ‘MedCities’ (grouping local authorities from Mediterranean countries), FAIC (Forum of Adriatic and Ionian Cities) and UBC (Union of Baltic Cities). The UBC, for instance, is a good case in point of how transnational territorial municipal networks can contribute to European integration (Herrschel & Newman, 2017, pp. 89–90). Its initial agenda of bridging Eastern and Western Europe on the basis of ancient town twinning links has gradually expanded, and the network now engages in international profile-building and EU policy-making by adapting its internal organisation. Cluster networks are also institutionalised, but they bring together a particular collective interest at the local level (cf. Greenwood, 2011, p. 192), such as cities with traditional industries (RETI) or a joint border (‘border twin cities’, CTA), capital cities (CCRN) and metropoles (Club des Eurométropoles). Some networks represent local authorities of a specific size, such as Eurotowns, a network of 18 medium-sized cities (50,000–250,000 inhabitants) founded in 1991 to develop joint projects and funding applications. 17 More commonly known is its bigger sibling EUROCITIES acting, together with the CEMR, as the peak association of local government at EU level (see Textbox 5.2). Unlike institutional networks, which stem from bottom-up initiatives (cf. Hooghe & Marks, 1996, p. 88), thematic networks have often emerged as functional ‘top-down spin-offs’ from specific EU-funded programmes (Hooghe & Marks, 1996, pp. 87–88; also Le Galès, 2002, p. 107; Van der Wusten & Mamadouh, 2010, p. 216; Greenwood, 2011, p. 192). Over the last decades, the Commission developed various programmes through which local authorities  have built horizontal partnerships and networks across the EU. Relevant action and framework programmes include the Environment Action Programme, Youth In Action, Europe for Citizens,

 https://www.eurotowns.org/.

17

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Textbox 5.2  EUROCITIES: The Network of European Cities

For cities with over 250,000 inhabitants, EUROCITIES provides the most effective platform for horizontal interaction on a regular basis. Initiated by the so-called second cities Barcelona, Birmingham, Frankfurt a. M., Lyon, Milan and Rotterdam in 1986, and formally established in 1991, in 1992 EUROCITIES opened an office in Brussels to support the activities of its members and maintain close links to EU institutions. The association allows its 140 members to share information and exchange knowledge in various fields of urban practice: culture, economy, environment, knowledge society, mobility, social affairs, urban governance and cooperation ­ (EUROCITIES18). Compared to institutional associations such as CEMR, EUROCITIES is a transnational network in which individual cities participate directly. The loosely coupled network disseminates information to its members, mediates interests and coordinates its positions on the basis of common urban interests. Each member can feed their input into joint policy positions through permanent thematic forums and non-permanent working groups of individual cities, and each has a vote at the Annual General Meeting (Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008, pp.  179–182). Though EUROCITIES is not organised in national sections, major cities of the same Member State do exchange information and positions in an informal national setting, such as the German EUROCITIES Dialogue (Münch, 2006a, p. 256).

Lifelong Learning,19 Intelligent Energy Europe, Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme, the Framework Programmes for Research and Technological Development and the LEADER initiative for rural development. These programmes allow local government to share examples of best practice and expertise in European affairs across national borders (Benington & Harvey, 1999, pp. 206–207; John, 1997, p. 220;

 http://www.eurocities.eu/eurocities/home.  This includes sub-programmes, such as Comenous for Schools, Erasmus for Higher Education, Leonardo da Vinci for vocational education and training and Grundtvig for adult education. 18 19

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Marshall, 2008, p. 110). In some cases, EU-funded networks developed from existing networks into short-term projects to produce particular outcomes (Kern, 2009, p.  17), while others transformed into lasting forums working on common interests (Huggins, 2018b, p. 209). Among thematic networks, policy networks share a common general focus (cf. Herrschel & Newman, 2017, p. 110) and are therefore more inclusive and extensive, often with hundreds of member authorities. They tackle fundamental European policies on a large scale, such as environment, sustainability, energy and climate (Climate Alliance, Covenant of Mayors Europe, Energy Cities, ICLEI Europe), transport and mobility (CIVITAS, POLIS), research and innovation (ERRIN), education (EARLALL) and culture (Europa Nostra, Les Rencontres). Policy networks provide excellent opportunities to pool knowledge and transfer practices amongst local authorities horizontally but also to feed information vertically into the European policy cycle. By developing joint policy agendas, policy networks contribute to the implementation of EU policy at the grassroots level and embody the top-down dimension of collective local-level Europeanisation in practice. Table 5.1 lists some of the largest policy networks of local authorities in the EU. Lastly, sectoral networks build on a synergy of localities with similar characteristics, functions or policy needs (cf. Goldsmith, 1993, p.  697; Ercole et  al., 1997, p.  221; John, 2000, p.  888). Urbact has been an important stimulus for such sectoral city networks under the mission “to enable cities to work together and develop integrated solutions to common urban challenges, by networking, learning from one another’s experiences, drawing lessons and identifying good practices to improve urban policies”. Over the last two decades, no less than 125 specific networks were set up covering a wider range of policy fields structured around five broad themes: integrated urban development, inclusion, governance, economy and environment.20 Sectoral networks in the EU tackle a wide range of issues (partly funded by Urbact): including the motor industry (MILAN), harbours (SEALINK), aerospace industry (AIRLINE), shipbuilding industry (RENAVAL), coal industry (Coal Communities Campaign), steel industry (RESIDER), facilities for small businesses (EUROGATEWAY), defence industry (KONVER), textile industry

20  URBACT I (2000–2006), URBACT II (2007–2013) and URBACT III (2014–2020). The overall budget for URBACT III was about €96m; for an overview of all networks, see https://urbact.eu/all-networks.

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Table 5.1  Local policy networks in the EU Network

Full name

Founding year/ location

Membership

CIVITASa

Cleaner and Better Transport in Cities

2002/ Brussels

300+ cities

Exchange of knowledge, innovation and best practice between cities committed to introducing sustainable urban transport policies 1700+ Promotion of climate municipalities action and reduction of greenhouse gases in European municipalities and working with indigenous communities in the Amazon basin 9000+ local and Bottom-up approach to regional energy and climate action authorities from 57 countries 13 regions and Contribution to EU counties policy-making and cooperation in projects in the field of lifelong learning

Climate Allianceb

1990/ Frankfurt and Brussels

Covenant of Covenant of Mayors Mayors for Europec Climate and Energy EARLALLd European Association of Regional and Local Authorities for Lifelong Learning Energy European Citiese Association of Cities in Energy Transition

2008/ Brussels

1990/ Besancon and Brussels

1000+ local authorities

ERRINf

2001/ Brussels

125+ regional and local authorities and other stakeholders

European Regions Research and Innovation Network

2001/ Brussels

Focus

Transformation of energy systems and policies, shaping a decentralised and renewable energy future, dialogue between citizens, local leaders and EU and national institutions Collaboration and knowledge exchange to support smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (continued)

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Table 5.1  (continued) Network

Full name

ICLEI Europeg

POLISh

Founding year/ location

Membership

Focus

Local 1990/ Governments for Bonn Sustainability

1750+ cities, towns and regions

Cities and Regions for Transport and Innovation

70+ cities, regions and other stakeholders

Driving sustainability policy and local action for low-emission, nature-based, equitable, resilient and circular development Exchange of experiences and the transfer of knowledge between European local and regional authorities (and industry, research centres and universities and NGOs) on local transport

1989/ Brussel

https://civitas.eu/ http://www.climatealliance.org c https://www.covenantofmayors.eu/ d https://www.earlall.eu/ e https://energy-­cities.eu/ f https://errin.eu/ g http://www.iclei-­europe.org/ h https://www.polisnetwork.eu/ a

b

(RETEX), rural development (LEADER), social exclusion (Quartiers en Crise), conferences (EFCT), haute cuisine (DELICE), lightning policy (LUCI), world heritage (OWHC) and winery (RECEVIN). As Atkinson and Rossignolo (2010, p. 206) have suggested, transnational municipal networks are “a space in which to nourish and enhance the European dimension in a kind of virtual circle where EU institutions and cities can play their respective roles and mutually influence one another in a positive way.” Institutional associations, geographic/cluster networks, policy networks and sectoral networks take an essential role to integrate local government in the European multilevel governance system. They are not only extremely useful arenas for the EU (and for Member States) to test its policies, but they also help channel interurban competition and

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strengthen the political leverage of the subnational levels vis-à-vis their national governments (cf. Leitner & Sheppard, 1999, p. 239). At the same time, members utilise their networks to compete for funding and to lobby EU institutions, while they internalise new norms and  modes of governance. In Chap. 7, we will further examine how such networks allow local government to engage vertically, and to feed into EU policies and into the integration cycle.

Territorial Cooperation Territorial cooperation is another essential horizontal engagement, specifically between public authorities in close proximity. European Territorial Cooperation has gradually taken a central role within the EU’s cohesion policy, primarily through the Interreg initiative (Medeiros, 2018a, p. 1). Launched in 1990, Interreg has been an essential instrument to promote European territorial interactions by funding cross-border (INTERREG A), transnational (INTERREG B) and interregional (INTERREG C) cooperation through a range of programmes (see also Chap.  3). While cross-border cooperation refers to a relatively small number of municipalities and regions along a common border, transnational cooperation involves larger regions and focuses on bigger geographical problems such as maritime pollution. Interregional cooperation then stands for a pan-European cooperation that covers the entire European continent and allows regions to showcase their policies and  to support their less developed partners (Van Bever et al., 2011c, p. 242). Territorial cooperative arrangements  vary strongly in scope and purpose, but also in terms of duration, formality and membership. Early forms of territorial cooperation within the European Community  took place along national borders and have made an important grassroots level contribution to European integration (Wassenberg & Reitel, 2015, p. 8). The end of the Second World War necessitated the development of a sense of European citizenship for people to overcome dividing lines within Europe, particularly between Germany and France, the Netherlands and Switzerland, but also  between Scandinavian countries (Guillermo-­ Ramirez, 2018, p. 27): Cross-border cooperation is not a simple partnership between local authorities: it is a means not only of surmounting natural, political and cultural frontiers, but also of overcoming psychological frontiers and reducing their

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capacity to separate. […] As a consequence, European integration and cross-border cooperation have the same objective: to safeguard peace in Europe and bring the peoples of Europe closer together. (Wassenberg & Reitel, 2015, p.11)

Cross-border cooperation contributes to overcoming the social dimension of borders, but it is just as much based on a cost-benefit analysis: borders present barriers impeding on economies of scale and the free flow of goods and services. By working together local actors can level out existing disparities between sub-state entities across and within Member States (e.g. between central and peripheral areas). As for other types of horizontal cooperation, cross-border arrangements facilitate policy innovation and provide an institutional structure to develop joint approaches towards EU policy-making (Van Bever et al., 2011c, pp. 246–250).21 The formation of cross-border regions had already started in the 1950s, and since the 1970s and 1980s, European multilevel governance has fostered the creation of new intermediate spaces between the national and the local level within and across state borders (Rowe, 2011, p. 34; Keating, 2017, pp. 10–11). Regular cross-border cooperation within the EU was pioneered on an informal basis by municipal politicians along the Dutch-­ German border, who coined the term Euregio (Evrard & Engl, 2018, p. 211). Dating back to 1958, the Gronau Euregio comprised 129 local authorities, which set up a joint council (84 members), a board (11 members), a secretariat and working groups, and now employ around 45 people (EUREGIO, 2019, 6). The Gronau Euregio has served subsequently as a model for over 100 other Euregions in Europe, of which many were established in the 1990s22 (Münch, 2006a, p.  206; Perkmann, 2003, p. 160, 2005, pp. 158 et seq.; Wessels, 2000, p. 277). Efforts by the Council of Europe and the EU (then the European Community) to strengthen regional policy in the 1980s played a significant role in promoting the legal status of cross-border regions. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Member State governments determined whether

21  For a detailed discussion of new institutional approaches to cross-border cooperation, see Van Bever et al. (2011c, pp. 246–250). 22  The Arbeitsgemeinschaft Europäische Grenzregion represents over 100 different border regions across Europe vis-à-vis Brussels.

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local and regional authorities could cooperate systematically on a formal basis. While some states, like the Benelux countries, were in favour of such endeavours, others, such as Italy, were reluctant to allow their subnational authorities to engage with their counterparts in other states (Evrard & Engl, 2018, pp.  211–212). Today, the majority of European local and regional authorities located near state borders have established cross-­ border arrangements23 for spatial planning, socio-economic development, labour markets, ecological issues, traffic, tourism, common histories and cultural links. Though not restricted to EU policies, Euregions have enabled systematic inter-municipal cooperation between local authorities on policies and joint projects, which are often financially supported by Interreg (Bullmann, 2001, p. 105; Perkmann, 2003, pp. 153–160, 2005, pp. 158 et seq.). In 2007, European Territorial Cooperation across the internal and external land and maritime borders of the EU24 became a fully fledged objective of the cohesion policy, seeking to promote “a harmonious economic, social and territorial development of the Union as a whole” (Medeiros, 2018b, p.  72). By providing a framework for cross-border, interregional and regional transnational cooperation, European Territorial Cooperation has to some extent even  challenged the existing borders between Member States (Reitel et al., 2018, p. 8): “This new terminology marks indeed a qualitative step from considering CBC [cross-border cooperation] as a form of integration on local and regional levels contributing to the internal market towards its use as a facilitator of an economically homogeneous European space without borders.” European Territorial Cooperation also included the establishment of new type of instrument: the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) was introduced in 2007 in response to demands from local and regional authorities to set up entities with a legal personality in order to deliver joint services together with other public bodies.25 This presented a new opportunity structure for territorial cooperation complementing the

 For an overview of over 70 cross-border regions between 1958 and 1999, see Perkmann (2003, pp. 161–162). 24  h t t p s : / / w w w. e u r o p a r l . e u r o p a . e u / f a c t s h e e t s / e n / s h e e t / 9 8 / e u r o p e a n territorial-cooperation. 25  https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/cooperation/european-territorial/egtc/. 23

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existing financial incentives provided by Interreg with a new legal framework and policy cycle (Van Bever et al., 2011b, p. 27). EGTC was the first instrument to allow local and regional authorities to establish cross-border bodies with a common legal structure, resources and staff, and autonomous capacities to act—about 60% of EGTCs have dedicated staff and resources, and 50% rely partly on EU funding (Evrard & Engl, 2018, pp. 213–221). This has marked another profound step towards the integration of local government in the EU: “When establishing an EGTC, (sub-) state authorities de facto institutionalise their cooperation, moulding their own “rules of the game” into the EU and national frameworks, defining a legal binding agreement between themselves.” (Evrard & Engl, 2018, p. 215). In 2017, there were 68 EGTCs (EC, 2018, p. 226) facilitating different types of territorial cooperation (Van Bever et al., 2011c, p. 244). EGTCs vary strongly in scope, scale and membership, ranging from large, multilevel scale bodies to smaller city networks (see Fig. 5.3). About half of the EGTCs are predominantly or exclusively made up of local authorities (e.g. to deal with cultural issues, tourism and rural development), and about a third stretch across multiple levels of governance. Since 2013, local authorities located in states outside of the EU also participate in EGTCs, which may become valuable across the Irish-UK and French-UK borders (Evrard & Engl, 2018, pp. 219–224). Beyond these transnational territorial activities, it is important to briefly highlight the relevance of intra-regional territorial cooperation within Member States for the European integration of local government. While in reality, regionalisation is often ‘a complicated and instable mixture of motives’ (Sturm & Dieringer, 2005, p. 282) including top-down imposition (state-regionalism) and bottom-up demands (regional-regionalism), the need to adapt to European integration (Euro-regionalism) has been another forceful driver of horizontal mobilisation (Jones & Scully, 2010, pp. 8–9). The expansion of European policies provided opportunities for local authorities to develop new institutional capacities allowing for joint working on issues (Mawson, 1998, pp. 226–227; Newman, 2000, p. 899). By stimulating new links between stakeholders and mutual learning processes, such horizontal arrangements bear great potential for innovation. In particular,

26  https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/studies/pdf/assess_egtc_ applic_en.pdf.

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Fig. 5.3  A map of European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (Wassenberg & Reitel, 2015, p. 67 © European Union 2020)

cohesion policy envisages functional, polycentric partnerships  aiming at a more inclusive regional development, though this may blur accountabilities for policy outcomes. Depending on pre-existing networks, the availability of resources, administrative capacities, local leaders’ attitudes (see Chap. 4) and a culture of cooperation, intra-regional cooperation on EU matters varies significantly across Member States. Dabrovski, for instance, found that in Northern and Western Europe, these conditions are more favourable than

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in the South and East. Yet, there are examples in newer Member States in Central and Eastern Europe, such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, where horizontal cooperation has become gradually internalised by local authorities triggering social learning processes (Da ̨browski, 2014, pp. 356–377).27 In the light of the great variety across European regions, Textbox 5.3 presents a specific case of intra-regional cooperation in North Rhine-Westphalia. Cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation have become an important driver for economic and social development and have been put on an increasingly systematic, formal basis to understand and manage common challenges and participate in EU policies and programmes (Guillermo-Ramirez, 2018, p. 39). For many local authorities, territorial cooperation is the most important way of engaging in European affairs. In the words of Wassenberg and Reitel (2015, p. 35): “European territorial

Textbox 5.3  Intra-regional Cooperation in North Rhine-Westphalia

North Rhine-Westphalia presents a valuable example of the interplay of state-, regional- and Euro-regionalism. While the German Länder hold the constitutional legitimacy and administrative responsibility over municipal activities, their monopoly has been slightly challenged by intra-Länder and trans-border cooperation between local authorities (Benz, 1998, pp. 126–127). And yet, the government of North Rhine-Westphalia has fostered cooperation across small and large local authorities to connect themselves, pool resources and deliver ERDF, ESF and LEADER programmes. As a result, larger cities have established joint associations, such as the Metropole Ruhr, the Regionalverband Ruhr and COMPASS of the Region Cologne-­Bonn (Wolf, 2006, pp.  258–261). For smaller local authorities, this has provided opportunities to stimulate transnational intra-regional cooperation and the exchange of good practice (see the Südwestfalen Regionale 201328 and the Münsterland Regional 201629). (continued)  This is most pronounced in Poland and less the case in the Czech Republic and Hungary.  https://www.suedwestfalen-agentur.com/. 29  http://www.regionale2016.de/de/start.html. 27 28

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Textbox 5.3  (continued)

A 2012 survey across local authorities based in North Rhine-­ Westphalia showed  that, depending on their size and status, local government have increasingly linked themselves with their counterparts in other Member States through transnational associations. About 65% of counties and county-exempted cities, but only about 17% of county-constituent municipalities, participate in EU-related networks and associations (predominantly CEMR, EUROCITIES and Euregio). Interestingly, the study revealed that the most important horizontal (largely, though not exclusively, EU related) activities take place within North Rhine-Westphalia, either across local authorities or at sub-regional level, including the education, third and business sectors (Landua, 2012, pp. 16–20). The EU Werkstatt NRW Kommunen is  an interesting  example of a forum through which an exclusive selection of local actors exchange, articulate and coordinate common positions towards EU policies to ensure coherence in vertical mobilisation and to avoid conflicts between urban and rural interests. This working group of European officers emerged in 2005 from the German section of the CEMR and was only open to actors from the major cities in North Rhine-Westphalia. Over time, the EU Werkstatt has adopted a formal character with its own statute and included more proactive actors from counties and municipalities. Membership in the forum is not based on local authorities, but on individuals who must be invited and accepted by a unanimous vote. The group promotes their positions across local authorities but has no formal mandate and cannot speak for their authorities without approval (Guderjan, 2013, pp. 274–275).

cooperation can be seen as an integration policy that established relations between local and regional stakeholders and the European institutions, while fostering horizontal links across borders.”

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Conclusion Horizontal cooperation, whether through town twinning, transnational municipal networking or territorial arrangements, is an integral part of local government’s integration within the EU and beyond. Exchanging experience, knowledge  and resources allows local authorities to be involved in Europe-wide developments, acquire innovative practices, allocate EU funding, embrace a common identity and formulate common positions towards EU policies. Town twinning serves not only to facilitate cultural exchange but also provides a basis for joint projects funded by the EU and for wider social, political and economic development. Transnational networks, of which the CEMR and EUROCITIES are the most influential examples, collect and distribute information and pool the political weight and interest of their members to subsequently lobby vertically (see Chap.  7). Cooperation on specific issues is supported by a range of EU-funded action programmes and frameworks, notably by Interreg and Urbact, as well as  by transnational networks with a specialised focus on various policies, including environmental protection, climate change, sustainability, energy, public service provision, education and economic development. While there is some nationwide engagement within Member states, for instance, among members of the CEMR and EUROCITIES or via municipal associations, geographical proximity is a natural driver to work together on and deliver European policies. Depending on pre-­existing networks, resources, administrative capacities, local leaders’ attitudes and a culture of cooperation, local authorities have established regional or sub-regional arrangements within and across state boundaries. Instead of acting in an isolated way, horizontal networks allow local authorities to become part of a wider system of governance in which they can establish closer contacts with representatives from the EU, promote joint practices and preferences and inform policy-making in Brussels. Town twinnings of active European citizenship can transform into influential tools of economic and social integration in this regard. At the same time, transnational networking contributes to the development of common European urban identities (Phelps et al., 2002, pp. 211–213). While thematic networks allow local authorities to participate in and shape European policies, institutional networks have become fully fledged channels of interest representation for local government. As we will show in Chap. 8, the nature of EU governance and the context of specific policies

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can work to the advantage of networks with either a broad membership lending themselves high levels of legitimacy, strong policy-specific expertise or clear synergies. Territorial cooperation demonstrates a functional and political spillover (see Chap. 2). Yet, horizontal arrangements between local authorities do not challenge or transform the constitutional structures of states, in the sense of MLG type I, but are often encouraged by higher levels of government (see North Rhine-Westphalia) and should be understood as a type II ‘network mode of governance’ according to which flexible, task-specific networks form a complex system of polycentric governance (cf. Eising & Kohler-Koch, 1999, p. 5; Bache & Flinders, 2004; Benz, 2010, p. 215).30 As we have outlined in this chapter, European integration of local government is not only about the vertical interaction of institutions and actors across different levels, it also relates to the cooperation among local actors and authorities. In this sense, territorial cooperation has become another ‘laboratory of European integration’, allowing local government to pool common resources; adapt services; develop joint agendas, infrastructures and economies; and support the evolution of a European citizenship. The amplitude of these evolutions, as well as the significance of a possible spillback, were exemplified by the unexpected flow of migrants and refugees in 2015, which has led to the reintroduction of border controls and travel restrictions, both practically and psychologically undermining interaction across state borders (Reitel et  al., 2018, pp.  16–17). Subsequently, the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic proved to be yet another far-reaching case in point reinstating the major significance of national borders and the severe disruption caused when they cannot be passed.

30  Therefore, the network approach is also closely linked to the literature on multilevel governance (Fleurke & Willemse, 2006, p. 85). Both approaches highlight the role of informal relations between organisations and actors instead of formal institutions (Goldsmith & Klausen, 1997, p. 9).

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Van der Wusten, H., & Mamadouh, V. (2010). The networks of European city governance. In A. Hamedinger & A. Wolffhardt (Eds.), The Europeanization of cities. Policies, urban change & urban networks (pp. 211–225). Techne Press. Vion, A. (2002). Europe from the bottom up: Town twinning in France during the Cold War. Contemporary European History, II(4), 623–640. Wassenberg, B., & Reitel, B. (2015). Territorial cooperation in Europe: A historical perspective. European Union. Wessels, W. (2000). Die Öffnung des Staates—Modelle und Wirklichkeit grenzüberschreitender Verwaltungspraxis 1960–1995. Leske & Budrich. Wolf, F. (2006). Europakompetenz in der Stadtverwaltung: Die Europaarbeit der Stadt Köln. In U. von Alemann & C.  Münch (Eds.), Europafähigkeit der Kommunen—Die lokale Ebene in der Europäischen Union (pp. 251–268). VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Zelinsky, W. (1991). The twinning of the world: Sister cities in geographic and historical perspective. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 81(1), 1–31. Zerbinati, S. (2004). Europeanization and EU funding in Italy and England. A comparative local perspective. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(6), 1000–1019. Zerbinati, S., & Massey, A. (2008). Italian and English local funding networks: Is there a winning formula? Local Government Studies, 34(1), 81–104.

CHAPTER 6

The Formal Bottom-Up Perspective: Constitutional Status and Institutionalised Participation

Introduction What distinguishes the EU from purely intergovernmental organisations is its ability to produce binding legislation via strong collective institutions and procedures that pool the powers and resources of Member States (Chryssochoou, 2001, p. 8; Wessels, 1997, p. 187). In the previous chapters, we have explained how local government has consequently been affected by the EU’s top-down impact (see Chap. 3) and adjusted its orientation, attitudes and organisations to the new reality (see Chap. 4). We now turn to the bottom-up dynamics of the integration cycle starting with local government’s formal role in European governance. As discussed in Chap. 2, the push from national institutions to participate in joint policy and decision-making has led to an ongoing expansion and formalisation of the European polity (Rometsch & Wessels, 1996, p. 328 et seq.; Wessels, 1998, p. 216 et seq.). This has spilled over to other actors, including the regional and local levels, driving constitutional and institutional reforms to provide a ‘fair’ balance of different interests (Wessels, 1992, pp. 47–48). To understand what Wessels (1997, p. 273) then called a ‘fusion’ of different levels, we start our discussion with the constitutional and institutional provisions through which local government is involved in European governance. While informal mobilisation and the actual influence of local © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Guderjan, T. Verhelst, Local Government in the European Union, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74382-6_6

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mobilisation are discussed in Chaps. 7 and 8, this chapter focuses on the acknowledgement of local self-government and subsidiarity, and the implicit recognition of multilevel governance, within the European Treaties. It then turns to the institutional and procedural channels that provide local actors with access to EU policy-making, primarily through the Committee of the Regions, but also through working committees, consultation procedures and institutionalised participation mechanisms at national and regional levels. Finally, it addresses the partnership principle within the delivery of Structural Funds and the EU Urban Agenda. This will draw a differentiated picture of local government’s formal integration with the EU.

Local Self-Government and Subsidiarity as Constitutional Principles The EU’s ‘partial’ or ‘complementary’ constitution (Bogdandy, 2009, p.  24) is mainly concerned with the allocation of competencies across European and national institutions. However, its constitutional provisions are not exclusive to the European and national levels but reach deep into the political-administrative structures of the Member States. As Panara (2015, p. 159) puts it: Its constitutive elements stem from the combined and coordinated work of the national constitutional system(s) and of the EU. Only a holistic approach, the combined analysis of the domestic system(s) and of the EU, can provide a satisfactory answer in relation to the status of the sub-national authorities in the EU or in relation to the coordination between sub-national authorities and the EU. Multilevel governance is legally and methodologically part of the complex European constitutional space.

Looking at the two major constitutional reforms relevant for local government—the right to local self-government and the principle of subsidiarity—allows us to understand how the EU’s multilevel constitution has extended to the local level. The Right to Local Self-Government The principle of local self-government refers to the legal authority for autonomous political organisation and decision-making, which is recognised in

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the constitutions of many Member States (CEMR, 2007). All EU Member States have, either fully or with reservations,1 signed the 1985 European Charter of Local Self-Government of the Council of Europe2 (EP, 2018). Articles 2 and 3 of the Charter state: Article 2: The principle of local self-government shall be recognised in domestic legislation, and where practicable in the constitution. Article 3: Local self-government denotes the right and the ability of local authorities, within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage a substantial share of public affairs under their own responsibility and in the interests of the local population. Even though the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE), which is a consultative body to the Council of Europe, monitors the implementation of the Charter of Local Self-Government, the Charter leaves wide room for interpretation and lacks the legal authority to be effective (Himsworth, 2015, pp. 9–11; 84 et seq.). Within the EU’s constitutional order, the right to local self-­government was introduced for the very first time by the Lisbon Treaty in 2007: Article 4.2 TEU: The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. This reference to local self-government indicates an increasing role in EU affairs and manifests the constitutional recognition of a ‘Europe of four levels’ (Hoffschulte, 2006, p. 63). It acknowledges political autonomy and implies that although local authorities are in most Member States subordinate to regional and/or national governments, they are not merely executing and implementing decisions made at higher levels but that they also take their own governmental action (Panara, 2013, pp. 371 et seq.). The acknowledgement of regional and local self-government by the EU can be interpreted as an implicit constitutionalisation of multilevel governance, which is not explicitly mentioned in the primary legislation. 1  When Central and Eastern European Member States joined the EU in 2004, they were required to implement the Charter by establishing institutions and laws to ensure local democracy and self-government (Marcou, 2007, pp. 50–51). 2  Although the Council of Europe is an international organisation distinct from the EU, it has been a staunch advocate for human rights, democracy and the rule of law since 1949.

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The codification of local self-government is not merely of symbolic but also of legal value and has provided local authorities with leverage to protect their interests and practices. In some cases before the European Court of Justice, the principle of local self-government was used to justify specific actions by local and regional authorities. For instance, C-156/13, Digibet v Westdeutsche Lotterie, [2014] (at 343) allowed the Land Schleswig-­Holstein to temporarily adopt more liberal game-of-chance policies than those of other German Länder. Another example is the Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi on C-115/14, RegioPost v Stadt Landau [2015] (at 82), which clarifies when a contracting authority can require businesses tendering for public services to comply with minimum wage special conditions. Chapter 8 will show how the right to local self-­government has also been used politically to support local positions in lobbying cases. The Principle of Subsidiarity The principle of subsidiarity is the second major constitutional provision manifesting the status of local government in the EU.  In federal states, subsidiarity is an established organising principle to guarantee the self-­ determination of regional and local levels of government. According to subsidiarity, higher levels of government should only rule over matters that cannot be dealt with by the lower level on its own. This idea has been an implicit norm for the EU since its early days as the European Coal and Steel Community, and it was later enshrined in the Treaty of Maastricht to regulate the relationship between the EU and Member States. The Treaty of Lisbon extended subsidiarity to the regional and the local level, which, along with the recognition of local  self-government, advances the legal manifestation of a multilevel constitutional space. Article 5.3 of the TEU states: Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level. 3  In the present case, the division of competences between the German Länder cannot be called into question, since it benefits from the protection conferred by Article 4(2) TEU, according to which the Union must respect national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, including regional and local self-government.

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In principle, EU legislation has to account for the appropriateness, necessity and proportionality of its measures, with Article 5.4 TEU specifying that “[u]nder the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties”.4 Consequently, the Commission has to “take into account the regional and local dimension” within the consultations for legislative acts (Article 2 of the Protocol on the Application of the Principle of Subsidiarity and Proportionality). As for the principle of local self-government, the possibility for subnational governments to challenge EU legislation on the grounds of an infringement of subsidiarity is limited and mainly reserved for Member State governments which can represent their regional and local authorities before the Court of Justice. When represented in a federal co-legislating chamber, regional governments can also challenge EU legislation indirectly via their national government (Panara, 2015, p. 160). The Court of Justice does not apply a systematic review of subsidiarity in its judgements and has never annulled a legal act because of an infringement of subsidiarity (Craig, 2012, p. 74). Hardly any legal cases have been forwarded to decide whether the EU complied with subsidiarity, and in the few cases that have alleged a breach of subsidiarity, this was not the first or principle plea5 (ibid., p. 80). When subsidiarity was made an issue, the Court decided that the EU was acting lawfully6 (Panara, 2015, pp. 82–83). Even if the Court did require an annulment of an EU Act when it infringes subsidiarity (or local selfgovernment), Panara (2015, p. 57) argues the Court has little leeway and can only apply a ‘minimal notion of multilevel governance’. Subsidiarity is not a ‘golden formula’ to define the allocation of competences, but a ‘useful device’ drawing attention to national and local diversity to validate the legitimacy of EU intervention (Syrpis, 2004, p.  334). The application of subsidiarity  remains subject to political rather than legal interpretation and, like local self-government, is mainly

4  Article 5 further states: “Draft legislative acts shall take account of the need for any burden, whether financial or administrative, falling upon the Union, national governments, regional or local authorities, economic operators and citizens, to be minimised and commensurate with the objective to be achieved”. 5  Craig (2012, p. 80) counted ten real cases in less than 20 years. 6  Case C-358/14 Poland v European Parliament and the Council of the EU is still pending. As the third plea, Poland considers the prohibition of menthol cigarettes under Directive 2014/40/EU to infringe the principle of subsidiarity.

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used as a political argument. Though the ‘legal constitution’ supports local government to protect its competences, cooperation and mutual understanding rather than conflict seem to guarantee effective and reconcilable policies. In 2018, a Task Force on Subsidiarity, Proportionality and “Doing Less More Efficiently”, with members from the CoR and national parliaments, therefore concluded that more ‘active subsidiarity’ would give subnational government a greater voice and would foster democratic support and ownership of EU policies: “This new way of working is based on a better shared understanding of subsidiarity and proportionality and an improved participation of national Parliaments and local and regional authorities in the design and implementation of policies, in line with the principle of multi-level governance”. (EC, 2018, p. 7)

Institutional Access and Formal Participation in EU Policy-Making Until today, formal involvement for local representatives in EU policy-­ making has only modestly advanced. National governments remain the key players driving policy-making, law-making and institutional reforms. Nevertheless, local actors do have formal participation mechanisms in the institutional set-up of the EU and their Member States, which we discuss in the following section. The Committee of the Regions The Committee of the Regions (CoR) is the most obvious example of direct formal representation of local government in Brussels. The Committee was established in 1994 following the Treaty of Maastricht and provides regional and local representatives with formal participation rights in EU policy-making on matters concerning their responsibilities. Membership provides local councillors and representatives with considerable access to policy development in various fields, including health, education, employment, social policy, economic and social cohesion, housing, transport, energy and climate change, maritime safety and fishing, culture and even EU budgeting (Guderjan, 2013, p. 181). The CoR operates as an advisory body to the Commission, the EP and the Council and holds

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consultative powers during the legislative stage. In practice, it can respond to legislative proposals, issue opinions and take legal action before the Court of Justice (EU, 2018). The CoR’s influence vis-à-vis the main EU institutions, however, is often called into question. Because the Committee was designed as an advisory body and not as an effective veto player, it is often seen as little more than a ‘talking shop’. Due to insufficient own technical and practical expertise, it seems unable to steer political debates, and its reports have a reputation for being bulky (and often mediocre) (cf. Van Bever et  al., 2009; Mastenbroek et  al., 2013; Panke et  al., 2015; Pazos-Vidal, 2019). And yet, with the establishment of the CoR, local government officially entered the European Politikverflechtung (Jahn & Derenbach, 2006, p. 48). The Committee comprises 350 democratically elected representatives from subnational authorities of all Member States, who are appointed for five years to reflect the political and geographical structure of each country. Plenary sessions take place up to six times per year (EU, 2018). Depending on the Member State, regional and/or local delegates are represented in the Committee (see Table 6.1). Whereas most Member States send mayors and local councillors to the CoR, federally organised states tend to send representatives from regional institutions and municipal associations to speak on behalf of local government. Consequently, some local actors prefer to rely on other forms of interest representation that better reflect their own properties and needs (Guderjan, 2015, p. 947). The CoR can only officially act on the basis of plenary majorities. Considering the diversity of its membership, this makes it difficult to agree on common positions and to act on behalf of specific local concerns. Positions by the CoR can even undermine those of subnational authorities and municipal associations, when they present competing or diverging preferences, which Table 6.1  Membership in the Committee of the Regions Predominantly local

Local and regional

Predominantly regional

Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden

Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, United Kingdom

Belgium, Germany, Spain

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other EU institutions can play off against each other (Pazos-Vidal, 2019, pp. 70–85).7 The Lisbon Treaty has made the CoR the designated ‘watchdog’ of subsidiarity on behalf of local and regional government. It exercises this function through its consultative powers during the legislative stage, as well as through litigation before the Court when subsidiarity is not respected. Article 8 of the Protocol on the Application of the Principle of Subsidiarity and Proportionality states: “In accordance with the rules laid down in the said Article, the Committee of the Regions may also bring such actions against legislative acts for the adoption of which the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that it be consulted”. In 2012, the CoR established a Subsidiarity Expert Group to monitor the legislative process. In the same year, the Commission and the CoR passed a cooperation agreement, which provides that the former produces a list of mandatory and optional consultations and takes the latter’s views into account and responds to its concerns (Arribas, 2017). Neither the CoR nor national parliaments have yet challenged an act for an infringement of subsidiarity but only warned of potential legal conflicts (see Textbox 6.1). Two reasons may explain why the CoR has never made use of the ‘nuclear option’ (cf. Pazos-Vidal, 2019, p. 100) and not taken legal action on the grounds of a subsidiarity breach. First, the Committee may be concerned that it risks losing its threat potential if the complaint is unsuccessful. Second, the Commission frequently takes the views of the CoR into account when drafting legislation because it prefers less confrontational measures over legal disputes. Unless there is a clear violation of subsidiarity, the relevance of the Committee is then in informing policy-making rather than in legal disputes (Panara, 2015, p. 122). Despite some inherent limitations, the CoR has in the past been able to act as the voice of subnational authorities (Piattoni & Schönlau, 2015) and developed into a key advisor on issues of regional competence (Jahn & Derenbach, 2006, p.  55). Even though the CoR cannot match the political weight of the EP, the Council or the Commission, the principle of subsidiarity has indeed increased the CoR’s political leverage through

7  As a consequence, the CoR also tends to take an explicitly pro-integration stance and to build new opinions upon previously agreed ones (ibid.).

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Textbox 6.1  Subsidiarity Warnings of the CoR

In 2012, the CoR warned of a violation of the subsidiarity principle by the so-called Monti Package II, which limited the right to strike for posted workers who are sent to provide a service in other Member States on a temporary basis. The CoR officially supported 12 national parliaments that used the ‘yellow card’ mechanism8 and for the first time threatened to take action for an ex ante appeal before the Court. Even though the Commission did not agree that it was disregarding subsidiarity, it withdrew its proposal. On a second occasion when national parliaments raised the yellow card, this time to oppose the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor Office, the CoR raised only informal concerns related to subsidiarity and proportionality of the measure. Again, the Commission thought that it had sufficiently considered the principle of subsidiarity, but this time it decided to keep its proposal without amendments (Piattoni & Schönlau, 2015, p. 97; Arribas, 2017).9 Whether the CoR appeals to the Court or not has to be decided by a majority of its appointed members. In 2013, for instance, a plenary session of the CoR voted not to challenge the EU’s right to make the acquisition of structural funds conditional on compliance with the macro-economic objectives of the Stability and Growth Pact. It was believed that macro-­economic conditionality in the 2014–2020 cohesion policy was not an infringement of subsidiarity (Piattoni & Schönlau, 2015, p. 98 et seq.). propositions, negotiations and consultations (cf. Neshkova, 2010). Especially by deploying its informal links to other EU institutions, Committee members have been able to feed into the EU’s wider policy agenda (see Chaps.  8). From her experience in working with the

8  “If reasoned opinions represent one third (one quarter in the area of freedom, security and justice) of the all the votes (each national Parliament shall have two votes), the draft must be reviewed. After such a review, the legislative initiator may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the draft, but should motivate its decision”. 9  The third time, national parliaments triggered the yellow card on a new proposal to review the Posting of Workers Directive in 2016. The CoR in essence agreed with the Commission, which decided to maintain it.

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Commission and the European Parliament (EP), a former councillor of Liverpool City Council suggested: The Council of Ministers does not want to listen to local and regional government, because we represent, in some respect, a wedge of potential opposition and so it does not want to see the Committee of the Regions as an institution that has power and influence. However, despite that, the power and influence is growing and that is because there is a recognition by many members of the European Parliament and many people inside the Commission and in the Member State governments that we actually speak with the voice of the people that is not once every five years represented in an election, but actually is immediate. (Guderjan, 2013, p. 197)

Procedural Adaptation at EU Level The complex system of committees, working groups and consultations provides local actors with other  formal procedures to engage with EU institutions. General consultations offer local authorities an official channel to feed their concerns into EU policy-making, raising their visibility and making it more likely that they will be invited to follow-up workshops, forums and conferences. In contrast to other interest groups, however, local actors rarely participate in these procedures on a systematic basis (Quittkat & Kotzian, 2011, pp. 410–412). Mastenbroek et al. (2013), for instance, found that though they regularly participate in online consultations, producing position papers and maintaining direct relationships with the Commission, Dutch provinces miss out on the opportunity to shape outcomes via impact assessments, comitology committees and expert groups.10 In terms of quantity, there is a strong variation in the usage of these consultations. In Germany, for instance, since the early 2000s, local authorities and associations have participated extensively in relevant consultations (Witte, 2013, p.  375). About 42% of cities (over 100,000 inhabitants) have participated in consultation procedures, and 37% submitted position papers on policy initiatives that affect them (Bacon, 2016, p. 163). In Belgium, where local authorities operate on a much smaller scale, only 19% of the municipalities have responded to public

 Although Dutch provinces are formally regarded as regions, in a comparative perspective, they are also considered as the second-tier of local government (cf. Heinelt & Bertrana, 2011). 10

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consultations either individually or through their association. The relatively low turnout is the result of a lack of information and awareness (see Chap. 3) rather than because of claims that consultations would be ineffective (Verhelst, 2019, p. 98). Another  formalisation of local representation relates to more flexible and less visible initiatives introducing procedures to improve the consideration of local interests. Throughout the 2000s, a number of initiatives have illustrated the intention of the Commission, and increasingly also the EP, to intensify cooperation with municipalities. The 2001 White Paper on European Governance sought to integrate different levels of government in the early stages of decision-making through systematic dialogues with regional and local representatives (Atkinson, 2002, pp. 782 et seq.; Karvounis, 2011, pp. 215 et seq.; Reilly, 2001, p. 1). This was part of a wider strategy of promoting openness and inclusiveness in order to enhance the legitimacy of EU policies. Despite these early intentions to establish procedures inclusive of subnational government, the White Paper was ‘long on analysis’ but ‘short on solutions’ (Greenwood, 2011, p. 183) and could in practice not stimulate a new style of joint governance (Münch, 2006, p. 174). Based on a public consultation with associations of local and regional authorities, in 2003 the Commission introduced the idea of a systematic dialogue to underpin its earlier efforts with tangible measures:11,12 The Union’s policy guidelines must be brought to the attention of the regional and local authorities so that the Commission can benefit from their expertise and opinions. Indeed, the regional and local authorities are often well placed to assess the coherence and effectiveness of the European policies that have a major impact on local areas and regions, for example regional development policy, transport, rural development or the environment. A more systematic dialogue with these protagonists will enable the Commission to take more effective decisions on the nature and intensity of the measures to be adopted, and to assess their impact. (EC, 2003)

11  The Commission paper included practical provisions on how to organise the dialogue, the participants and the agenda. 12  See COM(2003) 811 final ‘Dialogue with associations of regional and local authorities on the formulation of European Union policy’.

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The systematic dialogue aimed at providing local government an opportunity to forward opinions prior to formal decision-making on policies they would have to implement. It was also meant to increase a mutual understanding of EU policies and legislation and thereby to enhance transparency of and public support for European governance (cf. Leitermann, 2006, p. 335; Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008, p. 175). The Commission retained its right to initiate the dialogue with subnational authorities. While the first meetings with the President of the Commission (first Prodi, then Barroso) were disappointing for most local participants and did not allow for a real dialogue, the procedural initiative was, nevertheless, a clear acknowledgement of the role and expertise of municipal representatives within the EU (Münch, 2006, pp. 242 et seq.). In 2003, the EP also issued a resolution about the role of local and regional authorities in European integration (2002/2141(INI), which set out four key goals and corresponding actions: to bring the Union closer to its citizens (e.g. via new participatory mechanisms for local and regional government, the recognition of the role of subnational authorities in the European Treaties), to increase participation and representation (e.g. supporting the European Charter of Local Self-Government and the Commission’s White Paper, promoting input from subnational authorities to the Commission’s policy preparation), to engender legal appeals to the Court of Justice (for local and regional authorities as well as the CoR) and to foster transnational cooperation (e.g. actively promoting cooperation between regions and local authorities across national borders). The CoR subsequently  issued its own White Paper on Multilevel Governance in 2009 to draw further attention to the need to structurally involve local and regional government: Multilevel governance is not simply a question of translating European or national objectives into local or regional action, but must also be understood as a process for integrating the objectives of local and regional authorities within the strategies of the European Union. Moreover, multilevel governance should reinforce and shape the responsibilities of local and regional authorities at national level and encourage their participation in the coordination of European policy, in this way helping to design and implement Community policies. (CoR, 2009)

Five years later, the CoR even passed a Charter for Multilevel Governance in Europe that commits its members and signatories to transparent, open and inclusive policy-making:

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Given that many competences and responsibilities are shared between the various levels of governance in the European Union, we recognise the need TO WORK TOGETHER IN PARTNERSHIP to achieve greater economic, social and territorial cohesion in Europe. No single level can deal with the challenges we face alone. We can solve citizens’ problems on the ground by COOPERATING better and running JOINT PROJECTS to tackle the common challenges ahead of us. (CoR, 2014)

While this is an obvious position for the CoR to take and an example of formal mobilisation to further extend the participation rights of local and regional actors until today, it has remained up to the Member States and the Council to grant subnational representatives more access to and a say in the EU consultations. Since previous initiatives have not become the panacea to strengthen local representation, in 2018 the EP published a Report on the role of cities in the institutional framework of the Union which argues again for a stronger procedural role for local government in European policy-making. For this purpose, the Parliament has proposed to upgrade the role of municipal associations, such as EUROCITIES and the CEMR, and make them permanent advisors to EU institutions. The suggested measures included a permanent debating forum and a structured dialogue mechanism at the pre-legislative stage, as well as giving cities better access and a consultative voice on local matters in the working groups of the Council (2018, pp. 9–10). Procedural Adaptation at Member State Level In addition to institutional provisions at the European level, intra-state consultation procedures allow local actors to promote their preferences for EU policies indirectly via their national or regional representatives (Panara, 2013, p.  411). In 2007, the CEMR published an overview of consultation procedures across Europe. While a majority of countries established general arrangements for local government associations to feed their views on relevant issues into national decision-making, only a small minority adopted formal consultations in regard to EU legislation: • No specific or only informal procedures were introduced in Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.

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• In Denmark, Finland, Poland and Slovakia, local representatives participate in committees or working groups dedicated to European issues. • Some consultation rights to issue an opinion on EU matters that affect local government exist in Austria, Bulgaria, Germany,13 North Macedonia, Italy, the Netherlands14 and the United Kingdom.15 In the federal states of Austria, Belgium and Germany, consultation processes take place at the regional level, which can vary strongly across the different regions. Generally, regional and cohesion policy has been the main driver to introduce formal procedures to include local government in regional policy-making on European issues (cf. Blania, 2006, p. 290; Mawson, 1998, pp. 226–227; Wolf, 2006, p. 261). Whether at national or regional level, concertation provides local government with an opportunity to impact on EU decisions (see Chap. 8). However, even in Member States where procedures are in place, this does not mean that in practice local concerns are always considered by their national and regional delegations.

13  In Germany, since 1996 the rules of procedures of the Federal Ministries are the only consultation rights for municipal associations on European issues (see Art. 74 (5) Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der Bundesministerien). However, these are rarely applied (CEMR, 2007, p.  81). The Länder refused to grant municipal representatives any hearing rights in the Bundesrat, as they claim to represent the interests of local authorities via consultation procedures at the regional level (Münch, 2006, pp.  209 et  seq.). In 2009, the German Constitutional Court ruled that national legislation was required to amend the Lisbon Treaty. Legally non-binding Concomitant Laws (Begleitgesetze) were then passed explicitly referring to local public service provision and protection of municipal rights and interests within EU legal initiatives (Kirchbaum, 2009). 14  In the Netherlands, the ‘Code of Intergovernmental Relations’ provides for a coordination of national positions within European negotiations when local interests are concerned (Pazos-Vidal, 2019, p.  53). Local stakeholders can also participate in ‘Interadministrative Dossier Teams’ to translate their concerns into national positions (Mastenbroek et al., 2013, pp. 29–30). 15  In the United Kingdom, between 1997 and 2010, the Central-Local Partnership (CLP) provided local government leaders and the LGA with the formal right to dialogue with senior government ministers on matters of common concern, which included European policy issues. The arrangement was not made under a legal basis but was underpinned by the commitment of central government. It was later codified in the 2011 Localism Act to involve local actors in the Government’s policy formulation towards the EU if local issues are at stake (Varney, 2013, p. 355; see Chap. 3).

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Formalised Multilevel Partnerships The evolution of multilevel partnerships over time is not only an important example of procedural adaption but also of local government’s wider integration with the EU. According to Fuertes (2013, p. 9), partnerships are a means to achieve integration and develop from a state of relative isolation and fragmentation to convergence, alignment and cooperation: Integration would mean the highest level of coherence between levels, fields or stakeholders: a situation or process which goes beyond a one-off or project specific co-production or cooperation, towards a more sustained cohesion of shared objectives, understandings, processes and/or outcomes.

In the late 1980s, the Commission reformed the Structural Funds and introduced the partnership principle to decentralise the delivery of funding programmes.16 The new provision gave local actors across Europe a formal role to build proactive relationships with supranational institutions. Although national governments retained control over the final decisions over the allocation of funds, they were now expected to work in partnerships with local and regional authorities (and other societal actors) (Bache, 2004, pp. 166 et seq., 2008, p. 23; Conzelmann, 1995, p. 134; Goldsmith & Klausen, 1997, pp. 1 et seq.). Yet for a long time, the partnership principle had been ‘an empty shell’ (Schultze, 2003, p. 138), and measures to realise effective multilevel partnerships are still evolving until the present day. The Lisbon Agenda and the Europe 2020 Strategy introduced the ideas of partnership and dialogue into the EU’s economic strategies and provided the local level with a greater role in delivering the EU’s policy goals (Van Bever et al., 2011; pp. 236 et seq.). In particular, Europe 2020 presented a framework to which local authorities relate their own policies: “All national, regional and local authorities should implement the partnership principle, closely associating parliaments, as well as social partners and 16  According to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/93, Article 4.1: “Community operations shall […] be established through close consultations between the Commission, the Member State concerned and the competent authorities and bodies—including, within the framework of each Member State’s national rules and current practices, the economic and social partner, designated by the Member State at national, regional, local or other level, with all parties acting as partners in pursuit of a common goal. These consultations shall hereinafter be referred to as the ‘partnership’. The partnership shall cover the preparation and financing, as well as the ex ante appraisal, monitoring and ex post evaluation of operations”.

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representatives of civil society, contributing to the elaboration of national reform programmes as well as to its implementation” (EC, 2010). The Commission further emphasised the importance of multilevel dialogues and the inclusion of local authorities into the implementation of Europe 2020’s objectives. According to a consultation by the CoR at the beginning of the Europe 2020 programming period, the partnership principle struggled to live up to its ambition. Instead of promoting effective partnerships, like the Lisbon Strategy, Europe 2020 was strongly criticised by local actors for its hasty top-down implementation and for excluding subnational inputs (CoR, 2010a, 2010b). As a consequence, in 2010, the EP published a resolution on good governance in regional policy to strengthen the bottom-­up approach, the involvement of regional and local authorities and the cooperation between levels of government during the programming period. It also promoted the idea of a Territorial Pact of Local and Regional Authorities for Europe 2020, which was supported by the CoR (CoR, 2010b, 2010c): [The European Parliament] calls for the multi-level governance principle to be integrated into all phases of design and implementation of the EU2020 Strategy to ensure real ownership of the results by the regional and local authorities, which have to implement it; highlights in this connection the proposal for a ‘Territorial Pact of Local and Regional Authorities for Europe 2020’ to encourage regions and cities to contribute to the successful achievement of the objectives of the 2020 Strategy. (EP, 2010)

Though the Commission, EP and the CoR have shown their willingness to expand the formal procedures at EU level, they have only been moderately successful. Nevertheless, the partnership principle developed from a guideline for good practice to a legally binding instrument for the delivery of economic, social and territorial cohesion. Regulation 1303/2013 requires Member States to establish multilevel partnerships with subnational authorities and other societal actors in order to allocate funding.17 The Commission monitors compliance with the Code of

17  Art. 11: “For the Partnership Agreement and each programme respectively, each Member State should organise a partnership with the representatives of competent regional, local, urban and other public authorities, economic and social partners and other relevant

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Conduct on Partnership within programmes financed by the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) and may even suspend funding if Member States do not follow its recommendations (EC, 2014). The Code for the first time legally “binds Member States and Managing Authorities to work in close cooperation with local and regional authorities as full partners throughout the whole programming cycle: preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of Partnership Agreements (PAs) and Operational Programmes (OPs)” (CEMR, 2014, p.  4). Governments would hardly want to miss out on the significant amounts of funding they acquire from the Structural Funds. And yet, the configuration and modus operandi of multilevel partnerships have remained strongly dependent upon the politico-administrative traditions within the Member States—as much as on the Commission’s ability to impose partnerships on national government (cf. Conzelmann, 1995, pp.  135–139). As Partnership Agreements are designed in accordance with national law practices and leave room for broad interpretation, legal action against Member States is therefore only possible if they completely fail to establish multilevel partnerships with subnational authorities and other societal actors. Early evaluations of the impact of the partnerships for 2014–2020 provide mixed results. A CEMR (2014, p. 4) consultation came to the conclusion that “Member States implement the partnership principle in very different ways and there is room for improvement everywhere”. Only four Member States (Denmark, Finland, Lithuania, the Netherlands) had fully applied the Partnership Principle; ten cases (Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, France, Latvia, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom) had set up satisfactory channels of discussion and cooperation with local and regional authorities; and in four countries (Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia and Slovenia), local and regional partners only participated in irregular meetings along with stakeholders. Other studies also

bodies representing civil society, including environmental partners, non-governmental organisations and bodies responsible for promoting social inclusion, gender equality and non-discrimination, including, where appropriate, the umbrella organisations of such authorities and bodies. The purpose of such a partnership is to ensure respect for the principles of multi-level governance, and also of subsidiarity and proportionality and the specificities of the Member States’ different institutional and legal frameworks as well as to ensure the ownership of planned interventions by stakeholders and build on the experience and the know-how of relevant actors”.

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suggest that various countries in South-East Europe (Greece, Slovenia, Croatia—see Bache et al., 2011) and Central and Eastern Europe (Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania—see Dabrowski, 2014) only fulfilled the minimal requirements and produced highly prescriptive operational programme objectives (Van den Brande, 2014). Although Member States and the Commission remain in control, and more innovative, inclusive and efficient practices are often undermined by the individual interests of stakeholders, the 2014–2020 cohesion policy still presents a substantial contribution in the evolution of multilevel partnerships (Pazos-Vidal, 2019, pp. 159–161). After years in the making,18 in 2016, ministers responsible for urban matters agreed on the Pact of Amsterdam, which set out the EU Urban Agenda: “The Urban Agenda for the EU offers a new form of multilevel and multi-stakeholder cooperation with the aim of strengthening the urban dimension in EU policy” (Council of the EU, 2016, p.  4). This presents another  vital step forward in the formal involvement of local actors in EU policy-making. According to the Pact (Council of the EU, 2016, pp.  4, 9–16), voluntary, bottom-up partnerships across urban authorities, Member States, the Commission, Parliament, the European Investment Bank (EIB), local communities, businesses, knowledge institutions and civil society are the key delivery mechanism within the Urban Agenda. The initial list of Priority Themes (p.  7) included inclusion of migrants and refugees, air quality, urban poverty, housing, circular economy, jobs and skills in the local economy, climate adaptation, energy transition, sustainable use of land and nature-based solutions, urban mobility, digital transition and innovative and responsible public procurement. According to a 2017 report by the European Urban Knowledge Network (EUKN, 2017),19 the Pact of Amsterdam and the Urban Agenda were successful in ensuring that all expected partnerships included representatives from different government levels. The different partners acknowledged the multilevel working method as a promising way to strengthen cities’ role. Yet, in terms of project management, commitment, capacities and expertise, the partnerships are still a work in progress (EUKN, 2017), as they do not include every Member State; they lack formal leeway, which renders added value of the outputs unclear; and they  See, for instance, COM(2014) 490 final ‘The Urban Dimension of EU Policies’.  The European Urban Knowledge Network is an independent network on urban policy, research and practice and part of the Technical Secretariat of the Urban Agenda for the EU. 18 19

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suffer from a self-selection bias and mainly attract cities that are already strongly engaged. All in all, this undermines how representative the partnerships are of wider urban interests Pazos-Vidal, 2019, pp. 186–188). A 2018 survey in Belgium, for instance, found that the Urban Agenda has only (very) limited impact for most municipalities (Verhelst, 2019, pp.  88–89; 97). Only 5%, mostly large, regional cities or semi-urban authorities indicated a significant impact. Partnerships faced a number of issues including: the overly intensive workload, a lack of influence, extensive discussions about formal rules and procedures and uncertainty over the return on investment. The Commission (2017, p. 9) therefore initiated a series of new measures, such as the Urban Investment and Advisory Hub (Urbis)20 and the Urban Development Network,21 which seek  to optimise the implementation of partnerships, to increase the awareness among cities and to better tailor funding to urban needs. In addition, the EP (2018, p. 13) stated that the Urban Agenda should be put on a mandatory footing and be “coordinated, reinforced and formalised”.

Conclusion An essential feature of European integration has been the creation of supranational institutions through which Member States cooperate and take joint decisions (Diez & Wiener, 2009, pp. 3–4). As governmental and other actors seek access to EU decision-making, they exert constant pressure to adapt and expand the institutional structures and procedures to balance interests whilst still ensuring efficient common problem-solving (Wessels, 1992, pp. 47–48). As this chapter has shown, similar push and pull dynamics of integration apply for the local level (cf. Guderjan & Miles, 2016, p.  642). National governments prefer to keep control over local affairs, but they have also started to realise the potential that lies at the local level. As local authorities are pushing for more responsibilities to deal

20  “URBIS is set up to provide advisory support to urban authorities to facilitate, accelerate and unlock urban investment projects, programmes and platforms” (https://eiah.eib.org/ about/initiative-urbis.htm). 21  “The Urban Development Network is made up of more than 500 cities/urban areas across the EU responsible for implementing integrated actions based on Sustainable Urban Development strategies financed by ERDF in the 2014–2020 period” (https://ec.europa. eu/regional_policy/en/policy/themes/urban-development/network/).

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with European and global challenges, they have learned to deploy a variety of formal means and  to engage with EU institutions, either directly or indirectly through domestic channels (Eckert et al., 2013, p. 157; Van den Brande, 2014, p. 6; Guderjan & Miles, 2016, p. 643). Functional, cultural and political spillover have consequently affected European governance according to local interests, leading to a blurring, or ‘fusion’, of governance arrangements in which local actors have raised their profile remarkably (cf. Wessels, 1997, 273). Local government has thereby greatly benefitted from regional efforts to involve subnational authorities in a more structured way at the European level, for instance, in the case of regional policy, the European Regional Development Fund, the establishment of the CoR and the inclusion of local and regional self-government and the principle of subsidiarity within the European Treaties. Although local authorities have de jure been able to regain some of the status that they had de facto lost by European integration, local self-­ government and subsidiarity remain in practice direction devices guiding policy-specific negotiations and networks. The application of both provisions varies strongly across Member States and has not yet been properly tested in Court. That said, the principle of local self-government has already been successfully used reactively in legal cases to justify specific actions by local and regional authorities (see Chap.  7). Meanwhile, the constitutionalisation of subsidiarity and multilevel governance is also a source of ‘soft’ influence in lobby cases used to facilitate cooperation and mutual understanding (see Chap.  8) (cf. Bouwen & McCown, 2007, p. 422; Greenwood, 2011, pp. 43–44). The CoR is probably the most striking example of local government’s institutional involvement in the EU, even though its formal powers are merely consultative in nature, and the heterogeneity of membership sets limits to its influence vis-à-vis the main EU institutions. Nevertheless, the Lisbon Treaty has upgraded the status of the CoR and made it a ‘watchdog’ of subsidiarity, while informal links to the Commission and the EP have been an increasingly successful way to promote subnational concerns. There are other channels to represent local issues in EU policymaking, but they are not statutory, and their impact is more ad hoc and less visible. These include the committees and working groups of the Commission and European, national or regional consultations and concertation procedures.

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Because these channels did not lead to a consistent engagement between local and European actors, ever since 2000, a series of governance initiatives have been taken, such as systematic dialogues, a Territorial Pact of Local and Regional Authorities and the Urban Agenda, towards the recognition and creation of a genuine multilevel system with a more prominent role for local government (Panara and Varney, 2013). And yet, according to the EP (2018), “the current forms of cities’ participation remain unsatisfactory from the perspective of the desired impact on the design and implementation of EU policies and legislation”. Considering the formal status of local government, the idea that a fully fledged European multilevel governance system exists in which higher jurisdictions share political authority with the local level (see  MLG type I) would be misleading. National governments are traditionally unwilling to reallocate legislative competences at different jurisdictions (De Rooij, 2002, pp.  448–449; Fleurke & Willemse, 2006). The EU’s constitution may reach deep into the Member States, but it does not change intra-state structures. Multilevel governance is therefore most advanced in a procedural sense in the context of the partnership principle (see MLG type II). Member States could be brought to court if they completely fail to cooperate with subnational authorities when developing and implementing their operational programmes for the ESIF. However, the legal requirement for Partnership Agreements leaves room for generous interpretations and has in many states not been applied properly. Although the interdependency amongst different levels has grown, traditional state hierarchies have only to some extent eroded. The Urban Agenda presents a highly relevant example of this polycentric mode of governance in which different levels, groups and actors collectively deal with joint policies without directly challenging state authority (cf. Hooghe & Marks, 2010, pp. 18 et seq.). In summary, this chapter has clearly demonstrated that constitutional, institutional and procedural reforms have been essential for the integration of local government with the EU.  This bottom-up dynamic has changed European governance on a formal basis, and closing the circle at the top already in part confirms the validity of the integration cycle. However, as the following chapters will show, official channels alone are not sufficient to substantially feed local interests into European decision-­ making. It is above all the interplay of formal mobilisation and informal action which is a vital dynamic in the European integration of local government.

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CHAPTER 7

The Informal Bottom-Up Perspective: Mobilisation and Interest Representation

Introduction Although the status of local government in the EU has increasingly been put on a formal basis allowing local actors to upload their preferences into European policy-making, they still lack official channels to consistently achieve this goal. Due to their restricted formal participation rights, local actors have come to rely more often on complementary informal strategies to take part in European decision-making (Moore, 2008, p.  532). As Knodt (2011, p.  420) stated, “in multi-level systems such as the EU, marked by a lack of institutionalised representation for sub-national interests, territorial interests are also forced to represent their interests differently, i.e., via lobbying”. Direct lobbying as part of a wider process of interest representation then presents a rather pragmatic way to integrate municipalities as the fourth layer of government in the EU’s multilevel system. As opposed to formal involvement in decision-making through the CoR or institutionalised partnerships, in practice informal mobilisation is often subject to the flexible MLG type II forms, whereby local actors participate in loose policy coalitions and communities together with regional, national and European actors (cf. Pazos-Vidal, 2019). Like formal  participation, informal mobilisation of local government has been triggered by the EU’s overarching opportunity structure (cf. Greenwood, 2011, p. 196) and is first and foremost a direct response to

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Guderjan, T. Verhelst, Local Government in the European Union, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74382-6_7

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the downloading of EU legislations and policies (see Chap. 3). Particularly with regard to the Single Market and regional policy, functional spillover has driven local actors to promote their interests more actively at supranational levels. At the same time, the Commission and EP have tried to pull subnational authorities into EU governance to access necessary information and support for European policies and decisions (see Chap. 6), while local mobilisation has been sparked by maturing subnational identities and attitudes in general (see Chap. 4). By successfully uploading interests and demands, local government has evolved from a passive ‘policy-taker’ to a proactive ‘policy-maker’ (Schultze, 2003). Although it was long assumed that local government has little influence in European governance (Greenwood, 2011, p. 197), research has shown that neither is the EU dominated by private interests. In fact, public authorities have proven “comparatively efficient information processors, operating in many regards like other interest groups” (Chalmers, 2011, p.  484). Among the strand of research dealing with subnational mobilisation, most studies focus on regional interest representation or on umbrella organisations of subnational authorities (e.g. Hooghe & Marks, 1996; Bomberg & Peterson, 1998; Marks et al., 2002; Fleurke & Willemse, 2006; Callanan & Tatham, 2014; Tatham, 2010, 2013, 2015). While being often overshadowed by regional aspirations,1 local government has attuned itself to the evolving system of EU governance and has also impacted European outcomes (cf. Pazos-Vidal, 2019, pp.  50–51). Drawing on the literature on interest groups, this chapter will discuss how local government can upload its preferences to the EU beyond the existing formal structures. Starting with a discussion of the nature of local government as a territorial interest group, it continues to present the different lobbying strategies at the disposal of local actors and discusses how these are used in practice.

Local Government as a Territorial Interest Group When local authorities mobilise to advocate their cause at the European level on an informal basis, they engage in a form of interest representation, interest intermediation or lobbying (e.g. Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008;

1  Regions with legislative powers, which are part of the REGLEG network, are usually seen as the most powerful subnational authorities in the EU. This group includes regions from Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Finland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom (PazosVidal, 2019, p. 37).

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Hauser, 2011). While it is hard to find a single, undisputed definition of interest groups in the literature (cf. Baroni et al., 2014, p. 143), local government does not strictly meet the criteria of an interest group. Woll (2007, p. 465), for instance, considers interest groups as “formally organized groups who are united by specific political objectives and who try to influence the policy process in the pursuit of these goals”. Beyers et  al. (2010, pp. 4–5) suggested three key components that define an interest group: an interest group stands and speaks for aggregated individuals and/or organised forms of political behaviour (organisation); it seeks to influence political policy outcomes (political interests); and it usually pursues its goals via informal interactions with decision-makers instead of seeking to obtain a political office (informality).2 Although these definitions may not fully apply to local government, many scholars agree that local authorities are very similar to interest groups when they deploy particular strategies of regulatory mobilisation (cf. John, 2000; Marks et al., 2002; Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008). According to Bulmer (2007, p.  801): “Of course, local authorities are not normally regarded as interest groups. However, in their relations with the EU authorities, this is the best kind of parallel to make for their activities”. Beyers et al. (2010, p. 6) also believe that due to the presence of some form of organisation, the articulation of policy preferences, as well as the capacity to mobilise resources, local government has the potential to become a forceful actor on the European stage. Therefore, “it makes sense to conceive of such actors as interest organisations that are equivalent to interest groups” (ibid.). This is even more the case when local actors mobilise through their national and European associations and networks, such as CEMR or EUROCITIES (see below). With this in mind, local government may be best described as a territorial interest group.3 What sets territorial interest groups apart from other groups is above all the complexity stemming from their role as a distinctive level of government. Indeed, local authorities can mobilise as actors in their own right, but they can also serve as a vehicle for the interest representation of other actors and stakeholders on their territory (Greenwood, 2  Klüver (2013, pp. 5–6) uses ‘private status’ instead of informality as third criterion, which implies that interest groups are not public institutions funded by (and subject to) the state. 3  Other terms used in the literature are public interest group, the intergovernmental lobby or (associations of) public institutions (cf. Berkhout & Lowery, 2008; Greenwood, 2011; Knodt, 2011; Baroni et al., 2014).

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2011, p.  178). The nature of local government itself is also extremely broad and diverse in terms of political and legal organisation, functions, competences, autonomy and financial capacities (see Chap. 1). The municipal landscape covers cities, capital cities, metropolitan cities or areas, towns, districts or neighbourhood councils, provinces, counties, Landkreise and a myriad of municipal companies, inter-municipal arrangements and municipal networks and associations. Whether urban or rural, located at national borders, inland or at a coast, they all have a particular socio-­ economic structure, outlook and function, which can diffuse the interests they represent. Although the literature is still inconclusive as to whether the type of interest group conditions lobby success (Dür et al., 2015, pp. 952–953), local government’s nature as a territorial interest group provides both assets and obstacles in influencing European decisions. We discuss them here on the basis of a framework developed by Christiansen and Reh (2009, pp. 86–89), which comprises five main resources actors can build on: (1) formal and informal roles, (2) material capabilities and bargaining power, (3) epistemic resources, (4) ideational resources and (5) social resources.4 First, local actors can rely on their formal and informal roles in European decision-making. This resource has been promoted by the Commission and EP for some time, for instance, with the EU’s consultation regime and the formalisation of the partnership principle. At the national level, concertation procedures provide local actors with an extra voice in the European policy arena. However, except for the CoR’s advisory role, local government has no formal role in EU decision-making as such (see Chap. 6). In practice it might be more promising for local government to act informally as a territorial interest group and thereby to make the most effective use of the four other resources. Secondly, material capabilities and bargaining power refers to the size and economic weight of the local authorities. Depending on the constitutional status and internal competences of local government, these resources vary significantly across Member States as well as across subnational levels within a single Member State and across time (cf. Ladner et al., 2016). The large variety of material capabilities in  local government can affect local mobilisation in multiple ways. For one thing, mobilisation is 4  Rhodes (in Callanan, 2012, p. 759) uses a similar distinction of legal resources, financial resources, organisational resources, informational resources and political resources.

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inevitably more difficult when local authorities lack the financial capabilities. For another, the diffuse interests that local government often has to represent make it much harder to compete with specialised and powerful lobby groups. Local authorities can boost their economic weight and bargaining power, however, by combining capacities through inter-municipal cooperation, networks and associations (see Chap. 5) or by building ad hoc coalitions (cf. John, 1994, p. 909; Jeffery, 2000, pp. 14–16). Both epistemic resources, including knowledge of procedures, expertise and information, and ideational resources, referring to arguments, ideas and framing, add effect to local mobilisation. Chapter 4 has shown how local actors have gradually become more experienced and comfortable in their interactions with European institutions. Epistemic and ideational resources are linked to the Europeanisation of local authorities, manifested in their organisational adaptation, entrepreneurial spirit and political leadership (cf. Jeffery, 2000, ibid.). Local authorities possess plenty of experience and expertise which they can feed into EU policies—although this is more difficult for collegiate local executives, where political leadership is less focused (John, 1994, pp. 908–910). And because the Commission is more likely to consider aggregated local interests than inputs from individual authorities, national and EU-wide umbrella organisations of local government are particularly important to provide epistemic and ideational resources (Kettunen & Kull, 2009, p. 122; Montin, 2011, pp. 83 et seq.; Eckert et al., 2013, p. 162; Callanan & Tatham, 2014, p. 199; Guderjan, 2015, p. 248; Kull & Tatar, 2015, p. 235). Lastly, social resources comprise positive reputations, trust, alliances and legitimacy. Territorial interest groups bring legitimacy and social capital to the table, especially when they represent elected institutions and clearly defined constituencies (John, 1994, p. 908; Jeffery, 2000, p. 17; Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008, p. 175). At the grassroots level of representative democracy (cf. Steyvers, 2010, p. 17), local authorities can add a ‘democratic surplus’ to European policy-making, which the Commission may use when it clashes with national governments (John, ibid.). While strong regional governments provide additional opportunities to build alliances, strained relations between the local and national or regional levels, or even between national governments and the EU, can negatively impact on the chances for local positions to enter European discourses (John, 1994, pp. 909–910). Strong regions can also limit local actors’ room for manoeuvre if they perceive themselves as gatekeepers acting on behalf of local government (De Rynck, 1997).

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Taken together, these five basic resources help us to understand the specific assets and constraints of territorial interest representation. Whether they translate into real influence depends for a large part on the particular strategy chosen by the local actors, to which we turn in the following section.

Informal Mobilisation Strategies Interest representation is largely determined by the political system in which it takes place, whereby  interest groups adjust their agendas and strategies to the given opportunity structure (Greenwood, 2011, pp. 23–25). The EU is often characterised as a very open and accessible arena for interest representation (Callanan, 2012, p. 755) lacking a uniform process of decision-making with a clear hierarchy and a fixed centre of authority (Orbie, 2009, p.  161). Power is dispersed over the Commission, EP and the Council, and each dossier has to be negotiated by different actors, as the centre of authority shifts throughout the different phases of policy-making across these institutions. The interplay of institutions, actors and phases increases the possibilities for advocacy, which makes interest representation in the EU multifocal, miscellaneous and complex (cf. Bouwen, 2002; Bouwen & McCown, 2007).5 In order to achieve their goals, interest groups therefore have to make a series of conscious decisions throughout their mobilisation campaign the sum of which constitute their informal mobilisation strategy. We discuss this strategy on the basis of six major choices: who, what, why, where, when and how (see Table 7.1). Who? Actors and Their Interests The first question of local mobilisation concerns the actors involved and the interests they represent. As we have discussed earlier, local actors possess particular resources, such as status, economic power and leadership, which they can pool when mobilising collectively (see further below). In particular, national associations of local government are often used as 5  The number of interest groups in the EU has increased drastically since the late 1980s and early 1990s as a result of the expanding competencies of the Union after the creation of the Single Market (Woll, 2007, p.  456; Hauser, 2011, pp.  690–691). The Commission’s attempt to enhance the capacity and legitimacy of EU decision-making further boosted the activities of interest groups (Greenwood, 2011, p. 5).

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Table 7.1  Strategic choices in the informal mobilisation of local actors Choice

Element of strategy

Who?

Actors Interests (domain, focus, scope, salience) Tactic (legal, political: voice/access) Subject (legislation, policy) Initiative (proactive, reactive) Direction (positive, negative) Rationales (systemic, contextual, individual) Access point (Commission, EP, Council) Policy phase (pre-proposal, consultation, decision-making, transposition) Information (quantity, quality, selectivity) Framing (agenda-setting, issue-framing, support or opposition, contributory thinking, detailed amendments) Route (direct, indirect: domestic/European)

What?

Why? Where? When? How?

conduits in the European system of governance (Van Bever et al., 2011, pp.  283–284). Strong local government associations are then almost equivalent to strong regions in the EU, while weaker local government associations and individual local authorities share similarities to less forceful regions in their capacity as territorial interest groups (Callanan & Tatham, 2014, p. 19). The interests that local actors promote depend on the relevance of the respective  policy portfolio. Important EU policy domains, such as the internal market, economic enterprise and environment, for instance, attract more attention from interest representatives overall than others (Coen, 2007, pp. 336–337). Apart from cohesion policy and funding programmes, the most relevant policy fields which local government lobbies relate to the internal market, public services, environmental law, social and employment policies, culture, housing, transport, IT and, with increasing significance, immigration and refugee policies (Kettunen & Kull, 2009, p. 134; Guderjan, 2013, pp. 187–197). The focus, scope and salience of an interest are significant for the mobilisation strategy. In terms of focus, the literature differentiates between private and public interests and between broad European interests and national ones (Vass, 2008, p. 74). The scope of the interest groups can vary from specific or sectoral interests to diffuse or broad horizontal interests (Beyers, 2002, pp. 589–590; Greenwood, 2011, p. 14). In general, specific interests coincide with a clearly defined constituency and are therefore informed by homogenous priorities. Diffuse interests are more difficult to

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translate into coherent positions and struggle to make a strong impact on decision-making. The salience of an interest is another important concern that will affect the mobilisation strategy. Matters of high politics are generally much more difficult to steer compared to cases of low politics or technical day-to-day issues (Michalowitz, 2007; also Greenwood, 2003).6 Due to its special character as a territorial interest group, local actors are in fact more likely to successfully influence EU decisions, when they manage to present issues with a European focus and a wider scope (Witte, 2013, p. 389). In doing so, they lend important social resources, namely broad public support and democratic legitimacy, to European decisions, while at the same time, they rely on social resources when forging political alliances. The latter are particularly relevant for salient issues. Whereas technical day-to-day issues can be faced with factual expertise (epistemic resources), local actors need to present political arguments on highly salient issues (ideational resources), for instance, when local autonomy over public service provision is at stake (Witte, 2013, pp. 384–385). What? Objectives and Operational Choices Once actors have decided upon the constellation in which they mobilise and the interest they represent, they must select the best strategy and make operational choices about the goal of their campaign. Christiansen and Reh (2009, p. 86) identified three basic tactics to influence European decision-making: judicial agency, negotiation and going public. Judicial agency, or litigation, can be defined as “seeking to have a court rule on the unconstitutionality or otherwise improper nature of legislative provisions in order to change policy” (Bouwen & McCown, 2007, p. 426). Taking EU policies and regulations to court is often a valuable strategy to defend one’s interests at the end of the policy cycle (Coen, 2007, p. 340; Greenwood, 2011, pp. 43–44). According to Article 263 TFEU, Member States may take legal action against EU legislation “on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of power”. Member States can consider the interests of their municipalities in court, but local government itself has no privileged access to the Court of Justice. Like any private natural or legal person, local authorities can only challenge those acts which are ‘of direct 6  Private business interests, for instance, tend to be less relevant in highly conflictual and politicised debates (Dür et al., 2015, pp. 974–976).

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and individual concern to them’. Unlike private parties (cf. Bouwen & McCown, 2007, pp.  426–427), however, local authorities lack the resources to deploy litigation repeatedly and strategically and usually go ahead with their established practices until being brought to court by other actors. In most litigation cases, the involvement of local authorities, consortiums of local authorities and companies owned by public authorities was initiated by private companies, who claimed that they were unlawfully excluded from tendering for a public service provision. Even though local government then merely reacted to the legal claims of other parties, Textbox 7.1 shows that ‘reactive litigation’ has proven to be an effective way to defend practices of public service provision, and some judgements were subsequently codified by EU legislation (see Chap. 3).

Textbox 7.1  EU Litigation on Public Procurement

Public procurement is a particularly valuable example for local authorities’ successful involvement in litigation, and it demonstrates that legal actions can have far-reaching political implications for the European integration of local government. It has often been argued that the Court of Justice was biased towards the promotion of liberal markets and European integration (Bouwen & McCown, 2007, p. 430). As public procurement is of fundamental economic and political importance for the internal market, the first rulings of the Court challenged existing local practices by imposing strict requirements for public procurement. Over time, however, the Court refined its judgements and acknowledged specific municipal responsibilities and structures. Case C-107/98 Teckal v Comune di Viano (1999), for instance, clarified the exemption for direct service provision to wider ‘in-house’ companies that are essentially inwardly focused and sufficiently controlled by local authorities.7 The so-­called Teckal criteria listed in the (continued)

7  Teckal, a private company, argued that the gas supply through a consortium consisting of several Italian municipalities should have put the services out for tender, but the Court did not follow this line of reasoning.

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Textbox 7.1  (continued)

Court’s judgement became the most important guide for procurement policy. Case C-26/03 Stadt Halle v Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische Restabfall- und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna (2005) confirmed that local authorities can use their own resources to provide public services without being obliged to call on outside entities. But it also ruled that the Teckal criteria were not met in this case since the municipal company to which the public service contract was awarded without public tendering also involved a private entity. C-324/07 Coditel Brabant (2008) (and also Cases C-182/11 and C-183/11, Econord SpA v Commune di Cagno and others (2012)) then clarified that when several local authorities establish a joint entity for providing public services, the Teckal criteria are also fulfilled if control is exercised collectively. Through C-480/06 Commission v Germany (2009), the Court further broadened the Teckal exemptions for inter-municipal cooperation, which were then formally codified by the Procurement Directives 2014/23-25/EU (see Chap. 8). Next to judicial agency, going public and negotiation are two other basic tactics used to impact on European decisions. The interest group literature refers to these political strategies as voice and access (cf. Beyers, 2004, pp. 213–216). Voice means actions, such as protest or media campaigning, directed at the wider public to draw the attention of decision-makers to an issue in order to influence EU policy and decisions.8 Voice is, however, generally less relevant for public authorities. Access refers to “the exchange of policy-relevant information with public officials through formal or informal networks” (ibid., p. 213). This strategy is also known as (inside) lobbying, whereby interest groups deliver information to EU decision-­ makers with the explicit intention to influence policies and/or regulations (ibid.; also Bouwen & McCown, 2007, pp. 423–425). Access is typically 8  Voice strategies differ with regard to their primary target audience. Information politics (e.g. a press conference on a strategic moment in the policy cycle) is mainly aimed at signalling information at particular audiences (e.g. certain public constituencies or key decisionmakers). Protest politics (e.g. public demonstrations) deliberately stages an event to enhance public conflict and raise more general awareness amongst decision-makers about a policy issue (ibid.).

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used behind the scenes and relies on informal contacts between interest groups and policy-makers, for instance, in political or administrative committees, advisory bodies, and so on. When local actors opt for an access-based strategy, they must make a number of operational choices. It is above all the regulatory nature of the European governance system that triggers forms of interest representation (Pedler, 2002, p. 322). Interest groups will often choose legislative lobbying, which is directed at “the making of legislation in a policy area at the European level” (Bouwen, 2002, p. 366), over lobbying general EU policy (Callanan & Tatham, 2014, p. 5). The ambition to change European decisions is also known as regulatory mobilisation and means a “proactive, dynamic process where regional and local government interests seek to influence EU policy and legislative outcomes” (Callanan & Tatham, 2014, p.  4).9 Whereas proactive mobilisation implies that local actors lead in uploading issues onto the political agenda, reactive lobbying is only a response to pre-existing processes (RoB, 2013, p. 41). Lastly, positive lobbying seeks to convince decision-makers to enact or implement the proposed positions,  and negative lobbying, in contrast, tries to prevent legislation or policies that are not in the interest of the lobbyists (Hauser, 2011, p.  682). In practice, lobbying  objectives often  involve imposing smaller modifications, obtaining exemptions or postponing rules from coming into force (Mastenbroek et al., 2013, p. 17).10 According to Bouwen and McCown (2007), access is the most common and preferred form of interest representation. It follows a logic of supply and demand in which information is exchanged for access and/or influence between interest groups and the EU (cf. Bouwen, 2002, 2004; Hauser, 2011; Klüver, 2013). Throughout this process interest groups face three fundamental and interrelated choices of where to lobby, when to 9  The EU defines interest representation in its official Transparency Initiative as “activities carried out with the objective of influencing the policy formulation and decision-making processes of the European institutions” (EC, 2008, p.  3). This concept is different from financial mobilisation (see Chap. 3), which refers to “the tracking and gathering of information with a view to accessing EU funding” (Callanan & Tatham, 2014, p. 4). The aim to influence EU decisions and the unidirectional focus also distinguish interest representation from ‘city diplomacy’, which can be broadly understood as “the institutions and processes by which cities, or local governments in general, engage in relations with actors on an international political stage with the aim of representing themselves and their interests to one another” (Van der Pluijm, 2007, p. 6). 10  In Chap. 8 we operationalise the lobbying objectives.

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lobby and how to lobby. Yet, the most essential question is why local actors opt for lobbying as a mobilisation strategy in the first place. Why? Rationales Municipalities and regions make up a rather small share (7.3%) of all organisations registered to lobby European institutions (Wonka et  al., 2010, p. 467). This might not be surprising, since it is a complex interplay of different systemic, contextual and individual factors that determine whether local government engages in lobbying activities. This again relates to the resources of local government, its material capacities and bargaining power, and its epistemic, ideational and social resources. As Pazos-Vidal (2019, p.  109) notes: “the critical mobilisation factor is not so much quantitative (…) but qualitative”.11 With regard to a systemic rationale, rather than on their size and numbers, the decision to lobby depends on the nature and membership of local authorities and their associations, their social capital and agentic power, including financial, legal and political capacities.12 In Member States where local authorities have more competencies and enjoy profound autonomy, it is more likely that local actors will rally against a possible breach of subsidiarity caused by European rules. The contextual rationale acknowledges the political opportunity structure which further conditions the decision to lobby for favourable outcomes. The ability to form a lobby coalition is constrained when the interests at stake diverge across Member States, when coalitions face collective action problems and find it hard to subscribe to a joint position, or when a rational cost-benefit analysis suggests that the intended outcomes do not justify potential conflict with the EU and other government actors (Pazos-Vidal, 2019, pp. 99–101, 109). The last important set of reasons for informal mobilisation  relates to individual rationales. As the Europeanisation literature suggests, lobbying EU institutions typically follows from a gradual adaptation process at the local level (see Chap. 2). It is therefore one of the most challenging links in the relationship between local government and the EU only undertaken by a small group of highly proactive authorities (see Chap. 4). This makes it  one of the most distinguishing features of fully Europeanised local

 Referring to the mobilisation of multilevel coalitions of subnational actors in the EU.  See also Callanan’s study (2012) of collective lobbying through national associations.

11 12

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authorities, and one of the main differences between the Brussels offices of subnational authorities lies in how they prioritise lobbying policies and legislation (Marks et al., 2002, p. 8). Local authorities and their associations are more likely to lobby EU decisions if their administrations monitor the policy issue at stake, if they have a longstanding involvement in it and if they can deploy sufficient organisational, political and informational resources (John, 1994, pp.  909–910; Callanan, 2012, pp.  770–772; Pazos-Vidal, 2019, pp.  99–100). Local actors who have experience in cooperating with the Commission—municipal umbrella organisations, transnational networks, a few local policy entrepreneurs and engaged officers—have learned to steer their way through the messy maze of European governance and to participate and promote their interests in EU policy-­ making (Goldsmith, 2003, pp. 121 et seq.; Schultze, 2003, p. 124). And a final obvious facilitator of such an engagement  are general attitudes towards European integration as such (see Chap. 4). Where? EU Access Points The main access points for interest groups are the Commission, EP and the Council (Beyers, 2004, pp. 218–220; Bouwen, 2002, pp. 379–382; Greenwood, 2011, pp. 24–43; Hauser, 2011, pp. 694–699; Pedler, 2002, pp.  2–3, 315–319), of which each  plays a specific role in the legislative process and is reliant on particular information. Interest groups respond to this opportunity structure by attempting to lobby a combination of the three access points and adjusting their strategy to the relevant institution (cf. Bouwen, 2002, 2004; Beyers, 2004). The Commission, including Commissioners, cabinets, directorates-­ general, expert groups, rapporteurs, committees, and so on, is commonly the most important access point for lobbyists. Lobbyists can approach them through formal channels, such as online consultations, as well as through informal contacts (Klüver, 2012). The Commission relies most heavily on technical input from interest groups when developing legislation and monitoring policy implementation, which makes interest groups almost a ‘natural constituency’ (Greenwood, 2011, p. 33). The EP is the second major access point and covers domestic and other MEPs, committees, intergroups, rapporteurs, and so on. Its relevance has expanded markedly with the evolution of co-decision-making. Having no

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in-built political majority, as is common for national parliaments, the EP is highly susceptible to outside influence (ibid., p. 40). As they are expected to scrutinise Commission proposals through a wider European perspective, MEPs are generally more receptive towards general information with a European focus than towards technical information. The Council of the European Union then comprises national ministers, COREPER and the EU presidency and is not only the counterpart of the EP in the co-decision procedures but also considered to be the EU’s ‘supreme decision-maker’ (Bouwen, 2002, p. 381). Rather than the institution itself, it is mainly the Member States that are lobbied by their domestic interest groups via informal contacts and internal concertation mechanisms. The Council is widely seen as the most difficult access point and therefore a ‘last resort’ to exert pressure on the decision-making process (Beyers, 2004, p. 220). This is partly because Member States often have to reach consensus only at a very advanced stage in the policy cycle (Greenwood, 2011, p. 30). Interacting with the Commission allows local government to best utilise their epistemic and social resources. The Council is more difficult to approach directly, unless constituency issues are concerned or local and national level interests align. As far as the EP is concerned, local actors can provide essential links between MEPs and their electorate back at home, which gives these MEPs more leeway from their domestic party (Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008, pp.  174–175). According to Heinelt and Niederhafner (ibid., p. 175), cities and MEPs have already succeeded in building such alliances in the past, which allowed them to spark public debates on policy issues: Especially in cases where cities and their organizations try to influence actors at all different layers of the European multilevel system, like the EP, national governments and domestic parliaments, in order to push for or block a proposed piece of legislation, a public discourse can arise. Cities join forces in these debates with parties and party fractions across the different political groups of the EP […]. This has clearly been the case in the debate on subsidiarity in general and the role of municipalities in particular.

When? The EU Policy Cycle Local actors may get in touch with all three access points at different stages in the policy cycle. They can intervene during the pre-proposal (e.g. expert committees, online consultations, contacts with the Commission),

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consultation (CoR, EESC), decision-making (EP, Council) and the transposition (Commission, agencies) phases (Callanan, 2012, pp. 755–756). The pre-­proposal or policy formulation stage is commonly the best moment to exert real impact on the legislative process (Pedler, 2002, p.  315; Klüver, 2011, p. 485), which is also the case for local government, as Callanan (2012, p. 757) argues: “the European Commission has made an explicit invitation to local and regional government to become involved in policy making at the policy formation stage before the Commission issues new legislative proposals”. In Chap. 6, we presented the main initiatives in this regard. How? Information, Framing and Access Routes The transmission of information is the key to effective interest representation (cf. Bouwen, 2002; Klüver, 2012, 2013). This can be accomplished via agenda-setting, issue-framing, contributory thinking, detailed input to draft legislation, providing legitimacy and political support, opposition and consideration of policy measures and implementation (Greenwood, 2003, p. 27). Though it is vital to “provide the highest quantity and quality of the critical access good in the most efficient way” (Bouwen, 2002, p. 382), information comes in different forms and shapes (Bouwen, 2002, pp. 369–371). Expert knowledge refers to specific and technical know-how needed to develop policies and legislation. This enhances the quality of EU policies and strengthens the output legitimacy of EU decision-­making. Information about the European encompassing interest and information about the domestic encompassing interest aggregate the individual interests of domestic or European actors and mainly increase the input legitimacy of EU decision-making. As we highlighted before, acting collectively and representing a national or European encompassing interest allows local actors to boost the relevance of their inputs and positions. Interest groups have to deploy their epistemic, ideational and social resources to disseminate their arguments in an optimal way to respond to the resource dependency of European institutions. Because EU decision-makers need detailed, practical information to understand policy issues and the possible implications of future legislation, a strategic campaign is built on a combination of relevant expertise, affinity with the issue at stake and the legitimacy to support EU decision-makers. Interest groups may then use different access routes to provide the various EU institutions with information, which together constitute a comprehensive and varied ‘roadmap to Europe’. The combination of access through the domestic level and the European level creates a pattern of

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3

Local government Single authority, network, national association

European local actors Networks, associations, institutions 1

2

European institutions Commission, EP, Council

Domestic upperlevel actors National, regional government

Fig. 7.1  Local access routes to the EU (based on Beyers, 2002, p. 596)

three different (but non-exclusive) routes for local interest representation in the EU (cf. Beyers, 2002, p. 595): (1) via the direct route, local authorities contact EU officials individually or through their national association, a national network or an inter-municipal arrangement; (2) via the indirect domestic route, they address upper-level public actors in the Member States at national and regional levels; and (3) the indirect European route involves other local actors, organisations and networks at EU level (see Fig. 7.1). In practice, direct and indirect national as well as indirect European routes often work complementarily (see Textbox 7.2), especially when collective interests are at stake (Goldsmith, 1993, p. 698).13 Both for practical and ideological reasons, the Commission particularly prefers local actors to aggregate their interests and to speak with a collective, either national or European, voice: The preference for dealing with EU-wide and national local government associations […] is to some extent an attempt to deal with the huge increase in the number of organisations active in Brussels and the problem of ‘overcrowding’. […] The Commission has itself noted that while it attaches importance to input from Brussels-based representative offices and EU-wide associations, ‘the Commission will avoid consultation processes which could give the 13  The positions of the CEMR, for instance, represent the aggregated input of its national sections. Yet, when the interests of national member associations diverge, they can pursue their individual positions or join forces with other national umbrella associations and take an additional direct or indirect route to Europe (cf. Guderjan, 2013, p. 260).

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Textbox 7.2  Lobbying Strategies of Local Authorities in Belgium and the Netherlands

Van Bever et  al. (2011, pp.  283–284) studied the access routes towards the EU used by Flemish municipalities. Unsurprisingly the Flemish local government association is their most common route to Europe. Partnerships with other European local authorities and transnational networks (indirect European route) are additionally deployed by some 10% of municipalities on a regular basis. The municipalities only occasionally rely on other European platforms, such as the CEMR, and the indirect domestic route via regional and national governments to forward their interests to the European institutions. Mastenbroek et al. (2013, pp. 22–36) analysed the mobilisation of the Dutch provinces, which frequently follow a direct route to get in touch with the Commission, in particular with DG Regio, to discuss policy proposals. At the same time, they do neither approach EU expert groups or comitology committees nor respond to impact assessments very often. In the EP, the Dutch provinces maintain good direct contacts to their national MEPs and to foreign MEPs through the CEMR, which is another privileged partner providing an indirect European route. Provincial actors have considered their ties to the CoR as less effective or satisfactory. Despite the existing formal institutional channels in the Netherlands to transfer local claims to national representatives (indirect national route) (see Chap. 6), Council negotiations are the most difficult arena to access.

impression that “Brussels is only talking to Brussels’ … In many cases, national and regional viewpoints can be equally important in taking into account the diversity of situations in the Member States’. (Callanan, 2012, p. 758)

Whereas the national associations of local government provide a direct route to Europe, EUROCITIES and CEMR present a collective indirect European route. The two peak associations of local government at EU level promote the interests of their members as a key part of their activities

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(see Chap. 5).14 The indirect domestic route comprises intra-state relations and domestic concertation schemes and depends on the availability of social resources, such as party political links between politicians from local and higher levels, and compatible interests. When it comes to lobbying the EU, the relationship between local and regional actors and their national governments is predominantly based on cooperation. State bypassing and, in particular, open conflict between the different levels of government are not typical. If domestic concertation procedures exist, local authorities are even less likely to follow the direct European route, and bypassing becomes merely a fallback option (Callanan & Tatham, 2014, pp.  13–20).15 Although it is impossible for most local authorities to address every single access point (Callanan, 2012, p. 758), the most effective strategy usually combines different routes and access points (Beyers, 2004, p. 215; Coen, 2007, pp. 337–338).16 Such ‘multilevel venue shopping’ often starts at the closest (national) level before moving on to more distant (European) access points (cf. Beyers & Kerremans, 2012).

Conclusion Over the past three decades, the local level has received increasing formal status within EU governance without necessarily being provided with substantial political powers. Local actors have therefore started to operate as territorial interest groups to promote their interests. As part of their informal mobilisation, litigation allows local authorities to defend their practices when they are challenged in court. More proactive mobilisation strategies are about providing information to European institutions in

14  EUROCITIES’ core mission is to be the voice of cities at the European level, and the first pillar of the CEMR’s activities aims at influencing European policy and legislation in all areas that have an impact on municipalities and regions. 15  A comparative study at the end of the 1990s revealed that this practice also differs between states. In some countries (Germany, France, Spain, the United Kingdom), local mobilisation towards the EU was more often used to increase local autonomy or bypass central government (Klausen & Goldsmith, 1997, pp. 242–247). 16  A study of Kiers (2014), who investigated the influence of Dutch provinces in the EU, underlined the importance of strategic choices in the mobilisation process. Rather than developing a regular lobby pattern, the provinces were more effective when they adjusted their strategy according to the specific issue context at hand. The success rate increased when the appropriate access routes and access points were chosen to intervene at the right moment in time, while maximising the available resources and opportunities for joint action.

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exchange for influence. Access-based lobbying often seeks to actively or reactively change or obstruct specific pieces of European legislation or policy measures in various fields, such as cohesion policy and regional policy, environmental issues, social policy, IT policy, immigration, and so on. Whether and how local actors proceed to lobby European policy depends on systemic and contextual rationales, such as power, competencies and policy contexts. Yet, the ultimate decision to act depends rather on individual rationales, including the norms, rational choices and attitudes of the individual local actors and the organisational adaptation of their administration (see Chap. 4). Access-based mobilisation thrives on the transfer of information via direct and indirect routes to the EU’s three main institutions. In this complex and constantly changing environment, local actors have to decide on the access point(s), timing, route(s) to follow and on the information to provide. A well thought-out campaign takes the shape of a multilevel game in which local actors act collectively to pursue tangible interests that are relevant beyond a single Member State. Ideally, it starts early in the decision-making process and adapts the messaging to different audiences at different levels (cf. Hauser, 2011, pp. 699–702; RoB, 2013, pp. 47–48). Local actors then take the indirect domestic route through the regional and national levels, before gradually working their way up through a direct and indirect European route to access EU institutions. Local actors only represent a relatively small share of the wider interest group landscape, and they do not have a particularly strong reputation for being effective lobbyists. Yet, as territorial interest groups local authorities can have significant leverage supported by different resources. Since the EU is often described as an open system of governance that actively seeks information from interest groups, local government’s informal role in the European decision-making process is an important resource. When dealing with Commission officials, local actors can forward their expertise to anticipate the possible implications of European policies at the local level (epistemic resources) and provide public and political support. Political connections and intra-state relations, in turn, facilitate contacts with MEPs and the Council (social resources). Overall, local actors tend to be more effective when they pool their weight, which increases their material capabilities and bargaining power. As we will demonstrate in the next chapter, the combination of informal lobbying with formal mobilisation strategies allows local government to reach its objectives and impact on European decisions.

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CHAPTER 8

Closing the Cycle: The Impact of Formal and Informal Mobilisation

Introduction The previous chapters discussed how the local and European levels have become increasingly intertwined over the past decades. Yet, for a long time, local actors were not regarded as influential stakeholders with much political leverage in the EU’s decision-making arena: Many scholars note the mobilisation of sub-national interests […] However, there is not much concrete evidence that sub-national activity has influenced EU decision-makers; rather, EU decision-makers have used the lobbies to legitimate policies, to help implementation and as an aid in battles within Brussels. (John, 2000, p. 890)

Genuine integration of local government with the EU means that local positions not only mobilise but also have a real impact on European decisions (cf. John, 2000, pp. 889–890). Only then can we validate the idea of the integration cycle according to which local government makes a meaningful contribution to European governance on a systematic basis. Within both formal and informal mobilisation, there are wide claims that local government lacks influence. Despite enjoying a formal position in the EU’s polity, there is still a profound shortage of involvement by local actors (see Chap. 6); and as a territorial interest group, local government is not regarded as the most effective lobbyist in a landscape filled © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Guderjan, T. Verhelst, Local Government in the European Union, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74382-6_8

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with powerful and skilled interest groups (see Chap. 7).1 As Greenwood (2011, p. 177) suggested, many local actors lack a strong awareness and knowledge of how to promote their interests in European policy-making: “the history of regional interest lobbying is littered with examples of local government organizations misunderstanding the basic ways in which the EU takes decisions in fields which influence them”. And yet, with a growing top-down impact (see Chap. 3), local actors increased their awareness and adjusted to the new realities (see Chap.  4), which enhanced their profile as both formally recognised stakeholders in EU policy development and as a territorial lobby group. Its ‘turn to Europe’ has empowered the local level over time, as we will demonstrate in this chapter. Before we do so and discuss the various conditions that inform local influence, we start with a brief conceptual and methodological discussion of how to understand and measure influence in European governance.

Local Influence: Conceptual and Methodological Considerations Local actors have more than one reason for seeking to affect EU decisions and thereby to ‘close’ the integration cycle. We distinguish between five strategies to impact on European governance: • Agenda-setting approach: to sensitise the Commission, EP  and Council and promote local agendas in EU policies • Anticipatory approach: to inform decisions that may cause implementation problems to make them compliable with local practices • Prohibitive approach: to obstruct decisions that impact negatively on local government • Proactive approach: to modify decisions to match existing local practices and policies • Positional approach: to strive for a stronger recognition, status and participation in EU policy-making

1  Tatham’s study of regional interest representation in the EU (2015) confirmed the limits to the influence of regions as a generic territorial interest group. Their self-reported influence, however, is contingent upon size (a representational logic) and the supranational embeddedness of leading officials (a Matthew effect or cumulative advantage logic).

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Influence is very much a contested concept in political science, and existing research has not frequently or comprehensively examined questions of influence upon European policy-making (Bouwen, 2002, p. 366; Dür, 2008, p.  560), which is even more the case for ‘local  influence’ (Goldsmith, 2011, p. 37; Callanan & Tatham, 2014, p. 4). As it is exercised by multiple actors with varying interests across different channels and stages of the policy process, influence is conceptually and methodologically difficult to ascertain (Dür, 2008, pp. 561–562). Many studies have therefore focused on access to European institutions as a proxy for influence, even if access alone does not necessarily translate into influence and influence can also be exercised through voice and litigation (see Chap. 7) (cf. Bouwen, 2002, p. 366; Bouwen & McCown, 2007). The literature on interest groups uses many different definitions to capture the essence of influence. Dür (2008, p.  561), for instance, defines influence as “an actor’s ability to shape a decision in line with her preferences”. Dür and De Bièvre (2007, p. 3; see also Klüver 2011, p. 483) refer to it as “control over political outcomes”, which happens when actors “manage to influence outcomes in a way that brings them closer to their ideal points”. Similarly, Michalowitz (2007, p. 134) describes influence as a weaker form of power, which is exercised when “an actor is being persuaded to pursue a certain course of action, even if they initially did not wish to do so”. Stepping aside from this Weberian idea of influence as an expression of power, for Chalmers (2011, p.  474) lobbying revolves around the information exchange between interest groups and decision-­ makers. According to him, lobbying is not about convincing someone who has a different opinion but pushing someone whose opinion is already aligned with your own. Drawing on the essentials of these definitions, we conceive ‘local influence’ as an information exchange between local government and the EU and/or national decision-makers that results in changes to legislation, policies, procedures and even institutions at European level that would not have happened without an intentional intervention by local actors. As indicated above, this includes ‘positive’ achievements in promoting new positions as well as ‘negative lobbying’ when stakeholders obstruct unfavourable outcomes (cf. Hauser, 2011, p. 682; Witte, 2013, p. 63). The question of how to measure influence adds further complexity to this issue. Dür (2008, pp. 562–572, 2010, pp. 121–123; also Klüver 2011, pp. 489–491) proposes three methods for measuring the influence of interest groups in EU decision-making. The most common approach is

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process-tracing, which seeks to reconstruct the different steps of how lobbying leads to an adjustment of EU legislation. Process-tracing examines the relation between cause and effect by considering different preferences and aspects of lobbying, such as access, information, responses and outcomes. A second method looks at the ‘attributed influence’ by surveying how actors rate their own influence and the influence of others. The third method investigates the degree of ‘preference attainment’ by systematically comparing policy outcomes with the initial positions of interest groups. In light of these theoretical and empirical challenges, examining municipal influence requires a careful consideration of the context in which it is exercised (cf. Baumgartner & Leech, 1998, pp. 185–186). It also takes a good deal of pragmatism and critical reflection on the inherent methodological limitations and the generalisability of the findings (cf. Dür & De Bièvre, 2007, p. 3). Accordingly, we discuss a series of specific examples of both successful and failed local mobilisation that were analysed with the help of various methods, and we explain general patterns linked to the exercise of influence. We then present more detailed cases to examine the conditions under which local government is able to have an impact, even under particularly challenging circumstances.2 We  will demonstrate that by strategically combining formal and informal mobilisation routes local government has been able to leave its mark on European decisions, ranging from Treaty reforms to legislation, programmes and policy initiatives.

Local Influence through Different Strategies To illustrate how local influence affects different dimensions of European governance, the following section provides a wide range of examples concerning different strategies that local actors have successfully deployed, namely collective action, national concertation and individual actions, as well as unsuccessful attempts.

2  Our analysis rests on the basic premise that local actors should be aware of the given policy process and willing to change it as they see fit. This precludes cases where despite the apparent impact of EU decisions on local government, local actors did not mobilise to influence the decision, which de facto rules out influence as we have conceptualised it (see also Chap. 7). A marked example of such a case concerns the European harmonisation of public document recognition, whereby local authorities failed to identify subsidiarity concerns and consequently did not get involved in the decision process that would impact strongly and directly on their working (Pazos-Vidal, 2019, pp. 97–101).

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Collective Action Collective action is one of the most common and effective ways for local government to wield influence on EU decisions. In practice, this often blurs the lines between formal and informal mobilisation. Three ‘shining’ examples of successful collective mobilisation demonstrate that local actors have collectively been able to pursue a positional approach and affect constitutional, institutional and procedural matters: the CoR, the Lisbon Treaty and the Urban Agenda. First, in the early 1990s, a coalition of subnational actors, led by German and Belgian regions, successfully campaigned for the formal representation of local government in European policy-making, which led to the establishment of the CoR. Prior to the Maastricht negotiations, local actors from the United Kingdom were able to convince their national government of the value of such an institution, and the then British Commissioner for Regional Policies Bruce Millan was strongly in favour of formalising local consultation rights. Through the CEMR local associations amplified this proposal at the European level, which encountered hardly any opposition and was “a case of pushing an open door” (John, 1994, p. 915). The role of the CoR within the European polity illustrates the multifaceted nature of local influence. In spite of its formal advisory powers, the Committee does not enjoy a reputation for being particularly relevant in EU decision-making (cf. Hessel, 2003, p. 51; Greenwood, 2011, p. 176; Pazos-Vidal, 2019, p. 69). Its impact stems foremost from its power as the democratically legitimised voice of subnational government and its ability to engage on an informal basis with other European institutions (Guderjan, 2012, pp. 113–114; Piattoni & Schönlau, 2015). Cooperating with the Committee during the development and implementation of new policies has also provided the Commission with additional support for its proposals among Member States (Van der Storm, 2002, p.  238; Pazos-Vidal, 2019, p. 81) and prevented legal disputes.3 As a ‘watchdog of subsidiarity’, the CoR gained further political leverage vis-à-vis other institutions via propositions, negotiations and consultations (Piattoni & Schönlau, 2015, p. 98 et seq.). 3  The interplay between formal and informal powers is here reflected by the fact that until today, the CoR has not yet made use of the ‘nuclear option’ of going to court to defend local interests on the basis of the constitutionalised principles (cf. Pazos-Vidal, 2019, p. 100). An unsuccessful complaint would also risk taking away some of the Committee’s threat potential.

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While the CoR seems destined to follow an anticipatory and agenda-­ setting approach, empirical impact assessments demonstrate that a proactive approach is also effective to influence the other institutions. Neshkova (2010) studied the Committee’s influence on the position of the Commission across different areas: regional policy, culture policy, environmental protection and infrastructure. In more than one third of the cases she examined, the CoR influenced the Commission’s legislative decisions. Its impact appears most substantial in regional policy, the Committee’s core competence, when public discontent about the Commission’s initiatives was particularly strong and when the CoR’s amendments were politically highly relevant. In these cases, the CoR’s position provided ‘democratic support’ to the ‘technocratic’ Commission. In another assessment of the impact on decision-making exercised by the CoR and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), Panke et al. (2015) came to similar conclusions. The influence of both institutions is higher on matters of high public salience or when their position is close to the initial position of other institutions. The chance of influence further increases in areas where both committees have strong administrative capacities and when they can propose new, concise and useful ideas to tackle policy issues compared to other institutions or interest groups involved (see Textbox 8.1). Textbox 8.1  Proactive Influence of Local Councillors in the CoR (Guderjan, 2013, p. 197)

The example of former member Flo Clucas from Liverpool City Council demonstrates how local councillors enjoy considerable access to various policy fields dealt with at the European level through the CoR and can impact on European decisions in those policy fields. Until her retirement in 2012, councillor Clucas mainly worked on the EU budget, cohesion and regional policy but also on a wide range of other topics, such as housing policy, maritime safety and fishing, culture and transport systems. On request by the Italian MEP Alfonso Adria, she produced a paper on housing, and matters of regional policy suggested using housing policy as a means of regenerative and environmental policy by building energy-efficient buildings and thereby reducing their carbon footprint. Her paper went unopposed through the CoR to the EP and from there to the Commission, which was reluctant to take action, as housing is not (continuned)

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Textbox 8.1  (continued)

part of the EU’s competences. After three years of lobbying from 2007 to 2010, the Commission agreed to use up to 4% of the ERDF programme as a tool to promote energy-efficient housing within the Member States. Clucas then successfully lobbied the United Kingdom government to agree to such a programme, which was finalised for Merseyside and the North West of England in 2010. For the North West, several local authorities and housing associations work together, and in Merseyside local authorities with selected partners have set up a programme to create windproof and watertight homes in deprived housing areas. The second example for a successful positional approach refers to the 2007 Lisbon Treaty. After collective efforts, local government was able to expand its official status in the European polity through the constitutionalisation of the principles of local self-government and subsidiarity in the European Treaties. In the run-up to the 2004 Constitutional Treaty, the CEMR was an important player acting on behalf of its municipal membership (Leitermann, 2006, p. 337; Münch, 2006, pp. 114 et seq.). The then first deputy president of the CEMR, Heinrich Hoffschulte, was actively engaged in the European Convention between 2002 and 2003, and in this role, he contributed to the inclusion of subsidiarity and local self-­government in the European Treaties (Hoffschulte, 2006, pp. 69–70; Zimmermann, 2006, pp.  28–29). Subsequently, the CEMR rallied its national members to lobby their governments and secure their support for these provisions in the Intergovernmental Conference of 2003 (Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008, p.  179). Due to the constitutional reforms, local self-­government and subsidiarity have become guiding principles to promote a culture of cooperation and mutual understanding across different levels, and to some extent, they have already been used successfully by local actors before the European Court of Justice to justify their actions and fend off unwarranted EU legislation (see Chap. 6). This has provided an important source of political leverage and legitimacy for local actors and opened up new forms of interest representation and influence. The third case of municipal influence on the EU’s governance structures concerns the formalisation of the partnership principle in the Pact of

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Amsterdam (2016) and the EU Urban Agenda (Pazos-Vidal, 2019, p. 168). The new EU Urban Agenda was developed by a small and loose policy community of national officials and the Commission, which included local actors to promote a structural multilevel partnership for the design of urban policies at EU level. The lobbying strategy cleverly exploited a new window of opportunity opened by the Juncker Commission, which at the time declared the improvement of the regulatory regimes as one of its key objectives. Indeed, the coalition reframed its old demand for a European focus on urban spatial planning and EU cohesion policy at the local level as a new call for better regulation. Dutch government officials in particular had always been staunch advocates of an EU urban policy, and DG REGIO supported the cause in order to increase its policy portfolio within the Commission. Together, they could realise a long-standing goal and elevate the official status of their  policy community. Local actors, notably the CEMR and EUROCITIES, were asked to join the group and to add their technical and political experience, as well as to broaden the public support for the Urban Agenda, which was important to counter any potential opposition by Member States (ibid., pp. 169–172). Here, we want to briefly reiterate the relevance of the CEMR and EUROCITIES for collective action. While the EU polity is comprised of a wider range of organisations, associations and networks to mobilise vertically and horizontally (see Chaps. 5 and 7), the CEMR and EUROCITIES are overall the most important agents for local government. Due to their membership and particular interests, Heinelt and Niederhafner (2008) found an inverted logic of influence for both peak associations. EUROCITIES, a cluster network of Europe’s big cities, represents a very specific, homogenic clientele and draws on ample resources and expertise from its members. This makes the network particularly effective in providing information to European institutions on urban affairs. As the European institutional association of local and regional umbrella organisations, the CEMR inevitably adopts a broader and more diffuse focus and has less available resources to rally. Similarly to the CoR, the positions of the CEMR tend to become watered down among a wide range of different territorial and political interests (e.g. local versus regional, urban versus rural) and diverse national practices and cultures (cf. Greenwood, 2011, p.  190).4 The CEMR’s 4  According to Bergeret-Cassagne (in Pazos-Vidal, 2019, p.  57), the CEMR is further inflicted by the inherent political tension between members who prefer the CEMR to act as an intergovernmental organisation (the European umbrella of national associations) and

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capacity to provide information might be comparatively lower than that of EUCOCITIES, yet its positions enjoy a greater input legitimacy due to its broader membership (although the CEMR still has to compete with the CoR in this regard; Pazos-Vidal, 2019, p. 57). Member State Concertation Intra-state consultation allows local actors to convey their preferences indirectly to the European arena via their national or regional representatives (see Chap. 6). These procedures seem particularly suited for an anticipatory and agenda-setting approach. Especially in Member States where the local level enjoys a strong constitutional status with established forms of interaction, national channels can be effective means of promoting municipal concerns (Kettunen & Kull, 2009, p. 136; Callanan & Tatham, 2014, pp. 200–203; Guderjan, 2015, p. 248). Since it remains national government officials who decide whether to follow up on local positions, municipal influence depends on local government’s capacity to provide relevant information. Experience from Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands suggests that political cultures, such as corporatist and multiparty consociative traditions, impact on the information flow between local and national actors: the institutionalisation of consultation practices and, more importantly, of information sharing makes it very likely that the municipalities of these countries have a higher degree of influence (via their national associations) than much larger subnational authorities from other countries. (Pazos-­ Vidal, 2019, p. 55)

The revised Directive on the Services of General Interest (2004/18/ EC)5 illustrates the importance of indirect mobilisation through national channels (Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008, p.  174). With the support of national and regional governments, local authorities in France and Germany were successful in their attempt to include high social and environmental standards under explicit reference to local government in the members who perceive the CEMR as an instrument to foster a federal Europe (as codified in the 1953 Charter of Municipal Liberties). 5  Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts.

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directive. The local umbrella organisations in both Member States also convinced their national governments to oppose the Commission’s plans to liberalise the municipal provision of water supply and wastewater management. Against the resistance of the two largest Member States in the Council, the Commission failed to realise its proposals for service concessions in the 2004 Public Procurement Directives (2004/17-18/EC)6 (Witte, 2013, pp. 375–379).7 At the same time, there are clear limits to the effectiveness of intra-state concertation as, for instance, local authorities may not have the capacities to produce timely responses to official consultations (Pazos-Vidal, 2019, pp.  54–55). Because national and regional governments are not bound to represent local priorities in their own positions, consultations do not guarantee local influence when different interests clash (Mastenbroek et al., 2013, p. 32). Also, concertation can undermine other lobbying strategies, when local actors agree to compromise with their national government and then afterwards have little room for advocating other positions through complementary routes (cf. CoR, 2005, p. 290). Individual Action For single authorities or smaller networks, regional and cohesion policy provides the most obvious opportunity to translate issue ownership into political influence, as the following examples show. The city of Montpellier played a key role in the European negotiations for the Integrated Mediterranean Programme in the late 1980s (Goldsmith, 1993, p. 692). Montpellier subsequently used the funding for substantial public investments in the airport, a conference centre and technological poles. In the same period, British local authorities were able to influence the allocation and management of ERDF, Interreg, the ‘additionality principle’8 and funds for local areas affected by declining military expenditures (John, 1994, pp. 912–915). CASTer, the network of European regional and local authorities involved in the steel industry, was successful in defining the application criteria and provisions for INTERREG IIIC (Van der Storm, 6  Directive 2004/17/EC coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors. 7  The 2014 revision of the public procurement acquis is discussed below. 8  Additionality is one of the main principles of the European Structural and Investment Funds according to which EU funding must not replace, but add to public spending.

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2002, p. 242). Another example is the lobbying campaign of the Island Commission of the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe (CPMR) during the negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, which led to the acknowledgement of island regions as areas with specific needs (see Article 174 TFEU) (cf. Greenwood, 2011, p. 193). When information, concertation, collective action and issue ownership are complemented by internal factors such as awareness, entrepreneurialism and experience, single cities (or smaller local networks) can display a profound and systematic impact on European policy-making. For obvious reasons, these conditions often apply to big, well-resourced and ‘fully Europeanised’ cities.9 The city of Budapest is a good example of this (Tosics, 2010, pp.  138–142). During negotiations over Hungary’s EU membership, for instance, the city was successful in including urban issues on the agenda. Key to this end were an entrepreneurial mayor, the establishment of an office in Brussels and external expertise. Having learned how EU decision-making works, the city gathered experts and ministry officials of the Visegrad countries, who then lobbied for a share of the Structural Funds being dedicated to residential housing. Through EUROCITIES, Budapest could also promote an urban transport policy within the EU to preserve its post-socialist public transport heritage, which was acknowledged in the Guidelines on State Aid for railway undertakings. Budapest’s influence was based on international cooperation and multilevel networks, including national and local officers and politicians. While it was crucial to become involved at the early stages of policy-­ making, Budapest also shaped EU policies during the implementation phase. Examples of No Influence Of course, not all efforts to shape EU outcomes are successful, and the mere ownership over an issue is not sufficient to lobby successfully. Local actors need to provide adequate information or take collective action to

9  Van Bever and Verhelst (2013, pp. 9–10) found that the large majority of municipalities in Flanders (around 80%) perceived their impact on EU policies as little to none. Yet, a small number (6.7%) of proactive authorities, which lobbied European institutions, were moderately satisfied with the outcome of their actions. In most cases, these were undertaken by larger cities and targeted cohesion policy and funding (Verhelst, 2019, pp. 97–98).

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ensure that their concerns will be accounted for.10 The scope of their claims seems to be another vital condition. In the run-up to the Lisbon Treaty, for instance, German EUROCITIES members tried to constitutionalise consultation procedures between European institutions and municipalities (Rechlin, 2004, pp.  51–53; Deutsche EUROCITIES-­ Städte, 2002). While local actors achieved a formalisation of local self-­ government and subsidiarity, securing institutional access to EU policy-making stretched the scope of local demands beyond what national governments were prepared to agree to. Most importantly, the lack of formal participation rights sets significant limits to local actors’ input into European governance. Social policy is a good example of where other factors override the issue ownership of local actors. According to Calandrino and Güntner (2010, p. 158), “the inadequate involvement of local government in the social policy process is possibly one of the reasons for an insufficient attention to some crucial issues that are best perceived at the local level”. Local authorities take an important role as implementers of EU social policy and receive financial incentives from the EU to develop it. Yet despite having a number of mobilisation channels at their disposal to upload their positions (e.g. CoR, EUROCITIES, CEMR, national associations of local government, Sectoral Social Dialogue), local actors are not structurally involved in European policy-making on social inclusion. Instead, they have to rely on ad hoc lobbying and consultations, like any other interest group. Similarly, the European Social Dialogue between the CEMR, which represents local government as an employer, and the European Association of Public Service Unions (EPSU) failed to realise its potential. CEMR’s lack of influence in the Social Dialogue was mainly caused by internal divisions, which only allowed for softer information campaigns instead of forceful lobbying on legislative processes (Pazos-Vidal, 2019, pp. 57–59).11

10  UK local government, for instance, failed to lobby for reforms of the Structural Funds due to opposition between the London authorities and local authorities in North England, which forced their local government association to adopt only a vague position on this matter. At the same time, local authorities in London could not change the definition of the Objective 2 areas of the Structural Funds in the Maastricht Treaty because their effort was ill-prepared and less concise (John, 1994, pp. 916–918). 11  The establishment of the European Social Dialogue as such, however, was considered a successful case of policy entrepreneurialism by the CEMR.

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EU policy to integrate Roma people into local communities is another valuable case illustrating the limit to local influence caused by the absence of formal participation mechanisms. Cities have claimed that the EU Roma Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies 2011–2020 fails to recognise their role in Roma integration, to incorporate the issue of Roma migration from East to West after EU enlargement, or to allocate direct funding to develop urban capacities. A network of EUROCITIES members, including Barcelona, Rome and Ghent, has long campaigned for an integrated European approach that involves multilevel partnerships and better access to funding. Yet, despite their expertise to set the agenda,12 due to the lack of official status, these cities could not exercise real policy-­ making power.13 Finally, successful lobbying is path-dependent. It is much harder to change decisions or stop European legislation from coming into force (prohibitive approach) when local actors have to overturn the ideological predispositions of European policy-makers or when the issue has a salient history to European institutions. Two failed lobby attempts in this respect include attempts to water down environmental prescriptions that were high on the European agenda. UK local authorities stepped up too late and were unprepared to obstruct the 1991 Urban Waste Water Directive (91/271/EEC) and could not change the progressive ecological opinion in the EP in reaction to the Commission’s proposal for a directive on the Landfill of Waste (91/C190/01) (John, 1994, pp. 915–916). Nevertheless, the following section will explain how local government successfully used a very effective lobbying strategy to prevent unfavourable provisions in the public procurement directives in spite of it being a particularly salient issue for the Commission.

A Causal Model of Local Influence The given examples of successes and failures point towards a double scenario of local mobilisation. While it seems evident that issue ownership, concertation, collective action, information, entrepreneurialism and experience are basic conditions to exercise influence under ‘normal’ circumstances 12  http://www.eurocities.eu/eurocities/allcontent/Cities-share-good-practices-anddeliver-key-messages-at-the-EU-Roma-Week-WSPO-AXRUZ6. 13  http://www.eurocities.eu/eurocities/news/EUROCITIES-contribution-topost-2020-EU-Roma-Framework-WSPO-BBZ4CW.

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(scenario 1), it is more challenging for local actors to impact on European policy-making when additional factors create a difficult environment (scenario 2). For instance, they find it much harder to affect decisions when they participate only at a late stage in the process, seek to lobby particularly salient directives and regulations, face the diverging preferences of European decisions-makers or strong counter-lobbies and, not least, when they lack systematic representation (cf. John, 1994, pp.  909 et  seq.; Greenwood, 2011, pp. 176 et seq.; Schultze, 2003, pp. 135–139). John (1994, p. 919) suggested: “To measure power one needs to have some situations where lobbyists succeed in spite of the odds stacked against them”. To assert the full degree of local influence in the EU, we therefore need to focus on cases where local actors had to step outside their comfort zone and faced challenging circumstances (cf. Schultze, 2003, p.  139). Three specific cases allow us to assert the influence of local mobilisation under challenging conditions: the public procurement acquis, the EU Urban Mobility Plan and the European Transparency Register. The 2014 EU Public Procurement Directives (2014/23-24-25/EU)14 present an outstanding example of local influence far beyond the boundaries that were long thought to confine the impact of local actors. Starting in the early 1990s with the Service Directive 92/50/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of public service contracts, the conditions for exempting local authorities from public tendering were politically and legally contested, for instance, in the famous Teckal v Comune di Viano (C-107/98) judgement of the Court of Justice. Although over time local government was successful in turning the more restrictive rulings to decisions that were more sensitive and acknowledged specific municipal practices, the Commission continued to pursue a liberalisation of public service provision (see Textbox 7.1). Verhelst (2018) used process-tracing to construct a causal model of municipal lobby influence when circumstances are unfavourable. Underneath technical discussions, the need to preserve a common model of local public service delivery in many Member States was at stake for local government (proactive approach). Particularly in North West Europe, it has become common practice for many towns and cities to exchange goods and services among each other to create synergies and economies of 14  Directive 2014/24/EU on Public Procurement; Directive 2014/23/EU on the Award of Concession Contracts; and Directive 2014/25/EU on Procurement for Water, Energy, Transport and Postal Services.

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scale in public service provision (i.e. horizontal cooperation) or to pool them by creating formal inter-municipal arrangements (i.e. vertical cooperation), for instance, in the fields of ICT, waste management or energy distribution. The case addressed the fundamental question of whether, and under which conditions, forms of public-public cooperation (PPC, or quasi in-house service provision) should be exempted from the procurement acquis, which applies as a general rule to local authorities when they purchase goods and services from each other. Local actors pushed to stretch these exemptions as far as possible. The private business lobby was fiercely opposed to any kind of PPC exemption as that would interfere with free competition and limit their share of the service market. The Commission acknowledged that codifying the exemptions was necessary to provide more legal certainty over a matter that had so far only been settled by rulings of the Court of Justice. In its proposals, however, the Commission sought to strictly limit the exemptions to such general rules of the internal market. Despite this difficult environment (scope conditions), local actors were able to achieve significantly broader exemptions for PPC than those laid down in the Court’s jurisprudence and the Commission’s proposal (ibid.). Contrary to common wisdom about the difficulties of influencing outcomes at a late stage, even in the final phase of the negotiations, the legal texts were changed in response to local concerns. Against the urgent warning of the negative effects to free competition, three mutually reinforcing parts of the causal model (see Parts I–III; Fig.  8.1) turned the outcome in favour of local authorities. First, the local lobby strategy built on a strong and unified coalition led by influential German associations. Importantly, the coalition focused on a single issue and became a leading voice in the debate (issue ownership) by tailoring its arguments to different access points at various levels and phases in the policy-making process (multilevel venue shopping).15 Secondly, the campaign cleverly exploited the changes in the external opportunity structure at that time and could connect the discussion on public service provision to the public debate about the privatisation of drinking water that led to the first successful European Citizens’ Initiative (‘Right2Water’, cf. Schiffler, 2015). Due to 15  The aim of the business lobby to abolish any exemption from the directives was less strategic as it conflicted with the Commission’s goal to provide legal clarity, as well as the path dependency of EU policy-making which makes it difficult to reverse certain legislative ambitions once they are set into motion.

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Part II: External Opportunity Structure Scope Conditions (S)

Municipal Lobby (X)

Influence on EU DecisionMaking (Y)

Part I: Lobby Strategy

Part III: EU DecisionMaking Arena

Fig. 8.1  A causal model of local government influence in the EU (Verhelst, 2018, p. 208)

upcoming elections, the German government was highly sensitive towards the issue, while, at the same time, new jurisprudence by the Court of Justice offered evidence and arguments in support of the municipal position. Thirdly, apart from the Commission, the European decision-making arena was remarkably favourable to the local concern: it included many German MEPs with key positions, rapporteurs to the EP who were mayors and national delegations in Council familiar with the existing public service provision within their Member States. The combination of these factors makes the procurement case a striking example of local government’s political leverage on a highly salient and controversial issue. Its unique nature as a democratically elected and legitimised public stakeholder proved to be an essential asset to this end. The Commission’s 2009 Urban Mobility Plan, which fed into the 2013 Urban Mobility Package, presents a second important demonstration of local government’s influence. With this initiative the Commission sought to expand its legal remit to regulate urban mobility for the benefit of the internal market. The agenda was supported by an established policy community of representatives from the transport industry and transport committees in the  EP and the CoR16 (scope conditions). Still, a small loose 16  This ‘pro-EU urban mobility policy community’ also was disproportionally included in the pre-legislative stage, evoking fierce complaints from local actors (ibid., pp. 94–95).

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coalition of subnational actors from influential Member States, such as the United Kingdom and Germany, supported by their national governments and together with the CEMR and EUROCITIES, succeeded in maintaining the status quo in 2014 by stopping the Commission’s proposal (Pazos-­ Vidal, 2019, pp. 92–97). The lobbying strategy conveyed a uniform and simple ‘negative’ message to multilevel venues, claiming that EU legislation on urban mobility is unwarranted and conflicting with the principle of subsidiarity (prohibitive approach). The external opportunity structure was favourable and decisive in the end as the Commission faced opposition among Member States that backed the local position. Particularly in Member States where the local level exercises substantial powers over public transport, and even more so in states with a complex division of competences on public transport, the Commission was seen as exceeding its competences and further complicating the allocation of competences. In the European decision-making arena, actors did not present homogenous positions: while the EP could not agree on a common view on the matter, a Horizontal Subsidiarity Unit of the CoR was very outspokenly opposed to the Commission’s proposal. As a result, maintaining the status quo turned out to be the most realistic option for the Commission. One year later, a new report by the EP failed to restart the discussion as the Better Regulation Agenda of the newly appointed Commission under Jean-­ Claude Juncker had limited overly activist legislative initiatives—even though the subnational opposition to the urban mobility plan had weakened by then (ibid.). The last case to which we apply the influence model focuses on the status of local government in the revision of the EU Transparency Register in 2014 (Pazos-Vidal, 2019, pp. 101–110).17 The EU’s intention to give local authorities the same lobby status as private and civil society actors provoked a staunch lobbying campaign by local government associations and municipalities, which wanted to be treated as official, democratically elected governments and not as ‘common’ lobbyists (proactive and positional approach). Yet,  EU institutions had  been reluctant to grant local government an exemption from the lobby register because they have considered it to be a territorial interest group that represents a very broad mix of interests (scope conditions), as Greenwood (2011, p. 178) notes:

17  This overview is partly based on the authors’ interviews with local government lobbyists involved in this case.

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the levels of complexity involved in territorial interest representation are perhaps greatest of all because a territorial level can be a channel of influence for private interests, and a set of interests within itself, and because what constitutes a region [and a local authority] means different things in different member states.

In 2008, when the Stubb Report was issued, local and regional government formed a coalition led by the influential German and Austrian Länder that successfully lobbied the EP to secure a collective exemption from the Transparency Register. When the 2011 Cassani Report was published, the subnational lobbying strategy was less cohesive. Though individual local and regional authorities were still exempted, their offices, associations and networks now were to register in the Transparency Register of the EP and the Commission. The 2014 Gualtieri report then took local actors by surprise, as it installed different rules for local and regional government and reversed the previous exemption for the former but retained the exemption for the latter. As growing public concern over the impact of pressure groups allowed  the EP to tighten the transparency rules (opportunity structure), regional lobbyists sacrificed the local level to maintain their own exemption. In response, a new coalition was set up by the associations of German and Scottish municipalities who feared for the negative consequences to their status within their Member States.18 The coalition was joined by Austrian, Spanish, Danish and Swedish municipalities and was supported by the CEMR and the CoR. A focused and concerted campaign produced official responses to the formal consultation and deployed informal contacts at multiple levels (lobby strategy). Eventually, it was possible to convince MEPs to include a general exemption for local government in the new inter-institutional Transparency Register as proposed by the 2017 Giegold Report. The opportunity structure had changed to the advantage of local government, as the Better Regulation Agenda of the Commission provided a frame of reference in which subsidiarity worked as a key argument (ibid.). The case of the Transparency Register is not only remarkable because local and regional interests were treated differently and subsequently were traded off against each other, but the logic to use informal 18  The status in the EU is particularly important for British local authorities, because in the absence of a codified constitution, they do not enjoy any guarantee to their local autonomy. In Germany, local actors were concerned that losing their European status would give the Länder extra control over them.

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mobilisation to be officially acknowledged as a formal stakeholder is quite a paradoxical case of meta-lobbying. The three cases illustrate how some local actors have become skilful agents that proactively and reactively engage in EU policy-making to shape outcomes. Yet, “there are always second acts in policymaking” (Pazos-Vidal, 2019, p.  97). By the end of the 2014–2019 legislative period, the interinstitutional negotiations on the Transparency Register came to a standstill in the Council. Meanwhile, the policy community is resilient and continues to push for a European urban mobility policy through technical working groups and the Urban Agenda (ibid., p. 97). This underlines the strength and weakness of informal lobbying: though it seems to offer local government the strongest say over European decisions, it remains an ad hoc strategy without formal guarantees in the long run.

Conclusion According to the integration cycle, bottom-up mobilisation is a response of local actors to the EU’s top-down impact. Closing the integration cycle would mean that local government also impacts on European governance in a feedback loop. This chapter examined whether, to what extent and under which conditions local actors’ formal and informal mobilisation translates into a tangible impact. For this purpose, we have  presented a diverse range of cases across different policy areas where local actors provided information to European policy-makers with a view to initiate, shape or obstruct European decisions. Our findings led to three main insights. First, local actors have become skilled agents that can successfully upload their interests to the EU. There is a clear ‘trail of influence’ affecting constitutional provisions (subsidiarity, local self-government), institutions (CoR), procedures (Structural Funds criteria, partnership principle, Transparency Register) and policies (urban mobility, social service provision, environment, procurement, transport, housing). The scope of influence has expanded far beyond what is commonly assumed. Local actors have even modified decisions (in the legislative process as well as in court) when their positions conflicted with legislative proposals of the Commission. Their actions involve a combination of formal participation and informal lobbying. Though local government does not always get its way, its status as both formal stakeholder and a territorial interest group in European governance has undoubtedly grown.

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Secondly, the European integration of local government from the bottom-­up thrives on a remarkable dialectic relation between formal and informal mobilisation. Local authorities can apply both strategies simultaneously in a multilevel venue shopping game (cf. Beyers & Kerremans, 2012) by launching an informal lobbying campaign to secure a better formal position in the European polity or by instrumentalising formal principles such as local self-government and subsidiarity in informal lobbying. As local influence on European policy-making has turned out to be a complex and multifaceted matter, there is no all-embracing strategy which fits every purpose. Pedler (2002, p. 310) stated: “The most successful lobbyists are those who […] appreciated the limits of what the lobbying process can achieve”. Whether to rely on formal or informal mobilisation then depends on the institutional context, in which local actors must make strategic decisions while taking into account the political circumstances (cf. Witte, 2013). On top of this, we have seen that formal and informal mobilisation strategies each have their particular merits. When local actors are systematically involved in decision-making, they have a better chance of articulating policy agendas (agenda-setting approach) and informing EU decisions at an early stage (anticipatory approach). Formal strategies might be less forceful, but they can wield ‘softer’ influence in the long term and in the initial stages of development. When local actors seek to elevate their status in the EU (positional approach), seek to secure their autonomy over local practices and policies in the European rules (proactive approach) or want to obstruct intrusive rules (prohibitive approach), they can resort to informal lobbying tactics by approaching different access points in the multilevel polity. Highlighting their unique character as a democratically elected stakeholder lends credence to their arguments when confronting the diverging positions of EU institutions. Finally, looking at the conditions of successful mobilisation suggests two scenarios of local influence in the EU.  The first scenario refers to uncontroversial matters or circumstances of little salience. Local actors seem particularly effective when they promote a clearly defined topic over which they enjoy strong issue ownership and provide pinpoint information as part of a concise and well-prepared strategy. Concertation with national and regional governments and collective action via national and transnational organisations and networks are further determinants, and the likelihood of success increases when local actors face little opposition from the Commission or other powerful interest groups. Entrepreneurial attitudes of local actors are a fundamental precondition to this, and

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successful experiences can be internalised to stimulate learning. In the second scenario, highly contentious and politicised issues require additional conditions such as favourable windows of opportunity and policy environments, as well as benevolent actors in the European decision-making arena. It is the interplay of these factors then that makes the local lobby strategy a possible success. Under consideration of challenging circumstances, only a strategic and flexible multilevel lobby effort that draws cleverly on these factors can achieve the desired outcomes. Many examples of successful lobbying were supported by well-resourced actors from powerful Member States and in which local government enjoys a strong constitutional status or maintains good relations with national or regional government. Therefore, to understand local influence under challenging circumstances within newer and smaller Member States, further research will have to investigate if their positions can also affect EU decisions and thereby further close the integration cycle.

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Deutsche EUROCITIES-Städte. (2002, October 22). Lokale Demokratie stärken, die europäische Demokratieverwirklichen—Kölner Erklärung der deutschen EUROCITIES-Städte zum Europäischen Konvent. Retrieved September 9, 2020, from http://www.heide-­ruehle.de/heide/fe/pub/de/dct/70 Dür, A. (2008). Measuring interest group influence in the EU. A note on methodology. European Union Politics, 9(4), 559–576. Dür, A. (2010). Interest groups in the European Union: How powerful are they? In J. Beyers, R. Eising, & W. Maloney (Eds.), Interest group politics in Europe. Lessons from EU studies and comparative politics (pp. 110–128). Routledge. Dür, A., & De Bièvre, D. (2007). The question of interest group influence. Journal of Public Policy, 27(1), 1–12. Goldsmith, M. (1993). The Europeanisation of local government. Urban Studies, 30(4/5), 683–699. Goldsmith, M. (2011). Twenty years on: The Europeanization of local government. In E. Van Bever, H. Reynaert, & K. Steyvers (Eds.), The road to Europe. Main street or backward alley for local governments in Europe? (pp.  31–48). Vanden Broele. Greenwood, J. (2011). Interest representation in the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan. Guderjan, M. (2012). Local government and European integration—Beyond Europeanisation? Political Perspectives, 6(1), 105–128. Guderjan, M. (2013). When Europe meets the local level: A fusing multilevel compound? PhD thesis, Manchester Metropolitan University. Guderjan, M. (2015). Theorising European integration of local government— Insights from the fusion approach. Local Government Studies, 41(6), 937–955. Hauser, H. (2011). European Union lobbying post-Lisbon: An economic analysis. Berkeley Journal of International Law, 29(2), 680–790. Heinelt, H., & Niederhafner, S. (2008). Cities and organized interest intermediation in the EU multi-level system. European Urban and Regional Studies, 15(2), 173–187. Hessel, B. (2003). De rol van de Nederlandse decentrale overheden in het Europese wetgevingsproces. RegelMaat, 2, 46–68. Hoffschulte, H. (2006). Kommunen in Europa—Die bürgernahe Basis in einem “Europa der vier Ebenen”. In U. von Alemann & C.  Münch (Eds.), Europafähigkeit der Kommunen—Die lokale Ebene in der Europäischen Union (pp. 58–76). VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. John, P. (1994). Local government and the European Union lobbying. Contemporary Political Studies, 2, 906–921. John, P. (2000). The Europeanisation of sub-national governance. Urban Studies, 37(5–6), 877–894.

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Kettunen, P., & Kull, M. (2009). Governing Europe: The status and networking strategies of Finnish, Estonian and German subnational offices in Brussels. Regional and Federal Studies, 19(1), 117–142. https://doi. org/10.1080/13597560802692447 Klüver, H. (2011). The contextual nature of lobbying: Explaining lobbying success in the European Union. European Union Politics, 12, 483–506. Leitermann, W. (2006). Kommunale Interessenvertretung im Rahmen des Rates der Gemeinden und Regionen Europas. In U. von Alemann, C.  Münch, & C. (Eds.), Europafähigkeit der Kommunen—Die lokale Ebene in der Europäischen Union (pp. 333–338). VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Mastenbroek, E., Zwaan, P., & Liefferink, D. (2013). Provinciaal positiespel in Brussel en Den Haag. Een onderzoek naar de positie van provincies in Europese beleidsvorming. Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, Institute for Management Research. Michalowitz, I. (2007). What determines influence? Assessing conditions for decision-­making influence of interest groups in the EU. Journal of European Public Policy, 14(1), 132–151. Münch, C. (2006). Emanzipation der lokalen Ebene? Kommunen auf dem Weg nach Europa. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Neshkova, M.  I. (2010). The impact of subnational interests on supranational regulation. Journal of European Public Policy, 17(8), 1193–1211. Panke, D., Hönnige, C., & Gollub, J. (2015). Consultative committees in the European Union. No vote—No influence? ECPR Press. Pazos-Vidal, S. (2019). Subsidiarity and EU multilevel governance. Actors, networks and agendas. Routledge. Pedler, R. (2002). Changes in the arena: Lessons from lobby cases. In R. Pedler (Ed.), European Union lobbying. Changes in the arena (pp. 310–324). Palgrave. Piattoni, S., & Schönlau, J. (2015). Shaping EU policy from below: EU democracy and the Committee of the Regions. Edward Elgar. Rechlin, S. (2004). Die deutschen Kommunen im Mehrebenensystem der Europäischen Union—Betroffene Objekte oder aktive Subjekte? Discussion Paper, Social Science Research Center Berlin. Schiffler, M. (2015). Civil society and the EU concession directive: David beats Goliath, using a few tricks. In M.  Schiffler (Ed.), Water, politics and money (pp. 115–120). Springer. Schultze, C. J. (2003). Cities and EU governance: Policy-takers or policy-makers? Regional and Federal Studies, 13(1), 121–147. Tatham, M. (2015). Regional voices in the European Union: Subnational influence in multilevel politics. International Studies Quarterly, 59, 387–400.

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Tosics, I. (2010). The approach of Budapest to the European Union: The Europeanization of a post-socialist city. In A.  Hamedinger & A.  Wolffhardt (Eds.), The Europeanization of cities. Policies, urban change & urban networks (pp. 127–143). Techne Press. Van Bever, E., & Verhelst, T. (2013). Towards a more active approach of local level Europeanization: Discussing horizontal and bottom-up Europeanization in Flemish local government. 63rd Political Studies Association Annual Conference, Proceedings. Presented at the 63rd Political Studies Association Annual Conference. Van der Storm, I. (2002). CASTer: Creating the future in steel regions. In R.  Pedler (Ed.), European Union lobbying. Changes in the arena (pp. 229–254). Palgrave. Verhelst, T. (2018). Inside the municipal lobby: Explaining local government influence on the new EU public procurement directives. Lex Localis Journal of Local Self-Government, 16(1), 193–214. Verhelst, T. (2019). Vlaamse steden en gemeenten in de EU: van onverschillig naar proactief? Een stand van zaken anno 2019. In H.  Reynaert (Ed.), Verrekijkers voor lokale besturen: Een lange(re) termijnvisie?! (pp.  75–103). Vanden Broele. Witte, S. (2013). Einflussgrad der deutschen kommunalen Ebene auf die Politikgestaltung der EU. Peter Lang. Zimmermann, U. (2006). Die Europäische Verfassung—Eine Bilanz aus kommunaler Perspektive. In U. von Alemann & C. Münch (Eds.), Europafähigkeit der Kommunen—Die lokale Ebene in der Europäischen Union (pp.  25–47). VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

CHAPTER 9

Conclusion: Reflections on European Integration of Local Government

Introduction In its 2018 Report on the role of cities in the institutional framework of the Union (2017/2037(INI)), the EP (2018, p. 6) clearly acknowledges the essential role of local government for the success of the EU’s agenda: […] new global challenges posed by security and immigration, demographic shift, youth unemployment, challenges relating to the quality of public services, access to clean and affordable energy, natural disasters and environmental protection demand local responses and, therefore, a stronger commitment on the part of cities when designing and implementing EU policies.

Pressing policy challenges such as climate change, migration from within and outside the EU, the COVID-19 pandemic, the negotiations on the new Multiannual Financial Framework and not least Brexit have highlighted that European politics has increasingly become a question of local politics. For EU policies to be effective, they require the proactive support of European local authorities, which are dealing on a daily basis in close proximity to their citizens with the same issues the EU is facing. In this book, we therefore aimed to contribute to the understanding of the complex and often overlooked relationship between local government and the EU. Neither studies of European integration nor research on local government have paid a great deal of attention to the European integration of © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Guderjan, T. Verhelst, Local Government in the European Union, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74382-6_9

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local government despite its emerging political and practical relevance. Throughout the book, we have discussed how the expansion of EU governance has gradually pulled the local level into political affairs beyond national borders. To ensure that European policies meet local realities and to enhance the EU’s democratic legitimacy, the Commission and the EP have increasingly emphasised the need to systematically involve local actors in EU policy-making. This is reflected in the notion of the ‘Europe of four levels’ according to which local government is acknowledged as an emerging political stakeholder in the EU’s system of governance, actively contributing to the trajectories of European integration. To explore the nature and validity of this notion, this book set out to understand to what extent local government has become integrated into the European system of governance, if and how local government contributes to the trajectories of European integration and which dynamics drive this process. For this purpose, we have introduced the idea of an integration cycle that presents a holistic and systematic picture of the different elements in the relationship between European and local government. The purpose of the cycle is to present an analytical framework that links the macro-trajectories of European integration to the micro-dynamic of local-level Europeanisation and to arrive at a nuanced picture of the role of local government in the EU’s system of governance. We start this final chapter with a brief recap of the different stages of the integration cycle and explain the institutional settings, actors and policy environments conditioning it. We then present a theoretical reflection of how our insights relate to the literature on European integration, Europeanisation and multilevel governance. We end the book with some perspectives for further research and reflections on how to strengthen the ties between the local and European levels for the benefit of better European governance and a stronger role of local government within it.

The Cycle at Work An effective and systematic involvement of local government in EU policy-­ making has been under development since the 1957 Treaty of Rome introduced a European regional policy. Until today regional and cohesion policy offers the strongest links between the local, regional, national and European levels. Since the early 1990s, the growing impact of legislation to complete the Single Market on local practices, together with funding opportunities, fuelled the integration cycle. European legislation and

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policies have impacted on local authorities in their capacity as public service providers, employers, purchasers, licencing agencies, monitoring bodies, landowners, public building owners and data processors. This has limited some autonomy over local practices, which is only partly compensated for by the additional financial opportunities to regenerate deprived localities and to level out local disparities throughout Europe. As crucial implementers of policy and legislation, local authorities help in realising the EU’s wider energy, environmental, economic and social agendas. Local practices thereby gradually converge contributing to an integration of the local level across the EU (see Chap. 3). Due to the strong top-down impact, local actors have become increasingly aware of both the opportunities and constraints of an evolving political system outside their domestic space, which has affected their attitudes and norms. Many local actors may not be consciously aware of or articulate their preference for European integration and often complain about the extra burden stemming from EU policies and legislation. Yet, proactive local authorities have learned to appreciate both the tangible benefits and the general principles of an integrated Europe. Looking at the vast variety of different attitudes across European municipalities, we can say that local actors who have developed a genuine interest in European affairs generally oppose the interference of the EU in  local competences and autonomy. In doing so they have pushed for a more systematic involvement and representation at EU level. In order to deal with European affairs, participate in EU-funded programmes and respond to relevant policies, local authorities and associations have adapted their organisation and procedures by appointing dedicated members of staff and councillors, adjusting their strategic agendas and even opening offices in Brussels (see Chap. 4). Pooling and exchanging experience, resources and expertise has been a strong incentive for local actors, networks and associations to reach out to their counterparts inside and outside of national borders. This externalisation has gradually created a maze of thousands of EU-wide municipal networks that differ in size, scope and function. Horizontal cooperation of local government has therefore been a ‘laboratory of European integration’ at a grassroots level bringing political actors and civil society together on a Europe-wide basis. The horizontal engagement of local government contributes to a cultural, social and economic integration and enables joint participation in both EU programmes and policy-making. Important examples hereof are town twinning; institutional associations and cluster

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networks, such as the CEMR and EUROCITIES; thematic networks that adopt a focus on specific policies (e.g. environmental protection, tourism, social cohesion, economic growth) and are supported by EU initiatives, like Urbact; and territorial cooperation, either in the context of Euroregions, Interreg, European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) or intra-regional arrangements. Often, these settings are an important prerequisite for collective bottom-up mobilisation as they raise awareness towards specific issues, develop joint positions and articulate policy demands (see Chap. 5). Bottom-up mobilisation involves interactions with EU institutions on a formal and informal basis in order to upload local preferences to European policy-making. Through various policy initiatives and institutional and constitutional reforms, local government has  experienced a growing acknowledgment and formalisation of its role and status at EU level. This is an essential link in the cycle because it legitimises local government as an official political actor enabling it to influence the trajectories of European governance. In particular, the creation of the CoR in 1992 by the Treaty of Maastricht introduced the formal representation of regional and local government in EU policy-making on an advisory basis. The Lisbon Treaty codified the right to local self-government and the principle of subsidiarity explicitly for the regional and the local level, which constitutionalised multilevel governance as an operational principle. These provisions have not yet proven to be solid legal principles, but they foster cooperative working and increase the political leverage in debates with EU and national institutions. Consultation regimes at European and Member State levels have the potential to offer local actors a voice in policy formulation on a more systematic basis. But the later has only reluctantly formalised the status of local representatives within European governance, and when national and EU decision-makers have to weigh the different positions among a wide range of interests, municipal concerns are not necessarily at the forefront. Though municipal associations  are given an observer status at Council meetings, they are not recognised as official advisors to the EU, and local actors’ access to its working groups is marginal. Various initiatives since the early 2000s by the Commission, EP and CoR demonstrated the intention of EU institutions to intensify their cooperation with subnational government by establishing effective partnerships and systematic dialogues. Whereas these were only early, premature attempts to adopt more inclusive procedures, in the context of cohesion policy and the Urban Agenda, multilevel partnerships have become a legal requirement. Further

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examples of procedural adaptation of EU institutions and agendas to local government are the renaming of the DG Regional and Urban Policy in 2012 and the annual European week of Cities and Regions hosted by the CoR and the Commission (see Chap. 6). Considering that the institutional access  to EU policy-making is still underdeveloped, the living constitution makes an essential contribution to local integration with the EU. Though the institutionalisation of local-EU relations certainly matters, the actual implementation of subsidiary, local self-government and multilevel governance still heavily depends on national governments and intra-state relations. To overcome such structural challenges, local actors have learned to operate as territorial interest groups seeking to upload their preferences in a highly fragmented political arena. Local lobbying can target different access points in terms of institutions (Commission, EP, Council) and levels (supranational, national and regional governments). Effective local mobilisation usually entails a strategy of multilevel venue shopping, which searches for the optimal entrance point  during the different phases of the policy-making process (pre-­ proposal, consultation, decision-making and transposition), adjusting the claims and argumentations in the course of action. To join forces and amplify their demands, local actors often undertake such lobby attempts collectively (see Chap. 7). Contrary to the widespread assumption that local government has little means to actually influence EU policies and decisions, this book has demonstrated how strategic efforts of local actors have changed certain policy outcomes according to their preferences and prevented others from coming into force. Through the interplay of formal participation, litigation and informal lobbying, local actors are capable of influencing EU policy-­ making and even of shaping the constitutional principles and institutional structures and procedures of the Union—though there are clear limits and conditions to this. It comes as no surprise that local actors have primarily been successful on matters that are most relevant to them, such as regional policy. But local influence stretches much further. In various constellations of national and local actors and networks and European institutions, local government successfully lobbied for the constitutionalisation of local self-­ government and subsidiarity and subsequently used these provisions as arguments  to prevent  the European Urban Mobility Plan from coming into force. Intensive lobbying campaigns were successful in achieving an exemption from the Transparency Register and in altering the conditions for public service provision in the procurement acquis, even though local

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interests clashed with the core principle of free market competition. The success of local mobilisation depends on a number of crucial conditions, such as issue ownership, available resources, collective action, flexible strategies, providing pinpoint information and concertation with national and regional government. Particularly on highly salient and contentious issues, local actors have instrumentalised their unique position as democratically elected stakeholders in the European polity. Under very challenging circumstances, the prospect of having an impact is further determined by the external opportunity structure and the constellation of the European decision-making arena (see Chap. 8).

The Integration Cycle in a Neo-Institutionalist Perspective In the following, we adapt a neo-institutionalist approach to explain how local government passes through the different parts of the integration cycle, as the dialectic between structure and agency conditions the ways in which local authorities engage with Europe (cf. Hamedinger & Wolffhardt, 2010, pp. 28, 32). As Scharpf (1997, p. 41) puts it: “Once we know the institutional setting of interaction, we know a good deal about the actors involved, about their options, and about their perceptions and preferences”. In recognition of the actor-centred version of the new institutionalism proposed by Scharpf (1997), we further assume that policy choices and political actions result from the interplay between institutional settings and strategic actors who have specific capabilities and orientations and work in particular constellations within a given policy environment (Scharpf, 1997, pp. 43–49). We have started our analysis of the integration of local government by looking at the institutional setting of European governance. The hierarchical allocation of legislative and regulatory authority (the rules-in-form) allows national governments and the Commission (cf. Witte, 2013, p. 264) to disregard and overrule local concerns. Multilevel governance, partnership and subsidiarity have become valuable constitutional and policy principles, yet they do not necessarily hold as hard legal instruments to protect local interests when they clash with those of national governments and the EU. Despite the supremacy of EU legislation and the top-down promotion of EU policies, European governance nevertheless offers new opportunities for local government to cooperate on urban and rural, as

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well as on international, challenges. The institutional rationale and the rules of the game are thereby different to those of nation states, as Goldsmith (2005, pp. 244–245) stated: It is perhaps best described as a move towards more indirect forms of control and influence based on regulation and contractualization rather than on direct intervention, and which depends more on the willing cooperation of sub-national levels than before.

Given that institutional access to EU policy-making remains marginal, and that the CoR has merely consultative formal powers, engaging across different levels, at different stages of the policy cycle and with different institutions has become a key feature of a proactive integration. The normative and institutional setting of European governance is considered to be an inclusive and open system (the rules-in-use). The Commission and the Council can be harder to lobby for local actors, although the Council can be approached at national level. The EP constitutes a particularly valuable access point, and individual MEPs are typically more receptive to, and even reliant on, local input (cf. Witte, 2013, pp. 394–400). MEPs often have a background in local politics and have shown an awareness of and sympathy for local concerns as well as a willingness to present them vis-à-­ vis the other institutions. And party political links between local, regional, national and European actors provide favourable opportunities for this. The institutional setting at EU level raises a pressing question about local government’s ability to steer future developments in European governance: is the local level facing a ‘mobilisation trade-off’ of formal and informal strategies? A regular seat at the table and structured dialogues would undoubtedly enhance local government’s capacity to influence policies in the longer term and perhaps even set the policy agenda, as it allows raising local concerns at an early stage. Still, the Commission is not always prepared to negotiate on equal terms with local government, and with increasing formal recognition and participation rights, the leeway to operate as a territorial interest group is likely to suffer. Informal engagement remains then the most effective way to impact on European policy-making when local actors wish to modify or prevent unwarranted European decisions in order to protect local practices or push for a better position in the European polity. Yet this strategy provides hardly any guarantees for a lasting partnership with EU institutions and risks undermining local government’s unique characteristic as democratically legitimised stakeholder

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vis-à-vis other interest groups. At the same time, agency problems can occur as local actors do not always agree on joint preferences. The CEMR, as well as the institutionalised assembly of the CoR, has struggled to overcome the heterogeneity of their membership to forward positions beyond the lowest common denominator. The challenge is, overall, to strike a balance between formal and informal mobilisation and to establish a coherent and effective representation for the vast diversity in local government across the EU. The integration cycle is also strongly defined by formal and informal intra-state relations. It has been argued that subnational authorities have escaped the control of national governments, which have lost their monopoly over EU politics (cf. Bache & Flinders, 2004, p. 37). However, European integration does not fundamentally alter the existing intra-state relations between different levels, and the engagement of local government in European affairs is path-dependent (cf. Goldsmith, 2005, p. 244). The formal status of local government within Member States strongly conditions the legislative impact of the EU on local actors. Some Member States even enacted new laws to restore central control over local-­European relations and to deal with the consequences of non-compliance by local authorities. Other Member States established procedures to involve local government more structurally in national concertation when local interests are affected by European politics. Joint partnerships of local, regional and national authorities have become not only a guiding principle but also  a requirement for acquiring EU funding. Party political affiliations across local, regional and national levels can provide additional, informal opportunities to align political positions and to feed interests from the bottom up. Some regional governments are powerful players, themselves responsible for local government. Even though they provide an important institutional context and can be important allies for municipalities, regional ambitions towards the EU may put a strain on local aspirations. All in all, European integration has thus clearly left its mark on how different levels of government interact. Within the multi-layered nature of European governance, local actors make their policy choices on the basis of their capabilities, orientations and constellations. Ambitions and preferences depend strongly on the self-­ perception of local actors, which is to some extent based on their domestic status (cf. Witte, 2013, p. 286). In Member States with strong local authorities, local actors confidently embrace their autonomy and seek a prioritisation of their views to compensate for the constraining impact of EU

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legislation. In turn, local authorities with relatively little autonomy, such as in the United Kingdom, have shown preferences for bypassing their national government to deal directly with the EU and expand their activities and available resources. Nevertheless, most local actors think of the EU as an exclusive circle, and though they appreciate European integration as a way to support economic growth, environmental protection and security, they are also wary to protect their autonomy and competences from far-reaching EU interventions. Whereas most municipalities remain passive or reactive to European integration, it is hardly surprising that major cities are amongst the most active and pioneering authorities. Apart from status and competences, financial resources, the nature of local economies, history, culture, policy expertise, administrative capacities and the size of the municipality are likely to determine whether local politicians and administrators are aware of EU policies and have adapted their organisations, adjusted their agendas, cooperated with other municipalities, participated in networks and engaged in European affairs. This is not to say that smaller authorities are by default not engaged in European affairs. Entrepreneurialism with either international ambitions, a Europhile mindset, skills and experiences of transnational cooperation, mutual learning or previous endeavours with the EU are important factors in local actors’ orientations. Even more relevant than individual capacities and orientations is the constellation of local actors. Local government associations and networks provide collective capacities and formulate political positions on behalf of their members. While the Commission has neither the means nor an interest in listening to every single municipality, presenting a wider public concern with coherent and convincing arguments makes a strong case that is much harder for it to ignore, particularly if a campaign is supported by a broad coalition across different Member States. Such input can even present a welcome feedback on the efficacy of policy, or it can be used to justify the community initiatives vis-à-vis national governments. In addition to the interplay of actors and institutions, the meaningful integration of local government with the EU is often conditioned by a favourable external policy environment. Without a strong formal position within an institutional setting and national governments dominating European and domestic politics, local government’s role in the European integration process relies on the goodwill of actors and institutions inside and outside of their Member States. External circumstances open windows of opportunity for an ad hoc mobilisation on an informal basis. In the past, national and European elections have brought public attention

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towards issues that local lobbying could use to their benefit. New policy agendas and programming periods  launched by the EU inspired local actors to build proactive relationships across different levels and shape the delivery and implementation of policies at an early stage. Decisions by the Court of Justice provide another opportunity to bring forward arguments and make local concerns salient. As a last remark here, it is important to highlight that the policy environment works to the advantage of local government when other influential lobby groups act less strategically as they compete against municipal campaigns. Considering the institutional setting, the capacities and orientations of local actors and the external policy environment, we have emphasised that European integration of local government cannot be fully comprehended by only looking at formal arrangements. Rather, it is the living constitution which provides us with essential insights into the somehow still evolving (and circulating) relationship between the European and local levels. Although the idea of a cycle helps to break down its different dynamics for analytical purposes, European integration of local government is not coherent or universal but a complex, asymmetrical phenomenon with varying relevance for municipalities across and within Member States. The cycle does not necessarily follow a strict sequential logic. It  advances in waves, often with some delay after major developments at EU level, and can also be reversed.

Theoretical Reflections on the European Integration of Local Government Having discussed the dynamics that condition the integration cycle, we turn our attention to wider questions of local government’s integration with the EU and relate our conclusions back to the literature we started out with in Chap. 2: European integration, Europeanisation and multilevel governance. First of all, the European integration of local government takes a different intensity to that of Member State governments, which are directly involved in both intergovernmental negotiations and the development of an emerging supranational polity to which they transfer powers and resources. As Member States have pooled their sovereignty and shifted their focus and policy-making towards the European level, these macrotrajectories have spilled over to sub-state levels pulling them into a joint

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system of governance that spreads across multiple levels and affects the decisions, accountabilities and resources of local authorities. Functional spillover of EU policies has impacted on local practices in an increasing number of policy areas related to the internal market, environment, cohesion policy and public welfare. While local authorities have become essential implementers of EU policies leading to some convergence of practices, cultivated spillover has shifted the focus of EU policies and strategic frameworks, such as the Lisbon Strategy and Europe 2020, to the local level. Although adaptation pressures at the European level operate significantly weaker and more slowly for local than for national governments, we have witnessed changes in the EU’s organisation to accommodate a greater involvement of the local level over time. Through the expansion of constitutional provisions, institutions and procedures, local perspectives and actors have increasingly entered the European Politikverflechtung. Though on a different scale and less comprehensively, European integration of local government compares to similar processes at Member State level. By providing evidence that local actors influence European policy and polity, this book has illustrated that the integration cycle passes this litmus test. Depending on the institutional setting, actors’ capacities, orientations and constellations, as well as the policy environment, local government is not just a passive receiver from European integration, but an active shaper of it. It would be an overstatement to claim that this is happening on a systematic basis, as it is mainly through specific occasions that the fourth level further integrates with the EU (cf. Witte, 2013, p. 410). For Member States a push towards a joint system of governance subsequently created a pull, whereas local government was first pulled by spillovers and then started to push for a formalisation of local representation in response. In line with the idea of a ‘third-way’ integration, legislative and financial constraints to local self-government trigger a ‘sovereignty reflex’ to counter an excessive impact on municipal practices. At the same time, local actors know about the economic, social, environmental and security benefits of a united Europe and the opportunities for participation in EU programmes. Rather than opposing EU membership as such, they seek new channels of access to EU policy-making, which has led to an expanding of the EU’s polity. The integration cycle thus reflects a ‘reversed’ push-pull loop of adaptation between local government and the EU. This may not be an ever-continuing process. Eurosceptic governments set clear limits to the integration of local government. Brexit has been the most radical example of this, and it remains to be seen how British (and

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particular English) local government, which used to be among the most proactive local players, will engage in European affairs in the future. Recent challenges, such as economic crises, the arrival of refugees, the climate emergency and the COVID-19 pandemic, have further highlighted that national governments remain in charge of the European agenda when it touches their core interests. Secondly, the European integration of local government comes in different forms and shapes. By looking at the top-down, horizontal and bottom-­up domains of Europeanisation, this book has connected the macro-trajectories of European integration with micro-developments at the local level. All three domains are essential dynamics for a meaningful integration of local government, and while analytically distinct, they are strongly interlinked in practice due to a political spillover from the European to the local level, according to which local actors turn their attention towards Brussels and adjust their agendas and organisation. Looking at the direction and extent of Europeanisation allows us to say how far local-supranational relations have advanced. Based on our findings, it is fair to conclude that comprehensive political spillover is limited to a small group of entrepreneurial local authorities and actors, who understand that engaging in European affairs is both a necessity and an opportunity for the future of their municipality. Most local authorities tend to be reactive or passive, and only a minority of predominantly larger cities, counties and municipal organisations, associations and networks can be described as proactive or even fully Europeanised. Thirdly, the Multilevel Governance Approach (MLG) provides a useful complementary perspective to comprehend how local government interacts across levels of government, which is in practice an important integration dynamic. Rather than thinking of multilevel governance as a fully fledged, overarching system, it is better understood as a multitude of nested compounds that come in different sizes and shapes for different purposes. MLG type I refers to the defined hierarchies of state-like and federal arrangements, which continue to set the baseline for local authorities as a constitutionally and democratically manifested level of government in the EU. Though European Treaties provide a ‘complementary’ constitution (Bogdandy, 2009, p. 24) that regulates the relations between the EU and Member States, the latter have not significantly altered the internal allocation of legislative and fiscal powers. The formal status and competences of local authorities determine their role as implementers of European law and how they are included in the policy formulation of

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regional and national governments. At European level, representation in the CoR and the constitutionalisation of local self-government and subsidiarity indicate that local government is more than just a territorial interest group. In reality, however, the application of multilevel governance varies strongly, and local government commonly engages in European affairs through more flexible, functional and less formal arrangements, as envisaged by MLG type II. These patterns of ‘loose coupling’ (cf. Benz & Eberlin, 1999, p.  333) do not fundamentally challenge existing power relations, but they are acknowledged and promoted by EU institutions and allow local actors to feed into EU policies. Through multilevel arrangements, which are typically controlled by national and regional governments, local actors download and upload EU policy, and pool resources and capacities in cooperation with actors and institutions from other levels of government. Throughout this book there is evidence of multilevel policy communities that involve local actors and ‘micro-multilevel compounds’ (e.g. partnerships in European programmes and the Urban Agenda, local policy networks, EGTCs), in which different elements of the integration cycle intersect. Overall, MLG is important to understand the European integration of local government because it accounts for the ‘messy’ realities of blurred accountabilities and ‘overlapping and nested governance systems’ (Loughlin, 2001, p. 20).

Practical Recommendations and Prospects for Future Research Studying local government and the EU continues to occupy a narrow niche in political science. We hope that our book will shed new light on this relationship for academic and practical purposes. Because European integration pierces through the black box of the nation state and reaches deep down into citizens’ daily lives local government is an indispensable link and a useful ally for a successful development of the European project. Strengthening local-European ties can help local government in challenging times and in turn allow the EU not only to deliver its policies more efficiently and effectively but also to gain a stronger political, democratic and public foothold at a grassroots level. Integrating local government further into the EU’s system of governance can thus become an important piece of the puzzle to boost its input and output legitimacy. Local government remains less visible than national governments in dealing with the major challenges that lie ahead. Yet beneath the ‘high

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politics’, economic, environmental and social issues impact on and can only be solved effectively and efficiently together with local government. The Commission has stressed that the 2021–2027 cohesion policy will provide greater ownership over projects to local, urban and territorial authorities by promoting local management of funds and empowering locally led development strategies. Five priority areas indicate the scope of activities in which local authorities are expected to help the Commission implement its policy agenda and vice versa: economic growth and digitisation (smarter Europe); climate change and renewable energy (greener, carbon-free Europe); transport and digital infrastructure (connected Europe); social, employment and education policy (social Europe); and sustainable urban and locally led development (Europe closer to citizens).1 Notwithstanding that  the European Urban Initiative offers a new networking and capacity-building programme, cohesion policy and agriculture face however substantial cuts, which has been the subject of major criticism by local actors.2 In environmental terms, delivering on the ambitious agenda to tackle climate change (e.g. by reducing carbon emission and reaching the standards for air or water quality) requires political support and public investment at the local level. With regard to social issues, migration within and from outside the EU’s borders will continue to represent an important matter which requires joint efforts from local government and the EU. In order to integrate new arrivals in Europe’s societies, future European initiatives to manage immigration will have to be open to the demands of local government, including direct financial support. The Commission’s new strategy to support migrant integration by reinforcing the partnership principle and establishing the Asylum and Migration Fund (AMIF) for early-integration measures is an important first step in that direction. Local politicians and officers seem to enjoy plenty of incentives to proactively engage with EU policies, build relationships with EU institutions and participate in programmes, projects and networks. Yet, they need to be alert to available opportunities and, when they arise, show some entrepreneurship and flexibility to act and react spontaneously. Brussels might be less far away than it appears, EU institutions are generally receptive towards local actors and local government associations facilitate visits that provide a better understanding of how the EU works. Overcoming the 1 2

 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/2021_2027/.  https://www.ccre.org/en/actualites/view/3938.

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psychological barriers and leaving one’s comfort zone are the first steps in any evolving  relationship. At the same time, the structural obstacles to such endeavours are inevitable: resources are scarce; applying and conducting funded projects is highly competitive, complicated and burdensome; and EU legislation creates additional rules constraining local practices without necessarily compensating local government with a say in policy-making. Allocating public money cannot be done without adequately justifying and controlling how it is used. Without any prior experience or external guidance, it has become increasingly difficult for local authorities to compete for funding and to engage more comprehensively in European affairs. Local actors would therefore be well-advised to develop clear strategies, reach out to their peers and make use of networks and political connections to widen and deepen their opportunity structures. Though local actors have been successful in achieving exceptions from certain provisions of the internal market and could ensure the continuity of established practices in public service provision, they have to work hard to convince the Commission that these privileges are in the wider public interest. The Commission’s overriding preference for market liberalisation has in the past clashed with its commitments to work closer with local government. If the Commission wishes to overcome their scepticism and build genuine multilevel partnerships with local actors, it will have to  respect the value of local democracy, established municipal practices and public service provision in its future policies and legislative initiatives. Will the new European policy cycle start a new loop of integration for local government? Our idea of an integration cycle is obviously a simplified model of the real world. In the short term, the different elements do not have to follow each other step by step. They may occur simultaneously, fragmented or in a different sequence with periods of stagnation in between. Potentially, some developments could even reverse. Local-­ European dynamics do not attract much political and public attention and therefore may only become obvious with some delay. The new decade will allow us to validate whether new EU policies will trigger more and new ways of internal adaptation and horizontal and vertical mobilisation at the local level and whether institutional and procedural reforms at EU level will respond to a new push from local actors. Drawing on a combination of theoretical and operational approaches (e.g. integration theory, MLG, Europeanisation, network theory, interest group politics, learning and organisational change theory, litigation and

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compliance studies), as well as on a wide range of existing but fragmented empirical evidence, this book proposed a comprehensive theoretical concept of an integration cycle, along with a set of specific empirical tools and testable assumptions. It is up to future research to put these assumptions to the test. Comparative and longitudinal studies that combine qualitative explorations and quantitative evaluations of local authorities across the Member States are an essential requirement for a more systematic and holistic picture of the underlying conditions that make European integration work for local government. Further in-depth analyses of the cycle’s different stages will further help to update and refine the overarching theoretical model and the interplay of structure and agency (cf. Klausen & Goldsmith, 1997, p.  250; Hamedinger & Wolffhardt, 2010, p.  23). In light of the multifaceted nature of European integration, there are also good reasons to strengthen interdisciplinary links across political science, public administration, history, law and geography in future research agendas. As the evolution of local-European relations is not likely to come to a standstill any time soon, we are not only hopeful but strongly believe that this research will remain relevant and allow us to comprehend this complex, ever-fascinating phenomenon.

Bibliography Bache, I., & Flinders, M. (2004). Multi-level governance and the study of the British state. Public Policy and Administration, 19(1), 31–51. Benz, A., & Eberlin, B. (1999). The Europeanization of regional policies: Patterns of multi-level governance. Journal of European Public Policy, 6(2), 329–348. Bogdandy, A. von (2009). Founding principles. In A. von Bogdandy & J. Bast (Eds.), Principles of European constitutional law (pp. 11–54). Hart Publishing. EP (European Parliament). (2018). Report on the role of cities in the institutional framework of the Union. Committee on Constitutional Affairs. 2017/2037(INI). Goldsmith, M. (2005). A new intergovernmentalism? In B. Denters & L. Rose (Eds.), Comparing local governance. Trends and developments (pp. 228–245). Palgrave. Hamedinger, A., & Wolffhardt, A. (2010). Introduction. Understanding the interplay between Europe and the cities: Frameworks and perspectives. In A. Hamedinger & A. Wolffhardt (Eds.), The Europeanization of cities. Policies, urban change & urban networks (pp. 9–39). Techne Press. Klausen, K. K., & Goldsmith, M. (1997). Conclusion: Local government and the European Union. In M.  J. F.  Goldsmith & K.  K. Klausen (Eds.), European

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integration and local government (pp.  237–254). Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. Loughlin, J. (2001). Subnational democracy in the European Union. Challenges and opportunities. Oxford University Press. Radaelli, C. M. (2000). Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive change. European Integration online Papers (EIoP), 4(8) http://eiop. or.at/eiop/texte/2000-­008a.htm Scharpf, F. (1997). Games real actors play – Actor-centered institutionalism in policy research. Westview Press. Scharpf, F. (2006). Interaktionsformen  – Akteurzentrierter Institutionalismus in der Politikforschung. Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Witte, S. (2013). Einflussgrad der deutschen kommunalen Ebene auf die Politikgestaltung der EU. Peter Lang.

Index1

A Amsterdam Treaty/Treaty of Amsterdam, 185 Asylum and Migration Fund (AMIF), 58, 212 B Brexit, v, 26, 27, 73n2, 199, 209 C Charter for Multilevel Governance, 134 Charter of Local Self-Government, 125, 134 Cleaner and better transport in cities (CIVITAS), 104 Climate Alliance, 104 Cohesion Fund (CF), 55 Cohesion policy, 2, 4, 35, 45, 54n11, 56, 59n15, 68, 107, 109, 111,

131, 136, 140, 157, 169, 182, 184, 185n9, 200, 202, 209, 212 Committee of the Regions (CoR), 3, 50, 68, 74, 76, 91, 124, 128–132, 130n7, 131n9, 134, 135, 138, 142, 151, 154, 165, 167, 179–184, 179n3, 186, 190–193, 202, 203, 205, 206, 211 Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE), 125 Constitutional Treaty, 181 Council of Europe, 108, 125, 125n2 Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR), 2, 8, 50, 93–95, 97, 99–103, 100n13, 113, 114, 125, 135, 136n13, 139, 153, 166n13, 167, 168n14, 179, 181–183, 182–183n4, 186, 186n11, 191, 192, 202, 206

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Guderjan, T. Verhelst, Local Government in the European Union, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-74382-6

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Council of European Municipalities (CEM), 94 Council of Ministers/Council of the EU/Council, 4n1, 25n1, 73, 75, 76, 83, 92n1, 97, 108, 125n2, 127n6, 128, 130, 132, 135, 137n16, 140, 154, 156, 163–165, 167, 169, 176, 184, 190, 193, 202, 203, 205 Covenant of Mayors, 104 D DG Regional and Urban Policy, 1, 167, 182, 203 E Energy Cities, 104 Euregio/Euroregions, 108, 109, 113 EUROCITIES, 2, 69, 77, 102, 103, 113, 114, 135, 153, 167, 168n14, 182, 185–187, 191, 202 Europe 2020, 4, 4n2, 35, 56, 57, 70, 137, 138, 209 European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), 55 European Association of Regional and Local Authorities for Lifelong Learning (EARLALL), 104 European Centre of Employers and Enterprises (CEEP), 99, 99n12 European Citizens’ Initiative, 189 European Coal and Steel Community, 126 European Commission (EC)/ Commission, 1–4, 4n2, 25n2, 26, 33, 46, 53n9, 57, 60, 72–74, 91, 95, 100, 102, 108, 110, 127, 128, 130–134, 131n9, 133n11, 137–142, 137n16, 152,

154–156, 156n5, 161n9, 163–167, 169, 176, 179–184, 183n5, 184n6, 187–194, 189n15, 200, 202–205, 207, 212, 213 European Community, 108 European Confederation of Local Intermediate Authorities (CEPLI), 99, 99n11 European Convention, 181 European Council, 4n1, 25n1 European Court of Justice/Court of Justice, 46n1, 47, 53, 126, 127, 129, 134, 158, 159, 181, 188–190, 208 European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), 165, 180 European Fiscal Compact, 25 European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC), 109–111, 202, 211 European integration/integration, v, vi, 1–14, 21–38, 45, 54, 59–61, 67, 68, 70–75, 78, 79, 84, 85, 91–95, 100, 102, 107–110, 113–115, 123, 124, 134, 137, 141–143, 159, 163, 175, 176, 187, 193–195, 199–214 European Investment Bank (EIB), 140 Europeanisation, v, 11–13, 12n7, 22, 24, 28–32, 28n3, 29n4, 30n5, 35, 36, 46, 60, 67, 68, 69n1, 79, 92, 93, 104, 155, 162, 200, 208, 210, 213 European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF), 55 European Parliament (EP), 3, 5, 73, 91, 100, 125, 128, 130, 132–135, 138, 141–143, 152, 154, 156, 163–165, 167, 180, 190–192, 199, 200, 202, 203, 205

 INDEX 

European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), 1, 55, 142 European Regions Research and Innovation Network (ERRIN), 104 European Social Dialogue, 186, 186n11 European Social Fund (ESF), 2, 55, 112 European Stability Mechanism (ESM), 25, 25n2 European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), 55, 57, 139, 143, 184n8 European Territorial Cooperation (ETC), 56, 107, 109, 112 European Transparency Register, 188 Euroscepticism, v, 74, 93 F Federalism/federal, 21, 22, 24, 33, 53n8, 126, 127, 136, 183n4, 210 Financial mobilisation, 11–12, 54, 58, 59n15, 61, 161n9 Functionalist, 23 Fusion, 11n6, 12, 12n7, 24, 25, 36, 123, 142 I ICLEI, 104 Influence, 9, 12, 14, 25, 30, 33, 34, 37, 54, 61, 73, 80, 106, 123, 129, 132, 141, 142, 152, 153, 156, 158, 160, 161, 161n9, 164, 168n16, 169, 175–195, 176n1, 178n2, 202, 203, 205, 209 Integration cycle, 6, 12–14, 13n7, 21–38, 45, 59, 60, 84, 85, 92, 107, 123, 175, 176, 193, 195, 200, 204–209, 211, 213, 214

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Interest group politics, 213 Interest representation, 98, 114, 129, 151–169, 161n9, 176n1, 181, 192 Intergovernmentalism, 12, 25n1 Interreg, 3, 55–57, 107, 109, 114, 184, 202 L LAI-Index, 9 LEADER, 103, 106, 112 Lisbon Strategy, 56, 57, 70, 138, 209 Lisbon Treaty/Treaty of Lisbon, 4, 10, 26, 73, 74, 125, 126, 130, 136n13, 142, 179, 181, 186, 202 Litigation, 11, 130, 158–160, 168, 177, 203, 213 Lobbying, 37, 58, 59, 59n15, 69, 75, 77n4, 85, 99, 126, 151, 152, 160–163, 162n12, 167–169, 176–178, 181, 182, 184–187, 191–195, 203, 208 Local self-government, 4, 72–74, 84, 124–127, 126n3, 142, 181, 186, 193, 194, 202, 203, 209, 211 M Maastricht Treaty/Treaty of Maastricht, 3, 126, 128, 186n10, 202 Monti Package, 131 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), 54, 199 Multilevel governance (MLG), 3, 5, 10–13, 22, 27, 32–36, 106, 108, 115, 115n30, 124, 125, 127, 128, 134, 138, 139n17, 142, 143, 151, 200, 202–204, 208, 210, 211, 213

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Multilevel venue shopping, 168, 189, 194, 203 N Neo-functionalism, 12 Neo-institutionalism, 12 P Pact of Amsterdam, 4, 140, 181–182 Partnership Agreement (PA), 138n17, 139, 143 Partnership principle, 2, 4, 35, 124, 137–139, 143, 154, 181, 193, 212 POLIS, 104 Politikverflechtung, 6, 21, 129, 209 Post-functional, 27, 74 Public procurement, 48n3, 51, 72, 140, 159–160, 184n7, 187, 188 Public services/public service provision, 9, 48, 49, 53, 60, 97, 99n12, 114, 126, 136n13, 157–160, 183n5, 188–190, 199, 201, 203, 213 R RAI-Index, 8 Regionalism, 7 Regulatory mobilisation, 12, 54, 59n15, 153 S Services of general interest, 72 Single European Act, 2, 48 Single Market, v, 2, 26, 45, 60, 152, 156n5, 200 Spillover, 21, 23, 24, 26–28, 70, 96, 115, 142, 152, 209, 210

Stability and Growth Pact, 131 Structural Funds, 2, 29, 55, 57, 58, 60, 61, 76, 124, 131, 137, 139, 185, 186n10, 193 Subsidiarity, 4, 11, 13, 74, 124, 126–128, 130, 131, 139n17, 142, 162, 164, 178n2, 179, 181, 186, 191–194, 202–204, 211 Supranationalism, 27 Systematic dialogue, 3, 133, 134, 143, 202 T Teckal, 159, 159n7, 160 Territorial interest group, 14, 152–158, 168, 169, 175, 176n1, 191, 193, 203, 205, 211 Territorial Pact of Local and Regional Authorities, 138, 143 Town twinning, 92–97, 100, 102, 114, 201 Transnational municipal network (TMN), 92, 97–107, 114 Transparency Register, 188, 191–193, 203 Treaty of Rome, 1, 200 U Urbact, 55–57, 104, 114, 202 Urban Agenda, 4, 35, 54n11, 70, 73n2, 124, 140, 141, 143, 179, 182, 193, 202, 211 Urban Mobility Plan, 190, 191 W White Paper on European Governance, 3, 35, 133 White Paper on Multilevel Governance, 3, 35, 134