Local Government in Europe: New Perspectives and Democratic Challenges 9781529217209

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LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE

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LO C AL GOV E RN M E N T I N E URO P E N E W P E R S P ECT I V E S AN D D E MOC RAT I C C HAL L E N G E S E D I TE D BY M A RTA L AC KOWS K A , K ATA RZ Y N A S Z M I GI E L - RAWS K A A N D F I L I PE TE L E S

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE New Perspectives and Democratic Challenges Edited by Marta Lackowska, Katarzyna Szmigiel-​Rawska and Filipe Teles

First published in Great Britain in 2021 by Bristol University Press University of Bristol 1–​9 Old Park Hill Bristol BS2 8BB UK t: +44 (0)117 954 5940 e: bup-​[email protected] Details of international sales and distribution partners are available at bristoluniversitypress.co.uk © Bristol University Press 2021 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​1718-​6 hardcover ISBN 978-1-​5292-​1719-​3 ePub ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​1720-​9 ePdf The right of Marta Lackowska, Katarzyna Szmigiel-Rawska and Filipe Teles to be identified as editors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Bristol University Press. Every reasonable effort has been made to obtain permission to reproduce copyrighted material. If, however, anyone knows of an oversight, please contact the publisher. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the editors and contributors and not of the University of Bristol or Bristol University Press. The University of Bristol and Bristol University Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Bristol University Press and Policy Press work to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design by blu inc Front cover image: iStock/Svetlanais Bristol University Press uses environmentally responsible print partners. Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

Contents List of Figures and Tables Notes on Contributors Acknowledgements Preface

v ix xvi xvii

PART I  The Size of Municipal Reforms: When Size Matters 1 Advancing the Research Agenda on Local Territorial Reforms: Taking Time and Space Seriously António F. Tavares 2 Too Big to Be Local: Local and National Elite Complicity in the Narrative of English Council Mergers Colin Copus, Alistair Jones and Rachel Wall 3 Consequences of Forced Municipal Mergers: Evidence from Norway Harald Baldersheim and Lawrence E. Rose 4 Local Government Reforms in Denmark and Norway: Reform Tools and Outcomes Kurt Houlberg and Jan Erling Klausen 5 One Size Does Not Fit All: Growing Cities and Shrinking Towns in the Spanish Local Map Carmen Navarro and Esther Pano 6 Institutional Changes and Shifting Roles: Local Government Reform in Hungary, 2010–​2014 Gábor Dobos 7 Territorial Reforms in Bulgaria: The Cases of Municipal Divorces Desislava Kalcheva 8 Participation of Interest Groups at Local Level: Any Space for Democracy in Inter-​Municipal Cooperation? Jurga Bučaitė-​Vilkė

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3

18

39

63

81

99

117

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PART II  Local Democracy and Leadership 9 Municipal Size and the Nationalization of Local Party Systems: The Nationalized, Localized and Regionalized Local Party Systems of Denmark, Poland and Belgium Adam Gendźwiłł, Ulrik Kjaer and Kristof Steyvers 10 Co-​creating the Tolerant City: The Role of Inspirational Civic Leadership Robin Hambleton with a contribution by Wirginia Aksztejn 11 Urban Leadership: German and Polish Mayors in Comparison Hubert Heinelt 12 Urban Climate Leadership in Metropolitan Areas: How Has the Political Parliamentary Model Influenced Oslo’s Climate Leadership? Gro Sandkjær Hanssen PART III  Keeping the Pace with a Balanced Balance Sheet 13 Democratic Functions of Local Budgets Jerzy Bartkowski 14 Does Urban Sprawl Pay Off for the Suburban Municipal Budget in Poland? Julita Łukomska and Jarosław Neneman 15 Why Tourists Should Pay Local Taxes Marta Derek 16 Perspectives on European Local Government: Putting Local Democracy First! Marta Lackowska, Katarzyna Szmigiel-​Rawska and Filipe Teles Index

163

181

199 217

237 249

270 284

294

iv

List of Figures and Tables Figures 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 7.1 7.2 7.3 8.1 8.2 9.1

10.1 10.2 12.1 14.1 14.2 14.3

Local autonomy index in Hungary, 1990–​2014 Hungarian local autonomy in international comparison, 1990–​2014 The local actors’ influence over the local authority activities Changes of the horizontal and vertical relations Administrative districts in the Republic of Bulgaria as of 31 December 2019 Local revenue per capita and revenue growth for the period 2006–​2018 (Rodopi group in BGN) Local revenue per capita and revenue growth for the period 2006–​2018 Analytical model of democratic legitimacy dimensions in IMC initiatives Structural equation modelling results: the relationship between variables Index of local party system nationalization and size of municipality for the 98 Danish, 581 Belgian and 2,477 Polish municipalities after the latest local elections in 2017, 2018 and 2018, respectively Framing the political space available to local leaders The realms of place-​based leadership Illustrating the four governance modes of climate governance Revenue structure of Polish municipalities (2018) (excluding 500+) Current expenditures structure of municipal budgets in Poland (2018) Population change in Dopiewo (2004–​2018)

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105 108 111 112 121 132 134 147 155 176

184 187 219 255 256 260

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260 Per capita spending on administration in Dopiewo (treated unit) and synthetic control unit (2004–​2018, in PLN, constant prices) 14.5 Per capita net operating surplus in Dopiewo (treated unit) and 261 synthetic control unit (2004–​2018, in PLN, constant prices) 14.6 Per capita investment expenditures in Dopiewo (treated unit) 261 and synthetic control unit (2004–20​18, in PLN, constant prices) 14.7 Population change in Morawica (2004–​2018) 262 14.8 Per capita spending on administration in Morawica 262 (treated unit) and synthetic control unit (2004–​2018, in PLN, constant prices) 14.9 Per capita net operating surplus in Morawica (treated unit) 263 and synthetic control unit (2004–20​18, in PLN, constant prices) 14.10 Per capita investment expenditures in Morawica (treated unit) 263 and synthetic control unit (2004–​2018, in PLN, constant prices) 15.1 Tourist and spa taxes as a percentage of local budgets in the 277 Polish municipalities that collect them 15.2 Number of municipalities that collect the tourist and spa tax 278 in Poland 15.3 The relationship between the number of beds and the amount 279 of money collected from the tourist tax (including the spa tax) in Polish municipalities (2019) 14.4

Tables 2.1 3.1 3.2

3.3

3.4

Structural change: the legislative journey Hypotheses regarding the effects of municipal mergers Citizen satisfaction with municipal services. Per cent who say that services are satisfactory or very satisfactory according to their place of residence in 1993 and 1997, and per cent change from 1993 to 1997 Citizen opinion regarding the development of municipal services in the last few years, according to their place of residence in 1997, and per cent change compared to the distribution of opinion for all respondents in 1993 Consequences of amalgamation for residents’ relation to municipal politics. Per cent who say that which party or parties have a majority on the municipal council is of importance to them personally in 1993 and 1997 according to place of residence, and per cent change from 1993 to 1997

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26 47 49

50

51

List of Figures and Tables

3.5

3.6

3.7

3.8

3.9

3.10 4.1 4.2 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 6.1 7.1 7.2 7.3

Consequences of amalgamation for residents’ relation to municipal politics. Per cent who agree with the statement ‘what happens in municipal politics is rarely of any significance to me’ in 1993 and 1997 according to place of residence, and per cent change from 1993 to 1997 Consequences of amalgamation for residents’ relation to municipal politics. Per cent who say they are quite or very well informed about what happens in municipal politics in 1993 and 1997 according to place of residence, and per cent change from 1993 to 1997 Consequences of amalgamation for residents’ relation to municipal politics. Per cent who personally know a member of the municipal council or other political bodies in their municipality in 1993 and 1997 according to place of residence, and per cent change from 1993 to 1997 Consequences of amalgamation for residents’ views of their own opportunities for taking part and having some influence on what happens in the municipality. Per cent who say yes in 1993 and 1997 according to place of residence, and per cent change from 1993 to 1997 Consequences of amalgamation for residents’ views of how well the municipal council reflects peoples’ opinions. Per cent who say very well or quite well in 1993 and 1997 according to place of residence, and per cent change from 1993 to 1997 Residents’ acceptance of the new amalgamated Fredrikstad municipality in 1997. OLS regression results (beta coefficients) Governmental reform tools (Norway) Governmental reform tools (Denmark) Municipalities and population in Spain, 2018 Independent lists in local elections in Spain (1987–​2011) Participation in cooperation entities by size of the municipality (N = 947) Transference of tasks in Catalan municipalities of more than 500 inhabitants (term 2011–​15) Structure of income of municipalities by population (2018) Separation of politics and administration according to the mayors Distribution of municipalities by number of inhabitants (1991–​2019) Divorces of municipalities (by type) first year of operation (split in the previous year) The factors behind the municipal splits in Bulgaria (responses to the questionnaire)

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52

52

53

54

55

56 69 74 84 88 91 93 95 110 122 127 129

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8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 9.1

9.2 9.3 11.1 11.2 11.3

11.4 14.1 14.2

15.1

Average size of population in municipalities, Lithuania Groups of actors in inter-​municipal cooperation: factor analysis Incentives and reasons for inter-​municipal cooperation (input dimension): factor analysis Impact and results of inter-​municipal cooperation (throughput and output): factor analysis Results of the main model The local party system of Denmark (2017), Belgium (2018) and Poland (2018) compared to the most recent parliamentary election for the Folketinget (2015), the Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers/​Chambre des Représentants (2014) and the Sejm (2015), respectively Local party system nationalization at the local elections in Denmark (2017), Belgium (2018) and Poland (2018) Index of local party system nationalization explained by municipal size General characteristics of the social structure of German and Polish mayors Patterns behind mayors’ notions of how local democracy should work: result of a factor analysis Responses of German and Polish mayors to the question: ‘How important do you think the following tasks are?’. Result of a factor analysis Responses of German and Polish mayors to statements related to aims of new public management reforms Property tax rates in PLN (2019) Population and its changes and movements in the biggest Polish agglomerations (core cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants, excluding the Silesian and tri-​city conurbations) Tourist taxes in major European urban destinations (per person per night, rates for 2020)

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143 151 152 153 154 170

173 177 202 206 208

210 255 257

275

Notes on Contributors Wirginia Aksztejn is a research assistant at the Faculty of Geography and

Regional Studies, Department of Local Development and Policy, and a PhD student at the Doctoral School of Social Sciences, University of Warsaw, Poland. She has participated in several research projects focused on local development, central-local relations and local government studies in Europe. Since 2019 she has been the Polish team leader in a Horizon 2020 project: COHSMO: Inequality, Urbanization and Territorial Cohesion: Developing the European Social Model of Economic Growth and Democratic Capacity. In her dissertation and the recently published article ‘Local territorial cohesion: Perception of spatial inequalities in access to public services in Polish casestudy municipalities’ (Social Inclusion, 8(4)) she investigates territorial cohesion at the micro, intra-municipal level. Harald Baldersheim is Professor Emeritus in political science at the University

of Oslo, Norway. He has contributed to research on organizational development and political leadership in local government as well as digitalization of local administration and citizen participation. He has served as adviser to the Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities and the Council of Europe’s Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. He has also served as chair of IPSA’s Research Committee on Comparative Local Government. Recent publications include Patterns of Local Autonomy in Europe (with Andreas Ladner et al) and The Rise of the Networking Region (with Are Haug and Morten Øgård). Jerzy Bartkowski is Professor of Sociology at the University of Warsaw. His

focus is civic society, local politics and comparative studies. His research is both quantitative and qualitative. His research experience includes projects such as European Value Study, Local Democracy and Governance, Fiscal Austerity and Innovation Project. He has published articles on local social and political behaviour in Poland, specifically local and national elections, political elites, social and political change and social capital.

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Jurga Bučaitė-​V ilkė is Associate Professor of Sociology at Vytautas

Magnus University, Lithuania. Since 2020 she has been head of the Department of Sociology. Her long-running research interests include local governance systems, participatory and representative democracy, community development and territorial policies. She has published several articles and chapters on local democracy and municipal governance. Bučaitė-Vilkė also serves as an external expert for Research Council of Lithuania and other national science advisory boards. Colin Copus is Emeritus Professor of Local Politics at De Montfort

University, UK and Visiting Professor at the University of Ghent, Belgium. His academic interests are central-local relationships and the constitutional status of local government, local political leadership and the changing role of the councillor. Colin has worked closely with policy-makers and practitioners in central and local government and with parliamentarians in the House of Commons. Marta Derek is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Geography and Regional

Studies, University of Warsaw, Poland. Marta does research in Geography. Her research and teaching interests include tourism and recreation planning and development, with a focus on urban areas; gastronomy and urban space; and tourism–nature relationships. Her current research projects focus on the ecosystem services concept in tourism and recreation. Gábor Dobos is a research fellow at the Centre for Social Sciences (Budapest,

Hungary) and at the National University of Public Service (Budapest, Hungary). He is primarily interested in local politics and constitutional adjudication. His latest publications include the chapter ‘Hungary: The Expansion and the Limits of National Politics at the Local Level’ in Gendźwiłł, A., Kjaer, U. and Steyvers, K. (eds) The Routledge Handbook of Local Elections and Voting in Europe (Routledge, forthcoming). Adam Gendźwiłł is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Human

Geography in the Department of Local Development and Policy at the University of Warsaw, Poland. He has been a visiting researcher at Northwestern University, and University of Southern Denmark. His research interests comprise local elections, political representation, and territorial reforms at the local level. He has recently published a book on local elections (in Polish) and articles in Local Government Studies, Politics & Gender, Regional & Federal Studies, and Space & Polity.

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Notes on Contributors

Robin Hambleton is Emeritus Professor of City Leadership at the University

of the West of England, UK and Director of Urban Answers. He was the founding President of the European Urban Research Association (EURA). He has held professorial posts in city planning, city management and city leadership in four universities and served as Dean of the College of Urban Planning and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois at Chicago. His research and consultancy work with cities focuses on how to enhance justice by strengthening the power of place-based leadership in the modern world. His latest books are Leading the Inclusive City (2015) and Cities and Communities Beyond COVID-19: How local leadership can change our future for the better (2020), both published by Bristol University Press. Hubert Heinelt is Professor at the Institute of Political Science, Technische

Universität Darmstadt, Germany (retired since April 2018). Between 2010 and 2013 he was the President of the European Urban Research Association (EURA). Kurt Houlberg is Professor of Political Science/Public Policy at VIVE, The

Danish Center for Social Science Research, Denmark. His main research interest is the influence of scale, fiscal environment and political factors on local government policy, financial management and effectiveness. In recent years, a particular interest has been dedicated to studies of local government reforms and in particular the economic and democratic consequences of the Danish local government reform in 2007. His recent publications include: ‘Jurisdiction Size and Local Government Effectiveness: Assessing the Effects of Municipal Amalgamations on Municipal Performance’, European Journal of Political Research, 60(1): 153–174 (with Jens Blom-Hansen & Søren Serritzlew, 2021) and ‘How Government Agencies React to Termination Threats, Journal of Public Administration Research And Theory, 30(2): 324–338 (with Jostein Askim, Jens Blom-Hansen & Søren Serritzlew, 2020). Alistair Jones is Associate Professor and University Teacher Fellow in

the Faculty of Business and Law at De Montfort University, UK. He is an expert on British politics, the EU, public affairs, public administration and public sector management. He is a regular contributor to radio and television on all aspects of British politics. Alistair is one of the country’s leading experts on parish government and the author of a major book on the subject: The Resurgence of Parish Council Powers in England published by Palgrave Macmillan. Desislava Kalcheva is Lecturer at Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski,

Bulgaria. Her research interests focus on local governments, public

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investments and regional development. Her main publications are: Kalcheva, D. (2017) ‘Access to Debt Financing - Opportunities for Improvement of the Investment Capacity of Bulgarian Municipalities (for the period 20032015)’ Economic Alternatives, 3: 390-404; Swianiewicz P., Kurniewicz A. and Kalcheva D. (2019) ‘The Political Budget Cycle in Earmarked Taxes for Local Public Services: A Comparison of Poland and Bulgaria’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 21(5): 463-480; Kalcheva D. (2020) ‘The Bulgarian municipalities in the face of the crisis related to the spread of Covid-19’, Izvestia Spisanie na Ikonomicheski universitet Varna, 64(1): 5-21. Ulrik Kjaer is Professor in the Department of Political Science at the

University of Southern Denmark, Denmark. He has been visiting scholar at Stanford University, University of Colorado, and Rutgers University. Since 2009 he has been heading the Danish Local Election Study and appeared as an expert on local elections in most of the Danish media outlets. His research interests include local elections, political recruitment, women in politics, and political leadership. He has published ten books in Danish and his work has also been published in journals such as European Journal of Political Research, Local Government Studies, State and Local Government Review, and Urban Affairs Review. Jan Erling Klausen is Associate Professor at the University of Oslo, Norway.

His research focus is on local democracy, local government reform and central-local relations. His recent publications include ‘When do consultative referendums improve democracy? Evidence from local referendums in Norway’, International Political Science Review 42(2): 213-228 (with B. Folkestad, J. Saglie and S. Segaard, 2021) and ‘Local Government Reform: Compromise Through Cross-Cutting Cleavages’, Political Studies Review 19(1): 111-126 (with J. Askim and T. Christensen, 2021). Marta Lackowska is Professor at the University of Warsaw, Poland, in the

Department of Local Development and Policy, Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies. Between 2008 and 2010 she held the post of Research and Teaching Assistant at the Darmstadt University of Technology (Germany). Her scientific interests are focused on local government and governance, and include: intermunicipal and territorial cooperation, metropolitan governance, multi-level governance, Europeanization, urban politics, territorial identity, theories of organization and management, and local– central relations (currently she leads a project on city–state relations under the realm of recentralization). She is a board member of European Urban Research Association.

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Julita Łukomska is Assistant Professor in the Department of Local

Development and Policy at the Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies, the University of Warsaw, Poland. She has been involved in national and international research projects in the field of local and regional development. Recently her research focuses on the local public service provision (including corporatization processes), land use management as well as local tax and fees policies of Polish municipalities. In the last years, she has also been involved in international comparative research on the financial health of local governments. Her scientific interests and publications are in local politics and local government finance. Carmen Navarro is Associate Professor at the Department of Political

Science, University Autónoma of Madrid (UAM), Spain, where she teaches and researches on local government and public policy. She is Deputy Head of the Institute of Local Government and Law at UAM. Her main research interests are local government institutions, local leadership and local government reforms. Jarosław Neneman is Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Economics

and Sociology at the University of Lodz, Poland. Previously he worked at Lazarski University in Warsaw. In 2004-2005, 2006 and 2014-2015 he was Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Finance, responsible for tax policy and legislation. Between 2010-2014, he was voluntary counselor to the Polish President dealing with local governments. Since 2011 he has been Chairman of the Council of the Centre of Tax Documentation and Studies Foundation in Lodz. While not working for the Ministry of Finance, he teaches Microeconomics, Public Finance, Managerial Economics, Introduction to Game Theory and Tax Policy, alongside writing reports on tax issues and textbooks on applied economics for students. Esther Pano holds a PhD in Political Science by the University of Barcelona,

Spain. She is Associate Lecturer in the Department of Constitutional Law and Political Science, at the the University of Barcelona. She is also the coordinator of the project ‘Local Government Observatory’ held by the Fundació Carles Pi i Sunyer (http://www.pisunyer.org/). She is currently a member of the GREL (research group in local politics, www.ub.edu/ grel). Her research interests are related to empirical institutional analysis, local government, and those questions connected to institutional design both from a political perspective as from an organizational point of view. Lawrence E. Rose is Professor Emeritus in Political Science at the University of

Oslo, Norway. His research interests encompass various aspects relating to local

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government and administration, political behaviour and issues of democratic citizenship. Among other publications he is co-author of  Size and Local Democracy with Bas Denters, Michael Goldsmith, Andreas Ladner and Poul Erik Mouritzen, co-editor of Comparing Local Governance with Bas Denters, and co-editor of Territorial Choice: The Politics of Boundaries and Borders with Harald Baldersheim. He has served as editor or member of the editorial board of several journals, coordinated the European Summer School in Local Government Studies for many years, and has led or participated in numerous cross-national research projects. Gro Sandkjær Hanssen is Senior Researcher at the Norwegian Institute for

Urban and Regional Research at Oslo Metropolitan University, Norway. She also holds a position as Professor II at the Department of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Life Science (NMBU) in Norway. Her research interests are urban planning and urban leadership, participation and involvement, regional governance and multilevel governance. She led the evaluation of the Norwegian Planning and Building Act, and has been project leader of large research projects about citizen participation in and political steering of compact city development, of climate change adaptation now urban public spaces. She now leads a large cooperation-project about planning and including housing markets. Kristof Steyvers is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Department

of Political Science, Ghent University, Belgium. His research is conducted at the Centre for Local Politics and concerned with topics such as local elections and voting, local democratic innovations, local political leadership, local autonomy and local government reform. He has published widely on these topics in edited volumes published among others by Palgrave and Routledge. And in journal articles in journals including Local Government Studies, Lex Localis, European Urban and Regional Studies and Acta Politica. He chairs the Standing Group on Local Government and Politics at the European Consortium for Political Research. Katarzyna Szmigiel-​R awska is Associate Professor in the Department of

Local Development and Policy, in the Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies at the University of Warsaw, Poland. Her work is focused on inter-organizational collaboration and coordination mechanisms in local government. She is a coordinator and participant of national and international research projects and consulting projects for government organizations and local authorities. She was the principal of the project Institutions, local governance and land use changes – a comparative study of selected European countries financed by the Polish National Science Centre. She is the author

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of numerous articles and book chapters, and author or editor of seven books on local government and strategic public management. António F. Tavares received his PhD in Public Administration from the

Reubin O’D. Askew School of Public Administration and Policy at Florida State University, USA. He is currently Associate Professor with Habilitation in Political Science and member of the Research Center in Political Science at the School of Economics and Management of the University of Minho in Braga, Portugal. Since July 2015, he has also been Adjunct Associate Professor in the Operating Unit on Policy-Driven Electronic Governance at the United Nations University (UNU-EGOV). His research interests include local public service delivery arrangements, land use management, and civic engagement and political participation. He has published more than 30 articles in international scientific journals with double-blind peer review in the fields of Political Science and Public Administration. Filipe Teles is Assistant Professor at the University of Aveiro, Portugal, and

currently acts as Pro-rector for Regional Development. He holds a PhD in Political Science and is a member of the Research Unit on Governance, Competitiveness and Public Policy, where he has developed research work on governance and local government, territorial reforms, political leadership and innovation. Filipe Teles participates in several national and international projects and is the author and co-author of several books and articles in international journals of reference. He is the co-editor of the book series Palgrave Studies in Sub-National Governance, and has worked as an expert/consultant in and across different sectors. Currently he is a member of the Governing Board of the European Urban Research Association and of the ECPR’s Steering Committee of the Local Government and Politics Standing Group. Rachel Wall is a former PhD student and local government researcher at De

Montfort University, Faculty of Business and Law, UK. She was the researcher for the De Montfort University Councillor Commission and co-author of its final report which was presented to the Chairman of the House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee. Rachel was a co-author of a major study of centralization published by Palgrave Macmillan: Local Government in England: Centralisation, Autonomy and Control.

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Acknowledgements The editors of this volume would like to thank all the authors for their commitment to contribute to this book. The variety of topics and consistency of thought achieved in the volume is owing to them. We are also indebted to Bristol University Press, especially to Stephen Wenham and Caroline Astley, given the professional and high-​quality support we received. Special thanks to the reviewers of the volume, who by far contributed to the quality of the final text. This volume addresses the existing gaps in European local government studies and is intended also as a tribute to those academics who have played a relevant role, not only in exploring these new avenues of research but also in bringing geographies of knowledge usually seen as peripheral to European research. This book is dedicated to an outstanding example of such endeavour: a scholar whose contribution to the field of research on local government is of unquestionable relevance –​Paweł Swianiewicz. As the following pages will demonstrate, the authors involved in this effort acknowledge this fact through building upon the themes of his extensive research on European local governments. On his 60th birthday, and with several projects at hand and new research challenges envisaged, we are certain of the need to revisit this book in the future, to include his next relevant contributions to the discipline. Thank you, Paweł, for the results of your study, for the inspiration and for the fruitful and friendly cooperation. Marta Lackowska, Katarzyna Szmigiel-​Rawska and Filipe Teles

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Preface This book gives comprehensive coverage of current challenges to the very essence of local self-​government. Authors from different European countries give a picture of the current situation and of the future developments laying ahead of us. Europe provides an extremely diverse ground for local government studies: governance models, leaders’ roles, reforms intensity, emphasis on democratic forms of government –​all these aspects present a very vivid and dynamic picture. At the same time, local governments in Europe face common challenges, like climate change, increasing populism and democratic deficit. This volume aims to provide a road map of this diversity and to identify some of the challenges resulting from the communalities. It is a comprehensive volume gathering the most classical research perspectives in the studies of European territorial (mainly local) government and presenting both new research approaches as well as new trends. The main set of topics includes local territorial reforms, local leadership and democracy, and local finances. The authors represent the leading researchers in Europe, who had jointly participated in a few recent research projects crucial for development of the knowledge on European local government, including a strong representation of Eastern European countries (POLLEADER II –​Political leaders in European local governments –​Heinelt et al, 2018; LAI –​Local Autonomy Index –​Ladner et al, 2019; LSSR –​Local State–​Society Relations, Teles et al, 2021, to name just the most recent ones). The authors refer to a common pool of concepts which result from previous European comparative local government research, like the local government classification of Page and Goldsmith (1987); the typology of local leadership styles by Mouritzen and Svara (2002); or the LAI by Ladner et al (2019) –​all these concepts build up conceptual frames for the themes analysed in this volume. Local government studies have, in recent years, been perceived as a magnifying lens for the most important political, social and economic changes of global and national relevance. In this volume, we focus on three fundamental aspects of decentralized governance:

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• Territorial reforms, that is, the institutional framework for local government functioning, reached through either amalgamations or consolidation strategies –​this part contributes to the classical debate on the optimal size of municipalities, presenting the newest research on this topic. • Democratic governance –​this section touches upon issues related to (1) the mechanisms of local elections, (2) the interplay between subnational tiers and (3) how local leadership is facing new challenges. • New trends in local finances –​this section contributes to the dialogue essential for modern democracy on state versus local governments’ struggles over public finance management. Local finances are explained as emerging dimensions of local citizenship in the context of centralization trends in Central-​Eastern European countries. These topics are analysed both in the comparative cross-​country contributions, and through specific national perspectives. Some of the contributions refer to the Europeanization of local policies as an important variable in the European multi-​level governance system. The book spans research both geographically (in Western and Eastern Europe) and thematically (combining different topics, usually separated in the academic literature –​economy/​finance, local political institutions, EU studies). P. Swianiewicz and A. Kurniewicz have recently suggested the first span in Coming Out of the Shadow? Studies of Local Governments in Central and Eastern Europe in European Academic Research (2019), claiming the need for a more geographically integrated approach in local government studies. The latter span, that is, the integration of multiple perspectives and experiences, broadens the most common contributions to the literature in this field. In fact, many typologies tend to accentuate the differences between Eastern and Western Europe when it comes to local governance institutional arrangements. This divide hinders the possibility to see the similarities and build generalizations on theoretical explanations other than the geographical location. Moreover, less is known about the internal differentiation of the heterogeneous group of East European countries, characterized by different socio-​economic backgrounds, state traditions and political choices made by the elites and reformers of local governments. Faithful to this wider approach, this book provides some new insights regarding some of the most classical questions in the field: • • • • •

What are the outcomes of territorial reforms? What are the expectations? What are the ways of collaboration, and impacts of inter-​institutional relations? Does local leadership really make a difference? What shapes political party involvement in local politics?

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• What is the role of budgets in local democracy? • Are control, supervision and autonomy compatible? We believe that addressing all these questions by comparing practices and perspectives from different geographies can result in a significant contribution to the field.

Scope and structure This volume presents an insight into the contemporary challenges faced by local governments in Europe –​both for researches and practitioners. It is composed of a variety of specific topics, providing a vibrant and inspiring set of perspectives on relevant aspects of local government studies. The main research question organizing all the contributions relates to the role of local government. The classical distinction between effectiveness in service provision and in financial affairs is contrasted with its democratic merits. In the realm of economic prominence and global processes, is there any space left to justify the democratic foundation for localities and their place-​based politics and policies? The authors contribute to answering this question by analyzing a set of specific aspects of local governments’ functioning: • arguments in favour and against municipal mergers, both from the perspective of central government rhetoric (Copus et al; Houlberg and Klausen), and of the citizens (Rose and Baldersheim); • limitations to local governments’ autonomy (Dobos); • the democratic side of inter-​municipal cooperation (Bucaite-​Vilke); • the nationalization of local partisan systems (Gendźwiłł et al); • the democratic dimension of budgeting, not only from a theoretical perspective (Bartkowski) but also from the point of view of specific groups of people (Derek) or groups of municipalities (Łukomska and Neneman); • mayors’ perceptions of their role in contrast to traditional notions of democracy (Heinelt); • new challenges facing local leadership (Hambleton, Hansen). One could assume that politico-​administrative systems in European countries are well established, frequently discussed in the literature and do not present any interesting or new features for further research. However, this could not be further from the truth. As shown in the following chapters, there is a lot of room for legal and conceptual manoeuvre in local government systems. These changes (or need for change) are explicitly described in the chapters of Navarro and Pano; Dobos; Derek, and, indirectly, in a few others.

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Local government is indeed a living phenomenon, undergoing changes and permanent adaptation. The volume is organized in three thematic parts. The first part deals with a traditional topic of local government studies, namely territorial reforms. These chapters provide relevant insights regarding both new examples and processes in countries often present in European literature, like the UK, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, as well as in less obvious parts of ‘local Europe’ like Bulgaria, Lithuania, Hungary and Poland. The inclusion of the eastern part of the continent in European research is one of the enriching features of the volume and has much to be grateful for owing to the scholars of those geographies. Next to these brief pictures of various local government systems, the discussion about their specific problems (a renationalization trend in Hungary, the challenges to amalgamations in Scandinavian countries, a too equalized system in Spain, among others) brings new aspects to consider in contemporary research. The second part of the book is devoted to challenges to local democracy: nationalization of local politics, the need to embrace climate action and the sustainability agenda, and the role of local specificities in the global realm. The leadership part offers a journey through various concepts –​ from classical definitions, as suggested by H. Heinelt, and new challenges (G.S. Hanssen), to the very new concepts on leadership by R. Hambleton. What comes out of this part is a need to give new value to place-​based politics and place-​based leadership. The third part offers a detailed insight into the financial aspects of local governments. It opens with a general note on why local budgeting has a democratic dimension, and elaborates two specific, important issues: local tourism taxation and the costs and benefits of suburbanization. References Heinelt H., Magnier A., Cabria M. and Reynaert H. (eds) (2018) Political Leaders and Changing Local Democracy: the European Mayor, London: Palgrave​ Macmillan. Ladner, A., Keuffer, N., Baldersheim, H., Hlepas N., Swianiewicz, P., Steyvers, K. and Navarro, C. (2019) Patterns of Local Autonomy in Europe, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Mouritzen, P.E. and Svara, J.H. (2002) Leadership at the Apex: Politicians and Administrators in Western Local Governments, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Page, E. and Goldsmith, M. (1987) Central and Local Government Relations: A Comparative Analysis of Western European Unitary States, London: Sage.

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Swianiewicz, P. and Kurniewicz, A. (2019) ‘Coming out of the Shadow? Studies of Local Governments in Central and Eastern Europe in European Academic Research’, Local Government Studies, 45(2): 153–​174. Teles, F., Gendźwiłł, A., Stanus, C. and Heinelt, H. (eds) (2021) Close Ties in European Local Governance –​ Linking Local State and Society, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

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PART I

The Size of Municipal Reforms: When Size Matters

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Advancing the Research Agenda on Local Territorial Reforms: Taking Time and Space Seriously António F. Tavares

Introduction Back in 2014, Paweł Swianiewicz lamented in a piece published in Local Government Studies that ‘most of the academic literature on local government treats Eastern Europe either as terra incognita, requiring exploratory investigation in the future, or puts the whole region into one basket described as “new local democracies”, coupled with accompanying stereotypes’ (Swianiewicz, 2014a: 292). Observed from the south-​west corner of Europe, this grievance sounds eerily familiar. In my own experience with scholarly research on local government and politics, I have also encountered a fair share of broad stroke generalizations and stereotypes about the ‘Southern European’ model or the ‘new democracies’ of the 1970s when referring to Portugal, Spain and Greece. The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, I review three major contributions to the study of territorial reforms present in the work of Paweł Swianiewicz. Most of his studies were developed in the context of local governments in Central and Eastern European post-​communist countries, particularly Poland, but I argue that they have contributed to expanding the knowledge and study of territorial reforms in general. The second aim is to discuss how these contributions have enriched the study of territorial reforms in Western Europe and how they have broadened the scope of the field to

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encompass new research questions, theoretical approaches and country cases. In reflecting on these contributions, I will highlight the importance of time and space in advancing this research agenda on territorial reforms. The chapter is divided into five sections. After this introduction, the following three sections review the contributions of Paweł Swianiewicz’s writings in three major threads in the study of territorial reforms. Section two focuses on the importance of including inter-​municipal cooperation initiatives as part of the discussion of territorial reforms. The third section stresses the combined study of amalgamation and de-​amalgamation reforms as two sides of the same coin. Section four highlights the growing role of sub-​municipal government units (SMUs) in urban governance. The final section discusses how these contributions have been useful in expanding comparative work and East-​West dialogue on territorial reforms. Future research is likely to benefit from this broadened perspective as long as it takes time and space seriously.

Inter-​municipal cooperation and territorial reforms Scholarly interest surrounding territorial reforms of local and regional governments dates back to the 1980s. Early work by Page and Goldsmith (1987) suggests that territorial organization influences several features of local governments, including the scope of functions, the degree of pluralism and the relationship between levels of government. The past decade has witnessed a significant increase in research on the effects of municipal amalgamations. Despite a first wave of amalgamations dating back to the 1950s and 1960s, with a few exceptions (Nelson, 1992), systematic evaluations of these reforms only took place much more recently (see Tavares, 2018 and Gendźwiłł et al, 2020 for reviews). The Western European literature documents evaluations of amalgamations in Austria (Heinisch et al, 2018; Blesse and Roesel, 2019), Denmark (Blom-​Hansen, 2010; Kjær et al, 2010; Houlberg and Pedersen, 2015; Blom-​Hansen et al, 2016; Bhatti and Hansen, 2019), Finland (Moisio and Uusitalo, 2013; Saarimaa and Tukiainen, 2015), Germany (Roesel, 2017; Blesse and Roesel, 2019; Ebinger et al, 2019), Italy (Garlatti et al, 2020), Norway (Baldersheim and Rose, this volume; Houlberg and Klausen, this volume), Portugal (Rodrigues and Tavares, 2020), Sweden (Hanes and Wikström, 2008; Hanes, 2015; Erlingsson et al, 2020), Switzerland (Steiner, 2003; Soguel and Silberstein, 2015; Steiner and Kaiser, 2017) and The Netherlands (Allers and van Ommeren, 2016; Bikker and van der Linde, 2016). The Swedish case is particularly delayed, since the reform took place in 1948–​52 and most evaluation studies published in English date from the 21st century.

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Academic works on inter-​municipal cooperation (IMC) have evolved as a separate research stream. Initial studies can be traced back to the 1990s in the United States (Bel and Warner, 2016). Early work attempted to identify the main correlates of IMC measured as a percentage of services in a municipality provided jointly with or by other governments (Morgan et al, 1988; Morgan and Hirlinger, 1991) or as the amount of intergovernmental spending (Campbell and Glynn, 1990). These initial efforts were followed by a stream of studies with broader geographical scope, investigating the determinants of service delivery choices, where IMC was seen as one of the alternatives. Preference for IMC was attributed to a mix of production costs savings via economies of scale (Mohr, Deller and Halstead, 2010), lower transaction costs compared to externalization to private firms (Feiock et al, 2003; Shrestha and Feiock, 2011; Hultquist et al, 2017), and minimization of negative externalities and spillovers between local governments (Bel and Warner, 2016). Until the early 2000s, neither the North American nor the early Western European literature promoted an integrated discussion of IMC and territorial organization reforms. Back in 2002, Swianiewicz made a call for research on a set of topics linking the size of local government, local democracy and efficiency. Among the themes highlighted by the author, one stands out. While discussing the catchment areas of services delivered by local governments, the author asks a series of questions: How often does it happen that services delivered by one local government serve population in the surrounding units as well? To what extent is this a problem for small local governments in rural areas? How is this situation dealt with? (…) Is the service being delivered when a local government receives special compensation from the state budget? Are there mechanisms of horizontal compensation among local government budgets? Are there examples of voluntary and compulsory cooperation of local governments? (Swianiewicz, 2002: 25) What is perhaps most important to highlight in this quote, is the idea that both IMC and territorial reorganization reforms are related to service delivery and should be addressed in an integrated manner. In other words, IMC and amalgamations should not be discussed in isolation, as they can be alternative or complementary ways of accomplishing service delivery goals and/​or taking on additional allocation of functions by local governments. This was later recognized and highlighted in the flagship work on IMC in Western Europe. Hulst and van Monfort’s 2007 edited volume entitled Inter-​Municipal Cooperation in Europe was perhaps the most influential book on IMC in a decade. The link between IMC and amalgamations is recognized

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explicitly in several chapters. Haveri and Airaksinen (2007) report on a survey of local government actors and experts in Finland who support the idea of IMC and amalgamations as strategic alternatives to accomplish increased size and capacity for service delivery. Heinz (2007) recalls the dual outcome –​mergers and cooperative approaches –​as a result of Germany’s 1967–​1977 territorial reform. And while in France IMC was feared as a first step towards amalgamation (West, 2007), in Italy a 1990 law established the Union of Municipalities form desirably leading to permanent mergers in the period of a decade (Fedele and Moini, 2007). Since the initial call by Swianiewicz (2002), some progress was made to recognize the common features and challenges associated with upscaling strategies such as IMC and amalgamations (Teles, 2016). This work suggests a framework to address upscaling reforms by examining a set of common indicators and trade-​offs between alternative reform options: efficiency, capacity, service delivery and democracy. Equally important, empirical studies began to address these upscaling reforms as a package. For example, tentative evidence suggests that economic crises and austerity were likely drivers of increased IMC and amalgamation reforms in several European countries, including Albania, Greece, Ireland, Latvia and Portugal, among others (Raudla and Tavares, 2018; Swianiewicz and Teles, 2018). However, this evidence is less than systematic and, like the chapters in Hulst and van Monfort (2007) and Teles and Swianiewicz (2018), tends to report on single country cases rather than truly comparative research under a common theoretical framework.

Amalgamation and de-​amalgamation reforms In the first chapter of the 2002 edited volume Consolidation or Fragmentation? The Size of Local Governments in Central and Eastern Europe, Swianiewicz notices that the generalization present in the Sharpe (1995) report was largely exaggerated: neither Western European countries were dominated by consolidation reforms, nor Central-​East European countries characterized by extreme fragmentation. Instead, the author stresses the importance of history (tradition) and inertia of the spatial organization to explain the differences between countries. Besides the importance of time (history) and space, the same work also underscores territorial reforms as a pendulum, swinging between amalgamations and de-​amalgamations depending on the emphasis on an increased allocation of functions to local governments or on local identity, autonomy and self-​r ule. For example, amalgamation reforms took place in Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Bulgaria during the 1970s and 1980s. However, after the regime change in 1990, many countries in

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Central-​Eastern Europe (CEE) have fragmented their local government systems, namely Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia, in response to calls for increased local self-​r ule. Far from being a group of countries with homogenous territorial organization, CEE countries vary from highly fragmented (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Ukraine) to highly consolidated (Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland and Latvia), with others falling in between these extremes (Macedonia, Albania, Slovenia, Croatia and Romania) (Swianiewicz, 2002; 2006). The case of Georgia was the subject of an in-​depth case study analysis showing a unique case of successful amalgamation reform under very particular circumstances: a top-​down approach facing little resistance from a relatively unengaged populace indicates a deficit of the democratic dimension (Swianiewicz and Mielczarek, 2010). The nuanced view provided by the work on the CEE countries stresses the idea of going beyond large blocks of countries to study territorial organization and, instead, focusing on historical, economic, social and cultural drivers of reforms. In addition, it clearly indicates that amalgamation and de-​amalgamation reforms should be regarded as two sides of the same coin, with preference for one or the other influenced by the particular circumstances and historical context of each country (Kalcheva, this volume). In no other place than the country of Portugal is the importance of examining the timing and spatial context more visible. Portugal is frequently lumped with the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden as an example of a country where local governments have a large average size (Steiner et al, 2016), and with Spain, Italy and France as a country with high resistance to territorial reorganization and highly stable municipal borders (Askim et al, 2016). What these classifications usually ignore is the point of departure. Portugal reduced the number of local governments from over 800 to around 230 in the mid-​19th century. The timing and the purpose of the reform was distinct from the post-​WWII territorial reforms in Western Europe, but history explains this apparent outlier. Local governments in Portugal are larger in population when compared to their European counterparts because they were merged long ago. As a result, territorial boundaries appear resistant to change because no sense of urgency exists in territorial reorganization for service delivery purposes (all municipalities have more than 1,000 residents and the average approaches 35,000). If time (and history) are taken into consideration, the apparent contradiction is solved. In Swianiewicz (2018a), the author asks whether municipal splits have consequences that mirror those of municipal amalgamations. ‘A positive answer (…) would strengthen the argument that size really matters’ (6), but the current state of the field provides very few instances where

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scholars have undertaken empirical analysis of municipal splits or de-​ amalgamations (exceptions include Drew and Dollery, 2014; de Souza et al, 2015; Swianiewicz and Łukomska, 2019). The results are still tentative and inconclusive, which again suggests that more research is needed. The examples highlighted in this section serve to illustrate the importance of taking a long-​term perspective in the analyses of territorial reforms. They also show that the starting point of the analysis is relevant to understanding the pro-​consolidation or pro-​fragmentation tendencies prevailing on a given country or region.

SMUs of government in urban governance The study of neighbourhood government has a long history associated with the public administration and political science literatures. Chaskin and Garg (1997) analysed the likelihood of success of community-​based initiatives associated with their relationship with local governments, issues of representation, legitimacy and connection, and long-​term viability. Wagenaar (2007) underscored neighbourhoods as socially complex systems where citizen participation and deliberation can be effective tools in harnessing complexity. Lowndes and Sullivan (2008) highlight civic, social, political and economic rationales for neighbourhood governance. The authors go on to argue that the promises of neighbourhood governance can only be fulfilled by overcoming challenges of capacity, competence, diversity and equity, which neighbourhood governments will be forced to address. Many of these earlier writings about SMUs of government were motivated by wishes to enhance participatory democracy, either by promoting closer proximity between citizens and elected officials or by stimulating civic engagement and cultivating social capital through participatory or deliberative approaches. However, this growing concern with neighbourhood governance was not accompanied by empirical studies focused on the gamut of practical solutions found in cities and municipalities around Europe to tackle the diversity of concerns within their boundaries. Moreover, related to the initial call for the study of amalgamation reforms, Swianiewicz (2002) highlighted the need for ‘decentralization within the municipality’ to improve service delivery access in more remote villages after municipal mergers. Today, this observation seems justified by the mounting evidence underscoring the negative consequences of amalgamations for service delivery and political representation (Tavares, 2018), but at the time this was primarily visible to scholars with an in-​depth knowledge of the limitations in public transportation and internet infrastructure and fear of loss of autonomy and representation prevailing in CEE countries (Swianiewicz, 2010a).

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The ‘decentralization beyond the municipal tier’ (Navarro and Pano, this volume; Hlepas et al, 2018) is related, therefore, to territorial reforms in many ways. First, SMUs are set up as an attempt to minimize the negative effects of larger municipal size, whether or not this size is generated by amalgamation reforms. Overcrowded services and lower responsiveness by local administrative offices may trigger the establishment of sub-​municipal districts capable of improving the quality and proximity of service delivery (Hlepas et al, 2018). Second, larger municipalities tend to be more diverse in economic, social, cultural and environmental terms, thus creating specific demands for services across districts/​neighbourhoods. SMUs are more likely to respond to these diverse preferences, promote allocative efficiency goals and restore political trust (Van Assche and Dierickx, 2007; Tavares and Raudla, 2018). Third, in some instances, SMUs of government have a long tradition, and their existence is inextricably linked to local identities and they operate as a doorway for the supply of public services to local residents (Hlepas, 2018; Tavares and Teles, 2018). In the case of amalgamations, it is important for residents to keep the name of their municipality to defend their local identity (Soguel and Silberstein, 2015), and sub-​municipal governments can be an alternative solution when this is not a viable choice. Fourth, SMUs also have been created to respond to the needs of citizens living in more remote villages, away from the centre of the city/​municipality, often to mitigate the effects of amalgamation reforms (Swianiewicz, 2014b, 2018b). Despite the obvious connection between amalgamation reforms and the increased interest in SMUs of government, the literature has yet to investigate this link in a systematic manner. Alexander (2013) investigated the effects of amalgamations in the Australian Shire of Buloke and found that ‘post-​ amalgamation political structures failed to reconcile the diverse and often disparate interests of Buloke’s constituent towns and communities’ (482). More recent work by Jakobsen and Kjaer (2016) on the Danish amalgamation reform suggests an overrepresentation of the periphery in deliberative bodies of amalgamated municipalities. This is visible in terms of both the number of seats in the council (descriptive representation) and advancement of local interests by elected officials (substantive representation). Still in Denmark, Thuesen (2017) reports on the creation of sub-​municipal local councils at the village level in response to municipal amalgamations following the recommendations from outcome-​oriented deliberative democracy. The significant number of amalgamation reforms enacted in the past decade (Swianiewicz, 2018a), justifies a closer look at the consequences for the territory and citizens in amalgamated municipalities.

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A research agenda on territorial reforms: taking time and space seriously Perhaps one of the most remarkable aspects of the 2002 edited volume Consolidation or Fragmentation? The Size of Local Governments in Central and Eastern Europe is the research agenda it triggered based on the initial sets of questions proposed by its editor. Most of the research topics mentioned in the Introduction and the Conclusion of this volume, including IMC, territorial reforms and SMUs were either understudied or completely ignored at the time in mainstream political science and public Administration research. Since then, they became standard topics in the field and significant progress has been made from both a theoretical and an empirical standpoint. Currently, the bulk of research on each of these topics can be useful for politicians, policy-​makers and managers.

Conclusion This chapter highlighted three major contributions of the work of Paweł Swianiewicz in research on territorial reforms. These contributions were decisive in starting a dialogue between Western and CEE local government scholars, which had already produced important additions to the comparative literature (see Swianiewicz, 1992; Swianiewicz, 2010b; Hlepas et al, 2018; Teles and Swianiewicz, 2018). To close this chapter, I link these contributions to the new developments in the field and propose additional topics of research for the coming years. First, the joint study of IMC and amalgamation reforms has taken the backseat to the investigation of the causes and consequences of each topic individually. Is it possible to improve theoretical development to explain why decision-​makers prefer one to the other? Is theory able to predict the effects of these choices? Are IMC and amalgamation reforms complementary or substitute strategies to address limited capacity and scale in the provision of local public services? What factors influence the preferences for one or the other across time and space? Second, the comparative study of amalgamation and de-​amalgamation reforms in Europe has been taking place in a vacuum. While individual case studies value history, actors and social conflict in the enactment of these reforms (Erlingsson et al 2015; 2020), the rare cross-​country comparative research has ignored this perspective almost entirely. Why do amalgamation and de-​amalgamation reforms occur? What actors play important roles in these processes? How do national and sub-​national institutions interact with actors to produce successful or unsuccessful reforms? Why have amalgamation

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reforms varied in time and space? These questions require a robust theory that involves historical thinking in order to allow the extraction of more credible hypotheses to be tested with appropriate data, reliable information sources and systematic coding procedures. I believe historical institutionalism as a theoretical perspective and comparative historical analysis as a method have a yet untapped potential to frame the study of amalgamation and de-​ amalgamation reforms. Third, the extensive work on the economic, political and managerial effects of municipal amalgamation reforms is not matched by equivalent attention to the consequences affecting neighbourhoods, villages or remote areas in newly amalgamated jurisdictions. Have amalgamations caused citizen disenfranchisement in the neighbourhoods of newly merged municipalities? What were the impacts in terms of social equity and political representation? Have there been efforts to counter such negative effects by relying on alternative participatory strategies (including the enactment or reform of SMUs)? Answers to these questions require a focus on the redistributive effects of territorial reforms, something that has been largely absent from current research agendas, but which must be explored to provide a more comprehensive picture of the effects of amalgamation reforms. More generally, this research agenda needs to tackle two issues head on. On one hand, one of the most glaring omissions in the comparative study of territorial reforms is the attention paid to their starting point. The limited number of studies that engage in comparisons between reforms typically neglects the starting point for the countries under analysis. In this chapter I attempted to argue that time is a key variable in advancing comparative studies of territorial reforms and that scholars should engage in historical thinking in order to treat these kinds of social and political changes in a more precise manner. On the other hand, the treatment of space also requires an expansion, particularly following Swianiewicz’s call for looking to the other side of the ‘invisible fence’ between Western and CEE countries and finding commonalities in country reforms, irrespective of their location in the European continent. This second major gap in the study of amalgamation reforms requires the investigation of patterns of spatial diffusion employing arguments borrowed from the theory of policy diffusion to understand the mechanisms of adoption (Braun and Gilardi, 2006). Only by taking time and space seriously can local government scholars truly respond to the most pressing questions about territorial reforms. References Alexander, D. (2013) ‘Crossing Boundaries: Action Networks, Amalgamation and Inter-​Community Trust in a Small Rural Shire’, Local Government Studies, 39(4): 463–​487.

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Allers, M.A. and van Ommeren, B. (2016) ‘Intermunicipal cooperation, municipal amalgamation and the price of credit’, Local Government Studies, 42(5): 717–​738. Askim, J., Klausen, J.E., Vabo, S.I. and Bjurstrøm, K. (2016) ‘What Causes Municipal Amalgamation Reform? Rational Explanations Meet Western European Experiences, 2004–​13’, in S. Kuhlmann and G. Bouckaert (eds) Local Public Sector Reforms in Times of Crisis, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 59–​79. Bel, G. and Warner, M. (2016) ‘Factors Explaining Inter-​Municipal Cooperation in Service Delivery: A Meta-​Regression Analysis’, Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 19(2): 91–​115. Bhatti, Y. and Hansen, K.M. (2019) ‘Voter Turnout and Municipal Amalgamations –​Evidence from Denmark’, Local Government Studies, 45(5): 697–​723. Bikker, J. and Van der Linde, D. (2016) ‘Scale economies in local public administration’, Local Government Studies, 42(3): 441–​463. Blesse, S. and Roesel, F. (2019) ‘Merging County Administrations –​Cross-​ National Evidence of Fiscal and Political Effects’, Local Government Studies, 45(5): 611–​631. Blom-​Hansen, J. (2010) ‘Municipal Amalgamations and Common Pool Problems: The Danish Local Government Reform in 2007’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 33(1): 51–​73. Blom-​Hansen, J., Houlberg, K., Serritzlew, S. and Treisman, D. (2016) ‘Jurisdiction Size and Local Government Policy Expenditure: Assessing the Effect of Municipal Amalgamation’, American Political Science Review, 110(4): 812–​831. Braun, D. and Gilardi, F. (2006) ‘Taking “Galton’s Problem” Seriously: Towards a Theory of Policy Diffusion’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 18(3): 298–​322. Campbell, R.W. and Glynn, P. (1990) ‘Intergovernmental Cooperation: An Analysis of Cities and Counties in Georgia’, Public Administration Quarterly, 14(2): 119–​141. Chaskin, R.J. and Garg, S. (1997) ‘The Issue of Governance in Neighborhood-​Based Initiatives’, Urban Affairs Review, 32(5): 631–​661. de Souza, S.V., Dollery, B.E. and Kortt, M.A. (2015) ‘De-​amalgamation in Action: The Queensland Experience’, Public Management Review, 17(10): 1403–​1424. Drew, J. and Dollery, B. (2014) ‘Separation Anxiety: An Empirical Evaluation of the Australian Sunshine Coast Regional Council De-​Amalgamation’, Public Money & Management, 34(3): 213–​220. Ebinger, F., Kuhlmann, S. and Bogumil, J. (2019) ‘Territorial Reforms in Europe: Effects on Administrative Performance and Democratic Participation’, Local Government Studies, 45(1): 1–​23.

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Erlingsson, G.Ó., Ödalen, J. and Wångmar, E. (2015) ‘Understanding Large-​ Scale Institutional Change: Social Conflicts and the Politics of Swedish Municipal Amalgamations, 1952–​1974’, Scandinavian Journal of History, 40(2): 195–​214. Erlingsson, G.Ó., Ödalen, J. and Wångmar, E. (2020) ‘How Coerced Municipal Amalgamations Thwart the Values of Local Self-​Government’, Urban Affairs Review, doi.org/10.1177/1078087420921458. Fedele, M. and Moini, G. (2007) ‘Italy: The Changing Boundaries of Inter-​Municipal Cooperation’, in R. Hulst and A. Van Montfort (eds) Inter-​Municipal Cooperation in Europe, Dordrecht: Springer, pp 117–​138. Feiock, R. Clingermayer, J. and Dasse, C. (2003) ‘Sector Choices for Public Service Delivery: The Transaction Cost Implications of Executive Turnover’, Public Management Review, 5(2): 163–​176. Garlatti, A. Fedele, P. and Iacuzzi, S. (2020) ‘Can Amalgamations Deliver? Barriers to Local Government Mergers from an Historical Institutionalist Perspective’, Public Money & Management, 1–​11. Gendźwiłł, A. Kurniewicz, A. and Swianiewicz, P. (2020) ‘The Impact of Municipal Territorial Reforms on the Economic Performance of Local Governments. A Systematic Review of Quasi-​Experimental Studies’, Space and Polity, 25(1): 37–56. Hanes, N. (2015) ‘Amalgamation Impacts on Local Public Expenditures in Sweden’, Local Government Studies, 41(1): 63–​77. Hanes, N. and Wikström, M. (2008) ‘Does the Local Government Structure Affect Population and Income Growth? An Empirical Analysis of the 1952 Municipal Reform in Sweden’, Regional Studies, 42(4): 593–​604. Haveri, A. and Airaksinen, J. (2007) ‘Inter-​municipal cooperation in Finland: Old traditions and new promises’, in R. Hulst and A. Van Monfort (eds) Inter-​municipal cooperation in Europe, Dordrecht: Springer, pp 39–​65. Heinisch, R., Lehner, T., Mühlböck, A. and Schimpf, C.H. (2018) ‘How Do Municipal Amalgamations Affect Turnout in Local Elections? Insights from the 2015 Municipal Reform in the Austrian State of Styria’, Local Government Studies, 44(4): 465–​491. Heinz, W. (2007) ‘Inter-​M unicipal Cooperation in Germany: The Mismatch between Existing Necessities and Suboptimal Solutions’, in R. Hulst and A. Van Montfort (eds) Inter-​Municipal Cooperation in Europe, Dordrecht: Springer, pp 91–​115. Hlepas, N. (2018) ‘Between Identity Politics and the Politics of Scale: Sub-​Municipal Governance in Greece’, in N.K. Hlepas, N. Kersting, S. Kuhlmann, P. Swianiewicz and F. Teles (eds) Sub-​Municipal Governance in Europe: Decentralization Beyond the Municipal Tier, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 119–​143.

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Hlepas, N.K., Kersting, N., Kuhlmann, S., Swianiewicz, P. and Teles, F. (eds) (2018) Sub-​Municipal Governance in Europe: Decentralization Beyond the Municipal Tier, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Houlberg, K. and Pedersen, L.H. (2015) ‘Political Consensus and Fiscal Outcomes’, Local Government Studies, 41(1): 78–​99. Hulst, R. and Van Montfort, A. (eds) (2007) Inter-​Municipal Cooperation in Europe, Dordrecht: Springer. Hultquist, A., Harsell, D.M., Wood, R.S. and Flynn, D.T. (2017) ‘Assessing the Impacts of Transaction Costs and Rapid Growth on Local Government Service Provision and Delivery Arrangement Choices in North Dakota’, Journal of Rural Studies, 53: 14–​25. Jakobsen, M. and Kjaer, U. (2016) ‘Political Representation and Geographical Bias in Amalgamated Local Governments’, Local Government Studies, 42(2): 208–​227. Kjær, U., Hjelmar, U. and Leth Olsen, A. (2010) ‘Municipal Amalgamations and the Democratic Functioning of Local Councils: The Case of the Danish 2007 Structural Reform’, Local Government Studies, 36(4): 569–​585. Lowndes, V. and Sullivan, H. (2008) ‘How Low Can You Go? Rationales and Challenges for Neighbourhood Governance’, Public Administration, 86(1): 53–​74. Mohr, R., Deller, S.C. and Halstead, J.M. (2010) ‘Alternative Methods of Service Delivery in Small and Rural Municipalities’, Public Administration Review, 70(6): 894–​905. Moisio, A. and Uusitalo, R. (2013) ‘The Impact of Municipal Mergers on Local Public Expenditures in Finland’, Public Finance and Management, 13(3): 148–​166. Morgan, D.R. and Hirlinger, M.W. (1991) Intergovernmental Service Contracts: A Multivariate Explanation, Urban Affairs Quarterly, 27(1): 128–​144. Morgan, D.R., Hirlinger, M.W. and England, R.E. (1988) ‘The Decision to Contract Out City Services: A Further Explanation’, Western Political Quarterly, 41(2): 363–​372. Nelson, M.A. (1992) ‘Municipal Amalgamation and the Growth of the Local Public Sector in Sweden’, Journal of Regional Science, 32(1): 39–​53. Page, E. and Goldsmith, M. (1987) Central and Local Government Relations: A Comparative Analysis of Western European Unitary States, London: Sage. Raudla, R. and Tavares, A.F. (2018) ‘Inter-​Municipal Cooperation and Austerity Policies: Obstacles or Opportunities?’, in F. Teles and P. Swianiewicz (eds) Inter-​Municipal Cooperation in Europe, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 17–​41.

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Rodrigues, M. and Tavares, A.F. (2020) ‘The Effects of Amalgamations on Voter Turnout: Evidence from Sub-​Municipal Governments in Portugal’, Cities, 101: 1757–​1772. Roesel, F. (2017) ‘Do Mergers of Large Local Governments Reduce Expenditures? Evidence from Germany Using the Synthetic Control Method’, European Journal of Political Economy, 50: 22–​36. Saarimaa, T. and Tukiainen, J. (2015) ‘Common Pool Problems in Voluntary Municipal Mergers’, European Journal of Political Economy, 38: 140–​152. Shrestha, M.K. and Feiock, R.C. (2011) ‘Transaction Cost, Exchange Embeddedness, and Interlocal Cooperation in Local Public Goods Supply’, Political Research Quarterly, 64(3): 573–​587. Soguel, N. and Silberstein, J. (2015) ‘Welfare Loss with Municipal Amalgamations and the Willingness-​to-​Pay for the Municipality Name’, Local Government Studies, 41(6): 977–​996. Steiner, R. (2003) ‘The Causes, Spread and Effects of Intermunicipal Cooperation and Municipal Mergers in Switzerland’, Public Management Review, 5(4): 551–​571. Steiner, R. and Kaiser, C. (2017) ‘Effects of Amalgamations: Evidence from Swiss Municipalities’, Public Management Review, 19(2): 232–​252. Steiner, R., Kaiser, C. and Eythórsson, G.T. (2016) ‘A Comparative Analysis of Amalgamation Reforms in Selected European Countries’, in S. Kuhlmann and G. Bouckaert (eds) Local Public Sector Reforms in Times of Crisis, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 23–​42. Swianiewicz, P. (1992) ‘The Polish Experience of Local Democracy: Is Progress Being Made?’, Policy and Politics, 20(2): 87–​98. Swianiewicz, P. (2002) ‘Size of Local Governments: International Context and Theoretical Framework’, in P. Swianiewicz (ed) Consolidation or Fragmentation? The Size of Local Governments in Central and Eastern Europe, Budapest: Open Society Institute, pp 1–​29. Swianiewicz, P. (2006) ‘Poland and Ukraine: Contrasting Paths of Decentralisation and Territorial Reform’, Local Government Studies, 32(5): 599–​622. Swianiewicz, P. (2010a) ‘Territorial Fragmentation as a Problem, Consolidation as a Solution’, Territorial Consolidation Reforms in Europe, Budapest: OSI/​LGI, pp 1–​23. Swianiewicz, P. (2010b) ‘If Territorial Fragmentation is a Problem, Is Amalgamation a Solution? An East European Perspective’, Local Government Studies, 36(2): 183–​203. Swianiewicz, P. (2014a) ‘An Empirical Typology of Local Government Systems in Eastern Europe’, Local Government Studies, 40(2): 292–​311.

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Swianiewicz, P. (2014b) ‘Intra-​Municipal Units in Urban Political Systems in Poland: Vicious Roundabout of Marginalization or Dead-​End Street?’, NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, 7(2): 173–​198. Swianiewicz, P. (2018a) ‘If Territorial Fragmentation Is a Problem, Is Amalgamation a Solution? –​Ten Years Later’, Local Government Studies, 44(1): 1–​10. Swianiewicz, P. (2018b) ‘New Experiments of Maintenance of Old Traditions? Dual System of SMU in Poland’, in N.K. Hlepas, N. Kersting, S. Kuhlmann, P. Swianiewicz and F. Teles (eds) Sub-​Municipal Governance in Europe: Decentralization Beyond the Municipal Tier, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 167–​192. Swianiewicz, P. and Mielczarek, A. (2010) ‘Georgian Local Government Reform: State Leviathan Redraws Boundaries?’ Local Government Studies, 36(2): 291–​311. Swianiewicz, P. and Teles, F. (2018) ‘Inter-​Municipal Cooperation Diversity, Evolution and Future Research Agenda’, in F. Teles and P. Swianiewicz (eds) Inter-​Municipal Cooperation in Europe, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 335–​350. Swianiewicz, P. and Łukomska, J. (2019) ‘Is Small Beautiful? The Quasi-​ Experimental Analysis of the Impact of Territorial Fragmentation on Costs in Polish Local Governments’, Urban Affairs Review, 55(3): 832–​855. Tavares, A.F. and Raudla, R. (2018) ‘Size, Density and Small Scale Elections: A Multi-​Level Analysis of Voter Turnout in Sub-​Municipal Governments’, Electoral Studies, 56: 1–​13. Tavares, A.F. and Teles, F. (2018) ‘Deeply Rooted but Still Striving for a Role: The Portuguese Freguesias under Reform’, in N.K. Hlepas, N. Kersting, S. Kuhlmann, P. Swianiewicz and F. Teles (eds) Sub-​ Municipal Governance in Europe: Decentralization Beyond the Municipal Tier, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 193–​209. Teles, F. (2016) Local Governance and Inter-​M unicipal Cooperation, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Teles, F. and Swianiewicz, P. (2018) Inter-​M unicipal Cooperation in Europe: Institutions and Governance, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Thuesen, A.A. (2017) ‘Local Democracy in Large Municipalities: Co-​ Creating Democracy and Rural Development through Multi-​Level Participation Structures and Local Development Plans’, Town Planning Review, 88(3): 327–​348. Van Assche, D. and Dierickx, G. (2007) ‘The Decentralisation of City Government and the Restoration of Political Trust’, Local Government Studies, 33(1): 25–​47.

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Wagenaar, H. (2007) ‘Governance, Complexity, and Democratic Participation: How Citizens and Public Officials Harness the Complexities of Neighborhood Decline’, The American Review of Public Administration, 37(1): 17–​50. West, K. (2007) ‘Inter-​Municipal Cooperation in France: Incentives, Instrumentality and Empty Shells’, in R. Hulst and A. van Monfort (eds) Inter-​Municipal Cooperation in Europe, Dordrecht: Springer, pp 67–​90.

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2

Too Big to Be Local: Local and National Elite Complicity in the Narrative of English Council Mergers Colin Copus, Alistair Jones and Rachel Wall

Introduction Local government in England is an outlier when it comes to size (Baldersheim and Rose 2010; Swianiewicz, 2010; Denters et al, 2014). Yet, amalgamations are far from finished in England and this chapter will explore how a policy narrative has been developed articulating the need for the ever-​increasing size of English local government –​a narrative which is shared between central and local government. While it is the centre that takes the formal decision about council mergers, the process is easier if some local government political elites share a policy narrative with the centre that extols the virtues of larger local government and fewer councils. The council size debate reflects a series of assumptions about the purpose of local government (Bulpitt, 1983; Stewart, 1983 and 2003; Chandler, 2007; Copus et al, 2017) and the last wholesale reorganization in 1972 created councils which reflected those assumptions but not necessarily recognizable communities of place (John and Copus, 2011). Since the 1972 reorganization, subsequent governments have been shy of further massive territorial upheaval, preferring to cajole and convince local government into mergers through the creation of a policy narrative based on a folklore like belief in the efficacy of larger local government (Copus et al, 2017). Drew et al (2019) point out the dearth of scholarly activity exploring the nature of the arguments that are employed by proponents and opponents

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of municipal mergers to convince the public of the rightness of their cause. They employ a rhetorical analysis to examine the efficacy of those arguments which display the ‘dreadful consequences’ that could occur from failure to amalgamate or from amalgamation. In this chapter, we take a different approach to analyzing the arguments, preferring to employ the notion of policy narratives (explained in section two) particularly as politicians in England need care little about convincing the public, who will only nominally be consulted in the process and have no real say, such as via a referendum, on amalgamations. The audience that needs convincing, in the English case, are councillors, council leaders and chief executives who can be convinced to assess the world in the same way as the centre through a stabilizing general policy narrative (Jones et al, 2014). An important contextual component of developing a narrative supportive of mergers is the assumptions held by policy-​makers and local elites about the role of local government, which is not seen as an autonomous institution able to finance itself and develop a governing agenda independent of the centre. Rather, it is seen as an agent for the delivery of public services (Jones and Stewart, 1983; Young and Rao, 1997; 1999; Reynaert et al, 2005; Denters and Rose, 2005). This chapter explores the continuing debate about the appropriate size and number of tiers of English local government through an examination of the policy narrative shared between the national and local political elites designed to transmit the benefits of larger local government and minimize or ignore negative effects. It does this to throw light on why England is an outlier when it comes to council size and draw lessons from that narrative for amalgamation debates elsewhere. It is necessary to do this because studies of council size, as a traditional research topic, explore the benefits or weakness of council mergers but rarely focus on the arguments and narratives created to support, or oppose the case for mergers (see Copus et al, 2020, for a review). In this book, it is only this chapter and Chapter 4 by Klausen and Houlberg, which examine the arguments and narratives around the merger debate. While this chapter was being written, the government announced an upcoming devolution white paper in which devolution is linked to mergers and the creation of new, larger unitary councils. This chapter is therefore a timely exploration of the narratives employed in the debate about council size. The next section explains the methodological approach for the research and how utilizing a framework which centres on policy narratives is appropriate for assessing the research findings. It sets out how stories of events, features and individuals cluster together into narratives transmitting a normative message and how that message influences contemporary thinking and action. The third section presents the findings of research conducted among local and national political elites to show how a powerful merger

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narrative has come to dominate thinking among local and central actors regarding the size and shape of local government. The chapter concludes by summarizing the pervasive power of the bigger is better narrative in policy debates.

Policy narratives: shaping and controlling the debate Since the 1972 Local Government Act, the last major wholesale reorganization of local government, there has been a consistent central narrative that, crudely summarized, repeats the message: ‘bigger is better’ (John and Copus, 2011; Copus et al, 2017). The paper addresses the following questions: • What is the dominant policy narrative about the size of English local government and how does it display itself? • How has that narrative referred to in the first point become so powerful and dominant? • What are the consequences for English local government of the persistence and power of that dominant narrative?

Researching the narrative and methodological approach If we are to understand the power, persistence and effect of the dominant policy narrative about local government amalgamations and size then we must understand what policy actors see as the purpose of local government and how that view is supported through the narratives they employ. A qualitative approach to the research enabled an in-​depth understanding of how actors construct arguments and deploy them in shaping the policy environment. The paper explores the thinking and policy objectives used for shaping local government and forging amalgamations. The deep and rich data the qualitative approach uncovered provided detailed insights and clarity as to actors’ views, beliefs and arguments in a way a quantitative approach would not. Semi-​structured interviews were held with 100 senior councillors and a further 30 interviews held with national politicians in government and opposition; seven interviews were conducted with civil servants responsible for overseeing the development of local government policy at the national level; 12 senior politicians from the local government association were interviewed and five policy specialists situated within the leading local government think tanks. The interviews focused on attitudes, values and ideas about the purpose of local government and the size and tiers required to match that purpose.

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In addition to semi-​structured interviews, 30 focus group discussions were held across England to ensure a geographical spread of participants across a wide range of local government settings. The focus groups lasted from between one to two hours, involving senior councillors from majority and minority parties and in three cases were attended by senior council officers. In all, 310 councillors and 37 officers participated in the focus groups and a wide-​ranging set of discussions took place. The focus groups were carefully managed to ensure that alternative views to the dominant merger narrative were sought out and their expression encouraged. Given the nature of the attendees, senior councillors and senior council officers, the fear that some attendees might feel intimidated or lack confidence to express alternative views could be dismissed. The interviewees and focus group attendees were selected because of their involvement in amalgamation debates within their own localities or because they had publicly expressed views, in local and national debates, about the merits or otherwise of council amalgamations. The research team identified these interviewees from the local and national press and from the local government magazines: Municipal Journal and Local Government Chronicle. Thus, our respondents were actively involved in public debates and campaigns, and in shaping and employing the narrative to support their particular cause about amalgamations. The interviews and focus groups provided a forum within which the views and attitudes that support the merger policy narrative could be explored in-​ depth and how they emerged from past actions. The examples and stories given to support council mergers clustered around a set of core narratives explored in the next section. What became clear was that while actors in local government may appear independently motivated, their thoughts and actions are constrained and directed by well-​engrained policy narratives that take on an almost folklore-​like existence. It is also clear that there is no real use of evidence-​based policy –​certainly if such evidence conflicts with dominant policy narratives; rather there is a use of policy-​based evidence that supports the dominant narrative. A thematic analysis of the data was conducted to derive themes and statements which demonstrated significant meaning and relevance to the topic of council amalgamations and policy narratives (Bazeley, 2013). An inductive process of analysis was employed, which involved the use of flexible codes to organize the data and interpret emergent patterns and themes, and the interrelationships, and their significance between these patterns and themes for the purpose of developing a rich, detailed and complex account of the policy narratives (Braun and Clarke, 2006). The inductive approach to thematic analysis was adapted to incorporate a deductive element to the analytical process. While the themes and patterns discussed are emergent themes located within the data, the analysis to uncover these themes was

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conducted with the guidance of the conceptual framework of policy narratives that has been developed for the chapter (see, the following sub-​ section). The dual approach to qualitative data analysis meant that the more open thematic analysis was guided by a logical set of pre-​existing concepts and understandings to ensure that the emergent themes were relevant and useful for the research aims.

Policy narratives: supporting reorganization and increases in council size A policy narrative is a way of shaping the thinking and actions around political issues. Any policy narrative has at its base a set of stories, assumptions, explanations and scripts which come together to shape thinking about a policy issue (Hay, 2002; Boswell, 2013). Those seeking to influence policy or stimulate change will formulate arguments within well-​known scripts and plots and those that contribute to and employ a dominant narrative are more likely to be successful politically than those seeking to create a new narrative or to compete and conflict with the dominant narrative (see Jameson, 1989; Roe, 1994; Atkinson, 2000; Stone, 2002). The term narrative can be used to indicate how policy-​makers and politicians attempt to convince others of the sagacity and veracity of their policies. Policy narratives are valuable for understanding political debate and action as politicians develop solutions to intractable and complex problems or ‘wicked issues’ (Jones and Stewart, 1983; Stewart, 2003). Trowler (2012) described ‘wicked issues’ as complex and difficult to understand, and more complex to solve, as they have many levels of causation, their existence extends over a period with no logical end point and with no clear solution (also see Rittel and Webber, 1973). As we will see in the next section, an elaboration of the ‘wicked issue’ of the purpose and appropriate size local government is an important ingredient in developing a narrative to underpin those two factors and how political expediencies such as austerity and financial downturn can be co-​opted into narrative to support a policy objective. Policy narratives achieve a simplification of complex issues, the cause of the problem and possible solutions, and so reduce the complexity involved and undermine opposition views when the issue and solution is contested (Fischer, 2003). The policy narrative can embolden politicians to pursue certain courses of action when the issues are complex, complicated and the outcome uncertain (Roe, 1994). The dominant narrative stabilizes debate and underwrites a set of solutions which become resistant to change even in the face of uncertain, contradictory and inconsistent evidence (Roe, 1994). Atkinson (2000: 213) suggests that political consensus has a price: ‘Narratives attempt to project a particular version of reality, seeking to organize it in a certain manner while simultaneously attempting to

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mask or deny contradictions within that reality and limit our perception of such contradictions –​a form of closure or what is termed a strategy of containment.’ The policy narrative of larger local government being more efficient, effective and cheaper than smaller local government fits the ‘strategy of containment’ as it has become almost an article of faith in debates about English local government; policy narratives are the enemy of evidence-​based policy. Policy narratives are a tool of political conflict assisting in the creation of between actors with a common objective and bringing them into conflict with groups holding different policy solutions (Miller, 2012). To be effective, policy narratives rest on the willingness and ability of various actors to rehearse and perform the scripts supporting their favoured policy option frequently and forcefully, and for the narrative to be finessed to suit particular circumstances (Hajer, 2005; Beunen et al, 2013). By constant repetition the policy becomes familiar, taken-​for-​g ranted and common sense, and once this is achieved the narrative limits how the issue can be assessed, the solutions available and designates opposing camps of heroes (pro-​narrative) and villains (anti-​narrative) (Radaelli, 1999; Miller, 2012; Boswell 2013, for an excellent analysis also see Lowndes and Roberts, 2013). While governments can, and do, act without public support, creating a critical supporting mass around a policy option through a narrative means they are able to persuade and convince others rather than force action (Ringen, 2005). But narratives are not confined to governments, and as we will see in the next section, the larger local government narrative is rehearsed and performed by local political elites in alliance with the centre. That alliance transmits local government enlargement through a consistent message which has become familiar through its repetition and through a set of taken-​for-​g ranted stories about local government efficiency. What the narrative displays is that council mergers are logical and sensible. The narrative is far from neutral –​rather, it is pervasive, persuasive and manipulative (see, Polanyi, 1985; Rein and Schon, 1993; Skilling, 2012). Denters et al (2014:19–​22) summarize the larger local government argument as the ‘Brobdingnagian’ narrative (drawn for Gulliver’s Travels), which places a premium on the social diversity of larger, especially urban areas, in terms of beliefs, values, goals and social and economic characteristics. The narrative repeats an argument that the larger the geographical area, the greater the pool of knowledge and talent available to address social problems. Denters et al (2014: 21) point out that a concern with the effectiveness and efficiency of local government in public service delivery has seen the creation of larger units of local government as a way of professionalizing local administrators and administration. By extension, the increased quality

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of public services, at the centre of the Brobdingnagian narrative, will see increased public satisfaction, enhanced salience of local government and greater political interest as local government gets bigger. The strength of the Brobdingnagian narrative in English politics has been articulated through a continuing performance of a script, a collection of stories and taken-​for-​ granted responses to a set of problems about the efficiency, effectiveness and cost of local government. Policy narratives as a conceptual framework enable the identification of consensus development and how that consensus restricts the options for policy problems by simplifying and disguising the complexity of an issue and undermining alternative options. It also creates a ‘them’ and ‘us’ grouping where opponents can be dismissed or marginalized. The concept of policy narrative, the notion of a dominant narrative and the context within which the narrative is deployed is a useful conceptual tool for understanding how English local government got to be so big and why it will continue to get bigger.

Two-​tier, one tier or floods of tears: understanding the contemporary narrative and size myth The narratives for and against enlargement of local government are based on conflicting assumptions about the role and purpose of local government (Copus et al, 2017). Those purposes and their supporting narratives blur at the edges, while local government provides an additional layer of democracy, political representation and engagement in national politics, it is also responsible for vital public services. So, which of these purposes has priority? It is the answer to that question which is reflected in the competing policy narratives about size. The highly politicized nature of English local government means that parties in power locally can control vast tracks of public sector services and huge budgets and this is a clue to a particular view of the purpose and size of local government (see, Eulau et al, 1959; Chandler, 2007; Wilson and Game, 2011; Egner et al, 2013). The Brobdingnagian (Denters et al, 2014) –​bigger is better –​argument is predicated on the assumption that the purpose of local government is to provide efficient and effective public services, or to oversee the provision of those services by other agencies. Thus, the narrative of mergers must reflect this purpose and refute narratives predicated on the purpose of local government being to enhance and ensure local self-​government and a healthy local democracy through political engagement and participation. What we see within the conflicting narratives about local government is a democratic and technocratic tension.

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The Lilliputian (Denters et al, 2014) –​smaller is better –​narrative rests on local self-​government as the prime purpose of local government. It recognizes that councillors act politically within multi-​layered governance networks seeking to influence the decisions and policies of a range of external bodies that make public policy and spend public money but without a democratic mandate (see, Sorensen and Torfing, 2005; Sorensen, 2006; Klijin and Skelcher, 2007; Torfing et al, 2009; Sorensen and Torfing, 2014). At the same time, councillors represent and interact with communities as a vehicle for public engagement in local politics (Copus, 2016; Copus and Wall, 2017). Debates about the size of English local government have been developing almost since the inception of democratic local government through the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act (Webb and Webb, 1920; Chandler 2007). A continual and gradual reduction in the number of English councils has been a feature of the local government landscape, and the policy narrative rehearsed and performed today builds on multiple layers of stories about the purpose of local government and the appropriate territorial structure for that purpose. Table 2.1 sets examples of the Acts of Parliament dealing with council size. The creation of new councils, shown in the table, does not always indicate an increase in the overall total of councils. Rather, amalgamations took place which had the effect of reducing the number of councils. One of the consequences of continual mergers is that the boundaries of much of English local government has ceased –​by virtue of its size –​to reflect identifiable places, with histories, traditions, stories and memoirs to which people have an affinity. Rather, much of local government is shaped on artificially created, convenient administrative boundaries. The current shape of local government in England was created by the Local Government Act 1972, which reduced over 1,200 councils to 378. The policy narrative which successfully created a winning alliance of political, professional and policy-​maker interests that resulted in the 1972 Act, has been used since to galvanize support for further reorganizations. Indeed, the success of the policy narrative made the merger of councils easier through the Local Government Act 1992. Under this Act, council mergers can be created by the Secretary of State without the employment of the full process of parliamentary legislation or scrutiny. The dominant policy narrative of larger local government does not seek to reconcile the competing forces of technocracy and democracy (see Elcock, 1982; Stewart, 1986; Laffin and Young, 1990). Rather, the efficiency, effectiveness and cost of service delivery is given primacy over a democratic and politically representative function of local government (Young and Davis, 1990; Young and Rao, 1994; Berg and Rao, 2005). As policy narratives promote a case for a course of action, they cannot accommodate

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Table 2.1: Structural change: the legislative journey Act

Effect

London Government Act 1963 Greater London Council and 32 London boroughs Local Government Act 1972

Reduced 45 counties to 39; replaced 1086 urban and rural districts with 296 district councils; Abolished 79 county borough councils; Created 6 metropolitan county councils; Replaced 1,212 councils with 378

Local Government Act 1985

Abolished 6 metropolitan councils and the GLC

Local Government Act 1992

Resulted in: 34 county councils; 36 metropolitan borough councils; 238 districts; 46 unitary councils

2009 re-organization under the Reduced 44 councils to nine across seven English provisions of the 1992 Act county areas Megers/Abolitions under the 1992 Act post-2009 New unitaries since 2009

Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole: reduces three councils to one (2019) Dorset: reduces seven councils to one (2019) Buckinghamshire: reduces five councils to one (2020) West Northamptonshire: reduces four councils to one (includes the county) South Northamptonshire: reduces five councils to one (includes the county)

Merged districts post 2009

Somerset West and Taunton: reduces two councils to one (2019) East Suffolk: reduces two councils to one (2019) West Suffolk: reduces two councils to one (2019)

Source: Copus, Roberts and Wall, 2017 (amended).

contradictory elements, complexity or views seeking an alternative outcome. Policy narratives are not about reconciling differences but promoting a specific solution to an identified problem and dismissing alternative views. It is time, therefore, to explore in detail the Brobdingnagian local government policy narrative and to show that it is not just central government which has rehearsed and performed the stories of this narrative.

The Brobdingnagian policy narrative and local government size in England Government inspired inquiries of local government have focused on local government’s role in the provision of public services rather than its politically representative and governing role and have shaped the dominant narrative that promotes size increases and mergers. The Herbert Commission (1960), the Maud Committee (1967), the Radcliffe-​Maud Commission (1969) and the

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Widdicombe Committee (1986) focused more on the internal politics of local government, were powerful moments in the development of the bigger is better narrative and added weight to a central preference for larger local authorities. The Maud Committee (1967) made a startling observation that local political elites were acquiescing in government interference in local government, putting its independence and structure in danger. That recognition was taken further by the Widdicombe Committee (1986: 54), which used the importance of public services to justify greater central control of the localities and indicated that bigger authorities did not mean devolved local powers. The Redcliffe-​Maud Commission (1969) argued that councils should contain populations and areas large enough for the effective use of resources and to provide efficient services, and concluded that a population range of 250,000 to 1,000,000, would be ‘most suitable on functional and organisational grounds for authorities administering all local government services’ (1969, para: 276–​277: 73). Thus, at the same time, the bigger is better narrative was linked to the need for single, rather than multi-​tier local government. The Commission here did two things central to the Brobdingnagian policy narrative as it is performed today: first, it set a lower population figure of 250,000 for local government units, which indicated that the narrative could move beyond that figure when seeking further enlargement to the flexible upper limit of 1,000,000. Second, the Commission cemented the idea of all-​purpose (unitary) councils into the amalgamation narrative. The contemporary narrative not only favours increases in size, but a significant story-​line within it is that tiers are now redundant and should be replaced by more efficient, effective and cheaper unitary councils. While the 1972 Act and 1974 reorganization were a victory for the Brobdingnagians, the issue of local government size was far from settled. The origins of the population ranges held as a necessary for good local government by the Commission are unclear. Wood (1976) indicates that powerful local government professional vested interests of technical and service specialists provided estimates to the Commission of the population range that would ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of their particular services, with children’s services professionals being particularly influential (Wood, 1976: 56). What is even less clear is the veracity or source of the various population claims to efficiency but, like any effective narrative, the veracity is less important than the simplicity and power of the message, which was clear: big is beautiful. The power and resilience of the narrative constructed is reflected in contemporary debates as the ‘commonsense’ ‘taken-​for-​granted’ view that service delivery, performance and cost trump democracy when it comes to size (see, Bozeman, 2002; O’Flynn, 2004; Geddes, 2006). The narrative is

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immune to contrary arguments and evidence, and here we see the evidential self-​selective nature of a policy narrative: inconvenient evidence is ignored or refuted, such as that which suggests that the search for the optimum size of local government for service delivery is a chimera (Muzzio and Tompkins, 1989; Travers et al, 1993; Rose, 2002; Laamanen and Haveri 2003; Baldersheim and Rose, 2010; Denters et al, 2014; Gendźwiłł and Swianiewicz, 2016; Erlingsson, 2020; Copus et al, 2020). Evidence suggesting that increases in size have a deleterious effect on local democracy (Oliver, 2000; Denters, 2002; Ladner, 2002; Larsen, 2002; Baglioni, 2003; Kelleher and Lowery, 2004) are ignored because the success of the Brobdingnagian narrative rests on its ability to position public service provision as the most important role of local government. If credence is given to increases in size damaging local democracy (see Nielsen, 1981; Newton, 1982; Mouritzen, 1989; Keating 1995; Cusack, 1997; Rose, 2002; Frandsen, 2002; Denters et al, 2014), then the narrative unravels. It is not sufficient to marginalize evidence from alternative sources, but to develop a narrative that minimizes or rejects the idea that local government has a serious alternative role beyond public service delivery. The Brobdingnagian policy narrative is now explored in more detail to understand its resilience, influence and how some local political elites have become willing and enthusiastic allies and performers of that narrative.

Identifying and exploring the Brobdingnagian narrative The supporting arguments for increasing local government size have been remarkably consistent across time, and so too has the alliance of local and national political elites who provide the narrative with its influence. There are three clear strands to the arguments, performed in favour of amalgamations which comprise an overall narrative rehearsed and performed by national and local politicians. The narrative strands identified in the research are as follows: economic, administrative and convenience. Each has a distinct set of elements on which a particular pro-​merger and/​or pro-​ unitary authority argument is developed, employed and intertwined in the Brobdingnagian narrative). • The composite elements of the economic strand are arguments which reflect economies of scale, efficiency, effectiveness, cost reduction and reduction of the number of councillors and officers as a cost saving. • The administrative strand reflects arguments about avoidance of duplication of effort, staff and councillors, and the removal of layers of bureaucracy. It has a financial and service improvement element stressing the need to

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align local government boundaries to areas of economic activity, patterns of living, travel-​to-​work journeys or functional economic areas. • The convenience strand emphasizes the need for simplification of the local government system to provide organizational clarity and the need to create a single identifiable point of responsibility to ease public recognition of local government (see Copus et al, 2017 for an exploration of how council mergers and size increases are part of a centralization narrative). There is, of course, a blurring of the strands where, for example, economic reasons for mergers were also employed when an administrative argument was being performed, such as patterns of economic activity used to support administrative simplicity, whereas economic arguments focused mainly on economies of scale, rather than economic activity which was seen more as an administrative reward from merger. The convenience argument contained, for example, the reduction in staff and councillors as a convenience factor, but there is also a link to cost savings from this action, which reflects the economic strand of the narrative. While these strands are useful in separating the narrative into component parts, the strength of the narrative, much like a rope, rests in the combining of the strands in arguing for larger and unitary local government. The strands of the narrative were identified through our interviews and it is clear that they structure the overall narrative for enlargement. The following comments are taken as specific examples from the interview data and to elaborate and exemplify the strands of the Brobdingnagian narrative. They are indicative examples of the mass of data from the research, and are used here to condense and illuminate the narrative base. The economic strand is exemplified by the following interviewees’ comments: ‘We have created some tiny unitary councils (the average size of an English Unitary council that bear the name is 218,000); we need to create councils with 300,000 to 500,000 populations or more to ensure we can get the maximum efficiency savings and maximum effectiveness … that’s what we need for stronger and more prosperous areas.’ (Conservative council leader) ‘There is an obvious population size [for local government] that means we can reduce costs and provide services in the right way and can redesign those services so they can be above all, efficient and effective ... it is obvious to all that the economies

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of scale we will get from larger councils will improve what we do.’ (Labour councillor) ‘We can save money, reduce the number of councillors and officers and change what we do and at the same time improve services… . A new county unitary, consultants have told us, will save 18–​25 million a year and that will save taxpayers money and they [the consultants] estimate the tax liability of every household could be cut by £100.’ (Conservative councillor) The economic strand rehearses a central part of the Brobdingnagian narrative, that bigger and unitary councils are more efficient, effective and cheaper. The particular use of the word tiny to describe unitary authorities with an average population of 218,000 indicates the skill of the narrative in painting what is large as small and stressing that for efficient and effective services council populations should be in the range 300,000–​500,000. Recently, the County Councils Network has suggested that there should be no upper size limits on English councils, and populations well in excess of one million are perfectly acceptable (Henham Strategy, 2020). Many county councils and councillors are leading a charge to see their district council counterparts abolished and replaced by unitary councils across the 25 remaining two-​tier English council areas in 2022. There are six shire counties with populations of over one million: Kent, Essex, Hampshire, Lancashire, Surrey and Hertfordshire. Fortunately, for any idea of ‘local’ government, the steam has gone out of this round of the battle. The administrative strand is exemplified by the following comments from interviewees: ‘We have parish councils, district councils and the county council –​the public doesn’t know who does what ... then think about all those officers and councillors ... we could secure massive improvements if there was a single county council.’ (Conservative councillor) ‘Too confusing, too many units –​we need a structure that focuses on service provision not some ancient boundaries ... some councils are just too small to be economically viable.’ (Labour council deputy leader)

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‘Local government overall is top heavy and having too many councils means excessive bureaucracy, duplication and confusion.’ (Conservative council cabinet member) The convenience strand of the narrative is exemplified by the following interviewee comments: ‘I have argued all along that we scrap the districts, increase the powers of parish councils and have a single unitary county council which would make things simpler, easier to understand and the public would know who does what. We need a simple, understandable structure which we don’t have at the moment.’ (UKIP councillor) ‘The public are confused by too many tiers and too many councillors doing different things. We need one council on a scale that can act as a single organisation and point of contact ... we have to get bigger, it’s common sense ... look in industry you merge to get the economies of scale and ensure organisational structure fits your market –​councils are no different.’ (Conservative councillor) ‘We have argued this for years and it is obvious to all that the system needs clarity, single points of responsibility. There are nine chief executives across the county and nine sets of councillors and all of them sit in organisations that don’t make sense to the public ... we must get bigger to get better.’ (Labour district council leader) These comments illuminate the nature of the debate generated by some local political elites, normally county councillors and officers, or elites from unitary councils, who are an important set of performers for the Brobdingnagian narrative. They are in alliance with the centre and are vital actors if the public are to be convinced that bigger is better and that they should dispense with their smaller, more local council. The link between large authorities and efficiency is an article of faith for many involved in the English council size debate and is the core ingredient of the narrative, despite the lack of consistent evidence to support the narrative (Andrews et al, 2006; Chisholm and Leach, 2008). Governments of all parties have propagated the Brobdingnagian narrative with the last Labour government employing it to structure local government on managerial criteria (DCLG, 2006). Conservative politicians such as Lord Heseltine (former Environment Secretary in Mrs Thatcher’s cabinet from 1979–​83) stated in a recent report he drafted: ‘English system of local

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government remains overly complex and inefficient’ (Heseltine, 2012:2 9) and recommended large unitary councils across England linked to the economic strand of the narrative: ‘many English local authorities bear no relation to modern patterns of economic activity’ (Heseltine, 2012: 30). A recent report by the Centre for Cities (2020) calls for the creation of just 69 councils across England as yet another stage in the rehearsal of the bigger is better narrative which sees councils as little more than providers of public services (Jeffrey, 2020) with an economic imperative underpinning their role. The former Secretary of State for Local Government, who resigned in September 2020, has expressed support for councils with an optimum and flexible upper population of 400–​500,000, with a lower limit of 300,000. The national and local political elite have created a ‘grand conception’ (Feldman et al, 2004) of local government through a set of intertwined stories about the economic, administrative and convenience of taken-​for-​granted benefits of size increases, of local government. An interesting footnote to the debate, for that is all it is, is that where local referenda have been held on the creation of new, large unitary authorities, the public have shown they prefer their local government to remain local. The following shows the results of referenda called by district councils faced with abolition or merger and the percentage votes against mergers in areas where votes were held. 23 January 2007 referendum votes against a Shropshire unitary: Shrewsbury 70 per cent Bridgnorth 86 per cent South Shropshire 57 per cent 11 June 2007 referendum votes against Durham unitary: 76 per cent (The referendum was commissioned by the local authorities in Chester-​le-​Street, Derwentside, Easington, Sedgefield, Teesdale, Wear Valley and Durham City.) December 2017 referendum votes against Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole: 84 per cent of residents voting in Christchurch voted against a unitary Bournemouth, Christchurch and Poole. In each case, the wishes of the public, as expressed in a democratic process, were of no consequence, and the new unitaries were created. Despite the

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power of the Brobdingnagian narrative among elites, it seems to have failed to convince the public –​but the views of the public do not matter when it comes to the size of English local government.

Conclusion England already has some of the largest units of local government across Europe and the policy narrative which led to and sustains that fact is continually rehearsed and performed locally and nationally. It is powerful because it has created a common sense, taken-​for-​granted belief that bigger local government is better. That narrative is developed and sustained by stories that weave together the long tradition of council size increases in England with a long-​standing national objective. The narrative’s power comes from its strongly normative messages making appeals to values, rather than facts, and from how those that perform the narrative ignore, or are selective about, the evidence used to support the narrative (Haughton et al, 2016). We have seen that policy narratives, while promoting a simple message about complex issues, may themselves have a degree of complexity in their construction. The Brobdingnagian narrative has three intertwining strands –​ economic, administrative, convenience –​which draw on separate types of local and national stories and weave them together to promote the narrative that larger units are consistently more efficient, effective and result in cost savings, and that smaller units are no longer viable entities. It is a narrative that local and national elites use for a common policy objective, and as politics is as much about values as it is evidence, a narrative is more powerful if it can promote policy at the same time as undermining alternatives –​which the Brobdingnagian narrative achieves. The English version of the Brobdingnagian narrative has been a constant feature of local government which has seen both wholesale and piecemeal reorganizations over time, leading to larger and fewer councils. The narrative’s persistence shows that it is firmly embedded in the landscape of territorial debates and that it is not dependent on one set of actors. Rather, as political actors arrive and leave the scene, the narrative is adopted and adapted but does not fundamentally change. We are left wondering just how big is big enough for local government and at what point do we lose any sense of the ‘local’ in local government? References Atkinson, R. (2000) ‘Narratives of Policy: The Construction of Urban Problems and Urban Policy in the Official Discourse of British Government 1968–​1998’, Critical Social Policy, 20(2): 211–​232.

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Baglioni, S. (2003) ‘The Effects of Political Institutions and City Size on Political Participation: The Swiss Case’, Paper presented to ECPR Joint Sessions, Edinburgh, 28 March –​2 April. Baldersheim, H. and Rose, L. (2010) Territorial Choice: The Politics of Boundaries and Borders, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Bazeley, P. (2013) Qualitative Data Analysis: Practical Strategies, London: Sage. Berg, R. and Rao, N. (eds) (2005) Transforming Local Political Leadership, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Beunen, R., Van Assche, K. and Duineveld, M. (2013) ‘Performing Failure in Conservation Policy. The Implementation of European Union Directives in the Netherlands’, Land Use Policy, 31(1): 280–​288. Boswell, J. (2013) ‘Why and How Narrative Matters in Deliberative Systems,’ Political Studies, 61(3): 620–​636. Bozeman, B. (2002) ‘Public-​Value Failure: When Efficient Markets May Not Do’, Public Administration Review, 62(2): 145–​161 Braun, V. and Clarke, V. (2006) ‘Using thematic analysis in psychology’, Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3(2): 77–​101. Bulpitt, J. (1983) Ter r itory and Power in the United Kingdom, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Chandler, J.A. (2007) Explaining Local Government: Local Government in Britain Since 1800, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Chisholm, M. and Leach, S. (2008) Botched Business: The Damaging Process of Re-​Organising Local Government, 2006–​2008, Coleford: Douglas McLean. Committee of Inquiry into the Conduct of Local Authority Business (1986) Report of the Committee into the Conduct of Local Authority Business, Cm 9797, London: HMSO. Committee on the Management of Local Government (1967) Vol. I, Report of the Committee, London: HMSO. Copus, C. (2016) In Defence of Councillors, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Copus, C., Roberts, M. and Wall, R. (2017) Local Government in England: Centralisation, Autonomy and Control, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Copus, C., Leach, S. and Jones, A. (2020) Bigger is not Better: The Evidenced Case for Keeping ‘Local’ Government, London: District Council Network. Cusack, T.R. (1997) Social Capital, Institutional Structures, and Democratic Performance: A Comparative Study of German Local Governments, Berlin: Berlin Social Research Centre’s department of ‘Institutions and Social Change’ (Research Group on Social Change, Institutions, and Mediation Processes), January. Denters, B. (2002) ‘Size and Political Trust: Evidence from Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom’, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 20(6): 793–​812.

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Denters, B. and Rose, L. (2005) Comparing Local Governance: Trends and Developments, London: Palgrave. Denters, B., Goldsmith, M., Ladner, A., Mouritzen, P.E. and Rose, L. (2014) Size and Local Democracy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. (DCLG) (2006) Invitations to councils in England to make proposals for future unitary structures, October, London Department of Communities and Local Government. Drew, J., Razin, E. and Andrews, R. (2019) ‘Rhetoric in Municipal Amalgamations: A Comparative Analysis’, Local Government Studies, 45(5): 748–​767. Egner, B., Sweeting, D. and Klok, P-​J. (eds) (2013) Local Councillors in Europe, Wiebaden: Springer. Elcock, H. (1982) Local Government: Politicians, Professionals and the Public in Local Authorities, London: Methuen. Erlingsson, G.Ó., Ödalen, J. and Wångmar, E. (2020) ‘How Coerced Municipal Amalgamations Thwart the Values of Local Self-​Government’, Urban Affairs Review, 1–​26, doi.org/10.1177/1078087420921458. Eulau, H., Whalke, J., Buchanan, W. and Ferguson, L. (1959) ‘The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke’, American Political Science Review, 53(3): 742–​756. Feldman, M.S., Skoldberg, K., Brown, R.N. and Horner, D. (2004) ‘Making Sense of Stories: A Rhetorical Approach to Narrative Analysis’, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 14(2): 147–​170. Fischer, F. (2003) Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Frandsen, A.G. (2002) ‘Size and Electoral Participation in Local Elections’, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 20(6): 853–​869. Geddis, M., (2006) ‘Partnership and the Limits to Local Governance in England: Institutionalist Analysis and Neoliberalism’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 30(1): 76–​97. Gendźwiłł, A. and Swianiewicz, P. (2016) ‘Does Local Democracy Perform Better in Smaller Jurisdictions? Survey Evidence from Poland’, Lex Localis, 14(4): 759–​782. Hajer, M. (2005) ‘Rebuilding Ground Zero. The Politics of Performance’, Planning Theory and Practice, 6(4): 445–​464. Haughton G., Deas, I., Hincks, S. and Ward, K. (2016) ‘Mythic Manchester: Devo Manc, the Northern Powerhouse and Rebalancing the English Economy’, Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society Advance Acces, 2(3): 355–​370. Hay, C. (2002) Political Analysis, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Henham Strategy (2020) Making Counties Count: Weaving a New Tapestry for Local Government, London: County Councils Network.

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Heseltine, M. (2012) No Stone Unturned in Pursuit of Growth, London: Department of Business, Innovation and Skills. HMSO (1969) Royal Commission on Local Government in England, Report, Cmnd 4040, (Recliffe-​Maud Report), London: HMSO. Jameson, F. (1989) The Political Unconscious. Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act, Abingdon: Routledge. Jeffrey S. (2020) Levelling up Local Government in England, London: Centre for Cities. John P. and Copus, C. (2011) ‘The United Kingdom: Is There Really an Anglo Model?,’ in Louglin J., Hendriks, F. and Lidström, A. (eds) Oxford Handbook of Local and Regional Democracy in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 27–​47. Jones, G.W. and Stewart, J. (1983) The Case for Local Government, London: Allen and Unwin. Jones, M., Shanahan, E. and Mcbeth, M. (2014) (eds) The Science of Stories: Applications of the Narrative Policy Framework in Public Policy Analysis, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Keating, M. (1995) ‘Size, Efficiency and Democracy: Consolidation, Fragmentation and Public Choice’, in D. Judge, G. Stoker and H. Wolman (eds) Theories of Urban Politics, London: Sage, pp 117–​134. Kelleher, C. and Lowery, D. (2004) ‘Political Participation and Metropolitan Institutional Contexts’, Urban Affairs Review, 39(6): 720–​757. Klijn, E-​H . and Skelcher, C. (2007) ‘Democracy and Governance Networks: Compatible or Not?’, Public Administration, 85(3): 587–​608. Laamanen, E. and Haveri, A. (2003) ‘Size, Efficiency and Democracy –​How Local Government Boundaries Affect Performance’, EGPA Conference on Public Law and the Modernising State, Oerias, Portugal, 3–​6 September. Ladner, A. (2002) ‘Size and Direct Democracy at the Local Level: The Case of Switzerland’, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 20(6): 813–​828. Laffin, M. and Young, K. (1990) Professionalism in Local Government, Harlow: Longman. Larsen, C.A. (2002) ‘Municipal Size and Democracy: A Critical Analysis of the Argument of Proximity Based on the Case of Denmark’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 25(4): 317–​332. Lowndes, V. and Roberts, M. (2013) Why Institutions Matter: The New Institutionalism in Political Science, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Miller, H. (2012) Governing Narratives: Symbolic Politics and Policy Change, Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press. Mouritzen, P.E. (1989) ‘City Size and Citizens’ Satisfaction: Two Competing Theories Revisited’, European Journal of Political Research, 17(6): 661–​688.

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Muzzio, D. and Tompkins T. (1989) ‘On the Size of the City Council: Finding the Mean’, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 37(3): 83–​96. Newton, K. (1982) ‘Is Small Really so Beautiful? Is Big Really so Ugly? Size, Effectiveness and Democracy in Local Government’, Political Studies, 30(2): 190–​206. Nielsen, H.J. (1981) ‘Size and Evaluation of Government: Danish Attitudes Towards Politics at Multiple Levels of Government’, European Journal of Political Research, 9(1): 47–​60. O’Flynn, J. (2004) ‘From New Public Management to Public Value: Paradigmatic Change and Managerial Implications’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 66(3): 353–​366. Oliver, J.E. (2000) ‘City Size and Civic Involvement in Metropolitan America’, American Political Science Review, 94(2): 361–​373. Polanyi, L. (1985) Telling the American Story: A Structural and Cultural Analysis of Conversational Storytelling, New York, NY: Ablex Publishing Corporation. Radaelli, C. (1999) ‘Harmful tax competition in the European Union: Policy narratives and advocacy coalitions’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 37(4): 661–​682. Rein, M. and Schon, D. (1993) ‘Reframing Policy Discourse’, in F. Fisher and J. Forester (eds) The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, pp 145–​166. Reynaert, H., Steyvers, K., Delwit, P. and Pilet, J.B. (eds) (2005) Revolution or Renovation? Reforming Local Politics in Europe, Brugge: Vanden Broele. Ringen, S. (2005) The Powerlessness of Powerful Government, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rittel, H. and Webber, M. (1973) ‘Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning’, Policy Sciences, 4(2): 155–​169. Roe, E. (1994) Narrative Policy Analysis: Theory and Practice, Durham, CT: Duke University Press. Rose, L.E. (2002) ‘Municipal Size and Local Nonelectoral Participation: Findings from Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway’, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 20(6): pp 829–​851. Royal Commission on the Constitution (1973) Royal Commission on the Constitution, Vol.I, 1969–​1973, London: HMSO. Skilling P. (2012) ‘Performing Failure in Conservation Policy. The Implementation of European Union Directives in the Netherlands’, Critical Policy Studies, 6(4), 363–​378. Sorensen, E. (2006) ‘Metagovernance: The Changing Role of Politicians in Processes of Democratic Governance’, The American Review of Public Administration, 36(1): 98–​114. Sorensen, E. and Torfing, J. (2005) ‘Network governance and post-​liberal democracy’, Administrative Theory and Praxis, 27(2): 197–​237.

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Stewart, J. (1983) Local Government: The Conditions of Local Choice, London: Allen and Unwin. Stewart, J. (1986) The New Management of Local Government, London: Allen and Unwin. Stewart, J. (2003) Modernising British Local Government: An Assessment of Labour’s Reform Programme, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Stone, D. (2002) Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making Revised Edition, 3rd ed., New York, NY: W.W. Norton. Swianiewicz, P. (ed) (2010) Territorial Consolidation Reforms in Europe, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute. Torfing, J., Sorensen, E. and Fotel, T. (2009) ‘Democratic Anchorage of Infrastructural Governance Networks: The Case of the Femern Belt Forum’, Planning Theory, 8(3): 282–​308. Travers, T., Jones, G. and Burnham, J. (1993) Impact of Population Size on Local Authority Costs and Effectiveness, York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Trowler, P. (2012) ‘Wicked Issues in Situating Theory in Close-​Up Research’, Higher Education Research and Development, 31(3): 273–​284. Webb, S. and Webb, B. (1920) A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain, London: Longmans. Wilson, D. and Game, C. (2011) Local Government in the United Kingdom, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Wood, B. (1976) The Process of Local Government Reform 1966–​7 4, London: Allen and Unwin. Young, K. and Davies, M. (1990) The Politics of Local Government since Widdicombe, York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Young, K. and Rao, N. (1994) Coming to Terms with Change: The Local Government Councillor in 1993, York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Young, K. and Rao, N. (1997) Local Government Since 1945, Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell.

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3

Consequences of Forced Municipal Mergers: Evidence from Norway Harald Baldersheim and Lawrence E. Rose

Introduction In 1994, five municipalities in the Fredrikstad area of Norway were merged into one municipality –​what may be termed ‘New’ Fredrikstad. The merger was approved by parliament despite the fact that majorities on the municipal councils in four out of five municipalities were against the amalgamation. A majority of voters was also against the merger in referenda held on the issue in all five municipalities. What were the effects of the merger with respect to the residents’ relationships with the new municipality? Did citizens become more satisfied with municipal services and more engaged in local politics, as merger advocates argued, or was the outcome more negative, as expected by sceptics? And how was life in the new municipality affected by the fact that for the majority of the municipalities and residents this was an ‘involuntary’ merger? Or perhaps there was no noticeable effect at all? These questions have obtained renewed relevance in the light of the municipal reform recently carried out in Norway. This reform resulted in 47 newly amalgamated municipalities that have functioned since the beginning of 2020.1 Ten of these municipalities are so-​called municipalities created by coercion, that is, they were merged against the will of one or more of the municipalities concerned as expressed in decisions rendered by the municipal councils before the mergers. In reports and analyses carried out prior to this recent reform2 many assumptions were presented, but little evidence was offered that provided tangible answers as to what the effects of municipal mergers would be for citizens, whether these mergers be voluntary or not.3 At least one

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investigation, however, does shed some light on these issues. This study was carried out in connection with the forced merger that occurred in the Fredrikstad area. The Fredrikstad merger applied to one of several ‘squeezed cities’ which had been identified and investigated by the second Buvik Commission (NOU 1989:16; see what follows). With nearly 65,000 inhabitants, the new and enlarged municipality was two and a half times the size of what may be termed ‘Old’ Fredrikstad, and in area (285 km2) significantly larger than that. The former surrounding municipalities varied in population from 5,700 to 12,700 residents, so for most of the population the merger meant that from residing in a small and relatively transparent municipality they now found themselves incorporated into a larger municipality with political-​administrative arrangements that were new to them. What did this transition entail for the residents’ relationship to the new municipality? Both before and a few years after the amalgamation was implemented, population surveys were carried out in the affected municipalities (see Baldersheim et al, 1995; 1997). In both the pre-​and post-​merger surveys it was possible to identify and stratify the sample based on where the respondents lived –​either within the original Fredrikstad municipality or in one of the four surrounding municipalities that were merged with Old Fredrikstad. The data from these surveys provide a basis for assessing what consequences the forced merger may have had with respect to citizen perceptions of and interactions with the new municipality, and whether there were any lessons relevant for merging of other municipalities today. We are aware that not all municipal mergers have the same antecedent conditions or structures as those found in the Fredrikstad area where several smaller municipalities were incorporated into a larger urban municipality.4 We nonetheless believe that experiences from Fredrikstad may have some wider validity when the institutional framework for local politics changes from smaller to larger entities even in cases where merging has been of a more ‘voluntary’ character among relatively co-​equal units. In the following, we briefly elaborate the background for and implementation of the municipal merger in the Fredrikstad area. Based on existing academic literature we then discuss various expectations regarding the effects of these mergers. Next, data and empirical analyses are presented, and the chapter is rounded off with some concluding remarks.

The larger municipality is created –​a conflict-​r idden process In the 1980s two public commissions were appointed to examine conditions relating to what were termed ‘squeezed cities’ –​that is, relatively large

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municipalities that were encompassed by several smaller municipalities –​and to assess whether there was a need to revise municipal boundaries in the relevant areas. The first commission was appointed in 1984, the second in 1987, and Martin Buvik, a county prefect, headed both commissions. The commission’s two reports (NOU, 1986:7 and NOU, 1989:16) ultimately resulted in three rounds of mergers. In 1988, amalgamations of municipalities around Horten, Larvik and Tønsberg were enacted. In 1992, the cities of Sarpsborg, Hamar, Arendal and Hammerfest were expanded, and finally in 1994, it was Fredrikstad’s turn. Fredrikstad was not included in the Commission’s original mandate and came under scrutiny largely as a result of its own initiative. It began when Fredrikstad’s financial officer wrote chronicles in the city’s two newspapers commenting on the fact that Fredrikstad was not included in the original mandate for the Buvik Commission. The officer advocated a merger of several municipalities, which he believed would create the basis for a much-​needed dynamic in the district (Julsen in the Demokraten, 31 January 1987). The mayor of Fredrikstad agreed with this view, but mayors of the surrounding municipalities rejected the idea (Demokraten, 2 February 1987; quoted in Fagerlund 1995: 44). This pattern was to continue throughout the decision-​making process and to some extent also after the merger. On 6 May 1990, referenda on the merger plans were held in all five municipalities. Overall, turnout was low –​only 32 per cent in the district as a whole. Participation ranged from 19 per cent in one municipality to be incorporated (Borge), to 54 per cent in another (Rolvsøy). A clear majority in all five municipalities voted against a merger. Overall, 95 per cent of the residents who voted opposed the merger. Even in the Old Fredrikstad municipality, 52 per cent voted against the idea of a merger. In subsequent consultation statements, municipal councils in the four surrounding municipalities went against the merger, while Fredrikstad municipality and other bodies consulted favoured the merger. At the national level, the initiative from Fredrikstad had met with varying degrees of understanding. In 1987, the Minister of Municipal Affairs, Leif Haraldseth from the Labour Party, had managed to arrange a second round with the Buvik Commission in which the Fredrikstad district was included. By the time the Buvik Commission’s second recommendation was presented, however, Johan R. Jacobsen of the Centre Party had taken over as Minister of Municipal Affairs. Jacobsen and his party were more sceptical about merging the municipalities, preferring instead an alternative involving extensive inter-​municipal cooperation. But parties comprising the government coalition were divided on the issue inasmuch as both the Conservatives and the Christian People’s Party favoured a merger (Fagerlund 1995: 55). In the meantime, another change of government occurred. The

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government led by Jan Syse of the Conservative Party fell in the fall of 1990, and Kjell Borgen from the Labour Party took office as the new Minister of Municipal Affairs. Under Borgen, a parliamentary bill on the matter was prepared, whereby a merger of the municipalities was justified by, among other things, a need for more efficient decision-​making processes for the district as a whole and a need for greater expertise in management and better land use planning, the latter especially for environmental reasons. The merger was subsequently adopted by parliament in a plenary session on 14 February 1991 with support of the Conservatives and Labour Party representatives, while representatives of the Centre Party, the Progress Party, the Socialist People’s Party and the Christian People’s Party voted against. The fact that the parliamentary debate lasted for more than five hours indicates that this was a very controversial issue in national politics as well. Despite the parliamentary decision, opponents of the merger did not give up their resistance. They tried four times to have the issue raised again in parliament, the last time in October of 1994. The resumption initiative was promoted by the Progress Party but was rejected. At the local level, opposition was fronted by a newly formed party named ‘No to a larger municipality’ founded in March 1991. The party presented a list for an extraordinary municipal election held for the new enlarged Fredrikstad in the fall of 1993 and obtained 20 per cent of the votes cast. With this result, the party became the second largest group on the municipal council. The party retained its representation on the municipal council throughout the 1990s and a successor grouping, under the name ‘The People’s Voice’, was represented on the municipal council until 2011. Otherwise, the 1993 election could be said to represent a consolidation of the political elite in the district. The majority of those elected had experience of municipal government or chairship in one of the former municipalities. There was, in short, less ‘new blood’ in the council than was normal in municipal elections (Mjelstad, 1995: 48), which might have been reasonable to expect when five municipal councils were reduced to one. One of the major issues during the establishment of the new municipality was the choice of political organization. After some tugging back and forth, the council chose a geographic area model, whereby sub-​municipal councils corresponding to the old municipal boundaries were created with representation from both the newly elected municipal council and other members appointed by the municipal council (Fagerlund, 1995: 74ff). These councils were given extensive discretionary authority and responsibilities for kindergartens, primary schools and provision of welfare care services, which were some of the most important tasks in the municipal service portfolio (Hagen, 1995: 46). This organizational model was intended to facilitate

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contact and communication between the city administration and the citizens and thus lead to a positive view of the new municipality among citizens.5 Did it turn out like this?

Hypotheses –​what does the academic literature say? What could be expected to happen with respect to citizen-​city relations in the aftermath of the merger? The academic literature has, in particular, concentrated on the effect that variations of municipal size have on the efficient use of resources, but also, to some extent, on the consequences for the attitudes and behaviour of residents. With respect to efficiency, there are two main hypotheses –​often referred to as the reform hypothesis and the competition hypothesis (Ostrom, 1972; Ostrom and Bish, 1973; Mouritzen, 1989; Denters et al, 2014). The ‘reform hypothesis’ suggests that larger municipalities offer economies of scale in service provision and also provide a basis for better technical expertise, which in turn will entail cheaper and better services. If this is the case, one reasonable implication is that residents will be more satisfied with municipal services in larger municipalities than in smaller ones. Moreover, residents in larger municipalities, by virtue of being taxpayers, should be more satisfied because costs will be kept down through economies of scale. Arguably, satisfied users and taxpayers should then in turn prove to be more satisfied and trusting voters. Applied to the Fredrikstad area, this line of thinking suggests that before the municipal merger residents living in the larger Old Fredrikstad municipality should be more satisfied and trusting than in the smaller surrounding municipalities. Overall, moreover, all residents of the new enlarged municipality should be more satisfied after the merger than before, and that the change in satisfaction will be greatest among residents living in the smaller, newly ‘incorporated’ municipalities. The ‘competition hypothesis’, on the other hand, links efficiency to competition between municipalities. This hypothesis assumes that people are mobile, and that municipalities will strive to attract good taxpayers. In general, people are thought to emphasize good services and to seek municipal services that are well suited to their family and life circumstances; they are, however, at the same time concerned with an acceptable level of taxation and user fees (see, for example, Tiebout, 1956; Oates and Schwab, 1988). This gives municipalities incentives to produce good services at the lowest possible costs. Large municipalities that make it difficult for people to ‘vote with their feet’ reduce competition and thus efficiency. The more competitive the municipalities are, one would think, the more satisfied the citizens should be with services and politics.

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The Fredrikstad area should be a suitable place to test this thesis since it was an integrated labour and commuting district divided between several municipalities, where it was entirely possible to move between the municipalities without having to find a new workplace. The thesis leads to an expectation that the residents living in all municipalities before the municipal merger will be roughly equally satisfied since a ‘vote with your feet’ effect implies that people were living in a place where they felt at home, and that all municipalities had adapted fairly well to the expectations and requirements of the residents. To the extent any differences existed, they would be in favour of the smaller municipalities since it would be easier for them to provide customized services in small, relatively homogeneous and transparent municipalities. After the merger, satisfaction will in general have decreased since the new municipality’s standard services and tax rates are not likely to be as well adapted to variations in residents’ expectations, as the old ones were taken separately. The decline in satisfaction, moreover, can be expected to be greatest in the former smaller surrounding municipalities since the new municipality presumably sought to adjust services and taxes to the expectations of the demographic ‘centre of gravity’ which was found among residents of the original pre-merged Fredrikstad. When it comes to expectations regarding the democratic effects of the merger, these can be suggested based on nuances of theoretical arguments found in Dahl and Tufte’s book Size and Democracy (1973), a neoclassic analysis of the relationship between democracy and size. A major contribution of the book is the distinction between ‘system capacity’, or the political system’s ability to act, and ‘citizen efficiency’, understood as the ability of citizens to exert influence on and control over local politics. System capacity is expected to increase with increasing size, while citizen efficiency is expected to decrease. The focus of Dahl and Tufte’s discussion was the nation-​state, but the analytical perspective is equally relevant at the subnational level. Translated to the municipal context, this suggests that large municipalities will have greater ability to act through access to more resources (finances, competence, etc.) than small ones. In short, larger entities can handle more tasks and offer better services than smaller units, as the reform thesis argues. At the same time, municipal size is believed to have an impact on local politics and citizen efficiency. Local decisions in larger municipalities will, by definition, have an impact on more people. If in addition, larger municipalities have responsibility for a broader range of activities than small municipalities and there are more engaging issues on the agenda, local politics is likely to be of greater interest to voters. In general, more engaging policies can therefore be expected to lead to more citizen interest and involvement in large municipalities than in small municipalities, which should in principle be beneficial for citizen efficiency.

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Consequences of Forced Municipal Mergers

Dahl and Tufte, however, are cautious and qualify this expectation based on a further consideration. According to Dahl and Tufte, the link between citizens and decision-​makers is not as close and intimate in larger political units. In larger political arenas, it is typically more difficult to gain insight into local politics. More resources may be required to gain access and be heard, and greater demands are placed on the individual’s competence to participate effectively. As a result of increasing municipal size, in short, self-​perceived political competence and perceptions of one’s own ability to influence local decisions could be expected to be lower among the inhabitants in larger municipalities than in smaller ones. This is especially true with respect to political decisions made in the period between elections. Thus, the level of political participation and citizen efficiency may decrease rather than increase with the enlargement of municipalities. For the case of Fredrikstad, these considerations have several implications. First, the merger could have contributed to increased political interest and involvement in all areas of the new municipality, and most of all in the smaller, incorporated municipalities. Alternatively, merging may have led to a decline in participation, and especially in the four smaller municipalities. In a discussion of political involvement of citizens, it is also relevant, as previously suggested, to inquire about the consequences of municipal mergers for the citizens’ cognitive orientations to local politics. Are there differences in how people view local politics and their own capacities for participating in and influencing local political decisions before and after the merger? According to the reasoning suggested by Dahl and Tufte, one could, on the one hand, expect that people would attach greater importance to local policy choices and the composition of the municipal council after the merger than before. This applies to the residents in all areas of the municipality. On the other hand, it can be expected that people will find it more difficult to keep track of and be informed about what is happening in a new and larger municipality unless the new municipality makes an extra effort to inform residents. Increased size makes local governance less transparent. All else being equal, in short, it can also be expected that residents in the new merged municipality, precisely because of increased size, will feel that it is more difficult to participate and influence what is happening in practice. This effect is likely to be most visible among the inhabitants of the smaller, incorporated municipalities. In addition to these perspectives, it is possible to consider features of the implementation processes surrounding the municipal merger. As mentioned, the extraordinary municipal election held in 1993 was a consequence of a reform that was not wanted by the majority of the population (as expressed through the referenda held in 1991).6 Against this background, it is relevant to ask what considerations influenced the

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residents’ acceptance or rejection of the new municipality after some years of experience with the larger entity. Acceptance or rejection was mapped through a question asked in a survey conducted in 1997 –​that is, three years after the merger –​about how respondents would have voted if there were a referendum at that time. Were democracy-​related factors decisive for the citizens’ assessment or was service provision more important? Both considerations could be influenced by various factors, including, for example, the sub-​municipal councils that were introduced as part of the implementation of the reform. Previous research has shown that so-​called ‘output legitimacy’ seems to be generally more important than ‘input legitimacy’ for how citizens view and relate to their own municipality (Rose, 2011: 107–​110). It is therefore conceivable that satisfaction with services was foremost in conditioning acceptance of the new municipality. But in view of the conflictual merger process, it is every bit as conceivable that residents of the new enlarged Fredrikstad municipality were more concerned with democratic qualities, such as representation and participation, and that they, accordingly, viewed the new municipality more in terms of democratic political processes than with respect to service provision. Furthermore, it is well known that conflicts from a decision-​making phase can extend into and impact upon the implementation phase, often with there being greater effects the more bitter the original conflicts were (Van Meter and van Horn, 1975). Most reforms create losers and winners, and losers are often more negative to the outcome than are the winners (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991). Inasmuch as resistance expressed through the referenda was particularly strong in the surrounding municipalities, it is reasonable to presume the ‘losers’ were in this case particularly concentrated in these areas. Hence, the distribution of negative versus positive views of the outcome may be expected to exhibit a surrounding areas versus core district (Old Fredrikstad) pattern. Our hypotheses, based on the theoretical perspectives presented here, are summarized in Table 3.1.

Details about the data The empirical analyses in this chapter are based on two population surveys, one conducted in June 1993, and the other in June 1997. Both surveys were conducted as telephone interviews with a random sample of 1,000 people over 18 years of age.7 The sample in 1993 was distributed among the five municipalities that were to be merged relative to the population distribution.8 For the 1997 survey, the respondent’s residence (municipal

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Consequences of Forced Municipal Mergers

Table 3.1: Hypotheses regarding the effects of municipal mergers Reform hypotheses –​Hypotheses based on scale effects H1a: Before amalgamation, residents of the largest municipality (Old Fredrikstad) will be more satisfied with municipal services than residents of the smaller outlying municipalities. H1b: Overall, residents will be more satisfied with municipal services after the merger than before. H1c: The increase in service satisfaction will be greatest among residents of the smaller, recently incorporated municipalities. Competition hypotheses –​Hypotheses based on the advantages of smaller municipalities H2a: Before amalgamation, residents of all municipalities will be roughly identically satisfied with municipal services. H2b: If there are any differences in service satisfaction, they will be ‘in favour of ’ residents in smaller municipalities since it should be easier to provide well-​suited services in small, more homogeneous and transparent municipalities. H2c: After amalgamation, service satisfaction should generally decline since the new (larger) municipality’s services as well as taxes and fees imposed will not be as well adapted to variations in the expectations of residents as was the case in the prior municipalities each on their own. H2d: The decline in satisfaction should be greatest in the prior outlying municipalities since provisions in the new larger municipality are most likely to be best adapted to and in accordance with expectations of the demographic centre of gravity –​in this case residents of Old Fredrikstad. Democratic hypotheses –​Hypotheses based on the reasoning of Dahl & Tufte Engagement and interest in local politics H3a: People will attach greater importance to local politics and the composition of the municipal council after an amalgamation than they did before. This applies to residents in all parts of the new municipality. Knowledge and information H3b: People will find it more difficult to follow along and be well informed about what is happening in the new enlarged municipality. Perceived ability to have an impact H3c: Residents of the new amalgamated municipality will feel that it is more difficult to take part and influence what happens in local politics. H3d: This effect is likely to be most pronounced among residents in the smaller, recently incorporated municipalities. Representativeness of governing bodies H3e: Perceptions of the representativeness of governing bodies will decline following a municipal merger. H3f: This effect will in particular be evident among those living in earlier outlying municipalities. (continued ) 47

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Table 3.1: Hypotheses regarding the effects of municipal mergers (continued) Implementation hypotheses H4a: Acceptance of the new municipality is dependent upon satisfactory service delivery. H4b: Acceptance of the new municipality is dependent upon satisfactory representation of the residents’ opinions. H4c: Acceptance of the new municipality will vary based on concentrations of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ (Old Fredrikstad vs. the four outlying municipalities).

district) was identified and registered in connection with data collection. With this information, it is possible to compare the attitudes and behaviour of residents living in different parts of the new enlarged municipality at two points in time. Questions asked in the 1993 survey were for the most part formulated so that they concerned the individual’s relationship to the municipality in which they lived in the early summer of 1993. In the 1997 follow-​up survey, questions referred to the individual’s relationship with the new municipality, but with a possibility to control for the respondent’s residence. In the following, the pattern of responses at the two different points in time is compared to assess the validity of the hypotheses.

Empirical analyses and results Reform and competition hypotheses We begin our analysis by looking at citizens’ satisfaction with municipal service provision before and after the municipal merger. Table 3.2 shows the proportion of respondents who responded that they were either ‘very satisfied’ or ‘satisfied’ at the two different points in time. In addition, the percentage change in satisfaction from 1993 to 1997 is displayed. The first hypothesis (H1a) suggests that ‘Before amalgamation residents of the largest municipality (Old Fredrikstad) will be more satisfied with municipal services than residents of the smaller outlying municipalities’. This hypothesis is not supported. On the contrary, residents were more satisfied in the smaller surrounding municipalities than in Old Fredrikstad. Hypothesis H1b suggests that ‘Overall, residents will be more satisfied with municipal services after the merger than before’. Again, this hypothesis is not supported. We actually observe the opposite. There is a decline

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Table 3.2: Citizen satisfaction with municipal services. Per cent who say that services are satisfactory or very satisfactory according to their place of residence in 1993 and 1997, and per cent change from 1993 to 1997* Residence

% satisfactory 1993

% satisfactory 1997

% change 1993 to 1997

Old Fredrikstad

79

76

-​ 3

Borge

92

72

-​ 20

Rolvsøy

99

81

-​ 18

Kråkerøy

96

76

-​ 20

Onsøy

88

78

-​ 10

All respondents

87

76

-​ 11

* Question wording: ‘The municipality provides a variety of public services. All in all do you find your municipal services to be very satisfactory, satisfactory, less satisfactory or not satisfactory?’. Source: own calculation, based on the public opinion surveys which are described in the section ‘Details about the data’ (1993 and 1997).

in satisfaction among residents in all parts of the new municipality, and contrary to Hypothesis H1c, which states that ‘The increase in service satisfaction will be greatest among residents of the smaller recently incorporated municipalities’, a markedly larger decline is observed among residents living in the former surrounding municipalities. There was a decrease in satisfaction of only three percentage points in Old Fredrikstad but a full 20 percentage point decline in Kråkerøy and Borge. These tendencies are furthermore in evidence in responses to a question about how respondents experienced the development of municipal services in the last few years (see Table 3.3). In 1997, there was a significant increase in the proportion who said they experienced a decline in the quality of services in the new municipality compared to what they experienced in 1993. The proportion who thought that municipal services were poorer, moreover, was significantly higher in the surrounding areas than in the core of the municipality (Old Fredrikstad).9 Of the alternative hypotheses derived from the competition thesis, H2b, H2c and H2d are all supported by the patterns observed in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. On the other hand, H2a, which is not supported, suggested that residents would be roughly equally satisfied in all municipalities before the municipal merger (the Tiebout thesis). However, as already noted, residents of the smaller municipalities were, in fact, more satisfied than residents of the larger one before the merger. Instead, H2b and H2c are both supported: the differences in satisfaction go in favour of the smaller municipalities and

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Table 3.3: Citizen opinion regarding the development of municipal services in the last few years, according to their place of residence in 1997, and per cent change compared to the distribution of opinion for all respondents in 1993* Residence

% change for the worse

% no change

% change for the better

Old Fredrikstad

26

54

19

Borge

44

45

12

Rolvsøy

37

42

21

Kråkerøy

42

39

19

Onsøy

36

46

18

All respondents in 1997

34

48

18

+ 20

-​ 4

-​ 16

Per cent change from 1993 to 1997 for all respondents

* Question wording: ‘How would you say that municipal services have developed in the course of the last few years? Would you say for the better, for the worse, or have you not noticed any change?’. Source: own calculation, based on the public opinion surveys which are described in the section ‘Details about the data’ (1993 and 1997).

satisfaction has generally declined after the municipal merger. Moreover, as H2d suggests, the decline was greatest in the former surrounding areas. Again, evidence presented in Table 3.3 supports these patterns.

Hypotheses concerning local democracy Turning to hypotheses relating to the democratic consequences of forced mergers, we first investigate whether the general expectation derived from Dahl and Tufte’s reasoning applies –​namely that there is generally more local political interest and involvement in larger compared to smaller municipalities due to the fact that policy issues are more exciting and important in large municipalities. If this is true, it may be expected that people living in larger municipalities will attach more importance to municipal politics and the composition of the municipal council than those living in smaller municipalities. By extension, politics and the municipal council should be perceived as being more important to the individual after the merger, and people will place more emphasis on staying informed about local politics. The alternative is that there is a greater sense of powerlessness among people residing in larger municipalities due to greater distance to elected officials and a more complex system of governance.

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Table 3.4: Consequences of amalgamation for residents’ relation to municipal politics. Per cent who say that which party or parties have a majority on the municipal council is of importance to them personally in 1993 and 1997 according to place of residence, and per cent change from 1993 to 1997* Residence

% yes, of importance, 1993

% yes, of importance, 1997

% change 1993 to 1997

Old Fredrikstad

19

28

+9

Borge

20

24

+4

Rolvsøy

20

25

+5

Kråkerøy

19

29

+9

Onsøy

21

21

     0

All respondents

20

26

+6

* Question wording: ‘Is it of any importance to you personally which party or parties has a majority on the municipal council, or is it of little importance for you?’. Source: own calculation, based on the public opinion surveys which are described in the section ‘Details about the data’ (1993 and 1997).

The first hypothesis derived from this line of reasoning is H3a: ‘People will attach greater importance to local politics and the composition of the municipal council after an amalgamation than they did before. This applies to residents living in all parts of the new municipality.’ Table 3.4 presents answers to a question of whether it makes any difference to the respondent which party or parties have a majority on the municipal council. The proportion that attach great importance to this matter goes up marginally from 1993 to 1997 (six percentage points in all) but with no clear pattern in the distribution between different parts of the municipality. This response pattern can be interpreted as weak support for the hypothesis. However, the trend is contradicted by the pattern observed in the next table (Table 3.5), in which responses to a query about whether municipal politics have any significance for the person asked are presented. In this case, we find a clear increase in the proportion who say that municipal politics has no significance for them personally after the merger. This increase is greatest among respondents living in areas that constituted the old surrounding municipalities. The next hypothesis (H3b) concerns knowledge and information about local politics: ‘People find it more difficult to follow and be well informed about what is happening in the new enlarged municipality.’ Results in Table 3.6 are based on a question about how well informed respondents feel they are about what transpires in municipal politics. The table shows a slight increase in the proportion who feel quite or very well informed (+ 6 percentage points for residents of all districts). The largest increases are

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Table 3.5: Consequences of amalgamation for residents’ relation to municipal politics. Per cent who agree with the statement ‘what happens in municipal politics is rarely of any significance to me’ in 1993 and 1997 according to place of residence, and per cent change from 1993 to 1997* Residence

% agree 1993

% agree 1997

% change 1993 to 1997

Old Fredrikstad

37

45

+8

Borge

28

47

+ 19

Rolvsøy

33

45

+ 12

Kråkerøy

30

49

+ 19

Onsøy

34

47

+ 13

All respondents

33

46

+ 13

* Question wording: ‘What happens in municipal politics is rarely of any significance to me.’ Source: own calculation, based on the public opinion surveys which are described in the section ‘Details about the data’ (1993 and 1997).

Table 3.6: Consequences of amalgamation for residents’ relation to municipal politics. Per cent who say they are quite or very well informed about what happens in municipal politics in 1993 and 1997 according to place of residence, and per cent change from 1993 to 1997* Residence

% very or quite well informed, 1993

% very or quite well informed, 1997

% change 1993 to 1997

Old Fredrikstad

35

38

+3

Borge

16

30

+ 14

Rolvsøy

34

30

-​4

Kråkerøy

35

36

+1

Onsøy

26

40

+ 14

All respondents

30

36

+6

* Question wording: ‘How well informed would you say you are about what happens in municipal politics? Would you say very well informed, quite well informed, adequately or less well/​poorly informed?’. Source: own calculation, based on the public opinion surveys which are described in the section ‘Details about the data’ (1993 and 1997).

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Table 3.7: Consequences of amalgamation for residents’ relation to municipal politics. Per cent who personally know a member of the municipal council or other political bodies in their municipality in 1993 and 1997 according to place of residence, and per cent change from 1993 to 1997* Residence

% yes 1993

% yes 1997

% change 1993 to 1997

Old Fredrikstad

58

60

+2

Borge

59

57

-​2

Rolvsøy

69

53

-​ 13

Kråkerøy

66

53

-​ 13

Onsøy

71

46

-​ 25

All respondents

63

55

-​ 8

* Question wording: ‘Do you personally know a member of the municipal council or other political bodies in your municipality?’. Source: own calculation, based on the public opinion surveys which are described in the section ‘Details about the data’ (1993 and 1997).

in two of the former municipalities in the surrounding area. In contrast, responses shown in Table 3.7 indicate a clear decline in the proportion of respondents who personally know a member of the municipal council or some other political body in the municipality where they live. The biggest decline is in the more rural areas, especially Onsøy. Thus, proximity, which is often argued to be an important feature of local democracy, seems to be weakened as a consequence of municipal amalgamation. Equally, if not more important for local democracy and citizen effectiveness than knowing office holders personally, however, is how residents feel about their potential for taking part and influencing local affairs. Hypothesis H3c suggests that ‘Residents of the new amalgamated municipality will feel that it is more difficult to take part and influence what happens in local politics.’ Results in Table 3.8, which show the proportion of respondents who believe they have the capacity to influence local decision-​making, are noteworthy in this regard. Overall, there is a slight decline in the proportion who feel that they possess such capacities. The decline occurs mainly among residents living in newly amalgamated areas (except Borge), while there is little change for residents living in Old Fredrikstad. This pattern is in line with H3d: ‘This effect is likely to be most pronounced among residents of the smaller, recently incorporated municipalities.’

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Table 3.8: Consequences of amalgamation for residents’ views of their own opportunities for taking part and having some influence on what happens in the municipality. Per cent who say yes in 1993 and 1997 according to place of residence, and per cent change from 1993 to 1997* Residence

% yes 1993

% yes 1997

% change 1993 to 1997

Old Fredrikstad

29

30

+1

Borge

29

32

+3

Rolvsøy

42

25

-​ 17

Kråkerøy

46

31

-​ 17

Onsøy

31

27

-​ 4

All respondents

33

29

-​4

* Question wording: ‘Do you think that in practice you can take part in and have some influence on what happens in your municipality?’. Response alternatives: Yes, to a certain degree, no. Source: own calculation, based on the public opinion surveys which are described in the section ‘Details about the data’ (1993 and 1997).

Despite this apparently negative consequence of the municipal merger, opportunities for exerting direct influence may be less important to people if the governing bodies are perceived to be representative. At the very least, one can expect one’s attitudes to be taken into consideration during the processes of decision-​making. Merging municipalities, however, usually results in a reduction in the total number of municipal councillors, which was also the consequence of the merger in the Fredrikstad area. By implication, with fewer representatives the breadth of interests and opinions represented is likely to be reduced. Hypotheses H3e and H3f formulate expectations about the consequence of mergers that are relevant in this regard. First, H3e posits that ‘Perceptions of the representativeness of governing bodies will decline following a municipal merger.’ Table 3.9 shows a pattern consistent with this hypothesis. The municipal council’s representativeness is perceived to be greatly reduced (a decline of 20 percentage points). Moreover, the geographical pattern of responses is in accordance with hypothesis H3f that states ‘This effect will in particular be evident among those living in earlier outlying municipalities.’ The decline is indeed substantial among residents living in all of the four recently incorporated areas, most markedly in Kråkerøy.

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Table 3.9: Consequences of amalgamation for residents’ views of how well the municipal council reflects peoples’ opinions. Per cent who say very well or quite well in 1993 and 1997 according to place of residence, and per cent change from 1993 to 1997* Residence

% very or quite well, 1993

% very or quite well, 1997

% change 1993 to 1997

Old Fredrikstad

62

60

-​ 2

Borge

76

57

-​ 19

Rolvsøy

86

55

-​ 31

Kråkerøy

90

53

-​ 37

Onsøy

81

46

-​ 33

All respondents

76

56

-​ 20

* Question wording: ‘How well does the municipal council reflect peoples’ opinions in your municipality? Would you say that it reflects peoples’ opinions very well, quite well, less well or not at all?’. Source: own calculation, based on the public opinion surveys which are described in the section ‘Details about the data’ (1993 and 1997).

Implementation hypotheses Finally, with respect to our implementation hypotheses, acceptance of the new municipality is measured by means of responses to a question asked in the 1997 survey –​namely ‘How would you have voted today (in the event of a new referendum on an enlarged municipality)?’ Respondents could answer ‘yes to an enlarged municipality’, ‘no to an enlarged municipality’ or ‘don’t know’. For purposes of analysis ‘don’t know’ and ‘not answered’ were recoded into an intermediate category (‘indifferent to the question’). Three hypotheses were formulated relating to factors that could potentially influence residents’ acceptance of the new municipality: the new municipality’s qualities as a service provider, as a democratic arena and the distribution of ‘losers’ and ‘winners’ respectively. These hypotheses are tested by means of five successive regression analyses, the results of which are presented in Table 3.10. Results found in the first column (Model O) are from a base model containing only four control variables regarding personal characteristics that often affect attitudes to such questions. These variables can also be interpreted as relating to classic policy interest positions that affect people’s stakes in local services and local politics. As can be seen, gender, income and education all have a bearing on acceptance of the municipality, but together with household income, they account for very little of the variation

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Table 3.10: Residents’ acceptance of the new amalgamated Fredrikstad municipality in 1997. OLS regression results (beta coefficients)* Independent variables**

Models 0

A

B

C

D

Gender (female)

-​.063*

-​.083**

-​.090**

-​.087**

-​.026

Age

.028

.034

.031

.019

.033

Households’ gross .069* income

.042

.039

.040

.012

Highest education .142***

.138***

.130***

.105**

.062*

Satisfaction with services

.172***

.140***

.137***

.079***

.120***

.113***

.066**

.228***

.041

Representativeness of the municipal council Residence Vote in 1990 referendum

.682***

Adj. R2

.034

.061

.073

.124

.536

N

979

925

867

867

867

* Question wording: ‘How would you have voted today (1997): Yes or no to a continued enlarged municipality?’. Coding: 1= No to an enlarged municipality; 2 = Indifferent; 3 = Yes. NB! ‘Don’t know’ and ‘Not answered’ are coded 2. Source: Analyses based on the 1997 public opinion surveys described in the section ‘Details about the data’. Level of statistical significance: ***.001; **.01; *.05 ** Coding of independent variables Gender: 0 = Male, 1 = Female Age: 1 = Under 30 years; 2 = 30–​44 years; 3 = 45–​59 years; 4 = Over 59 years Gross household income (Norwegian crowns): 1 = Under 200,000; 2 = 200–​300,000; 3 = 300–​400,000; 4 = 400–​500,000; 5 = Over 500,000 Highest education: 1 = 7-​year grammar school; 2 = 9-​year grammar school; 3 = continuation school; 4 = 3-​year high school; 5 = higher education (university etc.) Satisfaction with municipal services: 1 = Not satisfied; 2 = Less satisfied; 3 = Somewhat satisfied; 4 = Very satisfied How well does the municipal council reflect public opinion: 1 = Not at all; 2 = Less well; 3 = Quite well; 4= Very well Residence: 0 = Surrounding areas; 1 = Old Fredrikstad Vote in 1990 referendum: 1 = No; 2 Indifferent; 3 = Yes NB: ‘Don’t know’ and ‘Not answered’ are coded 2

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in acceptance of the new municipality (adjusted R2 = 0.03), and we will therefore not comment any further on these effects. Results in the second column, labelled Model A, concern the effect of satisfaction with the services provided by the new municipality. As is evident, service satisfaction clearly has an impact on the respondent’s acceptance of an enlarged municipality. Satisfied respondents are more likely than those who are dissatisfied to vote ‘yes’ in a possible new referendum. In the column labelled ‘Model B’ the respondent’s attitude to the municipal council, and more specifically, whether the local council is perceived as being representative of public opinion or not, is added to the analysis. Again, not surprisingly, it turns out that those who consider the council to be reasonably representative are more likely to accept the new municipality than those who are sceptical of the council’s representativeness. In the next step, Model C tests the hypothesis that a concentration of ‘losers’ in the former surrounding municipalities will contribute to a reduced acceptance of the new municipality in these areas. This appears to be the case. The relationship is statistically significant, and explained variance increases markedly when this variable is included in the regression model. Residents living in Old Fredrikstad are more likely to accept the new municipality than those living in the surrounding recently incorporated areas. However, the variable that influences the acceptance of the new municipality more than anything else is how respondents voted in the referendum that took place in 1990 (see Model D). Attitudes from 1990 still colour how people view the new municipality. And this is an effect, furthermore, that is evident across the previous municipal boundaries. When the respondents’ voting position from 1990 is taken into account, the effect of residence is no longer statistically significant. Such a pattern corresponds quite well with the fact that even in former Fredrikstad the majority voted against the proposed merger. Scepticism of the new municipality is thus still present in Old Fredrikstad, not only in the surrounding area. In addition, even if slightly attenuated, perceptions regarding municipal services and the representativeness of the local council still have a significant effect on acceptance of the new municipality. In total, more than 50 per cent of the variance regarding acceptance is accounted for by the independent variables included in the final regression model.

Conclusion In this chapter we have sought to illuminate the experiences of residents with a merger of five municipalities in the Fredrikstad area in 1994 –​a decision which, with language used in connection with a recent structural reform,

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would be called ‘a compulsory or forced merger’. Residents’ experiences are highlighted through four theoretical perspectives: (1) a reform perspective, which emphasizes economies of scale associated with larger units; (2) a competition perspective that highlights the adaptive advantages of smaller units; (3) a democratic perspective that underscores both mobilization and transaction cost effects associated with larger political entities; and finally (4) an implementation perspective that focuses on how the merger process may influence acceptance of the reform. The empirical analysis is based on two surveys, the first completed one year before the merger (1993) and the second completed three years afterwards (1997). The data thereby provided an opportunity to undertake a pre-​/​post-​merger comparative study. Issues highlighted based on the first two perspectives –​reform and competition hypotheses –​revolve around the municipality’s role as a service provider. In essence, our findings support a competitive perspective. Citizens did not find that municipal services had improved after the merger, but rather quite the contrary. Before the merger, residents of the surrounding municipalities were more satisfied than people living in Old Fredrikstad. After the merger, those living in the areas of the four surrounding municipalities incorporated by the merger were less satisfied than people living in the older downtown municipal area, and they experienced a more marked decline. With respect to a democratic perspective that emphasizes the effects of scale, somewhat contradictory expectations can be derived. On the one hand, increased municipal size may arguably prove to be mobilizing and more engaging because of an enlarged and more exciting political agenda, and perhaps provide clearer political dividing lines than those found in smaller municipalities. On the other hand, the effect of transaction costs could have the opposite impact. Policy issues may become more complex and policy-​makers more distant under such conditions, in which case a sense of powerlessness can readily spread. Our findings provide most support for the latter alternative: the merger led to reduced citizen effectiveness. An expectation derived from an implementation perspective is also supported. The conflict-​laden merger process which occurred in Fredrikstad left its mark. Both assessments of the new municipality and acceptance of the amalgamation were clearly related to residents’ views of the merger issue. Opponents of the merger rated the new municipality’s performance more negatively than did supporters and were less likely to indicate that they would support a merger should the issue be put to a vote again. Negative attitudes from the opposition group unmistakably followed the new municipality, most notably in the form of a separate political party, ‘No to the enlarged municipality’, which was represented on the municipal council during several election periods.

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In short, when seen with the eyes of inhabitants, the label ‘forced mergers’ does not bode well for any municipality. As already mentioned, the scars of the merger lingered in the form of a protest party (‘No to Forced Merger’) represented on the local council until 2011. Furthermore, citizen views of local democratic practices in Fredrikstad seem to have remained at a relatively low level for some time. A survey of local democracy sponsored by the Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities in 2010 found Fredrikstad at the bottom of the league in terms of assessments rendered by citizens in 12 municipalities of roughly comparable size or larger (see Baldersheim and Rose, 2011).10 This is a conclusion emerging not only from the results presented here but also one supported by a study of Danish municipal mergers carried out in 2007 (see Kjær and Klemmensen, 2015). Of course, some cautionary provisos are in order. Developments in Fredrikstad after the merger may have been influenced by factors independent of the merger –​for example, suddenly declining revenues or higher spending needs than were expected in some areas, which in turn may have made it necessary to lower the quality of service provision. Likewise, political scandals may have affected people’s perceptions and confidence in municipal politicians. We have not been able to control for such external circumstances. Nonetheless, we have confidence in our conclusions since they are in agreement with research findings regarding the relationship between municipal size and people’s assessments of municipal policy and services in other settings (see for example Juul-​Madsen and Schou, 2006; Denters et al, 2014; Kjær and Klemmensen, 2015). Findings from the forced merger carried out in the Fredrikstad area in 1993 and 1997 provide in any event an interesting backdrop for considering evidence regarding the consequences of other forced mergers recently implemented in Norway. Notes 1

2

3

4

https://w ​ ww.regjeringen.no/n ​ o/t​ ema/k​ ommuner-o ​ g-​regions/​kommunereform/​Why-​ kommunereform/​nye-​kommuner/​id2470015/​ See, for example, a report submitted by a committee of experts, Kommunal-​ og moderniseringsdepartementet (2014). See also Klausen, Askim and Vabo (2016). For a critique, see Jansen and Jensen (2016). Studies had been conducted both before and after municipal mergers in Norway (see among others Brandsdal 1983; Flaaterud 1989), but these did not shed light on how residents experienced the mergers (Kommunal-​og arbeidsdepartementet 1993). In Denmark, however, a number of Danish studies were undertaken in the wake of the structural reform carried out in Denmark in 2007 (see Juul-​Madsen and Schou 2006); Lassen and Serritzlew 2010, 2011; Hansen 2013, 2015; Blom-​Hansen et al 2014; Nielsen & Westergaard 2014; Hansen & Helmet Hjelmar 2015). Among the recent mergers in Norway, many cases involved a number of small, relatively similar municipalities that were merged into a single larger unit, but a good number were quite similar to Fredrikstad’s amalgamation.

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7

8

9

10

The sub-​municipal councils were abolished in 2001. Given conflicts prior to the merger, it was not certain that the reform would prove durable. Experiences from mergers carried out in the late 1960s had shown that life in the new constructions was so difficult that a number of municipalities were actually dissolved after a few years. Based on a report of a public commission appointed to investigate 21 municipalities merged at that time (Tallaksen Commission, NOU 1974:14) Parliament subsequently decided to divide ten, the last as late as 1977. Referenda held in the municipalities in the Fredrikstad area had shown a massive majority against the merger in the four surrounding municipalities and a narrow majority against the merger in Fredrikstad. Nevertheless, Parliament decided to merge the municipalities. In both cases, the interview work was done by Opinion AS, a national opinion polling company. Opinion AS prepared a technical report in connection with both investigations. Unfortunately, these reports are not available at this time. Except for a mistake by which two questions were not asked of all respondents, and responses to these questions had to be deleted from the data file, there were no other known factors that affected the nature and reliability of the data material. In 1993, the number of respondents were as follows: Fredrikstad (342), Borge (179), Rolvsøy (155), Kråkerøy (153) and Onsøy (176). In 1997, the distribution of respondents was Fredrikstad (410), Borge (184), Rolvsøy (87), Kråkerøy (109) and Onsøy (190). It can be noted that the degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction varies somewhat when respondents were asked about experiences with specific services (elderly care, schools, etc.), but the relevant results are not reproduced here for reasons of space. The indicators of democratic governance applied in the survey of 2010 correspond largely to the ones used for the surveys in Fredrikstad in 1993 and 1997. It should be noted, however, that this study only had aggregate data for all of the newly amalgamated Fredrikstad, so we cannot tell how attitudes may have evolved in the constituent parts of the municipality.

References Baldersheim, H., Jamil, I., Offerdal, A. and Rose, L. (1995) Kan fem bli til en? Folks syn på kommunepolitikk og kommunale tjenester foran kommunesammenslåingen i Fredrikstadområdet, Rapport 95/​0 3, Bergen: LOS-​senteret. Baldersheim, H., Offerdal, A. and Rose, L. (1997) Folks syn på kommunepolitikk og kommunale tjenester etter kommunesammenslåingen i Fredrikstadområdet, Oppdragsrapport, Oslo/​Bergen: Institutt for statsvitenskap, Universitetet i Oslo/​Institutt for administrasjon og organisasjonsvitenskap, Universitetet i Bergen. Baldersheim, H. and Rose, L.E. (2011) Hvordan fungerer lokaldemokratiet? Kartlegging av innbyggernes og folkevalgtes erfaringer og oppfatninger, Oslo: Institutt for statsvitenskap, Universitetet i Oslo/​Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities. Blom-​Hansen, J., Houlberg, K. and Serritzlew, S. (2014) ‘Size, Democracy, and the Economic Costs of Running the Political System’, American Journal of Political Science, 58(4): 790–​803.

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Brandsdal, E. (1983) ‘Bygrensen som politisk barriere’, in H. Baldersheim (ed) Bypolitikk i Norge, Oslo: Gyldendal, pp 39–​56. Dahl, R.A. and Tufte, E.R. (1973) Size and Democracy, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Denters, B., Ladner, A., Goldsmith, M., Mouritzen, P.E. and Rose, L.E. (2014) Size and Local Democracy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Fagerlund, S.H. (1995) Kommunesammenslåingen i Fredrikstad-​distriktet. En politisk prosess… eller kanskje snarere prosess-​styrt politikk? Hovedfagsoppgave, Oslo: Institutt for statsvitenskap, Universitetet i Oslo. Fernandez, R. and Rodrik, D. (1991) ‘Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-​Specific Uncertainty’, American Economic Review, 81(5): 1146–​1155. Flaaterud, S. (1989) Kommunestørrelse og lokalpolitikere: En studie av kommunesammenslåinger i Vestfold, Hovedoppgave, Bergen: Institutt for administrasjon og organisasjonsfag, Universitetet i Bergen. Hagen, T. (1995) Fem er fingrene på hånden, et symbol på enhet og brorskap. En studie av kommunedelsutvalg i Fredrikstad, Hovedfagsoppgave, Bergen: Institutt for administrasjon og organisasjonsvitenskap, Universitetet i Bergen. Hansen, S.W. (2013) ‘Polity Size and Local Political Trust: A Quasi-​ Experiment Using Municipal Mergers in Denmark’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 36(1): 43–​66. Hansen, S.W. (2015) ‘The Democratic Costs of Size: How Increasing Size Affects Citizen Satisfaction with Local Government’, Political Studies, 63(2): 373–​389. Hansen, S.W. and Hjelmar, U. (2015) ‘Når kommuner bliver større: de korte og mere langsikgtede konsekvenser for lokaldemokrati’, Politica, 47(3): 464–​484. Jansen, A.-​I. and Jensen, B. (eds) (2016) Folkestyre eller elitestyre? Kommunereform i perspektiv, Oslo: Res publica. Juul-​Madsen, L. and Skou, M.H. (2006) ‘Kan man lægge kommuner sammen uden omkostninger for lokaldemokratiet?’, in J. Blom-​Hansen, J. Elklit and S. Serritzlew (eds) Kommunalreformens konsekvenser, Aarhus: Academica, pp 37–​62. Kjær, U. and Klemmensen, R. (2015) ‘What Are the Local Political Costs of Centrally Determined Reforms of Local Government?’, Local Government Studies, 41(1): 100–​118. Klausen, J.E., Askim, J. and Vabo, S.I. (eds) (2016) Kommunereform i perspektiv, Bergen: Fagbokforlaget. Kommunal-​ og arbeidsdepar tementet (1993) Så samles vi på valen: Erfaringer fra kommunesammenslutninger i byområder, Oslo: Kommunal-​ og arbeidsdepartementet.

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Kommunal-​ og moderniseringsdepartementet (2014) Delrapport fra ekspertutvalg. Kriterier for god kommunestruktur, Oslo: Kommunal-​ og moderniseringsdepartementet, mars 2014. Lassen, D.D. and Serritzlew, S. (2010) ‘Kommunalreformen og lokalpolitisk effektivitetsfølelse’, Politica, 42(2): 145–​162. Lassen, D.D. and Serritzlew, S. (2011) ‘Jurisdiction Size and Local Democracy: Evidence on Internal Political Efficacy from Large-​Scale Municipal Reform’, American Political Science Review, 105(2): 238–​258. Mjelstad, T. (1995) Konsekvenser av kommunesammenslåinger: Rekruttering og representativitet i lokalpolitikken i Fredrikstadregionen, Hovedfagsoppgave, Bergen: Institutt for administrasjon og organisasjonsvitenskap, Universitetet i Bergen. Mouritzen, P.E. (1989) ‘City Size and Citizens’ Satisfaction: Two Competing Theories Revisited’, European Journal of Political Research, 17(6): 661–​688. Nielsen, T.S. and Vestergaard, C. (2014) ‘Kommunestørrelse og demokrati –​ effekten af kommunestørrelse på borgernes politiske effektivitetsfølelse’, Politica, 46(2): 219–​236. NOU (1974:14) Vurdering av 21 kommunesammenslutninger, Oslo: Kommunal-​ og arbeidsdepartementet. NOU (1986:7) Forslag til endringer i inndelingen for byområdene Horten, Tønsberg og Larvik, Oslo: Kommunal-​og arbeidsdepartementet. NOU (1989:16) Kommuneinndeling i byområdene Sarpsborg, Fredrikstad, Arendal, Hamar og Hammerfest, Oslo: Kommunal-​og arbeidsdepartementet. Oates, W.E. and Schwab, R.M. (1988) ‘Economic Competition among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?’, Journal of Public Economics, 35(3): 333–​354. Ostrom, E. (1972) ‘Metropolitan Reform: Propositions Derived from Two Traditions’, Social Science Quarterly, 53(3): 474–​493. Ostrom, V. and Bish, R.L. (1973) Understanding Urban Government: Metropolitan Reform Reconsidered, Washington, DC: American Enterprise Press. Rose, L.E. (2011) ‘Den krevende borger: Kveles lokaldemokrati?’, in H. Baldersheim and E. Smith (eds) Lokalt demokrati uten kommunalt selvstyre? Oslo: Abstrakt forlag, pp 101–​131. Tiebout, C.M. (1956) ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures’, Journal of Political Economy, 64(5): 416–​424. Van Meter, D.S. and van Horn, C.E. (1975) ‘The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework’, Administration & Society, 6(4): 445–​488.

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4

Local Government Reforms in Denmark and Norway: Reform Tools and Outcomes Kurt Houlberg and Jan Erling Klausen

Introduction Reforming the territorial structure of local governments is a recurring item on governmental agendas in Europe and beyond (Gunlicks, 1981; Kjellberg and Dente, 1988; Meligrana, 2004). Many governments have seen merging of local governments into fewer and larger units as a way of boosting efficiency, saving costs, improving the quality of public service provision and achieving overall modernization (Baldersheim and Rose, 2010: 244; Kuhlmann and Wollmann, 2014). In Scandinavia and North-​Western Europe, broad-​scale reforms in the 1960s and 1970s have been explained as ‘institutional afterthoughts’ of public sector expansion following the development of highly decentralized welfare states (Ashford, 1982; Kjellberg, 1985;). More recent reforms have been seen as a response to new demands posed by Europeanization, for instance in Greece (Hlepas, 2010). Some countries in Central-​Eastern Europe saw structural reform as a necessary counter-​reaction to increasing fragmentation of local government systems in the years after the fall of the iron curtain (Swianiewicz, 2010; de Vries and Sobis, 2014), or as in Macedonia, to consolidate democratic rule (Kreci and Ymeri, 2010). In a comparative perspective, however, comprehensive reforms are few and far between. Many national and federal governments in Europe are constitutionally barred from implementing imposed reforms (Gendźwiłł et al, forthcoming) and have to rely on a mixture of persuasion and economic incentives if they want local governments to merge. Because

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merger reforms are often contentious, governmental reform initiatives have in some cases been rendered ineffective or downright torpedoed by political and institutional resistance. Finland’s torturous recent reform history is a telling example. While a government-​initiated reform in 2005–​2011 reduced the number of units by only about a quarter, a new reform attempt by the Katainen government in 2011–2014 proved almost wholly ineffective (Sandberg, 2014). The high diversity of reform outcomes and the varying political and constitutional preconditions for reform implementation inspires interest in governmental reform strategies, and more specifically in the toolbox of reform instruments that any given government has at its disposal. A growing literature on ‘the tools of government’ (Salamon, 2002; Hood and Margetts, 2007) facilitates classification of policy instruments, and provides theoretical approaches for understanding why some tools are chosen over others, under given circumstances. In what is to follow, we draw on this literature for comparative analysis of recent territorial reforms in two Scandinavian countries: Denmark and Norway. As decentralized, social democratic welfare regimes (Esping-​Andersen, 1990) in the North European class of local government systems (Sharpe, 1979) with highly autonomous local governments (Ladner et al, 2016) and long-​standing traditions for multilevel democracy (Sellers et al, 2020), these two countries offer excellent opportunities for comparative analysis as most similar cases. Notably, in both countries, central authorities are legally mandated to impose mergers on unwilling local governments, thereby enabling the full range of governmental policy instruments. Even so, the outcome of the two reforms differed substantially. While the reform in Denmark in 2007 reduced the number of local governments from 271 to 98 virtually overnight (Blom-​Hansen et al, 2014), Norway’s recent reform, completed in January 2020, only resulted in a cutback from 428 to 356 units (Klausen et al, 2019). Furthermore, while the Danish system following the reform comprises very few units with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants, the median-​ sized unit in Norway has 5,151 inhabitants, and 21 local governments have three-​digit population figures. Many factors probably explain why the two reforms had such different outcomes. In this chapter, we focus on the reform instruments put to use by the Danish and the Norwegian governments. What policy tools did the two governments choose, how and with what effect? This chapter is structured as follows. In the following section, we discuss some key aspects of the literature on tool choice, with an emphasis on how these tools can be used in the context of multi-​level governance. Two sections describe the reforms in Denmark and Norway, highlighting the

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most prominent policy tools put to use by the two governments. In the final section, the results of the two case studies are analysed comparatively. The chapter is based on previous research carried out by the authors and others.

Theoretical perspectives on policy tools It is uncontroversial to claim that governmental decisions are sometimes ineffective, not least when implementation relies on a complex chain of actors on several levels of government. As noted, great expectations in Washington are often dashed in Oakland (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). While the academic literature on policy implementation largely has ground to a halt (Hill and Hupe, 2014), increasing interest is devoted to the instruments that governments employ to reach their goals. A policy tool is defined as ‘an identifiable method through which collective action is structured to address a public problem’ (Salamon, 2002: 19). Because this definition in practice comprises everything governments do, the utility of the ‘tool’ term relies on classification and the ability to decompose often complex and ambiguous policies and programmes into distinct tools belonging to one particular class. A number of classifications have been proposed, based on varying dimensions. One simple and intuitive classification draws distinction between carrots, sticks and sermons (Vedung et al, 1998). A classification that has gained considerable traction in the literature, is the so-​called NATO framework (Hood, 1983; Hood and Margetts, 2007). This handle is an acronym of the resources governments can use for steering society, namely nodality, authority, treasure and organization. Governments can utilize their ‘nodal’ position in societal networks, by means of information-​based tools. While governmental authority is the basis for more or less coercive tools, the government’s ‘treasure’ –​their financial resources –​enable tools such as subsidies and grants. Finally, a class of tools are based on the government’s self-​organizing capacity; the ability to carry out tasks using its own administration. We will use this framework for structuring the case studies, as it offers a simple and intuitive approach for decomposing the composite set of tools involved in local government reforms. Although tools from each of the four categories could probably address most problems, tool choice is, in practice, always subject to constraints. Salamon (2002) noted that the choice of tools is of a distinctly political nature, because tools prioritize effectiveness, efficiency, equity, manageability and legitimacy/​political support differently. For instance, highly coercive tools may prove effective and suitable for ensuring equity, but at the same time, such tools may be cumbersome and resource consuming administratively because compliance needs to be monitored. Coercive instruments can also

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jeopardize political support. Salamon furthermore noted that tools vary in terms of their directness, related to the system employed to ‘deliver’ the tool. Whereas direct tools are authorized, funded and carried out by the same authority, indirect tools involve private subcontractors, NGOs or subordinate levels of government. Indirect tools can enhance political support, since they often provide more discretion to citizens or sub-​national governments, but this advantage sometimes comes at the price of lower effectiveness and manageability. ‘Intelligent policy design’ (Hood and Margetts, 2007: 144), following this, implies deliberate choice of tools, ensuring fitness of tools for purpose while using tools economically and within the bounds of moral acceptability. The fact that territorial reforms play out in a context of multi-​level governance adds to the challenge of appropriate tool choice. The multi-​ level context can pose both institutional and political restrictions on the government’s choice of tools. Lower-​level tiers in unitary states in many cases enjoy considerable ‘jurisdictional integrity’ (Skelcher, 2005), which to some extent insulates them from external pressures. If local governments effectively enjoy veto powers, unpopular territorial reforms may run aground in joint decision traps not uncharacteristic of intergovernmental relations in Scandinavia (Scharpf, 1988; Blom-​Hansen, 1999). Arguably, reforms in multi-​level systems pose particular demands on the government’s ‘enablement skills’ –​to activate complex partnerships, finding the right mix of rewards and punishments to elicit cooperation and so on (Salamon, 2002: 607–​608).

The Norwegian reform Context of the reform Norway’s local government system comprised 392 units at its establishment in 1837. Due to municipal splits, the number of units increased gradually to an all-​time high of 744 units in 1950. Broad-​scale reform in the 1960s reduced the number to 451 (Hansen, 1991). At the start of the current reform, in 2014, the number of units was 428. Norway has a two-​tier system of local and regional government. County governments with elected councils were established in 1974, and comprised of 18 units + the capital in 2014. Norway’s extensive welfare system developed gradually in the postwar period. The long prehistory of local self-​rule allowed extensive decentralization of welfare provision (Sellers and Lidström, 2007), leading to dramatic growth in municipal budgets and employment. Local governments

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enjoy a comparatively high level of local autonomy (Ladner et al, 2016), although state supervision seems to be increasing (Goldsmith and Page, 2010).

The reform process The national local government reform (NLGR) was initiated by the Solberg (Cons.) government in 2014, in a report to parliament (KMD, 2014a). The report called for merger of local governments into fewer and larger units in order to enhance the quality of public services, to enable comprehensive planning, to create more economically robust municipalities and to stimulate local democracy by reducing state supervision of the newly enlarged units. The reform was backed by the two parties in government –​ the Conservative party and the Progress Party –​as well as the government’s two supporting parties in parliament –​the Liberal Party and the Christian Democrats (Klausen et al, 2019). The government proposed a two-​year period for local governments to identify relevant partners to merge with and to conduct assessments, public hearings and negotiations, with the aim of agreeing on a merger proposal. Norwegian law stipulates that the government may decide on voluntary mergers by royal decree.1 If one or more parties to the proposal disagrees, the matter has to be decided by parliament. The government warned that although mergers as a main rule should be voluntary, single local governments would not be allowed to block proposals that were otherwise considered beneficial. Consequently, imposed mergers were presented as a realistic policy tool even from the beginning of the reform. Two deadlines were set for voluntary merger proposals: February and July 2016. The government put in place several financial incentives to encourage amalgamations (Askim et al, 2020). New local governments would be allowed to retain the current level of state transfers for the first 15 years after the merger. The government offered to reimburse process-​related costs. Furthermore, new units would receive a lump sum, relative to size, to spend at their own discretion for new projects. The most prominent incentive mechanism, however, came in the form of an adjustment to the municipal grants system. Small local governments are compensated for above-​average administrative costs. The government proposed to reduce this compensation for local governments that had voluntarily abstained from reducing administrative costs by merging with one or several neighbours. Due to resistance from the two supporting parties, the adjustment was watered down. Even so, for some small local governments the adjustment represented a significant loss of revenue. The government provided a broad range of reports, guidance materials and web-​based tools to assist local governments in the voluntary assessments

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and negotiation phase (Klausen et al, 2016). Two reports from a fast-​working expert committee preceded the reform (KMD, 2014b; KMD, 2014c; Kjærgaard et al, 2020: 36) and together with the report to parliament in 2014 (KMD, 2014a), the government had produced a substantial volume of text arguing in favour of amalgamations. These and other reports and assessments were presented on a dedicated website.2 A web-​based tool3 was set up to allow local governments to assess the consequences of relevant merger options for a broad range of indicators including demographic factors, municipal finances and services. Guidance materials were issued, covering issues such as the organization of the merger process, the use of instruments for public hearings and various management-​related issues. The minister for local governments and modernization, Jan Tore Sanner (Cons.) promoted the reform through speeches, press releases and otherwise. However, the government did not activate the corporate channel to secure support for the reform from KS, The Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (Kjærgaard et al, 2020: 50). The county governors4 were tasked with coordinating the local reform processes in their own counties (Klausen et al, 2016). Each county governor’s office hired a dedicated consultant to facilitate the process regionally. Because the ministry had supplied a quite general and open-​ended mandate, the county governors carried out their coordinating function quite differently (Glomsrud, 2017). Whereas some county governors worked very actively to promote amalgamations, others attained a more downplayed role. In the fall of 2016, after the voluntary phase had ended, the ministry requested a recommendation report from county governors about the future local government structure in their respective counties. While some county governors proposed a number of imposed mergers, others refrained from doing so (Askim et al, 2020: 331). The voluntary phase came off to a slow start. By the first deadline, February 2016, only five proposals involving 11 local governments had been submitted. Although 299 municipalities had signed 143 agreements of intention, many of these agreements were torpedoed by consultative referenda (221 referenda, 147 against, see Folkestad et al, 2021). The number of merger proposals increased substantially during spring, however, and there was an extension of the deadline. By the end of 2016, when all proposals from the local governments and from the county governors had been submitted, a group of four representatives in parliament’s local government committee took on a very active role in terms of producing the final proposal (Klausen et al, 2019). Between them, they agreed about a list of imposed mergers to be proposed in addition to the voluntary proposals. In February 2017, the two government parties and the two supporting parties presented a negotiated agreement about the full list of mergers. Although

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the Christian democrats decided that they would not support imposed mergers, the proposals achieved a bare-​knuckles majority in parliament in June 2017 (KMD, 2017). The two government parties’ primary position was that the second tier –​the county governments –​should be abolished (Klausen et al, 2019). Faced with insufficient parliamentary support for this proposal, the government instead proposed to postpone the question about the fate of the county governments. The two support parties, however, proposed that there should be a concurrent county government reform, in order to strengthen the county governments and ensure their continued existence. The two supporting parties achieved their goal by trading support for the local government reform with support for the regional reform. Contrary to the local government reform, the county government reform was implemented mainly through imposed mergers. The number of units was reduced from 18 to 11 through seven mergers in all, and only four of the mergers were voluntary. Focusing on the reform at municipal level –​which was the government’s initial aim –​the scale of reform was more modest. The number of municipalities was reduced from 428 to 356 by merging 119 municipalities into 47 new units. Eleven of the 47 cases constituted enforced merger, as one or all of the municipalities involved did not agree with the proposal.5

Tool use The main tools used by the government for implementation of the NLGR are presented in Table 4.1. While the government made extensive use of nodality-​based tools, in the form of reports, information materials, media statements and online tools, the government was not in a position to control the terms of the local debates. Most local governments commissioned their own reports and Table 4.1: Governmental reform tools (Norway) Tool class

Tool

Nodality

Reports, information materials, media statements, online tools/​webpage

Authority

Threat of imposed mergers; mergers decided in parliament

Treasure

Financial incentives, adjustments to the grants system

Organization

County governors’ coordination role

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assessments instead of relying on the government’s assessment tools. Active and vocal opposition to the reform on the national level, as well as locally, meant that the government’s key arguments were subjected to profound scrutiny and criticism. The fact that the government imposed a relatively small share of mergers means that the government, only to a limited extent, made use of authority-​ based tools. However, because the threat of imposed mergers remained until a late stage (Askim et al, 2020), indirect use of authority tools in the form of enforced mergers may have had an effect on the reform’s progression. As noted by Salamon (2002: 25), ‘The more coercive the tool (…) the greater the potential threat to political legitimacy.’ This assumption is supported empirically. Clearly, the feasibility of authority tools was delimited by heated controversy over imposed mergers and the minority government’s reliance on support parties. The government all in all made modest use of ‘treasure’ tools. Most of the financial incentives were modest, and the ‘hardest’ treasure tool, cuts in grants to ‘voluntarily small’ municipalities, was watered down. Lastly, the government’s use of ‘organization’ tools can be characterized as rather lax, since the county governors were given quite an open-​ended mandate for their activities. There is little to suggest that the county governors felt obliged to promote mergers proactively, or to propose mergers that the local governments themselves had not worked out. It should be noted that in Vestfold, the county governor assumed a particularly proactive role. In this county, all of the municipalities ended up in a merger. A related observation is that this particular county governor convinced local governments not to hold referendum. It is also noteworthy that no enforced mergers were carried out in counties where the county governor had not proposed any.

The Danish reform Context of the reform Like Norway, Denmark has a two-​tier system of local and regional government. Apart from a voluntary amalgamation of the five municipalities on the island of Bornholm in 2002, the number of municipalities and counties remained unchanged from a local government reform in the early 1970s to 2006. For more than four decades, the local government structure was thus composed of 275 municipalities (271 from 2002) and 14 counties + 2 capital units with a two-​tier status as both counties and municipalities. However, in 2007 a quick and radical reform with three main components was implemented (Mouritzen, 2010; Blom-​Hansen et al, 2014). First, 271 municipalities were by law amalgamated into 98 municipalities. Second, 14

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counties were amalgamated into five regions. Third, tasks were reshuffled across the three tiers of government, primarily in the form of transferring former county tasks to the state and municipal level. Denmark’s extensive welfare system, like in Norway, developed gradually in the postwar period, and especially after the 1970 reform, an increased number of tasks have been transferred to the two tiers of local government. The long history of extensive decentralization of welfare provision (Sellers and Lidström, 2007) has turned Denmark, like Norway, into one of the most decentralized countries in the world, both when it comes to fiscal decentralization and local autonomy (Ivanyna and Shah, 2014; Ladner et al, 2016). After the local government reform in 2007, the five regions are mainly responsible for health care, while the 98 municipalities are multi-​ purpose units responsible for a wide range of politically and economically important welfare services such as the public schools, childcare, elderly care, children and adults with special needs, and social security (Houlberg and Ejersbo, 2020). A notable organizational difference between Denmark and Norway is that in Norway a single organization organizes both municipalities and counties, whereas in Denmark municipalities and counties/​regions are organized by two different organizations. With the municipal organization, Local Government Denmark (LGD), as the strongest and most influential, not least after the reform.

The reform process The reform process began with the appointment of the Commission on Administrative Structure in August 2020 by the minority coalition government composed of the Conservative and Liberal parties. The Commission had a broad mandate and 15 months to assess both the number of tiers and the structure and functions of each tier, and to suggest alternative models for a new structure and distribution of tasks (Mouritzen, 2010). Though the Commission had three independent experts as members, it was mainly composed of civil servants from ministries pertaining to both government parties and the two local government organizations. The Commission thus constituted an intra-​ Commission platform for mediation of interests, problem perceptions and coalition building both across the two government parties as well as with local government organizations. In January 2004, the Commission delivered a deliberately large and inconclusive report (Mouritzen, 2009) suggesting a number of alternative models for restructuring the regional and local levels, including various elements of amalgamations and reshuffling of tasks. The report of more than

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1,500 pages concluded that a reform of the structure of the public sector was needed, but the report did not recommend any of the suggested models. The report was presented on 9 January 2002 at the largest public presentation ever of a commission report in Denmark, led by the Minister of the Interior, Lars Løkke Rasmussen (Christensen et al, 2009: 101–​102). Every existing entity, from local politicians and civil servants, to researchers and interest organizations showed up –​more than 900 people altogether. In addition, more than 150 journalists were present and the two national TV stations sent a three-​hour long live transmission (Christensen et al, 2009: 101–​102). When presenting the report –​as when forming the Commission –​the government did not signal any reform ambitions but kept its opponents behind a veil of vagueness (Christiansen and Klitgaard, 2010). Nevertheless, despite this confusion strategy by the government, everyone leaving the ‘presentation show’ had the impression that a major reform was inevitable. Less than three months later, and shortly after the deadline of the hearing of the Commission’s report, the government released a reform proposal. The proposal to replace 14 counties with five health care regions without the right to levy taxes, amalgamate municipalities to at least 20,000 inhabitants and transfer virtually all former county tasks, apart from health care, to the municipalities, came as a bombshell to the opposition in parliament and to the Association of Counties (ACC) (Christiansen and Klitgaard, 2010). The proposal transcended the models suggested by the Commission, and the Commission’s report in practice functioned more as a reason for the decision, a battering ram-​tool, than as a basis for the decision (Mouritzen, 2009). Long before the release of the reform proposal, local debates and soundings with neighbouring municipalities started. Actually, this started soon after the presentation of the report in January, and during the spring it reached a point of no return (Munk Christiansen and Klitgaard, 2008: 144). When preparing the proposal, the government had consulted LGD and its supporting party, the Danish People’s Party, to ensure support from these two core actors. LGD was compensated for the loss of mayoral positions by new functions in the municipalities, and the Danish People’s Party had their political ambition of abolishing the counties –​shared with the governing party of the Conservatives –​fulfilled (though replaced by five regions). As the Danish People’s Party publicly supported the proposal almost immediately after presentation, the government had a secure parliamentary majority before negotiations even started. Negotiations ran for 1.5 months, not least with the Social Democrats who, together with the governing Liberal Party, were holding the majority of mayoral positions at local level. However, a compromise was never reached and the reform finally rested upon a minimal winning coalition consisting of the government parties and the Danish People’s Party (Christiansen and Klitgaard, 2010). The

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reform was semi-​voluntary in the sense that the municipalities were given extensive autonomy in deciding with whom to merge, but not whether or not to merge (Munk Christiansen and Klitgaard, 2008: 152–​154; Blom-​ Hansen et al, 2014). The reform agreement gave the old municipalities six months to find amalgamation partners and explicitly stated that if municipalities were not able to meet the minimum size requirement of 20,000 inhabitants, the reform partners in parliament would decide on the amalgamation. Municipalities with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants could only avoid amalgamation if they entered into a cooperative arrangement with a large neighbouring municipality. In practice, only five municipalities out of more than 200 with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants succeeded in avoiding amalgamation by making such a cooperative arrangement (Blom-​Hansen et al, 2014). During the process, LGD actively supported the reform idea and the Minister of the Interior continuously acted as policy entrepreneur advocating for the reform both publicly and through intra-​party channels to tackle potentially critical Liberal mayors in many small municipalities that were about to be merged. In Denmark, no local state representatives were activated during the reform process. However, a well-​reputed former mayor from the opposition party, the Social Democrats, was appointed as mediator by the national government in a few cases where the plans suggested by the local governments did not comply with national guidelines (Blom-​Hansen et al, 2014). Instead, the government’s organizational resources were activated by making civil servants from politically important ministries with potentially diverging interests core members of the Commission assessing the need for a reform. At local level, the decision with whom to merge involved a complex mix of economic calculations, partisan considerations, personal ambitions, formal and informal consultations with neighbouring municipalities, along with insecurity as to whether the partner(s) you wanted to marry was willing to marry you –​or had an eye on other partners (Mouritzen, 2010). Due to the parliamentary threat of forced mergers, the decision, however, had to be made, and given the decision complexities, the process was surprisingly harmonious (Mouritzen, 2010). In 2005, the law complex on the reform was decided in parliament and by 1 January 2007, the new local government map was implemented by merging 271 municipalities into 98 new entities and replacing 14 counties with 5 regions. More specifically, 239 municipalities were amalgamated into 66 municipalities, while 32 remained untouched.

Tool use The main tools used by the government for implementation of the Danish reform are presented in Table 4.2.

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Table 4.2: Governmental reform tools (Denmark) Tool class

Tool

Nodality

A large commission report. A huge media-​covered presentation of the report. Veil of vagueness. Alliance with LGD. Advocating the reform publicly and through intra-​party channels

Authority

Minimum size requirement. Credible threat of imposed mergers

Treasure

Compensation with new tasks to municipalities and LGD organizing the municipalities

Organization

Civil servants as core members of the reform-​preparing commission

To summarize, ‘nodality’ tools were used extensively by the Danish government. Not at least by a large Commission report, a huge media-​ covered presentation and alliance building with the supporting party in parliament, and with LGD by consultation and compensation by new tasks. In addition, a veil of vagueness strategically kept potential reform opponents in the dark. Strong authority tools were activated and secured by an early political alliance with the government’s supporting party. A minimum size requirement of 20,000 inhabitants was set up by the majority in parliament, and the reform partners explicitly stated that they would decide on mergers if the minimum threshold was not met. This proved to be a very effective reform tool. No financial incentives were activated and ‘treasure’ tools in general were used modestly. However, a carrot in the form of new tasks reduced opposition from mayors and other local politicians –​and ensured active reform support by LGD. All in all the government made lax use of ‘organization’ tools. Organization tools were most visible in appointing civil servants as core members of the reform-​preparing Commission and by the Minister of the Interior’s advocating for the reform through intra-​party channels to tackle potentially critical Liberal mayors.

Conclusion Our point of departure was on the highly variant outcomes of two similar, government-​initiated reforms in two similar countries. Whereas the government of Denmark achieved a comprehensive structural reform of its local government system, Norway’s government was a lot less successful, in the sense that less than one third of the local governments in Norway

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ended up actually merging. To what extent can different use of reform tools explain these different reform outcomes? The use of ‘treasure’ and ‘organization’ tools comes off as modest and/​or lax in both countries, and may not offer significant leverage for explaining the different outcomes. Though neither of the two governments activated strong financial incentives, the Danish government, however, utilized the bifurcated organization of the local government organizations in Denmark and ensured active reform support from LGD by the carrot of new tasks for the municipalities. We have noted that both governments used ‘nodality’ tools extensively, not least by procurement of preparatory reports. However, whereas the Danish government appointed a commission that doubled as an alliance-​building device, securing the support of the LDG, the Norwegian government opted for a fast-​working expert commission without any alliance-​building potential. In addition, the Danish government when launching the reform idea to a larger degree than the Norwegian government, kept reform opponents in the dark with a veil of vagueness regarding the reform ambitions. Overall, the nodality factor thus appears significant. We would argue, however, that the key difference in tool use, and a key factor for explaining the different outcomes, lies in the use of ‘authority’ tools. Because the Danish government could credibly state that the minimum threshold of 20,000 inhabitants would, in fact, be enforced, the municipalities clearly perceived that resistance against the reform would be an exercise in futility. Norwegian local governments, on the other hand, were not similarly incentivized. Although enforced merger was perceived as an actual threat, the political contentiousness surrounding the question of enforced merger, as well as the lack of whole-​hearted support from a clear parliamentary majority probably provided licence for unwilling local governments to draw out the process and put their best bet on being able to remain unmerged. As it turned out, these assessments were largely correct, because few unwilling local governments were actually merged. These observations logically lead to comparing the preconditions for tool use. As for the different use of authority tools, it is notable that the Norwegian government early on decided against setting a minimum population threshold, stating that, ‘Distances can be an impediment to mergers (…) the local government reform needs to accommodate Norway’s varied geography’ (KMD, 2014a: 44). The fact that Norway’s territory is about nine times larger than Denmark’s, with roughly similar populations, effectively barred the Norwegian government from setting a size-​based rule –​a pivotal element of the Danish government’s highly effective strategy. Intergovernmental mandates tend to be uniform and non-​selective (Gormley, 1989: 184), and the absence of a standardized solution can thus be been seen

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as an impediment for the use of authority-​based rules. It seems, however, that the Norwegian government’s reluctance against using authority-​based tools was based on more than just practicality. As noted by Mayntz (1983), authority tools are inappropriate if the aim is to incite voluntary efforts and not just grudging compliance. The Ministry of Local Governments and Modernization often takes on the role as a staunch defender of local self-​rule (KMD, 2008), a stance that would logically induce hesitation over the use of authority tools. As for the county governors, many of them did not want to jeopardize their future working relations with the local governments in their jurisdictions by proposing enforced mergers (Glomsrud, 2017). Salamon (2002: 607–​608) has emphasized the importance of ‘enablement skills’ related to tool use. The relative inexperience of Norway’s government at the time of reform initiation may to some extent explain reform strategies that in hindsight seem to have impeded effective reform implementation, such as the failure to secure allegiance from KS and other key actors, as well as the reluctance against providing the county governors with a more specific mandate. However, the overarching explanation is certainly that the Norwegian government’s parliamentary position was a lot weaker than that of their Danish counterparts. Solberg’s government was a minority government that relied on the support of two smaller parties, one of which became an increasingly vocal opponent of enforced mergers as the reform progressed (Klausen et al, 2019). Denmark’s government, on the other hand, had a strong parliamentary position and, though a minority government, had a multi-​ year record of political agreements with its supporting party. In addition, an experienced minister of the interior with a well-​established image as a political entrepreneur led the reform process and actively supported the reform both publicly and through intra-​party channels. The Danish government also took advantage of the bifurcated organization of the local government organizations and succeeded in playing the two organizations off against each other by ‘bribing’ one organization with tasks from the other organization’s domain. Departing from its stronger parliamentary position, the experienced Danish government, to a larger extent than the less experienced Norwegian government, by a combination of policy tools, seem to have alleviated the potential dilemma between effectiveness and political support (Salamon, 2002) by simultaneously building support in parliament, as well as from the organizations of the municipalities that were facing merger. Notes 1 2 3

Territorial Divisions Act (Inndelingslova) of 2001. kommunereform.no [Accessed 6 July 2020] nykommune.no [Accessed 6 July 2020]

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5

The County Governors are multi-​purpose state territorial representatives appointed by the government, tasked mainly with supervisory functions. These 11 enforced proposals were decided by a majority of 86–​83 or even 85–​84 (decision on item 1, 8.6.2017). The other merger proposals were decided unanimously. See https://​ www.stortinget.no/​no/​Saker-​og-​publikasjoner/​Publikasjoner/​Referater/​Stortinget/​ 2016-​2017/​refs-​201617-​06-​08?m=16 [Accessed 12 January 2021].

References Ashford, D.E. (1982) British Dogmatism and French Pragmatism. Central-​Local Policy-​Making in the Welfare State, London: Allen and Unwin. Askim, J., Blom-​Hansen, J., Houlberg, K. and Serritzlew, S. (2020) ‘How Government Agencies React to Termination Threats’, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 30(2): 324–​338 Baldersheim, H. and Rose, L.E. (2010) Territorial Choice: The Politics of Boundaries and Borders, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Blom-​Hansen, J. (1999) ‘Avoiding the “Joint-​Decision Trap”: Lessons from Intergovernmental Relations in Scandinavia’, European Journal of Political Research, 35(1): 35–​68. Blom-​Hansen, J., Serritzlew, S. and Houlberg, K. (2014) ‘Size, Democracy, and the Economic Costs of Running the Political System’, American Journal of Political Science, 58: 790–​803. Christensen, J.G., Mouritzen, P.E. and Nørgaard, A.S. (2009) De store kommissioner: vise mænd, smagsdommere eller nyttige idioter, Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag. Christiansen, P.M. and Klitgaard, M.B. (2010) ‘Behind the Veil of Vagueness: Success and Failure in Institutional Reforms’, Journal of Public Policy, 30: 183–​200. de Vries, M.S. and Sobis, I. (2014) ‘Consolidation in Local Government. An International Comparison of Arguments and Practices’, in I.P. Kovacs and C.M. Profiroiu (eds) Regionalisation and Regional Policy in Central and Eastern Europe, Bratislava: NISPAcee Press. Esping-​Andersen, G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Cambridge: Polity Press. Folkestad, B., Klausen, J.E., Saglie, J. and Segaard, S.B. (2021) ‘When do consultative referendums improve democracy? Evidence from local referendums in Norway’, International Political Science Review, 42(2): 213–228. Gendźwiłł, A., Swianiewicz, P., Houlberg, K. and Klausen, J.E. (forthcoming) Municipal Territorial Reforms of 21st Century in Europe, Bristol: Bristol University Press. Glomsrud, H.R. (2017) Byråkraten mellom barken og veden, (master thesis), Oslo: University of Oslo.

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Goldsmith, M.J. and Page, E.C. (2010) Changing Government Relations in Europe: From Localism to Intergovernmentalism, London: Routledge. Gormley, W.T. (1989) Taming the Bureaucracy: Muscles, Prayers, and Other Strategies, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gunlicks, A.B. (ed) (1981) Local Government Reform and Reorganization, Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press. Hansen, T. (1991) ‘Norwegian Local Government: Stability through Change’, in J.J. Hesse (ed) Local Government and Urban Affairs in International Perspective, Baden-​Baden: NOMOS, pp 2011–​2240. Hill, M. and Hupe, P.L. (2014) Implementing Public Policy: An Introduction to the Study of Operational Governance, London: Sage. Hlepas, N.-​K. (2010) ‘Incomplete Greek Territorial Consolidation: From the First (1998) to the Second (2008–​9) Wave of Reforms’, Local Government Studies, 36(2): 223–​249. Hood, C.C. (1983) The Tools of Government, London: Macmillan. Hood, C.C. and Margetts, H.Z. (2007) The Tools of Government in the Digital Age, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian. Houlberg, K. and Ejersbo, N. (2020) ‘Municipalities and Regions Approaching the Limit of Decentralization?’, in P.M. Christiansen, J. Elklit and P. Nedergaard (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Danish Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 141–159. Ivanyna, M. and Shah, A. (2014) ‘How Close is Your Government to Its People? Worldwide Indicators on Localization and Decentralization’, Economics. The Open-​Access, Open-​Assessment e-​Journal, 8(3): 1. Kjellberg, F. (1985) ‘Local Government Reorganization and the Development of the Welfare State’, Journal of Public Policy, 5(2): 215–​239. Kjellberg, F. and Dente, B. (1988) The Dynamics of Institutional Change: Local Government Reorganization in Western Democracies, London: Sage. Kjærgaard, M., Houlberg, K., Blom-​Hansen, J., Vabo, S.I. and Sandberg, S. (2020) De nordiske kommunalreformer. Hvilken betydning har nationale reformstrategier haft for tilblivelsen og omfanget af reformerne i Danmark, Norge og Finland?, København: VIVE –​Det Nationale Forsknings-​og Analysecenter for Velfærd. Klausen, J.E., Askim, J. and Vabo, S.I. (2016) ‘Kommunereformen i Norge’, in J.E. Klausen, J. Askim and S.I. Vabo, (eds) Kommunereform i perspektiv, Oslo: Fagbokforlaget, pp 26–​46. Klausen, J.E., Askim, J. and Christensen, T. (2019) ‘Local Government Reform: Compromise through Cross-​Cutting Cleavages’, Political Studies Review, (online first) doi:10.1177/​1478929919887649. KMD (2008) Eit sterkt lokaldemokrati. St.meld. nr. 33 (2007–​2008) (report to Parliament), Oslo: Kommunal-​og moderniseringsdepartementet.

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KMD (2014a) Kommunereform. Meldingsdel i kommuneproposisjonen 2015 (Prop. 95 S), Oslo: Kommunal-​og moderniseringsdepartementet. KMD (2014b) Kriterier for god kommunestruktur: delrapport fra ekspertutvalg, Oslo: Kommunal-​og moderniseringsdepartementet. KMD (2014c) Kriterier for god kommunestruktur. Sluttrapport fra ekspertutvalg, Oslo: Norge Kommunal-​og, moderniseringsdepartementet. KMD (2017) Endringer i kommunestrukturen. Prop. 96 S (2016–​2017), Oslo: KMD. Kreci, V. and Ymeri, B. (2010) ‘Conceptualizing Territorial Reorganization Policy Interventions in the Republic of Macedonia’, in P. Swianiewicz (ed) Territorial Consolidation Reforms in Europe, Budapest: Open Society Institute, pp 129–​158. Kuhlmann, S. and Wollmann, H. (2014) Introduction to Comparative Public Administration: Administrative Systems and Reforms in Europe, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Ladner, A., Keuffer, N. and Baldersheim, H. (2016) ‘Measuring Local Autonomy in 39 Countries (1990–​2014)’, Regional and Federal Studies 26(3): 321–​357. Mayntz, R. (1983) ‘The Conditions of Effective Public Policy: A New Challenge for Policy Analysis’, Policy and Politics, 11(2): 123–​143. Meligrana, J. (2004) Redrawing Local Government Boundaries: An International Study of Politics, Procedures, and Decisions, Vancouver: UBC Press. Mouritzen, P.E. (2009) ‘Strukturkommissionen: Mellem politik og faglighed’, in J.G. Christensen, P.E. Mouritzen and A.S. Nørgaard(eds) De store Kommissioner: Vise mænd, smagsdommere eller nyttige idioter?, Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, pp 165–​188. Mouritzen, P.E. (2010) ‘The Danish Revolution in Local Government: How and Why?’ in H. Baldersheim and L.E. Rose (eds) Territorial Choice. The Politics of Boundaries and Borders, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian, pp 21–​41. Munk Christiansen, P. and Klitgaard, M.B. (2008) Den utænkelige reform: strukturreformens tilblivelse 2002–​2 005, Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforl. Pressman, J.L. and Wildavsky, A. (1984) Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland: Or, Why It’s Amazing that Federal Programs Work at all: This Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration: As Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build Morals on a Foundation of Ruined Hopes, 3rd ed., Berkeley, CA: California University Press. Salamon, L.E. (2002) The Tools of Government. A Guide to the New Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Sandberg, S. (2014) ‘Frivillighet och tvång i komunstrukturreformerna i Finland 2005–​2014’, Plan, 46(2): 22–​25. Scharpf, F.W. (1988) ‘The Joint-​Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration’, Public Administration, 66(3): 239–​278. Sellers, J.M. and Lidström, A. (2007) ‘Decentralization, Local Government, and the Welfare State’, Governance, 20(4): 609–​632. Sellers, J.M., Lidström, A. and Bae, Y. (2020) Multilevel Democracy. How Local Institutions and Civil Society Shape the Modern State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sharpe, L.J. (1979) Decentralist Trends in Western Democracies, London: Sage. Skelcher, C. (2005) ‘Jurisdictional Integrity, Polycentrism, and the Design of Democratic Governance’, Governance, 18: 89–​110. Swianiewicz, P. (2010) Territorial Consolidation Reforms in Europe, Budapest: Open Society Institute. Vedung, E., Bemelmans-​Videc, M.-​L. and Rist, R.C. (1998) Carrots, Sticks & Sermons: Policy Instruments & Their Evaluation, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

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5

One Size Does Not Fit All: Growing Cities and Shrinking Towns in the Spanish Local Map Carmen Navarro and Esther Pano

Introduction One of the most striking features of the Spanish local system is the varied size of municipalities and particularly the high number of very small governmental units. Indeed, 50 per cent of municipalities have less than 500 inhabitants and 1,360 have less than 100 inhabitants. However, big cities like Madrid (3.2 million inhabitants), Barcelona (1.6), Seville (0.8), ten other cities with more than 300,000 and an additional 50 cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants are also part of this diverse landscape. Some authors have referred to the Spanish local system as the ‘local galaxy’ (Botella, 1992) and they are right. The galaxy comprises big stars, medium planets and thousands of tiny asteroids. Such a picture indicates that Spain has been absent from the trend of territorial consolidation reforms that started in the 1950s in Scandinavian countries and have continued through the present day. Just between 2008 and 2017, municipal territorial amalgamation has occurred in 15 European countries (Swianiewicz, 2018). Making local governments perform more functions, thereby generating economies of scale and reducing problems of free-​riding, which have been the intended goals behind such reforms (Swianiewicz, 2010). In Spain, consolidation reforms have barely been present in the national political conversation. Only few proposals have been considered but never adopted. The most recent has been in the local government reform of 2013,

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where an attempt to merge municipalities was included in a first draft of the relevant statute (Navarro and Pano, 2019), but it was omitted from the final version, thus illustrating how territorial organization reforms are among the most politically difficult (Swianiewicz, 2018). On the contrary, historical inertia has defined the (non)evolution of the local map. For provinces, the number of territorial boundaries are exactly the same as they were almost two centuries ago. For municipalities, their number and territorial limits are very similar to what we could find a century ago. In 1813, there were about 12,000 villages, while the census of 1900 gave a figure of 9,214. Today the number of municipalities (1,824) is indeed lower, but not so much lower as to represent a substantial change in the local map. The choice of no change in combination with a rigid legal system regulating local government has had its consequences, which we attempt to analyse in the present chapter. We argue that Spanish territorial diversity does not find a correspondence in a flexible legal system adapted to different realities, big and small, rural and urban. Rather, all municipalities are bound by practically the same rules set by the national government. Very similar electoral rules, functional capacities, organizational criteria and financial regulations apply to all. Further, even in the few aspects in which the system does allow for variation based on population, it does not meet the real needs of cities and towns. To find the causes of the homogeneity of the Spanish local regime one has to go back to the Constitution of 1812, which promoted the territorial standardization of Spain as the expression of the liberal idea of equality and, related to it, the building of the nation, which implied the control of municipal government. Municipalities (municipum in Latin), whose existence dated back to the times of the Roman Empire, had been the first citizens’ communities in Hispania. In the Middle Ages, the Crown, via special charters, granted them the status of cities or towns, as well as a certain degree of autonomy. In modern times, the rise of liberal democracy meant the submission of municipal government to the parliament (Orduña, 2005). Interestingly, the Spanish model of decentralization does not impose this homogeneity. Under the current constitutional system, which began in 1978, there is room for flexibility. Both the state (via basic regulation) and autonomous communities (regional level of government) can diversify aspects of municipalities’ functioning to adapt them to their distinctive characteristics, but they have not done so. What we find instead is the hyper-​regulation of the state of local government. Under its power to pass ‘basic’ legislation, the central government has actually regulated local government extensively, even getting into minute detail, with a homogenizing logic. Far from ruling

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that the state has exceeded its authority, the Constitutional Court has, in fact, affirmed the state’s regulation of local matters. This ‘one system for all’ circumstance has neither normative nor practical justification. Additionally, it produces inefficiencies and binds municipalities up in a sort of straitjacket. It particularly affects both ends of the population continuum of municipalities: big cities and small towns. In the case of big cities, the homogeneous state of affairs prevents them from developing all of their potential. The fact that, for instance, functional responsibilities are the same for all local governments with more than 50,000 inhabitants limits their capacities to develop autonomous policies in key areas for the management of the city, such as immigration and economic development. At the other end of the continuum, in the case of the small villages and also referred to functional responsibilities, the legal system forces them to assume some compulsory services that they are not able to meet. The present chapter reflects on this structural situation, presenting its elements, pointing to the inefficiencies and examining its effects and implications. It focuses on the four dimensions of local government functioning where this homogeneity has the greatest impact: electoral, functional, organizational and financial. After presenting the characteristics of the Spanish local map and its evolution as a way to contextualize the topic, this chapter elaborates on each of these four dimensions, showing how and why one size does not fit all.

The Spanish municipal map The debate over the design and efficiency of the Spanish municipal map has been a never-​ending discussion in both academic and political terms. In fact, various governments and plans have advocated a merging, or a reduction of the number, of municipalities. Attempts at amalgamation are present in the history of local government in Spain even though none of them have succeeded in restructuring the municipal map. In fact, since the Constitution of 1812, and until 2001, there have been 11 projects to amalgamate municipalities (Burgueño and Lasso de la Vega, 2002: 70). Liberal governments supported some of these, while technocrats from the Franco regime supported others, but none of them achieved any success. The limits of population proposed were also completely different: from 150–​200 inhabitants in the projects of 1845 and 1903, to a minimum of 500 inhabitants in 1902, 1906 and 1960, to 2,000–​2,500 in 1860 and 1975. Other reform projects of 1884, 1966 and 1971, suggested various solutions related to supra-​municipal collaboration (Burgueño, 2004). In fact, the last attempt took place in 2013 in the framework of austerity programmes

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promoted by European institutions. Territorial and administrative reforms have often been among the requirements of the ‘memorandums of understanding’ that have been issued by the European troika in the context of the global recession. In 2013, the Spanish government passed a reform of the Local Government Act, the first draft of which showed a clear intention to reduce the number of municipalities. However, the final version of the statute included only some vague incentives to merge entities. Spain currently has an extremely fragmented and unevenly distributed municipal map. In 2018, there were 8,124 municipalities. As shown in Table 5.1, the majority of Spanish municipalities are very small. Towns with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants represent 84 per cent of Spanish municipalities. However, most Spaniards (87 per cent) reside in towns with more than 5,000 inhabitants. The figures show a small number of densely populated areas, while the vast majority of municipalities are extremely small and are inhabited by a small percentage of the Spanish population. This phenomenon developed over decades but has recently received more public interest, including coverage in the popular press, which has created a new expression to refer to the sparsely populated municipalities: ‘empty Spain’ (del Molino, 2016). This whole picture does not seem to change spontaneously. During the past few years, new municipalities have separated into smaller muncipalities and, Table 5.1: Municipalities and population in Spain, 2018 Population

Municipalities

% Municipalities

0–​100

1,360

16.74

78,080

0.17

101–​250

1,476

18.17

244,003

0.52

251–​1,000

2,159

26.58

1,137,762

2.44

1,001–​2,000

877

10.80

1,245,796

2.67

2,001–​5,000

953

11.73

3,005,045

6.43

5,001–​10,000

543

6.68

3,804,913

8.14

10,001–​20,000

351

4.32

4,946,227

10.59

20,001–​50,000

260

3.20

7,688,220

16.45

50,001–​100,000

82

1.01

5,884,410

12.59

More than 100,000

63

0.78

18,688,524

40.00

46,722,980

100

Total

8,124

100

Source: own elaboration from INE information, 2018.

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Aggregated % of population population

One Size Does Not Fit All

although there are some systemic mechanisms to prevent new separations, the official registers show that every year one or two more municipalities have to be added to the general account. The combination of these factors results in a very distinctive municipal map, characterized by sharp contrasts and completely different needs. The small entities suffer from a permanent scarcity of resources, both human and financial, while the largest urban areas have to face extremely demanding challenges equipped with only the capacities and powers of regular municipalities.

Homogeneity of the legal framework and its consequences The electoral system All the aspects of the local electoral system contained in the Spanish Electoral Law (Ley 5/​1985 Orgánica del Régimen Electoral General), and more or less the same rules apply to all municipalities. The constitutional provisions of 1978 left the model of local elections unspecified, but decision-​makers did not take advantage of this capacity to act. They just copied the system for electing the members of the national lower chamber in parliament (Congreso de los Diputados), a system essentially based on a proportional system and closed and blocked lists. Only elections in very small municipalities (fewer than 250 inhabitants) were granted specific regulations. The result was that the same rules apply for a village of 251 inhabitants and for the 3.2 million residents in the country’s largest city, Madrid. The law has been uncommonly durable. In the period of 40 years since it was passed, no relevant changes have been implemented. The uniformity of electoral rules for municipalities with more than 251 inhabitants covers almost all elements of elections: simultaneous elections in all municipalities; direct election of councillors and indirect election of mayors; the stipulation that each municipality, regardless of population, constitutes a single electoral district; a closed list proportional representation system, utilizing the D’Hondt method for allocation of council seats; a qualifying threshold of 5 per cent of valid votes; and a fixed date to elect the mayor exactly 20 days after elections, at the first council meeting session in all municipalities. Only the number of councillors elected varies with size, ranging from seven councillors in municipalities with 251 to 1,000 residents to 25 in municipalities with between 50,000 and 100,000 residents., In the largest cities, an additional councillor is added for every 100,000 additional (ie, beyond the first 100,000) residents.1

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This general system covers 65 per cent of the municipalities and 82 per cent of the population. However, as mentioned previously, municipalities with fewer than 250 inhabitants follow different rules. Two different models can be found in this group: one, based on an open assembly, for some municipalities with fewer than 100 inhabitants (those that decide to, and are allowed to, follow this system) and another, based on a majority open list system, for the rest. The first model is based on an assembly system called concejo abierto. Electors choose mayors directly, and all the residents are members of an assembly that acts as the local council. Originally, the first model applied to all municipalities with fewer than 100 residents, but recent reforms have limited it and nowadays it is very uncommon. Over the past decade, many municipalities that followed the open council system changed to the open lists system. There are, however, no registers capturing how widespread open councils currently are among the smallest municipalities, though studies limited to some territories reveal that they are not widespread at all. In Catalonia, for instance, only six of the 38 municipalities with fewer than 100 inhabitants function under the open council system (Pano et al, 2018). The second model applies to all municipalities with fewer than 250 inhabitants that do not follow the open council system. It implies the election of councillors by open lists. Each party or group of citizens submits a list of three (for municipalities with fewer than 100) or five (for municipalities with between 100 and 250) candidates. Electors pick two (in the smallest municipalities) or four candidates (in the rest) and the council is ultimately comprised of the candidates who have won the most votes. Interesting though their effects can be, these provisions for the smallest municipalities cover a minimal part of the Spanish local reality and only two per cent of the population. The general model (municipalities with more than 250 inhabitants) is arguably more relevant for an assessment of the electoral system. Looking at the general model, the first feature to consider is the functioning of the proportional system. And, indeed, the model works efficiently with respect to proportional representation. All political options manage to get representation as long as they pass the legal threshold of five per cent of the votes. Moreover, one might argue that having just one constituency for the whole municipality –​instead of the alternative first-​past-​the-​post (FPTP) system by district –​tends to favour city policies (Velasco, 2020). Inefficiencies do not appear in all of the municipalities in this group; they appear, rather, in the cases at both ends of the continuum: the largest and the smallest municipalities. In big cities, the inefficiencies are a product of council sizes, whereas in small ones they are the result of the obligation to compete in party lists.

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In big cities, councils are particularly small in comparative perspective. As was mentioned, council size grows with population. Councils in municipalities with 50,000 to 100,000 inhabitants comprise 25 councillors. However, from 100,001 inhabitants upwards, the council size increases only by one councillor for each additional 100,000 residents. Thus, the largest municipalities have disproportionally few councillors in relation to the rest. In Madrid, for instance, there is one councillor for every 56,140 inhabitants while in a municipality of 2,500 inhabitants; the ratio is one councillor for every 222 inhabitants. The result is remarkably small councils in big cities. The disproportion is even clearer when we look at other systems. From a comparative perspective, comparable European cities tend to have much larger councils, as in the case of Paris (2.2 million inhabitants and 163 representatives), Munich (1.5 million inhabitants, 80 councillors) and Warsaw (1.8 million inhabitants and 60 councillors) show. The relatively small size of local assemblies in big cities might have implications from a democratic perspective. Studies have found that some sectors of the population –​and women especially –​are disadvantaged in terms of local political representation (Vershelts et al, 2013 Navarro and Sanz, 2018). Immigrants, too, are under-​represented (Pérez-​Nievas et al, 2020). In these circumstances, the small size of the assemblies might operate as a bottleneck, limiting the entry of newcomers into politics. This limits diversity in political institutions, impoverishing the debate and, according to theories of substantive representation; it might act as a bias for policy selection and priorities (Wangnerud, 2009). A simple reform such as increasing the size of big cities’ councils might easily help in advancing inclusiveness. At the opposite end of the continuum, the subset of small municipalities seem to be functioning suboptimally as well, albeit with a different political landscape. Data extracted from the work of Martínez Fernández (2020) show how independent lists are more numerous and successful in smaller municipalities (Table 5.2). This singular trait in electoral competition suggests a more ‘personal’ way of doing local politics in small spaces, where everybody knows each other’s names and party logic does not apply. But this reality is not acknowledged by the legal system, which sets the same rules for municipalities with 1 million inhabitants and 251 inhabitants: a proportional system with closed and blocked lists. The threshold of 251 inhabitants does not suit the reality or the particular needs of local entities. The 250 inhabitants limit for open lists could be increased easily, offering citizens more options for political participation.

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Table 5.2: Independent lists in local elections in Spain (1987–​2011)

20,000 inhabitants

926 68.8

419 31.2

751

55.8

594

44.2

1,345

4,877 46.2 5,674 53.8 2,059

19.5

8,492

80.5

10,551

Total

Source: adapted from Martínez Fernández, 2020.

Functions The Local Government Act sets the functions and activities of municipal governments. Specifically, Articles 25 to 27 (and Article 28 as well, though it is currently revoked) define the different functions and responsibilities that local entities must provide according to population size. Thus, there is a first group of services that are considered essential, which are supposed to be provided by all municipalities (regardless of population size). This first group includes street lighting, burial, waste collection, street cleaning, provision of potable water, sewage services, access to populated areas, paving and maintenance of streets and roads, and food and drink control. The law established three additional groups of services which are compulsory, or not, depending on population size. A second group of services should be added for towns with more than 5,000 inhabitants including public parks, public libraries, public markets and waste treatment. A third group of compulsory services for cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants includes civil defence, social services, fire protection and firefighting services, municipal sport facilities and slaughterhouses. Lastly, cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants must also provide public transport and environmental protection. In addition to this range of services, Article 28 of the Local Government Act empowered municipalities to provide other services in order to fulfil the needs of their population. By means of this general reference, municipalities displayed a variety of services beyond the established standard. For example, activities related to non-​compulsory education, culture, social and elderly care, and infant care are included into this group of ‘non-​compulsory’ or ‘complementary’ services. Although there is a lack of official information about the impact and spread of these activities, their cost for the municipalities

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of Catalonia has been estimated to be around 27 per cent of the municipal budget (Vilalta, 2011). The vision on this fact had always been controversial. While a part of public opinion and the political elite considered this capacity to be an expression of self-​government and a manifestation of the political will of the city council linked to the principle of subsidiarity, others argued that city councils and local elites were using these activities to generate patronage networks, duplication of functions and an increase in municipal expenditure. Therefore, in 2013, Article 28 was revoked, and theoretically, municipalities must only provide services and activities that are specified by law. In fact, the justification of the reform was based on the belief that municipalities were developing activities beyond those that had been assigned to them, which led to expenses that had to be reduced. The reform was approved in the framework of the austerity programmes related to the financial crisis (Navarro and Pano, 2019). However, according to the information we have about municipalities in Catalonia (one of the 17 autonomous communities), most municipalities did not modify the range of services they were providing (Viñas et al, 2018). This structure of functions is designed according to the number of inhabitants of the municipality; therefore, we might conclude that it addresses the heterogeneity issue. However, the comparison between the distribution of municipalities according to the population and the pattern of functions already points to some elements. Regarding small municipalities, the law establishes that all the municipalities must deliver the basic services. This entails that even the smallest entities must ensure the provision of these activities. As Table 5.1 shows, 60 per cent of municipalities have fewer than 1,000 inhabitants. The majority of city councils are small or very small in population, and some of them also include different populated areas or sub-​municipal units (SMUs). This small-​scale municipal design might imply the existence of particular mechanisms to guarantee these activities. Nevertheless, the options are very limited and not specifically adapted to these entities. In fact, the regulation offers only two different systems, only one of which is especially conceived to address the lack of capacity of very small organizations. The most clearly defined way to compensate for this characteristic is a procedure called ‘exemption’. The exemption procedure implies that entities that determine that they lack resources to provide basic services can request that upper administrations act in their stead. This is a very distinctive mechanism that only can be activated under certain conditions: the services in question can only be the most basic ones, the municipality’s lack of capacity has to be provable, and a special administrative procedure must be utilized in order for the request to be authorized. The particular function/​service in question is

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then transferred to a higher governmental level. The exemption mechanism is, in fact, a last resort system and it is very difficult to know the extent of its use because local entities tend to find other solutions instead of utilizing it. Another system that can compensate for the difficulties related to small size is inter-​municipal cooperation (IMC). The Local Government Act includes the possibility of joint provision of public services through creating a voluntary association of municipalities. However, although IMC can be useful for aggregating resources and generating economies of scale, it should be taken into account that it does not involve any additional financial or organizational support. The structure of these entities is not easy and entails a complex administrative procedure. The obligations related to their regular operation are also arduous. These demanding conditions should be interpreted in the framework of a horizontal cooperation logic. In other words, IMC mechanisms depend strictly on the capacity of the members. Thus, it might be said that the IMC system can be especially challenging for small councils (Pano et al, 2018). The regulation does not provide funding or any other incentives to the creation and operation of IMC entities. That is to say, the value of the mechanism is based entirely on the benefits of synergy. Table 5.3 offers information about cooperation entities in Catalonia, and shows that smaller municipalities tend to cooperate less frequently than larger ones. The last support option consists of second-​tier institutions and multi-​level cooperation tools. Regarding second-​tier institutions, we find a number of different entities. Provincial councils have functions related to municipal support. Autonomous communities can also create additional second-​tier institutions. Aragon and Catalonia have created counties, which are also designed as resources for municipal support. Lastly, consortia are voluntary associations of entities that can include second-​tier governments, which would also be local institutions, and also upper administrations (autonomous communities or even the state). All these institutions are supposed to offer support to the municipal administrations, but they are not particularly designed to address the needs of the smallest towns. In fact, the aforementioned reform of the Local Government Act of 2013 tasked provincial councils with coordinating the activities of the municipalities with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants (ie, 95 per cent of the municipalities in Spain). However, the implementation of this option largely has not been carried out, possibly due to the lack of specificity. Other second-​ tier options, namely, the counties, seem to have been more adequate for the needs of the smallest towns (Pano et al, 2018), but they only exist in some areas. Finally, since consortia are voluntary associations their constitution and operation depend on the resources and capacities of the members. Concerning the largest municipalities, the system does also offer some adaptation options, but it is doubtful whether these are effectively suited to

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Table 5.3: Participation in cooperation entities by size of the municipality (N = 947) Municipalities by size

Not included in a cooperation entity

Inhabitants

Number

%

0–​250

60

32.3%

251–​500

36

24.7%

501–​1,000

35

22.7%

1,001–​2,500

29

18.6%

2,501–​5,000

14

14.6%

5,001–​10,000

7

8.0%

10,001–​20,000

0

20,001–​50,000

0

50,001–​100,000

0

100,001–​+

0

Total

181

19.1%

Source: adapted from Pano et al, 2018.

the peculiarities of the Spanish municipal shape. The general assignment of functions included in the law, involves only minor additional capacities. The general structure of the distribution of tasks does not really provide an adapted framework for the largest municipalities that develop additional services based on article 28 of the Local Government Act, which was revoked in the reform of 2013 precisely to prevent municipalities from carrying out activities that are not legally mandated. In synthesis, the attribution of functions to municipalities is based on population; however, it is not properly adapted to the particular shape of the Spanish municipal system. Regarding the smallest municipalities, the law establishes a range of basic activities that are necessary, and does not offer mechanisms particularly designed for the needs of these entities. At the other end of the continuum, the largest municipalities often seek greater capacity to act, but the legal configuration does not provide a clear framework for them to do so.

Organizational capacity The self-​government principle applied to organizational capacity implies that local councils can decide on the municipal structure. This has consequences in terms of both the political and the administrative structure. In general, the aspects related to organizational capacity can be adapted to the needs of the entity. These elements have more options for modifications.

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In the first place, regarding the political organization, some elements are compulsory, namely the mayor and the assembly. The local government board (executive committee) is mandatory for municipalities of more than 5,000 inhabitants, and councils representing municipalities with smaller populations can also create the body with agreement of the assembly. The regulation also offers the possibility of modifying the functions and capacities of the different municipal bodies. In that sense, although Spanish mayors have always been considered presidential figures with strong powers, the law offers options for transferring their capacities and powers to other positions or municipal bodies, such as the assembly or the local government board (Pano, 2017). The Local Government Act offers some possibilities for adapting the political architecture to the population size. Some of them are also related to the electoral system. The assembly system foreseen for the smallest municipalities (fewer than 100 inhabitants), that would imply the existence of a directly elected mayor and two chairs designated by the mayor, is a case in point. However, this system has become very rare. For the largest municipalities there would be two options. The first one is a set of articles contained in the tenth chapter of the Local Government Act and particularly addressed to the largest cities. The law also offers the possibility of special charters for the cities of Madrid and Barcelona. The possibility of creating bodies and structures, and modifying the allocation of tasks, has been widely utilized by municipalities (Pano, 2017). Thus, this materialization of the self-​government principle has proved intensively useful, and some municipalities have completely reshaped the design of their political architecture. The largest city councils are particularly active in applying these changes and adapting the legal configuration to their needs. Table 5.4 displays some information about this process for Catalan municipalities of more than 500 inhabitants. A very wide majority of municipalities of more than 5,000 inhabitants transfer tasks, while smaller municipalities seem to be more reluctant, although for them, as well, it is a very common practice. However, this autonomy does have limits. The electoral law limits the number of councillors, and the Local Government Act limits the number of members of local government boards to a third of the total councillors of city councils. This limitation entails consequences related to the nature and operation of municipal governments. Mayoral elections require the affirmative vote of council members. Although there is not a particular statutory provision requiring them to do so, mayors and municipal governments have tended to assign functions and responsibilities to almost all the councillors in their respective groups. This implies that more than half of councillors end up acquiring governmental functions. The limitation of the number of members serving on local boards constrains the effectiveness

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Table 5.4: Transference of tasks in Catalan municipalities of more than 500 inhabitants (term 2011–​15) Municipalities by inhabitants

Transferences of tasks

No transferences of tasks

N

N

%

501–​1,000

118

77.1

35

22.9

153

1,001–​2,000

100

84.7

18

15.3

118

2,001–​5,000

123

87.2

18

12.8

141

5,001–​10,000

80

90.9

8

9.1

88

10,001–​20,000

54

93.1

4

6.9

58

20,001–​50,000

36

90.0

4

10.0

40

50,001–​100,000

12

92.3

1

7.7

13

9

100.00

0

0.0

9

>100,000

%

Total

Source: adapted from Pano, 2017.

of those boards. In light of that constraint, municipalities have tended to generate alternative mechanisms for governmental coordination, leaving the local board as a formal structure. The executive branch members of local governments are also legislative branch council members, and they develop both positions. In the case of larger cities, some functions can be assigned to non-​elected positions; however, this occurs only infrequently. In terms of the bodies’ operation, members of local governments are also councillors, and at least the absolute majority of council members forms governments. Consequently, the number of members of the effective government exceeds the limitation established for the board and, at the same time, it ensures the easy adoption of decisions in the council. The provisions of the Local Government Act for the largest cities include the constitution of SMUs. However, the regulation does not allow city councils to generate systems for the direct elections of the sub-​municipal bodies, and it keeps all the aspects related to the election of the political structure under the general electoral regulation. In this context, these entities tend to become a mixture of participatory bodies and administrative decentralization. Second, concerning the administrative organization, the regulation also offers many options to decide the structure and organizational diagram of the entity. The municipalities can enrol staff, create units, constitute entities and decide on the delivery forms of public services. From this point of view, municipalities are able to develop adapted forms and mechanisms. The difficulties that arise in this matter concern the general administrative legal framework that affects all the entities of the

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public sector. The fact that both the central state and the autonomous communities can legislate regulations implies that municipalities must meet the requirements of both, which might be inordinately demanding. The result –​17 different governments and parliament regulations added to the central state general laws –​is a sometimes extremely intricate system of obligations and requirements. In general, laws related to transparency, administrative procedure, public procurement rules, recruitment of staff and budgetary procedure were conceived for the autonomous communities or for the central state structures, which creates difficulties when they are applied to municipal entities. This is particularly intense for the smallest towns that are supposed to implement this very same scheme with their reduced structures and modest budgets. This pattern can be also found in all the regulations that affect municipalities in one way or another, in the form of regulation that offers neither the largest cities nor the smallest towns sufficient autonomy because it is too rigid for the former and does not offer support or flexibility to the latter.

Financial system All municipalities are granted financial autonomy by the Constitution. Although the size of local finances is small in comparative terms (6 per cent of the GDP compared with an average of 11.1 in the European Union), local governments enjoy relatively high financial powers. They can tax their populations, most of the transfers they receive are unconditional and more than half of their total budgets come from their own resources. Local government revenues are mainly based on taxes (52.9 per cent, higher than the European average of 38.1 per cent). The main source of local government revenue is property tax, which as an average, represents around 27 per cent of all local government funds. Transfers from the state budget to the municipalities cover a smaller part of their current income (22.2 per cent in 2015). Most of the transfers from upper levels of governments are unconditional and, among the minority of transfers that are conditional, most of them are grants for specific investment projects. The structure of revenues and autonomy for spending is basically homogeneous among all municipalities, with minor specifications for very big cities. But the situation of both worlds –​big and small –​is notably different. With respect to revenues they raise themselves, big cities enjoy a more privileged situation. Their financial capacity is normally high, first, because property tax produces a substantive financial return to the extent that it is levied on real state that has higher value in cities than in medium sized cities or villages. Due to this structural aspect of the tax system, big cities do not

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suffer extraordinary reductions in income even during recessionary periods. By contrast, in rural municipalities the fiscal capacity is weak. For instance, real estate values in small municipalities are dwarfed by real estate values in cities, resulting in much lower property tax returns in the former. Revenues from other taxes and fees do not counterbalance this disadvantaged position. Therefore, for small municipalities, transfers become essential. However, transfers to small municipal units do not have a special status. On the contrary, the system ends up benefiting very big cities. The basic distribution criterion for transfers is essentially population size, but certain urban municipalities receive much more funding per capita than other medium or small cities. For big cities, the system applies some correction factors in the calculation of transfers. But it does not imply the existence of a general fiscal equalization system for a more equitable distribution of financial resources to all local units (Blair, 1992). It only benefits larger municipalities under the assumption that they have higher expenditure responsibilities, such as providing services to non-​residents (transport, cultural, parks, etc.) Our analysis of the structure of income by population (Table 5.5) shows that smaller towns are more dependent than larger municipalities on transfers from other levels of government. This implies that smaller municipalities have less financial autonomy and have less capacity to fund their activity with taxes and other sources based on their own decisions. Homogeneity in this dimension produces negative effects on the financial viability of rural municipalities and calls into question the validity of the constitutional principle of local autonomy (Velasco, 2020). The deficit of unconditional transfers to small municipalities is in some part mitigated by conditional financing by the state and the autonomous communities Table 5.5: Structure of income of municipalities by population (2018) Population

Taxes Property % income %

Transferences %

Financial income %

≤ 5,000 inhabitants

50.1

3.4

45.1

1.3

5,001–​20,000 inhabitants

58.3

1.9

37.0

2.7

20,001–​50,000 inhabitants

59.2

2.0

34.9

3.9

50,001–​100,000 inhabitants

63.2

2.2

30.9

3.7

100,001–​500,000 inhabitants

60.1

2.8

32.4

4.7

500,001–​1,000,000 inhabitants

52.4

1.4

37.4

8.8

>1,000,000 inhabitants

63.5

2.4

33.4

0.7

Source: own elaboration from data from the Spanish Ministry of Finances.

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(for projects not decided by local authorities but by these other levels of government). The under-​funding of small local governments is also related to the acute trend of depopulation in large parts of Spain. This demographic trend is an increasingly serious concern in the country, and addressing it has become a high priority in the central government’s agenda. Therefore, financial diversification of the transfers system –​whereby the demographic criteria would not be the only criteria determining the allocation of funds –​would particularly benefit small municipalities. Equalization funds would suit the Spanish reality, by taking into account criteria other than just population size, such as financial need, age (particularly high in small municipalities located in rural areas), the rural reality and the low level of revenues received from local taxes and fees.

Conclusion The Spanish municipal system comprises a high number of units and an extremely uneven distribution of the population. One might describe it as a universe of extremes governed by a single institutional rule. It might be said, in response, that local regulations already include some adaptations to different population thresholds. And indeed, adaptations to the population seem to be ubiquitous. However, as this chapter has shown, those adaptations are insufficient and even where they exist, the boundaries that limit them tend to impede effective municipal functioning. This state of affairs particularly affects growing cities and shrinking towns. Electoral laws provide specific rules for small municipalities, but only for those with fewer than 250 inhabitants, ignoring that above that threshold the same political dynamics of small municipalities apply. Regulation of functional capacities and the provision of services constrains the potential of big and very big cities, preventing them from developing autonomous policies in fields in which their activity would be abundantly justified. Organizational rules are too rigid and homogeneous, and overlook the reality of small municipalities and their limited capacity to meet the exigencies of many regulations (transparency, public procurement, etc.). And the current financial system lacks an equalization system which acknowledges fiscal diversity. The situation described does not prevent the local system from functioning. Informal practices correct some of the defects; ad hoc decisions compensate for others. This allows municipalities to navigate the formal uniformity and to succeed in meeting citizens’ demands, and municipal government has been emerging as a level of government that is highly appreciated by citizens. However, as this contribution has shown, relatively straightforward reforms are possible and the fate of ‘one size fits all’ might ultimately be reversed.

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Note 1

And one more in case the resulting number is even.

References Blair, P. (1992) ‘Financial Equalisation between Local and Regional Authorities in European Countries’, Local Government Studies, 18(4): 7–​27. Botella, J. (1992) ‘La galaxia local en el sistema político español’, Revista de Estudios Políticos, 76: 145–​160. Burgueño, J. (2004) ‘El eterno debate sobre la reforma del mapa municipal. El caso de Cataluña’, Revista de Geografía, 3: 7–​33 Burgueño, J. and Lasso de la Vega, F. (2002) Història del mapa municipal de Catalunya, Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya. Del Molino, S. (2016) La España vacía: viaje por un país que nunca fue, Madrid: Turner. Martínez Fernández, J.B. (2020) Los partidos de ámbito local en España, entre la vieja política y el nuevo municipalismo (1987–​2011). Doctoral thesis, University of Murcia. Navarro, C. and Sanz, A. (2018) ‘The Social Base and Career Development of Spanish Mayors’, Revista española de ciencia política, 46: 21–​48. Navarro, C. and Pano, E. (2019) ‘Spanish Local Government and the Austerity Plan: In the Eye of the Perfect Storm’, in A. Lippi and T.N. Tsekos (eds) Local Public Services in Times of Austerity across Mediterranean Europe, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 95–​114. Orduña, E. (2005) Historia del Municipalismo Español, Madrid: Iustel. Pano, E. (2017) Homogeneïtat i heterogeneïtat en la forma de govern municipal. Doctoral thesis, University of Barcelona. Pano, E., Medir, L., Puiggros, C. and Magre, J. (2018) ‘Layer upon Layer: The Position of Inter-​Municipal Cooperation in the Spanish Quasi-​ Federal System –​the Case of Catalonia’, in F. Teles and P. Swianiewicz (eds) Inter-​Municipal Cooperation in Europe. Institutions and governance, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Pérez-​Nievas, S., Vintila, D., Pamies, Ch. and Paradés, M. (2020) ‘La presencia de los inmigrantes en la política local está muy por debajo de su peso demográfico en la sociedad española’, Observatorio Social de la Caixa 2020, Barcelona: Fundació La Caixa. Swianiewicz, P. (2010) ‘If Territorial Fragmentation Is a Problem, Is Amalgamation a Solution? An East European Perspective’, Local Government Studies, 36(2): 183–​203. Swianiewicz, P. (2018) ‘If Territorial Fragmentation Is a Problem, Is Amalgamation a Solution?–​Ten Years Later’, Local Government Studies, 44(1): 1–​10.

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Velasco Caballero, F. (2020) ‘Municipios urbanos versus municipios rurales: homogeneidad y diversidad en el régimen local’, in Anuario de Derecho Municipal 2019, Madrid: Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, pp 21–​53. Verhelst, T., Reynaert, H. and Steyvers, K. (2013) ‘Political Recruitment and Career Development of Local Councillors in Europe’, in B. Egner, D. Sweeting and P.J. Klok (eds) Local Councillors in Europe, Wiesbaden: Springer VS, pp 27–​49. Vilalta, M. (coord) (2011) Despesa dels municipis catalans en serveis no obligatoris 2003–​2009, Barcelona: Diputació de Barcelona. Viñas, A., Pano, E., Barbal, M. and Magre, J. (2018) Més d’una dècada de Governs Locals en l’Anuari Polític de Catalunya in Anuari Polític de Catalunya, Barcelona: ICPS. Wängnerud, L. (2009) ‘Women in Parliaments: Descriptive and Substantive Representation’, Annual Review of Political Science, 12, 51–​69.

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Institutional Changes and Shifting Roles: Local Government Reform in Hungary, 2010–​2014 Gábor Dobos

Introduction After decades of the Communist regime and the Soviet-​type council system, a decentralized local government system was introduced in Hungary in 1990. As autonomy at the local level was considered a cornerstone of democracy, local governments gained wide autonomy in terms of their constitutional protection, service-​providing competencies and (formal) financial capacities. The extensive decentralization which occurred during the democratic transition resulted in many deficiencies on the sub-​national level: the local level was highly fragmented into more than 3,000 local units without any substantive differentiation in tasks between them, while the middle level (county governments) was designed to be weak with basic service-​providing tasks, and thus could not become a strategic planner and coordinator of the regions (see Dobos, 2016). In relation to their tasks, the local governments were under-​financed and the fragmented local level could not provide services in a cost effective manner. Based on the initial experiences of the local governments’ functioning, scholars and practitioners rapidly came to a consensus about the need for reform of the sub-​national institutions (Pálné Kovács, 2016a). However, as the prerequisite of a comprehensive local reform was the political consensus of the national parties (as any major changes required a two thirds majority in the parliament), successive national governments were forced to use financial measures to lessen the fragmentation and to enhance the effectiveness of the system (see Dobos, 2020).1

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In 2010, Viktor Orbán and the Fidesz-​KDNP party-​alliance achieved a landslide national electoral victory with a two thirds majority in the parliament and quickly began to carry out reforms that fundamentally changed the functioning of the sub-​national levels. While the formal autonomy of the local governments remained intact, the reform (which was carried out between 2010 and 2014) affected the fields of service-​ providing and finance, and fundamentally changed their position within the political system (vertical relations). In addition, the reform affected the relations of the local actors (horizontal relations) by strengthening the mayoral position. The aim of this chapter is to map these vertical and horizontal changes of the Hungarian local government system. To achieve this, I will use the results of three international empirical research projects: the data of the Local Autonomy Index (LAI) (see Ladner et al, 2019) for the vertical relations and the findings of the two POLLEADER projects (see Bäck et al, 2006; Heinelt et al, 2018a) for the horizontal relations.2 These empirical studies serve as useful tools to paint a ‘before and after’ picture of Hungarian local governments. The following section presents the chapter’s theoretical framework and I will argue that despite its shortcomings, the Heinelt-​Hlepas typology (2006) provides a suitable starting point for the analysis. I will then briefly introduce the aforementioned research projects and their methodologies. The analytical part concerns the vertical and horizontal relations of the Hungarian local governments. This section will briefly introduce the Orbán government’s reform of local government and examine how the alterations of the system decreased the effective autonomy of the local governments and how the shifts of the local positions are mirrored in the mayors’ perceptions. Finally, I will summarize the research results.

Theoretical framework and research methods Local government system typology of vertical and horizontal relations To analyse the horizontal and vertical shifts of the local governments’ position within the Hungarian political system, the classic typology by Heinelt and Hlepas (2006) is a suitable framework. The greatest strength of this classification is that it is able to capture the different aspects of power relations. The authors use the Hesse-​Sharpe typology (1991) for vertical relations and the Moritzen-​Svara typology (2002) for horizontal relations and they argue that combining these into a matrix creates a typology that is suitable for the classification of the local government systems of both Western and Eastern European countries.

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According to the Hesse-​Sharpe typology, there are three different groups of local government systems in Europe, based on their position in the political system: (1) the Franco group consists of systems in which the local governments are territorially defined communities with good access to the higher levels of the political system; (2) the local governments of the Anglo group have weak legal and political status –​they are regarded primarily as service-​providing local organs of the state, while autonomy at the local level is not emphasized; (3) the local governments of the North and Middle European group enjoy a strong constitutional status and relatively high financial autonomy coupled with extensive service-​ providing functions. As Heinelt and Hlepas note, the problem of the Hesse-​Sharpe typology is that it does not include the ‘new democracies’, the countries that established their local government systems during the post-​Communist democratic transitions in the early 1990s. To deal with this issue, they created a Central-​ East European group for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Heinelt and Hlepas (2006: 27) claim that the local governments of this group are similar to the local authorities of the North and Middle European group regarding their service-​providing capacities and financial independence, but they form a distinct category because of their historical background and the radical decentralization that took place in these countries during the democratic transition. The problem with the Central-​E ast European group is twofold. First, according to Swianiewicz (2014), there are more differences than similarities between the countries of this group. The local governments of these countries share some common characteristics3, but there are significant differences too: the level of functional decentralization shows high variation in the region; the territorial organization and the degree of fragmentation on the municipal level are different among these countries; the local leaders (mayors and local councillors) are elected in different electoral systems; the local party institutionalization shows different characteristics in the countries of the group (Swianiewicz, 2014: 297–​ 299). Although it is worth noting that Swianiewicz’s empirical typology consists of more Central and Eastern European countries than the extended Hesse-​Sharpe typology (thus, the variation in characteristics of the local government systems can be higher) and more importantly, the indicators (for example, functional decentralization and municipal spending) used by Swianiewicz describe the practical functioning of local government rather than the institutional framework (which is the basis of the extended Hesse-​Sharpe typology).

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Second, based on the characteristics of the Central-​East European group described by Heinelt and Hlepas, the Hungarian case fits into the group only to a certain extent. According to this extended typology, Hungary (in 2006) had local governments with a relatively high degree of financial freedom, a wide range of local services and strong legal protection. However, as I pointed out earlier, it was apparent even in the early 1990s that the system is under-​financed in relation to its tasks. The local governments had to fulfil their tasks with constantly declining financial support from the central government, while their de jure financial freedom was coupled with de facto ‘central remote control’ (see Vigvári, 2010).4 Thus, the Hungarian local governments enjoyed broad autonomy in theory (in terms of legal protection and the range of their tasks), but in practice they had little room for manoeuvre. Both criticisms of the typology imply that although the Hesse-​Sharpe typology (extended by Heinelt and Hlepas) can be used to describe the formal situation of the Hungarian local government (and hence it serves as a good starting point for the analysis), one has to use a measure that can capture the practical functioning of the system to be able to present the changes in the vertical relations.5 To depict the horizontal relations, Heinelt and Hlepas use the Mouritzen-​ Svara typology (2002), which classifies local government systems based on the answers to the question: ‘who controls the decision-​making and the executive functions in the local government?’ The four types are the following: (1) in the ‘strong mayor form’ a directly elected mayor controls the local council and directs the executive organs both formally and in practice; (2) in ‘committee-​ leader form’ the executive functions are shared between the person who is the political leader of the community and the local council, but that person does not necessarily have control over the council; (3) in the ‘collective form’ the decision-​making and the control of execution is in the hands of a collegiate body consisting of the members of the council and the mayor; (4) in the ‘council-​manager form’ the mayor primarily has ceremonial functions, the council (formally presided by the mayor) controls the decision-​making, while the executive functions are in the hands of a professional administrative manager (Heinelt and Hlepas, 2006: 31–​32). According to this typology, Hungary falls into the ‘strong mayor’ type. Formally, the local council and the mayor are equal partners: in the power-​ sharing structure, the council makes decisions and the mayor is in charge of execution (although mayor can act as a decision-​maker in certain cases). In practice, however, the directly elected mayor can effectively control the work of the local council (see Várnagy and Dobos, 2011). Based on this description, the Hungarian case fits into the ‘strong mayor form’, in line with the Mouritzen-​Svara typology.

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By combining the Hesse-​Sharpe typology (of vertical relations) and the Muritzen-​Svara typology (of horizontal relations), Heinelt and Hlepas created a classification of European local government systems. The classification can be used as a starting point for describing local government in Hungary: while it fits into the ‘strong mayor form’ in terms of horizontal relations, the Hungarian vertical relations fall into the Central-​East European group only to some extent. Therefore, the analytical part of the study will not only examine the effects of the second Orbán government’s local reform on vertical relations but also reflect on the Hungarian local government system’s position in the typology, compared to the other countries of the Central-​East European group.

Research methods Page and Goldsmith (1987) define the local government’s place in the political system by its freedom to make and implement decisions (‘self-​ rule’) and by its ability to influence the decision-​making of other levels of the political system (‘shared-​rule’). Thus, vertical relations can be changed either explicitly (for example, change of constitutional position or national supervision of higher levels) or through a change in local conditions (competencies, financial status, and so on). This differentiation is the basis of the Local Autonomy Index (LAI) project (see Ladner et al, 2019). The members of this international research initiative created a composite index to measure the autonomy of the local governments in 39 countries between 1990 and 2014. Local autonomy is defined in the project, based on the European Charter of Local Self-​Government, as a policy space for local democracy (Heinelt et al, 2018b: 33). I consider LAI in this chapter as an indicator that is suitable to describe the local governments’ position in the political system, and more importantly, as the project is conceived as longitudinal research, the shift of this position can be captured by the LAI. The index was developed to be a sophisticated measure of capturing different aspects of local autonomy. The research uses eight ‘self-​rule’ type indicators: • institutional depth (0–​3)6: the range of tasks local authorities can take; • policy scope (0–​4): the range of tasks for which local authorities are effectively responsible (in eight policy areas); • effective political discretion (0–​4): the real influence of local authorities over the tasks of the eight policy areas; • fiscal autonomy (0–​4): the extent to which local authorities can independently tax their local communities;

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• financial transfer system (0–​3): the ratio of conditional and unconditional transfers received by the local authorities (from the central government); • financial self-​reliance (0–​3): the proportion of own sources to all revenues of local authorities; • borrowing autonomy (0–​3): the extent to which local authorities can borrow; • organizational autonomy (0–​4): the extent to which local authorities are free to decide on their own organization and electoral system. The three ‘shared-​rule’ type indicators are as follows: • legal protection (0–​3): the existence of constitutional or legal means to assert local autonomy; • administrative supervision (0–​3): the extent of the central government’s legal and financial supervision over the local authorities; • central or regional access (0–​3): the extent to which local authorities are consulted to influence higher level governments’ policy-​making. Based on the LAI’s methodology, ‘self-​rule’ is a more important component of local autonomy than ‘shared-​r ule’. By differentiating between formal and practical operations with an emphasis on the financial aspects, the ‘self-​rule’ indicators can measure the effective autonomy of local governments. Furthermore, the effects of the 2010–​14 Hungarian local reform on vertical relations can be described precisely using this complex measuring method. In addition, the LAI can serve as a quantitative tool to investigate whether the countries of the Central-​East European type group in the Heinelt-​Hlepas typology really fall into the same category, and to examine the extent to which they have diverted from their initial levels of autonomy. The empirical analysis of the horizontal relations in this study is based on the Hungarian data of the POLLEADER (Political Leaders in European Cities) projects, which used surveys to record the perceptions of European mayors. The first project (or the first wave of the survey) was carried out in 2003 in 17 European countries (see Bäck et al, 2006), while the second wave was conducted in 2015 in 27 countries (see Heinelt et al, 2018a). The country expert teams of both projects asked the mayors of the cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants questions on various issues (in Hungary, 156 mayors were surveyed in 2003, and 165 mayors in 2015).7 Since some questions were asked in both surveys, they can be used to analyse the changes in local (horizontal) relations. Obviously, this method has its limitations. The projects conducted cross-​sectional surveys (that is, the two waves were not the stages of a panel research), thus the subjects of the analysis are not

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necessarily the same mayors in the different projects. Therefore, the changes of the mayors’ perceptions between the two waves might not be solely the result of the institutional changes. Still, my assumption is that the effects of the local reforms can be traced in the answers of the second survey’s subjects and in the differences between the results of the two projects. To map the local horizontal relations, I examined the answers to two questions of the POLLEADER surveys: the first focuses on the relations between the political leaders and the administrative actors, while the second investigates the influence of the different political actors over local authority activities. This set of questions allows an analysis of the power relations within local government. Finally, there is one question in the project which captures the changes in both the vertical (local-​national) and horizontal (mayor-​council) relations, thus the shift in vertical relations can be examined even through the perceptions of the mayors.8

Discussion Vertical relations According to the LAI, Hungarian local governments gained a fairly high degree of autonomy during the democratic transition (thus, they had a relatively strong position in the political system) and their autonomy level Figure 6.1: Local autonomy index in Hungary, 1990–​2014 30

25 7.0

LAI score

20

5.0

4.8

5.0 4.4

15

10

18.0

18.0

1990–4

1995–9

18.0

18.0

2000–4

2005–9

15.7

5

0

Self-rule

Shared-rule

Source: own production based on Ladner et al, 2015.

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remained more or less the same until 2012 (Figure 6.1). In the following, I will provide an overview of features of the local level based on the indicators of the LAI by briefly introducing the starting settings and their changes during the 25 years interval. Based on the range of their tasks (‘institutional depth’), Hungarian local governments can be considered highly autonomous: besides their mandatory tasks (for example, providing street lightning, maintaining municipal roads), they may also provide any voluntary services (that are not under the jurisdiction of other state organs). The freedom to take on any tasks was given to the local governments in 1990, and they retain it (formally) even after the Orbán government’s local reform.9 The range of functions for which Hungarian local governments are responsible (‘policy scope’) was quite wide in the first two decades following the demise of Communism: they were involved in the provision of education, social assistance, healthcare, housing and caring functions (kindergartens and elderly care). From 2013, there were major changes in two fields: (1) before the reform, the local authorities were partly responsible for primary schools,10 with the professional supervision of the central government. From 2013, local authorities fulfilled only a support function in education (they were the maintainers of the schools as the owners of the buildings and employers of the janitors and cleaners);11 (2) after 1990, social transfers were provided through the local authorities. In 2013, the central government took over most of the social competencies of the local governments. In both fields, the central government built its own (deconcentrated) institutional structures (district level government offices for social transfers and the Klebelsberg Centre for education) in parallel with the elected sub-​national institutions. Following the reform, the local governments’ policy competences clearly decreased, although they remain above the medium level of the LAI indicator. The effective influence (‘effective political discretion’) of local authorities over these competences was never high (for example, although the social assistance system worked through the local governments until 2013, the rules about transfers were mostly established by the central government). The only policy field of the LAI, where the local governments have effective influence is housing, via the social tenement system and in their involvement in the decisions on social housing supports. As I pointed out earlier, the substantive role of the local level decreased in the education sector and practically disappeared in social assistance in 2013. The local reform changed both the formal rules and the practical functioning in many policy fields, thus the decreases in the two policy related indicators caused a drop in the LAI. Regarding ‘fiscal autonomy’, Hungarian local authorities have never had much leeway. Although they receive revenues from taxes that are considered

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‘major’ taxes in the LAI methodology (for example, property tax, local corporate tax) and they can set the rates of these taxes to some extent, the proportion of local taxes in the local budgets was always relatively low at around 5–​10 per cent (Vigvári, 2010: 59). Between 1990 and 2012, the transfers were predominantly unconditional in the ‘financial transfer system’, as the local governments were subsidized from the central budget by means of per capita grants (they received a certain amount of money based on their activities). Since 2013, the local governments’ funding has changed to activity-​based finance (the municipalities receive a sum from the central government based on the calculated cost of a given activity), thus the transfer became fully conditional, which has resulted in a significant drop in the local autonomy level. The ‘financial self-​reliance’ of Hungarian local governments is relatively low. They are highly dependent on the transfers of the central government, as their own revenues12 add up to only 20–​25 per cent of the local budgets (Pálné Kovács, 2008: 221). This serious dependency on central government sources clearly limits the local authorities’ service-​providing ability since, according to a new regulation on local budgets introduced in 2011, only their own revenue can cover the voluntary services of local authorities. In addition, local governments can provide voluntary services only if this does not endanger the fulfilment of their mandatory tasks, and they cannot plan a deficit in their yearly budget. The result of this is that although local authorities may formally have the freedom to assume any tasks, in practice they are forced to confine their service-​providing to mandatory tasks.13 While the ‘borrowing autonomy’ of the local governments was originally very high, since they could borrow without restriction imposed by higher-​ level authorities, it was severely curbed in 2011. The conditions of issuing bonds and taking out loans were tightened up, as a new regulation on the process and the quantity of obtaining credit was introduced: local governments have to ask for permission from the central government to take out loans (unless it is for cover EU-​related developments, ensure liquidity or settle debts).14 The Hungarian local governments fulfil almost all the criteria of ‘organizational autonomy’15: they can hire their own staff, choose their organizational structure and establish legal entities and municipal enterprises. The ‘shared-​rule’ indicators show low variation in respect to Hungarian local government. Although there were minor constitutional alterations in 2011, the local authorities always enjoyed high levels of ‘legal protection’. The central government supervises the local governments’ legality through the county level government offices (‘administrative supervision’). In the first two decades after 1990, government offices could force the local authorities

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to change their resolutions only via court decisions. Since 2011, this legal control has been succeeded by legal supervision, which is a more powerful tool in the hands of the county authorities (for example, they can even fine the local governments if they find irregularities). Finally, the only significant pre-​2010 drop in LAI score is the result of the moderate decrease in ‘central or regional access’: in the first term, the representatives of the regional (county) governments were delegated by the local governments, then the direct election of the regional representatives was introduced in 1994, which lessened local access to higher tiers. According to the LAI, the Hungarian local government system’s autonomy goes against international trends (Figure 6.2). The starting autonomy of the system is quite high, with only seven countries of the North and Middle European group having higher values. However, based on the LAI, Hungary does not fit perfectly into this category, since its effective financial autonomy (described by four indicators) can be considered moderate at best. The other Central-​East European type countries (Poland and the Czech Republic) had significantly lower autonomy after the democratic transition. However, while local autonomy in general gradually grew in Europe, it dropped in Hungary following the Orbán government’s reform. This shift can be considered either as a decline or as a consolidation (that is, the Hungarian system moved closer to the international average by decreasing an abnormally high level of autonomy gained during the Figure 6.2: Hungarian local autonomy in international comparison, 1990–​2014 30 28 26

LAI score

24 22 20 18 16 14 12

1990–4

1995–9 LAI database

2000–4 CEE type countries

Note: Hungary is excluded from the other two categories. Source: own production based on Ladner et al, 2015.

108

2005–9 Hungary

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democratic transition). Regardless, Hungary shows the greatest fall among the countries covered by the LAI project, as local governments lost their position in the political system and a significant shift occurred in the vertical (national-​local) relations. This shift is clearly captured by the new (empirical) local government system typology of Heinelt et al (2018b: 44–​46), which clusters the LAI indicators into two dimensions of local autonomy (financial and institutional autonomy). Based on the pre-​2010 conditions, Hungary would be the member of the ‘Type IV’ group (along with Poland), with medium level financial autonomy and high-​level autonomy in terms of the institutional settings. However, as the result of the Orbán government’s reform, the country joined Latvia and England in group ‘Type VI’, which can be characterized by medium-​level financial and low-​level institutional autonomy.

Horizontal relations In Hungary, there is no formal hierarchy between the two elected local players, the local council and the mayor: they are in charge of different fields of local governance (decision-​making and execution respectively). The nature of the relationship between these two actors is often conflicting (especially in cases where the mayor and the majority of the council have different party affiliations). On the one hand, the mayor acts under the direction and control of the council, while on the other hand, the mayor is a member of the council who presides at its meetings, and who represents the council legally and directs the administrative organ of the local government (called the ‘mayor’s office’). The mayoral position has strong legitimacy rooted in its direct election, and as empirical research shows, they are the dominant actor of the local level in practice: the mayor has a key role in the initiation of local government decisions and effectively controls the whole decision-​ making process (see Várnagy and Dobos, 2011), thus Hungary meets the criteria of the ‘strong mayor form’. Besides the institutional changes, the 2010–​2014 local reform did not leave the relations of the local actors untouched either, as mayoral authority was clearly extended. Since 2013, the mayor has been able to veto the council’s decision once, if they consider it against the municipality’s interest, the mayor can decide if the council is unable to make a decision, and, in certain (urgent) cases, the mayor can decide without involving the council.16 The mayor’s control over the administration was also increased: before 2013, the council was the employer of the notary (the head of the administration and leader of the mayor’s office), but now they are employed by the mayor. This implies that although formally the notary is not involved in politics, the mayor

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Table 6.1: Separation of politics and administration according to the mayors First wave (2003)

Second wave (2015)

Local bureaucrats should as far as possible stick to politically defined goals

2.51

3.35

Politicians should only define objectives and control outputs, but never intervene into the task fulfilment of local administration

4.31

3.64

Note: the question given was ‘How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?’. 1 –​‘strongly disagree’, 5 –​‘strongly agree’.

might influence the local government’s administrative activities since the notary’s loyalty to the mayor is now an important factor. All these changes strengthened the position of the mayor, as they gained more authority over both the local council and the administration. Following the reform, the mayor is equipped to control the decision-​making and implementation processes more effectively, and with the new powers, and hence the mayor is not only the executor of the council’s decision but they can increasingly act as a decision-​maker. As a first step of the analysis, the separation of administration and politics will be examined. To accomplish this, I will use two statements of a question (Table 6.1): the first one is about the intertwining of politics and administration; the second is about their separation. Based on the data, the mayors’ views on this question had clearly changed by 2015, as they increasingly believe that the administration should stick to politically defined goals. Although the mayors of the second wave still agree more with the separation of politics and administration than with their intertwining, it is not regarded as self-​evident, as was common in the first wave. Sticking to politically defined goals became a more important characteristic of administration and it is no longer clear how deeply politicians should be involved in administrative matters. The next question (Figure 6.3) aims to explicitly measure the influence of local actors, and thus describe the shift in horizontal relations by comparing the two waves. According to the mayors, their own role did not change significantly between the two waves (from 4.83 to 4.88), and they obtained an almost maximum score in both occasions. Based on this, the mayors surveyed seem to be aware of their dominant role in the ‘strong mayor form’ institutional setting. While the mayoral position seems to be steady, the

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Figure 6.3: The local actors’ influence over the local authority activities Mayor 5 4 3 2

Local MPs or ministers

Single influential councillors

1 0

Heads of departments in the municipality

Municipal chief executive officer

First wave (2003)

Second wave (2015)

Note: the question given was ‘(…) please indicate how influential each of the following actors are over the Local Authority activities’. 1 –​‘no influence’, 5 –​‘high influence’.

influence of other actors visibly decreased: the standing of both the members of the local council and the leaders of the administration (the municipal CEO and the heads of departments of the mayor’s office) decreased compared to the mayor. The data shows that the influence gap between the mayor and other actors had clearly grown by 2015. The answers to the question also reveal that national politics increased in influence in comparison to local governments not only in institutional terms but also at the level of actors: based on the perceptions of the mayors, the second most influential actors of the local authorities are the MPs and ministers with local ties. The data suggests that local politics is shaped more by the actors of national politics than by the members of the local council. Finally, based on the surveys of the two POLLEADER projects, the vertical and horizontal changes can be described through the perceptions of the mayors in an integrated framework. The mayors were asked, in 2003 and in 2015, to assess how they would characterize the changes in influence among the main actors in local affairs during the last decade. The question had multiple ‘pairs’, on which the mayors had to decide how their relations had changed in the given time period. As the Hungarian surveys included both the ‘local–​national’ and the ‘mayor–​council (assembly)’ pairs, a coordinate system of the changes can be drawn (Figure 6.4).17

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Figure 6.4: Changes of the horizontal and vertical relations 1

2

3

4

5

6

7 7

NATIONAL

Horizontal relations

6

5 2015 MAYOR

COUNCIL

2003

4

3

2 LOCAL

1

Vertical relations

The data shows that, on the topic of horizontal relations, mayors perceived the same trends on both occasions, stating that there was a shift in influence from the local council towards the mayor not only between the two rounds of data collection but also following the democratic transition. Based on this, the strengthening of the mayoral position is not merely the result of the local reform after 2010 but can be regarded as a long-​term process. Thus, although formally the members of the local council and the mayor are equal actors, the mayor seems to have become an increasingly dominant player at the local level. Concerning vertical relations, the mayors in the first wave of surveying thought that the local level gained influence before 2003, while the shift shows an opposite direction in the period from 2005–​15. The average value of the answers in the second POLLEADER survey is 4.6, suggesting that the mayors perceive an increasing amount of influence from the national level. This result is in line with the findings of the LAI project and also with the answers to the previous question about the influence of national level politicians in the local governments. Figure 6.4 depicts the vertical and horizontal relations simultaneously. It shows that the mayoral position became more dominant while the local level in general lost influence in the political system compared to the national level. However, the time gap between the two survey waves is more than ten years and thus it is not certain that the shifts were the result of the 2010–​2014 local reform exclusively, but based on the data of the three

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research projects, one can assume that the reform affected the perception of the mayors.

Conclusion This chapter aimed to map the vertical and horizontal relations of the Hungarian local government system and their changes following the Orbán government’s local reforms between 2010 and 2014. The empirical analysis of the vertical relations (based on the data of the LAI project) shows that Hungary fits into the Central-​East European group to a certain extent: the autonomy of the Hungarian local governments is formally high, based on their legal protection and service-​providing competencies, but their financial freedom could be considered moderate at best even before the reform. Still, the starting autonomy level of Hungary in 1990 was considerably higher than for other countries of the group (the Czech Republic and Poland). Following the local reform, Hungary went in an entirely different direction to the other members of the group. Formally, the framework of local functioning remained the same, but the effective autonomy level of the local governments decreased drastically: with the alterations to the system of financing, the service-​providing capacity of the local level decreased, while the central government’s supervision over the local governments was strengthened. Thus, a significant shift occurred in vertical (national-​local) relations as the local governments lost their positions in the political system. Within the local government (horizontal relations), the mayor and the local council are formally equal partners, although in practice Hungary falls into the ‘strong mayor form’ category, as the mayor can effectively control the work of the council. The empirical analysis (based on the findings of the two POLLEADER projects) shows that the mayor was the most influential actor at this level even in the original institutional framework. The mayoral position became even more important following the local reform, which gave the mayor additional decision-​making competencies and more control over the council. This shift in local positions is clearly reflected in the perception of the mayors, who continued to rate their influence level as high, while the other political and administrative actors decreased in influence. Another important finding is that the influence of the external actors grew, with the players of national politics (MPs and ministers with local ties) now having greater influence on local affairs than the members of the local council. In sum, both vertical and horizontal relations of the Hungarian local governments changed as a result of the 2010–​2014 local reforms. Following

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the reforms, mayors are more and more influential rulers of their less and less important realms. Notes 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 13

Although the Horn government had the necessary two thirds majority between 1994 and 1998, the members of the governing coalition could not agree on the direction of the local government reform (Pálné Kovács, 2016b). I took part in the data collecting tasks in two of the three projects. I did the coding for Hungary in the case of the Local Autonomy Index with the guidance of Paweł Swianiewicz and I was a member of the team that conducted the surveys of Hungarian mayors in the second POLLEADER project. In the Central-​East European countries, the idea of decentralization was identified with the idea of democratization, the elected middle tiers of the sub-​national systems remained weak everywhere and these states had to face with the contradicts of the dynamically changing trends of local governments in Western Europe, such as the concepts of new public management or the Weberian state (Swianiewicz, 2014: 295–​296). In Hungary, the local governments faced a semi-​hard budget constraint: 60–​70 per cent of their funds depended on the annual decision on the central budget, while their mandatory tasks could be financed from the central government’s grants to a decreasing extent (Vigvári, 2010: 58). In 2018, Heinelt and Hlepas (with Kuhlmann and Swianiewicz) revised the typology of local government systems (and rejected the extended Hesse-​Sharpe typology) based on the results of the LAI project. According to this, the Hungarian case can be characterized by relatively high spending responsibilities and very low (effective) local autonomy (Heinelt et al, 2018b: 45). However, this classification cannot be used as a framework to capture the changes of the vertical relations, since it describes the post-​reform Hungarian local government system. I highlighted the value-​range for each indicator in parenthesis. Theoretically, the maximum local autonomy score is 37 (the sum of the maximum values of the indicators). In practice, the LAI scores of the evaluated countries in the project range between 12.0 and 29.8. In Hungary, the first survey was conducted by the Tocqueville Research Centre, while the second surveying was managed by the researchers of the Institute for Political Science (Centre for Social Sciences). The response rate was 59.6 per cent in 2003 and 43.6 per cent in 2015. The original project did not used the question about national-​local relations in the second wave, but it was added to the Hungarian version, therefore the results of the two waves can be compared. Act LXV of 1990 on Local Governments and Act CLXXXIX of 2011 on Local Self-​ Governments of Hungary. Until 2013, local councils could decide on the curriculum and they could even select the director of their schools. In 2017, the central government took over even the maintaining functions. At the moment, local governments own the buildings (that is, local properties were not requisitioned formally), but they have no competencies in the field of education. Sources of the own revenues are local taxes, fees and enterprises of the local governments. Furthermore, the first experiences of the practical functioning show that central government expects local governments to give up their own revenues and use them in the completion of their mandatory tasks (see Dobos, 2016).

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14

15

16

17

Besides the constraining of credit-​taking, the central government took another important step to consolidate the local level’s finance: the central government took over the municipal debt of over EUR 4 billion unconditionally (see Vasvári, 2020). The basic salary of the employees is regulated by central government and local authorities cannot determine the elements of their electoral system. The importance of these alterations increased during the COVID-​19 pandemic in early 2020. There were several cases where the mayors made decisions on important issues (for example, approving the local budget) without the inclusion of the council. In the coordinate system, the scores 1–​3 symbolize the increasing influence of the first member of the pair (vertical relations: local level; horizontal relations: mayor), while the scores 5–​7 imply the growing influence of the national level in vertical relations and the council in the horizontal relations. The value 4 means that there was no change in the last decade (1993–​2003 for the first wave and 2005–​15 for the second wave).

References Bäck, H., Heinelt, H. and Magnier, A. (eds) (2006) The European Mayor: Political Leaders in the Changing Context of Local Democracy, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Dobos, G. (2016) ‘Changing Local Relations: Effects of the 2010–​2014 Political and Administrative Reforms in Hungary’, in M.W. Sienkiewicz and K. Kuc-​Czajkowska (eds) Local Government in Selected Central and Eastern European Countries: Experiences, Reforms, and Determinants of Development, Lublin: Maria Curie-​Skłodowska University Press, pp 73–​90. Dobos, G. (2020) ‘Municipal Splits and Hidden Amalgamations in Hungary’, Miscellanea Geographica –​Regional Studies on Development, (online first) doi: https://​doi.org/​10.2478/​mgrsd-​2020–​0035. Heinelt, H. and Hlepas, N. (2006) ‘Typologies of Local Government Systems’, in H. Bäck, H. Heinelt and A. Magnier (eds) The European Mayor: Political Leaders in the Changing Context of Local Democracy, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag Für Sozialwissenschaften, pp 21–​42. Heinelt, H., Magnier, A., Cabria, M. and Reynaert, H. (eds) (2018a) Political Leaders and Changing Local Democracy: The European Mayor, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Heinelt, H., Hlepas, N., Kuhlmann, S. and Swianiewicz P. (2018b) ‘Local Government Systems: Grasping the Institutional Environment of Mayors’, in H. Heinelt, A. Magnier, M. Cabria and H. Reynaert (eds) Political Leaders and Changing Local Democracy: The European Mayor, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 19–​78. Hesse, J.J. and Sharpe, L.J. (1991) ‘Local Government in International Perspective: Some Comparative Observations’, in J.J. Hesse and L.J. Sharpe (eds) Local Government and Urban Affairs in International Perspective: Analyses of Twenty Western Industrialised Countries, Baden-​Baden: Nomos, pp 603–​621.

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Ladner, A., Keuffer, N. and Baldersheim, H. (2015) Self-​rule Index for Local Authorities (Release 1.0) Final report Tender No 2014CE16BAT031, available from: https://​ec.europa.eu/​regional_​policy/​sources/​docgener/​studies/​ pdf/​self_​rule_​index_​en.pdf [Accessed 24 June 2020]. Ladner, A., Keuffer, N., Baldersheim, H., Hlepas, N., Swianiewicz, P., Steyvers, K. and Navarro, C. (2019) Patterns of Local Autonomy in Europe, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Mouritzen, P.E. and Svara, J.H. (2002) Leadership at the Apex: Politicians and Administrators in Western Local Governments, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. Page, E.C. and Goldsmith, M. (1987) Central and Local Government Relation, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Pálné Kovács, I. (2008) Helyi kormányzás Magyarországon [Local Governance in Hungary], Pécs: Dialóg Campus. Pálné Kovács, I. (2016a) ‘Modellváltás a magyar önkormányzati rendszerben’ [Model Change in the Hungarian Local Government System], in A. Jakab and Gy. Gajduschek (eds) A magyar jogrendszer állapota, Budapest: MTA Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont, pp 583–​599. Pálné Kovács, I. (2016b) ‘A magyar területi közigazgatási reformok főbb állomásai’ [The Main Milestones of the Hungarian Territorial Public Administration Reforms], in I. Pálné Kovács (ed) A Magyar decentralizáció kudarca nyomában, Pécs: Dialóg Campus, pp 73–​85. Swianiewicz, P. (2014) ‘An Empirical Typology of Local Government Systems in Eastern Europe’, Local Government Studies, 40(2): 292–​311. Várnagy, R. and Dobos G. (2011) ‘Ki az úr a háznál? Döntéshozatal a magyar önkormányzati rendszerben’ [Who is in Charge? Decision-​Making in the Hungarian Local Government System], Pro Publico Bono, special issue: 130–​146. Vasvári, T. (2020) ‘Beneficiaries and Cost Bearers: Evidence on Political Clientelism from Hungary’, Local Government Studies [online], available from: https:// ​ w ww.tandfonline.com/ ​ d oi/ ​ a bs/ ​ 1 0.1080/​ 03003930.2020.1768852 [Accessed 24 July 2020]. Vigvári A. (2010) ‘Is the Conflict Container Full? Problems of Fiscal Sustainability at the Local Government Level in Hungary’, Acta Oeconomica, 60(1): 49–​77.

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7

Territorial Reforms in Bulgaria:​ The Cases of Municipal Divorces Desislava Kalcheva

Introduction The study of the reform of territorial and administrative division in Bulgaria has attracted the attention of both researchers and policy-​makers. A review of European academic journals has yielded numerous studies on amalgamation reforms and their consequences, albeit mainly in Western Europe (Wollmann, 2008; Boedeltje, 2010; Hlepas, 2010; Vrangbæk, 2010; Copus et al, 2017; Swianiewicz, 2018; Tavares, 2018; Garlatti et al, 2020). We have identified only a handful of papers dedicated to municipal splits. This trend can be attributed to two factors. Municipal splits are rarely the result of a targeted government policy. They rather result from bottom-​up pressure from local political elites and communities. Therefore, scholars interested in the impact analysis of government policies concentrate on merger reforms rather than municipal divorces (Swianiewicz, 2020: 28). The second potential contributing factor is geographical location. We have observed that the counties in Western Europe generate greater scientific interest compared to their counterparts in South-​East Europe. However, lately there has been stronger interest in municipal secession and more studies devoted to territorial reform in Romania, Slovenia and Hungary can be found (Swianiewicz, 2019; Stanuş, 2020; Dobos, 2021; Brajnic and Lavtar, 2021; Swianiewicz, 2021). According to the sources analysed, the most relevant scientific terms that define the process of separation of municipalities, are de-​amalgamation, de-​merger, municipal divorces, secession and splits. The first two are the most common, occurring when the process is preceded by amalgamation

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(merger) reforms. The terms secession and splits are used in a neutral sense. In our research, we use tall terms interchangeably. The assessment of the factors behind municipal divorces and the definition of the ‘type of divorce’ are of significant interest to researchers. Paweł Swianiewicz (2021) proposes a classification of municipal splits according to the relative size of two divorcing municipalities and group types of divorces as follows: • ‘Even-​stevens’ –​where two municipalities are relatively similar in terms of population size. Normally, this type of divorce occurs in rural areas with a local government unit consisting of two or more settlements (typically villages), and with two centres of gravitation of similar strength. In his calculations, this type is operationalized by the ‘abandoned municipality’ being not more than twice as big as the leaving partner. • ‘Nestling flying the nest’ –​a very small, new, local government breaks away from the much larger partner (in this case a local authority at least five times bigger). This situation may have two variants: the first, where the peripheral (suburban) district secedes from a much larger city, and the second, where a distant, small village separates from a larger one consisting of several settlement units of local government in the rural area. • ‘Young grown-​ups leaving the nest’ –​where a smaller partner breaks from the larger one, but the size difference is not particularly dramatic (between two and five times bigger). This classification can be used for an investigation of municipal splits in an analysis relevant to a single country or in comparative analysis of countries where de-​amalgamation reforms were undertaken. On the basis of our review of these studies, various reasons for the municipal splits have been identified: reaction to forced municipal amalgamation during the communist regime; small jurisdictions being more homogeneous and better suited to the individual preferences of local residents; different interests of the municipal centre and the periphery; involvement of citizens in local government; access to own revenues and local budget management; access to European funds, and so forth. According to Michael Illner (Illner, 2010: 222), ‘Other potential motives of separation are an expectation of economic gain, a desire to escape discrimination which the seceding communities had experienced within the central villages of which they had been parts, locally specific personal tensions and traditional antipathies between neighbouring villages.’ Paweł Swianiewicz (2021) proposes a model that classifies the factors behind the municipal divorces in four groups: institutional setting/​national level (including legal framework and central government policies); local

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political factors (including strong opposition interested in secession, citizen pressure, central-​level politician –​patron of the secession); economic factors/​ environmental factors –​(including secession of the rich; feeling exploited); cultural/​identity pressures/​environmental factors –​(including memory of past own local government; two municipal centres; long distance to town hall/​access to services). Swianiewicz’s model is based on a game-​theoretical model, which assesses the secessions of the Swedish municipalities (Erlingsson, 2005). Erlingsson’s model presents the reasons behind municipal splits in three groups: the economic push, the cultural push and the political push. The model proposed by Swianiewicz has been developed and expanded to meet the characteristics of the subnational policies of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. In 1991, Bulgaria was divided into nine provinces and 273 municipalities. With the 1998 reform of administrative and territorial division, the existing nine provinces were transformed into 28 provinces. In essence, the new provinces are now the same as those that existed until 1987. Today, the country is divided into 28 provinces (oblasti) and 265 municipalities (obshtini). It can be argued that since the fall of the Communist regime the only reform of administrative and territorial division at local level in Bulgaria has entailed the establishment of new municipalities through splits of existing municipalities. Most of these occurred in the 1990s. It should be noted that a study of municipal splits in Bulgaria has not been conducted in the last ten years and the financial and economic consequences of the territorial changes at local level after 1990 have not been analysed. The latest studies dedicated to the reforms in administrative and territorial division of Bulgaria are focused on the options for changing the structure of government at regional level (Dokova, 2012; Neikova, 2018; Kalinkov, 2016; Dimitrov, 2020). The authors argue that the reform of administrative and territorial division in Bulgaria should be linked to a change in the number and the status of the planning regions (NUTS-​3). They suggest that the planning regions should become self-​contained administrative and territorial units with their own structure and budget. It is important to note that these proposals are only discussed at academic level and that they are not supported by either the central or the local government. Proposals for municipal consolidation are periodically discussed, but meet with resistance from the representatives of both local government and local residents. In the period 1990–​2020 a total of nine new municipalities were established in Bulgaria. Although the number of newly established municipalities is low, we believe that the study of the process of secessions and the reasons for municipal divorces merit attention. The results from this chapter endeavour

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to fill the gap in the study of municipal splits and contribute to a future comparative analysis. It can be argued that the topic is of growing relevance on account of the recent behaviour of Bulgarian municipalities, which have called for greater autonomy. In 2020, the topic of municipal divorces once again topped the public agenda after the town of Obzor initiated legal action for secession from the municipality of Nesebar. A local referendum was held on 28 February 2021. The voters of the referendum were over 75% of the eligible voters. Over 73% of the voters supported the separation of the town of Obzor and the neighboring villages from the municipality of Nessebar. On March 24, 2021, the Council of Ministers adopted a decision on the establishment of the municipality of Obzor. A presidential decree is expected in September 2021. The main purpose of the chapter is to present the changes in administrative and territorial division at local level in Bulgaria (municipal divorces) in the period 1990–​2020, and to identify and describe the main factors and reasons behind municipal secessions. The future trends in territorial reform in Bulgaria are outlined. The research questions in our chapter are: • What are the main reasons (motives) behind municipal splits? What are the factors differentiating these motives? • What types of splits can be distinguished in Bulgaria? Do they correspond to the classifications developed in the theory? • What are the benefits from the splits? Do they match the expected results? The hypothesis is that the main reason for secession is municipalities striving for financial independence. We use the categorization developed by Paweł Swianiewicz (2021) to study and identify the factors and the motives behind municipal divorces. The initial information for the motives and the factors is based on a desk survey.1

State of the Bulgarian municipalities –​population, territory, finances As already noted, Bulgaria is divided into provinces and municipalities (see Figure 7.1). The province is the administrative and territorial unit responsible for the implementation of central government policy at provincial level, and ensuring harmony between national and local interests. Provinces are not independent chapters in the national budget and structure of management.

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Figure 7.1: Administrative districts in the Republic of Bulgaria as of 31 December 2019 Silistra

Vidin Ruse Montana

Pleven

Targovishte Veliko Tarnovo

Vratsa Lovech Pernik

Dobrich

Razgrad Shumen

Varna

Gabrovo

Sofia (stolitsa) Sofia

Sliven Silven Burgas

Stara Zagora Yambol Kyustendil

Plovdiv Pazardzhik Haskovo

Blagoevgrad Smolyan

Kardzhali

Capital District center Municipality center District border Municipality border

Source: National Statistical Institute.

The municipality is the main administrative and territorial unit of the local government. The citizens participate in the governance of the municipality both through their elected representatives in local government and directly through referenda. The boundaries of municipalities are established by referendum. Municipalities may cooperate to find solutions to common problems (Konstitutsiya na Republika Balgariya). The body of local government in the municipality is the municipal council. The body of the executive power is the mayor. The municipal council and the mayor are elected by popular vote for a term of four years. The average size of municipalities in Bulgaria in terms of population is approximately 26,200 inhabitants, with the smallest municipality, Treklyano, having a population of only 815 residents, and the largest municipality Sofia (having a population of 1,328,790 residents), followed by Plovdiv with a population of 346,893 residents. During the period covered by the study there is a clear trend of depopulation of small and medium-​sized municipalities and migration of the population to the larger municipal centres. In Table 7.1, municipalities are grouped by the size of their respective population. The most intensive transition of municipalities is observed in the first group (average by ten municipalities per year). At the end of the period, based on

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Table 7.1: Distribution of municipalities by number of inhabitants (1991–​2019) Group

1991

1997

2003

2009

2015

2019

Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of municipalities municipalities municipalities municipalities municipalities municipalities 29

45

55

69

76

II Group between 6,001–​10,000 inhabitants 51 (represent 21% of the number of all municipalities, and about 7% of the population inhabit their territory)*

59

54

54

56

57

III Group between 10,001–​20,000 inhabitants 79 (represent 23% of the number of all municipalities, about 13% of the population inhabit their territory)*

77

78

70

66

62

IV Group between 20,001–​50,000 inhabitants 62 (represent 17% of, the number of all municipalities and about 20% of the population inhabit their territory)*

59

54

54

48

46

V Group > 50,001 inhabitants (9% of the number 37 of all municipalities, and about 56% of the population inhabit their territory)*

34

33

31

26

24

258

264

264

265

265

255

Note: *The data is collected from publicly available sources. As at 31 December 2019. Source: National Statistical Institute, own elaboration.

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I Group < 6,000 inhabitants (represent 29% of the 26 number of all municipalities, and about 4% of the population of the country inhabit their territory)*

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the transition of a total of 50 municipalities in this group, the number of inhabitants increased more than twice. We use the Local Autonomy Index (LAI) (see Ladner et al, 2019) to present local autonomy, including the financial autonomy of municipalities in Bulgaria. Within the LAI project, the experts of the initiative have compiled an index that determines the autonomy of local governments in 39 countries between 1990 and 2014. The study assesses various aspects of local autonomy, including legal autonomy, policy scope, political discretion, financial autonomy, organizational autonomy, non-​interference and access. In particular, the project evaluated eight ‘self-​rule’ type indicators and the three ‘shared-​rule’ type indicators. The group of self-​rule type indicators includes institutional depth, policy scope, effective political discretion, fiscal autonomy, financial transfer system, financial self-​reliance, borrowing autonomy and organizational autonomy. The group of ‘shared-​rule’ type indicators includes legal protection, administrative supervision and central or regional access. To present the development of municipal finances in Bulgaria, we have used the following indicators from the self-​rule group: fiscal autonomy; financial transfer system; financial self-​reliance; borrowing autonomy. During the period covered by the study, an increase in the scores of the indicators was registered: fiscal autonomy (from 0 to 1); fiscal self-​reliance (from 1 to 2) and borrowing autonomy (from 0 to 2). No change was reported in the fiscal transfer system (score in 1994 –​0, score in 2014 –​0). The estimates presented are a small part of the indicators that were examined in the project. Based on the detailed calculation and presentation of the values of LAI for Bulgaria, we have noted a substantial increase in the assessment for the period. At the beginning of the period, LAI is valued at 36.7, and at the end of the period at 65.8. As a result of the fiscal decentralization process, the municipalities in Bulgaria have expanded their local autonomy in various dimensions. Local revenue in Bulgaria includes own resources (local taxes, fees and other non-​tax revenue) and transfers (subsidies) from the central government. Municipalities have the right to determine local taxes within legal boundaries. The local authorities cannot affect the tax base. They independently determine the amount and the type of local fees and other non-​tax revenue (Zakon za mestnite danatsi i taksi). Bulgarian municipalities receive revenue from the general equalizing subsidy, a general subsidy for delegated activities and a capital expenditure subsidy.2 During the budget year, municipalities may receive additional (emergency) transfers. The amounts of central government transfers are determined annually. The general equalizing subsidy for local activities is designed to provide a minimum level of service delivery at local level. The subsidy must provide

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unconditional financial aid to the municipalities for delivering public services at local level and to equalize their fiscal capacity. The mechanism for distribution of the general equalizing subsidy takes into account the ability of a municipality to generate tax revenue on an ongoing basis. This subsidy is not available to, and municipalities with stronger fiscal capacity.3 The revenue from the general equalizing subsidy represents the significant portion of the budget of smaller municipalities. The amount of the general subsidy for delegated activities is determined annually on the basis of adopted cost standards. The capital expenditure subsidy is determined on the basis of the following criteria: the number of agglomerations, the size of the municipal road network, population and territory of the municipality.4 At the end of 2019, the main average financial indicators for municipalities in Bulgaria were as follows: a ratio between the unconditional subsidy and the total amount of the subsidies received by the local government of 8 per cent; a ratio between own local revenue and total local revenue of 36 per cent; a ratio of local tax revenue and the own revenue of 43 per cent. Bulgarian municipalities are dependent on central government transfers, as are most local authorities in the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Higher local autonomy can be achieved by increasing the share of own revenue in municipal total revenue (over 50 per cent).

The procedure for the establishment of new municipalities The rules (requirements) for the establishment of an administrative and territorial unit in Bulgaria and for the implementation of reforms in administrative and territorial division are laid down in the Administrative and Territorial Structure of the Republic of Bulgaria Act (ATSRBA) (Zakon za administrativnoto i teritorialnoto ustroystvo na Republika Balgariya). The Act was adopted five years after the democratic changes in Bulgaria (1995). According to the Act the requirements for establishing a new municipality are: • population of more than 6,000 people in the agglomerations to be included in the municipality; • existence of an agglomeration –​a traditional unifying centre with social and technical infrastructure, providing services to the population; • inclusion of all neighbouring agglomerations, when they cannot establish an individual municipality or cannot join another neighbouring municipality;

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• the maximum road-​transport distance between the agglomeration and the centre of the municipality may not exceed 40 km; • the possibility of financing the expenditure of the new municipality from own revenue which is not less than the half of the average level for Bulgaria.5 The Act provides an exception to the rules for establishing new municipalities: ‘In cases when geographical, economical, communicational, historical and other reasons make the fulfilment of some of the requirements impossible, the Council of Ministers may adopt a decision to establish a new municipality in accordance with the Act’ (Article 8, para 3 of the ATSRBA). Since the adoption of the ATSRBA, only two amendments regarding the establishment rules for new municipalities have been adopted. The requirements for the minimum number of inhabitants and the maximum distance to the municipal centre by road have been changed. Until 1998, the minimum number of inhabitants was 4,000, and the distance between the settlements and the centre of the municipality was not more than 20 km. After 1990, all new municipalities in Bulgaria have been established through secession. The first step in the initiative to establish a new municipality is an official request from one or several agglomerations addressed to the respective municipal council. The request must be supported by signatures of at least 25 per cent of the residents having the right to vote in the respective municipality. The request must be accompanied by the opinions of the mayors of the agglomerations initiating the divorce. The municipal council must review the request within a period of one month and verify compliance with applicable legal requirements. The municipal council then submits its decision to the provincial governor. The provincial governor conducts further checks to verify the legality of the request and if all the conditions laid down by law are met, he/​she proposes to the municipal council to adopt a decision on holding a referendum in the agglomerations that would form the new municipality. Where the outcome of the referendum is in favour of secession, the provincial governor submits a report to the Council of Ministers within a period of two months. The Council of Ministers adopts a decision after receiving a positive opinion from the Minister of Regional Development and Public Works. The President must approve the decision of the Council of Ministers.

Municipal divorces (1990–​2020) –​motives behind municipal splits The first changes in administrative and territorial division at local level occurred immediately after the fall of the Communist regime. In 1991,

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six new municipalities situated within Sofia Province were established by a decision of the Minister of Construction, Architecture and Public Works. Due to the certain specificities, these territorial changes beyond the scope of this chapter. After the adoption of ATSRBA, and based on the Capital and Large Cities Territorial Division Act (Zakon za teritorialnoto delenie na Stolichna obshtina i golemite gradove), another set of administrative changes was adopted. Twenty-​four small metropolitan municipalities became urban districts (rayoni) of the capital. The changes are related to the introduction of the urban districts as constituent administrative and territorial units of the capital Sofia. The changes were made immediately after the adaptation of the Capital and Large Cities Territorial Division Act. No changes leading to the actual closure of municipalities have been made; it is not known that there was a registered initiative for this (Dokova, 2012: 44). The reforms in administrative and territorial division at municipal level in the following years also merit attention. The changes are of the same type and have led to the establishment of new municipalities through splits. Table 7.2 sets out the municipalities established by secession during the period 1990–​2020. Information about the population of the new municipalities and changes in the population of the ‘abandoned municipalities’ before and after the changes is also presented. There is a total of nine new municipalities established from five ‘abandoned municipalities’. More than 55 per cent of the ‘abandoned municipalities’ are situated in the same province (Plovdiv). In order to classify municipal divorces, we have used the model proposed by Paweł Swianiewicz. No cases of the type ‘even-​stevens’ municipal divorces have been identified in Bulgaria. The group ‘nestling flying the nest’ comprises three cases. More than 66 per cent of the divorces between municipalities in Bulgaria are classified in the group ‘young grown-​ups leaving the nest’, with the difference between the population of the ‘abandoned municipality’ and the new established one ranging between two and five times. In order to establish the reasons and motives behind these municipal splits, a desk survey was conducted. For the purpose of the survey, a questionnaire was sent to all of the municipalities created by secession, which comprised the following questions: • What are the main reasons (motives) for the split of municipality X from municipality Y. Do you believe that citizens are more involved in local politics following the secession? • What is your assessment of the financial condition of the municipality in recent years? Has there been an increase in the level of fiscal autonomy and local revenue?

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Table 7.2: Divorces of municipalities (by type) first year of operation (split in the previous year) Year Name of of old the municipality split

Population last year before the split

Population New first year municipality after the split

Population Type of first year divorce after the split

1997 Samokov

48,787

41,967

Dolna banya 4,787

‘nestling flying the nest’

1997 Maglizh

24,971

13,496

Gurkovo

5,943

‘young grown-​ups leaving the nest’

1998 Maglizh

18,720

13,556

Nikolaevo

5,090

‘young grown-​ups leaving the nest’

1998 Rodopi

78,418

40,880

Krichim

8,796

‘young grown-​ups leaving the nest’

Perushtitsa

5,445

‘nestling flying the nest’

Stamboliyski 23,069

‘young grown-​ups leaving the nest’

2001 Rodopi

40,783

33,933

Kuklen

6,579

‘young grown-​ups leaving the nest’

2003 Karlovo

69,415

57,326

Sopot

10,668

‘young grown-​ups leaving the nest’

2014 Velingrad

40,148

34,511

Sarnitsa

4,820

‘nestling flying the nest’

Note: the establishment of the municipality of Primorsko remains outside the mentioned cases. This change is defined as a special case, because the municipality was established from the territories of two municipalities Tsarevo and Sozopol. In the National Register of Settlements, the municipality is listed as a new municipality established in 1997. Source: National Statistical Institute, own elaboration.

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• Bearing in mind the negative demographic processes in Bulgaria, how would you assess the possibility of merging with a larger and financially independent municipality? What are the risks and benefits that you can mention from the amalgamation process? We received responses from five municipalities (55 per cent of the respondents). To complete the missing data for the rest of the municipal divorces, we used publicly available information, publications in local media and press releases. To identify and group the factors behind the municipal secessions, we used the model developed by Paweł Swianiewicz. The responses to the questionnaire and review of publicly available information warrant the conclusion that the main contributing factors behind municipal divorces are economic in nature and the main reasons are financial. The municipal splits initiated in 1997–​2001 stemmed from financial reasons. Until 2003, local authorities received shared revenue from personal income tax (PIT). Successful enterprises operated in the territory of the municipalities that initiated the secession. The majority of local inhabitants were employed at these enterprises (the place of the generation of the income and the number of the employees being the main criteria for distribution of PIT). Some examples are the new municipalities of Perushtitsa, Krichim, Stamboliyski and Kuklen. In this case, we can conclude that the affluent part of the municipality wished to split and become responsible for managing its finances independently in the interest of its residents. In the questionnaires, the representatives of the municipalities indicated, as the main motive behind the municipal divorce, the possibility to manage their own municipal budgets (see Table 7.3). Municipalities thus have the possibility to invest more in their territory. There is a unanimous opinion that infrastructural improvements in the new municipalities had been neglected. The funds from local revenue were primarily directed towards investments in other parts of the ‘abandoned municipality’. The municipalities that seceded after 2003 indicated as a motive for the divorce the possibility of access to funding under European Union programmes. These programmes finance a significant share of municipal capital investment in Bulgaria. Local authorities are one of the main beneficiaries of the operational programmes. In the second place, municipalities have mentioned reasons relating to the cultural identity and the distance from the administrative centre of the former municipality. The most common response is that after the split local residents will have the opportunity to become more involved in decision-​making at local level. Two municipalities (Krichim and Sarnitsa) stated in their replies that the reason for the secession was the distance from the administrative centre and the difficulty of accessing municipal services.

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Table 7.3: The factors behind the municipal splits in Bulgaria (responses to the questionnaire) Municipality Institutional Environmental factors setting (national level)

Cultural/​identity pressures

Economic factors

Dolna banya* -​

-​

Being used (exploited) by the other part of the municipality; striving for independence and own budget; opportunity to manage their own natural resources.

-​

Gurkovo*

-​

-​.

Being used (exploited) by the other part of the municipality; striving for independence and own budget.

-​

Nikolaevo

-​

-​

Being used (exploited) by the other part of the municipality; striving for independence and own budget; neglecting of the implementation of investments in the territory of Nikolaevo.

Proximity between citizens and their representatives.

Krichim

-​

-​

Being used (exploited) by the other part of the municipality; striving for independence and own budget; neglecting of the implementation of investments in the territory of Krichim.

Proximity between citizens and their representatives; highly developed local patriotism.

Perushtitsa

-​

-​

Achieving financial, social, infrastructural independence of the municipality.

Proximity between citizens and their representatives.

Stamboliyski* -​

-​

Being used (exploited) by the other part of the municipality.

-​

(continued)

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Local political factors

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Table 7.3: The factors behind the municipal splits in Bulgaria (responses to the questionnaire) (continued) Municipality Institutional Environmental factors setting (national level) Local political factors

Cultural/​identity pressures

Economic factors

-​

The first attempt at a Being used (exploited) by the other part of the municipal referendum municipality; striving for independence and own was unsuccessful (1998). budget. Not enough support from the local inhabitants. The successful procedure was in 2001.

Historical and cultural motives–​ Kuklen was an independent municipality before the 1979 reform.

Sopot*

-​

-​

Being used (exploited) by the other part of the municipality; neglecting of the implementation of investments in the territory of Sopot; lack of access to the EU funding.

Historical and cultural motives –​ preserving and strengthening the identity of the community.

Sarnitsa

-​

The request for secession was initiated in 1997. The request does not meet the legal requirement for a population of at least 6,000 inhabitants. The decision for establishment of the municipality was taken exceptionally by the Council of Ministers and approved by presidential decree in 2014.

Being used (exploited) by the other part of the municipality; neglecting of the implementation of investments in the territory of Sarnitsa; lack of access to the EU funding.

Proximity between citizens and their representatives.

Note: *the data is collected from publicly available sources. The rest of the data is from completed questionnaires.

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Kuklen

Territorial Reforms in Bulgaria

In relation to cultural identity factors, we should note that the two main amalgamation reforms have occurred during the former communist regime before the democratic changes. One of the reasons given in the sources for municipal divorces was precisely the desire to regain the autonomy taken away in the past as a result of municipal mergers. The first wave of the municipal amalgamations occurred in 1979. At the time, the reform was described as the most substantial and the most radical in Bulgaria. The number of municipalities in Bulgaria decreased from 1,389 to 291. Later their number once again increased to 300. The second wave of consolidation of municipalities was in 1987. Within the framework of this reform, the provinces were reduced from 28 to 9 and the number of municipalities from 300 to 249. (Kalinkov, 2016: 67). A search of the National Register of Urban agglomerations in Bulgaria shows that the nine municipalities that initiated the separation procedure have existed as independent municipalities in the past. Six municipalities were merged into others in 1979, and three were merged into others in 1987. However, only the municipality of Kuklen focused on these past events in its questionnaire, stating that this was one of the reasons sought for the secession. In connection with the factors from the group ‘institutional setting (national level)’, we should mention that all administrative changes are implemented in accordance with procedure stipulated in the ATSRBA6. Regarding the influence of factors from the ‘local political factors’ group, two cases can be mentioned. In the municipality of Kuklen, the first local referendum was unsuccessful due to the lack of sufficient support from local residents. In the municipality of Sarnitsa, the secession procedure took 17 years and the requirement for a minimum population of 6,000 residents has not yet been met. There is support from the central government for its separation and its request is in line with the exceptions provided by the law. Bearing in mind that nearly 28 per cent of the municipalities in Bulgaria have a population of less than 6,000 inhabitants, we can assume that the exception to the rule is acceptable. Where the central government is opposed to the secession of municipalities, it can use restrictive requirements to refuse future requests for secession. However, this would violate the right of local inhabitants to self-​governance. The result of the survey and analysis conducted, have confirmed the hypothesis of the study. The main motive for the secession is the desire of the new municipalities to gain financial independence. Economic considerations are among the main contributing factors for municipal splits. Nonetheless, we have observed a strong path dependency process, even though this is hardly mentioned by municipal representatives now.

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In terms of the responses to the questions ‘What are the benefits from the splits?’ and ‘Have they matched the expected results?’ we have summarized and analysed the answers from the questionnaires to present the dynamic of the indicator –​local revenue per capita. All municipalities except one (Perushtitsa) indicate that they generate stable local revenue and have no significant financial difficulties. These municipalities specifically note that local investments have increased. A significant part of the investments is implemented through European Union programmes. The answers pay special attention to the traditional dependence of municipalities on transfers from the central government, but this dependence applies to the majority of Bulgarian municipalities. In order to test the statements of the municipalities, we have traced the dynamic of the indicator –​local revenue per capita (tax revenue, fees and general equalizing grant) and compared the results of the municipalities concerned to the values for the ‘abandoned municipalities’ (see Figure 7.2). For greater clarity, we have divided the presentation in graphic form of the group of municipalities separated from the municipality of Rodopi and other municipalities. The new municipalities have gradually increased their own income per capita. Over the period 2014–20​18, they climbed higher and closer to the average values of the municipality from which they separated. Kuklen shows better results than the ‘abandoned municipality’ of Rodopi. Figure 7.2: Local revenue per capita and revenue growth for the period 2006–​ 2018 (Rodopi group in BGN)

Local revenue per capita

450

2006

400

2010

2014

2018

25%

350 300 250 200 150

17%

34% 29% 78%

28%

55% 54%

37%

128%

35%

45%

36%

1%

56%

100 50 0

Krichim

Perishtitsa

Stamboliyski

Kuklen

Rodopi– abandoned

2006

81

77

85

116

144

2010

145

119

132

264

145

2014

186

184

180

331

210

2018

251

249

230

386

287

Source: Ministry of Finance; Financial statements of municipalities; National Statistical Institute; Own elaboration.

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All municipalities report a percentage increase in their own revenue for the period. The revenue growth of Rodopi municipality is lower compared to other municipalities (between 1–​45 per cent). For the period 2006–​2018, the average rate of change of the revenue of the municipality of Rodopi is 27 per cent, and for the other municipalities the average value of the indicator for the period is over 35 per cent. The highest rate of change in revenue is reported by the municipality of Kuklen –​between 17 per cent and 128 per cent. Regarding this group, we can summarize that the new municipalities have the capacity to generate acceptable levels of own revenues. Referring to Erlingsson’s analysis, we can conclude that in this case the economic factor predominates in ‘The secession of the rich.’ Territorial parts of municipalities that have a higher income per capita (which is generally correlated with fewer immigrants, fewer people on social welfare programmes and lower unemployment rates) may wish to secede in order to secure financial growth. The premise is that secession will enable them, as independent municipalities, to handle their own tax base. In the second group of municipal divorces we have observed sustainable growth of own revenue due to the increase in revenue from local taxes and fees and to the annual increase in the general equalizing subsidy from the central government. The average rate of increase of the revenue of the ‘abandoned municipalities’ in the group is between 10 and 32 per cent. In the new municipalities, the revenue calculates an average growth for the period between 35–​46 per cent. We must keep in mind that the general equalizing subsidy represents a significant portion of the own revenue of municipalities. As at 31 December 2018, the share of the general equalizing subsidy in local revenue was as follows: Dolna Banya –​27 per cent; Gurkovo –​37 per cent; Nikolaevo –​53 per cent; Krichim –​31 per cent; Perushtitsa –​32 per cent; Stamboliyski –​ 32 per cent; Kuklen –​9 per cent; Sopot –​30 per cent; Sarnitsa –​43 per cent. The mechanism for allocation of the funds from the general equalizing subsidy supports the existence of small municipalities and allows the normal financing of their local activities. This is also a factor that allows maintaining financial stability in these municipalities. On the basis of the data received from the questionnaires, and the dynamic in the local revenue per capita indicator, we can confirm that the municipalities created by secession report a positive development in their own revenue. In other words, the motives and expectations behind the municipal divorces related to the financial independence are justified.

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Figure 7.3: Local revenue per capita and revenue growth for the period 2006–2018

500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0

2010

2014

2018

21% 30% 92% –10% –21% 25%

Dolnabanya

21% 33% 66%

Samokov – Gurkovo abandoned

40% 71% 38%

33% 25%

Nikolaevo

Maglizh – abandoned

63% 7% 47%

262%

14% 58%

4%

-12%

190% 147%

Sopot

Karlovo – abandoned

Sarnitsa

Velingrad – abandoned

2006

133

358

91

62

110

93

148

0

122

2010

166

283

151

107

138

137

130

0

147

2014

319

369

201

148

184

147

206

199

190

2018

286

447

242

191

257

240

234

207

262

Source: Ministry of Finance; Financial statements of municipalities; National Statistical Institute; Own elaboration

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134

Local revenue per capita

2006

Territorial Reforms in Bulgaria

Future trends and opportunities for administrative and territorial reform in Bulgaria The administrative and territorial changes at local level in Bulgaria occurred after the democratic changes and are the result of initiatives taken by the municipalities wishing to secede. There have been no initiatives seeking the amalgamation of municipalities during that period because their representatives and local inhabitants strongly opposed such reforms. This is confirmed by the answers to the questionnaires of the municipalities established through a split from larger municipalities. The stated motives against municipal mergers mainly stem from concerns about the decline and depopulation of settlements; lack of transport to the administrative centre of the municipality and access to basic municipal services; financial dependence on the new mother municipality; restricting the right of citizens to participate in the local government process; difficulties in financing important projects and local policies. On the other hand, new initiatives for municipal splits have also been identified in Bulgaria. The latest example is the initiative for the secession of the town of Obzor and its surrounding villages from the municipality of Nesebar. The main reason for the request is the distance between the settlements and the administrative centre of the municipality (more than 40 km) and the lack of investment in the town of Obzor. At the same time, tourism is successfully developing in Obzor and the revenue generated has been increasing on an annual basis. However, the request for secession does not meet one of the requirements for establishing a new municipality (at least 6,000 residents). The current population of the agglomerations is approximately 3,000 inhabitants.7 The municipal council of Nesebar did not approve the request for secession of the town of Obzor. After the negative vote, the request, the justification of the settlements seeking the split and the decision of the municipal council were sent to the provincial governor for an opinion. If the provincial governor gives a positive opinion, a local referendum will be held in the municipality. The question remains whether the exception applied to the establishment of the municipality of Sarnitsa will also be applied in this case. On the basis of this, and bearing in mind the declining population of small and medium-​sized municipalities in Bulgaria as an alternative to the amalgamation of municipalities, we can consider inter-​municipal cooperation (IMC). IMC is seen as a possible way to achieve additional benefits, increase capacity to deliver services, economies of scale, sometimes as an escape from the amalgamation of smaller municipalities (Teles and Swianiewicz, 2018).

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In the voluntary cooperation of municipalities, the process is imposed from the bottom up, and the IMC can continue for a certain period of time or for the achievement of a specific goal. In many countries, IMC has long been seen as a viable alternative for territorial reforms. In some of these countries, territorial reform is considered almost as politically impossible, due to several historical and social factors. This group of countries includes for example, France, but also the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia. (Swianiewicz et al, 2017). The positive effects and risks of the IMC are investigated in different studies (Swianiewicz, 2002; Swianiewicz, 2010; Swianiewicz, 2017; Baldersheim et al, 2010; Bartolini, 2015 Slack and Bird, 2013; Gendźwiłł et al, 2019). The Bulgarian Constitution and the ATSRBA provide possibilities for municipal cooperation. Municipal cooperation in Bulgaria can be in the form of municipal associations and in the form of agreements between individual municipalities. The National Association of Municipalities in the Republic of Bulgaria has been established at the national level. At the regional level, associations have been established, such as the Regional Association of the Municipalities of Thrace, the Regional Association of the Municipalities of Maritsa, the Association of the Bulgarian Black Sea municipalities and so forth. The most popular associations between individual municipalities in recent years are the associations in connection with the implementation of major projects funded by European Union programmes. A typical example is regional waste management associations. The successful construction and operation of regional landfills is a prerequisite for economies of scale and increases the satisfaction of local citizens. In 2018, the main objectives of municipal cooperation were defined: improving the quality of services of mutual interest provided; achieving more efficient spending of the financial and administrative resources at municipal level; optimizing municipal expenditure and improving the financial condition of the municipality; achieving economies of scale; improving financial control and transparency; implementing projects contributing to overcoming significant problems at the regional and local level. Bearing in mind the reluctance of the representatives of the local authorities and the local population for the implementation of amalgamation reforms, the IMC is assessed as a good alternative for achieving more efficient management of municipal finances and providing better services to the local citizens. The investigation of the details of the IMC in Bulgaria is beyond the scope of the current chapter.

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Conclusion The administrative and territorial reforms at the municipal level in Bulgaria after the democratic changes have entailed exclusively the establishment of new municipalities through secession. During the period 1990–​2020 in Bulgaria a total of nine new municipalities have been established. The analysis of the motives and the factors (researched on the basis of Swianiewicz’s methodology) behind the municipal divorces confirms the hypothesis that the main motive for secession is the desire for financial independence. The newly established municipalities implement a range of capital investments and manage their own budgets. Most local authorities have reported acceptable levels of own revenue due to the operation of many local enterprises and well-​developed businesses in their respective territories. Income from the general equalizing subsidy gives strong support to the local budgets. Based on the data received from the questionnaires and the dynamic of the local revenue per capita indicator, we can confirm that the municipalities created by secession are in a relatively stable financial position. In other words, the motives and expectations behind the municipal divorces that are related to more financial independence are justified. The local authorities and the population do not support reforms for amalgamation of municipalities in Bulgaria. The IMC can be considered as an alternative to the municipal amalgamations. Notes 1

2 3

4

5 6

7

The survey is based on a questionnaire completed by representatives of the newly established municipalities. Fiscal autonomy index increased from 0 to 5. The right to receive a general equalizing grant in 2021 have the municipalities whose permanent tax revenue as at 31 December 2019 per capita are lower than 120 per cent of the national average. The financing of public services from the municipal budgets can be divided into two groups. The activities delegated by the state are financed with funds from the general grant for delegated activities, and the local activities are financed up to the amount of the own revenue of the municipalities and the general equalizing grant, without restrictions on their spending. The rules are also valid for the municipality from which settlements are separated. The difference is found only in the requirement for population (from 4,000 to 6,000 people) and the requirement for distance from the administrative centre (from 20 to 40 km.). The change was made in 1998. At the same time, the establishment of municipality of Sarnitsa also did not match the criteria for population, but the secession process was successful. Moreover, the municipality of Sarnitsa has a much lower revenue capacity than the town of Obzor.

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References Bačlija, I. and Lavtar, R. (2021) ‘Factors Contributing to the Municipal Splits in Slovenia’, Miscellanea Geographica –​ Regional Studies on Development, 25(1): 54–​61. Baldersheim, H. and Rose, L. (2010) Territorial Choice: The Politics of Boundaries and Borders, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Bartolini, D. (2015) ‘Municipal Fragmentation and Economic Performance of OECD TL2 Regions’, OECD Regional Development Working Papers 2015/​02, Paris: OECD Publishing. Boedeltje, M. and Denters, B. (2010) ‘Step-​by-​Step: Territorial Choice in the Netherlands’, in P. Swianiewicz (ed), Territorial Consolidation Reforms in Europe, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 118–137. Copus, C. , Roberts, M., and Wall, R. (2017) Local Government in England Centralisation, Autonomy and Control, London: Springer. Dimitrov, D. (2020) ‘Kontseptsiya za novo administrativno-​teritorialno ustroystvo na Balgariya’, Geopolitika, 1(5): 14. Dobos, G. (2021) ‘Municipal Splits and Hidden Amalgamations in Hungary’, Miscellanea Geographica –​Regional Studies on Development, 25(1): 37–​45. Dokova S. (2012) ‘Tendentsii i problemi na administrativno-​teritorialnoto ustroystvo na mestno ravnishte’, Spisanie Ikonomicheski i sotsialni alternativi, 4(35): 49. Erlingsson, G. (2005) ‘Modelling secessions from municipalities’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 28(2): 141–​159. Garlatti A., Fedele P. and Iacuzzi S. (2020) ‘Can Amalgamations Deliver? Barriers to Local Government Mergers from an Historical Institutionalist Perspective’, Public Money & Management, www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs /10.1080/09540962.2020.1800216 Gendźwiłł A., Krukowska J. and Lackowska M. (2019) ‘Disappointment or Unexpected Gain? A Survey-​Based Study of the Outcomes of Inter-​ Municipal Cooperation in Poland’, Miscellanea Geographica –​Regional Studies on Development, 23(4): 235–​241. Hlepas N. (2010) ‘Incomplete Greek Territorial Consolidation: From the First (1998) to the Second (2008–​09) Wave of Reforms’, Local Government Studies, 36(2): 223–​249. Illner, M. (2010) ‘Top-​down or bottom up? Coping with territorial fragmentation in the Czech Republic’, in H. Baldersheim and L. Rose (eds) Territorial Choice: The Politics of Boundaries and Borders, Basingstoke: Palgrave​ Macmillan, pp 214–​233 Kalinkov, K. (2016) ‘Nova reforma v administrativno-​teritorialnoto ustroystvo na Republika Balgariya –​osnova za prilagane na evropeyskite printsipi na regionalizma’, Godishnik na Ikonomicheski universitet, Ikonomicheski universitet: Varna, pp 59–​128.

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Konstitutsiya na Republika Balgariya, https://www.parliament.bg/en/const. Ladner, A., Keuffer, N., Baldersheim, H., Hlepas, N., Swianiewicz, P., Steyvers, K. and Navarro, C. (2019) Patterns of Local Autonomy in Europe, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Neikova, M. (2018) Rayonite za planirane v Balagriya ili neobhodimostta ot novo administrativno-​teritorialno ustroystvo, Burgas: Yuridicheski sbornik, Burgaski svoboden universitet, pp 30–​54. OECD (2018) Key Data on Local and Regional Governments in the European Union, Paris: OECD, www.oecd.org/r​ egional/r​ egional-p​ olicy. Registar za teritorialni promeni (2020) [online] Available from https://​ www.nsi.bg/​nrnm/​index.php?f=2&ezik=bul [Accessed 10 May 2020]. Slack, E. and Bird, R. (2013) ‘Merging Municipalities: Is Bigger Better?’ IMFG Papers on Municipal Finance and Governance No. 14, Toronto: Institute on Municipal Finance & Governance, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto. Stanuş, C. (2020) ‘Territorial Fragmentation in Post-​C ommunist Romania: The Not So Curious Case of a De-​Amalgamation Reform’, Miscellanea Geographica –​Regional Studies on Development, 25(1): 62 –​70. Swianiewicz, P. (2002) Consolidation or Fragmentation? The Size of Local Governments in Central and Eastern Europe, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute. Swianiewicz, P. (2010) Territorial Consolidation Reforms in Europe, Budapest: Open Society Institute. Swianiewicz P. (ed) (2017) Territorial Reforms in Europe: Does Size Matter? Territorial Amalgamation Toolkit, Strasbourg: Centre of Expertise for Local Government Reform, Council of Europe. Swianiewicz, P. (2018) ‘If Territorial Fragmentation Is a Problem, Is Amalgamation a Solution? –​Ten Years Later’, Local Government Studies, 44(1): 1–​10. Swianiewicz, P. (2020) ‘Municipal Divorces –​The Under Researched Topic of Territorial Reforms in Europe’, Acta Geobalcanica, 6(1): 27–​33. Swianiewicz P. (2021) ‘From Post-​Communist Democratic Laissez-​Faire to Prevention of Territorial Fragmentation: Tightening the Rules of Municipal Splits in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990’, Miscellanea Geographica –​ Regional Studies on Development, 25(1): 5–​17 Swianiewicz, P. and Teles, F. (2018) ‘Inter-​Municipal Cooperation in Europe. Introduction to the Symposium’, International Review of Administrative Sciences, 84(4): 613–​618. Swianiewicz P. and Lukomska J. (2019) ‘Is Small Beautiful? The Quasi-​ Experimental Analysis of the Impact of Territorial Fragmentation on Costs in Polish Local Governments’, Urban Affairs Review, 55(3): 832–​855.

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Tavares, A. (2018) ‘Municipal Amalgamations and their Effects: A Literature Review’, Miscellanea Geographica –​ Regional Studies on Development, 22(1): 5–​15. Vrangbæk, K. (2010) ‘Structural Reform in Denmark: Central Reform Processes in a Decentralized Environment in 2007’, in P. Swianiewicz (ed) Territorial Consolidation Reforms in Europe, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative Open Society Institute, pp 27–​45. Wollmann, H. (2008) Comparing Local Government Reforms in England, Sweden, France and Germany: Between Continuity and Change, Divergence and Convergence, Berlin: Humboldt-​Universität zu Berlin, Institute of Social Science IfS Institut für Stadtforschung und Strukturpolitik GmbH Berlin.

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Participation of Interest Groups at Local Level: Any Space for Democracy in Inter-​Municipal Cooperation? Jurga Bučaitė-​Vilkė

Introduction In this chapter, we focus on the inter-​municipal cooperation (IMC) in Lithuania that contributes to the larger discussion on the variety of territorial reforms in Europe. A large share of European research was done to examine single country-​specific or comparative national data in discovering IMC phenomenon (eg, Borraz and Le Galés, 2005; Wollmann, 2010; Swianiewicz, 2014; Franzke et al, 2016). The available data find the relationship between the degree of territorial fragmentation and the consolidation of municipal functions and various forms and strategies for municipal cooperation. The lack of multiple resources and the need for better service delivery contribute to the more active involvement of municipalities in cooperative arrangements (eg, Hulst and Van Montfort, 2007; Rodrigues et al, 2012; Bel et al, 2013; Teles, 2016). Considering territorial reforms, Lithuania represents rather limited experience in tailoring local governance systems to a wider decentralization. Contrary to the European perspective on IMC contribution to territorial reforms, Lithuania is experiencing a complicated path trying to reconcile a single-​tier municipal system and the dominant national discourse on economies of scale and optimization. More qualitative management of the state, and better quality public services were considered as the main drivers for the decentralization process but were not fully implemented due to the

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lack of a systematic approach (Stonkute and Gaule, 2017). In the political agenda, IMC is seen as a substitute instrument for territorial reorganization reforms that have an impact on municipal functional performance, while the effects on democratic participation are vague. Generally, IMC has not received as much attention in Lithuanian research as in the countries with highly fragmented territorial administrative systems. Most of the research focuses on the institutional self-​government structure (Astrauskas, 2002, 2014; Burbulytė-​Tsiskarishvili et al, 2018), and citizen involvement and local democracy (Guogis et al, 2007; Bučaitė-​Vilkė and Žilys, 2016). Considering IMC issues, more attention is paid to the sectoral public services delivery (Civinskas and Dvorakas, 2011; Tamutienė and Civinskas, 2013; Klimovský et al, 2014) and options for better cooperation regarding the size of municipalities (Bučaitė-​Vilkė et al, 2018). The missing link in the literature is the analysis of different stakeholder involvement in different forms of cooperation and public interest issues. This chapter uses the example of IMC initiatives in Lithuania taking inspiration from the network governance approach. The main question is whether IMC arrangements can reveal the issues of democratic representation and legitimacy, whether local actors and institutions represent democratic participation characteristics, such as efficiency, accountability, transparency and inclusion. In other words, the chapter examines the challenges of democratic participation in emerging municipal cooperation networks. We ask about the main strategies used by local stakeholders, communities or associations to foster the involvement in municipal agendas, and whether local politicians and administrators sustain the norms of democratic accountability, inclusion and transparency. From the theoretical perspective we rely on the network governance approach that enables a grasp of democratic elements in IMC arrangements (Grote and Gbikpi, 2002; Haus et al, 2004). Cooperation as an institutional innovation is based on the premise that, despite possible conflicting or controversial situations, networking and coordination between different actors enable new policy decisions (Hargrave and van de Ven, 2006). This chapter uses quantitative initiatives in IMC survey results collected from December 2017 to May 2018. The survey was designed to study the preconditions, motives, forms and impact of IMC in Lithuania. We start with the current IMC situation in Lithuania. The theoretical and methodological chapters discuss the theoretical construct that allows identification of the preconditions for democratic legitimacy in the process of municipal cooperation. The analysis of empirical data presents a statistical structural model revealing the relationships between different interest groups in IMC processes. The conclusions provide a discussion on the importance of democratization processes in municipal cooperative arrangements.

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IMC in Lithuania: an overview During the last 30 years of transition, Lithuania has been characterized by a highly consolidated local government system with a relatively stable number of municipalities. Lithuania as an example of a single-​tier self-​government structure has 60 municipalities with a total population of 2.79 million. The internal variation of municipality size is an important indicator; for example, the largest four urban municipalities, including the capital of Vilnius, have on average more than 100,000 inhabitants compared with 75 per cent of municipalities with fewer than 50,000 inhabitants. The smallest municipality of Neringa has a population of only 3,097 inhabitants (Statistics Lithuania, 2021) (see Table 8.1). Despite the differences in size, the municipalities have the same functional responsibilities, administrative structure, competences and budgeting structure (Law on Local Self-​Government, 1994). The preserved and homogenous local government structure here is in contrast with the highly fragmented administrative structures in Western countries, as well as the other CEE counterparts. A slight trend of political discussions on the optimal size of municipalities and municipal autonomy level has been monitored over the years. Few attempts of municipal splits were recorded during the period of 1995–​2005. However, no systematic mechanism of reorganizing the municipal map was much discussed. On the other hand, the large municipalities are able independently to provide high-​quality public services that are used as a counter-​argument for higher levels of aggregation (Civinskas, 2019). As for IMC, Lithuania is characterized by the rather limited practice of establishing different cooperative arrangements. The scope, power, initiatives and side effects of IMC projects have not been a priority on the political level, nor have they been on the municipal agenda. Studies have found that depopulation, the growing power of so-​called ‘ring’ suburban municipalities, Table 8.1: Average size of population in municipalities, Lithuania Population size

Number of municipalities

Percentage

≥ 100,000

4

6.7%

100,000–​50,000

7

11.7%

45

74.9%

4

6.7%

≤ 50,000 10,000–​3,000 46,500 (average)

60 (in total)

Source: Statistics Lithuania, 2021.

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100%

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economic factors and a low level of municipal functional autonomy are disadvantages in terms of establishing institutionalized IMC forms (Civinskas, 2019). The strong traditions in centralized and state-​subsidized service provision also define the Lithuanian picture of IMC. For example, during the period 2012–​14 the central authorities’ role in the municipal services provision was particularly strengthened to sustain financial and quality monitoring of municipal interventions (Civinskas, 2019). Despite the political pressure, few sporadic institutionalized inter-​municipal arrangements in joint municipal service provision have been recorded, for example, water and energy provision, public transportation and cultural tourism services (Bučaitė-​Vilkė et al, 2018). On the other hand, the legal framework and characteristics of the administrative system such as low financial autonomy and limited functional discretion also affect IMC initiatives. There are no special regulations that can enforce local municipalities to establish joint ventures for service delivery. Despite many contradictions in legislation and local autonomy level, we could identify multiple forms in service provision. Referring to the Hulst and van Montfort typology on institutional IMC forms (Hulst and van Montfort, 2007), the dominant form is single-​purpose inter-​municipal agreements, joint ventures in transport, public utilities and water provision (264 municipal undertakings in 2017), and regional waste management companies (ten in total). The main drivers are voluntary efforts of municipal networks aimed at reducing costs and consolidating resources (Bučaitė-​Vilkė et al, 2018). More generally, Lithuanian IMC aims to overcome public services transaction and delivery costs stipulated by central government pressure on the scale of economy agenda. The effects of alternative IMC approaches to foster territorial reorganization and local government reforms have not yet been measured.

Is network governance approach important in IMC? Model and hypotheses We focus on the elements of network governance and democratic legitimacy in analyzing IMC initiatives in the Lithuanian case. The network governance approach provides a basis for horizontal and vertical interactions, and a variety of actors involved in cooperative arrangements and their roles. Additionally, democratic legitimacy reflects the normative criteria such as output effectiveness and input participation (Schmidt, 2013).

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Network governance and democracy in fostering cooperation As a starting point, our assumptions derive from the network governance approach, emphasizing the diversity of actors in networks, cooperation and consensus strategies, trust and formal and informal interactions. The network governance theory raises questions about the extent to which hybrid forms of governance are democratic, the extent to which various interest groups can be involved in governance networks, how decisions are made and how their legitimacy is ensured (Sørensen, 2002; Sørensen and Torfing, 2005; Klijn and Skelcher, 2007; Sørensen and Torfing, 2016). One of the key objectives is to involve stakeholders who have different interests by providing horizontal platforms for negotiation, discussion and communication. For the Lithuanian IMC initiatives analysis a few network governance approach elements are important. First, the concept implies that more flexible horizontal cooperation networks are replacing vertical hierarchical political and administrative structures that are autonomous and based on negotiations (John, 2001). Second, we are interested in developing public interest. According to numerous studies, public interest is linked to a shared vision, expectations, beliefs, attitudes or values that help to set the guidelines for a particular decision-​making field. Actors involved in governance networks need to share common opinions or expectations to identify critical issues and find joint solutions (Marin and Mayntz, 1991). Another critical issue is the horizontal relationships in cooperative arrangements and democratic involvement. One of the main risks in ensuring democracy is the active efforts of public authorities in regulating and controlling horizontal interactions, giving them more features of hierarchical governance (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005). As central or local government efforts to regulate networks become particularly significant, bureaucratic, hierarchical forms appear (Scharpf, 1997; Sørense and Torfing, 2005). The risk of democratic legitimacy might be solved using various forms of participatory governance that become self-​ reflection, self-​regulation and self-​correction power (Jessop, 2002).

Diversity of actors in cooperative arrangements In our analysis, we also consider the diversity of actors and their roles in IMC. Referring to Filipe Teles (2016), non-​governmental organizations, public institutions, citizens’ initiative groups and private business organizations represent the civic domain, and community interests are external agents in cooperative processes. Local politicians, bureaucrats, municipal administrations and other IMC actors refer to internal agents (Teles, 2016). The main difference between these groups of actors is the involvement and intensity of participation in collaborative processes. For example, local

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politicians can see municipal cooperation not only as an alternative to ‘good governance’ but also as an opportunity to enable this process through political instruments and coordination tools. The implementation of local policy decisions is highly dependent on the involvement of local bureaucrats and municipal administration (Teles, 2016). Another important group of actors contributing to municipal cooperation involves civic and public interests but plays a minor role in these processes, especially in the Lithuanian case. Civil society organizations are essential in informal cooperation networks, especially in welfare policy areas, such as social welfare services, social policy or education. Private companies are active in discussing public and private municipal service schemes and initiatives involving contractors. Citizens’ groups are important in ensuring the direct accountability of municipal cooperation networks and protecting the public interest. In some cases, citizens’ groups join advisory commissions or committees and participate in joint decision-​making. However, they possess limited powers and resources compared with internal actors in cooperation processes (Teles, 2016).

Theoretical model and hypothesis: between networks and democratic legitimacy in IMC We have already found that the network governance approach to cooperative arrangements focuses on a few issues. First, how to ensure that diverse actors in cooperation networks share equal opportunities, decision-​making powers and resources to benefit from the results of cooperation. Second, what mechanisms, strategies or tactics ensure that different actors should achieve collective outcomes? Third, how to ensure the democratic legitimacy and public accountability of IMC, increase the openness and transparency of joint decisions, inform inhabitants and increase their involvement. For the analytical model we borrow the ideas of the network governance and democratic legitimacy that is analysed in terms of normative characteristics, such as input, throughput and output legitimacy (Schmidt, 2013). First, the analysis of the input legitimacy of the municipal cooperation initiatives follows the assumption that the governance networks create interconnections to connect autonomous groups of stakeholders (‘input’ by (and of) the people (Schmidt, 2013). Diverse groups of actors have different attitudes and expectations. The patterns of mutual communication, coordination, negotiation, deliberation and cooperation allow them to connect to interaction networks that enable the participation of different groups of citizens (Sørensen and Torfing, 2016). Another dimension includes the efficiency of municipal cooperation networks and the results achieved (throughput legitimacy ‘with the people’

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Figure 8.1: Analytical model of democratic legitimacy dimensions in IMC initiatives Interest groups in IMC incentives: network potential and actors

Cooperation incentives (input)

Effectiveness of cooperation process (throughput)

Outcomes and benefits of cooperation (output)

Dimensions of democratic legitimacy characteristics in IMC

Source: Schmidt, 2013; Gendźwiłł and Lackowska, 2018; author’s elaboration.

and output legitimacy ‘for the people’) (Schmidt, 2013). We ask the question if there are democratic characteristics in cooperation networks. One of the main issues is whether local actors can achieve institutionalized outcomes, whether the agreements reached are formal or more related to informal ties, trust and communication (output legitimacy). The results of IMC reveal the network’s ability to reconcile several conflicting interest groups. According to Scharpf (1999), the transaction costs and outcomes of balancing the public interest in networks should be in line with the expected standards of the fairness of the redistribution mechanism (Scharpf, 1999). According to this line of reasoning, we propose the measurement model based on the extensive literature review concerning democratic legitimacy, network governance and cooperative arrangements (Gbikpi and Grote, 2002; Haus and Heinelt, 2004; Schmidt, 2013; Sørensen and Torfing, 2016; Gendźwiłł and Lackowska, 2018). Such an approach is superior in defining the dimensions of legitimacy processes in inter-​municipal arrangements and initiatives. We identify three analytical dimensions as an analytical framework in terms of groups of actors involved in IMC (see Figure 8.1): • The input legitimacy dimension asks which groups of actors/​agents have power in cooperative initiatives; how much the local stakeholders are involved, and the extent to which they cooperate with the other institutions or actors. • Throughput legitimacy means the effectiveness of cooperative arrangements in terms of whether the inhabitants receive information about cooperation, in what form, and the results from cooperative arrangements. • Output legitimacy refers to what results of cooperation are achieved or whether there are manifestations of public interest.

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We propose that there are relationships between diverse interest groups with different decision-​making powers, competencies and interactions (input), and other dimensions of legitimacy, such as incentives for IMC (throughput), and expect different outcomes (output): H1.  We assume that it is more likely that administrative and political (mayor) self-​government actors who possess more internal power resources, competencies and internal trust determine the benefits of cooperation in terms of service provision, economies of scale and public interest. H2. It is more likely that the involvement of upper-​level government interests group in IMC is determined by legal regulations, top-​down decisions and control of their implementation at the municipal level. H3.  It is more likely that the local community’s involvement in IMC refers to the improvement of public services quality and public interest. Greater involvement of local civic initiative groups enables the process of the democratic legitimacy in IMC.

Methodological remarks Dataset The quantitative data were collected as part of the research project on IMC1 implemented from 2017 to 2019. One of the main goals of the research was to assess the potential of inter-​institutional cooperation and network governance options for municipalities in Lithuania in delivering public services. A survey of Lithuanian municipalities was conducted using an electronic survey platform from January to May 2018. The survey aimed to explore the issues of the IMC potential for public service delivery, the attitudes of various local interest groups, internal and external networking and the role of municipalities in improving the public service, power distribution and impact of local governance reforms (Hulst et al, 2009). We followed a few theoretical assumptions to define survey objectives and the structure of the questionnaire variables (Hulst et al, 2009; Teles, 2016; Teles and Swianiewicz, 2018): • How important are the goals of IMC; what institutionalized arrangements are used and what factors determine the cooperative initiatives? The measurement variables include the areas of cooperative arrangements, the involvement of interest groups and their interaction, and the effectiveness of cooperation. • How important is the institutional and administrative context? The measurement variables include the municipal power in promoting

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cooperation, the scope of activities, responsibilities and opportunities for cooperation, and strategies for providing services. • What are the internal and external factors that determine the decision of municipalities to establish cooperative arrangements? We define the impact of population change on cooperative arrangements, and assess the need for services, budget options, satisfaction and expectations of the inhabitants.

Data sampling and measurement method A cluster random sampling procedure was applied to define the list of respondents representing different subgroups. The survey followed the assumption that the sample should consist of municipal representatives directly related to the IMC policy and agenda. The sampling frame consisted of distinct groups of respondents (clusters) representing municipal administrations, local politicians, municipal enterprises and local community groups. The list covered several respondent groups referring to their responsibility and institutional affiliation in fostering IMC: (1) municipal service provision (municipal enterprises); (2) the administrative level of municipalities (heads of municipal administrations and mayors); (3) the political level of municipalities (members of municipal council committees in economic affairs); (4) community level (local community, inhabitants’ interest groups). We also applied the criteria of convenience to define the respondents’ quotas referring to their geographical location (municipality) and positions in municipal institutions. A total sample is 1,545 respondents that constitute a response rate of 21 per cent that is required for survey research. A final effective sample of 284 respondents was achieved for the analysis that has an adequate representation of geographical dispersion of municipalities and clusters of respondents. Structural equation modelling (Partial least squares (PLS) model) was used to test a measurement model incorporating multiple endogenous (dependent) and exogenous (independent) variables. Theoretical literature has helped identify the variables of democratic legitimacy (input, output and throughput) in the process of municipal cooperation. The respondents were asked to indicate what interest groups and agents participate in IMC initiatives, the main reasons and the impact and results of cooperative initiatives. The model consists of four exogenous latent constructs (‘groups of actors in IMC initiatives’) and six endogenous constructs (‘incentives and reasons for IMC’ and ‘impact and results of IMC’ (sample N = 220). Statistical analysis used the PLS consistent algorithm that converged eight sequences. A casewise elimination procedure was used to define the final list of items in the model. Based on the theoretical model and the results

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of the exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, a measurement model was developed using SmrtPLS3 software. A bootstrapping procedure helped to measure the statistical significance (normality and linearity of variables) of the variable loads of latent constructs in the model.

Assessment of IMC initiatives: looking for democratic legitimacy evidence An exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis of the questions about the different groups of actors involved in the IMC initiatives was performed. The factor analysis also included issues that highlight the various incentives and outcomes of municipal cooperation that are included in the theoretical measurement model (see Figure 8.1). The output of the question on the diverse groups of actors involved in the process of municipal cooperation initiatives (question ‘Evaluate the position of the agents in IMC initiatives’) contained five factors (Table 8.2) used in the structural model as exogenous items. Individual factors indicate different interest groups of actors involved or have the power to initiate municipal cooperation. Some interest groups include the level of political representation (local politicians or councillors). Others represent institutions performing administrative and executive functions (municipal administration, municipal enterprises, the mayor (both political and representative role)) or local communities (such as voluntary organizations, local communities or business associations). The results of factor analysis demonstrate that the identified IMC groups represent a different relationship with the processes on the municipal level. For example, administrative actors directly represent local interests, share bureaucratic decisions and have access to various resources. In contrast, others perform ‘top-​down’ central government functions (a group of upper-​tier actors). We assume that the actors associated with the local community involvement (bottom-​up actors) are important to the democratic legitimacy process. We used the factor analysis for the question on the intentions for IMC to measure the item of the input dimension (endogenous items). Respondents were asked to rate on a Likert scale from 1 (no effect) to 5 (very significant effect) the main incentives promoting municipal cooperation. The results of the factor analysis showed that three factors determining the incentives of municipal cooperation stand out: internal network efficiency and trust building (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.818), central state pressure (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.733) and municipal service quality (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.764) (Table 8.3). Factor analysis revealed that the identified factors of municipal cooperation incentives include different interaction models. The factor of internal efficiency and trust explains ‘bottom-​up’ initiatives that increase the benefits of informal

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Table 8.2: Groups of actors in inter-​municipal cooperation: factor analysis Factors (exogenous items)

Variables: evaluate the position of the agents in initiating IMC

Pattern matrix: components

F1. Administrative and political (mayor) actors

Head of municipal administration

.839

Employees (specialists) of the municipal administration

.765

Mayor

.716

Municipal enterprises (municipal services)

.666

1

F2. Upper EU and the other decision-​making international institutions actors National state Regional development council

2

3

4

.304

.870 .843 .426

.320

F3. Local political actors

Majority in the council

.823

Opposition of the council

.590

F4. Social stakeholders

NGO’s and local communities

-​.788

Local business

-​ 711.

Local inhabitants

-​.691

F5. Neighbourhood actors

Mayors in neighbouring municipalities Councillors of neighbouring municipalities

5

.889 .417

.715

Extraction method: principal component analysis. Rotation method: Oblimin with Kaiser normalization.

communication. The process of organizational integration involves actors with functional or administrative responsibilities, such as municipal bureaucrats, who employ their competencies, resources or decision-​making powers (Teles, 2016). The municipal service quality factor identifies coordinated efforts to implement more efficient public service delivery and linked to the establishment of diverse service provision models or public and private sector

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Table 8.3: Incentives and reasons for inter-​municipal cooperation (input dimension): factor analysis (own calculations) Factors Variables: evaluate the (endogenous main incentives for items) fostering IMC

Pattern matrix: components

F1. Internal Increasing the brand of efficiency municipality and trust Sustaining networking building Aiming to establish joint projects

.849

1

3

.800 .789

Aiming to learn from other municipalities

.759

More options for outsourcing

.533

F2. Central Central state pressure state Legislation norms pressure Geographical and social-​ economic reasons

.795 .773 .700

National level demographic .348 and socio-​economic reasons F3. Municipal services quality

2

.417

Better public service delivery

.868

Public service price regulation

.837

Insufficient public service infrastructure

.396

.496

Extraction method: principal component analysis. Rotation method: Oblimin with Kaiser normalization.

initiatives (Rodrigues et al, 2012; Tavares, 2017). The factor of central state pressure signalizes the level of self-​governance autonomy. The traditions of territorial consolidation of territorial fragmentation systems are concerned with the problems of the municipal functions or financial autonomy. To identify the impact and results of IMC initiatives, three statistically significant factors were identified respectively: economies of scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.866), public interest (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.775) and top-​down effects of internal cooperation (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.729) (Table 8.4). The question of what, in your opinion, would be the main benefits and impact of IMC was used for the statistical analysis, asking the respondents to rate statements from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The economies

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Table 8.4: Impact and results of inter-​municipal cooperation (throughput and output): factor analysis (own calculations) Factor Variables: evaluate the (endogenous main results and impact items) of IMC F1. Economies of scale

F2. Public interest

F3. Internal cooperation and bottom-​up effects

Pattern matrix: components 1

2

3

More effective solutions for joint problems

.849

Costs savings and benefits from economies of scale

.771

Options for new public service delivery

.631

Benefits from new competencies, skills and good practice

.558

.410

Branding benefits for IMC partners

.481

.457

.477

Better availability for public .472 services

,442

‘Free-​r ider’ problem prevention

.792

Addressing service delivery issues related to demographic factors

.741

Strategy for sustaining public interest

.724

More effective top-​down policy implementation

.799

Greater influence on central authorities decisions

.646

Better access to outsourcing .347

.593

Extraction method: principal component analysis. Rotation method: Oblimin with Kaiser normalization.

of scale item indicates the predominant need for optimization of public services in cost-​saving and more efficient service delivery strategies, which are typical in countries with higher territorial fragmentation. Based on these arguments, vertical and horizontal forms of municipal service provision are analysed in different institutional contexts (Hulst et al, 2009). A factor in the implementation of the top-​down principle emphasizes the influence of the central government on municipal decisions in Lithuania. On the contrary,

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Table 8.5: Results of the main model (own calculations) Effects (hypothesis)

Standard P values pa deviation (Estimates) (STDEV)

Administrative and political (mayor) actors > Central state pressure

0.096

0.191

*

Administrative and political (mayor) actors > Internal efficiency and trust building

0.116

0.231

*

Administrative and political (mayor) actors > Municipal services quality

0.079

0.285

**

Central state pressure > Economies of scale

0.055

0.111

*

Internal efficiency and trust building > Economies of scale

0.074

0.287

**

Internal efficiency and trust building > Internal cooperation and bottom-​up effects

0.094

0.336

**

Municipal service quality > Economies of scale

0.076

0.219

**

Municipal service quality > Public interest

0.07

0.251

**

Local politicians > Central state pressure

0.084

0.169

*

Local politicians > Internal efficiency and trust building

0.069

0.192

**

Upper decision-​making actors > Central state pressure

0.082

0.234

**

Note: a non-​standardized estimates provided; *, statistically significant at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively, **p < 0.001; *p < 0.05.

the public interest factor allows us to discuss the broader context of IMC, searching for the satisfaction of the inhabitants and public interests. The structural model includes the aforementioned exogenous and endogenous factors to test the hypotheses regarding the involvement, incentives and results of different groups of actors in IMC process. Table 8.5 shows the unstandardized parameter estimates and covariation relationships among the items in the model. The path diagram (Figure 8.2) presents the structural model relations and hypotheses (only statistically significant correlation relationships are included in the model). The structural model results demonstrate that different groups of actors involved in cooperation have statistically significant relationships with variables of IMC incentives and outcomes. Regarding the involvement of administrative and political actors (municipal administration, the mayor and local politicians), the participation of these groups in IMC is significant. There is a statistically significant relationship

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Figure 8.2: Structural equation modelling results: the relationship between variables (own calculations) [+]

Administrative and political actors

[+]

Upper decisionmaking actors

[+]

0,231

[+] 0,164

0,008

Internal efficiency and trust building

0,234 0,080

−0,061 Political actors

−0,008 Social stakeholders

Economy of scale

0,2196 [+] 0,157

0,106

Central state pressure

−0,098 0,153

[+]

[+] 0,262

0,1118

0,192

0,169

0,287

[+] 0,118 Public interest

0,251

[+] 0,122

−0,047

Municipal services quality

[+] 0,165 Internal cooperation and bottom-up effects

Note: For visual purposes, not all relations and coefficients are provided in the figure. Model fit: χ2 = 119.9 (p = 0.00), df = 42.

between the group of administrative and political (mayor) actors and incentives for cooperation, defined as items of maintaining internal efficiency and trust networks (path coefficient, β-​value = 0.231, p < 0.05) and quality of municipal services (β -​value = 0.285, p < 0.001). It can also be stated that the incentives of administrative and political actors are determined by the pressure of the central government and top-​down delegated functions (β-​value = 0.191, p < 0.05). Another group of actors –​ municipal politicians –​is also affected by the existing internal interaction networks and mutual trust, which allows initiating IMC initiatives (β-​value = 0.192, p < 0.001). It is more likely that the IMC initiatives from local politicians are also determined by the decisions or legal regulations by the central government (β-​value = 0.169, p < 0.05). On the other hand, there are statistically significant positive correlations between the IMC incentives for internal efficiency and trust building and the outcomes in terms of greater

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internal cooperation and bottom-​up effects (β-​value = 0.336, p < 0.001), and economies of scale in the provision of public municipal services (β-​ value = 0,219, p < 0,001). Based on the statistical analysis results, we assume that our hypothesis about the involvement and importance of administrative and political (mayor) actors in the IMC processes can be partially confirmed. Another hypothesis assumes the involvement of upper-​level government interests in IMC, emphasizing the implementation of legal regulations and top-​down decisions at the municipal level. The model indicates that there is a positive relationship between several input, throughput and output variables: higher (central) government representatives, central government pressure as an incentive for cooperation (β-​value = 0.234, p < 0.001) and economies of scale (β-​value = 0,111, p < 0,05). The model analysis suggests that it is more likely that the pressure from the central government is connected to the results of cost optimization and operational efficiency in the municipal cooperation processes. Central government initiatives to control municipal cooperation through centralization can be associated with the search for a more efficient and optimal model of municipal services delivery initiatives (Hulst and Van Montfort, 2007). However, the question of local democracy is significant. The structural equation modelling results indicate that municipalities’ bottom-​u p cooperation initiatives are less important than legal regulation imperatives or state authorities’ initiatives for territorial consolidation. We assumed that civic interest groups are actively involved in IMC seeking to improve the quality of municipal services and implement the public interest. The analysis cannot confirm the hypothesis about the more active involvement of the local community actors in the IMC initiatives. Unsurprisingly, administrative and political (mayor) agents have special access to IMC policy coordination tools and mechanisms, including the process and outcomes of the cooperative arrangements. Conversely, civic actors possess fewer resources with limited involvement in IMC processes. Thus, it is challenging to formulate reliable conclusions about the democratic legitimacy in emerging IMC initiatives that could symbolize networks’ openness, engagement in local problems and better accountability for inhabitants.

Conclusion Research on IMC in European countries with a high level of territorial fragmentation has revealed the ‘democratic deficit’ issue. Growing multifunctional inter-​municipal institutional structures face challenges of democratic legitimacy and democratic accountability (Hulst and Van Montfort, 2007). Citizens’ involvement in IMC arrangements is often

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indirect, and their interests are under-​represented (Wollmann, 2010). Many of these IMC entities perform several functions, including public services provided by municipalities. Though more active citizen participation and involvement in IMC initiatives are being neglected, expected collaborative benefits are often considered a result of administrative or political efforts. The examination of the various forms of IMC suggests the extent to which the diverse local community, citizen or business interest groups are being represented and if the expectations of civic interests matter. Summarizing the discussion on the democratic characteristics of the emerging IMC process, we employed a theoretical concept of democratic legitimacy, consisting of variables of legitimacy efforts and costs (input legitimacy), cooperation effectiveness (throughputs legitimacy) and cooperation outcomes (output legitimacy). Legitimacy efforts (input) raise the issue of IMC network nature that connects autonomous stakeholder groups and agents. We ask which groups of local actors have more influence on promoting cooperation, whether local citizen groups are involved, and what types of participation they use. The variable of the cooperation effectiveness (throughputs) includes whether the IMC beneficiaries receive information about cooperative benefits, and the expected results and outcomes. Finally, the dimension of output legitimacy examines the effects and impact of IMC initiatives in terms of public interest. The results of the structural modelling analysis distinguish diverse groups of actors, determining the process of IMC cooperation. Different incentives and motives for IMC lead to varying results of cooperation and benefits. One of the most influential groups is that of the municipal administration and bureaucrats, working together with mayors and local politicians (councillors). A group of administrative and political actors define the agenda for various forms and strategies of possible cooperation using vertical and horizontal networks. When assessing the incentives and consequences of municipal cooperation, one of the most important reasons is the internal interaction networks, often based on formal and informal commitments or exchange of competencies, interests and resources. High mutual trust, effective communication and shared interests allow achieving the results of cooperation between municipalities, such as economies of scale, higher quality of provided services and the possibility of realizing the public interest. Concerning the involvement of upper-​level (central) government interests in municipal cooperation, top-​down decisions are essential, referring to the national centralization agenda in optimizing the resources of municipal functions. Central authorities hold critical positions of power in a vertical network. Finally, we assumed that more active citizen groups would signal a higher degree of democratic legitimacy in IMC through different stages of the

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process, such as forming an agenda for cooperative projects or accounting for the benefits. The results demonstrate that the active involvement of the local community and citizen actors in the emerging IMC process is statistically insignificant. However, we suggest that cooperation between municipalities should be seen not just as an instrumental approach to implementing joint initiatives on public service projects. In the Lithuanian case, IMC could be treated as an alternative arena of political identities, interests, leadership, democratic participation and involvement. It also replaces the missing link with the political reform agenda on territorial reorganization and local autonomy. Note 1

The Lithuanian Council of Research financed research project No. S-​MIP-​17-​3 entitled ‘IMC and Provision of Public Services: Options for Network Governance and the Public Interest Dilemma in Lithuania’.

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PART II

Local Democracy and Leadership

9

Municipal Size and the Nationalization of Local Party Systems: The Nationalized, Localized and Regionalized Local Party Systems of Denmark, Poland and Belgium Adam Gendźwiłł, Ulrik Kjaer and Kristof Steyvers

Introduction: Three tales of local party systems In the Danish municipality of Ringsted, the voters participating in the 2013 municipal elections were presented with a choice of eight different parties when they entered the polling booth. The number of parties listed on the ballot was neither special nor interesting, but the names of the parties were. The eight parties running for the 21 seats at the local council happened to be the exact same eight parties represented at the Danish parliament Folketinget at the time. And when the votes were counted, and the seats distributed, it turned out that all the eight parties obtained representation at the council which then –​in terms of the party system –​became a perfect microcosm of the national parliament. So, the council was made up of the same ingredients as the parliament, yet mixed in slightly different proportions, according to the preferences of the local electorate. However, this was the only one of the 98 Danish municipalities where this full nationalization of the local party system could be found (Baekgaard et al, 2017).1

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In the 2018 local elections held in Poland, the complete set of parliamentary parties competed for council seats in 13 municipalities, but only in the municipality of Głuchołazy did all major parliamentary parties receive at least one seat. Yet, they have been accompanied by the Association ‘Self-​Government Forum 2002’ (Forum Samorządowe 2002), a typical local independent list, which despite its generic name ran only in this municipality and won two out of 21 seats. In fact, none of the local councils in Poland copied the structure of the Sejm. The first reason for this is the high volatility of the national party system –​a constantly changing set of parties makes it difficult to compare choices available for voters in different elections and to trace changes over time. Despite some progress in the institutionalization of the party system, the set of main parties is far from being stable and their territorial structures remain underdeveloped. As the 2018 local elections took place almost three years after the regular parliamentary election, two out of five parties represented in the Sejm practically ceased to exist. Liberal Modern (Nowoczesna) merged with its larger counterpart Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska). After its electoral success in parliamentary elections, the protest movement Kukiz ’15 failed to institutionalize itself as a party. It endorsed candidates in less than 10 per cent of the municipalities, and shortly after disappeared. The second reason for the low level of nationalization is related to the electoral system design. The first-​past-​the-​post (FPTP) system, used to elect councillors in smaller municipalities (fewer than 20,000 inhabitants), combined with very permissive registration requirements and widespread anti-​party sentiments, incentivizes small local independent lists, particularly in smaller, rural municipalities (Gendźwiłł and Żółtak, 2017). At the 2018 local elections, almost nine thousand such ad hoc lists were established, some of them presenting one candidate only. In Belgium, a genuine counterpart for Ringsted is also lacking. After the ascendance of the regionalist parties in the 1960s, those representing the three traditional party families (socialists, Christian democrats and liberals) all split into a Dutch and French speaking sibling (eg, the sp.a and the PS are currently the respective members of the socialist party family). These can be considered sisters stemming from the same ideological parent, but they function as independent organizations. Hence, the party system became completely segmented along regional lines at the end of the 1970s. New forces emerging in the subsequent decades (such as the radical left, the greens and the radical right) largely followed this logic. Therefore, strictly speaking, there are no national but only regional parties and party systems (Deschouwer et al, 2017). Apart from the bilingual Brussels-​Capital region, parties only compete

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in their own linguistic area. Nevertheless, they come together in the federal parliament where the split further contributes to the fragmentation of the party system (galvanized by the proportional list system). That specific situation is emulated at the local level. In the Belgian case, ‘national’ effectively means ‘regional’, thus the presence and success of parliamentary parties in local elections and councils should effectively be assessed against regional standards.2 By such measures, several functional equivalents of Ringsted can indeed be found at the 2018 local elections. However, this full nationalization is rare and only appears in the Flemish region: in 11 (out of 300) municipalities, all of the six Flemish parties represented in the federal chamber, and only these six parties obtained seats in the municipal council. The examples include the city of Bruges (the seventh largest in the country by number of inhabitants) and some other suburbs or towns (but no rural entities). In all other municipalities (including those in the Walloon and the Brussels-​Capital region up to the total of 581 municipalities), either some parliamentary parties were not present in the council and/​or their non-​parliamentary counterparts (mainly non-​national lists) gained seats. In fact, the opposite situation is much more common with 107 municipalities having only representatives of non-​parliamentary parties. Such full localization of the party system is mainly situated in the Walloon region (90 out of 262 municipalities) and does not exist in the Brussels-​Capital region. It is found predominantly in rural environments (and in some suburbs or towns but excluding all cities) such as the smallest municipality of Herstappe. These examples illustrate that local party systems vary profoundly both between and within the analysed countries. The type and the number of the parties running and getting elected in local governments differ, and the local party systems resemble the national party system to different degrees. And a fully nationalized local party system, predicted by Rokkan more than half a century ago as a culmination of the process of democratic consolidation (Rokkan, 1966), is still to be found in a very few cases. Moreover, there is no evidence that the nationalization of local party systems gradually increases over time in any of the three countries. In the Danish case, it has been demonstrated that the nationalization progresses only with the amalgamation reforms increasing the size of the municipalities (Kjaer and Elklit, 2010a). In Poland, the presence of national parties in local governments has been efficiently limited by the electoral system and direct mayoral elections, favouring strongly personalized races (Gendźwiłł and Swianiewicz, 2017; Gendźwiłł and Żółtak, 2017). A similar situation can be observed in Belgium. In the long run, national parties superseded merely place-​bound phenomena in local elections, but a straightforward and increasing nationalization cannot

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be discerned: the local presence, success and shifts of and between national parties are not homogenous for the whole of the country, and non-​national lists occupy niches in local party systems (Steyvers and Heyerick, 2017). Looking at the local party systems through a multi-​level governance lens provokes the question: how local is the local party system effectively in different contexts? When it comes to the variation in how well the local party systems mirror the national, such variation can be expected in two different dimensions. As suggested by the previous examples, there can be a variation across countries, so that in some countries the local party systems are quite nationalized (as suggested by the Danish case) while others are quite localized (suggested by the Polish case). There can also be horizontal differences across various municipalities, usually explained by their size: the nationalized local party systems are found in larger and not in smaller municipalities, regardless of country. In this chapter, we basically ask the question which matters most for the nationalization of local party systems –​the institutional, cultural and historical differences between the countries in which the municipalities are nested or the size of the municipality, independently of which country the municipality is situated within. It is not, incidentally, that the three examples are drawn from Denmark, Poland and Belgium. As it will be shown, these three countries offer a unique possibility to test what impacts on the local party systems degree of nationalization the most: the country’s institutional set up or the municipality’s size. In the next section, we will discuss and operationalize the concept of nationalization of local party systems and lay out the hypotheses as to why variations across countries and municipalities should be expected. This will be followed by the empirical analyses of the three countries and a discussion of the implication of the findings based on this comparison.

The nationalization of local party systems In the multilevel approach to the electoral politics party system, nationalization is a key concept (Caramani and Kollman, 2017). Broadly, it pertains to the territorial homogeneity in the composition of the electoral offer and the distribution of parties’ electoral success over time and across space. This concept conceals an ongoing debate on the polysemic and multidimensional nature of nationalization (Caramani, 2004; Schakel, 2013; Lago and Montero, 2014). Initially describing the degree to which a party’s vote in territorial units varies over time, the dynamic view of nationalization revealed the extent to which voters, embedded in local electorates, react similarly to statewide stimuli (Stokes, 1967). Its

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distributional counterpart focuses on the degree to which there is an equal division of party votes across territorial units (Kasuya and Moenius, 2008). Finally, a party-​linkage variant probes into the extent to which candidates over a territory link together under a common party label (Chhibber and Kollman, 2004). Geographical differences in party systems can thus be perceived from a longitudinal (process or dynamic) as well as a cross-​ sectional (outcome or static) angle. Different conceptions entail alternative measures to either determine the uniformity of swings across territories over different elections –​in his overview, Bochsler (2010) discussed no less than 15 indices of static nationalization alone (see also Lago and Montero, 2014; Golosov, 2016). Increasingly refined yardsticks led to nuanced empirical findings in the extent of party system nationalization within and between countries and/​or over time. Recently, attention has also been devoted to ‘(…) the degree to which regional or local party systems correspond (vertically) to the national’ (Caramani and Kollmann, 2017: 52). Much of the antecedent work namely suffered from a ‘methodological nationalism bias (…) to choose the state-​ wide level as the natural unit of analysis’ (Schakel, 2013: 214). It addressed the territorial homogeneity of national party systems with the subnational (often dubbed local) referring to the constituency level. For a more integrated outlook, a genuine focus is needed on subnational (regional, local) elections and the extent to which their subsequent party system(s) (dynamics) are nationalized (Mustillo and Mustillo, 2012). To assess the degree to which local systems resemble national party systems, only relatively scarce evidence is available (Maškarinec, 2015: 629). The exceptions suggest an emergence of a nationalized supply and/​or success over time indicating a process of party politicization. This is central in the work of Rokkan (1966: 244) on societal modernization implying ‘(…) the breakdown of the traditional systems of local rule through the entry of nationally organized parties into municipal elections’. Assuming an almost teleological takeover of local politics by national political parties, in many contexts, however, traditional non-​partisan elements continue to hold local ground (Aars and Ringkjøb, 2005; Kjaer and Elklit, 2010a; Copus et al, 2012). The cross-​sectional evidence emphasizes the importance of comparing nationalization in different municipalities instead of assessing the overall degree of approximation of local electoral patterns vis-​à-​vis a national counterpart (Kjaer and Elklit, 2010b; Maškarinec, 2015). In line with most longitudinal findings, the sustaining and contingent divergence in local party system nationalization is often established with population size as the most important explanatory factor. Explaining differences in democratic features across municipalities, size has conquered the position as the lead explanation, almost codified with the publication of the book Size and Local Democracy (Denters

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et al, 2014) following up on Dahl and Tufte’s seminal work Size and Democracy (Dahl and Tufte, 1973). As municipal size increases, the space for amateur politicians shrinks, while the demand for coordination, institutionalized political representation and collective political actions increases, along with the presence of the ‘civil society infrastructure’ (Newton, 1982). Based on a discrete measure of multi-​level partisan resemblance, Kjaer and Elklit (2010b) confirmed the positive effect of municipal size on local party system nationalization in Denmark, whereas comparable evidence for Austria (Ennser-​Jedenastik and Hansen, 2013) highlighted the additional explanatory value of the degree of party organization. Research in Belgium found the number of inhabitants of the municipality, its metropolitan status, the relative vote share of national lists in the previous local elections, and a relatively nationalized prior council composition all significantly increasing the odds of a nationalized local party system (Steyvers and Heyerick, 2017). This chapter speaks to the later tradition taking a cross-​sectional perspective to describe and explain the municipal variance in local party system nationalization. We start from a relatively simple and straightforward measure of nationalization based on the central component from Kjaer and Elklit (2010a, 2010b): the degree to which the parties represented in the council correspond to those also present in the national parliament. However, there are two potential sources behind a local party system not perfectly resembling the national party system in a country: (1) one or more of the parties elected for parliament do not get elected to a given local council, and (2) one or more local lists, that is non-​partisan lists or independent candidates, obtain representation at a local council (Kjaer and Elklit, 2010b). Therefore, the index of local party system nationalization adopted in this chapter is a combination of two different dimensions, each tapping into these two sources of dis-​ resemblance. The first measure is the proportion of parliamentary parties elected for a local council –​the number of parliamentary parties elected to the council divided by the number of parties in the national parliament at the time of the local elections. The second measure is the proportion of the local parties/​lists elected for the local council –​the number of non-​parliamentary parties elected for the council divided with the total number of parties/​lists elected for the council. Observe that the denominators in the two measures are not identical –​in the first case, it is the number of parties represented at the national parliament while in the second it is the number of parties/​ lists at the local council. The combined measure –​the index of local party system nationalization –​is calculated as the number of parliamentary parties at the council divided by the sum of the number of parties in the national parliament and the number of non-​parliamentary parties/​lists elected for the council (see also Kjaer and Elklit, 2010b). The index runs from 0 where

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only non-​parliamentary parties/​lists are elected to 1 where all parliamentary parties and no non-​parliamentary parties are elected. So how nationalized are the local party systems in Denmark, Belgium and Poland? And does the degree of nationalization differ across municipalities of different sizes? We will answer these questions in turn, focusing exclusively on representation, that is, including only parties which obtained seats at the councils.

The bigger, the more nationalized? In Denmark, the parliamentary parties dominated the most recent local elections held on 21 November 2017 and won the lion’s share of the seats in the newly elected councils (see also Kjaer, 2020). As Table 9.1 demonstrates, the nine parties represented in the Danish parliament Folketinget at the time conquered at least one seat in most municipalities. Exceptions are the minor party Liberal Alliance and the newcomer Alternativet, whereas the two major parties, Socialdemokratiet (Social Democrats) and Venstre (Liberals) are present in all but two of the 98 municipalities. Local non-​partisan lists, which used to dominate Danish local politics before the 1970-​consolidation reform (a second reform was implemented in 2007) (Kjaer and Elklit, 2010), are still represented in four out of ten municipalities but with a total of 4 per cent of the seats, they are in most cases minor players (although they hold the mayoralty in two municipalities). In Belgium, the most recent local elections were held on 14 October 2018. As mentioned, the party systems varied between the three regions Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels. At the parliamentary elections in 2014, no less than 13 different parties were elected in the lower chamber Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers/​Chambre des Représentants. In most cases, this was due to sister parties running separately in the Flemish and French speaking parts, respectively. So, for instance, the green party runs in Flemish speaking districts under the label Groen, whereas in French speaking districts Ecolo is the green party. At the local elections, this means that in Flanders, Groen is often represented while Ecolo is not, and vice versa in Wallonia. In municipalities in the Brussels-​Capital region sometimes the parties run together under the bilingual label (such as Ecolo-​Groen) and sometimes apart under their monolingual counterparts. The seven major national parties (or pairs of parties) are, as demonstrated in Table 9.1, represented in many councils although substantial regional variation exists not directly visible here (Steyvers, forthcoming). While in the Brussels-​Capital region, each of them is represented in most councils, in Flanders most of them are represented in approximately half or more of the municipalities, and in Wallonia, each of them is often represented only in a minority of the municipalities. The

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Table 9.1: The local party system of Denmark (2017), Belgium (2018) and Poland (2018) compared to the most recent parliamentary election for the Folketinget (2015), the Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers/​Chambre des Représentants (2014) and the Sejm (2015), respectively Seats

no.

Municipalities with representation %

no.

%

Denmark Parties in the parliament A –​Socialdemokratiet

842

34.6

98

100.0

B –​Radikale Venstre

80

3.3

55

56.1

C –​Det Konservative Folkeparti

225

9.3

79

80.6

F –​SF –​Socialistisk Folkeparti

126

5.2

79

80.6

I –​Liberal Alliance

28

1.1

24

24.5

O –​Dansk Folkeparti

223

9.2

91

92.9

V –​Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti

688

28.3

96

98.0

Ø –​Enhedslisten –​De Rød-​Grønne

102

4.2

69

70.4

Å –​Alternativet

20

0.8

15

15.3

Parties not in the parliament

98

4.0

39

39.8

2,432

100.0

98

100.0

Radical left (PVDA/​PTB)

114

0.8

24

4.1

Greens (Groen/​Ecolo)

965

7.2

283

52.8

Socialists (sp.a/​PS)

1,576

11.7

245

42.2

Christian democrats (CD&V/​cdH)

2,136

15.9

280

49.2

Liberals (Open Vld/​MR)

1,385

10.3

232

39.9

Regionalists (N-​VA/​FDF)

1,579

11.7

274

47.2

341

2.5

129

22.2

5,354

39.9

336

57.8

13,450

100.0

581

100.0

PiS –​Prawo i Sprawiedliwość

5,808

14.7

1,284

51.8

KO –​Platforma Obywatelska + Nowoczesna

1,098

2.8

212

8.6

Total Belgium* Parties in the parliament

Radical right (VB/​PP) Parties not in the parliament Total Poland Parties in the parliament**

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Table 9.1: The local party system of Denmark (2017), Belgium (2018) and Poland (2018) compared to the most recent parliamentary election for the Folketinget (2015), the Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers/ Chambre des Representants (2014) and the Sejm (2015), respectively (continued) Seats

no. PSL –​Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe

Municipalities with representation %

no.

%

3,200

8.1

809

32.7

93

0.2

60

2.4

306

0.8

159

6.4

Parties not in the parliament

29,021

73.4

2,426

97.9

Total

39,526

100.0

2,477

100.0

K15 –​Kukiz ‘15 SLD –​Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej***

Note: * The categorization of certain lists as the local chapter of a parliamentary party (or not) is based on a formal criterion. Before the local elections, national parties (ie, those represented in the parliament) can partake in a formal procedure to obtain a national reference number. This number determines the initial ordering of the lists on the ballot paper (after which other lists are added). It is also a way to recognize officially a designated list as a local branch of a national party. Usually, but not invariably, the associated list will also carry (a slightly amended version of) the national party name (the procedure is thus also a means to protect the national brand name in the local elections). National parties are not obliged to partake in the procedure (and some do not). This does not preclude them (or local actors) from submitting lists with the national party name (eg, the radical left in the Flemish region, the regionalists or the radical right in Walloon region), signalling their national affiliation to the voter (this situation is exception rather than rule). As usual in Belgium, ‘national’ effectively means ‘regional’ (with the split party system and the region also a reference for local elections). The procedure is, however, the same in all regions. ** At the 2015 Sejm election, the German minority regional committee Mniejszość Niemiecka won a single seat, but the candidates running under this label in local elections have been assigned to the category of parties not in the parliament. ***During the 2015–​2019 SLD was outside the parliament, despite receiving 7.6% of popular vote. Yet, it kept the status of a national party. Source: Statistics Denmark, Steyvers, (forthcoming), and National Electoral Committee (PKW).

representation of local lists also varies across regions: non-​partisan lists are represented in 63 per cent of the councils in Flanders, 56 per cent of the municipalities in Wallonia and 3 per cent in the Brussels-​Capital region. The strength of the local anchorage of the various parliamentary parties also varies according to each region. Overall, centre and right wing parties have a larger share of seats in Flanders, while those on the left are relatively better represented in Wallonia. The latter also holds for non-​parliamentary parties (taking more than two thirds of the council seats in Walloon municipalities). In Poland, the most recent local elections were held on 21 October 2018, and five nationwide parties obtained representation –​the figures are reported

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in Table 9.1. The governing party Prawo i Sprawiedliwość was represented in a little more than half of the Polish municipalities, with the rest of the parties winning seats in fewer. At the time of the local elections, two of the parties elected for the Polish parliament, the Sejm, in 2015, Platforma Obywatelska and Nowoczesna ran under the common Koalicja Obywatelska label. The left alliance coalition organized by Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD) won seats in 6 per cent of the municipalities but even though it is a nationwide party, it was not a parliamentary party at the time (in the 2015 elections it failed to pass the high 8 per cent legal threshold for coalitions, yet it won 49 seats in the Sejm in the 2019 elections). Smaller parties, local non-​partisan lists and individuals outside the parties on the other hand have a strong presence in Polish local politics. As demonstrated in Table 9.1, almost three out of four seats in the local councils were won by the lists unrelated to the parliamentary party system (and this is even when including SLD as part of that). In all but 2 per cent of the Polish municipalities, at least one of the councillors is not representing any of the nationwide parties known from the Sejm. Although the cross-​country variation in the pattern can already be recognized in the description in Table 9.1, we have calculated the measures of local party system nationalization for each of the countries in Table 9.2. Whereas in the Danish case, the calculation is straightforward, a few comments on the Belgian and the Polish cases are needed. In Belgium, the 13 parties represented in the national parliament have not been used as a baseline in the calculations since, as described, some of them are sister parties running separately in the Dutch and French speaking regions. Therefore, for calculating the numbers for Belgium (in the row labelled Federal in Table 9.2), the six (Flemish) parties running in the Flemish municipalities and the seven (French) parties running in the Walloon municipalities are used as a baseline (while all 13 are used in the Brussels region). The numbers have also been calculated using the regional parliaments as a baseline (in the row labelled ‘regional’ in Table 9.2). In the Polish case, SLD is included as a parliamentary party even though at the time of the local election it was technically not represented in Sejm, whereas the German minority party is not included even though it had one seat in the parliament at that time. The indices are calculated separately for two electoral systems used in local elections: FPTP and open list proportional (the population threshold separating the two is 20,000). Table 9.2 shows that the three countries differ quite a lot: in Denmark, the proportion of the parliamentary parties which are also winning seats in the council is on average quite high, while the proportion of the elected parties which are not a branch of a parliamentary party is quite low, which means that the index of party system nationalization on average returns a high

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Table 9.2: Local party system nationalization at the local elections in Denmark (2017), Belgium (2018) and Poland (2018) Proportion of parliamentary parties elected (average (s.d.))

Proportion of elected parties which are non-​parliamentary (average (s.d.))

Index of local party system nationalization (average (s.d.))

Denmark

0.69 (0.15)

0.08 (0.10)

0.66 (0.17)

Belgium (Federal)

0.41 (0.30)

0.44 (0.35)

0.36 (0.28)

Regional

0.37 (0.27)

0.45 (0.35)

0.33 (0.25)

Flanders

0.50 (0.23)

0.27 (0.27)

0.45 (0.23)

Wallonia

0.22 (0.22)

0.68 (0.29)

0.17 (0.19)

Brussels

0.45 (0.09)

0.04 (0.07)

0.44 (0.09)

Poland

0.20 (0.17)

0.72 (0.25)

0.14 (0.13)

FPTP-​system

0.19 (0.17)

0.74 (0.24)

0.13 (0.13)

PR system

0.32 (0.16)

0.58 (0.22)

0.23 (0.13)

Source: Statistics Denmark, Steyvers, (forthcoming) and National Electoral Committee (PKW). Own calculations.

value of 0.66. In Belgium, both features are somewhat less nationalized –​the parliamentary parties being less present at the councils and the councils having more local lists –​and the index value is on average 0.36.3 And in Poland, the local party system resembles the national even less –​on average only one of the five parliamentary parties are elected to the councils, where, on the other hand, the local lists dominate –​and the index of local party system nationalization has an average value of 0.14. So, a clear difference in local party systems can be observed, with Denmark having a very nationalized local party system, Poland a very localized one and Belgium somewhere in between. So why is this the case? Before delving into inter-​country comparison, it is worth looking for intra-​country differences which might drive the cross-​ country differences (compare standard deviations with the means). While Denmark is not only a unitary state, it also has very few regional differences in political culture. At the same time, it has already been mentioned that the very segmented structure of the Belgian political system along geographical and linguistic cleavages creates regional differences in the party system.

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Also, the nationalization of the local party system can differ across regions so that the middle range level of nationalization might not be a Belgian feature but more a Flemish or Walloon one. Therefore, in Table 9.2 figures for the regions are also listed, and here we have used the party systems of the three regional parliaments –​Vlaams Parlement, Parlement de Wallonie and Parlement van het Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest/​Parlement de la Région de Bruxelles-​Capitale –​as baselines. As can be seen from Table 9.2, using the regional assemblies does not change a lot (compare the row ‘regional’ to the row ‘federal’). There are significant differences between the three regions, with Flanders having a more nationalized local party system compared to Wallonia’s more localized (with Brussels with very few local lists but otherwise like Flanders). When Belgium is concluded to be more nationalized in its local party systems than Poland, it is more correct to say that Flanders is more nationalized than Poland –​the Walloon municipalities have party systems more equivalent to their Polish counterparts than to their Flemish ones. Still, however, not even Flemish municipalities reach the level of nationalization found in Denmark. In Poland, there are also profound differences between groups of municipalities which could affect the local party systems. Two different electoral systems are used at the local level –​in 2,145 municipalities a FPTP system is applied, while in the remaining 332 a proportional representation (PR) system is used. While FPTP system is traditionally considered as favouring parties and typically produces consolidated two-​party systems, in local elections held in small constituencies, it seems to be much more personalized, favouring individual candidates’ reputation over party labels. This feature is additionally boosted by the simultaneity of council and mayoral elections (Gendźwiłł and Żółtak, 2017). Since the PR system is used also for parliamentary elections (and remembering Duverger’s claim that electoral system affects party system), it could be expected that municipalities with PR would have a more nationalized party system than municipalities with FPTP. According to Table 9.2, the presence of parliamentary parties is indeed lower in municipalities with FPTP compared to PR leading to a lower degree of nationalization. However, despite the difference, even in larger municipalities using PR, the nationalization is much lower than in Flanders/​Brussels and Denmark. It should be noticed that the FPTP–​PR difference reported in Table 9.2 could be caused by the electoral system as well as the size of the municipality, as the electoral rules applied are determined by the threshold of 20,000 inhabitants. This leads us to the size-​variable already introduced earlier. The average sizes of municipalities in the three countries actually match the pattern –​in Denmark the average size of the municipalities is 58,660 inhabitants, in Belgium 19,584 and in Poland 1,506, which correlates

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positively with the index (and in Flanders, municipalities are on average 21,787 inhabitants compared to Walloon’s 13,936). However, it should also be mentioned that comparing Denmark (where the cut-​off point when amalgamating municipalities has been 20,000, and where all municipalities use a PR system) with the PR municipalities in Poland (where the cut-​off point is 20,000 as well), the nationalization is far higher in Denmark than in urban Poland. However, to determine if and how much size matters we cannot say anything based on a rough comparison of aggregates but need to conduct analyses at the municipal level. Therefore, in Figure 9.1, for each of the three countries, the index of local party system nationalization is plotted against the size of the municipality. Figure 9.1 demonstrates that there is some correlation between municipal size and how nationalized the local party system is. In Belgium, the R-​ square of a model where the index of local party system nationalization is explained by municipal size (logarithmic), is 0.41, in Denmark 0.26 and in Poland 0.04. In Belgium, the size effect is consistent across the three regions (Flanders 0.29 compared to Brussels-​Capital 0.42 and Wallonia 0.46), whereas in Poland the positive size effect is found only among the larger PR municipalities (0.15), while between the many FPTP municipalities the relationship between size and nationalization is negative, yet statistically insignificant at the 5 per cent level. The two analyses conducted so far conclude that both country and size matter. This leaves us with the question of whether the size effect can account for the differences between countries when it comes to local party system nationalization. Is it the difference in sizes of municipalities which explains the differences observed across countries, or should the established variation be accounted for by other confounders? To answer this question, three pooled models are included in Table 9.3. In the first model, it is demonstrated that size matters and in the second, that country does too. The third model includes both variables and it is demonstrated that even though size matters it cannot account for the differences between the three countries –​there are significant and very substantial effects of the country variable even after controlling for size, and these tend to be relatively larger.4

Conclusion: Nationalized, localized or regionalized? In this chapter, we have studied local party system nationalization and what accounts for variation therein in Denmark, Belgium and Poland. Our preliminary analyses demonstrate that municipal size fairly well explains this in the three different national contexts. At the same time, it is evident that

175

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Figure 9.1: Index of local party system nationalization (Y-​axis) and size of municipality (X-​axis) for the 98 Danish, 581 Belgian and 2,477 Polish municipalities after the latest local elections in 2017, 2018 and 2018, respectively 1.000 0.800 0.600 0.400

0.000 1,000

10,000

100,000

1,000,000

10,000

100,000

1,000,000

1.000 0.800

176

0.600 0.400 0.200 0.000 1,000 1.000 0.800 0.600 0.400 0.200 0.000 1,000

10,000

100,000

100,000

1,000,000

Sources: Statistics Denmark, Steyvers, (forthcoming), and National Electoral Committee (PKW). Own calculations.

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0.200

Size and Nationalization of Local Party Systems

Table 9.3: Index of local party system nationalization explained by municipal size (1) Municipal size (inhabitants log10)

(2)

.220*** (.008)

(3) .144*** (.016)

Denmark

ref.

ref.

Belgium

-​.331*** (.018)

-​.255*** (.017)

Poland

-​.513*** (.017)

-​.414*** (.016)

Constant

-​.686*** (.032)

.657*** (.016)

-​.009 (.038)

R2

0.19

0.31

0.39

Note: N = 3,156 (Denmark 98, Belgium 581, Poland 2,477). Source: Statistics Denmark, Steyvers, (forthcoming) and National Electoral Committee (PKW). Own calculations.

the countries (or even regions within the country) occupy different places at the continuum of nationalization. Thus, institutional, cultural and historical features of national context supplement the structural explanation related to municipal size. This cross-​national evidence corroborates previous country-​ specific evidence from Denmark (Kjaer and Elklit, 2010b), Austria (Ennser-​ Jedenastik and Hansen, 2013) and Belgium (Steyvers and Heyerick, 2017). The three countries are cases in point. But to what extent can the findings be generalized to a wider array of political systems? Based on the analyses presented here, we can formulate the hypothesis that the nationalization of local party systems is related to the overall degree of institutionalization of the national parties and party system, as well as to the internal heterogeneity within countries. The highest level of nationalization is expected in countries with well-​embedded national parties, a homogeneous political culture and uniform electoral rules, particularly in systems with low personalization (such as closed list PR). The lowest level of nationalization is expected in countries with volatile national party systems, heterogeneous electoral rules (including systems with high personalization) and diverse patterns of political culture. In federal or strongly regionalized countries, one could furthermore expect that the resemblance between local and national party systems will be clustered around regions. These hypotheses cannot be tested on the same cases used to develop them; therefore, we call for further comparative studies, including other countries.

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Empirically, scrutinizing variation in local party system nationalization from a cross-​national perspective clearly is a worthwhile endeavour. However, it is difficult to assess the phenomenon more normatively. On the one hand, a high level of nationalization in a multi-​level governance setting might facilitate the policy coordination between levels of government and the circulation of political elites. Political parties serve as ‘linking agents’ not only between the electorate and the government but also between levels in multi-​level systems, exploiting in exchange the resources and opportunities available in local governments (Pedahzur and Brichta, 2000). Parties might thereby bridge the traditional juxtaposition between local and national stakes. On the other hand, the dominance of national parties might suppress grassroots local movements and single-​issue groups. It could also take the ‘local’ element more generally out of municipal politics. This could destroy the place-​bound essence of local politics, leading to de-​localization of voters’ political considerations and local voting behaviour. The risk is that the full nationalization of local party systems reduces the role of local elections to mid-​term or ‘barometer’ elections. The cases studied so far suggest that practice stands somewhere in the middle (note the variation in nationalization, the sustaining of non-​national lists or candidates, etc.). Contemporary local governance is not only multi-​level but also multi-​faceted between and within places: an insight central to the work of the man to which this volume is ultimately dedicated. Notes 1

2

3

4

In five other municipalities, the ballot was a copy of the national, and in eight other municipalities, all of the parliamentary parties and only these became represented at the council. Meanwhile, the partisan dynamic interacted with an institutional one transforming Belgium into a sui generis federation through a series of state reforms. In one of those, the regions achieved the competence to set the constitutive framework for local government (municipalities and provinces) on their territory. This also affects the organization of local elections. If the 13 parties in the Belgian parliament had been used, the three values reported would instead have been: 0.20, 0.44 and 0.19, respectively. In model 3, the attention should be paid to multicollinearity since the highest variance inflation factor (VIF) value is 6.26.

References Aars, J. and Ringkjøb, H.-​E. (2005) ‘Party Politicization Reversed? Non-​ Partisan Alternatives in Norwegian Local Politics’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 28(2): 161–​182.

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Baekgaard, M., Elklit, J. and Kjaer, U. (2017) ‘Den stadig ikke helt fuldendte landspolitisering af de lokale partisystemer’, in J. Elklit, C. Elmelund-​ Præstekær and U. Kjaer (eds) KV13. Analyser af kommunalvalget 2013, Odense: University of Southern Denmark Press, pp 265–​279. Bochsler, D. (2010) ‘Measuring Party Nationalization: A New Gini-​ Based Indicator that Corrects for the Number of Unit’, Electoral Studies, 29(1): 155–​168. Caramani, D. (2004) The Nationalization of Politics. The Formation of National Electorates and Party Systems in Western Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Caramani, D. and Kollman, K. (2017) ‘The Nationalization of Electoral Politics: Frontiers of Research’, Electoral Studies, 47(1): 51–​54. Chhibber, P. and Kollman, K. (2004) ‘The Formation of National Party Systems’, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Copus, C., Wingfield, M., Steyvers, K. and Reynaert, H. (2012) ‘A Place to Party? Parties and Nonpartisanship in Local Government’, in S. Clarke, P. John and K. Mossberger (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Urban Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 210–​230. Dahl, R.A. and Tufte, E.R. (1973) Size and Democracy, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Denters, B., Goldsmith, M., Ladner, A., Mouritzen, P.E. and Rose, L.R. (2014) Size and Local Democracy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Deschouwer, K., Pilet, J.-​B. and Van Haute, E. (2017) ‘Party Families in a Split Party System’, in K. Deschouwer (ed) Mind the Gap. Political Participation and Representation in Belgium, London: Rowman and Littlefield International, pp 91–​112. Ennser-​Jedenastik, L. and Hansen, M. (2013) ‘The Contingent Nature of Local Party System Nationalization. The Case of Austria 1985–​2009’, Local Government Studies, 39(6): 777–​791. Gendźwiłł, A. and Swianiewicz, P. (2017) ‘Breeding Grounds for Local Independents, Bonus for Incumbents: Directly Elected Mayors in Poland’, in D. Sweeting (ed) Directly Elected Mayors in Urban Governance: Impact and Practice, Bristol: Policy Press, pp 179–​200. Gendźwiłł, A. and Żółtak, T. (2017) ‘How Single Member Districts Are Reinforcing Local Independents and Strengthening Mayors: On the Electoral Reform in Polish Local Governments’, Local Government Studies, 43(1): 110–​131 Golosov, G. (2016) ‘Party System Nationalization: The Problems of Measurement with an Application to Federal States’, Party Politics, 22(3): 278–​288.

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Kasuya, Y. and Moenius, J. (2008) ‘The Nationalization of Party Systems: Conceptual Issues and Alternative District-​Focused Measures’, Electoral Studies, 27(1): 126–​135. Kjaer, U. (2020) ‘Local Elections –​Localized Voting Within a Nationalized Party System’, in P.M. Christiansen, J. Elklit and P. Nedergaard (eds) Oxford Handbook of Danish Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 382–​399. Kjaer, U. and Elklit, J. (2010a) ‘Party Politicization of Local Councils: Cultural or Institutional Explanations for Trends in Denmark (1966–​2005)’, European Journal of Political Research, 49(3): 337–​358. Kjaer, U. and Elklit, J. (2010b) ‘Local Party System Nationalisation: Does Municipal Size Matter?’, Local Government Studies, 36(3): 425–​444. Lago, I. and Montero, J. (2014) ‘Defining and Measuring Party System Nationalization’, European Political Science Review, 6(2): 191–​211. Maškarinec, P. (2015) ‘Nationalisation of the Czech Local Party System. Case Study of the 2010 Local Elections in Municipalities with Extended Powers’, Sociológia, 47(6): 625–​656. Mustillo, T. and Mustillo, S. (2012) ‘Party Nationalization in a Multilevel context. Where is the Variance?’, Electoral Studies, 31(2): 422–​433. Newton, K. (1982) ‘Is Small Really So Beautiful? Is Big Really So Ugly? Size, Effectiveness, and Democracy in Local Government’, Political Studies, 30(2): 190–​206. Pedahzur, A. and Brichta, A. (2000) ‘The Attractiveness of the Seemingly Unattractive: An Israeli Case’, Local Government Studies, 26(3): 55–​70. Rokkan, S. (1966) ‘Electoral Mobilization, Party Competition and National Integration’, in J. Weiner (ed.) Political Parties and Political Development, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp 241–​265. Schakel, A. (2013) ‘Nationalisation of Multilevel Party Systems: A Conceptual and Empirical Analysis’, European Journal of Political Research, 52(2): 212–​236. Steyvers, K. (forthcoming) ‘Belgium: Between National Barometer and Local Atmosphere?’ in A. Gendźwiłł, U. Kjaer and K. Steyvers (eds) Routledge Handbook of Local Elections and Voting in Europe, London: Routledge. Steyvers, K. and Heyerick, A. (2017) ‘Fifty Shades of Rokkan? Reconceiving Local Party System Nationalisation in Belgium’, Croatian and Comparative Public Administration, 17(4): 509–​538. Stokes, D. (1967) ‘Parties and the Nationalization of Electoral Forces’, in W. Chambers and W. Brunham (eds) American Party Systems. Stages of Political Development, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 188–​202.

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10

Co-​creating the Tolerant City: The Role of Inspirational Civic Leadership Robin Hambleton with a contribution by Wirginia Aksztejn

Introduction Over the last 20 years or so there has been a welcome expansion of academic interest in the role of political and managerial leadership in improving the quality of local government and local governance. In particular, international comparative study of the leadership efforts of elected politicians, appointed public servants and civic actors has grown, and, as a result, our understanding of the roles of different kinds of leader in shaping local life chances, as well as in improving processes of decision-​making, has been advanced (Mouritzen and Svara, 2002; Haus et al, 2005; Swianiewicz, 2006; Hambleton, 2015; Sweeting, 2017). This chapter is the first of three contributions in this volume that are designed to build on the established local government leadership literature and, hopefully, deepen our understanding of the changing nature of local, or place-​based, leadership in modern systems of governance. Heinelt (Chapter 11) provides new insights by comparing and contrasting mayoral leadership in Germany and Poland, and Hanssen (Chapter 12) illuminates our understanding of climate change leadership by providing a case study of the way the parliamentary model of governance in Oslo, Norway has been reshaped in recent years. In this chapter, I focus on the important contribution that inspirational local leadership can make to the governance of the multicultural city. For centuries, if not throughout human history, cities have grown and changed as a result of migration and immigration. A consequence is that all cities are, to some extent, multicultural or multi-​ethnic. As Peter Hall

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notes, in his magisterial review of creative cities in history, cultural diversity has been a key asset in the emergence and development of dynamic cities: Creative cities were nearly all cosmopolitan; they drew on talent from the four corners of their worlds, and from the very start, those worlds were often surprisingly far flung. (Hall, 1998: 285) In recent decades, the movement of peoples to cities has accelerated, and some cities, often described as ‘gateway cities’, now have a very high number of foreign-​born residents (Saunders, 2010; Oosterlynck et al, 2019). This increase in urban diversity poses important challenges for city leaders and public managers, and for the systems of representation in urban governance. This chapter offers a contribution to current debates about the leadership and management of multicultural cities and, in particular, it aims to identify lessons for policy and practice from places that are attempting to co-​create inclusive, tolerant cities. Inevitably, the COVID-​19 pandemic shapes the context for this chapter. In a recent book, Cities and Communities beyond COVID-​19, I suggest that city leaders are confronted with four major challenges at once: (1) the COVID-​19 health emergency, (2) a very sharp economic downturn arising from the pandemic, (3) the climate emergency, and (4) an upsurge in community anger about continuing inequality in society and, in particular, the continued existence of systemic racism in many societies (Hambleton, 2020a). This last point is particularly pertinent to our discussion. Sad to say, some politicians on the right of the political spectrum have sought to sow divisions in society by, for example, claiming, without evidence, that immigrants are responsible for various social and economic ills in modern societies. Indeed, some of these politicians, and former US President Donald Trump springs to mind, seem determined to promote hatred between various socio-​economic and ethnoreligious groups. These right-​wing politicians thrive on angry populism and simplistic slogans and, unfortunately, various influential privately owned news channels, such as Fox News in the USA, actively promote their intolerant and divisive policies. In a world in which ‘fake news’ is widespread in the mainstream media and, in particular, in the largely unregulated social media on the internet, the importance of scholarship in providing evidence-​based studies of policy and practice is elevated. This chapter, by drawing on international research on city and community leadership, addresses the question: how can local leadership help to resist the growth in angry populism? It will be argued that, largely unnoticed by the national media and the international news channels, city leaders and community activists in many countries are developing a wide range

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of progressive approaches to local problem solving. An opening section identifies a major challenge that now faces those wanting to co-​create inclusive, tolerant cities –​the growth of place-​less power. An emerging theme from this discussion is that the power of place has been seriously neglected in both the academic literature on public policy and politics, and in the practical world of public policy making. A second section offers a conceptual framework –​new civic leadership –​for understanding the power of place, and this provides fresh ways of thinking about how to go about collaborative problem solving in cities and communities. A third section introduces the idea of an ‘Innovation story’, meaning a short structured narrative describing the way a given city has attempted to bring about social innovation. Two Innovation Stories, chosen because they are respected examples of inclusive city leadership, are presented: (1) Gdańsk, Poland, and (2) Bristol, UK. A final section identifies emerging themes concerning the changing nature of place-​based leadership in the modern world.

Place-​less power and place-​based power The COVID-​19 pandemic is, of course, a global calamity. However, at the same time it is not so much a single phenomenon as a multitude of specific outbreaks affecting different localities and communities in very different ways. While the steps taken by national governments to respond to the COVID-​19 challenge have dominated the headlines, it is the case that thousands of cities and localities across the world have played, and are continuing to play, an enormously important role in responding to the crisis and in helping societies recover. Local leadership has the major advantage of being able to tap local knowledge and understanding. Moreover, civic leaders, inside and outside the state, are uniquely well placed to support and orchestrate local community-​based efforts to meet the needs of diverse vulnerable groups and invent new ways of doing things. Unfortunately, place-​based leaders across the world are up against a malign force, one that has seen a spectacular growth in the last 30 years or so: place-​less power. By place-​less power I mean the exercise of power by decision-​makers who are unconcerned about the impacts of their decisions on communities living in particular places. The forces of globalization, which have resulted in a remarkable growth in the number of multinational companies operating on a global basis, have provided the engine for this expansion in place-​less policy making, and the consequences for social, economic and environmental justice have been dire (Mason, 2015; Monbiot, 2017). By way of example, the growth of Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation, now stylized as News Corp, into a massive global empire,

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provides a striking example of the rise of place-​less power, in this case within newspaper and broadcasting industries (Wolff, 2008). When exploring how elected local governments and other place-​based actors might respond to societal challenges, it is important to understand the potential constraints on local political action. It is naïve to believe that elected local leaders are free agents able to respond directly and compassionately to the views and priorities expressed by their citizens. On the contrary, various powerful forces shape the context within which civic leaders operate. These forces do not erase the possibilities for local leadership. Rather, they place limits on what local leaders may be able to accomplish in particular countries and localities at particular moments in time. Figure 10.1 provides a simplified picture of the four sets of forces that shape the world of place-​ based governance in any given locality. At the bottom of the diagram are, what I take to be, the non-​negotiable environmental, or planetary, limits. The scientific evidence on climate change suggests that ignoring the fact that cities and local communities are part of the natural ecosystem is irresponsible, and failure to pay attention to environmental limits will store up unmanageable problems for future generations (Girardet, 2008; Jackson, 2009; Bulkeley, 2013). This side of Figure 10.1: Framing the political space available to local leaders

Source: Hambleton, 2015: 114.

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the square is drawn with a solid line because, unlike the other sides of the square, these environmental limits are non-​negotiable. On the left-​hand side of the diagram are socio-​cultural forces –​these comprise a mix of people (as actors) and cultural values (that people may hold). Here we find the rich variety of voices found in any city or locality. The people of a given city, or locality, will have different views about the kind of place they wish to live in, and they will have differential capacities to make these views known. Some, maybe many, will claim a right to the city (Lefebvre, 1967; Brenner et al, 2012). We can assume that, in democratic societies at least, elected leaders who pay little or no attention to these local political pressures should not expect to stay in office for too long. Expression of ‘citizen’s voice’, to use a phrase deployed by the famous economist Albert Hirschman, will see them dismissed at the ballot box (Hirschman, 1970). On the right-​hand side of the diagram are the horizontal economic forces that arise from the need for localities to compete, to some degree at least, in the wider marketplace –​for inward investment and to attract talented people. Some writers argue that owing to local resource deficits and the need to maintain a competitive position, cities have become dependent on higher levels of government and private investment for survival (Peterson, 1981). On this analysis, localities become ever more dependent on external forces, effectively helpless victims in a global flow of events. However, various studies have shown that, contrary to neoliberal dogma, it is possible for civic leaders to bargain with business (Savitch and Kantor, 2002). At the top of the diagram, we find the legal and policy framework imposed by higher levels of government. In some countries, the framing grants substantial autonomy to elected local governments, in others the central state virtually tells local authorities what they can and cannot do.

Place-​based leadership and the tolerant city Carl Nightingale (2012), in his global history of divided cities, highlights a contradiction that is well known to students of urban change and development. On the one hand, as Hall (1998) explains, successful cities are cosmopolitan; they welcome migrants and know that urban diversity provides a route to prosperity and a high quality of cultural life. On the other hand, the existence of racial, and ethnoreligious prejudice has led to the development of segregated cities with, in some cases, extreme arrangements for oppressing minorities –​the apartheid regime in South Africa, from 1948 to the early 1990s provides an infamous example. Nightingale comments:

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The very concept of urban segregation, after all, is self-​ contradictory. Cities are places where many different people come together, congregate, and create great agglomerations –​ where geographical distances between people are diminished, not increased. For whites who dominate multiracial cities, this contradiction often translates into a real political dilemma … when the advantages of urban growth arise from the gathering of large numbers of people of colour in cities, growth can also pose perceived political, economic and cultural threats to white rule. (Nightingale, 2012: 10) Studies of reform efforts, in different countries and contexts, to remove unfair discrimination from societies show that education backed by civil rights legislation can be very effective (Levin and Rabrenovic, 2004; Bagilhole, 2009). Research has also shown that it is the very local dimension that really matters. For example, Amin (2002) makes clear, in his insightful UK study of ethnicity in the multicultural city, that it is the sites of everyday encounter that open up pathways to mutual understanding. He comments on British policy and notes that, while much of the UK debate about racial and ethnic relations was taking place at a national level, the really important negotiations of difference were taking place in urban neighbourhoods. This brings us back fairly swiftly to place-​based leadership, and suggests that elected local authorities have a critical role to play in advancing the cause of equality and social inclusion. I now offer a conceptual framework that aims to enhance understanding of the changing nature of place-​based leadership. The New Civic Leadership (NCL) involves strong, place-​based leadership acting to co-​create new solutions to public problems by drawing on the complementary strengths of civil society, the market and the state. The details of this model are set out elsewhere (Hambleton, 2015). In essence, it highlights the role of local leaders in facilitating public service innovation. As shown in Figure 10.2, it suggests that in any given locality, place-​ based governance is likely to comprise five overlapping realms of place-​ based leadership, with leaders in each realm drawing on different sources of legitimacy: • Political leadership –​referring to the work of those people elected to leadership positions by the citizenry. • Public managerial/​professional leadership –​referring to the work of public servants appointed by local authorities, governments and third sector organizations to plan and manage public services and promote community wellbeing.

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Figure 10.2: The realms of place-​based leadership

Source: Hambleton, 2015: 127.

• Community leadership –​referring to the many civic-​minded people who give their time and energy to local leadership activities in a wide variety of ways. • Business leadership –​referring to the contribution made by local business leaders and social entrepreneurs, who have a clear stake in the long-​term prosperity of the locality. • Trade union leadership –​referring to the efforts of trade union leaders striving to improve the pay and working conditions of employees. These leadership roles are all important in cultivating and encouraging public service innovation and, crucially, they overlap. The areas of overlap can be described as innovation zones –​areas providing many opportunities for inventive behaviour. This is because different perspectives are brought together in these zones and this can enable active questioning of established approaches. It is fair to say that the areas of overlap in Figure 10.2 are often experienced as conflict zones within cities, rather than innovation zones. These spaces do, of course, provide settings for power struggles between competing interests and values. Moreover, power is unequally distributed within these settings. This is precisely why place-​based leadership matters.

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The author’s research on urban governance in several countries suggests that civic leadership is critical in ensuring that the innovation zones are orchestrated in a way that promotes a culture of listening that can, in turn, lead to innovation. Civic leaders are, of course, not just ‘those at the top’. All kinds of people can exercise civic leadership and they may be inside or outside the state. The author’s definition of leadership is, ‘Shaping emotions and behaviour to achieve common goals’ (Hambleton, 2007: 174). This definition puts emotions centre stage and stresses the importance of the co-​creation of new possibilities.

Two examples of inspirational civic leadership In this section, we consider the efforts of two cities in two different countries to co-​create inclusive and tolerant cities: Gdańsk, Poland and Bristol, UK. These two cities are chosen because they both have a track record of bold innovation in relation to social inclusion. Both can claim, with some justification, that they have had some success in promoting progressive policies and strategies. Elsewhere I have suggested that an inclusive city is one in which ‘All residents are able to participate fully in the society and the economy, and civic leaders strive for just results while caring for the natural environment on which we all depend.’ (Hambleton, 2015: 25). The evidence suggests that both Gdańsk and Bristol are developing policies and practices that are consistent with this aim. Both cities can be viewed as examples of the NCL in action. The two cities are presented as short Innovation stories. An Innovation story provides an accessible way of presenting information about an effort at urban reform. This format was introduced in my recent book on Leading the Inclusive City. (Hambleton, 2015: xiv). The idea is to provide a short account of radical change in a particular city and draw out lessons that can inspire bold civic leadership in other places. An Innovation story does not aim to identify so-​called ‘best practice’ in urban governance –​there is no such thing. Rather, a good story enhances understanding and stimulates a creative response. In this chapter, the following headings are used to structure each Innovation story: Orientation; Policies and initiatives; Leadership lessons; and Sources.

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INNOVATION STORY 1: INCLUSIVE LEADERSHIP IN GDAŃSK, POLAND Wirginia Aksztejn

Orientation In January 2019, Polish society went into mourning after Paweł Adamowicz, the inspirational Mayor of Gdańsk, was assassinated on stage at a charity event. Mayor Adamowicz should be remembered, not for his tragic death, but for the imaginative leadership he provided to Poland’s sixth largest city. Founded in the 10th century, a member of the Hanseatic League, throughout its history under Polish, Prussian and German rule, with periods of a free city status, Gdańsk has diversity entwined in its DNA. The 20th century added a new facet to the city’s identity. In the 1970s, Gdańsk became famous for anti-​government demonstrations and protests and, a decade later, witnessed the birth of the Solidarity trade union movement –​events which contributed to the eventual downfall of the Communist regime in Poland. In light of these developments, Gdańsk was dubbed a ‘city of freedom’ and became strongly associated with social change and innovation. Gdańsk, a vibrant city with a population of 471,000, lies at the heart of the Tri-​City agglomeration, a metropolitan area with a population exceeding one million people. Gdańsk, a harbour city with a well-​established legacy and ethos of openness to people from different walks of life, has a tradition of tolerance. In the last decade, this tradition of openness was reinforced by local authority leaders and, in particular, by the wise leadership shown by Paweł Adamowicz, who was elected mayor of the city in 1998. Adamowicz, who was first elected to the city council in 1990, became increasingly committed to communitarian values and, over time, he was transformed from respected technocrat into an influential, inclusive leader. Symptomatically, his first book about Gdańsk was titled Gdańsk as a Challenge (Adamowicz, 2008), and his most recent one was titled Gdańsk as a Community (Adamowicz, 2018). They document the process of enhancing the quality of local democracy in the city: from a broad vision to implementation of concrete policies. Adamowicz’s leadership style earned him a place in the influential book If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities (Barber, 2013). The inclusive character of the city’s policies manifests itself in both a tolerant, open attitude towards diversity, and as a strengthening of place-​related, civic engagement and participatory governance. Although Gdańsk is not free from economic growth versus cohesion tensions, social and political inclusion remain a vital element of the local

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agenda. In many respects, Gdańsk can be described as a national pioneer in developing novel inclusion policies and mechanisms, or at least one of their very early adopters. It is important to record that Gdańsk has been introducing a variety of progressive policies at a time when the rhetoric at national government level has tended to be anti-​migrant, homophobic and centralizing in tone.

Policies and initiatives Vigorous collaboration with non-​governmental organizations (NGOs), reorganization of the city’s administrative units in order to work outside the traditional silos, networking with international, inclusion-​oriented organizations (eg, Urban Action Europe –​URBACT) are noteworthy examples of measures taken to respond to social challenges in an integrated, collaborative and innovative manner. Gdańsk also brought civic participation in decision-​making process to a higher level. Gdańsk was the first city in Poland to introduce citizens’ assemblies. The idea of using this way of including residents in the policy-​making process was a bottom-​ up initiative of a local activist. Since 2016, there have been three such assemblies on: (1) adaptation to climate change; (2) improving air quality; and (3) policies to support civic action in Gdańsk. The uniqueness of this tool lies in its truly deliberative and egalitarian character. Participants who closely match the socio-​demographic structure of the local community (random-​quota sample design) are expected to offer a solution to a given problem after presentation of available options, opinions of stakeholders and information from experts in the field. Gdańsk city council is obliged to implement the preferred solutions identified by citizens’ assemblies providing that they are supported by more than 80 per cent of participants. The deceased mayor, Paweł Adamowicz, was an enthusiast for this method, and planned to establish a more continuous and regular form of such consultations, in effect, a kind of citizens’ deliberative parliament. Gdańsk keeps a vigilant eye on the changing social structure of the population and the potential dangers of social segregation. In response to an influx of labour immigrants and foreign students, City Hall established a new advisory body, a Council of Immigrants, created as a dedicated section in the employment office, which provided free counselling for new arrivals in the city in collaboration with a local NGO. In 2016, after broad and multi-​sectoral consultations, the city council enacted an Immigrant Integration Model –​a policy statement with an action plan for municipal institutions. The document encompassed a comprehensive range of everyday life situations where immigrants’ needs should be taken into consideration in areas such as education, culture, housing, social care, the labour market, violence prevention, local communities and health.

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The city also prepared a parallel model more generally addressing the issue of social exclusion. The Model for Equal Treatment provides guidelines aimed at inclusion of disadvantaged groups and prevention of discrimination on grounds of gender, age, disability, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation and identity. It includes a set of recommendations, grouped into several categories aligned with the city’s operational programmes: education, health and sport, social integration and civic engagement, culture and leisure, innovation and entrepreneurship, infrastructure, mobility and public space. This model, enacted by the city council in May 2018, met with protests from conservative organizations and groups, supported by the regional governor, an official appointed by central government. The governor challenged the act at the Regional Administrative Court, pointing to some legal and procedural flaws. However, the attempt to repeal the act was unsuccessful. The death of Mayor Adamowicz, after over 20 years in office, closed an important chapter in the history of Gdańsk. Hopefully, his work to make Gdańsk a welcoming place for everyone will be continued by his successor, and long-​lasting collaborator and deputy, Mayor Aleksandra Dulkiewicz.

Leadership lessons • Developments in Gdańsk support Barber’s claim that cities have the ability to tackle contemporary social problems that are either overlooked or deliberately ignored by national level governments. Through its inclusive migrant programmes, the city manages to live up to its welcoming ethos and, at the same time, mitigates its labour force deficiencies, creates a tolerant, diverse community and unleashes the potential of the newly arrived. • The preventive character of implemented policies on one hand, and openness to experimentation and innovation on the other, exemplify important leadership qualities for the current time of rapid change and emerging social and environmental problems. • Nurturing participatory and deliberative practices helps build a more engaged, more active and consequently more resilient local community. In addition, promoting a tolerant and inclusive culture empowers disadvantaged groups and reduces the risk of various forms of inequalities.

Sources Adamowicz, P. (2008) Gdańsk jako wyzwanie, Gdańsk: Słowo/​obraz terytoria. Adamowicz, P. (2018) Gdańsk jako wspólnota, Gdańsk: Słowo/​obraz terytoria. Barber, B.R. (2013) If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Urbact: https://​urbact.eu/​gda%C5%84sk Immigrant Integration Model: https://​www.gdansk.pl/​download/​2017–​06/​91579.pdf

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Model for Equal Treatment: https://​bip.gdansk.pl/​subpages/​akty_​prawne/​pliki/​2018/​ PMG_​2018_​7_​807_​zal01.pdf

Acknowledgements This profile of Gdańsk draws on findings from the COHSMO Project, which has received funding from the European Union Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under Grant Agreement No 727058.    

INNOVATION STORY 2: INCLUSIVE LEADERSHIP IN BRISTOL, UK Orientation In early 1963, Roy Hackett, a black resident of Bristol, saw another black man weeping in the street outside the Bristol Omnibus Company office in Broadmead, in the centre of the city. The distressed man explained that he was crying because the bus company had told him that he could not have an interview for a job as a bus driver solely because he was black (Andrews, 2020). Hackett, now celebrated as an important and influential activist in challenging racism in Britain, strode into the bus company office and told the official he met, ‘If he can’t drive it, then the bus won’t be moving, will it?’ The strategy here was not to ask for black people to be treated equally, it was to demand it. A community-​based organization, founded by Hackett and led by Paul Stephenson, orchestrated the Bristol Bus Boycott. Drawing inspiration from Rosa Parks and the 1955 Montgomery Bus Boycott in the USA, the Bristol boycott lasted for four months until the company was forced to discard its racist policies. This peaceful and enormously effective community campaign in Bristol contributed to the wider movement that led to the passing of the UK Race Relations Act 1965, which made ‘racial discrimination unlawful in public places’. Leap forward 50 years. In May 2016 Bristol citizens voted, in a landslide victory, to elect Marvin Rees as the directly elected mayor of Bristol making him the first ever mayor of black, African-​Caribbean descent to lead a major European city. Rees, a young and charismatic leader, led the Labour Party to a resounding victory, and his contribution to British politics was further elevated in the summer of 2020. On 7 June 2020, Black Lives Matter protesters in Bristol pulled down a bronze statue of the prolific slave trader, Edward Colston, and dumped it into Bristol harbour.

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Rees showed himself to be an empathetic and thoughtful leader when he explained, in numerous interviews with the media, that, ‘I do not condone criminal damage. … At the same time … I’m a descendant of Jamaicans … and I can’t say that that statue was anything other than offensive to me’ (Interview for The Telegraph 8 June 2020). His message was calm and balanced; he wanted to understand why some people were upset about the toppling of the statue. The policing of the demonstration was wise and proportionate; nobody was hurt. Bristol City Council retrieved the statue from the harbour, as well as the many placards that Black Lives Matters protesters placed at the base of the plinth on which the statue had once stood. The intention, at the time of writing, was to place the damaged statue of the slave trader plus the placards in one of Bristol’s museums so that the events of 2020 could become part of the recorded history of the city.

Policies and initiatives The central theme in Mayor Rees’s approach to governing the city, population 463,000, is inclusion. His City Office concept, which aims to unite public purpose in the city, brings together leaders and activists from the public, private and voluntary sectors. Following community consultation, this strategy was to become known as the Bristol One City Approach. The core objective is to bind together all those who care about the city in a much more effective collaborative effort. This approach is strongly place-​based in the sense that it draws inspiration and enthusiasm from the positive feelings people have about the place where they live. The details of the way the Bristol One City Approach has unfolded are documented elsewhere (Hambleton, 2020b). Here we can highlight four features. First, Rees initiated a series of City Gatherings of civic leaders, the idea being to draw together leaders from all the realms of place-​based leadership in the city –​public sector, community, business, trade union, universities, and so forth –​on a regular basis. City Gatherings, which now take place every six months or so, are not conventional public meetings. Rather, they are designed to create highly interactive city conversations, with participants working together in cross cutting teams, to examine the major challenges facing the city and to explore ideas on how to tackle them. The City Gatherings identify issues for attention for investigation by inter-​agency project groups. There are far too many City Office initiatives to list in this short account but they range from tackling homelessness, providing free meals for needy children in school holidays, to a period-​ friendly initiative designed to improve period dignity for women and girls in the city. Second, Rees orchestrated the co-​creation of the first Bristol One City Plan and secured civic commitment to delivering it. The idea of developing a shared long-​term vision

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for the future trajectory of the city emerged from discussions at several of the early City Gatherings. The Bristol One City Plan, launched in January 2019, is designed to orchestrate the creation of a ‘big picture’ strategy for the future development of the city, one that looks forward to 2050, and one that agencies are expected to commit to. The central aim is to create a city that is fair, healthy and sustainable. The third element in the One City Approach is the development of place-​based leadership talent. The City Gatherings identified the importance of developing and delivering new kinds of civic leadership programmes, ones that target under-​represented groups in the city. The City Office was encouraged to orchestrate a step-​change in the provision of place-​based leadership opportunities –​ranging from city leadership courses for young people (under 19s) through to advanced place-​based leadership workshops. A fourth element concerns the role of the two universities in Bristol –​the University of Bristol and the University of the West of England, Bristol. Well before he was elected in 2016, Mayor Rees recognized that the two local universities could make a major contribution to the work of his new City Office approach. He has encouraged both of them to become actively involved in helping to develop and critique the Bristol One City Plan. The first Bristol Forum, held in March 2019, provides a good example of city/​ university collaboration. This one-​day ‘free to attend’ event brought together over 200 participants from across academia and the business, third and public sectors, to explore the challenges facing the city and the city region, and to develop potential solutions.

Leadership lessons • The directly elected leader of a city has the legitimacy to set the public policy agenda and, if they adopt an empathetic style, they can convene a wide range of actors from inside and outside the state to work on the co-​creation of new understandings and solutions. • Inclusive city leadership involves creating spaces, or innovation zones, within which people from different backgrounds can work together to co-​create new solutions. • If inclusion is seen as a key objective it is essential to develop place-​based leadership programmes. Such programmes can bring new voices into local civic leadership and boost the wisdom and calibre of civic leadership.

Sources Andrews K. (2020) ‘Roy Hackett: the civil rights hero who stood in front of a bus –​and changed Britain for ever ’, The Guardian, 6 August. Hambleton R. (2020b) ‘The Bristol One City Approach to City Governance: New Civic Leadership in Action’, Urban Research and Practice, 13(2): 228–​237.

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Bristol One City Approach: https://​www.bristolonecity.com Bristol One City Plan: https://​www.bristolonecity.com Bristol City Forum: https://​www.bristolforum.org.uk    

Emerging themes for scholarship and practice The initial question posed at the beginning of this chapter was ‘How can local leadership help to resist the growth in angry populism?’ This is a challenging task and any effective societal response will need to be multi-​level and wide-​ ranging. By focusing more sharply on the role of local leadership we can, however, identify four related suggestions, or pointers, for future thinking and action, that flow from the analysis presented in this chapter. First, while place clearly matters in public policy, it is neglected. For example, many national governments continue to operate with a low level of spatial awareness. Their knowledge of place-​based outcomes for different communities and groups living in different places is often very poor and, in some countries, the UK provides an unhappy example, elected local authorities are seriously undervalued in public policy making. The experiences of innovative cities like Gdańsk and Bristol demonstrate that local leaders and activists can make an important contribution to improving the quality of life. The COVID-​19 pandemic has reinforced the value of supporting the development of strong and resilient local communities. There has been a remarkable upsurge in kindness and compassion in localities across the world and, if this asset is to be built on in the future, we need much stronger local governments. Second, place-​based leadership can make a significant difference to the quality of local governance and to societal outcomes. The analysis presented in this chapter suggests that inclusive, collaborative leadership can bring new energies and resources into the public problem solving process. In both Gdańsk and Bristol we have seen that successful efforts have been made to bring people together to tackle shared problems and concerns. This chapter provides the opportunity to celebrate the efforts of outstanding individual leaders. Pawel Adamowicz, Mayor of Gdańsk, was a remarkable civic leader who encouraged others to participate and introduced a range of significant progressive initiatives. Similarly, Marvin Rees, Mayor of Bristol, has an empathetic style of leadership that has helped to build bridges between diverse communities in the city. Both these mayors would, of course, be the first to say that the success of their city in tackling social and economic injustice is not about them. This is precisely why they should be celebrated as outstanding place-​based leaders.

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Third, progressive civic leaders create innovation zones and this should be recognized as a key task of modern city leadership. Figure 10.2 suggests that innovation zones bring together actors from different backgrounds to share knowledge, consider the evidence, listen to each other and co-​create new solutions. There are many ways of creating such zones. In Gdańsk, for example, we have seen how citizens’ assemblies have opened up new spaces for informed conversation about how to take the city forward. The City Gatherings, now held regularly in Bristol, provide another way of improving the quality and inventiveness of civic dialogue. Fourth, and most important, values matter. At a time when authoritarian forces appear to be gaining ground in some countries, the importance of local activists and leaders standing up for progressive thinking relating to social, economic and environmental justice is more important than ever. In relation to this theme, it can be claimed that scholars working in urban studies, public policy and related fields can play an important role in two ways. First, they can assist civic leaders and activists in the city, or country, where they are located. This idea of ‘engaged scholarship’ is gaining in popularity across the world. Second, scholars can contribute to the process of international city-​to-​city exchange –​an international learning process that now has increased importance, given the failings of national leadership in more than a few countries.1 Note 1

The European Urban Research Association (EURA) should be mentioned in this context. For more information visit: https://​eura.org

References Amin, A. (2002) ‘Ethnicity and the Multicultural City: Living with Diversity’, Environment and Planning A, 34(6): 959–​980. Bagilhole, B. (2009) Understanding Equal Opportunities and Diversity: The Social Differentiations and Intersections of Inequality, Bristol: Policy Press. Barber, B.R. (2013) If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Brenner N., Marcuse P. and Mayer M. (2012) Cities for People, not for Profit. Critical Urban Theory and the Right to the City, Abingdon: Routledge. Bulkeley, H. (2013) Cities and Climate Change, Abingdon: Routledge. Girardet, H. (2008) Cities, People, Planet. Urban Development and Climate Change, 2nd ed., Chichester: John Wiley. Hall, P. (1998) Cities in Civilisation, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.

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Hambleton, R. (2007) ‘New Leadership for Democratic Urban Space’, in R. Hambleton and J.S. Gross (eds) Governing Cities in a Global Era: Urban Innovation, Competition and Democratic Reform, Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp 163–​176. Hambleton, R. (2015) Leading the Inclusive City: Place-​Based Innovation for a Bounded Planet, Bristol: Policy Press. Hambleton, R. (2020a) Cities and Communities beyond Covid-​1 9, Bristol: Bristol University Press. Hambleton, R. (2020b) ‘The Bristol One City Approach to City Governance: New Civic Leadership in Action’, Urban Research and Practice, 13(2): 228–​237. Haus M., Heinelt H. and Stewart M. (eds) (2005) Urban Governance and Democracy. Leadership and Community Involvement, London: Routledge. Hirschman A.O. (1970) Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Jackson, T. (2009) Prosperity without Growth. Economics for a Finite Planet, London: Earthscan. Lefebvre, H. (1967) ‘The Right to the City’, in E. Kofman and E. Lebas (eds) (1996) Writings on Cities, Blackwell: London. Levin, J. and Rabrenovic, G. (2004) Why We Hate, Amhurst, NY: Prometheus Books. Mason, P. (2015) Post Capitalism. A Guide to Our Future, London: Penguin Books. Monbiot, G. (2017) Out of the Wreckage. A New Politics for an Age of Crisis, London: Verso. Mouritzen, P.E. and Svara J.H. (2002) Leadership at the Apex. Politicians and Administrators in Western Local Governments, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. Nightingale, C.H. (2012) Segregation. A Global History of Divided Cities, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Oosterlynck, S., Verschraegen, G. and van Kampen, R. (eds) (2019) Divercities. Understanding Super-​Diversity in Deprived and Mixed Neighbourhoods, Bristol: Policy Press. Peterson, P.E. (1981) City Limits, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Saunders, D. (2010) Arrival City. How the Largest Migration in History is Reshaping Our World, London: William Heinemann. Savitch, H.V. and Kantor, P. (2002) Cities in the International Marketplace. The Political Economy of Urban Development in North America and Western Europe, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Sweeting, D. (ed) (2017) Directly Elected Mayors in Urban Goverance. Impact and Practice, Bristol: Policy Press.

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Swianiewicz, P. (2006) ‘City Political Culture. What Is Expected from Policy Actors?’, in H. Heinelt, D. Sweeting and P. Getimis (eds) Legitimacy and Urban Governance. A Cross-​National Comparative Study, London: Routledge, pp 244–​264. Wolff, M. (2008) The Man Who Owns the News. Inside the Secret World of Rupert Murdoch, London: Bodley Head.

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11

Urban Leadership: German and Polish Mayors in Comparison Hubert Heinelt

Introduction Since the 1990s, there has been a political and academic debate on the relevance of local political leadership in general and the role of the mayor in particular. It is pointed out that local political leadership is crucial for mobilizing local development potential, which is seen not only as very important in times of competition for business and residents but also for achieving social cohesion in the local community (see, for instance, the contributions in John and Cole, 1999; Haus et al, 2005a; Hambleton, 2019). Particularly in the context of the debates on a shift from government to governance, conditions were sought for a ‘complementarity of urban leadership and community involvement’ (CULCI)1 –​regardless of whether the community to be involved is a resource-​full business community or a broad citizenry. Such a complementarity has been considered as crucial for effective as well as legitimate local policies (Haus et al, 2005b; Haus and Heinelt, 2005; Heinelt et al, 2006). Based on these debates, a triumphal march of the ‘strong mayor form’ of local government could be observed in Europe (for the distribution of this form among European countries see Heinelt et al, 2018b: 38). The ‘strong mayor form’ is mainly constituted by power relations between the mayor, the city council and the municipal administration in which the ‘elected mayor controls the majority of the city council and is legally and in actuality in full charge of all executive functions’ (Mouritzen and Svara, 2002: 55). In Germany, the strong mayor form existed only in two of the federal states (Bavaria and Baden-​Wuerttemberg) until the 1990s, but was extended

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to almost all other federal states in the second half of the 1990s (Wollmann, 2004).2 In Poland, the strong mayor form was introduced in 2002. Therefore, the power relations between the mayor, the city council and the municipal administration are similar in both countries. However, the strength of the mayors resulting from these institutionally determined power relations differs somewhat –​depending on how the institutionally determined strength of a mayor is measured (Heinelt et al, 2018b: 35–​37). According to an index of mayoral strength constructed by Heinelt and Hlepas (2006: 37–​38), strong mayors in Germany achieved a value of 9 and strong mayors in Poland a value of 8 (within a range in which Swedish local political leaders only reach a value of 3 and French mayors a value of 12). Another mayoral strength index (strongly based on Paveł Swianiewicz’s reasoning) indicates that strong mayors in Germany achieved a value of 9 and strong mayors in Poland a value of 10 (within a range in which Swedish local political leaders only get a value of 1 and French mayors a value of 13). Research on the (vertical) power relations between local government and upper levels of government in a country has for a long time referred to typologies developed by Page and Goldsmith (1987; see also Page, 1991; Goldsmith and Page, 2010a, 2010b) and Hesse and Sharpe (1991).3 These typologies have two weaknesses in common: since they were originally constructed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they cover neither the developments in Eastern Europe after the fall of the ‘Iron Curtain’, nor recent developments in the countries of the western part of the continent. These weaknesses have been resolved on the one hand by the Local Autonomy Index (LAI) recently developed by Ladner et al (2015; see also Ladner et al, 2016). According to this index, the autonomy of local authorities in relation to upper levels of government is similar in Germany and Poland (with values of 27.50 and 26.71 respectively; Ladner et al, 2015: 67).4 On the other hand, the aforementioned weaknesses of the typologies of Goldsmith and Page and of Hesse and Sharpe were overcome by a new typology of vertical power relations developed by Heinelt et al (2018b: 42–​47, with a major contribution by Paweł Swianiewicz), which takes into account the current constellations in the western and eastern parts of Europe. Following this typology, Germany and Poland belong (together with Switzerland) to the same group of countries. This group is characterized by the fact that municipalities (compared to municipalities in other European countries) show (a) a medium level of municipal expenditure in relation to GDP and local tax autonomy and (b) a high degree of institutional depth, institutional autonomy and financial autonomy, but are dependent on administrative supervision and financial transfers from upper levels of government.5 However, what do these institutional similarities between German and Polish local government mean? Does it mean that these institutional

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structures attract the same people for becoming a mayor, and –​even more importantly –​do those mayors share, for example, the same role perceptions or the same notion of democracy? Do institutions really matter regarding such issues? Results of a study on ‘party significance’ and the proportion of non-​partisans among the mayors in Germany and Poland may give reason to affirm these questions as it shows that Germany and Poland are again in the same group of countries characterized by (a) low ‘party significance’ and a relatively low percentage of non-​partisan mayors (lower than 80 per cent; see Egner et al, 2018: 345).6 However, a closer look at the results of this study shows that both the proportion of non-​partisan mayors in Germany is significantly higher than in Poland (71.9 instead of just 34.5 per cent; see Egner et al, 2018: 335) and that the ‘party significance’ is also higher in Germany than in Poland (see Egner et al, 2018: 343). This makes it reasonable to take a closer look at the mayors in Germany and Poland based on results of a survey of mayors from municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants carried out in 2015–​16 (see Heinelt et al, 2018a: 7–​12).7 In the following section, three topics are distinguished. Firstly, general social characteristics of German and Polish mayors will be outlined. This is followed by a discussion of the mayors’ notion of democracy which may express a particular view of human nature). Finally, the role perception of German and Polish mayors is dealt with, including a brief reflection on their attitudes towards core ideas of New Public Management reforms.

In search of differences between German and Polish mayors General characteristics of the social structure of German and Polish mayors A look at some general social characteristics of German and Polish mayors shows that they show a similar pattern as mayors in Europe in general: they are male, middle-​aged and have a middle-​class background –​when the latter is measured by educational attainment and recent professional activity (see Table 11.1 and for mayors in Europe, Steyvers and Reynaert 2006; Steyvers and Medir 2018). However, there are some differences between German and Polish mayors. Women are more strongly represented among Polish mayors (with 14.7 per cent) than among German ones (with 10.1 per cent). Although Polish and German mayors have on average a similar age (with 52.6 resp. 53.4 years), the distribution of mayors among age groups shows that there are significantly more people among Polish mayors (21.4 per cent), who are more than 70 years old.8

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Table 11.1: General characteristics of the social structure of German and Polish mayors Germany Poland Total Gender of the mayors (percentage) female

10.1

14.7

13.8

male

89.9

85.3

86.2

53.4

50.0

52.9

Age of the mayors average age (in years) by age groups (percentage)

to 40 years

6.2

7.4

9.1

between 40 and 49 years

22.7

18.1

25.1

between 50 and 59 years

46.0

37.6

35.5

between 60 and 69 years

24,7

15.5

25.4

0.4

21.4

4.9

over 70 years Highest completed education of the mayors (percentage) elementary school

14.7

4.2

secondary school or equivalent

12.0

5.1

15.9

university or equivalent

73.3

94.9

79.9

Academic discipline of mayors holding a university degree or equivalent (percentage) law

32.2

18.0

22.3

political and social sciences, economics

39.3

26.5

33.3

architecture and engineering

12.6

24.0

15.6

humanities (philosophy, literature, foreign languages)

8.5

7.0

11.9

medicine

0.4

2.5

5.6

natural sciences, physics, mathematics

7.0

22.0

11.3

Main profession (main source of income) before starting the current mandate as a mayor (percentage) chief executive, senior official or legislator

46.2

43.4

27.7

other managers

11.3

15.6

13.0

science and engineering professional

4.6

5.4

7.0

health professional

0.7

0.5

3.8

teaching professional

6.7

11.2

11.1

business and administration professional

4.2

7.8

7.6

legal, social and cultural professional

13.6

2.0

9.3

other professional

3.5

7.3

5.5

technicians and associate professional

2.1

clerical support worker

2.8

202

3.6 5.4

2.4

Urban Leadership

Table 11.1: General characteristics of the social structure of German and Polish mayors (continued) Germany Poland Total services and sales worker

2.8

3.0

other workers

0.5

1.0

3.1

elective/​executive function in a political party organization

1.2

0.5

2.8

Source: own calculation and compilation of results based on the survey of mayors (Heinelt et al, 2018a).

There are clear differences between German and Polish mayors regarding their highest completed education. Of the German mayors who took part in the survey, 14.2 per cent had completed primary school. This did not apply to any of the Polish respondents. Furthermore, 94.9 per cent of Polish mayors had a university degree (or equivalent) –​compared to 73.3 per cent of German mayors. If one compares mayors who have a university degree, among the German incumbents significantly more have a degree in law (32.2 in comparison to 18.0 per cent) and in political and social sciences or economy (39.3 in comparison to 26.5 per cent) than their Polish colleagues. In contrast, more Polish than German mayors have a degree in architecture and engineering (24.0 in comparison to 12.6 per cent) and in natural sciences, including physics and mathematics (22.0 against 7.0 per cent). These findings may indicate that German mayors –​at least regarding their formal education –​are better prepared for the office of an ‘executive mayor’, that is, an institutionally strong mayor vis-​à-​vis the council who is ‘also in full charge of the [municipal] administration [which has to provide] a broad spectrum of public provision’ (Heinelt and Hlepas 2006: 36).9 This interpretation is supported by findings about the main profession before starting the current mandate as a mayor. Although in both countries more than 40 per cent of the mayors had earned their income before as chief executive, senior official or legislator, it is interesting that German mayors had been employed to a higher percentage than their Polish colleagues as legal, social and cultural professionals (13.6 in comparison to 2.0 per cent), and Polish mayors to a higher percentage as teaching professionals (11.2 compared to 6.7 per cent) before entering the office of the mayor.

The notion of democracy as expression of a particular view of human nature When reflecting on different forms or common understandings of democracy, various models can be distinguished. 10 Habermas (1996)

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differentiates the model of representative or liberal democracy from that of deliberative democracy. • The model of representative or liberal democracy emphasizes the right of the individual to participate in general elections and thus the possibilities of (a) aggregating individual preferences with regard to the actions of those in power, and (b) making those in power accountable to the citizens (ultimately at the next election). • The model of deliberative democracy emphasizes the importance of free and public debates, by which, through the exchange of ‘good reasons’, others are convinced, but also opponents are forced to publicly explain and justify their position. This enables an agreement and ultimately a decision to be reached, if necessary, also by a majority decision in representative bodies –​ but with reference to the agreement reached previously in free and public debate (if necessary also about matters that have remained controversial). That the local level is particularly suitable for such debates is emphasized by Cohen and Sabel, who stress that ‘deliberative problem-​solving is by its nature focused on addressing specific problems in local settings. Giving reasons under these conditions is, generally speaking, a matter of offering considerations recognized by others as pertinent to solving the problem at hand’ (Cohen and Sabel 1997: 330). According to Benjamin Barber (1984), ‘liberal’ democracy implies a ‘thin democracy’ because its view ‘of human nature is founded on a radical premise no less startling for its familiarity: man is alone’ (Barber 1984: 68). ‘Liberal democratic politics is thus the logic of a certain form of radical individualism written out to its last political conclusion. It is atomism wearing a social mask. That mask gives to liberal democracy its characteristic dependency on interest theory and rational-​choice models and insulates it from more social understandings of human nature in the political setting’ (Barber 1984: 68). This ‘psychological frame’ of the liberal model of democracy (as Barber, 1984: 67 ff. phrased it) is complemented by a particular ‘preconceptual’ or ‘inertial frame’, that means something ‘[o]‌ne cannot “get behind (…)” ’ (Barber, 1984: 27). The inertial frame of liberal democracy is based on one axiom. This ‘axiom sets up materialismus. [It] posits that humans are material beings in all they are and in all they do’ (Barber, 1984: 32). Following Barber, the alternative to the ‘thin’ liberal democracy is ‘strong democracy’. It ‘is a distinctively modern form of participatory democracy’ (Barber, 1984: 117). ‘[L]‌iterally, it is self-​government by citizens rather than representative government in the name of citizens. Active citizens govern themselves directly here, not necessarily at every level and in every instance, but frequently enough and in particular when basic policies are being

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decided’ (Barber, 1984: 151). From the perspective of this understanding of democracy ‘human beings [are seen] with variable but malleable natures and with competing but overlapping interests [who] can contrive to live together communally not only to their mutual advantage but also to the advantage of their mutuality’ (Barber, 1984: 118). In this way, ‘the social nature of human beings’ (Barber, 1984: 215) is highlighted by this understanding of democracy. Moreover, the social nature of human beings can be seen as the ‘psychological’ and ‘inertial frame’ of this understanding of democracy. To see humans as social beings implies that they are not simply interacting with each other, but that they are also able ‘to create a public language that will help reformulate private interests in terms susceptible to public accommodation’ (Barber, 1984: 119) thereby transforming self-​centred interests through political interaction. To identify which notion of democracy is supported by mayors they were asked how much they agree with the statements shown in Table 12.2.11 It could be assumed that mayors supporting a liberal understanding of democracy or strict representatives of representative democracy would find it important to state that: • ‘[A]‌part from voting, citizens should not be given the opportunity to influence local politics.’ • ‘Political representatives [should] decide as they see fit, regardless of the opinion of the population.’ • ‘Results of local elections should be decisive for local politics.’ In contrast, a participatory understanding of democracy would be more likely if mayors considered it important that: • ‘Residents can actively and directly participate in important municipal decisions.’ • ‘Residents should have the opportunity to present their views before important municipal decisions are made by the elected representatives’ (the council). With the help of a factor analysis, it was examined whether the mentioned patterns of a definite approval or rejection of these statements actually exist on the level of individual mayors. And indeed, it can be shown for German mayors that there are separate patterns of opinions among them, which correspond to the two previously outlined basic understandings of democracy. • German mayors who tend to agree that the results of local elections should be decisive for local politics are also more likely to agree with

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Table 11.2: Patterns behind mayors’ notions of how local democracy should work: result of a factor analysis Statements

German mayors

Polish mayors

Component

Components

Participatory Representative Participatory Representative democracy democracy democracy democracy ‘Residents should 0.584 participate actively and directly in making important local decisions’

0.709

‘Residents should 0.690 have the opportunity to make their views known before important local decisions are made by elected representatives’

0.761

‘Apart from voting, citizens should not be given the opportunity to influence local government policies’

-​ 0.758

-​ 0.760

‘Political representatives should make what they think are the right decisions, independent of the current views of local people’

0.584

‘The results of local elections should be the most important factor in determining local government policies’

0.812

Extraction KMO: 0.626 method: principal component analysis. Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization. Values lower than 0.5 are not displayed.

0.678

KMO: 0.521

Source: own calculation and compilation of results based on the survey of mayors (Heinelt et al, 2018a).

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the statement that political representatives should decide as they see fit –​ regardless of the opinion of the population. • On the contrary, mayors who were clearly in favour of residents being actively and directly involved in important local decisions also tend to agree much more with the statement that residents should have the opportunity to express their views before important local decisions are taken by the council. They also clearly rejected the statement that citizens should not be given the opportunity to influence local politics other than by voting. The pattern to be identified for Polish mayors looks somewhat different. • Polish mayors who tend to agree with the statement that residents should have the opportunity to express their views before the council takes important local decisions are also more clearly rejecting the statement that citizens should not be given the opportunity to influence local politics other than by voting. • However, those Polish mayors who are more in favour of residents being actively and directly involved in important local decisions also tend to emphasize that the results of local elections should be decisive for local politics. • Finally, support for the statement that political representatives should decide as they see fit (regardless of the opinion of the population) is among Polish mayors so low that this factor does not load on any of the two components just mentioned. These results show that the theoretically deducible different models of democracy –​and their related views on human beings –​are more clearly found among German mayors than among their Polish colleagues. This is particularly true in view of the fact that the statement that political representatives should decide as they see fit is not clearly supported by Polish mayors, who tend to support the model of representative democracy. The findings for the approval or rejection of the aforementioned statements by Polish mayors on an individual level might indicate that the two notions of democracy are not as different as they appear when related to completely different axiomatic concepts of human nature. Instead, it can be argued (see for instance Heinelt 2010: 22–​27) –​and this is perhaps a widespread understanding among Polish mayors –​that in practice both concepts of democracy can complement each other to the benefit of collective self-​ determination. A vibrant and broader involvement of citizens and public deliberation in some phases of the policy process (such as the phases of problem definition and agenda setting as well as implementation) can be

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seen as compatible with the position that the results of local elections should be decisive for local politics.

The role perception of German and Polish mayors In order to capture the role perception of German and Polish mayors, their statements on the significance of the tasks listed in Table 12.3 for their activities were analysed. Among German mayors, there are clearly some who have a more or less inward-​looking understanding of their role, because they emphasize the tasks of ensuring the correctness of the political-​administrative process and guiding the staff in their daily business. On the one hand, this understanding Table 11.3: Responses of German and Polish mayors to the question: ‘How important do you think the following tasks are?’. Result of a factor analysis Statements

German mayors

Polish mayors

Components

Components

1

2

1

‘To encourage new projects in the community’

0.681

‘To set goals for transforming the administrative structure’

0.646 0.564

0.655

‘To ensure the correctness of the political-​administrative process’

0.688

0.742

‘To defend and promote the influence of local authorities in the political system’

0.527

0.539

‘To help citizens resolve complaints with the municipal government’

0.578

0.731

‘To guide the staff in day-​to-​day activities’ 0.645

0.704

‘To ensure the quality of local services’

-​ 0.641

‘To foster the cooperation with the neighbouring municipalities’ Extraction method: principal component analysis.

2

0.652 KMO: 0.574

0.661 KMO: 0.726

Source: own calculation and compilation of results based on the survey of mayors (Heinelt et al, 2018a). Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization. Values lower than 0.5 are not displayed.

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of their role is linked to the emphasis on supporting citizens in solving complaints with the municipal administration, which is ultimately also a task related to improving activities in the town hall. However, the same group of German mayors also see it as an important task to defend and promote the influence of local government in the political system, which is a task that goes beyond a narrow, inward-​looking focus on what happens in the town hall. Nevertheless, such a combination of tasks, which is perceived by some German mayors as important, is logical, because what can and must be done in the town hall depends strongly on the vertical power relations in the political system of the Federal Republic of Germany. In addition, there is a group of German mayors who believe that it is more important not to concentrate on the daily operation of the town hall, but to act strategically. This goes hand in hand with encouraging new projects in the local community, setting goals for transforming the administrative structure of the municipality and fostering cooperation with neighbouring municipalities. Interestingly, the task of ensuring the quality of local services is not so much emphasized as a task of a mayor. A similar understanding of roles can be found for Polish mayors –​although there are some differences. There is also a group among Polish mayors who see their role primarily as taking care of the everyday life in the town hall –​ but (in contrast to German mayors) including the task of setting goals for transforming the administrative structure of the municipality. And similar to Germany, there are mayors in Poland who place –​by encouraging new projects in the community and fostering cooperation with neighbouring municipalities –​more importance on tasks that are not primarily directed at activities in the town hall. Interestingly, ensuring the quality of local services clearly does not play a major role for these mayors. The finding that Polish mayors, who are primarily focused on everyday life in the town hall, are more in favour of setting goals for transforming the administrative structure of the municipality than their German counterparts corresponds to responses of Polish mayors on their agreement or disagreements with core ideas of new public management (NPM). Polish mayors seem to trust, more so than their German counterparts, in a transformation of the administrative structure of the municipality in line with NPM reform perspectives –​as shown in Table 11.4. On the one hand, these reforms aim to clearly separate the responsibilities of politicians from those of bureaucrats –​along the lines of the definition of ‘what’ by politicians and ‘how’ by bureaucrats. On the other hand, these reforms aim to reorganize public administration by applying concepts from business administration (such as target agreements and internal reporting as part of ongoing monitoring in the context of a management by objectives).12

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Table 11.4: Responses of German and Polish mayors to statements related to aims of new public management reforms How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (percentage) ‘Internal reporting systems contribute to a better steering of the departments’

German mayors

German mayors

Polish mayors

Polish mayors

German mayors

Polish mayors German mayors

Polish mayors

4.3

1.1

2.0

7.9

1.6

0.7

0.5

Disagree

15.3

11.7

11.1

27.7

9.7

0.5

7.7

3.2

Neither agree nor disagree

16.5

7.4

13.2

9.9

25.3

4.3

27.0

25.0

Agree

49.6

53.7

33.7

39.8

51.7

51.6

54.7

59.0

Strongly agree

14.4

26.1

40.1

14.7

11.7

43.6

9.8

12.2

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Total

Source: own calculation and compilation of results based on the survey of mayors (Heinelt et al, 2018a).

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210

Strongly disagree

‘Local bureaucrats should ‘Politicians should only ‘Internal target as far as possible stick to define objectives and control agreements contribute to politically defined goals’ outputs but never intervene a more effective steering’ into the task fulfilment of local administration’

Urban Leadership

Table 12.4 shows that Polish mayors agree (or strongly agree) more than their German counterparts with all the presented statements that point to the mentioned core aims of NPM reforms. It is particularly noteworthy that 95.2 per cent (ie, nearly all) of the Polish mayors agree (or even strongly agree) with the statement that ‘Internal target agreements contribute to a more effective steering’ –​in contrast to 63.4 per cent of their German colleagues. Political leaders from German municipalities may have lost hope in these reforms which they have tried to implement since the early 1990s.13

Conclusion At the beginning of this chapter, it was shown that German and Polish mayors have to act in similar institutional structures –​both with regard to (a) the horizontal power relations to the council and the municipal administration and (b) the vertical power relations towards upper levels of government. This led to the question of whether German and Polish mayors differ in social characteristics, but also in certain attitudes, or whether institutions play a role in attracting and selecting these office holders. The analysis of the social characteristics of German and Polish mayors has revealed that they correspond on average to what characterizes European mayors in general, with a clear predominance of men, in their early 50s and with a middle-​class background. However, a closer look at the data shows differences. This applies not only to a higher proportion of women and younger, but also older Polish mayors. What is more remarkable is that German mayors, in terms of their education and professional background, fit more to the image of an executive mayor than their Polish counterparts, that is, a mayor who not only has a strong institutional position vis-​à-​vis the council, but is also responsible for the provision of a variety of public services. This may be due to the fact that German mayors, in line with the public debate (even if it may differ regionally from state to state), are supposed to lead the municipal administration in a professional manner and solve problems rather than representing particular interests –​although there are differences between regions/​federal states (Egner, 2007; Huzel, 2019). It could also be made clear that the notion of democracy differs between German and Polish mayors. At least in the case of German mayors, these differences could be clearly related to a certain view of human nature. With regard to the understanding of the roles of German and Polish mayors, similarities can be observed at first glance, as there are mayors in both countries who are either more inward-​oriented (towards the everyday affairs of the town hall) or outward-​oriented. However, a closer look reveals differences here as well. The more inward-​looking Polish mayors are more

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inclined towards core ideas of the NPM reforms, while German mayors seem to have lost confidence in the feasibility of these ideas, which is probably related to the fact that in Germany the implementation of core ideas of the NPM reforms was started more than ten years earlier than in Poland. The results presented underline that formal institutional structures (or ‘organization fields’; Scott 1994: 70ff.) alone cannot explain differences in the social characteristics of public officials, nor can they explain essential attitudes. Rather, it depends on what is considered appropriate and practicable according to social discourses. Thus, the discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2008, 2010) appears to be a promising approach of explanation. Notes 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

The sought for a ‘complementarity of urban leadership and community involvement’ (CULCI) was, for example, the objective of a research project on ‘Participation. Leadership and Urban Sustainability’/​PLUS funded by the EU 5th Framework Programme for Research and Development in which Paweł Swianiewicz was involved. Exceptions are Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg, which represent special cases as city-​states, and the state of Hesse, where the directly elected mayor must act in a collective form of local government, because legally speaking the mayor is only a primus inter pares in an executive board, called the Magistrat. For an overview of these and other typologies, and also the index of vertical power relations constructed by Sellers and Lidström (2007), see Heinelt et al, 2018b: 21–​25 and 31–​33. Among the European countries considered, local autonomy is the lowest in Ireland (12.67) and the highest in Switzerland (29.76; Ladner et al, 2015: 67). For a description of the mentioned variables and the data for single countries, see Heinelt et al, 2018b: 43 and 64–​68. For the definition of ‘party significance’ and the construction of a ‘party significance index’ see Egner et al 2018: 341–​344. Paweł Swianiewicz made a major contribution to the development of this index. The German partners involved in this survey were Björn Egner, Hubert Heinelt, Sabine Kuhlmann, Markus Seyfried and Angelika Vetter. In Poland, the survey was conducted by Adam Gendźwiłł, Joanna Krukowska, Marta Lackowska and Paweł Swianiewicz. The fact that there are only a few German mayors (0.4 per cent) who are older than 70 years is a result of institutional regulations. Mayors of municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants are usually civil servants in Germany for their term of office, and for civil servants a particular retirement age is set by the German federal states (the Länder). This means that persons who have reached this age limit cannot be candidates for the office of mayor. Mayors from municipalities with less than 10,000 inhabitants can hold office on a voluntary basis. These regulations do not apply to them. Therefore, they may be older. For the distinction of ‘executive mayors’ from ‘political mayors’, ‘ceremonial mayors’ and ‘collegial leaders’, see Heinelt and Hlepas, 2006: 34–​36. See for instance Habermas, 1992: 349–​353; Pierre and Peters, 2000: 137–​141, or Cohen, 2007 and for early debates Pateman, 1970. A factor analysis was used here and in the next section to test whether the theoretically deduced differences in (a) the understanding of democracy and (b) the role perception of mayors are actually empirically verifiable.

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12

13

To understand the results of the factor analysis, Table 12.2 must be read as follows (similar applies to Table 12.3): The factor analysis shows that the answers of the mayors are concentrated around two components: one component is characterized, for example, for the German mayors –​as summarized in the text –​by a high support (positive ‘factor load’) of the statements ‘Residents should participate actively and directly in making important local decisions’; and ‘Residents should have the opportunity to make their views known before important local decisions are made by elected representatives’; and at the same time a strong rejection (a high negative ‘factor load’) of the statement ‘Apart from voting, citizens should not be given the opportunity to influence local government policies’. The other component is formed by high positive ‘factor load’ on the statements ‘Political representatives should make what they think are the right decisions, independent of the current views of local people’, and ‘The results of local elections should be the most important factor in determining local government policies’. These two areas are referred to in the debate as the internal dimension of NPM reforms. The external dimension, which includes privatization, outsourcing and the like, cannot be considered in this chapter due to lack of space. For interim results of NPM reforms in German local government see Bogumil et al, 2007.

References Barber, B. (1984) Strong Democracy. Participatory Politics for a New Age, Berkley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press. Bogumil, J., Grohs, S., Kuhlmann, S. and Ohm, A. (2007) Zehn Jahre Neues Steuerungsmodell. Eine Bilanz kommunaler Verwaltungsmodernisierung, Berlin: edition sigma. Cohen, J. (2007) ‘Deliberative Democracy’, in S.R. Rosenberg (ed) Deliberation, Participation and Democracy. Can the People Govern?, Houndsmill and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 219–​236. Cohen, J. and Sabel, C.F. (1997) ‘Directly-​Deliberative Polyarchy’, European Law Journal, 3(4): 313–​342. Derlien, H.-​U. and Peters, B.G. (eds) (2008) The State at Work: Comparative Public Service Systems, Vol. 1, Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar. Egner, B. (2007) Einstellungen deutscher Bürgermeister –​Lokale Eliten zwischen Institutionen und Kontext, Baden-​Baden: Nomos. Egner, B., Gendźwiłł, A., Swianiewicz, P. and Pleschberger, W. (2018) ‘Mayors and Parties’, in H. Heinelt, A. Magnier, M. Cabria and H. Reynaert (eds) Political Leaders and Changing Local Democracy: The European Mayor, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 327–​358. Goldsmith, M. and Page, E. (eds) (2010a) Changing Government Relations in Europe: From Localism to Intergovernmentalism, London and New York: Routledge. Goldsmith, M. and Page, E. (2010b) ‘Introduction’, in M. Goldsmith and E. Page (eds) Changing Government Relations in Europe: From Localism to Intergovernmentalism, London and New York: Routledge, pp 1–​13.

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Habermas, J. (1992) Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag. Habermas, J. (1996) Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers. Hambleton, R. (2019) ‘The New Civic Leadership: Place and the Co-​Creation of Public Innovation’, Public Money and Management, 39(4): 271–​279. Haus, M. and Heinelt, H. (2005) ‘How to Achieve Governability at the Local Level? Theoretical and Conceptual Consideration on a Complementarity of Urban Leadership and Community Involvement’, in M. Haus, H. Heinelt and M. Stewart (eds) Urban Governance and Democracy: Leadership and Community Involvement, London and New York: Routledge, pp 12–​39. Haus, M., Heinelt, H. and Stewart, M. (eds) (2005a) Urban Governance and Democracy: Leadership and Community Involvement, London and New York: Routledge. Haus, M., Heinelt, H. and Stewart, M. (2005b) ‘Introduction’, in M. Haus, H. Heinelt and M. Stewart (eds) Urban Governance and Democracy: Leadership and Community Involvement, London and New York: Routledge, pp 1–​11. Heinelt, H. (2010) Governing Modern Societies. Towards Participatory Governance, London and New York: Routledge. Heinelt, H. (2019) Challenges to Political Decision-​Making. Dealing with Information Overload, Ignorance and Contested Knowledge, London and New York: Routledge. Heinelt, H. and Hlepas, N.-​K. (2006) ‘Typologies of Local Government Systems’, in H. Bäck, H. Heinelt and A. Magnier (eds) The European Mayor. Political Leaders in the Changing Context of Local Democracy, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp 21–​33. Heinelt, H., Sweeting, D. and Getimis, P. (eds) (2006) Legitimacy and Urban Governance, London and New York: Routledge. Heinelt, H., Magnier, A., Cabria, M. and Reynaert, H (2018a) ‘Introduction’, in H. Heinelt, A. Magnier, M. Cabria and H. Reynaert (eds) Political Leaders and Changing Local Democracy: The European Mayor, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 1–​18. Heinelt, H., Hlepas, N., Kuhlmann, S. and Swianiewicz, P. (2018b) ‘Local Government Systems: Grasping the Institutional Environment of Mayors’, in H. Heinelt, A. Magnier, M. Cabria and H. Reynaert (eds) Political Leaders and Changing Local Democracy: The European Mayor, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 19–​78. Hesse, J.J. and Sharpe, L.J. (1991) ‘Local Government in International Perspective: Some Comparative Observations’, in J.J. Hesse, and L.J. Sharpe (eds) Local Government and Urban Affairs in International Perspective. Analyses of Twenty Western Industrialised Countries, Baden-​Baden: Nomos, pp 603–​621.

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Huzel, V. (2019) Bürgermeisterinnen und Bürgermeister in Baden-​Württemberg. Ein Amt im Umbruch, Baden-​Baden: Nomos. John, P. and Cole, A. (1999) ‘Political Leadership in the New Urban Governance: Britain and France Compared’, Local Government Studies, 25(4): 98–​115. Ladner, A., Keuffer, N. and Baldersheim, H. (2015) Self-​Rule Index for Local Authorities (Release 1.0), Brussels: European Commission. Ladner, A., Keuffer, N. and Baldersheim, H. (2016) ‘Measuring Autonomy in 39 Countries (1990–​2014)’, Regional and Federal Studies, 26(3): 321–​357. Mouritzen, P.E. and Svara, J.H. (2002) Leadership at the Apex. Politicians and Administrators in Western Local Governments, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Page, E.C. (1991) Localism and Centralism in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Page, E.C. and Goldsmith, M.J. (eds) (1987) Central and Local Government Relations. A Comparative Analysis of West European Unitary States, London: Sage. Pateman, C. (1970) Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. Pierre, J. and Peters, B.G. (2000) Governance, Politics and the State, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Schmidt, V.A. (2008) ‘Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse’, Annual Review of Political Science, 11(1): 303–​326. Schmidt, V.A. (2010) ‘Taking Ideas and Discourse Seriously: Explaining Change through Discursive Institutionalism as the Fourth “New Institutionalism” ’, European Political Science Review, 2(1): 1–​25. Scott, W.R. (1994) ‘Institutions and Organizations. Towards a Theoretical Synthesis’, in W. R. Scott and J.W. Meyer (eds) Institutional Environment and Organizations. Structural Complexity and Individualism, Thousand Oaks, London and New Delhi: Sage, 55–​80. Steyvers, K. and Reynaert, H. (2006) ‘ “From the few are Chosen the few …”: On the Social Background of European Mayors’, in H. Bäck, H. Heinelt and A. Magnier (eds) The European Mayor: Political Leaders in the Changing Context of Local Democracy, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp 43–​73. Steyvers, K. and Medir, L. (2018) ‘From the Few Are Still Chosen the Few? Continuity and Change in the Social Background of European Mayors’, in H. Heinelt, A. Magnier, M. Cabria and H. Reynaert (eds) Political Leaders and Changing Local Democracy: The European Mayor, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 79–​108.

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Wollmann, H. (2004) ‘Urban Leadership in German Local Politics: The Rise, Role and Performance of the Directly Elected (Chief Executive) Mayor’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 28(1): 150–​165.

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Urban Climate Leadership in Metropolitan Areas: How Has the Political Parliamentary Model Influenced Oslo’s Climate Leadership? Gro Sandkjær Hanssen

Introduction The Paris Agreement and IPCC reports (2014, 2018; see also UN 2019) have spurred ambitious climate efforts in many European cities. However, cities in metropolitan areas are dependent upon neighbouring municipalities to curb car use and enhance climate transition (Simoneova et al, 2017; Tønnesen et al, 2019). In addition, land use regulation and funding of transport infrastructure are often split between different governmental levels. Hence, for the cities, goal attainment requires comprehensive multi-​level coordination in the metropolitan area. In response, we see new modes of metropolitan coordination emerge that require urban political leaderships to take on new roles (Kern and Alber, 2008; Simoneova et al, 2017; Bulkeley, 2013). This chapter analyses political climate leadership in one of the Nordic capitals, Oslo. The city of Oslo is in many ways a best case, as it was the European Green Capital in 2019. Given this status, it is interesting to study what leadership strategies have been chosen to pursue climate adaptation and climate mitigation goals. Since core cities in metropolitan areas often are dependent upon neighbourhood municipalities and state and regional actors to ensure effective goal achievement, it is especially interesting to see how

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the political leadership role is played out in the metropolitan setting. Norway is one of the few countries in Europe to introduce an urban contractual management model to stimulate binding cooperation between actors in metropolitan areas. This chapter also discusses how the political models of local government influence climate leadership. The parliamentary model introduced in Oslo in 1986 deviated from the traditional consensus-​oriented alderman model. In the alderman model, the executive board mirrors the composition of the elected council (proportional principle), while in the parliamentary model, the executive derives support from the majority in the council (majoritarian principle), the latter creating a strong executive cabine. The analysis is based on qualitative interviews of key actors in the political and administrative leadership at local, regional and national level in two research projects.1

Theoretical background Urban climate leadership This chapter aims to bridge the literature on local government and local political leadership (Baldersheim, 2005; Berg and Rao, 2005; Swianiewicz and Teles, 2019; Ladner et al, 2016) with the literature on urban climate governance (Kern and Alber 2008; Bulkeley, 2013), regional governance and metropolitan planning (Zimmermann, 2009; Lackowska and Zimmermann, 2011; Simoneova et al, 2017; Swianiewicz et al, 2018). Metropolitan areas are often highly fragmented by local government boundaries, as they typically consist of a core city and its surrounding municipalities. Moreover, important transport infrastructure is usually administered by the national level of government. In sum, this gives metropolitan climate change governance a strong multi-​level dimension, where strategies and measures in multiple tiers of government need to be coordinated. Therefore, in order to implement climate policies, political leaders must embrace different governance modes, as described in Kern and Alber (2008) and Bulkeley (2010, 2013). The modes are illustrated in Figure 12.1. Local governments can resort to ‘governing by authority: the municipality as regulator’, which includes their strongest hierarchical governance tools: laws, regulations, plans, guidelines and budgets. Regulatory instruments have both intra-​and inter-​organizational governance potential. They may stimulate changes in practice in the municipal organization through vision building, strategies, vertical governance, cross-​sector cooperation and mainstreaming of new attitudes. Municipalities also have authority to regulate external actors (market actors and citizens) through, for example, transport policy and land

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Figure 12.1: Illustrating the four governance modes of climate governance

THE CITY/ MUNICIPALITY AS AN ORGANIZATION 1. Governing by authority: the municipality as a regulator (internal organization) 219

2. The municipality as a provider (energy etc)

1. Governing by authority: the municipality as regulator (external actors)

3. Self-governing: the municipality as consumer

Source: based upon Alber and Kern, in OECD 2008: 39; Bulkeley, 2013.

4. Governing through enabling: the municipality as facilitator (partnerships) Climate-conscious purchaser (stimulating market actors)

Urban Climate Leadership in Metropolitan Areas

SURROUNDINGS: Neighbouring municipalities, state authorities, market actors, civil society, citizens

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE

use planning. Vision building and strategies can stimulate changes in the behaviour of citizens and private actors. Second, cities can give direction through their role as providers by, for example, being shareholders in local utility companies for energy, transport, water and waste (Kern and Alber, 2008). Third, cities can exercise climate governance through ‘self-​governing: the municipality as consumer’, which refers to the core city’s governance potential as a climate-​conscious consumer and manager of its own infrastructure and transport fleet. Many cities have introduced the purchaser–​provider model, whereby they purchase goods and services from private actors instead of producing them themselves. This allows them to utilize their market power as a large-​scale procurer of goods and services. Fourth, municipalities can choose ‘governing through enabling’ (Bulkeley, 2013). This mode refers to the role of urban leadership in stimulating collaboration and coordination with state actors, neighbouring municipalities, private actors and community actors by, for example, establishing public–​private partnerships, network arenas and ‘nudging’ mechanisms (Lappegard Hauge et al, 2018).

Political models of local government This chapter also asks how the political model of the city of Oslo influences the political leadership in implementing its climate policy. Previous research has indicated that political models on the local level influence climate leadership (Lijphart, 1999; Mouritzen and Svara, 2002; Swianiewicz et al, 2018). A survey-​based comparison of local climate policies between Poland’s strong personal-​mayor model and Norway’s weak mayor model (Swianiewicz et al, 2018) showed that some of the differences could be explained by leadership models. As expected, based on Mouritzen and Svara (2002), the administrative leadership was more active in the weak mayor model. In Norwegian municipalities, the level of interest among mayors and local councillors in climate change issues was lower than among administrative staff, whereas in Poland the level of interest among local administrations was comparable to that of the mayors. In general, however, the level of climate awareness was higher in Norway. Most Norwegian municipalities were organized according to the consensual alderman model, and only three large cities (Oslo, Bergen and Tromsø) had a parliamentary model. The survey did not allow us to look into how the parliamentary model influenced political climate leadership. Studies have identified a general shift from the classic model of local government –​the council–​committee model –​to more executive-​oriented models such as the parliamentary and the presidential models (Klausen and Fimreite, 2003; Larsen, 2005; Berg and Rao, 2005; Bukve and Saxi, 2013;). As a result, we have seen a professionalization of political leadership

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roles (Larsen, 2005) and a decollectivization of political decision-​making in local government. At the same time, political leadership lies at the heart of many institutional reforms of local government (Berg and Rao, 2005; Larsen, 2005). Changes in structures and processes could give local political leaders a more clear-​cut role, one that focuses specifically on strategic and visionary aspects (Berg and Rao, 2005). Therefore, it is interesting to study the political leadership in the city of Oslo as a representation of this shift from a classic consensual committee model (alderman model) to a more executive-​oriented model (parliamentary model) in 1986. In the Norwegian alderman model, the municipal executive board (formannskap) mirrors the composition of the elected council. Thus, when boards and committees are composed on a proportional basis, the executive leadership consists of nearly all the parties in the council, rendering it a consensual assembly where the administrative chief executive is a strong administrative leader. The parliamentary model of local government, on the other hand, has a more ministerial format to provide stronger political leadership (Baldersheim, 2005; Bukve and Saxi, 2013). The city government comprises a strong executive ‘cabinet’ of six to eight vice-​mayors.2 The city government derives support from the majority of the city council, and governs as long as it enjoys its confidence. The cabinet assumes all executive functions and responsibilities which, under the alderman model, normally are assigned to a professional municipal manager (Baldersheim, 2005). Thus, the city of Oslo’s parliamentary model clearly separates political leadership from administrative leadership, as the vice-​mayors take on the role of the chief executives in the alderman model. This leads to a far more politicized executive-​oriented model. The members of the city government are the senior leaders of the relevant administrative staff, such as the Agency for Climate and relevant municipal agencies, having direct authority over them. This gives them strong potential to implement their policies throughout the municipal organization. This model has not travelled widely in Norway, only to Bergen and Tromsø. Tromsø introduced it in 2015–​2019 but later reverted to the alderman model (Saxi, 2006). Several regional elected councils have introduced the model (Røiseland and Stigen, 2003; Baldersheim, 2005; Bukve and Saxi, 2013). After the amalgamation of county municipalities in 2020, one of the new county councils (Viken) has also chosen to adopt the parliamentary model.

Analyzing urban climate leadership in the metropolitan area of Oslo As a study of a forerunner city in climate transition, one of the aims of the chapter is to identify and analyse how the political leadership navigates

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between Bulkeley’s (2013) four modes of climate governance, choosing a ‘mix’ of governance logics and instruments. In the following, we will study how the institutional setting of the parliamentary model influences the ‘mix’ and governance approach. The chapter also draws upon analyses from two research projects presented in Hofstad and Vedeld (2020), Hanssen and Hofstad (2020), Hofstad et al (2019), Simoneova et al (2017) and Tønnesen et al (2019).

Exercising political climate leadership by authority As Bulkeley (2013) emphasizes, the traditional role of local government leadership is ‘governing by authority: the municipality as regulator’, which includes vision building, strategies and goal formulation, as well as strong hierarchical governance tools such as laws, regulations, plans, guidelines and so forth. The city government, elected into office in 2015 and made up of the Labour Party, the Socialist Left Party and the Green Party, has used ambitious and radical goal formulation as an important part of its leadership strategy. Its expressed aim is to achieve a 95 per cent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 (20 years before the deadline set in the Paris Agreement). These goals have been operationalized into more specific visions and strategies, such as the policy document Platform for City Government Cooperation between the Labour Party, the Green Party and the Socialist Left Party in Oslo 2019–​2023. The ambitious goals are also expressed in the Climate Strategy for Oslo towards 2030 and in subordinate strategies such as the Bicycle Strategy for Oslo 2015–​25. Compared to previous city governments, the mandatory planning instruments (for example, the municipal master plan) are now used more strategically as policy instruments. Even if the strategies build upon previous city governments’ strategic work, they have been intensified and made more radical. One of the main instruments used for internal governance of the municipal organization has been the innovative climate budget (Hofstad et al, 2019). The climate budget serves as a budget-​system to the vice mayor for finance, who is in charge of the ordinary city budget. The climate budget requires a two-​year process. The first year is used for planning and assessing measures. The second year, the actual fiscal year, is used for reporting on the progress of the various municipal entities responsible for implementing the measures (Hofstad et al, 2019; Hanssen and Hofstad, 2020). The municipal entities must report how much of a reduction in CO2 emissions they have achieved. Each of them reports three times a year; each administrative entity summarizes the status for the measures for which they are responsible and progress is evaluated against the plan. The informants in our study considered

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the climate budget to be at the heart of the ‘climate governance system’ of the city, being an exceptionally powerful internal coordinating tool, integrating the climate goals within the whole municipal organization. The city government has also used institutional design, establishing the Agency for Climate with a staff of about 30, during its first year in office (2016). The Agency for Climate operates as a service agency with cross-​ departmental tasks within the city administration, and thus contributes to mainstreaming the climate goals in the organization. Similar agencies have been established in other cities, such as Zurich. The Agency for Climate plays an important role in the climate budget, and also leads the process of revising the climate strategy. Regulatory instruments also give authority to regulate external actors (market actors and citizens). In land use planning, the city government has used its regulatory power in an innovative way. Its climate strategy states that the city of Oslo will ‘strengthen the knowledge about the climate impacts of different types of land use’ and that the city will develop new methods for this. In addition, the climate strategy states that the city will actively use a climate accounting system for forests, land use and land use changes. It is currently awaiting data from the Norwegian Environment Agency in order to do this. But while waiting for more precise quantitative tools, it has pushed its Agency for Planning and Building Services to develop a qualitative assessment tool. The purpose is that the planning case documents being sent to the politicians for final decisions will, to a larger extent, illuminate the climate impacts of individual building projects. In 2016, the city government instructed the Agency for Planning and Building Services to develop such an assessment tool, but rather than giving detailed instructions, it left the agency itself to formulate the assessment criteria. The city government’s general approach to climate leadership seems to be to stimulate decentralized innovative processes rather than instruct its agencies in detail (Hanssen and Hofstad, 2020). As developing a new system took time, the request was repeated even more explicitly: ‘The agency is requested to find a set of criteria to assess the climate impacts.’3 In November 2019, the Agency for Planning and Building Services finally developed a system of qualitative assessment criteria4 containing categories related to climate mitigation and adaptation: (1) green mobility, (2) blue-​g reen infrastructure, (3) surface water, (4) energy, (5) recycling and reuse and (6) fossil-​free construction. For example, criterion 5, ‘recycling and reuse’, is operationalized as aims to ‘reuse existing technical infrastructure, buildings and building components’, ‘use building material with low emissions throughout the life span of the product, including transport’, and so forth. Private developers are obliged to describe how their project ‘delivers’ on the different criteria. The Agency for Planning and Building Services then summarizes the (qualitative) scores and

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concludes whether or not to recommend the proposal. The two descriptions, from the developer and the conclusions from the agency, are submitted to the politicians to make the final decision. The criteria are intended to make private developers more conscious about how they incorporate the six dimensions into their planning proposal, thereby stimulating changes in attitudes (Hanssen and Hofstad, 2020). How, then, has the parliamentary model influenced the leadership mode, especially related to the ‘mix’ of governance instruments in use? Our study indicates that the parliamentary model seems to stimulate the vision building and strategy part of the regulatory role because it gives clear political leadership as opposed to a more consensual model. The formulation of a platform for city government cooperation seems to be an important output of the parliamentary model. As the political landscape makes it difficult for one party to win support from a majority of the city council alone, almost all city governments in Oslo in recent years have been coalitions. In the negotiations for forming a coalition, the platform for city government cooperation is formulated as a joint steering document. Thus, many tough discussions have already been conducted and agreements reached before the city government coalition enters office, allowing it to start implementing the goals immediately.

Exercising political climate leadership as a provider The political leadership in cities can give direction by playing the role of ‘provider’, for example by being a shareholder in local utility companies for energy, transport, water and waste (Kern and Alber 2008). The city government of Oslo has used its role as owner in the joint metropolitan public transport company, Ruter, to stimulate improvements in the public transport system in and around Oslo, such as improved frequency, new bus routes and new metro tunnels. When it comes to waste, as co-​owner of the public waste company,5 the city government has pushed the national government for co-​funding of an innovative pilot for carbon capture from waste. The energy recovery plant at Klemetsrud on the outskirts of Oslo accounts for approximately 14 per cent of the city’s CO2 emissions. Hence, the carbon capture project is essential to implement in order to reach its goals. Leveraging the role of provider also requires active political leadership that is stimulated by the parliamentary model adopted by the city of Oslo. A political leadership with such ambitious goals also risks failing to achieve them. The parliamentary model already stimulates polarization between the political parties in position, and the opposition parties. The lack of consensual leadership contributes to a further polarization between the parties in the city council. As a consequence, the opposition parties are actively criticizing

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the political leadership in the media. As an example, the news that the City of Oslo had failed to reduce its emissions in 2016–​18, and had instead increased them by 4.5 per cent, led to hard criticism from the opposition parties in the media discussions. Thus, the parliamentary model creates a clear divide between the political parties in power and in opposition which the consensus-​oriented alderman model does not. Hence, the constant control and criticism from the opposition parties contribute to pushing the political leadership to find solutions to achieve its goals. However, they risk hard critics in the media discussions, which again can lead to less support in future elections.

Exercising political climate leadership as a consumer Another way of exercising climate leadership is by using the role of being a major consumer of goods. Bulkeley (2013) emphasizes that the city can leverage its role as purchaser (customer) to give direction to and stimulate changes in the private sector. In Oslo, the city government has used this role strategically by changing public procurement practices to achieve its ambitious climate goals. In public procurement of construction projects, the city of Oslo now requires emission-​free construction sites, stimulating different firms to develop electric tools and to change its routines (Hofstad et al, 2019). The city has invested in electric excavators and trucks, in cooperation with the region and neighbouring municipalities, to rent out to firms that are selected to undertake construction projects. Hence, in its role as purchaser, it stimulates potential providers of services to develop new technologies in the transport, energy and construction sectors. On a system level, the new climate strategy reveals that the city government is developing a system for measuring indirect emissions generated by the production of food, products and services. It intends to introduce such a measurement tool in its public procurement routines in order to assess differences between tenders regarding indirect emissions; for example, between providers of food to elderly care institutions. How then, has the parliamentary model of the city of Oslo influenced the leadership role by being a consumer? The city government takes on a proactive, strategic leadership role. The ambitious goals push it towards governance innovations, also in its role as a consumer.

Exercising political climate leadership through regional partnerships and cooperation In metropolitan areas, commuting and transport patterns often present one of the main challenges for reducing CO2 emissions. The main transport pattern in metropolitan areas often comprises car-​based daily commuting

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from the outskirts to the core city (Simeonova et al, 2017). The same applies to land use practices in the wider metropolitan area, often leading to urban sprawl and increased car use (Simeonova et al, 2017). Hence, urban climate leadership requires that the core city take part in regional and metropolitan cooperation in order to curb these trends (Kern and Alber 2008; Bulkeley, 2013). Thus, political climate leadership must contain leadership strategies and tools for cooperation in the metropolitan area aimed at curbing this commuting pattern. The Oslo metropolitan area is the largest in Norway, consisting of about 1,354,500 inhabitants. This makes it a typical urban metropolitan area in Europe (Simeonova et al, 2017). The urban agglomeration in this metropolitan area consists of the capital, Oslo, with 673,500 inhabitants, and its functional living and working (LW) region, in the county municipality of Akershus, with 22 municipalities, of which Bærum is the second most populous municipality (125,500). The two most important coordination tools used in the Oslo metropolitan area are the regional plan for land use and transport for Oslo and Akershus, which covers the whole metropolitan area, and the urban growth agreement for the same area, a contractual management tool introduced by the national government to coordinate the transport investments of national, regional and local governments with the land use policies of local governments. It is a political (not legal) agreement regulating large-​scale transport investments such as railways, roads and metro lines (Amundsen et al, 2019; Tønnesen et al, 2019). As Simoneova et al (2017) emphasizes, it is important for the core city to take a strong role in metropolitan planning and collaboration in order to increase the level of coordinated development. This is especially important regarding land use and transport, to curb urban sprawl and car dependence. The urban leadership of Oslo has been an active player in the multi-​level metropolitan game of committing national, regional and local (neighbouring) governments to ensuring more climate-​friendly land use and transport development of the metropolitan area. The core city of Oslo was a key player in developing a regional plan for the metropolitan region (Oslo and Akershus) in 2015, and is the most active key player in implementing it. As Simoneova et al (2017) found when studying ten metropolitan areas in Europe, a key factor is that the cities are building administrative capacity and competence to support the collaboration. Oslo has done this for many years, offering its administrative competence to support metropolitan collaboration to, for example, develop guidelines for the regional plan so that smaller neighbouring municipalities can more easily implement it. The core city of Oslo has also taken an active role in the urban growth agreement, being large enough to influence the priorities of the national government (Tønnesen et al, 2019).

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For example, the urban political leadership has insisted on committing national authorities to follow the priorities in the regional plan to avoid public services being located far from public transport hubs. Renegotiation of the agreements has currently come to a halt on account of the city of Oslo’s refusal to accept the extension of a motorway into Oslo. Thus, Oslo leverages its power as the largest city to try to prevent national investments that will increase CO2 emissions in Oslo. How then, has the city of Oslo’s parliamentary model influenced the leadership role as a metropolitan player in these two coordination tools? First and foremost, the parliamentary model has enabled a strong, strategic leadership. Combined with being the largest city in the metropolitan area, Oslo’s leadership model makes it a powerful player that is able to set the rules of the metropolitan multi-​level game. The contractual management tool of the urban growth agreement offers a formal arena for this game –​ where the roles between the governmental layers are more flexible. The parliamentary model stimulates a strong city government, which has used this window of opportunity to be a dominant but collaborative player at this arena.

How has the parliamentary model influenced the political climate leadership in Oslo? The studies of the ‘mix’ of governance modes and instruments in this chapter have shed light on how the parliamentary model has contributed to the way in which urban climate leadership is exercised in Oslo. The effects of the parliamentary model seem to have some similarities with the stronger versions of the ‘strong mayor’ models of Mouritzen and Svara (2002), as the city government take a collective ‘strong mayor’ role, while the mayor has a more ceremonial function. Thus, the potential for strong leadership is greater. We will discuss in more detail how this model, in different ways, represents favourable conditions for exercising active climate leadership, as well as some of its weaknesses. First, strong, collective leadership is a strength. Our study clearly supports other studies of the Norwegian parliamentary model (Hagen et al, 1999; Saxi, 2006; Bukve and Saxi, 2013) in that the model leads to a more majoritarian style of decision-​making. Like Bukve and Saxi (2013: 163), we also find that influence is concentrated in the political majority, and particularly in the executive. In the empirical studies, we find that the climate leadership role is taken by the city government collectively, even if only three vice mayors have specific responsibilities (see also Simoneova et al, 2017; Hofstad et al, 2019; Hanssen and Hofstad, 2020). Even if the parliamentary model is an

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example of an executive-​oriented model (Berg and Rao, 2005), we see that it deviates from other ‘strong mayor’ models. In other European strong mayor models, the mayor himself/​herself plays the essential role (Hintea et al, 2019; Ruano, 2019). In the parliamentary model adopted by the city of Oslo, there is instead a small ‘collective’ of strong mayors. The interviews indicate that the whole city government, with six or seven ‘ministers’ from different political parties, works as a strong collective leadership. Thus, it takes on the role of a strong mayor, while the formal mayor has more ceremonial functions. This collective –​but strong –​political leadership seems to be of crucial importance for ensuring integration of the climate goals with all the city’s sectoral policies, as the political leaders are ‘ministers’ of more specific policy fields. It also increase its (media) visibility towards societal actors in private sector, civil society and cultural life and their capacity for active dialogue with external partners, for example in networks. It also increases their ability to be hard negotiation partners in the interplay with neighbouring municipalities and with regional and national authorities. Second, the parliamentary model also ensures a constructive interplay between the political and administrative leaderships. What was a surprising finding in our studies, however, was the relationship between the political leadership and the administrative leadership. The parliamentary model is designed to introduce a clearer division between these leadership layers, making the political ‘ministers’ the top leaders of each policy sector, but with administrative leaders underneath them. In other studies, the lack of integration between the political and administrative leaderships has been found to be a problem. What we find in our study, however, is a rather well developed interplay, and that the political and administrative leadership strategies are nested in Oslo (Hofstad et al, 2019). This does not mean, however, that there is no division. On the contrary, our findings are consistent with the ideal of the model, with clearer divisions between the political and administrative parts of the organization. This clearer division also seems to stimulate strategic skills among the political leadership, formulating political strategies –​but leaving it to the professional part of the municipal organization to find the specific solutions to deliver on the goals and effectuate them. This more meta-​governance-​oriented role seems to be highly constructive, stimulating governance innovation at the administrative level in the city (Hanssen and Hofstad, 2020). Our study also finds that the city government has pushed its administration, acting like an insistent and impatient meta-​governor, for example in the case of developing a set of climate assessment criteria in land use planning. But the political leadership did not fall for the temptation of issuing detailed instructions on the solutions, and instead gave the city’s Agency for Planning and Building Services the opportunity to develop the criteria set itself, based on its knowledge, giving it ownership of the

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governance tool. Thus, the parliamentary model seems to stimulate a political leadership with high climate ambitions, to be impatient, without being too detailed-​oriented in their way of steering. The city government of Oslo seems to have retained its role as meta-​governor. Thus, administrative climate leadership has been allowed to develop new and innovative sectoral governance tools and practices. Third, climate policy needs integrative leadership that is underpinned by a political platform of a (coalition) city government. Recent studies on climate leadership have stressed the need for integrative leadership (Hofstad and Vedeld, 2020). In Oslo, one element of the parliamentary model that seems to be specifically positive for the conduction of integrative climate leadership is the formulation of a platform for city government (2015, 2019). This practice has evolved from Oslo’s history of coalition city governments. All the city governments in the past 20 years have been coalitions of two or three political parties. As a result, the different political parties in the coalitions must come to a formal agreement, which often takes several months. This agreement is made public, and has the status of a formalized agreement where the different political goals and promises put forward during electoral campaigns are listed and prioritized. In making this list, the political parties have to weigh their goals and rank them. This seems to stimulate a more strategically oriented governance mentality among all the member of the city government, avoiding a silo mentality and sectoral compartmentalization. Even though the formation of coalition agreements is also observed in municipalities with the alderman model (Martinussen, 2004; Bukve and Saxi, 2013), the coalition agreement in Oslo seems to have a very important impact on cooperation between the different parties in the city government. Other governance tools used by the city government seem to have similar integrative effects on how the city government works as an organization towards reaching its goals. Important integrating tools are the city government platform, the municipal master plan and the climate budget. Fourth, the model seems to politicize urban leadership. Our study shows that the parliamentary model leads to a clear distinction between the political parties in power and in opposition, which the consensus-​oriented alderman model does not. Hence, the constant control and criticism from the opposition parties contribute to pushing the political leadership to find good solutions. Fifth, the parliamentary model leads to a more visible political leadership. With the clear divide between the governing and the opposition parties, it is easier for the private sector and civil society to hold the city government accountable for the policies it implements. Bukve and Saxi (2013: 163) find that the parliamentary model in local and regional government tends to improve accountability. The city government has also established several

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networks to meet and collaborate with private sector actors. Rendering the political leadership more visible by clearly stating that it wants a green transition in the business sector also makes it a more attractive cooperation partner for business actors. However, the study also indicates that there are important preconditions for stimulating strong climate leadership under the parliamentary model. First, it must be ‘activated’ by strong, ambitious goals. The role must be filled by strong political will for a green shift in order to exercise strong climate leadership. This is in line with other European studies (Albrechts, 2006; Bryson et al, 2009). In 2015, the city gained a coalition government composed of the Labour Party, the Socialist Left Party and the Green Party, with radical climate goals. Its goal was to reduce emissions by 50 per cent by 2020 and by 95 per cent by 2030. However, it continued to pursue the main elements of the policies of the previous Conservative-​led city government, developing public transport, densifying around public transport hubs and car restrictions (toll roads, etc.). Still, it intensified all the earlier strategies and measures in order to reach its ambitious goals. In Oslo, the political leadership has a strong strategic governance approach, formulating and reformulating its climate strategy as one of its main strategies for governing illustrated in the model of Bulkeley (2013) in Figure 12.1. This strategy reflects the goals of the platform for city government cooperation, but are far more specific. Second, the fact that the parliamentary model is a more conflict-​oriented model, with a clear divide between governing parties and opposition parties, stimulates a two-​block political landscape with ‘a frustrated opposition’ (Bukve and Saxi, 2013). This can be counterproductive to making long-​term political strategies survive the four-​year election cycle, especially in climate policies, where measures are often unpopular (car restrictions, etc.). Third, earlier studies (Klausen and Fimreite, 2003; Bukve and Saxi 2013) have identified a risk of creating an unduly large divide between political leadership and administrative professional knowledge. Finally, the city government has vice mayors with responsibility for specific policy sectors, which poses an inherent risk of sectoral policies and compartmentalization.

Conclusion How then, can this study contribute to the European discussion about institutional conditions for urban political leadership? The study certainly contributes to the discourse about the shift in urban political leadership towards a more strategic, meta-​governance role (Jessop, 2004; Bache and Flinders, 2004). The findings in our study are clearly in line with observations in the broader European discussion about the political leadership role,

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observing a strategic shift, often with the use of meta-​governance tools (Jessop 2004; Hofstad and Torfing, 2017). This trend is described in several policy fields related to metropolitan governance, such as planning and land use, transport, climate mitigation and adaptation, general collaboration with the private sector and so forth. (Albrechts, 2006; Den Exter et al, 2015; Simoneova et al, 2017). The findings also support findings in earlier studies, for example, Mouritzen and Svara (2002) and Swianiewicz, Lackowska and Hanssen (2018) about the effect of strong mayor models. In Norwegian municipalities with a weak mayor model, the level of interest among mayors and local councillors was found to be lower than that of administrative staff whereas the parliamentary model, representing a type of strong mayor model, seems to stimulate and encourage strong climate leadership. Notes 1

2

3

4

5

The empirical study was conducted in the Interreg project SPIMA (2017) and the GREENGOV project (2020) funded by the Research Council of Norway. The data are document studies of strategies, plans and other steering documents. The study also includes in-​depth interviews with key actors in Oslo, such as administrative leaders, politicians, civil servants, environmental organizations and city districts. Twelve key actors were interviewed in 2019, in addition to three key actors from the national level, neighbouring municipalities and county municipalities. In SPIMA, ten key actors from the city, the surrounding county municipality and neighbouring municipalities were interviewed in 2017. https://​www.oslo.kommune.no/​politics-​and-​administration/​politics/​city-​government/​ #gref (12.1.2021), https://w ​ ww.oslo.kommune.no/p​ olitics-a​ nd-a​ dministration/p​ olitics/​ city-​governance/​[Accessed 22 March 2021]. Tildelingsbrev 2018, –​Plan-​og bygningsetaten. Oslo kommune, 4.2.1 (Measures in the climate budget. Kriteriesett for vurdering og synliggjøring av klimautslipp og klimatilpasning i planprosessen» til innsendte detaljreguleringer (fra utbyggere). The City of Oslo owns 50 per cent of Fortum Oslo Varme.

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Berg, R. and Rao, N. (2005) ‘Institutional Reforms in Local Government’, in R. Berg and N. Rao (eds) Transforming Local Political Leadership, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 1–​14. Bryson, J.M., Crosby, B.C. and Bryson, J.K. (2009) ‘Understanding Strategic Planning and the Formulation and Implementation of Strategic Plans as a Way of Knowing: The Contributions of Actor-​Network Theory’, International Public Management Journal, 12(2): 172–​207. Bukve, O. and Saxi, H.P. (2013) ‘Parliamentarism in Norwegian Regions: Majority Rule and Excluded Opposition’, Local Government Studies, 40(2): 163–​181. Bulkeley, H. (2010) ‘Cities and the Governing of Climate Change’, Annual Review of Environmental and Resources, 35: 229–​253. Bulkeley, H. (2013) Cities and Climate Change, London: Routledge. Den Exter, R., Lenhart, J. and Kern, K. (2015) ‘Governing Climate Change in Dutch Cities: Anchoring Local Climate Strategies in Organisation, Policy and Practical Implementation’, Local Environment, 20(9): 1062–​1080. Hagen, T.P., Myrvold, T.M., Opedal, S., Stigen I.M. and Østtveiten, Ø.S. (1999) Parlamentarisme eller formannskapsmodell. Det parlamentariske styringssystemet i Oslo sammenlignet med formannskapsmodellene i Bergen, Trondheim og Stavanger, Oslo: NIBRs Plusserie 3–​99. Hanssen, G.S. and Hofstad, H. (2020) ‘Climate Leadership: Developing Innovative Strategic Tools to Improve the Partnership-​Mode of Planning’, in U. Higdem and A. Hagen (eds) Innovation in Public Planning. Calculate, Communicate and Innovate, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 131–​149. Hinte̦a, C., Profiroiu, M. C., Țiclău and Tudor, C. (eds.) (2019) Strategic Planning in Local Communities. A Cross-​National Study of 7 Countries, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Hofstad, H. (ed) (2019) Governing Climate Transformation –​The Evolution of Climate Policies and Development of Co-​Creational Leadership in Four Forerunning Cities, Greengov-​report. Oslo: NIBR. Hofstad, H. and Torfing, J. (2017) ‘Towards a Climate Resilient City: Collaborative Innovation for a ‘Green Shift’ in Oslo’, in R. Alvarez (ed) Springer Book in the Green Energy and Technology Series, New York: Springer. Hofstad, H. and Vedeld, T. (2020) ‘Exploring Theories of Urban Climate Leadership: The Potential of an Integrated and Interactive Approach’, Environmental Policy and Planning, [online] Available from: https://​doi. org/​10.1080/​1523908X.2021.1883425 [Accessed 1 March 2021]. IPCC (2014) ‘Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects’, Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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IPCC (2018) Summary for Policymakers of IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C approved by governments [online] Available from: https://​ www.ipcc.ch/​2018/​10/​08/​summary-​for-​policymakers-​of-​ipcc-​special-​ report-​on-​global-​warming-​of-​1–​5c-​approved-​by-​governments/​ [Accessed 22 March 2021]. Jessop, B. (2004) ‘Multi-​Level Governance and Multi-​Level Metagovernance’, in I. Bache and M. Flinders (eds) Multi-​Level Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kern, K. and Alber, G. (2008) ‘Governing Climate Change in Cities: Modes of Urban Climate Governance in Multi-​Level Systems’, in OECD (2008) Competitive Cities and Climate Change, OECD Conference Proceedings, Milan, Italy, 9–​10 October 2008. Klausen, J.E. and Fimreite, A.L. (2003) Styringssystem i storby evaluering av styringssystemet i Bergen commune, Bergen: Rokkansenteret. Lackowska, M. and Zimmermann, K. (2011) ‘New Forms of Territorial Governance in Metropolitan Regions? “A Polish–​German Comparison”’, European Urban and Regional Studies, 18(2): 156–​169. Ladner, A., Keuffer, N. and Baldersheim, H. (2016) ‘Measuring Local Autonomy in 39 Countries (1990–​2014)’, Regional and Federal Studies, 26(3): 321–​357. Lappegard Hauge, Å., Hanssen, G.S. and Flyen, C. (2018) ‘Multilevel Networks for Climate Change Adaptation –​What Works?’, International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management, [online] Available from: https://​doi.org/​10.1108/​IJCCSM-​10–​2017–​0194 [Accessed 22 March 2021]. Larsen, H.O. (2005) ‘Transforming Political Leadership: Models, Trends and Reforms’, in R. Berg and R. Nirmala (eds) Transforming Local Political Leadership, Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp 195–​211. Lijphart, A. (1999) Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-​Six Countries, New Haven & London: Yale University Press. Martinussen, P.E. (2004) ‘Government Performance and Political Accountability at Subnational Level: The Electoral Fate of Local Incumbents in Norway’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 27(2): 227–​259. Mouritzen, P.E. and Svara, J. (2002) Leadership in the Apex. Politicians and Administrators in Western Local Governments, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. Røiseland, A. og Stigen, I.M. (2003) Fylkeskommunal parlamentarisme i Nordland: samspillet politikk-​administrasjon, Oslo: NIBR. Ruano, J.M. (2019) ‘Actors, Aims and Challenges of Local Strategic Planning in Spain’, in C.E. Hinte̦a, M.C. Profiroiu and C. Tudor Țiclău (eds) Strategic Planning in Local Communities A Cross-​National Study of 7 Countries, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Saxi, H.P. (2006) ‘Parlamentarisme i norsk kommunesektor –​fra konsensus til majoritetsstyre?’, Norsk statsvitenskapelig tidsskrift, 22(3): 256–​277. Simeonova, V., van Eupen, M., Clement, J., Baraggia, A., Hanssen, G.S., Hofstad, H., Tosics, I. and Gerohazi, E. (2017) SPIMA –​Spatial Dynamics and Strategic Planning in Metropolitan Areas. ESPON-​Report, Targeted Analysis, Luxembourg: ESPON. Swianiewicz, P. and Teles, F. (2019) ‘The Institutionalization of Inter-​ Municipal Arrangements in Europe: Findings from the Unusual Suspects’, Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences, 57: 119–​136. Swianiewicz, P., Lackowska, M. and Hanssen, G.S. (2018) ‘Local Leadership in Climate-​Change Policies’, Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences, 53: 67–​83. Tønnesen, A., Krogstad, J.R, Christiansen, P., Isaksson, K. (2019) ‘National goals and tools to fulfil them: A study of opportunities and pitfalls in Norwegian metagovernance of urban mobility’, Transport Policy 81, pp 35–​44. UN (2019) The Future Is Now: Science for Achieving Sustainable Development. Global Sustainable Development Report 2019, New York, NY: United Nations. Zimmermann, K. (2009) ‘Changing Governance Evolving Knowledge Scapes’, The Planning Review, 45(178): 56–​66.

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PART III

Keeping the Pace with a Balanced Balance Sheet

13

Democratic Functions of Local Budgets Jerzy Bartkowski

Introduction This chapter reflects upon the interesting but underdeveloped question of the democratic functions of local budgets with respect to local citizenship (Martin and Prasad, 2014). Typically, the democratic dimension of local budgets is perceived as a question of the fair allocation of expenditure. However, here we adopt another perspective, and consider the impact of local participation on the emergence of local citizenship. In particular, we examine the question of the role of budgets in local democracy. Should they only be seen as a means of control and supervision over local politicians? Or could they become a kind of school for local democracy? We look at these questions from the point of view of the local budget. The latter can be seen as a financial representation of the most important local decisions (Ebel and Petersen, 2012). How priorities are decided is an excellent opportunity to learn about local politics. Furthermore, trade-​offs highlight key problems in local governance, such as the balance between limited resources and excessive demand, and the need for support from citizens. Another key question relates to how to include considerations about the future of the local community in current decision-​making (see Łukomska and Neneman’s chapter in this volume). Looking at budgeting from the economic point of view highlights that citizens’ control over local decision-​making is both a democratic and pragmatic requirement. At the same time, the ability of citizens to understand local politics is closely related to the development of a political culture.

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The problems discussed in this chapter exclude two other important aspects of local budgeting, which are explored in other chapters (see Part III). The latter address the question of the uneven distribution of benefits (tourist amenities and suburban homes) and their costs –​externalities that are linked to both overtourism (Derek) and urban sprawl (Łukomska and Neneman). The presence of both newcomers and tourists can significantly change the social meaning of local budgets for residents. These phenomena raise the question of budgetary justice as a justification for specific, local taxation in the form of, for example, tourist taxes. We highlight the need to analyse how local democracy is manifested in local budgeting. We examine democratic decision-​making through the lens of the budgetary process. In general, the role of local democracy is to define key parameters for the executive branch of local government. These budgetary parameters, that is, the balance between revenue and expenditure, or the return on investment, become indicators of the quality of local leadership. The conversion of the political agenda into a would-​be budget makes it possible to carry out a cost-​benefit analysis of competing projects. This, in turn, opens up a very important opportunity for the optimal allocation of resources in both the political and social sense. The informed observer is able to understand political decisions, identify the pros and cons in decision-​making, and understand the social and political context. Such citizens have a good insight into local politics, and budgetary processes become more transparent. A key motivation for this close attention to the process is that it concerns ‘our’ money. Enhanced local citizenship helps to counteract fiscal illusions. The source of these illusions is found in the perception of the two main financial processes as separate; expenditure is seen as unrelated to revenue (the so-​called ‘tenants’ illusion’) (Guziejewska, 2016). Voters who have a better understanding of fiscal policy are more likely to view the political decisions of ‘their’ local authorities not only from the position of an informed observer, but they are also more likely to accept policy goals. Better-​informed citizens formulate more realistic demands, have a better understanding of the importance of long-​term decisions and, in the end, are better-​able to monitor the actions of local government. However, it should be noted that financial management at the local level is not a carbon copy of democracy at the national level. First, funding is not simply local; money also comes from external sources. Local tasks that are mandated at the national level are financed by grants and subsidies from central government. Although these issues might appear to be beyond the interests of citizens, the local use of national grants and funding is driven by their priorities. In

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practice, it can be very difficult to find the demarcation line between local and national interests in some areas. For example, the performance of local schools is a concern for parents, local authorities and the state. Local actors bring their knowledge and skills, and these mass phenomena can have very positive, macro-​scale effects. Another important aspect of the local use of national funds is the innovative role of local social policy. Local governments are not passive spenders of public money. Local officials and politicians have the scope to innovate in various fields, motivated by a pursuit for greater efficiency in the use of limited resources. Their reward is an increase in political support and a greater probability of re-​election. In this context, it is unfortunate that there is no record of all of the local initiatives that have been developed and implemented during the COVID-​19 pandemic.

Post-​1990 local public finances in Poland The introduction could be perceived as a description of a kind of utopia. But the role of local budgets in Poland is changing, and these changes illustrate the links between local budgets, local democracy and science. Renewed interest in local finances, and participation in local policy analyses are closely related to the revival of local democracy in Poland. Pre-​1990, local budgets were an irrelevant element in the main political mechanisms. Budgets were reduced to the circulation of cash, and the municipal economy closely resembled quasi-​natural economics. Local finance only emerged as an independent scientific field following the overwhelming changes that were initiated in 1990. The revival of local government is consistent with the revival of the science of local public finance. A peripheral part of the ‘old’ system, economic science now has a new and important role. However, the re-​emergence of local democracy did not immediately bring new (democratic) local budgeting functions (Kawala, 2016). Local democracy is characterized by fiscal dilemmas, from the problem of participation and representation, to local leadership and collective decision-​making. All parties contribute to reaching a final decision on the use of local resources. It could also be claimed that the quality of resource allocation relies heavily on local politics. Economic efficiency can be seen as a political postulate that reflects the proper execution of the mandate given by voters. Local governments rely on political support from citizens to accomplish long-​term objectives that require investment. This is, thus, not only an economic question but also a political one.

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Local budgets and local democracy In this section, we look in more depth at the mutual dependence between local budgets and local democracy. The main focus is on the development of specific knowledge about local public finances by participants and competent observers. We examine the reciprocal influence of political knowledge and local citizenship. The latter is not only a question of citizens acquiring specific knowledge and skills. Knowledge can also be extended through a new form of budgeting. One example is goal-​oriented budgeting, which can support more future-​oriented activities in local communities. Another example of a new development has emerged from the simple idea of juxtaposing expected revenue and expenses. This has produced a new and very useful tool to ensure the feasibility of plans. Budgets formalize the financial plans of local governments. They reflect decisions that have been taken about the allocation of local funds, as a function of the needs of residents. These collective decisions are taken within a democratic framework that begins with open debate. A second aspect is to obtain approval from citizens in the form of a legal, representative body –​a local assembly. The budget is also an act of political communication. It is a public announcement of the social and political priorities of current local leaders. On the other hand, it also reflects the power that is exercised by the legislative branch of the government over the executive arm –​the so-​called ‘power of the purse’ (Fergusson, 1961). Finally, local budgets are renewable and reflect the power of the local assembly. It should be noted that this power allows the assembly to exercise many other political functions, such as the effective representation of the needs of citizens.

The budget as a framework for political decision-​making How does the preparation of the budget, by the local assembly, affect local political decision-​making? How does local democracy affect the local budget? And, reciprocally, what is the role of local democracy in ensuring that budgets respect economic standards in terms of rationality and effectiveness? What, in practice, is the outcome of demands for transparency in budgeting? The budget encapsulates the idea of including all local finances in one document. It reflects political priorities in a condensed, visual form. It illustrates the intertwined, complex issues of local politics. Overall, it can highlight the close relationship between competing priorities, and reveal connections that can be examined in more detail. Another important benefit

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is that the vocabulary of economics is used to discuss the actions of local governments. At the national level, the debate on public finances is inherently founded on economic concepts such as the source of resources, resource scarcity and the purpose of expenditure, with the overall aim of efficiency. In principle, the word ‘budget’ is easy to understand –​the idea is familiar to every household. The metaphor can be used to connect local, public life with everyday cognitive resources and day-​to-​day activities. In this respect, it helps to legitimize public decisions, as the problem is similar: limited resources, while both domains require the consideration of the needs and desires of their members. Next, we look at the budget from the point of view of exercising control over local government. First and foremost, the budget must reconcile desires with resources. The relationship between the latter can be demonstrated, and the comparison carries an important message. Expenditure that exceeds resources is an indication of recklessness and political populism. Promises have been made, but there are insufficient resources to keep them. On the other hand, a positive balance indicates either an inability to use funds, or unnecessary and excessive taxation. How are budgetary transparency and local democracy related? First, the budget can be a great source of temptation for all of the participants in decision-​making. It is a huge cake, and a tempting opportunity that can be abused. Transparent local government practices can prevent this happening. Transparency is not only about compliance with formal regulations. Its role is more complex. One important goal is to support the purposeful use of a shared pot of money. The budget is made legitimate by its democratic goals (meeting citizens’ needs), efficiency (rationality of spending) and fairness (transparency) (Skica, 2004; Piwowarski, 2011). Efficient budgeting relies on not only economic but also political means. The rationality of expenses, and the effective use of resources are not important because they follow economic decision-​making principles; they are also the best way to legitimize local government activities. The latter observation supports the hypothesis that local democracy is not only a political postulate but also a pragmatic requirement. This seems to be the best way to make local government more effective. Democratic budgeting is both a political and an organizational postulate. Local government decisions are made under conditions of resource scarcity. How is this problem solved under conditions of local democracy? What does it bring to local democratic citizenship? The budget illustrates the problem of limited resources in a tangible, direct form through the need for balance. In reality, in any democratic decision-​making system, the needs and expectations expressed by the public exceed resources. Hence, making decisions requires setting priorities, which should express the shared

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values of the community, and compromises among the main political forces. These shared priorities give political legitimacy to many budgetary decisions and provide the foundation for transparency in the choice of investment goals. Transparency plays another important role in local decision-​making. It protects against accusations of corruption and private, group or party favouritism (Sustein and Holmes, 2000). The budget raises the issue of continuity. The latter is a social and political construction that makes people think about future consequences when making decisions. An important characteristic of mature local administrations is an understanding of the cost of a lack of continuity. One of the functions of the budget is to connect the present with the future. The process teaches forward thinking, and shows the importance of continuation and consistency. It supports group learning, achieved through trial-​and-​error. A budget requires collective consent if it is to meet its goals. Gaining political support for long-​term investment can encounter obstacles that are not only financial. Financing long-​term investments can mean a reduction in current expenses over an extended period. Public acceptance relies on a majority of citizens understanding the future benefits for them. The latter observation has other consequences as it reveals the integrative role of collective endeavour. These conditions can be met in an integrated local community. Community spirit is the best way to establish local cooperation. A commitment to the local area can overcome otherwise impenetrable borders created by fundamental ideological differences and the effects of wars waged by national parties. An interesting aspect of the process is the need to have a budget. The failure to approve a budget on time may lead to the loss of autonomy and the nomination of a receiver by the national government. In Poland, there has already been one case of local bankruptcy, which resulted in the liquidation of the commune (Ostrowice in 2019). Furthermore, local politics are much more complex than at the national level. The mayor and the local council are elected independently, which can result in many different political configurations (Sidor et al, 2017). Fortunately, if an agreement can be reached in one situation, it can serve as a basis for many other cases. This scenario has come to be seen as a kind of local political capital. What is the role of public finance theory with respect to local democracy? The budget is clearly an example of a framework for local decision-​making, and it is difficult to believe that it did not exist at one time. The simple juxtaposition of plans, intentions and measures is the product of a longer process. It could even be said that it is a kind of ‘invention’ that was given additional political significance when it became combined with a democratic form of governance. The creation of knowledge enables the analysis of the local political process. At the same time, the production of specific knowledge makes it

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possible to monitor this important process and, consequently, its democratic rationalization. It is worth emphasizing that different forms of participation in decision-​making (consultations, public hearings, etc.) are not only a way to articulate the position of participants, but are also a way to form public opinion. A lack of debate or a clash of opinions reduces the knowledge needed for rational decision-​making: participants need to become aware of each other’s preferences, and work out compromises based on the identified interests of stakeholders. The postulate of broad and open participation in decisions, the development of new forms of local democracy, using new forms of social communication, confirm that this is not only of political importance but also of pragmatic importance. Seeing the construction of the budget in terms of a problem of creating specific knowledge can be tentatively divided into first-​and second-​generation knowledge, rather than a hierarchy of importance. Here, it should be noted that the analysis of fiscal data has developed gradually and in specific ways. In the first stage, it concerned basic controls related to, for example, balancing the books. The accumulation of data enabled more complex operations; for example, they allowed an examination of the problem of efficiency. Currently, it is possible not only to imagine such problems but also to analyse them and even carry out actions to improve outcomes in a particular community. This creation of fiscal data makes it possible to analyse local finances from many perspectives. Here, we do not go into detail, but simply illustrate some of the uses. Fiscal data supports operations such as aggregation, and it can be used to distinguish and define different categories of phenomena. The budget can be grouped by project or department, funds can be divided into those coming from internal or external sources, expenditure can be current or investment, productive or unproductive, and expenses can be material or personal and so forth. Taken together, these classifications require different types of analysis. They also provide different insights into the activities of local government, along with their practical consequences (Lebas, 2001). On the one hand, they are a tool that can be used to look at actual activities. On the other hand, they make it possible to plan new activities, for example, whether borrowing can be used to fund a long-​term investment. Taken together, these two uses of knowledge extend the ability of local communities to shape both their present and their future.

Cognitive barriers to participation in local politics The democratic function of the budget is based on what could be called cognitive participation –​participation based on an understanding of the mechanisms of action. The latter aims to regulate system inputs, reveal desires

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and discourage wishful thinking, while encouraging more realistic postulates as well as supporting popular understanding of long-​term decisions. The goal is to encourage more realistic demands. Another objective is to protect local politics from fiscal populism and provide immunity against the phenomenon of borrowing from the future. Any discussion of the democratic potential of local budgeting processes is incomplete if we do not examine these obstacles. Understanding the meaning of the local budget encounters a number of barriers that are difficult to overcome. The budget process is difficult not only for the average citizen to understand but also for actors who are more deeply involved in local politics, such as councillors. First, the process is boring. Budgets contain many technical terms that are difficult for non-​ experts to understand. Moreover, the most important issues can be hidden by seemingly insignificant terms. Mastering this system requires a significant time and cognitive investment, with no clear rewards. The English writer, Parkinson, who observed the activities of financial committees, developed the so-​called Parkinson’s Laws. He claimed that the more important the decision, the less time is spent on it. Key decisions are often made after minimal debate (Parkinson, 1958). Another closely related issue relates to the level of detail, or generality. The higher the level of aggregation, the more general the categories that are used, and the less transparency there is. A high level of aggregation makes it easier for a skillful financier to hide budget lines that would not gain public support. On the other hand, details can absorb or bore the reader, who may fail to pay attention to overall assessments that are much more important. Local budget measures can be constructed in various ways. For example, they can be presented as a sum of programmes, or broken down into sections. The first form clarifies what public money is actually spent on, but the general division of funds into spheres is omitted. The second encourages a symbolic, irrational perception, for example, the percentage of the budget spent on culture. Democratic controls also give rise to a tendency to reduce items that are not clearly defined to reserves that are kept for a rainy day. Although they are necessary due to the uncertainty associated with many operations, they are often perceived as money given to politicians to use at their discretion. When talking about the rationality of action, it is common to understand this as social and political rationality. Spending money on restoring the historic town hall may serve to strengthen local bonds, especially if the building attracts tourists. On the other hand, an excursion by councillors may seem to be a clear waste of public money, but it can enhance integration. A city or commune festival can be an important highlight in local life, although it is difficult to list any material effects.

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Fiscal illusions are a big barrier in the perception of local finances. The phenomenon is widely encountered in the area of public finances, and impedes rational discussion (Buchanan, 1967). It can also lay the foundations for populism in cases where there are specific, local fiscal illusions (Pommerenhe and Schneider, 1978; Guziejewska, 2016). First introduced by Buchanan (1967), they can be interpreted as popular views of public finance. Although they seem to be a manifestation of fiscal ignorance, they are real phenomena that are hard to ignore. Examples are seen in preferences for highly progressive, inefficient and economically counterproductive taxes. Although the overall concept goes far beyond the scope of this chapter, here we discuss three types that are relevant to our subject. These are the perception of separate components of the budget process, the moralization of fiscal issues and the free-​r ider perspective. The first is seen in the division between expenses and revenue. This fiscal illusion only pays attention to one side of the budgetary process. Those who share this illusion only take into account one side of the budget, for example, increased expenditure on social benefits. Another example is opposition to governmental expenditure as a whole, regardless of utility. Both perspectives have one thing in common. They are one-​sided. The second type of illusion is the moralization of the discourse. Here, arguments are permeated with moral questions, notably about who should pay taxes, and who should profit from governmental expenditure. They relate to a debate about the role of social justice in taxation, rather than real, efficient sources of revenue. The third type of fiscal illusion is an appeal to a free-​r ider perspective. Fiscal populism appeals to citizens who primarily see politics from the perspective of his or her individual benefits. For this person, the most visible aspects of budgets are the number of taxes he or she pays, and the benefits that he or she receives from the government. These concerns strongly affect political debates, which are turned into a form of pork-​barrel politics. Candidates expect voters to choose a representative by comparing their bundle of promises, regardless of how realistic they might be. The result is a kind of auction of promises. This happens during difficult electoral campaigns that do not support rational debate. The issue of local development receives little attention. A particularly interesting fiscal illusion is called ‘the tenant illusion’. It refers to the tenant’s belief that demanding a greater range of benefits and amenities from their proprietor does not affect the amount of rent he or she pays. In local politics, this is seen in the illusion that the social benefits promised by politicians have no cost. They appear to be a consequence of the position of the external observer, someone who is only equipped with

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common knowledge. The hidden consequence of such populistic politics is that this use of public funds deprives citizens of an opportunity to decide the goals of local politics. If we extend the metaphor further, it could be said that the civic education that comes with the budgetary process has the potential to transform people from tenants to citizens. To teach people to become citizens, experiments have used budgeting as an extension of local democracy. There is no space in this chapter to discuss all of them. One example is the so-​called participatory, or citizen budget. A part of the local budget is decided directly by citizens. This was introduced in 2001 in one city in Poland, and was later adopted by others. By 2017, 320 cities were participating, with citizens managing a total of Polish złoty (PLN) 500,000 (ca. €100 000). In 2018, it became obligatory in the largest cities and optional in other cities.

The impact of localism on budgeting Finally, it is worth pointing out the importance of the local context and its significance when considering the democratic function of budgets. Local public finances are not an exact copy of what happens at the national level. There are many differences. While there is no space to discuss all of them, here we focus on some that seem to affect the financial dimension of local democracy. The first is the importance of subsidies and grants. Only a small proportion of local government spending is self-​financed. This is due to the dual status of local governments, which are, on the one hand, rooted in the local political microsystem and, on the other hand, responsible for executing many tasks imposed by the general administration. An important consequence of their dependency on subsidies and grants is that inhabitants do not feel that they finance their local government. This weakens the link between contributions and expenses in local communities (‘that’s what my money goes on as a taxpayer’) (Jones, 1996). A partial answer to this problem can be found in theories of fiscal relations between local and central budgets –​so-​called ‘fiscal federalism’ (Oates, 1972). Fiscal federalism is not only a mechanism for the spatial allocation of general resources. It is also responsible for mobilizing local resources into a general framework, and reflects the interaction between general goals, local interests and local knowledge. A good example is the quality of education, which is both a national and a local goal. High-​quality education is a key priority for the local community, notably the community of parents. Such local–​central coalitions of interests can also be found in other areas, such as health. Several other important points of view that are relevant to the arguments presented here are found in two other chapters in this book. One is the

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problem of sharing the cost of externalities arising from overtourism (Derek). The chapter by Łukomska and Nenemam addresses another important problem, which is that local public finance creates specific incentives that discourage seeing the quality of local life as a common pool of resources.

Conclusion In conclusion, it should be noted that local finances create an important, and underestimated, government–​citizen link. This is related to the fact that locality reflects the physical proximity between goals and the opportunity to observe the political process. It creates a short, easy-​to-​observe line of feedback between a decision and its consequences. Presented in a condensed and visible form, it creates a simple feedback loop. Power is given legitimacy by how resources are used. Transparency, as the basis of legitimacy, is not only a kind of ethical power but also a pragmatic postulate. This chapter underlines the democratic potential of local budgets. In synthetic form, the budget is an easily understandable metaphor for a system of wishes and the resources that are available for their implementation. The process illustrates the basic problem of local authorities, which is the effective allocation of resources. Solving this problem requires establishing priorities and reaching the consensus that is needed for their implementation. Appropriate political activity, which meets the needs of citizens, together with effective action, are both an economic postulate and a condition for the survival of local politicians. Rational use, efficient action and incentives for innovation are by-​products of the use of resources under conditions of local democracy. Understanding budgets is an acquired skill, which has the potential to serve various, general goals. It can operate directly through the innovative potential of local governments; but, furthermore, it can provide feedback to voters, teaching them to how to evaluate the proposals of candidates who are competing for their support. Many of the considerations that are outlined in this chapter can be rightly perceived as a kind of political postulate that has little chance of being implemented. However, this perspective is part of a long tradition of thinking about local politics, which sees it as a school of democracy for all citizens. References Buchanan, J. (1967) Public Finance in Democratic Process, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. Ebel, R. and Petersen, J. (eds) (2012) The Oxford Handbook of Local Government Finance, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Fergusson, J. (1961) The Power of the Purse, A History of American Public Finance, 1776–1 ​ 790, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. Guziejewska, B. (2016) ‘Theoretical Dimensions of Fiscal Illusions in Local Government Finance’, Journal of Economics, Business and Management, 4(1): 215–​219. Holmes, S. and Sunstein, C. (2000) The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes, New York, NY London: W.W. Norton. Jones, C. (1996) ‘Mass-​Based Income Taxation: Creating a Taxpaying Culture, 1940–​1952’, in W.E. Brownlee (ed) Funding the Modern American State, 1941–​1995: The Rise and Fall of the Era of Easy Finance, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, pp 107–​147. Kawala, J. (2016) ‘Funkcja demokratyczna finansów publicznych w gminach’ (The democratic function of public finance in the communes), Samorząd Terytorialny, 7–​8: 27–​43. Lebas, M. (2001) ‘Budgeting and Anticipatory Management’, in N. Smelser and P. Baltes (eds) International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Vol, 2, Amsterdam-P ​ aris-N ​ ew York-O ​ xford-S​ hannon-S​ ingapore-​ Tokyo: Elsevier, pp 1390–​1397. Martin, W. and Prasad, M. (2014) ‘Taxes and Fiscal Sociology’, Annual Review of Sociology, 40: 331–​345. Oates, W. (1972) Fiscal Federalism, New York: Harcourt. Parkinson, C. (1958) Parkinson’s Law or the Pursuit of Progress, London: John Murray. Piwowarski, R. (2011) Znaczenie przejrzystości w polityce fiskalnej (The Significance of Transparency in Fiscal Policy), Lodz: Wyd. Uniwersytetu Lodzkiego. Sidor M., Kuć-​C zajkowska, K. and Wasil, J. (2017) Koabitacja na poziomie gminnym w Polsce (Cohabitation at Local Level in Poland), Warszawa: Wyd. Scholar. Skica, T. (2004) ‘Znaczenie jawności i przejrzystości finansów publicznych dla kształtowania dobrych relacji państwo-​obywatel’, (The Significance of Publicness and Transparency in Public Finance in Building Good State-​ Citizen Relations), Finanse Komunalne, (7-8) 5–​17.

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Does Urban Sprawl Pay Off for the Suburban Municipal Budget in Poland? Julita Łukomska and Jarosław Neneman

Introduction There are many definitions of urban sprawl. In many studies, this term is used to cover not only the concept per se but also its causes and consequences. An interesting overview of definitions is presented in Report on Urban Sprawl in Europe (EEA, 2016) and the conclusion is that all definitions have three dimensions in common: • the expansion of urban areas; • the scattering of settlement areas; • low-​density development. Many authors treat urban sprawl as unplanned (Oueslati et al, 2015) or uncontrolled (Resnik, 2010) growth of cities. In Poland, Lityński (2019) defines urban sprawl as a spontaneous suburbanization. If it were planned and controlled, it would be just suburbanization. Sometimes authors propose a definition just for the purpose of a paper: ‘Here, urban sprawl is defined as a spatial growth of cities that is excessive relative to what is socially desirable’ (Ida and Ono, 2013: 2). According to van den Berg et al’s (1982) demographic life cycle of a city, Poland has moved from phase 3 (relative decentralization –​the pace of growth of the number of inhabitants in a city is lower than in suburbia) to

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phase 4 (absolute decentralization –​a decrease of the number of inhabitants in a city and an increase in suburbia) (Śleszyński, 2018). The Report on Urban Sprawl in Europe (2016) offers a review of the main environmental, economic and social consequences of sprawl with examples of literature too. Most of the economic consequences are strictly related to environmental degradation. Bigger demand for transportation, along with costs both explicit (cars, fuels, roads and so on) and implicit (time) also has a significant environmental footprint (smog, noise, congestion). Some of these costs are borne by beneficiaries, some by local government and some constitute an externality. There are also some positive consequences of urban sprawl; namely, families can live in bigger houses with green surroundings and more space, which translates into more privacy. However, the literature stresses serious negative environmental, economic and social consequences of urban sprawl (Burchell et al, 2002; Wilson and Chakraborty, 2013; Kowalewski et al, 2014; EEA, 2016; OECD, 2018; Śleszyński et al, 2020). The problem is that the benefits are usually private (for residents and, to some extent, municipalities), whereas the costs are public due to externalities. Urban sprawl is a good example of the tragedy of the commons (EEA, 2016) where each new resident’s private marginal benefit is bigger than private marginal cost, as the cost is spread among all residents (and to some extent on non-​residents as well). Ida and Ono (2013) point to this example as one of the three market failures leading to urban sprawl. According to the literature, the negative consequences outweigh the benefits. There is a consensus that this phenomenon should be curbed or at least controlled. However, on the other hand, we can observe that this process is gaining pace in all developed countries, suggesting that private benefits are significant. According to Brueckner (2001), paying additional taxes by new inhabitants does not usually cover the marginal costs of providing new infrastructure (highways, sewage systems, electrical and gas grid, schools, parks and recreational areas), which creates a net individual benefit for the new owner over the net social benefit. To reduce the cost of urban sprawl one can use legal as well as economic instruments (development taxes, congestion tolls and impact fees) (Ida and Ono, 2013). There is always a temptation for policy-​makers to use the law, that is, to set legal barriers to urban sprawl. However, this is difficult as the beneficiaries strongly oppose and seek loopholes which may cause the law to be inefficient. Economic instruments, in turn, are far more effective. But before any attempts to curb or control sprawl are made, one needs to identify key actors and their benefits. First of all, there are ‘settlers’ that move out of the city to suburbia paying just a small share of total costs; then we have landowners (usually farmers) for whom land, that can be converted to housing or industrial plots is a real

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treasure –​they can get far more if they sell their arable land for housing rather than if it is sold to another farmer. The third beneficiary are the developers who, again, do not pay the full cost of the infrastructure development. Last but not least, suburban municipalities seem to benefit out of this process, although it is not clearly confirmed in the literature. The aim of the chapter is to verify the hypothesis that, in Poland, population growth due to urban sprawl is beneficial for budgets of suburban municipalities. The main research question of this chapter is whether, thanks to the influx of large numbers of inhabitants from the central city, the financial situation of the suburban municipalities improves or deteriorates in comparison to other municipalities not experiencing suburbanization processes. We focus on financial aspects of urban sprawl at the level of a municipality that is the net fiscal impact of urban sprawl. This chapter addresses these issues by analyzing the dynamic relationship between urban sprawl and local budget variables using one of the methods based on the quasi-​experimental design: synthetic control method. Our research aims at comparing financial standing of two suburban municipalities and contrasts them with the control group/​municipalities that are similar units where the phenomenon of urban sprawl has not occurred. We do not consider environmental and social consequences, and thus our picture will not be complete. However, it’s very likely that, at least in the short-​run, aspects other than economics do not play that important a role in the decision-​ making process at the municipality level. Contrary to the view expressed by Lityński (2019), we believe that ‘more inhabitants’ is still an attractive strategy of local development. The chapter is organized in five major sections. First is a short review of literature on the relationship between urban sprawl and local budgets. The second section gives a very brief overview of the local government system in Poland, with a special focus on the municipal budgets, which are the subject of our empirical analysis. Then suburbanization processes in Poland are briefly discussed. The third section focuses on the data and methodology of empirical study. In the fourth section, empirical results are presented and discussed. Finally, the last section concludes.

The impact of urban sprawl on municipal finances In the case of natural monopolies, there is a high fixed cost and low marginal cost, therefore when the production increases the average cost falls. Hence, more is always better as more users implies a lower cost. This means that the higher the population density, the more compact the settlement, the lower the cost is due to the economies of scale (Elis-​Williams, 1987; McGuire

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and Sjoquist, 2002; Carruthers and Ulfarsson, 2006; EEA, 2006; Solé-​Ollé and Hortas-​Rico, 2008; Ida and Ono, 2013; Fregolent and Tonin, 2016; Goodman, 2019). Thus, urban sprawl must inevitably imply a higher overall social cost of providing certain goods and services, including public goods. This happens as inhabitants move from the cities, where the average cost is lower due to the economies of scale, to suburbia, where the cost is higher and the growing cost in the former is not compensated by the falling cost in the latter. Śleszyński (2018) showed that in the Polish cities, the average length of water pipeline is 2m for 90 per cent of inhabitants, whereas in suburbia this number goes up to 8.5m. But these considerations apply rather to a static analysis. When the density of population increases in suburbia, there is a chance that they will benefit from the economies of scale and the average cost may fall, even though it remains higher than in the core city. This means that suburbanization might be beneficial for suburbia in this regard, but still, the overall social cost might be higher. Again, the benefit is private –​here it belongs to the community, and the cost is spread over another community –​in this case a core city. The potential gain for the suburban municipality strongly depends on the type of settlement. The case of the Austrian community of Michelhausen is very instructive. Local authorities had an ambitious plan to increase its population by 700 inhabitants, that is, by 25 per cent. Using the infrastructural cost calculator, a strategic planning tool offered by the federal planning authority of lower Austria to their municipalities, five possible alternatives of settlement enlargement with varying housing types were assessed for their municipal financial consequences. The conclusion of this exercise is that ‘there are significant financial repercussions for municipalities based on where and how new inhabitants are settled and the effect on the local public budget over time cannot be underestimated. The empirical exercise confirmed that –​from a financial point of view at least –​preference should be given to inner-​development over settlement enlargement, to compact settlements over detached housing and –​regardless of the form of the planned development –​pre-​financing and negative local public financial balances must be expected in the short term. Only in the long term does efficient planning for growth pay off financially for a municipality’ (Humer et al, 2019: 34). Other researchers confirmed that more compact settlement implies lower costs (Ida and Ono, 2013; Fregolenta and Tonin, 2016). Polish literature also stresses the high cost of chaotic, scattered development (Kowalewski et al, 2014; Śleszyński, 2018; Lityński, 2019). They underline the need for planning.1 Lityński (2019) clearly underlines that suburbanization adversely affects financial standing of suburban municipalities. The deterioration is

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bigger when the settlement is more scattered. On the revenues side of the suburban municipality budget, there is a strong increase in tax revenues, but this is mitigated by smaller equalization grants as the community gets wealthier. This implies lower dynamics of the revenues. On the other hand, there is a strong demand for infrastructure development due to the infrastructure gap. The community must invest a lot, and the additional costs are not covered by additional revenues. As a result, the indebtedness of a suburban community goes up and its financial condition deteriorates. Lityński (2019) also points at crowding out of some municipality’s expenditure items (say social protection) by infrastructure investment spending. We do not consider changing the structure of expenditures as a negative consequence. With the growing number of inhabitants, the structure of inhabitants changes –​new inhabitants are usually richer, younger and healthier, which implies lower demand for social protection and health care. Yet, with growing total revenues and expenditures, the overall outlays for social protection and health usually rise, even though they are lower per capita. In the literature, in the context of the impact of urban sprawl on local public finances, attention is most often drawn to the fact that spatially expansive and low-​density growth increases the provision costs of basic local public services (Carruthers and Ulfarsson, 2002; 2006; Hortas-​Rico, 2014; Gielen et al, 2019). In his research, Ladd (1994) has reached a slightly different conclusion: higher density produces higher costs for public services. There is a nonlinear relationship in which, at first, at very low densities, the costs decrease as density increases, and then, as it approaches higher densities, the costs rise again. Hortas-​Rico (2014) estimates a panel vector autoregressive model using data for 4,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 1994–​2005 to analyse the dynamic relationship between urban sprawl and local budget variables. The results of this research show that the sprawl of cities produces both a current and a capital surplus leading to a short-​run overall surplus for local governments. Hortas-​Rico (2014) claims that sprawl leads to a short-​term current surplus, as the increase in current revenues offsets the increase in current expenditures due to public service provision for new developments. Additionally, urban sprawl is associated with large investment requirements as roads and basic infrastructures are extended for the new residents located in suburban areas. This can lead to a situation where municipal budgets face financial difficulties as they strive to satisfy their residents’ demands. Taking into account the previously discussed theoretical considerations and in order to answer our main research question we formulate three hypotheses:

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H1.  Population growth of local jurisdictions (due to urban sprawl) implies lower administrative costs per capita (economies of scale hypothesis). H2.  The influx of inhabitants (and more specifically the income that goes into local budgets) results in a better financial situation of suburban municipalities (urban sprawl pays off hypothesis). H3.  As a result of pressure exerted by new residents on local authorities, and higher municipality revenues, per capita expenditure on investments in suburban municipalities is higher (infrastructure gap hypothesis).

Institutional context –​suburbanization and local finance in Poland In Poland, there are three tiers of sub-​national governments: almost 2,500 municipalities, 314 counties plus 66 cities with a county status (that is performing both tasks allocated to municipal and county level of governments) and 16 regions. There is no hierarchical relationship between the three sub-​national levels. The municipal level is by far the strongest tier of sub-​national governments in Poland. That relative strength is visible in functional and financial dimensions. Municipalities (including cities with a county status) spend about three quarters of all sub-​national budgets and are responsible for a broad set of functions including pre-​school and primary school education, local culture and social protection, local public transport, waste management, water and sewage systems and local roads maintenance. Municipalities –​in contrast to counties and regions –​also have limited power of taxation, collecting over 20 per cent of their budget from locally controlled taxes (remaining parts of the budget come from the shares in revenues from national taxes –​personal income tax (PIT) and corporate income tax (CIT), general purpose as well as earmarked grants). In the current financing system of local governments in Poland, a significant part of revenues is linked to inhabitants’ income and the size of their properties –​see Figure 14.1. This creates an obvious incentive for suburban municipalities to pull inhabitants. The Polish system is not unique. In many countries, at the municipal level, money follows people, work and capital. The municipality’s share in PIT is slightly less than 40 per cent of total PIT revenues and in CIT it’s 6.7 per cent. The property tax is placed on land, structures and buildings, but only structures are taxed ad valorem, building and land is taxed per square meter. The maximum rates per square metre are set in the law and they are indexed with consumer price index (CPI). Local authorities can lower these rates (in 2019, 93 per cent of municipalities did this). The tax rate on buildings devoted to economic activity (say, a shop) is 30 times higher than for apartments. Farmers do not pay income tax –​they

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Does Urban Sprawl Pay Off ?

Figure 14.1: Revenue structure of Polish municipalities (2018) (excluding 500+)* 100%

Property tax

90% 80%

Tax sharing

70% 60%

Other own revenues

50% General grant

40% 30%

Current earmarked grants (excluding 500+)

20% 10%

Investment earmarked grants

0% Cities with county status

Suburban municipalities

Other municipalities

Note: *Programme 500+ is the payment for children (500 PLN (around ₤100) per month). The central government pays this, and local authorities play only the role of a cash desk. Source: own calculations based on municipal budget reports.

Table 14.1: Property tax rates in PLN (2019) Rate per m2 Ratio to agriculture tax Agriculture tax, arable land (best soil)

0.02

1.0

Agriculture tax, other land

0.04

2.0

Land tax, economic activity

0.93

49.0

Land tax, other

0.49

25.8

Tax on buildings, economic activity

23.47

1,237.5

Tax on buildings, trade in cereal seeds

10.98

579.0

Tax on buildings, healthcare

4.78

252.0

Tax on buildings, other

7.90

416.6

Tax on buildings, housing

0.79

41.7

Source: own calculations based on data from Polish Ministry of Finance.

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Figure 14.2: Current expenditures structure of municipal budgets in Poland (2018) 100%

Education Social assistance and health Administration

80%

60% Communal services 40%

Culture and sport Transportation

20%

Housing 0% Cities with county status

Suburban municipalities

Other municipalities

Other

Source: own calculations based on municipal budget reports.

pay a tax based on the size of arable land, quality of the soil and the price of rye. The tax burden is very low and if their soil is poor, there is no tax at all. Table 14.1 shows the benefits of land conversion for the municipal budget. The non-​taxation of farmers with an income tax and relatively high share of a municipality in PIT gives a strong incentive for a local government to convert arable land to housing plots and to replace farmers with PIT payers. On the expenditure side, expenses on education are the most important single item (see Figure 14.2). In theory, they should be financed with education grants, but in real life, municipalities co-​finance them with their own money. At first glance –​more inhabitants and more pupils mean more burden on the municipal budget. Due to demographic trends, the number of pupils constantly decreases, and that puts local authorities under pressure to close schools, which is very unpopular. Additional pupils due to urban sprawl might be a real blessing if these pupils do not require investments in new schools. New inhabitants are usually wealthy and not old –​the expenditures on social protection and health fall in relative terms (per capita). In the case of expenditures on administration, we can also observe a relative decrease of expenditures. No doubt, infrastructure expenditure grows at a faster rate, but a community responsibility is limited to water and sewage, roads and public transportation and waste collection. In the latter case, inhabitants are deemed to cover all costs. Public transportation in many municipalities does not exist at all since low density makes it completely not efficient. Moreover, almost all families have a car (or more than one) –​there is no big demand

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Does Urban Sprawl Pay Off ?

Table 14.2: Population and its changes and movements in the biggest Polish agglomerations (core cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants, excluding the Silesian and tri-​city conurbations) Population 2002

Population change 2002–​17

Number of people that moved from the city centre to the suburbs** (sum from 2002–​17)

Warsaw

1,688,194

+ 76,421

+ 134,256

Łodz

785,134

-​ 94,712

+ 39,421

Krakow

757,547

+ 9,801

+ 52,007

Wroclaw

639,150

-​ 564

+ 47,076

Poznan

577,117

-​ 38,484

+ 84,076

Szczecin

415,117

-​ 11,234

+ 27,221

Bydgoszcz 372,104

-​ 19,791

+ 31,928

Lublin

358,354

-​ 18,504

+ 25,653

Bialystok* 291,660

+ 5,628

+ 21,791

Kielce

211,810

-​ 15,006

+ 15,370

Torun

210,702

-​ 8,140

+ 20,050

Note: * data according to official statistics, without correction for enlargement of the city area that took place in 2006. ** In Poland, there are different delimitations of metropolitan areas. In the chapter, we use the delimitation developed by Śleszyński, 2013. Source: own calculations based on Central Statistical Office data.

for public transport services. Investments in road and water and sewage infrastructure is very often co-​financed with EU money, thus the burden on suburban municipalities’ budgets is reduced. In the case of a core city losing inhabitants, its financial standing must deteriorate –​revenues decline, but some costs are stable, so there is an increase in relative terms (per capita). This is also the case of the infrastructure costs, where fixed cost dominates. In water provision and sewage collection and treatment, fixed cost constitutes about 80 per cent of the total cost (Łukomska and Neneman, 2019). The largest Polish cities (see Table 14.2) have moved to the 4th phase of the demographic life cycle of a city (Śleszyński, 2018). Only Warsaw and Krakow are still in phase 3, which is when the number of inhabitants grows. An interesting case in which the decrease in the population of the central city in the analysed period is basically equal to the increase in the suburbs is Kielce (the capital city of the Świętokrzyskie region). In further analysis, we will look more closely at examples of the Poznan and Kielce

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agglomerations. We can see that in these areas, suburbanization processes are a significant/​prevailing phenomenon.

Data and method This chapter is focused on the effects of suburbanization processes that are visible in municipal budgets. The synthetic control method2 is used to investigate the relationship between the inflow of people to the suburban municipalities as a result of suburbanization processes and their financial situation of the local budget. In the empirical analysis, financial data from the reports on the execution of municipalities’ budgets for the years 2004–​18, provided by the Polish Ministry of Finance are used. To identify a group of suburban municipalities, we use the delimitation developed by Śleszyński (2013). Our research focuses on a detailed analysis of two suburban municipalities called treated units. When selecting these municipalities, we used demographic data on the population and on population flows between the central city and suburban municipalities. We decided to analyse one example from the Poznan agglomeration and one from the Kielce agglomeration. In both of these areas, we are dealing with distinct suburbanization processes, although they differ in their potential: Poznan is more than twice as large as Kielce. The synthetic control procedure requires the year of the most intensive change to be indicated. In our case, this is the year in which the largest population movement from the central city to the suburbs in the entire period 2004–20​18 is observed. In the case of both agglomerations, it was 2007 (change year). For a detailed analysis, we selected two municipalities that experienced the most intensive suburbanization processes in the demographic dimension (in which the largest population came from the central city), including the year of change, that is in 2007: Dopiewo (suburban municipality of Poznan) and Morawica (suburban municipality of Kielce). Our comparative analysis is an example of an analysis of different context and similar outcomes. We expected similar results of the analysis, despite the fact that the context of both cases is slightly different (agglomerations differ in size). In some respects, however, the cases are similar. For example, they are characterized by a similar type of suburbanization, so we expected that the results should be similar for both case studies. In our experiment, we looked at the financial situation of the local budget from the point of view of three dependent variables: per capita spending on local administration, per capita net operating surplus of the budget (the

258

Does Urban Sprawl Pay Off ?

difference between current revenues and expenditures, less the repayment of debt) and per capita investment expenditures of the local budget. Individual dependent variables constituted the operationalization of subsequent research hypotheses: H1 –​per capita spending on local administration, H2 –​the most popular measure of financial situation of local governments’ budgets, which is net operating surplus (Hansen et al, 2014; Swianiewicz and Łukomska, 2019), H3 –​per capita investment expenditures of the local budget. The essence of the synthetic control method is finding the ‘control group’ (or the ’control unit’) for each case of the treated unit. For each treated municipality, the method creates one synthetic control unit, an abstract construct that is selected as the weighted average of all the potential comparison units that best resemble the characteristics of the treated unit before the change year. The criteria of similarity include the ‘before the change year’ trend of our dependent variables as well as the population size, population density, the wealth of the local community (local budget own revenues per capita) and location in the same (NUTS-​2) region (excluding suburban municipalities). The comparison of the trends of dependent variables in the municipalities that experienced suburbanization processes and in the ‘control units’ of the most similar cases (not faced suburbanization processes) is a part of the procedure. The estimated effect is then the difference between the treated unit and its synthetic control unit for the post-​treatment period. In most cases, the synthetic control procedure selected the control group quite well (the results regarding the obtained root mean square prediction error (RMSPE) and the summary of values for the selected indicators for treated and control municipalities are included in the appendix).

Results Dopiewo is a rural municipality located 23 km west of Poznan on the A2 motorway (Warsaw-​Berlin). The municipality has a very affluent budget (throughout the period 2004–​18 it was in the highest decile group of affluence among rural municipalities in Poland). In political terms, the municipality is not the stablest, as in the period covered by the study there were three changes of the mayor. Basic local services (water and sewage, maintenance of local roads and greenery) are provided by a municipal company established in 2004, which means that throughout the period of the analysis there were no significant institutional changes that could affect an increase or decrease in the expenditure of the local budget.

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Figure 14.3: Population change in Dopiewo (2004–​2018) 32,000

220 200

27,000

180

22,000

160 140

17,000

120

12,000

100 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 population (see left of figure)

population change (2004=100) (see right of figure)

Source: own calculations based on Central Statistical Office data.

Figure 14.4: Per capita spending on administration in Dopiewo (treated unit) and synthetic control unit (2004–​2018, in PLN, constant prices)

Current expenditures on administration (PLN)

700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 treated unit

synthetic control unit

Source: own calculations based on municipal budget reports.

Between 2004 and 2018 the population of Dopiewo increased by as much as 112 per cent (Figure 14.3). About 65 per cent of this population growth is due to the move of residents from Poznan (the central city). During the intensive population growth caused by urban sprawl, the per capita spending on administration in Dopiewo increased more slowly than in similar municipalities located outside the metropolitan area. This difference has grown significantly in recent years (Figure 14.4). As far as the operating surplus is concerned, the results are much less conclusive. In the analysed period, the trend of this indicator resembles a sinusoid, increasing and decreasing. In the initial years in Dopiewo, the surplus is higher or equal to that of similar municipalities, but in the next few years, it is clearly lower (Figure 14.5).

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Does Urban Sprawl Pay Off ?

Figure 14.5: Per capita net operating surplus in Dopiewo (treated unit) and synthetic control unit (2004–​2018, in PLN, constant prices)

Net operating surplus (PLN)

1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 treated unit

synthetic control unit

Source: own calculations based on municipal budget reports.

Figure 14.6: Per capita investment expenditures in Dopiewo (treated unit) and synthetic control unit (2004–20​18, in PLN, constant prices) Investment expenditures (PLN)

2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 treated unit

synthetic control unit

Source: own calculations based on of municipal budget reports.

The feature of investment expenditures is their instability over time, and this can be seen clearly both in the case of Dopiewo and the synthetic control unit. However, in the whole analysed period, investment spending per capita of Dopiewo budget significantly exceeds the value of this indicator in similar municipalities.3 Compared to the earlier-​analysed variables, the difference between the treated unit and the control unit in this case is clearly the greatest (Figure 14.6). Morawica is a rural-​urban municipality (but until 2016 it was officially a rural municipality) located 15 km south of Kielce (the capital city of the

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Figure 14.7: Population change in Morawica (2004–​2018) 17,000

130

16,000

125 120

15,000

115 14,000

110

13,000

105 100

12,000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 population (see left of figure)

population change (2004=100) (see right of figure)

Source: own calculations based on Central Statistical Office data.

Current expenditures on administration (PLN)

Figure 14.8: Per capita spending on administration in Morawica (treated unit) and synthetic control unit (2004–20​18, in PLN, constant prices) 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 treated unit

synthetic control unit

Source: own calculations based on municipal budget reports.

Świętokrzyskie region in central Poland). The municipality has quite an affluent budget (8th decile group of affluence among rural municipalities in Poland). The municipality is politically stable as since 2002 the same mayor has been in charge. In 2012, a budgetary enterprise (zakład budżetowy) dealing with water supply and sewage services was transformed into a municipal company. This change did not have a significant impact on municipal expenditure. Between 2004 and 2018 the population of Morawica increased by as much as 26 per cent (Figure 14.7). About 90 per cent of this population growth is due to the move of residents from Kielce (the central city). The results of the empirical analysis for Morawica are very similar to those obtained in the case of Dopiewo. Lower increase in administrative unit costs

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Does Urban Sprawl Pay Off ?

Figure 14.9: Per capita net operating surplus in Morawica (treated unit) and synthetic control unit (2004–20​18, in PLN, constant prices) 1000

Net operating surplus (PLN)

900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 treated unit

synthetic control unit

Source: own calculations based on municipal budget reports.

Figure 14.10: Per capita investment expenditures in Morawica (treated unit) and synthetic control unit (2004–​2018, in PLN, constant prices)

Investment expenditures (PLN)

3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 treated unit

synthetic control unit

Source: own calculations based on municipal budget reports.

in Morawica compared to similar municipalities is visible (Figure 14.8). In the short term, the net operating surplus in Morawica is higher than in similar municipalities in the region, but after about five years the situation is reversed (Figure 14.9). Morawica allocates much more to investments than similar municipalities, and these expenses are clearly less stable compared to the synthetic control unit (Figure 14.10).

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Conclusions ‘To increase the number of inhabitants is a commonly stated top objective in municipal strategies across European countries’ (Humer et al, 2019). Poland is not an exception to this pattern. In the survey, mayors of suburbia stressed that their strategies years ago were aimed at getting new inhabitants, but now they also consider the consequences of urban sprawl (Gubański, 2020). Despite this, new inhabitants are still welcome in all municipalities. These inhabitants usually come from the city and therefore their expectations and demand regarding infrastructure and public goods are high, which puts local authorities under pressure –​they must invest a lot. This certainly leads to the budgetary dilemmas that Bartkowski writes about in the previous chapter, such as maintaining a balance between limited resources and excessive demand for investments, while at the same time having to obtain support from citizens. Our findings seem to confirm the common opinion that more inhabitants means better financial standing of a municipality. Current expenditures are spread over a bigger number of inhabitants and therefore the average cost, ceteris paribus, may fall. In Poland, due to the high growth rate and inflation, there was an increase in the value of administrative spending per capita in all municipalities. However, this increase was considerably lower in the treatment municipalities, than in the control groups (Figures 14.4 and 14.8). The picture of the net operating surplus is ambiguous. At the beginning, more inhabitants means more taxpayers which implies higher tax revenues, lower per capita cost of debt servicing and generally better financial situation. This, however, means that the borrowing and investing capability is higher –​this, in turn, increases the current expenditures and reduces the surplus (Figures 14.5 and 14.9). Investment outlays are definitely higher in the control municipalities –​ there is a bigger demand for public goods provided by the local government and bigger resources to finance them (Figures 14.6 and 14.10). Taking into account EU financing does not change the picture –​still the treatment group invests more than the control group. The urban sprawl from the perspective of the financial situation of municipalities (to which new inhabitants are flowing in) is a favourable phenomenon at least in the short and medium term. Indubitably, it is associated with a number of adverse effects (mainly environmental), but the balance is positive from the point of view of the narrowly understood financial interest of the municipality. Therefore, the final cost-​benefit analysis should be considered more broadly, taking into account that most of the benefits from urban sprawl remain on the individual private level (a garden, a big house), whereas most of the costs are covered by public actors (above all local governments but also central government due

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to externalities). This brings about the question on the democratic justice of urban sprawl reflected in local finances, to which Bartkowski referred in the previous chapter. Although limited to only two case studies, the main conclusion validates some of the previous studies and gives them a new perspective on territorial and financing processes. The hypotheses that we put forward result from the literature, and two tested case studies confirm what we find in the literature. On the example of these two cases, we can positively verify all three of our hypotheses. Definitely, from the local perspective, both treatment municipalities seem to be better off due to the inflow of inhabitants. Further research may include more treatment municipalities and take into account more variables. It would be also interesting to compare the financial consequences of chaotic settlement versus a planned one. Appendix Quality assessment of the control group selection (RMSPE, the comparison of the characteristics of ‘treated’ municipalities and the ‘synthetic control’ units) DOPIEWO

MORAWICA

Treated

Control Treated

Control

14,351

7,652

13,483

13,494

1,403

358

830

828

Density (2006)

133

53

96

96

Spending on administration pc (2004)

186

185

161

160

Spending on administration pc (2005)

167

169

177

175

Spending on administration pc (2006)

195

194

185

183

RMSPE

1.341

Per capita spending on Population (2006) administration Own revenues pc (2006)

265

0.000

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE

DOPIEWO Treated

Control Treated

Control

14,351

9,115

13,483

9,635

1,403

1,717

830

823

Density (2006)

133

97

96

93

Net operating surplus pc (2004)

482

482

338

337

Net operating surplus pc (2005)

636

636

419

420

Net operating surplus pc (2006)

692

692

404

404

RMSPE

0.000

Per capita net operating Population (2006) surplus Own revenues pc (2006)

Per capita investment expenditures

MORAWICA

0.000

Treated

Control Treated

Control

Population (2006)

14,351

6,358

13,483

8,145

Own revenues pc (2006)

1,403

951

830

459

Density (2006)

133

74

96

98

Investment expenditures pc (2004)

317

388

458

460

Investment expenditures pc (2005)

992

912

765

764

Investment expenditures pc (2006)

638

628

696

697

RMSPE

61.968

0.000

Notes 1

2

In Poland, local governments should prepare and obey strategic spatial plans. But from the perspective of a community and a prospective investor, it is better that the plan does not exist at all. In the absence of the plan, an investor can settle virtually where he or she wants. Therefore, communities perceive this plan as an obstacle to the development and they have no incentives to do the planning. The other obstacle is the need to get approval from the Ministry of Agriculture to convert arable land into housing plots. The municipality’s best strategy for pulling new inhabitants was no strategic spatial plan and conversion of arable land into housing plots. Efficiency of the settlement was, and in many cases still is, ignored. Synthetic control is one of the group of methods based on a quasi-​experimental design aimed at explaining cause-​effect relationships, being a modification of the

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Does Urban Sprawl Pay Off ?

3

Difference-​in-​Differences method, unlike the latter one, Synthetic control is most often used in the analysis of individual case studies. More about this method can be found from the work of Abadi’s team (see for example Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie, 2005; Abadie et al, 2010). We also have tested investments financed from own revenues (excluding external subsidies). The picture obta‑ined was almost identical.

References Abadie, A. (2005) ‘Semiparametric Difference-​in-​Differences Estimators’, Review of Economic Studies, 72(1): 1–​19. Abadie, A. and Gardeazabal, J. (2003) ‘The Economic Cost of Conflict: A Case-​Study for the Basque Country’, American Economic Review, 93(1): 113–​132. Abadie, A., Diamond, A. and Hainmueller, J. (2010) ‘Synthetic Control Methods for Comparative Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California’s Tobacco Control Program’, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 105(490): 493–​505. Brueckner, J. (2001) ‘Urban Sprawl: Lessons from Urban Economics’, in W.G. Gale and J.R. Pack (eds) Brookings-​Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, pp 65–​89. Burchell, R., Lowenstein, G., Dolphin, W., Galley, C., Downs, A., Seskin, S., Gray Still, K. and Moore, T. (2002) Cost of Sprawl –​2000, TCRP Report 74, Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Car ruthers, J.I. and Ulfarsson, G.F. (2002) ‘Fragmentation and Sprawl: Evidence from Interregional Analysis’, Growth and Change 33(3): 312–​340. Carruthers, J.I. and Ulfarsson, G.F. (2006) Does Smart Growth Matter to Public Finance? Evidence from the United States, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, PD&R Working paper # REP 06–​02. EEA (2016) Urban Sprawl in Europe, Joint EEA-​F OEN Report 11, Brussels: European Commission. Elis-​Williams, D.G. (1987) ‘The Effect of Spatial Population Distribution on the Cost of Delivering Local Services’, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, 150(2): 152–​166. Fregolent, L. and Tonin, S. (2016) ‘Local Public Spending and Urban Sprawl: Analysis of this Relationship in the Veneto Region of Italy’, Journal of Urban Planning and Development, 142(3): 1–​11. Gielen, E., Riutort-​Mayol, G., Miralles Garcia, J.L. and Palencia Jiménez, J.S. (2019) ‘Cost Assessment of Urban Sprawl on Municipal Services Using Hierarchical Regression’, Environment and Planning B: Urban Analytics and City Science, doi:10.1177/​2399808319869345.

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Goodman, B. (2019) ‘The Fiscal Impact of Urban Sprawl: Evidence from U.S. County Areas’, Public Budgeting and Finance, 39(4): 3–​27. Gubański, K. (2020) Społeczna percepcja zjawiska suburbanizacji. Wnioski z badań jakościowych w obszarach funkcjonalnych Poznania, Lublina oraz Bełchatowa, in: B. Gawrońska-​Nowak (ed) Analiza zysków i strat sub/​ dezurbanizacji w świetle badan społecznych, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Instytutu Rozwoju Miast i Regionów. Hansen, S.W., Houlberg, K. and Pedersen, L.H. (2014) ‘Do Municipal Mergers Improve Fiscal Outcomes?,’ Scandinavian Political Studies, 37(2): 196–​214. Hortas-​Rico, M. (2014) ‘Urban Sprawl and Municipal Budgets in Spain: A Dynamic Panel Data Analysis’, Papers in Regional Science, 93(4): 843–​864. Humer A., Sedlitzky, R. and Brunner, D. (2019) ‘When Does Population Growth Pay Off? A Case Study of Suburban Land Consumption to Assess the Lower Austrian Infrastructural Cost Calculator’, Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 34(1): 331–​344. Ida, T. and Ono, H. (2013) ‘Urban Sprawl and Local Governmental Cost in Japan’, The 6th Australasian Public Choice Conference, [online] Available from: https://e​ conomics.smu.edu.sg/s​ ites/d​ efault/fi ​ les/e​ conomics/E ​ vents/​ APCC2013/​Papers/​6Dec/​4_​tomoyaida.pdf [Accessed 22 March 2021]. Kowalewski, A., Mordasewicz, J., Regulski, J., Stępień, J. and Śleszyński, P. (2014) Ekonomiczne straty i społeczne koszty niekontrolowanej urbanizacji w Polsce, Warszawa: Fundacja Rozwoju Demokracji Lokalnej. Lityński, P. (2019) Budżetowe konsekwencje żywiołowego rozprzestrzeniania się miast dla samorządów gminnych, Kraków: Wydawnictwo UE. Łukomska, J. and Neneman, J. (2019) ‘Fiskalne konsekwencje rozlewania miast –​przypadek Miejskiego Obszaru Funkcjonalnego –​Lublin’, in J. Szołno-​Koguc and J. Śmiechowicz (eds) Dochody podatkowe samorządu terytorialnego i czynniki je kształtujące, Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS, pp 67–​83. McGuire, T.J. and Sjoquist, D.L. (2002) ‘Urban Sprawl and the Finances of State and Local Governments’, in D.L. Sjoquist (ed) State and Local Finances under Pressure, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp 299–​326. OECD (2018) Rethinking Urban Sprawl: Moving Towards Sustainable Cities, Paris: OECD Publishing. Oueslati, W., Alvanides, S. and Garrod, G. (2015) ‘Determinants of Urban Sprawl in European Cities’, Urban Studies, 52(9): 1594–​1614. Resnik, D.B. (2010) ‘Urban Sprawl, Smart Growth, and Deliberative Democracy’, American Journal of Public Health, 100(10): 1852–​1856. Solé-​Ollé, A. and Hortas-​Rico, M. (2008) ‘Does Urban Sprawl Increase the Cost of Providing Local Public Services? Evidence from Spanish Municipalities’, Urban Studies 47(7): 1513–​1540.

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Śleszyński, P. (2013) ‘Delimitacja miejskich obszarów funkcjonalnych stolic województw’, Przegląd Geograficzny, 85(2): 173–​197. Śleszyński, P. (2018) ‘Społeczno-​ekonomiczne skutki chaosu przestrzennego dla osadnictwa i struktury funkcjonalnej terenów’, Studia. KPZK PAN, 182(2): 29–​80. Śleszyński, P., Kowalewski, A., Markowski, T., Legutko-​Kobus, P. and Nowak, M. (2020) ‘The Contemporary Economic Costs of Spatial Chaos: Evidence from Poland’, Land, 9(7): 214, https://​doi.org/​10.3390/​ land9070214. Swianiewicz, P. and Łukomska, J. (2019) ‘Is Small Beautiful? The Quasi-​ Experimental Analysis of the Impact of Territorial Fragmentation on Costs in Polish Local Governments’, Urban Affairs Review, 55(3): 832–​855. van den Berg, L., Drewett, R., Klaassen, L.H., Rossi, A. and Vijverberg, C.H.T. (eds) (1982) Urban Europe: Study of Growth and Decline, Oxford: Pergamon Press. Wilson, B. and Chakraborty, A. (2013) ‘The Environmental Impacts of Sprawl: Emergent Themes from the Past Decade of Planning Research’, Sustainability, 5(8): 3302–​3327.

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15

Why Tourists Should Pay Local Taxes Marta Derek

Introduction Tourism is one of the world’s largest industries. It is responsible for 10 per cent of global GDP, and 1 in 10 jobs (WTTC, 2020). Although research that begin the late 1970s, notably the seminal work of Mathieson and Wall (1982), has highlighted its negative influence, especially in socio-​cultural and environmental domains, it has clear economic benefits for many destinations. Even in the era of ‘overtourism’ (Goodwin, 2017), when some cities and resorts face the challenge of managing too many tourists, other destinations are fighting for more visitors, and tourism is still seen as a very important factor in local development. Its role has become especially apparent during the COVID-​19 crisis, as it is clear that a lack of tourists is a significant economic problem in many places around the world. Although there is no doubt that tourism influences the local economy, little is known about the relationship with direct local taxation. In general, tourism taxation is discussed from the point of view of competitiveness, or demand for travel, that is, the business perspective, rather than a municipal perspective (Sheng and Tsui, 2009; OECD, 2014; Heffer-​Flaata, Voltes-​Dorta and Suau-S​ anchez, 2020). However, the unprecedented development of tourism worldwide has increased pressure on not only services and facilities, which are often maintained by local governments, but also infrastructure that ensures visitor safety and security, or protects the natural environment. Of course, tourists pay to stay in hotels and eat in restaurants, and so forth, but should they also pay direct taxes to the local municipality? In many places they already do. In this chapter, I argue that tourist taxes are not only necessary

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but also fair. I draw upon a number of practical examples, and illustrate my argument using the Polish variant of a tourist tax.

Why should tourists pay local taxes? The answer to this question is closely related to the issue of why local taxes are important. The main argument is that local taxes are necessary when markets are inefficient. The latter particularly applies in the following situations: to the supply of public and social goods; where there is a natural monopoly; and where there are externalities (Swianiewicz, 2004, 2011). These issues are widely debated in the economic literature, and will not be discussed further in this chapter. I will, however, focus on the relation with tourism. Two issues are particularly relevant: externalities and public goods. Externalities are the positive and negative effects arising from economic transactions. Positive effects have indirect benefits for individuals, and negative effects lead to indirect costs. Both situations are widely found in the tourism sector. Fisher (2016) notes that externalities, such as police and fire services, transportation or sanitation services have benefits for (among others) people who are not resident in the communities that provide these services. In many places around the world, tourists are a very important group of non-​residents. They enjoy many of the benefits provided by local government: public transport, police protection, public toilets, infrastructure in green areas, and so forth, without contributing to the cost through local taxes. Negative externalities are also very important. Areas visited by tourists can face a wide variety of problems, which can be seen as external costs. Tourists are responsible for increased waste production, higher traffic congestion, pollution, and so forth. A very important element in these costs relates to additional pressure on the environment. Although it is often quoted as an example of external costs in general, it is particularly relevant in the context of tourism. The literature (Hall and Page, 2006) cites multiple examples of degradation to the natural environment caused by tourism (loss of sand dunes, wetlands and beaches; damage to coral reef and marine resources; waste-​water discharge and sewage pollution, among others). Many cities that are affected by an excessive influx of tourists (a phenomenon that has been called ‘overtourism’; see Goodwin, 2017) experience crowded streets, queues to use local shops, higher prices in restaurants, and so forth. All of the latter are examples of external costs that are paid by local authorities. It is unfair to expect local inhabitants to bear the burden of these costs, and exclude tourists. In this context, some see charging a tourist tax as a way ‘to try to combat the effects of overtourism’ (Adams, 2019); although reasonable, this perspective is a considerable oversimplification.

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Another example of market failure, which is relevant to the tourism phenomenon, is public goods. In economics, the term is used to refer to goods or services that are non-​rival (an additional person can consume these goods without reducing any other consumer’s benefit), and non-​excludable (it is not possible to exclude consumers who do not pay from consuming the goods or services) (Fisher, 2016). One of the most frequently cited examples is street lighting, which is clearly applicable to the context of tourism: local government cannot exclude tourists from using street lighting, even if tourists do not pay to consume it. Rigall-​I-​Torrent (2008) suggests that we should understand public goods, in the tourism context, in a very broad sense. Specifically, the concept should extend beyond public services and infrastructures (roads, public safety, and the cleanliness of public places), and the preservation of the environment and landscapes, and also encompass the area’s cultural legacy (monuments, gastronomy, traditions, etc.), and its brand image (reputation, prestige). 1 Gooroochurn and Sinclair (2005) distinguish public goods (for example, roads and security) from unpriced amenities such as wildlife and historic buildings. In both cases, however, public goods are an important element in the tourism product that is provided by local authorities. Moreover, the influx of tourists can incur extra costs related to the provision and maintenance of amenities. Like other non-​residents, tourists do not contribute. Taxation could help to redress the balance: tourists, who are responsible for the increased costs of providing certain goods, contribute to paying for them (Swianiewicz, 1994; Gooroochurn and Sinclair, 2005). As Fisher (2016) points out, if a commodity is both non-​r ival and non-​excludable, then individual consumers have no incentive to reveal their demand for that good. Instead, they benefit from goods purchased by others, acting as so-​called free riders. This situation also supports the phenomenon of fiscal illusion, described by Bartkowski in this volume. Both of the situations noted are similar to the large, urban agglomerations that are described by Swianiewicz (2004, 2011). However, an additional factor is the high number of users of the different services provided by a local government. In the case of large urban areas this argument supports the idea of metropolitan governance (Lackowska, 2009); in our case, it may be an argument for tourism taxation. Imposing taxes on producers and requiring payment is often used as a way to internalize externalities, and include the real users of public goods; it is therefore only logical that tourists should also pay local taxes. In practice, tourist taxes have already been introduced in many places around the world, although solutions differ in their details.

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Tourist taxes in European cities The World Tourism Organisation has identified 45 taxes that are applied around the world (WTO, 1998, in Gooroochurn and Sinclair, 2005), in different sectors. Only 15 are levied on tourism businesses, while the remaining 30 are directly payable by tourists. The latter apply to, among other examples, obtaining a visa or travel permit, a tax on air travel, trekking fees, turnover tax, value-​added tax, a carbon tax, a casino tax and so forth. In the countries of the European Union, seven main taxes can be identified that have a direct impact on the tourism sector. The list includes corporate income tax, personal income tax, real estate taxes, value-​added tax, an occupancy tax, air passenger duty/​departure taxes, and other tourism-​specific taxes and levies. Most, however, are general taxes that impact the tourism sector in the same way as other sectors of the economy. Moreover, most are not local taxes and, therefore, are not analysed in this chapter. A very common tax, which is primarily focused on the tourism sector, is the accommodation tax. It is levied on accommodation facilities, and is typically charged per person per night or, sometimes, as a percentage of the room rate. A 2017 report on tourism taxation in Europe revealed that in 18 out of the then-​28 countries of the European Union, it was levied in 18 member states (PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2017). This tax is particularly relevant because it is local: in all of these countries (apart from Malta) it is levied at local government level, and municipalities have significant discretion over the rates that are applied (PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2017). According to an OECD report (OECD, 2014), based on the 30 OECD and partner countries, there are only five countries where taxes that are specific to hotels and accommodation facilities are administered at the national level. In all other cases, accommodation tax is paid primarily at the municipal (sometimes sub-​national) level. For example, in Barcelona there is an autonomous regional tax, 50 per cent of which is managed by the city, and 50 per cent by the region (Catalonia).2 Another example is Paris, where accommodation tax is a municipal tax, with an additional 25 per cent going to the département (10 per cent), and the region (15 per cent).3 In all but two major European destinations, overnight visitors pay an accommodation tax (Table 15.1). In the great majority of cases, the rate is variable and depends on the quality or price of the accommodation (which are usually correlated). In most cases, the higher the standard of accommodation, the higher the rate for one night. The cheapest rates are applied to open-​air facilities, for example, campsites. The highest rate is applied to a 5-​star hotel in Rome, where tourists are asked to pay €7, per person, per night for a maximum of 10 days.

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Venice is the only place where another criterion is taken into account in setting a rate: the facility’s location within the urban area. There are three zones: the highest rate applies to a hotel or other accommodation facility in the city centre. A 20 per cent reduction is applied to places in the Lido and Isole, and a 30 per cent discount is applied to facilities in Terraferma (the mainland of Venice). Moreover, the tax is slightly lower in January than in the other 11 months of the year, which introduces the notion of seasonality into its structure. Among the different ways of taxing tourists who use accommodation facilities is to charge a percentage of the room rate. In this case, the tax is called an occupation tax. The percentage varies from 3.2 per cent (Vienna), to 10 per cent for short-​stay accommodation (for example, apartments rented on Airbnb) in Amsterdam. In the latter case, a supplement was added to the existing 7 per cent tourist tax at the beginning of 2020: €3 per person per night in hotels (€1 in campsites). This seems to be a consequence of overtourism in the Dutch capital, as Amsterdam is one of the most iconic examples of the phenomenon in Europe. A similar solution will be applied in Istanbul. A tax was expected to be introduced in April 2020 but, due to the COVID-​19 crisis, its implementation has been postponed to the beginning of 2021.4 Prague is the only example where a flat rate is applied to all tourists who visit the city. Whether they stay in a five-​star hotel, or at a campsite, all tourists pay around 80 centimes (21 Kč) per night. While this is the maximum rate that a local government can levy on tourists in the Czech Republic,5 it is much lower than in other countries in Western Europe. With the exception of Istanbul (where, as noted, a tourist tax is expected to be introduced in 2021), the only major European tourist destination that does not levy a tax is London –​the city that attracts the largest (or second largest, after Paris, depending on the source and year) number of visitors in Europe. An analysis of information on tourism taxes shows that many European cities have just raised, or will soon raise their rates. Although the crisis in the overall tourism sector caused by the COVID-​19 pandemic has led some local authorities to postpone their plans (Istanbul, and a one-​day visit tax in Venice), it is clear that cities are increasingly willing to levy a local tax on tourists. Local authorities put forward different arguments in support of their decision to charge tourists a tax. Some state that they use the money to manage overtourism; others underline the promotional aspect. Paris, for example, links both aims, stating that ‘the tourist tax is being allocated to the development and promotion of tourism, allowing French municipalities to finance expenditure related to tourist visits, and to the protection of the natural environment’6. This is in line with an overall accommodation tax (la taxe de séjour, literally the visit tax, or the tax for a stay), which was initially

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Table 15.1: Tourist taxes in major European urban destinations (per person per night, rates for 2020) City

Rate

Rate varies according to:

London

-​

n/​a

Paris

0.25–​5€

Standard of the accommodation

Istanbul

-​ 1

n/​a

Rome

2–​7€

Standard of the accommodation

Prague

0.8€

n/​a

Milan

2–​5€

Standard of the accommodation

Barcelona

0.65–​2.25€

Standard of the accommodation

Amsterdam 7% of the room price + 1–​3€ in camping sites and hotels; 10%2 of the room price for holiday rentals, bed and breakfasts and short-​stay accommodation

Standard of the accommodation

Vienna

3.2%2 of the room price

n/​a

Venice

0.5–​5€

Standard of the accommodation and its location within the city

Berlin

5%* of the room price (excluding business travellers)

n/​a

2

Notes:   Expected to be introduced in 2021: 1 % of the room price in the first year, rising to 2% in following years. 1

  Excluding VAT, no breakfast or other extras included.

2

Source: municipality websites.

launched in 1910, but was reserved for specific, designated municipalities (les stations classées de tourisme). Over the years, it has been applied more widely: in 1985, it was also applied to mountain municipalities; in 1986, it was extended to littoral municipalities, in 1988 to municipalities that promoted tourism and, in 1995, to municipalities that were engaged in the protection and management of nature. Nowadays, the tax is levied in over 76 per cent of French municipalities. At the national level, over €500 million were collected in taxes –​almost twice as much as in 2012 (€239 million) (Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances, 2020). Compared to the money spent by visitors to France (€168 billion in 20177), €0.5 billion does not seem a lot. For many municipalities, however, it can make an important contribution to investments in both tourism promotion and environmental protection, especially as French law prohibits it being spent on other purposes (Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances, 2020).

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The Polish case: climate matters In Poland, the tourist tax (opłata miejscowa, literally the place tax, or more commonly called the climate tax) takes the form of an accommodation tax, which can be imposed by local governments. It was first applied in 1955 as the spa tax, and was only collected at spa resorts (Dekret…, 1955). It became the climate tax in 1975, and was collected in spa resorts and ‘other municipalities which have [had] highly favourable climate and landscape qualities, and appropriate environment allowing for tourist movement’ (Ustawa o niektórych podatkach..., 1975). Finally, 10 years later, it became the place tax (Ustawa o podatkach…, 1985), and continues to exist under that name, and under very similar regulations. Current law lists the conditions that have to be fulfilled by the municipality before it can introduce the tax (Ustawa o podatkach i opłatach lokalnych…, 1991; Rozporządzenie…, 2007). Three minimal conditions must be met: • Climate. This specifies certain airborne substances that may have an impact on human health, and permissible levels of electromagnetic fields, both of which are given in environmental protection regulations. • Landscape. This refers to a range of landscape elements that are important for recreation and leisure; examples include forests, water bodies, hills and mountains, and a number of specific cultural attractions. • Tourism. Accommodation facilities should be available in the municipality. In 2005, a specific accommodation tax was introduced. The spa tax (opłata uzdrowiskowa) can be levied on tourists who stay in municipalities with spa resorts. In Poland, the status of ‘spa resort’ is granted by the state. The list includes 45 towns or villages located in 43 municipalities. Both the tourist tax and the spa tax are levied locally. Every year, central government publishes maximum rates, which local authorities cannot exceed. Usually, the maximum rate for the spa tax is double the ‘normal’ tourist tax. In 2020, the maximum per person per night rate was 2.31 PLN (around €0.5) for the tourist tax, and 4.48 PLN (around €1) for the spa tax. If we compare these rates with other popular tourist destinations in Europe (apart from Prague), they are very low. Unsurprisingly, these taxes typically make very little contribution to the local budget in the great majority of Polish municipalities that collect them (Figure 15.1). In 2019, they contributed over 2 per cent to the budget in 30 (out of 229) municipalities (Figure 15.1), reaching a maximum of 8.3 per cent in the resort town of Ciechocinek. Most (17 of the 30) were spa resorts, where rates are not only higher, but also tourist registration is more systematic (the formal sector plays a greater role, and tax collection is more effective).

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Figure 15.1: Tourist and spa taxes as a percentage of local budgets in the Polish municipalities that collect them 90 80

2012

% of municipalities

70

2015

2019

60

50 40

30 20 10 0

0–1%

1–2%

>2%

Share of income in local budgets

Note: in 2012 n=280, in 2015 n=268, in 2019 n=229. Source: own calculations based on data from the Ministry of Finance.

Figure 15.2 shows that the number of municipalities that collect tourist and spa taxes is decreasing. In 2003, there were 341 (14 per cent of Polish municipalities), while by 2019 the number had fallen to 229 (9 per cent). Of these, 27 only collected the spa tax, while 15 collected both taxes at different localities. A key reason why municipalities do not take advantage of this opportunity to increase their budget is the first condition that must be met: climate considerations. Many municipalities, especially large cities, do not fulfil this criteria (especially regarding air pollution). At the same time, rising awareness of climate issues and their relationship with human health, together with increased monitoring of air pollution, are important limiting factors. Recently, tourists (or social organizations) have taken legal action, arguing that the tourist tax was not legal in a particular municipality, as air pollution was above the standard allowed by law. As a result, more and more municipalities have decided to disregard the tax, even some famous destinations. One notable example is Kraków, the number one tourist destination in Poland (or, according to official statistics, number two after Warsaw), which stopped collecting the tax at the beginning of 2016, due to the city’s high level of pollution. It does collect the spa tax, as there is a small spa resort located within its administrative boundaries. However, this is a very small proportion of the taxes that were collected before 2016. Figure 15.3 shows that the relationship between the number of beds8 and the amount of money collected from the tourist tax is not straightforward.

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Figure 15.2: Number of municipalities that collect the tourist and spa tax in Poland 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 2003

2012 Tourist tax

2015 Spa tax

2019 Tourist tax and spa tax

Note: in 2003 the spa tax was included in the tourist tax, with different rates for spa resorts. Source: own calculations based on data from the Ministry of Finance.

First, many municipalities that have tourist facilities, including a few large cities that are important destinations, do not collect the tourist tax (Warsaw, Kraków to some extent, Wrocław, Poznań). Second, municipalities that have a relatively high income due to the tax are mass tourism destinations, either located by the sea or in mountain areas (in the latter case, both winter and summer seasons are included). Third, municipalities with spa resorts are the greatest beneficiaries of the tax. As Figure 15.3 shows, spa resorts that are well located (by the sea, in mountainous areas) collect the most money. It is important to note, however, that these municipalities also have high expenditure, related to their status. Earning income from the spa tax is a relatively new phenomenon as, up until 2002, the situation was the opposite: taxes could not be collected from tourists who were accommodated in health resorts and sanatoriums (they were treated as patients rather than tourists). The change in the law made a huge difference to the budgets of municipalities with spa resorts (Derek, 2006).

Discussion Gago et al (2009) discuss four arguments for taxing tourists: it is an opportunity to earn a significant amount of revenue; it reduces the fiscal

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WHY TOURISTS SHOULD PAY LOCAL TAXES

Figure 15.3: The relationship between the number of beds and the amount of money collected from the tourist tax (including the spa tax) in Polish municipalities (2019)

Note: Sea shows a seaside municipality; Mount. shows a municipality located in a mountainous area; City shows a large city. Only municipalities with tourist facilities were taken into account (1,578 out of 2477 in 2019, according to official statistics). Source: the Central Statistical Office of Poland and the Ministry of Finance.

burden on local residents; it acts as a price substitute for the goods and services that tourists consume; and it corrects negative externalities, such as the strain on the destination’s natural resources, public transport and general infrastructure. The three latter arguments are in line with the two main market failure mechanisms, which were discussed in the first part of this chapter: public goods and externalities. Many cities that are important tourist destinations are aware of these failures, and levy local taxes on tourists in order to redress the balance between those who pay for services (local inhabitants) and those who use them (extra visitors). In recent years, tourism pressure has started to be perceived as a problem in many cities, and taxes have become increasingly widespread. Although this is likely to be why many commentators and journalists perceive that taxing tourists is a strategy that can combat overtourism, the problem is –​ as this chapter attempts to demonstrate –​much more complicated. Many

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cities argue that the tourist tax helps them to improve infrastructure and promote tourism, and that the money that is collected goes back to tourists. Some research even suggests that the reinvestment of tourist taxes in the arts, culture and other tourism-​related events has resulted in a substantial return on expenditure (Litvin et al, 2006). For example, the Explore France website, under the heading ‘What is it for’, explains that the money collected via the taxe de sejour will be used by the city ‘to fund, for example, the production of a promotional brochure, tourist activities and the modernization of tourist spaces (museum, castle, etc.). But it can also be used to cover the additional costs linked to the presence of tourists such as infrastructure and beach maintenance, seasonal workforce, etc.’9 In Poland, the tourist tax makes a marginal contribution to the local budget of most municipalities. Compared to other tourist destinations in Europe, the maximum rate for an overnight stay is low. Moreover, its structure is different to that of comparable taxes in most other countries (OECD, 2014; PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP., 2017). Three criteria must be fulfilled, related to the landscape, facilities and climate. The latter is the legacy of earlier legislation, which was in force during the communist period, and which underlined climate and health issues. As a result, many key destinations do not collect the accommodation tax because they do not fulfil climate requirements. The most notable example is Warsaw, which is one of the main tourist destinations in Poland. Based on estimations that suggest that around nine million tourists visit the city every year, a rough calculation shows that even if every tourist stayed in Warsaw for only one night, an additional 18.6 million PLN would be added to the municipal budget. For comparison, the budget of the Tourism Office of Warsaw in 2019 was 6.9 million PLN, with over 60 per cent dedicated to salaries (Budżet Miasta…, 2019). These figures show how important this tax could be to the local budget. Instead, the number of municipalities that collect the tourist tax is decreasing, and only around 1 per cent of municipalities gain any real benefit from it. This is an especially important problem in large cities, where air pollution exceeds allowed levels, but where tourist numbers are high. Seven of the biggest 20 municipalities have the highest number of tourist beds; six of them do not collect the tourist tax. Needless to say, these large cities are the best illustration of the problem of both externalities and public goods, and excluding them from being able to collect the tourist tax seems remarkable. Although they do not fulfil climate regulations, it is important to note that the arguments for introducing the tourist tax are changing. In particular, they are much more oriented toward the supply of facilities and infrastructure, rather than demand for fresh air and favourable climate conditions.

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Conclusion It is clear that tourists use local transport, public roads, street lighting, car parks, green areas and many other facilities that are paid for and managed by local authorities. Some are public goods and, by definition, tourists cannot be excluded from their consumption. In many cases, tourists are free riders, using goods and services they do not pay for. Moreover, they are responsible for increased waste production, higher congestion, more pollution, etc. Local taxes help to redress the balance, as tourists pay, at least to some extent, for the goods and services they consume. In Poland, however, this does not happen. Here, the tourist tax, which was introduced in 1975, reflects not only the need to consider market failures but also a change in the tourism paradigm. In particular, the latter defines tourist destinations not only as places to rest and recover (and where, therefore, climate conditions may be necessary) but also as places to visit and experience. Notes 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Rigall-​I-​Torrent (2008) further argues that, because public goods are not depleted by use, they could form the foundations for sustainable development in tourism municipalities. This issue, although a very interesting point, is beyond the scope of this chapter. https://a​ juntament.barcelona.cat/r​ elacionsinternacionalsicooperacio/e​ n/n ​ oticia/t​ ourist-​ tax-​to-​help-​kickstart-​the-​economy_​956119 [Accessed 21 February 2021]. https://​www.service-​public.fr/​professionnels-​entreprises/​vosdroits/​F743 [Accessed 21 January 2021]. https://​www.bakermckenzie.com/​en/​insight/​publications/​2019/​12/​accommodation-​ tax-a​ nd-v​ aluable-h ​ ouse-t​ ax [Accessed 31 July 2020]; https://w ​ ww.morogluarseven.com/​ news-a​ nd-p​ ublications/t​ urkey-p​ ostponed-t​ he-e​ ffective-​date-​of-​the-​accommodation-​tax/​ [Accessed 31 July 2020]. https://w ​ ww.praha.eu/j​ np/c​ z/p​ otrebuji_r​ esit/z​ ivotni_​situace/​poplatky/​mistni_​poplatek_​ z_p​ obytu.html?fbclid=IwAR3IIRlhsd8YSNq0FDwLpbRET3fJQoMhrhwkekZmxGX Y4d0OhuuyMi4zLh4 [Accessed 29 July 2020]. https://​pro.parisinfo.com/​reglementations-​et-​qualite/​hebergements-​et-​restauration/​ la-​taxe-​de-​sejour-​a-​paris/​la-​taxe-​de-​sejour-​a-​paris [Accessed 25 July 2020]. https://​www.entreprises.gouv.fr/​files/​files/​directions_​services/​etudes-​et-​statistiques/​ 4p-​DGE/​2019-​4pages_​N87-​CST.pdf [Accessed 29 July 2020]. In Poland, tourism statistics at the municipal level were partly classified after 2015; therefore, I was unable to use up-​to-​date data regarding the number of tourists or the number of nights spent in tourist accommodation. However, the number of beds is, obviously, highly correlated with the number of nights spent in them. In 2014, the last year for which data is available, the Pearson’s correlation coefficient is 0.93. https:// ​ca.france.fr/​en/​news/​article/​tourist-​tax- ​france- ​taxe- ​sejour [Accessed 22 March 2021].

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References (1955) Dekret z dnia 20 maja 1955 r. o podatkach i opłatach terenowych Dz.U. 1955 nr 21 poz. 136. (2019) Budżet Miasta Stołecznego Warszawy na 2019 rok, [online] Available from: https://​ w ww.bip.warszawa.pl/​ d okumenty/​ b udzet_​ f inanse/​ kompendium/​KompendiumB2019.pdf [Accessed 1 August 2020]. Adams, C. (2019) ‘London Mayoral Candidate Pledges to Introduce Tourist Tax in Capital’, Independent, 10 May, [online] Available from: https://w ​ ww. independent.co.uk/​travel/​news-​and-​advice/​london-​tourist-​tax-​visitor-​ levy-​shaun-​bailey-​sadiq-​khan-​mayor-​election-​a8908201.html [Accessed 5 July 2020]. Derek, M. (2006) ‘Opłata miejscowa –​niewykorzystywana szansa?’ Finanse komunalne, 1–​2: 64–​74. Fisher, R.C. (2016) State and Local Public Finance, Abingdon, Routledge. Gago, A., Labandeira, X., Picos, F. and Rodríguez, M. (2009) ‘Specific and General Taxation of Tourism Activities. Evidence from Spain’, Tourism Management, 30(3): 381–​392. Goodwin, H. (2017) The Challenge of Overtourism. Responsible Tourism Partnership Working Paper 4, October 2017, [online] Available from: http://​ www.millennium-​ d estinations.com/​ u ploads/​ 4 /​ 1 /​ 9 /​ 7 /​ 4 1979675/​ rtpwp4overtourism012017.pdf [Accessed 22 March 2021]. Gooroochurn, N. and Sinclair, M.T. (2005) ‘Economics of Tourism Taxation: Evidence from Mauritius’, Annals of Tourism Research, 32(2): 478–​498. Hall, C.M. and Page, S.J. (2006) The Geography of Tourism and Recreation. Environment, Place and Space, London and New York: Routledge. Heffer-​Flaata, H., Voltes-​Dorta, A. and Suau-​Sanchez, P. (2020) ‘The Impact of Accommodation Taxes on Outbound Travel Demand from the United Kingdom to European Destinations’, Journal of Travel Research, 60(4): 749–760. Lackowska, M. (2009) Zarządzanie obszarami metropolitalnymi w Polsce. Między dobrowolnością a imperatywem, Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. Litvin, S.W., Crotts, J.C., Blackwell, C. and Styles, A.K. (2006) ‘Expenditures of Accommodations Tax Revenue: A South Carolina Study’, Journal of Travel Research, 45(2): 150–​157. Mathieson, A. and Wall, G. (1982) Tourism, Economic, Physical and Social Impacts, Harlow: Longman. Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances (2020) Guide pratique. Taxes de séjour, [online] Available from: https://​www.entreprises.gouv.fr/​fr/​ tourisme/​conseils-​strategie/​guide-​pratique-​de-l​ a-t​ axe-d​ e-s​ ejour [Accessed 23 June 2020].

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OECD (2014) OECD Tourism Trends and Policies 2014, Paris: OECD Publishing, [online] http://​dx.doi.org/​10.1787/​tour-​2014-​en [Accessed 22 March 2021]. PricewaterhouseCoopers (2017) The Impact of Taxes on the Competitiveness of European Tourism: Final Report, Brussels: Publications Office of the European Union, [online] Available from: https://​ec.europa.eu/​docsroom/​ documents/​26445/​attachments/​1/​translations/​en/​renditions/​native [Accessed 22 March 2021]. Rigall-​I-​Torrent, R. (2008) ‘Sustainable Development in Tourism Municipalities: The Role of Public Goods’, Tourism Management, 29(5): 883–​897. Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów z dnia 18 grudnia (2007) ‘W sprawie warunków, jakie powinna spełniać miejscowość, w której można pobierać opłatę miejscową’, Dziennik Ustaw, 249(1851). Sheng, L., and Tsui, Y. (2009) ‘Taxing tourism: enhancing or reducing welfare?’, Journal of Sustainable Tourism, 17(5): 627–​635. Swianiewicz, P. (1994) ‘Pobudzanie rozwoju ekonomicznego a dochody gminy: korzyść dla budżetu czy kosztowny patriotyzm lokalny?’, Samorząd Terytorialny, 9: 28–​33. Swianiewicz, P. (2004) Finanse lokalne. Teoria i praktyka, Warsaw: Municipium SA. Swianiewicz, P. (2011) Finanse samorządowe. Koncepcje, realizacja, polityki lokalne, Warsaw: Municipium SA. Ustawa o podatkach i opłatach lokalnych z dnia 14 marca 1985 roku (1985) Dz.U. 1985 nr 12 poz. 50. Ustawa o podatkach i opłatach lokalnych z dnia 12stycznia 1991r (1991) Dz. U. 1991 Nr 9 poz. 31. Ustawa z dnia 19 grudnia 1975 r. o niektórych podatkach i opłatach terenowych (1975) Dz.U. 1975 nr 45 poz. 229. WTTC (2020) Travel & Tourism. Global Economic Impact & Trends, [online] Available from: https://w ​ ttc.org/R ​ esearch/E ​ conomic-​Impact/​moduleId/​ 1445/​itemId/​91/​controller/​DownloadRequest/​action/​QuickDownload [Accessed 24 June 2020].

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16

Perspectives on European Local Government: Putting Local Democracy First! Marta Lackowska, Katarzyna Szmigiel-Rawska and Filipe Teles

This book covered a wide range of questions and aspects related to local governments in Europe and set the landscape where the most vivid and relevant dimensions were highlighted and discussed. The topics addressed in these chapters touch upon three main aspects of research on local governments: • Space –​The spatial and territorial features of local governments and their changes. Studies testing the size hypothesis are still common in the field and touch all dimensions of local government performance. • Scope –​What are local government functions, possibilities and autonomy to address some of the most pressing policy issues and contemporary wicked problems? This question is considered within the relation and constant struggle between decentralization and centralization movements –​most systems strive to balance but it is still a goal and not an achievement. • Power –​Who leads the democratic processes at the local level and how is power gained? This question is answered in the context of electoral systems and political parties but also in relation to the interplay between councillors, mayors and civil society. In the Preface, we have formulated a question on the relevance of the democratic grounds of local government. The proposition behind it was that local government is constantly undergoing substantial changes and reforms that should be discussed on a deep ground of socio-​political values. In fact,

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the common argument, seen in most of the chapters, is the traditional discussion on the economic versus democratic functions of local government. All chapters present testimonies of ongoing changes and reforms as well as of debates regarding the role of local government in European countries. However, more than a simple confirmation of such movements, the key feature highlighted in the bulk of this book is the clear manifestation of concerns regarding the democratic aspects of governance. The arguments supporting this strong claim can be better understood through a more detailed analysis of the debates within each of its three main aspects.

Space –​time, reforms and narratives The first part of the book deals with what is widely understood as territorial reforms. The topic encompasses boundary changes, trials of such changes, institutional changes of local government significance within horizontal and vertical relations in a given political system, decentralization and re-​centralization processes. If, on one hand, similarities of the challenges of such reforms can be found between countries of different history and political systems, on the other hand, significant differences are observable between neighbours. What was crucial here was the broad coverage of European countries, moving away from traditional approaches that treat all CEE countries as a single and coherent object. This contributes to acknowledging the –​even more significant –​variety of European local governments. In 2014, Swianiewicz published in Local Government Studies a paper titled ‘An Empirical Typology of Local Government Systems in Eastern Europe’ (Swianiewicz, 2014). This was the first comprehensive typology to include Eastern European systems into European local government typologies, which consisted before only of West, North and South European countries. The new typology was built on a claim that internal diversification of big European regions in terms of local government systems is more significant than the differences between the regions themselves. It encouraged research and comparisons beyond the long-​standing division built on the shadow of the iron curtain. The way in which territorial reform, local service provision and democracy studies have started to enlighten the iron curtain shadow is explained by Tavares’ chapter in this volume. The author summarizes the changing approach to territorial reform studies and put forward questions which can advance local government studies in the future. These interrogations call for a more holistic approach to the field, for placing the research in space and time, and for the amalgamation of these two dimensions in one logic of local government studies, as both can be defined by their measuring function. Time

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as a constituent of research in the field is more neglected than space. While space, as a measuring function, is often present in research through the lens of size, time is usually only seen as a specific moment and not as a continuum. Time is, thus, often put among contextual constant variables or used as a tool for comparison. Local government studies need to take this objective more seriously into consideration and not only measure function of space but also function of time seen as lengths and reaching far in the past. These two dimensions cannot only be seen as elements of research context but also as a part of explanatory models. To reach this aim, academics will need to tackle the everlasting abyss between qualitative and quantitative approaches. Research on local governments, with its focus on locality, scale, community and importance of proximity seem to be an excellent laboratory to pursue this challenge. In the follow up to this section, one can distinguish two thematic subgroups: changes in territorial boundaries and changes in local autonomy. The first bloc of contributions referring to the question on local territorial boundaries, deals mainly with amalgamations, but municipal splits are also scrutinized (Kalcheva). All the authors discuss the argumentation used in the debates around municipal mergers. Baldersheim and Rose, analyzing the perception of municipal mergers by citizens, support the competition hypothesis and the claim that enlarging the size of local government decreases civic engagement. The most important explanatory factor for the inhabitants’ evaluation of the merger, found in the research, is their attitude towards the merger built in the time before the process was completed. The case studied in Baldersheim and Rose’s chapter is of a forced merger situation implemented in the mid-​1990s, but the study of a voluntary merger in Poland (Swianiewicz and Szmigiel-​Rawska, 2020) displays similar results regarding the importance of pre-​amalgamation attitudes. The major difference between the Norwegian and Polish cases is the voluntary versus the compulsory character of the decision on the merger and the way the process was implemented in the years preceding its outcome. In the Norwegian case, the public opposition towards the merger was displayed repeatedly by the municipal agents, but it did not influence the final decision or the process itself and resulted in decreased local civic engagement (Baldersheim and Rose, this volume). In the Polish case, the process was driven by local rules, self-​negotiated by merging local governments and municipal agents and resulted in a broad acceptance for the merger process and results (Swianiewicz and Szmigiel-​Rawska 2020). ‘Self ’ in ‘self-​governance’ seems to build up as the most important explanation for the acceptance of the mergers by citizens. The success factor of territorial reforms seems to be to convince local communities of the merits of a reform before it starts; it is too late to change their negative opinion after the merger is made.

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Kalcheva describes a more detailed set of concerns that are linked to mergers in the Bulgarian context: larger distance between local authorities and administration, more difficulties in seeing and meeting the needs of smaller (peripheral) parts, including fewer investments in these areas. The chapter on Bulgaria also offers a –​rarely met in the literature –​study on municipal splits. The field still needs more research on splits and, consequently, on the joint analysis of splits and amalgamations. These processes are usually not available in the same country at the same time, so knowledge on the nature of these two strategies is still scarce, even though seen as two sides of the same coin (Swianiewicz, 2020). Kalcheva presents some reasons for the scarce interest in the literature: (1) municipal splits are more often seen in countries not belonging to the main geographies of knowledge, and (2) amalgamations are usually related to a general central policy, whereas splits come often as a bottom-​up movement which requires different research methodologies (see also Swianiewicz, 2020). Indeed, in our volume, two contributions on amalgamations deal with a general national discourse around the reform. Houlberg and Klausen analyse central government strategies towards local amalgamations from the perspective of the multi-​level system by comparing the Danish and Norwegian reforms. Their conclusions stay in accordance with the findings of Baldersheim and Rose (this volume) who claim that inhabitants’ attitudes towards future reforms are crucial for its latter assessment. The inter-​state comparison of Houlberg and Klausen shows that the European central governments have only a ‘mixture of persuasion and economic incentives’ in their toolkit to build inhabitants’ consent around the reform. This results in many examples of ineffective trials of the number of local governments’ reduction in the European countries. Even if the central government has the legal possibility to force the merger reform it can fail in the process of persuasion. The comparison of the two countries with a long-​standing tradition of autonomous local governments shows possible explanations of the failure. This systematic comparison reveals that central government determination and the complex nature of implemented tools are crucial in these reforms. A successful reform was preceded by a broad informational campaign on the central level, and the local and county level reforms were taken jointly –​municipal politicians could have hoped for gaining a stronger discretion not only on municipal but also on county level. The merger was inevitable but the carrot (enlarged discretion) was presented as an incentive. While in the case of failed reform, the stick seemed more important than the carrot; the merger was not inevitable, and the informational support for local governments was not cohesive and comprehensive. It seems that ‘talking business’ is more effective than ‘menacing faces’ in local territorial reforms.

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A detailed study on the construction of narratives on municipal mergers is presented by Copus et al (this volume), which exemplifies the complexity of territorial reform by the case of the United Kingdom. The first intuitive thought of someone trying to get to know more about municipal mergers would be that it is a reform implemented in highly fragmented systems. Nothing could be more wrong, the most spectacular example of merger reform continues (since the 1970s) in a system where local governments’ size is the largest in Europe. In 2014, British and Irish local governments were three times bigger than the next in the size ranking: Denmark. The average size of the English local government is almost 100 times bigger than that of a typical French commune (Swianiewicz et al, 2017). The extensive territorial consolidation reform is still ongoing in the country with the smallest fragmentation in Europe, while the highly fragmented systems like the French and Spanish ones are resilient towards the reforms. There are several shreds of evidence discussed in this volume on the reasons for this kind of apparent lack of a logically expected pattern. The strongest evidence seems to be the public discourse limited to the national system undertaken before the reform is made. Careful negotiations and skillful informational policies were an important reform success factor evidenced both in the single country case studies and in the inter-​state comparative analyses presented in this volume. The well-​designed discourse within the political elites and with local actors can overcome factors shaped by power, finances and expected outcomes of a reform. While the lack of consistent informational policy leads to central government failures in local government border shaping processes. The most important message behind this narrative is the understanding of local government’s role in the national system –​is it to involve inhabitants in governing processes (democratic role) or is it to provide services (functional role)? Understanding this difference and political narratives provides the answers to questions on territorial reform patterns (Copus et al, in this volume). Usually in political practice, the argumentation behind territorial reforms is not focused on local government’s average size –​well defined, justified by science or example of other systems, size which fits the local government function. It is about making local government bigger despite its current size to gain a larger economic base and more political power.

Scope –​swings and roundabouts The second aspect is constructed around changes in the level of local autonomy. Here, we also find arguments related to two of the most common topics of mainstream local government studies: sub-​municipal units (SMU)

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and inter-​municipal cooperation (IMC). Both issues can be seen as a bridge between territorial reforms and reforms related to competences’ allocation (cf. chapter by Tavares). SMU creation and position within local government system is often an effect of gridlocks between local political actors (Swianiewicz, 2015). In the volume, SMU are presented in a few chapters as a way of overcoming the negative effects for local democracy that result either from mergers (Rose and Baldersheim) or from a large number of inhabitants in the cities experiencing a demographic influx (Navaro and Pano). The Spanish chapter (Navaro and Pano), calling for a national de-​unification of the local government system, presents SMU in the largest cities as a trial to acknowledge their specific character. IMC is discussed in the Lithuanian study, where Bučaitė-​Vilke raises important questions regarding network governance and democratic legitimacy. These refer to the challenge of assuring equal opportunities to provide significant inputs throughout the whole process to the various local actors participating in cooperation. The author looks for strategies that would provide, at the same time, democratic transparency and efficiency in achieving collective action. As the case studies on mergers, inter-​municipal cooperation scrutiny shows that, despite their networked nature, its structures often lack involvement from civil society organizations. At the same time, the density of networks and trust between actors are seen as crucial determinants of IMC efficiency. (Expected) changes in the level of local autonomy, as the designative characteristic of local government system, are discussed on the examples of Spanish and Hungarian cases. The Spanish chapter examines the drawbacks of the present system and calls for changes, whereas the Hungarian case discusses recent reforms regarding limiting municipal powers. Established systems of local government are characterized by the persistence and resilience towards boundary reform even if they generate high transaction costs and even if their efficiency is driven by informal institutions created in opposition to the defective legal framework. The Spanish case represents a system resembling a ‘local galaxy’ (Botella, 1992, in Navarro and Pano, this volume), consisting of huge nodes and very small ‘empty’ municipalities with very similar legal status assigned to each municipality. A thoroughly unified model for such a big and differentiated country causes numerous malfunctions, as described by the authors. It seems to be an example of a path-​dependent system operation rooted in the distant past, driven by a tangle of formal and informal institutions, where local wins the political struggle between local and central, and resists reforms even in face of austerity demands and the call for functional efficiency.

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The contrasting example is given by the case of the Hungarian reform made by Victor Orbán’s cabinet. In Hungary, local autonomy was ‘successfully’ limited by central government reforms (Dobos, this volume). The first steps in the process were not boundary changes or electoral system corrections, but centralization of service provision. The second step was to diminish the financial self-​sufficiency of local governments and, then, to increase the central government supervision on local government and give mayors more centralized power over the council and local administration. It was a step-​by-​step process of hollowing out local governments, carried out without any need of a territorial reform, by the means of ‘mere’ changes in competences and financing. It has led to the creation of empty shells ruled by one strong local political actor supervised by central government structures. In a way, it was also a reform which led to reducing the number of local agents, in this case, the number of locally empowered actors –​to a mayor-​centred model. As Dobos aptly summarizes, ‘Mayors are more and more influential rulers of their less and less important realms.’

Power –​divide and conquer or listen and collaborate The third aspect opens with a question raised by Gendźwiłł et al: how local are local elections? The authors examine the level of resemblance between parliamentary and local elections in relation to the party system. Among the three compared countries –​Denmark, Belgium and Poland –​there are significant differences in the level of nationalization of local elections (the congruence in party presence in parliament and local councils after last elections), which can be explained by the size of local governments, but –​above all –​by country-​specific characteristics of the political party system. The chapter confirms the size hypothesis but with some important reservations. The inter-​state comparison allows us to notice that country-​ specific factors are more relevant than the size of local government itself. The chapter underlines the main message of this book on undisclosed lines of division among different local government systems in Europe. It displays that the level of localization of local elections in Wallonia is more similar to the one in Poland than in Flanders. However, Belgium as a whole is somewhere between Poland and Denmark. The issue of power, and the consequent debate on the democratic essence of local governance, is discussed in the chapters focused on local leadership. The concepts of democracy itself are discussed in Heinelt’s chapter. Comparing German and Polish mayors, the author shows that despite the similarities noticed at first sight (both countries have a strong mayor model, according to Mouritzen and Svara, 2002), the attitudes of both groups are very different. German mayors seem to fit better into the

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traditional distinction between representative and deliberative democracy, whereas the Polish leaders tend to mix these two perspectives. Hanssen describes local power in the context of two specific challenges of contemporary local politics: climate change and pressures coming from suburbanization and metropolitanization. In doing so, she distinguishes four roles of metropolitan climate-​oriented leaders: strategic leaders and regulators, climate-​conscious providers, consumers and enablers of cooperation and partnerships. Her Oslo study confirms more general observations, according to which in Norwegian municipalities, representing a weak mayor-​model (Mouritzen and Svara, 2002), the interest in this pungent issue of mayors and local councillors were found to be lower than that of the administrative staff. Yet another crucial challenge for local leadership of the most pungent issues catalogue, the moral obligation to promote tolerant and open local communities, is described by Hambleton. He argues that this requires a return to place-​based leadership, instead of following global trends and threats. This calling can also be applied to local government studies –​in the realm of global concerns, place-​based research can offer a refreshing window of opportunities regarding ideas and solutions. Following the examples of outstanding mayors of Bristol (Rees) and Gdańsk (Adamowicz), the author claims that inclusive and collaborative leadership cannot only bring new energies and resources into the public problem solving process but also stimulate social innovations and value-​based community building. Last, but not least, at the end of the volume, local finances are discussed in the light of democratic concerns. Bartkowski offers a general thought on the democratic foundations for local budgeting, presenting this process as a crucial part for building local communities based on democratic decision-​ making. Constructing a budget is seen as the most difficult element of collective action. Two final chapters deal with the question of the uneven distribution of benefits (tourist amenities or suburban place of living) and their costs –​externalities linked to both overtourism and extensive urban sprawl. Starting from a classical question ‘whose right to the city?’ we are led by the authors to the question ‘whose bill?’ Again, economic drivers of people’s behaviour find democratic foundations. Łukomska and Neneman examine costs and benefits of urban sprawl experienced by suburban municipalities. Many suburban communes treat attracting new inhabitants as a development strategy, but the authors argue that financial benefits coming from a bigger number of taxpayers and lower administrative costs per capita are ambiguous and are accompanied by an increase in investment costs. Moreover, the results of cost-​benefit analysis may be deceiving as most of the benefits remain on the individual level (a garden, a big house), whereas most of the costs are covered by public actors

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(above all municipalities). This brings about the question on the democratic justice of urban sprawl. Derek casts yet another perspective on budgetary justice. Thinking about costs of intense tourism, she argues that local tourist tax is a fair (and only partial!) compensation for municipalities and their citizens. Interestingly enough, cities tend to explain collecting tourist tax by referring to the promotion costs and tourist infrastructure, rather than by a need to manage overtourism. An argument of social justice seems unpopular.

Conclusion To conclude, this volume presents a set of insights regarding the democratic foundations of local government. By focusing on scale, scope and power, through the multiple perspectives on territorial reforms, autonomy, cooperation, local elections, mayoral leadership and local finances, the chapters provide a coherent and constructive dialogue between contemporary challenges and the very foundational aspects of democratic governance. To put democracy first, as a clear message resulting from these pages, requires significant developments in both conceptual and methodological aspects of local government research. By widening the geographies of knowledge and providing an enriched and more diversified number of country examples, we believe that this book is already a step towards such endeavour. References Botella, J. (1992) ‘La galaxia local en el sistema político español’, Revista de Estudios Políticos, 76: 145–​160. Mouritzen, P.E. and Svara, J.H. (2002) Leadership at the Apex: Politicians and Administrators in Western Local Governments, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Swianiewicz, P. (2014) ‘An Empirical Typology of Local Government Systems in Eastern Europe’, Local Government Studies, 40(2): 292–​311 Swianiewicz, P. (2015) ‘Intra-​Municipal Units in Urban Political Systems in Poland: Vicious Roundabout of Marginalization or Dead-​End Street?,’ Journal of Public Administration and Policy, 7(2): 173–​198. Swianiewicz, P. (2020) ‘Municipal Divorces –​The Under Researched Topic of Territorial Reforms in Europe’, Acta Geobalcanica, 6(​1): 27–​33.

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Swianiewicz, P. and Szmigiel-​Rawska, K. (2020) ‘Why Some Local Governments Choose not to Free-​Ride when Undergoing Boundary Reform: A Study of Two Merger Cases in Poland’, Local Government Studies, https://doi.org/10.1080/03003930.2020.1761337. Swianiewicz, P, Gendźwiłł, A. and Zardi, A. (2017) Territorial Reforms in Europe: Does Size Matter? Territorial Amalgamation Toolkit, 1st ed. Strasbourg: Centre of Expertise for Local Government Reform, Council of Europe.

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Index References to figures appear in italic type; those in bold type refer to tables. References to endnotes show both the page number and the note number (137n4). A accommodation tax  273, 274, 276, 280 Adamowicz, Paweł  189, 190, 191, 195 Administrative and Territorial Structure of Republic of Bulgaria Act (ATSRBA)  124–​126, 131, 136 Agency for Climate  221, 223 Agency for Planning and Building Services  223–​224 Airaksinen, J.  6 Aksztejn, Wirginia  189 Alexander, D.  9 Alternativet  169 amalgamation(s)  18, 25, 40, 67, 285, 286 Brobdingnagian narrative for  28 consequences for residents’ relation  51–​54 consequences for residents’ views  55 finding partners of  73 IMC and  5–​6 municipal  4, 9, 20, 41, 118, 135 proximity effect  53 reforms  4, 6–​8, 9, 11, 117, 131, 165 sub-​municipal local councils  9 see also Denmark, amalgamation reform in Amin, A.  186 angry populism  182, 195 assembly/​assemblies  92 citizens’  190, 196 consensual 221  local  87, 240 members of  86 of local government board  92 open  86 regional  174 system  86, 92 Association of Counties (ACC)  72 Austrian community case of Michelhausen  252

authority/​authorities  central  64, 144, 157 discretionary  42 local 101, 105–​107, 111, 123, 124, 128, 185, 186, 195, 200, 238, 239, 252, 256, 274  mayoral  109 of municipalities  218 political climate leadership by  222–​224 prounitary authority argument  28 tool  65–​66, 70, 74, 74–​75 unitary  30, 32 autonomous/​autonomy  73, 92 borrowing  104, 107, 123 communities  82, 89, 90, 94, 95 financial  94, 95, 101, 108, 123, 144 fiscal  103, 106, 123 governments  106 institution  19 organizational  104, 123 policies  83, 96 regional tax  273 structure  94 see also local autonomy B Baldersheim, Harald  286, 287 Barber, B.R.  191, 204 Bartkowski, Jerzy  264, 272, 291 bootstrapping procedure  150 Borgen, Kjell  42 borrowing autonomy  104, 107, 123 Bristol One City Approach  193, 194 Brobdingnagian’ narrative  23–​24 identification and exploration  28–​33 and local government size in England  26–​28 Brueckner, J.  250 Brussels-​Capital region  165, 171

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budget(ing)  24 citizen  246 climate  222 democratic  241 from economic point of view  237 as framework for political decision-​making  240–​243 goal-​oriented  240 impact of localism on  246–​247 local  107, 238, 240, 259 municipal  66, 128, 137n4, 251, 258 participatory  246 sub-​national  254 see also democratic functions of local budgets Bukve, O.  227, 229 Bulgarian Constitution  136 Bulgaria, territorial reforms in  117 administrative districts  121 distribution of municipalities  122 future trends and opportunities  135–​136 municipal divorces  125–​134 procedure for establishment of new municipalities  124–​125 state of Bulgarian municipalities  120–​124 Bulkeley, H.  222, 225, 230 business leadership  187 Buvik Commission  41 Buvik, Martin  41 C Capital and Large Cities Territorial Division Act  126 capital expenditure subsidy  123, 124 Central-​Eastern Europe (CEE)  7, 8, 143, 285 countries/​group  6, 101–​103, 108, 114n3 central or regional access indicator  104 Chaskin, R.J.  8 Christian Democrats  67, 69, 164 citizen(s)  8, 39, 44, 207, 213n11, 223, 238, 246 assemblies  190, 196 citizen-​city relations  43 cognitive orientations  45 decision-​making  45, 237 demands  96 disenfranchisement in neighbourhoods  11 efficiency/​effectiveness  44, 53, 58 groups  146, 157 as informed observer  238 opinion regarding development of municipal services  50 participation and deliberation  8 participation and involvement in IMC initiatives  157 participation in governance of municipality  121, 135 perceptions  40

political involvement of  45, 118, 121, 142 pressure  119 satisfaction with municipal service provision  43, 48, 49, 58 self-​government by  204–​205 views of local democratic practices  59 voice of  185 civic leader(ship)  183, 188, 195–​196 civic leadership, inspirational  181 emerging themes for scholarship and practice  195–​196 examples  188–​195 place-​based leadership and tolerant city  185–​188 place-​less power and place-​based power  183–​185 political space  184 Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska)  164, 172 civil society organizations  146, 289 see also non-​governmental organizations (NGOs) climate  adaptation and mitigation  217, 231 budget  222–​223, 229 emergency  182 governance  219, 220, 222 leadership  218, 229 see also political climate leadership; urban climate leadership in Polish tourism  276–​278 policy 229  strategy  223, 225, 230 tax  276 climate change  184, 291 leadership  181 Climate Strategy for Oslo  222 cluster random sampling procedure  149 cognitive orientations  45 cognitive participation  243 cognitive barriers in local politics  243–​246 Cohen, J.  204 Colston, Edward  192 Commission on Administrative Structure  71 community  253 anger about continuing inequality  182 interests  145 leadership  182, 187 local  149, 190, 199, 209, 237, 246, 259 responsibility  256 spirit  242 suburbanization effect on  252–​253 competition hypothesis  43, 48–​50, 286 complementarity of urban leadership and community involvement (CULCI)  199, 212n1 Concejo abierto model  86 Constitution of 1812 in Spain  82, 83 consumer price index (CPI)  254

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cooperation  city government  224, 230 cross-​sector  218 diversity of actors in cooperative arrangements  145–​146 effectiveness variable  157 entities in Catalonia  90, 91 exercising political climate leadership through  225–​227 groups of actors  154 as institutional innovation  142 inter-​institutional  148 internal  152, 156 municipal  136, 141, 142, 146 network governance and democracy in fostering  145 outcomes  157 voluntary  136 see also inter-​municipal cooperation (IMC) corporate income tax (CIT)  254, 273 County Councils Network  30 county governments  66, 69, 99 county governors  68, 70, 76, 77n4 COVID-​19 pandemic  182–​183, 195, 270, 274 creative cities  182 Cronbach’s alpha  150, 152 cultural diversity  182 D Dahl, R.A.  44–​45, 50, 168 de-​amalgamation reforms  4, 6–​8, 10, 118 deliberative/​deliberation  146 approaches  8 bodies of amalgamated municipalities  9 democracy  9, 204, 291 practices  191 problem-​ solving  204 public  207 democratic/​democracy  budgeting  241 decision-​making  238, 241, 291 deliberative  9, 204, 291 as expression of human nature  203–​208 liberal  82, 204 local  see local democracy participatory  8 democratic functions of local budgets  237 budget as framework for political decision-​making  240–​243 cognitive barriers to participation in local politics  243–​246 and local democracy  240 impact of localism on budgeting  246–​247 post-​1990 local public finances in Poland  239 democratic legitimacy  analytical model  147

in analyzing IMC initiatives  144 identification of the preconditions  142 looking for evidence  150–​156 theoretical model and hypothesis  146–​148 variables  149 Denmark  64, 70 extensive welfare system  71 local government reforms  63–​74 local party system nationalization  166–​169, 170, 171, 173, 173–​175, 177 parliamentary parties  169 structural reform  59n3 sub-​municipal local councils  9 Denmark, amalgamation reform in  70, 287 context  70–​71 Danish municipality of Ringsted  163 process  71–​73 tool use  73–​74, 74 see also Denmark Denters, B.  23 Derek, Marta  292 D’Hondt method  85 directness  66 diversity  8 of actors in cooperative arrangements  145–​146 cultural  182 fiscal  96 of reform outcomes  64 Spanish territorial  82 urban  182, 185 Dobos, Gábor  290 Dopiewo (Poznan)  258, 259–​260 per capita investment expenditures in  261 per capita net operating surplus in  261 per capita spending on administration in  260, 265–​266 population change in  260 Drew, J.  18 E Ecolo  169 education  55, 146, 191, 203, 211 backed by civil rights legislation  186 civic  246 expenses on  256 non-​compulsory  88 quality of  246 support function in  106 Egner, Björn  212n7 electoral/​elections  42, 83, 85, 163, 167 laws  92, 96 local  164, 165, 168, 169, 205, 208, 290 mayoral  92, 165, 174 politics party system  166 regulation  93, 117 systems  85–​87, 92, 164, 165, 172, 174 Elklit, J.  168

296

Index

England  contemporary narrative and size myth  24–​33 local government in  18 narrative supportive of mergers  19 policy narratives  20–​24 structural change  26 Erlingsson’s model  119, 133 European Urban Research Association (EURA)  196n1 ‘even-​stevens’ municipal divorces 118, 126 exemption procedure  89 externalities  238, 247, 250, 271, 280, 291 negative  271, 279

Franco group  101 Fredrikstad area (Norway)  39, 45–​46, 56, 60n6 in Buvik Commission  41 municipal merger  40, 43–​45, 58, 59 free riding/​r iders  81, 245, 272

F factor analysis  150, 205, 212–​213n11 finances  44, 94–​96, 120–​124, 288 development in Bulgaria  123 financial diversification of transfers system  96 impact of urban sprawl  251–​254 local public finances in Poland  239 municipal  68, 123, 136, 251–​254 in Poland  254–​258 public  240, 241, 245, 246 structure of income of municipalities by population  95 transfer system  104 see also budget(ing); democratic functions of local budgets; local budgets/​budgeting; municipal budgets financial self-​reliance  104, 123 of Hungarian local governments  107 first-​past-​the-​post system (FPTP system)  86, 164, 172, 175; see also electoral/​elections fiscal autonomy  103, 106, 123 fiscal federalism  246 fiscal illusions  238, 245, 272 fiscal populism  244, 245 Fisher, R.C.  271, 272 Folketinget  163, 169 forced municipal mergers  39–​40 citizen opinion regarding development of municipal services  50 citizen satisfaction with municipal services  49 consequences of amalgamation for residents’ relation  51–​54 consequences of amalgamation for residents’ views  55 data  46–​48 empirical analyses and results  48–​57 hypotheses  43–​46, 47–​48 larger municipality  40–​43 residents’ acceptance of new amalgamated Fredrikstad municipality  56

G Gago, A.  278 game-​theoretical model  119 Garg, S.  8 gateway cities  182 Gendźwiłł, Adam  212n7, 290 Germany  1967–​77 territorial reform  6 general characteristics of social structure  201–​203, 202–​203 mayors in  199–​201 notion of democracy as expression of human nature  203–​208 patterns  206 responses  208, 210 role perception  208–​211 globalization forces  183 goal-​oriented budgeting  240 Goldsmith, M.  4, 103, 200 good governance  146 Gooroochurn, N.  272 governmental authority  65 Green Party  222, 230 Groen  169 H Hackett, Roy  192 Hall, Peter  181, 185 Hambleton, Robin  291 Hanssen, G.S.  222, 231, 291 Haraldseth, Leif  41 Haveri, A.  6 Heinelt, H.  100, 101, 102, 109, 114n15, 200, 212n7 Heinelt-​Hlepas typology  100 Heinz, W.  6 Herbert Commission (1960)  26 Hesse-​Sharpe typology  100–​103 Hesse, J.J.  200 Hirschman, Albert  185 Hlepas, N. -​K.  100, 101, 102, 114n15, 200 Hofstad, H.  222 Horn government  114n1 Hortas-​Rico, M.  253 Houlberg, K.  287 Hulst, R.  5, 6 Hungarian political system  100 Hungary, local government reform in  99 horizontal relations  109–​113, 112 legal protection in local governments  102, 104, 107, 123

297

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE

local actors’ influence over local authority activities  111 separation of politics and administration  110 theoretical framework and research methods  100–​105 vertical relations  105–​109, 112 I Illner, Michael  118 implementation hypotheses  48, 55–​57 inclusive leadership  in Bristol, UK  192–​195 in Gdańsk, Poland  189–​192 input legitimacy  46, 157 analysis of municipal cooperation initiatives  146 dimension  147 institutional depth  103, 106, 123, 200 intelligent policy design  66 inter-​municipal cooperation (IMC)  4, 10, 90, 135–​136, 141, 289 assessment of IMC initiatives  150–​156 data sampling and measurement method  149–​150 dataset  148–​149 groups of actors in  151 impact and results of  153 incentives and reasons for  152 in Lithuania  142–​144 methodological remarks  148–​150 network governance approach  144–​148 results of main model  154 and territorial reforms  4–​6 Inter-​Municipal Cooperation in Europe  5 J Jacobsen, Johan R.  41 Jakobsen, M.  9 jurisdictional integrity  66 K Kalcheva, Desislava  287 Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers/​Chambre des Représentants  169 Kielce agglomeration  258 Kjaer, U.  9, 168 Klausen, Jan Erling  287 Koalicja Obywatelska label  172 Krakow  257, 277 Krukowska, Joanna  212n7 Kuhlmann, Sabine  212n7 L Lackowska, Marta  212n7, 231 Ladd  253 Ladner, A.  200 leadership  business  187

climate  229 community  182, 187 inclusive  see inclusive leadership inspirational civic  see inspirational civic leadership local  182–​183, 195, 199, 238, 239 political climate  see political climate leadership public managerial/​professional leadership  186 trade union  187 urban  see urban leadership urban climate  see urban climate leadership urban political  227 Liberal Alliance  169 liberal democracy  82, 204 Liberal Modern (Nowoczesna)  164, 172 Liberal Party  67, 72 Lidström, A.  212n3 Lilliputian  25 Lithuania  assessment of IMC initiatives  150–​156 average size of population in municipalities  143 IMC in  141–​144 methodological remarks  148–​150 network governance approach in IMC  144–​148 Lityński, P.  249, 253 living and working region (LW region)  226 local autonomy  67, 71, 103, 123–​124, 125 changes in  286, 288–​289 contradictions in  144 dimensions  109 in Hungary  108, 108, 114n5, 290 in international comparison  108 in Ireland  212n4 local governments  66–​67 ‘self-​rule’ type indicators  103–​104 ‘shared-​rule’ type indicators  104 validity of constitutional principle  95 Local Autonomy Index (LAI)  100, 103, 123, 200 in Hungary  105, 114n2 local budgets/​budgeting  238, 239, 240, 244, 291 democratic functions  see democratic functions of local budgets effects of suburbanization processes  258 expenditures structure in Poland  256, 256 factors behind municipal splits in Bulgaria  129–​130 financial self-​reliance of Hungarian local governments  107 Norway’s extensive welfare system  66 in Polish municipalities  277

298

Index

local democracy  5, 24, 156, 238–​240 hypotheses concerning  50–​54 local budgets and  240 patterns behind mayors’ notions  206 proximity  53 relation with budgetary transparency  241 see also European local government local government  3, 284 of Anglo group  101 in Denmark  see Denmark in England  see England in Lithuania  see Lithuania localism impact on budgeting  246–​247 of North and Middle European group  101 in Norway  see Norway in Oslo  see Oslo place-​based leadership  291 in Poland  see Poland in Portugal  7 power  284, 290–​292 revenues  94 scope  284, 288–​290 space  284, 285–​288 in Spain  see Spain, local system in system typology of vertical and horizontal relations  100–​103 see also autonomous/​autonomy; electoral/​ elections; municipalities Local Government Act (1972)  20, 25, 88, 90–​92 provisions  93 Local Government Denmark (LGD)  71–​75 local government reforms  63 in Bulgaria  117, 122–​136 in Denamrk  70–​74, 163, 287 in Germany  201–​211 in Hungary  99–​113, 123 in Lithuania  141–​156 in Norway  66–​70 in Poland  252–​258, 262–​266 in Spain  81–​96 theoretical perspectives on policy tools  65–​66 local leadership  182–​183, 195 budgetary parameters as indicators  238 local democracy and  239 political leadership  199 local non-​partisan lists  169 local party systems  163, 170–​171 index  176, 177 nationalization of  168–​169, 170, 171, 173, 173–​175, 177 three tales  163–​166 see also electoral/​elections; party systems, local Lord Heseltine  31 Lowndes, V.  8 Łukomska, J.  291

M Magistrat  212n2 market failure  250, 279 public goods  272 Martínez Fernández, J.B.  87 Mathieson, A.  270 Maud Committee (1967)  26–​27 Mayntz, R.  76 measurement model  147, 149–​150 moralization  245 Morawica (Poland)  258, 261 empirical analysis results  262, 263 per capita investment expenditures in  263 per capita net operating surplus in  263 per capita spending on administration in  262, 265–​266 population change in  262 Mouritzen, P.E.  227, 231 Mouritzen-​Svara typology  100, 102–​103 multi-​level cooperation tools  90 municipal administration  90, 145–​146, 149–​150, 157, 209, 211 best practice in  188 power relations  200 SMUs in  3, 8–​9 strong mayor form  199 Municipal Corporations Act (1835)  25 municipal divorces  118, 125–​134 first year of operation  127 local revenue per capita and revenue growth  132, 134 municipalities  39, 82, 120–​121 abandoned  118, 126, 128, 132, 133 amalgamation of  41, 135 distribution  122 larger  40–​43 separation  117 structure of income by population  95 municipal mergers  135, 286, 288 see also forced municipal mergers municipal services  43, 58 authorities’ role in  144 citizen opinion regarding development  49, 50 citizens’ satisfaction with  48, 49 forms  153 implication  43 quality factor  151–​152, 156 municipal splits  117–​178 factors  129–​130 Murdoch, Rupert  183 N narratives  285–​288 Brobdingnagian narrative for amalgamation  28 contemporary  24–​33 policy  20–​24

299

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE

supportive of mergers  19 nationalization  full  163, 165, 178 of local party system  166–​169, 170, 171, 173, 173–​175, 177 national local government reform (NLGR)  67 national parties  99, 165–​166, 169, 170 National Register of Urban agglomerations in Bulgaria  131 NATO framework  65 neighbourhood governments  8 Neneman, J.  291 Nesebar municipality  135 ‘nestling flying the nest’, 118, 126  network governance approach  142, 289 in IMC  144–​148 New Civic Leadership (NCL)  183, 186 new democracies  3, 101 New Fredrikstad  39 new local democracies  3 new municipalities  39–​40, 44, 84, 128, 132, 133 acceptance of  55, 57 issues during establishment  42 procedure for establishment of  124–​125 satisfaction among residents  49 satisfaction with services  46 scepticism of  57 new public management (NPM)  209 reforms  210 News Corp  183–​184 News Corporation  see News Corp Nightingale, Carl  185 nodality tools  65, 69, 74, 74, 75 non-​excludable goods or services  272 non-​governmental organizations (NGOs)  145, 190 see also civil society organizations non-​r ival goods or services  272 Norway  64, 70 local government reforms  63–​74 Norwegian law  67 Norwegian parliamentary model  227 Norwegian reform  66–​70

urban climate leadership in metropolitan area  221–​227 output legitimacy  46, 146, 147, 157 overtourism  238, 247, 270, 271, 274, 279, 291

O Obzor  120, 135 Old Fredrikstad  40, 57 ‘one system for all’ circumstance  83 Orbán, Victor  100, 290 Oslo  217–​218 climate change leadership  181 Climate Strategy for  222 formulation of platform for city government  229 political leadership  230 political models of local government  220–​221

P Page, E.C.  4, 103, 200 panel vector autoregressive model  253 Parkinson’s Laws  244 parliamentary model  218, 224, 227 influenced political climate leadership  227–​230 parliamentary parties  164–​165, 168–​169, 172–​173 partial least squares model (PLS model)  149 participatory/​participation  8, 41, 46, 157 civic  190 cognitive barriers in local politics  243–​246 in cooperation entities  91 in decision-​making  243 democratic  8, 142, 158, 204, 205 governance  145 in IMC 142  of interest groups  145, 154–​155 in local policy analyses  239 political  45, 87 see also inter-​municipal cooperation (IMC) party systems, local  see local party systems People’s Voice, The  42 personal income tax (PIT)  128, 254, 256 place-​based leadership  185–​188 realms  187 place-​based power  183–​185 place-​less power  183–​185 Poland  current expenditures structure of municipal budgets in  256 local finance in  254–​258 literature  252–​253 municipal mergers  286 population and its changes and movements  257 revenue structure of Polish municipalities  255 SLD  172 tourism statistics in  281n8 tourist tax  276–​278 Poland, mayors in  201 democracy  203–​208 general characteristics of social structure  201–​203, 202–​203 patterns  206 responses  208, 210 role perception  208–​211 policy narratives  18, 20–​22, 25–​26 Brobdingnagian  27 self-​selective nature  28

300

Index

supporting reorganization and increases in council size  22–​24 policy scope  103, 106, 123 policy tools, theoretical perspectives on  65–​66 political climate leadership  217 by authority  222–​224 as consumer  225 parliamentary model in Oslo  227–​230 as provider  224–​245 through regional partnerships and cooperation  225–​227 political discretion, effective  103, 106, 123 political leadership  186, 218, 228–​229 local  199, 218 in Oslo  220–​221, 224–​225, 230 urban  217, 227 Political Leaders in European Cities projects (POLLEADER projects)  100, 104–​105, 111 political models Concejo abierto  86 decentralization model in Spain  82 for electoral rules for municipalities  86 interaction  150–​151 leadership  220 of local government  218, 220–​221 parliamentary model in Oslo  227–​230 political models of local government  218, 220–​221 pooled  175 rational-choice  204 strong mayor  227–​228, 231 structural  150, 154 Swianiewicz’s  119 populism  angry  182, 195 fiscal 244, 245  political  241 power  20, 143, 187, 240, 247, 284, 290–​292 of narrative  27 place-​less and place-​based  183–​185 relations  100, 105, 199–​200, 209 ‘power of the purse’, 240  Poznan agglomeration  258 Prague  274 Prawo i Sprawiedliwo ść (PiS)  172 proportional representation (PR)  85, 86, 174 see also electoral/​elections public goods  252, 264, 271, 272, 279, 280, 281n1 public managerial/​professional leadership  186 R Radcliffe-​Maud Commission (1969)  26–​27 Rees, Marvin  192–​194, 195 reform(s)  285–​288 administrative  84 amalgamation  4, 6–​8, 9, 117, 131, 165

de-​amalgamation  4, 6–​8, 10, 118 hypothesis  43–​46, 48–​50 local government  see local government reforms Orbán government  100 territorial  see territorial reforms see also Bulgaria, territorial reforms in; Denmark, amalgamation reform in; Hungary, local government reform in representative democracy model  204 Rigall-​I-​Torrent, R.  272, 281n1 ‘ring’ suburban municipalities  143 Rodopi municipality  133 Rokkan, S.  167 root mean square prediction error (RMSPE)  259 Rose, Lawrence E.  286, 287 roundabouts  288–​290 S Sabel, C.F.  204 Salamon, L.E.  65–​66, 70, 76 Sanner, Jan Tore  68 Saxi, H.P.  227, 229 Scharpf, F.  147 scholarship, engaged  196 Sejm  164, 172 self-​government  citizens  204 expression of  89 institutional 142  local  24–​25 principle  91, 92 single-​tier  143 ‘self-​rule’ type indicators  103–​104, 123 Sellers, J.M.  212n3 service delivery  6 effectiveness and cost  25 negative consequences of amalgamations  8 public  28, 148, 151 strategies  153 Seyfried, Markus  212n7 ‘shared-​rule’ type indicators  104, 107, 123 Sharpe, L.J.  6, 200 Simoneova, V.  222, 226 Sinclair, M.T.  272 Size and Democracy (Dahl and Tufte)  44 Śleszyński, P.  252, 258 Socialdemokratiet (Social Democrats)  169 Socialist Left Party  222, 230 socio-​cultural forces  185 Sofia Province  126 Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD)  172 Soviet-​type council system  99 space (as measuring function)  285–​288 Spain, local system in  81, 289 decentralization model  82 functions  88–​91

301

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE

homogeneity of legal framework and consequences  85–​96 municipal map  83–​85, 84 Spanish Electoral Law  85 spa tax  276, 277, 278 squeezed cities  40 strong mayor form  102, 103, 109, 110, 113, 199–​200 structural equation modelling  149, 155, 156 structural model  150, 154 sub-​municipal units (SMUs)  4, 89, 288–​289 of government in urban governance  8–​9 suburbanization  249, 251, 254–​258, 259, 291 Sullivan, H.  8 supervision  237 administrative  104, 107, 123, 200 central government  290 legal  108 professional  106 state  67 Svara, J.  227, 231 Swianiewicz, Paweł  3–​4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 118–​119, 120, 126, 212n7, 231, 272, 285 Swianiewicz’s model  119 swings  288–​290 synthetic control  266–​267n2 method  258, 259 unit  259 Syse, Jan  42 T Teles, Filipe  6, 145 tenants’ illusion  238, 245 Terraferma  274 Territorial Divisions Act  76n1 territorial reforms  3, 84 amalgamation and de-​amalgamation reforms  6–​8 IMC and  4–​6 research agenda on  10 SMUs of government in urban governance  8–​9 throughput legitimacy  146, 147 Thuesen, A.A.  9 Tiebout thesis  49 tolerant city  185–​188 Tønnesen, A.  222 top-​down principle  153 tourists/​tourism  270 municipalities  278 pay local taxes  271–​272 Polish case  276–​278 pressure  279 relationship between number of beds and amount of money  279 and spa taxes  277 statistics in Poland  281n8 taxes  238, 270, 273–​275, 275

trade union leadership  187 transparent/​transparency  96, 136, 142, 146, 244 in budgeting  238, 240–​242 democratic  142, 289 municipality  40, 44 laws related to  94 treasure tools  65, 74 treated units  258 Trowler, P.  22 Trump, Donald  181 Tufte, E.R.  44–​45, 50, 168 U Urban Action Europe (URBACT)  190 urban climate leadership  217 governance modes  219 in metropolitan area of Oslo  221–​227 theoretical background  218–​221 urban governance  see municipal administration urban leadership  199–​201 differences between German and Polish mayors  201–​211 of Oslo  226 political leadership  227 urban sprawl  226, 238, 249 data and method  258–​259 financial aspects  251 institutional context  254–​258 positive consequences  250 property tax rates in PLN  255 research results  259–​263 revenue structure of Polish municipalities  255 impact of urban sprawl on municipal finances  251–​254 V van den Berg, L.  249 Van Montfort, A.  5, 6 variance inflation factor (VIF)  178n4 Vedeld, T.  222 Venice  274 Venstre (liberals)  169 Vetter, Angelika  212n7 Vlaams Parlement, Parlement de Wallonie  174 W Wagenaar, H.  8 Wall, G.  270 Walloon region  165 Warsaw  87, 257, 278, 280 web-​based tool  67–​68 Widdicombe Committee (1986)  27 Wood, B.  27 World Tourism Organisation  273 Y ‘young grown-​ups leaving the nest’  118, 126

302

Ján Buček, Comenius University

“While local governance is inherently diverse in Europe, this book provides interesting insights on policy responses to common key issues across Europe: territorial reform, local finances and participation and leadership – worthy reading.” Germà Bel, University of Barcelona

Sabine Kuhlmann, University of Potsdam

Marta Lackowska is Professor in the Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies at the University of Warsaw, Poland. Katarzyna Szmigiel-Rawska is Professor in the Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies at the University of Warsaw, Poland. Filipe Teles is Assistant Professor in the Department of Social, Political and Territorial Sciences at the University of Aveiro, Portugal.

Drawing on classical and emerging research perspectives, this comprehensive book provides an up-to-date review of local government in Europe. Featuring an impressive range of contributors from both eastern and western Europe, the book addresses three main topics: territorial reforms, democratic empowerment of citizens and the role of local leadership, as well as new trends in local finances. Acknowledging their inherent diversity, the book examines the ways that local governments have responded to shared challenges, such as climate change, increasing populism and democratic deficit in order to identify both the variety and communalities between the country-specific features. In doing so, it provides a rich picture of the latest trends in local government, as well as pointing the way for future developments.

M ARTA L ACKOWSK A, K ATAR ZY N A SZ MI GI EL -RAWS K A A ND FI LIPE TE LES

“This is an exemplary up-to-date book that provides systematic and empirically informed in-depth analyses about local level reforms in Europe – a must-read for all those interested in understanding the challenges and perspectives of European local government.”

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE

“This impressive collection, prepared by leading scholars on local governments in various European countries, documents the permanent need for local government reforms, revealing their current directions, backgrounds and often contradictory features.”

LO C AL GOV E RN M E N T I N E URO P E N E W P E R S P ECT I V E S AN D D E MOC RAT I C C HAL L E N G E S E D I TE D BY M A RTA L A C KOWS K A , K A TA RZ Y N A S Z M I G I E L - RA WS K A A N D F I L I PE TE L E S

ISBN 978-1-5292-1718-6

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